Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia (An IISS Strategic Dossier)

an

strategic dossier

PREVENTING NUCLEAR DANGERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

published by

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 13–15 Arundel Street | Temple Place | London | wc2r 3dx | UK

an

strategic dossier

PREVENTING NUCLEAR DANGERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Arundel House | 13–15 Arundel Street | Temple Place | London | wc2r 3dx | UK

Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman Editor Mark Fitzpatrick Contributing Editor Tim Huxley Research Assistants Ben Rhode, Thomas Barton, Frederik Voute Editorial Dr Ayse Abdullah, Jessica Delaney, Katharine Fletcher, Sarah Johnstone, Dr Jeffrey Mazo, Caroline West Design and Production John Buck

This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his staff. It incorporates commissioned contributions from recognized subject experts, which were reviewed by a range of experts in the field. The IISS would like to thank the various individuals who contributed their expertise to the compilation of this dossier. The responsibility for the contents is ours alone. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole. The IISS thanks the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the Robert James Foundation for their financial support in the research and publication of this Strategic Dossier. The IISS is also grateful to the Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore for its financial and research support. First published 28 September 2009 by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. © 2009 The International Institute for Strategic Studies cover images: From top left: Bomb blast site in Bali, by Jemaah Islamiyah, 12 October 2002 (Getty); Vulcanos Sumeru and Bromo, Java, Indonesia (Valery Shanin/iStockphoto.com); Myanmar leader Senior General, Than Shwe (left) and Myanmar’s number two Vice Senior, General Maung Aye (right) in Myanmar’s capital Yangon (Getty); ANSTO Chairman Ziggy Switkowski (left) and Prime Minister John Howard (centre) at the official opening of OPAL, April 2007 (courtesy of ANSTO); the exterior of the new storage facility for highly reactive nuclear waste in Borssele, the Netherlands, September 2003 (Getty). Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by Hastings Print, East Sussex. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 978-0-86079-204-8

About The International Institute for Strategic Studies The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 100 countries. The Institute is independent and it alone decides what activities to conduct. It owes no allegiance to any government, any group of governments or any political or other organisation. The IISS stresses rigorous research with a forward-looking policy orientation that can improve wider public understanding of international security problems and influence the development of sounder public policy.

Contents

Common Abbreviations

4

Introduction

5

Chapter one Regional Cooperation

11

Chapter two The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

21

Chapter three Nuclear Safety and Security Snapshot comparison of nuclear-relevant plans, policies and energy data

31 52

Chapter four Brunei, Cambodia and Laos

53

Chapter five Indonesia

61

Chapter six Malaysia

87

Chapter seven Myanmar

101

Chapter eight Philippines

119

Chapter nine Singapore

131

Chapter ten Thailand

137

Chapter eleven Vietnam

151

Chapter twelve Australia

165

Chapter thirteen New Zealand

183

Chapter fourteen Policy Options

189

Index

201

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

3

Common Abbreviations

ARF

ASEAN Regional Forum

INFCIRC (IAEA) Information Circular

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

JI

Jemaah Islamiah

BWC

Biological Weapons Convention

kWt

Kilowatt of thermal power

CNS

Convention on Nuclear Safety

LEU

Low enriched uranium

CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

LNG

Liquefied natural gas

LWR

Light-water reactor

CSI

MWe

Megawatt of electrical power

MWt

Megawatt of thermal power

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

NSG

Nuclear Suppliers Group

NPT

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

PSI

Proliferation Security Initiative

RCA

Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific

Container Security Initiative

CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization CWC

Chemical Weapons Convention

EEZ

Exclusive economic zone

EIA

Energy Information Administration

FPDA

Five-Power Defence Arrangements

GDP

Gross domestic product

GNEP

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

SLD

Second Line of Defence

GTRI

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

SQP

Small Quantities Protocol

HEU

Highly enriched uranium

UF6

Uranium hexafluoride

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

WMD

Weapons of mass destruction

4

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Introduction

A nuclear renaissance in Southeast Asia? To the extent that the much-vaunted nuclear renaissance is real, it is taking place in Asia. Dozens of new nuclear power plants are under construction or in the planning stages in both Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and South Asia (India and Pakistan).1 In the large area in between, south of China and east of India, nuclear energy has played no role to date. However, that is likely to change in about a decade’s time. In recent years, three countries in Southeast Asia have announced detailed plans for constructing nuclear power plants and two others have begun to explore prospects for nuclear energy. In 2008, leaders in two further countries expressed an interest in nuclear energy for the first time. Meanwhile, the national debate in Australia about adding value to its uranium exports by enriching the product, while recently decided in the negative, may not be over. Indonesia decided in 2004 to introduce nuclear power, with plans for the first plant to be operational in 2017 (although this date will surely slip given grassroots opposition). Vietnam formally decided in 2006 to develop nuclear energy and set a goal of bringing two plants on line by 2020. In 2007 Thailand approved a similar plan to operate two power plants by 2020. The Philippines decided in 2007 to study the development of nuclear energy. The Malaysian government included in its national budget proposal in 2008 a line item for ‘exploration of nuclear energy’ and the cabinet in 2009 took a further decision in this direction. Collectively, the ten states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their major Asian partners agreed at an Asian energy security summit in January 2007 to work together to reduce dependence on conventional fuels, including through civilian nuclear power for those who were interested in it.2

Interest in nuclear energy is not new to the region. Indonesia has been studying the idea since the late 1970s, and the Philippines actually built a nuclear power plant in Bataan in 1984, but never operated it due to financial and safety considerations. The US ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 promoted interest in nuclear energy and supported fledgling nuclear energy research activities in Southeast Asia.

Nuclear energy rationale Despite previous interest, nuclear power has only recently taken on a sense of inevitability in the region. The rationale for nuclear power in Southeast Asia is largely the same as elsewhere: as a way to help meet rising electricity demands in rapidly developing economies, and to ensure energy security, energy autonomy and diversification of supply. Even in countries blessed with oil and gas deposits, governments are acutely aware that these are finite and depleting resources, and many are reluctant to be dependent on potentially unreliable external suppliers. The ASEAN region’s net dependency on oil imports is growing, and electricity demand has been expanding at over 7% a year.3 The low carbon output of nuclear energy at a time of global warming is seen as an additional benefit. However, governments in the region have not always thoroughly assessed the relative costs of alternative energy sources, including geothermal and hydropower, rigorously. The prestige associated with joining the nuclear-power club also contributes to the rising interest, and a marketing push by vendors may be an additional factor in some countries.

Concerns Notwithstanding these peaceful purposes, the surge of interest in nuclear energy gives rise to some

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

5

6

An IISS Strategic Dossier

0.177 0.010 4.357 0.023 2.426 0.236 1.270 2.142 3.780 1.334 5.637 0.882 472.078

0.37 14.00 234.69 6.52 24.84 47.37 91.08 4.55 65.07 85.26 20.43 4.13 6,595.77

1.95 1.77 1.32 2.48 1.90 0.99 1.94 1.72 0.76 1.12 0.93 1.06 1.22

482.1 0.706 18.8 3.6 99.4 5.0 14.2 476.8 58.5 15.8 278.2 215.7 72.4

7,671.30 82.09 496.32 233.13 3,724.98 84.16 556.10 8,176.26 1,914.27 602.26 10,720.76 9,436.72 3,240.30

4.4 2.3 4.8 7.2 5.4 1.5 2.3 1.8 4.8 10.5 3.3 0.9 2.2

Population Per capita energy Per capita electricity Household per capita growth consumption 2006 consumption 2006 electricity consumption 1998–2007 (%) (million BTU) (kWh) growth 2000–05 (%) 0.7 29 14.4 39.2 10.1 40.9 14.7 0 11.6 22.0 3.4 4.4 4.0

Agricultural 75 30 48.1 34.3 43.7 19.8 31.6 27.8 45.1 39.9 26.8 25.7 32.0

Industrial

156.9 0 1,052.3 0 727.2 22.4 25.1 361.2 8.6 315.1 585.4 66.8 85,471.8

13.7 0 1,081.7 0 536.5 20.7 246.7 1,038.2 1,051.2 0 696.2 111.1 82,589.3

Total refined petroleum products (thousand barrels per day) 2005 505 0 2,955 0 2,479 468 106 935 0 247 1,516 145 127,562

Natural gas (billion cubic feet) 2006

*‘Other electricity’ refers to geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste electric power. Source: EIA

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Thailand Singapore Vietnam Australia New Zealand World Total

Crude oil (thousand barrels per day) 2008

Energy production

3.10 1.16 125.67 1.64 99.08 5.96 53.93 130.68 37.08 54.28 236.85 42.09 17,987.31

Total electricity (billion kWh) 2006 3.10 1.11 109.82 0.05 93.13 2.67 34.15 119.83 37.08 30.92 217.96 14.39 11,943.04

Thermal power (billion kWh) 2006

0 0.05 9.53 1.59 5.95 3.29 9.84 7.87 0 23.36 15.54 23.22 2,997.06

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,583.11

Hydro power Nuclear power (billion kWh) 2006 (billion kWh) 2008

0 Negligible 6.33 0 0 0 9.94 2.99 0 0 3.57 4.48 414.31

Other* electricity (billion kWh) 2006

25 41 37.5 26.5 46.3 39.2 53.7 72.2 43.3 38.1 69.8 69.9 64.0

Service

Sector % breakdown of total value added (estimates range from 2005 to 2008)

Sources: Energy Information Administration (EIA), US Department of Energy; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2008; CIA World Factbook

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Australia New Zealand World

Total primary energy Population consumption 2006 2007 (quadrillion BTU) (million)

Energy and economic structure overview

0 0 254,812 331 1,120 1,455 2,600 20,105 0 49,141 435,690 5,330 7,081,121

Coal, all types (thousand short tons) 2007

52,432 1,871 3,595 1,963 14,552 1,924 3,295 49,879 8,015 2,593 37,829 27,310 14,122

Per capita GDP, purchasing power parity (USD) 2007

Introduction

Introduction

Breakdown of electricity production (%), electrification rate (%) and electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output). Coal 2006 Brunei

Laos Malaysia

Gas 2006

1.0

99.0

Biomass 2006

Hydro Geothermal 2006 2006

44.1

Total 2006 100.0

95.7

Cambodiaa Indonesia

Oil 2006

4.1 5.0

100.0

Myanmar

99

4.2

20

NA

54

13.4

NA

NA

14.6

7.2

3.0

64.0

7.7

100.0

98

4.9

5.8

40.2

53.9

100.0

11

19.5

Philippines

27.0

8.2

28.8

Thailand

18.0

6.1

67.8

Singapore

Losses 2004

29.1

NA 25.3

Electrification rate 2001–06

2.3

17.5

18.4

100.0

81

12.9

5.8

negligible

100.0

99

7.9

100.0

100

5.9

100.0

84

10.5

22.0

78.0

Vietnam

17.1

4.1

37.0

Australiab

79.0

0.9

12.1

0.8

6.4

100.0

100

6.1

New Zealandc

12.5

0.1

22.6

1.6

53.9

7.8

100.0

100

13.2

Worldd

40.8

5.8

20.0

0.9

16.4

0.3

100.0

71.3

14.0

41.8

Sources: Calculated from International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Statistics, http://www. iea.org/Textbase/stats/index.asp; Human Development Report, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/210.html citing IEA data published in World Energy Outlook, 2002 and 2006; World Bank, World Development Indicators; and Nationmaster, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/ene_ele_pow_tra_and_dis_los_of_out-power-transmissiondistribution-losses-output. a Cambodia generated 0.2% of its electricity in 2006 from solar PV. b Australia generated 0.7% of its electricity in 2006 from wind power. c New Zealand generated 1.4% of its electricity in 2006 from wind power and 0.1% from ‘other’ sources. d The world generated 0.3% of its electricity in 2006 from wastes, 14.7% from nuclear, 0.7% from wind power, 0.1% from other sources and negligible amounts from photovoltaic solar, solar thermal and tidal power.

uneasiness about how nuclear power in the region could be misused. Concerns about nuclear diversion for non-peaceful purposes are less pronounced than in many other regions. With the arguable exceptions of Myanmar and possibly Vietnam, obvious proliferation drivers are absent. In sharp contrast to large nations to the north and west, the countries of this region do not view nuclear weapons as useful for either national security or national status. The states in the region have embraced nonproliferation norms and declared Southeast Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Rivalries and territorial disputes linger but are managed, at least for the time being, by restraint on the part of Southeast Asian governments, which generally place greater emphasis on the benefits of regional cooperation. The interest that both Australia and Indonesia once showed in acquiring nuclear weapons is a distant memory, long replaced by an opposite inclination towards global nuclear disarmament. Yet states in the region could do more to burnish their nonproliferation credentials, including by ratifying the safeguards Additional Protocol, which is in force for only two ASEAN states, Indonesia and Singapore.

Commentators with an incomplete understanding of what it takes to build nuclear weapons often assume that the acquisition of nuclear energy could be an easy stepping stone to nuclear weapons if the nation in question so chose. There are ways that nuclear power programmes can contribute to a weapons programme, but nuclear power technology alone cannot be put to nuclear weapons use without the sensitive nuclear technologies of either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. None of the ASEAN countries or those in Australasia have any plans to introduce these sensitive technologies. Within the region, the larger questions about nuclear power are concerned with health and environmental considerations and the economic impact of a nuclear accident or incident of nuclear terrorism. The human and economic costs of an accident can include casualties, property damage, clean-up costs, liability and lost trade opportunities as well as the indirect cost to any future nuclear energy prospects and to the nuclear industry worldwide. Concerns have been raised about the safety of nuclear power in a region that is prone to seismic disasters and bureaucratic corruption and that has experienced

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

7

Introduction

home-grown terrorist activity. Nuclear safety depends as much on human factors as on reactor design, and the need for a strong safety culture, which is seen as lacking in some Southeast Asian countries, cannot be overemphasised. In addition to energy security, the threat of nuclear accidents, nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism should be key security considerations when nuclear power plants are introduced.4 The enthusiasm which some ASEAN states show towards nuclear energy is not matched in every case by efforts to establish the infrastructure and institutional arrangements to prepare for the safe and secure introduction of nuclear power. The number of personnel trained in the nuclear sciences is actually decreasing in some nuclear-aspirant countries such as Indonesia, and other countries such as Malaysia lack the independent regulatory bodies essential for safe operation. With regard to international instruments, among ASEAN states the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety is in force only for Indonesia and Singapore, while the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is in force only for Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines. In a different area of nuclear technology not involving power production, Myanmar in 2007 concluded an agreement with Russia to build a small research reactor. Six research reactors already operate in the region – three in Indonesia and one each in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia – where they are used mainly for the production of medical isotopes and for civilian nuclear research. Myanmar’s stated purpose is the same and, like the others, its plant, if built, will be under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Myanmar case arouses special interest, however, because of the paranoid nature of its military government and the persistence of unconfirmed rumours of secret nuclear activity and indeterminate cooperation with North Korea. Concerns about nuclear technology touch upon Southeast Asia in yet another way, highlighted by the participation earlier this decade by a Malaysiabased firm in a black-market enterprise to produce centrifuge parts for Libya’s nuclear weapons programme. Despite the gaps in Malaysia’s exportcontrol laws exploited by the A.Q. Khan network, the exposure of the operation has not yet led to significant improvements in the nation’s laws.

8

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Will nuclear plans materialise? Not all of the plans for nuclear energy in Southeast Asia will be implemented as envisioned. Previous plans for nuclear energy in the region and elsewhere have been set back by financial constraints, safety concerns and bureaucratic inconsistency. Grassroots concerns about the environmental impact of reactors in a seismic zone have led to postponement of nuclear energy plans in Indonesia, which until 2009 was on course to be the first ASEAN country to introduce nuclear power. Now the first is likely to be Vietnam, where state planning decisions face fewer political obstacles. Meanwhile, political turmoil in Thailand is likely to set back that country’s nuclear energy timetable, while the nuclear debate continues in the Philippines and is only getting started in Malaysia. It is difficult to assess the capital costs of nuclear power plants, especially since none have ever been built in the region with the exception of the aborted Bataan facility, the cost of which was inflated by corruption. The IAEA’s estimate of $1–2bn as the construction cost for a 1GWe plant5 appears to underestimate the financial uncertainties involved. In the US, it was recently estimated that the all-inclusive cost, including financing, is $5–6bn for a 1GWe plant.6 The need to establish a new physical and organisational infrastructure will add to the overall costs in countries where nuclear power is a novelty. If the all-inclusive cost is of the order of $5bn, nuclear power cannot be economically competitive unless other external factors are added to the equation. On one hand, the financing costs, which can be 25% to 80% of the total price, are likely to be lower in countries where government loan guarantees or tax credits lighten the burden.7 In addition, any future carbon taxes imposed on fossil-fuel-burning plants as a strategy for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions will increase the cost-competitiveness of nuclear energy,8 especially if new nuclear facilities become eligible for ‘clean development mechanism’ credits. The fall in oil prices in 2008–09 that has made nuclear power less competitive in the short term may not affect government investment decisions on nuclear power projects that have a multi-decade time horizon. The basic motivations for nuclear power described above are not fundamentally altered by fluctuations in the economic climate. On the other hand, the global financial crisis that worsened in 2009 could make it harder to finance

Introduction

the high cost of nuclear power plants. Smaller-scale energy projects employing wind, solar or naturalgas sources may be seen as safer investments than lending for nuclear power. In addition to the safety risks in the event of an accident and physical security concerns relating to theft and attack, Southeast Asian states must take into account the controversial environmental and political risks posed by nuclear waste in planning for nuclear power. The problem of waste management is considered the ‘Achilles heel’ of the nuclear industry. No country anywhere in the world has yet been able to build a long-term geological disposal site for the 20 tonnes of spent fuel annually discharged by each averagesized nuclear power plant.9 The usual practice is to simply store it on site in dry casks after the spent fuel is sufficiently cooled in liquid fuel-ponds. While interim dry cask storage is safe for 50 years and possibly up to 100 years,10 the above-ground presence of spent fuel often presents an unsatisfactory solution for political reasons relating to the ‘not-in-my-backyard’ mentality associated with nuclear waste, especially in areas of dense population. The plutonium in the spent fuel also presents a latent proliferation risk if, as was the case for North Korea, a nation has the technology and desire to chemically separate (or reprocess) it. States in Southeast Asia that introduce nuclear power will need eventually to find a solution for the disposal of spent fuel.

This dossier The need for nuclear energy to be harnessed in a manner that is safe, secure and non-threatening and for nations to prohibit illicit weapons-related trade provides the motivation for this dossier. International norms have been established to help nations create successful and sustainable nuclear power programmes. The states in the region that plan to introduce nuclear power or that are considering doing so appear to be well aware of the risks. National authorities in charge of nuclear planning know the steps and milestones for building up institutional capacity that are recommended by the IAEA for new entrants to the nuclear field.11 However, there is not a full awareness on the part of decision-makers or the national publics of all the considerations that should be assessed before nuclear power decisions are made. The IAEA notes

that introducing nuclear power entails a 100-year commitment, from development to decommissioning.12 To set the scene, chapter one of this dossier assesses the various ways in which the nations of the region have collaborated, including with outside partnership, to seek to build mutual confidence and cooperation, to reject the introduction of nuclear weapons, and more recently to address nuclear safety issues. In addition to a few forums that were specifically established with nuclear energy plans in mind, many of the regional institutions that were established for other purposes can also contribute to transparency and mutual reinforcement of nonproliferation and safety norms. The second chapter describes the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the nuclear fuel cycle and the ways that strategic trade controls can help stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Many ASEAN countries remain vulnerable to proliferators such as the A.Q. Khan network that sought to exploit their industrial strengths and legal weaknesses. Chapter three provides a primer on the safety and security risks of nuclear energy and the various steps and strategies for managing these risks. The bulk of the dossier consists of a countryby-country overview and assessment of national aspirations, plans and potential capabilities for nuclear energy. The country analyses describe the existing nuclear infrastructure in each state, including both facilities and institutions; the geopolitical context, the non-proliferation and nuclear safety policies and, where applicable, the national record in this regard. Our purpose is not to make judgements about the viability of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia. To help readers reach their own conclusions about the need for nuclear power and the unmet demand for electricity, however, each country chapter provides a snapshot of energy consumption and production trends, including estimated fossil fuel reserves13 and electric-power transmission losses.14 Given the past nuclear weapons development plans of Australia and the leading role it now plays, together with New Zealand, in nuclear nonproliferation and global disarmament efforts, these nations are included among the country analyses. Other Australasian and Pacific Island states are not included because they have no nuclear history,

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

9

Introduction

plans or potential, although they are included in the IAEA safeguards chart in chapter two. The final chapter assesses various policy options that can contribute towards the adoption of sound policies that would allow for the peaceful and safe introduction of nuclear energy in the region. Such policies include accepting full transparency measures, making use of market-based fuel-cycle services backed by international guarantees, and working towards a regional solution

to spent-fuel storage. Such policies would obviate any need for sensitive dual-use technologies that could spark proliferation concerns. Because plans for nuclear power typically take many years to materialise, there is time for the states of the region to put in place a robust regime of policies and practices that can create a strong nuclear safety culture and serve as a bulwark against the spread of nuclear technology that could be used for weapons purposes.

Notes 1

As of 28 August 2009, 16 power reactors were under

(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International

construction in China, five in South Korea, two in Japan,

Peace, 2009), pp. 30, 32. Stan Kaplan, ‘Power Plants:

two in Taiwan, six in India and one in Pakistan. At least

Characteristics and Costs’, CRS Report for Congress

126 more power reactors were planned or proposed in

2

RL34746, CRS, 13 Nov 2008.

these countries, which collectively had 111 nuclear power

8

Squassoni, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation., p. 14.

plants in operation. IAEA Power Reactor Information

9

Ibid., p. 65. Finland and Sweden are likely to be the first

System (PRIS) database, http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/

countries to open deep geological repositories. Their

db.page.pl/pris.opercap.htm. ‘Asia’s Nuclear Energy

parliaments have approved the concept, based on a judge-

Growth’, World Nuclear Association, August 2008, http://

ment that it is safe using existing technology, and their

www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf47.html.

nuclear agencies have moved ahead with plans and site

‘Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security Cebu,

selection. In the US, a plan to use Yucca Mountain as a

Philippines, 15 January 2007’, http://www.aseansec.

final repository has been derailed by political, legal and

org/19319.htm. 3

4

Total net ASEAN electricity consumption grew from

technical challenges. 10

Hippel, ‘Dry-cask Storage: How Germany Led the Way’,

Information Administration, US Department of Energy,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September–October 2009,

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricity.

pp. 24–32; for an argument that dry-cask storage is safe for

In the case of nuclear terrorism, the most likely risk is that

100 years, see Ernest Moniz, ‘Toward an Integrated Fuel

terrorists could seek to improvise radiological dispersal

Cycle’, EPRI Journal, April 2008, p. 29; see also chapter

devices by strapping dynamite to radiation emission sources stolen from hospitals or other lightly guarded

fourteen. 11

6

Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy

the scope of this dossier, except insofar as fuel for nuclear

Series No.NG-G-3.1, 4 October 2007, http://www-pub.iaea.

10

org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1305_web.pdf.

IAEA, ‘Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power

12

Ibid., p. 2.

Programme’, GOV/INF/2007/2, April 2007, p. 9, para-

13

Although this dossier standardises the figures by using

graph 26, http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/

the same source for each country, the reserve estimates

Launch_NPP/07-11471_Launch_NPP.pdf.

should be treated with care, because estimates vary

Moody’s Corporate Finance, Special Comment, ‘New Nuclear Generation in the United States’, October 2007.

7

IAEA Milestones in the Development of a National

facilities. The threat of ‘dirty bombs’ is largely beyond reactors might also be employed in such devices. 5

For the 50-year estimate, see Klaus Janberg and Frank von

313 billion kWh in 2000 to 470bn kWh in 2006. Energy

Sharon Squassoni, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation

An IISS Strategic Dossier

widely and can sharply change through new discoveries. 14

Transmission losses are mainly due to theft and thus an indirect indication of grid insecurity.

Chapter one

Regional Cooperation

Effective national policies and adherence to global regimes, as well as effective strategic-trade controls, will be central to ensuring the safety and security of Southeast Asian states’ emerging civilian nuclearenergy programmes in the coming years and decades. But coordination and cooperation at the regional level are also vital aspects of an effective safety, security and non-proliferation infrastructure. An encouraging feature of the contemporary nuclear scene in Southeast Asia is the existence of nascent interest in building a structure for regional collaboration on safety and security, despite the fact that no state in the sub-region has yet deployed nuclear energy for power generation, let alone – at least since Indonesia’s expression of interest in 1965 – shown any intent to develop nuclear weapons. How robust and useful this architecture will prove in coping with the challenge posed by the nuclear developments in prospect in Southeast Asia is another question. In particular, there is reason to question the extent to which cooperation through the ASEAN and its affiliate institutions will prove effective. With a population of 570 million, Southeast Asia is an extraordinarily diverse region in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, history, levels of economic development and political systems – its ten regional states include a feudal monarchy, a military dictatorship, states led by communist parties, and various forms of democracy. Nevertheless, since 1967, these states have collectively developed the world’s second most successful regional organisation, ASEAN. At the first ASEAN summit in Bali in February 1976, member countries signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which set out principles intended to provide a basis on which member states might intensify cooperation and forge political accords with the

aim of strengthening regional peace and security. Cooperation among ASEAN member states has since become extraordinarily wide-ranging and, in December 2008, members committed themselves to the ASEAN Charter, a constitution that establishes binding principles for the association and makes it a legal entity. ASEAN members have also agreed to establish an ASEAN Community by 2015. This is intended to transform the region into a free-trade area and create a political-security community, as well as a sociocultural community, among member states. However, the emphasis in the ASEAN Charter on the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, and on the principle of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs, differentiates ASEAN from the European Union, for example, where the pooling of sovereignty has increasingly characterised regional cooperation. Moreover, relations between some combinations of ASEAN members are sporadically tense, and have sometimes even threatened to deteriorate into armed conflict (as was the case on the border between Thailand and Cambodia in 2008–9). The association has usually proved unable to play an active part in resolving either interstate or intra-state conflicts in its region: ASEAN and all of its associated instruments operate on a voluntary basis, with no verification, enforcement or sanctions mechanisms. ASEAN has displayed particular weakness in dealing with the challenge generated by the political situation in Myanmar, where the military junta has remained largely impervious to persistent international dismay over and criticism of its appalling human-rights record. For these reasons, critics within and outside Southeast Asia have questioned ASEAN’s effectiveness as a regional organisation, particularly in the political and security sphere,

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

11

Chapter one

and also whether the association’s members should remain in the ‘driving seat’ of wider regional institutions – a particular concern in light of the debacle of Thailand’s cancellation of the postponed 4th East Asia Summit in April 2009 in response to antigovernment demonstrations at the meeting’s venue in Pattaya. While, faute de mieux, most ASEAN states will continue attempting to pursue deeper cooperation through ASEAN, it cannot be assumed that the association and its spin-off institutions will offer a comprehensive response to its members’ regionalcooperation requirements, including in the field of nuclear safety and security. A 2008 assessment of intra-ASEAN cooperation on nuclear matters by Michael Malley, an American specialist in Southeast Asian politics, emphasised that ‘members have left the Association almost entirely out of their nuclear plans’, primarily because those members most clearly determined to develop nuclear energy see greater benefit in working through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). While ASEAN members have developed several institutions relevant to the safety and security issues associated with their nuclear plans, they have appeared reluctant to make use of these institutions.1 Beneath the rhetoric of consensus, there is apparently little agreement among ASEAN members that cooperation within Southeast Asia on nuclear safety and security is a desirable adjunct to international cooperation through the IAEA on these matters.2

The Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Initial collaboration among Southeast Asian states on nuclear questions evolved in the context of the Cold War under the auspices of ASEAN. While primarily focused on promoting economic cooperation between its members (initially Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Brunei joined in 1984, and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam during the 1990s), ASEAN from the beginning possessed a security dimension, reflecting the uneasy regional circumstances engendered by the Second Indochina War. Seeking to insulate the association’s members from the effects of regional competition between the major powers, in 1971 the ASEAN states declared the objective of establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)

12

An IISS Strategic Dossier

‘free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers’ in Southeast Asia. While Indonesia and to a lesser extent Malaysia provided an initial impetus for ASEAN’s adoption of the ZOPFAN idea, there was insufficient agreement on strategic perspectives among the association’s members to make the proposal much more than a symbolic and essentially unrealistic ideal. Nevertheless, in December 1995, mainly as an effort to lend substance to ZOPFAN, an ASEAN summit meeting in Bangkok – which also involved the heads of government of Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (not then ASEAN members) – signed a treaty establishing a Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Also known as the Treaty of Bangkok after the city where it was signed, the treaty came into force in March 1997, when Cambodia became the seventh signatory state to ratify it. In 2001, the Philippines became the tenth and final ASEAN member to ratify the SEANWFZ Treaty. The agreement banned signatory states from manufacturing, storing or testing nuclear weapons and from permitting any other state to use their territory for these purposes. An important exception to this latter prohibition – which primarily reflects the security relations of several Southeast Asian states with the United States – allows signatories to grant access to nuclear powers’ military aircraft and naval vessels (which might, implicitly, carry nuclear weapons). The treaty covers the territorial waters, 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves of the signatories, as well as their land areas. ASEAN governments had – rather unrealistically – hoped that the nuclear-weapons states, particularly China and the US, would sign a protocol attached to the treaty. But China objected to the treaty’s inclusion of the Southeast Asian signatories’ continental shelves and EEZs, arguing that this prejudiced its own extensive claims in the South China Sea. The US and the other recognised nuclear-weapons states expressed concern that the treaty might impede the freedom of passage of their naval ships through the straits covered by the treaty. The US also had concerns about the inclusion of EEZs and continental shelves, neither of which are included in the nuclear-weapon-freezone agreements covering Latin America and the South Pacific that the US has ratified, and about the

Regional Cooperation

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nature of the legally binding assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons that the protocol entails. Despite China’s 1999 expression of willingness to sign the SEANWFZ protocol,3 by 2009 neither it nor any of the other nuclear-weapons states had taken this step or – even in the case of the new US administration led by Barack Obama – indicated that their approach was under review. Signatory states’ obligations under the SEANWFZ Treaty’s Article 4 (‘Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes’) and Article 5 (‘IAEA Safeguards’) go beyond those relating to nuclear weapons to cover the peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy and the disposal of radioactive waste. In particular, signatory states agree to subject any peaceful energy programmes to ‘rigorous nuclear safety assessment conforming to guidelines and standards recommended by the IAEA’ and to ‘support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA safeguard system’. Other articles provide for a ‘control system’ that requires signatory states to report what is referred to as ‘any significant event’. The general lack of strong interest in civilian nuclear power in the region before the second

N

D

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I

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Based on map prepared by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

half of this decade meant that nuclear energy did not initially feature prominently in thinking about the SEANWFZ, either within or outside governments. But the Plan of Action for the 2007–12 period announced by the SEANWFZ Commission in July 2007 following a review of states’ compliance with the treaty’s provisions included encouragement to ASEAN member states to sign and implement the full range of UN treaties and conventions relating to nuclear energy. Moreover, the commission stated its resolve to: seek cooperation with the IAEA, other international and regional bodies, other Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, Dialogue partners and other friendly states in developing legal framework [sic] to meet international standards on nuclear safety, establishing regional networks for early notification of nuclear accidents, developing a regional emergency preparedness response plan and strengthening capacity building in the region on nuclear safety issues.4 However, neither the commission’s Executive Committee nor any ASEAN member has ever

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter one

invoked the provisions of the SEANWFZ Treaty to ensure compliance with its terms, including those relating to civilian nuclear energy and the disposal of radioactive waste. More specifically, no member has reported any ‘significant event’, despite – for example – Myanmar’s decision in 2007 to purchase a research reactor from Russia.5

Other relevant ASEAN initiatives As Southeast Asian states’ interest in exploiting nuclear energy has developed and become more explicit over the current decade, several regional initiatives relating specifically to civilian nuclear safety and security have emerged, particularly – but not only – in the context of ASEAN. Singapore’s most recent chairmanship of the association (from August 2007 to July 2008) gave a significant boost to nuclear-safety initiatives under ASEAN auspices. Against the background ASEAN leaders of growing concern among also directed their ASEAN ruling elites over their countries’ future energy security in the face of escasenior officials lating international energy demand, at the association’s to ‘look into a twelfth summit, held in Cebu in the Philippines in regional nuclear January 2007, ASEAN heads of government collectively safety regime’ highlighted the need to diversify ASEAN’s energy supplies ‘by developing such alternative energy sources as biofuels and civilian nuclear power’. Reflecting the concerns of some member states, ASEAN leaders also directed their senior officials to ‘look into a regional nuclear safety regime’.6 Following that initiative, the 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting, held in Singapore in August 2007 under Singapore’s chairmanship, agreed in principle to establish an ASEAN Nuclear Energy Safety Sub-Sector Network (NES-SSN) to explore nuclearsafety issues in Southeast Asia; senior officials were tasked with determining the terms of reference and composition of the proposed network. At the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in November 2007, ASEAN heads of government noted their previous discussions on nuclear safety at the January 2007 summit; the SEANWFZ Action Plan adopted in

14

An IISS Strategic Dossier

July 2007; and the ASEAN energy ministers’ agreement, and reiterated in the ‘ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability’ their intent to forge ASEAN-wide cooperation to establish a regional nuclear-safety regime. The NES-SSN met for the first time in Singapore in January 2008, when IAEA officials briefed ASEAN representatives on IAEA activities on nuclear safety and security. Subsequent working-group meetings were held in Singapore in May and October 2008, but their proceedings have not been made public. As of late July 2009, the terms of reference had not been agreed.7 Also of acute potential relevance to the future development of civilian nuclear energy in Southeast Asia was the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the ASEAN Power Grid signed at the August 2007 25th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting in Singapore. This MoU built on previous energy-cooperation declarations by ASEAN members, which had since the late 1990s mentioned the objective of creating a regional grid, an idea first floated in regional think-tank circles in the 1980s. The memorandum was intended to accelerate progress towards establishing an ASEAN power grid ‘to help assure greater regional energy security and sustainability on the basis of mutual benefit’.8 It charged the Heads of ASEAN Power Utilities/ Authorities Council with forming an ASEAN Power Grid Consultative Committee to help implement the MoU’s recommendations. There are already 11 transnational interconnectivity projects in train as part of the proposed grid, of which five are scheduled to be operating by 2010. These include three interconnected power-transmission networks which Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed an agreement to build on the sidelines of the August 2007 Ministers on Energy Meeting.9 Singapore expects to connect its national grid to those in Johor (Malaysia) and Batam (Indonesia) during phase two of the ASEAN Power Grid Project, between 2009 and 2014. This would make it possible for the city state to receive electricity from any nuclear power plants that might be built in proximate parts of its two closest neighbours.10 However, Indonesia and Malaysia may view with some unease Singapore’s known interest in integrating its electricity grid with those of its neighbours, which would entail the country effectively acquiring a stake in and perhaps

Regional Cooperation

Leaders at the 12th ASEAN summit in Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007: (L-R) Brunei Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, Indonesian President Sisulo Banbang Yudhoyono, Lao Prime Minister Boussone Bouphavanh, Malaysian Prime Minister Abdula Ahman Badawi, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Long, Myanmese leader Gen. Soe Win, Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (Getty)

influence over their potential civilian nuclear programmes.11

Wider ASEAN-led initiatives The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1993, represents an effort by ASEAN to create a structure for multilateral security dialogue among the foreign-policy establishments of association members and their dialogue partners, both Asian (notably China, India, Japan and the two Koreas) and non-Asian (including Australia, the European Union, New Zealand, Russia and the US). While the ARF has sponsored annual meetings for its members’ foreign ministers, and a variety of meetings for senior officials on diverse security topics of regional relevance, the institution is not widely considered to have lived up to the expectations that many in the region originally held for it. Nevertheless, the ARF did take some interest in non-proliferation matters as early as 1996. Reflecting pressure from some members for the grouping to assume a more assertive stance on nuclear proliferation, in July 2004 ARF foreign ministers issued a statement on non-proliferation (the ‘Jakarta Statement on Non-Proliferation’), which included a declaration of support for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Passed in April 2004, this resolution called, inter alia, for states to establish effective domestic measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biolog-

ical weapons and their means of delivery. These measures specifically included developing and maintaining ‘effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in [such weapons and delivery systems]’. The ARF’s Jakarta Statement detailed non-proliferation steps that ARF participants agreed to take, which included developing and enforcing ‘effective national export control lists’ and reviewing their capacity ‘to control radioactive sources’, as well as redoubling efforts to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.12 While it is difficult to assign causality, the ARF Jakarta Statement probably helped to stimulate the subsequent noticeable improvement in national attention to export-control lists and wider adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia all signed in 2005. In a further statement in August 2007, ARF members agreed to provide ‘as and when appropriate, additional information to the 1540 Committee on national implementation’ and to work towards ‘practical capacity-building activities and cooperation’ to help them fulfil their UNSCR 1540 and other non-proliferation commitments.13 There has been some tension within the ARF between US-led promotion of non-proliferation efforts and the insistence of some Southeast Asian states, led by Indonesia, on an equal emphasis on

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter one

nuclear disarmament. By 2009, however, this tension has dissipated, and the ARF has created an annual Inter-sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament, thereby making these issues a permanent feature of the forum’s agenda. Through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) meetings – which involve China, Japan and South Korea as well as the ten ASEAN members – since 1997, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) – which additionally includes Australia, India and New Zealand – since 2005, ASEAN has formed the core of efforts to promote wider regional cooperation, including in the energy sphere. At the 3rd EAS Summit in Singapore in November 2007, EAS In 2007, EAS governments committed themselves through the Singapore Declaration on governments Climate Change, Energy and the Environment to cooperagreed to ating ‘on the development and use of civilian nuclear cooperate ‘on the power, in a manner ensuring nuclear safety, security and development of non-proliferation … within the framework of the IAEA civilian nuclear for those EAS participating countries which are interpower’ ested’.14 More specifically, following a Thai proposal at its 11th summit (which also took place in Singapore, the day before the EAS meeting), the APT agreed to establish the APT Forum on Nuclear Energy Safety, which first met in Bangkok in June 2008. Thailand and China jointly hosted the two-day event, which was intended ‘to enhance synergy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the region, particularly in terms of technology transfer and capacity-building’. Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama placed the event in the wider context of the challenge posed to longterm energy security in the wake of major oil-price increases. The core idea was evidently that interested ASEAN states could benefit from their Northeast Asian counterparts’ substantial advantages in terms of civilian nuclear technology and experience.15

Regional assistance programmes for civilian nuclear energy Southeast Asian states are also involved in nuclear collaborative ventures outside the ASEAN frame-

16

An IISS Strategic Dossier

work. These include IAEA regional technical assistance programmes to promote cooperative research and training in nuclear science and technology. In 1972, in partnership with the IAEA, a group of countries established the Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA). A model for nuclear-cooperation agreements in other regions, the RCA has coordinated more than 100 nuclear-science assistance projects in fields including human health, industry, agriculture, environmental protection, energy and radiation protection. Its 17 current members include seven ASEAN states (the non-participating ASEAN exceptions being Brunei, Cambodia and Laos), four South Asian states, four North Asian states, and Australia and New Zealand. Japan, motivated in part by commercial considerations, has provided much of the impetus for wider regional discussions on nuclear matters.16 Japan’s nuclear-industry lobby, through the nongovernmental Japanese Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF), launched a regional initiative in 1983 when it set up its International Nuclear Cooperation Center, which was renamed the Asia Cooperation Center in 1999. Indonesia has constituted a particular focus for Japan’s nuclear industry and in 1993, JAIF established its Jakarta Liaison Office ‘as a base for promoting mutual understanding and strengthening exchange of information among Southeast Asian countries’.17 Safety and security issues have not apparently figured prominently in JAIF’s efforts to promote civilian nuclear energy. However, the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), established by Tokyo with support from Japan’s Atomic Energy Commission, features ‘radiation safety and radioactive waste management’ and ‘safety culture’ as two of eight priority themes for information exchange among its member states (Australia, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam). The FNCA, which evolved out of the meetings of the International Conference on Nuclear Cooperation in Asia that have taken place annually in Tokyo since 1990, was inaugurated in Bangkok in 2000, and has subsequently sponsored annual ministerial and senior officials’ meetings (alternately in Tokyo and regional states), as well as workshops on the eight focal themes.

Regional Cooperation

Asian Nuclear Safety Network These broader regional activities provide the context for Japan’s support for more specific regional collaboration on nuclear safety and security. Japan provided the impetus for the IAEA’s ExtraBudgetary Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Installations in South East Asia, Pacific and Far East Countries, inaugurated in 1997. In 2002, the focus of this programme moved towards encouraging self-reliant, sustainable and autonomous efforts on the part of member countries, with the initiation of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) project. According to the ANSN website, the central idea behind the network is that: communicating, exchanging, pooling, analyzing and sharing the existing and new knowledge in the field of nuclear safety is an essential tool to facilitate sustainable nuclear safety structure activities, to establish, improve and maintain nuclear safety infrastructures and to achieve a high level of safety of nuclear installations in the Asian region.18 In essence, the ANSN is an Internet-based computer network comprising hubs in China, Japan and South Korea; ‘national centres’ in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and, since it joined in December 2008, Singapore; the IAEA’s own ANSN website; and websites provided by the network’s supporting countries: Australia, France, Germany and the US. Pakistan and Bangladesh associate themselves with the ANSN on matters of nuclear-power-plant safety and the strengthening of regulatory frameworks. In addition, the European Commission is thought to be seriously interested in supporting the network. The network’s primary activity is the sharing of technical information and documents relating to nuclear safety, including records of incidents and good practice. Following a pilot project involving four websites in 2003, the ANSN became operational in 2004, when three topical groups (on safety analysis, safety culture and safety management of research reactors) were also established. The ANSN operates an Internet portal linking to relevant nuclear-safety information on national centres’ websites and the IAEA website. Groups of experts in ANSN member countries have also addressed the

issues of operational safety, education, training and safety analysis. Since 2004, the ANSN has published newsletters covering nuclear-safety issues. Some of the information shared on the network is confidential, with its circulation restricted even within the network. However, there are plans to allow wider access to the database; in the meantime, pages on the ANSN website that were previously open only to network members are now open to the public. The ANSN also organises regular informationsharing meetings and workshops; personal contacts and exchanges have become as important as the network’s Internet-based sharing. In April 2009, the ANSN adopted a ‘new vision’, which may lead to additional forms of cooperation.19

Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network In April 2009, a senior officials’ meeting in Seoul, following an earlier meeting in Sydney in 2007, resulted in agreement on a regional nuclear-safeguards network that will to some extent parallel the ANSN. However, while the IAEA facilitates the ANSN, which is composed of states, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) is modelled on the European Safeguards Research and Development Association and comprises organisations concerned with nuclear safeguards from the eligible countries (Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and the US). Fourteen organisations from 11 of these states were represented at the meeting in Seoul. The primary objective of the APSN, which will commence operations in October 2009, is to ensure by ‘supporting the building and sustainability of national nuclear safeguards capability’ that its members are able to implement the IAEA safeguards system effectively and efficiently. The intention is to promote regional cooperation on applying safeguards by facilitating technical assistance on safeguards, providing a forum for sharing safeguards knowledge and developing a network of safeguards practitioners in the region. Activities will include developing Internetbased secure information exchange on safeguards, supporting training on safeguards, providing opportunities for professional exchanges, and facilitating R&D collaboration on safeguards and ‘related fields’. The first formal APSN meeting is expected to be held in Indonesia in April 2010.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter one

The establishment of this regional safeguards network is directed at practical steps to strengthen the performance of state systems of nuclear accounting and control in Southeast Asia, which have in the past been consistently weak. The initial impetus for the network came from the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office,20 whose director general is the inaugural APSN chair. While the focus of the APSN will initially be on safeguards, the network will probably eventually seek also to cover nuclear security and export controls, which cannot be totally separated from safeguards. At least one regional state initially objected to the establishment of the APSN, on the grounds that it did not wish to see a Ideally, SE Asian strong regional safeguards system akin to the European Atomic Energy Community states would (EURATOM) evolving, and wished the IAEA to remain collectively forge the only international body charged with verification. a comprehensive The fear was probably that Western states involved in regional the network might seek to response to these use it to pursue their own non-proliferation goals. Accordingly, the APSN’s challenges Statement of Principles explicitly states that the network ‘will not include an inspectorate or undertake verification activities’.21

Conclusions It is clear that managing and regulating nuclear energy and power generation will constitute vitally important challenges for Southeast Asian states over the coming decades, not least because of the safety, security and safeguards implications. Ideally, Southeast Asian states and their nuclear-related institutions would collectively forge a comprehensive regional response to these challenges. Indeed, elements of such a response have been in place for some years, and further institutional measures have evolved quite rapidly since 2007. At first glance, the most obvious potentially useful institutional vehicle in this context is ASEAN. Energy-policy specialist Andrew Symon argued in

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An IISS Strategic Dossier

2008 that ASEAN could and should develop an ‘ASEAN Nuclear Energy Authority’ to manage and regulate nuclear energy (with particular reference to safety, security and non-proliferation) and, potentially, nuclear power generation in Southeast Asia. In Symon’s view, ‘an ASEAN approach to nuclear power development would mesh with other aspects of cooperative ASEAN energy programmes, in particular efforts to foster crossborder electricity transmission supply’; moreover, an ASEAN nuclear-energy commission might also negotiate with nuclear-plant vendors on behalf of individual member states.22 He went on to argue that the European experience with the EURATOM Treaty might offer a useful model for ASEAN to follow. In Symon’s optimistic view, ‘the imperative of managing nuclear power development safely and economically may help catalyse and generally strengthen ASEAN’.23 While facing a key challenge such as the management of nuclear energy and power generation might provide a basis for the further deepening of intraASEAN cooperation as Symon suggested, others would argue that such deepening is unlikely to come about in the absence of a more thoroughgoing political accommodation among ASEAN members leading to a considerably greater degree of trust and a stronger sense of common destiny than currently exist, and that this kind of convergence within the association is not foreseeable except in the long term. The current approach to regional coordination on nuclear matters, notably safety, security and safeguards, may appear to be uncoordinated and at times seemingly characterised by inefficiency, even redundancy. However, given the existing circumstances, in which the political systems of ASEAN members remain eclectic, their strategic outlooks diverse and their technological capacity weak in the nuclear sphere, the existence of a variety of institutional mechanisms, including some that are outside ASEAN’s ambit but which benefit from the organisational impetus and technological input of interested non-Southeast Asian states and institutions, provides a promising basis for the adherence of Southeast Asian states to international standards as they contemplate embarking on nuclear power generation.

Regional Cooperation

Notes 1

Michael Malley, ‘Bypassing Regionalism? Domestic

12

Politics and Nuclear Energy Security’, in Donald K. Emmerson (ed), Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and

2 July 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16247.htm. 13

Implementation of United Nations Security Council

Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2008; Singapore: Institute of

Resolution 1540, 2 August 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/

2

Ibid, p. 255.

3

Subsequently referred to in a communiqué of the

region/asia-paci/asean/conference/arf/state0708-2.html. 14

Ministerial Meeting, Bangkok, 24–25 July 2000, paragraph

org/21116.htm. 15

17, http://www.aseansec.org/595.htm.

com/english/2008-06/16/content_8379882.htm. 16

Malley, ‘Bypassing Regionalism?’, p. 255.

6

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Chairman’s Statement of

2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Geoffrey-Gunn/2659. 17

the 12th ASEAN Summit, ‘One Caring and Sharing Community’, 13 January 2007, available on the ASEAN

8

‘Role of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Senior Officials’ Meeting on Energy to accelerate the final-

Office in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’,

isation of the terms of reference.

Supplementary Submission no. 86.1, 28 April 2009, http://

Memorandum of Understanding on the ASEAN Power

www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/jsct/nuclearnon_

‘RI Plans Power Grid with Neighbours’, Jakarta Post, 24

proliferation/subs/sub86_1.pdf. 21

Donaldson Tan, ‘Nuclear Power in ASEAN’, Singapore

Andrew Symon, ‘Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN’s Effectiveness to the Test?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no.1, April 2008, p. 133.

http://www.siiaonline.org/?q=blog/nuclear-power-asean. Malley, ‘Bypassing Regionalism?’, p. 255.

‘Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network: Statement of Principles’, 16 April 2009.

22

Institute of International Affairs website, 11 October 2008, 11

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office,

12 of the statement says the ministers encouraged the

August 2007. 10

‘Ninth Meeting of the ANSN Steering Committee’, Asian Nuclear Safety Network Newsletter, 1 June 2009.

20

Grid, 23 August 2007, http://www.aseansec.org/20918.htm. 9

ANSN website, ‘Welcome to the Asian Nuclear Safety Network’, http://www.ansn.org/ansn.org/home.aspx.

19

on Energy Meeting, Mandalay, Myanmar, 29 July 2009, http://www.aseansec.org/JMS-27th-AMEM.pdf. Paragraph

JAIF website, ‘Activities: International Cooperation’, http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/activities.html.

18

Secretariat website, http://www.aseansec.org/19280.htm. Joint Ministerial Statement of the 27th ASEAN Ministers

Geoffrey Gunn, ‘Southeast Asia’s Looming Nuclear Power Industry’, Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 11 February

http://www.aseansec.org/20775.htm. 5

‘ASEAN+3 Nuclear Safety Forum Kicks off in Bangkok’, China View website, 16 June 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.

Joint Statement on the Commission for the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, 30 July 2007,

Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, 21 November 2007, http://www.aseansec.

following year. Joint Communiqué of the 33rd ASEAN

7

ASEAN Regional Forum Statement Supporting National

Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 241, 256.

4

ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-Proliferation,

23

Ibid., p. 137.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter one

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An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter two

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Over the past half century, countries have banded together in various ways to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The system that has evolved from these efforts is generally referred to as the global non-proliferation regime. The cornerstone is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which came into force in March 1970. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as it is commonly called, imposed various obligations on its signa­tories. The five recognised nuclear-weapons states (China, France, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom and United States) pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons to any recipient nor to assist any non-nuclear-weapons state to manufacture or acquire such devices (Article I). In turn, each non-nuclear-weapons state party undertook not to receive any such transfer, nor ‘to manufacture or otherwise acquire’ nuclear weapons (Article II). In addition, these states also agreed to accept safeguards on all ‘source or special fissionable material’ within their territory or control (Article III.1). All but four states are party to the NPT. India, Israel and Pakistan are the only non-signatories, while North Korea declared its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003.

The nuclear-safeguards system Predating the NPT, in 1957 the UN established the IAEA, an autonomous body designed both to control and promote the development of nuclear energy. Among the specific functions assigned to it was the application of safeguards to civil nuclear facilities. Safeguards tools mainly consisted initially of on-site inspections and audits to confirm the completeness and correctness of state reports about the production, possession and use of nuclear materials, with the purpose of verifying that declared nuclear facilities were being used exclusively for

peaceful purposes. Safeguards cannot prevent the non-peaceful use of nuclear materials. They are designed, rather, to detect in a timely manner the diversion of nuclear material, and thereby to deter it. They are akin to alarms, not locks. The initial safeguards agreements were made in regard to particular declared facilities, material and equipment. Such item-specific agreements are still in use, and are usually the outcome of conditions agreed with the state supplying the item(s), using the provisions of IAEA document INFCIRC/66 as their basis. A decade after the IAEA was established and safeguards agreements were first formulated, nationwide ‘full-scope safeguards’ became the norm, under the newly signed NPT. Each ‘comprehensive safeguards agreement’ follows the structure and content set out in agency document INFCIRC/153. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are still largely limited to declared facilities and nuclear material. They do not give IAEA inspectors access rights to non-declared facilities, except under certain conditions of ‘special inspections’ that have rarely been utilised. As of July 2009, 164 countries had a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. After the 1991 Gulf War, and the discovery that Iraq had a clandestine nuclear-weapons-development programme separate from its declared civilian programme, IAEA member states agreed on the need to strengthen the safeguards system in order to increase the likelihood of detecting undeclared activities. In 1997, the IAEA board of governors finalised its approval of a new voluntary legal authority called the Additional Protocol to a state’s safeguards agreement. A state that accepts the Additional Protocol is required to provide the IAEA with a wide range of information covering all aspects of its nuclear-fuel-cycle-related activi-

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter two

ties, to grant the agency broader access rights and to enable it to use the most advanced verification tools in accordance with the Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540. The Additional Protocol allows the IAEA actively to seek information on nuclear activities within a state, rather than passively waiting for

information to be presented to it. As of July 2009, 123 countries had signed the Additional Protocol, and 91 had brought it into force. Safeguards agreements include provisions for subsidiary arrangements to define the verification details, including the frequency of inspections and

Nuclear nuts and bolts: the fuel cycle

Mining

Milling

Conversion

The nuclear fuel cycle is the sequence of operations involved in preparing fuel for nuclear-power generation, irradiating the fuel in a nuclear reactor and handling the fuel after it is discharged from the reactor. Activities involved in processing uranium for use in reactors are termed the ‘front end’ of the fuel cycle. The ‘back end’ of the cycle refers to the management of the spent fuel after it is irradiated. Both uranium enrichment in the front end and plutonium reprocessing at the back end are considered ‘sensitive’ fuel-cycle technologies because, in addition to their peaceful uses, they can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Certain other activities, such as heavy-water production and the handling of plutonium, are also considered ‘sensitive technology areas’ because of their connection with fissionable material that can further a military purpose. The fuel cycle starts with the mining of uranium ore. Uranium is found in a number of different minerals, combined with other elements in a variety of oxides, silicates and phosphates. Typically, uranium-bearing ores are mined using traditional underground or open-pit mining techniques, and the uranium is separated from other elements in a mechanical and chemical process known as milling. At a milling facility, the ore is crushed and ground into a fine powder, which is then dissolved and treated in a series of chemical processes designed to separate the uranium. After separation, the uranium is dried to produce solid uranium ore concentrate, known as ‘yellowcake’ because of its colour and texture. Typically, yellowcake contains 15–35% impurities, which must be removed. Uranium conversion is a general term denoting a number of chemical processes that can be used to purify yellowcake and convert it into the uranium compounds that are required for fuel fabrication or enrichment. Various different conversion processes have been devel-

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An IISS Strategic Dossier

Enrichment

Fuel Fabrication

oped by the nuclear industry. One typical process involves converting the yellowcake to ammonium diuranate, which is then converted to uranium dioxide (UO2) powder. After fabrication, the UO2 can be used as fuel for reactors that run on natural (unenriched) uranium. The UO2 can also be further converted to uranium tetrafluoride, and finally to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas, in preparation for the most common method of enriching uranium. Once enriched, UF6 can be ‘reconverted’ into UO2 for fabrication into fuel elements, or it can be converted into uranium metal in a process known as reduction. Enrichment is the process of increasing the percentage of the U-235 isotope present in uranium to the higher levels that are needed for use in most types of reactors and for nuclear weapons. A variety of enrichment technologies may be employed, including gaseous diffusion and centrifugation. Generally, enrichment levels of 3–5% U-235 are required to fabricate fuel for light-water power reactors, while much higher levels, around 90%, are desirable for nuclear weapons. Enrichment of 20% marks the cut-off between LEU and HEU. Fuel fabrication is the production of fuel elements for use in a nuclear reactor. It involves pressing UO2 powder into small pellets, which are then sintered at high temperatures to form a ceramic. The pellets are then stacked in long hollow tubes, known as fuel pins or rods, then sheathed in a metal cladding, typically an alloy of zirconium, and grouped together in a cage-like structure known as a fuel assembly. Fuel assembly designs are highly specific to reactor type; there are usually only a small number of suppliers whose fuel assemblies are certified for use in any given type of reactor. Irradiation is the process of exposing fuel elements or other items to ionising radiation. In nuclear reactors, accelerators (such as cyclotrons) and certain other nuclear facilities, irradiation involves the bombarding of

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

the information to be shared with the agency. Until 1992, the subsidiary arrangements required states to provide the agency with design information about new facilities 180 days before the first introduction of nuclear materials. After the discovery of Iraq’s undeclared nuclear programme in 1991, it became



Irradiation

Cooling

clear that design information is needed much earlier and it was agreed that subsidiary arrangements be changed so that design information for new facilities would be provided ‘as early as possible, and in any event not later than 180 days prior to the start of construction’.

Reprocessing

atoms with nuclear particles to produce a chain reaction for nuclear energy, or to produce new isotopes. Fuel that has been in a reactor is ‘irradiated’. Types of reactor Heavy-water reactors (LWRs) use heavy water as the moderator to help achieve fission, and/or as a coolant. Heavy water, or D2O, is chemically the same as ordinary water, but with the hydrogen atoms replaced with deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen that has an extra neutron in the atomic nucleus. Because heavy water can absorb fewer neutrons than light water (ordinary water), heavywater reactors can be fuelled with natural uranium. Light-water reactors use ordinary water both as moderator and coolant. The vast majority of power reactors in the world today are LWRs, which are more proliferation-resistant. Research reactors are typically used for research or training and to produce radioisotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial use. Because of their low power levels (typically ranging from 10kWt to 10MWt*), they are not used to produce electricity or heat. Research reactors need far less fuel than power reactors, but usually at higher levels of enrichment, typically up to 20%, although some still use 93% U-235. A common design is the pooltype reactor, in which the cluster of fuel elements in the core sits in a pool of water. Depending on their type and size, research reactors can pose a significant proliferation risk. There are approximately 280 research reactors in the world, located in 56 countries, while 30 countries have operational power reactors. * While power reactors are rated by their electrical output, most research reactors are rated by their thermal power output. 1MW of thermal power (1MWt) = approximately 1,000kg steam/hour. 1MW of electrical power (1MWe) = approximately 3MWt.

Storage

Disposal

Reprocessing refers to the chemical process for extracting plutonium and uranium from irradiated or ‘spent’ reactor fuel. The most commonly used method, known as the plutonium uranium extraction (PUREX) process, involves dissolving the fuel in acid and then treating the aqueous mixture with chemicals that separate the plutonium and uranium from the highly radioactive waste that is created when the fuel is irradiated. The technologies for civilian and military uses are largely similar, although the process is often called ‘recycling’ when the purpose is civilian, and ‘separation’ if the purpose is to extract plutonium for weapons use. For either purpose, reprocessing requires dedicated, heavily shielded facilities to protect operators from the intense radiation. Hot cells are shielded rooms with remote handling equipment for processing and examining radioactive material. Reprocessing plants have industrial-scale hot cells connected together for the bulk extraction of plutonium from spent fuel. Hot-cell laboratories, often associated with research reactors, are smaller facilities used for various radiochemical experiments. They can also be used to separate plutonium, albeit in small quantities, and therefore can also pose a proliferation risk. Spent-fuel storage is an interim solution to the problem of how to manage spent fuel. Most spent fuel is stored in ‘ponds’ at reactor sites, where water is used both for cooling and shielding. Some spent fuel is stored in dry casks or vaults with air circulation for cooling, following an initial period of at least a year in the pond. Ultimately, geologic disposal of conditioned waste is the last step in the fuel cycle, although few countries have overcome the political challenges involved in designating a central disposal site.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

23

Chapter two

Every ASEAN state has signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement. As of July 2009, only two ASEAN states had an Additional Protocol in force: Indonesia and Singapore. Four others – Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – have signed but not yet ratified the instrument. For states which have only very small quantities of nuclear material, the standard comprehensive safeguards agreement allows them to conclude a protocol which holds in abeyance most of the operative provisions of the IAEA’s verification tools. Commonly referred to as a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), this provision is a potential proliferation loophole. In a 2005 report to the agency’s board of governors, IAEA Director General Dr Mohamed ElBaradei drew attention to this loophole and to the agency’s need to receive initial reports on nuclear material, to obtain information on planned or existing nuclear facilities, and to be able to perform inspection activities in the field, if required, in regard to all states with comprehensive safeguards agreements. The board agreed, and in September 2005 it approved a modified SQP text reducing the number of safeguards measures held in abeyance and making an SQP unavailable to states with existing or planned facilities, as recommended by the IAEA Secretariat. States that already have an SQP are encouraged to amend it in line with the new provisions, and any state that newly signs a safeguards agreement with an SQP after September 2005 must accept the modified SQP. Five ASEAN states have an SQP; of these, Singapore has signed the modified protocol, while Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have the old, problematic SQP.

Non-treaty-based mechanisms Supplementing the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, a number of non-treaty-based multinational arrangements are also considered to be part of the global non-proliferation regime. Exporting nations have created several informal consensusbased organisations to regulate trade in sensitive technologies. The first was the Zangger Committee, established in 1971 by 15 countries that agreed on a ‘trigger list’ of items whose export would activate IAEA safeguards, What became known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in 1975 in response to India’s 1974 detonation of a ‘peaceful nuclear device’. To tighten what they saw

24

An IISS Strategic Dossier

as loopholes in the NPT, members created a set of guidelines restricting the export of items and tech­ nology especially designed for nuclear use (also called ‘trigger-list’ items). In 1992, reflecting the lessons learned from how Iraq had been able to evade restrictions to further its nuclear-weapons programme, the NSG tightened its controls and extended them to dual-use items. In 1994 the NSG adopted the so-called ‘nonproliferation principle’, whereby a supplier should authorise a transfer only when satisfied that it would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over time, the membership grew and in 2009 stood at 45, which includes Australia and New Zealand but not any of the newly industrialising states of ASEAN, some of which have the capability (as demonstrated by Malaysia) to be suppliers of nuclear-related goods. Indonesia and Malaysia are among the countries with whom the NSG engages in dialogue to share information in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and equipment. Concerned that the treaties and export-control regulations were still failing to stop trade relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)1, in 2003 the US and ten like-minded states formed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in which they agreed to explore ways to enhance their ability to cooperate in interdicting shipments of such goods. The focus of the PSI is on establishing greater intelligence and improving diplomatic and operational coordina­ tion among its partner states so as to reinforce their readiness and capability to detain, inspect and seize suspect cargo. As of May 2009, 95 states were participants in the PSI, meaning that they endorse the PSI statement of principles that identifies steps for effectively interdicting proliferation-related shipments, consistent with national authorities and international legal frameworks. Among the principles are that participants ‘seriously consider providing consent … to boarding and searching of [their] own flag vessels by other states’, and to put in place ship-boarding agreements with other states in advance, so that no time is lost should interdic­ tion be required. Participants are also encouraged to join PSI interdiction-training exercises and actual operations, should they arise. Of 38 PSI training exercises conducted worldwide through September 2009, involving over 70 participating countries, four were conducted in the Southeast Asian/Australasia

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

IAEA safeguards in Southeast Asia (as of 9 July 2009)  State

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

Small Quantities Protocol

Additional Protocol

Brunei

In force: 4 November 1987

Old SQP

Cambodia

In force: 17 December 1999

Old SQP

Indonesia

In force: 14 July 1980

Laos

In force: 5 April 2001

Malaysia

In force: 29 February 1972

Myanmar

In Force: 20 April 1995

Philippines

In force: 16 October 1974

Singapore

In force: 18 October 1977

Thailand

In force: 16 May 1974

Signed: 22 September 2005

Vietnam

In force: 23 February 1990

Signed: 10 August 2007

In force: 29 September 1999 Old SQP Signed: 22 November 2005 Old SQP Signed: 30 September 1997 Amended 31 March 2008

In force: 31 March 2008

IAEA safeguards in Australasia (as of 9 July 2009)  State

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

Small Quantities Protocol

Additional Protocol

Australia

In force: 10 July 1974

Fiji

In force: 22 March 1973

Old SQP

In force: 14 July 2006

Kiribati

In force: 19 December 1990

Old SQP

Signed: 9 November 2004

Marshall Islands

In force: 3 May 2005

New Zealand

In force: 29 February 1972

Old SQP

In force: 24 September 1998

Palau

In force: 13 May 2005

Amended 15 March 2005

In force: 13 May 2005

In force: 12 December 1997

In force: 3 May 2005

Papua New Guinea In force: 13 October 1983

Old SQP

Timor Leste

Approved by IAEA board on 11 Approved by IAEA board on September 2007 but not yet 11 September 2007 but not signed yet signed

Approved by IAEA board on 11 September 2007 but not yet signed

region between 2003 and 2008, hosted by Australia (twice), Singapore and New Zealand, with another Singapore-led exercise planned for October 2009. Australia, Singapore and New Zealand have also hosted meetings of the PSI Operational Experts Group. Four ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Philippines and Singapore) are PSI participants, as are Australia and New Zealand, as well as Fiji, the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea. Complementing, and sometimes confused with, the PSI is another US programme called the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which is focused on maritime cargoes bound for (or from) the United States. Whereas PSI addresses cargoes in transit, wherever they may be, the purpose of the CSI is to improve capabilities at major ports to screen cargo containers to ensure that they do not contain problematic items. Four ports in Southeast Asia are included in this programme: Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia, Laem Chabang in Thailand, and Singapore. A separate Megaports

Initiative, run by the US Department of Energy, provides radiation-detection equipment and related training to scan containers for radiation, regardless of destination. As a further response to the rise of a black-market trade in sensitive technologies and concern that terrorist groups might acquire weapons capable of inflicting mass casualties, in 2004 the US persuaded the UN Security Council to adopt unanimously a new anti-proliferation resolu­tion. UNSC Resolution 1540 mandates states to criminalise the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, requires states to adopt strict export controls and asks states to secure sensitive material. The resolution filled two gaps in the non-proliferation regime, by specifically addressing the transfer of sensitive technology and material to non-state actors, and by applying export-control requirements universally, not just limiting these to NPT parties or to the even more limited member­ ship of the NSG. It established a global norm: states

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

25

Chapter two

are accountable for what leaves or transits their borders. The resolution also established a common global baseline of transparency on national efforts: the requirement for submission of national reports and the development of a legislative database that provides primary-source material on how each UN Would-be member is dealing with the challenge of non-proliferaproliferators have tion compliance. However, this new international law is still beset by the perception an incentive to of inequality, since it was not arrived at through a negotiexploit weaker ated treaty but imposed by the 15-member UN Security controls in newly Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, industrialised meaning that these obligations are legally binding on countries all states. Negative attitudes towards the resolution combined with a lack of bureaucratic capacity probably account for the lacklustre manner in which several states in Southeast Asia responded to the 1540 requirement to report on national implementation of non-proliferation controls. Although all ten ASEAN states filed national reports, some were superficial and only four of the ten – Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam – responded to the 1540 Committee’s request for additional information.2

Strategic trade controls On a national basis, most states have introduced regulations, procedures and policies that seek to regulate the trade and transfer of military-use items, as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technology that have civilian applications but which could also contribute to military programmes. Many of the centrifuge components that the A.Q. Khan network arranged for a company in Malaysia to manufacture for the Libyan nuclear-weapons programme could be considered dual-use goods. The essential purpose of strategic trade controls is to balance the trade and security imperatives of states with those of commercial enterprises. While export controls can be imposed for various political and economic purposes, strategic trade controls, which are the

26

An IISS Strategic Dossier

focus of this dossier, are aimed at preventing the proliferation of arms and WMD capabilities. As such, strategic trade controls cover transfers that can contribute to the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technologies and missile capabilities. Transfers of concern include materials, equipment, components and know-how. Strategic trade controls differ from customs regulations. In the case of the latter, customs officials historically have been tasked with enforcing laws related to economic crimes (avoidance of duties and taxes), public safety (movement of hazardous materials) or trafficking offences (transfer of illicit goods like drugs, people, unlicensed firearms). Whereas, in the case of strategic trade controls, the dual-use items are not illicit, may not be at all hazardous and the proliferators may ensure that all taxes and duties are paid. While customs officers are trained to deal with smuggling, which involves the concealment of contraband, dual-use goods are rarely smuggled. They are more likely to be exported using standard customs documents but with inaccurate descriptions and technical data declared on the forms. This is a serious problem for all customs authorities, but a major headache for officers in countries where strategic trade controls have never been a priority and where technical capacity is lacking. High-tech approaches, such as the installation of portal monitors are often irrelevant for controlling such goods. The recent exposure of nuclear-proliferation activity by states including Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea has drawn attention to the need for the strict enforcement of strategic trade controls to supplement non-proliferation treaties.3 Most proliferation programmes of concern have been based on technology obtained from countries in the developed world with systems of strategic trade controls that have proved inadequate. As these states tighten their controls, would-be proliferators have an incentive to exploit weaker controls in newly industrialised countries. Two recent proliferation trends stand out. The first is the involvement of non-state actors in sensitive technology transactions between states. The most notorious case was the role that the black-market network led by Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan played in transferring nuclear-weaponsrelated technology to North Korea, Iran, Libya and possibly others. The second trend is the expressed

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

interest of terrorist groups (themselves a separate category of non-state actor) in acquiring WMD or other sensitive dual-use materials that they can fashion into crude weapons such as ‘dirty bombs’ made from nuclear fuel or radioactive sources. To the extent that such sensitive materials can be acquired in-country, moved within a licence-free trade zone or using simplified procedures such as a general licence, the WMD terrorism problem could be beyond the scope of strategic trade controls. Strategic trade controls are increasingly a means to secure global supply chains against unauthorised diversion and use, thus allowing greater hightechnology trade among ‘trusted partners’. The adoption of UNSCR 1540 formally recognised this trade–security linkage by focusing international attention on export controls4 as the actual, measurable indicators of compliance with non-proliferation treaty obligations.

Common best practices UNSCR 1540 does not provide universal standards; each country is allowed to tailor its system of strategic trade controls to its particular requirements. Among countries that have developed modern systems there remains a great deal of diversity in legislation, licensing procedures and approaches to enforcement. Implementation has been uneven, partly because many developing countries, including in Southeast Asia, mistakenly regard export controls as unfair trade barriers to economic development. The level of implementation is also low in the region owing to a lack of institutional capacity and, among the smaller states, low levels of technological development. Nevertheless, the resolution appears to be paving the way for the eventual harmonisation of perspectives and practices on strategic trade controls across the globe. In order to assess strategic trade controls and to compare national systems, it is useful to examine several qualitative indicators that are now used by the 1540 Committee, although they have been developed and used by several governments, inter-governmental organisations including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),5 and academic experts6 over the past decade. Notwithstanding the absence of agreed international standards, the best practices increasingly followed by states that have learned lessons from

the violation of inadequate past standards provide a useful benchmark. Broadly speaking, the following elements are crucial to a functioning system of strategic trade controls: „„A legal and regulatory framework that establishes non-proliferation as a rationale for regulating, controlling and monitoring the trade and transfer of WMD-relevant materials and technology. This includes the presence of one or more control lists, the identification of one or more government agencies as the focal points for implementation, and definitions of activities that are covered under the regulations. Such activities should not merely include export and import, but also re-exports, transit, transhipment,7 brokering,8 freight forwarding, and transfers of expertise and knowledge through intangible means.9 In addition there is the requirement that the government have the ability to control transfers of non-listed items – ‘catch-all controls’ – which are based on the knowledge or suspicion that the enduser might divert the items for WMD uses. „„An institutional framework that ensures a clear line of authority for the implementation of strategic trade controls, the allocation of personnel and technical resources, the procedures for licensing trade in controlled items, and the guidelines used in the issue of licences for each type of activity involving such items. „„Enforcement authority and capacity means the legal basis for entrusting enforcement functions to particular agencies (e.g., customs, border guards, armed forces, police), as well as their capacity to perform these tasks vis-àvis controlled items. The capacity is indicated by the number of personnel, their level of familiarity with proliferation issues, patterns and items, and the technological support available (such as monitoring equipment). Enforcement also requires penalties in cases of non-compliance or violation of the law. „„Industry–government interaction is crucial if national and multinational businesses are to understand and comply with government regulations.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

27

Chapter two

In addition to the above elements that can be assessed relatively easily, three additional criteria might be used to ascertain whether the system of strategic trade controls can actually deliver: political will, financial capacity and level of corruption. Of these, political will is clearly the most subjective and hence rarely used by inter-governmental organisations. Financial capacity might be a hurdle in sustaining a functioning system of strategic trade controls, even though all the elements exist. Finally, corruption can ensure that the system is circumvented, especially in the area of enforcement, for example by customs and border guards.

Convergence and divergence of systems The export-control systems of Australia and New Zealand are qualitatively different and more comprehensive than those of all the states in ASEAN, with the exception of Singapore. The two countries have long-established systems, partly as a result of their participation in the US-led Coordinating Committee on Export Controls during the Cold War (formed to ensure that militarily significant Western technologies did not reach the Soviet Union and its allies), which had sensitised them to the need for A common feature strategic trade controls. Unsurprisingly, therefore, both took a strong interest in is the absence the development of modern and more effective strategic of controls on trade controls. As developed transhipment and economies have engaged in the export of strategic materials and technologies for brokering, and of many decades, they have been able to devote financatch-all controls cial, personnel and technical resources to implementation, enforcement and industry-outreach activities. Singapore, which adheres to all the multilateral export-control regimes, has followed the examples of developed trading economies and instituted a comprehensive system of strategic trade controls, which covers all the required features, including a unified control list and licensing procedure, industry outreach and deployment of electronic resources for risk-management and targeting of shipments.

28

An IISS Strategic Dossier

All other ASEAN states can be broadly divided into two categories: those that use general laws to cover all types of WMD, and those that use amendments to existing safety-related laws to cover non-proliferation activities. In general, countries with higher industrial capabilities tend to have relatively more WMD-related regulations than those with less-developed capabilities. The regulations of ASEAN states other than Singapore focus on activities such as possession, use, transfer and import, but include hardly any controls on export or re-export. Another common feature among all these states is the absence of controls on transhipment and brokering, and of catch-all controls, even five years after Resolution 1540 brought the need for such controls to light. In most cases, the remits of implementation and enforcement authorities overlap and need to be clarified. Enforcement agencies are already overburdened in their efforts to control other types of trafficking (drugs, humans and arms), terrorism and cheating on revenues, and have progressively less interest in and fewer resources available to devote to proliferation control. All states have been forced to re-examine their legislative frameworks as these pertain to controlling WMD proliferation. In some cases, this re-examination has been a result of external pressure, for example from trading partners in developed states. Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam appear to have been affected by this external pressure to varying degrees, with Singapore having already recognised the need to have good trading credentials. The main motivation of these states appears to have been the need to attract more trade and investment and to showcase themselves as part of a secure supply chain. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, an additional factor for their interest in reforming strategic trade controls was the negative publicity and international attention they had received from export-related incidents. For the poorer states such as Cambodia and Laos, the promise of expensive monitoring equipment, which would also be useful for general customs activities, appears to be the main motive for cooperating with efforts to improve strategic trade controls. However, most of them, apart from Singapore, appear to be bogged down in bureaucratic turf battles that have largely stymied the passage of comprehensive legislation on WMD-related controls.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Challenges There are three main challenges facing advocates of strategic trade controls in Southeast Asia: Firstly, many officials and legislators in the region perceive the 1540 mandate in terms of expansive controls, bureaucratic procedures and denials and believe that implementing it will decrease their nation’s exports. In sum, they fear that it marks a return to the era of inefficiencies that preceded current export-led growth. Secondly, trade-control advocates from outside the region tend to focus on the security threats posed by not instituting controls. While terrorism is also a concern in the region, most stakeholders there do not see WMD terrorism as a real threat to the security of their own operations. There is no public dialogue on the economic benefits of instituting regulations that showcases compliant states as reliable business partners. Thirdly, relevant legislation in most of the countries does not focus on strategic trade controls or even non-proliferation. Existing measures mostly prohibit activities that potentially pose an internal-security or public-health threat, namely the possession, use,

transfer, development and import of hazardous and radioactive materials, hazardous chemicals, and new biological materials. Few regulations incorporate a non-proliferation viewpoint, encompassing export, re-export, transit and transhipment. Even fewer include equipment and expertise. Intangible technology transfers and brokering are usually ‘interpreted’ as part of anti-terrorism regulations banning the aiding and abetting of terrorist acts. Control lists, to the extent that they exist, follow the same pattern: a focus on hazardous materials (health, safety and environmental concerns) and no coverage of dual-use equipment. Except for Singapore, catch-all controls are conspicuous in their absence. Meanwhile, legal advisers in various agencies across the region are uneasy with open-ended catch-all controls that are based upon the characteristics of the end-user, and believe that infringements of such controls are not constitutionally prosecutable. Individual country chapters in this dossier discuss issues pertaining to strategic trade controls in more detail, and the final chapter assesses some policy options for countries in the region and their extra-regional partners.

Notes 1   The

2

term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ was first used

March 2007) barred certain arms exports, and UNSCR

in 1937 with regard to the aerial bombing of Guernica,

1803 (3 March 2008) added certain dual-use materials

Spain, but during the Cold War it came to mean non-

and technologies to the list of banned trade items. For

conventional weapons, first and foremost nuclear

North Korea, Resolution 1695 (15 July 2006), passed in the

weapons and then chemical and biological weapons, and

aftermath of a series of ballistic missile tests, required all

later radiological weapons. Ballistic missiles and other

UN members to prevent transfers of missile-related tech-

delivery vehicles are also sometimes loosely added to

nologies and financial resources for missile programmes

the category of WMD. Because the term blurs the distinc-

to the nation, while Resolution 1718 (14 October 2006),

tions between weapons types, it is used sparingly in this

which followed Pyongyang’s first nuclear-weapons test,

dossier.

banned the export of heavy weapons and luxury goods to

Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Facilitating Implementation of

North Korea and the export of any heavy weapons from

Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific’,

North Korea. Following North Korea’s second nuclear

chapter 3 of in Lawrence Scheinman (ed.), Implementing

test, Resolution 1874 (12 June 2009) banned most weapons

Resolution 1540: the Role of Regional Organizations (Geneva:

exports to the country, restricted financial assistance

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,

and loans, and authorised UN member states to inspect

September 2008), pp. 46–8, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/

North Korean cargo on land, sea, and air, and to destroy

articles/pdf-art2745.pdf.

any goods suspected of being connected to the nuclear

3   For

some of these cases, the UN Security Council has

imposed country-specific sanctions. In the case of Iran,

programme. 4   Resolution

1540 uses the traditional terminology –

UNSCR 1737 (23 December 2006) banned technical and

export controls – rather than the formulation ‘strategic

financial assistance to its enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-

trade controls’ more recently used by most experts in

water and ballistic-missile programmes, UNSCR 1747 (24

the field. However, the scope of activities the resolu-

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

29

Chapter two

tion actually requires to be controlled goes beyond ‘exports’ and includes transit, transhipment and brokering. 5   See APEC

trade refers to goods moving through a country;

tranship­ment refers to the reloading for export of goods that come from another country.

Key Elements for Effective Export Control

8   This

refers to services provided by individuals and

Systems, 2004, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/

companies that could include linking buyers with third-

anpo/kanri/bouekikanri/outreach/0322apecdocument.pdf.

party suppliers, facilitating transactions through financial

6   The

Center for International Trade and Security

(CITS) at the University of Georgia had established a methodology for assessing the national development

30

7   Transit

support, and assistance in finding legal loopholes to circumvent licence requirements. 9   Intangible

technology transfers can occur through emails,

of strategic trade controls in the late 1990s, and has

fax, web-postings, scientific seminars and trouble-

published assessments of over 20 countries since then.

shooting; in other words, information that helps the

See archived information at CITS website, www.uga.

end-user change the capabilities of the exported item so

edu/cits.

that it can be used for unauthorised purposes.

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter three

Nuclear Safety and Security

Introduction The production of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia would introduce nuclear facilities and materials with potential risks to the nations involved, as well as to their neighbours, if not managed safely and securely. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate these safety and security risks, as well as the steps that can be taken to manage them. At the outset, it should be recognised that the risks inherent in a well-run nuclear-power programme can be made quite small. The power plants used in most countries have less than one in a million chance per year of a significant accident, and there has never been a successful terrorist attack on a nuclear facility with radiological consequences. Nevertheless, to minimise the risks of the release of radioactive material, either from an accident or terrorist attack, a fundamental commitment of resources and political will is required. The first step is to recognise the risks. The risks associated with the use of nuclear power can be broken into three main areas: „„an accident could occur at a nuclear facility or in transportation, releasing significant amounts of radioactive material; „„a terrorist attack or sabotage on a facility or in transportation could lead to a release of radioactive material; or „„certain types of radioactive or nuclear materials could be stolen by terrorists or other groups. This final risk itself could be broken down into two: that nuclear weapons-usable material could be stolen and lead to the production of a nuclear explosive device, or that other radioactive material could be stolen and used in a so-called ‘dirty bomb’. All of these risks have important health, environ-

mental, financial, social and political implications. Their magnitude depends on the specific nuclear fuel cycles chosen and the effort put into averting and mitigating them. Collectively, these risks can be reduced through effective nuclear-safety and -security practices.

Safety and security concepts Nuclear safety involves designing, constructing and operating facilities to protect against the accidental release of radioactive material to workers, the public or the environment. Nuclear safety also includes the responsibility to respond effectively to an incident or accident, to minimise the radiological and other consequences. Nuclear security refers to the protective measures to keep an individual or group with malevolent objectives from harming a facility or stealing nuclear material. The tools of nuclear safety are human training, and the multiple and redundant safety features that keep unintentional events (e.g., operator mistakes, fires or explosions in plant machinery, natural events such as earthquakes or floods) from causing a release of radioactive material. The key tools of nuclear security are guards, guns, gates, limits on access to vital areas and intelligence on adversaries. Nuclear security also requires sound management, with responsibility shared by operators and governments. Safety systems can enhance security by making it very difficult for a group with malicious intent to intentionally cause a release of radiation. However, security systems can interfere with effective safety practice or emergency response. Thus, there are tensions between nuclear safety and security, which is precisely why they need to be practised in tandem. While nuclear safety relies on transparency and a culture that strongly encourages an open review of past mistakes, nuclear security relies on the confi-

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

31

Chapter three

INES The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale communicates the significance of a nuclear and radiological event using a consistent ranking system. INES levels 1–3 are called ‘incidents’, and levels 4–7 are called ‘accidents’.

Level 7: Major Accident: ‘Major release of radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures.’ Level 6: Serious Accident: ‘Significant release of radioactive material likely to require

implementation of planned countermeasures.’ Level 5: Accident with Wider Consequences: ‘Limited release of radioactive material likely to require implementation of some planned countermeasures; several deaths from radiation.’ Level 4: Accident with Local Consequences: ‘Minor release of radioactive material unlikely to result in implementation of planned countermeasures; at least one death from radiation.’ Level 3: Serious Incident: ‘Exposure in excess of ten times the statutory annual limit for workers; non-lethal

dentiality of information that may be of use to an adversary. Nuclear security relies on limiting access to vital areas of plants, while effective emergency response may require immediate access by nuclearsafety personnel and emergency responders. Nuclear safety and security share the common objective of protecting people and property from exposure to undesirable amounts of radiation and need to be well integrated. However, nuclear-safety and -security concepts and communities develop separately, which can create unclear responsibilities and gaps in coverage when these measures are applied.

Scale of safety risks There are more than 400 nuclear power reactors around the world and hundreds more facilities that

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An IISS Strategic Dossier

deterministic health effect (e.g., burns) from radiation.’ Level 2: Incident: ‘Exposure of a member of the public in excess of 10mSv; exposure of a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits.’ Level 1: Anomaly: ‘Overexposure of a member of the public in excess of statutory annual limits; minor problems with safety components with significant defence-in-depth remaining; low activity lost or stolen radioactive source, device or transport package.’ Source: IAEA, INES Fact Sheet, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Factsheets/English/ines.pdf

support these reactors, such as uranium-enrichment, fuel-fabrication, reprocessing, waste-processing and storage facilities. There are also more than 250 research reactors supporting scientific research and producing radioisotopes for medicine and industry. Accidents with significant health or environmental effects are very infrequent. In the extreme case, an accident could have serious, persistent and widespread effects, with important socio-economic impacts. More likely are events with limited or no radiological contamination, but which nevertheless have important safety or security implications and economic consequences. For the purpose of communication to the public, events are categorised by the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) into seven levels, based on radioactive doses to humans, radioactive releases to the

Nuclear Safety and Security

IAEA headquarters, Vienna (Getty)

environment and the degree to which the measures designed to prevent releases did not function as intended (see text box). For example, the Chernobyl accident was rated as a level-seven event because of the massive release of radioactive material. Three Mile Island was rated as a level-five accident, based on the severe damage to the core, even though little radiation was released. According to the IAEA, strong global nuclear-safety performance has continued in recent years, although there are signs that this is resulting in complacency among some operators, regulators and government organisations.1

Need for national infrastructure States can work to minimise safety and security risks through a mix of technical, financial and institutional measures. Preparing for a nuclear programme requires an intensive national effort. It is essential that states establish national infrastructures that they can adequately supervise and regulate. It is also vital that they support the safety and security of their facilities. Nuclear safety requires the commitment of all elements of the national government, as well as operating, regulatory, vendor and other organisations, to achieve the best possible safety in the preparation for and implementation of a nuclear-power programme. All of these require

significant and substantial infrastructure preparation prior to implementing nuclear power. The infrastructure necessary to support a nuclear programme is manifold. It includes a legal and regulatory framework, technical capabilities, educated and trained personnel, a stable electrical grid, adequate financial and industrial resources, and most importantly the development of what is often termed an adequate safety-and-security culture. To assist countries considering nuclear power, the IAEA has established a concept of infrastructure development and milestones to use in developing a nuclear-energy programme. According to the IAEA concept, new nuclear nations would proceed through three phases, with completion of the infrastructure conditions of each phase marked by a specific milestone: „„Milestone 1: Ready to make a knowledgeable commitment to a nuclear programme; „„Milestone 2: Ready to invite bids for the first nuclear power plant; and „„Milestone 3: Ready to commission and operate the first nuclear power plant.2 As each milestone is reached, the development effort should be assessed to aid the decision to

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move to the next phase. The above IAEA approach provides a useful conceptual framework for infrastructure development. However, the simplicity of the approach can lead to an underestimation of the difficulty and complexity of the implementation of each phase. Moreover, the vagueness of the milestones ultimately can lead countries to try to shorten the time, resources and level of development necessary for the safe and secure deployment of nuclear power. For example, the first milestone requires a strategy for financing the basic infrastructure before a nuclear plant is built, including the legislation necessary for dealing with national energy policies and responsibilities within governments, decisions with regard to the fuel cycle and disposal of nuclear waste, as well as many other considerations. Yet, several countries that have announced their commitment to use nuclear energy could probably not, under a rigorous analysis, meet the milestone at this time. Although the IAEA has devoted a great deal of effort and resources in encouraging countries to work on infrastructure development, neither the agency nor any other international organisation has the authority, institutional structure or political strength in the area of nuclear safety to rigorously evaluate whether countries embarking on nuclear-power development objectively meet each milestone. As Southeast Asian countries move toward nuclear power, it will be very important for them to develop a rigorous political and technical framework to critically assess whether they have met specific milestones before moving on to each successive phase of developing a nuclear-energy programme.

Nuclear risks and past accidents With the use of nuclear power and related activities comes the risk of the release of radioactive materials and associated contamination, displacement of populations, economic costs, and health and environmental impacts. This is illustrated by several significant accidents, though only one caused widespread health effects. Although the primary cause for the pause in nuclear-power expansion during the last three decades of the twentieth century was financial, the loss of public faith in the safety of nuclear technology played an important role.

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Chernobyl accident – health impact By far the most substantial accident globally was at the Chernobyl plant (then in the USSR, now in Ukraine) in 1986. According to the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, ‘the accident can be said to have flowed from deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory organizations’.3 The accident itself happened as a result of fatal design flaws and a badly managed test that placed the plant outside of normal operating conditions. One of the key design flaws was that the reactor had a positive void coefficient, which meant that the reactor power would increase rapidly and uncontrollably under certain conditions. The accident occurred after the reactor operators – without proper review or oversight – attempted to conduct a specialised test on the reactor and placed it in a state where the positive void coefficient would become important. The result was a rapid escalation in the reactor’s power which led to a large steam explosion that blew off the reactor lid and spewed fuel fragments into the air. The graphite covering the fuel ignited and burned, possibly for as long as ten days. While the number of deaths directly attributable to the accident was small, the social and economic costs were tremendous. The Chernobyl accident spread massive quantities of radioactive material over large areas of the USSR and other countries in Europe, contaminating land, water, flora and fauna. It caused serious social and economic disruption for large populations in what is now Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and it exposed millions of people to low doses of radiation. There is no consensus on the number of fatal cancers caused over time by radiation exposure from the Chernobyl accident. It is clear that two workers were killed in the explosion and, in the accident’s immediate aftermath, 134 plant staff and emergency workers received very high doses of radiation resulting in acute radiation syndrome. For 28 of them, this proved fatal. Moreover, because people consumed fresh milk contaminated with radioactive Iodine-131 in the first weeks after the accident, childhood thyroid cancer was one of the main detectable health impacts of the accident. By 2002, thousands of cases of thyroid cancer in Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine had been attributed

Nuclear Safety and Security

Repairs being carried out at the Chernobyl nuclear plant several months after a major accident, 1986 (Getty)

to the Chernobyl accident.4 Other than deaths of plant staff, emergency workers and thyroid-cancer victims, additional deaths are impossible to attribute to the accident given the normal variation in cancer rates in the affected areas. However, authorities use a hypothesis for radiation-protection purposes that allows one to estimate the number of deaths a given radiation dose can be expected to cause, even if that dose is distributed among many individuals and no related deaths are statistically detectable. Using this simple approach, the primary UN report on the effects of the accident estimates that, all in all, cancer deaths caused by the Chernobyl accident may reach a total of about 4,000 among those having received the greatest exposure.5

Chernobyl accident – economic impact The economic and social costs from the Chernobyl accident were immense. Economic costs included cleaning up the site, forcing closure of numerous farms because of the contamination of arable land, providing medical care for tens of thousands of people, providing new housing for more than 100,000 people, and the closure and decontamination of the operating Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. A

new sarcophagus or shelter around the damaged reactor 4 must also be built, which is anticipated to cost more than a billion dollars. In the exclusion zone (a 30-kilometre zone surrounding the plant in which contamination exceeded 1.48TBq/km2) about 135,000 people were evacuated and had to be resettled. This area was approximately 2,700km2. (TBq is shorthand for TeraBecquerel, which equates to 1012 or one trillion radioactive decays per second. These decays, which release ionising radiation, result from the radioactive materials deposited from the accident.) The larger ‘affected’ area, measuring about 25,000km2, where contamination exceeded 0.18TBq/km2 but did not exceed 1.48TBq/km2, had a population of about 825,000, many of whom have been monitored through national and international health- and environmental-impact studies. Estimated total costs of the Chernobyl accident are upwards of several hundred billion dollars.6

Three Mile Island accident Significant accidents at Western nuclear power reactors have had much smaller radiological, social and economic effects. The best-known nuclear accident in the United States was at the Three Mile

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Three Mile Island, April 1979 (Getty)

Island Unit 2 nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in 1979. A series of design flaws and poorly managed events led to a partial meltdown of the reactor core and the release of fission products through a relief valve in the primary water make-up system. Most fission products were retained in the water, but some radioactive gases were released into the atmosphere. While this was a very serious accident, the resulting public exposure to radiation was negligible. However, it affected nuclear-power programmes around the world and contributed to negative attitudes toward nuclear-energy use. It also led to increased costs, especially for new nuclear plants. On the positive side, the Three Mile Island accident led to several key design modifications to improve the safety of plants of the same type, and significant changes in the engineering of nuclearsafety procedures, including human factors. It also led to the creation of the industry-funded Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, which now conducts safety reviews of commercial nuclear power plants in the US. These are confidential reviews, and information is shared only within the nuclear-plantoperating community. Reviews identify whether

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there are safety problems and, if so, recommend improvements. A sister organisation is the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which was formed after the Chernobyl accident. WANO conducts confidential peer reviews of nuclearpower-plant operations across the globe.

Safety risks of ageing reactors As nuclear power plants age, safety issues become increasingly important; rigorous monitoring and inspection are essential. This was illustrated by an extremely serious near-accident that occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Ohio, which was discovered in March 2002. In this case, extensive degradation was discovered in the reactor pressure-vessel head. The reactor head is a fundamental part of the pressure vessel and had it been fully breached, this could have led to a major accident. The degraded area, which was 20–30 square inches in area, extended through the 6.63-inchesthick carbon steel head down to its internal stainless-steel liner cladding. While the cladding withstood the pressure of the reactor operation, it was not designed to perform this function, and it is impossible to know how long the reactor would

Nuclear Safety and Security

Security surrounding a nuclear power plant (Getty)

have operated without a breach. The near accident revealed weaknesses in both the operator’s actions and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s oversight, and led to the 2002–04 closure of the plant for repairs. On 20 January 2006, the owner of Davis-Besse, First Energy, acknowledged a series of safety violations by former workers and entered into a deferred-prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice.

Safety risks of reprocessing Nuclear reactors are not the only facilities vulnerable to accidents or attacks with potentially large radiological consequences. If the states of Southeast Asia choose to develop and maintain their own nuclear-power fuel cycles, they will also need to consider safety and security at supporting facilities such as reprocessing plants. There are two ways of managing spent nuclear fuel. The first method is called the ‘once-through’ fuel cycle because it uses the uranium in a fuel assembly once in a reactor and then disposes of the spent-fuel assembly in a permanent repository, without further processing. The second technique involves reprocessing the spent fuel, chemically

dissolving it to separate unused uranium and the plutonium produced inside the reactor. These separated materials are made into new fuel. While both methods produce highly radioactive waste that requires long-term storage, reprocessing produces a steady stream of plutonium. Because the separated plutonium is more easily used in nuclear weapons, it is more attractive to terrorists who may want to steal it. Moreover, reprocessing also produces large amounts of highly radioactive material in liquid form and involves greater requirements for the transportation of nuclear materials. This presents both safety and sabotage challenges. Indeed, the most serious nuclear accident prior to that at Chernobyl occurred at a reprocessing facility in the USSR. The accident, which occurred in 1957 at the Mayak Industrial Complex in the Southern Urals, was caused by the overheating of a storage tank containing radioactive nitrate-acetate salts from reprocessing. This overheating led to an explosion and the release of a massive amount of radioactive material (740PBq) over some 20,000km2 of the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions. The contaminated zone had a population of 272,000, thousands of whom had to be evacuated. While this was a military, rather than commercial, reprocessing facility, the accident clearly illustrates that fuel-cycle facilities can have major accidents if safety is not a priority.

Safety risks of uranium conversion In September 1999 at the Tokaimura uraniumconversion plant in Japan, workers violated operating procedures and poured 16.6kg of 18.8% enriched uranium into a tank, resulting in a ‘criticality excursion’ (accidental nuclear-fission chain reaction resulting in the release of dangerous amounts of neutron radiation). Two workers died because of radiation sickness from the accident, but the doses of direct neutron and gamma irradiation received by nearby populations were low or negligible, and no significant long-term effects are expected. Nonetheless, as a precaution, approximately 200 residents living within a 350m radius were evacuated. Of these, 90% received doses of less than 5 microsievert, which is considered a very low dose, and 10% received doses of 5–25mSv. There have been several other significant criticality accidents at experimental and civilian nuclear-research

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facilities, including in Yugoslavia (1958), Belgium (1965), Moscow, USSR (1971), and Argentina (1983), which indicate the impact poor safety practices can bring to bear.7

Safety and security risks at research reactors Research reactors are used for a wide range of activities supporting nuclear-power development. They also produce isotopes for medical, industrial and agricultural uses. Research reactors can pose safety risks too, although these are generally much smaller than those for power reactors. Research reactors typically have far lower power ratings and less radioactive material in the reactor core that can be dispersed in a worst-case accident. Because of their lower power levels, less radioactive decay heat emanates from a shut-down research reactor. Therefore, as long as there is cooling water around the reactor core, there is a lower likelihood of fuel elements melting down and releasing radioactivity into the environment. Nevertheless, fatal accidents have occurred at research reactors. For example, in 1958 at the Boris Kidric Institute in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, a research reactor overheated and six scientists were irradiated, one of whom died. In Idaho in the US in 1961, a power surge provoked an accident at a 3MWt research reactor (SL1) and three operators were killed. In 1983, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, one death occurred in an accident during refuelling of a critical assembly reactor. It is useful to note that these accidents occurred early in the relevant countries’ operation of nuclear facilities. This demonstrates the importance of good safety-infrastructure preparations. While the safety risks associated with research reactors are often small, IAEA safety standards are frequently the same for research reactors as they are for power reactors. As with power reactors, safety must be assured in a wide range of areas, including maintenance, testing and inspection, fuel handling and handling of radioactive material (including the production of radioisotopes), the installation, testing and operation of experimental devices, the use of neutron beams, research and development work, education and training using the research-reactor systems, and other associated activities. Some of these requirements, however, may be waived depending on the particular type of research reactor

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and taking into account such factors as the power level of the reactor, the amount and enrichment of fissile and fissionable material, the use of the reactor and its proximity to population groups. Research reactors also pose security risks. Some older reactors are fuelled with HEU, which can be used in nuclear weapons and is therefore of potential interest to terrorist organisations. However, all new research reactors – with the exception of the FRM II reactor recently built in Germany – are fuelled with LEU. Through the US Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and other security programmes, the United States, Russia and the IAEA are leading international efforts to discontinue use of HEU in all research reactors and to convert existing HEU-fuelled reactors to LEU. Southeast Asian countries with HEU-fuelled research reactors have taken part in securing HEU and converting these reactors to LEU. In particular, HEU has been removed and secured from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Researchreactor facilities in these countries have converted to LEU or, in the Philippine case, shut down. Research reactors can also present a target for terrorists who wish to spread ionising radiation or damage a symbolic facility representing technological progress. It is recognised that research reactors can pose greater security concerns than commercial reactors for five reasons.8 „„Research reactors are often located on university campuses or larger scientific research centres, which are relatively open to the public or have many users and visitors. (Some research reactors are located in military or national-laboratory settings and thus would tend to have considerably more security than those in universities.) „„Many research reactors are situated in urban environments, which also relates to ease of access. „„These facilities tend not to be surrounded by strong fences or even any rigorous perimeter protection such as vehicular barriers and motion sensors. „„Unarmed security guards typically provide daytime protection and verification of visitors for non-military research reactors.

Nuclear Safety and Security

„„After hours, an armed guard may be on site but may have to cover a wide area of the campus or larger research centre and thus would not always be physically present at the reactor. In addition, research facilities typically have one or at most a few guards, who are vulnerable to being overpowered by a relatively small group of armed terrorists. There are no internationally agreed, binding requirements for securing research reactors, but since 2003 the IAEA has been working with various countries to reduce the risks associated with these facilities. The agency has also taken significant steps to address the proper security of nuclear and radioactive materials through the creation of the Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and a variety of technical guidance documents. Although not legally binding, these documents have helped significantly to raise the awareness and maturity of security at such facilities worldwide.

Potential nuclear-safety and -security risks in Southeast Asia Risk of contaminating waterways Radioactive contamination of waterways is a natural worry for Southeast Asia. Such contamination can stem from discharges of radioactive material from land-based facilities, such as nuclear power plants, or from nuclear-powered submarines or ships. To curb these discharges, more than 80 states have accepted and ratified the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and its 1996 Protocol, Both of which also cover non-nuclear wastes. Any state party to the London Convention is required to report annually on all nuclear-facility permits issued and monitoring activities undertaken, and any releases of radioactive materials into the marine environment, including radioactive sources used in medical applications. In Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the short list of parties to the London Convention comprises Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands. The other states in the region would appear to have an interest in joining the convention to help protect the marine environment, which affects the livelihood of fishermen and the overall food chain.

While this convention helps curb the intentional release of radioactivity to waterways, it cannot control the risks of accidents at sea. For example, two American and five Russian nuclear submarines have suffered severe accidents that resulted in the sinking of these vessels to the bottom of the sea in the Atlantic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. And while the Russian submarine Nerpa was not lost at sea, it did suffer a significant accident in the Sea of Japan on 10 November 2008. This released poisonous gas that killed 20 on board, although it did not release radioactive materials. The resulting environmental contamination from such accidents depends on the depth of a wrecked submarine, whether the containment structures remain intact, and the damage done to the structural integrity of the vessel during the accident. To date, waterway contamination incidents have had limited consequences.

Risks relating to transportation of nuclear material The transportation of nuclear and radioactive material at sea must also be considered. While the safety risks are generally small, terrorist scenarios could lead to releases of radioactive material. According to the IAEA, maritime transport of radioactive material has a low level of radioactive risk and low potential for environmental consequences. The International Maritime Organisation has established international standards for ships carrying certain radioactive materials, including nuclear waste. These standards establish requirements related to ship design, structural considerations and fire protection. Ship collisions and fires are infrequent, and most ship collisions would not subject transport packages to significant forces. In cases of ship collisions that do potentially expose transport packages to significant forces, these are less than or comparable to the forces assumed during regulatory certification. This is because collision forces are absorbed by ship structures, not the material container. If a collision or fire were to lead to the sinking of the transport ship, recovery of the material container could be accomplished if loss were to occur on the continental shelf. If container recovery is not practical (i.e., loss does not occur on the continental shelf ) the rate of release of radioactive material into the ocean waters would probably be so slow that radiation

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A staff member of Tokyo Electric Power’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant shows, on 29 August 2007, a burned out wall after a massive earthquake hit Kashiwazaki city in Niigata prefecture, 250km north of Tokyo, 16 July 2007 (Getty)

doses received by people who consume contaminated seafood would be negligible. Nevertheless, there could be economic consequences due to the perceived danger. The magnitude of these costs can only be quantified on a case-by-case basis.9

Reducing the risk from accidents As Southeast Asian states venture into commercial nuclear power, they need to prepare for three threats: accidents, natural disasters and deliberate attacks on nuclear facilities. Reducing the risk of accidents depends on high quality assurance in the safety features of a nuclear plant and rigorous training of the plant’s operators. The interplay between safety equipment and operators is fundamentally important. Safety equipment is the first line of defence against an accident, and nuclear power plants are designed with multiple layers of safety protection against a release of ionising radiation into the environment. For example, at least four layers of protection guard against the release of radiation during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), which is considered a worst-case accident. Firstly, cladding around the nuclear fuel helps prevent release

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of radioactive fission products. The reactor pressure vessel provides secondary protection. If this is breached because of a significant coolant-pipe rupture during a major LOCA, a third protective layer, the emergency core-cooling system, will activate. Finally, almost all nuclear power plants have a containment structure of reinforced concrete around the reactor. The difference that a containment structure can make is illustrated by comparing the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl accidents. The Three Mile Island reactor experienced a partial meltdown of its core, but the strong containment structure prevented a massive release of radioactive material into the environment. The Chernobyl reactor did not have a containment structure, and the accident resulted in radioactive contamination across many countries. (Nevertheless, even if the Chernobyl reactor had had a Three Mile Island-type containment structure, the extremely powerful blast might have shattered it.)

Seismic risks in Southeast Asia In certain parts of Southeast Asia, earthquakes and flood hazards must be considered a serious threat

Nuclear Safety and Security

to nuclear-power facilities, and measures must be taken to anticipate all possible scenarios and mitigate these threats. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake illustrated just how much damage a major natural disaster in the region could cause. With an epicentre off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, the earthquake caused a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean, killing more than 225,000 people in 11 countries and inundating coastal communities with waves up to 30m high. It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in history. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand were hardest hit. With a magnitude of between 9.1 and 9.3 on the Richter scale, it was also the second-largest earthquake ever recorded. International standards recommend that nuclear power plants be designed to withstand natural phenomena such as earthquakes and floods, based on detailed studies performed when selecting the construction site. These studies define the maximum threatening phenomena expected at the site. However, these studies are not always sufficient. This was illustrated by the 2007 earthquake at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant in Japan. Remarkably, all safety systems worked as expected during the accident, even though the maximum acceleration observed at the station was 680gals, substantially greater than the designed acceleration at the observation point. At Unit Two of the plant, the maximum acceleration was 3.6 times the value anticipated in the design, indicating how important conservative estimates can be. Equally, major flooding (from a tsunami, for example) can have an important bearing on the safe operation of a plant and lead to accidents. Flooding may cause the failure of safety systems, such as the emergency power-supply systems. This can lead to a loss of critical heat-removal systems, for example. Damage can also be caused to safety-related structures and components, while water pressure on walls and foundations may affect their structural capacity. Finally, flooding can also disperse radioactive material in an accident. According to IAEA safety standards,10 if a nuclear plant is constructed in an area subject to tsunamis, a conservative analysis of the potential effects must be performed, and the plant should be designed for a probable maximum tsunami.

Anticipating attack and sabotage threats A deliberate attack on, or sabotage of, a nuclear plant or materials in transport could confront safety systems and operators with scenarios not fully contemplated during the design of the plant or activity. Most existing plants were designed with worst-case accident scenarios in mind, but until 11 September 2001 these did not include suicidal terrorists crashing large fuel-laden aircraft into them. The 9/11 terrorist attacks that saw airliners crash into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon have renewed security experts’ attention to the vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants. Many countries have since adopted additional protection measures to reduce the risks from such a plot. Some nuclear-regulatory officials have called for new plant designs to provide better protection against terrorist attacks; a new reactor in Finland is being redesigned to ensure this. In the United States in February 2009, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a new rule that requires all new reactors to be able to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft and prevent the release of radioactive material following such an impact.11 China’s nuclear-power authorities have also decided that they would require this design enhancement in the country’s newer reactors. The newer plants that Southeast Asian states may buy, therefore, would have added protection against attack or sabotage. However, despite more mitigation features, the risk of terrorist events remains as long as attackers or saboteurs are motivated to carry out such acts.

Chain of events for a successful attack For an attack on, or sabotage of, a nuclear facility to result in the release of ionising radiation, a specific chain of events must occur: 1. The attackers or saboteurs must be strongly motivated to target nuclear facilities rather than other major industrial infrastructure such as coal-fired power plants, chemical-processing and storage facilities, and electrical-grid systems. 2. They must have or must acquire personnel with the requisite knowledge and skills to conduct the attack or sabotage. At a minimum, they would need to identify the

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vulnerabilities of the nuclear facility. They may need to recruit insiders to facilitate a successful attack or act of sabotage. 3. They must gain access to the facility. Here again, insider assistance may be essential, depending on the mode of attack chosen. Physical infiltration could take many forms: crashing an aeroplane into the facility, barging through gates in commando raids or attacking through water routes. However, ‘access’ may not involve actual physical infiltration of the facility. For example, cyber-terrorists may try to gain remote electronic access to nuclear-power-plant control systems. 4. They must cause enough damage to overpower nuclear-facility safety systems and release ionising radiation. From the attackers’ perspective, this chain of events is daunting and every step poses significant challenges. While the first step – acquiring the necessary motivation – may appear easily achievable, it is worth underscoring that most terrorists are disinclined to conduct nuclear or radiological terrorism, or any terrorism that does not employ proven techniques. That is, terrorists tend to fear failure. In addition, terrorist groups such as national separatists tied to a local constituency would probably not want to risk alienating constituents by causing radioactive contamination on their own territory. Political, religious or nihilistic terrorists, on the other hand, may not have, or not care about, such ties, and are often interested in weapons of mass destruction for their novelty and lethality. Thus, those types of terrorists would probably have the motivations for a nuclear attack that could include power plants. The remaining links in the chain of causation appear even more challenging. Recruiting enough skilled and knowledgeable attackers is difficult without tipping off the relevant authorities. As long as nuclear-power-plant managers are monitoring the activities of employees by, for example, running personnel-reliability programmes, it will also be difficult to recruit insiders to assist the attackers. Cyber- and aircraft attacks cannot be guarded against by traditional security methods focused on gates, guards and guns. Cyber-threats require

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vigilant defence by identifying potential vulnerabilities quickly, installing defensive software tools and, in general, isolating the plant’s electronic controls from outside access as much as possible. Protecting against intentional aeroplane crashes requires tougher airport and airline defences, including rigorous passenger screening and the hardening of cockpit doors. One successful terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant could have wideranging effects on the global and regional prospects for nuclear power. However, the risk of such an attack can be significantly reduced by the multiple layers of defence employed today, including intelligence agencies’ tracking of terrorists, disruption of terrorist plots, well-trained guard forces, restricted access to vital plant areas, plant-personnel monitoring, cyber-security and protection against aeroplane hijacking. In sum, breaking even one link in the chain of causation will prevent a damaging attack from occurring.

Potential terrorist threats in Southeast Asia Several terrorist groups have been active in Southeast Asia, but few have shown a clear desire to conduct nuclear or radiological terrorism. Of those groups that may pose a threat to nuclear facilities or may try to seize nuclear or radiological assets, al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) stand out. Al-Qaeda began to establish part of its network in this region in the early 1990s. By exploiting relatively lax border controls, it has used the region as a meeting and planning area for major attacks. In addition, it has formed local cells that have helped provide safe havens for Arab members of al-Qaeda.12 While al-Qaeda has not launched any nuclear or radiological attacks, its leader, Osama bin Laden, has called on his group to acquire WMD. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Mohammed Atta, one of the cell leaders of the 11 September attacks, had expressed interest to the al-Qaeda leadership in crashing an aeroplane into a nuclear power plant. However, the report noted that he was apparently dissuaded because the target appeared relatively hardened against attack.13 Al-Qaeda, along with almost all other terrorist organisations, focuses on striking targets that are not well defended. JI, a pan-Asian terrorist organisation affiliated with al-Qaeda, has also exploited ‘soft’ targets. This group has had a widespread presence in Southeast

Nuclear Safety and Security

years ago to just five in 2008. While no pirates have shown an interest in attacking nuclear plants or materials in transport, this must be considered with the potential introduction of nuclear power into the region.

Nuclear facilities as military targets

Zarkasi, the self-confessed leader of Islamic militant network Jemaah Islamiyah at his trial in March 2008 (Getty)

Asia, with many cells in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesia, which killed about 200 people at a resort area with practically no defences, and for other bombings in Jakarta in 2003 and 2004. An offshoot terrorist group may have been responsible for the July 2009 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that killed nine. However, planning a major attack on a nuclear facility or the even more challenging manufacture of a crude nuclear weapon would require strong leadership, high skill levels and sufficient financial resources. All of these appear to be seriously lacking for JI and other terrorist groups in the region.

Pirate activity While much of the world’s attention on piracy in 2009 has focused on the waters off Somalia, pirates have previously been active in Southeast Asia’s most vulnerable sea chokepoints and lanes, especially in the Malacca Strait. Because of the numerous rivers and inlets that connect to the strait, it is almost impossible – and certainly too costly – to completely secure it. Joint efforts of regional states have succeeded in reducing piracy in Southeast Asia from an average of 50 attacks per year a few

Nuclear facilities also pose potential military targets. During wartime, or as a pre-emptive attack, an enemy may bomb nuclear power plants to disable an opponent’s electricity-production capacity. Another military motivation is to destroy, or at least delay, an opponent’s capability to use certain nuclear facilities to make fissile material for nuclear bombs. Targeted facilities could include uranium-enrichment facilities, reprocessing plants and reactors with a power rating large enough to make enough plutonium for a bomb. The power-rating threshold of concern for a research reactor fuelled by natural uranium is about 25MWt, because operating such a reactor at full power for at least 80% of a year would produce enough plutonium annually for one nuclear bomb. The facility that Israel bombed in Syria on 6 September 2007 may have housed a reactor of about this size (similar to the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon that the North Koreans refer to by its presumptive electrical output of 5MWe). Another example of a pre-emptive military attack was the 1981 Israeli bombing that destroyed Iraq’s Osiraq reactor, which Israel suspected would eventually be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. During the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraq bombed Iran’s nuclear power plant at Bushehr while it was still under construction. To defend against such attacks, a state could build air defences and could agree with opponents to keep civilian nuclear facilities off target lists. As a confidence-building measure, India and Pakistan have signed such an agreement; since 1988 they have annually exchanged facility lists.

Emergency preparedness and event consequences Need for well-coordinated emergencymanagement planning The consequences of any nuclear accident or attack in Southeast Asia would vary dramatically depending on the steps taken to prepare for such an emergency. Arrangements for emergency response

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Chapter three

must be in place, designating clear authorities and responsibilities among relevant organisations, as well as adequate procedures, equipment and training for postulated scenarios. Arrangements should anticipate severe emergencies, including those of a low probability, and responses should be pre-tested. Failure to make adequate emergency preparations can lead to unnecessary loss of life and severe economic consequences. Chernobyl provides a good illustration of the importance of rapid and knowledgeable emergency response. The radioactive doses immediately after the start of the accident at distances of 2–3km from the site were extremely high, sufficient to result in early deaths. However, officials in Pripyat, the town located 3km from the reactor, did not take protective actions promptly because of inadequate preparations, a situation made worse by the state’s insistence on secrecy. Pripyat residents were lucky that the radioactive plume impacted an uninhabited area, in which all of the trees were irradiated (creating the notorious ‘red forest’). Had the wind been blowing the other way, the health consequences of the accident could have been many times greater because of the slow response.14 Delays in announcing the accident and in taking protective measures affected many people off-site. In several countries, there was preventable exposure due to consumption of contaminated foodstuffs. (The first limits for the control of contaminated food were introduced ten days after the start of the accident.) In particular, regional exposure to contaminated milk caused an increase in thyroid cancer, especially in children. This increase was seen among the population living at distances up to about 350km from the site and could have been prevented if the affected population had been warned not to drink the local milk.15 At Three Mile Island, poor planning was also evident, resulting in a loss of public trust. During that emergency, officials made contradictory and confusing public statements concerning the severity of the accident and the action that the public should take.16 To minimise the inherent confusion that arises during an accident, it is important to have a well-integrated response plan that outlines clear responsibilities for communicating with the public. The criteria and policies for implementation of protective actions should be prepared in advance.

44

An IISS Strategic Dossier

An accident or emergency-response situation is not the time to establish criteria. For example, during the response to the Chernobyl emergency, it was extremely difficult to establish justified criteria for the implementation of most of the urgent and longer-term protective actions. These criteria had not been established in advance. Instead, they had to be developed during a period of heightened emotions and mistrust of officials and the scientific community. Lack of predetermined criteria during past emergencies has led decision-makers and the public to take actions that would be difficult to justify from a strictly radiation-protection point of view. One example was the thousands of abortions performed throughout Europe after the Chernobyl disaster because of the fear of radiation-induced effects. None of the women involved was exposed at levels that would necessarily warrant such decisions.17

Need to educate the public Past emergencies have also demonstrated that decision-makers must have the support of the public and other stakeholders if government emergency-response decisions are to be implemented effectively. For example, during the Three Mile Island accident, approximately 135,000 people evacuated their residences based on local newspaper articles and statements of danger from authorities, notwithstanding the lack of an official decision that evacuation was necessary.18 Decisionmakers must understand the guidance for dealing with the radiological risk and be able to explain it in clear terms to the public and other stakeholders. Wherever possible (e.g., in the vicinity of a nuclear facility) arrangements for dealing with nuclear or radiological emergencies should be developed with those who may be potentially affected. During the Chernobyl and other emergencies, members of the public took inappropriate and sometimes harmful actions, due to ignorance, fear and misunderstandings concerning radiation, its risks and how to reduce them.

Taking advantage of international assistance The countries of Southeast Asia should ensure that they have adequately prepared themselves for a major nuclear accident and should also take advantage of international assistance in this respect. In

Nuclear Safety and Security

2005, the IAEA announced the establishment of a fully integrated Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC). The functions of the IEC include coordinating prompt assistance in the case of a nuclear-security incident and assisting member states with their own preparedness to respond to nuclear and radiological incidents or emergencies, irrespective of the cause. This is not intended to replace states’ own need to be prepared, merely to supplement it. To coordinate a global response, the IEC hosts a Response Assistance Network (RANET) under which member states, parties to the international Notification and Emergency Assistance Conventions (see the following Global safety regime section) and relevant international organisations are able to register their response capabilities. This network aims to facilitate assistance in case of a nuclear or radiological incident or emergency in a timely and effective manner and is based on a regional model. It would be in Southeast Asian countries’ interest to register with RANET and create a regional network.

Global safety regime The responsibility for regulating nuclear safety lies with individual governments. However, over the past five decades, a global safety regime has been developed that supports these national efforts. This regime includes internationally accepted safety standards, a set of binding international conventions related to nuclear safety, and a system of IAEA and peer reviews.

IAEA nuclear-safety standards The first pillar of the nuclear-safety regime is the IAEA’s nuclear-safety standards. The IAEA is authorised by its statute to establish international safety standards. While generally not considered to be legally binding, they establish international norms for nuclear safety. The IAEA statute makes the safety standards binding on the IAEA in relation to its own operations. Any state entering into an agreement with the IAEA for agency assistance must comply with the standards pertaining to the activities covered by the agreement. Since 1958, when the first safety standard was issued, the IAEA has revised and published more than 200. The safety principles are co-sponsored by international organisations including Euratom, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD and the World

Health Organisation. In 2006, the IAEA published the unified Fundamental Safety Principles as the primary publication in its Safety Standards Series. For its implementation, a revised set of safety requirements is being established.

Safety conventions As a second pillar, the global safety regime is supported by four key conventions related to the regulation of nuclear-power-plant safety, handling of nuclear waste, notification in the case of an accident and the provision of assistance in the case of a radiation emergency. Other conventions establish an international liability regime that would channel liability to the operators of nuclear facilities, give exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of the country where the accident occurs, provide limits on liability, require parties to have a mechanism to provide compensation to victims in the case of an accident and, in certain cases, provide an international mechanism for compensation to complement national systems. The key nuclear-safety conventions are: „„The Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; „„The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; „„The Convention on Nuclear Safety; and „„The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The notification and assistance conventions were concluded quickly after the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and they establish an international framework for the exchange of information and the prompt provision of assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. They place specific obligations on the parties and the IAEA, with the aim of minimising consequences for health, property and the environment. The latter two conventions are more recent and have more complex provisions and implementation requirements. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, adopted in 1994, seeks to ensure a high level of safety by legally obliging participating states to meet a set of international benchmarks. These obligations are

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

45

Chapter three

based on the principles contained in the IAEA document ‘The Safety of Nuclear Installations’. They cover, for example, the siting, design, construction and operation of reactors and the establishment of an independent nuclear-regulatory authority with adequate financial and human resources. They also discuss the laws, regulations, rules and policies for assessing and verifying safety, as well as emergency preparedness. The convention requires parties to submit reports on the implementation of their obligations for ‘peer review’ at periodic meetings. The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was opened for signature in 1997. The joint convention applies to spent fuel and radioactive waste managed within exclusively civilian programmes, or when declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purpose of the convention by the contracting party, and planned and controlled releases into the environment of liquid or gaseous radioactive materials from regulated nuclear facilities. As with the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the obligations of the contracting parties with respect to the safety of spent-fuel and radioactive-waste management are based to a large extent on the principles contained in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals documents, in this case, ‘The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management’, published in 1995. They include, in particular, the obligation to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent-fuel and radioactive-waste management and the obligation to ensure that individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards, inter alia, by appropriate siting, design and construction of facilities and by making provisions for ensuring the safety of facilities both during their operation and after their closure.

Limitations of the conventions While the conventions are an important improvement to the global safety regime, their obligations are defined at such a high level that they fall into the category of general principles, rather than detailed safety standards. So it may be possible to comply with a convention, yet still maintain and operate facilities and activities that others would consider unsafe. Indeed, the conventions were intentionally

46

An IISS Strategic Dossier

designed this way to facilitate broad membership, including of states that continue to operate facilities that many consider unsafe, with the express purpose of using peer pressure to improve their practices. Thus, while there is no mechanism for verification or sanctions for non-compliance, the conventions do have broad membership and provide a mechanism to influence behaviour that would not exist if a country stayed out of the convention. According to the IAEA, the goal is that over time, through processes of self-improvement, acceptance of the obligations under the convention, peer pressure and periodic reviews, all the contracting parties will attain a higher level of safety.

Safety services The IAEA safety standards discussed above form the basis for all the IAEA safety services, such as the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), the Emergency Preparedness Review Mission and the Operational Safety Assessment Review Team, which can be considered the third pillar of the nuclearsafety regime. Responsibility for development of safety standards relates also to the pre-disposal management of radioactive waste and to its disposal. In these cases, the IAEA offers services to evaluate waste-management safety, decommissioning-plans safety and environmental reviews of previous events or practices with radioactive residues that currently present a problem. These review services provide advice and assistance to member countries on a wide range of nuclear and radiation-protection disciplines. The scope of the services or appraisals is directly related to the areas addressed by the safety standards and the requirements in those standards, which cover governmental organisation, operation, design, siting of nuclear power plants, waste, transport safety and emergency preparedness. The IRRS is potentially most relevant to countries embarking on new nuclear-power programmes. The modular IRRS covers legal and governmental infrastructurereview areas including legislative and governmental responsibilities, regulatory-body responsibilities and functions, organisation of the regulatory body, the authorisation process, and assessment, inspection and enforcement, as well as management systems for regulatory bodies. The IRRS is based first on self-assessment by the member country. At the outset, the state conducts a self-assessment

Nuclear Safety and Security

based on IAEA safety standards using IRRS guidelines and associated questionnaires. This helps to identify strengths and potential improvements in the regulatory framework and practices.

Emerging nuclear-security regime In contrast to the global safety regime, which has developed relatively strong international standards over several decades, the much younger global security regime has, for the most part, only reached the level of guidelines. Reasons for this include bureaucratic inertia, a natural imperative for secrecy when dealing with security matters, and a concern that national laws, cultures and practices in security vary widely and would be hard to standardise. A nuclear-security threat, by definition, involves a malicious actor who is trying to damage a nuclear facility, steal nuclear or radioactive material, or release radiation. Safety, by contrast, primarily involves hazards and accidents. Safety specialists can analyse a system, identify fault pathways and perform probability risk assessments. Operators can then receive extensive training about how to properly respond to potential accident scenarios, and system engineers can redesign equipment to try to reduce the safety risks. Sharing this information improves global safety. Security specialists face a more daunting challenge: an intelligent adversary who may know the system thoroughly. Indeed, facility operators may confront knowledgeable external or internal adversaries. Operators are assisted in the battle against such adversaries by information and assessments from intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, and they can seek protective assistance from lawenforcement agencies and possibly the military. Further complicating security is the potential trans­ national dimension of these threats. States rely on one another in compiling threat assessments, through intelligence sharing, law enforcement and military cooperation. Because international security is only as strong as its weakest link, or as strong as the controls that the least-prepared state has implemented, it is imperative for countries to ensure that each of them develops an effective security regime. Having recognised this interdependency, countries have now begun to build a global nuclearsecurity regime through the following measures:

„„IAEA guidelines; „„Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as revised; „„International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; „„IAEA nuclear-security services; „„World Institute for Nuclear Security; „„Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction; „„Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI); „„US-led Second Line of Defense programme; and „„Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Some of these mechanisms involve binding conventions or resolutions, while others are non-binding guidelines or affiliations. Many are aimed at universal application, whereas others, such as the Global Partnership, are focused on a small set of countries. Some mechanisms, such as the Global Partnership and the GTRI, have significant amounts of funding to implement projects. Others have no or limited external funds geared towards implementation, leaving individual states to fund many of their own security improvements.

IAEA guidelines The IAEA emphasises on its nuclear-security website that ‘no single international instrument … addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner’. Rather, a broad range of principles and legal instruments is helping to create a global nuclear-security regime. The IAEA has given limited assistance to member states via its Nuclear Security Fund. The agency also serves as an information source for member states seeking guidance on effective nuclear-security practices. This includes the publication of a Nuclear Security Series intended as a new set of guidance publications ‘to help states establish a coherent nuclear security infrastructure’. Importantly, the IAEA has linked these guidance publications to ‘the implementation of obligations contained in international legal instruments’. Unfortunately, while the development and adoption of relevant new security instruments since 9/11 has been fairly rapid, the IAEA’s effort to further strengthen the global nuclear-security regime with new guidance has been relatively slow. As of May 2009, the Nuclear Security Series had published 11 technical guides.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

47

Chapter three

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Since entering into force in February 1987, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) has been the only legally binding international instrument covering the physical protection of nuclear material. Its original purpose was to protect such material during international transport. For many years, however, several states expressed interest in amending the convention and expanding its coverage to make it legally obligatory for state parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use and storage. Eventually, a diplomatic conference was held in July 2005 to so amend the convention. The amendment also calls for increased cooperation among states concerning the recovery of stolen or smuggled nuclear material, and the mitigation of acts of radiological attack or sabotage. However, the improved CPPNM will not come into effect until two-thirds of the 112 parties ratify the amendments, which is expected to take several years. As of September 2009, Australia is the only country covered in this dossier to have ratified the amendment.

effectiveness of their national nuclear-security arrangements. These include peer reviews in the areas of regulatory infrastructure, physical protection systems and material control. Another IAEA service reviews countries’ overall and specific needs to strengthen their capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism.20

World Institute for Nuclear Security In September 2008, the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) was launched in Vienna to bring together nuclear-security experts, the nuclear industry, governments and international organisations to focus on a rapid and sustainable improvement of security at global nuclear facilities. Initiated by the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, WINS was created to enable security professionals responsible for on-the-ground security to collate the world’s best security practices for nuclear facilities and materials and share the information with peers worldwide. The institute’s initial activities will concentrate on highly enriched uranium and plutonium.21

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of WMD

In April 2005, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which entered into force in July 2007. This convention establishes a legal framework for greater international cooperation in the investigation, extradition and prosecution of nuclear terrorists. Parties to the treaty are required to amend national laws to block terrorists and their abettors from financing, planning and participating in acts of nuclear terror.19 The convention excludes actions by states as well as situations in which home-grown terrorists only commit an offence within a single country and the victims are citizens of that country. Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand have signed the treaty, as have Australia and New Zealand.

In one of the first major international efforts after the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the group of eight leading industrial nations (G8) launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This pledged to raise $20 billion ($10bn from the US and $10bn from other partners) over ten years to alleviate threats from WMD. The partnership has struggled to reach its funding goals and has been slow to commit pledged money to actual projects, largely because of disagreements between the funders and Russia. Most of the projects were directed toward Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. The US contributions largely derived from Cooperative Threat Reduction funds, which were designated for the former Soviet Union. However, the US Congress has in recent years allowed some of that funding to be applied to projects outside the former Soviet Union.

IAEA nuclear-security services

Global Threat Reduction Initiative

The IAEA has established several advisory services to help its members assess and enhance the

In May 2004, the United States launched the GTRI, which brought together many separate nuclear and

International Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

48

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Nuclear Safety and Security

radiological security schemes, including the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return programme, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme, the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programme, and the Radiological Threat Reduction programme. The GTRI has involved cooperative security work with more than 40 countries. It has removed nuclear-weaponsusable materials from many research reactors and other facilities worldwide, converted dozens of research reactors to run on non-weapons-usable fuel, secured spent nuclear fuel from several countries and secured thousands of other radioactive sources in dozens of countries. This initiative has coordinated closely with the IAEA. In September 2007, the GTRI completed conversion of the Dalat research reactor at the Nuclear Research Institute in Vietnam to non-weapons-usable fuel and returned Russian weapons-usable fuel to Russia from that facility.

Second Line of Defense programme The mission of the US Second Line of Defense (SLD) programme is to strengthen the capability of governments to deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime-shipping system. The goal is to reduce the probability of these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass destruction or a radiological dispersal device (e.g., a ‘dirty bomb’). Under this programme, the US works with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports and seaports with radiation-detection equipment. SLD provides training in the use of the systems for appropriate law-enforcement officials, plus initial system-sustainability support as the host government assumes operational responsibility for the equipment. SLD consists of a core programme and a ‘Megaports Initiative’. The core programme installs radiation-detection equipment at borders, airports and strategic feeder ports in Russia, former Soviet Union states and other key countries. Approximately 450 sites have been identified to receive detection equipment under the core programme. The Megaports Initiative provides radiation-detection equipment to key international seaports, so they can screen cargo containers.

Approximately 75 ports worldwide are targeted by the initiative.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism At the 2006 US–Russia Summit in Saint Petersburg, US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This is designed to reach out to partner nations to enhance international cooperation to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. As of August 2009, 76 countries have signed on as partner nations, but Cambodia is the only Southeast Asian signatory. The partner nations have adopted a core set of principles designed to prevent, manage and respond to attacks involving nuclear or radiological materials. Partners are not required to take part in all activities of the initiative and have not, in effect, ratified a binding convention. Rather, they have agreed to work voluntarily to: „„enhance accounting and protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials; „„improve security of civilian nuclear facilities; „„develop better radiation-detection capabilities; „„enhance national and international means of searching for, confiscating and maintaining safe control over illicit trafficked nuclear and other radioactive materials; „„prevent terrorists from establishing safe tax/ financial havens; „„implement improved legal and regulatory frameworks for permitted and proscribed nuclear activities; „„enhance response, mitigation and investigation capabilities for acts of nuclear or radiological terrorism; and „„promote country-to-country information sharing consistent with national laws. These are important endeavours but, to be effective, partner nations need to enact appropriate laws and regulations, develop a security-culture mindset, engage in well-coordinated anti-nuclear-terrorism exercises with other partners and strengthen the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

49

Chapter three

Conclusions While nuclear power has potential economic benefits, it also creates significant risks in terms of the theft of nuclear material, accidents or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. Careful preparations need to be made to minimise these risks. At the outset, countries interested in nuclear power should address a wide range of infrastructure issues to assess whether nuclear power is appropriate or desirable and, if so, create the necessary safety, security and nonproliferation infrastructure. Regional cooperation is important in this respect, and it is to be welcomed that the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and other Asian forums are taking these issues seriously. A wide array of government and, where applicable, private entities must be involved in developing and implementing any nuclear-power programme. An effective system of regulation and supervision must be in place to allow a credible licensing process for reactor-site selection and evaluation; construction and commissioning; and operation and eventual decommissioning and management of spent fuel. These tasks will involve a very serious commitment of resources from national authorities. They also require a willingness to take advantage of and follow the global nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation conventions, standards and guidelines. Countries should be ready to request additional resources available from bilateral partners and the IAEA, including the review and appraisal services that the IAEA has created for regulators and reactor operators. The international safety-and-security regime provides a useful framework, but countries must accept and adopt the framework, make it their own

and not rely on international assistance to fill the gaps. Nuclear safety and security is fundamentally a national responsibility and must be implemented in accordance with national laws, as well as international conventions and guidelines. It is vital that before a country commissions a reactor it has a legal structure that provides a strong basis for safety and security in national law, plus a strong nuclear regulator with the competence, independence and authority necessary to make and enforce its decisions. The operator of the reactor must have staff with the technical competence to undertake safe and secure operation of the facility and manage its nuclear wastes. The operator must also have the financial stability to fund safety and security maintenance and upgrades. The state and the operator should have effective emergency-response capabilities that are tested to ensure they can deal with an accident or malicious attack. When commissioning its first plant, a country should have in place a robust safety-andsecurity system that clearly protects all elements of the facility from accidents, sabotage or other malfeasance. This system must be tested and formally accepted by all involved. It must also include adequately trained operators, engineers, guards and other staff to deal with incidents, accidents and malicious threats. Emergency-response procedures should be in place, including arrangements with off-site response forces.22 The safety and security efforts should be well integrated, complementary and result in a safety-and-security culture that lasts until the plant is decommissioned, its wastes safely disposed of and the site returned to its natural state.

Notes 1

2

IAEA, ‘Nuclear Safety Review for the Year 2006’, GC(51)/

4

Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the

GC/GC51/GC51InfDocuments/English/gc51inf-2_en.pdf.

Government of Belarus, the Russian Federation and

IAEA, Milestones in the Development of a National

Ukraine’, The Chernobyl Forum: 2003–2005, Second

Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy

revised version, pp. 14–17, http://www.iaea.org/

Series, NG-G-3.1 (Vienna: IAEA, 2007). 3

50

‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and

INF/2, July 2007, p. 11, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/

Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf.

IAEA,The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1,

5

Ibid.

INSAG-7, report by the International Nuclear Safety

6

The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident,

Advisory Group (Vienna: IAEA, 1992), pp. 23–24, http://

report commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF, with the

www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub913e_

support of UN OCHA and WHO, January 2002, p.

web.pdf.

63, http://a4nr.org/library/failures/The%20Human%20

An IISS Strategic Dossier

–

Nuclear Safety and Security

Consequences%20of%20the%20Chernobyl%20 7

14

Kutkov, ‘Lessons Learned From Chernobyl And Other

Kenzo Fujimoto, ‘Final Report on Dose Estimation for

Emergencies: Establishing International Requirements

Three Victims of JCO Accident’, National Institute of

and Guidance’, Health Physics Society Journal, vol. 93, no. 5,

Radiological Science, Chiba, Japan, April 2002. 8

9

November 2007, p. 528.

George Bunn, Chaim Braun, Alexander Glaser, Edward

15

Ibid., p. 528.

Lyman and Fritz Steinhausler, ‘Research Reactor

16

Ibid., p. 528.

Vulnerability to Sabotage by Terrorists’, Science and Global

17

Ibid., p. 529.

Security, vol. 11, 2003, pp. 85–107.

18

Samuel Walker, A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective

IAEA,‘Severity, Probability and Risk of Accidents During

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004),

Maritime Transport of Radioactive Material’, Final report of coordinated research project, 1995–1999, IAEA10

p.174. 19

of Nuclear Terrorism’, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee

IAEA, ‘Flood Hazard for Nuclear Power Plants on Coastal

established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of

and River Sites’, IAEA Safety Standards Series, NS-G-3.5,

17 December 1996, United Nations General Assembly, 4

Vienna, 2003, pp. 54–56, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/

April 2005, available through http://untreaty.un.org/cod/

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘NRC Issues Final

terrorism/index.html. 20

Rule on New Reactor Aircraft Impact Assessments’, News rm/doc-collections/news/2009/09-030.html.

13

IAEA, ‘Promoting Nuclear Security: What the IAEA is Doing’, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/

Release, 17 February 2009, http://www.nrc.gov/reading12

‘International Convention for the Suppression of Acts

TECDOC-1231, Vienna, 2001.

publications/PDF/Pub1170_web.pdf. 11

Thomas McKenna, Elena Buglova and Vladimir

Accident%20-%20A%20Strategy%20for%20Recovery.pdf.

English/nuclsecurity.pdf. 21

Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘World Institute for Nuclear

Bruce Vaughn et al, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia’, CRS

Security (WINS) is Launched in Vienna; New

Report for Congress, September 2007, p. 3, http://www.

Organization Will Strengthen Security for Nuclear

fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf.

Materials’, press release, 29 September 2008, http://www.

The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (authorised edition) (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p. 245.

nti.org/c_press/release_WINS_092908.pdf. 22

IAEA, Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

51

52

An IISS Strategic Dossier

2,000MWe (+ 2,000MWe) (+ 6,000MWe) -total: 20,000MWe; has 1 RR

2,000MWe (+ 2,000MWe); has 1 RR

Vietnam

Thailand

Date

-

Low

None

None

Australia

Laos

New Zealand

-

AP

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

N (Signed)

N (Signed)

N (Signed)

N (Signed)

Y

Additional Protocol

Small Quantities Protocol

Convention on Nuclear Safety

AP

SQP

CNS

Abbreviations Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

NOT



Old

Old

-

Old

NS

NOT

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N (signed) Y

N

N

N

Y

Safety

RR Research reactor

Protection of Nuclear Material

CPPNM Convention on the Physical

New

Old

Old

-

-

-

-

-

SQP

Safeguards

*Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy - Review by energy type

-

-

Early signs of interest

Low

Singapore

Brunei

-

-

Purchasing RR

Ambitious intentions

Myanmar

Strong interest; public debate; defunct RR and NPP

Philippines

Cambodia

-

Strong interest; has 1 RR

Malaysia -

2020 (2021)

2020 (2021) (2030) 2040

2016-17 (2025)

Nuclear interest

2 x 600MWe (+ 6,000MWe); has 3 IRRs

Indonesia

Plans

Nuclear aspirations

Snapshot comparison of nuclear-relevant plans, policies and energy data

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

Nuclear power plant Observer

2.4

12.9

3.1

3.4

4.1

29.4

4.3

4.0

8.6

7.0

16.9

6.1

Electricity consumption growth, average y-o-y 2000–06 (%)

Obs

Y

N

Y

Obs.

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Obs.

N

N

PSI

NPP

CPPNM

Security

-

-

66

29

-

-

40

-

38

11

70

46

Gas

-

-

20

17

-

-

-

-

20

4

41

10

Oil

111

-

190

-

-

-

-

-

-

75

4

19

Coal

Proved fossil fuel reserves, end 2008 (years)*

Chapter three

Chapter four

Brunei, Cambodia and Laos

Brunei, Cambodia and Laos have no nuclear facilities of any kind and no known plans for nuclear power, apart from ambitious aspirations by Cambodia that would take many years of preparation before they could be implemented. These three smallest ASEAN countries are not members of the IAEA, but they do have comprehensive safeguards agreements in place and are signatories to the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Treaty. They present no known proliferation concerns of their own, though all three lack inadequate controls on trade, and these shortcomings could contribute to proliferation elsewhere.

Brunei The Sultanate of Brunei has no nuclear energy plans, but neither has it ruled them out. For the time being, it is collecting information only. In November 2007, for example, the Brunei Energy Association (BEnA) hosted speakers from South Korea in an open forum to explore aspects of nuclear energy. BEnA spokesperson Norizah Harun Taylor said the purpose of the forum was to identify answers to the questions that have been raised about nuclear power. ‘We are probably not going to move into the use of nuclear energy in the foreseeable future, and we also don’t know when the oil will run out, but when it does, what are we going to do? We start looking for alternative[s], and this is why we have to start now … so people can start reading, and start thinking’, she said.1 Brunei has no pressing need for nuclear power, given the nation’s large energy reserves. Brunei generates 98–99% of its electricity from natural gas, and the remainder from oil. The natural-gas reserves are estimated to last until 2038. The country has enjoyed almost complete electrification for several years, and transmission losses are minimal. Crude oil, petroleum products and

liquefied natural gas account for more than 90% of exports and just over half of GDP. Brunei is the thirdlargest oil producer in Southeast Asia, with reserves estimated to last until 2026 at 2009 production rates. Brunei’s natural-resource exports, set against its small population of 390,000, provide a per capita GDP of $53,100 (2008 estimate), the eighth highest in the world. Despite its large reserves of oil and gas, Brunei is keen to diversify its economy and its sources of energy. There is limited coal and hydropower potential, but other renewable energy sources have not been thoroughly explored. In 2008, Brunei signed a deal with Japanese trading giant Mitsubishi Corporation to undertake a three-year experiment on harnessing solar energy.2 Under the deal, Brunei’s government and Mitsubishi will jointly carry out a 1.2 MW photovoltaic demonstration project, which is scheduled to start in 2010, and is likely to be the largest in ASEAN. If Brunei were to explore nuclear power, it would have to start from scratch in constructing the necessary infrastructure. The country’s small population would make any nuclear energy programme difficult to implement without considerable external involvement, probably including a turnkey operation. In large part due to its lack of nuclear infrastructure, Brunei is not a member of the IAEA, although IAEA full-scope safeguards have been in force in the country since November 1987, with measures limited by a Small Quantity Protocol. Brunei has not signed an Additional Protocol, nor has it signed any of the nuclear safety and security conventions. There is no evidence that nuclear energy has been a priority to date. Change on this front could come relatively quickly, however, if the government were to see a need for nuclear power.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

53

Chapter four

Brunei’s energy production and consumption, 2003–07 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 World %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

196.4

204.4

213.6

221.9

180.6

–18.6

0.21

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

12.9

13.0

14.0

14.6

15.0

2.74

0.02

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

473.2

474.3

474.3

505.0

NA

6.5 (‘06/’05)

0.40 (‘06)

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

61.1

70.6

83.0

140.9

145

2.9

0.14

Coal production (thousand short tons)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Sources: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

Brunei has been a signatory to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty since December 1995 and is therefore committed not to start a nuclear weapons programme. It acceded to the NPT in 1985, and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1997, but has not yet ratified it. Brunei was an observer at the Singapore-led Deep Sabre Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise in August 2005, and at the Pacific Shield PSI exercise hosted by Japan in October 2007. In a report to the 1540 Committee in 2004, Brunei listed several legislative measures it considered relevant to controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.3 Its strategic trade controls are limited, however, to two control lists: one for radioactive materials and a ‘poisons list’, which includes chemical substances used in pharmaceutical, manufacturing and agriculture industries. Both lists are used only to regulate imports, and neither covers export, re-export, brokering, transit and transhipment activities. If Brunei is able to implement plans that were drawn up in the beginning of the decade to establish itself as a centre for international offshore finance and Islamic banking and to develop Pulau Muara Besar into a deep megaport capable of handling the next generation of supertankers, the nation will be well advised to expand its export controls to cover transit and transhipment as well as the kind of intangible technology transfers and

54

An IISS Strategic Dossier

brokering of sensitive technologies that can be used for nuclear proliferation.

Cambodia Both politically and economically, Cambodia is still recovering from its tumultuous history from the 1970s onward. Spillover from the war in Vietnam sparked Cambodia’s own civil war in 1970, which was followed by the genocidal Khmer Rouge rule in 1975–78, in which between an estimated one and two million Cambodians died. The Khmer Rouge’s reign of terror also destroyed the country’s physical and human infrastructure. In 1978, Soviet-backed Vietnam invaded, installing a puppet government and starting ten years of occupation and internal strife, in which the US and China supported rebel groups. In 1993, reasonably successful UN-sponsored elections took place, and a power-sharing deal emerged, although political violence continued to be a problem for the next decade. Due to its troubled past, half of its population of 14 million is less than 21 years of age. As far as is known, Cambodia has no industries relevant to production of materials directly useful to weapons of mass destruction programmes.

Nuclear aspirations Cambodia has no nuclear infrastructure: no nuclear facilities and no organisational structure or

Brunei, Cambodia and Laos

the field, this would take at least 15 years.6 Given Cambodia’s utter lack of such expertise, a foreignbuilt and -managed turnkey operation would seem to be the nation’s only viable option for nuclear power, but importing turnkey facilities would not overcome the need for qualified domestic operators, regulators and support staff.

Energy alternatives Cambodia’s newfound interest in nuclear energy has somewhat of a copycat aspect, but might be justified by the growing gap between its domestic energy demand and supply. Cambodia’s annual power consumption of about 125 million kilowatt-hours is the lowest in Southeast Asia and among the lowest in the world. Cambodia’s electricity-generation mix is 96% from oil, 4% from hydropower and less than 1% from solar power. Less than 15% of households have access to electricity (urban 53.6%, rural 8.6%).7 Nearly 80% of Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen (Getty)

personnel trained to operate, manage or regulate nuclear programmes. The nation is not currently a member of the IAEA and has not adhered to any nuclear safety or security conventions other than the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which it acceded to in 2006. Given this lack of nuclear experience, it came as surprise when, in September 2008, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced his government would build a nuclear power plant to address future energy needs and reduce Cambodia’s dependency on oil.4 Sat Samy, UnderSecretary of State for the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, echoed the announcement, arguing that as coal and hydropower capacity will peak in the next decade, nuclear power would be the best option to pursue. He said Cambodia’s nuclear plans were in line with what he described as efforts by ASEAN to promote nuclear energy among member states, and claimed that the plant was due to be developed ‘as early as 2020’.5 For Cambodia to realise its nuclear aspirations, it would have to start by building up a support infrastructure for nuclear power, including electricity grids, trained personnel, safety regulations and a framework establishing legal responsibility. The IAEA calculates that for any country new to

total energy consumption is in the form of biomass from dried twigs, bark, leaves, dung, and so on. Demand for electricity, 75% of which is supplied by outdated diesel-fuelled power plants, is growing by about 20% a year.8 The lack of electricity is symptomatic of Cambodia’s status as one of the world’s poorer countries, with an estimated per capita GDP of only $2,000 in 2008. The country possesses large hydropower reserves and some coal reserves. Offshore oil and gas reserves which initially looked promising were later found to be lying in complicated geological structures. Though expectations have been lowered considerably, production is scheduled to begin after 2010. The development of hydropower resources is Cambodia’s first energy priority, with four contracts for plants in the Mekong River, worth $3bn, already granted to Chinese companies. Between 2010 and 2019, Cambodia plans to open nine hydropower dams, supplying the country with 1942MWe. A 2007 government report does not mention nuclear plans, but instead outlines the prospects from 2008 to 2022 as focusing on hydroelectric power, coalfired power plants and improving the electricity distribution network, including links with the neighbouring states of Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.9 In recent years, oil has been discovered in the Gulf of Thailand, including in Cambodia’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone and areas where its

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

55

Chapter four

Cambodia’s energy production and consumption, 2003–07 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

3.7

3.6

3.6

4.2

4.4

4.76

0.01

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Coal production (thousand short tons)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

0.04

0.03

0.04

0.05

NA

25.0 (‘06/’05)

negligible

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Sources: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

claims are contested by Thailand. While relations with Thailand deteriorated after a long-running land-border dispute re-erupted in 2008–09, leading to soldiers from both sides dying in sporadic clashes, the countries have pledged to resolve their differences and constructively approach the exploitation of offshore resources.10 Although the Cambodian government had announced in 2008 that it hoped to receive revenues from offshore oil as early as 2011, the border dispute has created fresh uncertainty for Chevron, which holds a 55% stake in the project, as it attempts to determine when it can start production from the field.11

Strategic trade controls Cambodia’s constitution, adopted in 1993, prohibits the manufacture, use and storage of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. A draft law approved by the cabinet in March 2009 complements this prohibition by spelling out in detail a ban on ‘production, fabrication, receipt, storage, transport and use of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiation weapons’.12 There is apparently no provision in law to control import, export or re-export of strategic goods. Cambodia’s 2005 report to the 1540 Committee focuses on the nation’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention that year and its cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.13 Cambodia’s cash-based economy and porous borders make it

56

An IISS Strategic Dossier

vulnerable to money laundering, and narcoticsrelated corruption reportedly involves elements in the government, military and police.14 The culture of corruption, exacerbated by the country’s persistent economic problems, finds Cambodia ranked 166 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.15 The US ambassador to Cambodia claimed in May 2009 that corruption was costing the country up to $500m a year in lost revenue.16

Cambodia’s flag of convenience The potential for WMD-trafficking networks to take advantage of Cambodia’s inadequate trade controls is heightened by its ill-regulated maritime policies. Cambodia hosts a flag of convenience, allowing non-nationals to operate ships under its flag. A 2003 study shows Cambodia’s flag register regulatory capacity to be among the poorest in the world.17 In 1994, Cambodia set up an exclusive register, Cambodia Shipping Corporation (CSC), which was headed by Khek Vandy, King Sihanouk’s son-in-law, and partly owned by a North Korean diplomat. During this period the respective royal and ruling families of Cambodia and North Korea enjoyed close relations.18 After starting operations from Singapore in 1995, CSC registered at least a dozen North Korean ships.19 When interviewed in 2000 about the CSC’s operations, an official from Ministry of Public Works and Transport report-

Brunei, Cambodia and Laos

23 tanks of nitric acid rocket propellant and 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, none of which were on the cargo list. At Yemen’s request, the ship was subsequently released, but the incident provided much of the stimulus for the PSI announced by President George W. Bush the following May.

Non-proliferation and disarmament Cambodia ratified the NPT in 1972, and since 1999 has had in King Sihanouk is welcomed in Pyongyang by North Korean President and ‘Great Leader’ Kim Il-Sung during his period of exile (Getty) place a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, with measures limited by a Small Quantities edly said that ‘we don’t know or care who owns Protocol. Cambodia was a member of the IAEA the ships or whether they’re doing ‘white’ or from 1958 until 2003, when it withdrew, after being ‘black’ business ... it is not our concern’.20 While in arrears with its dues for several years. It is the no direct evidence exists of these ships trafficking only other country to have withdrawn from IAEA narcotics under the Cambodian flag, North Korean membership besides North Korea (which withdrew ships have been caught smuggling drugs on other in 1994 after being sanctioned for safeguards violaoccasions, and other Cambodian-flagged ships tions,) but in this case the North Korea connection have been caught doing so.21 In July 2002, bowing is coincidental. In August 2009, Cambodia applied to international pressure, Cambodia rescinded to resume its membership and concluded a dues CSC’s licence and announced the following repayment plan with the IAEA. Cambodia ratimonth that it would be returning the authority to fied the Convention on the Physical Protection of register ships to the Ministry of Public Works and Nuclear Material in 2006, but has not acceded to any Transport.22 However, in January 2003 it once again other nuclear safety or security convention. contracted another offshore company, this time Cambodia has committed itself not to develop in South Korea, prompting heavy criticism from nuclear weapons by its accession to the Southeast the International Transport Workers Federation Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1997. for having again outsourced its responsibility to a As a further demonstration of its non-proliferation foreign company.23 The most notorious incident in light of the commitment, in 2008 Cambodia endorsed the PSI Cambodia–North Korea connection took place statement of interdiction principles, and is thereby while the authority of the register was with considered to be a PSI participant. It participated the Cambodian Ministry of Public Works and in PSI exercises as an observer during Team Samurai Transport. In December 2002, Spanish marines, ‘04 led by Japan, and Pacific Protector hosted by operating on US-provided intelligence, interdicted Australia in 2006. the Cambodian-registered, North Korean-owned ship So San in the Indian Ocean. The So San, which Potential terrorism concerns was disguised and flying no flag, was found to be If Cambodia were to establish a nuclear power carrying 15 Scud missiles and warheads along with programme, security provisions would need to

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

57

Chapter four

be in place to guard against the potential threat of nuclear terrorism. In 2004, Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz of Chile, chairman of the United Nations Security Council’s committee on sanctions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, warned that Cambodia could become a breeding ground for terrorism. Muñoz noted that Hambali, the leader of Jemaah Islamiah, hid in Cambodia from late 2002 to early 2003.24 The local police considered that this period, during which he was reportedly accompanied by suspected Jemaah Islamiah members, was long enough for him to have put a network in place.25 Prime Minister Hun Sen angrily rejected Muñoz’s assessment, calling it ‘irresponsible and unsubstantiated’.26 By 2007, with help from Australia, Cambodia had drafted and ratified its first anti-terrorism laws. The two laws, ‘one providing a comprehensive legal basis for counter-terrorism efforts and the other to combat money laundering and terrorism financing’, are part of Cambodia’s wider participation in global counter-terrorism efforts. Between 1999 and 2007, Cambodia acceded to 12 key international counterterrorism instruments.27

Laos The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) is a one-party communist state, historically aligned with Vietnam. Laos is a poor, landlocked country with a per capita GDP of $2,100 in 2008 and a population of 6.8m. Its poverty, inadequate infrastructure and largely unskilled workforce are partly the result of the tumultuous history it shares with Cambodia and Vietnam. Civil war and American bombing campaigns caused a tremendous economic and humanitarian setback in the 1970s. Following the communist takeover in 1975, the constitutional monarchy was abolished and a socialist state put in place. After 11 years of socialist policies, in 1986 the Pathet Lao government initiated a gradual return to private enterprise and liberalised foreign-investment laws under the New Economic Mechanism programme. The results, starting from an extremely low base, were striking – growth averaged 6% per year in 1988–2007. Despite this rapid growth rate, Laos remains one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. It has no railroads, only rudimentary roads, and limited telecommunications.

58

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Laos acceded to the Southeast Asia NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1996 and therefore prohibits nuclear weapons. It ratified the NPT in 1970 and the CTBT in 2000 and adopted a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2001, with measures limited by a Small Quantities Protocol. It is not an IAEA member and has not signed any IAEA nuclear safety or security conventions.

Energy alternatives Laos has no nuclear programme, facilities or bureaucracy of any kind and has never expressed any interest in nuclear power. The main energy opportunity for Laos lies in hydropower, which already provides about 97% of its electricity. The World Bank is assisting Laos with the construction of hydropower projects, such as the Nam Ngum 5 and the Nam Theun 2 dams. A large share of the energy produced by the latter project will be sold to Thailand and Vietnam. Further projects include the outsourcing of the mining of coal and construction of coal-fired plants by commercial companies. Rural electrification is a major policy goal of the Laotian government because access to electricity is very limited, especially in rural areas, and distribution losses are very high. Of the total energy consumed, nearly 90% is in the form of biomass.

Strategic trade controls The country has little foreign trade and no WMD-relevant industries. However, its location and porous borders make it a potential concern for trafficking, smuggling and transit of sensitive materials within the region. In one possible such incident in June 2003, Thai authorities, following a US tip-off, arrested a Thai national who was trying to sell a small amount of caesium-137 (under one milligram, although erroneously said by some reports to total 30kg, because of the weight of the protective covering) to undercover agents. The suspect told police that the material was originally from Russia but had been smuggled through Laos, where additional supplies were stocked. Laotian officials checked the allegation but found no evidence of further stocks of radioactive material.28 More generally, corruption is a serious problem that will have to be overcome if the country is to implement a secure system of trade controls. In 2008 Laos ranked 151 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index.29

Brunei, Cambodia and Laos

Laotian energy production and consumption, 2003–07 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 World %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

2.9

2.9

3.0

3.1

3.2

3.23

negligible

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

0

0

0

0

0

–

–

Coal production (million tons oil equivalent)

314.2

319.7

330.7

330.7

330.7

0.00

negligible

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

125.7

121.3

132.3

132.3

132.3

0.00

negligible

1.3

1.4

1.7

1.6

NA

–5.9 (‘06/’05)

0.05 (‘06)

Hydropower (net generation, billion kWh)

Sources: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

The report that Laos submitted to the 1540 Committee in 2005 described a rudimentary strategic trade controls system that was under review.30 Most of the laws and regulations are focused inwards, with an emphasis on regulating imports for domestic use. Licenses are required for export of chemicals, explosives and armaments, although there are no regulations regarding their re-export, transhipment or brokering. Moreover, there are no control lists to define exactly what items are licensed.

Conclusions None of the three countries surveyed in this chapter pose nuclear safety or proliferation risks of their own. However, their weak regulatory mecha-

nisms could well be a reason for concern in terms of facilitating proliferation elsewhere. Insufficient trade and transhipment controls and weak financial regulatory regimes could also be exploited by non-state actors. Irrespective of whether these countries actively pursue nuclear power programmes in the future, early steps should be taken to enhance and render more effective their national trade controls, particularly as they relate to the storage and transhipment of dual-use materials and equipment. If Cambodia and Brunei were to decide to introduce nuclear power, they would need to start from scratch in following the IAEA guidelines on building up the necessary infrastructure, including a cadre of trained personnel, safety regulations and a legal and regulatory system.

Notes 1

Nurkhayrul Salam, ‘Bena to Host Forum on Nuclear

5

Energy’, Brunei Times, 11 September 2007. 2

3

4

‘Brunei Signs Solar Energy Deal with Mitsubishi’, ASEAN

Kay Kimsong, ‘Cambodia Sets Sights on Nuclear Power, Phnom Penh Post, 29 September 2008.

6

The IAEA has identified 20 preparatory steps a state

Affairs, 15 August 2008, http://www.aseanaffairs.com/

has to take when building its first nuclear power plant,

page/brunei_signs_solar_energy_deal_with_mitsubishi.

and estimates that on average 15 years of sustained

National Report of Brunei Darussalam to the 1540

national commitment are needed for the first plant. IAEA,

Committee, 30 December 2004, http://www.un.org/

‘Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power Programme’,

sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml.

GOV/INF/2007/2, April 2007, p. 7, http://www.iaea.org/

Ker Munthit, ‘Cambodia Hopes to Build Nuclear Plant’,

NuclearPower/Downloads/Launch_NPP/07-11471_

The Irrawaddy, 26 September 2008.

Launch_NPP.pdf.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

59

Chapter four

7

United Nations, Cambodia Energy Sector Strategy (draft),

19

p. 5, http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/ cambodia/energy.pdf. 8

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2004), p. 93. 20

Neil Hickey, ‘Cambodia Ramping Up Hydro’, Energy

International Shipping Weekly, 12 October 2000. 21

10

Electricity Authority of Cambodia, Report on Power Sector

22

Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 94.

of the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Year 2007, pp. 20–32.

23

Ibid. p. 95

‘Thai, Cambodian PMs Meet as Border Tension Eases’,

24

‘Cambodia could become Terror Source, Warns Security

Reuters, 27 February 2009. 11

Nguon Soyan, ‘Govt Seeking Talks with Thais on Offshore

Council Panel Chairman’, UN News Service, 22 October 2004. 25

Issue’, Phnom Penh Post, 29 May 2009. 12

Daily, 13 September 2003. 26

14

27

16

terrorism Efforts must Stress Prevention of Global

shtml.

Expansion, Address Legitimate Grievances’, Sixty-second

CIA World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-

General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 4th & 5th Meetings, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gal3319.doc.htm.

David W. Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–99:

28

Triggers Fears of “Dirty Bombs”,’ Wall Street Journal, 18

2001), pp. 78–81; ‘2008 Corruption Perception Index’,

June 2003; ‘Thai “Dirty Bomb” Suspect Denies Planning

Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/

Terrorist Attacks’, Agence France Presse – English, 14 June

news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table.

200; ‘Cesium-137 Seized in Thailand’, NIS Export Control

US Embassy, Phnom Penh, ‘Ambassador Rodley’s

Observer, July 2003, p. 19, http://cns.miis.edu/observer/

cambodia.usembassy.gov/sp_053009.html.

pdfs/ob_0307e.pdf. 29

Nik Winchester and Tony Alderton, Flag State Audit: 2003 University, 2003), http://www.sirc.cf.ac.uk/fsa.htm.

60

Transparency International, 2008 Corruption Perception Index, http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_

(Cardiff: Seafarers International Research Centre, Cardiff 18

Shawn W. Crispin and Gary Fields, ’U.S.–Thai Seizure

Power, Elitism and Democracy (Richmond: Curzon Press,

Remarks for Clean Hands Concert’, 30 May 2009, http:// 17

‘United States Tells Assembly’s Legal Committee Anti-

March 2005, http://www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalreports.

tions/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html. 15

‘Hun Sen Files Complaint to Annan over Criticism on Terrorism’, Cambodian Online, 28 October 2004.

press_release/pr_19-03-2009.php. National Report of Cambodia to the 1540 Committee,21

Phann Ana and Kevin Doyle, ‘Putting Down Roots: Radicals Try to Strengthen Ties in Cambodia’, Cambodia

Kingdom of Cambodia, Cabinet Plenary Meeting, press release, 20 March 2009, http://www.pressocm.gov.kh/eng/

13

Robert Neff, ‘Flags that Hide the Dirty Truth’, Asian Times Online, 20 April 2007.

profile Cambodia. 9

‘Ship Registers Feature: Kings, Communists and Pushers: The Strange Ways of the Cambodian Register’, Fairplay

Tribune, 19 May 2008; The World Bank: World Development Indicators database, April 2009, country

Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade (Singapore:

focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table. 30

National Report of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Bertil Lintner, ‘Odd Couple: The Royal and the Red’, Asian

to the 1540 Committee, 3 May 2005, http://www.un.org/

Times Online, 31 October 2007.

sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml.

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter FIVE

Indonesia

With three nuclear research reactors, a range of other nuclear-science facilities and a cadre of trained scientists and engineers, Indonesia has more nuclear-science expertise than any other member of ASEAN. Until very recently, it was expected to be the first country in Southeast Asia to generate electricity from nuclear power, with plans to have one nuclear power plant operating in Java by 2016–17, and three more there by 2025. However, local opposition in the area where the plants were to be built and wavering political leadership on the issue will probably result in delays to this timetable. Indonesia’s policies today give little reason for concern that it would use nuclear technology for military purposes. Short-lived nuclear-weapons aspirations under President Sukarno in the 1960s are long-buried and have been replaced with a strong emphasis on disarmament diplomacy. The country’s non-proliferation credentials will be further burnished as and when Indonesia follows through on its intention to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Meanwhile, safety and environmental issues surrounding nuclear energy in Indonesia still cause some nervousness among the country’s neighbours.

Short-lived nuclear-weapons aspirations under Sukarno Although Indonesia is now an active proponent of nuclear non-proliferation, this was not always the case. In the mid 1960s, under the leadership of President Sukarno, the country briefly considered acquiring and testing nuclear weapons. Many senior Indonesian officials praised China’s 16 October 1964 nuclear test, and Brigadier General Hartono, director of the Army Ordnance Department, spoke publicly of emulating China. In July 1965, Sukarno himself declared that, ‘God willing, Indonesia will

shortly produce its own atom bomb.’1 He was apparently motivated by a perceived threat to Indonesian security from the West, which included British support for the Federation of Malaysia in the lowlevel military conflict in which the two countries were then engaged as a result of Indonesia’s policy of Konfrontasi (‘confrontation’). Sukarno may also have been driven by a belief that promoting nuclear weapons would help generate domestic support for his regime amid the turbulent politics the country was experiencing. How Sukarno hoped to acquire nuclear weapons is not clear. Publicly, US officials made clear their view that Indonesia had neither the nuclear infrastructure nor the expertise to acquire an indigenous capability. Privately, however, they were becoming concerned that China might provide Indonesia with the necessary technical help to develop a bomb as an outgrowth of the informal alliance between the two countries formed in January 1965, known as the ‘Peking–Jakarta axis’. The Americans were also worried that China might conduct a test on Indonesian territory and allow Jakarta to take the credit, a concern that was reflected in the international media. However, historians have dismissed Sukarno’s bomb rhetoric as largely bluster, and

Indonesia-specific abbreviations BAPETEN

Nuclear Energy Control Board (Badan Pengawas Tenaga Nuklir)

BATAN

National Atomic Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional)

PTNBR

Nuclear Centre for Materials and Radiometry (Pusat Teknologi Nuklir Bahan dan Radimetri)

PUSPIPTEK Centre for Science and Technology Research (Pusat Penelitian Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi) WALHI

Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia)

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

61

Chapter five

there is no firm evidence that China ever discussed nuclear cooperation with Indonesia.2 In any case, the country’s purported quest for nuclear weapons was short-lived. What the military subsequently alleged to be a pro-Sukarno coup against the army by a group of dissident officers and members of Indonesia’s Communist Party on 30 September 1965 sparked a strong reprisal from Major-General Suharto, who assumed command of the army and, six months later, took over the presidency. In 1967, Suharto agreed to international safeguards on sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, alleviating international concerns about Indonesia’s nuclear aspirations. Ever since, the country appears to have been committed to the purely peaceful application of nuclear technology.

History of civilian nuclear activity and research As it happened, nuclear weapons elsewhere figured in the scientific work that led to Indonesia’s first exploration of civilian nuclear applications. In 1954, a National Commission for the Investigation of Radioactivity was formed to investigate the possibility of radioactive fallout on Indonesian territory from US nuclear-weapon tests in the Pacific Ocean. Influenced by the US ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme, in 1958 this commission evolved into the Atomic Energy Council, charged with advising the cabinet on nuclear energy. The council and the Institute of Atomic Energy, formed in 1959 to act as its operational arm in supervising research, were led by radiologist G.A. Siwabessy, who had directed the radioactivity study. In 1960, Jakarta signed a cooperative bilateral agreement with the US for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Indonesia. Under the Atoms for Peace programme, US firm General Atomics supplied Indonesia with its first research reactor (of a TRIGA Mark II type) and LEU fuel for it. The reactor, located at what became the Bandung Nuclear Complex, began operating in 1964 with an initial thermal power of 250kW, which in 1971 was upgraded to 1MW, and in 2000 to 2MW. In 1965, the Indonesian government reorganised the Atomic Energy Institute into the National Atomic Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional, or BATAN). The same year, after the fall of Sukarno, the government made a prelimi-

62

An IISS Strategic Dossier

President Sukarno (Getty)

nary decision to accept IAEA safeguards (which it formally adopted in 1967) in exchange for $350,000 of nuclear cooperation assistance from the US, previously withheld from the Sukarno regime.3 In 1966, BATAN established the Pasar Jumat Nuclear Research Centre in Jakarta. In 1974, another nuclear complex was established, in Yogyakarta in central Java, to house the Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology and the Polytechnic Institute of Nuclear Technology. Indonesia’s second research reactor was built at the Yogyakarta complex in 1979. Named Kartini (after a colonialera nationalist heroine), the 100kW TRIGA Mark II reactor, also supplied by General Atomics, uses low-enriched uranium fuel and is designed for research and training. In accordance with a nuclear-cooperation agreement Indonesia signed with the Soviet Union in 1960, Moscow had in 1965 supplied equipment for a 1–2MWt research reactor to be built at Serpong near Jakarta. The Soviets had also supplied a subcritical assembly for the Gadjah Mada Research Centre in Yogyakarta. However, Indonesia never built a facility to house the planned reactor, so the

Indonesia

Indonesia’s civil nuclear programme: chronology 1954

National Commission for Investigation of Radioactivity established

1959

Institute of Atomic Energy established

1960

Indonesia signs civil nuclear cooperation agreements with US and USSR

1961

Work begins on nuclear research facilities at Bandung

1964

TRIGA Mark II research reactor at Bandung begins operating

1965

Atomic Energy Institute reorganised as National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN)

1965

USSR supplies equipment for planned 1-2MWt research reactor at Serpong, which is never built

Oct 1965

Indonesia accepts IAEA safeguards in principle as condition for US agreement to nuclear cooperation assistance

1966

Pasar Jumat Nuclear Research Centre established

1967

Indonesia formally adopts IAEA comprehensive safeguards

1974

Yogyaharta Nuclear Complex established

1974

Indonesia asks IAEA to study economically justifiable scale and timing for a nuclear-power-plant programme

1976

IAEA study concludes that 8-18 reactors could be built between 1978 and 1992

1978–79

BATAN-Italian feasibility study concludes that nuclear power will be economically attractive from 2000

1979

Kartini 100kW research reactor completed

1980s

BATAN and IAEA undertake 8-year project to assess exploitation potential of uranium deposits

1987

30MWt G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor comes online

1989

BATAN begins comprehensive investigation of Muria peninsula as a candidate site for a nuclear power plant

1996

Indonesia resolves to move ahead with nuclear power based on a study by a Japanese consulting firm which concludes that nuclear power is competitive and that sites in Balong on the Muria peninsula are the best alternatives

1997

Plans for nuclear power are deferred due to funding problems stemming from the Asian financial crisis

2004

Government decides to add nuclear energy to the planned energy mix

March 2005

Government announces that two 600MWe reactors are planned to be operational by 2016

January 2006

President Yudhoyono announces that renewable energy sources, among them nuclear power, will account for 5% of the nation’s electricity supply by 2025

2006

Government earmarks $8 billion for four nuclear plants on the Muria peninsula

2007

Parliament approves ‘National Long-Term Development Planning’ which sets 2015–19 as the time frame for introducing nuclear power

2007-2008 Several thousand citizens demonstrate in Muria against nuclear power April 2009 Yudhoyono appears to back off from nuclear-energy plans, saying Indonesia would first focus on developing existing resources before nuclear energy would be considered May 2009 Minister of Research and Technology says tenders for nuclear power plants have been postponed indefinitely

parts lay unassembled for years and the project was officially abandoned in 1971.4 Serpong later became the site of Indonesia’s most important nuclear complex. In 1983, to support the introduction of nuclear power, Indonesia began construction in Serpong of an LEU-fuelled 30MWt pool-type lightwater multipurpose research reactor from German firm Interatom, a subsidiary of Siemens. The G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor, named after the long-time head of BATAN and its predecessor organisations, came online in 1987. Indonesia had planned to begin the construction of a fourth research reactor in 1998, a 10MWt

pool-type facility to be used for isotope production. BATAN designed the reactor, but the project never moved beyond the planning stage because the private company that was to have built it pulled out on economic grounds. In the 1980s, BATAN and the IAEA undertook a collaborative eight-year project to assess the exploitation potential of Indonesia’s uranium deposits. The project included training in uranium exploration for staff at the Nuclear Minerals Development Centre in Jakarta. Also during this period, a uranium-ore processing facility with a design capacity of 0.2 tonnes of uranium per year

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

63

Chapter five

Protesters on the site of a proposed nuclear power plant on the Muria peninsula, in the shadow of a dormant volcano, 30 November 2007 (Paul Hilton/Greenpeace)

was established for the pilot-scale production of yellowcake at the Centre for the Development of Nuclear Ore and Geology at Lemajung in Kalan, West Kalimantan. The facility operated from 1981 before being shut down in 1996. In the 1990s, Indonesia worked with the IAEA to assess the economic viability of establishing a uranium mine in Central Kalimantan. For a short time in 1989, Indonesia also extracted uranium from imported phosphate ore at the Petrokimia plant at Gresik in East Java.5 Beginning in 1979, Indonesia also worked with the IAEA to develop a fuel-fabrication capability (see below).

Nuclear-power-plant planning surveys and feasibility studies Although the idea of developing nuclear power was broached in a serious way in Indonesia as early as 1960, the first practical exploration of the option did not begin until 1974 when the government asked the IAEA to determine an economically justifiable scale and timing for a nuclear-power-plant programme. As US nuclear expert Dan Poneman noted in 1982, the resulting study published in 1976 proceeded from the assumption that nuclear power was the goal: ‘it presented ex ante the desirability of nuclear power for Indonesia, questioning not whether but how it should be introduced’. Disregarding

Indonesia political chronology

64

October 1964

Indonesian officials praise China’s nuclear test

January 1965

Informal alliance with China (‘Peking-Jakarta axis’) formed

July 1965

Sukarno declares nuclear-weapons intention

Sept 1965

Pro-Sukarno coup sparks reprisal from Suharto-led forces

March 1966

Suharto takes over presidency

May 1998

Suharto falls from power and is replaced by B.J. Habibie

Oct 1999

Abdurrahman Wahid elected president

July 2001

Megawati Sukarnoputri elected president

October 2004

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono elected president

July 2009

Yudhoyono re-elected

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Indonesia

key factors such as the availability of financing and skilled manpower, the study concluded that between eight and 18 reactors could be built between 1978 and 1992.6 Debating reactor types, the government leaned towards heavy-water reactors because they could use indigenous uranium for fuel without foreign enrichment assistance.7 There is no record of proliferation concerns being raised in this debate. A follow-up inter-agency committee identified Rembang and Lasem in central Java as suitable reactor sites. However, government financial retrenchment, a lack of international funding (including from the World Bank) for nuclear-power planning, bureaucratic opposition and environmental concerns slowed Indonesia’s nuclear-development plans.8 In 1978–79, a feasibility study was conducted by Nucleare Italiana Reattori Avanzati and BATAN with the assistance of the Italian government. The study and follow-up assessments concluded that nuclear power would be economically attractive from 2000, and that it would require a ten-year lead time. Minister for Research and Technology (and later President) B.J. Habibie was a strong proponent of the plan to go ahead on the basis of this projection, but decisions were deferred until after the Serpong research reactor was operational and could serve as a test bed. The Muria peninsula on the north coast of Java, which is dominated by a dormant volcano, emerged from the feasibility study as the most suitable area for a power reactor and in 1989 BATAN began a comprehensive investigation of the peninsula as a candidate site. In 1991, BATAN contracted Japanese consulting company NEWJEC Inc. to perform a more detailed site selection and evaluation study. In 1996, NEWJEC’s study concluded, inter alia, that the cost of generating electricity from a 600MWe nuclear power plant was competitive with the cost of generating from a similar-sized coal-fired plant, and that Ujung Lemahabang in the village of Balong, around 20 kilometres northeast of Jepara, would be the best site for the first plant. Ujung Grenggengan, also in Balong, and Ujung Watu a few kilometres east were identified as the best alternative sites. Basing its plans on these feasibility studies, in 1996 the Indonesian government resolved to advance its nuclear-power project. The scheme was intended to supply 2,000MWe of power to Java,

Sumatra and Bali. However, in 1997 the project was deferred, due to funding problems resulting from the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. The discovery and exploitation in the 1990s of additional gas sources in a large field northeast of the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea provided another reason to forgo nuclear energy for the time being.

Current nuclear infrastructure Indonesia’s human infrastructure in the nuclear field is significant, albeit ageing.9 BATAN employs 110 personnel with PhD degrees, 295 with Master’s degrees, 1,035 with Bachelor’s degrees and 570 with ‘diploma certificates’.10 Since 1958, Indonesia has received almost $7.5 million to support the training of BATAN staff through the IAEA’s Fellowships and Scientific Visits programme. While the number of nuclear personnel in Indonesia is substantial, it is not especially so by comparison with that of some other countries with comparable nuclear-research establishments. Egypt, for example, which has two research reactors, has 1,400 highly qualified academic scientists and 2,300 technical staff working at its Atomic Energy Agency.11 Though many of BATAN’s staff are well-qualified, their talents are not always well utilised. This is due at least in part to the organisation’s very small maintenance and equipment budgets, which have been limited since the economic crisis of the 1990s and which have suffered as a result of the devolution of political authority and budgets from federal to sub-provincial governments. BATAN personnel often take on another job to supplement their salaries.12 Similarly, though extensive, the physical infrastructure of Indonesia’s nuclear programme is ageing. In addition to various research facilities, Indonesia operates the three research reactors mentioned above, a fuel-fabrication plant for research reactors, an experimental fuel-fabrication plant for nuclear power and an isotope-production facility. These are housed at four nuclear complexes under the supervision of BATAN, and are subject to IAEA safeguards. The complexes are: „„The Bandung Nuclear Complex, site of the country’s 2MWt TRIGA Mark II research reactor, as well as laboratories for radiochemistry, radiobiology and radio metallurgy.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

65

Chapter five

Following a safety review in 2005, a decision was taken to limit the reactor’s power level to 1.25MWt. Its fuel has enrichment levels of 8.5%, 12% and just under 20%. The reactor is used for research and to foster expertise, including through R&D on basic materials, radioisotopes and labelled compounds, instrumentation and radiometry-analysis techniques, and the supervision of occupational and environmental radiation safety. The complex is located next to the Bandung Institute of Technology. Since 2006, it has been known as the Nuclear Centre for Materials and Radiometry (Pusat Teknologi Nuklir Bahan dan Radimetri, or PTNBR). Its staff includes 16 reactor operators.13 „„The Yogyakarta Nuclear Complex in central Java, which houses the 100kW Kartini TRIGA Mark II research reactor, the Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology and the Polytechnic Institute of Nuclear Technology. The complex also includes a sub-critical assembly, a laboratory for pure-materials research, various accelerators, laboratories for nuclear physics and chemistry, a work safety and health facility, library facilities and laboratory facilities for education. According to the IAEA research-reactors database, it has a staff of 34, including 17 operators. „„The Serpong Nuclear Complex, site of the 30MWt G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor. The complex is located in the Centre for Science and Technology Research (Pusat Penelitian Ilmu Pengetahuan dan Teknologi, or PUSPIPTEK) near the town of Serpong, 25km south of Jakarta. The reactor is a pool-type, light-water-moderated materials-testing reactor intended to support the development of nuclear power plants. As listed in the IAEA’s database, the reactor has a staff of 202, including 25 operators. The complex also houses the reactor’s fuelfabrication plant, an experimental-powerreactor fuel-fabrication plant and a development centre for radioactive-waste processing. There are further facilities for radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, radio metallurgy, reactor safety and engi-

66

An IISS Strategic Dossier

neering, nuclear information, computer technology and the storage of spent fuel elements and contaminated materials. „„The Pasar Jumat Nuclear Complex, as it is now called, in south Jakarta, which includes the Centre for the Application of Isotope and Radiation Technology, the Centre for Radiation Safety and Metrology Technology, the Centre for the Development of Nuclear Geology, the Centre for Education and Training and the Centre for the Dissemination of Nuclear Science and Technology. Facilities in the complex include three units of cobalt-60 gamma irradiators, two electronbeam machines, a laboratory for uranium processing, radiation-measuring equipment and an education and training facility. BATAN’s nuclear-research programme has contributed to the Indonesian economy in various ways, including by improving food production. Currently one million hectares of Indonesia’s rice crop (one tenth of the total) is based on high-protein species developed in BATAN laboratories using gamma-rayradiation mutation techniques. The laboratories have also developed a sorghum plant with an improved drought tolerance, ‘lodging resistance’, maturation cycle and yield. Through the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA), BATAN’s nuclear-science techniques have also contributed to geothermal exploration. BATAN’s research complexes are supplemented by active nuclear-research links with the domestic academic community, in particular with the Bandung Institute of Technology, which was established in 1959. A number of groups within the institute’s physics department carry out work on reactor physics and reactor design in collaboration with BATAN. Nuclear-related research is performed at 31 universities across Indonesia, including the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University. However, without significant improvements in training, the ageing nuclear talent pool is generally thought to be insufficient to support a nuclear-power programme.14 Indonesia has collaborated extensively internationally in order to develop its nuclear base: bilaterally, BATAN has signed memorandums of

Indonesia

Overlapping territorial claims by Indonesia, Philippines and others

Lemanjung, Kalan – pilot-scale production of yellowcake (1981-1966)

Kalan region – dormant uranium veins

Natuna Islands – gas field

Kalimantan – suggested site of nuclear power plant

Ambalat block – oil-rich area of contending territorial claims by Indonesia and Malaysia

P H I L I P P I NES Pacific Ocean

South China Sea BR U NEI

MALAYSIA

Gorontolo province – suggested site of Russian floating 70MWe nuclear power plant

MALAY S I A SIN GAPORE

SUMATRA

K A L IM A N TA N IR IA N J A YA

I N D O N E S I A SU L A W E SI

Jakarta

Java – see separate map 0

Miles

300

0

Km

500

JAV A

BALI TIMOR LESTE

© IISS

Bojonegara – suggested site of nuclear power plant

Pulau Panjang – suggested site of nuclear power plant JAKARTA

Balong – proposed site for nuclear power plant

Pasar Jumat Nuclear Complex

JAVA

Miles

100

0

Km

160

Gresik – site of Petrokimia plant where uranium was extracted from phosphate in 1989 Mt. Muria

Serpong Nuclear Complex – site of 30MWt G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor

0

fuel cycle, with activities covering the areas of uranium exploration, fuel fabrication and power-reactor planning.

Uranium resources

Indonesia is one of the few ASEAN states to Madura Island – Yogyaharta Nuclear possess potentially suggested site of Complex – site of 100kWt nuclear power plant Kartini research reactor significant uranium © IISS deposits. However, understanding on the peaceful use of nuclear techthese resources have yet to be developed, and it is nology with 22 foreign institutions, while Indonesia unclear whether they would be sufficient to provide is also active at the regional level through the RCA fuel for a large-scale power programme. Three and the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia. uranium veins have been identified in the Kalan Indonesia has benefited greatly from close region in West Kalimantan: Lemajung, Remajacollaboration with the IAEA. Between 1958 and 2008, Hitam and Rirang-Tanah Merah. The IAEA lists the Indonesia was the world’s sixth-largest recipient of veins as dormant, and the work performed there IAEA technical assistance, receiving US$25.2m and to date has been exploratory, with no substan1.5% of the IAEA technical cooperation budget.15 tial amount of uranium yet extracted. According Since the late 1970s the IAEA has completed 128 to BATAN, areas with possible uranium deposits national technical-cooperation projects and 86 interhave also been identified in Sumatra, Irian Jaya and regional and regional projects involving Indonesia. Sulawesi. The World Energy Council has reported In mid 2009, 16 IAEA national-cooperation projects that Indonesia has 6,800 tonnes of proven uranium were active in the country. These projects have reserves, 1,700 tonnes of ‘inferred’ resources helped Indonesia develop expertise in various and an estimated 12,500 tonnes of undiscovered nuclear-science applications, such as neutron-actiresources.16 Roughly 200 tonnes of natural uranium vation analysis and other analytical techniques, are needed to fuel a 1GW light-water reactor for one and across non-sensitive portions of the nuclear year. If Indonesia went ahead with four such power Bandung Nuclear Complex – site of 2MWt TRIGA Mark II research reactor

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

67

Chapter five

plants, proven domestic uranium reserves would not be sufficient to fuel them beyond around eight years, though it is possible that additional uranium reserves would by that time have been discovered. However, Indonesia would of course also be able to purchase uranium on the international marketplace and make use of the multinational fuel-guarantee projects currently under discussion.

Fuel fabrication R&D work on fuel fabrication in Indonesia is carried out at the Serpong Nuclear Complex. The country’s fuel-fabrication programme was initiated in the late 1970s and by the mid 1990s scientists at the Bandung Nuclear Complex had developed the capability to produce fuel suitable for use in the Serpong research reactor. Fuel-fabrication services are provided by state-owned company PT BATAN Teknologi, which was set up in 1996 and which says it is now able to produce fuel for all three domestic research reactors, as well as for export.17 The firm produces certified uranium–aluminium (U3O8-Al) and uranium silicide–aluminium (U3Si2-Al) alloy fuel elements from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feed material imported from the US, and has a production capacity of 70 fuel and control elements per year. Indonesian scientists have also carried out research into the development of fuel-fabrication techniques for advanced research and power reactors. The Centre for Nuclear Fuel Technology at Serpong has initiated research programmes on the development of fuel for both high-temperature and fast-breeder research reactors. Scientists are also investigating fuel-fabrication processes for lightwater power reactors, and have set a deadline of 2016 for attaining the ability to produce such fuel assemblies. Research is also being conducted into the manufacture of fuel elements for pressurised heavy-water power reactors. According to BATAN officials, this research is a legacy of the agency’s 1970s preference for CANDU heavy-water reactors, which were seen as advantageous because their fuel could be produced indigenously with no need to import enriched uranium. BATAN officials are aware that heavy-water reactors pose proliferation concerns and that for a variety of reasons (including the greater amount of waste produced by heavywater reactors), light-water reactors, which are

68

An IISS Strategic Dossier

the industry standard worldwide, may be a better choice.18 CANDU reactors have not been ruled out, however.

Isotope production Indonesia’s well-established research-reactor programme is used for the training of nuclear engineers and for research into areas including neutron scattering, radiography and neutron-activation analysis. The reactors are also used for the production of molybdenum-99 (99Mo), iodine-131, iridium-192 and phosphorus-32 radioisotopes, which have medical and industrial applications. The production of 99Mo at the Serpong reactor has a potential proliferation risk, as this has been carried out since 1996 using highly enriched uranium oxide targets. However, with support from Argonne National Laboratory as part of the US Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme, Indonesia has begun an initiative to reduce the proliferation risk by producing 99Mo using LEU foil.19 Indonesia’s radioisotope-production capacity now exceeds that required for domestic use, and it is looking to supply other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, PT BATAN Teknologi has signed radioisotope-export cooperation agreements with Bangladesh, China, India, Japan and Malaysia.

Waste management Spent fuel from Indonesia’s research reactors is stored as part of a once-through nuclear-fuel cycle and, eventually, shipped back to the United States. Such shipments have taken place on at least two occasions. Indonesia has no known capability to reprocess spent fuel, although scientists at BATAN have investigated a number of recycling processes, including dry-process recycling, pyrochemical recycling (salt melting) and an oxidation/reduction recycling method for the fabrication of DUPIC fuel.20 In addition, several Indonesian researchers have looked into the potential recycling of plutonium from spent pressurised-water-reactor fuel and the separation of uranium.21 Radioactive waste in Indonesia is generated from the country’s three research reactors and nuclear complexes, in particular from the Serpong Nuclear Complex and its 30MWt research reactor. Smaller amounts of radioactive waste are also generated

Indonesia

Indonesia’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world (%)

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

1,245.3

1,183.4

1,149.3

1,101.7

1,043.1

-5.32

1.24

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

1,142.7

1,232.6

1,279.2

1,207.8

1,179.0

-2.38

1.37

Natural-gas production (billion cubic feet)

3,155

3,030

2,984

2,955

2,797

-5.34

2.19 (’06)

805

675

719

992

913

-7.96

0.85

Coal production (million short tons oil equivalent)

127,076.7

145,893.1

168,033.0

213,173.8

254,812.5

19.53

3.60

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

27,768.3

29,676.4

25,470.0

24,071.2

31,967.0

32.80

0.45

Hydropower (net generation, billion kWh)

9.0

9.6

10.7

9.5

8.5

-10.53

0.32 (’06)

Net geothermal, solar, wind, biomass and waste electric power generation (billion kWh)

6.0

6.32

6.27

6.33

6.40

1.11

0.02 (’06)

Natural-gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy

by hospitals and research institutes. Nuclear-waste management comes under the remit of the Radioactive Waste Management Centre at Serpong. Facilities include the Centralised Radioactive Waste Management Station, which was set up in 1989 to dispose of low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste, and the Interim Storage Facility for Spent Fuel, at which spent fuel generated from the three research reactors is stored.

Sensitive fuel-cycle technologies There is no evidence of any concerted interest in Indonesia in sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, and BATAN’s leadership has made it clear that there are no plans to touch enrichment ‘for the time being’.22 This is not to say that there has been no interest at all in such topics among Indonesian scientists. A study published in an internal BATAN journal in 1996, for example, assessed the feasibility of designing a plant to enrich uranium using the chemical-exchange method.23 The author had apparently studied this area in Japan before returning to Indonesia.24 Indonesia’s representatives insist the nation will not give up its right to develop any area of the fuel cycle. As a practical matter, however, officials

in Indonesia’s nuclear establishment know that pursuing sensitive technologies could raise suspicions among its neighbours and further afield. They also acknowledge that it would not be costeffective for Indonesia to embark on enrichment or reprocessing.25 Indonesia is thus receptive to multinational guaranteed fuel-supply initiatives. Assessing the various proposals from a cost–benefit point of view, BATAN has judged that the approach of the American Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) may be the best option, because it offers the prospect of receiving both enriched uranium fuel and technologies for dealing with spent-fuel takeback.26

Decision-making and regulation Responsibility for energy policy in Indonesia rests with the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, which also has regulatory authority over the country’s uranium mines. While the ministry has had responsibility for nuclear planning since 2004, operational nuclear matters are handled by BATAN. Major decisions on nuclear policy and other energy issues are in the hands of the president, who alone can overrule the often-competing members of his cabinet.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter five

To separate nuclear regulatory responsibilities from nuclear promotion, Act no. 10 (1997) on nuclear energy, implemented in 1998, carved off BATAN’s regulatory functions to form the Indonesian Nuclear Energy Control Board (Badan Pengawas Tenaga Nuklir, or BAPETEN), which was given responsibility for regulatory development, licensing and inspection.27 BAPETEN was also given responsibility for nuclear-safety assessments, and for making sure that waste-management activities are undertaken in accordance with the basic radiation-protection requirements outlined by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the IAEA. BAPETEN keeps its licensing and inspection tasks separate from its responsibility for nuclearsafety assessments.28 Nuclear regulators from other countries who have worked with BAPETEN find no reason to question its independence.29 The board has received extensive foreign assistance and is open to international peer review. However, BAPETEN officials have not been immune to the corruption that has been endemic in much of Indonesia’s bureaucracy. In 2008, two of the board’s senior administrators were found to have inflated the price of land on which the BAPETEN Centre for Education and Training was to be built, and were convicted of embezzlement, fraud and bribery.30 Nevertheless, their heavy sentences – of three and four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment – reflect Indonesia’s efforts under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to ensure greater probity among officials. Several other bodies have been involved over the years in studies on the place of nuclear power in the country’s energy mix. A study on national energy planning in 2001, for example, involved personnel from BATAN, the Agency of Assessment and Application of Technology, the Directorate General of Electricity and Energy Development, the Directorate General of Oil and Gas, the Environmental Impact Control Agency, the National Centre for Statistics and the State Electricity Company.31

Current plans for nuclear energy After dusting off old plans, in 2004 the Indonesian government decided to add nuclear energy to the country’s planned energy mix for the following decade. In March 2005, Indonesia announced that two 600MWe reactors were planned to be operational

70

An IISS Strategic Dossier

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono delivers his address before the Indonesia’s House of Representatives, 3 August 2009 (Getty)

by 2016.32 In January 2006, President Yudhoyono announced his Presidential Decision that renewable energy sources, among them nuclear power, would account for 5% of the nation’s electricity supply by 2025.33 Parliamentary approval in 2007 of Act No. 17, ‘National Long-Term Development Planning’, set 2015–19 as the time frame for introducing nuclear power. In 2006, the government declared that it had earmarked $8 billion for four nuclear plants on the Muria peninsula, which were planned to generate 6GWe by 2025.34 The Research and Technology Ministry plans for nuclear power to contribute 4% of national power output by 2025,35 although one energy expert has estimated that a high level of operation would raise this figure to 7%.36 In early April 2009, while campaigning for parliamentary elections that month, President Yudhoyono made a statement that appeared to back off from nuclear-energy plans altogether. Speaking in the Muria region, he said that the country would first focus on developing existing, preferably environmentally friendly, resources before nuclear energy would be considered.37 Indonesian political analysts and some government officials de-emphasised the statement, treating it as campaign rhetoric of fleeting validity. One of the president’s rivals in

Indonesia

the campaign, Vice President Jusuf Kalla, had previously strongly denounced nuclear energy in the same constituency. Yudhoyono was formally ‘on vacation’ during the election campaign, so statements he made during that period did not have an official presidential imprimatur.38 Officially valid or not, his statement, which was made in response to a question that had been vetted in advance, demonstrates the degree to which nuclear power is a highly politicised issue in Indonesia. Several weeks later, on 28 May, Minister of Research and Technology Kusmayanto Kadiman said that tenders for nuclear power plants, which had been targeted for completion by the end of 2009, had been postponed indefinitely in light of an absence of political support following the parliamentary elections. Despite the postponement, however, he said that Indonesia would continue to pursue nuclear power.39

Motives for developing nuclear power Indonesia’s ambitious nuclear-power-plant construction plans are driven by spiralling energy demands, the need to diversify the country’s energy sources and free up oil and gas resources for export, and by a desire to cut the country’s greenhousegas emissions by reducing use of coal-based power plants. The long-term goal is energy security. In its pronounced reluctance to rely on others, Indonesia also displays the resource nationalism common to many developing countries. Some critics of Indonesia’s nuclear plans charge that the interest in nuclear power is also stimulated by foreign vendors.40 The economic case has, however, its own merit, even discounting pressure from potential suppliers. Indonesia has rich energy resources, but more than 30% of the country outside Java (and even some parts of Java) is without electricity.41 In the areas that are electrified, transmission losses are greater than 13%. The electricity supply in Java, especially in the industrialised zone centred on Jakarta, is notoriously unreliable, with the region suffering sporadic power shortages and black-outs from 2005 onwards and demand growing at a rate of roughly 10% a year. In 2005, Indonesia had a powergeneration capacity of 22.5GWe, producing 127 terawatt hours (TWh) per year, translating to a percapita electricity consumption of around 480kWh per year, less than one-seventh that of Malaysia, for example.42 The Energy Ministry expects that sharply

increasing industrial production will increase annual electricity demand to 175TWh in 2013 and 450TWh in 2026.43 The four planned nuclear power plants are intended to help meet these energy needs and to stabilise supply in the Java–Bali grid, which accounts for 75% of the nation’s electricity demand. Indonesia’s energy mix is under strain. In 2006, electricity in Indonesia was generated from coal (44%), oil (29%), gas (15%), hydroelectricity (7%) and geothermal resources (5%). Indonesia is the world’s sixth-largest producer of coal and its second-largest net exporter of coal, but at the 2008 rate of production, its proven reserves are expected to last only until 2028.44 Oil reserves are also being depleted, with proven sources expected to last until 2019.45 Indonesia was a member of OPEC from 1962, but in 2008 it withdrew from membership due to declining production: it had become a net importer of oil in 2004. However, the country’s gas reserves are around four times as large as its oil reserves. As recently as 2005, Indonesia was the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas. It is now the third largest. At the current rate of production, gas reserves are expected to last until 2055, according to British Petroleum.46 In recent years, the government has not renewed several natural-gas export contracts, in order for the gas to be used domestically instead. However, gas-fuelled electricity power plants are not being built in Java because of the high transport costs of bringing the gas in from the far-off fields where it is tapped. Indonesia also has extensive hydropower and geothermal potential. It currently ranks fourth in the world for geothermal power production. In 2006, the Indonesian government launched a crash programme of power-plant projects, dubbed the ‘10,000MW power programme’. In its first phase, in order to produce 10GW of electricity by 2011, 35 new coal-fired power plants are being built, mostly by China with concessionary loans. A second phase aims to install a further 10GW of capacity using a mix of coal-fired plants (40%) and renewables (60%). Of the renewable element, 48% is to come from geothermal plants and 12% through hydroelectrical power production.47 The country’s nuclear-power plans are not included in the 10,000MW power programme, which is almost certain to fall short of its goals. In the geothermal sector, for example, only ten of the targeted 40 plants are likely to come

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online in the next ten years, a result of insufficient investor interest due to the absence of firm government pricing policies.48

Foreign-vendor interest Indonesia’s 2006 Law on Nuclear Reactors allows the private sector to apply for nuclear-power-plant licences, and it appears likely that an independent power producer will build and operate the planned power plants, purchasing them from a foreign vendor and leasing the fuel.49 In 2003, BATAN was said to be deciding between two types of reactor for the plants: a 1,000MWe pressurised water reactor from South Korea and a 700MWe pressurised heavywater reactor from Canada. Indonesia appears to favour the South Korean reactor: in July 2007, Indonesian and South Korean companies signed a preliminary agreement to jointly develop nuclear power, under which South Korea hopes to build two 1000MWe plants.50 This agreement followed a three-year feasibility study by South Korean and Indonesian specialists on the future for nuclear power in Indonesia. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute has also worked with BATAN on an economic-feasibility study for two small 100MWe ‘system-integrated modular advanced reactors’ (SMART) for power and desalination on the island of Madura (see below). Originally envisaged to start operation in 2018, this project awaits the building of a reference plant in South Korea.51 In addition, Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and France’s Areva are contenders for the Muria project. Indonesia has also been courted for nuclear cooperation by Russia, which sees the country as a prime market for its so-far untested concept of floating power plants fitted with small reactors. In August 2003, the Russian government approved a draft intergovernmental nuclear-cooperation agreement with Indonesia. It was reported that the draft envisaged cooperation in the areas of: development, design, construction and operation of research reactors and nuclear power plants, including small power plants that comprise floating nuclear power units, and R&D; high-temperature gas-cooled reactors for industrial purposes; the use of atomic energy for desalinization of sea and artesian water; hydrogen production; production

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and application of radioisotopes, facilities and accelerators for irradiation in medicine and industry; administrative and scientific personnel training and retraining; [and] state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety.52 This draft agreement was not finalised at the time. Over three years later, in connection with a summit meeting in Moscow in December 2006, the two countries signed a framework agreement on civilian nuclear-power cooperation.53 Few details were released, however, and by mid 2009, no such cooperation has taken place. In October 2006, it was reported that officials from Gorontalo province in north Sulawesi had signed a memorandum of understanding for a joint venture under which Russia’s national electricity trading company RAO UES would explore the possibility of developing a floating 70MWe nuclear power plant.54 A year later, however, BATAN Deputy Chairman Natio Lasman commented that he did not want Indonesia to be used as a testing ground for floating reactors.55 Research and Technology Minister Kusmayanto Kadiman confirmed that Indonesia had no interest in a small-scale floating reactor, and was instead concentrating on larger nuclearpower-plant projects in Java.56 Nevertheless, in late 2008 it was reported that four provincial governors on Kalimantan had initiated dialogue with Russian suppliers for the export of small pressurised water reactors as a means of overcoming local power shortages. Under Indonesian law, such reactors could not be imported before a similar reactor is operated elsewhere. The same holds true for the pebble-bed reactor concept that the South African firm PBMR (Pty) has sought to market in Indonesia.57 Some nuclear cooperation has also been undertaken with the United States. In November 2004, Indonesia and the US signed a bilateral arrangement on nuclear safeguards and security. US officials had already worked with Indonesian nuclear experts to upgrade physical security at nuclear facilities in Indonesia and to address spent-fuel-disposal issues.  The 2004 November agreement expanded the scope of nuclear-non-proliferation cooperation between the two countries. Examples include cooperation on assessing potential threats at nuclear facilities, enhancing surveillance and reducing the time required to respond to threats. The US has

Indonesia

also tried to persuade Indonesia to join GNEP, as yet unsuccessfully, though there is some interest, from BATAN at least. Iran has also offered to provide nucleartechnology assistance to Indonesia. In March 2008, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told the visiting Indonesian president that Iran was ready to help Indonesia in nuclear engineering, nanotechnology and other fields.58 For his part,

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (L) and President Susilo Yudhoyono in Jakarta, 10 May 2006 (Getty)

President Yudhoyono reportedly asserted that ‘Iran’s nuclear programme is of a peaceful nature and must not be politicised.’59 However, there was no indication that Indonesia was seriously interested in nuclear assistance from Iran, and particularly not in any of the sensitive areas of the fuel cycle. Liability issues do not appear to pose a problem for foreign vendors to Indonesia as, in accordance with international standards, Act no. 10 (1997) on nuclear energy assigns liability to the operator in the event of an accident. In mid 2009, BAPETEN was preparing the regulations to implement this law. To reinforce this standard, Indonesia will be encouraged to become a signatory to one of the international conventions on third-party liability in the nuclear-energy field. Acceding to an international liability convention would also require operators to maintain adequate insurance coverage and ensure that they are protected against unreasonable or discriminatory claims.

Cost BATAN’s estimate in 2007 that a 1,000MWe reactor would require around $1.5bn to construct60 may not reflect the full costs involved. As noted in the introduction to this dossier, estimates elsewhere range up to $6bn for a 1,000MWe power plant, particularly if nuclear-waste-disposal costs are factored in from the beginning. Unanticipated start-up costs have

delayed many other large infrastructure projects in Indonesia, few of which presented as complicated a set of financial, political and environmental risks. To illustrate the delay issue, of 91 large-scale infrastructure projects tendered for in 2005, only three had gone ahead two years later.61 In addition, foreign investors are said to be dissatisfied with the government’s failure to reduce subsidies that price electricity consumption below the cost of production.62 Even foreign suppliers such as Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which enjoy the investment backing of their governments’ export-import banks, must pay due regard to profitability.

Site selection In 2006, the government said that it planned to begin building the country’s first nuclear power plant on the Muria peninsula by 2010, bringing it online by 2016. It was originally hoped that four reactors, each costing $1.5bn, would be operational at Muria by 2019, but this was later changed to 2025.63 In mid 2008, the government indicated that the selection of Muria was not final, and that other sites were being considered, including Pulau Panjang in the province of Banten, west Java, and the seaport project town of Bojonegara, also in Banten.64 Unspecified sites in Kalimantan have also been suggested,65 although the high transmission costs and loss of power from

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underwater electrical cables stretching the 350km from Kalimantan to Java make this alternative questionable on cost-efficiency grounds.66 Proposals have also been made for a nuclear-powered desalination plant on the island of Madura off the northeastern coast of Java that would also supply electricity for the Java grid.

Grassroots opposition Civil-society groups, flourishing under Indonesia’s democratic reforms, have raised several concerns about the introduction of nuclear power to Indonesia. With support from international environmental organisations, anti-nuclear grassroots organisations have often had the upper hand in the field of public opinion in what has at times been an unequal contest with a nuclear establishment less adept at public relations.67 Some local opponents to the nuclear project have primarily political objections to the plans. For instance, some worry that embarking on nuclear power would make Indonesia dependent on foreign nuclear-fuel supplies. There is good reason to believe that this particular concern is unfounded, however, as international trade in nuclear fuel has never failed to meet the fuel needs of a power plant, and Indonesia will be able to take advantage of several mechanisms tabled to ensure the supply of nuclear fuel. Local opposition to a nuclear power plant being sited at Muria is strong. In September 2007, Islamic teachers from the local chapter of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Islamic movement, condemned the building of such a plant as haram (forbidden or sinful) under Islamic law.68 After hearing out the government’s counter-arguments, the chapter ruled that the negative elements of the project outweighed its positive aspects, citing four particular areas for concern: the question of the long-term safe disposal and storage of radioactive waste; the potential environmental consequences, including the impact of heated cooling water on local fishing grounds; the lack of clarity about future potential costs; and the problem of dependence on foreign technology and fuel.69 Several thousand local citizens demonstrated against the power-plant plans in 2007 and 2008, and the local government in the Muria region has called for the plant’s construction to be postponed. Under

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the current decentralised democratic system, local governments in Indonesia pay more attention to the demands of local voters than to the federal government. Many national members of parliament have also been lobbied and won over by anti-nuclear groups. In April 2007, local press reported that researchers from the Research and Development Centre for Marine Geology Research in the Department of Energy and Mineral Resources had found two large seismic faults and numerous smaller faults in the Muria area that had not been previously identified.70 Foreign non-governmental organisations, particularly in Australia, have raised concerns about possible nuclear fallout in the event of a nuclear disaster at the proposed site.71 They argue that Indonesia can tap more geothermal, natural-gas and other less environmentally risky energy resources as alternatives. A vocal environmental group known as WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, or the Indonesian Forum for the Environment) argues that nuclear power would be unsafe anywhere in the country because of the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire’ area of seismic volatility on which Indonesia sits, and that even a small nuclear accident at a site in Java could affect tens of millions of people on the densely populated island, and could result in radioactive waste being pumped into nearby waterways.72 Though dormant, Mount Muria is still judged capable of erupting in the expected lifetime of any plant.73 The government counters that several other countries with extensive nuclear-power programmes are similarly located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, including Japan, China and the US.

Nuclear-safety issues According to BATAN, since the opening of the first such facility in 1964, Indonesia’s three research reactors have experienced no serious accidents. BATAN also notes that the Yogyakarta research reactor suffered no safety-related damage following a 5.9-magnitude earthquake less than 30km away in May 2006.74 Any power plant in Indonesia would need to be able to withstand a 7-magnitude earthquake without safety-related damage, as such a quake is statistically likely to hit the region in the 40–60-year lifetime of a nuclear power plant. The IAEA has approved Indonesia’s first plant designs,

Indonesia

and has promised that if construction goes ahead, the agency will ensure that all safety considerations are properly addressed. In 2007–08, the IAEA provided Indonesia with a total of $1.34 million in technical assistance under eight programmes aimed at promoting the safe use of nuclear power. The claim of no serious accidents pertains only to the research reactors and not to other areas of the complexes in which they are housed. An explosion in September 2007 at a chemical laboratory building at the Serpong research centre injured six people and attracted considerable media attention, but it was outside the reactor area and involved the testing of a new biofuel that had no connection to nuclear energy.75 A September 1994 accident at the Serpong research reactor that killed one worker was similarly said to be outside the reactor containment area and, according to the government, did not result in radiation leakage. Research and Technology Minister B.J. Habibie explained to parliament after the 1994 accident that an explosion had possibly been triggered by the ignition of a methane-based gas that had seeped from packages being removed from a laboratory storage room when a worker tried to light a cigarette.76 The lack of transparency and public accountability under President Suharto’s authoritarian regime between 1966 and 1998 makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the 1994 accident. All three research reactors have experienced technical problems, most of which may be attributed either to a lack of maintenance or to inadequate operational procedures. The TRIGA Mark II reactor showed bubbling in its core after its upgrade to 2MW in 2000. While the problem was being investigated, a fuel element became jammed and there was a leak of radioactivity.77 The Kartini-P3TM reactor has experienced bubbling of the reactor liner in three areas (measuring 8–9mm in height), probably due to the corrosion of debris, a situation that has been monitored for several years and that in 2003 prompted an IAEA technical-cooperation project.78 Maintenance problems affecting the Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor have included corrosion in the cooling system and a crack in the reactor liner.79 All these problems might be said to reflect an inadequate safety culture.80 Notwithstanding serious efforts under President Yudhoyono’s administration to reduce corruption,

a less-than-sterling national record in this sphere contributes to environmentalists’ concerns about the introduction of nuclear power to Indonesia. Indonesia is ranked 126th out of the 180 countries listed in 2008’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in which the country ranked first has the lowest level of perceived corruption (Indonesia was at number 143 in 2007).81 BATAN itself acknowledges concerns about the impact of bureaucratic corruption on nuclear safety. The chief of the board’s Cooperation, Legal and Public Relations Bureau recently argued that because the first nuclear power plant would be a turnkey project, ‘which could be owned and operated by foreign entities with minor local participation’, ‘the fear of corruption, which could compromise safety, can be minimised’.82 The national energy company, PNL, is reported to skimp on maintenance of its coal-fired power plants because government funding is insufficient to cover the subsidised consumer price of electricity.83 For coal plants, less attention to maintenance simply means that they run less efficiently. With nuclear power, the safety culture must be paramount. The environmental concerns that are raised with regard to nuclear energy in states throughout the world are heightened in Indonesia’s case by the country’s seismic instability, its record on political corruption and its less-than-reassuring past form on managing large-scale projects and responding to natural disasters. As Singaporean political analyst Tan See Seng recently commented, the need to dispose of spent fuel safely: is particularly worrisome given the apparent inability of consecutive Indonesian administrations to manage intermittent environmental problems, including severe flooding in Jakarta caused by torrential monsoons and pollution caused by forest fires in Sumatra. The dangers of nuclear contamination could prove far more serious to the region than floods or haze.84

Non-proliferation and disarmament For the most part, Indonesia has sterling non-proliferation credentials, which include accession to most key non-proliferation agreements. Indonesia signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and in 1995 was a founding member of the Southeast Asian NuclearWeapon-Free Zone Treaty.

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acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1986; signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 1997, though it has not yet ratified it; ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in 1993; and ratified the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in 1993. In June 2007, BAPETEN and the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office jointly chaired a meeting of Asia-Pacific nuclear-safeguards officials that led to the formation of a regional network to increase safeguards cooperation. The Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network was formally established at a subsequent meeting in Seoul in April 2009.

Disarmament emphasis Former President of Indonesia, B.J. Habibie (Getty)

The country was a charter member of the IAEA in 1957 and signed the NPT in 1970. Although it took nine years to ratify the NPT, Indonesia then quickly concluded an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, which entered into force in 1980. To demonstrate its support for agency safeguards, Indonesia has offered its facilities as a test case for IAEA environmental sampling. In 1999, Indonesia signed and brought into force an IAEA Additional Protocol. Based on the Additional Protocol declarations, the IAEA has since 2002 been able to conclude that there is no undeclared nuclear material or activity in Indonesia (in addition to the conclusion, based on Indonesia’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, that there has been no diversion of declared material). In 2003, Indonesia became one of the first three countries with which the IAEA was able to implement an ‘integrated safeguards’ approach of combining safeguards tools in the most effective and cost-efficient way. For Indonesia, this included upgraded surveillance systems and shortnotice inspections. The approach used in the country then became one of the models for the implementation of integrated safeguards elsewhere.85 Indonesia has ratified most nuclear safety and security conventions. It signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994 and ratified it in 2002;

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Indonesia plays an active role in international non-proliferation and disarmament forums, placing its emphasis on encouraging the nuclearweapons states to take steps towards disarmament. In 1992, it created the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Working Group on Disarmament, which it has chaired ever since. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, Indonesia was a leader among the NAM states that resisted indefinite extension of the treaty on the grounds that this would lead to a permanent division between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. Indonesia instead advocated limited extension periods tied to concrete disarmament steps from the nuclear-weapons states. Then-Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ultimately contributed to the final decision of the conference to indefinitely extend the treaty, however, by linking indefinite extension to a stronger five-year review mechanism. Indonesian Ambassador to the UN Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat chaired the 2004 Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. After that review conference broke up in disarray, Indonesia joined Norway’s ‘Seven-Nation Initiative’ intended to strengthen the three pillars of the NPT.

CTBT not yet ratified Although a 2005 ministerial declaration by the Seven Nations called for early entry into force of the CTBT, Indonesia itself had not yet ratified the

Indonesia

treaty. The country signed the treaty in 1996, but in mid 2009 it remains one of the nine states that have yet to ratify among the 44 whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force. A legislative backlog following years of political instability is one reason that has been given for this. In addition, Indonesia is waiting for the US to ratify. In April 2009, Ambassador Sudjadnan told the Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference that the Indonesian government needed to take domestic politics into account, with some constituents asking why Indonesia, having made other non-proliferation commitments, was expected to take the ratification step before some nuclear-weapons states.86 Visiting Washington in June 2009, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda said if the US ratified the CTBT, Indonesia would immediately follow suit.87 In 2008, Indonesia told the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that it was now making ‘serious preparations’ for ratification. Encouragement from the Inter-Parliamentary Union has been helpful in persuading Indonesian legislators to give ratification higher priority. One indication of a positive attitude towards the treaty might be seen in Indonesia’s agreement in November 2008 to sign a Tsunami Warning Arrangement with the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Making use of the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System, the arrangement will help the Indonesian government to issue tsunami warnings earlier than before. The Preparatory Commission maintains four auxiliary seismic-monitoring stations in Indonesia and has two more under construction.

Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda voiced concern that if Indonesia joined the initiative, the US could conduct interdictions in its waters, and complained that the initiative had not been put together through a multilateral process, but simply represented a group of nations with a common desire to conduct certain initiatives.88 Indonesia is also mindful that the PSI is largely focused on stopping assistance to nuclear and missile programmes in North Korea and Iran, countries with which Indonesia feels NAM solidarity. In March 2008, Indonesia was the only member of the Security Council not to vote in favour of Resolution 1803, which, inter alia, increased vigilance over Iranian financial institutions and provided for inspection of cargoes travelling to and from Iran. Explaining its abstention, Indonesia said it was not convinced that more sanctions would help resolve the problem regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, and also that Iran was already cooperating with the IAEA. The decision was driven by Indonesia’s domestic political dynamics, which had been influenced by aggressive Iranian diplomacy targeting the country’s politicians and civic leaders. Indonesia’s vote the previous year in support of Resolution 1747 tightening sanctions on Iran had nearly caused a constitutional crisis at home, with legislators criticising the government for aligning itself with the US and Israel against a fellow Muslim country. In September 2008, Indonesia nevertheless voted in favour of Resolution 1835, which reaffirmed earlier resolutions regarding Iran but did not impose any additional sanctions.

Strategic trade controls Independent position on counter-proliferation Indonesia’s support for the global non-proliferation regime does not fully extend to ad hoc measures that are not under UN auspices or that are led by the US and its Western allies. Proud of its position as the world’s fourth most populous country and its largest Muslim state, as well as of its status as the birthplace of the NAM, and mindful of its colonial history, Indonesia is not easily susceptible to pressure from the Western nations to undertake additional non-proliferation obligations, and is wary of being seen as imposing them on others. The country is critical, for instance, of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2006, then-

In 2004 and 2005, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Indonesia filed reports to the 1540 Committee on its export-control-related regulations.89 According to these reports, import and export controls in Indonesia are conducted through: „„Pre-service controls, which identify at-risk shipments through risk-management techniques such as information-gathering and analysis of the supplier, means of transportation and country of origin; „„Controls during the service process, undertaken through the examination of random samples or using ‘intelligence notes’ created

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from the analysis of customs documents; and „„Post-service controls, which include postaudits of both importer and exporter. However, like several other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has been lagging on adopting best practices in strategic trade controls.90 As a NAM leader, Indonesia has long been sceptical about the export-control regimes of the developed countries, which are often seen as operating like a cartel. The two areas in which Indonesia’s export-control regulations are relatively better developed are in relation to small arms and light weapons, and nuclear dual-use items. In both these areas, licensing procedure, control lists and requirements for end-use/end-user certifications exist, although the latter do not cover related technologies. Another deficiency is that none of the existing export-control laws regulate re-exports or transhipments. Given Indonesia’s relatively advanced industry and extensive maritime borders, the country could be vulnerable to being used as a base for proliferation by non-state actors, in a similar manner to that in which the A.Q. Khan network made use of neighbouring Malaysia to manufacture centrifuge parts for Libya’s nuclearweapons programme. There are no examples in the open literature, however, of any such blackmarket operations in Indonesia.

Risk assessment and geopolitical context Assessing the proliferation risk Indonesia gives no hint of any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons and there are few factors that might drive it in such a direction, short of an unlikely decision on the part of a neighbour such as Australia or Singapore to seek nuclear weapons. The country has sometimes been said to be of potential proliferation concern because of Sukarno’s past dalliance and the latent potential for use for weapons purposes that some see in its nuclearresearch activities.91 However, it has done nothing in the past several decades to deserve special proliferation scrutiny. Nevertheless, though Indonesia’s governments have strongly adhered to non-proliferation policies for more than 40 years, the long-term time frame of nuclear power makes it reasonable to try to assess the possibility of a radical regime coming to power

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and being in a position to misuse the country’s nuclear technology. Being well safeguarded, the country’s three research reactors present little proliferation risk. The biggest, the 30MWt G.A. Siwabessy reactor, is larger (in terms of having a greater thermal output) than the 25MWt reactor that produced the plutonium for North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programme. However, since the Siwabessy reactor is a modern research reactor with a relatively small core of 75kg of 19.90% LEU, its annual plutonium-production potential is much lower than its power level might suggest, and certainly much lower than the 8kg that the IAEA defines as a ‘significant quantity’ for safeguards purposes.92 While a study produced by the IAEA in 1994 indicated that if the Siwabessy reactor were used to irradiate uranium targets to maximise plutonium production, up to 3.6kg of plutonium a year might be achievable, this would involve abnormal operation and would be readily detectable. Plutonium production in normal operation would be much lower.93 Any diversion of fuel would also be detected by IAEA safeguards. In a (theoretical) NPT break-out scenario, Indonesia would not be able to import LEU for fuel to run the reactor for plutonium production, and it would not be able to reprocess the spent fuel it currently holds because it has no reprocessing capability; in any case, the uranium silicide spent fuel from the reactor is difficult to reprocess. A nuclear power plant would produce far more plutonium than the existing reactors, but it would not be well-suited to weapons purposes, and reprocessing technology would still be needed for there to be any proliferation risk. In the ‘what if’ scenario of Indonesia reverting to Sukarno-type radicalism or becoming a failed state on the edge of break-up, the absence of the full fuel cycle would be a barrier to nuclear-weapons development.

Assessing the risk of national disintegration After President Suharto’s 1998 resignation, Indonesia went through a five-year period of extreme political instability. At the beginning of the new century, there was considerable international speculation about whether the country might disintegrate as a result of political conflict at the centre, separatism at the periphery, and widespread ethnic and religious conflict stimulated by economic hardship and

Indonesia

facilitated by the loosening of Jakarta’s previously tight control. Home-grown terrorism with external connections also became particularly worrisome. In 1993, two Indonesian clerics exiled to Malaysia founded an indigenous Southeast Asian terrorist organisation, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), with the aim of creating a Muslim caliphate uniting Southeast Asia. They established a network of religious schools in Indonesia to promote their ideology, and from 2000 to 2005 JI was responsible for a series of terrorist attacks, among them the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings and the bombings of the Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2003 and 2004 respectively. JI developed links to al-Qaeda through its head of operations, Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali), who operated alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. However, speculation about national disintegration has proved to be unfounded. Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono defeated Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2004 in Indonesia’s first direct presidential election, the country’s economy has steadily improved, major separatist threats have been quelled, security problems have been isolated and the government has apprehended most of the hard core of JI members who had links with al-Qaeda. The 17 July 2009 bombings of the Marriott and RitzCarlton hotels in Jakarta, which killed nine and injured 50, showed that militant activity continues, but extremist Islamic groups have largely lost their popular support base.

Assessing the nuclear-terrorism risk Questions have been raised about the possibility that nuclear power plants in Indonesia could, through attack from outside or corruption from within, become sources of nuclear material for terrorist groups seeking to construct radiological dispersal devices.94 This concern is not particular to Indonesia, but it is perhaps heightened there by the confluence of the existence of an indigenous terrorist group, an imperfect general safety culture and a history of institutional corruption. Most Indonesian security experts believe that JI, whose attacks have been concentrated on soft targets frequented by foreigners, would not attack domestic facilities, particularly not ones such as nuclear power plants with relatively tight security. However, threat assessments based on the patterns

Bomb blast site in Bali, by Jemaah Islamiyah, 12 October 2002 (Getty)

of the past decade employ too short-sighted a time horizon, given the 40–60-year operational life of a nuclear power plant and the long half-life of the fission products in the spent-fuel by-products of reactor operation. Furthermore, new patterns of terrorism are likely to be seen over time. In addition, although the JI threat has been sharply reduced, radicalism continues to maintain a foothold, as indicated by the emergence in 2008 of a new radical group, the Jemaah Ansorut Tauhid, and the attacks of July 2009.95 Nuclear facilities must be designed and operated with all potential terrorist risks in mind. That said, the greatest terrorist risk relating to nuclear materials in Indonesia, as in most other countries, is that ‘dirty bombs’ might be constructed using one or more of the tens of thousands of radio­ active sources used in medical, agricultural and industrial applications throughout the archipelago. BATAN and BAPETEN have worked closely with the US and Australia to strengthen controls, both regulatory and physical, over radioactive sources that could be used in dirty bombs.

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Little national power projection With a generally peaceable foreign policy and an under-resourced military, Indonesia has not presented a military threat to any of its neighbours in the years since its invasion of East Timor in 1975. At times, reports of Indonesian interest in advanced missiles have raised questions about the country’s strategic objectives, but there has been little reason for lasting concern. In the early 1990s, there were unconfirmed reports of Indonesian interest in Russian short-range Scud missiles.96 Under a 2005 strategic partnership with China, Indonesia was to receive technological assistance to develop an indigenous land- and ship-based missile system with a range of up to 150km.97 Little has been reported since about the missile-development plan. More recently, Indonesia is reported to have shown interest in 290km-range Brahmos cruise missiles jointly developed by Russia and India.98 Nothing is known to have come of these various indications of missile interest. None of the missile systems reported to have been of interest would exceed the limit established by the Missile Technology Control Regime of a 300kg throw-weight, 500km-range system.

Few proliferation drivers Despite having briefly considered acquiring nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, Indonesia today has no obvious proliferation drivers. There are no evident external security concerns that would give the country reason to consider initiating a nuclearweapons programme. In the security field, Australia is an important point of reference for Jakarta. There has been considerable testiness in Indonesian–Australian relations over the past few decades. In the past, the relationship between the two countries has been marked on the Indonesia side by resentment over Australia’s support for Timor Leste’s independence from 1999 and also its asylum policies regarding ‘boat people’ passing through Indonesian waters, and concern about Australia’s acquisition of advanced weapons, such as the 2006 order for 370-km-range JASSM airto-surface missiles for its combat aircraft. In 2006, a new Australia–Indonesia Framework for Security Cooperation was drawn up to replace a predecessor agreement that Indonesia had abandoned in 1999 in response to Australia’s leading role in the UN intervention in Timor Leste. Known as the Lombok

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An IISS Strategic Dossier

Treaty, the agreement places bilateral relations on a new footing with an affirmation of equal partnership, and promotes cooperation on issues such as counter-terrorism, defence and maritime security, emergency preparedness and transnational crime. The agreement explicitly calls for ‘strengthening bilateral nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes’, giving rise to Indonesian expectations that Australia will sell it uranium in the future.99 Indonesia’s relations with its regional neighbours in ASEAN are generally positive, and Jakarta has played a central role in formulating some of ASEAN’s key declarations on international matters, in which Indonesia’s broadly non-aligned posture has been evident. Relations with Singapore have improved since Yudhoyono’s election in 2004. Only Indonesia’s relations with its closest neighbour, Malaysia, have recently been difficult: since 2004 (most recently in May 2009), both countries have sporadically deployed warships in support of their contending territorial claims in the oil-rich ‘Ambalat block’ off Borneo in the Sulawesi Sea. These deployments have sometimes assumed the character of a limited naval stand-off. Further afield, Indonesia’s relations with the nuclear-armed United States, China and India are all on an even keel, giving Indonesia no cause for security concern. The George W. Bush administration was keen to restore links with the Indonesian security forces as part of its effort to win Indonesia’s cooperation in the ‘war on terrorism’ from 2001. Indonesia’s democratic progress and improved human-rights record has in the meantime made for an easier friendship, especially under US President Barack Obama, whose childhood experience of living in Jakarta and Indonesian stepfather enhance his popularity in Indonesia. Soon after Obama’s election, Yudhoyono proposed a comprehensive partnership framework with the US, akin to the one signed with Australia in 2006. Indonesia’s relations with China have undergone a major transformation since the days when Suharto viewed the People’s Republic as a long-term strategic threat. Indonesian leaders now view China primarily in terms of economic opportunities. In April 2005, Beijing and Jakarta signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement, which emphasised economic and political cooperation, as well as providing for various forms of security cooperation and highlighting the

Indonesia

extent to which Sino-Indonesian relations have warmed. While China still lays claim to areas of the South China Sea that Indonesia considers to be its territory, Indonesia looks increasingly to China for investment in its energy infrastructure. Relations with India are cemented by that country’s status as one of ASEAN’s four dialogue partners, by India’s ‘Look East’ policy which recognises the economic and strategic importance of Southeast Asia, and by an impending India–ASEAN free-trade agreement.

Conclusions Should Indonesia proceed with its ambitious nuclear-energy plans, it will start from a position of technical strength, with five decades of experience in the nuclear sciences, an extensive nuclear infrastructure supported by research institutes and university programmes, and a cadre of trained, albeit ageing, personnel. Although the relative costs of energy alternatives bear further study, Indonesia can make a prima facie case for introducing nuclear power to its energy mix, and the proposed programme has received significant international interest. However, by mid 2009 no final decisions had been made, and arrangements appeared to be on hold. The strong ‘not in my backyard’ stance of local communities in what is now a decentralised, democratic country, and real concerns over inadequate attention to safety and security, have put Indonesia’s nuclearenergy plans in some doubt. If a site other than the

Muria peninsula were selected for the first power plant, the need for feasibility and environmentalimpact studies would postpone the target date by at least several years. Even in the national energy plan, nuclear power is considered the last option. In the current climate, the president is unlikely to risk a major political battle over the issue if there are still other options available at lower economic, environmental and political costs. If Indonesia does commit to nuclear power, it will undoubtedly be mindful of the need to instil a strong and enduring safety culture, with full attention to seismic risks and potential terrorist threats. Indonesia’s citizens will demand no less. Given Jakarta’s non-proliferation leadership, the dangers of non-peaceful use are much less of a cause for concern here than they are in some other nuclearaspirant countries. As outlined in the policy options of this dossier, there are additional steps Indonesia could take to burnish its non-proliferation credentials. Confirming a sovereign decision not to embark on uneconomical and unnecessary sensitive areas of the fuel cycle is one such step. A unilateral nonproliferation step of this nature is not likely to be taken, however, unless Indonesia sees real benefit to its national interests. At a minimum, Jakarta is likely to want equal attention given to the nuclear disarmament agenda on which it places most emphasis. Minimising nuclear dangers in this key ASEAN nation may require other countries, particularly those with nuclear arms, to take the lead.

Notes 1

A detailed examination of Indonesia’s brief consideration

Forum, http://www.fnca.mext.go.jp/english/rwm/news_

of nuclear-weapons proliferation is given in Robert M.

img/rwm_no17_2006.pdf.

Cornejo, ‘When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian

6

Poneman, ‘Indonesia’, pp. 192–3.

Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s’, Nonproliferation

7

A. Baiquni and Budi Sudarsono, ‘First Steps Toward a

Review, vol 7, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 31–43.

Nuclear Power Program: The Indonesian Experience

2

Ibid., pp. 36–7.

and Prospects’, American Nuclear Society Proceedings:

3

Daniel B. Poneman, ‘Indonesia’, Chapter 10 in James

The First Pacific Basin Conference on Nuclear Power

Everett Katy and Onkar S. Marwalt (eds), Nuclear Energy

Development and the Fuel Cycle, Honolulu, 11–14

in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Decision-Making

October 1976, published by the American Nuclear Society,

(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 186.

no date, p. 49. Cited in Poneman, p. 193.

4

Ibid.

8

Poneman, pp. 193–5.

5

Djarot S. Wisnubroto, ‘Task Group Meeting in

9

Suhartono Zahir, ‘Indonesia’s Activities to Improve

Indonesia―Nuclear Facility Decomissioning and its Waste

Safeguards and Nuclear Security’, presentation to the

Clearance’, Radioactive Waste Management Newsletter, no.

JAEA Forum on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Peaceful

17, November 2006, issued by Japan Atomic Industrial

Uses of Nuclear Energy in the Asia-Pacific Region, Tokyo,

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

81

Chapter five

24 June 2008, http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/activity/2008-06

Reactors, Prague, 23–27 September 2007, http://www.rertr.

-24/2008-06-24-2-2.pdf. 10

11

BATAN, ‘BATAN profile’, http://www.BATAN.go.id/

anl.gov/RERTR29/PDF/6-1_Briyatmoko.pdf. 20

Centre for Nuclear Fuel Technology, ‘Program Schedule

en2008/profil.php.

for the Mastery of Post Irradiation and Recycling

Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, ‘Historical

Technology’, http://www.BATAN.go.id/ptbn/html/Files/

Background’, http://www.eaea.org.eg/history.html.

Program_Daur_Ulang_en.pdf. DUPIC is an acronym for

12

Communication with regional expert, May 2009.

‘direct use of spent PWR (pressurised water reactor) fuel

13

The IAEA research-reactors database, which relies on data provided by member states, lists a total of 330 staff for the

14

in CANDU reactors’. 21

of Moderator Density Change on Plutonium Recycling

unusually high, may include staff for the entire Bandung

in PWR’, in ‘Prosiding Seminar Nasional Sains dan

nuclear complex, not just the reactor. ‘TRIGA Mark II,

Teknik Nuklir P3TkN – BATAN Bandung’, proceedings

Bandung’, in IAEA, ‘Nuclear Research Reactors in the

of conference at BATAN, 14–15 June 2005, http://www.

World’, accessible via http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/

BATAN-bdg.go.id//upload/images/AbdulWaris428433.

rrdb/.

pdf; Anastasia Niniek Bintartie, Bambang Edi Haryanto

Interviews, Jakarta, April 2009. See also BATAN,

Basuki and J. Djati Pramana, ‘Uranium Separation From

‘International and National Cooperation’, http://www.

Ru Using TBP Solvent by Membrane Emulsion Method’,

BATAN.go.id/en2008/coorporate.php; M.S. Ardisasmita,

in ‘Prosiding Presentasi Ilmiah Daur Bahan Bakar Nuklir

‘Preservation and Enhancement of Nuclear Knowledge

III’, proceedings of conference at BATAN, Jakarta, 4–5

Toward Indonesia’s Plan to Operate First Nuclear

November 1997, http://digilib.batan.go.id/sipulitbang/cari.

Power Plant by 2016’, paper presented to International Conference on Nuclear Knowledge Management, Saclay,

php?cari=pemisahan&pilih=0&page=0&limit=10. 22

France, 7–10 September 2004, http://www.iaea.org/km/ cnkm/abstracts/ardisasmitaindonesia.pdf. 15

16

17

Interview with Western government official, Jakarta, April 2009.

23

Ir. Fathurrachman, ‘Design of Uranium Isotope Separation

IAEA, ‘Technical Cooperation Report for 2008’, GC(53)/

Plant by Chemical Exchange’, in ‘BATAN Prosiding

INF/4/SUPPLEMENT, July 2009, p. 35, http://www.iaea.

Seminar Teknologi Pengelolaan Limbah II’, proceedings of

org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53InfDocuments/English/

conference in Jakarta, 19–20 November 1996, http://digilib.

gc53inf-4-att1_en.pdf

batan.go.id/sipulitbang/cari.php?cari=plant&pilih=0&pag

World Energy Council, ‘2007 Survey of Energy Resources’,

e=90&limit=10.

p. 223, http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/uranium_

24

Interview with nuclear expert, Jakarta, April 2009.

country_notes.pdf. These numbers appear to be based on

25

See, for example, A. Djaloeis, BAPETEN,

sources from the 1970s and 1980s, which have not been

‘Non-Proliferation and Future Nuclear Energy Programs

subsequently re-examined.

in Asia; Case in Point: Indonesia’, presentation to the

‘PT BATAN Technologi Exports to Asia-Pacific’, Antara

Annual Conference of the Sandia National Laboratories,

news agency, July 2007 (in Indonesian); Ratih Langenati,

‘Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime:

Widjaksana, Bambang Herutomo, ‘Sustaining Nuclear

Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle’, Chantilly,

Fuel Science and Technology Base’, IAEA-CN-153/4/P/19,

Virginia, 4–6 April 2005, p. 10, http://www.intlsecconf.

2007, p. 2, http://iaea.org/inisnkm/nkm/documents/

sandia.gov/djaloeis_05isc.pdf.

nkmCon2007/fulltext/FP/IAEA-CN-153-4-P-19fp.pdf; Iyos

26

Interviews, Indonesia, April 2009.

Subki and Zaki Su’ud, ‘Nuclear Energy Development

27

Zurias Ilyas and Ai Melani, ‘The Licensing for

Program in Indonesia’, presentation to the 16th Pacific

Decommissioning of Research Reactors in Indonesia’,

Basin Nuclear Conference, Aomori, Japan, 17 October

BAPETEN, http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/

2008, p. 17, http://www.pbnc2008.org/documents/

projects/r2d2/workshop3/national-presentations/indo-

Publish/16PBNC_Plenary_2-3_(7).pdf. 18

Interviews, Jakarta and Canberra, April 2009.

19

Budi Briyatmoko, Boybul et al., ‘Indonesia’s Current

nesia-licensing-for-decomm-of-rr.pdf. 28

Suhartono Zahir, ‘Indonesia’s Activities to Improve Safeguards and Nuclear Security’.

Status for Conversion of Mo-99 Production to LEU

29

Interviews, April 2009.

Fission’, paper presented to the 2007 International

30

‘Dua Pejabat Bapeten Divonis Bersalah’ [Two BAPETEN

Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test

82

For example, Abdul Waris dan Rizal Kurniadi, ‘Influence

Bandung TRIGA Mark II reactor. This number, which is

An IISS Strategic Dossier

officials convicted], Tempo Interaktif, 22 February 2008.

Indonesia

31

Partial translation available at http://www.globalcollab.

45

Ibid., ‘Oil Proved Reserves’, p. 6.

org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/aust-ind-nuclear/ind-np/

46

Ibid., ‘Natural Gas Proved Reserves’, p. 22.

muria/corruption-bapeten.

47

Indonesian Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources,

Mo Bissani and Sean Tyson, ‘Sister Lab Program

‘Geothermal Energy Dominates 10,000MW Power Project’,

Prospective Partner Nuclear Profile: Indonesia’, Lawrence

press release, 20 February 2009, http://www.indonesia.

Livermore National Laboratory, 12 January 2007, https://e-

go.id/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=

reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341922.pdf. 32

33

7797&Itemid=687.

‘Indonesia Revives Nuclear Power Plan’, Sydney Morning

48

Interview with industry expert, Jakarta, April 2009.

Herald, 23 March 2005.

49

Symon, ‘Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia’, p. 5.

‘Gas, Coal May Become Main Energy Resources in

50

‘Indonesia, South Korea Sign Preliminary Deal to Develop

Indonesia’, Indonesia: News and Views (bi-weekly bulletin

Nuclear Power Plant’, Associated Press, 25 July 2007; Ryu

of the Information and Socio-Cultural Affairs dept of the

Jin, ‘KEPCO Eyes Nuclear Power Plant in Indonesia’, Korea Times, 24 July 2007.

Indonesian embassy, Helsinki), issue I/03, 6 March 2006, p. 5, http://www.acehrecoveryforum.org/library/down34

35

(INDAG) to the IAEA, INDAG Newsletter, no. 5,

Tom McCawley, ‘Indonesia Looks to a Nuclear Future’,

September 2005, Annex, p. 8, http://www-pub.iaea.org/

Asia Times Online, 15 May 2007, http://www.atimes.com/

MTCD/publications/PDF/Newsletters/INDAG-NL-5.pdf;

atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE15Ae01.html.

World Nuclear Association, ‘Emerging Nuclear Energy

‘ASEAN OKs, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam to Build

Countries’. 52

‘Russia to Build Nuclear Power Plants in Indonesia’,

Andrew Symon, ‘Nuclear Power in Southeast Asia:

Bellona Foundation, 25 September 2003, http://www.

Implications for Australia and Non-Proliferation’, Lowy

bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke_industry/co-oper-

Institute Analysis, April 2008, p. 5, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=786. 37

International Nuclear Desalination Advisory Group

load.php?file=Indonesia%20News%20and%20Views.pdf.

Nuclear Power Plants’, Antara, 27 August 2008. 36

51

ation/31260.html. 53

Tom Allard, ‘Yudhoyono Backs Down on Nuclear Power

‘Russia, Indonesia Sign Deal on Nuclear Power Cooperation’, RIA Novosti, 1 December 2006, http://

Plans’, Sydney Morning Herald, 6 April 2009.

en.rian.ru/russia/20061201/56330342.html.

38

Interviews with political scientists, Jakarta, April 2009.

39

Yuli Tri Suwarni, ‘Future of Nuclear Power in Limbo’,

Nuclear Power Plant in Sulawesi’, Mining Top News,

Jakarta Post, 28 May 2009.

16 October 2006, http://www.miningtopnews.com/

See, for example, Geoffrey Gunn, ‘Southeast Asia’s

russia-indonesia-studying-deal-on-floating-nuclear-

40

54

Looming Nuclear Power Industry’, Japan Focus, 11 February 2008, http://www.japanfocus.org/-Geoffrey-

power-plant-in-sulawesi.html. 55

56

Play’, Austral Policy Forum 09-1A, 19 January 2009, http:// www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/apsnet/policy-

4, 30 October 2008. 58

59

Penkajian Energi Universitas Indonesia, ‘Indonesia Energy

Anna Fifield, ‘For Oil-Rich Iran, Friends are Not Proving Hard to Find’, Financial Times, 27 May 2008.

share.net/electricitygovernance/indonesia-324370/. 42

’Islamic World Can Become a Global Power: Leader’, Tehran Times, 12 March 2008.

of Energy and Mineral Resources presentation given in Singapore, 17–18 March 2008, slide 6, http://www.slide-

Mark Hibbs, ‘Indonesian Nuclear Plans Drifting without Central Government Support’, Nucleonics Week, vol. 49, no.

Maritje Hutapea, ‘Generating Dialogue, Clean Energy, Good Governance and Regulation’, Indonesian Ministry

‘Indonesia Not Interested in Floating Nuclear Power Plant’, Bernama news agency, 6 September 2007.

57

forum/2009/muria-nuclear-power/. 41

Tom Wright, ‘Russian Floats Plan for Nuclear Plant Aboard a Boat’, Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2007.

Gunn/2659; and Richard Tanter and Arabella Imhoff, ‘The Muria Peninsula Nuclear Power Proposal: State of

‘Russia, Indonesia Studying Deal on Floating

60

Outlook and Statistics 2006’, pp. 51, 64; World Nuclear

‘Indonesia to Build Nuclear Power Plant by 2016’, Antara, 22 February 2007.

Association, ‘Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries’, June

61

McCawley, ‘Indonesia Looks to a Nuclear Future’.

2009, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf102.html.

62

Tanter and Imhoff, ‘The Muria Peninsula Nuclear Power

43

McCawley, ‘Indonesia Looks to a Nuclear Future’.

44

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Coal Proved Reserves at End 2008’, p. 32.

Proposal’. 63

‘PLTN Muria Slated to Operate in 2016’, Antara, 3 January 2007; McCawley, ‘Indonesia Looks to a Nuclear Future’.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

83

Chapter five

64

‘Reframing Australia–Indonesia Security; Indonesian

77

‘Review Mission on the Safety Analysis Report of the

Nuclear Power Proposals: Muria: Contemporary

Bandung Research Reactor Bandung, 5–9 March’, Asian

Alternative Site Proposals’, Nautilus Institute, project

Nuclear Safety Network Newsletter, no. 43, 1 April 2007,

coordinator Richard Tanter, updated 7 May 2009, http://

http://www-ansn.iaea.org/Documents/ANSNNewsletter/

www.globalcollab.org/Nautilus/australia/reframing/aust-

ANSNewsletter_043.pdf; Communication with regional

ind-nuclear/ind-np/muria/contemporary-alternatives.

expert, May 2009.

65

Ibid.

66

According to a recent study, the costs would range

Reactor Tank Liners’, INS/9/022, 2003–2009, in ‘IAEA-TC

from 700,000 €/km to 900,000 €/km. See Iñigo Martínez

Projects by Country: Indonesia’, accessible from http://

de Alegría, Jose Luis Martín, Iñigo Kortabarria, Jon

www-tc.iaea.org/tcweb/tcprogramme/projectsbycountry/

78

Andreu and Pedro Ibañez Ereño, ‘Transmission

67

68

default.asp.

Alternatives for Offshore Electrical Power’, Renewable

79

Communication with regional expert, May 2009.

and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 13, no. 5, June 2009,

80

According to one regional expert who spoke to the IISS

pp. 1,027–38.

in May 2009, Indonesia has avoided thoroughly inves-

During interviews in Jakarta in April 2009, two leading

tigating the underlying causes of some of the accidents

Indonesian political analysts emphasised what they

that have taken place for fear that doing so might uncover

characterised as BATAN’s inept public-relations efforts.

more serious problems that could require plant shutdown

‘Muslim Clerics Say Indonesia’s Nuclear Plans “Sinful”’, Channel News Asia.com, 5 September 2007, http://

and loss of employment. 81

www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/

70

research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008.

Tanter and Imhoff, ‘The Muria Peninsula Nuclear Power

82

Aziz, ‘Is Nuclear Energy Safe Enough for Indonesia?’.

Proposal’.

83

Interviews with energy expert and foreign embassy offi-

‘Pembangunan PLTN, Aman atau Membahayakan: Peringatan Dini dari Patahan Muria’ [Development of

cial, Jakarta, April 2009. 84

Suara Merdeka, 18 April 2007, http://www.suaramerdeka. com/harian/0704/18/nas21.htm.

CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 461–2. 85

Nuclear-Powered Electricity Generating Plant’, Tempo

VERTIC, 2003), pp. 29–44. 86

nasional/2007/10/01/brk,20071001-108737,uk.html. 72

McCawley, ‘Indonesia Looks to a Nuclear Future’.

73

Alexander R. McBirney et al, ‘Volcanic and Seismic

dowment.org/files/npc_beyond20105.pdf. 87

N. Hassan Wirajuda, ‘The United States–Indonesia

Hazards at a Proposed Nuclear Power Site in Central

Comprehensive Partnership’, speech to Carnegie

Java’, Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, vol.

Endowment for International Peace and USINDO, 8 June

126, nos. 1–2, 2003, pp. 11–30. The authors assessed ‘prob-

2009, p. 6, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/FM_

x 10-4 to 4 x 10-5 during the next 100 years’. 74

Aziz, ‘Is Nuclear Energy Safe Enough for Indonesia?’.

75

‘Six Injured in Laboratory Blast’, Jakarta Post, 11 September

Wirajuda%20Prepared%20Remarks.pdf. 88

‘Indonesia Rejects US Request for Proliferation Security Initiative’, Xinhua General News Service, 13 March 2006.

89

‘Indonesian National Report on the Implementation of

2007.

Security Council Resolution 1540’, 28 October 2004; UN

‘One Dead in Indonesian Test Reactor Explosion’, World

Security Council, ‘Letter dated 22 November 2005 from

Information Service on Energy (WISE), 16 September 1994,

the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent

http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.

Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the

antenna.nl/wise/418/4145.html; ‘In Brief: Indonesia has Ruled out Sabotage’, WISE, 7 October 1994, http://www10.

84

2009 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, ‘Beyond 2010’, 7 April 2009, p. 13, http://www.carnegieen-

abilities of major eruptive episodes impacting the site of 5

76

Jill N. Cooley, ‘Integrated Nuclear Safeguards: Genesis and Evolution’, Verification Yearbook 2003 (London:

‘Australia Supports Indonesia’s Construction of Interaktif, 1 October 2007, http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/

Tan See Seng, ‘ASEAN: The Road Not Taken’, Chapter 16 of Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow (Stanford,

Nuclear Power Plants: Early Warning of Muria Fault],

71

Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2008’, http://www.transparency.org/policy_

view/297675/1/.html. 69

IAEA, ‘Inspection Procedures and Methods for Assessing

Chairman of the Committee’, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/45/Add. I. 90

Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Facilitating Implementation of

antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www10.antenna.nl/

Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific’,

wise/419/brief.html.

Chapter 3 of Lawrence Scheinman (ed.), Implementing

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Indonesia

Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations (Geneva:

91

93

Large Research Reactors’, IAEA, Safeguards Technical

unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-article.php?ref_article=2745.

Report Series no. 300, June 1994. Not publicly avail-

In the mid 2000s, the Stockholm International Peace

able.

Research Institute (SIPRI) and First Watch International

94

SIPRI, ‘Indonesia Country Profile’, July 2004.

included Indonesia – along with Australia – among

95

V. Ariati, ‘Legacy of the Bali Trio: A Changing Threat

13 countries that they considered to have the poten-

Pattern from the Jemaah Islamiyah’, RSIS Commentary, no.

tial to be of ‘nuclear strategic concern’. As the SIPRI

119, 14 November 2008, http://hdl.handle.net/10220/4535;

website explains it, ‘These countries have components

‘Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palembang Group”,

of a nuclear fuel cycle and therefore play an impor-

International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing no. 92, 20

tant role in the context of nuclear non-proliferation,

May 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.

while having the technological potential for developing nuclear weapons.’ See ‘Countries and Issues of Nuclear

cfm?id=6110&l=1. 96

Strategic Concern’, SIPRI website, http://www.sipri. org/research/disarmament/nuclear/researchissues/

‘Chinese Missile Aid for Indonesia: How Strategic a Partnership?’ IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 11, no. 6, August 2005.

default/?searchterm=”First%20watch%20international”. Under the IAEA definition, a ‘significant quantity’ is the

‘Indonesia Considers “Scuds”’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 18, no. 10, 5 September 1992, p. 10.

97

past_projects/issues_of_concern/issues_of_concern_ 92

V. Bragin et al., ‘Unreported Plutonium Production at

United Nations, September 2008), p. 51, http://www.

98

‘Indonesia and Malaysia Keen on Buying Brahmos’,

quantity from which production of a nuclear explosive

Frontier India Strategic and Defence, 14 April 2007; ‘Russia’s

cannot be excluded, allowing for processing losses. It

Missile Sale to Indonesia Upsets DRDO’, Indian Express, 20

is judged that 8kg would be needed to end up with the 5–6kg core required for a first-generation nuclear explosive device.

July 2006. 99

Malley and Ogilvie-White, ‘Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia’, p. 29.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

85

Chapter five

86

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter SIX

Malaysia

As a founding member of ASEAN, a signatory to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty and a vocal member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in IAEA councils, Malaysia has been an active advocate of non-proliferation and disarmament. The country’s increasing interest in nuclear energy, which is still at a formative stage, gives no grounds for concern about nuclear-weapons aspirations. Yet Malaysia’s record on nuclear matters is clouded by revelations that in 2002–03, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network used a front company in Malaysia to manufacture a number of components for centrifuge equipment that was then shipped to Libya in support of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gadhafi’s nuclear-weapons programme. The unravelling of the Khan network in 2004 exposed weaknesses in the Malaysian export-control mechanism that need to be corrected whether or not Malaysia follows through on its initial indications of interest in pursuing nuclear energy.

Nuclear infrastructure Malaysia has a small nuclear infrastructure, centred on a 1MWt research reactor, the TRIGA PUSPATI reactor in Bangi, about 30km south of Kuala Lumpur. The reactor went critical on 28 June 1982 and is operated by the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia). It is a standard TRIGA Mark II reactor manufactured by US company General Atomics, and is designed to operate at a steady-state power of 1MWt and a pulsing power of 1.2MWt. The reactor, which is normally operated for up to six hours a day, is used for training, research and the production of radioisotopes. It utilises a number of experimental facilities, including units for neutron radiography, small-angle neutron scattering and activation analysis. It produces both short- and longer-lived radioisotopes for industrial (iridium-

192), agricultural (iodine-131) and medical purposes (samarium-153). The reactor uses 20% enriched uranium–zirconium–hydride fuel supplied by General Atomics. Currently, Malaysia has a relatively small number of scientists and engineers trained to work in the nuclear industry. In 2007 the agency employed 322 professional and managerial staff. However, steps are being taken to increase this number, through in-house training and by sending scientists abroad to study. A small amount of nuclear-related work is carried out within the university sector. In particular, scientists at the National University of Malaysia are involved in research on nuclear physics and its applications and run a programme on nuclear science. Since the mid 1970s, Malaysia has carried out more than 100 national projects with the IAEA as part of the agency’s Technical Cooperation Programme. By mid 2009, 88 had been completed and 15 were still active. These projects have enabled Malaysia to develop expertise in nuclear-science applications including the production and use of radioisotopes and nuclear imaging for medical purposes. Malaysia has also been highly active in regional nuclear cooperation, participating in 158 inter-regional and regional technical-cooperation projects, of which 69 were still active in mid 2009 and 89 completed. Most of these were carried out under the auspices of

Malaysia-specific abbreviations AELB

Atomic Energy Licensing Board

MINT

Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (now called Nuclear Malaysia)

MOSTI

Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation

SCOPE

Scomi Precision Engineering

TNB

Tenaga Nasional Berhad (state utility provider)

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

87

Chapter six

Putrajaya – Administrative capital

Rompin – prospective site of nuclearmonitoring laboratory

Overlapping territorial claims by Indonesia, Philippines and others S o u t h

C h i n a

0

Miles

100

0

Km

160

S e a SABAH B R U NEI

Peninsular Malaysia St

ra it of

M

al

Port Klang ca

ac

IND O NES IA

MAL AYSI A Kuala Lumpur

SARAWAK Tanjung Pelepas

Ports participating in US Container Security Initiative

Although Malaysia does possess some uraniumyielding monazite, it has no known uranium reserves. Exploration carried out from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s did not reveal significant uranium deposits,1 and it would appear from open sources that no significant exploration has been undertaken since.

Management structure and regulatory framework Any decision about whether Malaysia should embark on a nuclear-energy programme would be the responsibility of the cabinet. As long as the Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition (which has been in power since independence) retains a comfortable parliamentary majority, legislative approval could be taken for granted. Responsibility for nuclear infrastructure and development is shared among several government agencies. The Ministry

An IISS Strategic Dossier

C e le b e s Se a I ND O NES I A

SINGAPORE

Bangi – headquarters of Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia), and site of 1MWt TRIGA PUSPATI research reactor

the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA), whose Internet homepage is hosted by Nuclear Malaysia. Malaysia produces a small amount of low-level nuclear waste each year, mostly from the research laboratories associated with its research reactor. The waste is managed at Nuclear Malaysia’s Radioactive Waste Management Centre, whose facilities include a low-level aqueous waste treatment plant, a lowlevel effluent treatment plant and a solid waste processing area (for the collection, segregation and storage of waste). The centre also has a pre-treatment storage facility, an interim long-term storage facility and a long-term storage facility that can accommodate 80,000 litres of waste.

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Bakun Dam – 2,400MW hydroelecticity project, expected to come online around 2012 © IISS

of Energy, Green Technology and Water, established in 2004 and reorganised under its current name in an April 2009 cabinet realignment, is responsible for energy-policy formulation and is also the energyservice regulator.2 The task of introducing and promoting the application of nuclear science and technology for national development is the responsibility of Nuclear Malaysia, which was known as the Centre for Application of Nuclear Energy when it was established in 1972. While its purpose has changed little since its creation, the agency has undergone several name changes and been placed under the control of several different government departments in its lifetime. Soon after its creation, it was renamed the Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre. In 1983, it was renamed the Nuclear Energy Unit (UTN) and placed under the direction of the Prime Minister’s Department. In 1990, the UTN was transferred to what is now known as the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI, then simply MOST). The agency became the Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) in 1994. Twelve years later, MINT was restructured and its name changed to the current one, Nuclear Malaysia. The agency remains under the direction of MOSTI. Any country undertaking a nuclear-power programme should have a legally independent nuclear regulatory framework. This is not the case in Malaysia at present. An Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) was created in 1985 under the Prime Minister’s Department and given responsibility for implementing the 1984 Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304), which provides for the ‘regulation

Malaysia

Malaysia’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

841.7

861.8

752.8

730.3

703.9

-3.61

0.83

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

479.9

508.0

521.8

520.0

547.0

5.19

0.64

Natural-gas production (billion cubic feet)

2,625

2,600

2,680

2,479

NA

-7.5 (‘06/’05)

2.29 (‘06)

968

879

914

940

855

-9.04

0.80

Coal production (thousand short tons)

168.7

379.2

884.1

1,164.0

1,119.9

-3.79

0.02

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

8,408.4

11,774.9

14,030.2

16,867.6

18,459.3

9.44

0.26

5.7

5.8

5.7

5.9

6.2

5.08

0.20 (’06)

Natural-gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy

and control of atomic energy… and any matters connected therewith’, including the construction and operation of nuclear installations.3 In 1990, the AELB was transferred to the control of MOST. The board’s main function is to supervise the production and application of atomic energy and related activities. As of July 2009, the AELB was still in the process of reviewing Act 304 in order to ensure that it conformed to international standards.4 In other work to upgrade the country’s regulatory infrastructure, the board in August 2008 adopted the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The AELB is also working with the US and Australia to strengthen controls, both regulatory and physical, over radioactive sources. For the AELB to be seen as a truly independent regulatory body, however, it should not be under the direction of a governmental body, particularly not a ministry that also contains a powerful organisation charged with the promotion of nuclear power. State utility provider Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) is the largest electricity producer in Malaysia. With a total installed generation capacity of around 11,200MW in peninsular Malaysia, the company is responsible for supplying the energy for 55% of the country’s industrial capacity through six thermal stations and 15 hydropower plants in peninsular Malaysia. In addition, the TNB manages and operates the national grid. The organisation advocates the use of nuclear energy in Malaysia.

Current nuclear-energy interest Energy motivations Before the late 2000s, there was no significant interest, either public or official, in exploring nuclear-power options in Malaysia. This lack of interest was no doubt due in part to the country’s significant reserves of oil and natural gas and its stable electricity situation. Malaysia is almost entirely electrified and transmission losses are minimal. Electricity is generated primarily from gas (64%). The rest comes from coal (25%), hydropower (8%) and oil (3%). In 2007, Malaysia had 75 trillion cubic feet of proven natural-gas reserves, second only to Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Domestic gas consumption in 2007 was 1,162bn cubic feet and exports, principally in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), were 1,116bn cubic feet,5 making Malaysia one of the world’s leading exporters of LNG. British Petroleum figures estimate that the country’s natural-gas reserves will last until 2047.6 While more gas reserves have been confirmed in recent years, the nation’s oil reserves have decreased, down to 3bn barrels in 2007 from a peak of 4.6bn in 1996. Malaysia expects to become a net oil importer by 2011, and its oil reserves are expected to last only until 2029.7 The country’s limited and declining coal reserves are used primarily for power production. Imports of coal for use in power generation are rising as the government has imposed a cap on domestic use of gas in order to conserve the commodity for

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export earnings. In peninsular Malaysia, new hydropower development is limited to small projects. However, in Sarawak state on Borneo, a large hydro project, the Bakun Dam, which will generate about 2,400 MW, is expected to come online around 2012, with the bulk of the power generated to be transmitted to peninsular Malaysia using the world’s longest under-sea cables.8 The dwindling of the country’s oil reserves, coupled with rising domestic energy consumption, has prompted Malaysia to begin seriously to consider embarking on a civilian nuclear power programme in order to diversify its energy supply. In 2006, the National Energy Policy stated its expectation that the country would not opt for nuclear power generation ‘in the foreseeable future’.9 But nuclear advocates were raising their voices. In August 2006, the chairman of the AELB was quoted as saying that Malaysia was planning to use nuclear power to generate electricity after 2020.10

Official interest Moves towards starting a nuclear-energy programme were accelerated in August 2008, when ‘exploration of nuclear energy’ was newly included in the national budget proposal for 2009 tabled in parliament. A comprehensive energypolicy study including consideration of nuclear power is to be completed by the Malaysian government before 2010.11 The state’s interest in nuclear power was officially confirmed in September 2008, when Energy, Water and Communications Minister Shaziman Mansor remarked that, given the fact that Malaysia’s fossil-fuel resources would eventually run out and that there was a long lead time for nuclear power, ‘We have no choice but to start the ball rolling.’ According to Shaziman, Malaysia intends to be using nuclear energy to generate electricity by 2023.12 An outline plan by the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation and the Minister of Energy, Green Technology and Water on Malaysia’s future use of nuclear energy was submitted to the cabinet at the end of June 2009.13 According to MOSTI, a decision on nuclear power was taken, but the policy announcement was being held until a later date.14 In October 2008, Shaziman said that the ‘next step’ would be to establish when Malaysia’s first nuclear power plant would be built. ‘It could

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be ten or fifteen years’, he added.15 Discussion of where any plant would be built was deferred. However, according to a senior Nuclear Malaysia official, the small size of the power grids in Sabah and Sarawak mean that, in practice, nuclear-powerplant construction will be limited to peninsular Malaysia.16 If the government decides to introduce nuclear power, it could come under sharp questioning from the opposition, which has not yet adopted a public stance on nuclear energy, but which has taken the government to task over alleged political corruption in relation to several large development projects. The high investment cost of nuclear power plants would be a natural focus for the opposition’s criticism, which is likely to be grounded in political considerations rather than in any intrinsic opposition to nuclear power. Keen to prevent such opposition from taking root in public opinion as it has in neighbouring Indonesia, the government emphasises the importance of increasing public awareness of the benefits of nuclear power. Although Malaysia’s nuclear-energy plans are still at a formative stage, foreign interest in any future programme has already been expressed, including by firms in France and Romania. However, South Korea appears to be the most likely partner. In March 2008, the TNB signed a preliminary agreement with its South Korean counterpart Korean Electric Power (KEPCO) to cooperate in the sale of KEPCO’s nuclear-power technologies in the region and beyond. In May 2009, TNB announced that it would embark on a pre-feasibility study with KEPCO. The tie-up with KEPCO was further strengthened during Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s June 2009 visit to Seoul, during which he was personally briefed by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak on the benefits of operating a South Korean-style small-scale nuclear power plant.17 Separately, both Japan and the US in 2008 attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Malaysia to join the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). In making the pitch, a US Department of Energy official said that the US recognised Malaysia as a regional leader in the development of nuclear energy and other advanced alternative-energy sources.18 No country has expressed any concern about Malaysia pursuing nuclear power, other than to quietly suggest that it put in place all the neces-

Malaysia

Key nuclear safety and security agreements to which Malaysia is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded to

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

2 Oct 1987

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

2 Oct 1987

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

16 Sept 2005 (signed)

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Malaysia is not party Instrument IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention on Nuclear Safety Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

sary regulatory and legal infrastructure to ensure safety. In July 2007, Malaysia decided to establish a national nuclear-monitoring laboratory at a cost of RM100 million (then $26m) in order to carry out environmental-sample analyses for safeguards purposes. Malaysia hopes that the laboratory, to be constructed at Rompin in Pahang state, will eventually be accepted into the IAEA’s network of safeguards analytical laboratories. At ASEAN’s November 2007 summit, Malaysia suggested that the facility, which would be the first of its kind in the region, could serve as a regional monitoring station to help ensure that the region is free of nuclear weapons. The laboratory was intended to be operational by 2010, but in mid 2009 the suitability of the identified site was still being assessed and the budget was still to be approved.

Nuclear safety and security In the absence of any national plans for nuclear power to date, questions about nuclear safety have not yet come to the fore. As and when they do, concerns about the possible effects of seismic activity will not be as pertinent for Malaysia as they are for some of the country’s neighbours. Although Malaysia is surrounded by a seismic ‘ring of fire’, the Malaysian peninsula itself is located within the stable Sunda tectonic plate and enjoys low seismicity. If Malaysia decides to introduce nuclear power, it will need to adopt the international conventions on nuclear safety recommended by the IAEA mile-

stone guidelines. It has already adopted two of these: in 1987, it acceded to the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. It has not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, or the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In 2003, the cabinet decided to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In mid 2009, an inter-agency governmental committee was still reviewing and updating the legal process for criminalising the relevant activities. The government says it will ratify the convention once these domestic mechanisms are in place.19 In December 2005, Malaysia signed the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, but in mid 2009 was still reviewing the legal processes required for ratification. Malaysia will be in a position to adopt the other two conventions once the AELB has completed a review of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304). According to the government, this review is being undertaken in order to give Malaysia a more comprehensive legal infrastructure that takes into consideration international nuclear legal instruments.20

Non-proliferation and disarmament Malaysia is a signatory to all major international non-proliferation treaties and has been an active opponent of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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Malaysia’s membership of non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date ratified or acceded to

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

6 Sept 1991

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

1 July 1968

Outer Space Treaty

20 Feb 1967 (signed)

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

11 Oct 1996

Chemical Weapons Convention

20 May 2000

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

17 Jan 2008

Additional Protocol

The country signed the NPT on 1 July 1968 and has been an active member of the IAEA since it joined in 1969, serving on its Board of Governors on several occasions. Malaysia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered into force on 29 February 1972. In December 1995, Malaysia signed the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. It ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on 17 January 2008, becoming the sixth ASEAN country to do so. In international forums, Malaysia has argued against making the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol compulsory for all NPT parties,21 but it has decided to adopt the measure itself. It signed the Additional Protocol in November 2005, and in mid 2009 was still working to put in place the necessary domestic nuclear-related laws and regulations in connection with the ongoing review of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984. In July 2009, a draft of the amended act was in the final stage of AELB review in discussion with the Attorney General’s Office. It is due to be tabled in parliament once this is completed. According to the government, the AELB is also reviewing manufacturing activity in Malaysia in order to identify industries or person(s) who may be involved in activities listed in Annex I of the Additional Protocol or with materials or components listed in Annex II, in order to ensure that proper reporting can be made to the IAEA as required under the Protocol.22 Although its ASEAN membership has become the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy, the country’s NAM membership has also exerted a considerable influence on its foreign-policy outlook. As chair of the NAM from 2003 to 2006, Malaysia gave priority to revitalising the movement, and focused on coordinating NAM positions in international forums, including by setting up a chapter in

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29 Feb 1972

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Signed 22 Nov 2005; not yet ratified

Vienna.23 During its chairmanship, Malaysian officials visited Iran, at Tehran’s invitation, to confer on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. In its capacity as chair of the NAM, Malaysia emphasised the ‘basic and inalienable rights’ of all states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and declared that the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved by peaceful means only.24 Its approach to this issue has sometimes resulted in difficulties with the US and other Western countries. Malaysia’s NAM chairmanship has not prevented it from cooperating with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1874 to counter proliferation by North Korea. In July 2009, Malaysian officials collaborated with US officials who were concerned that Malaysian banks could be used to channel payments for weapons transactions to North Korea. The US complimented Malaysia on the advanced nature of its financial intelligence unit and its bank oversight capabilities.25

Strategic trade controls Contribution to Khan black-market network Malaysia’s small nuclear-research infrastructure has never given any cause for suspicion about nuclearweapons intentions. The country’s inadequate export controls did, however, facilitate a contribution to nuclear proliferation elsewhere. In 2004, it was revealed that the nuclear-black-market network led by Pakistani engineer A.Q. Khan had used a company in Malaysia to manufacture and ship tens of thousands of aluminium centrifuge components for Libya’s nuclear-weapons programme. The Malaysian involvement in the proliferation network began in 2001, after Khan and his associates landed a lucrative deal to supply Iran with a uranium enrichment programme and began looking

Malaysia

Some of the machined products manufactured by Scomi Precision Engineering are displayed at the factory in Kuala Lumpur, 6 February 2004 (Getty)

around the world for sources for the various components that would be needed. In addition to using manufacturers in Switzerland, Germany, South Africa, Turkey and other countries, the network established a plant in Malaysia to produce 14 of the almost 100 components needed for a first-generation G1 centrifuge based on the 1970s designs that had been obtained by Khan.26 The components included B.S.A. Tahir (courtesy Royal Malaysian Police)

casings, end-caps and baffles. Malaysia was chosen because it was outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group, whose 45 members are committed to applying strict export controls, and because Khan’s chief lieutenant, Buhary Syed Ali (B.S.A.) Tahir, had a Malaysian connection. Tahir is a Sri Lankan citizen who was based in Dubai, but his wife, Nazimah Syed Majid, is Malaysian, from a prominent family through which Tahir had cultivated influential relationships.27 Tahir owned an expensive building in a Kuala Lumpur suburb and operated several businesses there. When the network had trouble finding centrifuge components elsewhere, he told Khan he could find a company in Malaysia capable of producing them.28 Tahir was connected to Scomi Group Berhad, an oil and gas conglomerate whose investors included Tahir’s wife and Kamaluddin Abdullah, the son of then-Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. Tahir himself was a director of an investment vehicle called Kaspadu that owned Scomi.29 In December 2001, under the Scomi firm’s umbrella, Tahir helped set up a subsidiary called Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE), which he contracted to produce centrifuge components based on Pakistani

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Urs Tinner. ©SF (Scene from the documentary “Der Spion, der aus dem Rheintal kam” by Hansjürg Zumstein, 2009)

designs in a 30-person factory at an industrial plant 25km north of Kuala Lumpur.30 To ensure quality control at the plant, in April 2002 Tahir hired as a consultant Swiss engineer Urs Tinner, son of longtime Khan associate Friedrich Tinner. Tahir also arranged for Libyan technicians to visit the plant and receive training on its machines.31 Under a two-year $3.5m contract, SCOPE sent the 14 types of component to Dubai in four shipments between December 2002 and August 2003. Five containers from the last shipments that were transhipped onto a German-registered ship bound for Libya, the BBC China, were intercepted in Italy in October 2003 in a joint operation by the German, Italian, UK and US governments. Urs Tinner later acknowledged that he had been cooperating with the CIA (since 2000, according to reports) and had tipped the agency off about the shipments.32 Tinner left Malaysia in October 2003, apparently soon after the BBC China was interdicted, taking his computer hard drive and personal files with him. According to Malaysian police, he gave the impression that he ‘wanted to ensure that the technical drawings did not fall into the hands of the SCOPE factory staff’.33 Following his arrest later in 2003, the Swiss authorities placed Tinner under ‘investigative detention’, from which he was released on 22 December 2008. Before his arrest, Tinner reportedly made electronic copies of a nuclear-weapons design and sent them to other members of the network, including Tahir in Malaysia.34 There is no open-source information on what became of that design. There is no evidence of any Malaysian government complicity in the Khan network operation, and

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the two key operatives – Tahir and Urs Tinner – are not Malaysian citizens. Malaysian police concluded that Scomi officials had not known that the components were destined for a nuclear-weapons programme in Libya.35 The workers involved said they had thought they were making tubes for the petrochemical and water-treatment industries. Examining photographs of the components, the AELB, which is responsible for implementing IAEA safeguards, stated that it was difficult to confirm that the parts were intended for centrifuge use and that they ‘could easily be fitted into many industrial or home components’.36 According to the US government, not all of the Malaysian participants in the venture were guiltless. On 12 January 2009, the US Department of State and Department of the Treasury announced the imposition of sanctions on 13 individuals and three private companies for their involvement in the Khan nuclear-proliferation network. Two of the 13 individuals were Malaysian: Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain, president, managing director and major shareholder of the Scomi Group, and Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, general manager of SCOPE. The State Department announcement provided no new information about the role of these individuals, other than that they were involved in the Khan network, which had ‘provid[ed] “one stop shopping” for countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons’.37 The announcement added that Malaysia was among the governments that had cooperated closely with the US to investigate and shut down the network.38 When presented with intelligence information by the UK and US in November 2003, the Malaysian police questioned Tahir about his role in assisting Libya’s nuclear-weapons programme. He quickly confessed, in detail sufficient to enable the Malaysian government to compile an 11-page dossier on the police investigation of the Khan network’s activities, which it posted on the Internet in February 2004.39 It was not until late May 2004, however, that the Malaysian authorities took Tahir into custody, which they did using the Internal Security Act, which allows for indefinite detention without charge or observation of habeas corpus. The government said that it could find no other way of jailing him, while opposition leaders claimed that the Internal Security Act had been used instead of

Malaysia

ordinary criminal laws so that the case would not come to court and risk the revelation of details that could incriminate or embarrass Kamaluddin Abdullah.40 Malaysia allowed the IAEA to question Tahir in May 2005.41 Later that year, the agency obtained further information from him,42 although it is not clear if it had been allowed to question him directly for a second time. In May 2008, Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Syed Hamid Albar told parliament that Tahir remained a threat to Malaysia’s national security because of his involvement in the Khan network. A month later, however, he was formally released under conditions that required him to remain in the country and report to the police weekly. According to Western officials, Tahir is still dangerous, because he knows the Khan supplier network down to the level of marginal participants who may have escaped the attention of law-enforcement authorities and might still be available for hire.43

Other trafficking cases Other cases of proliferators attempting to exploit Malaysia’s lax export controls involve North Korean and Iranian companies. In 2008, a US federal grand jury indicted Malaysian company Vast Solutions together with 15 other foreign nationals and companies alleged to have together broken US law by acting as a trading network providing Iran with sensitive technologies, such as those used in roadside improvised explosive devices in Iraq. Vast Solutions, run by Iranian national Majid Seif, was alleged to have acted as a hub within this network, buying goods in the US and lying in export documents about the final destination of these goods. The indictment mentions 13 similar cases of illicit trade through Malaysia, both attempted and successful. This particular operation, initially led through United Arab Emirates (UAE) company Mayrow in Dubai, with which Vast Solutions had regular contact before 2007, is alleged to have shifted to Malaysia when the Dubai company came under close US scrutiny from 2005. The UAE finally shut Mayrow down in March 2007. From February 2007, Vast Solutions is alleged to have traded for the Iranian company Toos Electronics, sometimes directly and sometimes using front companies, but always stating false end users.44

In late June 2009, Japanese police arrested two Japanese and one North Korean man on charges of weapons-technology proliferation. At the behest of a Hong Kong company with links to the North Korean military, the men had been trying to export a magnetometer to Myanmar. This device, which is used to measure the strength of magnetic fields, has civilian uses, but cannot be exported with a licence because it is also used in the manufacture of ballistic missiles. When the initial attempt to export the item failed, the men had tried to send it through Malaysia, still without a licence, but it was stopped by Japanese customs.45 This is the kind of transhipment case that Malaysian law is not equipped to handle.

Current strategic-trade-control structure Despite the evident exploitation by illicit traffickers of the gaps in its regulatory framework, Malaysia has still not put in place adequate laws and regulations governing trade in nuclear-related goods and technologies. The country’s Atomic Energy Licensing Act requires the AELB to issue permits for import and domestic use, but only for the purpose of protecting the public against hazardous trade, not to control proliferation. Among its deficiencies, Malaysia lacks ‘catch-all’ controls on nuclear and dual-use items, as well as controls on items transhipped through Malaysian ports. Penalties exist under the country’s trade-control laws, but neither Malaysia’s 2004 report to the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee46 nor other sources suggest that any such penalties have been imposed on any company or individual, including those involved in the Khan network. Malaysia has indicated that it is aware of its shortcomings on export control,47 and it has accepted assistance from the US, UK, Japan and Australia to build capacity in this area. Under the US Container Security Initiative, Malaysian and US customs officials have worked together at the Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas ports since 2004 to inspect US-bound cargo for WMD. In other ways, however, Malaysia has been resistant to foreign pressure to put in place strategic trade controls. One European critic of Western diplomacy in this area believes that Malaysia would have moved more quickly to adopt legislation if the issue had been approached with more cultural sensitivity and if there had been greater engagement with local partners.48

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In 2006, Malaysia announced that it had set up a working group on export controls, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to review existing laws and regulations and to promulgate a new comprehensive law on export control. Key questions to be addressed included what organisation should be the implementing agency, how it should operate, and how to overcome the lack of relevant expertise, particularly in the identification of dual-use items. Within the working group, an AELB-led subcommittee was established to tackle technical issues. The AELB also has taken the lead on dual-use items, dealing with questions of verification, destination and usage. As of July 2009, the working group has finalised a first draft of a ‘Strategic Goods Bill’, which has been submitted to the Attorney General’s Office for review.49 The government had also begun to organise seminars and workshops for companies that make dual-use items (such as the Chemical Association of Malaysia), and to provide advice to them on how to comply with export controls.

Geopolitical context Malaysia does not appear to have any proliferation drivers. It faces no immediate external threats. Although it has territorial disputes with several of its neighbours, none of these are likely to lead to large-scale conflict or to cause levels of insecurity that would lead Malaysia to seek a nuclear deterrent. The country has generally equable relations with nuclear powers further afield: China, the United States, India and Pakistan. Its legacy participation in the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)50 with the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore provides a further layer of protection against any potential proliferation motivations. Malaysian foreign policy in Southeast Asia is focused on promoting beneficial neighbourly relations, both bilaterally and through ASEAN. The country is particularly attached to the principle of non-interference and, notwithstanding its continuing engagement in the FPDA and low-key security relations with the US, it has been particularly sensitive to any hint of Western interference in regional security matters. For this reason, Malaysia does not participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), though in 2007 Malaysian officials attended the PSI-related interdiction and inspection training Pacific Shield 07 as observers. Malaysia’s position is

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that while it supports the principles of the PSI and, on an informal basis, implements interdictions and inspections largely in accordance with the PSI, it continues to question the initiative’s legitimacy and therefore has no immediate plans to join the official list of participants.51 Malaysia is an active member of ASEAN and was a strong advocate of the expansion of the institution to include Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the 1990s. When Malaysia last assumed the chair of ASEAN in 2005, it was quick to advance its ideas for regional security initiatives, which included persuading member nations to sign a new non-aggression pact and initiating regular meetings of ASEAN defence ministers.52 Notwithstanding this posture, Malaysia has been conscious of its neighbours’ military modernisation programmes, and since the 1990s has pursued a military procurement programme apparently aimed particularly at narrowing the capability gap between itself and small but well-armed Singapore. It is also seeking to secure its maritime interests in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.53 Malaysian officials insist, however, that the country’s defence plans are not targeted at its neighbours or indeed directed against any particular adversary. During the present decade, Malaysia’s ties with China have strengthened across the board. At the heart of the relationship lies economics, with two-way trade expanding by 15% in 2008 to $53.5bn, with Malaysian exports outpacing imports by $10.7bn.54 Partly as a result of these intensifying bilateral economic relations, Malaysia has become increasingly deferential towards China’s political sensitivities. Most notably, Malaysia adheres closely to a ‘One China’ policy and has banned its ministers from visiting Taiwan.55 In the past, Malaysia has had security concerns over China’s regional role, deriving mainly from Beijing’s sponsorship of the Communist Party of Malaya, which mounted a politico-military struggle successively against the British colonial authorities and then against the governments of independent Malaya and, from 1965, Malaysia. Today, the Malaysian authorities no longer view China as a serious security threat, and have not expressed concern over the country’s military modernisation programme. Though Malaysia lays claim to some of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which are claimed in their entirety by Beijing, there has been tentative bilateral cooperation

Malaysia

US President George W. Bush and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad sign a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism in May 2002 (Getty)

on security and defence. In September 2005, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation, whereby they would engage in activities such as military training, the exchange of personnel and regular dialogue. Malaysia and the United States enjoy a generally positive and fruitful relationship, particularly in the area of trade. The US is Malaysia’s largest trading partner. Additionally, Malaysia is perceived by the US to be an effective regional partner on counterterrorism. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism in May 2002, and Malaysia hosts the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Malaysia’s military ties with the US are far more extensive than those with China. In 1994, Malaysia and the US concluded a Cross Servicing and Acquisitions Agreement, which allowed US Navy ships and aircraft to undergo maintenance and resupply in Malaysia. The agreement remained secret until 2005, when the Abdullah government renewed it for another ten years. Military cooperation between the two countries also includes annual joint exercises involving the Malaysian and US navies, and US military personnel undertaking jungle-warfare training in Malaysia.

In terms of domestic security, there is little prospect of internal instability that could produce proliferation concerns in relation to Malaysia. The country did see considerable political unrest during the so-called ‘Emergency’, the communist insurgency between 1948 and 1960. By the time of Malayan independence in 1957, the insurgency was essentially defeated, though low-level conflict resumed in the early 1970s and lasted until 1989, when the last armed communist remnants surrendered. Although the Malaysian authorities have since 2002 used the country’s Internal Security Act to arrest and detain alleged members of violent Islamist groups such as the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia and the panregional Jemaah Islamiah, the country has not experienced the sorts of terrorist attacks seen in Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Malaysia has no regional separatist movements. Racial tensions between the politically dominant Malay community and minority Chinese and South Asian ethnic groups have in the past erupted in violence. Malaysia’s significant economic growth and the multiracial nature of the government have been significantly mitigated these tensions, and there have no significant outbreaks of violence

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since the major disturbances of 13 May 1969, in which several hundred people were killed. While there is substantial popular discontent with the performance of the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition government, and significantly expanded support for the opposition (which includes the Islamist Parti se-Islam Malaysia, known as PAS) was evident in the March 2008 general election results, in mid 2009 it seemed unlikely that the resultant political uncertainty would result in violent clashes on a large scale.

Conclusions Although still at an early stage, Malaysia’s intention to develop a nuclear-energy programme appears to be strong, driven by concerns about fossil-fuel limitations and a perceived need for new energy sources. Whether Malaysia also feels a need to keep up with ASEAN neighbours who are further advanced in their nuclear-power plans is unclear. As of the time this dossier was being prepared, the country’s government was believed to have made a decision on nuclear power, while withholding an announcement. Other key decisions, on issues such as types of reactor, location and whether to rely

on external sources of reactor fuel, are still years away. Malaysia has shown no indication of any interest in uranium enrichment or any other sensitive nuclear technology, but neither have its plans for nuclear energy progressed to the point where discussion of such things might become necessary. Whether Malaysia will choose to join one or more of the multilateral fuel-assurance schemes available could reveal something of its attitude towards these matters. It appears that, at present, there would be no rationale for Malaysia to begin a weapons programme, and it is difficult to foresee any arising in the near to medium term. If Malaysia does decide to embark on a nuclear-power programme, it should first put in place the necessary regulatory and legal infrastructure in conformity with the IAEA milestone recommendations, and adopt all the international non-proliferation, safety and security instruments. Regardless of what it decides about nuclear technology for itself, Malaysia should introduce modern strategic trade controls so that its industrial sector will no longer be exploited to support nuclear proliferation elsewhere.

Notes 1

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, ‘Uranium 2001:

10

Resources, Production and Demand’, 2002, p. 214. 2

3

Electricity’, Bernama (Malaysian national news agency), 9

See Ministry of Energy, Water and Communications website, ‘About the Ministry’, http://www.ktak.gov.my/

August 2006. 11

US Department of State, International Security Advisory

template01.asp?contentid=9.

Board, ‘Report on Proliferation Implications of the

Laws of Malaysia, Act 304, Atomic Energy Licensing Act

Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power’, 7 April 2008,

1984, Reprint 2006, http://www.agc.gov.my/agc/Akta/

Appendix C, page 3, http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/rpt_ ISAB_GlobalExpansionofCivilNuclearPower_Apr2008.pdf.

Vol.%207/Act%20304.pdf. 4

Communication with MOSTI, July 2009.

5

US Energy Information Administration, International

6

‘M’sia Requires Two Nuclear Reactors to Generate

12

Sarban Singh, ‘Malaysia to Use Nuclear Energy by 2023’, The Star, 20 September 2008.

Energy Statistics, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdb-

13

Communication with MOSTI, July 2009.

project/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=26&aid=4.

14

Ibid.

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’,

15

Singh, ‘Malaysia to Use Nuclear Energy by 2023’.

‘Natural Gas Proved Reserves’, p. 22.

16

Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, Malaysian Nuclear Energy,

7

Ibid., ‘Oil Proved Reserves’, p. 6.

‘Nuclear Power Prospects and Power Plant Envelope for

8

Shahriman Johari, ‘TNB to Boost Hydro Power’, Business

Malaysia’, presentation to IAEA Workshop on Elaboration

Times, 23 May 2009.

of Common User Considerations for Development and

Nuclear Malaysia, ‘Nuclear Energy Option and Energy

Deployment of Nuclear Power Plants in Developing

Planning in Malaysia’, 27 September 2006, http://www.

Countries, Vienna, 22–25 September 2008, https://www.

nuclearmalaysia.gov.my/MY/index2.php?option=com_

iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/INPRO/Files/2008-

content&do_pdf=1&id=100.

CUC-Workshop/PP5(Malaysia_Ibrahim).pdf, slide 34.

9

98

An IISS Strategic Dossier

Malaysia

17

18

‘Malaysia Keen To Develop Small-scale Nuclear Reactor :

information on programme at http://www-internet.sf.tv/

Najib’, Bernama, 2 June 2009, http://www.bernama.com.

sf1/dok/index.php?docid=20090122-2000-SF1. For a good

my/bernama/v5/newsindex.php?id=415373.

account of Tinner’s CIA connection and the interdiction of

Zaidi Isham Ismail, ‘US Official Says Malaysia Ready for

the BBC China, see Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist,

Nuclear Energy’, New Straits Times, 4 August 2008, http:// www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/arti-

pp. 248–50, 272–73, 308–10. 33

Royal Malaysian Police (Polis Diraja Malaysia), ‘Press

cleid/2473384.

Release by Inspector-General of Police in Relation to

19

Communication with MOSTI, July 2009.

Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components

20

Ibid.

for Libya’s Uranium Enrichment Programme’, 20

21

Most recently, at the NPT Review Conference 3rd

February 2004, paragraph 21, available at http://www.

Preparatory Committee held in May 2009, Malaysia

iranwatch.org/government/Malaysia/malaysia-police-

implicitly indicated its resistance to such a move when

libyareport-022004.htm.

it joined Iran in arguing that any multilateral fuel-cycle

34

Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p. 348.

arrangements should not introduce any additional

35

Royal Malaysian Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector-

non-proliferation obligations. See ‘Third Preparatory

General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the

Committee for the 2010 Review Conference: Monday,

Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium

11 May: Fuel Supply Assurance, Nuclear Energy, and

Enrichment Programme’, para. 32.3.

Withdrawal from the Treaty’, 11 May 2009, available at

36

Ibid., para. 30.

Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation, http://

37

US Department of State, ‘Designation of A.Q. Khan and

npsglobal.org/eng/index.php/prepcom-2009.

Associates for Nuclear Proliferation Activities’, Media

22

Communication with MOSTI, July 2009.

Note, 12 January 2009, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/115913.

23

‘Statement by the Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 14th

24

htm.

NAM Summit in Havana’, 15 September 2006, http://

38

Ibid.

www.kln.gov.my/?m_id=25&vid=353.

39

Royal Malaysian Police, ‘Press Release by Inspector-

‘Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Malaysia on

General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the

Iran’s Nuclear Issue’, 1 June 2006, http://www.kln.gov.

Alleged Production of Components for Libya’s Uranium

my/?m_id=26&vid=175. 25

Background Briefing on Interagency Delegation Meetings

Enrichment Programme’. 40

26

release, 8 July 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

41

Frantz and Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist, p. 352–53.

ps/2009/july/125845.htm.

42

Peter Crail, ‘Questions Surround Iran’s Nuclear Program’,

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation

Arms Control Today, March 2006. 43

networks – A net assessment (London: IISS, 2007), p. 81. 27

28

Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation,

Entities’ Illicit Military Procurement Networks’, Institute

Network (London: Hurst & Company, 2006), p. 113.

for Science and International Security (ISIS) Report, 12

Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist:

January 2009, pp. 4, 5, 12–13, http://www.isis-online.org/ publications/expcontrol/IranMilitaryProcurement.pdf. 45

‘Paper Trail Shows Malaysia Ties’, Associated Press, 18

46

Malaysia’s report to the 1540 Committee, S/AC.44/2004/

February 2004.

(02)/35, November 2004, available on the website of the

Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 114. Frantz and Collins, The

1540 Committee at http://www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalre-

Nuclear Jihadist, p. 272. 32

Jonathan Soble, ‘N Korea-Burma Link Suspected’, Financial Times, 1 July 2009.

(New York: Twelve, 2007).

31

David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel, ‘Iranian

Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan

Dangerous Secrets…and How We Could Have Stopped Him

30

Communication with Western government official, April 2009.

44

The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World’s Most

29

‘Malaysia Arrests Alleged Black Market Nuclear Agent’, Taipei Times, 30 May 2004.

in China and Malaysia’, US Department of State press

ports.shtml.

Corera, Shopping for Bombs, p. 115.

47

Ibid.

Hansjürg Zumstein, ‘Der Spion, der aus dem Rheintal

48

Communication with European expert in arms exports

kam – Wie ein Schweizer Mechaniker die Welt veränderte’, Swiss TV 1, 22 January 2009. See background

who has studied the Malaysia case, April 2009. 49

Communication with MOSTI, July 2009.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

99

Chapter six

50

Initiated in 1967 following Britain’s withdrawal from

53

Implications for US Policy’, CRS Report for Congress,

Arrangements are a set of bilateral agreements, signed in

21 October 2003, p. 12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/

1971, whereby the five states agree to consult with each other in the event of external aggression towards or threat 51

RL32129.pdf. 54

Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the

of attack on Malaysia or Singapore.

People’s Republic of China in Malaysia, ‘China–Malaysia

‘Malaysia Still Studying Membership in PSI, Says

Trade Keeps a Good Momentum in 2008’, 4 February

Najib’, Bernama, 17 April 2007; Stephanie Lieggi, ‘Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Hosted by Japan

52

Bruce Vaughn, ‘Malaysia: Political Transition and

military bases east of Suez, the Five-Power Defence

2009. 55

Stephen Leong, ‘Malaysia–Taiwan Relations: Political

Shows Growing Interest in Asia But No Sea Change

Imperatives Prevailing’, paper presented to ‘China–

in Key Outsider States’, WMD Insights, December

Southeast Asia Relations and the Taiwan Issue’,

2007–January 2008, http://wmdinsights.com/I21/I21_EA1_

conference sponsored by the Cross-Straits Relations

ProliferationSecurity.htm.

Center and the Shanghai Institute for International

‘Malaysia Spells Out Vision for ASEAN as New Chair’,

Studies, Shanghai, 23–24 October 2006, http://www.isis.

Agence France-Presse, 8 August 2005, http://www.

org.my/files/pubs/papers/SL_Malaysia_Taiwan_Relations.

aseansec.org/afp/129.htm.

pdf.

100 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter seven

Myanmar

Of all the countries in Southeast Asia, Myanmar1 is the most enigmatic. Reliable information about the country is scarce, particularly when it relates to national security, a subject with a very broad definition in Myanmar. Its military regime (known since 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) is opaque, and its policies and decisionmaking processes are often hard to understand. The consequent information gaps are filled with rumours, speculation and deliberate misinformation. The number of respected observers who pay close analytical attention to Myanmar is far smaller than those who watch similarly opaque countries such as North Korea. Clouding the picture even further, Myanmar has long been at the centre of a highly politicised, and highly polarised, debate over the most effective way to deal with the repressive military government, ensconced since 2005 in Naypyitaw,2 the country’s isolated new administrative capital. Largely as a result of these problems, Myanmar’s strategic objectives and current nuclear status are unclear. Publicly, the regime cites Myanmar’s long record of opposition to nuclear-weapons proliferation, and points to its peaceful nuclear-research programmes. However, since 2000, when the SPDC first announced its plan to purchase a small Russian reactor, this position has been under constant challenge. Activist groups and others have repeatedly warned that Myanmar is not to be trusted. Some have accused the regime of secretly trying to develop a nuclear weapon, with help from other ‘rogue states’. Over the past few years, ‘defectors’3 from Myanmar have cast further doubt on Naypyitaw’s non-proliferation credentials. To date, no firm evidence of a secret nuclearweapons programme has been produced, and no foreign government has confirmed any of the claims

put forward by regime opponents. Yet suspicions have intensified. Moreover, of all the Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar is the only one that might be considered to have a contemporary strategic motivation to develop nuclear weapons.

History of civilian nuclear activity For several decades, under various governments, Myanmar evinced a passing interest in nuclear research. In 1956 an atomic-energy division was established in the Union of Burma Applied Research Institute, which began to send dozens of scholars and technicians abroad for training in nuclear physics and related fields. The nation joined the IAEA upon its foundation in 1957, and began to receive technical assistance from the agency. By the mid 1970s Rangoon University’s physics department was operating an IAEA-supplied neutron generator. Lacking funds and technical expertise, Myanmar was not in a position to seriously contemplate the construction of significant nuclear facilities. More to the point, there was no demonstrated need to build such facilities, nor, it seems, any strong motivation to do so. From 1996, however, Myanmar began to take an interest in having its own isotopeproduction capability.4 This period saw Myanmar increase its interest in obtaining a nuclear reactor, with Minister for Science and Technology U Thaung providing the impetus. Not only did the country seek closer nuclear ties with Russia, but there were also reports that China, Pakistan and India had been contacted about the possible purchase of a nuclear reactor.5 Of these reported approaches, the Russian connection is the only one for which there is solid evidence. Russia was the most likely potential supplier, having provided research reactors to 17 countries. Apart from unconfirmed reports that two Pakistani nuclear scientists of interest to the

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

101

Chapter seven

Myanmar: recent political history 1948 January

Union of Burma established as an independent republic

1962

General Ne Win leads a military coup d’état

1974

Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma established under Ne Win, with central planning and one-party rule

1988

Unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression leads to widespread pro-democracy demonstrations. Security forces kill thousands of demonstrators and under General Saw Maung take back direct political power, forming the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The country is renamed ‘Union of Burma’

1989

Country’s official English name changed to ‘Union of Myanmar’

1990 May

Myanmar holds free elections for the first time in almost 30 years. The National League for Democracy, the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, wins a strong majority, but the SLORC refuses to honour the results

1992 April

General Than Shwe takes over as chairman of the SLORC and commander-in-chief of the military

1997

SLORC renamed the ‘State Peace and Development Council’ (SPDC)

2005

Administrative capital moved to Naypyitaw

2007 August–Sept Anti-government protestors demand political and economic reforms, in what some called a ‘Saffron Revolution’ 2008 May

Cyclone Nargis hits Irrawaddy Delta, causing the worst natural disaster in Burmese history, with 200,000 people reported dead or missing

CIA had visited Myanmar in 2001 in connection with a research project,6 there is no evidence that China, India or Pakistan have played any role in Myanmar’s nuclear programme. In September 2001 the SPDC requested the IAEA’s assistance in acquiring a nuclear research reactor. As reported by Nucleonics Week, the IAEA initially rejected the request on the grounds that it had ‘no confidence that Myanmar either needs a reactor or has the infrastructure and funding required to support such a project’.7 The agency also had doubts about Myanmar’s low economic status, its poor technological base and the virtual collapse of its public education system since the armed forces took back direct political power in 1988.8 These views were reinforced after an IAEA inspection team visited the country in November 2001 and reported that the country’s general standards were well below the minimum the body would regard as acceptable, even for conventional power plants.9

Russian agreement to provide a research reactor Nevertheless, in May 2002 the Russian government approved a draft agreement with Myanmar’s Ministry of Science and Technology to create a nuclear-research centre in Myanmar that would include a small 10MWt reactor and associated laboratories. Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry agreed

102 An IISS Strategic Dossier

to design the centre, advise on its location, deliver the nuclear fuel, and supply all essential equipment and materials, including facilities for the disposal of nuclear waste. Russian experts would assemble, install and help to operate the centre’s equipment, and train Burmese operators. Russia’s main motivation was commercial, but the agreement also provided an opportunity to cultivate relations with an ASEAN country rich in natural resources and a market for future military sales. A ground-breaking ceremony for the nuclear facility was reportedly scheduled to take place in January 2003 in the Magwe district in central Myanmar.10 This location has never been confirmed and perhaps has not yet been decided, although several press reports have pinpointed the facility’s location at Myaing, north of Pakokku.11 The reactor and associated equipment were due to be delivered later in 2003. At the time, the regime announced that the facility would be built ‘within a few years’.12 By the end of the year, however, the deal with Russia had been shelved, apparently because of disagreements over the project’s financing. Negotiations were eventually renewed in 2006 and, in May 2007, an agreement was signed, reviving the project. According to the official Russian press release, the research centre would include a 10MWt light-water reactor fuelled with 20% enriched uranium, an activation-analysis labo-

Myanmar

Myanmar’s civil nuclear programme: chronology 1956

An atomic-energy division is established in the Applied Research Institute

1957

Myanmar (then called ‘Union of Burma’) joins the IAEA and begins to receive technical assistance

1996

Myanmar reportedly develops an interest in having its own isotope-production capability

1997

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is established under the Ministry of Science and Technology by combining the Atomic Energy Research Department and the Research Policy Direction Board

1998

Atomic Energy Law is promulgated

2001 September SPDC requests IAEA assistance in acquiring a nuclear research reactor 2001 November

IAEA inspection team visits Myanmar and reports that the country’s general standards are well below the minimum regarded as acceptable, even for conventional power plants

May 2002

Draft agreement with Russia to create a nuclear-research centre to include a small 10MWt reactor and associated laboratories

2003

Deal with Russia shelved because of disagreements over financing

2006

Negotiations with Russia renewed

2007 May

Agreement signed with Russia for nuclear-research centre with a 10MWt light-water reactor and other facilities, plus training for 300–350 Burmese specialists to help build and operate the reactor; the training begins but as of September 2009, no contract is signed to begin construction

ratory, a medical-isotope production laboratory, a silicon-doping system, and nuclear-waste-treatment and burial facilities.13 The reactor would be safeguarded by the IAEA, and Russian universities would train 300–350 Burmese specialists to help build and operate it. The Burmese specialists to be trained in connection with the nuclear deal are in addition to 5,000 or so Burmese students reportedly receiving training in Russia for purposes unrelated to the nuclear project.14 According to Alexander Glukhov, first vice-president of Atomstroyexport, which is responsible for implementing the agreement on the Russian side, as of summer 2007, 230 students from Myanmar were studying in Russia, and it was expected that about 1,000 more students would join them within the next few years, including 300 experts who would eventually work in the nuclear-research centre to be built by Russia.15 By 2009, Burmese students, including both those in Russia in connection with the nuclear deal and the many more there for other purposes, could be found studying electronics, engineering, computer science, nuclear physics and related disciplines in Moscow’s leading technical universities, including Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, and Moscow Power Engineering Institute, as well as in the regional universities.16 The reactor itself is meant to be an updated version of the Soviet-designed VVR-M pool-type research reactors located in Poland, Ukraine,

Vietnam and elsewhere, with a redesigned core to accommodate LEU fuel. As with the cooperation agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with Libya for a research reactor at Tajoura, Russian experts would likely be based at the research centre during its initial years of operation to ensure safety and security standards are met. Atomstroyexport experts have said that it would take about five years to construct the centre.17 According to the estimates of leading Russian newspaper Kommersant, the cost of the contract to construct the research centre in Myanmar is about $50–70 million,18 although these figures seemed unrealistically low. Shortly after the intergovernmental agreement was signed in May 2007, Atomstroyexport said the cost of the centre could be €200–400m, depending on what equipment it would include19. These cost estimates probably include ten tonnes of LEU fuel for the reactor and the expenses related to the training of Burmese experts. Article 4 of the agreement calls for payments to be made in ’real’ money, not by barter trade. This was the most difficult article to negotiate, and is one of the key reasons why signing of the agreement was delayed for five years: initially Myanmar sought to pay through exports to Russia of rice, teak and rubber. The agreement did not resolve all aspects of the deal, however. In fact, an official from the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation said when the agreement was signed that it ‘opens the door so a contract can be concluded’.20 As of September 2009,

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

103

Chapter seven

the contract had not been finalised and there was no information on the final arrangements related to the format of payment. Even if the project goes ahead soon, the repeated delays and Myanmar’s many political, economic and social problems continue to justify doubts over the project’s viability.

Nuclear infrastructure and management In 1997, a Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was established under the Ministry of Science and Technology by combining two other governmental units, the Atomic Energy Research Department and the Research Policy Direction Board. DAE’s stated mission is to carry out research, development and training in the field of atomic energy, to ensure the safety of radiation sources and to provide protection from nuclear-radiation hazards. As of 2007, DAE had 200 employees, of whom 25% were trainees.21 Apart from the Russian research-reactor project, Myanmar is not known to have any significant nuclear facilities or to have conducted any work in any area of the nuclear fuel cycle. Small-scale facilities relating to basic research and to nuclear applications in the fields of health, industry and agriculture include two cobalt-60 gamma-irradiation chambers at Myanmar Agriculture Service and the DAE, used respectively for agricultural research and for tissue sterilisation; a 14MeV neutron generator at Rangoon University used for research; lab-scale nuclear equipment at Mandalay University; and, at the Radiation Monitoring Laboratory, radiation detectors, spectrometers for high-resolution spectrometry to measure rainwater and air samples for environmental monitoring, and a Neuro beam for quality control of medical X-ray diagnosis.22 The Ministry of Energy has identified five lowgrade uranium deposits in five areas in central and northern Myanmar. According to the British government, the total quantity of uranium at these sites is unknown, but is likely to be very limited.23 In 2007 Myanmar’s government indicated that it had stepped up uranium exploration and was conducting surveys and test mining at four sites, including in Kachin and Shan states.24 The IAEA’s database does not list a national nuclear authority for Myanmar. A rudimentary Atomic Energy Law, promulgated in June 1998, envisaged the formation of an ‘Atomic Energy Council’ chaired by the minister for science and

104 An IISS Strategic Dossier

technology as the policymaking and guiding body for all things related to atomic energy. However, the establishment of such a council has never been publicly announced, and it is likely the council does not exist. The 2008 constitution lists ‘atomic energy, nuclear fuel and radiation and mineral resources essential to its production’ under ‘Union Defence and Security Sector’.25 The absence of a regulatory body adds to international concerns about whether Myanmar could manage nuclear technology safely. An independent regulatory body is a fundamental principle of nuclear safety. By 2009, Myanmar had benefited from 67 IAEA Technical Cooperation projects on a national level, mostly in the fields of nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture and in radiation safety. Twenty of these projects were active in 2009. IAEA projects in the field of atomic-energy development have supplied ‘very basic assistance’ to help Myanmar set up a nuclear research and development infrastructure.26 Myanmar also participates in an IAEA regional nuclear-training assistance programme called RCA (the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific). One RCA project in 2006 brought a Burmese researcher to South Korea for six months to study advanced spent fuel management. This drew some attention from Western government officials who questioned Myanmar’s need for such advanced training and worried about the potential connection between spent fuel management and plutonium reprocessing.27 None of the IAEA technical-cooperation projects is known to be connected with the military in Myanmar.

Rationale for research reactor Myanmar has offered various reasons for its interest in a nuclear reactor, which the government has stressed will be developed openly and in accordance with international conventions. Then Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win said in 2002 that Myanmar wanted to acquire modern technology, train nuclear experts, and manufacture medical radioisotopes used in advanced medical applications such as brain and body scans.28 Foreign Minister Aung Win said that Myanmar hoped to study the prospects of producing electricity from nuclear energy.29 In 2003, a DAE official said that ‘nuclear power

Myanmar

Myanmar’s Energy Production, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

15.7

20.7

20.8

23.8

21.9

-7.98

0.03

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

36.0

40.3

43.0

41.0

40.0

-2.44

0.05

Natural-gas production (billion cubic feet)

363.7

384.9

485.6

467.9

N/A

-3.64 (‘06/’05)

0.37 (’06)

88.6

94.3

146.2

127.8

145

13.46

0.13

Coal production (thousand short tons)

1,078.1

1,159.6

1,499.1

1,527.8

1,455.1

-4.76

0.02

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

197.3

207.2

216.1

263.5

275.6

4.59

2.3

2.4

3.0

3.3

3.0

-9.09

Natural-gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

0.11 (’06)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy

production is desirable for the long-term’, and indicated Myanmar might consider introducing nuclear power in 2025.30 As of 2009, however, the Myanmar Ministry of Energy website said that ‘considerations have never been made either as a preference or as an option to utilize nuclear power for generating electricity’ and that while ‘studies are being conducted for alternative energy sources including nuclear energy’, the nuclear option is not ‘environmentally friendly … and malfunction of nuclear plants could create drastic problem [sic]’. Thus, nuclear energy is to be considered ‘as a last resort, when other means cannot be implemented’.31 Naypyitaw’s pursuit of complex and expensive research-reactor technology remains puzzling, considering that Myanmar is on the UN list of least-developed countries, with a GNP per capita of around $1,200, and is struggling to maintain its existing civil infrastructure. Indeed, there are compelling reasons why the country does not need the technology. To the extent that Myanmar’s basic medical services need radioisotopes, for instance, they can be acquired elsewhere in the region at a lower cost and with greater reliability. Any suggestion that Myanmar needs to train a nuclear-power workforce is also questionable. Myanmar derives 54% of its electricity from hydropower, 40% from natural gas and 6% from oil. The electrification rate is very low at only 11% and transmission losses are exceptionally high at about 20%.

Despite suffering from severe electricity shortages, Myanmar possesses extensive natural-gas reserves, including 7 trillion cubic feet of gas discovered in the Bay of Bengal in 2006. These reserves are estimated to last until 2049. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s hydroelectric potential is also beginning to develop. A logical conclusion is that status and prestige are key motivations for the nuclear project, as evidenced by U Thaung’s claim that nuclear research is essential for a ‘modern nation’.32 Although a reactor is likely to bring a variety of problems to Myanmar’s doorstep, including complications related to safety and financing, regional worries and international distrust, such high-status projects may give the regime a sense of keeping up with the neighbours.

Assessing the proliferation risk A 10MWt reactor could not make much of a contribution towards a weapons programme. A light-water reactor of this size would produce no more than 1kg of weapons-usable plutonium a year, even if operated at full power for this purpose. This is considerably less than the 8kg of plutonium defined by the IAEA as a significant quantity necessary for a weapon (although advanced nuclear states can produce weapons using less than the IAEA definition). As long as the reactor remained safeguarded, any attempt to exploit it for nuclearweapons purposes would be discovered within a

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

105

Chapter seven

year. IAEA inspectors would be able to detect: (a) if the reactor was operated in a manner to produce high-grade plutonium rather than medical isotopes; (b) if fresh fuel was diverted in order to extract the enriched uranium; or (c) if spent fuel was diverted in order to extract the plutonium. In either of the latter two scenarios, production of fissile material would require other sophisticated facilities, specifically plants to reconvert the uranium and further enrich it or a shielded reprocessing plant to chemically separate the plutonium from the rest of the spent fuel. Neither of these types of sensitive facilities is included in the Russian package, and there is no evidence to support speculation among defectors that they might be available from elsewhere, such as North Korea. No country is known to have produced plutonium for weapons purposes in a reactor as small as the one that Myanmar might acquire. A total of 19 countries have operated 10MWt research reactors, including Libya, which has used it for isotope production and basic and applied nuclear research. The 10MWt IRT-1 safeguarded reactor at Tajoura played no role in Libya’s nuclear-weapons programme. Pakistan’s 10MWt safeguarded research reactor at its Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology similarly was not used in its nuclear-weapons programme. In the 1960s, the USSR provided North Korea with a small 2MWt research reactor which was later upgraded to 8MWt and which, most realistically, might have supplied up to 4kg of plutonium for North Korea’s weapons programme.33 But the mainstay of North

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Myanmar is party „„Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (acceded to on 18 January 1998) Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Myanmar is not party „„Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency „„Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material „„Convention on Nuclear Safety „„Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management „„IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources „„International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

the reactor that was going to be built. Another safety issue was Myanmar’s record of earthquakes.35

Korea’s plutonium-production programme has been a larger reactor at Yongbyon that is generally considered to have a 25MWt output, although North Korea refers to it by its electrical output of 5MWe in order to promote the fiction that its purpose was for electricity production.

Concerns about physical security have also been raised. The day after the Russian agreement was announced, the US Department of State said that Myanmar lacked the necessary regulatory and management systems to operate a nuclear facility safely and that the US ‘would be concerned about the possibility for accidents, for environmental damage, or for proliferation simply by the possibility of fuel being diverted, stolen, or otherwise removed’.36 While most of Myanmar’s major insurgent groups have negotiated ceasefire agreements with the regime, some – including the Karen National Liberation Army and the Shan State Army– South – still pose a military threat, and conceivably might see a prestige reactor as an attractive target.37 One analyst has commented on the security risk of moving radioactive and fissile materials into and out of such a ‘tinderbox country’ in light of the risks of terrorists using ‘dirty bombs’.38

Safety and physical security

Non-proliferation and disarmament

As soon as Myanmar announced that it planned to build a nuclear reactor, there was a strongly negative international response. Given Myanmar’s poor safety record,34 there were widespread fears that it would be unable to cope with such a demanding technical facility, as noted by the 2001 IAEA visit. In light of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, Thailand was worried about Russia’s involvement in the project and the nature of

Myanmar has pursued activist diplomacy in support of disarmament for several decades. The military regime that came to power following General Ne Win’s coup d’état in 1962 described nuclear weapons as ‘futile and self-defeating’.39 Although national statements are not a reliable indicator of future intentions (witness Indian statements on disarmament before its own nuclear-weapons test), Myanmar’s diplomats have routinely described the

106 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Myanmar

Myanmar accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date of ratification or accession

Partial Test-Ban Treaty

15 November 1963

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

Signed 11 February 1971

Outer Space Treaty

18 March 1970

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

Signed 10 April 1972 but yet to ratify

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

2 December 1992

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

20 April 1995

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

17 July 1996

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Signed 25 December 1996; not yet ratified

total elimination of such weapons as ‘the only effective defence against nuclear catastrophe’.40 In pursuit of this broad aim, Myanmar in 1963 was one of the first countries to become a party to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty. Myanmar has also signed and ratified the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and signed the 1972 Seabed Arms Control Treaty. In 1992, Myanmar became a state party to the NPT and in 1995 it signed the Treaty of Bangkok, which established the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. In 1996, Myanmar signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but has not yet ratified it.41 Myanmar has been vocal in calling on nuclearweapons states to disarm. In statements at the Conference on Disarmament and the UN, the military government has also called, inter alia, for legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states, the establishment of more nuclear-weaponsfree zones, and for a diminution in ‘the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies, to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination’.42 Myanmar’s rhetoric regarding the disarmament obligations of nuclear-weapons states has not been fully matched by non-proliferation actions of its own. In 1995 Myanmar entered into a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, with a Small Quantity Protocol (SQP) that suspended most of the agency’s verification activities given that the nation had declared no nuclear material or planned nuclear facilities. A case can be made that once Myanmar entered into an agreement to build a reactor, it should have dropped the SQP. In any case, the IAEA has asked Myanmar to accept the modified version that the agency now asks of all SQP states, which

requires, inter alia, early design information for any planned nuclear facilities. The IAEA has also asked to accept the new international standard known as Code 3.1 of the safeguards subsidiary arrangements, which also requires states to supply design information as soon as any nuclear facility is ‘planned’. While Code 3.1 is now accepted by all states with significant nuclear activities (except Iran, which in 2007 unilaterally suspended implementation of the new provision), Myanmar has been resisting IAEA requests to accept the modified code and to revise its SQP since 2005.43 Myanmar’s current safeguards agreement with the IAEA only requires it to provide design information about new facilities six months before nuclear material is introduced. In addition, Myanmar has not signed a safeguards Additional Protocol which, if faithfully implemented, would give the IAEA a basis for drawing conclusions about the absence of undeclared nuclear activity. The Additional Protocol grants inspectors expanded rights of access to both information and sites. A key provision is the right to ‘complementary’ access at declared sites to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material or to resolve questions or inconsistencies. In fact, the IAEA already has the right to seek a ‘special inspection’ in Myanmar if, after consultation with the country, the agency concluded that it would not otherwise be able to fulfil its safeguards responsibilities. By IAEA Board of Governors decree, special inspections are to be used only rarely. In practice this tool has been applied only twice: in 1992 in Romania and 1993 in North Korea. The IAEA would not have strong grounds for seeking a special inspection in Myanmar unless it was provided with actionable information from a member state about the likely presence of nuclear material or,

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as in the case of Romania, the country asked for a special inspection to establish its bona fides. As of September 2009, there were no indications that any state had provided the IAEA with intelligence information, and the IAEA is not known to have sought to investigate defector claims of clandestine nuclear activity in Myanmar.

Strategic trade controls According to the government, ‘appropriate internal laws have been enacted to take necessary action against illicit trafficking and brokering of toxin [sic] chemicals, explosives and weapons’.44 The focus of these laws and regulations, however, remains on thwarting domestic opposition and armed uprisings, which the government justifies in terms of the counter-terrorism provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.45 Myanmar has no exportcontrol lists of any kind, and neither WMD-relevant materials nor dual-use technologies are controlled for any activity. Potential export-control concerns include the exploitation of human-, arms- and drug-trafficking routes46 for transit and smuggling WMD-related items from or into neighbouring states, with which Myanmar has porous boundaries. Of greater current concern than WMD-related trade emanating from Myanmar is the prospect of the country being a recipient of illicit transfers. So far, Myanmar is not known to have broken any international laws or commitments in this regard. However, in addition to persistent claims about missile and other sensitive-technology transfers from states such as North Korea, questions have been raised about Burmese purchases of high-precision dual-use equipment from private European companies. According to David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, the end-use declarations for equipment, including machine tools, that Myanmar imported from Europe in 2006 and 2007 are ‘inconsistent’, the equipment itself is ‘odd for [Myanmar] to acquire’, and it was shipped to educational entities that had connections to Burmese nuclear experts.47

A North Korean role? After the Russian project was suspended in 2003, news reports began to appear suggesting that the SPDC had turned to North Korea to help secretly

108 An IISS Strategic Dossier

build nuclear facilities. Given North Korea’s proliferation proclivities, such rumours seemed plausible. In addition to its widespread marketing of ballistic missiles, North Korea appears to have been the source of the uranium hexafluoride that Libya purchased for its nuclear-weapons programme from the A.Q. Khan black-market network in 2000–0148 and for the plutonium-production reactor that Syria had secretly begun building in 2001, before it was destroyed by Israel in 2007.49 If North Korea was willing to take the risk of secretly selling nuclear technology to Syria, it stands to reason that it would also be willing to sell such technology to Myanmar, as long as there was commercial gain to be had.50 It may or may not be a coincidence that reports about North Korean activity in Myanmar surfaced not long after the purported North Korean proliferation to Libya and Syria commenced. There is only circumstantial evidence of a North Korea–Myanmar nuclear connection, however, and less appears to be known about overall North Korean activity in Myanmar than was known about North Korean activity in Syria. The restoration of ties between the two outcast states contributed to rumours of nuclear cooperation. The regime had severed relations with Pyongyang after North Korean agents set off bombs during South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan’s state visit in 1983, killing 17 officials from his delegation and four Burmese citizens. Although Myanmar for several years rejected North Korean attempts to restore political and economic ties, the wide-ranging sanctions imposed on Myanmar after the 1988 uprising forced the military regime to look elsewhere for arms and technical assistance, including to North Korea.51 Formal relations between Myanmar and North Korea were restored in 2007. Even before then, however, Naypyitaw had arranged several arms deals with Pyongyang. In 2003, the SPDC even considered purchasing short-range Scud missiles, but was apparently dissuaded by Washington.52 Subsequent visits by North Korean freighters to Myanmar, and the secrecy surrounding their cargoes, suggest that other arms and military equipment have been delivered.53 In addition, North Korean technicians have been seen at defence facilities all around Myanmar. Some appear to be assisting with the delivery of conventional weapon systems, but it is reported that

Myanmar

General Shwe Mann (L) the third-ranking member of Myanmar’s ruling junta, and General Kim Kyok Sik (R) then-chief of staff of North Korea’s army, sign a memorandum in Pyongyang, November 2008 (PA)

others have been constructing tunnels and underground military facilities.54 In late 2003 suspicions grew when an article in the Far Eastern Economic Review suggested that North Korea had taken over from Russia as the supplier of a reactor to Myanmar. The article reported that North Korean technicians had been seen unloading heavy machinery from trains at Myothit, which is close to where the Russian-built research reactor was supposed to be located. It also reported that North Korean aircraft had been seen landing at Mandalay and military airfields in central Myanmar. The story, which has not been confirmed, added that representatives from the North Korean Daesong Electric Group, which has been linked to North Korea’s missile sales and to imports for its nuclear-weapons programme, were reported to be in Yangon.55 In May 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that Namchongang Trading Co., the main facilitator of North Korea’s nucleartechnology transfer to Syria (and which also deals in other goods, including missiles), has also been detected selling equipment to Myanmar that could be used for a nuclear programme.56 Other well-regarded analysts have similarly reported the presence of Namchongang personnel in Myanmar.57 North Korea apparently has also used Myanmar as a transit point for transporting military goods to third countries. In August 2008, for example, a

North Korean civil aircraft flying from Myanmar to Iran was denied clearance by India at Washington’s request because of a belief that it was carrying missile components, possibly gyroscopes for missile-guidance systems.58 As noted above, North Korea was reported to have discussed Scud sales to Myanmar as far back as 2003. Most recently, in November–December 2008, a delegation led by General Shwe Mann, Myanmar’s Joint Chief of Staff, reportedly visited a Scud-missile factory during a visit to Pyongyang that also apparently included the inspection of several military bases and arms factories and the signing of a memorandum of understanding outlining proposals for closer defence cooperation.59 In June 2009, Japan arrested two of its citizens and a North Korean national over an alleged attempt to ship to Myanmar via Malaysia a magnetometer, which is used to measure the strength of magnetic fields. The instrument has civilian uses but is also employed in the manufacture of ballistic missiles.60 After the original indictment, Japanese authorities discovered that the North Korean national had succeeded in November 2008 in shipping to Myanmar an instrument for grinding magnets that can be used to develop missile-control systems.61 There is strong reason to suspect that North Korea is either helping Myanmar to develop ballistic missiles or is using the country as a transit point for items for itself or third parties.62

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Defector claims In the past few years there have been many claims about the SPDC’s nuclear ambitions, ranging from the plausible to the highly imaginative. To add to the confusion, many of the claims have referred simply to Myanmar’s ‘nuclear programme’, without differentiating between the country’s openly declared nuclear-research programme and a possible secret nuclear-weapons project. In 2003, for example, the expatriate Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), based in Oslo, claimed that 80 Burmese military officers were in North Korea studying ‘nuclear and atomic energy technology’.63 Another activist website later claimed that North Korea was training 25 nuclear physicists from Myanmar.64 In 2004, an Indian commentator claimed that North Korea had signed a formal agreement that year to build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. The implication was that Myanmar had turned to North Korea for help after the breakdown in negotiations with Russia. The deal with Pyongyang was said to include a scientific survey of possible construction sites, and would cost in excess of US$200m, to be paid in cash and timber.65 One expatriate Burmese news service based in Thailand claimed that the regime had decided to move the site of the Russian reactor from the Magwe area to a more remote and better-protected location 70km east of Mandalay near Pyin Oo Lwin (formerly Maymyo).66 Other reports claimed that uranium from Myanmar was being exported to Iran and Pakistan. These suggested that before shipment, the ore was being processed into yellowcake at secret facilities north of Mandalay and near Kyaukse, in central Myanmar.67 Another unconfirmed report said that the Burmese army’s ‘Nuclear Battalion’ was testing high-explosive nuclear triggers at a research complex near Pyin Oo Lwin.68 A few commentators even suggested that North Korea had already provided Myanmar with nuclear weapons, either for Myanmar’s own use or in order to hide them from international monitoring agencies.69 These reports lacked verisimilitude. During 2008–09, the number of unconfirmed reports about nuclear-weapons work in Myanmar has increased sharply. Many of these reports were prompted by the appearance in Thailand in 2007 and 2008 of several Burmese defectors formerly working for or on behalf of the regime who claimed to have

110 An IISS Strategic Dossier

direct knowledge, or even first-hand experience, of a secret nuclear-weapons programme. Australian investigators Desmond Ball and Phil Thornton, who repeatedly interviewed two of the defectors, believe the stories need to be taken seriously.70 While the ‘evidence’ provided by these defectors has not always been clear, or consistent, their central claim was that in 2002 Myanmar’s military leaders launched a highly classified project to build a nuclear reactor for military purposes at Naung Laing, east of Pyin Oo Lwin, separate from the Russian reactor. Construction of both reactors was reportedly well advanced. The military reactor was said to be hidden underground and, in the opinion of one defector, similar in design to the Syrian facility bombed by Israel in 2007. A plutonium reprocessing facility was also said to be planned. The expertise for this secret military project was reportedly being provided by North Korea, but Russians, Iranians and possibly Pakistanis were also said to be involved. Ball and Thornton concluded that if what the defectors said is true, the ‘secret’ reactor could be able to produce a nuclear weapon a year by 2014.71 In their discussions with officials and others, some defectors have also claimed that a major effort has been made, with the help of Russian experts, to discover and exploit new uranium deposits, in addition to the five low-grade sites publicly identified by Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy. According to the defectors, two new mines are now being worked, one near Mohnyin in Kachin State and the other near Mogok in Mandalay Division. The ore was said to be refined at Thabeikkyin, which is situated roughly between the two mines, and at another mill on the Myit Nge River, south of Pyin Oo Lwin. In addition, some defectors said a number of nuclear-research facilities had been built in central Myanmar.72 Claims of a nuclear-weapons programme are not new. Following the 2002 announcement of the nuclear deal with Russia, a number of activist groups and media pundits expressed fears that Myanmar would become a ‘rogue terrorism state’, and try to develop a nuclear weapon.73 They cited the regime’s long record of duplicity and its customary disregard for international norms of behaviour. They dismissed assurances that the reactor was only intended for peaceful research and would be placed under IAEA safeguards. Yet few of the activists making such claims seemed to understand the diffi-

Myanmar

Many of the defectors’ claims do not stand up to scrutiny. The report that a Russian reactor is already under construction is flatly contradicted by Russia, which has no reason to dissemble on this matter or to deceive the IAEA. According to investigative reporter Mark Hibbs, the IAEA for months has been assessing open-source documents, overhead imagery and other data Unidentified building northeast of Pyin oo Lwin, first suspected of having a nuclear connection about Myanmar. Both the but later assessed to be a non-nuclear industrial workshop or machinery centre. IAEA and Western intelligence agencies have reportedly concluded that imagery of a suspected culty of evading IAEA safeguards or the practical nuclear facility at Pyin Oo Lwin is a ‘non-nuclear challenges of nuclear-weapons production. Some of industrial workshop or machinery centre’.78 The those who recognised that a small research reactor would not be well suited for a weapons programme argued that a nuclear reactor would at least give the military government the material for a ‘dirty bomb’, which could spread radioactive material through a conventional explosion. These earlier accusations were widely dismissed as far-fetched and self-serving,74 designed perhaps to win support for the anti-regime cause from the Bush administration, in hopes that it would do to the SPDC what it did to Saddam Hussein.75 The most recent claims, none of which have been verified, should also be assessed with a high degree of caution. Some may relate not to a secret nuclear programme but to Myanmar’s considerable efforts over the past 20 years to upgrade its military infrastructure. Particularly since the Gulf and Iraq wars, the regime has felt vulnerable to attack by a modern air force. It has reportedly constructed a number of underground command-and-control bunkers, possibly including some at Naypyitaw.76 The armed forces are believed also to have hardened their communications nodes and built protective shelters for a range of new conventional-weapon systems, including surface-to-air missiles. It is likely that North Korea, which has considerable expertise in constructing underground facilities, has been providing assistance for some of these projects.77

Institute for Science and International Security, which for years has been watching for signs of nuclear projects in Myanmar and analysing photos provided by defectors of purported nuclear facilities, has not found any convincing nuclear signatures.79 After reviewing ground photographs of suspected tunnel facilities posted online in June 2009, the institute concluded that at least one of the purported tunnel entrances was a dam penstock and that the facilities depicted on other photographs were not likely to be nuclear industrial facilities.80 Myanmar itself denied having any nuclear weapons intentions.81

International reactions It can be assumed that the defectors have been extensively debriefed by Thai and Western intelligence agencies, which now seem keen to find out if the defectors’ claims are accurate. In what may be a related development, during 2008 unmanned aerial vehicles operating out of Thailand, but most likely to be American, apparently conducted several overflights of central Myanmar.82 So far no governments have come out with any intelligence judgements giving support to the claims, perhaps because of the opacity of the Myanmar system. Strategic analysts have long been concerned about the dearth

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technology and other dangerous weapons’.87 This was the first time that a senior government official from any country had openly speculated about such nuclear-technology transfers. It was not clear if her comments were scripted, and State Department spokespersons repeatedly refused to elaborate. Off the record, US officials repeated the concern The freighter Kang Nam 1 docks in Yangon, 21 May 2007. En route to Myanmar again in mid June 2009, the Kang Nam 1 was trailed by US warships because of suspicion that it was carrying about cooperation on banned arms, but it reversed course after two weeks (Khin Maung Win/AFP/Getty Images) a nuclear-weapons programme but noted that US intelligence on this was incomplete.88 of reliable information on the military leadership’s thinking, particularly on key strategic issues. Myanmar’s developing relations with Pyongyang have raised concern for several years, particularly in Washington. For example, in 2004 a senior aide to Senator Richard Lugar, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that North Korea could be providing nuclear and missile technology to Myanmar.83 In 2007, two US academics who had recently held senior government positions wrote in Foreign Affairs that ‘Western intelligence officials have suspected for several years that the regime has had an interest in following the model of North Korea and achieving military autarky by developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons’.84 In early July 2009, incoming US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell told Congress that he would continue to closely watch all external support for Myanmar’s nuclear development, including from Russia and North Korea. He also reiterated the US belief that Myanmar did not have the legal, technological or financial infrastructure essential for safe nuclear development.85 At the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Phuket, Thailand, in late July 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the US government took very seriously the growing concerns about military cooperation between Myanmar and North Korea.86 In a television interview, she went further, saying the US was worried ‘about the transfer of nuclear

112 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Clinton’s comments were all the more noteworthy given the reticence of the George W. Bush administration on this subject, despite pressure by members of Congress and Burmese expatriates to give credence to rumours of nuclear-weapons development. In July 2008, the US Congress tried to force the administration’s hand by passing the Burma JADE Act, which required the Secretary of State within 180 days to submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form, describing military and intelligence aid to the regime from any other country, including ‘the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, capabilities, and technology, including nuclear, chemical, and dual use capabilities’.89 As of September 2009, the report had not been filed. Other governments have also been reluctant to openly voice concerns about Burmese nuclear proliferation. The British government stated in 2006 that it was ‘not able to corroborate’ any reports about the alleged transfer of nuclear technology from North Korea to Myanmar.90 The previous year it had claimed to have ‘no specific information’ on press reports that Pyongyang was providing nuclear training to Burmese nationals.91 Also in 2006, the UK put on the record its view that, with regard to some of the recent stories that had appeared on the Internet, no uranium was being processed in Myanmar, that Myanmar did not have any operational enrichment facilities and

Myanmar

that the UK was not aware of any uranium exports from Myanmar.92 In August 2009, unnamed Thai military officials refuted the reports that Myanmar was building a secret nuclear reactor. They said the US had warned about a North Korean nuclear transfer and asked the Thai army to monitor Myanmar–North Korea relations, but so far Thai army monitoring had ‘not found anything unusual’.93 Also in August 2009, in response to press reports about secret nuclear facilities in Myanmar, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said that if such reports were found to be true, Myanmar would be in violation of the Treaty of Bangkok and would therefore have to leave ASEAN.94

Geopolitical context Threat perceptions Myanmar’s security outlook has changed dramatically since 1988.95 Before then, despite being regarded as a military dictatorship, Myanmar was accepted by world councils and was a recipient of substantial international aid. The regime considered the greatest threats that it faced to be local insurgencies, pressure from Myanmar’s larger and more powerful neighbours and entanglement in the strategic competition between the superpowers.96 As a result, Myanmar’s armed forces were configured entirely for internal security operations. Disputes with China and India were managed through quiet diplomacy, while a neutral foreign policy, reliance on the UN and a focus on global disarmament helped Myanmar avoid Cold War rivalries. Internal unrest still worries the SPDC. Concerns were renewed in September 2007, when tens of thousands of Buddhist monks and other Burmese citizens took to the streets to demand political and economic reforms. Several armed insurgent groups also remain active around Myanmar’s borders. Externally, however, the regime’s threat perceptions have been transformed. While Myanmar once regarded China with suspicion and hostility, Beijing is now a key supporter of the SPDC regime, providing military, economic and diplomatic support. Conversely, relations with the US and UK have soured as Myanmar now views these countries with distrust and even as a threat to the survival of the regime.

These changes have led Myanmar to reassess its security policies. For example, they have encouraged Myanmar’s close relationship with such non-Western powers as China and Russia. Myanmar also joined ASEAN in 1997. Although it is not known precisely why the usually cautious and introverted military government agreed to join, one major factor appears to have been the hostility shown towards the SPDC regime by the US and other major Western countries. Fear of vulnerability to these stronger powers has also caused the regime to place further emphasis on the need for improved defence capabilities. Furthermore, Myanmar’s generals have held a deep suspicion of Thailand for some time and regard it as a proxy for what they see as US hegemonic ambitions. They may also believe that the SPDC armed forces need more powerful weapons to deter Thailand. Disputes with Bangladesh over disputed maritime claims and the status of Rohingya refugees add to Myanmar’s troubled relations. These threat perceptions contributed to Myanmar’s decision to develop and modernise its armed forces. Indeed, in 1998 the UK estimated that at least 30% of Myanmar’s gross national product is spent on its military.97 The impact is clear to see. Myanmar has gone from possessing a small army geared towards maintaining internal security to boasting the second-largest armed force in Southeast Asia. Although the Burmese military still suffers from serious problems, particularly in such areas as logistics, leadership and morale, it is now better organised and better armed, and capable of limited conventional military operations. These improvements help act as a deterrent against invasion from an outside power. While the improvements in Myanmar’s conventional forces clearly offer it increased levels of protection, the regime still worries about possible external intervention. In spite of its better-equipped military, Myanmar would be unable to resist a possible intervention from a superpower or a UN-led coalition. It is in these circumstances that a nuclearweapons capability could have some appeal. To most observers, the idea that Myanmar might be invaded by the US or a multinational force seems far-fetched. Despite Western rhetoric about ‘coercive humanitarian intervention’ after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar in 2008, such a dramatic step has

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never seriously been contemplated. Nor is it likely to be. It is not difficult to see how the embattled SPDC leadership might feel threatened, however, or why it is at least nervous about the possibility of external intervention, given Washington’s advocacy of regime change.98 The US has imposed a range of sanctions, which were renewed in May 2009, and numerous governments and non-governmental organisations have provided support to politicians and activist groups seeking the regime’s downfall. As Australian expert on Myanmar, Andrew Selth, has written, ‘it would not be difficult for the regime to construct a coherent, internally consistent picture of an existential threat that was supported by considerable empirical evidence’.99 In a case of circular causality, US antagonism resulting from Myanmar’s contempt for international norms feeds SPDC insecurity that leads to military build-up and possible proliferation-risk behaviour that would only heighten the antagonism.

The mindset of Myanmar’s military It has always been difficult to discern how Myanmar’s leaders look at the world, and why they adopt certain policies. If the regime were indeed pursuing a nuclear-weapons option, however, the decision to do so would likely have been influenced by two apparently contradictory lines of thinking. The first is strategic, namely the regime’s deepseated insecurity and its perceptions of a serious external threat, both to the military government and to the country itself. The second is political, stemming from the regime’s extreme nationalism, its determination to decide Myanmar’s future and its confidence, borne of experience, that it can survive whatever measures the international community may take against it. Myanmar’s generals are often portrayed as ignorant and stubborn, but their defiance of the international community seems to have been based on a hard-headed assessment of the risks involved, and a shrewd reading of the strategic environment. Since 1988, the regime has cleverly used Myanmar’s critical geo-strategic position and its abundant natural resources to play its neighbours against each other. The regime has cultivated relations with a range of countries that do not share the West’s views on such issues as military rule, human rights or nuclear proliferation. Also, the generals well

114 An IISS Strategic Dossier

understand the limits of the UN’s power and the obstacles faced by other international organisations in their attempts to change the regime’s behaviour.100 Myanmar’s military leaders have demonstrated that they are prepared to pay a high price to survive, and to preserve what they see as Myanmar’s independence and national sovereignty, even if that means a return to the isolation and poverty of the Ne Win years. Myanmar’s military government can cite cases where secrecy, contempt for international conventions and the passage of time appear to have paid dividends. North Korea, for example, is a country that, despite strong opposition, has been able to develop nuclear weapons and win certain benefits. India and Pakistan withstood widespread criticism after their nuclear tests in 1998,101 and sanctions imposed at the time have largely been dropped. These historical lessons would not be lost on Myanmar’s military leaders. The SPDC would be well aware, however, of the risks of a secret WMD programme which, if discovered, could fulfil the very fears of Western intervention that would have led to the programme in the first place. Supported by its allies, the US has actively intervened to halt suspected WMD programmes elsewhere. Also, any attempt by a volatile state like Myanmar to acquire nuclear weapons would alarm countries such as China and India, on which the regime relies for support. ASEAN has categorically rejected nuclear weapons and would react strongly to evidence that one of its members was attempting to acquire them. In considering the behaviour of hierarchical, authoritarian governments like that of Myanmar, some allowance must also be made for irrational actors, and the possibility that a single dominant figure can simply order the state apparatus to pursue illogical, illegal or self-destructive policies. There is evidence that SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe occupies such a position, and is personally responsible for some idiosyncratic decisions. Like General Ne Win before him, he is highly superstitious and is known to consult astrologers and numerologists before making important decisions.102 This is not uncommon among Burmese, but given Than Shwe’s singular position of power, such superstitions could contribute to irrational decisionmaking.

Myanmar

Conclusions Myanmar has no known capabilities that would lend themselves to a nuclear-weapons programme apart from limited uranium deposits and some personnel who have received nuclear training overseas. If it is built, a 10MWt research reactor and associated training from Russia could provide an initial basis for an eventual civilian nuclear-power programme, but few of the skills required for such a programme are readily transferable to nuclear-weapons development. Specialised reprocessing or enrichment facilities would be necessary to produce weaponsusable fissile material, and any attempt to divert plutonium from the reactor is likely to be detected by IAEA inspectors. The concern is whether Myanmar might take the road Syria appears to have taken by building secret facilities. With sufficient foreign help in the complex technologies and equipment required for plutonium-implosion weapons, lack of indigenous technical capabilities would not be an insurmount-

able hurdle. Nor, despite the huge investment required for nuclear weapons, would Myanmar’s relative poverty be a deal-breaker. The discovery of natural-gas reserves means that the regime is no longer short of funds for such ambitious projects.103 The question hinges more on political decisions. In this regard, there is insufficient information to make a well-founded judgement about Myanmar’s nuclear intentions and the North Korea connection. Concerned governments have therefore erred on the side of caution, refraining from committing themselves. Until recently, this approach also reflected scepticism about a secret nuclear programme. Since 2008, however, concerned governments and international organisations appear to be giving this matter a higher priority and making greater efforts to test the claims of defectors. There is a growing international determination to be alert to signals about nuclear-weapons programmes that in countries such as Israel and Pakistan were overlooked until it was too late.

Notes 1

In 1989, the new military government changed the coun-

7

and several other countries, however, have continued to

2

8

Myanmar through a one-party parliamentary system.

to honour the 1990 election victory by the National League

The armed forces originally took power in 1962 and ruled

for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi.

through a Revolutionary Council before a unicameral

While the city’s name has also been rendered as

‘parliament’ was created in 1974. 9

Article 440, of Myanmar’s 2008 constitution.

10

11

12

Myanmar Junta Makes Deal for Reactor, Strengthens

Department of Atomic Energy, Myanmar Ministry

Military’, WorldNet Daily, 8 February 2002, http://world-

http://www.most.gov.mm/index.php?option=com_

netdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=26375. 13

content&task=view&id=85.

‘Russia and Myanmar Sign Inter-governmental Cooperation Agreement’, Press Service of the Federal

Andrew Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and Perceptions, Regional Outlook No. 12 (Brisbane: Griffith

6

Anthony C. LoBaido, ‘Nuclear Politics in Burma:

SPDC, many of whom see the term as a badge of honour. of Science and Technology, ‘DAE’, 13 June 2007,

5

Bertil Lintner, ‘Burma’s Nuclear Temptation’, Yale Global Online, 3 December 2008.

Myanmar, it is the most commonly used term to describe regime opponents in exile who formerly worked for the

Richard Stone, ‘Planned Reactor Ruffles Global Feathers’, Science, vol. 295, no. 5556, 1 February 2002, p. 782.

Although ‘defector’ is a politically loaded term used by the military government to denigrate those who leave

‘Burma’s Nuclear Plans Worry IAEA’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 February 2002, p. 11.

English name of the capital as stipulated in Chapter XIII,

4

Between 1974 and 1988, the armed forces governed

use the old name as a protest against the regime’s refusal

‘Naypyidaw’ in English, ‘Naypyitaw’ is the official

3

‘IAEA Will Ignore Burmese Request for Research Reactor Assistance’, Nucleonics Week, 25 October 2001, p. 14.

try’s name from Burma to the Union of Myanmar. The US

Agency for Nuclear Energy, 15 May 2007. 14

‘Russia Denies Helping Burma Obtain Nuclear

Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2007), pp. 6, 9.

Know-How’, RIA News Agency, 11 April 2005. The

David Sanger, Douglas Frantz and James Risen, ‘Nuclear

distinction between 300–360 Burmese to be trained

Experts in Pakistan May Have Links to Al Qaeda’, New

as reactor builders and operators and 5,000 attending

York Times, 9 December 2001.

Russian educational institutions for what the Russian

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government calls ‘commercial’ purposes is somewhat

33

15

16

Security, vol. 8, 2000, p. 284.

‘Alexander Glukhov: “Myanme edva li interesno yadernoe oruzhie”’, [‘Alexander Glukhov: “Myanmar is Hardly

Jared S. Dreicer, ‘How Much Plutonium Could Have Been Produced in the DPRK IRT Reactor?’, Science & Global

unclear. 34

While not unique to Myanmar, the country’s poor safety

Interested in Nuclear Weapons”’], Vzglyad, 30 May 2007.

record is a matter of common knowledge among experts.

Communication with Russian nuclear specialist, Moscow,

Some diplomatic missions in Yangon, for example, are

March 2009.

forbidden to fly on local airlines due to safety concerns.

17

Ibid.

18

Alain Kornysheva, ‘Diktaturu Podkluchat k Reaktoru’

around the ancient capital of Pagan, which destroyed or

[‘Dictatorship will be Connected to the Reactor’],

damaged many large temples and pagodas. Pagan is less

Kommersant, 16 May 2007.

than 100km from the area believed to have been chosen

19

20

35

‘Alexander Glukhov: “Myanme edva li interesno yadernoe

In 1975, Myanmar experienced several major tremors

for construction of the nuclear reactor.

oruzhie”’.

36

‘US Criticises Burma Nuclear Plan’, BBC News, 17 May 2007.

Miriam Elder, ‘Moscow Offers to Help Myanmar Go

37

Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 8.

Nuclear’, Moscow Times, 16 May 2007.

38

Michael Roston, ‘Nuclear Archipelagoes? Secure Nuclear

21

Department of Atomic Energy, ‘DAE’.

Materials in Southeast Asia’, CSIS Pacific Forum,

22

Hla Hla Oo, ‘Country Report for IAEA/RCA Mid-term

21 June 2002, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/

Review Meeting of National Focal Persons on Radiation Protection’, 7–11 June 2004, People’s Republic of China,

pac0225%5B1%5D.pdf. 39

Appendix%20%2016A%20Country%20Report%20 Myanmar.doc. 23

1968), pp. 83–4. 40

Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the

Howells to Mr Clifton-Brown, Hansard, Column 1151W,

Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 11 February 2008’,

5 July 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/

http://www.myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease_PMGev/

htm#06070623005102.

25

CD%202008%2011%20March%2008%20Statement.htm. 41

general has ruled that for international instruments signed

Asia Times Online, 24 May 2007, http://www.atimes.com/

by the new military administration after 1988 (and by

atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE24Ae02.html.

the Revolutionary Council between 1962–74), ratification

Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008),

should be considered automatic because there is no higher

Ministry of Information, September 2008, Schedule 1, p.

organ of government to review the decisions to sign. See Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 23.

Mark Hibbs, ‘IAEA Probes Myanmar Data, Discourages

42

‘Statement by Ambassador U Wunna Maung Lwin’. Hibbs, ‘IAEA Probes Myanmar Data’, p. 4. Myanmar’s report to the 1540 Committee, 6 April 2005,

New Research Reactors’, NuclearFuel, 10 August 2009, p. 4.

43

27

Communication with investigator in Europe, August 2009.

44

28

‘Burma Gives Reasons for Planned Nuclear Research

available from the website of the 1540 Committee, http://

Reactor Project’, TV Myanmar, 23 January 2002, translated 29

According to one report, however, Myanmar’s attorney

Larry Jagan, ‘Myanmar Drops a Nuclear “Bombshell”’,

181. 26

‘Statement by Ambassador U Wunna Maung Lwin,

United Kingdom Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer from Dr

pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060705/text/60705w0017. 24

Foreign Policy of the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma (Rangoon: Burma Socialist Programme Party,

http://www.rca.iaea.org/members/Projects/RAS9029/

www.un.org/sc/1540/nationalreports.shtml.

by BBC Monitoring Service, 23 January 2002.

45

Ibid.

Larry Jagan, ‘Burma announces nuclear plans’, BBC News,

46

Myanmar is the world’s second-largest opium producer,

11 January 2002.

and produces 96% of Southeast Asia’s opium. It is also a

30

Paul Kerr, ‘US Accuses Burma of Seeking Weapons

significant player in the manufacture and regional traf-

31

‘Energy Efficiency, Conservation & Sustainability’,

Technology’, Arms Control Today, May 2004.

32

ficking of amphetamine-type stimulants. 47

Simon Martin, ‘Myanmar Activities Fuel NKorea Nuclear

Myanmar Energy Sector Website, http://www.energy.gov.

Suspicions: Expert’, AFP, 23 July 2009; Glenn Kessler, ‘U.S.

mm/energyefficiency.htm.

Concerns Growing About N. Korean Military Ties With

Bertil Lintner, ‘Burma Joins the Nuclear Club’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 December 2001, p. 26; Selth, ‘Burma and Nuclear Proliferation’.

116 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Burma’, Washington Post, 22 July 2009. 48

IISS, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (London: IISS, 2007) p. 78.

Myanmar

49

50

IISS, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of

62

‘Smugglers Assist North Korea-Directed Illicit Trade to

The speculation in some media reports that North Korea

Myanmar’, ISIS report, 14 July 2009, http://isis-online.

may have sought to place nuclear facilities in Myanmar for

org/publications/dprk/North_Korea_Myanmar_illicit_

its own benefit – for example, to hide them from inspectors – is not supported by any evidence, nor is it compatible

trade_14July2009.pdf. 63

Andrew Selth, Burma’s North Korean Gambit: A Challenge to Regional Security?, Canberra Paper No. 154 (Canberra:

November 2003. 64

University, 2004). ‘Developments in Burma’, Testimony of Matthew P.

org/articles/burmanuclear2.html. 65

and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, before the

com/atimes/South_Asia/FF04Df03.html. 66

Herald: Agency for News, 14 September 2005, http://

america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/March/200403251

www.shanland.org/index.php?option=com_

81911ASesuarK0.3054773.html. See also Robert Karniol,

content&view=article&id=535:nuke-plant-from-the-plains-

11 June 2003, p. 12.

to-the-hills&catid=86:war&Itemid=284. 67

Hidden Connection’, Dictator Watch, November 2006,

1, bound for Myanmar, was trailed by US warships on

http://www.dictatorwatch.org/articles/burmanuclear.html;

suspicion of carrying small arms banned by UN Security

Roland Watson, ‘Images of Suspected Uranium Mine and

Council Resolution 1874, enacted on 12 June after North

Refinery in Burma’, Dictator Watch, March 2007, http://

Korea’s 25 May nuclear test. The resolution requires states

www.dictatorwatch.org/phshows/burmafacility.html;

to inspect suspect North Korean cargo. After two weeks, the

and ‘Uranium Search in Burma Intensifies’, The Irrawaddy,

ship reversed course, apparently at the request of Myanmar,

Vol.14, no.10, October 2006, http://www.irrawaddy.org/

ments of Resolution 1874. See ‘US presses Myanmar on

print_article.php?art_id=6438. 68

2006, reported as ‘Arms Tests Reportedly Intensifying

Bertil Lintner, ‘Myanmar and North Korea Share a Tunnel

in Burma’s Mandalay’, BBC Monitoring Service, 19

atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG19Ae01.html.

September 2006. 69

Bertil Lintner and S.W. Crispin, ‘Dangerous Bedfellows’, Jay Solomon, ‘Tests Point to Spread of Weapons Trade’,

Pyongyang Deal’, Asia Times Online, 4 June 2004. 70

Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2009. 57

58

59

Alive and Ticking’, Bangkok Post, 2 August 2009.

Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),

Ibid.

Imagery Brief, 3 August 2009, http://isis-online.org/publi-

72

Ibid.

cations/burma/Burma_tunnels_3August2009.pdf.

73

See, for example, Kanbawza Win, ‘The Burmese Regime

Mark Hosenball and Christian Caryl, ‘North Korea Arms

Has Nuclear Weapons’, Kao Wao News Group, 3 October

Deal Intercepted’, Newsweek, 22 November 2008.

2004, http://www.kaowao.org/The Burmese regime has

Aung Zaw, ‘Asia’s “Axis of Evil” Flexes Its Muscles’, The

nuclear weapons.php. 74

Maxmilian Wechsler, ‘Nuclear Claims Deserve Scepticism’, Bangkok Post, 23 April 2006.

com/article.php?art_id=16168.

61

Desmond Ball and Phil Thornton, ‘Burma’s Nuclear Bomb

71

Irrawaddy, 23 June 2009, http://www.irrawaddymedia. 60

See, for example, Watson, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Burma’; and Bhattacharjee, ‘India Frets over Yangon–

Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 November 2003, p. 22. 56

Democratic Voice of Burma (in Burmese), 18 September

NKorea, Suu Kyi at Rare Talks’, AFP, 23 July 2009. Vision’, Asia Times Online, 19 July 2006, http://www. 55

Roland Watson, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Burma: The

In mid June 2009, a North Korean freighter, the Kang Nam

which pledged in late July that it would honour the require-

54

‘Nuke Plant: From the Plains to the Hills’, Shan

on Asia and the Pacific, 25 March 2004, http://www.

‘Myanmar Ditches Submarine Deal’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 53

Arun Bhattacharjee, ‘India Frets over Yangon–Pyongyang Deal’, Asia Times Online, 4 June 2004, http://www.atimes.

Daley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee

Roland Watson, ‘Analysis of Burma’s Nuclear Program’, Dictator Watch, January 2007, http://www.dictatorwatch.

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 52

‘Junta Officers Secretly Depart for Pyongyang to Study Advanced Technology’, Democratic Voice of Burma, 25

with the SPDC regime’s strong sense of nationalism. 51

David Albright, Paul Branna and Andrea Scheel,

Iran (London: IISS, 2008), pp. 73–5.

Jonathan Soble, ‘N Korea–Burma Link Suspected’,

75

Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation.

Financial Times, 1 July 2009.

76

Lintner, ‘Myanmar and North Korea Share a Tunnel

‘Fresh Warrant Served on Trader Over Illegal Export of

Vision’. In 2007, the UK government said it had

Machine’, Kyodo, 24 July 2009.

received ‘no verifiable reports’ of military bunkers being

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

117

Chapter seven

constructed near Naypyitaw. See The United Kingdom

uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060605/text/60605w0061.

Parliament, ‘Burma: Politics and Government’, Answer from Mr McCartney to Mr Clifton-Brown, Hansard,

htm#06060712000475. 91

Dr Howells to Mr Clifton-Brown, Hansard, Column 1514W,

parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070604/

10 July 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/

text/70604w0053.htm#07060529000138. 77

78

79

Andrew Selth, ‘Is There a Burma–North Korea–Iran

cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060710/text/60710w0025.htm. 92

from Dr Howells to Miss McIntosh, Hansard, Column

the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney,

1369W, 18 July 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.

25 February 2009, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/

uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050718/text/50718w25.

post/2009/02/Is-there-a-Burma-North-Korea-Iran-nuclear-

htm#50718w25.html_sbhd3. See also The United Kingdom

conspiracy.aspx#continue.

Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer from Dr Howells to Mr

Hibbs, ‘IAEA Probes Myanmar Data, Discourages New

Clifton-Brown, Hansard, 5 July 2006, Column 1151W, http://

Research Reactors’, p. 3.

www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/

Martin, ‘Myanmar Activities Fuel NKorea Nuclear

80

ISIS Imagery Brief, 3 August 2009.

81

Michael Sullivan, ‘Does Myanmar Want Nuclear

vo060705/text/60705w0017.htm#06070623000064. 93

mcot.net/view.php?id=11215. 95

96

bombshell-20090731-e4fw.html.

Foundation, 2001). 97

from Mr Fatchett to Mr Rowe, Hansard, Column 241, 25

voanews.com/burmese/archive/2004-02/a-2004-02-10-6-1.

February 1998, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/

Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, ‘Asia’s Forgotten

pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980225/text/80225w07.htm. 98

Crisis: A New Approach to Burma’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, So-Hyun Kim, ‘U.S. Eyeing N.K.–Myanmar Nuke Ties’, Korea Herald, 14 July 2009. 86

Robert Burns, ‘Clinton Worried about North Korean Ties to Myanmar’, Associated Press, 21 July 2009.

87

‘On Asia Tour, Clinton Issues Warnings to N. Korea, Iran’, PBS, 22 July 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/

88

89

(Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2008). 99

Andrew Selth, ‘Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar’s Fears of Invasion’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 30, no. 3, December 2008, pp. 379–402.

100 See,

for example, Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘Playing Us For

Fools’, The New Republic, 11 July 2008. 101 It

has been suggested that these tests triggered Myanmar’s

july-dec09/clinton_07-22.html.

consideration of a nuclear-weapons capability. See, for

Burns, ‘Clinton Worried about North Korean Ties to

example, Norman Robespierre, ‘Nuclear Bond for North

Myanmar’.

Korea and Myanmar’, Asia Times Online, 4 October 2008,

HR 3890 [110th] Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JJ04Ae01.

Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-286), enacted 29 July 2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3890. 90

Andrew Selth, Burma and the Threat of Invasion: Regime Fantasy or Strategic Reality?, Regional Outlook No. 17

no. 6, November–December 2007, pp. 147–58. 85

The United Kingdom Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer

Links’, Voice of America, 10 February 2004, http://www. cfm. 84

See, for example, Andrew Selth, Burma: A Strategic Perspective, Working Paper No. 13 (San Francisco: Asia

www.smh.com.au/world/revealed-burmax2019s-nuclear‘Top Senate Aide Raises Alarm Over Burma, North Korea

The primary source for this section is Selth, Burma and Nuclear Proliferation, used with permission.

Hamish McDonald, ‘Revealed: Burma’s Nuclear Bombshell’, Sydney Morning Herald, 1 August 2009, http://

‘Myanmar May Have to Leave ASEAN if it has Nuclear Plant’, Thai News Agency, 8 August 2009, http://enews.

www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1121646 91&ft=1&f=1004.

Wassana Nanuam and Anucha Charoenpo, ‘Army Denies Burma Ambitions’, Bangkok Post, 5 August 2009.

94

Weapons’, National Public Radio, 24 August 2009, http://

83

The United Kingdom Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer

Nuclear Conspiracy?’, The Interpreter, Weblog of

Suspicions: Expert’.

82

The United Kingdom Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer from

Column 231W, 4 June 2007, http://www.publications.

The United Kingdom Parliament, ‘Burma’, Answer from Ms Margaret Beckett to Mr Hague, Hansard, Column 310W, 5 June 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.

118 An IISS Strategic Dossier

html. 102 Aung

Zaw, ‘Than Shwe, Voodoo and the Number 11’, The

Irrawaddy, 25 December 2008, http://www.irrawaddy.org/ print_article.php?art_id=14844. 103 Sean

Turnell, ‘Burma’s Insatiable State’, Asian Survey, vol.

48, no. 6, November–December 2008, pp. 958–76.

Chapter eight

Philippines

In 1976, during the reign of President Ferdinand Marcos, construction work on the first Philippine nuclear power plant began in Bataan province. But after Marcos was driven from power in 1986, and in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, the plant closed down for safety reasons before it became operational. Subsequent governments have chosen to avoid the expense, as well as the physical and political risk, associated with starting up what has come to be regarded as a colossal ‘white elephant’. Although feasibility studies have begun to evaluate how the plant might be rehabilitated, an intense domestic debate over safety and cost factors is likely to mean that nuclear energy will remain only a future proposition for the Philippines. The nation presents no reason for any proliferation concern, although the prospect of nuclear terrorism cannot be discounted in light of an ongoing Muslim insurgency in the south.

History of civilian nuclear activity The Philippines has a long history of nuclear research and development which can be traced back to a bilateral agreement with the United States signed in 1955. In 1958 the Philippines established the Philippines Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), charged with overseeing the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In a government reorgan­ isation in 1987, the PAEC was reconstituted as the Philippines Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI). Under the US Atoms for Peace programme, the Philippines received a small research reactor, which went online in 1963. Supplied by the US company General Atomics, the facility was originally a 1MWt open general-purpose reactor until it was converted to a 3MWt TRIGA-type design in 1988. It had previously used 93% HEU, but its conversion to the TRIGA design enabled it to use LEU. Operated by

the PAEC and located within the campus of the University of the Philippines Diliman in Quezon City, the reactor was used for radioisotope production, neutron spectrometry, neutron-activation analysis, reactor physics and training purposes. However, shortly after being restarted in 1988, the PRR-1 reactor pool suffered a serious leak which led to the reactor being shut down permanently. Efforts were undertaken in the 1990s in collaboration with the IAEA to repair it, but these fell victim to the financial constraints encountered by the PNRI and in 2002 a decision was made to cease repairs and decommission the reactor.1 The decommissioning will take place under the auspices of the IAEA Research Reactor Decommissioning and Dismantling (R2D2) programme: the PRR-1 has been chosen as the model reactor upon which to demonstrate the decommissioning process. The irradiated HEU materials test reactor aluminium plate fuel was shipped back to the US in 1999, although as of 2009 the unirradiated and slightly irradiated TRIGA fuel rods remain on the PRR-1 reactor site. The Philippines has collaborated extensively with the IAEA in order to enhance and widen its nuclear expertise. As of mid 2009, it had participated in 11 active and 99 completed IAEA national

Philippine-specific abbreviations ASG

Abu Sayyaf Group

BNPP

Bataan nuclear power plant

DOE

Department of Energy

MILF

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF

Moro National Liberation Front

NAPOCOR Philippines National Power Corporation PAEC

Philippines Atomic Energy Commission

PNRI

Philippines Nuclear Research Institute

PRR-1

Philippines Research Reactor - 1

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

119

Chapter eight

0

Miles 100

0

Km

Selected for site characterisation for radioactive waste facility

160 Gattaran

Morong – Location of unused 621MWe Bataan Nuclear Power Plant Mt. Pinatubo – erupted in 1991

Quezon

Philippines Nuclear Research Institute complex – including 3MWt Philippine Research Reactor (PRR-1), Radioactive Waste Management Facility Jose Panganiban Paracale

MANILA Mt. Natib – dormant volcano

Torrijos Buenavista

Location of uranium deposits Potential uranium exploration sites

Malampaya gas field

Bataan nuclear power plant

PHILIPPINES South China Sea

Palawan Island

Overlapping territorial claims by Philippines, China and others Mindanao Island

‘Safe haven’ for the rebel Abu Sayyaf Group

SULU MALAYSIA

Su

lu

ar

ip ch

ela

go

Centre of separatist Muslim movements

© IISS

technical-cooperation projects, as well as 68 active and 83 completed interregional and regional projects. One of the earliest IAEA projects was a tripartite cooperative agreement also involving India. The project involved the supply of a neutron diffractometer facility from India, set up in the PRR-1 and used to train scientists and technologists in physics. Participants from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, China, Thailand and Indonesia also came to the Philippines for training. In 1972, the cooperative project became the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific. The IAEA projects have included technical assistance for uranium prospecting, which has been going on since the 1950s. Most of the activity has been carried out by the PNRI, which established a uranium-exploration databank within its Nuclear Materials Research Group in 1991. Scientists at the PNRI have carried out smallscale research on the production of yellowcake from uranium ore. With IAEA assistance a uranium-ore

120 An IISS Strategic Dossier

processing laboratory was constructed at the PNRI and used to produce yellowcake from low-grade uranium deposits at Paracale and Jose Panganiban in the province of Camarines Norte from 1974 to 1980. This was followed by a further IAEA technical cooperative project, completed in 1984, designed to give the PNRI the ability to refine yellowcake and to convert this into uranium dioxide. However, no evidence has emerged since this time to suggest that the Philippines has received any further training in this area. Furthermore, it does not appear that the Philippines has expanded this capability.

The most significant nuclear undertaking was the construction, between 1976 and 1984, of the Bataan nuclear power plant (BNPP), equipped with a 621MWe Westinghouse light-water reactor and located in the municipality of Morong, at the foot of Mount Natib, a dormant volcano. Marcos initiated the project in response to the 1973 oil crisis in order to decrease his country’s dependence on imported oil. The eventual US$2.3 billion cost of the project, financed by a loan (the final payment of which was made in April 2007), reportedly included a large degree of embezzlement by the Marcos regime.2 After Marcos was driven from power in the so-called ‘People Power Revolution’ in February 1986, and after the Chernobyl disaster two months later, the succeeding administration of Corazon Aquino indefinitely suspended the plant’s activation on safety grounds. In 1992, negotiations with Westinghouse to upgrade the power plant were halted owing to the anticipated high cost. The subsequent administrations of Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo have chosen not to bring the plant into operation. In 1997, the fresh uranium fuel was sent back to Siemens Power Corporation. Previously shelved plans for the BNPP include its conversion to a gas-fired power plant, to be funded by the Philippine national power corporation and a Shell-Oxy consortium. A long-term energy plan released by the Ramos government in 1993 forecast a role for nuclearpower production in the Philippines from 2005 to 2025,3 and a Nuclear Power Steering Committee was established in 1995. It identified ten potential sites for a new nuclear plant in the Philippines,4 excluding the option of rehabilitating the BNPP. But

Philippines

includes a wet laboratory for research and development activities, as well as storage rooms with a total capacity of approximately 520m3. The PNRI’s Nuclear Regulations, Licensing and Safeguards Division is charged with overseeing regulatory issues. The Philippines does not have a facility in which to store radioactive waste permanently. Owing to the geological instability of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (courtesy of Arkibong Bayan [www.arkibongbayan.org]) country, the selection of a suitable location for such a repository is crucial. In few practical steps were taken during the remainder a project initiated in 2003 with the IAEA, a number of the Ramos presidency or by the incoming Estrada of candidate sites for the construction of a low- and administration (1998-2001) towards the creation of a 5 intermediate-level radioactive waste facility were domestic nuclear-power programme. considered. Assessments were carried out in the Nuclear infrastructure provinces of Bohol, Cagayan and Bataan, from which Gattaran in Northern Luzon’s Cagayan Province Despite having a long history of nuclear research, was selected for site characterisation. Following on the Philippines does not have a large or advanced from this, as of 2009 the Philippines was working nuclear infrastructure. In common with many other on two further technical cooperative projects with developing countries, the country also lacks an indethe IAEA, one active and one awaiting funding, to pendent nuclear regulatory framework, a deficiency the IAEA has offered to help the Philippines overcome.6 At present, the PNRI combines both operational and regulatory functions relating to nuclear science and nuclear energy. It carries out research and development on peaceful uses, institutes regulations and enforces safety. At its Quezon City complex it operates a Radioactive Waste Management Facility for the collection, segregation, treatment and interim storage of radioactive waste. The facility

Government departments responsible for nuclear policies

President

Department of Energy

Nuclear Power Steering Committee

Task Force on Nuclear Power Programme

Department of Science and Technology Philippines Nuclear Research Institute

Energy Policy and Planning Bureau

Atomic Research Division

Energy Resource Development Bureau

Nuclear Services and Training Division

Nuclear Regulations, Licensing and Safeguards Division

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

121

Chapter eight

Philippines: Key nuclear-policy signposts 1958

Philippines Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) founded

1963

TRIGA research reactor goes online

1974-80

Uranium-ore processing laboratory built to produce yellowcake from low-grade uranium deposits

1976

Construction of Bataan nuclear power plant begins

1988

TRIGA research reactor is shut down

July 1991 Uranium-exploration databank founded within the PNRI 1993

Long-term energy plan forecasts a role for nuclear power from 2005 to 2025

May 1995 Nuclear Power Steering Committee founded 2002

Decision is made to decommission TRIGA research reactor

June 2007 Human-resources development programme created to improve knowledge and training in nuclear technology Aug 2007 Department of Energy (DOE) states that it would reconsider nuclear option as a means of becoming less dependent on energy imports Nov 2007 DOE creates task force on nuclear energy Nov 2008 DOE releases Philippine Energy Plan, outlining plans to bring a 600MWe nuclear power plant online by 2025

develop a near-surface radioactive-waste-disposal facility. The PNRI has worked with the IAEA since the early 1980s, under a number of technical coopera-

tion projects, to develop the skills and capabilities of its scientists across a range of fields involving nuclear applications. However, the Philippines National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), mainly responsible for the country’s energy requirements, now has only about 100 trained nuclear engineers, from a high of over 700 in the 1980s. Many of those who remain are set to retire over the next half-decade.7 The Philippine government has established a working group to assess the option of retaining engineering consultants to guide nuclear development and the rebuilding of skills in nuclear science and engineering. Though the Nuclear Power Steering Committee that was established in 1995 has never been abolished, it appears to be dormant. Significant uranium deposits have not to date been identified, although over 50% of the country has been surveyed according to a 2005 report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency.8 Nevertheless, it would appear that there is still some commercial interest in uranium exploration in the Philippines, as demonstrated in November 2007 when MacroAsia Mining Corporation, a subsidiary of MacroAsia Corporation, filed an application with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau to explore copper, gold and uranium prospects in the municipalities of Torrijos and Buenavista, in Marinduque province. It would not appear from open sources that work on mining and milling has taken place since the 1980s. Furthermore, it would not appear that

Philippine energy production and consumption, 2003–07 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

14.1

24.3

25.6

25.6

25.2

-1,56

0.03

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

332.6

337.2

340.8

318.3

322.0

1.16

0.37

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

127.1

127.1

127.1

105.9

NA

-16.68 (‘06/’05)

0.08 (’06)

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

102.4

102.4

102.4

77.7

102

31.27

0.06

Coal production (thousand short tons)

2,028.3

2,735.9

3,174.7

2,597.0

2,600.4

0.13

0.04

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

9,190.0

10,064.1

11,813.5

11,116.8

11,500.4

3.45

0.16

7.8

8.5

8.3

9.8

8.5

-13.27

0.33 (’06)

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration and US Department of Energy.

122 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Philippines

Internal structure for the core of the Bataan nuclear reactor, with control rod mechanisms sticking out of the top (courtesy of Arkibong Bayan [www.arkibongbayan.org])

the Philippines has carried out work on fuel fabrication. Since the shutdown of the PRR-1 in 1998, the Philippines has not had an online nuclear research reactor.

Current nuclear plans Apart from the preliminary efforts by the Ramos and Estrada governments in the 1990s, until recently the Philippines had not pursued a domestic nuclearenergy programme. But nuclear power has become a high-profile political issue once again. Since mid 2007 Arroyo’s government has made repeated statements indicating its consideration of a domestic nuclear-power option, and has begun to incorporate nuclear power into discussions of national energy planning. A bill mandating the immediate recommissioning of the BNPP was tabled in the House of Representatives in July 2008 and, as of mid 2009, remains under consideration. The influential Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines organised a round-table discussion in July 2007, which examined the prospects of using nuclear energy. Following this, several civil society groups have likewise organised their own discussions on the issue. Forecasts of regional power shortages predicted for 2009 to 2011 led the country’s Department of Energy (DOE) to announce in the summer of 2007 that it would reconsider the nuclear option.9 The Arroyo government’s interest in nuclear power

is a medium- to longterm proposition, and at present, in the words of Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes, it indicates that it is ‘keeping its options open’ in a broader process of energy planning.10 Imported oil and coal accounted for 44.3% of the Philippines’ primary energy mix in 2007;11 and the DOE has forecast total national energy demand to rise from 28.07 million tonnes of oil equivalent (MTOE) in 2010 to 51.31 MTOE in 2030.12

The revival of the nuclear debate was, therefore, cast in terms of the government’s desire for energy self-sufficiency: the 2008-2030 Philippine Energy Plan called for greater exploration of indigenous fossil-fuel resources, development of renewable energies and alternative fuels, and an energy-efficiency programme. Nuclear energy was mentioned as a long-term option, with the first step being an enhancement of human-resource capacity.13 To this end, Reyes announced in June 2007 the establishment of a human-resources development programme to train nuclear scientists and technicians, and in November of the same year the DOE established an internal task force on nuclear energy.14 A 2008 update to the Philippine Energy Plan forecast that a 600MWe nuclear power plant would be online by 2025 and that additional 600MWe capabilities would be installed by 2027, 2030 and 2034.15

Energy motivations In the past, the Philippine economy was heavily dependent on oil, but natural gas and coal now play larger roles. Power generation in the Philippines is well diversified: 29% from natural gas, 27% from coal, about 18% from both geothermal and hydro, and 8% from oil. About 80% of the population has access to a power supply. Transmission losses are quite high at 13%. Large-scale oil production in the Philippines began around 2001 but the country produces less than 8% of what it consumes. Over

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Chapter eight

History of Bataan nuclear power plant (BNPP) 1974

Decision to build the first nuclear power plant

1976–88

Nuclear power plant at Bataan is constructed

1986

Newly elected President Corazon Aquino suspends activity at the BNPP following the Chernobyl disaster

1992

Negotiatons to upgrade the power plant are dropped on grounds of cost

1997

Uranium fuel is returned to the US

2008

A bill is tabled to the House of Representatives encouraging the recommissioning of the BNPP

70% of oil imports are from the Middle East. Coal production is expected to increase slowly over the next decade but also is far short of demand. Even though gas production surged in 2001 with the opening of a new field at Malampaya, supply has only kept slightly ahead of demand. Future hydropower development is limited to small projects. The country does have significant geothermal power development potential.

Debate over recommissioning the BNNP After an inspection of the Bataan nuclear power plant in February 2008, the IAEA advised the Philippine government to commission technical inspections and economic evaluations of the plant’s viability, and to begin developing a domestic human and technical infrastructure programme. The leader of the IAEA mission emphasised the need for the plant’s technology to be modernised,16 but the IAEA’s remit did not cover the overall usability of the plant, nor the likely cost of its rehabilitation. Following on from the IAEA’s recommendations, NAPOCOR has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) for an 18-month feasibility study, and in

January 2009 KEPCO officials concluded a preliminary three-day visit to the BNPP site. In May 2009, Pio Benavidez, senior vice president of NAPOCOR, estimated that it would cost around $800m to $1bn to repair the power plant.17 A bill mandating the immediate recommissioning of the BNPP was introduced in the Philippine House of Representatives by Nationalist People’s Coalition Congressman Mark Cojuangco in July 2008, and reached plenary in June 2009. Cojuangco claims that the BNPP could generate power at P2.50 per kilowatt-hour – compared to P4.50 for power from coal-fired plants.18 The bill has drawn public criticism from a range of local and national sources, primarily on safety grounds. Greenpeace, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, and AGHAM, a domestic science and technology advocacy organisation, have launched a media campaign and organised local protests. Senate Majority Leader Juan Miguel Zubiri has stated his opposition to the Cojuangco bill, calling instead for the development of solar farms along the eastern coast.19 The opposition’s principal concern is the BNPP’s proximity to Mount Natib. Another nearby volcano, the previously dormant Mount Pinatubo, erupted in 1991 causing 300 deaths, and the level of risk of seismic activity near the BNPP site is the subject of much debate. A paper presented to the Geological Society of America in March 2009 found the risk of an eruption at Mount Natib in the next 40 years to be high in comparison to accepted values for risks of disruptive events at other nuclear facilities, and called for a comprehensive volcanic hazard assessment and monitoring of the Natib site.20 Competing articles on the subject by geologists in the Philippines were published in the first months of 2009.21 The BNPP has not shed its public image as a poisonous relic of the Marcos regime, and there

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which the Philippines is party Instrument Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Amendment to CPPNM

Date ratified or acceded 5 Jun 1997 5 Jun 1997 Formal support 22 Sep 1981 No

Convention on Nuclear Safety

14 Oct 1994 (signed)

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

10 Mar 1998 (signed)

124 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Philippines

Philippine accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

Date ratified or acceded 21 May 1973 5 Oct 1972

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

16 Oct 1972

South-East Asia Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

21 Jun 2001

Chemical Weapons Convention

11 Dec 1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Additional Protocol

23 Feb 2001 Signed 30 Sep 1997; not yet ratified

is a receptive public audience for claims that the plant itself is dangerously defective. Newspaper reports refer to an unreleased safety assessment completed by an ad hoc Senate committee under the Aquino administration in 1990, which reportedly found defects that would take six and a half years, and approximately US$1.5bn, to repair (although the study’s contents have not been publicly confirmed).22 Having passed through the House energy committee, the bill was amended by the appropriations committee in March 2009 to require the completion of a domestic safety and feasibility study at the expense of the DOE and NAPOCOR. The government, for its part, insists that the pursuit of the nuclear-energy option in the Philippines will indeed be contingent on the successful completion of safety and economic viability studies and consultations, and that nuclear power is not the highest priority in the government’s energy self-sufficiency strategy. Presidential Adviser on Global Warming and Climate Change Heherson Alvarez has referred to the plant as a ‘white elephant’, noting that the rehabilitation costs for the BNPP are likely to exceed US$1bn – which amounts to over a third of the government’s planned spending to support the struggling Philippine economy.23 However, a presidential spokesman said in February 2009 that if the DOE’s feasibility study and consultations conclude that the BNPP is fit for rehabilitation, ’then we would find no reason why we would have to delay’.24 In all, the Philippine commitment to nuclear energy remains a long-term proposition, whether

or not the BNPP is deemed suitable for rehabilitation. The project’s real and perceived safety risks are likely to provoke continued public opposition; the government’s immediate energy planning priorities lie elsewhere; and a continuing economic downturn may lead to a revision of calculations of medium-term energy demand. Most importantly, since the abandonment of the BNPP in the 1980s, the Philippines’ capacity to maintain a domestic nuclear energy programme has eroded almost completely. ’In effect’, as NAPOCOR President Froilan Tampinco put it, ’we will be starting from square one’.25

Nuclear safety and physical protection The Philippines has emphasised the need for high nuclear safety standards, and it is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (although not yet the 2005 amendment to it) and the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. It has sought the IAEA’s advice on important safety matters, such as the decommissioning of the PRR-1 reactor and the future of the BNPP. The Philippines also collaborates on such issues at a regional level and is an active member of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network, for which it hosted a five-day workshop in September 2008 covering the subjects of Project Planning, Management, Regulatory Review and Safety Assessment. This provided information on decommissioning and was attended by representatives from nine countries. As one of its domestic outreach functions, the PNRI’s Nuclear Regulations, Licensing and Safeguards Division conducted a ‘nuclear safety caravan’ that held four provincial sorties between March and July 2008. The caravan is a public information and education campaign that seeks to promote the open exchange of safety and security information among various stakeholders who are involved in the peaceful use of radioactive materials in the Philippines. The PNRI’s radiological emergency research group has been involved in searches for radioactive materials that have been reported missing. From 2001 to 2007 there were 13 such cases, all involving industrial devices such as density gauges that contain small amounts of radioactive materials such as americium-241/beryllium, cesium-237 and,

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Chapter eight

(CTBT). Underscoring its non-proliferation commitment, the Philippine constitution of 1987 outlines ’a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons’ on Philippine territory.30 As part of the security cooperation between the Arroyo government and the United States after 11 September 2001, the Philippines has expressed strong support for the Hans Blix, IAEA Director General, and William G. Padolina, Secretary of the Philippines’ US-led Proliferation Department of Science and Technology sign the Additional Protocol, 30 September 1997 (Petr Security Initiative (PSI).31 Pavlicek/IAEA) It sent observers to the Japan-led maritime interdiction drills in the Pacific in 2004 and 2007 but has in one case respectively, krypton-85 and iridiumnot yet contributed military personnel to PSI exer192.26 cises. Non-proliferation policies Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo’s chairmanship of the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in The Philippines is an active member of the global and 2007 emphasised regional approaches to the North regional non-proliferation regimes, and emphasises Korean and Iranian nuclear questions, implementanon-proliferation as a priority in its engagement tion of the SEANWFZ, and ratification of the CTBT.32 with international organisations. It joined the IAEA in 1958, signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified the treaty in 1972. It concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1974 and signed an Additional Protocol in 1997, although as of September 2009 the Senate had yet to ratify it. The issue of ratification has been stuck in the Senate foreign relations committee. Members of the Senate, whose attention is largely devoted to domestic issues, apparently see no reason to give priority to a complicated international accord that has little resonance with the public. Senators may also fear that ratification would be opposed by industry groups who might equate the Additional Protocol’s export-reporting requirements with ‘export controls’, which they oppose on economic grounds.27 Although the executive branch has said the measure should be universally adopted,28 ratification does not appear to be high on its agenda.29 The Philippines signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty in 1995 and ratified it in 2001. That year the nation also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

126 An IISS Strategic Dossier

In line with its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Philippines also emphasises the importance of disarmament on the part of nuclearweapons states. As a member of the UN Security Council from 2004 to 2005, it participated in the negotiations that led to the adoption of Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Philippines later served as vice chairman of the 1540 Committee. It promptly met the reporting requirements of 1540 in October 2004 and followed up a year later with additional information. Philippines ambassador to the United Nations, Libran Nuevas Cabactulan, was selected to chair the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Strategic trade controls The nation has established an extensive set of regulations and institutional framework for licensing exports in the nuclear field. The Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime, established in 2004, is the focal point for export-control policy development, and established an initial dual-use list of

Philippines

ment the Port of Manila was provided with 19 vehicle-radiation portal monitors, enabling the authorities to scan containers and detect radiation.

Geopolitical context Few proliferation drivers The Philippines does not appear to have any significant proliferation drivers. This is particuPresident Fidel Ramos (L) views the mothballed Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, 9 April 1996 (PA) larly so because of its alliance relationship with 245 controlled items. Reflecting its name, however, the US and the military and financial aid that would trans­national organised crime involving trafbe jeopardised were Manila to consider a weapons ficking in drugs, persons and small arms, as well as option. terrorism, is its primary focus. Arroyo administration support for US security The Philippines has created a National Authority priorities since 2001 has gone a long way to make up for WMD Inspection and Control to liaise with the for tensions in the bilateral relationship in the 1990s: IAEA, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT the US withdrew from its bases in the Philippines Organisation and the Organisation for the Prohibition following the Senate’s rejection of a base-lease extenof Chemical Weapons. This body, currently run by sion agreement and controversy over the US policy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains ad hoc in to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear nature, but allows representation from all the releweapons. President George W. Bush addressed a vant agencies. The Bureau of Customs in the Ministry joint session of the Philippine Congress in October of Finance and the Philippine National Police are the 2003, and in the same month the Philippines was main enforcement agencies for export controls. As is officially designated as a Major Non-NATO Ally. the case with customs agencies in many countries, The Philippines’ broader relations with the United non-proliferation export controls do not currently States are based on a legacy of colonial governance, appear to be their concern. wartime liberation, Cold War alliance, security The threats that the Philippines faces from cooperation and the perception of a shared affection terrorist groups (see below) has made the governfor liberal democratic norms. As was demonstrated ment much more open to international cooperation when the Philippine Congress voted down the and support on strategic trade controls, especially renewal of US base rights in 1991, Filipino nationfrom the US, Japan and Australia. The governalism often sits uncomfortably in political terms ment is particularly receptive to assistance that with the continuing influence of a former colonial simultaneously builds domestic capacity for ruler.33 However, in strategic terms the alliance is counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism. solid, underpinned by the US–Philippines Mutual Among other steps, in 2005 the Philippines joined Defense Treaty signed in 1951, and reinforced the Megaports Initiative, a US DOE programme after the US base withdrawal by a Visiting Forces implemented to prevent trafficking of nuclear and Agreement, signed by the Ramos administration in radioactive materials, by providing technological 1998. The US continues to provide significant levels support and training at large ports worldwide. of aid to the Philippines: in 2008, this amounted to Goods and containers are scanned regardless of their US$132 million, 60% of which was targeted at develorigin or intended destination. Through the agreeopment in Mindanao.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter eight

Philippine regional diplomacy pursues an agenda of constructive cooperation and accommodation of the major powers. The country was a founding member of ASEAN; it served as chair in 2006–07 and ratified the ASEAN charter in October 2008. A 2004 speech by then foreign minister Romulo expressed Philippine foreign policy in the twentyfirst century in terms of three ‘pillars’: national security, economic security and the welfare of the Filipino diaspora. He also outlined a range of new realities, including a recognition that ’China, Japan and the United States have a determining influence in the security situation and economic evolution of East Asia’, and a greater need for multilateral decision-making, through ASEAN.34 Bilateral relations with China have been broadly cooperative, and have been helped considerably by China’s engagement in the ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 processes. Economic ties are strengthening as China’s economy continues to grow: Philippine exports to China rose from US$328m to US$4.6bn in the decade up to 2006. However, the two countries’ overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea have been the subject of unresolved debates in Manila and have caused some policymakers there to view Beijing’s policies with distrust. Earlier in the decade, China rejected ASEAN pressure to adopt a code of conduct for behaviour around the Spratly Islands. The best that could be achieved was the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a non-binding agreement through which the states agreed not to occupy currently uninhabited islands and aimed to resolve territorial disputes peacefully without the use or threat of force.35 A three-way agreement on joint development, also involving Vietnam, lapsed in 2008. In March 2009, following a similar move by Vietnam, Arroyo signed into law a bill defining the ’baselines’ of the Philippine archipelago as including over 53 disputed islands in the South China Sea. Although both sides reaffirmed their desire to maintain and strengthen bilateral relations, this development sharpened divisions with Beijing and threatened to make cooperation more difficult.

Potential risks of disintegration and WMD terrorism The Philippine government’s most pressing security concerns come from domestic militancy. The most

128 An IISS Strategic Dossier

severe threat is the separatist Muslim movement on the southern island of Mindanao, the roots of which lie in grievances over settlement by Christians in the region. The continued perception of secondclass citizenship for the Moro Muslim population, as compared to sections of the Christian community, and distrust of the central government provide the movement’s organising power.36 The militant Muslim groups have shown a capability and will to attack not only the government’s security forces but also civilian targets including public markets, ports, airports, and buses. Although they have not given any hint that they might consider WMD terrorism, either through attacks on future nuclear facilities or the use of radiological dirty bombs, it is nevertheless worthwhile to assess the likelihood of such dangers emerging in the future and for security provisions at any nuclear facilities to take account of them. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) waged a campaign for Mindanao independence in the 1970s, briefly reaching a peace accord with the Marcos government in 1976. After the 1976 deal collapsed and Mindanao regressed into conflict, the MNLF splintered, producing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which now leads the Muslim insurgency, while the MNLF entered into a peace agreement with the Ramos government in 1996. The security situation in Mindanao is complicated by the involvement of the New People’s Army, a Maoist rebel movement which operates throughout the Philippines, as well as terrorist and criminal activity perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has often taken Filipinos and foreigners hostage for ransom. The US State Department lists Sulu as a being a safe haven for the ASG,37 and both the ASG and the MILF are thought to have provided refuge for renegade members of the pan-regional terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), which has been linked to al-Qaeda in the past. The 1996 peace deal with the MNLF signed by the Ramos government created an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. A monitoring mission under the auspices of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and led by Malaysia supervised a fragile ceasefire with the MILF from 2003, until the Arroyo government signed a memorandum of understanding in July 2008 to bring the MILF into the structure of the autonomous region. However,

Philippines

the agreement provoked demonstrations from local Christian residents, to which the government responded by suspending the peace deal in August 2008 following a supreme court restraining order, prompting the resumption of attacks by MILF forces. The intensity of the subsequent fighting suggests that the MILF may be able to hold or even expand the territory it controls, making it more difficult for the Philippine authorities to curb activities by the ASG, JI and other terrorist groups in the south.

Conclusions The Philippines would appear to be one of the least likely countries in Southeast Asia to start a nuclearweapons development programme. The country does not appear to have any security concerns or

domestic political pressures that would, either in the short or medium term, drive it to consider such a programme. In addition, the small scale and underdeveloped nature of its nuclear infrastructure mean that any such programme would need significant external assistance, both in technical and human capital. Even the country’s putative nuclear-energy programme appears to have an uncertain future, as in addition to the country’s lack of the necessary infrastructure to support and sustain such a project, financial and safety concerns are likely to impede its progress significantly. If the Philippines did ever decide to introduce nuclear power, it would need, inter alia, to establish an independent regulatory body, divorced from nuclear research and operational responsibilities.

Notes 1

R2D2 Project, IAEA, http://www-ns.iaea.org/projects/

10

2

‘Nuclear Power Plant Loan Finally Paid’, Philippine

11

4

Situation: Philippine Energy Plan 2008–2030 Public

nuclear energy option at ‘white elephant’ plant’, AFP, 8

Consultation’, p. 6, http://www.doe.gov.ph/PEP/ consultation.htm..

Carlito Aleta, ‘Energy security and the role of the nuclear

12

Ibid., p. 14.

energy option’, presented to the PNRI, 11 December 2007.

13

Ibid., p. 28.

Raymund Jose Quilop, ‘Using Nuclear Energy: A

14

Philippines Department of Energy, Departmental Order

Philippine Experience’, paper presented at the 11th

002007-11-0012, 5 November 2007: http://www.doe.gov.

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Working Group on Confidence and Security Building

ph/popup/DO%202007-11-0012.pdf. 15

May 1999, http://www.cscap.nuctrans.org/Nuc_Trans/

16

locations/philippine-june10/philippine.htm. Communication with Philippine political scientist, May

2009. 18

plenary’, Inquirer.net, 3 June 2009. Jess Diaz, ‘BNPP

‘Reyes meets with IAEA’s ElBaradei’, Philippines

operation to bring down the cost of power – lawmaker’,

gov.ph/News/2009-04-27-IAEA.htm.

8

The Philippines Star, 11 May 2009. 19

‘Solar farms instead of nuclear power plant reopening,

Paul M. Icamina ‘RP keeps nuclear option wide open’,

Sen. Zubiri says’, Philippine Information Agency, 25

Manila Sunday Times, 26 October 2008.

February 2009, http://www.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&fi=p090225.

Joint report by the OECD and IAEA, Uranium 2003: Resources, Production and Demand (Paris: OECD, 2004), pp.

9

Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, ‘Bataan nuke bill reaches House

of%20sec%20lotilla.html. Department of Energy, 27 April 2009, http://www.doe. 7

Alena Mae S. Flores, ‘$1b needed to rehabilitate aging Bataan nuclear plant’, Manila Standard Today, 11 May

Option’, Philippines Department of Energy, 10 June 2007,

6

‘BNPP validation right step: Savants’, Business Mirror, 9 March 2009:.

17

2009; ‘Statement of Secretary Lotilla on Nuclear Power http://www.doe.gov.ph/news/2007-06-10-statement%20

‘RP plans to start up 600-MW nuclear power plant by 2025’, Philippine Star, 3 November 2008.

Measures held in Seoul, Republic of Korea on 25–27

5

Philippine Department of Energy, ‘Philippine Energy

Business Inquirer/AFP, 13 June 2007; ‘Philippines revisits January 2009. 3

‘Gov’t still mulls on opening Bataan nuclear plant’, Sun Star, 22 February 2008.

r2d2project/overview.htm.

htm&no=56. 20

Alain C.M. Volentik et al., ‘Volcanic Hazard Assessment

186–7.

for Critical Facilities: The Example of the Bataan Nuclear

‘Reyes explores nuclear power option’, Manila Standard, 14

Power Plant (Philippines)’, delivered to meeting of

August 2007.

Geological Society of America Southeast Section, 12 March

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

129

Chapter eight

21

2009: http://gsa.confex.com/gsa/2009SE/finalprogram/

policy‘, to ’pursue an independent foreign policy‘, and

abstract_154813.htm.

to pursue ’a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons‘ on

Kevin S. Rodolfo, ‘The geological hazards of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant’, Philippine Star, 12 March 2009; ‘No

22

against terror’, Philippines government news release,

8 March 2009.

15 September 2005, http://www.gov.ph/index2.

‘CBCP rejects nuclear power plant revival’, Philippine Daily

php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=11757. 32

Heherson Alvarez, ‘Reviving a nuke plant in a fragile world’ ‘CBCP rejects nuclear power plant revival’, Philippine Daily

www.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&fi=p070727.htm&no=86. 33

Inquirer, 27 February 2009. 25

26

p. vii. 34

Speech to the Manila Overseas Press Club, 17 September

Friedrich Steinhäusler and Lyudmila Zaitseva, Database

2004, http://www.dfa.gov.ph/archive/speech/romulo/

Sources, Division of Physics and Biophysics, University of

realities.htm. 35

Salzburg [restricted access]. 27

Communication with regional experts, May 2009.

28

See ‘Philippine Statement’, United Nations, May

‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, ASEAN, 4 November 2002, http://www.aseansec. org/13163.htm.

36

Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Mary Judd, The Mindanao

2007, http://www.un.org/NPT2010/statements/

Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Cost, and Potential Peace

Philippine_01_05_pm.pdf.

Dividend, Working Paper 31822 (Washington DC: World

Communication with Philippine political scientist, May 2009.

30

Alberto G. Romulo, ‘Philippine Foreign Policy Realities’,

News/0109%5CJan%2019,%202009.pdf. on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation

29

H.W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992),

‘Kepco officials visit BNPP’, NAPOCOR Power Hotline, 19 January 2009: http://www.napocor.gov.ph/

‘Nuclear non-proliferation tops AMM agenda – Romulo’, Philippines government news release, 27 July 2007, http://

(letter to the editor), Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 January 2009. 24

‘PGMA endorses US proliferation security initiative

active fault at BNPP – geologist’, Philippine Daily Inquirer,

Inquirer, 27 February 2009. 23

Philippine territory. 31

Bank, 2005), p. 10. 37

‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2008’, US Department

Article Two of the 1987 constitution includes

of State, 30 April 2009, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/

commitments to ‘[renounce] war as an instrument of

crt/2008/122438.htm.

130 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter nine

Singapore

Singapore is a staunch supporter of nuclear nonproliferation efforts and has taken the lead in promoting regional safety and regulation in relation to nuclear power generation. Geographically compact and with no significant reservoir of nuclear expertise, it is the only advanced state in Southeast Asia not to have formally considered the introduction of nuclear energy. In the context of growing regional interest in nuclear power, however, the government has not ruled the option out. Indeed, since mid 2008, the idea of exploiting nuclear power has begun to take root in the city state.

Nuclear infrastructure If Singapore ever were to decide to pursue nuclear power, it would need to build the necessary physical, regulatory and personnel infrastructure from scratch. The nation has no research reactor and its only nuclear experience is with nuclear applications in medicine and industry. These applications include diagnostic radiology, radiotherapy, non-destructive testing inspections and gamma-ray sterilisation. Scientific research in these fields is carried out in universities and other educational institutions. Since 1976, Singapore has completed 25 national projects with the IAEA, mostly in the fields of radiation protection and radioisotopes. Two IAEA projects remained active in mid 2009. In addition, Singapore has participated in 53 still-active and 38 completed inter-regional and regional technical-assistance projects. An example of Singapore’s nuclear-science achievements can be seen in the March 2009 establishment by Singapore Radiopharmaceuticals Pte Ltd of a S$10.8 million (US$7.1 million) state-of-theart cyclotron and central radiopharmacy facility for the production of radiopharmaceuticals for molecular imaging of cancer, heart and brain diseases and biomedical research.

From 1973 to 2007, Singapore’s facilities and work in nuclear applications were controlled under the regulatory framework of the Radiation Protection Act. In 2007, the legislation was modified to transfer the roles and functions of the Centre for Radiation Protection from the Ministry of Health to the National Environment Agency under the Ministry of the Environment and Water Resources. The Centre for Radiation Protection was replaced by the Centre for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Science (CRPNS) and, with a staff of 25, the CRPNS is now the national regulatory authority for radiation and nuclear activities in Singapore. Its responsibilities include controlling the storage of radiation sources and the disposal of radioactive waste.

Nuclear energy prospects Until very recently, Singapore had never publicly considered embarking upon a civilian nuclear power programme. This was not for lack of a rationale relating to energy security and diversification, fossil-fuel prices and a growing need for electricity to sustain the island nation’s continued economic growth. Singapore has no fossil-fuel or hydropower resources, but it has enjoyed complete electrification for several decades and transmission losses are minimal. Singapore’s energy sources are less diversified than those of its closest neighbours, and the government has expressed concern over the state’s vulnerability to supply disruption.1 The instability of its political relationships with near neighbours contributes to Singapore’s concerns about energy security: about 80% of electricity is generated from natural gas piped in from Indonesia and Malaysia. The rest is generated from oil, over 70% of which comes from the Middle East. Singapore’s government projects that electricity consumption will double over the next 20 years.2 The future imple-

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter nine

mentation of new energy technologies and projects such as the electrification of the transport system could further increase electricity demand. The preceding considerations and the appeal of nuclear energy as a low-carbon source mean that the nuclear option must be included in any serious policy study of energy alternatives. A national energy policy report published in 2007 concluded, however, that because of problems associated with the size and population density of Singapore and the storage of nuclear waste, an indigenous nuclearenergy capability was not feasible.3 In December 2007, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong remarked that international standards requiring a 30kmwide safety zone around any nuclear plant meant that Singapore, which stretches only 40km east to west, could not consider producing nuclear energy.4 Though the safety-zone requirement standard to which Lee referred does not have such setback requirements, the idea that Singapore is too small for nuclear power was generally accepted.5 In December 2008, however, the prime minister indicated that the government had not ruled out the nuclear-energy option.6 Furthermore, former chief defence scientist at Singapore’s Ministry of Defence Lui Pao Chuen has remarked that a combination of a sufficiently costly carbon tax and consistently high oil prices could contribute to changing the way government views the nuclear cost–benefit equation in the future.7 How Singapore’s limited landmass could accommodate a nuclear power plant remains a big question, however, and government statements about the potential for nuclear energy remain vague. At an energy conference in late 2008, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew mooted the possibility of building a nuclear power plant at sea or on Pedra Branca island (near Malaysia),8 but the smile with which he said this, and Malaysia’s probable extreme sensitivity to any such construction, suggest that the idea may need to be taken with a grain of salt. One rather futuristic idea recently floated is to consider putting a nuclear reactor underground in stable rock formations.9 Russian nuclear researchers have worked on this concept for several years,10 but no such reactors are in operation anywhere in the world today. A more likely possibility, at least in terms of technical feasibility, is that Singapore could in future benefit from nuclear energy if Malaysia built nuclear power plants, as the electric grids of

132 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew at the 8th IISS Asian Security Summit, May 2009

the two countries are already linked for emergency sharing. Further integration of regional countries’ energy supplies would be in line with the ASEAN ‘ASEAN Vision 2020’ plan for an interconnecting power grid.11 However, there has been no official bilateral discussion so far of the possibility of drawing electricity from a future Malaysian nuclear power plant.

Nuclear safety and security Safety is the nuclear-related issue of greatest concern to Singapore. In considering the nuclear-energy aspirations of neighbouring countries, Singaporean officials are largely silent on the proliferation potential. They do worry, however, about trans-boundary health and environmental risks, and the impact a nuclear accident or incident might have on the trade and transport routes on which Singapore relies. They also know that any nuclear accidents in the region would probably set back any prospect of Singapore introducing nuclear energy, in the same way that the Chernobyl disaster inhibited construction of new nuclear power plants worldwide for two decades. Singapore’s awareness of the possible impact of a nuclear accident is reflected in its 1998 accession to the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. It also acceded to the Convention on

Singapore

Singapore’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

9.7

9.8

8.6

8.6

8.6

0.00

0.01

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

668.3

745.7

808.6

857.0

916.0

6.88

1.07

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

0

0

0

0

0

-

-

187.9

233.4

233.4

233.4

243

0.84

0.22

Coal production (thousand short tons)

0

0

0

0

0

-

-

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

14.6

13.7

3.3

7.7

8.8

14.29

negligible

0

0

0

0

0

-

-

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy

Nuclear Safety in the same year, though it has yet to sign up to conventions that deal with the physical protection of nuclear material, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment. Mindful of the possible dangers associated with nuclear energy, ASEAN leaders decided at their 13th Summit in November 2007 to establish a regional nuclear-safety regime. As chair of the 2007 ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Energy, Singapore assumed the chair of an ASEAN Nuclear Energy Safety Sub-Sector Network to explore safety issues, and hosted the first meeting of this group on 22 January 2008. In March 2009, the National University of Singapore’s recently established Energy Studies Institute hosted the first Southeast Asian roundtable on nuclear energy. The meeting brought together ASEAN officials and academics to discuss nuclear-energy generation, the global nuclear-safety regime and approaches to regulation, as well as more specific issues of nuclear-waste management, the transportation of spent fuel and emergency responses.

Non-proliferation and disarmament Singapore has been an active supporter of global efforts to combat nuclear-weapons proliferation. It ratified the NPT in 1976 and the following year adopted a comprehensive safeguards agreement with a Small Quantities Protocol, which in March

2008 it modified in accordance with IAEA advice. Also in March 2008, Singapore brought an Additional Protocol into force. Singapore has also been an active participant in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The country hosted PSI maritime and ground interdiction exercise Deep Sabre in October 2005 and will host another PSI exercise in October 2009. Singapore was the first Asian country to sign the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and has implemented a robust export-control system since 2003. The country also co-organised the ASEAN Regional Forum Seminar on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with China and the US in March 2006. In 2007, it hosted a pilot IAEA Sub-Regional Workshop on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Information Management and Coordination. A strong proponent of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Singapore has sought to persuade nuclear-weapons states to accede to the treaty, and has also supported other regional and global nuclear disarmament efforts.

Strategic trade controls Singapore has a strong export-control system, especially in comparison with other ASEAN states. Its strategic-goods-control law is comprehensive in its coverage of technology types, covering nuclear, chemical and biological and conventional weapons, and it imposes restrictions on the export, re-export, transhipment, transit, transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technologies related to such

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

133

Chapter nine

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Singapore is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded to

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

15 Jan 1998

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

15 Jan 1998

Convention on Nuclear Safety

15 Mar 1998

International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

1 Dec 2006 (signed)

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Singapore is not party Instrument IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

weapons. Controls also extend to intangible transfers of dual-use items. The items controlled mirror those controlled by the key multilateral supplier arrangements (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime). Singapore is not a member of these regimes because it is not a ‘supplier’ per se, although membership has been considered. The strategic-goods-control

law also has a catch-all provision for any items ‘intended for weapons of mass destruction end use but [which] have not been included in the control list’. Singapore’s clear and accessible legislation, relatively comprehensive control list and coherent licensing process aid the implementation of its export controls. Enforcement is enhanced by the extensive availability and use of scanners and hand-held devices such as Singaporean military specialists check for radiation during the Proliferation Security Initiative Pacific Shield 2007 exercise in Yokohama port (Getty) radiation detectors and explosives detectors to conduct non-intrusive and secure checks. Singapore has in addition implemented a Secure Trade Partnership programme with its businesses to help raise the overall level of supply-chain security standards in the state. The country participates in both multilateral (PSI) and bilateral (CSI) initiatives aimed at countering WMD proliferation, and Singapore Customs devotes considerable effort to outreach programmes to industry and the public. Because of the sheer volume of its trade, however, and the inadequate controls of many of its trading partners, Singapore’s export-control system is not leak-proof. As one of the most important business and transhipment hubs in the world, Singapore has been targeted by arms dealers and proliferators. US citizen Laura Wang-Woodford, the director of Singaporean firm Monarch

134 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Singapore

Singapore accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date ratified or acceded to

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

2 Dec 1975

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

10 March 1976

Outer Space Treaty

10 Sept 1974

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

18 Oct 1977

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

27 Mar 1997

Chemical Weapons Convention

20 June 1997

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

10 Nov 2001

Additional Protocol

31 March 2008

Aviation Pte Ltd, was arrested by US authorities in December 2007 on suspicion of illegally exporting components for Chinook military helicopters from the US to Singapore and thence to Iran, claiming the components were for commercial use. She pleaded guilty in March 2009, but at the time of writing has yet to be sentenced.12 Between December 2002 and August 2003, the A.Q. Khan proliferation network moved Malaysian-built centrifuge parts destined for Libya’s nuclear-weapons programme through the port of Singapore on their way to Dubai. Bikar Metal Asia, a Singaporean subsidiary of German firm Bikar Metalle, sold aluminium tubing to the Malaysian firm Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE), which used it in the manufacture of these parts. The management of Bikar Metal Asia was not found to have committed any crime by engaging in this supply, as it was determined that it did so in ignorance of the materials’ proliferation purpose.13 Centrifuge-related equipment from the Mitutoyo Corporation in Japan was also sent to SCOPE through Singapore in October and November 2001 for onward shipment to Libya’s nuclear-weapons programme.14 In April 2007, the US sanctioned Sokkia Singapore Pte Ltd for ‘actions that potentially make a material contribution to the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran and Syria’.15

Geopolitical context Although it has faced no immediate threats since the 1960s, as an island city state, Singapore is inherently vulnerable. Its relationship with Malaysia, on which Singapore relies for a large proportion of its food, water, energy and other natural resources, has been chequered since their traumatic separation in 1965.16 Relations with nearby Indonesia have generally been more equable, though Singapore is conscious of the

possibility of adverse political change that might see a hostile Islamist or ultra-nationalist regime coming to power there or in Malaysia. In the wider region, Singapore is concerned about the changing regional balance of power, in particular about the potentially destabilising impact of China’s growing power and confidence, notably in the South China Sea, where China has major territorial claims. Singapore views its security within the framework of a regional balance of power based on deterrence. This deterrence is provided by national military capabilities that are able to ensure the strategic pre-emption of potential regional adversaries.17 While deterrence is the fundamental tenet of Singapore’s defence policy, the superiority of the city state’s conventional military capability over that of its neighbours, combined with their nonnuclear status, means that it has had no reason to consider developing a nuclear-weapons capability. Careful to avoid provocation by naming any state as a potential threat, Singapore emphasises a doctrine of ‘non-directional deterrence.’18 This conventional deterrence posture is supplemented by a loose defence relationship with the UK, Australia and New Zealand through the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), to which Malaysia also belongs.19 Extended nuclear deterrence through majorpower guarantee has never featured explicitly in Singapore’s security calculations. Nevertheless, during the 1960s the United Kingdom kept nuclear weapons for its bomber aircraft at Singapore’s Tengah Air Base.20 More recently, since the 1990s Singapore has developed close security relations with the United States. In July 2005, the two countries signed a Strategic Framework Agreement intended to expand cooperation on defence and security. US

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

135

Chapter nine

naval vessels, including aircraft carriers, call regularly at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base. There are few realistic circumstances under which Singapore might be prompted to develop nuclear weapons in the future. The only conceivable scenario is one in which Indonesia or other regional states acquired their own nuclear weapons in the context of a dramatic deterioration in the AsiaPacific regional order characterised primarily by US

military disengagement and Chinese belligerence. Singapore would employ every lever at its disposal to prevent such a development. Today, it believes the best guarantee of national security lies in the combination of a strong national defence capability, close security ties to the US and other partners such as Australia, stable and mutually profitable relations with China, and a cooperative regional framework via ASEAN.

Notes 1

Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, ‘Energy for

11

Growth: National Energy Policy Report’, November 2007,

2004–2009’, adopted 9 June 2004, pp. 11–13, http://www.

http://app.mti.gov.sg/data/pages/2546/doc/NEPR.pdf, pp. 4, 16. 2  Ibid.,

Ibid., p. 32.

4

Li Xueying, ‘Nuclear Power Not Ruled Out’, Straits Times, 6 December 2008.

5

aseansec.org/pdf/APAEC0409.pdf. 12

p. 28.

3

‘ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC)

US Department of Justice, ‘Director of Singapore Firm Pleads Guilty to Illegally Exporting Controlled Aircraft Components to Iran’, 13 March 2009, http://www.usdoj. gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-nsd-227.html.

13  David

Crawford and Steve Stecklow, ‘How a Nuclear

Lee had probably been referring to the outer limit of the

Ring Skirted Export Laws’ Asian Wall Street Journal,

5–30km ‘urgent action planning zone radius’ recom-

22 March 2004; Sammy Salama and Nilsu Goren,

mended by the IAEA in case of a radiological emergency

‘Special Report: The A.Q. Khan Network: Crime ... and Punishment?’, WMD Insights, no. 3, March 2006, p. 6.

at a reactor. This safety standard is a guideline for emergency response, not for setback from populated areas, for

14

a setback standard the 5km maximum radius the IAEA

Martin Fackler, ‘5 Japanese Arrested in Atom Case’, New York Times, 25 August 2006.

which there is no set standard. Some countries apply as 15

‘US Imposes Nonproliferation Sanctions Against 14 Foreign

recommends for the area within which urgent precau-

Entities’, Export Control News and Alerts, April 2007, http://

tionary protective action should be taken in a radiological

learnexportcompliance.com/news/2007/04/17/us-imposes-

emergency. See IAEA, ‘Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency’, Safety Guide

nonproliferation-sanctions-against-14-foreign-entities/. 16

Tensions between Singapore and Malaysia have included,

no. GS-G-2.1, http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/

most importantly, disputes over the future of Malaysian water

pdf/pub1265_web.pdf.

supplies to Singapore, but also differences over Malayan

6

Li, ‘Nuclear Power Not Ruled Out’.

Railway land in Singapore, the siting of customs, immigration

7

Jessica Cheam, ‘Asia Weighs Nuclear Power Option’,

and quarantine facilities, the reconstruction of the land trans-

Straits Times, 22 December 2008.

port link across the causeway between the two states, and the

8

‘Transcript of Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s Dialogue with Singapore Energy Conference’, Singapore

Singapore Air Force’s use of Malaysian airspace. 17

9

10

Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 55.

Government Press Centre, 4 November 2008, http://www. news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/

18

Ibid.

mica/transcript/T-20081105-1.html.

19

Established to replace British defence guarantees

Alvin Chew, ‘Underground Nuclear Power Plant:

following the UK’s withdrawal from territories ‘East of

Why Not?’, RSIS Commentary, 4 March 2009, http://

Suez’, the FPDA is a set of bilateral agreements signed in

mlist.ntu.edu.sg/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0903&L=rsis_

1971 whereby the five member states agreed to consult

commentaries&T=0&F=P&P=600.

each other in the event of external aggression or threat of

See V.N. Dolgov, ‘Inherently Safe Power-Generating Unit for an Underground Nuclear Power Plant’, Atomic Energy, vol. 76, no. 2, February 1994, pp. 136–38.

136 An IISS Strategic Dossier

attack against Malaysia or Singapore. 20

Richard Moore, ‘Where Her Majesty’s Weapons Were’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 57, no. 1, January 2001.

Chapter ten

Thailand

In May 2010 Thailand plans to decide once and for all whether it will embark on a nuclear-energy programme, after several aborted attempts dating back to the 1960s. The intention, which is outlined in the June 2007 Power Development Plan (PDP), is to bring 2,000MWe of nuclear power online by 2020 and another 2,000MWe by 2021. Thai officials hope this will simultaneously help their country meet its growing energy needs and tackle a serious pollution problem caused by carbon emissions. A combination of political instability, legislative hurdles and public concerns about nuclear safety could prevent Thailand from sticking to its ambitious schedule. Conversely, competition with Vietnam’s nuclearenergy programme may generate a certain amount of momentum. The proliferation risks posed by Thailand’s proposed nuclear-power programme are low because of a generally benign environment. There is increasing regional integration within Southeast Asia, and Thailand has strong bilateral relationships with the United States, China and India. However, concerns do exist over Thailand’s ability to implement effective measures for nuclear safety and security, particularly given the country’s political instability, the existence of rebel groups and terrorist organisations, and evidence of corruption among enforcement agencies.

TRIGA research reactor at Bangkhen, Bangkok, was commissioned in 1961, operating with 1MWt of power between 1962 and 1975. It was shut for modification in 1975, and since 1977 has operated as a nominal 2MWt, multi-purpose TRIGA Mark-III reactor for applications such as neutron-activation analysis, radioisotope production, gem irradia-

History of civilian nuclear activity Thailand’s nuclear development began in 1954 with the launch of the Thai Atomic Energy Commission (Thai AEC), a policymaking body for the civilian use of nuclear energy. In 1957 Thailand joined the IAEA, and in 1961 the first Atomic Energy for Peace Act established the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP, quirkily renamed the Office of Atoms for Peace, OAP, in 2002). A US-supplied

tion, neutron radiography and research work. The reactor is light-water-cooled and heavy-watermoderated, and its low-enriched uranium fuel is supplied by the US. In 1993, the OAEP launched a second reactor project at the Nuclear Research Centre in Ongkharak in Nakhon Nayok province, 60 km northeast of Bangkok. The project was to involve the commissioning of a 10MWt TRIGA research reactor, supplied by US firm General Atomics, and the construction of facilities for isotope production and waste processing and storage, which would be carried out by a consortium of firms from the US, Japan and Australia. But the project was abandoned during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and, despite being reinstated under new contractual arrange-

Thailand-specific abbreviations Thai AEC

Thai Atomic Energy Commission

EGAT

Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand

MOST

Ministry of Science and Technology

NEPC

National Energy Policy Committee

NPIEP

Nuclear Power Infrastructure Establishment Plan

NPPDO

Nuclear Power Program Development Office

OAEP

Office of Atomic Energy for Peace

OAP

Office of Atoms for Peace

PDP

Power Development Plan

TINT

Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

137

Chapter ten

ments some years later, Prime Minister remains unfinished. Controversy over cost, lack of transparency and Thai Atomic Energy National Energy Ministry of Science serious safety concerns Ministry of Energy Commission Policy Committee and Technology caused lengthy delays, with the buildings and Office of Atoms for Peace Office of Energy Planning (OAP) (EPPO) visitor centre built but construction of the Nuclear Power Infrastructure Thailand Institute of Preparation Committee Nuclear Technology (TINT) reactor yet to begin as (NPIPC) of mid-2009. The Thai Nuclear Power Program National Environment Development Office (NPPDO) Board’s 2003 decision Electrical Generation to reject the OAEP’s Authority of Thailand (EGAT) environmental impact assessment reports because it omitted rele- Thai government bodies with a role in nuclear matters vant data including information on fault lines is just one example of the ment. The reactor has a total staff of 25, including 19 serious obstacles the project has faced.1 As a result operators.2 of these delays, the reactor at Bangkhen, which had been earmarked for decommissioning in 2006, remains Thailand’s only nuclear research reactor. Thailand’s nuclear power proposals have experienced similar difficulties over the years, beginning with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) proposal of 1966. The original plan was for a nuclear power plant at Bhai Bay in Chonburi province, eastern Thailand, with an electricity-generating capacity of 350–500MW. This was approved by the IAEA in 1970, but a fall in the price of natural gas removed the rationale for the programme. In 1976, the EGAT proposal was revived but, although it again received government approval and quickly reached the bidding stage, it was dropped because of growing public concerns over nuclear safety risks and because of the discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand in 1980. Nuclear power plans in the 1980s suffered a similar fate, as a series of highly publicised nuclearplant accidents around the world reinforced public safety fears. Later the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s wiped out funding and undercut the need for nuclear power.

Nuclear Infrastructure With the TRIGA research reactor at Bangkhen as its only significant nuclear facility, Thailand’s nuclear infrastructure is still in the early stages of develop-

138 An IISS Strategic Dossier

The OAP and the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) – both based in Bangkok – are the main bodies responsible for nuclear activities and are part of the Ministry of Science and Technology. The OAP is the regulatory body, responsible for overseeing nuclear facilities. It consists of an Office of the Secretary General and four bureaus dedicated to radiation, nuclear safety, atomic energy and technical support. Until recently, nuclear research and development was also conducted under the auspices of the OAP, but in 2006 the TINT was created separately for this purpose. The TINT is responsible for seven programmes: radioactive waste management; radioisotope production; research-reactor and nuclear-technology operation; radiation and nuclear safety; irradiation for agricultural research; chemistry and materials science research; and physics and advanced technology research. In December 2007, the Thai cabinet endorsed the creation of the Nuclear Power Program Development Office (NPPDO) under the Ministry of Energy. The NPPDO acts as the coordinating body for the implementation of the Nuclear Power Infrastructure Establishment Plan (NPIEP), coordinating with the TINT and OAP. In 2008, the NPPDO launched a public information programme to promote nuclear energy and coordinate media coverage of nuclearenergy issues.3

Thailand

Current nuclear plans Bangkok’s current Power Development Plan (PDP), approved by Thailand’s National Energy Policy Council in June 2007, aims for the generation of 2,000MWe of nuclear power by 2020 and another 2,000MWe by 2021. This should provide about 12.5% of Thailand’s electricity needs4 and is to be generated via a 4000MWe nuclear power complex consisting of four nuclear reactors. The plans are in the second year of the three-year NPIEP which is surveying potential sites, developing safety regulations and engaging in public education. Assuming the conclusions of the NPIEP are completed on schedule in May 2010 and receive government approval, site approval should follow in 2011, contract approval in 2013, construction approval in 2014 and operational approval in 2019–20.5 Some reports suggest that efforts to match Vietnam’s nuclear development are driving this ambitious schedule. EGAT’s assistant director for power-plant engineering, Kamol Takabut, said in January 2008: ‘Once Vietnam has nuclear power, it can produce goods that are cheaper than Thailand’s, so we will lose in competition to our arch rival.’6 He went on to express his concern that ‘Vietnam is already two to three years ahead of us.’ Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether, or how much, competition with Vietnam is genuinely a motivation or rationalisation for nuclear power in Thailand. According to a June 2008 presentation by Pricha Karasuddhi, nuclear-power program development technical advisor at Thailand’s Ministry of Energy, Thailand’s policy is ‘not to develop fuelcycle-sensitive technologies [such as] enrichment and reprocessing’.7 The country is far from having any such capabilities today, but the claim that this represents an ongoing policy decision is not corroborated anywhere else publicly.

Rationale for nuclear energy Thailand’s rationale for developing nuclear energy is familiar. Officials in the Ministry of Energy argue that rising fossil-fuel prices, potentially unstable fuel supplies, increasing energy demand and the prospects of growing energy competition in Asia have made the development of nuclear energy in Thailand inevitable. Concerns centre on the country’s dependence on natural gas from the Gulf of Thailand, which

generates 68% of the nation’s electricity, compared to 18% from coal, about 6% from hydropower and oil, and 2% from biomass. Thailand’s gas reserves have been declining since 2004 and, at current production levels, are expected to be completely exhausted by 2020.8 The country’s oil reserves are declining rapidly and are expected to last only until 2013 at the current rate of consumption.9 Discussions of energy diversification in Thailand have not been limited to nuclear power; hydroelectricity and coal have also been considered. However, advocates of nuclear energy argue that it is cheaper and more reliable than hydropower, which has to be imported from Laos, Myanmar and China. Thailand itself has huge hydropower potential, according to the IAEA,10 but strong opposition to large new hydropower plants has limited development within Thailand to small projects. Nuclear power is also seen as cleaner and less environmentally damaging than coal. Interestingly, the 2007 PDP identified coal as the most promising energy source, given the nation’s significant lignite resources and total coal reserves that are estimated to last until 2084. However, the PDP predicted serious delays in the construction of coal-fired thermal power plants because of strong opposition from residents concerned about carbon emissions.11 Given strong public opposition to nuclear power in Thailand in the past, the PDP assessment that nuclear power is now more publicly acceptable than coal suggests a shift in public attitudes. It also suggests that Thai officials, who have been trying to persuade a sceptical public of the environmental advantages of going nuclear, could be successfully influencing public opinion.12 Economic development has seen Thailand’s carbon emissions grow at a rate of 12.8% per year – higher than in China and India. This may well have influenced the debate, too.13 According to recent press reports, Thailand’s nuclear-energy plans have gained strong support from business and industrial interests, which see nuclear power as reliable.14 Support from this sector may be growing because of increased awareness of the pressure that economic development is placing on Thailand’s energy supplies – a situation that is likely to intensify if growth predictions are correct. Thailand’s population is expected to expand from 63.9 million in 2007 to 66.2m by 2013, with GDP per capita and electricity consumption per capita

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

139

Chapter ten

Thailand’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

261.1

258.5

307.8

331.3

345.4

4.26

0.41

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

832.3

915.5

930.9

941.0

952.0

1.17

1.11

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

833.8

860.3

925.3

934.8

NA

1.03 (‘06/’05)

0.73 (’06)

1018.8

1055.6

1149.9

1176.0

1250

6.29

1.17

coal production (thousand short tons)

20,757.0

22,088.5

23,621.5

21,021.7

20,105.3

-4.36

0.28

coal consumption (thousand short tons)

27,621.8

30,944.4

33,248.1

33,156.0

36,050.2

8.73

0.51

7.2

6.0

5.7

7.9

7.9

0.00

0.26 (’06)

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

forecast to increase by 50% and 35% respectively.15 The country’s power consumption is expected to increase from an estimated 142TWh in 2007 to 198TWh in 2013, requiring power imports during periods of peak demand. Forecasts made since the global economic slowdown began to bite in late 2008 predict a short-term impact on Thailand’s energy demands, with the economy expected to contract by 1.8% in 2009 before picking up again in 2010.16 This situation may well lead to delays and funding difficulties, but it is unlikely to have the same impact on Thailand’s nuclear plans as the 1997 financial crisis. This is because of the changed energy context, with heightened concerns about carbon emissions and the impending exhaustion of gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand.

External assistance Thailand’s nuclear development has benefited from generous assistance under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme for more than 50 years. Between 1958 and 2008, Thailand was the world’s seventh-largest recipient of IAEA technical assistance (after Egypt, Brazil, China, Pakistan, Poland and Indonesia), receiving US$24.7m and 1.5% of the IAEA technical cooperation budget.17 This included the provision of funding and expertise in the use of radioisotopes in agriculture, health and industry, as well as a technical cooperation project for nuclear power planning.

140 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Thailand is receiving external assistance from Japan, France and Canada in technical cooper­ ation programmes to develop the relevant human resources for its nuclear infrastructure. Beyond this, official talks have already started between China and Thailand over future civilian nuclear cooperation. In December 2007, talks in Bangkok between the then Chinese Defence Minister Cao Gangchuan and Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont covered ‘the transfer of nuclear technology to Thailand to build a nuclear power plant’.18 On a less formal level, Hitachi Ltd (Japan) and General Electric of the US have expressed an interest in supplying Thailand’s nuclear programme with their newly developed mid-sized 600-900MWe reactors.19 Areva of France, CANDU of Canada, and Mitsubishi and Toshiba of Japan have also reportedly expressed an interest in bidding when the process opens. Despite this flurry of interest, Thailand’s environmental legislation could create roadblocks. Thailand’s Environmental Act of 1992 places liability for accidents during the construction and operation of nuclear facilities on the firm supplying the technology.20 This clause was included in the terms of reference of the construction contract drawn up for the planned 10MWt reactor at Ongkharak, causing consternation among international bidders. In the end, only GA accepted the terms-of-reference conditions; other companies were concerned that the liability clause was inconsistent with the generally

Thailand

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Thailand is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

21 Apr 1989

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

21 Apr 1989

International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

14 Sep 2005

IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

Formal support

© IISS

M YA N M A R L A O S

VIE T N A M

Bangkhen 2MWt research reactor Office of Atoms for Peace Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology Ongkharak – Nuclear Research Centre, site of abandoned project to build 10MWt reactor

T H A ILA ND

Bangkok

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Thailand is not party

Preah Vihear Temple – centre of area of border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia

Pattaya

Instrument Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

CAMBODIA

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Chumphon

Gulf of Thailand

Convention on Nuclear Safety Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

accepted principles of nuclear liability embodied in the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. This issue has never been publicly addressed by the Thai government or the OAP, and it may well pose problems for any future move towards nuclear power.

Domestic Political Situation As evidenced by the protests in November 2008 that temporarily closed Bangkok’s airports and brought the country to a standstill, and the demonstrations that forced the last-minute postponement of the East Asia Summit in April 2009, Thailand has suffered from extreme political instability in recent years. Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (leader of the Democrat Party) became the country’s third leader in the space of a few months when he formed Thailand’s new coalition government on 15 December 2008. A few days later, an article in The Economist described him as an ‘untested leader‘ with a ‘near-impossible job‘ of leading ‘a polarised, exhausted democracy struggling through an economic slump’.21 Since then, Abhisit has increased his majority in parliament and seems better placed than his predecessors to survive Thailand’s turbulent political environment. His leadership position is by no means secure,

Chonburi province – selected site for NPP project, abandoned in 1970s VIETNAM

Surat Thani Nakhon Si Thammarat

Chumphon, Surat Thani and Nakhon Si Thammarat provinces – potential sites of nuclear power plant

Pattani Yala 0

Miles

100

0

Km

160

Narathiwat

Pattani region – centre of separatist insurgency group

MALAY SIA

however, given the continuation of the corruption scandals and social and economic tensions that have afflicted Thailand since the alleged corruption of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra and the military coup that removed him from power in 2006. In March 2009, for example, political tensions escalated when 30,000 supporters of the United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) surrounded Government House and called for Abhisit’s resignation. The ongoing tug of war between two deeply divided factions shows no sign of ending. The combination of political instability, economic slump and mixed feelings about nuclear power among the Thai public may delay Thailand’s nuclear development. This is unlikely to be a significant problem until the NPIEP is completed in May 2010 and more concrete decisions on reactor sites have to be taken. According to local press reports, 14 potential sites are being considered: 11 in southern

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

141

Chapter ten

Anti-government protesters breach security at the ASEAN summit in Pattaya, forcing postponement of the meeting, 11 April 2009 (Getty)

Thailand between Chumphon and Nakhon Si Thammarat provinces, one in Nakhon Sawan province north of Bangkok and two in Chonburi to the capital’s southeast. The 14 sites will be narrowed down to five in a feasibility study that is scheduled for completion in May 2010.22 In the meantime, senior decision makers in the Abhisit coalition appear to support previous administrations’ nuclear plans, and are content to leave the NPPDO and TINT to move ahead with early infrastructure planning, especially building public support for nuclear power and developing Thailand’s nuclear expertise.

Nuclear safety and security Thailand is party to four key nuclear-safety and -security agreements, as outlined in Table 1. It has stated its intention to join four others listed in Table 2, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Physical Protection Convention. Despite these commitments, Thailand has a mixed record on nuclear safety and physical protection. On the one hand, when critical situations have occurred, Thailand has accepted offers of international assistance and cooperated fully with the IAEA. On the other hand, serious incidents have exposed a poorly

142 An IISS Strategic Dossier

developed safety and security culture, and corruption among enforcement officials.23 Some of the more serious safety and security risks, including those posed by spent fuel storage, have been addressed via bilateral arrangements between Thailand and the US. Between 1975 and 1999, spent fuel from Thailand’s research reactor was kept in poorly secured cooling ponds at Bangkhen. However, when the risks posed by unsecured spent fuel became the focus of international attention in the 1990s, Thailand agreed to cooperate with the US Department of Energy (DOE) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel take-back programme and to repatriate its spent fuel elements to the US. At the time, OAEP officials claimed there had been no signs of problems with the storage arrangements, but they nevertheless signed an agreement with the DOE in 1996.24 In February 2000, a disused cobalt-60 teletherapy source, which was stored in insecure outdoor premises in Samut Prakarn, was unwittingly handled by scrapyard workers, causing severe radiation injuries to ten people. Three people died within two months of the incident, despite medical treatment, and 1,870 people living near the site were exposed to high levels of radiation (258 of

Thailand

whom required ongoing monitoring).25 The incident received widespread press coverage in Thailand and internationally, raising concerns about the low level of awareness in Thailand of the dangers caused by disused radioactive sources. According to a subsequent IAEA report, the source clearly displayed the trefoil radiation symbol, but those involved failed to recognise its significance.26 In another high-profile incident in June 2003, Thai police arrested a local schoolteacher who was trying to sell a quantity of radioactive cesium-137 to a potential client in Surin province in the country’s east. The arrest followed an eight-month US–Thai operation. Intelligence agents in Bangkok believed that terrorist organisations operating in Southeast Asia were trying to obtain the material, possibly for use in dirty bombs to target five embassies in Bangkok during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit meeting.27 In the week following the schoolteacher’s arrest, Thai police apprehended three men with ties to Jemaah Islamiah, whom they alleged were connected to the dirty-bomb plot. Mindful of these lapses, OAP and TINT have worked with the US and Australia to strengthen controls, both regulatory and physical, over radioactive sources that might be used in dirty bombs. There are anecdotal accounts of security lapses at Thailand’s nuclear research facilities. These include an article in Forbes magazine, in which journalist Ron Gluckman describes poor security measures at the Bangkhen research reactor and the unfinished nuclear centre in Ongkharak. Gluckman reports guards napping at Ongkharak and a failure of basic security procedures, such as collecting visitors’ passes on departure, at Bangkhen.28 This and other reports29 have built a picture of a poorly developed nuclear safety and security culture, creating fodder for individuals and groups who oppose the introduction of nuclear power. Thai officials are trying to counter such negative publicity. In his speech to the 2008 IAEA General Conference, Thailand’s ambassador to the IAEA, Adisak Panupong, ended by declaring there was ‘no room for compromise’ on nuclear safety. ‘We must inculcate the culture of nuclear safety in the minds of our citizens of this generation and the next’, he said, ‘for only through confidence building and proper dialogue can we muster the

Bangkhen research reactor (courtesy Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology)

necessary public support for the development of nuclear power plants.’30 Thai authorities have been reinforcing such promises with efforts to support regional nuclear-safety and -security initiatives. For example, in June 2008 Thailand hosted the ASEAN+3 Forum on Nuclear Energy Safety, and in January 2009 hosted an IAEA/TINT workshop on Sustainable Management of Disused Sealed Sources.31 Thailand is planning to host the first ‘1540 workshop’ in Southeast Asia in collaboration with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs.32 The goal of the workshop is to discuss the progress among states in the region in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent the proliferation of WMD to non-state actors. Despite these initiatives, questions have been raised about Thailand’s level of follow-through on its safety-related commitments. A small case in point was its failure to attend the Steering Committee meeting of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 12–14 May 2009. On a more macro level, there may be reasons for concern about the safety and security risks involved with intro-

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

143

Chapter ten

Thailand accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date signed or ratified

Outer Space Treaty

10 Sep 1968

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

2 December 1972

IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

16 May 1974

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

28 May 1975

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

12 November 1996

Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Treaty

20 May 1997

Chemical Weapons Convention

10 December 2002

IAEA Additional Protocol

Signed 22 Sep 2005; not yet ratified

ducing nuclear power in Thailand. For a country with a fairly high state of development, Thailand’s civil servants – in particular its military, police and customs officials – have a poor record with regard to corruption and complicity with criminal elements.33 Thailand ranks joint 80th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2008.34 A politicisation of the enforcement agencies adds to the difficulty of reforming the institutions.35 In addition, many Thai public servants are said to be less loyal to the institutions they work for than to their networks of relatives and ex-classmates, which undermines public-spiritedness.36 The potential risk to nuclear safety and security is exacerbated by the resurgence since 2004 of a long-running, separatist insurgency from within the ethnically Malay Muslim minority in the country’s southernmost ‘Pattani’ region. The heightened global sense of Muslim identity in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, combined with inequitable development policies and ill-timed changes in the organisation of government security agencies in the south, has led to an escalation of long-standing local Muslim grievances37 and the region has witnessed an increase in the number of private Islamic schools that follow Sharia law and teach in the radical Wahhabi tradition. Since January 2004, clashes between militants and Thai security forces have left more than 2,000 dead, while bombings, arson and shootings continue. More than 30,000 troops have been deployed to the three southernmost provinces (Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala), but the 5,000-strong insurgent groups continue to demonstrate tactical ingenuity. The Thai military and police seem unable to respond effectively to the shifting tactics of the insurgents.38 Although experts argue that there is no connection between al-Qaeda,

144 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Jemaah Islamiah and the Pattani insurgents,39 the terrorist tactics adopted by the insurgents heightens the need for fail-safe physical protection measures for any nuclear facilities that are built.

Non-proliferation and disarmament Thailand is an active proponent of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty, known unofficially as the Bangkok Treaty, after the city in which it was signed in 1995. Thailand also fully supports the Plan of Action endorsed by the SEANWFZ Commission to strengthen the implementation of the treaty from 2008–2013. In concert with other treaty members, it regularly calls upon the nuclear-weapons states to sign the Bangkok Treaty’s Protocol. In its diplomatic pronouncements, Thailand supports non-aligned movement (NAM) positions on most nuclear-related issues. This sometimes puts Thailand in opposition to nonproliferation policies of developed countries. For example, in May 2008 the Thai representative to the NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee meeting expressed concern over international fuel-bank proposals, arguing the traditional NAM position that ‘they should not in any way infringe upon the inalienable rights of member states to research, develop and use all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes’. He urged caution in any discussion of fuel-bank arrangements, calling for more consultation before any decisions were taken.40 In other areas, however, such as non-compliance safeguards, Thai officials have departed from the cautious stance of many of their NAM partners. While voicing support for international efforts to find a peaceful solution by diplomatic means to the Iranian nuclear issue, they have rejected Iran’s

Thailand

claims to an unqualified right to nuclear energy. Instead, Thai officials have been careful to stipulate that NPT parties have an obligation to uphold all ‘three pillars’ of the treaty (non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and that Article IV rights to peaceful nuclear technology are contingent on full compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Unlike many of its NAM partners, Thailand has also criticised North Korea’s nuclear defiance, including plans announced in 2008 to reactivate facilities at its Yongbyon reactor.41 Thailand’s record on implementing its nonproliferation commitments is variable – a situation that appears to arise mainly from administrative and technical constraints. On the one hand, the country has acceded to the major non-proliferation treaties and conventions. It has also cooperated with the US in other areas of WMD counter-terrorism, jointly arranging a biological warfare ‘First Responder’ training programme in 2001 and a chemical/biological incident-management training programme in April 2002. On the other hand, implementation of non-proliferation commitments has been patchy. For example, although in September 2005 Thailand became the third state in Southeast Asia to sign the Additional Protocol (after Indonesia and the Philippines), the agreement is yet to enter into force.42 In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which it joined in December 2002, Thailand is one of only 13 states that have yet to comply with their obligations to report on the progress of their national implementation programmes – and most of the other 13 states are small Pacific Island countries.43 With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Thailand has failed to submit annual reports on its participation in confidence-building measures to facilitate greater implementation of the convention.44 Furthermore, Thailand has only reported twice in five years to the UN 1540 Committee, unlike some states in the region which report on their implementation progress every year. Thailand has, however, requested external assistance with certain areas of 1540 implementation, suggesting that capacity problems are partly responsible for this patchy record.45

Strategic trade controls At the non-state level, there is evidence that private firms in Thailand had links to the A. Q. Khan

nuclear black-market network and were operating without the knowledge of the Thai authorities. Public sources indicate that the Bangkok branch of Japan’s Mitutoyo Corporation was involved in selling high-precision calibrating equipment used in the development of centrifuge technology to Libya in 2001.46 The machines were found at a Libyan nuclear facility during IAEA inspections sometime between December 2003 and March 2004. In 2008, the New York Times reported that US and IAEA experts investigating the A.Q. Khan network found electronic blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon on computers in Thailand, among other countries.47 Most other reports about nuclear weapons designs in the hands of the Khan network associates have not Thailand has mentioned a Thai connection.48 In arguing against the shown interest release of Swiss engineer Marco Tinner from custody in enhancing in connection with his role in the Khan network, Swiss strategic trade Prosecutor General Peter Lehmann stated in a letter controls to the Federal Criminal Court in Bellinzona in January 2009 that Tinner’s wife lived in Asia and he feared that Tinner would flee there. According to Swiss sources, Tinner’s wife is Thai and lives in Thailand.49 Thailand has shown a clear interest in enhancing strategic trade controls. Since Thailand joined the US Container Security Initiative in 2003, Thai and US customs officials have worked together at Thailand’s largest port, Laem Chabang, to inspect containerised cargo bound for the US. Thailand has participated as an observer in the maritimeinterdiction exercises organised by the Proliferation Security Initiative, although it is not an official PSI participant. However, the political instability that has plagued the country, especially the period that began in the summer of 2006, has resulted in many of Thailand’s export-control activities being put on hold. As a result, many of the controls in place are focused on internal security and safety. Possession, transfer, and the development and use of nuclear materials and chemicals are controlled, but not

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter ten

export, re-export, transit, transhipment or brokering.

Geopolitical context There are few serious proliferation pressures in Thailand, thanks to its successful policy of regional engagement (via ASEAN and numerous other regional institutions), its flexible policy of balancing with China and the US, and the absence of external security threats. There are a few border disputes with neighbours that could escalate: a sovereignty dispute with Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple; tensions with Myanmar over border incursions by the Burmese junta’s forces; and disagreements with Malaysia over the Pattani insurgency. However, even if these disputes were to lead to all-out conflict, it is extremely unlikely that they would trigger a proliferation decision in Thailand, given the severe repercussions this would have on Bangkok’s close ties with the US and China, and on its intensifying links with India. Thailand’s long-standing strategic alliance with the United States is the most significant of these bilateral relationships, and the strongest proliferation constraint. As one of only two formal US allies in Southeast Asia (along with the Philippines), Thailand benefits from a clear US security guarantee, which dates back to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization of 1954 and the Rusk–Thanat agreement of 1962.50 Since the mid-1970s, Thailand’s dependence on this protective relationship has been balanced by a deliberate strategy of engaging China. However, the US security relationship remains firmly in place, providing Thailand with economic and military assistance. In December 2003, for example, the US designated Thailand as a major non-NATO ally (based on the important role its airfields and ports play in US global military strategy), allowing Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its F-16 fighters – a first for a Southeast Asian state. The two countries also have close defence relations with the annual Cobra Gold and Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training regional multilateral military exercises. Thailand’s positive bilateral relationships with China and India are also likely to reduce potential external proliferation pressures. China supplies the Thai military with equipment at ‘friendship prices’,

146 An IISS Strategic Dossier

and has long been establishing closer links with Thailand through infrastructure, trade and energy cooperation.51 Successive Thai leaders have encouraged these links, using them to assist in Thailand’s economic development, which has been the country’s primary goal since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, India has held bilateral naval exercises with Thailand since 1995. In 2003 the two countries signed a Free Trade Agreement and began discussions on counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing. India has also offered defence equipment to Thailand, and Bangkok has purchased ammunition.52 Cooperation between ASEAN and India has also been growing apace, with India’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the conclusion of other security and economic agreements between ASEAN and India.53 The net effect of these regional and bilateral ties has been to provide a third balancing partner for Thailand, and thus even greater flexibility in the pursuit of Thailand’s foreign policy goals. Concerns over the ‘blue water’ ambitions of both China and India do exist, but are managed through the long-standing policy of regional cooperation and bilateral engagement. Thai security officials are becoming increasingly concerned about Burmese defector claims of clandestine nuclear activity in Myanmar and are cooperating with the US and other countries to investigate the reports. One domestic dynamic that could potentially mar Thailand’s benign proliferation profile is the existence of strong Thai nationalism. This dates back to the 1930 and 1940s, when Prime Minister Phibun Songkram used nationalist ideology to underpin a hegemonic expansionist policy in the region, claiming sovereignty over Cambodia, Laos and parts of Myanmar and northern Malaysia. Although these hegemonic ambitions were later replaced by a flexible policy of great power balancing and regional engagement aimed at promoting economic development, Thai nationalism remains a potent force.54 Rival political factions in Thailand have used competing visions of Thai nationalism to build their support base, which has fanned domestic social and political instability. It is conceivable that if there were to be a prolonged period of uncertainty over the nuclear ambitions and capabilities of traditional rival Vietnam, or other Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar, hypernationalism could lead to a reassessment of nuclear

Thailand

policy. To date, however, domestic disputes have not altered the country’s pragmatic foreign policy or its strong commitment to non-proliferation.

Conclusions After several aborted attempts during the past 50 years, Thailand in 2009 is on the brink of launching a nuclear-power programme. However, its proposed schedule of generating 2,000MWe of nuclear power by 2020 and another 2,000MWe in 2021 is probably unrealistic. Given the embryonic state of Thailand’s nuclear infrastructure and its dependence on extensive foreign assistance, the nation may not be ready to introduce nuclear power. Legislative hurdles and foreign investors’ concerns about political instability and liability are likely to be problematic. Budgetary constraints, brought about by the impact of the global economic slowdown, may add to these hurdles. However, these are unlikely to derail Thailand’s nuclear plans altogether unless the financial repercussions for Bangkok are far greater than economists predict. Public scepticism over the safety of nuclear energy may also create delays, although an energetic

Thailand’s nuclear power plant project schedule 2007

Power Development Plan approved by the National Energy Policy Council.

2011

Site approval due to take place.

2013

Contract approval scheduled.

2014

Construction work to begin.

2019-20

Nuclear reactors expected to begin operating.

education campaign advocating the environmental benefits of developing nuclear energy and highlighting the risks associated with dependence on fossil fuels appears to be reducing public resistance. The rationale for developing nuclear energy is entirely benign, if not entirely persuasive: a desire for greater energy security combined with concerns over the environmental impact of burning fossil fuels, and a sense of competition with Vietnam. If the nuclear programme goes ahead, a decision to develop a military nuclear capability is highly unlikely, given Thailand’s conventional capabilities, its close relations with the US and China, and its policy of regional engagement.

Thailand’s civil nuclear programme: chronology 1954

Thai Atomic Energy Commission established.

1961

Atomic Energy for Peace Act establishes the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace. TRIGA research reactor at Bangkhen is commissioned.

1966

Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) proposes construction of nuclear power plant in eastern Thailand, but proposals are shelved.

1976

EGAT proposal is revived, before being quickly dropped.

1975

Bangkhen research reactor shut down to allow upgrades.

1977

Bangkhen research reactor resumes operation.

1993

OAEP unveils plans for a second nuclear reactor at Ongkharak.

2003

National Environment Board rejects environmental impact assessment of the new reactor.

2006

Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology created.

2007

June

Power Development Plan is released.

December

Nuclear Power Program Development Office is established.

Notes 1

2

‘Thailand: EIA Report on Ongkarak Reactor Rejected’,

at the 4th Annual Workshop on Nuclear Energy

WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, 12 September 2003.

Non-proliferation in East Asia, Pusan, South Korea,

IAEA Research Reactors in the World, Thailand, TRR-1/ M1, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb/, last updated

3

18-20 August 2008. 4

Chavalit Pichalai, ‘Overview of Thailand’s Power Sector,

in April 2006.

Power Development Plan 2007, and Related Infrastructure

Pricha Karasuddhi, ‘Thailand’s Preparation for

Requirements’, Energy Policy Planning Office, Bangkok,

Starting a Nuclear Power Program’, paper presented

Thailand, 22 August 2007.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

147

Chapter ten

5

Dr Somporn Chongkum, ‘Status of Thailand’s Nuclear

17

INF/4/SUPPLEMENT, July 2009, p. 37, http://www.iaea.

Cooperation for Nuclear Export and Technical Support to

org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53InfDocuments/English/

Developing Countries, Kyeongju, Korea, 28 May 2008. 6

‘Four global giants vie to supply nuclear plants to

gc53inf-4-att1_en.pdf 18

Thailand’, Bangkok Post, 11 January 2008. 7

found at http://www.tint.or.th/en/news/2007/dec_01.html. 19

and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in the Asia Pacific

news/2008/july_02.html 20

in Thailand’, Watershed 7 (July-October 2001), p. 39, http://

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’,

www.terraper.org/articles/WS%207(1)%20feature%20-%20

another source, the gas reserves will run out in 20–30

nuclear%20industry.pdf. 21

faces a near-impossible job’, The Economist, 18 December

Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, Ministry

2008, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_

cc/energyreport2550.pdf .

id=12818184. 22  Apinya

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Oil Proved Reserves’, p. 6.

23

Richard Cronin, Mark Manyin, Larry Niksch, ‘Terrorism

Country Studies on Brazil, Cuba, Lithuania, Mexico,

in Southeast Asia’, CRS Report for Congress, updated 7 February 2005, pp. 24–28. 24

Origin: Requirements for Technical and Administrative

Yuji Matsuo, Seiji Kouno and Tomoko Murakami, ‘An

Preparations and National Experiences Proceedings of

Outlook for Introduction of Nuclear Power Generation

a technical meeting held in Vienna, August 28–31, 2006

in Southeast Asian Countries’, IEEJ (October 2008), p. 15:

(IAEA, July 2008), IAEA–TECDOC-1593, http://www-pub.

In Thailand, officials have linked announcements on

iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1593_web.pdf. 25

sources: lessons learned the hard way’, IAEA Bulletin 47:2

and negative impact of fossil fuels. See Statement of

(March 2006), p.3 of online version, http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull472/47202006163.pdf.

Representative of Thailand to the IAEA and Head of

26

Ibid.

Thai Delegation at the 52nd Regular Session of the

27

Charles D. Ferguson and Alessandro Andreoni,

General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 3

‘Analysis of Thailand Cesium Case Casts Doubt on

October 2008.

Amount of Radioactive Material Involved’, Center for

Karen Percy, ‘Thailand explores nuclear energy after poor

Nonproliferation Studies Research Report, 17 July 2003,

emissions report’, The World Today, ABC Radio (Australia), 27 November 2007, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/

http://www.cns.miis.edu (registration required). 28

content/2007/s2105119.htm.

html. 29

Thailand Power Report Q1 2009, Business Monitor

See, for example, Rajesh, ‘Radioactive Agenda: The Nuclear Industry in Thailand,’ MacKenzie, ‘Reducing the risk from

International, February 2009: http://www.mindbranch. 16

Ron Gluckman, ‘Going Nuclear’, Forbes, 17 September 2007, http://members.forbes.com/global/2007/0917/140.

‘Thailand Opens Study on Possible Nuclear Plant’, AFP, 31 January 2008.

15

Carolyn MacKenzie, ‘Reducing the risk from radioactive

nuclear energy plans to the challenges of global warming H.E. Mr Adisak Panupong, Ambassador and Resident

14

Return of Research Reactor Spent Fuel to the Country of

p. 411.

http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/456.pdf.

13

Bruce Vaughn, Coordinator, Emma Chanlett-Avery,

IAEA, Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development:

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Feb. 2007),

12

Wipatayotin, ‘Decision on nuclear sites draws

near’, Bangkok Post, 12 February 2009.

Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Thailand (IAEA and UN

11

‘New face, old anger: Thailand’s new prime minister

years. See Thailand Energy Situation, 2007, Department of of Energy, http://www.dede.go.th/dede/fileadmin/upload/

10

Noel Rajesh, ‘Radioactive Agenda: The Nuclear Industry

go.jp/04/np/activity/2008-06-24/2008-06-24-3-1.pdf. ‘Natural Gas Proved Reserves’, p. 22. According to

9

‘Hitachi, GE Seek First Orders for Mid-Sized Reactors’, Bloomberg, 23 July 2008, found at http://www.tint.or.th/en/

Agency International Forum on Nuclear Non-proliferation Region, 24-25 June 2008, Tokyo, Japan, http://www.jaea.

‘China to consider Thai-Proposed nuclear energy, road and rail Links’, MCOT English News, 3 December 2007,

Pricha Karasuddhi, Confidence-Building and Transparency and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Japan Atomic Energy

8

IAEA, ‘Technical Cooperation Report for 2008’, GC(53)/

Program’, presentation at the Seminar on International

radioactive sources: Lessons Learned the Hard Way’.

com/Thailand-Power-Q1-R302-5201/.

30

Statement of H.E. Mr Adisak Panupong.

‘Country Briefings: Thailand’, Economist Intelligence

31

IAEA Press Office, ‘Tackling Sustainable Management of

Review, 17 February 2009.

148 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources’, http://www-pub.

Thailand

iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Newsletters/NEFW32

43

the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

This workshop was originally supposed to take place in

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons

October 2008, but had to be delayed because of organi-

and on their Destruction in 2007’, December 2008, http://

sational problems, possibly related to domestic political instability in Thailand. 33

www.opcw.org/docs/csp/csp12/en/c1206(e).pdf. 44

BWC Confidence-Building Measures’, http://www.unog.

2006’, Transparency International Country Study

ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/41BF3B57E2CB6ED7C

regional_pages/asia_pacific/previous_projects/nis_

35

37

experts on identification of WMD-related materials and dual-use items and training courses and workshops on

2008’, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/

how to effectively detect, deter, prevent and combat the

surveys_indices/cpi.

transport, trafficking and brokering of illicit WMD and

‘The Thai police: a law unto themselves’, The Economist,

related materials. 46

Corporation as a Case Study in Determined Proliferation’,

James Ockey, ‘Thailand’s “Professional Soldiers” and

WMD Insights, October 2006, http://www.wmdinsights.

Coup-Making: The Coup of 2006’, Crossroads, Vol. 19, no. 1

org/I9/I9_EA1_EvadingExport.htm; ‘Japan Raids Firm

(spring 2007), pp. 95–127.

Suspected of Illicit Exports’, Global Security Newswire, 13 February 2006.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘The Malay-Muslim Insurgency in 47

Bomb Design Went to Others’, New York Times, 16 June

2007.

2008. According to this report, the bomb designs were

Neil J. Melvin, ‘Conflict in Southern Thailand: Islamism,

found on computers in Switzerland, Thailand, Dubai and Malaysia. 48

The Nuclear Jihadist, (New York: Twelve, 2007), pp.

in Thailand’s southern troubles’, IDSS Commentaries, 10

343–350; and David Albright, ‘Swiss Smugglers had

March 2005.

Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs’, Institute for Science

Statement of H. E. Mr Vijavat Isarabhakdi to the 2008

and International Security, 16 June, 2008, http://www.

NPT Preparatory Committee, 7 May 2008, http://www.

isis-online.org/publications/expcontrol/Advanced_

Cluster%203/May07Thailand_am.pdf.

42

See, for example, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins,

Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘Over-reading the Islamist factor

reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/ 41

David E Sanger and William J Broad, ‘Officials Fear

of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, Edward Elgar,

Policy Paper No. 20, September 2007.

40

Peter Crail, ‘Evading Export Controls: Mitutoyo

sad slide backwards’, The Economist, 29 January 2009.

Violence and the State in the Patani Insurgency’, SIPRI 39

In its 1540 reports, Thailand has requested advice from

Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index

Southern Thailand’, in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), A Handbook

38

12572DD00361BA4/$file/CBM_Submissions_by_Form.pdf. 45

country_studies_in_east_and_southeast_asia.

17 April 2008, (subscriber-only online article); ‘Thailand: a 36

United Nations Office at Geneva, ‘Participation in the

Ora-orn Poocharoen and Ake Tangsupvattana, ‘Thailand Report, accessible via http://www.transparency.org/

34

OPCW, ‘Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of

05-01.pdf.

Bomb_16June2008.pdf. 49

Communication with Swiss investigative journalist, May

Statement of H.E. Mr Adisak Panupong, Ambassador

2009. Also see Pascal Holenstein, ‘Fall Tinner: Abfuhr

and Resident Representative of Thailand to the IAEA and

für die Bundesanwaltschaft’ Neue Zürcher Zeitung am

Head of Thai Delegation at the 52nd Regular Session of

Sonntag, 25 January 2009; and Urs Gehringer, ‘Eine

the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, Austria, 3

ehrliche, aufrechte Familie’ (English version), Die

October 2008.

Weltwoche. 21 January 2009, http://www.weltwoche.

At the 2008 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, the

ch/ausgaben/2009-04/artikel-2009-04-interview-khan-

representatives from South Africa and Thailand argued

english-version.html. Thailand is one of the 17 countries

that the Additional Protocol is an indispensable instru-

to which Switzerland addressed requests for judi-

ment in cases where countries have advanced dual-use

ciary assistance in the case against Marco Tinner, his

technologies, but that developing states without such facil-

father and his brother. See http://www.parlament.

ities should not be burdened. This may help explain why

ch/f/dokumentation/berichte/berichte-delegationen/

the Additional Protocol has not yet entered into force in

berichte-der-geschaeftspruefungsdelegation/Documents/

Thailand. Rebecca Johnson, ‘2008 NPT PrepCom: Debates over, plus safeguards summary’, Disarmament Diplomacy, 7 May 2008, http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc06.htm.

bericht-gpdel-fall-tinner-2009-01-19-f.pdf, p. 4505. 50

SEATO, which was headquartered in Bangkok, was set up to prevent communist influence and insurgency

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

149

Chapter ten

of Power’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, December 2006,

in Southeast Asia. It hosted annual joint military exercises for its members, which included the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the

pp. 447–466. 52

of Growth and Cooperative Relations’, paper presented at the

disbanded in 1977, but the Rusk–Thanat agreement

2007 KPSA International Conference: The Rise of Asia and Its

(which reinforced SEATO security obligations through the provision of bilateral US security guarantees) remains

Future; http://nabh.pa.go.kr/board/data/policy/410/paper4.pdf. 53

Lawrence E Grinter, ‘China, the United States, and Mainland Southeast Asia: Opportunities and the Limits

150 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Sudhir Devare, India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), pp. 214–236.

in force. 51

Shanta Nedungadi Varma, ‘India’s Rise and Asia: Dynamics

Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. SEATO was formally

54

Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ‘The Pros and Cons of Thai Nationalism’, The Irrawaddy, 28 February 2007.

Chapter eleven

Vietnam

With ambitious plans to introduce nuclear energy to help meet its growing need for electricity, Vietnam is likely to be the first nation in the region to operate a nuclear power plant. Current plans call for two nuclear reactors to be online by 2020, and more to follow soon thereafter. Financial and staffing limitations may delay these plans, but Vietnam’s one-party political system and constraints on popular dissent provide less scope for the kind of local opposition and environmental concerns facing nuclear planners in more politically pluralistic countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. This ‘advantage’ is not necessarily in Vietnam’s interest, however, if it were to mean that less attention would be paid to safety issues. To date, Vietnam’s nuclear programme is transparent and meets all international standards. Safety issues aside, nuclear power in Vietnam should not provide any basis for concern about nuclear proliferation if Hanoi maintains its commendable non-proliferation record that includes signing the IAEA Additional Protocol and ratification of the CTBT. This record is notable given the proliferation drivers – most prominently Vietnam’s often tenuous relations with its nuclear giant to the north –- that might otherwise have given Hanoi a reason to consider keeping open a nuclear-weapons option.

History of civilian nuclear activity Vietnam’s nuclear history dates back to the 1960s, when a 250kWt pool-type TRIGA Mk-II research reactor was built in the central highlands city of Dalat, then in anti-communist South Vietnam, under the US Atoms for Peace programme. The US also provided the HEU fuel for the reactor, which reached its first criticality in 1963 and was then operated for training, research and radioisotope production. However, the research programme

was interrupted by the war between 1968 and 1975, when research was suspended and the reactor was shut down. In the war’s closing days, with North Vietnamese forces advancing, the United States launched a clandestine operation to remove unused fuel rods from the reactor, which were then transported back to the US.1 In 1976, the communist government of newlyunified Vietnam established the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC), with a mission to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To date, however, the VAEC’s work has been largely limited to nuclear research and various non-energy-related nuclear applications, in addition to laying the plans for the eventual introduction of nuclear power. Reconstruction work on the Dalat reactor began in 1982 and continued until 1984 when, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, Vietnam was able to restore and upgrade the reactor to a 500kWt Russian VVR-M design. It was also able to train a group of scientific and technical staff to develop nuclear technology for use in the agriculture and medical sectors. The Dalat reactor, which is light-water moderated and cooled, remains Vietnam’s only reactor. The level of staffing at the reactor is very low – 42 in total including 12 operators. In 2007, the reactor was converted from 36% HEU fuel to under 20% LEU fuel, and approximately 4.5kg of unused HEU fuel was returned to

Vietnam-specific abbreviations HRD

Human-resources development

VAEC

Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission

MOST

Ministry of Science and Technology

VARANS

Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety

VCP

Vietnamese Communist Party

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© IISS Russia. The conversion was carried out under CHINA the Russian–American Institute for Nuclear Science Reduced Enrichment and Technology and Institute Hanoi for Research and Test for Technology and Radioactive and Rare Elements Reactors programme with $2.4 million provided by LAOS the US National Nuclear Gulf of Tonkin Security Administration, Paracel Islands – Overlapping territorial claims which also agreed to by Vietnam and China provide physical protection upgrades at Dalat and other Vietnamese facilities with radiological sources. Spratly Islands – T H A I LA N D Overlapping territorial claims Vietnam’s interest by Vietnam, China and others V I E T N A M in developing nuclear power began in the Hoa Tam – investigated as early 1980s, coinciding Dalat – site of 500kWt possible reactor site with the upgrade of VVR-M research reactor Phuoc Dinh – site for first the Dalat reactor. Early CAMBODIA two 1,000MWe reactors, studies were conducted scheduled to come into operation in 2020 er during this time, but v i R ng o k Me it was not until 1995 Vinh Hai – site for second pair of reactors, scheduled Overlapping territorial that the rationale for Ho Chi Minh City to come online in 2021 claims by Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand a civil nuclear-energy South China Sea programme was assessed Gulf of Thailand Overlapping territorial Centre for Nuclear Techniques in earnest. That study claims by Vietnam, and Research Development 0 Miles 100 China and others recommended the introCentre for Radiation Technology 0 Km 160 duction of nuclear power by 2015, when electricity demand would reach more than 100 billion kWh. disused teletherapy unit, which is reportedly being Since then, several feasibility studies have been stored in a warehouse in Ho Chi Minh City. In addiundertaken. These culminated in a formal decision tion, there are five irradiator facilities in use and one by Prime Minister Phan Van Khai in 2004 to endorse in storage. One of these is located at the Vietnam the ‘Strategy for Vietnam’s Electricity Development Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology in 2004–2010’, the goals of which included exploring, Hanoi, and is used to sterilise medical supplies and researching and preparing facilities for the first irradiate food. At least two irradiators are located nuclear power plant in Vietnam.2 in Ho Chi Minh City, one of which had approxi-

Nuclear infrastructure Vietnam has several nuclear-related facilities besides the Dalat reactor, most of which are located in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (although their exact location is difficult to determine from open sources). As of 2007, Vietnam was known to have 13 ageing cobalt-60 teletherapy units in use: three in Hanoi; several in Ho Chi Minh City; and the others probably spread throughout the country. There is also a

152 An IISS Strategic Dossier

mately 400,000 curies in 1999. According to the US Department of Energy, little is known of their current status.3 Vietnam’s physical nuclear infrastructure falls into two categories: the ageing and the embryonic. The research reactor is nearing the end of its productive life and its ability to meet user needs. The government has launched a two-year ministerial project (2009–10) to develop a decommissioning plan for it, with the aim of replacing it

Vietnam

with a new higher-power research reactor before 2020.4 Vietnam’s radiotherapy centres and irradiation facilities are also ageing. Meanwhile, most of the infrastructure required to develop and utilise nuclear energy is at an early developmental stage. Vietnam has been involved in 100 IAEA national technical-cooperation projects (72 had been completed as of mid 2009), and 72 active and 93 completed interregional or regional projects. Most of the latter have taken place under the auspices of the Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific (RCA). Since 2001, IAEA assistance projects have provided about $1m annually in equipment, technical support and training. In November 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved nine nuclear projects valued at $2.5m for Vietnam for 2009–11.

Management infrastructure Current nuclear-energy plans are overseen by an inter-ministerial steering committee, led by the deputy minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). The Ministry of Industry and Trade, however, is responsible for ‘undertaking projects conducive to building nuclear power plants’ and for subsequently running and managing them. Within MOST, two organisations have responsibilities in the nuclear field: VAEC and the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS).5 The latter is the regulatory body responsible for managing radiation and nuclear safety and control, and has assumed the responsibilities formerly carried out by the Vietnam Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority. Whereas VARANS is an administrative body, the VAEC functions as Vietnam’s nuclear research and development organisation and has been key in pushing the case for nuclear-energy development since the mid 1990s. Its senior officials have been responsible for convincing the prime minister that the development of nuclear power is a realistic option in helping Vietnam to meet its growing energy needs.6 Five institutes operate under the VAEC umbrella: the Nuclear Research Institute (Dalat); the Centre for Nuclear Techniques (Ho Chi Minh City); the Research Development Centre for Radiation Technology (Ho Chi Minh City); the Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (Hanoi); and the

Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (Getty)

Institute for Technology and Radioactive and Rare Elements (Hanoi).

Nuclear plans Vietnam’s decision to introduce nuclear power was embodied in the ‘Strategy for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy up to 2020’ signed by the prime minister in January 2006. This document sets out guidelines to diversify Vietnam’s energy sources by developing nuclear energy, initially with a target of bringing a 2,000MWe nuclear power plant online by 2020 and gradually raising the ratio of nuclear power in the national electricity mix to 25–30% by 2040–50. Total nuclear-power capacity is planned to reach 20,000MWe by 2040. The strategy calls for a complete exploration of uranium reserves, as well as the development of both the technical and personnel infrastructure in nuclear science and technology. The goal is to train 500 nuclear scientists by 2020. In addition, the strategy calls for the nationwide use of other nuclear applications, including the construction of a National Centre for Radioactive Medical Treatment by 2010 and a network of ten regional centres.7 In 2007, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung approved an ambitious ‘Strategy Implementation

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Internal assessment of Vietnam’s nuclear-infrastructure needs Area of nuclear infrastructure

Action required

National position (commitment and domestic support for programme)

In good standing – no action required

Nuclear safety

Focus on establishing nuclear safety capability and safety culture

Management

Improve management ability

Funding and financing

Problematic, but no action listed

Legislative framework

Continue to develop relevant legislation

Safeguards

In good standing – no action required

Regulatory framework

Identify responsibility

Radiation protection

Develop standards, facilities and human resources

Grid

Evaluate nuclear power plants and grid interaction

Human-resources development (HRD)

Too early to implement HRD plan with funding

Stakeholder involvement

Identify role and develop action plan

Site and supporting facilities

Two sites for two nuclear power plants have to be finally decided

Environmental protection

Establish monitoring system

Emergency planning

Approve national plan

Security and physical protection

Approve national plan

Nuclear-fuel cycle

Decide fuel-cycle strategy and spent-fuel management

Radioactive waste

Study and agree site for waste disposal

Industrial involvement (manufacturing)

Focus on HRD and accumulation of technology

Procurement

Develop consistent policies for nuclear procurement

Industrial involvement (construction)

Identify local participation in power plant bids

Master Plan’, which sets out Vietnam’s nuclear-energy plan in detail, including milestones. The first stage of the plan includes the construction of two 1,000MWe reactors in Phuoc Dinh, southern Ninh Thuan province, scheduled to begin in 2015, with an expectation that they will come into operation in 2020. Following this, another 2,000MWe nuclear power plant (with two reactors) is planned for Vinh Hai, a picturesque seaside community 40km from Phuoc Dinh, to come online in 2021 with a further 6,000MWe by 2030.8 Each reactor is estimated to cost $2bn. The plan was approved by the National Assembly in June 2008 in a ‘Law on Nuclear Energy’ which provides a comprehensive legal framework for the development of nuclear energy.9 Hoa Tam in Phu Yen province has also been investigated as a potential site. The passing of this law clears the way for a reactor design to be chosen. Though it has yet to reach a decision, the VAEC has held consultations with Toshiba and JCI of Japan over the possibility of a Boiling Water Reactor; Mitsubishi of Japan over a Pressurised Water Reactor; AECL of Canada over a CANDU reactor; and KEPCO of South Korea over a Korean Standardised Nuclear Plant reactor.

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Notwithstanding the limited physical infrastructure that is available, the government does appear to be seriously committed to its nuclear-energy Master Plan. A team of 17 officials from five different institutions have been involved in the inter-ministerial steering committee to oversee progress, identifying where the biggest obstacles were likely to fall and devising strategies for overcoming them. The table above lists the conclusions of an IAEA-facilitated study the group produced in 2008, which serves as a ‘to-do list’ for the institutions involved in building Vietnam’s nuclear infrastructure.10 (Areas where IAEA and Vietnamese officials consider progress is weakest, and the challenges greatest, are highlighted in bold type.)

Rationale for nuclear energy Mounting energy demands have evidently motivated Vietnam’s decision to develop nuclear power. The country has relatively rich energy resources and exports up to 40% of the energy it produces. However, domestic demand is exceptionally high. When the 2006 nuclear-energy application strategy was approved, the Ministry of Industry forecast

Vietnam

Vietnam’s energy production and consumption, 2003–07 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

352.5

403.3

391.0

361.9

350.7

-3.09

0.42

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

214.6

238.4

244.6

255.0

270.0

5.88

0.31

Natural-gas production (bn cubic feet)

113.0

123.6

169.5

247.2

NA

45.8 (‘06/’05)

0.19 (’06)

95.4

105.9

141.3

201.3

203

0.84

0.19

Coal production (thousand short tonnes)

18,408.6

28,108.9

35,710.5

41,776.5

49,141.0

17.63

0.69

Coal consumption (thousand short tonnes)

11,464.0

16,424.4

15,994.5

17336.1

16,995.4

-1.97

0.24

18.8

17.5

21.2

23.4

27.1

15.81

0.78 (’06)

Natural gas consumption (bn cubic feet)

Hydropower net generation (bn kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

that the country’s electricity demand would double in just over four years, and then continue to rise by 17–22% annually over the 2010–15 period.11 Experts in the ministry argued that this growth in energy consumption could not be satisfied if Vietnam were to rely solely on its current mix of hydropower (42%), natural gas (37%), coal (17%) and oil (4%). They were also concerned about the unreliability of hydropower and the potential impact power outages could have on foreign direct investment. They predicted that a shortage of electricity supply could occur as early as 2010, and certainly by 2015, leaving Vietnam more dependent on electricity imports from China and Laos, which would need to be increased. Vietnamese officials worry that this dependence on foreign suppliers could compromise energy security. These figures have been questioned by external energy experts, who argue that an annual increase in energy demand of 12% is more realistic,12 but even these more modest predictions represent a significant growth in demand. It remains to be seen whether this demand can be met by other energy sources, such as by expanding gas production or hydropower. Natural-gas reserves are estimated to be about 560bn m3 and at the current rate of production will last until 2079.13 Oil reserves are projected to last until 2050.14 The hydropower option, once seen as having great potential in the Mekong River area, is less attractive today given wider recognition that large hydropower dams can cause considerable

environmental damage and displace local communities.15 Vietnam is the world’s 14th-largest producer of coal, but its proven reserves are projected to last only until 2013.16 Fuelling the surging energy demand is Vietnam’s dramatic economic growth, assisted by the government’s continuing reform programme, which began in 1986 with the aim of integrating Vietnam into the world economy. Under the policy of doi moi (renovation), Vietnam’s economy has gone from being centrally planned to market oriented, sparking the huge economic expansion that, by 2001, saw its annual economic growth of 7.6% exceed that of all other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the exception of China. Following the country’s entry into the World Trade Organisation in January 2007, this rapid growth accelerated even further to 7.9%, while foreign investment increased by 14%. According to the Asian Development Bank, this impressive growth rate slowed slightly in 2008 owing to a series of anti-inflation measures that were taken by the government in response to global macro­ economic turbulence, but medium-term economic prospects remain strong17 and Vietnam seeks to join the ranks of the industrialised countries by 2020.

External assistance Vietnam is heavily dependent on foreign assistance to help implement its Master Plan, in terms of providing nuclear reactors, training scientists

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Vietnamese deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Gia Khiem (fourth left, standing) and visiting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (third left, standing) witness the signing of a memorandum on nuclear energy cooperation during a ceremony held in Hanoi, 25 July 2009 (Getty)

and technicians, supplying materials and technology, and in the construction of the nuclear power plants.18 The first plant is expected to be built through a ‘Building and Transfer’ agreement, with 70–75% foreign credit loans.19 In addition to longstanding nuclear cooperation arrangements with Russia, since 2005–06 Vietnam has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the US. As the world’s nuclear-energy firms jostle for its business, each country has pledged to help Vietnam plan and prepare for the introduction of nuclear energy, including helping to educate experts in nuclear power and assisting in the formulation of nuclear-safety regulations. But Russia is still Vietnam’s primary partner. It has pledged its cooperation in building Vietnam’s first nuclear power plant and believes it has a strong chance of winning bids based on bilateral nuclear cooperation that dates back to the Soviet role in reconstructing the Dalat reactor in the 1980s. Since the National Assembly passed the atomicenergy law in June 2008, clearing the way for the formal bidding process to begin, competition among Vietnam’s nuclear partners has increased. In February 2009, for example, Westinghouse held a workshop at the Vietnam Nuclear Energy Institute

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in Hanoi, during which company representatives claimed that the Westinghouse AP 1000 nuclear technology offers significant nuclear-safety advantages.20 Meanwhile, it has been suggested that Japan may have an advantage because of its strategy of lobbying for new nuclear facilities to be eligible for clean development mechanism credits, which could significantly reduce the high capital costs associated with building nuclear power plants.21

Little domestic debate The nature of Vietnam’s political system means that there will be few political obstacles to implementation of the Master Plan. Its one-party system is run by a collective leadership comprising Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung and President Nguyen Minh Triet, who are all strongly in favour of developing nuclear energy. Furthermore, the National Assembly – a 493-member body – is almost exclusively composed of VCP members, affording the VCP a virtual monopoly on decision making. There has been very little public debate in Vietnam over the country’s nuclear future. This is in stark contrast to Indonesia, where key politicians, environmentalist NGOs and civil-society leaders

Vietnam

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Vietnam is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

30 Oct 1987

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

30 Oct 1987

IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Formal support

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Vietnam is not party Instrument Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention on Nuclear Safety Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

have openly opposed the government’s nuclearenergy plans. The closed nature of Vietnamese politics and the constraints on freedom of expression may be partially responsible for this lack of debate. Public criticism is often quickly punished.22 While intellectuals and officials have questioned some aspects of the nuclear-energy plans, criticism has been mild and low key, and has been countered by a vigorous public information campaign run by the government and the VAEC on the economic benefits of nuclear power.23 From the perspective of foreign suppliers, the semi-authoritarian nature of the regime and, therefore, the assumed reliability of the nation’s commitment to the nuclear-power project might be considered an advantage. The potential disadvantage is that final decisions may not be the result of an open debate encompassing all points of view.

Nuclear safety and physical protection Vietnam recognises the need to ensure that all nuclear activities are safe and secure. To this end, it has cooperated extensively with the US Global Threat Reduction Initiative, through which, as mentioned above, Vietnam collaborated with the US to remove HEU fuel and convert the Dalat reactor to run on LEU fuel, as well as to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials in the country. In order to reach the standards set by the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), in June 2008 the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and VARANS signed an Arrangement for exchange of information and cooperation, under which information on

the regulation of reactor safety will be exchanged, training for VARANS personnel will be provided, and Vietnam’s nuclear regulatory infrastructure will be enhanced.24 The CNS is one of several conventions fundamental to global nuclear safety and security to which Vietnam is not yet a party (see tables). Vietnam also remains outside the international nuclear conventions governing third-party nuclear liability. Insufficient personnel for the task is the most likely cause of these gaps in Vietnam’s international commitments, despite the high level of IAEA, US and other assistance it is receiving in this area, and despite the government’s efforts to meet international standards. One foreign government agency that has worked closely with Vietnam and praises its attention to safety has been frustrated by a frequent turnover among its Vietnamese counterparts, which may be a reflection of staff shortages and insufficient career rewards in the face of burgeoning competition from the private sector for well-educated personnel.25 In 2008, a well-placed local expert wrote that only 16 standards on nuclear safety had been issued in comparison with the 135 such standards generally required in advanced countries, but that the Radiation Control and Nuclear Safety Authority plans to issue about ten more standards a year, to bring Vietnam up to international standards in ten years’ time.26 The absence of any national repository for nuclear waste or even any clear-cut plan for nuclear-waste control potentially risks compromising security and radiological safety. Vietnam is

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Vietnam accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC)

20 Jun 1980

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

14 Jun 1982

Outer Space Treaty

20 Jun 1980

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

23 Feb 1990

South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok)

26 Nov 1996

Chemical Weapons Convention

30 Sep 1998

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

11 Mar 2006

Additional Protocol

Signed 10 Aug 2007; not yet ratified

already challenged by the need to store securely or dispose of radiological sources that are approaching the end of their operational life.27 In considering how to manage the much larger problem of nuclear waste from power plants, Vietnam plans to follow the common international practice of temporarily storing spent fuel on site, initially in spent-fuel ponds and then in dry storage in casks, until an international central storage facility can be developed. Informal discussions among Vietnamese nuclear experts indicates a willingness to consider seriously the possibility of sending spent fuel to a regional waste-management and storage centre, if one were to be established.28

In line with these comments, other experts have called on the government to commission just one reactor initially and to use that to iron out any problems before the more ambitious programme is implemented.31 Comments such as these may prompt a wider discussion of nuclear safety and security concerns, but in the face of strong assurances from the government and the VAEC, and the closed nature of Vietnamese politics in general, they are unlikely to provoke a groundswell of opposition nor have any significant impact on the government’s nuclear-energy plans.

Though Vietnam’s political system allows for little public dissent or questioning of nuclear-energy plans on the grounds of safety and environmental risks, a few examples of criticism have made it into the public record. Professor Chu Hao, former deputy minister of science and technology, has argued that Vietnam does not need nuclear power and recommended that plans to build the first nuclear power plant should be delayed until more advanced, safer nuclear technologies become available.29 His caution appears to stem from fears that current designs could still be susceptible to major nuclear accidents of the kind seen at Chernobyl. In addition, Professor Tran Dinh Long, deputy chairman of the Vietnam Electricity Power Association, has warned that nuclear power would impose technical demands on Vietnam that it might not be able to meet. He has stressed that building a nuclear power plant ‘is not as easy as building a shoe-making factory. We cannot affirm that engineers who have studied for five years will be able to build a nuclear power plant’. He is not opposed to Vietnam’s nuclearenergy plans, but has called for careful discussion of technologies, equipment and suppliers.30

Vietnam joined the IAEA in 1978, acceded to the NPT on 14 June 1982, and ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1990. It ratified the CTBT in 2006 and in August 2007 it signed a safeguards Additional Protocol (which as of September 2009 still awaited ratification by the parliament, which meets only twice a year), and it has called for other states to do the same. As a further manifestation of its commitment to the non-proliferation norms, the atomic-energy law of June 2008 explicitly forbids the development of nuclear weapons and all forms of nuclear proliferation. Vietnam has been a consistent advocate of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in regional and international forums, supporting Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)-sponsored disarmament resolutions and issuing independent statements that stress the importance of both non-proliferation and disarmament.32 In recent years, foreign-affairs officials have been increasingly outspoken on these issues – more so than most other NAM states – condemning North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006, and voting in favour of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in 2008 (unlike Indonesia, which abstained).

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Non-proliferation and disarmament

Vietnam

Vietnamese Ambassador to the IAEA Nguyen Truong Giang and Dr Werner Burkart, IAEA Deputy Director General for Nuclear Applications, sign the Additional Protocol, 10 August 2007 (D. Calma/IAEA)

Vietnam has been active in non- and quasi-governmental regional non-proliferation initiatives. It co-chairs the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) expert group on the proliferation of WMD. There is no evidence that Vietnam seeks sensitive nuclear technologies that would give it a weapons option. In 2005, VAEC chairman Vuong Huu Tan said Vietnam had not considered studying uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing.33 This was a statement about the past, however, and not necessarily a policy pronouncement for the future. Vietnam’s advocacy of global non-proliferation and disarmament norms has been expressed in the context of its experience of toxic chemicals and its empathy for those who have suffered nuclear attacks. Do Thanh Hai of CSCAP Vietnam sums up this sentiment: Our country was nearly a target of a nuclear attack by the Nixon administration in 1972.34 Luckily, it did not happen. However, 30 years after the end of the war, Vietnamese people and the world have witnessed hundreds of thousands of children affected by orange agents [Agent Orange]

massively sprayed onto Vietnam’s soils. So, from the historical perspective, we, the Vietnamese people, understand the spiritual and material loss of the Japanese people in August 1945, and how Iranians suffered from Iraqi forces’ chemical weapons in the 1980s.35

These views are also reflected in official statements, which speak of the horrific consequences of nuclear war, the devastation that could be caused by nuclear terrorism, and the need for states to live up to their non-proliferation and disarmament commitments in order to help reduce the risks that these catastrophic events will occur.36 They have condemned the nuclear-weapons states for developing nuclear doctrines that have generated new roles for nuclear weapons, and have expressed deep disappointment that states are not living up to their disarmament commitments.37 In line with its long-standing resistance to joining ad hoc groups outside the purview of the United Nations, Vietnam has refused to become a participant in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). However, in 2007 a government spokesman said that Vietnam ‘welcomes the spirit’ of the PSI.38

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Strategic trade controls Vietnam’s reports to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee in 2005 and 2008 on efforts to introduce WMD-related national legislation were relatively detailed compared to those of several other Southeast Asian states. All transit agreements between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have provisions that forbid the transit of toxic chemicals and radioactive substances. However, although Vietnam’s nuclear and biological regulations are relatively extensive, they do not include control lists, or cover re-exports, transhipment and brokering. Overlapping jurisdictions and a lack of clarity on which items are controlled on the grounds of safety and security or non-proliferation are among the reasons why Vietnam may find it necessary to streamline and strengthen its export-control system.

Geopolitical context Vietnam has never shown any interest in developing or acquiring WMD of any kind, and, besides the probable stocks of Soviet-supplied chemical weapons and toxins left over from the 1980s, there is no information in the open literature that suggests Vietnam has ever had any significant capabilities in this area. Nor are there any indicators that Vietnam currently harbours any nuclear aspirations beyond the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is not for a lack of proliferation drivers. In fact, the combination of factors that have been identified as sparking proliferation decisions elsewhere have been historically present in Vietnam, and yet Vietnam’s leaders have forgone the nuclear-weapons option. Potential proliferation triggers were strongest in the late 1970s and 1980s, when the leadership pursued an ambitious plan to create an Indochinese federation under its control. With the help of military and financial assistance from the Soviet Union, Vietnam established hegemony over Cambodia and Laos.39 This ambitious drive for sub-regional hegemony, combined with Vietnam’s growing nuclear expertise, its proximity to China (a nuclear-capable adversary) and recent experience of chemical warfare and threat of nuclear attack by the United States could – in theory – have created strong pressures on Hanoi to develop a nuclear-weapons capability. The lack of nuclear-weapons aspirations in Cold War Vietnam can largely be explained by the then close Soviet–Vietnamese alliance – a long-standing

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political, economic and military relationship that provided Vietnam with sophisticated conventional weaponry and equipment right up until the late 1980s. Given the mutual interest among Soviet and Vietnamese leaders in limiting China’s influence in Indochina, Moscow may even have provided nuclear guarantees to Hanoi. However, it is impossible to confirm through available open sources that this nuclear dimension existed; but even if it did, this failed to prevent China from invading Vietnam’s northern frontier provinces in 1979 in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Beijing’s ally, Cambodia. Non-material considerations also appear to have played a role in controlling proliferation dynamics in Vietnam during the Cold War. The fact that Hanoi acceded to the BTWC (1980), NPT (1982) and Outer Space Treaty (1982) during the period suggests that its leaders began to look to the evolving non-proliferation regimes to provide a security-enhancing alternative to indigenous WMD development. Hanoi’s disinclination to develop nuclear weapons persists today, despite Vietnam’s stilluneasy relationship with nuclear-armed and increasingly militarily powerful China, and the lack of any formal allies or security guarantees. Along with Vietnam’s continued military might (its total military manpower of 5.5m, including 5m reserves, make Vietnam’s military manpower on paper the second-largest in the world), its rapid economic expansion, and potential to become a sub-regional hegemon, these circumstances might have given Vietnam reason to seek dual-use nuclear capabilities. Given these factors, it is worth exploring whether, at some point in the future, Vietnam could be tempted to develop a nuclear-weapons option, either clandestinely or overtly. China’s rising power and influence, its nuclear status, and its assertive posture in relation to its territorial claims are the most significant external proliferation pressures to confront Vietnam. In January 2009, Beijing and Hanoi agreed on the demarcation of their previously contentious mountainous land border.40 This signalled a significant improvement in bilateral relations between China and Vietnam, but tensions over their competing claims in the South China Sea remain. The long-standing territorial disputes over these areas, potentially providing access to substantial unexploited hydrocarbon reserves, could produce proliferation

Vietnam

preferring to reduce tensions through bilateral agreements with the other countries involved. The most significant of these are the 1992 Joint Development Areas agreement with Malaysia; the 1997 sea boundary delimitation agreement with Thailand; and the 2006 Gulf of Thailand agreement with Cambodia. These HEU fuel was removed from the Dalat Nuclear Research Institute in September 2007 (CNN) regional dynamics are likely to continue to pressures on Hanoi, especially if Vietnam’s Master help control proliferation pressures in future as Plan for nuclear energy experiences serious delays, long as regional institutions are able to manage thus increasing dependence on fossil fuels. This energy and resource-security issues effectively. dispute, which also involves Brunei, Malaysia, the However, there are good reasons to question the Philippines and Taiwan, is particularly important to likely capacity of regional institutions to contribute Vietnam which, under the Exclusive Economic Zone significantly to Vietnam’s security should China’s (EEZ) and continental-shelf principle, claims a huge power and assertiveness continue to grow, as expanse of the South China Sea, including all the seems likely. In these circumstances, Vietnam may Paracel Islands (which China occupied in 1974) and look to more intense security collaboration with all the Spratly Islands, where Vietnam occupies 26 other major powers, notably the United States and features including reefs and banks. India. Since the late 1980s, Vietnam has tried to A third potential proliferation driver could balance Beijing’s influence through a policy of derive from regional tensions if nuclear capabiliregional engagement, with the wider foreign policy ties were developed among regional competitors aim of ensuring that Vietnam is ‘friends with all in ways that were not fully transparent or that countries’.41 Consequently Hanoi has become suggested a desire to keep dual-use options open. increasingly embedded in a network of regional Though unlikely in the foreseeable future, it is institutions, including APEC, ASEAN, the ASEAN conceivable that suspicions over nuclear activities in Regional Forum (ARF) and the South East Asian Thailand (Vietnam’s traditional rival) or elsewhere Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone, which have all in Southeast Asia could provoke a nuclear-policy constrained national ambitions, diminished tensions reassessment by Vietnam’s leadership. Any such and helped entrench non-proliferation norms. Over conflicts would most likely be kept at bay by the the past few years, this policy of engagement has network of regional organisations and institutions also drawn Vietnam closer to the United States and that already exist – particularly the Bangkok Treaty, India, including in counter-terrorism cooperation which outlines a comprehensive mechanism for and military-to-military ties, and peaceful nuclearhandling cases of suspected non-compliance. The energy cooperation. This network of regional and one ‘game-changer’ might be if Myanmar were bilateral ties may mitigate the impact of Vietnam’s known to be pursuing a military-oriented nuclear security concerns in relation to China.42 effort. Although this alone would not likely push Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has also been Vietnam to follow suit, given that the two countreading carefully in its claims to a larger EEZ, tries have no history of dispute or rivalry, Vietnam

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter eleven

might seek to keep its options open if a Burmese nuclear-weapons programme triggered a nuclear policy re-assessment in Thailand.

Conclusions The likelihood is that Vietnam will be the first in Southeast Asia to experience a nuclear renaissance owing to a combination of low domestic resistance, strong leadership commitment and foreign support. Hanoi is still in the early stages of implementing its nuclear-energy plans, however, and faces significant capacity constraints. Key challenges include creating a standard system of building and operating nuclear power plants, developing human resources for training nuclear technicians, introducing and implementing nuclear-security and safety legislation to comply with international standards, and drawing up effective plans to deal with nuclear-power-plant breakdowns. Although the initial target of bringing 2,000MWe of power online by 2020 appears feasible, the large-scale financing required for nuclear-power

projects makes it unlikely that Vietnam will be able to meet all of its future targets.43 Vietnam’s current nuclear activities and plans, its benign policy of regional engagement, and its commitment to non-proliferation all suggest that its nuclear aspirations are entirely peaceful. Proliferation pressures are currently held in check by the network of regional organisations and institutions that are encouraging further regional integration and cooperative security-building, and by strengthening bilateral relationships with the US and India. If these dynamics continue, the main risks from Vietnam’s nuclear programme are the potential for nuclear accidents and theft of sensitive materials rather than the threat of nuclear proliferation – something that is clearly recognised by the IAEA, the US and other states, which have been keen to help Vietnam develop its nuclear-safety and physical-protection procedures. Whether Vietnam’s one-party political system can produce an independent regulatory system for nuclear energy may be its greatest challenge.

Notes 1

2

Jeffrey Richelson, Defusing Armageddon (New York: W.W.

8

and Technology, ‘The Status of the Vietnam Nuclear

Ta Minh Tuan, ‘Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Development

Power Program’, Presentation to the 16th Pacific Basin

Plan until 2020’, paper prepared for National Bureau for

Nuclear Conference, Aomori, Japan, 13–18 October 2008,

Asian Research, updated 4 August 2008 and cited with

http://www.pbnc2008.org/documents/Publish/16PBNC_

permission of author. 3

Mo Bissani and Sean Tyson, ‘Sister Lab Program

Plenary_2-3_(9).pdf. 9

Prospective Partner Nuclear Profile: Vietnam’, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report no.

4

Infrastructure Development for Nuclear Power

reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341934.pdf.

in Vietnam’, presentation to the Workshop on

Luong Ba Vien, ‘The Preparation for the Decommissioning

Evaluation Methodology for Nuclear Power

Plan of the Dalat Nuclear Research Reactor’, presenta-

Infrastructure Development’, Vienna, 10–12

tion to the Regional Workshop on the Safety of Research

December 2008, http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/

Reactors, Manila, Philippines, 15–19 September 2008,

Meetings/PDFplus/2008/35095/p35095/05%20-%20

http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/projects/r2d2/

HoangAnhTuan-NPP-Infrastructure-VIETNAM-

Called the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear

Vien-Dec2008.ppt. 11

See the VAEC announcement of Prime Minister Phan Van in January 2006, http://www.vaec.gov.vn/News/baiviet.

2020’.

162 An IISS Strategic Dossier

‘Vietnam Country Profile’, Economist Intelligence Unit, 1 October 2007.

13

php?EV=0&iddomain=18&idbv=557. Tuan, ‘Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Development Plan until

‘Vietnam Government Approves Ambitious Power Plan’, Thanh Nien News, 7 September 2007.

12

Khai’s decision to endorse the VAEC strategy document

7

Hoang Anh Tuan, VAEC, ‘Status of the National

UCRL-TR-227253, 12 January 2007, pp. 4–5, https://e-

Safety and Control until late 2008. 6

Tuan, ‘Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Development Plan until 2020’.

10

workshop5/presentations/vietnam-decom-plan-dalat.pdf. 5

Tran Huu Phat, Chairman of VAEC Council of Science

Norton, 2009), p. 167.

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Natural Gas Proved Reserves’, p. 22.

14

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Oil Proved Reserves’, p. 6.

Vietnam

15

16

17

Andrew Symon, ‘Nuclear power in Southeast Asia:

29

Province’, Power Engineering International, 5 November

Institute for International Policy, April 2008, http://www.

2008, http://pepei.pennnet.com/display_article/344496/6/

lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=786.

ARTCL/none/none/1/Vietnam-to-build-two-nuclear-

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Coal

power-plants-in-Central-Province.

Proved Reserves at End 2008’, p. 32.

30

Ibid.

Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2008

31

‘Nuclear Power: Should Vietnam Build 4 Reactors at

Update, September 2008. 18

Once?’, VietnamNet Bridge, 21 October 2008, http://english.

This includes uranium. Although it has an estimated 210,000 tonnes of uranium ore deposits (mostly located in

vietnamnet.vn/reports/2008/10/809541/. 32

White, ‘Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia: Building

be dependent on importing materials because it does not

a Preventative Proliferation Firewall,’ The Nonproliferation

uranium and currently has no plans to develop it. See

20

Review, vol. 16, no.1, March 2009, pp. 25–45.

22

33

and the National Nuclear Power Development

Tuan, ‘Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Development Plan until

Program’, Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology,

2020’.

no. 5, 2005), http://www.vaec.gov.vn/News/baiviet.

‘US Nuclear Power Technology Introduced in Vietnam’,

php?EV=1&iddomain=7&idbv=360. 34

President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor

Symon, ‘Vietnam Sets Nuclear Pace in Southeast Asia’,

Henry Kissinger explored the possibility of using nuclear

Asia Times Online, 5 June 2008. As agreed under the Kyoto

weapons to end the war as quickly as possible. They

Protocol, the ‘clean development mechanism’ allows

also show that Vietnamese leaders were aware of this

industrialised countries to invest in projects that reduce

threat but remained defiant. William Burr and Jeffrey

emissions in developing countries and thereby receive

Kimball, eds, ‘Nuclear Weapons: the Vietnam War and

credit toward their own emission reduction commitments.

the ”Nuclear Taboo”’, National Security Archive Electronic

‘Tet 2009: Vietnam Ponders its Future’, The Nation,

Briefing Book No. 195, 31 July 2006, http://www.gwu.

12 January 2009. ‘Background Note: Vietnam’, US

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB195/index.htm. Whether

Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific

or not the Nixon administration seriously came close to

Affairs, March 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/

using nuclear weapons in Vietnam, many Vietnamese

bgn/4130.htm. It is worth noting, however, that the level

who are familiar with the issue say they believe that this

evidenced, for example, by the strong domestic opposition

was the case. 35

in Fighting the Proliferation of WMD: Views from the Next

a government plan to mine bauxite in the central high-

Generation (Honolulu, HI: CSIS Pacific Forum, 2006),

lands.

pp. 7–9, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/

Andrew Symon, ‘Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Power Thrust:

Publications/Detail/?ord588=grp1&ots591=0C54E3B3-

Southeast Asia, vol. 30, issue 1, April 2008.

25

1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=34718. 36

27

28

See, for example, Statement by Hoang Chi Trung, Deputy

United States Embassy, ‘United States Nuclear

Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of

Cooperation with Vietnam Fact Sheet’, 25 June 2008,

Vietnam to the United Nations at the 2007 Session of the

http://vietnam.usembassy.gov/nuclearfactsheet.html.

UN Disarmament Commission, New York, 9 April 2007,

Communication with Western government official, May

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/dc/state-

2009. 26

Do Thanh Hai, ‘Vietnam and the Proliferation of WMD’,

that recently emerged on environmental grounds against

Putting ASEAN’s Effectiveness to the Test?’, Contemporary 24

Recently declassified documents reveal that former US

namnet.vn/tech/2009/02/831557/.

of freedom and tolerance in Vietnam has increased, as

23

Vuong Huu Tan, ‘Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission

Lowe, ‘Vietnam’, p. 58.

VietNamNet Bridge, 23 February 2009, http://english.viet21

This section draws on Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-

the Nong Son basin, Quang Nam Province), Vietnam will have the operational or technological capability to extract

19

‘Vietnam to Build Two Nuclear Power Plants in Central

Implications for Australia and Non-Proliferation’, Lowy

Tuan, ‘Vietnam’s Nuclear Energy Development Plan until

ments07/Vietnam.pdf. 37

‘Vietnam Calls for End to World’s Nuclear Threat’, Nhân

2020’.

Dân, 11 April 2007; Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Bissani and Tyson, ‘Sister Lab Program Prospective

‘Vietnam willing to work with all others for general disar-

Partner Nuclear Profile’, p. 5.

mament’, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/

Communication with Vietnamese academic, April 2009.

nr040807105001/ns051006092438/view.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

163

Chapter eleven

38

39

Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Le Dung,

Committee - Vietnam Communist Party, 9th Tenure, at The

quoted in Grant McCool, ‘Vietnam Plays New Anti-Terror

Party’s 10th National Congress, updated 28 July 2007, http://

Role’, The China Post, 13 April 2007.

www.mofa.gov.vn/en/cs_doingoai/; Malley and Ogilvie-

Malley and Ogilvie-White, ’Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia’, p. 38.

40

‘China and Vietnam Settle Border Dispute’, The Associated Press, 1 January 2009.

41

White, ’Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia’, p. 38 42

Malley and Ogilvie-White, ‘Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia’, pp. 37–40.

43

Lowe, ‘Vietnam’, p. 59. Lowe predicts that a more real-

Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Vietnam Foreign

istic projection would be a total of 6,000MWe of installed

Policy’, extract from The Political Report of The Central

capacity by 2030.

164 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter twelve

Australia

Introduction Australia’s status as a country with no nuclear power reactors (and just one research reactor), no nuclear weapons and a reputation for disarmament diplomacy is in contrast to its long involvement in the nuclear field. Australia is a key player in the uranium business; the country possesses about 34% of known low-cost global reserves and currently meets about 13% of the world’s annual uranium requirements. It is consistently one of the world’s top three uranium exporters, alongside Kazakhstan and Canada. In defence terms, Canberra sees its nucleararmed ally, the United States, as critical to Australia’s security in the international system. Yet, anti-nuclear sentiment has long been strong in Australian political culture, both in relation to weapons and energy. For several decades, Canberra has been an active diplomatic player in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear disarmament. This is both because of domestic public opinion and because successive Australian governments have recognised that a restrained global nuclear order is strongly in their nation’s security interests. These mixed characteristics help explain the policy tensions throughout much of Australia’s nuclear history. Australia pursues global and regional non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy, while benefitting from extended deterrence. Australia is a major uranium exporter yet has no nuclear power reactors. In addition, the export of Australian uranium is influenced by multiple criteria – commercial, non-proliferation and geopolitical – and there are potential frictions between these that complicate policy. Yet, despite the long-standing tensions behind Australia’s nuclear policies, there are prospects for

change in the years and decades ahead. Growth in demand for nuclear energy worldwide and particularly in Asia means that Australian uranium exports are set to expand. Although Australian public opinion has long been broadly anti-nuclear, Australians are also deeply concerned about climate change. Some potential thus exists for a generational shift, wherein Australia reluctantly accepts the addition of nuclear power to its energy mix and becomes more deeply involved in regional and global nuclear industries.

Early nuclear history: Unfulfilled aspirations Australia’s involvement in the nuclear domain began in the 1940s. Until the 1970s, activities included: „„ the creation of national infrastructure for nuclear policy and research; „„ uranium mining and export; „„ proposals for domestic nuclear-energy production; „„ British nuclear-weapons testing;

Australia-specific abbreviations AAEC

Australian Atomic Energy Commission

ANSTO

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

ARPANSA Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency ASNO

Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office

AUA

Australian Uranium Association

HIFAR

High Flux Australian Reactor

ICNND

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

OPAL

Open Pool Australian Light-water reactor

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter twelve

„„ efforts to develop or retain the option of Australian nuclear weapons; and „„ the evolution of policies on non-proliferation, disarmament and extended deterrence. As with many countries in the era before the NPT, early Australian nuclear policy and activity did not involve a clear separation of nuclear weapons and energy. Canberra first became aware of British research into nuclear weapons in 1941 and took control of national uranium resources with a 1943 Atomic Energy Act. In 1946, Prime Minister Ben Chifley identified three stages to Australia’s nuclear efforts: uranium exploration and mining; research into nuclear physics and engineering; and preparations for nuclear energy for industrial purposes.1 A major step was the founding in 1953 of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), a statutory authority with its own legislative mandate. Its early responsibilities included overseeing the exploration and mining of uranium, negotiating uranium sales, developing an atomic-energy sector and fostering national expertise in the nuclear field. An immediate objective for the AAEC was the building of a research reactor, which was constructed at Lucas Heights on Sydney’s southern outskirts and went critical in 1958. The 10MWt High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) was moderated by heavy water and was based on the British DIDO reactor at Harwell. HIFAR was initially fuelled by 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU), but the fuelenrichment level was gradually lowered to 60% by the early 1980s to reduce the proliferation risk. Fuel came from the UK, US and France. The reactor was fully converted to run on 19.75% low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in 2006. The spent HEU fuel was sent back to the US, with the final shipment taking place in May 2009. The original purpose of HIFAR was nuclearmaterials testing, using its high neutron flux to give materials intended for use in any future nuclear power reactors their entire expected lifetime neutron exposure in a relatively short period of time. Until its replacement by a newer reactor in 2007, HIFAR was also used for the production of medical and industrial radioisotopes. Another early priority was to build a research base by training Australian scientists abroad, especially in the UK, and through spending on higher

166 An IISS Strategic Dossier

education in Australia. In this regard, the establishment of the Research School of Physical Sciences and Engineering at the Australian National University, under Australia’s pre-eminent nuclear physicist and Manhattan Project researcher Sir Marcus Oliphant, was of particular significance.2 Nuclear-research institutes were established at the universities of Melbourne, Sydney and New South Wales. At the same time, uranium mining and export was well under way. Following earlier mining of very small quantities for scientific research between 1906 and 1934, Australia’s first sizeable uranium reserves were discovered in 1949 at Rum Jungle, in the Northern Territory (NT). This was followed by discoveries in the South Alligator River region, NT (1953), Mary Kathleen, Queensland (1954) and Westmoreland, Queensland (1958). These sites were mined through the 1950s and 1960s. By 1971, when this first era of Australia’s uranium industry ended with the closure of the Rum Jungle operation, Australia had supplied large volumes of uranium to the US and the UK, contributing both to their civil energy sectors and their nuclear arsenals.3 Smaller amounts had been exported to Japan and France, and an experimental quantity may even have been sent to India.4 Little progress was made, on the other hand, in developing a nuclear-energy sector in Australia. This was not surprising for a country with plentiful coal reserves located close to population centres. The AAEC executive, under chairman Sir Phillip Baxter, was as much interested in advocating an Australian nuclear weapon as it was in promoting domestic nuclear energy.

Australian interest in nuclear weapons Australia’s early attitude to nuclear weapons involved assisting the UK programme through uranium exports or providing weapons-testing sites. This appears to have involved hopes for access to weapons-related knowledge or even eventually nuclear armaments. Such pursuit of a quid pro quo, however, was fitful, and did not get very far. Strategic considerations explain much of Australia’s initial interest in keeping its nuclear weapons options open. Still haunted by Japan’s 1942 bombing of Darwin and other towns in northern Australia, and uncertain how far it could depend on allies, Australia saw its region’s security as

Australia

© IISS Uranium mine (1954- 1971)

Indian Ocean

Darwin Rum Jungle Coral Sea

Ranger uranium mine

NORTHERN TERRITORY

Monte Bello islands – nuclear test site

A U

WESTERN AUSTRALIA North West Cape – US intelligence and tracking station

S

T

R

A

L

I

A

Mary Kathleen Uranium mine (1958-1963 and 1974-1982)

Pine Gap – US intelligence and tracking station

Emu Field – nuclear test site

QUEENSLAND

Olympic Dam uranium mine

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Four Mile uranium mine

Maralinga – nuclear test site

Beverly uranium mine Honeymoon – location of new mine expected to begin in 2010

Woomera – testing ground for British missiles, 1947–1977 and subsequently a test range for Australian Defence Force

S o u t h e r n

0

Miles

200

0

Km

320

O c e a n

precarious amid the advance of communism in the region. Among the regional nuclear spectres which concerned Australia in the 1950s and 1960s were Chinese nuclear capability, the possibility of Indian and Japanese nuclear weapons, and occasional allegations (however poorly founded) of interest in nuclear weapons from President Sukarno’s Indonesia. These anxieties converged with official assessments that nuclear weapons were becoming an irreducible element of modern force structures and warfare.5 The coincidence of Australia’s traditional reliance on allies and its perception of the prospect of nuclear proliferation posed a difficult choice. To develop an indigenous nuclear weapon would be costly, technologically demanding and diplomatically risky. On the other hand, neither was Canberra comfortable with relying solely on British or American extended deterrence. The solution was a compromise. With the 1951 signing of the ANZUS security treaty between

NEW SOUTH WALES Sydney

Adelaide

Canberra

Nurrungar – US intelligence and tracking station

Lucas Heights

VICTORIA

Location of ANSTO research establishment, including 20MWt Open Pool Australian Light-water reactor (OPAL); and formerly 10MWt High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR)

TASMANIA

Australia, New Zealand and the US, plus the hosting of British nuclear tests, and a ‘forward defence’ policy of being willing to fight alongside US and/or UK forces in Southeast Asia, Canberra tried to ensure the sustained support of its allies. Simultaneously, it sought a basic nuclear infrastructure, to create the option of commencing a weapons programme should the assurances of its allies weaken.6 The British sought Australian uranium for the Manhattan project in 1944.7 The Chifley Labor government agreed in 1946 to provide a testing ground for British missiles at Woomera in South Australia.8 The conservative government of Sir Robert Menzies went further, agreeing in 1950 to British nuclear-weapons tests on Australian territory. The first test took place in 1952 on the Monte Bello Islands off Western Australia, with further tests being held there as well as at Maralinga and

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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politicians, and conservative elements in civil society, notably the organisation representing war veterans.11 In 1956, the relevant minister proposed atomic bombs for the air force. That same year, the Defence Committee of Cabinet recommended that Australia seek nuclear weapons from the UK.12 Prime Minister Menzies raised the matter several times with the British between 1957 and 1961, but did not press hard or urgently. He was initially rebuffed, with UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan citing US determination to limit further horizontal proliferation. By the time Macmillan later offered ‘to see what could be done’, Menzies had softened his request, recasting it in terms of seeking information and keeping options open. He did, however, make one last half-hearted effort in 1961. Australian aircraft acquisition decisions at this time – notably the purchase of the nuclear-capable F-111 long-range strike aircraft – factored in possible future nuclear capabilities.13 A British nuclear test in Maralinga, 1952 (PA)

Between the bomb and the treaty Emu Field in the Woomera testing ground. In all, 12 nuclear explosive tests were carried out between 1952 and 1957. A ‘safety committee’ of Australian scientists monitored the tests, but the public seemed largely unconcerned at the time. Later, the tests came to be widely seen as a shameful episode in Australian history. Their impacts on the environment, Aboriginal communities and service personnel were the subject of judicial investigation in the early 1980s. The issue remains current, with a June 2009 ruling in the British High Court allowing ill British veterans to pursue a class action against the Ministry of Defence, and Australian veterans launching their own claim for damages. The tests remain a rallying point for Australia’s anti-nuclear movement. Menzies’ green light to British nuclear testing was influenced by loyalty to the British Empire.9 Yet he was also making a strategic calculation that Anglo–Australian nuclear cooperation would help Australian security, including the possibility that weapons thus developed would become available to Australia.10 Australia’s loosely-organised ‘bomb lobby’ in the 1950s and 1960s included senior AAEC figures, the air force, parts of the bureaucracy, right-wing

168 An IISS Strategic Dossier

A confluence of strategic developments and domestic political changes in the mid to late 1960s led to renewed interest in an Australian bomb, this time through a domestic programme. Externally, China demonstrated its nuclear capability, exploding its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1967; Britain was planning to withdraw its forces from Malaysia and Singapore; and the conflict in Vietnam – in which Australian troops were involved – was worsening. Internally, a younger, more nationalistic leadership had emerged. Prime Minister John Gorton, a veteran of the war against Japan, had earlier spoken in favour of an independent nuclear-weapons capability14, and seems to have taken several steps to that end, such as exploring a joint uranium-enrichment project with France and planning for a power reactor. But meanwhile pressures were building internationally for a treaty-based non-proliferation regime, and the United States was suggesting that its allies forgo nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear-weapon constituencies were developing domestically, including influential figures within Canberra’s external-affairs establishment, focused on the dangers of proliferation.15 Recently declassified US

Australia

Key signposts in Australian nuclear history 1944

Britain seeks uranium from Australia for the Manhattan Project.

1949

First substantial uranium reserves discovered in Australia. These sites were mined throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

1951

September

ANZUS Treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States, encouraging cooperation over defence and the security of the Pacific.

1952

October

British carry out first nuclear weapons test in Australia on the Monte Bello Islands. Tests were carried out until 1957.

1957 1958

PM Robert Menzies tentatively asks the British about acquiring nuclear weapons. These requests are repeated until 1961. January

High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) at Lucas Heights goes critical.

1972

Prime Minister Gough Whitlam cancels Australia’s nuclear power programme.

1973

Australia ratifies the NPT.

1986

August

Australia joins the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone along with 12 other states.

1995–96

Australian government establishes the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

1999–2000

Government rejects proposal for an international commercial nuclear waste site in Australia.

2006

Prime Minister John Howard increases government interest in nuclear energy and commissions a report to assess potential nuclear options for Australia. The report is led by ANSTO Chairman Ziggy Switkowski and delivered in December 2006.

2007

2008

April

Open Pool Australian Light-water reactor goes critical, replacing the HIFAR reactor.

August

Howard agrees ‘in principle’ to commence sales of uranium to India, subject to stringent security measures and regulation.

January

Newly elected Prime Minister Kevin Rudd reverses the previous administration’s policy by banning the sale of uranium to India.

July

Prime Minister Rudd announces the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

government documents have shed light on the disagreements between Washington and Gorton, and within Canberra, over the NPT. A 6 April 1968 cable from Secretary of State Dean Rusk reports a conversation in which Gorton presented ‘a full battery of reservations’ about the NPT and ‘sounded almost like De Gaulle in saying that Australia could not rely upon the United States for nuclear weapons under ANZUS in the event of nuclear blackmail or attack’. In his cable, Rusk described his reply this way: ‘I will not recount here what I said to him but I opened up all stops.’16 Armed with subsequent US reassurances and understandings about the NPT, the Department of External Affairs under Foreign Minister William McMahon outmanoeuvred the bomb lobby in Canberra.17 Gorton eventually signed the NPT, but did not ratify it, and pressed on with his nuclearenergy plans. His government’s chosen design for a

power reactor, to be located at the federal enclave of Jervis Bay on the New South Wales coast, was to be supplemented with gas-centrifuge systems adequate to produce significant quantities of highly enriched uranium. However, the whole enterprise was deferred when Gorton lost the Prime Ministership to McMahon in 1971, and was cancelled with the election in 1972 of the Australian Labor Party and Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, who went on to ratify the NPT in January 1973.

Later history: Abstinence and commerce Non-proliferation and disarmament: A zealous convert Australia’s contemporary reputation as a middle power busy in non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy can be traced to the policies it developed in the 1970s after rejecting the nuclear-weapons path and ratifying the NPT. Within a few years,

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Canberra went from being lukewarm about the NPT to becoming one of its staunchest advocates. The 1970s registered several improvements in Australia’s strategic circumstances. Détente and arms control talks grew between Washington and Moscow. Normalisation of US and Australian relations with China in 1972, Japan’s affirmation of non-proliferation, and largely improved Australia– Indonesia relations reduced some chief regional sources of Australian strategic worry. But a critical factor in locking Australia into its new creed of nuclear abstinence was growing international support for the NPT. Successive Australian governments came to rely strongly on the two pillars of the US alliance and the global non-proliferation regime for Australia’s protection from nuclear threats. This was despite the fact that, at roughly the same time, Australian defence policy came to espouse a doctrine of selfreliance in conventional defence. By 1974, Australia’s commitment to nonproliferation was such that India’s nuclear test and French nuclear testing in the Pacific served to galvanise rather than discourage Australian diplomatic activism in this field. Within another decade, Australia under the Labor government of PM Bob Hawke had consolidated its status as a campaigner in global nuclear dialogue. During the heightening of Cold War tensions in the early 1980s, Australia appointed an ambassador for disarmament and played a busy and sometimes mediating role in multilateral arms-control meetings. The country also led efforts against nuclear testing through the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and the promotion of what was to become the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). At the same time, Australia’s situation as a close US ally meant that its disarmament activism was measured rather than radical. For instance, the Hawke government resisted demands from the domestic anti-nuclear movement to eject US intelligence and tracking installations from Australian territory, including at Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape, emphasising that their monitoring capabilities were essential to crisis stability and arms control between the US and the USSR. Australia further burnished its mantle as a white knight of nuclear and other WMD non-proliferation into the 1990s. Relevant steps included the country’s

170 An IISS Strategic Dossier

promotion of strategic trade controls and safeguards, its shepherding of the Chemical Weapons Convention, its role in bringing the CTBT to the UN General Assembly in 1996 and its convening in 1995–96 of the expert and eminent Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Canberra Commission was in part a genuine effort to use the end of Cold War tensions as an opportunity to offer a practical blueprint for global nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the full picture of some of these efforts was untidy: one factor in the impetus for the Canberra Commission, for instance, was to offset domestic discontent with the slowness of the Labor government led by Paul Keating to condemn the 1995 French nuclear tests.18 In any case, under the conservative government of PM John Howard from 1996 to 2007, Australia’s reputation as a middle-power leader in multilateral arms control weakened. The Howard government’s focus was on bilateralism and the US alliance. It mistrusted international institutions, and tended to share the world view of the George W. Bush administration. In some areas, however – notably the pursuit of CTBT entry-into-force and of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – Canberra’s position differed from Washington’s. Under Howard, Australia did important work in strengthening IAEA safeguards and in support of the negotiation and implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Canberra during this time also responded harshly to the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, was a prominent and active critic of Iranian, North Korean and residual Iraqi nuclear ambitions, and strongly supported the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative to stop WMD-related shipments. Yet its credibility in the eyes of much of the global arms-control community was damaged by its soft-pedalling on nuclear disarmament, its shelving of many of the recommendations of the Canberra Commission, its uncritical view of most Bush administration activities and doctrines, and its proposal in 2007 to sell uranium to India.

Uranium exports: Building a national consensus Australia’s evolution as a player in non-proliferation largely ran parallel with the growth of a large uranium mining and export sector from the 1970s onwards. Although sharp political differences arose in the late 1970s – when the Labor party adopted

Australia

a platform opposed to uranium mining – the chief elements of what would become a broad national policy consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and uranium exports were already emerging. These drew upon a statement by conservative Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in 1977, following an inquiry into the impacts of Australia uranium mining and on the eve of a revival and expansion of this sector. The key policy elements were: „„To export Australian uranium, including in fulfilment of Australia’s commitment under Article IV of the NPT to facilitate peaceful uses of nuclear energy; „„To limit that supply to countries where Australia was satisfied this would not contribute to the production of nuclear weapons or any other military purpose; „„To require that such countries be in good non-proliferation standing; and „„To require that any countries wishing to import Australia uranium must conclude a bilateral agreement in addition, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, to IAEA fullscope safeguards. These have been central considerations to Australian uranium export policy ever since. Along the way there have been refinements; ‘good standing’ on non-proliferation has become defined specifically in terms of adherence to the NPT. There have also been occasional controversies, including over export to France before it had acceded to the NPT and over proposed export to India. The Labor Party, meanwhile, abandoned its outright opposition to uranium mining on the eve of its return to government in the 1980s. It adopted a compromise policy of allowing three pre-existing mines to operate, and finally ended this restriction shortly before its next return to power in 2007.

Enrichment Proposals for uranium enrichment, typically through international partnerships, occasionally continued to surface in the 1970s and 1980s, although these were with export and energy purposes in mind. The AAEC maintained a centrifuge research project from the 1960s until the 1980s. This was followed by a small-scale laser-enrichment research project,

intended to maintain sufficient expertise to keep government informed of international enrichment developments. In the late 1990s, this activity was absorbed into the work of a private-sector project. The company in question, SILEX, eventually sold the technology to the United States, where General Electric has continued research and development with a view to possible commercial use.

The present Contemporary nuclear infrastructure Other than in uranium mining, Australia’s contemporary nuclear infrastructure is modest for a nation of its size, level of development, resources and wealth. It includes a federal research authority, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), as well as its one research reactor. Although Australia’s nuclear objectives are limited, it retains a substantial body of scientists with advanced expertise in nuclear physics and engineering, in part due to the educational infrastructure bequeathed by its earlier ambitions. Nonetheless, due to relatively low levels of investment in nuclear-related education in recent decades, this pool would need to be expanded if Australia were to play a much greater role in the nuclear-fuel cycle.19 ANSTO was established in 1987 as the successor organisation to the AAEC. Its mandate, set out in the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation Act 1987, involves research and development in nuclear science and technology, applications of that research and development, nuclear-waste management, liaising with foreign entities on nuclear issues and the provision of advice to the government on nuclear matters including nuclear energy. ANSTO did not inherit its predecessor’s powers over uranium mining and sales, and is forbidden by law from undertaking ‘research or development in the design or production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’. Although ANSTO has statutory independence, it is subject to a relatively rigorous system of internal oversight. It is regulated by the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office (ASNO) for safeguards and security, and by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) for radiological safety.

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had been in operation for almost 50 years. OPAL is not intended for the production of nuclear power. Nor, without any facilities for separating plutonium from the spent fuel, could it provide the basis for a clandestine weapons programme. Moreover, only very small amounts of plutonium would be obtainable from the spent fuel from OPAL. It might yield about 500 grams per year, while a nuclear weapon needs about 6–8kg of plutonium. Unlike its predecessor, which was established in part to research the material requirements for nuclear power, OPAL is specifically designed for advanced research and traditionally ancillary purposes such as production of radioisotopic medicines, and materials analysis through advanced neutron-scattering and radiography. Spent fuel from OPAL will be sent to the US under a 2005 agreement with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The first shipment is due to be sent in 2014. The final decision on its disposition will rest with the DOE. ANSTO’s other national facilities include a national medical cyclotron, ANSTO Chairman Ziggy Switkowski (L) and Prime Minister John Howard used for research and the produc(centre) at the official opening of OPAL, April 2007 (courtesy of ANSTO) tion of medical radioisotopes, and a gamma technology research irradiWith around 950, mostly scientific, employees, ator, used for commercial irradiation services and ANSTO is the centre of Australia’s nuclear experresearch. ANSTO also has related non-nuclear faciltise, providing specialised advice to government, ities, such as particle accelerators, x-ray equipment universities and business, and improving public and electron microscopy. ANSTO also oversees understanding of nuclear issues. Its most critical several research centres: the Bragg Institute in functions, however, are to operate and administer neutron research (neutron-scattering and X-ray Australia’s research reactor. techniques) as well as institutes for environmental The centrepiece of Australia’s nuclear infrastrucresearch, materials engineering and radiopharmature is the new Open Pool Australian Light-water ceuticals research (which develops technology for reactor (OPAL), a 20MWt research reactor located biomedical imaging). In particular, ANSTO is a at the ANSTO research establishment at Lucas member of the IAEA’s network of analytical laboraHeights, Sydney. Fuelled by 30 kg of just under tories, providing sensitive analysis of samples taken 20% low-enriched uranium, and light-water moderby IAEA inspectors at facilities around the world. ated, this reactor of Argentine design was officially The 15-person ASNO is responsible for ensuring opened in April 2007, although it went critical some Canberra’s adherence to international commitments months prior. It replaces the HIFAR reactor, which under arms control and safeguard agreements,

172 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Australia

2008 Worldwide uranium production from mines (tonnes U)

Australia’s uranium mine history 1949

First substantial uranium reserves discovered.

1954

Mining of uranium at Rum Jungle (Northern Territory) begins.

8,430

1971

Rum Jungle mine closes.

Namibia

4,366

1980

Russia (est.)

3,521

Mining of uranium at Ranger (Northern Territory) begins.

Niger

3,032

1988

Olympic Dam (South Australia) uranium mine commences production.

Uzbekistan

2,338

2000

USA

1,430

Mining of uranium at Beverley (South Australia) begins.

2007

Australian Labor Party lifts its ban forbidding new uranium mines.

2008

Western Australia lifts ban on uranium mining after Colin Barnett becomes Premier.

2009

Federal government approves mining at Four Mile (South Australia)

Canada

9,000

Kazakhstan

8,521

Australia

Source: World Nuclear Association

including the NPT, the Australia–IAEA safeguards agreement, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and 22 bilateral safeguard agreements (covering 39 separate countries). ASNO has also contributed to the development of the international monitoring regime for the CTBT. ASNO has made a major contribution to the development of IAEA safeguards, including through a support programme for IAEA safeguards, chairing of the IAEA’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation over several years, OPAL reactor pools (courtesy of ANSTO)

the negotiation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, numerous bilateral activities and extensive regional outreach. ASNO experts have recently begun to cooperate with UK counterparts in research towards the verifiable dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The building of non-proliferation safeguards capacity in Asia-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia, is an important and growing part of ASNO’s core business. For instance, in 2007–08, ASNO staff provided training in nuclear safeguards, nuclear security and strategic trade controls to more than 180 personnel from 15 regional countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. In addition, ASNO has recently promoted the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network, to ensure high standards of safeguards in the region as its use of nuclear energy potentially grows. Australia’s capabilities in non-proliferation diplomacy more generally are based in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The resourcing and experience of Australia’s non-proliferation diplomats, however, is reportedly poorer than it was in the 1980s and early 1990s, owing to a downgrading of non-proliferation and disarmament as foreign-policy priorities under the Howard government and continued budget constraints under the current Labor government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.20 Australia’s intelligence-analysis capacity on non-proliferation, on the other hand, has received improved resourcing since the 2002–03 Iraq WMD intelligence failures.

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Uranium mining and export There are three commercial uranium mines in operation in Australia: Beverley and Olympic Dam in South Australia; and Ranger in the Northern Territory. Two of these, Ranger and Olympic Dam, have in recent years been the world’s second-largest and fourth-largest uranium producers. The operation of Ranger, located 230km east of Darwin, began in 1980. It comprises two major ore bodies, the first of which was mined out by the mid 1990s. Mining at the second ore body began in 1997 and continues today. Since 1996, Ranger has produced more than 4,000 tonnes of uranium oxide per year, and in 2007 production amounted to approximately 5,400 tonnes. It is owned and run by Energy Resources Australia which exports uranium to Asia, North America and Europe, and accounts for around 10% of global uranium production and supply. The Olympic Dam mine is located in South Australia, approximately 500km north of Adelaide. It is the largest known uranium deposit in the world, but is also mined for copper and gold. Since 2005, Olympic Dam has been owned and run by BHP Billiton, which is in the process of conducting a pre-feasibility study to determine future investment levels. Uranium ore production in 2007 was 3,985 tonnes. The Beverley mine is in South Australia, also located approximately 500km north of Adelaide. It is owned and operated by Heathgate Resources. Uranium deposits were first discovered there in 1969, but it did not commence industrial production until 2000. It is thought to contain approximately 21,000 tonnes of uranium in total, making it the second largest deposit in South Australia. Production reached 748 tonnes in 2007, but ongoing expansion projects are projected to increase production to around 1,500 tonnes from around 2009. In July 2009, Federal Environment Minister Peter Garrett granted approval for a new mine at Four Mile in South Australia near Beverley. Expected production, set to begin in early 2010, of 1,400 tonnes/year will make it the world’s 10th-largest uranium mine. Another smaller mine at Honeymoon, South Australia, is also expected to begin production in 2010. Massive uranium reserves exist at Jabiluka surrounded by Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory, but mining would

174 An IISS Strategic Dossier

proceed only if the land’s Aboriginal owners were to give consent, which continues to be unlikely. From 2002 to 2007, Australia exported close to 50,000 tonnes of concentrated uranium oxide (yellowcake), accounting for more than one-third of Australia’s energy exports in terms of power generated (while coal exports accounted for nearly two-thirds). In 2007–08, Australia exported 10,151 tonnes of uranium oxide, almost 6% more than the preceding year. Major destinations are the US (about 4,000 tonnes per year), EU (about 3,500 tonnes), Japan (2,500 tonnes), South Korea (1,000 tonnes) and Taiwan (via the US, about 500 tonnes).21 According to a report compiled by the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics, the value of Australian uranium exports for the financial year 2007–08 was almost A$890 million, an increase of almost A$230m on the previous year.22 In recent years, Australia has explored uranium supply relationships with several major powers. Australia’s first shipment of uranium to China took place in 2008, following a bilateral agreement concluded in 2006. A uranium supply agreement was signed with Russia in 2007, but has since been delayed by a parliamentary inquiry, amid concerns about Russia’s international security behaviour. A potential uranium supply relationship with India emerged in 2007, with the Howard government agreeing in principle to consider sales contingent on a bilateral safeguards agreement, an expanded India–IAEA safeguards agreement and approval of the US–India nuclear deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA. This brief policy shift was reversed by the Rudd government in January 2008. Australian uranium is exported for civilian purposes only and is subject to extensive bilateral safeguard agreements. Current policy is that recipient countries must be members of the NPT and have suitable safeguard agreements, as well as an Additional Protocol, in place with the IAEA. Furthermore, Australian uranium supply is subject to an additional treaty-level bilateral safeguards agreement, involving undertakings to account for Australian uranium and any nuclear material derived from it. Despite Australia’s role as a leading uranium supplier, the country’s uranium-mining industry has for much of its history had little open involvement in policymaking and debate on nuclear

Australia

Australia’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

629.8

557.3

572.4

551.2

585.3

6.19

0.69

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

885

897

921

920

938

1.92

1.09

Natural gas production (billion cubic feet)

1,282.6

1,315.0

1,446.5

1,516.5

1,540.6

1.59

1.19 (’06)

916.8

946.1

949.3

1,012.0

1,038.3

2.60

0.97

Coal production (thousand short tons)

376,619.0

388,230.8

404925.3

405046.5

435689.7

7.57

6.15

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

142,027.3

143,710.5

153,323.8

155,059.9

171,510.8

10.61

2.42

15.9

15.4

15.4

15.5

16.7

7.74

0.52 (’06)

Natural gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

Hydropower (net generation, billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy.

policy. In this regard, the establishment in 2006 of the Australian Uranium Association (AUA) was a significant departure. The AUA is a voluntary industry body aimed at open policy engagement and at improving public confidence in and awareness of the Australian uranium-mining sector. It has declared support for non-proliferation principles.23 Although in the 1960s and 1970s the Australian uranium industry may have chafed at efforts to restrict its markets, today’s Australian uranium miners appear to see safeguards and sound nonproliferation policy as lending stability to their business.

Nuclear energy aspirations, plans and activities For much of the 1996–2007 Howard era, Canberra remained deeply cautious about the extent of Australian involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle, mindful of public wariness and the generally anti-nuclear attitudes of both Labor and conservative state-level governments. Although Howard’s government made a priority of expanding the country’s uranium exports, it was quick to reject in 1999–2000 a commercial proposal for the establishment of an international high-level nuclear waste repository in Australia. The decision was supported by both sides of politics, at national and state level. This was despite arguments – which continue occasionally to be raised by prominent figures, including former Labor Prime Minister

Hawke – that Australia is the most geologically and geopolitically safe place in the world for such a site. Hawke has argued that Australia has a moral obligation and a massive economic opportunity in this regard.24 In 2006, against a background of growing enthusiasm for nuclear energy worldwide, official interest in nuclear energy in Australia was rekindled for the first time in decades. The US under the Bush administration sought to combine its nonproliferation agenda with the management of the nuclear-energy revival, through its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) initiative, which Australia joined. Australian voters were becoming both increasingly worried about climate change and persuaded that nuclear energy might have potential to reduce its severity. Public attitudes to nuclear energy appeared increasingly malleable, depending upon how the question was put. One poll suggested that 60% of Australians remained opposed to any nuclear power stations being built in their country, while almost half of the respondents to another poll indicated support for nuclear power to combat climate change.25 The Howard government chose this moment to encourage public interest in nuclear energy, with a major domestic policy review into the possible opportunities from uranium mining, processing and nuclear energy, under an expert taskforce headed by ANSTO Chairman Ziggy Switkowski.

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Key findings included:

of

the

Switkowski

review

„„Australia had opportunities to participate in the wider nuclear fuel cycle globally, such as uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication domestically, ‘given international confidence in the quality of our production processes, our sophisticated technology community … and the strength of our commitment to nuclear non-proliferation’; „„Domestic uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication could add up to A$1.8 bn a year in export value, but high commercial and technological barriers ‘could make market entry difficult’ and there might be little opportunity for Australian companies to profit; „„Nuclear power in Australia was likely to be 20–50% more expensive to produce than power from new coal-fired plants at the fossil-fuel prices of the day, but the gap would be closed to the extent that the costs of greenhouse-gas emissions were explicitly recognised in future fossil-fuel pricing. Even then, private investment in Australia’s initial nuclear power reactors might need ‘some form of government support or directive’; „„The development of an Australian nuclearpower sector would probably take 15 years to start delivering electricity to the grid, and Australia would need a single national nuclear regulator to support the sector; „„Were Australia to commence developing nuclear power immediately, it would be possible for about 25 nuclear reactors to produce about one-third of the country’s electricity by 2050; and „„Australia should establish a central repository for burial of low-level nuclear waste from all national sources including a future nuclearpower industry. The review also noted that Australia had sites suitable for high-level waste, but did not offer a recommendation on Australia’s hosting an international highlevel waste repository.26 The Switkowski report received support from parts of the Australian press, and general endorsement

176 An IISS Strategic Dossier

from John Howard and some in his government. Howard even announced plans for a new regulatory regime that might help ease the way to nuclear power in Australia. The government failed, however, to lay the ground for bipartisan or broad community acceptance of nuclear energy in Australia. The report was attacked by environmentalists and others in the anti-nuclear movement. Their criticisms included that: it paid insufficient attention to the health, pollution and proliferation risks of an expansion of nuclear energy; it was optimistic in its estimates of the cost of nuclear energy in Australia, not fully accounting for costs such as reactor decommissioning and waste disposal; it was biased against renewable energy sources, calling for government support of a nuclear industry but ignoring the benefits that might follow from government support of renewables; and it disregarded the huge political challenge in converting Australian public opinion to accept nuclear energy.27 That political challenge resurfaced immediately. Differences on nuclear policy were played out in a federal election, which saw the defeat of Howard by the Australian Labor Party under Kevin Rudd in November 2007. Nuclear policy was not a decisive issue in the election, but Labor probably benefited marginally by exploiting public fears about the possible locations of future nuclear reactors. The 2007 election result amounted to a postponement rather than a resolution of the debate over Australia’s nuclear future.

Energy economics Australia has been fully electrified for several decades and the transmission losses are minimal. Nearly 80% of the electricity generated is from coal, about 12% from gas and 6% from hydropower. The country has immense coal reserves and at the current rate of production these are expected to last until the 23rd century.28 Australia is the world’s fourthlargest coal producer and largest net exporter of coal. Australia’s reserves of natural gas are expected to last until 2075.29 The country is the fifth largest exporter of LNG in the world. It also produces oil, but these reserves are declining fairly rapidly and are expected to last only until 2029.30 Petroleum import dependency is expected to reach about 80% by 2010. The government would like to increase hydropower

Australia

minimise the proliferation risks arising from expansion of demand for nuclear energy. The commission is due to report initially at the end of 2009, and to conclude its work in late 2010. Other than the establishment of the ICNND and the reversal of the Howard government’s position on India, the Rudd government has not made any radical nuclear-related policy shifts. As of September 2009, no public announcement had been made regarding possible continuation or suspension of the Australian involvement in GNEP. Australia’s support for the Proliferation Security Initiative continues to be solid. Australian voting patterns in the United Nations First Commission and General Assembly have begun to tilt in favour of nuclear disarmament and reduced operational readiness. The Rudd government is building upon the work of its predecessor in encouraging the entry-into-force of the CTBT. Australia will host no fewer than 21 of the 337 global monitoring facilities for the treaty; it has 17 already in place, and is moving to plan and build the remaining four. Prime Minister Kevin Rudd delivers the keynote address at the 8th IISS Asian Security Summit, May 2009

generation but the country has experienced serious drought in recent years.

The Rudd government’s non-proliferation policies Prime Minister Rudd is seeking to define his government’s non-proliferation and disarmament policies in the activist middle-power tradition of some earlier Labor administrations. As of 2009, the chief initiative of his government in this field was the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), co-sponsored with the Japanese government and with former Australian and Japanese Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi as co-chairs. The ICNND is the most ambitious government-sponsored ‘second track’ forum of experts and eminent persons in this field to date. It has several purposes, including recommending ways to protect and strengthen the NPT regime at the treaty’s 2010 review conference, and to defining a path towards nuclear disarmament beyond that gathering. It also is placing some emphasis upon identifying ways to

The future Strategic context Canberra continues to see the US alliance as a pillar of Australia’s security, despite an aspiration to increase Australia’s own conventional ‘strategic weight’.31 Ultimately, this means an ongoing Australian reliance on the US nuclear deterrent. Australian governments have generally been reluctant to emphasise this publicly, although the Rudd Government in its May 2009 Defence White Paper made an unusually explicit declaration on this point, declaring: ‘For so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia’.32 Prospective changes in the Asian strategic environment, notably the rise of China and India and possible Russian and Japanese assertiveness in the face of their relative decline as powers in the region, are unlikely to reduce the importance of the United States to Australia. Indeed, as China rises, Australia may become even more concerned to maintain the US alliance and any associated nuclear guarantee. Australia’s anxiety will not be as acute as Japan’s, although in both cases strategic imperatives could be at odds with nuclear disarmament rhetoric and

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the sort of recommendations that may emerge from the ICNND. Geopolitical change in Australia’s nearer environment of Southeast Asia is also unlikely to have a deep effect on the centrality of the US to Australia’s security thinking. The consolidation of democracy in Indonesia in the past decade has been a highly positive development for Australia’s security. Internal unrest in other Southeast Asian states would be unlikely to change Australia’s view that it does not perceive ASEAN countries as military threats. On the other hand, prolonged political instability in any regional state interested in developing nuclear power could disturb any future Australian consideration of a uranium-supply relationship with such countries, were they to seek it.

Increasing uranium exports The growing demand for nuclear energy in Asia – especially in China and India but also potentially some ASEAN countries – has direct implications for Australia. The OECD’s Nuclear Energy Agency has forecast that annual world uranium demand will increase by between 41% and 83% by 2030. Of 319 new nuclear reactors in various stages of planning or proposal, 175 are in East or South Asia. Australia is a preferred uranium supplier for Asian countries not only because of its large and low-cost reserves but also for its location and political stability. All indications are that Australia’s uranium mining and exports are set to expand considerably over the medium term. The Switkowski report estimated that exports could reach over 20,000 tonnes a year by 2014–15, a doubling of the volume of recent years. Existing mines could be exploited further, new mines are being developed and exploration has increased dramatically in recent years. Since 2004, some dozens of companies have been active in this regard, with exploration expenditure more than doubling between 2006 and 2008. The uranium spot price rose more than thirteen-fold between 2003 and mid 2007. Although it dropped again steeply as the global financial crisis bit in 2008, it has risen since. Market analysts and companies continue to talk up its long-term prospects because of increasing nuclear-energy demands and concerns over carbon emissions.33 In addition, the potential of Australia’s federal system of government as a brake on uranium

178 An IISS Strategic Dossier

mining is likely to diminish, as an increasing number of state governments accept the possibility of uranium mines on their territory. A conservative government elected in Western Australia in late 2008 has ended this resource-rich state’s long-standing ban on uranium mining, and its new premier has foreshadowed mines being established within five years. The Labor government in Queensland, on the other hand, has renewed its opposition to uranium mining following its victory in a 2009 state election.

Prospects for nuclear energy in Australia The Rudd government’s response to climate change involves the introduction of an emissions trading scheme, under which the price of electricity from coal-fired power stations is due to increase and national efforts to develop cleaner energy sources will proceed. According to a White Paper on a national carbon pollution reduction scheme, the Australian Government is committed to reducing the country’s carbon pollution by 60% of 2000 levels by 2050. This will involve an initial phase of 5–15% national emissions reduction (depending on the level of agreement reached internationally) by 2020. The primary mechanism for achieving these cuts will be a national emissions trading scheme, due to be introduced on 1 July 2011. Divisions over nuclear energy within the Labor party are likely to resurface in the years ahead. A campaign is building in the press for reconsideration of nuclear energy. For instance, Switkowski has argued that public and political opinion on the viability of nuclear energy in Australia could shift as electricity prices rise, governments become desperate to find alternatives to polluting coal technology, and energy shortages occur.34 In August 2009, a trade union leader added his voice to the call for Canberra to reconsider nuclear energy.35 An interesting measure of possible flexibility in the public mood on nuclear issues can be found in opinion polling conducted in 2008 by an Australian foreign-policy think tank. The poll found that 42% of Australians were willing to ‘take responsibility for the nuclear waste from the uranium it exports by storing it in Australia’.36 This is a large minority in support of what would be a radical policy departure. It broadly hints at growing acceptance among Australians that their country will need to become more involved in the global nuclear industry.

Australia

Nonetheless, the establishment of nuclear energy in Australia would require a major political effort and government-led financial investment, both of which are unlikely in the near term. Even if a bipartisan consensus could be forged at a federal level to proceed with a national nuclear-energy strategy, its implementation – particularly the siting of reactors – would pose an exceptional challenge in the face of local interests and of public concerns, however exaggerated, about the industry’s safety record globally. Moreover, Australia’s political culture continues to be risk-averse. It is dominated by short-term decisions, a problem worsened by its short (threeyear) federal electoral cycles. Another impediment to a radical policy shift on questions of a domestic nuclear industry is the federal nature of the political system. Under this, state governments are responsible for electricity generation. Political parties typically find the federal system useful for exploiting parochial concerns to electoral ends as well as for blurring public understanding of the division of federal and state responsibilities. In this context, even substantial public acceptance of nuclear power as part of the solution to climate change could easily prove insufficient as a basis for policy action. These same dynamics are likely to keep constraining Australia’s near-term prospects for a nuclear value-adding industry – uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication. Assuming that demand for nuclear energy continues to rise globally, the Switkowski report’s arguments about Australia pursuing an export industry in nuclear fuel could be revived.37 In the gathering debate about whether nations should forgo their rights to sensitive nuclear technology under the NPT, fresh Australian interest in enrichment would complicate Canberra’s diplomacy. In such an eventuality, Australia would hardly be alone. Canada, for instance, appears comfortable developing its domestic nuclear industry while promoting non-proliferation internationally. But Australia faces circumstances that will make pursuit of enrichment difficult to sell. Australia could have trouble persuading its regional neighbours, as they develop civil nuclear sectors, to choose not to enrich uranium if it is doing so itself. In addition, Australia’s anti-nuclear left – already uncomfortable with uranium exports – would oppose an enrichment programme.

On the other hand, uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel-fabrication facilities – which need not be sited near large population centres – would attract less parochial opposition than reactors. Moreover, the potential concerns of the domestic disarmament constituency, and of some other countries, might ease somewhat were Australian enrichment to be part of an international fuel-bank arrangement. As with the question of nuclear energy in Australia, a push for enrichment is especially unlikely under a Labor government. Labor’s constituency continues to include a left wing that rejects the nuclear industry at a visceral level. Meanwhile the conservative opposition – although enthusiastic about uranium exports – will probably remain careful in any renewed advocacy of nuclear energy or enrichment, to avoid too close an association with the unpopular final stages of the Howard government. None of these factors rules out a gradual Australian acceptance of nuclear energy or of a national value-adding capacity. Such developments, however, would require a political gamble of a kind rarely taken by the country’s leaders. In the case of enrichment, the possible export earnings might well be deemed, on their own, to be insufficient to warrant such electoral and diplomatic risk. On questions of nuclear waste, too, Australian governments will probably defer hard decisions as long as they can. Although Australia is likely eventually to set up a single national repository for the low-level nuclear waste currently stored at many locations around the country, it remains highly unlikely that it will establish a high-level nuclear waste repository, especially in the absence of a national nuclear-energy sector.

Proliferation drivers: a future Australian nuclear weapon? There has been no serious official consideration of an Australian nuclear-weapons option since the early 1970s. Occasionally, scholars in Australia’s small security community will point out the inconsistency between the nation’s pursuit of defence self-reliance and its renunciation of nuclear weapons.38 However, the nuclear-weapons debate in Australia has become circumscribed to the point that even some purely analytical observations – such as that a drastic change in Australia’s strategic circumstances might

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter twelve

one day prompt fresh consideration of the nuclear option – can be construed as provocative.39 The idea of an independent nuclear arsenal remains beyond the pale for mainstream Australian politics. A revival of Australian interest in acquiring nuclear weapons would require extraordinary shifts in geopolitical circumstances, notably a cascade of nuclear proliferation in Asia and a dramatic diminution of Australian faith in the US alliance, as might occur through US failure to protect another

major ally from nuclear coercion. It is also hard to conceive of an Australian impetus to possess nuclear weapons without there first being the serious pursuit of nuclear weapons by other hitherto non-nuclear states in the wider region, in particular Indonesia.40 In any event, Australia is a most unlikely contender for nuclear breakout. In addition to a lack of infrastructure to produce fissile material, Australian civil society and media scrutiny would be a brake on any interest in nuclear weapons.

Australian accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

5 Oct 1977

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

23 Jan 1973

Outer Space Treaty

10 Oct 1967

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga)

10 Jul 1974 11 Dec 1986

Chemical Weapons Convention

6 May 1994

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

9 Jul 1998

Additional Protocol

12 Dec 1997

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which Australia is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

22 Sep 1987

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

22 Sep 1987

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

22 Sep 1987

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Convention on Nuclear Safety Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

180 An IISS Strategic Dossier

17 Jul 1998 24 Dec 1996 5 Aug 2003 Formal Support 14 Sep 2005

Australia

Notes 1

2

Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb

15

Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear

Janet Merkur, Sir Mark Oliphant (Cambridge: Cambridge

Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 50. No. 4. 2004, p. 540.

University Press, 1999). 3

4

World Nuclear Association, ‘A Brief History of Australian

16

of State, 6 April 1968, Secret/Nodis’, in The Impulse

Prospects, December 2008, http://www.world-nuclear.org/

towards a Safer World: 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear

info/inf48.html.

Nonproliferation Treaty, National Security Archive,

Richard Broinowski, Fact or Fission: The Truth about

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/ doc16a.pdf.

pp. 84–91, 94, 97–101.

17

Hubbard, ‘From Ambivalence to Influence’, pp. 526–543.

Australian Archives: A1209/80 58/5155, ‘Nuclear Weapons

18

Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer, ‘The Canberra

for the Australian Forces’, Memorandum by the Defence

Commission: Paths followed, paths ahead’, Australian

Committee, Canberra, February 6, 1958, p.3, quoted in

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53 No.1, 1999, pp. 3,

Jim Walsh, ‘Surprise Down-Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions’, The Nonproliferation 6

7–8. 19

Nuclear Energy Review, Submission by Mr John Carlson,

Ian Bellany, Australia in the Nuclear Age: National Defence

Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation

Press, 1972).

Office, August 2006, p. 10 20

Century: An Agenda for Australia, (Sydney: Lowy Institute

Nuclear Energy – Opportunities for Australia? (Canberra:

for International Policy: 2008), p. 9, http://www.lowyinsti-

ansto.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/38975/

tute.org/Publication.asp?pid=885. 21

Umpner_report_2006.pdf. Jeffrey Lantis, ‘Elections and Control Association, 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/

‘Australia’s Uranium and Nuclear Power Prospects’, World Nuclear Association, December 2008, http://www.

Enduring Realities: Australia’s Nuclear Debate’, Arms

world-nuclear.org/info/inf48.html. 22

Michael Lampard, ‘Uranium’ Australian Commodities,

act/2008_04/Lantis.

Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource

Wayne Reynolds, ‘Rethinking the joint project: Australia’s

Economics, Vo.15, No.3, September 2008, http://www.

bid for nuclear weapons, 1945–60’, The Historical Journal

abareconomics.com/interactive/08ac_Sept/htm/uranium.

vol.41, no.3, 1998, pp. 853–73, 856. 9

Rory Medcalf, Restraining Nuclear Arms in the Asian

Australian Government, Uranium Mining, Processing and Commonwealth of Australia, 2006), p.17, http://www.

8

Australian Government Uranium Mining, Processing and

Review, vol.5, no.1, Fall 1997, p.15. and National Developments, (Sydney: Sydney University 7

‘Document 16A: US Embassy cable 4842 to Department

Uranium Mining’, Australia’s Uranium and Nuclear Power

Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions, (Melbourne: Scribe, 2003), 5

Christopher Hubbard, ‘From Ambivalence to Influence:

(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2000), p.48

James McClelland, Royal Commission into British Nuclear

htm. 23

Australian Uranium Association press release,

Tests in Australia, Canberra, Australian Government

‘Uranium Industry Supports Anti-proliferation

Publishing Office, No.482, 1985.

Drive’, 26 March 2009, http://aua.org.au/Content/

10

Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, p.150.

260309Uraniumindustrysupportsantiproliferationdriv.

11

Broinowski, Fact or Fission, pp. 52–53.

12

Australian Archives A1209/23, 57/4067, ‘Procurement of

aspx. 24

Nuclear Weapons from the United Kingdom’, Report

News Online, 27 September 2005, http://www.abc.net.au/

by the Defence Committee, Canberra, November 1956, pp.2–3, quoted in Walsh, ‘Surprise Down-Under’, p. 3. 13

Walsh, ‘Surprise Down Under’, pp. 3, 7–8.

14

John G. Gorton, Speech to the Senate, Parliamentary Debates, Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, May

‘Hawke backs Aust as nuclear waste repository’, ABC news/newsitems/200509/s1468931.htm.

25

Jeffrey Lantis (2008) ‘Elections and Enduring Realities: Australia’s Nuclear Debate’, Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/Lantis.

26

Commonwealth of Australia, Uranium Mining, Processing

8, 1957, quoted in Jacques E.C Hymans, ‘Isotopes and

and Nuclear Energy — Opportunities for Australia?,

Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option,

Report to the Prime Minister by the Uranium Mining,

1949–1999’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.7, No.1, Spring

Processing and Nuclear Energy Review Taskforce,

2000, p.5.

December 2006.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

181

Chapter twelve

27

Ian Lowe, ‘Reaction Time - Climate Change and the

36

Nuclear Option’, Quarterly Essay, Vol. 27’, September 2007,

Foreign Policy, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International

pp. 30–42. 28

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Coal

Fergus Hanson, Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Policy, 2008), p. 14.

37

The Switkovski report assessed that if all of Australia’s

Proved Reserves at End 2008’, p. 32.

2005 uranium exports (12,000 tonnes) could be trans-

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’,

formed into fuel, additional export earnings would have

‘Natural Gas Proved Reserves’, p. 22.

amounted to A$1.8bn. The report acknowledged that the

30

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Oil

net economic benefit would need a ‘full consideration

Proved Reserves’, p. 6.

of costs’. Commonwealth of Australia, Uranium Mining,

31

Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Australia (Sydney: Lowy

Processing and Nuclear Energy – Opportunities for Australia?,

29

Institute for International Policy, 2006) pp. 54–57. 32

Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia-

p. 34. 38

Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra 2009. p. 50, http://apo.

Dependence, Deterrence or Denial?’, Security Challenges,

org.au/sites/default/files/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf. 33

34

George Lekakis, ‘Uranium Price up With Global Nuclear

Vol. 4. No. 1, 2008, p. 55. 39

Richard Tanter, ‘The Re-Emergence of an Australian

Push’, Herald-Sun, 3 January 2009.

Nuclear Weapons Option?’ Policy Forum Online,

Ziggy Switkowski, ‘Minds Closed to Cleanest and

7 November, 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/

Greenest Energy of All’, The Australian, 26 November, 2008. 35

Raoul E. Heinrichs, ‘Australia’s Nuclear Dilemma:

security/07085Tanter.html. 40

Rod Lyon, ‘Australia: Back to the Future?’, in Muthiah

Robert Ayson, ‘Nuclear Energy – Neither a Monster Nor a

Alagappa (ed.), The Long Shadow (Stanford: Stanford

Panacea’, The Age, 20 August 2009.

University Press, 2008), p. 434.

182 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter thirteen

New Zealand

New Zealand has never actively pursued a civilian nuclear-energy programme. From the mid 1940s to the 1970s, the reasons for this were primarily economic. Later, opposition to both nuclear weapons and nuclear power on environmental, safety and political grounds became a defining feature of New Zealand domestic and foreign policy. A legislated ‘nuclear-free zone’ since 1987, New Zealand is also a leading proponent of global nuclear disarmament and is proactive in non-proliferation diplomacy.

History of civilian nuclear activity New Zealand’s nuclear connections go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when native son and Nobel laureate Ernest Rutherford became the first scientist to split the atom and to discover and name alpha and beta radiation. Later New Zealand thinking on nuclear-related technology was shaped by British and American nuclear programmes, which inspired a government-initiated search for uranium reserves in the country. Some of the scientists involved in this were with the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), and collaborated with leading British and American nuclear scientists working on using atomic energy in warfare. But New Zealand had decided as early as 1945 that it did not wish to embark upon its own nuclear-weapons-research programme.1 After the Second World War, the government decided to establish a small indigenous atomicresearch programme with applications in biological, medical, industrial and chemical sciences,2 while also developing the country’s knowledge base in nuclear physics. A main goal was to demonstrate to New Zealand’s allies that the country had the technological know-how to contribute to Commonwealth and Western defence projects, and to increase its standing within that security community.

Research and exploration on uranium extraction were undertaken in the 1940s and 1950s, but by the 1960s the dominance of other players in the international market meant the prospects for exporting New Zealand uranium ore were poor, and the government stopped funding uranium prospecting.3 In 1957, the DSIR rejected the idea of building an indigenous research reactor on cost grounds. However, the Electricity Department, concerned about growing domestic energy demand, remained keen for New Zealand to develop its own nuclear power station into the 1960s. Throughout this period, voices within the Department of External Affairs and the Mines Department were also arguing that New Zealand needed its own nuclear-energy-research programme. But by the 1970s, the emergence of cheaper energy options with the development of plentiful hydroelectric resources and the discovery of abundant reserves of natural gas provided a powerful economic counter-argument. Greater weight was also being given to environmental concerns from the mid 1960s, as strongly antinuclear attitudes emerged in response to nuclear tests in the South Pacific. When the 1973 oil crisis prompted the government to seriously consider nuclear power, the ‘Campaign Half Million’ garnered signatures in opposition from more than 10% of the country’s three-million-strong population. Still, in 1978, the Royal Commission on Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand concluded that although nuclear energy was not required at the time, it might become necessary towards the end of the century, and that planning should be undertaken by the late 1980s – something that never eventuated.4 Today, New Zealand depends on hydropower for over half (54%) its total electricity generation,

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Chapter thirteen

New Zealand’s energy production and consumption, 2003–2007 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

% change (2007 over 2006)

2007 world %

Oil production (thousand barrels/day)

31.8

27.9

27.8

25.8

47.6

84.50

0.06

Oil consumption (thousand barrels/day)

147.4

152.4

154.6

156.7

158.4

1.08

0.18

Natural-gas production (billion cubic feet)

165.0

151.0

141.6

145.3

161.5

11.15

0.11 (’06)

Natural-gas consumption (billion cubic feet)

164.7

150.5

141.7

149.3

161.5

8.17

0.15

Coal production (thousand short tons)

5,709.9

5,682.8

5,806.1

5,917.1

5,330.1

-9.92

0.08

Coal consumption (thousand short tons)

3,917.5

4,160.6

4,642.0

4,177.7

3,427.5

-17.96

0.05

23.5

26.9

23.1

23.2

23.3

0.43

0.77 (’06)

Hydropower net generation (billion kWh)

Source: Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy

on gas for 23%, coal for 13%, geothermal for 8%, biomass for 2%, wind for 1% and oil for less than 1%. Distribution losses are high at 13%. The country’s coal reserves are the 21st largest in the world, and are estimated to last until 2120 at current rates of production.5

Nuclear infrastructure New Zealand’s nuclear infrastructure is exclusively concerned with applications in medicine, industry, agriculture, scientific research and non-proliferation. The Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences operates the New Zealand National Isotope Centre and conducts research into geothermal systems and biological and agricultural processes, as well as geological and environmental studies, and atmospheric research using radioactive isotopes. The National Radiation Laboratory (NRL) under the Ministry of Health regulates the use of ionising radiation sources, and is tasked with providing emergency-response capabilities in the event of a radiation outbreak. The NRL has been involved in working out technical details of the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A small sub-critical reactor that had been installed at the University of Canterbury in 1962 under the US Atoms for Peace programme and which was used to train electrical engineers in nuclear techniques was dismantled in 1981. Although some uranium exploration is still under

184 An IISS Strategic Dossier

way (with minimal results to date), uranium mining in New Zealand is prohibited under the Crown Minerals Act of 1996.

Anti-nuclear policy Opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear power became government policy in 1984 when David Lange’s Labour Party came to power and prohibited nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels (primarily US ships) from entering New Zealand waters. In 1987, Parliament passed the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, which codified the prohibition on visits from nuclear-propelled or nuclear-armed vessels and prohibited New Zealand citizens and residents from ‘manufactur[ing], acquir[ing], possess[ing], or hav[ing] any control over any nuclear explosive device’. Holding fast to a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy on the presence of nuclear weapons on its vessels, the United States decided that none of its warships would call at New Zealand ports and suspended its obligations towards the country under the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance hardened further when agents of the French intelligence agency DGSE were found to have sunk the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior on 10 July 1985 while it docked in Auckland harbour, sabotage that resulted in the death of a freelance Dutch photographer. The ship had been about to set out for the

New Zealand

The Rainbow Warrior, following its sabotage in Auckland harbour by the French secret services on 10 July 1985 (Patrick Riviere/ AFP/Getty Images)

Moruroa atoll to protest against French nuclear tests taking place there. New Zealand accepts the right of other nations to peaceful nuclear technology, but rejects nuclear power generation for itself, considering it to be incompatible with sustainable development because of the long-term economic costs, the problem of nuclear waste and the risk of nuclear proliferation.6 According to one 2008 survey, only 19% of New Zealanders favoured nuclear power as a best energy source for the country in the next ten years.7 Another opinion survey, however, found 36% believing that New Zealand should consider the option.8 The issue of nuclear energy was omitted from the 2006 draft of the New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy, and is not promoted as a viable energy option by any of the political parties.

Nuclear safety and security New Zealand has been a strong advocate of efforts to ensure nuclear safety. It is particularly attentive to the issues of the safe transport of radioactive materials and waste in its maritime region and of preventing terrorists from acquiring such material. Since 2002, New Zealand has regularly contributed

to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund to bolster that agency’s capabilities. In April 2009, New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed an arrangement for cooperation on non-proliferation assistance aimed at securing nuclear and radioactive materials that could be used in a nuclear or radiological weapon, and detecting and deterring trafficking in these materials. As part of the arrangement, New Zealand agreed to contribute NZ$685,000 (approximately US$350,000) to support the US Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense programme in equipping Kazakhstan’s borders with radiation monitors and providing related infrastructure and training.9 This built on a similar arrangement signed in May 2007, through which New Zealand contributed similar assistance to help secure Ukraine’s borders.

Non-proliferation and disarmament Over the past two decades, New Zealand has been a leader in disarmament and non-proliferation diplomacy. The country is a party to all the key international non-proliferation treaties and has advocated universal accession to both the NPT and

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

185

Chapter thirteen

New Zealand accession to non-proliferation treaties and agreements Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention

13 Dec 1972

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

10 Sep 1969

Outer Space Treaty

31 May 1968

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

29 Feb 1972

South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga)

11 Dec 1986

Chemical Weapons Convention

15 Jul 1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

19 Mar 1999

Additional Protocol

24 Sep 1998

Nuclear safety and security agreements to which New Zealand is party Instrument

Date ratified or acceded

Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

11 Mar 1987

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

11 Mar 1987

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

19 Dec 2003

Amendment to the CPPNM

No

Convention on Nuclear Safety

No

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

No

IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources

the IAEA Additional Protocol. It has also implemented the non-proliferation requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and provided technical support to smaller Pacific island states to assist them in meeting their nonproliferation obligations. New Zealand was an original proponent of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), which entered into force in 1986, and has been working closely with Brazil to establish a Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas NuclearWeapon-Free Zone. The country led cases in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1973 and 1995 against French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and participated in the 1995 ICJ case examining the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, arguing for their illegality. New Zealand is also an active member of the group of seven middle-power countries known as the New Agenda Coalition, which was formed in 1998 out of concern about a perceived lack of progress on nuclear-disarmament efforts in the aftermath of the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the implications of India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests. The coalition represents an effort to

186 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Formal Support

bridge the North–South divide that is widely seen as having stymied talks on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and its goal is a nuclearweapons-free world. Each year, New Zealand is a lead co-sponsor of four disarmament resolutions in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly: a New Agenda Coalition resolution entitled ‘Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Acceleration of the Implementation of Nuclear-Disarmament Commitments’; a resolution calling for a nuclearweapons-free zone for the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas; a resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and a more recent resolution calling for action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems. Successive New Zealand governments have maintained the country’s nuclear-free-zone status, which continues to have strong cross-party support. Although the ANZUS Treaty is active only bilaterally with Australia (and between Australia and the US), this has not prevented the restoration of close New Zealand–US relations, and armed forces from both nations cooperate in regional and international peacekeeping activities. New Zealand has also been a strong supporter of the US-led Proliferation

New Zealand

New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exchange an arrangement for cooperation on non-proliferation assistance, 7 April 2009 (Getty)

Security Initiative (PSI), and in September 2008 hosted an international PSI training operation, Exercise Maru. The exercise tested the ability of New Zealand and other PSI members to stop ships suspected of transporting WMD-related cargo.

Committee, which cover nuclear-related exports; the Australia Group, which deals with dual-use material that could be used in chemical and biological weapons; and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Strategic trade controls

Conclusions

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for policy on strategic trade controls. It has established an extensive Strategic Goods List of controlled items, which is divided into military and non-military lethal goods, and dual-use goods. In 2008, legislation was extended to include new end-use controls (‘catch-all’ controls) to cover goods and technologies that are not listed in the Strategic Goods List but which could still be used for WMD purposes.10 New Zealand is an active member of the four voluntary strategic-trade-control regimes. These are the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger

New Zealand’s anti-nuclear domestic and foreign policies have become an entrenched element of national identity. Reliance on nuclear deterrence has not been a part of New Zealand’s defence policy since 1987. It would take an unprecedented and unforeseen upheaval in geopolitical circumstances for New Zealand to ever again consider superpower-extended nuclear deterrence – let alone an indigenous nuclear deterrent – as necessary for its security. Any such change in its stance would be made within the context of a regional nuclear-arms cascade and the return of the strong possibility of conventional armed conflict.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

187

Chapter thirteen

Notes 1

In 1945, Prime Minister Ernest Marsden was quick to

Report submitted by the Government of New Zealand’,

dismiss the idea that New Zealand should embark on a

NPT/CONF.2005/38, 13 May 2005, pp. 1–2, http://

race to produce atomic weaponry. Marsden, ‘Report on

www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/global-issues/NZ-NPT-

Atomic Energy and Atomic Bombs’, PM 121/1, Part 1, 15 October 1945, quoted in Malcolm Templeton, Standing

implementation-report.pdf. 7

Upright Here: New Zealand in the Nuclear Age 1945–1990

Development, ‘New Zealanders’ Choice of Future Energy

(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2006), p. 16. 2

3

Marsden, ‘An Atomic Pile for New Zealand’, report, PM

Sources’, 7 April 2008. 8

Power as Option’, media release, 26 May 2008, http://

Here, p. 22.

www.researchnz.com/pdf/Media%20Releases/RNZ%20

Rebecca Priestley, ‘The Search for Uranium in “Nuclear-

Media%20Release%20-%2005-26-08%20Nuclear%20

to 1970s’, New Zealand Geographer, vol. 62, no. 2, August

Power.pdf. 9

for Cooperation on Nonproliferation Assistance’, press

‘Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand’, report of the

release, 7 April 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/

Standing Upright Here, pp. 58–61.

6

US Department of State, ‘US–New Zealand Arrangement

2006, p. 128. Royal Commission of Enquiry, 1978, cited in Templeton, 5

Research New Zealand, ‘Kiwis Ready to Consider Nuclear

121/2, Part 1, 1947, cited in Templeton, Standing Upright

Free” New Zealand: Prospecting on the West Coast, 1940s

4

ShapeNZ, New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable

ps/2009/04/121363.htm. 10

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2009’, ‘Coal

‘Export Controls: New Legislation’, http://www.mfat.govt.

Proved Reserves at End 2008’, p. 32.

nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Export-controls/index.

‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

php#legis.

188 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chapter fourteen

Policy Options

Introduction As the nuclear renaissance comes to Southeast Asia, the countries of the region face an important turning point. Decisions taken today will help determine whether nuclear energy will play a purely positive role in their economic development or whether a shadow of nuclear danger will accompany the positive benefits of this energy source. Some problems have already appeared and others are on the horizon. There are persistent worries about nuclear safety, the opacity of Myanmar’s nuclear plans and its growing connections with North Korea, and the extent to which vulnerabilities in national trade controls have been exploited by outside states and non-state actors. The continuing risks posed by terrorist groups, unstable tectonics and an insufficient safety culture add to nuclear concerns. Pledges of regional cooperation at regional forums do not dispel underlying worries about how nuclear power would be managed. National infrastructures and regional institutions must be strengthened to satisfactorily address the legitimate reasons for mistrust. The IAEA maintains that, to successfully introduce sustainable nuclear power, countries must first demonstrate a sustained national commitment to this goal and complete a series of intensive preparatory steps, including building up a body of trained personnel, a set of safety regulations and a framework establishing legal and regulatory responsibilities.1 Although power-plant construction can take as little as four to five years if all goes well, the preparatory requirements take at least 10–15 years. The states in Southeast Asia that have made decisions on nuclear energy are working to put these requirements in place, although prudent policymakers must continually ask themselves if they are doing enough.

In addition to the national context of nuclear decision-making, there is a wider context. The policies and practices adopted by states that embark on nuclear-power projects will set important precedents for others, both in the region and more widely. ASEAN member states have an opportunity to reinforce global standards aimed at minimising the safety, security and proliferation risks of nuclear energy. Indeed, given ASEAN’s tradition of regional cooperation, the region’s relatively benign strategic security environment and the norm of non-proliferation epitomised in the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) or Bangkok Treaty, this region is a promising one in which to develop strengthened arrangements for safe and secure nuclear energy that can stand as a model for other regions.2 Most of the policy options discussed below are couched in terms of applicability to the region that is the focus of this dossier, but they should not be seen as relevant only to Southeast Asia. Safe, secure and non-threatening use of nuclear energy is a global good that requires global efforts.

Safety and security Build a nuclear safety culture The need for utmost attention to safety is well understood among nuclear agencies in Southeast Asia, but has not always been internalised among all relevant organisations, especially in countries that are still developing traditions of industrial safety. If nuclear power does come to enjoy the renaissance that many predict, nuclear-aspirant countries in the region will be competing with many other buyers in a seller’s market. They will not likely secure international financing for nuclear-power ventures unless they minimise the risks by strictly following the IAEA’s nuclear-planning-milestone guidelines.

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

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Governments need to commit to national funding for nuclear safety and not rely predominantly on IAEA assistance, as tends to be the case today in several countries. Siting decisions for nuclear facilities must be undertaken with a priority given to safety, and with ample attention to seismology. Feasibility studies may need to be revised, employing the latest techniques in geological surveying. Technical competence must be enhanced among nuclearagency personnel, quantitatively and qualitatively, including by teaching and insisting on proficiency in English, the international language of nuclear safety. To motivate and retain trained staff, governments must also pay adequate salaries and provide career paths to nuclear specialists. Well-functioning information-technology systems are another priority. Building a nuclear-safety culture also requires facing up to mistakes and investigating the root causes of any accidents or ‘near misses’ with full transparency.

Create strong, independent regulators Safe and sustainable implementation of nuclear power requires a strong legal and regulatory framework, with a licensing and oversight body that is truly independent. Regulators must be free from political influence and bureaucratically separate from organisations in charge of operating nuclear facilities and promoting nuclear energy. This is not the case today in several ASEAN countries. In addition to independence, the nuclear-safety regulatory body must have technical competence and adequate financial and human resources so that it can bolster its authority to ensure that nuclear facilities meet the requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In one-party states, the creation of such an independent regulator can be particularly challenging.

Insist on standards Cognisant that a nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere, akin to the impact that accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island had in bringing nuclear plans around the world to a halt for nearly 20 years, nuclear vendors have more than an altruistic motive to supply nuclear technology responsibly. Not all foreign suppliers, however, insist that any nuclear power plants that come online meet the highest standards of safety

190 An IISS Strategic Dossier

and security. Nor do all vendors provide the same level of wider safety and technological support. This is particularly the case with vendors such as Russia’s Rosatom that are not as engaged across all levels of infrastructure as are companies such as France’s Areva and US-based Westinghouse. Nuclear suppliers should also agree on minimum safety requirements on the part of recipient countries, including adherence to IAEA safety, security and nuclear-waste conventions. Supplier responsibility would also be enhanced by transparency in nuclear-cooperation agreements, such as in the United States, where they are on the public record and subject to Congressional oversight.3 Only two ASEAN countries (Indonesia and Singapore) have ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and only three (Indonesia, Philippines and Cambodia) are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (none have ratified the 2005 amendment). No ASEAN countries are party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the only ASEAN state which is party to any nuclearliability convention is the Philippines.4 In addition to fulfilling such major commitments, there is more that ASEAN members can do on a smaller scale to create the institutional bonds that will be necessary to create regional unity, such as through regular and proactive participation in mechanisms like the Steering Committee of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network.

Safeguards Encourage adoption of the Additional Protocol IAEA comprehensive safeguards do not provide sufficient assurance of peaceful use. At a minimum, they must be buttressed by the Additional Protocol. Even this measure, however, is not a panacea against proliferation. The Additional Protocol cannot stop a determined proliferator, nor does it address threats associated with nuclear smuggling. It does, however, give the IAEA further access rights and requires additional information from states that together help the agency provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activity. The Additional Protocol thus has become an international norm for confirming a state’s non-proliferation credentials and should be

Policy Options

as a condition of supply. France and the US can be expected to impose this requirement for most buyers, although they do not always do so explicitly, so as to avoid provoking political resentment. Russia shows less willingness to insist on the protocol, and is able to point to the US willingness to relax export-control rules for nuclear assistance to India as a precedent. Among other suppliers, while Japan has made universality of the Additional Protocol a strong foreign-policy objective, Korea is not known to have included it as a topic in its own nuclearmarketing discussions with Southeast Asian states. Adding this element to bilateral talks on nuclear cooperation could help accelerate what has been a slow legislative ratification process in some of the states in the region. In the four ASEAN states where ratification is pending, there is no public opposition in prin-

Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. In May 1997, the Board approved the text of a model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements (Dean Calma/IAEA)

ratified and implemented by all states in the region, as everywhere else in the world. Countries that are seriously considering adopting national nuclearpower programmes should therefore ratify and implement the Additional Protocol as one of their first steps. As of September 2009, only two ASEAN states – Indonesia and Singapore – have implemented the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol. Indonesia’s leadership in this respect is particularly to be applauded. Indonesia was one of the first nations in the world to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, and also one of the first for which the IAEA has been able to draw conclusions that all nuclear material remains in peaceful activities.5 The four other states in Southeast Asia that plan to introduce nuclear power or are on the verge of making this decision – Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam – have signed the instrument but have yet to ratify it. Countries considering supplying nuclear-power technology should require the Additional Protocol

ciple to taking this legislative step, but neither is there visible promotional work toward Additional Protocol ratification. Quiet encouragement from potential suppliers could strengthen the incentives for bringing this safeguards-strengthening measure into force in these four states. When implementation of the Additional Protocol is the norm in ASEAN, its members would then have more moral authority to encourage ratification in Myanmar, where the transparency afforded by the Additional Protocol will bring the most benefit to regional security. It has been suggested that the Bangkok Treaty should be amended to require adoption of the Additional Protocol,6 by adding it to the Article 5 requirement that each state party conclude a fullscope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Others argue that it would be more effective to set up a group modelled after the UNSC 1540 Committee to promote regional non-proliferation efforts, including adoption of the Additional Protocol.7 Such a group might also usefully promote ratification of the CTBT by the four ASEAN states that have not taken this step (Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand). CTBT ratification is particularly important for Indonesia, which is one of nine remaining states worldwide whose ratification is required before the CTBT can come into force, and it is encouraging that Indonesia has pledged to ratify as soon as the United States does so.

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Promote acceptance of the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) Among other transparency measures, those countries that have an SQP to their IAEA safeguards agreement should follow Singapore’s lead in adopting the modified version of this protocol as promulgated by the IAEA in September 2005 in order to close the loophole that holds in abeyance most IAEA verification tools. Acceptance of a modified SQP is of particular relevance to Myanmar, where IAEA investigation of reports of clandestine nuclear activity could address growing global concerns. Since an SQP is only applicable to countries without significant nuclear activity, Myanmar would have to forgo this measure altogether if and when a contract is finalised to build a Russian research reactor.

Concerns about Myanmar Keep close watch The Bangkok Treaty requirement for members to share information about nuclear-development plans is nowhere more important than with regard to Myanmar. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, concerns about nuclear projects are focused on safety and security issues. Those concerns are relevant to Myanmar as well. However, it is the prospect of that country having an interest in nuclear weapons that causes the most concern about nuclear matters in Southeast Asia. Although reports of a North Korea nuclear link remain unconfirmed, Myanmar’s growing relationship with Pyongyang, the North’s record of onward proliferation, and the Myanmar leadership’s secretive nature, paranoid perspective and disregard for international norms are ample reason for others to keep closely attentive.

Insist on openness Myanmar can help address these concerns by adopting international standards of nuclear transparency. This means accepting and fully implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol and amending the Small Quantities Protocol to Myanmar’s safeguards agreement. The country’s neighbours should encourage this transparency, and those that have the outdated SQP (Cambodia and Laos) should similarly update it. Although the Burmese government has not shown itself to be susceptible to external pressure in its treatment of domestic opposition, it

192 An IISS Strategic Dossier

does care about its international reputation and may be more amenable to persuasion in selective cases, as demonstrated by the government’s agreement to adhere to UN Security Council resolution 1874 banning arms exports from North Korea. Fellow ASEAN members may wish to consider invoking the Bangkok Treaty Article 13 provision to request a fact-finding mission to Myanmar to clarify some of the questions that have been raised.8 Myanmar should also allow the IAEA to investigate credible reports of clandestine nuclear cooperation with other countries, including the purpose for which North Korean personnel have been in the country. Other states should be willing to share with the IAEA any intelligence information about such reports, so that the agency has good grounds for conducting an investigation. Myanmar’s nuclear cooperation with Russia is not itself of proliferation concern, given the plutonium-production limitations of the planned 10MWt reactor. The possibility cannot be dismissed, however, of Myanmar having a hidden nuclear agenda. National pride is the most logical explanation for why such an impoverished country would seek such a high-tech facility, but it is conceivable that secondary motivations might include providing a cover for a parallel military nuclear effort or as a step in a programme to build up a cadre of technical expertise that might be put to weapons-related work. Myanmar cannot be unaware of what North Korea accomplished in the nuclear field after starting from a small scale in the early 1960s with a small research reactor. It would behove Russia to itself insist on full transparency – as well as strict safety measures, including adherence to international safety conventions – before a final contract is agreed. Russia and Myanmar should also share with the IAEA details of discussions on site selection, and provide design information before any construction begins on the reactor.

Begin contingency planning If concerns are borne out and it is discovered that Myanmar is, in fact, engaged in secretive nuclear cooperation with North Korea or any other country or non-state actor, ASEAN and the SEANWFZ will be put to the test. If Myanmar were to pursue nuclear weapons, the Association as it stands today and its dispute-resolution mechanisms alone would

Policy Options

not be able to dissuade Myanmar from that path. Prudent planning for such a contingency could lead ASEAN members to take steps now to improve these mechanisms, starting with enforcing the information-sharing requirements of the Bangkok Treaty. Meanwhile, India and Myanmar’s other closest neighbours, along with outside powers with regional interests, may wish to consider sharing analysis of Myanmar’s nuclear intentions.

Strategic trade controls The changing context of economic growth in ASEAN underscores the need for greater attention to taking responsibility for what leaves one’s borders. At a previous stage of development, the ASEAN states were able to enjoy rapid economic growth without effective strategic trade controls because the growth was based primarily on manufacture and export of low-tech items. For the next phase of economic growth, most of the ASEAN countries recognise the need to move up the technology ladder. This move has to take into account the increased international focus on secure trade and on non-diversion guarantees increasingly required by technology-supplier states. Countries with good strategic trade control systems and a compliant and aware industry are more likely to be seen as ‘safe’ for high-technology transfers than those without. This realisation regarding the trade–security nexus is one of the main reasons behind strategic trade control reforms in dynamic economies like China and India – and their trade statistics do not appear to have suffered as a consequence.

Adopt effective controls The need in a globalised economy for every country to adopt effective strategic trade controls does not necessarily mean there is a single set of best practices that all states should adopt. While consistency should be optimised, specific national conditions must be taken into account if nations are to integrate both the spirit and letter of trade controls and to implement them as concerned stakeholders. Taking into account national characteristics cannot be an excuse, however, for inaction that creates an exploitable weak link in the chain. All members of the international community – whether suppliers or potential transit or transhipment states – need to devote resources to monitor trade in dual-use tech-

nologies on a sustained basis, and to continuously update strategic trade control systems to address new proliferation trends and technologies.

Take advantage of UNSCR 1540 assistance UN Security Council Resolution 1540 imposes legally binding obligations on states to adopt export controls to counter WMD proliferation, but the resolution also offers opportunities through its emphasis on providing assistance. Countries in the region are able to benefit from donor assistance to help improve their security and export controls before their nuclear facilities come on line and the risks increase. The UN 1540 Committee has sought, with mixed success, to help coordinate assistance providers from outside the region. It may be useful, for example, for donors to divide up areas of training and assistance so that each would focus on a particular country. Other organisations can help. In 2008, an independent commission set up by IAEA Director General ElBaradei called on the IAEA to expand its assistance to help states put in place effective export and transhipment controls, including by developing model legislation. The commission also recommended an expansion of the IAEA unit focused on black-market technology networks, along with an expansion of its mission to include helping states to shut down these networks and to find and fix leaks in their control systems.9

Accentuate trade benefits of controls In many developing countries, including in Southeast Asia, misconceptions, scepticism, and suspicions about strategic trade controls hinder indigenisation of the training and other assistance that is provided by donor states. For such assistance to lead to longlasting improvements in strategic trade controls, such scepticism has to be dealt with systematically. The best way may be for developed states to offer trade incentives, in addition to training and monitoring equipment. This would include explicitly recognising improvements made by Asian states in strengthening strategic trade control systems and encouraging technology-embedded partnerships with those ASEAN countries that have stronger systems. An indirect means of overcoming scepticism would be to sponsor research that would give an analytical basis to anecdotal evidence that

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suggests a positive correlation between stronger strategic trade controls among recipient states in the region and an increase in number of export licenses granted by developed supplier states.

Consider region-wide trade controls Given its well-established legitimacy and capability to develop common frameworks of interpretation, ASEAN can help mitigate difficulties in implementing Resolution 1540.10 Association members may wish to consider a regional-based system of strategic trade controls, with common standards and a strict no-undercut role. The developing nations of Southeast Asia do not want to lose business to their neighbours by adopting strict controls governing transit and transhipment that cause shippers to take their business elsewhere. There are useful lessons to be drawn from how the export-control groups began – as a means to control exports without losing business to competitors.

Adopt guidelines A long-established regional non-governmental network, the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), has developed a comprehensive set of ‘Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods’. The elements include comprehensive legislation, effective measures for licensing and enforcement, industry–government cooperation and financial and technical assistance. The recommendations for legislation suggest that controlled activities include possession, stockpiling, transport, exports, re-exports, transfers, imports, transit, transhipment, brokering, intangible transfers and warehousing. The guidelines also recommend that national legislation include provisions for ‘catchall’ controls that allow regulation of any export transaction regardless of whether the item is on a control list or not, when the exporter has reason to believe that it will be used in a WMD programme. CSCAP also suggested that member states consider establishing a region-wide common control list and common minimum licensing criteria.11 It has also been suggested that ASEAN establish a dedicated entity to liaise with the 1540 Committee and to oversee and coordinate 1540 implementation in the region. This entity could also usefully construct an ASEAN website to identify gaps and keep track of all cooperative WMD-related counter-

194 An IISS Strategic Dossier

terrorism initiatives taking place across the region; this could include a regional experts’ register. Among other advantages, this would create a peer-review tool to assist in capacity building and monitoring and to encourage best practice in the area of export controls.12

The front and back ends of the fuel cycle The proliferation risks of nuclear energy are best minimised if countries accept full transparency with enforceable verification and concentrate on the technologies they really need for nuclearpower production, while staying away from the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle. Nuclear weapons production requires either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, but neither of these technologies are necessary for countries that seek only to produce nuclear power. The proliferation dangers of these technologies have been a source of widespread concern ever since the 1970s. More recently, the erosion of technical barriers to nuclear weapons and the widespread proliferation of enrichment technologies by black-market networks have magnified the problem. In 2003, ElBaradei called for the exclusive restriction of reprocessing and enrichment to facilities under multinational control.13 This recommendation triggered widespread discussion and spurred various other initiatives to stop the expansion of these sensitive technologies. An encouraging global awareness is emerging that these technologies do need to be controlled.

Encourage states to voluntarily forgo sensitive fuel-cycle technologies Most of the proposals for regulating sensitive fuelcycle technologies have been based on positive incentives to encourage states to decide, of their own sovereign will, not to pursue the full nuclear fuel cycle. States that agree voluntarily to purchase sensitive fuel-cycle services on the international market rather than develop indigenous facilities will find that the international route considerably eases their path to nuclear power. Moreover, the market to date has never failed to provide fuel. Using foreign fuel-cycle services will be far less costly, in both economic and political terms, and will shorten the timeframe for bringing nuclear power on line. As noted earlier in this dossier, Indonesia’s nuclear

Policy Options

agency has quietly decided not to pursue enrichment and Vietnam said it was not considering either enrichment or reprocessing. These decisions are to be encouraged, while recognising that these remain issues of sovereign national rights. In unofficial forums, academics have floated the idea of amending the SEANWFZ Treaty to ban enrichment and reprocessing.14 This would make Southeast Asia an enrichment- and reprocessing-free zone. The idea has no official backing, however. If a state’s primary motivations for seeking nuclear power are energy security and reducing atmospheric pollution from fossil fuels (rather than strategic security or national pride), then it should concentrate on the technologies it really needs for this purpose. Its nuclear focus should be on reactors, safety and waste disposal. Indigenous fuel fabrication, as Indonesia has undertaken, may also make sense and is not a proliferation concern in itself. Because reactor fuel is highly specific to reactor type, there may only be one or two outside suppliers of fuel for a given reactor, in contrast to generic LEU, which is produced by several suppliers. But there is no economic need for indigenous enrichment for states newly entering the nuclear-power field.

Guarantee fuel supply Pursuing the logic of positive incentives and focusing on the most urgent issue of the front end of the fuel cycle, a number of states and other bodies have tabled at least 12 different proposals to guarantee the supply of enriched uranium fuel. These proposals include a fuel bank under IAEA auspices that is backed by funding pledges totalling $150m, and a Russian plan to donate LEU produced by its international enrichment facility at Angarsk as guaranteed supply to any country meeting criteria determined by the IAEA. An attempt at the June 2009 IAEA Board of Governors meeting to move towards implementing these two proposals was blocked by members of the Non-Aligned Movement, however, because of concerns that fuel-supply-guarantee initiatives were a masked effort to deny technology rights to developing countries – a claim that developed countries strongly refute. Proponents remain optimistic that the political difficulties will be overcome as developing countries recognise the value of the enhanced energy security that would be afforded by fuel assurances.

Remove spent fuel In contrast to the plethora of proposals for multinational enrichment services, the back-end of the fuel cycle (that is, managing the spent fuel) has received much less international attention. Yet it is the part of the fuel cycle in respect of which many countries with nuclear-power programmes are most in need of assistance. Such countries may be more willing to depend entirely on foreign supply of enriched fuel if they also could rely on foreign disposition of their spent fuel. Given the ready availability of reactor fuel in the international marketplace, customer states do not appear to accord much value to fuelsupply guarantees. In contrast, there is almost no international market for spent-fuel disposition. No state today has an indigenous capability for permanent disposal, and many states have neither the financial resources nor the stable geology ever to realistically consider it. If a fuel take-back and repository service could be offered, perhaps as part of a nuclear-fuel-services agreement, it would be of high value and could be the best means of forestalling the proliferation of sensitive weapons technologies. A persuasive case can be made that addressing the various challenges of nuclear energy as one collective solution might afford a better chance of simultaneously meeting energy security, national security, non-proliferation and waste-management objectives than if each of these concerns is addressed as a separate issue.15 Having the option to return spent fuel would relieve a state of the safety and environmental hazards of storing radioactive waste and the financial cost and technological difficulty of constructing a permanent disposal facility, for which many countries do not have the appropriate geological conditions in any case. The ideal arrangement would be fuel leasing, whereby suppliers provide the enriched fuel, take back the spent fuel and arrange for final disposition of conditioned nuclear waste, possibly after first reprocessing to recover the unburned uranium and plutonium content. However, for both political and environmental reasons, few supplier countries are ready to take another country’s nuclear waste. France accepts spent fuel for reprocessing but cannot keep the nuclear waste. The political issues associated with nuclear-waste disposal in the US and elsewhere are magnified if the fuel is of foreign origin, even though the amount would typically be

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minuscule in comparison with domestic nuclear waste. The security and environmental dangers involved in shipping spent fuel add to the difficulties, even if such dangers are more apparent than real.16

Create an international repository Long-term storage of conditioned nuclear waste in an international repository would Interior of nuclear waste storage site, New Mexico, US (Getty) be the best solution for managing the back end of the fuel cycle, if the eration, safety and security objectives. The idea of significant political hurdles in the way of creating a regional facility for spent-fuel management and such a repository could be overcome. Such a reposdisposal has surfaced intermittently since the 1970s. itory could also be used to dispose of long-lived The US, beginning under President Carter, explored radioactive wastes from research reactors and other whether a spent-fuel storage facility was feasible in nuclear applications not involving nuclear power. the Pacific Ocean area. In the early 1980s, a US–Japan Advantages of a multinational repository include joint study suggested Palmrya Atoll, a US-owned economy of scale, collective savings through island in the Pacific (between Hawaii and American joint efforts, disposal options for more countries, Samoa) with no indigenous population, as a possible non-proliferation and security and the prospect location for an interim fuel-storage facility. Given for technology sharing. Disadvantages include the history of nuclear testing in the Pacific, however, the need for complex international negotiation, and the nuclear-safety concerns that erupted after possible negative impact on domestic efforts for the accident at Three Mile Island, the image of a waste disposal, increased transportation requirespent-fuel dump in the region made the idea politiments, and ethical and fairness concerns.17 Finding cally unpalatable. In 1994 the then president of the Marshall Islands suggested his country might host a a host country that is both suitable and willing is spent-fuel repository, but the idea provoked considthe greatest challenge. Australia was once seen as erable domestic controversy as well as opposition having the ideal geology, technical skills and stable from the US.18 In the late 1990s, a Pacific version of government to provide safe and secure operation of a spent-fuel repository. But while some Australian statesmen recognised the global contribution the country could make by hosting a repository, the ‘not in my backyard’ syndrome currently makes it impossible.

Partner on a regional basis for spent-fuel management One alternative for small and new nuclear countries is to create a partnership to develop regional multinational waste-disposal facilities. By banding together on a waste-management solution, countries could minimise the costs and optimise non-prolif-

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Euratom was proposed as means of regional cooperation on safety, research, recycling and spent-fuel management.19 A more recent approach to regional waste management is modelled on successful national siting approaches in Finland and Sweden, which avoided premature selection of potential sites.20 Regional partners, who need not commit at the outset to hosting a multinational repository, should first explore the possibility of shared facilities, examining the legal, economic and technical issues, including transportation requirements. They should then establish a set of technically based common

Policy Options

The exterior of the new storage facility for highly reactive nuclear waste in Borssele, the Netherlands, September 2003 (Getty)

criteria for excluding unsuitable areas within their respective countries. Only then should communities in non-excluded areas be invited to express interest on a voluntary, non-committal basis. This approach is being pursued in Europe through a European Commission-sponsored project which proposed a staged, adaptive, implementation strategy for a European Repository Development Organisation.21 Postponing site selection until participating countries have established confidence in the benefits of cooperation and developed better appreciation of the respective advantages and disadvantages might overcome the problems that plagued past proposals for regional repositories. The political difficulties of repository siting might be mitigated if repositories were seen not as waste dumps but as a critical contribution to the interlocking global goals of non-proliferation, energy security and disarmament. Proponents of multinational fuel-cycle facilities argue that the concept promotes trust, confidence and transparency, all of which can contribute to peaceful and safe utilisation of nuclear energy. On the other hand, multinational solutions can be extremely complicated in practice and sometimes can promote as much distrust as trust. Given the practical complications involved in agreeing and setting up a facility with multiple-country ownership and management, a set of bilateral arrangements may work best.

Rely on interim storage Until the political and technical challenges of building international fuel repositories on a regional or extra-regional level can be overcome, the countries that produce nuclear power and its unwanted by-products will have to rely on temporary storage of the spent fuel. During this time, it is possible that the technology may evolve in ways that make recycling of the recoverable plutonium in the spent fuel practical and free of proliferation risks. All options are thus kept open and the spent fuel is saved for its use as a future energy source. Limiting the marketbased mechanism for spent-fuel management to an interim storage solution reduces many of the moral and political drawbacks to using the market for an international solution. A 2001 joint Harvard–University of Tokyo study noted that although spent fuel contains weaponsusable plutonium, it is bound up in highly radioactive spent-fuel assemblies that can be easily secured and safeguarded. The study suggested that 30–50 years – the planned operating lifetime of many reactors – is an appropriate initial timeframe for interim storage facilities, but noted that the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission has concluded that dry-cask storage would be safe for 100 years.22 A CSCAP study by New Zealand political scientist Ron Smith in February 2000 recommended regionally based above-ground interim storage for 100 years, but noted that any plan

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along these lines would have to address the issue of what happens when the 100 years have elapsed.23 The IAEA’s Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which entered into force in 2001, recognises that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of these materials rests with the country which produces them.

Conclusions A leitmotif common to most of the policy options discussed above is the benefit of regional coordination. As described in chapter 1, the regional institutions that might be expected to play a greater role in promoting nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation have been underutilised and in some cases ignored. This is due in part to disagreement among member states as to whether regional or global bodies dealing with these issues better serve respective national interests. There is also an inclination to avoid troublesome issues and interference in their neighbours’ business. Some of the institutions are too young (in the case of the AsiaPacific Safeguards Network, newly born) to have established a track record. As regional institutions mature, they are likely to take on more relevance, particularly to the extent that their focus is on technical issues that are not hugely encumbered by political differences. The question of whether there should be a region-wide approach to nuclear-energy issues has in some sense been answered in the affirmative through adoption of the Bangkok Treaty with its respective articles covering basic undertakings and information exchange, and through the 2007 decision by the ASEAN leaders to establish a regional nuclear-safety regime. Cooperation to date has, however, been insufficient. As is often noted, if ASEAN is to evolve into more of a European Union-type regional community, its members will need to share some level of national control over selective economic sectors. Just as Euratom was an initial plank in the construction of the EU, so a regional approach to nuclear-energy development and regulation could be a stepping stone to Southeast Asia regional integration as well as providing for economies of scale, enhanced safety and greater transparency. Coordinating more closely on nuclear safety, security and non-prolif-

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Summary of policy options Safety and security Build a nuclear safety culture Create strong, independent regulators Insist on safety standards Safeguards Encourage adoption of the Additional Protocol Promote acceptance of the modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) Concerns about Myanmar Keep close watch Insist on openness Begin contingency planning Strategic trade controls Adopt effective controls Take advantage of UNSCR 1540 assistance Accentuate trade benefits of controls Consider region-wide trade controls Adopt guidelines The front and back end of the fuel cycle Encourage states to voluntarily forgo sensitive fuel-cycle technologies Guarantee fuel supply Remove spent fuel Create international repository Partner on a regional basis for spent-fuel management Rely on interim storage

eration would be a concrete step towards meeting the ASEAN commitment to establish a ‘security community’ by 2015. The potential for such coordination is also clear. In contrast to many other regions of the world, Southeast Asia enjoys a commitment to regional cooperation, a stable security environment, and sustained economic growth built on solid foundations. This uniquely positive region can further benefit by working together regionally, sharing experiences and being open about mistakes. It is claimed that only about 30% of all of ASEAN’s commitments over the years have actually been implemented.24 American scholar Michael Malley suggests that in the nuclear realm the percentage is even lower, to the point that ASEAN is ‘peripheral to one of the most important sets of issues on the region’s horizon’.25 Some steps should be taken immediately. At a minimum, it would make sense for ASEAN members to share information about nuclear-development plans, as would seem to be required by the SEANWFZ Treaty Article 11

Policy Options

commitment for each state party to report on ‘any significant event within its territory … affecting the implementation of this Treaty’. Among other commitments, it would be seen as a highly positive step if ASEAN members followed up the SEANWFZ ‘Plan of Action for 2007–2012’ encouragement by implementing the full range of treaties and conventions relating to nuclear energy. Further down the road, the successful introduction of an extra-national fuel-cycle facility serving

Southeast Asia would potentially have benefits far beyond the regional benefits of spent-fuel management and non-proliferation of sensitive technologies. It could create a useful model for emulation elsewhere and bring closer to realisation ElBaradei’s vision of making all sensitive nuclear facilities international, and thus bring closer as well the vision of a stable nuclear-weapons-free world in which no one country has an exclusive latent weapons break-out capability.

Notes 1

IAEA, ‘Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power

Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540’,

Programme’, GOV/INF/2007/2, April 2007, http://www.

9 September 2008, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/080909_1540.

iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Launch_NPP/0711471_Launch_NPP.pdf. 2

htm. 11

Memorandum No. 14 – Guidelines for Managing Trade of

Capabilities in Southeast Asia; Building a Preventive

Strategic Goods’, March 2009, p. 3, http://www.cscap.org/

Proliferation Firewall’, Nonproliferation Review, vol. 16, no. 1, March 2009, pp. 27, 40. 3   Sharon

4

index.php?page=memorandum-14. 12

Squassoni, ‘Nuclear Energy; Rebirth or

Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific’, chapter 3 of Lawrence Scheinman (ed.), Implementing

Peace, 2009, pp. 75, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/

Resolution 1540: the Role of Regional Organizations, (Geneva:

files/nuclear_energy_rebirth_resuscitation.pdf.

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,

There are several liability conventions. The Philippines rati-

September 2008), p. 75, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/arti-

and the Philippines have signed the 1997 Protocol to

cles/pdf-art2745.pdf. 13

revise the Vienna Convention and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation, but neither has ratified it.

Mohamed ElBaradei, ‘Towards a Safer World’, Economist, 16 October 2003.

14

IAEA, ‘Safeguards Statement for 2006 and Background to the Safeguards Statement’, June 2007, http://www.iaea.

6

Tanya Ogilvie-White,’ Facilitating Implementation of

Resuscitation?’, Carnegie Endowment for International

fied the 1963 Vienna Convention in 1965. Both Indonesia

5

CSCAP Export Controls Experts Group, ‘CSCAP

Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Nuclear

Eighth meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD, p. 3.

15

Thomas Isaacs, ‘Challenges and Opportunities of a Global

org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2006.html.

Nuclear Energy Future’, presentation at Forty-Fifth Annual

Eighth meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation

Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection &

in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering

Measurements, 2–3 March 2009; see abstract at http://www.

the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific, Bangkok, Thailand, 23–24 January 2009, Chairman’s

ncrponline.org/Annual_Mtgs/2009_Electronic_Program.pdf. 16

Although New Zealand and some other Pacific Island

Report, p. 5, http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/

countries have expressed concern about the shipping

WMDSGReports/8WMDRpt.pdf

of nuclear material through the South Pacific, the safety

7

Ibid.

record for shipment of nuclear materials via specialised

8

Andrew Selth, Burma and North Korea: Conventional Allies or Nuclear Partners?, Regional Outlook No.22

9

ships and operators is excellent. 17

(Brisbane: Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, 2009)

Cooperation on High Level Nuclear Waste (HLW) and

‘Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and

Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Management’, November

Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond’,

2004, pp. 16–18, http://www.pacificnuclear.org/pnc/

IAEA May 2008, pp. 19–20, http://www.iaea.org/ NewsCenter/News/PDF/2020report0508.pdf. 10

Pacific Nuclear Council, ‘Report on International

HLW-report.pdf, pp 30–31. 18

Matthew Bunn et al., ‘Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear

Lawrence Scheinman and Johan Bergenas, ‘Strengthening

Fuel: A Safe, Flexible, and Cost-Effective Near-Term

a Weak Link in the Global Security Chain: Regional

Approach to Spent Fuel Management’, Harvard

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

199

Chapter fourteen

University and University of Tokyo, June 2001, p. 71,

21

Ibid.

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2150/

22

Bunn et al., ‘Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel’, pp.

interim_storage_of_spent_nuclear_fuel.html. 19

Ralph A. Cossa, ‘Pacatom: Building Confidence and

ix–x. 23

Enhancing Nuclear Transparency’, Pacific Forum CSIS,

Problem’, CSCAP Working Group on Confidence

October 1998; Robert A. Manning, ‘PACATOM: Nuclear Cooperation in Asia’, Washington Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2,

Building and Security Measure, February 2000. 24

Spring 1997, pp. 217–32. 20

Tommy Koh, Walter Woon, Andrew Tan and Chan Sze-Wei, ‘Charter Makes ASEAN Stronger, More United and Effective’, Straits Times, 8 August 2007.

Charles McCombie, Neil Chapman and Thomas H. Isaacs, ‘Global Developments in Multinational Initiatives at the

Ron Smith, ‘International Solutions to the Spent Fuel

25

Michael Malley, ‘Bypassing Regionalism? Domestic

Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle’, paper prepared

Politics and Nuclear Energy Security’, in Donald K.

for the 12th International Conference on Environmental

Emmerson (ed.), Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and

Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management

Regionalism in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein

ICEM2009.

Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2008, p. 262.

200 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Index

A

Abdullah Badawi 93, 97 Abdurrahman Wahid 64 Abhisit Vejjajiva 141 Abu Sayyaf Group 119, 128, 129 Additional Protocol 15, 21, 22, 24, 25, 52, 53, 76, 92, 107, 125, 126, 133, 135, 144, 145, 151, 158, 159, 170, 173, 174, 180, 186, 190–191, 192, 198 Adelaide (Australia) 174 Adisak Panupong 143 AECL 154 Afghanistan 79 Agency of Assessment and Application of Technology (Indonesia) 70 AGHAM (Philippines) 124 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 73 Albright, David 108 Ali Alatas 76 al-Qaeda 42, 58, 79, 128, 144 Alvarez, Heherson 125 Angarsk (Russia) 195 ANZUS 167, 169, 184, 186 Aquino, Corazon 120, 124, 125 Areva 72, 140, 190 Argentina 38, 156, 172 Argonne National Laboratory (US) 68 Army Ordnance Department (Indonesia) 61 Arroyo, Gloria. See Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria ASEAN 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14–16, 18, 24, 25, 26, 28, 53, 55, 61, 67, 80, 81, 87, 91, 92, 96, 98, 102, 112, 113, 114, 126, 128, 132, 133, 136, 142, 143, 146, 161, 178, 189, 190ff, 198, 199 ASEAN+1 128 ASEAN+3 16, 128, 143 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 15, 16, 133, 161 Asian Development Bank 155 Asian energy security summit 5 Asian Nuclear Safety Network 17, 50, 125, 143, 190 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 27, 143, 161 Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network 17–18, 76, 173, 198 Association of South East Asian Nations. See ASEAN Atomic Energy Act (Australia) 166 Atomic Energy Council (Indonesia) 62 Atomic Energy Law (Myanmar) 103, 104 Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Malaysia) 88, 89, 91, 92, 95 Atomic Energy Licensing Board (Malaysia) 87ff, 94, 95, 96 Atomic Energy Ministry (Russia) 102 Atomic Energy Research Department (Myanmar) 103, 104 Atomic Energy for Peace Act (Thailand) 137, 147 ‘Atoms for Peace’ 5, 62, 119, 151, 184 Atomstroyexport 103 Atta, Mohammed 42 Auckland 184, 185 Aung San Suu Kyi 102

Aung Win 104 Australia 5, 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28, 48, 52, 57, 58, 74, 78, 79, 80, 85, 89, 95, 96, 114, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143, 165–182, 184, 186, 196 early nuclear history 165–168 energy economics 176–177 energy production and consumption 175 later nuclear history 169–171 non-proliferation 177, 179–180 nuclear energy plans 175–176, 178–179 nuclear infrastructure 171–173 strategic context 177–178 uranium mining and export 174–175, 178 Australia Group 134, 187 Australian Atomic Energy Commission 165, 166, 168, 171 Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 174 Australian National University 166 Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation 165, 169, 171, 172, 173, 175 Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency 165, 171 Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 18, 76, 165, 171, 172, 173 Australian Uranium Association 165, 175

B

Bakun Dam (Malaysia) 90 Bali 11, 65, 71, 79 Ball, Desmond 110 Balong (Indonesia) 63, 65 Bandung (Indonesia) 62, 63, 65, 66, 68 Bandung Institute of Technology (Indonesia) 66 Bangi (Malaysia) 87 Bangkhen (Thailand) 137, 138, 142, 143, 147 Bangkok (Thailand) 12, 16, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146 Bangkok Treaty. See Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZone Treaty Bangladesh 16, 17, 68, 113 Banten (Indonesia) 73 BAPETEN. See Indonesia, Nuclear Energy Control Board Barents Sea 39 Barisan Nasional (Malaysia) 88, 98 Barnett, Colin 173 Bataan nuclear power plant (Philippines) 119, 120–121, 123, 124–125 Bataan (Philippines) 5, 8, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 127 Batam (Indonesia) 14 BATAN. See Indonesia, National Atomic Energy Agency Baxter, Phillip 166 Bay of Bengal 105 BBC China 94 Belarus 34

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

201

Index

Belgium 38 Belgrade (Yugoslavia) 38 Bellinzona (Switzerland) 145 Benavidez, Pio 124 Beverley (Australia) 173, 174 Bhai Bay (Thailand) 138 BHP Billiton 174 Bikar Metal Asia 135 Bikar Metalle 135 bin Laden, Osama 42, 79 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 92, 107, 125, 144, 145, 158, 160, 180, 186 Blix, Hans 126 Bohol (Philippines) 121 Bojonegara (Indonesia) 73 Boris Kidric Institute (Yugoslavia) 38 Borneo 80, 90 Borssele (Netherlands) 197 Bragg Institute (Australia) 172 Brazil 140, 186 BP 71, 89 Brunei 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 24, 25, 52, 53–54, 59, 161, 191 Brunei Energy Association 53 Buenavista (Philippines) 122 Buenos Aires (Argentina) 38 Bureau of Customs (Philippines) 127 Burkart, Werner 159 Burma JADE Act (US) 112 Bushehr (Iran) 43 Bush, George W. 49, 57, 80, 97, 111, 112, 127, 170, 175

C

Cabactulan, Libran Nuevas 126 Cagayan (Philippines) 121 Camarines Norte (Philippines) 120 Cambodia 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 24, 25, 28, 48, 49, 52, 54–58, 59, 96, 146, 160, 161, 190, 192 energy alternatives 55–56 energy production and consumption 56 nuclear aspirations 54–55 strategic trade controls 56–57 terrorism concerns 57–58 Cambodia Shipping Corporation 56, 57 Campbell, Kurt 112 Canada 17, 72, 140, 154, 156, 165, 173, 179 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 169, 170 Cao Gangchuan 140 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference 77 Carter, Jimmy 196 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines 124 Cebu (Philippines) 14, 15 Central Intelligence Agency (US) 94, 102 Centre for Accelerator and Material Process Technology (Indonesia) 62, 66 Centre for Application of Nuclear Energy (Malaysia) 88 Centre for Education and Training (Indonesia) 66, 70 Centre for Nuclear Fuel Technology (Indonesia) 68 Centre for Nuclear Techniques (Vietnam) 153 Centre for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Science (Singapore) 131 Centre for Radiation Safety and Metrology Technology (Indonesia) 66 Centre for Science and Technology Research (Indonesia) 61, 66 Centre for the Application of Isotope and Radiation Technology (Indonesia) 66 Centre for the Development of Nuclear Ore and Geology (Indonesia) 64 Centre for the Dissemination of Nuclear Science and Technology (Indonesia) 66

202 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines 123 Changi Naval Base (Singapore) 136 Chelyabinsk (Russia) 37 Chemical Association of Malaysia 96 Chemical Weapons Convention 56, 92, 125, 144, 145, 158, 170, 180, 186 Chernobyl (Ukraine) 33, 34–35, 36, 37, 40, 44, 45, 106, 119, 120, 124, 132, 158, 190 Chevron 56 Chifley, Ben 166, 167 Chile 58 China 5, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 41, 54, 61, 62, 64, 68, 71, 74, 80, 81, 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 113, 114, 120, 128, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 146, 147, 155, 156, 160, 161, 167, 168, 170, 174, 177, 178, 193 Chonburi (Thailand) 138, 142 Chu Hao 158 Chumphon (Thailand) 142 Chun Doo Hwan 108 Clinton, Hillary 112, 185, 187 Cobra Gold 146 Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA) 39, 89, 91, 106, 124, 157, 180, 186 Cojuangco, Mark 124 Cold War 28, 113, 127, 146, 160, 170 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 57, 58, 92, 107, 125, 126, 158, 180, 186 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 54, 58, 61, 76, 77, 92, 107, 125, 126, 127, 144, 151, 158, 170, 173, 177, 180, 184, 186, 191 Conference on Disarmament 107 Container Security Initiative 25, 95, 133, 134, 145 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency 45, 76, 91, 106, 124, 132, 134, 141, 157, 180, 186 Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 45, 52, 76, 91, 106, 124, 125, 132, 134, 141, 157, 180, 186 Convention on Nuclear Safety 8, 45, 46, 52, 76, 91, 106, 124, 132, 134, 141, 142, 157, 180, 186, 190 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 8, 47, 48, 52, 55, 57, 76, 91, 106, 124, 125, 133, 134, 141, 157, 173, 180, 186, 190 Co-operation Afloat Readiness and Training 146 Coordinating Committee on Export Controls 28 Corruption Perceptions Index 56, 58, 75, 144 Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 159, 194, 197

D

Daesong Electric Group 109 Dalat (Vietnam) 49, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 161 Darwin (Australia) 166, 174 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (US) 36, 37 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 128 Deep Sabre 54, 133 De Gaulle, Charles 169 Democratic Voice of Burma 110 Department of Atomic Energy (Myanmar) 103, 104 Department of Energy (Philippines) 119, 122, 123, 125 Department of Energy (US) 25, 38, 90, 127, 142, 152, 172, 185 Department of External Affairs (Australia) 169 Department of External Affairs (New Zealand) 183 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia) 173 Department of Justice (US) 37 Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (New Zealand) 183 Department of State (US) 94, 106, 112, 128 Department of the Treasury (US) 94 DGSE 184 Directorate General of Electricity and Energy Development (Indonesia) 70

Index

Directorate General of Oil and Gas (Indonesia) 70 Do Thanh Hai 159 Dubai (UAE) 93, 94, 95, 135

E

East Asia Summit 12, 16, 141 East Timor 80. See also Timor Leste The Economist 141 Egypt 65, 140 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 5 ElBaradei, Mohamed 24, 193, 194, 199 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 137, 138, 139, 147 Emergency Preparedness Review Mission 46 Emu Field (Australia) 168 Energy Resources Australia 174 Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore 133 Environmental Act (Thailand) 140 Environmental Impact Control Agency (Indonesia) 70 Estrada, Joseph 120, 121, 123 Euratom 18, 45, 196, 198 European Commission 17, 197 European Repository Development Organisation 197 European Safeguards Research and Development Association 17 European Union 11, 15, 198 Evans, Gareth 177 Exercise Maru 187

F

Far Eastern Economic Review 109 Federal Criminal Court (Switzerland) 145 Fellowships and Scientific Visits programme (IAEA) 65 1540 Committee 15, 26, 27, 54, 56, 59, 77, 126, 145, 160, 191, 193, 194 Fiji 25 Finland 10, 41, 196 First Energy 37 First Watch International 85 Fissile-Material Cut-off Treaty 170 Five-Power Defence Arrangements 96, 135 Forbes 143 Foreign Affairs 112 Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programme 49 Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia 67 Four Mile (Australia) 173, 174 France 17, 21, 90, 140, 156, 166, 168, 170, 171, 184, 185, 190, 191, 195 Fraser, Malcom 171

G

G8 48 Gadhafi, Muammar 87 Gadjah Mada Research Centre (Indonesia) 62 Gadjah Mada University (Indonesia) 66 Garrett, Peter 174 G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor (Indonesia) 63, 66, 75 Gattaran (Philippines) 121 General Atomics 62, 119, 137, 140 General Electric 140, 171 Geological Society of America 124 Germany 17, 38, 93, 94 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 47, 49 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 69, 73, 90, 175, 177 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction 47, 48 Global Threat Reduction Initiative 38, 47, 48, 49, 157 Gluckman, Ron 143 Glukhov, Alexander 103

Gorontalo (Indonesia) 72 Gorton, John 168, 169 Greenpeace 124, 184 Gresik (Indonesia) 64 Gulf of Thailand 55, 138, 139, 140, 161 Gulf War 21, 111

H

Habibie, B.J. 64, 65, 75, 76 Hambali 58, 79. See Riduan Isamuddin Hanoi (Vietnam) 151, 152, 153, 156, 160, 161, 162 Harrisburg (US) 36 Hartono 61 Harvard University (US) 197 Harwell (UK) 166 Hassan Wirajuda 77 Hawke, Bob 170, 175 Heathgate Resources 174 Hibbs, Mark 111 HIFAR 165, 166, 169, 172 High Court (UK) 168 Hitachi Ltd 140 Hoa Tam (Vietnam) 154 Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnan) 152, 153 Honeymoon (Australia) 174 Hong Kong 95 Howard, John 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179 Hun Sen 55, 58 Hussein, Saddam 111

I

IAEA 8, 9, 10, 12ff, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 45ff, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 62ff, 70, 74ff, 87, 91, 92, 94, 98, 101ff, 110, 111, 115, 119ff, 124ff, 131, 133, 134, 137ff, 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 162, 170ff, 180, 185, 186, 189ff, 195, 198, 199 International Comisssion on Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament 165, 177, 178 Idaho (US) 38 India 5, 10, 15, 16, 21, 24, 41, 43, 68, 80, 81, 96, 101, 102, 106, 109, 110, 113, 114, 137, 139, 146, 156, 161, 162, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 174, 177, 178, 186, 191, 193 Indian Ocean 41 Indonesia 5ff, 11, 12, 14ff, 24, 25, 26, 38, 41, 43, 52, 61–86, 89, 90, 97, 120, 131, 135, 136, 140, 143, 145, 151, 156, 158, 167, 170, 173, 178, 180, 190, 191, 194, 195 civilian nuclear history 62–65 current nuclear infrastructure 65–70 nuclear energy plans 70–74 nuclear safety issues 74–75 nuclear weapons aspirations 61–62 Indonesian Forum for the Environment 61, 74 Institute of Atomic Energy (Indonesia) 62, 63 Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (New Zealand) 184 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (US) 36 Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pakistan) 106 Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (Vietnam) 153 Institute for Science and International Security (US) 108, 111 Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IAEA) 46, 47 Interim Storage Facility for Spent Fuel (Indonesia) 69 Internal Security Act (Malaysia) 94, 97 International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament 169 International Commission on Radiological Protection 70 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 47, 48, 91, 106, 134, 141, 157, 180 International Court of Justice 186 International Maritime Organisation 39 International Monitoring System 184 International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 32 International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group 34

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

203

Index

International Transport Workers Federation 57 Inter-Parliamentary Union 77 Iran 26, 43, 73, 77, 92, 95, 107, 109, 110, 135, 144, 170 Iran–Iraq War 43 Iraq 21, 23, 24, 26, 43, 170 Iraq War 111 Irian Jaya (Indonesia) 67 Irrawaddy Delta (Myanmar) 102 Israel 21, 43, 77, 108, 110, 115 Italy 65, 94

J

Jabiluka (Australia) 174 Jakarta (Indonesia) 43, 62, 63, 66, 71, 79, 80 Jakarta Statement on Non-Proliferation 15 Japan 5, 15, 16, 17, 37, 41, 54, 57, 68, 74, 90, 95, 109, 126, 127, 128, 135, 137, 140, 145, 154, 156, 166, 167, 168, 170, 174, 177, 191, 196 Java (Indonesia) 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 73, 74 JCI 154 Jemaah Ansorut Tauhid 79 Jemaah Islamiah 42, 43, 58, 79, 97, 128, 129, 143, 144 Jepara (Indonesia) 65 Jervis Bay (Australia) 169 Johor (Malaysia) 14 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 45, 46, 76, 91, 106, 124, 134, 141, 157, 180, 186, 190, 198 Jose Panganiban (Philippines) 120

K

Kachin (Myanmar) 104, 110 Kakadu National Park (Australia) 174 Kalan (Indonesia) 64, 67 Kalimantan (Indonesia) 64, 67, 72, 73, 74 Kalla, Jusuf 71 Kamaluddin Abdullah 93, 95 Kamol Takabut 139 Kang Nam 1 112, 117 Karen National Liberation Army 106 Kartini reactor (Indonesia) 62, 63, 66, 75 Kashiwazaki (Japan) 40, 41 Kaspadu 93 Kawaguchi, Yoriko 177 Kazakhstan 165, 173, 185 Keating, Paul 170 KEPCO 90, 124, 154 Khan, Abdul Qadeer 8, 9, 26, 78, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 108, 135, 145 Khek Vandy 56 Khin Maung Win 104 Khmer Rouge 54 Kim Il-Sung 57 Kim Kyok Sik 109 Kiribati 25 Kommersant 103 Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 72 Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power 73 Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) 87, 93, 94 Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia 97 Kusmayanto Kadiman 71, 72 Kyaukse (Myanmar) 110

L

Laem Chabang (Thailand) 25, 145 Lange, David 184 Laos 6, 7, 12, 16, 24, 25, 28, 52, 55, 58–59, 96, 139, 146, 155, 160, 192 Lasem (Indonesia) 65 Latin America 12 Lavrov, Sergei 156

204 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Law on Nuclear Energy (Vietnam) 154 Law on Nuclear Reactors (Indonesia) 72 Lee Hsien Loong 132 Lee Kuan Yew 132 Lee Myung-bak 90 Lehmann, Peter 145 Lemajung (Indonesia) 64, 67 Libya 8, 26, 78, 87, 92, 94, 103, 106, 108, 135, 145 Limited Test Ban Treaty 75 Lombok Treaty 80 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 39 Lucas Heights (Australia) 166, 169, 172 Lugar, Richard 112 Lui Pao Chuen 132 Luzon (Philippines) 121

M

Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 120, 123, 126, 127, 128 Macmillan, Harold 168 MacroAsia Corporation 122 MacroAsia Mining Corporation 122 Madura (Indonesia) 72, 74 Magwe (Myanmar) 102, 110 Mahathir Mohamad 97 Majid Seif 95 Malacca Strait. See Strait of Malacca Malampaya (Philippines) 124 Malaysia 5ff, 12, 14ff, 24, 25, 26, 28, 43, 48, 52, 61, 68, 71, 78, 79, 80, 87–100, 109, 128, 131, 132, 135, 146, 161, 168, 173, 191 energy production and consumption 89 geopolitical context 96–98 non-proliferation and disarmament 91–92 nuclear-energy interest 89–91 nuclear infrastructure 87–89 nuclear safety and security 91 strategic trade controls 92–96 Malaysian Institute for Nuclear Technology Research 87, 88. See also Nuclear Malaysia Malley, Michael 12, 198 Mandalay (Myanmar) 104, 109, 110 Mandalay University 104 Manhattan Project 166, 167, 169 Maralinga (Australia) 167, 168 Marcos, Ferdinand 119, 120, 124, 128 Marinduque (Philippines) 122 Marriott Hotel (Jakarta) 43, 79 Marsden, Ernest 188 Marshall Islands 25, 196 Mary Kathleen (Australia) 166 Mayak Industrial Complex (Russia) 37 Maymyo (Myanmar) 110 Mayrow 95 McCully, Murray 185, 187 McMahon, William 169 Megaports Initiative 25, 49, 127 Megawati Sukarnoputri 64, 79 Mekong River 55, 155 Melbourne (Australia) 166 Menzies, Robert 167, 168, 169 Middle East 124, 131 Mindanao (Philippines) 127, 128 Mines and Geosciences Bureau (Philippines) 122 Ministry of Defence (Singapore) 132 Ministry of Defence (UK) 168 Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (Indonesia) 69, 71, 74 Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water (Malaysia) 88 Ministry of Energy (Myanmar) 104, 105, 110

Index

Ministry of Energy (Thailand) 138, 139 Ministry of Finance (Philippines) 127 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Malaysia) 96 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Philippines) 127 Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand) 187 Ministry of Health (New Zealand) 184 Ministry of Health (Singapore) 131 Ministry of Industry and Trade (Vietnam) 153, 154 Ministry for Research and Technology (Indonesia) 70, 71, 72 Ministry of Science and Technology (Myanmar) 102, 103, 104 Ministry of Science and Technology (Thailand) 137, 138 Ministry of Science and Technology (Vietnam) 151, 153 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (Malaysia) 87, 88, 89, 90 Missile Technology Control Regime 80, 134, 187 Mitsubishi 53, 140, 154 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 72, 73 Mitutoyo Corporation 135, 145 Mogok (Myanmar) 110 Mohnyin (Myanmar) 110 Monarch Aviation Pte Ltd 134 Monte Bello Islands (Australia) 167, 169 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 119, 128, 129 Moro National Liberation Front 119, 128 Morong (Philippines) 120 Moruroa Atoll 185 Moscow Engineering Physics Institute 103 Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology 103 Moscow Power Engineering Institute 103 Moscow (Russia) 103 Mount Natib (Philippines) 120, 124 Mount Pinatubo (Philippines) 124 Muñoz, Heraldo 58 Muria (Indonesia) 63, 64, 65, 70, 73, 74, 81 Myaing (Myanmar) 102 Myanmar 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 24, 25, 52, 95, 96, 101–118, 139, 146, 161, 162, 189, 191, 192, 193, 198 civilian nuclear history 101–104 energy production 105 geopolitical context 113–114 non-proliferation and disarmament 105–106, 106–107, 110–111, 192–193 North Korean connection 108–110 nuclear infrastructure 104 nuclear safety and security 106 strategic trade controls 108 Myanmar Agriculture Service 104 Myit Nge River (Myanmar) 110

N

Nahdlatul Ulama 74 Najib Tun Razak 90 Nakhon Nayok (Thailand) 137 Nakhon Sawan (Thailand) 142 Nakhon Si Thammarat (Thailand) 142 Non-Aligned Movement 76, 77, 78, 87, 92, 126, 144, 145, 158, 195 Namchongang Trading Co. 109 Namibia 173 Nam Ngum 5 dam (Laos) 58 Nam Theun 2 dam (Laos) 58 Narathiwat (Thailand) 144 Cyclone Nargis 102, 113 Natio Lasman 72 National Atomic Energy Agency (Indonesia) 61, 62, 63, 65ff, 72ff, 79 National Authority for WMD Inspection and Control (Philippines) 127 National Centre for Radioactive Medical Treatment (Vietnam) 153 National Centre for Statistics (Indonesia) 70

National Commission for the Investigation of Radioactivity (Indonesia) 62, 63 National Energy Policy Committee (Thailand) 137 National Energy Policy Council (Thailand) 139, 147 National Energy Policy (Malaysia) 90 National Environment Agency (Singapore) 131 National Environment Board (Thailand) 138, 147 National League for Democracy (Myanmar) 102 National Nuclear Security Administration (US) 152 National Radiation Laboratory (New Zealand) 184 National University of Malaysia 87 National University of Singapore 133 Natuna Islands (Indonesia) 65 Naung Laing (Myanmar) 110 Naypyitaw (Myanmar) 101, 102, 111 Nazimah Syed Majid 93 RF Nerpa 39 Netherlands 197 Ne Win 102, 106, 114 NEWJEC Inc. 65 New South Wales (Australia) 166, 169 New York Times 145 New Zealand 6, 7, 9, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28, 48, 52, 96, 135, 167, 169, 183–188, 197 New Zealand Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy 185 New Zealand National Isotope Centre 184 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 184 Nguyen Minh Triet 156 Nguyen Tan Dung 153, 156 Nguyen Truong Giang 159 Niger 173 Niigata (Japan) 40 Ninh Thuan (Vietnam) 154 Nong Duc Manh 156 Noppadon Pattama 16 Northern Territory (Australia) 166, 173, 174 North Korea 8, 9, 15, 21, 26, 43, 56, 57, 77, 78, 92, 95, 101, 106, 107, 108–110, 111ff, 145, 158, 170, 189, 192 North West Cape (Australia) 170 Norway 76 Norwegian Sea 39 Notification and Emergency Assistance Conventions 45 NPT Review Conference 76, 126, 144 nuclear accidents 34–36 Nuclear Centre for Materials and Radiometry (Indonesia) 61, 66 Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD) 122, 178 Nuclear Energy Control Board (Indonesia) 61, 70, 73, 76, 79 Nuclear Energy Unit (Malaysia) 88 nuclear fuel cycle 22–23, 194–198 Nuclear Malaysia 87, 88, 90 Nuclear Materials Research Group (Philippines) 120 Nuclear Minerals Development Centre (Indonesia) 63 nuclear non-proliferation 21–30 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 13, 21, 24, 25, 54, 57, 58, 76, 78, 92, 107, 125, 126, 144, 145, 158, 160, 166, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 177, 179, 180, 185, 186. See also NPT Review Conference. Nuclear Power Infrastructure Establishment Plan (Thailand) 137, 138, 139, 141 Nuclear Power Program Development Office (Thailand) 137, 138, 142, 147 Nuclear Power Steering Committee (Philippines) 120, 122 Nuclear Regulations, Licensing and Safeguards Division (Philippines) 121, 125 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US) 157, 197 37, 41 Nuclear Research Centre (Thailand) 137

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

205

Index

Nuclear Research Institute (Vietnam) 49, 153, 161 nuclear safeguards regime 21–24, 190–192 nuclear safety and security 31–52, 189–191 concepts 31–32 emergency preparedness 43–45 emerging security regime 47–49 global safety regime 45–47 Indonesia 74–75 Malaysia 91 Myanmar 106 New Zealand 185 Philippines 125–126 risks 32–33, 36–43 Singapore 132–133 Thailand 142–144 Vietnam 157–158 Nuclear Security Fund 47, 185 Nuclear Suppliers Group 24, 25, 93, 134, 174, 187 Nuclear Threat Initiative 48 Nucleare Italiana Reattori Avanzati 65 Nucleonics Week 102 Nurrungar (Australia) 170

O

Obama, Barack 13, 80 Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (Thailand) 137, 138, 142, 147 Office of Atoms for Peace (Thailand) 137, 138, 141, 143 Office of the Special Envoy on Transnational Crime (Philippines) 126 Ohio (US) 36 Oliphant, Marcus 166 Olympic Dam (Australia) 173, 174 Ongkharak (Thailand) 137, 140, 143, 147 OPAL 165, 169, 172, 173 Operational Safety Assessment Review Team (IAEA) 46 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 56, 127 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 45, 122, 178 Organisation of the Islamic Conference 128 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 71 Osiraq (Iraq) 43 Oslo (Norway) 110 Outer Space Treaty 92, 107, 144, 158, 160, 180, 186

P

Pacific Protector 57 Pacific Shield 54, 96, 134 Padolina, William G. 126 Pahang (Malaysia) 91 Pakistan 5, 10, 17, 21, 26, 43, 93, 96, 101, 102, 106, 110, 114, 115, 140, 170, 186 Pakokku (Myanmar) 102 Palau 25 Palmrya Atoll (US) 196 Papua New Guinea 25, 39 Paracale (Philippines) 120 Paracel Islands 161 Partial Test-Ban Treaty 107 Parti se-Islam Malaysia 98 Pasar Jumat Nuclear Complex (Indonesia) 62, 63, 66 Pathet Lao 58 Pattani (Thailand) 144, 146 Pattaya (Thailand) 12, 142 PBMR (Pty) 72 Pedra Branca Island (Singapore) 132 Pentagon (US) 41 Petrokimia 64 Pham Gia Khiem 156 Phan Van Khai 152

206 An IISS Strategic Dossier

Phibun Songkram 146 Philippine Energy Plan 122, 123 Philippine National Police 127 Philippines 5ff, 10, 12, 14ff, 24, 25, 26, 28, 38, 39, 43, 48, 52, 97, 119–130, 145, 146, 151, 161, 190, 191 civilian nuclear history 119–121 energy production and consumption 122 geopolitical drivers 127–129 non-proliferation policies 126 nuclear infrastructure 121–122 nuclear plans 123–125 nuclear safety and security 125–126 strategic trade controls 126–127 Philippines Atomic Energy Commission 119 Philippines National Power Corporation 119, 122, 124, 125 Philippines Nuclear Research Institute 119, 120, 121, 122, 125 Philippines Research Reactor-1 119, 120, 123, 125 Phuket (Thailand) 112 Phuoc Dinh (Vietnam) 154 Phu Yen (Vietnam) 154 Pine Gap (Australia) 170 PNL 75 Poland 103, 140 Polytechnic Institute of Nuclear Technology (Indonesia) 62, 66 Poneman, Dan 64 Port Klang (Malaysia) 25, 95 Port of Manila (Philippines) 127 Power Development Plan (Thailand) 137, 139, 147 Preah Vihear temple 146 Pricha Karasuddhi 139 Pripyat (Ukraine) 44 Proliferation Security Initiative 24, 25, 54, 57, 77, 96, 126, 133, 134, 145, 159, 170, 177, 186, 187 PT BATAN Teknologi 68 PTNBR. See Indonesia, Nuclear Centre for Materials and Radiometry Pulau Muara Besar (Brunei) 54 Pulau Panjang (Indonesia) 73 PUSPIPTEK. See Indonesia, Centre for Science and Technology Research Putin, Vladimir 49 Pyin Oo Lwin (Myanmar) 110, 111 Pyongyang (North Korea) 57, 109

Q

Queensland (Australia) 166, 178 Quezon City (Phillipines) 119, 121

R

Radiation Control and Nuclear Safety Authority (Vietnam) 157 Radiation Monitoring Laboratory (Myanmar) 104 Radiation Protection Act (Singapore) 131 Radioactive Waste Management Centre (Indonesia) 69 Radioactive Waste Management Centre (Malaysia) 88 Radioactive Waste Management Facility (Philippines) 121 Radiological Threat Reduction programme 49 Rainbow Warrior 184, 185 Ramos, Fidel 120, 121, 123, 127, 128 RANET 45 Ranger (Australia) 173, 174 Rangoon University 101, 104 RAO UES 72 Rarotonga 186 Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors programme 49, 68, 152 regional cooperation 11–20 Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training in Nuclear Science and Technology in Asia and the Pacific 66, 67, 88, 104, 120, 153 Remaja-Hitam (Indonesia) 67

Index

Rembang (Indonesia) 65 Research and Development Centre for Marine Geology Research (Indonesia) 74 Research Development Centre for Radiation Technology (Vietnam) 153 Research Policy Direction Board (Myanmar) 103, 104 Research Reactor Decommissioning and Dismantling programme (IAEA) 119 Reyes, Angelo 123 Riduan Isamuddin 79 Rirang-Tanah Merah (Indonesia) 67 Ritz-Carlton Hotel (Jakarta) 79 Rohingya (Myanmar) 113 Romania 90, 107, 108 Rompin (Malaysia) 91 Romulo, Alberto 126, 128 Rosatom 190 Royal Commission on Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand 183 Rudd, Kevin 169, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178 Rum Jungle (Australia) 166, 173 Rusk, Dean 169 Rusk–Thanat agreement 146 Russia 14, 15, 17, 21, 34, 38, 39, 48, 49, 58, 72, 80, 101, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110ff, 115, 132, 152, 156, 173, 174, 190, 191, 192 Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation 103 Rutherford, Ernest 183

S

Sabah (Malaysia) 90 Samut Prakarn (Thailand) 142 Sarawak (Malaysia) 90 Sat Samy 55 Saw Maung 102 Scomi Group Berhad 93, 94 Scomi Precision Engineering 87, 93, 94, 135 Seabed Arms Control Treaty 107 Sea of Japan 39 Second Indochina War 12 Second Line of Defense programme 47, 49, 185 Second World War 183 Selth, Andrew 114 Senate Foreign Relations Committee (US) 112 Seoul (South Korea) 17 Serpong (Indonesia) 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 75 Seven-Nation Initiative 76 Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain 94 Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban 94 Shan (Myanmar) 104, 106 Shan State Army–South 106 Shaziman Mansor 90 Shell-Oxy consortium 120 Shwe Mann 109 Siemens Power Corporation 120 King Sihanouk 56, 57 SILEX 171 Singapore 6, 7, 8, 12, 14ff, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 43, 48, 52, 54, 56, 78, 80, 96, 168, 190, 191, 192 energy production and consumption 133 geopolitical context 135–136 non-proliferation and disarmament 133 nuclear energy prospects 131–132 nuclear infrastructure 131 nuclear safety and security 132–133 strategic trade controls 133–135 Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment 16 Singapore Radiopharmaceuticals Pte Ltd 131 Siwabessy, G.A. 62, 63, 66, 75, 78 Small Quantities Protocol 24, 25, 52, 53, 57, 58, 107, 192, 198 Smith, Ron 197

Sokkia Singapore Pte Ltd 135 Solomon Islands 39 Somalia 43 So San 57 South Africa 93 South Alligator River (Australia) 166 South Australia 167, 173, 174 South China Sea 65, 81, 96, 128, 135, 160, 161 Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty 12–14, 53, 54, 57, 58, 75, 87, 92, 107, 113, 125, 126, 133, 144, 158, 161, 189, 191, 192, 193, 195, 198, 199 Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 97 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 146 Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone 186 South Korea 5, 10, 15, 16, 17, 53, 57, 72, 90, 104, 120, 154, 156, 174, 191 South Pacific 12, 183, 186 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 169, 170, 180 South Vietnam 151 Soviet Union 21, 28, 34, 37, 38, 48, 49, 63, 103, 151, 160, 170 Spain 57 Spratly Islands 96, 161 Sri Lanka 41, 93 State Electricity Company (Indonesia) 70 State Law and Order Restoration Council (Burma) 102 State Peace and Development Council (Myanmar) 101, 102, 103, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114 St Petersburg (Russia) 49 Strait of Malacca 43, 96 strategic trade controls 26–29, 193–194 Cambodia 56–57 Indonesia 77–78 Laos 58–59 Malaysia 92–96 Myanmar 108 New Zealand 187 Philippines 126–127 Singapore 133–135 Thailand 145–146 Vietnam 160 Strategy for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy up to 2020 (Vietnam) 153 Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat 76, 77 Suharto 62, 64, 75, 78, 80 Sukarno 61, 62, 64, 78, 167 Sulawesi (Indonesia) 67, 72, 80 Sulu (Philippines) 128 Sumatra (Indonesia) 41, 65, 67, 75 Sunda plate 91 Surayud Chulanont 140 Surin Pitsuwan 113 Surin (Thailand) 143 Sverdlovsk (Russia) 37 Sweden 10, 196 Switkowski, Ziggy 169, 172, 175, 176, 178, 179 Switzerland 93, 94, 145 Sydney (Australia) 17, 166, 172 Syed Hamid Albar 95 Symon, Andrew 18 Syria 43, 108, 109, 110, 115, 135

T

Tahir, Buhary Syed Ali 93, 94, 95 Taiwan 96, 120, 161, 174 Tajoura (Myanmar) 103, 106 Taliban 58 Tampinco, Froilan 125 Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) 25, 95 Tan See Seng 75 Taylor, Norizah Harun 53

Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia

207

Index

Team Samurai’04 57 Technical Cooperation Programme (IAEA) 87, 140 Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Malaysia) 87, 89, 90 Tengah Air Base (Singapore) 135 Thabeikkyin (Myanmar) 110 Thai Atomic Energy Commission 137, 147 Thailand 5ff, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28, 38, 41, 43, 48, 52, 55, 56, 58, 106, 110ff, 120, 137–150, 161, 162, 173, 191 civilian nuclear history 137–138 energy production and consumption 140 geopolitical context 146 nuclear infrastructure 138 nuclear plans 139–142 nuclear safety and security 142–144 Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology 137, 138, 142, 143, 147 Thaksin Shinawatra 141 Than Shwe 102, 114 Thornton, Phil 110 Three Mile Island (US) 33, 35–36, 40, 44, 190, 196 Timor Leste 25, 80 Tinner, Friedrich 94 Tinner, Marco 145 Tinner, Urs 94 Tokaimura uranium-conversion plant (Japan) 37 Tokyo Electric Power 40 Tokyo (Japan) 40 Toos Electronics 95 Torrijos (Philippines) 122 Toshiba 140, 154 Tran Dinh Long 158 Transparency International 56, 144 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 11, 146 Tun Ismail Atomic Research Centre (Malaysia) 88 Turkey 93

U

Ujung Grenggengan (Indonesia) 65 Ujung Lemahabang (Indonesia) 65 Ujung Watu (Indonesia) 65 Ukraine 34, 103, 185 Union of Burma 101, 102, 103 Union of Burma Applied Research Institute 101 United Arab Emirates 95. See also Dubai United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship (Thailand) 141 United Kingdom 21, 94, 95, 96, 104, 112, 113, 135, 166, 167, 168, 169, 173 United Nations 21, 54, 105, 107, 113, 114, 159, 177, 192, 193 General Assembly 48, 77, 170, 177, 186 Office for Disarmament Affairs 143 Security Council 25, 26, 58, 77, 92, 95, 126, 158 United States 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 24, 25, 28, 35ff, 41, 47, 48, 49, 54, 56ff, 61ff, 68, 69, 72, 74, 77, 79, 80, 87, 89, 90, 92, 94ff, 105, 106, 108, 112, 113, 114, 119, 124, 126, 127, 128, 133ff, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159ff, 165ff, 177, 178, 180, 184ff, 190, 191, 195, 196, 197 University of Canterbury 184 University of Indonesia 66 University of the Philippines Diliman 119 University of Tokyo 197 UNSCR 1540 15, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 77, 108, 126, 143, 145, 186, 193, 194, 198 UNSCR 1747 77 UNSCR 1803 77 UNSCR 1835 77

208 An IISS Strategic Dossier

UNSCR 1874 92, 192 Urals (Russia) 37 US–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty 127 U Thaung 101, 105 Uzbekistan 173

V

Vast Solutions 95 Vienna (Austria) 92 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 141 Vietnam 5ff, 12, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26, 28, 38, 49, 52, 54, 55, 58, 96, 103, 128, 137, 139, 146, 147, 151–164, 168, 173, 191, 195 civilian nuclear history 151–152 energy production and consumption 155 geopolitical context 160–162 non-proliferation and disarmament 158–160 nuclear infrastructure 152–153 nuclear plans 153–156 nuclear safety and security 157–158 Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety 151, 153, 157 Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission 151, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159 Vietnam Electricity Power Association 158 Vietnamese Communist Party 151, 156 Vietnam Institute for Nuclear Science and Technique 152 Vietnam Nuclear Energy Institute 156 Vietnam Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority 153 Vinh Hai (Vietnam) 154 Visiting Forces Agreement (Philippines) 127 Vuong Huu Tan 159

W

WALHI. See Indonesian Forum for the Environment Wall Street Journal 109 Wang-Woodford, Laura 134 Washington DC (US) 77, 108, 114 Western Australia 167, 173, 178 Westinghouse 120, 156, 190 Westmoreland (Australia) 166 Whitlam, Gough 169 Woomera (Australia) 167, 168 World Association of Nuclear Operators 36 World Bank 58, 65 World Energy Council 67 World Health Organisation 45 World Institute for Nuclear Security 47, 48 World Trade Centre (US) 41 World Trade Organisation 155

Y

Yala (Thailand) 144 Yangon (Myanmar) 109, 112 Yemen 57 Yogyakarta (Indonesia) 62, 63, 66, 74, 143 Yokohama (Japan) 134 Yongbyon (North Korea) 43, 106, 145 Yucca Mountain (US) 10 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 63, 64, 70, 71, 73, 75, 79, 80 Yugoslavia 38

Z

Zangger Committee 24, 187 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 12 Zubiri, Juan Miguel 124