PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW Controlling Excessive Government Actions
E. Thomas Sullivan Richard S. Frase
1 2009
1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright © 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Sullivan, E. Thomas. Proportionality principles in American law : controlling excessive government actions / E. Thomas Sullivan & Richard S. Frase. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-532493-8 1. Proportionality in law. I. Frase, Richard S. II. Title. K247.S85 2008 340'.11—dc22 2008006939
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
The only stable form of government is where the rule of law reigns and does not depend on any person.
—immanuel kant
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PREFACE
in this book we argue for more explicit and consistent application of proportionality principles when courts in the United States are called upon to decide whether a challenged government action is excessive. This normative argument is based in part on a descriptive claim that American courts are already widely applying various proportionality principles. But these courts rarely make explicit reference to proportionality, and when they do, the principles employed lack precise and consistent definition. Much of the problem is semantic. In the United States, when most people think of proportionality, they think of symmetry or balance (the relationship between a part and the whole, especially in human features, art, and architecture) or a constant ratio between two quantities (so that one varies in direct relation to the other). If people are thinking about government, they might think of proportional voting strength or representation, and if they are lawyers or philosophers, they might think about retributive theories of criminal punishment, which propose that penalties vary in relation to (or at least not greatly exceed) the offender’s culpability or “just deserts.” Independent of the latter theory, most American philosophers would also recognize that nonretributive (utilitarian) theories of punishment require that penalties be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense (measured by the social harm caused or risked by the crime, with consideration
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Preface
perhaps also being given to the need for greater penalties because the crime is difficult to detect, hard to discourage, etc.). In the legal systems of other Western countries and in international and European regional law, these legal and philosophical proportionality principles are much more fully developed, and they are explicitly and frequently invoked when courts review legislative and executive actions and lower-court decisions. As in the United States, these foreign reviewing courts do not seek to substitute their own preferences as to the optimum or most proportionate solution to the matter at hand; instead, they recognize the greater institutional competence and/or the greater democratic legitimacy of the government actors whose decisions are under review and therefore confine their oversight role to setting meaningful limits on the severity or intrusiveness of government measures. They seek, in other words, to safeguard citizens and other government actors from excessive government measures—to prevent clear cases of disproportionality. However, all proportionality concepts require an analytic or normative framework—proportionality relative to what? Foreign and international laws apply several well-defined disproportionality concepts. Criminal penalties must not be disproportionate to retributive notions of culpability, and all government measures, whether criminal or civil, must not be disproportionate in two distinctive utilitarian senses: First, the costs or burdens of the measure must not clearly exceed the likely benefits (a concept we refer to as “ends” or “ends-benefits” proportionality). Second, the measure must not be clearly more costly or more burdensome than equally effective alternative measures (a concept of necessity and narrow tailoring that we refer to as “means” or “alternative-means” proportionality). American courts often invoke one or more of these three proportionality principles under a variety of doctrines that only occasionally use the language of proportionality. We discuss the many examples of implicit and occasionally explicit constitutional proportionality principles that U.S. courts apply. We also examine the historical origins of these principles in just war doctrines, briefly survey the use of the principles in foreign and international law, and discuss early common law examples of proportionality concepts in the law of damages. We also note several contemporary uses of these concepts in nonconstitutional American law. We seek to more clearly define the different types of proportionality principles illustrated by these historical, international, and contemporary U.S. doctrines. By doing so, we hope to encourage American lawyers, judges, legislators, and legal philosophers to apply these principles more frequently and more consistently. However, we do not propose to substitute proportionality analysis for all existing standards of constitutional judicial review. In particular, we would retain strict scrutiny analysis in the areas where it currently applies; although strict scrutiny implicitly incorporates ends- and means-proportionality principles, we
Preface
ix
believe that fundamental rights and historically protected classes deserve the stronger protections provided by the rulelike presumptions of strict scrutiny. We also recognize that, in certain areas, reviewing courts have rightly applied absolute principles, for example, principles of human dignity that prohibit public whipping even if it is arguably proportional in all three of the senses we identify. Our proposed proportionality analysis would apply in areas now governed by rational basis review, by intermediate scrutiny standards, or by review standards that have not been assigned to any of the Supreme Court’s three levels of scrutiny. This project has benefited greatly from the contributions of our student and administrative assistants, colleagues, and friends. For their diligent research assistance and source checking we are indebted to current and former students Rachel Anderson, Courtney Clixby, John Lassetter, Kelly Loudon, Aaron Marcus, Nick Smith, Eric Steinhoff, and Oleh Vretsona. Preparation of the manuscript was expertly supervised by secretary Julie Hunt. Helpful comments and suggestions on this project and related earlier works were provided by current and former colleagues and friends Brian Bix, Guy Charles, Joshua Dressler, Dan Farber, Barry Feld, Oren Gross, Wayne Logan, John Matheson, Marc Miller, Michael Paulsen, Kevin Reitz, Adam Samaha, Michael Tonry, David Weissbrodt, Ron Wright, and Frank Zimring. We also have benefited greatly from the careful reading and useful comments of the publisher’s outside reviewers and from the suggestions and corrections of our editors. Minneapolis E.T.S. and R.S.F.
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CONTENTS
Introduction
3
I ORIGINS From the Annals of History to the Twenty-first Century
13
1 Proportionality in International and Foreign Law 2 Proportionality Principles in the Common Law of Damages
15 37
II PROPORTIONALITY IN AMERICAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE
51
3 Implicit Proportionality Principles in American Standards of Constitutional Review 4 Explicit Proportionality Principles in Discrete Areas of American Jurisprudence III PROPORTIONALITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
53 67 91
5 Procedure Implicit Proportionality Limits on Police Powers and Defendant Rights
95
6 Criminal Law Implicit Proportionality Limitations on Criminal Liability
115
7 Punishment Explicit and Implicit Proportionality Limits on Sanction Severity
129
Conclusion
169
Notes Subject Index Case Index
175 251 277
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
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INTRODUCTION
as states find themselves more heavily involved in new areas of public life and as citizens are being further integrated into the polity, the tensions between the need for administrative and penal regulation, the advancement of social welfare, and individual autonomy become increasingly visible. True to their traditional role of upholding the rule of law and recognizing the vulnerability of the individual faced with coercive state power, courts in the United States and other Western nations have developed a variety of mechanisms to curtail government intrusion where it excessively impinges on individual rights and autonomy. Courts have also ruled on whether governmental action unduly invades the powers of another branch or level of government or whether an individual action invades the rights of other citizens. These issues have in common the need for courts to determine when a challenged action is excessive. More precisely, we argue, a reviewing court must decide whether the challenged action is disproportionate in one or more of the following senses—to the benefits likely to be achieved by the action; to alternative methods of achieving those benefits; or to the blameworthiness of a party subject to a penalty or compensation order. As discussed more fully below, we refer to the principles underlying these three review standards, respectively, as “ends-benefits,” “alternative-means,” and “limiting retributive” proportionality principles. 3
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
Proportionality principles can take many forms, most of which are more familiar to readers than the three just described, so it is important to understand how the principles we discuss differ from those found in other contexts. In art and architecture, for example, proportionality refers to the balanced relationship between a part and the whole; in math and science it refers to a constant relationship between two quantities that vary in a fixed ratio. The latter usage also occurs in political theory and election law, where writers and courts speak of proportional voting strength or representation; similar fixed-ratio proportionality concepts appear in legal or informal contexts where co-owners or beneficiaries expect to vote or receive proceeds corresponding to their respective fractional shares. In criminal law and philosophy, proportionality is often discussed in relation to theories of punishment. The most common usage refers to the retributive punishment theories that underlie the limiting retributive principle we identify. A lesser-known usage, found in nonretributive (utilitarian) theories of punishment, corresponds to our ends-benefits proportionality principle. A proportionality concept similar to the ends-benefits principle has also been invoked as a limitation on rights to use force in self-defense, to arrest, or to protect property and prevent crime. One of the earliest applications of proportionality principles in law and philosophy is evident in the ancient concept of just war developed by prominent public and secular figures such as Cicero, Saint Augustine, Saint Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius. More recently, with the rise of the administrative state following World War II, proportionality principles have become important elements of the rule of law.1 These principles provide essential checks on government power, thus serving to preserve formal legality,2 maintain a just legal order, and reconcile the interests of the state, the polity, and its citizens so that state regulation produces more benefit to the public interest than harm to individual autonomy.3 In each country the scope of application of the principle of proportionality depends largely on the extent of its acceptance and recognition of individual rights. In this matter, the differences among countries are ordinarily observed in the areas of social, economic, and cultural rights because the majority of government intervention takes place there, and countries usually differ in their level of recognition and enforcement of these rights. Civil and political rights generate more uniform government acceptance and protection. The welfare states (e.g., Germany and, to a lesser extent, France), as well as supranational political formations like the European Union, which afford comprehensive humanitarian protection, extensively use the principle of proportionality in testing the fairness of their legislation and administrative law. The principle enjoys limited application in laissez-faire countries such as the United States.4 The system of constitutional review in the United States affords the highest degree of protection to fundamental rights that are either enumerated in the
Introduction
5
Constitution5 or, while unenumerated, are “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition,” such as when the public has well-settled expectations.6 The Supreme Court cautiously avoids expressly deriving any of these rights from natural law principles,7 perhaps out of fear that the natural rights theory has no limiting principle that could curtail the power of the judiciary. The Court, nevertheless, recognizes that certain unenumerated rights are protected because they form part of the implicit, ordered liberty.8 Similar concerns with the prospect of vesting the Court with unlimited power to strike down federal and state laws whose general thrust does not coincide with the opinions of its majority9 have caused the Court to avoid widely using the Ninth Amendment10 for support of unenumerated rights.11 Rights that are considered less foundational to ordered liberty are afforded less protection under the rational basis review, and the majority of social, cultural, and economic rights fall under this category.12 Very limited review, perhaps not substantially exceeding rational basis, is also applied to the liberty interests of convicted offenders when they challenge lengthy prison terms imposed by statutes or courts.13 There is a strong presumption of constitutionality of government action involving these rights and liberty interests, with the Court affording a great amount of deference to the government.14 The Court reserves a more rigorous standard of judicial review, “strict scrutiny,” for the protection of a narrow category of fundamental rights—the rights and equal protection of certain discrete and insular minorities—and of the political processes designed to safeguard the rights of such minorities.15 An approach of intermediate scrutiny provides medium-to-high protection in certain contexts, including gender discrimination,16 state encroachment of federal powers,17 and violation of the freedom of speech by content-neutral regulation of speech.18 As discussed in later chapters, intermediate scrutiny (albeit implicit rather than explicit) is also the approach applied to criminal procedure standards, imposition of criminal liability without fair notice, eligibility for the death penalty, and the use of severe fines and forfeitures. The narrow definition of fundamental rights that are afforded strong judicial protection in American jurisprudence, combined with the presumption of constitutionality, deprive many individual, social, and economic rights of meaningful protection against government intrusion. The Supreme Court has recently identified several areas of economic and social regulation that require heightened scrutiny, and the Court has explicitly invoked proportionality principles. These areas include the use of punitive damages,19 land-use permit conditions,20 civil forfeitures,21 and criminal punishment.22 Finally, the Court’s concern that Congress’s broad remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, if unchecked, would be damaging to the states, has led to the judicial curtailment of these powers through the principle of “congruence and proportionality.” 23
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
The Court’s express move in these areas toward proportionality as an instrumental principle of review is commendable. It is also in line with the specific forms of proportionality analysis described later, which, as we show, are implicit in many of the Court’s doctrines. Yet, the Court’s arbitrary application of express notions of proportionality in a few select areas, while failing to recognize its importance in other areas of judicial review, undermines the doctrinal value of the principle of proportionality: It seems that the Court’s intention in using the term “proportionality” was to increase the intensity of judicial review in the select areas from rational basis to a more rigorous standard of review, thus reducing proportionality to a role of a quasi standard of review placed somewhere between rational basis and intermediate scrutiny on a continuum of intensity of judicial review. A better approach for the Court, we argue, would be to recognize the instrumental role of proportionality in any standard of judicial review of government action. This book first identifies the many forms that proportionality standards have taken and categorizes and more clearly defines them. Our principal theses are the following: (1) that proportionality review is emerging in U.S. law but is not yet a unified theory; (2) that proportionality, even when explicitly invoked, has not been applied in a coherent fashion; (3) that proportionality standards should be more clearly defined along the lines we suggest; and (4) that every intrusive government measure that limits or threatens individual rights and autonomy should undergo some form of proportionality review. We do, however, suggest retaining the more restrictive, context-specific standards that apply under strict scrutiny review, as well as certain absolute prohibitions such as those imposed by principles of human dignity. Our focus is thus on public law and civil liberties. However, to demonstrate the wide variety of proportionality principles and the broad support for them, we also discuss examples broader than government-versus-citizen issues. In addition, we cite instances from foreign, regional, and international law in which proportionality review is explicitly and frequently employed.24 Courts and legislatures use a number of retributive and utilitarian proportionality principles as guides when deciding whether a given measure is excessive.25 Retributive proportionality strives to ensure a proportional relation between the punishment or award of damages and the actor’s blameworthiness, as measured by the harm caused and the actor’s intent, motives, mental capacity, and contributory role in joint conduct. While a pure retributivist approach recognizes blameworthiness as the sole evaluative criterion, limiting retributivism, or modified just deserts, utilizes retributive proportionality principles to define a range of appropriate sanctions by setting upper and lower limits. Thus, the limiting retributivism approach controls both who may be held liable and how severely that person may be punished. In this book we refer when applicable to these two proportionality limits, respectively, as limiting retributive liability principles and limiting retributive severity principles.
Introduction
7
Other proportionality principles focus on excessiveness relative to the achievement of practical purposes, such as crime control or regulatory goals, rather than to an actor’s blameworthiness. This utilitarian paradigm was a central feature of just war doctrine and eighteenth-century utilitarian philosophy. Under this approach, a measure is deemed disproportionate if the costs or burdens it imposes exceed the likely benefits or if the measure is unnecessarily severe considering other equally effective, less burdensome means. We refer to these principles, respectively, as “ends” (or “ends-benefits”) proportionality and “means” (or “alternative-means”) proportionality. Ends proportionality usually involves a comparison of a single measure to its expected benefits, whereas means proportionality involves comparison of the costs and burdens imposed by equally effective alternative measures designed to achieve the same benefits. But assessments of alternative measures can also involve a form of ends proportionality; if one of the measures imposes higher costs or burdens but is also more effective, the question is whether the greater benefits of that measure justify the added costs or burdens it imposes. A clear example of the latter form of ends-proportionality analysis appears in a well-known decision of the Israeli Supreme Court that involves a challenge to the construction of a lengthy security fence between Jewish and Arab residential areas. The court held, inter alia, that the fence violated the principle of proportionality “in the narrow sense” (involving assessment of whether expected benefits justify the burdens imposed) because, although the government’s routing of the fence would slightly increase security, compared to the challengers’ proposed alternative route, the former would impose much more severe burdens on local residents.26 Courts apply the preceding proportionality principles in a number of ways; they can be adapted to fit any context. The intensity of judicial review can be custom fit to each legal system’s normative policy choices and unique history.27 The principles can be applied categorically either as a rule or on a case-by-case basis as a standard. Courts may also adopt a hybrid approach somewhere between a rule and standard, or they may fashion their proportionality review by combining elements of both approaches.28 Depending on the context, a finding of disproportionality can be viewed as problematic per se or may play only an evidentiary role (for example, as a way to infer the true intent of government or private actors). Courts most often utilize proportionality review in the criminal justice and civil liberties arena to ensure that government encroachment on citizens’ rights does not become excessive. Sometimes, however, citizens’ rights may be curtailed under a utilitarian proportionality regime; a finding of disproportionality favors the government, not the citizen. Proportionality principles can also guide a court in settling disputes between two branches of government or two adverse parties. Proportionality principles determine both the legality of government or private
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
action and, if legal, whether the action was excessive in scope, intensity, and duration. Proportionality analysis was utilized in a similar fashion with regard to just war doctrine, where proportionality regulated both the decision to declare war ( jus ad bellum) and the conduct of war ( jus in bello). Proportionality analysis has some points in common with the balancing of competing interests. In particular, the ends-benefits proportionality principle described earlier involves a type of cost-benefit analysis often invoked when courts engage in balancing. However, alternative-means proportionality calls for a very different kind of balance (if “balance” is even the right word to use); it involves comparing a particular measure with less costly or burdensome alternative means of achieving the same goal. Limiting retributive proportionality also involves a comparison—between the severity of a measure and the degree of individual fault of the person subject to the measure. This, too, could be viewed as a kind of balancing, although that term is not used in opinions and writings that invoke retributive theory. Even if proportionality and balancing analysis have points in common, we argue that the proportionality principles we have identified are better suited to serve as limiting principles in guiding judicial review of excessive government measures. The balancing metaphor suggests a specific, optimum solution. But asking courts to determine that optimum solution implies a degree of judicial power and precision that is usually unattainable and often inappropriate. It is easier and more appropriate for a reviewing court to say “this is clearly too much” than to say “this is (or would be) the optimum.” Courts have limited ability to gather and weigh empirical data, limited legitimacy in making complex policy choices, and limited power to enforce their judgments. Legislative and executive officials and private actors are the primary decision makers, and they must be accorded substantial deference and allowed a considerable margin for error or difference of view. However, courts must still impose some meaningful limits on these decisions. Although proportionality analysis requires courts to make difficult factual determinations and value judgments, this is true whenever courts review challenged government measures for excessiveness. Thus, some degree of judicial review is both necessary and inevitable—courts already engage in review under a variety of standards, and as this book shows, many of these standards implicitly or imprecisely incorporate proportionality principles. We argue that more explicit and precise application of such principles will produce more consistent and defensible exercise of essential judicial oversight. Foundations for the exercise of any of these principles of proportionality may be found in federal and state constitutional law, common law, or legislative principles. Although the Supreme Court has adopted expressly retributive proportionality in some contexts under the federal constitution, its proportionality review
Introduction
9
based on that document has been limited, perhaps because of concerns about federalism and democratic legitimacy. These concerns, however, are reduced or nonexistent when a state court bases its proportionality review on the state constitution or when courts and legislatures apply proportionality review to nonconstitutional issues. Despite solid legal foundations and the lack of strong concerns to the contrary, U.S. courts and policy makers have failed to implement proportionality review on a broader scale. As such, U.S. courts have had a difficult time protecting citizens in a systematic and coherent fashion from excessive government encroachment. Widespread acceptance of proportionality principles has been hindered by the courts’ failure to properly identify proportionality review when it is utilized. Furthermore, they have been reluctant to adopt explicit proportionality review outside of a very narrowly defined fault-based analysis. Normatively, courts should employ a consistent basis for their decisions so that those rulings are understood, command respect, and provide a predictable guide to the efficient resolution of future claims and disputes. The diversity of contexts in which proportionality review has been and can be invoked indicates that the principles outlined earlier are flexible and useful analytic tools. By recognizing proportionality principles in their variable forms and implementing them broadly, courts could adopt a more consistent approach to resolving legal dilemmas, thereby improving not only the decisions they must make but also how those decisions are received and acted upon. Questions may arise as to whether American courts are capable of competently applying the principle. To do so, courts will be forced to move beyond the rigid categorization that the current jurisprudence requires. In light of the recent moves by the Supreme Court toward applying proportionality and the experience of other courts in successfully applying these principles, we argue that the American judicial system possesses the institutional competency to use proportionality to protect individual rights and set meaningful limits on state regulation and punishment. Proportionality may also be utilized by the legislative branch when drafting and passing regulations.29 The described beneficial values of proportionality can best be understood through an examination of domestic, foreign, and international experience,30 as well as its history. Examination of proportionality in broad comparative and historical perspective demonstrates the universality of these principles in space and time—these are fundamental, long-standing, and widespread concepts in European and American jurisprudence. Of course, when making comparisons across doctrines, even within domestic law, the specific doctrinal context of the rules is important. Nevertheless, there is great value in comparing rules or underlying principles in differing doctrinal contexts—a kind of interdoctrinal comparative law. Like more traditional uses of comparative law, examination of the similarities
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW
and differences across legal doctrines opens our eyes to new ways of thinking about familiar rules. It also helps us to make the rules more coherent and consistent or at least as consistent as they can be, considering differences in context. Part I of this work explores the conceptual underpinnings of the principle of proportionality, traces its gradual development under the auspices of the ancient concept of just war, and describes the experience of foreign legal regimes, including the European Union, in their use of proportionality principles to control government regulation. Part I also discusses both common law notions of proportionality in the assessment of reasonableness of compensatory and liquidated damages and implicit proportionality principles applied in fashioning antitrust remedies. We have chosen to discuss most of the foreign, international, and common law examples first, even though some readers may question the relevance of this material or be impatient to get to the discussions of contemporary U.S. constitutional law in chapters 3 to 7. We begin with foreign and historical examples because we want to emphasize the universality of proportionality principles, as well as their common themes and important variations. Examining these examples at the outset lays the foundation for our principal descriptive and normative claims, summarized earlier. The proportionality principles we discuss in this book are fundamental, long-standing, and widespread concepts in European and American jurisprudence, and American courts should not hesitate to invoke them. Indeed, as the later chapters show, American courts are already using versions of these core principles; they need to do so more explicitly and with more precise definitions, as foreign courts have already done. Part II examines the general doctrinal standards of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and equal protection clause. It also analyzes the discrete areas of American constitutional jurisprudence in which proportionality is explicitly named as a standard of review by the Court to determine the scope of allowable government intrusion into individual autonomy or the autonomy of the several states, as well as the use of proportionality as a remedial tool for establishing the need for government action to protect a guaranteed freedom or right. Part III analyzes the importance of the principle of proportionality in the American system of criminal justice. Many implicit examples of the proportionality principles we identify appear in constitutional and subconstitutional rules of criminal procedure and in rules limiting criminal liability. Explicit and implicit federal and state constitutional proportionality limits have also been applied, although not consistently, to the severity of punishments and the treatment of prisoners, and proportionality principles are widely recognized in scholarly writings on sentencing theory and in subconstitutional sentencing laws and practices in the United States and foreign countries.
Introduction
11
We recommend that every government intrusion into individual autonomy, be it regulation or penalty, undergo some form of proportionality review unless strict scrutiny or another more restrictive standard applies. Although rational application of the principle of proportionality requires the intensity of judicial scrutiny to vary across different areas of legislative or executive action, we submit that even the minimum degree of judicial control over government regulation must be sufficiently scrupulous to meaningfully reconcile societal and individual interests. Applying these principles will enhance the coherence, consistency, and legitimacy of the courts’ decisions. To date, the Supreme Court, in its ad hoc approach to decision making, has not considered a general theory of proportionality, although the principle has found expression in isolated cases. In this work, we explicitly advance such an instrumental theory.
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ORIGINS From the Annals of History to the Twenty-first Century
T
I
he chapters in this part demonstrate the broad and long-standing acceptance of proportionality principles in Western legal systems. Chapter 1 shows how the tradition of proportionality in government affairs finds its roots in the just war theory that was developed by Cicero, Saint Augustine, and Saint Thomas Aquinas to judge the morality of going to and waging war. Building on the teachings of these prominent figures, the renowned Dutch philosopher and legal scholar Hugo Grotius expanded the use of proportionality to ensure not only that the act of going to war was just but also that its actual conduct corresponded with the war’s objectives. In his treatise on war,1 Hugo Grotius also underscored the key role of natural law in shaping the decisions of governments and individuals. Further importance of the principle of proportionality in the law of war has been recognized by the United Nations. In particular, the UN Charter,2 adopted after World War II, prohibited the use of force except in self-defense, and Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 19493 condemned excessive suffering in the conduct of war. 13
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ORIGINS
The modern limitations on the initiation and conduct of war incorporate both alternative-means and ends-benefits proportionality principles. Recourse to war must be in legitimate self-defense, only as a last resort, and only when necessary and proportionate to the needs of self-defense. In the conduct of war, military actions must seek to minimize unnecessary suffering and destruction and must not be excessive relative to the military objectives they attempt to achieve. At about the same time that these important developments took place in the international regulation of the law of war, Germany, France, and other European democracies began realizing their transformation into welfare states. As discussed in the second part of chapter 1, the emerging need to balance state regulation and individual autonomy has resulted in the adoption of the constitutional requirement of proportionality of government measures to the objectives sought, including both ends- and means-proportionality assessments. This doctrine was also successfully integrated into the legislative and administrative structure of the European Union. Meanwhile, the United States chose to review government action without an express reference to the principle of proportionality.4 This is despite the fact that its system of judicial review espouses all of the elements of proportionality recognized in European jurisdictions.5 The American judiciary, led by the Supreme Court, has used the term “proportionality” only to signify a standard of review stricter than rational basis but less rigorous than intermediate scrutiny.6 The second chapter in this part examines the development of proportionality principles in the English and U.S. common law limitations on compensatory damages in contract and tort. Although proportionality principles have subsequently been defined and further developed, the common law originally embraced proportionality in the general sense. Chapter 2 concludes with an examination of implicit proportionality principles applied by U.S. federal courts when fashioning remedies for antitrust violations.
1
PROPORTIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN LAW
A. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE INITIATION AND CONDUCT OF WAR 1. The Concept of Just War The use of war as an instrument of sovereign policy has emerged with the realization that war is undertaken for the advancement of peace. Cicero said in his De Officiis that accepting war as a method of state policy for resolving disputes must come only after the state has had recourse to their peaceful resolution. He urged that “wars should be undertaken for the one purpose of living peaceably without suffering injustice.” 1 Any other resort to war at the level of state policy is characteristic of beasts rather than civilized human beings.2 From this idea emerged the concept of just war—a method for distinguishing barbarity from the use of force as a necessary element of sovereign policy.3 Cicero’s concept of just war was embraced by ancient writers such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Saint Augustine, a prominent philosopher from Hippo, fifth century ad, wrote about the concept of just war in his treatise City of God.4 He believed that waging war was counter to human nature. Only the injustice of the opposing side could justify and even impose a duty to wage a war.5
15
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ORIGINS
Even when the war to be waged is just, the person thus compelled should “lament the necessity of just wars.”6 Saint Thomas Aquinas agreed with this formulation some seven hundred years later in his Summa Theologica,7 in which he mentioned the basic requirements for a war to be just. To begin with, there must be “the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged.”8 Individuals are not entitled to take the law into their own hands by resorting to the sword, nor are they authorized to gather people to wage wars.9 The assumption is that a sovereign will have made a legitimate assessment of the justice of going to war. Also, because war is ordinarily followed by peace, the authority of a sovereign is required to enforce the demands and fulfill the promises or concessions reached in the negotiations of peace.10 Thus, Aquinas quoted Augustine as saying that “[t]he natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.”11 Moreover, “a just cause is required” for a war to be just: “[T]hose who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.”12 Aquinas finds backing for this proposition in the writings of Augustine, who said that the goal of war is to avenge wrongs inflicted by the other state or its subjects.13 It is required, Aquinas observed, that “the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”14 Augustine, said Aquinas, specifically emphasized that only wars undertaken with righteous motives were deemed peaceful by any true religion.15 Both Augustine and Aquinas agreed that wars guided by vengeance, desire for power, and cruelty should be condemned.16 Three hundred years later, prominent natural rights theorist Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius), disgusted at the Christian world’s propensity to go to war without regard to any human or divine law, published his treatise On the Law of War and Peace (De Jure Belli ac Pacis).17 He attempted to set forth the laws of war binding on and applicable to the whole of humanity.18 He disagreed with some of his fellow writers that Christians were forbidden to use arms.19 Instead, Grotius reasoned that war could be used as a means of restoring a violated right against those “who could not be held in check by judicial process.”20 Thus, he contended that not all wars are just and argued that, to be justified, wars “must be carried on with not less scrupulousness than judicial processes are wont to be.”21 Grotius also reasoned that there cannot be a right to an unjust war.22 Because “right is that, which is not unjust,” he said, there can be no right to resort to unjust war.23 He defines injustice as that “which is repugnant to the nature of society, established among rational creatures.”24 Grotius agrees with Cicero that only when it is impossible to use normal human understanding can there be resort to force in resolving a dispute.25 He argued that the right of a human being to self-defense
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is a natural right, one that is not acquired by habit or custom but is “engraven in our hearts and minds with [nature’s] own hand.”26 Thus, not all wars are repugnant to nature, but one should discover the just causes for war through natural reason.27 According to Grotius, the force of natural law is so great that even God cannot appoint things contrary to it if “the law of nature positively forbids or commands.”28 Grotius refined the theory of just war articulated by Augustine and Aquinas. His requirements of just war were just cause, rightful intention,29 proper authority and public declaration,30 war as last resort (necessity),31 probability of success,32 and proportionality of response to aggression.33 “The justifiable causes generally assigned for war are three, defense, indemnity, and punishment. . . .”34 In pursuance of these causes, just war can be declared in response to a committed or an imminent injury.35 Just war can also be declared in protection of others.36 Quite remarkably, Grotius foreshadowed in his treatise the lawfulness of preemptive wars. He maintained that, although nations may prevent remote or immediate aggression against them, “the suspicion of hostile intentions, on the part of another power, may not justify the commencement of actual war, yet it calls for measures of armed prevention, and will authorise indirect hostility.”37 Accordingly, war cannot be waged as a matter of expediency, as when one nation is feeling uncomfortable about the growing power of a neighboring nation.38 In this respect, Grotius said that no complete security exists in human life, which is why “[t]he only protection against uncertain fears must be sought, not from violence, but from the divine providence, and defensive precaution.”39 He added that, whenever there is doubt about the justice of the cause of war, one must err on the side of peace.40 Grotius recommended that, in case of doubt, nations avoid hostilities at all cost and attempt to resolve their disputes peacefully by conference or compromise or by lot or single combat.41 Even if no doubt exists and a just cause for going to war has been established, said Grotius, nations are to refrain from having recourse to arms.42 The application of Grotius’s theory of just war was not limited to the ends of war. The means of war, he said, were “never to be considered by themselves, but only as they have a tendency to the proposed end.”43 He laid down three basic rules for assessing the proportionality44 of the means of war to the war’s ends. First, the tendency of the desired object to produce good or evil must be determined.45 Second, if there is uncertainty as to whether the good or the evil will predominate, the use of force may be chosen only if the actor has means to shift the preponderance in favor of the good.46 Third, the actor may decide in favor of the means—even “if the good and the evil bear no proportion to each other” or the means are inadequate to the end—if the comparative likelihood of the good occurring is greater than the potential excess of the evil over the good, had the evil occurred, or if the
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potential excess of the good over the evil, had the good occurred, is greater than the comparative likelihood of the evil occurring.47 Grotius rephrased these complicated rules by using Cicero’s simple analogy to the practice of medicine: Doctors apply weaker remedies to fight weaker diseases and stronger ones to ward off serious illnesses.48 He observed that “no war should be undertaken, but where the hopes of advantage could be shewn to overbalance the apprehensions of ruin.”49 Unlike his predecessors, Grotius dedicated several chapters of his treatise to the proportionality of the conduct of war. He established the principle of discriminate application of force and the requirement that the means undertaken in war must be necessary for the attainment of the military objective.50 The treatise is revolutionary in emphasizing the humanitarian aspects of war and praising the sanctity of human life. For the first time, it offered a global view on the role of the principle of proportionality in reducing unnecessary human suffering in the conduct of war. The values Grotius developed in On the Law of War and Peace laid the foundation for gradual restriction of the use of force; the treatise began the introduction of humanitarian law into military affairs. The purpose of this excursus in history is not to provide a complete account of the development of the principle of proportionality in military affairs but to show its ancient roots. Thus, in the next section we shift our discussion to the modernday developments of proportionality in military law, skipping several generations of just war philosophers who have built upon the foundation created by Grotius.
2. The Development of the Principle of Proportionality in the Law of War before the Adoption of the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention of 1949 The world’s concern with war was again on a rise in the period between the Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The conventions codified a number of important customary international rules and limitations on the conduct of war and the behavior of victors in the occupied territories. This was also the time when the doctrine of proportionality began emerging as a fullfledged principle of the law of armed conflict, restricting the range of available means to inflict damage on the enemy.51 Adopted before the St. Petersburg Declaration, the Geneva Convention of 1864 marks the first significant international attempt to limit suffering in the conduct of war. The convention was signed to ameliorate the conditions of wounded soldiers.52 It contained rules for the treatment of wounded soldiers and established the neutral status of military hospitals and ambulances.53 To inhabitants of a country who had helped wounded soldiers it guaranteed freedom from harm and
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even prescribed that, if a household was taking care of a wounded enemy soldier, it would be exempt from the quartering of troops.54 Sir Phillimore, a member of the English Privy Council, wrote in 1873 in his Commentaries upon International Law that not everything is “ ‘lawful against the enemy,’ but only those things which are essential to the vigorous prosecution and speedy termination of the War.”55 He said that ill treatment of “unarmed and unoffending men, much more of women and children” and means of unjustifiable destruction of territory were strictly prohibited.56 He also declared that the principles of just war forbade the killing of prisoners or wounded or helpless enemies and that such killing would be considered murder.57 The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 furthered these principles. They were adopted by the First and the Second International Peace Conferences at The Hague, which convened to codify the generally binding rules of the law of war and warfare.58 The resulting conventions extensively covered the issue of the accepted law of war embodied in the state of customary law at the time of adoption.59 The Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land focused specifically on limiting the means available to the belligerent parties in the conduct of war.60 Proportionality figures implicitly in several of the convention’s provisions. Most important, the document recognizes that “[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”61 Several military practices were specifically prohibited as conducive to unnecessary suffering.62 Finally, several clauses call for a tight fit between the military means and the military objective.63 Despite its important pronouncements, the scope of the Hague Convention was limited to prevention of excessive means of conducting a war (jus in bello64), not unjust war itself ( jus ad bellum65). Proportionality had not found its way into conventional sources of international law regulating the justice of war until the intensification of international security cooperation after World War II, when the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions were adopted.66 Sources of customary international law using proportionality for this purpose were likewise scarce. The only significant evidence that proportionality persisted in both jus in bello and jus ad bellum was the Caroline incident,67 one of those rare occasions in this period when proportionality played an important role in determining the appropriateness of the use of force. The Caroline was a small American steamer that was used to smuggle antiBritish insurgents and arms into Canada to support an insurgency against British rule.68 In 1837 it was destroyed by British forces, who viewed the Caroline as an enemy.69 The Americans considered this an act of aggression, whereas the British contended that the destruction of the ship was in self-defense.70 After long and heated discussions, the foreign ministers of both countries accepted the principle
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that the use of force must be proportional to the threat to the sovereign territory of an independent nation: “ ‘Respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent nations is the most essential foundation of civilization,’ and . . . this can only be legally overridden by ‘a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation,’ and ‘the act . . . must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.’ ”71
3. The UN Charter Regime and the Geneva Conventions The role of the principle of proportionality in the law of war and the law of warfare was advanced considerably by the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the Geneva Conventions’ Additional Protocols.72 These international treaties represent the general willingness of world nations, shocked by the cruelties of World Wars I and II, to diminish the use of force in the resolution of international disputes. They also provide greater protection of and respect for human rights in the conduct of war. The treaties embrace the essential force of Cicero’s words that resort to force without compromise and negotiation is characteristic of wild beasts, not civilized human beings.73 The charter and the Geneva Conventions retained the meaningful division of the law of war into jus ad bellum and jus in bello and preserved in both the role of proportionality.
a. Proportionality of Resort to Force The Charter of the United Nations prohibits the threat or use of force74 except in legitimate individual or collective self-defense,75 thus allowing the customary principle of proportionality to play an important role in the avoidance of the unnecessary use of force. As one of the requirements borrowed from the doctrine of just war, proportionality measures the appropriateness of military response to an armed attack.76 The recourse to force must be proportionate to the needs of self-defense. In this capacity, proportionality closely correlates with the just war requirements of just cause, last resort (necessity), probability of success, and proper authority. Use of force is not considered proportional if any of these requirements are not met. Two important cases decided by the International Court of Justice explored the use of proportionality in determining the lawfulness of the use of force in self-defense. Each acknowledged that the requirement of proportionality is not specifically introduced by Article 51 of the charter but rather was incorporated in the charter as part of customary international law.77 In the first case, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), the court held that the “rule whereby self-defense
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would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it” was a rule “well established in customary international law.”78 The court found that the American activities “relating to the mining of the Nicaraguan ports and the attacks on ports, oil installations, etc.,” did not satisfy the requirement of proportionality.79 The United States’ military attack on Nicaragua, the court held, was so much greater in scope than the perceived dangers to El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica—in protection of whom the United States commenced these attacks, claiming the right to collective self-defense against the military aid provided by Nicaragua to the Salvadorian opposition army—that it failed to satisfy the principle of proportionality.80 Moreover, the United States continued its assaults well beyond the period in which the dangers from Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran opposition army could still be perceived.81 As a result, the court concluded that the United States’ invocation of the right to collective self-defense against an armed attack on El Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica to validate its activities against Nicaragua could not be accepted,82 leaving the United States’ attacks on Nicaragua without proper legal support. In the second case, the court similarly held that United States’ strikes on Iranian oil platforms failed to satisfy the principle of proportionality.83 Two incidents prompted the U.S. military to attack the oil platforms. First, a Kuwaiti oil tanker, sailing under the American flag for protection,84 was hit by a missile believed to have been launched by Iran.85 Second, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, while traveling in international waters in the Persian Gulf, struck a mine that the United States suspected had been installed by Iran.86 In addition to considering these strikes unnecessary and finding insufficient evidence for treating the Iranian oil platforms as legitimate military objectives,87 the court further condemned one of the United States’ assaults as disproportional.88 The attacks in response to the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts were part of a more extensive program named “Operation Praying Mantis.”89 Although this case dealt with the destruction of two oil platforms in the course of this program, the court could not “close its eyes to the scale of the whole operation, which involved, inter alia, the destruction of two Iranian frigates and a number of other naval vessels and aircraft.”90 The court, therefore, held that “neither ‘Operation Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the Salman and Nasr platforms, [could] be regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in self-defence.”91 b. Proportionality of the Means of War The principle of proportionality of the means of war and the rules of combat ( jus in bello) were codified in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949
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(Protocol I). Protocol I stands for the proposition that, if the resort to force in selfdefense is valid, proportionality should be employed to protect combatants and noncombatants from excessive attacks. It is implicitly incorporated in a number of articles that regulate the means and methods of warfare. Customary rules of the law of armed conflict, however, continue in effect with regard to nonparties to the protocol.92 That the rules of armed conflict and the attendant requirement of proportionality ought not to be suspended with regard to aggressors is indicative of the expanded role of proportionality in the law of war.93 Several provisions of Protocol I require special attention in our study of proportionality. Article 35, for instance, embraces the principle of proportionality by declaring that the means and methods of warfare are not unlimited and by prohibiting the use of weapons that may cause excessive and unnecessary suffering. Interestingly, nuclear weapons, whose use without causing excessive and unnecessary suffering is impossible, were not outlawed as disproportionate per se. Having acknowledged that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of armed conflict and humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice held that, “in view of the current state of international law” and facts at the court’s disposal, “the Court [could not] conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”94 Article 51(4) of Protocol I prohibits attacks that are not directed at a specific military objective, employment of means or methods that cannot be directed at a specific military objective, or the use of means or methods of conduct that are not capable of discrimination. Article 51(5)(b) gives proportionality a central role in avoiding loss of civilian life.95 This essential provision requires balancing, ex ante,96 the “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, [and] damage to civilian objects,” which is reasonably expected to be caused in the course of a military attack, against “the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”97 An attack is unlawful if the undesired collateral effects bear no reasonable relation to the military benefit attained. Article 51(5)(b) requires that both military targets and the means and methods of warfare be reviewed for disproportionality.98 The rule requires “that proportionality be assessed in relation to each individual attack, rather than on a cumulative basis.”99 Protocol I also specifically provides for the protection from military attack of certain essential objects: cultural and religious items,100 objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,101 the natural environment,102 and installations containing dangerous forces.103 Thus, a proportionality analysis of any method of warfare must take into account a variety of factors, including the importance of the military target, the presence of civilian population and infrastructures in the target area, the potential civilian use of the military target, the ability to provide prior notice to the authorities about the
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threat to civilian population, the likely short-term and long-term environmental damage,104 the type of weapon available and its accuracy, and the rights of neutral countries in the target area. Several important matters of proportionality of means of war were articulated in the documents of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. First, with regard to the relative values to be assigned to negative collateral effects and the achieved military advantage balanced under the principle of proportionality, both the tribunal105 and the committee106 supported the view that the determination of values be that of a “reasonable military commander.” While, as the committee admitted, it would be unlikely for military commanders to agree on the values to be assigned to the collateral damage and military advantages in close cases, in many instances reasonable military leaders would concur on that issue.107 It is often the case that military objectives are interspersed with or share the use of civilian objects. Moreover, the party responsible for the civilians located in these objects frequently fails to remove them before an attack.108 Failure of a party in control of the targeted objects to relocate the civilians within or in the vicinity of military objects does not relieve the attacking side from taking these civilians into account in conducting the proportionality analysis before an assault.109 The committee also cited with some approval the application in the Kupreskic Judgment of a cumulating approach to assessing the scope of collateral harm inflicted in a military campaign: [R]egard might be had to considerations such as the cumulative effect of attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians. In other words, it may happen that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul per se of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 [of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949] (or of the corresponding customary rules). However, in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping with international law.110 The committee observed that cumulating collateral damage was useful in conducting the overall assessment of a military campaign, despite the insufficiency of cumulation of instances of collateral damage to constitute a crime.111 Based on the total casualty figures, the committee decided that there was no sufficient basis for
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charges of genocide or crimes against humanity.112 It also found that none of the individual incidents warranted an investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor.113 Arguably, proportionality balances between “two opposing goals: the swift achievement of the military goal with the minimum losses of one’s own combatants and the protection of the other party’s civilian population.”114 This subjective approach is bound to shift the balance in favor of one’s own combatants,115 an effect observed in the first Gulf War. To avoid ground war in Iraq in 1991, the United States launched an extensive air attack that destabilized and weakened Saddam Hussein’s army. The swiftness of “Operation Desert Storm” has been praised, but no mention is made of the substantial damage the United States’ air strikes caused to the civilian system of Iraq with long-term devastating effects on the civilian population.116 Despite these drawbacks, the requirement of proportionality of the means and methods of warfare remains an important instrument for the protection of human life in the law of armed conflict.
4. Contemporary Application of Just War Principles The just war doctrine may also prove an effective tool for assessing contemporary decisions to go to war and for deciding on a method to carry it out. In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush promulgated a new national security strategy that focused on “identifying and destroying the [terrorist] threat before it reaches our borders.”117 Affirmative actions would be taken without international support, if necessary, and the president would not hesitate “to exercise our right to self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists.”118 President Bush is the first U.S. president to explicitly endorse preemptive strikes as an affirmative national defense strategy.119 The president implied that this new strategy was simply an extension of the just war doctrine adapted to the fundamentally different way that terrorist organizations wage war.120 He argued that when opposing forces manifest an “imminent danger of attack,” international law recognizes that one need not wait to be attacked before engaging the threat with force.121 Historically, an imminent threat was one that the sovereign could observe, such as the mobilization of enemy troops or the strategic placement of weaponry.122 Preventive war—commenced to defeat an adversary before it is able to gather sufficient forces to launch a successful attack—has largely been condemned as unjust.123 When the threat is great enough, however, the president expressed a willingness to authorize preemptive strikes “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”124 The president also contended that “emerging threats” and gathering dangers are legitimate targets of preemptive strikes.125 This propensity for declaring a
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preemptive strike against uncertain threats stands on an unsure foundation with respect to the principle of proportionality. The president’s expansion of the concept of imminent threat necessarily raises the question of whether the standard of evidence used to justify a preemptive strike is satisfied.126 While resolution of the question is beyond the scope of this book, the missing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq127 or a 1 percent probability of a threat128 arguably would not meet this standard. It is unclear whether Grotius would agree that President Bush’s strategy is merely an “adapt[ation of] the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”129 Although it is possible to view the differences between Grotius and the president as mere semantics, it is important to remember the great cost of waging war.130 Grotius’s repeated appeal to sovereign authority to ensure that every decision to go to war be strictly proportional to the magnitude and imminence of the threat suggests that the use of force based on uncertain circumstances would not be justified. As Grotius urged, prudence dictates that doubts about the justification of a particular war should be resolved in favor of peace.131 The United States has also adopted and utilized methods of warfare that raise proportionality concerns. During the buildup to the Gulf War, General Colin Powell articulated a military policy that built on ideas espoused by former secretary of defense Casper Weinberger and centuries of military experience.132 Now known as the Powell Doctrine, the policy requires decision makers to ask themselves important questions before entering into a war: “Is the political objective important, clearly defined and understood? Have all nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation to be altered, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?”133 Later the doctrine was also interpreted to require a viable exit strategy—a “timetable for victory and withdrawal.”134 Once the decision to go to war is made, the Powell Doctrine calls for massive or overwhelming force to be used135 in order to minimize the United States’ casualties and hasten the end of active hostilities.136 Thus, when a decision must be made between protecting one’s own military forces and objectives and safeguarding the opponent’s civilian population, the Powell Doctrine clearly favors the former.137 The very language used to describe the force required—overwhelming and massive—raises serious proportionality concerns that implicate the just war doctrine and international conventions.138 Although the trend in international law has been toward formalizing proportionality analysis and requirements, Powell argued that a rigid national defense policy was imprudent.139 Ambiguous constraints on the use of force aided deterrence by forcing one’s enemy to guess how severely one might respond to a
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provocation.140 Powell also argued that adopting a rigid policy would effectively tie the hands of decision makers in adopting the most prudent type of force in any given situation.141 Instead, Powell favored a pragmatic approach that would allow for the type and magnitude of force necessary to accomplish legitimate military goals. In sum, the principle of proportionality has an important place in the international system of the laws of war.142 It reflects the world’s growing desire to avoid war and to reduce to a minimum incidental civilian loss. Proportionality offers a meaningful way to balance the evils of war against the benefits of the military objective, with a view of retaining war as a method of last resort in the resolution of international conflicts. The principle of proportionality thus stands not only to limit the number of times nations will choose to go to war but also to limit the number of human lives lost during those wars. Just as the principle as applied in just war doctrine recognizes the importance of human life, proportionality as applied in other contexts recognizes the value of individual rights and autonomy and serves to limit both the quantity and quality of government encroachment of those rights.
B. PROPORTIONALITY IN FOREIGN LEGAL REGIMES The principle of proportionality has more often been employed in a more peaceful context to measure the fairness of the balance between state regulation and individual autonomy. It has played an important role in the constitutional law of many jurisdictions, where it is used to balance the costs and the benefits of government regulation in the search for the least intrusive and most effective measures. The emergence of the principle of proportionality in European countries was associated with the rise of the social state.143 The level of government’s social involvement in and recognition of basic human rights determines the scope of application of the principle of proportionality. The following examples demonstrate how proportionality measures the balance between the benefits and the costs of the government regulation. Several nations provide illuminating examples of the use of both alternative-means and ends-benefits proportionality principles.
1. Canada Canadian constitutional jurisprudence derives the principle of proportionality from Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.144 It provides that the rights guaranteed in the charter may be “subject only to such reasonable
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limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”145 The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes146 developed a two-tier constitutional control test. Once the claimant has proved a violation of a right guaranteed in the charter, the government must satisfy two criteria to establish that the limit on individual rights “can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”147 First, measures limiting a constitutionally protected right must serve an important objective that “relate[s] to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society.”148 This requirement can normally be satisfied since courts are generally deferential to legislative choice of action.149 On several occasions, however, the government has failed to satisfy this requirement.150 Legislation limiting the rights of English-speaking parents in Quebec to educate their children in English-speaking schools151 or requiring the Lord’s Prayer in secular schools152 has been found lacking an important public objective. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada was unable to find any legitimate public objective that justified denying protection to gays and lesbians under Alberta’s human rights law in Vriend v. Alberta.153 In R. v. Zundel it also prohibited an intrusive use of a law that was unrelated to the objectives originally contemplated by the Parliament when that law was enacted.154 Once an important public objective or end has been established, the selected means to attain it must be “reasonable and demonstrably justified.”155 The court said in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. that this determination involves “a form of proportionality test.”156 Although it varies depending on the facts of the case, the test involves the balancing of public and individual interests based on three principles.157 First, the means must be rationally related to the objective.158 The court has infrequently struck down legislation for lack of any rational relation to the objective pursued.159 It employs a rather deferential and contextual160 approach to determine the rational relation of a provision to the desired end.161 Second, the means should “impair ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question.”162 This is believed to be the decisive element of proportionality review.163 It requires that the legislature adopt the least intrusive measure capable of attaining the desired objective.164 A good example of the application of this element of proportionality appears in a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in which it invalidated a provision of Quebec legislation prohibiting the use of the English language in signs and posters.165 The court held that the desired promotion of the French language could be achieved through a less intrusive alternative by “requiring that commercial signs display a marked predominance of French.”166 Most recent cases recognize that the legislatures must be afforded a “zone of discretion within which different legislative choices in derogation of a Charter right could be tolerated.”167
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Lastly, the public objective and actual effects168 of the means adopted for its attainment must be proportionate to an important public end or objective.169 The court noted that even if the means satisfies the first two criteria, it may be declared unconstitutional in view of its disproportionate harmful effects on an individual.170 Despite this language, the court has not invalidated a provision solely for failure to balance the costs and benefits of its implementation if it satisfied the first two criteria of proportionality.171 Rather, courts use balancing to reinforce their conclusions under the “rational relation” and “minimum impairment” components of the proportionality test172 and to avoid invalidation of legislative provisions for “insubstantial” unconstitutional effects on individual freedoms.173
2. Germany The principle in Germany is an unwritten constitutional rule derived from the principle of the rule of law.174 The high court of Germany described proportionality “as an expression of general right of the citizen towards the State that his freedom should be limited by the public authorities only to the extent indispensable for the protection of the public interest.”175 The principle of proportionality in German law incorporates three important subprinciples: suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrower sense. According to the high court of Germany, any government interference with basic rights must be suitable and necessary for reaching the ends sought. Its disadvantages to individuals “are generally only permissible if the protection of others or of the public interest requires them, after having due regard to the principle of proportionality.”176 Suitability is the tendency of the course of action to achieve or facilitate the achievement of the desired end. Legislators are given sufficient discretion in determining whether a course of action is suitable.177 Despite this deferential standard, Germany’s high court has not refrained from invalidating the legislative determination of suitability of legislative measures on several occasions.178 Necessity requires the adoption of the least intrusive, equally efficient alternative. Regarding proportionality in the narrower sense, “the burden resulting from the measure must not be excessive in relation to the public interest concerned.”179 Germany requires meaningful proportionality review of any public interference with a basic right by legislative or administrative action. The importance of the principle of proportionality is largely defined through the measure of guaranteed personal autonomy. The scope of protection afforded to personal autonomy in Germany is remarkable. The court stated in the Reiten im Walde Case:180 “According to the principles developed in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, Art. 2(1)
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[of the Constitution of Germany181] guarantees general freedom of action in a comprehensive [sense]. This does not only protect the limited area of development of the personality. It protects every form of human activity regardless of the weight attaching to it in the context of development of the [personality].”182 Several basic rights that belong to the “inner core” of one’s autonomy are “accorded absolute protection and thus are withdrawn from interference by public authority.”183 Given the social nature of a human being, rights outside the “inner core” are limited by the rights of others, the constitutional order, and the moral code as embodied in the German Constitution.184 Responding to the criticism of this broad protection of individual freedom, the court said that limiting the constitutional protection to a narrow set of individual rights “would bring with it difficult demarcation problems which could hardly be satisfactorily resolved in practice.”185 Any interference with the enjoyment of the latter group of rights is subject to judicial proportionality control.186 Proportionality, according to the court in the Reiten im Walde Case, tests, in reference to Article 2(1) of the German Constitution, whether the legal norm that affects the freedom of action “belongs to the constitutional order, that is to say is formally and materially in harmony with the norms of the [Basic Law187].”188 Thus, the court concluded that “the principle of proportionality offers a yardstick by which the general freedom of action may be limited.”189 As such, the principle of proportionality has two purposes. First, it is used to determine whether “the pursuit of the public interest merits precedence generally.”190 Second, it ensures that the measures undertaken are suitable, necessary, and proportionate to the desired end.191 The court applied the test of proportionality in the following landmark cases. In the Cannabis Case,192 the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany applied proportionality to determine whether possession, sale, purchase, or use of cannabis should be punishable and whether the criminal sanctions imposed for various cannabis violations were excessive. First, the court used proportionality as a test to determine whether the prohibition of cannabis was proportional to the need of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the public.193 It reasoned that the legislature possesses a considerable amount of discretion in determining the sorts of behavior to be punishable by criminal law.194 Noting that there is no scientifically based information capable of showing which one of the conflicting views about the threat of cannabis to health and public order is correct, the court deferred to the legislature’s choice to prohibit cannabis under the threat of criminal punishment.195 With regard to the criminal penalties, the court focused on assessing the proportionality of criminal sanctions in the narrower sense—whether the restrictions imposed on individual liberty were outweighed by the resulting benefits of protecting the health of society.196 If the costs of a criminal sanction outweigh its benefits, the right to individual liberty must take precedence.197
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The court found proportionate all provisions of the Intoxicating Substances Act that imposed criminal sanctions.198 It explained that the legislature could comply with the principle of proportionality in the narrower sense by taking into account the relative wrongfulness and culpability in certain groups of cases through substantive or procedural provisions.199 Substantive measures would involve a regime of lower sanctions for petty offenses involving cannabis, while procedural differentiation would be achieved mainly through granting prosecutorial discretion in such cases.200 The federal legislature opted for procedural differentiation, which, said the court, was entirely consistent with the principle of proportionality.201 The Lebach Case202 dealt with the proportionality between media reports about a specific crime and the perpetrator’s autonomy. The court observed that when the freedom of reporting news impinges on other protected interests, “the purpose of the individual broadcast, the manner of its presentation, and its actual foreseeable effect may become relevant.”203 When two constitutionally protected interests conflict, said the court, it is important to determine which takes precedence in light of the circumstances of the case and whether its proposed intrusion on the other interest is necessary, suitable, and proportional to the desired end.204 The court concluded that the right of personality (personal dignity) of a perpetrator of a crime must give precedence to reporting about the crime in the media because the latter serves the important functions of informing the public about a dangerous crime, publicizing the measures undertaken by the government to solve it, and deterring similar future transgressions.205 Because the “interest to receive information does not prevail absolutely,”206 the negative effects of a news report suffered by the perpetrator must still be proportional to the public’s need to receive information and to the seriousness of the offense.207 To protect perpetrators from unwanted intrusion into their personal life and to facilitate their reintegration into society, the balance between the public’s right to receive information and a perpetrator’s right to “be left alone” begins to shift in favor of the latter following the initial news broadcast.208 In Reiten im Walde Case,209 discussed earlier in connection with the scope of the principle of proportionality, the court reviewed the constitutionality of a measure that restricted horseback riding in North Rhine Westphalia to specially designated trails. The claimant argued that he should be able to ride on certain other park trails that were designated for hiking only.210 The court decided that riding was a form of human activity protected under Article 2(1) of the Constitution of Germany but that it did not belong to the core rights that were exempt from any government intrusion.211 As such, riding could be subject to statutory limitations aimed at accommodating the rights of others.212
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The court accepted the local government’s explanation that, by restricting the park trails available for horseback riding, the local government intended to protect hikers from the dangers and inconveniences of unwanted encounters with horses and to safeguard hiking trails from damage due to horseback riding.213 The court considered the regime of designating separate park trails for riding suitable and necessary for the attainment of the desired aims.214 Finally, the court concluded that the measure was proportionate to the desired end.215 Acknowledging that riders and hikers have an equal claim to the use of park trails, the court concluded that, because riders represent a smaller proportion of park visitors than hikers, the aims of protecting hikers and maintaining hiking trails would be more appropriately served by designating special tracks for riding rather than vice versa.216
3. France France employs the principle of proportionality to create a means of effective control over growing executive discretion and government intervention into private affairs. The principle of proportionality in France has not been granted general application in administrative law, however.217 As a general rule, proportionality review has been applied in the following areas: fundamental rights and freedoms, disciplinary action against civil servants, town planning and land development, and environmental protection.218 In these areas, “[t]he principle of proportionality has been used to ensure that the administration seeks a reasonable balance between the different interests affected by its decisions.”219 Conversely, administrative courts also recognize the need for sufficient administrative discretion for administration “to function with regularity and certainty.”220 French courts have a sliding scale of judicial review, including minimum control, normal control, and maximum control.221 The intensity of review depends on the subject matter and the scope of discretion.222 A recent rise in state social and economic regulations was matched by a corresponding expansion of proportionality review into the areas of minimum control, such as town planning and land development.223 The threshold for judicial intervention in the areas of minimum control is manifest disproportionality.224 “Nevertheless, it is still for the judge to evaluate every aspect of the case before him in order to verify whether the principle of proportionality has been respected by the administration.”225 Thus, as a general matter, proportionality review of an administrative action in France generally involves the balancing between advantages and disadvantages of the administrative action.226 The stricter requirement that an administrative action be the least restrictive of individual liberty is believed to be limited to areas of maximum judicial control, where fundamental individual rights and freedoms are at stake.227
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4. Eastern Europe The Constitutional Court of Poland has used the principle of proportionality to determine the constitutionality of a statutory provision requiring that all transactions among legal entities be conducted through banking institutions. This measure was adopted to promote transparency in the national economy and to facilitate the collection of corporate and personal taxes. According to Article 6 of the Constitution of Poland of 1952, as amended in the postcommunist period, “the Republic of Poland shall guarantee freedom of economic activity regardless of the type of ownership; restrictions of this freedom may be imposed only by means of statute.”228 This constitutional provision required not only that any limitation on the freedom of economic activity be implemented by statute but also that any such legislative intrusion not be excessive in relation to the importance of the advancement of the public interest.229 To establish excessiveness of a legislative provision, the court considered the nature of the implicated individual rights and freedoms, “because they determine the general boundaries of permissible limitations.”230 This review, said the court, “should provide answers to the following three questions: 1) is the regulation capable of achieving the intended objectives? 2) is this regulation necessary to protect the public interest it refers to? 3) are its results proportional to the burdens imposed on citizens?”231 Notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality of legislative actions, the court declared its willingness to intervene should a legislative action exceed the degree of allowable discretion and constitute a drastic violation of the constitution. It noted that, based on the established system of constitutional values, the level of legislative discretion will be highest in regard to economic rights and lowest in regard to political and civil rights.232 The court upheld the provision in question because it satisfied all of the elements of the proportionality test, finding that the legislative measure was rationally related to the attainment of the sought objective.233 It explained that the banking system was well equipped to monitor commercial transactions and to avoid the migration of resources into the shadow economy. The court also held that to require running large commercial transactions through the banking system was necessary for the attainment of the desired market transparency.234 In this regard, it noted the importance of the ability of the banking system to improve transparency of commercial transactions, monitor cash flow of commercial organizations, and eliminate cheating in taxation.235 In conclusion, the court determined that the adopted measure was proportional to the desired end because its benefits considerably outweighed the risks of unsecured commercial deposits and bank bankruptcies.236 In the end, said the court, commercial organizations face a variety of business risks in their everyday operation, which makes the addition
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of the potential loss of funds due to bank bankruptcy de minimis.237 The threequestion test developed in this case “is considered the standard formulation of the proportionality requirement” in Poland.238 A similar provision of proportionality was established by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in its decision reviewing the constitutionality of Article 69 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.239 Article 69 authorized the Ukrainian courts to impose a lesser criminal penalty than prescribed by the code on individuals convicted of grievous and intermediate crimes based on mitigating circumstances or de minimis social harm,240 but it did not afford similar treatment to individuals convicted of petty crimes.241 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine ruled that the principle of proportionality required individualization of criminal punishment to ensure that the burden imposed on an individual charged with a crime is proportional to the social harm the individual caused.242 It derived the principle of proportionality from the general notion of fairness of the criminal process and from the constitutional principle of the rule of law.243 The court noted that the requirements of the principle of proportionality were not satisfied in regard to citizens charged with petty crimes, as Article 69 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine did not offer them an option of a lesser sentence in the event that they established the requisite mitigating or character circumstances.244
5. The European Union As with many other general principles of law, the European Union borrowed its general principle of proportionality from its member states. Germany had the most elaborate doctrine of proportionality; after initially employing a much narrower definition of proportionality, the union now has virtually adopted the German system.245 At the time of its founding, many members of the European Union entertained some notion of proportionality in government regulation, which gave the union grounds for treating proportionality as a general principle of law.246 The origin of the principle of proportionality was initially not discussed, as had been the case with other general principles.247 Scholars have argued that the European Court of Justice made an exception because it might have viewed the principle of proportionality as “such a fundamental and obvious principle that its presence in the Community legal order was deemed self-evident with no need for any further explanation and clarification.”248 Admitting that the national constitutional systems of the member states contributed to the strengthening of the principle of proportionality in its operation to protect fundamental rights, the court rejected national law as one of the plausible origins of the principle of proportionality.249
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In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,250 the court determined that the principle of proportionality derived from the general principles of law protected by European Community law.251 The court did not reject the various articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC treaty), which contains the words “required”252 or “necessary”253 or which “cause[s] the least disturbance to the functioning of the common market,”254 as the origins of the principle of proportionality. Yet many scholars argue that the principle of proportionality derives its power from the rule of law that underlies the European Community’s legal order.255 The principle of proportionality is closely linked with the principle of subsidiarity utilized to control EC legislative action.256 Article 5 of the EC treaty prescribes that the “Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.”257 The principle of subsidiarity derived from this language is interpreted to contain a presumption that “primary responsibility and decision-making competence should rest with the lowest possible level of authority of the political hierarchy.”258 Thus, subsidiarity limits community power in relation to the member states; it determines whether EC action is warranted.259 The requirement of proportionality contained in Article 5 of the EC treaty—as derived from the words that “[a]ny action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty”260—supplements the principle of proportionality by limiting the breadth of the community action once it is established that one is required.261 In sum, Article 5 proportionality controls EC legislation, while the judicially established principle of proportionality controls its implementation. The principle of proportionality applies to community regulation affecting the member states262 and individuals. The test of proportionality, as developed by the European Court of Justice, contains three elements—suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrower sense.263 The burden of proof is on the contesting party.264 The court, however, might not apply all three elements in a particular case.265 Suitability has been assigned a secondary role since most cases involve “complex economic situations” that warrant “wide discretionary powers.”266 As such, the assessment of suitability is limited to determining whether, “at the time when the measure was adopted, it was manifestly unsuitable to achieve the desired end.”267 The test of suitability in European Union jurisprudence is a test of manifest arbitrariness.268 Necessity has a leading role in proportionality jurisprudence of the court. It requires that the least intrusive regulatory measure be adopted.269 Absent manifest error, the court is deferential to the choice of regulatory or legislative action in “the exercise of discretionary powers in the field of economic policy.”270
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The test of proportionality in the narrower sense is ordinarily used to prevent excessive penalty claims and encroachments on fundamental rights recognized as part of the general principles of law or rights granted by the EC treaty.271 Derogations from EC treaty rights are subject to strict scrutiny and will be allowed in cases of “genuine and serious threats to national interests [of member states]” if the measure is necessary to the attainment of the desired end.272 Derogations from fundamental rights recognized as part of the general principles of law are subject to suitability, necessity, and proportionality review.273 Measures are lawful if they are not disproportionate to the end sought in a way that impairs the substance of a fundamental right.274 This is particularly true in areas of wide discretionary powers, such as in the field of economic policy. Finally, although it recognizes the principle that penalties must not be excessive, the court “is unlikely to intervene unless the disproportionality is reasonably evident.”275 At present, the doctrine of proportionality in the European Union is in a state of constant development to accommodate gradual expansion of community regulation.276 European experience with proportionality is indicative of the principle’s ability to be flexible to the myriad needs of different countries and governmental systems. Germany’s experience—where the principle is most intricately defined and applied because of its constitutional status—demonstrates that proportionality is of sufficient legal character to adequately protect individual autonomy interests in a developed country. The European Community’s successful adoption of the principle also demonstrates that proportionality may be used even where different levels of government are involved, effectively curbing unwarranted intrusions into individual autonomy by either level of government and protecting each level of government within its assigned sphere of action.
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PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN THE COMMON LAW OF DAMAGES
the concept of proportionality is not entirely foreign to the common law. Proportionality, arguably, was embodied in the old common law principle of reasonableness. Indeed, both principles are related, and their application leads to similar results in the majority of cases.1 The closeness between reasonableness and proportionality on the continuum of limitations on government discretion is instructively suggested by the experience in foreign jurisdictions where the two principles coexist effectively. Reasonableness and proportionality, for instance, have been treated as coordinate principles of German constitutional law deriving from the same source—the requirement of justice for the individual, which is “an integral part of the rule of law.”2 According to some scholars, however, proportionality and reasonableness represent somewhat different ideas. Proportionality is generally focused on the relationship between two variables, for example, means and ends.3 By contrast, reasonableness “is used to assess whether the particular circumstances of the person concerned allow the fulfillment of certain duty by him or not”; in other words, it does not necessarily involve the relationship between two variables.4 Scholars have argued that the principle of proportionality calls for an objective means-ends assessment, whereas reasonableness involves a subjective standard for “the assessment of the totality of the circumstances of the case to which it is to be applied.”5 37
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The conclusion, nonetheless, is clear—proportionality and reasonableness often work in tandem to determine the justice of a particular situation to an individual. The common law principle of proportionality (reasonableness) dates back more than a hundred years. Early judicial decisions discuss a need for proportionality in the context of private law, such as contract law, in particular with respect to damage awards. Proportionality analysis extends to the actual damages versus contract price, liquidated damages versus actual or foreseeable damages, and compensatory damages versus contributory fault. What recurs in contract law cases is a concern for fairness, expressed as freedom to contract and honoring a person’s reasonable expectations of the deal. Contract law is the province of the state. Rarely does the Supreme Court of the United States decide contract disputes, with the exception of early admiralty or government contract cases. These rare Supreme Court decisions, combined with those of a few U.S. Courts of Appeal, express some commitment to an idea of proportionality in awarding damages. Though given only cursory treatment by the high court, common law doctrines rooted in proportionality are referenced by early U.S. courts and are also recorded as restatements of contract law. Courts have largely applied ends-means proportionality to ensure that there is a congruent relationship between the evil and the means used to eradicate it.
A. THE RULE OF FORESEEABLE DAMAGES: WHEN LIABILITY IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CONTRACT PRICE The classic contract law case, Hadley v. Baxendale, established the principle that consequential damages should be limited to foreseeable losses, which are those that “may reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”6 The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale is based on the idea that “the costs of the untoward consequence of a course of dealings should be borne by that party who was able to avert the consequence at least cost and failed to do so.”7 This rule corresponds to the tort principle that “the amount of care that a person ought to take is a function of the probability and magnitude of the harm that may occur if he does not take care. If he does not know what that probability and magnitude are, he cannot determine how much care to take.”8 Defendants must have notice of any special circumstances that could give rise to extraordinary or disproportionate liability. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner cited Hadley v. Baxendale when explaining and applying the concepts of foreseeable loss in Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.9 In Evra, Evra Corporation sued Swiss Bank, alleging that the bank’s failure to make a timely
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transfer of funds was negligent and resulted in the cancellation of Evra’s contract to charter a ship to carry scrap metal overseas. Evra sued for the additional $2 million it paid to charter the ship under a new contract, the rate of which was double that of the previous contract. The court held that Swiss Bank was not liable to the ship charterer for the two million dollars in consequential damages related to Swiss Bank’s improper handling of the wire transfer because it was not on notice of the special circumstances that gave rise to them. The court concluded that “Swiss Bank did not have enough information to infer that if it lost a $27,000 payment order, it would face liability in excess of $2 million.”10 A court is not required to award damages for all foreseeable losses; it may limit foreseeable damages “if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation.”11 When there is “an extreme disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the party whose liability for that loss is in question, . . . [t]he fact that the price is relatively small suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability.”12 Likewise, if the deal is informal, the parties may not have carefully attempted to allocate all of the risks.13 The theory behind preventing disproportion is that the liable party did not intend to cover large risks of loss.14 The great majority of courts that address liability for loss in breach of contract cases are state courts, and many limit foreseeable damages in the circumstance of disproportionate compensation.15 Disproportion between contract price and foreseeable damages alone, no matter how excessive, is not enough to convince all courts that the parties did not contemplate that the defendant would bear the risk of liability. In International Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Services, Inc.,16 a shipper of fertilizer sued the inspection service in contract and in tort for improper inspection and certification of the ship hired by the shipper to transport its fertilizer. When the shipment reached its destination in New Zealand, authorities rejected it because of contamination. The district court denied the plaintiff recovery on its contract claim because the damages were outrageously disproportionate to the contract price. The lower court found that the disparity between the contract price of $150 for inspection service and the $2.4 million in damages indicated that the parties neither anticipated the loss nor intended to allocate the risks that way.17 There was no meeting of the minds:18 It is not always in the interest of justice to require the party in breach to pay damages for all of the foreseeable loss that he has caused. There are unusual instances in which it appears from the circumstances either that the parties assumed that one of them would not bear the risk of a particular loss or that, although there was no such assumption, it would be unjust to put the risk on that party. One such circumstance is an extreme
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disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the party whose liability for that loss is in question. The fact that the price is relatively small suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability.19 The district court awarded damages of $713,666 on the plaintiff ’s tort claim but reduced them by 50 percent for contributory negligence.20 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. It did not agree, however, with the district court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the grounds of disproportion. The Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the inspection “was precisely to guarantee the condition of the hold so as to insure the preservation of the cargo.”21 Since SGS was fully aware that its negligent inspection might cause the loss of an entire cargo, the court reasoned, it must be liable for the consequential damages resulting from its breach.22 The purpose of the service rendered may help determine whether a party should be held liable for a loss that is disproportionate to the contract price. The Second Circuit, in International Ore, distinguished its holding in Sundance Cruises v. American Bureau of Shipping 23 on this basis. In Sundance Cruises, the owners of an ocean-going passenger vessel that sank after hitting an underwater rock sued the insurance classification society that had issued it a certificate verifying compliance with international safety conventions.24 The Second Circuit denied the plaintiff consequential damages and held that the owners were not entitled to rely on the classification certificate as a guarantee that the vessel was soundly constructed, particularly considering the great disparity between the fee charged for the service and the amount of damages sought.25 “The purpose of the classification certificate [was] not to guarantee safety, but merely to permit [the shipowner] to take advantage of the insurance rates available to a classed vessel.”26 The damages that followed did not flow from the issuance of the certificate since the shipowner was ultimately responsible for the maintenance and operation of the ship.27 Not all damages are capable of being anticipated before (or even calculable after) a breach of contract. Contract law, therefore, allows liquidated damages clauses where parties can agree in advance on the amount of damages due after breach. This stipulation of damages facilitates contracting by reducing the risk that would otherwise be associated with unpredictable or inestimable liability.28
B. DISPROPORTIONATE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AS UNENFORCEABLE PENALTIES Liquidated damages clauses are meant to estimate damages fairly in order to reimburse a party for hardship that occurs from a broken contractual promise.
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Damages clauses are not intended to be a punishment for nonperformance, nor are they a threat or an oppressive tool with which to secure performance.
1. Older Common Law Tradition to Void Clauses The common law of the United States has refused to enforce penalties in contracts because they violate the principle of just compensation. As a comment to the restatement explains, “[p]unishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no justification on either economic or other grounds and a term providing such a penalty is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”29 The Supreme Court recognizes that “an exaction of punishment for a breach which could produce no possible damage has long been deemed oppressive and unjust.”30 Just as it is unfair to impose punishment where there is no damage, it is also unfair to impose liability that is grossly disproportionate to the amount of damage incurred. Regardless of whether the clause provides for damages too large when compared to the harm caused31 or “fixes an unreasonably small amount as damages,”32 if the damages are completely disproportionate to the degree of the breach, then “the parties have not adhered to the rule of just compensation.”33 Courts vary in how they assess the proportionality of liquidated damages clauses. Some have judged the proportionality of a clause using a prospective approach, looking at whether the provision was a reasonable estimate of damages at the time of the contract drafting.34 Other courts employ a retrospective approach, comparing the stipulated amount to the realized damages.35 Still other courts consider both the reasonableness of the forecasted damages at the time of drafting and the comparison between the stipulated provision and the actual amount of loss.36 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: “Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”37 The more difficult it is to prove actual damages or adequately ascertain their precise amount, the more likely a court will find that the stipulated damages are reasonable.38 This is so because, when it is objectively difficult to identify actual harm or the precise amount of damages, there is no reason to believe a judge’s or jury’s estimate will “accord with the principle of just compensation any more than would the advance estimate of the parties.”39 If “it is clear that no loss at all has occurred,” the restatement provides that “a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages is unenforceable.”40
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2. Modern Trend to Enforce The Supreme Court has moved away from the common law practice of voiding liquidated damages provisions. The modern trend, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, is to respect freedom to contract and enforce liquidated damages provisions if intended by the parties.41 In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., the Court enforced a liquidated damages provision even though the trial court found that there were no actual damages.42 Although at one time courts “would scarcely admit that there ever was a valid contract providing for liquidated damages,” the Supreme Court established that the modern trend is to respect the parties’ freedom to contract.43 In Bethlehem Steel, the Court concluded that the parties intended the contract to provide for liquidated damages because the harm was hard to ascertain in advance and impossible to prove and the parties did not intend the clause to be a penalty. Comparing the stipulated amount to a prospective estimate at the time of contracting, the Court did consider proportion in determining the parties’ intentions. The Court concluded, “[t]he amount is not so extraordinarily disproportionate to the damage which might result from the failure to deliver the carriages as to show that the parties must have intended a penalty, and could not have meant liquidated damages.”44 A court does not have the authority to disregard the parties’ provision for liquidated damages merely because the amount is disproportionate to the loss.45 It is unfair to interfere with a contract in which an owner of property already has “affix[ed] his own estimate of its value” simply because others disagree with it.46 The parties to a contract are in a more competent position to justly determine a fair amount of damages than a jury concluding after the fact and affected by the partisan testimony of others.47 According to the Supreme Court, the proportionality of the stipulated amount to actual harm is relevant only to the extent that it is indicative of intent.48 The Court established in Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v. Moore49 and then followed in Bethlehem Steel that modern courts look to the intent of the parties to determine whether the liquidated damages provision is a penalty.50 If damages are uncertain and have been liquidated by an agreement, it is the duty of the court to enforce the parties’ intention as long as it is not to penalize.51 The Court recognized that disproportion has been relevant in an action at law when the stipulated amount is grossly disproportionate on the face of the contract, thus indicating intent to penalize.52 a. Determining Intent of Parties The Supreme Court has relied on three factors to determine whether the parties intended a penalty: (1) disproportion on the face of the contract; (2) a lump sum
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rather than one that varies with length of delay; and (3) express language describing the provision as either a “penalty” or “liquidated damages.” 1) Disproportion on the Face of the Contract It seems clear that a clause that provides for the payment of a fixed sum due upon nonperformance is a penalty rather than a liquidated damages provision if a court finds disproportion on the face of the contract.53 In Sun Printing, the Court first explained that when a party alleges disproportion, “it has usually been an excessive disproportion between the stipulated sum and the possible damages resulting from a trivial breach apparent on the face of the contract. . . .”54 Five years later, in Bethlehem Steel, the Court reiterated that if the amount provided in the contract is extraordinarily disproportionate to the damage that might result from the failure to perform, “the parties must have intended a penalty, and could not have meant liquidated damages.”55 In Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, the Court refused to honor a residential lease provision that, upon the tenant’s filing of bankruptcy, terminated the lease and awarded the landlord rent for the remainder of the two-year term, which ended up being more than a full year’s worth.56 Although recognizing that courts are inclined to enforce the intentions of the parties and allow liquidated damages, the Supreme Court asserted, “agreements to pay fixed sums plainly without reasonable relation to any probable damage which may follow a breach will not be enforced. This circumstance tends to negative any notion that the parties really meant to provide a measure of compensation. . . .”57 The Court concluded that the provision in Taylor Trust was a penalty.58 2) A Lump Sum A provision that provides for a fixed rather than a variable sum for stipulated damages indicates an intent to penalize because it tends to be more disproportional, bearing a lesser relation to an actual amount of damage.59 In Tayloe v. Sandiford,60 an 1822 construction contract dispute, the Court observed that an agreement to pay a specified sum weekly while the party failed to complete the work would look much more like liquidated damages than reserving the whole sum as one lump payment.61 The Court summarized, “[i]n general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for the nonperformance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty. . . .”62 Likewise, in Maryland Dredging & Contracting Co. v. United States,63 the Court found that an excavating contract provision providing $20 for each division for every day the completion was delayed, had no element of deception or exorbitance, and it could “see no ground upon which the claimant can escape from the terms to which he had agreed.”64 Particularly in construction contracts, courts find liquidated damages provisions that compensate based on each day’s delay to be “an appropriate means of inducing due performance” or compensating for failure to perform, and courts will enforce them.65
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3) Express Language Courts are more likely to determine that a liquidated damages provision is a penalty if the contract language defines the stipulated amount as a “penalty.” As the Supreme Court observed in Tayloe, “[m]uch stronger is the inference in favour of it’s being a penalty, when it is expressly reserved as one.”66 The covenant at issue in Tayloe read: “The said houses to be completely finished on or before the 24th of December next, under a penalty of one thousand dollars, in case of failure.”67 The Court found that the plain language of the contract indicated it was a penalty.68 Conversely, in Wise v. United States,69 the government construction contract language read: “[I]n view of the difficulty of estimating with exactness the damages which will result, deduct as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, the sum of two hundred dollars ($200.00) for each and every day during the continuance of such delay and until such work shall be completed. . . .”70 The Court upheld the validity of the provision.71 Although courts have increasingly shown a willingness to enforce liquidated damages provisions, a finding of disproportionality continues to serve as an effective check on the types of provisions that they will uphold. This area of law demonstrates that proportionality may be used to protect not only individual rights from intrusion but also important common law doctrines, such as just compensation. That proportionality has been used effectively in the United States, albeit in a narrow context, indicates that the principle is consistent with the underpinnings of American common law.
C. PROPORTIONALITY OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES IN TORT The common law definition of negligence implicitly incorporates an ends-benefits proportionality analysis. The formula developed by Judge Learned Hand72 balances the probability and severity of the potential harm with the “burden of adequate precaution.”73 Recovery is appropriate when the likelihood or gravity of injury outweighs the cost of providing necessary protection.74 Compensatory damages issues arise primarily in tort cases, which are generally decided under state law. The rare cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court have been in the area of admiralty law in the context of joint tortfeasors and apportioning liability among multiple defendants. Drawing from the notion of comparative negligence adopted by most state jurisdictions in the United States75—which generally mandated apportionment of damages either in proportion to the fault attributed to the defendant and the plaintiff or among multiple defendants and the plaintiff—the Supreme Court has expressed loyalty to the idea of liability in proportion to fault unless clearly indicated otherwise
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by statute. This policy corresponds to its position on liquidated damages: Fairness requires proportionality where that is possible to ascertain unless the relevant parties have expressly intended otherwise, in which case the court should not interfere.
1. Liability in Proportion to Fault: Replacing the Divided Damages Rule In admiralty, like typical state tort cases, where more than one party is at fault, all of the parties should be liable for the harm in proportion to their fault. This is a relatively recent departure from the traditional rule of divided damages. Divided damages operated such that the property damage in a maritime collision or stranding was equally divided whenever two or more parties involved were found to be guilty of contributory fault, regardless of the relative degree of their fault. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,76 the Supreme Court replaced the admiralty rule of divided damages with a new rule requiring, when possible, the allocation of liability for damages in proportion to each party’s relative fault. The Supreme Court reasoned that a vessel should assume a share of the damages in proportion to its share of the blame and that “[a]n equal division of damages is a reasonably satisfactory result only where each vessel’s fault is approximately equal . . . or where proportionate degrees of fault cannot be measured and determined on a rational basis. The rule produces palpably unfair results in every other case.”77 The Court accepted an equal division of damages as equitable “[w]hen it is impossible fairly to allocate degrees of fault.”78 Otherwise, the justices regarded divided damages as an “archaic and unfair rule” and endorsed the apportionment of liability on the basis of fault.79
2. Proportionate Liability When One of Multiple Defendants Settles Even in settlement, the Supreme Court has adhered to the principle that defendants’ liability should be apportioned relative to their fault. In McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde and River Don Castings, Ltd.,80 the Court held that the liability of nonsettling defendants in admiralty cases should be calculated with reference to the jury’s allocation of proportionate responsibility.81 This apportionment of liability, referred to as the proportionate share rule, is based on fairness. Since “other defendants are not entitled to a reduction in liability when the plaintiff negotiates a generous settlement, . . . they are not required to shoulder disproportionate liability when the plaintiff negotiates a meager one.”82 The Court rejected two pro tanto rule alternatives, each of which would subtract the dollar amount of settlement from the total liability for which the nonsettling defendants would be responsible.83 The first alternative left the
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nonsettling defendants with a right of contribution against the settling defendants.84 The second did not.85 The Court predicted that under a pro tanto rule, “a litigating defendant’s liability will frequently differ from its equitable share, because a settlement with one defendant for less than its equitable share requires the nonsettling defendant to pay more than its share.”86 The proportionate share approach, whereby the settlement diminishes the injured party’s claim against the nonsettling tortfeasors by the amount of the equitable share of the settling tortfeasor’s obligation rather than by the actual dollar amount of settlement, is more consistent with the proportionate fault approach of Reliable Transfer; litigating defendants ordinarily pay only their proportionate share of the judgment. Under this approach, “no suits for contribution from the settling defendants are permitted, nor are they necessary, because the nonsettling defendants pay no more than their share of the judgment.”87 Courts have applied the proportionate share approach in contexts other than admiralty. Lower courts, for instance, have held that the proportionate share judgment reduction formula, endorsed by the Supreme Court in McDermott, is appropriate in class action settlement agreements.88
D. PRESERVING INTENT Despite its allegiance to the idea of liability in proportion to fault, the Supreme Court has generally deferred to the relevant parties’ intent. In the realm of liquidated damages provisions, the Court honors the parties’ freedom to contract and executes their intentions to the extent allowable by law. In the area of compensatory damages, the Court interprets statutes to execute the intentions of Congress. In Edmonds v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique,89 the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split over whether, by means of a maritime workers’ compensation scheme,90 Congress intended to impose a proportionate fault rule in admiralty law so as to change the judicially created admiralty rule that the shipowner can be made to pay all the damages not due to the longshoreman’s own negligence.91 The Court held that Congress did not intend to impose a proportionate fault rule, thus preserving joint and several liability. The dissent in Edmonds argued that this was “an unfair and unjust result” and that the Court should fashion a rule of comparative negligence in longshoremen workers’ compensation cases. Despite the dissenting justices’ protests that “[o]ur duty, in such a case, is to adopt the interpretation most consonant with reason, equity, and the underlying purposes Congress sought to achieve,”92 the Court honored what it felt was the legislature’s intent—to preserve joint and several liability.
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E. IMPLICIT PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW Some notions of proportionality also exist in other areas of American law governing remedies. Despite the fact that most remedies raise issues similar to those informing the Court’s analysis in punitive damages cases, the Court has been slow to expressly adopt proportionality as a mode of their review. Antitrust remedies provide a good example of this cautious approach. The Court appears to have implicitly adopted several of the proportionality principles we identify, but has never explicitly used the language of proportionality. These judicially crafted applications of proportionality had their origin in the common law.93 There are three aspects in which the Supreme Court’s analysis has implicitly leaned toward using proportionality/reasonableness to determine the adequacy of antitrust remedies. The first relates to monetary and injunctive/structural relief in private antitrust actions. The second pertains to damages awards in private antitrust actions. The third is relevant both to monetary relief in private antitrust actions and injunctive/structural relief in private and government antitrust actions. The first aspect is the requirement of “antitrust injury” established in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.: [T]o recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, [plaintiffs] must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”94 An antitrust remedy, whether damages or injunctive/structural relief, must redress the harm caused by a violation of the antitrust laws. Like suitability, which is an element of the European Union and German test of proportionality, the requirement of “antitrust injury” tests the reasonable relation of a remedy to the harm it is sought to redress.95 In addition, the requirement that the injury be “the type of loss the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause” may reflect an implicit limiting retributive principle—defendants should not held liable for treble damages if they could not have reasonably foreseen that their violation would cause such injury. The second aspect is the “direct purchaser rule” established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.96 According to the rule, indirect purchasers are precluded from
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seeking treble damages in federal antitrust actions.97 The Third Circuit explained the Supreme Court’s adoption of the direct purchaser rule by the need to contain the extraordinary treble damages remedy under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. In particular, it said that, in view of the remedy’s extraordinary nature, it must be “confined within reasonable limits.”98 Moreover, the Third Circuit implicitly emphasized that the Supreme Court limited the recovery of treble damages to direct purchasers because it was optimal for deterrence of future antitrust violations, it advanced the judicial efficiency of the private federal antitrust enforcement system, and it prevented the adverse economic effects that could stem from granting access to the treble damages remedy to indirect purchasers.99 Thus, the adoption of the direct purchaser rule, according to the court, was a result of the balancing of the costs, including excessive treble damages litigation, and benefits of the treble damages remedy in direct and indirect purchaser scenarios. As indicated, the rule reflects a proposition that the costs of the treble damages remedy in the indirect purchaser scenario outweighs its deterrence benefits.100 This is an implicit form of ends-benefits proportionality. The third aspect of American remedial antitrust jurisprudence that may have some resemblance to the rule of proportionality is the federal courts’ concern over the scope of injunctive/structural relief. Such relief must be proportional to the harm caused by the defendant’s antitrust violation to the market101—an implicit form of ends-benefits proportionality analysis. What makes the task of assessing the fit between an antitrust remedy in the form of injunctive/structural relief and the harm caused to the market particularly challenging is the fact that, in fashioning a remedy, the courts may address conduct beyond the scope of the conduct that is illegal under the antitrust laws.102 The breadth of allowable injunctive/structural antitrust remedies is not without limits. One limit is that the remedy must be fit to redress the loss to the market caused by the defendant’s antitrust violation.103 Another limit on the scope of allowable nonmonetary antitrust remedies was mentioned in United States v. Microsoft Corp.104 The court established a relationship of proportionality between the severity of the remedy and the strength of the causal connection “between the conduct and the creation or maintenance of the market power”: “Mere existence of an exclusionary act does not itself justify full feasible relief against the monopolist to create maximum competition. Rather, structural relief, which is designed to eliminate the monopoly altogether . . . require[s] a clearer indication of a significant causal connection between the conduct and creation or maintenance of the market power.”105 Finally, the scope of a nonmonetary antitrust remedy, similarly to punitive damages,106 depends on the reprehensibility of the illegal conduct, thus suggesting an implicit version of limiting retributive proportionality.107 In United States
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v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,108 the Court specifically emphasized that more reprehensible conduct warrants “call[s] for repression by sterner measures than where the steps could reasonably have been thought permissible.”109 The principle of proportionality/reasonableness is an ancient one preceding the formation of the U.S. legal system we know today. In antitrust jurisprudence, the Court has relied on implicit notions of proportionality when crafting remedies. The “antitrust injury” requirement reflects the German suitability concept and perhaps also the limiting retributive liability principle that governs who may be held liable, while the requirement of proportionality in the scope of the remedy adheres to both the limiting retributive severity principle and ends-benefits proportionality. The latter principle also informs the “direct purchaser rule,” thereby limiting those who may seek treble damages because the ends of such allowance are not justified in light of their overwhelming cost. Common law contract cases reference the concept of proportionality in determining what is fair and just. To the extent that the Supreme Court has decided issues of determining damages, the Court has expressed a commitment to the idea of proportionality. Whether in the context of foreseeable damages, liquidated damages, or compensatory damages, the Court’s position seems to be that fairness requires proportionality except (1) when the relevant parties have expressly intended otherwise and (2) when it is impossible to ascertain the proper proportions.
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PROPORTIONALITY IN AMERICAN CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE
I
II
n contrast to the practice of the foreign jurisdictions described in part I, American jurisprudence has made only limited use of the term “proportionality” in the evaluation of government conduct.1 Proportionality is rarely mentioned as an underlying basis of constitutional decisions. Despite the reluctance of American courts expressly to employ proportionality as a limit to government discretion, the values promoted by proportionality have not been rejected by American constitutional jurisprudence. Traces of notions akin to proportionality, including balancing of constitutional values,2 appear in the U.S. system of substantive doctrinal standards of constitutional judicial review.3 More important, the Supreme Court has explicitly used the term “proportionality” in several matters that came under its review4—in particular, punitive damages,5 property permit conditions,6 congressional enforcement actions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,7 criminal penalties,8 and
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forfeitures.9 The first three topics are discussed in chapter 4 of this part; criminal penalties and forfeitures are discussed in part III. However, this presence of proportionality in American law can be quite misleading. The prevailing two-tier system of judicial review10 is a set of categorical rules that allow courts to decide cases based on a characterization at the outset of the aspects of individual autonomy implicated by government regulation. This system excludes a meaningful reconciliation, usually present in foreign decisions applying proportionality, of individual autonomy values and the goals justifying the government action.11 If the only protection for which an individual’s interest or right qualifies is rational basis, the individual’s case against government regulation is frequently lost. Likewise, if the government happens to venture into an area governed by strict scrutiny, the individual is likely to prevail.12 Even in its express resort to proportionality, the Supreme Court is either inconsistent or frequently unaware of the doctrine’s broader application. The inconsistency is well illustrated by the fact that defendants enjoy the strong protection of the principle of proportionality from excessive punitive damages and forfeitures,13 but they are virtually unprotected from excessive imprisonment.14 With respect to punitive damages and land-use permit conditions—both socioeconomic matters that traditionally fall under rational basis review—the Court employs proportionality not to embrace the principle that government regulation must be proportional to the ends sought and attendant harm to an individual but rather to create a standard of review stricter than rational basis but more deferential to government than intermediate scrutiny. This practice unjustifiably transforms the versatile and flexible principle of proportionality into a narrow standard applicable to only a few narrow matters of constitutional law. Finally, the Court, by requiring “rough” proportionality, marginalizes the principle of proportionality in land-use permit conditions and federal enforcement actions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 By definition, proportionality as a measure of constitutional compliance is never exact; thus, the use of the word “rough” in conjunction with the principle of proportionality suggests the Court’s intention to dilute further the principle’s force. In this part we provide a brief, critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s general substantive standards of judicial constitutional review and the related doctrine of fundamental rights (chapter 3). We then touch on modern proportionality trends in the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence and discuss the internal inconsistencies in the Court’s analysis (chapter 4).
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despite calls for a sliding scale of judicial constitutional review,1 the high court has for the most part retained its two rigid standards of strict and rational basis scrutiny.2 These standards generally apply to challenges of state or federal legislation under the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Although these tests are often called standards of judicial review, they are more similar to legal rules than standards.3 Indeed, they help the Court to categorize cases that involve a variety of competing interests into either strict or rational basis scrutiny.4 The Court, however, has deviated from this rigid categorization of constitutional issues in limited circumstances, developing what is known as a rational basis standard with bite, an intermediate scrutiny standard, and recently a softer version of strict scrutiny.5 It is not surprising that these exceptions involve some balancing of competing constitutional interests implicated by a government action. After all, the move to a more flexible mode of constitutional review in several limited areas is consistent with the ideal of a sliding-scale judicial review that usually involves a degree of constitutional balancing. Such balancing of competing interests resembles ends-benefits proportionality analysis, although the Court rarely uses the language of proportionality. In contrast, the Court’s traditional rational basis and strict scrutiny tests apply implicit ends-proportionality principles more 53
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crudely. The importance of the government’s asserted goals, the likely benefits, and the resulting burdens on individual autonomy are evaluated in a categoric fashion, which, depending on the categorization, determines the outcome. On the other hand, the traditional “narrow-tailoring” requirement of strict scrutiny has always permitted case-specific analysis in a manner quite consistent with alternative-means proportionality principles.
A. STRICT SCRUTINY If a government action is subject to strict scrutiny, the action is almost always invalidated.6 To survive strict scrutiny, a government action must be necessary to achieve a compelling government interest.7 This method of constitutional analysis employs several inquiries that are also present in traditional proportionality review. First, the Court must determine whether the government action infringes on a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class.8 If it does, the Court must invalidate the government action unless it is necessary for the attainment of a compelling government interest.9 The government interest involved must be sufficiently important to justify a suspect classification or government invasion of individual autonomy.10 The result is that the government action is invalidated if the Court is able to find a less restrictive, yet equally effective, alternative to the proposed method. Strict scrutiny in substantive due process and equal protection cases derives its force from the famous footnote 4 in the Supreme Court case United States v. Carolene Products Co., which indicates that the presumption of constitutionality of government action will have a significantly lesser force in situations involving “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” or an infringement of a fundamental right.11 In some respects, strict scrutiny is similar to the absolute protection of “inner core” autonomy in Germany, as only a rare statute can survive strict scrutiny.12 However, a recent case shows the Court’s move toward a softer strict scrutiny standard at least in the area of affirmative action. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court declared that “strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”13 Using racial classification as an example, the Court explained that, although people suffer injury under the Equal Protection Clause whenever a government action treats them unequally based on their race, the suspect action must not be automatically invalidated.14 The Court went on to point out that the goal of strict scrutiny is to assist the Court in determining whether the government interest underlying the proposed classification is sincere and sufficiently compelling to outweigh the right of an individual to equal protection.15 In other words, the Court said that not all use of race in government
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regulation is prohibited; the Court’s decision will consider the context in which race is used. Using this line of reasoning, the Court approved the affirmative action program at the University of Michigan Law School.16 The Court considered student diversity a sufficiently compelling government interest to allow the law school to take race into account when making admissions decisions.17 The Court’s decision is unusual when viewed from the standpoint of conventional strict scrutiny. Rather than review the compelling nature of student diversity—the goal that the school claimed justified using race in the admissions process—and the means used for its attainment with the usual thoroughness and skepticism characteristic of strict scrutiny review, the Court deferred to the law school’s educational judgment.18 The dissenting justices criticized the majority’s decision, arguing that deference has no place in strict scrutiny.19 The Court performed its analysis of the law school’s race-conscious admissions program in a similar deferential fashion under the “narrowly tailored” prong.20 It was satisfied that the program was narrowly tailored to the compelling state objective of student diversity.21 According to the Court, if a race-conscious admissions program uses race as a plus factor and allows individualized consideration of a variety of other factors bearing on diversity, the members of other racial or ethnic groups will not be foreclosed from competing for enrollment.22 The Court found that the law school’s admissions program allowed this result since it required that students be selected who demonstrate the greatest potential to enhance diversity, irrespective of the nature of diversity-enhancing factors.23 Grutter marks a substantial relaxing of the strict scrutiny analysis, at least in the context of higher education. According to the principles pronounced by the Court in Grutter, the invalidation of a government action is no longer predetermined merely because it falls within the ambits of strict scrutiny. Instead, the fate of a government action is decided by balancing the competing constitutional interests in specific contextual circumstances. This type of balancing is characteristic of the ends-benefits proportionality principle employed in foreign jurisdictions24 and of intermediate scrutiny used by the Supreme Court in gender discrimination cases, dormant commerce clause cases, and some First Amendment scenarios. Similar softening of strict scrutiny review has also occurred in the field of substantive due process, where strict scrutiny is employed to protect fundamental rights from government intrusion. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 25 is an example in which the Court applied a less rigid strict scrutiny approach. In Casey, the Court adopted an “undue burden” method of balancing a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy with the state’s “profound interest in potential life.”26 The government is permitted to promote its pro-life interests as long as it does not impose an undue burden on a woman’s freedom to have
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an abortion.27 In other words, instead of allowing one of the competing interests to override the other, the Court established a standard that accommodated both of them. By contrast, conventional strict scrutiny allows one of the competing interests to completely override, not accommodate, the other. The overridden interest regains its power only when the right or freedom protected by strict scrutiny is abused and causes harm to others. This type of overriding analysis is found in Roe v. Wade,28 which established a woman’s limited right to terminate her pregnancy. Roe prohibited any interference with a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester.29 The state’s interest in the potentiality of human life was suspended until after viability, when, in the Court’s opinion, a woman’s decision to have an abortion could harm a viable human organism.30 A similar conventional approach was employed in relation to several other freedoms such as the right to marry;31 the right to have children;32 the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children;33 the right to marital privacy, including the right to procreate or not to procreate;34 the right to use contraception;35 the right to bodily integrity;36 the right to refuse medical treatment;37 and other fundamental rights.38 None of these rights is absolute; strict scrutiny is employed to ensure that their exercise is suspended only when necessary to accommodate an overriding state interest such as public safety and health. In a sense, the Court engages in balancing when contemplating the enforcement of these rights, but the extent of this balancing is narrower than under the standard proposed in Casey and Grutter. Further, the Court did much more in Casey than just soften the strict scrutiny standard of review and allow for balancing. It gave the constitutional doctrine of fundamental rights a semblance of proportionality to review the constitutional validity of government interference. The Court arguably used the language “undue burden”39 to signal its intention to inquire into the proportionality of the benefits of a state action to the harm inflicted on the bearer of a fundamental right to have an abortion. The concept of undue burden contemplates the existence of some due, or fair, burden. There is little doubt that to constitute a due burden, the beneficial effects of a state action must be proportional to the inconvenience suffered by the bearer of the right to abortion. Otherwise, the burden would be undue; the utility of the state action would then be outweighed by its disutility. Strict scrutiny has traditionally been observed to result in a virtually automatic invalidation of a challenged federal or state action.40 The situation may change, however, in light of the constitutional developments described earlier, which indicate that the Court is willing to consider strict scrutiny’s less rigid alternatives. There is also much potential for the application of the principle of proportionality in the field of constitutional protection of fundamental rights,
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primarily because these rights are not absolute and their exercise may be subject to government interference. Indeed, the principle of proportionality is very well suited for limiting regulatory or legislative discretion to means that are necessary and proportionate to the desired results. In short, proportionality is an essential tool that the Supreme Court could use to detect unnecessary government usurpation of individual autonomy because, in addition to the suitability and necessity of a government action, proportionality weighs the corresponding burden on individual autonomy against the proposed action’s anticipated beneficial outcome.
B. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY Intermediate scrutiny is a less exacting test applied when there is no objective basis for a strong presumption in favor of or against the validity of a government action.41 This occurs when competing constitutional interests have relatively equal constitutional standing. For instance, nondiscriminatory state legislation is reviewed with intermediate scrutiny under the dormant commerce clause42 because it carries sufficient constitutional weight to compete with the federal interest on an equal footing. By contrast, facially or otherwise discriminatory laws are subject to a more rigorous scrutiny mainly because their discriminatory nature provides a sufficient assurance of their invalidity and diminishes the weight of the underlying state interest.43 The Supreme Court formulated the test for nondiscriminatory state legislation in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:44 “[W]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”45 This is an American rendition of the principle of proportionality found in German and European Union law; all of the elements of proportionality are present. First, the extent of the burden tolerated depends on the importance of the state interest. In the same way, the comparative weight of competing constitutional interests is instrumental in German constitutional law46 for determining the extent of deference to a government regulation. Second, the requirement of suitability is either implicit or represented by the words “the statute regulates . . . to effectuate a legitimate local public interest.” Because a statute cannot regulate to effectuate a legitimate state interest unless it is suitable for such effectuation, under this test, the Court will have to consider whether the statute is suitable to achieve the desired public objective.47 Third, the Court pronounced the requirement of necessity of the state action in Pike when it said that “the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will . . . depend . . . on whether it could be promoted
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as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”48 Finally, the Pike Court laid out the third requirement of the principle of proportionality—proportionality in the narrower sense—by specifically commanding that the burden the state statute imposed on interstate commerce could not be “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”49 The weighing of the evils and benefits of a state action is a quintessential characteristic of the requirement of proportionality in the narrower sense.50
1. First Amendment Protections of Speech A similar approach may be observed in some First Amendment cases. In fact, Justice Breyer, who is a strong proponent of the principle of proportionality,51 expressly suggested that it be used in such situations to find a constitutional equilibrium. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, he stated: In such circumstances—where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways—the Court has closely scrutinized the statute’s impact on those interests, but refrained from employing a simple test that effectively presumes unconstitutionality. Rather, it has balanced interests. And in practice that has meant asking whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive alternative). Where a legislature has significantly greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments—at least where that deference does not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.52 Justice Breyer’s language proposed to apply a standard that balances competing constitutional interests—a characteristic of intermediate scrutiny—to all cases in which the protection of First Amendment free speech rights faces competition from a similarly important constitutional right. The Court did not expressly adopt this proposition. It did, however, create an intermediate scrutiny standard for all “content-neutral” regulation of speech,53 arguing that the government’s burden to justify “time, place, and manner” regulations addressing the “secondary effects” of speech should be lower than strict scrutiny because they did not pose such a serious threat to the right to free speech as “content-based” regulations would pose.54 “Content-based” regulations of speech are still subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.55
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In United States v. O’Brien,56 the Court established the requirements for the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to regulations affecting speech. Such a regulation must be within the government’s constitutional power and must be adopted in furtherance of an important or substantial government interest.57 The former requirement resonates with that of suitability, one of the elements of the test of proportionality in Germany and the European Union, but the O’Brien test goes further: The insistence on an important or substantial government interest represents an implicit form of categoric ends-proportionality analysis (whereas the third German and EU test, proportionality in the narrow sense, is an endsproportionality standard that evaluates government interests on a sliding scale).58 The requirement mentioned in O’Brien that government regulation be unrelated to the suppression of free expression also pertains to suitability.59 The notion of necessity, the test of proportionality in Germany and the European Union,60 was reflected61 in O’Brien’s requirement that a government regulation restrict no more protected interests than were needed for addressing the government’s legitimate interests.62 Unlike the European and German tests,63 however, intermediate scrutiny does not require strict necessity (least restrictive means).64 a. The Overbreadth Doctrine In addition to the listed requirements, the test of intermediate scrutiny regarding “content-neutral” regulation affecting speech is modified by the so-called overbreadth doctrine. This doctrine has elements of both the second and the third tests of proportionality in German and EU law;65 the Court examines not only the availability of more narrowly tailored means (necessity) but also the degree of interference with protected activity (proportionality in the narrow sense). The overbreadth doctrine allows facial challenges of a law if it punishes a “substantial” amount of protected speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”66 A finding of overbreadth allows the plaintiff to request a complete invalidation of the law “until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.”67 The Court explained the availability of this remedy based on the concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad content-neutral law may “ ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech.”68 The relation of the overbreadth doctrine to proportionality is based on more than a mere implication from the language adopted by the Supreme Court to describe the doctrine. In fact, Justice Scalia, delivering the Court’s opinion in Virginia v. Hicks69—and, incidentally, rejecting the plaintiff ’s request to apply the overbreadth doctrine in that case70—explicitly criticized the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia under consideration as erroneous for ignoring “the
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proportionality aspect of [the Court’s] overbreadth doctrine.”71 He said that a facial challenge of a law based on its overbroad application to protected speech required substantial effects on the protected speech “not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate application.”72 He added that it was the effect of the law on protected speech “taken as a whole” that was considered for the purposes of determining its overbreadth.73 In the conclusion of his opinion in Hicks, Justice Scalia added one other caveat to the application of the overbreadth doctrine: “[T]he overbreadth doctrine’s concern with ‘chilling’ protected speech ‘attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from “pure speech” toward conduct.’ ”74 A law will rarely be invalidated with the use of the overbreadth doctrine, then, if it is not directed at speech or conduct substantially related to speech.75 b. Commercial Speech Proportionality is also present in cases that deal with the “commercial speech doctrine,” a matter related to trade and antitrust regulation, as well as to the protection of the freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment. Under the commercial speech doctrine, the government cannot regulate speech that does not threaten the asserted state interest, “nor can it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well.”76 This formulation implicitly invokes alternative-means proportionality principles. In determining whether a government regulation of commercial speech is overbroad or excessive, the court must first determine whether an expression is protected by the First Amendment.77 To qualify, commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.78 The next inquiry is whether the government’s interest is substantial,79 a test that invokes implicit ends-benefits proportionality principles in a categoric rule: The potential benefits associated with less than “substantial” government interests can never justify burdens on commercial speech. If that test is met, the court “must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.”80 The Court has expressly invoked proportionality principles in some of these cases, but the justices continue to debate the level of proportionality necessitated by this fourth and final requirement.81 In Central Hudson,82 the Court found that the contested advertising of electric energy could advance valid business goals that were not related to the asserted government interest of conserving energy.83 The Court said: “To the extent that the Commission’s order suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State’s interest in energy conservation, the Commission’s order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .”84 The Court also held that the regulation was overbroad because
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the commission could not prove that a narrower means would be completely ineffective.85 Note that the commercial speech doctrine is not a subspecies of the overbreadth doctrine we discussed earlier in this book because, under the commercial speech doctrine, the plaintiff is asserting its own First Amendment rights, not the rights of chilled third parties.86 To summarize, the constitutional standards that govern the regulation of commercial speech implicitly incorporate both ends- and means-proportionality principles. Ends proportionality is implicit in the requirement of a substantial government interest; means-proportionality analysis is implicit when courts consider the availability and effectiveness of narrower restrictions on the speech.
2. Gender The intermediate scrutiny used in gender discrimination appears to be more rigorous than that employed in constitutional review of state actions under the dormant commerce clause and the First Amendment. The state bears the burden of justification for a classification based on gender.87 The justification must be “exceedingly persuasive.”88 The Court admitted the existence of inherent differences between men and women but cautioned that these differences justify only actions “to compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ ”89 “to ‘promot[e] equal employment opportunity,’ ”90 and “to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.”91 However, they cannot be used to promote “legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”92 Intermediate scrutiny has been instrumental in embedding the roots of the principle of proportionality in American constitutional jurisprudence. It is arguably an effective tool for harmonizing competing constitutional interests. In spite of this, intermediate scrutiny should not be used to assess the validity of government interference with strong overriding interests. Otherwise, the constitutional weight of the interest will be diminished by the concomitant deference to the state.
C. RATIONAL BASIS Rational basis review is employed in situations where strict or intermediate scrutiny is inapplicable. All laws must meet this minimum level of constitutional scrutiny.93 Like strict scrutiny, the traditional rational basis standard is outcome determinative—government action subject to rational basis review is afforded a strong presumption of constitutional validity. As such, it is rarely invalidated.94
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Such minimal scrutiny corresponds to the suitability test of proportionality in Germany and the European Union. However, where it applies, rational basis is the only test, whereas Germany and the EU also apply two additional tests (necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense) corresponding to means and ends proportionality. Recent Supreme Court decisions that adopt somewhat stricter standards reflect dissatisfaction with the toothlessness of rational basis review.
1. Traditional Standards The traditional rational basis test is highly deferential to the government.95 It merely requires that the law be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.96 The purpose does not have to be actual; for rational basis review, the Court can accept any conceivable government objective.97 For example, in Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., the Court said that “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ”98 The rational basis standard tolerates both under-99 and overinclusiveness100 of a legislative act. Thus, for rational basis purposes, a law does not have to affect everyone similarly situated the same. Courts “are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.”101 As indicated, the rational basis standard is applied to the majority of state and federal economic and social legislation that does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification.102 The extreme deference to the government that courts exercise when reviewing state action under the rational basis test emerged as a response to excessive judicial interference with the states’ police powers during the so-called Lochner era.103 Under Lochner v. New York,104 the Court showed little or no deference to the states’ political and economic judgment. Economic and social laws were overturned on the finding that they were not reasonably related to the declared end. The principle of rational relation of regulatory means to the desired objectives proclaimed in Lochner bears some notion of proportionality in that it was intended to protect the freedom of individuals from government interference with their economic activity. In Lochner, for example, the Court overturned as unduly intrusive a law restricting bakers’ working hours, holding: “The [state] act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.”105
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Although the legislature based the law on perceived threats to “the safety, the morals, [or] the welfare . . . of the public,” the Court was unable to find any such danger caused by allowing bakers the freedom to set their working hours.106 It held that, bearing no rational relation to its declared objectives, the challenged state action unduly interfered with the freedom of individuals “to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best.”107 The fallacy in the Lochner Court’s application of balancing under the adopted rational basis test was that it did not balance the competing interests. Rather, the Court used heightened scrutiny to invalidate the state law at issue in that case without giving any weight to its social purpose and utility.108 The Court limited the state interests that could compete with the individual economic freedom to public health, safety, and morals.109 Along similar lines, it invalidated minimum wage laws,110 laws protecting unionizing,111 and consumer protection laws.112 A significant jurisprudential change occurred nearly thirty years later in 1934, when the Court in Nebbia v. New York sustained price regulations for milk.113 Regarding the groundwork for an inquiry into the proportionality of government measures, the Court said: Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.114 Implicit in this language is the notion that the Court is willing to engage in constitutional balancing as a means to harmonize the competing individual and public constitutional interests in the socioeconomic field. Regrettably, the Court failed to advance this idea into an overarching requirement of proportionality of government action. Eventually the Court moved from the position of no deference to that of broad deference to state socioeconomic legislation.115
2. Rational Basis with a Bite A positive shift in the direction of a more searching rational basis review outside the areas traditionally reserved for strict or intermediate scrutiny can be gleaned from several recent Supreme Court decisions. The first group of cases reveals congressional or state desire to harm a politically unpopular or disadvantaged group;
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the Court focuses on the hurtful legislative intent, declares it to be illegitimate, and declines to consider or posit possible valid government purposes (as is done under traditional rational basis review, discussed earlier). The second group deals with the protection of individuals, entities, and states from excessive civil penalties and unconstitutional enforcement actions. In this part we focus primarily on the first group. The second group of cases is discussed in chapter 4. The first important decision of the Supreme Court to invalidate a piece of federal legislation because it failed the rational basis test was United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.116 The Court invalidated § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which, “with certain exceptions, exclude[d] from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who [was] unrelated to any other member of the household.”117 Sensing that the challenged legislation would primarily harm “those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility” under the food stamp program, the Court concluded that the challenged classification was not related rationally to the stated purpose of the act, which was to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm surpluses.118 The Court, moreover, rejected an additional government objective of preventing “so-called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communities’ from participation in the food stamp program” found in the legislative history.119 In particular, the Court pointed out that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”120 Finally, the Court rejected the government’s contention that preventing “hippie communities” from participating in the food stamp program served the purpose of minimizing fraud in the administration of the program. It reasoned that the antifraud mechanisms incorporated into the Food Stamp Act were sufficient to fight fraud in this field.121 According to the Court, the challenged exclusion of households containing unrelated persons from the food stamp program would not so much minimize fraud as harm those who cannot afford separate residences to retain their eligibility under the program.122 The Court employed similar reasoning in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., in which the city of Cleburne, Texas, had denied a special use permit for the operation of a group house for persons with a mental disability.123 As in Moreno, the Court perceived a strong hint of prejudice and invalidated the government action.124 The Court, however, rejected the proposal to afford a quasi-suspect status to persons with a mental disability because of the state’s need to deal with different variations of mental disability, from slight deviations in the functioning of mental facilities to severe impairments of mental activity.125 The Court found additional support for its decision in an argument similar to that used in gender
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classification. In particular, it stated that a requirement that a state must justify its efforts in protecting and helping persons with a mental disability would chill much beneficial government action in this field.126 It added that “given the wide variation in the abilities and needs of the [persons with a mental disability] themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial efforts.”127 The denial of quasi-suspect status to persons with a mental disability did not prevent the Court from invalidating the permit requirement under the rational basis test. Having analyzed the proffered reasons in this case for denying the permit to the group home for persons with a mental disability, the Court concluded that the city’s decision was driven by an “irrational prejudice against the mentally [disabled].”128 These considerations provided no rational basis for denying the permit. Other examples of rigorous use of the rational basis test along the same lines include two Supreme Court decisions that deal with state regulation targeting the freedom of sexual orientation and sexual activity. In the first case, Romer v. Evans,129 the Court invalidated a constitutional amendment that deprived gays, lesbians, and bisexuals of state antidiscrimination protection. The Court considered the breadth of the amendment’s effect on a single named group to speak of nothing but “animus toward the class it affects.”130 The Court was particularly disturbed by the fact that this animosity may have caused the state to single out the named class from the rest of its citizens to deprive it of any opportunity to seek government protection except by constitutional amendment.131 As a measure that intends to make gays, lesbians, and bisexuals unequal to everyone else, the amendment was invalidated. In the second case, Lawrence v. Texas,132 the Court strengthened the protection of the freedom of sexual orientation and sexual activity under the due process clause. The Court reviewed a challenge to a Texas statute that criminalized consensual sodomy between two persons of the same sex in the privacy of their home. Unlike in Romer, the Court decided to invalidate the Texas statute under the due process clause133 to provide protection from government interference with the freedom of sexual orientation and sexual activity irrespective of an individual’s membership in a discrete class or group. It held that criminalizing sodomy between members of the same sex in this situation not only gave effect to an unlawful public prejudice against a specific choice of sexual orientation but also constituted an unwarranted government intrusion into a sphere of protected individual liberty.134 Generalizing from all of these cases, it seems the Court may be willing to apply a more rigorous scrutiny than the conventional rational basis test in circumstances in which it perceives a strong countervailing interest of individual liberty
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or senses that a government action implicitly promotes public prejudice against a single named group. This so-called rational basis test with a bite appears to be more flexible than ordinary rational basis review in accommodating a variety of societal and individual interests without denigrating any of them or blindly allowing one interest to override another. Such qualities make it a model for transitioning the two-tier system of constitutional review into a meaningful sliding-scale proportionality analysis. Furthermore, developments in the field of fundamental rights, such as Lawrence’s remarkable expansion of the scope of individual autonomy entitled to more than nominal protection under the due process clause, will require proportionality to play a more prominent role in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Foreign experience shows that proportionality is better suited for reconciling the expansion of protected individual autonomy with the rule of law principle that individual autonomy should be preserved insofar as it does not harm others or inhibit the normal functioning of human society.135 Proportionality can balance competing constitutional interests without allowing the majority to impose its views of morality on the minority unless those views are independently supported by evidence of some important public interest.136 By contrast, the existing conclusory-oriented tests of strict scrutiny and rational basis simply lack the ability to check the regulatory discretion of the state in accord with the growing realization of individual autonomy, leaving a substantial part of individual autonomy unprotected.
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despite the traditional application of the deferential rational basis standard of judicial review to government action in the sphere of socioeconomic regulation,1 the U.S. Supreme Court has moved in select areas of its jurisprudence toward a more searching scrutiny than is typically present in rational basis decisions. We have already discussed the effect of the Court’s enhanced rational basis review on matters of equal protection and substantive protection of individual autonomy. We now turn to its explicit use of proportionality as a means of increased constitutional oversight of remedial or regulatory actions, including (1) punitive damages, (2) land-use exactions, (3) attorney’s fees awards, and (4) federal enforcement measures under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As we will see, the Court applies different degrees of proportionality to different remedial measures. It demonstrates an initial, although inconsistent, doctrinal readiness for the gradual importation of the overarching principle of proportionality into U.S. constitutional law. On the other hand, selective employment of proportionality in various socioeconomic matters may have a negative impact on the prospects of introducing proportionality as a general instrumental tool of constitutional review. It is patently obvious from the cases that follow that the Court uses proportionality as another standard of review, placed in light of its level of intensity between rational 67
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basis and intermediate scrutiny. In this manner, the role of proportionality may become marginalized in those areas where the Court chooses not to apply it as an express limitation on government discretion.
A. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES Punitive2 and compensatory damages serve different purposes. Compensatory damages compensate a plaintiff for the loss suffered as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct.3 Punitive damages, on the other hand, have no compensatory basis;4 they serve the broader public functions of deterrence and retribution.5 States possess a substantial amount of autonomy in promoting private enforcement of public interests through the mechanism of punitive or exemplary damages.6 As a general matter, the Supreme Court found this autonomy to be consistent with the guarantees of fundamental fairness enshrined in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment7 and refused, in large measure because of its consistent common law history, to declare the common law method of assessing punitive damages unconstitutional per se.8 The Court, nonetheless, acknowledged very early in the history of punitive damages that they may become suspect under the due process clause when they are “wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.”9 This position remained largely symbolic throughout the twentieth century until BMW v. Gore, when the Court invalidated a punitive damages award as excessive under the due process clause.10 As discussed later, the factors used by the Court in identifying unconstitutionally disproportionate punitive damages awards seem to incorporate all three principles we have identified: limiting retributive, ends-benefits, and alternativemeans proportionality. When the Court’s punitive damages standards and holdings are compared to those in prison-duration cases (discussed in chapter 7), it appears that the Court grants more protection to the security of civil defendants’ property than to criminal defendants’ liberty.
1. Pre-BMW Jurisprudence Several important principles that govern matters of constitutional validity of punitive damages were elaborated prior to BMW. In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,11 the Court held that the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment did not apply to punitive damages. The Court explained that the excessive fines clause was “concerned with criminal punishment and with direct actions initiated by government
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to inflict punishment.”12 Accordingly, the intent of the Eighth Amendment was to address potential government abuse of its prosecutorial power, not to constrain the state’s ability to facilitate private enforcement of public interests through punitive damages.13 The Court refused to decide whether excessive punitive damages could violate the due process clause because the issue had not been properly raised on appeal.14 It also rejected the plaintiffs’ invitation to impose a common law requirement of reasonableness on state punitive damages awards because common law excessiveness principles, as matters of state law, were outside the Court’s jurisdiction.15 The next two decisions tested the validity of punitive damages under the due process clause. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,16 the Court upheld an award of punitive damages because the award was based on identifiable objective criteria of reasonableness, notwithstanding the facts that it was four times the amount of compensatory damages, two hundred times the amount of the plaintiff ’s out-of-pocket expenses, and larger than any available applicable criminal fine.17 The Court refused to find a common law method of assessing punitive damages unconstitutional per se.18 Two years later, in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,19 the Court declined to assign a specific level of scrutiny to punitive damages and rejected proposals to apply either heightened scrutiny or rational basis, holding that it would not adopt a bright-line mathematical formula to determine whether an award of punitive damages was constitutionally acceptable or unacceptable.20 The Court said a punitive damages award resulting from fair procedures was “entitled to a strong presumption of validity.”21 It also indicated that concerns about the reasonableness of punitive damages were valid22 and that potential harm to the plaintiff could be considered in determining whether punitive damages were excessive.23
2. Guideposts of Proportionality under BMW and State Farm BMW v. Gore 24 and State Farm v. Campbell 25 established the constitutional principles currently governing awards of punitive damages. Both cases express the Supreme Court’s approval of using punitive damages to further the state interests of retribution and deterrence.26 The Court recognized that states and their juries have a substantial degree of flexibility with regard to the amount of punitive damages awards.27 That said, it cautioned that a punitive damages award may run contrary to the implicit notion of fairness embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it can “fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation” to the state interests of deterrence and retribution.28
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Two important principles control the constitutional validity of punitive damages. First, “a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent” to punish the defendant for its conduct outside the state’s jurisdiction, whether lawful29 or unlawful.30 Imposing economic sanctions for lawful outof-state conduct, according to the Court, would violate other states’ constitutional autonomy to promote values and shape conduct falling within their jurisdiction.31 The state’s authority to impose punitive damages for a defendant’s unlawful outof-state conduct without joining the out-of-state victims of such conduct was also considered questionable.32 Both lawful and unlawful out-of-state conduct, however, could be considered as evidence that bears on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct insofar as it is related to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.33 Second, to meet the requirements of the due process clause, a punitive damages award must provide the defendant sufficient notice of the severity of the penalty that may be imposed for the defendant’s conduct.34 To facilitate this inquiry, the Court established a test that consists of three guideposts of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. Implicit in these guideposts is the notion that a punitive damages award must be proportional to the harm inflicted. a. Guidepost #1: Reprehensibility of Defendant’s Conduct The first and most important guidepost deals with the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.35 The language of “reprehensibility” and repeated references to the defendant’s “culpability” and “blameworthy” acts36 suggest that the Court is imposing implicit limiting retributive caps on punitive damages awards. This interpretation is also supported by the Court’s list of factors to consider in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. Those include whether “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.”37 The Court treats punitive damages awards as suspect if none of these factors supports the plaintiff ’s case of punitive damages, but it has cautioned that the existence of any of them still might not be dispositive to the issue of whether a punitive damages award must be affirmed.38 With regard to judicial determination of reprehensibility, the Court was particularly troubled by the problem of multiplicity of punitive damages awards. In State Farm, it criticized Utah’s reliance on the evidence of the defendant’s unrelated questionable conduct in determining the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct that harmed the plaintiff.39 “A defendant’s dissimilar acts,
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independent from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages.”40 A contrary practice, said the Court, would lead to the adjudication, for the purposes of imposing punitive damages, of unrelated, hypothetical third-party claims and eventually burden the defendant with multiple punitive awards for the same conduct.41 The same concerns are present in the use of recidivism as an aggravating factor, so the definition of recidivism is limited solely to replication of prior transgressions.42 The present and past transgressions must be sufficiently related or similar to give rise to the charge of recidivism.43 Wholly unrelated past conduct may not be used to supply the repetition element of recidivism.44 The Court’s argument regarding multiple punitive awards is somewhat arbitrary, however, because it condemns only the use of the defendant’s unrelated conduct in the calculation of punitive damages.45 The Court fails to acknowledge that evidence of the defendant’s similar or related conduct harming others, if admitted, might create no less a possibility of multiple punitive damages than the evidence of its unrelated conduct. The threat of multiple punitive awards is inversely related to the ability of juries and courts to accurately attribute punitive damages to the plaintiff ’s harm.46 The task of correlating punitive damages to the plaintiff ’s harm is substantially difficult regardless of the relation that conduct has to the plaintiff ’s harm. Legal scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to the problem of multiplicity of punitive damages awards, including the societal damages approach to punitive damages47 and bifurcated class-action punitive damages trials.48 Both have significant drawbacks. The difficulties with correlating punitive damages to a specific harm are not alleviated in a class action, where juries and courts face the challenge of attributing punitive damages to the harm suffered by a class.49 The theory of societal harm suggests that a portion of punitive damages represents and should cover two types of compensatory societal damages—specific harms, which include absent plaintiffs with cognizable tort claims and “quasi plaintiffs,” whose harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is not yet recognized as cognizable under any existing damage theory;50 and diffuse harms, which consist of any structural harm inflicted on society by the defendant’s conduct.51 One point of criticism of allowing absent plaintiffs to participate in the distribution of punitive damages as compensation for their actual harm may be that the defendant’s due process protection against arbitrary takings of property may be implicated without adequate adjudication of absent plaintiffs’ claims in a direct individual or class action trial. With regard to quasi plaintiffs, it would be more prudent to provide this category of potential claimants with compensation through a less arbitrary process of direct judicial recognition of certain new physical or psychological harms. Admittedly, judicial acceptance of new types of
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compensatory damages is not always aligned with the emerging empirical notions of harm, though this fact alone cannot provide sufficient basis for avoiding the rigors of judicial debate that usually attends the expansion of the theory of compensatory damages.52 Compensation of diffuse harms through punitive damages is fraught with even bigger problems. It would permit a state to avoid the constraints of the excessive fines clause by allowing an individual plaintiff to proceed on behalf of the state rather than having to prosecute the defendant’s wrongful conduct directly. More important, contrary to the controversial nature of punitive damages that usually militates in favor of restricting their use, the proposition to compensate diffuse harms through punitive damages would unduly expand their use by adding to the existing traditional purposes of punitive damages in American jurisprudence the goal of compensation of societal harm. A better solution to the problem of multiplicity of punitive damages awards, at least concerning the difficulties that juries and courts experience in accurately attributing punitive damages to the plaintiff ’s harm, exists in the form of split-recovery statutes. Under a split-recovery statute, a state allows the court to reallocate a portion of punitive damages back to the state.53 Properly drafted,54 a split-recovery statute would reallocate a portion of a punitive damages award, erroneously attributed to the plaintiff ’s harm, to societal use in the areas that suffered from the defendant’s conduct.55 b. Guidepost #2: Proportionality to Actual or Potential Harm Because punitive damages are paid to the plaintiff, the Court in State Farm and BMW fashioned the second guidepost of reasonableness, or proportionality, to demand a certain proportional correlation between a punitive damages award and the harm inflicted on the plaintiff.56 The Court seemingly accepted the principle stated in TXO that there must be a reasonable relationship between a punitive damages award and the potential, as well as actual, harm inflicted on the plaintiff.57 Despite the acceptance of potential harm as an allowable benchmark for the constitutional evaluation of punitive awards, both BMW and State Farm proceeded on the basis of actual harm, thereby limiting the importance of the inquiry based on potential harm to TXO-like situations. The focus on actual or potential harm suggests that the second guidepost reflects implicit ends-benefits proportionality principles. In TXO, the potential harm from the defendant’s conduct was sufficiently cognizable to enter the punitive ratio calculus mainly because the defendant’s conduct set in motion a chain of events that, unless stopped, would continue causing the plaintiff harm without any additional affirmative action by the defendant.58
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Embarking on its fraudulent scheme, the defendant in TXO did not plan to get caught, and, as a result, the total amount of harm to the plaintiff and gain to the defendant was part of the defendant’s wrongful intent, for which the defendant had to be punished.59 The situation was different in State Farm and BMW, where the extent of damage to the plaintiff from the defendant’s conduct was effectively exhausted before the commencement of the suit.60 On the matter of an actual, constitutionally allowable ratio, the Court has given scant guidance. It has consistently refused to impose rigid ratio benchmarks,61 concluding simply that, “in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”62 The Court has given no justifiable reason for treating singledigit ratios as more constitutionally defensible than larger ratios,63 but in State Farm it did express one caveat: Ratios higher than a single-digit may be upheld where especially reprehensible conduct results in small actual damages.64 The Court rejected a multiplier formula, under which the total amount of punitive damages would be calculated based on the difficulty of detecting and quantifying the plaintiff ’s harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.65 It also held that the defendant’s wealth alone could not justify a large punitive damages award.66 Finally, if it is likely that the harm suffered by the plaintiff could be covered by compensatory damages and punished by punitive damages at the same time, a lesser ratio would be appropriate.67 c. Guidepost #3: Necessity to Achieve Adequate Deterrence The third guidepost tests the necessity of a punitive damages award by comparing it to the existing legislative sanctions for comparable conduct.68 The Court observed that the severity of these legislative sanctions represents what the state expected would be the size of a civil penalty needed to deter the conduct at issue.69 To comply with due process, a remedy must be necessary and superior to less drastic alternatives. As the Court stated in BMW, “[t]he sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal.”70 In BMW there was no history of statutory noncompliance to test the effectiveness of the existing statutory remedies for comparable conduct, which, in the Court’s opinion, made it unreasonable to assume that the public goals of retribution and deterrence could not be achieved with a less intrusive remedy than the punitive damages under consideration.71 The State Farm Court added that lower courts should avoid using criminal penalties for the calculation of punitive damages.72 Admitting that the existence of a criminal penalty reflects the state’s assessment of the social disutility of the
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defendant’s action, the Court cautioned that punitive damages should not take the place of criminal penalties without the heightened protection of the criminal process.73 In sum, said the Court, “the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award.”74 State Farm and BMW are among the first few Supreme Court decisions that apply proportionality principles to state socioeconomic regulation. Interestingly, despite the fact that proportionality was the underlying principle of the standard of review newly established in BMW, that case omitted the word “proportionality” from the standard’s description. It took the Court seven years to finally recognize in State Farm that the test in BMW embraces the principle of proportionality. “[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”75
B. THE ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY OF LANDUSE PERMIT CONDITIONS In following its concern over discretionary, ad hoc76 government interference into the autonomy of entities and individuals, the Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of proportionality in a narrow class of cases to provide protection for private property from unconstitutional takings. In particular, the Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard 77 instituted a requirement of “rough proportionality” to measure the reasonableness of the relationship between the severity of individualized conditions imposed by the government on land-use permits and the impact of a proposed land development. The inquiry was designed to supplement the “essential nexus” test developed by the Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission78 to ensure that a permit condition is substantially related to the public burden that a proposed land-use development imposes. Nollan inquired into the existence of a fit between a permit condition and a projected development’s impact, while Dolan examined the required tightness of that fit. The two inquiries became the prongs of a test employed to assess the constitutional validity of governmental land-use permit conditions.79 The test recognizes the important role of government exactions in land-use regulation and employs the traditional constituent elements of the German doctrine of proportionality—suitability, necessity (alternative-means proportionality), and proportionality in the narrower sense (ends-benefits proportionality)80—to screen constitutionally excessive land-use permit conditions. The application of the Nollan-Dolan test has not been limited explicitly to possessory81 exactions.82 Yet, the Supreme Court has rejected the test’s use in cases involving legislative land-use restrictions83 or where owners are merely denied land-use permits.84
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As an initial step in the constitutional protection of private property from excessive land-use permit conditions, Nollan established the requirement of essential nexus between land-use permit conditions and projected development impacts.85 In Nollan, the Court dealt with a condition the California Coastal Commission had imposed on its approval of a rebuilding permit requested by the Nollans.86 The commission held that the new house the Nollans planned to build “would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of ‘a wall of residential structures’ that would prevent the public ‘psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit.’ ”87 Thus, the commission required that the Nollans dedicate an easement across their property to provide access to public beaches.88 The Supreme Court agreed that states may impose permit conditions that serve the same purpose that a denial of a permit would serve.89 The Court opined that a permit condition in Nollan would be constitutional if it were directed, as a height or width limitation on a structure would be, at the protection of the public’s ability to view the beach.90 Along the same lines, the state would be permitted to condition the land-use permit on the Nollans’ providing a viewing spot for the public on their property.91 Despite the fact that absent attachment to a land-use permit, the latter alternative would have constituted a taking, according to the Court, the commission would be justified in using its police power in this manner as an alternative to denial of a development permit, provided, of course, that such concession of property rights by the owner served the same purpose as the denial of the development permit would serve.92 The commission in Nollan, however, did not utilize any of these permissible methods of conditioning a land-use permit because dedication of an easement for public passage through the Nollans’ property served the purpose of maintaining public access to public beaches, not the objective of preserving the public’s view of the beach from the street, which would be served by denial of development.93 The Court held that, “unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an ‘out-and-out plan of extortion.’ ”94 Because the condition imposed by the commission served a different purpose, the Court held that the condition constituted an unconstitutional taking without compensation.95 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,96 the Court added to the requirement of essential nexus the demand for proportionality between a governmental exaction imposed as a condition to a permit and the projected development impact. The City of Tigard Planning Commission required that Mrs. Dolan “dedicate the portion of her properly lying within the 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system along [the adjacent creek] and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.”97
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The commission justified the imposed conditions by the need to prevent flooding along the creek and to reduce additional traffic congestion created in the central business district by the proposed development.98 Quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon,99 the Court reinforced the notion that “[a] land use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.’ ”100 It then observed two important distinctions of the case at issue from the sort of land-use regulations examined in Agins.101 First, said the Court, the regulations described in Agins represented legislative zoning determinations, while the land-use decision here was an “adjudicative decision” imposing an individualized condition on an individual parcel of land.102 Second, the limitation here did not merely restrict the use of land by the owner as in Agins but also required that the owner completely give up portions of her property in favor of the city.103 Under these circumstances, the Court noted, a person cannot be compelled to give up her constitutional right to receive compensation for condemned property in return for a discretionary governmental benefit unrelated to the property.104 The Dolan Court had no problem finding an essential nexus between the permit conditions at issue and the projected impact of the proposed development of the property. It said that sufficient nexus existed between preventing flooding and not developing in the floodplain since the proposed expansion of the premises on the property would increase the amount of storm water runoff.105 Similarly, the Court found it reasonable to reduce traffic congestion created as a result of the proposed development by building new pedestrian/bicycle paths as additional means of access to the city’s business district.106 Under Nollan, the inquiry into the constitutional validity of these permit conditions would end here. The Court, however, went on to add an additional prong to its analysis—whether the degree of government exactions reasonably related to the severity of the projected impact of the proposed development.107 In other words, the court was to determine whether the public benefit and the property owner’s detriment from the imposed condition were roughly proportional to the harm from the proposed land use. To establish a meaningful standard, the Court surveyed a number of applicable state court practices in this area.108 It rejected the rational basis standard109 and the test of direct proportionality,110 reasoning that both of these standards failed to reflect adequately the balance of competing constitutional interests in this type of case. The Court concluded that the test of rough proportionality best corresponded to the needs of constitutional review relative to land-use permit conditions.111 It said that the test required no mathematical calculation “but that the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”112
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A detailed review of the Court’s examination of the permit condition in question in Dolan is necessary for a better understanding of the thrust of the Court’s “rough proportionality” test. The Court could find no reasonable relation between dedication of an easement lying within the floodplain and prevention of flooding.113 In the Court’s view, the same goal could have been achieved by the extant zoning requirement that the owner refrain from building within the established floodplain.114 In other words, the complete abridgment of Mrs. Dolan’s right to exclude others from her property was excessive and unnecessary for the attainment of the municipal goal of flood prevention.115 Regarding the pedestrian/bicycle path, the Court opined that the city failed to show that the increased number of vehicle and bicycle trips caused by the proposed development reasonably related to the requirement that Mrs. Dolan dedicate a portion of her property as a public easement for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.116 The Court emphasized that the city merely provided evidence that the contemplated pedestrian/bicycle pathway could reduce some of the additional traffic created by the proposed development instead of offering proof that the path would or was likely to do so.117 Dolan’s rough proportionality test bears certain resemblance to the proportionality review of governmental interference with social and economic individual rights in foreign jurisdictions discussed earlier. The intensity of constitutional inquiry introduced by the Court in relation to land-use permit conditions in the United States reflects the position of the protected constitutional interests in the established constitutional hierarchy.118 The Court shied away from adopting the requirement of strict proportionality, viewing the need for government regulation of land use sufficiently important to allow for a certain flexibility of action.119 On the other hand, the Court realized that the intensity of government intrusion involving land-use permit conditions warrants the placement of the burden of showing rough proportionality on the government.120 According to Nollan, this is because often the conditions that require the permanent dedication of property to public use “would have to be considered a taking if [they] were not attached to a development permit.”121 In sum, owners’ concessions of property in exchange for land development permits do not constitute a taking per se precisely because they are demanded in exchange for a development permit the government would be authorized to deny.122 Thus, the owner is vested with the choice whether to forego the contemplated development or make a possessory property concession. This aspect saves uncompensated land-use permit exactions from per se unconstitutionality, but it does not entirely remove the concern that the government will use its leverage, which it possesses by virtue of its being the issuer of land-use permits, to demand excessive exactions. Thus, an inquiry more searching than the rational
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basis standard is required to protect individual property rights from excessive land-use permit conditions.123 Like its counterparts abroad, the inquiry of proportionality contemplated under the aegis of Dolan’s rough proportionality test includes the assessment of the imposed condition’s suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrower sense. Suitability of a land-use permit condition is assessed under Nollan’s essential nexus test. Like the inquiry of suitability, the essential nexus test requires that a permit condition be designed to redress the projected harm of the proposed property development.124 Absent such meaningful connection, a permit condition will be invalidated.125 The requirements of necessity and proportionality were conflated in Dolan’s analysis of the permit condition. The Court criticized the city for not choosing a less restrictive and more proportional exaction to offer the owner in exchange for a land-use permit.126 For instance, granting an easement over a strip of land to create a public greenway was neither necessary nor proportional to the reduction of the projected increase of the amount of storm water runoff to the adjacent creek created by the contemplated expansion of retail premises and parking lots.127 The Court concluded that the same objectives were achievable through the existing restrictions on construction within the floodplain area and that, as a result, dedication of a strip of land within the floodplain area was excessive in relation to the perceived threat of increased flooding caused by the proposed development.128 This position was further reinforced by the city’s concession of the ancillary nature of the recreational easement to “the city’s chief purpose in controlling flood hazards.”129 The Court’s necessity and proportionality analysis was less cogent relative to the city’s second objective that the permit condition at issue was intended to serve. The necessity and proportionality of the demanded dedication of an easement to the city’s objective of reducing traffic congestion created by the proposed expansion of business premises, according to the Court, hinged on individualized evidence showing that dedication of an easement would—not merely could or was likely to—reduce the increased traffic congestion.130 The Court seems to have mistaken the requirement of “rough proportionality” for that of “essential nexus.” In effect, it used the central inquiry of the essential nexus test—whether the permit condition at issue was suitable to attain reduction of traffic congestion created by the proposed development—to invalidate the said condition under the requirement of rough proportionality.131 In doing so, the Court diminished the value of rough proportionality and its constituent elements of necessity and proportionality in the narrower sense. Dolan failed to define the scope of the “rough proportionality” test, thereby leaving open the questions of whether it applied to legislative regulation of
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zoning132 and/or nonpossessory permit conditions,133 like impact fees or fees in lieu of dedication. These issues were subsequently raised in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.134 The plaintiff contested the city government’s zoning regulations, which foreclosed the plaintiff from developing its land. The Court attempted to dispel any ambiguity that existed regarding whether the requirement of rough proportionality applied to general land-use regulation, holding that a meaningful proportionality analysis of takings is necessary only in “the special context of exactions—land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.”135 Having acknowledged that “in a general sense concerns for proportionality animate the Takings Clause,”136 the Court nonetheless maintained that in applying the test of rough proportionality the Court had not ventured beyond permit-incentivized land dedications.137 It concluded that mere denials of development did not call for the heightened protection of rough proportionality because they derived their authority from legislative land-use regulation and did not involve the permit-for-land-dedication scenario present in Dolan and Nollan.138 Several important conclusions flow from City of Monterey. The Court recognized that proportionality plays a role in the relationship between the government and property owners. The Court’s searching proportionality review has been limited to a specific group of cases in which the Court detected a threat to individual property rights from uncompensated takings disguised as permit conditions.139 Despite the possible interpretation of the Court’s focus in City of Monterey on possessory exactions140 as an exclusion of nonpossessory exactions from the reach of the test of rough proportionality, there is sufficient jurisprudential evidence to the contrary. The primary weakness of this interpretation is that the Court’s language in City of Monterey limiting the use of rough proportionality to possessory exactions was dictum with regard to nonpossessory exactions because the case did not deal with a nonpossessory exaction. Moreover, a subsequent reversal and remand by the Supreme Court to consider “in light of Dolan” a California decision that a fee imposed on a developer to mitigate the loss of community recreational facilities on the developer’s property was valid141 further supports the view that the Court did not intend to exclude nonpossessory exactions from the reach of the Dolan test. On remand, the Supreme Court of California held that the rough proportionality test established in Dolan applied to nonpossessory (i.e., monetary, exactions).142 The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari,143 perhaps indicating that the Nollan-Dolan rough proportionality inquiry is applicable to nonpossessory exactions. The question whether the Nollan-Dolan rough proportionality test was applicable to legislative land-use enactments was resolved finally by the 2005 Supreme Court decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.144 The Court determined that
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neither the “substantially advances” test developed in Agins v. City of Tiburon145 nor similar tests related to due process standards of review were applicable in the context of regulatory takings.146 The Court explained that the takings clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”147 The proper inquiry, therefore, must focus not on the validity of the government action but on the economic burden imposed on the property to determine whether a taking of property has occurred by reason of that property’s having been deprived of all of its economic value as a result of government regulation.148 The validity of the government action ordering a taking is a separate inquiry that applies the deferential rational basis test used in all economic and social regulation.149 Despite its general attack on any heightened judicial scrutiny of takings, the Chevron decision did not disturb the application of the rough proportionality test in land-use permit exactions.150 A land-use permit exaction—a government demand of land or money in return for a permit that the government could deny—constitutes a denial of a constitutionally mandated compensation for taken property. As such, the Court reasoned, the rough proportionality standard was appropriate to test the validity of government intrusion into the enjoyment of that constitutional right;151 however, it was wholly irrelevant in the context of regulatory takings, as the issue there was whether there was a taking, not whether a constitutional right to receive compensation for condemned property was denied.152 It is unfortunate that the use of proportionality in land-use regulation was limited to nonlegislative discretionary adjudicative exactions. This leaves landowners virtually unprotected from government land-use regulation because the deferential rational basis test153 provides no adequate, thorough balancing of the public interest being advanced by a land-use regulation with the competing individual property rights. Arguably, landowners should be protected from excessive government intrusion into their economic autonomy irrespective of whether the intruder is a legislature or an executive body taking the land in an adjudicative nonlegislative manner.154
C. PROPORTIONALITY OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES Punitive damages and attorney’s fees play a similar public policy role. The proportionality of attorney’s fees has been considered in the context of reasonable attorney’s fees awards in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.155 Despite the fact than an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff in § 1988 actions serves the same goal of deterrence as punitive damages156—to which the Court has
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applied the requirement of proportionality to screen out unconstitutionally excessive punitive damages awards157—the Court has refrained from imposing a requirement of proportionality on attorney’s fees awards under § 1988 on the ground that it would significantly reduce the incentives plaintiffs have to litigate this type of case.158 As determined by the Court, proportionality can be used only to test the validity of attorney’s fees awards in civil rights cases under § 1988 if it is established that the primary purpose for the civil rights litigation was recovery of damages.159 As a general matter of reasonableness, the Court held in Hensley v. Eckerhart160 that a plaintiff ’s success is an important factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988.161 Courts should attempt to detect and exclude excessive and redundant fees.162 In some cases, for example, counsel may bring distinct actions against the same or different individuals. If counsel prevails under one cause of action and fails under another, the attorney’s fees for the litigation of a distinct cause of action on which the attorney failed to prevail should not be taken into consideration when determining the award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.163 By contrast, where counsel obtained “substantial relief ” for the client, the award of attorney’s fees should not be reduced merely because counsel did not succeed on all theories or claims advanced.164 However, in a case of limited success, the court should award reasonable attorney’s fees relative to the degree of success in the matter.165 Hensley’s general analysis of reasonableness of attorney’s fees in § 1988 actions failed to answer whether there should be any overriding proportional relationship between compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, mainly because the matter of the allowable amount of attorney’s fees was not raised on the theory of proportionality.166 The Court nonetheless effectively promoted the notion of proportionality by elevating the plaintiff ’s success to the level of becoming a crucial determinant of the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.167 It seems that successful claims provided the Court with an assuring assessment of harm suffered by the plaintiff that it could use as an objective benchmark of reasonable attorney’s fees. As a logical extension of this reasoning—and not unlike punitive damages cases that use compensatory damages as a proxy for the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct168—the Court could effectively use compensatory damages as a rough equivalent of plaintiff ’s success to provide a benchmark for assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. The Court rejected this easily administrable test of reasonableness of attorney’s fees for an important reason. In City of Riverside v. Rivera,169 the plurality acknowledged that the amount of compensatory damages was pertinent to the issue of attorney’s fees awards but denied giving it a decisive role in determining the reasonableness of those awards. The plurality held that the size of a compensatory award in a case brought under § 1988 was merely one of the factors170 to be
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considered under the prevailing totality of circumstances analysis.171 According to the Court, attorney’s fees awards should not be pegged to the amount of compensatory damages “[b]ecause damages awards do not reflect fully the public benefit advanced by civil rights cases.”172 Moreover, the Rivera plurality expressly rejected the proposition that attorney’s fee awards under § 1988 must “necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights plaintiff actually recovers”173 because, according to the plurality, such a requirement would eliminate virtually all of the incentives that full recovery of attorney’s fees creates for private plaintiffs to litigate civil rights violations.174 The plurality underscored the narrow application of this decision to § 1988 attorney’s fees cases. In particular, it stated that the adopted rationale for rejecting proportionality as a measure of reasonableness of attorney’s fees in civil rights cases did not apply to most private law cases, where damages awards, unlike the same in civil rights cases, reflect the harm to the plaintiff and the public benefit arising out of private law litigation.175 Thus, Rivera does not preclude the use of proportionality in private law cases—where, by law or contract, courts may award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff—to test the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in relation to the plaintiff ’s success, measured, inter alia, by the amount of the plaintiff ’s compensatory damages award.176 Rivera is most interesting for Justice Powell’s concurrence, which shifted the result in favor of the plurality and full attorney’s fees. He agreed with the plurality that § 1988 attorney’s fees do not have to be proportional to damages recovered in a civil rights action.177 Yet, he urged that the use of proportionality of attorney’s fees as a measure of reasonableness hinges on the plaintiff ’s purpose for engaging in civil rights litigation.178 If the primary purpose of the civil rights litigation is recovery of damages179 and no significant public interest is served by vindicating the violated constitutional rights, “a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought.”180 This formulation fits within the traditional understanding of the ends-benefits analysis of proportionality. To the contrary, if vindicating a constitutional right, irrespective of the novelty of the constitutional ruling, may substantially serve a public interest, it should be considered in addition to the recovered damages in the calculation of attorney’s fees.181 Justice Powell’s position was subsequently adopted in the majority opinion in Farrar v. Hobby.182 “Having considered the amount and nature of damages awarded, [a district] court may lawfully award low fees or no fees without reciting the 12 factors [from Hensley] bearing on reasonableness.”183 In the case sub judice, where the plaintiffs requested a large damage amount but recovered only nominal compensatory damages, the Court decided that the measure of reasonableness of attorney’s fees had to focus on the extent to which the plaintiffs were
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able to prove actual injury necessary for the recovery of compensatory damages.184 This was so because the primary purpose of the litigation, in light of the large amount of requested compensatory damages, was recovery of damages.185 Rivera was never intended to allow windfalls to plaintiffs’ attorneys, the Court reasoned.186 Lower courts have subsequently interpreted Farrar as establishing what amounts to an ends-benefits proportionality principle in awarding attorney’s fees in civil rights cases, and some of these courts have explicitly mentioned proportionality.187
D. USE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE Proportionality, as argued here, is key to preventing excessive government intrusion into individual autonomy and also to striking a meaningful balance between the federal government’s limited powers and the states’ police power. One point of tension between the federal and state powers, in which proportionality principles are implicitly employed under the guise of intermediate scrutiny, is determining whether nondiscriminatory state laws violate the dormant commerce clause (discussed earlier in this book).188 This section explores the application of proportionality in determining the constitutionality of a congressional enforcement action imposed on state governments under the authority of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 189 The Court has indicated in several of its decisions that the Constitution requires such enforcement actions to be “congruent and proportional” to the harm they are intended to redress.190 The primary test was established in City of Boerne v. Flores.191 It resulted from the Court’s concern that unchecked congressional enforcement power could lead to unjustifiable abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity as recognized in the Eleventh Amendment.192 The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only when there is an identified pattern and history of constitutional violations by the states and if Congress uses means that are congruent and proportional to those violations to remedy the unconstitutional conduct.193 Otherwise, the Court could fairly interpret the congressional action as an “attempt [to effect] a substantive change in constitutional protections, proscribing state conduct that the Fourteenth Amendment itself does not prohibit.”194 Such a congressional exercise of constitutional interpretive power is not allowed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.195
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In deciding these matters, the Court begins its inquiry by making certain that Congress has expressed its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. If Congress has done so, the Court then considers the validity of such abrogation by assessing the implicated constitutional right, documented state constitutional violations, and the remedy provided by the abrogation.196 The nature of the constitutional right Congress intends to protect is crucial for determining whether the state has violated the right. The Court is more deferential to the state when congressional action intends to protect a right that is normally subject to the rational basis standard of judicial review.197 By contrast, it will more readily find violations of constitutional rights by state conduct deserving of congressional reaction if the rights are protected by higher scrutiny.198 Thus, using the level of scrutiny applicable to the constitutional right Congress intended to protect, the Court reviews the congressional findings to ascertain whether the alleged state conduct rises to the level of a constitutional violation. If the proof provided by Congress is sufficient, the Court will find that Congress is entitled to enact remedial legislation.199 The final step in the analysis is to determine whether the means used by Congress to remedy a constitutional violation are congruent and proportional to that violation. The Court permits prophylactic legislation with a degree of overbreadth, prohibiting some constitutional conduct, but the scope of the remedy must not greatly exceed the identified violations.200 This is an example of means-proportionality analysis.201 However, the Court may have been as concerned with protecting its monopoly on constitutional interpretation from congressional encroachment as it was with protecting the states from excessively broad remedies. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirmed the Court’s adherence to the Boerne principles. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank202 held that the Boerne test was the primary standard for scrutinizing Section 5 legislation. Following Florida Prepaid by a year, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents203 confirmed that it was the judicial branch’s role to determine what constitutes a substantive constitutional violation and that Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must necessarily be of a remedial character. It also held that the level of scrutiny applicable to the constitutional right Congress intended to protect controls the weight of the burden that Congress can impose on the states pursuant to its remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.204 The question of fit between the remedial action and the alleged constitutional violation had long evaded coherent discussion. Several opinions now shed at least limited light on the issue. United States v. Morrison205 required that the congruence and proportionality of a congressional remedial action
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depend on the measure’s effectiveness in changing state conduct. Board of Trustees v. Garrett,206 on the other hand, declared Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) incongruent and disproportional to the desired end because the remedy of rights granted by Congress in the ADA to employees with disabilities far exceeded the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also emphasized that conduct by local government and the private sector was irrelevant to the inquiry whether a state had been violating the Constitution.207 Although the Supreme Court’s methodology in this area of law represents only a recent foray into proportionality, the principle’s adoption and application demonstrate how proportionality may be used to protect constitutional interests while still respecting the division of labor between state and federal levels of government and the sovereign interests inherent in our federal system. Proportionality allows courts to recognize the importance of the interests that Congress is attempting to protect from state intrusion, while at the same time giving appropriate consideration to the states’ sovereign immunity. As the Supreme Court continues to flesh out this important area of law, it would serve the Court well to consciously consider the extent to which proportionality may help find an appropriate balance between individual and state interests.208
E. PROPORTIONALITY AS A TOOL TO DETECT VOTING RIGHTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS The earlier sections of this part have focused on the implicit or explicit use of proportionality as a limiting principle on government discretion in regulating personal autonomy. This role gives proportionality the feel of an instrumental principle designated to facilitate the enforcement of citizens’ due process and equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. This section discusses another use for proportionality that clothes the principle with a constitutional significance different from that in the areas described in earlier sections and chapters. Specifically, the Supreme Court has accepted proportionality in some areas of its equal protection and voting rights jurisprudence as one of the factors that inform the Court’s decision in determining whether there has been a violation of a constitutional norm; disproportionality plays an evidentiary role. The two most widely recognized examples are public school desegregation and vote dilution. However, another aspect of voting rights, the one-person-one-vote rule, involves proportionality as a substantive right rather than an evidentiary tool; in addition, the standards used to enforce that rule incorporate several of the proportionality concepts we have identified.
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1. Proportionality in Public School Desegregation In a 1968 decision, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,209 the Court— displeased with the slow pace of desegregation allowed by the relaxed requirement established in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II),210 which required public schools to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”—created an affirmative duty to integrate schools that were historically segregated. The freedom-of-choice plans deemed sufficient under Brown II were no longer acceptable if they were ineffective in achieving a “racially nondiscriminatory school system.”211 The Court said, “[t]he time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.”212 The time had come for school boards to bear the higher burden of “com[ing] forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.”213 To ensure the school boards complied with this order, the Court assumed “jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed.”214 The Court’s opinion in Green seems to suggest that the effectiveness of school desegregation plans in achieving integration would be judged by numbers. Numbers and correlations of numbers played a particularly important role in two of the categories identified by the Court as relevant to the assessment of the school districts’ compliance with the constitutional equal protection requirements: student assignments and teacher and principal assignments.215 Proportionality was a logical tool for the Court to apply in the examination of numbers and correlations of numbers in these two categories, given its implicit predisposition to a requirement for some degree of proportionality between the racial makeup of the total number of students and staff and the assignments to various schools.216 It was not until 1971, however, that the Court expressly empowered district courts in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education217 to require racial proportionality, or racial balancing, as a remedy to previous segregation and as a tool to achieve integration. The Court was careful, however, to limit this decision with the caveat that the order’s proportionality requirement was not a substantive constitutional right218 but rather a “starting point in the process of shaping a remedy.”219 This suggests an instrumental approach to the principle’s application. The Court also limited the use of proportionality to schools that were intentionally segregated by the state in the past220 and disallowed its application to higher educational institutions.221 Proportionality was not limited to serving only a remedial role. According to Swann, it could also be used to detect equal protection violations in traditionally segregated school districts. The Court created a presumption that schools historically separated by race with a substantially disproportionate racial composition were in violation of their constitutional duty to create an integrated educational environment in public schools.222 If the school district presented a desegregation
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plan under which some schools in a racially diverse district would continue to be attended predominantly by one race, the school district bore the burden to show that its disproportionate racial composition within the schools was not attributable to past discrimination.223 This burden required the school district to show that “any current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.”224 As time passes, however, the presumption of a constitutional violation in the presence of a racial imbalance may lose its force. The longer the time span between the initial action to achieve desegregation and the present, arguably, the less likely the current racial disproportionality in school attendance can be attributed to state conduct, absent proof of a school district’s intent to segregate.225 Indeed, demographic changes unrelated to state conduct—unsuccessfully presented as vestiges of public school segregation warranting remedial action from federal courts in Pasadena Board of Education v. Spangler 226—have been the major recent contributor to racial imbalance in public schools. Thus, if the school district demonstrates “a history of good faith compliance,” the causal link between a state’s conduct and the racial imbalance becomes more attenuated, and the district court could fairly “accept the school board’s representation that it has accepted the principle of racial equality and will not suffer intentional discrimination in the future.”227 Courts may not create a presumption of an equal protection violation from racial imbalance in higher education.228 The different approach is justified by the fact that students have a choice in which school to attend and cannot be forced to attend a certain institution.229 Thus, the presence of a racial imbalance at a higher educational institution is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the state.230 Rather, the burden shifts when the state is shown to have continued policies “rooted in its prior, officially segregated system that serve to maintain the racial identifiability of its universities.”231 When the burden thus shifts, the school must either dismantle the violating policies or show that it would be impossible to eliminate those policies without disadvantaging the school’s educational needs.232 The Court’s use of proportionality as a tool to detect constitutional violations with regard to race demonstrates the principle’s utility in protecting important constitutional interests. That the Court turned to proportionality to help enforce equal protection rights—which, given the historical underpinnings of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, subject classifications based on race to the strictest judicial scrutiny—demonstrates the principle’s ability to flex and fit different legal systems and standards. The variance in presumptions of unconstitutionality between public education and higher education also demonstrates that a finding of proportionality can be adapted to fit the needs of different contexts, even within the same legal system.
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2. Proportionality in Voting Rights Cases An examination of Supreme Court voting rights decisions reveals two situations in which the Court applies proportionality. First, proportionality is constitutionally required as a substantive right in the representation of individuals. Second, proportionality may be used as an evidentiary tool for detecting dilution of the voting strength of a racial class of voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Given that groups do not have a constitutional right to proportional representation, the latter use of proportionality is used as a rough baseline to determine whether group votes have been diluted. a. “One Person, One Vote”: Proportional Representation Among Voting Districts The meaning of proportionality in the representation of individuals derives from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional command that representatives be chosen “by the People of the Several States” as requiring that “as nearly as practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.”233 To obtain this result, the Court established a constitutional requirement that congressional districts contain equal numbers of inhabitants.234 Based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same requirement applies to state legislative districts.235 Compliance with this principle requires states to revise their districts with a reasonable frequency, at a minimum every ten years.236 It also requires that both houses of a bicameral state legislature be apportioned substantially on a population basis.237 The one-person-one-vote proportionality standard is strict for federal elections. The Constitution allows only the smallest deviation possible and only if it is necessary for the attainment of a legitimate state objective.238 A party challenging a population difference must prove that the “population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.”239 If the challenger fails to meet this burden, the contested districting plan will be affirmed.240 If the plaintiff can show that the contested population differences were not a product of the state’s good-faith effort to achieve equality, the state must prove that the differences were necessary to achieve a legitimate goal.241 As long as the justifications are nondiscriminatory, the court may approve of a number of goals put forward by the state, including achieving compact districts, following municipal lines, preserving the essence of previous districts, and “avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.”242 To summarize, the population-based, substantive right to proportional representation is enforced with two of the proportionality principles this book examines. Deviations from proportional representation must be justified by a legitimate
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state interest (a standard akin to the German suitability requirement), and such deviations must be necessary to achieve the asserted interests (a version of alternative-means proportionality analysis). b. Vote Dilution Despite statutory provisions indicating that no group or class is entitled to proportional representation,243 proportionality has also found its way into group voting rights as a factor that indicates an absence of vote dilution. The basic preconditions for a vote dilution claim were established in Thornburg v. Gingles,244 based on the statutory provisions of sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).245 Section 2(a) guarantees that neither race nor color can be used as a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting.”246 Section 2(b) stipulates the following: A violation of [Section 2(a)] is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.247 In light of these provisions, the Gingles Court required an initial showing for a successful vote dilution claim to include numerocity and compactness of the minority group sufficient to constitute a majority in a single-member district, political cohesion of the minority group, and white majority bloc voting in the contested district such that the minority group’s preferred candidate will usually be defeated.248 Once an initial showing is made, the absence or presence of vote dilution is determined on the basis of the totality of circumstances,249 including previous elections that resulted in a proportional representation of the minority group.250 Proportionality in electoral success is only one of the factors to be considered.251 Proportional representation of minority groups is not an unvarying indicator of the absence of vote dilution.252 There are other, more subtle ways, argued the Court, in which minority group voting strength could be diluted without affecting
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proportionality.253 Despite this language, some scholars argue that a showing of proportional representation in previous elections would make the burden on the minority group to prove vote dilution a very heavy one.254 It is clear that tension exists between considering proportionality in previous electoral success as a baseline for vote dilution and the specific prohibition against requiring proportional representation in Section 2(b) of the VRA, as well as the constitutional rejection of race-conscious districting.255 Justice O’Connor very aptly described the essence of this tension in her Gingles concurrence: We know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution claims to be brought under § 2, but we also know that Congress did not intend to create a right to proportional representation for minority voters. There is an inherent tension between what Congress wished to do and what it wished to avoid, because any theory of vote dilution must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of minority voting strength that makes some reference to the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.256
PROPORTIONALITY IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
T
III
he chapters in this part examine the many ways in which implicit and explicit proportionality principles have been incorporated into American rules of criminal procedure, criminal liability, and punishment. The emphasis is on constitutionally required rules, but we also cite examples of proportionality principles in subconstitutional law to illustrate the breadth of support for these principles. The first chapter explores examples of implicit ends-benefits and/or alternative-means proportionality principles in criminal procedure rules. The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment standards defining “unreasonable” searches and seizures employ a balancing test that incorporates ends and occasionally also means proportionality. Cases that interpret the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause and subconstitutional pretrial release laws implicitly incorporate means proportionality. Ends-proportionality principles may be implicit in statutes and rules that make offense seriousness a factor when setting release conditions. In several cases the Supreme Court has implicitly invoked ends- and/or means-proportionality 91
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principles to invalidate rules or practices that place a substantial burden on the exercise of constitutionally protected trial rights. When the government seeks to forcibly administer powerful medications to render defendants competent to stand trial or to make inmates easier to manage in jail or prison, the Supreme Court has imposed limitations that reflect both endsand means-proportionality principles. Implicit means-proportionality principles are applied by courts when deciding whether a civil or regulatory measure is sufficiently punitive to trigger the substantive due process ban on punishment without criminal procedure safeguards; however, a finding of disproportionality merely serves an evidentiary function by implying an intent to inflict punishment. Finally, ends- and means-proportionality analysis has sometimes been used to limit criminal procedure rights; in these cases, a finding of disproportionality favors the government, not the citizen. Numerous cases that require “standing,” permit impeachment use, or otherwise limit the scope of the Fourth Amendment and other constitutionally required exclusionary rules are based on a finding that the benefits of more frequent exclusion of evidence are not worth the cost (ends proportionality) or that such exclusion is not needed to provide adequate deterrence (means proportionality). Ends proportionality is implicit in cases that deny Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial in less serious cases; subconstitutional criminal procedure laws also often grant fewer procedural safeguards in such cases, apparently on the theory that the benefits of such safeguards are not worth the costs. The next chapter examines implicit proportionality limits on the imposition of criminal liability. Various constitutional and subconstitutional rules, barring liability in the absence of “fair notice,” reflect an implicit limiting retributive rationale: Persons who lack such notice are not sufficiently culpable to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions and stigma. Retributive principles and means and/or ends proportionality may also underlie constitutional prohibitions on “status” crimes and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. In subconstitutional criminal law, retributive and other proportionality limits are implicit in rules that bar or discourage strict liability. “Voluntary act” requirements reflect limiting retributive principles. Self-defense and other affirmative defenses of justification implicitly incorporate both ends- and means-proportionality principles; excuse defenses primarily incorporate limiting retributive proportionality. Retributive and ends-proportionality principles are implicit in criminal statutes that scale crime severity according to degrees of offender culpability and social harm. The final chapter in this part explores proportionality as a limitation on criminal and quasi-criminal punishments. Unlike the topics in the two previous chapters, these are areas in which courts, state constitutional provisions, and scholars often explicitly speak of “proportionality” limits, but such limits have
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usually not been clearly defined. In cases that apply the Eighth Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment and excessive fines clauses to the death penalty, lengthy prison terms, and civil or criminal forfeitures of property, the Supreme Court has invoked a standard of “gross disproportionality” to the offense being punished or the misconduct leading to the forfeiture. Death penalties and forfeitures are clearly limited by retributive principles, but it is less clear whether the Court intends to also put means- and/or ends-proportionality limits on these sanctions. Its standards for evaluating severe prison terms are even less clear; the Court has seemed to reject any independent retributive limits on such sentences and has failed to provide itself or lower courts with much guidance about when and why a long prison term should be found constitutionally excessive. A different set of rules, also based on the Eighth Amendment but not closely tied to the Court’s sentencing cases, places some limits on harsh treatment of prisoners. The focus of these cases seems to be on unnecessary harshness, thus suggesting a form of means proportionality. This chapter also examines state constitutional sentencing provisions, which courts have sometimes used to grant additional protections not required by the Eighth Amendment. Many examples of implicit retributive, ends-, and meansproportionality principles can be found in the cases construing these provisions. The chapter ends with a survey of proportionality principles in model codes and scholarly writings on sentencing and in sentencing laws and jurisprudence in the United States and other countries. Scholars expressly recognize all three types of proportionality, and these principles are often explicit or implicit in model codes, sentencing laws, and sentencing decisions. When viewed separately, U.S. constitutional criminal procedure, criminal liability, and punishment rules show only halting, inconsistent, and often incoherent application of proportionality principles. But when these rules are viewed in the aggregate, along with the corroborating testimony of scholarly writings, model codes, and sentencing laws and decisions in the United States and abroad, it becomes clear that limiting retributive, ends-benefits, and alternative-means proportionality principles all enjoy broad support. In exercising their judicial review functions, courts should not hesitate to invoke these fundamental principles of justice. Courts should also state clearly which principle or principles they are applying, and adapt the principles to the particular context.
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PROCEDURE Implicit Proportionality Limits on Police Powers and Defendant Rights
this chapter examines the many examples of constitutional and subconstitutional criminal procedure rules that incorporate ends-benefits and/or alternativemeans proportionality principles. The application of these principles is almost always implicit; courts rarely use the language of proportionality, and they do not separately analyze and clearly distinguish ends- and means-proportionality concepts. In each of the topic areas summarized here, we first identify the implicit proportionality principles being applied in the Court’s decisions and then discuss how the policy analysis in these cases would be improved by their more explicit recognition and application. Part A discusses Fourth Amendment standards that define “unreasonable” searches and seizures. In many of its decisions the Supreme Court has implicitly incorporated ends-proportionality principles in a multifactor balancing test under which the importance of asserted law enforcement or other government interests is weighed against the nature and degree of the resulting intrusion into privacy, physical liberty, and property. Occasionally the Court’s balancing analysis has also implicitly applied means-proportionality principles and taken into account the availability of less intrusive ways of achieving the government’s asserted purposes. In a few cases the Court has used a simpler version of balancing that is keyed to offense severity and offender risk. Under this (still implicit) offense- and 95
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offender-proportionality approach, the police have broader investigatory powers when they investigate more serious crimes; similarly, more serious intrusions into privacy, liberty, and/or property require a showing of more important government interests and thus can be used only to respond to serious offenses or apprehend dangerous suspects. Part B discusses proportionality limits on pretrial detention and release conditions. The Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause prohibits bail set at an amount higher than necessary to reasonably ensure the appearance of the accused at trial (alternative-means proportionality). Similarly, subconstitutional pretrial release and detention rules and statutes often define a range of increasingly restrictive release conditions and direct courts to choose the least restrictive option that will reasonably guarantee appearance and public safety. Constitutional and subconstitutional rules may also implicitly incorporate ends-proportionality principles by limiting bail in minor cases and requiring courts to consider offense seriousness as a factor in setting bail or other release conditions. Part C examines a line of cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated rules or practices that placed excessive burdens on the defendant’s exercise of constitutionally protected criminal procedure rights. Sometimes these decisions have been based on the availability of less burdensome ways of achieving the state’s asserted interests—a means-proportionality argument. In other cases the Court has seemed to invoke ends proportionality—the state’s interests were not deemed to be of sufficient weight to justify the substantial burden on important rights. In still other cases the basis for the decisions is unclear but seems to reflect either ends proportionality or both ends and means proportionality. Part D discusses constitutional limits on authorities’ efforts to forcibly administer powerful medications in order to render an inmate easier to manage in jail or prison or to make a defendant competent to stand trial. The Supreme Court has placed both ends- and means-proportionality limits on these practices. The charged offense must be serious, the medication must be medically appropriate and effective, and there must be no less intrusive means of administering the drugs and achieving the desired effects. Part E examines the use of proportionality principles in deciding when a nominally “civil” or “regulatory” measure is actually intended as “punishment” and is therefore subject to constitutionally required criminal procedure rules and limitations. The Court appears to be using a means-proportionality test here in asking whether the challenged measure is more severe than necessary to achieve the asserted nonpunitive, regulatory goal. However, the concern is not with disproportionality itself but rather with the inferred punitive intent—disproportionality serves an evidentiary function.
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In the last two parts of this chapter the focus shifts from proportionality analysis as protector of rights to proportionality as a justification for limiting the scope of criminal procedure rights and remedies. Part F explores the many cases in which the Supreme Court has used implicit proportionality arguments to limit the scope of the exclusionary rules that enforce Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth amendment rights. The exclusionary remedy is not applied when the Court concludes that the cost of excluding the evidence in question would outweigh the additional enforcement benefits likely to result from exclusion (ends proportionality). Some justices have also argued that certain exclusionary remedies should be narrowly tailored—a form of means proportionality. In these contexts, a finding of ends and/or means disproportionality favors the government, not the citizen. Part G examines implicit proportionality limits on pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedural rights. Sixth Amendment rights to appointed counsel and jury trial have been limited when the crime or the penalty is minor—a categoric endsproportionality rule that is based in part on the assumption that for minor crimes the cost and administrative burdens of these safeguards outweigh their truth-seeking and other benefits. Here again, a finding of disproportionality favors the government. By the same reasoning, subconstitutional laws often grant fewer procedural rights in less serious cases, thus, in effect, “making the procedure fit the crime.”
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION OF UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Ends- and means-proportionality principles are implicit in many of the Court’s decisions defining the limits the Fourth Amendment places on government search-and-seizure powers. The language of proportionality has occasionally been explicitly invoked but without any clear or consistent definition.
1. Proportionality Principles Implicit in “Reasonableness Balancing” In law enforcement and regulatory contexts in which special needs or other circumstances make the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause standards impractical, the Supreme Court has used the amendment’s more general prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures” to uphold a wide variety of warrantless (and often also suspicionless) intrusions. The Court has interpreted “reasonableness” as requiring a balancing of the strength of the government interests supporting the search or seizure against the nature and degree of the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy, liberty, and/or property rights. Using this approach, the
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Court and lower courts have upheld municipal building inspections; searches of regulated industries; investigatory stops, weapons frisks, and property detentions; automobile and jail inventories; immigration and drunk driving roadblocks; airport, subway, and other security measures; searches and drug testing of high school students, public employees, and convicts; and various extensions of police powers beyond the scope already justified by a warrant or an individualized suspicion.1 When courts invoke reasonableness balancing they examine a wide range of factors.2 Some factors primarily reflect ends-benefits proportionality by directly or indirectly assessing the strength of the government’s justifications for and interests served by the intrusion—the seriousness and immediacy of the harms the government sought to prevent and the degree of individualized or target-group suspicion. Other balancing factors primarily reflect alternative-means proportionality principles—the feasibility of applying individualized suspicion and warrant requirements in this context (versus the need to dispense with them) and the availability of less intrusive means to achieve the government’s objective. However, the latter appears to be a fairly weak factor; at one time the Court seemed ready to adopt a least-intrusive means test in Terry v. Ohio (“stop and frisk”) cases, but later cases expressly rejected this requirement not only under Terry but also in several other contexts.3 Finally, some factors in the balance reflect both ends- and meansproportionality principles—assessments of the nature and degree of the intrusion (and of alternative means); considerations of the presence of a warrant, warrant substitute, or other limits on police discretion in conducting the intrusion; and the effectiveness of the government’s challenged measures (and of alternative means to achieve these same purposes). A number of scholars have articulated Fourth Amendment proportionality principles,4 but majority opinions of the Supreme Court have never explicitly sought to justify the Court’s reasonableness-balancing approach on proportionality grounds. However, several justices have cited proportionality principles in concurring or dissenting opinions. In McDonald v. United States,5 Justice Jackson opined that warrantless entry to arrest for a minor offense would display “a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.” And in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista Justice O’Connor invoked proportionality principles in her forceful dissent, critiquing the majority’s refusal to engage in case-specific balancing and its approval of the custodial arrest of a woman for violation of a seat belt law punishable by only a $50 fine. Justice O’Connor argued that Atwater’s arrest was disproportionate not only in relation to the minor nature of her offense (ends proportionality) but also relative to any legitimate need to take her into custody (means proportionality).6 Justice O’Connor thus clearly approved of both ends- and means-proportionality principles, although she did not clearly identify and distinguish them.
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Application of proportionality analysis, rather than the Court’s multifactor balancing approach, would clarify the essential ends-benefits tradeoffs and might also encourage courts, in appropriate cases, to apply alternative-means analysis more frequently. In the Atwater case, for example, a better understanding of the distinct ends- and means-proportionality principles implicit in Justice O’Connor’s dissent (and recognition of their widespread application) might have persuaded one of the five justices in the majority (most likely Justice Souter or Justice Kennedy) to invalidate the totally unnecessary, minor-offense arrest at issue in that case. Another advantage of using explicit proportionality concepts is that they lend themselves more readily to the actual task courts face in these cases—setting appropriate and meaningful limits on excessive government measures. As the Introduction points out, proportionality principles are better suited to the process of judicial review than is a balancing metaphor since the latter suggests a specific, optimum solution. Courts have limited time, competence, and legitimacy to determine optimum solutions to complex, fact-specific, and fast-moving law enforcement problems. It is much easier and more appropriate for a reviewing court to say “This was clearly too much” than to say “This would have been the optimum.” When courts review police search-and-seizure decisions after the fact and in the absence of previously defined decision rules (discussed later), the question is not what the optimum ends-benefits balance was at the time the decision was made or what the optimum choice among alternative means would have been but rather whether the measures used were so severe, relative to their purposes and/or to alternative means, that a court should find the search or seizure to be unreasonable. However, proportionality analysis, like reasonableness balancing, is a standard that, because it depends on many factors assessed under the “totality of the circumstances,” may be quite difficult for police and other officials to apply. These officials need practical, simplified decision rules. For this reason, the Supreme Court has often used balancing only to decide that further limits on or expansions of certain police powers are needed, after which it formulates a simpler set of rules to guide the exercise of these powers.7 Yet judicial drafting of such decision rules is problematic: By what logic do courts translate from general standards to specific rules? And in doing this, how can they avoid the appearance of engaging in “judicial legislation”? One solution to these problems would be for courts to simplify the first step in this process. At the policy-analysis stage, instead of engaging in vague, multifactor reasonableness balancing, courts could use a simplified version of proportionality, which would translate much more directly into a workable decision rule
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for officials. As discussed in the next section, the Court has in fact employed this approach in a few of its Fourth Amendment cases.
2. Simpler Proportionality Rules Based On Offense Severity and Offender Risk In several cases the Supreme Court used implicit ends-proportionality principles keyed to offense severity and/or offender risk to limit the use of specified police measures. This approach (hereafter “offense-offender seriousness”) is essentially a simplified version of reasonableness balancing, but the Court has not always invoked balancing in these cases, and the two approaches differ in important ways. Reasonableness balancing and offense-offender seriousness both examine the nature and degree of the intrusion on privacy, physical liberty, or property that the search or seizure entails, but the offense-offender seriousness standard is much simpler on the “government need” side of the ledger. As noted in the previous section, reasonableness balancing examines a broad range of factors, including the immediacy of potential harms it seeks to prevent, degree of individualized or target-group suspicion, feasibility of applying individualized suspicion and warrant requirements, availability of less intrusive means to achieve the government’s interest, presence of a warrant or other limits on police discretion, and effectiveness of the government’s challenged measures and alternative measures. In contrast, the offense-offender seriousness approach focuses entirely on the severity of the suspected offense or the dangerousness of the offender. This narrower focus makes the offense-offender seriousness approach easier to apply and also facilitates direct translation into practical decision rules for police and other public officials. Most of these cases have in fact announced such a decision rule, based on offense severity and/or offender risk, and aimed at specified police measures. In Welsh v. Wisconsin8 the Court held—without mentioning reasonableness balancing—that the police could not make a warrantless, exigent-circumstances entry of a person’s house to effect an arrest for a nonjailable first offense of drunk driving. The officers had probable cause to arrest and also reason to believe that delaying the arrest until a warrant was obtained would result in the loss of the crucial evidence of intoxication (blood alcohol levels steadily diminish over time in the absence of continued drinking). The Court noted that many courts view the seriousness of the offense as an important factor in assessing the reasonableness of a warrantless entry and concluded that “it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.”9 It also quoted from an earlier decision in which Justice Jackson opined that warrantless entry in such a case would involve “a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.”10 The Court recognized
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that drunk driving poses major risks to persons and property but concluded that Wisconsin’s decision to classify first-time violations as nonjailable, civil offenses is the best indication of the extent of the state’s interest in making an arrest to enforce this law.11 In effect, the Court in Welsh held that the substantial intrusion of warrantless home entry was disproportionate in relation to the minor crime that intrusion sought to investigate. Yet the Court’s emphasis on the warrantless nature of the entry and its citation of prior warrantless entry cases implied that the same physical acts would not have been viewed as disproportionate if the entry were based on an arrest warrant. Moreover, no subsequent case has extended Welsh to warrant-based entries to arrest. However, ends-proportionality principles still serve to justify the Court’s narrow decision because warrantless entry is a greater intrusion than entry made with a warrant, and the former is also less likely to benefit the government. Warrantless entry is a greater intrusion subjectively because the homeowner has less assurance that the arrest is legal and that the officer’s powers are limited. It is a greater intrusion objectively and also less likely to benefit the government because an arrest that lacks prior judicial review is more likely to lack probable cause and to intrude on innocent persons. A similarly limited, offenseseverity proportionality principle underlies the common law rule (still recognized in some form by most states12) that forbids warrantless arrest for misdemeanors not committed within the presence of the arresting officer or citizen. In several later cases, the Court used implicit offense-offender seriousness and ends-proportionality principles to limit other police measures. Although the Court in these cases invoked “reasonableness balancing” and did not cite its holding in Welsh, the reasoning of these decisions, as well as the decision rules adopted, was similar to the Court’s approach in Welsh—the “government need” discussion focused almost entirely on the seriousness or dangerousness of the suspected offense or offender, and in most of these cases the Court, as it had in Welsh, fashioned a categoric decision rule limited to the particular police measure being challenged. In Tennessee v. Garner,13 the Court held that police may not use deadly force to stop and arrest a fleeing suspect unless there is probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others or has committed a crime that involves the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. Garner reflects ends-benefit proportionality in that the Court expressly assumed it is better that a nondangerous suspect wanted for a nonviolent crime be allowed to flee than that the suspect be killed; death or risk of death to the suspect and/or to bystanders is disproportionate in relation to the public interest served by promptly apprehending such a suspect. Although the Court invoked reasonableness balancing, its focus on offender dangerousness and offense seriousness make
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the analysis much more like the approach of Welsh. Moreover, as in Welsh, the Court fashioned a practical decision rule keyed both to offense-offender seriousness and to the particular police measure at issue. The decision in Garner was also based in part on a principle akin to means proportionality. The Court specified that deadly force must be necessary to prevent escape (nondeadly force must be used if it will be effective) and that, if feasible, some warning must be given (which, if it causes the suspect to submit, avoids the need to shoot); the Court further noted that a majority of American police departments forbid their officers to use deadly force against nonviolent suspects and concluded that “there is a substantial basis for doubting that the use of such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power in all felony cases.”14 In other words, nondeadly force (on the scene or in subsequent efforts to apprehend the suspect if he does initially escape) appears to be adequate to enforce the law against nonviolent suspects; the use of deadly force is unnecessary—and therefore means disproportionate—in relation to effective nondeadly means of apprehension. Ends- and means-proportionality principles have also been implicitly invoked, along with explicit offense-offender seriousness criteria, to assess claims of excessive nondeadly force in making arrests, investigatory stops, and other seizures of the person. In Graham v. Connor15 the Court held that three factors should be considered in such cases: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” The first and second factors reflect ends proportionality and offense-offender seriousness—as in Garner, the Court is saying that the force police use to effect a seizure may be excessive relative to the benefits to be achieved by the use of such force, as measured by the seriousness of the suspected crime or the suspect’s dangerousness. The third Graham factor may reflect means proportionality: In the absence of active resistance or flight, the force used by the police may exceed what is necessary to safely effect the arrest. In United States v. Hensley16 the Court suggested another possible offenseoffender seriousness proportionality limit on police powers. While holding that the Terry v. Ohio investigative stop procedure could be used to investigate a completed felony crime, the Court expressly declined to decide whether such stops may also be used for less serious, completed offenses. Several lower courts have adopted this ends-proportionality-based limitation on the Terry doctrine.17 Moreover, in a variety of other contexts, lower courts have considered the seriousness of the offense to be an important factor in determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure, particularly very intrusive police measures.18 To summarize: Welsh v. Wisconsin and later cases that put offense-offender seriousness limits on specified police measures suggest a simpler and better way
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for courts to evaluate and limit such measures—better than the Court’s vague, reasonableness balancing approach and perhaps also better than direct application of the ends- and means-proportionality principles that underlie reasonableness balancing. Offense-offender seriousness rules are easier for reviewing courts to apply, and, as these cases show, they also translate directly into workable and defensible decision rules for police and other public officials.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUBCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON PRETRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE ORDERS Proportionality principles are implicit in federal and state constitutional texts and interpretive case law, as well as in statutes and rules governing pretrial release and detention. Alternative-means proportionality is widely recognized, but endsbenefits proportionality may also be implicit in some rules and decisions.
1. Federal and State Constitutional Excessive Bail Clauses The prohibitions of “excessive” bail found in the Eighth Amendment and in many state constitutions clearly imply some sort of proportionality limit, but courts have had few occasions to interpret the meaning of these provisions. The sole U.S. Supreme Court ruling to date was in Stack v. Boyle,19 where the Court, having stated that the purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at trial and other hearings, concluded that “[b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”20 This language strongly implies a form of alternative-means proportionality: If a lower bail amount would suffice to achieve the government’s interest, any higher bail is excessive.
2. Other Proportionality Limits on Pretrial Release and Detention Measures Subconstitutional state and federal pretrial release rules also frequently incorporate alternative-means proportionality principles in provisions that regulate the use of various pretrial release alternatives. These laws define a range of increasingly restrictive release conditions and direct courts to choose the least restrictive option that will protect specified government interests. For example, the federal statute provides that defendants shall be released on an unsecured appearance bond or promise to appear unless the court finds “that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the
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safety of any other person or the community”; when such a determination has been made, the court must then impose “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,” from a list of fourteen options, that will “reasonably assure” appearance and safety.21 Some state constitutions, statutes, codes, and case law, as well as pretrial detention rules in foreign countries,22 apply an offense- or expected-sentence-severity criterion as one factor and/or as an absolute upper limit on the amount of bail or the availability of pretrial detention. Some rules state that bail may not exceed a specified multiple of the maximum fine for the most serious offense charged; other rules preclude high bail or any bail requirement for specified minor crimes or offense categories.23 Reviewing courts sometimes invalidate high bail amounts at least in part on the grounds that the amount is too high for the seriousness of the charged offenses.24 Rules of this type might just represent an indirect measure of the risk of flight or further crime: Offenders who face more serious charges are presumed to have a stronger motive to flee and/or to be more dangerous. On this theory, proportionality to offense severity is not valued for its own sake but rather serves an evidentiary or proxy role.25 However, to the extent that charged-offense severity is deemed directly relevant, such rules appear to reflect utilitarian endsbenefit proportionality principles; in less serious cases, the expense and hardship of high bail and pretrial detention are not justified by the state’s interest in the prosecution. (Although offense severity is also relevant to limiting retributive proportionality principles, the latter do not seem to apply to measures that are not and constitutionally cannot be intended as punishment. See part E for a discussion of the “regulation” versus “punishment” distinction, as well as the general discussion in chapter 7 on retributive theory.) The paradigmatic case under such an offense-based approach would be an offender charged with a minor crime who is deemed to be dangerous or to pose a substantial risk of flight—such an offender might commit other crimes or flee unless bail is set very high (hence, there is no means-proportionality problem), but the burdens of high bail or pretrial detention may outweigh the value to society of obtaining a conviction. Such cases are rarely reported, in part because pretrial release issues often become moot by the time appellate review can be obtained, but in several minor-crime cases, bail was reduced despite substantial evidence of offender danger and/or flight risk.26 Given the importance of pretrial release decisions—which may determine or render moot the ultimate resolution of the charges by trial or plea—it is surprising how little specific content the courts have given to federal and state constitutional and subconstitutional pretrial release and detention provisions. Courts might be encouraged to provide more frequent and useful guidance if they were to focus more specifically on the ways in which bail and other pretrial release decisions
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can be excessive. As the scattered examples discussed here suggest, these varieties of excessiveness correspond to alternative-means and possibly also ends-benefits proportionality.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF EXCESSIVE BURDENS ON DEFENSE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS In several cases the Supreme Court has invalidated rules or practices that placed a substantial burden on the defendant’s exercise of constitutionally protected trial rights. Both the rationale and the scope of some of the rulings are unclear. Several decisions seem to be based on principles akin to means proportionality, whereas other decisions reflect implicit ends-proportionality principles or both means and ends proportionality. In United States v. Jackson27 the Court struck down a federal statute that permitted the death penalty to be imposed only when conviction is obtained by jury trial and the jury recommends death. In holding that this statute burdened the rights to plead not guilty and demand a jury trial and that the asserted state interest could be satisfied in less burdensome ways, the Court implicitly applied a means-proportionality requirement: The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one. But that goal can be achieved without penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury trial. In some States, for example, the choice between life imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in every case—regardless of how the defendant’s guilt has been determined. . . . Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right. Another case based on implicit means-proportionality principles and explicitly using the language of proportionality is Rock v. Arkansas.28 The Court held in Rock that limits on the defendant’s right to testify at trial must be narrowly tailored and must not sweep more broadly than necessary to achieve legitimate government purposes. The Court noted that [o]f course, the right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” But restrictions of a defendant’s right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to
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the purposes they are designed to serve. In applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to testify [internal citations and footnote omitted]. Applying these standards, the Court struck down an Arkansas rule that placed an absolute ban on the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Because various less drastic procedural safeguards are available to deal with the potential unreliability of such testimony, Arkansas’s rule was overbroad and unconstitutional. In United States v. Jackson (supra), the Court cited an earlier decision, Griffin v. California,29 which had held that adverse comment by the trial judge or prosecutor on the defendant’s failure to take the stand impermissibly burdened the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. But unlike Jackson, nothing in the language or procedural context of Griffin suggested a means-proportionality theory (i.e., one focused on alternatives to comment, available to the court and the prosecutor). Nor did the Court in Griffin signal an intent to rule broadly; it did not say that such comment lacks any probative value or that, regardless of probative value, any state action that burdens the defendant’s testimonial choice is impermissible. However, a narrower, ends-proportionality argument can justify the holding in Griffin; the probative value of the (comment-encouraged) inferences that might be drawn from the defendant’s silence is low and is therefore outweighed by the burden that comment or the threat of comment places on the decision not to testify. Since the jury cannot know all of the reasons for the defendant’s decision—some of which (e.g., the availability of impeaching prior convictions; the desire to shield a loved one or gang boss from liability) are consistent with innocence of the charged offense—the inference of guilt from defendant’s silence is sometimes very weak. Subsequent cases appear to reinforce this view of Griffin. For example, in Portuondo v. Agard,30 the Court distinguished Griffin and refused to condemn a prosecutor’s argument to the jury that the defendant’s presence at trial allowed him to tailor his testimony to that of prior witnesses. The Court concluded that such comment serves the central truth-seeking function of trial and does not impermissibly burden the right to be present at the trial. An ends-proportionality analysis clearly underlay the Court’s decision in Brooks v. Tennessee,31 which struck down a state law that permitted the defendant to exercise his right to testify only if he took the stand at the outset of the defense case. The Court recognized the state’s interest in preventing the defendant from shaping his testimony to conform with other defense witness testimony but held that the state law in question impermissibly burdened the right to testify (and also interfered with the effectiveness of counsel’s assistance in exercising that right) by forcing the defendant to testify (or forego testifying) before he could determine
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whether taking the stand was in his best interest. The Court concluded: “Although the Tennessee statute does reflect a state interest in preventing testimonial influence, we do not regard that interest as sufficient to override the defendant’s right to remain silent.”32 This language strongly suggests ends-proportionality analysis: The burden on the defendant’s trial rights was found to be more important than the state’s interests, which were supposedly served by imposing that burden. Finally, the Supreme Court has implicitly invoked both means- and endsproportionality principles in cases limiting in-court use of visible shackles. In Deck v. Missouri,33 the Court held that the due process clause forbids the use of visible shackles in front of the jury during the penalty phase of a capital case, just as it forbids their use during the guilt phase of trials “unless that use is ‘justified by an essential state interest’—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the defendant on trial.” The “essential state interest” requirement is a categoric ends-proportionality rule (like “compelling” interest, in strict scrutiny analysis, discussed in chapter 3). The constitutional standards regulating in-court shackling also incorporate means-proportionality principles. In Deck supra, the Court criticized the absence of any finding of a need for shackling and added: “Nor did [the judge] explain why, if shackles were necessary, he chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see—apparently the arrangement used at trial.”34 This language suggests a narrow-tailoring concept or even a least-restrictive-alternative requirement, akin to means proportionality. These cases imply but do not clearly state their grounding in ends- and/or means-proportionality principles. The rationale and scope of these holdings— particularly Griffin—would have been clearer if the Court had made explicit reference to ends- and means-proportionality principles and had specified which aspects of each rule were governed by each principle.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON FORCED MEDICATION OF INMATES AND DEFENDANTS AWAITING TRIAL The Supreme Court has held that prison inmates and pretrial detainees have a due process liberty interest in avoiding forced medication with antipsychotic drugs designed to either make them easier to manage in jail or prison or render them competent to stand trial. The Court’s decisions place both ends- and meansproportionality limits on these practices. The latest of these cases, Sell v. United States,35 involved the use of drugs designed to induce and maintain trial competency. The Court held that
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the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer anti-psychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.36 The Court specified that a sufficiently important governmental interest exists where the offender is charged with a serious crime against person or property. However, trial and reviewing courts must also consider, as offsets to the government’s substantial interest in timely prosecution, conviction, and punishment, whether the defendant has already been confined for a substantial period of time in a medical or mental health center and/or would be so confined if not rendered competent by forced medication. Either form of confinement would protect public safety and could satisfy a substantial portion of any future criminal sentence (via credit for time served awaiting trial), and any treatment received during such confinement might reduce the likelihood of the defendant’s committing future crimes. The Sell opinion further provides that forced medication requires a finding that less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results. Courts must also consider less intrusive means for administering the drugs (e.g., ordering the defendant to take the drugs, with threatened contempt sanctions, before forcibly administering them), and they must make certain that administration of the drugs is in the defendant’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition, the potential side effects, and the likely effectiveness of the drugs in his case. The Sell standards embody independent ends- and means-proportionality principles. Forced medication violates ends-proportionality principles if the loss of liberty and attendant medical risks outweigh the importance of the charges and the drugs’ probable effectiveness in restoring competence and ensuring a fair trial. Such medication violates means proportionality if there are less intrusive ways to restore competency or administer the drugs. Moreover, forced medication might violate both of these proportionality principles if it were found not to significantly further the state’s asserted interest. In the first in this line of cases, Washington v. Harper,37 involving the proposed medication of a dangerous prison inmate, the Court appeared to apply a somewhat looser standard, more akin to rational basis review, by asking whether the prison regulation was “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” However, some proportionality analysis was implicit, and it is possible that the stricter standards adopted in later, trial-competency cases like Sell have modified
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Harper. Of course, proportionality standards can and should be tailored to the specific context, and it seems likely that the Court will evaluate trial competency measures more strictly than measures designed to maintain prison and jail security.38 The precise scope of the Court’s rulings and the different standards applied in different contexts would be clearer if the Court were to explicitly recognize and separately apply the ends- and means-proportionality principles that underlie each of these decisions.
E. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR DISTINGUISHING CRIMINAL FROM CIVIL MEASURES In a variety of contexts, courts must decide whether a nominally civil or regulatory measure is actually intended as punishment and is therefore subject to constitutionally required criminal procedure rules and limitations (an issue sometimes referred to as the “civil-criminal divide” or “boundary”).39 If a government measure is deemed to be a form of regulation, it can be imposed using much less demanding civil or administrative procedures—even if that measure imposes substantial monetary or custodial conditions (e.g., civil fines, pretrial detention of criminal defendants, involuntary civil commitment).40 But if the measure is deemed to be punishment, its imposition without conviction and compliance with constitutionally required criminal procedures violates substantive due process.41 Similar rules that distinguish between regulation and punishment determine whether a measure is subject to the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses.42 In each of these contexts, proportionality is not sought in its own right but instead serves an evidentiary function—the excessiveness of a measure implies that the actual intent is to impose punishment. The notion of excessiveness applied in these cases seems to be a means proportionality concept by asking whether the measure is unnecessarily broad or unreasonably intrusive in light of its supposed nonpunitive purpose. Some scholars have suggested that a similar goal of flushing out illicit unconstitutional motivations underlies the narrow-tailoring requirement (also a form of means proportionality) under strict scrutiny analysis.43 However, only a few cases have invalidated government measures on this ground.44 In recent years the Supreme Court has almost always found measures to be regulatory and has stressed that the excessiveness inquiry is only one of several factors courts should consider.45 Moreover, in applying the excessiveness factor the Court has rejected a requirement of narrow tailoring—“a statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”46 Of course, there are many degrees of means-proportionality analysis,47 and the Court’s rejection of narrow tailoring does not rule out less
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constraining forms. The focus in these cases was on the use of disproportionality to infer punitive intent, but the Court’s strong language may also have been intended to signal an unwillingness to constitutionalize strict means proportionality as a direct limit on severe civil or regulatory measures, as some lower courts have done in the contexts of juvenile justice and involuntary civil commitment.48
F. PROPORTIONALITY LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES In criminal and quasi-criminal justice contexts, proportionality analysis is most often employed to safeguard individual rights and liberties from government overreaching. However, a finding of disproportionality sometimes favors the government. Several examples are discussed in this part (exclusionary rules) and in part G (proportionality-based limits on pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedural rights). The Supreme Court has invoked a cost-benefit concept akin to ends proportionality to justify a variety of limits on the scope of exclusionary remedies for violations of constitutionally protected rights. The Court used this approach to admit evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on an invalid search warrant,49 to limit the number of persons granted standing to contest police illegalities,50 and to permit impeachment and other collateral use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment or the Miranda rule.51 In each of these contexts the Court concluded that any added deterrence of police illegality obtained by applying or extending the exclusionary rule in the manner sought by the defendant is outweighed by the added cost of excluding reliable evidence.52 As economists would say, the marginal cost of exclusion outweighs the marginal benefit. A different ends-proportionality argument underlies another limitation on exclusionary remedies, the “attenuation” doctrine. In Brown v. Illinois,53 the Court recognized four factors as relevant to whether the causal link between an illegal arrest and a subsequent confession would be deemed sufficiently attenuated to allow the confession to be admitted in the prosecution’s case: whether Miranda warnings were given; the temporal proximity between the illegality and the confession; the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; “and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy” of the illegal arrest (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the gravity of the police “offense” against the Constitution is the most important factor in determining the scope of the exclusionary rule—more egregious illegalities justify the exclusion of more remote evidentiary fruits.54 The implicit reasoning is similar to one of Bentham’s arguments in favor of punishments proportional to crime seriousness: The benefits of preventing more serious crimes justify the greater costs of more severe penalties.55
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A similar, implicit ends-benefits proportionality principle may explain the narrower exclusionary remedies that many courts apply to subconstitutional rights violations.56 The underlying ends-proportionality policy argument (rarely made explicit in these decisions) is that subconstitutional rights are less weighty and the benefit of enforcing these rights is outweighed by the cost of excluding relevant and reliable evidence. As noted earlier, most decisions that limit the scope of constitutional exclusionary rules seem to reflect ends-benefits proportionality principles. However, a few could be viewed as applying an alternative-means proportionality concept. In Harris v. New York,57 permitting impeachment use of evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda rule, the Court stated: The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.58 Since the Court viewed the deterrence likely to be obtained from exclusion in the case in chief as sufficient to satisfy minimum constitutional requirements for an effective remedy, the analysis here is a form of means proportionality. Where exclusion of illegal evidence for impeachment adds no constitutionally required benefit, then a broader exclusionary rule that forbids such impeachment use would be excessive (means disproportionate) relative to a more narrowly tailored, constitutionally adequate remedy. Similarly, several justices have recently articulated a narrow-tailoring, “nomore-than-necessary” test that reflects means-proportionality principles as a limitation on the Miranda rule