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P R E S S A N D P OLITIC S IN THE W E I M AR R EPUB LI C
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Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic BERNHARD FULDA
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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York Bernhard Fulda 2009
The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Fulda, Bernhard. Press and politics in the Weimar Republic / Bernhard Fulda. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–19–954778–4 1. Press and politics–Germany–History–20th century. 2. Press–Germany– History–20th century. I. Title. PN5208.F85 2008 073–dc22 2008041402 Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–954778–4 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
For my parents
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Acknowledgements When I first set out to write my Ph.D., I wanted to write a history of the economics and politics of the German press between 1910 and 1924. However, I was soon to discover the reasons for what I considered an exciting gap in the existing literature: air raids towards the end of the Second World War and newspaper archives containing tons of paper in the heart of city centres had failed to co-exist harmoniously. In fact, any historian of the German press before 1945 has to make do with a very sparse and eclectic archival source base, while at the same time facing a deluge of surviving newspaper issues. I faced two choices: either to give up the entire enterprise; or to change the research question to one that would rely less on sources from publishing houses. So I decided to widen the scope of the book, and to assess the significance of the press within the political culture of the Weimar Republic more generally. With the benefit of hindsight, I could not have asked for a more fascinating research topic. At the time, however, the happy ending of this odyssey was not always as obvious, and I owe great thanks to three historians without whom this book would not have come into existence: my doctoral supervisor, Richard J. Evans, offered constant support, displayed an unwavering interest in my research, and successfully kept me going. My undergraduate tutor, Niall Ferguson, continued over the years to provide thought-provoking and stimulating feedback on my writing, and has been very helpful in many ways. Last, but certainly not least, Adam Tooze read the entire manuscript not just once but twice: first as a Ph.D. examiner some years ago, then the expanded version as a friend and colleague. It is difficult to express in words how important his advice has been. When I say that this is certainly a much better book as a result of his criticisms and suggestions, this ought to be taken as evidence for the fact that I am getting ever closer to mastering the art of British understatement. I am also very grateful to those who, over the last few years, have read and commented on parts of this book, and who have helped form my ideas, in particular to Richard Bessel, Frank B¨osch, Chris Clark, Moritz F¨ollmer, Norbert Frei, Karl Christian F¨uhrer, Jocasta Gardner, Dominik Geppert, Stefan Goebel, Oliver Grant, Abigail Green, Oliver Kr¨uger, Naomi Ling, David Midgley, Gerhard Paul, Hartmut Pogge-von Strandmann, Matthew Robinson, Torsten Riotte, Corey Ross, Emma Rothschild, Sujit Sivasundaram, Andrew Zurcher, and my brothers Joachim, Andreas, and Christian. Christopher Wheeler, my editor at Oxford University Press, was everything that an author could wish for: highly informed, interested, helpful, and reliable. Working with him was both a joy and a privilege. I owe further thanks to the participants of our weekly Monday workshop in German History, who read through early drafts and helped me cut
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Acknowledgements
a lane through the maze of historical detail. From this benefited the participants of seminars at the University of Oxford, the Institute for Historical Research in London, the German Historical Institute in London, and the Deutscher Historikertag in Kiel, who provided me with further thoughtful comments and criticism. I would also like to thank the many institutions which have funded my research and often provided a very stimulating environment, in particular the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes; the Centre for History and Economics, King’s College, Cambridge; St John’s College, Cambridge; the Arts and Humanities Research Council; the Kurt Hahn Trust; and the Sir John Plumb Charitable Trust. Over the last few years, I have enjoyed the invaluable privilege of being a Research Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. It is a wonderful place for a historian, and I am deeply grateful to my colleagues and my students there. Further thanks go to Mrs Lilian Grosz and Ralph Jentsch of The Estate of George Grosz, Princeton, New Jersey, USA, for the permission to use Grosz’s great painting St¨utzen der Gesellschaft; to Elke Schwichtenberg and Romana Berg from the Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz; and to Walter M¨uhlhausen and the Stiftung Reichspr¨asident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkst¨atte in Heidelberg for all his help. Finally, I could not have written this dissertation without the support of archives and their archivists. I would therefore like to thank the staff of the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz and Berlin-Lichterfelde, of the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem, and of the Landesarchiv in Berlin; of the Politisches Archiv des Ausw¨artigen Amtes, then still in Bonn; Joachim Zeller and his colleagues at the Zeitungsabteilung der Staatsbibliothek in Berlin-Westhafen; Hans Bohrmann at the Zeitungsinstitut in Dortmund; and Dr Labs of the Springer Archive in Berlin. Above all, however, I am extremely grateful to Aya Soika for the unquestioning love and support she has given me over the last ten years, and to my parents, from whom I have my love of books and interest in politics. They have given me more than I shall ever be able to thank them for; this book is dedicated to them.
Contents List of Illustrations List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations
xiii xiv xiv xv
Introduction 1. The Berlin Press, 1918–32
1 13
Commercialization and consumer orientation Weltanschauung and politicization Newspaper circulation and elections Readers and content Newspaper finances Tabloids Press support and electoral behaviour Conclusion 2. Media Personalities, 1918–24 The personification of defeat The press campaign against Erzberger Erzberger on trial Climate of hate Rising from obscurity Putsch stories Creation of a media personality Conclusion 3. Competing Stories, 1924–5 Press politics and scandal-mongering The Magdeburg trial Staging Barmat: the judiciary as catalyst Scandal as a political weapon The proliferation of scandal The consequences of scandal Conclusion
15 17 21 26 29 32 38 42 45 46 50 55 60 63 65 68 72 75 76 80 89 91 96 98 103
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Contents
4. The ‘Unpolitical’ Press: Provincial Newspapers around Berlin, 1925–8 The ‘unpolitical’ F¨uhrer: rallying for Hindenburg Politics of the ‘unpolitical’ press Expropriating the princes Conclusion 5. Conquering Headlines: Violence, Sensations, and the Rise of the Nazis, 1928–30 The crisis of the parliamentary ‘system’ The rise of political violence May Day 1929: creation of scapegoats Hugenberg, Young, and the Nazis Scandal-mongering The making and breaking of parties Spinning murder stories The perception of dynamism Campaigning against the Nazis Breakthrough Conclusion 6. War of Words: The Spectre of Civil War, 1931–2 Facing an unruly press The spectre of civil war Crisis Gauging public opinion Spreading terror The proliferation of violence Press manipulations The making of the president Hindenburg’s non-partisanship Rolling back democracy Conclusion 7. Conclusion The imagination of influence The dynamics of political communication The Weimar Republic in the eyes of the beholder
107 109 117 120 126 131 132 134 136 143 146 150 152 155 159 162 166 169 170 172 174 178 180 184 187 190 195 198 200 203 203 207 211
Contents Salesmen of ideology Governing the press Consequences Notes Bibliography Index
xi 216 218 222 225 299 317
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List of Illustrations 2.1 2.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 7.1
Anti-Erzberger caricature in Kladderadatsch, August 1919 Anti-Erzberger caricature in Kladderadatsch, March 1920 Local newspapers campaigning for Hindenburg in April 1925 Photo-collage from Mosse’s 8-Uhr-Abendblatt, 101, 2 May 1929 Press photo of barricade, May 1929 Vorw¨arts caricature of Communist accounts of the May riots 1929 Angriff caricature at the occasion of the anti-Young Plan campaign 1929 Angriff illustrations of Communist violence, 1929–30 Angriff caricature after Nazi election success in Saxony in June 1930 Angriff caricature of anti-Nazi press coverage, September 1930 Angriff caricature of putsch scare in liberal press, September 1930 Front page of Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe on 31 October 1931 Hindenburg election poster, spring 1932 ( Bundesarchiv) George Grosz, Pillars of Society, 1926 ( The Estate of George Grosz, Princeton/New Jersey, USA)
54 59 111 139 140 142 145 154 157 160 164 182 193 208
Unless otherwise stated, copyright of these illustrations is held by the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Zeitungsabteilung. The publisher and the author apologize for any errors or omissions in the above list. If contacted they will be pleased to rectify these at the earliest opportunity.
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List of Figures and Tables
List of Figures Fig. 1.1 Berlin elections to Reichstag, Prussian parliament, and city council, 1924–32 Fig. 1.2 Advertising and sales income of Hugenberg papers, 1925–32
25 31
List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3
Circulation figures for the Berlin press, 1925–32 Elections to the Reich presidency, 1925 Expropriation referendum, 1926 Elections to the Reichstag, 1924–32
24 115 124 128
Abbreviations 12UB
(Neue Berliner Zeitung) Das 12-Uhr-Blatt
A
Angriff
AZ
Angerm¨under Zeitung und Kreisblatt
BA
Brandenburger Anzeiger
BArchK
Bundesarchiv Koblenz
BArchL
Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde
BaM
Berlin am Morgen
BBC
Berliner B¨orsen-Courier
BBZ
Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung
BLA
Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger
BM
Berliner Morgenpost
BT
Berliner Tageblatt
BVP
Bayerische Volkspartei (Bavarian People’s Party)
BVZ
Berliner Volks-Zeitung
BZ
Brandenburger Zeitung
BZaM
BZ am Mittag
DAZ
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
DDP
Deutsche Demokratische Partei (German Democratic Party)
DNVP
Deutschnationale Volks-Partei (German Nationalist People’s Party)
DP
Deutsche Presse
DTgbl
Deutsche Tageblatt
DTztg
Deutsche Tageszeitung
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Abbreviations
DVP
Deutsche Volks-Partei (German People’s Party)
DZ
Deutsche Zeitung
FZ
Frankfurter Zeitung
G
Germania
GG
Geschichte und Gesellschaft
GStAPK
Geheimes Staats-Archiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, BerlinDahlem
KPD
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)
KrZ
Neue Preußische (Kreuz-)Zeitung
KZ
K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung
LAB
Landesarchiv Berlin
MM
Montag-Morgen
NA
Nachtausgabe
NbKbl
Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt und Bernauer Zeitung
NP
National-Post
NSDAP
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party)
OGA
Oranienburger General-Anzeiger
P
Der Prignitzer
PolArchAA
Politisches Archiv Ausw¨artiges Amt (Foreign Office Archive, Berlin)
PZ
Prenzlauer Zeitung
RF
Rote Fahne
RM
Reichsmark
SA
Sturmabteilungen (Storm Troopers)
SPD
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
T
Tempo
Abbreviations UK
Uckerm¨arkischer Kurier
V
Vorw¨arts
VolksZ
Volks-Zeitung
VZ
Vossische Zeitung
WaA
Welt am Abend
Z
Zentrum (Catholic Centre party)
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Introduction What is truth? For the masses that which they continually read and hear. May some poor blighter sit around somewhere and collect facts to determine ‘the truth’—it will remain his own truth. The other, the public truth of the moment, which alone matters for effects and successes in the real world, is today a product of the Press. What the Press wills, is true. Its commanders evoke, transform, interchange truths. Three weeks of press work, and all the world has acknowledged the truth. . . . No tamer has his animals more under his power. Unleash the people as reader-mass and it will storm through the streets and hurl itself upon the target indicated, terrifying and smashing windows. A hint to the press-staff and it will become quiet and go home. (Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, vol. 2, 1922)
There was no shadow of a doubt in Oswald Spengler. The press, he proclaimed in his bestselling book, The Decline of the West, had become an overwhelming power in Western culture and was currently bringing about the end of democracy. Dictators of the press like the British press magnate Northcliffe were keeping the ‘slave-gang’ of their readers under the whip of leading articles, telegrams, and pictures. With its destructive potential, Spengler declared, the press today was an army, ‘with journalists as officers and readers as soldiers’. Like in every army, the soldier ‘obeys blindly’, oblivious of war-aims and operation plans. Kept in unqualified intellectual slavery, the modern newspaper reader was a hapless subject to the whims of those who controlled the press.¹ It is unclear how many of Spengler’s own readers actually made it to these pronouncements, which came towards the very end of a rather fat second volume. What is clear, however, is that Spengler’s belief in the power of the press was neither specifically German nor simply the transient product of a particular moment in time, namely the years immediately after the First World War. For more than two hundred years now, ever since commentators of British politics pointed to the emergence of a ‘fourth estate’, academics, politicians, and journalists have subscribed to the idea that the press (and the media more generally) wields enormous political power.² However, how this power actually translates into political influence is one of the most puzzling questions historians and media scientists have tried to address.
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Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
The Weimar Republic is a case in point. It was abolished by a politician, Adolf Hitler, who benefited from landslide gains at elections, yet his party press was miserably unsuccessful. At the same time, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Germany, the Berliner Morgenpost, was a product of the phenomenally successful publishing house Ullstein, a Berlin-based Jewish enterprise supporting the left-liberal Democratic Party, which—despite this support—had ceased to exist by the end of 1930. This paradox is addressed by the present study, which sets out to analyse the influence of the press on politics and political culture in Germany’s first republic. Of particular interest is the relationship between press and electoral behaviour. Historians still struggle to explain the crucial loss of legitimacy that democracy suffered, for which the Nazi electoral breakthrough in September 1930 was but one symptom. Hitler’s success at the 1930 elections is no longer explained simply by the onset of the Great Depression and its concurrent rise in unemployment. Most of the recent electoral analyses have concluded that conventional approaches to the complex electoral movements towards the end of the Republic have been insufficient. The one factor they all emphasize needs more research is local newspaper ‘climate’.³ The idea that the Nazi breakthrough could be linked to a particular press climate is not exactly new. In fact, one of the key tenets of Weimar history is that the press magnate Alfred Hugenberg helped Hitler to achieve national stature through an alliance in 1929 against the reparations plan, the Young Plan. Through the press support that Hitler received from the Hugenberg papers, many researchers explain the sudden rise of the Nazis in the early 1930s. Yet to assume that the Nazi breakthrough of 1930 was brought about ‘in Cinderella fasion by the magic touch of Hugenberg’s headlines’ raises more questions than it answers.⁴ It does not explain why Hugenberg, himself the leader of the right-wing nationalist party DNVP and radically anti-republican, failed to achieve electoral success, despite the continuous backing he received in his own papers. It is the same phenomenon we encounter in Berlin’s newspaper market, where over 50 per cent of all newspapers sold in the early 1930s originated in the Jewish publishing houses of Mosse and Ullstein, staunch supporters of political liberalism, whilst electoral support for liberal parties was on the point of vanishing. In fact, for all those who consider the Republic doomed right from its beginning, it should come as a surprise that until the very end of Weimar democracy newspapers of Jewish publishing houses were the most popular in Germany. By 1931, Ullstein publications had a weekly circulation of well over four million, making the company the giant of German publishing. Its development was the liberal success story of the 1920s; Ullstein came to be regarded as a pillar of the Weimar state like the Bauhaus, the Reichstag, and Stresemann.⁵ As it turned out, it was a crumbling pillar. Thus, the power of the press remains a questionable concept for Weimar Germany, and numerous questions about the press and its effects for the new democracy arise. What newspapers did people read? why did they read them?
Introduction
3
and what—if any—political effect did newspaper consumption have? What was the nature of political coverage in the German press of this time? What did the great majority of German contemporaries actually know about the democracy in which they were living? These are anything but easy questions to answer, not least because of the particular structure of the decentralized German newspaper market in the 1920s. There was a greater wealth of newspaper types than ever before or after. Many a small provincial town had its own newspaper with a circulation of a few hundred copies. Official party organs competed for readers with commercial mass newspapers which offered light entertainment, advertisements, and a strong regional focus. In the cities there were newspapers which only appeared on Mondays, or only in a specific district. Tabloid newspapers experienced their breakthrough in the Weimar Republic and existed alongside daily newspapers published by trade unions or the Reich Agrarian Association. Statistical handbooks and advertisers’ manuals at the time listed well over 3,000 newspapers in all of Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s.⁶ Contrary to the impression conveyed by Spengler, the press in this period was not a homogeneous collective but a colourful assortment of very different publishing enterprises. The mass media of the 1920s have recently attracted an increasing amount of scholarly work. However, historians of German mass culture have mostly chosen to concentrate on radio and film.⁷ This is surprising, because throughout the 1920s newspapers were the predominant medium of mass communication in Germany. Radio broadcasting was only beginning to take off, with 3.5 million registered listeners by 1930.⁸ Even when families of those registered listeners are taken into account, the occasional radio audience of nine or ten million was just half the figure of the total daily circulation of the German press, at around twenty million copies in the early 1930s—and, of course, newspapers tended to be read by more than one person, making the total newspaper audience much larger.⁹ Significantly, newspapers were not just bought for the political news they provided but also for the entertainment they offered. Almost all accounts of mass culture in Weimar Germany ignore the fact that newspaper reading was—at least quantitatively—the most popular spare-time activity and an important cornerstone of mass entertainment in this period. Film has attracted more scholarly attention, but even in a record year like 1929, when some 350 million cinema tickets were sold, about twenty times as many newspaper copies were consumed by readers.¹⁰ If the 1930s were to become the decade of film and radio in Germany—and even this is open to doubt—the 1920s were undoubtedly the decade of the press.¹¹ The relative lack of historical interest in the press is striking because the ascendancy of a mass press had once been high up on the academic research agenda. In 1910, at the very first conference of the German Association for Sociology, Max Weber—one of the later fathers of the Weimar constitution—delivered a paper exlusively devoted to the newspaper business. He raised
4
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
some fundamental questions: what power relations are created by newspapers? What sort of link is there between newspapers and political parties, the business world, the numerous pressure groups influenced by, and trying to influence, public opinion? Does the increase in capital constitute an increase in the power to influence public opinion at will, or, on the contrary, are capital-intensive businesses more sensitive to fluctuations in the public’s mood since they do not want to put invested capital at risk by offending subscribers? What exactly is the influence of the final product, the newspaper?¹² Academics all over Germany took up the call: newly founded institutes for ‘Zeitungswissenschaften’ (newspaper science) sprang up in Cologne, Berlin, Leipzig, and Heidelberg, churning out doctoral theses on economic, cultural, and technical aspects of the newspaper business year after year. After 1918, public debate about the reasons for the ‘defeat’ in the ‘press struggle’ during the First World War provided a further boost to this new area of academic investigation.¹³ In fact, institution building increasingly dominated the scholarly agenda. Between 1928 and 1930 Otto Groth published his monumental four-volume work, Die Zeitung, with the explicit aim of creating a new academic discipline.¹⁴ After 1945 Groth and his colleagues Karl d’Ester and Emil Dovifat were successful in (re-)establishing newspapers and publishing more generally as a area of distinct research called ‘Publizistikwissenschaft’. Although the official English translation of this term given by German universities these days is ‘media studies’, the literal translation (‘publishing’ or ‘journalism’ science) still reflects the origins in newspaper science. But while the founding fathers of Publizistikwissenschaft all had a strong interest in the historical dimension of their research topic, the majority of their disciples located their field primarily in the social sciences rather than in the humanities.¹⁵ Apart from a few notable exceptions, the history of the German press and its political influence has therefore received relatively little attention from practitioners of media studies.¹⁶ An early pioneer of press history in Germany was Kurt Koszyk. Koszyk started his academic career in the 1950s with studies of the socialist press in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, and then went on to produce the first archive-based studies of the history of the German newspapers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to 1945.¹⁷ Taking up some of the issues raised by Max Weber in 1910, Koszyk was primarily interested in highlighting the proprietary and organizational structures of the German political press. This topic acquired increasing significance in the wake of the 1968 student unrest, when Axel Springer, the conservative owner of Germany’s largest press empire and of the tabloid Bild, became one of the main targets of left-wing criticism. It is no coincidence that the 1970s and early 1980s saw the appearance of a number of studies dealing with Alfred Hugenberg, the right-wing press baron of Weimar Germany.¹⁸ These works provided a comprehensive analysis of the organizational and financial intricacies of Hugenberg’s elaborate corporate architecture, and his role in the DNVP. However, with the exception of Wernecke’s study, none
Introduction
5
examined how Hugenberg actually employed the media resources at his disposal for his political aims. There was no engagement with the actual output of the Hugenberg press empire, the newspaper content produced, and little analysis of the more general issue of newspapers’ influence. Ironically, at a time when the consensus among media scientists was that media influence on consumers was very weak, these historical studies of Hugenberg, like Koszyk’s more general work, simply took the power of the press for granted, and implicitly assumed a direct link between newspaper proprietor and editorial policy. As an effect, the role of political editors has been reduced to that of subservient scribes. In fact, proprietorial influence over the editorial policy of a paper was a very circumstantial and often ineffective process. The private papers of Georg Bernhard, chief editor of Ullstein’s political flagship, the Vossische Zeitung, contain ample evidence of the strong disagreement of the Ullstein brothers with the politics which Bernhard propagated in their paper.¹⁹ Similarly, Theodor Wolff, chief editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, and Otto Nuschke, chief editor of the Berliner Volks-Zeitung, over ten years successfully resisted repeated attempts of their publisher, Lachmann-Mosse, to determine editorial policy, at least until December 1930.²⁰ At Hugenberg’s Scherl concern, Adolf Stein and the chief editor of the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, Friedrich Hussong, were masters of political rhetoric and polemics. Like their counterparts at the liberal papers, they were political actors in their own rights, and it seems that they had considerable influence on Hugenberg’s politics. The role of political editors has not gone completely unnoticed, thanks to Bernd Sösemann’s extensive research on Theodor Wolff.²¹ The interaction between liberal editors and politicians has also been highlighted by an excellent monograph by Modris Eksteins on the contrast between the decline of political liberalism and the apparent strength of liberal publishing houses.²² Matthias Lau has convincingly demonstrated that attempts by some of Weimar’s federal states to influence editors through official press offices were, by and large, unsuccessful.²³ Continuing on this path of enquiry, one of the aims of the present study is to highlight the role of journalists as political actors, and to assess the impact of their articles as an integral part of the Weimar political system. Press coverage often had a decisive impact on the political agenda and vocabulary of decision-makers, and helped to determine their room for manœuvre. Yet this was not a one-way relationship: journalists also reacted to political initiatives, and what they wrote depended to no small degree on what they read in other newspapers. Some historians have recently adopted a regional approach, and their studies of the local press in Munich, Leipzig, and Bielefeld have made significant contributions to our understanding of the decentralized German press.²⁴ The main focus of this literature, however, has been on structural or editorial developments which influenced the production of newspapers. They do not, therefore, provide a fully satisfactory account of the political impact of the press in the 1920s
6
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
and early 1930s. Still, a regional focus is clearly needed if we are interested in assessing what political news coverage was available to contemporaries of Weimar Germany, and what political influence newspaper consumption might have had. This book concentrates on Berlin and its surrounding countryside. Berlin was not just the capital of the German Reich but also the capital of the Republic’s largest state, Prussia, and thereby a unique political hotspot, especially after the expansion of democratic mass franchise. At the same time, as Germany’s most important industrial city its population size was such that it could accommodate a whole range of political milieux, which were themselves large enough to sustain different mass papers. Although Berlin featured more newspapers than any other German city in this period, little has been written on the Berlin press. The only existing monograph is a popular history which dates back to 1959 and which contains a wealth of anecdotal material informed by the author’s experience as a journalist in Berlin during the 1920s.²⁵ More recently, the cultural historian Peter Fritzsche analysed Berlin newspapers as modernist texts involved in the construction of the metropolis and the perception of urban modernity around 1900. Politics, however, are noticeably absent from his otherwise very stimulating analysis.²⁶ There are two main reasons why so little has been written on the Berlin press. First, most of the archival material of the big Berlin publishing houses perished during the great fire caused by one of the last air raids on central Berlin on 3 February 1945.²⁷ Primary material relating to the production of Berlin newspapers is therefore sparse, and the few remains are scattered over a whole variety of archives in different locations. We therefore lack much valuable information relating to discussions of editorial policies, publishers’ commercial strategies, and journalistic practice. Secondly, and more importantly, the main corpus of primary material—newspapers themselves—is an unwieldy subject for analysis. Many historians have shied away from concentrating on newspaper coverage because, as Modris Eksteins explained at the time, ‘a study merely of editorial opinions will always remain, to a large extent, an exercise in précis and paraphrase’, Indeed, later studies of such-and-such an event or topic ‘in the mirror of the press’ have hardly attracted much critical attention or proven intellectually inspiring.²⁸ As there is little straightforward empirical evidence for the actual reception of newspaper content by contemporaries, most historians have avoided tackling this question altogether. The press and its political influence in the Weimar Republic, in other words, is not an easy subject to study. Yet even if one does not share Spengler’s apocalyptic vision of the press and its readers, it is difficult to deny the importance of the mass media for contemporaries’ state of informedness. For most Germans in the 1920s, newspapers constituted the only available window on politics. On the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, in 1925, Hugenberg received a letter from an old university friend, the historian Heinrich Rickert, professor in Heidelberg, who told him he often encountered Hugenberg’s name in the Frankfurter Zeitung.
Introduction
7
Unfortunately, Rickert admitted, he rarely understood the complexities of party politics: ‘After all, I cannot participate in public life, and so I remain a spectator. But although my interest is still quite lively, I am struggling to find orientation in the commotions of our time, so that I cannot even identify the intentions and plans of the various parties.’²⁹ Like Professor Rickert, most Germans did not actively participate in politics and were ‘spectators’. In Berlin, like in any other German city, most citizens would derive their knowledge on the political process and particular events through information mediated by the press. According to Leo Wegener, another of Hugenberg’s friends, this dependence on newspapers also applied to politicians.³⁰ Of course, newspapers were not the only source of information for Berliners in the 1920s. Other print media, like weekly or monthly magazines, posters, and leaflets carried information which Berliners would consume. These were accompanied by a whole range of oral sources: conversations among neighbours, in pubs at the traditional Stammtisch, on the tram, subway, and buses, as well as topics discussed at association meetings and political rallies. For a historian interested in the state of informedness of Berliners during the Weimar Republic, these communication flows are almost impossible to reconstruct.³¹ However, there are good reasons to believe that newspapers formed the basis of many of these conversations, since they permeated society as they had never done before. Many contemporary sources say that newspaperreading was a favourite pastime on buses and subways; working-class neighbours exchanged their newspapers to save money; every pub offered at least one newspaper for perusal.³² Police spy reports of workers’ conversations during the Wilhelmine period show the extent to which newspapers informed much of the talk of ordinary people.³³ Within the communication system of Berlin in the 1920s, newspapers were still the predominant medium for information on politics. While we lack sources about other communication flows, newspapers have survived in great numbers and form the core of this study. However, source analysis of newspapers is complicated, not least because of the vast amount of text which calls for some sort of structured approach.³⁴ Many communication scientists since Harold D. Lasswell have championed a quantitative approach to content analysis, based on the compilation and coding of sample texts to derive exact and verifiable results, and have denied the legitimacy of ‘reading between the lines’.³⁵ This approach has not gone unchallenged. One of the most adamant critics of quantification, Siegfried Kracauer, was himself a journalist in the Weimar Republic. He criticized the hugely complicated procedure which ignores all expertise and experience of the analyst while overemphasizing frequent but irrelevant aspects of the analysed text.³⁶ Admittedly, quantitative content analysis has made significant progress since Kracauer’s criticism, and few would now dispute the degree of sophistication which goes into the creation of coding frames and context analysis.³⁷ Yet this has not necessarily helped to make the approach more appealing to historians. In the case of the Weimar press the
8
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
proposition of coding a meaningful sample of newspaper texts—let alone the complete volumes from 1918 to 1933 of more than thirty Berlin and regional dailies on which this book is based—bears little relation to the archival and research realities at the present stage. This is not to say that a quantitative element in the analysis would be without value. In fact, the situation would be very different if all newspaper texts were available in digital format allowing for a variety of analyses. Being able to state with confidence the frequency with which certain terms appeared in the Berlin press, for example, would help to clarify the role of newspapers in community sensitization and agenda-setting. Arguably, most historians would be already satisfied with a simple ‘search’ function. There can be no doubt that if newspapers as a source were accessible in electronic format, we would witness a surge of historical interest in the role of the media in different periods. In fact, despite the lack of digital newspaper databases for this period, the last few years have seen an increasing engagement of historians with the emergence of a mass press and the impact this had on German society, especially during the Wilhelmine period. Rosenberger’s study of the role of the press in the origins of the First World War has demonstrated the limitations of a quantitative content analysis approach.³⁸ More convincingly, Jeffrey Verhey has made use of newspaper texts in his analysis of public opinion and the creation of the myth of the ‘spirit of 1914’.³⁹ Frank Bösch has written extensively about the nexus of democratization and the medialization of politics in the Wilhelmine Empire, analysing political scandals.⁴⁰ And the cultural historian Philipp Müller has analysed the public dramatization of crime in late Wilhelmine Berlin.⁴¹ Above all, Peter Fritzsche’s book on the role of the Berlin press in the construction of the narrated city around 1900 has been an important inspiration for my own work, because I was fascinated by his analysis and yet disagreed with some of his main findings. Fritzsche argues that in an age of urban mass literacy, the city as a place and the city as text defined each other in mutually constitutive ways: ‘The crush of people and welter of things in the modern city revised ways of reading and writing, and these representational acts, in turn, constructed a second-hand metropolis which gave a narrative to the concrete one and choreographed its encounters.’⁴² Like Fritzsche, the present study emphasizes the importance of mass-media texts and images for the perception and sense of reality of contemporaries. Ranke’s dictum that historians should find out ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’ should not be understood simply as a call to establish what ‘really’ or ‘actually’ happened, but to reconstruct the specific traits of past events, how it ‘essentially’ was. And this ought to include an attempt at finding out about ‘wie es anscheinend gewesen’—the different appearances of events to contemporaries which influenced their perceptions and convictions. Media scientists have found that the way that information is communicated has fundamental effects on reception and subsequent constructions of meaning and significance. This is why an analysis
Introduction
9
of the mass media should be a indispensable element of any historical study. Yet, unlike Fritzsche, I find it difficult to blind out the significance of politics, especially when dealing with the daily press. Fritzsche’s focus on the pre-war period ignores the fact that, quantitatively, the apogee of metropolitan texts was reached only in the late 1920s when tabloids added an additional one million newspaper copies to Berlin’s daily street life. Yet if he had chosen to focus on 1930 rather than 1900 he would have had to conclude that there was not one secondhand metropolis but many, and not one narrative but many conflicting ones. Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe, the Communist Welt am Abend, and Mosse’s liberal 8-Uhr-Abendblatt did not add up to one big metropolitan collage, but constituted hostile players in an urban battle of political opinion-shaping. My book aims to show that the fragmentation of the press into competing and often mutually hostile communication networks was a key feature of Weimar Germany’s political culture, and that this was crucial in sustaining and intensifying the ideological politics of this period. My two way argument, pace Fritzsche, is that reading and writing about politics invited as well as contained individuals’ movements through the abstract world of German politics.⁴³ In terms of media effects, the present study draws on the theories and findings of media studies over the last two decades.⁴⁴ One particularly significant phenomenon re-emerges throughout the period covered: individuals believed that other contemporaries were much more strongly influenced by the media than they were themselves. This impression was one created by the media itself as well as by media experts, intellectuals, and politicians, often through generalizing statements about ‘public opinion’ or the ‘public’. Oswald Spengler was not the only one who shared this belief. ‘That which is reported to the reader in black and white as a factual occurrence [geschehene Tatsache], he mostly believes’, was a typical declaration of one newspaper scientist.⁴⁵ Weimar contemporaries loved to refer to Napoleon who had allegedly described the press as one of Europe’s ‘great powers’.⁴⁶ Napoleon’s alleged utterance was used for the title of a sensationalist book—Grossmacht Presse. Enthüllungen für Zeitungsgläubige; Forderungen für Männer— which aimed to expose the true power behind national and international politics. These days, the author proclaimed, the press was not just a ‘great power’ as Napoleon had it, but a ‘world power’: ‘Greater than the influence of priests and scholars is the influence of journalists.’⁴⁷ The assumption that others were helpless subjects to the persuasive and manipulative powers of the mass media induced many decision-makers to initiate some action; action which was therefore motivated primarily through media coverage.⁴⁸ This ‘third person effect’ emphasizes that it is not necessarily the actual effects of media coverage that matter, but the question if, and how many, people believe that the media exercises a powerful influence.⁴⁹ Politicians in particular were prone to this belief: they were inexperienced in the management of public relations in the new age of mass democracy and mass media, as well as being convinced of the omnipotence of the press. The following chapters will offer ample evidence for
10
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
politicians’ close interaction with the press, and their responses and reactions to press coverage. I have taken what could be labelled a commonsensical case-study approach to the selection of texts which mostly come from newspapers that appeared at least six times a week. For example, for the analysis of the press campaign against Matthias Erzberger, all selected newspapers were read for the period October 1918 to April 1920, and June to September 1921. One of the themes in the campaign against Erzberger, the alleged ‘backstabbing’ of the undefeated German army in 1918, resurfaces in the analysis of the defamation trial involving Reich President Ebert in December 1924, for which newspapers were read for the two weeks of the court proceedings, plus the two weeks immediately before and after the trial. Following hot on the heels of the Ebert trial, the Barmat scandal of early 1925 was a more lengthy affair covered from the first press mentioning of the Barmat concern in November 1924 to Hindenburg’s election as Reich President in April 1925. The Barmats reappeared in the press at the occasion of the conclusion of the parliamentary investigating committee in October 1925, at the beginning of the Barmat trial in January 1927, and at its end in March 1928. For these instances, newspapers were read for up to fourteen days. Every time a period was covered, any reference to any one of the analysed past events, issues, or personalities was also registered, a cumulative process with a steep learning curve and an exploding number of photocopies on file. For some of the events covered by this book, contemporary newspaper clipping collections proved a useful indicator for the topicality of an issue.⁵⁰ However, for information on the distribution of these newspaper texts and their actual impact on the average readers, we will mostly rely on circumstantial evidence drawn from a whole range of other written sources. Part of the Scherl publishing archive has survived in the collection of Hugenberg’s papers in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz; the archive of the Axel-Springer-Verlag in Berlin accommodates the few remains of the Ullstein archive. Quite a lot of pressrelated material has been found in the private papers of editors and politicians kept in the Bundesarchiv in Berlin and Koblenz. For further information on journalists’ and publishers’ concerns, the relevant issues of the journals Deutsche Presse and Zeitungs-Verlag have been consulted. Other sources include published diaries and governmental files, as well as parliamentary minutes. Chapter 1 benefited particularly from the surviving material on the organization of the KPD, the Communist party, especially its press and propaganda files in the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO), held in the Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde; the Prussian Ministry of Justice files and those of the Berlin General State Prosecution were very useful for Chapter 3; similarly, the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Reich Chancellory files yielded important contextual evidence for Chapter 6. My analysis of the impact of Berlin papers on politics and political culture in this period moves on several levels, both chronologically and conceptually. The
Introduction
11
first chapter describes the structure of the Berlin press, highlights the importance of politicization and popularization for newspapers, and analyses the relationship between newspaper circulation and electoral results. This study is the first to provide a survey of circulation developments, and attempts to point out the strengths and limits of a quantitative approach to political culture. At the same time, the chapter emphasizes the fragmented nature of the Berlin newspaper market, in which, for example, consumers of the Communist Rote Fahne would be confronted with a completely different version of ‘news’ than were readers of the reactionary Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung. These themes are then developed in the following chapters, which try to reconstruct—through different case studies—the actual influence the press had on voters and on the actions of political decision-makers at certain points. For much of this period, politicians themselves mostly read elite political papers. The first chapter shows that these elite papers had relatively little impact on the voting population. But as the second and third chapters demonstrate, political coverage in these broadsheets could have a decisive impact on the nature of parliamentary conflict and repeatedly determined the terms of politcal debate. Who was a ‘very important person’ in post-war Germany? The abdication of William II left the German media without its most popular political celebrity. This void was filled by the press through the creation of scapegoats and the construction of new political heroes. The second chapter studies the right-wing hate-campaign against one prominent member of the new regime, Matthias Erzberger, and the rise to stardom of a political fringe figure, Adolf Hitler between 1922 and 1924. What did contemporaries know about the politicians in the new democracy? How were politicians visualized and dramatized in the press, and to what extent did this inform contemporaries’ political choices? The third chapter focuses on the interdependence of press, judiciary, and legislature, and sets out to demonstrate the crucial role of small partisan broadsheets in Weimar’s political process. It is based on two case studies; the defamation trial initiated by Reich President Ebert in December 1924; and the Barmat scandal of spring 1925. The Ebert trial enabled nationalist journalists to portray the Reich president as a traitor who carried responsibility for the stab-in-the-back in 1918. The scandal-mongering against Jewish businessmen, the Barmat brothers, resulted in the collapse of their consortium, the arrest and death of a Reich minister, and a widespread perception of endemic corruption in the new democratic system. On another level, the book sets out to clarify the concept of media landscapes and communication networks, by looking at the effects of regionality in the Weimar press, which is studied in Chapter 4. The decentralized, fragmented nature of the German newspaper market meant that the great majority of contemporaries derived political information from a local paper. This chapter analyses provincial press coverage of the presidential election campaign in 1925, and the referendum calling for the expropriation of the princes in 1926. It shows that even in self-professed ‘unpolitical’ newspapers catering to a local audience,
12
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
ideological news coverage was the norm. At the same time, it demonstrates that overt press support for particular candidates or parties did not have a significant electoral effect. Only where alternative sources of information, like a competing newspaper of a different political orientation, did not exist could the press excert a noticeable electoral impact. Chapter 5 then deals with Berlin’s mass press, particularly with the tabloid press which experienced its breakthrough in Germany in the 1920s. By 1930, mass and tabloid newspapers held a marketshare of over eighty per cent in Berlin. This chapter highlights the change in tone in political coverage after the summer of 1928, and it analyses the media image of the two radical parties, the KPD and NSDAP, before the crucial Reichstag election of September 1930. Particular emphasis is given to the depiction of violence, the construction of a media reality through press photography, and the use of cartoons to carry political messages in Berlin’s mass newspapers. The chapter presents new evidence to explain the Nazi breakthrough in 1930, not with the alliance between Hugenberg and Hitler in 1929 but with the repeated splits within Hugenberg’s Nationalist Party, which happened in full view of the newspaper-reading public. The final chapter studies the intensive news coverage of political violence in the last two years of the Weimar Republic, and examines the failure of government press management. Even at this point, the Nazi press was unsuccessful in attracting a wider readership. So why did voters choose to support the Nazis? The chapter argues that the economic crisis as such was insufficient in mobilizing voters to vote for the NSDAP. Rather, press presentation of increasing Communist violence and the perceived threat of civil war, together with the media image of an indecisive government, turned the Nazis into an attractive choice for voters desperate for decisive action. July 1932 was just the climax of a long period of hostile press coverage with which Weimar democracy was faced, and which led to a political climate favourable to all anti-system parties. The end of democracy was not brought about by the press single-handedly, as Oswald Spengler prophesied in his Decline of the West. But, ultimately, the dysfunctional relationship between press and politics which originated in the revolutionary establishment of the Weimar Republic played a crucial role in undermining the legitimacy of Germany’s first parliamentary democracy.
1 The Berlin Press, 1918–32 Hugenberg servant, Mosse slave, Ullstein vermin From Deutsche Presse, 20, 22 May 1926: ‘Kollegiales’
For much of the nineteenth century, German newspapers had been small, distinctively elitist, political enterprises with a limited public. They started prospering only when they were discovered as viable business enterprises, a development triggered by the abolition of a prohibitive government tax on the press in 1874. Coupled with innovations in printing technology, this resulted in a rapid and continuous growth in newspaper titles and total circulation until the 1920s.¹ This growth was primarily driven by a distinctively new concept of commercial newspaper, the Generalanzeiger, which emerged in the 1880s.² Generalanzeiger were newspapers that had an extensive advertisement section and where advertising income had replaced sales income as the main source of funding. By lowering prices, publishers reached a vast literate working-class audience formerly excluded from newspaper reading. Between 1885 and 1900 newspapers became omnipresent factors of everyday life, with almost every other citizen buying a newspaper, compared to one in nine in 1850.³ Newspaper publishers now had to cater to a mass audience. At the same time, the increasing dependence on advertisements also limited a paper’s geographical distribution: most advertisers ran local businesses and were predominantly interested in attracting readers from the close vicinity.⁴ Hence, the growth of the German press had a strongly regionalized nature, with even the smallest town having its own newspaper. Between 1881 and 1932 the number of newspaper titles in Germany increased from around 2,400 to over 4,700, more than in Britain and France put together.⁵ But there was not one German newspaper with a truly national circulation, or even with a circulation over a million copies. In 1913, the average circulation of a German paper was just under 5,700 copies.⁶ Still, newspaper circulation in this period reached unprecedented heights. The First World War further boosted demand for news and generally increased newspaper circulation.⁷ This increase was then reduced by inflation, but nevertheless the 1920s saw considerably higher distribution figures than in the pre-war period. Circulation figures for the whole German press are notoriously difficult to construct, as publishers rarely published print-runs, and, if they did,
14
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
often inflated circulation figures to attract potential advertisers. Contemporary estimates of at least 25 million for 1932 were probably overly optimistic.⁸ Based on the first reliable figures published for 1934, it seems reasonable to put the total print-run of the German press in the late 1920s at around 20 million copies.⁹ The mixture of a mass readership in a relatively clearly defined local context was characteristic of Berlin. Already before 1914, three publishing houses had established themselves firmly in the Berlin newspaper market: Mosse, Ullstein, and Scherl.¹⁰ Their flagship papers excelled at combining vast advertisement sections, low sale prices, and a huge circulation. By 1914 these three companies had developed into Germany’s biggest publishing empires, covering a great range of printable products. Once it was possible to print photos of great quality, weekly illustrated magazines had become hugely popular and were an important source of advertisement income; Scherl’s Die Woche and Ullstein’s Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung sold all over the country.¹¹ Their dailies, however, lacked a similar nation-wide circulation. Although Mosse’s Berliner Tageblatt, Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost, and Scherl’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger had the highest circulation of all German newspapers, sales centred on Berlin. Dependent on local advertisements and with a strong emphasis on local news coverage, the newspapers were targeted at Berliners and held little interest to people outside Berlin. While they dominated the Berlin newspaper market with a combined total circulation of nearly a million copies each day, they hardly ever found their way west of the River Elbe.¹² Despite the powerful position of big publishing firms, Berlin’s newspaper market also reflected the decentralized geographical fragmentation of the German press. Apart from the big dailies, Berlin featured about thirty daily district papers. These were small papers with a distribution limited to one or several of the twenty districts which formed Greater-Berlin after the communal reform of 1920. In their emphasis on local district news and local advertisements, district papers were quite similar to the average small-town Generalanzeiger. A third of them had a circulation of over 10,000; the biggest, the Spandauer Zeitung printed over 27,000 copies a day; one of the smallest, the Karlshorster Lokal-Anzeiger ran at 2,500.¹³ Berlin was the German press capital not just because it accommodated Germany’s three biggest publishing houses but also because of the existence of a greater number of political newspapers than in any other city. This, again, was a consequence of long-term developments in the growth of the press in Germany. German newspapers had a long tradition of adhering to a political cause. The revolution of 1848 had resulted in a multitude of newspaper foundations with a clearly defined political agenda. It was not just a quip that ‘newspapers found parties’: as a platform for a particular political line they soon served as focal points for political movements.¹⁴ In the second half of the nineteenth century, they often developed into official party organs. Thus, the K¨olnische Zeitung and the Frankfurter Zeitung stood for the bourgeois Liberals; the Neue Preußische Kreuz-Zeitung and Die Post were semi-official organs of the Conservatives, as were
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
15
the K¨olnische Volkszeitung and Germania for the Catholic Centre party. Even if these papers were rarely as closely a part of the official party apparatus as was the case in the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, they were often used for party-political objectives, sometimes labelled ‘Gesinnungspresse’.¹⁵ Half of all papers in 1913 were openly committed to some political conviction.¹⁶ With both the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag sitting in Berlin, the city became the focal point of German politics after 1871, and an increasing number of partisan papers were published in Berlin. Elite political papers had traditionally been concerned primarily with high politics. Based on sales revenue, their high subscription prices prevented a high circulation. Advertisements, local news, and entertainment—in short, everything that effectively made newspapers popular—were frowned upon. Many political commentators prior to the First World War dismissed the emerging Generalanzeiger press as ‘unpolitical’.¹⁷ However, although local papers and Generalanzeiger often avoided overt political commentary in order not to deter a significant part of their readership, they were by no means apolitical: most tended to be on official-conservative bourgeois lines, supportive of the monarchy and hostile to Social Democracy. The same was true of the majority of other papers running under the official banner of being parteilos or not stating any political stance at all. Before 1918 this applied to fifty per cent of all papers.¹⁸ The Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger was a prime example for this patriotic—‘national’—stance on politics, which repeatedly indulged in radical and polemic political campaigning.¹⁹ Thus, it was not the existence or lack of politics in the papers but the different motivation behind the existence of the two newspaper types that distinguished Generalanzeiger from overtly political papers: whereas the former were primarily conceived as business enterprises aiming at consumer satisfaction and profit maximization, the latter were perceived as an elementary part of the political struggle, as political mouthpieces with an ‘idealist’ attitude to the economics of the newspaper business.²⁰ The advertisement section thus became the dividing line between Generalanzeiger and Gesinnungspresse.²¹ But increasingly, especially after the First World War, this line became blurred, and nowhere more so than in Berlin. On the one hand, the 1920s experienced the breakthrough of a consumeroriented press, while seeing at the same time an increase in the politicization of newspapers. These two trends, sometimes competing, sometimes converging, shaped all newspapers in this period. C O M M E RC I A L I Z AT I O N A N D C O N S U M E R O R I E N TAT I O N Since the beginning of the twentieth century, newspapers had realized the need to provide the readership with updated information. For this and for economic reasons—principally, in order to work their printing presses to capacity—many
16
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
newspapers came up with a second daily edition in Berlin, in most cases adding an evening edition to the morning edition.²² The whole economic concept lay in the calculation that an extra edition was possible with little concurrent increase in overheads: the editorial staff was rarely augmented for the extra edition. The pressure to produce larger quantities of text with limited human resources resulted in an increasing reliance on syndicated columns from press agencies and Korrespondenzen.²³ But it was not just the increase in frequency that expanded the scope of metropolitan papers. Also, the intensification of competition and the ever-increasing demand for entertainment meant that newspapers had to appeal to particular target groups in the reading audience, particularly women. They did this by introducing weekly or, if they could afford to, daily, supplements like the ‘Hauswirtschaftliche Plauderei’ in Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost, alongside supplements focusing on youth, house and garden, science and technology, travel, and daily sections on sports, entertainment such as film and theatre reviews, radio programmes, music, and so on. The war and its aftermath accelerated the introduction of distinctly modern features into the German media. Tabloids were one example.²⁴ Traditionally, sales of newspapers in Germany had exclusively relied on weekly or monthly subscriptions and home delivery. Tabloids, however, were primarily distributed through street sales. The first daily ‘Boulevardzeitung’, Ullstein’s BZ am Mittag, had already been successfully launched in 1904. Other Berlin publishers soon realized the advertisment value of selling a limited number of their subscription dailies through their own street vendors, but despite the unusually great success of BZ am Mittag they shied back from publishing a proper ‘Strassenverkaufszeitung’ themselves. The main reason for this reluctance was the commercial challenge of this particular form of retailing. Sales figures could vary wildly, with increases of more than 200 per cent in events of great sensation, and—more often—decreases of more than fifty per cent on quiet and rainy days.²⁵ The conflict between street vendors and publishers about the price for returned copies added further complexity to the tabloid business.²⁶ Without a firm subscription basis, a tabloid paper had to acquire its readership every day anew, and thus relied heavily on attractive headlines and a certain amount of sensationalism. Not surprisingly, this sensationalism encountered the supercilious disdain of many bourgeois contemporaries. ‘Certain newspapers in the big city’, criticized one observer, ‘cultivate sensation as a genre and thereby paint a picture of life that does not correspond with reality.’²⁷ The outbreak of war in 1914 changed the situation dramatically. Readers did not want to have to wait to find out about the latest developments. Readers everywhere developed an insatiable demand for the latest ‘news’, and publishers accommodated this demand with a multitude of high-circulation special editions sold exclusively on the street. At a time of falling advertisement income, sales income played an increasingly important role. Bold headlines, pictures, boxes, and bars changed the layout even of traditional subscription newspapers, which
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
17
now sold well over ten per cent of their circulation on the street.²⁸ War did not just result in a politicization of sensations, it also sensationalized politics. Politicians, who had previously deplored the profit-orientation of allegedly non-political, sensation-mongering newspapers, slowly began to change their views. Even Social Democrats recognized the need for a certain amount of sensationalism to sell politics. As Otto Braun, later to become the first Social Democratic prime minister of Prussia, pointed out at the 1917 party conference: We like talking among ourselves condescendingly of the need for sensation of the great masses. But let us be honest: every human being has the need for a bit of sensation. The more eventful the time, the more this need becomes apparent, and the daily press which completely ignores this human weakness would soon appear without a reading public, because nobody goes to the newsvendor to buy sleeping pills.²⁹
After the war, the number of Berlin tabloids multiplied: in 1919, some editors of the 8-Uhr-Abendblatt decided to start up another tabloid, to compete with Ullstein’s BZ am Mittag, called Neue Berliner Zeitung which soon became popular under its trading name Das 12-Uhr-Blatt. The newly founded Communist paper, Die Rote Fahne, found its tabloid equivalent in Die Welt am Abend, a socialist evening paper founded in 1922, which was bought up by Willi M¨unzenberg in 1925 and turned into Berlin’s most popular Communist newspaper. In 1922, Hugenberg too established an evening tabloid edition, Die Nachtausgabe, of his political broadsheet, Tag. These tabloids inundated Berlin’s streets and resulted in a cut-throat competition for publication times.³⁰ Thus, during the Weimar Republic Berlin featured a wealth of newspapers unrivalled by any other city. In 1925, there were thirty different daily newspapers in Berlin, plus another thirty to forty daily district newspapers.³¹ Counting all dailies, including morning and evening editions as well as the district papers, Berlin in 1925 was already faced with an enormous three million newspaper copies per day. With a potential readership of three million adults, Berlin at that time indeed had the ‘most insatiable newspaper readers in the world’.³² One contemporary commentary helps to illustrate the impression created by this ‘spectacle of the unprecedented development’ of the Berlin press: Each Berlin hour throws millions of newspaper pages onto the streets, into houses, into the administration, into the directors’ offices of banks, into branch offices, into factory offices, into taverns and into the theatre. They flood public transport . . . they drown the parks and they are being transported by newspaper planes beyond mountains, forests and seas: politics, economics, traffic, technology, stock market, sport, art fill and shake the air . . . each hour with loud and novel news, which the press is giving speedy wings.³³
WELTANSCHAUUNG A N D P O L I T I C I Z AT I O N The impression here described is that the city was covered by a tightly knit network of newspapers providing an abundance of information. However, this
18
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
suggests a homogeneity of the press and an availability of information which stood in stark contrast to the reality of Berlin’s heterogeneous media landscape. Communication flows in 1920s Berlin were complex and heavily fragmented. If a Berliner wanted news on a particular subject, the information he received depended on the kind of communication network in which he moved. In Berlin during the Weimar Republic the free exchange of information was severely restricted by an increasing political polarization of society. Readers of the Communist newspaper Rote Fahne and those of the reactionary Neue Preussische Kreuz-Zeitung would move in completely different worlds. Here, as in other overtly political papers, the effects of political polarization on the paper’s information policy were fundamental. There was hardly any political topic where coverage of the two papers would provide the reader with even similar information: news was reported highly selectively; stories were given a strong slant and edited to accord with the papers’ different political outlooks.³⁴ Arthur Koestler, foreign editor of Ullstein’s tabloid B.Z. am Mittag, recalled in his memoirs that the main determinant of German journalism’s approach to politics was the political world-view as propagated by the individual paper: [German journalism’s] starting point was the correspondent’s Weltanschauung, and the political philosophy of the paper for which he worked. His job was not to report the news and facts . . . but to use facts as pretexts for venting his opinions and passing oracular judgments. ‘Facts’, a famous German editor said, ‘are not fit for the reader when served raw; they had to be cooked, chewed and presented in the correspondent’s saliva.’³⁵
Fed on this kind of diet, Koestler concluded, the German reading public’s ‘approach to reality was distorted by Weltanschauung’.³⁶ According to Koestler’s colleague, Georg Bernhard, the chief editor of Ullstein’s prestigious Vossische Zeitung, there was nothing wrong with this approach to journalism. The primary purpose of the press was not to provide information but ‘views’, he explained in a speech in 1924: ‘[The newspaper] wishes to bring order into things which the reader sees before and around himself every day; it wishes to bring the events in the world to the attention of the reader from a definite point of view.’³⁷ Another editor even claimed that newspapers were forced to be subjective: ‘The demand of the masses for guidance . . . from their think-organ [‘ihr Denkorgan’, i.e. their paper] is so strong that today’s newspapers can no longer expect of their readers to put up with simple news and naked truths.’³⁸ The Weltanschauungs-basis of journalism in the Weimar Republic had its roots in the politicized tradition of the German press. The First World War further intensified the politicization of German society. While the SPD split over the question of support for the war, resulting in a division of the working class, war aims and a fear of continuing democraticization led to a rift in the conservative camp. Mounting domestic political tensions about strategy and war aims were mirrored in an increasingly polarized press. The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts bore the brunt of internal party strife, which ultimately resulted in the imposition of
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
19
a new team of editors by the party executive committee in November 1916.³⁹ At the same time, the Pan-German intention to oust Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg resulted in a violent and eventually successful campaign by Hugenberg’s newly acquired Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger against the government.⁴⁰ But it was not just the partisan spirit that rose during the war. The war also increased the awareness of the importance of public opinion, and government intervention in press affairs increased.⁴¹ The initial political unity at the outbreak of war, the ‘Burgfrieden’, was kept up artificially in the press by a ‘state of siege on truth’. Most editors became used to interpretative reporting and the construction of a propagandistic reality that had little resemblance to events on the ground, a fact satirized in Karl Kraus’s epic play Die letzten Tage der Menschheit.⁴² In doing so, editors felt they were contributing to the national struggle.⁴³ Right-wing observers in particular came to explain the revolution and thus the outcome of the war with the superiority of enemy propaganda, among other factors.⁴⁴ The end of the war and the revolution of 1918 left German society deeply polarized. The majority of political parties which had found a modus vivendi with monarchical rule were overtaken by events, and had to redefine their position in the changed political constellation of the Weimar Republic.⁴⁵ Like the political parties, most newspapers had had to reconsider their politics, and contemporaries would recognize general or party-political tendencies in almost every paper.⁴⁶ In fact, newspaper directories listed the political stance of each paper as provided by the publisher among other information relevant for potential advertisers.⁴⁷ Like all of Hugenberg’s papers, the majority of newspapers was unsympathetic to the concept of a republican democracy, and most overtly political papers started on a political crusade that was to last for the lifetime of the Weimar Republic.⁴⁸ Revolution and democracy meant that the mobilization of the public became top priority on any political agenda. It was no coincidence that the Spartakus uprising in January 1919 started with the occupation of the Berlin press district. Some of the most widely circulated images of the uprising showed armed revolutionaries posing behind barricades made of giant rolls of newspaper.⁴⁹ Contemporaries were convinced that the press constituted a crucial factor in the democratic political process; newspapers were destined to ‘lead the masses’.⁵⁰ At the root of this conviction lay a crude, linear perception of newspaper reception. Georg Bernhard was fully convinced that a German viewed his favourite newspaper ‘not merely [as] a source of news information, but also [as] an organ of instruction’.⁵¹ The partisan approach to politics culminated on election days, when almost all newspapers would explicitly encourage their readers to vote for a particular political grouping. Not only did editors think that they could directly influence the masses, they also felt themselves to be participants in the political struggle of opposing Weltanschauungen. When in 1927 the Berliner Volks-Zeitung, Mosse’s left-liberal paper aimed at a working-class audience, celebrated its seventy-fifth birthday, it declared it had always been ‘a paper devoted to battling the forces of darkness’.⁵²
20
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
Its chief editor was Otto Nuschke, one of the leaders of the German Democratic Party (DDP) in the Prussian parliament. In fact, a great number of editors of political papers were members of either the Reichstag or the Prussian Landtag: in 1924, thirteen per cent of the Reichstag’s deputies were publicists by profession.⁵³ The line between editor and politician was never more blurred than during the Weimar Republic. Theodor Wolff, chief editor of Mosse’s Berliner Tageblatt and most prominent voice of German liberalism, was a founding member of the leftliberal DDP; and Georg Bernhard, head of the Vossische Zeitung, was one of the party’s Reichstag deputies.⁵⁴ Joseph Goebbels’s political career before September 1930 was based primarily on his tabloid, Der Angriff. Like Goebbels, many socialists had once started in journalism. Most prominent Social Democracts had been editors of party newspapers for some years before reaching the republic’s highest offices, like Carl Severing, Rudolf Hilferding, Kurt Eisner, Hermann M¨uller, Paul L¨obe, to name just a few. This blurring between politics and journalism resulted in a distinctively aggressive press. Attacks on individual politicians or representatives of the ‘system’ were common.⁵⁵ If a correction was not enforced and no sympathetic paper came to the support of the attacked, the offending paper triumphantly declared the veracity of its allegations.⁵⁶ These could then be taken up by other journalists as established ‘facts’. This happened frequently, because articles written in other newspapers constituted an important source of material.⁵⁷ In fact, editors were avid newspaper readers: a typical editorial office would have subscribed to over a hundred different papers covering the whole range of political world-views.⁵⁸ In Berlin, the biggest single delivery in the daily distribution of the Social Democratic organ, Vorw¨arts, went into the Jerusalemerstrasse, the heart of the newspaper district.⁵⁹ Articles from papers of a similar political leaning would often be reprinted in excerpts; even articles by a political opponent would sometimes be reprinted, if they provided information which could not be found anywhere else and if this suited the political objective of the editor. Thus articles of the Communist Rote Fahne critical of the SPD were often quoted extensively in DNVP-organs, and vice versa. All political journalists were acutely aware of this multiplier effect and struggled to confront in their own articles each hostile statement in the various papers. In a city with a newspaper-density like Berlin this made for a very intensive preoccupation with the writings of other journalists. The present-day reader of 1920s newspapers is struck by the obvious inter-paper warfare and the system of self-reference: media coverage itself was an important focus of political news reporting. It was usual to attack other papers’ news policy, especially the selection of information conveyed. The amount of quotations from other newspapers and references to particular articles is a distinctive feature of the German press in this period.⁶⁰ The political self-understanding of editors determined the peculiar quality of news reporting, particularly in overtly political papers. Some of the most striking features of Berlin newspapers in this period are the lack of differentiation
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
21
between news and editorials, the amount of unverified and partisan information, and the deliberate holding back of particular news and information. Despite the abundance of newspapers in Berlin, it would therefore be wrong to assume that there was one general public where each individual was equally well informed through the mass media. Weltanschauung journalism, political polarization, and the fragmentation of the newspaper market resulted in a multitude of differentiated communication flows. In Berlin, readers of the Catholic Centre party’s newspaper, Germania, formed a different communication network from the readers of the Social Democratic Party organ, Vorw¨arts, which again carried different information from the Communist Rote Fahne or Hugenberg’s Tag: there were several distinct reading publics. The fragmentation of the print media into competing and often mutually hostile communication networks was a crucial feature of Weimar Germany’s political culture. N EW S PA PE R C I RC U L AT I O N A N D E L E C T I O N S Due to the fragmentation of the German newspaper market there were quite a lot of newspapers that could be considered important by political decision-makers. In 1924, the Ausw¨artige Amt drew up a list of the most important German dailies and their party-affiliations and arrived at a total of sixty-six.⁶¹ More than a third of these were Berlin papers. The Berlin titles were more or less the same ones that the State Commissioner for Public Order had drawn up in 1920 when providing the government with a list of twenty-two Berlin papers and their estimated circulation figures.⁶² In 1922, when the Reich chancellor asked his civil servants for the circulation figures of the most important Berlin dailies, the list included fifteen titles.⁶³ These lists show two things: a continuous consensus on which were ‘important’ papers; and a widespread ignorance concerning their distribution. Contemporaries hardly ever knew circulation figures. Apart from Ullstein, which started publishing quarterly circulation figures in 1926, most publishers kept this information secret. Even when submitting information relevant for advertisers in the various newspaper advertising handbooks, circulation figures were the exception rather than the norm.⁶⁴ Only in 1933 were compulsory statistical reports imposed on publishers; the subsequent ‘drop’ in circulation figures had more to do with previous exaggerations than with the decreasing attractiveness of gleichgeschaltet newspapers.⁶⁵ For contemporaries it was thus very difficult to assess the impact of any given newspaper, and for the most part circulation was overestimated. The list the Reich chancellor received in 1922 lacked data for five of the fifteen titles—among them the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, the Communist Rote Fahne, and the Germania of the Catholic Centre party. This absence of exact circulation figures, coupled with the remarkable growth of newspaper titles and circulation over the preceding decades, furthered contemporaries’ vague and rather subjective impression of the political power of the press.
22
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
One reason for the secrecy about circulation figures was business interests or, more specifically, advertisement prices.⁶⁶ Even for political papers, advertising income had become a significant and stable source of revenue. While falling circulation figures led directly to decreasing sales income, advertisement prices would not have to be lowered if the fact of decreasing circulation could be kept from advertisers. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (DAZ ) was a case in point. In 1922 the industrialist Hugo Stinnes merged the newly bought T¨agliche Rundschau with the DAZ, which he had taken over in 1920 to secure industrialist influence.⁶⁷ At the time of the merger the two papers had had a circulation of 40,000 and 32,000 respectively, according to information of the Reich chancellery.⁶⁸ Stinnes invested in the new DAZ, and for a short while the newspaper prospered.⁶⁹ For 1925, one advertiser’s press catalogue gave a circulation of 79,000 for the DAZ —just over the combined total of the two papers in 1922.⁷⁰ For 1926, the catalogue gave the information ‘circa 60,000’.⁷¹ In fact, this was a rather optimistic account of the paper’s print-run: by this time circulation had already fallen to only a little over 50,000, and was continuing to decrease rapidly.⁷² By 1930, the newspaper had continued to decline, was making heavy losses, and was running at 31,500 copies, according to the private papers of the then chief editor, Fritz Klein.⁷³ In various advertisement catalogues, however, the DAZ claimed it had a circulation of 63,000.⁷⁴ Apparently, the publisher had just added up the two daily editions, a common practice prior to 1933.⁷⁵ However, unlike the circulation figures, the catalogues’ entries for advertising prices for the various papers were real. Significantly, advertising prices for the DAZ increased considerably between 1925 and 1930, despite the fact that the paper was down almost 60 per cent from its previous level.⁷⁶ It paid to inflate circulation figures: total advertising revenue of the DAZ in 1930 was about RM 1.1 million, compared to RM 960,000 of Hugenberg’s Tag, which ran at over 70,000 copies per day.⁷⁷ For some publishing houses, like Ullstein or Scherl, we have relatively exact circulation data, at least for the post-inflationary period; for others, we depend on chance findings in editors’ private papers, or on internal party documents as in the case of the Communist Rote Fahne. For some, advertisement catalogues are the only source, which, despite all inaccuracies, give at least some indication as to a paper’s distribution, since the figures given can be seen as the upper limit, and will rarely have been exaggerated by more than 30 per cent.⁷⁸ When piecing this puzzle together, the overall structure of the Berlin press presents an interesting picture. In 1925, there were three distinct types of newspaper: elite political papers, with a total circulation of about 600,000; Berlin’s mass subscription papers, with a run of nearly a million copies; and tabloids, with a total of around 350,000. Until 1930 total circulation grew by over 30 per cent—but this growth was driven almost exclusively by the explosion of tabloids, which nearly tripled between 1925 and 1930. In the same period the circulation of elite political newspapers fell by some 20 per cent. The contrast becomes even
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
23
stronger when looking at the figures for 1932: as a result of the Great Depression total circulation had declined to a level just over that of 1928; elite political papers, however, despite the increasing politicization of society, had fallen by more than 35 per cent from the figure for 1925. As Table 1.1 reveals, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was not the only political paper to have a relatively low and decreasing circulation between 1925 and 1932. In fact, many of the most prominent political newspapers, like the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts or the Communist Rote Fahne, had relatively small circulation figures: in 1929, Vorw¨arts ran at around 75,000 copies per edition; the Rote Fahne even less with under 30,000.⁷⁹ Apart from Vorw¨arts, only political newspapers from big publishing houses like Mosse, Ullstein, Scherl, and M¨unzenberg had a circulation of over 50,000. Most others ran at under 40,000; the reactionary Kreuz-Zeitung, with a circulation of around 6,000 copies, was practically clandestine. Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung was the only one which resisted the general downward trend of political newspapers, at least until 1930. These figures raise some important questions about the electoral impact of newspapers: why did the circulation of the overtly pro-DDP Vossische Zeitung increase from 1925 to 1930 by over 30 per cent, whilst the electoral support for the DDP in Berlin declined from over 250,000 votes in December 1924 to under 150,000 in September 1930? In 1930, the political newspapers of Ullstein and Mosse had a combined circulation of almost double the number of DDP voters.⁸⁰ In fact, these two liberal Jewish publishing houses held over 50 per cent of the Berlin newspaper market, with the total circulation of all their titles standing at over 1.3 million copies per day—but less than 10 per cent of their readers supported the parliamentary party they were backing. Hugenberg was in a similar dilemma. Thanks to his new tabloid, the Nachtausgabe, total circulation of all his papers increased from c.340,000 in 1925 to just under 500,000 in 1930; but with every extra newspaper copy he sold he seemed to lose one vote: electoral support for his party, the DNVP, declined from around 550,000 votes in December 1924 to about 350,000 votes at the Reichstag elections in September 1930. The extra support which the DNVP received from the Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, the Kreuz-Zeitung, and the Deutsche Zeitung —with a combined daily circulation of 85,000 to 100,000—also did not translate into votes. Goebbels, on the other hand, was experiencing a different phenomenon altogether. The circulation of his tabloid, Der Angriff, founded in 1927, was almost exclusively limited to the party membership, and the paper had less than 10,000 subscribers in late 1929.⁸¹ At the city council elections in November 1929, however, the NSDAP garnered over 130,000 votes. Less than a year later, at the Reichstag elections in September 1930, the Nazi vote was close to 400,000, while the circulation of the Angriff did not surpass 50,000 until the end of the year.⁸² In fact, much of the increase in circulation was perhaps a result of the election, as was the case with the V¨olkischer Beobachter: according
Elite political papers Mass papers
Rote Fahne Vorw¨arts Vossische Zeitung Berliner B¨orsen-Courier Germania Der Deutsche Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Der Jungdeutsche Deutsche Tageszeitung Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung Der Tag Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung Deutsche Zeitung Sub-total Berlin am Morgen Berliner Morgenpost Berliner Volks-Zeitung Berliner Tageblatt Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger Sub-total Welt am Abend 8-Uhr-Abendblatt Tempo BZ am Mittag Neue Berliner Zeitung/12-Uhr-Blatt Nachtausgabe Angriff Sub-total Total
KPD SPD Ullstein liberal Z Z DVP nationalist Agrarian - DVP/DNVP DVP/DNVP Hugenberg–DNVP DNVP DNVP M¨unzenberg–KPD Ullstein Mosse Mosse Hugenberg–DNVP
Berlin tabloids
Newspaper title
M¨unzenberg–KPD Mosse Ullstein Ullstein liberal Hugenberg–DNVP NSDAP
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
32.5 95 36 40 43 24 79 42 30 34 86.5 6 60 608.5 – 492 90 170 220.5 972.5 12 90 – 180 30 37.5 – 349.5 1,930.5
37 90 58 40 43 28.5 53 42 30 42.5 74.5 6 48 592.5 – 569 80 163 209 1, 021 54.5 91.5 – 185.5 30 59.5 – 421 2,034.5
37 85 66.5 25 43 33.5 47.5 33.5 27.5 42.5 72 6.5 36.5 556 – 581.5 75 158 212.5 1, 027 104.5 93 – 186 40 66 4.5 494 2,077
32 82 69 25 43 38 42.5 25 25 42.5 77 6.5 24.5 532 – 608.5 70 150 219 1, 047 185 95 – 197 60 127.5 7 671.5 2,251
28 74.5 72 25 43 38 37 28 25 42.5 71 6.5 26 516.5 70 617 73 137 219.5 1, 116.5 229 97.5 118.5 190.5 50 193.5 15 894.5 2,527
25 75 76.5 24 43 38 31.5 25 25 32 69.5 6 26 496.5 75 607.5 77.5 121 213 1, 094 225 100 142 183.5 75 206.5 50 982 2,572.5
23 69.5 69 21.5 41 36 30.5 24 24 29 67.5 5 25.5 465.5 70 553 75 1400 197.5 1, 035.5 180 90 122 167 100 197 70 926 2,427
1932 19 56.5 56 17.5 34.5 30.5 25 20 20 25 57.5 4 25 390.5 65 478 80 130 183.5 936.5 180 80 106 151.5 120 185 98.5 921 2,248
Note: Figures rounded to the nearest 500. Figures given in italics are informed estimates. Sources: See www.hist.cam.ac.uk/academic staff/further details/fulda-press-and-politics.html Abbreviations: KPD = German Communist Pary; SPD = German Social Democratic Party; DDP = German Democratic Party; Z = Catholic Centre party; DVP = German People’s Party; DNVP = German Nationalist People’s Party; NSDAP = National Socialist Party
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
Publisher–Politics
24
Table 1.1. Circulation figures for the Berlin press, 1925–32 (000s)
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
25
1,000,000 900,000 800,000 votes cast
700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000
KPD SPD DDP Z DVP WP DNVP NSDAP
200,000 100,000 De c. Ju 24 ne De 25 c. Ju 25 ne De 26 c. Ju 26 ne De 27 c. Ju 27 ne De 28 c. Ju 28 ne De 29 c. Ju 29 ne De 30 c. Ju 30 ne De 31 c. Ju 31 ne 32
0
Fig. 1.1. Berlin elections to Reichstag, Prussian parliament, and city council, 1924–32 Sources: Otto B¨usch and Wolfgang Haus (eds.), Berlin als Hauptstadt der Weimarer Republik, 1919–1933 (Berlin, 1987), 323. Abbreviations: KPD = German Communist Party; SPD = German Social Democratic Party; DDP = German Democratic Party; Z = Catholic Centre party; DVP = German People’s Party; WP = Business Men’s Party; DNVP = German Nationalist People’s Party; NSDAP = National Socialist Party
to Social Democratic information, the V¨olkischer Beobachter had a street sale of around 8,000 copies just before 14 September 1930. This shot up to over 70,000 in the first weeks after the elections and then fell under 10,000 again by Christmas.⁸³ Despite the rising electoral support for the Nazis, the Berlin edition of the V¨olkischer Beobachter ceased publication in March 1931.⁸⁴ Even at the height of its circulation in 1932, the Angriff sold only 110,000 copies, while well over 700,000 Berliners voted for the Nazis. One explanation for the difficulty of finding a simple correlation between newspaper circulation and electoral behaviour lies in the fact that political papers were increasingly difficult to sell to a mass consumer audience. In 1923, the financial director of the Scherl publishing house tried to contain attempts by supporters of the DNVP to turn the Tag ever more nationalist, and warned Hugenberg of the grave consequences ‘if the Tag were to be turning into an outright party newspaper, with which after all we have had nothing but bad experiences in Germany’.⁸⁵ Hugenberg actually shared this view. In 1927, he was speaking from experience when explaining that partisan papers did not sell: ‘In the long run, there are not going to be major newspapers in Germany which are owned by an [industrial] company . . . or an association of lobbyists . . . In the long run, there are not going to be major newspapers representing the interests of such a group or such an association—for the simple reason that readers would be deserting them.’⁸⁶ For some reason, though, this knowledge did not lead him
26
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
to abandon the Tag, which had lost over 15 per cent of its readership within the previous two years. He clearly had the same conviction of the persuasive power of the press that motivated industrialist pressure groups in 1927 to buy up the deficit-making Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, which was continuously losing readers. READERS AND CONTENT Unlike the DDP and the DNVP, the KPD gained electoral support between December 1924 and September 1930. Yet, while the Communist vote increased from 350,000 to 750,000, the party organ, the Rote Fahne, was constantly losing subscribers, despite a huge proletarian readership in Berlin. Most workers, however, were subscribing to Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost, which in 1924 already had over half a million readers, fifteen times as many as the Rote Fahne. This was troubling the Communists, and in 1924 the party propagandists set out on a reader survey to find out why the workers were refusing to buy the party newspaper. The concluding report, ‘What do workers think about Rote Fahne?’, contained frank replies and amounted to a devastating critique of the Communist press.⁸⁷ It consists of over sixty responses, sometimes summarized but often verbatim, from readers and non-readers, party members and non-party members, men and women, who were asked about their views on the Rote Fahne and for reasons why most workers preferred to read the Berliner Morgenpost. Since this is one of the few documents which give evidence of newspaper reception, it is worth quoting at greater length. Many replies complained about the rabble-rousing in the paper.⁸⁸ One railway employee put it politely: ‘Even if much of what this newspaper reports is true, one can naturally not expect that people should enjoy these Schimpfkanonaden day after day.’⁸⁹ Many pointed out that the style was difficult to understand and not aimed at simple workers. One comrade noted: ‘The Rote Fahne is not writing for but about the workers’; another concluded ‘The writing style is rubbish.’⁹⁰ Thus the political message would often be lost, as the frank reply of another comrade, a woodworker, proved: ‘Whether I am reading and understanding everything? Nope!’⁹¹ Party politics at the most simple level were, however, equally unappealing, as an employee complained: ‘The thing which the masses . . . often find most disgusting is the great number of proclamations held in a turgid tone.’⁹² It was, he pointed out, ‘more a paper for party functionaries than for the masses’. It did not help that the distribution of the Rote Fahne was extremely unreliable: often it arrived too late in the morning to be read before going to work.⁹³ Another bone of contention was news coverage: many news items were outdated by the time of publication, and there were too many opinions and not enough news: ‘[We] are . . . always only served opinions and statements; the facts one has to collect from the [Berliner] Morgenpost or the
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
27
[Berliner] Lokalanzeiger.’⁹⁴ However valid this Communist news strategy might be, someone remarked, their press bore little relation to reality.⁹⁵ The complaint which appeared most often was that the party organ was ‘not entertaining enough’.⁹⁶ One non-Communist spelt out his expectations: ‘I . . . want to hear something about the natural sciences, about politics, about literature, about crime, in short I want to feel the pulse of life . . . not always politics, politics, and again politics.’⁹⁷ Readers demanded local news and courtroom news, they wanted illustrated supplements and entertaining serialized novels, ‘bourgeois’ sports coverage (particularly of football), and much more advertisements. As one female party member explained it was difficult to compete with the bourgeois press and its ‘Interesting News from Around the World, Brummb¨ar [complaints about local issues], Letter Box, Household Chat, Fashion Templates and such likes.’⁹⁸ One female Morgenpost reader explained she was quite satisfied ‘that there is at least one newspaper which reports as good as nothing on politics’.⁹⁹ Although this was not necessarily an accurate account of the Morgenpost’s offerings, it reflected the widespread consensus that the entertainment provided by the Ullstein paper was the decisive buying factor. Women generally did not hold back with their criticism of the Communist party organ. One Communist’s wife complained: ‘At least on Sundays I want to be reading what is happening in the rest of the world, [I] want to read an entertaining serialized novel on Sunday . . . A lot of wives of your comrades hold the same opinion like me, and other women even more, naturally.’¹⁰⁰ Many a husband who did not read the Rote Fahne indicated that it was his wife who decided which newspaper was read. Numerous reports tell of quarrels within the family about the Communist party organ, with cases of wives cancelling the subscription to the Rote Fahne and ordering the Berliner Morgenpost instead. When not subscribing to the Morgenpost themselves, many women shared the newspaper with a neighbour’s wife. A common reply of non-Rote Fahne readers was ‘that I also have a wife and that she would raise hell if I were to cancel the Motte [Morgenpost] and would subscribe instead to the [Rote] Fahne . . . And in order . . . to have peace and calm at home I adhere to my wife’s wishes in this regard.’¹⁰¹ One construction worker confirmed this picture of domestic newspaper struggle: ‘When I am reading the Rote Fahne, my wife keeps nagging me, or she orders the [Berliner] Volkszeitung for herself.’¹⁰² When questioned, his wife elaborated on her refusal to read the Communist party organ: The Volkszeitung at least comes twice a day, and then it provides me with more entertainment. . . . After all, I don’t want to be reading about politics all the time, that is something for men. I want to read something amusing off and on, like a travel report, what it is like in the Sommerfrische, about winter sports and such things. If one cannot go there oneself, at least one wants to imagine what is is like.¹⁰³
The Rote Fahne failed to appeal to women just like the KPD failed to appeal to the female electorate.¹⁰⁴
28
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
The Communist party organ was becoming a victim of the rising consumer society, and it was not the only paper to suffer this fate. Many complaints about the Rote Fahne were equally valid for other partisan political newspapers. Social Democrats, like Communists, were aware that their party papers were lacking the popular support from which the party benefited at elections. Since the First World War, the SPD press had been torn between party doctrine and the recognized need for modernization by opening to a wider audience, particularly women. Already during the war, SPD papers had experienced a drop in circulation of about fifty per cent, mainly because the families of drafted soldiers had switched to bourgeois papers.¹⁰⁵ Despite revolution and a change of political system, socialist newspapers continued to suffer from falling circulation figures: Social Democratic papers had dropped from 1.8 million before the war to just 1.1 million in 1925.¹⁰⁶ Like the Communists, Social Democratic editors struggled with the question why ‘non-political’ Generalanzeiger kept outperforming their own newspapers, even in predominantly working-class areas. One prosaic reason suggested was that these newspapers simply offered more paper and that readers did not care whether their wrapping paper contained editorial text or advertisements. This was not entirely facetious: in the absence of plastic, newsprint was a crucial element in any household and value for money was not only measured in terms of content.¹⁰⁷ But content was important, too. The equivalent of the Communist reader survey in 1924 was the keynote speech by Wilhelm Sollmann, member of the Reichstag and chief editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, to a conference of Social Democratic editors in Berlin in January 1926. He, too, turned to the Berliner Morgenpost to find out about workers’ tastes: after all, he reminded his colleagues, it had a circulation of just under half of that of the total Social Democratic press.¹⁰⁸ Obviously, Kleine Anzeigen, private advertisements, held a great appeal to the readership: obituaries, engagement and birth announcements, as well as escaped canaries and the like were more popular than political editors realized, Sollmann admitted.¹⁰⁹ The weakness of the Social Democratic press, he contended, lay in the excessive coverage of politics at the expense of local coverage: ‘The overwhelming majority of people get more excited by local events and interests than by high politics.’¹¹⁰ Regional editors ought to draw on the political material available from Berlin, and concentrate on the local section of their newspapers. But instead of writing for their local audiences, regional editors engaged in irrelevant press feuds, Sollmann claimed: The political colleague in Constance, in Cologne, in G¨orlitz, in K¨onigsberg, in Flensburg polemicizes against the Kreuz-Zeitung, against the Deutsche Tages-Zeitung, against the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, and against other papers of which 99 per cent of his readers have never caught sight, and the editor responsible for local news believes he has to prove once more in his section the abysmal evilness of the German Nationalists, of the Volksparteiler and of the Communists by way of fierce polemics against their local presses.
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
29
Let us leave out the political racket from the unpolitical section of our newspaper. We are polemicizing, we are ranting too much and we are chatting too little.¹¹¹
Newspapers had to cater to a mass audience, especially the female reader, who mostly decided which paper a family subscribed to. An attractive serialized novel could raise circulation by several thousand, Sollmann pointed out.¹¹² However, the Social Democratic version of entertainment was relatively unattractive; as Sollmann admitted, the feuilleton in the SPD press was sometimes ‘grotesquely one-sided and boring’.¹¹³ Court-reporting was still deficient; the partisan coverage of political trials, Feme-murders, and secret organizations was tiring in its repetitiveness.¹¹⁴ The Social Democratic news agency, the Pressedienst, had expanded its unpolitical production to include sports, feuilleton, chronologies, but even here it was still too overtly political.¹¹⁵ Light entertainment and local news, with less political news—this mixture served by the Generalanzeiger suited the taste of a mass audience, and according to Sollmann the duty of SPD editors was to accommodate this Massengeschmack while at the same time not compromising in their party political struggle and education.¹¹⁶ Sollmann’s suggestions were met with approval, although doubts remained among his fellow editors that party functionaries would tolerate such an ‘Americanization’ of the party press.¹¹⁷ Most papers introduced women’s supplements in the mid-1920s and extended their sports coverage. Illustrations were particularly important in helping circulation figures to recover from inflation lows: photos and caricatures were introduced in the Vorw¨arts in 1924; the first news photo appeared on 11 August 1927.¹¹⁸ These journalistic efforts to modernize were paralleled with developments in the economic management of party papers. From the mid-1920s onwards, business managers gained an increasingly important role in socialist papers and began to demand overall leadership within the publishing enterprises.¹¹⁹ The most significant reform was the foundation of the ‘Konzentration AG’ by the SPD in March 1925 as a central procurement agency for all party newspapers and a centralized instance of business control.¹²⁰ But while all this modernization led to an increase of about 300,000 readers up to 1929, party newspapers were constantly losing money.¹²¹ Between 1925 and 1930, the Konzentration paid out credits and subsidies amounting to RM 4.2 million.¹²²
N EW S PA PE R F I N A N C E S In this, Social Democratic papers were sharing the fate of all other political papers in this period: not one of them was profitable. Because of these endemic financial difficulties, Berlin witnessed the merger and disappearance of many partisan newspapers after 1918. The reactionary Neue Preußische Kreuz-Zeitung lost money continuously and was forced to enter an alliance with the agrarian
30
Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
Deutsche Tageszeitung in 1926.¹²³ In 1929, when the Kreuz-Zeitung announced that it was cancelling one of its two daily editions, the paper complained about the difficult times for a ‘political fighting organ’ like itself: ‘[The Kreuz-Zeitung] perceives as an extraordinary threat the fact that in the hunt for ever novel information which are cajoling the audience’s craving for sensations through blatant luridness, every possibility for the serious reader to form for himself a consistent image of the events in the world is vanishing.’¹²⁴ The Deutsche Tageszeitung was struggling with falling circulation figures, too, and in 1932 the nationalist veterans’ organization, the Stahlhelm, agreed to take over the KreuzZeitung and its deficits.¹²⁵ Other papers folded even before the experience of the economic slump of 1929–32: the party organ of the DNVP, the Nationalpost, went bankrupt in June 1925 and was discontinued.¹²⁶ Berlin’s only v¨olkisch paper, the Deutsche Tageblatt, ceased publication as a daily in July 1929.¹²⁷ Stresemann’s title, the Zeit, founded in 1923, survived only 18 months and was then merged with the T¨agliche Rundschau in June 1925.¹²⁸ In fact, the T¨agliche Rundschau was probably the most notable victim of financial difficulties: it was taken over in 1922 by Stinnes and merged with his Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.¹²⁹ The DVP then started another T¨agliche Rundschau which went bankrupt in June 1928.¹³⁰ In 1930, it was once more revived by the Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst, a splinter group of the DNVP, but continued to be such a loss-maker that it was once more sold in 1932.¹³¹ Even the Nazi V¨olkischer Beobachter which appeared with a Berlin edition from March 1930 stopped this publication little more than a year later because its circulation never rose much above 5,000 copies.¹³² If they were able to survive, such small papers only managed through sustained subsidies, or minimizing production costs, often by understaffing the editorial office. A prestigious paper was expensive to maintain: the Catholic Centre party organ, Germania, for example, ran up a deficit of nearly RM 400,000 in 1930.¹³³ The costs of better-equipped papers were much higher still. The editorial office of Mosse’s Berliner Tageblatt alone cost around RM 3.3 million per year in 1929.¹³⁴ Over the next years, its publisher tried to reduce costs radically, but in 1932 the Mosse concern was on the brink of bankruptcy.¹³⁵ The losses of Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung after 1923 were allegedly running into seven figures each year; by 1928 the yearly deficit was over RM 2 million, and by the beginning of 1933 it was costing the firm RM 200,000 a month to keep the paper alive.¹³⁶ Newspapers like the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung or the only prestigious non-Berlin paper, the Frankfurter Zeitung, became financially dependent on interest groups which wanted to secure industrialist influence on politics.¹³⁷ The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung alone needed subsidies of around RM 4 million in the period 1929–31.¹³⁸ If not sustained by external subsidies, such costly newspapers would rely on cross-subsidies from within a big publishing empire. The publishers of the Vossische Zeitung and the Tag, Ullstein and Hugenberg, paid for these papers out of the income generated by the Berliner Morgenpost and the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger.
The Berlin Press, 1918–32
31
12,000,000 10,000,000 BLA ads BLA sales calc. Tag ads Tag sales calc. NA ads NA sales calc.
8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
Fig. 1.2. Advertising and sales income of Hugenberg papers, 1925–32 (RM) Sources: Advertising income from Scherl business reports, BArchK, N1231 Hugenberg, 269, f. 23; 270, ff. 19–20; 300, f. 14; 271, f. 13; 273, f. 19; 274, f. 8; 275, f.12. Sales income calculated from circulation figures (same as Table 1.1). Abbreviations: BLA = Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger; NA = Nachtausgabe
It is possible to reconstruct the income generated by Hugenberg’s three big newspapers from the surviving annual business reports of the Scherl firm.¹³⁹ This reconstruction (Fig. 1.2) shows the importance of the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger within Hugenberg’s enterprise: in 1928, for example, the BLA was generating about RM 20.5 million, more than five times as much as the Tag. The BLA advertisements alone were making more money than the Tag in total. But there is another, even more interesting, trend: the explosive growth of the Nachtausgabe revenue, from RM 1.3 million in 1925 to RM 7.7 million in 1930. Its share of the total revenue generated by all three papers grew from five per cent in 1925 to nearly thirty per cent in 1932. Of course, growing income cannot generally be equated with growing profitability, due to variable costs. For example, an increase in sales revenue, generated through rising circulation figures, could be offset by the concurrent increase in production costs, particularly by a rise in expenditure on paper.¹⁴⁰ But like all dailies with a high circulation, both the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger and the Nachtausgabe benefited after October 1925 from falling paper prices.¹⁴¹ The annual report for 1928 gives a gross profit of RM 3.2 million for the BLA, constituting more than half of the total gross profit of the Scherl publishing firm of RM 6 million.¹⁴² A profit-and-loss account for 1931 and 1932 shows that even during the height of recession the Scherl firm was still making a sizeable gross profit, with RM 3.6 million and RM 2.6 million, respectively.¹⁴³ It also shows that the total of production and retailing costs for all Scherl publications was lower than the income generated by BLA and Nachtausgabe alone.
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The published business reports of the Ullstein firm contain so little detail that it is impossible to reconstruct figures for the individual papers. However, the reports suggest that business developments were generally similar.¹⁴⁴ As one editor complained, the Ullstein brothers considered the BZ am Mittag more important than the Vossische Zeitung —hardly surprising in view of the finances as reconstructed for the Scherl concern.¹⁴⁵ There is also some circumstantial evidence from the Mosse publishing house indicating the importance which mass tabloids held for publishing business. Unlike Ullstein and Scherl, Mosse did not publish a tabloid until January 1927, when the publisher LachmannMosse bought the 8-Uhr-Abendblatt from Victor Hahn.¹⁴⁶ The price, about RM 4 million, was widely considered excessively high.¹⁴⁷ But in fact the 8-UhrAbendblatt carried 50 per cent more advertisement pages in 1927 than did the Nachtausgabe, sold 80,000 copies for at a subscription price of RM 1 per week, and will have generated income of over RM 4.5 million in 1927.¹⁴⁸ Compared to small loss-making political newspapers such as the reactionary Kreuz-Zeitung, Berlin’s tabloids were big business in a growing market. TA B LO I D S Even more than newspapers of the Generalanzeiger-type, so-called ‘Boulevardzeitungen’ tabloids, encountered contemptuous disdain among the political class. They were considered more unpolitical than Generalanzeiger, aimed at titillating the readership with sensations, pictures of train crashes and other catastrophes, providing crime reports, sports news, serialized novels, and other entertainment. Sex was not yet a major issue, though to some contemporary observers the occasional photo of a new swimming star in her bathing suit, or of film stars in light dress proved sufficiently upsetting. Hugenberg in particular struggled with fellow DNVP Protestant puritans who considered his Nachtausgabe an immoral enterprise aimed at titillating the masses.¹⁴⁹ But Hugenberg was unwilling to leave this field to Ullstein and Mosse. ‘The profits of this paper fund the party’, he allegedly replied to such criticism.¹⁵⁰ Hugenberg was also aware that there was a limit to the reach of his other two papers, Tag and Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger. Even the latter had a predominantly bourgeois or petit-bourgeois readership.¹⁵¹ Already in 1919, the right-wing star columnist Adolf Stein had pointed out to Hugenberger that ‘[t]hrough our nationalist newspapers we do not reach the masses who read social democratic or democratic papers’.¹⁵² Nachtausgabe, founded in 1922, was Hugenberg’s attempt at wooing a metropolitan, predominantly working-class readership. This was not simply a commercial move, but one driven by political motives, as Hugenberg defended himself in front of his nationalist colleagues in April 1930. In all big cities of the world, he explained, a tabloid relied on a particular layout and composition—it was not meant to be a traditional ‘Sonntagsblatt’: ‘Otherwise these big city folk [Großst¨adter] simply
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don’t buy it. They buy it because of the sensation which it carries—and they swallow the politics which is contained in between.’¹⁵³ Hugenberg’s pragmatic approach to a metropolitan mass audience was mirrored by that of the Communist Willi M¨unzenberg, nicknamed the ‘Red Hugenberg’.¹⁵⁴ M¨unzenberg’s position as the KPD’s most talented propagandistic manager had been firmly established through his organization of the Internationale Arbeiter Hilfe (IAH), initiated in 1921 to raise funds to help combat starvation in Soviet Russia, a consequence of the civil war. The IAH became a comprehensive propaganda concern with a huge publishing output. As the owner of Neuer Deutscher Verlag, M¨unzenberg was independent of dogmatic party conventions and could tailor his products to appeal to the taste of a metropolitan readership, as he demonstrated with the Welt am Abend. Founded in 1922, Welt am Abend was a leftist evening tabloid which had failed to acquire a larger readership: it had a circulation of 3,000 copies when sold to M¨unzenberg in November 1925 for a price of just RM 7,000.¹⁵⁵ Similar to Hugenberg, whose Nachtausgabe aimed at enlarging the limited audience exposed to nationalist politics, M¨unzenberg aimed at reaching many more readers than just Berlin’s KPD party members. He professionalized retailing, he hired non-party members as editors, and successfully avoided being seen as under Moscow’s thumb.¹⁵⁶ Already by January 1926 circulation was over 20,000; 80 per cent of the readership were allegedly non-Communists.¹⁵⁷ By 1929, circulation had grown to over 200,000, making Welt am Abend the Communist newspaper with the highest circulation in Germany. Not all Communists were equally impressed with this development, and those responsible for the successful tabloid repeatedly had to convince their colleagues in the flagging party organ, Rote Fahne, that they were not competing for the same readership. At a Reich conference of Communist editors in Berlin in September 1927, Welt am Abend’s chief editor, Otto Heller, pointed out that his paper was not run or branded as a party organ. He emphasized the difference by explaining how the presentation of the news was tailored to appeal to the petit-bourgeois attitude of many workers: Every day we monitor street sales [figures] graphically in a curve. . . . [W]e can then find out, which newspapers were of greatest interest. Also whom they interested most, according to city district and segment of the population. 20 per cent of our headlines, we openly admit, are absolutely non-serious, but they guarantee our customer pool. 30 per cent are half-serious, 50 per cent are watertight [hieb- und stichfest]. Of course, an [official] party organ cannot do the same.¹⁵⁸
Just why such sensationalism had to be untenable for a party organ remained unclear. No one reading Welt am Abend in the late 1920s and early 1930s was left in any doubt that this paper was a staunch supporter of Communism, and its mass reach was considerably greater than that of Rote Fahne. In any case, the Communists were deluding themselves about the relationship between
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Rote Fahne and Welt am Abend. By 1930, the party organ had lost over half its readership and sold only around 18,000 copies—not even a tenth of the circulation of M¨unzenberg’s Welt am Abend.¹⁵⁹ Even KPD party members did not always choose to buy Rote Fahne if they could have Welt am Abend, as the party publishing house complained to Berlin’s Communist district leadership.¹⁶⁰ By 1928, all tabloids were composed more or less the same way: ten to sixteen pages in total, about two pages on politics, three with local news, three to four with serialized novels and articles on film, theatre, and other cultural events, up to three pages on sports, two with business and stock market news, the rest carrying advertisements. Every edition was interspersed with many photos, drawings, and some caricatures. They all had a strong emphasis on entertainment, as evident in the space devoted to serialized novels, which would often amount to more than a page. Welt am Abend would offer ‘Jack the Ripper: Revelations on the life of the notorious sex murderer’, Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe ‘Nelly is dissapointed by men! Novel of a brunette girl’.¹⁶¹ Sales figures indicate that this was what Berliners liked to read: both the Nachtausgabe and the Welt am Abend more than doubled between December 1927 and December 1928, to about 151,000 and 174,000 copies, respectively. Party newspapers generally were on the decline, one journalist declared in 1928: The working population of Berlin is reading the lively and well-edited papers whether they are produced by the publishing houses Mosse, Ullstein, Hugenberg or M¨unzenberg; they don’t generally bother about the party tendency . . . The working population . . . wants a quick and precise news service, wants pictures and demands a certain tickle. It does not want to be lectured, but to be informed, and to be slightly sensationalized [sich leicht ansensationalisieren lassen]. That explains the smashing success of the ‘Boulevardbl¨atter’ . . . ’¹⁶²
However, other commentators doubted the claim that tabloid readers did not generally distinguish between the various political backgrounds on offer.¹⁶³ According to the editors of Welt am Abend, for example, their readership overlapped with that of the BZ am Mittag, Vorw¨arts, Berliner Morgenpost, and 8-Uhr-Abendblatt.¹⁶⁴ In this group of liberal and left-wing publications, Hugenberg’s right-wing Nachtausgabe did not feature. The Communist reader survey of 1924 corroborates this assessment: from over sixty mainly workingclass newspaper readers, only two referred to a Hugenberg paper, while all others preferred liberal Ullstein or Mosse papers.¹⁶⁵ Apparently, Hugenberg’s papers were too openly anti-socialist to be palatable to a working-class readership with strong socialist dispositions. For traditional political papers, the increasing loss of market shares to tabloids meant that they had to adapt to the new style of metropolitan journalism in order to consolidate their existing readership. Eye-catching headlines, photos, and caricatures became increasingly common after 1925.¹⁶⁶ Shortly before the
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Reichstag elections in 1928, the SPD attempted to jump on the tabloidbandwagon and turned the evening edition of its party organ, Vorw¨arts, into a tabloid-style paper, called Der Abend. Some critics made fun of the attempted modernization. ‘Despite the new fac¸ade’, one Weltb¨uhne journalist scoffed, ‘on the inside it is the same old Mief ’.¹⁶⁷ Others, particularly on the political right, exaggerated the extent of sensationalization of the Social Democratic paper. ‘As a sensationalist paper, Abend can easily compete with the worst products of sensation-journalism’, the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung proclaimed.¹⁶⁸ The truth lay somewhere inbetween: Abend’s lack of sensationalist coverage of nonpolitical crime, accidents, and catastrophes betrayed its origin as party organ; on the other hand, it clearly represented a considerable sensationalization of politics. And this sensationalism was not simply a question of style and packaging, but also had the potential of influencing the course of political events. In fact, the rising awareness of consumer demands on the side of newspapermen did not result in a depoliticization of content. Even tabloids, with their apparently unpolitical packaging of news, were anything but unpolitical. Like the political papers, they would serve political news according to a particular Weltanschauung, and openly support a particular grouping on election days. As the editor of Hugenberg’s Tag pointed out in 1928, tabloids held a particular function in the political ‘Meinungskampf ’ (struggle of opinions) because when making political points in decisive questions they would excel with glaring propaganda.¹⁶⁹ However, the degree of politicization of tabloids would vary greatly. Ullsteins BZ am Mittag retained a relatively neutral stance with its focus on sports for most of the 1920s, and became more radically pro-democratic only with the appointment of Franz H¨ollering as chief editor in 1929, whom the Ullsteins had poached from M¨unzenberg’s successful Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung.¹⁷⁰ Ullstein’s other tabloid, Tempo, was similarly conceived primarily as a business enterprise. It was Ullstein’s reply to Mosse’s acquisition of the 8-Uhr-Abendblatt, and their decision to enter into competition with the other two late-afternoon tabloids, M¨unzenberg’s Welt am Abend and Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe.¹⁷¹ Tempo was the most radical proponent of American-style tabloid journalism, with an emphasis on the latest news, up to three revised editions in one afternoon, and an abundance of sensations and catastrophes outdoing everything Berlin had read so far.¹⁷² During the first months of its existence, Tempo lacked almost any political coverage, and soon became the epitome of the Americanization of the press, decried as ‘asphalt flower’ and ‘Jewish flurry’.¹⁷³ Goebbels’s Angriff, in contrast, existed exlusively for political purposes. Founded in July 1927 in response to a ban of the NSDAP in Berlin, the paper was not aimed at appealing to what Goebbels described as the ‘educated public’: ‘Angriff was meant to be read by the masses, and the masses usually only read that which they understand.’¹⁷⁴ After the electoral breakthrough in September 1930, the Angriff became a daily on 1 November 1930. On this occasion, Goebbels explained the paper’s programme: ‘We penetrated . . . the wall of icy boycott
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erected around us. We shouted and ran riot, we fought with foil and heavy sabre, we shot with firecrackers and poisoned arrows, and so we slowly made our way up . . . One had to hear us.’¹⁷⁵ Sensationalism was a crucial ingredient in this strategy. ‘Berlin needs its sensations like a fish needs water. The city thrives on it, and all political propaganda which fails to recognize this will miss its aim’, Goebbels described his political style.¹⁷⁶ But Angriff struggled to reach the standard set by the tabloids of the big publishing houses. There was no choice but to market the inability of Angriff to compete in terms of news provision as a distinct strength of the paper. As a novel type of ‘fighting newspaper’, Goebbels explained in 1932, Angriff was not in the business of providing information but political motivation.¹⁷⁷ There were many similarities between Angriff and the rest of the Berlin press. From early on, Angriff had to offer at least to some extent content which Berlin newspaper readers had come to expect from their papers, like theatre, film, radio and book reviews, a women’s and a youth’s supplement, and the like.¹⁷⁸ Its layout, in particular, owed everything to the tabloid press.¹⁷⁹ In its early years, Angriff could not afford photo reproductions, and the bulk of its images was provided by a caricaturist from Hugenberg’s tabloid, Nachtausgabe, Hans Schweitzer. For almost five years, Hans Schweitzer provided both tabloids with caricatures.¹⁸⁰ Under his Nazi nom-de-plume ‘Mj¨olnir’, Schweitzer was to become the National Socialists’ most important caricaturist, illustrator, and visual propagandist, hailed after 1933 as ‘the Third Reich’s graphic artist’.¹⁸¹ Schweitzer’s Angriff ideal types of tall, blond, male Aryans, aggressive and determined, with jutting jaw lines and muscular bodies, were more openly propagandistic and his caricatures generally more anti-Semitic than most of the drawings he produced for Nachtausgabe; still, the fact that Schweitzer published anti-republican caricatures on a daily basis for Hugenberg’s tabloid demonstrates the degree of politicization of the tabloid press in this period. Less than a decade after the demise of the Weimar Republic, this fact was still widely appreciated. All tabloids prior to 1933, a German doctoral thesis from 1941 emphasized, were ‘more or less party political-oriented newspapers’.¹⁸² Goebbels certainly felt that Berlin’s tabloids with their mass circulation were a major political challenge. Attacks on the ‘Jewish press’ became a trademark of Angriff, and in a regular column devoted to Berlin’s press (‘Around the rotary machine’) mass papers and tabloids became his main targets. This was not just because these were the papers Angriff readers were most likely to encounter, but also because tabloids such as Welt am Abend, 12-Uhr-Blatt, and especially Mosse’s 8-Uhr-Abendblatt were at the forefront in writing against the National Socialists. In fact, Angriff engaged excessively in the inter-paper warfare which was so typical of the established political papers. Its style was cruder, more aggressive, and distinctly anti-Semitic, but other than that not dissimilar in nature to other openly anti-democratic papers in Berlin. Like the more ‘serious’ papers, Angriff would offer many quotations from classic German literature to embellish its
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articles.¹⁸³ What distinguished Angriff from other—more traditional—papers of the extreme right was Goebbels’s skill in combining human-interest stories with sensationalist politics. This was also obvious in his campaign against Berlin’s deputy police president, Bernhard Weiss. Continuing in the tradition of Hugenberg’s press campaigns against Erzberger and Stresemann, Goebbels brought tabloid methods to politics by chosing a local representative of the democratic system as a target, in line with the Angriff ’s strong emphasis on Berlin affairs.¹⁸⁴ The fact that there was an abundance of partisan tabloid papers in Berlin also shaped the content of those tabloids, which had originally been intended as exlusively commercial enterprises. Ullstein’s Tempo is a good case in point. In contrast to other Ullstein publications, Tempo was not an instant success. Introduced in 1928 at 100,000 copies daily, it had grown a mere 14,000 by September 1929. Within two more months, however, circulation had surpassed 140,000. There is no direct evidence which would explain this increase, but there is good reason to believe it was Tempo’s role in the course of the so-called Sklarek scandal in October-November 1929, an affair involving several high-ranking local government officials, including Berlin’s mayor Gustav B¨oss. Tempo established itself as one of the most vociferous prosecutors, and attracted a lot of attention by its sensationalist exposure of local corruption. Very different from its previous policy of almost abstaining from political coverage, and contrary to Ullstein’s long tradition of supporting the democratic cause, the Tempo now joined Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe and M¨unzenberg’s Welt am Abend in attacking Berlin’s political leadership. Although the emphasis lay on sensationalist revelations and was not driven by an anti-democratic Weltanschauung, effectively the Tempo contributed to the growing number of voices denigrating the democratic system.¹⁸⁵ Whether this was a conscious business decision is difficult to establish. But it is a fact that from 1925 anti-democratic tabloids were benefiting from better growth rates than were those supporting the parliamentary system. Unlike the political papers, where Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung was outperforming Hugenberg’s Tag, democratic tabloids like Ullstein’s BZ am Mittag, Mosse’s 8-Uhr-Abendblatt, or the 12-Uhr-Blatt were struggling to keep up the circulation they had reached in the early 1920s, and never came close to the growth displayed by Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe or M¨unzenberg’s Welt am Abend after 1925. We know from the Communist readers’ survey of 1924 that a paper was not just bought for its political conviction, shared by the reader, but for the entertainment it provided. Also, a lot of circulation growth was clearly driven by non-political factors: part of the Nachtausgabe’s increase in circulation was the result of well-advertised prize draws in 1928 and 1929, the latter with a mass-participation of some 316,000 Berliners.¹⁸⁶ Circulation subsequently more than doubled between May 1928 and December 1929.¹⁸⁷ But at the same time neither the 8-Uhr-Abendblatt nor the BZ am Mittag managed to grow decisively, despite being staffed with highquality journalists and benefiting from the resources of the Mosse and Ullstein
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publishing houses. They, too, organized their own prize draws and provided a similar amount of illustrations, caricatures, and entertainment, without the success of their ‘anti-system’ opponents. P R E S S S U P P O RT A N D E L E C TO R A L B E H AV I O U R This phenomenon is significant because tabloids depended much more on street sales, rather than on subscriptions like all other German papers. As distinct from a monthly subscription to a Generalanzeiger, the potential reader had to make a daily decision about which of the tabloids on offer he would buy. Because of this form of retailing, Berlin’s tabloids were more sensitive to popular sentiments than were other papers.¹⁸⁸ It is, therefore, interesting that from 1925 to 1929–30 those tabloids championing ‘anti-system’ politics fared best. Thus, we are back to the question of the interrelation between newspapers and electoral behaviour. Any analysis of this phenomenon will encounter a problem well known in the area of media studies, that of media reception: did these papers fare better because they met the preferences of one part of the Berlin public with a strong anti-democratic disposition? Or did these papers sell well and thereby influence readers with the propagation of anti-system opinions? Of course, the two explanations are not mutually exclusive. But in Berlin the rise of ‘anti-system’ tabloids coincides with a change in political climate: there is a strong correlation between the rise in circulation of Berlin tabloids opposing parliamentary democracy and the degree of electoral hostility to the Weimar Republic, as expressed by votes for the KPD, NSDAP, and DNVP between 1925 and 1930. Admittedly, hostility to democracy increased elsewhere, too, in places which had never seen tabloids. But as a detailed electoral analysis of Berlin has shown, the radicalization of Berlin voters was constantly above the Reich average, and, with one exception, always surpassed that of other major cities in Germany.¹⁸⁹ Most accounts of the Berlin press have so far struggled to establish a connection between newspapers and electoral behaviour. This is a result largely of the dichotomy between the apparent strength of Ullstein’s and Mosse’s newspapers until 1932, and the diminishing electoral support for the democratic values they represented.¹⁹⁰ One historian engaging with circulation trends of Berlin newspapers has claimed there is ‘no clear interrelation between the political preferences of the readership on the one hand, and circulation developments of the various politically clearly defined papers on the other’.¹⁹¹ Of course, it would be oversimplifying the complex nature of the Berlin newspaper market, on the one hand, and the interaction between paper and reader, on the other, if one were to seek an unambiguous correlation between number of newspaper copies and votes cast at an election. But it would be wrong to conclude from these complexities that press support had no effect on electoral behaviour. One of the reasons why traditional studies have failed to find any apparent link between
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press support and electoral behaviour is the ignorance conventional studies have displayed towards mass papers. Almost all historians have so far adapted the dismissive view of mass and tabloid papers held by many contemporaries, and therefore ignored the enormous popularity of these papers in the second half of the Weimar Republic. Analyses of newspapers of the 1920s have almost always skimmed over the question of circulation, and concentrated on a sample of ‘representative’ papers, mostly elite political papers, with a total circulation of less than the Berliner Morgenpost.¹⁹² These could not really have much of a mass impact—for that, one must look at the mass papers. When one includes the mass papers in an analysis of the voting behaviour of Berliners between 1924 and 1930, there are numerous indications of the crucial role of the mass print media in Berlin’s political culture. One case in point is the performance of the KPD in Berlin. In the Reichstag elections of May 1928, the Communists received 10.6 per cent of all votes cast in the Reich, an increase of 1.6 per cent in real figures, or a growth of nearly 18 per cent over its result in December 1924.¹⁹³ Winkler names the greater mobilization of core voters as one reason for the success of the KPD.¹⁹⁴ This factor, however, does not suffice to explain the phenomenal success of the KPD in Berlin. Here the Communists increased their share of the votes by over 50 per cent, almost triple the average growth in the Reich. This radicalization was not simply driven by the economic or social composition of the electorate: in Braunschweig, the constituency with the highest share of workers, the KPD even lost votes in 1928.¹⁹⁵ There is good reason to believe that the performance of the KPD in Berlin was boosted by the successful Welt am Abend, which helped to mobilize voters: driven by this tabloid, the market share of the Communist press in Berlin had more than quadrupled, from 2.3 per cent in 1925 to 9.6 per cent in 1928. The success of the M¨unzenberg papers in Berlin helps to explain the lack of success of the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, as well as the relative lack of electoral success of the SPD in Berlin. Admittedly, the results of the SPD in Berlin were better than the SPD average in the Reich, but that was mainly due to the social composition of the Berlin electorate with its high share of working-class voters. In February 1928, prior to the Reichstag elections in May, the SPD tried to improve its popular appeal by launching its own tabloid, which they did by transforming the evening edition of Vorw¨arts into the tabloid-style Abend. However, the Abend did not become a real tabloid separate from the party organ, but remained the evening edition of Vorw¨arts, just with more illustrations, which readers received as part of their Vorw¨arts-subscription. The market share of the Social Democratic press decreased between 1925 and 1928 from about 5 per cent to 3.7 per cent, and this relative lack of success is mirrored by the Social Democratic electoral performance. While on Reich average the SPD increased its share of votes from 26 per cent to 29.8 per cent, a relative increase of 14.6 per cent, the Berlin SPD grew by only 8.6 per cent.
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Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic
For the DNVP, too, press support proved important in garnering electoral votes in Berlin. Although not every Hugenberg paper that was sold translated into a vote cast for the DNVP, the strength of the Scherl press concern in Berlin helped to slow down the general decline of the deutschnational party. Throughout this period, the DNVP in Berlin outperformed the average Reich results. At the Reichstag elections in May 1928, for example, the DNVP was punished by the electorate, like all other government parties, for its participation in government.¹⁹⁶ In Berlin, however, the DNVP lost only 26 per cent of the share it had gained in December 1924, as opposed to 31 per cent on average in the Reich. Two years later, the difference was much more remarkable: in the Reich the DNVP literally collapsed, from 14.2 per cent in 1928 to 7 per cent at the September 1930 Reichstag elections, a loss of over 50 per cent. In Berlin, however, Hugenberg’s party managed to retain 73 per cent of its 1928 result. It is in between these two Reichstag elections that the Nachtausgabe doubled in circulation, from 100,000 copies in May 1928 to 210,000 in April 1930, rallying to the DNVP’s support.¹⁹⁷ Without Hugenberg’s papers, the DNVP would probably have fared much worse in Berlin. But this was probably little consolation to Hugenberg: already by May 1928, more Hugenberg papers were bought each day than votes cast for the DNVP at the Reichstag election. In September 1930, total circulation of the three Hugenberg papers stood at around 485,000, while only 352,000 Berliners voted for the DNVP: either Hugenberg’s political message was wasted on some of his readers or they interpreted it more freely than the press magnate had intended. Still, there is some strong evidence that Hugenberg’s papers had a decisive electoral impact. Prior to the electoral defeat in May 1928, Hugenberg had not been able not position his papers against a political system in which his own party formed part of the government. After becoming chairman of the DNVP in autumn 1928, he steered the party back on to a course of fundamental opposition to democracy, a message his papers relentlessly proclaimed over the next years. Some figures indicate that the electorate took up the message, but at election times chose from a variety of anti-system parties. This is where the Nazis come in. The NSDAP achieved its first significant breakthrough at the city council elections in 1929 in those city districts with a population composed predominantly of the lower middle-classes and better-off workers; in 1930 its growth rates were greatest in workers’ districts.¹⁹⁸ These were the most important target groups for tabloids, too, not least of Goebbels’s Angriff. There is good reason to believe that the combined onslaught of anti-democratic newspapers convinced Berliners to vote for either of the two nationalist anti-democratic parties. In 1928, the combined total of Hugenberg’s three titles, plus the two explicitly DNVP papers, the Kreuz-Zeitung and the Deutsche Zeitung, plus Goebbels’s Angriff, stood at around 480,000 copies daily, while the NSDAP and the DNVP received a total of 478,000 votes in Berlin at the Reichstag election
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in May. At the time of the city council election in November 1929, when NSDAP and DNVP garnered almost 537,000 votes, the combined total of the same papers had reached 540,000. With Stresemann’s death in October 1929 an increasing number of bourgeois–nationalist papers joined the chorus of anti-democratic voices, like the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the Deutsche Tageszeitung, and the Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung, which led to a total circulation of over 660,000 rightist anti-system copies in 1930, and 748,000 votes for DNVP and NSDAP at the Reichstag election in September 1930. Not least due to Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe, Goebbels’s Angriff did not become the commercial success Amann had jealously expected in November 1929.¹⁹⁹ But there is some evidence that supports contemporaries’ conviction that the NSDAP was reaping the fruits of Hugenberg’s labours at election times. But how does one explain the apparent might of the liberal Mosse and Ullstein houses and the abject decline in political fortunes of the DDP which they supported? Partly it was a consequence of the rather vague political message of Ullstein’s mass papers. Although generally well disposed towards the leftliberal DDP, Ullstein’s most popular newspaper, the Berliner Morgenpost, was not very explicit in its support. According to one Ullstein editor, the paper was ‘slightly coloured pink’ (the colour associated with the DDP), but in most respects ‘the political guideline was simply: consumer’s viewpoint’.²⁰⁰ Ullstein’s strength was the provision of relatively balanced news, light reading, and lots of entertainment. Apart from Vossische Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt, and Berliner Volks-Zeitung, for most of this period Ullstein’s and Mosse’s mass papers avoided overtly partisan policies and championed a left-of-centre tendency to appeal to a mass readership from various political backgrounds. Many of the leading Berliner Morgenpost editors were, in fact, members of the SPD but without the propagandistic zeal of their counterparts at Vorw¨arts. This policy of moderation was commercially successful but politically fateful: as the Communists’ readers’ survey shows, workers would read Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost or Mosse’s Berliner Volkszeitung and then still vote for the KPD, or the SPD, as did many workers’ wives, for whom the KPD held less appeal.²⁰¹ The overlap between democratic, socialist, and Communist readers and voters becomes apparent when adding up Ullstein’s, Mosse’s, and the Communist papers for 1928 and 1930, and comparing them to votes cast for the DDP/Staatspartei, the SPD, and the KPD: 1.65 million copies in 1928 and 1.9 million in 1930 contained the electoral potential of 1.6 million voters in 1928 and 1930. Even if this is just a very rough approximation of reader movements and electoral behaviour, the figures suggest that the effects of some vague, prodemocratic writing were less distinct than the consonance caused by a barrage of overtly negative political coverage denigrating parliamentary democracy. This conclusion relies so far on numeric evidence, but it concurs with numerous findings in the area of media studies which have emphasized the greater impact of negative news on media consumers.²⁰² The fact that we have a correlating
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development of anti-democratic mass papers and increasing hostility to the parliamentary system shows there is some significant interaction between mass media and political sentiment in the population, a point already hypothetically made by those historians engaging in Weimar election analyses.²⁰³ Of course, one cannot simply go from correlation to causation. But the evidence, once one considers the full ecology of the Berlin press, is suggestive of a far stronger connection between mass papers’ political message and electoral behaviour than has hitherto been realized. C O N C LU S I O N Accelerating modernization and increasing politicization were the two defining characteristics of the German press—and specifically the Berlin press—during the existence of the Weimar Republic. The 1920s ‘information’ society in Berlin was characterized, on the one hand, by an unprecedented wealth of newspaper formats and content, and, on the other, by the existence of different, sometimes overlapping (reading) publics, partly formed by milieu and political affiliation, partly by which newspapers the consumer decided to buy. The fact that the rise of mass and tabloid papers did not result in a depolicization of content was caused by the Weltanschauungs-basis of German journalism. Editors of SPD, KPD, or NSDAP newspapers were primarily political agitators. Their bourgeois counterparts conceived of themselves as political actors, too. Often, they were also submitted to not very subtle pressures from their publishers: in 1927, a survey of employment contracts of editors throughout Germany showed that about half of these contracts stipulated the political line which they were meant to be toeing.²⁰⁴ In particular the high-profile political papers in Berlin were seen as instruments in the political struggle rather than serving as media for information. Because of the strongly politicized nature of German newspapers and the subsequent fragmentation of news networks, contemporaries often had to read more than one paper if they were interested in a broader view of daily issues.²⁰⁵ At the same time, the trend towards a mass public put fundamental strains on the traditional concept of political newspapers. Only those papers which were part of big publishing houses with sufficient resources and an elaborate retail system stood a chance of surviving. Many political papers lacked this support and were becoming the victims of the rise of the consumer society: smaller papers, like the ultra-conservative Kreuz-Zeitung, or even the main Social Democratic paper, Vorw¨arts, lacked resources, especially personnel. Thus, the mixture of limited human resources and the partisan spirit firing the majority of political journalists in this period resulted in a distinctly aggressive press, where editors often relied on syndicated texts or other journalists’ writings which they then spiced up with headlines, introductions, and comments. However, in an
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increasingly competitive environment, dry, moralizing politics just did not sell. Most political papers were caught in a vicious circle: with a low circulation they could not attract enough advertisers and thus could not introduce lower cover prices, with which they could have increased circulation to make advertisements more attractive. Moreover, because political papers mostly ignored local news and were, therefore, lacking in appeal to the local community, small local businesses refrained from placing advertisements in them. The lack of a sound financial basis meant that political papers were mostly unable to compete with the big papers. They could not afford modern printing technology and thus could not exploit some of the most important copy-selling features of the 1920s—pictures and photographs—on any significant scale. Most importantly, their focus on politics prevented them from embracing the provision of entertainment as a crucial element in newspaper publishing. Already limited in their reach, political newspapers mostly declined in circulation and were becoming significant financial liabilities to their proprietors. The alternative to old-fashioned political papers in Berlin were mass tabloids. Their growth in the second half of the 1920s was the most significant innovation within the German press in this period. The sensationalist presentation and the packaging of news with entertainment were exceedingly popular. The emphasis moved away from politics, but tabloids were not unpolitical. On the contrary, they sold politics in a distinctly modern style: in smaller, more concise, portions, illustrated, and populist. The modern format did not preclude radically partisan political coverage, as Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe, M¨unzenberg’s Welt am Abend, and Goebbels’s Angriff all demonstrated. But most political decision-makers were slow to discover the public impact of these papers, and therefore tended to focus their attention on the elite political press. This attitude was most markedly reflected in the utilitarian approach to these more traditional papers: throughout this period, parties, pressure groups, and governments all considered control over at least some newspapers as important for pursuing their interests. Ironically, the only papers such groups could afford to acquire were the lossmaking, old-fashioned, and increasingly unpopular elite political papers, which they themselves read. The fate of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was a manifestation of this belief in the political power of the classical press: Stinnes purchased it in 1920 to secure industrialist influence; after his death it was secretly bought up by the Prussian government in 1925; less than a year later it was taken over by the Reich government on Stresemann’s initiative, before being sold again when the affair came to light. None of the owners achieved any noticeable advantage in approaching political aims through the support of the DAZ ; in the case of Stinnes it quite often worked as an impediment.²⁰⁶ The DAZ is thus not only a prime example for the utilitarian approach of contemporaries to the press, but also for the mismatch between the contemporary perception of the power of the press and the limited direct influence newspapers actually wielded. In the
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case of the reactionary Kreuz-Zeitung, the perceived importance of the paper as expressed in the continuous reactions to it—especially by Vorw¨arts —stood in stark contrast to both its actual circulation figures and the little headway made in this period by the politics it championed. In a similar vein, political opponents of the Communists tended to overestimate the Rote Fahne as an influence on Communist workers. The question of the political significance of Berlin’s newspapers has many facets. Most contemporaries underestimated the political impact that mass papers had, while overestimating traditional political papers. The Welt am Abend boosted KPD support, and the DNVP was one of the parties benefiting from the anti-parliamentary stance of the Nachtausgabe and the Berliner LokalAnzeiger. The absence of a Social Democratic mass tabloid proved an important electoral disadvantage to the SPD in Berlin: Social Democrats generally failed to augment their appeal to younger voters.²⁰⁷ The correlating development of anti-democratic mass papers and increasing hostility to the parliamentary system contradicts those historians who claim there was no clear interrelation between circulation developments and political preferences of the readership.²⁰⁸ But, then, the electoral impact of newspapers is only one facet of the political influence of the press in this period. As will become clear in the following chapters, a newspaper did not need to have a large circulation to have a political impact: the agenda-setting role of newspapers like the Kreuz-Zeitung could have significant repercussions for the political climate in the Weimar Republic. Media coverage of individual politicians, and the publicity that came with it—whether negative or positive—decisively influenced individuals’ room for political manœuvre.
2 Media Personalities, 1918–24 The German believes what his paper tells him. Men to whom much space is devoted are to him great men. Georg Bernhard, ‘The German Press’, in Der Verlag Ullstein zum Welt-Reklame-Kongress 1929 (Berlin, 1929), 59.
On 9 November 1918, Reich Chancellor Prince Max von Baden decided to force events and, without consulting Wilhelm II, announced that the Kaiser had abdicated. Fifteen minutes later, newsboys of the Ullstein publishing house roamed the streets of Berlin, selling copies of BZ am Mittag announcing the sensational news. It was a scoop in which the publishers were to take pride for decades to come.¹ But not only did the abdication of Wilhelm II strip the German media of their most popular political celebrity, it also changed decisively the nature of the relationship between press and politics in Germany.² The demise of constitutional monarchy meant that there was no longer a universally acknowledged authority, a grand narrative of legitimate power, within which journalists could position their articles. Of course, the oppositional press in the Wilhelmine era had played an increasingly important role in critizing various aspects of the political system, at the level of Reich government as well as in the locality.³ But even in the most extreme cases, and despite the occasional abundance of vituperative polemics, politicians and journalists hardly ever questioned the overall legitimacy of constitutional monarchy. As is well known, even the Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert, who later became the first president of the Weimar Republic, tried until the early days of November 1918 to safeguard the monarchy as an element of political order and authority.⁴ Despite all the continuities between the Wilhelmine period and the Weimar Republic which historians have rightly emphasized in the past, in one respect the revolution of 1918 signified a crucial break: there existed no longer a consensus on what constituted legitimate power. The resulting struggle for interpretive predominance was to plague the young democracy throughout its existence. It was a struggle in which the German press played a key role. Journalists promoted a wide range of particularist readings of parliamentary democracy through the articles which they produced and through the selection of news which they relayed to their readers. And what these readers
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encountered was often not likely to endear democracy to them. But Weimar democracy did not just have a bad press, reflecting the partisan nature of German politics. Right from the beginning of the Weimar Republic, partisan press coverage itself influenced the course of political events and determined the nature of German politics. This was nowhere more obvious than in the case of certain political personalities. As newspapers constituted the only source of information about politics for the vast majority of Germans at this time, the press was able to create public images of politicians that were primarily a product of any given paper’s Weltanschauung, their politial agenda. This in turn constrained—or enlarged—the range of political options open to decision-makers. The following chapter tells the story of the revolutionary establishment of the new democracy through the media, by investigating the right-wing hate-campaign against one prominent member of the new regime, Matthias Erzberger, and the rise to stardom of a political fringe figure, Adolf Hitler. T H E PE R S O N I F I C AT I O N O F D E F E AT In early November 1918, the imperial cabinet under Prince Max von Baden appointed the Catholic Centre politician Matthias Erzberger to travel to France to negotiate an armistice deal with the Allies. It was clear that this was going to be a thankless task. While revolution was breaking out in Germany, Erzberger tried in vain to secure any significant improvements in Entente conditions. On 11 November, after three days of frustrating talks with the French commanderin-chief, Marshal Foch, Erzberger signed the armistice. After more than four years of bitter fighting, the guns finally fell silent on the Western Front. One might imagine that this would have been a big media event. Instead, in the tradition of nineteenth-century-style secret diplomacy and military censorship, the signing took place in a railway carriage in the middle of the isolated forest of Compi`egne, some eighty kilometres north of Paris.⁵ In Germany, the signing of the armistice received relatively little attention in the general excitement of the emperor’s abdication, the declaration of the republic, and the turmoil of political revolution. Press reports on the signing were short and factual, rarely mentioned Erzberger, and mostly focused on the harsh armistice terms imposed by the Entente powers. Even in right-wing newspapers there was no indication that Erzberger would soon be pilloried as the man responsible for Germany’s misery.⁶ In December 1918, during the negotiations about the first prolongation of the armistice, journalists emphasized their indignation about the very severe armistice terms, but did not blame Erzberger personally.⁷ It was only in mid-January 1919, after Erzberger had negotiated the second prolongation of the armistice resulting in even harsher terms, that the nature of newspaper coverage changed completely, particularly in the right-wing press. Headlines now proclaimed the
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‘rape of Germany’.⁸ Allied demands were labelled ‘unjust’, ‘humiliating’, and ‘degrading’, and Erzberger was heavily criticized for accepting them.⁹ According to many nationalist journalists, a more forceful negotiator could have achieved much more. ‘Why not say no!’ ran one headline, summing up the criticism.¹⁰ Within days, Erzberger was widely perceived to have betrayed vital German interests. In a rally conducted by patriotic associations in Berlin in late January 1919, one speaker’s attack on Entente demands for extradition of German ‘war heroes’ met with stormy cries of ‘Down with Erzberger!’¹¹ This sudden concentration of right-wing criticism on Erzberger had several reasons. Prior to mid-January 1919, the hate figures of the national right were the Communist leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Their revolutionary radicalism terrified the German bourgeoisie.¹² On the pages of the conservative press, and in the eyes of many nationalists, the Spartacus uprising in Berlin in early January 1919 seemed to prove the very real threat of a Russian-style revolution ending in total anarchy. The press singled out Liebknecht and Luxemburg as the chief agitators in this process. In fact, the uprising had been the result of grass-roots activism surprising an unprepared KPD leadership, which struggled in vain throughout the crisis to regain control of developments.¹³ But through the personalization in the press, the perceived threat emanating from the KPD was concentrated in the figures of the two Communist leaders. Hence, when the Social Democratic government called in right-wing army troops to quell the uprising, nationalist officers did not hesitate to arrest and then shoot Luxemburg and Liebknecht.¹⁴ The sensational news of their murder caught the attention of all newspaper readers.¹⁵ According to one editor, the streets of Berlin saw scenes of joyful excitement. The public preoccupation with this news was such that no one seemed to care about the aggravation of the armistice conditions.¹⁶ With the deaths of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, the way was now clear for nationalist editors to focus on an old opponent. During the war, Erzberger had been the driving force behind the Reichstag’s peace resolution of July 1917, and as such he had been vilified by the annexionists, who accused him of breaking the German will to victory.¹⁷ At the head of the assailants then stood the chief editor of the nationalist T¨agliche Rundschau, Friedrich Hussong, who published a pamphlet in September 1917 in which he embellished an acount of Erzberger’s transformation from former annexationist to father of the peace resolution, with accusations that he was a British and Vatican agent, a draft dodger, and a war profiteer.¹⁸ All this became suddenly relevant again because of the general elections to the National Assembly, held on 19 January 1919. The Social Democrats gained 35 per cent of the vote, which meant that they needed to enter a coalition government with two bourgeois parties, the Liberal Democrats and the Catholic Centre party.¹⁹ This combination of forces was identical to that which had seen through the peace resolution in July 1917. The architect of the peace resolution, Erzberger, was now a key figure
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within the new governing coalition, and described as ‘the bond between Centre and Social Democrats’.²⁰ According to the Centre party organ, Germania, the proliferation of right-wing attacks on Erzberger in 1919 had one objective: to discredit the Centre party and thus to lure conservative Catholics into the nationalist fold.²¹ But there was more to the right-wing attacks on Erzberger than just party political strategy. At the heart of the campaign was the issue of responsibility for the German defeat, and the legitimation of the post-revolutionary political system. In November 1918, even die-hard monarchists had little choice but to accept the new situation.²² Within weeks, however, the nationalist Right came to identify the revolution as the decisive factor in weakening Germany’s position towards its enemies. Military collapse, they argued, would not have occurred without domestic forces undermining German fighting morale. Rightwing newspapers played a crucial role in the construction of this argument. They provided a first draft of history, an attractive narrative of military heroism, supported by an eclectic range of detailed evidence. The image of an undefeated military front ‘stabbed in the back’ by civilian forces—allegedly the statement of a British general—was a journalistic invention first published in Germany in mid-December 1918 by the nationalist Deutsche Tageszeitung.²³ One year later, this right-wing press narrative served as blueprint for Hindenburg’s infamous statement about the alleged backstab to the National Assembly’s investigation committee researching the causes of the German defeat.²⁴ By early February 1919, press criticism of Erzberger’s armistice negotiations concentrated on the fact that he had agreed to specific Entente conditions—like the handing over of the German merchant fleet—without consulting relevant experts. Even left-wing democratic observers became increasingly sceptical about Erzberger’s suitability as Germany’s chief negotiator.²⁵ Flagships of the liberal press, like the Frankfurter Zeitung and Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung, declared him unfit for the task.²⁶ In the debate on the armistice conditions in the National Assembly in Weimar in mid-February, the spokesman of the German Nationalist Party referred explicitly to these press attacks to strengthen his own case against Erzberger.²⁷ Erzberger responded by launching a counter-attack: German steel industrialists had allegedly refused to provide expert advice as long as Erzberger was banning the industrialist Hugo Stinnes from the German delegation. Many left-wing and liberal commentators were shocked by this industrialist attempt at blackmailing the government, and described Erzberger’s speech as a decisive blow to the nationalist Right.²⁸ Over the following days, however, it turned out that Erzberger had misrepresented the situation. Readers of Social Democratic or liberal newspapers learned about this only if they perused the small print of the daily protocols of the National Assembly meetings.²⁹ In right-wing newspapers, on the other hand, articles accusing Erzberger of lying to the Assembly abounded.³⁰ Reactionary newspapers delighted in reprinting an open letter to Erzberger by a conservative Catholic priest, who stated that ‘the better
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part of the German people would welcome the day when you vanish from the political stage’.³¹ By spring 1919, this kind of press attack had turned Erzberger into Germany’s most controversial politician. Outward appearance played a role, too. ‘Many people confess an unconquerable aversion to the physical figure of [Erzberger], although they cannot give reasons for their aversion’, one journalist noted in early March 1919.³² As a small, chubby man with a very full, round face, always good-humoured and smiling, Erzberger was the least likely representative of a nation suffering the consequences of food shortages due to the Allied blockade.³³ Erzberger always ‘looks like someone who has just had a good meal and is now giving [the waiter] a tip’, Harry Graf Kessler noted in his diaries.³⁴ Although photos were still limited to the weekly illustrated supplements which only occasionally showed politicians, Erzberger’s features were well known to Germans by a multitude of caricatures in satirical magazines and supplements. Erzberger’s round, smiling face made him an easy target.³⁵ Like all German politics, right-wing antagonism against Erzberger was further radicalized by the actual peace treaty hammered out at Versailles. The severity of the peace terms received in May 1919 shocked politicians and journalists in equal measures. In Weimar, Germany’s prime minister, the Social Democrat Scheidemann expressed an almost unanimous sentiment when declaring the terms ‘unacceptable’.³⁶ Erzberger, however, did not flinch from his pragmatic line, insisting that outright refusal was a recipe for disaster. Within the Reich cabinet and in his own party, Erzberger was the driving force arguing for a constructive approach towards the Allies.³⁷ None of his activities found their way into the German press in any detail. However, the fact that Erzberger was somehow working against foreign minister Brockdorff-Rantzau, an ardent opponent of the Allied proposal, soon became public knowledge, not least through news on French press reports describing Erzberger as the German politician most willing to sign the peace treaty.³⁸ Even liberal commentators accused him of breaking up the unified ranks against the peace stipulations. ‘Every time over these last weeks after having explained to an Entente envoy that the German government could and would not sign unbearable terms, he would . . . mention the name Erzberger at the end of the conversation, as counterevidence’, noted Theodor Wolff, the chief editor of the liberal Berliner Tageblatt. ‘For all these gentlemen Erzberger was the dagger in the robe, the trump card which one cannot beat.’³⁹ After the resignation of the Scheidemann government on 19 June 1919, Erzberg took the initiative to form a majority coalition willing to sign the peace treaty. Within the new cabinet headed by the Social Democrat Gustav Bauer, Erzberger remained finance minister and vice-chancellor, and was widely perceived as the dominant personality: ‘Cabinet Erzberger, called Bauer’, ran one typical headline.⁴⁰ On 22 June, the National Assembly voted in favour of conditional acceptance. Press commentators from Left to Right blamed Erzberger.
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The nationalist Deutsche Tageszeitung demanded that Erzberger should sign it and that the peace be called ‘Erzberger peace’.⁴¹ Bitterness about Erzberger’s role extended far beyond right-wing circles. One Social Democratic secretary of state told Harry Graf Kessler ‘that if [Erzberger] cannot be removed by other means, he himself would go to him and beat him to death with a club; no jury court would sentence him for such a deed’.⁴² Kessler himself feared that Erzberger would share Liebknecht’s fate, adding in his diary the telling sentence: ‘But not like Liebknecht undeservedly, but self-inflicted by his baneful activity.’⁴³ Kessler’s fears nearly materialized the following day when a group of angry soldiers incited by press agitation very nearly killed Erzberger.⁴⁴ T H E P R E S S C A M PA I G N AG A I N S T E R Z B E RG E R Over the following weeks, newspaper attacks on Erzberger presented him as the personification of defeat, revolution, armistice, Versailles, and democracy. The person primarily responsible for this press campaign was Karl Helfferich, state secretary in the Treasury during the early years of the war, then interior minister and vice-chancellor until November 1917. His antagonism towards Erzberger reached back to 1905–6, when the two had clashed during a campaign against colonial mismanagement directed by Erzberger.⁴⁵ After the ratification of the Versailles peace treaty, Helfferich decided to attack his old opponent personally. As Helfferich was not a member of the National Assembly, the obvious forum for his assaults was the press. He published his articles in Germany’s most elitist newspaper, the staunchly conservative and monarchical Neue Preussische (Kreuz-)Zeitung. Helfferich’s choice of newspaper makes clear that he did not aim to reach a mass audience: the Kreuz-Zeitung, as it was called, had a low circulation of less than ten thousand copies and was predominantly read by the aristocracy, senior civil servants, East Elbian landowners, and conservative politicians. This readership did not need convincing that Erzberger was a stain on Germany’s national honour. But by publishing in one of the capital’s high-profile political papers, Helfferich was able to reach two constituencies of professional newspaper readers which he wanted to provide with argumentative ammunition: journalists and politicians. He knew his attacks would thus be carried into other newspapers and into parliament. In his first article Helfferich explained what he was setting out to do: to reconstruct the events which led to the moral collapse during the war which ‘destroyed our power of resistance, brought us the disarmament which was wrongly called ‘‘armistice’’, which ultimately led to the misery and disgrace of the ‘‘peace’’ of Versailles’.⁴⁶ According to Helfferich, the German disaster originated with the July resolution of 1917. Just when German unrestricted submarine warfare was beginning to yield results and the Entente was getting ready to enter negotiations, Erzberger’s peace initiative conveyed the impression
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of German weakness, strengthened Allied fighting morale, and undermined the German home front. On top of all this, Erzberger’s initiative had allegedly been triggered by the demoralized Austrian foreign minister, Count Czernin. ‘Herr Erzberger stooped to manage the affairs of Vienna politics against his own government’, was Helfferich’s damning conclusion.⁴⁷ Erzberger immediately responded with an article in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which he accused Helfferich of falsifying history. According to his version, the July resolution had been the final opportunity to avert catastrophe. It had been organized in full consultation with the then Reich government, and had not been initiated by Vienna.⁴⁸ Helfferich, in turn, replied in the Kreuz-Zeitung, ending his article by claiming that his intention was to prevent the fatherland from perishing from the ‘cancer Erzberger’.⁴⁹ This was a slogan eagerly picked up by other right-wing newspapers, which now started reprinting Helfferich’s attacks.⁵⁰ It was also the beginning of a press war between Helfferich and Erzberger. Over the next days and weeks, the two sides published numerous articles accusing the other of lying, misrepresenting facts, or obfuscating personal responsibility.⁵¹ Helfferich also attacked Erzberger in his speech at the first party convention of the DNVP, the German Nationalist Party in Berlin, in mid-July 1919, calling him ‘the personification of the evil spirit of the German people’.⁵² His audience responded enthusiastically; there were even voices calling for Erzberger’s hanging. The depth of the anti-Erzberger feeling at the convention was not lost on other senior DNVP politicians. The speaker after Helfferich pronounced it a disgrace to all political parties that Erzberger had so far not been ‘hunted down’ and reaped long and noisy applause for this remark.⁵³ Count Westarp brought down the house by labelling Erzberger a ‘Volksverderber’. Press reports noted ‘several minutes of boisterous applause’ and ‘stormy cries: Dog! Traitor! Scoundrel!’ Encouraged by this response, Westarp called to eliminate Erzberger from the government. Journalists turned his call ‘Away with this person!’ into the more catchy slogan ‘Away with Erzberger!’⁵⁴ Erzberger was convinced that the press attacks on him in mid-July 1919 were at least partly motivated by opposition to his tax reforms which he was presenting to the National Assembly, especially the steep, one-off tax on wealth, the so-called Reichsnotopfer. In his eyes, Helfferich’s recent accusation that he had enriched himself and was guilty of corruption was simply the attempt to discredit the minister responsible for the implementation of these tax proposals.⁵⁵ But he was aware that his personal credibility was at stake. At the end of July, he suffered a major set-back when the right-wing Hamburger Nachrichten published an account by the former German ambassador to Vienna, Wedel, of Erzberger’s trip to Vienna in 1917 which seemed to confirm Helfferich’s accusation of treason. Journalists who had been following the Helfferich–Erzberger press feud over the preceding weeks saw Wedel’s article as a decisive blow to Erzberger, and either reprinted the entire piece or quoted lengthy passages under headlines like ‘Wedel’s accusation against Erzberger’ or ‘Erzberger—the Reich vermin’.⁵⁶
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The next day, these press reports were discussed in the cabinet. They were also taken up in the National Assembly when the German Nationalist Count Graefe launched a furious attack on the revolution and on Erzberger, whom he accused of having acted as if paid by the enemy.⁵⁷ Graefe’s speech relied heavily on a whole variety of newspaper reports which he quoted as evidence for the points he was making. The speech left a great impression; even some left-wing observers considered it a ‘rhetorical success’.⁵⁸ But Erzberger managed to win the debate, not least by his sensational revelation that the Right had prevented an earlier peace by sabotaging a previously undisclosed British peace initiative in late summer 1917. The German collapse was not the result of the revolution, Erzberger proclaimed, but the outcome of the incompetence in foreign and domestic policy of the Conservatives and the Supreme Army Command.⁵⁹ The clash between Graefe and Erzberger in the National Assembly was given front-page treatment throughout the German press. It was not just the personalization of the conflict which attracted media attention. The issues under debate were the reasons for Germany’s defeat and the role of the revolution at the end of the war. But depending on the political orientation of their newspapers, readers in Berlin and in the rest of Germany were given completely different interpretations. The liberal press which had previously been highly sceptical of Erzberger now realized that right-wing attacks on his person were inextricably linked to a wholesale condemnation of the new republic.⁶⁰ They now reported on the parliamentary debate with headlines announcing ‘Erzberger’s indictment speech’ or ‘Erzberger’s victory over the German Nationalists’.⁶¹ Leftwing newspapers, too, interpreted Erzberger’s speech as an effective assault on the nationalist camp, and considered his revelations a comprehensive indictment of the old elites.⁶² This was not the view of the right-wing press. ‘Herr Erzberger and the government press declare unanimously that the revolution was the daughter of defeat, not its mother’, a right-wing commentary summarized the ideological differences.⁶³ In the Kreuz-Zeitung, Helfferich scoffed at Erzberger’s ‘revelation’ and claimed that his opponent had made up the British peace initiative in order to divert attention from the disastrous effect of his 1917 July peace resolution. In reality, the British peace initiative was nothing but the British reply to the failed papal peace initiative of August 1917.⁶⁴ Over the following days, press coverage of the debate triggered reactions from those involved in German foreign policy in 1917 which again contradicted Erzberger’s account and confirmed Helfferich’s position. Articles about Erzberger’s duplicity and lying abounded in the right-wing press, and the T¨agliche Rundschau demanded that Erzberger be put on trial before a state court.⁶⁵ The people most aware of this clash of interpretations were journalists themselves. ‘The right-wing press which consists of many papers in Berlin with few readers seeks by all means to obfuscate the devastating effect of Erzberger’s revelations’, commented the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts. ‘It clings to rehashing quotes from Graefe’s speech and thereby tries by lying to turn the assault
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on Pan Germans into a confrontation with Erzberger, the government or the revolution.’⁶⁶ The nationalist Deutsche Tageszeitung presented the opposite case by criticizing what it called a left-wing ‘deception of the people’: ‘Vorw¨arts and the majority of the left-wing press are publishing victory articles about the [recent] debate. The defeat of the ‘‘Pan Germans’’ is said to be a devastating one . . . The ‘‘people’’ will believe this, of course, because their newspapers say so, their account of parliamentary discussions is fragmentary and misleading, and in any case, only a very small part of the readership of the left-wing press is reading through and following the entire debates, or even tries to get to know the statements of oppositional parliamentarians by reading their complete accounts in other newspapers.’⁶⁷ Politicians, too, were aware of the limited readership and the biased nature of parliamentary reports reprinted in the daily press. This was one of the reasons why the Social Democrats pushed a motion through the National Assembly to have Erzberger’s speech publicized by the government in the form of millions of posters throughout Germany.⁶⁸ Right-wing politicians demanded that Graefe’s speech should be added in order to allow citizens to make up their own minds. When this failed, the DNVP placed advertisements in the provincial press proclaiming that the statements in Erzberger’s speech had been proven wrong.⁶⁹ In Berlin, the nationalist T¨agliche Rundschau advertised reprints of Graefe’s speech to counter the government initiative.⁷⁰ Helfferich, too, continued to publish articles against Erzberger. He picked up the idea of the T¨agliche Rundschau of putting Erzberger on trial, by declaring that he considered him guilty of high treason. He announced that through his personal attacks he was hoping to trigger a court case by which Erzberger would be forced to give evidence under oath.⁷¹ Encouraged by the press resonance, Helfferich repeated his intention of bringing Erzberger to trial in various articles in early August 1919, and he challenged the government to take legal actions against his claim that Erzberger was a typical example of the new political-parliamentary corruption.⁷² This challenge was widely reported throughout the German press. Helfferich increased the pressure by having his entire article series collected in a brochure entitled Fort mit Erzberger!, ‘Away with Erzberger!’ It was published by Hugenberg’s Scherl publishing house, in a series which provided a right-wing view of the end of the war, the home front, and the revolution.⁷³ Helfferich sent the brochure to Reich President Ebert, accompanied by an open letter published by many newspapers in which he explained that he thereby wanted to force legal action against himself.⁷⁴ The cabinet now decided to react and opened criminal procedures. News of this decision was greeted in the Kreuz-Zeitung with the headline ‘Finally’.⁷⁵ It is impossible to establish just how closely the average German newspaper reader followed events around the Erzberger controversy. There can be no doubt, however, that anyone taking the slightest interest in politics at this time was aware of the conflict. Many caricatures visualized Erzberger as the villain in the story. In early August 1919, Kladderadatsch showed the finance minister
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Fig. 2.1. The right-wing satirical magazine Kladderadatsch was at the forefront of the press campaign against Erzberger. In 31, 3 August 1919 it presented him as the person who had encaged the German eagle, with the caption ‘Mr. Erzberg`ere’ labelling him as the representative of Anglo-French interests.
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smiling and rubbing his hands, standing next to a cage with the Reich eagle in chains, under the heading ‘Mr. Erzberg`ere.’⁷⁶ Many nationalist journalists now followed Helfferich’s example and published anti-Erzberger brochures, reworking material from their own newspaper clipping collections.⁷⁷ Liberal and left-wing newspapers spoke of a ‘witch hunt’ against Erzberger initiated by right-wing parties and newspapers.⁷⁸ Reports of political rallies in right-wing newspapers provide an idea of the extent to which Erzberger had become an easy target for oppositional orators throughout Germany.⁷⁹ When Helfferich gave a speech at a DNVP rally in Paderborn later that month, attendance was such that hundreds of people were unable to find seats.⁸⁰ In Upper Bavaria, the T¨agliche Rundschau enthusiastically reported to its readers, a mock ‘people’s court’ had sentenced Erzberger to death for high treason and burned his effigy at a giant stake.⁸¹ E R Z B E RG E R O N T R I A L Wherever an anti-Erzberger report appeared anywhere in the far-flung reaches of the German press, nationalist journalists could be relied upon to reprint it in their own papers.⁸² By summer 1919, this right-wing focus on Erzberger had succeeded in constructing a scapegoat responsible for all major national ills. Erzberger was the negative symbol of integration for an imagined community of nationalist newspaper readers convinced that defeat in war had not been inevitable. Long before Hindenburg made his appearance in the parliamentary investigation committee in November 1919, the right-wing press had worked out a detailed and not implausible history of the ‘stab in the back’. Hindenburg’s statement mainly helped to coin and popularize a catchy right-wing slogan to sell this storyline to a mass audience. It also heightened expectations regarding Erzberger’s libel action against Helfferich. After the furious debate caused by Hindenburg’s pronouncement, it was widely expected that the court case would finally establish the validity of the ‘stab-in-the back’ argument by investigating the moral credibility of Erzberger. Indeed, when the court convened in January 1920, the popular view was that it was not Helfferich but Erzberger who was on trial, a view which right-wing newspapers tried to encourage through their choice of headlines.⁸³ Helfferich’s strategy further reinforced this view: in the first session he declared he would deliver proof of the truth for the accusations that he made in his brochure Fort mit Erzberger! which allowed him to take an active and aggressive role throughout the trial. His first speech at the trial was published as a pamphlet by the DNVP and distributed to the press in advance.⁸⁴ Throughout the trial Helfferich briefed nationalist journalists prior to the individual sessions, to make sure his main points would receive maximum press attention.⁸⁵ Court reporting on the Erzberger–Helfferich trial dominated press coverage of domestic politics from mid-January to mid-March 1920, until the pronouncement of the judgement. To some extent, this media preoccupation was
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the result of a long press tradition which had taken shape over the course of the nineteenth century. At a time of limited parliamentary representation, law courts had emerged as one of the main constituents of the public sphere. Also, the drama, conflict, and human-interest potential inherent in crime and legal retribution had turned police news and court reporting into one of the major selling points of the emerging mass press.⁸⁶ Although it is impossible in the case of the Erzberger–Helfferich trial to ascertain how many readers perused the many columns of trial proceedings, general interest seems to have been great. Court sessions were public, and both auditorium and gallery were regularly ‘very crowded’, as the Kreuz-Zeitung noted.⁸⁷ There was no doubt that the sessions had a significant entertainment value. Already in the first few days, Helfferich presented numerous witnesses who testified on Erzberger’s rapid conversion in 1917 from enthusiastic annexationist as a member of the Thyssen supervisory board, to ardent opponent of the annexationist Pan Germans once he had left Thyssen’s service. More compromising still, Helfferich presented evidence that in July 1917, when Erzberger had initiated the anti-annexationist peace resolution, he was at the same time organizing—still an employee of Thyssen—a press campaign calling for the annexation of the Belgian iron ore basin of LongwyBriey. At first glance, Helfferich’s argument that some of Erzberger’s activities were directly linked to his own financial interests appeared plausible, especially to those who were eager to have their prejudice confirmed that Erzberger was, indeed, corrupt.⁸⁸ At the end of the fourth day of hearings, one of the spectators went up to Erzberger’s car and shot him twice. Erzberger was lucky to survive: one bullet was deflected by his golden watch chain, the other only wounded his right shoulder. The assassin, Oltwig von Hirschfeld, was a 20-year-old demobilized officer candidate, a subscriber of Hugenberg’s right-wing Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, and an avid newspaper-reader.⁸⁹ In a first reaction, the Reich government declared that the bloody deed would have been impossible ‘without the senseless and irresponsible baiting which has been carried out against the Reich Finance Minister over the last months and especially these last days.’⁹⁰ Catholic, left-wing, and liberal newspapers were equally quick to accuse the right-wing press of having incited to murder.⁹¹ They had no trouble quoting from a multitude of articles from Deutsche Zeitung, Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, T¨agliche Rundschau, Deutsche Tageszeitung, and Post —incidentally all Berlinbased papers—to provide evidence for the ‘Erzberger baiting’ that had prepared the ground for the assassination attempt.⁹² Unsurprisingly, most nationalist journalists rejected the charge and pointed out that the Right had a great interest in keeping Erzberger alive so that he would have to live through the entire trial.⁹³ The Kreuz-Zeitung was the only major paper to admit that without the right-wing press campaign against Erzberger the crime would probably not have happened.⁹⁴ Commentaries in the provincial press were often more straightforward. ‘Among many who hate this man with a passion, news of the
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assassination attempt on Erzberger will have triggered if not a happy, than at least a hopeful interest: is he dead?’, wrote the Arnswalder Anzeiger, a nationalist district paper in Pommerania. ‘And an expression of . . . undisguised disappointment will have appeared on many faces upon the report that apparently the injury is only slight and there is no fear for the life of the Minister.’⁹⁵ This was an accurate observation. In his diaries, the linguist Victor Klemperer noted an encounter with a young female student who was enthusiastic about the attempt on Erzberger’s life. She only regretted the fact that he had survived.⁹⁶ The trial of Hirschfeld highlighted the extent to which right-wing press publications had motivated the young assassin. Erzberger had been working against the welfare of the people, Hirschfeld declared, he had participated in stabbing the German Front in the back, and he was corrupt. When asked by the judge about his sources for these claims Hirschfeld referred to newspapers and Helfferich’s brochure, Fort mit Erzberger!⁹⁷ He was not the only one whose negative image of Erzberger had been shaped by the press. His mother testified that the family had received numerous letters praising her son for his deed.⁹⁸ Hirschfeld eventually received a light sentence, eighteen months in prison, because the jury believed his claim that he had only wanted to injure Erzberger to force him to lay down his political offices. The outcome of the Hirschfeld trial in late February 1920 was overshadowed by a new anti-Erzberger initiative. An editor of the right-wing Deutsche Zeitung had somehow obtained copies of Erzberger’s tax file, which he tried to publish as a brochure. When the police intervened and confiscated the manuscript prior to publication, he passed on the material to the right-wing Hamburger Nachrichten. That paper was then able to publish extracts from Erzberger’s private tax declaration which it contrasted with information about his income which had come to light during the Helfferich trial. At first glance, there seemed little doubt that the Reich finance minister had been evading income tax for several years.⁹⁹ Many other right-wing newspapers, both in Berlin and in the provinces, had been provided with advance information so that they were able to quote extensively from the Hamburg article in their Sunday editions.¹⁰⁰ It was a thoroughly planned press attack meant to bolster Helfferich’s position in the ongoing libel trial. It caused a major sensation: Erzberger, who had preached the strictest tax morals ever since he had become finance minister, was apparently exposed as a fraud and a hypocrite. Two days later, Erzberger took the only possible action left to him: he asked Reich President Ebert for leave from his office as finance minister, and at the same time demanded a comprehensive investigation of his personal tax affairs.¹⁰¹ In early March 1920, the Helfferich trial ended with a resounding defeat for Erzberger. Although Helfferich was found guilty in some minor cases of formal slander and sentenced to a fine of RM 300, the judge declared Helfferich’s attempt to provide evidence to support his accusations as largely successful. Erzberger was found responsible in a number of cases of improper acts, the incorrect fusion of
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political activities with personal financial interests, and of lying under oath. The judge summarized his view of Erzberger in a widely quoted statement: ‘[Erzberger] is a man of undoubted talent, exemplary industriousness, admirable memory, great energy and extraordinary activism, but on the other hand of deplorable lack of judgement and an almost surprising incorrectness in all things.’¹⁰² The next day Erzberger resigned from government. Not surprisingly, right-wing journalists were jubilant. Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger celebrated the ‘liberation from Erzberger’; the T¨agliche Rundschau declared on its front page that Erzberger had been sentenced to political death, but also expressed its concern that Erzberger may yet come back: ‘One cannot beat to death an Erzberger in one go.’¹⁰³ These were to prove prophetic words. In fact, Erzberger immediately set out to rehabilitate himself. He instigated proceedings against himself to counter the judge’s statement that he had lied in court. In summer 1921, the investigation was terminated with the result that the available evidence did not suffice for a trial for perjury. Similarly, a thorough examination of Erzberger’s income tax declarations concluded in August 1921 that, apart from minor mistakes owing to the complicated tax system during the war, there was no evidence for systematic tax evasion.¹⁰⁴ These findings were to be of little benefit to Erzberger. His reputation was thoroughly ruined by the press coverage of the Helfferich trial. Even the sympathetic Social Democratic Vorw¨arts noted on the day of the judgement that ‘the trial has been followed by millions of people, and they have formed their own opinion on the issues that have been brought up. . . . Public opinion concerning Erzberger after this trial is unfavourable, this much has to be openly admitted.’¹⁰⁵ The right-wing star columnist Adolf Stein exploited the prevalent anti-Erzberger sentiment by publishing the entire set of his tendentious trial reports for the T¨agliche Rundschau as a book.¹⁰⁶ Among nationalists, Erzberger was now firmly established as Germany’s bˆete noire. One Heinrich Schulz, member of a Free Corps unit during the right-wing Kapp putsch, described the mood of contempt in a statement made many years later. ‘During my membership to the Navy Brigade Ehrhardt . . . whenever I talked to a comrade we often railed against Erzberger. In our circles he was the best-hated person.’¹⁰⁷ Schulz also recalled the proliferation of anti-Erzberger information available, through the massive press coverage of the libel trial in the right-wing press and through numerous pamphlets distributed at v¨olkisch rallies in late 1920. ‘[A]fter everything that I had heard about Erzberger’, Schulz concluded, ‘I considered him a very dodgy personality, yes even a first-class enemy of the people.’¹⁰⁸ Schulz’s view was eventually to have lethal consequences for Erzberger. However, public condemnation of Erzberger was far from unanimous. Catholic newspapers, like the Centre party organ, Germania, staunchly defended Erzberger against right-wing attacks, a fact repeatedly noted and criticized by journalists on the political Right. The audacity of the press campaign against Erzberger reminded Catholic journalists of Bismarck’s anti-Catholic campaign during the
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Fig. 2.2. The fact that the Catholic Centre party organ, Germania, kept defending Erzberger even after his resounding defeat at the Helfferich libel trial attracted a great deal of right-wing polemics. In this caricature in Kladderadatsch from 7 March 1920, entitled ‘A good soul’, a Catholic nun clad in newsaper issues of Germania comforts the crying Erzberger after the beating he has received. The caption reads: ‘This child, no angel is as pure . . . ’.
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1870s and 1880s, and they instinctively closed ranks. Grass-root support in his home region, Swabia, was equally strong. In May 1920 he received an overwhelming endorsement by delegates at the Wurttembergian Centre party convention to lead the regional party into the imminent Reichstag elections.¹⁰⁹ They had no reason to regret this decision. At the elections in June 1920, the Centre party in Wurttemberg managed to improve on its 1919 performance, against the Reich trend, to achieve its best result during the years of the Weimar Republic.¹¹⁰ By contrast, in Berlin, the centre of the anti-Erzberger press campaign, every third voter who had backed the Centre party in 1919 now switched to another party.¹¹¹ Of course, this was not simply the result of the right-wing smear campaign, but part of a wider rejection of liberal and republican parties by the German middle classes in the wake of the Versailles Treaty and Ruhr uprising. But for a considerable number of voters the nationalist depiction of Erzberger, the scapegoat, was plausible enough to opt for one of the right-wing parties. C L I M AT E O F H AT E In summer 1921, when investigations declared Erzberger innocent of tax evasion and perjury, Erzberger prepared his comeback onto the political stage.¹¹² Rightwing newspapers responded immediately with new anti-Erzberger headlines.¹¹³ ‘Today, no name triggers reactions as quickly and as violently like the name Erzberger’, observed the official Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. ‘On both sides, the name Erzberger has become a fighting slogan.’¹¹⁴ Indeed, by mid-August, the struggle against Erzberger once more dominated the pages of the nationalist press. ‘So the fight against Erzberger continues’, the Deutsche Tageszeitung declared in a front-page commentary. ‘[I]t is a duty of the German people, now more than ever. Because Erzberger’s aims . . . are the undoing of Germany. They are: the surrender of Reich and Prussia to the Social Democrats and the Independent [Socialists], i.e. the eternalization of our disorganization, our weakness and disgrace . . . Killing of any national self-determination, total submission to France . . . [H]e is the enemy of the new ascent and renaissance of the entire German people.’¹¹⁵ It was this kind of press attack which was to cost Erzberger his life. One of his murderers, Heinrich Tillessen, referred to an anti-Erzberger article in the National Socialist V¨olkischer Beobachter when describing Erzberger as a ‘disgusting traitor of the fatherland’ in March 1921.¹¹⁶ Like Tillessen, the exFree Corps member, Schulz also considered Erzberger ‘the most dangereous enemy of the German people’, a view which he based on his reading of the rightwing daily press.¹¹⁷ Both Tillessen and Schulz were members of a right-wing terrorist group, the so-called ‘Organisation Consul’. ‘Beat Erzberger to death’, was the summary of another member of that group of the general sentiment within extremist circles.¹¹⁸ The order to eliminate Erzberger which Tillessen and
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Schulz received in early August 1921 was later described by them as the ‘vital spark’ which allowed them to release their pent-up anger and aggression against Erzberger.¹¹⁹ On 26 August 1921, they sought out Erzberger in a small village in the Black Forest where he was spending his holiday with his family and shot him dead.¹²⁰ The perpetrators managed to escape abroad, and the background to the murder was only solved after the Second World War. Among republicans at the time, however, there was no doubt as to the cause of the murder. The Centre party organ, Germania, described Erzberger as a victim of the right-wing press campaign: ‘Over these last years, whatever misfortune and sorry events there were for the German people, the papers of the [political] Right, [like] the Kreuzzeitung, the Deutsche Zeitung, the Deutsche Tageszeitung and whatever the names of these scandal sheets of DNVP propaganda may be, masterfully managed to associate all this with the name Erzberger.’¹²¹ The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, too, accused the two right-wing parties DVP and DNVP and their press as morally responsible. ‘Against no man in Germany has there been a more indecent and sordid campaign than against the murdered Erzberger’, the SPD organ wrote. ‘The evil trustee [of German defeat] became the scapegoat: rather than despising Ludendorff and his clique, the misled German bourgeoisie clamoured that Erzberger was ‘‘the traitor’’.’¹²² The liberal Vossische Zeitung focused its criticism on Helfferich and other right-wing journalists: ‘Whoever browses through the newspaper volumes of the last years is shocked by the extent with which energy and unscrupulousness were spent to ruin one individual person . . . Never before did anything similar happen in [the history of] the German Reich.’¹²³ And in Mosse’s Berliner Volks-Zeitung, Carl von Ossietzky described Erzberger as a ‘martyr testifying to the dreadful influence of the press, a warning to every German journalist not to abuse the power which they have in their hands’.¹²⁴ Right-wing journalists in Berlin rejected all these accusations, distanced themselves from political murder, and criticized what they considered the partypolitical exploitation of the crime.¹²⁵ Only the v¨olkisch Deutsches Tageblatt voiced sympathy for the deed under the headline ‘Mitigating circumstances’: ‘This man was a real traitor, one of those responsible for the stab in the back of 1918 and ever since . . . The state’s legal system failed in his respect. It is no excuse, but from a historical perspective it is just natural that the judge Lynch appeared on the stage.’¹²⁶ In the provinces, right-wing journalists were equally outspoken. Many editors voiced their relief that Erzberger was now unable to cause further harm. The Oletzkoer Zeitung in East Prussia, for example, stated that Erzberger had met the fate ‘which most nationalist-minded Germans wished for him’, and that he had received the punishment which he deserved as a traitor of the fatherland.¹²⁷ The anti-Semitic Volksstimme in Nuremberg was even more damning. ‘To devote a word of regret to the end of this unprincipled adventurer would constitute the basest hypocrisy . . . To be dragged on a cow hide to the place of execution, there to be branded with a red-hot iron and hanged from the
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highest gallows: that would have been the death which Erzberger deserved.’¹²⁸ These views were shared among many nationalists. Reading an extra-edition announcing Erzberger’s death, put up on a wall on Unter den Linden in Berlin, the Social Democratic Reichstag President Paul L¨obe overheard the following comments: ‘That’s it, he won’t cause further damage anymore.’ To which a woman replied: ‘That’s what ought to happen to all revolutionaries.’¹²⁹ Liberal and democratic newspapers reported of numerous similar expressions of bourgeois approval. Of course, these sentiments were far from universal. Erzberger’s murder also triggered vast articulations of republican solidarity. Throughout Germany, Social Democrats and Communists staged huge and sometimes violent demonstrations against what they saw as the first step towards a reactionary coup d’´etat.¹³⁰ Polemics against right-wing parties in the socialist press reached fever pitch and were described by the nationalist T¨agliche Rundschau as a ‘prelude to civil war’.¹³¹ Partly in response to these demonstrations and press polemics, but mainly as a reaction to the Erzberger murder, President Friedrich Ebert declared a state of emergency, and issued a decree against the ‘boundless instigation and the brutalization of the public mores’.¹³² Yet government efforts to combat anti-republican propaganda soon ran out of steam.¹³³ The state of emergency was lifted in December 1921. It was only after the assassination of the foreign minister, Walther Rathenau, in summer 1922 that a Law for the Protection of the Republic was finally passed. With this law, republicans hoped to be able to reign in the destructive power of the press. Not only did this prove to be largely unsuccessful, it also established a dangerous precedent of press censorship which was to have bitter consequences in the early 1930s. The stipulations of the Law for the Protection of the Republic regarding press publications make clear that the government was primarily worried about articles which might result in physical attacks on individual members of the cabinet. This reflected politicians’ sense of vulnerability in the face of a partisan and violently polemical press. Their solution was ultimately a return to an old instrument of state control, namely censorship. But outright press incitement to murder or to topple the current government by means of violence continued to be the exception rather than the rule. Partisan journalists had numerous ways in which politics and politicians could be framed and presented which allowed readers to draw their own, more radical, conclusions. The Law for the Protection of the Republic was unable to control the real political influence of the press, namely its agenda-setting role and the biased provision (or keeping back) of ‘news’. As a tool of press politics, the Law for the Protection of the Republic was ultimately inadequate because it underestimated the complexity of press dynamics. The press campaigns against Erzberger and later Rathenau convinced democrats that the primary task was to restrain individual journalists and editors. But excessive and violent polemics was not the main problem. Even if the
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Law for the Protection of the Republic had been in place from 1919 onwards, Erzberger would still have been turned into a negative symbol of integration for the nationalist Right. It was the collective partisan focus on certain aspects of his political activities, in a multitude of local and regional newspapers, which gave Erzberger the prominence—and the reputation—which was to cost him his life. Erzberger knew that anything he initiated as Reich finance minister would be presented by a significant part of the German press as the work of the individual allegedly responsible for the German defeat, the humiliating terms of the armistice, and the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. Erzberger’s decision to sue Helfferich for libel was an action of last resort, a desperate attempt to safeguard the bare minimum of political legitimacy needed for public office. He probably thought that a ruling in his favour would forestall the worst excesses of press polemics regarding his personality. Instead, the trial proceedings allowed his opponent Helfferich to exploit the mechanisms inherent in the media machine. The trial’s production of ‘news’, the confrontational nature of the proceedings, the apparent attempt at revealing closely guarded and controversial ‘secrets’, the in-built tension between accusations, denials, and the promise of resolution in form of the ultimate judgement—in other words, the spectacle inherent in the judicial process—guaranteed that Erzberger stayed at the centre of public scrutiny for a significant amount of time.¹³⁴ For Erzberger, the combination of right-wing press attacks and a conservative judiciary unsympathetic to the new political regime resulted in a public relations fiasco. Erzberger’s political career was destroyed, and when he managed to extricate himself from the legal implications of the trial’s outcome, and was about to re-enter Reich politics, he fell victim to the political climate created by press narratives which portrayed him as Germany’s greatest evil. R I S I N G F RO M O B S C U R I T Y Yet Erzberger’s fate should not be taken as evidence that the political significance of the press was based primarily on its potential to destroy political careers. Media prominence gained through a political trial did not necessarily have to be of a negative nature. The sudden concentration of press interest on one particular political player could equally well result in the creation of a new national appeal. Adolf Hitler is a good case in point. The press played a crucial role in transforming him into a right-wing celebrity. But not only did press coverage transform him into a leading national figure, it also changed his self-perception and ambitions. When and how did this extremist rise out of obscurity, and what was the public image constructed by the press? Ironically, Erzberger played an important part in Hitler’s very early career. Hitler joined the extremist Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (German Workers’ Party), the precursor of the
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NSDAP, in September 1919.¹³⁵ He quickly established himself as the party’s most effective orator, not least by passionate speeches against the Versailles Peace Treaty in which ‘Erzberger, the Jew’ served as the main culprit.¹³⁶ Throughout 1920 and 1921, Erzberger featured in numerous of Hitler’s speeches as ‘scoundrel’, ‘national criminal’, and ‘traitor’, always to the delight of the assembled crowd.¹³⁷ From surviving notes for his speeches, as well as police and newspaper reports, it is clear that Hitler’s attacks on Erzberger were more or less directly modelled on the right-wing press campaign.¹³⁸ After Erzberger’s murder, Hitler caused a small scandal in Munich by staging a big anti-Erzberger rally in the Hofbr¨auhaus beer hall. Posters advertising the event claimed that Hitler would talk about Erzberger with ‘appropriate reverence’; in fact, as the V¨olkischer Beobachter noted with satisfaction, Hitler spoke ‘in a drastic manner’ about Erzberger’s career, ‘his ‘‘parliamentary’’ activities, his ‘‘business sense’’, his dishonourable behaviour in Compi`egne, [and] his treason of the German people . . . ’.¹³⁹ The event attracted a large crowd, including many tourists.¹⁴⁰ At this point in time, Hitler was able to draw and entertain audiences of several thousand people in Munich. But outside Bavaria he was still completely unknown. This lack of media presence decisively shaped Hitler’s political strategy. In summer 1922, he rejected a parliamentary strategy because he realized that the National Socialists stood not the slightest prospect of success at the Reichstag elections anywhere outside Munich.¹⁴¹ Even if some National Socialists were able to make it into parliament, the lack of press coverage would render them ineffective. There was no justification for parliamentary opposition in its own right, Hitler claimed: ‘The effectiveness of critique is only given the moment when this critique is presented in the forum of the public sphere. In our case that is entirely impossible.’ It was ‘childish’ to expect the enemy press which ‘constitutes public opinion these days’ to cover National Socialist parliamentary activity: ‘After all we have experienced how in a city like Munich the entire press from left to right keeps a deadly silence about our enormous mass rallies which are unrivalled by any other party.’¹⁴² Hitler’s complaint about being ignored by journalists was not entirely justified. At least in Munich, the Social Democratic M¨unchner Post regularly commented on, and attacked, the National Socialist movement.¹⁴³ But outside Munich most Germans at this time were blissfully unaware of Hitler’s existence. In Berlin, the two bestselling newspapers, the liberal Berliner Morgenpost and the right-wing Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, contained no news of Hitler’s National Socialists throughout most of 1922. Even the Nazi propaganda highlight of 1922, the ‘German Day’ in Coburg where hundreds of SA men clashed with socialist opponents in mid-October, found no mention in Berlin’s mass papers. News of the negotiations about reparations payments, the partition of Upper Silesia, the resignations of the French government under Briand in January, and of the British prime minister, Lloyd
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George, in October, all this was of considerably greater interest to the average German newspaper reader than the activities of an extremist Bavarian splinter party. P U TS C H S TO R I E S In fact, it was through foreign political developments that the National Socialists first moved into the limelight. At the end of October 1922, Mussolini ordered 40,000 of his paramilitary followers, the so-called ‘Blackshirts’, to march on Rome. Faced with this fascist uprising, the Italian king appointed Mussolini prime minister. These events constituted front-page news and received extraordinary coverage in the German press. After their own experience of a failed right-wing coup in 1920, German editors took a keen interest in these Italian developments. For days, newspapers reported of the progress of the uprising, Mussolini’s arrival in Rome, his meeting with the king, the composition of his government, and the victory parade in early November.¹⁴⁴ The existence of a successful anti-socialist mass movement had an intrinsic news value particularly for nationalist journalists. ‘Fascism—what is it?’ opened a typical article giving background information on the novel movement in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger.¹⁴⁵ Dissatisfaction with the perceived inefficiency of parliamentary democracy in Germany was evident in the way in which the right-wing press treated the emergence of a strong leader in Italy. The Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger devoted a front-page leader to Mussolini’s first government speech, under the headline ‘Dictator and parliament’.¹⁴⁶ There was not the slightest doubt that the correspondent sympathized with Mussolini and that he considered parliamentarism an outdated political system. Hitler and his movement benefited enormously from the media interest in these Italian events. Certain parallels between fascists and National Socialists were immediately obvious even to the most cursory observer. National Socialists themselves began to recommend a fascist-style march on Berlin, and compared Hitler with Mussolini.¹⁴⁷ In Munich, an increasing number of people were now curious to experience Hitler in action. National Socialist rallies in November and December 1922 were overflowing with participants; parallel rallies had to be staged to accommodate the crowds.¹⁴⁸ This sudden popular appeal resulted in a great deal of media interest, which in turn further increased Hitler’s popularity. ‘There are a lot of people who believe him to be the German Mussolini’, noted the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger in its first front-page commentary on Hitler. ‘Even those who have never heard him [speak] get to know so much about him that he has become the subject of conversations in all classes.’¹⁴⁹ The first article about Hitler in the Ullstein tabloid BZ am Mittag made fun of his rabid anti-Semitism, but also carried the suggestive headline ‘Hitler–Mussolini’.¹⁵⁰
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Politicians now started to take Hitler serious, too. On 15 November 1922, the Prussian interior minister banned the NSDAP in Prussia.¹⁵¹ The following week, Social Democrats initiated a discussion in the Bavarian state parliament about the increasing National Socialist violence, a fact now deemed newsworthy even by Berlin’s mass papers.¹⁵² Mussolini’s coup d’´etat put Hitler on the map of German politics. But right from the beginning, his public image was very controversial. Journalistic presentation of Hitler was decisively shaped by the partisan approach to politics which prevailed in the German press. One liberal correspondent in Munich peppered his first account of the National Socialists and Hitler with terms which left no doubt as to his personal views: these ‘Fascistolini’ were a ‘bunch of thieves’ characterized by ‘cowardly violence’ and a ‘pronounced dislike of any kind of thinking’; Hitler a ‘cockalorum’ with the popularity of a ‘provincial actor whose gimmicks delight the female theatre subscribers every time anew’.¹⁵³ That same week, the right-wing Kreuz-Zeitung devoted its first front-page article to the National Socialist movement and praised Hitler’s ‘extraordinary eloquence and the intoxicating drive of his personality’, the ‘fanatical love for his fatherland, his glowing idealism, his rock-solid belief in his ideas, his ruthless spirit of the offensive against everything halfhearted and tepid, in short the peculiar mixture of apostolic and soldierly nature’.¹⁵⁴ The degree of politicization of a newspaper did not only determine the quality of coverage, but also the quantity. The bestselling Berliner Morgenpost, for example, with its emphasis on local news and entertainment, paid little attention to Hitler. In January 1923 the high drama of the French occupation of the Ruhr area dominated its political section. A Nazi mass rally in Munich at which Hitler railed against the present government and the so-called ‘November criminals’ in front of a crowd of over 10,000 was left unreported. In contrast, other Berlin papers like the liberal Berliner Tageblatt called the meeting a ‘public scandal’, and the official Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung drew its readers’ attention to it with the headline ‘Hitler’s song of hate’.¹⁵⁵ In mid-January Hitler’s increasing radicalism caused rumours in Munich that the National Socialists were preparing a putsch. The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, sensitized by the local SPD paper M¨unchener Post, devoted several articles to these rumours; as did several other left-liberal newspapers.¹⁵⁶ Readers of Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost, on the other hand, were left uninformed. Only in late January, when the Bavarian government declared a state of emergency two days before the first National Socialist Reich party rally did the threat of a Nazi coup in Munich make front-page news in this mass paper, too.¹⁵⁷ Hugenberg’s nationalist Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger also chose to ignore the putsch rumours, though primarily out of right-wing sympathy. When the National Socialists were unexpectedly given permission to hold their rallies despite the state of emergency, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger concentrated its sparse coverage on the fact that the Nazi events took place without any incidents.¹⁵⁸ Newspapers more critical towards the National Socialists devoted considerably
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more space to what they considered a scandalous turn of events, not least in view of the fact that Social Democratic demonstrations remained forbidden under the state of emergency.¹⁵⁹ This pattern of coverage remained constant throughout most of 1923. Those newspapers which had covered the putsch rumours in mid-January also reported of Nazi provocations in mid-July and the subsequent debate about a pending civil war; those who had refrained from doing so in January also ignored the news in July.¹⁶⁰ Socialist and Communist newspapers devoted most coverage to the National Socialists, always with a negative slant.¹⁶¹ In the eyes of right-wing observers, this only added to Hitler’s appeal. ‘By now, Adolf Hitler is surrounded by legends, and people who come to Munich from outside are burning to see this famous or notorious man, depending on the position of their favourite newspaper’, declared one right-wing publication in summer 1923.¹⁶² According to the anti-Semitic Deutsches Tageblatt, Hitler was ‘loved fanatically by hundreds of thousands, and passionately hated by millions’.¹⁶³ This was undoubtedly an exaggeration aimed at glorifying Hitler. In fact, most Germans, especially those reading provincial newspapers, knew very little about Hitler and probably cared even less. From February 1923, a number of articles appeared throughout the provincial press carrying headlines like ‘Who is Adolf Hitler?’, but it is rather unlikely that these stirred up any great emotions.¹⁶⁴ Seen in relation to the political context of Ruhr occupation and hyper-inflation, the occasional article on the National Socialists can hardly have left a deep impression. Only within Communist propaganda did the Nazis establish a permanent presence because from winter 1922–23 the KPD leadership began to concentrate on what it called the ‘fascist threat’.¹⁶⁵ At the end of September 1923 Hitler made front-page news briefly, again based on rumours of a pending National Socialist putsch. The Bavarian government responded by declaring a state of emergency and by appointing the monarchist Gustav von Kahr as general state commissar, turning him into the ‘Bavarian dictator’, as the Berliner Morgenpost announced in its headlines.¹⁶⁶ Press attention quickly turned away from Hitler when tensions rose between Munich and Berlin because Kahr refused to submit to the national state of emergency declared by the Reich government. Throughout October, relations between Bavaria and the Reich became increasingly hostile and seemed on the brink of an armed confrontation at the end of the month. Kahr and the commander of the Bavarian military, Lossow, actively prepared a Mussolini-style ‘march on Berlin’.¹⁶⁷ In early November, Berlin newspapers were full of reports of right-wing paramilitary troops gathering at the Bavarian–Thuringian border ready to strike under the direction of the former Free Corps commander Ehrhardt.¹⁶⁸ Despite the general awareness that a right-wing coup was in the offing, Hitler’s decision to force Kahr’s hand by launching a putsch on 8 November still came as a surprise to most observers. Over the preceding weeks, Hitler had completely receded into the background of Bavarian politics. With his action in
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the B¨urgerbr¨au beer hall in Munich, Hitler forced himself onto the front page of every German newspaper on 9 November 1923.¹⁶⁹ Later that day, special and evening editions in Berlin reported the sensational news that Kahr and Lossow, who first appeared to be part of the coup, had switched sides and were now opposing Hitler and Ludendorff.¹⁷⁰ The following day, readers learned that both Hitler and Ludendorff had been arrested and the putsch put down by the military. In their first reactions, commentators from left to right dismissed the coup as a laughable event; Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger spoke of a ‘spook’, the Berliner Tageblatt called it a ‘buffonery’, and the Berliner Volk-Zeitung described it as a ‘carnival’.¹⁷¹ The background to the coup, however, remained murky, especially the extent of collusion between Kahr and Hitler prior to the putsch. Readers in Berlin did not have a chance of finding out more because on 10 November the printers’ union went on strike, leaving the city without newspapers for one week. By the time this newsless period was over, other events competed for attention, like the currency reform, the crisis and eventual downfall of the Stresemann government, and international developments regarding the reparation issue.¹⁷² C R E AT I O N O F A M E D I A PE R S O N A L I T Y Although Hitler became known throughout Germany through his failed putsch in early November 1923, it was the extensive press coverage of his trial in February and March 1924 that turned him into a household name. Already weeks before it started, expectations among journalists were very high. They quoted the state prosecution that this was going to be ‘the greatest political trial of the post-war period’.¹⁷³ Numerous articles reported on trial preparations, security concerns, and the latest news on Kahr, whose role during the putsch was increasingly criticized especially by his former supporters, and who stepped down as general state commissar a week before the beginning of the trial. Media interest in the trial far exceeded the limited seating capacity in the courtroom, and thereby became a news item itself.¹⁷⁴ Press coverage of the opening day of the trial on 26 February 1924 significantly exceeded that of the putsch on 9 November 1923. For the next five weeks, news of the Hitler trial became the daily bread of almost all newspaper readers in Berlin. Mass papers as different in political orientation as Hugenberg’s right-wing Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger and Ullstein’s liberal Berliner Morgenpost regularly devoted front pages to the proceedings. As far as it is possible to tell, newspaper readers took a keen interest.¹⁷⁵ Historians have often accused the presiding judge of allowing Hitler to turn the courtroom into a stage for his own propaganda.¹⁷⁶ Both Hitler’s testimony on the first day of the trial and his closing speech at the trial’s end lasted for several hours, and were stuffed with derogatory comments concerning the November revolution, the Reich government, and parliamentary
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democracy more generally.¹⁷⁷ These speeches had a powerful impact on many of those present in the courtroom. Right-wing journalists enthused about Hitler’s oratory skills; the editor-in-chief of Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger witnessed ‘some unconcealed tears and some bashful blowing of noses’ after Hitler had ended.¹⁷⁸ In fact, some of Hugenberg’s journalists present later joined the National Socialist Party, especially the young artist Hans Schweitzer, who produced the Nachtausgabe’s illustrations to the trial, and who became the Nazi’s most important caricaturist.¹⁷⁹ But it would be wrong to attribute too much importance to Hitler’s rhetorical performance in court. The overwhelming majority of Germans learned about the trial from their reading of newspapers, and therefore encountered Hitler’s statements in a much abridged and significantly less impressive form. Even a nationalist newspaper like the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung which was fundamentally sympathetic to Hitler condensed his four-hour testimony into just two columns.¹⁸⁰ At the end of the trial, the Deutsche Tageszeitung did not even publish excerpts of Hitler’s closing speech, although it commented favourably on it.¹⁸¹ The real star of the trial was the ‘hero’ Ludendorff (Deutsche Tageszeitung), the ‘best loved and best hated man’ as the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger put it.¹⁸² Ludendorff’s statements at the beginning and at the end of the trial received far more coverage than did Hitler’s in most right-wing newspapers.¹⁸³ When the trial ended in early April 1924, news of Ludendorff’s acquittal always preceded comments on Hitler’s lenient sentence.¹⁸⁴ Just like in 1922 when Hitler had benefited from media interest in Mussolini, he now benefited from Ludendorff ’s star status. In an attempt to keep Ludendorff out of the line of fire, right-wing newspapers insisted on the label ‘Hitler trial’ in their newspaper coverage. Even if readers did not actually read the trial reports, Hitler’s name stared them in the face in numerous headlines throughout the five weeks of the trial. Left-wing and liberal editors mostly prefered the term ‘Hitler–Ludendorff trial’, not least in order to compromise their old wartime opponent. The unintentional consequence was that Hitler appeared on the same footing as one of the greatest heroes of the nationalist right. Reports of Ludendorff’s devotion to Hitler and his undisguised admiration of the young man’s abilities contributed further to hightening Hitler’s standing within nationalist circles.¹⁸⁵ Already during the trial critical observers commented on the extent to which Hitler was gaining in attraction. The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts even published a psychological analysis of Hitler’s appeal to the extremist Right under the ironic title ‘The German Messiah’.¹⁸⁶ The verdict of 1 April 1924 was spectacularly lenient. Ludendorff was acquitted and Hitler was sentenced to a mere five years’ imprisonment for high treason. In fact, the lay judges had only been prepared to accept a ‘guilty’ verdict on condition that Hitler received the lightest possible sentence, with the prospect of early release after six months. Already by the end of the year, Hitler was
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out of prison.¹⁸⁷ For Hitler the sentence was better even than an acquittal would have been. He was handed a martyr’s crown which he did not have to wear for very long, but which further enhanced his reputation among rightwing groups. ‘All the accused in the trial had shared a common, great idealist objective: to save Germany from her great misfortune’, the conservative KreuzZeitung commented on the judgement.¹⁸⁸ Other right-wing papers were equally approving.¹⁸⁹ Meanwhile, liberal and left-wing editors vented their frustration with the sentence. ‘Judicial bankruptcy’, ‘Leniency for high traitors’, ‘Germany’s judicial scandal’ ran the headlines in their papers.¹⁹⁰ All newspapers reported on the jubilant reception of the verdict by National Socialist supporters in Munich. Ludendorff was given an enthusiastic welcome outside the court building, and Hitler repeatedly had to show himself at a window to respond to the euphoric masses.¹⁹¹ The trial in early 1924 was the decisive boost to Hitler’s political career. Many historians have remarked on the fact that up to spring 1924 Hitler still considered himself merely to be the ‘drummer’ of the National Socialist movement, preparing the stage for a great national dictator to take charge at a later point—someone like Ludendorff.¹⁹² It was only after his trial, during his imprisonment in Landsberg, that Hitler began to conceive of himself as Germany’s future leader, the political messiah who would turn around the country’s fate eventually, a vision which he formulated over the summer of 1924 when writing his political autobiography, Mein Kampf. This transformation of Hitler’s self-conception was not just the result of his experiences in the courtroom and his enthusiastic reception by crowds in the streets of Munich. Nor was it simply the pragmatic lesson drawn from the failed putsch that he needed the greatest possible freedom from external dependencies to achieve his political aims.¹⁹³ It was the fact that the trial had turned into a national media event which dramatically changed Hitler’s perception of himself and of his political future. Reading his own name in all of the major German papers at the time undoubtedly gave him a new sense of importance and self-respect: as a political actor, he was now playing on the national stage. Some journalists at the time were aware of the psychological impact that media coverage could have. ‘If one talks about a cockalorum he will appear even greater to other people, and as a giant to himself’, one Munich correspondent justified his silence on the Nazi movement in late 1922.¹⁹⁴ In early 1924, Hitler was no longer a news item that journalists could chose to ignore. And Hitler could hardly fail to notice the impact that the extensive press coverage had on his national image. During the trial and after, he received an avalanche of letters and telegrams from all over Germany expressing support and encouragement.¹⁹⁵ The fan mail which teemed into Landsberg was visible proof of his new status as right-wing media celebrity.¹⁹⁶ The media presence of National Socialists generally, and Hitler’s name particularly, also changed the options available to the extremist movement. Two
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years previously, in summer 1922, Hitler had still ruled out a parliamentary strategy because he thought that the National Socialists would stand no chance at elections in view of the deadly silence with which they were treated in the press. Now the Nazis benefited from the amount of press coverage devoted to them through the Munich trial. Five days after the verdict, elections to the Bavarian state parliament saw landslide gains for the extremist Right. The so-called V¨olkischer Block, the electoral alliance of members of the various racist movements, not least from the banned NSDAP, received a spectacular 17 per cent of the vote, overtaking the German Nationalists and giving them as many parliamentary seats as the SPD.¹⁹⁷ In a secret report from mid-April 1924, the Reichskommissar for the supervision of internal order explained the election result as a direct outcome of the Hitler trial.¹⁹⁸ Some weeks later, at the Reichstag elections in early May, the National Socialist electoral alliance received nearly two million votes, or over 6 per cent, more than the liberal DDP. In certain regions, like in Middle Franconia, on the Baltic coast around Rostock, or in the border region of Posen-West Prussia, the Nazis even received more than 40 per cent of the popular vote.¹⁹⁹ Compared to the situation in the early 1920s, this was a spectacular achievement. Although Hitler himself was still sceptical about pursuing a parliamentary strategy, he was not reluctant to take credit for the electoral upswing.²⁰⁰ The media attention that was lavished on ‘his’ trial, the fact that his name was now universally known throughout Germany suggested to him that his personality was at the heart of the recent successes. It was an impression reinforced by the never-ending flow of visitors who were keen to meet up with the new star of the extreme Right in his Landsberg prison. In fact, popular demand to meet the now famous man eye-to-eye was such that Hitler had to issue repeated press statements asking his fans to abstain from visits unless they had received confirmation from him that he would be able to see them.²⁰¹ Press reports also told him that a v¨olkisch celebration of his birthday in the B¨urgerbr¨au beer hall drew such crowds that the police had to intervene to prevent a mass panic.²⁰² Of course, not all media reports were sympathetic to Hitler. He was well aware of the scathing comments in the left-wing and liberal press. Indeed, in his preface to Mein Kampf, Hitler explained that writing his autobiography was an opportunity ‘to destroy the foul legends about my person dished up in the Jewish press’.²⁰³ Mein Kampf was thus both an attempt at setting the record straight and to reconceive his own life in a more heroic light, as appropriate for someone who had been in the limelight of the national media. The initial suggestion to write the book probably came from Max Amann, the publisher of the party newspaper V¨olkischer Beobachter, who persuaded Hitler to cash in on the publicity stirred up by the trial.²⁰⁴ In Hitler’s eyes, the media attention which he had won in early 1924 totally transformed the chances of the Nazi movement under his own leadership. ‘I’m no longer an unknown, and that provides us with the best basis for a new start’, he declared full of conviction after his release in December 1924.²⁰⁵
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C O N C LU S I O N Press campaigns against politicians were not an exclusive characteristic of Weimar Germany, and Erzberger’s libel trial was not a unique event in Germany’s political culture. Even Bismarck had suffered from right-wing newspaper attacks in the mid-1870s. Famously, a judge in a libel case initiated by Bismarck acknowledged extensively in his reasoning the severity of the public insults against the chancellor, but justified the imposition of a minimal fine with the explanation that Bismarck was truly an evil minister.²⁰⁶ What was new in the case of Erzberger was the rapid proliferation of derogatory discourse throughout society, shaped and amplified by a partisan mass press. This particular discourse, however, was not the dominant one in Germany: it was strongly disputed by voices from within the Communist, socialist, liberal, and not least Catholic Centre milieux. The resulting polyphony of press discourses contributed decisively to the polarization of German politics. ‘Depending on whether Wurttembergian lawyers are readers of Stuttgart’s Deutsche Volksblatt or Stuttgart’s S¨uddeutsche Zeitung, they are either friends or deadly enemies of Erzberger’, one commentator noted in his book on the political influence of the press, written in 1920.²⁰⁷ What is interesting in this remark is not only the term ‘deadly enemies’ (‘Todfeinde’ in German) one year prior to Erzberger’s murder, but even more so the causal relationship implied in this sentence. According to this contemporary observer, it was the newspaper that ultimately determined the political views of its readers. There was no realization of the fact that readers were not just passive, hollow forms that could be filled at journalists’ will with any ideology. In fact, a reader’s decision to subscribe to either the Catholic Centre newspaper Deutsche Volksblatt or the DNVP-oriented S¨uddeutsche Zeitung —to revert to the example given above—depended among other things on that reader’s pre-existing political sympathies. Only very few writers at the time questioned the concept of a powerful top-down press influence. The publication of Ferdinand T¨onnies’s Kritik der o¨ffentlichen Meinung in 1922 started a debate of the question whether there was such a thing as a (single) public opinion, and, if so, whether newspapers were creating or simply reflecting it.²⁰⁸ But this debate was very much limited to scholarly circles. Most journalists and politicians, although very conscious of the polarized and fragmented nature of the German public sphere, continued to subscribe to the idea that newspapers exerted great political influence on the masses. While they considered themselves media savvy, aware of manipulative intentions and misrepresentations, and therefore relatively immune to press influence, in their view the average newspaper reader was a helpless victim and passive consumer of such press manipulations. Ironically, it was exactly this elite belief in the omnipotence of the press (the ‘third person’ effect, as media scientists have labelled it) which enabled newspapers to influence German politicians.
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Erzberger sued Helfferich because he thought that Helfferich’s press attacks and his brochure Away with Erzberger! actually mattered, because they influenced the ‘general reader’ to adapt an anti-Erzberger stance. In fact, those readers who adopted Helfferich’s specific accusations prior to the libel trial needed little convincing, and they constituted only a small fraction of Germany’s newspaperreading public. Although one can only speculate, it is very likely that Erzberger’s electoral support would not have been gravely affected if he had chosen to ignore the attacks. It was only the much greater publicity generated by the trial, and the ‘facts’ created by it and amplified by the press, that seriously undermined Erzberger’s trustworthiness—though, as mentioned above, not necessarily in the eyes of his core supporters. Although the press was not as directly influential and potent a political weapon as contemporaries thought, this is not to say it was inconsequential. On the contrary, press coverage and press campaigning were crucial in personalizing political conflict, and certainly contributed to intensifying political feelings. While right-wing newspapers could not determine what their readers should think, through the amount of coverage devoted to Erzberger they could easily influence what they should think about, and thereby identify Erzberger as a plausible target for nationalist recriminations. But it was not just through agenda-setting that the right-wing press campaign affected the popular perception of politics. Individuals within right-wing milieux, like his assassins Oltwig von Hirschfeld and Heinrich Schulz, could easily draw inspiration from the aggression of press polemics and translate it into justification for direct, violent action. Even if these were extreme cases, the fact that many nationalist Germans were prepared to voice publicly the depth of their anti-Erzberger sentiments, calling him a criminial, using biological metaphors of disease when describing his role within the German polity, or indeed wishing him dead, seems to suggest that it was not just quantity of coverage which mattered but also quality. Erzberger, in other words, was framed by opinion leaders within the right-wing press in a way that allowed other individuals—other editors, parliamentarians, local dignitaries, pub regulars, political activists (like Hitler)—to use these press narratives both as affirmation of their own views and as a toolkit for the construction their own political pronouncements. The working of these media effects, of agenda-setting and framing, are also apparent in Hitler’s rise to prominence. Mussolini’s coup d’´etat provided Hitler with a frame of reference which made him into national news material, as well as shaping his followers’ expectations. Although Hitler’s own putsch attempt was a miserable failure, and initially dismissed by newspapers of all political persuasions as a pitiful event, the subsequent trial significantly boosted his national standing. Whether called ‘Hitler trial’ or ‘Hitler–Ludendorff trial’, the label used helped to construct a political personality with a much higher profile than his previous regional incarnation had enjoyed. The presentation of Hitler and his followers in the nationalist press as youthful, idealistic, upright nationalists who had tragically
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been betrayed by their wavering conservative co-conspirators allowed Hitler to take on a new gravitas in the eyes of right-wing Germans, and resulted in an outpouring of adulation during and after the trial. But this right-wing media image not only framed the perception of Hitler among a significant number of frustrated nationalists, it also decisively influenced Hitler’s own self-conception. To understand why, it is worth noting Hitler’s views on the power of the press as expressed in his book, Mein Kampf, in 1924. Historians conventionally emphasize Hitler’s insistence on the fact that, in propaganda, the spoken word was more powerful than the written word.²⁰⁹ But in fact, still savouring his sudden rise to stardom, and repeating cultural commonplaces of the time, he left no doubt in Mein Kampf that the press was extremely powerful. Its ‘importance really is immense’, he claimed, it ‘cannot be overestimated, for the press really continues education in adulthood’.²¹⁰ Readers fell into three groups, he argued: those who believed everything they read; those who ceased to believe anything; and those with a critical mind to examine what they read and pass their own judgement. The first group was by far the largest, Hitler proclaimed, and consisted ‘of the great mass of the people’ and ‘the simplest-minded part of the nation’.²¹¹ Like many other politicians at the time, Hitler greatly overestimated the power of press influence, and was therefore able to imagine a reading public as bowled over by the amount and quality of press coverage as he was himself. It is no surprise that he now ceased to conceive of himself merely as the movement’s ‘drummer’ and instead described himself self-confidently as the ‘leader’, or F¨uhrer, in Mein Kampf. Hitler was indeed ‘no longer an unknown’ at the end of 1924. The prominence gained earlier that year helped him to consolidate his hold over the v¨olkisch movement in the following years. Of course, his celebrity status did not automatically translate into electoral support: at the Reichstag elections in 1928, the Nazis were unable to mobilize large numbers of dissatisfied voters. In Berlin, less than 40,000 people cast their vote for the NSDAP. But Hitler’s fame was undiminished, as was evident during his first trip to the Reich capital after the Prussian government had lifted its speaking ban. Hitler’s first public appearance in Berlin, on 16 November 1928, drew an enormous crowd. Police were still turning people away once 16,000 punters had filled the Sportpalast to capacity. And those coming to witness the famous man’s oratory were also willing to be enthused. ‘Again and again [the speech is] interrupted by thundering applause’, Goebbels noted in his diary afterwards. ‘At the end, a hurricane. Everyone rises. Deutschland u¨ ber alles.’²¹² The Nazis were still a long way from enjoying the kind of mass support from which they benefited in the early 1930s. But at a time of quickly changing Reich governments and a confusing array of special interest splinter parties, sporting a recognizable figurehead—a nationalist brand name—as leader of the party was eventually to prove an invaluable political asset.
3 Competing Stories, 1924–5 The character of political life everywhere is determined largely by the character of the press . . . Bernhard Guttmann, Berlin correspondent of Frankfurter Zeitung, ‘Die Presse im demokratischen Staate’, in Deutsche Presse, 22–3 (1927).
Driven by the political will and skill of two of Weimar’s most able politicians, Friedrich Ebert and Gustav Stresemann, and based on the American willingness to provide financial support under the terms of the Dawes reparation plan, 1924 saw the gradual consolidation of the Weimar Republic. Yet the intensity of political struggle did not abate: on the contrary, 40 per cent of all deputies voted into the Reichstag in May 1924 were members of anti-republican parties. And everyone involved in German politics knew that the following year would see the first democratic election of the Reich president, an event of decisive importance for the future course of German politics. On the extreme Left and Right, efforts now concentrated on discrediting the major political force safeguarding the democratic achievements of the revolutionary period, the Social Democratic party, and its most likely candidate for Germany’s highest public office, the present incumbent, Friedrich Ebert. By May 1925, Ebert was dead and the former General Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg installed as Germany’s new president. Although his election contributed significantly to the short-term stabilization of Germany’s democracy, Hindenburg was to turn out to be one of the grave-diggers of the Weimar Republic. As in the area of economics, where it was not so much inflation but the conditions of stabilization that really damaged the republic, the stabilization of Weimar democracy brought about by Hindenburg’s election came at a huge political cost. How could this happen? How could a convinced monarchist, responsible for directing the German war effort that resulted in defeat and the deaths of nearly two million German soldiers, be a credible and even popular candidate for the presidency? In order to understand the choice of those who elected Hindenburg in April 1925, it is crucial to delve into the hot-house of German politics in the months preceding the presidential elections. These months were dominated by two major media events: the libel trial of Friedrich Ebert in Magdeburg; and a corruption scandal involving several high-ranking politicians connected to the
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Barmat business. At issue was the role of Social Democracy in the military defeat of 1918, and the trustworthiness of representatives of the new democratic system. Partisan coverage of these events inspired political spitefulness both inside and outside parliament. More importantly, the unsavoury spectacle which unfolded on the pages of the daily press helped to discredit parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary committees proved not to be organs of the objective investigation of truth, but instruments of party-political ‘bickering’; trust in the judicial authorities was seriously undermined; numerous commentators repeatedly criticized the unreliability of the media. For many a German newspaper-reader, casting a vote for ‘the saviour’ who allegedly stood above democratic partisan politics seemed an attractive option in spring 1925. P R E S S P O L I T I C S A N D S C A N D A L - M O N G E R IN G Three weeks before the elections to the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag on 7 December 1924, a local corruption scandal made headlines in the Berlin press. The head of the political police in Berlin, Bartels, had just been arrested for corruption. He had been paid by a Russian businessman, Holzmann, to collect incriminating material against another Berlin-based Russian businessman, Iwan Kutisker. Holzmann had then blackmailed Kutisker and threatened him with deportation, on the strength of his influence with Bartels.¹ Kutisker filed a suit against Holzmann and Bartels; however, no sooner were they in prison than Kutisker, too, was arrested for fraud. He had managed to accumulate loans for more than RM 14 million from Prussia’s state-owned central bank, the Preußische Staatsbank (Seehandlung), by bribing bank officials. Eighteen months later, Kutisker was to be sentenced to four years in prison for credit fraud. In late November 1924, however, journalists were somewhat confused as to the identity of the villain in the piece. All that seemed clear was that there was suddenly a daily menu of corruption cases.² Electoral strategies determined the press coverage of these stories. Communists used the corruption case in the Berlin police to denigrate conditions in SPDruled Prussia, even though the official in question, Bartels, was known to be a national-conservative.³ Bartels’s offence had nothing to do with Kutisker’s credit fraud, but the presentation of the news in the Communist Rote Fahne consciously blurred the distinction between the various offences in order to accuse the SPD of bad governance.⁴ At the other end of the political spectrum, nationalist papers chose to focus on the foreigners involved. The Pan-German Deutsche Zeitung, for example, pointed out that it was typical that both Holzmann and Kutisker were Jewish. They stood for the perceived influx of foreigners into the German economy, a ‘typical’ side-effect of the turmoil of revolution, inflation, and deflation. Hence, when the Deutsche Zeitung singled out Kutisker, it really aimed at the post-revolutionary political system.⁵ Once set on its anti-Semitic
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course, the Deutsche Zeitung dug for more dirt, and came up with the Barmat business. The Russian Barmat brothers had also received Staatsbank loans, the paper declared.⁶ It presented a series of grossly distorted half-truths that was to become typical of the Barmat coverage. The business, the paper stated, was run by seven Jewish brothers—in fact there were four, two of whom ran it—and the eldest, Julius Barmat, had bragged about his close friendship with Berlin’s Social Democratic police president Richter. The Deutsche Zeitung considered this link sufficiently incriminating to justify clamouring for the intervention of the state prosecutor.⁷ The Communists immediately recognized the potential for attacking the Social Democrats through the Barmats, and took up the lead provided by the PanGerman paper. The Rote Fahne researched the relationship between the Barmats and the Staatsbank, and produced a front-page story alleging the ‘corruption’ of the Weimar coalition parties, by pointing out the involvement of Social Democrats and Centre party politicians in the Barmats’ business. One Reichstag deputy of the Centre party sat on their supervisory board, as did the leader of the Social Democratic faction in the Prussian Landtag, Ernst Heilmann.⁸ Even a former Reich chancellor, Gustav Bauer of the SPD, was at that time a member of the supervisory board of one of Barmat’s enterprises. Over the next days, the Communist party paper claimed that the ‘affair SeehandlungKutisker-Bartels-Barmat’ was growing into the ‘Panama Scandal of the German Republic’.⁹ The violent polemic against the SPD did not fail to impress at least the right-wing press, which quoted extensively from the Rote Fahne articles.¹⁰ The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts dismissed the whole issue as Communist ‘election swindle’, not even mentioning the name Barmat.¹¹ The Rote Fahne, in turn, took the silence of Vorw¨arts and other democratic newspapers in Berlin as proof that there was something to conceal. The Communists were fighting to win the struggle for the workers’ votes, and the question of influence over public opinion loomed large in editors’ minds. The Rote Fahne was convinced that the policy of slander was paying off.¹² Five days before the elections, editors of the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts were finally worried enough about the potential impact of this news story that they tackled the Barmat issue head on, denying the main charges. Ernst Heilmann wrote a lengthy declaration stating that he was a close friend of Julius Barmat, that he had accepted membership on various boards within the business out of friendship without deriving material advantages from them, and that he had no knowledge of any loans whatsoever.¹³ Vorw¨arts also commented on the formation of a hostile network of newspapers against the SPD, highlighting in particular the ‘co-operation’ of Hugenberg’s right-wing Tag and the Communist Rote Fahne.¹⁴ The Rote Fahne relayed this communication to its readers as a ‘full confession’ on the part of Social Democracy.¹⁵ No honest worker, according to the Communist paper, could vote for ‘corrupted Barmat-socialists’.¹⁶ Denigration of the SPD went hand in hand with anti-republican rhetoric: ‘Does the never-ending
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corruption era within this Republic not stink to high heaven? Do we need ever new scandals and trials to open the eyes of Social Democratic workers, too? . . . Can he [the worker] cast his vote for these men, who are striking deals with these dirty upstarts who stick at nothing?’¹⁷ The right-wing agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung quoted extensively from the Rote Fahne, but differed in its conclusion from the original: only if the nationalist Right won at the upcoming election, would socialist corruption come to an end.¹⁸ Two days before election day, the nationalists regained the initiative in the press campaign from the Communists. The Bergisch-M¨arkische Zeitung, a small regional paper in the west of Germany, published by the DNVP Reichstag deputy Walter Bacmeister, alleged that during the revolution of 1918–19, the Barmats had been granted a monopoly on fat imports by Ebert’s personal assistant, by agreeing to pay a certain percentage of their proceeds into the SPD party coffers. Since the Bergisch-M¨arkische Zeitung was part of the Hugenberg group, these allegations quickly passed through right-wing information channels and papers churned out another spate of polemical articles.¹⁹ Again Vorw¨arts rejected the story in a small notice as a ‘Nationalist-Communist election lie’.²⁰ But this did not keep the story from spreading through the editorial offices.²¹ The heavily anti-republican rhetoric of Communist and nationalist newspapers stood in stark contrast to the actual facts: at this point, all that the Social Democrats had been accused of was the fact that some of their functionaries were sitting on the supervisory boards of various Barmat enterprises. The Barmat business had received some large loans from the Prussian Staatsbank, and the Social Democrats were suspected to have derived financial benefits from their connections to the Barmats. Only some of it was true, most of it was grossly exaggerated, and none of it amounted to an illegal action, but it served well as a target for polemic. Every allegation that the Communist press raised against the Social Democrats and the democratic system more generally, the nationalist press amplified, and vice versa.²² On election day, 7 December 1924, Vorw¨arts commented on these press attacks and stated that the election campaign had been dominated by political slander: ‘All of Germany is reeking of lies! Never before has Germany experienced something as nasty and sordid like the methods of our jointly operating opponents from left and right in this [election] struggle.’²³ The SPD, however, emerged the victor from the elections. The KPD lost nearly a million votes, while the SPD increased its share by nearly two million. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Nazis and other v¨olkisch parties lost more than a million votes, while the DNVP gained half a million.²⁴ Still, as always in the 1920s, there was no clear-cut winner. In the Prussian Landtag election on the same day, the SPD lost twenty-two of its 136 seats, while the KPD gained thirteen, and the DNVP even as many as thirty-three to reach a total of 109.²⁵ But the Barmat story did not seem to have had much of an impact on voting behaviour. In Berlin, which had provided the major part of the Barmat
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news readership, the SPD gains were most impressive: an increase of over 50 per cent from its May results made it the strongest party in the city, overtaking the DNVP which had only increased its share by 10 per cent.²⁶ One reason for the ineffectiveness of the anti-SPD Barmat propaganda was its limited public impact. In early December, the Berlin public at large was not aware of the alleged Barmat scandal. The public profile of the Barmat brothers in 1924 was so low that all those papers that gave them coverage felt the need to introduce them to their readers first.²⁷ But the number of papers that took to providing their readership with information about the Barmats remained very limited. While the Rote Fahne considered the Barmats proof of the corruption of Social Democracy by bourgeois society, most editors seemed not to be convinced that the Barmats could be convicted of any wrongdoing.²⁸ In fact, the highly polemical anti-SPD nature of the Barmat story limited its news value for the majority of Berlin newspapers. Only those papers involved in partisan campaigning used the ‘information’ available—and those were papers with very low circulation. For the great majority of the Berlin and Prussian newspaper readership, however, the Barmats did not become an issue. Neither mass papers like Ullstein’s Berliner Morgenpost and Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, nor any of the high-circulation tabloids had given coverage to the emerging Barmat story.²⁹ Regional and local papers in the rest of Prussia never mentioned the name Barmat. In Berlin, depending on which newspaper the Berliners read, they would ‘know’ a great deal about the Barmats—or nothing at all. Considering the very small circulation figures of the partisan papers, the majority of the public will have belonged to the latter category in December 1924. Politicians, however, were avid newspaper readers, and consumed particularly those partisan political papers that gave coverage to the Barmats. In fact, these papers were an important source of substantiation for political attacks, and many parties and political pressure groups had their own newspaper-clipping collections to supply functionaries with an archive of politically relevant material. The agrarian Reichslandbund, for example, kept files exclusively devoted to clippings about ‘SPD and finance’, drawn exclusively from partisan papers.³⁰ Politicians thus operated in different information networks from the majority of the public: to some of them, the amount of coverage devoted to the Barmats in the partisan papers seemed to indicate that this issue loomed large in the public’s mind. Just before the elections, the DNVP submitted a parliamentary question in the Prussian Landtag, demanding to know the role that the bank’s management and officials had played in Barmat affair which had caused such ‘immense excitement’.³¹ The liberal Berliner Tageblatt and the Vossische Zeitung, which had not given any coverage to the Barmat issue, commented on the apparent exaggeration of the phrasing ‘immense excitement’.³² However, it was less a question of distortion than of misconception. Unlike politicians, the great majority of the reading public had simply remained unaffected by the ‘revelations’ because they had not been exposed to them.
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Also among the limited readership of elite political papers were civil servants, whose decision-making was influenced by the negative coverage to which the Barmat business had suddenly been exposed. This was crucial for the further development of the firm, because the Barmats were particularly dependent on the goodwill of the Preussische Staatsbank. After the stabilization of the currency in 1924, the Barmats repeatedly needed big loans to keep solvent. By early September 1924, they owed the Staatsbank over eight million RM. After some management anxiety over these large sums, the bank scrutinized the economic viability of these loans, and prolonged them until mid-December 1924, with a promise to extend the deadline a further three months.³³ However, by early December the Barmats had failed to pay back some hundred thousand Mark in interest and short-term credit, and needed another five million. But this time the officials of the Staatsbank refused to grant a further loan, and, worse still, withdrew its promise to prolong the existing loans, which threatened the survival of the business. On Julius Barmat’s request, the Social Democrat Ernst Heilmann contacted the Prussian minister of finance, von Richter, of the right-wing DVP. Von Richter explained that the bankers considered the loans economically justified and secured with sufficient collateral: ‘But they reject categorically an increase in credits not least in consideration of the public attacks . . .’.³⁴ Up to this point in early December 1924, Staatsbank officials had considered the Barmat group, with some forty companies and about 13,000 employees, a respectable business partner. What proved lethal to the Barmats was the untimely coincidence of increasing financial needs in a time of economic downturn, and a poisonous volley of press attacks accusing them of improper business dealings. It is ironic that those civil servants who should have known the Barmat finances best were impressed by what was clearly grossly distorted press coverage: the actual debt was less than a third of the sum which partisan papers claimed the Barmats had received. The question of whether the Barmats would have managed to save their business if the loans had been prolonged is open to speculation: even bigger firms, like that of the recently deceased Hugo Stinnes, came crashing down as a consequence of stabilization in 1925.³⁵ In the case of the Barmats, hostile press attacks unquestionably led to the denial of the promised extension of the much-needed loans, forcing the firm into liquidation within a few months. T H E M AG D E BU RG T R I A L It became clear after the elections that the Barmat story had been primarily driven by electoral strategies: as suddenly as it had appeared in the newspapers, it vanished again after 7 December. Other stories dominated the news in December 1924. Papers were claiming electoral victory or disguising defeat, and devoted their pages to the incipient cabinet crisis and ensuing coalition negotiations.³⁶ Political commentators were also preoccupied with the news that France and Britain
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were unwilling to respect the evacuation schedule according to which Cologne would have returned to German administration in January 1925. On a less political note, the beginning of the trial of the mass-murderer Fritz Haarmann in Hanover provided the readership with extensive coverage of this ‘blood-dripping ‘‘sensation’’ ’.³⁷ But despite its juicy detail and stirring revelations, the Haarmann trial was only second-rate news. The press, and particularly opponents of Social Democracy, turned their attention to Magdeburg, where on 9 December 1924 a trial began against Erwin Rothard, editor of the Mitteldeutsche Presse, a small v¨olkisch paper in the Prussian province of Saxony, who had accused Friedrich Ebert of high treason. The Reich president had taken him to court for libel, but the proceedings turned into a judicial assessment of the veracity of the ‘stabin-the-back’ legend. With a government crisis as a backdrop and presidential elections looming on the political horizon, the Magdeburg trial provided ample propagandistic potential.³⁸ From 1919, Ebert had been a prime target for journalistic slander. One photo became particularly notorious. Taken in summer 1919, it showed Ebert and the then Reichswehr minister Noske standing in the Baltic Sea, in bathing trunks. The photographer sold it to Ullstein’s Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung, the only German weekly magazine with a circulation of well over one million copies. There it was published on the front cover on 24 August 1919—three days after the swearing-in of Ebert as Reich president in Weimar. The liberal-democratic Ullstein publishing house had probably not intended to ridicule Ebert. It had simply used the occasion of the new Reich constitution to present the new president tongue-in-cheek as a normal citizen, presenting an entertaining photo that combined two popular magazine themes: the holiday and summer features, which traditionally dominated issues in July and August; and the presentation of the private life of a famous personality. The photo, however, turned into a sensation: the public was shocked at this display of nudity, which stood in stark contrast to the pomp and circumstance of the late Wilhelmine era. The photo soon became part of the anti-republican iconography: the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung turned it into a postcard with the title ‘Past and Present’, framing Ebert and Noske with photos of William II and Hindenburg in their dress uniforms. Over the next years, opponents of the new Republic continued to use, and refer to, the bathing photo to denigrate Ebert and democracy. At first, Ebert took it in good humour: when, on his second presidential visit to Munich in June 1922, a student greeted him waving a red bathing suit, he laughed and waved back. After the assassination of Walter Rathenau, Ebert changed his policy towards defamation and insults, using libel proceedings as a weapon to defend the Republic’s standing. During his five years in office, he started a total of around 200 criminal prosecutions.³⁹ During his visit to Munich in June 1922, Ebert had also been greeted by the v¨olkisch editor, Dr Emil Gansser, local politician and Hitler supporter, who yelled ‘Landesverr¨ater’, traitor to the fatherland, at him. During the subsequent trial in Munich in February 1924, Gansser claimed that Ebert had committed
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high treason by his participation in the munition workers’ strike in Berlin in January 1918. The pre-trial proceedings clarified the matter: all the witnesses stated that the Social Democrats had been taken by surprise by the outbreak of the strike, and that the only reason for their participation in the strike committee had been the intention of terminating the strike as quickly as possible. Still, the trial went ahead, and when the Munich court subpoenaed Ebert, it became clear that the trial was to be exploited politically. Ebert’s lawyer advised the Reich president to withdraw his suit to prevent further insults in court.⁴⁰ Officially, Ebert’s lawyer claimed that the hearing of evidence had proven Gansser wrong and that they thereby let the matter rest.⁴¹ But Gansser did not relent. In an open letter published by many Bavarian newspapers he repeated his claims, denied that Ebert had cleared himself, and demanded that someone shouldering ‘the charge of high treason’ should resign as Reich president.⁴² The v¨olkisch Right was delighted and took up the call. In February and March 1924 alone Ebert instigated five court actions on the basis of the libel of treason. Gansser took flight and only returned when protected by the immunity of the National Socialist Reichstag mandate that he won in the general elections in May 1924.⁴³ One of the right-wing newspapers which reprinted Gansser’s open letter was the small Saxon Mitteldeutsche Presse, edited by Erwin Rothard. Rothard published the letter on 23 February 1924 under the heading ‘A bitter pill for Fritze Ebert’, adding the following paragraph: ‘Will Ebert swallow this pill, or will he . . . appear in court in Munich after all? Go on, Herr Ebert, and prove that you are not a traitor. You need not be afraid of the red bathing trunks which will greet you upon your arrival in Munich.’⁴⁴ Ebert filed a suit; the trial against Rothard eventually started on 9 December 1924. Rothard, 28 years old at this point, was a provincial lightweight with a criminal record.⁴⁵ The first two interrogations after his article had appeared showed he was anything but a fearless fighter for the nationalist cause. Rather surprisingly, he stated that Gansser’s attack was probably unfounded, he himself certainly did not have any proof: he was sorry if his article conveyed the impression of embracing Gansser’s thesis. Rothard was subdued, repentant, and intimidated.⁴⁶ But when his lawyers served their documents it became obvious that in the meantime he had been encouraged to take up Gansser’s cause. He now insisted that he would prove that Ebert had committed treason. The support that he received from the DNVP was probably the crucial factor in this change of heart.⁴⁷ Hugenberg’s Nachtausgabe devoted its entire front page to the opening of the trial, full of polemic anticipation, promising that for the first time the history of 1918 was to be written ‘under oath’.⁴⁸ The ‘stab-in-the-back’ legend had played a major role in the nationalist campaign leading up to the Reichstag elections of 7 December. Thus, the Magdeburg trial offered an ideal opportunity for nationalists to substantiate their interpretation of 1918 and to smear the Reich president well in advance of the presidential elections due in spring 1925.⁴⁹ Social Democratic and liberal journalists were acutely aware of the trial’s
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political thrust: the intention, they claimed, was to falsify history through the proceedings and amass propaganda material against Ebert.⁵⁰ The presentation of the news certainly indicated that the trial was being used for propagandistic ends. Newspapers tried to sell their particular political interpretation of events, with headlines a focal point of political polemic. In its very first article, the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts made a point of specifying Ebert’s role as plaintiff in the headline.⁵¹ This did not keep right-wing newspapers from calling the proceedings ‘Ebert trial’, insinuating that the person on trial was Ebert.⁵² Headlines played a particularly important role in the political interpretation of the trial, since most of the partisan newspapers, Left and Right, subscribed to the same news-agency reports on the proceedings.⁵³ These minutes were reprinted after being edited to provide the required political thrust: particular parts of witness statements were printed in bold as eye-catchers, some parts were left out, and the whole text was interspersed with smaller striking headlines. One witness statement particularly damaging to Ebert may serve as an example of the competing accounts of the trial proceedings. The question of how to deal with the draft notices that all strikers received was of particular importance. On the first day of the trial, a witness of Ebert’s speech to the strike rally in Treptower Park on 31 January 1918, a worker named Syrig, claimed he had seen Ebert receive a note from a member of the audience, presumably with a question concerning the draft, whereupon Ebert told workers to ignore such orders. For the right-wing Deutsche Zeitung, it was most important to highlight this statement: Someone gave him a note. Upon this, Herr Ebert said: Strike only serves to shorten the war. He who receives his induction orders ought not present himself. Chair[man]: Are you not erring in this statement?—Witness: Impossible, I have heard it entirely clearly.⁵⁴
Readers of the extremist Deutsche Zeitung could thus conclude that here was an independent worker testifying against Ebert. The paper’s evening edition reinforced this impression with a smaller headline, placed somewhat arbitrarily in the report on the proceedings: ‘Call to Refuse Military Service’.⁵⁵ The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts, although using the same news agency, presented a totally different picture. It introduced this part of the proceedings under the small headline ‘A strange witness’. Syrig’s statement was reprinted in normal typeset. Bold letters were, however, applied to the cross-questioning of Syrig by Ebert’s lawyers, Heine, the part left out by the Deutsche Zeitung: R.-A. [Rechts-Anwalt] Heine: Rothardt has employed someone who has received considerable funds to organize witnesses against Herr Ebert. R.-A. Martin: One cannot after all refuse the defendant to search for witnesses. . . . R.-A. Bindewald: I can here provide the intelligence that the witness has been ordered by his past regimental commander . . . to contact the German Nationalist State Parliamentarian Koch, who was looking for witnesses of the events in Treptower Park.⁵⁶
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Here, readers learned that the DNVP parliamentarian Pfarrer Koch had used party rallies to ask for potential witnesses against Ebert to come forward. Although Syrig denied having received money, doubts about him remained. Vorw¨arts highlighted the nationalist involvement in the trial and declared Syrig’s statement proof of the ongoing ‘slander of the Reich President’.⁵⁷ Berlin’s liberal-democratic press, which had at first refrained from using polemical headlines, now sided with Vorw¨arts.⁵⁸ This change in tone was immediately noticed by right-wing papers, which broadened their attack to include all the democratic papers. Kreuz-Zeitung quoted the polemical headlines of the Berliner Volkszeitung, Vossische Zeitung, and Vorw¨arts to prove the existence of a leftist press alliance that was allegedly siding against Rothardt in a ‘scandalous’ way in an attempt to influence the proceedings.⁵⁹ Polemic was the newspapers’ weapon in a struggle for opinion-leadership, and both sides closely observed each other. With no new proceedings to report on 11 December, right-wing newspapers published articles solely dealing with the opposing press’s coverage of the trial, pointing at all apparent inconsistencies and quoting extensively from what they called an attempt to influence public opinion.⁶⁰ Vorw¨arts, in turn, closely observed right-wing coverage, quoting Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger and Tag and denigrating their special correspondent’s coverage. Among the rank of nationalist ‘stink bomb hurlers’ Vorw¨arts singled out the Deutsche Zeitung as ‘particularly repulsive’ because it claimed that Ebert had once served a prison sentence: ‘Abuse, slander and baiting are having real orgies’, it concluded.⁶¹ Deutsche Zeitung retorted in similar style, labelling Vorw¨arts ‘the Jewish libel paper’.⁶² This preoccupation with the writing of other elite political papers, resulting in polemical self-reference, was a characteristic feature of the partisan press in Weimar Germany, adding considerably to the climate of political antagonism. The media war fought over Magdeburg also affected the court proceedings. The lawyers were very aware of the news value of their position.⁶³ The day following Vorw¨arts’ attack on Deutsche Zeitung, Ebert’s lawyer Landsberg picked up the complaints and remonstrated against the way some right-wing papers reported on the trial in an attempt to ‘poison’ the court. Rothardt’s lawyers, in turn, complained about the Vossische Zeitung’s accusation that the defence had ‘fabricated’ witnesses. The presiding judge stated that the court too considered ‘such news reporting and the distortion in leading articles’ completely unacceptable.⁶⁴ But the criticism of the press in court only helped to provoke journalistic tempers and led to increasing antagonism in the coverage. Kreuz-Zeitung and Deutsche Zeitung, for example, devoted considerable space over the following two days to attacking Vorw¨arts and Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung, explaining that they were only trying to refute the ‘lies and falsifications’ emanating from the ‘left-wing press’.⁶⁵ This, in turn, inspired Rothard’s lawyer to complain about the local SPD newspaper, the Magdeburger Volksstimme. His complaint was couched in almost exactly the same terms as the nationalist Kreuz-Zeitung’s attack on Ullstein’s
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Vossische Zeitung.⁶⁶ In response, the presiding judge requested the lawyers to keep discussions of the press out of the proceedings. This served only as an incentive to editors to reinforce their attacks.⁶⁷ The hearing in the second week concentrated on Ebert’s speech to the Berlin workers during the strike in Treptow, and his intentions in joining the strike committee. All the witnesses heard on Tuesday 16 December stated that Ebert had entered the strike with the firm intention of stopping it as soon as possible. Regarding his Treptow speech, witnesses agreed it was impossible for Ebert to have encouraged draft-dodging since that would have meant overturning a firmly established SPD policy of supporting the draft, a political sensation that would have caused Ebert’s immediate arrest, as a former officer of Berlin’s political police confirmed.⁶⁸ His speech, the witnesses stated, had been without fire, his calling for calm and restraint had been met with cries like ‘strike breaker’ and ‘traitor of workers’. However, one witness by the name of Lehnhoff stated that Ebert had indeed made an ambiguous appeal. Not least because his speech had met with so very little approval, Ebert had allegedly proclaimed towards the end: ‘Just hold on. Your working brothers . . . are standing by you.’⁶⁹ Lehnhoff was unsure if this had been meant as a call to continue striking or as a call for moderation. This was what the right-wing press had been waiting for: ‘Sensational turn in Ebert trial’ the Nachtausgabe titled on its front page. This, it proclaimed, was proof of Ebert’s true face, and the incident was skilfully dramatized: ‘No boot is creaking and no clearing of throats is audible. Everyone knows: this is the decisive hours. Everyone feels: now the fog is lifting. The genius of truth is right in the middle of the room. . . . The truth breaks the lie about the patriotism of all Scheidem¨anner.’⁷⁰ The fact that Lehnhoff had explicitly contradicted Syrig’s account concerning Ebert’s stance on induction orders was ignored by Hugenberg’s special correspondent. More importantly, Nachtausgabe readers were kept ignorant of the discrediting of Syrig, the main witness against Ebert so far. A colleague who was supposed to back up Syrig’s statement now stated he would not dream of helping Syrig to commit perjury. Syrig had told him that he was ‘being looked after’. Vorw¨arts took this as evidence of the alleged fabrication of witness statements by the nationalists and focused its headlines on this fact.⁷¹ Readers of Berlin newspapers were thus presented with two opposing versions of the Magdeburg trial: while the Nachtausgabe triumphantly declared the hearing a victory for truth and a proof of treason, Vorw¨arts described it as a ‘black day’ for Rothardt’s defence which had been revealed as a ‘German Nationalist witness factory’.⁷² If they reported on Syrig’s collapse at all, the right-wing press smoothed over it to a greater or lesser extent.⁷³ For Vorw¨arts, this was yet again proof of the nationalist distortion of reality.⁷⁴ The following day, on the last day of the hearing, one more witness appeared unannounced. A worker named Gobert claimed that it was he who had asked Ebert about draft orders at the rally, upon which Ebert had clearly proclaimed
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that the orders were to be ignored.⁷⁵ He stuck to this testimony despite intense cross-questioning. Apart from Syrig, he was thus the only witness to claim Ebert had encouraged workers to refuse the drafting, contradicting the statements of at least a dozen other witnesses. Coincidentally, he was also the last witness to be heard. Thus, for the right-wing press the hearing ended on a high note.⁷⁶ Since there was no court session the following day in order to give lawyers time to prepare their speeches, Vorw¨arts set out to destroy Gobert’s credibility: it revealed that Gobert had eight previous convictions for fraud, and highlighted his political background as a former member of the counter-revolutionary Erhardt Freikorps in Berlin.⁷⁷ These revelations were quickly taken up by Berlin’s liberal press.⁷⁸ The right-wing press, on the other hand, bridged the days without courtroom news with commentaries on the SPD’s wartime policy and munitions shortages during the war.⁷⁹ If they commented on the Gobert revelations at all, they did so by accusing the ‘Linkspresse’ of attempting to influence a pending judgement.⁸⁰ The judgement on 23 December 1924 was a sensation. Whilst condemning the editor to three months in jail, the judge stated in his verdict that Rothardt’s accusation that Ebert was a ‘traitor’ (a Landesverr¨ater) was—legally speaking—correct. Rothardt’s form of address, ‘Fritze’, the term ‘bitter pill’, the mentioning of the bathing trunks, and, most importantly, the sentence ‘Go on, prove that you are not a traitor’ were clearly meant as an insult under §185, the judge acknowledged. But the term ‘traitor’ could not be considered libel under §186. The judge decided that Ebert’s participation in the strike committee, and particularly the exhortation ‘Just hold on!’ in Ebert’s Treptow speech constituted treason.⁸¹ The judgement was highly ambiguous: Rothardt’s usage of the term ‘traitor’ was considered a serious insult, since, although legally justified, he had not held any proof of his claim at the time of writing the article. All Berlin newspapers ran the judgement as front-page news. Vorw¨arts considered it shocking: the judge had acknowledged that Ebert’s motivation for joining the strike was his intention of terminating it as quickly as possible, and yet he claimed that Ebert had committed treason.⁸² Liberal papers joined Vorw¨arts in expressing their surprise at the judge’s argument.⁸³ They attacked the nationalist press for its hounding of the president, and claimed that Ebert’s case had been thoroughly vindicated through the trial.⁸⁴ This was wishful thinking. Nationalist newspapers considered the judgement a triumph for ‘truth’ and an important step towards establishing the veracity of the ‘stab-in-the-back’.⁸⁵ Headlines announced ‘Landesverrat’ in extra-bold letters over the front page.⁸⁶ Since nationalist commentators had ceased to expect this outcome, they were jubilant, none more so than the Deutsche Zeitung. Ebert, the right-wing paper concluded, ‘has been finished politically for all times’: the German people now had to decide if it wanted to tolerate ‘the rule of the ammunition strikers’ any longer.⁸⁷ Editors tried violently to promote their interpretation of the judgement, so that the press polemics that had accompanied and influenced the trial continued
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for some days after 23 December 1924. Because of the deeply divided landscape of the political media in Berlin, newspapers tried to establish some kind of ‘public’ opinion mirroring their own views by collecting other newspapers’ published opinion, creating articles called ‘Judgement on the judgement’ or ‘The echo of the Magdeburg judgement’.⁸⁸ Berliner Tageblatt, for example, quoted Berliner Volks-Zeitung, Vossische Zeitung, Berliner B¨orsen-Courier, and Germania, concluding that there was ‘no doubt anywhere that the Magdeburg judgement with its reasoning constitutes a misjudgement . . . of the worst order’.⁸⁹ This again induced Kreuz-Zeitung, buoyed by the judgement, to attack the ‘Linkspresse’ once more for lies and falsifications, and for obfuscating the true situation.⁹⁰ Deutsche Zeitung did likewise and published a vitriolic attack on Vorw¨arts that was only restrained, as it ironically admitted, by its ‘sincere respect of the State Supreme Court and the Law for the Protection of the Republic’.⁹¹ In fact, without that law the polemics would have been even more poisonous. Right-wing journalists openly deplored the fact that the ‘patriotic press’ had had to be very careful and restrained in its support of Rothardt since Ebert was protected by the law.⁹² Many politicians considered the judgement and press polemics harmful to Germany’s political culture. In the Reich cabinet meeting on 23 December1924 the DVP vice-chancellor Jarres called the judgement’s reasoning ‘horrendous’, and asked his colleagues for a joint statement in support of Ebert. Foreign minister Stresemann, who had come under heavy attack from Hugenberg’s papers at the beginning of 1924, pointed out that all that had happened to Ebert now could happen to any of them tomorrow.⁹³ A statement was drawn up in which the cabinet assured Ebert that it was unanimous in its conviction that his activities had always been aimed at serving the good of the German fatherland.⁹⁴ The following day cabinet ministers jointly visited Ebert to deliver the statement. This public show of confidence by the bourgeois cabinet was seen by many as a validation of the criticism aimed at the judgement.⁹⁵ The right-wing press mocked the visit. Deutsche Zeitung considered it a touching move fitting for Christmas day, labelling it a ‘visit of condolence’ on its front page.⁹⁶ On this note, the Pan-German paper ended its ‘Magdeburg’ coverage. Over the course of the trial it had devoted a total of sixteen out of twenty-six front pages to the story. Throughout the trial the presentation of the news was determined by the competition between right-wing and left-liberal interpretations of the events of 1918.⁹⁷ It would be wrong to assume that the editing of trial proceedings led to a complete distortion of what happened in Magdeburg. But the impression all newspapers conveyed was that the ‘opposite’ press lied, distorted, and falsified throughout the trial.⁹⁸ The reader, editors claimed, was thus led to construct his own version of the story: ‘Something always tends to stick—and one’s own reader does not get to learn the truth, but instead . . . is continuously being lied to.’⁹⁹ However, although the proceedings were regularly presented in a way that supported the newspaper’s political stance on 1918, it was the
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extent to which journalists criticized each other’s reporting that aggravated the increasing antagonism, which again determined the presentation of the news. Any attack by the correspondent ‘Fdes’ of the Kreuz-Zeitung on the Vossische Zeitung automatically drew a reply in kind.¹⁰⁰ A few individuals like ‘Fdes’ could thus function as amplifiers of polemics within Berlin’s political discourse, provoking a response that was out of all proportion to the low circulation figures of the Kreuz-Zeitung. Probably the most important ‘amplifier’ was Adolf Stein, who provided the Hugenberg papers with commentaries under his nom de plume ‘A’ or ‘Job Zimmermann’. Stein considered himself a ‘politician and . . . an old expert in the area of influencing public opinion’; as such he had come into contact with Hugenberg in 1919 when he had asked him for money to fund pamphlets against Social Democracy.¹⁰¹ Hugenberg had soon realized Stein’s talent and poached him from Hugo Stinnes’s T¨agliche Rundschau to write for his newly founded Tag.¹⁰² Stein knew his worth to Hugenberg, repeatedly asking for pay rises, until he was paid four times the standard wage of a senior editor and twice as much as Friedrich Hussong, chief editor of Hugenberg’s Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger.¹⁰³ In the Magdeburg courtroom, Stein demonstratively positioned himself right behind Rothardt, next to Gansser.¹⁰⁴ His commentaries always made the front page, and were always combined with a heartfelt hatred of Social Democracy and the new political system. ‘This trial is one big lesson for the German people’, he wrote at one point, ‘an educational film against Social Democracy. . . . The pending judgement here is—at least seen politically—no longer relevant. Much more important . . . is [the fact] that finally the party of revolution parasites is reduced to its true nature.’¹⁰⁵ His commentaries were one continuous onslaught on the legitimacy of the Republic, and his polemics reached a big audience since his articles were published in all three Berlin papers of Hugenberg’s Scherl publishing house, with a total circulation of nearly 350,000 in 1925.¹⁰⁶ Compared with Adolf Stein, the hapless Rothardt was only a minor ‘amplifier’ of polemical discourse. But his original article that had started the trial was a symptom of the low-level hostility that parliamentary democracy was continuously exposed to through the media: Rothardt had just picked up the rampant anti-republican rhetoric of his time. Liberal observers blamed the DNVP and its press for this poisoning of political culture, and pointed at the similarities to the hate-campaigns of the past which had resulted in the murders of Erzberger and Rathenau.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, Rothardt, through his trial, was a conduit for even more nationalist attacks on the Republic. Ernst Feder, deputy chief-editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, highlighted in his comment on the judgement the dangerous synthesis of partisan politics, a manipulated legal system, and nationalist press coverage.¹⁰⁸ The Centre party organ in Berlin, Germania, also pointed at the obvious partisan interest of the DNVP in this ‘crusade’ against Ebert: the next elections would be fought on a ‘nationalist’ ticket ‘against the ‘‘traitor’’, against the ‘‘back-stabbing brothers’’, against the ‘‘November criminals’’ ’.¹⁰⁹ It
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took only two weeks of such coverage to establish ‘Magdeburg’ as a leitmotiv of right-wing anti-republican rhetoric. A week after the Magdeburg judgement, another synthesis of deutschnational press campaign and anti-republican judiciary spawned a further leitmotiv: after Ebert had left the stage, the Barmats were suddenly moved back into the spotlight. S TAG I N G B A R M AT: T H E J U D I C I A RY A S C ATA LY S T The contested transgressions of the Barmat scandal seem quite harmless, at least to the present-day observer. Several politicians were members of various supervisory boards, and had exercised their influence to help the enterprises in their business. Hugenberg, in comparison, sat on the boards of forty-seven companies without this being considered scandalous. There was, however, some truth in the rightwing claim that Barmat had profited from political patronage. The success of Julius Barmat’s business had, to some extent, depended on his ability to make political connections work in his favour. At the beginning of his business carreer in the Netherlands, he had joined the Dutch Social Democrats in 1908, and when after the war Dutch and German Social Democrats began to co-operate closely, he moved to exploit these links, offering the Social Democratic Second International temporary office space in his Amsterdam house. For the owner of an export–import business, this must have seemed a natural means of extending his international contacts.¹¹⁰ He was introduced to some of the leading German Social Democrats, and these connections proved useful in acquiring business with state-run enterprises which dealt with foodstuffs.¹¹¹ Ernst Heilmann, leader of the SPD in the Prussian parliament, and Gustav Bauer, a former Reich chancellor, came to support his activities on a regular basis. Heilmann became a close friend of Barmat and joined the supervisory boards of six of Barmat’s enterprises. As such, he had written several letters of recommendation on behalf of Barmat, but was always careful not to accept any emoluments or other financial advantages.¹¹² This distinguished him from another prominent Social Democrat, Wilhelm Richter, the president of the Berlin police, who received numerous presents and repeatedly dined out at Barmat’s expense.¹¹³ Barmat also became acquainted with Otto Wels, chairman of the SPD, and Friedrich Ebert in 1919, and repeatedly bragged about his influential connections.¹¹⁴ In the distorted accounts of the right-wing press, he kept a photo of Ebert in his office, onto which he himself had allegedly copied a dedication by Ebert and his signature.¹¹⁵ None of this was illegal. But when recounted by right-wing papers prior to the elections in December 1924, it certainly seemed so. And this press coverage proved consequential. It intimidated bank officials, so that they denied the Barmats the promised prolongation of their credit, thus forcing the business into illiquidity. It also impressed the judiciary, which formed a large part of the
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readership of right-wing newspapers. It was a young state prosecutor from the unit working on the Kutisker case, Kussmann, who turned the press allegations against Barmat into what subsequently became the Barmat scandal. Kussmann saw his own anti-socialist views confirmed by press rumours concerning Barmat in late 1924. In December 1924, fired up by the Magdeburg trial and the onslaught of the right-wing press on Social Democracy, Kussmann decided to embark on a political crusade of his own, in close co-operation with the right-wing press, in particular with Hugenberg’s mass circulation Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, that became the main platform for the Barmat story, provided with a generous flow of leaks by Kussmann.¹¹⁶ The fact that the Lokal-Anzeiger was clearly better informed than the official Prussian news agency, the Amtliche Preußische Pressedienst, did not escape the attention of contemporaries. It led to repeated accusations that the state prosecution office was leaking information to certain papers that it was withholding from the official state news service.¹¹⁷ In fact, Kussmann’s efforts in media management far exceeded the traditional practice of leaking confidential information, as became evident in summer 1925. By this point, the Prussian Ministry of Justice had already taken Kussmann off the Barmat case.¹¹⁸ In late July, Kussmann’s house was searched and material was found which proved that he had enjoyed close contacts with a nationalist news agency, led by a close friend, Ernst Knoll. Knoll’s office had been partly financed by a DNVP Reichstag deputy, and was co-operating closely with a DNVP office set up in order to exploit the Barmat affair.¹¹⁹ Kussmann admitted that he had conceived of the Barmat affair as an act of political cleansing directed against ‘parties which propagated socialism whilst secretly enriching themselves’.¹²⁰ Among the correspondence found in Knoll’s DNVP-affiliated news agency were letters to editors of all those right-wing media that played a prominent role in fanning the Barmat scandal, among them Hugenberg’s news agency, the Telegraphen-Union.¹²¹ The letters showed the careful orchestration of the nationalist media hype. For example, when material was made available to the Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung, Knoll followed it up with several letters of guidance to various other editors, like to those of the Deutsche Zeitung: ‘I have enclosed the copy of an article by the Bergisch-M¨arkische Zeitung, which in turn makes references to [an article in] Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung of Saturday afternoon No. 204. On its part, Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung will react to [the article in] Bergisch-M¨arkische Zeitung tomorrow morning, and it would be very desirable for achieving the said goal if you, too, would take up the issue and comment on it appropriately in the following issue.’¹²² In one of his private letters, Knoll highlighted the extent to which his orchestration was just assisting a news practice that was already operating very smoothly.¹²³ In the early hours of 31 December 1924, Kussmann launched a grand police action against the Barmats, staged in such a way as to guarantee maximum media attention.¹²⁴ The villa of Julius Barmat on the Schwanenwerder peninsula was surrounded, and a police boat cruised offshore to prevent any attempt to
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escape. Simultaneously about 100 police officers all over Berlin arrested the other three brothers and raided the various offices of the Barmat group. As intended, this highly theatrical coup made front-page news in almost all the papers in Berlin. Reports spoke of 300 or even 400 police officers and a flotilla of police boats involved in the operation.¹²⁵ Barmat became the topic talk of the day at every regular’s table, noted Adolf Stein with satisfaction in his column in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger.¹²⁶ This highly successful media launch of the Barmat story immediately attracted the criticism of the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts which accused the state prosecution of staging the arrests ‘in the form of a sensational film’.¹²⁷ Liberal papers also remarked on the co-operation of State Prosecution Office and media in creating highly marketable news.¹²⁸ Rather unusually, the state prosecution office refrained from giving an official account of the accusations against the Barmats.¹²⁹ The Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, on the other hand, was able to tell its readers that the arrest was because party-political connections had been used to secure loans from state-owned financial institutes, as well as enabling the Barmats to make very profitable deals with Reich offices and Reich companies. These were the exact claims that had been voiced against the SPD in the first round of the Barmat affair in the pre-election period.¹³⁰ The partisan press that had then engaged in the anti-SPD campaign simply recycled its articles and accusations.¹³¹ Many editors of papers that had not reported on the story earlier in 1924 now took up the theme.¹³² The scale of the operation initiated by the state prosecution office now gave credibility to these press claims. SCANDAL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON Although sensational in nature, the dramatic arrests of the Barmats would not have resulted in one of the Weimar Republic’s biggest media scandals had it not coincided with the up-coming election campaign for the Reich presidency in spring 1925.¹³³ Despite the damage to his reputation caused by the Magdeburg trial, Friedrich Ebert still constituted a formidable challenge to all those who were dissatisfied with the outcome of the revolution of 1918. The opportunity of smearing Social Democracy generally, and Ebert in particular, loomed large on journalists’ minds.¹³⁴ Again, as during the Magdeburg trial, the labelling in headlines became a focal point of political point-scoring. The agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung announced the arrest of several more Staatsbank officials under the headline ‘Giant expansion of Barmat scandal—Several Eastern Jews arrested’.¹³⁵ In contrast, the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts declared it a continuation of the ‘Staatsbank-Skandal’, highlighting the responsibility of the Staatsbank management.¹³⁶ Ullstein’s liberal Vossische Zeitung used the less polemical term ‘Barmat-Aff¨are’, while Berlin’s other renowned liberal daily, Mosse’s Berliner Tageblatt called it ‘Die Aff¨are Kutisker-Barmat’.¹³⁷ The struggle over the political interpretation of the events manifested in these various labels
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was itself newsworthy: ‘What is the name of the case?’ was the headline used by Georg Bernhard, the chief editor of the Vossische Zeitung, for his first front-page commentary on the affair.¹³⁸ He called it ‘The Seehandlung case’, putting it into the general context of business funding during the inflation period, and drawing parallels with the Stinnes business, which, in turn, led to violent polemics in the right-wing press.¹³⁹ With the arrest of the Barmat brothers, the affair had ceased to inhabit exclusively the pages of the party-political press. Editors all over Berlin knew—or had heard rumours—of the allegations made in the run-up to the December elections. They were, therefore, aware of the politically explosive potential of this affair, and their need to take a position in the wider spectrum of possible viewpoints. Ullstein’s liberal Berliner Morgenpost, for example, which in early December 1924 had ignored all ‘corruption’ charges against the SPD and the Barmats, reported of the arrests of Staatsbank officials on 30 December 1924 under the headline ‘Korruption!’; but in view of the right-wing rhetoric it continued the headline with the otherwise inexplicable ‘How it was in the past—The Monarchy covered up, the Republic overhauls’, with numerous examples of cases of corruption in the Wilhelmine Kaiserreich in the article itself.¹⁴⁰ On the other end of the political spectrum, the amount of coverage given to the Barmat story in Hugenberg’s newspapers was an interpretation in itself of the perceived gravity of the affair. Within the limited space of Scherl’s tabloid paper, the Nachtausgabe, the Barmat story loomed large, in contrast with the minor coverage given to the events by its competitor, Ullstein’s BZ am Mittag. The identity of the villain of the piece and the question of political responsibility became hotly contested issues. The right-wing press immediately defined the affair a ‘political scandal’ and fulminated against the perceived attempts of other papers ‘to pass on the blame from the main protagonists with the poetical foreign first and familiy names to the currently quite innocuous-appearing officials of the Prussian Seehandlung’.¹⁴¹ Vorw¨arts was indeed selling the affair as an ‘oldPrussian finance scandal’, explicitly countering the agitorial and anti-republican character of right-wing coverage. ‘For the German Nationalists, it is fact that the Seehandlungs scandal could only happen under the new regime and as a consequence of the republican constitution’, Vorw¨arts declared. ‘The diffusion of such false rumours through the right-wing press serves partly agitatorial ends against Social Democracy, partly it means to distract attention from the core of the scandal, the Staatsbank.’¹⁴² Within this context of general scandal-mongering by antagonistic newspapers, and conflicting accounts of what was at issue, editors recognized the need to place events within a story that would make a convincing political case. The right-wing Nationalpost believed this to be a service to the readership: ‘Increasingly, the Barmat scandal reveals itself to be a scandal of Social Democracy. Already now it has reached such dimensions and is constantly expanding further, that the startled newspaper reader is completely
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at a loss faced with the impact of the daily revelation avalanche. So what is the issue in essence? In a few words the following: . . .’¹⁴³ Then followed the accusation that leading Social Democrats had used their influence to secure state funds for the Barmats while benefiting financially from these transactions, both individually and as a party. The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts considered this article scandalous, but could not for the moment present an alternative version of events for lack of information. Whilst the attacks had mostly been led by the Communist Rote Fahne before the December elections, the Social Democrats now perceived themselves as victims of a distinctly right-wing attack.¹⁴⁴ It soon transpired, however, that the arrests of the Barmat brothers had been premature, and based on no factual evidence.¹⁴⁵ In the little time the state prosecution had spent on the Barmat files prior to the arrests, it was impossible to identify irregularities that would have justified these unprecedented steps.¹⁴⁶ In fact, it took the state prosecution office until December 1925 to define its charges against the Barmats.¹⁴⁷ When in March 1928 Julius Barmat was eventually sentenced to eleven months in prison, it was not for fraud but for bribery: Julius and Henry Barmat had met the head of the Reich postal ministry, Anton H¨ofle, in June 1924, who then received some RM 120,000 over the course of the next few months from them. In September 1924 the Barmats then applied for a loan from the Reich postal ministry, and H¨ofle agreed to grant them RM 14.5 million.¹⁴⁸ Giving the lie to the accusations voiced in the right-wing press, H¨ofle and another parliamentarian bribed by the Barmats were not Social Democrats but members of the Catholic Centre party. Overeager to fight Social Democracy, Kussmann had been looking for the wrong culprits. Rumours about substantial loans to the Barmats by the Reich postal ministry emerged shortly after the Barmats’ arrests. H¨ofle felt compelled to issue a statement through Wolff’s news agency: in order to avoid job losses in the Barmat business, he had granted them RM 14.5 million in October 1924, on the normal terms and conditions.¹⁴⁹ However, the Hugenberg papers claimed he had given the Barmats RM 45 million, paid out on explicit command of the minister, bypassing normal departmental procedure for reasons of secrecy.¹⁵⁰ They also reported that H¨ofle had authorized several loans which went towards enterprises in which a couple of his party colleagues were sitting on the supervisory board.¹⁵¹ On 9 January 1925, the Lokal-Anzeiger announced that the state prosecution was extending its investigation to include H¨ofle.¹⁵² Although H¨ofle denied the accusations, he tendered his resignation in view of the pending legal investigation. Even after his resignation, H¨ofle kept denying the exaggerated accusations voiced against him, but his resignation gave these claims a credibility that the right-wing media skilfully exploited.¹⁵³ The exact circumstances of H¨ofle’s misdemeanours only became known much later, over the course of the trial of the Barmats in 1927.
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The fact that H¨ofle was a member of the Catholic Centre party did not deflect the thrust of the right-wing attacks in early 1925: the lead commentary of Hugenberg’s tabloid, the Nachtausgabe, following H¨ofle’s resignation carried the headline ‘Social Democracy in Barmat-Quagmire’.¹⁵⁴ The Centre party was spared the wholesale condemnation by the right-wing press from which Social Democrats suffered, primarily because of the complex negotiations under way to form a coalition which followed the resignation of Marx and his cabinet after the December Reichstag elections.¹⁵⁵ Although theoretically a Grand Coalition of SPD, Centre party, DDP, and DVP would have been possible, the DVP categorically rejected such an option and demanded the formation of a bourgeois ‘Rechtsblock’, which included both the Centre party and the DNVP. Negotiations took more than a month before Hans Luther could finally announce his cabinet on 15 January 1925. It was an openly bourgeois coalition of the Right. The SPD almost relished its relegation to the role of main opposition party, promising the new government a ‘ruthless fight’.¹⁵⁶ Within the framework of this newly defined politics of confrontation, the SPD constituted a prime target in the Barmat affair. In Prussia, the situation was different. Here the DVP had left the coalition with SPD, DDP, and Zentrum after the December elections. This left Otto Braun with a minority government. The subsequent government crisis lasted until April 1925.¹⁵⁷ This crisis not only provided good headlines; right-wing journalists also hoped to bring down the government—perhaps even the whole democratic system.¹⁵⁸ The involvement of SPD and Centre politicians in the Barmat affair enabled their political opponents to apply the term ‘Barmat-Block’ to the Prussian coalition.¹⁵⁹ The different roles of the Catholic Centre party at the Reich and Prussian levels also explained the difference in tone and style of the investigation of the affair in the Reichstag and Prussian Landtag parliamentary committees. The former was of practically no significance, whilst in the latter the political conflict was carried to extremes.¹⁶⁰ When in January 1925 the Prussian Landtag reconvened for the first time after its Christmas break, the DNVP tabled the motion for an investigating committee to look into the affair. Over the following months, it was press accusations that set the agenda for the investigating committee which needed a total of fifty-two sessions to distinguish between fact and fiction.¹⁶¹ Its final report was issued only on 12 October 1925, and its apparently arbitrary preoccupation with inconsequential facts cannot easily be understood without a knowledge of the gross media hype that surrounded the affair. Although the official subject of the investigation was supposed to be the question of the Staatsbank loans to the Barmats, it hardly featured in the committee’s deliberations.¹⁶² On innumerable occasions, parliamentarians tabled motions to hear further evidence on the basis of press allegations.¹⁶³ So blatant did this become that during the tenth session of the committee, the agenda-setting role of the press was brought into question: ‘Tomorrow some
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journalist publishes any odd story. Immediately, someone in the committee will thereupon table a motion,’ criticized one SPD member, and a DDP member pointed out that if the committee continued to react to all press allegations they would have to extend the hearings until 1950.¹⁶⁴ For the DNVP deputy chairman of the committee, however, there was no longer any distinction between published and public opinion; he considered it his duty ‘to investigate rumours, certain assertions, which appear in the press in public’.¹⁶⁵ He was no examining magistrate, nor a detective, he complained: ‘From where am I meant to get leads? What has been claimed in the press, in the public at large, has to be investigated, in order to cleanse the atmosphere completely.’¹⁶⁶ Ironically, therefore, the press became the prime force in the alleged attempt to cleanse the political atmosphere which journalists had almost single-handedly poisoned themselves. The willingness of politicians to let the press dominate the agenda was remarkable, particularly considering the many complaints individual members made about their treatment at its hands.¹⁶⁷ After one of these complaints, the committee’s chairman called on the press to refrain from mudslinging, but added: ‘I am not saying that it ought to be objective, because it would then become boring.’¹⁶⁸ According to the minutes, this remark met with ‘great amusement’ on the side of other committee members. The situation was no different in the Reichstag, where the first debate on the affair also showed politicians to be under the influence of the first phase of newspaper coverage. The Communist Stoecker demanded an immediate discussion of the ‘stinking corruption scandals’ which he said engrossed all the press and the public.¹⁶⁹ Like Deerberg, Stoecker and probably most other politicians, derived their concept of ¨ ‘Offentlichkeit’ from the press. The activities of the Prussian investigation committee reached a first climax at the end of January 1925, when it invited Gustav Bauer to give evidence. Bauer, SPD member of the Reichstag and, between May 1921 and November 1922, Reich chancellor as well as minister of finance, had helped Barmat to win food import contracts from various Reich offices. He had also entered into business relations with Barmat upon leaving office, though only once, when helping with one scrap-metal deal for which he received a commission. Their relationship came to an end in late 1923, when Bauer and Barmat fell out over the amount of money that Bauer was to receive for that deal.¹⁷⁰ Bauer’s ventures into the business world did not receive the wholehearted support of his party, ‘because the opinion prevailed that what might be a matter of course for bourgeois members of parliament was not suitable for a Social Democrat’, as Vorw¨arts later explained.¹⁷¹ Some of this unease about his relations with Barmat was evident in Bauer’s own behaviour. In early December 1924, when press reports first mentioned that he was a board member of one of the Barmat enterprises, he kept silent; in early January 1925, after the arrest of the Barmats, he issued a denial.¹⁷²
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Consequently, he did not cut a convincing figure when being cross-examined by the Prussian investigation committee. It transpired that he had exercised his influence on behalf of Barmat much more frequently than his earlier denials had suggested.¹⁷³ Even more damaging for Bauer was his concession that, contrary to his earlier denials (which right-wing papers had been forced to publish under the threat of the press law), he had indeed been sitting on the supervisory board of one of Barmat’s enterprises. However, repeatedly pressed on this issue, he denied having received any financial renumeration from Barmat.¹⁷⁴ Only a few days later, in early February 1925, however, the Lokal-Anzeiger published an article in which it reprinted a letter from Barmat’s company to Bauer during the time of their dispute in late 1923, which listed the various occasions on which Bauer had allegedly received money from Barmat.¹⁷⁵ The SPD promptly asked Bauer to resign his Reichstag seat. Bauer’s resignation, like H¨ofle’s, was widely portrayed as proof of most of the previous allegations.¹⁷⁶ T H E P RO L I F E R AT I O N O F S C A N D A L ‘Day after day a mud current of suspicions and accusations and invectives is emanating from the right-wing press against men who hold public office’, complained the chief editor of Mosse’s Berliner Volks-Zeitung, the DDP politician Otto Nuschke in January 1925.¹⁷⁷ Whilst Nuschke’s paper was itself highly critical of Barmat and his connections to Social Democratic politicians, it deplored the way the affair played into the hands of the DNVP. Nuschke therefore attempted to neutralize the political capital made out of the ‘Barmat-Ausschuß ’, as the investigating committee of the Prussian parliament was widely called. On 29 January 1925—the same day that saw Bauer give testimony to the investigation committee—Nuschke tabled a motion to broaden the investigation to include events at the Prussian Landespfandbriefanstalt where the director had just resigned: rather than providing funds for house building right-wing officials had apparently lost millions in real-estate speculations. Significantly, Nuschke explicitly based his motion on information he taken from the press.¹⁷⁸ Nuschke obviously hoped this would damage the DNVP. The Social Democrats considered it more profitable to demand a separate investigating committee, in which the events surrounding the Landespfandbriefanstalt would be given undivided attention. Ullstein’s BZ am Mittag deemed all this sufficiently sensational to devote a front page to it, declaring it ‘The new scandal in the Landespfandbriefamt’.¹⁷⁹ By chance, the Reichstag provided the Social Democrats with a much more spectacular topic on the same day that the right-wing press concentrated on Bauer’s testimony. In the Reichstag budgetary committee the newly appointed DNVP finance minister von Schlieben had been forced to reveal that the government was paying out over RM 700 million to the Ruhr industry in
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compensation for losses suffered in 1923. The Ruhr industrialists had complained that they were carrying the main financial burden of the declaration of a general strike after the occupation of the Ruhr by the French in January 1923. The decision to reimburse them for the losses incurred was based on an informal pledge of the then Reich chancellor Stresemann, and had been finally taken by the outgoing Marx government in December 1924. As the Social Democrats now pointed out, there had been no law authorizing the government to take such action, nor had the government made the decision public. It had merely published an announcement in the Reichsanzeiger which stated an unlimited ‘duty of recompensation’. The fact that the money had not even been accounted for in the Reich budget constituted a clear violation of parliamentary budgetary obligations. Vorw¨arts turned it into a front page story, declaring: ‘Is this not a much greater scandal than anything which has been revealed in connection to Kutisker, Barmat and Michael? In the one case nonfeasances or misdoings of subordinate officials, here decisions of the highest authorities, if not even of the entire Reich government . . .’.¹⁸⁰ The Ullstein press followed suit, devoting the front page of the Berliner Morgenpost to this issue.¹⁸¹ The right-wing press, on the other hand, barely touched upon the disclosure. The government that had taken the decision originally, Hugenberg’s Tag pointed out, had enjoyed the support of the SPD, too. The issue of the Ruhr money, the Scherl papers declared, was Vorw¨arts’ failed attempt to create a scandal; the Landespfandbriefanstalt affair equally a failure of the democratic press.¹⁸² In the case of the Landespfandbriefanstalt none of the officials involved had benefited from their decisions in any way. According to the Tag, the whole affair was without public interest. Just what was of interest to the public was difficult to determine in the days following Bauer’s testimony to the Prussian investigation committee in late January 1925, the disclosure of the Ruhr compensation and the loans of the Landespfandbriefanstalt. News coverage was neither balanced nor complete. Indeed, the news policy of the various papers became once again subject to fierce criticism from other papers. ‘Whilst in the investigation committee on the Barmat affair the most terrible source of corruption is being revealed blow by blow, the united marxist democratic press manages to keep secret all those conclusions through coarsest hypocrisy’, commented the v¨olkisch Deutsche Tageblatt. ‘Instead they construct a ‘‘finance scandal of the right-wing bloc’’ by means of mendacity, distortion and with scarce material.’¹⁸³ Even a paper like the Berliner B¨orsen-Zeitung, which focused on economic and financial issues, ignored the Ruhr payments and the Landespfandbriefanstalt. Instead, it published a series of extended front-page stories with ‘inside’ information on the Barmat’s ‘corruption machine’.¹⁸⁴ Vorw¨arts accused BBZ of sensationalism, but itself published a letter which showed that H¨ofle had intervened on Barmat’s behalf with his fellow ministers.¹⁸⁵ The Ruhr payments, in comparison, held little excitement: the present Reich government was only executing directives
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that a former government had formulated, and it had promised an official memorandum which would account for the decision. The Barmat affair was excellent news material not only because of the constant stream of revelations that it provided but also because its consequences were so spectacular. On Friday 6 February, Bauer resigned his parliamentary seat because of the Barmat letter published by the Lokal-Anzeiger. Three days later, H¨ofle, further to his resignation as minister, also resigned his parliamentary seat; the day after that he was arrested. On 13 February, the Prussian interior minister Severing sent police president Richter on leave; the following week the Amtliche Preußische Pressedienst announced that the Prussian Staatsministerium had decided to send Richter into interim retirement.¹⁸⁶ Only Ernst Heilmann, leader of the Social Democratic faction in the Prussian Landtag, survived the affair, despite his well-known friendship to Barmat. His statement to the investigating committee in early February 1925 revealed no compromising information, and gave the right-wing press only little further ammunition: Barmat had only contributed a total of around RM 50,000 to the Social Democratic cause over the last six years, a figure which fell considerably short of the sums that had been alleged in the press.¹⁸⁷ Heilmann also reported that he had intervened with the Prussian finance minister on 8 December 1924 to support Barmat’s request for further funds. Although many commentators did consider this intervention questionable, Heilmann could not be accused of any improper acts.¹⁸⁸ Encouraged by the list of prominent casualties, German Nationalists now switched their attention to the ultimate prize, Friedrich Ebert. In early February 1925, the DNVP tabled a motion in the Prussian investigating committee demanding to hear evidence on Ebert’s knowledge of his office’s dealings with Barmat. The session on 23 February of the investigating committee established that Barmat had indeed received letters of recommendation with the letterhead of the presidential office from one of the office’s employees. Eight months later, in the final sitting of the Barmat-Ausschuß, Ebert was acquitted of any sort of wrongdoing.¹⁸⁹ On 23 February, however, the Ebert–Barmat connection made provocative front-page headlines, while the non-existence of alleged monopoly contracts and profit participation was considered less interesting. Vorw¨arts and the Catholic Germania were united in their distaste of such artificial generation of scandal by the ‘Rechtspresse’: ‘For weeks this motion has been published by the German Nationalist press, and the virtuous German Nationalist readers were naturally convinced because of the respectability of their party that where there is so much smoke there is also fire.’¹⁹⁰ T H E C O N S E QU E N C E S O F S C A N D A L Although Ebert would easily have survived the attacks aimed at him politically in 1924 and 1925, he did not survive them physically. According to Ebert’s
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friend, Gustav Noske, the president was hounded to death through ‘shameful baiting that an abysmally despiteful press had long been engaging in until the final days’.¹⁹¹ Ebert refused to undergo medical treatment to stand up to the political attacks. ‘Because he was exposed to new accusation in the Barmat investigation committee every day, he remained—tortured by pain—in office’, Noske recalled later. ‘On Monday, 23 February, I was again . . . with him, this time for the last time. . . . While he was bending over with pain, he talked with deep bitterness how he was suffering from the baiting that had been organized against him for years.’¹⁹² On 26 February, his doctors diagnosed acute appendicitis and peritonitis, and Ebert underwent an emergency operation. He died on 28 February 1925. With Ebert dead, H¨ofle arrested, Bauer out of office, and Richter sent into retirement, the Barmat affair had spent itself.¹⁹³ Although Heilmann remained subject to repeated attacks due to his relationship with Barmat, scandal-mongering newspapers found no proof of personal gains.¹⁹⁴ By mid-March, most of the people initially arrested at the same time as the Barmats had had to be released by the state prosecution office, which had altered its charges against the Barmats three times in as many months.¹⁹⁵ The death of Friedrich Ebert, followed by his state burial and then by the nomination by each party of its candidate for the presidential elections, completely dominated the news in early March 1925. The sessions of the Prussian Barmat committee lumbered on until October, but they received considerably less coverage than before Ebert’s death, and by mid-March several newspapers had declared the Barmat scandal dead.¹⁹⁶ The name ‘Barmat’, however, did continue to haunt the political discourse of the following months; the affair was repeatedly brought up in party political propaganda. Ebert had only just been buried when the DNVP produced leaflets highlighting his responsibility for letting the Barmats into Germany.¹⁹⁷ In the Reichstag, the Communist Remmele interrupted the eulogies to the deceased Reich president by declaring that the six years of his presidency had consisted of ‘six years of corruption . . . six years of Barmatism, six years of robbery of public money by notorious profiteers and frauds . . .’.¹⁹⁸ Already in early February, the Communists had published a brochure, Barmat und seine Partei, which summarized the allegations of corruption that the Rote Fahne had printed.¹⁹⁹ The DNVP followed suit in early March, with ‘The Kustiker–Barmat scandal—According to the publications of the press up to now’.²⁰⁰ ‘The press’, in this case, was the Pan-German Deutsche Zeitung, from which all excerpts had been taken—a fact kept hidden from the reader. The right-wing parties eventually nominated the former Reich interior minister and mayor of Duisburg, Karl Jarres, as their candidate. Otto Braun, for the SPD, and Wilhelm Marx, former Reich chancellor of the Catholic Centre, stood little chance of gaining more votes than Jarres.²⁰¹ The right-wing contingent behind Jarres, the Reichsblock, used the Barmat affair extensively in its election
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campaign. When Vorw¨arts polemicized against this ‘scandal campaign’ it was attacked by Hugenberg’s Tag, which proclaimed that the Social Democrats had good reason to be afraid of the upcoming ‘Barmat elections’.²⁰² The Barmats were also a popular topic at election rallies. In his description of a rally in the Berlin Sportpalast, Carl von Ossietzky emphasized the importance of the Barmat affair as a common rhetorical denomination that united the Reichsblock in its opposition to Social Democracy: ‘Four speakers perform, four speakers from different political groupings, but they all operate consistently with the Barmat–Kutisker-scandal. One gentleman from the Vaterl¨andische Vereine has the gall to ask why the Social Democrats have not nominated Herr Barmat instead of Herr Braun, and minutes of jubilations reward this effrontery.’²⁰³ None of the candidates received the necessary absolute majority in the first round of the presidential election, necessitating a second round in which a relative majority would suffice for victory. Since both Braun and Marx were candidates for the presidential office and potential candidates for the post of Prussian minister-president, the two parties struck a deal: Braun withdrew from the presidental election and was elected in Prussia with the support of the Catholic Centre on 3 April; in return, the SPD supported Marx, who also received the support of the liberals, for the presidency.²⁰⁴ Against Marx as the candidate of the so-called Volksblock Jarres was likely to lose, so the Reichsblock exchanged him for Paul von Hindenburg. The nomination of the old field marshal sent shock-waves through the German political system. The vote for the president looked likely to turn into a vote on the Republic. The SPD executive saw the republic in danger, and pointed in particular at the efforts of its political opponents to mobilize non-voters: ‘every libel is played out anew, all lies newly lied . . .’.²⁰⁵ Indeed, the Reichsblock heightened its anti-republican rhetoric and encouraged the German electorate to vote for ‘Schwarz-Weiß-Rot’, the colours of the old Kaiserreich, and against the republican ‘Schwarz-Rot-Gold’. The union of Social Democrats and Catholic Centre lent itself to the label ‘Barmatblock’. The rightwing agrarian Reichs-Landbund drew on the anti-Social Democratic files in its extensive newspaper-clippings collection to produce leaflets on Barmat that were distributed throughout the countryside.²⁰⁶ A spate of right-wing pamphlets in late March and in April aimed to highlight the corruption inherent in the republican system in general, and in Social Democracy in particular: Barmat and his Friends by Hugenberg’s star columnist Adolf Stein; From Rathenau to Barmat, by the anti-Semitic writer Otto Armin; and, most controversially, The Barmat Quagmire, by Dr Kaufhold.²⁰⁷ Kaufhold was a member of the Prussian Barmat committee. The pamphlet contained numerous inaccuracies and polemically distorted the findings of the committee. It became a hotly contested issue within the investigating committee on 4 April, when the committee voted to distance itself publicly from the publication.²⁰⁸ Newspaper coverage of this session mostly ignored the vote, whilst often using the title of the publication for headlines.²⁰⁹
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The decision to call Julius Barmat as a witness before the investigating committee a few days before the elections was also influenced by election strategies. The fact that nothing incriminating was revealed by questioning Barmat was withheld from the public.²¹⁰ Six days before the decisive second round of the election, former Reich Post minister H¨ofle died in custody from an overdose of medication. His death intensified the existing antagonism in the press. The Catholic Centre party, unnerved by the constant barrage of propaganda against its presidential candidate, Marx, reacted strongly. On its front page, Germania raged against the political opponents: ‘For months they, the organs of the right-wing bloc, have fumed and fulminated against Barmat and Barmat comrades. They hoped to hit a political system, and they only hit a poor ill human.’²¹¹ Germania harshly criticized the state prosecution office, which had kept H¨ofle in custody despite his deteriorating condition. The reasons for H¨ofle’s sudden arrest came under scrutiny, and again it transpired that the the press had provoked his premature arrest and the subsequent strict detention: the state prosecution had acted on the basis of an article anonymously published by a DNVP member of the Prussian parliament in the Deutsche Zeitung, which had—wrongly—accused H¨ofle of secretly destroying official files after his resignation.²¹² Vorw¨arts declared his death cold-blooded ‘Justizmord ’, pointing at the state prosecution’s decision to have H¨ofle pumped full with narcotics to keep him available for questioning.²¹³ The right-wing press claimed it had been suicide, interpreting it as an admission of guilt on H¨ofle’s part.²¹⁴ The autopsy seemed to indicate that death had not been self-inflicted; but there was room for doubt.²¹⁵ The investigation committee set up to clarify this issue did not deliver a conclusive verdict. In July 1925, after twenty-six sessions, the committee announced that the state prosecution office had lacked proper judgement and tact in the H¨ofle case, and self-determined suicide could not be proven.²¹⁶ For Social Democrats, however, it was clear that the Barmat press campaign was to blame. ‘There would be no H¨ofle case if there had not existed a German Nationalist and Communist campaign against this man’, explained the Social Democrat Ernst Kuttner during the final session of the H¨ofle investigation committee. ‘The German Nationalists created a mood of pogrom within the population; . . . the concurrent terror affected civil servants. The indirect cause of death of H¨ofle is: baiting and slander.’²¹⁷ In the plenary discussion of the findings in October, many members of the coalition parties joined Kuttner in blaming H¨ofle’s death on the malicious press campaign of their political opponents: they had created a ‘Barmat psychosis, to which unfortunately also judges, state prosecutors, civil servants and doctors fell prey’.²¹⁸ The presidential election of 26 April 1925 demonstrated that the Barmat press campaign had influenced more than just a few judges, civil servants, and professionals. The damage done to the credibility of SPD and Centre party
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was such that Hindenburg was elected president, with a small majority of just 900,000 votes over Marx. One of the main reasons for Hindenburg’s narrow victory was the Reichsblock’s success in mobilizing former non-voters. Six years after the foundation of the Republic, the promise offered by a former Prussian general and convinced monarchist to restore social harmony and guarantee non-partisanship in the president’s office struck a chord with the German electorate.²¹⁹ Hindenburg’s election could have meant the ultimate demise of the Barmat affair, yet the revelation of Kussmann’s press connections in summer 1925 revived media interest shortly. The belated discovery that Barmat’s spectacular arrest and the judicial proceedings against him had been based on political motives and designed to produce a media scandal in the run-up to the presidential elections did not result in a dramatic reversal of published opinion. On the contrary, the media response to these revelations was indicative of the partisan coverage that had accompanied the Barmat affair from the beginning. Vorw¨arts, Germania, and the liberal papers considered the events scandalous;²²⁰ the right-wing press described the raid on Kussmann’s appartment as a result of political pressure on the state prosecution;²²¹ the Communists labelled it both ‘judicial corruption’ and ‘Barmat relief campaign’.²²² Where the Barmats were concerned, the Communist paper pointed out, it was not the origins of the incriminating material but their authenticity that mattered.²²³ Many papers, however, just noted the initial house-search, and gave coverage to Kussmann’s denial.²²⁴ Headlines like ‘Echo of the Barmat scandal’ reaffirmed the political interpretation of earlier coverage.²²⁵ Kussmann’s testimony to the Barmat committee in September was often completely ignored. He was later put on trial for the malfeasance of leaking official material in pending proceedings. Ironically, however, before the court could reach a verdict, his case was dropped under the general amnesty that Hindenburg declared on political offenders late in 1925.²²⁶ On 14 October 1925, the Vorw¨arts reported the conclusions of the Barmat committee in a small note headlined ‘End of the scandal’. The committee had established that the loans given to the Barmats by the Staatsbank had not resulted in a direct or indirect financial advantage to any of the politicians involved, even if some of them—in particular Bauer and Richter—could be reproached for careless behaviour and insufficient caution in their private relations with the family. Ebert, the committee explicitly stated, had maintained a spotless reputation. Vorw¨arts editor Kuttner, who was a member of the committee, blamed the apparent discrepancy between accusations and findings on the press: ‘If the findings of the committee diverge so completely from that which a sensation-craving baiting press has led the population to believe for months, this is not caused by the attempt to hush up or cover up something, but by the unscrupulousness of this muckraking.’²²⁷ However, interest in the affair had by this stage completely evaporated. Moreover, the unspectacular findings of the committee were no match for the big news-story
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of mid-October, Stresemann’s negotiations in Locarno, widely depicted as a sequel to the Versailles negotiations. While Stresemann performed his balancing act in the limelight of public attention, the Barmats faded out of view. What remained of them was the memory of a huge, unsavoury spectacle which had tarnished the reputation of Germany’s new parliamentary democracy. C O N C LU S I O N During the Magdeburg trial, the Social Democratic Vorw¨arts hoped that revelations about the DNVP manipulation of witnesses and the press would help to improve the political culture in Weimar Germany: ‘Their manœuvres will repel all those still numerous members in all parties in the country who slowly want to lift our people out of the atmosphere of poisoned struggle to more dignified forms of political competition.’²²⁸ The opposite was the case: this atmosphere of vicious polemics, accusations, and counter-accusations rife through the media inspired state prosecutor Kussmann to set out on further political crusades—in co-operation with right-wing newspapers. The individual action of this one judicial official triggered off what would otherwise not have become a political scandal. In the long term, the combination of a predominantly anti-republican judiciary enabling and ‘protecting’ anti-republican press polemics proved lethal to the legitimacy of Weimar democracy.²²⁹ Certainly, the Barmat scandal in 1925 had none of the legitimizing effects that some theorists attribute to political scandal.²³⁰ The whole affair allowed commentators to embark on anti-Semitic, anti-socialist, and anti-democratic polemics which intensified existing political antagonism. The impression was created that the reputation of parliamentarism had seriously suffered. V¨olkisch commentators gloated that ‘the so-called Republic could hardly lose any more of its reputation’.²³¹ Democratic observers, too, were worried about the effects of the hostile press campaign. One Austrian correspondent in Berlin considered it more dangerous than previous military coups: ‘There is no denying the fact that of all reactionary initiatives against the Republic the scandal campaign is the most dangerous.’²³² This was an accurate observation. Friedrich Ebert was destroyed: first by Magdeburg, after which he made up his mind not to stand again; then by the Barmat committee, which he accorded higher priority than his health—a lethal calculation, as it turned out. It was a political atmosphere in which former Reichs minister H¨ofle died in prison, pumped up with narcotics to allow further interrogation by the state prosecution. Gustav Bauer died, too, if only politically. He struggled long to re-establish his reputation; it took him until May 1926 to be readmitted to his party.²³³ Newspapers relayed stories like Magdeburg and Barmat to a wider audience in the country that had neither alternative sources of knowledge nor
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immediate access to information about Reich politics: to the great majority of German citizens, politics in the Republic were exactly as the newspapers depicted them. Of course, it is difficult to determine the exact impact of the polemics which accompanied the Magdeburg trial and the Barmat scandal. There are numerous levels of audiences. A few indications suggest that ‘the man on the street’ constituted a very receptive audience: immediately after the Magdeburg trial, Stein published his collected commentaries as a pamphlet, Ebert’s Trial, which sold 100,000 copies within a few weeks.²³⁴ He repeated this feat with another conglomerate of his articles, Barmat and his Friends, shortly before the second round of the presidential elections.²³⁵ Recently published recollections of Weimar Germany also indicate the extent to which the presentation of the Magdeburg trial in the media shaped especially young people’s perception of Ebert, 1918, and the Republic.²³⁶ Members of the Prussian investigating committee complained about the formidable load of daily correspondence concerning the Barmat affair they received from members of the public.²³⁷ On another level, politicians and their preoccupation with political news provided another audience. Here, circumstancial evidence for the effects of newspaper coverage can be found in the terminology of parliamentary discourse. ‘Quagmire’, ‘furuncle’, and ‘stench’, on the one hand, ‘dirt’, ‘rubbish’, and ‘dung’, on the other, were terms which consistently pervaded commentaries, to the extent that their ubiquity was considered poisonous to political culture. ‘Let us do away with all this disgusting corruption-muckraking’, one left-liberal journalist appealed in March 1925. ‘It only serves to poison the atmosphere . . .’.²³⁸ The terminology of the Barmat scandal spread by the media affected the political atmosphere significantly in 1925. Politicians who were exposed to this press coverage over several weeks and months reacted to the strong language that they encountered in the papers, either by picking it up or by dismissing it in equally strong terms, which again gave the press something to report on. This interaction of politicians and journalists led to an increasingly vicious circle of opprobrious discourse, which influenced the way parliament worked. It was not really surprising that there was genuine dissatisfaction with the way the investigating committee functioned. ‘[Here] the different party directions collide with unrestrained passion and drastic terminology’, noted one journalist in March 1925.²³⁹ The partisan spirit inherent in all polemics triumphed over objective fact-finding, and the parliamentary system seemed unable to clarify the contested issues.²⁴⁰ More generally, newspapers were crucial in constructing and maintaining competing perceptions of reality. The Barmat scandal was thus confirmation of nationalists’ long-held views of the present, which compared unfavourably with the allegedly more glorious past.²⁴¹ The ‘non-republicans’, as Tag labelled itself, claimed they wanted to depict present conditions to show the German population the nature of the system of which it needed to rid itself.²⁴² Political corruption, the
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right-wing media claimed, was an exclusive feature of democracy, and a hitherto unknown phenomenon in German and Prussian history.²⁴³ Thus, the narrative combination of the Magdeburg trial and the Barmat scandal served as a means to win over the reading public to a world-view in which Barmat stood for the ‘corruption economy which has prevailed in the post-November-revolutionary epoch in Germany . . . when Social Democracy took up political leadership in the German Reich’.²⁴⁴ Their liberal and left-wing colleagues could not win: if they ignored the charges, their opponents declared them to be true; if they pointed out that corruption had already existed in the Kaiserreich, their opponents gleefully interpreted that as an admission that in the present affair one was indeed dealing with corruption.²⁴⁵ Similarly, any rejection of the exaggerated charges levelled at the Barmats was interpreted as a sign of complicity, and therefore proof of the charges. Hostility to the new political system found a suitable target in what some contemptuously labelled ‘a black-red-yellow scandal’.²⁴⁶ Hence, the strategy of Democrats and Social Democrats to come up with competing scandals also backfired. In view of the opprobrious discourse accompanying all the scandalizing, observers could not help feeling that an era of scandals was indeed being ushered in. The media exploitation of the Magdeburg trial and the Barmat scandal did not pay off for one particular party: all the anti-Barmat/SPD propaganda that the Reichsblock could muster did not suffice to get the DVP party politician Jarres elected in the first round of the presidential elections. However, the moment the right-wing parties could present, in Hindenburg, a candidate who could be credibly presented to be standing above (democratic) partisan politics, the majority of the electorate responded. Magdeburg and Barmat provided the right kind of political backdrop in front of which Hindenburg could be cast as the ‘Retter’, Germany’s saviour, as right-wing propaganda hailed him.²⁴⁷ The key to his success lay in the mobilization of former non-voters, and their dissatisfaction with the present system. At the same time, his victory was a very close-run thing. It is questionable whether Hindenburg would have scraped into office without four months of media barrage aimed at discrediting the Republic. The Magdeburg trial and the Barmat scandal did great damage to Weimar’s political culture: by the creation of scapegoats, enemies, and pariahs, political divisions in Germany were deepened, antagonism strengthened, and the legitimacy of the political system undermined. The terminology of 1924–5 was of long-lasting influence. Magdeburg and Barmat provided commentators and politicians with an imagery that could be reused for years to come, since it had been invested with a certain amount of legitimacy. Novembermord, Parteibonze, and System were not, as has sometimes been suggested, National Socialist inventions to denigrate the republic.²⁴⁸ They were part of the right-wing vocabulary, which had gained credibility at the occasion of political trials and scandals, and which had been spread by the media
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for years. In this respect, the election of Hindenburg was, in fact, a mixed blessing: on the one hand, it showed how an anti-republican majority could be mobilized; on the other, it did at least provide a period of respite for the Weimar Republic, a cease-fire in the media’s onslaught on the Republic’s legitimacy.
4 The ‘Unpolitical’ Press: Provincial Newspapers around Berlin, 1925–8 What we know about society, yes, about the world in which we live, we know from the mass media. Niklas Luhmann, Die Realit¨at der Massenmedien (Opladen, 1996), 9.
On the night of Sunday 26 April 1925, many citizens of the small Brandenburg town of Oranienburg who wanted to find out about the outcome of the Reich presidency election gathered in front of their local newspaper publishing house, where updates of the election counts were projected on the walls. Despite the incessant rain, many stayed until long after midnight, when the incoming results from rural constituencies tipped the balance of the close race in favour of Hindenburg.¹ Editors of the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt worked through the night to publish a special edition on Monday morning carrying the sensational news that the veteran field marshal had been elected as new Reich president. On Tuesday, the paper was mostly devoted to the outcome of the election, reactions to it from abroad, and, among the extensive local news, reports of events on election day as well as the individual results for the various district towns and villages. Editors were sure that their local readership would study this edition carefully, and they did not miss the opportunity of advertising for their own paper: the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt, a big advertisement pointed out, was the local paper of record. Due to its many supplements it featured more reading material than any other local paper; it also claimed to report quickly and reliably about all noteworthy events ‘within the closer and wider fatherland and abroad’.² This advertisement, like the whole Tuesday edition, makes clear why Berlin papers stood no real chance of finding a wider reading audience outside the metropolis, even in a town like Oranienburg, less than 35 km from central Berlin. Apart from entertainment value, readers subscribed to a paper primarily for the local news, eager to find out about what happened in their immediate surrounding area: information on the Landrat’s action on an outbreak of swine fever was much more relevant than news of a tram accident in BerlinWedding. No Berlin newspaper provided information on the election results in Oranienburg, Bernau, and Liebenwalde, not to mention tiny villages like Werder
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bei Rehfelde or Vogelsdorf. An advertisement of the Oranienburger Bank would have been completely wasted in a Berlin paper. To increase further the appeal to a local readership, the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt carried the sub-title Bernauer Zeitung, as well as calling itself Tageblatt f¨ur Altlandsberg, Neuenhagen und Hoppegarten. In Oranienburg itself, it even appeared under a completely different name, Oranienburger General-Anzeiger; in the small town of Liebenwalde, it was called Zeitung f¨ur Liebenwalde. In Oranienburg, there was just the one paper; in Bernau, the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt was competing with the Bernauer General-Anzeiger, which, however, appeared only three times a week.³ If a citizen of Bernau moved about 20 km to the south-west, to Berlin-Pankow, he or she could choose from nearly seventy daily Berlin papers. The density of the Berlin newspaper market stood in stark contrast to the world of the provincial press. Like Bernau and Oranienburg, a typical small town in Weimar Germany would have one or two local newspapers at most. Unlike Berlin, where readers would often receive two or even three daily editions, provincial readers were satisfied if they could enjoy a newspaper every day of the week: a third of Germany’s newspapers appeared three times a week or less in 1925.⁴ Circulation was also much lower than in Berlin: several studies during the 1920s established that 67 per cent of all papers had a circulation of fewer than 5,000 copies; around 84 per cent ran at under 10,000.⁵ Tabloid papers and street sales were unknown; retailing centred on weekly or monthly subscriptions. In rural areas, the state of informedness also depended on the season. The long working hours in agriculture meant that newspaper reading was a luxury often reserved to the winter months. Once the harvest began, subscriptions to some local papers slumped by up to 50 per cent.⁶ Many of the provincial newspapers had been established in the last decades of the nineteenth century by local jobbing printers who wanted to reduce the long hours of inactivity of their printing machinery. These enterprises were usually undercapitalized and economically unstable. Often they did not even have an editorial board: they were run as one-man businesses and involved a lot of cutting and pasting. Quite a number of them used so-called Matern—commercially available ready-made typesets—to which only a local section including the advertisements needed to be added. In many cases the only difference between one paper and another was the different title, as was the case with the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt and the Oranienburger General-Anzeiger. Many critics condemned these purely commercial publications, calling them ‘parasites’ that lived off reprinting other papers’ articles.⁷ But while newspapers from the capital were often the source of inspiration for the relatively short political sections of the local press, the true strength of local papers lay in the provision of local news and advertisements. This demand for local news resulted in a regionally fragmented, decentralized German press, in which Berlin papers held little appeal to people outside Berlin, with the possible exception of local editors. In terms of available information, contemporaries of the Weimar Republic were experiencing totally different situations, depending on whether they lived
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in an urban context with its multiple, competing, channels of communication or in a provincial town or village with limited access to information beyond the immediate local sphere. The extent to which this different media experience resulted in a different outlook on politics has never been analysed. Of course, it is impossible for any study to look at the total of some 3,300 daily papers in Germany, not least because only few of them have been collected for future use.⁸ But fortunately a great number of local papers have survived in the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, mostly from the Brandenburg province. This allows us to take a sample of local newspapers from a relatively clearly defined region, and to look at their particular character and the coverage of current affairs in provincial Germany. The Prussian province of Brandenburg was typical in many respects. In 1932, there was a total of 256 newspapers appearing in 169 different towns in Brandenburg. They tended to have a slightly lower circulation than the average across the Reich: 75 per cent running at under 5,000 copies; 90 per cent at under 10,000. The percentage of dailies, around 70 per cent of all newspapers, was only a fraction higher than the Reich average. Almost every fourth paper was a sub-edition, having the same content as the main edition but appearing under a different name. Only just over 7 per cent of all Brandenburg newspapers were left wing in political orientation, a fraction less than the Reich average.⁹ The nine newspapers analysed for this chapter appeared in six towns: Brandenburg, Wittenberge, Prenzlau, Angerm¨unde, Bernau, and K¨onigswusterhausen.¹⁰ Local papers were the main source of information for the inhabitants of these provincial towns, as radio was still limited mainly to the provision of light entertainment, especially music—news was rarely broadcast.¹¹ ¨ T H E ‘ U N P O L I T I C A L’ FUHRER: R A L LY I N G F O R H I N D E N BU RG For most of this period, the majority of regional newspapers would normally try to avoid overtly partisan positions, in order to appeal to as large and politically heterogeneous a readership as possible. Because of this policy provincial papers, like the Generalanzeiger press more generally, were often perceived as ‘unpolitical’ by urban observers who were used to a more openly partisan press. This was a crass oversimplification. The extent to which local editors understood their newspapers to have a political function was most obvious at election times. The election campaign leading up to the Reich presidency elections in April 1925 was a case in point. Hindenburg’s candidature after the first round of elections proved essential in mobilizing editorial support in the provinces. Even newspapers which, during the first round of elections, had tried hard to maintain a relatively neutral stance, like the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt or the K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung, now succumbed to the popularity of the old field marshal. His first electoral
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address to the German population, published on Easter Sunday, promptly made it on to the front pages. Hindenburg’s message was quintessentially nationalist: ‘patriotically minded Germans from all German Gauen and tribes’ had asked him to stand, now he appealed to all Germans to ‘help in the resurrection of our fatherland’.¹² Marketed under the headline ‘Hindenburg’s Easter Message’, the wording was semi-religious and aimed at portraying him as standing above the low culture of party politics. The declaration of his opponent, the ‘Easter Greeting’ of Centre politician and former Reich chancellor Wilhelm Marx, in contrast, was mostly ignored. This set the tone for the coming weeks. Normally without illustrations on their front pages, almost all non-socialist papers printed portraits of Hindenburg on their cover at least once before the elections.¹³ Marx featured rarely and, apart from the Social Democratic newspapers, only few provincial papers even mentioned the activities of the so-called ‘Volksblock’ supporting Marx’s candidature. The K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung would on most days have a front-page column entitled ‘Vom Wahlkampf ’ covering both camps, but it would always begin with, and have more to say about, the Hindenburg campaign. The week before the elections, the K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung began publishing daily appeals in favour of Hindenburg on page three.¹⁴ This campaign found a climax on election day, when a third of the front page was taken up by a lengthy pro-Hindenburg proclamation: ‘Who is against class struggle, profiteering, atheism, sloppiness! Then vote for Hindenburg!’¹⁵ This was quite drastic language for an allegedly ‘parteilos’ paper.¹⁶ Editors were obviously willing to alienate a significant part of the K¨onigswusterhausen electorate: at the first round, the candidates of the three parties which now supported Marx—the SPD, the DDP, and the Centre party—had received 1,036 votes in the town, slightly more than Hindenburg’s predecessor, Jarres.¹⁷ The K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung was not untypical of bourgeois editors’ approach to electioneering. In Prenzlau, both daily newspapers, the Prenzlauer Zeitung and the Uckerm¨arkischer Kurier, backed Hindenburg in a similar way. Marx was given short shrift.¹⁸ During the last week before election day, the Uckerm¨arkischer Kurier changed its layout and inserted a large box on its front page, immediately underneath its title, advertising ‘W¨ahlt Hindenburg!’¹⁹ The Prenzlauer Zeitung did likewise for several days before 26 April.²⁰ In this paper, it was obviously editorial policy to ignore Marx’s candidature. While the Uckerm¨arkischer Kurier did publish an announcement of a Volksblock rally, albeit on page 4, and once even included a provocative pro-Marx advertisement on the front page, the Prenzlauer Zeitung denied republicans the opportunity to advertise in the paper.²¹ As the editor explained in one leading article, whoever voted for Marx was supporting the ‘eternalization of a rotten and corrupt system’.²² The composition of the Prignitzer in Wittenberge displayed the same mixture of exclusive coverage of the Hindenburg campaign,²³ polemical attacks on the republican candidate,²⁴ and front-page appeals for, and portrayals of, Hindenburg.²⁵ Even more explicitly partisan were the two self-proclaimed
Provincial Newspapers around Berlin, 1925–8 111 Fig. 4.1. Local newspapers campaigning for Hindenburg in April 1925. On the day before the elections, the allegedly ‘parteilos’ (non-partisan) Prignitzer (left) explicitly called on its readership to back the old field marshal. It was no less partisan than an openly ‘national’ newspaper like the Brandenburger Anzeiger (right).
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‘nationalist’ newspapers in Angerm¨unde and Brandenburg. Here, editors were also the main organizers of the Reichsblock, the union of right-wing parties supporting Hindenburg. The Angerm¨under Zeitung published at least five special editions called ‘Der neue Reichspr¨asident’ providing Reichsblock election propaganda, and distributed several pamphlets, which readers apparently received with their daily paper.²⁶ In Brandenburg, the two main Reichsblock rallies were not only prominently advertised in the Brandenburger Anzeiger, but the meetings themselves were chaired by the paper’s chief editor, who was chairman of the Reichsblock committee in Brandenburg.²⁷ More distinctively than other provincial papers, the Angerm¨under Zeitung and the Brandenburger Anzeiger also constructed the image of a large national political consensus. Day after day in April, these two papers would devote considerable space to the news that such-and-such an organization or personality had thrown their support behind Hindenburg.²⁸ On paper, there was an increasing dynamic of national rallying behind Hindenburg, a picture of large groupings of German society bowing to the authority of the old hero. To a certain extent, this was nothing but literary construction: ‘The entire German small trade for Hindenburg’ was the headline announcing that the Deutsche Handwerkerbund had decided to back Hindenburg—but failed to mention that this was a small association with only a few local groups in Pomerania, East Prussia, and Mitteldeutschland.²⁹ The Social Democratic Brandenburger Zeitung severely criticized this misrepresentation of the ‘public’, accusing the right-wing press of ‘lying to its ‘‘nationalist readership’’ and deluding themselves’.³⁰ As the election result showed, far from being united behind Hindenburg, German society was, in fact, deeply divided into two camps of almost the same size. This, however, was not reflected on the pages of most provincial newspapers. The upbeat presentation of the Hindenburg campaign stood in sharp contrast to the mood of its organizers in Berlin. Gustav Stresemann, foreign minister and chairman of the DVP, had serious qualms about Hindenburg’s candidature.³¹ He feared that hostile reactions to Hindenburg abroad would have significant repercussions for his foreign policy. Indeed, immediately after Hindenburg’s nomination, newspapers of the Mosse and Ullstein publishing houses reported an overwhelmingly critical reception of the news in French, English, and American newspapers.³² Citing foreign press reports verbatim, they warned that the election of Hindenburg would greatly damage Germany’s finances, as American loans under the Dawes Agreement would be thrown into doubt. These press reports, and incoming diplomatic reports which seemed to confirm these anxieties, had a great impact on Stresemann and Reich chancellor Luther, both of whom considered asking Hindenburg to resign in favour of an all-party candidate. Such a candidate, however, was not found, and the idea was dropped. The DVP’s support for Hindenburg was subsequently characterized by strong scepticism, as was the case in parts of the Bavarian People’s Party, the BVP. The mood was such that Hindenburg himself seems to have considered retiring from
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the race.³³ Less than a week before the election, Stresemann noted in his diary the Berlin mood as ‘fully pessimistic in view of Hindenburg’s chances’, describing the campaign as chaotic and without drive.³⁴ This was not only Stresemann’s view. At a meeting of the DNVP’s party executive in the week of the elections, strong criticism was voiced against the DVP and BVP. The Reichsblock was denounced as ‘an awful conglomeration’ and its propaganda management deplored.³⁵ This dissent within the Reichsblock was made public through Mosse’s Berliner Tageblatt, which had somehow acquired the minutes of the meeting.³⁶ Democratic and socialist newspapers widely reprinted the minutes to highlight the infighting within the Reichsblock, which stood in such marked contradiction to the efforts to present Hindenburg as standing above party politics. But news of this Reichsblock crisis hardly ever made it through to the provincial readership in the Brandenburg region. Bourgeois newspapers only mentioned it—by giving the DNVP’s official version of the meeting—in response to the reports of their local Social Democratic competitors.³⁷ This was symptomatic of the way political conflict from the capital filtered down to a provincial readership: while little information was provided, it was often steeped in hostile partisan rhetoric. The reception of Hindenburg’s nomination abroad was a case in point. None of the sampled bourgeois provincial papers admitted that there was a certain justification for the concern of Germany’s neighbours about the possible election to the presidency of a self-declared monarchist and militarist. Instead, they fiercely attacked Socialist and Democratic papers for suggesting that such concerns should have any bearing on the electoral decision.³⁸ The Ullstein papers in particular drew heavy fire for their overtly critical stance. They were accused of fabricating, and indeed provoking, this foreign ‘opinion’ through their negative Hindenburg coverage.³⁹ It was suggested that it was not Hindenburg, but rather the BZ am Mittag and the Vossische Zeitung, that ruined Germany’s reputation abroad.⁴⁰ Ullstein’s, Mosse’s, and Social Democratic newspapers were bundled together as ‘the press of the so-called Volksblock’ that could only be read with disgust.⁴¹ Anti-Marxism and anti-Semitism were blended in attacks on Vorw¨arts, Vossische Zeitung, ‘and other Galicians’ (sometimes referred to as the ‘German Press’ in inverted commas), representatives of the ‘Internationalistenpresse’ and its ‘pathetic submission’ to foreign powers.⁴² Explicit parallels were drawn to enemy propaganda during the world war, where such ‘poisoning of the people’ had allegedly resulted in the stab-in-the-back.⁴³ Apart from some local editors, provincial readers were not normally exposed to the Berlin papers to which the polemics referred. So why were they so heavily attacked? To some extent, editors used them to rail against a political argument occasionally taken up by those few provincial papers that were critical of Hindenburg.⁴⁴ Also, provincial papers often followed the line of argument pursued by anti-Marxist papers in Berlin, for whom their Democratic and
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Social Democratic counterparts seemed a real challenge. But most importantly, newspapers with a large readership such as the BZ am Mittag were perceived as political actors in their own rights, and were therefore valid targets in their own right, as the prime representatives of a metropolitan and democratic political system.⁴⁵ While Marx himself was careful to avoid an open confrontation with Hindenburg, newspapers backing him were less subtle in their electioneering and were therefore attacked as the real campaign managers.⁴⁶ For the political culture of the Weimar Republic, this media war had serious repercussions: even when politicians themselves were trying to steer a moderate line, intent on avoiding the degeneration of political competition into ideological mud-slinging, the press took an active role in escalating any conflict. Thus, even during the socalled ‘golden years’, parliamentary democracy was denied the veneer of political respectability. What were the effects of newspaper support for the election result? Again, as in Chapter 1, the answer is not clear cut. In the second round of the elections, Hindenburg received 25 per cent more votes than the Reichsblock’s candidate, Jarres, had achieved in the first round, and he was particularly successful in provincial Germany. In Angerm¨unde and Prenzlau, where the only available newspapers were overtly pro-Hindenburg, he achieved over 60 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively. However, it was not the degree of overt backing that seemed to be decisive, but rather the media consonance in any given town. In Brandenburg, the openly nationalist Brandenburger Anzeiger gave Hindenburg the greatest possible support, but simultaneously the Social Democratic Brandenburger Zeitung called on its readers to vote for Marx. Over 50 per cent of the voters decided to back Marx. In Wittenberge, the campaigning of the Prignitzer was countered by the Social Democratic Volks-Zeitung. Because of the division of the readership in Wittenberge and Brandenburg along political lines, it is very likely that the Prignitzer and the Brandenburger Anzeiger were preaching to the converted. In both Brandenburg and Wittenberge, Hindenburg increased the Reichsblock vote, but considerably less than on average across the Reich. This can be contrasted with Hindenburg’s performance in those towns where media backing was less partisan, but in essence unchallenged. This did not automatically result in a majority of citizens voting for him, as the case of Bernau shows. But in Bernau, as in Oranienburg, Hindenburg’s vote increased by two to three times as much as in Brandenburg. They were catered for by the Oranienburger General-Anzeiger and the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt, which both assiduously backed Hindenburg. Locals in Bernau and Oranienburg had not been exposed to any explicitly anti-Hindenburg paper. The same was true of K¨onigswusterhausen. At the first round, the candidates of the Volksblock had achieved a narrow lead over the Reichsblock. Hindenburg improved by 30 per cent over the first Reichsblock result, achieving a total of 1,321 votes. Votes for Marx also increased, but only by 20 per cent, falling behind Hindenburg with only 1,236.⁴⁷ The mobilization of voters by Marx’s
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Table 4.1. Elections to the Reich presidency, 1925 (various towns around Berlin) Volksblock∗ (Votes & %)
Reichsblock∗∗ (Votes & %)
Th¨almann (Votes & %)
Brandenburg 1st round 2nd round
18,610 (54.5%) 17,901 (50.5%)
13,613 (39.8%) 15,074 (42.5%)
1,947 (5.7%) 2484 (7.0%)
34,170 35,459
Wittenberge 1st round 2nd round
5,198 (42.3%) 5,869 (43.3%)
5,732 (46.7%) 6,644 (49.1%)
1357 (11%) 1031 (7.6%)
12,287 13,544
Prenzlau 1st round 2nd round
4,220 (37.3%) 4,069 (34.3%)
6,662 (58.9%) 7,385 (62.3%)
424 (3.8%) 400 (3.4%)
11,306 11,854
Angerm¨unde 1st round 2nd round
1,312 (30.8%) 1,319 (28.5%)
2,885 (67.8%) 3,245 (70.1%)
58 (1.4%) 66 (1.4%)
4,255 4,630
Bernau 1st round 2nd round
2,332 (47.9%) 2,770 (49.7%)
1,696 (34.9%) 2,128 (38.2%)
838 (17.2%) 670 (12%)
4,866 5,568
Oranienburg 1st round 2nd round
2,310 (37.6%) 2,264 (32.3%)
3,029 (49.2%) 3,963 (56.5%)
812 (13.2%) 785 (11.2%)
6,151 7,012
K¨onigswusterhausen 1st round 2nd round
1,036 (45.2%) 1,237 (44.5%)
1,006 (43.9%) 1,321 (47.5%)
249 (10.9%) 221 (8%)
2,291 2,779
Total
Notes: ∗ First round results give the combined total of votes cast for Braun (SPD), Marx (Centre), and Hellpach (DDP). In the second round, these parties supported the Centre politician Marx as the Volksblock candidate. ∗∗ First round results give votes cast for Jarres, joint candidate of the DVP and DNVP; second round results give votes cast for Hindenburg, the new Reichsblock candidate.
Sources: Compiled from Brandenburger Anzeiger, 98, 28 April 1925; Volks-Zeitung, 97, 27 April 1925; Der Prignitzer, 75, 30 March 1925; Prenzlauer Zeitung, 98, 28 April 1925, Angerm¨under Zeitung, 97, 27 April 1925; Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt, 76, 31 March 1925 and 98, 28 April 1925; K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung, 98, 28 April 1925.
Volksblock had suffered from two strategic disadvantages: firstly, in the absence of a local party organization in both the Centre party and the DDP, the task of holding rallies had fallen exclusively on the Social Democrats, which probably alienated some of the bourgeois electorate.⁴⁸ Secondly, the town’s largest daily newspaper, the K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung, with its circulation of over 5,000, had given little coverage to the republican candidate, and had clearly championed Hindenburg. This, in the absence of a newspaper backing Marx, had helped to mobilize bourgeois voters. Of course, the election result cannot be explained exclusively in terms of media support. As has often been pointed out, the Communists’ decision to
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support their own candidate, Th¨almann, in the second round prevented a greater working-class vote for Marx.⁴⁹ Rural and protestant Germany responded to the name Hindenburg even in places where newspapers did not exist. Cases like the little village of Felchow in the Angerm¨unde district, where 252 votes for Hindenburg contrasted with 5 for Marx and Th¨almann, showed that voting was influenced at least as much by social and communal pressures.⁵⁰ Also, there were clear limits to the extent of newspapers’ electoral impact: 45 per cent of the voters in K¨onigswusterhausen did, after all, decide to back Marx. But the effect of pro-Hindenburg newspaper support is clearly discernible, especially in places where alternative sources of information were lacking: here growth of the Hindenburg vote, and the overall result, were well above average. At the same time, media support paid off to a much lesser extent than many contemporaries assumed. The media boost to Hindenburg can hardly have exceeded 5 per cent even in the areas most favourable to the nationalist cause. Yet this support provided Hindenburg with the crucial margin to scrape into office. But, clearly, one should not look exclusively at election days to measure the political impact of newspapers. As the previous chapter showed, the press exercised a day-to-day influence on individual decision-makers in Berlin. The same was true at a local level. Local editors often reacted to the Berlin coverage of the campaign by following the lead of some papers and countering the statements of others. Most importantly, grass-root activities were co-ordinated through, and amplified by, newspapers. However, newspapers did not only publish announcements of election rallies and follow up with space devoted to their coverage, they also provided much of the content of local political campaigning. As in the case of the Barmat scandal, where parliamentarians in Berlin had relied on particular newspapers for the supply of ‘information’ that could be used in the political struggle, local activists relied on their dailies for help in conducting rallies. The agenda of local political meetings was largely set by the arguments provided in the daily press. This is vividly illustrated by the activities of the Reichsblock in the town of Brandenburg. Their second major election rally on 23 April 1925 was opened by the chief editor of the Brandenburger Anzeiger, who acted as chairman of the Brandenburg Reichsblock.⁵¹ The first speaker, a teacher, started by dwelling on the difference between the Parteimann Marx and Hindenburg, who was above party politics.⁵² Warming to his theme, he castigated the deal between the Centre party and Social Democrats that had resulted in the SPD’s support for Marx in exchange for Catholic support for Braun as prime minister in Prussia as symptomatic of party politics.⁵³ Next, he addressed Social Democratic newspapers’ claim that through Hindenburg the republic was in danger.⁵⁴ Finally, he rounded off his speech by quoting articles of democratic and social democratic newspapers from before and during the war, which were largely positive about Hindenburg. This material was itself taken from recent press coverage, which had used quotations to demonstrate the
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opportunism of those papers now backing Marx.⁵⁵ The second speaker elaborated on Germany’s need for a ‘F¨uhrer’, a theme which ran like a leitmotiv through the Hindenburg press coverage.⁵⁶ To prepare themselves for their speeches, the speakers had obviously studied their newspapers with great care. The same was true of the Hindenburg rallies in Oranienburg, Angerm¨unde, and Wittenberge: here, too, the speakers went through the topics which had dominated the election coverage in the local press.⁵⁷
P O L I T I C S O F T H E ‘ U N P O L I T I C A L’ P R E S S In early May 1925, a German press statistic was published, which gave the number of German dailies as 3,168, of which only 150 were Social Democratic, with over 50 per cent declaring themselves parteilos (literally: non-partisan) or not giving any political tendency.⁵⁸ This percentage remained stable up until 1933.⁵⁹ The fact that the majority of German local papers described their political stance as parteilos stood in stark contrast to the strong pro-Hindenburg bias in the local press as described above. Still reeling from the shock of Hindenburg’s election, republican commentators decried this label and pointed, like Carl von Ossietzky, to the impact of these so-called parteilos papers: ‘This means, translated into experience, that these papers are reactionary, monarchist, militarist, that they are nothing but scantily camouflaged German Nationalist party organs . . . 51% of all German newspapers are therefore sailing under a false flag, are supplying—under the label of neutrality—party arsenals, are popularising . . . slogans and ideology of the party which has bought them.’⁶⁰ According to Ossietzky, many of these newspapers were more or less being bought by the DNVP to propagate nationalist politics. Five years later, a fellow journalist, Richard Lewinsohn from Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung, took a slightly more differentiated view: Politically they [i.e. provincial newspapers] are steering a bourgeois mainstream line. Prior to the war, they were national-liberal, now they are volksparteilich, but depending on business cycle and local circumstances they adapt to the general mood: sometimes they venture to the right wing of the Democrats, more often they take the course to the Right and promote, always under the disguise of non-partisanship, German Nationalist politics.⁶¹
While generally displaying a moderately right-wing tendency, the provincial press broadly followed local political sentiment to some extent. This was certainly true in the districts of Prenzlau and Angerm¨unde. Here, the DNVP, DVP, and right-wing splinter groups had received over 60 per cent of the vote at the Reichstag elections in December 1924. The local papers’ decision in April 1925 to back Hindenburg was thus anything but surprising, as it was in line with the political majority in these districts.
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The enthusiasm of the grass-root support for Hindenburg’s candidature that was reported in the local news of provincial dailies goes some way to explaining the press support that Hindenburg enjoyed. Even when discounting the positive gloss that was undoubtedly put on the reporting of events, the picture that emerges is one of unprecedented mobilization of bourgeois provincial Germany. Rallies were attended by record numbers and resulted in overcrowded halls, public parades were set in train by local associations, and numerous incidents of private campaigning were reported.⁶² In view of this popular support, editors were risking the alienation of substantial sections of their readership if they decided not to back Hindenburg. Alternatively, one might argue that the predictable surge of support for Hindenburg allowed local editors to be more openly partisan than usual. After all, newspapers did not simply reflect local sentiment: many of the articles written in Hindenburg’s favour preceded the full-scale mobilization of grass-root support in particular localities. It was a two-way relationship: while to some extent reflecting the general political disposition of their readership, provincial newspapers were simultaneously a crucial factor in activating and reinforcing a political trend. Clearly, Ossietzky and Lewinsohn were right to question the self-description of ‘non-partisan’ (parteilos) papers, but they were wrong to equate their political bias with Hugenberg’s German Nationalist party, the DNVP. In fact, it should rather be seen as an implicit rejection of party-based parliamentary politics tout court. As the Hindenburg election showed, many papers were promoting a new kind of protestant, nationalist, and anti-socialist Sammlungspolitik, an explicitly non-party political alliance that was based on the concept of heroic leadership. Although there was a great proximity to DNVP politics, there was a clear rejection of the kind of party politics of which the DNVP formed part. This was also expressed in the 1925 press statistic mentioned above: only 104 out of 3,168 dailies gave their stance as deutschnational, while almost four times as many chose a more general, non-party self-description: 108 preferred the label ‘bourgeois’, thirty-three ‘right-wing’, and 242 either ‘nationalist’ or ‘patriotic.’⁶³ The English translation of deutschnational as ‘nationalist’ blurs the difference many editors felt existed between adhering to a DNVP platform and subscribing to a truly nationalist political world-view. True nationalism did not come with a particular party membership, and on election days, papers would often call on their readers to vote ‘nationalist’ or ‘German’. If specifying this recommendation, the DVP and the DNVP would almost always both be given as possible options. Even Hugenberg himself was aware of the need to downplay the link to the DNVP for some of his press products. His right-wing news agency, the TelegraphenUnion (TU ), that serviced some 1,600 local newspapers in Germany, was more influential than any of Hugenberg’s other attempts at spreading the nationalist gospel. But despite clear political instructions for journalist joining the TU, they were not expected to toe the DNVP line, but contracted to pursue ‘a line of political and economic re-building of Germany without party-political or other affiliation on a national basis’.⁶⁴
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119
As regional anaysis of electoral statistics has shown, the Hindenburg vote in 1925 is one of the best predictors of the Nazi vote in September 1930 and July 1932.⁶⁵ This suggests that the ‘radical nationalist’ coalition that ultimately backed the Nazis had assembled beforehand, and was not solely a product of economic hard times in the early 1930s.⁶⁶ In this period of profound realignment of middleclass party loyalties, local newspapers constituted a crucial influence, because they combined a continuity of political sentiment with the rejection of party-political allegiances. The fragmented landscape of Weimar party politics meant that local newspapers normally tried to avoid being too closely associated with one particular parliamentary group, in order not to alienate significant sections of their bourgeois readership. They overcame the domestic fragmentation by focusing on foreign news, in particular that which arose out of questions related to the Versailles Treaty. Throughout the 1920s, local papers attributed much more of their limited space to questions of foreign policy than did metropolitan newspapers. In their coverage of domestic news, most local newspapers continued to display a moderate hostility to Social Democracy, and a dismissive view of Parteiengez¨ank reminiscent of the pre-war period. But within the context of Weimar politics, this parteilos politics pursued by local papers acquired a new partisan dimension. It was a populism based on the two greatest common denominators of the bourgeois readership: nationalism and anti-socialism. Many urban commentators perceived a very distinct provincial political culture shaped primarily by the local media. Lewinsohn considered the parteilos regional papers of ‘enormous importance’ for Germany’s political life, as they dominated the major provincial towns in Germany, wielding an influence much more extensive than that of the so-called political press in Berlin.⁶⁷ The editors of the Social Democratic Volkszeitung in Wittenberge repeatedly called on its readers to send on the paper, once read, to relatives, friends, and acquaintances ‘into the provinces . . . where the right-wing monarchist press is still predominant’.⁶⁸ Although wrong in equating the anti-SPD tendency of most regional newspapers with being ‘monarchist’, Social Democrats were right to address the structural disadvantage they faced all over Germany: SPD papers had a total circulation of only 1.1 million copies in 1924 and 1.3 million in 1929, out of an estimated total daily printing nationwide of 20 million copies.⁶⁹ Even allowing for the large circulation of a handful of liberal General-Anzeiger and tabloid papers concentrated mainly in Berlin, it is clear that the political right enjoyed a huge advantage in its domination of channels of communication. Many contemporaries commented on the fact that the new Republic was faced with a mass media overwhelmingly hostile to its democratic achievements, particularly in provincial Germany. In the left-wing weekly Die Weltb¨uhne, Tucholsky painted a stark picture of what an urban democrat could expect if he dared to venture beyond the limits of his metropolitan existence: he would find neither court, nor administrative officials, nor press to support him. Local newspapers, Tucholsky claimed, were kept toeing a ‘reactionary’ line through boycotts, firing
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of editors, and withdrawals of advertisements. The ‘unpolitical’ atmosphere of a rural German town thus darkened the light which shone in Berlin.⁷⁰ E X P RO P R I AT I N G T H E P R I N C E S Tucholsky’s article ‘Berlin and the Provinces’ is interesting for two reasons. On the one hand, it is a portrayal of the sense of insecurity and scepticism with which metropolitan democrats viewed the various institutions of civil society in provincial Germany. At the same time, it is evidence for the way in which stereotypes proliferated through the mass print media, helping to reinforce preexisting notions of antagonism between the metropolis and the provinces.⁷¹ The same applies to Social Democratic election analysis after Hindenburg’s election, when the Volks-Zeitung in Wittenberge explained the result with the appeal of a grand military name on ‘the mass of the unpolitical’.⁷² However, whilst these stereotypes did little justice to the political complexities on the ground, many historians have taken them at face value. Picking up the Social Democratic propaganda that depicted Hindenburg as a representative of the monarchy, various historians have explained his election with the German demand for an ‘Ersatzkaiser’, seeing 1925 as monarchism’s last hurrah in Germany.⁷³ But explaining the 1925 presidential election by a mass of unpolitical monarchistsat-heart being swayed by an outburst of pro-Hindenburg media coverage squares uneasily with events in 1926, more particularly the relative success of the campaign for the expropriation of the former German princes. The political controversy about the wealth of the former German princes was the dominant domestic political issue in 1926. The revolution of 1918–19 had not resulted in an expropriation of the former princes, and the question of how to disentangle private from state property had been dodged by the National Assembly—it was not a Reich, but a state matter. After 1919, extensive negotiations and judicial proceedings on a state level had mostly failed to produce a comprehensive solution to the problem. But by 1925, more and more courts appeared to side with the deposed princes.⁷⁴ The Prussian ministry of finance drafted a compromise in October 1925 that was intended to settle the dispute with the house of Hohenzollern. But as soon as the compromise became public, parliamentary opposition arose, not least because it envisaged ceding three quarters of the disputed land to the Hohenzollerns. The Communists were quick to recognize the potential of widespread dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, particularly at a time of rising unemployment. In early December 1925, the Communist Rote Fahne published an open letter addressed, among others, to the executive committees of the SPD and the General German Trade Union Congress (ADGB), suggesting a concerted effort to organize a referendum calling for the expropriation, without compensation, of all former German princes.⁷⁵
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This proposal was in line with the new ‘United Front’ strategy that the KPD had adopted over the autumn of 1925 when ousting—with considerable support from Moscow—the ultra-Left group around Ruth Fischer and Maslow.⁷⁶ The aim now was to mobilize the masses with the slogan ‘expropriation’, in the hope of regaining many of the voters that the KPD had lost at the December 1924 Reichstag elections. Equally, it presented a unique opportunity to drive a wedge between the leadership and the membership of the Social Democrats as well as the trade unions.⁷⁷ Social Democrats were very aware of Communist intentions, and were at first opposed to entering an alliance with them. By late January 1926, however, they had drafted a provisional law jointly with the Communists and trade unions along the lines suggested by the KPD. This change of mind had been brought about by two factors: the formation of a new right-of-centre government, and the perceived mass support for expropriation. After securing the acceptance of the Locarno Treaties by the Reichstag in late November 1925, the Luther government had fallen apart, and for the next six weeks coalition negotiations took place. Until mid-January 1926, the Social Democrats kept open the option of participating in a Grand Coalition with the DVP.⁷⁸ During this time, the expropriation issue was muted in order not to alienate potential bourgeois coalition partners. Only after 12 January 1926, when the members of the SPD in the Reichstag voted against the formation of a Grand Coalition, and after the formation of a bourgeois minority government, did the Social Democrats resume their role as opposition party. More importantly, however, the leading Social Democrats in Berlin had been exposed by this stage to a barrage of newspaper reports indicating that a great majority of party members sympathized with the Communist proposal.⁷⁹ If the SPD leadership refused to support a referendum, the press coverage suggested, the dissatisfaction of workers would benefit only the KPD. These reports were published exclusively by the Rote Fahne. The Social Democratic Vorw¨arts failed to report on any of the grass-roots support within the SPD for a referendum.⁸⁰ Most of the cases of spontaneous socialist co-operation reported by the Rote Fahne concerned small towns and sub-sections of the Social Democratic organization. In fact, the Rote Fahne built up a literary image of unanimous workers’ support for the expropriation of princes in a similar way to right-wing newspapers’ reporting on unanimous, national support for Hindenburg’s candidacy. But SPD politicians took these reports seriously and, on 19 January 1926, the party committee (Parteiausschuss) ordered that preparations for a referendum be made.⁸¹ The alliance of Social Democrats and Communists was a very uneasy one. The sole aim for the Communists—as evidenced from an internal directive of the KPD Berlin-Brandenburg district executive—was to use the referendum to alienate the masses of Social Democratic voters and party members from the SPD leadership and to attract them to the Communist cause.⁸² Right from the beginning of their co-operation, Social Democrats and trade unionists kept a sometimes acrimonious distance from the KPD.⁸³ Thus, although the SPD and
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KPD both supported the referendum, the Communists failed to create United Front Committees, and the two parties conducted entirely separate campaigns.⁸⁴ In their campaigning, the Communists openly admitted that they saw the expropriation of the former princes as the first stage of an all-out attack on private property. The Social Democrats, in contrast, promoted the referendum primarily as a way of further securing the democratic basis of the Republic.⁸⁵ Those parties and social groupings opposed to the referendum hardly ever acknowledged these diverging intentions of the two workers’ parties. Where the KPD had failed, the bourgeois press unhesitatingly projected the image of a united Left: the provincial press depicted the referendum as carried by ‘the Marxists’, ‘the Bolshevists’, ‘the Reds’, or simply ‘the Communists’.⁸⁶ Editors constructed the threat of a concerted socialist attack on private property, for which the expropriation of the former princes was just the beginning.⁸⁷ The editor of the Angerm¨under Zeitung felt it necessary to reassure his readers that ‘nationalist circles’ were ‘ready to suppress a second revolution which would mean Germany’s death’.⁸⁸ The image of a revolution in the making was used regularly by nationalists in their opposition to the referendum. In Berlin big posters proclaimed ‘Victory of the referendum results in revolution!’⁸⁹ These scare tactics sometimes replaced, and at other times supplemented, a policy of withholding all information on the expropriation issue. The petition for a referendum, which took place from 4 to 17 March 1926, was almost entirely ignored by most bourgeois provincial newspapers. Again, as in the case of Hindenburg’s election in 1925, the news selection of these papers amounted to a clear endorsement of one particular policy. To some extent, they were even more partisan than during the 1925 election campaign: then they had covered at least superficially some of the movements and statements of Hindenburg’s opponent, Marx, whereas now they censored almost all pro-referendum activities. The comparison to the presidential race of 1925 is interesting, because the opponents of the expropriation referendum were almost identical to those groupings supporting Hindenburg in 1925. But while bourgeois Sammlungspolitik and press support had seen Hindenburg into office, it now proved much less effective. In many Brandenburg towns the petition received greater support than had Hindenburg the year before; the petition results showed that popular support for expropriation considerably surpassed the combined vote of KPD and SPD at the Reichstag elections of December 1924. Unlike the case of Hindenburg’s candidature, when provincial editors had accurately captured grass-roots enthusiasm by throwing their support behind the field marshal, they now refused to acknowledge the popularity of the suggested expropriation of the former princes. Editors did not simply reflect popular sentiment; they did not switch allegiances, nor did they start writing critical assessments of the expropriation issue. Their position, like their editorial policy, remained unchanged; they kept trying to influence their reading public. News selection continued to be biased against the referendum, which was scheduled for
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20 June 1926. And what information the non-socialist provincial newspapers did provide on the expropriation issue tended to originate from anti-expropriation sources.⁹⁰ The coverage of Reichstag debates was slanted in the usual way. In a display of apparent neutrality, the allegedly parteilos K¨onigswusterhausener Zeitung summarized and partly quoted the speeches of one parliamentarian of each major party. But the contribution of the leader of the DNVP, Graf Westarp, received the most generous coverage, thus ensuring that the provincial readers were able to appreciate fully his polemic against the ‘lies and terrorism’ that were used in an attempt at a ‘dry revolution’ and his expression of ‘disgust’ for the ‘wretched lowness’ of the ‘revolution profiteers’. The paper even found place to reprint some anti-Semitic heckling from the back-benches.⁹¹ The Angerm¨under Zeitung did not even attempt to provide a summary of the discussion, and instead reprinted exclusively the entire speech by Westarp.⁹² Whether in Wittenberge, Brandenburg, or elsewhere, it was impossible to find either a verbatim report or an impartial summary of the Reichstag deliberations in either bourgeois or Social Democratic newspapers.⁹³ Throughout the run-up to the referendum, newspapers like the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt kept information on the expropriation debate as rare as possible. This was not because editors thought the referendum was unimportant—on the contrary. While the headline announcing the defeat of the referendum—‘The People Against the Expropriation of the Princes’—would run over the whole front page of the Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt on the Tuesday after the vote, on the previous Sunday, 20, June, the paper chose simply to ignore the fact that a referendum was taking place.⁹⁴ Pro-referendum news items almost never broke through this policy of editorial denial. The referendum’s opponents, on the other hand, enjoyed another important advantage within this context of partisan news selection: the bourgeois Reich government led first by Luther, and then—after Luther’s resignation—by Marx, was opposed to the referendum, and made various statements to this effect. The fact that a Centre-Right government opposed expropriation without compensation was not really surprising, but many local newspapers still managed to turn this item into front-page news.⁹⁵ Even more significant than the government’s position on the referendum was Hindenburg’s intervention less than a month prior to the vote. The DNVP parliamentarian Loebell had written to Hindenburg asking him for a public statement opposing the referendum. In his answer Hindenburg declined, pointing to the neutrality demanded by his office, but went on to describe his ‘private’ views, which were very explicit in their condemnation of the referendum. In early June Loebell published this letter with Hindenburg’s consent.⁹⁶ This was a political sensation that always made it on to the front page.⁹⁷ The SPD papers did their best to downplay it and condemned the fact that Hindenburg had violated the neutrality of his office.⁹⁸ The issue was, of course, the subject of heated discussion in the Reichstag—but this merely provided further opportunity for the local press to reiterate Hindenburg’s anti-referendum stance.⁹⁹ The symbolic
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Table 4.2. Expropriation referendum 1926 (various towns around Berlin)
Brandenburg Wittenberge Prenzlau Angerm¨unde Bernau Oranienburg K¨onigs Wusterhausen
KPD & SPD Reichstag election December 1924
Volksbegehren 4–17 March 1926
Volksentscheid 20 June 1926 (change over 1924 in %)
18,061 6,241 3,880 1,113 2,512 2,609 1,124
20,502 8,325 (2,800)∗ 603 4,280 4,040 1,571
22,400 (+24%) 8,864 (+42%) 3,961 (+2.1%) 1,161 (+4.3%) 4,666 (+85.7%) 4,398 (+68.6%) 2,105 (+87.3%)
Notes: ∗ No figure could be established. Estimate based on referendum result. Sources: Compiled from Volks-Zeitung, 141, 21 June 1926; Der Prignitzer, 75, 30 March 1926; Uckerm¨arkischer Kurier, 143, 22 June 1926; Angerm¨under Zeitung, 142, 21 June 1926; Niederbarnimer Kreisblatt, 76, 31 March 1926 and 98, 28 April 1926; K¨onigs Wusterhausener Zeitung, 143, 22 June 1926; M¨arkischer Stadt- und Landbote, 67, 20 March 1926; Zeitung f¨ur Liebenwalde, 66, 19 March 1926; Oranienburger General-Anzeiger, 66, 19 March 1926.
power of government and president helped to give anti-referendum messages a media presence which supporters of expropriation lacked. Like in Berlin, Weltanschauung journalism had an immediate impact on the political information available to the average citizen. But what were the consequences? Some newspapers started their own anti-referendum campaigns, like the nationalist Angerm¨under Zeitung, which, apart from endless news on anti-referendum activities, featured several polemical leading articles.¹⁰⁰ There is a certain temptation to conclude from the relatively low turnout of proreferendum voters in Angerm¨unde—only 4 per cent more than had voted for the KPD and SPD in December 1924—that the mass of anti-referendum items in the Angerm¨under Zeitung did perhaps tip the balance. But the same cannot be said of Brandenburg and Wittenberge, where the Brandenburger Anzeiger and the Prignitzer had campaigned just as intensely against the referendum as had the Angerm¨under Zeitung.¹⁰¹ The referendum found 24 per cent more voters in Brandenburg than had voted for the KPD and SPD in December 1924; in Wittenberge the figure was even 42 per cent. In fact, even though the referendum fell 5.5 million votes short of the necessary support of twenty million voters throughout Germany, it proved much more popular than anyone had initially expected.¹⁰² In the Brandenburg region, the results were particularly striking in those towns in which Hindenburg’s candidature had elicited the greatest growth in votes in 1925: in Oranienburg the referendum’s vote outdid the KPD/SPD result of 1924 by 67 per cent, in Bernau by 86 per cent, and in K¨onigswusterhausen by 87 per cent. Here, as in many other towns, the expropriation of the princes proved considerably more popular than Hindenburg in 1925. In the light of these figures, Hindenburg’s election a year earlier can
Provincial Newspapers around Berlin, 1925–8
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clearly not be seen as the result of an overwhelming surge of monarchical nostalgia. Rather than a return to the past, Hindenburg’s election pointed to the anti-parliamentary radicalization of a large section of the electorate. Try as they might, provincial editors could not counter the inherent appeal of the expropriation proposal to a wide spectrum of voters. Nor could they counter the effects of economic hardship and political disillusionment in the final phase of Weimar’s post-inflationary stabilization. Many conservative middle-class voters had supported the DNVP in 1924 and Hindenburg in 1925, attracted by unrealistic promises concerning the Aufwertung (revaluation) of their credits and savings lost during inflation. The subsequent law passed by the Luther government in 1925 proved to be a big disappointment for these voters. As many editors acknowledged, this created enormous resentment towards the DNVP.¹⁰³ In the run-up to the expropriation referendum, the question was often posed why the princes should get a better deal than did the thousands of savers and creditors expropriated by inflation.¹⁰⁴ The results in the electoral districts of Potsdam I and II showed that a substantial number of traditional right-wing voters supported the referendum, too, often belonging to the so-called ‘revaluation victims’.¹⁰⁵ Perhaps not surprisingly there was little detailed discussion of the referendum’s result in local papers. While giving the overall figures, most editors refrained from engaging with the question of non-socialist support for expropriation. Instead, many editors deplored the referendum result as a ‘black day’ for Germany, and saw it as ‘a reminder for a united front against the threat of bolshevism’.¹⁰⁶ One editor warned: ‘Those bourgeois, who yesterday provided the Communist-Socialist thieving riff-raff with the service of fellow-travellers, will recognize only too soon that they have put themselves at their mercy. But then it is too late, and the red flood will race over Germany, and bury the last remains of law and order.’¹⁰⁷ The sources of evil were the cities, as another editor emphasized, where violent clashes were on the daily agenda and part of the terror of the red parties.¹⁰⁸ The Angerm¨under Zeitung went on to paint a gloomy picture of German society: ‘The cool reason of the Germans has been driven out by the lowest instincts, and the glorious past of our Reich is dragge