Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues (Oxford World's Classics)

OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S PRINCIPLES O F HUMA N KNOWLEDG E AND

THREE DIALOGUE S GEORGE BERKELE Y was born i n Kilkenny , in Ireland , i n 1685 . H e entered Trinit y College Dublin i n 170 0 and wa s elected a Fellow in 1707. The Principles of Human Knowledge was published in 1710 and the Three Dialogues in 1713. He moved to London an d became a member o f th e literar y circles o f his day , numbering Pope , Swift , Gay, an d Addison amongst his friends. H e toure d th e Continen t a s chaplain t o the Ear l of Peterborough, 1713-14 , an d a s tutor t o th e son of the Bishop of Clogher, 1716-20 . During thi s latter period he wrote the De Motu. He returned t o academic life in Dublin until he became Dean o f Derry i n 1724 . Desiring t o found a new civilization free o f European decadence , he obtaine d a promise o f money from th e governmen t t o establis h a colleg e in Bermuda. In 172 8 he married Ann e Forster an d sailed for America . Whe n th e governmen t finall y refuse d t o pa y th e money, the y returne d t o Englan d i n 1731 , an d th e followin g yea r he publishe d Alciphron. I n 173 4 h e becam e Bisho p o f Cloyne and publishe d th e Analyst, whic h concerne d mathematic s an d infinitesimals. Plan s fo r improvin g th e stat e o f Irelan d wer e th e subject o f Th e Querist, 1735-7 . I n Americ a h e ha d acquire d a peculiar fascinatio n wit h th e healin g powe r o f tar-water . I n Siris (1744) h e discusse s thos e powers , Platonistic metaphysics, an d th e Trinity. He retire d t o Oxford in 175 2 and die d there on 1 4 January 1753 , and was buried in Christ Churc h Cathedral . He was survived by his wife and three children . HOWARD ROBINSO N i s Soro s Professo r o f Philosoph y a t th e Eotvos Lorand Universit y in Budapest an d Reade r in the Depart ment of Philosophy at Liverpool University. He i s author of Matter and Sense (Cambridge : Cambridg e Universit y Press , 1982 ) an d Perception (London : Routledge , 1994) ; editor , wit h John Foster , of Essays o n Berkeley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985 ) with Raymond Tallis o f Th e Pursuit of Mind (Manchester : Carcanet , 1991) , wit h Henry Blumentha l o f Aristotle an d th e Later Tradition (Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1991) , an d o f Objections t o Physicalism (Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1993).

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OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S

GEORGE BERKELE Y

Principles of Human Knowledge and

Three Dialogues Edited with an Introduction and Notes by HOWARD ROBINSON

OXPORD UNIVERSITY PRES S

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRES S

Great Clarendo n Street , Oxfor d 0x2 6o p Oxford Universit y Press i s a department o f the Universit y of Oxford. It further s the University' s objectiv e o f excellence in research, scholarship , and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford Ne w York Athens Aucklan d Bangko k Bogot a Bueno s Aires Calcutt a Cape Town Chenna i Da r e s Salaam Delh i Florenc e Hon g Kong Istanbu l Karachi Kual a Lumpur Madri d Melbourn e Mexic o City Mumba i Nairobi Pari s Sa o Paulo Singapor e Taipe i Toky o Toront o Warsa w with associated companies in Berli n Ibada n Oxford i s a registered trade mark of Oxford University Pres s in the UK an d in certain other countrie s Published i n the United State s by Oxford University Press Inc., New York Text © A. A. Luce an d T E. Jessop (The Complet e Works of George Berkeley , 1948-57 , Nelson) Editorial matter © Howard Robinso n 199 6 The mora l rights of the autho r have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published as a World's Classic s paperbac k 1996 Reissued as an Oxford World's Classic s paperbac k 1999 All rights reserved. No par t o f this publication may be reproduced , stored i n a retrieval system, or transmitted, i n any form o r by any means, without the prio r permission in writing of Oxford University Press , or as expressly permitted by law, or under term s agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproductio n outside the scop e of the abov e should b e sent to the Rights Department , Oxford Universit y Press, a t the addres s above You must no t circulat e this book in any other binding or cover and you must impos e this same condition o n any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Dat a Data availabl e Library of Congress Catalogin g in Publication Dat a Berkeley, George, 1685-1753 . [Treatise concernin g the principle s of human knowledge] Principles o f human knowledge; and, Three dialogues / edite d with introduction b y Howard Robinson .

p. cm .

Includes bibliographica l references. 1. Knowledge, Theory of . 2 . Idealism. 3 . Soul. I . Robinson , Howard. II . Berkeley , George, 1685-1753 . Thre e dialogues. III. Title . IV . Title: Three dialogues. B1331.B47 199 6 192—dc2 0 95-1046 9 ISBN 0-19-283549-1

35 79 1 08 6 4 Printed i n Great Britai n by Cox & Wyman Ltd. Reading, Berkshire

To John and Helen Foster , Rachel, Gerard, Richard, Alice, and Kitty

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CONTENTS Editor's Introduction Note on the Texts Select Bibliography A Chronology of George Berkeley PRINCIPLES O F HUMA N KNOWLEDG E THREE DIALOGUE S

ix xxxviii xxxix

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Explanatory Notes

209

Index

233

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTIO N i. Th e Texts an d their Philosophy Berkeley i s generally regarde d a s the invento r o f subjective idealism; that is , of the theor y tha t th e physica l worl d exist s only in the experiences mind s have of it. This is one version of the doctrin e tha t reality i s wholly mental: the othe r version is pan-psychism (whic h is from th e Greek, meanin g 'everythingmind-ism'). Pan-psychism hold s that there are minds in everything. S o th e kitche n tabl e ha s a mind , o r i s compose d o f minds, o r i s run throug h wit h th e presenc e o f mind i n som e other way. Pan-psychism accepts the autonomous existenc e of objects outside creatures tha t we normally think of as possessing minds, but says that these other things, contrary to general belief, also have consciousness in them, in some way or other . Amongst majo r philosophers , Leibni z and , perhaps , Spinoz a are pan-psychists . Berkeley' s idealis m restrict s min d t o th e usual list of humans, God, animals , and whatever other spirits there ma y commonly b e though t t o be , an d say s that every thing else—th e intrinsicall y non-mental—exist s onl y a s features o f the experienc e o f these minds . This seem s t o b e a very bizarre view , but, a s we shall see , it arise s naturall y ou t o f th e philosoph y an d scienc e o f th e seventeenth century . Tha t scienc e wa s articulate d philo sophically b y Joh n Lock e i n hi s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Becaus e i t articulate d the ne w knowledg e i n a fairl y discursiv e style , i t foun d a read y audience . Bu t Berkeley, unlike Locke, was not a discursive thinker; he deal t in cris p an d purportedl y decisiv e abstrac t arguments . Thi s meant that , in his first exposition of idealism in the Principles, his shocking doctrine was stated rathe r to o nakedly and without th e scene-settin g tha t migh t hav e mad e i t acceptable . Consequently, i t was simply dismissed a s eccentric. Th e Dialogues ar e hi s attempt t o presen t hi s doctrine i n a more per suasive way . I n th e Dialogues, therefore, h e personifie s th e debate that leads from th e fashionable scientific philosophy of

x Introduction Locke t o his own idealism in two characters. One , Hylas (th e name is derived from th e Greek for matter) defends the scientific vie w of th e materia l worl d a s existin g independently o f the mind ; th e other , Philonous (fro m th e Gree k lover o f mind) defend s idealism. Th e Dialogues ar e masterpiece s o f both literatur e an d philosophy . Th e styl e is almost perfectly lucid an d the debat e proceed s wit h something as close to th e dynamic o f a rea l argumen t betwee n intelligen t an d sympa thetic interlocutors as one coul d hope t o capture i n the writ ten word. There are few long speeches an d the dialogue has a natural to-and-fr o quality . Hylas' thought s follo w a natural development and , i n th e cours e o f th e dialogues , h e make s every objectio n tha t migh t reasonabl y hav e occurre d t o an opponen t o f Berkeley's . I n short , Hyla s i s a s fa r fro m the tedious sycophants who constitute Socrates ' opponent s i n most o f Plato' s dialogue s a s on e coul d hop e t o get . Thi s i s because in Plato's dialogues the discussio n is usually between master and student: Hylas and Philonous are, in all except th e outcome o f th e argument , friend s an d equals . Becaus e th e Dialogues ar e mor e accessibl e than th e Principles, i t i s fro m the perspective of the Dialogues that most of this Introduction is written. But almos t al l the argument s find a place i n bot h sources.

ii. Historical Background George Berkeley was born at Kilkenny on 1 2 March 1685. His grandfather had gone to Ireland afte r th e Restoration o f 1660 and hi s fathe r wa s a gentlema n farmer . He entere d Trinit y College Dublin i n 1700 , took hi s BA in 170 4 and was elected a Fellow i n 1707 . There he developed hi s system in the note s now publishe d a s the Philosophical Commentaries an d pub lished his first work, Essay Towards a New Theory o f Vision in 1709. Thi s remaine d th e standar d theor y o f visio n until th e mid-nineteenth century. In 171 0 he was ordained pries t in the Anglican Churc h an d publishe d th e Principles o f Human Knowledge. Because this was thought merely peculiar in intellectual circle s i n London, h e wrot e th e Three Dialogues an d published the m in London in 1713 . Both volumes were moti-

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vated by Berkeley's resistance to the 'ne w philosophy' of the seventeenth century . This new philosophy was, roughly, the philosophical articulation o f the ne w science o f the period . Isaa c Newton (16421727) wa s the greates t scientis t o f th e age , an d Joh n Lock e (1632-1704) th e philosophe r mos t crucia l i n turnin g Newtonian scienc e int o a philosophy, but man y other philo sophers an d scientists , includin g Descarte s (1596-1650) , Malebranche (1638-1715) , Galile o (1564-1642) , an d Boyl e (1627-91) helped for m and popularize the new ideas. Most of the moder n thinkers—wit h th e importan t exceptio n o f th e Cartesians—were atomists . Atomist s no t onl y believe d tha t bodies are made from minute particles, they also held that the particles, an d th e bodie s mad e fro m them , posses s onl y primary, an d no t secondar y qualities . Descartes , thoug h reject ing atomism, agreed that bodies really only possessed primary qualities. This means that, in themselves, bodies posses s size, shape, motion , an d impenetrability , bu t no t colour , sound , taste, hardness, or smell. 1 These latter qualitie s are said to be dependent o n the senses—colour is, so to speak, generated in the min d through the eye , sound throug h th e mechanis m of hearing, etc . Bu t th e secondar y qualitie s ar e a vita l compo nent of the world as we experience it . It follows that the world of experienc e i s very different fro m th e worl d as science discovers it really to be. And not merely are they different quali tatively, but they are located in different realms . Because th e things o f which we ar e immediatel y aware reall y do posses s secondary qualities , an d becaus e secondar y qualitie s exis t only 'in the mind', then what we are aware of are 'ideas in the mind', not object s i n the externa l world . The idea s o f which we are aware are, indeed, held to represent, and , in respect of primary qualities , resemble, object s in the world , but, nevertheless, the y als o constitut e a 'vei l o f perception ' standin g between th e perceive r an d th e externa l world . S o th e phenomenal or experiential realm , on the on e hand , is differ 1 Th e classi c philosophica l statemen t o f th e distinctio n i s i n Joh n Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2 . 8.

xii Introduction ent from th e real or external world investigated b y science, o n the other . The ter m 'idea ' a s coined b y Locke an d use d b y Berkele y does not hav e its normal sense— a fact muc h remarked upo n by Locke's contemporaries . W e think of ideas as creatures of the intellect , a s things that ar e thought: indee d 'idea ' i s very close t o 'concept' . Locke, however, defined a n idea a s 'whatever is the object o f the understanding when a man thinks' and included sensation s an d sensor y image s amongs t ideas : in deed, not merely did he include them, they became the paradigm ideas, for ideas are treated a s sensory, or quasi-sensory, images. Traditiona l Aristotelia n an d scholasti c philosoph y had distinguishe d between two kinds of objects of mental life . On th e on e hand , ther e ar e form s o r species , whic h ar e universals, and so appropriate fo r intellect and thought: these are, roughly , what w e woul d cal l 'concepts' . O n th e othe r hand, there ar e phantasms, which ar e the object s for sensor y perception, an d ar e particula r sensor y image s o r sense-data . Locke's adoptio n o f th e ter m 'idea ' fo r al l menta l object s signalled hi s determination t o assimilat e thes e tw o groups— the intellectua l and the sensory—to each other , an d to make the sensory the model for both. (Wh y he did this we shall see in section (vii). ) Once one has accepted tha t one is directly aware of ideas in the mind, in the sense just explained, not o f external things, it becomes pressin g t o prove tha t ther e reall y are an y external things at all. To dramatize the possibility that there may be no external world , Descarte s suggeste d tha t ou r experienc e could be the product of an evil demon whose intention was to deceive us. He the n trie d to refute suc h sceptical possibilities by proving, a priori, the existence of a good God; such a God , he argued, would not deceive us, nor allow us to be deceived, in somethin g s o fundamenta l a s ou r belie f i n a n externa l world. But Descartes's wa y of proving the existence of God— the ontological argument—did no t comman d genera l accept ance, eve n amongs t theists . Locke' s respons e t o scepticis m was hardl y mor e helpful . H e wa s robustl y anti-sceptica l i n spirit, but had little to offer i n the way of argument against the sceptic. Althoug h non e o f th e majo r figure s o f seventeenth century philosoph y wer e sceptics , th e ne w philosoph y wa s

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always tainted, i f not wit h espousing scepticis m explicitly , at least wit h havin g n o convincin g refutatio n o f i t and , hence , encouraging it amongst its readers. Thi s potentia l fo r scepti cism cam e t o fruitio n i n a majo r philosophe r slightl y later , with David Hum e (1711-76) . Closely connecte d t o th e fea r o f scepticis m wa s a fea r o f materialism and atheism . The mechanistic and, hence, deter minist vie w o f th e physica l worl d tha t wen t wit h atomis m made it difficult t o understand how immaterial spirits, such as the soul or God, were related to the physical world: in particular it was thought difficult t o understan d ho w there coul d be causal interaction betwee n a material and an immaterial substance. Descartes' s attemp t t o mak e th e interactio n o f mind and body scientifically respectable by saying that it took plac e in a particular part o f the brain—namel y th e pinea l gland — conspicuously failed t o addres s the problem. Th e uneas e fel t about interactio n suggeste d tha t a materialis t theor y o f th e mind would be preferable. And just as the mechanistic view of the bod y threatene d t o squeez e ou t th e immateria l sou l o r mind, so Newton's rigorously determinist law s of motion lef t God littl e t o d o i n th e cosmo s a t large . Th e respons e wa s deism, according to which God set s the worl d in motion, but then i t runs withou t Hi s suppor t o r intervention . Atheis m i s the next step. These tendencies had already borne frui t i n the materialist philosophy o f Thomas Hobbe s (1588-1679).

iii. Berkeley's Philosophical Task We can see common sens e a s clinging to tw o principles. On e is that we are directl y aware of physical objects and the othe r is that physical objects are independent o f us and exist outside our minds . The ne w philosoph y mad e i t impossibl e t o hol d both thes e principles i n their natural sense. I f we are directl y aware o f idea s i n ou r mind s an d no t o f th e externa l world, then ou r naiv e realist understandin g of perception canno t b e maintained. The ne w philosophers, typified b y Locke, there fore abandoned naiv e realism in favour of representative real ism. Berkeley, by contrast, was determined t o hold o n to th e idea tha t w e ar e directl y awar e o f th e physica l worl d itself , whilst acceptin g tha t wha t w e ar e awar e o f mus t b e mind dependent ideas . H e was , therefore, force d t o conclud e tha t

xiv Introduction the physical world consists essentially of ideas in our minds— that it s esse i s percipi: fo r materia l objects , t o b e i s t o b e perceived. S o instead of abandoning direc t realism , Berkeley preferred to abandon the principle of the mind-independenc e of th e physica l world . A t least , h e modifie d it . Th e min d independence o f objects, according to Berkeley , is not absol ute, but relative. A physical object, unlike a hallucinatory one, is not dependen t o n the perceptio n o f any given person, and , in tha t sense , i s mind-independent. Bu t h e denie s tha t any thing exist s outsid e al l mind s take n together . Th e physica l world consist s of those pattern s o f experience tha t ar e available to all: so metaphysical mind-independence is not neede d to guarantee objectivity. But i f the worl d is just experience, the n there i s a problem about th e origi n o f experience , fo r i t ca n n o longe r b e explained b y th e interactio n o f th e subjec t an d th e mind independent physica l world. The natura l alternativ e explan ation i s tha t God , instea d o f creatin g a mind-independen t world whic h the n produce s experienc e i n us , produce s th e experience directly, and these experiences are deemed to constitute th e physica l world . O n thi s scheme , w e ar e directl y acquainted wit h the physica l world, so removing the barrie r which made scepticism a temptation, an d God i s made essential to th e existenc e o f the worl d at every moment.

iv. Perception and th e World: The Philosophical Options Before considerin g Berkeley' s argument s fo r hi s idealism, i t would b e helpfu l t o hav e a roug h taxonom y o f th e variou s accounts of the relatio n betwee n perception an d the physical world that have appeared i n modern philosophy. There are at least eigh t such theories, an d they mark out the groun d fro m naive realism , through differen t kind s of representative real ism, to idealism . The tw o forms o f realism that hav e already been mentioned are : (\d) Naive o r direct realism. Thi s i s suppose d t o b e th e theory o f untutore d commo n sense , an d i t hold s tha t i n normal perceptio n w e ar e awar e onl y o f mind-independen t

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physical objects and their mind-independent properties . S o if, in normal perception, I seem t o see a red patch, then th e red expanse of which I am aware is the surface of a physical object in public space: it is not simpl y some ide a o r sense-datu m in my mind. (2/7) Scientific o r Lockean representative realism. This is the view attribute d i n sectio n (ii ) t o th e 'ne w philosophy' : th e external worl d possesse s onl y primary qualities , th e second ary bein g propertie s o f ideas ; bu t th e primar y qualitie s of external thing s do resemble thos e o f ideas. So if I accurately perceive a red square, the external object will be square in the way I perceive i t to be; but its redness consists only in the fac t that it has the power to cause in me the sensatio n of red; redas-I-see-it exist s only in the mind' s eye . I hav e calle d thes e (10) an d (26 ) becaus e ther e ar e tw o positions s o far not mentioned , one o f which is an attenuate d kind of direct realism and the othe r a richer kind of representationalism whic h fal l betwee n the m o n th e spectru m o f options. The attenuate d versio n of direct realism is not a very plausible theory, but Hylas seems to defend it at one point in the argument , and it has had more recent supporters . I t is (ib) Primary quality direct realism. This theor y i s a com promise betwee n naiv e an d representativ e realism . I t say s that the secondar y qualities of which we are awar e exist only in our minds , but th e very instances of the primar y qualities of which we are awar e are external. So if I am aware of a square patch o f red, the re d i s a feature of an 'idea', but th e square ness is the contour of an external physical thing. This is a very odd theory, because it would seem that the shape must be the shape o f th e re d patch, s o i f th e re d i s i n th e mind , tha t particular instanc e o f shape mus t be s o too. Hyla s migh t b e defending primary quality direct realism on pag e 12 6 o f th e Three Dialogues. (Se e not e to thi s passage.) The riche r for m of representativ e realism is (20) Simple representative realism. We ar e directl y awar e only o f 'idea s i n th e mind' , bu t th e externa l physica l world resembles these idea s in respect o f both primary and second -

xvi Introduction ary qualities . Bot h idea s an d externa l thing s ca n be , fo r example, red and square in just the same way. Visual ideas are like coloured photograph s o f a coloured world . There ar e tw o othe r mor e attenuate d form s o f represen tative realism which were no t explicitl y developed unti l after Berkeley's death , bu t agains t whic h some o f hi s argument s can be employed. (3) Structural representative realism. The primar y qualities that externa l object s posses s canno t b e sai d t o resembl e those qualitie s as found in ideas. What they have in common is purel y forma l o r structural . Thi s ma y mea n n o mor e than tha t the y ca n b e describe d i n th e sam e mathematica l way. (4) Kantian o r 'barely representative' realism. Nothing, or virtually nothing , can b e sai d abou t th e natur e o f the mindindependent world , except tha t i t is , in som e sense , respon sible for th e worl d of experience . All thes e form s of realism can be subdivide d according t o how the y stand o n a further issue. I have been talkin g about the externa l worl d in terms o f the kin d of qualities it i s supposed to possess, but physical objects are substances and there is the question of what there is to a substance in addition to its qualities—if anything. That there is an extra something seems to follow from th e thought that qualities and other propertie s belong to something an d that this something is not itself just a bundle o f qualities , but a deepe r 'thinginess' . Becaus e o f its mysteriousness, not everyone agrees that one needs this extra. Indeed, althoug h Lock e wrot e a lon g chapte r o n substanc e (Essay, 2 . 23 ) an d talke d extensivel y about th e substratum which i s ove r an d abov e qualities , scholar s canno t agre e whether h e was for i t or agains t it! So all the abov e form s of realism ca n be distinguished int o a versio n i n whic h th e externa l worl d consist s o f sensibl e qualities whic h belon g t o som e furthe r substratum o r substance—the unknow n extr a tha t own s th e qualities—an d a version whic h has th e externa l object s consistin g entirel y of

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qualities. This distinction is relevant t o our concerns becaus e Berkeley discusse s th e ide a tha t matte r possesse s a substratum, a s wel l a s th e questio n o f wha t qualitie s matte r i s supposed t o possess . There remai n th e tw o principa l form s o f non-realism , as articulated b y Berkeley an d Hume . (5) Berkelian idealism. Ther e i s nothin g t o th e physica l world except our experience an d its patterns. This ordering of experience i s sustained directl y by God. (6) Sceptical o r Humean phenomenalism. There i s nothing to the physica l world except experienc e an d its patterns, and there i s no goo d reaso n t o loo k fo r a n explanatio n o f why there shoul d b e suc h ordere d experiences : thei r existenc e is just a brute fact . Although som e o f thes e position s wer e no t explicitl y formulated unti l afte r Berkeley' s day , there ar e argument s that can be deploye d agains t all except (5) , Berkeley's ow n position, i n th e text s i n thi s book . Berkele y can , therefore, b e read a s trying to eliminate all the above options other than his own. First, he seeks to refute naive realism, then the forms of representative realism , discreditin g th e notio n o f material substratum o n the way: then t o show that God i s required fo r the system . This is , in effect , th e structur e o f the Three Dialogues. At the centre of such a strategy is the refutation of the realism that is common to (i)-(4). This Berkeley attempts in two radically different ways . One wa y is to examin e the concept o f matter an d discove r that i t lacks any proper content . The essenc e o f thi s strateg y i s t o enquir e wha t propertie s mind-independent matte r i s supposed t o possess and to show that it could not posses s an y of them. This is a natural part of the attack s o n naiv e an d representativ e realism , fo r i t i s by arguing tha t neithe r primar y no r secondar y qualitie s nor a residual substratu m coul d b e mind-independen t tha t h e re futes th e theorie s o f perception an d the theorie s of the physical world tha t ar e containe d i n (i)-(4). The secon d strateg y against matter i s radically different an d philosophically more esoteric. I t starts not primarily from reflectin g on the conten t

xviii Introduction of the concep t o f matter, but fro m reflectin g o n the natur e of thought—on what it is for something to be, or be the conten t of, an idea—and concluding that there cannot be a concept or idea o f anythin g essentiall y independen t o f mind . I t i s thi s strategy of which Berkeley was most proud and which greatly impressed Hume. 2 I t i s expresse d i n th e attac k o n abstrac t ideas and the supposed proo f tha t one cannot conceive of the unperceived. A t it s cor e lie s th e theor y tha t thought s ar e merely images—that is, they are not essentially different fro m sense-contents an d sensations . Berkele y want s t o res t a knock-down demonstration o f idealism on th e foundatio n of this theory of thought, but, as we shall see, this conception of thought i s so confused an d inadequat e tha t Berkele y ha s t o fall bac k o n th e mor e luci d an d commonsensica l argument s that constitute hi s more general attack on matter. This is why it is the mas s of arguments that make up hi s criticisms of th e other theorie s an d o f particula r conception s o f matte r tha t have mor e usuall y impresse d hi s more moder n readers , an d why i t ha s bee n a puzzl e fo r man y commentator s ho w th e attack o n abstractio n i s suppose d t o relat e t o th e proo f o f idealism.

v. Th e Main Argument o f th e Three Dialogue s a. Against the externality of secondary qualities. First I shal l consider th e les s esoteri c argumen t o f th e Three Dialogues. The Dialogues wer e writte n t o mak e th e doctrin e an d th e argument o f th e Principles mor e accessible . Th e Principles starts from Berkeley's more or less novel theory of concepts— his attack o n 'abstract ideas'—and approaches th e notion s of matter an d mind-independenc e wit h tha t nove l theor y ver y much i n mind . Th e Three Dialogues, b y contrast , start s from th e kin d o f argument s agains t naiv e realis m tha t would hav e bee n familia r t o hi s reader s an d seek s t o show that thes e argument s develo p naturall y int o argument s against representative realism , and, hence, agains t realism in 2 Hum e said that Berkeley's dismissal of abstract ideas was 'one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republi c of letters'; Treatise o f Human Nature, i. 7.

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general. The attac k o n abstrac t idea s is invoked wher e help ful, bu t i t is not th e cornerston e tha t i t is meant t o b e i n th e Principles. In th e Three Dialogues Berkele y attack s ever y one o f ou r eight options excep t (5)—hi s own form of idealism—more or less in the orde r I number them. After a n initial exchange on the danger s o f scepticism , Hyla s an d Philonou s agre e tha t 'sensible things' consis t o f 'sensibl e qualities', suc h as 'lights, colours, figures, sounds, tastes , odours' . Philonous set s out to prove tha t al l these sensibl e qualitie s and, hence, al l sensible things ar e mind-dependent . T o d o thi s he mainl y uses thre e arguments that would have been familiar to, and accepted by, the 'moder n minded ' amongs t hi s readers. Tw o of these ar e still amongs t th e stock-in-trad e philosophica l argument s against naive realism. The first is the argument from illusion, which concludes from th e fac t tha t objects look (o r sound, or feel, etc. ) differen t t o differen t observer s o r t o th e sam e observer a t differen t times , whils t not themselve s changing , that wha t on e i s directl y awar e o f i n thos e varie d 'looks ' cannot b e th e object s themselves . Th e secon d i s the causal argument, whic h argue s fro m th e fac t tha t ou r experience s are cause d a t th e en d o f a chai n o f event s tha t run s fro m the object to the sense organ and then the brain, to the conclusion tha t th e immediat e object s o f thos e experience s mus t also be cause d at the end of the proces s and so be 'i n the mind' o r 'i n th e head' ; they , therefore , canno t b e identica l with the objects in the external world that initiated the causal chain. Th e thir d argument , whic h is o f ancien t origin , doe s not hav e th e sam e moder n currenc y as the othe r tw o an d is less familiar . I t migh t b e calle d th e assimilation argument. Certain menta l content s ar e incontrovertibl y subjective , s o that i t makes no sens e t o sugges t that the y might exist extramentally. Ther e are , fo r example , n o thoughts , emotions , pains, o r sensation s outsid e o f minds . On e wa y o f showin g that sensibl e qualitie s ar e subjectiv e would b e t o sho w tha t they ar e essentiall y interconnected wit h on e o f these neces sarily subjectiv e element s an d s o assimilat e th e sensibl e quality to the subjectiv e one. Berkeley follow s a line of argument datin g at least from Aristotle , which asserts that certai n

xx Introduction sensible qualitie s ar e essentiall y connecte d t o pleasur e an d pain. A n exampl e o f thi s strateg y i s hi s treatmen t o f heat . An intens e degre e o f hea t i s a ver y grea t pain , s o intens e heat ca n b e assimilate d t o pai n an d s o doe s no t exis t i n the externa l world. 3 1 mention this now largely ignored strategy becaus e i t wil l featur e i n th e crucia l question , t o b e discussed later, of whether 'an idea can be like nothing but a n idea'. I cannot dea l satisfactorily here with the stil l controversial question o f whethe r these , an d simila r argument s agains t naive realis m ar e successful. 4 A s they were the commo n currency of the day, Berkeley's claim to fame rests, not on them, but o n th e idealis t developments h e make s fro m them . On e point is, however, worth making. On pages 112-25 °f the First Dialogue he applies the above arguments to secondary quali ties, an d conclude s 'Colours , sounds , tastes , i n a word , al l those termed secondary qualities, have certainly no existenc e without th e mind. ' Berkele y i s here makin g an exaggerate d claim. Al l tha t th e arguments , even i f sound , justif y on e i n concluding i s tha t thos e instance s o f secondar y qualitie s o f which one is immediately aware exist only in the mind: they do not, tha t is , refute (20} above , simple representative realism, according to which both primar y and secondary qualities belong both to ideas in the mind and to the external objects the ideas represent. I n making this confusion, Berkeley is simply following Locke , who had used similar arguments against th e objectivity o f secondary qualities . Both Lock e an d Berkeley , that is , confuse arguments which , if successful, show that th e immediate object s o f ou r awarenes s ar e subjective , wit h proofs tha t secondar y qualitie s are per s e subjective. 5 I n th e case of secondary qualities this is, perhaps, an understandabl e mistake, because secondar y qualitie s play such a central role 3

I discuss this argument in the not e t o Dialogues, p. 112 . I argue that, contrary to current belief, the argument s are successfu l in Perception (London: Routledge, 1994). 5 I n Essay, 2. 8. 21 Locke argue s that the perceptio n of primary qualities does not vary with subjective conditions, as perception of secondaries does, an d tha t this shows the forme r to exist externally and th e latte r in the mind. 4

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in constitutin g the immediat e object s o f our awareness . But , as we shall see when considering primary qualities, the error is more gros s tha n that ; for i t appear s t o involv e the principl e that, i f a kin d o f qualit y i s prove d t o exis t i n th e mind , i t follows that it does not als o exist outside th e mind, and this is question-begging. b. Against th e externality o f primary qualities. Believing himself t o have dispose d o f secondary qualities , Berkeley ca n b e read a s then considerin g the bizarr e optio n (ib)\ tha t w e are directly awar e o f externa l primar y qualities , thoug h no t o f secondary. He has no difficulty refutin g this by using the same arguments as he had used t o refute th e objectivit y of second ary qualities, and similarly proceeds t o conclude tha t primary qualities exis t onl y i n th e mind . H e i s thereb y misle d int o thinking tha t h e ha s dispose d o f the form s o f representativ e realism containe d i n (20) , (2/7) , an d (possibly ) (3) . Locke' s mistaken interpretation o f these arguments is, therefore, eas ily turned against his own philosophy. It is not unti l late on in the firs t dialogue , afte r a n interestin g digression , tha t Hyla s realizes that representationalis m i s still available. The digres sion contains three arguments that all involve backtracking on his concession tha t no sensible qualitie s exis t externally. Two of thes e argument s merit comment . In on e o f these , Hyla s suggest s tha t i f on e distinguishe s between th e act and the object o f perception on e can see that the forme r i s subjectiv e an d th e latter—whic h include s th e sensible qualities—i s not . Thi s i s a strateg y widel y use d b y modern philosophers . The y argu e tha t perceiving i s some thing we do an d th e objects o f perception ar e thing s we do it to. Th e psychologica l state is the ac t an d th e objec t i s out i n the world: such terms as 'idea' only serve to conflate these two poles o f perception. A prope r discussio n of this point woul d take us into the more sophisticated reache s o f the philosoph y of perception , bu t Philonous ' respons e i s not withou t force . He replie s tha t perceptua l experience —as oppose d to , fo r example, th e ac t o f turnin g one' s hea d t o look—i s entirel y involuntary an d the act-objec t distinctio n canno t b e applie d where th e wil l is not involved .

xxii Introduction The othe r interestin g argumen t i n th e digressio n come s from Hylas ' suggestio n that sensibl e qualitie s ca n be looke d on i n eithe r o f tw o ways : the y ca n b e considere d eithe r a s modes of sensation whic h could not exist outside the mind; or as modes o f a material substratum. Thi s doe s nothin g t o an swer directl y the argument s already employed agains t mindindependent sensibl e qualities , and face s als o the proble m of giving some literal sense to 'substratum' and its task of 'underlying' or 'supporting ' qualities . Berkeley argues that on e can make sense of an unknown, such as substratum is meant to be, only if one can set it in a known relation to something known. An example of this might be that I can form an idea of Smith's father, though I do not know him, because I know Smith and understand the relation 'bein g the father of. Substratu m supposedly stands in relation to known sensible qualities, but that relation—'underlying' o r 'supporting'—i s itsel f metaphor ical—not 'a s you r leg s support you r body' . S o there ar e no t two known s and on e unknown , but tw o unknowns and onl y one known . Thi s i s essentiall y Berkeley' s objectio n t o al l those forms of realism that make material substance consist of more tha n qualitie s alone. The digression ends when Hylas realizes that he should b e defending a representative realis m involving qualities alone , so picking the argumen t up where it should have left of f afte r the attac k on naive realism. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects, the on e perceive d immediately , which are likewis e called ideas', th e other ar e real thing s or external objects perceived b y the mediatio n of ideas , whic h ar e thei r image s an d representations . No w I own , ideas do not exis t without the mind; but the latter sort o f objects do. I am sorry I did not thin k of this distinction sooner . .. (pp. 142-3 )

Philonous glosse s this, saying: 'you will have our ideas, which alone ar e immediatel y perceived , t o b e picture s o f externa l things . ..' Philonou s make s two important responses : (i ) He asks ho w w e coul d eve r com e t o kno w abou t th e object s behind th e pictures . I n th e cas e o f norma l pictures , we ca n perceive bot h pictur e an d objec t wit h th e sam e degre e o f

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directness, bu t i n the cas e o f ideas an d thing s only the idea s are directl y availabl e in experience . Ou r knowledg e o f ob jects, therefore, would have to be 'by some internal faculty of the soul , a s reason o r memory' . Hylas here admit s 'I d o not find I can give you any good reaso n for ' believin g in objects, but in the second dialogu e he comes near to the natural reply by saying that the external world causes, and thereby explains, our ideas. That the y provide suc h an explanation woul d be a reason fo r believin g in external objects. Berkeley's respons e t o this suggestion brings into play one of th e mos t contentiou s o f hi s anti-realis t claims. H e argue s that only minds are real causal agents, so the postulation of an external world could never explain anything. He backs this up by an appeal to introspection. W e know from experienc e tha t our volition s can cause things, but tha t ideas ar e passive: we see the whit e blob touc h th e re d blo b an d the re d blo b the n moves, and we see such things regularly, but see no making o r causing connectin g th e whit e an d th e re d ideas . Berkeley' s position woul d have seemed muc h weaker i f he ha d concen trated on tactile, rather tha n visual cases. The feeling of being pressed an d the feelin g of motion that is associated wit h it do not seem to be merely contingently connected—it seems to be part of the nature of the one that it tends to lead to the other . Even i f this is so (which is not clear ) th e Berkelia n nee d no t worry. The feeling of being pushed is still a feeling and, hence, a mental state. To say that causal power in the world is like a feeling o f pressur e excep t tha t i t i s outsid e o f min d seem s hardly better than sayin g it is like an extra-mental act of will. Phenomenological judgements in these areas are very difficult to evaluate , but i t i s plausible for a Berkelia n to argu e tha t saying something is like what you feel when you feel yourself being pushed , excep t tha t i t i s not a sensation , i s no bette r than saying that something is like yellow, but not a colour, (ii) His second response is to deny that there could be anything in the externa l worl d whic h wa s like anythin g presented i n a n idea: 'nothin g bu t a n ide a coul d b e lik e a n idea' . I f thi s i s correct the n n o kin d o f representativ e realis m whic h allows the representatio n t o tel l u s anythin g abou t wha t th e thin g

xxiv Introduction represented i s like, will be possible: thi s would certainly rul e out (20) an d (26 ) which claim that ideas an d th e worl d share certain positiv e qualities . I t woul d probabl y permi t (4) , for that makes no claims about th e natur e o f the physical world: whether i t allow s (3 ) will depen d o n whethe r structura l features ar e 'likenesses ' i n th e sens e covere d b y thi s argument (whatever tha t sens e exactly may be). c. That 'an idea can be like nothing but an idea'. When applie d to perceptual ideas , thi s principl e seems , a t firs t sight , both sophistica l and question-begging. O n the ordinary, nonphilosophical sens e o f 'idea', where i t means thought o r concept, it is plausible to say that nothing outside the mind could be lik e a n idea , fo r thing s like bit s o f thought s canno t floa t around i n the externa l world. But Berkele y is using 'idea ' in Locke's way, to mean anything with which the mind concern s itself directly , whic h include s perceptual content s a s wel l a s intellectual contents. And i t seems simply to beg the question against the representativ e realis t to asser t a s a principle tha t the extra-menta l worl d coul d no t b e lik e ou r perceptua l contents. The situatio n for Berkeley' s argument i s not, however , as bad a s thi s suggests . I t i s true, no t onl y tha t nothin g extra mental coul d b e lik e a thought, bu t als o tha t nothin g extra mental coul d b e lik e a sensation . A s I pointe d ou t whe n discussing th e assimilation argument above , ther e ca n b e n o pains, itches , o r tactil e sensations , o r anythin g like them, in the externa l world . Berkeley ha s to show , therefore, tha t al l perceptual 'ideas ' fal l int o this category: in particular, he ha s to show that colour patche s ar e just as much mere sensation s as twinges and feelings . His attac k o n visua l depth (whic h is discussed in (vii)) is part o f such a strategy. It can be carrie d further b y a thought-experiment . Imagin e someon e bor n blind, wh o wa s given , b y direc t cortica l stimulation , visua l sensations. Give n tha t thes e wer e no t s o ordered a s to ma p onto his picture of the world gained through the other senses , would there be anythin g about the m whic h made them see m any different i n status from othe r sensations? Although this is speculative, i t seem s reasonabl e t o gues s tha t the y woul d

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seem to be 'in the head' and no more apparently externa l than aches and throbs. It is the kind of structure that normal visual experience possesses , rathe r tha n it s intrinsi c nature , tha t makes it natural to read its contents a s external.6 If our visual experience wer e chaoti c an d accidental , eve n tha t featur e of i t that w e identify a s visual shape woul d have no apparen t claim t o greate r objectivit y tha n an y othe r featur e o f th e sensation. If thes e consideration s hav e force, the n the externa l world would no t b e lik e ou r idea s o f i t an d s o woul d hav e t o b e something th e natur e o f which (if it has one ) i s hidden fro m us. Thi s conceptio n o f physica l realit y i s on e tha t wa s de veloped afte r Berkeley , but ther e ar e argument s in our texts which are relevant to it. Hylas suggests that we have no other conception o f matter than a s that which causes experience. I f developed systematically, this would lead to the conceptio n o f the physica l world as th e forma l structur e o f causa l law s tha t explai n th e phenomena: that is , as a version o f (3), structural representative realism. Berkele y admit s tha t ther e coul d b e thing s of which we do not know the intrinsic nature (pp. 164-5), so his

only direc t objectio n t o thi s attenuate d realis m i s the clai m that causatio n i s essentially connecte d wit h will and , hence , mental.7 In desperation Hyla s attenuates matte r further : ' I at present understan d b y matter neither substance nor accident , thinking no r extende d being , neithe r cause , instrument , no r occasion, bu t somethin g entirel y unknown , distinc t fro m all these ' (p . 163) . Thi s conceptio n i s reminiscent o f Kant' s noumenon, in that it is wholly negative: matter ha s become a mere place-holder (no t literally, for Hylas concedes that place has been show n to b e mental) . Philonou s ha s little difficult y persuading Hylas that this idea is entirely empty. Having done this, eac h o f (i ) t o (4 ) ha s bee n dispose d o f t o Berkeley' s satisfaction. 6 Fo r th e classi c exposition of this account of externality, see Hume' s Treatise, i. 4. 2. 7 Thi s is the onl y argument apart fro m thos e t o b e considere d i n th e next section by which he argue s that the ver y idea of extra-mental existence is defective.

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vi. Mites, Men, and Objective Space There i s an argumen t tha t Berkele y use s agains t th e objec tivity of physical space which is not, I think, taken seriously by most commentators, bu t which I believe has more forc e than is generally appreciated. Berkele y argue s that because things look bigge r to a mite than t o a human an d ther e i s no clea r sense i n whic h on e o f the m perceive s th e 'right ' size , the n there i s no fac t abou t th e siz e and , therefore, n o suc h thin g as rea l o r objectiv e size , an d s o n o suc h thin g a s mind independent spatia l dimensions. The first objection t o this argument that spring s to mind is that measurement ca n pick out real size and that, irrespective of ho w it looks t o mit e or man , an object will have a specifi c measurable size ; for example, being two inches long. But this will achieve nothing unless we can give objectivity to units of measurement, an d a n inch i s a long distance to a mite an d a small on e t o a human , so i n agreein g tha t a n objec t i s tw o inches lon g th e mit e an d th e ma n hav e onl y a n illusio n of agreement. Ther e i s agreemen t o n th e relativ e size s o f th e object an d a n inc h o n a ruler , bu t n o agreemen t abou t th e absolute siz e o f either . I t seem s tha t subject s o f radicall y different size s ca n agre e o n th e relative sizes of objects , bu t not on their intrinsic dimensions. The response to this is obvious, namely that siz e is a relative matter an d agreein g on th e relative dimension s o f thing s i s agreein g o n thei r actua l di mensions. The matter is not, however, quite so simple. It can be prove d tha t a purely formal definition of space, i n terms , say, o f Cartesia n co-ordinate s an d axes , i s no t a complet e representation o f the nature o f space.8 As well as such formal features, ther e mus t b e somethin g intuitiv e an d qualitative , like th e wa y tha t extensio n present s itsel f experientiall y i n vision. But it is in respect of this qualitative feature that things look man y time s large r t o th e mite : relativ e size s ar e pre served, bu t th e qualitativ e interpretations o f dimensions ar e not. I f suc h a n interpretatio n i s essentia l t o an y rea l space , as I hav e claime d i t is , then ther e i s a problem . Th e physi cal worl d i n whic h thing s canno t al l doubl e i n size—as 8

Joh n Foste r show s this in Th e Case For Idealism, 73-88.

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they can when one moves from a human world to a mite's—is an abstractio n create d b y measuremen t fro m th e variou s worlds o f experience , whic h ar e th e ultimat e constituents of reality. This i s a line o f argument tha t I think merits further investigation.9

vii. Th e Principle s an d Abstraction The featur e of The Principles on which I want to concentrat e is Berkeley' s theor y o f thought . Thi s i s t o b e foun d i n th e attack on abstract ideas in the Introduction, and in section 23, where h e argue s tha t w e canno t for m th e ide a o f a n extra mental object . (Thi s argumen t als o occur s i n Dialogues, pp. 139-40.) Berkeley's purpose i s to demystif y ou r understand ing o f thought. Thoughts and their contents possess two strictly distinct but closely connecte d properties . First , thought s posses s inten tionality, which means that the y ar e about thing s other tha n themselves: my thoughts are about elephants or books, which are no t themselve s simply events i n my mind. Second, mos t thought contents possess generality . All our concepts, excep t those strictl y used to name o r indicat e particular objects, express features , such a s being red o r bein g human , whic h a n indefinite number o f things might possess. Being about things and being general are mysterious properties, i n the sense tha t they ar e peculia r t o min d an d ar e no t possesse d b y physical particulars i n thei r ow n right . Th e classica l an d medieva l preoccupation wit h form s an d universal s was precisel y con cerned with the generality of thought and with how the world had t o b e s o tha t i t coul d matc h th e generalit y foun d i n thought—that is , how th e worl d ha d t o b e s o tha t thought s could b e tru e o f it . Thi s concer n spawne d a whol e clas s of general o r potentiall y genera l entities , suc h a s forms , universals, essences , an d sensibl e species . Nominalists—o f 9 I n a sens e i t ha s alread y receive d suc h investigation , for Foster' s argument i n pt . 3 o f Th e Case fo r Idealism ca n b e regarde d a s a very sophisticated developmen t o f Berkeley' s point . Physica l spac e require s an intuitiv e element , bu t wha t thi s elemen t i s actuall y like mus t b e a function o f th e natur e o f experience , no t o f som e mind-independent reality.

xxviii Introduction whom Ockha m i s the mos t notorious—denie d th e realit y of generality i n th e world , someho w wantin g generality t o b e spun by language, and by the seventeenth century nominalists had gaine d the da y with regard t o supposed generalit y in the external world , bu t some , suc h a s Descartes , stil l accepte d generality a s an intrinsic feature of mental life . Britis h philosophers—including bot h Hobbe s an d Locke—wer e deter mined tha t absolutel y everythin g rea l ha d t o b e wholl y particular. This leaves a problem for the undoubted generality of thought . Th e particular s tha t wer e agree d t o constitut e thought were images, conceived of as colour patches, sounds, etc. Thu s ther e was no essentia l differenc e betwee n though t and sensation. Lock e trie d t o solve the problem o f generality by invoking abstract general ideas, which, sometimes a t least, he treat s as abstract genera l images. So the ide a of triangle is an imag e whic h is , a t th e sam e time , ever y specifi c kin d o f triangle—isosceles, rectangle, scalene, etc.—an d none in particular. Berkele y ha s n o difficult y showin g tha t ther e i s n o sense i n the ide a o f such a n image . His alternativ e theor y is that a thoroughl y particula r imag e become s genera l b y representing or standing for som e class of images. From th e poin t of view of the subject , this happens by his selectively attending to the relevant featur e o f the image. So, though I am imaging an equilateral triangle, I take it as representing all triangles by selectively attending just to the fact that it has three sides, and ignoring their relativ e proportions, it s size, colour, etc . This explain s why Berkeley though t his attack o n abstrac tion refuted the belie f in mind-independent reality . If we can have genuin e idea s onl y of those features which are literall y realized i n images , suc h a s re d o r square , o r ar e name s fo r collections o f suc h idea s (suc h a s 'apple' ) the n being mindindependent, being unperceived, o r material substance will not be genuin e ideas , for n o ide a ca n literall y possess thes e fea tures: al l idea s ca n occu r i n hallucination s an d n o halluci nation can literally possess suc h characteristics. Nor ca n they be name s fo r a collection o f ideas, unles s one agree s t o give these concept s thei r Berkelian gloss. His theory of thought explains what otherwise can seem th e rather strange argument in section 23 . Berkeley appears to be

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arguing tha t yo u canno t for m th e ide a o f somethin g unthought of, for once you form such an idea its object is, ipso facto, though t of. To make out [tha t the object s of your thought may exist without the mind], it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of , whic h i s a manifes t repugnancy . Whe n w e d o ou r utmost t o conceiv e the existenc e o f externa l bodies , w e ar e al l th e while only contemplating our ow n ideas.

Put i n this way, the argumen t feels sophistical : all you need is a distinctio n betwee n th e thought an d it s object, an d thoug h the forme r is in the mind , the latte r i s not. Thi s distinctio n is what we mean by the intentionality of thought. The theor y of thought foun d i n th e introductio n t o th e Principles under mines such an appeal to intentionality. If everything thinkable can be realized in an image as a feature of it, then the concept s of mind-independen t matter , an d mind-independence , simpliciter, shoul d b e s o realizable . But , necessarily , suc h things canno t b e propertie s o f images, which are essentiall y mental, s o we cannot hav e ideas o f them. It i s at thi s point tha t th e argumen t abou t visua l distance, which had bee n the mai n topic of the Ne w Theory o f Vision, Berkeley's firs t book , become s important . I t i s natura l t o suggest that we are directly aware of distance in sight, because things look t o be out i n front o f us and som e o f them look t o be furthe r awa y tha n others : s o thes e visua l ideas d o see m really to represent th e property of externality and mind-independence. Berkele y argue s agains t thi s suggestio n tha t dis tance i s no t a rea l visua l phenomeno n becaus e i t i s ' a lin e turned en d o n to the eye' . If we consider visua l space o n th e left-right an d up-down axes, then a space of , say, two inches is represented b y an are a i n which a two-inch visual object— an extent of colour—could be present to awareness. For thes e axes, that is , a spatial distance is something in which a visual phenomenon i s presented. But thi s is not s o for depth. I f on e object i s two inche s behind anothe r the n th e spac e betwee n them i s invisible , i n th e sens e tha t somethin g place d ther e cannot be seen. The line is end-on to the eye in the sense that no spatia l exten t i s directl y visibl e i n depth . Ou r sens e o f

xxx Introduction depth come s onl y fro m a learnt associatio n betwee n certai n visual experience s an d th e fac t tha t w e have t o reach ou t t o touch th e mor e distan t objects. It i s this correlation betwee n touch an d visio n tha t create s th e experienc e o f depth , no t something intrinsi c to vision. The objectio n fro m intentionality , however , i s no t ad equately deal t wit h merely by disparaging our perceptio n o f depth. No theory of thought can operate without a distinction between th e thought , considered a s a psychological episode, and what the thought is about. Berkeley does not deny that I can now think of myself a s existing yesterday, and tha t I can think o f your mind an d wha t might be i n it: but neithe r pas t time nor other minds and their contents can be features of the current imag e with which I am thinking. If a current episod e of thought could not be about something outside that episode , then we would be stuck in a solipsism of the present moment ; that is, we could have no thought o f anything but th e curren t contents o f our ow n consciousness . Berkeley does implicitly take notice o f these problems, for, as we hav e seen , h e doe s hav e a doctrin e o f representatio n whereby a n ide a ca n stan d fo r others . A s w e shal l see , hi s account o f this is seriously inadequate . Berkeley's clai m that particular ideas stand for other idea s is the source of the doctrine ofassociationism, whic h was to be the principle empiricist account of meaning and thought until the en d o f the nineteent h century . Associationists explaine d thought and meaning by saying that the meanin g of a mental episode consisted in its association with other mental episode s which tende d t o occu r i n close proximit y to it . For example , the word 'red' means the colour red because the word tends to summon up an image of the colour. Hume applies this idea to explain ou r attributio n o f necessit y t o causa l relations : be cause we have often see n event s of type F followed b y events of type G, whenever we see an F our minds immediately form an idea o f G, and s o we think them necessaril y connected . A fatal flaw with associationism can be exposed by noticing an ambiguity in the notion o f association. An associatio n can be either objective o r subjective i n the followin g way. It might just b e a matte r o f fac t tha t certai n idea s tende d t o occu r

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together, or it might be the case that the subject noticed these associations and s o actively thought of them a s associated. I n so far a s we are tryin g to understand the experience of meaningful thought , it must be th e latte r tha t i s intended, fo r th e bare occurrenc e o f correlation s woul d no t alon e constitut e the experience of meaning. Berkeley certainly meant the subjective association when he talked of attending to the triangularity o f a particular triangle and ignorin g its other features. But t o allo w that on e ca n subjectivel y see a n ide a a s repre senting others an d that on e ca n attend to som e feature of an idea reimports the original problem of generality. For what is it for one idea to represent others to a subject, if it is not onl y for the m t o be objectively associated? Making an association between particula r idea s canno t consis t i n havin g anothe r wholly particular idea or image. It would seem to be for them to b e brough t unde r a concept , wher e a concep t i s a n in herently genera l kin d o f entity . An d th e kin d o f attentio n involved in selectively attending to the triangularit y of a particular ide a is not a mere focusing on a spatial region o f th e idea, it is the focusin g o n a conceptual featur e of the image , and thi s presupposes , i t doe s no t analyse , the possessio n o f concepts. Even if we were to ignore these difficulties wit h Berkeley's nominalism, th e doctrin e o f th e associatio n o f idea s canno t overcome th e problem s wit h intentionality raised b y sectio n 23. If my current idea can mean the othe r idea s with which it is associated, then I am no longer trapped in a solipsism of the present moment , fo r m y curren t ide a ca n mea n othe r idea s with whic h m y experienc e associate s it . Bu t I a m stil l a solipsist, fo r n o associatio n ca n b e mad e i n m y experienc e between a n ide a o f min e an d a n ide a o f yours , for I neve r experience the latter. For Berkeley, the fundamental form by which idea s represen t on e anothe r i s throug h resemblance , not simpl y b y brut e contingen t association , lik e caus e an d effect, whic h nee d posses s n o similarity . S o one triangl e can represent al l triangles . I can , therefore , thin k o f somethin g similar to my current idea and impute it either to my own past or t o you r mind . Thes e othe r time s an d othe r mind s ar e intelligible becaus e the y ar e like—o r a t leas t strongl y ana -

xxxii Introduction logous to—the present moment and my own mind. Intentionality is , for Berkeley , therefore , a matter o f associatio n and , primarily, of resemblance. It is at this point tha t the argumen t based o n the natur e of thought cease s t o b e autonomous . I f the presen t red , squar e idea can represent othe r idea s that ar e square , why cannot it represent squar e a s it occurs in the external , physical world? Once ther e i s allowed t o b e 'intentionalit y b y resemblance', then qualities in the world similar to those in the mind should be amongs t the things one can intend. At thi s point th e principle tha t 'a n ide a ca n b e lik e nothin g bu t a n idea ' (s . 8 ) becomes essentia l to the argument , for only by appeal to that principle ca n it be denie d tha t image s can represent externa l qualities that resemble them . Bu t th e sam e principl e wa s essential t o th e attac k o n representative realism . 'Nothin g bu t an idea can be like an idea' turns out to be the corner-stone of both of Berkeley's argumentative strategies, and the nominalist argument loses an y independent force .

viii. Salvaging Berkeley o n Abstraction Berkeley's remark s on abstraction ar e not a s completely misconceived a s the abov e ma y suggest . Imagism a s a theory of what concepts are is hopeless, but an imagist approach to what we ca n conceive of —that is , to th e content s o f concepts—i s not ope n to the sam e objections , and capture s more directly the spiri t o f empiricism. It i s empiricism free d fro m th e con cern t o b e nominalist . Imagis m a s a theory o f the content of concepts, rathe r tha n o f th e natur e o f concept s themselve s could be expresse d a s follows : The onl y properties tha t w e can conceive o f as they are in themselves ar e one s tha t ca n b e presente d in , o r con structed fro m feature s presented in , experience. Clearly not all concepts could have their contents represente d in image s in this way. For example , logica l connectives, such as 'and', 'or' , and ' i f . . . then', do not hav e that kin d o f content—though ultra-empiricist s hav e trie d suc h move s a s equating th e sens e o f 'or' with a feeling o f uncertainty at th e back o f the neck ! An d on e woul d probably nee d somethin g

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like analog y to carr y on e fro m a grasp o n one's own experi ence to giving sense to something as being another mind and its contents , fo r th e propert y o f belonging t o someone else could not b e directl y imaged. But i t is intuitively plausible to claim tha t th e fundamenta l properties o f the worl d mus t b e like somethin g i n themselves. An d i f w e canno t experienc e certain propertie s directly—a s w e canno t th e propertie s o f electrons or , i f the defenc e given above o f the principl e that 'an idea can be like nothing but an idea' is sound, the properties of the mind-independent world in general, then we cannot know what those properties—electrons, or the external world in general—are like in themselves. We can then either thin k of them o n analog y with what we experience b y constructing models t o interpre t them , or ca n tr y t o trea t thei r concept s on analogy with the logical connectives, as ideas used to structure an d relat e element s tha t hav e th e mor e full-bloode d imageable content. For reasons that it is not possible to give here, it has proved difficult t o make progress clarifying eve n this modest empiricism, bu t i t doe s expres s th e ambitio n o f empiricis m more accurately tha n th e attempt , wit h whic h i t i s confuse d i n Berkeley, t o giv e a reductiv e imagisti c account o f concept s themselves.

ix. Th e Case for Theistic Idealism This completes Berkeley's case against physical realism, but it leaves open th e choic e betwee n hi s theistic idealism and th e sceptical phenomenalis m o f Hume , tha t is , between option s (5) and (6) . The plain fact i s that Berkeley does not seriously consider th e sceptica l possibilit y tha t ou r experienc e ma y come—and com e i n ordered patterns—withou t an y cause. It seems obvious to him—as it does to common sense—that such things are not acceptable as brute facts. Similarly, he does not consider Hume' s radica l empiricis t principl e tha t wha t i s probable o r improbable ca n only be based o n experience, so there ca n be nothin g improbabl e in the fac t tha t experienc e just happen s t o come , an d com e i n patterns; thi s canno t b e improbable, o n Humea n principles , becaus e experienc e shows u s i t happen s tha t way . Th e differenc e betwee n

xxxiv Introduction Berkeley an d Hum e i s that Berkele y i s implicitly acceptin g that ther e ar e a prior i probabilitie s relevan t t o matter s o f fact—that is , tha t consideration s o f wha t i s possible ca n b e enough on their own to influence probability, without furthe r information abou t ho w things actually work. This is too diffi cult a question t o investigat e here.10 In general , Berkelia n idealis m differ s fro m sceptica l phenomenalism i n it s attitud e toward s spirit an d it s powers . The ful l version of Berkeley's famous maxim is esse estpercipi vel percipere: perceiver s exis t a s wel l a s th e perceived . Be cause they are not objects of awareness, but agents, spirits and their activities ar e not ideas. A full-blown empiricism, there fore, tha t say s that onl y idea s ar e intelligibl e ha s a proble m with spirit . I n hi s earl y notebook s Berkele y considere d th e theory tha t ther e are only ideas and, hence, considered wha t we thin k o f a s th e Humea n thesi s tha t th e sel f i s onl y a collection o f ideas. Berkeley, however, thought tha t he could hold o n t o spiri t an d it s powers—acts o f understandin g an d of will—because , thoug h no t capture d i n ideas , the y ar e captured b y consciousness . Berkele y woul d hav e rejecte d Hume's clai m that when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other ... I never catch myself at any tim e withou t a perception, an d neve r ca n observe anythin g bu t the perception . (Treatise, i . 4. 6)

because ther e is a conscious experience o f acting, as oppose d to merel y undergoing , an d o f the endurin g unit y o f the self . Berkeley has ofte n bee n criticized for inconsistenc y in refus ing t o allo w tha t matte r i s intelligibl e thoug h no t a n idea , whilst spirit is allowed, though not a n idea. There is no inconsistency, however, because h e doe s argu e that consciousnes s makes spiri t availabl e t o u s i n a wa y tha t i t canno t mak e matter: thoug h ther e ar e n o idea s o f spiri t o r it s activities , there ar e wha t Berkele y call s 'notions' . I n short , Berkele y 10 I t is dealt with a little more fully i n Robinson, The Genera l Form of the Argumen t for Berkeleia n Idealism', in Foster an d Robinso n (eds.) , Essays o n Berkeley (Oxford: Clarendo n Press, 1985), 163-86 .

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believes tha t experienc e present s u s wit h it s agen t an d hi s activities, as well as with its objects, though the agen t sid e of the divid e is more elusiv e tha n th e objec t side . A s wit h th e issue of a priori probabilities, it is not possible to pursue here the argument s betwee n Hum e an d Berkeley , whic h remain live issues. But the Humean has great difficulty explainin g the unity of the self , both throug h time , and, more crucially , at a time: what i s it tha t constitute s th e experience d unit y of my current thoughts , emotions , an d perception s fro m differen t senses, i f not tha t the y ar e al l given to a single subject? Th e difference betwee n idea s floatin g int o th e min d an d con trolled though t i s also difficul t t o explai n i f there i s no suc h thing as agency or will.

x. Berkeley's Influence In a sense , Berkeley' s mai n influenc e has bee n just th e op posite o f wha t h e intended . Instea d o f savin g religio n an d common sense from atheis m and scepticism, Berkeley is seen as providing th e stepping-ston e fro m Locke' s scientifi c real ism to Hume's radical empiricism and scepticism: Hylas' verdict o n Berkeley' s syste m has , fo r th e mos t part , bee n followed b y history , bot h i n Berkeley's ow n day , and since . There are a variety of reasons fo r this. First, ther e ar e those , such a s Hume , wh o thin k ther e i s a n actua l inconsistenc y between Berkeley' s strict empiricist criterion o f meaning and allowing i n spirit s an d thei r activities . W e hav e see n tha t Berkeley was ready to meet thi s objection, but it continues to be used; (for example, by A. D. Lindsay in the introduction t o the ol d Everyman edition of the Principles and Dialogues). If one share s this feeling, the n Berkeley will merely be clearing the wa y fo r Hume' s consisten t statemen t o f empiricism . Second, there was the powerful influence of John Stuart Mill. Mill described physica l objects as 'the permanent possibilitie s of sensation ' and , reasonably, regarde d thi s as equivalent t o Berkeley's understandin g of th e physical . Mill was th e vita l link betwee n eighteenth-centur y empiricis m an d th e twentieth-century, mor e positivistic , versions o f i t (a s represente d by Bertrand Russell , A. J. Ayer, an d the Vienn a Circle ) and

xxxvi Introduction his advocacy of Berkeley turned th e Anglican bishop into th e officially approve d forerunne r o f modern radica l empiricism and phenomenalism . I n a famou s article , Si r Kar l Poppe r suggests that Berkeley be seen a s the precursor o f both Ernst Mach, the proto-logical positivist, and of Albert Einstein, thus adopting Berkele y int o a moder n scientifi c empiricis m tha t was completel y unconcerne d wit h hi s spiritua l objectives . Third, th e etho s of both Christianit y an d commo n sens e ha s proved resolutel y Johnsonian. D r Johnso n claime d to refut e Berkeley b y kicking a stone t o prove tha t th e worl d was real and solid, and though no one—probably not eve n Johnson— thought thi s a seriou s argument , i t represent s a perennia l feeling about the system, and one that makes it, as a matter of psychological fact , generall y unbelievabl e b y thos e wh o ar e supposed t o find it most congenial. Radical empiricists, on the other hand , fin d th e mixtur e o f reductionis m an d a hin t of scepticism extremel y attractive . Fourth , ther e i s a matte r of Zeitgeist. Th e Enlightenment , and th e scientifi c ag e that followed it , wer e no t th e tim e fo r a religiou s metaphysic — especially a n idealis t one—t o commen d itsel f t o advance d thinkers. A s a plai n matte r o f history , therefore , Berkele y occupied a plac e i n a proces s tha t wa s mor e receptiv e o f certain o f his ideas tha n o f others. Thi s i s no doub t wh y th e more spiritual Berkeleian ethos found a n echo in those philosophers wh o wer e reactin g agains t th e Enlightenment , namely certai n Hegelia n idealists . Th e Hegelia n tradition , represented i n Britai n mos t notabl y b y F. H . Bradley , too k Berkeley's attac k o n matte r a s conclusiv e an d agree d wit h him that Absolute Mind was in control o f the universe . They did no t conceiv e o f tha t min d a s a n independen t spiritua l substance, as did Berkeley. It was more like a Humean bundl e composed o f all the experience s that make up the total idealist universe : excep t that , fo r th e Hegelians , unlik e Hume , a bundle is more than the sum of its parts, and so has a principle of unity or identity in its own right, which is lacking in Hume's conception. If Berkeley's defence of orthodox religion is to have its day, that da y ha s no t ye t come . Bu t ther e ar e moder n philo sophers, suc h a s Joh n Foste r an d Timoth y Sprigge , wh o

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defend idealis t philosophies that owe much to Berkeley. The processes agains t whic h Berkele y struggled , however , gro w stronger, an d th e nee d fo r hi s insight s grow s greater , no t less.11 11

Th e strea m o f philosophica l orthodox y ha s alway s ru n agains t Berkeley's religiou s metaphysic, but its influence agains t the current ha s not bee n negligible . C. S. Lewis credits Berkele y with a major rol e i n his reconversion t o Christianit y an d Cardina l Newma n admitte d a deb t t o him in the developmen t of his own empiricist Catholicism . I suspect tha t Berkeley's influenc e i n privat e religiou s resistanc e t o th e metaphysica l mischief o f the Enlightenmen t i s greater tha n the secula r public consen sus reveals .

NOTE O N TH E TEXT S The Principles was published twice in Berkeley's lifetime; first in Dubli n i n 171 0 (thi s is known as A), second i n London i n 1734, togethe r wit h th e Three Dialogues (editio n B). Th e Three Dialogues wer e publishe d thre e times ; 171 3 (A), 172 5 (B), 173 4 (C) . Th e text s use d her e ar e th e 173 4 versions, as found i n volum e ii of th e complet e Works, edite d b y A . A . Luce and T. E. Jessop (London, 1948-57) . In the Notes I have drawn attention to those differences between the editions that may be o f philosophical interest .

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPH Y The standar d editio n o f Berkele y i s Works o f George Berkeley, Bishop o f Cloyne, edited b y A. A . Luc e an d T . E . Jessop i n 7 vols. (London: Nelson , 1948-57). An elegan t and brief introduction is the excellent volume in the Tast Masters' series, J . O . Urmson , Berkeley (Oxford : Oxfor d Universit y Press, 1982) . Longer an d more difficul t monograph s are : Bennett, J., Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Oxford Universit y Press, 1971) . Dancy, J. , Berkeley: A n Introduction (Oxford : Basi l Blackwell, 1987) . Grayling, A. C, Berkeley: Th e Central Arguments (London : Duckworth, 1986) . Pitcher, G. , Berkeley (London : Routledg e & Kega n Paul , 1977). Tip ton, I . C. , Berkeley: Th e Philosophy o f Immaterialism (London: Methuen, 1974) . Warnock, G. J., Berkeley (Harmondsworth : Pelican , 1953) . Winkler, K. P., Berkeley: A n Interpretation (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1989) . Useful collection s o f articles include: Foster, J. , an d Robinson , H . (eds.) , Essays o n Berkeley (Oxford: Oxfor d University Press, 1985) . Martin, C . B. , an d Armstrong , D . M . (eds.) , Locke an d Berkeley (London : Macmillan , 1968). Sosa, E. (ed.) , Essays o n th e Philosophy o f George Berkeley (Dordrecht: Reidel , 1987) . Turbayne, C . (ed.) , Berkeley: Critical an d Interpretative Es says (Manchester : Mancheste r Universit y Press, 1982) . Modern defence s of idealism can be foun d in : Foster, J. , Th e Case fo r Idealism (London : Routledg e & Kegan Paul, 1982) .

xl Bibliography Robinson, H. , Th e Genera l For m o f th e Argumen t fo r Berkelian Idealism' , in Foster an d Robinson (eds.) . Sprigge, T., The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983) . A more accessible version of Foster's argument can be foun d in his The Succinc t Case for Idealism', in H. Robinson (ed.) , Objections t o Physicalism (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1993) . Also relevant is the final chapter of H. Robinson, Matter an d Sense (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1982) .

A CHRONOLOG Y O F GEORGE BERKELE Y 1685 1696 1700 1702 1704 1707 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1716-20

1720 1721 1724 1726 1728 1728-31 i73i

1732 1733

Berkeley born i n County Kilkenny, 12 March. Enters Kilkenn y College. Enters Trinit y College Dublin . Elected a scholar o f Trinity College . Receives his BA. Deat h o f John Locke . Elected a Fellow of Trinity College. Develops his system over the next three years, as found in the notebooks now called the Philosophical Commentaries. Publishes th e Essay Towards a New Theory o f Vision. Ordained pries t i n the Churc h o f Ireland ; publishes th e Principles of Human Knowledge. Birth o f David Hume . Publishes Passive Obedience. First visi t t o England ; publishe s Three Dialogues. A s chaplain to the Earl of Peterborough, he visits Paris until the followin g year. Travels i n Franc e an d Ital y a s tuto r t o th e so n o f th e Bishop o f Clogher . The 'South Sea Bubble' helps to disillusion Berkeley with Europe an d lead s t o hi s plans fo r a colleg e i n th e Ne w World. De Motu, written the previou s year in France, publishe d in Britain. Appointed Dea n o f Derry; birth of Immanuel Kant . Grant o f £20,00 0 promised b y th e governmen t fo r th e college i n the Ne w World. Marries Anne Forster an d sails to Virginia. Lives in Newport, Rhode Island , waiting for the gran t to be paid, preaching an d writing Alciphron. Learning tha t th e mone y wil l no t b e paid , h e return s t o England. Publishes Alciphron. Publishes Theory o f Vision Vindicated an d Explained.

xlii i?34

i?35 1735-7

1739 1744 1752 1753

Chronology Consecrated Bisho p o f Cloyne ; publishe s Analyst. Berkeley live s i n Cloyne , attendin g t o th e affair s o f hi s diocese an d working for the improvemen t of the stat e of Ireland, until 1752. Publishes Defence o f Freethinking i n Mathematics. The thre e part s o f Th e Querist published i n succeedin g years. Hume's Treatise o n Human Nature published . Publishes Siris. Leaves Cloyn e for Oxford , to se e hi s so n throug h Uni versity. Dies i n Oxford , 1 4 January ; burie d i n Chris t Churc h Cathedral. H e i s survived by his wife an d three children.

PRINCIPLES O F HUMAN KNOWLEDG E

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ANALYTICAL CONTENT S (by section numbers) Introduction: Attack o n Abstract Ideas 1-2 Philosophy , instea d of bringing serenity, brings disturbanc e and doubt; 3-5 This must be due to false principles, whic h will b e investigated; 6-9 Fundamental fals e principl e i s doctrine o f abstract ideas ; 10 Tha t ca n abstrac t spatia l parts but no t logica l features; 11 Lock e o n abstractio n a s differentiating u s fro m animals ; 11-12 Berkeley' s ow n accoun t o f generality; 13-14 Locke' s own account an d th e difficult y o f abstracting; 15-16 Berkeley' s accoun t o f generality developed ; 17-21 Th e error s ar e cause d b y taking all words to name ideas ; 22-5 Lookin g behin d word s to idea s will avoi d error.

Parti: Th e Main Text 1-33 Initia l statement of the arguments for idealism, of which the most importan t element s are: 3, 6,10, 22-4: various forms of the psychological appeal tha t we cannot form the idea—that is, an image—of a n object independent o f perceptio n (22- 3 constitute s th e majo r argument o f this form) . 7: That i t is a contradiction tha t a n ide a shoul d exis t in a n unperceiving substance ; 8: That a n idea ca n be lik e nothing but a n idea; 9-15: Attac k o n Lockea n representationalis m an d th e primary-secondary quality distinction; 10: Cannot conceiv e primar y without secondary; n: Great , small , swift , an d slo w ar e relative , therefor e mind-dependent; 12: Number is relative, so mind-dependent ; 13: Unity i s relative, s o mind-dependent ; 14-15: Argument fro m illusio n equally effectiv e agains t both kind s of qualities; 16-17: Emptiness o f calling matter a substratum; 18: Argument fro m hallucination;

4 Principles:

Analytical Contents

19-20: That the hypothesi s of a mind-independent world is idle; 25: The inactivit y of ideas; 26-7: Spiri t a s the caus e of ideas; 27-8: Th e natur e of spirit; 29-33: The differenc e betwee n veridica l ideas an d others , and th e rol e o f God i n this. 34-84 Seventee n objection s t o hi s theor y an d th e answer s t o them. 34-40: (i ) 'Al l tha t i s rea l an d substantia l i n natur e i s banished ou t o f the world' ; 41: (2) That ther e is a great differenc e betwee n a real thing and a n idea o f it; 42-4: (3 ) Tha t w e se e thing s a t a distanc e outsid e o f us : Berkeley's accoun t o f depth; 45-8: (4 ) That Berkeley's theory has things being constantly created an d destroyed ; 49: (5 ) I f extensio n an d figur e exis t i n th e min d the n th e mind is extended an d shaped ; 50: (6 ) Hi s theor y undermine s explanator y valu e o f th e corpuscularian philosophy; 51-3: (7) It i s absurd t o replac e natura l cause s with spirits; 54-5: (8 ) That the whole world believes in matter and could hardly be mistaken; 56: (9) That there i s a need t o explai n this error ; 58-9: (10 ) Tha t i t i s inconsisten t wit h certai n truth s o f philosophy an d mathematics; 60-6: (n ) I t leaves no point t o the mechanism s of nature. Berkeley replie s b y givin g idea s a rol e a s signs no t a s causes', 67-72: (12 ) Tha t matte r a s a substanc e withou t accident s could stil l exist , perhaps a s an occasio n fo r God' s giving us ideas; 73-6: Digression o n th e motive s fo r believin g i n materia l substance; 77-8: (13 ) Matte r migh t possess qualitie s wholly unknown to us; 79: (14) That ther e is no contradiction in matter, even if we do not kno w what it means; 80: (15) Matter coul d b e 'a n unknown somewhat'; 81: (16) That i t is sufficiently distinguishe d from nothin g by bare idea o f existence;

Principles: Analytical Contents 5 82-4: (17 ) That scripture require s the existence of materia l substance. 85-134 Positiv e consequence s of Berkeley's doctrine: 85-96: (i) Refuting errors consequent o n a belief in matter, especially connecte d wit h scepticism , fatalism , an d atheism; 97-117: (2) Clarification o f various scientific concepts which had bee n confuse d by being treated a s abstract ideas : 98: (a) Natur e of time; 103-9: (£> ) Concep t o f attraction ; 110-17: (c) Absolute spac e an d motion ; 118-34: (3 ) Clarificatio n o f mathematica l concept s confused b y the doctrin e o f abstract ideas : 119-22: (a) Numbers as signs, not abstrac t objects; 123-34: (b) Problem s wit h th e suppose d infinit e divisibility of extension an d wit h infinitesimals. !35~56 Th e natur e and rol e o f spirits: 135-8: There is no ide a o f spirit; 139-40: This does not make it insignificant, because we have a notion; 141: Natural immortality of the soul ; 142-5: Spirits wholly unlike ideas, but ar e known to other s through their rol e i n producing ideas; 146-50: God is plainly knowabl e by the ideas He produces ; 151-4: The proble m o f evil; 155-6: Inexcusability of atheism an d conclusion .

THE PREFACE* What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seem'd to me evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, particularly to those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of GOD, or the natural immortality o f th e soul Whether it be so or no, I am content the reader should impartially examine. Since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written, than as it is agreeable to truth. Bu t t o the end thi s ma y no t suffer, I make i t my request that th e reader suspend hi s judgment, till he has once, at least, read th e whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject matter shall seem to deserve. For as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied} to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them: so likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, 'tis very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I flatter myself, it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity, which some of the following notions may seem to bear, 'tis, I hope, needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth, that is capable of demonstration, for no other reason but because it's newly known and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men, who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

INTRODUCTION* 1. Philosoph y bein g nothing else but th e stud y of wisdom and truth , i t ma y wit h reaso n b e expected , tha t thos e wh o have spen t mos t tim e an d pain s i n i t shoul d enjo y a greate r calm an d serenit y o f mind, a greater clearnes s an d evidenc e of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficult ies tha n othe r men . Ye t s o i t i s w e se e th e illiterat e bul k of mankin d that wal k the high-roa d o f plain, common sense , and ar e governe d b y th e dictate s o f Nature , fo r th e mos t part eas y an d undisturbed . T o the m nothin g that' s familia r appears unaccountable or difficult t o comprehend. They complain not o f any want of evidence in their senses, and ar e ou t of al l dange r o f becomin g sceptics. Bu t n o soone r d o w e depart from sens e and instinct to follow the light of a superior principle, t o reason , meditate , an d reflec t o n th e natur e o f things, but a thousand scruple s spring up i n our minds , concerning thos e thing s which before w e seeme d full y t o com prehend.* Prejudice s an d error s o f sens e d o fro m al l part s discover themselves to our view; and endeavouring to correc t these b y reason w e are insensibl y drawn into uncout h para doxes, difficulties , an d inconsistences , whic h multipl y an d grow upo n u s a s w e advanc e i n speculation ; til l a t length , having wander'd through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where w e were, or , whic h is worse, si t dow n i n a forlorn scepticism . 2. Th e caus e of this is thought to be the obscurit y of things, or th e natura l weaknes s an d imperfectio n o f ou r under standings. I t i s said the facultie s we have ar e few , and thos e designed b y Nature fo r th e suppor t an d comfor t of life , an d not t o penetrat e int o th e inwar d essenc e an d constitutio n of things. * Besides , th e min d o f ma n bein g finite , whe n i t treats o f things which partake o f infinity, i t is not t o b e wondered at , i f it ru n int o absurditie s an d contradictions ; ou t o f which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself , it being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended b y that which is finite.

8 Principles:

Introduction

3. Bu t perhap s we may be to o partia l t o ourselve s i n placing the faul t originall y in our faculties , and not rathe r i n the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose, that right deductions from tru e principles shoul d ever en d in consequences whic h canno t b e maintaine d o r mad e consistent . We shoul d believe that Go d ha s dealt mor e bountifull y wit h the son s o f men , tha n t o giv e the m a stron g desir e fo r tha t knowledge, which He had placed quite out of their reach. This were no t agreeabl e t o th e wonted , indulgen t method s o f Providence, which , whatever appetites it may have implanted in th e creatures , dot h usuall y furnish the m wit h such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined t o thin k that th e fa r greate r part , i f not all, o f thos e difficultie s whic h hav e hithert o amuse d philo sophers, an d blocked u p th e wa y to knowledge , ar e entirel y owing to ourselves. That w e have first raised a dust, and the n complain, we cannot see . 4. M y purpos e therefor e is , t o tr y i f I ca n discove r what those principle s are, which have introduced al l that doubtfulness an d uncertainty , thos e absurditie s an d contradiction s into the several sects of philosophy;* insomuch that the wisest men hav e though t ou r ignoranc e incurable , conceivin g i t t o arise fro m th e natura l dulnes s an d limitation o f our faculties . And surel y it i s a work wel l deserving our pains , t o mak e a strict inquir y concerning th e first principles o f human knowledge, t o sif t an d examin e them o n al l sides: especially sinc e there ma y b e som e ground s t o suspec t tha t thos e let s an d difficulties, whic h stay an d embarras s th e min d i n it s searc h after truth , do no t sprin g from an y darkness an d intricac y in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from fals e principle s which have been insisted on , and might have been avoided . 5. Ho w difficul t an d discouragin g soever thi s attempt ma y seem, whe n I conside r ho w man y grea t an d extraordinar y men hav e gon e befor e m e i n the sam e designs : yet I a m no t without som e hopes , upo n th e consideratio n tha t th e larges t views ar e no t alway s the clearest , an d tha t h e wh o i s shortsighted wil l b e oblige d t o dra w th e objec t nearer , an d may , perhaps, by a close an d narrow survey discern that which had escaped fa r better eyes .

Principles: Introduction 9 6. I n order t o prepare the mind of the reader for the easie r conceiving what follows, it is proper t o premise somewhat, by way o f introduction , concernin g th e natur e an d abus e o f language. Bu t th e unravellin g this matte r lead s m e i n som e measure t o anticipat e m y design , b y takin g notic e o f wha t seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate an d perplexed, an d to hav e occasioned innumerabl e er rors and difficulties i n almost all parts of knowledge. And tha t is the opinio n tha t the min d hath a power o f framing abstract ideas or notions o f things. He wh o is not a perfect stranger to the writing s an d dispute s o f philosophers , mus t need s ac knowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These are in a more especial manner, thought to be the object o f those science s whic h go b y th e nam e o f Logi c an d Metaphysics, and o f all that which passes under the notio n of the mos t abstracte d an d sublim e learning , i n al l whic h on e shall scarc e fin d an y questio n handle d in suc h a manner , as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them. 7. I t i s agreed o n al l hands, that th e qualitie s or mode s of things do neve r reall y exist each o f them apar t b y itself, an d separated fro m al l others , bu t ar e mixed , a s i t were , an d blended together , several in the same object. But we are told, the min d bein g abl e t o conside r eac h qualit y singly , o r ab stracted fro m thos e othe r qualitie s wit h whic h i t i s united , does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived b y sight an object extended , coloured, an d moved: this mixed or compound ide a the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive o f th e rest , doe s fram e th e abstrac t idea s o f extension , colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension: but only that the mind can frame t o itself b y abstraction the ide a o f colour exclusive of extension, and o f motion exclusiv e of both colou r an d extension . 8. Again , the min d havin g observed tha t i n the particula r extensions perceive d b y sense , ther e i s somethin g commo n and alik e i n all , an d som e othe r thing s peculiar , a s thi s o r that figur e o r magnitude , which distinguis h them on e fro m another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common, makin g thereo f a mos t abstrac t ide a o f extension,

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which is neither line , surface, no r solid , nor ha s an y figure o r magnitude but is an idea entirely prescinded from al l these. So likewise th e min d b y leavin g ou t o f th e particula r colour s perceived b y sense , tha t whic h distinguishe s them on e fro m another, an d retainin g tha t onl y whic h i s commo n t o all , makes a n ide a o f colou r i n abstrac t whic h i s neithe r red , nor blue , no r white , nor an y other determinat e colour . An d in lik e manne r b y considerin g motio n abstractedl y no t onl y from th e bod y moved , bu t likewis e fro m th e figur e i t de scribes, an d al l particula r direction s an d velocities , th e ab stract idea of motion i s framed; whic h equally corresponds t o all particula r motion s whatsoeve r tha t ma y b e perceive d b y sense. 9. An d a s the min d frame s t o itsel f abstrac t idea s o f qualities o r modes , s o doe s it , b y th e sam e precisio n o r menta l separation, attai n abstrac t idea s o f th e mor e compounde d beings, whic h includ e severa l coexisten t qualities . Fo r example, th e min d havin g observe d tha t Peter , James , an d John resembl e eac h other , i n certain common agreement s of shape an d other qualities, leaves out o f the comple x or compounded ide a it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, tha t whic h i s peculia r t o each , retainin g onl y wha t i s common to all; and so makes an abstract ide a wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely from an d cutting off all those circumstances an d differences , whic h might determine i t to an y particular existence . An d afte r thi s manner i t i s said w e com e b y th e abstrac t ide a o f man or , i f you please, humanity or human nature; wherein it is true, there is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour; becaus e ther e is no on e particula r colou r wherei n all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither tal l stature no r lo w stature, nor ye t middle stature , but somethin g abstracte d fro m al l these. An d s o of the rest . Moreover, ther e bein g a great variety of other creatures tha t partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the min d leaving ou t thos e part s whic h are peculia r t o men , and retainin g those onl y which are commo n t o al l the livin g creatures, frameth th e idea of animal, which abstracts not only

Principles: Introduction u from al l particular men, bu t als o al l birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. Th e constituen t part s o f th e abstrac t ide a o f animal are body , life , sense , an d spontaneou s motion . B y body i s meant, bod y withou t an y particula r shap e o r figure , ther e being no one shape o r figure common to all animals, without covering, eithe r o f hai r o r feathers , o r scales , &c . no r ye t naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties o f particular animals , and for that reaso n left ou t of the abstract idea. Upon th e same account the spon taneous motio n mus t b e neithe r walking , no r flying , no r creeping, it is nevertheless a motion, but wha t that motion is, it is not eas y to conceive . 10. Whethe r other s have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, the y bes t ca n tell : fo r mysel f I fin d indee d I have a facult y o f imagining , o r representin g t o mysel f th e ideas of those particula r things I have perceived an d o f variously compoundin g an d dividin g them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracte d o r separate d fro m th e res t o f the body . Bu t then whateve r han d o r ey e I imagine , i t mus t hav e som e particular shap e an d colour . Likewis e the ide a o f man tha t I frame t o myself , mus t be eithe r o f a white , or a black , or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middlesized man . I canno t b y an y effor t o f though t conceiv e th e abstract idea above described. And i t is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from th e body moving, an d whic h is neither swif t no r slow , curvilinear no r rectilinear; an d th e lik e ma y b e sai d o f al l othe r abstrac t general idea s whatsoever. To b e plain , I ow n myself abl e t o abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated fro m others, with which though they are united i n some object , yet, it is possible the y may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another , or conceiv e separately , those qualitie s which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstractin g fro m particular s i n th e manne r aforesaid . Which tw o las t ar e th e prope r acceptation s o f abstraction. And ther e ar e ground s to thin k most me n wil l acknowledge

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themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It's said they ar e difficul t an d no t t o b e attaine d withou t pain s an d study. W e ma y therefor e reasonabl y conclud e that , i f such there be , they ar e confined only to the learned . ii. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrin e o f abstraction, and tr y if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinion, so remote fro m commo n sens e a s that seem s t o be . Ther e ha s been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher , who , no doubt , has give n i t very much countenance b y seeming to thin k th e having abstrac t genera l idea s i s what put s th e wides t differ ence i n point o f understanding betwix t man an d beast . Th e having of general idea s (saith he ) i s that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the facultie s o f brutes d o b y no mean s attai n unto . Fo r i t is evident w e observ e n o footstep s i n the m o f makin g us e o f general signs for universal ideas; from whic h we have reaso n to imagin e tha t the y hav e no t th e facult y o f abstracting or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other genera l signs . And a little after. Therefore , I think , we may suppos e tha t i t i s in thi s tha t th e specie s o f brute s ar e discriminated fro m men , an d 'ti s tha t prope r differenc e wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For i f they have an y idea s at all , and ar e not bar e machine s (a s som e woul d hav e them ) w e canno t deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do some of them in certain instances reason a s that they have sense , bu t i t i s onl y i n particula r ideas , jus t a s the y receive them from thei r senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (a s I think) the faculty t o enlarg e them by any kind of abstraction.' Essay o n Hum. Underst., b. 2. c. 11. sects. 10 and n. I readily agree with this learne d author , tha t th e facultie s o f brute s ca n b y n o means attai n t o abstraction. Bu t the n i f thi s b e mad e th e distinguishing property o f that sor t o f animals, I fear a great many of those tha t pas s for men must be reckoned int o thei r number. Th e reaso n tha t i s here assigne d wh y w e hav e n o grounds to think brutes have abstract general ideas, is that we

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observe i n them n o us e o f words or an y other genera l signs; which is built on this supposition, to wit, that the makin g use of words , implie s th e havin g genera l ideas . Fro m whic h i t follows, tha t me n wh o us e languag e are abl e t o abstrac t o r generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his answering the question he in another place puts. 'Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come w e by general terms? ' His answer is, 'Words become genera l b y bein g mad e th e sign s o f genera l ideas. ' Essay o n Hum. Underst., b . 3. c. 3. sect. 6. But i t seems that a word become s genera l b y bein g mad e th e sign , no t o f a n abstract general idea but, of several particular ideas, any one of whic h i t indifferentl y suggest s to th e mind . For example , when i t i s sai d th e change o f motion i s proportional t o th e impressed force, o r tha t whatever ha s extension i s divisible', these propositions ar e to be understood o f motion an d extension i n general , an d nevertheles s i t wil l no t follo w tha t the y suggest t o m y thought s a n ide a o f motio n withou t a bod y moved, o r an y determinat e directio n an d velocity , or tha t I must conceive a n abstract genera l idea of extension, which is neither line, surface nor solid , neither great no r small , black, white, nor red, nor o f any other determinate colour . I t is only implied tha t whateve r motion I consider, whether i t be swif t or slow , perpendicular, horizonta l o r oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other o f ever y particula r extension , i t matter s no t whethe r line, surfac e o r solid , whether o f thi s o r tha t magnitud e o r figure. 12. B y observin g ho w idea s becom e general , w e ma y th e better judg e ho w word s ar e mad e so . An d her e i t i s to b e noted tha t I d o not den y absolutel y ther e ar e genera l ideas , but onl y tha t ther e ar e an y abstract general ideas: fo r i n th e passages abov e quoted , wherei n ther e i s mention o f genera l ideas, it is always supposed tha t the y ar e forme d by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sects. 8 and 9. Now if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that a n idea, which considered i n itsel f i s particular, becomes general , b y bein g made to represent o r stand for all other particular ideas of the

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same sort. To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician i s demonstrating the method , of cutting a line in two equal parts. H e draws , for instance , a black line of an inch in length, this which i n itsel f i s a particular lin e i s nevertheles s with regard to its signification general, since as it is there used, it represent s al l particular lines whatsoever; for tha t wha t is demonstrated o f it , i s demonstrate d o f al l line s or , i n othe r words, o f a lin e i n general . An d a s tha t particula r lin e be comes general, by being made a sign, so the nam e line which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general . And a s the former owes its generality, not to its being the sign of a n abstrac t o r genera l line , bu t o f all particular righ t line s that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its generality fro m th e sam e cause, namely , the variou s particular lines which it indifferently denotes . 13. T o giv e the reade r a yet cleare r vie w of the natur e of abstract ideas , an d th e use s the y ar e though t necessar y to , I shall ad d on e mor e passag e ou t o f the Essay o n Human Un derstanding, whic h i s a s follows . 'Abstract ideas ar e no t s o obvious o r eas y t o childre n or th e ye t unexercise d min d a s particular ones . I f the y see m s o t o grow n men , i t i s onl y because b y constant an d familia r us e they ar e mad e so . For when w e nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas ar e fiction s an d contrivance s o f th e mind , tha t carr y difficulty wit h them, and d o not s o easily offer themselves , as we are apt to imagine. For example, does i t not requir e som e pains and skil l to form th e genera l idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract comprehensive an d difficult) fo r it must b e neithe r obliqu e no r rectangle , neither equilateral , equicrural, nor scalenon , but al l and none of these a t once. In effect, i t i s somethin g imperfec t tha t canno t exist , a n ide a wherein some parts of several different an d inconsistent ideas are put together. I t is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste t o them it can, for the convenienc y o f communicatio n an d enlargemen t o f knowledge, to bot h whic h it i s naturally very much inclined . But yet one has reason t o suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. A t leas t thi s i s enough t o she w tha t th e mos t abstract an d general idea s are not thos e tha t the mind is first

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and mos t easil y acquainte d with , no r suc h a s it s earlies t knowledge i s conversant about' , b. 4. c. 7. sect. 9 . If any ma n has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend t o dispute him out of it , nor woul d I g o about it . All I desire is , that th e reade r would fully an d certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea * o r no . An d this , methinks, can be n o har d tas k fo r anyone to perform. What mor e eas y than for anyone to loo k a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attai n t o have , a n ide a tha t shal l correspon d wit h th e description tha t is here given of the genera l idea of a triangle, which is, neither oblique, nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once! 14. Muc h i s here sai d o f th e difficult y tha t abstrac t idea s carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite t o the forming them . And i t is on al l hands agree d tha t ther e i s need o f great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate our thoughts from particula r objects , an d rais e the m t o thos e sublim e speculations tha t ar e conversan t abou t abstrac t ideas . Fro m all which the natura l consequence shoul d seem t o be, that so difficult a thing as the formin g abstract idea s was not necess ary fo r communication, which is s o eas y an d familia r t o al l sorts of men. But we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, It is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know at what time it is, men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, an d furnishing themselves with those necessar y help s fo r discourse . I t canno t b e when they ar e grow n up, for then i t seems the y ar e no t con scious of any such pains-taking; it remains therefore to be th e business of their childhood . An d surely , the grea t an d multiplied labour of framing abstrac t notions, wil l be found a hard task for that tender age . Is it not a hard thing to imagine, that a coupl e o f childre n canno t prat e together , o f thei r sugar plumbs and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tacked togethe r numberles s inconsistencies, an d so framed i n thei r mind s abstract general ideas, an d annexe d them t o ever y common nam e the y mak e use of? 15. No r d o I thin k the m a whi t more needfu l fo r th e en largement of knowledge tha n for communication. I t is I know

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a point , muc h insiste d on , tha t al l knowledg e an d demon stration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction i n th e manne r premised ; universality, s o fa r a s I can comprehen d no t consistin g i n th e absolute , positiv e nature o r conception o f anything, but i n the relatio n i t bears to th e particular s signifie d o r represente d b y it : b y virtu e whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendere d universal. Thus whe n I demonstrate an y proposition concernin g triangles, it is to be supposed tha t I hav e i n vie w the universa l ide a o f a triangle; * which ought not t o be understoo d a s if I could fram e a n idea of a triangle whic h was neither equilatera l no r scaleno n no r equicrural. Bu t onl y tha t th e particula r triangl e I consider , whether o f this or that sort i t matters not, doth equall y stand for an d represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sens e universal. All whic h seem s ver y plain an d no t t o include any difficult y i n it. 16. Bu t her e i t wil l b e demanded , ho w w e ca n kno w an y proposition t o b e tru e o f al l particula r triangles , excep t w e have firs t see n i t demonstrate d o f th e abstrac t ide a o f a triangle which equally agrees t o all ? Fo r becaus e a propert y may b e demonstrate d t o agre e t o som e on e particula r tri angle, it will not thenc e follo w tha t i t equally belongs t o an y other triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For example, havin g demonstrated tha t th e thre e angle s o f a n isosceles rectangula r triangl e ar e equa l t o tw o righ t ones , I cannot therefor e conclud e thi s affectio n agree s t o al l other triangles, whic h hav e neithe r a righ t angle , no r tw o equa l sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this proposition is universally true , w e mus t eithe r mak e a particula r demon stration fo r ever y particular triangle , which is impossible, o r once for al l demonstrate i t of the abstract idea o f a triangle, in which al l th e particular s d o indifferentl y partake , an d b y which the y ar e al l equall y represented . T o whic h I answer , that though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration, be , fo r instance , tha t o f a n isoscele s rectangula r triangle, whose sides are o f a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles,

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of wha t sor t o r bignes s soever . An d that , becaus e neithe r the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides, are at all concerned i n the demonstration . I t is true, th e diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but the n there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. I t i s not said , the thre e angle s ar e equa l t o tw o right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because th e sides comprehendin g i t ar e o f th e sam e length . Whic h suffi ciently shew s tha t th e righ t angl e migh t hav e bee n oblique , and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration hav e held good. And fo r this reason it is, that I conclude that to be true o f an y obliquangula r o r scalenon , whic h I ha d demon strated o f a particula r right-angled , equicrural triangle ; an d not becaus e I demonstrate d th e propositio n o f th e abstrac t idea o f a triangle. And her e i t must b e acknowledge d tha t a man ma y conside r a figure merely a s triangular, withou t at tending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides . S o far h e ma y abstract : bu t thi s wil l neve r prove , that h e ca n fram e a n abstrac t genera l inconsisten t ide a o f a triangle. I n lik e manne r w e ma y conside r Pete r s o fa r fort h as man , o r s o fa r fort h a s animal , withou t framin g th e forementioned abstrac t idea, either o f man o r of animal, in as much as all that i s perceived i s not considered . 17. I t wer e a n endless , a s well as an useless thing, to trac e the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifol d inextricabl e labyrinth s o f erro r an d dispute , which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seem s t o have le d the m into . Wha t bickering s an d controversies , an d what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what might y advantag e hat h bee n fro m thenc e derive d t o mankind, ar e thing s a t thi s da y to o clearl y know n t o nee d being insisted on. And i t had bee n wel l if the il l effects o f that doctrine wer e confine d t o thos e onl y wh o mak e th e mos t avowed profession of it. When me n conside r th e grea t pains, industry an d parts , tha t hav e for s o many ages been lai d ou t on the cultivatio n an d advancemen t of the sciences , and tha t notwithstanding al l this, the fa r greate r par t o f them remai n full o f darknes s an d uncertainty , an d dispute s tha t ar e lik e never t o have a n end, and even those tha t ar e thought to be

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supported b y the most clear and cogent demonstrations, con tain i n them paradoxe s whic h are perfectl y irreconcilable t o the understanding s o f men , an d tha t takin g al l together , a small portio n o f the m dot h suppl y any rea l benefi t t o man kind, otherwis e tha n b y bein g a n innocen t diversio n an d amusement. I say, the consideratio n o f all this is apt t o throw them int o a despondency, an d perfec t contempt o f all study. But this may perhaps cease, upon a view of the false principles that hav e obtaine d i n th e world , amongst al l which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide influence over the thoughts of speculativ e men, than this of abstract genera l ideas . 18. I com e no w t o conside r th e sourc e o f thi s prevailing notion, an d tha t seem s t o m e t o b e language . An d surel y nothing o f less extent tha n reaso n itsel f could hav e been th e source of an opinion s o universally received. The trut h of this appears a s fro m othe r reasons , s o als o fro m th e plai n con fession o f th e ables t patron s o f abstrac t ideas , wh o acknow ledge that they are made in order to naming; from whic h it is a clea r consequence , tha t i f there ha d bee n n o suc h thing as speech or universal signs, there never had been any thought of abstraction. See b. 3. c. 6. sect. 39 and elsewher e o f The Essay on Human Understanding. Let us therefore examine the manner wherei n word s hav e contribute d t o th e origi n o f tha t mistake. Firs t then , 'ti s though t tha t ever y nam e hath , o r ought t o have , on e onl y precis e an d settle d signification , which inclines men to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas, which constitute the true and only immediate signification o f each general name. And tha t it is by the mediatio n of thes e abstrac t ideas , that a general nam e come s t o signif y any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precis e an d definit e signification annexed t o an y general name, they all signifying indifferentl y a great number of particular ideas . Al l whic h dot h evidentl y follo w fro m wha t has been already said, and will clearly appear t o anyone by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected, that every name that has a definition, is thereby restrained t o one certain significa tion. For example , a triangle is defined to b e a plane surface comprehended b y three right lines', b y whic h tha t nam e i s limited t o denot e on e certain ide a an d no other . To which I

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answer, that in the definitio n it is not said whether the surface be grea t o r small , black o r white , nor whethe r th e side s ar e long or short, equal or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification o f the wor d triangle. Tis one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, and another t o make it stan d everywher e for th e sam e idea : the on e i s necessary, the othe r useles s an d impracticable.* 19. Bu t t o giv e a farther accoun t ho w words came t o pro duce the doctrine o f abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion , tha t languag e has no other en d but th e communicating ou r ideas , an d tha t ever y significan t nam e stands for a n idea. This being so, and i t being witha l certain, that names, which yet are not thought altogether insignificant, do no t alway s mar k ou t particula r conceivabl e ideas , i t i s straightway conclude d tha t the y stan d fo r abstrac t notions . That ther e ar e many names i n use amongst speculative men , which d o not alway s suggest to others determinat e particula r ideas, i s wha t nobod y wil l deny . An d a littl e attentio n wil l discover, that i t is not necessar y (even i n the strictes t reason ings) significan t name s whic h stan d fo r idea s should , ever y time they are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are mad e t o stan d for : i n readin g an d discoursing , name s being for the most part used as letters are in algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked b y each letter, yet to proceed righ t it is not requisit e that i n every step eac h lette r suggest t o you r thoughts , tha t particula r quantit y i t wa s appointed t o stan d for. 20. Besides , the communicatin g of ideas marked by words is no t th e chie f an d onl y en d o f language, * a s i s commonly supposed. Ther e ar e othe r ends , a s th e raisin g o f som e passion, th e excitin g to , o r deterrin g fro m a n action , th e putting the min d in some particular disposition; to which the former i s i n man y case s barel y subservient , an d sometime s entirely omitted , when these ca n be obtained withou t it, as I think dot h no t infrequentl y happe n i n th e familia r us e o f language. I entreat th e reader t o reflect wit h himself, and see if i t dot h no t ofte n happe n eithe r i n hearin g o r readin g a

20 Principles:

Introduction

discourse, that th e passion s of fear, love , hatred, admiration , disdain, and th e lik e arise, immediately in his mind upon th e perception o f certai n words , withou t an y idea s comin g be tween. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned idea s that wer e fit to produce thos e emotions ; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that when language is once grown familiar, th e hearing of the sound s or sight of the character s is oft immediately attended with those passions, which at first were wont to be produced b y the interventio n o f ideas, that ar e no w quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected wit h the promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with danger sufficient t o excite a dread , thoug h w e thin k no t o f an y particular evi l likely to befall us , no r ye t fram e t o ourselve s a n ide a o f dange r i n abstract? I f anyon e shal l join eve r s o littl e reflectio n o f hi s own to what has been said, I believe it will evidently appear t o him, tha t genera l name s ar e ofte n use d i n th e propriet y o f language without th e speaker' s designin g them fo r mark s of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of th e hearer . Eve n prope r name s themselve s d o no t see m always spoken, with a design to bring into ou r view the idea s of those individual s that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a Schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me to embrace hi s opinion wit h the deference an d submission which custom has annexed t o tha t name . An d thi s effec t ma y b e s o instantly produced i n the minds of those who are accustomed t o resign their judgmen t t o th e authorit y o f tha t philosopher , a s i t is impossible an y idea eithe r o f his person, writings , or reputa tion should go before. Innumerable example s of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things, which everyone's experienc e will , I doub t not , plentifull y sugges t unt o him? 21. W e have , I think , shewn th e impossibilit y of abstract ideas. W e hav e considere d wha t ha s bee n sai d fo r the m b y their ables t patrons ; and endeavoured t o shew they are of no use for those ends , to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have trace d the m t o th e sourc e fro m whenc e the y flow, which appear s t o be language . It canno t b e denied tha t

Principles: Introduction 2

1

words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge whic h has been purchased b y the joint labour s of inquisitive men i n all ages and nations, may be draw n into the view and made the possession o f one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been strangel y perplexed an d darkened b y the abus e of words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered . Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare an d naked into my view, keeping out o f my thoughts, so far a s I a m able , thos e name s whic h lon g an d constan t us e hath so strictly united with them; from whic h I may expect t o derive the followin g advantages. 22. First , I shal l b e sur e t o ge t clea r o f al l controversie s purely verbal ; the springin g up o f which weeds in almos t al l the science s has been a main hindrance t o the growt h of true and soun d knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricat e myself out o f that fin e an d subtl e ne t o f abstract ideas, whic h ha s s o miserabl y perplexed an d entangle d th e minds o f men, an d tha t wit h this peculiar circumstance , tha t by ho w muc h th e fine r an d mor e curiou s wa s the wi t of any man, by so much the deepe r wa s he like to be ensnared, an d faster hel d therein . Thirdly , so long as I confine my thoughts to m y ow n idea s diveste d o f words, I d o no t se e ho w I ca n easily b e mistaken . The object s I consider , I clearl y an d ad equately know . I canno t b e deceive d i n thinkin g I hav e a n idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine, that any of my own ideas are alik e or unlike, that are not truly so. To discer n th e agreement s o r disagreement s ther e ar e be tween m y ideas, t o se e what idea s ar e include d i n an y compound idea , an d wha t not , ther e i s nothing mor e requisite , than a n attentiv e perceptio n o f wha t passe s i n m y ow n understanding. 23. Bu t the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception o f words, which I dar e hardl y promise myself ; s o difficul t a thin g it i s to dis solve a n unio n s o earl y begun , an d confirme d b y s o lon g a habit a s that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seem s to have been very much increased b y the doctrin e o f abstrac-

22 Principles:

Introduction

tion. For so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexe d to their words , it doth no t see m strang e tha t the y should us e words for ideas : i t being foun d a n impracticabl e thin g to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itsel f wa s perfectl y inconceivable . This seem s t o m e th e principal cause , wh y thos e me n wh o hav e s o emphaticall y recommended t o others , th e layin g aside al l use o f words in their meditations , an d contemplatin g thei r bar e ideas , hav e yet faile d t o perfor m it themselves. O f lat e man y have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes , which gro w ou t o f th e abus e o f words. * An d i n orde r t o remedy thes e evil s the y advis e well , tha t w e atten d t o th e ideas signified , an d dra w of f ou r attentio n fro m th e word s which signify them . But how good soeve r thi s advice may be, they have give n others, i t is plain they could no t hav e a du e regard t o i t themselves , s o lon g a s the y though t th e onl y immediate us e o f word s wa s t o signif y ideas , an d tha t th e immediate significatio n o f every general name was a determinate, abstract idea. 24. Bu t these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater eas e prevent his being imposed o n by words. He tha t knows h e ha s no othe r tha n particula r ideas, will not puzzl e himself i n vai n t o fin d ou t an d conceiv e th e abstrac t idea , annexed t o an y name . An d h e tha t know s name s d o no t always stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas, where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours, to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, separating from the m all that dress and encumbranc e of words which so much contribut e t o blind the judgment and divid e the atten tion. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens, and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men , and trace the dar k footsteps o f antiquity; we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit i s excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 25. Unles s w e tak e car e t o clea r th e firs t principle s o f knowledge, from the embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinit e reasoning s upo n the m t o n o purpose ; w e may

Principles: Introduction 2

3

draw consequence s fro m consequences , an d b e neve r th e wiser. Th e farthe r w e go , w e shal l onl y los e ourselve s th e more irrecoverably , an d b e th e deepe r entangle d i n difficul ties an d mistakes . Whoeve r therefor e design s t o rea d th e following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading, that I had in writing them. By this means it will be eas y for hi m to discove r th e trut h o r falsit y o f what I say . He wil l b e ou t o f al l dange r o f bein g deceive d b y my words, an d I d o no t se e how he ca n b e le d int o a n erro r b y considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

OF TH E PRINCIPLE S O F HUMAN KNOWLEDG E PART I * 1. I t is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the object s of huma n knowledge , tha t the y ar e eithe r idea s actuall y imprinted o n the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind,* or lastly ideas formed b y hel p o f memor y an d imagination , eithe r com pounding, dividing , o r barel y representin g thos e originall y perceived i n th e aforesai d ways . B y sigh t I hav e th e idea s of light and colours with their severa l degrees an d variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion an d resistance , an d o f al l these mor e an d les s eithe r as to quantit y or degree . Smellin g furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in al l their variet y o f tone an d composition . An d a s severa l of thes e ar e observe d t o accompan y eac h other , the y com e to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed a s one thing. Thus, fo r example , a certai n colour , taste , smell , figur e an d consistence havin g bee n observe d t o g o together , ar e ac counted on e distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Othe r collections o f idea s constitut e a stone , a tree , a book , an d the lik e sensibl e things ; which, a s the y ar e pleasin g o r dis agreeable, excit e the passion s o f love, hatred, joy, grief, an d so forth . 2. Bu t beside s al l tha t endles s variet y o f idea s o r object s of knowledge , there i s likewis e somethin g whic h know s o r perceives them , an d exercise s diver s operations , a s willing, imagining, remembering abou t them . Thi s perceiving , active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or myself. B y which words I d o no t denot e an y on e o f m y ideas , bu t a thin g entirely distinct fro m them , wherein they exist , or, which is the sam e thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists i n being perceived.

Principles: Part I 2

5

3. Tha t neithe r ou r thoughts , no r passions , no r idea s formed b y th e imagination , exis t withou t th e mind , i s what everybody wil l allow . And i t seem s n o les s eviden t tha t th e various sensation s or idea s imprinte d on th e sense , however blended o r combined togethe r (tha t is, whatever objects they compose) canno t exis t otherwis e tha n i n a min d perceiving them. I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained o f this, by anyone that shall attend t o what is meant by the term exist when applie d t o sensibl e things . The tabl e I write on , I say, exists, that is , I se e an d fee l it ; and i f I were ou t o f my study I shoul d sa y it existed , meaning thereb y tha t i f I wa s i n my study I migh t perceiv e it , o r tha t som e othe r spiri t actuall y does perceiv e it . There was an odour , tha t is , it was smelled; there wa s a sound , tha t i s to say , it wa s heard ; a colou r o r figure, and it was perceived b y sight or touch. This is all that I can understan d b y these an d th e lik e expressions . Fo r a s to what i s sai d o f th e absolut e existenc e o f unthinkin g things without any relation t o their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse ispercipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them . 4. I t i s indee d a n opinio n strangel y prevailin g amongs t men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects hav e a n existenc e natural or real , distinct fro m thei r being perceived b y the understanding. But with how great an assurance an d acquiescenc e soeve r thi s principle may be en tertained i n the world ; yet whoever shal l find in his heart t o call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involv e a manifes t contradiction . Fo r wha t ar e th e forementione d objects bu t th e thing s we perceive b y sense, an d what do we perceive beside s ou r ow n idea s o r sensations ; an d i s i t no t plainly repugnan t tha t an y on e o f these o r an y combinatio n of the m shoul d exist unperceived? 5. I f we throughl y examin e thi s tenet , i t will , perhaps , b e found a t bottom t o depen d o n th e doctrin e o f abstract ideas. For ca n there b e a nicer strai n o f abstraction tha n t o distinguish th e existenc e o f sensible object s fro m thei r bein g per ceived, s o a s t o conceiv e the m existin g unperceived ? Ligh t and colours , heat an d cold , extensio n an d figures, in a word

26 Principles:

Part I

the thing s we see an d feel , wha t are the y but s o many sensations, notions , idea s o r impression s o n th e sense ; an d i s i t possible t o separate , eve n i n thought, any of these fro m per ception? Fo r m y par t I migh t a s easil y divid e a thin g fro m itself. I ma y indeed divid e i n my thoughts o r conceiv e apar t from eac h othe r thos e thing s which , perhaps , I neve r per ceived b y sens e s o divided . Thu s I imagin e th e trun k o f a human body without the limbs , or conceive th e smel l of rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far I will not deny I can abstract, i f tha t ma y properl y b e calle d abstraction, whic h extends onl y to th e conceivin g separately suc h objects , a s it is possible ma y really exist or b e actuall y perceived asunder . But m y conceiving or imaginin g power doe s no t exten d be yond the possibilit y of real existence or perception. Henc e as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation o f that thing, so is it impossible for m e t o conceiv e in my thoughts any sensible thin g or objec t distinc t fro m th e sensation o r perception o f it.* 6. Som e truth s there ar e s o near an d obvious to the mind, that a man need onl y open his eyes to se e them. Suc h I tak e this important on e t o be , to wit , that al l the choi r o f heave n and furnitur e o f th e earth , i n a word al l those bodie s whic h compose the mighty frame o f the world, have not any subsistence withou t a mind , tha t thei r bein g i s to b e perceive d o r known; tha t consequentl y s o lon g a s the y ar e no t actuall y perceived b y me , o r d o no t exis t i n my mind o r tha t o f an y other created spirit , they must either have no existence a t all, or els e subsis t i n th e min d o f som e eterna l spirit : i t bein g perfectly unintelligibl e and involvin g all the absurdit y of abstraction, to attribut e to an y single part o f them a n existenc e independent o f a spirit. To be convinced o f which, the reade r need onl y reflect an d try to separat e i n his own thoughts the being of a sensible thin g from it s being perceived.* 7. Fro m wha t ha s bee n said , i t follows , ther e i s no t an y other substanc e tha n spirit, o r tha t whic h perceives. Bu t fo r the fulle r proo f o f this point, let it be considered, th e sensibl e qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the idea s perceived b y sense. Now for an idea t o exist in a n unperceivin g thing, is a manifes t contradiction ; fo r t o

Principles: Part I 2

7

have a n idea i s all one a s to perceive: that therefor e wherei n colour, figure, and the like qualities exist, must perceive them; hence i t i s clea r ther e ca n b e n o unthinkin g substanc e o r substratum o f those ideas. * 8. Bu t sa y you, thoug h th e idea s themselve s d o no t exis t without the mind, yet there may be things like them whereof they ar e copie s o r resemblances , whic h things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but a n idea;* a colour or figure ca n be like nothing but anothe r colou r o r figure . I f we look bu t eve r s o little into ou r thoughts , we shal l find it impossibl e fo r u s t o con ceive a likeness except onl y between ou r ideas . Again , I ask whether those supposed original s or external things, of which our idea s ar e th e picture s or representations , b e themselve s perceivable o r no ? I f the y are , the n the y ar e ideas , an d w e have gained our point; but i f you say they are not, I appeal t o anyone whethe r i t b e sense , t o asser t a colou r i s like some thing which is invisible; hard o r soft , lik e something which is intangible; and so of the rest . 9. Som e there are* who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities : by the former , they mean extension , figure motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability and number: by the latte r the y denote al l other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, an d s o forth. Th e idea s we have o f these the y acknowledge not t o be the resemblance s o f anything existing without the mind or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of th e primar y qualitie s t o b e pattern s o r image s o f things which exis t withou t th e mind , i n a n unthinkin g substanc e which the y call matter. By matter therefor e w e are t o under stand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion, do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have alread y shewn , tha t extension , figur e an d motio n ar e only idea s existin g in the mind , and tha t a n ide a ca n be lik e nothing but another idea , and that consequently neither they nor thei r archetype s ca n exis t i n a n unperceivin g substance . Hence it is plain, that the ver y notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction i n it. 10. The y who assert that figure, motion, an d the rest of the primary o r origina l qualities d o exis t withou t th e mind , i n

28 Principles:

Part I

unthinking substances , d o a t th e sam e tim e acknowledg e that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such like secondary qualities, d o not , whic h the y tel l u s ar e sensation s existin g in th e mind alone, that depend o n and are occasioned b y the differ ent size, texture and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyon d al l exception. No w i f it b e certain , tha t thos e original qualities ar e inseparably unite d wit h the othe r sens ible qualities , an d not , even i n thought , capabl e o f bein g abstracted fro m them , i t plainl y follows tha t the y exis t only in th e mind . But I desir e anyon e t o reflec t an d try , whether he can by any abstraction o f thought, conceiv e the extensio n and motio n o f a body , withou t al l othe r sensibl e qualities . For m y ow n part , I se e evidentl y that i t i s not i n m y powe r to fram e a n ide a o f a body extende d an d moved , but I must withal giv e i t som e colou r o r othe r sensibl e qualit y whic h is acknowledge d t o exis t onl y i n th e mind . I n short , exten sion, figure , an d motion , abstracted fro m al l other qualities , are inconceivable.* Where therefor e the other sensibl e qualities are , ther e mus t thes e b e also , t o wit , in th e min d an d nowhere else . ii. Again , great an d small, swift an d slow* ar e allowe d to exis t nowher e withou t th e mind , bein g entirel y relative , and changin g as the fram e o r position o f the organ s of sens e varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind, is neither grea t no r small , the motio n neithe r swif t no r slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But say you, they are extension in general , an d motio n i n general : thu s w e se e ho w muc h the tene t o f extended, moveable substance s existin g without the mind , depends o n tha t strang e doctrin e o f abstract ideas. And her e I canno t bu t remark , ho w nearl y th e vagu e an d indeterminate descriptio n o f matte r o r corporea l substance , which th e moder n philosopher s ar e ru n int o b y thei r ow n principles, resemble s tha t antiquate d an d s o much ridicule d notion o f materia prima* t o b e me t wit h i n Aristotl e an d his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefor e i t ha s bee n shew n tha t extensio n exist s no t in a n unthinkin g substance , th e sam e mus t als o b e tru e of solidity .

Principles: Part I 2

9

12. Tha t numbe r is entirely the creatur e o f the mind , even though th e othe r qualitie s b e allowe d t o exis t without , wil l be eviden t t o whoeve r considers , tha t th e sam e thin g bear s a different denominatio n o f number, as the mind views it with different respects. * Thus, the sam e extensio n is one o r three or thirty six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard , a foot , o r a n inch . Numbe r i s s o visibl y relative, and dependen t o n men' s understanding , tha t i t i s strang e to thin k ho w anyon e shoul d giv e i t a n absolut e existenc e without th e mind . W e sa y one book , on e page , on e line ; all these ar e equall y units , thoug h som e contai n severa l o f th e others. An d i n eac h instanc e i t i s plain , th e uni t relate s t o some particular combination o f ideas arbitrarily put togethe r by the mind. 13. Unit y I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea , accompanyin g all other idea s into the mind. * That I have any such idea answerin g the word unity, I do not find; an d i f I had , methink s I coul d no t mis s findin g it ; o n the contrary it should be the most familiar t o my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived b y al l the way s of sensatio n an d reflexion . T o sa y n o more, i t is an abstract idea. 14. I shall farther add, that after th e same manner, as modern philosopher s prov e certai n sensibl e qualitie s t o hav e n o existence in matter, o r without the mind, the same thing may be likewis e proved o f all other sensibl e qualitie s whatsoever. Thus, for instance , it is said that hea t an d col d ar e affection s only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in th e corporea l substance s whic h excit e them , fo r tha t th e same bod y whic h appears col d t o on e hand , seems warm t o another. No w why may we not a s well argue tha t figure and extension ar e not pattern s o r resemblances o f qualities existing in matter, because to the same eye at different stations , or eyes o f a differen t textur e a t th e sam e station , the y appea r various, an d canno t therefor e b e th e image s o f anythin g settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetnes s i s no t reall y i n th e sapi d thing , becaus e th e thing remaining unaltered th e sweetnes s i s changed int o bitter, a s in case o f a fever o r otherwise vitiated palate. I s it no t

30 Principles:

Part I

as reasonabl e t o say , tha t motio n i s no t withou t th e mind , since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter , th e motion, i t is acknowledged, shal l appear slowe r withou t an y alteration i n any external object. 15. I n short , le t anyon e conside r thos e arguments , which are though t manifestly to prov e tha t colour s an d tastes exis t only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force , be brought to prove th e sam e thin g of extension, figure, and motion. Thoug h i t must be confesse d this method o f arguing doth not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outwar d object, as that w e do not kno w by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object.* But the arguments foregoing plainl y shew it to b e impossible tha t an y colour o r extension a t all , or other sensibl e qualit y whatsoever, should exist i n a n unthinkin g subject without th e mind , or i n truth , that ther e shoul d b e an y such thing as an outward object. 16. Bu t le t u s examin e a littl e th e receive d opinion . I t i s said* extensio n i s a mod e o r acciden t o f matter , an d tha t matter i s the substratum tha t support s it . Now I desir e tha t you woul d explai n wha t i s mean t b y matter' s supporting extension: sa y you, I hav e n o ide a o f matter, an d therefor e cannot explai n it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet if yo u hav e an y meanin g a t all , yo u mus t a t leas t hav e a relative ide a o f matter ; thoug h yo u kno w not wha t it is , yet you must be supposed t o know what relation i t bears to accidents, an d what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident support canno t her e be take n i n it s usual or litera l sense , as when w e sa y tha t pillar s support a building : i n wha t sens e therefore mus t it be taken ? 17. I f we inquire into what the mos t accurate philosopher s declare themselve s t o mea n b y material substance', w e shal l find them acknowledge, they have no other meaning annexed to thos e sounds , bu t th e ide a o f bein g i n general , togethe r with the relativ e notion o f its supporting accidents . The gen eral ide a o f bein g appearet h t o m e th e mos t abstrac t an d incomprehensible o f all other; an d a s for it s supporting acci dents, this, a s we have just now observed , canno t b e under stood i n the commo n sens e o f those words ; it must therefor e be take n i n som e othe r sense , bu t wha t tha t i s they d o no t

Principles: Part I 3

1

explain. S o that whe n I conside r th e tw o part s o r branche s which make th e significatio n of the words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum o r support o f figure and motion, and other sensibl e qualities ? Doe s i t no t suppos e the y hav e a n existence withou t th e mind ? An d i s not thi s a direc t repug nancy, and altogethe r inconceivable ? 18. Bu t thoug h i t wer e possible tha t solid , figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding t o the idea s w e have o f bodies, ye t ho w i s it possibl e fo r u s t o know this?* Either we must know it by sense, or by reason. As for ou r senses , b y them w e hav e th e knowledg e onl y of ou r sensations, ideas , o r thos e thing s that ar e immediatel y per ceived b y sense , cal l the m wha t yo u will : bu t the y d o no t inform u s that things exist without the mind , or unperceived , like to those which are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remain s therefore tha t i f we have any knowledge a t al l o f externa l things , i t mus t b e b y reason , inferring thei r existence fro m wha t is immediately perceived by sense. Bu t what reason ca n induce us to believe th e existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the ver y patrons o f matter themselve s d o not pretend , ther e is any necessary connexio n betwix t them an d our ideas? I say it i s grante d o n al l hand s (an d wha t happen s i n dreams , phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute ) that it is possible w e migh t b e affecte d wit h al l th e idea s w e hav e now , though n o bodie s existe d without , resemblin g them . Henc e it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessar y for th e producin g ou r ideas : sinc e it is granted the y ar e pro duced sometimes , an d migh t possibl y b e produce d alway s in th e sam e orde r w e se e the m i n a t present , withou t thei r concurrence. 19. Bu t thoug h w e might possibl y hav e al l ou r sensation s without them , ye t perhap s i t ma y b e though t easie r t o conceive an d explai n th e manne r o f thei r production , b y supposing externa l bodie s i n thei r likenes s rathe r tha n otherwise; and so it might be at least probable ther e ar e such things a s bodie s tha t excit e thei r idea s i n ou r minds . Bu t

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neither ca n thi s be said ; for thoug h w e giv e the materialist s their externa l bodies, they by their ow n confession are neve r the neare r knowin g how our idea s ar e produced : sinc e the y own themselves unable to comprehend i n what manner body can act upon spirit , or how it is possible it should imprint any idea i n the mind . Hence it is evident the productio n o f ideas or sensation s i n ou r minds , ca n b e n o reaso n wh y w e should suppos e matte r o r corporea l substances , sinc e that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this supposition . I f therefor e i t wer e possibl e fo r bodie s to exis t withou t th e mind , ye t t o hol d the y d o so , mus t needs b e a ver y precariou s opinion ; sinc e i t i s t o suppose , without an y reason a t all , that Go d ha s created innumerabl e beings tha t ar e entirel y useless , an d serv e t o n o manne r o f purpose. 20. I n short , i f there wer e external bodies , i t is impossible we shoul d eve r com e t o kno w it; an d i f there wer e not , w e might have the very same reasons to think there were that w e have now. Suppose, what no on e ca n deny possible, an intelligence, withou t th e hel p o f externa l bodies , t o b e affecte d with th e sam e trai n o f sensation s o r idea s tha t yo u are , imprinted i n th e sam e orde r an d wit h lik e vividnes s i n hi s mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existenc e of corporeal substances , represented b y his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have fo r believin g the sam e thing ? O f thi s ther e ca n b e n o question; whic h on e consideratio n i s enoug h t o mak e an y reasonable perso n suspec t th e strengt h o f whateve r argu ments h e ma y thin k himsel f t o have , fo r th e existenc e o f bodies withou t the mind. 21. Wer e it necessary to ad d an y farther proo f agains t th e existence of matter, after what has been said, I could instance several o f thos e error s an d difficultie s (no t t o mentio n impieties) whic h hav e sprun g fro m tha t tenet . I t ha s occa sioned numberles s controversie s an d dispute s i n philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter int o th e detai l o f them i n this place , a s well becaus e I think, arguments a posteriori ar e unnecessary for confirmin g what ha s been , i f I mistak e not, sufficientl y demonstrate d a

Principles: Part I 3

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priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion t o say somewhat of them.* 22. I a m afrai d I have give n cause t o thin k me needlessly prolix i n handlin g thi s subject . Fo r t o wha t purpos e i s it t o dilate o n tha t whic h ma y b e demonstrate d wit h th e utmos t evidence in a line or two, to anyone that is capable of the least reflexion? I t i s but lookin g int o you r ow n thoughts , an d s o trying whethe r yo u ca n conceiv e i t possibl e fo r a sound , o r figure, o r motion , o r colour , t o exis t withou t th e mind , o r unperceived. This easy trial may make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content t o pu t th e whol e upon thi s issue; if you can but con ceive it possible fo r one extende d moveabl e substance , or in general, fo r an y on e ide a o r anythin g like a n idea , t o exis t otherwise tha n i n a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause : An d a s fo r al l tha t compages o f externa l bodie s which you contend for , I shall grant you its existence, though you canno t eithe r giv e m e an y reaso n wh y yo u believ e i t exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinion's being true, shall pass for an argumen t that i t is so. 23. Bu t sa y you, surely there i s nothing easie r tha n t o imagine trees , fo r instance , i n a park , o r book s existin g i n a closet, an d nobody by to perceive them. * I answer , you may so, there is no difficulty i n it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more tha n framing i n your mind certain idea s which you call books an d trees, and a t th e sam e tim e omittin g to fram e th e idea o f anyon e tha t ma y perceiv e them ? Bu t d o no t yo u yourself perceiv e o r thin k o f them al l the while ? This there fore i s nothing t o th e purpose : i t onl y show s yo u hav e th e power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but i t doth not she w that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought ma y exis t without the mind : to mak e ou t this , i t is necessary tha t yo u conceiv e the m existin g unconceive d o r unthought of , which is a manifes t repugnancy. When w e d o our utmos t t o conceiv e th e existenc e o f external bodies , w e are al l the whil e onl y contemplating ou r ow n ideas. But th e mind takin g no notic e o f itself, i s deluded t o thin k it can an d doth conceiv e bodie s existin g unthough t o f o r withou t th e

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mind; thoug h a t th e sam e tim e the y ar e apprehende d b y or exist i n itself . A littl e attentio n wil l discove r t o anyon e th e truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary t o insis t o n an y othe r proof s agains t th e existenc e o f material substance . 24. I t i s very obvious, upon th e leas t inquiry into ou r ow n thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant, by th e absolute existence of sensible objects i n themselves, o r without th e mind. T o m e i t i s eviden t thos e words mark ou t either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all . And t o convinc e other s o f this, I kno w n o readie r o r fairer way , than t o entrea t the y would calmly attend t o thei r own thoughts: and if by this attention, the emptiness or repugnancy of those expression s doe s appear , surel y nothing more is requisit e for thei r conviction . I t i s on thi s therefor e tha t I insist, to wit, that the absolut e existenc e o f unthinking things are word s withou t a meaning , o r whic h includ e a contra diction. Thi s i s wha t I repea t an d inculcate , an d earnestl y recommend t o the attentiv e thoughts of the reader . 25. Al l ou r ideas , sensations , o r th e thing s which we perceive, b y whatsoeve r name s the y ma y b e distinguished , ar e visibly inactive, there i s nothing of power o r agenc y included in them. So that one idea or object of thought cannot produce , or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied o f the trut h of this , there is nothing els e requisit e bu t a bare observatio n of our ideas . For sinc e they and ever y part o f them exis t only in the mind , it follows tha t ther e is nothing in them bu t what is perceived. Bu t whoeve r shal l atten d t o hi s ideas, whethe r of sens e o r reflexion , wil l no t perceiv e i n the m an y powe r or activity ; ther e i s therefor e n o suc h thin g containe d i n them.* A little attention wil l discover to us that the very being of a n ide a implie s passivenes s an d inertnes s i n it , insomuc h that i t i s impossibl e fo r a n ide a t o d o anything , or , strictl y speaking, t o b e th e caus e o f anything : neither ca n i t b e th e resemblance o r pattern o f any active being, as is evident fro m sect. 8 . Whence i t plainl y follows tha t extension , figur e an d motion, cannot b e the caus e of our sensations . T o say therefore, tha t thes e ar e th e effect s o f powers resultin g from th e

Principles: Part I 3

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configuration, number , motion , an d siz e o f corpuscles, mus t certainly be false . 26. W e perceiv e a continual successio n o f ideas, some ar e anew excited, others ar e changed or totally disappear. There is therefore som e cause of these idea s whereon the y depend , and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be an y quality or ide a o r combinatio n o f ideas, is clear fro m the preceding section . I t must therefore be a substance; but it has bee n shew n tha t ther e i s no corporea l o r materia l sub stance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal activ e substance o r spirit. 27. A spiri t i s on e simple , undivided , activ e being : a s i t perceives ideas , i t i s called th e understanding, an d a s it pro duces or otherwis e operates abou t them , it is called th e will. Hence there ca n be no ide a forme d of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever , bein g passiv e an d inert , vide sect . 25 , they cannot represen t unt o us , by way o f imag e o r likeness , tha t which acts. A little attention will make it plain to anyone, that to hav e a n ide a whic h shal l b e lik e tha t activ e principl e of motion an d chang e of ideas, is absolutely impossible . Such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, bu t onl y by th e effect s whic h it produceth. I f an y man shall doubt o f the truth of what is here delivered, le t him but reflec t an d tr y i f he ca n fram e th e ide a o f an y power o r active being ; an d whethe r h e hat h idea s o f tw o principa l powers, marked by the names will and understanding, distinct from eac h othe r a s well as from a third idea o f substance o r being i n general , wit h a relativ e notio n o f it s supportin g o r being the subject of the aforesaid powers, which is signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some hold; but s o far as I can see, the word s will, soul, spirit, do not stan d for differen t ideas, or in truth, for any idea a t all, but fo r something which is very different fro m ideas , and which being an agent canno t be like unto, or represented by , any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some notio n of soul, spirit, and the operation s o f the mind , such as willing, loving, hating , i n a s muc h a s w e kno w o r understan d th e meaning of those words.*

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28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shif t th e scen e a s of t a s I thin k fit . I t i s n o mor e tha n willing, an d straightwa y this o r tha t ide a arise s i n m y fancy : and b y th e sam e powe r i t i s obliterated, an d make s wa y for another. Thi s makin g and unmakin g of ideas dot h ver y properly denominate th e min d active. Thus much is certain, an d grounded o n experience : bu t whe n w e tal k o f unthinkin g agents, o r o f excitin g idea s exclusiv e o f volition , w e onl y amuse ourselves with words. 29. Bu t whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I fin d th e idea s actuall y perceived b y sens e hav e no t a lik e dependence o n m y will. When i n broad day-ligh t I ope n m y eyes, i t i s not i n my power t o choos e whethe r I shal l se e o r no, o r t o determin e wha t particula r object s shal l presen t themselves to my view; and s o likewise as to the hearin g an d other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will . Ther e i s therefor e som e othe r wil l o r spiri t tha t produces them . 30. Th e idea s of sense ar e mor e strong , lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effect s o f human wills often are, but in a regular train o r series , th e admirabl e connexio n whereo f sufficientl y testifies th e wisdo m and benevolenc e o f its Author. Now th e set rules or established methods, wherein the mind we depend on excite s i n u s th e idea s o f sense , ar e calle d th e Laws o f Nature: an d thes e w e learn b y experience , whic h teaches u s that suc h an d suc h idea s ar e attende d wit h suc h an d suc h other ideas , in the ordinar y course of things. 31. Thi s give s u s a sor t o f foresight , which enable s u s t o regulate ou r action s for the benefi t of life.* An d withou t this we should be eternally at a loss: we could not know how to act anything that might procure u s the leas t pleasure , o r remov e the leas t pai n of sense. That foo d nourishes , slee p refreshes , and fire warms us; that t o so w in the seed-tim e i s the wa y to reap in the harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive, all this we know, not by discoverin g an y necessar y connexio n betwee n ou r ideas , but onl y b y th e observatio n o f th e settle d law s o f Nature ,

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without which we should be al l in uncertainty and confusion , and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs o f life, tha n a n infan t just born. 32. An d ye t this consistent uniform working, which so evidently display s th e goodnes s an d wisdo m o f tha t governin g spirit whose will constitutes the Law s of Nature, is so far fro m leading our thoughts to him, that it rather send s them a wandering afte r secon d causes . Fo r whe n w e perceiv e certai n ideas o f sens e constantl y followe d b y othe r ideas , an d w e know thi s i s not o f ou r doing , w e forthwit h attribute powe r and agenc y to the idea s themselves, and make on e the caus e of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, fo r example , having observed tha t whe n we perceive b y sigh t a certain roun d luminou s figure , w e a t th e same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do fro m thenc e conclud e th e su n to be th e caus e of heat. And i n lik e manne r perceivin g th e motio n an d collisio n o f bodies to be attended wit h sound, we are inclined to think the latter a n effec t o f the former . 33. Th e idea s imprinte d o n th e sense s b y th e Autho r of Nature ar e calle d real things: and those excited i n the imagi nation bein g less regular, vivid an d constant , ar e more prop erly terme d ideas, o r images of things, which the y cop y an d represent. Bu t then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing . The idea s of sense ar e allowe d to have more realit y in them, that is , t o b e mor e strong , orderly , an d coheren t tha n th e creatures o f the mind ; but thi s is no argumen t that the y exist without the mind. They ar e als o less dependent o n the spirit , or thinkin g substance whic h perceives them , in that the y ar e excited b y th e wil l o f anothe r an d mor e powerfu l spirit : ye t still the y ar e ideas, an d certainl y n o idea, whether fain t o r strong, can exist otherwise tha n i n a mind perceiving it. 34. Befor e we proceed an y farther, it is necessary to spen d some tim e i n answerin g objection s whic h ma y probabl y b e made agains t the principle s hithert o lai d down . I n doin g of which, if I seem to o prolix to those o f quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, sinc e all men do not equally appre-

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hend thing s of this nature; and I am willing to be understoo d by everyone. First then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles , al l tha t i s rea l an d substantia l i n Natur e i s banished ou t o f th e world : and instea d thereo f a chimerica l scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind , that is , they ar e purel y notional . Wha t therefor e becomes o f the sun , moon, an d stars ? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Ar e al l these bu t s o many chimeras an d illusion s on the fancy ? T o al l which, an d whateve r els e o f the sam e sor t may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised, we are no t deprive d o f an y on e thin g i n Nature . Whateve r w e see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive o r understand, remains as secure a s ever, and is as real as ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinctio n between realitie s an d chimeras retain s its full force . This is evident from sects . 29, 30, and 33 , where we have shew n wha t i s mean t b y real things i n oppositio n t o chimeras, or idea s o f ou r ow n framing ; bu t the n the y bot h equally exist in the mind , and i n that sense ar e alik e ideas. 35. I d o no t argu e agains t th e existenc e o f an y on e thin g that we can apprehend, eithe r b y sense o r reflexion. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist , I mak e no t th e leas t question . Th e onl y thin g whose existence we deny, is that which philosophers call matter o r corporea l substance . An d i n doing o f this, there i s no damage don e t o th e res t o f mankind , who, I dar e say , will never mis s it. Th e atheis t indee d wil l wan t th e colou r o f a n empty name to support his impiety; and the philosophers may possibly find , the y hav e los t a grea t handl e fo r triflin g an d disputation. 36. I f an y ma n think s thi s detract s fro m th e existenc e o r reality of things, he i s very far fro m understandin g what hath been premise d i n th e plaines t term s I coul d thin k of . Tak e here a n abstrac t o f wha t ha s bee n said . Ther e ar e spiritua l substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves a t pleasure: bu t thes e ar e faint , weak , and un steady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being impressed upo n the m accordin g t o certai n rule s o r law s of Nature, speak themselves the effect s o f a mind more powerfu l

Principles: Part I 3

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and wis e tha n huma n spirits . Thes e latte r ar e sai d t o hav e more reality i n them tha n th e former : by which is meant tha t they ar e mor e affecting , orderly , an d distinct , an d tha t the y are no t fiction s o f th e min d perceivin g them . An d i n thi s sense, the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sens e here given o f reality, i t i s evident tha t ever y vegetable , star , mineral, an d i n genera l eac h par t o f th e mundan e system , i s as much a real being by our principle s as by any other. Whethe r others mean anythin g by the ter m reality differen t fro m what I do, I entreat the m to look int o their ow n thoughts an d see . 37. I t wil l be urge d tha t thu s much at leas t i s true, t o wit, that we take away all corporeal substances . To this my answer is, that if the wor d substance be taken in the vulga r sense, for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like; this we cannot be accused of taking away. But i f it b e take n i n a philosophi c sense , fo r th e suppor t o f accidents o r qualitie s withou t th e mind : the n indee d I ac knowledge tha t w e take i t away , i f one ma y b e sai d t o tak e away tha t whic h neve r ha d an y existence , no t eve n i n th e imagination. 38. But , sa y you, it sound s ver y hars h t o sa y w e ea t an d drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so, th e wor d idea no t bein g use d i n commo n discours e t o signify th e severa l combination s o f sensibl e qualities , which are calle d things: an d i t i s certain tha t an y expressio n whic h varies from th e familia r us e o f language, will seem harsh and ridiculous. Bu t thi s dot h no t concer n th e trut h o f th e pro position, which in other word s is no more tha n to say, we are fed an d clothed wit h those thing s which we perceive immediately b y ou r senses . Th e hardnes s o r softness , th e colour , taste, warmth, figure, and such like qualities, which combined together constitut e th e severa l sort s o f victuals and apparel , have bee n shew n t o exis t onl y i n th e min d tha t perceive s them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas', which word, i f i t wa s a s ordinaril y use d a s thing, would soun d n o harsher no r mor e ridiculou s than it . I a m no t fo r disputin g about the propriety, but th e trut h of the expression . If therefore yo u agre e wit h me tha t w e ea t an d drink , an d ar e cla d

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with th e immediat e object s o f sens e whic h canno t exis t unperceived o r withou t th e mind : I shal l readil y gran t i t is more prope r o r conformabl e t o custom , tha t the y shoul d b e called thing s rather tha n ideas. * 39. I f it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, and do no t rathe r i n compliance wit h custo m cal l them things . I answer, I do it for two reasons: first, because the term thing, in contradistinction t o idea, i s generall y suppose d t o denot e somewhat existin g without the mind: secondly, because thing hath a more comprehensiv e significatio n tha n idea, including spirits or thinking things as well as ideas. Sinc e therefore th e objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless an d inactive , I chos e t o mar k the m b y th e wor d idea, which implies those properties . 40. Bu t sa y what we can, someon e perhap s ma y be ap t t o reply, h e wil l stil l believ e hi s senses , an d neve r suffe r an y arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them . Be i t so, assert th e evidenc e of sense a s high a s you please, w e are willin g t o d o th e same . Tha t wha t I see , hea r and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived b y me, I no more doubt tha n I do o f my own being. But I d o no t se e how th e testimony of sense can be alleged, as a proof for the existenc e of anything , which is not perceive d b y sense. W e ar e no t fo r having any man turn sceptic, and disbelieve hi s senses; on th e contrary we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more opposite t o scepticism, than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearl y shewn . 41. Secondly , it will be objected tha t there is a great differ ence betwixt real fire, for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining one's self burnt, and actually being so: this and the like may be urged in opposition t o our tenets. T o all which th e answe r is evident fro m wha t hath bee n alread y said, and I shall only add in this place, that i f real fire be very different fro m th e ide a o f fire, so als o i s the rea l pai n tha t i t occasions, very different fro m th e ide a o f the sam e pain : an d yet nobod y wil l pretend tha t rea l pai n eithe r is , or ca n possibly be , i n a n unperceivin g thin g o r withou t th e mind , an y more than it s idea.

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42. Thirdly , i t wil l b e objecte d tha t w e se e thing s actually without o r a t a distance fro m us , and whic h consequently d o not exis t in the mind , it being absur d tha t thos e thing s which are see n a t the distanc e of several miles, should be as near t o us as our ow n thoughts. I n answe r t o this , I desir e i t may be considered, tha t i n a drea m w e d o of t perceiv e thing s a s existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledge d t o have their existence onl y in the mind . 43. Bu t fo r the fulle r clearin g of this point, it may be worth while t o consider , ho w i t i s tha t w e perceiv e distanc e an d things placed at a distance by sight. For that we should in truth see externa l space , an d bodie s actuall y existin g i n it , som e nearer, other s farthe r off, seems to carry with it some opposi tion to what hath been said, of their existing nowhere without the mind . The consideratio n o f this difficulty i t was, that gave birth to my Essay towards a new Theory o f Vision, which was published not lon g since. Wherein i t is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediatel y of itself perceived b y sight, nor yet apprehended o r judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hat h a necessar y connexio n wit h it : bu t tha t i t i s only suggested t o ou r thoughts , b y certai n visibl e idea s an d sen sations attendin g vision , whic h i n thei r ow n natur e hav e n o manner o f similitud e o r relation , eithe r wit h distance , o r things placed a t a distance. Bu t b y a connexion taugh t us by experience, the y come t o signify an d suggest them to us, afte r the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made t o stand for . Insomuch tha t a man born blind , and afterwards made to see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw, to be without his mind, or at any distance fro m him. See sect. 41 of the forementione d treatise . 44. Th e idea s of sight and touch make two species, entirely distinct an d heterogeneous . Th e forme r ar e mark s an d prognostics o f th e latter . Tha t th e prope r object s o f sigh t neither exis t without the mind, nor are the images of external things, wa s shewn eve n i n tha t treatise . Thoug h throughou t the same , th e contrar y b e suppose d tru e o f tangible objects : not that to suppose tha t vulgar error, was necessary for establishing the notion therein lai d down; but because it was beside

42 Principles:

Part I

my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concernin g vision. S o tha t i n stric t trut h th e idea s o f sight , whe n w e apprehend b y them distanc e and thing s placed a t a distance , do not sugges t or mark ou t t o us things actually existing at a distance, bu t onl y admonis h u s wha t idea s o f touc h wil l b e imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such and suc h actions . It is, I say, evident from wha t has been sai d in the foregoing parts of this treatise, and in sect. 147 , and elsewhere o f the essay concerning vision, that visibl e idea s ar e th e languag e whereb y th e governin g spirit, on whom we depend, informs us what tangible ideas he is abou t t o imprin t upo n us , i n cas e w e excit e thi s o r tha t motion i n our ow n bodies. Bu t fo r a fuller informatio n in this point, I refer to th e essa y itself. 45. Fourthly , i t wil l b e objecte d tha t fro m th e foregoin g principles it follows, things are every moment annihilate d an d created anew . The object s o f sense exis t only when the y ar e perceived: th e trees therefor e ar e in the garden, or the chairs in th e parlour , no longe r than while there is somebody b y to perceive them . Upo n shuttin g my eyes all the furniture in the room i s reduced t o nothing, an d barely upon openin g the m it is again created. I n answe r to al l which, I refer the reade r t o what ha s bee n sai d i n sects. 3 , 4, &c. and desir e h e wil l consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea, distinc t fro m it s being perceived. Fo r m y part, afte r th e nicest inquir y I coul d make , I a m no t abl e t o discove r tha t anything els e i s mean t b y thos e words . An d I onc e mor e entreat th e reade r t o soun d hi s own thoughts, an d not suffe r himself t o b e impose d o n b y words . I f h e ca n conceiv e i t possible eithe r fo r his ideas o r thei r archetype s t o exis t without being perceived, then I give up the cause: but if he cannot , he wil l acknowledge it is unreasonable fo r him to stan d up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend t o charge on me as an absurdity, the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom hav e no meaning in them. 46. I t wil l no t b e amis s to observe , ho w fa r th e receive d principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities . I t i s though t strangel y absur d tha t upon closin g m y eyelids , al l th e visibl e object s roun d m e

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should b e reduce d t o nothing; and yet is not thi s what philosophers commonl y acknowledge , whe n the y agre e o n al l hands, that ligh t and colours, which alone ar e the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mer e sensation s that exis t n o longer tha n the y ar e perceived ? Again , i t may to som e per haps see m ver y incredible , that thing s should b e ever y moment creating, yet this very notion i s commonly taught in the Schools. Fo r th e Schoolmen , thoug h the y acknowledg e th e existence o f matter , an d tha t th e whol e mundan e fabric k i s framed ou t o f it , ar e nevertheles s o f opinio n tha t i t canno t subsist withou t th e divin e conservation , whic h b y the m i s expounded t o be a continual creation. * 47. Farther , a little thought wil l discover to us, that thoug h we allow the existence of matter or corporeal substance , yet it will unavoidabl y follo w fro m th e principle s whic h ar e no w generally admitted , tha t th e particula r bodie s o f wha t kin d soever, d o non e o f them exis t whils t the y ar e no t perceived . For it is evident from sect , n an d the following sections , tha t the matte r philosopher s contend for , is an incomprehensibl e somewhat whic h hat h non e o f thos e particula r qualities , whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one fro m another . Bu t t o mak e thi s mor e plain , i t mus t b e remarked, that the infinite divisibility of matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerabl e philosophers, wh o o n th e receive d principle s demonstrat e i t beyond all exception. Hence it follows, that there is an infinite number o f part s i n eac h particl e o f matter , whic h ar e no t perceived b y sense. The reason therefore , that an y particular body seem s t o b e o f a finit e magnitude , o r exhibit s onl y a finite numbe r o f parts t o sense , i s not becaus e i t contains n o more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because th e sens e i s not acut e enoug h t o discer n them . I n proportion therefor e a s the sens e i s rendered mor e acute , it perceives a greater numbe r o f parts in the object , that is , the object appear s greater , and its figure varies , those part s i n its extremities which were before unperceivable , appearing now to boun d i t i n ver y differen t line s an d angle s fro m thos e perceived b y a n obtuse r sense . An d a t length , afte r variou s changes of size and shape , when the sens e becomes infinitel y

44 Principles:

Part I

acute, th e bod y shal l seem infinite . Durin g al l which there is no alteratio n i n th e body , bu t onl y i n the sense . Eac h bod y therefore considere d i n itself, i s infinitely extended , an d con sequently voi d o f al l shape o r figure . Fro m whic h it follows , that though we should grant the existence of matter to be ever so certain , ye t i t i s withal a s certain , th e materialist s them selves are by their own principles forced t o acknowledge, that neither th e particular bodies perceived by sense, nor anything like the m exist s withou t th e mind . Matter , I say , an d eac h particle thereo f i s according to them, infinite an d shapeless, * and i t is the min d that frames al l that variety of bodies whic h compose th e visibl e world , an y on e whereo f doe s no t exis t longer than i t is perceived. 48. I f we consider it, the objectio n proposed in sect. 45 will not b e foun d reasonabl y charge d o n th e principle s w e hav e premised, s o a s in truth t o mak e an y objection a t al l against our notions. For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we ma y no t henc e conclud e the y hav e n o existenc e excep t only while they are perceived by us, since there may be som e other spirit that perceives them, though we do not. Whereve r bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from th e fore going principles, that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, o r exis t not a t al l during the interval s between ou r perception o f them. 49. Fifthly , i t ma y perhap s b e objected , tha t i f extensio n and figur e exis t only i n the mind , i t follow s tha t th e min d is extended an d figured; since extension i s a mode o r attribute , which (to speak with the Schools ) is predicated o f the subjec t in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as the y ar e perceive d b y it , tha t is , not b y wa y o f mode o r attribute, but onl y by way of idea', and it no more follows, tha t the sou l o r min d i s extende d becaus e extensio n exist s i n i t alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are o n al l hand s acknowledge d t o exis t i n it , an d nowher e else. A s t o wha t philosophers sa y of subjec t an d mode , tha t seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this

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proposition, a die is hard, extended and square, they will have it tha t th e wor d di e denotes a subjec t o r substance , distinc t from th e hardness, extension an d figure, which are predicate d of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from thos e things which are termed it s mode s o r accidents . An d t o sa y a di e i s hard , extended an d square , i s not t o attribut e thos e qualitie s t o a subject distinc t from an d supportin g them , but onl y an explication o f the meanin g of the wor d die. 50. Sixthly , yo u wil l sa y ther e hav e bee n a grea t man y things explained by matter and motion: take awa y these, and you destro y th e whol e corpuscula r philosophy , an d under mine thos e mechanica l principle s whic h hav e bee n applie d with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, whatever advance s hav e bee n made , eithe r b y ancien t o r modern philosophers , i n the stud y of Nature, do al l procee d on th e supposition , tha t corporea l substanc e o r matte r dot h really exist . T o thi s I answer , tha t ther e i s no t an y on e phenomenon explaine d on that supposition, which may not as well be explaine d without it, as might easily be made appea r by a n induction of particulars. To explai n the phenomena , is all one a s to shew , why upon suc h and suc h occasions w e ar e affected wit h suc h an d suc h ideas . Bu t ho w matte r shoul d operate on a spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident, there can be no use of matter i n natural philosophy. Besides , they who attempt t o accoun t fo r things , do i t no t b y corporea l sub stance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth n o mor e tha n mere ideas, and therefore canno t b e th e cause o f anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25. 51. Seventhly , i t wil l upo n thi s b e demande d whethe r i t does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate operation o f spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but tha t a spiri t heats , an d s o forth . Woul d no t a ma n b e deservedly laughe d at , wh o should tal k afte r thi s manner ? I answer, he would so; in such things we ought to think with the learned, an d speak with th e vulgar* The y wh o t o demon stration ar e convinced of the trut h of the Copernica n system,

46 Principles:

Part I

do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun sets, or comes to the meridian: and if they affected a contrary style in common talk, it woul d withou t doub t appea r ver y ridiculous . A littl e reflexion o n wha t is here said wil l make it manifest, that th e common us e o f language would receiv e n o manne r o f alter ation o r disturbance from th e admissio n of our tenets . 52. I n th e ordinar y affair s o f life , an y phrase s ma y b e re tained, s o lon g a s the y excit e i n u s prope r sentiments , o r dispositions t o ac t i n suc h a manne r a s i s necessary fo r ou r well-being, how fals e soeve r the y may be , i f taken i n a strict and speculative sense. Nay this is unavoidable, since propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited t o the receive d opinions, which are not alway s the truest. Hence it is impossible, even i n the mos t rigi d philosophic reasonings , so far t o alter the bent an d genius of the tongu e w e speak, as never t o give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficultie s an d inconsistencies. Bu t a fair an d ingenuous reader wil l collect the sense , from th e scop e an d tenor an d connexion o f a discourse, making allowance s fo r thos e inaccurat e mode s o f speech , which use has made inevitable . 53. A s t o th e opinio n tha t ther e ar e n o corporea l causes , this ha s bee n heretofor e maintaine d b y som e o f th e Schoolmen, as it is of late by others amon g the modern philosophers,* wh o thoug h the y allo w matte r t o exist , ye t wil l have Go d alon e t o b e th e immediat e efficien t caus e o f al l things. These men saw , that amongst al l the object s of sense, there was none which had any power or activity included in it, and tha t b y consequenc e thi s wa s likewise true o f whatever bodies the y supposed t o exist without the mind, like unto th e immediate object s o f sense . Bu t then , tha t the y shoul d suppose an innumerable multitud e o f created beings, which they acknowledge ar e no t capabl e o f producing an y on e effec t i n Nature, an d which therefore ar e mad e to n o manner o f purpose, sinc e Go d migh t have don e everythin g as well without them; this I say, though we should allo w it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable an d extravagant supposition . 54. I n th e eight h place, th e universa l concurrent assen t of mankind may be thought by some, a n invincible argument in behalf o f matter, or the existenc e o f external things. Must we

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suppose th e whol e worl d t o b e mistaken ? An d i f so , what cause ca n b e assigne d o f so widespread an d predominan t a n error? I answer , first, that upo n a narrow inquiry, it wil l no t perhaps be found, so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of matter o r things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believ e tha t which involves a contradiction, o r has n o meaning i n it , i s impossible : and whethe r th e foregoin g expressions are not o f that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense indeed, men may be said to believe that matter exists , that is, they act as if the immediat e cause o f their sensations , whic h affect s the m ever y momen t and i s s o nearl y presen t t o them , wer e som e senseles s un thinking being . Bu t tha t the y shoul d clearl y apprehen d an y meaning marked b y those words , and for m thereo f a settle d speculative opinion, is what I am not abl e to conceive. This is not th e onl y instance wherei n men impos e upo n themselves, by imagining they believe those proposition s the y have ofte n heard, though a t bottom the y have no meaning in them. 55. Bu t secondly , though w e shoul d gran t a notio n t o b e ever s o universally and stedfastl y adhered to , ye t thi s i s bu t a wea k argumen t o f it s truth , t o whoeve r consider s wha t a vast number o f prejudices and fals e opinion s ar e everywher e embraced wit h the utmos t tenaciousness , by the unreflectin g (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when th e Antipode s an d motio n o f th e eart h wer e looke d upon a s monstrous absurdities , even by men o f learning: and if i t be considere d wha t a small proportion the y bear t o th e rest o f mankind, we shall find that a t thi s day, those notion s have gained but a very inconsiderable footin g in the world. 56. Bu t it is demanded, that we assign a cause of this prejudice, an d accoun t fo r it s obtainin g i n th e world . T o thi s I answer, tha t me n knowin g the y perceive d severa l ideas , whereof the y themselve s wer e no t th e authors , a s not bein g excited from within , nor dependin g on the operatio n o f their wills, this made them maintain , those ideas or objects of perception ha d a n existenc e independen t of , an d withou t th e mind, withou t eve r dreamin g tha t a contradictio n wa s in volved i n those words . But philosopher s having plainly seen, that the immediate objects of perception d o not exist without

48 Principles:

Part I

the mind , the y i n som e degre e correcte d th e mistak e o f th e vulgar, bu t a t th e sam e tim e ru n int o anothe r whic h seem s no les s absurd , t o wit , tha t ther e ar e certai n object s reall y existing withou t th e mind , o r havin g a subsistenc e distinc t from bein g perceived, o f which ou r idea s ar e onl y image s o r resemblances, imprinte d b y those object s o n th e mind . An d this notio n o f th e philosopher s owe s it s origi n t o th e sam e cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were no t th e author s o f thei r ow n sensations , whic h the y evidently kne w wer e imprinte d fro m without , an d whic h therefore mus t hav e some cause , distinct from th e mind s on which they ar e imprinted . 57. Bu t wh y they shoul d suppose th e idea s o f sense t o b e excited i n us by things in their likeness , an d no t rathe r hav e recourse t o spirit whic h alon e ca n act, may be accounte d for , first, because the y were not awar e of the repugnancy there is, as well i n supposing thing s like unt o ou r idea s existin g without, a s i n attributin g t o the m powe r o r activity . Secondly , because th e suprem e spiri t whic h excite s thos e idea s i n ou r minds, i s no t marke d ou t an d limite d t o ou r vie w b y an y particular finite collection o f sensible ideas , a s human agent s are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because hi s operation s ar e regula r an d uniform . Wheneve r the cours e o f Natur e i s interrupte d b y a miracle , me n ar e ready t o ow n the presenc e o f a superior agent . But whe n we see things go on in the ordinar y course , they do not excit e i n us any reflection; their orde r an d concatenation, thoug h it be an argument o f the greates t wisdom , power, an d goodnes s i n their Creator, i s yet so constant an d familiar t o us, that we do not think them the immediate effect s o f a free spirit: especially since inconstanc y an d mutabilit y i n acting , thoug h i t b e a n imperfection, i s looked o n a s a mark o f freedom . 58. Tenthly , i t wil l b e objected , tha t th e notion s w e ad vance, ar e inconsisten t wit h severa l soun d truth s i n philo sophy an d mathematics . Fo r example , th e motio n o f th e earth i s now universally admitted b y astronomers, a s a trut h grounded o n th e cleares t an d mos t convincin g reasons ; bu t on th e foregoin g principles , ther e ca n b e n o suc h thing . For motio n bein g onl y a n idea , i t follow s tha t i f i t b e no t

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perceived, i t exist s not ; bu t th e motio n o f th e eart h i s no t perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will b e found to agre e with the principle s we have premised : for th e question , whether th e eart h move s or no, amounts in reality to no more tha n this , to wit , whether w e have reaso n to conclud e fro m wha t hat h bee n observe d b y astronomers , that i f w e wer e place d i n suc h an d suc h circumstances , and such or such a position an d distance, both fro m th e eart h and sun , we should perceiv e th e forme r to mov e amon g th e choir o f th e planets , an d appearin g i n al l respect s lik e on e of them : an d this , by th e establishe d rule s o f Nature, which we hav e n o reaso n t o mistrust , is reasonably collecte d fro m the phenomena . 59. W e may, from th e experienc e w e have had o f the trai n and succession of ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures , bu t sur e an d well-grounde d predic tions, concerning the ideas we shall be affected with , pursuant to a grea t trai n o f actions , an d b e enable d t o pas s a right judgment of what would have appeared t o us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different fro m thos e we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of Nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from th e magnitude of the stars, or an y other discoverie s in astronomy o r Nature. 60. I n th e elevent h place , i t wil l b e demande d t o wha t purpose serve s tha t curiou s organizatio n o f plants , an d th e admirable mechanis m i n th e part s o f animals ; might not ve getables grow, and shoo t fort h leaves and blossoms, and ani mals perform all their motions, as well without as with all that variety o f interna l part s s o elegantl y contrive d an d pu t together, whic h being ideas have nothing powerful or opera tive i n them , no r hav e an y necessar y connexio n wit h th e effects ascribe d t o them ? I f i t b e a spiri t tha t immediatel y produces every effect b y a fiat, or act of his will, we must think all tha t i s fine and artificia l i n the works , whether o f man o r Nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath mad e th e sprin g an d wheels , an d ever y movemen t o f a watch , an d adjuste d the m i n suc h a manne r a s h e kne w

5O Principles:

Part I

would produce th e motions he designed; yet he must think all this don e t o n o purpose , an d tha t i t i s an intelligenc e which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day . If so, why may not the intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making th e movements , an d puttin g the m together ? Wh y does no t a n empt y cas e serv e a s well as another ? An d ho w comes it to pass, that whenever there i s any fault i n the going of a watch, there i s some correspondin g disorde r t o be found in th e movements , which being mended b y a skilfu l hand , all is right again ? Th e lik e ma y b e sai d o f al l th e clockwor k of Nature, great par t whereo f i s so wonderfully fine and subtle , as scarce t o be discerne d b y the bes t microscope . I n short, it will be asked , how upon ou r principles an y tolerable accoun t can b e given , o r an y fina l caus e assigne d o f a n innumerable multitude o f bodie s an d machine s frame d wit h th e mos t exquisite art , whic h i n th e commo n philosoph y hav e ver y apposite use s assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena . 61. T o al l whic h I answer , first , tha t thoug h ther e wer e some difficultie s relatin g to the administratio n of providence, and th e use s b y i t assigne d t o th e severa l part s o f Nature , which I coul d no t solv e b y th e foregoin g principles, ye t thi s objection coul d b e o f small weight against the trut h an d cer tainty of those thing s which may be proved a priori, with th e utmost evidence. Secondly, but neither ar e the received principles fre e fro m th e lik e difficulties ; fo r i t ma y stil l b e de manded, t o wha t en d Go d shoul d tak e thos e round-abou t methods o f effectin g thing s b y instrument s an d machines , which no one can deny might have been effected b y the mer e command o f hi s will , withou t al l tha t apparatus: nay , i f w e narrowly conside r it , w e shal l find the objectio n ma y b e re torted wit h greater forc e on thos e wh o hold th e existenc e of those machine s without the mind ; for i t ha s bee n mad e evident, tha t solidity , bulk, figure, motion an d the like , have no activity o r efficacy i n them , so a s to b e capabl e o f producing any on e effec t i n Nature . Se e sect . 25 . Whoever therefor e supposes the m t o exis t (allowin g th e suppositio n possible ) when they are not perceived, does it manifestly to no purpose; since th e onl y us e tha t i s assigne d t o them , a s the y exis t

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unperceived, i s that the y produc e thos e perceivabl e effects , which in truth cannot be ascribe d t o anythin g but spirit . 62. Bu t t o come neare r th e difficulty , i t must be observed , that thoug h th e fabricatio n of al l those part s an d organ s b e not absolutel y necessary to th e producin g any effect, ye t it is necessary t o th e producin g o f thing s i n a constant , regula r way, according to the Laws of Nature. There are certain general laws that ru n throug h the whol e chain of natural effects : these are learned by the observation and study of Nature, and are b y men applie d a s well to th e framin g artificia l thing s for the us e and ornamen t o f life, a s to the explainin g the various phenomena: whic h explicatio n consist s onl y i n shewin g th e conformity an y particula r phenomeno n hat h t o th e genera l Laws of Nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity ther e is in the productio n o f natural effects; a s will be eviden t to whoeve r shal l atten d t o th e severa l instances, wherein philosopher s preten d t o accoun t fo r appearances . That ther e i s a grea t an d conspicuou s us e i n thes e regula r constant method s o f workin g observe d b y th e Suprem e Agent, hat h bee n shew n in sect. 31. And i t is no les s visible, that a particular size, figure, motion and dispositio n of parts are necessary , thoug h no t absolutel y t o th e producin g an y effect, ye t t o th e producin g i t accordin g t o th e standin g mechanical Law s of Nature. Thus, fo r instance , i t cannot b e denied tha t God , o r the intelligenc e whic h sustains and rules the ordinar y cours e o f thing s might , i f h e wer e minde d t o produce a miracle, choose al l the motions on the dial-plat e of a watch, though nobody ha d eve r mad e the movements , and put the m i n it: but ye t i f he wil l ac t agreeabl y t o th e rule s of mechanism, by him for wise ends established an d maintained in the Creation , it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements an d rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that an y disorder i n them b e attende d wit h the perceptio n of some corresponding disorder i n the movements , which being once correcte d al l is right again. 63. I t may indeed on some occasions be necessary, that the Author o f Nature display his overruling power i n producing some appearanc e ou t o f th e ordinar y serie s o f things . Suc h

52 Principles:

Part I

exceptions fro m th e genera l rule s o f Natur e ar e prope r t o surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the Divine Being: bu t the n the y ar e t o b e use d bu t seldom , otherwis e there i s a plai n reaso n wh y the y shoul d fai l o f tha t effect . Besides, Go d seem s t o choos e th e convincin g our reaso n o f his attributes by the works of Nature, which discover so much harmony an d contrivanc e i n thei r make , an d ar e suc h plai n indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rathe r than to astonish us into a belief of his being by anomalous and surprising events . 64. T o se t this matter in a yet clearer light , I shall observe that what has been objected i n sect. 60 amounts i n reality to no mor e tha n this : idea s ar e no t anyho w an d a t rando m produced, there being a certain order and connexion betwee n them, lik e to tha t o f cause an d effect : ther e ar e als o severa l combinations o f them , mad e i n a ver y regula r an d artificia l manner, which seem like so many instruments in the han d of Nature, tha t bein g hi d a s i t wer e behin d th e scenes , hav e a secret operatio n i n producin g thos e appearance s whic h ar e seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. Bu t since one idea cannot b e th e caus e o f another , t o wha t purpos e i s tha t connexion? And since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions i n th e mind , ar e no t subservien t t o th e production o f natura l effects ; i t i s demande d wh y the y ar e made, or , i n othe r words , what reaso n ca n b e assigne d why God shoul d make us, upon a close inspection int o his works, behold so great variety of ideas, so artfully lai d together, an d so much according to rule; it not being credible, that he would be a t th e expens e (i f on e ma y s o speak ) o f al l tha t ar t an d regularity to no purpose ? 65. T o al l which my answer is, first, that th e connexio n of ideas does not impl y the relatio n o f cause and effect, bu t onl y of a mark or sign with the thing signified. Th e fire which I see is not th e caus e o f the pai n I suffe r upo n m y approaching it , but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner, the noise that I hear i s not th e effec t o f this or that motion or collision of th e ambien t bodies , bu t th e sig n thereof . Secondly , th e reason wh y ideas ar e forme d into machines , that is , artificia l

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and regular combinations, is the same with that for combinin g letters int o words. That a few original ideas may be made t o signify a grea t numbe r o f effect s an d actions , it i s necessary they be variously combined together: and to the end their use be permanen t an d universal , thes e combination s mus t b e made by rule, and with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are t o expec t fro m suc h and suc h actions, and what method s are proper t o b e taken , for th e excitin g such an d suc h ideas : which i n effec t i s all tha t I conceiv e t o b e distinctl y meant, when i t i s sai d tha t b y discernin g th e figure , texture , an d mechanism o f the inwar d parts o f bodies, whether natura l o r artificial, we may attain to know the severa l uses and proper ties depending thereon, o r the natur e o f the thing . 66. Henc e i t is evident, tha t thos e thing s which under th e notion o f a caus e co-operatin g o r concurrin g t o th e pro duction of effects, ar e altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper an d obviou s us e assigne d them , whe n the y ar e con sidered onl y as marks or sign s for ou r information . And i t is the searchin g after , an d endeavourin g t o understan d thos e signs instituted by the Author o f Nature, that ought to be the employment o f the natural philosopher, and not the pretending t o explai n thing s b y corporea l causes ; whic h doctrin e seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise spirit, in whom we live, move, and have our being* 67. I n th e twelft h place , i t ma y perhap s b e objected , tha t though i t b e clea r fro m wha t ha s bee n said , tha t ther e ca n be n o suc h thin g a s a n inert , senseless , extended , solid , figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind , such as philosopher s describ e matter : ye t i f an y ma n shal l leav e out of his idea of matter, the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word, an iner t senseles s substance , tha t exist s withou t th e mind , or unperceived , whic h i s th e occasio n o f ou r ideas , o r a t the presenc e whereo f Go d i s pleased t o excit e idea s i n us: it doth no t appear , bu t tha t matte r take n i n thi s sens e ma y possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems n o

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less absur d to suppose a substance withou t accidents, tha n it is t o suppos e accident s withou t a substance . Bu t secondly , though we should grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet wher e ca n i t be suppose d t o be ? Tha t i t exist s no t in the min d is agreed, and tha t i t exists not i n place i s no less certain; sinc e al l extensio n exist s only i n th e mind , a s hat h been alread y proved. I t remain s therefor e tha t i t exist s no where a t all. 68. Le t us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this i s al l tha t i s mean t b y sayin g i t i s a n inert , senseless , unknown substance; which is a definition entirely mad e up of negatives, exceptin g onl y th e relativ e notion o f it s standing under o r supporting : bu t the n i t mus t b e observed , tha t i t supports nothin g a t all ; an d ho w nearl y thi s come s t o th e description o f a non-entity, I desire ma y be considered . But , say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the presenc e of which, ideas are excite d in us by the wil l of God.* Now I would fai n know ho w anythin g ca n b e presen t t o us , whic h i s neithe r perceivable by sense no r reflexion , no r capabl e o f producing any ide a i n ou r minds , no r i s a t al l extended , no r hat h an y form, no r exist s in an y place. The word s to be present, when thus applied , mus t need s b e take n i n som e abstrac t an d strange meaning, and which I am not abl e to comprehend . 69. Again , let us examine what is meant by occasion: so far as I can gather from th e commo n us e of language, that word signifies, eithe r th e agen t whic h produces an y effect , o r els e something tha t i s observed t o accompany , or g o before it, in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses . For matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent o r efficien t cause . I t i s als o unperceivable , a s bein g devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasio n of our perceptions i n the latter sense: as when the burning my finger i s sai d t o b e th e occasio n o f th e pai n tha t attend s it . What therefor e can be mean t b y calling matter a n occasion 1? This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some sense very distant from it s received signification .

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70. Yo u wil l perhap s sa y tha t matter , thoug h i t b e no t perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasio n o f excitin g ideas i n ou r minds . For , sa y you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there ar e certain constan t an d regula r occasion s o f thei r bein g pro duced. Tha t i s to say , that ther e ar e certai n permanen t an d distinct parcels of matter, corresponding t o ou r ideas , which, though the y d o no t excit e the m i n ou r minds , o r an y way s immediately affec t us , a s bein g altogethe r passiv e an d unperceivable t o us, they are nevertheless t o God , b y whom they ar e perceived , a s it wer e s o many occasion s t o remin d him whe n an d wha t idea s t o imprin t o n ou r minds : that s o things may go on in a constant uniform manner. 71. I n answer to this I observe, that as the notion of matter is here stated , the questio n i s no longer concernin g the existence o f a thing distinct from spirit an d idea, from perceivin g and being perceived: but whether there ar e not certain ideas, of I kno w not wha t sort , i n th e min d o f God , whic h ar e s o many mark s o r note s tha t direc t hi m ho w t o produc e sen sations in our minds, in a constant and regular method: much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music t o produc e tha t harmoniou s trai n an d compositio n of sound, which is called a tune] thoug h they who hear the music do no t perceiv e th e notes , an d ma y b e entirel y ignoran t of them. Bu t thi s notio n o f matte r seem s to o extravagan t t o deserve a confutation . Besides , i t i s i n effec t n o objectio n against what we have advanced, to wit, that there is no senseless, unperceived substance. 72. I f w e follo w th e ligh t o f reason , w e shall , fro m th e constant uniform metho d o f our sensations , collect th e goodness an d wisdom of the spirit wh o excites them i n our minds. But this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence . To me , I say , it i s evident that th e bein g o f a spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful i s abundantly sufficient t o explain all the appearance s o f Nature. Bu t a s for inert senseless matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads t o th e thought s o f it . An d I woul d fai n se e anyon e

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explain any the meanest phenomenon in Nature by it, or shew any manne r o f reason , thoug h i n th e lowes t ran k o f prob ability, that h e ca n have fo r it s existence; o r eve n mak e an y tolerable sens e o r meanin g o f that supposition . Fo r a s to it s being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion: it remains therefore that it must be, i f at all , the occasio n t o Go d o f exciting ideas i n us ; an d what this amounts to, we have just now seen . 73. I t is worth while to reflect a little on the motive s which induced me n t o suppos e th e existenc e of material substance ; that so having observed the gradual ceasing, and expiration of those motive s o r reasons , w e ma y proportionabl y withdraw the assen t that was grounded o n them. First therefore , i t was thought tha t colour , figure, motion, an d th e res t o f the sen sible qualities or accidents , did really exist without the mind ; and fo r thi s reason , i t seeme d needfu l to suppos e som e un thinking substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they coul d no t b e conceive d t o exis t b y themselves . After wards, in process o f time, men bein g convinced that colours , sounds, and the rest of the sensible secondary qualities had no existence withou t the mind , they strippe d thi s substratum o r material substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and such like, which they still conceived to exis t without the mind , and consequently to stan d in need of a materia l support . Bu t i t havin g been shewn , that none , even o f these, ca n possibly exist otherwise than i n a spirit or mind which perceives them, it follows tha t we have no longer any reaso n t o suppos e th e bein g o f matter. Nay , tha t i t i s utterly impossible there should b e an y such thing, so long as that wor d i s take n t o denot e a n unthinking substratum o f qualities or accidents , wherein the y exist without the mind. 74. Bu t though it be allowed by the materialists themselves, that matte r wa s though t o f onl y fo r th e sak e o f supportin g accidents; and th e reaso n entirel y ceasing, one migh t expec t the min d should naturally , and without an y reluctance a t all, quit th e belie f o f what was solely grounded thereon . Yet th e prejudice i s rivete d s o deepl y i n ou r thoughts , tha t w e ca n scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itsel f i s indefensible , a t leas t t o retai n th e name',

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which we apply to I know not wha t abstracted an d indefinite notions o f being, o r occasion, thoug h withou t an y she w o r reason, a t leas t s o far a s I ca n see . Fo r wha t i s there o n ou r part, or what do we perceive amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions, which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, fro m whenc e ma y b e inferre d th e existenc e o f a n inert, thoughtless , unperceived occasion ? an d o n th e othe r hand, on the par t o f an all-sufficient spirit, what can there b e that should make us believe, or even suspect, he is directed by an inert occasio n t o excit e ideas in our minds? 75. I t is a very extraordinary instance of the forc e of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind o f man retains so grea t a fondness agains t al l the evidenc e o f reason, fo r a stupid thoughtles s somewhat, b y the interpositio n whereof it would, a s it were , scree n itsel f fro m th e providenc e o f God , and remov e him farther off from th e affair s o f the world . But though we do the utmost we can, to secure the belief of matter, though whe n reaso n forsake s us , w e endeavou r t o suppor t our opinio n o n th e bar e possibilit y of the thing , and thoug h we indulge ourselve s in th e ful l scop e o f a n imaginatio n no t regulated by reason, to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot o f al l is, that ther e ar e certai n unknown ideas i n th e mind o f God; fo r this , if anything, is all that I conceive t o b e meant b y occasion with regar d t o God . An d this , at th e bot tom, is no longer contendin g for the thing, but fo r the name. 76. Whethe r therefor e ther e ar e suc h ideas in the min d of God, an d whethe r the y may be calle d by the nam e matter, I shall not dispute . But i f you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance , o r suppor t o f extension , motion , an d othe r sensible qualities , then t o m e i t is most evidentl y impossible there should be any such thing. Since it is a plain repugnancy, that thos e qualitie s shoul d exis t i n o r b e supporte d b y a n unperceiving substance. 77. Bu t sa y you , thoug h i t b e grante d tha t ther e i s n o thoughtless suppor t o f extension , an d th e othe r qualitie s or accident s whic h w e perceive; yet ther e may , perhaps, b e some iner t unperceivin g substance , o r substratum o f som e other qualities , as incomprehensible to us as colours ar e t o a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them.

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But i f we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doub t of thei r existence, tha n a blind ma n mad e t o se e does of th e existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean by the word matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, i t i s n o matte r whethe r ther e i s suc h a thin g o r no, since it no way concerns us: and I do not see the advantage there i s in disputin g about w e know not what, and w e know not why. 78. Bu t secondly , i f w e ha d a ne w sense , i t coul d onl y furnish u s with new idea s o r sensations : an d the n w e should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceivin g substance, tha t ha s bee n alread y offere d wit h relatio n t o figure, motion, colour , an d th e like . Qualities, a s hath bee n shewn, ar e nothin g els e bu t sensations o r ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas w e ar e acquainte d wit h at present , bu t likewis e o f all possible idea s whatsoever. 79. Bu t yo u will insist, what if I have no reaso n t o believ e the existence of matter, what if I cannot assign any use to it, or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? Yet still it is no contradiction to say that matter exists, and tha t thi s matte r i s in general a substance, or occasion of ideas', though , indeed, t o g o about t o unfold the meaning , or adhere t o an y particular explicatio n o f those words , ma y b e attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together a s you please, without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example , tha t twice two i s equal t o seven, s o long a s you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, bu t fo r marks of you know not what . An d by the sam e reason yo u may say, there is an inert thoughtless substance withou t accidents , whic h i s th e occasio n o f ou r ideas. An d w e shal l understan d jus t a s muc h b y on e pro position, as the other . 80. I n th e las t place , yo u wil l say , what i f we giv e up th e cause o f materia l substance , an d assert , tha t matte r i s a n unknown somewhat, neither substance no r accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing i n n o place ? For , sa y you, whateve r ma y b e urge d

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against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion o f matter, hath no place a t all, so long as this negative definition o f matter i s adhered to . I answer , you may , if so it shall seem good , use the wor d matter in the sam e sense , tha t other me n use nothing, and so make those terms convertibl e in your style. For afte r all , this is what appears to me to be th e result o f tha t definition , th e part s whereo f whe n I conside r with attention , eithe r collectively , o r separat e fro m eac h other, I d o no t fin d tha t ther e i s an y kin d o f effec t o r im pression mad e o n my mind, different fro m wha t is excited by the term nothing. 81. Yo u will reply perhaps, that in the foresaid definitio n is included, wha t dot h sufficientl y distinguis h i t fro m nothing , the positive , abstract ide a o f quiddity, entity, o r existence. I own indeed, tha t those who pretend to the faculty o f framin g abstract genera l ideas , d o tal k a s i f the y ha d suc h a n idea , which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all, that i s to m e th e mos t incomprehensibl e o f al l others. Tha t there ar e a grea t variet y o f spirit s o f differen t order s an d capacities, whos e faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding those the Autho r of my being has bestowed o n me, I see no reason t o deny. And for me to pretend t o determin e by m y ow n few , stinted , narro w inlet s o f perception , wha t ideas the inexhaustibl e power of the Suprem e Spirit may imprint upo n them , wer e certainl y th e utmos t foll y an d pre sumption. Sinc e ther e ma y be , fo r augh t tha t I know , innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different fro m on e another, an d fro m al l tha t I hav e perceived , a s colour s ar e from sounds . But how ready soever I may be, to acknowledge the scantines s of my comprehension, wit h regard t o the end less variety o f spirits and ideas , tha t migh t possibly exist , yet for an y on e t o preten d t o a notio n o f entit y o r existence , abstracted fro m spirit an d idea, fro m perceivin g an d bein g perceived, is , I suspect , a downrigh t repugnancy and triflin g with words. It remains that we consider the objections, which may possibl y be mad e o n the par t o f religion. 82. Som e there are* who think, that though the arguments for th e real existence of bodies, which are drawn from reason , be allowe d no t t o amoun t t o demonstration , ye t th e Hol y

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Scriptures ar e s o clea r i n th e point , a s wil l sufficientl y con vince ever y goo d Christian , tha t bodie s d o reall y exist , an d are somethin g mor e tha t mer e ideas ; ther e bein g i n Hol y Writ innumerabl e fact s related , whic h evidently suppose th e reality of timber, an d stone, mountains, and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer, that no sort of writings whatever, sacre d o r profane , whic h us e thos e an d th e lik e words in the vulgar acceptation, o r so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine . Tha t al l those thing s d o really exist , that ther e are bodies , eve n corporea l substances , whe n take n i n th e vulgar sense , ha s bee n show n t o b e agreeabl e t o ou r prin ciples: an d th e differenc e betwix t things an d ideas, realities and chimeras, ha s bee n distinctl y explained. An d I d o no t think, that eithe r wha t philosophers cal l matter, or th e existence o f object s withou t the mind , i s anywhere mentioned i n Scripture. 83. Again , whethe r ther e be , o r b e no t externa l things , it is agree d o n al l hands , that th e prope r us e o f words , i s th e marking ou t conceptions , o r thing s onl y a s the y ar e know n and perceive d b y us ; whenc e i t plainl y follows , tha t i n the tenet s w e hav e lai d down , ther e i s nothing inconsisten t with th e righ t us e an d significanc y o f language, and tha t dis course o f what kind soever, s o far a s it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. Bu t al l this seem s s o manifest, fro m wha t hat h been set forth in the premises , that it is needless t o insist any farther o n it. 84. Bu t it will be urged, that miracles do, at least, lose much of thei r stres s an d impor t b y ou r principles . Wha t mus t w e think of Moses's rod, was it not really turne d into a serpent, or was ther e onl y a chang e o f ideas i n th e mind s o f th e spec tators? And can it be supposed, tha t our Saviour did no mor e at th e marriage-feas t in Cana , tha n impos e o n the sight , and smell, and tast e of the guests , so as to creat e in the m the appearance o r idea only of wine? The sam e may be said of all other miracles : which, in consequence o f the foregoin g principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusion of fancy . T o this I reply, that the ro d wa s changed into a real serpent, an d th e wate r int o rea l wine . That thi s dot h not , in

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the least , contradic t wha t I hav e elsewher e said , will be evi dent fro m sects . 3 4 and 35 . But thi s business o f real an d im aginary hat h been already so plainly and full y explained , an d so often referre d to , an d th e difficultie s abou t i t are s o easily answered from wha t hath gone before, that it were a n affron t to the reader' s understanding , to resume th e explicatio n o f it in this place. I shall only observe, tha t if at table al l who were present shoul d see , an d smell, and taste, an d drink wine, and find the effect s o f it, with me ther e coul d b e n o doub t o f its reality. S o that, a t bottom , th e scrupl e concernin g rea l mir acles hat h n o plac e a t al l on ours , bu t onl y on th e receive d principles, an d consequentl y maket h rathe r for, tha n against what hath been said . 85. Havin g done wit h the objections , which I endeavoure d to propos e i n the cleares t light , and gav e the m al l the forc e and weight I could, we proceed i n the next place to take a view of ou r tenet s i n their consequences . Som e o f these appea r a t first sight, a s that severa l difficul t an d obscur e questions , o n which abundanc e o f speculation hat h bee n throw n away , are entirely banishe d fro m philosophy . Whethe r corporea l sub stance can think? Whether matte r be infinitely divisible? And how i t operate s o n spirit ? thes e an d th e lik e inquirie s hav e given infinite amusemen t t o philosophers i n all ages. But de pending o n th e existenc e o f matter, they have n o longe r an y place on our principles. Many other advantage s there are , as well wit h regar d t o religion a s th e sciences, which i t i s eas y for anyon e to deduce from wha t hath been premised. Bu t this will appear mor e plainl y in the sequel . 86. Fro m the principle s w e have lai d down , it follows, hu man knowledg e may naturally be reduced t o two heads, that of ideas, and tha t o f spirits. O f eac h o f thes e I shal l trea t i n order. An d firs t a s to idea s o r unthinkin g things, ou r knowledge o f thes e hat h bee n ver y muc h obscure d an d con founded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence o f the object s of sense, the on e intelligible, o r i n th e mind , th e othe r real an d withou t th e mind: whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence o f their own , distinct from bein g perceived b y spirits. This which , if I mistake not, hat h been shew n to b e a

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most groundless an d absur d notion , is the ver y root of scepticism', fo r s o lon g a s me n though t tha t rea l thing s subsiste d without th e mind , and tha t thei r knowledg e wa s only s o far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows, they could no t b e certain tha t the y had an y real knowledg e at all. For how can it be known, that the things which are perceived, are conformabl e t o thos e whic h ar e no t perceived , o r exis t without the mind? 87. Colour , figure , motion , extensio n an d th e like , con sidered onl y as so many sensations in the mind , are perfectly known, there bein g nothin g in them whic h is not perceived . But if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes* existin g without the mind, then are we involved all i n scepticism. W e se e onl y th e appearances , an d no t th e real qualities of things. What may be the extension , figure, o r motion o f anythin g reall y an d absolutely , o r i n itself , i t i s impossible fo r u s t o know , bu t onl y th e proportio n o r th e relation the y bear t o our senses . Things remainin g the same , our idea s vary , an d whic h of them , o r eve n whethe r an y of them a t al l represen t th e tru e qualit y reall y existin g i n th e thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, al l we see , hear , an d feel , ma y b e onl y phanto m an d vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things, existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows, fro m ou r suppos ing a difference betwee n things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, or unperceived. I t were easy t o dilat e o n thi s subject , an d she w ho w th e argument s urged b y sceptics i n al l ages , depen d o n th e suppositio n o f external objects . 88. S o long a s we attribut e a real existenc e t o unthinking ' things, distinct from thei r bein g perceived , i t i s not onl y impossible fo r u s to kno w with evidence the natur e of any real unthinking being, but eve n that i t exists. Hence it is, that we see philosophers distrust thei r senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, eve n of their own bodies. And afte r al l their labour an d struggle of thought, they are forced to own, we cannot attai n to any self evident o r demonstrativ e knowledg e of the existenc e o f sensible things. But al l this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and

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confounds the mind, and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes o f th e world , vanishes , i f w e anne x a meanin g t o ou r words, an d d o no t amus e ourselve s wit h the term s absolute, external, exist, and suc h like , signifyin g w e know not what . I can a s well doubt o f my ow n being , a s of th e bein g o f those things which I actuall y perceive b y sense: i t being a manifest contradiction, that an y sensible objec t should be immediately perceived b y sigh t o r touch , an d a t th e sam e tim e hav e n o existence i n Nature, since the very existence o f an unthinking being consists in being perceived. 89. Nothin g seems of more importance , toward s erecting a firm system of sound an d real knowledge, which may be proof against the assault s of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinc t explicatio n o f what is meant b y thing, reality, existence: for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existenc e of things, or pretend t o an y knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meanin g of those words . Thing or being is the mos t genera l nam e o f all , i t comprehend s unde r i t tw o kinds entirel y distinc t an d heterogeneous , an d whic h hav e nothing common but th e name , to wit , spirits an d ideas. The former ar e active, indivisible substances: th e latte r ar e inert, fleeting, dependent beings, whic h subsis t no t b y themselves , but are supported by , or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehen d ou r ow n existenc e b y inwar d feelin g o r reflexion, and that of other spirit s by reason.* We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas . In lik e manne r w e know an d hav e a notio n o f relations be tween thing s o r ideas , whic h relation s ar e distinc t fro m th e ideas o r thing s related , inasmuc h a s th e latte r ma y b e per ceived b y u s withou t ou r perceivin g th e former . T o m e i t seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respectiv e kinds, th e objec t o f huma n knowledg e an d subjec t o f dis course: an d that the term idea would be improperly extende d to signif y everythin g we know or hav e an y notion of . 90. Idea s imprinte d o n th e sense s ar e rea l things , or d o really exist; this we do not deny , but we deny they can subsist without th e mind s whic h perceive them , o r tha t the y ar e re semblances of any archetypes existing without the mind: since

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the ver y bein g o f a sensatio n o r ide a consist s i n bein g per ceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin, in that the y are not generated fro m within , by the min d itself , bu t imprinte d b y a spiri t distinc t fro m tha t which perceive s them. Sensibl e object s may likewis e be sai d to be withou t the mind , in another sense , namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but i t must be i n another mind. * 91. I t were a mistake to think, that what is here said dero gates in the least from th e reality of things. It is acknowledged on th e receive d principles , tha t extension , motion , an d i n a word al l sensibl e qualities , hav e nee d o f a support , a s no t being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense, are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, an d consequentl y canno t subsis t b y themselves . Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived b y sense, a n existence independent o f a substance, or suppor t wherei n the y ma y exist , we detract nothin g fro m the receive d opinio n o f thei r reality, an d ar e guilt y o f n o innovation in that respect. All the difference is , that according to us the unthinking beings perceived by sense, have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exis t in an y othe r substance , tha n thos e unextended , indivisible substances, or spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them: whereas philosophers vulgarly hold, that the sensible qualities exist i n a n inert , extended , unperceivin g substance , whic h they call matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior t o al l thinkin g beings , o r distinc t fro m bein g per ceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eterna l mind of the Creator, wherei n the y suppos e onl y idea s o f th e corporea l substances created b y him: if indeed the y allow them t o be at all created . 92. Fo r a s we hav e shew n th e doctrin e o f matte r o r cor poreal substance, to have been the main pillar and support of scepticism, s o likewise upon th e sam e foundatio n have been raised all the impiou s schemes of atheism and irreligion. Nay so great a difficulty hat h i t been thought , to conceiv e matte r produced ou t of nothing, that the most celebrated amon g the

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ancient philosophers, eve n of these who maintained the being of a God, have thought matter to be uncreated an d coeternal* with him. How great a friend materia l substance hath been to atheists i n al l ages , wer e needles s t o relate . Al l thei r mon strous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence o n it, tha t whe n thi s corner-ston e i s onc e removed , th e whol e fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer worthwhile, to bestow a particular consideration o n the absurditie s o f every wretched sec t o f atheists. 93. Tha t impiou s an d profan e person s shoul d readil y fal l in with those system s which favour thei r inclinations , by de riding immateria l substance , an d supposin g th e sou l t o b e divisible and subject to corruption a s the body; which exclude all freedom , intelligence , an d desig n fro m th e formatio n of things, an d instea d thereo f mak e a self-existent , stupid, un thinking substance the root and origin of all beings. That the y should hearken to those who deny a providence, or inspection of a superior mind over the affair s o f the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity, arising fro m th e impuls e o f on e bod y o n another . Al l thi s is very natural. And o n th e othe r hand , when me n o f bette r principles observe the enemie s o f religion lay so great a stress on unthinking matter, and al l o f the m us e s o muc h industry and artific e t o reduc e everythin g to it ; methinks they shoul d rejoice t o se e the m deprive d o f thei r gran d support , an d driven fro m tha t onl y fortress , withou t whic h you r Epi cureans, Hobbists, an d the like , have not eve n th e shado w of a pretence , bu t becom e th e mos t chea p an d eas y triumph i n the world. 94. Th e existenc e o f matter , o r bodie s unperceived , ha s not only been the main support o f atheists and fatalists, bu t o n the sam e principl e dot h idolatry likewis e i n al l it s variou s forms depend. Di d men but consider tha t the sun, moon, and stars, and ever y other objec t o f the senses , ar e onl y so many sensations i n their minds , which have no othe r existenc e bu t barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down, and worship their own ideas', but rather address their homage to tha t eterna l invisibl e Min d whic h produce s an d sustain s all things.*

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95. Th e sam e absur d principle, by mingling itself with th e articles o f ou r faith , hat h occasione d n o smal l difficulties t o Christians. Fo r example , abou t th e resurrection, how man y scruples an d objection s hav e been raise d b y Socinians * an d others? But do not th e most plausible of them depend o n the supposition, that a body is denominated th e same, with regard not t o th e for m o r tha t whic h is perceived b y sense, bu t th e material substanc e whic h remain s th e sam e unde r severa l forms? Tak e awa y this material substance, about th e identity whereof al l the dispute is, and mean by body what every plain ordinary perso n mean s b y tha t word , t o wit , that whic h is immediately see n an d felt , whic h i s onl y a combinatio n o f sensible qualities, or ideas: and then their most unanswerable objections com e t o nothing. 96. Matte r being once expelled out of Nature, drags with it so man y sceptica l an d impiou s notions , suc h a n incredibl e number o f disputes and puzzling questions, which have bee n thorns i n th e side s o f divines , as wel l a s philosophers , an d made s o muc h fruitles s wor k fo r mankind ; that i f the argu ments w e hav e produce d agains t it , ar e no t foun d equa l t o demonstration (as to me they evidently seem) yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion, have reason to wish they were. 97. Besid e th e externa l existence o f the object s of perception, anothe r grea t sourc e o f errors an d difficulties , wit h re gard to ideal knowledge, is the doctrin e of abstract ideas, such as i t hat h bee n se t fort h i n th e Introduction . Th e plaines t things in the world , those w e are mos t intimately acquainted with, an d perfectl y know , whe n the y ar e considere d i n a n abstract way, appear strangely difficult an d incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken i n particular o r concrete, ar e what everybody knows; but havin g passed throug h the hand s of a metaphysician, they become to o abstrac t an d fine, to b e apprehended b y me n o f ordinar y sense . Bi d you r servan t meet you at such a time, in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberat e o n th e meanin g o f thos e words : i n conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither , h e find s no t th e leas t difficulty . Bu t i f time b e

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taken, exclusive of all those particular action s and idea s that diversify th e day , merely for the continuatio n of existence, or duration i n abstract, then i t will perhaps grave l even a philosopher t o comprehend it . 98. Wheneve r I attemp t t o fram e a simpl e ide a o f time, abstracted fro m th e successio n o f idea s i n m y mind , which flows uniformly, and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled i n inextricable difficulties . I have no notio n o f it at all, only I hear others say, it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence : since that doctrin e lay s one unde r a n absolut e necessity of thinking, either tha t he passes away innumerable ages withou t a thought , o r els e tha t h e i s annihilate d every moment o f hi s life : bot h whic h see m equall y absurd . Tim e therefore bein g nothing , abstracte d fro m th e successio n o f ideas i n our minds, * it follows that th e duratio n o f any finite spirit mus t b e estimate d b y th e numbe r o f idea s o r action s succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence it is a plain consequence tha t the soul always thinks:* and in truth whoever shall go about t o divid e in his thoughts, or abstrac t the existence of a spirit from it s cogitation, will, I believe, find it no eas y task. 99. S o likewise, when we attempt to abstract extension and motion fro m al l other qualities , an d conside r the m b y themselves, w e presentl y los e sigh t o f them , an d ru n int o grea t extravagancies. All which depend o n a two-fol d abstraction : first, it i s supposed tha t extension , fo r example , ma y b e ab stracted fro m al l other sensibl e qualities ; an d secondly , tha t the entit y of extension may be abstracte d fro m it s being per ceived. But whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what h e says , will , i f I mistak e not , acknowledg e tha t al l sensible qualitie s ar e alik e sensations, an d alik e real, tha t where th e extensio n is , there i s the colou r too , t o wit , in his mind, an d tha t thei r archetype s ca n exist only in some othe r mind: an d tha t th e object s o f sens e ar e nothin g bu t thos e sensations combined , blended, o r (i f one ma y so speak) concreted together : non e o f al l which can b e suppose d t o exis t unperceived.

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TOO. Wha t i t is for a man t o b e happy, o r a n object good, * everyone ma y think h e knows. But to fram e a n abstract ide a of happiness, prescinde d fro m al l particula r pleasure , o r o f goodness, from everythin g that i s good, thi s i s what few ca n pretend to . S o likewise , a ma n ma y b e jus t an d virtuous , without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinio n that thos e an d th e lik e words stan d fo r genera l notion s ab stracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality difficult, an d the study thereof of less use to mankind. And i n effect, th e doctrin e of abstraction has not a little contribute d toward s spoilin g th e mos t usefu l part s o f knowledge. 101. Th e tw o grea t province s o f speculativ e science , con versant abou t idea s receive d fro m sens e an d thei r relations , are natural philosophy an d mathematics', with regard t o eac h of these I shall make some observations. And first, I shall say somewhat of natural philosophy. On this subject it is, that th e sceptics triumph : all that stoc k o f arguments they produce t o depreciate our faculties, and make mankin d appear ignoran t and low, are drawn principally from thi s head, to wit, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with th e outsid e an d she w o f things . Th e rea l essence , th e internal qualities , an d constitutio n o f every th e meanes t ob ject, is hid fro m ou r view ; something there is in every drop of water, ever y grain o f sand , which i t i s beyond th e powe r o f human understandin g t o fatho m o r comprehend . Bu t i t i s evident fro m wha t has been shewn , that al l this complaint is groundless, an d tha t w e are influence d by false principles t o that degre e a s t o mistrus t ou r senses , an d thin k w e kno w nothing o f those things which we perfectly comprehend . 102. On e grea t inducemen t t o ou r pronouncin g ourselve s ignorant o f th e natur e o f things , i s the curren t opinio n tha t everything includes within itself the caus e of its properties: o r that ther e i s in eac h objec t a n inwar d essence , whic h i s th e source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Som e have pretended t o account for appearances by occult qualities , bu t o f lat e the y ar e mostl y resolve d int o

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mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and such like qualities of insensible particles:* whereas in truth, there is no othe r agen t o r efficien t caus e tha n spirit, i t being eviden t that motion , a s well a s all other ideas, is perfectly inert. Se e sect. 25 . Hence, t o endeavou r t o explai n th e productio n o f colours o r sounds, by figure, motion , magnitude and the like , must need s b e labou r i n vain . And accordingly , we se e th e attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said, in general, of those instances, wherein on e idea or quality i s assigned fo r th e caus e o f another. I need no t say , how many hypotheses and speculations ar e left out , and how much the stud y of Nature is abridged b y this doctrine. 103. Th e grea t mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls t o the earth , or the se a swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficientl y explaine d thereby . But ho w ar e w e enlightene d by bein g tol d thi s i s don e b y attraction? I s i t tha t tha t wor d signifie s th e manne r o f th e tendency, an d tha t i t i s b y th e mutua l drawin g o f bodies , instead o f thei r bein g impelle d o r protrude d toward s eac h other? But nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it ma y a s trul y (fo r augh t w e know ) b e terme d impulse o r protrusion a s attraction. Again, th e part s o f stee l w e se e co here firmly together, an d this also is accounted fo r by attraction; bu t i n this , as in th e othe r instances , I d o no t perceiv e that anything is signified beside s the effec t itself ; for as to th e manner o f th e actio n whereb y i t i s produced , o r th e caus e which produces it , these are no t s o much as aimed at . 104. Indeed , i f we tak e a view of th e severa l phenomena, and compar e the m together , w e may observ e som e likenes s and conformit y between them. For example , in the fallin g of a ston e t o th e ground , i n th e risin g o f th e se a toward s th e moon, i n cohesio n an d crystallization , ther e i s somethin g alike, namely an union or mutual approach o f bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena, may not seem strange or surprisin g to a ma n wh o hat h nicel y observe d an d com pared th e effect s o f Nature. For tha t only is thought so which is uncommon , or a thin g b y itself , an d ou t o f th e ordinar y course o f our observation . That bodie s shoul d ten d toward s the centr e o f th e earth , i s not though t strange , because i t is

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what w e perceive ever y momen t o f ou r lives . But tha t the y should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon, may see m od d an d unaccountabl e to mos t men , because i t is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of Nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, a s well in the heaven s as the earth , that argu e innumerabl e bodie s t o hav e a mutua l tendenc y towards eac h other , whic h he denote s b y th e genera l nam e attraction, whatever ca n b e reduce d t o that , he think s justly accounted for . Thus he explains the tide s by the attractio n of the terraqueou s glob e toward s the moon, whic h to him dot h not appea r odd or anomalous, bu t onl y a particular exampl e of a general rul e o r la w of Nature. 105. I f therefore we consider the differenc e ther e is betwixt natural philosopher s an d othe r men , wit h regar d t o thei r knowledge of the phenomena , w e shall find it consists, not i n an exacte r knowledg e o f th e efficien t caus e tha t produce s them, for that can be no other than the will of a spirit, but only in a greater largenes s of comprehension, whereb y analogies , harmonies, an d agreement s ar e discovere d i n th e work s of Nature, an d th e particula r effect s explained , that is, reduced to genera l rules , se e sect . 62 , which rule s grounde d o n th e analogy, and uniformness observed i n the production of natural effects, ar e most agreeable , and sough t afte r b y the mind; for tha t they extend ou r prospect beyon d what is present, and near to us, and enable u s to make very probable conjectures, touching thing s that ma y hav e happene d a t ver y grea t dis tances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come ; which sor t o f endeavou r toward s omniscience , i s muc h af fected b y the mind. 106. Bu t w e shoul d procee d waril y in suc h things : for w e are ap t t o la y to o grea t a stres s o n analogies , an d t o th e prejudice o f truth , humou r tha t eagernes s o f th e mind , whereby i t i s carrie d t o exten d it s knowledg e int o genera l theorems. Fo r example, gravitation, or mutual attraction, because it appears i n many instances, som e ar e straightwa y for pronouncing universal'* and that to attract, and be attracted by every other body, is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas i t appear s th e fixed stars hav e no suc h

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tendency toward s eac h other : an d s o fa r i s that gravitation , from bein g essential to bodies, that, in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to she w itself: as in the perpendicu lar growt h o f plants , an d th e elasticit y o f th e air . Ther e i s nothing necessar y o r essentia l i n th e case , bu t i t depend s entirely on the wil l of the governing spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other, according to various laws, whilst he keeps other s a t a fixed distance; and to some he gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder, just a s he see s convenient. 107. Afte r wha t ha s bee n premised , I thin k w e ma y la y down the followin g conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire fo r an y natural efficient cause , distinct from a mind o r spirit. Secondly, considering the whol e creation is the workmanshi p of a wise and good agent, it should seem to become philosophers, to employ their thought s (contrar y t o wha t som e hold ) abou t th e final causes o f things : an d I mus t confess , I se e n o reason , wh y pointing ou t th e variou s ends , t o whic h natura l thing s ar e adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived , shoul d no t b e though t on e goo d wa y of accounting fo r them , an d altogethe r worth y a philosopher . Thirdly, fro m wha t hat h bee n premise d n o reaso n ca n b e drawn, why the histor y of Nature should no t stil l be studied , and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, i s not th e resul t o f an y immutabl e habitudes, or rela tions between thing s themselves, but onl y of God's goodnes s and kindnes s to me n i n the administratio n o f the world . See sects. 3 0 an d 31 . Fourthly , by a diligen t observation o f th e phenomena withi n ou r view , w e ma y discove r th e genera l laws of Nature, and from the m deduce the other phenomena, I d o no t sa y demonstrate', fo r al l deductions o f that kin d de pend on a supposition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance o f those rules we take for principles: which we cannot evidentl y know. 108. Thos e men * wh o fram e genera l rule s fro m th e phenomena, an d afterward s deriv e th e phenomen a fro m those rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. A man

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may wel l understan d natura l sign s withou t knowin g thei r analogy, o r bein g abl e t o sa y b y wha t rul e a thin g i s s o o r so. And a s it is very possible to write improperly, through to o strict a n observanc e o f general grammar-rules : so in arguing from genera l rule s o f Nature , i t i s no t impossibl e w e ma y extend th e analog y to o far , an d b y tha t mean s ru n int o mistakes. 109. A s in reading other books, a wise man wil l choose t o fix his thoughts on the sens e an d appl y it to use , rather tha n lay the m ou t i n grammatical remarks o n th e language ; so in perusing the volume of Nature, it seems beneath the dignity of the min d t o affec t a n exactnes s i n reducin g eac h particula r phenomenon t o general rules, or shewing how it follows fro m them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, such as to recreate an d exal t th e mind , wit h a prospec t o f th e beauty , order, extent , and variety of natural things: hence, by proper inferences, t o enlarg e ou r notion s o f th e grandeur , wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator: and lastly, to make the several parts o f th e Creation , s o far a s in u s lies , subservient t o th e ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfor t of ourselves and fellow-creatures. no. Th e bes t ke y fo r th e aforesai d analogy , o r natura l science, will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated treatise of mechanics: in the entranc e o f which justly admired treatise,* time , spac e an d motion , ar e distinguishe d int o absolute an d relative, true an d apparent, mathematical an d vulgar: whic h distinction , a s i t i s a t larg e explaine d b y th e author, dot h suppos e thos e quantitie s t o hav e a n existenc e without the mind: and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature, the y bear n o relation a t all. in. A s fo r time, a s i t i s ther e take n i n a n absolut e o r abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what hath been alread y said on that subject, sects. 97 and 98. For th e rest, this celebrated autho r hold s there is an absolute space, which , being unperceivable to sense , remain s i n itself similar and immoveable: and relative space to be the measure

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thereof, which being moveable, an d defined by its situation in respect o f sensibl e bodies , i s vulgarly take n fo r immoveabl e space. Place h e define s t o b e tha t par t o f spac e whic h i s occupied b y any body. And accordin g as the space is absolute or relative, so also is the place . Absolute motion is said to b e the translatio n o f a bod y fro m absolut e plac e t o absolut e place, as relative motion is from on e relative place to another . And because the parts of absolute space, do not fall under ou r senses, instea d o f the m w e ar e oblige d to us e thei r sensibl e measures: and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies, whic h w e regar d a s immoveable . Bu t i t i s said , i n philosophical matter s we must abstract fro m our senses, sinc e it may be, that none o f those bodie s whic h seem t o be quiescent, ar e trul y so: and th e sam e thin g which i s moved rela tively, ma y b e reall y a t rest . A s likewis e one an d th e sam e body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relativ e motion s a t th e sam e time , accordin g a s its place is variously defined. Al l which ambiguity is to be foun d in the apparent motions , but not at all in the true or absolute , which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true , w e ar e told , ar e distinguishe d from apparen t o r relative motions by the followin g properties . First, i n true o r absolute motion , all parts whic h preserve the sam e positio n with respec t t o th e whole , partak e o f th e motion s o f th e whole, Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved: so that a body moving in a place which is in motion, doth participate the motio n of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated o r changed, otherwise than by force impresse d o n th e bod y itself . Fourthly , tru e motio n i s always change d b y forc e impresse d o n th e bod y moved . Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative, there is no centrifu gal force, which nevertheless in that which is true or absolute, is proportional t o th e quantit y of motion. 112. Bu t notwithstandin g what hath bee n said , it doth no t appear t o me, that ther e ca n be an y motion othe r tha n relative: s o that t o conceiv e motion , ther e mus t be a t leas t con ceived two bodies, whereof the distanc e or position i n regard to eac h othe r i s varied . Henc e i f ther e wa s on e onl y bod y

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in being, it could not possibl y be moved. This seems evident, in tha t th e ide a I hav e o f motio n dot h necessaril y includ e relation. 113. Bu t thoug h i n ever y motio n i t b e necessar y t o con ceive mor e bodie s tha n one , ye t i t ma y b e tha t on e onl y is moved, namely that on which the force causing the chang e of distance i s impressed , o r i n othe r words , tha t t o whic h th e action i s applied. For howeve r some ma y define relativ e motion, so as to term that body moved, which changes its distance from som e othe r body , whethe r th e forc e o r actio n causing that change were applied to it, or no: yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs o f life, it should seem that every man o f common sens e knows wha t i t is , as well as th e bes t philosopher : no w I as k anyone, whether i n his sense o f motion a s he walks along the streets, th e stone s h e passe s ove r ma y be sai d t o move, because they change distance with his feet? To me it seems, that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessar y tha t eac h ter m o f the relatio n b e denomi nated fro m it . As a man ma y thin k o f somewhat which dot h not think , so a body may be moved to or from anothe r body , which is not therefor e itself in motion. 114. A s th e plac e happen s t o b e variousl y defined , th e motion whic h is related t o i t varies. A ma n i n a ship may be said t o b e quiescent , wit h relation t o th e side s o f the vessel , and ye t mov e wit h relatio n t o th e land . O r h e ma y mov e eastward in respect o f the one , and westward in respect o f the other. In the common affairs o f life, men never go beyond th e earth to define the place of any body: and what is quiescent in respect o f that , i s accounte d absolutely t o b e so . Bu t philo sophers wh o hav e a greate r exten t o f thought , an d juste r notions o f the syste m of things, discover eve n the eart h itsel f to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions, they seem to conceiv e th e corporea l worl d a s finite , an d th e utmos t unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place, whereby they estimate tru e motions . I f w e soun d ou r ow n conceptions , I believe we may find all the absolut e motion we can frame a n idea of , to b e a t botto m n o othe r tha n relativ e motio n thu s defined. For a s hath been already observed, absolute motio n

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exclusive o f al l external relation i s incomprehensible: and t o this kind of relative motion, al l the above-mentione d proper ties, causes, and effect s ascribe d t o absolut e motion , will , if I mistake not , b e foun d t o agree . A s t o wha t i s sai d o f th e centrifugal force , tha t i t dot h no t a t al l belon g t o circula r relative motion: I do not see how this follows fro m th e exper iment* whic h i s brough t t o prov e it . Se e Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, i n Schol Def. VIII . For th e water in the vessel , at that tim e wherein it is said to have th e greatest relativ e circula r motion , hath , I think, no motio n a t all: as is plain fro m th e foregoin g section. 115. Fo r t o denominat e a body moved, it is requisite, first, that i t chang e it s distanc e o r situatio n wit h regar d t o som e other body : and secondly, that the force or action occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I do not thin k tha t agreeabl y t o th e sens e o f mankind , o r th e propriety o f language, a body ca n be sai d t o b e i n motion. I grant indeed , tha t i t is possible fo r us to thin k a body, which we se e chang e it s distanc e fro m som e other , t o b e moved , though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion) , but the n it is, because th e force causing the chang e o f distance , i s imagine d b y u s t o b e applie d o r impressed o n that body thought to move. Which indeed shews we ar e capabl e o f mistaking a thing to b e i n motion whic h is not, an d tha t i s all. 116. Fro m wha t hat h bee n said , i t follow s tha t th e philo sophic consideratio n o f motion dot h no t impl y th e bein g of an absolute space, distinc t fro m tha t whic h i s perceive d b y sense, and related to bodies: which that it cannot exist without the mind, is clear upon the sam e principles, that demonstrat e the lik e o f al l othe r object s o f sense . An d perhaps , i f w e inquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot eve n fram e a n idea of pure space, exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, a s bein g a mos t abstrac t idea . Whe n I excit e a motion i n som e par t o f m y body , i f i t b e fre e o r withou t resistance, I say there i s space: but i f I find a resistance, then I say there i s body: an d i n proportion a s the resistanc e t o mo tion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or \esspure. So that whe n I spea k o f pur e o r empt y space , i t i s no t t o b e

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supposed, tha t the word space stands for an idea distinct from, or conceivable withou t body and motion. Thoug h indee d we are ap t t o thin k ever y noun substantiv e stands for a distinct idea, that ma y be separated fro m al l others: which hath occasioned infinit e mistakes . Whe n therefor e supposin g al l th e world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure space: thereb y nothin g els e i s meant, bu t onl y that I conceiv e i t possible , fo r th e limb s o f m y bod y t o b e moved on all sides without the least resistance: but i f that to o were annihilated, then ther e coul d be no motion, an d consequently no space. Some perhaps may think the sense of seeing doth furnis h them wit h the ide a o f pure space; but i t is plain from wha t we have elsewhere shewn , that the idea s of spac e and distanc e ar e no t obtaine d b y tha t sense . Se e th e Essay concerning Vision. 117. Wha t i s her e lai d down , seem s t o pu t a n en d t o al l those disputes and difficulties, whic h have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature otpure space. But the chief advantage arisin g fro m it , is , tha t w e ar e free d fro m tha t dangerous dilemma, t o whic h severa l wh o hav e employe d their thoughts * on thi s subject, imagine themselves reduced , to wit , of thinking either tha t rea l spac e i s God, o r els e tha t there i s somethin g besid e Go d whic h i s eternal , uncreated , infinite, indivisible , immutable . Bot h whic h ma y justl y b e thought pernicious an d absurd notions. I t is certain that not a few divines , as well a s philosophers of great note, have, fro m the difficult y the y found in conceiving either limits or annihilation o f space, concluded it must be divine. And som e of late have set themselves particularly to shew, that the incommunicable attribute s of God agre e t o it . Which doctrine, how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divin e Nature, yet I do not see ho w w e ca n ge t clea r o f it , s o lon g a s we adher e t o th e received opinions . 118. Hithert o o f natural philosophy: we come now to make some inquir y concerning that other grea t branch of speculative knowledge , to wit , mathematics. These , ho w celebrate d soever they may be, for their clearnes s and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless b e suppose d altogethe r fre e fro m mistakes ; if in

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their principle s ther e lurk s some secre t error , whic h i s common t o the professor s of those science s wit h the res t of mankind. Mathematicians , thoug h the y deduc e thei r theorem s from a great heigh t o f evidence, ye t thei r first principles ar e limited b y th e consideratio n o f quantity : an d the y d o no t ascend int o an y inquir y concernin g thos e transcendenta l maxims, which influence all the particula r sciences, eac h par t whereof, mathematic s no t excepted , dot h consequentl y par ticipate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from thos e principles clear and incontestable, we do not deny. But w e hold , ther e ma y b e certai n erroneou s maxim s of greater exten t tha n th e objec t o f mathematics , an d fo r tha t reason no t expressl y mentioned , thoug h tacitl y suppose d throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the ill effects o f those secret unexamined errors are diffused throug h all th e branche s thereof . T o b e plain , we suspec t th e math ematicians are, as well as other men , concerne d i n the error s arising fro m th e doctrin e o f abstrac t genera l ideas , an d th e existence o f objects without the mind. 119. Arithmetic hat h bee n though t t o hav e fo r it s objec t abstract ideas of number. Of which to understand the proper ties and mutual habitudes i s supposed n o mean part of speculative knowledge . Th e opinio n o f th e pur e an d intellectual nature of numbers in abstract, hath made them in esteem with those philosophers, who seem to have affected a n uncommon fineness and elevatio n o f thought. It hat h se t a price o n th e most triflin g numerica l speculation s whic h in practice ar e o f no use, but serv e onl y for amusement : an d hath therefor e so far infecte d th e mind s o f some , tha t the y hav e dream t o f mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempte d th e explication o f natura l thing s by them . Bu t i f w e inquir e int o our own thoughts, and consider what hath been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries about numbers, only as so many difficiles nugae* s o far as they are not subservien t to practice, an d promot e th e benefi t o f life . 120. Unit y in abstrac t w e hav e befor e considere d i n sect . 13, from whic h and wha t hath been sai d in the Introduction ,

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it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But number being defined a collection of units, we ma y conclud e that , i f ther e be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of numbe r i n abstrac t denote d b y th e numerica l names an d figures. Th e theorie s therefor e i n arithmetic , i f the y ar e abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from al l use and practice, a s well as from th e particula r things numbered, can be supposed t o have nothing at all for their object. Hence we may see , how entirel y the scienc e o f numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes, when considered a s a matter o f mere speculation. 121. Howeve r sinc e ther e may b e some , who , deluded b y the speciou s she w o f discoverin g abstracte d verities , waste their time in arithmetical theorems an d problems which have not an y use: it will not be amiss, if we more fully consider, and expose th e vanit y o f tha t pretence ; an d thi s wil l plainl y ap pear, by taking a view of arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what i t wa s that originall y put me n o n th e stud y of tha t science, an d t o wha t scop e the y directe d it . I t i s natural t o think that a t first, men, for ease of memory and hel p of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, points o r th e like , each whereo f wa s made t o signif y a n unit, that is, some one thing of whatever kind they had occasion t o reckon. Afterward s the y foun d ou t th e mor e compendiou s ways, o f makin g on e characte r stan d i n plac e o f severa l strokes, or points. And lastly , the notation o f the Arabians or Indians cam e int o use , wherei n b y th e repetitio n o f a fe w characters o r figures , an d varyin g th e significatio n of eac h figure according t o th e plac e i t obtains , al l numbers ma y b e most aptl y expressed : whic h seem s t o hav e bee n don e i n imitation o f language , so tha t a n exac t analog y i s observe d betwixt th e notatio n b y figures and names , th e nin e simple figures answering the nin e first numeral names an d places in the former , correspondin g t o denomination s i n th e latter . And agreeabl y t o thos e condition s o f th e simpl e an d loca l value o f figures, were contrive d method s o f finding from th e given figure s o r mark s o f th e parts , wha t figure s an d ho w placed, ar e prope r t o denot e th e whol e o r vice versa. An d having foun d th e sough t figures , th e sam e rul e o r analog y

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being observed throughout , it is easy to read them into words; and s o the numbe r become s perfectl y known . Fo r the n th e number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the nam e o r figure s (wit h their du e arrangement ) that according to the standin g analogy belong to them. For thes e signs bein g known , we ca n b y th e operation s o f arithmetic, know the sign s of any part o f the particula r sums signified b y them; and thus computing in signs (because of the connexio n established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things, whereof on e i s taken fo r a n unit) , we may b e abl e rightl y to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend t o number . 122. I n arithmetic therefor e w e regar d no t th e things bu t the signs, which nevertheless ar e no t regarde d fo r their own sake, bu t becaus e the y direc t u s how t o ac t with relation t o things, and dispose rightly of them. Now agreeably to what we have befor e observed , of words in general (sect . 19 . Introd. ) it happen s her e likewise , tha t abstrac t idea s ar e though t t o be signifie d b y numera l name s o r characters , whil e the y d o not sugges t ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at presen t ente r int o a mor e particula r dissertatio n o n thi s subject; bu t onl y observ e tha t i t i s eviden t fro m wha t hat h been said , thos e thing s whic h pas s fo r abstrac t truth s an d theorems concernin g numbers , are , i n reality , conversan t about n o objec t distinc t fro m particula r numerabl e things , except only names and characters; which originally came to be considered, o n n o othe r accoun t bu t thei r bein g signs, o r capable t o represen t aptly , whateve r particula r thing s me n had nee d t o compute . Whenc e i t follows, tha t t o stud y them for thei r ow n sake * woul d b e jus t a s wise , and t o a s goo d purpose, as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention an d subservienc y of language , should spen d hi s time i n impertinent criticism s upon words, or reasonings and contro versies purely verbal. 123. Fro m number s w e procee d t o spea k o f extension, which considere d a s relative, is the objec t o f geometry . Th e infinite divisibilit y o f finit e extension, thoug h i t i s no t ex pressly lai d down , either a s an axio m o r theore m i n the ele ments of that science, yet is throughout th e sam e everywhere

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supposed, an d thought to have so inseparable an d essential a connexion wit h th e principle s an d demonstration s i n geo metry, tha t mathematician s neve r admi t i t int o doubt , o r make the least question o f it. And a s this notion i s the sourc e from whenc e d o sprin g al l those amusin g geometrical para doxes, which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sens e o f mankind , an d ar e admitte d wit h s o muc h reluctance into a mind not ye t debauched by learning: so is it the principa l occasio n o f al l that nic e an d extrem e subtlety , which render s th e stud y of mathematics s o difficul t an d tedi ous. Hence if we can make it appear, that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible , it follows that w e shal l a t onc e clea r th e scienc e o f geometr y fro m a great numbe r o f difficultie s an d contradictions , whic h hav e ever been esteemed a reproach t o human reason, an d withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains, than it hitherto hath been . 124. Ever y particula r finit e extension , whic h may possibly be th e objec t o f ou r thought , is a n idea existin g only i n th e mind, and consequently each part thereo f must be perceived. If therefore I cannot perceive innumerabl e part s in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it: but it is evident, that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceiv e by sense , o r figur e t o mysel f i n m y mind : wherefor e I con clude they ar e not containe d i n it. Nothing can be plainer t o me, than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas, and it is no less plain, that I cannot resolve any one o f my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that the y ar e no t infinitel y divisible . If b y finit e extension b e meant something distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affir m o r deny anything of it. But if the terms extension, parts, and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable , that is, for ideas; then t o say a finite quantity or extensio n consist s of part s infinit e in number , is so manifest a contradiction, that everyone at first sight acknowledges it to be so. And i t is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature, who is not brough t to it by gentle an d slo w degrees, a s a converted Gentil e t o the belief

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of transubstantiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices d o ofte n pass into principles: and those propositions which once obtai n the forc e an d credi t o f a principle, ar e no t onl y themselves , but likewis e whatever is deducible fro m them , though t privileged fro m al l examination . An d ther e i s n o absurdit y s o gross, whic h b y thi s mean s th e min d o f ma n ma y no t b e prepared t o swallow. 125. H e whose understanding is prepossessed wit h the doctrine of abstract general ideas, may be persuaded, that (whatever be thought of the idea s of sense), extension in abstract is infinitely divisible . And on e wh o think s the object s o f sens e exist withou t th e mind , wil l perhap s i n virtu e thereo f b e brought t o admit , tha t a lin e bu t a n inc h lon g ma y contai n innumerable parts really existing, though too smal l to be discerned. These errors ar e grafte d as well in the mind s of geometricians, as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings; an d i t wer e n o difficul t thing , t o she w ho w th e arguments from geometr y made use of to support the infinit e divisibility of extension, are bottomed o n them. At present we shall only observe in general, whence it is that the mathemat icians are al l so fond an d tenaciou s o f this doctrine. 126. I t hat h bee n observe d i n another place , tha t th e the orems and demonstrations in geometry ar e conversant abou t universal idea s (sect . 15 . Introd.) . Wher e i t i s explaine d i n what sens e thi s ought to be understood , t o wit , that the par ticular lines and figures included in the diagram, are suppose d to stan d for innumerable others o f different sizes : or in othe r words, th e geomete r consider s the m abstractin g fro m thei r magnitude: which doth no t impl y that h e form s a n abstrac t idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent t o th e demonstration : henc e i t follows, tha t a line in th e scheme, bu t a n inc h long , mus t b e spoke n of , a s thoug h i t contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but a s it is universal; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which ma y b e distinguishe d te n thousan d part s o r more , though there ma y not b e abov e a n inch in it. After this manner th e propertie s o f the line s signifie d ar e (b y a ver y usual

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figure) transferre d to th e sign , an d thenc e throug h mistak e thought to appertai n t o i t considered i n its own nature. 127. Becaus e ther e i s no number o f parts so great, but i t is possible ther e may be a line containin g more, the inch-lin e is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified b y it. But me n no t retainin g that distinctio n i n their thoughts, slide into a belief tha t th e smal l particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch'* but ther e is o f a mile o r diameter o f th e earth, which may b e signifie d by that inch. When therefor e I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius: this I consider as divided into ten thousan d o r an hundre d thousan d parts , o r more . Fo r thoug h th e ten thousandth par t o f that line considered i n itself, i s nothing at all, and consequentl y may be neglected withou t any error o r inconveniency; ye t thes e describe d line s bein g onl y mark s standing fo r greate r quantities , whereof i t ma y b e th e ten thousandth par t i s very considerable , it follows, tha t t o pre vent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of ten thousand parts , or more . 128. Fro m what hath been sai d the reaso n i s plain why, to the en d an y theore m ma y becom e universa l i n it s use , i t is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper, as though they containe d part s whic h reall y the y d o not . I n doin g o f which, if we examine the matte r throughly , we shall perhap s discover tha t w e canno t conceiv e a n inc h itsel f a s consisting of, o r bein g divisibl e int o a thousan d parts , bu t onl y som e other lin e which is far greate r tha n a n inch , an d represente d by it . An d tha t whe n w e sa y a lin e i s infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here observed seem s t o b e th e chie f cause , wh y t o suppos e th e infinite divisibilit y o f finit e extensio n hat h bee n though t necessary in geometry. 129. Th e severa l absurditie s an d contradiction s whic h flowed from thi s false principl e might, one woul d think, have been esteeme d s o many demonstrations agains t it . Bu t b y I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori ar e no t

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to b e admitte d agains t proposition s relatin g t o infinity . A s though i t wer e no t impossibl e eve n fo r a n infinit e min d t o reconcile contradictions. O r a s if anything absurd an d repug nant coul d hav e a necessar y connexio n wit h truth , o r flow from it . But whoever considers the weakness of this pretence , will think it was contrived on purpose t o humour the laziness of the mind, which had rather acquiesc e in an indolent scepticism, than be a t the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principle s i t hath eve r embrace d fo r true . 130. O f lat e th e speculation s abou t infinite s hav e ru n s o high, and grow n to suc h strang e notions, a s have occasione d no smal l scruple s an d dispute s amon g the geometer s o f th e present age . Som e ther e ar e o f great note , wh o not conten t with holdin g that finite line s ma y b e divide d into a n infinit e number o f parts, d o ye t farthe r maintain, that eac h o f thos e infinitesimals i s itsel f subdivisibl e int o a n infinit y o f othe r parts, o r infinitesimal s o f a secon d order , an d s o o n a d infinitum. These , I say , asser t ther e ar e infinitesimal s of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, without ever coming to an end. So that according to them a n inch doth not barely contain an infinite numbe r o f parts , bu t a n infinit y o f a n infinit y o f a n infinity a d infinitum o f parts . Other s ther e b e wh o hol d al l orders o f infinitesimal s below th e firs t t o b e nothin g a t all , thinking it with good reaso n absurd , to imagin e there i s any positive quantit y o r par t o f extension , whic h thoug h multi plied infinitely , ca n eve r equa l th e smalles t give n extension . And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd, to think the square, cube , o r othe r powe r o f a positiv e rea l root , shoul d itself b e nothin g at all ; which they who hol d infinitesimals of the firs t orde r denyin g al l o f th e subsequen t orders , ar e obliged to maintain. 131. Hav e w e not therefor e reaso n t o conclude , that they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect n o such thing as part s infinitel y small , or a n infinit e numbe r o f part s con tained i n an y finit e quantity ? Bu t yo u wil l say , tha t i f thi s doctrine obtains , i t wil l follow th e ver y foundations of geo metry ar e destroyed : an d thos e grea t me n wh o hav e raise d that scienc e t o s o astonishin g a n height , hav e bee n al l th e while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied, that

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whatever i s usefu l i n geometr y an d promote s th e benefi t o f human life , dot h stil l remain firm and unshaken o n ou r principles. That science considered a s practical, will rather receive advantage than an y prejudice from wha t hath been said . But to se t thi s i n a du e light , ma y b e th e subjec t o f a distinc t inquiry. For th e rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricat e an d subtl e part s o f speculative mathematics may be pared of f without any prejudice to truth; yet I do not see what damage will be thenc e derive d t o mankind . On th e contrary, it were highly to be wished, that men o f great abili ties an d obstinat e applicatio n would dra w off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer th e concern s of life, or have a more direc t influence o n the manners . 132. I f i t b e sai d that severa l theorems undoubtedl y true, are discovere d b y methods i n which infinitesimals ar e mad e use of , whic h coul d neve r hav e been , i f thei r existenc e in cluded a contradictio n i n it. I answer , tha t upo n a thoroug h examination i t wil l no t b e found , tha t i n an y instanc e i t i s necessary t o mak e us e o f o r conceiv e infinitesima l part s o f finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensibile: nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.* 133. B y what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous an d importan t error s hav e take n thei r ris e fro m thos e false principles , which were impugned in the foregoin g parts of this treatise. And the opposites of those erroneous tenet s at the sam e tim e appea r t o b e mos t fruitfu l principles , fro m whence d o flo w innumerabl e consequence s highl y advan tageous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly, matter or the absolute existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn t o b e tha t wherei n th e mos t avowe d an d perniciou s enemies o f al l knowledge , whether huma n o r divine , hav e ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely , if by distinguishing the rea l existence of unthinking things fro m their bein g perceived , an d allowin g the m a subsistenc e o f their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in Nature ; bu t o n th e contrar y a grea t man y inexplicabl e difficulties arise : if the suppositio n o f matter is barely precarious, as not bein g grounded o n so much as one singl e reason: if it s consequence s canno t endur e th e ligh t o f examinatio n

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and fre e inquiry , but scree n themselve s unde r th e dar k an d general pretence of infinites being incomprehensible: if withal the remova l of this matter be not attende d wit h the leas t evi l consequence, i f it be not eve n missed in the world, but everything a s well, nay muc h easie r conceive d withou t it: if lastly, both sceptics an d atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirit s an d ideas , an d thi s schem e o f thing s is perfectly agreeable bot h t o reason and religion: methinks we may expect i t shoul d b e admitte d an d firml y embraced , thoug h i t were propose d onl y a s a n hypothesis, an d th e existenc e o f matter had been allowe d possible , which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated tha t i t is not. 134. Tru e i t is , that i n consequenc e o f the foregoin g principles, several disputes and speculations, which are esteeme d no mea n part s o f learning, ar e rejecte d a s useless. But ho w great a prejudice soever agains t our notions, this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and made large advances i n studie s of that nature : ye t b y others , w e hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenet s herein lai d down , that the y abridg e the labou r of study, an d mak e huma n science s mor e clear , compendious , and attainable , than the y were before . 135. Havin g dispatched wha t we intended t o sa y concerning the knowledge o f ideas, the method we proposed leads us, in th e nex t place , t o trea t o f spirits: wit h regar d t o which , perhaps huma n knowledg e i s no t s o deficien t a s i s vulgarly imagined. Th e grea t reaso n tha t i s assigne d fo r ou r bein g thought ignorant of the nature o f spirits, is, our not having an idea of it. But surel y it ought not t o be looked o n a s a defect in a human understanding, that i t does not perceiv e th e ide a of spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be an y such /dea. And this , if I mistake not, has been demonstrated i n sect. 27: to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shown to be the only substance or support, wherein the unthinking beings or idea s ca n exist : but tha t thi s substance which supports o r perceives idea s shoul d itsel f b e a n idea o r lik e a n idea, i s evidently absurd . 136. I t will perhaps b e said , that we want a sense (a s some have imagined) proper to know substances withal, which if we had, we might know our own soul, as we do a triangle. To this

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I answer , that in case we had a new sense bestowe d upo n us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations of ideas of sense. Bu t I believe nobody wil l say , that wha t he mean s by the term s soul an d substance, is only some particula r sor t of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer, that all things duly considered, i t i s not mor e reasonabl e t o thin k ou r facultie s defective, in that the y do not furnis h u s with an idea o f spirit or activ e thinkin g substance, tha n i t woul d b e i f we shoul d blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square. 137. Fro m the opinion that spirits are to be known after th e manner of an idea o r sensation , have risen many absurd an d heterodox tenets , an d muc h scepticis m abou t th e natur e o f the soul . It is even probable, tha t this opinion may have pro duced a doub t i n some , whethe r the y ha d an y sou l a t al l distinct fro m thei r body , sinc e upo n inquir y the y coul d no t find they had a n idea of it. That a n idea which is inactive, and the existenc e whereo f consists in being perceived, should b e the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems t o need n o othe r refutation , tha n barel y attendin g t o wha t i s meant b y those words. But perhaps yo u will say, that though an idea canno t resembl e a spirit, i n it s thinking , acting, o r subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects : an d it is not necessary that a n idea or image be in all respects lik e th e original. 138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent i t in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For by the wor d spirit w e mean onl y that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and thi s alone, constitute s the significatio n of that term. If therefore i t is impossible tha t any degree of those powers shoul d b e represente d i n a n idea , i t i s evident ther e can be n o idea o f a spirit. 139. Bu t i t will be objected, that if there is no idea signifie d by the term s soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, o r hav e no meanin g in them. I answer , those words do mea n o r signif y a real thing , which is neither a n ide a no r like a n idea , bu t tha t whic h perceive s ideas , an d wills , an d reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by

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the ter m I , is the sam e with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be sai d that thi s is only quarrelling at a word, and that since the immediate significations of other names are by commo n consen t calle d ideas, no reaso n ca n be assigned , why that which is signified b y the nam e spirit o r soul may no t partake i n the sam e appellation . I answer, all the unthinking objects o f th e min d agree , i n tha t the y ar e entirel y passive , and their existenc e consist s only in being perceived: whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists not in being perceived, but i n perceiving ideas an d thinking . It is therefore necessary , i n orde r t o preven t equivocatio n an d confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit an d idea. See sect . 27. 140. I n a larg e sens e indeed , w e ma y b e sai d t o hav e a n idea, o r rathe r a notio n o f spirit, tha t is , we understan d th e meaning of the word,* otherwise we could not affir m o r deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the idea s that are in the mind s o f othe r spirit s b y mean s o f ou r own , whic h w e suppose to be resemblances of them: so we know other spirit s by means of our ow n soul, which in that sense is the imag e or idea o f them , i t havin g a lik e respec t t o othe r spirits , tha t blueness o r hea t b y m e perceive d hat h t o thos e idea s per ceived by another . 141. I t mus t not * b e supposed , tha t the y wh o asser t th e natural immortality of the sou l are o f opinion, that i t is absolutely incapable o f annihilation even by the infinit e powe r of the Creator who first gave it being: but only that it is not liable to be broken o r dissolved by the ordinar y Laws of Nature or motion. They indeed , who hold th e sou l o f man t o be onl y a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body, since there is nothing more easily dissipated tha n suc h a being, which it is naturally impossible should surviv e the rui n o f th e tabernacle , wherei n i t i s en closed. An d thi s notio n hat h bee n greedil y embrace d an d cherished by the worst part o f mankind, as the most effectua l antidote agains t all impressions o f virtue an d religion . Bu t i t hath been made evident, that bodies of what frame o r texture soever, ar e barel y passive idea s i n th e mind , whic h i s more distant and heterogeneous fro m them, than light is from dark-

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ness. We have shew n that th e sou l is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer , tha n tha t th e motions , changes , decays , an d dissolutions whic h we hourl y se e befal l natura l bodies (an d which is what we mean by the course of Nature) canno t possibly affect a n active, simple, uncompounded substance: such a being therefore i s indissoluble by the forc e of Nature, that is to say , the soul o f ma n i s naturally immortal. 142. Afte r wha t hath bee n said , it i s I suppos e plain , that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits an d ideas are things so wholl y different , tha t whe n w e say , they exist, they ar e known, or the like, these words must not be thought to signif y anything commo n t o both natures. There is nothing alik e or common i n them: and to expect tha t by any multiplication or enlargement o f our faculties , we may b e enable d t o kno w a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We may not I think strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion o f them. I have som e knowledg e o r notion of my mind , an d it s act s abou t ideas , inasmuc h a s I kno w o r understand wha t is meant by those words. What I know, that I have some notio n of . I will not say , that the term s idea an d notion ma y no t b e use d convertibly , if the worl d will have it so. But ye t i t conducet h t o clearnes s an d propriety , that w e distinguish things very different b y different names . It i s also to be remarked, that all relations including an act of the mind, we canno t s o properly b e sai d t o hav e a n idea , but rathe r a notion o f the relation s or habitude s between things . But i f in the moder n wa y th e wor d idea i s extende d t o spirits , an d relations and acts ; this is after al l an affai r o f verbal concern.* 143. I t will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas hat h ha d n o smal l shar e i n renderin g thos e science s intricate and obscure, which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstrac t notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider the m

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prescinded, as well from th e mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects . Henc e a great numbe r o f dark and ambiguous terms presumed to stand for abstract notions, have bee n introduce d int o metaphysic s an d morality , an d from thes e hav e grow n infinit e distraction s an d dispute s amongst the learned . 144. Bu t nothin g seems more t o have contributed toward s engaging me n i n controversie s an d mistakes , with regard t o the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak o f those things, in terms borrowed fro m sensibl e ideas. For example , th e wil l i s termed th e motion o f th e soul : thi s infuses a belief, that th e min d o f man i s as a ball i n motion, impelled an d determined b y the object s of sense, as necessarily a s tha t i s by th e strok e o f a racket . Henc e aris e endles s scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which I doub t no t ma y b e cleared , an d trut h appea r plain , uniform, an d consistent, could but philosophers b e prevaile d on t o retir e int o themselves , an d attentivel y conside r thei r own meaning.* 145. Fro m wha t hath bee n said , it i s plain tha t w e canno t know th e existenc e o f othe r spirits , otherwise tha n b y thei r operations, o r th e idea s b y the m excite d i n us . I perceiv e several motions , changes , an d combination s o f ideas , tha t inform m e ther e ar e certai n particula r agent s lik e myself , which accompan y them , an d concu r i n thei r production . Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledg e of my ideas; but dependin g o n the inter vention o f ideas , b y me referre d t o agent s o r spirit s distinct from myself , a s effects o r concomitan t signs. 146. Bu t thoug h ther e b e som e thing s which convince us, human agent s ar e concerne d i n producin g them ; ye t i t i s evident t o everyone , tha t thos e thing s which ar e calle d th e works o f Nature, tha t is , the fa r greate r par t o f the idea s o r sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on the will s of men. There is therefore some other spiri t that causes them , sinc e i t i s repugnan t tha t the y shoul d subsis t by themselves . Se e sect . 29 . Bu t i f w e attentivel y conside r the constan t regularity , order, an d concatenatio n o f natural things, th e surprisin g magnificence , beauty , an d perfectio n

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of th e larger , an d th e exquisit e contrivanc e o f th e smalle r parts o f th e creation , togethe r wit h th e exac t harmon y and correspondenc e o f th e whole , bu t abov e all , th e neve r enough admire d law s of pain an d pleasure , an d th e instinct s or natura l inclinations , appetites , an d passion s o f animals ; I sa y i f w e conside r al l thes e things , an d a t th e sam e tim e attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one, eter nal, infinitely wise, good, and perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesai d spirit, who works all in all* and b y whom all things consist* 147. Henc e it is evident, that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other min d o r spiri t whatsoever , distinc t from ourselves. We may even assert, that the existence of God is fa r mor e evidentl y perceived tha n th e existenc e o f men ; because th e effect s o f Natur e ar e infinitel y mor e numerou s and considerable, than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produce d by him, whic h doth no t mor e strongl y evince the bein g o f tha t spirit wh o i s th e Author o f Nature. Fo r i t i s evident tha t i n affecting othe r persons,* the will of man hath no other object , than barely the motion o f the limb s of his body; but tha t such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another , depend s wholl y o n th e wil l o f th e Creator . H e alone it is who upholding all things by the Word of hi s Power* maintains that intercours e betwee n spirits , whereby they ar e able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and clea r light which enlightens everyone, is itself invisible . 148. I t seem s t o b e a genera l pretenc e o f th e unthinkin g herd, tha t the y canno t se e God . Coul d w e but se e him , say they, a s w e se e a man , w e shoul d believ e tha t h e is , an d believing obe y hi s commands . Bu t ala s w e nee d onl y open ou r eye s t o se e th e sovereig n Lor d o f al l things with a more ful l an d clea r view , than w e do an y on e o f ou r fellow creatures. No t tha t I imagine we see God (a s some wil l have it) b y a direc t an d immediat e view , or se e corporea l things , not b y themselves, but b y seeing that which represents the m in the essenc e o f God, which doctrine is I must confess to me incomprehensible. Bu t I shall explain my meaning. A huma n spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea;

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when therefor e w e se e th e colour , size , figure , an d motion s of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in ou r ow n minds : an d thes e bein g exhibite d t o ou r vie w in sundr y distinc t collections , serv e t o mar k ou t unt o u s the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain, we do not se e a man, if by man i s meant that which lives, moves , perceives, an d think s a s w e do : bu t onl y suc h a certai n collectio n o f ideas , a s direct s u s t o thin k ther e i s a distinc t principl e of thought an d motio n lik e t o ourselves , accompanying an d represente d b y it . An d afte r th e sam e manner w e se e God ; al l th e differenc e is , tha t wherea s some on e finit e an d narro w assemblag e o f idea s denote s a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do a t al l times an d i n al l places perceiv e manifes t tokens of the divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense , bein g a sig n or effec t of the Powe r of God ; as is our perceptio n o f thos e ver y motions , whic h ar e produce d by men . 149. I t is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of the least reflexion, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually affec t us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, i n short , i n whom w e live, an d move, and have our being. That th e discover y of this great truth which lies so near an d obviou s to th e mind , should b e attaine d t o b y th e reason o f s o ver y few, is a sa d instanc e o f th e stupidit y and inattention o f men , who , thoug h the y ar e surrounde d wit h such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little affecte d by them, that they seem as it were blinded with excess of light. 150. Bu t yo u wil l say , hat h Natur e n o shar e i n th e pro duction of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to th e immediate and sol e operation o f God? I answer, if by Nature is mean t onl y th e visibl e series of effects , o r sensation s im printed o n ou r mind s according to certai n fixed and genera l laws: then i t i s plain, that Natur e take n i n thi s sens e canno t produce anythin g at all. But i f by Nature is meant some being distinct fro m God , a s well a s fro m th e Law s o f Nature , an d things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an

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empty sound, without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature i n thi s acceptatio n i s a vai n chimera introduce d b y those heathens, who had not just notions of the omnipresenc e and infinit e perfectio n o f God. Bu t i t is more unaccountable , that i t should b e receive d amon g Christian s professin g belief in the Hol y Scriptures , which constantly ascribe thos e effect s to the immediate han d of God, that heathen philosopher s ar e wont to impute to Nature. Th e Lord, he causeth the vapours to ascend; he maketh lightnings with rain; he bringeth forth the wind ou t o f hi s treasures, Jerem., chap. TO . ver. 13 . He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night, Amos , chap . 5 . ver . 8 . H e visiteth th e earth, and maketh it soft with showers: he blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with his goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. See Psalm 65 . But notwithstandin g that thi s is the con stant languag e o f Scripture ; ye t w e hav e I kno w no t wha t aversion fro m believing , that Go d concern s himsel f so nearly in our affairs . Fai n would we suppose hi m at a great distanc e off, an d substitut e some blind unthinking deputy in his stead, though (i f we may believe Saint Paul) he be not far from every one of us. 151. I t wil l I doub t no t b e objected , tha t th e slo w an d gradual methods observed in the production o f natural things, do not seem to have for their cause the immediate han d of an almighty Agent. Besides , monsters , untimel y births , fruit s blasted i n the blossom , rains falling i n desert places , miseries incident to human life, are so many arguments that the whole frame o f Natur e i s no t immediatel y actuate d an d superin tended b y a spiri t o f infinit e wisdo m an d goodness . Bu t th e answer to this objection i s in a good measure plai n from sect . 62, it being visible , that th e aforesai d methods o f Nature ar e absolutely necessary, i n order to working by the mos t simpl e and genera l rules , and afte r a steady an d consisten t manner ; which argues bot h th e wisdom an d goodness o f God. Suc h is the artificia l contrivanc e o f thi s might y machin e o f Nature , that whilst its motions an d various phenomena strik e o n ou r senses, th e han d whic h actuate s th e whol e i s itsel f unperceivable t o me n o f fles h an d blood . Verily (sait h th e

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prophet) thou art a God that hidest thyself, Isaiah, chap. 45. ver. 15. But thoug h God concea l himsel f from the eye s of the sensual an d lazy, wh o wil l no t b e a t th e leas t expenc e o f thought; yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more plainl y legible, than th e intimat e presenc e o f an allwise Spirit, wh o fashions , regulates , an d sustain s th e whol e system o f being . I t i s clea r fro m wha t w e hav e elsewher e observed, that the operatin g accordin g to general an d state d laws, is so necessary for our guidanc e in the affair s o f life, an d letting us into th e secre t o f Nature, that withou t it, all reach and compas s of thought, all human sagacity and desig n could serve to no manner o f purpose: it were even impossible there should b e an y such faculties or powers in the mind . See sect. 31. Whic h on e consideratio n abundantl y out-balances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise . 152. W e shoul d furthe r consider , tha t th e ver y blemishe s and defect s of Nature ar e no t withou t thei r use , in that they make an agreeable fort of variety, and augment the beauty of the res t o f the creation , a s shades in a picture serve to se t off the brighte r and mor e enlightene d parts . W e would likewise do well to examine, whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, an d accidenta l destructio n o f plant s an d animals , before the y com e t o ful l maturity , a s a n imprudenc e i n th e Author of Nature, be not the effec t o f prejudice contracted by our familiarit y wit h impoten t an d savin g mortals . I n ma n indeed a thrifty management of those things, which he cannot procure withou t much pains an d industry , may be esteeme d wisdom. Bu t w e must not imagine , that th e inexplicabl y fine machine o f a n anima l o r vegetable , cost s th e grea t Creato r any mor e pain s o r troubl e i n it s productio n tha n a pebbl e doth: nothin g bein g mor e evident , tha n tha t a n omnipoten t spirit ca n indifferentl y produc e everythin g by a mere fia t o r act of his will. Hence it is plain, that the splendi d profusion of natural things should no t b e interpreted , weaknes s o r prodigality in the agen t wh o produces them , but rathe r b e looke d on a s an argumen t o f the riche s o f his power . 153. A s for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of Nature, and the actions of finite imperfect spirits: this, in the state we are in at presen t

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is indispensabl y necessar y t o ou r well-being . Bu t ou r pros pects ar e to o narrow : we take, for instance, the ide a o f some one particula r pai n int o ou r thoughts , an d accoun t i t evil, whereas i f w e enlarg e ou r view , s o a s t o comprehen d th e various ends , connexions , an d dependencie s o f things , o n what occasions an d i n what proportions w e are affecte d wit h pain an d pleasure , th e natur e o f huma n freedom , an d th e design wit h whic h w e ar e pu t int o th e world ; w e shal l be forced to acknowledg e that those particula r things, which considered i n themselves appea r t o b e evil, have th e natur e of good, whe n considere d a s linke d with th e whol e syste m of beings . 154. Fro m wha t hat h bee n sai d i t wil l b e manifes t to an y considering person, that it is merely for want of attention an d comprehensiveness o f mind, that ther e ar e an y favourer s of atheism o r th e Manichean heresy* t o b e found . Littl e an d unreflecting soul s may indeed burlesqu e th e work s of Providence, th e beaut y and order whereo f they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains to comprehend. Bu t those who are masters o f any justness and exten t o f thought, and ar e withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admir e the divine traces of wisdo m and goodnes s tha t shin e throughou t th e econom y of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind , that b y an aversio n o f thought, a wilful shuttin g of the eyes , we ma y no t escap e seein g it ? I s i t therefor e t o b e wondered at, if the generalit y of men, who are eve r intent o n business or pleasure, an d little used t o fix or open the ey e of their mind , should not hav e all that convictio n an d evidenc e of th e bein g o f God, whic h might be expecte d i n reasonabl e creatures? 155. W e shoul d rathe r wonder , that me n ca n be foun d so stupid a s to neglect , tha n tha t neglectin g the y shoul d b e un convinced of such an evident and momentou s truth . And ye t it is to be feare d that too man y of parts and leisure , who live in Christian countries, are merely through a supine and dreadful negligenc e sunk into a sort of atheism. Since it is downright impossible, tha t a sou l pierced an d enlightene d with a thor ough sense o f the omnipresence , holiness , and justice of that Almighty Spirit, should persist in a remorseless violation of his

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laws. We ought therefore earnestl y t o meditate an d dwell on those important points; that so we may attain conviction without al l scruple , that th e eyes o f th e Lord ar e i n every place beholding the evil and the good', that he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat, and raiment t o put on', tha t h e i s presen t an d consciou s t o ou r innermost thoughts ; an d tha t w e hav e a mos t absolut e an d immediate dependence o n him . A clea r vie w of which grea t truths cannot choos e bu t fill our hearts with an awful circum spection an d hol y fear , whic h i s th e stonges t incentiv e t o virtue, and the bes t guar d against vice. 156. Fo r afte r all , what deserves th e first place i n our studies, is the consideratio n o f God, an d ou r duty, whic h to pro mote, a s i t wa s th e mai n drif t an d desig n o f m y labours , s o shall I estee m the m altogethe r useles s an d ineffectual , i f by what I have said I cannot inspir e m y readers wit h a pious sense o f the presence o f God: and having shewn the falseness or vanit y o f thos e barre n speculations , whic h mak e th e chief employmen t o f learne d men , th e bette r dispos e the m to reverenc e an d embrac e th e salutar y truth s o f the Gospel , which t o kno w an d t o practis e i s th e highes t perfectio n o f human nature .

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THREE D I A L O G U E S

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ANALYTICAL CONTENT S (by page numbers) First Dialogue Concerns th e basi c arguments fo r th e non-existenc e o f the physica l world an d o f material substance . 107-10 Introductor y passages : th e dange r o f scepticism ; clarifica tion o f th e concep t b y movin g fro m classica l t o moder n conception o f scepticism . 111-12 Raise s questio n o f whethe r sensibl e thing s exis t externa l to the mind. 112-25 Discussio n o f the objectivit y of secondary qualities: 112-16: Hea t an d cold ; usin g assimilation argument an d argument from illusion; 116-18: Tastes; usin g same; 118-19: Smells; using same; 118-20: Sounds; using causal argument; 120-6: Colours ; usin g illusion i n for m o f colou r o f sk y and microscopi c vision : Hylas supplement s wit h causal argument. 126-33 Discussio n o f objectivity o f primary qualities : 126-8: Extension an d shape ; usin g illusion i n for m o f difference i n size perception between mites and men ; 128-9: Motion; usin g illusion; 129-30: Solidity; using illusion an d clai m that resistance i s feeling, no t propert y o f body; 130-2: Absolute, non-specifi c extension; 132-3: Pure intellect and abstracting ideas. 133-6 Distinctio n betwee n sensation s and thei r objects . 136-8 Matte r a s substratum. 139-40 Conceivin g the unperceived . 140-2 Wh y visual depth i s not externality. 142-7 Discussio n o f Lockean representationalism : Berkeley's thre e responses : 143-5: (i) No way of knowing such an external world exists; 145-6: (2) Diverse appearances coul d not represent a stable object; 146-7: (3 ) Sensation s an d idea s coul d onl y b e lik e sen sations an d ideas .

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Second Dialogue Consists o f a n introductio n re-examinin g th e 'moder n philosophy' , then tw o major parts : first he trie s to sho w that hi s conclusions are not sceptical , an d th e rol e o f Go d i n this ; second, variou s etiolate d conceptions o f matter , accordin g t o whic h i t transcend s sensibl e qualities, are discussed . 148-50 Introductor y remarks on the 'moder n philosophy'. 148-9: Hyla s canno t se e ho w t o avoi d th e causa l ex planation o f the generatio n o f ideas; 149-50: Philonous ' tw o replies : (i ) inconsisten t wit h pre vious proo f tha t bodie s ar e ideas ; (2 ) tha t ther e coul d be n o connectio n betwee n th e motio n o f nerve s an d sensations. 150-6 Th e rol e of God i n making idealism non-sceptical: 150-2: Philonous' eulogy on the beauty of the world; Hylas' response that thi s is inconsistent wit h previous sceptica l conclusions; 152-3: Not sceptical, because the world is mind-dependent, yet independen t o f m y mind , s o depend s o n divin e mind; 153-6: Berkeley's objection to Malebranche's vie w that we see al l things in God . 156-68 Attenuate d conception s o f matter: 156-7: Matter a s whatever cause s ideas ; Reply: coul d not, because inert; 157-60: Matter a s instrument for God's action; Reply: onl y use instrumen t if cannot ac t without; 160-2: Matte r a s occasio n fo r divin e action ; Reply: Go d does not need t o be prompted; 163-4: Matter a s necessary idea with no empirical content ; Reply: Challeng e t o form—i.e . produc e imag e of—thi s idea; 165-8: Hyla s stil l feel s matte r neede d fo r bar e realit y of things.

Third Dialogue The majo r theme o f this dialogue is Hylas' insistence that idealism is shocking even i f true: it is disingenuous to presen t i t a s a version of common sens e o r a s compatible wit h Christian doctrine.

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69-73 Hyla s accepts Philonous ' conclusions, whic h he takes to be sceptical: the y disput e whethe r th e rea l objec t i s identical with th e appearance s o r wit h what lie s behin d them , an d whether w e ca n kno w what, if anything, lies behin d them . Philonous say s appearances ar e th e rea l things. T 73 Hyla s raises question of ability of objects to exist when on e is dead . Philonou s replie s the y can , give n th e existenc e of God to perceive them . 173-7 Ho w ca n we have idea of active being, such as God, and, if we can , wh y no t o f matter ? Reply, w e hav e a consciou s intuition o f ourselve s an d Go d i s similar , with th e limita tions removed. We have no conscious contac t wit h matter. 177 I s idealism not contrar y t o commo n sense ? Reply: physica l existence i s equivalen t t o perceivability , onl y idea s ar e perceivable an d ideas ar e actuall y perceived. 177-8 Th e difference s betwee n chimera s an d reality : (i ) vivid ness; (2) connectedness . 178-9 I s it not strang e t o sa y that only spirits an d ideas exist ? Reply, onl y verbally; Locke's theor y is really stranger . 179-80 Idealis m make s Go d responsibl e fo r evil ; Reply, (i ) i t i s neither bette r no r wors e to ac t through an instrument; (2) it is the inten t no t th e physica l action that counts ; (3 ) Go d is not th e onl y spiritual agent . 181-2 Ho w are illusions possible? Reply: idea s are never false, but inferences base d on them can be. 182-3 I s the dispute not purely verbal? Reply: no , because it would not be correct to call an active, unextended being 'material'. 183-4 Woul d God not suffer pai n and other imperfections? Reply: God know s ideas but doe s no t suffe r the m b y sense . 184-6 Th e law s o f motio n ar e proportiona l t o th e quantit y o f matter an d so require it s existence; Reply: th e laws depend on qualitie s of matter, not substance . 186-8 I s Go d no t deceivin g us ? A t leas t th e theor y i s a grea t 'novelty'; Reply: materia l substanc e i s required neithe r b y reason no r revelation . T a m no t fo r changin g things into ideas bu t idea s int o things. ' 188-92 Ca n w e perceive th e sam e thing s whe n w e have differen t ideas? Reply: no t i n a strict sens e o f 'same' but i n a loose r one. 192 'Same ' requires an externa l archetype ; Reply: ther e i s one in God' s mind. T 93~5 I f extended ideas are in the mind, then minds are extended;

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Reply: idea s ar e 'i n th e mind ' onl y i n th e sens e o f bein g perceived b y it. 195-202 Idealis m an d creation : 195-7: If creatio n consist s simply i n thing s i n God' s mind being mad e availabl e t o us , the n creatio n i s condi tional upon huma n existence ; Replies: (i) there coul d be other finite spirits; (2) conditional existence will do, as for things unperceive d i n the desert ; 197-9: If things are eternall y i n God's mind the n the y ar e never created ; Replies: (i) the y are created onl y relative to finite spirits; (2 ) and a similar proble m mus t arise fo r any changeless God ; 199-200: Idea s mus t exis t i n a n ectypa l an d i n a n arche typal form ; 200-202: Th e natura l sense o f scripture i s idealist. 202-4 Advantage s of idealism: (i) it makes science clear and nonmetaphysical; (2 ) scepticism rest s o n th e metaphysica l be lief i n matter . 205-6 Certai n mistake s in argument that Philonous think s can be used agains t idealism. 206-8 I t i s possible t o retai n th e ter m 'matter ' onl y if one use s it with care . 208 Idealis m come s fro m combinin g the vulga r trut h tha t th e things immediatel y perceive d ar e rea l wit h th e moder n philosophical insigh t tha t th e thing s w e ar e awar e o f ar e ideas in the mind .

THE PREFACE* Though it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of Nature and Providence, that the end of speculation be practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those, who are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of another mind. And, indeed, if we consider the pains that have been taken, to perplex the plainest things, that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences; it will not seem strange, that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge. Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise scepticism an d paradoxes. I t i s not enough, that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing. Its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For, though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which they laugh at, and despise. In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; and, if possible, to lay down such principles, as, by an easy solution of them, together with their own native evidence, may, at once, recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Which, with a plain demonstration of the immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue. This design I proposed, in the First Part of a Treatise con-

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cerning the Principles o f Human Knowledge , published i n the year ijio. But, before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new light Which i s the business o f th e following Dialogues . In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader, any knowledge of what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I advance, into the mind, in the most easy and familiar manner; especially, because they carry with them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind. If the principles, which I here endeavour to propagate, are admitted for true; the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence, are, that atheis m an d scepticis m will b e utterly destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of science retrenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense. And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexion to some, that when they have taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions, they should at last come to think like other men: yet, methinks, this return to the simple dictates of Nature, after having wandered through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home from a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future. As i t was my intention t o convince sceptic s an d infidel s by reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope, it will be manifest, that the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of thought: whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling way, not altogether improperly termed free-thinking , b y certain libertines i n thought, wh o ca n no more endure th e restraints of logic , than those o f religion , o r government . It will, perhaps, be objected to my design, that so far as it

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tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons; but, if by their speculations rightly placed, the study of morality and the Law of Nature were brought more into fashion among men of parts and genius, th e discouragements that draw t o scepticis m re moved, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the principles of natural religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences: there are grounds to think, these effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the world; but also, by shewing, that such parts of revelation, as lie within the reach of human inquiry, are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose all prudent, unprejudiced persons, to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries, which are above the comprehension of our faculties. It remains, that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these Dialogues, till he has read them through. Otherwise, he may lay them aside in a mistake of their design, or on account of difficulties or objections which he would find answered in the sequel A treatise of this nature would require to be once read over coherently, in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading; this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain: especially, if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote, some years since, upon vision , an d th e Treatise concerning th e Principle s of Huma n Knowledge . Wherein divers notions advanced i n these Dialogues , ar e farther pursued, o r placed i n different lights, and other points handled, which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.

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THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS THE FIRS T DIALOGU E P H I L O N O U S . * Goo d morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroa d s o early. H Y L A S . * I t i s indee d somethin g unusual ; bu t m y thought s were s o take n u p wit h a subjec t I wa s discoursin g of last night, that finding I could no t sleep , I resolved t o ris e and take a turn in the garden . P H I L O N O U S . I t happened well , to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter tim e of the day, or a more delightful seaso n of the year ? That purpl e sky, these wil d but swee t notes of birds, th e fragran t bloom upo n th e tree s an d flowers, the gentle influenc e o f th e risin g sun, these an d a thousan d nameless beautie s o f natur e inspir e th e sou l wit h secre t transports; it s facultie s to o bein g a t thi s tim e fres h an d lively, are fit for those meditations , which th e solitud e of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. Bu t I a m afrai d I interrup t you r thoughts : fo r yo u seemed ver y intent o n something . H Y L A S . I t is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any means depriv e mysel f o f you r company , fo r m y thought s always flow more easil y in conversation with a friend, than when I a m alone: bu t m y request is , that yo u woul d suffe r me to impar t my reflexions t o you. P H I L O N O U S . Wit h al l m y heart , i t i s wha t I shoul d hav e requested myself , i f you had no t prevente d me . H Y L A S . I wa s considerin g th e od d fat e o f thos e me n wh o have i n al l ages , throug h a n affectatio n o f bein g distinguished fro m th e vulgar , or some unaccountable tur n of thought, pretende d eithe r t o believ e nothin g a t all , o r t o believe the most extravagant things in the world. This how-

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ever might be borne , if their paradoxe s an d scepticis m did not dra w after the m som e consequence s o f general disad vantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when men o f les s leisur e se e the m wh o ar e suppose d t o hav e spent thei r whol e tim e i n th e pursuit s o f knowledge , professing a n entir e ignorance of all things, or advancin g such notions a s are repugnan t t o plai n an d commonl y received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicion s concerning the most important truths , which they had hitherto held sacre d an d unquestionable . P H I L O N O U S . I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affecte d doubt s of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone o f late in this way of thinking , that I have quitte d severa l o f the sublim e notions I had go t in their school s fo r vulga r opinions. An d I give it you on my word, since this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictate s of Nature an d common sense , I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easil y comprehen d a great man y things which before were al l mystery and riddle. H Y L A S . I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard o f you. P H I L O N O U S . Pray , what were those ? H Y L A S . Yo u were represented i n last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered int o the min d of man, to wit, that ther e i s no such thing as material substance in the world. P H I L O N O U S . Tha t ther e i s n o suc h thin g a s wha t philo sophers cal l material substance, I a m seriousl y persuaded: but i f I wer e mad e t o se e anythin g absurd o r sceptica l i n this, I should then have th e sam e reaso n to renounce this , that I imagine I have now to reject the contrar y opinion . H Y L A S . What ! ca n anythin g b e mor e fantastical , more re pugnant t o commo n sense , o r a mor e manifes t piec e o f scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matterl P H I L O N O U S . Softly , goo d Hylas . Wha t i f i t shoul d prove , that you , who hold there is , are by virtue of that opinio n a greater sceptic, an d maintai n mor e paradoxe s an d repug nancies t o commo n sense , tha n I wh o believ e n o suc h thing?

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H Y L A S . Yo u ma y a s soo n persuad e me , th e par t i s greate r than th e whole , a s that , i n orde r t o avoi d absurdit y an d scepticism, I should eve r be oblige d to giv e up my opinion in this point. P H I L O N O U S . Wel l then , ar e yo u conten t t o admi t tha t opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable t o common sense , and remot e fro m scepticism ? H Y L A S . Wit h all my heart. Since you are fo r raising disputes about the plainest things in Nature, I am content for once to hear wha t you have to say. P H I L O N O U S . Pray, Hylas , what do you mean b y a sceptic? H Y L A S . I mea n wha t al l me n mean , on e tha t doubt s o f everything. P H I L O N O U S . H e the n wh o entertain s n o doub t concernin g some particula r point , with regard t o that point canno t b e thought a sceptic. H Y L A S . I agre e wit h you. P H I L O N O U S . Whethe r dot h doubtin g consis t i n embracin g the affirmativ e o r negativ e side of a question ? H Y L A S . I n neither; for whoever understands English, cannot but kno w that doubting signifie s a suspense between both . P H I L O N O U S . H e the n tha t deniet h an y point, ca n no mor e be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth i t with the same degree of assurance . H Y L A S . True . P H I L O N O U S . An d consequently , fo r suc h hi s denia l i s n o more t o be esteeme d a sceptic tha n the other . H Y L A S . I acknowledge it. P H I L O N O U S . Ho w comet h i t t o pas s then , Hylas , tha t yo u pronounce m e a sceptic, because I deny what you affirm, t o wit, th e existence o f matter? Since, for ought you can tell, I am as peremptory i n my denial, as you in your affirmation. * H Y L A S . Hold , Philonous, I have been a little out i n my defi nition; but ever y false ste p a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on . I said indeed, that a sceptic wa s one who doubted o f everything ; but I shoul d hav e added , o r wh o denies th e realit y an d truth of things. P H I L O N O U S . Wha t things? Do yo u mean the principles and theorems o f sciences ? Bu t thes e yo u kno w ar e universa l intellectual notions , an d consequentl y independen t o f

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matter; the denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them . H Y L A S . I grant it. But are there n o other things ? What think you o f distrusting the senses , o f denying the rea l existenc e of sensibl e things , or pretending t o kno w nothing of them. Is not thi s sufficient t o denominat e a man a sceptic] P H I L O N O U S . Shal l w e therefor e examin e whic h o f u s i t i s that denie s th e realit y o f sensibl e things , or professe s th e greatest ignorance of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed th e greates t scepticl H Y L A S . Tha t i s what I desire . P H I L O N O U S . Wha t mean yo u by sensible things ? H Y L A S . Thos e things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagin e that I mean anythin g else? P H I L O N O U S . Pardo n me , Hylas , i f I a m desirou s clearl y t o apprehend you r notions , sinc e this may much shorte n ou r inquiry. Suffer m e then to ask you this farther question. Are those thing s onl y perceive d b y th e sense s whic h ar e per ceived immediately ? Or may those thing s properly be said to be sensible, which are perceived mediately , or not without th e interventio n o f others? H Y L A S . I do no t sufficientl y understan d you. P H I L O N O U S . I n readin g a book , wha t I immediatel y per ceive ar e th e letters , but mediately , or b y means o f these , are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that th e letter s ar e trul y sensible things, or per ceived b y sense , ther e i s n o doubt : bu t I woul d kno w whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too. H Y L A S . N o certainly , it were absurd t o thin k Go d o r Virtue sensible things, though they may be signified an d suggested to th e min d b y sensibl e marks , wit h whic h the y hav e a n arbitrary connexion . P H I L O N O U S . I t seems then, that by sensible things you mean those onl y which can be perceive d immediatel y by sense. H Y L A S . Right . P H I L O N O U S . Dot h it not follo w fro m this , that though I see one par t o f th e sk y red , an d anothe r blue , an d tha t m y reason dot h thence evidently conclude there must be some cause o f that diversit y of colours, yet tha t caus e canno t b e

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said t o b e a sensibl e thing, or perceive d b y th e sens e o f seeing? H Y L A S . I t doth . P H I L O N O U S . I n lik e manner , thoug h I hea r variet y o f sounds, ye t I canno t b e sai d t o hea r th e caus e o f thos e sounds. H Y L A S . Yo u cannot . P H T L O N O U S . An d when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say with any truth or propriety, that I feel the caus e o f its heat o r weight. H Y L A S . T o prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only which are perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing whic h they d o no t perceiv e immediately : for the y make n o inferences . The deducin g therefore o f cause s o r occasions fro m effect s an d appearances , whic h alon e ar e perceived b y sense, entirely relates t o reason . P H I L O N O U S . Thi s point then i s agreed between us , that sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. You wil l farther inform me, whethe r we immediately perceiv e b y sigh t anythin g beside light , and colours , and figures : o r b y hearing , anythin g but sounds : b y th e palate, anything beside tastes : by the smell , beside odours : or by the touch , more than tangible qualities. H Y L A S . W e do no t P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s therefore , tha t i f yo u tak e awa y all sensible qualities, there remain s nothing sensible . H Y L A S . I grant it. P H I L O N O U S . Sensibl e thing s therefore ar e nothin g else bu t so man y sensibl e qualities , o r combination s o f sensibl e qualities. H Y L A S . Nothin g else. P H I L O N O U S . Hea t then is a sensible thing . H Y L A S . Certainly . P H I L O N O U S . Dot h th e realit y o f sensibl e thing s consis t i n being perceived? or , is it something distinct from thei r be ing perceived, and that bears no relation t o the mind? H Y L A S . T o exist is one thing , and t o b e perceived i s another. P H I L O N O U S . I speak with regard to sensible things only: and

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of thes e I ask, whether b y their rea l existence yo u mean a subsistence exterio r t o th e mind , an d distinc t fro m thei r being perceived ? H Y L A S . I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without an y relation t o their bein g perceived. P H I L O N O U S . Hea t therefore , i f i t b e allowe d a rea l being, must exist without the mind. H Y L A S . I t must. P H I L O N O U S . Tel l me , Hylas , is thi s rea l existenc e equall y compatible t o al l degrees o f heat, which we perceive: or is there an y reason wh y we shoul d attribute it t o some , an d deny i t others ? An d i f ther e be , pra y le t m e kno w tha t reason. H Y L A S . Whateve r degree o f heat w e perceiv e b y sense , w e may be sur e the sam e exists in the objec t that occasions it. P H I L O N O U S . What , the greates t as well as the least? H Y L A S . I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both: the y ar e bot h perceive d b y sense ; nay , th e greate r degree o f hea t i s mor e sensibl y perceived ; an d conse quently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existenc e tha n w e ca n b e o f th e realit y o f a lesse r degree. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t i s not th e mos t vehemen t an d intense degree of heat a very great pain?* H Y L A S . N o on e ca n deny it. P H I L O N O U S . An d i s any unperceiving thing capable o f pain or pleasure? H Y L A S . N o certainly. P H I L O N O U S . I s your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense an d perception? H Y L A S . I t i s senseless, without doubt. P H I L O N O U S . I t cannot therefore be th e subjec t of pain. H Y L A S . B y no means. P H I L O N O U S . No r consequentl y o f th e greates t hea t per ceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain. H Y L A S . I grant it. P H I L O N O U S . Wha t shall we say then of your external obj ect; is it a material substance, or no ?

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H Y L A S . I t i s a material substanc e wit h the sensibl e qualities inhering in it. P H I L O N O U S . Ho w then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot i n a material substance? I desire yo u woul d clear thi s point . H Y L A S . Hold , Philonous, I fear I was out i n yielding intense heat t o be a pain. It should see m rather, that pain is something distinc t from heat , an d th e consequenc e o r effec t o f it. P H T L O N O U S . Upo n puttin g you r han d nea r th e fire , d o you perceive on e simpl e uniform sensation , or two distinct sensations? H Y L A S . Bu t on e simpl e sensation. P H I L O N O U S . I s not th e heat immediately perceived? H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . An d th e pain? H Y L A S . True . P H I L O N O U S . Seein g therefor e the y ar e bot h immediatel y perceived a t th e sam e time , an d th e fir e affect s yo u onl y with one simple, or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea is both th e intense heat immediatel y perceived, an d th e pain ; an d consequently , tha t th e intens e heat immediately perceived, is nothing distinc t from a particular sort o f pain. H Y L A S . I t seem s so. P H I L O N O U S . Again , tr y i n you r thoughts , Hylas , i f yo u can conceiv e a vehement sensation to b e withou t pain, or pleasure. H Y L A S . I cannot . P H I L O N O U S . O r ca n yo u fram e t o yoursel f a n ide a o f sensible pain or pleasure i n general, abstracted fro m ever y particular idea o f heat, cold, tastes, smells ? &c. H Y L A S . I do not find that I can. P H I L O N O U S . Dot h it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothin g distinc t fro m thos e sensation s o r ideas , i n a n intense degree ? H Y L A S . I t i s undeniable; an d t o spea k th e truth , I begi n t o suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.

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P H I L O N O U S . What ! ar e yo u the n i n tha t sceptical stat e o f suspense, between affirmin g an d denying? H Y L A S . I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful hea t canno t exis t without the mind. P H I L O N O U S . I t hat h no t therefore , accordin g t o you , an y real being. H Y L A S . I ow n it. P H I L O N O U S . I s it therefore certain , that there is no body in nature reall y hot? H Y L A S . I have not denie d ther e is any real hea t i n bodies. I only say, there i s no suc h thing as an intense real heat . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t di d you not sa y before, that al l degrees of heat wer e equall y real: or i f there was any difference, that the greater wer e more undoubtedl y real tha n the lesser ? H Y L A S . True: but it was, because I did not then consider th e ground ther e i s for distinguishin g betwee n them , which I now plainl y see . An d i t i s this : becaus e intens e hea t i s nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation ; an d pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense hea t ca n reall y exis t i n a n unperceivin g corporea l substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree t o exis t in such a substance. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t ho w shall we be abl e t o discer n those de grees of heat which exist only in the mind, from those which exist without it ? H Y L A S . Tha t i s no difficul t matter . You know , the leas t pain cannot exis t unperceived ; whateve r therefor e degre e o f heat i s a pain, exist s only in the mind . But a s for al l other degrees o f heat , nothin g oblige s u s t o thin k th e sam e of them. P H I L O N O U S . I thin k yo u grante d before , tha t n o unper ceiving bein g wa s capabl e o f pleasure , an y mor e tha n o f pain. H Y L A S . I did. P H I L O N O U S . An d i s not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat tha n what causes uneasiness, a pleasure ? H Y L A S . Wha t then ? P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y it cannot exis t without the mind in any unperceiving substance, o r body.

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H Y L A S . S o it seems. P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e therefore, a s well those degree s o f heat that ar e no t painful , a s those tha t are , ca n exis t only i n a thinking substance ; ma y w e no t conclud e tha t externa l bodies ar e absolutel y incapabl e o f an y degre e o f hea t whatsoever? H Y L A S . O n second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure, as that a great degree of heat is a pain. P H I L O N O U S . I d o no t preten d tha t warmt h i s a s grea t a pleasure a s heat i s a pain. But i f you gran t it to b e eve n a small pleasure, it serves to mak e good m y conclusion. H Y L A S . I coul d rathe r cal l i t a n indolence. I t seem s t o b e nothing more tha n a privatio n o f both pai n an d pleasure . And tha t suc h a qualit y o r stat e a s thi s ma y agre e t o a n unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny. P H I L O N O U S . I f you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree o f heat, is no pleasure, I know not ho w t o convince yo u otherwise , tha n b y appealin g t o you r ow n sense. But wha t think you o f cold? H Y L A S . Th e same that I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain; for to fee l a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat. P H I L O N O U S . Thos e bodie s therefore , upo n whos e application t o ou r own , we perceiv e a moderat e degre e o f heat , must b e conclude d t o hav e a moderat e degre e o f heat o r warmth in them: and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them. H Y L A S . The y must. P H I L O N O U S . Ca n any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man int o a n absurdity? H Y L A S . Withou t doub t i t cannot. P H I L O N O U S . I s i t no t a n absurdit y to thin k tha t th e sam e thing should be a t the sam e time both col d and warm? H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . Suppos e no w on e o f your hands hot , an d th e other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not th e wate r seem col d to one hand, and warm to the other ?

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H Y L A S . I t will . P H I L O N O U S . Ough t w e not therefor e b y your principle s t o conclude, it is really both cold an d warm a t the sam e time , that is , accordin g t o you r ow n concession , t o believ e a n absurdity. H Y L A S . I confess it seems so . P H I L O N O U S . Consequently , th e principle s themselve s ar e false, since you have granted that no true principle lead s to an absurdity. H Y L A S . Bu t afte r all , can anythin g be mor e absur d tha n t o say, there is no heat in the fire? P H I L O N O U S . T o mak e th e poin t stil l clearer ; tel l me , whether i n two case s exactl y alike , w e ought no t t o mak e the sam e judgment? H Y L A S . W e ought . P H I L O N O U S . Whe n a pin pricks your finger, doth it not ren d and divid e the fibres of your flesh? H Y L A S . I t doth . P H I L O N O U S . An d when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more? H Y L A S . I t doth not . P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e therefor e yo u neithe r judg e th e sensa tion itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasione d b y the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire. H Y L A S . Well , since i t must be so , I a m conten t t o yiel d thi s point, an d acknowledge , tha t hea t an d col d ar e onl y sen sations existing in our minds: but there still remain qualities enough t o secur e th e realit y of external things . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t wha t will you say , Hylas, if it shall appear that th e cas e i s the sam e wit h regard t o al l other sensibl e qualities, an d tha t the y ca n no mor e b e suppose d t o exis t without the mind, than hea t an d cold? H Y L A S . The n indee d yo u wil l hav e don e somethin g t o th e purpose; bu t tha t i s what I despair o f seeing proved . P H I L O N O U S . Le t us examine them in order. What think you of tastes , do they exis t without the mind , or no ? H Y L A S . Ca n an y ma n i n hi s sense s doub t whethe r suga r is sweet, or wormwood bitter ?

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P H I L O N O U S . Infor m me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure o r pleasant sensation , or i s it not ? H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . An d i s not bitternes s some kin d o f uneasiness or pain? H Y L A S . I grant it. P H I L O N O U S . I f therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporea l substance s existin g withou t th e mind , ho w can sweetnes s an d bitterness , tha t is , pleasur e an d pain , agree t o them ? H Y L A S . Hold , Philonous , I now see what it was deluded m e all this time. You aske d whethe r hea t an d cold , sweetness and bitterness , wer e no t particula r sort s o f pleasur e an d pain; to which I answered simply , that they were. Whereas I shoul d hav e thu s distinguished : thos e qualities , a s per ceived b y us, are pleasure s o r pains , but no t a s existing in the externa l objects . We mus t no t therefor e conclud e ab solutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but onl y that heat o r sweetness , a s perceived b y us, are no t i n the fire or sugar. What sa y you to this? P H I L O N O U S . I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogethe r concerning sensible things, which you defined t o b e th e thing s w e immediately perceive b y ou r senses. Whatever other qualities therefore you speak of , as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at al l belong t o the poin t i n dispute. You ma y indeed pre tend t o have discovered certain qualitie s which you do not perceive, an d asser t thos e insensibl e qualitie s exis t i n fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do yo u acknowledg e tha t hea t an d cold , sweetnes s an d bitterness (meanin g those qualities which are perceived b y the senses ) d o not exis t without the mind? H Y L A S . I see it is to no purpose t o hold out, so I give up th e cause a s to thos e mentione d qualities . Though I profess it sounds oddly , to sa y that suga r is not sweet . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t fo r you r farthe r satisfaction , tak e thi s along with you: that which at other times seems sweet, shall to a distempered palat e appea r bitter. An d nothin g can be plainer, than that divers persons perceive different taste s in

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the sam e food , sinc e tha t whic h on e ma n delight s in, an other abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent i n the food ? H Y L A S . I acknowledge I know not how. P H I L O N O U S . I n the next place, odours ar e to be considered . And wit h regar d t o these , I woul d fai n know , whethe r what hat h bee n sai d o f taste s dot h no t exactl y agre e t o them? Ar e the y no t s o man y pleasin g o r displeasin g sensations? H Y L A S . The y are . P H I L O N O U S . Ca n yo u the n conceiv e i t possibl e tha t the y should exis t in an unperceiving thing? H Y L A S . I cannot . P H I L O N O U S . O r can you imagine, that filth and ordure affec t those brute animal s that fee d o n the m ou t o f choice, with the sam e smells which we perceive i n them? H Y L A S . B y no means . P H I L O N O U S . Ma y we not therefor e conclude o f smells, as of the other forementioned qualities , that they cannot exist in any but a perceiving substance o r mind? H Y L A S . I think so. P H I L O N O U S . The n a s t o sounds, * wha t mus t w e thin k o f them: are they accidents really inherent i n external bodies, or not ? H Y L A S . Tha t they inhere not i n the sonorous bodies, is plain from hence ; because a bell struck in the exhausted receive r of a n air-pump , send s fort h n o sound . Th e ai r therefor e must be though t the subjec t of sound. P H I L O N O U S . Wha t reaso n i s there fo r that, Hylas? H Y L A S . Becaus e whe n an y motio n i s raise d i n th e air , w e perceive a sound greater or lesser, in proportion t o the air' s motion; but without some motion i n the air , we never hear any soun d a t all. P H I L O N O U S . An d grantin g that w e never hea r a sound bu t when some motio n is produced i n the air , yet I do not se e how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air. H Y L A S . I t i s this ver y motio n i n th e externa l air , tha t pro duces i n th e min d th e sensatio n o f sound. For , strikin g

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on th e dru m o f th e ear , i t causet h a vibration , whic h b y the auditor y nerve s bein g communicate d t o th e brain , the sou l i s thereupo n affecte d wit h th e sensatio n calle d sound. P H I L O N O U S . What ! is sound the n a sensation ? H Y L A S . I tel l you, as perceived b y us , i t i s a particula r sensation in the mind. P H T L O N O U S . An d can any sensation exist without the mind? H Y L A S . N o certainly . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w then can sound, being a sensation exist in the air , if by the air you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind? H Y L A S . Yo u mus t distinguish , Philonous, betwee n soun d a s it i s perceived b y us , an d a s it i s in itself ; o r (whic h is th e same thing ) between th e soun d w e immediatel y perceive, and tha t whic h exist s withou t us . Th e forme r indee d i s a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion i n the air . P H I L O N O U S . I though t I ha d alread y obviated tha t distinc tion b y th e answe r I gav e whe n yo u wer e applyin g it i n a lik e cas e before . Bu t t o sa y n o mor e o f that ; ar e yo u sure then tha t soun d i s really nothing bu t motion ? H Y L A S . I am . P H I L O N O U S . Whateve r therefore agree s to real sound, may with truth be attribute d to motion . H Y L A S . I t may. P H I L O N O U S . I t i s then good sens e t o spea k o f motion, as of a thing that i s loud, sweet, acute, or grave. H Y L A S . I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident, those accident s or mode s belon g onl y t o sensibl e sound, o r sound i n th e commo n acceptatio n o f the word , but not to sound in the real and philosophic sense, which, as I just now told you , is nothing bu t a certain motio n o f th e air? P H I L O N O U S . I t seems then there ar e two sorts of sound, the one vulgar , or that whic h is heard, th e othe r philosophica l and real . H Y L A S . Eve n so . P H I L O N O U S . An d th e latte r consists in motion.

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H Y L A S . I told yo u s o before. P H I L O N O U S . Tel l me , Hylas , t o whic h o f th e sense s thin k you, th e ide a of motion belongs : to the hearing ? H Y L A S . N o certainly, but t o th e sigh t and touch. P H I L O N O U S . I t shoul d follo w then , tha t accordin g t o you , real sounds may possibly be seen or felt, bu t neve r heard. H Y L A S . Loo k you , Philonous , you ma y i f you pleas e mak e a jes t o f m y opinion , bu t tha t wil l no t alte r th e trut h of things . I ow n indeed, th e inference s you dra w me into , sound somethin g oddly; but commo n language , you know, is frame d by , an d fo r th e us e o f th e vulgar : we mus t no t therefore wonder , i f expression s adapte d t o exac t philo sophic notions, see m uncout h an d ou t o f the way. P H I L O N O U S . I s i t com e t o that ? I assur e you , I imagin e myself t o hav e gaine d n o smal l point, sinc e yo u mak e s o light o f departin g fro m commo n phrase s an d opinions ; i t being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road , and most repugnant t o the general sens e o f the world . But ca n you thin k i t n o mor e than a philosophica l paradox , t o sa y tha t real sounds ar e never heard, and that th e idea of them is obtained by some other sense. And i s there nothing in this contrary to nature and th e trut h o f things? H Y L A S . T o dea l ingenuously , I d o no t lik e it. And afte r th e concessions alread y made, I had a s well gran t that sound s too have no real being without the mind. P H I L O N O U S . An d I hope you will make n o difficult y t o acknowledge the sam e of colours. H Y L A S . Pardo n me : the cas e of colours* is very different. Ca n anything be plainer, than that we see them on the objects? P H I L O N O U S . Th e object s yo u spea k o f are , I suppose , cor poreal substance s existing without the mind. H Y L A S . The y are . P H I L O N O U S . An d hav e tru e an d rea l colour s inherin g i n them? H Y L A S . Eac h visibl e object hath that colour which we see in it. P H I L O N O U S . How ! I s ther e anythin g visibl e bu t wha t w e perceive by sight?

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H Y L A S . Ther e is not. P H I L O N O U S . An d d o w e perceive anythin g by sense, which we do not perceive immediately ? H Y L A S . Ho w ofte n mus t I b e oblige d t o repea t th e sam e thing? I tell you, we do not . P H I L O N O U S . Hav e patience , goo d Hylas ; an d tel l m e onc e more, whether there i s anything immediately perceived by the senses , excep t sensibl e qualities . I kno w yo u asserte d there was not: but I would now be informed, whether you still persist i n the sam e opinion . H Y L A S . I do. P H I L O N O U S . Pray , is your corporeal substance eithe r a sensible quality, or made u p of sensible qualities? H Y L A S . Wha t a question tha t is ! who ever though t i t was? P H I L O N O U S . M y reaso n fo r askin g was , because i n saying, each visible object hath that colour which w e see i n it, yo u make visible objects to be corporeal substances ; which implies either that corporeal substance s are sensible qualities, or els e tha t ther e i s somethin g besid e sensibl e qualitie s perceived b y sight : but a s thi s poin t wa s formerl y agree d between us , an d i s stil l maintaine d b y you , i t i s a clea r consequence, tha t your corporeal substanc e is nothing distinct fro m sensible qualities . H Y L A S . Yo u may draw as many absurd consequences a s you please, an d endeavou r t o perple x th e plaines t things ; but you shal l neve r persuad e m e ou t o f m y senses . I clearl y understand m y own meaning. P H I L O N O U S . I wish you would make m e understan d i t too . But sinc e yo u ar e unwillin g t o hav e you r notio n o f cor poreal substanc e examined , I shal l urge tha t poin t n o farther. Onl y b e please d t o le t m e know , whether th e sam e colours whic h w e see , exis t i n externa l bodies , o r som e other. H Y L A S . Th e ver y same. P H I L O N O U S . What ! are then the beautiful red and purple we see o n yonde r clouds , reall y in them? O r d o yo u imagine they have in themselves any other form, than that of a dark mist or vapour ? H Y L A S . I must own , Philonous, those colour s ar e no t reall y

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in th e cloud s as they seem t o b e a t this distance. The y ar e only apparent colours . P H T L O N O U S . Apparent cal l yo u them ? ho w shal l w e distinguish these apparen t colour s from real ? H Y L A S . Ver y easily. Those are to be thought apparent, which appearing onl y a t a distance , vanis h upo n a neare r approach. P H I L O N O U S . An d thos e I suppos e ar e t o b e though t real , which ar e discovere d b y the mos t nea r an d exact survey. H Y L A S . Right . P H I L O N O U S . I s the nearest an d exactest survey made by the help o f a microscope, o r by the nake d eye ? H Y L A S . B y a microscope, doubtless . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t a microscope ofte n discovers colours in an object differen t fro m thos e perceive d b y th e unassiste d sight. An d i n case w e had microscope s magnifyin g t o an y assigned degree ; i t i s certain , tha t n o objec t whatsoeve r viewed throug h them , woul d appea r i n th e sam e colou r which it exhibits to the nake d eye . H Y L A S . An d wha t will you conclude from al l this? You cannot argu e that there ar e really and naturally no colours on objects: becaus e b y artificia l management s they ma y b e altered, or made t o vanish. P H I L O N O U S . I thin k i t ma y evidentl y b e conclude d fro m your own concessions, that al l the colour s w e see with our naked eyes , are only apparent a s those o n the clouds, since they vanis h upo n a mor e clos e an d accurat e inspection , which is afforded u s by a microscope. The n as to what you say by way of prevention: I as k you, whether th e rea l an d natural stat e o f a n objec t i s bette r discovere d b y a ver y sharp and piercin g sight, or by one whic h is less sharp ? H Y L A S . B y the forme r without doubt. P H I L O N O U S . I s it not plai n from dioptrics, that microscope s make the sigh t mor e penetrating, and represent object s as they woul d appea r t o th e eye , i n cas e i t wer e naturall y endowed wit h a most exquisit e sharpness ? H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y th e microscopica l representa tion i s t o b e though t tha t whic h bes t set s fort h th e rea l

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nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours there fore b y it perceived, are more genuine and real, than thos e perceived otherwise . H Y L A S . I confess there is something i n what you say. P H I L O N O U S . Besides , i t i s no t onl y possibl e bu t manifest , that ther e actuall y are animals , whose eye s ar e b y Nature framed t o perceiv e thos e things , which by reaso n o f thei r minuteness escap e ou r sight . What thin k yo u o f those in conceivably smal l animal s perceived b y glasses ? Must w e suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries , which appears in that of all other animals? An d i f i t hath , i s i t no t evident , the y mus t se e particles less than their own bodies, which will present them with a fa r differen t vie w in eac h object , fro m tha t whic h strikes ou r senses ? Eve n ou r ow n eyes d o not alway s represent object s to us after th e same manner. In the jaundice, everyone knows that all things seem yellow. Is it not there fore highl y probable, thos e animal s in whose eye s we discern a very different textur e fro m tha t o f ours, an d whos e bodies abound with different humours , do not see the same colours i n every object that we do? From al l which, should it not see m t o follow, that all colours ar e equally apparent , and tha t non e o f thos e whic h w e perceiv e ar e reall y in herent i n any outward object? H Y L A S . I t should. P H I L O N O U S . Th e poin t wil l b e pas t al l doubt , i f yo u con sider, that in case colours were real properties o r affection s inherent in external bodies, they could admi t of no altera tion, withou t som e chang e wrough t i n th e ver y bodie s themselves: but i s it not eviden t from wha t hath been said, that upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the humour s of the eye , or a variation of distance, without an y manne r o f rea l alteratio n i n th e thin g itself , th e colours o f an y objec t ar e eithe r changed , o r totall y disappear? Na y al l othe r circumstance s remainin g th e same , change bu t th e situatio n o f som e objects , an d the y shal l present differen t colour s t o th e eye . The sam e thin g happens upo n viewin g a n objec t i n variou s degree s o f light .

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And what is more known, than that the same bodies appea r differently coloure d b y candle-light, from wha t they d o i n the ope n day ? Ad d t o thes e th e experimen t o f a prism , which separating the heterogeneous ray s of light, alters th e colour of any object; and will cause the whitest to appear of a dee p blu e o r re d t o th e nake d eye . An d no w tel l me , whether yo u ar e stil l o f opinion , tha t ever y bod y hat h it s true rea l colou r inherin g i n it ; an d i f you thin k i t hath , I would fai n kno w farthe r fro m you , wha t certai n distanc e and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye , what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining tha t tru e colour , an d distinguishin g it fro m apparent ones . H Y L A S . I ow n mysel f entirel y satisfied , tha t the y ar e al l equally apparent; an d that ther e i s no such thing as colou r really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light . And wha t confirms m e i n this opinion is , that i n proportion t o th e light , colours ar e stil l more o r less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet how is it possible fo r us to perceive them? Fo r n o externa l body affect s th e mind , unless i t ac t firs t o n ou r organ s of sense. But th e onl y action o f bodies i s motion; an d motio n cannot b e communicate d otherwis e tha n b y impulse . A distant objec t therefor e canno t ac t on th e eye , nor conse quently make itself or its properties perceivabl e to the soul. Whence i t plainly follows, tha t it is immediately some con tiguous substance, whic h operating o n the ey e occasions a perception o f colours: an d suc h is light. P H I L O N O U S . How ! i s light then a substance ? H Y L A S . I tell you, Philonous, externa l ligh t is nothing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, an d in various manners reflected from the differen t surface s of outward object s to th e eyes , communicate different motion s to the optic nerves; which being propagated t o the brain, cause therein various impressions: and thes e ar e attende d wit h th e sensation s o f red , blue , yellow, &c.

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P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s then , th e ligh t dot h n o mor e tha n shake th e opti c nerves . H Y L A S . Nothin g else . P H I L O N O U S . An d consequen t t o eac h particula r motio n o f the nerve s th e min d i s affecte d wit h a sensation , whic h is some particula r colour . H Y L A S . Right . P H I L O N O U S . An d thes e sensation s hav e n o existenc e without the mind . H Y L A S . The y hav e not . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w then do you affirm tha t colours are in the light, sinc e b y light yo u understan d a corporea l substanc e external t o the mind? H Y L A S . Ligh t and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant cannot exis t without the mind. But in themselves they are onl y th e motion s an d configuration s of certai n insen sible particles o f matter. P H I L O N O U S . Colour s the n i n the vulga r sense, o r take n fo r the immediat e object s o f sight , cannot agre e t o an y but a perceiving substance . H Y L A S . Tha t i s what I say. P H I L O N O U S . Wel l then , sinc e yo u giv e u p th e poin t a s t o those sensible qualities , which are alone thought colours by all mankin d beside , yo u ma y hol d wha t yo u pleas e wit h regard t o those invisibl e ones o f the philosophers . I t i s not my business to dispute about them; only I would advise you to bethin k yourself , whethe r considerin g th e inquir y w e are upon , i t b e pruden t fo r yo u t o affirm , th e red an d blue which we see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or can see, are truly so . Are no t thes e shockin g notions, and ar e no t the y subject t o as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were obliged t o renounc e befor e i n the cas e o f sounds ? H Y L A S . I frankl y own , Philonous, tha t i t i s in vai n t o stan d out an y longer. Colours, sounds , tastes, in a word, all those termed secondary qualities, hav e certainl y n o existenc e without th e mind . But b y this acknowledgmen t I must no t be supposed t o derogate anythin g from th e reality of matter

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or externa l objects , seein g i t i s n o mor e tha n severa l philosophers maintain , who nevertheles s ar e th e farthes t imaginable fro m denyin g matter . Fo r th e cleare r under standing o f this , you mus t kno w sensibl e qualitie s ar e b y philosophers divide d int o primary an d secondary. Th e former ar e extension , figure, solidity, gravity, motion, an d rest. An d thes e they hold exis t really in bodies. Th e latte r are thos e abov e enumerated ; o r briefly , al l sensibl e qualities beside the primary, which they assert are only so many sensations o r idea s existin g nowhere bu t i n the mind . But all this , I doub t not , yo u ar e alread y apprise d of . For m y part, I hav e bee n a lon g tim e sensibl e ther e wa s such a n opinion curren t amon g philosophers , bu t wa s neve r thoroughly convinced o f its truth til l now. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u ar e stil l the n o f opinion , tha t extensio n and figures are inherent i n external unthinking substances. H Y L A S . I am . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t wha t i f th e sam e argument s whic h ar e brought against secondary qualities, will hold goo d against these also ? H Y L A S . Wh y then I shall be oblige d t o think , they too exis t only in the mind. P H I L O N O U S . I s i t you r opinion , th e ver y figure and exten sion whic h yo u perceiv e b y sense , exis t i n th e outwar d object o r material substance ? H Y L A S . I t is. * P H I L O N O U S . Hav e al l othe r animal s a s goo d ground s t o think th e sam e o f the figur e an d extensio n whic h they se e and feel ? H Y L A S . Withou t doubt, i f they have an y thought a t all. P H I L O N O U S . Answe r me , Hylas. Think yo u the senses were bestowed upo n al l animals for their preservation an d well being in life? or were they given to men alon e for this end? H Y L A S . I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals . pHT L o N o u s. I f so, is it not necessar y they should be enable d by the m t o perceiv e thei r ow n limbs , an d thos e bodie s which are capabl e o f harming them? H Y L A S . Certainly .

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P H I L O N O U S . A mite* therefore must be supposed t o see his own foot, an d things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension; though at the same time they appear t o yo u scarc e discernible , o r a t bes t a s s o man y visible points. H Y L A S . I cannot den y it. P H T L O N O U S . An d t o creature s les s tha n th e mit e the y wil l seem yet larger. H Y L A S . The y will . P H I L O N O U S . Insomuc h tha t wha t yo u ca n hardl y discern , will t o anothe r extremel y minut e anima l appea r a s som e huge mountain. H Y L A S . Al l this I grant. P H I L O N O U S . Ca n on e an d th e sam e thin g b e a t th e sam e time i n itself of different dimensions ? H Y L A S . Tha t wer e absurd to imagine. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t fro m wha t you hav e laid dow n it follows , that bot h th e extensio n b y yo u perceived , an d tha t per ceived b y the mit e itself, a s likewise all those perceived by lesser animals , are eac h o f them th e tru e extensio n o f th e mite's foot, that is to say, by your own principles you are led into a n absurdity. H Y L A S . Ther e seems t o be som e difficult y i n the point . P H I L O N O U S . Again , hav e yo u no t acknowledge d tha t n o real inheren t propert y o f any object ca n be changed , without som e chang e in the thin g itself? H Y L A S . I have. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t a s we approach t o o r reced e fro m a n ob ject, the visibl e extension varies , being at one distanc e ten or a n hundre d time s greate r tha n a t another . Dot h i t no t therefore follo w fro m henc e likewise , that i t i s not reall y inherent i n the object ? H Y L A S . I own I am at a loss what to think . P H I L O N O U S . You r judgment will soon be determined, if you will venture to think as freely concerning this quality, as you have don e concernin g th e rest . Wa s i t no t admitte d a s a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand, and cold to the other ? H Y L A S . I t was.

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P H I L O N O U S . I s it not th e ver y same reasonin g t o conclude , there i s no extensio n o r figure i n an object, because to on e eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears t o the other , great, uneven, and angular? H Y L A S . Th e very same. But doth this latter fact eve r happen? P H T L O N O U S . Yo u may at any time make the experiment, by looking wit h on e ey e bare , an d wit h th e othe r throug h a microscope. H Y L A S . I know not ho w to maintain it, and yet I am loth t o give up extension, I see so many odd consequence s follow ing upon suc h a concession . P H I L O N O U S . Odd , sa y you? Afte r th e concession s alread y made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness.* But on the othe r han d shoul d i t not see m ver y odd , if the gen eral reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea nor anything lik e a n ide a ca n exis t i n a n unperceivin g sub stance, the n surel y i t follows , tha t n o figur e o r mod e o f extension, which we can either perceive or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in matter; not to mention the peculia r difficult y ther e mus t be , i n conceivin g a ma terial substance, prior to and distinct from extension , to be the substratum of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will, figure, o r sound, or colour; it seems alike impossible it should subsis t in that which doth no t perceiv e it . H Y L A S . I giv e up th e poin t fo r th e present , reservin g stil l a right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false ste p in my progress t o it . P H I L O N O U S . Tha t i s a righ t you canno t b e denied . Figure s and extension being dispatched, we proceed next to motion. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time both ver y swift an d ver y slow? H Y L A S . I t cannot . P H I L O N O U S . I s not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion t o th e tim e i t takes u p i n describin g any given space? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour, moves three time s faster tha n i t would in case i t described onl y a mile in three hours .

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H Y L A S . I agree with you. P H I L O N O U S . An d i s not tim e measured b y the successio n of ideas in our minds? * H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . An d i s it not possible ideas should succeed on e another twice as fast in your mind, as they do in mine, or in that o f some spiri t o f another kind. H Y L A S . I ow n it. P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y th e sam e bod y ma y t o anothe r seem to perform its motion ove r an y space i n half th e time that it doth to you. And th e sam e reasoning will hold as to any other proportion: tha t is to say, according to your principles (sinc e the motion s perceive d ar e bot h reall y i n th e object) i t is possible on e an d th e sam e body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very swift an d very slow. How i s this consisten t eithe r wit h common sense , o r wit h what you just now granted? H Y L A S . I have nothing to sa y to it. P H I L O N O U S . The n a s fo r solidity, eithe r yo u d o no t mea n any sensibl e qualit y by tha t word , an d s o i t i s beside ou r inquiry: o r i f you do , i t mus t b e eithe r hardnes s o r resist ance. But both the one and the other ar e plainly relative to our sense : i t bein g evident , tha t wha t seem s har d t o on e animal, may appear sof t t o another, who hath greater forc e and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain, that the resistance I feel i s not i n the body . H Y L A S . I ow n th e ver y sensatio n o f resistance , which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body, but the caus e of tha t sensatio n is. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t the causes of our sensations ar e not things immediately perceived , an d therefor e no t sensible . Thi s point I thought had been alread y determined. H Y L A S . I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: I know not ho w to quit my old notions. P H I L O N O U S . T o help you out, do but consider, that if extension b e onc e acknowledge d t o hav e n o existenc e withou t the mind , the sam e must necessarily be grante d of motion, solidity, and gravity, since they all evidently suppose exten -

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sion. It is therefore superfluou s to inquire particularly concerning eac h o f them . I n denyin g extension , yo u hav e denied the m all . to have any real existence . H Y L A S . I wonder , Philonous , i f wha t yo u sa y b e true , wh y those philosopher s wh o den y th e secondar y qualitie s an y real existence, should yet attribute it to the primary. If there is no differenc e betwee n them , how can this be accounte d for? P H I L O N O U S . I t i s no t m y busines s t o accoun t fo r ever y opinion o f th e philosophers . Bu t amon g othe r reason s which ma y b e assigne d fo r this , i t seem s probable , tha t pleasure an d pain being rather annexed t o the former than the latter , ma y b e one . Hea t an d cold , taste s an d smells , have something more vividl y pleasing or disagreeable tha n the idea s o f extension , figure , an d motion , affec t u s with. And i t being too visibl y absurd to hold, that pain or pleasure ca n b e i n a n unperceivin g substance , me n ar e mor e easily weaned fro m believin g the externa l existenc e o f th e secondary, than the primary qualities. You wil l be satisfie d there is something in this, if you recollect the differenc e yo u made betwee n a n intens e an d mor e moderat e degre e o f heat, allowing the on e a real existence, while you denied it to th e other . Bu t afte r all , there i s no rationa l groun d fo r that distinction ; fo r surel y a n indifferen t sensatio n i s a s truly a sensation, as one more pleasing or painful; an d consequently shoul d no t an y more tha n the y b e suppose d t o exist in an unthinking subject. H Y L A S . I t i s just come into m y head, Philonous, tha t I have somewhere hear d o f a distinctio n betwee n absolut e and sensibl e extension . No w thoug h i t b e acknowledge d that great and small, consisting merely in the relation which other extended being s have to the parts of our own bodies, do no t reall y inher e i n th e substance s themselves ; ye t nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to absolute extension, whic h i s somethin g abstracte d fro m great an d small, fro m thi s o r tha t particula r magnitud e o r figure . So likewise as to motion, swift and slow are altogether relative t o th e successio n o f idea s i n ou r ow n minds . Bu t it dot h no t follow , becaus e thos e modification s o f motio n

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exist not without the mind, that therefor e absolut e motio n abstracted fro m the m dot h not . P H I L O N O U S . Pra y what i s it tha t distinguishe s one motion , or one part o f extension fro m another ? I s it not somethin g sensible, a s som e degre e o f swiftnes s o r slowness , som e certain magnitude or figure peculia r t o each ? H Y L A S . I think so. P H I L O N O U S . Thes e qualitie s therefor e strippe d o f al l sen sible properties, ar e withou t all specific an d numerica l differences, a s the School s call them. H Y L A S . The y are . P H I L O N O U S . Tha t i s to say , they ar e extensio n i n general , and motion i n general . H Y L A S . Le t i t be so . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t i t i s a n universall y received maxim , that everything which exists, i s particular. How the n ca n motion in general , o r extensio n i n genera l exis t i n an y corporea l substance? H Y L A S . I will take time to solv e your difficulty . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t I think the point ma y be speedily decided. Without doub t yo u can tell, whether you are abl e to fram e this or tha t idea . Now I a m content t o pu t ou r disput e on this issue . I f yo u ca n fram e i n you r thought s a distinc t abstract ide a o f motion o r extension , divested of all thos e sensible modes , a s swif t an d slow , great an d small , round and square , an d the like , which ar e acknowledge d to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But i f you cannot , i t wil l b e unreasonabl e o n you r sid e t o insist an y longer upon what you have no notio n of . H Y L A S . T o confes s ingenuously, I cannot . P H I L O N O U S . Ca n yo u eve n separat e th e idea s o f extension and motion, from th e ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction , term secondary. H Y L A S . What ! is it not a n easy matter, to consider extensio n and motio n b y themselves , abstracte d fro m al l other sen sible qualities ? Pra y ho w d o th e mathematician s trea t of them? P H I L O N O U S . I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficul t t o for m general propositions an d reasoning s abou t thos e qualities ,

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without mentioning any other; and in this sense to conside r or trea t o f them abstractedly . But ho w dot h i t follo w tha t because I ca n pronounce th e wor d motion b y itself , I can form th e ide a o f i t i n m y min d exclusiv e of body ? O r be cause theorem s ma y b e mad e o f extensio n an d figures , without any mention of great or small, or any other sensible mode o r quality ; that therefor e i t i s possible suc h a n ab stract ide a o f extension , withou t an y particula r siz e o r figure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended b y the mind ? Mathematicians treat o f quantity, withou t regardin g wha t othe r sensibl e qualitie s i t i s attended with , a s being altogethe r indifferen t t o thei r de monstrations. Bu t whe n layin g aside th e words , they con template the bare ideas, I believe you will find, they are not the pur e abstracte d ideas of extension. H Y L A S . Bu t wha t sa y yo u t o pure intellect! Ma y no t ab stracted idea s be frame d b y that faculty ? P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e I cannot fram e abstrac t idea s a t all , it is plain, I canno t fram e the m b y th e hel p o f pure intellect, whatsoever facult y yo u understan d b y thos e words . Be sides, not to inquire into the nature o f pure intellect and its spiritual objects , a s virtue, reason, God, o r th e like ; thu s much seem s manifest , tha t sensibl e thing s ar e onl y t o b e perceived b y sense, or represented b y the imagination. Figures therefore an d extensio n being originally perceived by sense, d o not belong t o pure intellect . But for your farther satisfaction, tr y i f yo u ca n fram e th e ide a o f an y figure , abstracted fro m al l particularitie s o f size , o r eve n fro m other sensibl e qualities. H Y L A S . Le t me thin k a little—I do not find that I can.* P H I L O N O U S . An d ca n yo u thin k i t possible , tha t shoul d really exis t i n Nature , whic h implie s a repugnanc y i n it s conception? H Y L A S . B y no means . P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e therefor e i t i s impossibl e eve n fo r th e mind to disunite the ideas of extension an d motion from all other sensibl e qualities , doth i t not follow , tha t wher e th e one exist , there necessaril y the othe r exis t likewise? H Y L A S . I t shoul d see m so . P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y th e ver y same arguments which

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you admitted, as conclusive agains t the secondary qualities , are withou t an y farthe r applicatio n o f forc e agains t th e primary too. Besides , if you wil l trust your senses, i s it no t plain al l sensibl e qualitie s coexist , o r t o them , appea r a s being in the sam e place? Do the y ever represent a motion, or figure , a s being divested of all other visibl e and tangible qualities? H Y L A S . Yo u nee d sa y no mor e o n thi s head . I a m fre e t o own, if there be no secret erro r or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, tha t al l sensible qualitie s ar e alik e to b e de nied existence without the mind. But my fear is, that I have been to o libera l i n my former concessions , o r overlooke d some fallacy or other. I n short, I did not take time to think. P H I L O N O U S . Fo r tha t matter , Hylas , yo u ma y tak e wha t time yo u pleas e i n reviewin g the progres s o f ou r inquiry . You ar e a t libert y t o recove r an y slip s yo u migh t hav e made, or offer whateve r you have omitted, which makes for your first opinion. H Y L A S . On e grea t oversigh t I take t o b e this : that I did not sufficiently distinguis h the object fro m th e sensation* No w though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thenc e follo w tha t the forme r cannot . P H I L O N O U S . Wha t objec t d o yo u mean ? th e objec t o f th e senses? H Y L A S . Th e same . P H T L O N O U S . I t i s then immediatel y perceived . H Y L A S . Right . P H I L O N O U S . Mak e m e t o understan d th e differenc e be tween what is immediately perceived, an d a sensation. H Y L A S . Th e sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besid e which , there i s something perceived ; an d thi s I call the object. For example , there i s red and yellow on that tulip. But the n th e ac t of perceiving those colour s i s in me only, and not i n the tulip . P H I L O N O U S . Wha t tuli p d o yo u spea k of ? i s i t tha t whic h you see ? H Y L A S . Th e same . P H I L O N O U S . An d what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension? H Y L A S . Nothing .

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P H I L O N O U S . Wha t yo u would say then is , that th e re d an d yellow are coexisten t with the extension ; i s it not ? H Y L A S . Tha t is not all; I would say, they have a real existence without the mind , in some unthinking substance. P H I L O N O U S . Tha t the colours ar e really in the tulip which I see, is manifest. Neither can it be denied, that this tulip may exist independen t o f your mind o r mine ; but tha t an y immediate object of the senses , that is, any idea, or combina tion o f ideas , shoul d exis t i n a n unthinkin g substance, o r exterior t o al l minds, is in itsel f a n eviden t contradiction . Nor ca n I imagine how this follows from wha t you said just now, t o wi t that th e re d an d yello w were o n the tuli p you saw, sinc e yo u d o no t preten d t o se e tha t unthinkin g substance. H Y L A S . Yo u hav e an artfu l way , Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from th e subject. P H T L O N O U S . I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To retur n the n t o you r distinctio n betwee n sensation an d object; i f I take yo u right , you distinguis h in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not. H Y L A S . True . P H T L O N O U S . An d thi s actio n canno t exis t in , o r belon g t o any unthinkin g thing; but whateve r besid e i s implied i n a perception, may. H Y L A S . Tha t is my meaning. P H I L O N O U S . S o that i f there wa s a perception withou t an y act o f the mind , it were possible suc h a perception shoul d exist i n an unthinking substance. H Y L A S . I grant it. But it is impossible there shoul d be such a perception. P H I L O N O U S . Whe n i s the min d sai d to be active ? H Y L A S . Whe n i t produces , put s a n en d to , o r change s anything. P H I L O N O U S . Ca n the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything but b y an ac t o f the will? H Y L A S . I t cannot . P H I L O N O U S . Th e min d therefor e i s to b e accounte d activ e in it s perceptions , s o fa r fort h a s volitio n i s include d i n them.

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H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . I n plucking this flower, I a m active , because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upo n my volition ; s o likewis e i n applyin g it t o m y nose . Bu t i s either o f these smelling? H Y L A S . No . P H T L O N O U S . I ac t too i n drawin g the ai r throug h m y nose ; because my breathing so rather than otherwise, is the effec t of m y volition. But neithe r can thi s be calle d smelling: for if i t were , I shoul d smell ever y tim e I breathe d i n tha t manner. H Y L A S . True . P H I L O N O U S . Smellin g then i s somewha t consequen t t o al l this. H Y L A S . I t is.

P H I L O N O U S . Bu t I d o no t fin d m y wil l concerne d an y farther. Whateve r mor e ther e is , a s tha t I perceiv e suc h a particular smell or any smell at all, this is independent of my will, an d therei n I a m altogethe r passive . D o yo u fin d i t otherwise wit h you, Hylas? H Y L A S . No , th e ver y same . P H I L O N O U S . The n a s t o seeing , i s it no t i n you r powe r t o open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way? H Y L A S . Withou t doubt . P H T L O N O U S . Bu t doth it in like manner depend on your will, that i n lookin g o n thi s flower , yo u perceiv e white rathe r than any other colour ? O r directing your open eyes toward yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darknes s the effec t o f your volition? H Y L A S . N o certainly . P H I L O N O U S . Yo u ar e the n i n thes e respect s altogethe r passive. H Y L A S . I am. P H I L O N O U S . Tel l m e now , whethe r seeing consist s i n per ceiving ligh t an d colours , o r i n openin g an d turnin g th e eyes? H Y L A S . Withou t doubt, in the former. P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e therefore yo u are in the ver y perceptio n

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of ligh t an d colour s altogethe r passive , wha t i s becom e of tha t actio n yo u wer e speakin g of , a s a n ingredien t in every sensation? An d dot h i t not follo w fro m you r own concessions, tha t th e perceptio n o f ligh t an d colours , including n o actio n i n it , ma y exis t i n a n unperceivin g substance? An d i s not thi s a plain contradiction ? H Y L A S . I know not wha t to thin k of it. P H I L O N O U S . Besides , sinc e yo u distinguis h th e active an d passive i n every perception, you mus t do i t in that o f pain. But ho w is it possible tha t pain, be i t as little activ e as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? I n short , do bu t conside r th e point , an d the n confes s ingenuously , whether ligh t an d colours , tastes , sounds , &c . ar e no t al l equally passions o r sensations in the soul . You may indeed call the m external objects, an d giv e the m i n word s wha t subsistence yo u please . Bu t examin e you r ow n thoughts, and the n tel l me whether i t be not a s I say? H Y L A S . I acknowledge , Philonous , tha t upo n a fai r obser vation o f what passe s i n m y mind , I ca n discove r nothin g else, but tha t I am a thinking being, affected wit h variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exis t in an unperceiving substance. Bu t the n o n th e other hand , whe n I loo k o n sensibl e thing s i n a differen t view, considerin g the m a s so many modes an d qualities , I find it necessary t o suppose a material substratum, without which they canno t b e conceived t o exist. P H I L O N O U S . Material substratum cal l you it? Pray, by which of you r senses cam e you acquainte d wit h that being? H Y L A S . I t i s not itsel f sensible; it s modes an d qualitie s only being perceived b y the senses . P H I L O N O U S . I presume then , it was by reflexion and reaso n you obtained th e ide a o f it. H Y L A S . I d o no t preten d t o an y prope r positiv e ide a o f it . However I conclud e i t exists , because qualitie s canno t b e conceived t o exis t without a support . P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s the n yo u have onl y a relative notio n of it, or that you conceive it not otherwis e than by conceiving the relatio n i t bears t o sensibl e qualities . H Y L A S . Right .

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P H I L O N O U S . B e please d therefor e t o le t me kno w wherein that relatio n consists . H Y L A S . I s i t no t sufficientl y expresse d i n th e ter m substratum, o r substance] P H I L O N O U S . I f so, the wor d substratum shoul d import, that it is spread unde r the sensibl e qualities or accidents. H Y L A S . True . P H I L O N O U S . An d consequentl y under extension . H Y L A S . I ow n it. P H I L O N O U S . I t i s therefore somewha t in its own nature en tirely distinct from extension . H Y L A S . I tel l you , extensio n i s onl y a mode , an d matte r i s something tha t support s modes . An d i s it no t eviden t th e thing supported i s different fro m th e thin g supporting ? P H I L O N O U S . S o that somethin g distinct from, an d exclusive of extension, is supposed to be the substratum of extension. H Y L A S . Jus t so. P H I L O N O U S . Answe r me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension ? o r i s not th e ide a o f extensio n necessarily included i n spreading! H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . Whatsoeve r therefor e yo u suppos e sprea d under anything , mus t hav e i n itsel f a n extensio n distinc t from th e extensio n o f that thin g under whic h i t is spread. H Y L A S . I t must. P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y every corporeal substanc e being the substratum o f extension , mus t hav e i n itsel f anothe r extension by which it is qualified t o be a substratum', and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the substratum wa s somethin g distinc t from , an d exclusiv e of extension. H Y L A S . A y but , Philonous , yo u tak e m e wrong . I d o no t mean tha t matte r i s spread i n a gros s litera l sens e unde r extension. The wor d substratum i s used onl y to expres s in general the sam e thing with substance. P H I L O N O U S . Wel l then, let us examine the relatio n implie d in th e ter m substance. I s i t no t tha t i t stand s unde r accidents?

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H Y L A S . Th e ver y same. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t that one thing may stand under or suppor t another, must it not b e extended ? H Y L A S . I t must. P H I L O N O U S . I s not therefor e thi s suppositio n liabl e t o th e same absurdit y with the former? H Y L A S . Yo u stil l take thing s i n a stric t litera l sense : tha t i s not fair , Philonous . P H I L O N O U S . I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you ar e a t libert y t o explai n the m a s you please . Onl y I beseech you , make me understand something by them. You tell me, matter support s o r stands under accidents . How ! is it as your legs support you r body? H Y L A S . No ; that i s the litera l sense . P H I L O N O U S . Pra y le t rne know any sense, litera l or no t lit eral, tha t yo u understand i t in. Ho w lon g must I wait for a n answer , Hylas? H Y L A S . I declar e I kno w no t wha t t o say . I onc e though t I understood wel l enough wha t was meant b y matter's sup porting accidents . But no w the mor e I think o n it, the les s can I comprehend it ; in short, I find that I know nothing of it. P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s the n yo u have n o ide a a t all , neithe r relative nor positiv e o f matter; you know neither wha t it is in itself, nor wha t relation i t bears t o accidents . H Y L A S . I acknowledg e it. P H I L O N O U S . An d ye t you asserted, tha t you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving a t the sam e tim e a material suppor t o f them. H Y L A S . I did . P H I L O N O U S . Tha t i s t o say , whe n yo u conceiv e th e rea l existence o f qualities , yo u d o witha l conceiv e somethin g which you cannot conceive . H Y L A S . I t wa s wron g I own . Bu t stil l I fea r ther e i s som e fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into m y head , tha t th e groun d o f al l ou r mistake s lie s i n your treatin g o f eac h qualit y b y itself . Now , I gran t tha t each quality cannot singl y subsist without the mind. Colou r cannot withou t extension , neithe r ca n figure without som e

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other sensibl e quality. But as the several qualities united or blended togethe r for m entir e sensibl e things , nothing hinders why such things may not be suppose d t o exist without the mind. P H I L O N O U S . Either , Hylas , you ar e jesting , or hav e a very bad memory. Though indeed w e went through all the qualities b y nam e on e afte r another ; ye t m y arguments , o r rather you r concessions nowhere tende d t o prove, that th e secondary qualitie s di d not subsis t each alone by itself; but that they were not a t all without the mind . Indeed i n treating of figure an d motion, we concluded the y could not exist without th e mind , becaus e i t wa s impossibl e eve n i n thought to separate them from al l secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon thi s issue . I f yo u ca n conceiv e i t possibl e fo r an y mixture or combination of qualities, or an y sensible object whatever, t o exis t withou t th e mind , the n I wil l gran t i t actually to be so. H Y L A S . I f i t come s t o that , th e poin t wil l soo n b e decided . What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of , and unperceive d b y an y mind whatsoever? I d o a t thi s presen t tim e conceiv e the m existin g after tha t manner . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the sam e time unseen ? H Y L A S . No , that were a contradiction . P H I L O N O U S . I s i t no t a s grea t a contradictio n t o tal k o f conceiving a thing which is unconceivedl* H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . Th e tre e o r hous e therefor e whic h yo u thin k of, i s conceived by you. H Y L A S . Ho w shoul d it be otherwise ? P H I L O N O U S . An d wha t is conceived, is surely in the mind. H Y L A S . Withou t question , tha t whic h is conceived i s in th e mind. P H T L O N O U S . Ho w the n cam e yo u t o say , you conceive d a

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house o r tre e existin g independent an d ou t o f al l minds whatsoever? H Y L A S . Tha t wa s I ow n a n oversight ; but stay , let m e con sider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present t o see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existin g unperceive d o r unthough t of , no t considerin g that I myself conceive d i t al l the while . But no w I plainly see, that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceiv e in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, o r a mountain , but tha t i s all. And thi s i s far fro m proving, that I can conceive them existing out of th e minds of all spirits. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u acknowledg e then tha t yo u canno t poss ibly conceive, how any one corporeal sensibl e thing should exist otherwis e than in a mind. H Y L A S . I do. P H I L O N O U S . An d ye t yo u wil l earnestl y conten d fo r th e truth of that which you cannot s o much a s conceive. H Y L A S . I profess I know not what to think, but still there ar e some scruples remain with me. Is it not certai n I see things at a distance? D o w e not perceiv e the star s and moon, for example, to be a great way off? I s not this, I say, manifest to the senses ? P H I L O N O U S . D o yo u not i n a drea m to o perceiv e thos e o r the lik e objects? H Y L A S . I do . P H I L O N O U S . An d hav e they not the n th e sam e appearanc e of bein g distant? H Y L A S . The y have . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t yo u d o no t thenc e conclud e th e appari tions in a dream t o be without the mind? H Y L A S . B y no means . P H I L O N O U S . Yo u ought not therefore to conclude that sensible object s ar e withou t the mind , from thei r appearanc e or manner wherei n the y are perceived . H Y L A S . I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases ? P H I L O N O U S . B y n o means . Th e ide a o r thin g whic h yo u immediately perceive, neither sens e nor reason infor m you

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that i t actually exist s without th e mind . By sense you onl y know that you ar e affecte d wit h such certain sensations of light and colours , &c. And thes e yo u will not sa y are without th e mind. H Y L A S . True : bu t besid e al l that, do you not thin k the sight suggests something of outness or distance! P H I L O N O U S . Upo n approaching a distant object, do the visible siz e and figur e chang e perpetually , or d o the y appea r the sam e at al l distances? H Y L A S . The y ar e i n a continual change . P H I L O N O U S . Sigh t therefor e dot h no t sugges t o r an y wa y inform you , tha t th e visibl e objec t yo u immediatel y per ceive, exist s at a distance,* or wil l be perceive d whe n you advance farther onward, there bein g a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other, during the whole time of you r approach . H Y L A S . I t dot h not ; but stil l I know, upon seein g a n object , what objec t I shal l perceiv e afte r havin g passe d ove r a certain distance : no matte r whethe r it be exactl y the sam e or no : there i s still something o f distanc e suggeste d i n th e case. P H I L O N O U S . Goo d Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether ther e be any more in it than this. From the idea s you actually perceive b y sight, you have by experience learne d t o collec t wha t othe r idea s yo u wil l (according t o th e standin g orde r o f Nature ) b e affecte d with, after suc h a certain successio n of time an d motion . H Y L A S . Upo n th e whole , I take it to be nothing else . P H I L O N O U S . No w i s it no t plain , that i f we suppos e a ma n born blin d was on a sudden mad e t o see , h e coul d a t first have no experienc e o f what may be suggeste d by sight. H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . H e woul d not the n accordin g to you have any notion o f distance annexe d to the things he saw; but would take the m fo r a ne w se t o f sensation s existin g only i n hi s mind. H Y L A S . I t i s undeniable. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t t o make it still more plain : Is not distance a line turned endwis e to the eye ? H Y L A S . I t is.

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P H I L O N O U S . An d ca n a lin e s o situate d b e perceive d b y sight? H Y L A S . I t cannot . P H I L O N O U S . Dot h i t no t therefor e follo w tha t distanc e i s not properl y an d immediately perceived b y sight? H Y L A S . I t shoul d seem so. P H I L O N O U S . Again , is it your opinion tha t colour s ar e a t a distance? H Y L A S . I t must be acknowledged, they are only in the mind. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t d o no t colour s appea r t o th e ey e a s coexisting in the sam e place with extension an d figures ? H Y L A S . The y do . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w ca n yo u the n conclud e fro m sight , tha t figures exis t without , whe n yo u acknowledg e colour s d o not; the sensibl e appearanc e bein g th e ver y same wit h regard to both? H Y L A S . I know not wha t to answer. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t allowin g that distanc e wa s trul y an d im mediately perceive d b y the mind , yet i t would not thenc e follow i t existed ou t o f the mind . For whateve r is immediately perceived i s an idea: and ca n an y idea exis t out o f th e mind? H Y L A S . T o suppos e that , wer e absurd : bu t infor m me , Philonous, ca n w e perceiv e o r kno w nothin g besid e ou r ideas? P H I L O N O U S . A s fo r th e rationa l deducin g o f cause s fro m effects, tha t i s beside ou r inquiry . An d b y th e sense s yo u can bes t tell , whethe r yo u perceiv e anythin g which is no t immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the thing s immediately perceived, are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation , declare d yoursel f o n thos e points ; bu t you seem b y this last question to have departed fro m what you then thought . H Y L A S . T o speak th e truth, Philonous, I think there ar e two kinds of objects, the on e perceived immediately , which are likewise calle d ideas; th e othe r ar e rea l thing s or externa l objects perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. No w I own, ideas do not exist

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without th e mind ; but th e latte r sor t o f object s do.* I a m sorry I di d no t thin k o f thi s distinctio n sooner ; i t woul d probably have cut short your discourse. P H T L O N O U S . Ar e thos e external objects perceived by sense, or by some other faculty ? H Y L A S . The y ar e perceive d by sense. P H I L O N O U S . How ! i s ther e anythin g perceive d b y sense , which is not immediatel y perceived? H Y L A S . Yes , Philonous, in some sor t ther e is . For example , when I loo k o n a picture o r statu e o f Julius Caesar , I may be sai d afte r a manne r t o perceiv e hi m (thoug h no t im mediately) by my senses. P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s then , yo u wil l hav e ou r ideas , which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance t o ou r ideas. H Y L A S . Tha t i s my meaning. P H T L O N O U S . An d i n th e sam e wa y tha t Juliu s Caesar , i n himself invisible , is nevertheles s perceive d b y sight ; rea l things in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense. H Y L A S . I n th e ver y same. P H I L O N O U S . Tel l me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar , d o yo u se e wit h you r eye s an y mor e tha n some colours and figures with a certain symmetry and composition o f the whole ? H Y L A S . Nothin g else. P H I L O N O U S . An d woul d not a man, who had neve r known anything o f Julius Caesar, see a s much? H Y L A S . H e would. P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y he hath his sight, and the us e of it, in as perfect a degree a s you. H Y L A S . I agree with you. P H I L O N O U S . Whenc e come s i t then tha t you r thoughts are directed t o th e Roma n Emperor , an d hi s ar e not ? Thi s cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage ove r hi m in that respect . I t shoul d see m therefor e t o proceed fro m reaso n an d memory: should i t not? H Y L A S . I t should.

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P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y i t wil l no t follo w fro m tha t in stance, tha t anythin g i s perceive d b y sens e whic h i s no t immediately perceived . Thoug h I gran t w e ma y i n on e acceptation be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception o f ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others perhaps belonging to another sense , which are wont to be connected wit h them. For instance , when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only th e sound ; bu t fro m th e experienc e I hav e ha d tha t such a sound i s connected wit h a coach, I a m sai d to hea r the coach. It is nevertheless evident , that in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound: and the coac h i s not then properl y perceive d b y sense , bu t suggeste d fro m ex perience. S o likewise when we are said to see a red-hot ba r of iron; the solidit y and heat o f the iro n ar e not the object s of sight, but suggested to the imaginatio n by the colour and figure, which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, whic h would have been perceived , in case that sam e sense ha d the n bee n firs t conferre d o n us . A s fo r othe r things, i t i s plain the y ar e onl y suggeste d t o th e min d by experience grounded on former perceptions. Bu t to retur n to you r compariso n o f Caesar' s picture , i t i s plain , i f yo u keep to that, you must hold the real things or archetypes of our idea s are not perceived b y sense, but b y some interna l faculty o f the soul , as reason o r memory. I would therefor e fain know , what argument s you ca n dra w from reaso n fo r the existence of what you call real things or material objects. Or whethe r yo u remember t o have seen the m formerl y as they are in themselves? or if you have heard or read of any one that did. H Y L A S . I see , Philonous , yo u ar e dispose d t o raillery ; bu t that wil l never convince me . P H T L O N O U S . M y ai m i s only t o lear n fro m you , the wa y t o come a t th e knowledg e o f material beings. Whateve r w e perceive, i s perceived eithe r immediatel y o r mediately : by sense, or by reason an d reflexion. But as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason yo u have to believe thei r

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existence; or what medium you can possibly make use of, to prove i t either t o mine o r your own understanding. H Y L A S . T o dea l ingenuously, Philonous, no w I consider th e point, I d o no t fin d I can giv e you an y good reaso n fo r it . But thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such thing s ma y reall y exist . An d a s lon g a s ther e i s n o absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved t o believe a s I did, til l you bring good reason s t o the contrary . P H I L O N O U S . What ? i s it come to this, that you only believe the existenc e o f materia l objects , an d tha t you r belie f i s founded barel y o n th e possibilit y of it s bein g true ? The n you wil l hav e me brin g reasons agains t it: though anothe r would think it reasonable, th e proof shoul d lie on him who holds th e affirmative . An d afte r all , thi s ver y point whic h you ar e now resolved to maintain without any reason, is in effect wha t you have more than once during this discourse seen goo d reaso n t o giv e up. Bu t t o pas s ove r al l this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind; but that they are copies, images, or representations of certain original s that do . H Y L A S . Yo u tak e m e right . P H I L O N O U S . The y ar e then lik e external things. H Y L A S . The y are . P H I L O N O U S . Hav e thos e thing s a stable an d permanent na ture independen t o f our senses ; o r ar e the y in a perpetua l change, upo n ou r producin g an y motion s i n ou r bodies , suspending, exerting, or alterin g our facultie s o r organ s of sense. H Y L A S . Rea l things , it is plain, have a fixed and rea l nature , which remains the same, notwithstanding any change in our senses, o r i n the postur e an d motio n o f our bodies ; which indeed may affect th e ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect o n things existing without the mind. P H I L O N O U S . Ho w then is it possible, that things perpetually fleeting and variabl e as our ideas , shoul d b e copie s o r images o f anythin g fixe d an d constant ? O r i n othe r words , since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c. that is, our ideas are continually changing upon ever y alteration in

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the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinat e materia l object s b e properl y represente d or painted fort h b y several distinc t things, each o f which is so differen t fro m an d unlik e th e rest ? O r i f yo u sa y i t resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguis h the tru e cop y from al l the fals e ones ? H Y L A S . I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to this . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t neithe r i s this all. Which ar e materia l ob jects in themselves, perceptible o r imperceptible ? H Y L A S . Properl y an d immediately nothing can be perceive d but ideas . Al l materia l things therefor e ar e i n themselves insensible, and to be perceived onl y by their ideas . P H I L O N O U S . Idea s then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible. H Y L A S . Right . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t how can that which is sensible be like that which i s insensible? Ca n a rea l thin g in itsel f invisible b e like a colour, or a real thing which is not audible, be lik e a sound! In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea? H Y L A S . I must own, I think not . P H I L O N O U S . I s it possible ther e should be an y doubt i n th e point? D o yo u not perfectly know your own ideas? H Y L A S . I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceiv e or know, can be no part o f my idea. P H I L O N O U S . Conside r therefore , an d examin e them , an d then tel l m e i f there b e anythin g in the m whic h ca n exis t without the mind: or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind . H Y L A S . Upo n inquiry , I find it i s impossible fo r m e t o con ceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. An d i t is most evident , that n o idea ca n exist without the mind. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u ar e therefore by your principles forced t o deny th e realit y o f sensibl e things , sinc e yo u mad e i t t o consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to say , you ar e a downrigh t sceptic. So I hav e gaine d m y point, which was to shew your principles led to scepticism .

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H Y L A S . Fo r th e presen t I am , i f not entirel y convinced , a t least silenced . P H I L O N O U S . I woul d fai n kno w wha t mor e yo u woul d re quire in order t o a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were an y little slip s in discourse lai d hol d an d insiste d on ? O r wer e you no t allowe d t o retrac t o r reinforc e anythin g you ha d offered, a s best serve d you r purpose? Hat h not everythin g you could say been heard an d examined with all the fairness imaginable? I n a word , have yo u no t i n ever y poin t bee n convinced ou t o f you r ow n mouth ? An d i f yo u ca n a t present discove r an y fla w i n an y o f you r forme r con cessions, o r thin k o f an y remainin g subterfuge , an y ne w distinction, colour , o r commen t whatsoever , why d o yo u not produce it ? H Y L A S . A littl e patience , Philonous . I a m a t presen t s o amazed t o se e myself ensnared , an d a s it were imprisone d in the labyrinth s you have drawn me into, that o n the sudden i t canno t b e expecte d I shoul d find my way out. Yo u must giv e me time t o loo k abou t me , and recollect myself. P H I L O N O U S . Hark ; i s not thi s the college-bell ? H Y L A S . I t rings for prayers . P H I L O N O U S . W e will go in then if you please, an d meet here again to-morro w morning . In the mea n tim e yo u may employ you r thought s o n thi s morning' s discourse , an d tr y if you ca n find any fallacy i n it , or inven t any new mean s t o extricate yourself. H Y L A S . Agreed .

THE SECON D DIALOGU E H Y L A S . I be g you r pardon , Philonous , fo r no t meetin g you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation, that I had no t leisur e to thin k of the tim e of the day , or indee d o f anything else. P H T L O N O U S . I am glad you were so intent upon it , in hopes if there were any mistakes in your concessions, o r fallacies in m y reasoning s fro m them , yo u wil l no w discove r the m to me. H Y L A S . I assur e you , I hav e don e nothin g eve r sinc e I saw you, bu t searc h afte r mistake s and fallacies , an d wit h tha t view hav e minutel y examine d th e whol e serie s o f yester day's discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon revie w appea r stil l more clea r an d evident ; an d th e more I conside r them , th e mor e irresistibl y do the y forc e my assent . P H I L O N O U S . An d i s not this , think you, a sign that the y ar e genuine, that they proceed from Nature , and are conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictes t surve y sets them bot h of f to advantage . While the fals e lustr e of error an d disguis e cannot endur e bein g reviewed, or too nearly inspected . H Y L A S . I own there is a great dea l in what you say. Nor ca n anyone be mor e entirel y satisfied o f the trut h o f those od d consequences, s o long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But when these ar e out of my thoughts, there seems o n the othe r han d somethin g so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible in the modern way of explaining things, that I profess I know not ho w to reject it. P H T L O N O U S . I know not wha t way you mean . H Y L A S . I mean th e wa y of accounting for ou r sensation s o r ideas. P H I L O N O U S . Ho w i s that? H Y L A S . I t is supposed th e sou l makes her residenc e i n some part of the brain, from whic h the nerves take their rise, and are thenc e extende d t o al l parts o f the body : and that out -

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ward objects by the differen t impression s they make on the organs o f sense, communicat e certai n vibrativ e motions t o the nerves ; an d thes e bein g fille d wit h spirits , propagat e them to the brain or seat of the soul, which according to the various impressions o r traces thereb y mad e i n the brain , is various affecte d wit h ideas. P H I L O N O U S . An d cal l you this an explication of the manne r whereby we are affecte d wit h ideas ? H Y L A S . Wh y not , Philonous , hav e yo u anythin g t o objec t against it ? P H I L O N O U S . I woul d firs t kno w whethe r I rightl y under stand your hypothesis. You make certain trace s in the brain to b e th e cause s o r occasion s o f ou r ideas . Pra y tel l me , whether b y the brain you mean an y sensible thing ? H Y L A S . Wha t els e thin k yo u I could mean ? P H I L O N O U S . Sensibl e thing s ar e al l immediatel y perceiv able; an d thos e thing s which ar e immediatel y perceivable, are ideas; and these exis t only in the mind. Thus muc h you have, if I mistake not, lon g since agree d to . H Y L A S . I do no t den y it. P H I L O N O U S . Th e brain therefore yo u speak of , being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether yo u think i t reasonable t o suppose , tha t on e ide a or thing existing in the mind, occasions al l other ideas . An d if yo u thin k so , pray how d o yo u accoun t fo r th e origi n of that primar y idea o r brain itself ? H Y L A S . I d o no t explai n th e origi n o f ou r idea s b y tha t brain whic h i s perceivabl e t o sense , thi s bein g itsel f onl y a combinatio n o f sensibl e ideas , bu t b y anothe r whic h I imagine. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t ar e no t thing s imagine d a s trul y i n th e mind a s things perceived? H Y L A S . I must confess they are . P H I L O N O U S . I t come s therefor e t o the sam e thing ; and you have bee n al l thi s whil e accountin g fo r ideas , b y certai n motions o r impression s i n th e brain , tha t is , b y som e alterations i n a n idea , whethe r sensibl e o r imaginabl e i t matters not . H Y L A S . I begin t o suspec t m y hypothesis.

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P H I L O N O U S . Besid e spirits , all that we know or conceive ar e our ow n ideas . When therefor e yo u say , all ideas ar e oc casioned b y impressions in the brain , do you conceive thi s brain or no ? I f you do, then yo u talk o f ideas imprinted in an idea, causing that sam e idea, which is absurd. If you d o not conceiv e it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis. H Y L A S . I no w clearl y se e i t wa s a mer e dream . Ther e i s nothing in it. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u nee d no t b e muc h concerne d a t it : fo r after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never hav e satisfie d any reasonable man . What connexio n is there betwee n a motion i n the nerves, and the sensations of soun d o r colou r in the mind ? or how is it possible thes e should b e th e effec t o f that? H Y L A S . Bu t I could never think it had s o little in it, as now it seems to have. P H I L O N O U S . Wel l then , ar e yo u a t lengt h satisfie d tha t n o sensible thing s have a rea l existence ; and tha t yo u ar e i n truth a n arrant sceptic! H Y L A S . I t i s too plai n to b e denied . P H I L O N O U S . Look ! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure ? I s ther e no t somethin g i n th e wood s an d groves, i n th e river s an d clea r spring s tha t soothes , tha t delights, tha t transport s th e soul ? A t th e prospec t o f th e wide an d dee p ocean , o r som e hug e mountai n whos e to p is lost in the clouds , or of an old gloomy forest, ar e no t ou r minds fille d wit h a pleasin g horror ? Eve n i n rock s an d deserts, i s there no t a n agreeabl e wildness ? How sincer e a pleasure i s it to behold th e natura l beauties o f the earth ! To preserv e an d rene w our relis h for them , i s not th e vei l of nigh t alternately drawn over her face , an d dot h sh e no t change he r dres s wit h th e seasons ? Ho w aptl y ar e th e elements disposed ? Wha t variet y an d us e i n th e meanes t productions o f Nature? Wha t delicacy , what beauty, what contrivance i n anima l an d vegetabl e bodies? Ho w exquis itely ar e al l things suited, a s well to thei r particula r ends , as t o constitut e apposit e part s o f th e whole ! An d whil e they mutually aid and support, do they not als o set off and illustrate eac h other ? Rais e no w you r thought s fro m thi s

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ball o f earth , t o al l thos e gloriou s luminarie s tha t ador n the hig h arc h o f heaven . Th e motio n an d situatio n o f th e planets, ar e the y no t admirabl e fo r us e an d order ? Wer e those (miscalled erratic) globes ever known to stray, in their repeated journey s throug h th e pathles s void ? D o the y not measure area s roun d th e su n ever proportioned t o the times? S o fixed , s o immutabl e are th e law s b y whic h th e unseen Autho r o f Nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificen t and ric h tha t negligen t profusion , with which they appea r to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet if you take th e telescope , i t bring s int o you r sigh t a ne w hos t of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer vie w immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and i n those world s the energ y o f a n all-perfect mind displaye d i n endles s forms . Bu t neithe r sens e no r imagination ar e bi g enough t o comprehen d th e boundles s extent with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert an d strain each power to its utmost reach, ther e still stand s out ungraspe d a surplusage immeasurable. Ye t all th e vas t bodie s tha t compos e thi s might y frame , ho w distant an d remote soever , ar e by some secre t mechanism , some divin e ar t an d forc e linke d in a mutua l dependenc e and intercourse with each other, even with this earth, which was almos t slip t fro m m y thoughts , an d los t i n th e crow d of worlds . I s no t th e whol e syste m immense , beautiful , glorious beyon d expressio n an d beyon d thought ! Wha t treatment the n d o those philosopher s deserve, who would deprive thes e nobl e an d delightfu l scene s o f al l reality ? How shoul d thos e principle s be entertained , tha t lea d u s to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare ? T o b e plain , ca n yo u expec t thi s scepticis m of your s wil l no t b e though t extravagantl y absur d b y al l men o f sense ? H Y L A S . Othe r me n ma y thin k a s the y please : bu t fo r you r part you have nothing to reproach m e with. My comfort is, you ar e a s much a sceptic a s I am.

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P H I L O N O U S . There , Hylas, I mus t be g leav e t o diffe r fro m you. H Y L A S . What ! have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxe s b y mysel f whic h yo u le d m e into ? Thi s surely i s not fair . P H I L O N O U S . I deny that I agreed wit h you in those notion s that le d t o scepticism . Yo u indee d said , the realit y o f sensible thing s consiste d i n a n absolute existence ou t o f th e minds of spirits, or distinct from thei r being perceived. An d pursuant to thi s notion o f reality, you ar e oblige d t o den y sensible things any real existence: tha t is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said no r though t th e realit y o f sensibl e thing s wa s t o b e defined afte r tha t manner . T o m e i t i s evident , fo r th e reasons yo u allo w of, that sensibl e thing s cannot exis t otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not tha t they have no real existence, but that seeing they depend no t on m y thought, and hav e a n existenc e distinc t fro m bein g perceived b y me , there must b e some other mind wherein they exist. A s sur e therefor e a s th e sensibl e worl d reall y exists, s o sur e i s ther e a n infinit e omnipresen t spiri t wh o contains and support s it. * H Y L A S . What ! this is no more tha n I and al l Christians hold ; nay, an d all others too who believe there i s a God, an d that he knows and comprehend s al l things. P H I L O N O U S . Ay , bu t her e lie s th e difference . Me n com monly believ e tha t al l thing s ar e know n o r perceive d b y God, because the y believe the being of a God, whereas I on the othe r side , immediatel y an d necessaril y conclud e th e being o f a God , becaus e al l sensibl e thing s mus t b e per ceived b y him. H Y L A S . Bu t s o lon g a s w e al l believe th e sam e thing , what matter i s it how we come b y that belief? P H I L O N O U S . Bu t neithe r d o w e agree i n the sam e opinion . For philosophers , thoug h the y acknowledg e al l corporea l beings to b e perceive d b y God, ye t they attribut e t o the m an absolute subsistenc e distinc t from thei r being perceive d by any mind whatever, which I do not. Besides, is there n o

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difference betwee n saying, there is a God, therefore h e perceives all things', and saying , sensible things do really exist: and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God. This furnishes you with a direct an d immediate demonstra tion, from a most eviden t principle, o f the being of a God. Divines an d philosopher s ha d prove d beyon d al l contro versy, from th e beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustmen t of things , a n infinit e min d shoul d b e necessaril y inferred from th e bar e existence o f the sensibl e world, is an advantage peculia r t o the m onl y wh o hav e mad e thi s eas y reflexion: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our severa l senses; and that nothing is perceived b y the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than i n a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffl e the mos t strenuou s advocat e fo r atheism. Those miserabl e refuges, whethe r i n a n eterna l successio n o f unthinkin g causes an d effects , o r i n a fortuitou s concourse o f atoms ; those wild imaginations of Vanini,*Hobbes, and Spinoza; in a word the whol e system of atheism, is it not entirel y overthrown by this single reflexion o n the repugnanc y included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless o f the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one o f those abettor s o f impiety but loo k int o his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confuse d jumble of atoms; how anything a t all , eithe r sensibl e o r imaginable , ca n exis t independent o f a mind , an d h e nee d g o n o farthe r t o b e convinced o f his folly. Ca n anythin g be fairer tha n t o pu t a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, an d from a notional to allo w it a real existence?* H Y L A S . I t canno t b e denied , ther e i s something highl y ser viceable t o religio n i n what yo u advance . But d o yo u no t

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think i t looks very like a notion entertained b y some emi nent moderns, * of seeing all things in Godl P H I L O N O U S . I would gladly know that opinion; pray explain it to me . H Y L A S . The y conceiv e tha t th e sou l being immaterial, is incapable o f being united wit h material things, so as to per ceive the m i n themselves , bu t tha t sh e perceive s the m b y her unio n with the substanc e o f God, which being spiritual is therefore purel y intelligible, or capabl e o f being the im mediate objec t o f a spirit' s thought . Besides , th e divin e essence contain s i n i t perfection s corresponden t t o eac h created being ; an d whic h ar e fo r tha t reaso n prope r t o exhibit or represent the m t o the mind. P H T L O N O U S . I do not understan d ho w our ideas , which are things altogethe r passiv e an d inert , ca n be th e essence , o r any par t (o r lik e any part ) o f th e essenc e o r substanc e of God, wh o i s an impassive , indivisible, purely active being. Many more difficultie s an d objection s ther e are , which occur at first view against this hypothesis; but I shall only add that i t is liable t o al l the absurditie s o f the commo n hypo theses, i n makin g a create d worl d exis t otherwis e tha n i n the mind of a spirit. Beside all which it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And i f it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in th e sciences , tha t the y suppos e Natur e o r th e divin e wisdom t o mak e somethin g i n vain, or d o tha t b y tediou s round-about methods, which might have been performed in a muc h mor e eas y an d compendiou s way , what shal l w e think o f tha t hypothesi s whic h suppose s th e whol e world made i n vain? H Y L A S . Bu t what say you, are not you too of opinion that we see al l things in God ? I f I mistake not , what you advanc e comes near it. P H I L O N O U S . Fe w me n think , ye t al l wil l hav e opinions . Hence men' s opinion s ar e superficia l an d confused . I t i s nothing strange that tenets, which in themselves are ever so different, shoul d nevertheles s b e confounde d wit h eac h other by those who do not consider the m attentively. I shall not therefor e b e surprised, if some men imagine that I run

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into the enthusias m o f Malebranche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He assert s an absolute external world , which I deny . He maintain s that w e ar e de ceived b y our senses, and know not the real natures or th e true form s and figure s o f extende d beings ; o f al l whic h I hold th e direc t contrary . So that upo n th e whol e there ar e no principle s mor e fundamentall y opposit e tha n hi s an d mine. It must be owned* I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, that in God w e live, and move, and have our being. But that we see things in his essence after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing . Take her e in brief my meaning. It is evident tha t the thing s I perceive ar e my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor i s it les s plai n tha t thes e idea s o r thing s b y m e per ceived, eithe r themselve s o r thei r archetypes , exis t independently of my mind, since I know myself not t o be thei r author, it being ou t o f my power t o determin e a t pleasure , what particular ideas I shall be affecte d wit h upon openin g my eye s o r ears . The y mus t therefor e exis t in some othe r mind, whose wil l it is they shoul d be exhibite d t o me . Th e things, I say , immediatel y perceived, ar e idea s o r sensa tions, cal l them whic h yo u will . But ho w ca n an y ide a o r sensation exis t in, or be produced by , anything but a mind or spirit ? Thi s indee d i s inconceivable; an d t o asser t tha t which i s inconceivable, is to tal k nonsense : Is it not? H Y L A S . Withou t doubt . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t o n th e othe r hand , i t i s very conceivabl e that they should exist in, and be produced by, a spirit; since this is no more tha n I daily experience i n myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and by an act of my Will can form a grea t variet y o f them , an d rais e the m u p i n m y imagination: though it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, a s those perceive d b y my senses , which latte r are calle d real things. From al l which I conclude, there is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. An d fro m th e variety , order, an d manner of these, I conclude the Author o f them to be wise,

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powerful, an d good, beyond comprehension. Mar k it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represent s them i n th e intelligibl e substanc e o f God . Thi s I d o no t understand; bu t I say , th e thing s b y m e perceive d ar e known b y the understanding , an d produce d b y the will , of an infinite spirit . And i s not al l this most plain and evident ? Is there any more in it, than what a little observation o f our own minds, and that which passes in them not only enablet h us to conceive, bu t als o obligeth us to acknowledge ? H Y L A S . I thin k I understan d yo u ver y clearly; and ow n th e proof yo u giv e of a Deity seem s n o les s evident , tha n i t is surprising. But allowin g that Go d i s the Suprem e an d Universal Caus e o f all things, yet may not ther e b e stil l a third nature besides spirits and ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not fo r al l that b e matter! P H I L O N O U S . Ho w ofte n mus t I inculcat e th e sam e thing ? You allo w th e thing s immediatel y perceive d b y sens e t o exist nowher e withou t th e mind : but ther e i s nothing perceived by sense, which is not perceived immediately: there fore ther e i s nothing sensibl e tha t exist s without the mind . The matte r therefor e whic h you still insist on, is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason, an d not b y sense . H Y L A S . Yo u ar e i n the right . P H I L O N O U S . Pra y le t m e kno w wha t reasonin g you r belie f of matte r i s grounded on ; an d wha t this matte r i s in you r present sens e o f it. H Y L A S . I find myself affecte d wit h various ideas , whereo f I know I a m no t th e cause ; neithe r ar e the y th e caus e o f themselves, o r o f one another , o r capabl e o f subsistin g by themselves, a s being altogethe r inactive , fleeting , depend ent beings . The y hav e therefor e som e caus e distinc t fro m me an d them : o f which I preten d t o kno w no more , tha n that i t is the cause o f m y ideas. And thi s thing, whatever i t be, I call matter . P H I L O N O U S . Tel l me , Hylas , hat h everyon e a libert y t o change th e curren t prope r significatio n annexed t o a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you, that in a certain country men might pass

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unhurt through the fire; and, upon explainin g himself, you found h e mean t b y th e wor d fir e tha t whic h other s cal l water: or if he should assert there are trees which walk upon two legs, meaning men by the ter m trees. Would you think this reasonable ? H Y L A S . No ; I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standar d o f propriet y i n language . An d fo r an y ma n to affec t speakin g improperly , i s t o perver t th e us e o f speech, an d ca n neve r serv e t o a better purpose , tha n t o protract an d multiply disputes where there i s no differenc e in opinion . P H I L O N O U S . An d dot h no t matter, in th e commo n curren t acceptation o f the word , signify a n extended , solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive substance? H Y L A S . I t doth . P H I L O N O U S . An d hat h i t no t bee n mad e evident , tha t n o such substance can possibly exist? And thoug h it should be allowed t o exist , ye t ho w ca n tha t whic h i s inactive be a cause; o r tha t whic h i s unthinking b e a cause of thought? You ma y indeed, if you please, anne x to the wor d matter a contrary meaning t o what is vulgarly received; an d tell me you understand by it an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this, than to play with words, and ru n int o that ver y fault yo u just now condemned wit h s o muc h reason ? I d o b y n o mean s find fault wit h your reasonin g in tha t yo u collec t a caus e fro m the phenomena ; bu t I den y tha t th e caus e deducibl e b y reason ca n properly b e termed matter. H Y L A S . Ther e is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid yo u d o no t thoroughl y comprehen d m y meaning. I would b y n o mean s b e though t t o den y tha t Go d o r a n Infinite Spiri t is the suprem e caus e of all things. All I contend for , is, that subordinat e t o the suprem e agen t ther e is a caus e o f a limite d and inferio r nature , whic h concurs in the productio n o f our ideas , no t b y any ac t o f will or spir itual efficiency, bu t b y that kind of action which belongs t o matter, v/z . motion. P H I L O N O U S . I find, you are at every turn relapsing into your old explode d conceit , o f a moveable an d consequentl y a n extended substanc e existing without the mind. What! Have

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you alread y forgo t yo u were convinced , o r ar e you willing I shoul d repea t wha t has been sai d on that head ? I n truth this is not fai r dealin g in you, still to suppos e th e bein g of that whic h yo u hav e s o ofte n acknowledge d t o hav e n o being. But not t o insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I as k whethe r al l you r idea s ar e no t perfectl y passive and inert , including nothing of action in them? H Y L A S . The y are . P H I L O N O U S . An d ar e sensibl e qualitie s anythin g else bu t ideas? H Y L A S . Ho w often hav e I acknowledged that the y are not ? P H I L O N O U S . Bu t i s not motio n a sensible quality ? H Y L A S . I t is. P H I L O N O U S . Consequentl y i t is no action . H Y L A S . I agre e wit h you . And indee d i t i s very plain, tha t when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but m y will which produced th e motion , is active. P H I L O N O U S . No w I desir e t o kno w i n th e firs t place , whether motio n bein g allowe d t o b e n o action , yo u ca n conceive an y actio n beside s volition : an d i n th e secon d place, whethe r t o sa y something an d conceiv e nothin g be not to talk nonsense: an d lastly, whether having considered the premises, yo u do not perceive that to suppose any effi cient or active cause of our ideas, other than spirit, is highly absurd an d unreasonable? H Y L A S . I give up the point entirely . But though matter may not b e a cause , ye t wha t hinder s it s bein g a n instrument subservient t o th e suprem e agen t i n th e productio n o f our ideas ? P H I L O N O U S . A n instrument , say you; pray what may be th e figure, springs, wheels, and motion s o f that instrument? H Y L A S . Thos e I preten d t o determin e nothin g of , both th e substance an d its qualities being entirely unknown to me . P H I L O N O U S . What ? Yo u ar e the n o f opinion, it is made u p of unknow n parts, tha t i t hat h unknow n motions , an d a n unknown shape . H Y L A S . I d o no t believ e it hath an y figure or motio n a t all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

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P H I L O N O U S . Bu t wha t notion i s i t possibl e t o fram e o f a n instrument voi d o f al l sensibl e qualities , eve n extensio n itself? H Y L A S . I do not preten d t o have any notion of it. P H I L O N O U S . An d wha t reaso n hav e yo u t o think , this un known, this inconceivable somewhat doth exist ? I s i t that you imagine God canno t ac t as well without it, or that you find by experienc e th e us e o f som e suc h thing , when yo u form idea s i n your own mind? H Y L A S . Yo u ar e alway s teasing me fo r reasons o f my belief. Pray, what reasons hav e you not t o believe it? P H I L O N O U S . I t is to me a sufficient reaso n not to believe th e existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But not t o insist on reasons fo r believing, you will not s o much as let me know what it is you would have me believe, since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat yo u to consider whether it be like a philosopher, o r even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what , and you know not why. H Y L A S . Hold , Philonous. When I tell you matter is an instrument, I do not mea n altogethe r nothing . I t i s true, I know not th e particula r kin d o f instrument; but howeve r I hav e some notio n o f instrument i n general, which I apply to it . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t wha t if it should prove tha t there i s something, eve n i n th e mos t genera l notio n o f instrument, a s taken in a distinct sense from cause, which makes the use of it inconsistent wit h the divin e attributes? H Y L A S . Mak e that appear , an d I shall give up the point . P H I L O N O U S . Wha t mea n yo u b y the genera l natur e o r no tion o f instrument! H Y L A S . Tha t whic h is common t o al l particular instruments, composeth th e general notion . P H I L O N O U S . I s it not commo n t o al l instruments, that the y are applied to the doing those things only, which cannot be performed b y the mer e ac t of our wills ? Thus for instance, I never us e an instrument t o mov e my finger, because i t is done by a volition. But I should use one, if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? Or can you shew any example where an instru-

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ment i s mad e us e o f i n producin g a n effec t immediatel y depending o n the wil l of the agent ? H Y L A S . I own, I cannot . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w therefor e ca n yo u suppose , tha t a n all perfect spirit , on whose will all things have an absolute an d immediate dependence , shoul d nee d a n instrumen t i n his operations, o r not needing it make use of it? Thus it seems to m e tha t yo u ar e oblige d t o ow n th e us e o f a lifeles s inactive instrument , t o b e incompatibl e wit h th e infinit e perfection o f God; tha t is , by your ow n confession, t o give up the point . H Y L A S . I t dot h no t readil y occur wha t I can answer you. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t methinks yo u should b e ready to ow n the truth, whe n i t hath bee n fairl y prove d t o you . We indeed , who ar e being s of finite powers, ar e force d t o mak e use of instruments. An d th e us e o f a n instrumen t shewet h th e agent t o b e limite d b y rules o f another's prescription , an d that he cannot obtai n his end, but in such a way and by such conditions. Whence i t seems a clear consequence , tha t th e supreme unlimite d agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The wil l of an omnipoten t spiri t i s no soone r exerte d tha n executed, withou t the applicatio n o f means, which, if they are employe d b y inferior agents , i t is not upo n accoun t o f any rea l efficac y tha t i s in them , o r necessar y aptitud e t o produce an y effect, bu t merely in compliance wit h the laws of Nature , o r thos e condition s prescribe d t o the m b y th e first cause, who i s himself abov e al l limitation o r prescrip tion whatsoever . H Y L A S . I wil l n o longe r maintai n tha t matte r i s a n instru ment. However , I woul d no t b e understoo d t o giv e up its existence neither ; since , notwithstandin g wha t hat h bee n said, it may still be a n occasion* P H I L O N O U S . Ho w man y shape s i s your matte r t o take ? O r how ofte n mus t i t b e prove d no t t o exist , before yo u ar e content t o part wit h it? But t o say no more o f this (thoug h by all the law s of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changin g the significatio n o f the principa l term ) I would fain know what you mean b y affirming tha t matte r

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is an occasion, having already denied i t to be a cause. An d when you have shewn in what sense yo u understand occasion, pray i n th e nex t plac e b e please d t o she w m e wha t reason inducet h you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas . H Y L A S . A s to the first point: by occasion I mean a n inactive unthinking being , a t th e presenc e whereo f Go d excite s ideas in our minds . P H I L O N O U S . An d wha t may b e th e natur e o f tha t inactiv e unthinking being? H Y L A S . I know nothing of its nature. P H I L O N O U S . Procee d the n t o th e secon d point , an d assig n some reaso n wh y we shoul d allo w an existenc e t o thi s inactive, unthinking, unknown thing. H Y L A S . Whe n w e see ideas produced i n our mind s afte r a n orderly an d constan t manner , i t i s natura l t o thin k the y have som e fixed and regula r occasions , a t th e presenc e o f which they ar e excited . P H I L O N O U S . Yo u acknowledg e the n Go d alon e t o b e th e cause of our ideas, and that he causes them at the presenc e of thos e occasions . H Y L A S . Tha t is my opinion . P H I L O N O U S . Thos e thing s whic h yo u sa y ar e presen t t o God, withou t doubt H e perceives . H Y L A S . Certainly ; otherwis e the y coul d no t b e t o Hi m a n occasion o f acting. P H I L O N O U S . No t t o insist now on your making sense o f this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties i t i s liabl e to : I onl y as k whethe r th e orde r an d regularity observabl e i n th e serie s o f ou r ideas , o r th e course o f Nature, b e no t sufficientl y accounte d fo r b y th e wisdom an d powe r o f God; an d whethe r i t doth no t dero gate fro m thos e attributes , t o suppos e H e i s influenced , directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by any unthinking substance. And lastly whether, in case I granted all yo u conten d for , it woul d mak e anythin g to you r pur pose, i t no t bein g eas y t o conceiv e ho w th e externa l o r absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from

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its being perceived, can be inferre d from m y allowing that there ar e certai n thing s perceive d b y th e min d o f God , which ar e t o Hi m th e occasio n o f producing ideas in us. H Y L A S . I am perfectly at a loss what to think , this notion of occasion seeming now altogether a s groundless a s the rest . P H I L O N O U S . D o you not at length perceive, that in all these different acceptation s o f matter, you hav e bee n onl y supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kin d of use? H Y L A S . I freel y ow n mysel f les s fon d o f m y notions , sinc e they have been s o accurately examined. But still, methinks I have some confuse d perception tha t ther e i s such a thing as matter. P H I L O N O U S . Eithe r yo u perceive the being of matter immediately, o r mediately . If immediately , pray infor m m e b y which o f th e sense s yo u perceiv e it . I f mediately , le t m e know b y wha t reasonin g i t i s inferre d fro m thos e thing s which you perceiv e immediately . S o much for th e percep tion. The n fo r th e matte r itself , I as k whethe r i t i s object, substratum, cause, instrument , o r occasion ? Yo u hav e al ready pleaded fo r each o f these, shiftin g you r notions, an d making matter t o appea r sometime s i n one shape , the n in another. And what you have offered hat h been disapproved and rejecte d b y yourself . I f yo u hav e anythin g ne w t o advance, I would gladly hear it . H Y L A S . I thin k I hav e alread y offere d al l I ha d t o sa y o n those heads . I am at a loss what more t o urge . P H I L O N O U S . An d ye t yo u ar e lot h t o par t wit h you r ol d prejudice. But to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside wha t ha s bee n hithert o suggested , you wil l farther consider whether , upon suppositio n tha t matter exists , you can possibly conceive how you should be affected b y it? O r supposing i t di d no t exist , whethe r i t b e no t eviden t yo u might for al l that be affecte d wit h the sam e ideas you now are, an d consequentl y have th e ver y same reason s t o be lieve its existence tha t yo u now can have? H Y L A S . I acknowledg e i t i s possibl e w e migh t perceive al l things just as we do now, though there was no matter in the world; neithe r ca n I conceive , i f ther e b e matter , ho w i t

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should produc e an y ide a i n ou r minds . And I d o farthe r grant, yo u hav e entirel y satisfie d me , tha t i t i s impossibl e there shoul d be such a thing as matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is matter i n som e sens e o r other . Wha t tha t i s I d o no t indeed preten d t o determine . P H I L O N O U S . I d o no t expec t yo u shoul d defin e exactl y th e nature o f that unknow n being. Only be please d t o tell me, whether i t i s a substance : an d i f so, whether yo u ca n sup pose a substance without accidents; or in case you suppos e it t o hav e accident s o r qualities , I desir e yo u wil l le t m e know wha t thos e qualitie s are , a t leas t wha t i s meant b y matter's supportin g them . H Y L A S . W e hav e alread y argue d o n those points . I have n o more t o say to them. But to prevent an y farther questions , let m e tel l you , I a t presen t understan d b y matter neithe r substance no r accident , thinking nor extende d being , neither cause , instrument , no r occasion , bu t somethin g en tirely unknown,* distinct from al l these. P H I L O N O U S . I t seem s the n yo u includ e i n you r presen t notion o f matter , nothin g bu t th e genera l abstrac t ide a of entity. H Y L A S . Nothin g else , sav e onl y tha t I super-ad d t o thi s general ide a th e negatio n o f al l thos e particula r things , qualities, o r idea s tha t I perceive , imagine , o r i n any wise apprehend . P H I L O N O U S . Pra y where do you suppose this unknown matter to exist ? H Y L A S . O h Philonous ! no w yo u thin k yo u hav e entangle d me; fo r i f I say it exist s in place, then yo u wil l infe r tha t i t exists in the mind, since it is agreed, that place or extensio n exists onl y in the mind : but I a m no t ashame d t o ow n my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not i n place. Ther e i s a negativ e answer for you : and yo u must expec t n o othe r t o al l the question s yo u put fo r th e future abou t matter . P H I L O N O U S . Sinc e yo u wil l no t tel l m e wher e i t exists , b e pleased t o infor m me afte r wha t manner yo u suppose i t to exist, or what you mean b y its existence.

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H Y L A S . I t neithe r think s no r acts , neithe r perceives , no r is perceived. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t wha t i s there positiv e i n you r abstracte d notion o f its existence? H Y L A S . Upo n a nic e observation , I d o no t fin d I hav e an y positive notion o r meanin g at all . I tell you again I am no t ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its existence, or how it exists. P H I L O N O U S . Continue , good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part , an d tel l m e sincerel y whethe r yo u ca n fram e a distinct ide a o f entit y in general , prescinded fro m an d ex clusive o f al l thinking an d corporea l beings , al l particular things whatsoever. H Y L A S . Hold , le t me think a little . .. I profess, Philonous, I do no t fin d tha t I can. * A t firs t glanc e methough t I ha d some dilut e an d air y notion o f pure entit y in abstract ; bu t upon close r attentio n i t hat h quit e vanishe d ou t o f sight. The mor e I thin k o n it , th e mor e a m I confirme d in m y prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretendin g t o th e leas t degre e o f an y positiv e know ledge or conceptio n o f matter, its where, its how, its entity, or anythin g belonging to it. P H I L O N O U S . Whe n therefor e you spea k o f the existenc e of matter, you have not an y notion i n your mind. H Y L A S . Non e a t all. P H I L O N O U S . Pra y tell me if the cas e stands not thus: at first, from a belief o f material substance yo u woul d have it that the immediat e objects existe d withou t the mind ; then tha t their archetypes ; the n causes ; nex t instruments ; the n oc casions: lastly , something i n general, whic h bein g inter preted prove s nothing. S o matter come s t o nothing . What think you , Hylas, is not thi s a fair summar y of your whole proceeding? H Y L A S . B e tha t a s it will , ye t I stil l insis t upo n it , tha t ou r not bein g able t o conceiv e a thing, is no argumen t against its existence . P H I L O N O U S . Tha t fro m a cause , effect , operation , sign , o r other circumstance , there ma y reasonably b e inferre d th e existence o f a thing not immediatel y perceived, an d that it

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were absur d for an y man t o argu e against the existenc e of that thing, from hi s having no direct an d positive notion of it, I freely own. But where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induce us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceivin g and being perceived, from spiri t and idea: lastly, where there is not so much a s the mos t inadequat e o r fain t ide a pretende d to : I will no t indee d thenc e conclud e agains t the realit y of an y notion o r existenc e o f anything: but m y inference shal l be, that yo u mean nothing at all: that you employ words to n o manner o f purpose , withou t an y desig n o r significatio n whatsoever. An d I leav e i t t o yo u t o conside r ho w mer e jargon should b e treated . H Y L A S . T o deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem i n themselve s unanswerable , bu t the y hav e no t s o great a n effec t o n me a s to produce tha t entire conviction, that heart y acquiescenc e whic h attend s demonstration . I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmis e of I know not what , matter. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concu r t o tak e awa y all scruple, an d wor k a plenary assent i n the mind ? Let a visible object b e se t in never s o clear a light, yet if there i s any imperfection in the sight , or if the ey e is not directe d toward s it, it will not b e distinctly seen. An d thoug h a demonstratio n b e neve r s o wel l grounded an d fairl y proposed , ye t i f there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected o n a sudden to perceive clearly and adhere firmly to the truth? No, there is need o f time and pains: the atten tion mus t b e awakene d an d detaine d b y a frequen t re petition o f th e sam e thin g place d of t i n th e same , of t i n different lights . I have said i t already , and fin d I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be parallele d i n any art o r science , an y sect o r profes sion o f men? O r i s there anythin g so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable t o be met with even in the lowes t of

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common conversation ? But perhap s yo u will still say, matter ma y exist , thoug h a t th e sam e tim e yo u neithe r kno w what i s meant b y matter, or b y its existence. This indee d is surprising, an d th e mor e s o because i t is altogether volun tary, you not bein g le d to i t by any one reason ; for I challenge yo u t o she w m e tha t thin g i n Natur e whic h need s matter t o explain or accoun t fo r it. H Y L A S . Th e realit y of things cannot b e maintaine d without supposing th e existenc e o f matter . An d i s not this , thin k you, a good reason wh y I should be earnest i n its defence? P H I L O N O U S . Th e realit y of things! What things , sensible o r intelligible? H Y L A S . Sensibl e things. P H I L O N O U S . M y glove, for example ? H Y L A S . Tha t o r an y other thin g perceived b y the senses . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t t o fix on som e particula r thing; is it not a sufficient evidenc e to me of the existenc e of this glove, that I see it, and fee l it , and wear it? O r i f this will not do , how is it possible I should be assure d o f the realit y of this thing, which I actuall y see i n thi s place, b y supposin g tha t som e unknown thing which I never did or can see, exists after a n unknown manner , i n a n unknow n place , o r i n n o plac e at all? How can the suppose d realit y of that which is intangible, b e a proo f tha t anythin g tangibl e reall y exists ? o r of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or in general of anythin g whic h i s imperceptible , tha t a perceptibl e exists? D o bu t explai n this, and I shal l think nothin g to o hard fo r you. H Y L A S . Upo n the whole , I am content t o ow n the existence of matter i s highly improbable; but th e direc t an d absolut e impossibility of it does not appea r t o me . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t grantin g matter t o b e possible , ye t upo n that account merely it can have no more claim to existence, than a golden mountain o r a centaur. H Y L A S . I acknowledge it; but stil l you do not den y it is possible; an d tha t whic h is possible, fo r augh t yo u know , may actually exist. P H I L O N O U S . I deny it to b e possible; an d have, if I mistake not, evidentl y proved fro m you r own concessions tha t i t is

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not. I n the commo n sens e o f the wor d matter, is there any more implied , than a n extended , solid , figured, moveabl e substance existin g withou t th e mind ? An d hav e no t yo u acknowledged ove r an d over , tha t yo u hav e see n eviden t reason for denyin g the possibilit y of such a substance ? H Y L A S . True , but tha t i s only one sens e of the ter m matter. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t i s it not th e onl y proper genuine receive d sense? And i f matter i n such a sense be proved impossible , may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Els e ho w coul d anythin g be prove d impossible ? O r indeed ho w coul d ther e b e an y proo f a t al l on e wa y o r other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the commo n significatio n of words? H Y L A S . I though t philosopher s migh t b e allowe d t o spea k more accuratel y than the vulgar, and were not alway s confined t o th e commo n acceptatio n o f a term. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t thi s no w mentione d i s th e commo n re ceived sens e amon g philosopher s themselves . Bu t no t t o insist on that, have you not been allowed to take matter in what sense you pleased? An d hav e you not used this privilege i n the utmos t extent , sometimes entirely changing, a t others leavin g out o r putting into th e definitio n of it whatever for the present bes t served your design, contrary to all the know n rule s o f reaso n an d logic ? An d hat h no t thi s shifting unfai r metho d o f yours spun ou t ou r disput e t o a n unnecessary length; matter havin g been particularly examined, an d b y your ow n confession refute d in each o f thos e senses? An d ca n any more be require d t o prove th e abso lute impossibility of a thing, than th e provin g it impossible in ever y particula r sense , tha t eithe r yo u o r anyon e els e understands it in? H Y L A S . Bu t I a m no t s o thoroughly satisfie d tha t yo u hav e proved th e impossibilit y of matter i n the las t most obscur e abstracted an d indefinite sense. P H I L O N O U S . Whe n i s a thing shewn to b e impossible ? H Y L A S . Whe n a repugnanc y i s demonstrate d betwee n th e ideas comprehended i n its definition. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t where there ar e no ideas, there n o repugnancy can be demonstrate d betwee n ideas .

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H Y L A S . I agre e wit h you. P H I L O N O U S . No w in that whic h you cal l the obscur e indef inite sens e o f th e wor d matter, i t i s plain , b y you r ow n confession, ther e wa s included n o ide a a t all , no sens e ex cept a n unknow n sense , whic h i s the sam e thin g as none . You ar e no t therefor e t o expec t I shoul d prov e a repug nancy betwee n idea s wher e ther e ar e n o ideas ; or th e impossibility of matter take n i n an unknown sense , tha t i s no sense a t all . M y busines s wa s onl y t o shew , yo u mean t nothing', an d thi s yo u wer e brough t t o own . S o that i n all your various senses, you have been shewed eithe r t o mea n nothing at all, or if anything, an absurdity. And i f this be no t sufficient t o prove th e impossibilit y of a thing, I desire yo u will let me kno w what is. H Y L A S . I acknowledg e yo u hav e prove d tha t matte r i s impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But a t the sam e time that I give up this, I suspect al l my other notions . Fo r surel y non e coul d b e mor e seemingl y evident tha n thi s onc e was : and ye t i t no w seem s a s fals e and absur d a s ever i t did true before . Bu t I think w e have discussed the point sufficientl y fo r the present. The remaining part o f the da y I would willingly spend, in running over in my thoughts the severa l heads o f this morning's conver sation, and to-morrow shal l be glad to meet yo u here again about th e same time . P H I L O N O U S . I will not fai l t o atten d you .

THE THIR D DIALOGU E P H I L O N O U S . Tel l me , Hylas , wha t ar e th e fruit s o f yester day's meditation? Hath i t confirmed you in the sam e min d you wer e i n a t parting ? o r hav e yo u sinc e see n caus e t o change your opinion ? H Y L A S . Trul y m y opinio n is , that al l our opinion s ar e alik e vain and uncertain. Wha t w e approve to-day , we condemn to-morrow. W e kee p a sti r abou t knowledge , an d spen d our live s in th e pursui t o f it, when alas ! we know nothing all th e while : no r d o I thin k i t possibl e fo r u s eve r t o know anythin g i n thi s life . Ou r facultie s ar e to o narro w and to o few . Natur e certainl y neve r intende d u s fo r speculation. P H I L O N O U S . What ! say you w e can know nothing, Hylas? H Y L A S . Ther e is not tha t singl e thing i n the world , whereof we can know the rea l nature , o r wha t it is in itself . P H T L O N O U S . Wil l you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is? H Y L A S . Yo u ma y indee d kno w tha t fir e appear s hot , an d water fluid : bu t thi s i s n o mor e tha n knowin g wha t sen sations ar e produce d i n your ow n mind, upon th e applica tion of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, thei r tru e an d rea l nature , yo u ar e utterl y i n the dar k a s to that. P H I L O N O U S . D o I no t kno w thi s t o b e a rea l ston e tha t I stand on , and tha t whic h I see before m y eyes to be a real tree? H Y L A S . Knowl No , i t i s impossibl e yo u o r an y ma n aliv e should kno w it . Al l yo u know , is , tha t yo u hav e suc h a certai n ide a o r appearanc e i n your ow n mind. Bu t wha t is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you, that colour, figure, and hardness, whic h you perceive, ar e not th e real nature s of those things , or in the leas t like them. The sam e may be said o f all other rea l thing s or corporea l substance s whic h compose th e world . The y hav e non e o f the m anythin g in themselves, like those sensible qualitie s by us perceived.

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We shoul d no t therefor e preten d t o affir m o r kno w any thing of them a s they are i n their ow n nature . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t surely , Hylas , I ca n distinguis h gold , fo r example, fro m iron : an d ho w coul d thi s b e i f I kne w no t what eithe r trul y was? H Y L A S . Believ e me, Philonous, yo u can only distinguish between you r ow n ideas . Tha t yellowness , that weight , and other sensibl e qualities , thin k yo u the y ar e reall y i n th e gold? The y ar e onl y relativ e t o th e senses , an d hav e n o absolute existenc e i n Nature . An d i n pretendin g t o dis tinguish th e specie s o f rea l things , b y th e appearance s i n your mind, you may perhaps ac t as wisely as he that shoul d conclude two men were of a different species , because thei r clothes wer e no t o f the sam e colour . P H I L O N O U S . I t seems then we are altogether pu t off with the appearances o f things, and thos e fals e one s too . Th e ver y meat I eat, and the clot h I wear, have nothing i n them lik e what I see and feel . H Y L A S . Eve n so . P H I L O N O U S . Bu t is it not strange the whole world should b e thus imposed on , an d s o foolish as to believe thei r senses ? And ye t I know not ho w it is, but me n eat , an d drink , and sleep, an d perform al l the office s o f life a s comfortably an d conveniently, a s i f the y reall y kne w th e thing s the y ar e conversant about . H Y L A S . The y do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain thei r mistakes, and for all that, make a shift t o bustle through th e affair s o f life . Bu t philosopher s kno w bette r things. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u mean, they know that they know nothing. H Y L A S . Tha t i s th e ver y to p an d perfectio n o f huma n knowledge. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t are you all this while in earnest, Hylas ; and are you seriously persuade d tha t you know nothing real in the world ? Suppos e yo u are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink , and paper, lik e anothe r man ; and d o you not kno w what i t is you cal l for ? H Y L A S . Ho w ofte n mus t I tell you, that I know not th e rea l

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nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. An d th e sam e i s true wit h regard t o ever y other cor poreal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the tru e an d rea l natur e o f things, but eve n o f their existence. I t canno t b e denie d tha t w e perceiv e suc h certai n appearances o r ideas ; bu t i t canno t b e conclude d fro m thence tha t bodie s reall y exist . Nay , now I thin k o n it , I must agreeabl y t o m y former concessions farther declare , that it is impossible an y real corporeal thin g should exist in Nature. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u amaz e me. Was ever anythin g more wild and extravagant than the notions yo u now maintain: and is it no t eviden t yo u ar e le d int o al l these extravagancie s by the belie f o f material substance! Thi s make s you drea m of those unknow n nature s i n everything . It i s this occasion s your distinguishin g betwee n th e realit y an d sensibl e ap pearances o f things. It i s to thi s you are indebte d fo r bein g ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. No r is this all : you ar e no t onl y ignorant o f th e tru e natur e of every thing , bu t yo u kno w no t whethe r anythin g reall y exists, o r whethe r ther e ar e an y true nature s a t all ; foras much a s you attribut e t o you r material beings an absolut e or externa l existence , wherei n yo u suppos e thei r realit y consists.* And a s you are forced in the end to acknowledge such a n existenc e mean s eithe r a direc t repugnancy , or nothing a t all , it follows tha t yo u ar e oblige d t o pul l down your ow n hypothesis o f material substance, an d positively to deny the rea l existence of any part o f the universe . And so you ar e plunge d int o th e deepes t an d mos t deplorabl e scepticism tha t eve r man was . Tell me, Hylas , is it not a s I say? H Y L A S . I agre e wit h you . Material substance wa s n o mor e than a n hypothesis , an d a fals e an d groundles s one too . I will n o longe r spend m y breath i n defence of it. But whatever hypothesi s yo u advance , o r whatsoeve r schem e o f things you introduce in its stead, I doubt no t i t will appea r every whit as false: le t m e bu t b e allowe d to questio n you

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upon it . That is , suffer m e t o serv e you i n your own kind , and I warran t i t shal l conduc t yo u throug h a s man y per plexities and contradictions, to the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present . P H I L O N O U S . I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to fram e any hypothesis at all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe m y senses, an d leav e thing s a s I find them. T o b e plain, i t i s my opinion , tha t th e rea l thing s ar e thos e ver y things I se e an d feel , an d perceiv e b y my senses . Thes e I know, an d finding they answer all the necessitie s and pur poses o f life , hav e n o reaso n t o b e solicitou s abou t an y other unknow n beings. A piec e o f sensibl e bread , fo r in stance, woul d sta y m y stomac h bette r tha n te n thousan d times a s much of that insensible , unintelligible, real brea d you spea k of . I t i s likewis e my opinion , tha t colour s an d other sensibl e qualities are o n the objects . I cannot fo r my life hel p thinkin g tha t sno w i s white , an d fir e hot . Yo u indeed, wh o b y snow an d fir e mea n certai n external , unperceived, unperceivin g substances, ar e i n th e righ t t o deny whiteness or heat , t o b e affection s inheren t i n them. But I , who understand b y those word s the thing s I see and feel, a m obliged t o thin k like other folks . An d a s I a m n o sceptic with regard t o the natur e o f things, so neither a m I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plai n contradiction; sinc e I canno t prescin d o r abstract , even i n thought , th e existenc e o f a sensibl e thin g from it s being perceived. Wood , stones , fire, water, flesh, iron, and the lik e things, which I name an d discours e of , are thing s that I know. And I should not have known them, but that I perceived the m b y my senses; and thing s perceived b y th e senses ar e immediatel y perceived; an d thing s immediately perceived ar e ideas ; an d idea s canno t exis t withou t th e mind; their existenc e therefor e consists in being perceived; when therefore they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that scepticism, all thos e ridiculou s philosophica l doubts . Wha t a jest i s it for a philosophe r t o questio n th e existenc e o f sensibl e things, til l h e hat h i t prove d t o hi m fro m th e veracit y of God: or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of

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intuition o r demonstration ? I migh t a s wel l doub t o f m y own being, * a s o f th e bein g o f thos e thing s I actuall y se e and feel . H Y L A S . No t s o fast, Philonous : you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not? P H I L O N O U S . I do .

H Y L A S . Supposin g yo u wer e annihilated , canno t yo u con ceive i t possible, tha t thing s perceivable b y sense ma y stil l exist? P H I L O N O U S . I can ; bu t the n i t mus t b e i n anothe r mind . When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but al l minds. Now it is plain the y hav e a n existenc e exterio r t o m y mind, since I find them b y experienc e t o b e independen t o f it. There is therefore som e othe r min d wherei n the y exist , during the intervals between the time s of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and woul d do afte r m y supposed annihilation . And a s the sam e is true, with regard t o all other finite created spirits ; it necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, whic h know s an d compre hends al l things, an d exhibit s them t o ou r vie w in suc h a manner, an d accordin g t o suc h rule s a s h e himsel f hat h ordained, and ar e b y us termed th e Laws of Nature* H Y L A S . Answe r me , Philonous . Are al l our idea s perfectly inert beings? Or hav e they any agency included in them? P H I L O N O U S . The y ar e altogethe r passiv e and inert . H Y L A S . An d i s not Go d a n agent , a being purely active? P H I L O N O U S . I acknowledge it. H Y L A S . N o idea therefore ca n be like unto, or represent th e nature o f God . P H I L O N O U S . I t cannot . H Y L A S . Sinc e therefor e yo u hav e n o ide a o f th e min d o f God, ho w can you conceiv e i t possible, tha t thing s shoul d exist in his mind? Or, i f you ca n conceive the min d of Go d without having an idea o f it, why may not I be allowe d t o conceive th e existenc e o f matter , notwithstandin g that I have no ide a o f it? P H I L O N O U S . A s to your first question; I own I have properly no idea , eithe r o f Go d o r an y othe r spirit ; for thes e bein g

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active, canno t b e represente d b y thing s perfectly inert, a s our ideas are. I do nevertheless know, that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly, as I know my ideas exist. Farther , I kno w wha t I mea n b y th e term s / an d myself \ and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I d o no t perceiv e i t a s I perceiv e a triangle , a colour , o r a sound . Th e mind , spiri t o r soul , i s tha t indivisibl e unextended thing , which thinks, acts, an d perceives . I say indivisible, because unextended ; and unextended, becaus e extended, figured , moveabl e things , ar e ideas ; an d tha t which perceive s ideas , whic h think s an d wills , i s plainl y itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived: an d spirit s a sor t o f beings altogethe r differen t from them . I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my soul ma y b e sai d t o furnis h m e wit h a n idea , tha t is , a n image, or likenes s of God , thoug h indee d extremel y inadequate, Fo r al l th e notio n I hav e o f God , i s obtained b y reflecting o n m y ow n sou l heightenin g its powers, an d re moving it s imperfections. I hav e therefore , though no t a n inactive idea, yet i n myself som e sort of an activ e thinking image o f th e Deity . An d thoug h I perceiv e Hi m no t b y sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning . My own mind an d m y own ideas I have a n immediate knowledg e of ; an d b y th e hel p o f these , d o mediately apprehen d th e possibilit y o f th e existenc e o f other spirit s an d ideas . Farther , fro m m y ow n being , an d from th e dependency I find in myself an d my ideas, I do by an ac t o f reason , necessaril y infer th e existenc e o f a God , and o f al l created thing s in the min d o f God . S o much fo r your first question. For th e second : I suppose b y this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive matte r objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea, nor know it, as you do yourself by a reflex act : neither d o you mediately apprehend i t by similitude of the on e o r the other : no r ye t collect i t by reasoning fro m tha t whic h you know immediately. All whic h makes th e cas e o f matter widely differen t from tha t o f the Deity. H Y L A S . Yo u sa y your own soul supplies you with some sor t

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of a n ide a o r imag e o f God . Bu t a t th e sam e tim e yo u acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no idea of your own soul. You eve n affir m tha t spirit s are a sort o f beings altogether differen t fro m ideas . Consequently that no ide a can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admi t nevertheles s tha t ther e i s spiritua l substance , although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thin g a s materia l substance , becaus e yo u hav e n o notion o r idea of it. Is this fair dealing ? To act consistently, you must either admi t matter o r reject spirit. What say you to this? P H I L O N O U S . I sa y in the first place, tha t I d o no t den y th e existence o f material substance , merely because I have n o notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent, or in other words , because it is repugnant that there should be a notion o f it . Man y things , fo r ough t I know , ma y exist , whereof neithe r I nor any other man hath o r can have any idea o r notio n whatsoever . Bu t the n thos e thing s must be possible, tha t is , nothing inconsisten t mus t b e include d i n their definition . I sa y secondly , tha t althoug h w e believ e things to exis t whic h we do no t perceive ; yet w e may no t believe tha t an y particula r thin g exists , withou t som e reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence o f matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither ca n I mediately from m y sensations, ideas , notions, actions or passions, infer a n unthinking, unperceiving, inactive substance , eithe r b y probable deduction , or necessar y consequence. Wherea s the bein g of myself, that is, my own soul, min d o r thinkin g principle , I evidentl y kno w b y reflexion. You wil l forgive me if I repeat th e sam e things in answer t o th e sam e objections . I n th e ver y notio n o r defi nition o f materia l substance , ther e i s included a manifest repugnance an d inconsistency . Bu t thi s canno t b e sai d of the notion of spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, o r b e produce d b y wha t dot h no t act , i s repugnant. But it is no repugnancy to say, that a perceiving thing should be the subjec t of ideas, or an active thing the caus e of them . I t i s granted w e hav e neithe r a n immediat e evi dence no r a demonstrativ e knowledg e o f th e existenc e of

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other finit e spirits ; but i t wil l no t thenc e follo w tha t suc h spirits are o n a foot wit h material substances: if to suppos e the on e b e inconsistent , an d i t be no t inconsisten t t o sup pose the other ; i f the on e ca n be inferre d by no argument, and ther e i s a probability for th e other ; if we see signs and effects indicatin g distinct finit e agent s lik e ourselves , an d see n o sig n o r sympto m whateve r that lead s t o a rationa l belief o f matter. I sa y lastly, that I have a notion o f spirit, though I have not, strictl y speaking, an idea o f it. I do no t perceive it as an idea or by means of an idea, but know it by reflexion. H Y L A S . Notwithstandin g all you hav e said , t o m e i t seems , that accordin g to you r ow n way of thinking, and i n consequence of your own principles, it should follow that you ar e only a syste m o f floatin g ideas , withou t an y substanc e t o support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material substance, the on e i s to be explode d a s well as the other . P H I L O N O U S . Ho w ofte n mus t I repeat , tha t I kno w o r a m conscious o f m y ow n being ; an d tha t I mysel f a m no t m y ideas, bu t somewha t else , a thinkin g activ e principl e tha t perceives, knows , wills, and operate s abou t ideas . I know that I , on e an d th e sam e self , perceiv e bot h colour s an d sounds:* that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour : tha t I a m therefore on e individua l principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, fro m all other sensible things and inert ideas. But I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of matter. O n th e contrary , I know that nothin g inconsistent can exist, and that th e existenc e o f matter implie s an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean, when I affirm tha t there is a spiritua l substanc e o r suppor t o f ideas , tha t is , that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But I do not know what is meant, when it is said, that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upo n th e whol e no parit y of case between spiri t an d matter . H Y L A S . I ow n mysel f satisfie d i n thi s point . Bu t d o yo u i n

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earnest think , the rea l existenc e o f sensible thing s consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguis h between them ? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist is another . P H I L O N O U S . I am content, Hylas, to appea l t o the commo n sense o f th e worl d fo r th e trut h o f m y notion . As k th e gardener, wh y h e think s yonde r cherry-tre e exist s i n th e garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him, why he think s an orange-tre e no t t o b e there , an d he shal l tell you, becaus e he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it is, or exists', but that whic h is not perceivable , th e same , h e saith , hath n o being. H Y L A S . Yes , Philonous , I gran t th e existenc e o f a sensibl e thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived. P H I L O N O U S . An d wha t is perceivable but a n idea? And ca n an ide a exis t withou t bein g actuall y perceived? Thes e ar e points long since agree d betwee n us . H Y L A S . Bu t be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not den y it is shocking, and contrary t o th e commo n sens e of men. Ask the fellow , whether yonder tree hath an existence ou t o f hi s mind : wha t answe r thin k yo u h e woul d make? P H I L O N O U S . Th e sam e tha t I shoul d myself , t o wit , that i t doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the rea l tree existing without his mind i s truly known an d comprehende d b y (tha t is , exists in) th e infinit e min d o f God . Probabl y h e ma y no t a t first glance be awar e of the direc t and immediate proof there is of this , inasmuch a s the ver y being o f a tree, or an y othe r sensible thing , implies a mind wherein it is . But th e poin t itself h e canno t deny . The questio n betwee n th e material ists and me is not, whether things have a real existence ou t of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence , distinc t fro m bein g perceived b y God , and exterio r t o al l minds. This indee d som e heathen s an d

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philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notion s of th e Deit y suitabl e t o th e Hol y Scriptures , wil l b e o f another opinion . H Y L A S . Bu t accordin g t o you r notions , wha t differenc e i s there betwee n rea l things , an d chimera s forme d b y th e imagination, o r th e vision s o f a dream , sinc e the y ar e al l equally in the mind ? P H T L O N O U S . Th e idea s formed by the imaginatio n ar e fain t and indistinct ; they hav e beside s a n entire dependenc e o n the will . Bu t th e idea s perceive d b y sense , tha t is , rea l things, are more vivid and clear, and being imprinted o n the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not a like dependenc e on ou r will . Ther e i s therefore n o dange r o f confoundin g these with the foregoing : and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, an d confused . An d thoug h the y shoul d happe n t o b e never s o livel y an d natural , ye t b y thei r no t bein g con nected, an d o f a piece wit h th e precedin g an d subsequen t transactions o f our lives , they might easily be distinguishe d from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish things fro m chimeras o n you r ow n scheme , th e same , i t is evident, will hold also upon mine. For it must be, I presume, by som e perceive d difference , and I a m no t fo r deprivin g you o f any one thin g that yo u perceive . H Y L A S . Bu t still , Philonous, you hold, there i s nothing in the world bu t spirit s an d ideas . An d this , you mus t need s ac knowledge, sound s ver y oddly. P H I L O N O U S . I own the word idea, not being commonly use d for thing, sound s somethin g ou t o f th e way . M y reaso n for usin g it was, because a necessar y relatio n t o th e min d is understoo d t o b e implie d b y tha t term ; an d i t i s no w commonly use d b y philosophers, t o denot e the immediate objects o f th e understanding . Bu t howeve r oddl y th e proposition ma y sound i n words, yet it includes nothing s o very strang e o r shockin g i n it s sense , whic h i n effec t amounts t o n o mor e tha n this , t o wit , that ther e ar e onl y things perceiving , an d thing s perceived; o r tha t ever y un thinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceive d b y som e mind ; i f no t b y an y finit e

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created mind , yet certainl y by the infinit e min d of God, i n whom w e live, an d move, an d have ou r being. I s thi s a s strange a s to say , the sensibl e qualitie s ar e no t o n th e ob jects: or, that w e cannot b e sur e of the existenc e of things, or know anything of their rea l natures, though we both see and fee l them , and perceive the m b y all our senses ? H Y L A S . An d i n consequence o f this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes ; but tha t a spiri t i s th e immediat e caus e o f al l th e phenomen a i n Nature? Ca n ther e b e anythin g mor e extravagan t tha n this? P H I L O N O U S . Yes , i t i s infinitely mor e extravagan t to say , a thing whic h i s inert , operate s o n th e mind , an d whic h i s unperceiving, is the caus e of our perceptions . Besides , that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant, is no mor e tha n th e Hol y Scripture s assert i n a hundred places . I n the m Go d i s represente d a s th e sol e an d immediate Author of all those effects, which some heathens and philosopher s ar e won t t o ascrib e t o Nature , matter , fate, o r th e lik e unthinkin g principle. Thi s i s so much th e constant languag e o f Scripture , tha t i t wer e needles s t o confirm i t by citations . H Y L A S . Yo u ar e no t aware , Philonous, tha t i n making Go d the immediat e autho r o f al l th e motion s i n Nature , yo u make him the author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins . P H I L O N O U S . I n answer to that, I observe first, that the imputation o f guil t i s the same , whethe r a perso n commit s an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose Go d t o ac t by the mediatio n o f an instrument, or occasion, calle d matter, you a s truly make Him th e autho r of sin as I, who think Him th e immediat e agen t in all those operations vulgarl y ascribed t o Nature . I farthe r observe , that si n or moral turpitude doth not consis t in the outward physical actio n o r motion , bu t i n the interna l deviatio n of the wil l from th e law s of reason an d religion . This i s plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally t o death , i s not though t sinful , thoug h the outwar d act be the very same with that in the cas e of murder. Since

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therefore si n dot h no t consis t i n th e physica l action , th e making God a n immediate caus e o f all such actions , is not making him the autho r o f sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that Go d is the onl y agent who produces all the motions in bodies. I t is true, I have denie d ther e ar e an y other agent s beside spirits : but thi s i s ver y consisten t wit h allowin g t o thinking rational beings, in the productio n o f motions, th e use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derive d from God , but immediatel y unde r th e directio n o f thei r ow n wills , which i s sufficien t t o entitl e the m t o al l th e guil t o f thei r actions. H Y L A S . Bu t the denying matter, Philonous, or corporeal substance; there i s the point. Yo u can never persuade m e that this i s no t repugnan t t o th e universa l sens e o f mankind . Were ou r disput e t o b e determine d b y most voices , I a m confident yo u woul d giv e up th e point , withou t gatherin g the votes . P H T L O N O U S . I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the judgment of men who had plai n commo n sense, withou t th e prejudice s o f a learne d education . Le t me be represented a s one who trusts his senses, who thinks he know s th e thing s h e see s an d feels , an d entertain s n o doubts, o f their existence ; and yo u fairl y se t fort h wit h all your doubts , you r paradoxes , an d you r scepticis m abou t you, and I shall willingly acquiesce in the determinatio n of any indifferent person. * That there is no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit , is to me evident. And tha t th e objects immediatel y perceive d ar e ideas , i s o n al l hand s agreed. And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived, no one can deny. It is therefore evident there can be no substratum of those qualities but spirit , in which they exist, not b y way of mode or property , bu t a s a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that ther e is any unthinking substratum o f the object s of sense, and in that acceptatio n that there is any material substance. But if by material substance i s mean t onl y sensibl e body , tha t which is seen an d fel t (an d the unphilosophica l part o f th e world, I dare say, mean no more) then I am more certain of matter's existenc e than you, or any other philosopher , pre-

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tend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse from th e notions I espouse, it is a misapprehension tha t I deny the realit y of sensible things : but as it is you wh o ar e guilt y of that an d no t I , it follows tha t i n truth their aversio n is against your notions, and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being, that there ar e bodies or corporeal substance s (meaning the things I perceive b y my senses), an d that granting this, the bulk o f mankin d wil l tak e n o though t about , no r thin k themselves a t al l concerned i n th e fat e o f thos e unknow n natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men ar e so fond of . H Y L A S . Wha t sa y you t o this ? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistake n i n thinkin g th e moo n a plai n luci d surface , about a foo t i n diameter ; o r a squar e tower , see n a t a distance, round ; o r a n oar , wit h on e en d i n th e water , crooked? P H I L O N O U S . H e i s not mistaken with regard t o the ideas he actually perceives; but i n the inference s he makes from hi s present perceptions . Thus in th e cas e o f the oar , wha t h e immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; an d so far h e i s in the right . But i f he thenc e conclude , that upon taking the oa r ou t o f the wate r he shal l perceive th e sam e crookedness; o r tha t i t woul d affec t hi s touch, a s crooke d things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shal l conclude from wha t he perceives i n one station , that i n cas e h e advance s towar d th e moo n o r tower , h e should stil l be affecte d wit h the lik e ideas, h e i s mistaken. But hi s mistake lie s not i n what he perceive s immediatel y and at present (i t being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect o f that) but in the wrong judgment he make s concerning th e idea s h e apprehend s t o b e con nected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from wha t he perceive s a t present, he imagines would be perceived i n other circumstances. The cas e is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive an y motio n o f th e earth : bu t i t wer e erroneou s thence t o conclude, that in case we were placed a t as great

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a distance from that , as we are now from th e othe r planets , we should no t the n perceiv e it s motion . H Y L A S . I understand you; and must needs ow n you say things plausible enough : bu t giv e me leav e t o pu t yo u in mind of one thing . Pray, Philonous, were you not formerl y as positive that matter existed , a s you are now that i t does not ? P H I L O N O U S . I was. But here lies the difference . Before , my positiveness was founded without examination, upon prejudice; but now , after inquiry , upon evidence . H Y L A S . Afte r all, it seems ou r disput e i s rather about word s than things . We agre e i n the thing , but diffe r i n the name . That we are affected wit h ideas from withou t is evident; and it i s n o les s evident , tha t ther e mus t b e ( I wil l no t sa y archetypes, but ) power s withou t th e mind , correspondin g to those ideas. And as these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there i s some subjec t of them necessaril y t o b e ad mitted, which I call matter, and you call spirit. This is all the difference. P H I L O N O U S . Pray , Hylas, is that powerful being , or subjec t of powers, extended ? H Y L A S . I t hath no t extension ; but i t hath th e power t o rais e in you th e ide a o f extension. P H I L O N O U S . I t i s therefore itsel f unextended . H Y L A S . I grant it. P H I L O N O U S . I s it not als o active ? H Y L A S . Withou t doubt : otherwise , ho w coul d w e attribut e powers t o it? P H I L O N O U S . No w le t m e as k yo u tw o questions : first , whether i t be agreeable t o the usage either of philosophers or others, t o give the name matter to an unextended activ e being? And secondly, whether i t be not ridiculously absurd to misappl y name s contrar y t o th e commo n us e o f lan guage? H Y L A S . Wel l then, let i t not b e calle d matter , sinc e you will have i t so , but som e third nature distinc t fro m matte r an d spirit. For , wha t reaso n i s ther e wh y yo u shoul d cal l i t spirit? does not th e notion o f spirit imply, that it is thinking as well as active an d unextended ? P H I L O N O U S . M y reaso n i s this : becaus e I hav e a min d t o have som e notio n o r meaning i n what I say; but I have no

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notion o f an y actio n distinc t fro m volition , neithe r ca n I conceive volitio n t o b e anywher e bu t i n a spirit: therefor e when I spea k o f a n activ e being , I a m oblige d t o mea n a spirit. Beside , wha t can be plainer tha n tha t a thing which hath n o idea s in itself, canno t impar t the m t o me ; and i f it hath ideas, surely it must be a spirit. To make you compre hend th e point stil l more clearl y if it be possible: I assert as well a s you , tha t sinc e w e ar e affecte d fro m without , w e must allo w power s t o b e withou t i n a bein g distinc t fro m ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ a s to th e kind o f this powerful being . I wil l have i t t o b e spirit , you matter, o r I know not wha t (I may add too, yo u know no t what) thir d nature . Thu s I prov e i t t o b e spirit . Fro m th e effects I se e produced , I conclud e ther e ar e actions ; an d because actions , volitions ; and because ther e are volitions , there must be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, the y or their archetypes , ou t o f my mind: but being ideas , neithe r the y no r thei r archetype s ca n exis t otherwise tha n i n a n understanding : there i s therefore a n understanding. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sens e a mind o r spirit . The powerfu l caus e there fore o f my ideas, is in strict propriety o f speech a spirit. H Y L A S . An d no w I warran t yo u thin k yo u hav e mad e th e point ver y clear , littl e suspectin g tha t wha t yo u advanc e leads directl y t o a contradiction . I s i t no t a n absurdit y t o imagine an y imperfection i n God ? P H I L O N O U S . Withou t doubt . H Y L A S . T o suffe r pai n i s an imperfection . P H I L O N O U S . I t is. H Y L A S . Ar e w e no t sometime s affecte d wit h pai n an d un easiness b y some othe r being ? P H I L O N O U S . W e are . H Y L A S . An d hav e yo u no t sai d tha t bein g i s a spirit , an d i s not that spiri t God ? P H I L O N O U S . I grant it. H Y L A S . Bu t yo u hav e asserted , tha t whateve r idea s w e perceive fro m without , ar e i n th e min d whic h affect s us . The idea s therefor e o f pai n an d uneasines s ar e i n God ; or i n othe r words , Go d suffer s pain : tha t i s to say , ther e is a n imperfectio n i n th e Divin e Nature , whic h yo u

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acknowledged wa s absurd . S o yo u ar e caugh t i n a plai n contradiction. P H T L O N O U S . Tha t Go d knows or understands all things, and that He knows among other things what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation , and what it is for His creatures t o suffer pain , I make no question . But that God , thoug h He knows an d sometime s cause s painfu l sensation s i n us , can Himself suffe r pain , I positively deny. We who are limite d and dependent spirits , are liable to impressions of sense, the effects o f an externa l agent , which being produced agains t our wills , ar e sometime s painfu l an d uneasy . Bu t God , whom no externa l being can affect , wh o perceives nothin g by sense a s we do, whose will is absolute an d independent, causing al l things, and liabl e to b e thwarte d or resiste d b y nothing; it is evident, such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor b e affecte d wit h any painfu l sensation , o r indee d an y sensation at all. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions ar e connecte d wit h corporeal motions . B y the Law of our Nature we are affecte d upo n every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body: which sensible body rightly considered , i s nothin g bu t a complexio n o f suc h qualities or ideas, as have no existenc e distinc t from bein g perceived b y a mind: s o that thi s connexio n o f sensation s with corporeal motions, means no more than a correspondence i n the orde r o f Nature betwee n tw o set s o f ideas, or things immediatel y perceivable . Bu t Go d i s a pur e spirit , disengaged from al l such sympathy or natural ties. No corporeal motions ar e attende d wit h the sensation s of pain o r pleasure i n his mind. To know everything knowable is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel any thing by sense , i s an imperfection . Th e former , I say , agrees t o God, bu t no t the latter . God know s or hath ideas ; but His ideas are not convey'd to Him by sense,* as ours are . Your not distinguishin g where ther e i s so manifest a difference , makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there i s none. H Y L A S . Bu t al l this while you have not considered , tha t th e quantity o f matter hat h bee n demonstrate d t o b e propor tional t o th e gravit y o f bodies . An d wha t ca n withstan d demonstration?

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P H I L O N O U S . Le t me se e how you demonstrate tha t point. H Y L A S . I la y i t dow n fo r a principle , tha t th e moment s o r quantities of motion in bodies, are i n a direct compounde d reason o f the velocitie s and quantitie s of matter containe d in them . Hence, wher e th e velocitie s ar e equal , i t follows , the moments ar e directl y as the quantit y of matter i n each. But i t i s found b y experience , tha t al l bodie s (batin g th e small inequalities , arisin g fro m th e resistanc e o f th e air ) descend wit h a n equa l velocity ; the motio n therefor e o f descending bodies, and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional t o th e quantity of matter: which was to b e demonstrated . P H I L O N O U S . Yo u lay it down as a self-evident principle, that the quantit y o f motion i n any body, is proportional t o th e velocity and matter taken together: an d thi s is made us e of to prove a proposition, from whence the existence of matter is inferred. Pray is not thi s arguing in a circle? H Y L A S . I n th e premis e I only mean, tha t th e motio n i s proportional t o th e velocity , jointly wit h th e extensio n an d solidity. P H I L O N O U S . Bu t allowin g thi s t o b e true , ye t i t wil l no t thence follow, that gravity is proportional t o matter, in your philosophic sens e o f th e word ; excep t yo u tak e i t fo r granted, tha t unknow n substratum, o r whateve r els e yo u call it, is proportional t o thos e sensibl e qualities ; which t o suppose, is plainly begging the question . That there is magnitude an d solidity , o r resistance , perceive d b y sense , I readily grant; as likewise that gravit y may be proportiona l to thos e qualities , I wil l not dispute . But tha t eithe r thes e qualities as perceived b y us, or the power s producing them do exis t i n a material substratum', thi s i s what I deny , an d you indee d affirm , bu t notwithstandin g your demonstra tion, have not yet proved. H Y L A S . I shal l insist n o longe r on tha t point . D o yo u thin k however, yo u shal l persuade m e th e natura l philosopher s have been dreaming all this while; pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose th e existenc e o f matter? P H I L O N O U S . Wha t mean you , Hylas, by the phenomena?

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H Y L A S . I mea n th e appearance s whic h I perceiv e b y m y senses. P H I L O N O U S . An d th e appearance s perceive d b y sense , ar e they not ideas ? H Y L A S . I have told you so a hundred times . P H I L O N O U S . Therefore , t o explai n th e phenomena , i s t o shew how we come to be affected wit h ideas, in that manner and orde r wherei n the y ar e imprinte d o n ou r senses . I s it not? H Y L A S . I t is .

P H I L O N O U S . No w i f yo u ca n prove , tha t an y philosophe r hath explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of matter, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all tha t hat h bee n sai d agains t i t a s nothing : bu t i f yo u cannot, i t is in vain to urg e the explicatio n o f phenomena . That a bein g endowe d wit h knowledg e an d will , shoul d produce o r exhibi t ideas , i s easily understood. Bu t tha t a being which is utterly destitute of these facultie s shoul d b e able t o produc e ideas , o r i n an y sor t t o affec t a n intelli gence, thi s I ca n never understand . Thi s I say , though w e had some positive conception of matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend it s existence, would yet be so far fro m explainin g things, that it is itself th e mos t inexplicable thing in the world . And ye t fo r al l this, it will no t follow, tha t philosopher s hav e bee n doin g nothing ; for b y observing and reasoning upon the connexion o f ideas, they discover the law s and methods o f Nature, which is a part of knowledge both usefu l an d entertaining . H Y L A S . Afte r all , can it be suppose d Go d woul d deceive all mankind? D o yo u imagine , h e woul d hav e induce d th e whole world to believe the bein g of matter, if there wa s no such thing? P H I L O N O U S . Tha t ever y epidemica l opinio n arisin g fro m prejudice, o r passion , or thoughtlessness , ma y be impute d to God , a s the Autho r o f it, I believ e yo u wil l no t affirm . Whatsoever opinio n w e fathe r o n him , i t mus t b e eithe r because h e ha s discovere d i t t o u s b y supernatura l revelation, o r becaus e i t i s s o eviden t t o ou r natura l faculties, which were framed and give n us by God, tha t it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the

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revelation? or where is the evidenc e that extorts th e belief of matter ? Nay , how does it appear, tha t matte r take n fo r something distinc t from wha t we perceive b y our senses , is thought t o exis t b y al l mankind, or indee d b y an y excep t a fe w philosophers, wh o do not kno w what they would b e at? You r questio n suppose s thes e point s ar e clear ; an d when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer . In the mean time let it suffice tha t I tel l you, I do not suppos e Go d ha s deceived mankin d at all. H Y L A S . Bu t th e novelty , Philonous, th e novelty ! There lie s the danger . Ne w notion s shoul d alway s b e discoun tenanced; the y unsettl e men' s minds , an d nobod y know s where the y will end . P H I L O N O U S . Wh y the rejectin g a notion that hath n o foun dation eithe r i n sens e o r i n reason, o r i n divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded o n all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion, are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own . But is there th e like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before, is an innovation in knowledge: and if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would* have made a notable progress in th e art s an d sciences . Bu t i t i s none o f m y busines s t o plead fo r noveltie s an d paradoxes . Tha t th e qualitie s w e perceive, ar e no t o n th e objects : that w e must no t believ e our senses : tha t w e kno w nothin g o f th e rea l natur e o f things, an d ca n neve r b e assure d eve n o f thei r existence : that rea l colour s an d sound s ar e nothin g bu t certai n un known figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swif t no r slow : tha t ther e ar e i n bodie s absolut e extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless and inactive, operates on a spirit: that th e leas t particl e o f a body, contains innumerable extended parts. These are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuin e uncorrupted judgmen t of all mankind; and being once admitted , embarrass th e mind with endless doubts an d difficulties . An d i t is against these and the like innovations, I endeavour to vindicate common

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sense. I t i s true, in doing this, I may perhaps b e oblige d t o use some ambages* an d ways of speech no t common . But if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them, will in effect b e found to amount t o no mor e tha n this : that i t i s absolutel y impossible , an d a plain contradictio n t o suppose , an y unthinkin g bein g should exist without being perceived by a mind. And i f this notion b e singular , it is a shame it should be so at this time of day , and i n a Christian country . H Y L A S . A s fo r th e difficultie s othe r opinion s ma y b e liabl e to, thos e ar e ou t o f th e question . I t i s you r busines s t o defend you r ow n opinion . Ca n anythin g b e plainer , tha n that yo u are fo r changing all things into ideas? You , I say, who are no t ashame d to charg e me with scepticism. This is so plain, there i s no denyin g it. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u mistak e me. I am not fo r changing things into ideas , but rathe r idea s int o things ; since thos e immediate object s o f perception , whic h accordin g t o you , ar e only appearance s o f things , I tak e t o b e th e rea l thing s themselves. H Y L A S . Things ! yo u ma y preten d wha t you please ; bu t i t is certain, you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outsid e onl y which strikes the senses. P H T L O N O U S . Wha t you call the empt y forms an d outsid e of things, seem s t o m e th e ver y thing s themselves . No r ar e they empt y o r incomplet e otherwise, than upo n you r supposition, tha t matte r i s a n essentia l par t o f al l corporea l things. W e bot h therefor e agre e i n this , that w e perceiv e only sensibl e forms : bu t herei n w e differ , yo u wil l hav e them to be empty appearances , I real beings. In short yo u ' do not trus t your senses, I do. H Y L A S . Yo u sa y you believ e you r senses ; an d see m t o ap plaud yoursel f tha t i n thi s you agre e wit h the vulgar . According t o yo u therefore , th e tru e natur e o f a thin g i s discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qual ities, perceived al l manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope , th e bette r t o discove r th e tru e natur e o f a body, if it were discoverabl e t o th e nake d eye ?

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P H I L O N O U S . Strictl y speaking , Hylas , w e d o no t se e th e same objec t tha t w e feel ; neithe r i s th e sam e objec t per ceived by the microscope, whic h was by the naked eye . But in case every variation was thought sufficient t o constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number o r confusion of names woul d render languag e impracticable. Therefor e t o avoid thi s as well as other inconveniencies whic h are obvi ous upo n a littl e thought , me n combin e togethe r severa l ideas, apprehended b y divers senses, or b y the sam e sens e at differen t times , o r i n differen t circumstances , bu t ob served howeve r t o have som e connexio n i n Nature, eithe r with respec t t o co-existenc e o r succession ; al l whic h the y refer t o on e name , an d conside r a s on e thing . Henc e i t follows tha t whe n I examin e b y my other sense s a thing I have seen , i t is not i n order t o understan d bette r the sam e object whic h I ha d perceive d b y sight , th e objec t o f on e sense not being perceived b y the other senses. And when I look throug h a microscope , i t i s no t tha t I ma y perceiv e more clearl y wha t I perceived alread y with my bare eyes , the object perceived b y the glass being quite differen t fro m the former . But i n both case s my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together ; and the more a man knows of the connexio n o f ideas, the mor e h e i s said t o know o f th e nature o f things . What therefor e i f our idea s ar e variable ; what if our sense s ar e not i n all circumstances affected wit h the sam e appearances ? I t wil l no t thenc e follow , the y ar e not t o be trusted , or tha t the y ar e inconsisten t eithe r wit h themselves or anything else, except i t be with your preconceived notion o f (I know not what ) one single , unchanged, unperceivable, rea l nature , marke d b y eac h name : whic h prejudice seem s t o hav e take n it s rise fro m no t rightl y understanding the commo n languag e of men speakin g of several distinc t ideas , a s unite d int o on e thin g by th e mind . And indee d ther e i s caus e t o suspec t severa l erroneou s conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while the y bega n t o buil d thei r schemes , no t s o much o n notions a s words, which were framed b y the vulgar, merely for convenienc y and dispatch in the common action s of life, without an y regard t o speculation .

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H Y L A S . M e thinks I apprehen d you r meaning . P H I L O N O U S . I t is your opinion, the ideas we perceive by our senses ar e no t rea l things , but images , o r copie s o f them . Our knowledg e therefor e i s n o farthe r real , tha n a s ou r ideas are the true representations o f those originals. But as these suppose d original s ar e i n themselve s unknown , it is impossible t o kno w ho w fa r ou r idea s resembl e them ; o r whether they resemble the m at all. We cannot therefor e be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, a s our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed rea l things, it necessarily follows the y cannot al l be tru e copie s of them: or if some are, and other s ar e not , it is impossible to distinguish the forme r from th e latter . And thi s plunges us yet deeper i n uncertainty. Again, when we consider th e point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should hav e an absolute existenc e out o f a mind: nor consequently, accordin g t o you , how ther e shoul d b e an y real thing in Nature. The resul t o f all which is, that w e ar e thrown int o th e mos t hopeles s an d abandone d scepticism. Now give me leave to ask you, first, whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances , as thei r originals , be no t th e sourc e o f al l this scepticism? Secondly, whethe r yo u ar e informed , eithe r b y sens e o r reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, whether , upon inquiry , you find there i s anything distinctly conceive d o r mean t b y th e absolute o r external existence o f unperceiving substances? Lastly, whethe r th e premises considered , i t b e no t th e wises t wa y t o follo w Nature, trus t you r senses , an d layin g asid e al l anxiou s thought abou t unknow n natures or substances , admit with the vulgar those for real things, which are perceived by the senses? H Y L A S . Fo r the present, I have no inclination to the answering part . I woul d muc h rathe r se e ho w yo u ca n ge t ove r what follows . Pra y ar e no t th e object s perceive d b y th e senses o f one , likewis e perceivabl e t o other s present ? I f there wer e a n hundre d mor e here , the y woul d al l see th e garden, the trees , an d flowers as I se e them. Bu t the y ar e

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not i n the sam e manne r affecte d wit h the idea s I frame i n my imagination. Does not thi s make a differenc e betwee n the forme r sort o f objects and th e latter ? P H I L O N O U S . I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a differ ence between the objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible object s exis t unperceived , becaus e the y ar e per ceived b y many. H Y L A S . I own , I ca n mak e nothin g of tha t objection : bu t i t hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses w e perceive onl y the idea s existing in our minds? P H I L O N O U S . I t is. H Y L A S . Bu t the sam e idea which is in my mind, cannot be in yours, o r i n an y othe r mind . Dot h i t no t therefor e follo w from you r principles, that n o tw o can see the sam e thing? And i s not thi s highly absurd? P H I L O N O U S . I f th e ter m same b e take n i n th e vulga r acceptation, i t i s certai n (an d no t a t al l repugnan t t o th e principles I maintain) tha t differen t person s ma y perceiv e the sam e thing; or the sam e thin g or idea exist in differen t minds. Word s ar e o f arbitrar y imposition ; an d sinc e me n are use d t o appl y th e wor d same wher e n o distinctio n or variety i s perceived , an d I d o no t preten d t o alte r thei r perceptions, it follows, that as men have said before, several saw th e same thing, s o the y ma y upo n lik e occasion s still continue t o us e th e sam e phrase , withou t an y deviatio n either fro m propriet y o f language , o r th e trut h o f things. But i f the ter m same b e use d i n th e acceptatio n o f philosophers, wh o preten d t o a n abstracte d notio n o f identity, then, accordin g t o thei r sundr y definition s of thi s notio n (for i t i s not ye t agree d wherei n tha t philosophi c identit y consists), it may or may not be possible for divers persons to perceive th e sam e thing . Bu t whethe r philosopher s shal l think fit to call a thing the same or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Le t u s suppos e severa l me n together , al l endued with the sam e faculties, and consequentl y affected i n like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would without question agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of

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speech, som e regardin g th e uniformnes s of what wa s per ceived, migh t cal l i t th e same thing : other s especiall y re garding th e diversit y o f person s wh o perceived , migh t choose th e denominatio n o f different things . But wh o see s not tha t al l the disput e i s abou t a word ? t o wit , whethe r what i s perceived b y differen t persons , ma y ye t hav e th e term same applied to it? Or suppose a house, whose walls or outward shel l remainin g unaltered , th e chamber s ar e al l pulled down, and new ones built in their place; and that you should cal l thi s th e same, and I shoul d sa y it wa s not th e same house: would we not for all this perfectly agre e in our thoughts of the house , considere d i n itself? an d woul d no t all the differenc e consis t i n a sound? If you shoul d say, we differed i n ou r notions ; fo r tha t yo u superadde d t o you r idea o f th e hous e th e simpl e abstracte d ide a o f identity , whereas I di d not ; I woul d tel l yo u I kno w no t wha t yo u mean b y that abstracted idea o f identity, an d shoul d desir e you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yoursel f . . . Wh y so silent, Hylas ? Ar e yo u not ye t satisfied, me n ma y disput e abou t identit y an d diversity , without an y real differenc e i n their thought s an d opinions , abstracted fro m names ? Tak e thi s farthe r reflexio n wit h you: tha t whether matter be allowed to exist or no, the cas e is exactly the sam e a s to the point i n hand. For th e materi alists themselve s acknowledg e wha t w e immediatel y per ceive b y ou r senses , t o b e ou r ow n ideas . You r difficult y therefore, tha t n o tw o se e th e sam e thing , makes equall y against th e materialist s and me. H Y L A S . Bu t the y suppos e a n externa l archetype, * t o whic h referring thei r several ideas, they may truly be sai d to per ceive th e sam e thing . P H I L O N O U S . An d (no t t o mentio n you r havin g discarde d those archetypes ) s o may you suppos e a n externa l arche type on my principles; external, I mean, to your own mind; though indee d i t mus t b e suppose d t o exis t i n tha t min d which comprehend s al l things; but the n thi s serve s al l th e ends of identity, as well as if it existed out o f a mind. And I am sur e you yoursel f will not say , it is less intelligible .

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H Y L A S . Yo u hav e indee d clearl y satisfie d me , eithe r tha t there i s no difficult y a t bottom i n this point; or i f there be , that i t makes equally against both opinions . P H T L O N O U S . Bu t that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions, ca n be a proof agains t neither . H Y L A S . I acknowledg e it . Bu t afte r all , Philonous , whe n I consider th e substanc e o f what you advanc e against scepticism, it amounts to no more tha n this. We are sure that we really see , hear , feel ; i n a word, that w e ar e affecte d wit h sensible impressions . P H T L O N O U S . An d ho w are we concerned an y farther? I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it : and I am sure nothing canno t be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real. Take awa y the sensations o f softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and yo u take awa y the cherry . Since it i s not a being distinc t fro m sensations; a cherry, I say , is nothin g but a congerie s of sensible impressions , or idea s perceived b y various senses : which idea s ar e unite d int o on e thin g (o r hav e on e nam e given them ) b y th e mind ; becaus e the y ar e observe d t o attend eac h other . Thu s whe n th e palat e i s affecte d wit h such a particula r taste , th e sigh t i s affecte d wit h a re d colour, th e touc h wit h roundness , softness , &c . Hence , when I see, and feel, and taste, in sundry certain manners, I am sur e th e cherry exists , or i s real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted fro m thos e sensations. Bu t if by the word cherry yo u mean an unknown nature distinct from all those sensibl e qualities, and b y its existence somethin g distinct from its being perceived; then indeed I own, neither you nor I , nor an y one els e can be sur e it exists.* H Y L A S . Bu t what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the ver y sam e reason s agains t th e existenc e o f sensibl e things in a mind, which you have offered agains t their existing in a material substratuml P H I L O N O U S . Whe n I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them . H Y L A S . I s the min d extended o r unextended ? P H T L O N O U S . Unextended , withou t doubt. H Y L A S . D o you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

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P H I L O N O U S . The y are. H Y L A S . Again , hav e I no t hear d yo u spea k o f sensibl e impressions? P H I L O N O U S . I believe yo u may. H Y L A S . Explai n to m e now , O Philonous ! ho w it is possible there shoul d be room fo r all those trees and houses to exist in you r mind . Ca n extende d thing s b e containe d i n tha t which i s unextended ? O r ar e w e t o imagin e impression s made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot sa y objects are in your mind, as books i n your study: or that thing s are imprinted o n it , a s the figur e o f a sea l upo n wax . In wha t sense therefor e ar e w e t o understan d thos e expressions ? Explain m e thi s i f yo u can : an d I shal l the n b e abl e t o answer al l those querie s you formerly pu t t o m e abou t my substratum. P H I L O N O U S . Loo k you , Hylas , whe n I spea k o f object s a s existing in the mind or imprinted o n the senses; I would not be understood i n the gross literal sense, as when bodies ar e said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. M y meanin g i s onl y tha t th e min d comprehend s o r perceives them ; an d tha t i t is affected fro m without , or b y some bein g distinc t fro m itself . Thi s i s m y explicatio n of your difficulty ; an d ho w it can serve t o make you r tenet of an unperceivin g materia l substratum intelligible , I woul d fain know . H Y L A S . Nay , if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be mad e o f it . Bu t ar e yo u no t guilt y o f som e abus e o f language in this? P H I L O N O U S . Non e at all: it is no more than common custom, which yo u kno w i s the rul e o f language , hat h authorized : nothing bein g more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediat e objects of the understandin g as things existing i n th e mind . No r i s there anythin g i n this , but wha t is conformable t o the general analog y of language; most par t of the mental operations bein g signified by words borrowed from sensibl e things ; as is plain i n th e term s comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c. which being applied to the mind, must not b e take n i n their gross original sense . H Y L A S . Yo u have, I own, satisfied m e in this point: but ther e

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still remains on e great difficulty, whic h I know not how you will ge t over . An d indee d i t i s o f suc h importance , tha t if you coul d solv e al l others , withou t bein g abl e t o fin d a solution fo r this , yo u mus t neve r expec t t o mak e m e a proselyte to your principles . P H I L O N O U S . Le t m e kno w this mighty difficulty . H Y L A S . Th e Scriptur e accoun t o f th e Creation , i s what ap pears t o m e utterl y irreconcileabl e wit h you r notions . Moses tell s us of a Creation: a Creation o f what? of ideas? No certainly , but o f things , o f rea l things , soli d corporea l substances. Brin g your principles to agre e wit h this, and I shall perhaps agree wit h you. P H I L O N O U S . Mose s mention s th e sun , moon , an d stars , earth an d sea , plant s an d animals : that al l these d o really exist, and were in the beginning created b y God, I make no question. I f by ideas, you mea n fiction s an d fancie s o f th e mind, the n thes e ar e n o ideas . I f b y ideas, yo u mea n im mediate object s o f th e understanding , o r sensibl e thing s which canno t exis t unperceived , o r ou t o f a mind , the n these things are ideas . Bu t whethe r yo u do, or d o no t cal l them ideas, it matters little . The differenc e i s only abou t a name. And whether that name be retained o r rejected, the sense, the truth and reality of things continues the same. In common talk , th e object s o f you r sense s ar e no t terme d ideas bu t things. Cal l the m s o still : provide d yo u d o no t attribute t o the m an y absolut e externa l existence , an d I shall neve r quarre l wit h yo u fo r a word . Th e Creatio n therefore I allo w to hav e been a creation o f things, of real things. Neithe r i s thi s i n th e leas t inconsisten t wit h m y principles, a s i s eviden t fro m wha t I hav e no w said ; an d would have been evident to you without this, if you had no t forgotten wha t ha d bee n s o ofte n sai d before . Bu t a s fo r solid corporea l substances , I desir e yo u t o she w wher e Moses make s an y mentio n o f them; an d i f they shoul d b e mentioned b y him , o r an y othe r inspire d writer , it woul d still b e incumben t o n yo u t o she w thos e word s wer e no t taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for matter, or an unknown quiddity , with a n absolut e existence . When yo u

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have proved thes e points, then (an d not till then) may you bring the authorit y of Moses int o ou r dispute . H Y L A S . I t i s in vain to disput e abou t a point s o clear. I a m content t o refe r i t t o you r ow n conscience . Ar e yo u no t satisfied ther e i s som e peculia r repugnanc y betwee n th e Mosaic account o f the Creation , an d your notions? P H I L O N O U S . I f al l possible sense , whic h ca n b e pu t o n th e first chapter o f Genesis, may b e conceive d a s consistently with m y principle s a s an y other , the n i t ha s n o peculia r repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, beside spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither d o you pretend the y exist without the mind. H Y L A S . Pra y let me se e an y sense yo u can understand i t in. P H I L O N O U S . Why , I imagine that if I had been present at the Creation, I shoul d hav e see n thing s produce d int o being ; that is , become perceptible , i n the orde r describe d b y th e sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the Creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it . Whe n thing s ar e sai d t o begi n o r en d thei r existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in his mind: but when thing s befor e imperceptibl e t o creatures , ar e b y a decree o f God , mad e perceptibl e t o them ; the n ar e the y said t o begi n a relative existence , wit h respec t t o create d minds. Upon readin g therefor e th e Mosaic accoun t o f th e Creation, I understand tha t th e severa l parts o f the world became graduall y perceivabl e t o finit e spirits , endowe d with prope r faculties ; s o that whoeve r suc h wer e present , they wer e i n trut h perceive d b y them . Thi s i s th e litera l obvious sens e suggeste d t o me , b y th e word s o f the Hol y Scripture: i n which is included n o mentio n o r n o thought, either o f substratum, instrument, occasion, o r absolut e existence. And upon inquiry, I doubt not, it will be found, that most plai n hones t men , wh o believ e th e Creation , neve r think o f those thing s an y more tha n I . What metaphysica l sense yo u may understand i t in, you onl y can tell. H Y L A S . But , Philonous , yo u d o no t see m t o b e aware , tha t

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you allo w create d thing s in the beginning , onl y a relative, and consequentl y hypothetica l being : tha t i s to say , upo n supposition ther e wer e me n t o perceiv e them , withou t which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein Creation migh t terminate. I s it not therefor e accordin g t o you plainly impossible, the Creatio n o f any inanimate creatures shoul d preced e tha t o f man? An d i s not thi s directly contrary t o the Mosaic account? P H I L O N O U S . I n answe r t o tha t I say , first, created being s might begi n t o exis t i n th e min d o f othe r create d intelli gences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradictio n betwee n Mose s an d m y notions, unles s you firs t shew , there wa s no othe r orde r o f finit e create d spirits i n bein g befor e man . I sa y farther, in cas e w e conceive th e Creation , a s w e shoul d a t thi s tim e a parce l o f plants o r vegetable s o f al l sorts , produce d b y a n invisible power, in a desert where nobody was present: tha t this way of explainin g o r conceivin g it , i s consisten t wit h m y prin ciples, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensibl e or imaginable: that i t exactly suits with the common , natural, undebauched notion s o f mankind : That i t manifest s th e dependence o f all things on God; and consequently hath all the goo d effec t o r influence , whic h i t i s possible tha t im portant articl e o f ou r fait h shoul d hav e i n makin g me n humble, thankful , an d resigne d t o thei r Creator . I sa y moreover, that in this naked conception o f things, divested of words , there wil l no t b e foun d an y notio n o f what yo u call the actuality o f absolute existence. You may indeed rais e a dust with those terms , and s o lengthen ou r disput e to n o purpose. Bu t I entrea t yo u calml y to loo k int o you r ow n thoughts, an d the n tel l m e i f they ar e no t a n useles s an d unintelligible jargon. H Y L A S . I own, I have no very clear notion annexe d to them . But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible thing s consist in their being in a mind? And wer e not al l things eternall y i n th e min d o f God ? Di d the y no t therefore exis t fro m al l eternity , accordin g t o you ? An d how could that which was eternal, be created i n time? Ca n anything be clearer o r better connected tha n this?

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P H I L O N O U S . An d ar e no t yo u to o o f opinion , tha t Go d knew al l things from eternity ? H Y L A S . I am . P H T L O N O U S . Consequentl y the y alway s had a bein g i n th e Divine Intellect . H Y L A S . Thi s I acknowledge. P H I L O N O U S . B y you r ow n confessio n therefore, nothin g i s new, o r begins to be, in respect o f the min d of God. S o we are agree d i n that point . H Y L A S . Wha t shal l we make then o f the Creation ? P H I L O N O U S . Ma y w e no t understan d i t t o hav e bee n en tirely in respect o f finite spirits; so that things , with regar d to us, may properly b e sai d to begi n thei r existence , o r b e created, whe n Go d decree d the y shoul d becom e percept ible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which he the n established , an d w e no w cal l the law s of Nature ? You ma y call this a relative, or hypothetical existence if you please. Bu t s o long as it supplies us with the mos t natural , obvious, an d litera l sens e o f th e Mosai c histor y o f th e Creation; s o long as it answers all the religiou s ends of that great article ; in a word, so long as you can assig n no othe r sense o r meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it t o compl y with a ridiculous sceptical humour o f making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say , it i s for th e glor y of God . Fo r allowin g it t o b e a thing possibl e an d conceivable , tha t th e corporea l worl d should have an absolute subsistence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits: yet how could this set forth eithe r th e immensit y or omniscienc e of the Deity , o r th e necessar y an d immediat e dependenc e o f all things on him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogat e from thos e attributes ? H Y L A S . Well , bu t a s t o thi s decre e o f God's , fo r makin g things perceptible: wha t say you, Philonous, is it not plain, God di d either execut e tha t decre e fro m al l eternity, o r a t some certai n tim e bega n t o wil l wha t h e ha d no t actuall y willed before, but onl y designed t o will. If the former, then there coul d b e n o Creatio n o r beginnin g o f existenc e i n finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge some-

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thing ne w t o befal l th e Deity ; whic h implie s a sor t o f change: and al l change argue s imperfection . P H I L O N O U S . Pra y conside r wha t yo u ar e doing . I s i t no t evident, this objection conclude s equall y against a creatio n in an y sense ; nay , agains t ever y othe r ac t o f th e Deity , discoverable by the ligh t of Nature? None o f which can we conceive, otherwis e tha n a s performed i n time, and having a beginning. God i s a being o f transcendent an d unlimited perfections: hi s natur e therefor e i s incomprehensibl e t o finite spirits . I t i s no t therefor e t o b e expected , tha t an y man, whether materialist or immaterialist, should hav e exactly just notion s o f th e Deity , hi s attributes , an d way s of operation. I f the n yo u woul d infe r anythin g agains t me , your difficulty mus t not be drawn from th e inadequatenes s of our conception s o f the Divin e Nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; but from th e denial of matter, of which there i s not on e word , directl y o r indirectly , in wha t yo u have now objected . H Y L A S . I mus t acknowledge , th e difficultie s yo u ar e con cerned t o clear , ar e suc h onl y a s aris e fro m th e non existence of matter, and are peculiar to that notion . So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to think ther e is no suc h peculiar repugnanc y betwee n th e Creation an d your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctl y know. P H I L O N O U S . Wha t would you have! do I not acknowledge a two-fold stat e o f things , th e on e ectypa l o r natural , th e other archetypa l an d eternal ? Th e forme r wa s created i n time; the latter existed from everlastin g in the mind of God. Is not thi s agreeable t o the commo n notion s o f divines? or is an y mor e tha n thi s necessar y i n orde r t o conceiv e th e Creation? Bu t yo u suspec t som e peculia r repugnancy , though you know not wher e i t lies. To tak e awa y al l possibility of scruple in the case , do but conside r this one point . Either yo u ar e no t abl e t o conceiv e th e Creatio n o n an y hypothesis whatsoever ; an d i f so , ther e i s n o groun d fo r dislike o r complain t against m y particular opinio n o n tha t score: o r yo u ar e abl e t o conceiv e it ; and i f so, why not o n my principles , sinc e thereb y nothin g conceivabl e i s taken

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away? Yo u hav e al l alon g bee n allowe d th e ful l scop e o f sense, imagination , an d reason . Whateve r therefor e yo u could befor e apprehend , eithe r immediatel y o r mediatel y by your senses, or by ratiocination fro m you r senses; whatever yo u coul d perceive , imagin e o r understand , remain s still with you. If therefore the notio n yo u have of the Crea tion by other principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion a t all; an d s o there i s no loss of it. And indee d i t seems to m e very plain , tha t th e suppositio n o f matter , tha t is , a thin g perfectly unknow n an d inconceivable , canno t serv e t o make u s conceiv e anything . And I hope , i t nee d no t b e proved to you, that if the existence of matter doth not make the Creatio n conceivable , th e Creation' s bein g withou t it inconceivable , ca n b e n o objectio n agains t it s non existence. H Y L A S . I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied m e in this point o f the Creation . P H I L O N O U S . I would fain kno w why you are not quit e satisfied. You tel l me indeed o f a repugnancy between the Mo saic history and immaterialism : but yo u know not wher e it lies. I s thi s reasonable , Hylas ? Ca n yo u expec t I shoul d solve a difficulty withou t knowing what it is? But to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured ther e is no repugnancy betwee n th e receive d notion s o f materialist s and the inspire d writings? H Y L A S . An d s o I am. P H T L O N O U S . Ough t th e historica l par t o f Scriptur e t o b e understood i n a plain obvious sense, or i n a sense which is metaphysical, and ou t o f the way? H Y L A S . I n the plai n sense , doubtless . P H I L O N O U S . Whe n Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been create d b y God; thin k you not th e sensibl e things, commonly signified by those words, are suggested to every unphilosophical reader ? H Y L A S . I cannot hel p thinkin g so. P H I L O N O U S . An d ar e no t al l ideas, o r thing s perceived b y sense, t o b e denie d a real existenc e b y the doctrin e o f th e materialists?

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H Y L A S . Thi s I have alread y acknowledged. P H I L O N O U S . Th e Creatio n therefore , accordin g t o them , was no t th e creatio n o f things sensible, which have onl y a relative being, but o f certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being , wherein Creatio n migh t terminate. H Y L A S . True . P H I L O N O U S . I s it not therefore evident, the asserters of matter destro y th e plai n obviou s sens e o f Moses , wit h which their notion s ar e utterl y inconsistent; and instea d o f it obtrude o n us I know not what , something equall y unintelligible to themselves and me? H Y L A S . I cannot contradic t you . P H T L O N O U S . Mose s tell s u s o f a Creation . A Creatio n o f what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or substratumsl No certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled t o them. H Y L A S . I see you can assault me wit h my own weapons. P H I L O N O U S . The n a s t o absolute existence', wa s ther e eve r known a more jejune notion tha n that ? Somethin g i t is, so abstracted an d unintelligible , that you have frankly owne d you could not conceiv e it, much less explain anything by it. But allowin g matte r t o exist , an d th e notio n o f absolut e existence t o be as clear a s light; yet was this ever known to make th e Creatio n mor e credible ? Na y hat h i t no t fur nished th e atheists an d infidels o f al l ages , wit h th e mos t plausible argumen t agains t a Creation ? Tha t a corporea l substance, whic h hat h a n absolut e existenc e withou t th e minds of spirits, should b e produce d ou t o f nothing by th e mere wil l o f a spirit, hath bee n looke d upo n a s a thing so contrary t o al l reason, s o impossible an d absurd , tha t no t only th e mos t celebrate d amon g th e ancients , bu t eve n divers moder n an d Christia n philosopher s hav e though t matter coeternal wit h the Deity. Lay these things together, and the n judg e you whethe r materialis m disposes me n t o believe th e creatio n o f thing. H Y L A S . I own , Philonous , I thin k i t doe s not . Thi s o f th e Creation i s th e las t objectio n I ca n thin k of ; an d I mus t needs own it hath been sufficiently answere d as well as the

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rest. Nothin g no w remain s to b e overcome , bu t a sor t o f unaccountable backwardnes s tha t I find in mysel f towar d your notions. . P H I L O N O U S . Whe n a man i s swayed, he know s not why , to one side of a question; can this, think you, be anything else but th e effec t o f prejudice, which never fail s t o atten d ol d and roote d notions ? An d indee d i n thi s respec t I canno t deny the belief of matter to have very much the advantag e over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education. H Y L A S . I confess it seems t o b e a s you say. P H I L O N O U S . A s a balance therefore to this weight of prejudice, le t u s throw int o th e scal e the grea t advantage s that arise fro m th e belie f o f immaterialism , bot h i n regar d t o religion an d huma n learning . Th e bein g o f a God , an d incorruptibility o f the soul , those grea t article s of religion, are the y not prove d wit h the cleares t an d most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure genera l caus e o f things, whereof w e have no con ception, but G o d, in the strict and proper sense of the word. A bein g whos e spirituality , omnipresence , providence , omniscience, infinite powe r an d goodness, ar e a s conspicuous a s th e existenc e o f sensibl e things, of which (notwithstanding th e fallaciou s pretences an d affecte d scruple s of sceptics) ther e is no more reason to doubt, than of our own being. The n wit h relatio n t o huma n sciences ; i n natura l philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions, hat h th e belie f o f matte r le d me n into ! T o sa y nothing o f th e numberles s dispute s abou t it s extent , con tinuity, homogeneity , gravity , divisibility , &c . do the y no t pretend t o explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according t o the law s of motion? and yet, ar e the y abl e to comprehend ho w any one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an iner t bein g wit h a cause; o r i n conceiving how a n accident migh t pass from on e bod y to another ; ye t by all their strained thought s an d extravagan t suppositions, have the y been abl e t o reac h th e mechanica l productio n o f an y on e animal or vegetable body? Can they account by the law s of motion, fo r sounds , tastes , smells , o r colours , o r fo r th e regular course o f things? Have the y accounted b y physical

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principles fo r th e aptitud e an d contrivance , eve n o f th e most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But laying aside matter an d corporea l causes , an d admittin g onl y th e effi ciency o f a n all-perfec t mind , ar e no t al l th e effect s o f Nature easy and intelligible? If the phenomena are nothing else bu t ideas; Go d i s a spirit, bu t matte r a n unintelligent, unperceiving being . I f the y demonstrat e a n unlimite d power i n thei r cause ; Go d i s activ e an d omnipotent , bu t matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulnes s of them, can never be sufficiently admired ; God i s infinitely wise and provident, but matte r destitut e o f all contrivance and design . These surel y ar e grea t advantage s in physics. Not t o mentio n tha t th e apprehensio n o f a distan t Deity , naturally dispose s me n t o a negligenc e i n thei r moral ac tions, whic h they would b e mor e cautiou s of , in case the y thought Hi m immediatel y present , an d actin g o n thei r minds withou t the interpositio n o f matter , o r unthinkin g second causes . The n i n metaphysics •; wha t difficultie s con cerning entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures, substance an d accident , principle of individuation, possibilit y o f matter' s thinking , origi n o f ideas, th e manne r ho w tw o independen t substances , s o widely different a s spirit an d matter, should mutually operate o n eac h other? * Wha t difficulties , I say , an d endles s disquisitions concernin g thes e an d innumerabl e othe r th e like points , d o w e escap e b y supposin g onl y spirit s an d ideas? Eve n th e mathematics themselves , i f we tak e away the absolut e existenc e o f extende d things , becom e muc h more clea r an d easy ; th e mos t shockin g paradoxe s an d intricate speculation s i n thos e sciences , dependin g o n th e infinite divisibilit y o f finit e extension , whic h depend s o n that supposition . Bu t wha t nee d i s ther e t o insis t o n th e particular sciences ? I s no t tha t oppositio n t o al l scienc e whatsoever, that phrens y of the ancien t an d moder n sceptics, built on the sam e foundation? Or ca n you produce s o much a s on e argumen t agains t th e realit y o f corporea l things, or i n behalf o f that avowe d utter ignoranc e of their natures, whic h doth no t suppos e thei r realit y to consis t in an externa l absolut e existence ? Upo n thi s suppositio n indeed, th e objection s fro m th e chang e o f colour s i n a

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pigeon's neck , o r th e appearance s o f a broke n oa r i n th e water, must be allowe d to hav e weight. But thos e an d th e like objection s vanish , if we d o no t maintai n th e bein g of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleetin g indeed , an d changeable ; howeve r no t changed a t random , bu t accordin g t o th e fixe d orde r o f Nature. Fo r herei n consist s tha t constanc y an d trut h o f things, whic h secure s al l th e concern s o f life , an d dis tinguishes that which is real from th e irregular visions of the fancy. H Y L A S . I agre e t o al l yo u hav e no w said , an d mus t ow n that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion, more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; an d thi s woul d b e a might y abridgemen t i n know ledge. Wha t doubts , wha t hypotheses , wha t labyrinth s of amusement, wha t field s o f disputation , wha t a n ocea n of fals e learning , ma y b e avoide d b y tha t singl e notio n of immaterialisml P H I L O N O U S . Afte r all , i s there anythin g farther remaining to be done? Yo u may remember yo u promised t o embrac e that opinion , which upon examinatio n should appea r mos t agreeable t o commo n sense , an d remot e fro m scepticism. This by your own confession is that which denies matter, or the absolut e existenc e o f corporea l things . Nor i s this all; the sam e notio n ha s bee n prove d severa l ways , viewe d in different lights , pursued i n its consequences, and al l objections against it cleared. Ca n there b e a greater evidenc e of its truth? o r i s it possible i t should have all the mark s of a true opinion , an d yet be false ? H Y L A S . I ow n myself entirely satisfie d fo r th e presen t i n all respects. Bu t what security can I have that I shall stil l continue th e sam e ful l assen t t o you r opinion , an d tha t n o unthought-of objectio n o r difficult y wil l occur hereafter? P H I L O N O U S . Pray , Hylas , d o yo u i n othe r cases , whe n a point i s onc e evidentl y proved, withhol d you r assen t o n account of objections or difficulties i t may be liable to? Ar e the difficulties tha t attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, o f th e angl e o f contact , o f th e asymptote s t o curves or th e like , sufficient t o mak e you hol d ou t agains t

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mathematical demonstration ? O r wil l yo u disbeliev e th e providence o f God, becaus e ther e ma y be som e particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficultie s attendin g immaterialism , there ar e a t th e same tim e direc t an d eviden t proof s fo r it . Bu t fo r th e existence o f matter , ther e i s not on e proof , an d fa r mor e numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties yo u insist on? Alas! you know no t wher e o r wha t the y are ; somethin g which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretenc e fo r withholding you r ful l assent , yo u shoul d neve r yiel d it t o any proposition , ho w fre e soeve r fro m exceptions , ho w clearly and solidl y soever demonstrated . H Y L A S . Yo u hav e satisfie d me , Philonous . P H I L O N O U S . Butt o arm you against all future objections, do but consider , tha t which bears equall y hard o n two contradictory opinions, can be a proof agains t neither. Wheneve r therefore an y difficulty occurs , try if you can find a solution for i t on the hypothesi s of the materialists. Be not deceive d by words ; but soun d you r ow n thoughts. An d i n cas e yo u cannot conceiv e i t easie r b y th e hel p o f materialism, it i s plain it can be no objection against immaterialism. Had yo u proceeded al l along by this rule, you would probably have spared yoursel f abundance o f trouble i n objecting; since of all you r difficultie s I challeng e yo u t o she w on e tha t i s explained b y matter; nay, which is not mor e unintelligible with, tha n withou t tha t supposition , an d consequentl y makes rathe r against than fo r it . Yo u shoul d conside r i n each particular, whether th e difficult y arise s from th e nonexistence o f matter. If i t dot h not , yo u migh t as well argue from th e infinit e divisibility of extension agains t the divin e prescience, a s from suc h a difficulty agains t immaterialism. And ye t upo n recollectio n I believ e yo u wil l fin d thi s t o have been often, if not always the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a petitio principii* On e is apt to say, th e unknow n substance s ough t t o b e esteeme d rea l things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but th e unthinkin g externa l substanc e ma y concu r a s a cause o r instrumen t in the productio n o f our ideas ? But is

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not thi s proceedin g o n a suppositio n tha t ther e ar e suc h external substances? An d t o suppose this, is it not beggin g the question ? Bu t abov e al l things you shoul d bewar e o f imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism, which is called ignoratio elenchi* Yo u talke d ofte n a s i f yo u though t I maintained the non-existence of sensible things: whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am: and it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively den y it . Everythin g tha t i s seen , felt , heard , o r any wa y perceive d b y th e senses , i s o n th e principle s I embrace, a rea l being , bu t no t o n yours . Remember , th e matter you contend for is an unknown somewhat (if indeed it ma y b e terme d somewhat} whic h is quite strippe d o f all sensible qualities , an d ca n neithe r b e perceive d b y sense , nor apprehende d b y the mind . Remember , I say, that it is not an y objec t whic h i s hard o r soft , ho t o r cold , blu e o r white, round o r square, &c. For al l these thing s I affirm d o exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from bein g perceived ; o r tha t the y exis t ou t o f al l mind s whatsoever. Think o n these points ; let them be attentively considered an d stil l kep t i n view . Otherwis e yo u wil l no t comprehend th e stat e of the question ; without which your objections wil l alway s be wid e of the mark , an d instea d of mine, ma y possibl y b e directe d (a s mor e tha n onc e the y have been) agains t your own notions. H Y L A S . I must needs own , Philonous, nothing seems to have kept m e fro m agreein g with you more tha n this same mistaking the question. In denying matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel; but upon reflexion find there is no ground for it. What think you therefore o f retaining th e nam e matter, and applyin g it t o sensible things ? This ma y b e don e withou t any change i n your sentiments : an d believ e m e i t woul d b e a mean s of reconciling the m t o som e persons , wh o ma y b e mor e shocked a t a n innovation in words than i n opinion . P H I L O N O U S . Wit h all my heart: retain the word matter, and apply it to the object s o f sense, if you please, provided yo u do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from thei r being perceived . I shal l never quarre l wit h you fo r a n ex-

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pression. Matter, o r material substance, ar e term s intro duced by philosophers; an d as used by them, imply a sort of independency, o r a subsistenc e distinc t fro m bein g per ceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or if ever , it is to signif y the immediat e object s of sense. One would think therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the term s sensible, substance, body, stuff, an d the like , ar e retained , th e wor d matter shoul d b e neve r missed i n common talk . And i n philosophical discourses it seems the bes t wa y to leav e i t quite out ; since there i s not perhaps an y on e thin g tha t hat h mor e favoure d an d strengthened th e deprave d ben t o f the min d towar d atheism, than th e us e of that genera l confused term . HYLAS. Wel l but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion o f a n unthinkin g substanc e exterio r t o th e mind , I think yo u ough t no t t o den y me th e privileg e of using the word matter as I please, an d annexin g it to a collection of sensible qualitie s subsistin g only in the mind . I freely ow n there i s no other substanc e in a strict sense, than spirit. But I hav e bee n s o long accustomed t o th e ter m matter, that I know not ho w to par t wit h it. To say , there is no matter in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say, there is no matter, if by tha t ter m b e mean t a n unthinkin g substanc e existing withou t th e mind : but i f by matter i s meant som e sensible thing , whose existence consists in being perceived, then ther e i s matter: this distinctio n give s it quit e anothe r turn: and me n wil l come into your notions with small diffi culty, when they are proposed i n that manner. For afte r all , the controvers y about matter in the stric t acceptation o f it, lies altogethe r betwee n yo u an d th e philosophers ; whos e principles, I acknowledge , ar e no t nea r s o natural , o r s o agreeable t o th e commo n sens e o f mankind , an d Hol y Scripture, a s yours . Ther e i s nothin g w e eithe r desir e o r shun, but as it makes, or is apprehended t o make some part of ou r happines s o r misery . Bu t wha t hat h happines s o r misery, joy o r grief , pleasur e o r pain , t o d o wit h absolut e existence, o r wit h unknow n entities , abstracte d fro m al l relation to us? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing o r displeasing : and the y ca n pleas e o r displease ,

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only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther therefore we are no t concerned ; an d thu s fa r yo u leav e thing s a s yo u found them . Ye t stil l there i s something ne w i n thi s doc trine. It is plain, I do not now think wit h the philosophers , nor ye t altogethe r wit h the vulgar . I would kno w how th e case stands in that respect: precisely, what you have adde d to, or altere d i n my former notions . P H I L O N O U S . I d o no t preten d t o b e a setter-up o f new notions. M y endeavour s ten d onl y t o unit e an d plac e i n a clearer ligh t tha t truth , whic h was before share d betwee n the vulga r and th e philosophers : th e forme r being of opinion, that those things they immediately perceive are the real things', and the latter, that the things immediately perceived, are ideas which exist only i n th e mind. Whic h tw o notion s put together, do in effect constitut e the substance of what I advance.* H Y L A S . I hav e bee n a lon g tim e distrustin g m y senses ; methought I sa w things by a di m light , an d throug h fals e glasses. No w th e glasse s ar e removed , an d a ne w ligh t breaks i n upon m y understanding. I a m clearly convince d that I see things in their native forms; and a m no longe r in pain abou t thei r unknow n natures o r absolut e existence . This is the stat e I find myself in at present: thoug h indee d the cours e tha t brough t me t o it , I d o no t ye t thoroughly comprehend. Yo u se t ou t upo n th e sam e principle s tha t Academics, Cartesians , an d th e lik e sects, usuall y do; and for a lon g tim e i t looke d a s i f yo u wer e advancin g thei r philosophical scepticism', bu t i n th e en d you r conclusion s are directly opposite t o theirs. P H I L O N O U S . Yo u see , Hylas, the wate r of yonder fountain, how i t i s forced upwards , i n a round column , t o a certai n height; at which it breaks and falls back into the basin fro m whence i t rose : it s ascen t a s wel l a s descent , proceedin g from th e sam e uniform law or principle o f gravitation. Just so, the same principles which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued t o a certai n point , brin g me n bac k t o commo n sense.

EXPLANATORY NOTE S PRINCIPLES O F HUMA N KNOWLEDG E

The Preface 6 thi s was omitted fro m B, the 173 4 edition, but its sentiments are sufficiently t o th e poin t t o merit inclusion.

Introduction 7 Introduction: bot h Lock e an d Berkele y star t thei r majo r wor k with a lon g attac k o n wha t the y tak e t o b e th e sourc e o f th e errors o f their opponents . In bot h cases, this purging of error is meant t o clea r th e wa y for a correct empiricism . I n bot h cases , the rea l contributio n o f thes e supposedl y importan t prelimin aries is unclear. Locke attack s 'innat e ideas'. O n th e on e hand, it is plain why an empiricist should wish to prove that we have no other sourc e o f knowledg e excep t experienc e and , therefore , that we have no innate knowledge. On the othe r hand , Locke' s way o f attackin g innat e idea s seem s t o concer n itsel f entirel y with th e genesi s o f ou r ideas , no t wit h thei r justificatio n an d hardly to engage with the role given to a priori truth and reasoning as it is found i n Descartes, Spinoza , or Plato. Locke' s attac k seems hardly relevant to the real issues between rationalism and empiricism. I n a simila r way , it is , fro m a certai n perspective , clear why someone who believes that esse estpercipi shoul d want to insis t tha t our genuin e concepts operat e b y closely reflectin g experience an d should not b e built up into 'abstract' structures. But his attack on abstract ideas, apart from refuting an eccentric account of generality he finds in Locke, hardly seems to relate to anything els e i n th e histor y o f philosophy . Neithe r Lock e no r Berkeley had captured the source of their opponents' 'errors' in the wa y they thought they had. By the same token, by failing t o analyse correctl y wha t the y wer e against , the y als o faile d t o express wha t constitute s a prope r empiricism , as the y under stood it . Thi s ha s bee n a perennia l proble m fo r empiricism . Hume though t on e coul d simpl y sa y tha t al l idea s ar e fade d impressions, then ha d t o admi t that we could hav e a n idea o f a shade we had neve r experienced , thereby admittin g a kind of a priori structur e in colour perception tha t his empiricism did not allow. And , i n th e twentiet h century , the failur e t o contriv e a

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plausible version of the verification principle i s another instance of th e sam e difficulty . In Berkeley' s case , th e unclarit y has it s roots i n a confusion about whethe r th e offendin g abstractnes s i s a featur e o f th e ideas a s psychological phenomena , o r whethe r it is a feature of their contents—tha t the y ar e idea s o f improperl y abstrac t con ceptions. The attac k o n Locke is an attack o n the former, for its burden is that there could not be an actual psychological episod e of th e kin d Lock e appear s t o sa y abstrac t idea s are . Further more, Berkele y explicitl y exonerates hi s opponents o f claiming to conceiv e of impossibl y abstract things , for h e says , at s . 7: 'It is agreed o n al l hands, that th e qualitie s or mode s o f things d o never really exist each o f them apart b y itself...' Thus it is only to the account of the conceiving that he objects, not to their idea of what is conceived of . This is the opposit e of what he requires if abstractio n i s t o b e th e sourc e o f ou r fals e conception s o f matter an d mind-independence , fo r thes e ar e th e content s o f conceptions, no t th e psychologica l vehicl e o f them . Equally , when he attacks those who believe numbers are objects for being deceived by abstraction, it is the object of the conception, not th e mode o f conceiving he i s calling abstract. An a t least partial resolutio n o f this problem ca n be foun d i n Berkeley's imagistic theory o f thought, accordin g t o which con cepts are just images and the image is or contains th e content of the concept . Th e imag e is , for Berkeley , identica l with ( a face t of) the thing it is an image of, so the distinction between conceiv ing an d it s objec t i s dissolved . I discus s i n sectio n (vii ) o f th e Introduction how the imagistic theory is supposed t o function in the argumen t for immaterialism, and what its weaknesses ar e as a theory o f concepts: and , in section (viii) , why, though a failur e as such a theory, it may not be so bad as a theory of certain kind s of conceptua l content . 7 Bu t n o sooner... comprehend: a classi c instanc e o f thi s i s th e first o f Descartes' s Meditations. It i s said... things: e.g . in Locke, Essay, i . i. 5; 4. 3. 6. 8 principles . . . philosophy: Jessop , i n his edition, says : 'The chief of the impugned principles are—tha t there ar e abstract "ideas" ; that "ideas" can be copies of what is by definition unperceivable ; that the corporeal exist s independently of any mental apprehen sion whatever ; tha t th e corporea l ha s causa l power , i.e . origi nates change; and that mind is, or would be if our knowin g were adequate, a n "idea" , i.e. an object o f the sam e genera l kind , on

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1

the sam e plane , a s th e object s o f sense . Ther e ar e derivativ e principles, suc h a s the untrustworthines s of the senses , an d th e infinite divisibility of matter.' This is a useful list, but it should be remembered tha t the error of abstraction is meant to underlie all the rest : see s . 6. 15 such a n idea: ther e ar e those , suc h a s Yolton , wh o den y tha t Locke's ideas are images and say that they are more like ideas in our intellectualis t sense . I t i s hard t o se e wha t i s the difficult y Locke ha s i n mind if it is not tha t o f forming thes e very strange images—the concep t o r definitio n o f a triangl e doe s no t see m attended wit h an y problem. 16 triangle: in C this section ende d here ; the remainde r was added in B . 19 'Tis .. . impracticable: This shows how odd is Berkeley's concep t of a n idea . What is a definitio n o f if not a n ide a o r concept ? If Berkeley were to reply that it is of the meanin g of a word, what notion are we to have of meaning that does not reintroduc e the problem? communicating. . . language: the doctrin e o f this paragraph ha s proved popula r with modern philosopher s wh o wish to empha size th e emotiv e meanin g o f word s an d Wittgensteinia n ap proaches t o 'meanin g a s use' , no t reference . Whethe r o r no t these approache s hav e an y meri t i n thei r ow n right , I d o no t think they are much help to Berkeley. He i s struggling with th e problem o f generality and this resides as much in emotive effec t or other kinds of standards of usage as it does in reference. (The concept of a rule, which involves generality, is much discussed in connection wit h Wittgenstein.) It i s no hel p to sa y that w e may be 'affected wit h the promise of a good thing, though we have no idea wha t i t is' , fo r w e mus t hav e th e concep t o f a good thing even if we have no picture o f what particular good it is: and i t is the concep t w e should be interested in. 22 many. .. words: fo r example , Hobbes , Leviathan, i. 4; Locke, Essay, 3 . 10 .

Parti

24 Part I : th e mai n tex t i s calle d 'Par t I ' becaus e Berkele y ha d intended t o write a second par t dealin g with the nature of spirit: indeed h e claims that he di d 'make considerable progress in it', but los t i t o n a journe y i n Ital y an d coul d no t b e bothere d rewriting it . I canno t believ e tha t Berkele y i s no t tellin g th e truth, but it is also almost impossible to believe that any interest-

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ing ideas he may have had o n spirit would not hav e found thei r way int o Alciphron, whic h concerns th e philosoph y of religion , or Siris' eccentri c metaphysical meditations. He was prepared t o rework th e Theory o f Vision int o th e Theory o f Vision Vindicated, an d th e Three Dialogues wer e compose d becaus e th e Principles ha d escaped notice . It is incredible that he should not have foun d some vehicl e fo r publishing an y ideas o n spirit wit h which he wa s at al l satisfied . In Berkeley's argumen t of ss. 1-5, the first two sections summarize hi s system, and fro m th e las t half sentence o f s. 2 to th e end o f s. 3 is a rather force d appeal t o intuitio n to suppor t tha t system. I n s . 4 h e ha s t o fac e th e fac t tha t i t i s a n 'opinio n strangely prevailing' that 'sensibl e objects have a n existence . .. distinct fro m thei r bein g perceive d . ..' Tha t ther e shoul d b e such a prevailing opinio n is particularly strang e a s it is based o n a 'manifes t contradiction' . He explain s it in s. 5 as the seductiv e power o f abstract ideas . It i s no t surprisin g tha t fe w wer e influence d b y Berkeley' s arguments o n reading the Principles. The blun t appea l t o intuition i s not convincing . I t doe s no t see m 'evident' , a s he claims , that th e 'idea s imprinte d o n sens e . .. cannot exis t otherwis e than i n a min d perceivin g them' , no r tha t th e existenc e o f th e table consists in the actua l an d possibl e experience s on e migh t have of it (though , of course, it s existence doe s imply th e availability o f such experiences) . An d th e argumen t tha t th e mind independence o f sensibl e qualitie s i s a manifes t contradictio n seems to rest on precisely that ambiguity in Locke's us e of 'idea' for whic h s o man y criticize d him . Th e wor d 'idea ' normall y means, roughly , 'thought' , an d thought s ar e mind-dependent , but 'idea ' as used by Locke to mean 'whatever is the object o f the understanding whe n a man thinks' , does not see m t o hav e thi s implication. Nor is it obvious, as he implies, that a sensory idea— that is , a sensory object —is th e sam e a s a sensation. The appea l t o th e dange r o f abstrac t idea s shows , however, that ther e i s a deepe r rational e t o Berkeley' s intuition . As th e last sentenc e o f s . 5 make s clear , a non-abstract—tha t is , a n imagistic—conception o f a n objec t wil l represent i t a s it would be if perceived fro m a certain perspective, s o that al l conceptio n is i n term s o f wha t a perceptio n woul d b e like . Thi s lin e o f argument is developed i n ss. 22-4. The Introduction, and ss. 1-5, ss. 22- 4 o f th e mai n tex t constitut e a mor e o r les s complet e argument. See Editor's Introduction, (vii ) and (viii).

Explanatory Notes: Principles 21

3

24 operations o f th e mind: some commentator s hav e been worrie d by the fac t tha t Berkeley doe s not believe that operations of the mind give rise to ideas, but onl y to notions, for activities canno t be caugh t i n th e 'stil l frame ' o f a n idea . The y are , however , objects o f huma n knowledg e an d idea s i n th e loos e sens e tha t Berkeley occasionall y allows . See ss . 27, 35-40, 14 2 for notions. 26 perception o f it : following this , A adds : 'In trut h the objec t an d the sensatio n ar e th e sam e thing , an d canno t therefor e b e ab stracted fro m eac h other. ' To b e convinced. . . perceived: this sentence exhibit s Berkeley' s imagism. Th e tas k on e i s aske d t o tr y t o perfor m canno t b e simply a verbal-conceptual one , for it is difficult t o see what on e would ther e b e tryin g to do , excep t formin g a straightforward sentence; the task is that of concentrating to see whether one can form a certain kin d of image. 27 there can be. . . ideas: again, this seems to rely on the ambiguity of th e ter m 'idea' . an idea can be like nothing bu t an idea: I discuss this maxim in the Editor's Introduction , sectio n vc . The glos s Berkeley her e gives it—'a colou r o r figur e ca n b e lik e nothin g bu t anothe r colou r or figure'—shows that i t ca n b e multipl y ambiguous. Th e glos s suggests th e innocuou s ' a qualit y ca n b e lik e nothin g bu t th e same kin d o f quality'. Then there i s the stronge r 'anythin g (or , perhaps, an y quality} whic h is an objec t o f a mental activit y can be lik e nothin g bu t somethin g whic h i s als o th e objec t o f a menta l activity' . Third, 'th e indubitabl y subjective content o f a menta l stat e (fo r example, a sensation) coul d b e lik e nothing that wa s not als o the subjectiv e content o f a mental state'. Th e first an d th e thir d o f thes e are , I think , uncontroversial , bu t the secon d i s what is required an d i t seems t o be g the questio n and/or cash in on the ambiguity of Locke's use of 'idea'. I suggest in the Editor' s Introduction , however, ways in which, by the us e of th e assimilation argument, on e coul d ge t fro m th e thir d t o the second . There i s a somewha t differen t ambiguit y in th e argumen t a t the end of s. 8. A colour qua quality could never be invisible, but it coul d b e invisibl e qu a havin g a certai n ontologica l location. Thus a red patch could be invisible because it qualified a n area of physical spac e an d no t a n are a o f a visua l field, but qu a re d i t would b e just like th e re d tha t qualifie s a visual field. Some there are: Locke, Essay, 2 . 8.

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28 extension . . . inconceivable: o n th e on e hand , thi s i s agai n a n appeal to imagism. O n the other hand, th e thought tha t matter cannot b e purely formal or geometrical an d mus t possess som e quality at least analogou s to a secondary qualit y is one tha t i t is difficult t o abandon . Se e Robinson , Matter an d Sense, ch. 7. great and small, swift and slow: it is natural to objec t tha t thes e are relative term s an d not objectiv e sizes . That there i s no suc h thing a s objective siz e ca n be go t fro m th e argumen t abou t th e mite i n th e firs t Dialogue (se e Editor' s Introduction , vi ) and , perhaps, fro m th e argument s in s. 1 2 and s . 13 that number an d unity ar e subjective , fo r thi s woul d mak e an y metri c fo r siz e subjective. materia prima: Aristotle, like most of the ancients , believed tha t there are four elements , earth , fire, air, and water, each elemen t possessing tw o qualities ; for example , fire is hot an d dry , earth hot an d wet , etc . H e als o believe d tha t thes e element s coul d transform int o eac h other , s o tha t i f its wetness wer e replace d by dryness , a portio n o f eart h woul d b e transforme d int o fire . Furthermore, h e believe d tha t whe n anythin g changed, some thing mus t underli e tha t chang e an d persis t throug h it . I n th e case of elemental chang e there is no more basic describable kin d of thing to underli e it, so what underlies elementa l chang e must be a bare , characterles s materiality , calle d 'prim e matter' . It canno t exis t o n it s ow n an d i s a pur e potentialit y fo r bein g some determinat e elemen t o r other . Som e scholar s no w den y that Aristotl e believe d i n prim e matter . Fo r th e tex t an d a thorough discussion , se e C . J. F . Williams' s translatio n o f an d commentary on De Generatione et Corruptione in the Clarendo n Aristotle series . 29 That number. .. respects: the argument is that, because countin g is concept-relative , the n ther e ar e n o objectiv e fact s abou t number. So , becaus e somethin g ma y b e on e wor d an d four letters it is neither on e no r fou r objectively . From thi s it would seem t o follo w that , i f th e individuatio n o f object s i s sortal relative (tha t is, kind- or concept-relative) the n the individuatio n of object s i s mind-dependent . If , i n Quine' s words , ther e i s 'no entit y withou t identity' , thi s woul d mak e thei r existenc e mind-dependent. Th e mov e fro m sortal-relativit y t o mind dependence woul d no t b e vali d i f ther e wer e natura l kind s in the world . Th e crucia l premis s i n Berkeley' s argumen t i s tha t there canno t b e natura l kind s / / ther e ar e alternativ e way s of individuating—something canno t naturall y b e bot h on e word

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5

and four letters, for i t canno t b e bot h on e an d four . This raises the kin d o f issue s discusse d in , fo r example , Davi d Wiggins , Sameness and Substance. Unity. . . mind: Locke say s this at Essay, 2 . 7. 7; 2. 16 . i . 30 Though i t must be confessed... object: th e argumen t in s. 1 4 has two parts. First, it says that the argumen t from illusio n is just as applicable t o primary qualitie s as to secondary . Secon d i t take s that argumen t as showing that the qualities to which it is applied 'have n o existenc e i n matter , o r withou t th e mind' . Th e firs t claim is correct, th e secon d copie s a mistake of Locke's (Essay, 2. 8 . 21) . Th e argumen t fro m illusio n onl y show s tha t those instances of th e quality o f which w e are directly aware exist only in th e mind , no t tha t ther e ar e n o othe r instance s outsid e th e mind. Lock e is , therefore, wron g t o us e th e argumen t t o sho w that secondary qualitie s are essentially subjective. In the middle of s . 15, Berkeley more o r les s recognizes this point, and ha s t o fall bac k o n previou s arguments . // is said: Locke , Essay, 2 . 8. 19 ; 2. 23. 2; 1.4. 8. 31 how. .. to know this?: ss. 18-20 state the epistemologica l argument against an external world. Once it is agreed tha t we are no t directly awar e o f such a world, then belie f i n it cannot b e justified from perception . S o it mus t b e fro m reason , bu t th e poss ibility o f tota l hallucinatio n show s tha t ther e i s n o necessar y connection whic h coul d form th e foundatio n of such reasoning . In s. 19, however, Berkeley considers what we would now call an argument t o the best explanation fo r positing a world. He ha s n o objection to this as a kind of argument but thinks it will not do in this context . H e doe s no t argue , a s h e doe s i n s . 25 , that th e physical worl d woul d b e a useles s suppositio n because , a s nothing bu t a wil l ca n reall y caus e anything , a physica l worl d could not be the explanatio n o f our experience. Hi s argument is more sophisticate d an d does not depend o n the doctrine tha t all causation i s will. It rests on the fac t tha t it appears wholly unintelligible why bodies shoul d give rise specificall y t o experience , even if they are causally active with respect to each other . I t has been remarked, a t least from Locke, that there is no way that the production of conscious states can be made intelligible from th e perspective o f physical science. Most o f the strategie s fo r doin g so ar e reductionist , suc h a s behaviouris m an d functionalism , and, i n th e vie w o f mos t othe r philosophers , simpl y den y th e reality o f consciousness . 33 sa y somewhat o f them: this is done, ss . 85-134.

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33 nobody b y to perceive them: resumption of the strateg y from s . 5. Notice the extremely psychologistic conception o f conceivability in s . 22 and s . 24. The argumen t in s . 23 is extensively discussed in the Editor' s Introduction. To se e s. 23 as a development o f s. 5, see Peacocke, i n Foster an d Robinso n (eds.) . H e argue s tha t all imaginin g is a s fro m a viewpoin t an d tha t i t is , therefore , problematic whethe r on e ca n for m a n empirica l conceptio n of ho w th e objec t i s i n itself, independentl y o f al l perceptua l perspectives. 34 n o such thing contained i n them: it is more plausibl e to sa y that visual ideas do not includ e power tha n tha t tactil e ones d o not. 35 Though i t must. . . words: th e las t sentenc e o f thi s section wa s inserted onl y in B . 36 enables us . . . benefit o f life: thi s is a point at which Berkeley ca n be seen no t to have been awar e of a major proble m fo r idealism or phenomenalism. Th e laws of nature are stated i n terms of the behaviour o f physical objects an d events not i n terms o f ideas. I t is the fundamenta l principl e o f analytica l phenomenalis m tha t statements abou t th e forme r ca n b e analyse d int o statement s about th e latter . If this were possibl e the n i t would be possibl e to reinterpre t th e law s o f natur e a s bein g abou t ideas . I f th e analysis wer e impossibl e the n on e woul d hav e t o accep t tha t physical concepts wer e basi c t o natura l laws , even i f the thing s they applied to were nothing more than collections of ideas. This marks a majo r distinctio n o f type s o f idealism . A s a matte r of fact, the attemp t t o analyse physical concepts in terms of ideas is generally agree d t o hav e bee n unsuccessful . Tha t w e canno t eliminate o r analys e our physica l concepts i s a major feature of Kantian idealism . 40 things rather than ideas: followin g naturally fro m th e previou s note, we can say that Berkeley fails to notice the need for a more developed accoun t o f wha t make s a se t o f idea s int o a physical thing, and, hence, fails to notice th e problems i n such a construction. 43 continual creation: the doctrin e o f continuou s creatio n i s th e orthodox doctrine . Fo r example , S t Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologiae, pt. I , q. 104 , art. i . 44 infinite an d shapeless: thi s is an interestin g reductio o n th e con cept o f matter. I t coul d be reconstructe d a s follows: i. Matter , i f physically real, is infinitely divisible .

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2. An y rea l featur e o f a physica l o r empirica l realit y i s rep resentable i n perception . 3. An y perceptua l representatio n ha s finite extent (i.e . i s not infinitely small) . Therefor e 4. An y rea l featur e o f a physica l o r empirica l realit y i s of positive finite extent. Therefor e 5. An y piec e of matter, if physically real, consists of an infinit e number o f finitely large pieces . 6. Anythin g infinit e i s formles s (fo r t o hav e for m i s t o b e bounded, whic h contradicts infinity). Therefor e 7. Al l pieces o f matter ar e infinit e an d formless. I suppos e th e argumen t ca n b e avoide d i f on e distinguishe s between bein g empiricall y infinitel y divisible , s o ther e ar e a n infinity o f actua l physica l parts , an d bein g mathematicall y s o divisible, a s i s an y continuum . Th e part s o f th e forme r would have t o b e empiricall y rea l an d so , perhaps , i n principl e per ceptible b y som e possibl e sense : bu t th e part s o f a continuu m are mer e point s an d no t rea l i n the sam e sense , and , certainly, not necessaril y perceptibl e b y anything. In fact, in a way similar to Zeno's paradoxes, Berkele y i s trying to generate a boundles s infinite ou t o f the delimite d infinit e o f the continuum . 45 think with th e learned, and speak with th e vulgar: Jesso p notes that thi s ta g i s quoted b y Baco n i n D e Augmentis Scientiamm (5. 4 ) an d i s fro m th e sixteenth-centur y Italian , Augustinu s Niphus. 46 schoolmen. .. modern philosophers: amongs t th e medievals , Jessop cite s Thoma s Bradwardin e (€.1290-1349) , Nichola s d'Autrecourt (fourteent h cent.) , an d Algaze l (1059-1111 ) a s having hel d doctrine s lik e this . Amongs t th e moderns , Descartes, Principia i . 28 ; Malebranche , Recherche, 6 . 2 . 3 ; Samuel Clarke , Discourse o n th e Being and Attributes o f God. 53 i n whom w e live, move, and have ou r being: Acts 17 : 28. 54 unknown occasion. . . will o f God: a n occasion , i n thi s sense , is contraste d wit h a cause . Som e Cartesians—fo r example , Malebranche—believed that mind and matter could not interact, so Go d produce d th e appropriat e 'interactive ' effect s directly . The stat e of the materia l world (presumabl y of the brain ) being the occasion fo r Hi s actin g directl y o n mind , an d th e stat e o f a min d (fo r example , a n ac t o f will ) bein g th e occasion o f his acting directly on the brain to produce th e willed behaviour.

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59 Some there are: Jesso p cite s Malebranche , Entretiens su r l a metaphysique, an d Bayle, Dictionaire historique, s.v. 'Zenon', n. H, an d s.v . Thyrron', n. B. 62 archetypes: prototype s o r model s fo r othe r derivativ e instance s or copies . 63 that of other spirits b y reason: Berkeley's system only overcomes scepticism i f we have ground s for believin g in th e idea s ha d b y others an d no t ourselves . The victi m of a Cartesian evi l demon , or th e 'brai n i n a vat' bein g fe d coheren t hallucinator y experi ences by the wicked scientist, can be sure of the existence of their own ideas, but are wrong in believing that they are part of a real, intersubjective world. This comes down to the problem o f other minds, for, if the other bodies we seem to experience d o have the appropriate experience s associate d wit h them , a s w e assum e they do, then the world is, by Berkelian standards , a real one. As God i s directly responsible fo r ou r perception s o f other bodie s there i s no causa l necessity fo r ther e t o b e othe r huma n minds associated wit h them. Everythin g then turn s on havin g a proo f that th e spiri t who causes our experience s i s not, in this respect , a deceiver . I t i s fai r t o sa y tha t Berkele y doe s no t giv e thi s problem th e attentio n i t deserves , talkin g a s if , onc e h e ha s argued tha t ou r experience s mus t b e cause d b y God , h e ha s solved al l difficulties. H e doe s no t recogniz e th e independenc e of th e proble m o f other minds . See als o note o n s . 147. 64 must b e in another mind: thi s is not strictl y consistent wit h th e doctrine o f s . 3 , whic h allow s a hypothetica l existenc e t o unperceived objects . Th e fac t tha t everythin g exist s i n God' s mind ha s le d som e scholar s t o distinguis h betwee n idealism, according to which objects are made up solely of actual ideas and are guarantee d thei r permanen t existenc e b y their permanen t presence, i n archetypa l form , i n God's mind : an d phenomenalism, according t o whic h object s consist o f actual idea s an d th e truth o f counterfactual s abou t wha t experience s peopl e would have o r would have ha d unde r appropriat e circumstances . Th e question the n arise s whethe r Berkele y wa s a n idealist , i n thi s strict sense , o r a phenomenalist wh o held tha t Go d guarantee d the trut h o f th e counterfactuals ; o r whethe r h e inconsistentl y oscillated between th e two . This question i s nicely dealt with by Urmson in his Berkeley. H e argues that there is no inconsistency in th e text , an d tha t Berkeley' s idealis m i s a for m o f theisti c phenomenalism. Indeed, it is not clear why the archetypa l existence o f the idea s in the mind of God nee d b e differen t fro m Hi s

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possessing the appropriat e intention s wit h respect t o Hi s crea tures' experiences . 65 uncreated an d coeternal: th e eternit y o f matte r wa s th e mos t common vie w amongs t th e Greeks , becaus e the y foun d th e notion o f creatio n fro m nothin g unintelligible . Fo r example , Aristotle, De Caelo, 2. i, 283*26 ff. Mind. . . sustains all things: Berkeley never gives attention to the obvious possibility of a pagan Berkelianism , according to which different spirit s migh t b e responsibl e fo r providin g th e experi ences associate d wit h different objects . The sun could then have its ow n spiri t whic h provide s u s wit h ou r sun-appropriat e ex periences: i n general, different part s o f nature woul d have their ruling spirit. This was the kind of Berkelianism supported b y the more romanticall y Irish Yeats . 66 Socinians: early Unitarians , denying th e Trinit y an d the divinit y of Jesus . 67 Time . .. succession of ideas in our minds: in his second lette r t o Johnson, Berkele y say s that th e successio n o f ideas constitutes time an d i s no t simpl y it s metric . Issue s connecte d wit h time , space, th e continuum, or infinity ar e among the most intractable in philosophy . On e proble m wit h Berkeley' s theor y i s tha t i t would see m t o b e necessar y tha t th e individua l idea s whos e succession makes up time must themselves have duration or less than a n infinit e numbe r o f the m coul d no t posses s tempora l extent. Time cannot , therefore consist in the successio n o f ideas for they must possess it individually. The natural response i s that the individua l idea s posses s th e minima l discernibl e tim e inter val, like the minima visibilia that are supposed t o make up space. The difficult y wit h this is that i t is hard t o thin k o f any positiv e extent o r duratio n withou t i t makin g sens e t o thin k tha t ther e must be withi n it a half o f that exten t o r duration . the soul always thinks: Descarte s believe d tha t th e sou l always thinks. H e neede d thi s becaus e o f hi s vie w that consciousnes s (i.e. thought) i s the essenc e o f mind, so it can never lac k it. See his 'Respons e t o th e Fift h Se t o f Objections' . Berkele y ha d added t o this section in manuscript th e following Sure I am that shou' d anyon e tel l me there i s a time wherei n a spiri t actuall y exists withou t perceiving , o r a n idea withou t being perceiv'd, or that there is a 3rd sort of being which exists tho i t neithe r will s nor perceive s no r i s perceived, hi s words would have no other effec t o n my mind than if he talk'd in an

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unknown language . Tis indeed a n easi e matte r fo r a ma n t o say th e min d exist s withou t thinking , bu t t o conceiv e a meaning that , may correspond t o thos e sounds , o r to fram e a notion o f a spirit's existenc e abstracte d fro m it s thinking, this seems to me impossible, an d I suspect that eve n they who are the stiffes t abetter s o f tha t tenen t migh t abat e somewha t of their firmness wou'd the y but lay aside the word s an d calml y attending to their ow n thoughts examine what they meant by them. 68 a man t o be happy o r an object good: the argumen t of this section is that i f there ar e n o abstrac t ideas , the n ther e i s no rol e fo r conceptual analysis. This is, at least, a natural conclusion: notice that th e example s give n o f happiness , goodness , justice , an d virtue ar e typica l o f th e thing s tha t Plat o trie s t o define . Presumably Platoni c form s ar e paradigm s o f abstrac t ideas . Berkeley argue s that , wit h hi s ontology , t o striv e t o provid e necessary an d sufficien t condition s for th e applicatio n o f a concept, when we know perfectly well in practice how to apply it, is pure pedantry . O n th e othe r hand , i t i s unclear wh y a prope r definition o f general ideas, as he conceives of them, is not just as necessary a s for genera l idea s conceived o f as abstract . 69 bu t o f late... insensible particles: se e Locke' s real essences', Essay, 3 . 3 . 1 5 ff. 70 some ar e . .. for pronouncing universal: in this and the followin g section Berkele y doe s no t merel y reject a realist interpretatio n of scienc e bu t doubt s th e existenc e o f exceptionles s scientifi c laws, eve n i n th e operationa l sense . I n som e ways , his vie w of natural la w i s Aristotelian—thing s happe n 'usuall y o r fo r th e most part' rather than universally. His belief in the irreducibility of teleologica l explanatio n i s als o Aristotelian . Thi s 'reaction ary' aspec t o f Berkeley's philosoph y o f scienc e i s developed a t length in Siris. 71 Those men: this section in A begins : Tt appears fro m sectio n 66, etc. tha t th e steady , consistent methode s o f nature, may not b e unfitly style d th e language of its Author, whereby h e discover s his attributes t o ou r view , an d direct s u s ho w t o ac t fo r th e convenience and felicit y o f life. An d t o me , those me n .. .' 72 Th e best key . .. admired treatise: A ha s instead, 'The best grammar o f the kin d we are speakin g of, will easily be acknowledged to b e a treatis e o f mechanics , demonstrate d an d applie d t o nature, by a philosopher o f a neighbouring nation whom all the

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world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks, on the performance o f that extraordinar y person : only some thing s h e has advanced, so directly opposite t o the doctrin e w e have hitherto lai d down, that we should b e wanting, in the regar d du e t o the authorit y of so great a man, did we not tak e som e notic e of them. I n th e entranc e o f tha t justl y admire d treatis e . ..' Th e treatise referre d t o her e an d i n B i s Newton' s Principia. Berkeley discusse s the topic s o f these section s more full y i n D e Motu. Th e referenc e i n A t o Newto n a s a philosophe r 'o f a neighbouring nation ' i s ofte n cite d a s evidenc e tha t Berkele y thought o f himsel f a s Irish . B y contrast , when , slightl y ove r a century later , th e Duk e o f Wellingto n wa s aske d whethe r he , being born i n Ireland, of Anglo-Irish family, considere d himself Irish, replied 'no t everythin g born in a stable is a horse'. 75 experiment: th e 'bucke t experiment ' i s on e o f tw o though t ex periments tha t Newto n employe d t o sho w that spac e wa s absolute no t relative . Imagin e a bucke t containin g wate r an d suspended b y a rope . No w imagin e th e bucke t spinning—sa y turning it until the rope becomes tens e an d letting it go. At first the bucket will turn leaving the water stationary, but, as a result of friction, th e wate r will start to turn with th e bucket , until it is fully turning with the bucket an d so stationary wit h respect to it. Centrifugal forc e wil l make the water higher at the edge , wit h a trough i n the middle . No w suppose tha t th e bucke t i s the onl y thing in the physical universe. It will not be spinning with respect to anything , but, a s the stat e o f the wate r shows , it is spinning. Hence it is moving through absolute , no t relative , space. I n th e other thought experimen t w e imagine tw o metal spheres joined by a tau t rope . I f th e sphere s begi n t o spi n roun d eac h othe r tension increase s in th e rope . I f the y ar e alon e i n the physica l universe, they ar e no t movin g with respect t o anything , yet th e increased tensio n show s the y ar e moving , hence they , too , ar e moving in absolute space . As fa r a s I a m aware , no on e ha s answere d thes e argument s satisfactorily. Mac h claime d tha t w e d o no t kno w tha t thes e phenomena would occur in an otherwise empt y universe, but as neither th e centrifuga l forc e no r th e tensio n ar e cause d b y th e gravitational pul l of other bodies, the assumptio n i s reasonable. Berkeley's answe r seem s unsatisfactory , for h e denie s tha t th e water i s movin g an d so , presumably , believes it s surfac e mus t remain flat in any world where nothing else exists. This i s probably not the line he should have taken, for the experiment can be

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turned t o hi s advantage , b y usin g i t t o sho w tha t ther e i s n o adequate accoun t o f autonomou s physica l space . Th e experi ments show that the relational view is defective and the standard objections sho w tha t absolut e spac e i s impossible . Physica l theory seem s t o require tha t th e bucke t shoul d spin. If space is not absolute then the idea of its spinning cannot be explained by reference t o its relationship t o othe r possible objects , for to say that i t would be movin g relative t o something a t p presuppose s an independent identit y of that point. The notion o f the rotatio n of a single object round its own axis makes clear sense in a visual or phenomenal field. So, without absolute space , onl y by reference t o what it would be experientially like can the phenomen a Newton cite s mak e sense . / / absolut e spac e i s a defective conception the n spac e mus t b e a construct fro m experience . ( I am grateful t o m y colleagu e Barr y Dainto n fo r explainin g th e experiments.) 76 dilemma t o which several .. . employed their thoughts: i n entr y 298 o f th e Philosophical Commentaries Berkele y say s tha t Locke, More , and Raphson 'see m to make Go d extended'. 77 difficiles nugae: Latin fo r 'difficul t trivialities' . 79 T o study them for their own sake: the questio n o f whether numbers need t o be treated a s entities in their ow n right—Platonism about numbers—i s stil l a ver y liv e issue . Practisin g mathema ticians are ofte n Platonists , Godel being a striking example. Fo r a moder n defenc e o f realism , se e Bo b Hale , Abstract Objects (Oxford: Blackwell , 1987) . Berkeley' s positio n seem s t o b e a mixture o f extrem e nominalism , whic h turns number s int o nu merals, an d th e reductio n o f numbers t o sets , s o that 'five' , fo r example, stands for any group of five things. The forme r theor y is wholly incapable o f dealing with the necessity of mathematical truth, for signs are ruled only by convention, or, derivatively, by the laws of nature which govern the thing s they are signs of, but arithmetical truth s are no t contingen t i n either o f these ways. 82 n o such thing a s the ten-thousandth part o f a n inch: Berkeley' s argument her e show s that h e ha s not properl y worke d ou t th e difference betwee n the physical and the phenomenal. Th e use of microscopes an d othe r instrument s gives a perfectly good sens e to th e notio n o f a ten-thousandt h o f a n inc h a s a par t o f th e physical world. The 'idea ' tha t represents tha t siz e when some one views through a microscope wil l not b e one ten-thousandt h the siz e of the 'idea ' he has when viewing an inch-long object in a norma l way . There ma y b e n o sens e t o th e ide a o f one ten -

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thousandth o f a visual field. One respons e to this problem i s to deny that th e microscopic i s a real part o f the physica l world. It exists only as a theoretical devic e for prediction an d explanation . It i s difficul t t o reconcil e thi s wit h th e fac t tha t magnification comes in degrees an d Berkeley woul d not wan t to say that what is seen throug h an ordinary magnifying glas s is unreal. The only consistent positio n i s to treat th e physica l ontology, bot h a t th e ordinary an d scientifi c levels , as a necessary mod e o f interpret ing experience , whic h interpretation ha s a conceptual structur e of it s own , no t necessaril y intelligibl e directl y i n term s o f th e properties o f ideas. This, of course, would be difficul t t o fit with everything Berkeley say s about abstraction . 84 i t being impossible: followin g this , A als o has : 'An d whateve r mathematicians may think of fluxions or the differentia l calculu s and the like, a little reflection will show them, that in working by these methods, they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what ar e perceivabl e t o sense . The y may , indeed, cal l those littl e an d almos t insensibl e quantitie s infinitesimal s o r infinitesimals o f infinitesimals, if they please: bu t a t botto m thi s is all, they being in truth finite, nor does the solution of problems require th e supposin g an y other . Bu t thi s wil l b e mos t clearl y made ou t hereafter. ' 87 w e understand th e meaning o f th e word', this criterion o f mean ingfulness, namel y tha t w e tak e ourselve s t o understan d th e words, is too libera l fo r Berkeley' s othe r purposes , a s it would allow in most abstractions . It must not. . . \ A start s les s abruptly: The natura l immortality of the sou l is a necessary consequence o f the foregoin g doctrine. But befor e w e attempt t o prove this , it is fit that w e explain th e meaning o f that tenet . I t mus t no t 88 w e ma y not. . . verbal concern: thi s secon d hal f o f s . 14 2 wa s added i n B. 89 retire. .. meaning: in A, instead o f 'retire' t o the end , ther e is: 'depart from som e received prejudices and modes of speech, an d retiring into themselves attentivel y consider their ow n meaning. But th e difficultie s arisin g o n this head deman d a more particular disquisition , than suits the design s of this treatise.' 90 wh o works al l in all: I Corinthian s 12 : 6 by whom all things consist: Colossians i : 17 .

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90 other persons: this reinforces the point made in the note to page 64. Berkele y take s th e evidenc e fo r othe r huma n mind s a s unproblematic even though such minds are not directl y responsible fo r the idea s we perceive o f their bodies . upholding al l things by. . . his Power: Hebrews 1:3 . 94 Manichean heresy: to which St Augustine subscribe d befor e hi s conversion to Catholi c orthodoxy. It held that there wa s an evil god a s wel l a s a goo d one . I t wa s partl y reactio n agains t thi s heresy that led Augustine to emphasize that evil has no positive existence an d i s a mere absence o f good. THREE D I A L O G U E S

In A an d B the subtitl e reads: The desig n of which is plainly to demonstrate th e realit y an d perfectio n o f huma n knowledge , the incorporea l natur e o f th e soul , an d th e immediat e provi dence of a Deity: in opposition to sceptics and atheists. Also, t o open a method for rendering the sciences more easy, useful, an d compendious.' The Three Dialogues were written because the Principles had failed t o mak e a n impact . There is , therefore, a similarit y between Berkeley's reasons fo r writin g them an d Hume' s fo r following u p hi s Treatise wit h th e Enquiries. I n bot h case s th e author had not taken enough care in the original work to present shocking doctrin e in the mos t digestibl e form. The argumen t of the Principles had reste d to o muc h o n th e essentiall y obscur e attack on abstract ideas. The Dialogues begins from issue s in the philosophy o f perceptio n wit h which hi s readers wer e familia r and whic h seeme d intuitivel y easy t o understand . Th e overal l structure o f the argumen t can be represente d a s follows . 1. Al l sensibl e qualities, both primary and secondary , exist as ideas—that is, in the mind . 2. Nothin g can be lik e an idea but a n idea. Therefor e 3. Al l sensibl e qualities , bot h primar y an d secondary , exis t only i n the mind . There ar e the n variou s arguments , mainly in th e Second Dialogue, to show that conceptions o f matter that try to do without imputing sensible qualities to it, are vacuous. The argument fo r (i) divides int o two parts; first a proof tha t secondary qualitie s exis t a s ideas , the n th e sam e fo r primar y qualities. This argument, however, takes place under the shadow

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5

of a confusion , namel y that provin g that a qualit y exists in th e mind show s tha t i t exist s i n tha t for m only . Se e not e o n s . 1 5 of th e Principles. A s the y ar e originall y presented , therefore , the argument s fo r (i ) ar e take n t o b e argument s fo r (3) , fro m which (i ) is not though t to differ . I t is when Hylas realizes tha t refuting nai'v e realis m is not equivalen t to refutin g representa tive realism that Philonous is obliged to employ (2 ) to complet e the argument . The for m o f representative realis m that Philonous i s trying to controvert a t tha t stag e i s not Lockea n representativ e realism , but on e tha t hold s tha t th e externa l worl d possesse s bot h pri mary an d secondar y qualitie s (that is , (20) no t (2b) o f my Edi tor's Introduction) fo r the distinction i n status between primary and secondar y qualitie s ha s alread y bee n attacked . Th e subargument which does thi s is 1. Secondar y qualities do not/canno t exis t outsid e th e mind . 2. Primar y qualities cannot be conceived to exist without sec ondary qualities . Therefor e 3. Neithe r primar y no r secondar y qualitie s exis t outsid e th e mind. The secon d premis s o f the secon d argumen t i s less general an d less important t o Berkeley' s syste m than th e secon d premis s of the first. 103 Th e Preface: thi s was omitte d fro m C .

First Dialogue 107 Philonous: fro m th e Greek , meaning 'love r of mind'. Hylas: fro m th e Greek , meanin g 'matter' . 109 m y denial... your affirmation: th e scepticis m o f th e ancien t sceptics, such as Pyrrho (c.^6^-c.2j^ BC), was founded on the belief tha t ever y reaso n fo r believin g a propositio n coul d b e matched by an equally good one for not believin g it. So one was supposed t o suspen d belie f an d thi s detachmen t fro m carin g about th e trut h wa s meant t o brin g peace o f mind. The discus sion here follow s the move to a more moder n sens e of the term , in which scepticism i s doubting o r denying th e realit y of funda mental objects of belief, such as God o r the externa l world. The thought tha t scepticis m i s engendere d b y th e wa y ou r sense contents stan d a s a 'veil of perception' between th e subjec t and the worl d is modern no t classical .

226 Explanatory

Notes: Dialogues

112 Bu t i s not.. . heat... pain?: Berkele y her e use s wha t I call , in the Editor' s Introduction , th e assimilation argument agains t a naive realist theor y o f the perceptio n o f heat. 1. Grea t heat is identical to pain . 2. Pai n is mind-dependent: it is not possibl e for an unperceiving thing to have pain. 3. Materia l substanc e is not a perceiving thing. Therefore 4. Materia l substance is not a subject of pain. Therefor e 5. Materia l substance is not a subject of heat. To avoi d th e conclusio n Hyla s decide s tha t grea t hea t cause s pain but i s not identical with it. Philonous' repl y is that as, when being burnt , we have one , painful , sensation , th e pai n an d th e heat mus t be on e idea. He probabl y should have said that the y are features of one and the same idea, like the shape and colou r of a visual datum, which ca n b e discerne d b y selective attention (see m y Editor's Introductio n (vii)) . The n whe n Hyla s argue s that ver y moderat e hea t ha s neithe r pai n no r pleasur e wit h it, Philonous could have replied that if a feature F is ever a feature of a kin d o f ide a whic h possesse s anothe r featur e G whic h is essentially mind-dependent then any idea of which F is a feature will be mind-dependent: an idea cannot move in and out of being mind-dependent a s it acquires other features. Instead, Philonous resorts t o th e argumen t from illusio n to clinc h th e cas e agains t heat. Thi s sam e strategy— assimilation followe d b y illusion—is used agains t naive realis m about tast e an d smell . 118 a s to sounds: the strateg y against sound is entirely different fro m those used so far; it is the causal argument against naive realism. Hylas' respons e involve s th e firs t us e i n th e dialogu e o f th e primary-secondary qualit y distinction in th e manne r o f Lock e and contemporar y science . Th e experimen t wit h th e bel l i n a near-vacuum wa s performed b y Ott o vo n Guerick e (1602-86) , who was also the invento r of the air-pump . 120 th e case o f colours: th e strateg y agains t colou r i s the argumen t from illusion , putting most stres s o n th e generatio n o f 'unreal ' colours, like the illusory purple of mountains and blue of the sky, and the difference s o f colour unde r microscopic perception. H e cites the ordinar y variations of perceptible colou r o f objects in passing. Newton's experiment s with prisms and ligh t ha d take n place abou t fifty years before Berkeley wrote th e Dialogues. 126 I s i t your opinion. . . ? I t is : thi s i s a ver y strang e view—o r appears t o be . Hyla s appear s t o agre e tha t th e very same in stances o f shap e a s thos e w e se e ar e i n th e externa l world ,

Explanatory Notes: Dialogues 22

7

though no t th e sam e instance s o f colour ; thoug h th e shape s are, i t woul d seem , nothin g bu t th e outline s o f th e colours . I discuss thi s i n th e Editor' s Introductio n (iv) . Thi s vie w is no t simply strange in itself, but i t is odd that it should be mentione d in this context , where Hyla s ha s just referred t o contemporar y philosophers, wh o propounde d no t thi s primary quality direct realism, bu t Lockean representative realism. Perhap s b y 'ver y figure an d extension ' Berkele y doe s no t mea n ver y sam e in stance, but specifically jus t like: the contras t i s with the sugges tion soo n t o follo w tha t object s posses s extensio n wit h n o specific magnitude (or, presumably, form). The argumen t based on th e differenc e i n perception betwee n mite s an d me n which follows ca n be interpreted (a s I do in the Editor's Introduction ) as a n argumen t agains t th e possibilit y of extensio n existin g as real an d unperceived : bu t Philonou s compare s i t t o th e argu ment use d t o sho w tha t w e do no t perceiv e hea t directly . This suggests tha t th e 'mite ' argumen t i s against a direc t realis t ac count o f th e perceptio n o f shape , whic h requires tha t Hyla s is propounding primar y qualit y direc t realism . Mos t probably , there i s confusio n bein g caused—onc e again—b y th e uncer tainty about what the argumen t from illusio n proves. If Hylas is following Locke' s apparen t principl e that an y proof tha t w e do not perceive a given quality directly is ipso facto a proof that that quality does not exist outside the mind, then the hypothesis that primary qualities exist outsid e th e min d will entail that we perceive the m directly . Given tha t i t has already been prove d tha t we d o no t perceiv e secondar y qualitie s directly, this is primary quality direct realism. 127 mite\ I discuss the 'mite ' argumen t in the Editor' s Introductio n (vi). 128 Odd. . . oddness: thi s was th e exten t o f thi s speec h i n th e firs t two editions , the res t wa s added i n C. 129 time measured. . . in our minds?: se e discussio n of time in Principles, s . 98. 132 Le t me think.. . / do not find that I can: this remark and some in the preceding passage only make sense if 'frame th e idea' means 'form a n image': it is difficult t o see what the proble m would be in thinking the concept s in any other sense . 133 distinguish th e object from th e sensation: this an d th e followin g argument concernin g substratu m ar e discusse d i n th e Editor' s Introduction, sect. (\b)

228 Explanatory

Notes: Dialogues

139 a contradiction . . . conceiving a thing which is unconceived?: se e Introduction (v ) and th e secon d not e o n Principles, p. 33. 141 the . . . object you . . . perceive, exists a t a distance: this i s deal t with in greater detai l in Essay Towards a New Theory o f Vision and Theory o f Vision Vindicated. 143 ideas d o no t exist without th e mind. . . objects do : it i s from thi s point tha t th e discussio n i s directed unequivocall y against rep resentative realism , though agains t the for m tha t allows secondary qualities to be possessed b y matter. He has three argument s against, two of them serious and one extremely weak. The first is epistemological—that w e could no t com e t o kno w of the exist ence of an external world. This is discussed more satisfactorily at Principles, ss. 18-20. The secon d i s the wea k claim , 'things perpetually fleeting and variable a s our idea s [coul d not be ] copie s or image s o f any thing fixed or constant' . The thir d i s the prin ciple tha t 'a n ide a ca n b e lik e nothin g bu t a n idea' , whic h i s discussed a t length i n the Editor' s Introduction, s . (vc).

Second Dialogue 152 infinite omnipresent spirit who .. . supports it : see second note on the Principles, p. 65. See als o note on Principles, p. 64. 153 Vanini, Hobbes, an d Spinoza'- tha t Hobbes , famou s fo r th e Leviathan, was a materialis t is uncontroversial . Spinoza , i n hi s Ethics, identifie s the worl d wit h God , becaus e i t i s a necessar y being. I t i s a permanent matte r o f controversy whether h e was a materialis t wh o calle d th e physica l worl d 'God ' o r whethe r he reall y believed tha t th e worl d a s a whole was both physical and conscious . Vanin i wa s an Italia n pries t burne d fo r atheis m in 1606 . to allow it a real existence?: Berkeley's point remains a good one . Naturalistic explanation s o f th e orde r i n th e world—fo r example, the Darwinia n explanation o f order in living creatures that Butle r an d Pale y cite d i n thei r natura l theology—ca n overturn the traditional arguments, but not Berkeley's; for, without matter , ther e coul d no t b e a naturalisti c explanatio n o f the world. 154 a notion entertained b y some eminent moderns: thi s i s Malebranche's view . 155 Fe w men think... It must be owned: this pan o f the speec h was added i n C . 160 occasion: see th e not e o n Principles, p. 54.

Explanatory Notes: Dialogues 22

9

163 something entirely unknown: th e concept s o f matte r discusse d from her e to th e end , which deny it all positive know n features and put i t outside space an d time , can be compared wit h Kant' s noumenon', i t i s a n utterl y unknowable , non-menta l place holder. 164 I do not find that I can: another instanc e in which the peculiarity of Hylas' efforts to think sugges t tha t th e idea s mus t be images .

Third Dialogue 171 external existence, wherein . .. reality consists: this is another instance, like that discusse d at Principles, p. 36, where Berkeley is unaware o f th e degre e o f autonom y o f physica l concepts . I f Putnam, Kripke , an d othe r moder n philosopher s ar e correct , natural-kind substanc e names—suc h a s 'water' , 'salt' , 'tiger' — operate b y designating the real essences or scientific structure of the kind s of things in question; they do not hav e a proper nominal essence, or determinat e verba l definition . (For thes e terms , see Locke's Essay, 3.6.) The internal structures are not known by ordinary perception. Al l this could be tru e o f our physica l concepts even if internal structures had a purely theoretical or hypothetical existence , a s a n idealis t o r phenomenalis t requires . Berkeley talk s a s if it were no t par t o f ou r ordinar y concept o f the physica l tha t i t possesse d propertie s tha t ar e hidde n fro m normal perceptio n an d ar e essentia l t o it . He doe s no t nee d t o claim this—though an y empiricis t will insis t that th e conten t of any microscopi c descriptio n wil l b e constraine d by , an d give n sense by , its relation t o experience . None o f this has a very direct connection wit h scepticism. For this, se e note o n Principles, p. 63. The discussio n moves rather uneasily between knowin g the real nature of things and knowing whether the y exis t a t all . 173 might a s well doubt o f m y ow n being: se e Principles, ibid . Berkeley doe s nee d a proof o f the goodnes s o f Go d befor e h e can overcom e scepticis m o f the 'evi l demon ' o r 'brai n i n a vat' kind. Laws o f Nature: a t Principles, s . 3 0 Berkele y ha d sai d tha t the law s o f natur e gover n th e orderin g o f ideas an d her e i t i s physical things. For why this makes a difference, see note on that passage (p . 36). 176 perceive both colours an d sounds: th e theor y tha t th e sel f i s merely a collectio n o f idea s wa s defende d b y Hume , bu t h e never seemed to get to grips with the point Berkeley makes here.

230 Explanatory

Notes: Dialogues

No 'bundl e theorist ' ha s eve r satisfactoril y explaine d th e re lation between th e content s of the differen t sense s and facultie s that constitutes their being experienced a s belonging to the same subject. A s thi s 'unit y o f apperception ' (i n Kant' s phrase ) ha d been remarke d o n b y Aristotle (D e Anima, 425 bi2) a s well as used explicitl y b y Berkele y t o rejec t th e bundl e theory , i t i s strange tha t i t has not receive d mor e serious attention. 180 Le t m e b e represented. . . determination o f an y indifferent person: wha t follows i s an illuminating argument. It runs : 1. I t i s evident that only minds have ideas . 2. I t i s on al l hands agreed that all objects o f immediate per ception ar e ideas. 3. N o on e ca n deny that sensible qualitie s are object s o f immediate perception . Therefor e 4. Sensibl e qualitie s exist only in minds. The argumen t i s valid . Poin t (3 ) state s th e common-sens e o r naive realis t theor y o f perception . I t looks , therefore , a s i f common sens e is committed t o idealism. But the flaw is that (i ) and (2 ) equivocate betwee n the natura l and th e Lockea n sens e of 'idea' . In the norma l sense , it is evident that only minds have ideas, but it is agreed onl y amongst Lockean philosopher s t o call everything the mind concerns itself with, an 'idea', as opposed to some othe r kin d of thing. It i s wort h considerin g whethe r a seriou s argumen t ca n b e brought for the Lockean conflatio n of all the objects of the mind with ideas , a s normall y understood . B y 'seriou s argument ' I mean, a t least , on e tha t doe s no t res t simpl y o n takin g th e expression 'i n the mind' in an overly literal way. A more serious reason woul d probabl y star t fro m th e clai m tha t th e min d ca n relate to something a s an object of thought only if there is some kind o f mental representatio n o f it which is 'in th e mind ' in th e more litera l sense . I f thi s i s augmente d wit h th e doctrin e tha t mental representation s ar e images, with the understanding tha t images neither have, nor are vehicles for, anything with intrinsic intentionality, the n on e ha s th e Lockea n doctrine . Th e latte r requirement—the absence o f intrinsic intentionality—is derived from th e nominalis t reactio n agains t Aristotle . Aristotl e believed tha t though t wa s accompanied b y images, bu t th e ca pacity of a psychological episode t o possess the definin g proper ties o f though t depende d no t o n th e image s bu t o n th e form s which th e image s mad e available : th e intellec t abstract s th e forms from the images, which are the vehicles whereby the forms

Explanatory Notes: Dialogues 23

1

are mad e availabl e t o consciousness . Forms , whic h are , whe n thought, universals , ar e paradigm s o f abstract ideas . Th e rejec tion of such abstraction i n favour of a nominalist particularism — the rejectio n o f al l universa l o r non-particula r entities—leave s one with images pure and simple. In brief, Locke's conception of an idea ca n be derive d b y combining th e though t tha t a mental act requires a mental vehicle with the insistence tha t that vehicl e is entirely particular in its nature. This is at one with the failure s of imagism to deal with thought; see the discussio n of Principles s. 23 in the Editor' s Introduction . 184 ideas. .. not conveyed t o Hi m b y sense: this look s suspiciously close t o allowin g Go d t o hav e abstrac t ideas . Th e spiri t o f Berkeley's genera l theor y i s that sensibl e objects hav e only their sensible form—ther e i s not som e refine d intellectual versio n o f the sam e content . Berkele y i s carefu l no t t o attribut e God' s possession o f archetypal version s o f the idea s t o Hi s being pur e intellect, without sensation, fo r that would prompt th e respons e that ou r intellec t is , a s such , immaterial , an d shoul d b e abl e to gras p qualitie s i n thei r intellectua l form . Bu t h e doe s pu t i t down t o God' s bein g wholl y active—tha t is , pure will , an d hi s account o f the human self is that it is, in itself, just will (se e A . C. Lloyd i n Foste r an d Robinso n (eds.)) . Th e poin t i s tha t Berkeley's nee d t o den y tha t Go d ha s experiences o f a certai n kind whils t allowin g Hi m th e knowledg e tha t woul d g o wit h those experience s force s hi m t o allo w tha t th e objects o f ou r cognition ca n tak e a non-perceptual form ; and tha t i t is difficul t to se e wha t objectio n ther e coul d i n principle b e t o allowin g a similar kind of cognition t o th e huma n spirit , which is an imag e of th e divine . 187 me n would: ther e i s a dispute amongs t scholar s whether a 'not' was omitte d fro m al l three edition s (whic h is one's immediat e reaction t o th e sense ) o r whethe r ther e i s irony in the mod e of expression. 188 ambages: circumlocutions, dark o r obscur e language . 192 they suppose a n external archetype: Hyla s ha s th e importan t point tha t we make sens e of the worl d not jus t as a bundl e of sensible features , bu t a s object s an d that , therefore , a n under standing o f objec t concept s i s required . Thi s fit s i n wit h muc h modern conceptua l analysis . Berkeley , lik e Lock e an d th e em piricists i n general , befor e th e developmen t o f 'logica l empiri cism' i n th e twentiet h century , regard s thi s a s a specie s o f scholasticism: given that we know that object s are no more tha n

232 Explanatory

Notes: Dialogues

collections of ideas and are not united by real occult entities such as forms, o r possesse d o f Scotus' s mysteriou s 'this-ness ' the n working ou t necessar y an d sufficien t condition s fo r th e appli cations o f concepts i s pure pedantry . 193 neither you nor I. . . ca n be sure it exists: Berkeley is failing again to notice the scope give n for scepticism by the importance to his system of intersubjectivity. See not e o n Principles, p. 63. 203 substantial forms. . . o n each other, these topic s are take n fro m the scholastics, the Cambridge Platonists, Locke, and Descartes . It i s fair t o remar k that Berkeley faile d to delive r Part I I o f th e Principles, which would have explained th e nature of spirit—the major metaphysica l lacuna in his own system. 205 petitio principii: th e fallac y o f begging the question . 206 ignoratio elenchi: the fallac y o f missing the point . 207 which two notions . . . constitute the substance of what I advance: this i s a valuabl e wa y o f lookin g a t Berkeley' s system , bu t Philonous' wa y o f describin g i t a s placin g 'i n a cleare r ligh t that truth , whic h wa s befor e share d betwee n th e vulga r an d the philosophers ' i s a littl e disingenuous . Th e vulga r an d th e philosophers ha d incompatibl e positions , namel y naiv e an d representative realism . Berkelian idealis m is formed by melding the direc t theory of perception fro m th e former with the latter' s belief tha t th e object s o f th e min d ar e purel y mental . Thi s i s more th e productio n o f a ne w syste m b y compromise , rathe r than exposin g a shared truth . Berkelianism i s not s o much pure common sense , a s the bes t one can do for common sense , in the light o f th e argument s o f th e philosophers . On e i s force d t o choose betwee n th e direc t intuitio n that wha t w e are awar e of is the worl d itself an d the somewha t mor e metaphysica l conviction of its absolute mind-independence . Berkeley very plausibly judges tha t th e forme r i s mor e essentia l t o bein g a t hom e i n the world.

INDEX abstract idea s xix , xxvii-xxxiii, 7-23, 25-6 , 29 , 59, 67-8, 77 , 79, 81-2, 88-9, 131,155 , 209-TO, 220 , 224

, 23 1

Academics 20 8 accidents 30 , 137 , 13 8 act-object analysi s xxi , 132-6 agency, power 34 , 36, 51-2, 68-9 , 71, 89, 17 4 Alciphron 21 2 Algazel 21 7 animal minds 1 2 Aquinas, St Thomas 21 6 archetypes 155 , 164 , 19 2 argument t o best explanatio n 2T5

Aristotle xii , xix, 20, 28, 219, 220, 230 assimilation argumen t xix , xxiv, 112-15, 117 , 118 , 213 associationism xx x astronomy 4 9 atheism xiii , 59, 65, 84-5, 94 , 153, 201, 207 atomism x i attraction 69 , 70 Augustine, St 22 4 Augustinus Niphus 21 7 Autrecourt, N. d' 21 7 Ayer, A. J. xxx v

causation xxiii , 36-7, 46 , 52, 68, 70-1, 157 , 17 9 chimeras 17 8 Clarke, S. 21 7 colour xx , 9-10, 27, 67, 120-6, 133-4, 135 , 136 , 169 , 213, 226 concepts, see abstract ideas Copernican syste m 45 , 18 1 Creation, th e 151 , 195-20 1 Dainton, B. 22 2 deism xii i Descartes, R. xi , xii, xxviii, 209, 210, 219, 232 direct realism xiv , xix, 111-25 distance, perception o f 41 , 14 1 dreams 31 , 140 , 17 8 Duns Scotu s 23 2 Einstein, A . xxxv i empiricism 209-1 0 Epicureans 6 5 Essay towards a New Theory of Vision x , xxix , 212 , 228 esse est percipi vel percipere xiv , xxxiv, 25-7, 63 , 84, Ti2 , 172 , 209 extension 9 , 13 , 27-8, 30 , 44, 67, 79-80, 126-30 , 131 , 132 , 133 , 134, 18 5

Bacon, Sir F. 21 7 Bayle, P. 21 8 beauty 148 , 150- 1 Boyle, R. x i Bradley, F. xxxv i Bradwardine, T. 21 7 brain 148- 9 'bucket experiment' 75 , 221-2

fatalism 6 5 fire 21 6 force (Newtonian ) 73 forms 23 1 Foster, J. xxxv i free wil l 4 8

Cambridge Platonist s 23 2 causal argument (agains t direct realism) xix , 118-20, 124- 5

Galileo x i general ideas 1 3 geometry 79-8 4

Index

234

God ix , xii, xvii, 6, 8, 32, 46, 51-2, 55-6, 57 , 70-1, 76, 90-5, TTO , 132, 152-7 , 159 , 161 , 173-4 , 177, 178-9 , 196 , 198-9 , 201-3, 225, 229, 23 1 Gddel, K. 22 2 goodness 6 8 gravity 129 , 233-4 Guericke, O. von 22 6 happiness 6 8 heat an d col d xx , 29, 112-16, 127 , 130, 169 , 226 Hegel, F . xxxv i Hobbes, T. xiii , xxviii, 65, 153 , 211

Hume, D . xiii , xvii, xviii, xxxiiixxxv, xxxvi, 209, 224, 22 9 identity 191-2 , 21 4 ignoratio elenchi 20 9 illusion, argument fro m xix , 115-16, 117 , 118 , 126-3 0 imagination n , 36, 37, 155, 178 , 190-1 imagism xviii , xxxii, 213 see also abstrac t idea s immortality o f soul 8 7 infinite divisibilit y 79-8 2 infinitesimals 83 , 223 innate idea s 20 9 instrument, matter a s 159-60 , 16 4 intellect, pure 13 2 jaundice 12 3 Jessop, T. E. 210 , 217, 218 Johnson, D r S . (lexicographer ) xxxvi Johnson, S . (American divine ) 219 Kant, I. xxv , 216, 229, 23 0 knowledge 6 1 Kripke, S . 22 9 language 9 , 13 , 18-21 , 45-6, 60, 189, 19 4

Leibniz, G. i x light 124 , 135 , 13 6 Lindsay, A. D. xxx v Lloyd, A. C . 23 1 Locke, J . ix-xiii , xvi, xx , xxviii, XXXV, T2 , 14-15 , 27-30, 142-7 , 209, 2TO , 2 T T, 2T2, 2T5, 22O, 222, 227 , 232

Mach, E. xxxvi , 22 1 Malebranche, N . xi , 155 , 217, 218 , 228 Manicheanism 9 4 mathematics 48 , 68, 76-84, 131 , 203 matter: as supposed caus e o f ideas 156-7, 182-3 , 20 5~6 as supposed occasio n fo r idea s 54-5, 160-2 , 164 , 20 T Locke's theory o f 2 7 role in science 185- 6 memory 14 3 microscopes 12 2 Mill, J. S . xxx v miracles 48 , 51, 60 momentum 18 5 morality 68 , 89, 203 More, H. 22 2 motion 9 , 27-8, 66, 67, 69, 72, 128-9, T 32 absolute an d relative 72-6 , 130-1 as intermediate caus e of sensation 157-8 , 202-3 naive realism , see direct realis m natural science 45 , 68-76, 202-3 nature: laws of 36 , 70-2, 160 , 18 6 order i n 141 , 204 'new philosophy' xi , xiii, 148-50 see also atomism; natura l science Newton, Si r I. xi , xiii, 221 his Prindpia 72 , 75 nominalism xxvii-xxxii , 230 , 231

Index notions xxxiv , 63, 87, 88, 109 , 164 , 165, 175 , 213 number 29 , 77-9 Ockham xxvii i pain xx , 40, 52, 54, 90, 94, 112-15, 130, 136 , 183-4 , 226 pan-psychism i x passivity: of idea s 34 , 15 8 of min d i n perceptio n 13 5 petitio principii 20 5 phantasm xi i Philosophical Commentaries x , xxxiv place 66 , 73 Plato 209 , 220 pleasure xx , 68, 90, 114-15, 13 0 Popper, K . xxxv i primary qualitie s xi , xv, xvi, 27-30, 34, 56, 126 , 130 , 13 3 primary qualit y direct realis m xv , 126-33, 226-7 Principles, Pt. I I 21 1 providence 50 , 65, 205 Putnam, H. 22 9 Pyrrho 22 5 Quine, W . V. O. 21 4 Raphson, J. 22 2 rationalism 20 9 real essence s 220 , 22 9 reason 31 , 63, 85, 132 , 143 , 165 , T?4

relations 63 , 88 religion an d immaterialism 59-6T, 85 , 87 , 153 , 202

representative realis m xiv , xv , xviii, xxiii , 9-15, 142-7 , 225, 227 resurrection o f Chris t 6 6 revelation 165 , 18 7 Russell, B. xxx v

235

107, 109-10 , 146 , 150 , 151 , 169-70, 188 , 190 , 193 , 202, 204, 208 schoolmen xii , 17, 20, 43 Scripture 59-60 , 92 , 155 , 178 , 179 , 195-7, 207 secondary qualitie s xi , xv, xx, xxi, 27-8, 29-30 , 43 , 56, 125-6, 130, 133 , 13 9 self, th e 24 , 86-7, 174 , 175- 6 sensation 25 , 67, 86, 133 , 136 , 155 sense dat a xi i shape 126-8 , 133-4 , 16 9 sight 41-2 , 135 , 14 1 sin, God no t responsibl e fo r 179-80 Siris 212 , 220 smell 118 , 135 , 202 Socinians 6 6 solidity 129 , 18 5 soul 6 , 24, 35, 65, 67, 86, 87, 88, 154, i? 4 sounds 118-19 , 202 space 72 , 76 Spinoza, B. ix, 153 , 21 0 spirit xxxiv , 24, 26, 32, 35, 37-8 , 51,55,63, 67,84, 85-9, 129 , 140, 152 , 20 3 as sole efficien t caus e 69 , 70, 71, 155 , 158 , 17 9 as sole substanc e 26 , 85 Sprigge, T. xxxv i structural representativ e realis m xvi substratum xi-xii , xxii, 56, 136-7, 180, 185 , 20 1 taste 29 , 116-17, 202 time 66-7 , 72 touch 4 1 understanding 3 5 uniformity o f nature 36-7 , 48 , 51,

scepticism xii , xvii, 6, 7, 62-4, 85, unit

71

y 29 , 77- 8

236

Index

Vanini 15 3 'veil o f perception' x i velocity 18 5 verification principl e 21 0 Vienna Circl e xxx v virtue 87 , 95, no, 13 2

Yeats, W . B. 21 9 Yolton, J . W. 21 1

Wellington, Duk e o f 22 1

Zeno 21 7

will xxiii , 35, 70, 89 , 134-5, *55 » 158, 180 , 18 6 Wittgenstein, L. 21 1

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD'S CLASSICS

THOMAS AQUINA S

Selected Philosophical Writings

GEORGE BERKELE Y

Principles of Human Knowledg e and Three Dialogues

EDMUND BURK E

A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful Reflections on the Revolution in France

THOMAS CARLYL E

The French Revolution

CONFUCIUS

The Analects

FRIEDRICH ENGEL S

The Condition of the Working Class in England

JAMES GEORG E FRAZE R

The Golden Bough

THOMAS HOBBE S

Human Natur e and De Corpore Politico Leviathan

JOHN HUM E

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion Selected Essays

THOMAS MALTHU S

An Essay on the Principle of Population

KARL MAR X

Capital The Communist Manifesto

J. S . MIL L

On Liberty and Other Essays Principles of Economy and Chapters on Socialism

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCH E

On the Genealogy of Morals Twilight of the Idols

THOMAS PAIN E

Rights of Man, Common Sense , and Othe r Political Writings

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEA U

Discourse o n Political Economy and The Social Contrac t Discourse on the Origin of Inequality

SIMA QJA N

Historical Records

ADAM SMIT H

An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

MARY WOLLSTONECRAF T Politica l Writings

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S The Bhagavad Gita The Bibl e Authorize d King James Version With Apocrypha

The Koran The Pancatantra Upanisads AUGUSTINE

The Confession s On Christian Teachin g

BEDE

The Ecclesiastical History

HEMACANDRA

The Lives of the Jain Elders

SANTIDEVA

The Bodhicaryavatara

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD'S CLASSICS Classical Literary Criticism Greek Lyric Poetry Myths from Mesopotamia

APOLLODORUS

The Library of Greek Mythology

APOLLONIUS O F RHODE S

Jason and the Golden Fleece

APULEIUS

The Golden Ass

ARISTOTLE

The Nicomachean Ethics Physics Politics

CAESAR

The Civil War The Gallic War

CATULLUS

The Poems of Catullus

CICERO

The Nature of the Gods

EURIPIDES

Medea, Hippolytus, Electra, and Helen

GALEN

Selected Works

HERODOTUS

The Histories

HESIOD

Theogony and Works and Days

HOMER

The Iliad The Odyssey

HORACE

The Complete Odes and Epodes

JUVENAL

The Satires

LIVY

The Rise of Rome

LUCAN

The Civil War

MARCUS AURELIU S

The Meditations

OVID

The Love Poems Metamorphoses Sorrows of an Exile

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S

PETRONIUS

The Satyricon

PLATO

Defence of Socrates, Euthyphro, and Crito Gorgias Phaedo Republic Symposium

PLAUTUS

Four Comedies

PLUTARCH

Selected Essays and Dialogue s

PROPERTIUS

The Poems

SOPHOCLES

Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Electra

STATIUS

Thebaid

TACITUS

The Histories

VIRGIL

The Aeneid The Eclogues and Georgics

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S

JANE AUSTE N

Catharine an d Other Writings Emma Mansfield Park Northanger Abbey, Lady Susan, The Watsons, and Sanditon Persuasion Pride and Prejudice Sense and Sensibilit y

ANNE BRONT E

Agnes Grey The Tenant of Wildfell Hall

CHARLOTTE BRONT E

Jane Eyre The Professor Shirley Villette

EMILY BRONT E

Wuthering Heights

WILKIE COLLIN S

The Moonstone No Name The Woman in White

CHARLES DARWI N

The Origin of Species

CHARLES DICKEN S

The Adventures of Oliver Twist Bleak House David Copperfield Great Expectation s Hard Times Little Dorrit Martin Chuzzlewit Nicholas Nickleby The Old Curiosity Shop Our Mutual Friend The Pickwick Papers A Tale of Two Cities

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD'S CLASSICS

GEORGE ELIO T

Adam Bede Daniel Deronda Middlemarch The Mill on the Floss Silas Marner

ELIZABETH GASKEL L

Cranford The Life of Charlotte Bronte Mary Barton North and South Wives and Daughter s

THOMAS HARD Y

Far from the Madding Crowd Jude the Obscure The Mayor of Casterbridge A Pair of Blue Eyes The Return of the Native Tess of the d'Urbervilles The Woodlanders

WALTER SCOT T

Ivanhoe Rob Roy Waverley

MARY SHELLE Y

Frankenstein The Last Man

ROBERT Loui s STEVENSON

Kidnapped and Catriona The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Weir of Hermiston Treasure Islan d

BRAM STOKE R

Dracula

WILLIAM MAKEPEAC E THACKERAY

Barry Lyndon Vanity Fair

OSCAR WILD E

Complete Shorter Fiction The Picture of Dorian Gray

A SELECTIO N O F

OXFORD WORLD' S CLASSIC S Oriental Tales

WILLIAM BECKFOR D

Vathek

JAMES BOSWEL L

Boswell's Life of Johnson

FRANCES BURNE Y

Camilla Cecilia Evelina The Wanderer

LORD CHESTERFIEL D

Lord Chesterfield's Letters

JOHN CLELAN D

Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure

DANIEL DEFO E

Captain Singleto n A Journal of the Plague Year Memoirs of a Cavalier Moll Flanders Robinson Crusoe Roxana

HENRY FIELDIN G

Joseph Andrews and Shamela A Journey from This World to the Next and The Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon Tom Jones The Adventures of David Simpl e

WILLIAM GODWI N

Caleb Williams StLeon

OLIVER GOLDSMIT H

The Vicar of Wakefield

MARY HAY S

Memoirs of Emma Courtney

ELIZABETH HAYWOO D

The History of Miss Betsy Thoughtless

ELIZABETH INCHBALD

A Simple Story

SAMUEL JOHNSO N

The History of Rasselas

CHARLOTTE LENNO X

The Female Quixot e

MATTHEW LEWI S

The Monk

A S E L E C T I O N O F OXFOR

D WORLD' S CLASSIC S

ANN RADCLIFF E

The Castles of Athlin and Dunbayne The Italian The Mysteries of Udolpho The Romance of the Forest A Sicilian Romance

FRANCES SHERIDA N

Memoirs of Miss Sidney Bidulph

TOBIAS SMOLLET T

The Adventures of Roderick Random The Expedition of Humphry Clinker Travels through France and Italy

LAURENCE STERN E

The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman A Sentimental Journey

JONATHAN SWIF T

Gulliver's Travels A Tale of a Tub and Other Works

HORACE WALPOL E

The Castle of Otranto

GILBERT WHIT E

The Natural History of Selborne

MARY WOLLSTONECRAF T

Mary and The Wrongs of Woman

M O R E A B O U T OXFOR

The Oxford World's Classics Website

D WORLD' S CLASSIC S

www.worldsclassics.co.uk • Informatio n about new titles • Explor e the full range of Oxford World's Classics • Link s to other literary sites and the main OUP webpage • Imaginativ e competitions, with bookish prizes • Perus e Compass, the Oxford World's Classics magazine • Article s by editors • Extract s from Introduction s • A forum for discussion and feedback on the series • Specia l information for teachers and lecturers

www.worldsclassics.co.uk

M O R E A B O U T OXFOR

D WORLD' S CLASSIC S

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