Propaganda: the formation of men's attitudes

J

Effectweneu

of

Propaganda

It is impossible, io my view, to establish precise measurements of the effoctJveuess or ineffectiveness oi propaganda. In honesty, ope tan judge it only in umjinietion with very broad facts and very general ideas. I shall give here some criteria oi judgment, often very banal and simplistic, which permit the conclusion that propaganda is indeed effective. First, some very general reasons deserve to be considered. The first is that today all politicians and all big businessmen agree that psychological action, propaganda, advertising, human relations, and public relations are indispensable and definitely produce results. Could one say that these men obey a new fashion, are victims of an illusion, or have not really thought about it? I n view of the deliberate attempt on the part of some sotio-psychologists to demonstrate that puliticsl men err when they "believe" in the effectiveness of propaganda, one might ask who is the real victim of illusions here. If we think of men motivated entirely by the desire for efficacy, like Lenin, or of biisin«smen entirely motivated by the desire for higher profits, it would be hard to admit that such people, who are very resdistic, allow themselves to be taken in by iHusioos in this domain, A second argument on the same order is the following: All those who have lived in a strongly propagandized environment and have been subjected to the effects of propaganda (while trying to remain unaffected), all those who have seen propaganda in massive action, are agreed that propaganda is effective. Those who deny it live in countries that are still liberal and not subf«ted to intense propaganda. Today hardly any Germans, Rus¬ ™ , or Algerians question the effectiveness of propaganda. Only those who see it from afar, who are not directly subjected to it. who do not witness opinion-changes caused by propaganda, who MDfound the brushfire of a McCarthy with the propaganda of a Utfbbels, erpress doubts. Moreover—and this is characteristic -they do it to the same degree that they fail to see the true propaganda practiced on them. This er^lains why manv American swio-psychologists deny the effectiveness of propaganda, but admit, that of Public Relations and Human Relations; for these precisely the form propaganda takes in the United States.

i88)

EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPAGANDA

There, It is the only truly developed, systematized, and longlasting form of propaganda. We must now turn to some very general and broad facts that are open to various interpretations. First: How can the following developments be explained without an admission that opinion and behavior changes took place as a result of the use of mass media? 1 . The attainment of consciousness on the part of the labor class between 1848 and 19x7, M a n is perfectly right when be says that the actual condition of the proletariat Is nothing unless the proletariat Is aware of that condition^ that such awareness is simultaneously the creator of the labor class and the revolutionary will, and that it cannot occur spontaneously or individually. It LS the fruit of what the workers are told by certain Intellectuals, the result of an "education"—In reality, of a propaganda. Propaganda, sometimes uncertain and searching for a way but effective in the long run. has led the working class to where it Is now, and hai done so by closely miilng action, education, mass meetings, and "propaganda" In the strict sense of the term, according to the formula that 1 have indicated as typical for propaganda in the broad sense. 2. The spread of the Socialist mentality In France between 1900 and 1950: How did this famous shift to the teft come about? Why did the number of Socialist and, later. Communist votes increase constandy? Why were the Socialist reforms oi the State and the economy effected without revolution? Who would question today the nationalization of certain enterprises, social security, paid vacations, and so on? A distinction must be made between those who vote Socialist and those—whose number is far greater—who are so imbued with Socialism that they no longer even recognize si Socialist what were considered to be purely Socialist demand* fifty years ago. Here again we see a slow penetration by propaganda. 3. The revolutions of 1917 and 1933 are the results of propaganda, in the very words of those who made them. Lenin and Trotsky, Hitler and Coebbels said time and again that the success of their revolutions was the result of propaganda, which made the masses become adherents of a minority. 4 . The spread of Communism and the Communizaiinn of the populations in the peoples democracies and China are also the result of propaganda. Those populations are progressively trans-

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developments into coordinates them, makes people conscious of them. Obviously, propaganda docs not cunt by Itself. But without it, nothing I happen, ft really start* the engine. And once the movement || underway, propaganda keeps i t going directs i t , and ensures its success. From a different point of view one can also see the importance of this fact if one realizes that no enterprise now is possible anywhere without psychologica. preparation, conditioning, persuasion, and so on. Every event in Our society supposes the allegiance or approval of all. and such participation in mind or action can be obtained only by propaganda. The fact [hat it is utilized in so many different field* show* that our society is in the process of booming a total society, e.g.. a society in which no single ait c a n be a matter of IndiDcrence: every act and feeling assumes a political character; no act is purely personal. Not to participate in Itidcr's Wlnferhif/e (winter collection for the pour), not to participate in the national enthusiasm in some n e w African State, not to take an interest in the problem of school systems In France in 1959, is no longer an individual act but a breaking of ties with commiuiitv; and tlie community cannot function today unless its citizen* are sufficiently integrated so that every reform, no matter what kind, is carried out by all, and assumes u political character. From there on, propaganda is necessary-. At the same time, one must assert that the mechanism works this w n and generally achieves its aim because propaganda is effective. these

Is it necessary to remind the reader here of the phenomenon of advertising^ I liave said that one cannot draw general conclusions from its workings, but It seems impossible nowadays to deny that it i * effective in lis own sphere: I need not reiterate the examples found in all the books—about cigars smoked by gangster* in films or about cigarette-manufacturers who thought they had conquered the market, stopped advertising, and soon lost their sales, but I i n u * t give at least three indications. Even the careful reader, alert to exaggerations, must take seriously facts and examples given by Vance Packard, which testify to the public's enormous sensitivity to advertising. Second, every month new products appear for which there is no prior need, but which take their plan- in the market without much resistance. That exclusively (he result of prupaganda. New needs are created from the day a new product appears. Alter a few months of

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3P *? * the U S S B * , U^.ununists had œn*,der.*i sdv^fnstag to be a capitalist d u * » , a non-prcduLfve expenditure, and so on, and after liaviw M^lished It as useless in a Socialist country, they Itave b r u u l ,< bac* o W g the past ten year,. It goes hand in hand w.ih beliel m R u c t i o n . VSe may be certain that wh™ production wiJJ W * m^eased further and produced new and more refined products advertising wM show an upsurge similar to that in thVv^ States. Does thrs not show that advertising is really effective? Let us now ™ m * aether Geld in w h i c h propaganda is effective, m private life, and i n matters thai mm entirely outside ' '^vertheless, show the individual-, extr-urdinary lensitivity to propaganda -^-» Can it be said that popaganda affect* an individual ukeq i i M

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fuperfictal p^btic opuuoos of an individual and the psalourj . t t i hides that remain.with him, we might conclude that prop*, ganda works on the former and not on the latter. This i , (he generally preva.ling-and reassurmg-view. The individual would be reached by propaganda only to the extent that \„- participates n i j u b h c opm.or, for to the extent that he is W i . h V d ^ ) and then on y m the upper levels of lus individual mvehd™,* and ^ collectively that. In this way, p^hologicai rfZS not transcend the effets of public opinion and would mZ no effect on the core of personahtv. Seeking mass effect, propaganda would determine only collective behavior, and lha. 3 d ihow why propaganda has so little effect on private conduct a [

I >p.cal examples are propaganda against alcoholism or for -higher b , r t h rate. Such propaganda, it I , said, doe. not work because .1 deals with private matters. The stereotypes of heahn « nahorial power, pubhdy accepted by e v e r y ^ y ^ H ^ d «*wti-bly to respect for temperance and for large families but *ey have not reduced a l e . h n l , ^ , , , ™ thelize oî l ^ i l i e s propaganda, even if if succeeds in sparking specific collect e actions, is incapable of affecting persouahxv d

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facts. First of all. it Is not correct to say that in Franc* the respect for temperance and large families is general; anion* die working class and the bourgeoisie, the general |udgment that a Urge family is madness and Rentle intoxication agreeable Is at least as strong as that respect What might be culled the mentality of the Canard Enchain* is surely that of the ma(ority in this corinection. And the stereotype of the boo vivant who eniovs bis wine plays around, and is not concerned with having children is certainly more powerful than the stereotype of the water-driiuring famdy man. But the anti-alcoholic propaganda posters in the Paris sunways are slowly beginning to reach the individual. There are no actual figures as yet. but the protests by producers of wine and alcohol, addressed to the French Parliament, are a significant Indication. To cause auch excitement, effects on liquor consumption must have been felt. The same Is true for propaganda In favor of a higheT birth rate. One can no longer doubt that propaganda has had a profound effect on births. What really is curious is that there has been a considerable increase in births without a similar change in surface public opinion in favor of large families I t seems hardly debatable today that in Nazi Germany, in Fascist Italy, and in France since 1941. the increase in births resulted from propaganda. In the same way that propaganda can work for a higher birth rate it can (contrary to what I mvself believed until recently) also work for a lower one. The surprising experience in Japan is significant. I t Is well known that a country begins, spontaneously, to produce more children after a defeat. Japan, already very prolific before, was no exception to this rule: beginning m 1045 Its birth rate increased rapidly. But it was quickly realized that this would lead to disaster. As a result, propaganda for a lower birth rate was launched in 1 9 4 s To be sure, in accord with whs, I have said many times, the campaign did not have an immediate effect But propaganda conducted sobdly for four years managed to show results in 1950. From 3 * 3 E » thousand in 1947, the rate dropped to 2 9 in ig*p. to 2 0 in 1954. *7* • f"" " of 5 0 percent in ten years, which had never been seen before. Japan now has one of the world's lowest birth rates." A striking to

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aspect of this development is that birth control spreads taster In rural areas than in the cities. A final example: since 1950 at least, there has been concern in France that there were too many students in the Arts and in Law, too few in Science and in Technology But there wax no change until It was decided that "a propaganda actiuo should be undertaken with the parents, to direct their children toward •he deficient areas' (November 1 9 5 1 ) . From that ujumt-ut 0 0 a change took place, even though the propaganda was not par ocularly coherent, insistent, or continuous. The propaganda launched in 1 9 5 1 began to take hold in 1956: from 1956 until 1959 a shift of 3 5 percent of students in the desired direction took place. It follows that even in his personal conduct the individual is very sensitive to propaganda in some domains. I think this leads to the conclusion that the same is true of political behavior in fact, where the purchase of a product is concerned, the individual can rely on personal experience as to his needs, the value of the product, and m 0 0 . He can make companions before shopping, ail this is 0 0 the level of his direct eiperieoce, a simple poces*' Now, if he can be influenced in this domain (though only up to a point—he will not again buy products that turn out to ba inferior), be can be influenced all the more on the Level of economics or politics outside his range of personal eiperieoce, never simple, and always hard to compare. Similarly, where bis private conduct is concerned—to have children or not, or what to make them study—the individual generally knows what he wants and obeys motivations that are truly personal and concern him closely So, if he can be Influenced even there, will he not be susceptible to being influenced on much more reinóte and eicitinp question! that concern him Jess directly? Finally, to demonstrate furrier the extreme susceptibility of the ^dividual, we must look at rumors and ftahUm—two c W y halted phenomena. Every rumor that circulates has a certain effect It is an amazing fact that rumors whose origins are not fcnown have a small audience fn the begtrring, *, large audience alter some time. The farther away the source and the greater the

E F F E C T I V E * ESS U K P B O P A C A N T M

Timber of individuals who have passed it on. the more the objective fact loses importance and the more the rumor is believed by the multitudes who adhere to it. An individual does not remain unaffected by a rumor that is spontaneously circulated in hii milieu by a growing number of persons. Obviously, he pays uo attention to it unless he is already personally interested. In fact, no rumor can circulate if the individual is not concerned. He may be concerned, or feel he is. simply on the basis of the judgment —or what he thinks is the judgment—of his milieu. This is where we find fashion. But it may be objected that the decisive element is a commercial mechanism: a fashion is launched by the producers, and advertising plays the biggest role j in the form of an oraanized rumor launched by propagandists). This is true [n the maiority of cases, even in the case of such absurd fashions as the Yo-Yo, the Hula Hoop, or Davy Crockett. But it is oot always that way sometimes an absurd fashion spreads without adverOsine. from onlv one point of departure, such as in the astonishing case of the Scoubidou. Beginning with an article in a ch.ldrens magazine and witliout any commercial interest being mvolved, France was submerged within a mouth by W b i d o u s made by children and adults. Evidently, we are lace to face with the phenomenon Of imitation, pure and simple, but to the extent that this Imitation U caused by an article that reaches Only a Limited number of children, it is an example of the individuals « < ™ susceptibility, his capacity to be influenced and propagandized Even if he defies it even if he stiffens in the presence of true propaganda, he still is extremely vulnerable. These reflecboosand statements, selected arbitrarily from various fields and based « different methods, lead us to conclude that the effectiveness of propaganda is indeed great and decisive. p

fioj Obviously, no psychic changes or reversals of opinion can be produced suddenly. I have also said that well-established opinion ihould not be attacked head on. However, propagandi consists first of all of a stocktaking of existing limitations. Outside those limits it is obviously ineffective. But it would be absurd to deny the efficiency of automobiles as a means of transportation merely because they cannot travel ou open fields or on the beach. At the same time, the limits of propaganda's field of actioo are very large ' 1

fn an attempt to trace these limits, we might Erst remember four elements alreadv examined: 1 . Pre-erisring attitudes. In the beginning, propaganda cannot move except within the framework of these attitudes, which it can modify only very slowly. a. The general trends and sociological factors of the society in which it acts. The first limitation is relative and can be overcome, but this second is an absolute limit. Propaganda cannot reverse fundamental trends in a society. For «ampie, in the United States no propaganda that would be against a democracy [formally) and in favor of a monarchy would be able to "take " Nor could any propaganda against Socialism be successful in the U.S.S.R.. nor any propaganda, anywhere in the world, against technology, progress, happiness, and so on. 3 A third limitation is the necessity for consonance with the facts. A basic fact is always necessary. Propaganda can never be a propaganda of ideas, but must pronounce judgment on certain facts (whether these judgments are accurate or not). Propaganda cannot prevail against facts that are too massive and definite: Goebbels changed his propaganda after Stalingrad because •t was impossible to transform that debacle into a victory. His propaganda of success was followed by his pronacanda of heroism. 3

4. The Limit* of

Propaganda

Propaganda, though effective, obviously does not have unlimited powers It would be erroneous to conclude that anything at aB can be obtained from people by propaganda. 1 have ahead? pointed out some limitations. Certain psychological or sociology conditions must pre-exist for the mechanism to work. For esamrjla the needs to be satisfied by propaganda must be kept in mini

4- A last limit that abridges the capabilities of all propaganda from points of view. To have any effect, the psycho!• W i question ai propagan^ ID B pan k l y aroun in iht grip of

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logical action must be lasting and continuous. But time imposes a limitation because of the weak durability of the direct effects. To German public opinion, the Nazi doctrine is now disappearing. All propaganda evaporates progressively when it ceases. One therefore cajioot hope to create a final current of opinion or a type of man. But here again this limit is growing less restricting: the longer a propaganda has been made, the more durable its effects. The more profound, total, aod technically superior it has been, the more it will have changed man. The propagandist's work is never done. After forty years of rernakable propaganda in the U.S,S.H,, much remains to be done to capture man completely. Points that were believed to be won and no longer in need of propaganda treatment, must be taken up again and given a different treatment I shall now turn to two new elementsOne limitation upon the eEectiveness of propaganda has not yet become clear: foreign countries. Tlie conditions for the development and effectiveness of propaganda analyzed here were mainly concerned with internal propaganda, inside a large group, society, or nation. Propaganda is most effective, most dangerous, and least noticed inside a group. Propaganda addressed to the outside is inevitably Ineffective to a large extent-.* there is the propagandist's psychological ignorance of tlie attitudes, centers of interest, and presuppositions of his target, and the spontaneous suspicion on the part of the target of all tiiat comes from the outside. There is the difficulty of establishing continuity, the impossibility of being in real "communication,'' the inevitable delay with regard to immediate events, the impossibility of all the mass media, of making "pre-propaganda," of using obsessive propaganda, and so on. Even when a country is occupied by a foreign power, the latter cannot really make effective propaganda (for example, German propaganda toward the occupied countries during World War IT). A poster or an article that evokes a response in one country may fail to do so in a neighboring one* Only very elementary operations are possible, very much prey to 5

•Let I U remember Ote violen) attack* oF 1960-1 tgaJnR poorly made propaganda. Much 1J !• ' •• prop*Hinds » a i considerad boring and doRnnUi. U bad to change to an BCUQC mrlhod to iÜmuiale higher pfodufflvltyj El mud c e a « being abfbaCt and rétale 10 facta. •Inia La how Dio* of ÜU M u r e a cJ German propaganda «ero regarded In ueiilraJ and occupied tVmnttW. * From which fl foüüwl that one carme* eiport prOpaSJruia. :

Appendix

(997

unforeseeable drcurrtstances—and that realty is not modem propaganda. What is remarkable is that such propaganda is actually evoking the greatest interest, and that ft should represent the form fry which the effectiveness of propaganda as such It being judged. Psychological warfare is of passionate Interest to people, though i t is the least convincing type of propaganda. I have already discussed this. Too often propaganda has been judged by Its effects on • stranger or an enemy. From its effects on the Gemían army, Americans have concluded that propaganda is not effective (moreover, with variations of evaluations}. 1. In turn, am astonished that even one soldier should have surrendered as the result of a leaflet. Similarly, propaganda toward the Socialist countries has only very limited value or effect (even if it is heard, which Is not certain, so many receiving sets being official). I t if giving such propaganda undeserved honor to attribute to i t the revolts in East Berlin and Hungary. I t is more Likely that, once the revolts had broken out, the rebels remembered and took seriously the formulas of that propaganda, and that when those were not followed by action, the rebels felt they had been deceived and rejected the West doubly: this is the famous boomerang effect which undeniably occurs. At the most, such propaganda can create a certain ambiguity in the thoughts and feelings of the foreigner. It can disturb certain ideas and judgments, show up certain claims of domestic propaganda as false, and create a certain amount of bad conscience. A l l that Is not negligible, but must not be exaggerated or considered as typical with regard to the effects of propaganda. Spear* has analyzed perfectly the weakness of propaganda addressed to the outside. He even considered such questions as: who, in an opposed nation, is really the enemy? Should one aim at the military elite as much as at the pxiUtical elite? Who, in such a nation, is a potential or actual ally? Who exercises the real power? What can and should be modified by propaganda—the ideological bases, political stnicruies, social Institutions? None of these questions can be given a precise answer, for to answer them we would need psychological mvestigations that cannot be carried out in a foreign country, even teas i n an enemy •inDarje] Leans f e d ) ;

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country Ona can be guided only by general Ideu and estrrnatei. W one must not think that it is eaiier to operate with propa­ ganda in a democratic country than m a dictatorship. Ob^ouary, in the former e r a , the mjectwo of propaganda from the uutnde It easy, but on the one hand, it may be more readily fdt u propaganda (because the domestic goverTjmental propaganda ii leu evident, less well recognized) and is therefore mistniited; on the other b a n i it «Jpood* much lew to a need In a totalitarian country, most people, before they are fully Intepated, want to hear what ii forbidden, the other line, which, incidentally, Is the only lupport foreign propaganda has. But In a democracy, this need ii much lesi felt, so that even though the reasons are less obvious, it hj as difficult to conduct external propaganda • gainst a democracy as against a dictatorship, These limitations on the effectiveness of "foreign" propaganda also apply when foreigners ]hre m a territory COT trolled by the propagandist. This held true for the Arabs and the Kabyla in Algeria, There. French propa­ ganda was addressed to a people who remained foreigners. We are really facing here the greatest obstacle to psychological action: It can be fully effective only in the hands of nationals ad­ dressing themselves to their fellow citizens. This is undoubtedly the secret of the great force and effectiveness of Communist propaganda. The homeland of socialism does not make Its propa­ ganda directly to other peoples That propaganda is made by the Communist parties, which are national parties, and which, conse­ quently, are within easy elbow-rubbing distance of those to be seduced. Subjects and methods may then vary peatly from country to country. This does not mean contnuliction between various Communist parties, but only a certain freedom <J action on the level of propaganda, which must be adapted to every nation. Every time a uniBeabon of propaganda dogmas was at­ tempted (for example in 1949^0!. effectiveness was educed. Thus, even though coming from the outside and doing the work of the US.S.R.. Communist propaganda nevertheless is a national propaganda playing on inclinations and using facts known directly and undents J A last limitation must be considered. Despite all technique, m thefinal analysis, • certain Inability to foresee the response that the Individual ii called upon to give remains. As the result of a stimulus, a personality may react with various responses, opinion*

Append* or actions. The number of possible responses differs from p e r s o n to person. Obviously, an esthete's reaction to a poster will differ from a worker's. The response really depends on the entire context of an individual, on his milieu, bii education, his family, his profession. In this domain of immediate and Lwl<«*^ re­ sponse, the theory of pr*-extsttaç attitudes applies most clearly. It has been proved, for example, that in the case of a film, those who approached it with the most favorable attitude wan rnoct rraTueoced by it. (VS. Army Information Service, 1544.) Also, people will be more influenced by the propaganda of their own group, more prone to give it the expected response. To know exactly what response to- expect from a given indi­ vidual, a complete psychological analysis would be necessary. One factor that profoundly modifies responses is culture. A high culture is favorable to propaganda because it makes man mor* able to understand facts, become interested in problerns. form judgments, and learn new attitudes. But this capability is decisive Only if the propaganda is really serious. Conversely, culture makes the prop* gsndist's work harder, for it will lead to 1 wider variety of responses t.. 1 stimulus responses that will often be contradictors the prupaçandüt is then not certain of bis effect Culture rnakea men see several solutions, discuss them, feel uncertain of thenown convictions, and for those reasons, either not an 1 ui all. or make an unexpected response. Converse!,, the culture teams responses more slowly and Is less easily incited or provoked Into giving a response; but when the initiation is fdt, such a man will not have a great variety of responses, least of all contradictory ones. The propagandist's work müt be different in this case: a weak imitation to begin with, "^'^rpttı by a second argument, and esduding a plurality of lesponara when be speaks to a cultured milieu; but a violent ladtatioo, without secondary argumentation, in the face of an iymil 111»I publicIt must be remembered, however, that culture is only one of the piemen hi that determioe the response The problem for the propagarjdist is to obtain, from among all the response* of which • person is capable, the one diretil > related to the political objec­ tive of his propaganda. This will be the "related respmue." U . , the specific, expected response, in harrriony with both the pjoDoied aim and the Instrumental process that w** put into no-

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tion. This "related" response can never be tained automatically If one world on • free public opinion: too many factor* are put Into tnot-oa to make it possible 10 predict the results. The situ* tton It different If there has been pre-propaganda. But aside From that COM. propaganda can fail when the power of the stimulus is too weak If the -stimulus runt counter to existing opinions, or if the power of other responses is stronger than that of tin destred one. The choice of the stimulus. Its reach, its powtr. with relation to the propagandas sociological and psychological milieu, are the propagandist's work that will make certain resporL-es more Or Less likely. p

On the other bandt the propagandist can facilitate the response, either by auxiliary responses, or by developing prior response, called * pre-active responses* by Doob. An auxiliary response u ooe evoked with certainty by viewing or hearing something, It may pot relate direcdy to the pursued aim, but will facilitate the hoped-for response. All a d v e r t i n g Is based on such auxiliary responses. A well-done ad evokes a favorable over-all response, makes one stop in his tracks to examine i t , there It an esthetic response thai may be followed by the desired response. Those i n auxiliary responses to the one hoped for: the purchase of the advertised product Similarly, the presentation of certain merchandise by a pretty young girl provokes an esthetic or erode response, or one of Hibernation or identification—auxiliary responses to the main decision expected from the viewer. There is no direct connection between the auxiliary response and the "related" response- The latter does not necessarily follow the former, which merely facilitates it. The Auxiliary response may arouse attention, create a favorable climate* erase some other unfavorable feeling, increase the force of a subsequent stimulus, but it will not lead directly to acceptance or to action. It may, however make the individual more receptive to an unexpected response from the propagandist The propagandist must look for other means to induce action In i certain tense one can say that "propaganda is a fnrni of communication demanding the learning of new responses. These responses cannot be learned except after the perception of a propaganda stimulus, and after the evocation of individualized responses related to the objective of propaganda" (Doob)- Ifl h

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j i c i the desired response can take place only after a spontaneous TSpoottt Learned responses are attitudes and predispose peopl* to certain actions. Learned responses that become integrated in i the sum total of an Individuals responses must be taken Into iccount I f these responses were learned through propaganda, they may be called* as by Doob, "pre-action responses*; this Indicates their proximity to, and their distance from, action. Propaganda can, in fact, modify opinions and obtain responses that will remain without external manifestation for a certain period of time. That is the passive participation discussed earlier. A man (nay be in agreement with the propagandist and yet not set as the propagandist would have h i m i n certain cases, the propagandist will be satisfied with such agreement without external manifestation: the paralysis provoked by a propaganda ui terror completely achieves the alms of the propagandist But most often—for example, In connection with election propaganda —the individual must be led from this "pre-action" response to action. The propagandist wflX therefore, by to give to this pre-actin response the greatest possible power of involvement- The indi ridual who learns a certain response and becomes capable of i t feels, as a result of this response, the need to go past i t to pass ffver to action, which then appears as a consequence of the "preactkoT response established by propaganda- Such a response will have power if It represents a centra] drive in the personality. It will be stronger if it is more recent and if reinforced by auxiliary AD this allows us to understand the response sought by the propagandist But this response Is n e w certain whether a vut* or allegiance to a party is concerned. To the extent that such response, even if learned, even If supported by all auxiliary r » (pomes, even if based on every possible calculation* must be the result of a determined, specific propaganda campaign, it remains unforeseeable. I t is all the more JO if the propagandist addre^es himself to specific persona (trying to anticipate how a particular person will react to a particular propaganda ) and if a definita act is to be obtained- Only after a campaign can it be seen whether response was favorable or n o t But such a situation I * unacceptable to the propagandist Because be is a technician, he oonot simply accept this uncertainty, which a sociologist would p

3 Qt }

ETFEtTTVENrH OF PROPAGANDA

APPENDIX

be satisfied to have emphasized. The propagandist seeks mare certain and automatic responses. TO begin with, he will give tip anticipating how the *ruiitidW will react Me will think of the group and be satisfied with a gq. erally favorable result—for example, with So percent o f the ztsponsei obtained. On the other hand, he will A l i o make less uf an effort to elicit a specific response toward a localised action than to obtain a general attitude that, in turn, will create locaJ response*. Therefore, the propagandists effort will aim at the eLixninitin of individualizing factors- The expected response miut be lew and leis conditioned by natural elements (milieu, education, and so On) and more and more by the ^pre-education" provided in depth by propaganda. At the moment when the attitudes learned by propaganda begin to prevail over The "natural" attitudes that are man's second nature, they become collective, and the prop gandist who has taught them can then calculate more eastk what a given stimulus will elicit from them-

DO MAO T S E - T U N G ' S PROPAGANDA 1

Mao rigorously applied the principles of Leninist propaganda adapting them to his own circumstance* He did no more than that, but he did it with remarkable precision and perfect comprehension of the given facts From the point of v k w of propaganda, the iituation had three essential aspects: the compi*** absence of mass media (no newspapers and practically no posters), the vast number of people to be reached, and the revolutionary character of the war he led Because of that lituabon, the two principles of his propaganda had to be education and organizationBy "education* is not meant here merely intellectual instruction or the promulgation of information. Information—directed and manipulated, moreover, on the Leninist pattern—was, to•On

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gether with instruction, incorporated Into an education whose aim was lo modify the whole human being by giving him a totally new view of tilt world am! awakening in him a range of feelings reactions, thoughts, and attitudes entirely different from those to which • • was accustomed.* By "organization" is meant that every individual must be put into a network comprising many organizations that surround him On all sides and control him on all Levels. But die aim is not to stifle the individual through organization it is to make him an active pitmbtr of that organizationThese principles underwent modifications according to change Ing circumsninccs. Obviously, the period ol war must b e distinguished from die period of consolidation.

J.

Tlie War.- From 1926 to 1949

Education In conquered and more Or less controlled territories, the task was to spread the principal revolutionary theses of Manlsro via slogans, through explanations of the Three Principles of the People." and by meetings at which the weilthy and the exploiters were to be denounced. Political education was aimed less at agitation and rebellion and mure at slow end deep Infusion of certain economic notions bused on the widespread desire for land distribution. Meetings, marches, banners, and posters were used for the disseminition of these slogans. Explanations always took place in naturally structured groups, such as the Peasant Union. Political education clearly was pushed much harder in the principal propaganda organization: the army. With the help of a permanent Manist education, an attempt was made to raise the political level of party and army members. This was accompanied by the struggle against putschism, individualism, egabtarianisTn. and so on. Trie object was, therefore, not so much immediate rebellion as 'political mobilization." in the course of which propaganda had •AJUvugh M-n alwayi ( I ^ T fir* plwe to education, propaganda In the Ent pF*lod received equally intra** JiHerilnm. Thr .ti * U tu elicit hatred-, to (pUT natunlw and patriotic fcrUntf. to play an itte p i o U q t ot th" 4.ilJ]-.r and on the fav at rtprU-Jj. Hen m l o r l b f WitfunaJ ur*it| ul pnjplfcJUlda.

Appendix

(3°S

to set into morion the masses, who would tliemseloes realize the catchwords and promises of propaganda. This may well be an original idea conceived by Mao: he who formulates a slogan not being the one to fulfill the promise it contains- The slogan will mobilize the people, who will then have to do the work to attain the objective contained in the formula that excited mem in the first place. In non-controlled territories, t h i i type of work wan much less intense. On the One hand, attempts were made to reach enemy troops through prisoners. Captured enemy soldiers were objected to intensive propaganda, new political formation, complete transformation of their view of the world (this process later became brain washing), then they were released. This liberation was in itself a propaganda act designed to show the Communist's generosity toward their opponents, but beyond that, the released soldiers were meant to eihibit their new attitudes in the midst of the old army. On the other hand, the revolutionary struggle led Mao temporarily to occupy zones that were later abandoned—and frequendy —with much infiltration and a great How of people back and forth. Here the purpose was to leave an ideologically formed popolation behind when the revolutionary army had to withdraw, In the face of an enemy widiout any ideological weapon, this permitted Mao little by little to contaminate the enemy army when it occupied these territories. To be sure, these zones could not be left too long without propaganda; infiltration and partial occupation had to take place to renew and strengthen 'political education" At that stage, political education consisted in taking the prevailing misery, the widespread oppression, and the spontaneous reactions against it as points of departure for providing coherent explanations, for designating enemies who could serve to catalyze existing hatreds, for sketching out the myth of liberation, and for showing the means of that liberation f cooperation of the people and adherence to Communism), with all these elements united into a solid whole. Organization The propagandized people had to U inserted into a system. During the period of battle, Maos organization contained three elements. First, "Peasant Unions" designed to organize the peasants of a region, to teseminate slogans, and to explain them

3 O6) M A O TSETUNC's PBOfACAiVDA in discusnon gruupt T h o r . with their very Lvgt member­ ship and Unix—at first gluiice—very liberal orientation, were under the official direction of the Party Mao could M Y with justification: "Would II have been possible, even if we had let up teds of thuusands of schouL fur political education, tu educate all the men and women even in the remotest village* in so short a time? ' These Peasant Unions were neither combat nor action organization*, but large groupings to serve the purposes of psycho­ logical organization and polarization1

The second element was the famous parallel hierarchy. Side by side with (he official adminKtrulion he administration of the enemy government In tlie battle areas f u clandestine, revolu­ t i o n * ^ and • •• • - I i le •-11 n i -i i . • r • 1— w a s being built. This adminstration had its own finance*, its own police—and very precise propaganda functions. The point was, Mao said "to mobilize the masses bv reporting to organization work-" J

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Actually, this administration transformed general ideas and new views. acquired •• • a m u l t ol pubf I C H I education. Into action raboos lupplin. wa(es and so m Social and economic trans fonnatkn h i d to take place un the inside and secretly until It could be superimposed on prior organization, and the participa­ te -ii of the individuals oil all f-b w u needed to strengthen the conviction that this transformation was not imposed from outbid* and above. T h e methods of mobilizing the masses must not be bureaucratic," Mao said. The parallel hierarchy was called upoo to "make propaganda in every instance* in order to create ii sense of participation In the common WOlfe, with Mao knowing full well that as soon iui this feeling of participation was acquired, all action would provide its own justification and would involve the individuals more deeply. Mao often insisted that the creation of the parallel hierarchy could serve no purpose without this propa­ ganda designed to lead people to act "spontaneously." h

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Finally, the third propaganda organization was the army. The Chinese Red Army is an armed organization fulfilling the political tasks of the revolution . . , It ha* important t u b to fulfill propaganda among the masses, organization of the m i t t e n and i on i . . The Red Army dors not make war for war's sake: tha war i t d wtf for propaganda in the midst Of tfht mass*!.* Th* first task was to shape the soldiers of thai Red Army, to teach them why they had to fight, and then to turn them into props-

Appndix

(307

gandifti and camen of these ideas Tbey had tu b\e tvmbıotıt*lly with the dvüiini in order tu conquer the proplr keulugi Lilly fend progressively auinUlatr thnu Such propaganda methods are subtle and • |V% cover Ilıt wliole gamut from tenor to tüdu/truıah İroni parada to Involvement in action- But it can take place ouk m the case of 1 strictly popular army. This emerges from the famous and oft-rtpeated formula; T h e army must function among the people like a fish in water." This implies, of cour*e that such an army must be recruited from thr population, eipres* l( find 1 up port in it* share its interests, never act as it wuuld in a conquered country, serve the public—and thai Its struggle have positive meaning for the people If these prior eondltlotu are not fulfilled, no propaganda instrument can be made out of the army (this ac­ counts fur the failure of the attempt to adopt Maui methods in Algeria j . The fled Army is a propaganda apptHtut became it k formed on the basis of ideolog} and became its pretrucr mobüızeı ihe people they have no choice but In participate ajtd to become involved. h

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2. Since ¡94» After victory, the propaganda principles remained unchangod. but were applied differently. On February 37, 1^57. In Ins report to die Supreme Conference of the State Mao said; "One cannot force a people to renounce idealism or force a people to believe in Maoism. To settle ideological problems, one must act through the democratic methods of discussion, criticism, persuasion, and appropriate education " But we must remember the—incident­ ally quite remarkable—method of the "Hundred Flcwert" As in Kali Germany in 15^3»' there was a period of apparent liberalism when expressions of all son of crttkUtn, deviabooism, tdetliiQc and religious inclinations and to rm. were tolerated, tythoriied, even encouraged. Tben. after all opponents had ipoien. the wive of repression hit them amat fad sentence*, and. above a l l political re-education took place The purpo*e of the ^Hundred Flowers Campaign" was to make opponent* come p

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out LCL the open to they could be arrested and eliminated The lubscquent "rectification" campaign could not in Mao's wordi, be "gentle u a breeze or a tumrner rain ior the enemies ol the people.* Even a propaganda centered on education cannot do without terror- In order to arTivo at full compliance with propaganda, the 7 percent "incorrigible" individualists mult be eliminated The objective of Mao's propaganda is a double one: to integrate individuals into the new body politic as deeply as possible* and. at the same time, to detach them from the old groups, tuch as the family or traditional village organizations These groups must be disintegrated, always through action from within* For this there must be maximum conformity on the pari of the individual According to men like B Cuillain and Tibor Mende. this enterprise was succesiful Mende has written: "Rendered perfectly malleable by ten vean of pounding, the prototypes, mass-pro¬ duced by the party, are now replacing lite categories imposed earlier by Confucian scholar*," On the other hand the task is to make the individual work beyond his strength for economic development. All Ethese leaps forward" rest exclusively On prop.iganda. Propaganda may take the form of eicJtation, mass demonstrations (China must overtake the United States, and hatred fnr capitalists is arotsedj. or emulation d Lt Fiatiht*-*. but It is mainly in the form of education and persuasion in the economic domain. When orientations change, methods changr a, well

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placed in l l * mold evoy year . . . I hav» g o « through a remold­ ing oi my own thoughts . .and I must continue * Thar it. QB the one hand, a mold of the perfect Socialist man which appears as the absolute ideal There is, on the other hand, M method 10 press people again and again Into this mold, to give them this shape conforming to the ideal. This is no Longer tbe spontaneous formation of the new mm a* a result oi changes in the social structure, as with Karl Marx. Nur b it the voluntary formation of a new man who must be built, but whose eventual entity is not known, as ondei Lenin. For Mao, the idea of the moid implies the idea of a recognizable Ideal piototype to which every man must be tailored. This interpretation by Mao is con­ firmed by hi* concern for laying down criteria of action, dogma­ tic dehnJtioci* as to what a man shu*üd br and, among (-then, bis ılı criteria of Good "Acts can be judged good by these Hi criteria ı if they sene to unite the people rather than divide them, if they are favorable to the building of Socialism, if they con­ solidate the people's democratic dictatorship, If they consolidate democratic centralism, if they reinforce the direction of the Communist party, if they are favorable to international Socialist solidarity" These criteria of Cood reflect Mao'* concern with furnishing simple means of judgment fur Socialists and clearly defining what kind of man is to be shaped by the mold. Party members must also go through the mold. But this assumes that there is a man or a group making the diagnosis, and placing people in the mold, in any event, it is above all a psychological and ideological operation. But tbe aim i i perfect conformity of the individual to the Marxist doctrine and the new structure of so­ ciety. And the adaptation will be slow, progressive, and sys­ tematic as a result of successive remolding!. r

Encirclement I have already covered this important point in my discussion of horizontal propaganda Let ui only remember that the army no longer has a favored role as a propaganda instrument.

3.

Brainurtdtmf

This term has become famous, though it it onlv a secoodary aspect of Chinese prupaganda To be sure, brtmwashing has nothing to do with the type of magic described in L'Ejpraw, is 1957, under that title. The aim of brainwashing Is to retrieve enemies and transform rather than eUminate them—either to make them exponent* of Marxism and then send them back home, or to turn them into edifying example*. The process, tu tbe extent that it can be recognised, has three principal aspects: J. Tbe individual is cut off from everything from hi) fonneT social milieu, from uews and iniormattoL This can be done only if he is placed in a prison cell or a camp. The individual is totally uprooted The absence of newt places this man, who has been used to receiving irtformation. in a vacuum, which is bard to endure after a certain time. Complementary methods are added to this: a certain privation uf food and sleep to weaken his psychological resistance, to make him more susceptible to Influences (though there is no intention of exhausting him), frequent isolation and solitude, winch cause a certain anxiety, increased by the uncertainty of his fate arid the lack of a definite sentence or punishment; also frequently i n c a r c e r a t l o D Ln windowless cells with only electric light, with irregular hours for rreals, sleep, interrogation!, and so on, in order to destroy ev«D kii sense of time. The principal aim of these psychologic*! methods Is to destroy a man's habitual patterns, space, hours, milieu, and so on. A man must be deprived of his accustomed lupports Finally, this man lives in a situation of inferiority and humiliation, aimed not at destroying him but at reconstructing

a A man placed in the above circumstances is subjected to a bombardment of slogans by radio oi by fejWprisoneri, who rhcugh prisoners themselves, showei him with reproaches and * g j because they already are on the road to their own re«i " p i

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construction. Tliere is an endless repetition of formulas* explanations, and simple stimuli. Of course in the beginning all thii merely evokes the subject's scorn and disbelief. After some time, however, erosion takes place; whether the subject likes it or not, he ends up l o w i n g by heart certain formulas of the catechism repeated to him a thousand times; he ends up inhabited by these slogans, which still cany no conviction] he docs not yield to some advertising slogan, for example* just because he knows It. But it must not be forgotten that the prisoner hear^ nothing else, and that the incessant repetition of these slogans also prevents any personal reflection or meditation- The noise of the slogan is present all the time. The result is an involuntary penetration and a certain intellectual weakening, added to the impossibility o i leading a private intellectual life. 3. The third element of brainwashing, closely tied to the two others, is group discussion according to the ^democratic method." Obviously, the leader must be an agile man, intellectually superior, able to answer all questions and objections. But deafly the aim of such discussions is not that of free groups. Tbe first objective will be to create an ambiguity in the mind of the prisoner with regard to his ideas and convictions, an uncertainty, a doubt (After all could this be true?) on questions of fact— for example, on inforrnation that the leader (the only source of inloimaTion) will provide, and at the same time a feeling of guilt based on ideas of morality in the individual himself. (1 belonged to a group, a class, a people that has done much harm, great wrongs to humanity. This kind of thinking will attach itself quite easily to a Christian conscience, for example.) The creation of a guilt feeling obviously leads to the desire to get rid of i i to cleanse, purify, and redeem oneself h

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When it appears that ambiguity of conviction and guilt feelings are well established in the group, a new stage can be reached: erplanations. These explanations are furnished on two levels. One set deals with tbe personal situation of the prisoner* his guilt his humiliation, his imprisonment: he is showo the legitimacy of all that, its logic, its validity, so as to eliminate his resentment toward his jailer. The jailer, on the other hand, reveals his goodwill and his good intentions toward the prisoner. The other •<* of explanations ccnccras the general problems of the world and the political situation. History and the universe are depicted with

the help of very clever dialectics. An entire WeU^schauung i* unfolded progressively not dogmatically and with great speeches, but adjusted hit by hit to the personal experience of the prisoner, and with individual explanations given him. Gradually, his traditional—Christian, bourgeois, liberal, or feudal—view of the universe is removed and replaced by a different view. At the same time, the slogans previously learned by heart now fall into place. From then on, elementary formulas, repeated a thousand times, are alternated with explanatory discussions in depth unceasingly. Then there is a final stage: "The Road to Redemption-^ Once entered into the new Weltanschauung^ and even more convinced of his guilt, "the individual is eager to deliver himself, to purify himself" He then accepts the rules of belonging, and the actions proposed to him. He thus justifies himself both in his own eye* and in the eyes of others. h

This is approximately the technique of brainwashing- I t must he noted that because it is slow and uses complex methods and highly qualified personnel, it can be practiced Only On a very small number of individuals, who are hand-picked and special persons. Moreover, its effects are not very durable except when the prisoner, once liberated, enters a society with the same Weltanschauung as the one imposed on him. If be does not, what was built up will eventually wear off. In any case, this technique Is only of incidental importance in Mao's system-' * This type of brainwashing W M practiced in the Algerian internment camps after MBT. I D JapuMy 1 9 5 8 an officii] notice dealing with the French Psychological Action, was published in the campi simply confirming what we have f%td e i r i W Somt detail* deserve to be remeinhefedi £•)] The ctihlBcttfep of Indtaduib into "inoorrigable." « f t , " ^ M t f l m b W * ( b } The nation that according: to thfc ChinsK, braiDwuhmff took betwaen s l i months Add two J*ais depending on the level of the prisoner. But In Algeria, L*H time Wtt needed (which undoubtedly accounted for the French failmTeri}. (c) The division Into thr™ stages: {1) dbintegmlon of the- individual, ( i ) •Creation of a collective conscience, plui reindofmriiianum, {$) peU-entKitm and fuU enqireirftnt In the new line. I d ) The cication of collective: aebMificiplkie, wfth u a c t k m i applied by tk« inmates themsdvei. fe) The system o l Kmi-weetfy "waves *? wivea of discipline, « S V H of gaiety, wive* of *Otk* atudy. and » en. Tbjt created a cnllectto H a t ( 0 The mechanism of literatim: Tbe people have the right to pvdon atimV nali": the collectivity o i the camp in a general meeting, with diKuaiim, crinkzum. selfnmitiriiTn on the pan of tho» to be liberated who had become m m b e n of the New French Algeria. All this h i e d almost tmttreV became there: F B I ne realJy unable [denlngy, aod particularly becauae t h o u were no tuffid.cntly well - j ; Cadre*. a

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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'jt#.

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DOdb, LwnaidW.: Co*bb*U PrilcIpW ûi Pnrr^gajld* ' Ifj a rt J —1 : Public Opinion and Propagande New Yotk: Henry Holt & COCDpajiy; 1^48, ; IVi .riifa; ftj PiythoJogy and Tichntqu* . New York; Henry HoJt & Company 1955. DriÉiicf-iai. Jaccjufl= Î^J Propagande-. vuwAf force po&Hgiw. Parti; A. Colin; 1950. Dupcury, Bernard- £ j Propagande don* la guern- ifAlgérie { i u 0 - B 5 & ) Algitn UaJaan Jei Livra; 195B-

-

1

J

Virtuchung. Berlin; Pont» Verlig; 195a Eldenveld Samuel J : "Fenorud Contact QT Ma» Propagande* la Katief al. EUuL Jacquti: Trvpagaûde et évUigékMtiûn " Ji# 1 m de ftuangf Jiafltfcm F-.: •••

I ! - :: - i h: Tagebuch der

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1 T J Cria* de foptriii >- et la propagande" Fol * i Via . ••n.Sl1 "La Mythe* rcudems." Diogène : "Information et propagande " DiQgètt ( 1 "Les PréluppftaitlOrii aùdûlogîqufd ^ T ^ . -J ~ ErWlgetiatFw Thê-

; £d Taxrtalcjui oufrrtfiudurtMe- Para; A, Colin; 1954. [Tfinilat&d aa Thé Ttdirwkçitùl Socirty. New York: Alfred A Knopf; 1964,] — : T* : jande." Bulletin de JT.F.0-F. ( 1 9 5 4 ) . : i r J T, - . M i>*f de prvpBgtmdç. Coun potyoopli; >9S^ H

Fanage Ladialal: UriUiri Fropaganda," tnifrd Norton* Wprfd Filk*. Flullpp* vli- Foutu an dét»rt txtôtx* coiïecttvti- Partf; A. y

Coebbelf Jwephi D#r An^rfS. Aiifiù^atu •Pi h

oe* Kumpfmtù

(194&). MÎCÎUSIL

Munich: F. Eher^

:

Homey. T b W«m*c Perwufüy
r

f

InkeJ« Aln- FubUc Optf*« an Sooiet Huflto Cambridge. M u f . i tUryud Unlvmity Pr«i 1958InitltxLte IntematJoul de Frene- L a FWriona du poutwk J V fai p*vw F

>

irtoo. Frederic* C-i FuMi Opintort aid Propagsnda New YoA; Thomu T. Ooweil; 1950Jtnu. Irving L . tod Seymnr Fttbbicb: "EflecQ ct Fear-aroutlng Contmuraicarjooi on RsctVa tr> e . New • . • •" la Hitt e( aL t i U , DanleJ, Dwwlo Cartwrtght, StmxtfJ J B d e m e l l tod Alfred M c O ^ a L « ; Fu^ÜC OpMcm and Propaganda. N e w "r •: * Drydeu PraCp 19^4. tc-Li - FirAjr^wii. Eruti OlcB&mUp ünd Patau! Folic*. Oxford: Boulkdge; WSKncli, David, and Richard S. CrutchGeld: Theory and Problem* of SodJ F*y^ • .-Y- New l ^ k UcGraw-Uill Book Unpanyi lfi^B. 196*-

31f Kna. Enut. and Nathaj) U :-.-> "Trnodi in TwiWbrth-Ceutkiry Propaganda • In Leraer j . HaTu Sprier, ri dJ Gar-run RddJo Propaganda. StudaU of the [nitJtiirjr ov World Affair*. New York: Oiford UWmlty Pre» 1944 r

h

I-ange M u CuAv: ri £rxi*o4iftg. dor £>tl*>iungjjyittfm dmr Sott(ftfiHW DeuittUandj. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Praokfuilcr Hufle; JflJ^ LaPteie. Richard Tracy; A T W t / 0 / Soriol Cmiwl. New York: MciCraw Hill Dock Company: 1934. uaarweU. Harold D-; Prycnppatriido^ arid Politic*. New YurK; Viking Prttt. "Hfile dei Idiokpgie* " Rapport AiSP (19911). "Political bind PaychoJogitaJ Warfare* In Lamer ieA)* "Tie Strategy rj| Soviet Propaganda " :.. U n w (ad.). ; "PrOpagaiula and H i i J Loarxuiiry " Pryrnaairy { 1930). and Dorothy Blumeoitork. Wirtd rblvfuHontffy fropagpnde. New York: Alfred A. Inopi 1 9 3 » Laxirtfdd, Paul F . Bernard Renbut± and Haial Caudet; The Peppier Choice. New York; Columbia L niveriity P ™ . 19*8. n*8u i n d Robert K. MarioO: SfttdieJ rft Rud4o und M m FrojKigfWMifl Traniactloni of the New York Academy of Sclencej. Seine* I I . 6. 1943. LJH. Alfrod M - 1 i i : ..• f f m t io [Tnderjfdnd Prppogando New York; flinehan. 1

b

r

F

LdnJfi, V. J.: Stitcttd Work*. Motoow; People* Puhltilnug Home; 1954Lomer Daniel («L)f PrppogW* fai War * i r J Criiit New York: G*vjrgt W Stewart; 1951. : "Effective Propaganda, Condition* nod Evaluation " |n U T M T (ad.l. Lawln. liurt: RawJuing Social Confbdr Sdeclfd Pa per I on Crotcp 1 ^ ™ » New York; Harper & Brother^ L94S Up*rt S M "Oplniqd Formation In a Crlala TMruaHon " I n Katz * i ot h

MaiDougait C; LndffrrWifLg Fuhlit Opinion N*w York: The Macmlllan Company. 1951. MacFerquliar, Roderick <ed ): TV Jfundnrd Fit**™ Campaign and the Chlnfjp tnteUccttiaU. New York; Frederick A. Fraegen 1960. Maler, Norman B. F-; PnJncfpbf 0/ Hupr«jn Hiitfiionj. New York: jotm Wiley A Sou; 1951MaoTae-tung: Seleclfd Work*. New York: International Fubllahen; V o k L IH Mautorpa, Paul: Fryctalogie del rwtit-enwftHi t u r u u r . FarU: Prefatea :."mvenllairredc France; 1950M*Krtt M#um. L'Actim ptychalogk/i**. P**{*. A. Fay*rd- 19^9. Uerton. rkrhert K. 1 Moaa PirtvoriofL The Socio! PayrhoJogy of a Wgr Bond Drtw- New York; Harp* b Broihm. 194« Ukrttu Adtoou. "Folk c propaganda " Pnvologifl e otta coitivmporeHa

: F r k ^ i a ^ H . . • . _ rloreuce Editn^ LQi^emlaria. I f t t j MonnerCri, Jul«; £ j Cwm- rn qi^rtion Pi. J. Faral: Gallvaani 19S* —: Sociology and r i „ ' - K j , of CoamuMarn Bofl«: Ba^rxm PnaM I K Moru Edgar: The Slort. New York Crura PreatL i960. Murwn, Edward TV Uanajrnwni of Men. Hemlhook *m Syaurna«K Dauiopmerat of JUuroie end Control of Hwtrw- £*h*L*ff New York; Henry Holt A Company 1911J

rt

h

P

Og|e Marbuiy B ; Pu&iic Opinion end MUkW Dyndmi^. Bo«ton= Houghton Mifflin Company; J9jo. Oplrpton Pohll^LfC. L - Ouvjage cuUnrtd ( r

P

Packard. VMM 0.;

PemWeri

The MM™

New York: David Mcfcay Corn-

^tarlin, I^majd L. and Morru hoaenberg: Propaganda T t t h u 4 ] u o i in [nxQ^itWal AdverUungJ In Katxet dl. P.jhlr. Heina. D r r Rund/un* o!r fnafnjniefir drr fcJitii. con 1933 Ml jgjS Hamburg: Haru-Brsdow Jnatltul: 1995. Ppl. Quentin: Ld Propaganda pOHH^ue, une lec^m^ur nuweUe F*ii*. 11«. Pokruki. Jacijuea: U frt##r la prt^pcrgonde 1 : rppfnlon pulque auut focrbpoKon. Paris: Plon; 1943 Pritcbett. Charlea Hrtnnan: Thm Tenna'taet Vo/jV^ Atflhori^. A Sfudy tn PoWic AdmrraLmolion Chapel Hill, N C ; Urnvmity uf North Carr> Una Preu; 1943Ptoptigonda Ttthniqutt irf Omwn Fwctom. New York: Jnitituta- of Piopa ganda AnalyaU; F

Bauactuung, Hennann^ The Revolution of Ntha|i#m Wa™*og 10 the Wear New York: Alliance Book ' 1939Batwald. P.: De fttprtr dei nuaaaa eatW da pa^rk4ogie ccJIecNctf Pb U. V. NeucbAtd: DeUchem at NwetU; 1949-50. Rieaman. David: The Lonely Croud New Haven: Yak Univerrity Praai.

P

H

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HJa« Curl: Joaeph G<#bb*U A Biography New York: Doobl*d*y Com pany; 1948. rlcbln Armand; LB F O U M T panda. Paria: Ediflona de Miauitn J953i "Eapertbe de k f»urM parole/ SnraH d artidea Qj • H! r ^ 1949), h

H

4

Savvy, Alfred;

La Kstor*

modete.

Fariai Pramaa

• itulm de

Fruot;

— : LVfMm puhnflirf Parti. PnaH ' vajiatalrtai da > 1 - Ift^fl Schnnun. WJbur L : Comaaunacafton nt Modem Sodefy_ Urfaaraa, D.; UniveM." of Dltaok FreaiL 194^ - Edwajd A m*i MorrU JauMti: "CabenM and DmntEgraniv b lb* Wahrmacht." In Leraar fed.).

3*o)

Siepmann, Chürlea A.: Radio. TV. and Society* New York: Oxford Unfreility Pre**; 1950. Sil. Franz A.: Die pöÜHjctw Propaganda der ,V.S I? A.P im Kampf um d(e Macht. J!«-;. Winter; 1936. Sladen. Frank J<: P^cMatfy and the War. Ptj. IIL IV. Springfield. EL: k.!. ••; r 11 J C 1 :JS; 1943Smith. Bru» IV: Tiopfig&ida AnalysEi and the Seien« of Democracy/ Pufäic Opinion Qmrteriif. V [1541). Speter. Hani; "Moral* and Propaganda/* In Lemer (ed ), and Margaret Otis: "Gennan tUdiofropaganda."In Lamer ( a t ) . StoetzeL JeaAn E^uta* dVjn* fMjrie de* opinion* Fari*; Precet TJoivir. altaitts de France; 1943f

P

Tarde Gabriel de: L'Opinkm et ia fouU- Ffirijj Alcanj 1901, Taylor, Edmoodi I'm: Strategy of TiTT^r. BCVCDD: Houghton Mifflin C a » pany; 1940» TtfLilhi.:::j. Serge: The Raps of the Howe*- New York Alliance Book Co.; p

tots Tr&dfr Arthur; E Technique* of Guidance. New York: Harper A Bröthen TrumaUp David B.: CoKrnm^ntdJ Fmet* Political inifferfi and PuHto Opinion, New York: Alired A . Knopf; 1951, h

Waldrüp. Fraok C, and Jweph Boa Hu: TeJioiriOft: A Struggle for Ppuwr. New York: William Morrow * Co.; 1938. WhyU^WÜliuoH.: The (>ganiiaHon Mdn, New York: Simon and Schulten iB5& Young, îimball; Social Ptycholvgy* New York:

F.

& Crotta;

1947*

acbnn-renW, obtained try propaganda, advcrtJilng, 40. flj 88 89. 64, 119. ifln, F

boomorane rfiact p | r t 3 8 « ^ a f l i . aap BHXiTrkauo\ Françoia. aAfl bra^waahidg, 303. 311-13 h

i ? * i m MB* "74. a9o-i and mo- Bmiier, Jerome: S., u at

veradry I D , Buddhiiin, 198 to political Bulganin, N Â - . L L L aa. propaganda, S&S; bued 00 lUJÜlary Bj^antLum, 49 responaee, 30Q within Airlift, propaganda to. 43. 54, 74» 134, cad™. trvatioaal ÎE#CUJ .

1 İDsHflctıveiie« of :

47

3

1»

agitation prc^jranda, IO, Jtft, 7 0 - ^ A 77, 7^ 7B. 10% İ l i . İ t * AlbEg, John, ü 3 at. 94 * , 1B7. aj3 la. AlhüT± T * 133 Akarla, 1 3 a , a j » , 11: IL. 43*., ( f t F

p

61. 7*. 7 4

Bft 99- 1 ^ 7 ^ I f l l L

189, aoj M&H 164. i6s 380. aflfl; and failure Of French artecnpti F

at hTainwaihiilgi 313 A.

lUgfrie ffMvamm (ffimXS&afl

aJitnation, through propaganda. IRO-TA aliened «û*«uaoeiı, in Soviet Union, 179*.

American 1^ ^on 144 anti-SaniOım, 19% 17a JL anwty. in modan *&ci*ty

h

154,

army, dvfc education c£ ta W«torn damocradM, A T T A Haymood, 118 Ada, oropagaDda in, 4«, 1x0,134 Athenian demücracy, L4, S9 Amtrla* 134 •njflfary ratpefiae, 300 AMrbaijan, 9& Bartlett P. C, H i beoavioriim,. 36. 39 Belgium,, aifi SercM Edward 7^ 119u, Bıdault, George aiA birth rate, lacreaaed by rarrr^^anda. a^a black (covert? propaganda, i ^ 16 and A-b

5Ç ^.. 161 ru

^ımjeutock, Don*hy ^-a. b

a16-17

p^Utkal jauty

H

^cempala^* propaganda, lal CampbslL Anpia, 353 la. Carnuap Albifft, 146 Canada, 17a

caphtalimL. t a t , n*% U 4 Cartway iJ1, Dorwln, 379 I L Castro. Fidel, 58^ 7*. 7«P 1 J I > t» CatLoliciifEF. faillirai qf, franca, 1 9

Caucam, •emorablp. ıfin.» i a ^ centraliud atate^ 41 Chan.:-:.. P aoa T>

aao

0 , i . , « . Coınmurnat. flı, 0% 7J —a, 7^ 6 » , öß. » ıiû» 141. afia aSft, W A M Mao Taewfung fJi LriMf- Rid Army, 906-7 .'v. fis. aoi> aaS-^a daai ûMmabeàWÊ* J7.115» 177. eoj Cold War, k_. 13% 13% a i l a^:. ajfj Common Market, 119 Commune*» rnedleVa^ 14 CO I • LT : JJ . VJL I jfjii, m m EM*İU ,J i ü S—^ 164 Cocnmuntun, i f t j B ^ 1 6 9 * , t r t itf7, w i " S * A O , tffa\ riRf a* logy ami myth, • • 7. 194; aaa alaa r^hlna, Comm^oUtn Urraah^avv Nltha; Lenin, Nlic4al; HaO Taatong Soviet Union; Stalb, loa*! Commuai!* partlea» laıneanmaa. bv aa n a t W pa - .r- • > ™ ^ CMlJiiunliti, ^ y 1 4 * . ¿5. 45, Sa, US- 1S4; 157. iSS. i . > s 7 l ^ a ï * OCftdlüonH refler, i 38. «D. a Ä ftHtad by propaganda. 3 1 . 3« 1

£

P

Nia Eactuallty. problem of. 53-7 raleehocrfi 4a Instrument of propaganda, 53, 00 and 4L, fli family ar obtfacla to horizontal propa­ ganda, 8a Conıtant, it*rıjamin 03 Fafcüm, 17a, aoj, 145. a d j CooHdga. Calvin. i?3 ccrvart ( b i a t i ) propaganda, 13, ı â and Iarhleo juictptlbUlty to. 193. 394 fear. In modem aociety. 153« ' 8 * tj löa-t CrutchnaEd, Richard S-, 83 n. Öj. ¿77. federalim. 4 1 Fflfc*. Philippe de. ITS 179 cryrtaİltaatiOD, piyihûlûgkaJ, 169-8 PigifO, L i r 313 cuJtural triafiVıfliÜChrt, L^anlnV cali for Fort** & Llbêtrion NuiiOiwlt ( F .L . H I . lOÖrt. « H 5*- 6ip 7*. 7 * Wrt-H 143* . *esiculture: Individ nal psychology rbap&d » ı by, 34 ft; average, ai prerequisite far France. 3 1 . ^ * J H 100. H I , l a f l a , propaganda, t v ^ U j reaponiM 14 137 »rıd n. 137, 14I. 189. lçj9 Aı8j 340, 347. 390. Jeaoaon network h^ propaganda m«t!âed by 309 13 n_; trend tL-ward ı&c4a Uatlön C •••. h. i . - ^ H İ I . I . 131. 133. 134 In, 43 aftflj Amerken prOpagHFLcU •ritflectiva rrx 70; agrittıltu^aT Dean, Jamei, i ^ n cctiitrucriot]' in, n f failure ol Ca> do Gaulle, Charier. 046. 248 thüllctsra l n I M Conuaiimüt party demand, rymboLi ol. 1Ö3 n. En, 318. afin. i Ö l regrouping i r i dernocracy: propaganda by 10.133-43 Right En. 3 i y ; Communiât pr^pa^aaHİJ ^53i *54- a j j . 356: ar fundamental I En, 3Cİ3 304: anti-alcohofc pro^n^Hiîdii Ideology. 117; and public opinion, In. 3GJ3; Lncrtased birth rat« In, flfla; 133 and n_. 134. JaSj rpft LaSH* I ropaeanda i n lor Encrcujc Id OUm^ r of içtence and teC-hoology ahji3y 131, 139-401 tubfecttd ro L-• -• i warfaro 133. 134i 3JJL • d«nla. 303; Sconbidour UL A04 propaganda weapon forced uporj. fiencb FiycliologJcal Aitiotr. 3 1 3 » hr ı . ! : Pevolutkın 117 133- J 34^ IJSH I37H ta8n J 3 İ - S rwritm freud Sigmund, g i j O j oppoiing propaganda! In, Friudmann. M . C_. 334 obligation to btK^nve religion, 251 Fundaf?\*nUiU af SwMüi F q i W o g y depth pfYchology, ' i -.. Dewey. John 5 13 O. Dicka, Henry V. 370 diplomacy, and prcpâ£tiu(İ4 13 Gallup. Cflcrge. ıÖS direct propaganda. 15 dissociation oflı-it d pTTJOigaodih J7Ö- Germany. 136, 345, 37fr at time of Weimar Sepublic. 51; Nasi. ¿ 1 . 186, i o 3 3itt. 379- afla, Jfr? i r i s fffrö Doob, Leonard W rii lark- &3*- *O3Goebbels. Josef. Flitler. Adolf- N » » l 30* afia. 3791 quoted 109, a ? * new army In, 130 3 » 301 Cüebbel*. ] D 5 t ( . 13 n_, ıfln.. iS n-.. aO n. Drienoaurt, ) t c q u n . i - i i . 342 B 5 ^ x 33JL 3 * r*.p 4 m . . aSn. 53 and n=. H r t . s5fi.F 56. 5 7 n . 6or*. E ait Berlin, revolt In. ifl? o3 l i S o - 174ft. ı*W. aaı. MÖr ayflEyjpt: and United Arab Republic^ 33 370. ı S f l ' i . j iB4 Î95; quotecL i n . and ft.; wcalmeii of piopdganda l n 35 n. *6 0., 38 a . 43 i r . 131 ft-, aofl. 100 ags*. Kiienhower. Dwight U . 3-17. »53, 373 election campaign, m * flee tiv trie 11 o! gOVcrameDit propjgandj b^j 137. l i t . propaganda during. 19. 361 130, i 3 i 13a; OTdta State elite, formation of organic groupi of. g i Çroup dynamSca, 80. Si eacapt. ai ne^J oi r-wdern man, 151 n grouping., and prupaganda, 9-11-33 LBIH. oup*, partitioning of. aıa-ıfl Kuiooean DtFarue Cosnnl unity, l a y , aate-mala. Fridav * Î Sonowa in. 153 Guillain. B. ao8 •rlrttnrialljm, lan guilt feelirj^f, Almukted by propa­ erpectaticru lyınbolı of 103 ft. ganda. j8y £iprm L\ 1 L. 311 Gurfeiu, Murray l . i 7 0 i T l t t . . aÉUn. rf.ııfL-Luo! •. in jErHt • Cuogo 74. 77. B5

triâtİH 14

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u

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dirringviahed from fhmriwAg. I aj it I VmnTJ* I>0. 197 i - j ia£ HartrH?y Eugertt L . 1 3 n_ hatnd roji? in propaganda. 73- 74. 7*. 77, i 5 * 183. aoo hwlvniim. y^n. Hetoid Trän**, K e * i " i A 70 hero, cuh r 17a and aV# 173 hungry, ai t u r i ^ A b e E i t J uhvth. 40 Hillef. Adolf, a l i u . , 1711., iBn_ 53 and n- 53. 57. 60 and n.. Gi. &3. 71. 7&. S5. 89. i a 8 n . 133. iftS3Ü384 L a8S, 390 HLtler Tonth 171. a w Ho Chi Ufnn* 7a hnrirnntal propaganda. S0-4. 309 n_. 3io Horntv. Karen, 154, 3.55, j f i j ; ouutfd. 188 Kovland. Carl I , 44 ti_ Human En Eint*riug. 10c Human Rt L l l o n j. 143. jaB l8o a&3^ In Uninid Stat« 141-3. 1S30-J SS7

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P

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3

F

F

d

F

h

• • • j j i . u i - i

-

301

HUPTKHIU^ L'

r

Irion, Frederick C_ 53 İtilan, 198 Italy: F a i c i i t 51. 39a. Goounuuirt party r

fiLeMl

Jat-njbinLfm. 344 Janywi&, Horrti, ^ n.. 370. 384 n. Japan, 343. propagiuida for lo-a^r birth rate m. ana Jeanaon ruftwork, ta F r a n « 13«. John$oF., Lyndon B.. l a s h

Khruïhclbev, NikUa. I Î 41 "4 45 and ft . 46. 48H 5ÎH 5^H 59- 8a 13a, 133. •U*.. 174 eëflï and T T i t M on EcofkOtnJc rteavtd 63 n,, 65.097, 378 • • E nut, 139 n. Krvkudil, 153 Kronriudt Htbcllion, 78 Krüger, quoted. 378 Ku Mux Klan. UAA F

h

h

h

h

ai a

"Hundred F l o w e d campaign, Mao i

laborJ ideology of, 134; propaganda eflecti on, a.33-4 p^jitf^ Hunvarian rtnolutkei (ly863 aa l&a. langujiEe, a i pur#- found" i n propa­ ganda, p8o •85. >97 LasweH. Harold D . i n . , iE. i Q I n , LdentiScatioti. lymbob of 163 n. ^83 r 197 240. 341, 383 and FI. td^ology. 118-17. and propaganda. 38. LuartfFİd Faul F.. aıa, a f l j 38? 103-aoa; drBnition ni. 118 leadtralï£p and group opEnlon:, 100 Hyk-hev. LcOnLd 334 r.. Leibaa^ Nathan. 85 n_ 90 n S39 tu tackmerrt direct and Indirect. 16-17, Lenin, Nikolai. Jan., 13, 1 9 « . . 3a n.> 340 53 and n- 60 n. 8 i 71,78.9J 10Ô n. Jodia. 56 106 109 ». 195. ıçfl. 4*4 3S7. 3flS utdLvlduah propaganda addrewd tOj aa 310= aïjd Doctrine of the State, 13 pjirt of masi. 6-9. 105-8. t j o : oecd Lerntr Daniel. jrLi n_ 363 n.. 39711. of, for propaganda. 37 and r.. 131, liberal democracy. lupprtued hy pîopa>»8-53. I S M O , colleotlv* <xnter gfttfc(U a8 of Entere«. 49, 50. j i ; dkminlahed by lie. at EnrtrumenL of propügajıda, ¡ 3 . 80 participation iq meal l w i c t y 149, and n Ëi ISlj ^eed of, for repression. 151 [Jui-Viet, 99 n. individualüt Bocletjr. go. g i g i 93, ^7 LiJion. Robert Jay 311 it. lDdochma & 8cj "yS and r... go and n Lipaet $ M . , l i a 143 n-H 144. aSü i Literacy, aa pr^requiaite for prûpagarjda, Lnformatlon: dErtlngm'shed from propa­ LIO ganda. 8J; pcnonaL judgflient eUrnteratujt. and propàgatjda. 14 ÜLAted by lurfarit of 87= propaganda "looely i r o w d / B-g, 147. 148 related to, H 3 ^ L € 144—7, a j o Lüldı X I V . 133 Inkelrt, Alex, So n. 370 Lumumba, Patrice. ?4 77, flj innuendo, technique of 56—7 mititute for Propaganda Analyaii, ri, McCarthyüm 68 107 13 Tf. y a c ^ j u g a i l , C 6s, 3 0 j a??. 37S intcgratinni propaganda. 1ft 70, 74-fc Incral Propaganda, 31 81, 04, 10^, 1 1 3 . iS8, a i o Mftlenkiv. C w r a i 55 Iraq. 33 Mao Dun, quoted, 14 H

307-s

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Ph

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B

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r

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J r

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INDEX

iv)

İ l » Tasking. 13 t o d Bp I I t m Napoleon, 13, î t as 1 U 1*3 * ¡ n . - j - . i . . sift, 3 3 İ K S 3 * . 7% NaUer. Camal Abdel S i 58 .• _u Auocaetioa of : ^ T ( . A Tft SJ, 8a Ri. &5. »Ö, n o . J f i g i t aû», JS3J M I 1 t W x j GÍ "mold, T » * , . aatLoualixm^ aroused by pc^pe^and*, TÛP ı m lOfl-ıü' pfopAiiiwi* of 303¬ 35, 41 a89L 41 fın^damcntal ¿=l-s>líta-, 3131 apolitical education* by 304-3; 117 and bndfiWMhlrj^ 305. 311-13: Pt4> NATO. 119 -H Ucioaı ı n a a i l c d by. :y>5-6; Hazla* l8> ag. 3P 5 7 » . T * * 157. l8B* OFÍÍW**Í fled AJ^LV fit 1 ' I ;. y - 1 lif. ı«fl 197. 3J.3.. 041. * 4 ^ a6s and "Hundred r W ı campáis* aTO. i 7 l , "7^ a-*, aflo, -L. «Sa­ by, 3*7-8; ^d£f«*wn^Qi'^n' ín part with Soviet Union, 17B unity' methcd of. ¡toS-fr and crlneedá> üWA and utilized by prnpaeanda, tarla oE ¡-.vi." 310. ata abo China, 37 and ^ ı a ı . 13S-Í3, ai*-»30 Coniniimlat N e p o problem, in United State*, Marahall Han. 69-70 neurOtEa. 1S7-S. i?S Mara, t a r i 37, 157¬ Ntrrt Economic Policy, to Soviet Urden. 310 109 fk hfarjdım, l i o . a B » a8ft 304, 307. 3 " EttWfpApetl, U JOi, l i r i 104. 1 0 Û * I M M media úf ccanffluni catino, t O*—5, NCHdfi Korea, LIOtSe Norih Virtnarn. 78 man juxftW. 90, 9 1 , ga, H . 94 ar>d n_. Nuremberg trialt. 14 SK t A 97H ÇA 9 * aıöj Individual dirniniıbrd by 140. 15U cult Ot I • - J • O A-S , ]Qi Th aoBik ln 17a, 17J Ghátrtwáetjr, L \ I I measen X O L K «• •!:•• eddreeoed to. !" M. Ode, Marhury ft . ••: ^ :¡ •• ! ••*• d al participaUOQ oí, ío political affairs. O W WkJi jdealtigŞt l&n, İDİ i a i - 7 130. 13*. 130 operatienfl] terms, 48 malpjrialianx. 39 and FI opEtJoTi, public, are public opinio* Meerloot * M • Uégret, U a u r k t , tíll*-, rira, * 9 Ortega y Giísei, Joaí. 93 ». 59 i u 118 w.. 93a N_ calhj^rary fls^Ji Meode, l i b e r . 303 jofi, Jog overt ¿wfiiLej propaganda, i % 1 0 end Mendaa-Francft. Pierre 56. 117IL rt rrricro-Hxdnlogy. 75*rûiddlfi rJaaa> ^ p a g a n d l i t a ncrulted Packard, Vanoe, 405 RL, ago from, zofl paranoia, 185 Ministry of Propaganda, İn mod^TJ participation obtftiner] by rmpagind*. «ata, ao. l l S a& n ; afi^J, 30 Mkrtto. Antonlû. r ü iS. * 7 i partit*. polltJcAL pontJcal parnVi ı:::l]ı:::İ.Ll». ı t i . I f l . 183-4 partitioriing oí ^nupa, *Jft—L6 Dx4»UİHtku of indlvisluaK aı öbjüKÖYö Pavlov. Ivan, 9 of propngarıcla, 95 i t , 30 and m, " m o l i " Mao's theory _J. ;e t*- 79. 10?. peace, propatandfl h » 45-8 Fearlin, Lwuard 1^ 75 309-10 l l o r e ^ Le. ta *-> 43 *K ı*7 w , 130 * L , Feríele*, w PCeven, R e n t I t ? 135 quoted, 48 MccnerOt. fulce, »70 political educe000, i n Communist leaaa. M orín. E^97 31 FL 33 n. ?8 fls. 19a, 304-5 Ho«xrw trial* (1938), 14 political partief, 196. iarj. 030, 473; Motion Picture Aasochcion. 67 propaganda n-ıftdfi by, a i É - a i motion pbcturetf utilized by rpropag&nda, political propaganda, 6 i flo> iSa a*. 64. JÛ3. US» A M p u l i d a a l preaent-day focui of InCereat, -rv • • i \ • • • 11 -; rtncarcb, t ? A, Munich, rucceaa .-' propaganda opera­ popukrjüTj dcniity. i u ; T^arulred i • tion at. j 8 effective propaganda, g ; MuiulinL* Benito, . ıafl potter. uQlized by prtpe^aûrK 10 myth, 3% A » 6 . 1*7. * 4 İ *+*> *45- Frocetip 14^ 130 14& *47 P-;-. . utilized and creatod jare-attive U tn p r o p a g a n d a ^ 300, by rprrrpafltiMİA, iı^ 3 1 - * , 38. 4^ Ja. J01 4 i , igg-anO F

F

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1

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HJ

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ri

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P

+,

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1 1 1

1 1

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4 +

+

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MM pre) udice, and m pö Rinda, 33, 35> ^ 184. l W aofi preTOidLtAtad uuaciuuaneaa. In Soviet Union, 179 ra^propaganda, 13, **> 30-1. 3a and « * »96, 3 « * _ prrer. utilized by prt^r^anda, iO ı » , i o i 104. 109** privatization, ıSûrt,, 190. Iflí. ara progreaa. N.lnJ rn^ 39, 40, 4 1 . 4J- I * , P

P

•en

proletariat, a i i . aS8 prrpagandai baaed oO paychology. 4> 5* *}. 33-8 puralm; iclenU£c oasi* ca% a-A M l - A n d e a n , s. 3*. 60. ÛJ-Sr 69-70. 85 (tea nlio United States). Stalinlft 5> 80. r j i ija, 1841u, aoa, 281 (*e# alto Soviet Uiuout Stalin^ JoaoDs Hltlerian, 5. Ao and ik. 6 ı , 6a, M 5 i*t#ûl*Q Hitler. Adolfn Nanti)t addreued to Jfidividual ar part of dUS, 6-9^ 105-8. 3,50? extnrnai dnuacterltrici of 8-3*i tn+aL 9-17* 97T 105-17. * 4 l . m y t l * utilized and created by. ıı> 3 1 - * , 3

P

3a. 4AP 4t> 4*1 i 9 9 - » > ¡ flf » crEüCitnX 11-la, 153»-; Soviet. I l ­ i a , 13 and n 14, i 6 f k . aa and a6f*.. acjik. 3 i and f t . 4 3 * - 53-3*o. 6 1 . 73 and n., 78. 84, 9S 111. 11311.. iao I39rt. 114-15, A77P *78i and diplomacy 13: and literature. İ4J direct, 15i D r o i t ^SP 10 " i d ft.; covert. 1S1 l 8 and n , , 5911,, aSatt; K O Ü I - ^ . I ı^_ ı ; - : j 8 l democrarİLV ¿8, ^35-4!, a53t ^ 5 * *S5i •S6. continuEty and duratfnn of. 17¬ *0; changeabÚEry of 18 and *>J of agitation, no. 33 ft, 71-4x 7fl> 77 7*V 79. 105. n a , prycbologicaj and physical action aa Inseparable rlomeoü of l O - i . OTganİniHöO OÍ. 90-4, afl-cj, 99 fx; hoinan^relatiomi tech­ nique of 14; and Orthoprajryp 95-39; Qfttur*i of refatiomnip tû public opinio- dS. 171p aoz^i9. participattoö r.ltainid by. tóa., 1 $ ^ flTJ; action-rafiei obt&ined by. sS-o^ 30; n i mte^rarJon, ağ. 70^ 74-9, B l . & + 105, u s , 188. aiOn Internal charac> terirtLca of 33-6^ *od DOo^firang e ( E « t 34 FV. 38 981. 997J jtaecv typet .reiudica. and eatabUihed opinion* utilized try, 35-6* 37. 3&, 16a, 183 and au 1Û4. 188. aotX J77. •Tflh and Fdwlogy. aÖ> 193-3M; human needa met and udlrzw by 37 and r*^ m . 138-53, 158-60; « d o logical pr«urjpotf nont utilized by S Í 3fc 4A 4İİ relatad to tedmolcgy. P

h

40 4fr 84i of tbneliniua, 43-8; frar peace, 45-*J; relatad to *u.p S*J RÜgioua. 49. a-79: and truth, 5A-81; faliebood ax Instrument of 53, 60 and n_, 8> aunoce- aa tachruque İO, Î S Î innuendo aj tKhrUqua İn. SÖ-71 intentinna and İnterprejtar flonf m, 57-61 i LeninM, 80 and 6a, 89. 111. a w , aoa. m *77^ı 303 (aaa olto Lenír^ N . l • .1 Soviet Union )i defkıition of flu preseritniay Chinea^ 6 ı , 63, y z - n . So. Bl i l l (aee OÍH Ouna. Cuıomıı • •'. Man Tie-tune); categoriea of, fll-&tt JEhnjthvhev'tj 6a (jee oba Ehnul>chev NlÜt*¡ Soviet Uniouh pûütıcai 8a So, atJi; vertical 7S-80- 8aborfaontal, 80-4, » 0 9 « , , 310; diatupguiabed froccı ınfoTnıatEod. 84; rational and IrraHonal. 84-7: Mflql o p t s l condtDoaa for eriilenco MÍ. 90-105; combloatlon of demographic plttUOmeoa required for. 95r " mearu of reinforcing cppinloni. 1O4; and need of average standard of l M n g , 103-8; average culture required for. ıoti-ıa related to inlomıaUon, n e a i 8 144-^p 950; neceuity for 116-80, l 8 a - 7 poMttrn; by gcWfnmient iay JJeV 130, I 3 i i 3 ü a> üWWtarv p

h

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h

fr

F

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P

p

P

h

h

h

f

P

?

T

h

n

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p

b

ri

weapon for democracy, 133* 134, * 3 ¿ 137* 138. »3*-S PWrAnj aSo pea> •onality and íreedorn dearroyed bv, 137. 171. 17ft; required t o provide modvadocLi for aacrucea. 1 4 * - ^ 174, 177; M renvedy for Loutlineatp 148; peychoLogkaJ effe^ti of. 161-99; ccn> p l e m c r d a r a c t c r • I . lSa-i reli^lOni pcnooallty conferred by. 16Ğ-T: CrEtLcal Judgment luppTe^ed by. i8fr^Tlh 173î aHenarJon through. 169-78: artificial needj created by 176. i.77i psychic dissociation effete o t 17B— 18a; thought devalued by, 179, J8O, overCTdtement provofced by 179 it.. tranrEormanİEm of words in* a8ü¡ ahoclr effect of, ıflı and M 4 . 437; rñjchridaüzatiorj agafnat, 183-4: aenalbihzatioo to. 18V7; ambiguity of prycbolo^cal e^erJc of I87-»9H guih i w l l f i g i ftlrmilatad by. 189; War, 100, 37» 173- prr^tizatJon u h l i z * i b y 191. iga; W t o j o t t f c d efittíí of, 193-457 poarirrt; ^ateletno'" role fa* 904 end *4 translated into 'verbal actien,* ao?; and arouptait a ı a - > made by poLiücaT p a r t H h

3

+

t

F

propaganda (oCrfOMuai) sluWej; affactf on l*hor a U - 8 r^urirfp; uBtCta OO cburehaa, 3*8-3*1 i-hfi-%-!J of International. ¿4 i- Jo; * f facta of l o t * ™ ! , 350-7; need for HTriTJ attitude toward, m- defend agalna*, B37i dlfflcultiea of mouurlag - i ^ i;vrt:..-:[ of, aijo-77, **7: <J**tkdty ol, a*B Inadequacy of cnathom i t i " J rnetbudf for •vHaumDimt j | . 179-7; problem! ounccied with 1ritJi1 .-!. J • • violent t u r u m *8o; affectiveriM* of. 1* • 3pj- limit* of 494—309^ uiti-rn*], M moat efitctive, *y6-3; by Ccrrimuniit partJca, roarOn lor effectiverteia of. agS. "related rorponH^ to, 3^-300: "pre-utivci reroOnr** to. 301; Mao T w h i b g l , 303*13 ( « ah" China. ConuriuiUit) paydrOarjalyrLi, l j i 154 payriotogionl ntctkm. by Wertern democraclM 13^—7 pevubolugiral LTyvtaUEHtfan, I&i-S paychnlogy. 89: propaganda baaed OTJ. 4 i ' i 33-8 poidrt; behavioriitic. 36. 69, depth. 38. 8fl of tnillnctt, 30; and effects of propaganda. 161Li;*. tea aleo r ^: vidua! public opinion, 68, ^ ^ 1«lOa, | U 165. 198. 199: nature of re-latlonlblp to propaganda, a6. 171. a f l t - u j In modern atate. 133-8. 130. 13a. 13J-40h flJl, attempti at analy1I1 o i Id United Statei. 087; limited uaefuln™ o l tOrveyi of, 167-70 Public ReJatinni. 383: in United States, 335. 187 p

j

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b

r

r

r

h

ri

h

racial prejudice, propaganda Ineffective againrt 33 radio un-a3J udtlicd by propaganda. 7. 8, iO i l * I03 104, i o j 16a Rant. I . Arthur* quoted^ 67 tationaLratiou, 155-6, 57. fLauachnlnp. Hermann, 60 HtwifVl Dig erf. 64. 70 rtfies, conditioned, arw conditioned r

h

h

h

r

s

reflex HelOrmacLon, 14 Pdchitag Brc 14 "related reaponaa." to propaganda, l y o 300 rellv-iOU* propaganda, 49- *79 Renaitaance, 14 rapetitloOH principle of. 17 t#^ 18 rdpOTiae: related, acfl^oo; auxiliary. h

JOOL prt-actlve. 300. 30 J

Sc+virt Union feonfinuedr utj as dclcnder oí democrauy. 6o¡ P¿d¿(iflío Lampaígn in. ?a^ rjonrtadt RctwlUun nv 78. ouLtur? u) hntegr^ted ifLto u n j v v K of propag^iKla, 109: publit optniun in. 124 A., n j , I J O - L ¡ r-.c Year Plana of. l a i . 334 ft; agltatorv and ihock i^rkeri

Aeoarto of tfw CarfWA Darnoerafac Jla pu&Jic, 83 : . of the U a t t U TA* 93 * . flaw* atAction r^iWafre. n6± n. RedrmariH David. iBfl Rltia. Curt, 11 JL, 59 n. fllvero. quoted 937-4 rUvet, Paul 110 fieman Empire 57 Roman Republic. 14 Rommel. ErwU. 57 r

1

in.

t

h

rumor, fuice^tlhlhry to. 393-4 Ruarían Revolution. S9

d

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r

b

h

h

h

h

h

h

P

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h

1

F

H

h

u

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191. iua, and uulttical partios, aso, » 1 ; propaE^nda cofU rwl alwaya counted by. 374-5. " f t ¿dro guvernfne^l rtetlalfa, ¿4, 373 rtrrcutypef, uiüWd bv pn papaalt^ M - 3^ 3f]. 37. 163 arid n. 364, 1 « . 306H 377. 376 Steveniün Adlal E-, s.53

j±r> A

United Aiah J - i u i u 13 United Natkai*. 13 n. United Stalat. Bg lao, 486. i i f l . aj6_ h

344-

»47-

H3t

17J.

a^n..

JP*FI.

3^3^ "ivlh u u l u r d by 3a, i n U m, of uparuneiiUil ¿mfia^anda, j ü . j?. M r p o prubLan ••. j (atluallty an prupaganda ttuiuula uf, j j , poaa of. al deíender oí |Jberly 60 ¡ cunlurmrty in. AS. 149. "afttatnn" aa. G^L prcpaganda o> integration in. 7S-6 maw media of -^^rnunlLation In, as; uudi>rdcvelE>ped nitfun* aided by 134; fluntan H«|at4f In, 141-a. iSJn.. 387: cull of hero in. 171; ttaptffurmation in polinVn] pflTtiei of 3l6. Public Relation! In. 995, 3^-7. ualoni In. aa6. 337 -v l n. inO 'tiarnph al analym of publk opdnhon aftV h

4

r

h

a

MWlblllratlon, 184-7 Shlb. Edward A . 9 » , 370. 376. 184 and ra_ 3$j ibock eflcCt of propaganda. 1S1 and nBO4. 337 5bM0 PSOL "jlcslcton" role In propaganda, ao4 and f t itogana: ai evocative tymbdb, I ^ P ; MaO i . 304H 305. 308. 3o8-9>3llH3ia ScclalLrm. aaa 933. üü4h ^35. asS. a88 aa ftmdarnental Ideology 117; Wí Communism sucErty; Individualist. 90, 9 l 9a, 93. 97: mau. j f f trwtf toclety •oClologUal propaganda, 13. 63-71. 81 sociology, 89: propaganda baaed on. 4. 5. 6 ftdd collective prrruppOfiti™ In modem world 3S & 4°F 4 Sophoda ^35 Soviet Undoo. (aft 134, MX. afij, aflSn 396; propaganda of n - i a i 13 and Pi.. L4i i 8 n . aa and T> afin.. agn. 33 and n., a3fl- 5 i " l 60. 6 i 75 t n ^ A.. 78. &4.íA i n 113 H.. t » , 190% a i j - i l t 177- Í 7 8 : orrhcdoi Church m+ 130-; reffei udtued by, 3a; Ehruabcnev'a clalma lor agfldJrural production of (igS7>. 5«-*0: r ™ r

unhfliUB, j J

4

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Sartre* Jaan-Paul, 378 6auvy Alfred, 53 i 6 n . 59 n . 77. 1*4 PV> 1*6 n. tdifccjjphirtrtla 183 KlcT>ce aa fundamental myth 40 lefret CMJcEcuinesi. In Sovlvt Unlco> 179 election, technique ol. ^6 and f t »U-crLticlim. propaganda o l 11—11,

h

n

uncoiuck-uJ. the, reached by propaa? Undecided. tha ard prou^jj^iKla. 465a. 34. aRo

h

h

h

141 n.- adí-crltichiEn ka. 1

Lomcurtiibrult of curuciOLiiitfat fn* 179 n.; Cült uJ prv|;.i - ,-i.Jj N_; in pací with Naxüi a^8. rrJ ppcu drifc •f ^ :••=!. L IP, 391. tee UPHJ CcarpL rnunum. P-. !.• . ! -i-v. SÍLÍIM. Lruhh, Kifcolai; Stalut, ]u*tf Sptitr. Han*, ij^n. Stalíhjnovistci 141 n. Stalin. Jo*e|_ S, 4 ^ 6a. 139. 17a, 179 n_ fktth ceur; J I I . - L I . 414 nupagandü neceaaary tcr. i a i j and bmblK opinicn i23-6 130, 139^40, a a i . íuntriurj uf. and pn-

•avert, FranaJJn D.. _sv 348 Roper. Ehno, 03 sfiS ftoaeuberg, hiotttl 73 Rourveau. Jean-Jaoquei. ia8 FtubeL M- 137

ri

H

t

Tnrijhy. Leon, abd truth. RIKI propa^airda. 53-61

B

r

United S i n n Army Infunnanvn ^trvka. pk

r

SfiFTirTiung. -JiiÜit^i.ipthcd írom J^JítrUg.

aSnStuebel. Jean, 173. Í&.T¡ and ao4 a8ü 391; qjuottd. 96, 163 n., 165, aoí. a 10 •tructure of eipectataw. uf propaganda, 37 n. S U B propaganda upíraüon, 38 fMrt-trys. bjnited vírlu-lnt^H of. 367-70 Swpdcn, 15a «vnibriili. relatad tü Earrrotypea. 1&3 a.. l&a n>. Syrta* aa. a3 n. h

r

Taft-Hartky k w , ftfi tatftCion. 133. 143 Tchakhotin. Serge rfv p*.. 373 T*thnotagteQÍ Svtfciy, TA*, a j í . a^i techriclDgy: prupuganda relaied to, 40, 49,84; rnod^ru man obseased by AO y> Crlrvirion. 6, 175-6. 336; utábaed by propaganda, 103, 104. 105, 3¡53 ¿54 Tibertuij l i a t±nebnesi. prOpa^nda oí, 43-8 Tifo. M^ffbaL íag torture, oí política! e n e m l ^ aoi tutal proptejanda. 9-17. 97. iOJ-i7 343. gbpÉctlve oonrliclúna OÍ. 105-17 L

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vcF-tril uction,^ 307 vertical propaganda. 79-80 Ha VLfrt.Mnih 9»n. Vilben de L l i l e Adam. Colunal quutedn 135-6 Voice of America i a . 103 -r

r

wa- pmpap; rhda. 190,

*7S

H

Walai. WjTter. 44 n. Wirier&eldj BradJurd. inH and n. while (Overt? p^opagartda, Í3, iG and PI Whytc. Willütpn H . 84.3*3 Winance, Eltutherfua, 3J1 A. Wtmt+totoi fJitlurV 390 worlí: rola ra modero Üít, 14*-^ mechanization OÍ, 180 World Wfrr J 89. 333 Wurld War a ñ& and i ^ u ™ bito "war ansa* of Amerloan »kberi. í 7 0 37a: atudiea üí üermao toldherv in wafre of, 9.70-a.. 376. a&4 and n.: And failure of Carman wvprn^nim occupied courrtriea. 396 and n WrigbL g., u n r

r

Young. rCtmbalt. 1:3, a n Yugoi3avia. 33a

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rtj

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378

r

Jacijur* EUuJ wai born in Bordtfiuj. in 1911. A Graduate in Jumprude&ce i n 1936. he thereat** L., • .:. Frcrtcb uruventtjn until he wa> discharged b> the- Vtcby rrgiuw He then joined and fought in the RtsiatajiU. After Franc*/* liberation, while Attached to the city government of Bordeaux, he 1 . named Profetsor at the law school there. En 1947. he waa appointed to a chair la law and social historv el the [mtitut dEtudei Pulitiquej. His iAcrvaririg reputation as 1 tigtiifjcant woal and political philosopher wa* Grtl eitabluhrd in the United States bv the publication here of The Technological Society ¿1964). Propaganda (1965), and The Folifkul Jifuiton ¡1967)1