Provincial power and absolute monarchy: the Estates General of Burgundy, 1661-1790

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P ROV I N C I A L P OW E R A N D A B S O L U T E M O N A RC H Y The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661–1790

This is the first book in English to study the history of the Estates General of Burgundy during the classic period of absolute monarchy. Although not a representative institution in any modern sense, the Estates were constantly engaged in a process of bargaining with the French crown, and this book examines that relationship under the ancien r´egime. Julian Swann analyses the organisation, membership and powers of the Estates and explores their administration, their struggles for power with rival institutions and their relationship with the crown and with the Burgundian people. The Estates proved remarkably resilient when confronted by the challenges posed by the Bourbon monarchy, and by the reign of Louis XVI they were seemingly more powerful than ever. However, the desire to protect their privileges and to extend their authority had not been accompanied by an attempt to forge a meaningful relationship with the people they claimed to serve. j ul i a n s wa n n is Lecturer in Early Modern European History at Birkbeck College, University of London. He is the author of Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754–1774 (1995).

new studies in europe an histo ry Edited by pe t er ba ldwin , University of California, Los Angeles ch ri s toph er cl a rk , University of Cambridge ja m es b. collin s , Georgetown University m i a rod r´ı g u e z - s a lg a d o , London School of Economics and Political Science ly n da l roper , Royal Holloway, University of London

This is a new series in early modern and modern European history. Its aim is to publish outstanding works of research, addressed to important themes across a wide geographical range, from southern and central Europe, to Scandinavia and Russia, and from the time of the Renaissance to the Second World War. As it develops the series will comprise focused works of wide contextual range and intellectual ambition. Books in the series Royalty and Diplomacy in Europe, 1890–1914 roderick r. m clea n Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque Religious Identity in Southwest Germany, 1550–1750 m a rc r. fors ter Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War a n n ika m om bau er Peter the Great The Struggle for Power, 1671–1725 pau l bu s h kovitch Fatherlands State Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany a biga il green The French Second Empire An Anatomy of Political Power roger price Origins of the French Welfare State The Struggle for Social Reform in France, 1914–1947 paul v. du t ton Ordinary Prussians Brandenburg Junkers and Villagers, 1500–1840 willia m w. h age n Liberty and Locality in Revolutionary France Six Villages Compared, 1760–1820 peter jon es

P ROV I NCIAL POW ER AND AB S OLUT E MO NARCHY The Estates General of Burgundy, 1661–1790

JU L I A N S W A N N Birkbeck College, University of London

   Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , United Kingdom Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambrid ge.org/9780521827676 © Julian Swann 2003 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2003 - isbn-13 978-0-511-06273-5 eBook (NetLibrary) - isbn-10 0-511-06273-7 eBook (NetLibrary) - isbn-13 978-0-521-82767-6 hardback - isbn-10 0-521-82767-1 hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

A` Manon et Margot

Contents

List of illustrations List of figures List of appendices List of map Preface List of abbreviations Map: The duchy of Burgundy in the eighteenth century

page ix x xi xii xiii xv xvi

1

Historians, absolute monarchy and the provincial estates

2

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

26

3

The Estates General of Burgundy

41

4

Nosseigneurs les ´elus and the officers of the Estates

91

5

The provincial administration: authority and enforcement

126

6

‘It’s raining taxes’. Paying for the Sun King, 1661–1715

154

7

Provincial administration in an age of iron, 1661–1715

194

8

The limits of absolutism: crown, governor and the Estates in the eighteenth century

230

Provincial rivalries: the Estates and the Parlement of Dijon in the eighteenth century

262

Tax, borrow and lend: crown, Estates and finance, 1715–1789

295

An enlightened administration?

330

9 10 11

vii

1

viii 12

Contents The coming of the French revolution in Burgundy, 1787–1789

365

Conclusion

400

Appendices Bibliography Index

413 430 447

Illustrations

1 The grande salle of the Estates of Burgundy (Source: Mus´ee des Beaux-Arts de Dijon) 2 Plan of the chamber of clergy at the Estates of Burgundy in 1697 (Source: Archives D´epartementales de la Cˆote d’Or) 3 Plan of the chamber of the third estate at the Estates of Burgundy in 1697 (Source: Archives D´epartementales de la Cˆote d’Or) 4 Plan of the chamber of ´elus of the Estates of Burgundy (Source: Archives D´epartementales de la Cˆote d’Or)

ix

page 56 60 72 127

Figures

3.1 3.2 3.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 10.1

Chamber of the clergy: attendance, 1682–1787 Chamber of the nobility: attendance, 1662–1787 Chamber of the third estate: attendance, 1688–1787 Triennial accounts of the Estates of Burgundy, 1645–1716 Annual cost of the military ´etapes, 1675–1715 Expenditure of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689–91 Revenue of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689–91 Taille levied in Burgundy, 1668–1715 Revenue of the Estates of Burgundy, 1706–8 Annual income and expenditure of the Estates of Burgundy, 1715–65 10.2 Taille levied in Burgundy, 1715–89 10.3 Cost of the military ´etapes in Burgundy, 1715–86 10.4 Annual borrowing by the Estates of Burgundy on behalf of the king, 1742–87

x

page 58 65 73 167 170 179 181 182 184 297 301 312 322

Appendices

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Governors of Burgundy, 1661–1789 Intendants of Burgundy, 1661–1789 ´ of the clergy, 1662–1790 Elus ´ of the nobility, 1662–1790 Elus ´ of the third estate, 1662–1790 Elus Vicomtes-mayeurs of Dijon, 1661–1790 Treasurer generals of the Estates of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Secr´etaires des ´etats of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Procureurs syndics of the Estates of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Conseils des ´etats, 1661–1790 Alcades of the clergy, 1668–1790 Alcades of the nobility, 1662–1790 Alcades of the third estate, 1668–1790 Receivers of the taille in Burgundy, 1661–1789

xi

page 413 413 413 415 416 417 418 418 418 419 419 421 423 426

Map

1 The duchy of Burgundy in the eighteenth century (Source: Archives D´epartmentales de la Cˆote d’Or C 3 860)

xii

page xvi

Preface

This book has taken nearly a decade to produce and in the course of what has often seemed an interminable struggle I have accumulated a large number of debts. I would particularly like to thank James Collins, William Doyle, Jo¨el F´elix, Roger Mettam, Mark Gilbert and Munro Price who have kindly given up their time to read all, or part, of the manuscript and to offer much help and encouragement. The three anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press were also an invaluable source of constructive and helpful criticism. Together they helped me to avoid many pitfalls and errors, although all the remaining defects of this book are my own. Within the wider circle of Burgundian enthusiasts I have enjoyed and benefited from many discussions with Mark Bryant, Chris Corley, Simon Everett, Jim Farr, Mack Holt, Jeff Houghtby and Charles Papon. In Dijon, professor Hugues Richard generously shared his extensive knowledge of the Estates. I am also grateful to my former research supervisor, Tim Blanning, for his support at every stage of my career. I should also like to thank Richard Fisher and Michael Watson of Cambridge University Press for their patience and professional assistance. Much of the research for this book was conducted in the Archives D´epartementales and the Biblioth`eque Municipale of Dijon and the friendly and efficient staff made it a real pleasure. They offer another splendid example of how the Parisians could learn from the provinces. I should also like to thank the British Academy for a small personal research grant awarded in 1993 and the Scouloudi Foundation for an award that helped to fund the initial stages of my work. While working in Dijon and Paris, I have been helped immensely by the friendship and hospitality of Philippe and Flore Dollo, Alain and Sophie Meunier, Vincent and Sophie Moron and Anne Thierry. My Burgundian family, Gil, Pierre, Emmanuelle, Dimitri and Clara have all given their

xiii

xiv

Preface

constant support, as have my own family, Ron, Barbara, Jan, Paul and Rene. However, this book would never have been started had it not been for one very special Burgundian, my wife, Manon, to whom this book is dedicated. Manon and my daughter, Margot, never cease to remind me of the most important things in life.

Abbreviations

ADCO ADSL AN BMC AC BMD BN

Archives D´epartementales de la Cˆote d’Or Archives D´epartementales de la Saˆone et Loire Archives Nationales Biblioth`eque du Mus´ee Cond´e, Archives Cond´e Biblioth`eque Muncipale de Dijon Biblioth`eque Nationale

xv

Map 1

The duchy of Burgundy in the eighteenth century

chapter 1

Historians, absolute monarchy and the provincial estates

t h e ‘w h i g i n t e r p re tat i o n ’ o f f re n c h h i s to ry After witnessing the rise and often rapid fall of three monarchies, two empires, five republics and the Vichy regime in the space of less than two centuries, the French people can be forgiven a certain scepticism about the durability of both their rulers and the country’s political institutions. Yet through the ruins and debris left by kings, emperors and politicians of every hue, the French have long been able to seek solace in the fact that the state went on forever. The existence of a strong, centralised bureaucracy, simultaneously loved and loathed by the public, supplied a sense of permanence and reliability denied to the mere mortals who flitted across the political stage. Since at least the early nineteenth century, veneration of the state and a belief in its centralising mission has formed an important part of French national identity. It offered a force for unity that a divided and politically traumatised people could cling to, and, not surprisingly, scholars looked back beyond 1789 in search of its origins. The result was what we might describe as the French version of the Whig school of history. Whereas the British exponents of that school believed that the history of their country could be written in terms of a long and triumphant march from the Magna Carta to parliamentary democracy, the French saw a no less inexorable rise of the state. The argument can be pushed back to the middle ages when the monarchy gradually gained control of formerly independent provinces such as Brittany, Burgundy, Provence or Languedoc, but it is the first half of the seventeenth century that is usually taken to mark the birth of the Leviathan. Historians of the early nineteenth century, most famously Alexis de Tocqueville, believed that it was during the reigns of Louis XIII and Louis XIV that the monarchy first began the process of centralisation with the ‘same patterns’ and the ‘same aims’ as in their own day.1 Throughout his 1

A. de Tocqueville, The ancien r´egime and the French revolution, trans. S. Gilbert (London, 1955), p. 132.

1

2

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

inspirational work, The ancien r´egime and the French revolution, Tocqueville made repeated references to the alleged continuity of the French government before and after 1789, declaring that in the eighteenth century it ‘was already highly centralised and all-powerful’.2 Indeed, ‘centralisation fitted in so well with the programme of the new social order that the common error of believing it to have been a creation of the revolution is easily accounted for’.3 To justify his thesis, Tocqueville identified a series of interrelated factors including the exclusion of the nobility from an active part in public affairs, the decline of intermediary bodies, the dominance of Paris over the provinces and the establishment of a central authority of royal council, ministers and intendants.4 There was nothing particularly original about these arguments.5 In 1844, Alexandre Thomas had published a magnificent study of Burgundy during the reign of Louis XIV in which he presented the Sun King, Richelieu, Franc¸ois I and even Louis XI as servants of the ‘great national cause’ through their contribution to ‘the forging of unity through centralisation’.6 Thomas was engaging in a polemic with Legitimists about the merits of the ancient privileges and charters of the French provinces, which he represented as a source of weakness and abuse, while Tocqueville had the regime of Napol´eon III firmly in his sights. Yet their arguments formed part of a much broader interpretation of the ancien r´egime that took root in the same period and which has become known to generations of students as the ‘age of absolutism’. The broad contours of that thesis are reassuringly familiar.7 From 1614 to 1789, the French monarchy ruled without recourse to the Estates General, seemingly giving concrete expression to the theory that the king was accountable to God alone. Representative government in the provinces was also sharply curtailed with, among others, the provincial estates of Dauphin´e, Normandy, Guyenne and the Auvergne falling into abeyance. During the reign of Louis XIII the foundations of absolutism were laid. Under the gaze of the cardinal de Richelieu, the Calvinist citadel of La Rochelle was stormed in 1628, marking the end of the Huguenot ‘state within a state’. Within a few years, it seemed as if the iron cardinal had 2 3 5 6 7

For this, and other examples, see ibid., pp. 25, 61, 84–5, 94, 222. 4 Ibid., pp. 57, 62, 64–5, 99, 100–1, 222. Ibid., p. 88. Tocqueville borrowed extensively from P. E. Lemontey, Essai sur l’´etablissement monarchique de Louis XIV et sur les alt´erations qu’il ´eprouva pendant sa vie de prince (Paris, 1818). A. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV. Situation politique et administrative de la Bourgogne de 1661 a` 1715, d’apr`es les manuscrits et les documents in´edits du temps (Paris, 1844), pp. xiv–xv. The following is no more than an attempt to distil the most significant elements of what we might call the absolutist thesis, and some of its tenets have been subsequently proved to be inaccurate.

Historians, monarchy and the provincial estates

3

made good his boast to ‘abase the pride of the nobles’.8 After the king’s brother, Gaston d’Orl´eans, had led the latest in a long string of unsuccessful aristocratic revolts, Richelieu ordered the execution of his principal lieutenant, the duc de Montmorency, in October 1632. Such ruthless treatment of a powerful grandee sent an unequivocal message that the habitual disobedience of the high aristocracy would no longer be tolerated. Finally, once France had officially entered the Thirty Years War in 1635, the government’s desperate need for funds obliged it to circumvent traditional judicial and administrative officeholders, whose loyalty and efficiency were questioned. They were replaced by the intendants, holding revocable commissions, whose broad professional remit was defined to include ‘justice, police and finance’. It was these new state servants who were supposedly in the vanguard of centralisation. When Richelieu and Louis XIII died within a few months of each other the political scene changed dramatically. In 1643, the new king, Louis XIV, was a mere child, and the regency government of Anne of Austria and cardinal Mazarin was soon confronted by a backlash led by angry officeholders and disgruntled aristocrats, with the latent support of a war weary populace. The boy king was driven temporarily from his capital during the parlementaire Fronde of 1648–9, and then saw his own relatives, headed by the Grand Cond´e, raise their standards against Mazarin. Although eventually defeated, the Fronde was a painful reminder of royal weakness, providing a lesson that was not lost on the young monarch. After Mazarin’s death he was determined to complete the work that Richelieu had started, breaking the power of the grandees by obliging them to attend upon him in his magnificent chateau at Versailles where, cut off from their power bases in the provinces, they were effectively domesticated. New robe nobles, allegedly of middle-class origins, dominated government and, after being chased from the provinces during the Fronde, the intendants returned to their posts with their powers and status enhanced. Finally, the parlements were punished for their earlier rebelliousness by a law of 1673, which obliged them to register laws before making remonstrances. Here, then, are the main ingredients of a thesis that seemingly carried all before it, ensuring that historians long treated the monarchy of Louis XIV and absolutism as synonymous. There was, of course, one glaring problem with the concept of the Sun King commanding a powerful, centralised state – the revolution. How could the monarchy have declined so rapidly and comprehensively? In answering that question, historians were undoubtedly 8

L. Andr´e, ed., Testament politique (Paris, 1947), p. 95.

4

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

aided by the personal shortcomings of Louis XV and Louis XVI, neither of whom could match the regal splendour of their great predecessor. Yet, as both men had employed ministers whose commitment to reform was unquestioned, a more weighty explanation was required. The answer was to be found in the persistence of privilege. According to this interpretation, the death of Louis XIV was followed almost immediately by a reaction of powerful privileged groups led by the parlements, the Catholic Church and the court aristocracy. Their largely selfish opposition to egalitarian reform of the fiscal system paved the way to the royal bankruptcy that preceded the revolution of 1789.9 The monarchy had thus been unable to complete its centralising mission, and to return once more to Tocqueville, it was the revolution that picked up the baton, completing ‘at one fell swoop, without warning, without transition, and without compunction . . . what in any case was bound to happen, if by slow degrees’.10 With this teleological flourish, worthy of the finest Whig historians, he nailed his colours to the mast; the rise of the modern French state was one long and inevitable process. t h e a d m i n i s t r at i ve m on arc h y If few historians were tempted to put matters quite so bluntly as Tocqueville, by the late nineteenth century the absolutist thesis was firmly established as the orthodox interpretation. Rare were those like Pierre Ardascheff, who, on the eve of the First World War, published an innovative study of the intendants during the reign of Louis XVI, arguing that they worked in a mutually rewarding partnership with the provinces.11 Ardascheff also rejected Tocqueville’s claim that the intendants were part of a tightly controlled, centralised administration, suggesting instead that they were far more independent than was usually imagined.12 The impact of his argument was limited, and subsequent historians tended to reinforce the prevailing interpretation. After examining the early decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule, the influential Georges Pag`es declared: 9

10 11

Historians of all political hues were attracted to this interpretation, see: A. Cobban, ‘The parlements of France in the eighteenth century’, History 35 (1950), 64–80; F. L. Ford, Robe and sword. The regrouping of the French aristocracy after Louis XIV (London, 1953); and A. Soboul, The French revolution, 1787–1799. From the storming of the Bastille to Napoleon (London, 1989), pp. 27–8, 37, 81–2. Tocqueville, Ancien r´egime and revolution, p. 51. 12 Ibid., pp. 95–6, 400. P. Ardascheff, Les intendants de province sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1909).

Historians, monarchy and the provincial estates

5

. . . the former frondeurs have become the most attentive courtiers. The parlements register edicts without saying a word. The assemblies of the [provincial] estates no longer even discuss the don gratuit. The malcontents have disarmed or are compelled to fall silent.13

A belief in the modernising role of the monarchical state was another familiar feature of the historical landscape. As a result, many of the great institutional and political histories of the first half of the twentieth century traced the seemingly permanent struggle between the crown and the parlements or provincial estates of the realm.14 Historians were divided about the virtues of royal polices and the legitimacy of the provincial opposition, but they were united in assuming that the extension of state power had been achieved through confrontation and conflict. There was also a general consensus that one of the consequences of the governmental changes of the seventeenth century was the emergence of a more impersonal bureaucratic monarchy.15 That interpretation has received its fullest recent expression in the works of Michel Antoine, who has examined both the maturation of the governmental structure of councils, ministers and intendants created by Louis XIV and its shortcomings.16 As Antoine makes clear, the almost exponential growth of business transacted by the contrˆoleur g´en´eral transformed his office into the real heart of government. Yet the sheer volume and complexity of the workload handled by the contrˆole g´en´eral meant that even the most dedicated monarch was unable to control its operations. As a result, decisions supposedly emanating from the king’s council were being made elsewhere by the increasingly specialised technocrats of what he terms the ‘administrative monarchy’. Antoine’s works are those of a passionate defender of the system, but he is ultimately forced to concede that the monarchy died by its own hand by creating a bureaucratic structure that was beyond the 13 14

15

16

G. Pag`es, La monarchie d’ancien r´egime en France de Henri IV a` Louis XIV , 3rd edn. (Paris, 1941), p. 181. A classic example was provided by the spat between Marcel Marion and Barth´elemy Pocquet about the rights and wrongs of the infamous Brittany affair, M. Marion, La Bretagne et le duc d’Aiguillon, 1753–1770 (Paris, 1898), and B. Pocquet, Le pouvoir absolu et l’esprit provincial. Le duc d’Aiguillon et La Chalotais, 3 vols. (Paris, 1900–1). For a number of influential examples, see: Pag`es, Monarchie d’ancien r´egime, pp. 134–81; M. Bordes, ´ ‘Les intendants e´clair´es de la fin de l’ancien r´egime’, Revue d’Histoire Economique et Sociale (1961), 57–83 and his L’administration provinciale et municipale en France au XVIIIe si`ecle (Paris, 1972); F. Bluche, Louis XIV (Oxford, 1990), pp. 133–56, 615–26; J. Egret, Louis XV et l’opposition parlementaire (Paris, 1970), pp. 43–5, 93–132; and J. Rule, ed., Louis XIV and the craft of kingship (Ohio, 1969), pp. 9–10, 28–30. M. Antoine, Le conseil du roi sous le r`egne de Louis XV (Geneva, 1970), pp. 377–431, 629–34.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

control of the king and the traditional ideas and institutions that supported him.17 According to Antoine, one of the consequences of these developments was the emergence of modern public employees, ‘the first senior civil servants’.18 Eighteenth-century France gave the world the term bureaucracy, and certain of its characteristics can be glimpsed in key institutions, offering some qualified support for his hypothesis. The engineers of the Ponts et Chauss´ees are amongst the most persuasive examples, as they were appointed by competitive examination, were paid salaries and retirement pensions and founded their careers upon talent rather than personal contacts.19 Philippe Minard has observed similar patterns in his thoughtful analysis of Colbert’s inspectors of manufacturers, and he concludes that amongst their ranks ‘the face of the civil servant can be glimpsed through that of the commissaire’.20 The employees of the ferme g´en´erale, the intendants of finance and the premiers commis who served in the bureaux of the secretaries of state can also be added to this list.21 In a period when finance ministers flitted across the stage as frequently as actors in a theatrical farce, it was their permanent officers who provided a much needed repository of knowledge and competence. It was in these lower tiers of the government that the backbone of the state machine was to be found, and in terms of personnel at least the continuity between the ancien r´egime and its revolutionary successors is beyond doubt.22 There were, therefore, forces within the monarchy that were seeking to move in a more uniform and egalitarian direction, and from an administrative perspective there was undoubtedly a degree of continuity in the years after 1789. Yet the degree of modernisation of the governmental structure should not be exaggerated, and during the last twenty-five years the traditional conception of a bureaucratic, administrative monarchy has been subject to serious challenge. 17 19 20 21

22

18 Ibid., p. 390. Ibid., p. 634. J. Petot, Histoire de l’administration des ponts et chauss´ees, 1599–1851 (Paris, 1958), and A. Picon, L’invention de l’ing´enieur moderne. L’´ecole des ponts et chauss´ees, 1747–1851 (Paris, 1992). ´ et industrie dans la France des lumi`eres (Paris, 1998), P. Minard, La fortune du colbertisme. Etat pp. 75–114, esp. 113. See: G. T. Matthews, The royal general farms in eighteenth-century France (New York, 1958), pp. 185–227; J. Clinquart, Les services ext´erieurs de la ferme g´en´erale a` la fin de l’ancien r´egime. L’exemple de la direction des fermes du Hainaut (Paris, 1995), pp. 60, 183–208; and J. F´elix, ‘Les commis du contrˆole g´en´eral des finances au XVIIIe si`ecle’, L’administration des finances sous l’ancien r´egime. Colloque tenu a` Bercy les 22 et 23 f´evrier 1996 (Paris, 1997), 81–102. C. H. Church, Revolution and red tape. The French ministerial bureaucracy, 1770–1850 (Oxford, 1981), offers an impressive analysis of the development of French bureaucracy.

Historians, monarchy and the provincial estates

7

revi s i o n i s m a n d t h e n ew ort h o d ox y It was with a certain amusing symmetry that Yves-Marie Berc´e published his textbook, La naissance dramatique de l’absolutisme in France at exactly the same time as Nicholas Henshall’s, The myth of absolutism, appeared in Britain.23 These diametrically opposed texts illustrate perfectly the gulf separating the hostile camps in the debate. Berc´e has written of the rising power of the French state in the half century after 1630, with Mazarin’s victory in the Fronde marking ‘the triumph of the very absolutism and centralisation against which it had been directed’.24 It is a firm restatement of the classic thesis, and when Berc´e declares that ‘Mazarin wagered on a cause which had a long past and a glorious future: the power of the French state’ his stance is unequivocal. He is not alone, and Franc¸ois Bluche, while more nuanced in his judgement, suggested in his acclaimed biography of Louis XIV that the king could be considered the ‘first enlightened despot’.25 Henshall, on the other hand, rejects the term absolutism as a myth resulting from a misreading of the political system of the ancien r´egime by the historians of the nineteenth century.26 As he freely acknowledges, his work has been inspired by the writings of, among others, Roger Mettam and Peter Campbell, who form part of the radical wing of revisionist thinking. They are at pains to point out that to talk of absolutism is to commit the sin of anachronism, and to risk imposing a whole series of value judgements about the nature of the French monarchy that would have made little sense to contemporaries.27 When an historian as distinguished as Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret can describe the death of Louis XIV as ushering in a period of ‘destalinisation’,28 it is easy to share their misgivings. Louis XIV 23

24 25 26 27

28

Y-M. Berc´e, La naissance dramatique de l’absolutisme, 1598–1661 (Paris, 1992), published in English as The birth of absolutism. A history of France, 1598–1661 (London, 1996), and N. Henshall, The myth of absolutism: change and continuity in early modern European monarchy (London, 1992), Sharon Kettering, French society, 1589–1715 (London, 2001), pp. 81–95, has recently made a useful attempt to steer between the two extremes. Y-M. Berc´e, Birth of absolutism, p. 177–8. Bluche, Louis XIV , p. 619. A claim repeated by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The ancien r´egime. A history of France, 1610–1774 (Oxford, 1996), p. 130. Henshall, Myth of absolutism, pp. 210–12. As does J. B. Collins, The state in early modern France (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 1–2, in another important general survey. For a sample of their comments, see: Henshall, Myth of absolutism, pp. 199–212; R. Mettam, Power and faction in Louis XIV’s France (Oxford, 1988), pp. 6–7, 34–41; and P. R. Campbell, The ancien r´egime in France (Oxford, 1988), pp. 46–70, and his Louis XIV (London, 1993). G. Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French nobility in the eighteenth century, trans. W. Doyle (Cambridge, 1984), p. 10. The introduction to this hugely influential work is entitled ‘le ghetto dor´e de la noblesse royale’, and has as its starting point the assumption of an aristocracy reacting against the absolutism of Louis XIV.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

behaved on occasions as an autocrat, as the Huguenots and the nuns of PortRoyal could both testify, but he should never be compared with modern tyrants. As a result, Mettam treats the term ‘absolutist historians’ as if it was synonymous with error, and Campbell has suggested that ‘baroque state’ be used as an alternative.29 Revisionism is, however, about more than just terminology, and it strikes at the heart of our understanding of the development of the French state, with almost every aspect of the traditional interpretation being vigorously challenged. As we have seen, it was long argued that the political authority of the nobility rapidly declined once the great aristocrats had been confined to Versailles, far way from their power bases in the provinces. Rather than seeing the palace as part of a deliberate strategy to tame the nobility, historians such as Mettam and Jeroen Duindam have offered an alternative explanation.30 They have drawn our attention to the court’s primary role as royal household, an arena to which the grandees naturally gravitated both to protect their own rank and status and to pursue their wider personal and family strategies. It was through attendance upon the king that they could hope to secure the titles, offices and pensions needed to finance their opulent lifestyles and to reaffirm their position in the social hierarchy. Even the most cursory glance at the generals, governors, ambassadors and senior clergy appointed between 1661 and 1789 confirms that the grandees were fully employed. It is true that during the personal reign of Louis XIV, the offices of secretary of state were dominated by the robe dynasties, most famously those of Colbert, Le Tellier and Ph´elypeaux. Yet as Mettam makes clear, Louis XIV constantly sought the advice of members of his extended family and the aristocratic courtiers, none of whom would have accepted the office of secretary of state, which they believed was beneath them.31 It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that these aristocratic prejudices were abandoned with damaging consequences for the monarchy. Crucially, Louis XIV took personal responsibility for the distribution of royal favour, successfully ‘focusing attention upon himself as the fount of patronage, because of his evenhanded distribution of favours’.32 The contrast with the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, when many aristocratic revolts had been inspired by a sense of hopelessness resulting from 29 30 31

Mettam, Power and faction, passim, and P. R. Campbell, Power and politics in old regime France, 1720–1745 (London, 1996), pp. 4–5, 314. Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 47–65, and J. Duindam, Myths of power. Norbert Elias and the early modern European court (Amsterdam, 1994). 32 Ibid., p. 56. Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 55–65, 81–101.

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the monopoly of royal favour enjoyed by the cardinals, was striking. Such desperate measures were no longer required, and to achieve their ends, the courtiers formed into relatively fluid factional groupings, the infamous cabals and partis that haunted the corridors and council chambers of Versailles. It was a world that changed little in the hundred years after 1682, when Louis XIV made the great palace the principal residence of his government and court.33 By putting Versailles back into its proper historical perspective, the argument that the nobility was deprived of its authority loses some of its shine. Much the same can be said of our understanding of politics in the period. One of the dangers arising from a uniquely bureaucratic conception of the monarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that it overlooks the persistence of more traditional features of government. The ability of individuals or institutions to achieve their personal or corporate goals depended, in part, upon their ability to secure access to the monarch, or the powerful courtiers or ministers that surrounded him. Within this context, influence was exerted through private, informal contacts, and winning the ear of the king’s favourite,34 or mistress, could produce results far more rapidly than petitioning through the official channels of ministers and their clerks. There is nothing incompatible about a vision of government functioning in both a formal and informal way, and to try and study the royal administration from just one perspective runs the risk of distortion. Rethinking the nature of court society is only one part of a broader revisionist programme, and there is now a much greater awareness of the enormous degree of continuity within almost every aspect of ancien r´egime society and government. Central to that argument is a belief that it was, in part, through the workings of patronage and client`ele that the crown extended its authority, suggesting that the ancien r´egime state had as much, if not more, in common with its medieval ancestors as with modern bureaucratic regimes. A lively debate has raged about the strength of client`ele ties, with, at it most extreme, Roland Mousnier arguing that it was possible to talk of emotionally intense bonds of loyalty, what he termed ‘fidelit´es’, 33

34

Recent studies highlighting the role of court faction in old regime politics include: M. Bryant, ‘Franc¸oise d’Aubign´e, marquise de Maintenon: religion, power and politics – a study in circles of influence during the later reign of Louis XIV, 1684–1715’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of London, 2001); Campbell, Power and politics; J. Hardman, French politics, 1774–1789. From the accession of Louis XVI to the fall of the Bastille (London, 1995); M. Price, Preserving the monarchy. The comte de Vergennes, 1774–1787 (Cambridge, 1995); and J. Swann, Politics and the parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754–1774 (Cambridge, 1995). Bryant, ‘Marquise de Maintenon’, provides an excellent example.

10

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

linking patron and client.35 Such bonds undoubtedly existed, and there is no shortage of examples of individuals risking their lives and their fortunes for a benefactor. However, as we might expect, many patron-client ties were more complex, or, as Sharon Kettering describes matters, ‘the ideal may have been a fidelity relationship of lifelong devotion to one patron, but the political reality was messier’.36 It was, therefore, common for clients to swap patrons, or serve multiple patrons, as part of the broader pursuit of self-interest, and it was these personal, non-bureaucratic ties that proved crucial not only to the expansion of royal power in the seventeenth century, but also to the functioning of the ancien r´egime political system. An examination of the principal officers and administrative servants of the crown quickly reveals the importance of patronage. Struck by the contrast between the aristocratic warlords, who repeatedly plunged France into civil war before 1661 and their courtier descendants, historians assumed that they had been cut off from the provinces, where the intendants now reigned supreme, with governorships being gradually transformed into sinecures.37 By the end of the eighteenth century it is likely that this was the case,38 but the pace of change was much slower than was initially thought. Instead of losing contact with the provinces, the absentee governors, in the words of Robert Harding, ‘revived their renaissance roles as brokers’.39 Their social rank brought proximity to the king and an authority that even the most powerful minister could not ignore, and quite naturally provincial bodies, or private individuals, looked to them for assistance and preferment.40 The works of Katia B´eguin and Beth Natcheson have provided some of the most compelling evidence in favour of the continuing power of the governors. They have demonstrated the immense influence wielded by the Cond´e in Burgundy, and this study will reinforce that argument.41 Elsewhere the evidence is more mixed. The duc de Chaulnes proved an effective governor 35

36 37 38 39 40 41

R. Mousnier, ‘Les concepts de “ordres”, d’ “´etats”, de “fidelit´e” et de “monarchie absolue” en France de la fin du XVe, si`ecle a` la fin du XVIIIe’, Revue Historique 502 (1972), 289–312, and his ‘Les fid´elit´es et client`eles en France aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe si`ecles’, Histoire Sociale – Social History 15 (1982), 35–46. S. Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients in seventeenth-century France (Oxford, 1986), p. 21. Kettering’s work is an essential introduction to the subject. Bordes, L’administration provinciale, pp. 26–7, 32–5. A research project on the role of the provincial governors in the reign of Louis XVI might well yield some interesting results. R. R., Harding, Anatomy of a power elite: the provincial governors of early modern France (New Haven, 1978), pp. 201–3. Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 47–54. K. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e. Rebelles, courtisans et m´ec`enes dans la France du grand si`ecle (Paris, 1999), and B. Natcheson, ‘Absentee government and provincial governors in early modern France: the princes of Cond´e and Burgundy, 1660–1720’, French Historical Studies 21 (1998), 265–98.

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of Brittany, and successive generations of the Villeroy family proved to be able and active governors of the Lyonnais.42 Others were less conspicuous, Kettering has suggested that in the second half of the seventeenth century, the governors of Provence ‘chose to focus their careers on military service in the royal armies’,43 and William Beik’s study of Languedoc in the same period conveys a similar impression of decline.44 That Kettering and Beik should discount the role of the governors after 1661 is not the result of any doubts about the importance of patronage to Louis XIV’s government. Instead, as Beik describes matters, one of the reasons for the sun king’s success lay in the fact that ‘for the first time under Colbert, the dominant client network was really a royal network, centering on the king himself and tied directly to the central administration’.45 Closer examination of other areas of government has produced further evidence of the significance of client`ele and of the persistence of patrimonial attitudes within the government structure at odds with the supposedly more modern bureaucratic ethos of the administrative monarchy. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of government finance. In 1973, Julian Dent made what, at the time, must have seemed a quite an extraordinary claim that ‘during the years 1635–61 and 1683–1715, financiers came to dominate the financial administration of the state, parcelling it up into private fiefs in a fragmentation of authority and power redolent more of a low species of bastard feudalism than of absolutist bureaucracy’.46 Yet his suggestion that the financial system was controlled by fiscal client`eles, of whom the most famous chiefs were those great rivals Colbert and Fouquet, has been borne out by a series of meticulous studies.47 The army has also provided fertile ground for re-evaluation. David Parrott has argued that 42

43 44 45

46 47

For details on the actions of the Villeroy, see Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 198–9, and W. G. Monahan, Year of sorrows The great famine of 1709 in Lyon (Columbus, 1993), pp. 49–51, 59–60, 80, 168–9. S. Kettering, Judicial politics and urban revolt in seventeenth-century France. The Parlement of Aix, 1629–1659 (Princeton, 1978), pp. 147–8. W. Beik, Absolutism and society in seventeenth-century France. State power and provincial aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 48, 228–44. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 244. Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients, p. 223, argues that ‘the ministers of a centralizing Bourbon monarchy created their own administrative clienteles in the provinces’. D. Bohanan, Crown and nobility in early modern France (London, 2001), is another to stress the importance of royal patronage in this regard. J. Dent, Crisis in finance: crown, financiers and society in seventeenth-century France (New York, 1973), p. 20. Amongst the most important are: F. Bayard, Le monde des financiers au XVIIe si`ecle (Paris, 1988); R. J. Bonney, The king’s debts. Finance and politics in France, 1589–1661 (Oxford, 1981); J. B. Collins, Fiscal limits of absolutism: direct taxation in seventeenth-century France (London, 1988); and D. Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et soci´et´e au grand si`ecle (Paris, 1984).

12

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for all their absolutist reputation, the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin left control of the French army firmly in the hands of the great aristocratic patrons.48 As for the reinvigorated naval administration, it has been defined as ‘a lobby comparable to that surrounding Colbert in the financial domain’.49 Even the intendants can be integrated into a framework of patronage and client`ele. They were recruited from a relatively narrow section of the robe nobility, and their advancement was frequently dependent upon family or personal contacts.50 Many of their subdelegates were officeholders and the premier commis, who most closely resembled modern bureaucrats, required patronage as well as talent to secure an appointment. David Parker has gone as far as to claim that ‘patrimonial mechanisms of rule remained more important than bureaucratic ones’.51 Finding a generally acceptable conclusion to this argument is never going to be easy, but it is clear that any balanced assessment of the monarchical administration has to take both factors into consideration. t h e c a r rot a n d t h e s t i ck The traditional image of provincial independence being broken by the intendants has presented a particularly tempting target for revisionists, not least because earlier historians had tended to exaggerate the ability of a few dozen individuals, working alone in large and often hostile g´en´eralit´es, to act as the single-minded agents of centralisation. As William Beik remarks ‘they appear more frequently in local studies as isolated, beleaguered bearers of unpopular edicts, who are threatened with denigration, pillage, and popular insurrection’.52 He was referring to the early seventeenth century, and doubts if they became the ‘triumphant dictators of centralization . . . until very late’. Indeed, the extent to which they ever became so dominant in the pays d’´etats remains to be proven. Even the most powerful intendants had to tread warily because creating a good impression at Versailles was about 48

49 50 51

52

D. Parrott, Richelieu’s army. War, government and society in France, 1624–1642 (Cambridge, 2001). Nor did matters change all that rapidly during the reign of Louis XIV, as Guy Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, aristocratic power and the elite units of the French army’, French History 13 (1999), 303–31, has shown. D. Dessert, ‘La marine royale, une filiale Colbert’, in C. Giry-Deloison and R. Mettam, eds., Patronages et client´elismes (London, 1992), pp. 69–83, 80. R. J. Bonney, Political change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624–1661 (Oxford, 1976), pp. 29–111, and Kettering, Patrons, brokers and clients, pp. 224–8. D. Parker, Class and state in ancien r´egime France. The road to modernity? (London, 1996), pp. 26–7, 173–87. Church, Revolution and red tape, provides persuasive evidence of how patrimonialism continued to stifle the bureaucratic tendencies within the ancien r´egime administration. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 14–15.

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more than blind obedience to ministerial diktat, it was also vital to achieve results. Respect for provincial social elites and an awareness of their interests was highly advisable, otherwise the intendant risked provoking opposition that could wreck his career. A degree of caution is therefore advisable when assessing their role, but, as Richard Bonney has argued, the intendants were still a priceless asset to the crown because of the administrative flexibility they offered.53 Their powers could be increased, or quickly amended to take account of changing circumstances, and unlike governors, provincial estates or other institutions, they could be dismissed without cost. Downplaying the authoritarian nature of the intendants is part of a broader revisionist strategy designed to recast the power of Louis XIV as more apparent than real and great emphasis has been laid upon the success of royal propaganda in dazzling both contemporaries and subsequent historians.54 The coercive element in government has also been questioned, and Albert Hamscher’s meticulous studies of the Parlement of Paris have demonstrated that Louis XIV was prepared to protect its legitimate interests in the field of the law.55 What he did not wish to see was a repetition of the events of his minority, when the parlements had strayed into the political arena. Mettam has gone further, claiming that Louis XIV’s declaration of 24 February 1673, obliging the parlements to register laws before making remonstrances, was much less restrictive than previously thought.56 John Hurt has recently challenged this harmonious vision, arguing persuasively that in 1673 the king really did strike a severe blow against parlementaire pretensions.57 By forcing the parlements to register edicts, declarations and letters patent immediately, Louis XIV curtailed the often lengthy pre-registration debates, remonstrances and obstructionist tactics that had so frequently frustrated his predecessors. Although Hurt does not dispute Hamscher’s findings about cooperation on judicial matters, he describes this as the result of the successful application of Louis XIV’s absolutist policies culminating in the declaration of February 1673. Moreover, Hurt has revealed the immense financial burden deliberately imposed upon the parlementaires, who by the end of the reign were in a sorry state ‘with their offices taxed, yielding scant income, reduced in value, 53 54 55

56 57

Bonney, Political change, pp. 442–3. Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 13–14, 16, 26–7, and Campbell, Power and politics, pp. 12–13. A. N. Hamscher, The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653–1673 (London, 1976), and his The conseil priv´e and the parlements in the age of Louis XIV: a study in French absolutism (Philadelphia, 1987). Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 266–7, argues that it applied to letters patent, not edicts and declarations and it is true that the text is ambiguous. J. J. Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements. The assertion of royal authority (Manchester, 2002).

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heavily mortgaged, exposed to creditors and with unpaid augmentations de gages’.58 It is a telling reminder that revisionism should not be overdone, and that Louis XIV’s government had an iron fist inside the velvet glove. The monarchy often acted arbitrarily and its relationship with French elites could also be conflictual.59 Yet if the government had relied too heavily on coercion, the tactic would have soon proved counter-productive, as events during the reign of Louis XIII had demonstrated. Louis XIV’s rule was so successful in restoring order because he also made a conscious effort to woo French elites, and the theme of cooperation is the leitmotif running through the different strands of revisionist thinking. This is particularly relevant when we turn our attention to the pays d’´etats, where recent research has revealed a far more complex relationship with the crown than was hitherto suspected. Beik, in particular, has offered a remarkable insight into the government of Languedoc in the seventeenth century. During the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, the province was rocked by periodic revolts, suffered attacks on some of its leading institutions, notably the Estates, and experienced a dramatic increase in the fiscal burden. It was, as Beik tellingly describes it, a period that demonstrated ‘how badly the system could work’.60 During the early years of Louis XIV’s personal rule the situation was transformed with the establishment of order and tranquillity. The king’s success was not the result of repression, ‘but of a more successful defense of ruling class interests, through collaboration and improved direction’.61 According to Beik’s analysis, absolutism was nothing less than the ‘story of a restructured feudal society’, with monarch and landed aristocracy ‘exploring ways of defending their interests in a changing world’. Louis XIV was deeply suspicious of any form of dissent and was determined to be obeyed, but he was also prepared to be generous towards those willing to collaborate. Languedoc’s elites soon learned that they would be rewarded for good behaviour. The crown tolerated their control of the local fiscal system, the siphoning off of large sums into the pockets of those involved in tax collection, and the distribution of generous pensions and gifts to the powerful.62 Earlier sources of dispute, such as the costs of provisioning the military ´etapes, or the winter quarters of royal armies, were also subject to more sensitive treatment. Rather than try to impose 58 59 60

Ibid., p. 116. An argument that most revisionists are happy to accept, see, for example, Collins, The state in early modern France, pp. 1–2. 61 Ibid., p. 31. 62 Ibid., pp. 258–78. Beik, Absolutism and society, p. 219.

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its decisions arbitrarily, the government revealed a genuine willingness to consult with provincial bodies and to delegate responsibility. After much initial hesitation the Estates were persuaded to contribute towards the costs of constructing the Canal du Midi, and they also participated enthusiastically in the renewed campaign of persecution against the Huguenots, which culminated in the decision to revoke the edict of Nantes.63 Finally, the personal rule of Louis XIV was characterised by respect for the rights of existing institutions and for social hierarchy, something that could only profit the privileged classes, who, according to Beik, were ‘basking in the sun’. Beik’s study reveals the glaring weakness at the heart of older interpretations based upon the almost inevitable confrontation between the crown and the provinces. He also reinforces one of the revisionists’ most powerful arguments, namely that mutually beneficial cooperation is the key to understanding how Louis XIV calmed the unrest that had threatened to tear France apart during his minority. Beik does not seek to claim that Languedoc was typical of the kingdom as a whole, but the research of James Collins in another pays d’´etats, Brittany, reveals a similar pattern.64 The willingness of the king to cooperate with local elites is again one of the defining features of the regime, and, as Collins describes matters, ‘the compromise of Louis XIV protected the vital interests of everyone: greater security for investors in royal debt; reduced direct taxes; a more stable tax leasing environment; clear support for the traditional social, moral, and political order of the localities’.65 As in Languedoc it was the tax-paying peasantry which lost out as a result of what he describes as a ‘cozy little relationship’ of noble landowners, the legal class and the crown.66 The model of French government that emerges from recent scholarship is one in which the deft distribution of patronage, or careful management of the nobility, seems more important than the centralising drive of an absolutist bureaucracy. That clearly raises awkward questions about exactly what type of state, or society, the ancien r´egime monarchy represented, and how closely it might be related to the modern state. Scholars such as Beik or Parker, who have been seeking to provide a reinvigorated Marxist analysis of monarchical absolutism, have no qualms about describing the seventeenth-century monarchy as essentially feudal. Moreover, they have largely abandoned the classic search for evidence of class struggle in favour 63 64 65

Ibid., pp. 287–97. Collins, Classes, estates, and order in early modern Brittany (Cambridge, 1995). The work of Bohanan, Crown and nobility, pp. 126–50, should also be consulted. 66 Ibid., p. 175. Collins, Classes, estates, and order, p. 283.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

of an analysis which posits the existence of a single ruling class working in harmony with the crown. Parker thus asserts that ‘the [old regime] state does not simply serve ruling class interests but is actually an instrument in the hands of the ruling class’.67 Without wishing to deny the important insights that the Marxist scholarly tradition has to offer, it is not necessary to be a disciple of Mousnier to have certain doubts.68 There is a danger that a portrayal of Louis XIV’s France as a feudal society, dominated by a monarchy working in tandem with a single powerful class, is both too static and oversimplified. Perhaps the greatest problem arises from the attempt to integrate aristocratic grandees, sword nobles, the robe nobility and the wider world of officeholders and financiers into a single coherent ruling class.69 Although they undoubtedly had much in common, Beik emphasises their access ‘to that most precious commodity, power’,70 they were also divided. Conflicts arose on account of, amongst other things, social status, corporate affiliation, profession, wealth and the actual extent of their political connections. It was precisely because ancien r´egime society was so fragmented that the monarchy was obliged to work with so many different social and institutional groups, whose composition varied markedly from one province to the next. Conflict amongst themselves and with the crown was endemic, and to try and conceptualise often distinct social and professional groups as a unique class seems needlessly restrictive and potentially misleading. As a result, many scholars, including this one, are happier to talk of elites as a more accurate representation of a complex society. Such an approach has the advantage of underlining the importance of balance and mutual reward in Louis XIV’s ruling consensus, and of explaining the breakdown of that relationship in the eighteenth century. There is also a danger that the revisionist argument more generally exaggerates the extent to which the monarchy was in thrall to vested interests. In part, this is the result of the strong emphasis on the pays d’´etats whose institutional structure facilitated the defence of local rights. The history of the pays d’´elections in the same period has attracted less scholarly attention, and further research is required before we will have a fully rounded picture 67 68

69

Parker, Class and state, pp. 26–7, 266. Throughout a long and distinguished career, Mousnier sought to refute a class analysis of seventeenth-century France, seeking instead to prove the existence of a society of orders. His The institutions of France, 1598–1789, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1979–84), provides a full exposition of his views, which have now largely fallen out of favour. M. Bush, ed., Social orders and social classes in Europe since 1500. Studies in social stratification (London, 1992), and R. Mettam, ‘Two dimensional history: Mousnier and the ancien r´egime’, History 66 (1981), 221–32, explain why. 70 Ibid., p. 55. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 42–55, 335–9.

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of Louis XIV’s government. Indeed, when confronted by a hostile European coalition after 1689, Louis XIV was forced to mobilise fiscal and military resources on a hitherto unimagined scale, a development with profound political and administrative consequences. One of the most striking results was the extension of direct taxation to the privileged classes. In his examination of the dixi`eme tax levied by Louis XIV in 1710, Richard Bonney has questioned whether the monarchy’s reputation for fiscal ineptitude is deserved when ‘a wide-ranging new scheme of taxation could be “invented” relatively fast and, moreover, be made to work’.71 Bonney is conscious that there were social and political limits to what could be achieved, but Michael Kwass has recently made a compelling case for the argument that in the eighteenth century the privileged were far more heavily taxed than is often thought.72 Yet, as Kwass illustrates so ably, any benefits accruing from this success were more than outweighed by the resulting anger of the privileged taxpayers. Unlike the peasants, who had long borne the brunt of the fiscal burden, the privileged had the time, knowledge and above all the opportunity to protest, whether through simple petitions to the intendant, or by voicing their complaints in institutions such as the parlements or provincial estates, and in the process they made a vital contribution to an increasingly ideologically charged political debate.73 p r i v i l e g e rev i s i t e d A fresh approach to office-holding and privilege forms a further prong of the revisionist assault. The initial attack was directed against the concept of a reforming monarchy, vainly seeking to overcome the selfish obstructionism of privileged groups, notably the parlements.74 That has been followed by a re-evaluation of the precise relationship between the monarchy and privilege, with historians such as David Bien, Gail Bossenga and William Doyle emphasising the complex and mutually reinforcing fiscal relationship 71 72

73 74

R. Bonney, ‘ “Le secret de leurs familles”: the fiscal and social limits of Louis XIV’s dixi`eme’, French History 7 (1993), 383–416. M. Kwass, Privilege and the politics of taxation in eighteenth-century France (Cambridge, 2000). His work confirms a thesis first pioneered by C. B. A. Behrens, ‘Nobles, privileges and taxes in France at the end of the ancien r´egime’, Economic History Review 15 (1963), 451–75, and her ‘A revision defended: nobles, privileges and taxes in France’, French Historical Studies 9 (1976), 521–31. For a critique of her work, see G. Cavanaugh, ‘Nobles, privileges and taxes in France: a revision reviewed’, French Historical Studies 10 (1974), 681–92. Kwass, Privilege and politics, pp. 155–222, 311–19. W. Doyle, ‘The parlements of France and the breakdown of the old r´egime, 1771–1788’, French Historical Studies 6 (1970), 415–58, was especially influential in this regard.

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which bound them together.75 It is well known that the monarchy sold thousands of offices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, raising millions of livres in the process. Venality was, however, about much more than selling offices because their purchasers were organised into corps and subsequently provided an irresistible target for further fundraising. The paulette was the most famous of these devices, with officers paying an annual fee of one-sixtieth of their official office price to guarantee the right to pass it on to their successors, a key step in the creation of an hereditary caste of officeholders which the crown could never afford to replace. That did not prevent the state from continuing to draw money from the system. Having invested large sums in an office, and frequently the right to exercise a profession, the owners were understandably determined to protect what was now a significant portion of their patrimony. They were consequently extremely vulnerable to the extortionist tactics of the crown, which ruthlessly exploited expedients including augmentation des gages, and the threat, real or imagined, of creating new offices, or removing privileges from existing ones, to raise funds.76 To protect its investment, the endangered corps was usually quick to propose an alternative, principally by offering a substantial sum to the royal treasury to buy off the threat. Once a deal had been struck, the king would magnanimously agree to confirm all of the corps’ existing rights and privileges, thus providing the collateral it needed to borrow. Much the same tactics were employed against the provincial estates, town councils and even the Catholic church, and it has to be said that the system proved lucrative.77 As Bien has demonstrated, the corps were using their own credit to raise money for the king at a rate far below what the monarchy could command on the open market.78 Far from being locked in a life and death struggle with privileged interests, the monarchy continued to reinforce the system as it provided one of its most dependable sources of revenue. a p ro b l e m ? After a generation of revisionism, our understanding of ancien r´egime society and its institutions has been greatly enriched. The simple clich´e of an 75

76 77 78

See: D. Bien, ‘Offices, corps, and a system of state credit’, in K. M. Baker, ed., The French revolution and the creation of modern political culture, vol.1, The political culture of the old regime (Oxford, 1987), pp. 89–114; G. Bossenga, The politics of privilege: old regime and revolution in Lille (Cambridge, 1991); and W. Doyle, Venality. The sale of offices in eighteenth-century France (Oxford, 1996). Doyle, Venality, pp. 26–57, and Bossenga, Politics of privilege, pp. 41–6, are rich in examples. M. Potter, ‘Good offices: intermediation by corporate bodies in early modern French public finance’, The Journal of Economic History 60 (2000), 599–626, examines the system in detail. Bien, ‘Offices, corps’, 106–12.

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absolutist monarchy crushing opposition in the seventeenth century, only to succumb in turn to the nefarious effects of privileged opposition less than a hundred years later is largely discredited. Instead, what revisionists have demonstrated is that the government of Louis XIV continued to have much in common with that of its predecessors. What distinguished it was an ability to make old methods of rule function more effectively and the restoration of order was the result. Patronage was clearly central to the workings of the system, with the Sun King’s relatively balanced distribution of royal largesse convincing the grandees that their old rebelliousness was no longer fruitful or appropriate. In the provinces, especially the pays d’´etats, rather than falling under the jackboots of the intendants, local elites were drawn into the royal patronage network, reaping rewards of both a material and honorific nature. As the Bretons discovered to their cost in 1675, opposition to the king was dangerous and unprofitable, and a willingness to wield both the carrot and the stick meant that when Louis XIV launched France on another cycle of wars no less costly than those of 1635–59 there was no repetition of the unrest seen during the Fronde. Many of the most influential revisionist texts are, therefore, happy to conclude midway through the reign of the Sun King, having answered in their own distinctive ways the question of how a previously disorderly kingdom was pacified.79 Yet it was after 1688 that the monarchy faced its sternest test, and so far there has been little analysis of how the new ‘absolutist’ consensus met the challenge,80 nor has the development of that relationship in the eighteenth century been scrutinised in any depth. A detailed history of the Estates General of Burgundy cannot hope to provide a definitive answer to these questions alone, but it does offer a valuable means of analysing the evolution of the relationship between the centre and the provinces, opening up wider debates about the nature of French government and society. h i s to r i a n s a n d t h e p rov i n c i al e s tat e s The study of representative institutions in early modern Europe has a long and distinguished history and it continues to be the focus of stimulating debate.81 Much ink has been spilt disputing whether or not estates were 79 80

81

This applies to the works of, among others, Beik, Bohanan, Bonney and Kettering cited above. One exception is Collins, The state in early modern France, pp. 140–6, 163–72, who has argued that ‘The great period of reform and change under Louis XIV came not early in the reign, under Colbert and Louvois, but at its end’, ibid., p. 146. The academic journal Parliaments, Estates and Representation provides a good example of continuing interest.

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medieval relics, blocking the path to more modern political and administrative systems, or beacons of light in the absolutist darkness pointing towards a parliamentary future. Disputes about the role of the French provincial estates have been no less passionate. In 1844, Thomas fulminated: the struggle of the memories of the past against the victorious influences of the present, the struggle of a decadent provincial administration against that of the monarchy in all its force, that is what I have seen everywhere in Burgundy under Louis XIV.82

The Estates were the principal target of his ire, and to his credit Thomas was well aware that they had retained considerable power; he simply considered that regrettable. In his study of the Estates of Languedoc published at the end of the nineteenth century, Paul Rives declared: when this administration so envied by the pays d’´elections is examined closely, the legend disappears leaving a sad reality. Certainly the Estates formed a safeguard for the province, but a very weak and fragile one; powerless before the royal authority and often an obstacle in face of the legitimate demands of public opinion.83

Franc¸ois Olivier-Martin later reached similar conclusions: ‘the provincial estates, already badly suited to the conditions of the sixteenth century had become by the eighteenth century irreparably archaic, so that come the great crisis of the revolution, their decrepitude was immediately apparent’.84 The Estates of Burgundy have frequently provided historians with a tempting example of supposed decadence. To be fair, despite his Whiggish attachment to the onward march of the forces of centralisation, Tocqueville was aware that the pays d’´etats could not be integrated comfortably into his grand schema. Instead, he inserted a rather cumbersome footnote, praising the administration of the provincial estates of Languedoc.85 Unfortunately, he seems either to have missed or ignored the earlier work of Thomas, and claimed that ‘true provincial self-government existed only in two provinces, Brittany and Languedoc. Elsewhere the estates had become mere shadows of their former selves, ineffectual and inert’.86 Tocqueville may have been inspired by the opinion of the marquis d’Argenson, who in the 1730s had written that ‘the Estates of Languedoc are episcopal and the best for the public good; those of Brittany are noble, mutinous and jealous; those of 82 83 84 85

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. iv. ´ P. Rives, Etude sur les attributions financi`eres des ´etats provinciaux et en particulier des ´etats de Languedoc au dix-huiti`eme si`ecle (Paris, 1885), p. 67. F. Olivier-Martin, L’administration provinciale a` la fin de l’ancien r´egime (Paris, 1988), p. 309. 86 Ibid., p. 229. Tocqueville, Ancien r´egime and revolution, pp. 229–39.

Historians, monarchy and the provincial estates

21

Burgundy are obedient to a despotic government’.87 In the face of such damning verdicts, the value of writing a history of the Estates of Burgundy might appear slight. Fortunately, these sweeping generalisations can be discounted, and throughout the period after 1661 they remained a lively and effective institution.88 However, the argument that the provincial estates were declining is not entirely without foundation. The early seventeenth century sounded the death knell of the local assemblies in many provinces, which were transformed into pays d’´elections. As Kettering has noted, ‘provinces with Estates were notoriously uncooperative in granting and paying the taille’,89 and it is tempting to assume that the crown’s fiscal motives lay behind their demise.90 Certainly in Provence it would seem that the king found it easier to work with an alternative body, the Assembly of the Communities, and allowed the Estates to lapse,91 while in Dauphin´e the divisions amongst the members of the assembly provided a pretext for its suppression.92 Fear of political unrest may also have influenced the decision of the crown, especially in rebellious Normandy, although provinces such as Burgundy, Brittany and Languedoc were all guilty on that score and their assemblies survived. The remaining Estates were also flawed in the sense that their assemblies were not representative of society as a whole, and most failed even to represent the two privileged orders adequately. This was certainly the case in Burgundy, and, if anything, attendance was becoming even more restrictive after 1661.93 87

88

89 90 91

92 93

Quoted in A. Babeau, La province sous l’ancien r´egime, 2 vols. (Paris, 1894), i, p. 29. D’Argenson, who disliked the duc de Bourbon, presumably meant a despotic governor, although the phrase is ambiguous. As I will be discussing the literature on the Estates of Burgundy in greater detail in subsequent chapters, it seemed unnecessary to repeat the exercise here. However, for a sample of the more important publications, see: F. Dumont, Une session des ´etats de Bourgogne. La tenue de 1718 (Dijon, 1935); D. Ligou, ‘Les e´tats de Bourgogne et les probl`emes fiscaux a` la fin du dix-huiti`eme si`ecle’, in M´elanges Antonio Marongiu (Palermo, 1967), pp. 97–128, and his ‘Elus et alcades des Etats de Bourgogne aux XVIIIe si`ecle’, Actes du 92e Congr`es des Soci´et´es Savantes (Strasbourg and Colmar, 1967), 19–40; L. Blin, ‘Les subsistances en Bourgogne, 1709–1710’, Annales de Bourgogne 12 (1940), 69–80 and 13 (1941), 308–17; and H. Richard, ‘Nouveaux documents sur les e´tats de Bourgogne (1787), a` propos d’une lettre de Girard-Labrely’, Annales de Bourgogne 69 (1997), 65–88. Kettering, Judicial politics, p. 86. Bonney, Political change, pp. 349–51. Bonney has noted that the provincial estates survived in regions of the taille r´eelle, in those where the taille was personelle they did not. Ibid., pp. 64–5. The work of F-X. Emmanuelli, Un mythe de l’absolutisme bourbonien: l’intendance, du milieu du XVIIe si`ecle a` la fin du XVIIIe si`ecle (Aix-en-Provence, 1981), is essential for understanding the administration of Provence in the subsequent period. D. Hickey, The coming of French absolutism: the struggle for tax reform in the province of Dauphin´e, 1540–1640 (London, 1986), and Bohanan, Crown and nobility, pp. 101–25. See chapter 3.

22

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

Few have made a greater contribution to the study of representative institutions in early modern France than Russell Major, but even he was convinced that they were a fading force in the seventeenth century.94 Major argued that the renaissance monarchy of the sixteenth century was constitutional in the sense that there were ‘significant institutional, theoretical, and/or practical limitations upon the authority of the king’.95 Moreover, this was not the result of royal weakness relative to the institutional remnants of an earlier age, but, rather, part of a much more positive relationship in which the ‘growth of self-government paralleled the growth of monarchical government’.96 For Major, it was not until the seventeenth century, and particularly the reign of Louis XIV, that the representative, renaissance monarchy was transformed into an absolute monarchy, where ‘there were no theoretical limitations on the king’s authority other than those imposed by divine, natural, and a few fundamental laws’.97 Major’s analysis of the reign of the sun king remained wedded to a largely traditional interpretation, with the provincial estates falling silent. As we shall see, reality was more complicated, and despite his absolutist reputation Louis XIV was prepared to tolerate their existence, with his government coming to realise that they could perform a valuable service. The Estates of Languedoc, for example, enjoyed a deserved reputation for efficient fiscal management, a potentially attractive quality for the crown if the two sides were prepared to cooperate. Beik has demonstrated Louis XIV’s willingness to work with local elites, and he argues that although not a representative body in a consultative sense, the Estates ‘may have provided a useful compromise between the king, wanting steady funds, and the provincial rulers wanting a hand in their management’.98 In his study of the Estates of Brittany, Armand Rebillon also stressed the practical advantages that the king could derive, arguing that: it was from practical necessity that the crown found itself forced to have recourse to their mediation, it was in the shortcomings of its administrative organisation and the difficulty of confronting directly its subjects in Brittany, to tax and to impose change, that the Estates found the means to oblige it to count upon them.99 94

95 97 98 99

J. R. Major, Representative government in early modern France (London, 1980), and his From renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy. French kings, nobles and estates (Baltimore, 1994), are particularly helpful. 96 Ibid., p. 177. Major, Representative government, p. 2. Major, Renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy, p. xxi. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 117–46, esp. 146. A. Rebillon, Les ´etats de Bretagne de 1661 a` 1789. Leur organisation, l’´evolution de leurs pouvoirs leur administration financi`ere (Paris, 1932), p. 209.

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23

If anything Collins is even more direct, commenting that the ‘Estates of Brittany (and those of Languedoc) survived because they were useful to the king and to the local ruling classes; the Estates that perished served no serious function’.100 There is no doubt that the surviving estates became increasingly important to the crown. They were amongst the most remarkable examples of those corporate institutions able to mobilise their own credit on the king’s behalf, and Mark Potter and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal have revealed how in the eighteenth century they developed sophisticated financial networks.101 Given the monarchy’s almost permanent shortage of funds, it was unlikely to risk upsetting the apple cart by threatening their privileges. The portrait of the provincial estates that emerges from recent scholarship of the seventeenth century reinforces the general revisionist perspective. Although not representative in a parliamentary sense, the surviving assemblies provided a useful forum for bargaining between provincial elites and the crown. The king’s ability to dispense patronage and maintain client`eles was essential to the conduct of business, and, ultimately, a mutually beneficial relationship was constructed, with the provinces receiving material inducements and confirmation of existing privileges in return for obedience. There is, however, a danger that this harmonious vision can be exaggerated, prompting us to underestimate the extent to which conflict persisted, or to ignore the almost constant need of the Estates to protect their prerogatives. One of the aims of this study is to ascertain the precise nature of the relationship between the Estates of Burgundy and the monarchy after 1661. Wider developments in the history of French provincial administration must also be considered. The eighteenth century has been represented as the golden age of the administrative monarchy and its enlightened intendants, and we might expect the provincial estates to have withered on the vine. That was not the case. As Rebillon noted, in his monumental study of the Estates of Brittany, ‘on the eve of the revolution, the constant conflict between the Estates of Brittany and the crown swung clearly in favour of the former. They appeared more powerful and were in any case richer in [terms of] functions than ever’.102 Russell Major offered a similar 100 101

102

Collins, Classes, estates, and order, p. 285. M. Potter and J-L. Rosenthal, ‘Politics and public finance in France; the estates of Burgundy, 1660–1790’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 27 (1997), 577–612, and their ‘ “The Burgundian estates” bond market; clienteles and intermediaries, 1660–1790’, in R´eseaux et culture du credit du XVI`eme au XX`eme si`ecle en Europe (Louvain, 1997), 173–95. ´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, p. 455.

24

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

hypothesis, suggesting that under Louis XV ‘the surviving provincial estates regained their former brilliance and resumed responsibility for a large part of provincial administration’.103 That argument has been strengthened substantially by the recent publication of a major study of the provincial estates of Artois, Cambr´esis and Flanders by Marie-Laure Legay.104 She rejects the traditional interpretation, exemplified by Rebillon, of an ongoing struggle between the provincial estates and the crown, and makes the important point that in the course of the eighteenth century their role was redefined. Rather than resisting the forces of centralisation, the Estates became part of the mechanism through which the crown extended its power, gradually accumulating new powers and jurisdiction to the detriment of an increasingly marginalised intendant. For a cash-strapped monarchy, such a policy had the dual advantage of transferring the financial burden to the province, while appearing to respond to calls for a more decentralised government. The authority of the Estates was clearly reinforced, but at a cost. By taking an ever more active administrative role, they undermined their traditional claim to act as the protectors of the province, and ultimately became the target of accusations of despotism previously directed at the intendants. Legay’s assumption that the crown was relentlessly pursuing the twin goals of centralisation and modernisation through the medium of the provincial estates is, however, questionable. What recent scholarship has demonstrated is the strong element of pragmatism that lay behind the policies of the crown as it sought internal peace and ready access to the taxes and credit necessary for the pursuit of its military and diplomatic objectives. Legay is, however, right to draw our attention to the fact that the provincial estates were not hidebound, medieval relics, but vibrant and dynamic institutions throughout the period after 1661. In Burgundy, the Estates would prove themselves to be adaptable institutions, capable of providing a valuable service to the crown, while simultaneously protecting their own interests and those of local elites. As they did so, the Estates developed increasingly sophisticated and effective administrative machinery that could stand comparison with that of the intendants in the pays d’´elections. Far from being in decline during the ‘age of absolutism’, the example of the Estates of Burgundy suggests that representative institutions had lost neither their importance nor their vigour. 103 104

Major, Renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy, p. 357. M-L. Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux dans la construction de l’´etat moderne (Geneva, 2001).

Historians, monarchy and the provincial estates

25

The aim of this study is, therefore, to examine the construction of a consensus between the crown and the Estates of Burgundy, and to chart the subsequent course of that relationship in the century preceding the revolution of 1789. In doing so, it will break new ground by revealing both the continuities and the changes that affected the French state and political system during a crucial period in its history. It will also provide the first detailed analysis of the Estates themselves, by discussing their organisation, membership and activities. Such a study enables us to pose questions about the possession and exercise of power, the influence of patronage and clientage, the relationships between rival corps within the province and the attitude of public opinion. As we shall see, during the eventful period from 1661 to 1789, the authority of the Estates waxed and waned, but there is no doubt that they proved resilient and effective when confronted by the challenges posed by the Bourbon monarchy. Indeed, by the reign of Louis XVI the confidence of the Estates and its administration had never been higher. Yet any celebrations were likely to be premature, because the desire to protect their privileges and to extend their powers had not been accompanied by an attempt to forge a meaningful relationship with the people they purported to serve.

chapter 2

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

Today the very name Burgundy conjures up a rich tapestry of images, from the chivalric splendour of the courts of the Valois dukes to the wines and gastronomic delicacies that embody the bucolic charm of provincial life. Nostalgia for a lost golden age is always best treated carefully, but a grain of truth does lurk behind this rosy picture. At its height in the mid-fifteenth century, the Burgundian state stretched from the foot of the Alps to the North Sea in a broad arc encompassing the duchy and comt´e of Burgundy, part of Lorraine, Luxembourg, Flanders and the Low Countries. Rich from the taxes and subsidies provided by the prosperous towns of the north, the Valois dukes raised courtly life to new heights, dazzling contemporaries with the magnificence of their artistic patronage. Yet the life of this new state was as brief as it was brilliant, coming to an end in a muddy field on a cold January day in 1477, with the death in battle of the last duke Charles le T´em´eraire. His great rival, Louis XI, struck quickly, wresting the duchy from the fallen duke’s heir, his daughter Marie, whose subsequent marriage to Maximilian of Austria ensured that her other possessions became part of the bountiful patrimony of the House of Habsburg. Their grandson, the emperor Charles V, ruled the most extensive empire that the world had yet seen, and in 1525 his troops shattered the army of Francis I at Pavia, taking the French king and his sons prisoner in the process. The key condition of their release was the restitution of the duchy, and for an instant it seemed as if that goal had been achieved. Once safely back in Paris, however, Francis I reneged upon his agreement, leaving the emperor vainly protesting his rights as duke of Burgundy. As late as 1630, there were reports of rioting crowds crying ‘long live the emperor’,1 but these exceptional, possibly apocryphal, events could not disguise the fact that the province was definitively French. 1

J. R. Major, Representative government in early modern France (New Haven, 1980), p. 538.

26

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

27

Despite having given its name to such an illustrious state, the Burgundy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was of comparatively modest dimensions. The duchy proper consisted of the twelve bailliages of Arnay-le-Duc, Avallon, Autun, Auxois, Beaune, Chalon-sur-Saˆone, Dijon, Montagne (Chˆatillon-sur-Seine), Montcenis, Nuits-Saint-Georges, SaintJean-de-Losne and Saulieu. They in turn formed part of a much larger entity, the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon, to which was added the comt´es of Auxonne, Auxerre, Bar-Sur-Seine, Charolles and Mˆacon, plus the so-called paysadjacents, namely Bresse, Bugey, Valromey and Gex.2 As an administrative unit, the g´en´eralit´e made much sense, as it included the area under the jurisdiction of the intendant, coincided with the boundaries of the military gouvernement, and was used by royal officials as the basis for their calculations when apportioning the financial burden. Clear lines on a map cannot, however, convey the far more complex reality on the ground, and for many contemporaries Burgundy was synonymous not with the g´en´eralit´e, but with the territories administered by, or under the tutelage of, the Estates General of the province. That meant the duchy and the comt´es, not the paysadjacents, and for reasons that should become apparent this study shares their bias. It was from the continued existence of the Estates that Burgundy enjoyed its privileged status as a pays d’´etats, placing it alongside only a handful of other great provinces, such as Artois, Brittany and Languedoc, which had preserved a measure of self-government. The Estates claimed with some justification to be at the apex of the Burgundian institutional hierarchy. Jostling by their side was the Parlement of Dijon, which, despite being created by Louis XI in 1476, claimed a rather more distinguished pedigree.3 If the Parlement was prepared to challenge the pre-eminence of the Estates, it in turn had to struggle against the pretensions of the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon, whose attested history could be traced back to the middle of the fourteenth century.4 The Chambre was a close contemporary of the Estates and, as we shall see, their members shared common interests arising from the institutional and administrative structure of the province. Like the Estates, the jurisdiction of the Parlement did not include the whole of the g´en´eralit´e and was instead limited to the duchy and the pays adjacents. The comt´es of Auxerre, Bar-sur-Seine and Mˆacon escaped its cognisance and were subject to the Parlement and the Cour des Aides of Paris. These 2 4

3 See chapter 9. Dombes joined the list of pays-adjacents in 1781. C. Court´ep´ee and E. B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale et particuli`ere du duch´e de Bourgogne, 3rd edn., 4 vols. (Paris, 1967–8), i, pp. 379–81.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

jurisdictional quirks were a familiar feature of the period, with the Mˆaconnais providing the most remarkable example. Legally it formed part of the jurisdiction of the Parisian courts, while in administrative terms it had its own ´etats particuliers, making it a pays d’´etats, albeit one that was simultaneously a pays d’´elections due to the presence of the ´election of Mˆacon.5 The ´etats particuliers, and those of the other comt´es, sent deputies to the assemblies of the Estates General in Dijon, and, predictably enough, friction between them was endemic. The trend over the course of the period after 1661 was for the Estates and administration in Dijon to gain the ascendancy, with the ´etats particuliers of Bar-sur-Seine, Auxerre and Charolles being absorbed by their larger cousin. By 1789, only the Mˆaconnais had preserved its own Estates and a degree of administrative independence.6 t h e p rov i n c e Burgundy lies some 150 kilometres south-east of Paris, and by crossing its territory a traveller makes the transition from the north to the south of France, leaving behind the plains of Champagne and the Ile-de-France for Lyon and the Rhˆone valley, the gateway to Provence. At the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule, it was very much a frontier province, and neighbouring Franche-Comt´e remained under Spanish Habsburg rule as a seemingly permanent legacy of the past. As for the pays-adjacents, they skirted Franche-Comt´e and formed part of the border with the Swiss Confederation. To the west lay the provinces of the Orl´eanais, Nivernais and Bourbonnais, which, if not inhabited by the subjects of a foreign king, were scarcely more familiar, given the logistical difficulties of travelling contrary to the prevailing north-south axis. Diversity was very much the hallmark of the Burgundian landscape. To the north of Dijon was the pays de la montagne, the popular name for the bailliage and region around Chˆatillon-sur-Seine.7 Although not possessed of any great peaks, more than two-thirds of the bailliage was situated above 400 metres of altitude, forming part of the cold, arid ‘Langres plateau’. 5 6 7

J. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent a` la Bourgogne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe si`ecles. Le Mˆaconnais pays d’´etat et d’´election (Mˆacon, 1937), p. 19–20, 87–110. The administration of the Mˆaconnais is not examined directly in this study, and the work of Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, should be consulted. Contemporary descriptions include that of the intendant Ferrand presented in D. Ligou, ed., ´ L’intendance de Bourgogne a` la fin du XVIIe si`ecle. Edition critique du m´emoire pour l’instruction du duc de Bourgogne (Paris, 1988), pp. 379–94, and Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, iv, pp. 195–7. The work of Pierre de Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne du nord au dernier si`ecle de l’ancien regime (Paris, 1960), pp. 9–14, is also invaluable.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

29

Heavily wooded and with a poor stony soil ill-suited to cultivation, the montagne was a hard taskmaster for those who sought to scrape a living from its cultivation. As for the river Seine, whose source was to be found between Chanceaux and Billy, while not navigable it did at least provide more fertile soils along the valleys where it passed. By contrast, the Dijonnais presented a far more hospitable prospect. To the east of the city lay the valley of the river Saˆone, the ‘Nile of Burgundy’ which entered the province near Talmay,8 and flowed down to Mˆacon before leaving it for Lyon and its junction with the Rhˆone. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the river to the economic life of the province. Navigable from the town of Gray in Franche-Comt´e, it provided one of the chief commercial arteries of the kingdom permitting the rapid transport of grain, wine, iron and other goods. Taxation of commerce on the river was also an essential element of the fiscal relationship between Burgundy and the crown.9 Many of the more important towns nestled along the river’s banks, notably Auxonne, a vital frontier town due to its proximity to Dole and Besanc¸on. Even after the conquest of Franche-Comt´e, Auxonne maintained its military tradition, and by the mid-eighteenth century it was home to a major military garrison and a school of artillery, whose list of alumni boasts the name of Napol´eon Bonaparte. Martial inspiration, if it was needed, was close to hand. Just down river was the town of Saint-Jean-de-Losne, whose citizens had, in 1636, heroically resisted the Habsburg army commanded by Gallas, providing one of the most glorious footnotes in the annals of French arms. Other notable communities bordering the Saˆone included Seurre and Verdun-sur-le-Doubs, but the most significant were the cathedral cities of Chalon-sur-Saˆone and Mˆacon. Merchants whose trade contributed to local prosperity inhabited all of these urban centres, but it was the plain that was the real source of wealth. As the intendant, Antoine Franc¸ois Ferrand, explained in his memoir for the duc de Bourgogne, written at the end of the seventeenth century, it was ‘a very fertile plain, producing a variety of grains in abundance’.10 In most years, these fields yielded a surplus that made Burgundy a key supplier of grain to the hungry metropolis of Lyon.11 The Dijonnais was doubly blessed in the sense that within sight of the gates of the capital city rose the heights of the Cˆote de Bourgogne, running thereafter in a gentle arc behind the towns of Nuits-Saint-Georges and Beaune before descending through the Chalonnais past Givry and on to 8 9 11

The reference to the Nile is cited by B. Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne au XVIIIe si`ecle (Dijon, 1996), p. 180. 10 Ligou, ed., L’intendance de Bourgogne, p. 193. See chapters 6 and 10. W. G. Monahan, Year of sorrows. The great famine of 1709 in Lyon (Columbus, 1993), pp. 6, 24.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

Mˆacon and beyond. The slopes of the Cˆote were already dotted with the names of villages such as Gevrey, Volnay and Meursault whose famous wines attracted an international client`ele. From their summit it was possible to survey the plain of the Saˆone below, and beyond that the mountains of the Jura, and, on a clear day, the Alps. Yet despite being able to observe these distant peaks, the inhabitants of Beaune, and many of the villages of the Cˆote, insisted that where the vines stopped the ‘montagne’ began. This was not the result of any perverse local logic, but recognition of the fact that the arri`eres cˆotes shared the geological characteristics of the Chˆatillonnais.12 Thus from Saint-Seine in the north down to the town of Nolay the same inhospitable combination of forests and poor soil made life precarious for the local inhabitants. The south-eastern corner of the province, namely the Autunois, the Charolais and the Brionnais presented a rather different spectacle. Autun itself was flanked to the west by the Morvan, whose rude climate, granite hills and dense forests spawned the jibe that it was a pays from whence came ‘neither good winds, nor good people’.13 Ferrand was not much impressed by the surrounding area, describing the land as ‘very dry and ungrateful’.14 He was, however, forced to admit that the Autunois possessed ‘excellent pasture which fed and fattened a good head of cattle which provides the principal wealth of the inhabitants’, and the same could be said with even greater emphasis of the Charolais and the Brionnais.15 Finally, the bailliage of Semur-en-Auxois and the comt´e of Auxerre formed the north-east of the province. As a whole, the Auxois presented a happy prospect for the farmer, and one local historian has claimed that it was ‘for cereals what the Cˆote is for the vine’.16 The inhabitants of the Auxerrois, on the other hand, took advantage of their own favourably positioned slopes to produce their highly prized wines in abundance. t h e bu rg u n d i a n pe ople According to the last intendant of Burgundy, Amelot de Chaillou, the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon boasted a population of 1,106,217 inhabitants in 1786.17 12 13

14 16 17

Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 12–15. As the Morvan was for fifty years the fief of that slippery political chameleon, Franc¸ois Mitterrand, it is possible that the insult is of more recent vintage. Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, iv, p. 109, wrote of ‘the wild and little known lands of the Morvan’. 15 Ibid., p. 256. Ligou, ed., L’intendance de Bourgogne, p. 255. Quoted in R. Robin, La soci´et´e franc¸aise en 1789: Semur-en-Auxois (Paris, 1970), p. 95–6. The situation was not always so rosy as Robin makes clear, ibid., pp. 91–100. C. Lamarre, ‘La population de la Bourgogne a` la fin du XVIIIe si`ecle a` travers le d´enombrement Amelot (1786)’, Annales de Bourgogne 55 (1983), 65–99.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

31

Such a degree of precision in a notoriously difficult science immediately raises suspicions, but recent historians have accepted his figure as a decent best estimate given the documents at their disposal.18 A total of just over one million Burgundians in 1789 undoubtedly represented an increase when compared to the dark days of the previous century. Until the definitive conquest of Franche-Comt´e in 1678, the province had suffered grievously at the hands of Habsburg armies and supposedly friendly French troops, and the scourge of war had been accompanied by its companions in arms, famine and pestilence. As a result, the population grew only very slowly, and actually fell temporarily after the harrowing famines of 1660–1, 1693–4 and 1709–14. In its general outlines, Burgundy’s demographic history was consistent with that of the kingdom as a whole, although it is possible that population growth in the eighteenth century was slightly less vigorous than elsewhere.19 What is beyond doubt is that the province was typical of ancien r´egime France in that its population was overwhelmingly rural, with four out of five Burgundians living in the countryside. The capital Dijon was a city of great historical and architectural importance, well endowed with royal courts, great churches and public buildings. It was, however, a legal and administrative, rather than a commercial, centre, and its population rose slowly from perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 during the course of the century preceding the revolution.20 This placed Dijon very much in the second rank when compared with larger and more dynamic eighteenth-century cities such as Bordeaux, Marseille or Nantes. Four of the other leading towns of the province, Autun, Auxerre, Chalon-sur-Saˆone and Mˆacon were seats of bishoprics with populations estimated at between 8,000–10,000, a figure matched by Beaune.21 Other mercantile or administrative centres such as Avallon, Auxonne, Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, Saulieu and Semur-en-Auxois had in the region of 3,500–5,000 souls, and below them came a much larger group of small towns and bourgs whose population was often only just in four figures. Even with what is to modern eyes a very generous definition of urban, the overwhelming majority of the population was still best qualified as rural. 18 19

20

21

Ibid., 65–8, 99. At least that is the impression conveyed by local experts, see: Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne, pp. 21–64; Lamarre, ‘La population de la Bourgogne’, 65–72, 93–8; and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 525–7, 605. Much ink has been spilt attempting to find an acceptable estimate, see: G. Bouchard, ‘Dijon au XVIIIe si`ecle. Les d´enombrements d’habitants’, Annales de Bourgogne 25 (1953), 30–65, and Lamarre, ‘La population de la Bourgogne’, 86–98. The definitive study of the small towns of Burgundy is C. Lamarre, Petites villes et fait urbain en France au XVIIIe si`ecle. Le cas bourguignon (Dijon, 1993), esp. pp. 120–42.

32

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

Attempting to provide an accurate social profile of the French population is notoriously difficult, and the members of the nobility in Burgundy were no exception. At their head were a number of great aristocratic families such as the Damas, Lux, Saulx-Tavanes, Thianges and Vienne who had left, or were in the process of leaving, the province in favour of the bright lights of Paris and Versailles.22 They retained their lands in Burgundy and could be expected to attend the provincial Estates, but were, in effect, absentees, with increasingly weak ties to the region and its social and cultural life. The extent of the exodus should not, however, be exaggerated. Nearly 250 families were able to provide proofs of their right to attend the Estates in 1679, and, as serving members of the robe were deliberately excluded, it reveals the existence of a substantial group of noble families, many of whom were undoubtedly of old sword stock, that was still living in Burgundy. Dijon was home to the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and a variety of other legal bodies, and it has been estimated that no less than two-fifths of its inhabitants were officeholders of one form or another.23 Some of the most prestigious families such as the Berbisey, Bouhier, Fyot, Gagne, Legouz, Macheco and Julien had been ennobled in the sixteenth century, or earlier, and had intermarried both amongst themselves and with the older sword nobility.24 A steady stream of newcomers, who had ploughed the well-worn furrow of ancien r´egime social ascension, making money from commerce, finance or other ventures before purchasing ennobling office, had joined them. Their growing ascendancy in Dijon was mirrored in the surrounding countryside, where they purchased their own landed estates and built the chˆateaux needed to add a seigneurial lustre to their new coats of arms. Not surprisingly, by the end of the ancien r´egime members of many of the same families were represented in both the provincial Estates and the great law courts of Dijon.25 These powerful and wealthy clans dominated the city, providing employment both professionally, for those who worked in or around the law courts, and domestically, by maintaining an army of household servants. If we are relatively well informed about the noble elites, comparatively little is known about the ordinary gentlemen of the 22

23 24 25

R. Forster, The house of Saulx-Tavanes. Versailles and Burgundy, 1700–1830 (Baltimore, 1971), offers a classic example of a widely accepted thesis; see, amongst others, H. Drouot and J. Calmette, Histoire ´ de Bourgogne (Paris, 1941), pp. 298–300; G. Roupnel, La ville et la campagne au XVIIe si`ecle. Etude sur les populations du pays dijonnais (Paris, 1922), pp. 197–8; and J. B. Collins, The state in early modern France (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 135–40. For a more comprehensive discussion of the number of privileged in Dijon, see Bouchard, ‘Dijon au XVIIIe si`ecle’. A. Colombet, Les parlementaires bourguignons a` la fin du XVIIIe si`ecle (Dijon, 1937), pp. 41–112, provides a helpful, if now rather dated, introduction to the local parlementaires. See chapter 3.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

33

countryside, who possessed neither an office, nor a fief. The second estate in Burgundy was not as numerous as its Breton counterpart, but there is some evidence that a substantial body of hobereaux did exist, living in genteel obscurity and often poverty.26 As we might expect, the relatively small size of the Burgundian towns meant that the bourgeoisie was of a very traditional nature, headed by nonnoble officeholders, lawyers and members of the liberal professions.27 To these should be added merchants in those towns connected to the wine trade, or to the commerce of the Saˆone. The absence of any substantial industrial or manufacturing base limited the size of the middle class and ensured that artisanal crafts and trades had a traditional flavour with, amongst others, butchers, bakers, carpenters, cobblers, masons and tailors forming a relatively prosperous social group. The work of James Farr has brought the world of the artisans of Dijon to life, illustrating the codes of honour and the social and professional strategies that bound them together in the century before 1650, and there is every reason to believe that the patterns he identified continued well into the eighteenth century.28 Much less is known about the ordinary wage labourers who formed the majority of the urban population, many of whom lived in poverty with the constant threat that unemployment, ill health or old age would render them destitute. As elsewhere in early modern Europe, life for the vast majority of Burgundians, if not always ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’,29 was precarious. Most were constantly preoccupied with finding their daily bread and the money needed to keep themselves clothed, housed and out of the clutches of the tax collectors. The size of the problem can be gauged by the fact that in Semur-en-Auxois at the end of the ancien r´egime at least 6 per cent of the population were classed as living in ‘indigence’, so poor that they were not considered worth assessing for tax.30 In the provincial capital, the situation was far worse, with somewhere between a fifth and a quarter of the population receiving official assistance of one form or another.31 For those left without family or official aid the future was bleak, and despite the efforts of the puritanically minded ecclesiastical and civil authorities crime and prostitution could not be driven from the streets.32 26 27 28 29 30 32

See chapter 3. They are the subject of a forthcoming University of London doctoral thesis by Sue Carr, ‘Gentilshommes simplement: the lesser nobility of Burgundy, 1688–1789’. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, and Lamarre, Petites villes, are the essential guides. J. R. Farr, Hands of honor. Artisans and their world in Dijon, 1550–1650 (London, 1988). T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London, 1968), p. 186. 31 Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne, pp. 132–6. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 220. J. R. Farr, Authority and sexuality in early modern Burgundy, 1550–1730 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 124–55.

34

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

In the countryside, the social structure had its own distinctive features. The Burgundian nobility was increasingly urban, and while most of the wealthier members of the second order could boast a country seat their presence, other than at crucial moments such as the harvest, was far from guaranteed. If examples can be found of families maintaining close contact with the tenants on their estates out of either a spirit of noblesse oblige, or Christian paternalism, good grounds remain for believing that the ties of mutual respect and dependence that bound nobles to peasants were dissolving rapidly. Burgundy, along with Brittany and Franche-Comt´e, was one of the regions where the weight of seigneurialism was particularly heavy, with serfdom (mainmorte) common in the western half of the province and the Bresse Chalonnaise.33 It has also been suggested that the province supplies some of the most compelling evidence for the existence of a seigneurial reaction in the second half of the eighteenth century. There can be no doubt that many landlords were determined to squeeze every penny out of their seigneurie, and the proliferation of legal experts skilled in the exploitation of their terriers helped them to achieve that end before a Parlement staffed by men who shared the same social and economic interests.34 Whether or not there was anything new about this process must remain open to doubt, and Saint Jacob found similar evidence from the final years of the reign of Louis XIV.35 What seems undeniable, however, is that the peasants increasingly resented paying dues that were not only demeaning, but also offered them next to nothing in return. As the presence and authority of the rural seigneurs declined, there was no bourgeoisie, in the sense of officeholders or liberal professions, to take their place. Any bourgeois tempted to live in the countryside were as likely to be scared off by the fiscal threat of contrainte solidaire, which made the wealthier inhabitants liable for the unpaid taxes of the community,36 as by the boorishness of their neighbours. In the absence of the seigneur it 33

34

35

36

For a discussion of the problem, see: J. Bart, La libert´e ou la terre (Dijon, 1985); J. B. Collins, Classes, estates, and order in early modern Brittany (Cambridge, 1994), p. 22; Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, pp. 141–3; H. Root, Peasants and king in Burgundy. Agrarian foundations of French absolutism (London, 1987), pp. 155–204; and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 50–74, 405–34. Forster, The house of Saulx-Tavanes, pp. 92–103, provides a very pertinent example. The attitude of the Parlement to lawsuits brought by landlords, or their peasant antagonists is discussed by Root, Peasants and king, pp. 156–8, 166, 169, 176–83. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 205–6, 249, 434, 570. W. Doyle’s, ‘Was there an aristocratic reaction in pre-revolutionary France?’, Past and Present 57 (1972), 97–122 is a splendid critique of the argument that the seigneurial reaction was unique to the late eighteenth century. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 531–5. We could also add other disincentives such as the corv´ee, militia, billeting of troops and other charges to which the rural population was subject.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

35

was the village cur´e who headed the list of notables, being usually the son of more substantial peasant proprietors, the laboureurs and fermiers, who formed what Saint Jacob described as a rural bourgeoisie.37 These families had the good fortune to own, or to be able to lease, sufficient land, livestock and agricultural equipment, above all ploughs, to farm independently. They produced a surplus that enabled them to prosper from the demand for Burgundian grain, and their profits made them the employers, and often creditors, of their humbler neighbours. These coqs de village were understandably few in number, and it was the larger group of fermiers, whose limited landholdings forced them to rent land from nobles, ecclesiastical institutions or the urban bourgeoisie, who, together with the village artisans, headed by the blacksmith, formed the middling classes of village life. They were the ones who were expected to carry much of the fiscal burden, and it has been argued that in the course of the eighteenth century, a combination of taxation and demographic and inflationary pressures was making their situation increasingly precarious.38 What the fermiers feared was falling back into the ranks of the rural poor, who made up the overwhelming majority of the population. Most sought to eke out a living as manouvriers or journaliers (day labourers), the crucial distinction being that the former owned, or leased, a little land, albeit not enough to support a family. As we might expect, work was seasonal and often in short supply, and a man in the prime of life would be lucky to earn an annual wage of 150 livres from his labours.39 Here were the principal victims of the wars and economic stagnation of the seventeenth century, and their position improved little thereafter as they were exposed to the new scourges of land shortage and price inflation, which marked the final decades of the ancien r´egime. For some, especially the young, flight to the towns was the obvious solution, but it was not enough to prevent an alarming increase in poverty and vagrancy which was a source of growing concern for both royal and provincial administrators after 1750. t h e e co n o m y Historians are in general agreement that the second half of the seventeenth century was a period of economic hardship, even decline, as an overwhelmingly agricultural economy reeled under the effects of harsh climatic 37 38 39

Ibid., pp. 531–5. Ibid., pp. 530, 536–9. The artisans were less affected by these factors and their position may have been improving. It might well be less, Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne, pp. 112–13.

36

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

conditions and almost constant warfare.40 Although at odds about the precise timing, they also agree that the more clement natural and international climate of the eighteenth century stimulated a general recovery as the kingdom entered a prolonged period of growth that would not begin to falter until the reign of Louis XVI. There were, however, immense regional variations. On the Atlantic coast, Bordeaux and Nantes became great boom towns, profiting from the rich rewards to be gained from the slave trade and commerce in sugar, coffee and other exotic goods. Other notable success stories included Rouen, the cotton capital of France, Marseille, which grew rich on the Mediterranean trade, and the north-eastern provinces of Flanders and Hainaut, where there were signs of proto-industrialisation comparable to that across the Channel. Finally, the rapid growth of Paris had transformed the agricultural economy of its hinterland as ever larger and more productive farms sought to satisfy the seemingly insatiable demand for grain. Yet the dynamism of certain sections of the economy contrasted sharply with the far more lethargic state of those regions cut off from the benefits of proximity to a large city, access to the sea or some other means of contact to markets. Here there was no economic boom and life continued much as before. At first sight, landlocked Burgundy appeared to have few economic trump cards. Dijon was a bustling provincial capital, but one where the chatter of lawyers was more audible than the clatter of machinery, or the humming of looms. While the work of the law courts and the provincial administration was the source of employment, at no point did the city act as a significant motor for the local economy. Nor was there any strong demographic growth to provide an expanding market. There was little in the way of manufacturing or textile production, and over the course of the eighteenth century the woollen industry was gradually declining, and new enterprises such as L’Isle of Dijon, which became the principal producer of cotton, were rare. Nor were the other urban centres much different, although Verdun-sur-le-Doubs was a major centre for the manufacture of tiles, covering not only the buildings of Burgundy, but also those of Lyon and the Rhˆone Valley.41 Yet if Dijon was no match for Bordeaux or Rouen, it does not necessarily mean that the province was relegated to the status of an economic backwater. 40

41

Amongst recent important contributions to the burgeoning literature on the French economy of the ancien r´egime are P. T. Hoffman, Growth in a traditional society: the French countryside, 1450–1815 (Princeton, 1996), and L. Vardi, The land and the loom: peasants and profit in Northern France, 1680–1800 (Durham, NC, 1993). Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne, pp. 172–3.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

37

In fact, Burgundy was one of France’s most important producers of iron, and in 1772 it was estimated that, together with Champagne, the province supplied more than half of the kingdom’s output.42 Growth continued throughout the century, and one of the most dramatic consequences was a vertiginous rise in the price of wood needed to fire the furnaces. For the large, generally noble, landowners, whose estates included most of the provincial forests, it was a welcome windfall, albeit one with dire repercussions for the poor who depended upon cheap firewood for cooking and heating. It is important to remember that iron production was usually carried out in small-scale forges, not modern factories, using traditional artisanal methods. After 1750, however, there was a real interest in the new techniques being pioneered by the British, with the great naturalist, Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, establishing his ‘great forge’ near Montbard. Even more spectacular was the development of a new industrial complex at Le Creusot where, aided by the legendary English engineer, Wilkinson, the power of coal, mined locally, iron and steam were brought together with remarkable results. Despite these developments, the Burgundian economy remained overwhelmingly agrarian and its commerce was tied to the marketing of the grain, wine, livestock and other goods produced by the people of the countryside. Agriculture was slow to recover from the crisis of the early eighteenth century, with vines destroyed by the terrible winter of 1709, and cattle perishing from an epidemic in 1713–14. Saint Jacob believed that real recovery did not begin until the late 1720s, and it proved to be far more intermittent than the broad picture of a prosperous eighteenth century might lead us to expect. According to his analysis, the mid-century wars led to renewed agricultural crisis, and, if the period from 1762 to the War of American Independence was favourable, the last decade of the ancien r´egime was little short of calamitous.43 Not that the balance sheet was entirely negative. Attempts to introduce new crops, such as maize, potatoes and turnips were partially successful, and, after 1760, a local movement for agrarian reform inspired, in part, by the ideas of the physiocrats became a real force in both the Parlement of Dijon and the Estates.44 On the larger farms of the plain, or on the estates of wealthy agronomes, it was possible to find examples of what contemporaries deemed good practice. However, in the final analysis, Burgundy did not experience an agricultural revolution. As Arthur Young traversed the province from Auxonne to 42 43 44

Forster, The house of Saulx-Tavanes, pp. 70–1, and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, p. 222. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 235–6, 292–9, 353–5, 561–5. Root, Peasants and king, pp. 105–54, and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 347–434.

38

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

Autun in the summer of 1789, he peppered his journal with sharp observations such as ‘agriculture quite contemptible’ and ‘villainously cultivated’,45 declaring that ‘if I had a large tract in this country, I think I should not be long in making a fortune’. Yet if he was correct in identifying the potential fertility of the region, the solution was not quite as straightforward as he imagined. As Arnoult, one of the Burgundian representatives in the Constituent Assembly, declared when discussing the failure of agricultural reform: Oh you who complain of the intractability of the peasant when he refuses to adopt your new ploughs, your new seed drills . . . your deep furrows, your doses of fertiliser that are four times greater than what he can afford, before tripling his expenses in the uncertain hope of a tripled harvest, begin by putting him in a state of being able to buy clogs for his children.46

Not that everything in Burgundian agriculture was quite as sombre as Young and Arnoult would have us believe. In the course of the eighteenth century, the farmers of the Autunois, Charolais and Brionnais would become highly specialised in the production of beef cattle, which, once fattened on the lush local pastures, were marched off to urban markets, especially those of Paris. Other areas of specialisation can be cited, including the crops of onions ´ harvested around the town of Auxonne, the prized cheeses of Epoisses, that the abb´e Court´ep´ee boasted were superior to those of Brie,47 and the wool of the Auxois. Yet these paled into insignificance when compared to the importance of viticulture. The province had enjoyed a reputation for producing fine wines since at least the middle ages, and as transport improved and the urban markets of France and northern Europe expanded the demand for Burgundy soared. In response to these commercial possibilities, a new class of wine merchants (n´egociants) sprang up in Beaune, Chalon-sur-Saˆone and Dijon.48 Despite the renown of the wines produced by the villages of the Cˆote, it was still common for vignerons to practise polyculture with animals, fruit trees and vegetable plots, all to be found on the illustrious slopes. As the eighteenth century progressed, such practices were declining, and the abb´e Court´ep´ee could claim, without fear of embarrassment, that the vines ‘cultivated like gardens produce these excellent 45 46 47 48

A. Young, Travels in France during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789 ed. C. Maxwell (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 200–1. Quoted in Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, p. 404. Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, i, p. 303. T. Brennan, Burgundy and champagne. The wine trade in early modern France (London, 1997), pp. 111–40.

Ancien r´egime Burgundy

39

wines that are so sought after by foreigners’.49 Viticulture was not, however, restricted to the Cˆote, or other distinguished regions such as the Auxerrois, and the peasants of the arri`eres cˆotes of Beaune or Nuits-Saint-Georges, as well as those of the plain, were engaged in various forms of polyculture with the vine playing an ever more significant part. Although we should not forget that life for the vignerons was hard and that vines were vulnerable to frost, hail and disease, sometimes producing too much and other times not enough, it is still reasonable to conclude that viticulture contributed substantially to the province’s economic well-being. c u lt u re a n d l i fe s t y le Whether dazzled by the mirrors of Versailles, or intimidated by the arrogance of Parisians, both contemporaries and many later historians convinced themselves that cultural life in the provinces was no more than a pale imitation of the court and the capital.50 It is true that many Burgundian luminaries, such as Louis XIV’s favourite cleric, bishop Bossuet, the composer, Rameau, and the poets and playwrights, Cr´ebillon and Piron, left the province to seek their fortune. Even so, it is clear that like many other provincial cities Dijon possessed a lively intellectual and cultural life of its own. For much of the period, it was the robe nobility, headed by men such as the presidents Jean Bouhier, Charles de Brosses and Benigne Legouz de Gerland that set the tone. Through their patronage and active participation the robe elites were responsible for the establishment of Dijon’s public library, its botanical gardens, several masonic lodges and the Academy, rendered immortal by its presentation of a first literary prize to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. At a less exalted level, the city and indeed the province as a whole shared in the improvement in literacy that was such a feature of the period. Caf´es and libraries became an established part of local life, where the public could read the local affiches, discuss the latest quarrel involving the Parlement and the Estates and consider the affairs of the day. Local pride expressed through the medium of the Estates and the close patronage of successive princes of the House of Bourbon-Cond´e was of immense significance. Together they embarked on an expensive and highly ´ impressive programme of beautification not only for the Palais des Etats, but also for the city as a whole. The political influence of the Estates was decisive in the foundation of the University of Dijon, whose legal faculty 49 50

Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, ii, p. 78. For a comprehensive discussion of the arguments for and against, see: M. Bouchard, De l’humanisme a` l’encyclop´edie. L’esprit public en Bourgogne sous l’ancien r´egime (Paris, 1930).

40

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

had earned a national reputation by the reign of Louis XVI, and in the provision of public education through the agency of the Academy.51 Not surprisingly, the city became a firm favourite with foreign tourists, and the English in particular were captivated by its charms. After his visit in 1739, Thomas Gray wished that he had not ‘lingered so long at Rheims’, while the author of The Gentleman’s Guide, published in 1770, declared that Dijon’s ‘inhabitants shew [sic] an hospitality and generosity, that I met not with in any other part of France’.52 If Dijon was to the fore in developing a thriving civic culture, the smaller provincial towns were not far behind. Money and effort were spent on an impressive range of activities, including the construction of town halls, the improvement of lighting and public health, and the provision of pavements, parks, monuments and promenades, all of which helped to improve the quality of life for the population as a whole.53 Finally, opportunities for relaxation of a more traditional nature were not neglected. In the towns, and especially Dijon, the local authorities organised civic celebrations to mark great events such as the birth of a dauphin, a military victory, or the publication of a peace with fireworks, music, food and wine for the inhabitants. For rural dwellers, on the other hand, village Saints’ days and the harvest celebrations were amongst the high points of the calendar, and they were marked by festivals, processions, and, in all but the most difficult times, a substantial meal. If these were exceptional events, the constant lamentations of the clergy suggest that taverns and cabarets everywhere did a brisk trade. Such broad-brush strokes can only convey an impressionistic portrait of Burgundian life in the last century-and-a-half of the ancien r´egime. As we might expect, Burgundy shared many of the demographic, economic and cultural patterns of the kingdom as a whole, and its institutional structure resembles that of the other great pays d’´etats with which it is frequently compared. Yet on closer inspection it becomes clear that the province had its own unique character, an originality that was wholly consistent with the essentially diverse nature of ancien r´egime society. Through a detailed examination of the Estates General of Burgundy, this study offers further proof of the complex and heterogeneous nature of provincial life in the age of absolute monarchy. 51 52 53

See chapter 11. B. Chevignard, ‘Thomas Jefferson et Dijon: une rencontre manqu´ee’, in M. Baridon and B. Chevignard, eds., Voyage et tourisme en Bourgogne a` l’´epoque de Jefferson (Dijon, 1988), pp. 23, 38. Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 497–590.

chapter 3

The Estates General of Burgundy

According to the sixteenth-century antiquarian, Pierre de Saint-Julien, the Estates General of Burgundy had originated with the Gauls as a meeting of druids, soldiers and plebeians.1 The three estates of his own time were allegedly descended from these distant ancestors, but, however fanciful his theories, it is true that the precise origins of the institution are obscure. The first authenticated meetings of an assembly of clergy, nobility and third estate took place during the reign of Philippe le Hardi in the midfourteenth century.2 Thereafter they gradually settled into a pattern of regular meetings called to vote the taxes required to fund the ambitious political and cultural policies of the Valois dukes. When catastrophe struck at the battle of Nancy on 5 January 1477, with the death of Charles le T´em´eraire, the last of the line, Louis XI seized the duchy of Burgundy. In an effort to win the affection of his reluctant new subjects, the French king recognised their rights and privileges, including the principle that no tax could be levied in the province without the consent of the Estates. Here was the basis of what would become known as the Burgundian constitution, and the Estates would remain central to the relationship between the crown and the province until 1789. It is true that during the troubled years of the Wars of Religion the province followed its governor, Charles de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne, and was a bastion of the Catholic league.3 Yet when Henri IV finally defeated him, Burgundy’s privileges were respected and the Estates continued to meet. A far greater threat was posed by the centralising ambitions of Louis XIII’s government, which imposed the dreaded system of ´elections in 1629, endangering the very existence of the Estates and the ‘constitution’ of 1477.4 1 2 3 4

Major, Representative government, pp. 185–7. J. Billioud, Les ´etats de Bourgogne aux XIV et XVe si`ecles (Dijon, 1922), pp. 7–14. H. Drouot, Mayenne et la Bourgogne, 2 vols. (Paris, 1937), remains the classic study of the period. A definitive explanation of this important episode has so far proved elusive, see: Bonney, The king’s debts, pp. 115–58; Major, Representative government, pp. 535–85.

41

42

Provincial power and absolute monarchy

Popular riots inspired, in part, by hostility to these measures erupted in Dijon in February 1630, bringing down the wrath of the king, who personally visited the city to mete out punishment and confirm the new political and administrative structure.5 Burgundy was saved from being permanently reduced to a pays d’´elections by a combination of factors including the disgrace of Marillac, after the day of dupes in November 1730, and the death of the surintendant of finances, d’Effiat, two years later.6 Despite his authoritarian reputation, the cardinal de Richelieu, who now assumed full control of government, was prepared to strike a deal with the Estates. In return for a substantial payment of some 1,600,000 livres, the ´elections were abolished.7 The crisis of 1629–31 was the most serious ever faced by the Estates, and if the civil wars of the Fronde brought political chaos for the elites and great hardship for the people they did not threaten the province’s institutional structure.8 As elsewhere in France, the personal reign of Louis XIV ushered in a period of financially demanding, but politically conservative rule. The sun king summoned the Estates at regular three-year intervals, only breaching that convention in 1679 when an assembly was called a year earlier than expected. The deputies raised a storm of protest, claiming that they enjoyed the privilege of triennial assemblies.9 At first sight, it might seem odd that they should want to restrict the number of their gatherings in this fashion. However, at each Estates the deputies were expected to vote a don gratuit, and frequently other financial subsidies as well, and by meeting less often they presumably hoped to keep the fiscal burden down. If that was their intention they would be disappointed, and by the eighteenth century the long period between assemblies would become a serious obstacle to reform. From 1679 until the French revolution the Estates were convoked every three years, assembling thirty-six times, usually for no more than two or three weeks. Composed of representatives of the three orders of the duchy and the deputies from the comt´es of Bar-sur-Seine, Charolles and Mˆacon, the Estates were great occasions, bringing together an important section of the local elite to discuss the demands of the crown and to examine the conduct of the provincial administration. 5 6 7 8

9

The causes of the riots have been analysed by W. Beik, Urban protest in seventeenth-century France. The culture of retribution (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 126–33, and Farr, Hands of honour, pp. 201–10. Bonney, The king’s debts, pp. 115–58, and Major, Representative government, pp. 535–85. Drouot and Calmette, Histoire de la Bourgogne, p. 256. For a discussion of the fronde in Burgundy see: H. Gronau-Chenillet, ‘Le jeu des client`eles au parlement de Bourgogne sous la fronde: la rivalit´e entre les familles Bouchu et Brulart’, Annales de Bourgogne 65 (1993), pp. 5–24. ADCO C 3049, fol. 53. In Brittany, the Estates had also petitioned the king not to assemble the Estates for two years in both 1649 and 1651, Collins, Classes, estates and order, p. 207.

The Estates General of Burgundy

43

t h e g ove r n o r Other than in exceptional circumstances, the assemblies were held under the direct gaze of the governor. Once the Grand Cond´e had made his peace with Louis XIV in 1660, he was restored to the governorship of Burgundy, and his family would hold the office almost as an apanage until the revolution (see appendix 1). It has generally been assumed that the governors became increasingly marginal figures during the reign of Louis XIV.10 The works of B´eguin, Natcheson and Smith have shown that in Burgundy such a model is unconvincing, and it is impossible to provide an accurate portrait of provincial life without constant reference to the role of the governor.11 Close study of the Estates reinforces their findings for the reign of Louis XIV, and suggests that, after suffering a severe setback following the death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740, the Cond´e had succeeded in recapturing much lost ground by the eve of the revolution. Although absent from Burgundy for all but a few weeks every three years, successive governors perfected the art of ruling from a distance, and their patronage was frequently decisive in appointing the officers of the Estates. The Cond´e maintained their own agents and intendants in Burgundy, who were charged with reporting on all aspects of provincial life, collecting ‘news, statistics, information about local issues and personalities’, while conveying the governor’s orders to individuals and institutions.12 From 1660 to 1713, the Th´esut family held the post of intendant in Burgundy for the Cond´e, which subsequently passed to their relatives, the Chartraire. The correspondence and paperwork generated by these officials was relayed to Chantilly, where it was examined by a bureau for Burgundian affairs, which provided the co-ordination and institutional continuity for Cond´ean rule in the province. Moreover, if the governor was only rarely in Dijon, the provincial elites were frequently in Paris, or at court to pursue their personal or corporate business. Whenever they made such a journey, the paying of compliments to the governor was almost obligatory, permitting yet another channel for communication with the province.13 The Cond´e thus possessed a complex and effective machine for the gathering of information and the distribution of orders that in some ways mirrored that of the crown. Throughout the period after 1660, the governor’s influence on the Estates was profound, and whenever a matter of 10 11

12

It is true that in other provinces governorships changed hands regularly, and few could match the control of the Cond´e in Burgundy. See: B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e; Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’; and R. E. Smith, ‘A provincial administration under the Bourbon monarchy: the government of Burgundy in the eighteenth century’, unpub. Ph.D. thesis (Ann Arbor University, 1975). 13 Ibid., 273, n. 23. Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’, 277–81.

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importance confronted them their first reflex was to contact the master of Chantilly. It is not an exaggeration to state that nothing of import escaped the governor’s attention, not only because of the vigilance of the Cond´ean network, but also on account of a genuine belief that he could be counted upon to protect the interests of the Estates. They were wise to put their trust in ‘their prince’, and for more than a century the Cond´e and the Estates of Burgundy enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship. For the province to have a prince of the blood almost constantly available to defend its interests brought many tangible rewards within a political system that was dependent, in part, upon access to the king and a handful of ministers at Versailles. For the governor, on the other hand, the benefits took a variety of forms. In the eyes of an aristocratic warrior and frondeur such as Louis II de Bourbon, the Grand Cond´e (1621–86), Burgundy was first and foremost a power base, where his patronage could secure the supplies of men and money needed to fuel his ambitions.14 Even after 1660, it is unlikely that he changed an outlook forged at a time when a prince of the blood could draw his sword against a hated first minister with relative impunity. Changes in military technology, combined with the political acumen of Louis XIV, were rapidly making such behaviour redundant, and, in 1670, the Grand Cond´e arranged for the transfer of his governorship to his son, Henri-Jules de Bourbon, duc d’Enghien (1643–1709). Henri-Jules had a burning ambition to imitate the martial triumphs of his father, and at the first whiff of grapeshot he immediately displayed almost suicidal courage. Unfortunately, despite winning fame and fortune for his technical skills as an inventor, his lack of judgement made him almost as big a threat to his own troops as to his enemies, and his military career ended in disappointment.15 Henri-Jules would find some consolation in his role as governor, a calling in which he had few equals. He spent hours every day poring over the affairs of the province,16 and built up the network of clients inherited from his father. From the 1690s onwards, he was assisted by his own son, Louis III de Bourbon (1668–1710), who shared his passion for Burgundian affairs. Father and son died within a few months of each other in 1709–10, and it was left to Louis III’s young heir, Louis-Henri de Bourbon (1692–1740), to carry on the family tradition. A prominent beneficiary of John Law’s 14 15 16

B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 23–145, provides an important reassessment of the Cond´ean client`ele during the Fronde. P. de Pi´epape, Histoire des princes de Cond´e au XVIIIe si`ecle. Les trois premiers descendants du Grand Cond´e, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911–13), i, pp. 13–14, 18. Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’, 297.

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infamous bank, and a short-lived first minister of Louis XV, the duc de Bourbon attracted the scorn of contemporaries and of most subsequent historians.17 Deprived of any hope of playing a role on the national stage, the duke sought compensation in his gouvernement, where he matched the conscientious attitude of Henri-Jules. Bourbon’s death in 1740 left the Estates defenceless. His son, Louis-Joseph, the new prince de Cond´e (1738–1818) was a babe-in-arms, and during his minority the governorship was exercised by the duc de Saint-Aignan. Here was the very model of an absentee governor, a figure so marginal to the life of the Estates that the ´elus did no more than maintain the contacts demanded by social etiquette.18 Great was the relief in 1754 when Saint-Aignan stepped down to allow the prince de Cond´e to assume his inheritance, and from then until the revolution he served as governor. During the Seven Years War, he demonstrated immense bravery and flashes of the military talents of his illustrious ancestor.19 Yet despite winning his laurels as commander at the battle of Johannisberg in 1762, there would be no Rocroi,20 and the last governor of Burgundy never fulfilled his martial ambitions. Nor did he ever match the close political control of the province achieved by his father, or HenriJules. Nevertheless, the experience gained during some thirty-five years as governor meant that little escaped his attention, and he was more firmly in control of the Estates and its administration in 1787 than had been the case in 1754. This brief examination of the governors reveals a common theme of frustration born of the failure to establish a national military or political career, which undoubtedly ensured that extra time and effort was devoted to Burgundy. Material interest was undoubtedly another important factor, and the Cond´e benefited substantially from the pensions, gifts and financial system of the Estates.21 Yet the Cond´e were motivated by more than just personal gain, and time and time again they revealed a genuine commitment to their role. Indeed, at times, the impression that they were the repository of the memories and traditions of the Estates is inescapable. The ability to provide patronage in the form of offices, titles and pensions reinforced 17 18 19 20 21

Campbell, Power and politics, pp. 69–109, offers by far the most objective assessment of his ministry. The voluminous registers containing the correspondence of the ´elus makes this clear, ADCO, C 3354, fols. 55–160, and C 3360–61. Pi´epape, Princes de Cond´e, ii, pp. 38–51. The great battle won by the Grand Cond´e over the Spanish in 1643 which established his military reputation. The work of B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 246–53, 323–8, is the essential guide, but D. Roche, ‘Aperc¸us sur le fortune et les revenus des princes de Cond´e a` l’aube du 18e si`ecle’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 14 (1967), pp. 217–43, should also be consulted.

46

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the prestige of the governors, and no opportunity to exercise those rights was spurned. Nothing of significance could be decided without reference to Chantilly, and even the king’s ministers were obliged to tread carefully when dealing with the head of the House of Bourbon-Cond´e. t h e i n t e n d a nt If the governor’s interest in the activities of the Estates can legitimately be described as helpful and benign, the position of the provincial intendant was more ambiguous. As the intendant was appointed by the crown to oversee its interests in the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon, and to carry out important financial, administrative and legal duties it is often assumed that he controlled the provincial government. Benoˆıt Garnot has recently described the intendant as ‘all-powerful’,22 while Hilton Root has made the remarkable claim that ‘there is also evidence that the crown’s authority was strongest in Burgundy. At the end of the old regime, Burgundy had thirty-four subdelegates more than any other province’.23 In reality, the intendants were severely restricted in their scope for action, and it is not true to say that ‘the intendant of Dijon could usually rely upon the Estates to do his bidding’.24 Instead, it was the permanent commission of the Estates, known as the chamber of ´elus, that dominated the financial and administrative life of the duchy, and only in the pays adjacents was the intendant king. Moreover, as he was expected to assist the governor at the meetings of the Estates and in other aspects of his gouvernement it was necessary for him to tread warily. Defining the precise duties of the intendant and the boundaries between his authority and that of the ´elus is difficult. On many issues, such as military affairs or public order, they worked closely together. In terms of taxation, the ´elus were dominant within the duchy and comt´es and only rarely did the intendant intervene in their affairs. His own authority was limited to Bresse and the pays adjacents. The intendant and his subdelegates were, however, central to the life of the towns and villages of the province. In October 1662, the intendant was charged with the verification of communal debts and in February 1665 he was authorised to oversee their liquidation.25 Thereafter the intendant became established as the guardian 22 23 24 25

Garnot, Vivre en Bourgogne, pp. 67–71. Root, Peasants and king, p. 13. To be fair to Root, elsewhere he is much more sceptical about the power of the intendant. As P. M. Jones, Reform and revolution in France. The politics of transition, 1774–1791 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 36, has claimed. Root, Peasants and king, p. 36.

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of village life, and, as one informed observer noted, ‘the administration of communal goods and business is attributed directly to the intendant; it is he who authorises and sanctions all acts that are collective in nature’.26 The intendant was, therefore, a powerful figure and both Saint Jacob and Root have supplied numerous examples of his interaction with the towns and villages of the province. Indeed, as opposition to Burgundy’s harsh seigneurial regime mounted during the second half of the eighteenth century, successive intendants regularly sided with the peasants. The intendant also played an important role in all matters affecting hospitals and public health as well as supervising the actions of the corporations of arts et metiers. Needless to say, he was also expected to act as the eyes and ears of the king in the province, supplying information about the conduct of institutions and individuals, the state of the harvest, population levels and much else. Yet if it is important to recognise the significance of the intendant, it is still apparent that when compared with the ´elus of the Estates he was a secondary power in the administrative sphere. Although over the long period covered by this study, their relative powers waxed and waned, with the intendant especially powerful during the 1650s and again during the interregnum of 1740–54, it was the ´elus who usually predominated. During the early years of Louis XIV’s personal rule, the intendant was Claude Bouchu, a member of a prominent local family, whose father had served as first president of the Parlement of Dijon thanks to the patronage of the Cond´e (see appendix 2).27 Until his death in 1683, Bouchu proved a model intendant, remaining on excellent terms with the governor, while busying himself with his work in the Bresse, and, especially, with overseeing the financial administration of the towns and villages of the province.28 Henri-Jules explained the nature of his relationship with the intendant in a letter to his trusted adviser, the secr´etaire des ´etats Claude Rigoley, written just after Bouchu’s death. He wrote that: when I was in Dijon I signed everything together with M. Bouchu, when I was absent he did not inform me of an endless number of minor cases that he decided between Pierre and Jean . . . but he always informed me before issuing ordinances on matters of importance or [those] which might affect the mayors and ´echevins.29 26 27

28 29

Ibid., pp. 42–3. As Root notes ‘most of the powers exercised by the Burgundian intendant before the revolution can be traced to the campaign to verify debts’. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, p. 404, and Kettering, Patrons and brokers, p. 114. His career is examined in greater detail by C. Arbassier, L’absolutisme en Bourgogne. L’intendant Bouchu et son action financi`ere, d’apr`es sa correspondance in´edite, 1667–1671 (Paris, 1921). Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, pp. 119–49, 154–73, and Root, Peasants and king, pp. 22–44. BMD MS 2239, fol. 90, Henri-Jules de Bourbon to Rigoley, 16 July 1683.

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Although the governor was not directly responsible for the choice of Bouchu’s successor, Nicolas Auguste de Harlay de Bonneuil, the governor had every reason to believe that harmony would be maintained, he added: ‘M. d’Harlay has tried hard to assure me of his desire to act in a fashion that will give me cause to be content, and so I have reason to be happy with this.’ The governor, therefore, ordered Rigoley to do all in his power to assist the new intendant on his arrival in Dijon.30 D’Harlay’s brief spell in the province was a resounding success, underlining the benefits of co-operation. He was replaced by Florent d’Argouges, whose disastrous period as intendant was an object lesson in how not to approach the task in a pays d’´etats.31 He almost immediately antagonised the governor’s own intendant, Charles-B´enigne Th´esut de Ragy, beginning a feud that would continue until 1694 when d’Argouges was recalled. Th´esut was a powerful enemy, but he was not the only person responsible for the intendant’s disgrace. D’Argouges made the mistake of behaving as if he really was the all-powerful figure of popular legend, crossing, amongst others, the ´elus, the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon, the avocat g´en´eral of the Parlement and the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone. Despite protesting loudly and repeatedly to his relative the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Louis Ph´elypeaux de Pontchartrain, about the ‘conspiracy’ against him, his fall was all but inevitable. He paid the price of forgetting the first maxim of a successful intendant in a pays d’´etats – cooperation. The lesson was not wasted on his successors, who were generally sufficiently astute to realise that good relations with Chantilly were an essential requirement if they wished to be allowed to pursue their own affairs in peace. From the perspective of the Estates, the relative weakness of the intendant was a blessing. Although he was expected to pay close attention to the activities of the ´elus and to report regularly to Versailles, the intendant was never able to win control of the local administration. Any attempt to do so risked raising a clamour at the next meeting of the Estates, and, possibly, of attracting the displeasure of their protector in Chantilly. It was no coincidence that the periods during which the intendants were most powerful were during the exile of the Grand Cond´e and later the interregnum caused by the death of the duc de Bourbon.32 30 31

32

Ibid ., fol. 94, Henri-Jules de Bourbon to Rigoley, 27 July 1683. His problems have been discussed by R. Bonney, ‘Les intendants de Louis XIII: agents de la r´eforme fiscale?’, L’administration des finances sous l’ancien r´egime. Colloque tenu a` Bercy les 22 et 23 f´evrier 1996 (Paris, 1997), 197–217, esp. 202–3, and Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’, 289–95. Kettering, Patrons and brokers, pp. 91, 114, has demonstrated that while the Grand Cond´e was in Spanish service, the intendant, Bouchu was able to fill the vacuum. What Kettering fails to note is that this ascendancy was only temporary. The events following the death of the duc de Bourbon are examined in chapter 8.

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In general, however, the relationship between the Estates and the intendant was harmonious, with both sides anxious to avoid trespassing on the others prerogatives.33 When Antoine Jean Amelot de Chaillou, intendant from 1764 to 1774, departed from Dijon he received a glowing testimonial from the ´elus who declared that ‘the administration will never forget, sir, the attachment and confidence that you have shown it at all times, the eagerness with which you have agreed with all its projects, the harmony that you established between your operations and its own’.34 The chamber was under no obligation to write such a letter, and the warmth of their affection for Amelot appears to have been exceptional.35 Even by the reign of Louis XVI, the intendant and his thirty-four subdelegates were in no position to overawe the Estates. In 1781, Feydeau de Brou, who currently held the royal commission, found himself homeless when the bishop of Dijon decided to live in the intendance. The unfortunate Feydeau was obliged to pester the ´elus to provide him with lodgings.36 That the Estates should be asked to subsidise the construction of a new intendance to the tune of some 200,000 livres was hardly surprising, as they were already paying for Feydeau’s salary, bureau and staff.37 Whereas intendants elsewhere were able to siphon off the ‘free funds’ (revenants bons) of the capitation, or other royal taxes, to fund their schemes,38 the intendant of Burgundy was largely dependent upon the goodwill of the Estates. When Antoine-L´eon Amelot de Chaillou, the last intendant of the province, sought further financial assistance to meet the costs of his bureau, the ´elus sent a firm letter of objection to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, reminding him that the principal work of ‘the intendance resides in the province of Bresse, Bugey, Valromey et Gex’.39 Only there was his administrative burden heavy, and as that was nothing to do with the Estates of Burgundy they saw no reason to contribute to its costs. When Amelot then attempted to persuade the ´elus to pay ‘to his subdelegates and their clerks fees’ commensurate to their zeal and importance he received another rebuff.40 He was informed that the Estates had their own officers, the mayors, who were 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Particularly good examples of this mutual respect are to be found in the correspondence of the chamber with the intendant, Amelot, and his officials, ADCO C 3363, fols. 195–6, Amelot to the ´elus, 25 November 1773, and their reply dated 4 December 1773, and C 3364, fol. 228, secr´etaire des ´etats, Rousselot, to d’Armenault, secretary to the intendant, 6 August 1780. ADCO C 3363, fol. 240, the ´elus to Amelot, 8 December 1774. I have found no evidence of similar letters being sent to the other intendants. ADCO C 3364, fol. 275, 288–9, Feydeau de Brou to the ´elus, 31 May 1781 and 8 August 1781. Root, Peasants and king, p. 77, and ADCO C 3366, fol. 122, the ´elus to Calonne, 16 December 1784, and ibid., fol. 139, Calonne to the ´elus, 10 January 1785. Kwass, Privilege and politics, pp. 54–7. ADCO C 3366, fols. 122–4, the ´elus to Calonne, 18 November 1784. ADCO C 3367, fol. 92, Amelot to the ´elus, 11 September 1787.

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expected to perform demanding and onerous tasks without remuneration.41 The intendant was, therefore, obliged to work alongside the Estates, and the portrait that emerges from any close study of the Burgundian administrative structure during the period is one of collaboration, even teamwork, between two distinct, but mutually respectful institutions. Of the legendary ‘all powerful’ intendant we have yet to catch a glimpse. t h e m i n i s t ry For the Estates, coping with the existence of an intendant was part of the broader problem of dealing with the crown. The ´elus were continually in contact or correspondence with the dominant figures in the ministry, especially the contrˆoleur g´en´eral and the secretary of state for the maison du roi, whose department traditionally included responsibility for Burgundy. As we might expect, the enormous expansion of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral’s administrative remit after 1665 meant that the ´elus were almost constantly bargaining about financial, economic and commercial matters. The secretary of state, on the other hand, acquired additional stature after 1740, when the crown took advantage of the duc de Bourbon’s death to trim the power of the Cond´e.42 The holder of the office in 1740 was the comte de Saint-Florentin, a man who has generally been dismissed as an authoritarian nonentity, despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that he served continuously from 1721 until his retirement in 1775. He certainly took a far more active role in provincial affairs after 1740, assuming many of the duties previously performed by the governor. Once the prince de Cond´e came of age, it was not immediately apparent where authority lay. Rather than ask too many awkward questions the ´elus corresponded with both the governor and the secretary of state on all matters affecting the administration. Almost identical letters were sent to both men, containing information, explaining problems and asking for aid and support. If power had shifted towards the minister, it is unlikely that he took many decisions without reference to the prince, who was determined to make his own contribution and to assume the traditional role of mediator between the Estates and the crown. After Saint-Florentin’s resignation no other secretary of state remained long in office, and the governor’s prestige and his impressive knowledge of the local situation meant that his authority increased. He was helped by the fact that the reign of Louis XVI was auspicious for the provincial administration generally. From 1775 to 1783, the secretary of state for the 41

ADCO C 3358, fol. 104, the ´elus to Amelot, 7 October 1787.

42

See chapter 8.

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maison du roi was that old friend of the chamber of ´elus, Amelot de Chaillou, whose son was in turn intendant after 1784. Another former intendant of the province, Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury was contrˆoleur g´en´eral between 1781 and 1783, a post which had been held briefly in 1776 by a former ´ member of the Parlement of Dijon, Jean-Etienne Bernard de Clugny de Nuits. Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, Louis XVI’s trusted minister of foreign affairs, was another prominent Burgundian, while the bishop of Autun, Yves Alexandre de Marbeuf, ´elu of the clergy from 1778–81, held the powerful office of the feuille des b´en´efices. Relations between the Estates and the crown were, as ever, dominated by the king’s need for loans and taxation, but when defending provincial interests the ´elus were in a strong position. p re pa r at i o n o f t h e e s tat e s The decision to summon the Estates was taken by the king in consultation with the governor, and the opening ceremony was always scheduled well in advance, usually between the months of April and November.43 The period leading up to the assembly was spent in detailed preparation, with the most important part of the procedure involving the drafting of the governor’s instructions. These were the king’s formal demands to be presented to the Estates, and constituted the principal business of the assembly. By the late seventeenth century many of these instructions had become permanent features, including requests for taxes, such as the don gratuit, and demands for the province to meet the costs of the public highways or to fund the military ´etapes. In addition to these regular articles, the instructions could also contain new demands of a financial or administrative nature.44 When drafting the instructions it was necessary for the ministry to work closely with both the governor and the provincial intendant in order to gain the necessary information about the state of the province and the likely mood of the Estates. Both were continually obliged to remind the government of earlier precedents, adopting a generally sympathetic stance towards the privileges of the province. When the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Cl´ement Charles Franc¸ois de L’Averdy, wanted to include an article demanding a contribution to the costs of billeting military officers in 1766, the intendant, Amelot, persuaded him to drop the matter.45 He argued that such a 43 44 45

Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 6–7. For examples, see AN H1 99, fol. 58, and H1 134, fol. 68, ‘Observations sur quelques articles de l’instruction pour messieurs les commissaires du roi a` l’assembl´ee des e´tats de Bourgogne’. AN H1 128, dos. 1, fol. 1, Amelot to L’Averdy, 10 June 1766.

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request would almost certainly incite trouble because the Estates already paid an annual sum of 200,000 livres to ensure exemption from quartering troops. Three years later, the prince de Cond´e entered into a detailed correspondence with the duc de Choiseul, about his plans to construct a port at Versoix on lake Geneva.46 As Versoix was in the pays of Gex it formed part of the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon, and the minister was hopeful that the Estates would contribute to the cost of his project. Cond´e was quick to disabuse him. In a long memoir he explained that Gex and the other pays adjacents were not subject to the administration of the Estates, nor was Geneva especially important to local commerce, which was connected instead to the river Saˆone. He concluded with the observation that ‘it is hard to suggest to the assembly [that] it contribute to an untested enterprise which does not appear to be useful to it’.47 Choiseul had the good grace to concede the issue and looked elsewhere for his funds, but the exchange was typical. Successive governors acted as the protectors of the Estates and their privileges, while engaging in what was generally an amicable and productive dialogue with the ministry. The crown could only gain from the presence of a knowledgeable and active governor who could prevent it from antagonising the Estates through ignorance of the local situation. By spending so much time on the detailed preparation of the instructions, the prince de Cond´e, like his predecessors, ensured that he was well equipped to cope with the demands of the assembly. Not surprisingly in these circumstances, the king was willing to allow his representative considerable latitude in his dealings with the Estates. However, he frequently took the precaution of providing the governor with secret personal instructions to be employed in the event of resistance to royal demands.48 In 1763 and 1778, for example, rumours of impending trouble within the assemblies of the Estates inspired the ministry to equip the prince de Cond´e with meticulous plans designed to curb the expected unrest.49 It was a tribute to the skills of the governor that he was not obliged to resort to these extraordinary measures on either occasion. The drafting of his instructions was not the only task requiring the governor’s attention. Orders had to be given for Dijon and the Palais des 46

47 48

49

AN H1 174, dos 2, fols. 47–8, ‘Copie du m´emoire de M. le prince de Cond´e envoy´e a` M. le duc de Choiseul le 28 Novembre 1769 sur les difficult´es de proposer aux e´tats de Bourgogne, de concourir a` l’´etablissement de Versoix’. Ibid . In 1763, Cond´e was provided with an elaborate set of secret instructions. These are discussed in a series of letters written by the prince’s former secretary, Girard, to the premier commis of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, AN H1 127, dos. 2, fols, 31, 58, Girard to Menard de Conichard, 23 October 1763 and 5 November 1763. These events are discussed in chapters 8 and 9.

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´ Etats to be cleaned and lit, and for the city to be adequately provisioned, especially in periods of dearth when an influx of deputies threatened to consume supplies and inflate prices. During the subsistence crisis of 1775, the prince de Cond´e informed the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, that ‘we would have to reproach ourselves, you and I, if for want of the necessary precautions . . . the markets of Dijon were not sufficiently provisioned, above all during the holding of the Estates’.50 With the opening ceremony planned for May his concern was understandable, but he failed to shake the laissez-faire principles of the minister. Within days of the governor’s warning Dijon was wracked by what was arguably its most serious riot since 1630.51 Most of the remaining organisation of the Estates was of a more mundane character. Letters of convocation were sent to the senior clerics, religious institutions, and nobles who were eligible to attend, or send deputies, to the assembly. As the chamber of the third estate consisted overwhelmingly of the mayors of those towns with the right of representation in the Estates, it was necessary to fill any vacancies with suitably qualified candidates. Letters were also sent to the seven alcades, who had been appointed by the previous Estates, ordering them to assemble in order to scrutinise the conduct of the administration and prepare their remarques.52 Finally, efforts were made to resolve any outstanding disputes involving the Estates or its administration that might disturb the tranquillity of the meeting. For the particularly punctilious governor, Henri-Jules, that could extend to the dress code of the deputies. Having taken the trouble to design the splendid new purple robes of the third estate, he was annoyed to hear that many of the towns had refused to meet the costs of their manufacture.53 His response was emphatic. Any deputy who failed to fulfil the sartorial requirements of his office would be refused entry because, as the prince made clear, ‘I believe . . . that having built a hall where the Estates can meet honourably, those present should be clothed in a manner appropriate to the dignity of the Estates’. His conscientious attitude was typical. When the time came for the governor to pack his bags for the journey to Burgundy very little had been left to chance. 50 51

52 53

AN K 569, fol. 30, Cond´e to Turgot, 14 April 1775. The riots of April 1775 were caused by the high price of grain, and have been examined by G. Dumay, Une emeute a` Dijon en 1775 suivie d’une ode a` monseigneur d’Apchon (Dijon, 1886), and J. Richard, ‘L’assassinat de FilsJean de Sainte-Colombe et les e´lections d’Avril 1790 en Cˆote-d‘Or’, Annales de Bourgogne 61 (1989), 115–39. C. A. Bouton, The flour war. Gender, class, and community in late ancien r´egime French society (Pennsylvania, 1993), provides a thorough discussion of the crisis of 1775 as a whole. Their role is examined in detail below. ADCO C 3148, fols. 361–2, Cond´e to the ´elus, 4 June 1703.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy t h e o pe n i n g c e re m on y

The voyage of the Cond´e to Dijon had all the dignity of a royal progress. In 1718, for example, the duc de Bourbon was accompanied not only by the majority of his household, but also by many of its effects including his own ‘crockery’ and provisions.54 There is no record of his having taken the kitchen sink, but the size and logistical complexity of his retinue was typical. As the governor travelled south, he accepted the homage of major towns such as Auxerre and Montbard, and sampled the hospitality of the local bishops, or other dignitaries. Protocol dictated that as the governor approached Dijon, he was formally welcomed at Chanceaux, just outside the city, by the vicomte-mayeur and the ´echevins of the town, who were waiting patiently under the shelter of a canopy.55 From there his carriage formed part of a triumphal procession covering the eight kilometres to Dijon, where his entrance was greeted by the firing of the cannons of the chˆateau. To the sound of trumpets, he progressed through streets lined by some 3,000 armed townsmen, who fell in behind the guards escorting his ´ carriage as it completed its journey to the Palais des Etats. According to the official account of 1754, the prince de Cond´e was met on his arrival in his apartments by ‘several persons of distinction’, and he had no more than an hour to relax before receiving the first of a series of customary deputations.56 At the head of the queue were the ´elus, who had been summoned together with the leading officers of the Estates.57 They were escorted into the prince’s cabinet where the bishop of Dijon, acting ´elu of the clergy, offered a few words of welcome. The deputation then trooped out and was replaced by the seven alcades of the Estates, who delivered their own greetings before, in turn, giving way to the ´echevins of Dijon, whose compliments were accompanied by a traditional gift of wine.58 Much of the next day was taken up with the reception of further deputations from, among others, the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and Bureau des Finances of Dijon. That evening the city was illuminated ‘with exquisite taste . . . and, at intervals, there were pyramids of lanterns surrounded by garlands creating a marvellous effect, there were also fountains of wine and at both ends of the Place [Royal] stood amphitheatres to position the drums and oboes [so] that the people could dance’.59 54 55 56 57 59

Dumont, Une session des ´etats, p. 154. Ibid , pp. 15–16, describes the etiquette from the Estates of 1718, and little had changed when the prince de Cond´e arrived for the first time in 1754, ADCO C 3021, fols. 399–456. ADCO C 3021, fol. 399. For a comparison, see Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 15–22. 58 Dumont, Une session des ´etats, p. 16. ADCO C 3021, fols. 399–400. G. Dumay, ed., Le mercure Dijonnois ou journal des ´ev´enements qui se sont pass´es de 1742 a` 1789 (Dijon, 1887), p. 72.

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The opening ceremony of the Estates took place on the second morning after the governor’s arrival. At 10 a.m. the bishops of Autun and Chalon´ sur-Saˆone marched off side-by-side from the Palais des Etats with the other clerics following in their wake to the Sainte Chapelle. The third estate, headed by the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon followed them. Finally, the prince left his suite, with the local commandant, intendant and first president, preceded by the mar´echauss´ee, his guards and pages and the members of the chamber of nobility who attended the governor throughout his stay in the city.60 Once inside the Sainte Chapelle, Mass was celebrated by its dean, Grosbois, the official chaplain of the Estates. Having paid its respects to the Almighty, the assembly was now free to march the short distance to ´ the great hall of the Palais des Etats where the king’s business could begin (see plate 1). Within the great hall, the governor sat in an armchair decorated with the fleur de lys and the arms of the province, which occupied a slightly raised position on a dais adorned with a portrait of the king. He was flanked by the provincial commandant, the intendant, the first president of the Parlement and two tr´esoriers de France. The deputies of the Estates filled the main body of the hall, with the senior clerics and the ´elu of the nobility seated in armchairs and the other deputies of the two privileged orders facing each other on benches richly decorated with tapestries. The members of the third estate had their own benches that were placed at the back of the hall. As for the officers of the Estates, they sat behind their bureaux in an area known as the parquet. The scene was completed by the presence of members of the public who peered down from the gallery.61 Once the assembled throng was seated, the prince signalled for the ceremony to begin, a ritual that was described succinctly by the abb´e Court´ep´ee during the reign of Louis XVI: the senior member of the Bureau des Finances opens the session with a speech whose purpose is to present the letters of convocation. The governor speaks next to assure, in a few words, the Estates that he will inform the king of their loyalty and zeal. The first president’s harangue is concerned specifically with the administration of justice; that of the intendant explains the king’s intentions and the aid that he expects [to receive]. Finally, the bishop of Autun delivers a concluding speech exposing the needs and interests of the people.62 60 61 62

ADCO C 3021, fols. 401–3. Ibid., fol. 405. Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, i, p. 329. The content of these speeches was formal and relatively predictable as can be seen by comparing those delivered in 1754, ADCO 3021, fols. 406–8, with the earlier texts of 1677, ADCO C 2982, fols. 11–14.

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Plate 1

The grand salle of the Estates of Burgundy

The governor then received yet another deputation, this time of the whole body of the Estates, and had to endure a further speech from the bishop before the deputies finally retired to their respective chambers. The ceremonial described above dates from the late eighteenth century, but it could, with minor modifications, have been drawn from any of the

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meetings held between 1661 and the revolution. The opening ceremony conveys a sense of the gravity of the occasion and of the immense significance attached to these assemblies. In a society obsessed by social rank, precedence and hierarchy, processions and deputations were of the utmost importance, and they were studied avidly by the different corps and by the wider public. Moreover, for a provincial city of 20,000–25,000 inhabitants, the influx of the prince, his retinue and hundreds of deputies, amongst whom were bishops and great aristocrats, offered a tremendous spectacle as well as a great opportunity for profit. But, above all, the assembly and its attendant ritual reinforced the message that the Estates were at the apex of the social and political life of Burgundy. It was a source of pride for the self-styled first province of the kingdom, and with ‘our prince’ presiding over a gathering of the provincial elite in the imposing edifice of the Palais ´ des Etats, Burgundians could dream of the halcyon days of their dukes.63 t h e c h a m b e r o f t h e c l e rg y When the local intendant, Antoine Franc¸ois Ferrand, drafted his ‘Memoir’ for the instruction of the duc de Bourgogne at the end of the seventeenth century, he provided what he believed were the essential details about the assembly of the Estates, including lists of those eligible to sit in the various chambers.64 In his entry for the clergy, he noted that in addition to the bishops of Autun, Chalon-sur-Saˆone, Mˆacon and Auxerre there were sixtysix clerics with recognised rights of entry.65 Immediately after the bishops came eighteen abb´es of religious houses, headed by the abb´e g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux, seven deans and twelve deputies of the cathedral chapters and principal churches of the province. They were joined by three deputies from the comt´es of Mˆacon, Charolles and Bar-sur-Seine, eighteen prieurs and finally eight deputies chosen by provincial abbeys. According to Ferrand’s estimates there were at least seventy clerics eligible to sit in the chamber either on account of their own eminence, or that of the institutions to which they belonged. Over the course of the eighteenth century that number increased slightly, largely on account of the establishment 63 64 65

The reference to ‘notre prince’ comes from the correspondence of Alexis Piron, BN MS Fr 10435, fol. 39, Piron to abb´e Du May, 28 August 1754. Ferrand, like the other intendants had been ordered to prepare these reports for the education of Louis XIV’s young grandson, Ligou, L’intendance de Bourgogne. Ligou, L’intendance de Bourgogne, pp. 180–3. Court´ep´ee and B´eguillet, Description g´en´erale de Bourgogne, i, p. 328, offered a total of 119 for the reign of Louis XVI, an increase explained by a figure of seventy-two prieurs classed as eligible. If correct, very few clerics were taking advantage of their rights, possibly because some of the abbeys were held in commendam.

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60

50 40

30

20 10

84

78

17

72

17

66

17

60

17

54

17

48

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42

17

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30

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24

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12

Figure 3.1

17

06

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94

17

88

16

16

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82

0

Chamber of the clergy: attendance, 1682–1787

of the bishopric of Dijon in 1731. If we examine the attendance lists of the clergy for the period 1682 to 1787 (figure 3.1), it is clear that far fewer actually took advantage of their rights.66 During the later part of the reign of Louis XIV, from 1682 to 1715, an average of forty-three clerical deputies attended the Estates, with a high point of fifty in 1712 and only thirty-nine in 1694.67 An average attendance of forty-five for the reigns of Louis XV and Louis XVI was hardly more impressive, but it is noteworthy that after 1774 the numbers present never fell below fifty. Only thirty-one deputies made the trip to Dijon in 1721,68 thirty-nine in 1742,69 thirty-three in 1748 and forty in 1772,70 although the more substantial total of fifty-seven clergy was present in both 1754 and 1778,71 and no less than fifty-one assembled in 1775. Behind these dry statistics a number of interesting patterns emerge. The peaks and troughs of attendance were connected to the person of the 66 67 68 70 71

The figures that follow have been compiled from the registers of the d´ecrets of the Estates, ADCO C 3018–24, and those of the chamber of clergy, ADCO C 3030–5. ADCO C 3018, fols. 120–2, 203–5, 253–5, 312–14, 356–8, and ADCO C 3019, fols. 55, 113–16, 215–17, 299–302, 409, 505, 580–9. 69 ADCO C 3021, fols. 150–1. ADCO C 3019, fols. 722–4. ADCO C 3021, fols. 297–8, and C 3022, fols. 394–5. ADCO C 3021, fols. 451–3, and C 3023, fols. 104–6.

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governor, or more accurately to the presence of a member of the House of Bourbon-Cond´e. When the Cond´e were absent because of ill-health, military service or political disgrace the number of deputies plummeted.72 The trend was particularly apparent during the interregnum of 1740 to 1754 when the duc de Saint-Aignan was governor. Not surprisingly, the triumphal entrance of the young prince de Cond´e at the Estates of 1754, saw the numbers present leap to fifty-seven, the highest total of the century. No doubt a variety of motives account for the attraction of the Cond´e. Their patronage made it advisable for all but the most saintly to attend, and the additional prestige associated with participation in an Estates presided over by the prince was probably difficult to resist. As we shall see, the magical name of Cond´e had an even more dramatic effect on attendance amongst the nobility, adding further proof, were it needed, of the continuing influence of the provincial governor. Within the chamber of the clergy, great authority was invested in the hands of the bishops, whose office, social status and control of preferment made them formidable figures. Men such as Nicolas and Andr´e Colbert, successively bishops of Auxerre, Antoine de Malvin de Montazet, bishop of Autun and grand almoner of Louis XV, or his successor Marbeuf, had access to levers of power at the very highest level. It was the bishop of Autun who presided over the chamber, and in his absence the role was filled by one of his colleagues. Power and hierarchy amongst the clergy were reflected in the plan of the seating arrangements of the chamber sketched in 1697 (plate 2).73 As we can see, the three bishops present on that occasion sat in armchairs in front of the bureau together with the two abb´es, who were only entitled to ‘straight backed chairs’. In front of them, starting from the left, was a semi-circle of deans and deputies from the cathedrals and collegiate churches, while to the right sat the prieurs r´eguliers. Finally, the deputies from the three comt´es were seated behind the bishops. If the bishops possessed immense influence, they were not all-powerful. The other clerics had ample opportunity to contribute to the deliberations and votes of the chamber on both internal matters and the business of the Estates. On assembling after the opening ceremony, their first task was to conduct the election of a new ´elu and the other officers who would serve during the forthcoming triennalit´e. The vital office of ´elu rotated from the 72

73

The duc de Bourbon was unable to attend in 1721 due to illness, while his son was on active military service in both 1757 and 1760. After opposing the ‘revolution’ of chancellor Maupeou in 1771, the prince de Cond´e was temporarily exiled from court and was, therefore, unable to preside at the Estates of 1772. ADCO C 3029, bis, ‘Plan of the chamber of the clergy 1697’.

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Plate 2

Plan of the chamber of clergy at the Estates of Burgundy in 1697

bishops to the abb´es and then to the deans, many of whom were substantial figures in their own right destined to hold some of the highest positions in the French church. Theoretically it was an open election, but in practice all had been negotiated in advance because the crown clearly wanted a reliable and competent figure in such a vital post.74 There was less need to exercise a tight rein on the appointment of the two clerics who would serve as alcades, and as these positions were shunned by the great prelates they were a source of fierce competition amongst their juniors. This was also true of the orator, chosen to compliment the other chambers on behalf of the clergy, and the two rapporteurs, who presented information to the chamber. For an aspiring cleric, these posts presented a golden opportunity to shine before their ecclesiastical superiors and even the governor. Once the election of its officers was complete, the chamber was in a position to deliberate upon the don gratuit and the other articles contained in the governor’s instructions. These issues would dominate the Estates, but there were also internal matters to be considered that were specific to the chamber. Some were permanent features, notably the reading of a report 74

See chapter 4.

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by the outgoing ´elu on the conduct of the provincial administration during his triennalit´e.75 However, the vast majority of ecclesiastical energy was dissipated in a series of quarrels about the respective rights and privileges of those present. The problem began at the top, where the bishops failed to set an example of Christian humility. Successive bishops of Autun were determined to establish their own pre-eminence not only within the chamber, but also in the Estates as a whole. It is true that the bishop of Autun presided over his fellow clerics, and he enjoyed the privilege of speaking in the name of the Estates at both the opening and closing ceremonies. What caused trouble was the attempt to claim the rather ambiguous title of ‘president n´e’ of the Estates,76 a privilege enjoyed by the archbishop of Narbonne in Languedoc. Bishop Louis Dony d’Attichy of Autun had first raised the issue at the Estates of 1656,77 bringing an immediate response from bishop Henri F´elix of Chalon, who employed the spoiling tactic of claiming the same title.78 Dony d’Attichy backed down, declaring that he had been misunderstood and had only meant to refer to his right to preside over the clergy.79 F´elix was even prepared to attack that privilege in 1679, albeit unsuccessfully, on the basis that he was the senior bishop having been consecrated first. A fragile peace was then restored, but in 1703 the newly appointed bishop of Autun, Bertrand Senaux, renewed the claim to be recognised as the ‘president n´e’, and he had sufficient guile to petition the king for an arrˆet du conseil confirming his pretensions without first informing the Estates.80 His ruse caused uproar at the assembly of 1703, producing an outright refusal to recognise the arrˆet, and a further arrˆet du conseil of 27 May 1706 fared no better.81 The Estates of that year repeated their earlier protest, adding that there had never been a president of the three orders, and that ‘M. d’Autun who presides over the clergy collects their votes alone’.82 Even the backing of the elderly and authoritarian Louis XIV had not been enough to force the Estates to alter their traditional practices.83 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 83

Examples of their reports include those presented by Henri Emanuel de Roquette in 1697 and 1715, ADCO C 3030, fol. 329, and C 3031, fol. 16. Had he won that right, he would, in theory, have presided over the three chambers. ‘Remontrance faite au roy, a` Paris le xv mai mdclix par messire Loys d’Attichy, eveque d’Autun, pr´esident n´e et perpetuel des e´tats de Bourgogne’. BMD MS 840, fols. 71–2, ‘M´emoire concernant la tenue des e´tats de Bourgogne et les s´eances des particuliers qui composent lesdits e´tats’, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 68–70. The re-establishment of the status quo was confirmed in an arrˆet du conseil of 1659, BMD MS 840, fol. 71. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 87. 82 Ibid., fol. 10. ADCO C 3001, fols. 9–10. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 87, reached a similar conclusion.

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Precedence quarrels were not restricted to the bishops of Autun and Chalon, and successive incumbents of the sees of Mˆacon and Auxerre were preoccupied with their own feud. As neither wished to recognise the preeminence of the other, the governor, Henri-Jules, came up with an ingenious solution at the Estates of 1682, permitting them to alternate precedence from one day to the next.84 Any relief was short-lived. At the assembly of 1694, the bishop of Autun noted ruefully that neither bishop had entered the Estates for ten days because of their continuing rivalry.85 It was not until 1697 that the matter was resolved by a treaty negotiated by Henri-Jules, which stipulated that the bishop and clerics of Auxerre would have ‘rank and station, each according to their dignity’ after those of the duchy.86 If the bishop of Mˆacon had been defeated, he could at least console himself with the knowledge that his dominance of the ´etats particuliers of the Mˆaconnais was undisputed. Almost inevitably, the foundation of a new bishopric of Dijon in 1731 triggered a fresh set of precedence disputes. Despite being a new creation Dijon was, of course, at the heart of the duchy, and thus prevailed over the former comt´e, but in 1787 the unhappy Auxerrois were still protesting at the perceived infringement of their rights.87 The bishops were not the only clerics obsessed with precedence, and the chamber resounded to the clamour of deans, abb´es and prieurs upholding their own status or that of their corps. Amongst the most belligerent were successive abb´es g´en´eraux of Cˆıteaux, who fought a long battle for parity with the bishops. In 1697, the abb´e won a famous victory, forcing the acceptance by the chamber of an arrˆet du conseil entitling him to the same size, make and shape of armchair as the bishops.88 It was only the beginning. In 1730, the abb´e g´en´eral, Dom Andoche Pernot, demanded ‘to sit in cape, rochet and with the [pectoral] cross’ rather than in his ‘habit’.89 Having registered an initial protest, he attempted to enter the Estates wearing his clerical hat (bonnet quarr´e), but was refused. He then turned to the royal council, obliging the chamber to appoint a commissioner charged with defending its privileges both at Versailles and before the General Assembly of the French church.90 The affair rumbled on for years, producing many comic scenes, not least that of 1748 when the abb´e presented himself at the Estates in full ecclesiastical regalia, only to find the entrance to the chamber of the clergy blocked while his peers considered his fate.91 The 84 85 86 89 91

BMD MS 840, fol. 72. AN G7 158, fol. 472, bishop of Autun to Pontchartrain, 28 October 1694. 87 ADCO C 3035, fol. 9. 88 ADCO C 2982, fols. 366–70. ADCO C 3030, fol. 347. 90 ADCO C 3030, fol. 403. ADCO C 3031, fols. 299–300. For an account, see ADCO E 1245, Andre de La Poix to M. de Mignot, 23 May 1748.

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unfortunate Pernot was obliged to wait in an antechamber, surrounded by ‘lackeys’, gradually drawing a large crowd that clambered up on to some adjacent benches in order to catch a glimpse of this unusual martyr. His suffering would bring its reward, but not in this life. It was his successor, abb´e Francois Trouv´e, who entered the chamber in 1751, resplendent in ‘rochet, cape, clerical hat, and pectoral cross’ thanks to an arrˆet du conseil of 29 May 1751.92 Immediately abb´e Dubreuil de Pontbriand of Saint Martin d’Auxerre sprang to his feet to claim the same privilege. The resolution of one dispute had thus given birth to another, and in 1757 all of the abb´es were granted the privilege of wearing ‘capes and rochets’.93 After more than twenty-five years of struggle to establish their superior rank, the abb´es g´en´eraux of Cˆıteaux were back to square one. In addition to these arguments about precedence the chamber also policed its own membership, and despite seemingly precise entrance requirements disputes still arose. Inspired by the actions of the nobility, and by a surprisingly large attendance of some fifty clerics, the chamber voted, in 1712, to appoint commissioners to examine the titles of those wishing to enter, a practice confirmed in 1715.94 Throughout the period there were attempts to establish or re-establish entrance rights. In 1745, for example, Joseph Negret, pr´evot of the collegiate church of Notre Dame of Autun, lodged a successful petition to join the chamber, and he was followed in 1748 by the dean of the collegiate church of Cuiseau.95 The dean of Cuisery, Reboullet, on the other hand, was to be disappointed. An aspiring antiquarian, he had assembled what he believed were the necessary legal proofs, but his attempt to enter the Estates in 1727 was thwarted.96 The other deans produced a memoir disputing his claims, and in 1730 the conseils des ´etats were invited to consider the matter. They rejected his arguments, and although he continued to supply new evidence at subsequent assemblies he eventually abandoned his struggle in 1742.97 To modern eyes many of these squabbles might appear ridiculous, and it does seem remarkable that a gathering of no more than fifty clerics could generate so much conflict. Historians have frequently issued damning verdicts on their activities, and Billioud denounced ‘these vain quarrels of precedence, [a] sign of moral weakness and from which no historical 92 94 95 96 97

93 Ibid., fols. 210–15. ADCO C 3032, fol. 88. See: ADCO C 3019, fol. 505 and C 3031, f. 4; and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 61. Negret’s case is conserved in ADCO C 3031, fol. 542, and that of the dean of Cuiseau in ADCO C 3032, fol. 24. ADCO C 3031, fol. 234, ‘M´emoire pour les doyens des e´glises cathedralles et collegialles de la province ayant entr´e et s´eance dans la chambre du clerg´e des e´tats, sur la pr´etention du doyen de Cuisery’. ADCO C 3031, fols. 490–1.

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instruction can be drawn’.98 Nothing could be further from the truth. These struggles were vital to those involved precisely because the Estates were a vibrant and important institution, offering the perfect stage upon which to fight the battles for precedence that were central to the society and culture of the ancien r´egime. Not that the chamber was paralysed by these wrangles, or reduced to a confused heap of fractious clerics, and all of those present were well aware that their colleagues had no choice but to defend their respective rights and privileges. While discussion of the internal affairs might prolong the assembly, it would not prevent the chamber from addressing the king’s business nor the affairs of the Estates. t h e c h a m b e r o f t h e n obi li t y In a memorable portrait of his father, Ren´e de Chˆateaubriand recalled a proud Breton gentleman so attached to his medieval fortress of Combourg that he would never leave it, not even to attend the Estates of Brittany.99 His compatriots were more adventurous, and tales of literally hundreds of Breton nobles flocking to these assemblies are legion,100 but were their Burgundian counterparts equally assiduous? During the opening decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule more than 100 nobles regularly attended the Estates with 189 present in 1671.101 Concern about the credentials of those present prompted the chamber to vote, in 1679, in favour of tightening its entry regulations. Previously all members of the second estate, apart from those holding judicial office in the sovereign courts, were eligible.102 Henceforth the simple title of gentleman would no longer suffice, and only those possessing a fief in the province would be admitted to the chamber. Nobles of the robe continued to be excluded, and those wishing to secure entry needed to supply proofs for verification by a commissioner of the chamber, who would issue a ‘certificate confirming that they are gentlemen of the quality required and not simply noblemen’.103 Here was an interesting form of noble census because in 1682 the commissioners presented a list by bailliage of the 247 nobles who had satisfied 98 99 100 101

102

´ Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, pp. 102–3. ´ M. Levaillant ed., Chˆateaubriand M´emoires d’outre-tombe. Edition du centenaire int´egrale et critique, 2 vols. (Paris, 1949), i, pp. 106–111, 158–60, 195–98. ´ The noble attendance at the provincial estates of Brittany has been analysed by Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, pp. 80–101. ADCO C 3018, fols 132–8. The figures that follow have been compiled using the registers of the d´ecrets of the Estates, ADCO C 3018–22, and those of the chamber of the nobility itself, ADCO ´ C 3041–8. The work of H. Beaune and J. d’Arbaumont, La noblesse aux Etats de Bourgogne de 1350 a` 1789 (Dijon, 1864), has also been consulted. 103 Ibid., fol. 60. ADCO C 3018, fols. 58–60.

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200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1662

1671

1679

1688

1697

1706

1715

1724

1733

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Figure 3.2 Chamber of nobility: attendance, 1662–1787

these requirements.104 Well over half of those named had made the trip to Dijon for the Estates, but thereafter numbers declined. On average, only eighty-five nobles attended the eleven meetings of the Estates held between 1685 and 1715.105 The almost constant warfare after 1688 may well account for the frequent low turn out, with only sixty-nine present in 1694, sixty-one in 1703 and seventy-four in 1712 when the two great conflicts at the end of Louis XIV’s reign were at their height. From 1718 to 1784 an average of seventy-five nobles attended the Estates, although that figure disguises some remarkable fluctuations.106 More than 100 were present in 1733, 1754, 1766 and 1769,107 but only forty-eight in 1748, forty-nine in 1757 and sixty-one in 1772.108 Military factors probably played a part in both 1748 and 1757, but a clear pattern of highs and lows associated with the presence of the governor, or to be more precise a member of the House of Bourbon-Cond´e, is unmistakeable.109 As a social group, the Burgundian 104 105 106 107 108 109

Ibid ., fols. 132–7. The figures are taken from ADCO C 3018, fols. 205–7, 253–5, 314–16, 358–61; C 3019, fols. 55–60, 116–19, 220–2, 304–6, 409, 505, 588–9. An average calculated using the attendance records contained in ADCO C 3019–23. ADCO C 3020, fols. 265–6, 453–4; C 3022, fols. 205–7, 300–1. ADCO C 3021, fols. 298–9, 546–7; C 3022, fols. 397–8. The period from 1740 to 1751 when the Estates were presided over by the duc de Saint-Aignan was marked by a steep fall in the attendance of both nobles and clerics.

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nobles were heavily represented in military service, and their ties of loyalty to the governor were strong. Even so, the proportion of nobles present was still small relative to the number eligible to attend. A list of those who received ‘letters of convocation’ in 1760 contains some 247 names,110 and it suggests that only about a third of the potential membership was bothering to attend an assembly that only met for two or three weeks, every three years! Moreover, a glance at the records of those present suggests that many came just once, and having established their credentials were never seen again.111 Explaining the high level of absenteeism is difficult. While it is clear that the Estates had retained great power and influence over the administration of the province, it is possible that they had become detached from the lives of the provincial gentlemen. As we shall see, most of those chosen to serve as ´elu were from rich and ancient families of the province, many of whom were now resident at court, or drawn from the intimate circle of the Cond´e household.112 The absence of the poorer local nobility may have resulted from frustration at being denied access to positions of influence reserved for the governor’s client`ele. Another factor that may have had some bearing was the relative poverty of many of these provincial gentlemen,113 whose absence might be explained by a refusal to tolerate the condescending treatment of the courtiers. Finally, it is conceivable that the tight political control of the assemblies exercised by the governor had caused some nobles to become disillusioned with the institution. In 1789, the marquis de Chastenay, a keen advocate of reform, claimed that the threat of lettres de cachet kept all but ‘parasites and young partygoers’ from attending the Estates.114 It is difficult to know if his attitude was typical, but the political impact of a relatively small attendance was considerable, especially as many of those sitting in the chamber were clients of the Cond´e. Burgundy had no equivalent to the Breton ‘bastion’ of inveterate noble opponents of the crown, nor was there a vast gallery of provincial hobereaux to play to.115 This was an important factor in ensuring that the Estates of Burgundy would not acquire a reputation for intransigence, and the role of the Cond´e in encouraging harmony was crucial. Their constant interest in the functioning 110 111 112 113 114 115

BMD MS 1164, fols. 1–6, ‘Rolle des lettres du roi pour la convocation des e´tats assign´es au 15 Novembre 1760’, and ADCO C 3022, fols. 121–3. This is certainly the impression gained from reading the registers of the chamber. See chapter 4. Some examples of noble poverty are cited below. BMD 21537, Lettre de m. le vicomte de Chastenay, de Flavigny en Bourgogne, le 20 F´evrier 1789. The role of the bastion has been discussed by Rebillon, Les ´etats de Bretagne, pp. 100–1, who warns us not to exaggerate the extent of its influence.

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of the local administration, together with their regular attendance at the Estates, helped both to preserve ties of fidelity and deference, and to overawe potential troublemakers. Finally, the presence of the governor enabled powerful local families to forge a bond with the Cond´e to their mutual advantage. In Brittany, on the other hand, the crown made the mistake of cutting the governor off from the Estates, which only met twice under his stewardship during the whole of the eighteenth century.116 Responsibility devolved on to the shoulders of the provincial commandants, who rarely remained in office long enough to build up the networks of patronage and loyalty needed to manage the Estates. As befitting a social class that, whatever the social and economic realities, preached the virtues of equality, the chamber of the nobility had none of the elaborate quarrels about precedence and seating arrangements that so obsessed the clerics. The plan of the chamber drawn up in 1697 reveals a room dominated by a large central bureau at the head of which were two armchairs, one for the outgoing ´elu and the other for his successor.117 The only other distinctions were the places reserved for the ´elus and deputies of the comt´es of Mˆacon and Charolles, and for an officer of the Estates, who served as secretary, and his clerks. As for the nobles themselves, they were free to sit wherever they pleased, although the convention was for elderly, or distinguished, members to congregate at the front close to the central bureau.118 It was the incumbent ´elu, or in his absence his nominated successor, who presided over the chamber.119 He named the orator and rapporteurs of the chamber, and introduced the various propositions for deliberation before collecting ‘the votes in no particular order’. All of those present could contribute to the debate, although an internal regulation adopted in 1778 contained the requirement that a speaker be at least twenty-five years of age.120 Given the importance of the ´elu, both within the chamber and the provincial administration, it is not surprising that the office was highly prized, and despite the theory of noble equality and the superficially democratic flavour of their assembly, it was not a post that was open to all. Only the most powerful, or well-connected, could entertain a realistic hope of election.121 The alcades were politically less significant than the ´elus, but 116

117 119

Ibid ., p. 184. The governorship was held by the comte de Toulouse, from 1695 to 1737, and thereafter by his son, the duc de Penthi`evre. It was Penthi`evre who attended the Estates in both 1746 and 1774. Rebillon argues that the Breton governors were only interested in the financial and honorific rewards of their office. 118 Ibid., and BMD MS 840, fol. 84. ADCO C 3036, bis. 120 ADCO C 3023, fol. 117. 121 See chapter 4. BMD MS 840, fols. 84–7.

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their appointment was still watched over closely by the governor, further reducing the chances of the Burgundians emulating the tumultuous and often rebellious scenes played out in the Estates of Brittany. When they were not considering the king’s business, the clergy had time to pursue their precedence disputes. The nobles, on the other hand, were preoccupied with defining the qualities required to sit amongst their ranks. The r`eglement of 1679 was not the first attempt to restrict entry to the chamber, and it would certainly not be the last.122 As ennoblements continued apace during the second half of Louis XIV’s reign, the nobility sought to impose barriers against an imagined tide of parvenus. In 1688, a new deliberation stipulated ‘that only the grandsons of secr´etaire du roi could be received in the chamber’.123 Further concerns were voiced in 1697, and again in 1712 when the governor sanctioned the demand that at least sixty years should have elapsed before the grandson of an anoblis was admissible.124 Even this was not enough to end confusion, and in 1727 and 1769 new regulations were issued.125 According to the terms of the deliberation of 1769, the chamber expected a candidate to produce proofs on a specially printed form of at least four degrees of nobility, and of 100 years of unbroken membership of the second estate.126 Finally, in a substantial r`eglement of some eighteen articles adopted in 1778, the Burgundian nobility codified its own requirements for admitting new members.127 As with the earlier regulations, entrance to the chamber was theoretically reserved for gentlemen practising the profession of arms. This was a polite way of excluding those holding judicial office, but in a significant gesture of goodwill towards one of the most powerful sections of the local elite it was agreed that any judge of distinguished family who sold, or resigned from, his office would be eligible to sit in the Estates.128 Yet despite their elaborate efforts to distinguish themselves, the provincial gentlemen could still suffer the ignominy of not being recognised when they sought entry to the Palais ´ des Etats. Honour was saved by a deliberation of 1775, which decreed that henceforth members of the chamber would sport in their buttonhole ‘a cross of gold . . . representing the ancient cross of Burgundy’.129 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

The issue had first surfaced during the reign of Henri IV, BMD MS 840, fol. 84, ‘M´emoire concernant la tenue des e´tats de Bourgogne . . .’. ADCO C 3018, fol. 260. The details from 1697 and 1712 are contained in ADCO C 3019, fols. 59, 510. ADCO C 3020, fol. 135, C 3023, fols. 116–19, C 3046, fols. 69–70. ADCO C 3022, fol. 402. The form itself was introduced in 1772. ADCO C 3023, fols. 116–19. Ibid ., fol. 116. Many of the local judges took advantage of their rights. ADCO C 3022, fol. 515.

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The existence, or otherwise, of an aristocratic reaction in eighteenthcentury France continues to be a source of dispute amongst historians.130 In Burgundy, at least, the evidence for a closing of noble ranks against either commoners, or anoblis, has to be treated extremely carefully. The members of the chamber of nobility had been suffering from periodic bouts of existential angst since at least the first half of the seventeenth century. If recent anoblis were the obvious targets for exclusion, with the imposition of first a sixty-year and then a 100-year rule, they were not the only nobles to be disappointed. The requirement for all members of the chamber to possess a fief, or part of one, in the province was no less an obstacle to those whose fortune did not match their distinguished pedigree. Both old and new families were thus barred from attending the Estates, and with many nobles sitting in the Parlement or Chambre des Comptes the chamber could hardly claim to be representative of the second estate as a whole. Amongst the other more important internal deliberations of the nobility were matters pertaining to the levy of the arri`ere ban, which was revived for the last time during the War of the League of Augsburg.131 Within the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon some 220 nobles were mobilised in 1692, of whom 173 were drawn from the duchy and comt´es.132 When we consider that many Burgundian nobles were already serving in the royal army, or had been included in the arri`ere ban of the previous year, it represented a significant levy. At least one septuagenarian received his call to arms, but as he bravely prepared himself for the fray others proved more reluctant.133 At the next assembly of the Estates, the comte de Briord, ´elu and president of the nobility, made representations to the governor about the excessive demands of the arri`ere ban, and two deputies were appointed to compile a list of those eligible to serve in order to substantiate their claims.134 After 1700 the arri`ere ban was allowed to lapse, and the official registers reveal the nobility engaged in the more congenial task of distributing gifts and pensions amongst themselves. The chamber had long reserved the right to help deserving cases such as M. de Montferrand, gentilhomme de la porte of the noblesse, who was awarded a pension of 100 livres for life in 1742 after 130

131 132 133 134

B. de Fauconpret, Les preuves de la noblesse au XVIIIe si`ecle: la r´eaction aristocratique. Avec un recueil de tous les ordres, honneurs, fonctions, ´ecoles, chapitres, r´eserv´es a` la noblesse (Paris, 1999), provides a stimulating recent discussion of the subject. J. Lynn, The giant of the grand si`ecle. The French army, 1610–1715 (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 369–71. ADCO C 3599, ‘Repartition pour l’arri`ere ban, 1692’. The remainder were raised in Bresse and the pays adjacents. ADCO C 3599, the requˆete of Daniel de Pri´ezac to the intendant. The old gentleman was excused service by the intendant. In 1691, ten nobles failed to arrive at their military rendezvous of Le Mans. ADCO C 3041, fol. 77.

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his chˆateau was destroyed by fire.135 Such generosity was made possible by the quirks of the local fiscal system, which fixed the nobility’s contribution to the province’s capitation at 31,000 livres, a sum that remained unchanged throughout the eighteenth century.136 Collection of the noble capitation was entrusted to a group of commissioners, appointed by the governor from amongst the members of the chamber, and they were able to ensure a healthy surplus. By the end of the reign of Louis XV, the chamber was able to use that fund to provide financial assistance to large numbers of impoverished gentlefolk. Charlotte Franc¸oise Dumouchet, for example, was granted an annual pension of 300 livres for life in 1772, while Jeanne Louise Denise de Beaurepaire received 1,200 livres, to be paid in three separate instalments, in 1775.137 Jacques Ducrest and his two aged sisters were also favoured with a bequest of 150 livres each for life.138 More surprising was the case of the chevalier de Ligny, if only because he was the grandson of Jean Bart, the great sea captain of the War of the Spanish Succession.139 Rather than seek his fortune on the high seas, the chevalier was living in genteel obscurity in land-locked Burgundy, but his troubles merited an annual pension of 300 livres for life. Most of the recipients of financial aid were the impoverished spinster daughters of serving military officers, retired soldiers eking out an existence on a meagre pension or the victims of fire or natural disaster.140 There are, however, cases like that of M. de Maigret, the ‘son of a gentleman reduced to beggary’,141 who was helped to establish himself in an honourable career. His face was his fortune in the sense that he was described as possessing ‘a likeable, honest and attractive appearance’, inspiring the president of the chamber to propose that he receive a pension to meet his expenses as a volunteer in one of the regiments of Monsieur, brother of Louis XVI. Maigret senior was also granted financial aid, and even when his claims to be a Burgundian were later revealed to be bogus his son’s stipend continued to be paid.142 Those seeking financial aid also advanced less conventional reasons. During the assembly of 1775, the comte de Jaucourt reported on the case of an anonymous gentleman who wanted to borrow 3,000 livres from the chamber in order to complete ‘a pressing affair’.143 Jaucourt’s good offices 135 136 137 140 141 143

ADCO C 3022, fols. 549–50. This figure excludes the tax paid by office holders and privilegi´es. The inequalities of the tax system are discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 10. 138 Ibid., fol. 510. 139 Ibid., fol. 402. ADCO C 3022, fols. 402, 508. For more examples see: ADCO C 3022, fols. 401–5, 506–15; C 3023, fols. 249–51; C 3024, fols. 254–6. 142 ADCO C 3023, fols. 249–51. ADCO C 3022, fol. 515. ADCO C 3022, fols. 513–14.

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were sufficient to guarantee that the loan was made, but the accompanying deliberation specifically forbade similar actions in the future. When the comte de Briailles sought to borrow money from the nobility to assist ‘with the legal costs of an important lawsuit from which he expected to profit handsomely’, he met with a firm rebuff.144 The change in mood was, in part, the result of a short-term cash flow crisis generated by earlier munificence, which obliged the chamber to curb its generous instincts.145 According to the terms of a deliberation of 1778, no request for financial assistance would be considered until a report of the state of the capitation fund was available. Henceforth the total amount to be distributed was fixed at 10,000 livres per annum, with individuals limited to an annual maximum of 600 livres.146 Finally, as the purpose of the fund was to help nobles who had fallen on hard times, only those families paying the noble capitation would be eligible for assistance. It proved to be a shrewd decision. The sudden threat of being cut off from a potentially vital source of outdoor relief had a rejuvenating effect on the nobility’s capitation rolls. Whereas only 880 ‘cottes’ were listed in 1782, producing some 45,000 livres, that figure had leapt to 1,200 by 1787 and was worth no less than 70,000 livres.147 The chamber had thus pulled off the remarkable feat of increasing the number of noble taxpayers by nearly a third in just five years, raising some interesting questions about how much tax they had been contributing over the previous seventy years! It also sounds a note of warning to those historians who have been tempted to use the capitation rolls of 1789 as a yardstick for measuring the number of nobles in the French population.148 Finally, the administration of the capitation offers an excellent example of how the chamber of nobility, working in cooperation with the governor, was able to supervise its own affairs. t h e c h a m b e r o f t h e t h i rd e s tat e Despite its all-encompassing title, the chamber of the third estate was never intended to represent the whole of that order. Instead, full representation was confined to just twenty-five towns, drawn overwhelmingly from within the duchy, whose presence was justified by distant historical precedent, rather than a contemporary assessment of their size or economic importance. A further nine towns, four from the Auxerrois and five from the 144 146 148

145 ADCO C 3046, fol. 272. ADCO C 3024, fol. 284. 147 ADCO C 3048, fol. 59. Ibid ., fol. 289. As Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French nobility, pp. 28–31, has done.

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Plate 3 Plan of the chamber of the third estate at the Estates of Burgundy in 1697)

Outre-Saˆone, were permitted to send deputies in rotation, effectively allowing each to enter the Estates once every twelve or fifteen years.149 As for the twenty-five towns with full membership, they were in turn split into two groups known as the grande and petite roues, although it should be noted that the towns of the grande roue were also members of the petite, which also determined the seating arrangements in the chamber as can be seen in plate 3.150 At the head of the thirteen towns forming the grande roue was Dijon, whose vicomte-mayeur was the permanent president of the chamber. The capital also enjoyed the privilege of sending three deputies to the Estates, the other members of the grande roue being restricted to just two. These towns 149 150

The towns of the Auxerrois were Seignelay, Cravant, Vermanton and St Bris, while those from the Outre-Saˆone were Cuiseaux, Saint-Laurent-l`es-Chalon, Louhans, Cuisery and Verdun. ADCO C 3048, bis. The towns of the grande roue were: Dijon, Autun, Beaune, Nuits-St-Georges, Saint-Jean-de-Losne, Chalon-sur-Saˆone, Semur-en-Auxois, Montbard, Avallon, Chˆatillon-surSeine, Auxonne, Seurre, Auxerre. They were joined by the towns of Bar-sur-Seine and Charolles after their unions with the duchy in 1721 and 1751 respectively. The petite roue was composed of: Arnay-le-duc, Saulieu, Flavigny, Taland, Montr´eal, Mirebeau, Marcigny, Bourbon-Lancy, Semuren-Brionnais, Viteaux. They were joined by deputies from: Outre-Saˆone, Auxerrois, Charolais, Mˆaconnais and Bar-sur-Seine.

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60

50

40

30

20

10

0 1688

1694 1700 1706 1712 1718 1724

1730

1736

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1748

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1766 1772 1778 1784

Figure 3.3 Chamber of the third estate: attendance, 1688–1787

shared the honour of providing the ´elu of the third estate, with the office passing from one to another in strict rotation. The system had originated in the sixteenth century, when the order of precedence had been carved onto a wooden wheel to prevent disputes about whose turn it was to hold the office.151 A similar method was employed to choose the three alcades, who were again chosen in rotation but from the towns of both the grande and petite roues. Whereas attendance in the chambers of both the clergy and the nobility fluctuated considerably, the deputies of the third estate were a model of consistency (figure 3.3). Fifty-nine deputies were present in 1688, and an average of fifty-four between 1691 and the end of the reign of Louis XIV.152 Although numbers fell slightly during the reign of Louis XV, to an average of fifty,153 the final years of the ancien r´egime (1775–84) witnessed a steady recovery with an average of fifty-five deputies present, and at the 151 152

153

´ Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, p. 103. The figures have been compiled from the registers of the d´ecrets of the Estates, see: ADCO C 3018, fols. 262, 316–22, 365; C 3019, fols. 59–62, 120–3, 223–7, 307–10, 418–22, 510, 589, 656–60, 727; C 3020, fols. 51, 135, 256–7, 270; C 3021, fols. 78–9, 151–3, 218–20, 300–3, 392–4, 456–8, 551–2; C 3022, fols. 61–3, 127–9, 217–19, 300–1, 405, 515–17; C 3023, fols. 128–9, 251–4, 256; and those of the chamber itself, ADCO C 3049–54. The average is based upon the nineteen assemblies from 1718–1772.

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last meeting of the Estates in 1787 attendance reached sixty, one more than at the assembly of 1688. It was the mayors and the ´echevins of the towns who served as the representatives of the third estate. Traditionally, they had been elected by tumultuous assemblies of their fellow citizens, but by the late seventeenth century it was the governor who controlled the majority of appointments.154 When these positions were converted into venal offices in 1692 that power was confirmed. Rather than allow the formation of an independent oligarchy, the Estates bought the offices themselves in 1696, and thereafter the mayors were appointed by the ´elus, acting in concert with the governor.155 Within the chamber, the presidency was exercised by the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon, whose position and claim to the title of ‘perpetual mayor’ of the third estate was uncontested.156 In their deliberations, the deputies spoke in turn according to a long-established system of precedence, beginning with Dijon and the towns of the grande roue and then continuing on around the petite roue before drawing to a close with the representatives of the Outre-Saˆone and the comt´es. Although most of the major towns had two deputies only one, usually the mayor, had a ‘vote’, and his colleague was present in a purely consultative capacity.157 In contrast to the other chambers there was relatively little internal controversy, except for a series of protests about precedence, which marked the opening of every Estates. This consisted of little more than the mayor of Beaune claiming that he ought to be seated and give his opinion before his colleague from Autun.158 He would be followed by the mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone, demanding precedence over Beaune, the mayors of Nuits-Saint-Georges and Saint-Jean-de-Losne asserting their superiority over Chalon-sur-Saˆone and so on. While we should never ignore the significance of these quarrels, the fact that the same protests were issued at every meeting of the Estates for over a century without any action being taken does imply that they were more of a formality than a sign of genuine grievance. 154

155 156 157 158

For a discussion of these elections in Dijon, see M. P. Holt, ‘Popular political culture and mayoral elections in sixteenth-century Dijon’, in M. P. Holt, ed., Society and institutions in early modern France (London, 1991), pp. 98–116. B. Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’, 280, has argued that the Cond´e controlled the appointment of mayors in the reign of Louis XIV. We should not, however, forget that before 1692, elections were still held and the office frequently changed hands as the first president of the Parlement of Dijon made clear when arguing against the introduction of venality, AN G7 157, fol. 91, Brulart to Pontchartrain, 8 December 1689. Brulart’s memoir was entitled ‘Sentiment sur certaines propositions faite pour la Bourgogne’. See chapter 4. After 1740, the ´elus had more scope for independent action relative to the mayors. BMD MS 840, fol. 92. Only in his absence did disputes occur. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 10, n. 1. For an example of these protests, see ADCO C 3018, fol. 318, and C 3049, fol. 186.

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Of more pressing concern were the attempts of towns excluded from the Estates to gain entry, or of those from the Outre-Saˆone or comt´es to obtain full membership.159 Daniel Ligou has claimed that for the towns representation in the Estates was seen as worthless by 1710,160 but before and after that date they fought hard to secure the privilege. At the assembly of 1682, the inhabitants of Arc-en-Barois presented a requˆete seeking admission to the chamber and were refused.161 Undaunted by their setback, they tried again in 1694, and this time took the precaution of procuring a royal lettre de cachet supporting their demand.162 It was to no avail, and they once more found the doors of the chamber closed. If gaining access to the Estates was difficult, it was not completely impossible. At the assembly of 1733, the chamber agreed that in future Mailly-la-Ville would be added to the list of towns from the Auxerrois eligible for representation.163 As there were now five towns to share the privilege on a rotating basis, they had won the right to send a deputy to Dijon once every fifteen years. In 1784, however, there were signs that the chamber had begun to adopt a more welcoming stance, allowing each of the five towns of the Outre-Saˆone to send deputies to every meeting of the Estates. There was, therefore, a very slight increase in the number of towns represented at the final assembly of the Estates held in 1787.164 Yet it is still striking just how narrow the representation of the third estate actually was. The former comt´es of Auxerre, Auxonne and Charolles were all disadvantaged relative to the duchy, and unlike Mˆacon they no longer had the compensation of possessing their own ´etats particuliers. Perhaps more important was the complete absence of any deputies from the peasantry, a problem exacerbated by the exclusion of ordinary cur´es from the chamber of the clergy. In theory, the peasantry was represented by the great noble or ecclesiastical landlords, who could be expected to protect their interests against those of the towns. However, by the eighteenth century these traditional arguments were wearing very thin, and in 1789 the cahiers produced by the inhabitants of the Burgundian countryside were filled with calls for political representation, alongside denunciations of a harsh seigneurial regime. 159 160

161 162

Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 107–8. D. Ligou, ‘La communaut´e d’Is-sur-Tille et les e´tats de Bourgogne, 1692–1789’, Actes du 93e CNSS. Section d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 2 (1968), 27–45. Lamarre, Petites villes, p. 108, repeats Ligou’s argument, but without offering any further evidence. ADCO C 3018, fol. 146. According to the register the inhabitants of Cuzeau [sic], near Auxonne, presented a similar requˆete. 163 ADCO C 3020, fol. 270. 164 Lamarre, Petites villes, p. 108. ADCO C 3018, fol. 364.

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With the three orders firmly ensconced in their respective chambers, communication between them depended upon an elaborate system of deputations. When examining the orders contained in the governor’s instructions, it was the third estate that enjoyed the right of making the first proposition.165 If, for example, the king had requested a don gratuit of one million livres and the chamber had voted to accord such a sum, then two deputies would be sent to carry news of the decision to the other chambers. Once the clergy had received word from the third estate, it would deliberate before dispatching its own envoys to inform both the nobility and the third estate. Needless to say, the nobles themselves followed the same procedure, and with all three chambers sending emissaries to convey news of their actions it is easy to imagine the amount of traffic generated by all but the most straightforward issue. Each chamber had huissiers strategically positioned to warn them of approaching deputations, who, in line with a strictly observed protocol, were greeted at the door and escorted to armchairs especially arranged for their reception.166 As the work of the Estates progressed, the three orders found time to indulge in a round of self-congratulation, sending deputies to deliver ‘compliments of honour’ to the other chambers. These were predictable affairs. The third estate would assure the clergy of their respect, praise their charitable and religious zeal, and ask for protection and moral and spiritual guidance for the people.167 The second estate was usually less verbose, and was happy to inform the clergy of ‘the nobility’s great esteem for such a respectable corps’.168 As for the nobility, they received praise for their martial valour from the third estate, and expressions of respect from the clergy. Finally, the third estate could expect to hear a brief compliment expressed in patrician tones from both of the privileged orders. The etiquette of these exchanges was closely monitored, and little changed throughout the period after 1661. It is, therefore, easy to imagine the shock caused by the compliments delivered by Gueneau de Mussy, mayor of Semur-enAuxois, on behalf of the third estate in 1769. Rather than flatter the clergy with further praise of their Christian virtues, he delivered ‘a discourse on 165 166 167 168

The procedure was explained in a letter sent by the local intendant to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral in 1766, AN H1 128, Dos. 1, fol. 20, Amelot to L’Averdy, 7 August 1766. ADCO C 3032, fols. 287–8, for a description of the protocol from the Estates of 1760. For a typical example, see the speech of 1736, ADCO C 3031, fol. 399. ADCO C 3032, fol. 24. This particular quote is from the compliment of 1748.

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the benefits that would accrue from enclosures’.169 His hosts listened respectfully, and the bishop of Autun then suggested that he pass a copy of his speech to the ´elus. Gueneau’s intervention was a classic example of the mania for agricultural improvement that gripped the Estates in the second half of the eighteenth century, but he did not begin a new style of ‘compliments of honour’. His successors stuck fast to the traditional routine and nothing as daring was heard at subsequent meetings of the Estates. Deputations were also the principal means of officially informing the governor of events within the Estates, and once the chambers had elected their new ´elu they each sent a six-man deputation to inform him of their choice.170 The procedure was repeated after every important deliberation, and when the votes failed to match the terms of the governor’s instructions, the tone and content of his reply would be relayed to the chambers as they pondered their next move. During the reign of Louis XIV, communication between the chambers was also possible through the appointment of small committees composed of representatives of the three orders. In 1688, for example, deputies assembled to consider problems arising from the payment of the don gratuit, a procedure repeated in 1700 when reform of abuses in the collection of the taille was on the agenda.171 Working on their own, or under the orders of the governor, the committees were expected to draft proposals that could then be put to the chambers for swift ratification. Such a system avoided the almost inevitable delays and confusion caused by debating complicated fiscal or administrative matters in three separate assemblies simultaneously. Perhaps surprisingly, given the obvious advantages of the committee system, it never seems to have become a permanent feature of the Estates, and references to it after 1715 are elusive.172 It was not until 1787 that there was a serious attempt to revive the practice, and by then the earlier precedents had been forgotten.173 If official deputations provided the main public channel for communication within the Estates, there were, of course, many other routes by which messages could pass. As we might expect, the role of the governor was particularly important. He was responsible for deciding the order and 169 171 172 173

170 For an example, see ADCO C 3000, fol. 205. ADCO C 3033, fol. 35. ADCO C 3030, fol. 181, and C 3041, fol. 229. For other examples from the Estates of 1715, see C 3031, fols. 11–14. I have found no further examples in the registers of either the Estates, or the individual chambers. See chapter 12.

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timing of the demands put before the chambers, and, as the intendant ruefully observed in 1766: I am not informed about the different matters to be put before the assemblies, which are discussed in the private committees that are held every morning by His Serene Highness, because I do not attend these committees.174

The exclusion of the intendant from these crucial meetings reflected his comparatively lowly status at the Estates, where he was very much the junior partner to be called upon, or not, as the governor saw fit. Those who were present in the governor’s committees were the presidents of the three chambers, together with ‘those persons most informed about the affairs [of the Estates]’.175 With prior organisation and consultation the governor could be reasonably confident of dealing with most eventualities. When trouble did arise, he was expected to use all of his powers of persuasion to overcome opposition to royal demands. The prince de Cond´e gave a good indication of what was involved in 1763, when coaxing the reluctant Estates to vote funds for the coastal militia, an expense that was particularly resented in land-locked Burgundy. In a letter to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral he wrote: I spent the whole of yesterday speaking, or listening, to one or another, I assured myself of the third estate, I finally had grounds to hope that the clergy would come back to its original position, but I must confess that I despaired of the nobility, even if I must do it the justice of saying that it is full of well-intentioned people.176

Despite his pessimistic tone, the prince’s efforts were not in vain, and the nobility eventually gave its approval to the article. When seeking to overcome opposition in the Estates, the governor could call upon the professional knowledge and expertise of the intendant and the assistance of local dignitaries such as the military commandant or the bishops.177 From 1722 to 1761, the post of commandant was held by the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, the head of one of Burgundy’s foremost aristocratic houses, and he wielded great influence over both the local nobility and the Estates.178 The Saulx-Tavanes, and other distinguished families, 174 175 176 177

178

AN H1 128, Dos. 1, fol. 20, Amelot to L’Averdy, 7 August 1766. BMD MS 2285, fol. viii, ‘notes sur les e´tats de Bourgogne’. This memoir written by a local cleric, Andre Chenevet, tallies with the account of Amelot in 1766. AN H1 127, plaque 1, fol. 48, Cond´e to Bertin, 29 November 1763. A good example is provided by the long serving intendant, Bouchu. A local man, he was able to make good use of his personal contacts, and his letter to Colbert of 24 May 1671 is particularly revealing, Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, p. 113. Forster, The house of Saulx-Tavanes, is the essential guide.

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could usually be relied upon to throw their weight behind the governor when the need arose, and much the same could be said of the bishops. They expected to assist the governor, and in 1691 the bishop of Autun was mystified when he failed to receive instructions prior to his departure for Dijon. He informed the contrˆoleur g´en´eral that ‘I arrived here yesterday, a little before monseigneur the prince, and for the first time in the twentyfive years that I have been bishop [of Autun], I am going to appear [at the Estates] without having been informed of what I should say that will be of service to His Majesty’.179 We should not, however, assume that these local dignitaries were simply acting on the orders of the crown. While they were determined that the Estates should proceed smoothly, they were no less committed to protecting the interests and privileges of the province. During the Estates of 1721, the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, who was presiding for the absent governor, provided a classic illustration of his role as powerbroker, mediating between the interests of the king and those of the province. In order to bolster his own authority, he demanded permission for the Estates to pay part of their don gratuit in the near worthless paper currency left after the collapse of John Law’s system.180 After describing the plight of the province, he informed his uncle, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral F´elix Le Pelletier de La Houssaye, that the province would have ‘a very poor opinion of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral’s nephew’ if he could not obtain the favour. Just in case Le Pelletier was in any doubt about how seriously Saulx-Tavanes viewed the matter, he concluded his letter with the words ‘I count on this absolutely, or I will renounce for ever the right to preside at the Estates of Burgundy. You will have to reproach yourself for having deprived me of something that flatters me immensely’. The commandant’s request was granted, and it offers a fine example of how local powerbrokers could succeed in establishing a mutually rewarding relationship with the crown. The urgent tone of Saulx-Tavanes’ correspondence with Le Pelletier derived, in part, from his understandable desire to make a favourable impression when presiding at the Estates. With the governor absent, the potential for unrest was greater, and it explains why Saulx-Tavanes wanted to have some tangible concessions from the government to demonstrate the strength of his own credit. Indeed even the Cond´e were sensitive on this score, and once the king had shown favour to one governor he could not remove it from his successor for fear of undermining his prestige. Thus on 179 180

AN G7 157, fol. 175, Autun to Pontchartrain, 30 May 1691. I assume this was the result of an oversight on the part of the crown rather than deliberate policy. AN H1 100, fol. 94, Saulx-Tavanes to Le Pelletier de La Houssaye, 10 May 1721.

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his accession to the governorship in 1712, the duc de Bourbon successfully demanded an additional reduction of the don gratuit on the basis that such a grace had been accorded to his father.181 Winning concessions from the crown was not the only way to woo the members of the Estates. The triennial gatherings in Dijon were one of the highlights of the social calendar, and in the course of two weeks of banquets, balls and gambling sessions there was ample time to pursue official business in more congenial surroundings, while forging, or renewing, personal and family ties.182 The reputation for revelry generated by these events was sufficient to merit official censure. In 1727, the secretary of state, Saint-Florentin, informed Saulx-Tavanes ‘that during the assemblies of the Estates in the provinces the most sumptuous banquets are held. His Majesty has done me the honour of informing me that he disapproves of this excessive expenditure’.183 He added, at the next meeting of the Estates ‘you will serve at your table no more than is indispensable for an honourable constitution’. Despite being dated 1 April, the minister’s letter was not a joke, but such puritanical sentiments had little impact in a province blessed with fine wines and a gastronomic tradition to accompany them. Nor did his strictures make political sense. The ability to entertain the deputies was a valuable weapon, and the prospect of an invitation to dine with the governor could help to persuade wavering deputies of the benefits of loyalty. Indeed, they were not the only ones to benefit from the prince’s hospitality. During the assembly of 1754, it was reported that ‘a thousand tickets were distributed and that the bourgeoisie was invited. There was dancing in three halls and the ball was [one of the most] glistening’.184 Not surprisingly, therefore, the Estates continued much as before, and local commentators appear to have judged their success by reference to the quality of the entertainment. Overall the evidence from the Estates held between 1661 and the revolution reveals the existence of a well-oiled political machine. If the reaction of the deputies could never be taken for granted, the governor and his lieutenants exuded an air of confidence. They were familiar with the rituals and ceremonies of the Estates, respected the privileges and concerns of the chambers and had considerable knowledge of the deputies themselves. These were all potential trump cards when it came to the 181 182 183 184

ADCO C 3030, fols. 580–6. Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 153–7, provides some fascinating details of these events from the Estates of 1718. Similar scenes were enacted at the gatherings of the Estates in other provinces. ADCO E 1679, Saint-Florentin to Saulx-Tavanes, 1 April 1727. Dumay, Mercure Dijonnois, p. 73.

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negotiations and bargaining necessary to achieve compliance with the king’s demands. t h e wo rk o f t h e a s s e m bly The principal purpose of the Estates was to consider the articles contained in the governor’s instructions, and, first and foremost, that meant the don gratuit. Until 1674, it was common for the bargaining process to last several weeks, with the governor obliged to engage in protracted negotiations with the parsimonious deputies. Although the don gratuit was rarely a source of contention after 1674, the Estates continued to question royal fiscal demands, and other taxes were the target of fierce criticism. Winning approval for taxation was, therefore, the overriding priority for the crown, and the most important objective of the governor. He could not, however, afford to neglect the other items in his instructions, most of which had fiscal implications of one form or another. Persuading the Estates to provide for the military ´etapes, maintain the road network or fund new manufacturing ventures all cost money. The Estates were generally happy to accept administrative responsibilities because they increased their standing within the province, and by the mid-eighteenth century they were actively campaigning for new powers.185 Any worries about incurring extra costs could be offset by the knowledge that the Estates themselves would be responsible for raising the money and overseeing how it was spent. As for the crown, it was prepared to allow the province a considerable degree of latitude in return for an untroubled supply of taxes and loans. That the king’s business could be transacted in the short space of two to three weeks was the result of a generally harmonious relationship that was reinforced by the authority of the Cond´e, and the skilful management of the Estates that they represented. When not discussing the articles contained in the governor’s instructions, the deputies were free to examine the conduct of the provincial administration. Each chamber would listen to the reading of the cahier de remontrances presented to the king during the voyage of honour, and his response to their grievances.186 They would also receive deputations from both the alcades and the conseils des ´etats to present their remarques. The seven alcades (two clerics, two nobles and three members of the third estate), as elected representatives of the three chambers, were treated with great respect. They followed immediately behind the ´elus when saluting 185

See chapter 11.

186

The voyage of honour and the remonstrances are examined in chapter 5.

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the governor on his arrival in Dijon, and as a corps made a tour of the principal dignitaries and institutions of the province to offer and receive compliments.187 Their high ceremonial standing was matched by the gravity of their office, which was to examine the work of the provincial administration, and, where appropriate, censor its conduct or suggest plans for reform. The presentation of their remarques was one of the most important events of the Estates, and each article was the subject of a separate deliberation by the three chambers, which rarely rejected their suggestions outright. Instead, they tended to recommend that the articles be added to the cahier de remontrances, referred to the chamber of ´elus or adopted as a d´ecret of the Estates. The alcades were frequently outspoken in their criticisms, and there is no doubt that they took their oath to censor the administration very seriously. The potential benefits of this system of scrutiny are obvious, but unless their recommendations were backed by a formal d´ecret they were not binding on the ´elus, who often ignored them. Despite these limits to their effectiveness, the alcades were respected, and the prospect of their remarques becoming a focus for dissent was always a source of concern for the governor, who feared that their publication would incite opposition.188 After censoring several of their remarques in 1742, the government ordered that in future their report should be sent to the secretary of state for approval before the alcades presented them to the Estates.189 Even that was not enough to prevent a major crisis in 1781, when the governor was obliged to strike out several articles that he believed to be inflammatory. The remarques of the conseils des ´etats were less contentious. They too presented their report to the various chambers, which then considered the articles in the manner described above. As we might expect of professional legal experts, they tended to make observations on the impact of new royal legislation, or the laws and customs of the province, suggesting innovations or amendments where necessary.190 Given the complicated nature of many of these issues, the articles were frequently accompanied by detailed legal memoranda that were presumably ignored by all but the most conscientious deputies.191 Not surprisingly the majority of their suggestions were referred to the ´elus, and later formed the basis of the cahier de remontrances. 187 188 190 191

The protocol is described in the registers of the alcades, ADCO C 3306, fol. 3. 189 See chapter 8. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 22–3. For examples from 1706 and 1709, see ADCO C3030, fols. 506–13, 529–66. For a good example of their work, ADCO C 3032, fol. 144.

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The process of scrutinising the administration also involved the examination of the carnet des ratifications. These imposing registers contained records of the deliberations of the ´elus over the previous three years, and in the overwhelming majority of cases the chambers did no more than add their seal of approval. In particular, the Estates gave their retrospective consent to the appointment of provincial officials, the loans or taxes contracted during their absence and to the daily decisions taken by the ´elus acting in their name. Much of this was a pure formality, but there are some examples of protests arising from the reading of the carnet. In 1757, the Estates were angry to learn that the ´elus had agreed to a substantial increase in their contribution to the costs of the militia and the decision to remonstrate was approved unanimously.192 On occasions the desire to police the activities of the ´elus could be taken to extremes. In 1778, for example, it was discovered that the published version of a decision taken by the ´elus failed to match the minutes in the official register, producing a d´ecret forbidding such laxity in the future.193 Finally, within the chambers, the various members had the right to raise issues of concern that could, in theory, prompt the Estates to pass a d´ecret regulating the procedures of the ´elus or the provincial officials. Taken together, the remarques of the alcades and the practice of verifying the carnet des ratifications meant that the ´elus could not take the approval of the Estates for granted. In addition to watching over the activities of the chamber of ´elus, the Estates could also issue d´ecrets designed to reform or improve the quality of the provincial administration. In a d´ecret of 1665, they declared ‘that no tax could be levied nor payment authorised without the presence of at least two of the representatives of the [three] orders’.194 An almost identical d´ecret was issued in 1682, and its scope was extended to include all ‘important affairs’.195 From the perspective of the Estates, it was crucial for their ´elus to control their own chamber rather than allow their permanent officials to exercise power in their name. That the d´ecrets of 1665 and 1682 repeated in large measure those of 1554, 1557, 1584, 1611, 1614 and 1645, to name but a few, demonstrates the vigilance of the Estates and one of their principal weaknesses. While the ´elus were, when it suited them, proud to boast that ‘a d´ecret of the Estates is a law for us’,196 there were few direct sanctions that could be applied against them if their deeds failed to match their fine words. During the triennalit´e of 1751–4, for example, the ´elus avoided 192 193 195

ADCO C 3006, fol. 31, and C 3051, fol. 100. The increase was from 204,817 livres to 344,726 livres per annum. 194 ADCO C 2997, fol. 92. ADCO C 3011, fol. 13. 196 ADCO C 3354, fol. 321. ADCO C 2999, fols. 6–7.

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adding an item to the cahier des remontrances, despite an explicit d´ecret from the Estates.197 Much grumbling ensued, but there was not much the Estates could do other than add the missing article to their next set of remonstrances. Such complaints were, however, increasingly rare after 1682, and the ´elus were generally assiduous in the accomplishment of their duties. Instead, new d´ecrets focused upon the rules governing administrative practice, although they all suffered from the problem of enforcement. Despite the exhortations of the Estates, and even the good intentions of the ´elus, the d´ecrets formed a massive corpus of instructions stretching back into the middle ages. Not surprisingly, rather than spend time in the archives checking that they were acting in accordance with earlier d´ecrets, successive waves of ´elus tended to copy the administrative practice of their immediate predecessors.198 To overcome this institutional inertia required persistence on the part of the Estates, pressure from the crown or the governor or the emergence of a general consensus in favour of change. Yet even the most cursory investigation of the d´ecrets reveals that the Estates were far from moribund, and the ´elus were never entirely free of their control. The regulations governing the internal procedures of the Estates were also subject to periodic revision. In 1668, a d´ecret ordered the presidents of the three chambers to read the results of their deliberations at the end of every session, and then to sign the approved versions in order to prevent confusion and error.199 Similar d´ecrets were issued concerning the rituals, ceremonies and assemblies of the Estates, and it is clear that as a body they enjoyed real independence when it came to defining their internal rules and procedures. The crown was generally tolerant of the situation, and it was not until the interregnum following the death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740 that it intervened directly. Royal r`eglements issued in 1742 and 1744 tightened the king’s control over the internal affairs of the chamber of ´elus and the appointment of the most important offices of the Estates. The battle to overturn these r`eglements was one of the principal preoccupations of the Estates in the final years of the ancien r´egime.200 Time was also devoted to resolving the internal wrangles of the individual chambers, and it was to the authority of the Estates that the chamber of the clergy turned when trying to block the pretensions of the abb´e 197 198 199

ADCO C 3005, fols. 458–9 As the alcades noted in their censored remarques of 1742, ADCO C 3304, fols. 81–2. 200 See chapter 8. ADCO C 2997, fol. 102.

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g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux in 1730. The other chambers condemned the abb´e, and ordered the procureurs syndics to seek official confirmation of their decision from the king.201 Meetings of the Estates could also be used as a platform from which to wage war against other corporate bodies, notably the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and the ´etats particuliers. Protecting the position of the Estates within the provincial hierarchy by upholding its privileges and jurisdiction was treated as an almost sacred duty, and the history of the period is punctuated by often fierce disputes with these local rivals. In addition to examining the king’s requests and their own affairs, the Estates were expected to consider the many requˆetes submitted by the communities, institutions and people of the province. As many as one hundred of these petitions were received at every meeting, and the hospitals and religious orders such as the General Hospital and the Bon Pasteur of Dijon, or the Aumˆone G´en´eral of Autun, were amongst the most frequent recipients of financial aid. The towns and villages of the province also appealed for help on a variety of matters, and demands for tax relief after a poor harvest were ubiquitous. Variations on the theme included the requˆete of 1691 from the inhabitants of Baigneux ‘to have their taille reduced and to be exempted from providing a soldier for the militia because of the [losses caused by] frost and the passage of troops’.202 Fire, pestilence, whether an affliction of man or beast, and numerous other natural or man-made disasters were the inspiration behind these appeals for a tax reduction. Requests for the construction or repair of roads and public buildings were perennial features of the petitions. To add weight to their demands, it was common for several communities to present a joint requˆete as the villages of Seigny and Grignon did in 1691 when seeking the repair of a bridge.203 Even more powerful and exalted towns such as Auxerre, Beaune and Semur-en-Auxois thought it worthwhile combining in 1787 to request ‘the complete construction of the road from Beaune to Noyers’.204 Individual requests were usually for services rendered. The various officers of the Estates, or their dependents, sought pensions and gratifications for their labours, and even less wellconnected figures felt it worthwhile seeking financial aid. The chambers deliberated on all of these petitions individually, and they had three main options to choose from, namely to approve the requˆete, reject it, or refer it to the ´elus for a final decision. 201 203

202 ADCO C 3018, fol. 303. ADCO C 3004, fol. 374. 204 ADCO C 3048, fol. 86. Ibid ., fol. 301.

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As the number of requˆetes presented at the Estates was relatively stable during the century before 1789, and included demands from a representative sample of the province’s communities, from the towns of the grande roue to the smallest hamlets, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Estates continued to be recognised as an effective means of obtaining favour, assistance or redress.205 While the administration of the ´elus would become a target of criticism in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Estates themselves retained a degree of respect. In 1789, there were widespread calls for their reform, almost none for their suppression. pe n s i o n s a n d g i f ts If humble individuals or communities could hope for succour from the Estates, the rich and powerful expected to receive more substantial rewards. At every triennial assembly the Estates voted dons et gratifications for the favoured few. Historians of both Brittany and Languedoc have been extremely critical of the prodigality of the provincial Estates,206 and it is interesting to follow the evolution of the dons et gratifications in Burgundy. At the Estates of 1662, the total spent was exactly 112,050 livres divided amongst twenty-five individuals, with a further 24,000 livres paid to the governor’s guards and 20,500 livres for the services of ‘people of quality’.207 Little had changed when the Estates assembled in 1688, and some 99,200 livres was shared between thirty-six individuals, with a further 24,000 livres allocated to the governor’s guards and a miserly twelve livres for the mendicant orders.208 As we might expect, the governor was the main beneficiary of the system. In total, he received some 56,000 livres.209 After him came the lieutenant g´en´eral of Dijon, d’Amanz´e, with 9,000 livres, M. de Chˆateauneuf, the secretary of state whose department included Burgundy, who received 6,000 livres and the lieutenants g´en´eraux of Autun, Chalon, Mˆacon and Charolles who were awarded 3,000 livres each. The same sum of 3,000 livres was paid to a number of dignitaries, including the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Le Peletier, the first president of the Parlement of Dijon and the provincial intendant. The remainder was distributed in relatively small amounts of 200–1,000 livres each to officials of the Estates or ministers in 205 206 207 209

Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 396–408, argues persuasively that the Estates of Artois, in particular, had lost the confidence of the population when it came to seeking redress. See: Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 117–46; Collins, Classes, estates, and order, pp. 193–8; and ´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, pp. 97–8. 208 ADCO C 2999, fols. 158–9. ADCO C 2997, fols. 51–5. This figure included the 6,000 livres that was attributed to the now defunct Estates of Auxonne.

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Versailles as well as to members of the governor’s household. Finally, the Estates voted a fund of 26,500 livres to be distributed ‘on the recommendation of His Serene Highness’, noting that ‘it is necessary, as has been the case since time immemorial, to express their gratitude to several persons of quality who could serve the province’.210 By 1736, a total of 103,312 livres was being shared by approximately thirty-two individuals.211 Little had changed since the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule either in monetary terms, or in relation to the actual beneficiaries who, after the governor, were an almost identical mixture of the military commandants and provincial and royal officials. Nor had the fund to be used at the discretion of the governor been increased, and that remained fixed at 26,500 livres. The death of the duc de Bourbon allowed the crown to intervene, and in a r`eglement of 1742 the king formally identified those who were eligible for dons et gratifications and the amounts they would receive.212 A total of 151,139 livres was henceforth to be divided amongst thirty-seven people, with most of the increase pocketed by the governor, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral and the secretary of state for the province. Although the cost of the dons et gratifications had not risen dramatically, the Estates were incensed. The chamber of the nobility, in particular, voiced loud protests about the new governor, the duc de Saint-Aignan, receiving 68,539 livres, when the Cond´e had been content with just 56,000 livres for more than a century.213 Nor was the royal interference in the distribution of the patronage of the Estates appreciated. Both of the privileged orders protested that: this r`eglement takes away the liberty, that the Estates have always enjoyed, to favour those who have rendered them service, or to deprive those who have not merited it, because it stipulates that gratifications can neither be increased nor decreased without the express consent of His Majesty.

The fear that the Estates would lose control of the funds distributed in their name was a real one, and such a defeat might have had costly implications. Repeated remonstrances failed to overturn the r`eglement, but when, in 1757, the king awarded a pension of 20,000 livres to the recently retired governor, all three orders made vigorous protests and the charge was dropped.214 210 211 212 214

ADCO C 2999, fol. 159. ADCO C 3003, fol. 234. It is not possible to be precise because the registers speak of ‘plusieurs officiers’ sharing 2,600 livres. 213 Ibid., fol. 108. ADCO C 3044, fols. 104–6. ADCO C 3045, fol. 136. The Parlement of Dijon also launched its own attack on the pension.

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The Estates were, therefore, far from lax when it came to policing the gifts dispensed in their name,215 and it was the crown that was responsible for the modest increase in the dons et gratifications of 1742. When the prince de Cond´e assumed control of his governorship in 1754, a new r`eglement was drawn up which would remain in force until 1789.216 Some 262,623 livres was allocated for each triennalit´e (87,541 livres per annum), of which 176,723 livres went to the governor, his guards and other military and civilian officers. The remaining 85,900 livres was divided between the traditional recipients at Versailles and those within the province. The popularity and credit of the young prince smoothed the progress of the new r`eglement, and the issue of dons et gratifications would not attract serious attention again until the very eve of the revolution. t h e co n f e re n ce To complete the business of the Estates generally required no more than two or three weeks. When the governor was satisfied that his instructions had been implemented, and that the useful work of the chambers was concluded, he gave orders for the summoning of the ‘conference of the Estates’, and sought permission from the king to leave the province.217 The conference was the official climax to the assembly. All three orders were reassembled in the Grande Salle, where the individual deliberations of the chambers were read out. When all three orders were in agreement, the president, usually the bishop of Autun, pronounced simply the word ‘d´ecret’. If, on the other hand, the clergy and one other order opposed a third then the phrase ‘d´ecret to the church’ was declared. Finally, if the nobility and the third estate were in favour and the clergy against, the president pronounced ‘d´ecret to the nobility’. The reality behind these formulae was the binding nature of a vote by two orders to one. However, on important matters, especially those concerning the king’s business or significant reforms of the administration, unanimity was preferred, not least because of the added solemnity accorded by the verdict of the Estates as a whole. The governor was, therefore, willing to engage in lengthy negotiations to achieve that end, to the extent of ordering new deliberations within the chambers before agreeing to the convocation of the final assembly. 215 216 217

An opinion shared by Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 125–7, in his discussion of the Estates of 1718. ADCO C 3041, fols. 99–101, and ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 113. The pays adjacents contributed 36,000 livres and the Mˆaconnais 21,272 livres. BMD MS 2285, fol. viii, and Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 77–127.

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Once the conference had opened it was too late for changes of this sort to be made, and the raising of new issues, or the reopening of old debates, was forbidden.218 The only serious interruptions to the ceremony were caused by the confusion resulting from so many independent deliberations. Since at least 1668, the three presidents had been required to read the relevant decisions to their respective chambers at the end of every working day, and then to sign the agreed text.219 As with many d´ecrets, it was not always obeyed to the letter, and in 1745 the crown intervened with a r`eglement designed to enforce the practice.220 Such measures helped to facilitate what was an already brief meeting, and after two or three hours the conference was concluded. Finally, the new ´elus swore an oath before the bishop of Autun, who then addressed a final harangue to the governor, wishing him ‘adieu’.221 For the next three years at least, the Estates were closed. Historians have often been harsh in their assessment of the Estates of Burgundy, and Bouchard spoke for many when he declared that: an excessive and rigid ceremonial limited the scope for individual initiative; the programme of deliberations was largely traced in advance, precedence quarrels and social calls consumed a good part of the time and the cares that public affairs required.222

Many of his criticisms were judicious, but talk of the decline of the Estates after 1661 has been exaggerated. Historians have been misled by the relative absence of political conflict into assuming that the institution had lost all useful purpose. Yet in his splendid account of the assembly of 1718, Dumont painted a very different portrait, arguing that: without e´clat, without quarrels between the orders, knowing when and how to assert the rights of the province, watchful of its interests, such are, after the d´ecrets, the Estates of 1718; such were, perhaps, the Estates of Burgundy in the eighteenth century.223

His intuition is borne out by a more detailed examination of the Estates, and from the evidence provided by the attendance figures and the internal activities of the three chambers. Under the tutelage of the Cond´e, the Estates remained an effective means of contracting business with the crown, and 218 221 222 223

219 ADCO C 2997, fol. 102. 220 ADCO C 3004, fol. 190. BMD MS 2285, fol. viii. For examples from 1703 and 1754 respectively, see ADCO C 3000, fols. 206–8, and C 3021, fol. 409. ´ Bouchard, De l’humanisme, p. 28. Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, pp. 102–3, was, if anything, even more scathing. Dumont, Une session des ´etats, p. 82.

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of articulating the grievances of the province. There were of course many faults; not least the extremely narrow range of social groups represented in the Estates, something that would become increasingly resented as the eighteenth century progressed. Nevertheless the Estates were not a rubber stamp for the demands of the crown, nor were they simply a social gathering dedicated to the distribution of spoils amongst local elites. Throughout the period after 1661, the Estates were a living institution, a working body, and not a medieval relic surviving in an ‘absolutist’ or ‘enlightened’ age.

chapter 4

Nosseigneurs les e´lus and the officers of the Estates

With the Estates General in session for only a few weeks every three years, power and responsibility was devolved to its representatives and officers in the chamber of ´elus. No less an authority than Chr´etien Guillaume de Lamoignon de Malesherbes, first president of the Cour des Aides of Paris and later an enlightened minister of Louis XVI, observed in the remonstrances he addressed to Louis XV in July 1763 ‘that as many disputes are settled and as much business conducted in this chamber of ´elus as in the most active intendance’.1 As rivals and fierce critics of the ´elus, Malesherbes and his colleagues sought to denigrate the Burgundian administration by maintaining that, despite their immense workload, ‘in reality the ´elus only assemble in Dijon once each year, that this assembly lasts for about two months and, in the intervals, there are no other meetings’.2 In their absence the daily administration ‘is necessarily handed over to subordinates who are permanently resident in Dijon’. Despite the polemical tone of the remonstrances, which were written during a particularly bitter jurisdictional quarrel with the Estates,3 many subsequent historians have been happy to repeat these allegations as part of a more general critique of the competence and integrity of the ´elus.4 In his discussion of the province’s fiscal system, Bouchard was unequivocal: ‘the ´elus of the clergy and the nobility played almost no role at all. The majority of the time, they resided in a monastery, a chˆateau or in 1 2 3 4

Quoted in J. Egret, Louis XV et l’opposition parlementaire (Paris, 1970), p. 145. The remonstrances in question were those of 23 July 1763. Ibid . The episode is discussed in chapter 10, and J. Swann, ‘Power and provincial politics in eighteenthcentury France: the Varenne affair, 1757–1763’, French Historical Studies 21 (1998), 441–74. For all of its merits, this is the core argument of Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV . A similar theme runs through the works of: T. Foisset, Le pr´esident de Brosses. Histoire des lettres et des parlements au XVIIIe si`ecle (Paris, 1842), pp. 204–6; E. de la Cuisine, Le parlement de Bourgogne: depuis son origine jusqu’`a sa chute 2 vols. (Dijon, 1857), ii, pp. 393–4; Olivier-Martin, L’administration provinciale, pp. 309–10.

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another town than the capital of the province’.5 Not surprisingly, he followed Malesherbes in placing real power with the permanent officials. Nor was Bouchard prepared to accord the ´elus much respect when they were actually present. On examining the tax rolls of 1786, he discovered four widows who had inexplicably escaped being assessed for the taille. For his own calculations, he counted them as ‘common taillables, although they enjoyed privileges that were, in all likelihood, of an erotic nature’.6 These unsubstantiated comments reveal more about the author than they do the ´elus, but they also offer a perfect illustration of the harsh judgements they have attracted. Indeed even Pierre d’Orgeval, who wrote a highly favourable history of the provincial tax system, concluded that it was the permanent officials, not the ´elus, who were the driving force behind the administration.7 The attack on the competence of the ´elus has proved so persuasive because it dovetails neatly with broader arguments stressing the antiquated nature of the Estates relative to the supposedly more modern administration of the intendants. Yet the ferocity of the condemnation of the ´elus has not been matched by a similarly rigorous investigation of their actions, competence and decision-making procedures. If the ´elus really were the ignorant squires and otherworldly monks described by their critics, then the accusations against them should be relatively easy to substantiate. However, closer inspection of their social and professional backgrounds soon reveals that they were men of an altogether different stamp. Drawn from the very highest ranks of French society, they had the social capital, knowledge and experience required to advance the interests of the Estates. Moreover, throughout the period, many of the ´elus and the permanent officers were intimately connected to the House of Bourbon-Cond´e, raising further questions about the nature of the provincial administration. Historians have generally assumed that after 1661 patronage and client`ele networks were directed from the centre with the king, or Jean-Baptiste Colbert acting in his name, assuming a role previously left to provincial powerbrokers.8 The Estates of Burgundy does not fit that pattern, and the patronage of the governor remained a factor of great significance until the end of the ancien r´egime. 5 6 8

G. Bouchard, ‘Comptes borgnes et fiscalit´e aveugle au dix-huiti`eme si`ecle’, Annales de Bourgogne 26 (1954), 26. 7 P. d’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne au XVIIIe si`ecle (Dijon, 1938), p. 15. Ibid . Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 244, and Kettering, Patrons and brokers, p. 223.

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The chamber of ´elus had originated as the permanent tax collecting body of the Estates during the reigns of the Valois dukes.9 By the early sixteenth century, it was an established convention that the three orders each chose a deputy to sit in the chamber, alongside a representative of the crown, known as the ´elu du roi, two representatives of the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon and the vicomte-mayeur of the city. These seven individuals collectively formed the chamber, although they could call upon the expertise of a team of permanent officials, whose duties and specialist knowledge rendered them indispensable. By the early eighteenth century, the right of the ´elus to ‘govern and administer the revenues of the province’ was firmly established, and they had the direction of everything affecting its ‘administration and well-being’.10 As we have seen, ever since the stinging criticisms of Malesherbes it has been assumed that the permanent officials accomplished the work of the chamber. It is true that the elective principle from which they derived their name had been progressively undermined, but who were the ´elus and do they deserve their supine reputation? t h e e´ lu s o f t h e c l e rg y If we examine the forty-three ´elus of the chamber of the clergy appointed between 1662 and the revolution, many of the myths about their personal qualities and competence are quickly dispelled (appendix 3). What is immediately striking is the strong link between them and the Cond´e. In 1662, the election fell to Louis Dony d’Attichy, bishop of Autun. He was close to the Grand Cond´e and his sister, the comtesse de Maure, was an ‘habitu´e’ of the Hˆotel de Cond´e and was married to Louis de Rochechouart who had served as a general in the princely armies during the Fronde.11 His successor in the see of Autun, Gabriel de Roquette, was chosen as ´elu in 1671 and again in 1697, and had worked with Rochechouart on behalf of the princes during the Fronde. He owed his elevation to the episcopate to the prince de Conti, but from 1662 he was one of the Grand Cond´e’s intermediaries with the ministers of Louis XIV.12 Another member of the 9 10 11 12

´ The origins and development of the chamber have been examined by Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, pp. 161–2, 165–8, 169–71. AN G7 166, fol. 27, ‘M´emoire concernant les e´tats de Bourgogne’. It was written during the regency, probably in 1720. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 416, 436, and J. Bergin, The making of the French episcopate, 1589–1661 (London, 1996), pp. 610–11. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, p. 436, and Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 37.

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Roquette clan, Henri Emanuel, abb´e de Reims, was chosen as ´elu in both 1694 and 1712. Other notable Cond´eans included Abraham de Th´esut, doyen of the collegiate church of Chalon-sur-Saˆone, ´elu in 1677. He was the son of the Grand Cond´e’s ‘intendant des affaires’ in Burgundy, Jacques de Th´esut, whose influence in the province was feared and respected in almost equal measure.13 His nephew, Jean de Th´esut, sieur de Ragy, whose daughter married Gagne de Perrigny, pr´esident a` mortier in the Parlement of Dijon, subsequently served as the governor’s intendant. It was almost certainly not a coincidence that abb´e Aim´e Franc¸ois Gagne de Perrigny was chosen as ´elu in both 1727 and 1739. Finally, it is possible to cite the examples of Charles Andrault de Longeron, abb´e de Maulevrier, ´elu in 1685, a member of a clan that was solidly entrenched in the Cond´e household,14 and abb´e Edm´e Mongin, a former preceptor to the duc de Bourbon, who was appointed ´elu at the Estates of 1718.15 The interregnum following the death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740 did not alter the picture substantially. Amongst later prot´eg´es of the governor were Claude-Franc¸ois de Luzines, a former lecteur of the prince de Cond´e, who was ´elu in both 1772 and 1781, and abb´e Louis-Henri de La Fare, the future bishop of Nancy, who was chosen at the Estates of 1784.16 These examples of the patronage power of the Cond´e are not intended to be exhaustive, merely to illustrate the importance of the governor’s influence over the choice of the clergy’s ´elu. Not that the Cond´e were likely to act unilaterally. As expert practitioners of the art of managing the Estates, they took soundings from influential Burgundians before making their choice, while those clerics with a realistic hope of securing election courted the support of the governor as part of a mutually rewarding partnership. Thus, in 1703, Henri-Jules chose abb´e Le Goux as ´elu with the aim of rewarding a powerful parlementaire clan. Th´esut de Ragy subsequently informed the governor that the Parlement of Dijon was delighted, adding that ‘the family of M. Le Goux, which is connected to the very best in this town, will be for ever indebted to you’.17 When it was the turn of the bishops to provide an ´elu, the governor’s scope for independent action was more limited. In 1706, the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone had seniority on his side and was anxiously courting the 13 14 16 17

The role and importance of the Th´esut family has been examined by B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, p. 439. 15 Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 137. Ibid ., p. 396. Ibid ., p. 194, n. 51, and N. Aston, The end of an elite. The French bishops and the coming of the revolution, 1786–1790 (Oxford, 1992), p. 101. BMC AC GB 29, fol. 231, Henri-Jules to abb´e Fyot, June 1702, and Th´esut de Ragy to Henri-Jules, 20 November 1702.

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governor. He had good reason to be nervous because the recently appointed bishop of Auxerre, Charles-Gabriel Daniel Thubi`ere de Caylus, had the backing of madame de Maintenon and he subsequently prevailed.18 Astute as ever, Henri-Jules was careful to ensure that Thubi`ere de Caylus paid a price for his victory, obliging him to ratify the treaty of union between the comt´e of Auxerre and the Estates of 1668. By doing so, the bishop accepted that, within the Estates, the clergy of his diocese would cede rank and precedence to those of the duchy. It was an effective way of smoothing the ruffled feathers of the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone and any of his supporters who had been vexed by the governor’s choice. Madame de Maintenon was not the only powerful patron to take an interest in Burgundian affairs, and the social and political connections of senior clerics such as Andr´e Colbert, bishop of Auxerre, cousin of the legendary Jean-Baptiste, and ´elu of the clergy in 1679, made them strong candidates for election even if their relationship with the governor was no more than lukewarm. Yet even such a powerful figure as Michel Le Tellier still felt it necessary to write an effusive letter of thanks to the Grand Cond´e when his son, Charles Maurice, was elected in 1665.19 Others held influential positions in their own right, notably Yves Alexandre de Marbeuf, bishop of Autun, holder of the feuille des b´en´efices, during the reign of Louis XVI. In a letter to his counterpart in Mˆacon, some three months before the Estates of 1778, Marbeuf wrote to ask for his ‘vote for the clerical election in the forthcoming Estates of our province. I shall be very happy to depend upon your support for a place that His Majesty has so graciously nominated me’.20 Not surprisingly in these circumstances, he was subsequently elected unanimously, a pattern that can be observed in elections both before and after.21 Bishops such as Colbert or Marbeuf could never be classed as clients of the Cond´e, and even if many of the others owed their eminence to the influence of the governor, they were unlikely to risk their credit in the province by acting as the puppets of a princely master in Chantilly. When subject to close scrutiny the clerical ´elus do not fit the stereotype of otherworldly men of God ill-suited to the task of public administration. What historians have overlooked is the wealth of ambition, talent and experience amongst the ranks of the clergy. In Burgundy, as in other pays d’´etats, the bishops were familiar with the task of running their diocese and 18 19 20 21

BMC AC GB 31, fol. 498, and ibid., fol. 507, Th´esut de Ragy to Henri-Jules, 5 April 1706. B´eguin, Princes de Cond´e, pp. 307–8. ADSL C 504, fol. 13, Marbeuf to the bishop of Mˆacon, 12 February 1778. The details of the Estates of 1778 and 1781 are recorded in ADCO C 3033, fols. 157–60, 256.

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frequently the affairs of the French church itself.22 There was never any shortage of talent in the clerical ranks. Claude Fyot de la Marche, abb´e of Saint Etienne of Dijon, who was chosen as ´elu in both 1674 and 1700, was a particularly shining example. In addition to being a conseiller d’honneur in the Parlement of Dijon, he had been named a conseiller d’´etat in 1669 and was reputed to have ‘defended brilliantly his theological thesis before the king, monsieur and the cardinal de Mazarin’.23 A passionate bibliophile, local savant and artistic patron, he was responsible for the rebuilding and ´ beautification of the church of Saint Etienne. As for the abb´e de La Fare, ´elu from 1784 to 1787, he was the precocious nephew of cardinal de Bernis, and had shone at the General Assemblies of the French clergy held in 1785 and 1786.24 After his successful triennalit´e in Burgundy, which included a spell at the Assembly of Notables of 1787, he was appointed to the see of Nancy. Such was his reputation that he was elected to represent his new diocesan clergy at the Estates General of 1789, and was accorded the great honour of delivering the sermon at the opening ceremony. He achieved the twin triumph of visibly annoying Marie-Antoinette, while enthusing his audience, and ‘when he inveighed against the evils caused to countryfolk by the gabelle, applause broke out in the church’.25 La Fare was clearly a gifted prelate, and he was by no means an exception amongst those who served the Estates of Burgundy after 1662. Drawn from the aristocratic elites, or the highest reaches of the robe nobility, they were men of immense authority. They understood the rules by which government was conducted, and had ready access to the levers of power at Versailles. Many had been nominated by the governor, and few would have deliberately set out to oppose his interests, but they were neither his ciphers nor those of the king. Most had family connections to the province, and, as intelligent and often experienced administrators, they undoubtedly brought their own ideas to bear. The argument that they were incapable of assuming their responsibilities in the chamber of ´elus is both inaccurate and misleading. t h e n o b l e e´ lu s The noble ´elus (appendix 4) were men of a different stamp, lacking the corporate solidarity that united the clergy, and their overwhelmingly military 22

23 24

The administrative role of the bishops has been discussed by Aston, End of an elite, pp. 30–45, and J. McManners, Church and society in eighteenth-century France Vol. I: the clerical establishment and its social ramifications (Oxford, 1998), pp. 235–61. J. Garnier and C. Muteau, Galerie Bourguignonne, 3 vols. (Dijon, 1858), i, p. 368. 25 Ibid., pp. 22–3. Aston, End of an elite, p. 101.

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backgrounds meant that they were more closely tied to the governor. In 1662, H´erard Bouton, comte de Chamilly, was chosen as ´elu and he enjoyed the rare distinction of being elected again in 1665. It would be difficult to find a more loyal client of the Cond´e. Having entered their service at the age of thirteen, he fought at Rocroi and remained a companion in arms of the Grand Cond´e throughout the Fronde, eventually following his chief into exile in the Low Countries.26 In addition to the honour of twice being chosen as ´elu, his rewards included nomination as governor of the chˆateau of Dijon. An active military man of the old sword nobility of the province, Chamilly was typical of the noble ´elus in the period after 1662.27 Other good examples of their ilk were Gabriel de Briord, marquis de Senozan, ´elu in 1679 and 1691, and Joseph de Xaintrailles, ´elu in 1688. Both were members of the Cond´e household, and in the case of Briord his loyalty to the prince during the Fronde had led to the confiscation of his lands in Bugey and Bresse.28 When his patron was restored to royal favour his affairs prospered once more, and he would later serve as Louis XIV’s ambassador to Turin and subsequently The Hague. Little changed in the course of the eighteenth century. Armand de Madaillan de Lesparre, marquis de Lassay, was a first gentleman in the princely household and married the legitimised daughter of Henri-Jules.29 He was not originally from the province and did not enter the Estates until 1697, but his intimate ties to the governor ensured that he was chosen as ´elu in 1700. His son, who served in one of the Cond´es’ regiments, continued the family tradition and served as ´elu in 1712.30 Marie Roger de Langhac, marquis de Colligny, the prospective ´elu at the Estates of 1724, explained the importance of the governor when seeking support. He wrote: His Serene Highness . . . having done me the honour of giving his approval for the election of this next triennalit´e, I have the honour of begging you, sir, to grant me your suffrage, I dare hope that your affection for our great prince will secure me that favour.31

The death of the duc de Bourbon is usually assumed to have led to a sharp decline in the governor’s influence, with the king making the choice of ´elu. Yet once the prince de Cond´e took over the reins of the family governorship in 1754, he too asserted his influence, and the idea that the king appointed the noble ´elu in the second half of the eighteenth century refers to the theory, not the practice. As early as 1747, the commandant of 26 27 28 30

Aumale, Princes de Cond´e, pp. 245–50, and B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, p. 406. ´ et alcades des e´tats de Bourgogne au XVIIIe si`ecle’, Actes du 92e Congr`es Nationale D. Ligou, ‘Elus des Soci´et´es Savantes (Paris, 1970), 19–40, provides a useful introduction. 29 Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 113. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 407, 440. 31 ADCO E 754, M. de Langhac to M. Fevret, 31 January 1724. Ibid., pp. 113–14.

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the province, the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, had approached the secretary of state, Saint-Florentin, seeking the nomination of the comte de Vienne as ´elu.32 He was to be disappointed. As Saint-Florentin explained, ‘he has rivals and, amongst others, the marquis d’Anlezy, governor of the prince de Cond´e. The support of this prince who shall soon be in possession of the governorship of Burgundy can only be extremely favourable to him’.33 D’Anlezy was nominated, and the comte de Vienne would have to wait until 1760 before his ambition was fulfilled. The noble ´elus were not all members of the Cond´e household. Distinguished individuals were confident enough to write directly to the governor pressing their claims, as Franc¸ois de Choiseul-Chevigny did in 1697, promising to fill the role ‘with honour, e´clat and [by] spending more than any other’.34 Patrons also wrote on behalf of their relatives and clients. After nominating the comte de Verdun in July 1695, Henri-Jules informed the mar´echal de Tallard that ‘knowing, as I do, the interest that you take in his affairs, and that you recommended him for that [the election], I am delighted to have been presented with this opportunity to please you’.35 As there were normally several eligible candidates, successive governors ordered their secretaries to prepare a dossier on prospective ´elus analysing their strengths and weaknesses.36 Making the final decision was a delicate matter, as the governor would be understandably wary of antagonising prominent individuals. Indeed, the list of noble ´elus confirms that for the great Burgundian aristocratic clans to be chosen as ´elu was something of a birthright. Louis de Pernes, comte d’Epinac, ´elu in 1671, was succeeded by his son, GeorgesAnne, first gentleman of the duc de Bourbon, in 1709. Amongst the other families to share the distinction were the Thiard, ´elus in 1668, 1715 and 1745, the Vienne, 1721 and 1760, the Saulx-Tavanes, 1727, 1751 and 1769, and the Bourbon-Busset, 1766 and 1787. These families were the cream of the Burgundian aristocracy, and most could trace their origins back not only to the glorious days of the Valois dukes, but even beyond.37 The BourbonBusset could even boast of a common kinship with the royal family, having 32 33 34 35 36 37

ADCO E 1679, Saint-Florentin to Saulx-Tavanes, 5 May 1747. Ibid ., Saint-Florentin to Saulx-Tavanes, 7 November 1747. BMC AC GB 28, fol. 430, Choiseul-Chevigny to Henri-Jules, 22 November 1697. His request was accepted. Ibid ., fol. 253, Henri-Jules to Tallard, July 1694. The procedure is explained in a letter from the duc de Bourbon’s secretary, Girard, to Chartraire de Biere, BMC AC MS 1409, fol. 42, 21 August 1728. ´ et alcades’, 26–8. Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 261–3, identified a similar pattern in Ligou, ‘Elus the Estates of Artois.

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been recognised as the descendants of the illegitimate offspring of Louis de Bourbon.38 Many of the noble ´elus had substantial landholdings in Burgundy, but it is true that they spent a large proportion of their time in Paris or at Versailles. Aristocratic courtiers and soldiers do not appear as natural administrators, and when considering possible ´elus in 1732, the governor’s secretary, Girard, remarked that ‘in this triennalit´e we need someone who is capable of serving the province usefully, and we can hardly count on the ´elu of the nobility whoever it might be’.39 Few knew the Estates better than Girard, but on this occasion he was a little harsh. To exert influence on behalf of the Estates it was necessary to possess social status and personal influence, and like the bishops the noble ´elus had that in abundance. Most were familiar with the world of the court, and when required they could be highly effective ambassadors for their native province. t h e e´ lu s o f t h e t h i rd e s tat e When compared to the illustrious figures who represented the two privileged orders, the ´elus of the third estate, nearly all of whom were serving as mayors in the towns of the grande roue, were of comparatively humble stock (appendix 5). As the famous wheel took thirty-six years to complete its journey, it was predictable that few should enjoy the honour twice. However, the men who sat in the chamber had much in common. The overwhelming majority possessed a legal qualification and the title of conseiller du roi, with many practising, in one capacity or another, as avocats, procureurs or lieutenants of the local bailliage.40 Within their own communities these were men of substance, and families such as the Baudesson of Auxerre, ´elus in 1727 and 1763, La Ramisse of Auxonne and Saint-Jean-de-Losne, 1703 and 1757, Champion of Auxerre, 1715 and 1751, Noirot of Chalon-sur-Saˆone, 1706 and 1784, and Jouard of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, 1715 and 1754, provided several generations of ´elus. Many like Georges de Guyon of Avallon, 1679, Henri Silvestre de la Forest of Montbard, 1712, Claude Martenne of Saint-Jean-de-Losne, 1781, and Philibert Hugues Gueneau d’Aumont of Semur-en-Auxois, 1787, were already noble, or well on the way to becoming so.41 Overall, therefore, the 38 39 40

41

Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 340. BMC AC 1411, fol. 291, Girard to Chartraire de Montigny, 5 December 1732. ´ In his study of the ´elus of the third estate in the eighteenth century, Ligou, ‘Elus et alcades’, 33, found that nineteen out of twenty-five had a legal qualification. Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 403–20, is the indispensable guide to the social origins and professional activities of the mayors. ´ et alcades’, 34. Ligou, ‘Elus

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chamber of the third estate was composed of a relatively narrow section of the urban elite, and exhibited most of the defining characteristics of an oligarchy. The introduction of venality in 1692 ended any lingering element of popular election, but the mayors were generally resident in their towns, and they were familiar with the state of the province and the needs of its people. Through the exercise of their duties they had also acquired valuable administrative experience. Jean-Franc¸ois Maufoux, for example, mayor of Beaune and ´elu in 1775 was simultaneously the respected subdelegate of the intendant.42 Before the introduction of venality, the mayors were frequently part of the Cond´ean patronage network, and it was not uncommon to see individuals such as Th´eodore Chevignard, conseiller secr´etaire of monseigneur le prince, who, in 1679, was serving as the mayor of Beaune.43 The duc de Bourbon was particularly scrupulous in distributing his patronage, insisting that only the most able and loyal candidates should receive his blessing. To assist in his deliberations, he ordered his agent in the province, Chartraire de Montigny, who was also the treasurer general of the Estates, to compile an elaborate dossier on all of the principal inhabitants of the towns where he held the power of appointment.44 The result was the infamous ‘Devil’s register’, containing literally hundreds of entries on the age, fortune and character of the local population. Antoine Guyton, for example, a doctor from Autun was described as being thirty-six years of age, from a good family and an ‘honourable man . . . of sound morals and good character, [who] has never held office, refuses it, could, however, hold the place of ´echevin’.45 Jean Genot, a sixty-year-old bourgeois of Autun received a less favourable report. He was allegedly possessed of an ‘unstable, even dangerous character, and having once served for two years as an ´echevin he was ‘not fit to hold the office again’.46 Many more cases could be cited, but what is striking is the care taken by the duc de Bourbon to inform himself about those who might be worthy of his patronage. Needless to say, he was equally scrupulous when choosing mayors, and it was only with his blessing that an aspirant could hope to secure an office. As a result, after 1696 the chamber of the third estate was more completely under the tutelage of the governor than either of the privileged orders. Any deputy who pushed resistance beyond permitted limits risked deposition. When Bourbon died in 1740 control over the mayors passed to the ´elus, who were 42 43 45

Maufoux’s dual responsibilities eventually caused problems, see chapter 5. 44 BMD MS 2243. The dossier was compiled in 1736. ADCO C 3018, fol. 62. 46 Ibid., fol. 6. Ibid ., fol. 7.

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content to perpetuate the existing system in which offices were dominated by a relatively narrow group of local families. The social and professional barriers separating the representatives of the three orders were considerable, but they still possessed traits in common. By birth or adoption they were Burgundians, proud of their office and the prestige of the Estates, acting out of a variety of motives including loyalty to the Cond´e, family tradition, duty and ambition. As the fierce competition to be ´elu demonstrated, the position was highly prized, and it was given additional gloss by the possibilities it opened for personal gain. According to a detailed memorandum written during the reign of Louis XVI, probably by Gueneau d’Aumont, who as mayor of Semur-en-Auxois served as an alcade in 1781 and as ´elu in 1787, the ´elus of the two privileged orders received 40,289 livres each for their labours.47 As for the representative of the third estate, he received 26,859 livres, or two-thirds of that paid to his social betters.48 These were substantial sums at a time when the annual wage of a day labourer was unlikely to exceed 150 livres. Moreover, these official payments were not the only ones to find their way into the pockets of the ´elus. When abb´e Henri Emanuel de Roquette, ´elu of the clergy in both 1694 and 1712, prepared to meet his maker, he sought to atone for his sins. In the codicil to his last will and testament, he wrote: as I have twice been ´elu of the province of Burgundy and, following a long established practice, I have received certain gifts and bribes that I should not in all honesty have taken, I beg my executors to restore to the said province of Burgundy the sum of 10,000 livres . . . [so] that I can die without having my conscience burdened by assets that do not strictly belong to me.49

With the ´elus responsible for distributing public works contracts, selling leases for the farming of indirect taxation and completing tax assessments it is easy to imagine how Roquette was led into temptation. No doubt most of his colleagues received similar ‘gifts’ without suffering any moral qualms. The ´elus were also the grateful recipients of a ‘purse of jetons’ from the Estates. The ´elus of the clergy and the nobility both received 300 jetons in silver impressed with the arms of the province, and 1,200 in bronze, while the ´elu of the third estate could count upon 200 in silver and 800 in bronze.50 Finally, by virtue of their position, they had easy access to the 47

48

ADCO 1 F 460, ‘Administration de la province de Bourgogne consider´ee comme pa¨ıs d’´etats’. On the binding is written ‘´ecrit de la main de M. Gueneau d’Aumont ancien e´lu g´en´eral de la province: depuis sous-prefet de Semur; mort le 27 Aoˆut 1814’. That is certainly possible because the memoir could only have been written by someone with an inside knowledge of the provincial administration. 49 ADCO C 3056. 50 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 260. ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 202.

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prized fiscal system of the Estates in order to invest their own patrimony, or that of their relatives, in the provincial debt. t h e e´ lu d u r o i As the representatives of the Estates, the ´elus of the three orders were the most powerful and prestigious members of the chamber, but they could not ignore the opinions of their colleagues. At first glance, the ´elu du roi appears as potentially the most troublesome figure, as his role had originally been to act as the eyes and ears of the Valois dukes.51 He also had the important advantage of being a permanent member of the chamber, serving continuously from one triennalit´e to the next, thus acquiring knowledge and experience denied to the other ´elus. According to the author of a memorandum explaining the duties of the office, written in the early eighteenth century, the scope of his jurisdiction was impressive.52 His key functions were defined as participating in the deliberations of the chamber affecting the levy and employment of taxation and ‘all the other affairs of the province’,53 and preventing ‘anything occurring in the chamber of ´elus contrary to the interests of the king and his subjects’. Such weighty responsibilities, if carried out conscientiously, should have made the ´elu du roi a powerful check on the activities of the chamber. However, as so often under the ancien r´egime, a position initially intended for a devoted royal servant had been transformed into a venal office. The chief beneficiaries were the prominent local robe family, the Richard, who had first held the post in 1618 and subsequently purchased the office in 1640.54 By 1748, Gilles-Germaine Richard de Ruffey was the sixth member of his clan to serve in the chamber.55 The ideal of the ´elu du roi as the fearless defender of the king’s interests and those of his subjects had, therefore, been compromised. It is true that Richard de Ruffey did occasionally question the decisions of his colleagues,56 but his heart was not in the task and in 1748 51

52

53 55

56

´ de Bourgogne, p. 169, discusses the origins of the office. The work of F. Dumont, ‘L’´elu Billioud, Etats ´ du roi aux e´tats de Bourgogne’, in Droit priv´e et institutions r´egionales. Etudes historiques offertes a` J. Yver (Paris, 1976), pp. 197–207, should also be consulted. ADCO C 3059, ‘M´emoire touchant la charge d’´elu pour le roi aux e´tats de Bourgogne’. This was deposited in the archives on 7 July 1789, but had been written before 1750. A second memoir AN G7 166, fol. 27, ‘M´emoire concernant les e´tats de Bourgogne’, is also helpful. 54 Ibid. ADCO C 3059, ‘M´emoire touchant la charge’. The only interruption to their reign came after the premature death of G´erard Richard in 1682. Until his son came of age in 1694, the duties of the office were exercised by his relatives Prosper Ba¨uyn (1682–89) and Jean Quarr´e (1689–94). A good example is his quarrel with the other ´elus in 1742–3 which earned him a rebuke from the ministry, see BMD MS 1738, fol. 6, Saint-Florentin to the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, 19 December 1742, and ibid., fol. 10, Saint-Florentin to Richard de Ruffey, 7 February 1743.

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he sold his office to Jean-Baptiste Voisenet.57 As the mayor of Semur-enAuxois, he was an unlikely candidate for such a prestigious post, but he was already close to Richard de Ruffey and had the priceless advantage of being ´elu of the third estate for the triennalit´e of 1745–8.58 His enhanced status helped to overcome any doubts about his background at Versailles, and in May 1748 the comte de Saint-Florentin gave permission for the sale.59 This did not mark the arrival of a new administrative dynasty, and in a dramatic coup the intendant, Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury, bought the office from Voisenet in 1754.60 He had high hopes of dominating the chamber of ´elus, but within four years the Estates had broken his spirit and he agreed to sell the office to them. They in turn sold it on to the Bureau des Finances of Dijon, and thereafter members of that corps held it in strict rotation. That the crown took no further interest in the choice of the ´elu du roi was the perfect illustration of how the original purpose of the office had been corrupted. As for the members of the Bureau des Finances, they could contribute, or not, as they saw fit to the administration of the province, and pocket their ‘fees’ (taxations) of 17,700 livres without any particular concern for the interests of the monarch. t h e vi co m t e - m aye u r o f d i j o n a nd t h e d e pu t i e s o f t h e c h a m b re d e s co m pt e s The vicomte-mayeur of Dijon was another a permanent member of the chamber of ´elus. Unlike the mayors of the smaller towns, the vicomte-mayeur was elected, although the franchise was increasingly restricted after 1692 and the incumbents subsequently served for life. Nine individuals held the office between 1662 and 1692 and several, including Franc¸ois Baudot, B´enigne Boullier and Jean Joly, were elected on more than one occasion (see appendix 6).61 Thereafter the office changed hands less frequently, and only thirteen mayors served between 1692 and the revolution. However, throughout the period there was a great deal of continuity in terms of their social and professional backgrounds. Franc¸ois Baudot, who was vicomte-mayeur from 1694 to 1703, had already served a term of office in 57 58 59 60 61

Thereafter Richard de Ruffey devoted his energies to literary and cultural matters, Bouchard, De l’humanisme, p. 626. It was Richard de Ruffey who had backed Voisenet’s bid for the office of mayor in 1740, BMD MS 1738, fol. 2, Saint-Florentin to Richard de Ruffey, 26 November 1740. Ibid., fol. 14, Saint-Florentin to Richard de Ruffey, 26 May 1748. This important episode has been examined by Dumont, ‘L’´elu du roi’, and is discussed further in chapter 8. ADCO 1 F 614, fol. 145. Ford, Robe and sword, pp. 140–1, supplies details for the period 1700–50.

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the period 1691–2. His relative Philippe Baudot’s tenure as vicomte-mayeur from 1729–31 was cut short by his premature death, but he was not the only ´ one to inherit the mantle of his forefathers. Etienne Baudinot, in office from 1714 to 1728, was the descendant of Benˆoit-Palamades Baudinot, who had twice presided over the affairs of the city. Looked at as a whole, the twenty-one mayors to serve from 1662 to 1789 formed a recognisably homogeneous social and professional group, albeit one that was gradually becoming more distinguished. Four avocats were elected before 167862 but none thereafter, and they were replaced by members of the great law courts. No fewer than seven were councillors in the Parlement of Dijon, four were drawn from the benches of the Chambre des Comptes and two were members of the Bureau des Finances. The others all possessed the prestigious legal office of lieutenant g´en´eral in the bailliage of Dijon. Taken as a whole, the vicomte-mayeurs were all established members of Dijon’s robe elite, albeit not from the great dynasties such as the Berbisey, Bouhier, Fyot or Macheco. As we might expect, the importance of the vicomte-mayeur to both the Estates and the city meant that the governor’s influence was usually decisive in the election. The duc de Bourbon, in particular, was careful not only to choose well-qualified mayors, but even to change them on occasion in order to encourage ‘competition’.63 The mayors could be in no doubt about the need to preserve their credit with the governor, and the effects could be dramatic if his favour was lost. Guillaume Raviot, vicomte-mayeur from 1770 to 1783, provided an excellent example of the procedure involved. He was recommended to the governor by the provincial commandant, PhillipeAntoine de La Tour du Pin de Gouvernet, and his subsequent services were so appreciated by the prince de Cond´e that he agreed to be named as the ‘godfather by proxy’ of Raviot’s son.64 Yet despite his powerful connections, Raviot was dismissed in 1784 after falling foul of the intendant, Feydeau de Brou.65 At first glance this would seem to suggest a decline in the governor’s influence, especially as his replacement was Pierre-Franc¸ois Gauthier, a man who did not enjoy the prince’s confidence. Such hasty judgements should be avoided. After inspecting the logis du roi, the governor’s official residence in Dijon, without first obtaining clearance from Chantilly, the new mayor was sacked. He had spent just six months in office.66 His replacement was 62 63 65 66

ADCO 1 F 614, fol. 145. They were Jacques de Frasans, Pierre Guillaume, B´enigne Boullier and Pierre Monin. 64 Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 214. BMC AC 1409, fol. 47. Ibid ., p. 215, and L. Gueneau, ‘Maire et intendant: la r´evocation du vicomte-mayeur de Dijon Raviot (1784)’, Annales de Bourgogne (1929), 133–6. Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 215.

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Louis Moussier, who had the explicit backing of the prince de Cond´e, and he served without interruption until the revolution. Membership of the chamber of ´elus was completed by the presence of two deputies, usually a president and a master of accounts, from the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon. They served for one triennalit´e only on a rotating basis, and neither the king nor the governor had any direct influence over their appointment. The presence of members of the Chambre des Comptes dated back to at least the fifteenth century, and was an accepted part of the administrative scene.67 There was, however, occasional grumbling about the role of the court in auditing the accounts of the Estates, a task for which it was handsomely rewarded.68 Resentment of the costs incurred led some to argue that the participation of the two deputies in the levy of taxation was incompatible with their primary duty as auditors.69 As one acerbic commentator remarked, they should be excluded from the chamber of ´elus because, after all, they had first been admitted in bygone days when the other ´elus had trouble counting.70 The Estates thought rather more highly of their services, and like the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon each deputy received fees of 10,200 livres for the triennalit´e, plus 100 silver and 400 bronze jetons as their official recompense.71 Taken as a whole, the seven ´elus offered a reasonable cross-section of the province’s elites. The nobility of robe and sword as well as the more modest mayors of the principal towns all sat side-by-side in the chamber. While many undoubtedly had ties of loyalty, even ‘fid´elit´e’, to the governor, they were assured of a degree of independence which derived from, amongst other things, their own corporate or professional backgrounds, traditions of family service, personal knowledge of the province, and, perhaps most importantly, the pride of representing the Estates General of Burgundy. The men who sat in the chamber of ´elus after 1662 were not the isolated monks or provincial squires whose caricatures feature in so many accounts of the provincial administration. Most had the social status and practical experience needed to face both the king’s ministers and their own officials with equanimity. t h e pe r m a n e n t o ff i c e rs The permanent officers of the Estates with the right of entry to the chamber of ´elus were the treasurer general, two secr´etaires des ´etats, two procureurs 67 69 70

68 See chapters 7 and 12. ´ Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, pp. 169–71. BMD MS 2073, f. 2, ‘Remarques sur la chambre des e´lus de Bourgogne’. 71 ADCO 1 F 460, f. 202, 260. Ibid.

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syndics, three conseils des ´etats and, in the eighteenth century, the provincial engineer-in-chief. Before 1742, these officials were all appointed by the Estates, which in practice meant ratifying the decision of either the governor or the ´elus. All of this changed with the r`eglement of 1742, which reserved the right of appointment to the king. Bitterly resented, it would be the target of unremitting opposition until the revolution.72 Given the authority wielded by these officials the concern of the Estates was understandable because together they formed the kernel of the administration. t h e t re a s u re r g e n e ral As the need to raise money was almost a prerequisite for the continued survival of the Estates, the role of the treasurer general became increasingly important once the wars of Louis XIV began in earnest. In 1684, Antoine Chartraire replaced his uncle, Franc¸ois Bazin, as treasurer general, marking the arrival of a dynasty that would jealously guard control over the financial affairs of the Estates until the revolution (see appendix 7).73 It was Bazin who, in 1671, had united two offices that had previously been held by Antoine Bossuet, brother of the celebrated bishop, and Thomas Bertier, respectively receivers alternatif and ancien of the Estates. In 1652, Bossuet had paid 65,729 livres for the office of receveur ancien,74 while Bertier, who had previously been one of the two secr´etaires des ´etats, had invested 75,000 livres for that of receveur alternatif . Bazin, in turn, paid the widow Bertier 72,310 livres in June 1671, a price that was still quoted in 1711, which suggests that this nominal figure had been maintained as a deliberate family strategy when Antoine Chartraire took over from his uncle in 1684. It proved to be an excellent investment, and four generations of the Chartraire family would reap the rewards. When Marc-Antoine Chartraire de Montigny died prematurely in 1750, the attendant disorder in his affairs allowed the crown to intervene with the declaration of 30 July 1752, fixing the price and gages of the office of treasurer general.75 The official valuation was set at 600,000 livres, and the gages at an annual rate of denier 60 (1.633 per cent), a paltry sum even when compared with the rentes issued by the Estates that were rarely below denier 72 73 74 75

An issue discussed in chapter 8. For details of the transfer, see: AN H1 123, dos. 1, fol. 1, ‘M´emoire au sujet de la charge de tr´esorier g´en´eral de la province de Bourgogne’. The text dates from either 1750 or 1752. Ibid . ADCO C 3452, ‘D´eclaration du roi du 30 Juillet 1752, qui confirme tous les finances ci-devant pay´ees par les officiers comptables d´ependants des e´tats g´en´eraux de Bourgogne’.

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20 (5 per cent). Fortunately for the Chartraire, the real value of the office lay elsewhere, in the fees and other benefits associated with almost total control of the local fiscal system, and the handling of vast sums of money on behalf of the Estates. The treasurer received a percentage of the sums he advanced to the crown, notably 1 per cent of the proceeds of the taille, four deniers per livre of the capitation and vingti`emes, ten livres per 1,000 livres of loans raised by the province and a variable sum, around 1.5 per cent of loans contracted for the king using the credit of the Estates. Two separate memoranda prepared during the reign of Louis XVI estimated that the treasurer earned between 100,000 and 150,000 livres annually from these fees, depending upon the amount of taxation levied.76 Moreover, the crown’s increasing reliance upon loans raised using provincial credit could lead to some spectacular windfalls. According to one, admittedly rather hostile witness, Necker’s borrowing spree netted Antoine Chartraire de Montigny 240,000 livres in 1778–9 alone.77 In reality, the director of finances had reduced the percentage paid to Chartraire, who was fortunate to receive half that amount.78 Even so, these were fabulous sums, and they were only the legitimate, official rewards of the office. It is well known that before 1789 access to the fiscal system offered plenty of scope for less scrupulous enrichment, and it would be remarkable indeed if the Chartraire had not capitalised upon their position. However, the role of the treasurer was not without risk, and it is important to remember that he was obliged to raise millions of livres, often at very short notice, and frequently during wars or periods of natural disaster, when normal sources of revenue were exhausted. By the eighteenth century, the Chartraire had developed networks of credit throughout France and even as far afield as Italy and Geneva.79 When examined over the century as a whole, the Chartraire provided a classic example of social ascension. Moreover, their rise, like that of earlier treasurers, was intimately linked to service for the governor. Before acquiring the office of treasurer general, Franc¸ois Bazin had served as a receiver of ‘land revenues’ for the Cond´e in Burgundy, and he had enjoyed the title of commensaux in their household.80 His predecessor, Thomas Bertier, on the other hand, was one of the secr´etaires ordinaires of the Grand Cond´e, so 76

77 79 80

ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 250, and ADCO C 3485, ‘Des droits attribu´ees au tr´esorier g´en´eral des e´tats; aux quinze receveurs particuliers des bailliages, et a` celui qui est charg´e de faire le recouvrement des cr¨ues sur le sel’. 78 Ibid. ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 250. Potter and Rosenthal, ‘Politics and public finance’, 594–600, and BMD MS 1945, ‘Correspondance de Cousin de M´ericourt’. B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 212, 400.

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it was hardly surprising that Antoine Chartraire, who was not initially the governor’s favoured candidate, was obliged to integrate into the Cond´ean client`ele as a condition of his succeeding Bazin in 1684. As Katia B´eguin has explained, Antoine’s son, Franc¸ois, was installed as one of the commensaux in what at first sight appears to be a form of medieval hostage taking.81 The reality, while less melodramatic, was nevertheless decisive for the future of the Chartraire. Once under the Cond´ean wing they had the opportunity to prove their loyalty, and reaped their reward in 1709 when Franc¸ois was able to succeed his father as treasurer general. By then the family had put down deep roots in the tight network of families that surrounded the governor. Franc¸ois married the daughter of Louis Girard, sieur du Thil, who was the nephew and heir of Jean Perrault, the financier whose immense wealth and fanatical loyalty had funded the Grand Cond´e’s armies during the Fronde.82 Her death was followed by a second marriage, this time to B´enigne de La Michodi`ere, whose brother, Claude, was chef du conseil of the duc de Bourbon. Both Franc¸ois and his son, Marc-Antoine, who succeeded him as treasurer general in 1728, were the faithful servants of the duc de Bourbon, with both men acting as his intendant in the province. Thus the most powerful officer in the fiscal administration of the Estates helped direct the network through which an absentee governor controlled the affairs of the province.83 Before the death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740, it was highly unlikely that anything of import discussed in the chamber of ´elus escaped the attention of Chantilly. That grip was relaxed during the subsequent interregnum, but after 1754 the prince de Cond´e picked up the reins of his father and continued to rely upon the services of the Chartraire. As time passed, the Chartraire gradually built up an impressive portfolio of lands, offices and marriage alliances within the province. Originally from the region of Semur-en-Auxois, by 1789 they possessed a chˆateau with a substantial estate as well as hˆotels in Dijon and Paris.84 The office of lieutenant of the town and fortress of Semur-en-Auxois was maintained in the family, and the younger son of Franc¸ois Chartraire was a pr´esident a` mortier in the Parlement of Dijon and married into the robe dynasty of Bouhier. Meanwhile their relative, Guy Chartraire de Saint Aignan, another financier and a prot´eg´e of the duc de Bourbon, was a councillor in the same court. By the mid-eighteenth century, they were securely integrated into the local robe nobility, and the treasurer general had every reason 81 83 84

82 Ibid., pp. 112–46, 188–231, 242–3, 410, 433. Ibid ., pp. 214–15. As the work of Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’ has argued. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 121.

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to feel at ease in the chamber of ´elus. His professional knowledge and expertise were enhanced by his credentials as a favourite of the governor and by ties of kinship with powerful local families. Not surprisingly, the treasurer enjoyed the confidence of the Estates, and he was frequently asked to undertake negotiations with ministers, or take responsibility for complicated administrative tasks, on their behalf. t h e s e c r e´ ta i re s d e s e´ tats Similar claims can be made on behalf of the two secr´etaires des ´etats, whose importance to the administrative life of the province equalled that of the treasurer general in the financial sphere. The original office of secr´etaire was as old as the Estates themselves, and it was not until 1631 that a second office was created.85 Each officer was responsible for a bureau charged with a number of specific tasks, including the preparation of the tax rolls and the collation and recording of the deliberations and correspondence of the ´elus. The secr´etaires were also appointed as the commissioners of the chamber, and were responsible for the drawing of lots for the provincial militia, inspecting public works and overseeing the military ´etapes. Many other duties could be added to this list, and like the treasurer they were frequently asked to act as intermediaries shuttling between Dijon, Chantilly and Versailles on provincial business. The importance of the secr´etaires was reflected in the price of their offices, and as early as 1631 they had been valued at 50,000 livres for the secr´etaire ancien and 55,000 livres for the alternatif .86 By 1750, that had risen to 64,000 and 97,000 livres respectively, although it is important to note that these were rates fixed by the Estates, with the consent of the crown, and a free market price would almost certainly have been higher.87 When a third office was established in 1752, it too was valued at 97,000 livres, which was double the going rate for the office of councillor in the Parlement of Paris.88 In return for these substantial investments, the secr´etaires received a gage at an annual rate of denier 20, plus the payment of fees for their services and other gifts and pensions from the Estates themselves. In theory, the incumbents served in alternate years, a result of the second office being a financial expedient from the age of Richelieu, but in practice after 1661 85 86 88

´ Billioud, Etats de Bourgogne, p. 176. They were often referred to as greffiers. 87 AN H1 123, dos. 1, fol. 23. AN H1 123, dos. 2, fol. 98. F. Bluche, Les magistrats du parlement de Paris au XVIIIe si`ecle, 2nd edn (Paris, 1986), p. 118–23.

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both men were fully occupied, even if their fees and other ‘gratifications’ continued to reflect the original imbalance. In 1752, for example, they were fixed at 4,695 livres for the ‘year in service’ and 1,041 livres for the ‘year out of service’,89 and by the 1780s that had risen to 6,000 and 7,900 livres respectively.90 When we add the income received from their gages these were by no means trifling sums, and they only represent the most obvious rewards of the office. Nor was prosperity to be measured in livres alone. No less important was access to the governor and to ministers in Versailles who could assist in the search for further preferment. In 1661, the offices were held by Guillaume Despringle, secr´etaire alternatif , and Denis Rigoley, secr´etaire ancien (see appendix 8). Despringle was an avocat in the Parlement from a noble family who had succeeded Thomas Bertier after his purchase of a part share of the office of treasurer general. In 1674, Despringle sold his office to Benoˆıt Julien. Interestingly Julien had been ´elu of the third estate since 1671, and he was ideally placed to win the approval of the governor when the opportunity arose. His family had provided ´elus on several previous occasions, and was not without distinction as the cadet branch of a local noble family.91 When Benoˆıt died in 1685, his son Jacques was appointed to replace him, despite the fact that he was not old enough to assume his duties until 1689.92 Jacques Julien served the Estates for the rest of his life, and when he died in 1725 it was his son-in-law, Claude-Charles Bernard de Blancey who replaced him.93 He too was a member of a local noble family, and his ancestor, Jean Bernard, had been an infantry captain and an ´ecuyer of Catherine de Medici.94 He proved a stalwart servant of the province, as did his son Andr´e Jean Bernard de Chanteau. Between them the two men occupied the office of secr´etaire des ´etats until 1785. From then until the revolution, the office was held by Balthazar Girard de la Br´ely, a gifted avocat from the Dauphin´e, who had previously served in the same capacity for the ´etats particuliers of Mˆacon.95 His experience in that role had won him admirers, notably the powerful local bishop who had facilitated his rise. As for Denis Rigoley, he had first acquired the office of secr´etaire ancien in 1661, and he also succeeded in passing it on to his son Claude, who was 89 90 91 92 93 95

ADCO C 3414, ‘D´elib´eration qui e´gale et fixe les droits, revenus et emoluments des trois greffiers et secr´etaires en chef des e´tats’. ADCO C 3302, remarques of the alcades (1781), and 1 F 460, fol. 218. ´ Beaune and Arbaumont, La noblesse aux Etats de Bourgogne, pp. 214–15. They were carried out by Rigoley during the interim. 94 Beaune and Arbaumont, Noblesse de Bourgogne, p. 127. ADCO C 3043, fol. 91. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, p. 215, and H. Richard, ‘Nouveaux documents sur les e´tats de Bourgogne (1787), a` propos d’une lettre de Girard-Labrely’, Annales de Bourgogne 69 (1997), 69.

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an important link in the Cond´ean network in Burgundy.96 Throughout thirty-nine years of steadfast service, Claude was in constant contact with successive governors, acting as their valued agent in the province.97 When Henri-Jules was too ill to attend the Estates of 1697, Rigoley was expected to send him a daily journal of events, while acting as a chaperone for his son. As the governor described matters: I have told my son of the confidence that I have in you, it is important that you tell him everything affecting the business of the Estates and of how I am accustomed to administer them either for the form or the substance.98

While ensuring the necessary continuity between father and son, Rigoley was thus introduced as an adviser to the young duc. When the Estates were not in session, he continued to receive orders from the governor. As the ´elus sought to resolve the thorny issues raised by the introduction of the system of venality for the office of mayor, Henri-Jules demanded to be kept abreast of the progress of the relevant law, as well as ‘what the Parlement, mayors and the public say of it’.99 He was worried that the mayors would escape from the tutelage of the ´elus, and he informed Rigoley that ‘it is necessary to sustain the ´elus and to make the mayors understand that they should not have pretensions that I have [already] disapproved of during the Estates’. Here is a perfect illustration of how the agents of the governor were expected to keep their master informed and to act as conduits for his orders. The confidence Henri-Jules placed in Rigoley was demonstrated by his willingness to consult him on the most sensitive matters. In 1699, no less a figure than the marquis de Lassay, began to petition the governor in order to be chosen as the next ´elu of the nobility. Henri-Jules was unsure: he claims to possess a fief, and that his affairs are in order in this respect, but I am unsure if being lieutenant du roi in the Bresse is not an exclusion . . . [and,] above all, if he is capable of holding this post.100

As a precaution, the prince had scrawled ‘speak to no one of this’ at the bottom of his letter. To a large extent the ambitions of the marquis de Lassay depended upon the good opinion of Rigoley, who did, in fact, find the necessary proofs to support his claim.101 At the Estates of 1700 the 96 97 98 99 100 101

ADCO C 2997, fol. 25, and Smith, The government of Burgundy, p. 38, n. 18. Part of their correspondence is housed in the BMD MS 2239–40. BMD MS 2239, fol. 426, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, July 1697. Ibid ., fol. 436, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 24 July 1697. BMD MS 2240, fol. 107, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 12 November 1699. Ibid ., fol. 114, Rigoley to Henri-Jules, 26 November 1699.

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marquis proudly took his place as the incoming ´elu of the nobility. The favour would later be returned, and one of Rigoley’s sons would serve as a captain in Lassay’s regiment.102 Rigoley helped the prince to decide on other less exalted matters of patronage, and more than once he was able to advance the interests of his relatives in the process.103 He also reaped a rich personal return for his labours. In 1685, he asked Henri-Jules for permission to buy the office of secr´etaire du roi. The governor replied graciously: ‘I happily consent to your desire to acquire the office of secr´etaire in the grande chancellerie provided that it is not incompatible with your duties in Burgundy and does not oblige you to reside outside of the province’.104 Once his noble credentials had been polished with a little ‘soap for scum’, he was ready for better things, and in 1712 the governor secured for him the prestigious position of first president in the Chambre des Comptes. His son, Denis Claude, was then installed in his father’s berth as secr´etaire des ´etats, where he would serve for nearly forty years.105 The Rigoley family had thus established themselves within the robe elite, and it was no coincidence that Claude’s first wife was none other than Anne-Madeleine Chartraire de St-Aignan, consolidating an alliance that would serve both clans well. After her death he remarried, this time to Odette-Th´er`ese Languet, whose father Guillaume had been a councillor of the Grand Cond´e and one of the financiers in the circle of his principal banker, Jean Perrault.106 What becomes clear from this tangled web of relationships is that the key offices of treasurer general and secr´etaire des ´etats were held by closely connected dynasties whose ascent had, in large measure, been facilitated by their membership of the governor’s client`ele. The accumulation of power in the hands of the Chartraire and Rigoley families almost inevitably attracted jealousy and criticism. Throughout the eighteenth century there were rumblings of discontent about the profits made by the treasurer general in particular,107 and when tragedy struck in 1750, with the untimely death of Marc-Antoine Chartraire de Montigny, many of these underlying tensions were brought out into the open. His son and designated successor was only a child, and it was necessary to concoct a strategy that would protect his inheritance from those who hoped to take advantage of the family’s misfortune. 102 103 104 105 107

B´eguin, Princes de Cond´e, p. 435. BMD MS 2239, fols. 128, 140, Rigoley to Henri-Jules, 15 October and 23 December 1684. Ibid ., fol. 164, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 24 December 1685. 106 Ibid., p. 425. B´eguin, Princes de Cond´e, p. 435. In 1742, one of the censored remarques of the alcades had called for a reduction in the payments to the treasurer, and this would be repeated by a variety of official and unofficial critics until 1789.

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The task was rendered doubly difficult by the problems in the Cond´e household, where the young prince was still a minor, and much depended on the attitude of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Jean-Baptiste Machault d’Arnouville. Initially the Chartraire proposed that the office be transferred to Antoine Chartraire de Montigny, with Nicolas Seguin, the long-serving receiver of the taille of Dijon, acting as his commis under the financial caution of Antoine’s uncles.108 The ´elus, the intendant and the provincial commandant all threw their weight behind this arrangement, but Machault was unconvinced. He rejected the suggestion, and instead ordered Denis Rigoley de Mypon, the brother-in-law of the deceased treasurer general, to assume the office on behalf of his nephew.109 Rigoley had been serving as secr´etaire des ´etats for nearly forty years, and his experience made him an ideal replacement. As part of the arrangement another of Rigoley’s nephews was given the survivance on his office of secr´etaire des ´etats, which was in turn to be exercised by Jacques Varenne, hitherto one of the three conseils des ´etats.110 After much hard bargaining, the Chartraire and Rigoley clans could congratulate themselves on having successfully traversed a crisis. Their relief was short-lived. In May 1752 Rigoley de Mypon died. With no obvious candidate to succeed him and the usually decisive influence of the Cond´e still absent, matters were now grave, and they were made worse by the realisation that all was not well with the inheritance of Marc-Antoine Chartraire de Montigny.111 The problem was largely one of liquidity brought about by his extravagant building programmes, and despite the value of his property, investments and other fixed assets it would not have been an exaggeration to talk of bankruptcy. There was a substantial sum of several hundred thousand livres owing to the province, and the ambitious glimpsed an opportunity to topple the Chartraire-Rigoley clan from its lucrative perch. In order to defend themselves, the incumbents had to come up with a viable candidate quickly, and on 24 May Jean Rigoley de Puligny, first president of the Chambre des Comptes, wrote to Machault proposing his nephew, Claude-Jean Rigoley d’Ogny, son of the recently deceased Rigoley de Mypon.112 A twenty-seven-year-old councillor 108 109

110 111 112

AN H1 123, fols. 49, 51, 52, 53. ADCO C 3354, fol. 145, Machault to the ´elus, 1 May 1750, and C 3361, fols. 101–3, the ´elus to Machault, Saint-Florentin and the marquis d’Anlezy, 27 April 1750. It is worth noting that the ´elus were sending details of their actions to the young prince’s governor, d’Anlezy. These details were set out in a long letter from the minister, ADCO C 3361, fol. 106, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 14 June 1750. AN H1 123, dos. 1, fols. 1–23, dos 2, fols. 1–103, are a vital source for the history of the crisis, and offer an insight into the complicated financial affairs of the treasurer general. AN H1 123, dos 2, fol. 75, Rigoley de Puligny to Machault, 24 May 1752.

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in the Parlement of Dijon, he had no direct knowledge of financial affairs, although Rigoley de Puligny argued that he had been kept informed by his father and that he would lend his own expertise, some thirty-six years as first president of the Chambre des Comptes, where necessary. Clearly aware that there would be no shortage of alternative candidates, Rigoley de Puligny also sent several letters to Machault’s first commis, Clautrier, who was charged with reporting on the qualities of the candidates to the minister.113 He claimed that his nephew had widespread support, adding that ‘I have written proof from all the orders of the province, and in particular the receivers [of the taille], the people of town and country are united in seeing this favour as a comfort for them in the loss they have sustained’.114 The idea of the taxpayers of Burgundy lamenting the misfortunes of the Chartraire clan stretches credulity to its limits, and, in reality, the united front of royal and local officials present in 1750 had collapsed. The intendant, Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury, informed the first commis that ‘I wish fervently that he [Machault] would cast his eyes upon M. Talon: the fear of a foreigner is based upon nothing more than the desire to keep things hidden; confidence will not be affected because the treasurer resides [in the province]’.115 A number of other candidates were proposed,116 and within the province there were at least four experienced figures that put themselves forward. While Rigoley de Mypon was on his deathbed, Carrelet, receveur g´en´eral of the taillon, was already outlining his own credentials to Machault.117 Nicolas Seguin, receiver of the taille in Dijon, offered himself as treasurer general in his own right, as did Jacques Varenne, who had been acting as secr´etaire des ´etats since 1750.118 Another to throw his hat into the ring was Ba¨uyn, whose family had provided an ´elu du roi during the late seventeenth century, and who possessed what he hoped would be a trump card, namely a common grandmother with the contrˆoleur g´en´eral.119 Finally, other vultures were circling, hoping to take advantage of the crisis. Claude Marlot, vicomte-mayeur of Dijon, contacted Machault in order to offer his services as secr´etaire des ´etats in the event that Varenne became treasurer general.120 113 114 116 117 118 119 120

AN H1 123, dos. 1, piece 11, Rigoley de Puligny to Clautrier, 25 May 1752. 115 AN H1 123, dos. 1, piece 8, Joly de Fleury to Clautrier, 20 May 1752. Ibid . See: AN H1 123, dos. 2, fol. 62, Charolais to Machault, 14 May 1752, and ibid., fol. 55, chevalier de Grieu to Machault, May 1752. Ibid ., fol. 64, Carrelet to Machault, 13 May 1752. Ibid ., fol. 70, Marlot to Machault, 24 May 1752. Ibid ., fol. 77, Ba¨uyn to Machault, 15 May 1752. Ibid ., fol. 70, Marlot to Machault, 24 May 1752.

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With what appeared to be the first cracks in the ruling dynasties for nearly a century, it is easy to imagine the excitement and bitterness generated amongst those scrabbling for preferment. Joly de Fleury, who continued to campaign on behalf of his relative, Talon, described the feuds amongst the ´elus in withering terms.121 According to his account, the bishop of Dijon, ´elu of the clergy, detested Varenne, while the comte de Saulx, his counterpart from the chamber of the noblesse, favoured Seguin. As for his own view of the candidates, the intendant claimed that Rigoley d’Ogny lacked the necessary experience, while Chartraire de Bourbon, who had the skills but not the vocation, was ‘too slavishly devoted to the House of Cond´e’.122 Seguin was dismissed as too humble, and if his own preference for Talon was overlooked then Carrelet or Varenne should be chosen. Division and discord were the order of the day, and perhaps the only thing the feuding parties, with the exception of the intendant, could agree upon was that the final decision should favour a suitably qualified Burgundian.123 Their wish was granted, and in June Machault approved the appointment of Rigoley d’Ogny. He would serve as treasurer general until 1770, when Antoine Chartraire de Montigny finally came of age. In agreement with the ´elus, the minister also sanctioned a generous settlement with the Chartraire that in effect allowed them several years to amortise their debts and reestablish order in their financial affairs.124 The principal concern of all those involved was to protect public confidence in the financial management of the Estates, but the Chartraire could count themselves doubly fortunate to have escaped bankruptcy and to have fought off their rivals for the office of treasurer general. The final chapter in the drama concerned the offices of secr´etaire des ´etats. Although not chosen as treasurer, Varenne had won the respect of the ministers in Versailles and of the intendant, and he used that credit to persuade them to authorise the creation of a third office in November 1752 as he was currently no more than temporary replacement for yet another young Rigoley.125 The experiment with the extra secr´etaire proved short-lived. Varenne’s over zealous defence of the interests of the Estates 121 122 123 124 125

Ibid ., fol. 47, Joly de Fleury to Machault, 30 April 1752. Ibid ., fol. 66, Joly de Fleury to Machault, 18 May 1752. For a good example of their thinking, see AN H1 123, dos. 1, fol. 13, comte de Saulx to Clautrier, 11 May 1752. AN H1 123, dos. 2, fols. 100, 103. On this occasion for Rigoley de Puligny, grandson of the first president of the Chambre de Comptes. AN H1 123, dos. 2, fol. 48, ‘M´emoire’ (this was probably written by the intendant, Joly de Fleury), and ADCO C 3361, fol. 152, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 18 August 1752. The letters patent were dated 2 November 1752.

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in a quarrel with the Parlement of Dijon led to his forced resignation in 1763, and the office was suppressed.126 Once the dust had settled, there was only one more significant change before the revolution, and that was the resignation of Rigoley de Puligny in 1769. He assumed the office of first president of the Chambre des Comptes, marking the end of his family’s long presence in the provincial administration.127 He was replaced by NicolasClaude Rousselot, vicomte-mayeur of Dijon, a prot´eg´e of the prince de Cond´e, who was still in place in 1789.128 From this discussion it becomes clear that the secr´etaires des ´etats were a tight-knit group, owing their good fortune to the favour of the Cond´e, and holding on to their offices with great tenacity. They were men of talent and experience, and it was common for individuals to serve for decades, simultaneously preparing the next generation through the flexible use of the system of survivance. After 1750, for example, the ´elus permitted Bernard de Chanteau to work alongside his father and to deputise for him in his absence.129 Similarly Rousselot secured the survivance on his office for his son-in-law, who helped to share the administrative burden after 1773. In the course of their labours, the secr´etaires accumulated an enormous range of skills, knowledge and experience, and they were certainly qualified to run the provincial administration if the ´elus allowed them to do so. t h e l e g a l o ff i ce rs If the treasurer general directed financial affairs and the secr´etaires the administration, the two procureurs syndics and three conseils des ´etats provided the legal firepower. Traditionally these officers were chosen from amongst the procureurs and avocats of Dijon, and these highly qualified professional lawyers brought considerable expertise to the chamber.130 The procureurs syndics swore an oath to defend the province’s privileges whether before the king’s council, his law courts, the chamber of ´elus or the Estates assembled.131 They were also responsible for pursuing legal cases, or other like matters, resulting from the deliberations of the ´elus.132 A few examples 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

See chapter 9. ADCO C 3363, fol. 44, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 12 October 1769. The Rigoley had been struck by a series of untimely deaths which left them with little alternative. ADCO C 3363, fol. 169, the ´elus to Cond´e, 18 May 1773, and Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 193, n. 49. ADCO C 3005, fol. 38, and C 3302. The recruitment of the procureurs syndics and conseils is discussed in a memoir prepared by the procureurs of Dijon, dated 2 January 1776, ADCO C 3417. BMD MS 2285, fol. 149, ‘Notes sur les e´tats de Bourgogne’. According to the terms of the royal r`eglement of 1744, BMD MS 981, fol. 135.

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help to provide an indication of the scope of their activities. When, in 1667, Antoine Bossuet, joint treasurer of the Estates, sought to deflect part of his loss of some 230,000 livres, resulting from the flight of one of his employees, on to the province, it was the procureurs syndics who defended the interests of the Estates before the king’s council.133 Similarly they could appeal to the royal council against the decisions of a Parlement, bailliage or other court, as well as prepare legal requˆetes and memoirs for the Estates.134 Thus, in December 1705, the procureur syndic, Nicholas Guenichot, was sent to court with instructions to pursue a variety of lawsuits, notably one against the farmers of the gabelle.135 Not that he would have completely free rein because the ´elus were careful to stipulate that he should act ‘following the orders that he shall receive from His Serene Highness’. Finally, it was the procureurs syndics who liaised with both the Parlement of Dijon and the local intendant, not only about legal matters, but also those affecting the administration of the province. The conseils des ´etats, on the other hand, were experienced avocats who assisted the governor and the members of the administration with legal counsel. In 1713, the duc de Bourbon was working hard to reduce the number of receivers of the taille in the bailliage of Autun, and he was determined to have the necessary arms to stave off opposition. In a letter to the conseil des ´etats, Boillot, he wrote: on your arrival in Burgundy, I order you to begin work immediately researching the rights and privileges of the Estates, [those of] the ´elus and other subjects which might be useful to the province, in the original deeds and records to be found in the archives of the Estates.136

His orders on this occasion were typical of the activities of the conseils, whose consultations were a vital weapon in the defence of provincial privilege. The conseils also enjoyed the honour of presenting their remarques, drafted in consultation with the procureurs syndics, to the triennial assemblies of the Estates.137 These were weighty and impressive documents, primarily concerned with advancing ideas for the modification of Burgundian law or judicial procedure. The Estates were not obliged to act on their recommendations, but the authority of the province’s legal experts usually guaranteed that their advice was heeded. 133 134 135 136 137

BMD MS 1282, ‘Proc`es intent´e par les procureurs syndics des e´tats de Bourgogne a` Antoine Bossuet’. ADCO C 3363, fol. 96, Amelot to the ´elus, 9 March 1771. ADCO C 3336, deliberation of the ´elus dated 9 April 1705. ADCO C 3415, duc de Bourbon to Boillot, 14 July 1713. The procedure is discussed in chapter 3, for examples of their remarques see ADCO C 3041, fols. 262–3 (1700), and fols. 330–8, (1703).

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Both the procureurs syndics and the conseils were chosen by the governor, usually in concert with the ´elus, acting in the name of the Estates. Aspiring candidates and their patrons sent their petitions to Chantilly, where dossiers were compiled from which the governor could make his decision.138 After 1742, that right was theoretically reserved to the crown, but ministers were loath to use a power that might antagonise the Estates. When, in 1763, the archbishop of Bourges approached the comte de Saint-Florentin about a vacancy amongst the conseils des ´etats, the minister admitted that the ‘grace’ depended on the ´elus and they rarely acted without first consulting the governor.139 In return for their professional services, the procureurs syndics received 150 livres annually, 500 livres after 1752.140 Even when their fees and other ‘gratifications’ are taken into consideration these were comparatively modest sums, and most of these officers were simultaneously pursuing careers at the bar or as professors in the university of Dijon. Yet there was no doubting their commitment to the Estates, and many of the legal officers spent decades in their service (see appendices 9–10). Pierre Durand, who resigned as procureur syndic in 1691, had been in place since 1665, and his predecessor Barth´elemy Moreau had served for twenty-five years. Nicholas Guenichot, who also retired in 1691, was a comparative novice, having only served for eighteen years. During the eighteenth century similar feats of endurance were recorded. Jean Rougeot laboured away throughout the period from 1719 to 1751, and Franc¸ois Joseph Jacquinot was in office from 1769 until the revolution. The pattern was repeated amongst the conseils des ´etats. Hubert-Joseph Boillot gave legal counsel from 1697 to 1730, Guillaume Raviot from 1712 to 1751 and Simon Ranfer, who took up his duties in 1757, was still going strong as a robust octogenarian until his death in 1789. As in any prestigious institution, families once installed in an office sought to preserve it as part of their patrimony. When Nicolas Guenichot resigned in 1691 it was to the benefit of his son, and Nicolas Perchet managed to complete an identical manoeuvre in 1747.141 Amongst the conseils des ´etats, Lazare Louis Thiroux succeeded his father in 1684, as did Franc¸ois Boillot in 1710. These were, however, exceptional cases, and there was no equivalent to the Chartraire or Rigoley dynasties amongst the legal experts. 138 139 140 141

BMC AC GB 27, fols. 255–6, Henri-Jules to the abb´e g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux, 29 March 1683, and AC 1410, fols. 2, 68, for examples from 1729–30. ADCO C 3362, fol. 149, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 3 September 1763. ADCO C 3361, fol. 162, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 2 December 1752. ADCO C 3168, fol. 392, and C 3361, fols. 192–3.

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Their position was not a venal office, and that combined with the need for a high degree of professional competence no doubt accounted for the different pattern of recruitment. What they did have in common was the habit of using the Estates as part of a broader strategy of social advancement. Families such as the Guenichot, Guillaume or Raviot gradually progressed to the benches of one of the great law courts in the provincial capital. Others achieved distinctions elsewhere. Jean Bannelier, conseil des ´etats from 1751 until his death in 1766, was dean of the law faculty of the university of Dijon, while one of his successors, Andr´e Remy Arnoult, represented the third estate of the city at the Estates General of 1789. Finally, the chamber could call upon the expertise of the avocat au conseil, whose services in Paris were retained by the province.142 His role was to keep the legal officers in Dijon informed of the progress of cases affecting the Estates before the king’s council, and to liaise with them when they travelled to Paris on provincial business. Ten avocats would hold the position between 1679 and 1789, and it was never monopolised by a single family. Theoretically the ´elus made the appointment, but even here the influence of the governor was discernible. In July 1780, the chamber gave its blessing to Fenouillot de Closey who had long coveted the place, and a few days later they received a letter from the prince de Cond´e confirming their right to nominate to the position.143 However, the governor added that he would personally be delighted to see a certain sieur Rigault chosen instead. A few months later a heartbroken Fenouillot de Closey wrote to the ´elus swearing his undying commitment to the province and begging to be informed of the reasons for his sudden disgrace.144 The unhappy avocat had no reason to reproach himself. His replacement by Rigault was another typical example of the ´elus bowing to the wishes of the governor. No matter how minor a post, or how stiff the competition, a candidate with the blessing of Chantilly would almost inevitably prevail. t h e p rov i n c i a l e n g i n e e r s During the century preceding the revolution, the role of the Estates in the construction and upkeep of the province’s road network saw the emergence of the provincial engineer whose presence became a regular feature of the chamber of ´elus. The original appointment was the result of a d´ecret passed at the reforming Estates of 1682, which had ordered the ´elus to choose 142 143 144

A practice followed by the other pays d’´etats, Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 153–4. ADCO C 3416, prince de Cond´e to the ´elus, 26 July 1780. ADCO C 3365, fol. 18, Fenouillot de Closey to the ´elus, 23 January 1782.

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‘an expert and intelligent person to watch over, under their supervision, public works’.145 The move proved to be a resounding success, and Antoine Rouillet served with distinction until 1706. Pierre Morin, who replaced him, was a talented, irascible figure, and he was ignominiously sacked in 1736 after being accused, probably unfairly, of a mixture of graft and shoddy workmanship.146 This unfortunate episode proved untypical, and in 1753, the ´elus appointed two ‘deputy engineers’ to work alongside Thomas Dumorey who was an altogether more successful chief. Under his guidance, the province built an impressive road network, which was further expanded by his deputy and eventual successor, Emiliand-Marie Gauthey, whose skills were responsible for the construction of the Canal du Centre. Napol´eon was one of many admirers of Gauthey, who pursued a successful career after 1789, and he was eventually named a commander of the l´egion d’honneur.147 the alcades Although not members of the chamber of ´elus, the seven alcades were officers of the Estates, and like the ´elus of the three orders they were appointed to serve for the duration of a triennalit´e. The post first appeared at the end of the sixteenth century, and by the reign of Louis XIV it was customary for the clergy and the nobility to each choose two alcades, while the third estate nominated three. The role of the alcades was to scrutinise the activities of the chamber of ´elus, praising good practice, criticising abuse and making suggestions for administrative reform. They more than fulfilled their brief, although the absence of any guarantee that their reports, known as remarques, would be acted upon was one of the principal weaknesses of a potentially valuable system. The alcades were chosen from within the three chambers, and they were generally of a lower social status than the ´elus.148 Of the seventy-six clerical alcades to serve between 1668 and the revolution (appendix 11), there were at least fifty-one chanoines and nineteen prieurs. The bishops never deigned to serve as alcades, nor did the heads of religious houses such as the abb´e g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux, and these were clearly men from a slightly lower rung of the ecclesiastical ladder. Nor did the clerical alcades have much hope of joining the ranks of the ´elus. Only one individual, abb´e Antoine de La Goutte, alcade 145 146

147

ADCO C 2999, fol. 12. L. Blin, ‘Le proc`es de Pierre Morin, ing´enieur de Bourgogne de 1710 a` 1736’, M´emoires de la Soci´et´e pour l’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays Bourguignons, Comtois et Romands 32 (1973–4), 209–41. 148 Ligou, ‘Elus ´ et alcades’, 24–5. Garnier and Muteau, Galerie Bourguignonne, i, pp. 386–8

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in 1745–8 and 1754–7, achieved that distinction during the whole period of this study, serving during what proved to be the tumultuous triennalit´e of 1775 to 1778.149 Some alcades were from very distinguished families, including the robe dynasties of Fevret, Quarr´e and Bretagne. Others had strong links with the Cond´e, notably Louis de Th´esut, a member of the family of the governor’s intendant in the province who was chosen as alcade in 1679, and Louis Robinet, almoner of monseigneur le duc, alcade in both 1697–1700 and 1712–15. Abb´e Donnadieu (1748–51), on the other hand, was a member of the dauphine’s household, and she clearly felt that he was indispensable because he was excused from the meetings of his colleagues in Dijon, while continuing to be paid his fees.150 While these were amongst the most distinguished, the majority of clerical alcades were from noble families.151 Amongst the nobility the great court aristocrats were largely absent from the alcadat.152 Instead, those elected were drawn from within the elite of those nobles permanently resident in the province, and thanks to the workings of a ‘wheel’ the different bailliages and comt´es were all represented (see appendix 12). Again it is striking that a two-tier system was operating, and it was comparatively rare for an alcade to subsequently be chosen as an ´elu. The exceptions to this rule, such as Antoine Franc¸ois de La Tournelle, alcade in 1730 and ´elu in 1736, were the particular favourites of the governor.153 The existence of this relatively sharp division between those members of the second order, who were deemed worthy of serving as ´elu and the rest belies the official image of noble equality preached by the chamber. It might also account for the often critical tone of the remarques produced by the alcades, as these local men were presumably quick to spot the failings of the aristocratic ´elus. The alcades of the third estate were a more familiar group, being composed of the mayors of the petite roue (see appendix 13). As the towns of the grande roue, which provided the ´elus, were also members of the petite roue there was a considerable degree of overlap. One of the advantages of this system was the detailed knowledge of the administration possessed by men like Claude Champion, mayor of Avallon, Guy Jouard, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, and Nicolas Pourcher, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges, all of whom had been alcades before they served as ´elu of the third estate. If they were tempted to turn a blind eye to any imperfections within the 149 151 152

150 ADCO C 3361, fol. 115. Ibid ., and chapter 8. ´ Ligou, ‘Elus et alcades’, 24–5, on the other hand, claims that only nine were noble, but without entering into details. 153 Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 14, n. 137. Ibid ., 26–30.

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administration, there were always two other mayors from the towns of the petite roue to remind them of their duty. As few of the alcades could aspire to the election, they undoubtedly derived satisfaction, pride and honour from acting as the guardians of the interests of the Estates. Their remarques provide an eloquent testimony to the time, thought and effort they expended in fulfilling their commission. Competition to become an alcade was fierce, and even amongst the third estate the existence of the roues was not enough to prevent quarrels about which town had the right to the office.154 It was, however, the privileged orders that were most frequently engaged in disputes about the choice of their alcades. When Dom Pierre Thibault, deputy of the abbey of Saint B´enigne of Dijon, secured election to the alcadat in June 1766, he was chal155 ´ lenged a few days later by Bazin, deputy of the church of Saint Etienne. The quarrel was eventually referred to the other chambers, and they found in favour of Bazin. Trouble also flared amongst the nobility in 1709, when Claude Viard de Quemigny lodged a protest against alleged vote fixing in the chamber, provoking a furious row in the process.156 He was angry that Jacques de La Cousse d’Arcelot, the powerful commissioner charged with verifying the proofs of those wishing to enter the chamber, had ‘lands or fiefs in several baillages or comt´es’ and through his credit would ‘monopolise all of the offices of the chamber of nobility’. He maintained that rather than have an open vote of the eighty nobles present, a clique composed of ‘M. d’Arconey, d’Epinac, de Foudras, de Xaintrailles, de Lassey and de Tavannes decided between themselves’.157 As all of those cited were amongst the most powerful men in the chamber, Viard was almost certainly correct in his assessment, but all he earned was a sharp reprimand from the governor. Yet his complaints reveal the emotions generated by the struggle for office, and if the choice of the alcades was less tightly controlled than that of the ´elus the patronage of the governor was often decisive. Once appointed by the Estates, the alcades had no direct involvement in the functioning of the chamber of ´elus. Before 1682, they were not expected to reassemble in order to prepare their remarques until two weeks before the next meeting of the Estates. This clearly left no time to examine the activities of the administration in any depth, and on their own recommendation the alcades were subsequently able to meet during the month of December preceding an assembly, with the aim of putting ‘matters in such a state that they can complete the remainder of their remarques during the eight 154 156

155 ADCO C 3030, fols. 483–5. ADCO C 3030, fol. 533 (1709), and C 3051, fol. 167 (1763). 157 ADCO C 3019, fol. 417. ADCO C 3019, fols. 416–18, and C 3042, fol. 149.

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or ten days that they are assembled before the opening of the Estates’.158 The Estates were keen to enforce the new system, repeating the terms of the d´ecret of 1682 when the alcades failed to abide by its terms, and it quickly became part of established practice remaining in force until the revolution.159 Despite the terms of the d´ecret of 1682, the alcades were still permitted a relatively short space of time to investigate the work of the administration. Their remarques do contain occasional complaints about restricted access to crucial documents, but the overall impression is of a committee confronted by rather more information than could be digested in the time available.160 According to the register kept by the alcades of the triennalit´e of 1742–5, they first met on 3 December 1744 and remained in session until the end of that month. They followed a relatively busy schedule: ‘we were gathered in the chamber every day . . . in the morning from nine until midday and in the afternoon from three to six, Sundays and holy days excepted’.161 During their assemblies, they were occupied: with reading the d´ecrets of the Estates of 1742, the cahiers presented to the king during the voyage of honour and the replies of His Majesty, the registers and the deliberations of the current triennalit´e; the state of the [fiscal] administration, in income and expenditure, and as we completed this reading, we made observations of a general and specific nature that we communicated to each other, contenting ourselves to make a memorandum of the subjects of our remarques.162

The above account was written at the beginning of a series of official registers kept by successive alcades, and was intended to serve as a model for future reference. It does, however, represent a reasonably objective description of the working practices of the body as a whole. If the alcades carried out their duties conscientiously, they had an impressive corpus of documents, running into thousands of pages, at their disposal, and these would certainly provide a reliable insight into the actions of the ´elus. Yet it would be a view of the administration taken from the standpoint of the chamber of ´elus in Dijon, with very little sense of how its decisions were being implemented, or side-stepped, in the province at large. To remedy that deficiency, the alcades had to call upon their own local knowledge, and the reports and complaints sent to them individually in the hope of influencing their remarques. As we have seen, the alcades had no 158 159 160 161

These were the terms of the d´ecret of 1682, ADCO C 2999, fol. 9. The offending alcades were rebuked at the Estates of 1688, ibid., fol. 181. Complaints were, for example, voiced in the remarques of 1742, ADCO C 3303, fol. 168, and again in 1766, C 3304, fols. 7, 10–11. 162 Ibid. ADCO C 3306, fol. 4.

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means of guaranteeing that their recommendations would be adopted, but to conclude that ‘their role was very limited’ is misleading.163 The d´ecrets of the Estates and the remonstrances presented to the king are full of ideas and measures that first saw the light of day as articles in the remarques of the alcades. Moreover, the governor, ´elus and the ministry in Versailles were all concerned about the possible impact of their criticisms upon both the Estates and the wider public in Burgundy. It was no coincidence that by 1789 many would-be reformers of the Estates believed that strengthening the powers of the alcades was the first step to take.164 From this discussion of the chamber of ´elus and the permanent officers of the Estates, it becomes clear that many of the criticisms contained in the remonstrances of Malesherbes or the works of subsequent historians are excessive. Too often studies of the Estates have assumed that the chamber was divided between an ill-informed elite and their highly qualified subordinates. It is true that the treasurer general, the secr´etaires des ´etats and the legal officers possessed great experience and familiarity with the workings of the provincial administration, but they were not dealing with political ing´enues. Nor is the division of ´elus and permanent officials necessarily helpful when it comes to understanding how the chamber actually worked. Bishops and court aristocrats might lack specialist knowledge of financial or administrative practice, but they could bring other assets to the chamber. They had the social status required to approach the king or his ministers, and a familiarity with the workings of Versailles needed to ensure that the ideas and proposals of the permanent officers did not just gather dust on the desk of a ministerial clerk. When looked at from this perspective, the administration of the Estates of Burgundy strongly resembles that of the monarchy. At Versailles, the king’s councils and the offices of secretary of state were filled by great aristocrats or members of the robe dynasties, ably assisted by the maˆıtres des requˆetes, intendants des finances and their first commis who provided the specialist knowledge upon which their decisions were based. In other words, there was a division of labour that matches almost perfectly that between the ´elus and their permanent officials. Rather than being in conflict, the two arms of the provincial administration were usually pulling in the same direction. The great majority were Burgundians, connected by ties of kinship to other members of the chamber, or the wider circle of noble and office-holding elites, who were fiercely proud of the Estates and conscious of their responsibility to protect their privileges and those of the province 163

´ et alcades’, 40, has done. As Ligou, ‘Elus

164

See chapter 12.

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as a whole. Moreover, many owed their appointment to the governor, and formed a client`ele with ties of loyalty to the House of Bourbon-Cond´e. Here the Estates of Burgundy would appear to offer an alternative model to that identified by historians of the other pays d’´etats. Rather than the personal rule of Louis XIV ushering in a period of government through a royal patronage network,165 it witnessed the re-establishment of Cond´ean rule.166 Successive governors were able to control many of the appointments to the chamber of ´elus and before the death of the duc de Bourbon talk of a division between ´elus and permanent officers is meaningless, as they frequently shared a common bond with Chantilly. It was the complementary nature of the ´elus and the permanent officials that would make them such effective defenders of the privileges and authority of the Estates. After 1754, the powers of the last governor of the province, the prince de Cond´e, were still impressive, and only the brave, or foolhardy, would deliberately ignore his wishes. 165 166

As has been argued by Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 244, and Kettering, Patrons and brokers, p. 223. Here I am in full agreement with the works of B´eguin, Natcheson and Smith cited above.

chapter 5

The provincial administration: authority and enforcement

t h e c h a m b e r o f e´ lu s i n s e s si o n If the myth of ignorant ´elus has been laid to rest,1 their actual contribution to the running of the provincial administration remains to be proven. According to critics such as Malesherbes, the ´elus were rarely present in Dijon, leaving their chamber closed, or in the hands of the permanent officers.2 As we shall see, these accusations were inaccurate, and to fully appreciate the activities of the ´elus it is necessary to define their competence, examine their working practices and consider how decisions reached in Dijon were put into effect. A simple plan (plate 4) sketched early in the eighteenth century offers a glimpse into the chamber itself.3 It was the ´elu of the clergy, or in his absence the representative of the nobility, who presided over the work of the assembly from his armchair positioned at the head of a large rectangular bureau around which were seated the other ´elus, the deputies of the Chambre des Comptes and the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon. The serving secr´etaire des ´etats sat facing the president from the other end of the table, and behind him were the two procureurs syndics. A separate desk accommodated the clerks recording the deliberations, and further seating was reserved for any ‘persons of distinction’ who might enter the chamber. Although their presence was not obligatory, the treasurer general, conseils des ´etats and the provincial engineer were regularly summoned for consultation. When taking decisions about provincial affairs, or issuing orders to be carried out by their subordinates, the opinions of the seven ´elus were not of equal weight. Instead, the representatives of the two privileged orders and the ´elu du roi cast one vote each, while the vicomte-mayeur and the ´elu of the third estate had one vote between them, as did the two deputies from the Chambre des Comptes.4 If either of these pairings disagreed, then their 1 3

2 Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, p. 145. See chapter 4. 4 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 202. ADCO C 3055, bis.

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Plate 4 Plan of the chamber of ´elus at the Estates of Burgundy

opinions were cancelled out. The combination of the vicomte-mayeur and the ´elu of the third estate was justified on the basis that both represented the same order, which would otherwise be favoured relative to the clergy and nobility, and similar motives presumably account for the treatment of the Chambre des Comptes. Decisions within the chamber were reached by simple majority voting, and, in the event of a tie, it was the ´elu of the clergy who cast the deciding vote. The voting system thus had the advantage of giving increased weight to the ´elus of the three orders, who as the direct representatives of the Estates could be expected to protect their interests. Once a decision had been reached all of the members of the chamber were expected to add their signatures to the resulting text, known as a d´elib´eration, mandement or an ordinance. Even on the most controversial issues this convention was obeyed, and when the bishop of Dijon baulked at the prospect of signing a deliberation increasing the number of engineers employed by the province, the secretary of state, Saint-Florentin, was quick to inform him of his error.5 The minister declared that the deliberation ‘having been reached by a majority of votes it must stand, and no member of the chamber should exempt himself from signing it even if he 5

ADCO C 3361, fol. 168, Saint-Florentin to the bishop of Dijon, 9 January 1753.

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was of a different opinion’. These deliberations varied from comparatively minor matters, such as the payment of a pension accorded by the Estates, or the issuing of a commission for a member of the chamber to inspect public works, to detailed ordinances laying down the regulations governing the tax system. During each triennalit´e hundreds of these decisions were taken, and each was added to the voluminous registers to be verified and retrospectively approved at the next session of the Estates. As each of their deliberations was technically provisional, the ´elus occasionally took fright when the crown demanded additional funds, fearing that they would subsequently be disowned. A few reassuring words from the governor was usually enough to calm their fears, and examples of the chamber being called to account by the Estates are rare. Other safeguards had been built into the procedures of the chamber of ´elus with the aim of bolstering the position of the representatives of the Estates and restraining the permanent officials. In 1662, a d´ecret of the Estates had stipulated that deliberations affecting taxation or the spending of the province’s revenues would only be valid if two of their ´elus were present.6 A few years later, in 1682, the Estates repeated an earlier d´ecret stating that no deliberation would be binding unless it was concluded in the presence of two of its representatives.7 The need for the Estates to issue such d´ecrets provided later historians with the ammunition to attack the shortcomings of the ´elus,8 and there is no doubt that a certain laxity did persist into the personal reign of Louis XIV. The case of Pierre du Ban, comte de La Feuill´ee, illustrates the point perfectly. Named ´elu of the nobility in May 1677, he was not a man to trouble the chamber with his presence. In July of that same year, his colleagues in Dijon received a letter from the comte informing them that: when paying his respects to the king, His Majesty had said that the services he could render him in Germany would be as welcome and useful as those he could perform in Burgundy . . . that His Majesty for this reason had ordered him to return to the army.9

La Feuill´ee added that he was leaving immediately, asking the other ´elus ‘to count him as present in all the affairs they dealt with in his absence, promising to ratify them on his return’. In modern parlance, the comte might best be described as a ‘virtual ´elu’, physically in the Empire, but with his signature appearing on the deliberations taken in Dijon. To complete the picture, the chamber agreed that his ‘fees would be paid, as if he had been present and had assisted’.10 6 9

7 ADCO C 2999, fols. 6–8. 8 See chapter 7. ADCO C 2997, fol. 72. 10 Ibid. ADCO C 3057, La Feuill´ee to the ´elus, 21 July 1677.

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Here was an extreme example of noble absenteeism, and later critics of the Estates have assumed that it was endemic.11 Yet we need to beware of reading too much into the behaviour of errant ´elus because other cases can be cited to demonstrate a more conscientious attitude to their work. Louis Antoine Paul de Bourbon, vicomte de Bourbon-Busset, the last ´elu of the Burgundian nobility, was exemplary in his dedication. In a letter to his friend, the former intendant of the province, Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury, written in January 1788, he explained why he would have to forsake the attractions of Paris for the foreseeable future. He wrote: I need to gain a detailed knowledge of the affairs and interests of the province in order to avoid being embarrassed during the voyage of honour. The information that I require can only be obtained through constant work, I would also like to examine personally the canal [du centre] and see the works of art carried out in the different cantons at the province’s expense. You can well imagine, sir, that here are a good many reasons to delay my return.12

Clearly a vast gulf separated Bourbon-Busset from his predecessor, La Feuill´ee, and common sense suggests that most noble ´elus fell somewhere between the two extremes, performing the duties expected of them without excessive zeal. Throughout the period there are examples of the ´elus seeking to improve the quality of their administration, often without the need for threats or sanctions. Generally when the chamber was not in session, the ´elus scattered in order to attend to their own affairs, leaving one of the secr´etaires des ´etats to answer any urgent correspondence in their absence. However, in April 1689, the ´elus passed a deliberation appointing members of the chamber to investigate different aspects of the administration during the vacation, including the verification of the payments made by the receivers of the taille, the progress of lawsuits delegated to the procureurs syndics and the state of repairs being conducted on the province’s roads.13 Even though the ´elus were under no obligation to assume these extra responsibilities, periodic innovations of this type were common. What tended to undermine their effectiveness was the absence of any guarantee that their successors would be motivated by a comparable zeal. Unless backed by a d´ecret of the Estates, or orders from the governor or a minister, even the most salutary measures might subsequently be allowed to lapse. Yet despite these institutional weaknesses, it is still possible to argue that the d´ecrets of 1662, 1679 and 1682, that have inspired critics of the administration, were not signs of 11 12 13

Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 29–30. B N collection Joly de Fleury, MS 608, fol. 57, Bourbon-Busset to Joly de Fleury, 15 January 1788. ADCO C 3055, fol. 136.

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deep and uneradicable abuse. Instead, they formed part of a long-running campaign to improve both the conduct of the ´elus and the effectiveness of their administration. In the century before 1789 many of these efforts would be rewarded. The d´ecret of 1682, for example, went beyond a simple concern that at least two of the three ´elus of the Estates should be present; it also sought to regulate the life of the chamber. To achieve that end, the ´elus were to reside ‘as often as possible in the city of Dijon and shall hold their sessions at least twice per annum, the first from 1 May until the end of June, the second from 15 November until the end of December’.14 If they failed to complete their business in the allotted time, or were called away to court, their sessions were to be rescheduled as closely as possible to those original dates. If two or more of the ´elus of the three orders wished, they could open the chamber to deal with emergencies, or pressing affairs, otherwise it would remain closed.15 The d´ecret even went as far as to stipulate the order in which the chamber should complete its business, for example, by preparing the next year’s tax rolls during their assemblies in May. These regulations were part of a more general reforming wave, and the ´elus were warned that they should be ready to justify their actions at the next assembly of the Estates.16 The inability to threaten more dire sanctions was one of the weaknesses of the Estates, and it is tempting to conclude that the d´ecret was ignored.17 It is true that in 1709, the alcades asked the assembly to repeat its call for the ´elus to be resident in Dijon, or risk being deprived of their fees and ‘gratifications’.18 That these familiar criticisms should be voiced again certainly illustrates the difficulties involved in trying to force the ´elus to conform, but did this new warning have any effect? As the registers of the deliberations of the chamber have been preserved it is possible to check. If we take the relatively short triennalit´e of December 1712 to June 1715, and examine both the number of times that the ´elus assembled and who was actually present then some interesting patterns emerge. On 12 December 1712, the seven ´elus trooped into the chamber with abb´e Henri Emanuel de Roquette, who was beginning his second spell as ´elu of the clergy, at their head. He was accompanied by Leon de Madaillan de Lesparre, comte de Lassay, representing the nobility and Henri Silvestre de La Forest, mayor of Montbard, a nobleman serving as the ´elu of the third estate. They were joined by Germain Richard, ´elu du roi, Nicolas La Botte, vicomte-mayeur of Dijon, and Jean-Barth´elemy 14 17 18

15 Ibid., fols. 7–8. 16 See chapter 7. ADCO C 2999, fol. 7. As Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 17–19, 21, has argued. ADCO C 3042, fol. 162.

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Joly and Guillaume Grillot de Predelys, deputies of the Chambre des Comptes.19 Between the opening session and 24 March 1713, they held seventy-nine meetings, an impressive total in a period of just 103 days.20 Individual attendance rates were equally striking. Abb´e de Roquette attended every assembly, La Forest was missing on just one occasion, while La Botte, Richard, Joly and Grillot de Predelys were absent twice. The only truant was the comte de Lassay. He appeared in the chamber sixteen times before 9 January, and was not seen thereafter. During these assemblies, the ´elus had worked on a variety of tasks, notably preparing the tax rolls, reimbursing communities for the costs of the military ´etapes and auctioning public works contracts. Once the chamber closed its doors at the end of March 1713, the ´elus had a month to organise their affairs before the voyage of honour to present Louis XIV with the remonstrances agreed at the recent meeting of the Estates. Lassay rejoined his colleagues at Versailles, and from the end of April until mid-July, he assisted Roquette and La Forest with the heady round of formal presentations, negotiations and social events at court.21 It was not until 2 November 1713 that they reassembled in Dijon, but we should note that the chamber had frequently convened in Paris to deal with provincial matters during the voyage. According to the terms of the d´ecret of 1682, the chamber was supposed to be open from 15 November until the end of December, and then close again until May. In reality, it was far more active. Starting on 2 November, the ´elus assembled forty-four times before the end of 1713,22 and the New Year was not the signal for a bout of recreation. From 2 January until 1 May 1714, when in theory they should not have been sitting,23 they held seventy-eight assemblies, and a further thirty-six were completed by the end of June, the closing date of their second official period of service. Even that was not enough to permit the closure of the chamber, which had opened another forty-one times by the end of September.24 This assiduous approach to their duties was not repeated during the winter of 1714–15, and the chamber was closed.25 Once more other matters had intervened, and the secr´etaire des ´etats, Julien, was obliged to keep the ´elus informed of events in Dijon because Roquette and Lassay were in Paris ‘to confer with the ministry’. 19 21 22 24

20 ADCO C 3158, fols. 823–910, and C 3159, fols. 1–324. ADCO C 3158, fol. 823. The details of the voyage of honour are to be found in ADCO C 3310. 23 ADCO C 3160, fols. 38–252, 252–343. ADCO C 3159, fols. 343–504. 25 ADCO C 3161, fol. 37. Ibid., fols. 343–468.

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There could be few complaints about the amount of time that the chamber was opened, but who was actually present? Roquette was at the head of the roll of honour, having presided over all of the 199 sessions held between 2 November 1713 and 24 September 1714. La Forest was not far behind having attended 173, but the comte de Lassay had graced the chamber with his presence on just three occasions. Were a similar analysis of the actions of the ´elus to be undertaken for the whole of the period, it is likely that the noble ´elu would be the most frequent absentee, even if not always matching the truancy rates of the comte de Lassay. The need to attend to affairs at court, or to serve in the army, offered some mitigating circumstances, but an aristocratic distaste for a ‘desk job’ probably played a substantial part. Lassay’s absenteeism meant that the burden fell heavily on to the shoulders of the other two representatives of the Estates because, in theory, no business could be contracted without their presence. In fact, Roquette presided over twenty-six meetings when La Forest was missing, thus contradicting the d´ecret of 1682. It was a relatively minor transgression, and there is no evidence that serious decisions affecting taxation or other financial matters were taken. Of the other members of the chamber, Richard, ´elu du roi, attended 103 times, La Botte, eighty-nine out of a possible 168 (he died in July 1714),26 while Joly and Grillot de Predelys appeared at 175 and 198 meetings respectively. Attendance records were impressive, and on their own they underestimate the contribution of the ´elus to the work of the chamber. The practice of giving commissions to individuals was central to the workings of the administration, and most of those present could expect to spend time making ‘visits’ to, for example, draw up a new tax roll or oversee the levy of the militia. Most of La Forest’s absences were due to his role as commissioner for the chamber, liaising with the officers of the cavalry regiments quartered in the pastures of the Saˆone.27 His colleagues undertook similar tasks, and it is not an exaggeration to talk of a group of dedicated and active administrators. It is true that the comte de Lassay was a glaring exception, but even he contributed to the administration during the voyage of honour and the later negotiations at court in the winter of 1714–15. The triennalit´e of 1712–15 was not exceptional, and for the purposes of comparison two other years have been chosen at random to illustrate the fact. During 1750, the chamber was assembled on seventy-five separate occasions, and in 1786 it met no fewer than 117 times.28 The attendance 26 28

27 Ibid., fol. 361. ADCO C 3160, fol. 376. The figures have been compiled from the registers of the chamber of ´elus, ADCO C 3198 and C 3241.

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figures for 1750 have a familiar ring, with abb´e Grosbois, ´elu of the clergy, present throughout, and Edme Doublot, ´elu of the third estate, missing just one assembly, that called in extremis after the sudden death of the treasurer general.29 As for Louis Franc¸ois de Damas, marquis d’Anlezy, ´elu of the nobility, he had deigned to appear in the chamber just three times.30 His other colleagues were more assiduous, and all were present at the majority of the assemblies held that year. In 1786, on the other hand, of the 115 occasions for which we have attendance figures, abb´e de La Fare was ever present.31 The comte de Chastellux, ´elu of the nobility, attended no fewer than eighty-one times, while Franc¸ois Noirot of the third estate made seventy appearances. There were no recorded assemblies without at least two ´elus of the orders present, and the chamber was never closed for long periods. Only in the months of September and October, when it met on just nine occasions, was there any real hiatus. That break, coinciding with the harvest, was typical of comparable institutions throughout Europe. There is no evidence to support Malesherbes’ allegations that the ´elus assembled for just two months and that in the intervening period their chamber was closed. It would, therefore, appear that the sins of the ´elus have been exaggerated, and the eighteenth century witnessed a gradual improvement in their working practices, with even a modest degree of professionalisation. Whereas the alcades had felt it necessary to rebuke the ´elus periodically throughout the seventeenth century, references to their shortcomings are difficult to find after 1750. Indeed, effusive praise was not uncommon. In their remarques of 1778, the alcades declared that there was: no abuse that they have not tried to expose, to reform; no public good that they have not endeavoured to perform; what wisdom, what equity have we admired in the distribution of taxation. Above all, how tender was their compassion for the misery of the people! How sincere their desire to relieve them!32

Such fulsome praise immediately arouses suspicions, but even those remarques that were censored by an angry prince de Cond´e in 1781 contained criticisms of the permanent officials, not the ´elus.33 It was not a coincidence. By the final decades of the ancien r´egime, the chamber was displaying a real enthusiasm for reform, a sentiment that can also be detected in the assemblies of the Estates. Moreover, the ´elus were contributing to its development 29 32

33

30 Ibid., fols. 651, 670, 679. 31 ADCO C 3239. ADCO C 3198, fol. 200–1. ADCO C 3306, fol. 189. In 1784, they wrote that to ‘faire le rapport de l’administration de MM. les e´lus de la triennalit´e qui vient de finir c’est tracer le plan d’une administration e´galement active et e´clair´ee, toujours juste, toujours sage et aussi heureuse’, ibid., fol. 218. See chapters 8 and 12.

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themselves, and they were not simply responding to the orders of the crown, or the d´ecrets of the Estates. By 1789, there was no shortage of criticisms to direct at the Burgundian administration, but a lack of either commitment or good intentions were not amongst them. t h e wo rk o f t h e c h am ber At the beginning of every triennalit´e one of the most urgent tasks confronting the new ´elus was the preparation of the remonstrances to be delivered to the king during the voyage of honour. The remonstrances themselves were generally composed of a series of articles, typically between fifteen and thirty, in the form of pleas for aid, or requests for specific legislation from the king.34 It was customary to begin the cahier by outlining the willing sacrifices made by the province, the suffering of its people and the need for a reduction in taxation. During the reign of Louis XIV, the disorder and expense occasioned by the movement of troops through the province was another common grievance, as was the proliferation of new offices which were responsible for increasing the burden of the taille.35 The response to these protests was usually brief and unprofitable, mostly consisting of no more than a promise that the king would consider their request when circumstances permitted. The other articles tended to be of a more technical nature, demanding new laws or amendments to existing legislation.36 As any request of this type affected the interests of the Parlement of Dijon, it was natural for the ´elus, or the procureurs syndics, to consult with the judges before drafting their remonstrances.37 Indeed, when referring an issue to the ´elus for inclusion in the cahiers, the Estates occasionally added a proviso stating ‘that the ´elus shall confer with the first president and procureur g´en´eral of the Parlement and in the light of their advice shall make any remonstrances to His Majesty that they deem appropriate’.38 By taking these precautions, the ´elus could reduce the risk of being disowned by the 34 35 36

37

38

The complete collection of remonstrances presented between 1661 and 1785 has been preserved, ADCO C 3328–35. The remonstrances of 1689, ADCO C 3329, fols. 100–5, and of 1692, ibid., fols. 113–21, provide good examples. The remonstrances presented in 1782, for example, contained a whole series of these requests, including calls for the tightening of legislation affecting crimes ‘commis dans les bois’, which sounds more exciting that it actually was, ADCO C 3334, fols. 1–47. The meetings between the procureurs syndics and leading parlementaires in 1770 about whether or not the legal maxim ‘aux cede aut solve’ should be applied in Burgundy was typical, BMD MS 912, fol. 275. ADCO C 3000, fol. 254.

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notoriously prickly judges, and secure the advantage of a united provincial front when negotiating with the crown. The actual timing of the voyage of honour was determined by the king in consultation with the governor, and when the ´elus were informed they usually had a few weeks to organise themselves before departing for the court.39 As with so many other aspects of the ceremonial life of the Estates, the protocol for the voyage was finely calibrated.40 Those entitled to participate were the ´elus of the three orders, the treasurer general, one of the two secr´etaires des ´etats and a procureur syndic.41 Before leaving Dijon, the ´elus solemnly issued a deliberation ordering the treasurer general to borrow the generous sum of 90,000 livres to pay for their expenses,42 allowing them to climb into their carriages for the journey to Paris in good heart. Once in the capital, the ´elus faced a busy and, one assumes, quite a pleasurable round of ceremonial duties, interspersed with the more serious business of bargaining with the ministry about the contents of their remonstrances. Although the chamber in Dijon was closed during the voyage, the ´elus assembled regularly in Paris to deal with provincial affairs, and they continued to issue ordinances as they saw fit. On the voyage of honour of 1682, the ´elus arrived in Paris at the end of September, and they immediately had an audience with the governor, Henri-Jules.43 At that meeting, the secr´etaire des ´etats, Julien, read out a draft of the remonstrances that he had prepared, which was amended and finalised by the ´elus and the governor.44 Over the next few days, Henri-Jules held several private meetings with the ´elu of the clergy, abb´e Armand de Quinc´e, and his trusted adviser Claude Rigoley, the other secr´etaire des ´etats, at which they agreed the distribution of 26,500 livres of ‘gratifications’ to those likely to be of service to the Estates.45 After a formal presentation to Colbert, the ´elus, assisted by the governor, prepared for the crucial official ‘conference’ with the minister by identifying all of the articles of remonstrance that fell within his vast 39

40 41 42 43 44 45

Studies of the voyage include Dumont, Une session des ´etats, pp. 128–52, and C. Dugas de La Boissonny, ‘Les voyages d’honneur des e´tats de Bourgogne de 1682 a` 1785’, Annales de l’Est (1986), 251–308. As the registers of the voyages compiled between 1682 and 1785 make clear, ADCO C 3309–27. Both of the procureurs syndics had made the trip before 1721, ADCO C 3002, fol. 107. Thereafter they followed the same system as the secr´etaires, with the honour alternating between the two officers. The amount remained unchanged throughout the period. The voyage of 1682 has been chosen as an example because it was the first for which a precise record has been preserved, ADCO C 3309. Ibid., fol. 1. This fund was voted at the triennial meetings of the Estates, and was then distributed by the governor, see chapter 3 and Dumont, Une session des ´etats, p. 132.

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administrative domain.46 At that meeting, the relevant articles were read out and Colbert offered his observations which were duly noted. Other informal meetings followed, with Quinc´e and Rigoley visiting Colbert’s first commis to distribute financial ‘gifts’ and to ask for ‘the continuation of their good offices’. Once the deputation had digested the implications of Colbert’s response to their draft cahiers, they met again with the governor to finalise their text. They also agreed to try and capitalise upon their privileged access to the minister by presenting ‘several memoirs and projects of requˆetes’ to him during their stay. Although Colbert was undoubtedly the minister whose administration had the most direct bearing on the interests of the Estates in 1682, deputations were also made to the other secretaries of state.47 It was not until 12 November, nearly two months after their arrival in Paris, that the remonstrances were finally delivered to Louis XIV. After the official presentation to the king, the Burgundian party made a tour to offer their compliments to the dauphin, the queen, the young duc de Bourgogne and other members of the royal family as well as to the king’s ministers. Thus before presenting the province’s grievances, the ´elus had been engaged in a lengthy process of official and unofficial consultations that reveals much about the functioning of both the Estates and the government of Louis XIV. Although it was the secr´etaire des ´etats, Julien, who had written the original articles of remonstrance, his ideas had been subject to scrutiny and modification by the governor, the ´elus and even Colbert himself before actually being presented to Louis XIV. Meanwhile, the governor, aided by Quinc´e and Rigoley, had used the funds at their disposal to prepare a smooth passage for their demands. An astute combination of consultation and financial inducement, while not guaranteed to bring success, at least promised that the province’s grievances would receive a fair hearing. Having accepted their remonstrances, the king passed them to the chancellor, who appointed a group of five rapporteurs ‘to assist the council in responding to the cahiers’.48 In the weeks that followed it was essential for the ´elus and their officers to maintain their presence in order to ensure a favourable reply. Once again, the multifaceted nature of ancien r´egime society and government is striking, and the Burgundian deputation acted as a kind of mirror image of the royal administration. If it was the procureur syndic or the secr´etaire des ´etats who prepared the legal briefs and unearthed the precedents needed to convince the maˆıtres des requˆetes who acted as rapporteurs, it was the governor and the ´elus who pressurised the ministers, 46

ADCO C 3309, fol. 2.

47

Ibid., fol. 3.

48

Ibid., fol. 5.

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influential courtiers and even the king on behalf of the Estates. This was especially important when they were involved in conflict with other institutions, such as the Parlement of Dijon or the municipal council of the city of Lyon. These rivals would be simultaneously mobilising their own supporters, and the ´elus needed to respond. It was not until mid-December that the chancellor informed the abb´e de Quinc´e that all was ready for the reading of the official response to the cahiers, a ceremony that took place before the grande direction.49 The work of the voyage was now complete, and after another round of ceremonial ‘adieux’ the deputation could begin to make its way back to Dijon. The ´elus had spent three months defending the interests of the province in Paris, but they had not neglected their own affairs. Quinc´e and the ´elu of the nobility, the marquis de Thianges, had also won an historic victory, keeping their hats firmly on their heads ‘when receiving the response to the cahiers from the mouth of the chancellor in council’, restoring parity with the deputies of the Estates of Brittany and Languedoc, who had already secured that privilege.50 The voyage of honour of 1682 was the first for which a detailed register was compiled, and subsequent records make it clear that the same general pattern was followed thereafter. Had a deputy from 1682 found himself suddenly transported to the reign of Louis XVI, he would have had little difficulty recognising the procedure. The voyage of 1785, for example, involved the same meetings with the governor, formal presentation and work behind the scenes designed to produce a favourable response to the remonstrances.51 Much of the etiquette was identical to that of 1682, although new details had been added, notably the jealously guarded right of the ´elus to have the fountains of Versailles played in their honour.52 Once the voyage was concluded, the ´elus were supposed to spend the rest of the triennalit´e in Dijon, unless summoned to court for specific negotiations, or sent there to defend the interests of the Estates. When in session, there was never a shortage of business to keep them occupied.53 In December 1785, the ´elus issued a deliberation which attempted to ‘establish a fixed order and method in the activities that must occupy the chamber 49

50 52 53

The grande direction was a surviving subcommittee of the conseil d’´etat et des finances. It was composed of ‘the chancellor, the members of the conseil royal des finances (except for the king), the intendants des finances, the masters of requests, and the councillors of state who sat on the financial bureaux of the councils’, Hamscher, Conseil priv´e and the parlements, p. 10, n. 10. 51 The details are contained in ADCO C 3327. ADCO C 3309, fol. 7. When the Gazette de France forgot to include a reference to the fountains being played for the ´elus in 1725, they protested to Louis XV, ADCO C 3311, fol. 18. ADCO C 3055.

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in the course of its winter sitting’, setting out a list of priorities that were intended to serve as a model for their successors. Firstly, they noted that ‘above all we concern ourselves with everything affecting the finances of the province’.54 Their second item of responsibilities was classified as ‘military’, which effectively meant the raising of recruits for the provincial militia and the provision of ´etapes for troops passing through the province. The third category, ‘public works’, would in the course of the century after 1688 become one of the most important areas of activity, with the chamber overseeing a major programme of road building and canal construction as well as the more mundane tasks of maintaining public buildings. Finally, the deliberation of 1785 identified ‘useful institutions’ as the fourth sphere of administrative competence. Under this heading, they grouped the various projects for the encouragement of agriculture, industry and the arts. Taken as a whole the deliberation encompassed the vast majority of duties performed by the chamber, although others could usefully be added to the list. These included the need to deal with emergencies caused by famine or natural disaster, providing information for the government and disciplining the officers working for the Estates. The need to defend the privileges of the Estates and the broader interests of the province was another permanent preoccupation. Finally, the ´elus played a prominent part in the ceremonial life of Dijon. When the dauphin was born in 1729, they organised a huge celebration in the city, the focus of which was the roasting of an oxen for distribution to the poor who gathered to watch an elaborate fireworks display in front of an 55 ´ illuminated Palais des Etats. Similar festivities greeted the birth of the duc de Bourgogne in 1751, and the ´elus provided 15,000 livres to fund dowries for poor ‘daughters of the province’.56 No military victory or national event was complete without the performance of a Te Deum in the Sainte Chapelle in the presence of ‘our lords the ´elus’, resplendent in their finery, representing what they firmly believed was the principal institution of the first province in the kingdom. t h e p rov i n c i a l bu re au crac y The ´elus and the permanent officials acted as the executive for the Burgundian administration, but for their will to extend beyond the confines of their bureau in Dijon it was necessary to have both a network of junior 54 56

55 ADCO C 3055. Ibid., deliberation of 14 December 1785. ADCO C 3361, fol. 142, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 9 December 1751.

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officials and representatives in the towns and villages of the province. After 1661, the Estates gradually developed an administrative structure that by 1789 had begun to exhibit certain of the basic characteristics of a modern bureaucracy.57 Yet if the Burgundian administration, like that of the crown, was more professional than it had ever been, it was simultaneously characterised by the continuing presence of more traditional patterns of patrimonialism, patronage and client`ele that were amongst the defining features of ancien r´egime society. There was also great diversity in terms of the way in which different branches of the provincial administration functioned. While the bureaux of the secr´etaires des ´etats, or that of the provincial engineer, were expanding and developing ever more sophisticated working methods, other important posts such as those of receiver of the taille or mayor altered only marginally. The lower tiers of the administration were, therefore, something of a hybrid as closer inspection makes clear. The secr´etaires des ´etats had traditionally formed the hub of the administration, and each officer had a bureau with a commis working under his supervision, who, in turn, directed the clerks employed to draft the registers and minutes of the chamber of ´elus. In 1688, Claude Thierry and Jean Gelyot had both worked as commis for over a decade, and in a requˆete presented to the ´elus seeking an increase in their gages they claimed that it was their only employment and that ‘they are forced to employ clerks to expedite business’.58 Their appeal bore fruit, and the salary for their year of service was increased from 300 to 500 livres,59 a decent if not exactly princely sum in a period when the demands on the provincial administration were increasing dramatically. By the second half of the eighteenth century the number and size of the different bureaux had expanded appreciably. The two original bureaux continued to alternate, but the reference to the year ‘out of service’ bore little relation to reality. In a memoir of 1786, drafted, it has to be said, in defence of a system that appeared to be ripe for cost-cutting, their work was explained in detail.60 The author, who almost certainly worked for the Estates, argued that the bureau ‘out of service’ was charged with laying the 57

58 59 60

D. Ligou, ‘Le personnel de l’intendance et des e´tats de Bourgogne: aux origines du fonctionnarisme moderne’, 111 e Congr`es National des Soci´et´es Savantes (Poitiers, 1986), 65–77, and P. Bodineau, ‘Aux origines des fonctionnaires r´egionaux: la politique du personnel administratif des Etats de Bourgogne’, M´emoires de la Soci´et´e pour l’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays Bourguignons, Comtois et Romands (1990), 147–61. ADCO C 3454, ‘Requˆete du 13 Mai 1688’. It should be noted that they received payment in alternate years. ADCO C 3453. The anonymous document was simply entitled ‘M´emoire’.

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groundwork for its counterpart ‘in service’. It began with the preparation of: the registers of the taille and capitation, the rolls and registers of the capitation of the privileged, the individual orders sent to the receivers for the collection of the taille . . . to register all the requˆetes that are classed by bailliage to be sent to the receivers for their opinion.61

In addition, each bureau had responsibilities unique to itself that did not alternate. The first handled the paperwork connected with military ´etapes and convoys as well as the provincial stud, while the second performed a similar role for all matters relating to the militia. With the bureau ‘out of service’ laying the foundations, the work of the bureau ‘in service’ was much facilitated, especially when it came to completing the various tax rolls. These had to be finalised, then recorded and distributed to, amongst others, the receivers of the taille, the ´etats particuliers and privileged corps such as the Parlement of Dijon. In addition, the bureau ‘in service’ was expected to produce the copies of the ordinances and correspondence of the ´elus, maintain the minutes of their deliberations and attend to other clerical duties. As with most administrative bodies, there was a suspicion that the work available expanded in relation to the numbers employed, and after 1785 the ´elus launched a concerted, if largely unsuccessful, attempt to trim the size of the bureaux.62 If the activities of the bureaux of the secr´etaires des ´etats were relatively eclectic, they were joined in the course of the eighteenth century by a number of new creations to handle specific tasks. In 1756, the negotiation of an abonnement made it necessary to establish a separate bureau des vingti`emes that was occupied almost exclusively by the affairs of that tax. A bureau of ponts et chauss´ees was formed in 1782,63 reflecting both the growing stature of the provincial engineer, who presided over it, and the scale of the public works under his supervision. Finally, in 1774, a bureau des archives, to which historians will for ever owe a debt, was created with the aim of bringing order to the ever more voluminous quantity of paper generated by the Estates. The archivists were able to build on solid ground. The need for such a service had been recognised since at least 1677, when the ´elus discovered that their ‘registers, especially the most ancient, were in a wretched state’.64 61 62 63

Ibid. ADCO C 3454, deliberations of 3, 4, 10 February 1786, and P. Bodineau, ‘Fonctionnaires r´egionaux’, 147–61. 64 ADCO C 3458. Bodineau, ‘Fonctionnaires r´egionaux’, 148.

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Their solution had been to appoint the commis, Jean Gelyot, to make copies of those papers most in danger of perishing. As rats and mice were consuming vast quantities of the provincial heritage, they also instructed the secr´etaire des ´etats, Julien, to order the manufacture of several stout chests where the precious documents could be kept under lock and key. These wise precautions had the double advantage of frustrating unwanted vermin, while simultaneously thwarting their two-legged counterparts who had been borrowing provincial papers and not returning them.65 It was not until the reign of Louis XV that further advances in the conservation of the provincial archival record were achieved. After prompting from the alcades, backed by several d´ecrets of the Estates, the ´elus ordered the compilation of a general ‘inventory’ of the archives.66 Calls were also made at the Estates for the establishment of ‘an alphabetic table of all the d´ecrets and deliberations contained in the province’s registers as well as the subjects on which they were formed’.67 Work was begun in 1764, but it was not until 1774 that Simon Bernard Masson was named as the official archivist, working under the orders of the secr´etaires des ´etats. Henceforth he was to act as the guardian of the documentary patrimony, no papers could leave the archives without his accord, and he was to supervise the progress of the ‘inventory’. If these were the principal responsibilities of the five bureaux in existence by the reign of Louis XVI, whom did they employ? In 1778, the ´elus fixed the numbers of personnel and the pay of their employees in four of the five bureaux. Each had a first commis, paid gages of 3,000 livres annually, and a second commis, who received between 1,400 and 2,000 livres for his services, and there were a further thirty-four clerks.68 To this it is necessary to add the bureau of ponts et chauss´ees, with a first and second commis and six juniors.69 A policy of rationalisation and cost-cutting during the 1780s did temporarily reduce the costs of the bureaux from a high of 81,900 livres in 1784 to just 72,000 livres in 1789. The effects of this purge were likely to be short-lived because the imposition of a salary scale and a pension scheme meant that costs would have risen automatically after 1790.70 By the reign of Louis XVI, it was certainly permissible to talk of a salaried bureaucracy, and the ´elus had come to accept the need to treat their employees in a consistent fashion. Before 1750, the gages paid to the first commis were expected to be used, in part, to cover the costs of the 65 67 68 69

66 ADCO C 3004, fol. 356, and C 3005, fol. 85. Ibid., deliberation of 31 March 1676. ADCO C 3458, deliberation of 10 January 1764. ADCO C 3453, deliberation of 16 December 1778. 70 ADCO C 3455. Bodineau, ‘Fonctionnaires r´egionaux’, 156.

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junior clerks they employed on an ad hoc basis.71 The ´elus recognised the shortcomings of this system in a deliberation of 1752, noting in their preamble that: affairs having increased [in number] and become more significant than ever before, it is just that the principal clerks and their subordinates, who have rendered themselves worthy by their constancy and diligence, are assured of a secure and stable lot.

Thereafter they were paid an annual sum in six monthly instalments, and the system was gradually extended to all the clerks working in the bureau.72 As salaries became regularised, the ´elus took a greater interest in the activities of the bureaux. Concerned about rumours of idle clerks, they issued the deliberation of 31 December 1767 stipulating that its employees: shall be required to enter the bureau at 8 o’clock and to remain until midday, to return at 2 o’clock until 7 o’clock . . . and to spend their time usefully, on pain of loss [of salary] not only of days or half-days, but even of the hours for which they were absent.73

A desire to police the activities of the clerks also inspired the deliberation of July 1784, stating ‘that no person employed by the province shall fill any office or serve in any other administration’.74 Here was a clear example of how far the provincial administration had moved in the direction of establishing a permanent and stable personnel, and it went further by recognising its obligations towards its employees by introducing a system of retirement pensions in a deliberation of February 1786.75 In 1789, a total of eleven retired clerks were sharing 9,800 livres annually with pensions varying from 330 to 2,400 livres.76 Had the revolution not interrupted these reforms, it is likely that they would have reinforced the already pronounced loyalty of the clerks to the institution of the Estates. On the eve of the revolution, four first commis could point to a combined total of seventy-eight years service, with Simon Bernard Masson and Franc¸ois Herbert accounting for thirty-two and twenty-nine years respectively. They were typical of the period as a whole, and they highlight the contradictions common to many late eighteenthcentury institutions. While new working practices, regular salaries and pensions seem to point towards modern bureaucratic norms, they should not be allowed to disguise the persistence of patrimonialism.77 Of the first 71 72 73 75

ADCO C 3456, deliberation of 6 December 1752. ADCO C 3456–7, deliberations of 26 November 1756 and 2 January 1760. 74 Ibid., deliberation of 16 July 1784. ADCO C 3456, deliberation of 31 December 1767. 76 ADCO C 3455. 77 Church, Revolution and red tape, pp. 1–68, 307–16. ADCO C 3456.

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and second commis in 1780s, Clement, Jacob, Herbert and Guillemin, to name just a few, had their sons serving as ordinary clerks in one or other of the bureaux, but a hint of change was in the air.78 When contemplating a reduction in the number of clerks, the ´elus were advised that there were only two points to consider: ‘Firstly, that the ´elus only take years of service into consideration when all else is equal, and that as a consequence they choose the most intelligent, conscientious and honest clerks with the finest handwriting.’79 For the unfortunate Gouveau, cursed with a particularly illegible hand, twenty-eight years of service as a clerk was about to come to an end.80 His compulsory early retirement offered a poignant example of the changes taking place within the administration after 1750. In terms of recruitment, the bureaux were still staffed by men who owed their position to the presence of another family member and/or the patronage of the governor, an ´elu or another influential powerbroker.81 Respect for tradition was strong, and when the comte de Saint-Florentin attempted to secure the position of first commis for one of his prot´eg´es the ´elus replied that they had already appointed a candidate, who had the advantage of ‘forefathers’ who had distinguished themselves in their service.82 Yet despite the importance of these traditional attitudes, there was a growing emphasis upon the personal qualities of the clerks, who, in return for regular pay and retirement pensions, were expected to display the virtues of punctuality and competence and commit themselves to the Estates as their sole employer, forsaking the temptations of moonlighting that had been the only way of making ends meet for their predecessors. There were also less tangible changes, with the work of the bureaux acquiring greater respect. A particularly striking example was provided by the career of Philippe Joseph Jarrin. After being appointed procureur syndic of the Estates in 1776, he made the remarkable decision to switch to the post of first commis in the bureau des vingti`emes in 1783.83 Although an isolated example, the willingness of Jarrin to change career in this fashion underlines the growing stature of the first commis. When the revolution swept the provincial administration away, most would have no trouble finding work in 78 79 80 81

82 83

ADCO 1 F 460, fols. 221–2, and C 3468, contain lists of those employed in the bureaux. ADCO C 3453, ‘M´emoire pour servir de suite au m´emoire r´elatif au travail des bureaux’. Ibid. For examples of individuals securing places within the bureaux for their prot´eg´es see: ADCO C 3361, fol. 254, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 2 December 1756, and C 3362, fol. 106, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 14 July 1761. ADCO C 3363, fols. 114–15, secr´etaire des ´etats Rousselot to Saint-Florentin, July 1771. ADCO C 3454, and C 3365, fol. 140, the ´elus to Amelot, 3 July 1783.

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the new departments created in its wake.84 The more ambitious would even make careers on the national stage, and former commis Claude Basire was briefly a member of the Committee of General Security before becoming a victim of the guillotine in April 1794.85 Not that all of those employed by the province were clerks, and a variety of specialists were also at the disposal of the ´elus including an architect, a doctor, a gardener, two notaries, four huissiers and several veterinary surgeons and, after 1766, the inspector of the provincial stud. Others could be added to the list, but here were the most prominent servants of the Estates. mayo r s a n d re c e i ve r s – t h e p rov i n ce ’s s u b d e le g at e s The ´elus could thus call upon the services of the permanent officers and their clerks in Dijon, but for their policies to become a reality in the province at large it was necessary to have agents in the towns and countryside. In the pays d’´elections, the intendants had by the end of the seventeenth century adopted the practice of employing subdelegates to provide them with information and enforce their instructions. Burgundy had more than its fair share of subdelegates,86 but for the ´elus to rely upon the intendant’s right-hand men risked setting a potentially dangerous precedent. Instead, they developed their own parallel administrative network based upon the fifteen receivers of the taille and the mayors of the principal towns. Appointments to these positions were closely monitored by the governor, or by the ´elus, acting in the name of the Estates. The receivers held revocable commissions, while the province had owned the mayors’ offices since 1696. The ´elus could, therefore, count on their loyalty, and both groups had been integrated into the client`ele and kinship networks that we have already identified when examining the membership of the chamber of ´elus. The receivers were naturally implicated in nearly all matters affecting taxation, and they also assisted with just about every other aspect of the provincial administration, including raising the militia, pursuing deserters, reimbursing the military ´etapes and collecting information about communities or individuals.87 Indeed no task was considered beyond the receivers, and Perrin of Charolles was ordered to conduct a survey of the river Arroux to see if it could be rendered navigable.88 Within the towns the mayors were 84 85 87 88

Bodineau, ‘Fonctionnaires r´egionaux’, 154. 86 Root, Peasants and king, p. 13. Garnier and Muteau, Galerie Bourguignonne, i, p. 39. The registers of the chamber are full of deliberations of this type, for example, ADCO C 3166, fol. 327, C 3165, fol. 39, and C 3174, fol. 248. C 3360, fol. 85, Bernard de Blancey to Perrin, 21 March 1731.

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expected to provide a similar range of services, even to the extent of acting as informants on the conduct of the receivers!89 To a certain extent, the ´elus treated the mayors as the equivalent of subdelegates, and they were wary of those individuals who sought to combine both positions.90 The case of Jean-Franc¸ois Maufoux, mayor of Beaune, and a highly valued subdelegate of intendant Amelot, proved this very clearly. Having annoyed the ´elus for allegedly failing to cooperate in the composition of a nouveau pied de taille, he was sacked in December 1768.91 The intervention of Amelot, and an apology from Maufoux, was sufficient to secure his reinstatement a few weeks later, but it was not the end of the story. Maufoux again fell foul of the ´elus in February 1781, this time for intervening in the administration of the corv´ee in his capacity as subdelegate, without first obtaining authorisation from the chamber in Dijon. Suspecting that he was deliberately seeking to undermine their authority, Marbeuf, bishop of Autun and ´elu of the clergy, informed the other ´elus that ‘this trap set for the administration by an agent of its authority is a crime for which you must punish the author’.92 The mayor was promptly dismissed, and not even the continued support of Amelot, now a prominent minister of Louis XVI, was enough to save him. As assistants to the administration and potential ´elus or alcades, the mayors were important men whose appointment had always been a significant matter. The governor had traditionally kept a very close eye on those chosen, and when, in 1700, it proved difficult to find a suitable buyer for the office in Autun, Henri-Jules ordered the ´elus to provide part of the finance needed to ensure that his preferred candidate could make the necessary transaction.93 The duc de Bourbon followed a similar strategy in 1715, when he discovered that the prohibitive cost of acquiring the offices was keeping out ‘deserving subjects’, ordering the ´elus ‘to reimburse part of the finance of their office’.94 After the duc’s death in 1740, the ´elus were allowed more independence, appointing and dismissing the mayors with comparatively little interference from either the governor or the crown. Not that a great deal changed, and in most towns the mayors continued to be drawn from the same family, with a relative of the previous incumbent being smoothly accepted by ´elus and ministers alike. 89 90 91 92 93 94

ADCO C 3167, deliberation of 22 March 1720. ADCO C 3046, fols. 288–9. At the Estates of 1778, the chamber of the nobility had declared that the two roles were ‘enti`erement incompatibles’, and urged the ´elus to stamp out the practice. ADCO C 3363, fol. 24, the ´elus to Cond´e, 5 January 1769. ADCO C 3364, fols. 248–9, bishop of Autun to the ´elus, 30 December 1780. ADCO C 3145, fols. 165–6, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 24 March 1700. ADCO C 3161, fols. 176–7, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 5 June 1715.

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When new blood was required, or a competitor with good connections arrived on the scene matters could become more complicated. Thus despite nearly twenty years of blameless service, mayor Baudinot of Charolles was deposed because Mlle de Sens, princesse de Cond´e, wanted the position for one of her prot´eg´es.95 When one of les grands, especially one belonging to the House of Bourbon-Cond´e, intervened the ´elus were unlikely to resist. In general, however, they were allowed to act with a degree of freedom, and, where possible, they defended the interests of a local man against outside interference. When the secretary of state, Saint-Florentin, ordered that Didier, mayor of Saint-Seine, be sacked for allegedly being illiterate and too poor to merit such a distinguished position, the ´elus first ignored his demand and then subsequently ensured that the office passed to Didier’s son-inlaw.96 Many other examples of the ´elus protecting the mayors could be cited, but what motivated them above all was respect for those individuals, or families, that had proved themselves by loyal service. Only in the case of those towns within the grand roue, where the mayors were likely to become ´elus, was that rule broken. When Jean-Baptiste Ligeret, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges and ´elu of the third estate died only months into the triennalit´e of 1778 to 1781, his colleagues were faced with precisely this predicament. As secr´etaire des ´etats, Rousselot, observed in a letter to the bishop of Autun, sentiment pointed towards his younger brother, but this must be ‘subordinated to the ability and intelligence required of the mayor of a town’.97 Unfortunately, the brother was still very young, and more tellingly ‘he has little aptitude for affairs and even less experience and without discussing his intelligence, we can at least be certain that it has not yet developed’. With such a damning reference Ligeret was unlikely to go far, and Rousselot, writing on behalf of the chamber, ´ instead praised the virtues of a second candidate, Etienne Gilles. Although not much older, he was described in glowing terms as a young man, mature beyond his years, with ‘the gift of conciliation’ essential for the office to which he aspired. Not surprisingly, Gilles was chosen, yet, as Rousselot confirmed, what helped to sway opinions in his favour was his ‘unselfish conduct as he offered to give his fees for the triennalit´e to Ligeret’s children, only reserving for himself sufficient to pay for the voyage of honour and his residence in Dijon’.98 Through this generous arrangement, the province acquired a talented and apparently benevolent ´elu, and the Ligeret were compensated for their loss. 95 96 97

ADCO C 3360, f. 208, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 19 July 1741. Ibid., fols. 88–9, Didier to Bernard de Blancey, 13 November 1760. ADCO C 3364, fols. 124–5, Rousselot to the bishop of Autun, 10 November 1778.

98

Ibid.

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We are well informed about the social backgrounds and professional lives of the province’s mayors.99 Far less is known about the receivers, and in the light of their importance to the administration it is instructive to investigate them in some detail. The receivers were not officeholders in the same way as magistrates in the Parlement or Chambre des Comptes. Instead, they held a commission from the Estates, for which they advanced the finance, usually in the region of 50,000 livres, together with a substantial deposit of some 20,000–30,000 livres. The Estates had the right to revoke the commission and to reimburse the holder whenever they saw fit, and unlike the crown they had the means and often the will to do so.100 In general, however, they condoned the practice of receivers passing on their commission to a close relative, and even allowed the sale of the commission if the correct procedures were followed. What that meant in reality was securing the prior agreement of the governor, or, at the very least, that of the ´elus, for the proposed transaction. After 1740, the procedure altered to the extent that it became necessary to consult the secretary of state in Versailles, something which was bitterly contested by the Estates.101 It has been possible to identify a total of 109 individuals who held the commission of receiver in the fifteen bailliages that were under the direct orders of the ´elus in Dijon between 1661 and 1789 (see appendix 14).102 They were a tight-knit group, representing sixty separate families, which were, as one might expect, united by professional solidarity and strong ties of kinship. Once established as a receiver, there was a tendency to put down deep roots. The commission of the bailliage of Avallon was held continuously by the Deschamps family from 1684 to 1789, and they simultaneously exercised the charge in Auxerre from 1684 until 1784, when Joseph-Guillaume-Augustin Deschamps de Charmelieu fled after getting into financial difficulties.103 Stability was a feature of several other bailliages, notably Beaune, where four generations of the David family acted as receivers between 1695 and the revolution, Chalon-sur-Saˆone, which was controlled by the Petit and Burgat clans from 1660 to 1786, and Auxonne, where the Suremain family reigned supreme from 1639 to 1763. If these were amongst the longest-serving families, almost all of those to hold a commission attempted to transform it into part of their patrimony. Many of the receivers held the position throughout their careers, and men such 99 100 101 102 103

Thanks principally to the scholarship of Lamarre, Petites villes. In the period after 1661, the number of receivers was gradually reduced to one for each bailliage. See chapter 8. The list is not exhaustive and the record of the earlier period is rather sketchy. ADCO C 3434, deliberation of 16 November 1784.

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as Charles Languet, receiver of Arnay-le-Duc from 1701 to 1742, Nicolas Seguin, his counterpart in Dijon from 1702 to 1752, and Claude Petit, receiver of Saint-Laurent-l`es-Chalon from 1728 to 1773, were notable examples of a more general pattern. Any individual lucky enough to be involved with the ancien r´egime’s tax collecting system was liable to become rich in the process. The receivers of the Estates of Burgundy were no exception, and one or two generations of service was enough to amass the fortune required to buy an office in one of Dijon’s great law courts. Thus the Suremain, R´emond, Perrin and David clans all produced councillors in the Parlement of Dijon. Nicolas Seguin provided a shining example of what could be achieved by a successful receiver. He was appointed to one of the three commissions of the bailliage of Dijon in 1702, but his good fortune was in no way accidental. The vacancy was created by the decision of the holder, Jean-Baptiste Jannon, whose family had been in office since 1679, to sell to Bonnard, a member of another clan of receivers from Arnay-le-Duc. They made the terrible mistake of concocting the deal without reference to either Chantilly, or the ´elus. The consequences were grim. Having been informed of their plans, the governor vetoed the sale, ordering the chamber to reimburse Jannon and award his commission to Seguin.104 Seguin was already acting as the commis of Jannon, and he was clearly well placed to profit from the misfortunes of his superior. There was, however, much more to the story. Although a member of a relatively undistinguished bourgeois family from Chalon-sur-Saˆone, Seguin’s mother was Thomasse Lamy, and she provided the key to his future career. By 1702, Seguin’s relative, Edme Lamy, was one of the great success stories of Burgundian finance. Having started as the procureur and receveur des ´epices of the Chambre des Comptes in 1678, he had progressed to the office of receiver general of the taillon in Burgundy by 1689.105 He expanded his empire rapidly thereafter, becoming receiver for the bailliage of Nuits-Saint-Georges in 1692, and receiver general of the province’s salt tax (crues) in 1702.106 Three years later, he added the farm of the octrois on the river Saˆone to an already impressive portfolio.107 The purchase of an office of secr´etaire du roi meant that worldly success was crowned by the acquisition of noble status.108 After a brief scare during the Regency, when the Chamber of Justice threatened Lamy, his brilliant rise was crowned in 1725 with a sign of royal favour when his estate of La Perri`ere was granted the title of ‘marquisat’. 104 105 107

ADCO C 3147, fols. 514–15, 554–5, deliberation of 24 October 1702, and the letter of Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 12 December 1702. 106 ADCO C 3429. D’Arbaumont, Chambre des comptes, p. 263. 108 D’Arbaumont, Chambre des comptes, p. 263. ADCO C 3149, fols. 754–7.

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It was to Lamy that Seguin owed his own elevation. Once the ´elus had awarded him the receivership of Dijon, the two men were quick to visit a notary where Seguin described the real nature of the transaction. He acknowledged that: he has absolutely nothing in the said office of receiver and he has only lent his name to Edme Lamy . . . the said commission belongs to the said Lamy who is the real proprietor and that he [Seguin] holds it only as a precarious holding, recognising that the said Lamy has provided from his own fortune the sum of 51,188 livres which he has paid to our lords the ´elus.109

Seguin could have added that his benefactor had also provided the deposit of 30,000 livres required by the Estates.110 In return, he had agreed to act as a loyal commis of Lamy, to make over to his patron whatever portion of his gages requested of him and to resign if asked to do so.111 There could be no doubt about who was the master in the relationship, but Seguin proved to be a gifted apprentice. As Lamy gradually relinquished his hold on his various offices, presumably to enjoy the fruits of life as the marquis de La Perri`ere he made his young relative his beneficiary.112 Seguin thus became receiver of the taillon in the province, while his younger brother, who was revealingly called Edme, secured the blessing of the duc de Bourbon to succeed his uncle as receiver of Nuits-Saint-Georges and as receveur des ´epices of the Chambre des Comptes.113 Both brothers subsequently bought offices of secr´etaire du roi, and ended their lives as members of the second estate. The rise of the Lamy and Seguin families was typical, with rapid social ascension made possible by access to the tax system. Moreover, the way in which Lamy ensured that his nephews benefited from his own success was part of a more general pattern. When Edme Seguin parted from the receivership of Nuits-Saint-Georges in 1753, he had already secured the survivance on the office for his nephew, Edme Fabry.114 The Fabry family themselves were following the well-beaten track of social improvement, serving as the farmers of the octrois on the river Saˆone. When they in turn passed the receivership to Bernard Mollerat in 1780, there was yet another family connection with Bernard’s nephew having married the daughter of Edme Fabry two years earlier.115 Finally, in 1785, young Bernard Fabry, 109 110 112

113 114 115

ADCO C 3448. The notarial deed is dated 5 November 1702. 111 ADCO C 3448. ADCO C 3432. Lamy’s own sons were destined for higher things with one serving as a president in the Chambre des Comptes and another as a judge in the Parlement of Besanc¸on, D’Arbaumont, Chambre des comptes, p. 263. ADCO C 3433, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 20 December 1730. Ibid., deliberation of 3 December 1749. A. Bour´ee, La chancellerie pr`es le Parlement de Bourgogne de 1476 a` 1790 avec les noms g´en´ealogies et armoiries de ses officiers (Dijon, 1927), pp. 206–7.

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procureur g´en´eral of the Table de Marbre of Dijon, proposed marriage to ´ the daughter of the recently deceased Etienne de Charolles, receiver of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, on condition that the family secure the commission for him.116 While hardly the most romantic of gestures, his offer was accepted. Closer examination of the other receivers would reveal many more examples of the family strategies and kinship ties that bound them together, or linked them to the entourage of the governor, the members of the sovereign courts or the administration of the Estates. As families such as the Lamy, Fabry and Seguin bought their way into these bodies, they found themselves sitting on benches alongside the scions of the R´emond or Suremain clans who had blazed the trail before them. Becoming part of the provincial robe nobility was not, however, incompatible with the continued exercise of a receivership, and fear of d´erogeance or of being tainted by connection to the world of finance did not cause these families to sever their connections with their old profession. As a result, there were very few opportunities for newcomers to take advantage of the system. Whenever a vacancy occurred, those within the provincial administration, and especially the chamber of ´elus, were best placed to win the prize. Just such a case arose in the bailliage of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine after the death of Joseph Franc¸ois R´emond in 1755.117 Perhaps unduly complacent after holding the commission for nearly a century, the R´emond had not taken the precaution of arranging the survivance, and they suddenly found themselves in a desperate fight to retrieve the situation. Alexandre de Mairetet, councillor in the Parlement of Dijon and the uncle of the late receiver, tried hard to win the commission for his own son.118 Despite his eminence and the otherwise impeccable credentials of the R´emond, the commission was ´ given to Etienne Thomas Marlot, son of the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon. As he was too young to assume the office, Franc¸ois Jouard, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine and currently the ´elu of the third estate, was named as his commis.119 That the vicomte-mayeur and Jouard were able to stage this coup was due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, but their case was not unique. In 1786, Franc¸ois Noirot, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone and ´elu of the third estate, managed to secure the commission of that bailliage when the long reign of the Burgat family came to an end.120 116 117 118 119 120

ADCO C 3449. For details of the struggle for the commission, see: ADCO C 3433, E 1245 and E 1585. ADCO E 1245, Rigoley d’Ogny to Mairetet, 14 March 1755. He in turn appointed Pierre d’Autecloche as his deputy for the remainder of the triennalit´e, and it was not until 1761 that Marlot finally took up his post. ADCO C 3434, deliberation of 4 April 1786. Jean Burgat de Tais´e had recently died without a direct male heir.

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Choosing receivers from within the local elite was perfectly natural in the political and social context of the times, and it had the added advantage of keeping a veil drawn over the affairs of the Estates. The receivers were thus of a similar stamp to the other servants of the Estates, they were almost exclusively local men, profiting from their involvement in the fiscal system to amass the wealth and contacts needed to join the robe elite. Their success depended upon the goodwill of the Estates, and with the ever-present threat of removal they could be expected to serve the ´elus loyally, while simultaneously feathering their own nests. That the provincial government should rely so heavily upon the service of the receivers was a real weakness, equating other mundane administrative tasks with the hated ‘fisc’. All that can be said in their defence is that they possessed the means to carry out these duties cheaply because, like the mayors, they received no additional payments for their services. a d m i n i s t r at i ve p r i d e Within the administration there was a strong sense of corporate solidarity, and the Estates took pride in the achievements of their officers. The ´elus thus petitioned the king to bestow the cordon de Saint Michel on the provincial engineers, Thomas Dumorey and Emiliand Gauthey.121 When informed that the honour was reserved for those possessing ‘hereditary nobility’, something neither Dumorey nor Gauthey could boast, the ´elus began a campaign on their behalf.122 They called upon the assistance of the governor, secretary of state and other influential figures and eventually both men received lettres de noblesse. It is true that Dumorey had fought and been wounded at the siege of Fribourg, but it was his service to the Estates of Burgundy, not his valour, which had raised him into the ranks of the second estate.123 That the ´elus should have been concerned about the dignity of their engineers, to the extent of designing a special uniform for them to wear at the assemblies of the Estates in 1786, was indicative of their growing stature within the administration. They were not, however, the only recipients of such favour. In the same year, the ´elus wrote to the garde des sc¸eaux, Miromesnil, supporting mayor Baudesson of Auxerre who was seeking the title of conseiller d’´etat. They noted that ‘this reward would be 121 122 123

ADCO C 3356, fols. 10, 201, Vergennes to the ´elus, 22 November 1775, and Amelot to the ´elus, 22 June 1783. ADCO C 3363, fols. 225, 234, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin and the prince de Cond´e, 26 November 1774. ADCO C 3362, fol. 218, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 10 January 1765.

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the prize for the long and distinguished service that he and his forefathers have rendered to the city of Auxerre and it will serve as a model for the other mayors of the province’.124 Recognition for individuals was accompanied by more general attempts to raise the prestige of the mayors. Although Necker turned down a request from the Estates that they be granted exemption from the franc fief in 1779,125 other honours were granted. In 1758, for example, the chamber persuaded the crown that mayors who had served for twenty years ‘to the satisfaction of their superiors and the public’, should enjoy exemption from both the taille and the obligation to billet troops, ‘in order that this privilege should act as an incentive’.126 The ´elus were clearly delighted to secure these privileges for those in their service, but they wanted them to be earned. When Franc¸ois Jouard, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, succeeded in persuading the comte de Saint-Florentin to support his request to retire with full privileges after just fifteen years in office, the ´elus were unimpressed.127 While happy to praise his conduct as both a mayor and a former ´elu, they still felt it necessary to inform the minister that ‘we cannot fail to remind you, sir, that it sets a bad precedent to bestow this privilege before the twenty years of service are complete’. To serve the Estates was honourable and rewarding, but it was not a sinecure and Jouard was obliged to remain at his post until 1768. ‘Our lords the ´elus’ were permanently on guard against any slight to their authority, and a peasant who dared to oppose the muster for the militia, evade the corv´ee or insult a member of the administration could expect punishment. Those of a higher social station also needed to be wary of offending the ´elus, as their response to an insult addressed to the secr´etaire des ´etats, Bernard de Blancey, when levying the militia makes clear. The quarrel arose when a local noblewoman, Mlle de Chastenay, attempted to exempt her servant from drawing lots.128 This was contrary to the royal ordinances on the matter, and Bernard turned down her request. The lady was outraged, and sent the secr´etaire a scornful letter in which she claimed to have ‘powerful means of humiliating’ those who dared to challenge her authority. In his reply, Bernard explained why he had been obliged to act against her wishes, adding good-naturedly that he had originally 124 125 126 127 128

ADCO C 3357, fol. 186, the ´elus to Miromesnil, 16 November 1786. ADCO C 3364, fols. 181–2, Necker to the ´elus, 12 September 1779. ADCO C 3362, fols. 34–5, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 26 June 1758. ADCO C 3363, fols. 104–5, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 26 July 1761. ADCO C 3362, fols. 52–3, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 23 November 1758, and ibid., fol. 54, ‘Extrait de la r´eponse faitte par M. de Blancey a` Mlle de Chastenay, 20 Octobre 1758’.

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believed her letter to be for his ‘lackey’. Matters might have rested there had not Mlle de Chastenay’s brother, an infantry captain, intervened with a further letter, containing ‘everything contemptible and insulting that it is possible to address to an honourable man’.129 An angry Bernard demanded satisfaction from the ´elus, who wrote immediately to both Saint-Florentin and the prince de Cond´e, asking rhetorically who would accept his duties ‘if it was necessary to be the butt of the scorn and insults of the first who, rightly or wrongly, claims to be dissatisfied with his work’.130 The reply from Versailles was swift. On the orders of the governor, Chastenay was arrested and imprisoned in the chˆateau of Dijon.131 Within days the ´elus were writing to ask for his liberation, which was quickly accorded. From the perspective of the ´elus the point had been made. No individual, not even one of the highest social station, could challenge their authority with impunity. Malesherbes was perfectly correct in his assessment that the chamber of ´elus was as busy as any intendance, and it was responsible for the vast majority of fiscal and administrative tasks in the duchy and comt´es. He was, however, either mistaken or disingenuous to imply that the ´elus neglected pressing affairs by allowing their doors to remain closed. Instead, they ignored the official timetable, and assembled regularly throughout the year to attend to a wide range of fiscal and administrative tasks. In doing so, they called upon the expertise of their permanent officials and of an increasingly professional and numerous bureaucracy. By the reign of Louis XVI, the commis and clerks toiling away in Dijon were displaying certain characteristics of modern officialdom, with regular working patterns, salaries, pensions and other benefits. Yet we should avoid exaggerating the degree of administrative modernity. These same officials continued to function within a system shaped by patrimonialism and the exercise of patronage, something that was even more marked in the case of the mayors and the receivers of the taille. The administration of the Estates had much in common with other ancien r´egime institutions, and it was certainly not as archaic as some of its more extravagant critics have maintained. Instead, it had proved itself to be flexible and adaptable, coping effectively with a heavier and more complex workload. We now need to examine to what ends its power and authority was directed. 129 131

130 Ibid., fol. 53. Ibid., fols. 52–3. ADCO C 3362, fol. 58, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 16 December 1758, and ibid., fols. 59–60, the prince de Cond´e to the ´elus, 16 December 1758.

chapter 6

‘It’s raining taxes’. Paying for the Sun King, 1661–1715

In the course of his long literary correspondence with his friend Soyrot, the Burgundian savant, Bernard de La Monnoye, paused to reflect upon the inclement state of natural and human affairs. He wrote: to the devil with the war which brings us so many taxes, the year, as you know, has been extremely wet, the rain has finally ceased, it is only the taxes that never end and keep falling still.1

His letter was written in 1689, and although he could not have foreseen it the fiscal precipitations of the first half of Louis XIV’s reign had been no more than an unpleasant shower, the second half would bring a deluge. In the autumn of 1688, the aggressive policies of the Sun King plunged France into the ruinous War of the League of Augsburg (1688–97), against what would prove to be a powerful coalition of European states.2 After nine years of fighting, for little apparent gain, the peace of Ryswick offered an exhausted kingdom the much-needed prospect of peace. The death of the childless Charles II of Spain in 1700, and the dying monarch’s decision to bequeath his throne to Louis XIV’s grandson, dashed those hopes. By accepting the will, the French king committed his people to the no less costly War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13), which by 1709 had brought France close to collapse and foreign invasion. In their desperate attempts to pay for these conflicts, successive finance ministers introduced two new direct taxes, the capitation and the dixi`eme, while simultaneously exploiting almost every other conceivable fiscal expedient.3 In a period marked by harsh climatic conditions and economic stagnation, the results were catastrophic. Millions died from starvation, or from the diseases that preyed upon a weak and malnourished 1 2 3

BN MS Fr 10435, fols. 16–17, La Monnoye to Soyrot, undated 1689. J. Lynn, The wars of Louis XIV, 1667–1714 (London, 1999), pp. 191–360, provides the essential guide. Collins, The state in early modern France, pp. 140–6, 163–72, and Kwass, Privilege and politics, pp. 23–61.

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population.4 Here was the grim reality of life for those who lived in the shadow of the Sun King, and Burgundy was not spared its share of the hardship. As the crown looked around for the funds needed to keep its armies in the field, it was the Estates that had to face the fiscal onslaught5 and the system established between 1689 and 1715 would endure in most of its principal characteristics until the revolution. Detailed investigation of the Burgundian fiscal system is important because it provides a means of testing different scholarly interpretations of ‘absolutism’, and the monarchy’s precise relationship with the provincial estates. Russell Major suggested that during the 1660s and 1670s their traditional independence was eroded as they gradually abandoned the practice of haggling with the king’s representatives about the size of the don gratuit, or other royal taxation.6 In Burgundy, the effects of this more authoritarian mode of government were striking, and according to Major ‘the will of the Estates had been broken’ by 1674.7 Recent revisionist historiography has downplayed the coercive nature of Louis XIV’s rule, preferring to highlight the degree of cooperation between the provincial estates and the government of Louis XIV.8 It is, therefore, helpful to examine whether the Estates of Burgundy were cowed into submission as was once thought, or if they too were charmed by the prospect of collaboration with the king. No less important is the need to examine whether or not the relationship constructed during the first two decades of the reign was maintained during the troubled years after 1689. Much revisionist historiography of ‘absolutism’, is firmly anchored in the earlier period,9 but it was the War of the League of Augsburg that marked the beginning of the real trial of the monarchical state. It was a period that would reveal the flexibility of the Estates, and the ability of representative institutions to protect their own interests, while providing a vital service to the state. t h e rewa rd s o f o b e d i e n c e The beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule coincided with a severe subsistence crisis which encouraged the already truculent Estates to do all in their 4

5

6 7 8 9

Two impressive recent studies of these events are M. Lachiver, Les ann´ees de mis`ere: la famine au temps du grand roi (Paris, 1991), and W. G. Monahan, Year of sorrows. The great famine of 1709 in Lyon (Colombus, 1993). For a more detailed analysis of the fiscal consequences, see J. Swann, ‘War and finance in Louis XIV’s Burgundy, 1661–1715’, in M. Ormrod, M. Bonney and R. Bonney, eds., Crises, revolutions and self-sustained growth. Essays in European fiscal history, 1130–1830 (Stamford, 1999), pp. 293–322. Major, Representative government, pp. 631–2. Ibid ., p. 640, and his more recent work Renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy, p. 344. See: Beik, Absolutism and society; Bohanan, Crown and nobility; and Collins, Classes, estates and order. See chapter 2.

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power to evade his fiscal demands. Using a strategy that combined resistance and procrastination in almost equal measure, they pushed legitimate opposition to its limits. At the Estates of 1658, the chambers effectively ignored the presence of Louis XIV and cardinal Mazarin in Dijon, and offered the derisory sum of 300,000 livres in don gratuit, when asked for the considerably more imposing contribution of 1.8 million livres.10 No amount of threats or entreaties could persuade the deputies to meet the king’s demands, not even when it was made clear that he would accept a lower figure than that initially requested. For their temerity, the Estates were dismissed and then reconvened at Noyers, where the effects of disgrace persuaded them to promise the 1,053,000 livres requested by the king. To the annoyance of the ministry, the ´elus then took up the baton, employing a policy of passive resistance by refusing to levy the necessary taxation for as long as possible. It was in these inauspicious circumstances that Louis XIV began his personal rule, but he was quick to assert his authority. Within a month of Mazarin’s death, the Grand Cond´e, who had recently been restored to the king’s good graces after his treachery during the Fronde, wrote to the ´elus, who were refusing to levy part of the taille. He informed them that: the king has strongly disapproved of your delay in imposing taxation . . . His Majesty has done me the honour of speaking about it, and he has informed me that he was not satisfied by the manner in which you have acted. You will see from his letter that he does not approve of your plan to send a deputation and that he orders you to levy the necessary taxation forthwith. I have included with my own letter that of His Majesty to warn you that you risk incurring his displeasure if you do not act promptly in accordance with his wishes.11

To ensure that the ´elus were under no illusions about what was expected of them, the governor added ‘as for myself, I urge you to give His Majesty the satisfaction that he desires of you’. By intervening in this decisive fashion, Louis XIV gave his Burgundian subjects the first hint of what his personal rule would mean, but the ´elus continued their policy of obstruction regardless. Despite the ever more pressing orders of the governor they refused to comply, citing ‘the absence of one ´elu or another’,12 and they persisted in their earlier resolution of 10

11 12

Major, Renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy, p. 300. The assembly was presided over by the ´ governor, the duc d’Epernon, but with regular communication with the king and the cardinal, J. Garnier, Inventaire sommaire: fonds des ´etats de Bourgogne (Dijon, 1959), pp. 25–7. ADCO C 3352, fol. 116, Cond´e to the ´elus, 13 April 1661. The phrase is the governor’s, ibid., fol. 119, Cond´e to the ´elus, 3 May 1661.

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sending a deputation to court with the aim of presenting their woes.13 By the end of June 1661, Cond´e was thoroughly exasperated, and he sent the ´elus a quite remarkable letter washing his hands of their enterprise altogether, declaring: since you have resolved to send a deputation here I cannot stop it, all I would say to you is that I am confident you will not receive satisfaction . . . I am aggrieved to see you always so opposed to what is asked of you and, in truth, it will be for your deputies to extricate themselves as best they can because . . . I shall not be able to offer them any service.14

The ´elus had proved willing to stand firm against the combined might of Louis XIV and the Grand Cond´e, and by the end of the year they were busily thwarting Colbert. He was anxious to begin negotiations about the province’s tax contribution for 1662, and he ordered the ´elus to send a deputation to Paris.15 In a novel twist to their earlier strategy, they showed no inclination to make the journey and the governor was again obliged to intervene.16 Yet, despite the king threatening to send troops into the province, in April 1662 the ´elus still owed the royal treasury 360,000 livres in tax arrears from the previous year, forcing Colbert to accord them a further delay in making the payment.17 This episode was typical of the relationship between the Estates of Burgundy and the crown in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, and the pattern was repeated in the other pays d’´etats.18 Consent to taxation was grudging at best, and the ´elus revealed themselves to be masters of the art of procrastination. The terrible suffering of the province after the harvest failure of 1661 undoubtedly stiffened their resolve, and, with Cond´e only recently reinstalled as governor and the true meaning of the king’s personal rule not fully apparent, these were exceptional times. Yet the willingness of the ´elus to risk the wrath of the imposing triumvirate of Louis XIV, the Grand Cond´e and Colbert, provides ample testimony to their spirit of independence. When the Estates reassembled in June 1662, there was every reason to believe that further opposition to royal taxation would be forthcoming. In Burgundy, the taille was composed of five separate levies, but the most substantial were the don gratuit extraordinaire and the subsistance et 13 14 15 16 17 18

Ibid., fol. 120, Cond´e to the ´elus, 25 May 1661. Ibid., fol. 123, Cond´e to the ´elus, 29 June 1661. Ibid., fol. 126, Colbert to the ´elus, 3 December 1661. Ibid., fol. 127, Cond´e to the ´elus, 27 December 1661. Ibid., fol. 147, Colbert to the ´elus, 29 June 1662. Major, Representative government, pp. 630–52.

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exemption des gens de guerre.19 The don gratuit was accorded by the Estates at their triennial assembly, while the subsistance et exemption were subject to royal commissions, agreed by the ´elus and approved retrospectively by the Estates.20 As their names suggest, the subsistance was, in theory, levied to support royal troops during their winter quarters, while the exemption was paid to ensure that they were not billeted in Burgundy. The unwillingness of the Estates to continue paying these commissions at a wartime rate after the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659 had been a significant cause of the conflict with Colbert in 1661–2. It was, however, the don gratuit which remained the touchstone of local attitudes towards taxation because of its symbolic importance at the assemblies of the Estates. In June 1662, Cond´e was sent to Dijon with orders to obtain a don gratuit of 1.5 million livres, but, in anticipation of the hard bargaining to come, he had secret instructions to accept 1.2 million livres.21 Four days of haggling followed with the Estates making no fewer than six separate offers, starting at a miserly 500,000 livres and rising slowly to a final total of 1,050,000 livres.22 They also attempted unsuccessfully to include the subsistance et exemption as part of the package, and stubbornly refused to do anything about existing tax arrears, totalling some 220,000 livres, before the next harvest.23 Having obtained the offer of 1,050,000 livres, the governor revealed his own bartering skills, informing the deputies that he would accept 1.2 million livres rather than the 1.5 million livres initially demanded. He also announced his refusal ‘to make any other proposition to the king’, adding ‘that they could do nothing better for their own interests than to obey the king blindly’.24 Even this advice was not enough to inspire obedience, and Louis XIV eventually received 150,000 livres less than requested in the governor’s secret instructions. In his analysis of these events, Cond´e was generally sympathetic to the Burgundians, noting their good intentions and the miserable state of the province. It was the chamber of the third estate that had fought the hardest against the don gratuit, but, as the governor admitted, ‘that is pardonable because they are the ones who pay nearly all the taxes’.25 19

20 21

22 24

They were known as the octroi ordinaire, the don gratuit extraordinaire, the taillon, garnisons and the subsistance et exemption des gens de guerre. For a useful discussion of the taille in Burgundy, see d’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne. C. Arbassier, L’absolutisme en Bourgogne. L’intendant Bouchu et son action financi`ere, d’apr`es sa correspondance in´edite, 1667–1671 (Paris, 1921), p. 109. See: G. B. Depping, ed., Correspondance administrative sous le r`egne de Louis XIV , 4 vols. (Paris, 1850–5), i, pp. 424–35; Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 32–7; and Major, Representative government, p. 639. 23 Ibid., p. 432 Depping, Correspondance, i, pp. 428–9. 25 Ibid. Ibid ., pp. 426–31, Cond´e to Colbert, 18 June 1662.

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In these circumstances the government could consider the assembly to have been a success. Patient bargaining had coaxed forth a don gratuit equal to that of 1658, and there had been no repeat of the acrimonious scenes preceding the ‘exile’ to Noyers. As the subsistence crisis eased and the governor and ministry settled into their respective roles the relationship between the crown and the Estates improved further. In November 1662, Cond´e informed the ´elus that the king required a contribution of 100,000 livres towards the costs of the Treaty of Dunkirk.26 He informed them that they should do all in their power to comply, as ‘His Majesty has done me the honour of speaking about it with great warmth and I am certain that he will be touched if you make this effort through affection for him’. There was no repeat of the earlier obstructionism, and to Cond´e’s delight the sum was voted without hesitation.27 To draw maximum advantage from the decision of the ´elus, he summoned the comte de Chamilly to court where he made a presentation of the ‘gift’ to a grateful Louis XIV.28 Not that everything was sweetness and light because in February 1663 Colbert was still hectoring the ´elus about the late payment of the subsistance and exemption.29 Nor was there any appreciable change at the Estates of 1665. Instead, the pattern of lengthy bargaining was repeated until the crown secured a don gratuit of 1,050,000 livres. The outbreak of the War of Devolution in May 1667 determined the king to summon the Estates of 1668 in January of that year, rather than in the Spring or early Summer as was traditionally the case. By reducing the time between meetings of the Estates, the crown could increase its tax yield if it raised an identical or larger don gratuit. The governor did, in fact, have similar instructions to those of the previous two meetings, an official demand of 1.5 million livres, but secret orders stating that 1.2 million would suffice.30 Neither the war nor the experiences of 1662 or 1665 seemed to make any impression on the Estates. After their initial deliberations, the third estate sent deputies to the two privileged chambers in order to deliver a suitably pathetic discourse, lamenting the misery of the people and their inability to find the funds needed to match their zeal for the king’s service.31 They proposed a don gratuit of 500,000 livres, a sum increased to 600,000 by the members of the privileged orders. Not surprisingly, the governor was unimpressed, and a further round of bargaining produced an improved bid of 700,000 livres. 26 27 28 29 30

ADCO C 3352, fol. 149, Cond´e to the ´elus, 7 November 1662. Ibid., fol. 150, Cond´e to the ´elus, 1 December 1662. Ibid., fol. 151, Cond´e to the ´elus, 13 December 1662. Ibid., fol. 156, Colbert to the ´elus, 2 February 1663. 31 ADCO C 3039, fols. 21–2. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 37.

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It was hardly a generous offer, and it was further compromised by the decision of the Estates to attach conditions. When approaching the governor, they asked that the king be ‘implored to recognise the innovations introduced during the last triennalit´e and [begged] that none will be made during the present’.32 This was an oblique reference to the early summoning of the Estates and to unpopular increases in the commissions for the subsistance et exemption, and it illustrates the determination of the assembly to question almost every royal demand. Cond´e simply replied ‘that it was astonishing that less was offered in wartime than during the peace, and that for all his goodwill for the province he could not accept it because it is impossible to maintain great armies without money’. Previous experience suggested that the Estates would have to match the dons gratuits of 1658, 1662 and 1665, but the third estate was in no mood to capitulate.33 Throughout it fought tenaciously to limit the size of the don gratuit, and when it finally agreed to propose one million livres it was with a string of conditions attached, including the prior agreement that the king provide some assistance in paying the sum.34 The governor remained steadfast, demanding that the conditions be dropped and the offer increased. These negotiations had now dragged on for more than a week without producing an acceptable compromise. The Estates, therefore, decided to change tack, suggesting that the bishop of Autun, Gabriel Roquette, be invited to confer privately with the governor ‘and attempt to discern what His Majesty desired of the Estates’.35 Once these discussions were completed, the governor sanctioned an extraordinary general assembly of the three chambers to hear the bishop’s report. Roquette informed the deputies that the governor’s instructions were to obtain 1.2 million livres, adding that the prince had nevertheless agreed to write on their behalf if they refused to offer more. In response, the clergy and third estate united in favour of an offer of 1,050,000 livres, albeit with the understanding that 1.2 million would be forthcoming in the event of a royal refusal. As promised, the governor sent word to the king, but when his courier returned from court the news was sombre. His Majesty was prepared to accept their offer on condition that the Estates assume liability for the military ´etapes.36 For a frontier province such as Burgundy this was a nasty threat, and the assembly quickly made clear its intention to pay the 1.2 million livres in full.37 The Estates had finally yielded, but they were far from happy. The remonstrances delivered during the subsequent voyage of honour were particularly angry in tone, 32 35

Ibid ., fol. 22. Ibid ., fol. 32.

33 36

Ibid., fol. 23. Ibid., fols. 46.

34 Ibid., fol. 29. 37 Ibid., fols. 46–7.

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stressing the desperate plight of the province, and protesting against both the cost of the don gratuit and the subsistance et exemption.38 Significantly, Louis XIV proved receptive to their pleas, and the don gratuit was reduced by 50,000 livres. The assembly of 1668 provided a classic example of the traditional relationship between the monarchy and the provincial estates. Despite being engaged in a major European war, the crown had been obliged to participate in nearly two weeks of public bargaining, and to employ all manner of threats and entreaties in order to secure the desired don gratuit. Within the Estates, the representatives of the third estate had proved to be the most obdurate, but the opposition of the privileged orders should not be discounted. Had they been the pliant creatures of the governor, or cowed by the ‘absolutism’ of their king, then a simple vote of two to one would have sufficed to extinguish the resistance of the third estate. That did not occur, and both the clergy and the nobility had participated wholeheartedly in a bargaining process that seemed to have become a permanent feature of the Estates. The Estates of 1671 certainly began as if they were to follow a preordained pattern, with four days packed full of the usual ingredients of pleas of poverty from the third estate, gradually increasing offers – with or without conditions – deputations and polite refusals from the governor.39 Eventually the Estates fell back on the model of 1668, sending deputies to ask the governor what was expected of them. In the course of a long meeting, he explained that their current offer was insufficient, but held out a carrot by announcing that ‘His Majesty’s intention was to relieve the province by paying its debts and that for this purpose he had designated the 2 crues of 40 sols’.40 All that was needed was satisfaction on the issue of the don gratuit. Yet even this seemingly generous gesture did not sway the deputies. The third estate sullenly refused to offer more than 800,000 livres, and the two privileged orders would not meet the governor’s request for one million livres, proposing 950,000 instead.41 The return of peace after the brief War of Devolution may account, in part, for the obstinacy of the Estates, but the example of 1668, when similar resistance had been countered by the threat to transfer responsibility for the military ´etapes, was hardly propitious. Cond´e nevertheless agreed to 38 40

41

39 ADCO C 3039, fols. 51–8. ADCO C 3328, fols. 150–2. Ibid., fol. 57. The crues were an additional charge levied on salt sold in the province, which the crown had been in the habit of alienating to the Estates to assist the payment of their charges. Their importance to the fiscal system is discussed below. ADCO C 3039, fol. 58.

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write on behalf of the province, and further assistance was forthcoming from the intendant, Claude Bouchu. He wrote to Colbert independently, informing him that Burgundy was in desperate need of aid, adding that ‘the shortage of money is so great that it is scarcely ever seen’.42 These appeals coincided with a change of mood at court. When the governor’s courier returned with the royal response not only had the king deigned to accept the 950,000 livres offered by the Estates, but he had even decided to reduce that sum by 150,000 livres. According to Bouchu, the Estates heard this news: with such expressions of delight . . . that it would be difficult to describe it to you, and it was not necessary to be eloquent to persuade them that they could never do anything more beneficial to themselves than to submit to the orders of the king, and that His Majesty, in his goodness, takes greater care of their fortunes than they do themselves.43

As the intendant was writing to Colbert, he was presumably a little over effusive in his description of events, and it had not escaped the attention of the Burgundians that similar reductions had recently been accorded to the provincial estates of Artois, Brittany and Languedoc. Yet even if this is taken into account they still had much to celebrate. The original offer of 950,000 livres had been lower than those paid over the previous decade, and to see that sum reduced to just 800,000 livres was as welcome as it was dramatic. The assembly marked a watershed in the relationship between the crown and the Estates, and at the next meeting, held in 1674, traditional practice was abandoned. Rather than engage in the usual round of bargaining, the Estates were careful to establish what the king expected of them before voting ‘unanimously’ to offer an unconditional one million livres in don gratuit.44 When the official deputation informed the governor, Henri-Jules duc d’Enghien, of their decision, he accepted their offer and then, like a conjuror pulling a rabbit from his hat, announced that His Majesty would be content with 900,000 livres.45 Henri-Jules also informed the startled deputies that they would receive various other financial concessions, notably a discharge of debts accruing from Colbert’s manufacturing and canal building schemes. Finally he added that the king would look favourably on any request for a continuation of the right to raise the crues to help meet the cost of the don gratuit. Such generosity was even more remarkable 42 43 44 45

Quoted in Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, p. 114, Bouchu to Colbert, May 1671. Ibid ., pp. 114–15, Bouchu to Colbert, 29 May 1671. ADCO C 2998, fol. 1. They also offered an extra 53,000 livres for the octroi ordinaire. The outbreak of the Dutch War in 1672 was almost certainly a major influence on their actions. Ibid . The news was rendered even more popular by the fact that this included the octroi ordinaire.

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given that France had been at war with the Dutch since 1672. The official registers of the Estates claimed that after ‘such a surprising response from His Majesty’, the Estates were ‘beside themselves with joy’. It is easy to understand why, and here was firm proof that prompt obedience would bring its reward. From 1674 until the revolution, the voting of the don gratuit was transformed into a carefully stage-managed ritual of ‘spontaneous’ and ‘joyful’ obedience to the king, which Thomas witheringly described as an act of ‘blind deference’.46 It gradually became a convention that the province offered one million livres, and after praising their zeal the governor subsequently informed them that His Majesty would be satisfied with just 900,000 livres. The granting of the right to levy the crues for a further three years was also an established part of the bargain. Clearly the change between the Estates of 1668 and those of 1674 had been both sudden and dramatic, but what was responsible for this remarkable transformation? There had been no sign of dispiritedness, nor a collapse in the confidence of the Estates in either 1668 or 1671, and Major’s argument that the ‘will of the Estates had been broken by 1674’ is unconvincing.47 Nor had Louis XIV resorted to a law comparable to that of 1673, which had forced the parlements to register new laws before making remonstrances. The potential for opposition was, therefore, undiminished, and although the don gratuit ceased to be the central focus of subsequent assemblies both the Estates and their ´elus proved to be tenacious defenders of provincial privilege. To find a satisfactory explanation for the ending of the bargaining process it is necessary to investigate Louis XIV’s attitude towards the provincial estates more closely. In his memoirs written for the instruction of the dauphin, the king looked back to the early days of his personal rule, noting that: it had been the custom not merely to ask them [the provincial estates] for large sums in order to obtain meagre ones . . . but also to tolerate their putting conditions on everything, to promise them everything, to circumvent everything they had been promised soon thereafter under various pretexts, even to issue a great number of edicts with no other intention than to grant, or rather to sell, their revocation soon thereafter. I found this method undignified for the sovereign and unsatisfactory for the subject. I chose an entirely different one that I have always followed since, which was to ask them for precisely what I intended to obtain, to promise little, to keep my promises faithfully, hardly ever to accept conditions, but to surpass their expectations when they appealed to my justice and to my kindness.48 46 47 48

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 44. Major, Representative government, p. 640, and his Renaissance monarchy to absolute monarchy, p. 344. Quoted in Major, Representative government, pp. 631–2

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Louis XIV put considerable time and effort into preparing his memoirs, and his analysis of how to manage the provincial estates is revealing. Despite his claims to the contrary, the king had engaged in the same bargaining process as his predecessors throughout the first decade of his personal rule, and the habit of producing unpleasant edicts with the aim of persuading the provincial estates to pay for their suppression would be exploited ruthlessly after 1672. However, the king was undoubtedly sincere when he expressed a desire to replace what he considered to be unseemly public bartering with a more orderly system of clear royal demands, obedience and rewards. Indeed, throughout the 1660s, there had been signs that Louis XIV was seeking to redefine his relationship with the provincial estates, but it was probably not until 1671 that the plan of conduct described in the memoirs reached fruition.49 In Burgundy, it was the meeting of 1674 that had finally broken the mould, and the correspondence of Henri-Jules confirms that he was following instructions very close to those in the royal memoirs. In a letter to Colbert, he revealed that ‘I contented myself with revealing in private the true nature of my orders to some of the most important [deputies, informing them that], . . . it was not in their interest to bargain with His Majesty’.50 Instead they were expected to display complete confidence in their royal master, whose ‘favours this obedience would unfailingly attract’. The governor was obliged to work hard in the fortyeight hours preceding the opening of the Estates, but his mission was eventually crowned with success. The policy was not confined to Burgundy, and the other pays d’´etats, with the notable exception of the rebellious Bretons, were simultaneously learning that obedience would bring rewards. There is, therefore, some truth in the argument that Louis XIV conquered the Estates by kindness and after the opening of the Estates of 1679 the intendant could crow that ‘the day passed in rejoicing and expressions of gratitude for the king’s favours’.51 Certainly the Estates quickly warmed to their new role, and it has to be said that they had done well out of the deal. Before 1674, the don gratuit had regularly been in excess of one million livres, despite all of the haggling that preceded it. Thereafter it rarely exceeded that sum, and the king always reduced the final amount by at least 100,000 livres, and offered the rights on the crues at the same time. 49

50 51

Cond´e’s speech to the Estates in 1662 in which he informed them that ‘Je croyois qu’ils ne pouvoient rien faire de mieux pour leurs int´erˆets que d’ob´eys aveuglement au roy’, might be interpreted as an early sign that the strategy employed in 1671 and 1674 had already been considered. Major, Representative government, pp. 646–7, suggests that the king’s experience at the Estates of Brittany in 1661 inspired him in this regard. Depping, Correspondance, I, pp. 448–9, Henri-Jules to Colbert, 12 April 1674. Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, p. 115.

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As the Estates admitted in their remonstrances presented to Louis XIV in 1689, they had voted the don gratuit ‘knowing full well that their obedience would produce more favours from Your Majesty and [bring] more aid in the burden that they carry than all the remonstrances they might make’.52 The impact of these concessions on the don gratuit should not, however, be exaggerated, and once war broke out in 1672 provincial expenditure and taxation rose sharply.53 Indeed, even during the years immediately after the assembly of 1674, the deputies displayed a truculence that was at odds with the grateful congregation portrayed in the official accounts. In their remonstrances, drafted after the assembly of 1677, the king was confronted with a long litany of grievances about the high cost of taxation and the other fiscal burdens resulting from the Dutch War (1672–9).54 Nor did the return of peace bring an end to recriminations. When the governor arrived in Dijon for the Estates of 1685, he was approached by the deputies of the third estate who had prepared a ‘Memorandum to present to His Serene Highness and to beg him to represent to the king how much the province’s burden has increased’.55 Although they no longer protested publicly, the members of the third estate had not abandoned their traditional defence of the province’s taillables, it was the form of the protest that had changed. There were other results of Louis XIV’s policy that were perhaps not quite what the monarch had intended. The transformation of the voting of the don gratuit into a piece of political theatre effectively blocked off the tax as a means of raising additional revenue, and new financial resources had to be found elsewhere. Finally, if the king’s orderly mind abhorred public opposition to his wishes, he was generally willing to tolerate protests addressed to him personally, through the medium of unpublished remonstrances, or the private petitions of the governor or aristocratic ´elus. As a result the years after 1674 would lack some of the drama and excitement of the struggles against the don gratuit, but when faced with the fiscal onslaught of Louis XIV’s later years the Estates demonstrated that they were far from broken. t h e p rov i n c i a l bu d g e t As Louis XIV’s armies ran amok in the Palatinate during the spring of 1689, bringing desolation to their victims and shame on their sovereign, they began a period of warfare that would continue almost uninterrupted until 1714.56 The fiscal screw would be tightened more firmly than ever 52 54 56

53 As is explained in greater detail below. ADCO C 3329, fol. 100. 55 ADCO C 3049, fol. 104. ADCO C 3329, fols. 25–49. Lynn, The wars of Louis XIV , pp. 193–9.

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before, and the king’s much vaunted ability to manage the Estates was put to the sternest of tests. To understand the costs of those wars, it is helpful to look at the accounts prepared by the provincial administration and especially those of the alcades. At the end of every triennalit´e, it was common practice for one of the secr´etaires des ´etats to prepare a register entitled ‘State of the administration’, which outlined details of the taxes, loans and other fiscal operations of the ´elus. These were scrutinised by the alcades, who also had access to the papers of the ´elus, the tax rolls compiled by the chamber and the registers of the treasurer general.57 The reports produced by the alcades from this mass of documentation are of mixed quality. Overall the figures for the spending of the Estates are the most reliable,58 but the estimates of income need treating with particular caution. As the alcades drafted their remarques at the end of the third year of any given triennalit´e, they could never be sure that tax or other receipts would match the expected returns. After 1694, it became an accepted convention that they would invite their successors to ‘watch out’ relative to the incomplete accounts of the third year, an instruction that was not always heeded.59 A further problem resulted from their habit of basing estimates of revenues on the sums levied in the tax rolls, which inevitably represented what ought to be collected, not what had actually been paid to the treasurer general. Finally, it is important to remember that the massive loans floated during nearly every triennalit´e were included as part of the province’s revenues, not its liabilities. Despite these drawbacks, the accounts do provide a valuable insight into the fiscal pressure exerted on the province. Figure 6.1 contains a representative sample of the triennial accounts for the period 1645 to 1716 and the dramatic escalation of both the income and the expenditure of the Estates is immediately apparent.60 During the troubled final years of the reign of Louis XIII, when the Thirty Years War was at its height, the triennial ‘budget’ was hovering around the figure of four million livres. From then until 1670 the situation remained relatively stable with spending reaching a peak of 4,858,120 livres just prior to the Fronde (1645–7). The Dutch War brought a sharp increase, with expenditure close to six million livres in the final triennalit´e of the conflict. Yet, as we have suggested, it was the War of the League of Augsburg which 57 58 59 60

The procedure was explained in ADCO C 3303, fol. 158. Bouchard, ‘Comptes borgnes’, 14, has gone further, arguing that the ‘´etats au vrai’ of the treasurer general are precise for expenditure, but that the ‘recettes’ were chaotic. ADCO C 3041, fol. 248. These figures were taken from the surviving remarques of the alcades, ADCO C 3039–42, 3049, 3303.

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16,000,000 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0 1645-7 1650-2 1662-4 1665-7 1668-70 1677-9 1688-911691-3 1694-6 1696-8 1700-2 1703-5 1706-8 1714-16

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Figure 6.1

Expenditure

Triennial accounts of the Estates of Burgundy, 1645–1716

marked the real watershed. The first triennalit´e of the war saw spending reach 7.3 million livres, and from then until the Peace of Ryswick it never fell below nine million livres.61 The brief respite before the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession was not enough to alter the picture significantly, and rose further reaching 12.96 million livres between 1709 and 1712. When peace was restored, it brought no immediate relief and during the triennalit´e of 1714–16 expenditure topped fifteen million livres. It was altogether fitting that the year of the king’s death saw the highest level of spending of his entire reign with some 7,049,751 livres accounted for by the alcades.62 The seventeenth century was a period of economic stagnation, and, even allowing for the sharp depreciation in the value of the livre due to the monarchy’s habit of revaluing the currency, the increase in the fiscal burden was still impressive. p rov i n c i a l e x pe n d i t u re Thanks to the remarques of the alcades and the other fiscal data generated by the provincial administration it is possible to be relatively precise about the causes of the Estates’ increased expenditure. Despite the enormous 61

ADCO C 3041, fols. 110–11, 162, 172.

62

ADCO C 3049, fols. 346–50.

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cost of warfare after 1688, the crown made no attempt to augment the five impositions that together formed the taille. As we have seen, the don gratuit never exceeded 900,000 livres, and the taillon and garnisons were fixed annual sums of 71,550 livres and 86,000 livres respectively, and they remained unchanged throughout the reign. The subsistance et exemption, on the other hand, fluctuated considerably before 1685, with the exemption rising from 112,000 livres in 1662 to 200,000 livres by 1680. The cost of the subsistance also rose to 345,000 livres by 1679 before falling to 300,000 livres in 1685.63 There was no further change in the amounts of these charges until the revolution. With the proceeds from the taille stable, the crown was forced to look for funds elsewhere, and Louis XIV’s boasts about the rules of honesty and integrity that guided his conduct towards the provincial estates soon began to ring hollow. On 31 May 1689, the governor, Henri-Jules, summoned the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone and a large deputation of ´elus and permanent officials to Paris for negotiations.64 Once they had arrived, he informed them that the king had requested a secours extraordinaire of 800,000 livres towards the war effort. As the Estates had separated only a few months earlier, having voted a don gratuit of 900,000 livres for the whole triennalit´e, this represented a substantial sum, as the deputies lost no time in reminding him.65 Predictably they stressed the difficulties of raising additional revenue, highlighting the misery of the province and its inhabitants. However, their trump card was their claim that ‘the Estates had given them no authority to grant sums beyond those of the don gratuit and that the practice on like occasions was to assemble the Estates, or at least their principal members’. It was a defining moment. Had the crown heeded their advice and reassembled the Estates it might have created the precedent for more determined resistance to its policies in the future. Instead, the ministry decided to avoid the political risks of an extraordinary assembly by treating directly with the ´elus. The governor had already prepared the ground for such an arrangement before the arrival of the Burgundian deputation. He had informed the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Claude Le Peletier, that he would need to grant the Estates some form of revenue to cover the borrowing needed to pay the secours extraordinaire. Initially Henri-Jules and the ´elus were thinking in terms of an extension of the right to levy the crues. When they petitioned Le Peletier, however, he announced that the king would be willing to grant the Estates the right to half of the octrois levied on goods transported on 63 64

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 148. 65 Ibid., fol. 190. ADCO C 3134, fols. 186–7.

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the river Saˆone.66 Over the previous twenty years, these revenues had been used by Colbert to extinguish the debts of the towns and the villages of the province,67 and by passing them to the Estates the monarchy made it possible for the ´elus to borrow the 800,000 livres. To forestall any opposition or delay, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral demanded an immediate response, and the deputies took the final decision in concert with the governor. They accepted the offer, justifying their action on the basis that: His Majesty could establish the said octrois in their entirety and award them to individuals who would impose them rigorously, that, if on the contrary, they were raised by the province it would be in a gentler manner, more suitable to the public good, and it would be easier to obtain their suppression if this was judged appropriate in the future.

Any hopes of suppressing the octrois would prove illusory, and they remained a fundamental feature of the fiscal policy of the Estates until the revolution. By alienating the octrois, the king had supplied the income against which the Estates could borrow. It was a technique that would be repeated regularly thereafter. Louis XIV demanded a further secours of 450,000 livres from the Estates in 1691, and identical sums were requested every three years until the end of the war.68 The secours was not, therefore, as onerous for the province as it might at first appear, as it was only the interest that was a direct burden to the taillables. A more disturbing development was the use of another royal expedient designed to tap the wealth of the Burgundians, the military ´etapes. When confronted by the particularly obstinate Estates of 1668, Louis XIV had threatened to make the province pay for the costs of the ´etapes if his demand for a substantial don gratuit was not met. Thereafter the matter was dropped, but any celebrations were premature. Once the Dutch War was in full swing, Colbert returned to the idea and this time he could not be deflected.69 After 1675, he stopped advancing the funds to cover the cost of the ´etapes, leaving the Estates to foot the bill. As figure 6.2 demonstrates, the seemingly interminable stream of troops marching into Franche-Comt´e, the Empire and the Italian states meant that the effects were dramatic.70 In 1675, some 66 68 69 70

67 Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, pp. 122–71, and Root, Peasants and king, pp. 36–44, 49. Ibid. ADCO C 3030, fols. 232–3, and C 3000, fol. 88. A letter from Colbert to Bouchu of 1 January 1668 cited by Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, pp. 109–11, makes it clear that the minister had been planning to do this for some time. ´ des sommes dont la province de Bourgogne a fait les fonds annuellement AN H1 99, fols. 120–1, ‘Etat pour le remboursement des e´tapes . . . depuis l’ann´ee 1676’.

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700,000

600,000

500,000

400,000

300,000

200,000

1715

1713

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Figure 6.2 Annual cost of the military ´etapes, 1675–1715

286,476 livres were needed to meet the cost,71 and similar amounts were consumed every year until the end of the war. It is, however, unlikely that anything could have prepared the Estates for the shock of the War of the League of Augsburg. In the brief period from 1690 to 1692, the ´etapes consumed no less than 1,633,865 livres, with a massive 675,388 livres required in 1692 alone.72 In terms of cost, that proved to be the most expensive year of the reign, but between 1676 and 1718 the province spent on average 284,250 livres per annum and totals of more than 400,000 livres were common. To put these figures in context, it is worth remembering that the province paid 300,000 livres annually for the don gratuit. By transferring responsibility for the ´etapes, Colbert had found a neat way of milking the resources of the province, without having to employ the politically more controversial route of direct taxation. It is true that, from the perspective of the Estates, this form of alternative taxation had the advantage of keeping the funds raised in Burgundy, but they were not easily convinced of the virtues of the new arrangement. Complaints were voiced in the Estates of 1677 and, as a result, the very first article in their subsequent remonstrances was a 71 72

ADCO C 2982, fols. 59–60, and C 3675. ´ AN H1 99, fols. 120–1, ‘Etats des sommes’, and ADCO C 3676.

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demand for full payment of the ´etapes.73 The conclusion of the Dutch War in 1679 offered the Estates an ideal opportunity to renew their appeals, but they were again unsuccessful. Undaunted, the Estates tried again in 1686, informing the monarch with great precision that since 1674, they had paid 2,397,030 livres 17 sols, ‘more than 250,000 livres annually’, which would soon reduce the province to penury if he did not grant some assistance.74 Their appeals fell on deaf ears and the ´etapes were gradually accepted as part of the burden supported by the province, appearing as a perennial article of the governor’s instructions until 1789.75 The crown also resorted to other expedients to draw funds from the province, occasionally demanding that the ´elus supply grain to the royal armies, or quarter cavalry regiments on the pastures of the Saˆone at the province’s expense.76 These were minor irritations when compared to the cost of the military ´etapes, but that did not prevent the ´elus from protesting about the infringement of their privileges. In his memoirs, the king had commented unfavourably upon the expedient of issuing edicts with the deliberate aim of persuading the provincial estates to pay for their suppression. After 1672, he could no longer allow himself the luxury of such scruples, and successive finance ministers settled into a pattern of creating unwanted offices such as commissioners of wines, spirits, cider and other liquors, knowing full well that the Estates would seek to protect Burgundy’s precious wine trade.77 Once an edict creating such offices had been issued, or simply proposed, the ´elus were quick to contact the contrˆoleur g´en´eral with the offer of a cash advance (rachat) for their withdrawal. The government was totally ruthless in its exploitation of this expedient, and the same offices were re-established on several occasions, forcing the Estates to pay repeatedly for their suppression. For the king, the system was a lucrative source of funds and 300,000 livres were raised in 1693, 200,000 livres in 1696, 922,000 livres in 1700, 491,000 livres in 1703, 620,000 livres in 1706, 804,000 livres in 1708 and, finally, one million livres in 1710.78 These examples are by no means exhaustive, but they do reveal both the regularity and the value of the rachat system for Louis XIV. Given the king’s all too evident need for money, and the more authoritarian nature of his rule after 1688, opportunities for outright opposition were limited, but the Estates were not powerless. In the early months of 1706, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Michel Chamillart, unveiled plans to create a series of offices, including the ubiquitous commissioners of wines, to the tune 73 75 76 78

74 ADCO C 3329, fols. 85–6. ADCO C 2982, fols. 19–21. The articles of 1691 are contained in AN G7 157, fol. 170, ‘Projet d’instruction’. 77 ADCO C 2982, fols. 261, 331–2. See chapter 7. For details of the ‘buy outs’ contracted between 1688 and 1715, see ADCO C 3495–500.

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of over one million livres.79 The governor summoned the procureur syndic, Guenichot, to Versailles, and together with his loyal aide, the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, they set about negotiating with the minister. With his typical concern for the province’s interest, Henri-Jules informed Chamillart that his plans would be ‘ruinous’ for Burgundy. Nor was he simply making a token protest. According to Guenichot: His Serene Highness then promised to ask M. de Chamillart to release to the province the sums that the king is accustomed to hand over to the traitants and to take note that the majority of these trait´es have already been bought out on previous occasions.

These efforts bore fruit, and the eventual cost of the rachat was 620,000 livres, considerably less than Chamillart had originally envisaged. HenriJules and his advisers were also careful to ensure that the contrˆoleur g´en´eral promised the Estates a further extension of their right to farm the octrois on the river Saˆone.80 By doing so, the minister supplied the ´elus with the revenue needed to borrow, a technique that was employed for all of the rachats contracted during the period. The willingness of the king to assist in the payment of the extra sums he demanded from the Estates oiled the wheels of the system. The role of the governor was decisive in mediating between the province and the crown, a service for which he was handsomely rewarded by both.81 Finally, although conducted in private, it is clear that the ´elus and their representatives were still able to bargain effectively on behalf of the Estates. Thus in November 1707 the ´elus, who were in Paris during their voyage of honour, found themselves confronted by a demand from Chamillart that they ‘buy out’ offices that the minister claimed were worth a total of 1,468,400 livres.82 As before, Henri-Jules coordinated the provincial response, ordering the ´elus to prepare memoranda about each of the edicts in turn, together with an assessment of ‘those which must be bought out and those that one might reject’.83 He was also anxious to be informed of how the province expected to pay. The ´elus did as they were told, presenting the governor with the necessary details prior to the final negotiations with the minister. The result 79 80 81 82 83

ADCO C 3151, fols. 69–70, procureur syndic, Guenichot, to the ´elus, (received 21 February 1706). His letter contains a report of the events discussed below. ADCO C 3049, fols. 227–8. The work of B´eguin, Les princes de Cond´e, pp. 246–53, 323–8, is the essential guide, but Roche, ‘Fortune des princes de Cond´e’, 217–43, should also be consulted. ADCO C 3310, fols. 10–11. The offices were an eclectic mix, including inspectors of boucheries and of batiments and the offices of ‘maires alternatifs’. Ibid , fol. 13.

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was a ‘buy out’ totalling 950,000 livres and an extension of the rights to both the octrois and the crues. By the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, the ‘buy out’ system had been pushed to its limits with approximately 2,000,000 livres raised from this source between 1708 and 1712 alone.84 Perhaps not surprisingly some ominous warning signs began to appear. In September 1710, the furious ´elus wrote to the duc de Bourbon protesting that an edict doubling the municipal octrois that they had supposedly bought out was still being enforced.85 They claimed that ‘this was, monseigneur, the principal reason why we agreed to pay such a significant sum’, and they implored the duc to intervene on their behalf. A further indication of the seriousness of the affair was provided by the decision of the Parlement of Dijon to draft remonstrances on the subject.86 Further criticisms surfaced at the Estates of 1712 about another example of government bad faith, this time an edict creating various officers of weights and measures who were still in existence despite the payment of substantial sums.87 All three orders voiced protests, and they also refused to contemplate any additional ‘buy outs’, ordering the ´elus to pursue the matter further. While the effect on the increasingly autocratic Louis XIV was likely to be limited, the Estates were still capable of protest and the sight of the Parlement of Dijon threatening to make common cause was a potentially significant development.88 Yet from the perspective of the crown, these murmurs of dissent were a small price to pay for a lucrative source of revenue that had raised several millions in the critical years between 1688 and 1715. Assessing the motives of the Estates in the ‘buy out’ system is more complicated. As we have seen, they did all in their power to reduce the sums paid, but who were the winners and losers from the deals they contracted? This question is of particular relevance because of the strong emphasis within recent scholarship on the role of the provincial estates in advancing the ‘class’ interests of the privileged elites.89 There is no doubt that in Burgundy, the Estates regularly ‘bought out’ edicts and offices harmful to their authority, or to the wallets of their members. As early as May 1660, the first president of the Parlement of Dijon, Brulart, had denounced the self-interested conduct of 84 85 86 88

89

We should also note that a further 2.6 million livres was paid for a partial ‘buy out’ of the capitation in 1710, a transaction that is analysed below. ADCO C 3155, fols. 504–6, the ´elus to the duc de Bourbon, 27 September 1710. 87 ADCO C 3030, fols. 603–4. Ibid, fol. 504. The parlementaires also attacked the increase in direct taxation and the late payment of their gages, matters that directly affected their own material interests, AN U 1062, remonstrances of 24 May 1707, 9 June 1711, 5 June 1714 and 19 August 1715. The works of Beik, Absolutism and society, and Collins, Classes, estates and order, are good examples.

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the ´elus.90 He informed Fouquet that their opposition to the ‘commissioners of the francs-fiefs’ arose from ‘the damage to the personal interests of several amongst them that this investigation might cause’. The ´elus were also keen to protect their administrative competence and jurisdiction by paying for the suppression of edicts creating minor offices, whose privileges, or rights, threatened to interfere in the fiscal system.91 As we shall see, once a ‘buy out’ had been signed, the Estates were forced to borrow, presenting their members with a lucrative opportunity for investment. The losers were the taillables who were obliged to support the resulting interest payments.92 Here, then, is another example of the mutually rewarding cooperation between Louis XIV and provincial elites based upon the creditworthiness of the Estates and the tax payments of the peasantry. Yet while not denying the inequalities of the fiscal system, it is important to recognise that the Estates had very little room for manoeuvre. Louis XIV did not tolerate public opposition, and a refusal to treat with his finance ministers would certainly have had grave consequences. Indeed, if they had allowed the creation of the many offices proposed by the crown, the wine and other trades would have been damaged and the already large number of privileged would have been swollen further. Neither of these outcomes would have brought much joy to the hard-pressed taillables in the Burgundian countryside. Ultimately it seems fair to assume that the crown knew the Estates well enough to apply pressure where it threatened to hurt most, and by collaborating time and time again in the various ‘buy outs’ the Estates made the best of a bad job. Much of the increase in the financial burden after 1688 was the result of fiscal expedients, or costs being deflected on to the Estates. These rather crude traditional methods of extorting revenue were accompanied by some more innovative measures. After the harrowing famine of 1693–4, Louis XIV was forced to introduce the capitation, or poll tax, in January 1695, a measure revolutionary in the sense that all of his subjects, from the princes of the blood to humble peasants, were expected to pay. When examined from a long-term perspective, the king had crossed a fiscal Rubicon, potentially opening the way to a more equitable distribution of taxation.93 In the short-term, however, the tax arose from the crown’s desperate need to find new sources of revenue. Protests from the church, accompanied by the promise of a substantial don gratuit, were enough to preserve the clergy’s cherished immunity from direct taxation, and the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, 90 91 92

La Cuisine, Brulart, i, pp. 166–7, Brulart to Fouquet, 26 May 1660. A conclusion also reached by Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 206–7. 93 Kwass, Politics and privilege, pp. 23–61. The procedure is explained below.

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Louis Ph´elypeaux de Pontchartrain, clearly expected the provincial estates to follow suit. During the winter of 1695–6, he proposed that the ´elus contract an abonnement to replace the capitation of the taillables.94 This was a tempting offer. The administration of the capitation had been confided to the intendant, a particularly worrying development for the Estates. Pontchartrain was expecting to receive 400,000–500,000 livres for the abonnement, in return for which the ´elus would receive the right to levy the tax themselves. Though no doubt tempted by the prospect of bolstering their own authority, the ´elus informed the minister that they could not accept responsibility for ‘the levy of these monies at a rate that it is impossible to implement’.95 Instead they made a bid of 300,000 livres, much to the annoyance of the minister who replied ‘I believe that I would do the Estates a very real disservice if I informed His Majesty of the offer you have made’.96 Behind the scenes, the governor ordered the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, to investigate the responses of the provincial estates of Brittany and Languedoc, and he was especially concerned that any contract of abonnement should transfer full administrative responsibility to the ´elus.97 Precise details of what followed have proved elusive, but no abonnement was signed, suggesting that the ´elus refused to meet the contrˆoleur g´en´eral’s demands. The tax continued to be levied by the intendant until its suppression at the end of the war in 1697. When the capitation was revived in 1701, the Estates did finally agree to an abonnement at the annual rate of one million livres, of which 180,000 livres was to be paid by the pays adjacent.98 Significantly the amount actually levied on the taillables was never higher than 362,934 livres and was generally in the region of 300,000 livres, considerably less than the amount demanded by Pontchartrain in 1696.99 The crown allowed the ´elus to raise a further 400,000 livres by borrowing against the future proceeds of the octrois on the river Saˆone, with the interest payments being added to the taille.100 It would appear, therefore, that the ´elus had negotiated a better deal in 1701 than the one they had rejected in 1696, but any benefit to the taillables was marginal at best. As we shall see, the real beneficiaries were the members of the privileged elites. A series of crushing defeats by the armies of Marlborough and Eug`ene de Savoie combined with the effects of the arctic winter of 1709 forced the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Nicolas Desmarets, to introduce a new direct tax on 94 96 97 98

ADCO C 3141, fols. 46–7, the ´elus to Pontchartrain, 7 January 1696. Ibid., fol. 79, Pontchartrain to the ´elus, 14 January 1696. BMD MS 2239, fol. 307, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 26 January 1696. 99 ADCO C 5688–702. 100 ADCO C 5573. ADCO C 5573.

95

Ibid., fol. 47.

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income, the dixi`eme, in 1710.101 A reforming breeze was blowing through the corridors of power in the early eighteenth century, and the new tax was inspired, in part, by the ideas of Vauban and Boisguilbert. This offered scant consolation to the Estates, whose failure to contract a satisfactory abonnement allowed the intendant to draw up the rolls.102 In theory, at least, he was likely to be less sympathetic to the interests of the privileged, and this unwanted intrusion into what the ´elus believed to be their own administrative domain compounded the misery of a tax that would cost the province’s taxpayers another 700,000 livres per annum until its suppression in 1717.103 To make matters worse, Desmarets was soon pressuring the ´elus to accept a ‘buy out’ of part of the capitation, while simultaneously demanding one million livres for the suppression of various unwanted edicts.104 The governor had opposed the measure, but his death in 1709 was followed closely by that of his son, creating an opportunity that Desmarets was quick to seize.105 He requested that the Estates pay 2.4 million livres to reduce the annual abonnement of the capitation to 600,000 livres in perpetuity.106 In the militarily critical year of 1710, the crown was prepared to go to almost any lengths to secure desperately needed funds. As with so many other such arrangements, it facilitated the exchange by extending the rights to the octrois for another twelve years. There was, however, one crucial difference about this particular ‘buy out’. Rather than allow the interest to be added to the taille, Desmarets agreed that 120,000 livres could be deducted from the 600,000 livres of the abonnement.107 In other words, the king was now alienating the future revenues of one of his principal taxes in return for a cash advance. The total bill to the royal treasury would be some 3.5 million livres because the capital would not be fully reimbursed until the end of 1748. Once he had started down this path, Desmarets found it impossible to resist going further. In October 1714, he informed the ´elus that the king ‘requested a loan of 2,000,000 livres’.108 There was no pretence that offices or edicts needed to be bought off, simply that the credit of the Estates be used to the benefit of the crown. As with the ‘buy out’ of the capitation the terms were generous. The minister announced that: 101 103 104 105 107 108

102 ADCO C 3030, fol. 615. Bonney ‘Louis XIV’s dixi`eme’. ADCO C 5808, and AN G7 164, fol. 1. ADCO C 3155, fols. 273–4, Desmarets to the ´elus, 20 August 1710. 106 ADCO C 5573. AN G7 162, fol. 258, Richard (´elu du roi) to Desmarets, 5 June 1709. The province borrowed the 2.4 million livres at denier 18 and received the octrois for the period from 1737 to 1748. ADCO C 3352, fol. 195, Desmarets to the ´elus, 23 October 1714.

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100,000 livres of rente at denier 20 will be alienated to the ´elus to be drawn on the sums that the province pays annually to the royal treasury, the treasurer general of the Estates will retain in his hands, every year until the entire redemption of the total, the sum of 200,000 livres, a part of which will be used to pay the interest and the remainder to reimburse the capital.

The arrangement was advantageous to the province, and it was this loan that helped to push the Estates spending for the triennalit´e of 1714–16 to its highest ever level, and it would have risen even further if Desmarets had succeeded with a plan to replace the capitation and dixi`eme with a joint abonnement of 1.4 million livres.109 The minister was aware that his latest proposal was likely to encounter opposition. The Estates of 1712 had refused an abonnement of 800,000 livres for the dixi`eme, and the assembly of May 1715 proved no more amenable. When the duc de Bourbon informed the chambers of the king’s demand that they contract an annual abonnement of 1.4 million livres for the two taxes their opposition was unanimous.110 Rather than accept, the Estates voted to send deputies to present their remonstrances to the minister.111 The governor had secret instructions to drop the matter if he encountered serious resistance, but before he abandoned his efforts he asked the three presidents to prepare a memorandum outlining what they thought the assembly would accept.112 In their response, the presidents admitted that currently 1,456,000 livres was paid for the capitation and dixi`eme combined.113 However, they stressed the fact that the province had borrowed a total of fourteen million livres to assist the crown, and it was exhausted by the effects of war and natural disaster. They concluded that ‘the Estates will offer with pleasure an annual sum of 800,000 livres’ for the forthcoming triennalit´e. To accomplish the task, they requested that the ´elus receive ‘the same power and authority as the intendant has for the dixi`eme’. This was not quite a return to the pre-1674 system of bargaining with conditions, but it was very close and it helps to explain why Desmarets abandoned his scheme. On 1 September 1715 Louis XIV died, bringing the curtain down on a reign that had been more costly than glorious. To pay for his military adventures, the king had exploited just about every conceivable fiscal 109 110 111 112 113

AN G7 165, fols. 215–16, the duc de Bourbon to Desmarets, May 1715. Ibid ., see the letters of the duc de Bourbon and the bishop of Autun to Desmarets, May 1715. ADCO C 3001, fol. 281, and C 3042, fol. 278. AN G7 165, fol. 220, the duc de Bourbon to Desmarets, 20 May 1715. Ibid ., fol. 300, ‘M´emoire sur la proposition du trait´e pour la suppression du 10e et de la capitation de la Bourgogne, et les pays de Bresse, Bugey et Gex’. Their figures of 600,000 livres for the capitation and 865,000 livres for the dixi`eme also included the contribution of the pays adjacent.

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expedient, and Burgundy had felt the resulting pressure in a variety of ways. New direct taxes had been accompanied by constant demands for the ‘buy out’ of unwanted edicts, the payment of secours extraordinaire, loans and the provision of the military ´etapes. Yet for all the dramatic increase in the fiscal burden, there was no public resistance comparable to that of 1658. There are a number of important and mutually reinforcing factors behind the relatively quiescent attitude of the Estates. Perhaps most importantly, the character and governing style of Louis XIV would have loomed large in the minds of those inclined to oppose his demands. Current historiography stresses the Sun King’s ability to manage the interests and flatter the egos of provincial elites. We should not forget that he could also be ruthless. The harsh punishment meted out to the Estates and Parlement of Brittany after the revolt of 1675 offered a salutary lesson for anyone dreaming of a return to the days of the Fronde.114 It is also likely that the temper of the Estates was moderated by the conversion of the previously elective post of mayor into a venal office in 1692. The subsequent purchase of those offices by the Estates meant that the deputies of the third estate, who were traditionally the most vigorous opponents of increased taxation, were now more closely controlled than ever before. As the fiscal demands rained down on the province, any mayor brave enough to raise his head above the parapet risked being quickly brought to heel by either the ´elus or the governor. The immense prestige and influence of the Cond´e was another factor ensuring compliance, as any opposition to their wishes was almost as great a sin as challenging the king. Finally, what guaranteed that the relationship between Louis XIV and the Estates would survive all of the stresses and strains of a tumultuous reign were the benefits that Burgundian elites derived from the financial system, something that becomes very clear when we turn to the question of how the Estates paid for the taxes, ‘buy outs’ and other fiscal demands of the crown. w h e re t h e m o n ey we n t If we can be reasonably precise about the causes of the increased expenditure of the Estates during the reign of Louis XIV, it is important to remember that not all the money raised actually left the province. When the alcades produced their remarques for the Estates of 1691, they took care to consider the problem in detail.115 They divided expenditure into three distinct 114 115

Collins, Classes, estates, and order, pp. 249–70. ADCO C 3041, fols. 36–42. The remarques themselves are examined in greater depth in Swann, ‘War and finance’, pp. 303–12.

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32%

52%

16% Crown

Province and people

individuals

Figure 6.3 Expenditure of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689–91

categories: payments to the royal treasury, spending to the ‘advantage of the people and the embellishment of the province’ and charges ‘to the profit of individuals’ (see figure 6.3).116 According to their calculations, overall spending for the triennalit´e of 1689–91 amounted to 7,455,715 livres of which some 3,867,251 livres, or 51.87 per cent, was consumed by payments to the royal treasury.117 A variety of smaller sums were also included, notably the 99,144 livres paid in gages to the mar´echauss´ee and the coureurs de poste and 20,928 livres contributed towards the cost of repairing the chˆateaux of Chalon-surSaˆone and Auxonne. The alcades were rarely so precise in their remarques, but it is possible to compare the figures from 1689–91 with those for 1706–8 presented at the Estates of 1709.118 Total spending for 1706–8 was estimated at 12,504,439 livres, with 6,871,650 livres, or 55 per cent, passing into ‘the coffers of the king’.119 Although the sums involved had increased, the actual proportion paid to the crown had only risen slightly, and there is no reason to believe that the figures of 1691 and 1709 were exceptional. The second account identified by the alcades of 1691, that described as spending to the ‘advantage of the people and the embellishment of the 116 117 118

119

ADCO C 3041, fol. 36–42. This figure includes those sums passed to, or collected by, the receveurs des finances, receveur g´en´eral du taillon and the tr´esorier extraordinaire des guerres. ADCO C 3042, fols. 154–5. For once the alcades had the good sense to prepare their remarques using the final year of the previous triennalit´e together with the first two years of that for which they were responsible. By acting in this fashion, they could supply more accurate information than would normally be the case. ADCO C 3042, fol. 156.

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province’120 amounted to 1,181,774 livres, or 15.85 per cent, of expenditure as a whole, most of which went directly to reimburse the military ´etapes. During the triennalit´e of 1689–91, no less than 892,570 livres (12 per cent) of total spending was consumed in this fashion, a figure comparable to the 1,172,511 livres (9 per cent) recorded between 1706 and 1708.121 With the ´etapes proving so costly, only modest funds were left over between 1689–91 for other projects such as the repair and upkeep of roads and public buildings (208,551 livres), the commissioning of an equestrian statue of Louis XIV (50,000 livres) and the maintenance of the royal stud in the province (23,000 livres).122 As for the third category of spending, that ‘to the profit of individuals’, it amounted to an impressive 2,406,690 livres (32.28 per cent of overall spending) for the triennalit´e of 1689–91, a pattern repeated between 1706–8 when 4,460,278 livres (36 per cent of overall spending) fell into this category.123 The final destination of these huge sums says much about the Burgundian fiscal system under Louis XIV. In 1691, nearly half of the money described as ‘to the profit of individuals’ was required to cover interest payments on the provincial debt,124 and although precise figures are missing for 1706 to 1708 there is every reason to believe that they would have been substantially higher. Of the remainder, some 233,045 livres was allocated to the pensions, gifts and salaries paid by the Estates, 154,673 livres was needed to pay the fees of the ´elus, 78,060 livres for those of the treasurer general and the provincial receivers and 122,079 livres was paid to the officers of the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon. An additional 97,670 livres was needed to meet the costs incurred in the collection of the crues de sel and the levy of the militia.125 Finally, the alcades acknowledged the existence of approximately 150,000 livres of spending of a miscellaneous nature. The remarques prepared by the alcades are far from perfect, but whatever their shortcomings, they do supply a valuable insight into the nature of provincial expenditure, demonstrating that a high proportion of the money raised was spent within the province. As in Languedoc, a substantial slice of provincial revenue passed directly into the pockets of members of the Estates and local officeholders.126 Moreover, as Louis XIV’s wars drove spending ever higher there had been ample opportunity for those within 120 122 124

125

121 ADCO C 3042, fol. 157. ADCO C 3041, fol. 39. 123 Ibid., fols. 39–40, and C 3042, fol. 157. ADCO C 3041, fols. 38–9. As these were payments on loans raised to meet the financial demands of the king, they might legitimately be added to the first category of payments to the royal treasury. The alcades were clearly influenced by the fact that the money was paid to individual investors, most of whom belonged to local elites. 126 Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 245–78. ADCO C 3041, fols. 39–40.

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1% 3%

24%

61% 11%

Taxation

Crues

Borrowing

Octrois

Miscellaneous

Figure 6.4 Revenue of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689–91

the charmed circle of the Estates to take financial advantage by investing in the expanding provincial debt. For these elites, war, whatever its other inconveniences, was profitable and to understand why it is necessary to examine how the Estates raised money. p rov i n c i a l reve n u e s As figure 6.1 demonstrates, the seemingly inexorable rise of provincial expenditure was matched by a simultaneous increase in revenue. In their remarques of 1691, the alcades identified five main sources of income and these are represented in figure 6.4.127 By far the most important source of revenue was direct taxation, and as the ´elus were responsible for levying the taille and, after 1701, the capitation there was, in theory, no reason why they could not just increase the burden on ordinary taxpayers. During the triennalit´e of 1688–91, the ´elus levied some 4,387,351 livres in taille, which represented 61 per cent of total income. To calculate this figure, the alcades had almost certainly consulted the taille rolls drawn up by the ´elus, which match very closely and this raises a very awkward problem.128 The rolls drawn up in the comfort of the chamber of ´elus were a poor reflection of what was actually collected in the towns and villages of the 127

ADCO C 3041, fols. 40–1.

128

ADCO C 3041, fol. 41, and C 4879–81.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

84 16 86 16 88 16 90 16 92 16 94 16 96 16 98 17 00 17 02 17 04 17 06 17 08 17 10 17 12 17 14

82

Figure 6.5

16

80

16

76

74

72

70

78

16

16

16

16

16

16

16

68

0

Taille levied in Burgundy, 1668–1715

province. The figures provided by the alcades were, therefore, estimates of what the revenue of the Estates should have been, and for the accounts to tally it was necessary to await the final receipts from the receivers. If the taille rolls need to be treated with caution, they nevertheless offer an insight into the fiscal policies of the ´elus and how they sought to meet the costs of Louis XIV’s wars. Figure 6.5 reveals the amount of taille levied for the period 1677 to 1715.129 Towards the end of the Dutch War, in 1677, the ´elus set the taille at 1,610,988 livres, a burden that fell slightly with an annual average of 1.45 million livres imposed in the relatively peaceful decade between 1678 and 1688.130 These sums are similar to those levied in 1668 and 1671 (1.4 and 1.44 million livres respectively), and, as we might expect, the two great wars at the end of the reign did see the burden increase. After 1689, it never fell below 1.4 million livres, and during the Nine Years War it averaged 1,708,044 livres. When the Peace of Ryswick brought a temporary respite, the ´elus were quick to reduce the taille, which had fallen to the comparatively modest rate of 1,423,821 livres by 1700. The War of the Spanish Succession saw the resumption of the upward curve, and more than two million livres were levied in the ill-fated year of 1709 and the taille peaked at 2,361,274 livres in 1712. 129

ADCO C 4854–905.

130

ADCO C 4867–78.

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183

Nor was the taille the only threat to the purses of Burgundian taxpayers. After 1695, they were obliged to pay the capitation, and the weight of the new tax fell heavily on the taillables. The duchy and comt´es were liable for 820,000 livres of the abonnement of one million livres paid by the g´en´eralit´e of Dijon as a whole. According to the terms of the letters patent of 1701, 400,000 livres was raised in loans using the rights to the octrois on the river Saˆone.131 The government also stipulated that the ´elu of the order and four gentlemen chosen by the governor would impose 52,500 livres on the province’s nobility. The officers of the Parlement of Dijon were assessed at 43,404 livres and an additional 64,202 livres was to be collected from the other courts and officeholders in the province. The remaining sum of 273,934 livres fell on to the taillables, and thereafter it gradually increased reaching a peak of 362,934 livres in 1714.132 When combined with the taille (for which it was effectively a surtax) the increase is even more striking, and in the peak year of 1712 they sought to raise a combined sum of 2,660,741 livres. Fortunately for the taillables, the sharp depreciation of the livre after 1688 reduced the impact by perhaps as much as one third. Yet even if the net increase was less dramatic than the data might at first suggest, its effects should not be dismissed in the light of the more unfavourable economic climate of the period. Finally, the province’s taxpayers found themselves pursued on another front after 1710, with the introduction of the dixi`eme whose combined rolls were estimated at 691,554 livres in 1717.133 It was the taillables who bore the brunt of taxation, and the privileged had been assessed for a combined sum of just 160,106 livres in the original abonnement of the capitation 1701. They were quick to complain, and the Parlement of Dijon was pleading poverty in 1707 in order to explain arrears of 6,302 livres on its capitation payments.134 Help was soon at hand for the province’s wealthiest taxpayers. When Desmarets persuaded the Estates to pay 2.4 million livres in order to ‘buy out’ of part of the abonnement to the capitation of 1710, the subsequent fiscal reorganisation was totally to their advantage. The abonnement of the duchy and comt´es fell to 420,000 livres, and the portion allotted to the nobility was reduced from 52,500 livres to just 31,000 livres in 1714.135 The magistrates of the Parlement of Dijon had already seen their assessment cut by a sixth since 1703, and the other provincial officeholders also benefited from the new arrangement. The taillables were less fortunate. Despite the reduction in the overall cost 131 134 135

132 ADCO C 5701. 133 ADCO C 5808. ADCO C 5573. ADCO C 5573. To be fair to the parlementaires, Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements, pp. 67–124, has shown that they were subject to a financial squeeze. ADCO C 5573, deliberation of 14 November 1713.

184

Provincial power and absolute monarchy 5%

3%

5%

56%

31%

Taxation

Borrowing

Crues

Octrois

Miscellaneous

Figure 6.6 Revenue of the Estates of Burgundy, 1706–8

of the abonnement they saw their tax assessment increase! Between 1701 and 1710 approximately 300,000 livres had been levied in capitation on this group, but by 1715 it had increased to 358,286 livres.136 The conclusion seems inescapable. The reduction in the abonnement of the capitation had been of no benefit at all to the taillables. When confronted by the unprecedented fiscal demands of Louis XIV, the Estates had continued to draw a substantial proportion of their revenues from direct taxation, something which contrasts sharply with the situation in Brittany.137 There the Estates relied heavily upon the indirect taxation of wine, and it will come as no surprise to learn that the Burgundians preferred to look for their funds elsewhere. However, direct taxation on its own was not enough to meet the Estates financial engagements. During the three years from 1706–8, the ´elus levied 7,048,499 livres in taille and capitation, but overall expenditure was colossal, reaching 12,504,439 livres.138 As we can see in figure 6.6, taxation was only covering 56 per cent of expenditure, and it had fallen slightly as a proportion of revenue from 1689–91, when 4,387,351 livres (60 per cent) had been raised from that source.139 136 138

137 Collins, Classes, estates, and order, pp. 229–48. ADCO C 5688–702. 139 ADCO C 3041, fols. 40–1. ADCO C 3042, fols. 155–6.

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To make up the shortfall, the Estates had other sources of income. Amongst the most important of these were the crues levied on salt sold in the province. Although the members of the Parlement of Dijon and other important privileged groups, notably the major religious houses, were exempt, the tax base of the crues was far wider than that of the taille.140 Moreover, indirect taxation on a staple commodity guaranteed a steady income. Throughout the period after 1688, the Estates were granted crues of forty sols and fifty sols, which produced nine livres per minot sold.141 In 1694, the king created a further crue of ten sols which was given to the Estates in perpetuity in 1697 in return for a payment of 352,000 livres.142 The crues provided a substantial income during the triennalit´e of 1689–91, producing an estimated 833,321 livres, and the comparable figure for 1706–8 was 605,082 livres.143 Predictably returns were declining slightly during the difficult years of the early eighteenth century, but the crues still produced in the region of 250,000–300,000 livres annually between 1689 and 1715. The octrois levied on the river Saˆone represented a third significant source of revenue. First granted to the Estates in 1689, these rights had been increased in 1691 and were subsequently prolonged at various intervals throughout the remainder of the reign.144 Once in possession of the octrois, the Estates auctioned the lease to syndicates of tax farmers, receiving a guaranteed income in the process. The annual lease was worth 175,000 livres in 1691, rose to 212,000 livres between 1697 and 1703 and then remained at 205,000 livres until 1716. However, recouping the money was not always trouble free. The king’s habit of issuing passports providing free passage for those supplying his armies via the river was a frequent cause of legal wrangling between the ´elus and the tax farmers about the question of compensation. These were the principal sources of revenue, but the alcades occasionally referred to other sums that had found their way into the coffers of the Estates. In 1691, for example, they cited a total of 247,134 livres to be recovered from ‘individuals and free funds’,145 while in their remarques of 1709 the alcades referred to 96,647 livres of ‘free funds’, and a ‘remittance of His Majesty’.146 These were unpredictable windfalls and, while welcome, they did not have much bearing on the financial activities of the provincial 140 141 142 143 144 145

ADCO C 2982, fol. 15, and Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, pp. 149–50. A minot was the equivalent to seventy-two litres or 100 livres in weight. ADCO C 2982, fol. 388. ADCO C 3041, fol. 41, and C 3042, fols. 155–6. The figure for 1706–8 includes an advance of 100,000 livres from the new tax farmers. ADCO C 3136, deliberation of 23 June 1691. 146 ADCO C 3042, fols. 155–6. ADCO C 3041, fols. 41–2

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administration. Instead it was the crues and the octrois that together provided the key to the Burgundian response to Louis XIV’s fiscal demands. While the annual income of approximately 500,000 livres generated by indirect taxation would not make up the shortfall between revenues from direct taxation and total spending, what it could do was supply the credit needed to borrow. According to the alcades of 1691, the Estates had raised 879,000 livres during the triennalit´e, and they also referred to an existing capital from loans of 902,600 livres which, when combined, meant that 1,785,600 livres (24.22 per cent) of provincial income came from borrowing.147 There was nothing exceptional about these figures. The alcades of 1694 calculated that in 1693 borrowing produced 1,341,200 livres, an impressive 32 per cent of income for that year, while the remarques of 1697 recorded loans of 1,757,460 livres in 1696, representing some 42 per cent of income. In 1709, the alcades identified a total of 3,863,511 livres (31 per cent) of borrowing in their estimate of 12,494,670 livres of revenue for the years 1706–8.148 The validity of treating borrowing as a principal source of revenue could be disputed, but there is no doubt that the system was effective. In the period before 1688, the Estates had little trouble keeping a sense of balance in their financial affairs. The alcades of 1679 noted that the debt stood at 1,124,550 livres, and they were optimistic about the prospects of reducing that burden. They noted that the: two crues of salt of 50 sols produce an estimated 123,750 livres which, after deducting the interest payments of 56,227 livres, leaves only the sum of 67,522 livres to subtract from the principal, leaving 1,047,027 livres.149

They continued the exercise for 1681 and 1682, when the current rights to the crues were due to expire, anticipating a reduction in the debt to just over 800,000 livres. Any unexpected royal demands for a ‘buy out’ or other contribution would have quickly invalidated their calculations, but in 1679, the crues of fifty sols were sufficient in themselves to pay the interest on the debt, and to reimburse a portion of the outstanding capital. That allowed the Estates to use the crues of forty sols to pay towards the cost of the don gratuit, thus reducing the weight of the taille in the process.150 It was for this reason that the voting of the don gratuit at the assemblies of the Estates was followed almost immediately by pleas for the governor to 147

148 150

ADCO C 3041, fol. 41. The phrase ‘plusieurs principaux que la province devoit auparavant’ is admittedly odd, but the alcades did treat the sum of 902,600 livres as if it was the proceeds of an earlier loan. 149 ADCO C 3049, fol. 49. ADCO C 3042, fol. 155. ADCO C 2997, fols. 93–5. This was not an isolated instance, a similar calculation was made in 1668, ADCO C 2997, fols. 93–5.

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use his good offices to secure an extension of their rights to the crues. A convention gradually became established that the king would accord these rights for three years, although it could occasionally be longer. Ideally the revenue from the crues should have marched in step with the don gratuit, with both covering the same triennalit´e. Such a happy equilibrium seemed to be in sight in February 1685, and Henri-Jules was hopeful that all four would expire in 1688 and that balance would be achieved.151 That was the last occasion when such hopes could be entertained. Despite the additional resources provided by the octrois, the subsequent fiscal pressure saw the proceeds of both rights pledged for years in advance. Thus at the Estates of 1688, the crues of forty and fifty sols were extended until the end of 1692, and by 1700 both had been consumed until the end of 1707. Thereafter, the pace accelerated. By the Estates of 1709, the revenues had been pledged until the end of 1719, and at the final assembly of the reign in 1715 all four crues were granted until the end of 1732. In the case of the octrois, the situation was even more dramatic. They had initially been granted for five years in 1691, and by 1700 they had been prolonged until the end of 1707. During the War of the Spanish Succession their money raising potential was exploited to its limits, and by 1710 the prospective proceeds from 1748 had been pledged to cover borrowing! Thus by the end of the Sun King’s reign future revenues had, in effect, been spent for decades in advance. Every time the crown had demanded a new ‘buy out’, or some other form of financial contribution, the ´elus had raised new loans using either the crues or the octrois as collateral. In the vast majority of cases, the interest charged on these loans was then added to the taille. Not surprisingly, the provincial debt had grown almost exponentially. At the end of the Dutch War in 1679, the alcades had estimated that the Estates owed 1.12 million livres.152 At the Estates of 1715, the presidents of the three chambers informed the governor that the debt now exceeded fourteen million livres.153 With both the crues and the octrois already assigned to repay creditors until 1732 and 1748 respectively, the enormous cost of Louis XIV’s wars becomes clear. Massive borrowing was the key to the finance of the Estates, and their ability to raise so much money at comparatively low rates of interest in a period of war and natural disaster requires further explanation.154 Most of their loans were floated at 5 per cent, and if wartime pressures caused 151 152 153 154

BMD MS 2239, fols. 146–7, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 22 February 1685. ADCO C 3041, fols. 45–9. AN G7 165, fol. 300, ‘M´emoire sur la proposition du trait´e pour la suppression du 10e et de la capitation de la Bourgogne, et les pays de Bresse, Bugey et Gex’. Potter, ‘Good offices’, should also be consulted.

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this to rise to 6 per cent, the return of peace was enough to allow their prompt reimbursement in favour of new contracts at the lower rate.155 Confidence was the essential ingredient in the success of the Estates. Despite the almost continual borrowing, the provincial administration never failed to make prompt and complete payments of the interest on the rentes of their creditors. Moreover, every year the ´elus ordered the reimbursement of part of the debt using the income from the crues and the octrois. Those who lent to the Estates could be confident that if they subscribed to a loan the eventual repayment of their capital was assured and that in the intervening period they would receive their interest payments. There was no need to fear that the necessary revenues would be diverted elsewhere, as was so often the case with the crown. By raising loans quickly and cheaply, the Estates had provided a valuable service for Louis XIV, and as the debt expanded and the fiscal system became progressively more complex, they proved to be tenacious defenders of their reputation for fiscal integrity. Any attempt by the crown to meddle with their credit structure provoked strong protests. Thus in 1700, a royal declaration confiscating half of the profits of the crue of twenty sols, bought in perpetuity only a few years earlier, forced the ´elus to make furious protests to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral.156 With some justification they argued that the loss of these revenues, which had been assigned to the repayment of the 352,000 livres borrowed to finance the original purchase, risked undermining confidence. The battle was lost on this occasion, but it was very much the exception and the Estates had realised that they needed to defend their credit at almost any price. When famine threatened after the terrible winter of 1709, Louis XIV suspended the octrois on the river Saˆone in order to allow the free passage of grain and other essentials. A measure designed to alleviate suffering and keep the king’s armies supplied had threatened to undermine the Estates’ credit at a crucial moment. The reaction of the Estates and the governor was instructive; they united to demand the re-establishment of the octrois to restore investor confidence.157 Louis III de Bourbon, who was in Dijon for the assembly of 1709, captured the general mood in a letter to Desmarets, arguing that the octrois ‘assure all [of ] the credit of this province, without which it will collapse completely and once there is mistrust it will be impossible to borrow.158 155 156 157 158

ADCO C 3145, fols. 451, 497–8, deliberations of 28 August and 18 November 1700. ADCO C 3144, fol. 58, the ´elus to Rigoley, 4 January 1700. AN G7 162, fol. 281, Louis III de Bourbon to Desmarets, 19 July 1709, and ibid., fols. 289, 312–13. Ibid ., fol. 289, Louis III de Bourbon to Desmarets, 29 July 1709.

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These protests eventually bore fruit, and the octrois were restored and the crisis passed, leaving only legal squabbles about compensation with the tax farmers in its wake. It is true that at the very end of Louis XIV’s reign the system began to show signs of strain. With some 5.8 million livres borrowed between 1710 and 1715 alone, the ´elus were increasingly tempted to tolerate the expedient of raising loans without assigning revenues for their future reimbursement. At the Estates of 1712, this practice was denounced by the alcades, and similar concerns were voiced at the meeting of 1715.159 To resolve the problem, they suggested increasing the taille by 100,000 livres annually in order to repay ‘unassigned rentes’.160 As with many of their remarques, the alcades were obliged to repeat their demands before action was taken, but the mere presence of these criticisms of financial malpractice was a further source of reassurance for investors. As many of the principal lenders sat in the chamber of ´elus, or the Estates, there was every reason to believe that the long-term solvency of the financial system would be protected. t h e p rov i n c i a l i n ve s tor s For those with funds to spare the Estates represented a sound investment. During the difficult years after 1688, there were few opportunities to make a guaranteed, risk free annual return of five or six per cent. Investors literally flocked to the Estates in the hope of placing their money, forcing the ´elus to try and end the practice. In a deliberation of August 1700, they declared that: having been informed that several individuals, foreseeing the loans that we are obliged to raise on behalf of the province, have transported substantial sums to the Hˆotel of sieur Chartraire, treasurer general of the Estates, in the expectation that their deposit will force [him] to employ these sums in the said loans, have deliberated that the sieur Chartraire shall neither receive nor take responsibility for any monies to be employed for loans . . . [before] they have been authorised, and the deliberation[s] of the sums, and the individuals from whom they are to be taken, have been signed by the said ´elus.161

The Estates were thus in the remarkable position of being able to turn away eager investors, and those lucky enough to profit from the system were the ´elus themselves, the permanent officers and members of the Estates and local elites. In 1700, the ´elus were busily contracting loans for a series of ‘buy outs’ and were simultaneously replacing wartime loans with new borrowing at a 159

ADCO C 3042, fols. 231, 304.

160

Ibid., fol. 304.

161

ADCO C 3145, fol. 460.

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lower rate of interest. As they did so, they received a letter from the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, who was anxious to remind them of certain obligations.162 He warned them to watch out for the interests of the marquise de Croissy, who the governor himself had promised to assist.163 Rigoley added that ‘M. de Xaintrailles [a former ´elu and first gentlemen of the governor] has asked me if you would be so kind as to leave his reimbursement to another time, I will not speak of my own affairs, nor those of my relatives, because I am sure that you will have the goodness to do everything you can’. Preferential treatment for those intimately connected with the Estates, or for the friends and favourites of the governor was a pronounced feature of the system. In addition to helping the marquise de Croissy, the governor was simultaneously pressing the bishop of Autun to accept investments of 60,000 livres from both the comte d’Estr´ees and Mlle de Noailles.164 The ´elus could not refuse the governor’s request, but the results were not always as rewarding as his cronies had expected. In a letter to his trusted lieutenant, Rigoley, Henri-Jules grumbled that his efforts to help place the funds of the comtesse de Grammont had not been well received by the ´elus.165 At first they had protested, and ‘when they resolved to accept it they invested it as badly as they possibly could’. The ´elus were unhappy that the governor had tried to arrange preferential terms for the comtesse, but their reluctance to accept her money was part of a more general prejudice against courtiers.166 Whenever possible, loans were contracted locally and from amongst a narrow circle of lenders, as we can see if we examine the system in depth.167 The registers of the ´elus record details of 829,697 livres that were borrowed in twelve separate instalments during 1700. Of that sum, 248,675 (30 per cent) was lent by the ´elus, permanent officers and other employees of the Estates, while 371,000 livres (45 per cent) was provided by members of either the Parlement or the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon. In these lists, the names of ´elus, such as Roquette, Xaintrailles and Choiseul, feature alongside those of the Estates’ permanent officers, notably Chartraire, Rigoley and Lamy, and members of the illustrious robe dynasties of Bouchu, Bouhier and Macheco. As for the outstanding 210,014 livres, much of that came from 162 163 164 165 166 167

Ibid ., fols. 153–5, Rigoley to the ´elus, 3 February 1700. Ibid ., and BMD MS 2240, fol. 73. Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 24 March 1699. ADCO C 3143, fols. 161–2, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, January 1698. BMD MS 2239, fol. 292, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 10 August 1690. For a good example of their attitude, see ADCO C 3161, fols. 256–7, the ´elus to Voysin, 12 August 1715. The following is based upon an examination of the loans contracted in 1700 and on the interest paid, or capital reimbursed, on existing rentes during that year, ADCO C 3145. For a more thorough examination of the debt over the period as a whole see Potter and Rosenthal, ‘Politics and public finance’, and their ‘The Burgundian estates’ bond market’ as well as Potter, ‘Good offices’.

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familiar sources, including various scions of the Chartraire and Th´esut clans and the religious houses and hospitals of the province. These figures were representative of a more general pattern, as an examination of the interest paid on a portion of the province’s debt at the end of December 1700 makes clear. The ´elus issued instructions for payment of interest on some 2,997,600 livres of debt, of which 597,000 livres (20 per cent) was owed to the ´elus, permanent officers and their immediate families. Another 1,205,200 livres (40 per cent) had been borrowed from the members of the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and Bureau des Finances of Dijon, and 238,301 livres (8 per cent) from the religious houses and hospitals of Burgundy. These figures underestimate the lending by the first two groups, as only those creditors whose affiliation was clearly stated have been included. That left 957,099 livres (32 per cent) which had been provided by members of the extended families of the above, and by a wider cross section of the public. Amongst these were intimates of the governor, notably Jean Th´esut de Ragy who alone had 76,500 livres invested, and courtiers such as Claude Charlotte de Grandmont, the duc de Lauzun and the comte d’Estr´ees whose combined investment totalled 170,000 livres. Yet, despite the presence of these aristocrats, it is striking that all but the tiniest fraction of the lenders recorded in 1700 were Burgundians, and the presence of the ´elus, permanent officers and leading members of the Estates and sovereign courts of Dijon was overwhelming.168 They were able to profit from the great expansion of the debt at the end of the seventeenth century, and while it would not prevent the Estates from driving a hard bargain in their negotiations with the crown, the benefits of the fiscal system almost certainly contributed to the lack of serious opposition after 1688. The continued expansion of the debt in the eighteenth century widened the circle of those lending to the Estates, and, in their impressive studies of the subject, Potter and Rosenthal have demonstrated that the credit network spread well beyond the province itself. However, at the end of Louis XIV’s reign the idea that lending to the Estates should be a local prerogative was widespread, which speaks volumes for the creditworthiness of the Estates. During the long and phenomenally expensive reign of Louis XIV, the Estates of Burgundy had developed a fiscal structure whose principal features would remain intact until 1789. At the beginning of his personal rule, the king had confronted an institution long accustomed to resisting his fiscal demands by haggling over the size of the don gratuit, or by deliberately 168

Presumably offering some compensation to the parlementaires who were suffering financially on other fronts, Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements, pp. 67–124.

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delaying payments to the royal treasury. Only gradually did the pattern change as Louis XIV and Colbert took advantage of the relatively peaceful and prosperous decade after 1661 to establish a more harmonious relationship with the Estates. The king’s memoirs provide an enduring testament to the ideal of a beneficent monarch ruling his obedient Estates through the exercise of paternal generosity and good faith. There was some truth in this rosy picture, and the Sun King’s initial success in ending the haggling and procrastination of earlier times owed much to his conscious policy of rewarding obedience. Once war returned to darken the horizon after 1672, there was no revival of public resistance to the king’s fiscal policies, even when he broke the good intentions contained in his memoirs. Yet, this should not be taken as evidence that the Estates had been silenced, or that they were simply content to bask in the rays of the Sun King. As he grew older, Louis XIV was increasingly intolerant of dissent, and to oppose his wishes in wartime was to court disaster. Instead, the ´elus and the Estates, ably assisted by the governor, learnt new techniques of bargaining with the ministry. Usually abonnements, or ‘buy outs’, could be negotiated with at least the compensation of some form of aid, such as the rights to the crues or octrois. Nor were the Estates frightened of refusing the crown’s terms if it proved reluctant to reduce its demands. In the context of the times it is doubtful if much more was possible, especially once the effects of venality had reduced the scope for opposition within the traditionally belligerent third estate. Another major cause of the relative calm of the Estates in the face of the fiscal onslaught after 1688 was the growth of the provincial debt and the development of its credit structure. After 1688, the Estates demonstrated that representative institutions could be of immense value to the absolute monarchy. Rather than impose unacceptable levels of taxation and risk a return to the fiscal revolts of the Thirty Years War, the crown obliged the Estates to borrow on its behalf. Crucially by alienating the revenues from the crues, octrois and, after 1710, direct taxation, it provided the means to underwrite those loans. The Estates were happy to accept the bargain, as their influence and prestige was reinforced while their members and other provincial elites were the principal beneficiaries of a sound investment opportunity. As many of those investors controlled the fiscal administration of the province, there were good grounds for public confidence. As the intendant, Harlay, explained in a letter to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Pontchartrain, in a letter of May 1687, they:169 169

AN G7 157, fol. 55, Harlay to Pontchartrain, 19 May 1687.

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keep such a strict account of all the expenditure of the province, from the largest to the most insignificant, never authorizing any [payment] without [an] ordinance registered by the ´elus, [that] there is nothing of this type of which the king could not be informed in an instant if it so pleased you.

Burgundian elites could thus relax content in the knowledge that they would receive regular interest payments and the eventual reimbursement of their capital. The War of the Spanish Succession would begin the process of widening and deepening the province’s credit networks, something that itself would be possible because of earlier success. Amidst the financial ruins of 1715, the Estates could reflect on the fact that they had proved their continuing utility and, unlike the crown, they had survived the reign of Louis XIV with their reputation for financial integrity intact.

chapter 7

Provincial administration in an age of iron, 1661–1715

In the face of the relentless fiscal pressure exerted by the government of Louis XIV, the Estates of Burgundy had proved effective in protecting their own privileges and the interests of local elites. Bargaining over taxation, contracting loans and securing concessions from the crown were, however, only part of the story. Once these matters had been settled, it was the responsibility of the chamber of ´elus to supervise the collection of tax revenues and to cope with any problems arising from, for example, the provision of military ´etapes, or the raising of the militia. They were also expected to meet the challenge posed by a series of emergencies, notably the subsistence crises caused by the harsh climatic conditions of the late seventeenth century. It was a demanding brief, and the only historian to have examined the provincial administration in detail during this period was damning in his assessment of its actions. Citing the criticisms contained in the various remarques of the alcades and conseils des ´etats, Thomas wrote scathingly of the incompetence of the ´elus.1 He claimed that the provincial administration was a lethargic and hidebound institution, arguing that ‘all the great administrative projects, the stud, manufacturing, the forests, the canals, the bridges and highways, would have remained in neglect if the central government had not pushed and prodded the sloth and ignorance of the provincial government’.2 As for the fiscal administration, it was, if anything, worse, and he fulminated against what he termed the ‘brutal and blind methods of the fisc’,3 adding that ‘in no other province, and perhaps at no other time, has the levy of taxation cost what it cost then in Burgundy’.4 The local administration certainly contained abuses, and it was frequently guilty of acting unwisely, but such a sweeping condemnation needs taking with a pinch of salt. Writing in the political context of the 1840s, Thomas was determined to 1 2

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 133–4, 141–3. 3 Ibid., p. 143. 4 Ibid., p. 141. Ibid., pp. 133–4.

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prove the virtues of a strong centralised state. From such an ideological standpoint, the provincial estates were a troublesome anachronism whose shortcomings he was anxious to highlight. Many of his conclusions are open to challenge, and Pierre de Saint Jacob, although not primarily concerned with the Estates, did hint in his classic study of the Burgundian peasantry that the picture was less black and white.5 This study shares that conviction, and after an interval of more than 150 years the conduct of the provincial administration is ripe for re-evaluation. t h e ta i l l e Before the introduction of the capitation in 1695, direct taxation in France was synonymous with the taille, which, in Burgundy, included the monies raised for local purposes as well as those paid to the crown. The ´elus were responsible for tax collection, and once they had agreed the total to be levied they divided it amongst the communities of the province. According to the terms of the ‘treaties’ signed between the Estates and the ´etats particuliers of the comt´es, the Mˆaconnais contributed one-twelfth of the overall total, the Charolais one-twenty-fourth and Bar-sur-Seine a sixtieth.6 The ´elus in Dijon sent commissions to the local administrations, which were responsible for their own portion of the taille. The size of the contribution paid by the comt´es was a source of frequent squabbles, with the ´etats particuliers arguing consistently that the ´elus in Dijon overtaxed them.7 Not surprisingly, the ´elus rejected the charge, and to establish conclusively one way or another would require a study in its own right. However, when the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine was absorbed into the administration of the duchy in 1721 there was no dramatic change in the scale of its fiscal contribution.8 The demise of the ´etats particuliers of the Charolais in 1751, on the other hand, was followed by a significant increase in taxation. During the period from 1740 to 1751, a period dominated by the War of the Austrian Succession, the Charolais had seen its contribution to the taille vary from a low of 54,103 livres in 1741 to a high of 69,597 livres in 1748.9 In the decade after 1751, it never paid less than 81,000 livres, and in 1758 a tax of 97,761 livres was imposed.10 This was an impressive increase, even allowing 5 6 7 8 9

Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 173–209. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 216. Ibid., pp. 216–17. A good example is provided by the complaints of the deputies from the Charolais in 1697, ADCO C 2982, fols. 353–4. As the taille rolls of 1710–30 make clear, ADCO C 4900–20. 10 ADCO C 4942–51. ADCO C 4930–41.

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for the effects of the Seven Years War which began in 1756. It, therefore, seems reasonable to suggest that the complaints of the comt´es in the period before their union with the duchy formed part of a relatively successful strategy designed to minimise their share of the tax burden. It would also help to explain why the ´etats particuliers of the Mˆaconnais fought so hard to preserve their independence throughout the eighteenth century. Within the duchy, however, it was the chamber of ´elus that held sway, and it divided the taille amongst the different bailliages. Each community was, in turn, assessed on the basis of a system of feu, or hearth, and in the early seventeenth century the ´elus had regularly conducted ‘general visits’ of the province to ensure that they were properly informed about the property and income of the taillables. Once the rolls were complete, the ´elus issued the commissions for tax collection to the receivers in the various bailliages.11 Their ‘treaties’ stipulated that the taille was to be paid in twelve equal portions commencing on 1 February, for which they were paid fees for their services. While the receivers oversaw tax collection they relied heavily upon the cooperation of the local population, and in July of every year the ´elus sent a mandement to the different communities of the province whose assemblies elected both the assessors (ass´eeurs) and the collectors (collecteurs) of the taille.12 The assessors were expected to use a combination of local knowledge and the record of the existing tax rolls to divide up the burden. Once they had completed their task, the rolls were signed by the ´echevins and/or, two of the most respected taillables chosen from those present at the original election.13 A copy was then taken to the relevant receiver who in turn signified his approval before forwarding a copy to the ´elus. Once a given community’s taille had been set, the collectors were left with the unenviable task of knocking on doors in order to persuade their neighbours to part with their hard-earned cash.14 Not surprisingly, the office was viewed as ‘abject and contemptible’, and many of the wealthier taillables sought exemption.15 The only compensation for the collectors was the opportunity to retain a tiny fraction, usually a few deniers per livre, of the revenues that passed through their hands on route to the provincial receivers. The first half of the seventeenth century had seen France convulsed by almost constant tax revolts, and the lowly status of the collectors would probably have rendered their task impossible without the threat of coercion. 11 12 13

For further details, see: d’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 51–71; Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 142–63, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 134–41. D’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 100–2, and Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 103. 14 Ibid., pp. 207–13. 15 Ibid., p. 211. D’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, p. 111.

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Louis XIV’s restoration of order at a national level after 1661 undoubtedly helped, but for the Burgundian peasantry the application of the law of contrainte solidaire was a more immediate threat. The Parlement of Dijon had upheld the principle that an entire community was responsible for the taille in 1650,16 a decision that was regularly contested by the wealthiest taillables. As a result, in their remonstrances of 1665, the Estates requested a law confirming that the whole community, including those assessed for cotes d’office, should be subject to contrainte solidaire.17 The crown issued the necessary legislation on 24 November 1666, and a later declaration of 1710 upheld its principles.18 In effect, those who defaulted on their share of the tax risked the sale of their goods, or even prison, and it was this threat which helped to open doors to the collectors. Needless to say, it was the receivers themselves who benefited most from the business of tax collection. Provincial tax revenues flowed from their coffers into those of the treasurer general in Dijon, or in the case of the taillon and octroi ordinaire to the receveurs g´en´eraux des finances, who were royal officeholders independent of the Estates.19 The ´elus were expected to police the activities of both the treasurer general and the receivers in the bailliages by scrutinising their annual accounts (´etats au vrai). Finally, as elsewhere in the kingdom, it was the local Chambre des Comptes that was charged with verifying and approving the final accounts of the treasurer general and the receivers. Here, in essence, are the broad outlines of the Burgundian tax system, which has been accused of, amongst other things, arbitrariness, inequality, corruption and negligence.20 There is some substance to these claims, but there is also evidence that the degree of criticism has been excessive. s upe rv i s i o n o f ta x co l l e ct i o n Despite occasional disputes amongst legal experts, the taille in Burgundy was generally recognised to be personnelle, that is to say dependent upon the legal status of an individual, and was levied primarily on income from land, although other revenues could be taken into consideration. To work effectively, the system required accurate information about the wealth of taxpayers, and to gather that knowledge the ´elus were expected to undertake regular ‘general visits’ of the various towns and communities of the duchy. 16 18 20

17 ADCO C 3328, fol. 136. Root, Peasants and king, pp. 40–2. 19 D’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 224–5. ADCO C 4730. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 136–45, 216–17. Bouchard, ‘Comptes borgnes’, was equally scathing.

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The virtues of such a procedure are obvious, and yet it has been claimed that during the reign of Louis XIV they were carried out irregularly, if at all.21 General visits were, however, carried out in 1679, 1686 and 1689–90 and something very similar was enacted in 1700, and the ´elus were never completely inactive.22 Instead, they tended to replace the general survey with visits to individual communities, usually after receiving a request from the municipality or the local inhabitants.23 The town of Saulieu, for example, petitioned the Estates of 1688 for a visit on the basis that the town’s economic circumstances had much deteriorated since its last inspection.24 The request was approved along with several others of a similar nature, and within a few weeks the ´elus had acted, sending the ´elu du roi, Ba¨uyn, to Saulieu where he oversaw the visit. In effect, what they had ordered was the preparation of a nouveau pied de taille, namely a reassessment of the fiscal burden within a given community.25 This procedure had been authorised by an arrˆet du conseil of November 1666 (confirmed on 6 June 1667), which stipulated that prudhommes, or assessors be appointed to draft a new taille roll in the presence of a representative of the chamber of ´elus. After 1690, it appears that the chamber sought to substitute regular nouveaux pieds de taille for the more expensive general visits. While ultimately less effective, the procedure did improve the quality of the information at the disposal of the ´elus and helped to reduce the scope for fraud on the part of the wealthier taxpayers. Similar motives had led to the ´elus being granted the right to impose cotes d’office in 1641. If an individual was suspected of evading his fair share of the tax burden, for example by bribing or threatening the assessors, the ´elus had the right to fix his tax assessment by administrative fiat. Thus, in 1697, Jacques Goussard, a fermier from Arc-sur-Thil, was assessed by cote d’office on the basis that: Goussard had over several years made a large number of substantial purchases and that he was responsible for all of the commerce of the said community, and although they [the assessors] were permitted to increase his contribution to take account of his acquisitions they did not dare to act for fear that he would start a lawsuit against them.26 21 22 23 24 25

26

Arbassier, L’intendant Bouchu, p. 101, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 136–45. The visit of 1700 is discussed below. Examples include: Beaune (1668), ADCO C 2997, fol. 124; Avallon (1688), C 3133, fol. 398; Montbard (1692), C 3137, fol 389; Chalon-sur-Saˆone (1690), C 3135, fols. 48–9. ADCO C 2999, fols. 133–4. A useful history of the procedure in Burgundy is contained in a draft r`eglement prepared during the reign of Louis XVI, ADCO C 3452, ‘R`eglement du 1er f´evrier sur l’administration et r´egie des finances renouvell´e dans plusiers de ses dispositions par d´elib´eration du 19 f´evrier 1777’. ADCO C4957, bis, fol. 1.

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These details were contained in a requˆete signed by more than twenty local inhabitants and was accompanied by a report from Baudot, mayor of Dijon. Here was the classic justification of the cote d’office, namely that it offered a means of preventing wealthy taxpayers from using their influence to avoid paying their fair share of the taille. The potential benefits of the procedure persuaded the conseils des ´etats, in their remarques of 1700, to demand that the ´elus use cotes d’office when conducting visits in the duchy.27 Yet despite its apparent usefulness, it was not always a very accurate weapon. Most of the decisions to impose a cote were the result of denunciations from neighbours, and the veracity of their complaints is questionable to say the least. Moreover, taxpayers who wished to appeal had few options, as they were required to lodge their protest before the ´elus themselves, and if that was unsuccessful to seek justice before the king’s council. The evidence that survives suggests that the cote d’office was employed sparingly during the reign of Louis XIV, but that, as the eighteenth century progressed, it became a regular practice. One of the consequences was a series of angry confrontations with the Parlement of Dijon, which claimed the right to hear appeals itself, and increasingly complaints from those subject to what appeared to be the arbitrary authority of the ´elus.28 Whatever its practical deficiencies the cote d’office was intended to protect the ordinary taillables from the machinations of their wealthy neighbours. Similar motives lay behind the Estates’ repeated demands for a law restricting the opportunity for appeals against increases in taille assessments. The problem was stated succinctly in the remonstrances presented to Louis XIV in 1689. They declared that: as the frequent lawsuits, that the wealthiest inhabitants start almost daily in opposition to the surtax of the taille, ruin the best part of the communities of this province, which usually collapse under the expense, Your Majesty is very humbly beseeched to issue a declaration, stating that, in future, no inhabitant shall be heard in opposition to his taille, if he cannot justify by reference to the last roll that it has been increased by [at least] an eighth without good cause.29

Reducing the scope for opposition to their decisions was undoubtedly a tempting prospect for the ´elus, and in a litigious age their desire to cut the number of petty court cases was understandable. The call for a new law was repeated regularly thereafter without success, and it was not until 1719 that the crown finally issued the necessary arrˆet du conseil. The Parlement of Dijon promptly refused to register the necessary letters patent,30 and it was not until 1735 that a law was finally enforced which restricted 27 29

ADCO C 3000, fol. 154. ADCO C 3329, fol. 105.

28 30

These themes are examined in chapters 9 and 12. Presumably because they wished to hear any subsequent appeals.

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appeals against a ‘surtax’ to those whose liability had been increased by at least one-twelfth.31 The Estates were delighted with the arrˆet, and they petitioned successfully for its renewal at the beginning of every subsequent triennalit´e. Another important source of information available to the chamber of ´elus came from the requˆetes submitted by individuals and communities either directly, or via the assemblies of the Estates. Most were appeals for aid after frost, hail or some other natural calamity had destroyed property, crops or livestock. If the requˆete was accompanied by a proc`es verbal signed by the local seigneur, priest or municipal officer then it was likely to be approved. Thus in May 1688, the ´elus considered the plight of the villages of SaintMartin-de-Vaulx and Mercurey in the Chalonnais, whose vines had been stripped by hail. As the necessary paperwork was in order, the chamber instructed the local receiver ‘to treat the inhabitants and communities as quit of the sums discharged on their taxes for the current year 1688’.32 The registers of the ´elus are full of similar deliberations and even the most humble individual could hope for a favourable hearing. If the ´elus were better informed and more active than some of their critics have imagined, their actions were not always disinterested. When it came to distributing the tax burden there was an obvious temptation to favour their own towns, or the villages on their estates, with a light assessment. In a letter to the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, written in May 1699, the governor, Henri-Jules, referred to rumours ‘that several estates of the leading inhabitants are treated far too lightly’.33 The practice was denounced by the alcades in 1715, who claimed that ‘each one of them [the ´elus] has assumed the right to secure for their favoured town a considerable reduction [in the taille]’.34 While such behaviour is hardly surprising, the fact that the alcades could persuade the assembly to forbid it in the future is a good example of their continuing efforts to police the activities of the provincial administration. Yet even when enshrined in the format of a d´ecret these pious hopes were unlikely to restrain the ´elus for long. Notions of bureaucratic impartiality were alien to the mental world of Louis XIV’s France, and it was assumed that those in authority would use their influence to their own advantage. The bad example was set at the highest level. In June 1703, for example, the prince de Conti informed the ´elus of ‘the extreme poverty’ of Maillyle-Chˆateau, a parish on one of his estates, and asked for its taille to be 31 32 33

ADCO C 3331, fols. 12, 17, 68. ADCO C 3173, fols. 306–7. The shortfall was made up by increasing the burden elsewhere. 34 ADCO C 3042, fol. 303. BMD MS 2240, fol. 79, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 8 May 1699.

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reduced.35 The chamber was quick to comply. Nor were great aristocrats the only ones to take advantage of their position. The secretary of state, La Vrilli`ere, wrote to the ´elus in May 1702, informing them that the inhabitants of Tanlay were overtaxed and needed relief, adding that ‘I know that, on like occasion, you have been so kind as to relieve them on the recommendation of my father’.36 Such requests were difficult to refuse, and the ´elus clearly knew what was expected of them. When the son of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Nicolas Desmarets, was appointed abb´e of the church of Saint B´enigne in Dijon, the ´elus informed his father that ‘our first care in distributing the taille was to reduce the burden on the parishes and communities depending upon the abbey of Saint B´enigne’.37 To expect the ´elus to behave any differently when assessing their own towns and villages requires an extremely optimistic view of human nature. Those historians who have berated the corruption of the Burgundian tax system have solid evidence to support their arguments, but we should be aware that any attempt to apply modern standards of equity to seventeenth-century institutions runs the risk of anachronism. The ethics of the ´elus are not the only things to have been called into question, and it was frequently alleged that they failed to control the activities of the receivers of the taille.38 Probably the most important example of this supposed laxity was the perennial problem of tax arrears. The taille was paid in cash, an extremely rare commodity in the reign of Louis XIV, and access to it opened up many lucrative investment possibilities for the receivers. The longer the gap between tax collection and the transfer of those funds to Dijon, the greater their profits were liable to be. Clearly it was in the interest of the receivers to devise every possible excuse for delay, and their accumulation of substantial fortunes suggests that they were expert procrastinators.39 They were helped by an inbuilt delay within the tax system, confirmed by a d´ecret of 1662, which ordered them to present their accounts to the chamber of ´elus within eighteen months of the completion of any given tax year.40 However, in 1697, the alcades alleged that several receivers were more than eighteen months behind schedule and suggested a regl`ement ordering the ´elus to verify their payments before authorising further borrowing.41 These good intentions do not appear to have improved matters. In 1706, 35

36 37 38 40

ADCO C 3148, fols. 413–14, Conti to the ´elus, 15 June 1703, and ibid., fol. 414, 18 June 1703, for their reply. Such favouritism was widespread and firmly entrenched, see Collins, Fiscal limits of absolutism, pp. 169–73. ADCO C 3147, fol. 377, La Vrilli`ere to the ´elus, 19 May 1702. AN G7 163, fol. 141, the ´elus to Desmarets, 22 December 1710. 39 See chapter 5. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 137–41. 41 ADCO C 3041, fols. 179–80. ADCO C 2997, fol. 20.

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the alcades again denounced the conduct of the receivers, arguing that ‘the province pays them 5 deniers per livre on condition that they advance the fund of their receipts from month to month . . . yet there is not one of them who fulfils the said treaty, it is unjust that they profit from this remittance’.42 Periodic threats to withhold their fees did produce a short-term effect, but similar complaints were still being voiced in the reign of Louis XVI.43 The attitude of the ´elus was almost certainly tempered by the essential role played by the receivers in the provincial administration, but even if they had been stricter, forcing the receivers to meet the terms of their ‘treaties’, it was not necessarily going to improve the lot of the taillables. Any pressure on the tax collectors would have been quickly passed on to the peasantry, and by allowing a bit of slack the tax system functioned relatively effectively, and Burgundy did not experience fiscal revolts like those that affected the Boulonnais or Brittany.44 Late payments to the treasurer general did, however, force the ´elus to borrow in order to cover the shortfall, thus increasing the fiscal pressure on the taillables on whom the interest charges were levied. If those arrears became too excessive they might even endanger the credit of the Estates, which meant that the ´elus could not afford to be too negligent in their treatment of the receivers. They also possessed the means to bring the receivers to heel because the Estates had the right to withhold their fees, or in extreme cases strip them of their commissions. Thus, in 1710, the activities of Perrin, receiver of the Charolais, caused the officers of the ´etats particuliers to appeal for help. The ´elus responded with a terse letter, informing Perrin that: the ´elus of the Charolais have informed us that you make your collections in a fashion that distresses [the people] of this comt´e and that for trifling sums that are owed to you, seize a large quantity of livestock causing serious complaint, it is important that you make the collections of which you are authorised, but the people must be treated carefully . . . we recommend that you take heed for otherwise we shall be obliged to act.45

Thereafter Perrin needed to tread warily, as it would not be difficult to replace him in the coveted place that he occupied. The receivers also needed to beware of exhausting the patience of the chamber. Tired of hearing Daniel R´emond, receiver of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, blame his arrears on the 42 44 45

43 See chapters 8 and 11. ADCO C 3042, fol. 84. For details of the revolt in the Boulonnais, see Mettam, Power and faction, pp. 31, 36, 311–12. The Breton revolt has been examined by Collins, Classes, estates, and order, pp. 249–88. ADCO C 3155, fols. 517–18, the ´elus to Perrin, November 1710.

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rebelliousness of a group of villages within his jurisdiction, the ´elus decided to check for themselves.46 The vicomte-maire of Dijon, La Botte, was sent to Chˆatillon-sur-Seine with instructions to examine R´emond’s conduct and to decide if his claims were justified. Regular checks of this type would undoubtedly have had a salutary effect, but the ´elus tended to react to events rather than initiate good practice. However, nothing was more certain to set alarm bells ringing in Dijon than rumours of a receiver in financial difficulty. When, in November 1667, Antoine de La Croix, receiver of Saint-Laurent was discovered to owe the Estates a substantial sum from the taille of the previous year he was given just two weeks to set his house in order.47 He failed to re-establish confidence, and he was forced to sell his office a few months later.48 A similar disaster struck Charles Bailly, receiver of Bar-sur-Seine, in 1707.49 When informed of his problems, the ´elus ordered the treasurer general to prepare a precise account of his debt, gave instructions for his accounts to be checked – if necessary by force – and made preparations to replace him. He was found to owe some 43,978 livres, almost the entire revenue from the taille of Bar-sur-Seine for 1706 and 1707, as well as a significant sum to the governor. Bankruptcies such as those suffered by La Croix and Bailly were comparatively rare, and the threat they posed was sufficient to rouse even the most lethargic of ´elus. If the alcades were frequently critical of the receivers, they were more circumspect when it came to the activities of the treasurer general, presumably because of the extremely close ties between the Chartraire family and successive governors.50 The Chambre des Comptes presented a more vulnerable target. There were periodic attacks on the ´epices charged by the court during the first two decades of Louis XIV’s personal rule,51 and it required the governor’s mediation to produce a mutually acceptable settlement in 1679.52 According to the terms of that agreement, the Chambre des Comptes would process ‘all types of monies destined for the use of the province, whether they have been raised, borrowed or levied on salt, or otherwise, in whatever manner it might be’.53 It was also agreed that ´epices would be fixed at a rate 46 48

49 50 52

53

47 ADCO C 3447, and C 2997, fol. 109. ADCO C 3159, fol. 244. The receivers were not venal officers in the conventional sense. Instead, they held commissions from the Estates which they could sell, or pass on to their descendants, under certain conditions, see chapter 5. ADCO C 3432, and C 3152, fols. 356–7, 361, 365. 51 ADCO C 2997, fol. 45. See chapter 4. ADCO C 3485, ‘M´emoire des observations faites sur les e´pices que la chambre des comptes perc¸oit sur les comptes des impositions de la province’. This memoir was written during the reign of Louis XVI, and supplies a history of the quarrels between the Estates and the Chambre des Comptes. Ibid.

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of one percent of the sums processed. Despite these seemingly precise terms there were still occasional outbursts against the Chambre in the assemblies of the Estates, and in 1706 the alcades launched a full-scale denunciation. They declared that: the ´epices paid to the Chambre des Comptes are one of the greatest expenses of this province, the rights attributed to it are exorbitant, they should only charge on monies raised by taxation, but they go much further, they charge indistinctly on the total of the general receipts and often three or four times on the same sum, on the arrears of old accounts, on the receipts of the receivers [of the taille], on the remittances that the king grants on the transport of monies to the royal treasury, on loans, the crues of salt, francs-fiefs, capitation and the militia, finally, on all forms of monies under whatever title they might be presented before them.54

The Chambre des Comptes was certainly well rewarded, although its critics tended to forget that the multiplicity of fiscal officers meant that a whole series of separate accounts required auditing. As a result, when the duc de Bourbon negotiated a new ‘treaty’ between the Chambre and the Estates in 1715, it did no more than clarify the ´epices paid for the different financial transactions.55 All matters pertaining to the taille, crues and the octrois levied on the river Saˆone were classed as ‘ordinary affairs’, with 1 per cent to be charged in ´epices as before. The other financial transactions, notably loans and abonnements, were treated as ‘extraordinary affairs’, with ´epices fixed at the ‘four hundreths’, or 250 per 100,000 livres. A long period of comparative harmony followed, and it was not until the reign of Louis XVI that the fees of the Chambre des Comptes again became a target of reformers. As the issue of the ´epices demonstrates, the Estates continued to take a close interest in the fiscal system, scrutinising its administration and making suggestions for its improvement. The 1680s, in particular, witnessed a series of reforming Estates, and one of their most notable d´ecrets was that of 1688, forbidding the treasurer general ‘to make payments of mandements and ordinances other than those signed by at least two of the ´elus of the [three] orders’.56 Amongst the more Byzantine practices of the chamber of ´elus was its habit of treating each of the five taxes forming the taille in isolation,57 with each community being assessed for its contribution to the taillon, garnisons or don gratuit separately. This allowed them to claim fees for each tax, and not just once for the taille as a whole. The abuse was denounced with vehemence by the alcades at the Estates of 1709, and the chambers agreed to its reform.58 54 56 58

55 ADCO C 3485, ‘M´ ADCO C 3042, fols. 84–5. emoire des observations’. 57 For the composition of the taille, see chapter 6. ADCO C 2999, fols. 8–9. ADCO C 3042, fols. 157–8. Albeit not unanimously as the nobility opposed the measure.

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The second half of the seventeenth century also witnessed a gradual streamlining of the administration with a reduction in the number of financial offices. In 1671, Franc¸ois Bazin succeeded in acquiring both the office of treasurer ancien and alternatif and thereafter the Estates had a single officer at the head of their finances.59 In the bailliages, the number of receivers was also gradually reduced, and, by 1715, only Dijon and Autun had more than one. Indeed, only the refusal of two out of the three receivers at Autun to be reimbursed had preserved their precarious hold over their offices after 1712. The case raised important questions because the Estates had always maintained that the receivers were simple commissioners, who could be appointed and dismissed at will. The duc de Bourbon threw himself into the fray on behalf of the Estates and after a lengthy legal battle they emerged triumphant, and by 1730 the principle of one receiver per bailliage was established.60 The policy of reducing the number of financial officers had been consciously pursued over several decades, and, as the Estates of 1712 had made clear, the aim was to prevent confusion and ‘to avoid the multiplication of expenses’.61 If reform had taken time to implement, it had been achieved nevertheless. Other useful measures can be cited, and, in a deliberation of 24 August 1686, the ´elus ordered the collectors to take the original taille roll to ‘the receiver of their bailliage when making their first payment’.62 An exact copy was then to be prepared and signed by the receiver who would forward it to Dijon. The aim of the ´elus was to verify that the amounts levied tallied with their orders. When the receivers proved reluctant to comply, the ´elus issued a further deliberation in June 1687 threatening to withhold the gages of the recalcitrant.63 At the Estates of 1700, further reforms were pursued after the assembly had appointed a committee of the three orders to examine the causes of abuse in the tax collection system and to propose means of eradicating them.64 The result was a d´ecret ordering the ´elus to undertake a series of visits to each of the fifteen bailliages within the duchy. The ´elus obeyed these instructions within weeks, and on 31 August issued a series of deliberations sending commissioners to the principal towns of the province. They were to liaise with the receivers and collect information on, for example, the total number of inhabitants, the names of those suspected of manipulating the assessors or collectors and details of any privileged individuals known to engage in trade or commerce.65 It was a general visit in all but name and it provides further proof that the Estates were 59 62 64

60 ADCO C 3157, fol. 650, and C 3433. 61 ADCO C 3001, fol. 194. See chapter 4. 63 Ibid., deliberation of 11 June 1687. ADCO C 4730. 65 ADCO C 3145, fols. 471–4. ADCO C 3041, fols. 229, 235.

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not indifferent to complaints about the provincial tax system. Indeed the remarques of the alcades, and the remonstrances presented to the king, were full of complaints about the nefarious effects of the excessive sale of privileged offices after 1688.66 Finally, while the taille remained the main focus of attention, that began to change after 1701 when the ´elus established control over the levy of the capitation.67 They immediately set to work, ordering the mayors and receivers to provide ‘an exact account of all the privileged and [those] exempt from the taille and other taxes in your town, and an estimate of the property and income that they possess . . . in order that nobody is overlooked or has cause for complaint’.68 From this discussion, it is clear that the Burgundian fiscal system had its fair share of inequalities, corruption and abuse, but there were also chinks of light. Neither the Estates nor the ´elus were content to wallow in a sea of iniquity, and if many of their proposed reforms fell short of their objectives through want of resources, or the sustained political will to carry them out, the same could be said of most seventeenth-century institutions. ta x fa r m i n g Tax collection was not the only preoccupation of the ´elus, and they were also responsible for leasing the rights to the crues on the sale of salt and the octrois levied on goods transported on the river Saˆone. Rather than create the necessary administrative apparatus themselves, the Estates were content to lease those rights to syndicates of tax farmers. In theory, this should have meant auctioning the rights to the highest bidder, but the leases were monopolised by the powerful local financial clans. Thus from 1695 to 1701, the receiver general of the crues was none other than Franc¸ois Chartraire de Mypon, who was, in turn, succeeded by Edme Lamy whose fingers were in nearly every Burgundian financial pie.69 He held the lease until 1729 when it was taken over by his relative and prot´eg´e, Edme Seguin. As for the farm of the octrois, that too was exercised by Lamy between 1704 and 1716, and it then passed to another of his relatives, Nicolas Fabry, who was eventually succeeded by Edme S´eguin in 1740.70 Perhaps not surprisingly, the concentration of so much power in so few hands aroused suspicions of corruption in the bidding process. In a letter 66 67 68 69 70

For examples of the attacks on offices, see ADCO C 3329, fols. 113–14; C 3041, fol. 335; and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 118–22. See chapter 6. ADCO C 3146, fols. 15–16, the ´elus to the mayors and receivers of Burgundy, 16 January 1701. See chapter 5. See: ADCO C 3044, fol. 47; C 3390, fol. 91; and C 5367.

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to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Pontchartrain, the ill-fated intendant, Florent d’Argouges, accused the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone of plotting against him, adding that he had committed ‘this falsehood’ because ‘it pleased the farmers of the octrois from whom this prelate has taken a good deal while he was ´elu’.71 The paranoid intendant saw plots and cabals at every turn,72 but the bishop had been an ´elu in 1691 when the lease had been accorded to a syndicate headed by Claude Girard, the former lieutenant criminel in the bailliage of Chalon.73 From the perspective of the crown a more serious worry than the existence of a few bribes was the fear that the ´elus allowed the leases to be sold below their market value, either through negligence or as part of a more sinister plot to share in the subsequent profits.74 There is some evidence that this was the case. In 1689, when Louis XIV had first granted the octrois to the Estates, the governor fought hard to win control over the auctioning process for the ´elus.75 He was nevertheless careful to point out that they needed to act responsibly by allowing the time and opportunity for as many syndicates as possible to present their bids. That lease, and the revised one of 1691 criticised by d’Argouges, escaped official censure, but in 1696 fresh doubts were raised. The ´elu du roi, Richard, informed Pontchartrain that the lease was being sold cheaply, largely because of collusion amongst the rival syndicates.76 The governor was also concerned that the ´elus had acted hastily, by not allowing sufficient time for a number of Parisian entrepreneurs to enter the race.77 Henri-Jules correctly predicted that a second auction would be ordered, and the annual value of the lease eventually rose from the 191,000 livres initially accepted from a syndicate based in Chalon, to 212,000 livres offered by its Parisian rivals.78 It was, therefore, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, ably assisted by the governor, who had, on this occasion, prevented the ´elus from underselling a precious financial resource. In addition to overseeing the renewal of the leases, the ´elus were expected to deal with occasional crises. In 1703, the Parisian syndicate fronted by a local man, Jean Cabrol, another Chalonnais, ran into financial difficulties. At one point the Estates were owed 260,000 livres, a cause of grave 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

AN G7 158, fol. 306, D’Argouges to Pontchartrain, 1 November 1693. He was eventually recalled in 1694 after antagonising a string of local worthies. ADCO C 3384, fol. 27, and C 5366. The ´elu du roi, Richard, claimed that the lease of 1696 was initially sold too cheaply, AN G7 159, fol. 136, Richard to Pontchartrain, 20 August 1696. ADCO C 3134, fols. 233–4, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, August 1689. AN G7 159, fol. 136, Richard to Pontchartrain, 20 August 1696. BMD MS 2239, fols. 366–7, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 29 August 1696, and ibid , 4 September 1696. ADCO C 3141, fols. 363–4, 441, 501–2.

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concern for the wider credit structure which depended so heavily upon the income from the octrois. When the treasurer general reported in April 1704 that ‘he could not find a sol’ and that the province’s credit was on the verge of collapse,79 the ´elus and the governor were obliged to launch a rescue operation.80 Cabrol was imprisoned and had his property seized before Henri-Jules and his secretary, Th´esut de Ragy, worked out a compromise acceptable to both sides. The lease was broken and a new one auctioned, and after such a nasty shock the ´elus were happy to transfer the farm to the familiar and solvent hands of Edme Lamy. As far as the ´elus were concerned it was an ideal solution. Whenever possible they preferred to entrust their financial affairs to local men, and when, in 1728, they were challenged about their actions, the example of Cabrol was cited in their defence. They claimed that: one of the principal concerns of this administration has been the care the ´elus have always taken to confide the collection of provincial taxation to those whose conduct, commitments and creditworthiness, by their property and reputation in the province, is well known to them.81

Their policy had the additional advantage of protecting their administration from the prying eyes of the crown. stuck in the mud As part of his propaganda offensive, Louis XIV was keen to have equestrian statues of himself, in suitably military pose, erected in towns and cities throughout France.82 Dijon was not to be spared its own part in this celebration, and in 1686 the governor obliged the ´elus to commission a statue. The Estates of 1688 meekly ratified the decision, and the substantial sum of 50,000 livres was advanced, although the deputies were far from enthusiastic about the prospective site of the monument. Over the previous ´ which had been decade they had been busy embellishing the Palais des Etats partially assigned to them by the king who was anxious to beautify Dijon once the conquest of Franche-Comt´e had reduced its military importance. When the governor informed them that the equestrian statue was to stand at its centre, looming down on their Palais, the Estates were thoroughly 79 81 82

80 ADCO C 3148, fols. 233, 240–1, and C 3149, fols. 754–7. ADCO C 3149, fol. 378. ADCO C 5367, ‘M´emoire pour les e´lus g´en´eraux des e´tats de Bourgogne contre les sieurs Le Normant et compagnie’. P. Burke, The fabrication of Louis XIV (London, 1992), pp. 3, 93–7, 156, and R. Mettam, ‘Power, status and precedence: rivalries among the provincial elites of Louis XIV’s France’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 38 (1988), 43–62.

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dismayed. For the Estates, the building work had been intended to glorify the province, and their pre-eminent place within it, not to reflect the ‘gloire’ of their sovereign. Yet, whatever their misgivings, they had no choice but to comply. By 1692, the statue was complete and it began its journey from Paris to Dijon, entering the province close to Auxerre. When all seemed lost, relief arrived from an unexpected quarter, the province’s roads. A mixture of bad weather and the appalling state of the highways made further progress impossible.83 Repairs were needed before the statue could be moved and the ´elus seized their opportunity, informing the governor that in time of war it would be unpatriotic to divert funds to projects of beautification when there were so many other pressing matters requiring their attention. Rather than grace the Place Royal in Dijon, Louis XIV’s equestrian monument was parked in a barn in the village of La Brosse where it would remain for the next thirty years. This amusing tale says much about the ability of provincial elites to sidestep the demands of the king, but were Burgundy’s roads really in such a pitiful state?84 The question is an important one because the Estates were responsible for their upkeep, and during the decade after 1680 there had been a serious attempt to improve the quality of their administration. At the Estates of 1682, the three orders had identified a series of problems, notably persistent errors in the estimates for public works and a failure to carry out proper checks once the digging had begun.85 The solution was to appoint a qualified engineer to assist the ´elus. In addition to the above, he was ordered to identify ‘those roads that it was suitable to build, or repair, [and] to prepare projects and estimates for presentation to the ´elus during their assemblies’. The engineer was also responsible for checking the quality of materials and workmanship, and for his efforts he received gages paid by the Estates. The d´ecret of 1682 inaugurated an office that in the eighteenth century would provide one of the jewels in the province’s administrative crown. Antoine Rouillet, who was the first man to hold the post, quickly impressed his new employers. At the Estates of 1685 he reported that the ‘highways’ were in a ‘very poor state’, prompting the assembly to vote an annual sum of 30,000 livres for their repair.86 Three years later that fund was increased to 36,000 livres as part of a wide-ranging d´ecret setting out the duties of the engineer and the regulations to be followed by the chamber of ´elus when 83 84 85

Mettam, ‘Power, status and precedence’, 57–8. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 162–3, was convinced that this was the case, commenting that ‘la m´ediocrit´e du reseau routier ne fait pas de doute’. 86 Ibid., fols. 78–9. ADCO C 2999, fol. 12.

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distributing public works contracts.87 The d´ecret supplied the foundations, or perhaps more accurately the ideal, for the organisation of public works in the province until well into the reign of Louis XV. A reforming breeze was blowing through the Estates during the 1680s, and the ´elus themselves were affected. In a deliberation of 1 April 1689, the chamber ordered Butard, ´elu of the third estate, to investigate the: repairs of the highways and to examine all the contracts authorised by the ´elus over the previous ten years, [to] establish what the entrepreneurs were paid and what remains due on the price of their tenders, the examinations that have been made of their works, those that have not been verified . . . and if the entrepreneurs meet the clauses and conditions of their contracts.88

In theory, therefore, the provincial administration had a well-regulated system for the maintenance of its roads. Aided by an expert engineer, the ´elus were expected to identify where new routes were needed or repairs required before opening public works contracts for bids by entrepreneurs, whose estimates, use of materials, workmanship and final product were subject to verification. In seventeenth-century France, the fine words contained in the official decrees of the Estates of Burgundy should no more be taken at face value than the similarly impressive sounding legislation of the king. There remained an immense gulf separating the good intentions of the administrators in Dijon from the reality in the province at large, and the statue of Louis XIV was not the only traveller to get stuck in the mud. For the d´ecrets to be put into practical effect required diligence and hard work on the part of the ´elus. When this was forthcoming, as in April 1689, much could be achieved, but with the membership of the chamber changing every three years there could be no guarantee that such zeal would be maintained. Instead, negligence and abuse could creep into the administration. In August 1693, the intendant, d’Argouges, sent a damning report to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral denouncing the conduct of the ´elus.89 He claimed that despite the d´ecret ordering them to spend 30,000 livres on the highways, ‘they do not even spend 4,000 livres, and they use the surplus as they see fit’. According to the intendant, they also authorised payment to their preferred contractors confident ‘that no one would dare question their conduct, and the Chambre de Comptes always plays their game because it provides two ´elus at each triennalit´e’. D’Argouges had almost certainly blackened the picture because his letter was part of a request to be allowed to verify the actions of the chamber. Yet even less biased observers found much to criticise. One 87 89

88 ADCO C 3055, deliberation of 1 April 1689. Ibid., fols. 126–30. AN G7 158, fol. 284, d’Argouges to Pontchartrain, 20 August 1693.

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of the most common complaints concerned the diversion of funds away from the main roads to the benefit of the ´elus themselves. As d’Argouges’ more tactful successor, Ferrand, observed, too often money was spent on ‘repairs that the ´elus in place have made during their triennalit´e on the roads leading to their estates and chateaux’.90 The intendant claimed that no less than two-thirds of the budget put aside by the Estates for the repair of the highways was being siphoned off in this fashion, and he was not alone in his opinion. The fermiers de la diligence running between Paris and Lyon presented a series of allegations to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral in 1699.91 After noting that Rouillet had prepared the necessary reports on repairs to be undertaken, they declared that: for the last two years, the fund has been distributed at the discretion of the ´elus and to their entire satisfaction on tracks and roads that serve no other purpose than to go to their estates.

Thus 10,000 livres had been spent on the orders of the bishop of Autun, ´elu of the clergy, a further 7,000 livres to improve a minor road linking the chˆateau of the comte de Chevigny, ´elu of the nobility, with Semuren-Auxois and Montbard and 5,000 livres to repair a bridge connecting the estates of Bonaventure R´emond, deputy of the Chambre des Comptes, with the road to Chˆatillon-sur-Seine. Other examples were cited, and an examination of the deliberations of the ´elus confirms the veracity of these allegations.92 The efforts of the Estates to improve Burgundy’s roads were thus being undermined from within, and it has to be said that the ´elus were not the only ones abusing the system. The king’s ministers set an equally poor example. When the secretary of state, La Vrilli`ere, heard that the bridge at Tanlay was on the verge of collapse, he informed the ´elus that ‘I have also been informed that it will ruin my best meadows and one of my mills, so I kindly request that, as this is a public work, which will cause severe prejudice to commerce, you give the necessary orders’.93 Not surprisingly in these circumstances contemporary reports are unanimous in declaring Burgundy’s roads to be a threat to life and limb and accidents were common.94 Even the governor himself had a narrow escape 90 91

92 93 94

AN G7 159, fol. 346, Ferrand to Pontchartrain, 7 April 1699. Ibid., fol. 347, ‘M´emoire de ce qui est a` observer de la consommation mal employ´e du fond fait pour la r´eparation des grands chemins de la province de Bourgogne pendant la triennalit´e qui a commenc´e l’ann´ee 1697’. ADCO C 3145, fols. 357, 588, deliberations of 27 July and 19 November 1700. ADCO C 3146, fol. 120, La Vrilli`ere to the ´elus, 1 February 1701. AN G7 159, fol. 345, Ferrand to Pontchartrain, 7 April 1699.

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when travelling to the Estates along the road from Auxerre to Dijon.95 When looked at from a short term perspective, the reforms of the 1680s had failed in their objective. Yet we should be wary of expecting rapid results because administrative change in the seventeenth century proceeded at an almost glacial pace. Progress required a change of mentalities as well as constant surveillance from the Estates, governor or the crown before effective results could be achieved. After the complaints from the fermiers of the diligence, the Estates were persuaded at their meeting of 1700 to increase spending on the highways to 120,000 livres.96 More importantly, the governor gave explicit instructions for the roads from Auxerre to Dijon and from Dijon to Chalon-sur-Saˆone to be repaired.97 Henri-Jules made it clear that he was working in consultation with the new contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Chamillart, and it was more difficult for the ´elus to evade their instructions. The danger with such a personal approach lay in the fact that abuse was likely to creep back in once the spotlight had shifted. As a result, in 1709, the alcades suggested defining exactly what the Estates meant by ‘highways’ in order to prevent confusion, whether accidental or otherwise. Their suggestion was eventually acted upon, and the Estates of 1715 adopted a new d´ecret encompassing many of the reformist ideas voiced at their assemblies over the previous two decades.98 Henceforth the highways were clearly defined on a map of the province specifically drawn for that purpose. To prevent the ´elus straying from their chosen path, the Estates stipulated that they would be expected ‘to conform entirely to the map, without adding new roads or investing in others than those indicated’. In future, they would be accountable for their actions and, crucially their spending, before the assembled chambers. As the Estates again felt the need to order the full implementation of their d´ecret of 1688 at their next meeting in 1718, it is clear that the provincial administration was not transformed overnight. Yet the slow pace of change should not lead us to conclude that the Burgundian administration was completely inert. The appointment of the chief engineer, the promulgation of the regulations governing public works in the d´ecret of 1688, and the designation of a highway network in 1715 were positive achievements that would be built upon in the years to come. Indeed, when the Estates were reminded in 1718 that the barn housing the equestrian statue of Louis XIV was in need of repair, there was a renewed attempt to transport it to Dijon. Under the 95 97 98

96 ADCO C 3145, fols. 443–4. ADCO C 3041, fol. 253. Ibid., fols. 434–5. The text contains a report from the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, on his voyage to court, dated 19 August 1700. ADCO C 3001, fol. 278.

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auspices of the provincial engineer, Pierre Morin, the late king’s monument finally completed its journey to the provincial capital.99 m i l i ta ry m at t e r s Nothing was more certain to send shivers down the spines of early modern Europeans than the sight of approaching troops. Whether hostile or not, they almost invariably brought disease, pillage and rape in their wake, and it was not for nothing that the Estates paid the king an annual sum for the privilege of exemption from billeting troops during the winter months. Burgundy had nevertheless suffered grievously during the Thirty Years War, most famously at the hands of the marauding Habsburg army of Gallas, and the ostensibly friendly forces of Cond´e had scarcely behaved more civilly during the Fronde. The threat of invasion receded after the definitive conquest of Franche-Comt´e in 1678, but Louis XIV’s wars would ensure that the province had to cope with the constant passage of troops marching to the battlefields of Italy and Germany. Traditionally the king had paid the cost of their food and lodgings, an expense that Colbert was determined to pass on to the Estates, especially after the outbreak of war in 1672.100 His aim was to persuade the ´elus to appoint an ´etapier g´en´eral, as in neighbouring Champagne, who would ‘furnish the ´etape in cash, while the province supplied everything necessary above the king’s pay’. When the governor relayed these instructions to the chamber, he warned them that ‘His Majesty will remove the fund of the ´etapes from the province if it fails to do what he asks on this occasion’. The ´elus would have been wise to accept the minister’s offer. Instead, they succeeded in delaying a decision until the Estates of 1674, and continued to drag their heels until Colbert eventually carried out his threat to suspend payments of the ´etapes altogether.101 Repeated protests failed to reverse his decision, and the Estates were reluctantly obliged to take up what would prove to be a massive financial burden.102 Despite pressure from Colbert and a series of negotiations involving both the governor and the intendant, the ´elus eventually chose not to appoint an ´etapier g´en´eral. Instead they established a system of their own, whereby communities or individuals who were obliged to billet troops furnished the necessary food and lodgings before claiming reimbursement from the 99 100 101 102

Blin, ‘Le proc`es de Pierre Morin’, 215–16, and Mettam, ‘Power, status and precedence’, 58. ADCO C 3352, fols. 204, 207, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 4 March 1672 and 28 October 1672. ADCO C 3675, and C 3352, fol. 236, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 1 November 1675. See chapter 6.

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Estates.103 To receive payment they were expected to provide a ‘billet’, signed by the relevant municipal and military authorities, which could be checked against the marching orders issued by the secretary of state for war. Predictably Thomas was outraged, declaring that: the entire system was founded upon an erroneous principle: the advances were made by the community, or the inhabitant himself, the reimbursements by the province. The repayments were neither prompt nor sure; the advances were always obligatory and urgent.104

Gaston Roupnel was equally scathing, declaring that the ruinous effects of the ´etapes in Dijon meant that by 1693 ‘the majority of innkeepers had closed and left the city’.105 If the payments made by the ´elus were late, insufficient, or both, then these arguments would be difficult to refute, and there is some evidence to support their claims. The ´elus first began to reimburse the ´etapes in 1675 and they quickly fell into arrears. In a deliberation of 4 April 1678, they ordered the payment of the ´etapes for 1676 – a two-year delay with undoubtedly unpleasant consequences for those affected.106 Part of the explanation for their tardiness may well lie in the fact that in 1677 the Estates had issued a r`eglement for the ´etapes, and it had taken time for the chamber to settle into a regular working pattern. If that was the case, matters improved rapidly. The ´elus divided the year into two parts, the first of five months and the second of seven, to coincide with the official assemblies of the chamber, and the repayment of the ´etapes was completed within six months of the end of any given period.107 When, in the spring of 1687, anonymous complaints reached the ears of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral about supposed delays in the refunding of the ´etapes, he asked the intendant, Harlay, for his opinion.108 Although he was under no obligation to support the ´elus, Harlay wrote back in May confirming that the ´etapes for 1686 had already been paid in full,109 and the registers of the chamber make it clear that such promptness was common. 103 104 105 106 107

108 109

ADCO C 3675, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 153–65. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 158–9. Roupnel, La ville et la campagne, p. 35. ADCO C 3675, deliberation of 4 April 1678. Payments were made regularly and usually on time, see: ibid., deliberation of 6 February 1685, paying the ´etapes for the last seven months of 1684; ibid, deliberation of 29 March 1689, paying the last months of 1688; deliberation of July 1690 for the end of 1688; and C 3133, fols. 414–16, deliberation of July 1688, paying the first five months of that year. AN G7 157, fol. 55, Harlay to Pontchartrain, 19 May 1687. Ibid. According to his account the complaints had arisen because of an earlier dispute between the ´elus and the town of Montbard.

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Thomas and Roupnel were arguably on firmer ground when they challenged the equity of a system that placed the initial expense on the population rather than the province. Alternatives were, however, in short supply. The actual number of troops passing through the province in any given year fluctuated wildly, and if large sums of money had been advanced to the towns and villages on the main military arteries the scope for fraud and theft would have been immense. Moreover, trying to recoup unspent funds after the event was certain to be time-consuming and probably fruitless, thus from an administrative perspective it made sense to verify claims for expense actually incurred, and for the ´elus themselves to oversee final payments. Harlay described the advantages of the Burgundian system in a letter to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, noting that: the officers of the chamber of ´elus can visit the towns that must be reimbursed, to oversee the distribution which is carried out in their presence, following a method they have practised over recent years very usefully to prevent the abuses and errors that the mayors and ´echevins of the towns might commit if no one enlightened their conduct in this regard.110

Again the information provided by the intendant tallied with that contained in the registers of the ´elus, and by 1688 the system was working sufficiently smoothly to win the approbation of the assembled Estates.111 As a result, a d´ecret was passed removing the obligation for the ´elus to make reimbursements in person, and permitting the mayors and ´echevins to act in their stead. Thereafter the ´elus increasingly delegated responsibility, and by the early eighteenth century the alcades were beginning to have second thoughts about the wisdom of that decision. In their remarques of 1706, 1712 and 1715 they pressed the ´elus to resume full responsibility for overseeing the reimbursements – a call that was only partially heeded.112 During the period from 1675 to 1715, both the ´elus and the Estates made sporadic attempts to improve the efficiency of the ´etapes. As early as 1677, the ´elus had realised that tampering with billets was a common form of fraud, and refused to accept those that had been defaced.113 A further attempt to tighten the procedure was introduced in a deliberation of May 1711.114 It stipulated that a register was to be kept in each of the province’s town halls recording ‘the number of officers, cavalry, dragoons and soldiers’ lodged, together with their official route number issued by the secretary 110 113 114

111 ADCO C 2999, fol. 144. 112 ADCO C 3147, fols. 161–2, and C 3160, fol. 365. Ibid. ADCO C 3675, deliberation of 29 December 1677. Its terms were repeated in a second deliberation of 3 June 1687. Ibid., deliberation of 16 May 1711.

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of state. The ´elus were clearly attempting to reduce fraud, and there are examples of individuals being arrested after investigation by the procureurs syndics.115 Occasional exemplary punishments were probably not enough to prevent collusion between unscrupulous military officers and municipal officials, who could inflate the size and cost of a particular ´etape. To try and curb abuse, the Estates of 1694 had the bright idea of trying to count the numbers of officers and men as they left the province at Tournus, Auxonne, Bar-sur-Seine and other frontier points, but even in the unlikely event that an accurate count was possible it would not have told the chamber much about where they had been lodged.116 Ultimately the Estates lacked the manpower to police the ´etapes in anything more than a cursory fashion because they relied upon the mayors and ´echevins to organise them and provide the information needed for their repayment. They were asking poachers to act as gamekeepers. As we might expect, it was the third estate that was obliged to billet the soldiery and the unpleasant nature of the task made exemption a highly prized and useful privilege.117 The crown was quick to realise that it was one of the most marketable commodities at its disposal when selling offices during the war-torn years after 1688. The Estates frequently protested about the nefarious effects of these exemptions in their remonstrances to Louis XIV, albeit to no avail.118 They did, however, attempt to improve the lot of those providing hospitality to the troops by cutting their taille assessments. A d´ecret of 1682, for example, ordered the ´elus to take billeting into consideration when drawing up the tax rolls.119 What prevented these efforts from having a significant impact was the sheer volume of troop movements after 1688, which left almost no scope for such altruism. That pressure did, however, force the ´elus to amend their procedures. Prior to the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg, they had levied an additional 80,000 livres on the taille to cover the costs of the ´etapes, half of which was advanced to the main towns on the military thoroughfares to stockpile essential food and fodder.120 War transformed the situation, and by March 1690 the ´elus were already expecting the ´etapes to cost 300,000 livres (they, in fact, totalled 440,598 livres).121 To make up 115 117 118 119 120 121

116 Ibid. Ibid., deliberations of 16 July 1696 and 4 February 1700. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 183–4, cites a number of examples of the problems posed by unruly troops during the 1690s. Examples include: ADCO C 2980, fol. 313 (1654) and C 2982, fols. 255–6 (1691). ADCO C 2999, fol. 18. ADCO C 3675, deliberation of 9 March 1690, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 160. ADCO C 3135, fol. 430, and AN H1 99, fol. 106.

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the shortfall they borrowed 220,000 livres and agreed that the capital and interest would be levied on the taille over the next four years. In 1692, they made provision for a fund of 300,000 livres, but the amount required to pay the ´etapes was a staggering 675,388 livres, forcing them to repeat the exercise. Here was a perfect illustration of the problem they faced, with the sheer unpredictability of the numbers involved upsetting even the best-laid plans. In these difficult circumstances, the ´elus sought to borrow the necessary funds, spreading the repayments over ever longer periods, while simultaneously attempting to speed up the process of reimbursement. In November 1694, for example, they began distributing money to those most badly affected without waiting for the official starting date of 31 December.122 The annual payment of the subsistance et exemption meant that Burgundy generally escaped the scourge of quartering royal armies during the winter months. Whenever the crown feigned to ignore this principle, the ´elus were quick to defend an important privilege, and they could usually count upon the assistance of the governor. As the duc de Bourbon observed in August 1713, it was vital ‘to pay attention to the privileges and immunities that this province has so long enjoyed on the faith of a treaty. It would be extremely distressing for me if, at my accession, they were breached after having been so religiously observed under my forefathers’.123 Plans to send as many as fifty cavalry squadrons into the province in the winter of 1714 produced a suitably robust response from abb´e de Roquette and the marquis de Lassay, respectively the ´elus of the clergy and nobility.124 They took advantage of their presence at court to persuade the ministry to reverse its decision, and thanked the secretary of state for war with a present of wine, a reward he abstemiously declined. The only significant breach of the province’s defences occurred during the 1680s when the crown began to send cavalry regiments to quarter on the pastures bordering the Saˆone near Auxonne.125 News that this was to be repeated in 1687 prompted the ´elus to send one of their number, Pierre Barbier, who was coincidentally the mayor of Auxonne, to prepare lodgings for the officers and supplies for their mounts.126 As contact between civilian and military officials was frequently tense, they asked the governor to send a local nobleman, the comte de Foudras, to liaise with the cavalry officers. 122 123 124 125 126

ADCO C 3676, deliberation of 8 November 1694. AN G7 164, fol. 236, duc de Bourbon to Desmarets, 24 August 1713. ADCO C 3160, fol. 57. BMD MS 2239, fol. 206, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 24 May 1687, and C 2982, fol. 205. ADCO C 3133, fols. 350–1.

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Finally, the governor informed the commanding officer, the mar´echal de Boufflers, of the preparations made by the ´elus.127 With these elaborate precautions, the ´elus had every reason to believe that the quartering would pass off without serious incident. Indeed, when the government repeated the exercise in 1714, the chamber followed the precedent from 1687 to the letter.128 Through the experience gained in managing the ´etapes and the camps on the Saˆone, the chamber progressively acquired knowledge and expertise that was valuable to the crown. Their abilities would be tested even further after 1688 when the king introduced the militia (milice), effectively a form of conscription that remained in force until 1789.129 Each g´en´eralit´e was expected to raise its share of troops, initially for garrison duty, but as Louis XIV’s wars dragged on they increasingly filled the ranks of the regular army. Within the duchy, the ´elus had responsibility for raising the militia and for its prompt and peaceful mustering at the designated assembly points. It would be difficult to exaggerate the unpopularity of the militia, which was loathed by the peasant communities on whom the greatest burden fell.130 The problems of evasion and desertion were rife, and any attempt to force unwilling young men to participate in the drawing of lots brought a potential threat to public order, and for this reason the ´elus were expected to work in close collaboration with the governor and the intendant. To levy the militia, the ´elus first divided up the number of men required amongst the various communities of the province using the taille rolls as the basis for their calculations.131 Orders were then sent to the provincial receivers, mayors, retired military officers and, after 1701, to the intendant’s subdelegates, who presided over the drawing of lots. The new recruits were then gathered together and marched off to Dijon for inspection by the intendant before being transferred to the tender care of their officers. Desertion between the drawing of lots and arrival at Dijon was a constant problem, and the ´elus regularly issued orders for the imprisonment or punishment of those that were subsequently recaptured.132 Nor were angry mothers exempt from the wrath of the ´elus. A woman known only as ‘the wife of Pierre Caloux’ was arrested and imprisoned in Chalon-sur-Saˆone 127 128 129 130 131 132

BMD MS 2239, fol. 206, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, May 1687. ADCO C 3160, fols. 310–14. A. Martin, Les milices provinciales en Bourgogne, 1688–1791 (Dijon, 1929), is the essential introduction to the militia in Burgundy. See chapter 12 and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 183–4. ADCO C 3134, fols. 3–20, contains the details of the levy carried out in 1689. ADCO C 3353, fol. 83, Barbezieux to the ´elus, 14 April 1695; C 3141, fols. 99–100, 122–3, the e´lus to Barbezieux, 6 and 23 February 1696.

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for rebellion, after refusing to let her son leave once he had drawn a short straw.133 In an effort to appease the aggrieved peasantry, the ´elus attempted, in 1690, to make service in the militia more palatable by paying four sols per day rather than two as laid down in the royal ordinances.134 The marquis de Louvois vetoed their initiative. The ´elus then changed tack and began to condone the no less illegal practice of buying a militiaman. Communities or groups of young men were given the option of paying for a volunteer who would serve on their behalf. At the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, the secretary of state for war, Michel Chamillart, tried to stamp out the practice.135 The ´elus ignored him completely, and they actually encouraged their commissioners to employ the method when raising the militia in the province.136 As the war dragged on, the need for fresh troops ensured that the minister was constantly nagging the ´elus about delays in conscripting the troops.137 They predictably excused their conduct by referring to the exhausted state of the province, as part of a persistent campaign to reduce its contribution to the levy. An increase in the numbers raised in 1703 provoked the Estates of that year to remonstrate that Burgundy was providing twice the number of recruits of neighbouring provinces, and both the ´elus and the governor repeated the charge.138 Their pleas fell on deaf ears, but in 1708 the ministry suddenly changed its tactics. In a letter to the ´elus, the duc de Bourbon announced that the province had been given ‘the option of supplying men for the militia, or of paying 100 livres for each one that they must raise’, and that he thought it was better to pay the money.139 The ´elus were as quick to strike a bargain as they were reluctant to fund it, and in November 1709 the new minister of war, Daniel Franc¸ois Voysin, was complaining about the late payment of this rather curious ‘buy out’.140 It is difficult to offer a balanced assessment of the organisation of the militia in Burgundy. Most of the complaints directed at the provincial administration from above were about delays in mustering sufficient numbers of adequate men. Such grumbling should not, however, be allowed to 133 135 136 137 138 139 140

134 ADCO C 3135, fols. 41–2. ADCO C 3149, fols. 366–7. ADCO C 3353, fol. 136, Chamillart to the ´elus, March 1701. ADCO C 3603, ‘M´emoire pour messieurs les commissaires’. ADCO C 3148, fol. 34, Chamillart to the ´elus, 27 December 1702, and C 3353, fol. 137, the ´elus to the ´etats particulier of Charolles, 5 March 1707. See: ADCO C 3330, fol. 104; and C 3149, fol. 290, the ´elus to Chamillart, 8 March 1704; ibid., fols. 261–3, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 24 February 1704. ADCO C 3153, fol. 832, Louis III de Bourbon to the ´elus, November 1708. ADCO C 3353, fol. 153, Voysin to the ´elus, 26 November 1709.

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disguise the existence of a more general pattern of cooperation with the crown. The correspondence of the ´elus with the war minister, governor or intendant was dominated by the practical issues associated with conscription. Was a particular profession exempt? Should married men be included? Was a village with a serving militiaman, or one who had been killed in action, exempt from the next round of recruitment?141 These, and many other, questions occupied the ´elus in the late autumn and early spring when the militia was assembled, or disbanded, and the registers of the chamber convey an impression of orderly routine. Events on the ground were usually more chaotic. The sheer unpopularity of the militia made it hard to find suitable recruits. As a result, the ´elus ignored explicit warnings from the secretary of state for war, and continued to allow communities to pay for a volunteer. If this was an abuse, it was at least one that worked to the advantage of the local population. e co n o m i c d eve lo p m e n t Not for nothing has the seventeenth century been described as the age of iron, and for much of the period the provincial administration was preoccupied by the need to find men and money. Yet the Estates were also charged with promoting the economic well-being of the province. In his study of Languedoc, Beik has placed great emphasis upon the role of the construction of the Canal du Midi in creating a reciprocal bond between local elites and the crown.142 After initial hesitation, the Estates of Languedoc were gradually won over to the scheme, and, if few shared the commercial motives that inspired Colbert and Paul-Pierre Riquet who devised and built it, most could enjoy the ‘prestige of using public monies for monuments to their joint glory’.143 Burgundy appeared to present fertile ground for a similar venture, and since the time of the cardinal de Richelieu there had been talk of constructing a canal to link the rivers Saˆone and Loire. At the Estates of 1665, Colbert revived the project, proposing a canal that would connect the two waterways via the Dheune and Bourbince.144 The plan was perfectly feasible and over a century later something very similar would be realised, but the Estates proved wary, possibly because it was not connected to traditional trade routes.145 They were anxious that the king contribute towards the 141 142 144 145

For these, and other, examples, see: ADCO C 3137, fols. 93–4; C 3148, fols. 605–6. 143 Ibid., p. 297. Beik, Absolutism and society, pp. 291–7. ADCO C 2997, fols. 59–60, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 185–7. Depping, Correspondance, I, pp. 441, Bouchu to Colbert, 24 May 1665.

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cost, and seemed more interested in the issue of compensation for those affected by the construction work than the project itself. The governor nevertheless succeeded in prising the huge sum of 600,000 livres from the assembly. Work was begun, albeit to no great effect and within a few years the project collapsed, largely as a result of the absence of local leadership or initiative.146 The idea for the canal had come from Colbert, and he had no one with the genius of Riquet to direct operations in Burgundy. It was a classic example of the limitations on the power of even the most able minister. Much the same could be said of Colbert’s efforts to stimulate interest in manufacturing. At the assembly of 1668, the governor’s instructions asked for an annual sum of 40,000–50,000 livres to be set aside for that purpose.147 The parsimonious Estates refused to offer more than 30,000 livres, but Colbert was not easily disheartened. He summoned the ´elus, together with the governor, in October 1671, to discuss where the money was to be spent.148 A substantial sum of 20,000 livres was directed towards an existing factory at Seignelay, on Colbert’s own estates, which was producing ‘woollens’, while other grants were distributed to assist individual entrepreneurs to start production. Finally, it was agreed that a bounty would be paid to skilled workers who settled in the province and married a local girl, with the happy couple receiving a bonus on the birth of their first child. Such measures were typical of a mercantilist age, and with its illustrious patron the factory at Seignelay initially prospered.149 Elsewhere the returns on the Estates’ investment were less reassuring. When the bishop of Autun and the comte d’Espinac decided to make a tour of the enterprises subsidised by the Estates in September 1673 they received a nasty shock.150 On arriving at one site near Auxerre, where they expected to find a ‘textile factory’ that had already received 8,000 livres of an intended 16,000 livres of subsidy, ‘we discovered neither buildings nor artisans, only two men who claimed to be from Picardy’. It is unlikely that the money was returned. To their credit, the ´elus did at least try to keep a check on where the province’s money was spent, and d’Espinac, in particular, visited several other sites where economic activity was in progress.151 However, the overall value of these 146 147 149 150 151

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 185–7. 148 ADCO C 3718. ADCO C 2997, fol. 99. A. Leroux, ‘Les industries textiles dans la Bourgogne d’ancien r´egime’, Annales de Bourgogne 43 (1971), 5–33, 10. ADCO C 3718, deliberation of 29 September 1673. Ibid., deliberations of 22 June 1672 (Arnay-le-Duc), and 7 July 1672 (Autun).

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schemes was limited. As Colbert would discover elsewhere, new commercial ventures would best take root in regions where a mercantile community already existed. Attempting to graft them on to regions such as Burgundy, which generally lacked those human resources, was liable to be expensive and ultimately disappointing. Even projects of a narrower scope ran into these same hurdles. In 1682, the crown obliged the Estates to vote 6,000 livres to pay for the establishment of a royal stud (haras) in the province.152 By 1688, the cost had risen to 20,000 livres for the triennalit´e, which the Estates dutifully paid throughout the remainder of the reign. Yet there is no evidence that the stud achieved its objective of improving the quality of provincial bloodstock, or of stimulating interest amongst the population. What really engaged the attention of the Estates were matters pertaining to existing economic interests. Needless to say, the wine trade loomed particularly large in this respect, as did issues affecting the transport of grain or other goods via the Saˆone. Probably the greatest threat to wine production came from the kingdom’s burdensome system of indirect taxation. The Estates stoutly defended the provincial privilege of exemption from the aides, but all wine exported elsewhere in France, or to international destinations, was subject to duties incurred on its route. The remonstrances of the Estates were thus peppered with demands for reductions or exemptions from the octrois in Champagne (on the road to Paris or the Low Countries), or at Lyon (the gateway to the Midi and Italy).153 As quality was already one of the hallmarks of Burgundian viticulture, the Estates also petitioned for royal edicts permitting the ‘uprooting’ of vines planted in areas where they had not previously been cultivated.154 Such measures had the dual advantage of protecting quality, while reducing the volume available for sale, which in turn kept prices high. While wine was emblematic of Burgundy’s economy, grain was no less important for the plains of the Saˆone and the Auxois. As a net exporter of grain, the province relied upon the river to act as the highway taking its surplus south. However, as the barges passed down the Saˆone they frequently fell foul of the municipal authorities in Lyon, who forced Burgundian merchants to wait in the city for three days to await local buyers.155 The aim was to oblige them to sell cheaply, and even if the merchants held firm they could still be obliged to sell if the city’s magistrates used the pretext of an emergency. The 152 153 154 155

ADCO C 2999, fol. 24, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , p. 195. ADCO C 2982, fols., 19–21, 22, 259. Ibid., fol. 66. In 1680, they requested that this edict apply to all vines planted in the course of the previous eighteen years. Monahan, Year of sorrows, pp. 25–6, Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 212–13.

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Estates regularly protested, persuading the crown to issue arrˆets du conseil forbidding the practice, unfortunately they cut little ice in Lyon.156 Within the limits of the possible, the Estates attempted to protect the traditional economic interests of the province, and some of their campaigns were of genuine utility. Despite their historic importance neither Autun nor Dijon possessed a university, and it was not until the definitive conquest of Franche-Comt´e in 1678 that Dole became a trouble-free alternative. The Estates called immediately for its university to be raised to the standard of those elsewhere in the kingdom.157 A favourable reply inspired the conseils des ´etats to move a step further in their remarques of 1688, when they called for a university to be established in Dijon.158 Their demand struck a chord with the deputies and the request was repeated regularly until the end of the reign. Persistence eventually brought its reward, and in 1718 Dijon was endowed with a faculty of law, marking the birth of the city’s university. With the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and numerous other legal institutions within the province it soon proved to be a valuable acquisition. fa m i n e If war was the great scourge of the seventeenth century, famine and plague were never far behind. The beginnings of the personal reign of Louis XIV had coincided with the terrible famine of 1661, and during the decade after 1688 the province endured a series of subsistence crises. Burgundy did not experience a complete harvest failure, but the shortfall was sufficient in 1691, 1693 and 1698 to remove the surplus that in normal years made it an exporter of grain.159 The pressure on the poorest members of the population was intense. After travelling to the Estates of 1691, the prince de Cond´e informed Pontchartrain that ‘I am forced to tell you that I have found more misery here than I believed’, adding that in ‘the villages on the road that I took, I did not see a single inhabitant who did not ask me for alms’.160 Other contemporary witnesses corroborate his story,161 and in December 1693 the desperate ´elus claimed that starvation stalked the towns of the province. They alleged that in Beaune a number of unfortunates had already died, and when autopsies had been performed they were discovered 156 157 159 160 161

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 212–13. 158 ADCO C 3040, fol. 1. ADCO C 2982, fols. 62–3. Monahan, Year of sorrows, pp. 6, 24, and Saint-Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 176–9. AN G7 157, fols 180–1, Cond´e to Pontchartrain, 4 June 1691. Ibid., fols. 210–13, Combes to Pontchartrain, 19 July 1691.

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to be ‘full of grass’.162 Many similar reports could be cited, and even if the ´elus had exaggerated the degree of misery to win concessions from the government there is no doubt that the crisis of the 1690s was real. The Estates, or in their absence the ´elus, were not the only institution concerned by the threat of famine, and the governor, the intendant and the Parlement and the municipal authorities of Dijon were all expected to play their part. In a society attuned to every vagary of the agricultural year, it did not take much to set alarm bells ringing. Thus, on 7 October 1698, the comte de Choiseul-Chevigny, ´elu of the nobility, informed the chamber that the harvest had produced less than half of that recorded the previous year.163 He suggested writing immediately to the governor and to the bishop of Autun, both of whom were at court, to press them to intervene with the contrˆoleur g´en´eral. In the meantime, the secr´etaire des ´etats, Claude Rigoley, prepared a memoir for the intendant, Ferrand, who was touring his administrative fief in Bresse, calling for grain exports from the province to be banned. By 14 October, Choiseul-Chevigny could report that he had seen the intendant and that the procureur syndic of the Estates had presented him with the necessary requˆete demanding the export ban. The next day, Ferrand issued an ordinance ‘on the requˆete’ and the doors for the export of Burgundian grain were closed.164 If the administrative protocol for dealing with a grain shortage was clear, it was impossible for Burgundy to batten down the hatches completely. Armies could not be left unfed, and if Lyon was simultaneously stricken by dearth the crown could not risk leaving a city of 100,000 souls to its fate. In these circumstances, the ´elus and the Parlement of Dijon (which was responsible for public order in the city) could find themselves defending local interests against those of Lyon, army quartermasters and even the crown. The famine of 1693–4, which was one of the worst of the century, illustrated this point perfectly. During the late autumn of 1692, the ´elus pleaded with the governor and the contrˆoleur g´en´eral to stop further purchases of grain that were driving prices skywards.165 The comte de Briord, ´elu of the nobility, was sent to Versailles armed with memoranda to distribute in defence of their cause. According to the ´elus, Burgundy was threatened by merchants from Lyon who were fraudulently collaborating with the military 162 163 164 165

ADCO C 3138, fols. 458–9, 23 December 1693. The ´elus wrote a very similar letter to the governor, Cond´e, ibid., fol. 458. ADCO C 3143, fols. 227, 298. Ibid., fol. 320. On the protocol involved, see AN G7 158, fol. 359, Ferrand to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, 24 October 1699. ADCO C 3138, fol. 423.

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quartermasters, who had permission to draw more grain from the province to support the army defending the fortress of Pinerolo in Savoy.166 While trying to remain sympathetic, Pontchartrain replied that Lyon could not be left without supplies, and the poor harvest of 1693 made matters worse.167 When in December 1693, the minister gave orders for the ´elus to provide 90,000 sacks of grain for the royal armies, they replied angrily that ‘the total exhaustion of this province makes it absolutely impossible’.168 It was in this letter that the ´elus referred to starvation in Beaune, and their protests did produce results with the minister agreeing to reduce his demand to 50,000 sacks.169 Faced with a hungry population the response of the ´elus was procrastination. First they argued that the province had already been emptied of grain, and when this failed they contradicted themselves somewhat by proposing to buy the grain. Pontchartrain eventually allowed them to purchase one-third of the total, with the remainder being collected by ‘imposition’ on the Burgundian population as a whole. It was the insistence of the ´elus which ensured that this extraordinary levy fell on ecclesiastics, nobles and other members of the privileged elites and not just the taillables.170 Not that the ´elus showed any real enthusiasm for collecting the grain. By March 1694 they had only succeeded in buying 12,800 sacks, while a further 7,000 had been requisitioned.171 To parry the expected blows from Versailles, the ´elus wrote to Pontchartrain describing the allegedly apocalyptical state of the population, especially in the Charolais and Autunois where: for at least two months they [the people] live mostly on bracken roots [and] are gathered in the forests where they steal anything they can find, they [have] set fire at night to several farms in order that the animals are trapped in the flames and they can devour their remains.172

As the intendant had requested troops to deal with disturbances around Charolles in March 1694, there was some truth in these allegations, and during the spring of 1694 the crisis reached its height.173 However, Ferrand subsequently accused the ´elus of negligence in collecting the remaining grain, earning them a sharp rebuke from both the governor and Pontchartrain.174 166 167 168 169 170 171 173 174

Ibid., fols. 213–14, the ´elus to Pontchartrain, 8 August 1693. Ibid., fols. 256–7, Pontchartrain to the ´elus, 17 August 1693. Ibid., fols. 458–9, the ´elus to Pontchartrain, 23 December 1693. ADCO C 3139, fols. 97, 117–18, 119, 123–6. This was eventually reduced further to 30,000 sacks. Ibid., fol. 150, Pontchartrain to the ´elus, 16 February 1694. 172 Ibid. Ibid., fols. 202–3, the ´elus to Pontchartrain, 27 March 1694. AN G7 158, fols. 354, 357, Ferrand to Pontchartrain, 11 March 1694, and ibid, 28 March 1694. ADCO C 3139, fols 243–4, Henri-Jules to the ´elus, 15 June 1694.

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The ´elus defended their conduct stoutly, and the quarrel was derived, as much as anything, from the conflicting roles of those involved. When presented with explicit orders to assist the army or the authorities in Lyon, the intendant could not forget that he was a royal nominee whose future depended, in part, on the goodwill of the ministry. The ´elus had no such constraints and they could, and did, put what they believed were the interests of the province first. As for the governor, he was generally sympathetic to the ´elus. When the threat of famine returned in 1698, he was quick to act. The city authorities in Lyon once again sought to draw grain from the province, despite the export ban imposed in October of that year.175 As before, the intendant went along with their demands, providing passports for grain to be sent down the Saˆone. Henri-Jules was suspicious, ordering Rigoley to send agents to compile details of prices in Lyon as well as in the major markets of Burgundy. He called for haste and had the good sense to order this to be accomplished in secret, remarking on more than one occasion that ‘it was not fair to die of hunger in Burgundy to ensure abundance in the city of Lyon’.176 Between them the governor and the ´elus provided a doughty, if not impregnable shield against outside interference in time of dearth. When the last great crisis of the reign arrived in the form of the terrible winter of 1709 they once again swung into action.177 From 5 January until early March the kingdom was paralysed by arctic temperatures that saw the river Saˆone freeze almost overnight, while the bitter frost killed vines and an entire crop of winter wheat.178 As the harvest of 1708 had been poor, panic quickly set in as the prospect of hunger once more appeared on the horizon. In his study of the crisis, Monahan has revealed how the authorities in Lyon, aided by the local governor, Villeroy, acted decisively. In addition to purchasing grain in Provence, the Franche-Comt´e and even Italy, the authorities in Lyon turned their attention to Burgundy. Ignoring the angry protests of the local population, Villeroy at one point in May 1709 sent troops to move grain down the Saˆone from Auxonne,179 and only serious riots in Chalon-sur-Saˆone in August prevented further shipments. In the light of the problems experienced during the 1690s, a clash with Lyon was almost inevitable. However, Monahan suggests that Burgundy 175 176 177

178

BMD MS 2240, fol. 53, Henri-Jules to Rigoley, 13 December 1698. Ibid., 27 November 1698, and C 3144, fol. 298. The works of Lachiver, Les ann´ees de mis`ere, pp. 268–369, and Monahan, Year of sorrows, provide the essential guides to the crisis. Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 193–202, supplies an introduction to the situation in Burgundy. 179 Ibid., pp. 104–5. Monahan, Year of sorrows, pp. 71–8.

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was at a disadvantage for want of adequate protectors.180 It is true that the venerable governor, Henri-Jules, died in April 1709, and his son, Louis III, also succumbed in 1710, but the province was not quite as helpless as it might at first appear. As rumours that troops were to be used to move grain began to circulate, the ´elus received alarming reports that the local population was arming itself to resist.181 After warning the governor, they ordered JeanBaptiste Suremain, receiver for the bailliage of Auxonne, to travel down the river informing the population of their actions in a largely successful bid to calm the situation. A few weeks later, in early July, the arrival of Louis III in Dijon to open the Estates provided the opportunity for the adoption of further measures designed to alleviate the crisis. Agents were despatched to buy grain and seed corn from provinces less badly affected by the terrible winter.182 The abb´e de Saint-Maurice, who was on a mission to Marseille, proved particularly enterprising. He discovered that there were abundant supplies of grain in both North Africa and Italy, but that enemy shipping made importation hazardous.183 His proposed solution was to ‘arm two ships to go and fetch grain’. The intrepid abb´e’s attempt to add another footnote to the history of the War of the Spanish Succession was vetoed by the more pusillanimous ´elus, who told him to buy rice instead.184 While seeking to import rice and grain, the administration adopted more novel tactics to redistribute scarce resources, namely by imposing a levy in kind upon those parts of the province least affected by the crisis.185 Grain and vegetables were requisitioned from those communities with a surplus in place of the taille, while the Chalonnais, the Brionnais, the Charolais and the Morvan received free seed corn, which was distributed by the receivers of the taille. As for the vegetables, they were sent to the hard-pressed towns of Autun, Semur-en-Brionnais, Montcenis and Couches ‘to be sold cheaply in order to help the local inhabitants . . . to survive more comfortably’.186 The money raised from these sales was to be delivered to the treasurer general, thus helping to make up the shortfall in the taille. As tax collection had all but collapsed in three of the fifteen bailliages,187 the scheme appears enlightened, and given the harsh criticism of the provincial administration by subsequent historians a degree of revisionism seems essential. Alas, there was a sting in the tail. In May 1710, when the crisis had begun to abate, the ´elus received a letter from Andr´e Cheval de Fontenay, receiver 180 182 183 185 186 187

181 ADCO C 3154, fol. 180, d’Arconey to the ´elus, 18 April 1709. Ibid., pp. 27, 48–50, 116. AN G7 162, fol. 281, Louis III to Desmarets, 19 July 1709, and ADCO C 3030, fols. 531–3. 184 Ibid., fols. 516–17, the ´elus to Louis III, 25 August 1709. ADCO C 3154, fols. 423–5, 516–17. ADCO C 3688, deliberation of 25 September 1709. Ibid., deliberation of 9 December 1709. Saint Jacob Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 195–6.

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at Autun, asking what he should do with the stockpiles of unsold vegetables in the four towns where they had been sent. Only at Autun had they been purchased in any significant quantities because ‘the same vegetables were available more cheaply than the price the ´elus had fixed for those they had sent’.188 As for the rice, that too had found few takers amongst local peasants. Of the ‘2,592 pounds of rice that he had received, nearly 2,000 remained and he awaited the orders of the ´elus’. Not for the last time a well-intentioned bureaucracy had discovered the power of market forces, and the vegetables and rice were sold at a loss. Happily for the province, Burgundian peasants were more experienced in these matters. During the spring of 1709 they had planted barley to replace their perished wheat and had reaped a bumper crop. By the autumn of 1709, barley bread was selling in Lyon like the proverbial hot cakes, undercutting that baked in the city using expensive Italian flour.189 Previous accounts of the Burgundian administration during the reign of Louis XIV have been damning in their assessment of an institution that was allegedly rotten to the core. Real problems undoubtedly existed. Corruption within the chamber of ´elus, whether in drawing up tax rolls, auctioning leases for the octrois or distributing public works contracts was an almost daily occurrence. The procedures followed by the chamber were frequently lax, and by drawing upon the criticisms of the alcades and the correspondence of frustrated ministers it would be relatively easy to produce more evidence reinforcing this unfavourable verdict. While acknowledging the many weaknesses of the provincial administration we should, however, remember that there was another side to the story. Throughout the reign of Louis XIV, the Estates continued to police the activities of their officers and useful reforms were implemented. Yet if the debate is simply reduced to the level of an argument about whether the Estates and their administration was corrupt and inefficient, or dedicated and reforming, our understanding of the institution will not advance very far. One of the principal obstacles to attaining a balanced judgement is provided by the nature of the documentary record available. When examined over a long period, the remarques of the alcades or the d´ecrets of the Estates seem to suggest that little was achieved. Despite reforms, such as the d´ecret of 1682, regulating the conduct of the chamber of ´elus, or that of 1688, policing the administration of public works, the alcades were still obliged to criticise the ´elus many years later. For Thomas, this was a sign of their failure. The problem with such an interpretation derives from the 188

ADCO C 3688, Cheval to the ´elus, 23 May 1710.

189

Monahan, Year of sorrows, p. 154.

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assumption that institutions evolve in a smooth and linear fashion, with the adoption of new practices and reforms taking the administration on to a higher plane. In reality, evolution, if that is the right term, was a more complicated process. Given the structure of the chamber of ´elus, and the strategic importance of the representatives of the three orders who changed with every triennalit´e, it was necessary to repeat d´ecrets on a regular basis to ensure that their contents became an established part of administrative practice. If this did not occur, even the most salutary measure could fall by the wayside. The remarques of the alcades, or the d´ecrets of the Estates should not, therefore, be cited as evidence of total failure, but rather a part of the slow and piecemeal process by which an imperfect, yet vibrant institution developed. A rounded assessment of the administration of Burgundy in the harsh climate of the late seventeenth century suggests that something positive had been achieved, even if an awful lot remained to be done.

chapter 8

The limits of absolutism: crown, governor and the Estates in the eighteenth century

Historians are in agreement that Louis XIV’s government was more effective than its predecessors in controlling the French provinces, even if they continue to quarrel about the means by which it was achieved. In Burgundy, the crown had been largely content to rely upon the services of the governor to manage the Estates, and the financial and other demands of the crown were worked out in consultation with Chantilly. The role of the intendant, while important, had never been all powerful, and successive incumbents were obliged to work with the governor or risk dismissal.1 During the early years of the new reign, the duc de Bourbon continued the family tradition by jealously guarding his authority in the province, his determination undoubtedly redoubled after the failure of his brief spell as Louis XV’s first minister.2 The premature death of Bourbon in January 1740 threw his family and the province into consternation. His son, Louis-Joseph, the new prince de Cond´e, was a child of four, and the resulting interregnum offered the crown a golden opportunity to tighten its control over the Estates. The interim governor, the duc de Saint Aignan, was no more than a figurehead, who did little beyond presiding at the triennial meetings of the Estates. The crown was forced to fill the resulting power vacuum, issuing a string of r`eglements designed to limit the powers and police the activities of both the Estates and the ´elus. No less disturbing for the provincial authorities was the king’s decision to assume responsibility for appointing the key officials in the local administration. Finally, in 1754, the intendant, Joly de Fleury, struck what appeared to be a decisive blow against provincial independence by purchasing the office of ´elu du roi.3 He thus acquired a permanent position within the chamber of ´elus, and had every reason to hope that the administration would now do his bidding. 1 2 3

The classic example being d’Argouges in 1694, see chapter 3. Campbell, Power and politics, pp. 69–109. ´ du roi’, is the essential introduction to this episode. Dumont, ‘Elus

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The death of the duc de Bourbon has, therefore, been seen as a turning point in the history of the province, marking a sharp decline in the influence of the Cond´e, who could no longer treat it as if it were their own personal fiefdom.4 Burgundy had apparently joined the rest of the kingdom in bowing beneath the power of the administrative monarchy and its principal agents, the intendants. Yet when examined in detail, the events of 1740 to 1754 proved to be a swing of a pendulum, rather than a definitive change of direction. Once the prince de Cond´e assumed charge of his governorship in 1754 many of the old practices were reinstated. While never establishing the complete control over the administration exercised by his father, he remained one of the principal figures through whom the king controlled the Estates. If the governor acted as a brake on the centralising ambitions of the crown, he was ably seconded by the actions of the Estates themselves. They never accepted the reduction in their powers of appointment and selfregulation, and in the course of the second half of the eighteenth century they would fight hard to reverse the decisions taken during the interregnum. the duc de bourbon As Burgundy began to recover from the damage inflicted by the wars of Louis XIV, its inhabitants at least had the satisfaction of knowing that the new reign promised a bright future for their governor. With Louis XV no more than a child, power passed to the regency government of the duc d’Orl´eans, who was always careful to seek the support of the other princes and the court grandees. The duc de Bourbon was made a member of the regency council, and became a firm supporter of the Scottish financier, John Law. With his insider knowledge of Law’s system he was able to make millions, neatly avoiding the crash when it came in 1720. Bourbon was sufficiently grateful to provide the horses and his mistress the carriage, when the Scotsman fled the kingdom in December of that year.5 When the regent finally succumbed to his rakish lifestyle and collapsed and died in December 1723, Bourbon replaced him as the king’s first minister.6 Historians have been almost unanimous in their harsh condemnation of his rule. ‘Talentless’,7 of ‘very limited capacity’, ‘ugly, blind in one eye, 4 5 6 7

The argument is common to the works of Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 165–75; Bordes, L’administration provinciale, pp. 32–3; and Natcheson, ‘Absentee government’. J. H. Shennan, Philippe duke of Orl´eans, regent of France, 1715–1723 (London, 1979), pp. 115–16. The following is drawn from Campbell, Power and politics, pp. 69–92. Shennan, Orl´eans, pp. 37, 145.

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bandy-legged, and stupid’8 are some examples of the scorn heaped upon the duc, who was allegedly dependent on the advice of his equally unpopular mistress, Mme de Prie. Many of these critics have underestimated the difficulties facing Bourbon, who had a relatively weak position at court and little time to acquire the experience needed to govern.9 Ultimately he was worsted by a far more wily political operator, the cardinal de Fleury, who was able to use his immense credit with the king to bring about the duc’s disgrace in December 1725. If Bourbon’s ambitions to play a role on the national political stage were over, he could at least seek consolation in his family’s Burgundian powerbase. Until his death he would prove to be a conscientious and able governor, revealing an attention to detail worthy of his grandfather, HenriJules. It was Bourbon who used his political credit to facilitate the merger of the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine, bringing it under the administrative control of the chamber of ´elus, a project that had been under consideration since at least 1677.10 He was also prepared to defend the privileges of the Estates,11 and to fulfil the traditional role of intermediary with the crown, especially on matters of taxation.12 Finally, he was determined to maintain his own authority, and the rights of appointment that went with it. As we have seen, he ordered his trusted adviser, the treasurer general, Chartraire de Montigny, to prepare the famous ‘Devil’s register’ containing information about potential candidates for preferment.13 He was no less meticulous in examining the conduct of the administration. The ´elu du roi, Richard, discovered this to his cost in January 1717 when he acted without consulting the other members of the chamber. The duc informed him sternly that: you should know that all of the affairs of the province must pass by the canal of the ´elus of the three orders, who alone are the guardians of the authority of the Estates, and I can only strongly disapprove of the conduct of those who do not respect this right and practice.14

If Bourbon was determined to uphold the rights of the Estates and their ´elus, he was, if anything, even more jealous of his own authority. In November 1732, he was mortified to hear that the ´elus had failed to make a payment 8 9 10 11 12 14

The verdicts of A. M. Wilson and Alfred Cobban respectively cited in Campbell, Power and politics, p. 70. Campbell offers by far the most sympathetic and convincing study of his ministry, Power and politics, pp. 69–109. Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 129–30. A good example is provided by the quarrel over the right of the Estates to appoint and dismiss the receivers of the taille, ADCO C 3432–3, and C 3415. 13 See chapter 4. See chapter 10. BMC AC GB 31, fol. 1, duc de Bourbon to Richard, 3 January 1717.

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he had explicitly authorised. A firm letter was quickly despatched to the ´elu of the clergy, Moreau, in which the governor declared: when I make my intentions known to you as clearly and as positively as I have on this occasion, it is for me to answer to the king for my actions and for you others to execute my orders without fearing to be disavowed by the Estates who, by the affection that they have for me and the care they know I have for their interests, will always find pleasure and honour to follow where I shall lead.15

His letter reveals much about the relationship between the governor and the Estates, and with the mayors and other Burgundian officials over whom he held sway. t h e ‘ag e o f a b s o lu t i s m ’ Having lived under the unbroken rule of the Cond´e since the beginning of Louis XIV’s personal rule, it is easy to imagine the shock caused by the news of the duc de Bourbon’s death on 27 January 1740.16 There were rumours that the family would lose control of the province, but Louis XV was quick to announce that Bourbon’s young son, Louis-Joseph, would inherit his father’s position once he came of age. If the governorship had been passed to his uncle, the comte de Charolais, during the interim as the family demanded, then their influence in Burgundy would have been undiminished.17 Unfortunately, the comte was a mentally unstable, violent character who was not thought fit to be left in charge of a pays d’´etats.18 Instead, Paul-Hippolyte de Beauvilliers, duc de Saint-Aignan, the French ambassador in Rome, was named governor. According to the marquis d’Argenson, he received the office in order to restore the lamentable state of his personal finances.19 It is also likely that Fleury had used the governorship as a way of sweetening the bitter pill of recall from Rome, as the two events overlapped in a way that suggests more than just coincidence. Surprisingly, Saint-Aignan was offered the chance to install himself in Dijon, where the role of resident governor would undoubtedly have been a significant one.20 He rejected the idea, and throughout the fourteen years of his tenure he treated his office as nothing more than a lucrative sinecure. 15 16 17 18 19

BMC AC GB 33, fols. 252–3, Bourbon to abb´e Moreau, 26 November 1732. The best account of the crisis of 1740 is Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 165–72. Charolais tried to exchange the government of Burgundy for that of Touraine which he held in his own right, ibid., p. 168. Smith claims that he was ‘a violent man who could not be entrusted with the supervision of a pays d’´etats’. 20 Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 167–8. D’Argenson, Journal, ii, pp. 399–404.

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The Estates were thus robbed of their greatest protector, and their relative weakness when confronted by a determined ministry would soon be brought home in earnest. Within days of Bourbon’s death the ´elus received a letter from the secretary of state, the comte de Saint-Florentin summoning them to Paris.21 The ´elus, unaccustomed to such peremptory treatment from the minister, delayed their departure on the pretext of urgent business in Dijon. However, they could not resist the new wind blowing from Versailles for long. From 1740 until his retirement in 1775, Saint-Florentin became a key figure in the relationship between the Estates. His remarkable political longevity was a key factor in the strengthening of central control, and henceforth the ´elus were obliged to correspond directly with him on nearly all matters pertaining to the local administration. More worrying from the point of view of the Estates was the government’s determination to interfere in their internal affairs. As the members gathered for the assembly of June 1742, Saint-Florentin became convinced that a conspiracy was afoot. In a stern letter to the alcades he warned that: the king has been surprised to learn that you have altered the practice of your predecessors by admitting a clerk of the Estates into the chamber where you work, this innovation, while unimportant in itself, implies nevertheless an element of mystery which gives His Majesty cause to suspect that you wish to innovate in your remarques in ways that are unrelated to your mission, or are perhaps even contrary to the interests of His Majesty and to the tranquillity of the Estates.22

The minister went on to name Claude Sauvage, one of the alcades of the third estate, as the ringleader, concluding menacingly that: truth should dictate your observations, [but] it is no less reasonable that there should be neither malignancy not bitterness [in your remarques], if they cause the least trouble, His Majesty proposes to examine them himself and they could serve against those of you who are the authors.

The ministry was clearly nervous that the death of the duc de Bourbon would weaken its control over the assembly, and the remarques of the alcades were one obvious channel through which opposition could be directed. Rather than take any risks, the new governor and the intendant took the decision to intervene, persuading the alcades to ‘modify part of the preamble as well as article[s] 1, 13 and the last [one] and to suppress entirely articles 3.5.6.7.8.9.10.14.16.17.18.19.20.21.23.25.26.30.31 et 33’.23 21 22 23

ADCO C 3360, fol. 179, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 9 February 1740. ADCO C 3304, fols. 3–4, ‘copie de la lettre de M. le comte de Saint-Florentin a` messieurs les alcades, 26 May 1742’. ADCO C 3304, fol. 2.

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Such draconian measures indicate the government’s determination to avoid trouble at the Estates, and how serious it perceived the threat to be. The remarques themselves were certainly outspoken.24 The alcades had been incensed by the refusal of the permanent officials to provide them with the ‘crucial evidence of the administration of the last triennalit´e’.25 It was their subsequent decision to prepare a protest that caused Saint-Florentin to panic, and it presumably accounts for the hypersensitive reaction of Saint-Aignan and the intendant. They were worried that the complaints of the alcades would inspire the Estates to take a closer look at the provincial administration, and it is true that a number of the censored articles could be interpreted in that sense. Amongst their principal targets were the ‘gratifications’ and pensions awarded by the Estates at a time when the ‘province is overburdened with taxes’.26 They also called for a tighter control of the province’s officials, especially in relation to the awarding of public works contracts and the leases for the collection of the salt tax (crues). Finally, they proposed a number of potentially controversial reforms, notably that ‘it would be appropriate to issue a d´ecret granting the treasurer general a fixed annual sum in place of so many gages, salaries, costs and rights of receipt and remittance’.27 These were long and detailed remarques, and they certainly had the potential to stir the Estates. Yet, when looked at from a long-term perspective, they were hardly unique, and the alcades had a distinguished record of criticising the administration. In the particularly sensitive context of 1742, the minister and the king’s representatives in Dijon decided to take no chances, and the assembly passed off without serious incident.28 Saint-Florentin had learnt from the experience, and before the next meeting of the Estates he acted to reinforce his own authority. In a letter sent to the alcades in January 1745, he ordered them to keep proper records and a formal register of their proceedings, adding that they were also to send their remarques to him in order that ‘I can, after taking his orders [the king’s], send them back to you before your final meetings prior to the Estates, and [the king] expects that the same procedure shall be followed in the future by all those who succeed you in the functions of alcades’.29 24 25 28

29

Ibid., fols. 7–82. In the register, ibid., fol. 2, is written ‘ce m´emoire a e´t´e donn´e par le comte de Brancion qui e´tait un des alcades de la noblesse’. 26 Ibid., fols. 61–2. 27 Ibid., fol. 79–90. Ibid., fols. 10–11. ADCO C 3004, fol. 16, and C 3044, fols. 104–5. The only real crisis resulted from the increase in the amount paid in ‘dons et gratifications’, which in itself helps to explain why some of the alcades remarques were unwelcome The incident is examined in greater detail in chapter 3. ADCO C 3302, Saint Florentin to the alcades, 6 January 1745.

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Not content with attempting to muzzle the alcades, Saint-Florentin was busily interfering in the organisation of the Estates, removing the arms of Cond´e from the great hall and regulating the ceremonial for the new governor.30 More importantly, the ministry was also planning an assault on the prerogatives of the Estates and the authority of the ´elus. In September 1742, the new ´elus received some very unwelcome news from SaintFlorentin, who informed them that in future not only their own positions, but also those of the treasurer general, secr´etaires des ´etats, procureur syndics and receivers would be filled by the king.31 Only the mayors, the provincial engineer, the architect and the avocat au conseil would continue to be chosen by the Estates. These changes were incorporated in a r`eglement of 14 May 1742 which dealt a severe blow to both the Cond´e, who had previously been almost solely responsible for filling these offices, and the Estates which had ratified their choice. Such a decision would have been inconceivable during the lifetime of the duc de Bourbon, and without their protector the ´elus were almost helpless. The Estates were not due to meet again until 1745, and the crown was in no mood to tolerate opposition. When the ´elus decided to await the formal opening of their chamber in November 1742 before making an official response, Saint-Florentin was quick to issue a reprimand. In an uncompromising missive he declared that: His Majesty has been surprised to learn that you intend to deliberate at your next assembly on the precise orders contained in these letters, and he has ordered me to explain once again his intentions about which he does not expect to hear any remonstrances.32

In the age of Fontenoy and of Louis le Bien-Aim´e resistance seemed pointless, and the ´elus meekly complied.33 It was a peaceful revolution, and one that seemed to mark a fundamental change in the relationship between the crown and the Estates. Since 1660, successive governors had controlled key appointments to both the chamber of ´elus and the provincial administration and that power had, in theory, now been lost. It is true that after 1754, the prince de Cond´e would regain de facto, if not de jure, control of many of these offices,34 but his patronage was no longer as all encompassing as before. The provincial receivers, in particular, continued to be nominated by the crown, and it became a burning ambition of the Estates to recover complete authority over these vital officers. 30 31 32 33

Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, p. 172. ADCO C 3360, fol. 225, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 22 September 1742. Ibid ., fol. 225, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 5 November 1742. 34 See chapters 4 and 5. Ibid ., fol. 227, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 15 November 1742.

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The next stage in the royal assault upon provincial independence was to regulate the composition and organisation of the administration. Before 1740, it was the Estates themselves who policed the chamber of the ´elus by issuing d´ecrets, but in the course of 1743 Saint-Florentin announced the king’s intention to legislate on these matters himself.35 After consulting with the chamber, Louis XV issued an arrˆet du conseil, dated 9 April 1744, in the form of a r`eglement for the chamber of ´elus.36 It set out the rights and powers of the respective officers, and, although it was little more than a formal statement of existing practice, the fact that it was the king, rather than the Estates, who was calling the tune was highly significant. While not challenging the right of the Estates to issue d´ecrets, the r`eglement created a precedent that in future might prove difficult to resist. As a body, the chamber of ´elus was content to register the r`eglement without comment or protest, and the only opposition came from the Chambre des Comptes of Dijon.37 Its officers were angered by article two, which had stated that only the ´elu of the clergy, or in his absence the ´elu of the nobility, could preside in the chamber. Despite mobilising a series of ancient precedents to support their claim to share the honour, their protest was rejected.38 By issuing the r`eglements of 1742 and 1744, the king had seemingly broken with the traditional practice of using the Cond´e as his intermediaries for controlling the Estates, sharply reducing their patronage power.39 With Saint Aignan little more than a figurehead, the crown was clearly obliged to take responsibility for decisions previously taken by the governor. The crucial question for the Estates was whether or not the king would enforce the r`eglements to the letter. The initial signs were not encouraging, and, to make matters worse, they were simultaneously confronted by an ambitious intendant, Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury. He revived an idea first mooted by Colbert and Bouchu of acquiring the office of ´elu du roi, and convinced the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Machault, of the virtues of his scheme, arguing that it would make ‘the intendance of Burgundy one of the most attractive in the 35

36 37 38

39

ADCO C 3360, fols. 242–3, Saint-Florentin to the bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone, 6 September 1743. In this letter, the minister makes it clear that the Estates had already provided memoirs and that the king wanted to check if further information was likely to be forthcoming. BMD MS 981, fols. 135–7, ‘Arrˆet du conseil du roy portant reglement pour la chambre des e´lus g´en´eraux de Bourgogne du 9 avril 1744’. ADCO C 3055, ‘Observations sur le m´emoire de la chambre des comptes de Dijon concernant le r`eglement fait pour la chambre des e´lus en 1744’. ADCO C 3360, fol. 298, Saint-Florentin to the abb´e de Cˆıteaux, ´elu of the clergy, 17 July 1746. It has to be said that this decision was in accordance with the sentiment of the Estates themselves, which had long insisted on the need for the presence of their own ´elus. As we have seen, in chapter 4, the extent of their decline was less extensive than usually thought.

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kingdom’.40 When Colbert had proposed the idea in 1668, the Estates were incensed, quite reasonably suspecting that it was part of a plan to reduce their powers.41 The Grand Cond´e had rallied to their side, and, according to one reliable account, had exchanged sharp words with Colbert, threatening that: if this union was accomplished he would very humbly beg His Majesty to agree that he should never return to Burgundy. M. Colbert responded warmly and [it] became a serious matter that was discussed before the king.

According to the author of this report, Cond´e’s recent role in the conquest of Franche-Comt´e had reinforced his credit with Louis XIV and the idea was dropped. Joly de Fleury was sufficiently astute to realise that his revival of that plan would provoke the hostility of the Estates, and he was obliged to move stealthily. Rather than reveal his design, he arranged for the local receveur g´en´eral des finances, Antoine Carrelet, to buy the office on his behalf for the imposing sum of 110,000 livres.42 The negotiations dragged on, and it was not until June 1754 that the transaction was complete, just in time for the Estates of that year which were due to open in August. The intendant was delighted, and clearly believed that he was now in a position to control the chamber of ´elus and through them the provincial administration. At first all appeared to go well, and after his entry into the chamber he wrote ‘everything passed off quietly, they sense that they have no means to complain. The first flames were hot, but no more will be said and they will become accustomed to it in the end’.43 Much of the initial opposition came from the deputies of the Chambre des Comptes, who were horrified to discover that Joly de Fleury had procured a royal arrˆet giving him precedence over themselves. His intention to take an active role in the administration was all too clear, and his enhanced status was expressed at the Estates where he cast off the traditional black robe of a maˆıtre de requˆetes in favour of ‘coloured clothing’ like the governor.44 His confidence was misplaced, and his hopes of dominating the chamber of ´elus were soon dashed. Through no fault of his own, the timing of the intendant’s coup could not have been worse. On 28 July 1754, Machault resigned as contrˆoleur 40 41

42 43

´ du roi’, pp. 199–200. The essential guide to this affair is Dumont, ‘Elu BMC AC GB 27, fols. 665–7, bishop of Autun to Henri-Jules, 8 February 1689, and attached ‘M´emoire de ce qui se passa en 1668 et de ce qui peut avoir donn´e occasion a` ce qui s’est dit que feu M. Colbert avoit eu quelque dessein de r´eunir a` l’intendance la charge d’´elu du roi en la province de Bourgogne’. The details of the sale are contained in ADCO C 3059. 44 Ibid. ´ du roi’, p. 202. Cited in Dumont, ‘Elu

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g´en´eral, moving to the politically less sensitive berth of secretary of state for the marine. A genuine reformer, he was no friend of the provincial estates, whose privileges and administrative independence clashed with his plans for a more uniform fiscal administration. His successors were less rigorous, and Joly de Fleury could not count upon their wholehearted support. A second, probably decisive blow, was the arrival of the new governor, the prince de Cond´e, who made it clear that he was determined to exercise his family’s traditional role as defender of the Estates. When the new ´elus made plans for the voyage of honour at the beginning of 1755, the intendant demanded the right to accompany them in his capacity as ´elu du roi.45 The governor backed the other ´elus in their protests to the ministry, informing the new contrˆoleur g´en´eral that: this claim is not only against custom, but it is also contrary to the king’s r`eglement of 1744. You tell me, sir, that you have not heard word of this matter. As it might escape your attention amidst the many affairs of which you are charged, I ask you to recall it in the event that M. de Fleury makes an approach to you.46

No more was heard of the matter, and the intendant was obliged to remain in Dijon, while the ´elus re-established their old links with the governor and presented their remontrances to the king. The setback of March 1755 was part of a more general pattern. Without resorting to drastic measures, the ´elus, backed by the governor, made it clear that, within the chamber, Joly de Fleury would be treated as the ´elu du roi, and that he could not confuse that position with his authority as intendant. His hopes of directing the administration were thwarted, and after sapping his morale the Estates resorted to their tried and tested formula of buying their way out of difficulty. In a deal negotiated with the ministry, Joly de Fleury and the local Bureau des Finances, the Estates bought the office of ´elu du roi for themselves at the inflated price of 210,000 livres.47 Of that sum 110,000 livres was to conclude the arrangement between Carrelet and Joly de Fleury, while the remainder was employed to sweeten the bitter pill of defeat for the intendant. As a later commentator noted: the province had first bought this office for just 110,000 livres, but to rid themselves of M. de Fleury . . . who was suspected of having bought it with the aim of knowing the resources of the province and of informing the ministry, five contracts of rentes of 20,000 livres each were created for him.48 45 46 47

Ibid., p. 203. ´ du roi’, p. 203. Cond´e to Moreau de S´echelles, March 1755, cited in Dumont, ‘Elu 48 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 55. Ibid., and ADCO C 3059.

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A generous golden handshake was a small price to pay to be rid of unwanted interference. The Estates were now free to sell the office to the Bureau des Finances of Dijon for 110,000 livres, and thereafter the office of ´elu du roi was held in strict rotation by members of that corps. The events of the period 1740 to 1754 had demonstrated that, in the absence of a powerful and sympathetic governor, the Estates were vulnerable to a determined ministry. Joly de Fleury’s acquisition of the office of ´elu du roi represented the high-water mark of royal interference in the internal affairs of the Estates, coming as it did after the r`eglements of 1742 and 1744 affecting the appointment of its officers and the procedures of the administration. Thereafter the prince de Cond´e and the Estates would reassert their influence, and a more traditional balance of power would be restored. Indeed, the second half of the eighteenth century would see an increasingly confident provincial administration take advantage of the growing weakness of the crown. g ove r n o r a n d t h e e s tat e s af te r 1754 Challenges to the interests of the Estates usually resulted from the fiscal policies of the crown, but during 1763 and 1764 the reforming measures of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, L’Averdy, brought a new threat. After the defeats of the Seven Years War, the desire for change was in the air, and the publication of a variety of reformist texts arguing for wider participation in government undoubtedly inspired the minister. In a bold move, he sought to reinvigorate French municipal life by abolishing venal offices and restoring elections.49 His measures were a precursor of later attempts to reform local government through the establishment of provincial assemblies, and they were a potentially effective way of restoring the popularity of a monarchy vulnerable to accusations of despotic behaviour. Reaction in the towns was favourable, and when the experiment was later abandoned, largely on account of L’Averdy’s fall and a change of political direction at Versailles, the reintroduction of venality proved unpopular.50 49

50

The most thorough treatment of the subject is M. Bordes, La r´eforme municipale du contrˆoleur g´en´eral Laverdy et son application 1764–1771 (Toulouse, 1968), although J. F´elix, Finances et politique au si`ecle des lumi`eres. Le Minist`ere L’Averdy, 1763–1768 (Paris, 1999), pp. 227–62, and J. Horn, ‘The limits of centralization: municipal politics in Troyes during the L’Averdy reforms’, French History 9 (1995), 153–79, should also be consulted. Terray, the minister responsible for reversing policy, was a long-standing critic of L’Averdy’s scheme. Popular reaction is discussed by: Bordes, R´eforme municipale, pp. 113, 270; F´elix, L’Averdy, pp. 260–1, and Horn, ‘Troyes’, 178–9.

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In Burgundy the situation was very different. When L’Averdy introduced his measures in the spring of 1764, he ran into fierce opposition from the local political establishment. Encouraged by the governor and his adviser, the abb´e Terray, the ´elus prepared a series of memoranda seeking to justify their claim that the province should be excluded from the reform.51 They argued that the Estates had already paid over five million livres for the municipal offices in the province, and, presumably aware that such a defence would not impress the minister, added that it would ‘overturn the constitution of the Estates’.52 The prince de Cond´e wrote to L’Averdy in support of the ´elus, and the intendant, Amelot, added his weight to the cause, incurring the wrath of the minister who tried in vain to secure his removal.53 Only the Parlement of Dijon, which had just spent a year in disgrace as a consequence of a quarrel with the ´elus, was enthusiastic. It called upon the minister to send the necessary edicts for its approval, presumably with the aim of embarrassing the ´elus.54 The origins of Burgundian hostility to the municipal reforms are not hard to find. Millions had been spent purchasing the offices of mayors because of their importance to the assemblies of the Estates, and it was the ´elus, acting in harmony with the governor, who controlled appointments. The danger of opposition within the Estates was, therefore, much reduced, and venality had the additional advantage of providing the ´elus with a legitimate excuse for interfering in the administration of the towns.55 If elections were introduced into Burgundy that control would be lost, and L’Averdy grew ever more frustrated at the resistance he encountered, particularly as he was personally willing to make amendments to his legislation to allay local anxieties.56 His efforts were in vain, and the Estates of 1766 proved impervious to change. During the subsequent voyage of honour the ´elus made fresh remonstrances, declaring that the existing system had provided stability, ‘peace and union’ which elections could never provide.57 Increasingly burdened by a series of political and financial crises, L’Averdy had the good sense to realise that his reforms had run into the sands of 51 52 53 54 55 56

57

ADCO C 3354, fol. 268, Cond´e to the ´elus, 11 December 1764. In his letter, the governor acknowledged receipt of these memoirs, and expressed his full agreement with them. ADCO C 3362, fols. 188–9, the ´elus to L’Averdy, 27 November 1764. F´elix, L’Averdy, pp. 259–60. The dispute with the ´elus is examined in chapter 9. The Parlement’s attitude towards the municipal reforms is discussed by Bordes, R´eforme municipale, pp. 147–60. Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 9, 103–14. AN H1 128, dos. 1, fol. 19, Menard de Conichard to Amelot, 30 July 1766. L’Averdy’s first commis makes it clear that the minister was extremely angry after the Estates of 1766, and that the intendant was the principal target of his wrath. ADCO C 3332, fols. 81–6, ‘Cahier de remontrances’ of the Estates of 1766.

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provincial privilege, and he let them drop. It was not a particularly edifying tale, but the Estates and their governor had once again demonstrated their ability to block measures which threatened their interests. Fighting off external interference in their affairs was not the only concern of the Estates, and quarrels with the ´etats particuliers were another regular feature of provincial life. These were usually caused by arguments about the distribution of the tax burden, and the prospect of ending these disputes by merging the smaller administrations with those of the Estates of Burgundy was always tempting. In 1751, the crown sanctioned the absorption of the comt´e of Charolles into the duchy, suppressing the local estates on the basis of their excessive cost and alleged incompetence.58 As the ´etats particuliers of Bar-sur-Seine had suffered a similar fate in 1721, that left those of the Mˆaconnais, the last surviving example of parochial self-government, extremely vulnerable to the aggrandising ambitions of the ´elus in Dijon. The ´elus were seconded by the intendant, Joly de Fleury, who, in 1756, recommended that the two administrations be merged on the death of the bishop of Mˆacon.59 The willingness of successive bishops to protect the ´etats particuliers, over which they exercised great influence, proved crucial to their survival. When the incumbent, Henri-Constance de Lort de S´erignan de Valras, died in 1763, his successor Gabriel Franc¸ois Moreau moved quickly, using his credit at court, to block plans for the absorption of the Mˆaconnais submitted by their ´elus in Dijon.60 Both bishops proved to be wily defenders of the local cause, and perhaps realising that the best means of preserving the ´etats particuliers lay in strengthening their powers, they launched a number of initiatives that brought them into conflict with the duchy. In 1756, for example, after the ´elus had concluded an abonnement for the two vingti`emes, the ´etats particuliers sent their own deputation to Versailles with the aim of negotiating a separate deal.61 If the Mˆaconnais could establish its own right to bargain about taxation, then its dependence upon the administration of the duchy would have been much reduced. Moreover, experience taught that an institution tied into a direct fiscal relationship with the crown need not fear suppression. To the dismay of the ´elus in Dijon, a cash-hungry government 58

59 60 61

The ´etats particuliers of the Charolais and the circumstances surrounding their suppression have been discussed by L. Laroche, ‘Les e´tats particuliers du Charolais’, M´emoires de la Societ´e pour l’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays Bourguignons, Comtois et Romands 6 (1939), 145–94. AN H1 124, dos. 2, fols. 41–3, Joly de Fleury to Peyrenc de Moras, 13 September 1756. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, pp. 195–6, and Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 204–5. ADCO C 3361, fols. 247–8, Joly de Fleury to the ´elus, 18 November 1756. As Joly de Fleury was simultaneously intendant and ´elu du roi in 1756, he kept the chamber informed of the negotiations.

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was happy to take advantage of the offer to contract a second, more lucrative abonnement. With the ´etats particuliers seemingly poised to escape the tutelage of the duchy, the prince de Cond´e intervened with the contrˆoleur g´en´eral.62 He brokered a compromise whereby the taxation needed to pay the abonnement, signed by the representatives of the Mˆaconnais, could only be levied ‘on a commission’ issued by the ´elus of the Estates of Burgundy. Here was a good example of the beneficial intervention of the governor, who had defused a crisis without wounding the prerogatives of either side. He would have ample opportunity to perfect those skills in the years to come, as the two administrations bickered about who had the right to oversee road building in the Mˆaconnais, the size of their respective contributions to the general tax burden and whether or not the inhabitants of ´ the comt´e should contribute to the costs of embellishing the Palais des Etats in Dijon.63 By the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI relations between the two institutions were at an all time low, and the abb´e de La Goutte, ´elu of the clergy, presented a memoir to the Estates of 1778 entitled Sur la n´ecessit´e de supprimer l’administration particuli`ere du Mˆaconnais.64 As the abb´e had just presided over what was arguably the most stormy triennalit´e of the century, neither the governor, nor the ministry was prepared to listen to his proposals.65 It was not until 1781 that tempers cooled sufficiently for negotiations, aimed at resolving outstanding differences, to begin. The secr´etaire des ´etats, Rousselot, met with his counterpart, Girard de Labr´ely from the Mˆaconnais to draft memoranda explaining their respective positions. These texts served as the basis for a series of conferences held between representatives of the disputing administrations under the presidency of the governor in June and July of 1782.66 The resulting treaty, signed by Cond´e and rapidly confirmed by an arrˆet du conseil of 27 July, put the relations between the two institutions on a much sounder footing, recognising the rights of the ´etats particuliers to administer the comt´e under the overall direction of the ´elus of Burgundy.67 62

63

64 65 66 67

As can be seen from his correspondence with the ´elus, ADCO C 3361, fol. 264, Cond´e to the ´elus, 8 January 1757, and the letter sent to the governor by Peyrenc de Moras dated 31 December 1756, ibid., fols. 264–5. For details of these quarrels see: ADCO C 3355, fol. 47, the ´elus to the intendant, Amelot, 7 September 1767; C 3363, fol. 32, Amelot to the ´elus, 25 March 1769; C 3363, fols. 153, 158, the ´elus of Macon to the ´elus [of Dijon], 30 December 1772, and the ´elus [of Dijon] to Cond´e, 5 January 1773. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, pp. 201–2. La Goutte’s period in office is examined in greater detail below. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, pp. 202–3, and Smith, ‘The government of Burgundy’, pp. 205–7. Roussot, Un comt´e adjacent, p. 203.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy d ef e n d i n g t h e p re ro g at i ve s of th e e s tat e s

The struggles against L’Averdy’s municipal reforms, or the pretensions of the ´etats particuliers, were typical of the tenacity with which the Estates sought to defend their right to police their internal affairs. As we have seen, the crown had challenged that independence in the early 1740s, but the reign of Louis XVI would witness a strong counterattack, especially in regard to the appointment of the province’s financial officers. Before 1740, the ´elus, acting in concert with the governor, had appointed the fifteen receivers of the taille, and they had stoutly defended the principle that they were commissioners of the Estates and not royal, or venal, officeholders. When in 1716, the regency government established a Chamber of Justice to punish those financial officers and tax farmers accused of malpractice during the previous reign, it demanded that the Burgundian receivers justify their conduct.68 The duc de Bourbon led the opposition to the measure, declaring that the treasurer general and his subordinates ‘do not handle the taxes of the king only those of the province’.69 On his orders a deputation of ´elus and permanent officials trekked to Paris, where they argued successfully that their financial officers were ‘simple commissioners’, subject to the verification of the alcades of the Estates, not the Chamber of Justice.70 Keeping the prying eyes of the crown away from details of the local fiscal system was essential if the Estates were to bargain effectively, and once they had recovered from the shock of the royal offensive triggered by the death of the duc de Bourbon they attempted to regain control of their financial officers. For most of the remainder of the reign of Louis XV, the ´elus and the comte de Saint-Florentin worked in comparative harmony. When a receiver wished to transfer his office, or arrange for the survivance of a son or close relative, he petitioned the ´elus, who in turn recommended his case to the minister.71 Disagreements were comparatively rare, although SaintFlorentin was not above advancing the interests of his own prot´eg´es such as Daniel Louis Fidel Amand Bocquillon, a newcomer to the province, whose appointment as receiver of Auxonne in 1763 was entirely due to 68 70 71

69 ADCO C 3162, fol. 194, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 10 June 1716. ADCO C 3163, fol. 132. The details of these and other arguments employed by the deputation are contained in ibid., fols. 384–5, 388. Thus in November 1746 the minister agreed that Pierre Seguin de la Motte should be granted the survivance on the office of his father, the receiver of Dijon, and act for him during his current illness, ADCO C 3354, fols. 110–11, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 21 November 1746. He also agreed that Claude Burgat de Taisey should have the survivance on the office of receiver of Chalon which was held by his father-in-law.

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the patronage of the minister.72 Bocquillon proved to be an unfortunate choice. He used tax receipts to fund his business ventures, notably a scheme to establish himself as a wine merchant, and by 1778 he was bankrupt.73 His troubles came at a highly opportune moment for the ´elus who had just launched a campaign to restore full control over their financial affairs. The initial catalyst for the affair was provided by the Gouvillier family, receivers of the taille in the bailliage of Charolles, who had petitioned the new minister, the former intendant of Burgundy, Amelot, for the survivance on their office directly, rather than first seeking the approval of the ´elus.74 When the ´elus received a letter from the minister in January 1777 informing them that he had granted the family’s request, they were outraged.75 Instead of complying, they sent Amelot a copy of a royal declaration of 1752, which they claimed had overridden the earlier r`eglement of 1742, giving ‘to the Estates, the nomination and choice of the financial officers of the province’.76 To underline the seriousness of their intent, they subsequently sent a second letter presenting the younger Gouvillier for the survivance on his father’s office, thus emphasising their refusal to recognise the minister’s original decision.77 As the ´elus, headed by the abb´e de La Goutte, were already engaged in a series of other quarrels with the ministry, matters rested there. However, aware that the alcades would probably raise the issue at the Estates, due in May 1778, the government prepared a series of secret instructions for the governor, arguing that the declaration of 1752 had given the Estates rights over the ‘property’ of their receivers, not their appointment.78 Close examination of the text suggests that matters were not quite as clear cut as the government maintained, and, at the very least, the precise legal situation was ambiguous.79 The ministry was nevertheless convinced that the pretensions of the ´elus were unfounded, and the governor’s instructions stated clearly that ‘the intention of His Majesty is that his right of nomination is upheld, 72

73 74 75 77 78 79

The minister had first persuaded the ´elus to employ Bocquillon in the bureau des vingti`emes, ADCO C 3361, fol. 254, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 2 December 1756, and he continued to advance his career thereafter, ADCO C 3362, fols. 135–6, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 31 July 1763, and, especially, ADCO C 3363, fol. 207, Saint-Florentin to the ´elus, 28 December 1773. ADCO C 3333, fol. 12, and AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur les cahiers de Bourgogne’. AN H1 132, dos. 2, fol. 34, ‘Coppie de l’article 4e de l’instruction particuli`ere’. These were part of the secret instructions drafted for the Estates of 1778. 76 Ibid. ADCO C 3364, fol. 37, the ´elus to Amelot, 16 January 1777. AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur les cahiers de Bourgogne’, and ADCO C 3364, fol. 41, the ´elus to Amelot, 13 February 1777. AN H1 132, dos. 2, fol. 34, ‘Coppie de l’article 4e de l’instruction particuli`ere’. For two conflicting contemporary assessments, see ADCO 1 F 460, fols. 227–31, and AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur les cahiers de Bourgogne’.

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it is based upon ancient rights and usage that are anterior to the r`eglement of May 1742’. The Estates were unimpressed, and the incoming ´elus were instructed to protest during the voyage of honour. Before setting out for Versailles, they were presented with an ideal opportunity to press their case when Bocquillon’s business ventures collapsed. The bankruptcy of a receiver was a rare event, and in the eyes of the ´elus nothing could better illustrate the dangers of allowing a ‘foreigner’ to meddle in their financial affairs.80 They were quick to take advantage. As the survivance on the office was held by Bocquillon’s son, who was still a minor, they installed his uncle, Collenot, to act in his stead. The ´elus then wrote a letter to Amelot informing him of the fait accompli, reminding him that the Estates had ordered them to make a protest in due course.81 The stage was now set for the voyage of honour, and in the remonstrances delivered to Louis XVI the ´elus described the right to appoint their financial officers as nothing less than ‘an inherent right of the provincial constitution’.82 According to their analysis: the province forms a political body in the state and this corps having the right to administer itself, under the protection and authority of Your Majesty, its right to choose its officials, that is essential to any administration, cannot be contested.

The ´elus backed these general arguments with copious references to the declaration of 1752 and earlier royal legislation, before concluding with a reference to Bocquillon, ‘a foreigner who was not, and never would have been, chosen by the province’.83 These strongly worded remonstrances are in some ways reminiscent of the language of the parlements which had spent much of the eighteenth century arguing about their rights in this way. The provincial estates were generally more reticent, and, in Burgundy at least, they had rarely felt the need to make extravagant claims on their own behalf. In the short-term it had little effect, and after consulting with the intendant the ministry announced that the r`eglement of 1742 would stand, and that the king would nominate the province’s fiscal officers as before.84 When the next vacancy occurred, the ´elus renewed their campaign. Ordered by Amelot to install Bernard Mollerat as the new receiver of Nuits-Saint-Georges they procrastinated for months, eventually attracting the wrath of the minister.85 The ´elus had no objection to Mollerat, who 80 81 82 85

ADCO C 3333, fol. 12, and AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur les cahiers de Bourgogne’. ADCO C 3364, fol. 138, the ´elus to Amelot, 16 December 1778. 83 Ibid., fol. 12. 84 Ibid. ADCO C 3333, fol. 7. ADCO C 3356, fol. 114, Amelot to the ´elus, 23 April 1780, ibid., fol. 122, 4 September 1780, and C 3364, fol. 234, Amelot to Rousselot, 12 October 1780.

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was an ideal candidate, having married the daughter of his predecessor and was closely related to Louis Moussier, a future vicomte-mayeur of Dijon. Instead, their actions were part of the continuing campaign to regain control of appointments, and when the powerful bishop of Autun, Marbeuf, finally gave his consent he ordered the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rousselot, to add a clause to the registers stating that they had acted ‘by the express command of the king’, noting that ‘this formula is in no sense disobedient, [and] will justify our action in the eyes of the province’.86 The Estates of 1781 matched the defiant mood of the ´elus, and further remonstrances were ordered. As before, the protest was boldly written, and the ´elus argued that the constitution of the province, recognised by French kings since the time of Louis XI, was in danger.87 Having raised the rhetorical stakes, they then offered a telling critique of the r`eglement of 1742, arguing that the king had used the term ‘designation’ not ‘nomination’ when referring to the province’s fiscal officers.88 Having established this seemingly academic point, they declared that ‘it is clear that in the spirit of this r`eglement, designation and accord are purely synonymous’, in other words that Louis XV had only intended that the ´elus seek his approval for decisions affecting the choice of their officers. The truth of these disputes about the finer points of jurisprudence was frequently in the eyes of the beholder, but it is true that Saint-Florentin had left the ´elus considerable leeway in these matters. The ministry was in no mood for further dispute, and promptly conceded the point. Henceforth the receivers would be chosen by the Estates on condition that the ´elus asked ‘His Majesty for his accord’ before the appointee fulfilled any official functions.89 Although the king made no concessions relative to the office of treasurer general, the seemingly untouchable status of the Chartraire family meant that the Estates could celebrate an important victory. When a receivership next fell vacant, the ´elus proudly despatched letters to both the minister and the governor informing them of their choice.90 There could be no better illustration of the new situation than the sight of the baron de Breteuil, the new minister of the maison du roi, writing to the ´elus in February 1784 asking them to consider one of his prot´eg´es for a receivership.91 In their reply, they made it clear that they already had their eyes on a local man, and that if he refused ‘the prince de Cond´e has made it known to us that 86 87 89 91

ADCO C 3364, fol. 236, the bishop of Autun to Rousselot, 10 November 1780. 88 Ibid., fols. 8–9. ADCO C 3334, fols. 7–8. 90 ADCO C 3365, fol. 83. Ibid., fol. 15. The ´elus refer to his request in their reply ADCO C 3366, fol. 36, the ´elus to Breteuil, 18 February 1784.

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it would please him if we named a person for whom His Serene Highness wishes to obtain it’. The old hierarchy was firmly back in place. Indeed, when the alcades considered the events of the triennalit´e in their remarques presented in 1784, they rejoiced not only at the success with the receivers, but also in the fact that the king had approved the candidates suggested by the ´elus for other positions within the administration.92 At the Estates of 1787, the alcades took the logical next step declaring that: it would be desirable for the good of the administration that the motives of justice and equity that have determined His Majesty during the last triennalit´e to restore to the Estates the right to nominate their fiscal officers could engage him to return as well [the right to nominate] their other officers that he reserved by his r`eglement of 1742.93

Had the revolution not intervened, it seems likely that the Estates would have continued to chip away at the increasingly threadbare r`eglement of 1742, eventually regaining complete control over the appointment of their officers. The Estates had thus proved to be remarkably adept, both at resisting innovations such as L’Averdy’s municipal reforms and unwanted intrusions into their affairs like the r`eglement of 1742. They achieved their aims through dogged persistence, with the remarques of the alcades, the d´ecrets of the Estates and the remonstrances and other protests drafted by the ´elus all contributing. After 1754, they had the further advantage of being able to count upon a governor, who maintained the family tradition of protecting the privileges of the Estates. Finally, they were able to capitalise upon the changing political climate as the government became more sympathetic to the idea of ceding powers and responsibilities back to the provinces. th e a b b e´ de l a g o u t t e a n d t h e l i m i ts o f prov in c ia l i n d e pe n d e n c e That transformation was achieved in a generally peaceful manner, with crown, governor and the Estates working in apparent harmony, but the reign of Louis XVI produced the first signs of strain. In May 1775, the abb´e Antoine de La Goutte was chosen as ´elu of the clergy. A member of a local family of the robe nobility, he was a man of some charisma determined to implement what he believed were necessary reforms.94 He 92 94

93 ADCO C 3307, fol. 61. ADCO C 3306, fol. 245. His opponents acknowledged his drive and commitment, even if they rejected his methods, see, for example, ADCO C 3350, ‘Motifs des protestations du 26 F´evrier 1777’.

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was seconded by Jacques Franc¸ois Damas, marquis d’Antigny, ´elu of the nobility, and the mayor of Beaune, Jean-Franc¸ois Maufoux, ´elu of the third estate. La Goutte’s leadership subsequently became the focus of controversy, and his critics alleged that he had overawed his fellow representatives of the Estates.95 It undoubtedly suited the interests of those opposed to reform to depict the abb´e as a quixotic figure who had succeeded in manipulating the chamber. It is true that little is known about d’Antigny, beyond the fact that he was a member of a distinguished Burgundian noble house and a serving military officer. He may, therefore, have been ill-informed about the provincial administration. No such claims could be made about Maufoux. He was a highly respected mayor of Beaune, and a long-serving subdelegate of the intendant. Both d’Antigny and Maufoux proved to be sympathetic to the ideas of La Goutte, and it was their votes within the chamber of ´elus that enabled him to implement his projects. The plans of La Goutte and his allies fell into three broad categories. Firstly, they intended to root out abuse in the tax system by ending the inequalities that so favoured the privileged classes. Secondly, they were determined to reduce the power of the treasurer general and to force the provincial receivers to obey the letter of their commissions. Finally, they planned a campaign of spending cuts which they hoped would reduce the burden of the taille. The campaign began in earnest in the winter of 1775–6 during the first official working session of the new triennalit´e. Within days, Mairetet de Thorey, who was following events in Dijon closely, wrote that ‘the current Estates [read ´elus] are doing everything for themselves, the treasurer general and the secr´etaires [des ´etats] who were previously everything, dare not open their mouths and are in their place’.96 Chartraire de Montigny bore the brunt of the assault, and it was rumoured that he left the chamber in tears after one particularly stormy session. The tense state of relations between the ´elus and their permanent officials was revealed by their quarrel over the choice of a new receiver of the vingti`emes for the city of Dijon. On 19 November 1775, the prince de Cond´e wrote to the ´elus in support of a request from Chartraire de Montigny to be permitted to make the appointment.97 The governor was aware that there had been a dispute about the post, and his letter was intended to calm tempers in Dijon. He concluded: ‘I believe that you have sufficient confidence in M. de Montigny 95 96

97

ADCO C 3350, ‘Motifs des protestations’. ADCO E 1245, undated. Mairetet de Thorey was in regular correspondence with his mother. This letter refers to the quarrel with the governor over the appointment of the controllers of the vingti`emes and was almost certainly written in November 1775. ADCO C 3434, Cond´e to the ´elus, 19 November 1775.

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not to doubt his respect for you at anytime, and I am also persuaded that your intention is not to deprive him of rights that are legitimately attributed to his place’. The ´elus replied on 25 November with a strongly worded letter of their own, rejecting Chartraire de Montigny’s claims and arguing that they possessed the right of appointment.98 In an effort to resolve the disagreement, the prince devised a seemingly ingenious solution of leaving the disputed place vacant, while transferring the relevant duties to the collector of the taille, which, he believed, was the practice elsewhere.99 It is easy to imagine his surprise when a few days later he received a message from the ´elus informing him that ‘we see with regret, monseigneur, that in these facts [behind his decision] Your Serene Highness has been deceived’.100 Not content with criticising the basis on which the prince had made his decision, they continued by casting doubt on its motives describing them as ‘neither more sincere nor more well founded than the means and the facts first employed by M. de Montigny’. The ´elus clearly believed that the governor was being manipulated by the treasurer general, adding that because he had no right to participate in the choice of receiver of the vingti`emes, his aim was ‘to mortify the administration, [and] to stop the chamber from exercising the rights belonging to it’. Their letter offers a glimpse of the anger and tensions in Dijon, but in assuming that the governor was a puppet of the treasurer general the ´elus had committed a grave error. In his reply, an outraged Cond´e revealed that the project of abolishing the post of collector of the vingti`emes was his own, and in aggrieved tones he declared: I am completely astonished that you imagine me capable of other motives than the good of the province; you are the first ´elus who have so suspected me. No, sirs, I have not been deceived; Burgundy is too dear to me not to examine its affairs myself; personal interests are nothing to me, and it is to be wished that everyone thought as I do; if I could, I would willingly multiply the rights of the administration at the expense of my own; it is a justice that the Estates will render me, if their representatives refuse it.101

The horror of the ´elus when they discovered their error is easy to imagine, and a cringing apology was soon heading for Chantilly.102 It was too late, the damage had been done, and when the ´elus subsequently found themselves in trouble with the ministry they could not count on the usually steadfast support of the governor. 98 99 101

Ibid ., the ´elus to Cond´e, 25 November 1775. Ibid ., Cond´e to the ´elus, 6 December 1775. Ibid ., Cond´e to the ´elus, 15 December 1775.

100 102

Ibid., the ´elus to Cond´e, 12 December 1775. Ibid., the ´elus to Cond´e, 20 December 1775.

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The faux pas with the prince did not deflect La Goutte and his friends from their reforming course, and they next turned their attention to the receivers of the taille. In a deliberation of 23 December 1775, they issued a series of instructions designed to improve the quality of the information upon which the levy of the taille was based.103 Complaints about the inequalities in collecting the tax were legion, and throughout the eighteenth century the alcades had called for the chamber to conduct a ‘general visit’.104 Rather than act themselves, La Goutte and his colleagues decided that they would transfer responsibility for conducting the visit to the receivers of the taille.105 According to the terms of the deliberation, the receivers were appointed as the commissioners of the chamber to visit annually and without charge a number of the towns and communities of their bailliage.106 The ´elus further stipulated that for the larger bailliages such as Dijon, Autun and Chalon-sur-Saˆone a minimum of fifty communities should be visited annually, whereas those of Bar-sur-Seine, or Auxerre, which were much smaller, could be toured every year. By forcing the receivers to familiarise themselves with the state of their bailliages, they would be better able to fulfil their legal duty of informing the ´elus prior to the annual composition of the taille rolls. It would also reduce the need for costly visits by its members to oversee the procedure of a nouveau pied de taille. The reform of December 1775 was predictably unpopular with the receivers, whose time and money would be spent carrying out the inspections. Some of their objections are to be found in an anonymous document written some months later attacking La Goutte’s policies as a whole. Its author argued that the purpose of a general visit was to decide the ‘contribution of each community relative to the other communities of the province by a comparison of their respective strengths’.107 Only the ´elus could undertake this task which, he added, should not be confused with the quite separate procedures of a nouveau pied de taille. If the ´elus could be accused of offering half measures, rather than a thorough reform based upon a general visit and a cadastre such as that implemented by Bertier de Sauvigny in the g´en´eralit´e of Paris,108 there was nothing especially controversial about their measure. 103 104 105 106

107 108

ADCO C 3228, fols. 364–6. The ´elus later wrote a justification of the principles behind their reform, ADCO C 3350, Requˆete des ´elus au roi. See chapter 11. The ´elus defended their decision in the Requˆete des ´elus au roi presented in the summer of 1776, ADCO C 3350. ADCO C 3350, ‘Observation sur la requˆete present´ee au roy par les e´lus g´en´eraux des e´tats . . . tendante a` r´evocation de l’arrˆet du conseil du 28 juillet 1776 qui annulle trois de leurs d´elib´erations des 23 d´ecembre 1775, 10 janvier et 1 f´evrier 1776’. ADCO C 3350,‘Observation sur la requˆete’. M. Touzery, L’invention de l’impˆot sur le revenu. La taille tarif´ee, 1715–1789 (Paris, 1994).

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During the previous triennalit´e, the chamber had ordered the mayors and the receivers to send complete lists of every inhabitant claiming exemption from the taille on the basis of their noble status or office.109 That the deliberation of 23 December was subsequently quashed by the crown owed more to the reforms that followed. The most radical of these was the deliberation of 10 January 1776, which sought to establish the collection of the vingti`emes on an equitable footing.110 When the tax had first been imposed in 1749, it was the intendant who had been responsible for the verification of tax assessments submitted by the province’s inhabitants. That process was still incomplete when, in 1757, the Estates had first contracted an abonnement and began to collect the vingti`emes.111 As a result, inequality was rife, and the principal beneficiaries were the privileged elites who proved adept at evading their fair share of the tax.112 Realising that earlier efforts at verification had failed,113 La Goutte and his allies adopted an alternative approach. They argued that the system of abonnement meant that the tax was transformed, and ‘that it was not really the vingti`eme, but a sum representing it, that was raised in the province’.114 As it was paid by all, the ´elus argued that: to be just, all taxation must be equitable, it must be proportional; and to be proportional, it is necessary to be relative not only to the means of the taxpayer, but also to the total sum imposed.115

To achieve equality, La Goutte intended dividing the tax between the communities of the province, without distinction of order or estate, which were then to assemble and elect their assessors. The local seigneur would have the automatic right to choose one assessor, while the forains, those nonresidents with land or property in the community, and the local inhabitants could each choose up to three, albeit on condition that they would cast one vote each. In the event of conflict, appeals were to be heard by the ´elus themselves, but for La Goutte and his supporters the merits of the reform were clear as ‘it tends to establish a proportional equality between all taxpayers’.116 Equality was not one of the defining features of the Burgundian fiscal system, and the deliberation of 10 January, when combined with the 109 110 112 113 114 115

ADCO C 4730, ‘D´elib´eration du 2 Janvier 1775’. 111 See chapter 10. ADCO C 3329, fols. 124–9. Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 122, and Bordes, L’administration provinciale, p. 107 As recently as 1772, the Estates had ordered the verifications to be resumed, but without effect. ADCO C 3350, ‘Requˆete des e´lus au roi’. This was almost certainly written by La Goutte in the summer of 1776, and its arguments are consistent with the deliberation of 10 January. 116 Ibid. Ibid .

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other actions being taken simultaneously by the chamber, was bound to cause controversy. According to the critics of the reform, the details were ‘scarcely printed before they spread alarm and consternation throughout the province’, and there is no doubt that the larger landowners, in particular, were quickly roused.117 Mairetet de Thorey noted that: this new form of imposing the vingti`emes has alarmed a good many people, and notably the seigneurs and forains, I am sure that it will be essential to agree in the communities something that is difficult enough, besides there is the fear of the cadastre and the plans of the ´elus seem to point there indirectly.118

Critics argued that it was for the ´elus to levy the vingti`eme, not the assessors, and they added the more weighty objection that the projected reform was, in reality, nothing more than a revised version of the method used to collect the taille, which the reformers themselves had admitted was prone to abuse.119 Moreover, if the communities were now to be assessed as a body, rather than the tax being levied individually, there was the serious question of what to do about those who defaulted. With the taille, the administration could resort to the threat of contrainte solidaire, but such powers were not available in the case of the vingti`emes. These solid, if not insurmountable, arguments were accompanied by remonstrances from the Parlement of Dijon. However, the most effective opposition came from the members of the privileged orders themselves, who either delayed holding the necessary assemblies to appoint the assessors,120 or supplied ‘their leases and made their declarations without distinguishing between their properties by individual community’.121 With the collection of the vingti`eme in danger of collapse, the ´elus voted to suspend their reform on 12 July 1776 and returned to the old system for what they hoped would be a temporary period.122 The third element of La Goutte’s strategy was encapsulated in a deliberation of 1 February 1776 and was directed at the financial officers of the Estates, who allegedly lived a pampered life at the province’s expense. In any given year, they were supposed to begin making the monthly payments of the taille to the treasurer general on 1 March and to have processed their 117 118 119 121 122

ADCO C 3350, ‘Motifs des protestations du 26 F´evrier [1777]’, and AN H1 132, dos. 2, fol. 5, ‘Projet d’instructions particuli`eres’. ADCO E 1245, Mairetet de Thorey to his mother, 1776. There is no precise date on this letter, but it was clearly written soon after the issuing of the deliberation of 10 January 1776. 120 Ligou, ‘Probl` ADCO C 3350,‘Observation sur la requˆete’. emes fiscaux’, 122. ADCO C 3350, Requˆete des ´elus au roi. Ibid . Their critics maintained that the suspension was simply a failed attempt to prevent the ministry from acting against them.

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accounts for the fiscal year within six months of its completion.123 In reality, the receivers were many months in arrears, and the chamber had long followed the practice of borrowing to cover payments to the royal treasury. The deliberation of 1 February was intended to force the receivers to meet the conditions of their annual ‘treaties’ with the Estates, and was justified on the basis that it would prevent unnecessary borrowing, thus lightening the burden of the taille.124 Not surprisingly, the treasurer general and the receivers opposed the new policy vigorously, and they appealed directly to the royal council.125 They argued that their belated payments resulted from an inbuilt delay within the tax system, rather than laxity on their part. The taille rolls were drawn up in November, and it was not until March at the earliest that collection could begin, a situation that had been tolerated by the Estates for over a century.126 As one critic made clear, if the receivers were obliged to accelerate payments, they would inevitably increase pressure on the taillables. This argument was subsequently repeated in February 1777 by several of the ´elus, when they attempted to distance themselves from the policies of the abb´e.127 They argued that the ‘treaties’ signed by the receivers were ‘old stylistic clauses that are copied from year to year without consequence because they can no longer be enforced’. If they were imposed, ‘every taxpayer would be at the mercy of the receivers’, many of whom would rather abandon their posts than become ‘oppressors’.128 Within a few months, the abb´e de La Goutte and his colleagues had succeeded in shaking up the traditionally tranquil world of the Burgundian administration. Preaching the virtues of fiscal equality, while simultaneously attacking the vested interests of the province’s pampered fiscal officers, was a bold and potentially popular strategy. It also had the advantage of being in tune with the reformist intentions of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Turgot, who made no move to stop La Goutte’s campaign despite the howls of protest from the province’s privileged taxpayers and fiscal officers.129 However, on 123 124

125

126 127 129

ADCO C 3198, fols. 4–7, contains the trait´e of receiver S´eguin of Dijon for 1750. These trait´es were included in the registers of the ´elus for the whole period of this study. ADCO C 3229, fols. 205–9. Similar motives lay behind a related decision to cease borrowing in order to pay the annual sum of 300,000 livres of don gratuit extraordinaire. Instead, that sum was to be taken directly from the proceeds of the crues levied on the sale of salt. Although unsigned, it seems likely that the following memoirs criticising La Goutte were written by the fiscal officers themselves, ADCO C 3350, ‘Observation sur la requˆete’, and C 3452, ‘R`eglement du 1f´evrier 1776 sur l’administration et r´egie des finances renouvell´e dans plusieurs de ses dispositions par deliberation du 19 f´evrier 1777’. ADCO C 3452, ‘R`eglement du 1 f´evrier 1776’. 128 Ibid. ADCO C 3350, ‘Motifs des protestations du 26 F´evrier [1777]’. According to Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 122, Turgot was favourable to the reforms, although he does not offer any evidence to support that assertion.

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12 May 1776, Louis XVI dismissed his talented minister, and, in a foretaste of what would prove an unhappy reign, replaced him with a comparative nonentity, Clugny de Nuits. The new man was a Burgundian, a former councillor in the Parlement of Dijon, and he proved sympathetic to the critics of the reform. La Goutte and his allies ploughed on regardless. On 8 July, an infuriated Amelot discovered that the ´elus had dismissed one of his prot´eg´es, Jolivet, the official architect of the Estates, without informing him.130 When the minister complained, he was informed that the office was ‘useless and onerous’, and had been suppressed as part of an attempt to reduce the burden on the taillables.131 Clearly oblivious to any danger the ´elus continued their cost-cutting programme, but they were skating on very thin ice. The change in government policy, when it came, was sudden and decisive. On 28 July 1776, the royal council took the almost unprecedented decision to issue an arrˆet which quashed the deliberations of the chamber of ´elus dated 23 December 1775, 10 January and 1 February 1776. As La Goutte and his colleagues were in Paris for the voyage of honour it was a real humiliation, and their discomfiture was increased by the immediate publication of the arrˆet not only in Burgundy, but throughout France.132 Clugny de Nuits explained the reasons behind the change of policy in a letter to the ´elus, declaring that: His Majesty, having been informed of the alarm spread throughout the orders of the province and of the reaction of the Parlement of Burgundy regarding your deliberations on these matters, . . . has judged that he could not stop their execution too promptly [in order] to calm the fears and [prevent] actions whose consequences could become extremely unfortunate and capable of troubling [public] tranquillity and good order.133

To prevent any further quibbling about the disputed deliberations, the crown referred the matter to the Estates ‘for consideration at their next assembly, if they see fit’. After such a rebuff, the ´elus fell back on the tried and trusted formula of appealing to the prince de Cond´e. It was now that they would have cause to regret their earlier indiscretion. Rather than fulfil his habitual role as protector of the Estates, the governor remained aloof. On 23 August, the ´elus were reduced to writing a desperate note pleading that ‘we have sent several times to the Palais Bourbon and we have not been informed of the times when Your Serene Highness would be present. We have in 130 131 133

ADCO C 3364, fol. 20, Amelot to the ´elus, 8 July 1776. 132 ADCO C 3350, ‘Requˆ Ibid ., fol. 21, the ´elus to Amelot, 26 July 1776. ete des e´lus au roi’. ADCO C 3356, fol. 22, Clugny de Nuits to the ´elus, 29 July 1776.

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consequence, monseigneur, to write to you to beg you to accord us an audience’.134 Nor was the secretary of state, Amelot, likely to be more helpful after the recent incident involving the provincial architect. The ´elus were totally isolated, and they faced an almost hopeless task in trying to overturn the arrˆet of 28 July. It was to defend their reforms that the ´elus drafted their Requˆete au roi in the autumn of 1776, which sought to justify their actions and demonstrate that the arrˆet quashing their judgements was irregular, constituting nothing less than ‘un coup d’autorit´e’ against their rights and those of the Estates.135 They argued that as ´elus, they were not simply expected to implement the decisions of the Estates, ‘they represent them, they stand in for them, they are the stewards and administrators of the province in the name of the Estates’. While not denying that the king was in turn the superior of the Estates, they claimed that as ´elus they were: subject to the Estates, and the authority of Your Majesty must not bear on the content of their r`eglements before the Estates have used their right to confirm them or wipe them away; such is the ancient and immemorial institution of the duchy of Burgundy, and this ancient right, confirmed from reign to reign, has been observed inviolably until this day.136

The ´elus finished their constitutional lesson with the observation that by quashing their deliberations, the ministry had placed ‘the authority of the [king’s] council between the Estates and the ´elus’, overturning their privileges, rights and liberties in the process. The Requˆete au roi was a bold statement of provincial independence, and if accepted would have rendered the ´elus the absolute masters of the provincial administration. Realistically they had little chance of winning the argument because the king had to reserve the right to quash their deliberations in much the same way as he did the arrˆets of the parlements. Only if the Estates subsequently backed their ´elus, or issued comparable d´ecrets, was the decision of 28 July 1776 likely to be reversed. La Goutte was unwilling to accept that verdict, and on 19 February 1777 he proposed a new reform to the ´elus which strongly resembled that of 1 February 1776. His measure split the chamber, with the marquis d’Antigny and Maufoux supporting his proposal and the other ´elus opposing it. As the vicomte mayeur of Dijon and the ´elu of the third estate were on opposing sides, the result was a tie and the matter was decided by La Goutte’s casting vote as ´elu of the clergy. Normally the dissenting ´elus would have been expected to sign 134 135

ADCO C 3364, fol. 25, the ´elus to the prince de Cond´e, 23 August 1776. 136 Ibid. ADCO C 3350, ‘Requˆete des e´lus au roi’.

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the deliberation and to support it as an expression of corporate will. Instead, they drafted a strongly worded protest criticising La Goutte and his policies and sent it to Versailles.137 With the intendant also voicing his concerns, the ministry did not require much prompting to take further action, and on 5 May 1777 the offending deliberation was quashed.138 Any lingering hopes of reviving the reform were dashed in January 1778, when Necker rejected the proposal that the principles contained in the deliberations of 1 February 1776 and 19 February 1777 should be included in a new calendar of payments for the province’s taxes.139 La Goutte and his supporters were left to await the Estates, and to hope that the assembly would share their concerns about the alleged threat to the provincial constitution posed by the arrˆets du conseil of 28 July 1776 and 5 May 1777. The government was well aware of the danger, and the intendant Dupleix de Baquencourt, informed Necker that if the Estates sided with La Goutte ‘this would be the signal for a war between the ministry and the province’.140 The crown was determined to prevent such a conflict, and armed the prince de Cond´e with a series of secret instructions designed to head off trouble.141 The ministry was fortunate to be able to count upon the experience of the governor, who was requested to ‘employ the means of persuasion’ with the presidents and leading members of the three orders. Sensibly his instructions stopped short of forbidding discussion of the disputed arrˆets, and even permitted the matter to be raised in the cahier des remontrances. It was nevertheless vital to avoid any proposition questioning ‘the incontestable right[s] of His Majesty, as father and guardian of his subjects and as sovereign legislator’.142 If the ministry was prepared to allow discussion, even protest, it did not intend to tolerate constitutional debate. The Estates opened in May 1778 and the intendant was soon informing Necker that there was no cause for alarm, as the ‘party’ of the ´elus was ‘very small’.143 In an effort to stir the assembly, supporters of La Goutte secretly placed a bundle of documents relating to the disputed deliberations, 137 138 139

140 141 142 143

ADCO C 3350, ‘Motifs des protestations du 26 F´evrier [1777]’. The government’s action was explained in a letter sent to the chamber by the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Taboureau, ADCO C 3364, fol. 62, Taboureau to the ´elus, 8 May 1777. Necker raised the idea of a ‘terme fixe’ for the payment of the taxation to the royal treasury in December 1777, and the ´elus tried unsuccessfully to persuade him that this could only be achieved in conjunction with their own reforms, ADCO C 3364, fols. 95, 96, 102, Necker to the ´elus, 28 December 1776; the ´elus to Necker, 3 January 1778; and Necker to the ´elus, 31 January 1778. AN H1 132, dos. 2., fol. 9 bis, Dupleix to Necker, 2 March 1778. Ibid ., fol. 5, ‘Projet d’instructions particuli`eres’, and ibid., fols. 28, 31, 32, Necker to Amelot, 21 April 1778, and the two letters from Necker to Cond´e, 24 April 1778. Ibid ., fol. 5, ‘Projet d’instructions particuli`eres’. AN H1 132, fol. 44, Dupleix to Necker, 4 May 1778, and ibid., fol. 38, 25 April 1778.

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and a printed defence of the outgoing administration, in each of the three chambers.144 Even that failed to rouse their members, who decided unanimously to exclude the deliberations ‘as null and void, as they contain several measures that might produce an effect contrary to that which the zeal of the ´elus had promised’.145 All that stood between La Goutte and complete defeat were the alcades, whose remarques provided another occasion to raise the matter. As his brother was one of the seven alcades, he had firm grounds for optimism and their report was indeed glowing. Throughout their remarques, there were references to the ‘patriotism’ of the ´elus, and when the alcades turned their attention to the disputed reforms they were full of admiration.146 They urged the Estates to adopt the measures as their own, offering at the same time a number of recommendations for improving the particularly controversial deliberation of 10 January 1776.147 The most important proposal was for the individual bailliages to be divided into departments, with a commissioner appointed by the ´elus to oversee the meetings of the assessors of the vingti`emes in the different communities. The aim was to prevent abuse and to reduce the possibility of the seigneurs and forains using their wealth and authority to their own advantage. The alcades concluded by approving the Requˆete des ´elus au roi, and they urged the Estates to petition the king for the revocation of the arrˆet du conseil of 28 July 1776. Despite the eloquence of their appeal, the chambers refused to reverse their earlier decision to treat the deliberations as ‘null and void’,148 and in the official registers it states simply that ‘the Estates decreed that there was no need to deliberate on this remarque’.149 The assembly of 1778 had passed off without serious incident and the ministry could congratulate itself upon a highly satisfactory outcome. Yet the pusillanimity of the Estates had left many deputies disappointed. In a memoir written between 1778 and 1781, one member of the assembly expressed his anger and frustration, arguing that: the Estates have not charged the current ´elus to request the revocation of the arrˆet du conseil, they have approved it by their silence, and as a consequence they give their consent to the destruction of their privileges, privileges that our forefathers have acquired at the price of their blood, privileges that we have even more right to demand be preserved because the absorption of this province under Louis XI was by the free and good will of the Estates, and under the express condition that their [privileges] would be preserved without any innovation.150 144 145 147 148 150

Ibid ., fol. 48, Dupleix to Necker, 9 May 1778. 146 ADCO C 3306, fols. 189–204. ADCO C 3046, fols. 277–8. The observations of the alcades were contained in article seven of the remarques, a copy of which is conserved in ADCO C 4730, ‘Decret des e´tats, reglemens annull´es’. 149 ADCO 4730 , ‘Decret des etats, reglemens annull´ ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 158. es’. ´ ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 243.

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Here were precisely the kind of sentiments that the government feared, and the failure of serious protests to surface during the Estates of 1778 demonstrates how carefully they had been managed. The issue of reform would not, however, go away. When the Estates next assembled in May 1781, the alcades were even more determined to press for change, taking up many of the policies of La Goutte and adding many more of their own.151 Never before had such radical criticisms of the administration been drafted, and they included attacks on the financial officers, the inequalities of the tax system and the excessive fees charged by the Chambre des Comptes. Nor were the ´elus spared, and the need for the Estates to assume responsibility for the administration featured amongst a broader programme of reforms.152 Yet before this potentially incendiary document could be presented, the prince de Cond´e summoned the alcades to his cabinet, where ‘he forbade them, in the name of the king, to submit their remarques to the chambers’.153 The stunned commissioners retreated to their bureau to ponder their next move, but the next day they received orders from the governor not to present themselves before the Estates. Such a decision was unprecedented, and the anger and bewilderment of the alcades can be gauged from reading the comments scrawled on a copy of the remarques, almost certainly by one of their number.154 He wrote: suffice it to observe that this coup d’autorit´e completely ruins and destroys the rights, privileges and liberties of the province, if the Estates are jealous to conserve them, the general assembly must neglect nothing to ensure its remonstrances reach the feet of the throne and to recover the rights that have been taken away otherwise they can say that the [province’s] ability to govern itself has gone and is lost for ever. If there are no more Estates it is useless to assemble the province at great expense for a meeting which no longer has a useful aim or purpose.

Yet despite the e´clat caused by the censoring of the remarques, the Estates remained calm, and there was no sign of a challenge to the authority of the governor. The events of May 1781, coming so soon after the furore caused by attempted reforms of La Goutte, were a clear sign that managing the Estates was becoming more difficult. There was a genuine desire for reform, and the projects presented in the decade after 1774 presaged those that would be voiced with ever greater urgency in the increasingly febrile political 151 152 154

ADCO C 3302, ‘Copie de la minute des remarques des commissaires alcades . . . pour l’assembl´ee des e´tats ouvert le 6 May 1781’. 153 ADCO C 3302, ‘Copie de la minute’. These are examined in chapter 12. Ibid . The fact that these comments were written on one of the rare copies of the original remarques makes it highly likely that one of the alcades was responsible.

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atmosphere after 1787. At the last meeting of the Estates of Burgundy, held in November of that year, these ideas finally broke into the open with a genuine debate about the conduct and composition of the Estates.155 As ever, the prince de Cond´e maintained a firm grip on events, displaying an impressive degree of political acumen in difficult circumstances. However, the hold of ‘our prince’ over the hearts and minds of Burgundians was slipping, and in 1789 the governor’s hopes of being elected to represent the province at the Estates General were dashed. He was one of the first to emigrate after the events of 14 July 1789, and when the English traveller, Arthur Young, arrived in Dijon a few days later he was informed by the local people that if the governor presented himself in the city he would be lynched.156 The relationship between the Estates and the crown during the eighteenth century has usually been depicted in terms of growing centralisation as the secretary of state and the intendant progressively superseded the governor. It is certainly true that the death of the duc de Bourbon was followed by much closer royal scrutiny of both the Estates and the provincial administration, and for a brief period the success of the intendant in purchasing the office of ´elu du roi threatened to increase his influence substantially. Once the prince de Cond´e came of age, however, matters immediately became more complicated, and as he grew in stature and experience he recaptured some of the ground lost in 1740. Working in harmony with the Estates, he fulfilled his family’s traditional role of protecting their interests, most notably in repelling L’Averdy’s municipal reforms, and he continued to act as the mediator of their disputes, successfully resolving the longrunning feud with the ´etats particuliers of the Mˆaconnais. Although the relationship between the Estates and the crown was relatively harmonious, it was still necessary for the assembly and the ´elus to defend their rights, as the battle to overturn the r`eglement of 1742 illustrates perfectly. There are, therefore, good grounds for challenging the Whiggish assumptions that lie behind historical interpretations stressing the centralising mission of the monarchical state. Indeed, if anything, the second half of the eighteenth century witnessed a movement in the opposite direction with the Estates recovering old powers and establishing new ones to good effect. There were nevertheless limits to provincial independence, and as demands for reform grew louder the government reacted nervously, preferring to side with the privileged interests of financial officers and wealthy landowners. The Estates were an important source of credit, and a reluctance to rock the 155

See chapter 12.

156

Young, Travels in France, p. 192

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boat was understandable. Ultimately, the reformers proved relatively easy to control, especially once the fall of Turgot had robbed them of ministerial support. No less significant was the conservative temperament of the prince de Cond´e, who was unsympathetic to the arguments of the abb´e de La Goutte, or those of the alcades in 1781. The king continued to rely on the governor’s authority, and far from negligible political skills. He remained the central focus of the crown’s management of the Estates, and a comparison with events in contemporary Brittany suggests that he fully deserved that confidence. As the political mood began to change after 1774, not even the prince de Cond´e could be sure of presiding serenely over the Estates. Yet if his popularity had begun to fade during the twilight of the ancien r´egime, it is still difficult to escape the conclusion that he had preserved his family’s influence almost to the last.

chapter 9

Provincial rivalries: the Estates and the Parlement of Dijon in the eighteenth century

Institutional life in ancien r´egime France was characterised by almost constant conflict as rival corps fought to maintain their status, power and privileges. For the king, who was the source and the guarantor of corporate rights, these quarrels were frequently more of a nuisance than a threat, and they helped to ensure that combined challenges to his authority, such as that experienced during the Fronde, were extremely rare.1 Within individual provinces, especially the pays d’´etats, it might be expected that local privileges would provide a rallying point for these fiercely independent corps. In practice, the amount of collaboration was limited. In his study of seventeenth-century Languedoc, Beik has demonstrated that the province’s rulers ‘shared common aspirations, but the modes of operation of their institutions set them against one another in a perpetual equilibrium of adversarial relationships which only the king could arbitrate’.2 James Collins has also identified areas of conflict in Brittany, but he adds that ‘in general, the Estates, the Parlement and chamber [Chambre des Comptes] would work together’ to protect their own interests and those of the province.3 There is no doubt that in the right circumstances cooperation between institutions was possible, and this was illustrated most dramatically during the reign of Louis XV, when a combination of growing hostility to taxation and bitter 1

2 3

In 1648, the Parlement of Paris, Grand Conseil, Cour des Aides and Chambre des Comptes had temporarily forgotten their traditional hostility and had formed the Chambre Saint-Louis to press their demands upon the regency government, see: A. L. Moote, The revolt of the judges. The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643–1652 (Princeton, 1971), pp. 91–222. The gradual resolution of the crisis is examined by Hamscher, Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, pp. 82–154. During the reign of Louis XV, the parlements developed the theory of a union des classes, but despite frightening the crown on several occasions the theory was never put into practice, J. Swann, ‘Robe, sword and aristocratic reaction revisited. The French nobility and political crisis, 1748–1789’ in R. G. Asch, Der europ¨aische adel im ancien r´egime. Von der krise der st¨andischen monarchien bis zur revolution, 1600–1789 (Cologne, 2001), pp. 151–78. Beik, Absolutism and society, p. 177, and pp. 165, 187–9, 198–219. Collins, Classes, estates, and order, pp. 210–11.

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personal rivalries provoked the infamous Brittany affair.4 The Estates and Parlement formed a united front, eventually forcing the imperious local commandant, the duc d’Aiguillon, from the province. Yet according to the most authoritative historian of the eighteenth-century Breton Estates, such behaviour was exceptional and ‘the Parlement only backed the action of the Estates when its own political interests required it’.5 Overall it is probably fair to say that periods of outright conflict or enthusiastic cooperation were the exception, and that for much of the time different corps existed in a state of mutual respect and suspicion. In Burgundy, the Estates considered themselves, with some justification, to be the province’s most prestigious institution. To preserve that status they were obliged to keep a close eye on the activities of the ´etats particuliers, especially those of the Mˆaconnais, whose administration was frequently suspected of harbouring hopes of independence, and to resist any attempts by the crown to bolster the authority of the intendant.6 The Chambre des Comptes, which provided two of the seven ´elus and profited handsomely from its involvement in the fiscal system of the Estates, was less obviously a threat. Yet despite sharing common interests, the two sides were often at odds during the reign of Louis XIV about the value of ´epices or issues of fiscal jurisdiction.7 It was, however, the Parlement of Dijon that provided the closest competitor to the Estates both in terms of prestige and the honour of claiming to defend the privileges of Burgundy. Relations between the two great corps were not always conflictual and many of the same families were represented in both institutions. Moreover, most benefited in one way or another from the fiscal system overseen by the Estates, whether directly in terms of pensions, or through the credit and tax structure.8 There was also a desire to avoid unnecessary antagonism, and there are numerous examples of the Estates’ legal officers working with senior parlementaires on issues of joint concern.9 While not averse to sniping behind each other’s backs, relations between the Parlement and the Estates were reasonably 4 5 7 9

For classic and conflicting accounts see: Marion, La Bretagne et le duc d’Aiguillon, and Pocquet, D’Aiguillon et La Chalotais. 6 See chapters 8 and 11. ´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, p. 211, and pp. 209–10, 216. 8 See chapters 6 and 10. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 207–9. In their remarques of 1700, the conseils des ´etats suggested ‘que pour empescher les vexations qui se font souvent dans le cours des d´ecrets et saisies r´eelles par les cr´eanciers . . . les e´tats ont d´ecr´et´e qu’il en sera conf´er´e par messieurs les e´lus avec m. le premier pr´esident et m. le procureur g´en´eral du parlement pour apr`es les e´claircissements puis faire telles remontrances a` Sa Majest´e qu’ils jugeront a` propos’. ADCO C 3000, fol. 154.

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harmonious throughout the reign of Louis XIV,10 but in the course of the eighteenth century that calm was shattered. As Christopher Corley has recently demonstrated, the legal officers of the Estates clashed with the Parlement over the issue of paternal rights and inheritance law in the 1720s, engaging in a highly public quarrel with both sides publishing pamphlets in an effort to sway the public.11 It was a pattern that would be repeated with increasing regularity thereafter. The second half of the reign of Louis XV witnessed a national resurgence of parlementaire opposition, notably against the religious and fiscal policies of the crown. The Burgundian magistrates were largely untouched by the great quarrels arising from the persecution of the Jansenists, but they were far more active when it came to resisting new taxation. That role, when combined with a desire to scrutinise the increasingly powerful administration of the ´elus, would provoke a series of fierce conflicts after 1750.12 An analysis of these disputes reveals much about the relative strengths and weaknesses of both institutions, and helps to explain why there was little sign of provincial solidarity before 1789. t h e s to r m c lo u d s gat h e r Arguably the most important, and certainly the most amusing, Burgundian corporate quarrel of the early eighteenth century was the legendary ‘armchair affair’.13 At stake was the claim of the military commandant, the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, to enjoy the same privileges as the governor during the interregnum following the death of the duc de Bourbon. Saulx-Tavanes demanded a variety of ceremonial honours, including the right to be seated in an imposing armchair, decorated with blue velvet and gold fleur-delys, when fulfilling his official duties in the Parlement. The commandant’s rather tenuous claims were those of a haughty man, who, as a Burgundian, perhaps ought to have known better, but despite the seemingly trivial nature of the dispute the Parlement was outraged. Remonstrances and complaints 10 11 12

13

The correspondence of first president Brulart contains a number of sharp attacks on the motives of the ´elus, La Cuisine, Choix de lettres par Nicolas Brulart, i, pp. 159–60, 166–71, 179–82. C. Corley, ‘Parental authority, legal practice, and state building in early modern France’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Purdue University, 2001), 156–224. For an introduction to the quarrels between the Parlement and the Estates, see: Colombet, Les parlementaires bourguignons, pp. 4–30; E. F. de La Cuisine, Parlement de Bourgogne, ii, pp. 393–408; J. Richard, ‘Le parlement de Bourgogne et la monarchie aux deux derniers si`ecles de l’ancien r´egime’, Annales de Bourgogne 49 (1977), 107–19; and J. Swann, ‘The Varenne affair’. The following is based upon J. Ormancey, ‘L’affaire de fauteuil, 1744’, Annales de Bourgogne 38 (1966), 81–99.

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poured forth and the quarrel was judged sufficiently serious for the king to exile six leading magistrates. Saulx-Tavanes eventually prevailed, prompting one local wag to declare that just as the local proverb foretold that much could pass between the wine glass and the nose so too could it between the ‘arse and the armchair’.14 This curious affair did have a serious side. It underlined the lengths to which the Parlement of Dijon was prepared to go in order to defend its own prestige and honour, and after 1750 the increasingly assertive court had the ´elus firmly in its sights. The first hint of friction was provided by the king’s decision of June 1755 to award an annual pension of 20,000 livres, payable by the Estates, to the recently retired governor, the duc de SaintAignan.15 The ´elus dutifully levied the sum on the province’s capitation rolls and informed the Parlement, but when the Estates met in August 1757 the three chambers voted unanimously to demand the suppression of the pension in their remonstrances.16 Matters might have rested there if SaintAignan had not presented letters patent, confirming the establishment of his pension, to the Parlement in January 1758. His pension was in existence de facto since the autumn of 1755, but the letters patent allowed the judges to criticise both the crown and the ´elus. On 2 March 1758, they issued an arrˆet forbidding the levy of any taxes not registered in the form of letters patent, voting simultaneously to prepare remonstrances. The arrˆet was a bold assertion that the Parlement, not the Estates, had the right to approve taxation, but the ´elus chose to turn a blind eye because ‘it [the arrˆet] had neither been printed nor published’.17 If the arrˆet remained secret the subsequent remonstrances did not, and when the king subsequently relieved the province of the burden of paying for Saint-Aignan’s pension in August 1758 both sides were in a position to claim the credit.18 It was an early sign of the growing competition between the two institutions for public approval and support. The spat over the issue of the governor’s pension was rapidly eclipsed by the revival of an ancient quarrel arising from the vexed question of administrative and judicial competence in cases of cotes d’office and nouveaux pieds de taille. As the ´elus were responsible for preparing the taille rolls, they also had the right to impose cotes d’office. Put simply, this allowed them 14 15 16 18

BN MS Fr 10435, fol. 34. ADCO C 3349, ‘Extrait du m´emoire contenant un pr´ecis des faits relatifs aux d´em´eles d’entre le parlement cour des aydes de Dijon et les e´tats et e´lus g´en´eraux du duch´e de Bourgogne’ 17 ADCO C 3349, ‘Extrait du m´ ADCO C 3045, fol. 136. emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. See: J. Varenne’s, M´emoire pour les ´elus g´eneraux de ´etats de Bourgogne (Lyon, 1762), p. 74; ADCO C 3349; and the Parlement’s remonstrances of 16 March 1762.

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to fix the taille assessments of wealthy individuals, who might otherwise use their influence to escape their obligations. Problems only arose when the taxpayers concerned wished to appeal. According to the ´elus, and all the legal evidence, such cases were to be heard by themselves, and, if the appellant was still dissatisfied, by the royal council.19 The judges, on the other hand, maintained that their own court should hear appeals, sitting as Cour des Aides, a claim they justified by reference to the pays d’´elections. The dispute had a long history. The ´elus had first been authorised to impose cotes d’office in March 1641, but in 1660 first president Brulart was still protesting that ‘this enterprise is a pure revolt of the ´elus against the authority of their sovereign magistrates’.20 The personal reign of Louis XIV restored calm, and it was not until a declaration of August 1715, that clarified procedure in the pays d’´elections, that battle was rejoined.21 The Parlement requested the application of the new law in Burgundy, a move that the ´elus quickly contested. The matter was referred to the king’s council in May 1716, where it was still ‘pending’ more than forty years later. Rather than antagonise either party, the crown had simply allowed the matter to drop and the ´elus had continued to levy cotes d’office unmolested. It was not until the spring of 1759 that this truce broke down.22 On 17 April, the king issued a declaration suspending the fiscal privileges of certain minor officeholders, ordering the ´elus to assess them for the taille by cotes d’office. When the Parlement of Dijon registered the law it added the proviso that any appeals be heard by itself sitting as the Cour des Aides. The royal council quashed its arrˆet in September 1759, but the judges demonstrated their increasing combativeness by opening up an attack on another front. While their pretensions relative to cotes d’office rested on shaky ground, they had a better case on the issue of nouveaux pieds de taille. In Burgundy, the different towns and communities of the province had the right to request the composition of a new taille roll to take account of changing population 19

20 21 22

When the Dijonnais sent a letter to the Parlement of Rennes, asking for information about the procedure affecting cotes d’office in Brittany, they received a very unwelcome reply. According to the Bretons, the commission intermediaire of the Estates was responsible for such matters and heard all complaints which went on appeal to the royal council. They added ‘jamais le Parlement n’en prend connoissance, ny comme Parlement, ny comme Cour des Aides’, ADCO C 3349. For all their efforts to disguise the fact, the same was legally true in Burgundy. La Cuisine, Brulart, i, pp. 167–71, Brulart to Cond´e, 2 June 1660, and ibid., pp. 171–3, Brulart to Fouquet, 2 June 1660. D’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 57–8, 189–92. The following is based upon: ADCO C 3349, ‘Extrait du m´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’, and AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis des faits relatifs aux d´emel´es d’entre le Parlement Cour des Aydes de Dijon, et les Etats et e´lus g´en´eraux du duch´e de Bourgogne’. The second m´emoire, from which the first was largely drawn, was written by the secr´etaire des ´etats, Jacques Varenne.

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or ownership patterns. What was in doubt was whom they should ask, the chamber of ´elus or the Parlement. As with much ancien r´egime jurisdiction, the precise legal position had never been clarified and both bodies ordered nouveaux pieds de taille when they saw fit. In February 1760, the judges broke that tacit agreement by opening investigations into a nouveau pied de taille overseen in the town of Charolles by Jacques Varenne, secr´etaire des ´etats, acting on the orders of the ´elus. In response, the chamber successfully petitioned for an arrˆet du conseil d’´etat, dated 28 June 1760, confirming its right to order both cotes d’office and nouveaux pieds de taille. For Varenne, who had prepared the statement of their case, it would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory because the language and arguments he employed in defence of the Estates would bring down the wrath of the Parlement upon him. The deteriorating relationship between the Parlement and the chamber of ´elus was transformed into a full-scale public conflict because of the king’s need to increase direct taxation. With France facing defeat in the Seven Years War, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Henri L´eonard Bertin, was obliged to levy a third vingti`eme and to double the capitation. The relevant edicts were sent to the Parlement of Dijon in March 1760, and the local judges were quick to add their voice to the wider chorus of parlementaire protest.23 The judges issued remonstrances and ignored three sets of lettres de jussion before finally registering the new taxes on 22 September. Such obstinacy was typical of the period and would have been thoroughly unremarkable had it not been for the earlier action of the ´elus. Without waiting for the judges in Dijon, a deputation from the chamber of ´elus, including Varenne, had already bowed to pressure from Bertin and signed what they believed to be an advantageous abonnement for the third vingti`eme on 26 August. In other words, they had agreed to pay a tax, which, in theory, might not be levied if the king heeded the Parlement’s remonstrances. Varenne subsequently claimed that the deputation had received private reassurances from senior judges that the abonnement would be acceptable.24 If so, he had been misled because the court feared that it would set a precedent, undermining both their rights of registration and remonstrance.25 23

24 25

Events in Dijon are examined by G. Dumay, ‘Une session des e´tats g´en´eraux de Bourgogne a` Autun ´ en 1763’, M´emoires de la Soci´et´e Eduenne 8 (1879), 4–6, and Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, pp. 202–3, 206–10. For the reaction of the other parlements, see Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, pp. 93–112, 140–8, and Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 182–91. AN K709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. The magistrates continually stressed this point in their remonstrances, pamphlets and private correspondence, see: BMD MS 778, fol. 30, ‘Le parlement outrag´e’, by Joly de B´evy; BMD MS 912, fol. 172, Fontette to Drouin de Vaudeuil, 25 January 1763; and ADCO C 3349, ‘M´emoire au sujet de la datte des lettres d’abonnement’.

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Rumours about the abonnement were already circulating in Dijon when the Parlement assembled on 22 September, and it was almost certainly in response that the court decided to add a clause to its arrˆet d’enregistrement stipulating that the third vingti`eme was to be imposed for 1761 and 1762 only, thus contradicting the terms of the abonnement, which had also included the last quarter of 1760. When the letters patent authorising the abonnement were formally delivered to the Parlement, the government missed an opportunity to calm the situation by refusing to change the date it contained.26 Thus in their arrˆets d’enregistrement of 10 February 1761, for the vingti`eme, and 7 March 1761, for the doubled capitation, the judges added further modifications. On 10 February, they stated their position in unequivocal terms declaring that ‘no new tax can be established, distributed, nor levied in the jurisdiction of the court, other than by virtue of edicts, declarations or letters patent duly verified in the said court’.27 In the remonstrances of the Parlement of Paris, this statement would have been unremarkable. In Burgundy, the same doctrine was controversial because the Estates voted the five taxes composing the taille,28 and, if the Parlement’s arrˆet was interpreted literally, only the capitation and vingti`emes were legally valid. Claiming an insult to their privileges, the ´elus sent a strongly worded requˆete for cassation, drafted by Varenne, to the conseil des finances which quashed the Parlement’s arrˆets of 22 September 1760, 10 February and 7 March 1761, on 27 October 1761. There were a number of reasons why the government, and especially Bertin, was prepared to side with the Estates and enter into conflict with the Parlement. In the summer of 1760, the crown was just emerging from a long struggle with the parlements to increase taxation that had begun in August of the previous year, and it could ill-afford further delays.29 Another important factor in the government’s calculations was the role played by the Estates in raising taxation and loans, which meant that it had a vested interest in supporting the prerogatives of the ´elus. In a conversation with the prince de Cond´e’s secretary, Girard, Bertin lauded the ‘administration of Burgundy’s zeal for the king’s service’, declaring ‘that if all the g´en´eralit´es could behave in the same fashion he would be pleased to see them all made into pays d’´etats’.30 The Parlement had adopted the role of attacking 26

27 28 30

The Parlement did protest about the date and tried without success to get it changed, although Bertin did promise that the events of August 1760 would not be repeated. Dumay, ‘Une session des e´tats’, 5, and Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, p. 202. ADCO C 3349, ‘M´emoire au sujet de la date des lettres d’abonnement’. 29 Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 182–92. See chapter 6. BMC AC MS 1416, fol. 24, Girard to Rigoley, 17 November 1760.

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the same administration in the name of the taxpayer, and Bertin was unsympathetic to their complaints in wartime.31 As one magistrate noted bitterly in a later pamphlet, the ´elus were delighted by their victory and printed: an infinite number of examples that they distributed in Paris and throughout the province, and in order to make the insult to the Parlement more public and more outrageous, if it were possible, they posted it everywhere after having signified it to the procureur g´en´eral.32

In addition to its natural resentment at seeing the crown side with the ´elus, the Parlement was incensed by this public humiliation and in particular by a phrase used by Varenne when preparing his requˆete for the Conseil des Finances, which appeared in the printed version of the arrˆet.33 He had written that: at a time when His Majesty had accorded the said abonnements, he was perfectly well informed of the Parlement of Dijon’s resistance to the registration of the edict of February 1760, from which it is necessary to conclude that the changes dictated by this court have been motivated by personal interest completely unconnected to the public good.

The horrified magistrates approved remonstrances on 9 January 1762, declaring that it was the first time that a court had been ‘insulted under the very eyes of the sovereign, and had found its honour exposed to attack’.34 The court threatened a judicial strike if it did not receive a positive reply to its remonstrances within a month. Nothing was heard from Versailles, and the judges made good their threat on 1 February, voting at the same time to draft yet more remonstrances. The crisis intensified on 2 April when the government forcibly registered letters patent forbidding future attacks on the legitimacy of abonnements contracted by the ´elus. Almost inevitably further protests followed, and the ministry reacted with a novel version of an old tactic by ‘exiling’ the judges to their hometown of Dijon, where they remained for nearly a year. The government presumably believed that this would inconvenience the judges, who could not visit or 31

32 33 34

Bertin’s attitude can be gauged from reading his extensive correspondence with Miromesnil, P. Le Verdier, ed., Correspondance politique et administrative de Miromesnil, premier pr´esident du parlement de Normandie, 5 vols. (Paris, 1899–1903), i, ii. ADCO C 3349, ‘Lettre de M. de . . . a` M. de . . . sur les d´em´el´es actuels du Parlement de Dijon avec les e´lus g´en´eraux de la province de Bourgogne’. BMD MS 2326, fol. 241. The text was quoted in the Parlement’s remonstrances of 7 July 1762, with the offending phrase d’INTERET PERSONNEL capitalised, ADCO C 3349. Ibid. They added that the insult ‘a e´t´e port´e a` son comble par l’impression, la publication et l’affiche’.

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attend to their country estates, without causing the stir of sending them into exile elsewhere. Through this rather tangled web of events it is possible to identify a series of overlapping disputes that had, by the end of 1761, produced a bitter conflict between the ´elus and the Parlement, resulting in the disgrace of the latter. In 1759, the Parlement of Dijon had launched one of its periodic campaigns against the provincial administration on the disputed grounds of cotes d’office and nouveaux pieds de taille. Behind these superficially dry and complicated jurisdictional issues real power was at stake. Victory for the Parlement would have placed it in a position to scrutinise the province’s fiscal administration and have given it the means to censure the conduct of the ´elus. It was for this reason that the two sides fought so fiercely about cotes d’office throughout much of the eighteenth century.35 An already tense situation was transformed into a crisis because of the government’s pressing need for increased taxation. Rather than wait for the Parlement to register the necessary edicts, Bertin encouraged the ´elus to contract an early abonnement, and then did nothing to soothe the hurt feelings of the parlementaires. Finally, the ´elus, championed by Varenne, had shown themselves willing not only to stand up to the challenge of the Parlement, but even to question its integrity and its claims to be the guardian of the public interest. t h e b at t l e fo r p u b l i c opi n i o n As we have seen, during these angry exchanges one name came regularly to the fore, that of the secr´etaire des ´etats, Jacques Varenne. Such was his importance that as the crisis developed he became its principal focus, and ever since it has been known as ‘the Varenne affair’.36 By 1760, Varenne was seemingly at the summit of a long and distinguished career. He was born in 1710 into one of Dijon’s most talented legal families, which was gradually making the transition into the local robe nobility. His uncle, Claude, was a celebrated avocat, nicknamed the ‘grand Varenne’, whose praises had been sung by leading magistrates such as president Bouhier.37 His father was also a lawyer, albeit one who had made his fortune as the receiver of the taille in Bourg-en-Bresse, where he had also served as the subdelegate of the intendant.38 As for Jacques Varenne himself, there is no 35 36 37

President Bouhier wrote a detailed M´emoire on the problem of cotes d’office in 1715–16, ADCO C 3349. The quarrel was renewed during the reign of Louis XVI and will be discussed below. For a more detailed discussion see Swann, ‘The Varenne affair’. 38 Bour´ La Cuisine, Parlement de Bourgogne, ii, p. 395, n. 1. ee, Chancellerie, pp. 76–8.

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doubt that he possessed one of the sharpest legal minds in the kingdom. Even historians who have denounced his methods have described him as ‘a man of rare talents’,39 ‘capable, audacious’40 and possessing ‘a wonderfully sharp mind’.41 So formidable were his skills as a polemicist that he could easily hold his own with parlementaires such as Malesherbes and Charles de Brosses, and the latter was so impressed that he even sought to enlist the aid of Jean-Jacques Rousseau to write the remonstrances defending the Parlement against his attacks.42 With such potential, it is hardly surprising that the young Varenne had attracted the attention of local dignitaries. Following in the footsteps of his father, Jacques acquired administrative knowledge while serving as the subdelegate of the intendant in the Bresse.43 He was also taken under the wing of the first president of the Parlement of Dijon, and it was with his encouragement that the duc de Bourbon, governor of the province, wrote in glowing terms to the ´elus in January 1730: sirs, I have received such advantageous reports of sieur Jacques Varenne, avocat in the Parlement of Dijon, that I believe I do not know of a better choice to fill the vacant charge of conseil des ´etats.44

Thus began a sparkling career in the service of the province, and the duc was sufficiently satisfied to write again in May 1736 requesting the payment of a pension worth 1,000 livres to Varenne.45 Further promotion followed in November 1752 with his appointment to the office of secr´etaire des ´etats, again with the backing of the governor, by now the duc’s son, the prince de Cond´e.46 The esteem in which Varenne was held can be gauged by the willingness of the Estates to create a third office of secr´etaire des ´etats for his son, Antoine Varenne de B´eost,47 a noted agronome and promoter of physiocratic doctrines,48 and to grant him the survivance on the office of his father. The two men, together with Jacques’ other son, Varenne de F´enilles, who, in addition to being a correspondant of the Acad´emie des Sciences was a member of the agricultural societies of Dijon, Lyon and Paris, formed a formidable team that was well qualified to challenge the pretensions of the Parlement.49 39 41 43 44 45 46 48 49

40 Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, p. 145. La Cuisine, Parlement de Bourgogne, ii, p. 395. 42 Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, p. 147. Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, p. 211. AN H1 123, dos. 2, fol. 98, ‘M´emoire contre l’´etablissement d’une troisi`eme place de greffier secr´etaire des e´tats de Bourgogne’. ADCO C 3415, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 24 January 1730. Ibid ., duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 31 May 1736. 47 See chapter 4. Ibid ., prince de Cond´e to the ´elus, 25 November 1752. Bouchard, De l’Humanisme, pp. 847–52, discusses some of his plans for agricultural improvement. See: P. Grosclaude, Malesherbes: t´emoin et interpr`ete de son temps (Paris, 1961), pp. 480, 482–4; Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, p. 216; and Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, p. 145.

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By the mid-eighteenth century the great institutions of the kingdom almost invariably contrived to publish their legal memoirs or remonstrances,50 and with such an able champion at their disposal, it was not surprising that the ´elus turned to Varenne’s legal and literary skills to refute the arguments of the Parlement. The secr´etaire des ´etats drafted a vigorous defence of the rights and privileges of the Estates that was approved unanimously when it was read to the chamber of ´elus on 23 January 1761.51 The memoir was subsequently published, sparking what proved to be a lively and sophisticated debate about the history and constitution of the province.52 Using his considerable knowledge to good effect, Varenne challenged the prestige, authority and jurisdiction of the magistrates. On the disputed question of consent to taxation, he argued that the dukes of Burgundy had regularly assembled the three orders of the province in order to demand a don gratuit, which once voted was collected by the ´elus.53 Rather cuttingly he added that the Parlement had nothing to do with this procedure: it did not exist. When the line of the dukes was extinguished, Louis XI had confirmed the constitution, rights and privileges of the province, and fiscal matters continued to be guided by the principle that ‘the king has requested, the Estates have consented’, and he cited the don gratuit to prove his point. This had always been agreed without any consultation with the Parlement, and as a coup de grˆace Varenne pointed out that the Estates had petitioned Louis XI to establish the Parlement of Dijon in 1476. By emphasising the historical importance of the Estates and the comparatively recent vintage of the Parlement, Varenne sought to reinforce the pre-eminence of the ´elus over the judges. If they accepted his version of provincial history, the parlementaires would have been at a distinct disadvantage. Instead they offered an alternative historical scenario drawn, in part, from the fertile constitutional imagination of the Jansenist antiquarian, Louis-Adrien Le Paige.54 In their published remonstrances of 16 March 50 51 52

53 54

In theory, remonstrances were for the king’s eyes only, but despite occasional grumbling the government seems to have realised that there was little it could do to prevent publication. ADCO C 3209, deliberation of 23 January 1761. Varenne wrote a number of judicial requˆetes and m´emoires during the crisis. The most important, which are analysed here, were the M´emoire pour les ´elus g´en´eraux des Etats du duch´e de Bourgogne which was also signed by the comte de Vienne and dealt primarily with the issue of consent to taxation, and his M´emoire pour les ´elus g´en´eraux des Etats du duch´e de Bourgogne contre le parlement cour des aides de Dijon (Lyon, 1762), which was a revised version of his original memoir on cotes d’office and nouveaux pieds de taille. It was published with a new preface in response to the Parlement’s remonstrances of 16 March 1762. ADCO C 3349, ‘M´emoire pour les e´lus g´en´eraux’, fols. 26–33. Aspects of his career and writings are examined by: D. Van Kley, The Jansenists and the expulsion of the Jesuits From France, 1757–1765 (New Haven, 1975); K. M. Baker, Inventing the French revolution. Essays on French political culture in the eighteenth century (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 31–58, and, especially, C. Maire, De la cause de dieu a` la cause de la nation. Le jans´enisme au XVIIIe si`ecle (Paris, 1998).

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1762, they argued that the Parlement had been in existence for thirteen centuries, and that long before the reign of its dukes Burgundy had been part of the kingdom of France.55 Nor had Louis XI created the Parlement of Dijon in the manner described by Varenne. The edict establishing the court had been registered in the Parlement of Paris, which had transferred its rights ‘to the new tribunal which was affiliated to it and was allotted a part of its ancient territory’.56 In an important pamphlet, entitled Le Parlement Outrag´e, which was published anonymously by a young councillor, Louis-Philibert-Joseph Joly de B´evy, this argument was pushed even further. Joly invoked the theory of a union des classes to defend the Parlement of Dijon with ideas that were little more than a paraphrase of Le Paige’s Lettres Historiques.57 These arguments are significant for a number of reasons. The magistrates had enthusiastically seized upon the theory of a union des classes, according to which the different parlements formed part of a symbolic whole.58 By pretending that there was only one Parlement with a thirteen-hundred-year history, they were able to claim precedence over the Estates, whilst sidestepping the awkward fact that their own institution dated from 1476. The theory of a union des classes, developed by the Jansenists in Paris during their struggle against Unigenitus, was thus adapted to defend the Parlement of Dijon’s authority in the Burgundian context. As Louis XV had vehemently and publicly reprimanded the Parlement of Paris for using similar language in 1759, the Burgundian magistrates were presumably not thinking of influencing their sovereign with these arguments.59 Instead, the remonstrances were for public consumption both within the province, where they could counteract the arguments of Varenne, and outside it where they could hope to attract the support of other magistrates. 55 56 57

58

59

The remonstrances were printed and widely distributed in Burgundy, Paris and elsewhere in the kingdom, ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon, 16 Mars 1762’. ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon, 16 Mars 1762’. BMD MS 778, ‘Le Parlement Outrag´e’, fols. 16–17, 20–3. The pamphlet is examined in detail below. Joly wrote that the Parlement of Dijon ‘n’est ainsy que les autres parlements e´tablis dans les provinces, qu’un d´emembrement de celui de Paris, qui e´toit autrefois unique et universel’, and added ‘que les parlements, quoique dispers´es en diff´erentes classes, ne composent cependant qu’un seul et mˆeme parlement. For a comparison with the text of Le Paige, see his Lettres historiques sur les fonctions essentielles du parlement sur le droit des pairs et sur les loix fondamentales du royaume (2 vols., Amsterdam, 1753–4), i, pp. 153, 274, 313–14. The theory of a union des classes has been examined by: R. Bickart, Les parlements et la notion de souverainet´e nationale au XVIIIe si`ecle (Paris, 1932), pp. 276–9; J. Egret, Le parlement de Dauphin´e et les affaires publiques dans la deuxi`eme moiti´e du XVIIIe si`ecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1942), i, pp. 91–2, 110–11, 252–5; and Swann, ‘Robe, sword and aristocratic reaction revisited’, pp. 153–7, 165–70. The clash had occurred as a result of the Besanc¸on affair which is discussed in J. Swann, ‘Parlements and political crisis in France under Louis XV: the Besanc¸on affair, 1757–1761’, Historical Journal 37 (1994), 803–28, esp. 815–16.

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Not that the judges relied solely upon the fashionable theories of the parlementaire opposition because in the same remonstrances they adopted a stance that could be described as ‘more royalist than the king’. They argued that with the death of the last duke, ‘the particular laws of the province were extinguished’.60 The ´elus were, therefore, guilty of transforming the: reunion of Burgundy to France in 1477 in to a kind of voluntary and free accession on the part of the Estates of this province . . . they announce Burgundy as a country under foreign rule reunited by Louis XI to the kingdom under certain conditions.

They continued by arguing that the events of 1477 were not in themselves important: ‘Louis XI was not the author of this union’ because Burgundy had been part of France since the time of the Frankish kings. They were, therefore, vaunting the authority of the crown and the Parlement’s historic role in upholding it, not defending the privileges or constitution of Burgundy. The judges were not ill-disposed to the notion of provincial rights and liberties, it simply suited their strategy to downplay their significance. As Jean Richard has noted, they reversed their position in May 1788 and used the ‘contract’ of 1477, that supposedly did not exist in 1762, to combat Lamoignon’s reforms.61 It is a good example of the flexibility of the arguments employed by the parlementaires, which were intended to reinforce their position in a corporate struggle. Varenne was unimpressed, declaring that if the parlementaires were correct the Parlement of Paris should have registered the fiscal and other laws issued by the Valois dukes.62 Nor was he worried about publicly ridiculing the pretensions of the magistrates. While admitting that it was not his place to comment on the theory of a Parlement originating in the gothic mists, he pointed out that most historians dated its establishment to the end of the thirteenth century. Varenne was no less cutting in his analysis of the constitutional claims of the judges. Quoting La Rocheflavin, he wrote that legislative power ‘and all the other powers which form a government belong uniquely and essentially to the king’, adding ‘si veut le roi, si veut la loi’.63 That phrase was one of the principal rallying cries of those authors who defended the judicial reforms of chancellor Maupeou after 1771, and it is not surprising that he tried to persuade Varenne to join their number.64 60 61 62 64

ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon, 16 Mars 1762’. Richard, ‘Le parlement de Bourgogne’, 118. 63 Ibid. p. 23. ADCO C 3349, M´emoire pour les ´elus g´en´eraux, pp. 21–6. Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 877. After being forced to resign from his office in Burgundy, Varenne wrote his Histoire de la ligue en Bourgogne which attracted the approbation of the chancellor who wanted to publish it in 1771.

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The sarcastic, almost mocking tone of some of Varenne’s prose certainly suggests that he was intellectually hostile to the constitutional claims of the parlements. His colleague, the secr´etaire des ´etats, Bernard de Blancy, later expressed similar sentiments in private. In a letter to Varenne, he poured scorn on Joly de B´evy and other local parlementaires, and denounced the ideas of the parlements generally, declaring that: when, a few years ago, the Parlement of Rouen imagined the classes, it was necessary to re-establish good order right away, for it revealed a dangerous association against the state that will only be destroyed today with great difficulty, if it can be achieved at all.65

It is not an exaggeration to talk of an ideological split between these permanent officers of the Estates and the parlementaires, and personal factors may also have played a part. When pleading a lawsuit for the pr´esidente de La Marche in 1744, Varenne had attracted the ire of president Gagne de Perrigny, a member of one of the principal robe dynasties in Dijon. In his published reply, Gagne wrote: an angry woman can say anything, an impudent hack can write anything; we laugh at one and despise the other: neither are of any consequence.66

The opportunity to settle a few scores with Gagne and his colleagues probably added a dash of bile to Varenne’s quill, but, if so, his revenge was to be bought at a very high price. To an impartial observer, Varenne clearly held the upper hand when it came to describing the historical origins of the Parlement of Dijon, but we should not forget that the theory of a union des classes was taken very seriously prior to the Maupeou reforms of 1771. The judges were, however, able to muster some more telling arguments by emphasising the discrepancy between Varenne’s theories and local administrative practice. When disputing the need for registration in the Parlement, he had cited the superior authority of the Estates. Yet, as we have seen, that body was only in session for two or three weeks every three years, and when the secr´etaire des ´etats wrote of the Estates in practical terms he meant the ´elus. It was they who contracted the abonnements for taxes such as the capitation or vingti`emes, which were always approved retrospectively. Rightly or wrongly, they were accused of corruption, or, more tellingly, of despotism, and the judges informed Louis XV that the ´elus were acting ‘as the sovereign arbiters of the most important matters of which the Estates have neither expressed 65 66

AN H1 127, dos. 2, fol. 24, Bernard de Blancey to Varenne, 28 September 1763. Bouchard, De l’humanisme, p. 812.

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an opinion, nor ceded any power’.67 It was the ´elus who ‘leave Your Majesty only the right to propose taxation; they dare to reserve to the votes of the ´elus, or if one prefers the consent of the Estates, the force of sanction’.68 The authority of the ´elus more than matched that of intendants in the pays d’´elections, and they were vulnerable to similar criticisms. Yet attacking the ´elus carried social and political risks that could not be treated lightly. The chamber was staffed by members of the local noble and office-holding elites, and if the magistrates launched a full-scale assault on their conduct they risked provoking an angry reaction at the next meeting of the Estates, scheduled for May 1763. Moreover, the judges were not hostile to the Estates as such, and Varenne found himself cast as an ideal scapegoat. In their remonstrances of July 1762, they claimed that ‘a rigorous inquisition’ left the ordinary citizen at the mercy of ‘coups d’autorit´e, that an enemy of the state would like to substitute for the lawful authority’ of king and Parlement. Varenne was that ‘enemy’, and the ´elus were guilty of nothing more serious than gullibility and inexperience. By attacking the secr´etaire en chef personally, and by accusing him of being the ´eminence grise behind the quarrels about abonnements and cotes d’office, the Parlement could seek to minimise its disagreement with the ´elus. Here was the basis of what would become the classic criticism of the ´elus, to be repeated regularly by would-be reformers before 1789 and by subsequent historians ever since.69 According to the parlementaires, the ´elus were well-intentioned, but ill-informed and thus prey to manipulation by their permanent officials of whom Varenne was a perfect example. Varenne had, in part, conjured the storm through his own actions, not least by his willingness to question the sincerity of the Parlement’s motives in his requˆete to the royal council that had secured the arrˆet of 27 October 1761.70 He was scarcely more tactful in his published memoirs, writing that it was the ´elus who deserved the gratitude of the province for negotiating an advantageous abonnement in August 1760. He declared: ‘such is the crime of which the ´elus have been found guilty, and for which they are reproached with such bitterness [by] the Parlement which profits from their labours and reaps the fruit of the favour they have obtained from the goodness of the sovereign’.71 Varenne’s vaunting of the role played by the ´elus in reducing the fiscal demands of the crown offers another illustration of how Parlement and the Estates competed for public acclaim, but even 67 68 70 71

ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon, 16 Mars 1762’. 69 See chapters 4 and 12. Ibid . ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 7 Juillet 1762’. Ibid ., ‘M´emoire pour les e´lus g´en´eraux’, p. 74.

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if he had a good point he would have been wiser to leave these words unsaid. The magistrates were genuinely incensed by Varenne’s arguments and this accounts, in large measure, for the quarrel transforming itself into a vendetta. In January 1761, the anger of the parlementaires poured forth in Joly de B´evy’s tract, the Le Parlement Outrag´e.72 When his printer was arrested, Joly came forward and, after making a brief, noble speech to his assembled colleagues, he resigned.73 The government was not mollified, and a few days later he was arrested and imprisoned for eight months in the Bastille. The offending pamphlet consisted of some thirty pages of character assassination, directed at Varenne, plus a panegyric of the Parlement, which he described as ‘a corps composed of all that is most grand’.74 As the title suggests, Joly accused Varenne of insulting the court, but, more importantly, of betraying its trust. It was alleged, not unreasonably, that it was the patronage of the first president, which had allowed Varenne to transfer from his original profession of avocat au parlement to ‘an employment that is, in truth, lucrative but subaltern’75 in the Estates. By attacking the Parlement, Varenne had turned upon his benefactors, or as Joly put matters: he ought, this boastful author, to be more imbued than anyone with respect and veneration for the Parlement. Raised, so to speak, under its eyes, it is to the kindness with which the Parlement admitted him into its sanctuary, to hear there his first words, and to form them, that he is indebted for his rhetorical talent that it would have been better for him and the good of the people to have suffocated at birth, if it could have been foreseen that one day he would abuse it with such insolence.

Varenne had allegedly hoodwinked the ´elus, who, Joly claimed, had ‘no part in this pretension, destructive of all good, of all liberty’, and their only fault was in failing to stop him from causing further damage.76 It is true that Varenne was the author of the line that had so infuriated the magistrates, but his offending requˆete had been signed by the ´elu of the noblesse, the comte de Vienne. Moreover, it was Vienne, assisted by Varenne, who had headed the deputations to Versailles on behalf of the Estates in both the summer of 1760 and throughout much of 1762. Yet the judges made no attempt to accuse him of collusion, and in their remonstrances of 72

73 75

BMD MS 778, ‘Le Parlement Outrag´e’. Similar, if less vehement criticisms of Varenne were published in the ‘M´emoire sur les d´em´el´es actuelles du Parlement de Dijon avec les e´lus g´en´eraux de la province de Bourgogne’ which appeared a few months later, ADCO C 3349. It was written by Guenichot de Nogent, a local magistrate. 74 BMD MS 778, ‘Le Parlement Outrag´ Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, pp. 212–13. e’, fols. 4–5. 76 Ibid., fols. 7–9. Ibid., fol. 1.

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7 July 1762 they made a direct appeal to Vienne and the nobility, declaring that they should be indignant to see: an author [Varenne], so little suited to be its voice claim that title. If it [the nobility] is distressed, it is with us, Sire, when it reads the name of a subaltern alongside that of a gentleman of high birth, whose qualities and those of his forefathers, are equally respected in the chamber of the nobility and in the Parlement.77

Varenne was, therefore, a social upstart, a ‘clerk’ who had tried to rise above his station and break the natural harmony between the Parlement and the Burgundian noblesse. In their published remonstrances and pamphlets, the magistrates revealed their contempt for the humble secr´etaire des ´etats and lauded their own aristocratic pretensions as part of a strategy designed to persuade the nobility to abandon their dangerous prot´eg´e and place themselves under the protection of the Parlement. In Brittany after 1750, there were signs of an alliance between the nobility in the Estates and the local parlementaires.78 The potential for such cooperation certainly existed in Burgundy. The second estate of the province was a tight knit group, and the comte de Vienne’s father had been a conseiller d’honneur in the Parlement, while some magistrates went directly into the Estates after resigning their office. During the crisis, at least one attempt was made by the magistrates to influence the forthcoming assembly of the Estates. In December 1762, informal contacts were established with the alcades, who were supplied with material about the affair in the hope that they would censure Varenne.79 The alcades refused, but if the Varenne affair failed to produce an alliance between the Estates and the Parlement to match that in Brittany, it nevertheless acted as a catalyst on the thinking of the local elite. The senior magistrate, F´evret de Fontette, who represented the Parlement in the negotiations with the ministry to end the crisis during 1762, wrote at length about the attitude of his colleagues towards the Estates.80 He argued that since the time of Louis XIV, the Estates had failed to assert their privileges and whenever an 77

78 79 80

ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 7 Juillet 1762’. No less than 1,500 copies of these remonstrances were printed by the Parlement and they were sent to Louis XV, the dauphin, the king’s ministers, magistrates and lawyers in Paris and Dijon and crucially to the members of the chamber of the noblesse in the Estates of Burgundy, BMD MS 1621, fol. 95. For the situation in Brittany, see Marion, La Bretagne et le duc d’Aiguillon; Pocquet, D’Aiguillon et ´ La Chalotais; and Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, pp. 338, 369. AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. This claim was made by Varenne, but the reaction of the government prior to the Estates of 1763 suggests that he was correct. ADCO C 3349, ‘Second projet de r´eponse de m. le chancelier au nom du roy au remontrances du Parlement de Dijon’. Throughout Fontette laments the failure of the Estates to reclaim their ancient rights.

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attempt had been made to do so they had been silenced. It was the Parlement, which was permanently in session, that had assumed responsibility for protecting the interests of the province and its inhabitants. As long as the Estates remained quiescent, only the Parlement could fulfil this role because the ´elus were administrators or ‘economes’ with no other authority than that invested in them by the Estates. re ac t i o n i n d i j o n The desire to avoid a serious split with the actual membership of the Estates ensured that Varenne would be the chief target of the Parlement of Dijon.81 In their unremitting campaign against him, the judges were anxious to claim the support of the wider public. Within the province there is no doubt that they held the upper hand. Joly de B´evy’s Le Parlement Outrag´e first appeared in manuscript form during the Christmas celebrations of December 1761.82 Distribution was primitive, but effective: ‘at night it was thrown furtively in to the courtyards and drives of houses. It is even said that fourteen copies were thrown in to the courtyard of Varenne’. There was soon a healthy demand, and according to one observer the pamphlets were exchanging hands at one louis per copy.83 If Joly de B´evy was hoping to arouse popular support for the Parlement he seems to have succeeded. Varenne was widely denounced as ‘the Catilina of Burgundy’,84 and in his own version of events, he admitted that: the sieur Varenne was menaced with stoning, with burning, he and his family in their house, his servants were insulted in the streets, and he had cause to fear becoming the victim of the blind rage of an unthinking populace.85

Similar angry scenes followed the public burning of his revised memoir on 7 June 1762, which the Parlement turned into a piece of political theatre. Large crowds gathered, filling the squares and even roofs of the town,86 in order to watch the ceremony, almost certainly with the encouragement of the parlementaires, who were sufficiently proud of their supporters to refer to them in their remonstrances. They crowed about ‘the crowds of people’ 81 82 84 85 86

The judges were careful to flatter the Estates and the nobility for being penetrated by ‘l’esprit d’´equit´e et de patriotisme’, ADCO C 3349, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 7 Juillet 1762’. 83 Ibid., fol. 132. BMD MS 912, fols. 123–32. G. Dumay, ed., Mercure Dijonnois, p. 174. ADCO C 3349, ‘Premi`eres personalit´es contre le Sr Varenne’, and AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. Even Varenne, who can have drawn no pleasure from the fact, noted the presence of large crowds on 7 June, AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’.

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that had attended the spectacle and referred to the popular ‘joy’ at seeing the downfall of their enemy.87 As in other provincial crises, such as the Besanc¸on or Brittany affairs,88 the magistrates ostracised their opponents. All social contact with the members of the chamber of ´elus was forbidden and ‘the proscription . . . was extended to their wives, children and even their servants’.89 When the Parlement resumed its service in March 1763, the emotional hold of the magistrates over the local population was strikingly reaffirmed. During three weeks of celebrations ‘the boutiques remained closed all day, and at night the Dijonnais manifested their joy by illuminating their houses, lighting bonfires and by throwing firecrackers. On 5 March the theatre played for free . . .’.90 Different quarters of the town competed to build elaborate loges, decorated with the arms of Burgundy and the House of Bourbon-Cond´e, and emblazoned with ‘Long Live the King, Long Live the Parlement’.91 At night, the wealthy dined on the upper floor of the loge Saint Nicolas, while an orchestra played music for their entertainment and for that of the people who danced and drank in the streets below. On 10 March, a triumphal chariot, pulled by six horses and filled by 24 ‘nymphs’, made a tour of Dijon, throwing sugared almonds to the crowd and stopping to distribute laurels to the parlementaires. In the course of these festivities, odes, songs and ditties were composed, some in local patois, to praise the Parlement.92 When Cl´ement Perrier, a clumsy partygoer, accidentally shot his hand off while saluting the magistrates, his misfortune was put to good effect. Within hours, the city was being entertained by an impromptu verse about the tragic hand of Perrier lost as it ‘took part in the hour of the patrie’.93 Not surprisingly, Varenne told a very different story, alleging that at least one magistrate informed his family that he would not be secure in Dijon, even with a ‘safe conduct’ signed by the king.94 In these circumstances Varenne and his son were obliged to flee the province and shelter at Versailles. In lurid terms he recorded their plight:95 87 88 90

91 92 93 94

ADCO C 3349, remonstrances of 7 July 1762. They also noted their satisfaction at seeing ‘la voix du peuple si g´en´eralement, si ouvertement d´eclar´ee’. 89 ADCO C 3349, ‘Premi` Swann, ‘The Besanc¸on affair’. eres personalit´es’. Dumay, ‘Une session des e´tats’, 11. These festivities were typical of the displays of local solidarity with the provincial parlementaires before 1771. Other examples include the celebrations after similar crises in Besanc¸on and Rennes, Swann, ‘The Besanc¸on affair’, 824–5. BMD MS 1620, fols. 168–171. For a sample, BMD MS 912, fols. 193–9, and MS 2326, fols. 211–31. Ibid ., fol. 199, ‘Impromptu. Sur la main de Cl´ement Perrier, emport´ee par un coup de pistolet le 1er mars 1763 a` l’occasion des rejouissances pour la rentr´ee du parlement’. 95 Ibid. AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’.

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they never ceased to accuse them, slanderously, of facts, words, speeches that they had never even thought of. The very serenity of their faces was a crime, the modest confidence born of a clear conscience was attributed to arrogance and bravado.

Even if Varenne exaggerated somewhat, it is clear that Dijon was extremely agitated on several occasions during the crisis. Moreover, it was the parlementaires who were able to count upon public support, not the ´elus, nor even the Estates. The judicial strike which continued uninterrupted from February 1762 until March 1763 was clearly a significant cause of local solidarity with the magistrates.96 Dijon was socially and economically beholden to the Parlement, whose members were some of the largest employers, directly or indirectly, and who counted amongst the most substantial landowners in the surrounding countryside.97 There was, however, more than just noblesse oblige and material interest behind support for the Parlement, and we should beware of the assumption that local people followed the magistrates blindly in their campaigns. Micault, author of the Mercure dijonnais and agr´eg´e in law, believed that the arguments of Varenne were superior to those of the Parlement, and suggested that it was to win back public support that Joly de B´evy launched such a personal attack on his opponent in Le Parlement Outrag´e.98 In another subtle analysis of the Varenne affair, Jean-Edm´e Durande, avocat in the Parlement of Dijon and mayor of the city under Napol´eon, wrote that:99 I do not accept the theory of the Parlement entirely, and I feel that the ´elus, levying the taille and [exercising] the functions of the intendants, have the same power and the same authority, that they have the right to issue cotes d’office, that opposition to these taxes is of their cognisance, and that appeals in this matter must be sent to the Parlement Cour des Aides. That is my opinion, I doubt that it will be heeded; the credit of the ´elus will prevail and the poor Burgundians, fearing to plead in a distant tribunal at great expense, will prefer to carry the yoke that it has pleased the ´elus to impose rather than to complain.

Durande was an informed member of the public, who was respectful of the authority of the two contestants, and he favoured the Parlement’s position in the dispute on cotes d’office on the perfectly reasonable grounds that Burgundians would otherwise be obliged to plead their appeals in 96 97 98

99

The Parlement contributed 10,000 livres to the hardship fund for those members of the legal profession most affected by the strike, BMD MS 1621, fol. 95. The classic studies are: Roupnel, La ville et la campagne; and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne. According to Bouchard, De l’humanisme, p. 533, n. 3, pp. 871–2, he wrote: ‘nous avoue que si le Parlement, comme il fallait s’y attendre, conservait dans son parti un grand nombre de gens distingu´es, les raisons de ses adversaires semblaient meilleure que les siennes’. Quoted in d’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 29–30. Durande discussed the Varenne affair as part of his broader examination of the taille in the province.

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Paris. He also inadvertently highlighted one of the principal causes of the unpopularity of the Estates. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the ´elus were viewed as the agents of the government, performing in Burgundy the tasks allotted to the intendants in the pays d’´elections.100 This, when combined with the infrequent assemblies of the Estates, left the Parlement alone as the only permanent institution willing and able to criticise royal fiscal policy, and for all their undoubted faults the judges were appreciated for performing a worthwhile role. Thus despite the vivacity and pertinence of the arguments employed by Varenne and the ´elus, they had lost the battle for public opinion in the province. t h e i n t e rve n t i o n o f t h e par is ia ns While the battle raged in Burgundy, a campaign of another sort was being fought in Paris and at Versailles. After the publication of the Parlement’s remonstrances of 16 March 1762, Bertin and Saint-Florentin urged Varenne and the comte de Vienne to reply.101 Varenne was happy to oblige. He revised his earlier judicial memoir on cotes d’office and added a forthright new preface defending the ´elus against the charges of the magistrates, which was published in Lyon in April 1762. Despite the presence of his distinguished patrons, Varenne would have been wise to decline their invitation. The original judicial brief was legally untouchable; but once published it fell into the public domain.102 Worst still for Varenne, Lyon was part of the jurisdiction of both the Parlement and the Cour des Aides of Paris. He had unwittingly presented his enemies with a golden opportunity, and they were quick to pounce. On 5 May 1762, the Cour des Aides of Paris condemned Varenne’s revised M´emoire on cotes d’office to be lacerated and burnt by the public executioner. The court pursued its attack on 26 May by summoning Varenne and ordering the arrest of Desventes and of Louis Buisson, who had respectively printed and sold the offending manuscript in Lyon. In a concerted attack, the Parlement of Dijon sentenced the same text to a similar fate on 7 June.103 The intervention of the Cour des Aides was the result of lobbying from Dijon and its own jurisdictional interest. Varenne’s memoir had been published in its ressort and affected cotes d’office in the comt´es of Mˆacon, Auxerre and Bar-sur-Seine. If pushed to its logical limits, his argument 100 101 102 103

Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, has identified a similar pattern elsewhere. AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. This important point was emphasised by Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, p. 211. The government evoked all cases arising from the memoir to the Requˆetes de l’Hˆotel.

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would have meant that the ´elus rather than the Cour des Aides heard appeals against cotes d’office there too.104 In a period when the parlements were increasingly assertive, the action of the Cour des Aides appeared to herald the start of a concerted campaign on behalf of the Parlement of Dijon. Rather than leave their fate to chance, however, the Burgundians thought it wise to send signals of their distress. In June 1762, the abb´e Boullemier, director of the public library of Dijon105 and a prot´eg´e of president F´evret de Fontette, was sent on a clandestine mission to Paris. Travelling under the alias of ‘l’abb´e de la Magdelaine’, he was to enter into contact with ‘the painter’ [procureur g´en´eral of the Cour des Aides], ‘the wheelwright’ [avocat g´en´eral of the Cour des Aides], ‘M. Capperonnier’ [Drouin de Vaudeuil] and other unlikely characters.106 They were then to organise the denunciation and prosecution of the ‘berline’ [m´emoire on cotes d’office] and of its author ‘the jeweller’ [Varenne] by both the ‘gilder’ [Cour des Aides] and the ‘king’s library’ [Parlement of Paris].107 With Joly de B´evy languishing in the Bastille and the Parlement confined within the city walls of Dijon, these elaborate precautions were not quite as ridiculous as they seem. What they confirm is the complicity of the Parlement of Dijon and the Cour des Aides and their joint desire to enlist the support of the Parlement of Paris.108 In order for that court to become engaged in the affair, it was necessary to find a Parisian magistrate willing to ‘denounce’ government policy in Burgundy.109 Drouin de Vaudeuil was, on the surface, a good choice.110 He was a rather pompous individual, on the fringes of the Parlement’s parti jans´eniste, who was only too pleased to show his ‘love for the public good’.111 In addition to approaching Drouin, the Burgundians revealed an astute awareness of how the Parlement of Paris functioned by sending Boullemier for an audience with Louis-Adrien Le Paige, who was already informed about the ‘berline’.112 One could be forgiven for assuming that 104 105 106

107 108 109 110 111 112

There was no financial interest because these cases were heard without ´epices, see the memoir of president Bouhier on this aspect, ADCO C 3349. Bouchard, De l’Humanisme, p. 579. BMD MS 912, fol. 142. There are a number of bulletins from Boullemier sent from Paris to the ‘marchand’ [Fontette] during the summer of 1762. Thankfully one of them subsequently had the good grace to provide details of the code. Ibid . Malesherbes stated this explicitly in a letter to Fontette written during July 1762, ibid., fols. 152–3. The procedure is explained in Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 62–6. For details of Drouin’s career, ibid., pp. 100, 137, 139, 293–4, 297–8. Drouin explained his motives in a letter to the Parlement of Dijon, ADCO C 3349, 17 October 1762. BMD MS 912, fol. 148, anon to l’abb´e de la Magdelaine [Boullemier], 13 June 1762.

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a denunciation was inevitable, and Boullemier informed the ‘merchant’ [Fontette] on 14 June that Capperonnier [Drouin] had prepared ‘his catalogue [denunciation] . . . of which he hopes for great success’ and that he had approached the ‘head librarian’ [first pr´esident Mol´e] as a final courtesy before addressing the ‘library’ [Parlement of Paris].113 Despite all of their efforts, the magistrates in Dijon would be disappointed and no denunciation of their treatment would ever be heard in the Parlement of Paris. According to Boullemier:114 the librarian’s reply was not quite what M. Capperonnier had hoped. He seems fearful of the catalogue because of the many affairs that the library is already involved with, and he has asked for a delay of at least two months.

Mol´e was under pressure from Bertin to keep his colleagues out of the affair, and Drouin was, to a certain extent, the dupe of the minister. Bertin had the good sense to invite Drouin to prepare projects for the resolution of the crisis, which he diligently produced. When these were subsequently rejected by the Parlement of Dijon, Drouin was sufficiently honourable to inform the Burgundians that ‘it would not be decent if I denounced with e´clat the very ideas I have, you might say, dictated’.115 Yet if Drouin was in this predicament his colleagues were not, and anyone of them could have delivered the speech needed to set the Parlement of Paris in motion. They chose not to do so, in part, because they had bigger fish to fry. Many of the most influential, and often troublesome, members of the Parlement were busily dislodging the remaining foundations of the Society of Jesus.116 They were doing so with the compliance of a ministry that had effectively coopted them into government.117 Bertin was not only using Drouin to tackle the Varenne affair because during the autumn of 1762 he had also established a committee, headed by an extremely reluctant Daniel Charles Trudaine, to resolve the crisis.118 Amongst those taking part in these negotiations were Bertin, the prince de Cond´e, the chancellor, Malesherbes, the gens du roi of the Cour des Aides, Mol´e, Drouin and those stalwarts of the Parisian parti jans´eniste, Cl´ement de Feillet, Murard and L’Averdy.119 To the immense disappointment of their colleagues in Dijon, the Parisians remained unimpressed by many of their arguments, and when the Burgundians threatened to reject a proposed settlement in January 1763 an 113 115 116 118

119

114 Ibid ., fol. 144, bulletin of 18 June 1762. Ibid ., fol. 143, bulletins of 14 and 16 June 1762. ADCO C 3349, Drouin de Vaudeuil to the Parlement of Dijon, 17 October 1762. 117 Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 206–17. Van Kley, Jansenists and Jesuits. BMD MS 912, fols. 169–70, Trudaine to Fontette, 20 November 1762. Trudaine informed Fontette that ‘quant a` moi, vous sc¸avez, que c’est malgr´e moi que je suis entr´e dans la discussion de cette affaire’. Ibid ., fol. 204, Chevignard to Fontette, 26 April 1763, and BMD MS 1620, fol. 167.

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open split seemed likely. It would be difficult to exaggerate the aggrieved and angry tones in which Drouin tore into his Burgundian colleagues for trying to ‘treat with the king as equals’, and for their ‘inflexibility’ over the issue of abonnements.120 He claimed that they were quibbling unnecessarily and came close to accusing the Parlement of wanting to usurp the rights and prerogatives of the Estates. In a bid to force the judges back to the line of duty, he wrote:121 what . . . will the public think when they realise that you have refused to resume your duties, that you only ceased because you claim that your honour and dignity were attacked (for that was the real motive behind your cessation), that you refuse, I repeat, to resume [your service] when the king has satisfied you in this respect?

Drouin was not alone in reminding the Burgundians of these home truths,122 and it gradually dawned upon them that they would not win any major concessions on either the abonnements or cotes d’office. What they were offered instead was the head of their enemy. As Drouin described matters, they should not allow other considerations to prevent them from avenging the province and their corps for the ‘wrong that Varenne had done them’.123 c r i s i s re s o lu t i o n None of the Parisian magistrates in either the Cour des Aides or Parlement had any qualms about using a sacrificial offering to save the Parlement of Dijon’s face, and Mol´e, Malesherbes, Cl´ement de Feillet and Drouin joined in pursuit of what president Charles de Brosses sportingly termed the ‘game’.124 It was in the course of this offensive that de Brosses wrote to Rousseau imploring him to write remonstrances for the Parlement: ‘this task, glorious in itself, worthy of your noble liberty and of the eloquence that you employ only for the good of humanity’.125 His appeal failed and a reluctant de Brosses had to take up the burden himself. In a letter to his cousin he lamented that ‘I have become a victim of the public good, that one gains nothing by serving’.126 With tongue presumably firmly in cheek, he described his task: 120 122 123 124 125 126

121 Ibid., fol. 177. BMD MS 912, fols. 175–7, Drouin to Fontette, 2 February 1763. Ibid ., fols. 177–8, Fontette to Trudaine, 6 February 1763. Fontette admitted that the Parisians ‘nous grondent tr`es serieusement’. Ibid ., fol. 177, Drouin to Fontette, 2 February 1763. Ibid ., fol. 178, de Brosses to Courtois, 25 April 1763. Quoted in Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 861–3. Y. B´ezard, Lettres du pr´esident de Brosses a` Ch. C. Loppin de Gemeaux (Paris, 1929), p. 297, de Brosses to Gemeaux, 3 January 1763.

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the rights of the Estates, the privileges of the province, the usurpations of the ´elus, the wrongs of the ministry. What a vast field! I locked myself away. I have written a little quarto that is a real masterpiece: demonstrative, anti-Bertin, anti-Vienne, anti-Varenne. It has worn me out and bored me to death. Thankfully it will not bore the others, for I am the dupe of my kind heart.

Such worldly irony was characteristic of de Brosses and we need to avoid putting too much emphasis on his professed boredom because he was no less committed than his colleagues to pursue Varenne. Negotiations to end the Parlement’s judicial strike finally came to fruition in March 1763. On the issue of abonnements, there was scope for compromise. The ´elus conserved their traditional right to negotiate financial commissions and contract abonnements, although the government agreed that, in future, they would not precede registration in the Parlement. What this meant, in fact, was a return to the status quo that had existed prior to the dispute of August and September 1760. Nor did the Parlement make any headway on either cotes d’office or nouveaux pieds de taille. The ministry was content to wait until tempers had cooled, and then issued an arrˆet du conseil confirming the right of the ´elus to order cotes d’office in 1765, while leaving the door theoretically open by allowing the Parlement to prepare memoirs outlining possible reforms of the practice. This was scant reward for all the effort invested by the Parlement since the autumn of 1761, and for the judges to emerge from the crisis with honour they needed to be able to display Varenne’s scalp. After their initial attempts to prosecute the secr´etaire en chef for publishing his memoir on cotes d’office in May and June of 1762 both the Parlement of Dijon and the Cour des Aides had been quietened by a combination of government attempts at evocation and negotiations for a wider settlement. The Parlement’s resumption of ordinary judicial service in March 1763 was followed by letters patent annulling all procedures connected to the disputed memoir, but they had little effect. Encouraged by the Burgundians, the Cour des Aides ordered Varenne’s arrest on 13 May,127 and began a new investigation into charges of suborning witnesses against Varenne de B´eost. On 24 May, it ordered a search of Varenne’s property in Dijon, and, on 19 June, it summoned him for interrogation at Versailles, where he was sheltering under orders from the king. 127

For reasons that remain obscure the court simultaneously issued a ‘d´ecret d’assign´e pour eˆtre ou¨ı’ against his publisher Buisson and a ‘d´ecret de prise de corps’ in the case of Desventes. Such inconsistent treatment of the three accused provided Varenne with one of his most telling arguments against what he perceived as the biased, even vindicative, conduct of the Cour des Aides, AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’.

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When subjected to the sustained and coordinated attack of the Parlement of Dijon and its allies in the magistrature, the ´elus were at a disadvantage. They did, however, maintain an almost permanent deputation, headed by the comte de Vienne, at Versailles, where they hoped that ministerial support would counterbalance the pyrotechnics of their opponents. They were also aided by the unwavering support of the prince de Cond´e, who made an unequivocal statement of his own position by securing the Order of Saint-Michel for his prot´eg´e, Varenne, in March 1762. In October, the prince sent a letter to the secr´etaire des ´etats,128 praising his efforts on behalf of the Estates and expressly forbidding him to resign. The prince made no secret of his position, and he sharply criticised the magistrates when they solicited his support in April 1762.129 Unbeknown to Varenne, he had an even more illustrious protector because in June 1762 Louis XV had informed the chancellor that he did not wish to see Varenne interrogated by the Cour des Aides. The king added in his own enigmatic style: ‘I have reasons for that which are close to my heart’.130 Unfortunately for Varenne, in the summer of 1763 the personal backing of Louis XV was almost worthless.131 With the government struggling to overcome the hostility of the parlements to post-war taxation,132 the king soon proved incapable of making good his earlier promise to protect Varenne. He did summon Malesherbes for a reprimand on 9 June 1763, and letters patent were issued confirming the evocation of the affair to the Requˆetes de l’Hˆotel, but to no avail.133 The Cour des Aides simply ignored the measure and Varenne turned in desperation to the Conseil des D´epˆeches, which promulgated further letters annulling all procedures against him. Thinking that he was finally free from the clutches of his enemies, Varenne, his son and Desventes agreed to attend the Cour des Aides on 29 August.134 Such were the passions aroused by the affair that Malesherbes and his colleagues deliberately twisted the nature of the ceremony. Rather than simply registering lettres d’abolition de procedures criminelles of the accusations against the three men, they acted as if the king had issued lettres de grˆace pardoning them for a serious criminal 128 129 130 131 132 133 134

AN K 709, dos. 5, Cond´e to Varenne, 9 October 1762. BMD MS 912, fol. 136, Cond´e to the Parlement of Dijon, 11 April 1762. Grosclaude, Malesherbes, p. 218, n. 20. Antoine, Louis XV , passim has attempted to rehabilitate the reputation of the king. Despite his efforts, the impression of a fundamentally weak and indecisive ruler persists. Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 218–49, and D. Hudson, ‘The parlementary crisis of 1763 in France and its consequences’, Canadian Journal of History 7 (1972), 97–117. ADCO C 3349, ‘Premi`eres personalit´es’, and AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. The letters patent were dated 25 August 1763, AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’.

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offence.135 As a result, Varenne was obliged to remove his hat and kneel in the centre of the court. Once the formalities were completed Malesherbes, turned towards him and declared: Varenne, the king has granted you letters of pardon, the court ratifies them: go away, your penalty is remitted, but your crime is not.136

With such a humiliating and public rebuke, the Cour des Aides avenged the judges in Dijon for the perceived insult by Varenne, and helped to compensate them for the fact that they had lost the battle over cotes d’office. As for Varenne, his position was now perilous, and with the crown desperate to end the quarrel his only hope lay with the Estates that were due to assemble in November.137 Throughout the crisis the prince de Cond´e had shown his partiality for both Varenne and the ´elus, and his anger was underlined by the remarkable decision to convoke the Estates of 1763 in Autun.138 For the first time since 1658, when the Estates had fallen foul of Louis XIV, the meeting was held outside of Dijon. Contemporaries were under no illusions about the cause of the move, which was a thinly veiled rebuke for both the Parlement and the public of the city.139 According to the secr´etaire des ´etats, Bernard de Blancey, ‘the city of Dijon deserves to be deprived of the prince’s presence and of the profits that he would have brought: the wild joy that it expressed for an imaginary triumph of the Parlement merits a real misfortune, for which its gullibility has not yet been sufficiently punished’.140 In their correspondence, Bernard and Varenne vented their anger against Joly de B´evy, Fontette and the parlements generally, but even the news of the move to Autun brought them little comfort. There was no sign of support within the Estates for the beleaguered secr´etaire. Instead, the autumnal air was thick with rumours about plots and conspiracies designed to rouse the Estates on behalf of the Parlement. The government took the threat extremely seriously, and much of the preparation for the assembly involved drafting secret instructions for the 135 136 137

138 139 140

ADCO C 3349, ‘Lettres patentes du 25 Aoˆut 1763’, and the ‘Arrˆet de la Cour des Aides du 29 Aoˆut 1763’. La Cuisine, Parlement de Bourgogne, ii, p. 408, n. 1. ADCO C 3349, Saint-Florentin to Varenne, 15 September 1763. He informed Varenne that the judges had admitted his innocence and that he should not worry about the judicial forms as they were following the ordinance of 1670. A letter from Saint-Florentin to the comte de Vienne, dated October 1763, confirms that the government wanted a speedy conclusion to the affair, BMD MS 1621, fol. 96. Dumay, ‘Une session des e´tats’, 1–88, provides a colourful description of the assembly. Ibid ., 3. AN H1 127, dos. 2, fol. 24, Bernard de Blancey to Varenne, 28 September 1763. See also ibid ., fol. 22, ‘Extrait d’une lettre ecritte de Dijon a` M. Varenne secr´etaire des e´tats, le 8 7bre 1763’.

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governor to be used in the event of trouble. Amongst these papers were a number of memoirs and anonymous letters accusing a group headed by Bouhier de Versalieux of seeking to ‘excite trouble in the order of the noblesse’.141 Bouhier and his ‘party’ had allegedly been travelling around the province trying to drum up support for a full-scale attack on the provincial administration that would involve a series of reforms based on the model of the provincial estates of Brittany, with a commission int´ermediaire to replace the chamber of ´elus and the establishment of an office of procureur g´en´eral syndic. In Brittany, the Estates, and especially the nobility, had maintained much closer control over those acting in their name, something that had presumably struck a chord in Burgundy.142 It is also clear that the remonstrances written by Malesherbes for the Cour des Aides in July 1762, which had been widely disseminated in the province, had led some to question the conduct of the local administration.143 To counter the threat, the prince de Cond´e was sent to Autun with a sheaf of blank lettres de cachet and orders to prevent innovations of any kind. Indeed so nervous was the ministry that it further stipulated that ‘if, despite the interdictions, they [the chambers] persist in wanting to deliberate on these matters, then in these circumstances the prince de Cond´e will dissolve the assembly immediately and will inform His Majesty by a courier that he will dispatch to this effect’.144 In November 1763, the fortunes of Louis XV’s government were at their lowest ebb, and these precautions were understandable, if rather excessive. Not for the last time, the governor would show his political skills, defusing the tensions in Autun without needing to resort to any of the draconian measures referred to above. According to the treasurer general, Rigoley d’Ogny, the prince had succeeded in preventing trouble ‘without appearing to compromise the liberty of the Estates’.145 Varenne was unable to share in the general sense of relief, and both he and his son were obliged to resign in December 1763, while their chief antagonist, Joly de B´evy, returned to his office in the Parlement during April 1764.146 To add insult to injury, the new ´elus, appointed at the Estates of November 1763, distanced themselves from Varenne, and even refused to pay his expenses incurred whilst at Versailles 141 142 143 144 145 146

AN H1 127, dos. 2, fol. 15, ‘Observations pour monseigneur [Cond´e]’, and ibid., fol. 11, 14–15, ‘Projet d’instruction’, and ‘Projet d’instruction s´ecrette pour m. le prince de Cond´e’. ´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, pp. 290–1, 460–3, 471–6. AN H1 127, dos. 2, fol. 15, ‘Observations pour monseigneur [Cond´e]’. Ibid ., fol. 12, ‘Projet d’instruction’. Ibid ., fol. 55, Rigoley d’Ogny to Bertin, 4 December 1763. The Parlement also forced Rigoley d’Ogny to choose between his position as treasurer general and his office of councillor in the Parlement, in effect forcing him to quit, BMD MS 912, fol. 216, arrˆet´e of 2 August 1763.

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on provincial business.147 Only the prince de Cond´e showed any loyalty to his disgraced prot´eg´e, securing for him an ‘extraordinary payment’ of 10,000 livres and the office of receveur g´en´eral of the Estates of Brittany in 1766.148 Years later, in 1785, the prince revealed his continuing affection for the family by sending his portrait to the Varenne.149 It was a small consolation prize for a man who had played for high stakes and lost. t h e co l d wa r As the smoke of battle cleared, the chamber of ´elus and the Parlement of Dijon found themselves occupying much the same ground as before. The crown had upheld the administrative and jurisdictional competence of the ´elus, but the fall of Varenne offered a warning that power needed to be exercised with restraint relative to the interests of the Parlement. As for the judges, they were able to draw comfort from the public support they had mustered in Dijon which was, in part, the result of their ability to pose as the defenders of the taxpayer against those charged with overseeing the fiscal administration. As for the assembly of the Estates, it had been carefully managed by the governor, and there was never any serious danger of an alliance with the Parlement, or of a strong campaign for internal reforms. The continuing division of Parlement and the Estates was revealed in 1771, when chancellor de Maupeou implemented his notorious revolution.150 The Parlement of Dijon, along with the other sovereign courts, was remodelled and a small number of its members exiled, and the prince de Cond´e himself suffered temporary disgrace for opposing the chancellor. It is true that Maupeou’s reforms in Dijon caused less conflict than elsewhere,151 but both the ´elus and the Estates of 1772 remained silent, presumably because of their lack of sympathy for the magistrates.152 The legacy of the Varenne affair was a form of cold war between the two corps, and the reign of Louis XVI would bring further clashes. On 1 December 1783, the ´elus published a long deliberation reforming the 147 148 149 150

151 152

ADCO C 3354, fol. 267, ´elus to L’Averdy, 6 December 1764. 148 AN K 709, dos. 5, ‘M´emoire contenant un pr´ecis’. It was in order to justify his conduct to the Estates of Brittany that Varenne wrote his own version of the troubles in Burgundy. Dumay, ‘Une session des e´tats’, 12–13, n. 2. For details of the events of 1771, see: W. Doyle, ‘The parlements of France’; D. Echeverria, The Maupeou revolution. A study in the history of libertarianism (Baton Rouge, 1985); Egret, L’opposition parlementaire, pp. 182–228; and Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 314–68. The threat of being replaced by the Chambre des Comptes persuaded the majority of magistrates to remain at their posts, rather than resign, La Cuisine, Parlement de Bourgogne, iii, pp. 285–321. Neither the chambers of the Estates, nor the alcades stirred in 1772, ADCO C 3009, and C 3302.

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administration of the taille in the province.153 The Parlement reacted angrily, claiming that the ´elus had based their ordinance upon laws that had not been registered in Dijon.154 With both sides making explicit connections to the Varenne affair, the crown acted decisively by issuing an arrˆet du conseil, dated 14 June 1784, confirming the rights of the ´elus. The Parlement picked up the gauntlet, composing a series of remonstrances, declaring that: in 1762, the Parlement pleaded the cause of the peoples of its jurisdiction, it defended the constitutional right of the French nation, only to recognise edicts, declarations and letters patent that have first been verified and registered in Parlement.155

To support their claims, the judges once again sought to establish their own superiority over the Estates through historical argument. Rather than rehearse the now largely discredited doctrine of the union des classes,156 they turned to the work of president H´enault, arguing that just as the Parlement of Paris was superior to the Estates General, so too was the Parlement of Dijon to the Estates of Burgundy.157 The conflict was exacerbated by a second dispute arising from the crown’s decision of December 1776 to grant the ´elus full jurisdiction over disputes arising from public works on minor roads (chemins finerot). The Parlement certainly coveted that authority for itself,158 and jealousy turned to rage when the ´elus issued an ordinance in December 1778 based upon royal letters patent that had not been registered by the court.159 Clearly the quarrel about the ordinances of December 1778 and December 1783 hinged on the interpretation of the right of registration relative to the administrative activities of the ´elus. However, these arguments were given a further twist on 27 November 1786, when the ´elus effectively sidestepped the Parlement altogether by ‘registering’ letters patent confirming their jurisdiction over the chemins finerots ‘in the registers of the Estates of Burgundy’.160 The Parlement predictably launched another tirade, accusing the ´elus of arbitrary behaviour and of threatening the very constitution of the kingdom.161 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161

ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 1 December 1783, and chapter 11. ADCO C 4731, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 22 Juillet 1784’. ADCO C 3350, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 12 Mars 1785’. The failure of the parlements to act in unison when confronted with the policies of Maupeou undoubtedly reduced the popularity of the idea. ADCO C 3350, ‘Remontrances du Parlement de Dijon du 12 Mars 1785’. See the comments of the local intendant, AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur le cahier de Bourgogne [1779]’. Ibid . ADCO C 3350, ‘M´emoire sur deux questions controvers´ees entre les e´lus g´en´eraux du duch´e de Bourgogne, comt´es et pays adjacents d’une part et le Parlement cour des aides de Dijon d’autre’. For a good example of their arguments, see ibid., ‘Arrˆet du Parlement qui annulle et supprime . . . du 28 D´ecembre 1786’, and the remonstrances of 27 February 1787.

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With the Parlement seeking the historical and constitutional high ground, it is not surprising that the ´elus dusted off their yellowing copies of Varenne’s works and fought back. As before, the memoirs written on behalf of the chamber stressed the superior pedigree of the Estates, arguing that: it is sufficient to recall that the ´elus demonstrated that the practice followed in Burgundy for several centuries and long before the creation of the Parlement Cour des Aides of Dijon, had as its basis the national law, the inaugural and fundamental law of Estates.162

As a result, the ‘registers of the Estates’ predated those of the Parlement, and, as the repository of the charters and privileges of the province, were their superior. For good measure, they claimed that the Estates were the guardian of the Burgundian constitution, and accused the parlementaires of employing ‘a seditious discourse’ and of attempting to usurp the king’s authority. Despite the efforts of the ´elus, public opinion remained firmly behind the Parlement, and they were reduced to arguing that ‘the people do not reason, they do not suspect a revered tribunal of wishing to inspire [them] with false terrors’.163 By the eve of revolution, the two great corps remained locked in a familiar cycle of conflict, with the crown increasingly favouring the ´elus, while the public was generally sympathetic to the Parlement. Nor was this the only quarrel engaging the attention of the ´elus. They were simultaneously battling their old enemies in the Cour des Aides of Paris about the familiar issue of cotes d’office within the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine, which was administered by the Estates, but was outside the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Dijon. The familiar clash of judicial memoirs and remonstrances was followed, in 1784,164 by the remarkable decision of the Estates to try and buy the comt´e out of the jurisdiction of the Parisian court altogether.165 The history of the Estates and the Parlement in the eighteenth century can perhaps best be summed up by the fact that in January 1788 the two 162

163 164

165

ADCO C 3350, ‘M´emoire sur deux questions controvers´ees’. Similar arguments were made in ibid., ´ ‘M´emoire des e´lus g´en´eraux des Etats de Bourgogne . . . au sujet de deux arrˆets du Parlement Cour des Aides de Dijon, du mˆeme jour 28 D´ecembre 1786’. ´ Ibid ., ‘M´emoire des e´lus g´en´eraux des Etats de Bourgogne’, and ibid., fol. 50, the ´elus to the garde des sc¸eaux, 29 April 1787. ´ For a sample, see: ibid., ‘R´eflexions pour les e´lus g´en´eraux des Etats du duch´e de Bourgogne . . . ´ sur l’´ecrit intitul´e R´eponse de la Cour des Aides de Paris, a` l’article 12e des cahiers des Etats de ´ Bourgogne’, and ‘M´emoire pour les e´lus g´en´eraux des Etats du duch´e de Bourgogne, comt´es et pays adjacents en reponse aux remontrances pr´esent´es a` Sa Majest´e par la Cour des Aides de Paris . . .’. See chapter 10.

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sides were once again preparing for war over cotes d’office.166 This time, however, the problem would be rapidly eclipsed by national events, not least by Lamoignon’s attempts to break the power of the parlements in May 1788. As the kingdom divided over the rights and wrongs of this latest royal coup d’autorit´e, one of the noble alcades, the marquis de Digoine, took it upon himself to protest in the name of provincial privilege.167 He declared that the reforms imposed by force in Dijon on 10 May were nothing less than an attempt to destroy ‘the ancient French constitution’, and he demanded the re-establishment of the old judicial system and its officers in their entirety. His outburst could not be justified by his office as alcade, and the ´elus reprimanded Digoine and distanced themselves from his protest by ordering the secr´etaires des ´etats ‘to put it to sleep in the registers under lock and key, without power to withdraw it, unless it is with the permission of the king, or by our command’.168 Instead, they drafted their own humble and respectful ‘grievances’ against Lamoignon’s reforms, which did nothing to endear them to the public. From Semur-en-Auxois, the lawyer, Braine, asked his colleague Cortot: do you know the grievances of the ´elus of Burgundy, personally I have only heard of them via a good citizen who is familiar with them and he assured me yesterday that they were execrable, and that the moderation which, it is claimed, meant that they have been kept secret, was nothing more than weakness and bad faith.169

By the time the dust had settled after the disgrace of Lamoignon and the recall of the Parlement in September 1788 the situation had changed irrevocably. With the national Estates General scheduled for May 1789, debate shifted to the broader issues of constitutional reform and political representation. The long struggle between the Parlement and the Estates for the right to speak in the name of Burgundy and its privileges was over. Despite their professed attachment to the privileges and constitution of Burgundy, the ´elus and the Parlement of Dijon had never united to defend a common platform. Instead, they had spent much of the eighteenth century eyeing each other suspiciously, and on several occasions they had been involved in protracted and acrimonious conflict. Amongst the principal causes of dispute were matters of jurisdictional or administrative competence, and, in a period when the powers of the chamber of ´elus were expanding, the Parlement was defensive of its own rights on issues such as cotes d’office or nouveaux pieds de taille. It is also clear that the judges had 166 167

ADCO C 3350, fol. 145, the ´elus to the prince de Cond´e, Lomenie de Brienne, Lambert and Lamoignon, 12 January 1788. 168 Ibid. 169 ADCO E 642 bis, Braine, fils, to Cortot, 14 June 1788. ADCO C 3302.

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hopes of exerting some kind of scrutiny over the activities of the chamber, and many of their arguments mirrored those employed against the intendants in the pays d’´elections. The provincial administration was therefore accused of acting in an arbitrary, even despotic fashion and these charges were subsequently repeated in the other pays d’´etats, especially during the course of the pre-revolutionary crisis of 1787–9.170 In the course of their quarrels, both sides resorted to the traditional strategies of writing remonstrances, sending deputations to Versailles and appealing to the governor, but they also attempted to win the support of public opinion. Through the memoirs of Varenne, the chamber of ´elus proved unusually combative, employing historical and constitutional arguments designed to emphasise the superiority of the Estates. The parlementaires replied with the remonstrances written by, amongst others, Charles de Brosses and Malesherbes, and pamphlets, such as the Parlement Outrag´e of Joly de B´evy. The attempt by de Brosses to recruit Rousseau to aid their cause is in itself a sign of the sophistication of the debate, and the importance attached to it by the protagonists. In their attempts to woo public support, the combatants aimed their arguments at specific targets, including the members of the Estates, the legal and literate classes within the province, the officers of the royal administration and the other parlements. Nor was the literate public the only opinion that counted. The Parlement in particular was determined to mobilise the wider population of Dijon, and it encouraged, with great success, displays of popular support that gave substance to its claims to be defending the ordinary citizen against the arbitrariness of the provincial administration. Within a predominantly parlementaire city, the ´elus were at a distinct disadvantage, and their problems were exacerbated by their respective roles. With their responsibility for tax collection, the ´elus were never likely to be popular, and the infrequent meetings of the Estates meant that it was the judges who spoke out against increased taxation. If the Parlement consistently won the battle for public opinion, its efforts to police the activities of the ´elus largely foundered. When forced to make a choice, the crown invariably supported the chamber because of the importance of the Estates to royal credit. The result was a simmering hostility between Burgundy’s two most important institutions that would endure until 1789. 170

Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, provides some excellent examples.

chapter 10

Tax, borrow and lend: crown, Estates and finance, 1715–1789

By the close of Louis XIV’s long and expensive reign the Estates of Burgundy had been pushed to their fiscal limits. The provincial debt stood at record levels, and future revenues from indirect taxation had been pledged for decades in advance.1 Although the credit of the Estates still inspired confidence amongst investors, concern was undoubtedly growing about their ability to raise further loans against the sombre background of subsistence crises, economic depression and tax arrears.2 The return of peace in 1714 prevented the crisis from spiralling out of control, and the death of the Sun King coincided with the start of a largely peaceful generation. The Estates were able to take advantage of this more favourable climate to restore their financial affairs, and when a new cycle of conflict began in 1740, with the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8), they were ready to meet the predictable fiscal onslaught. The three great wars of the mid-eighteenth century were largely fought on foreign soil, and they never threatened the kingdom with disaster on the scale of the War of the Spanish Succession, but they were all phenomenally expensive.3 Moreover, the Seven Years War (1756–63) witnessed a series of humiliating military reverses that would shake the very foundations of the monarchy. The governments of Louis XV and Louis XVI were more absolute in theory than in practice, and as they sought to raise the funds needed to wage war they encountered a level of opposition unmatched since the time of the Fronde. The Catholic Church, the parlements and the provincial estates of Brittany and Languedoc, to name just a few, all protested about increased taxation, and the failure of the crown to overcome these privileged opponents has long been interpreted as one of the principal 1 3

2 Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 199–202. See chapter 6. Recent studies of the financial costs of the wars include: J. C. Riley, The Seven Years War and the old regime in France: the economic and financial toll (Princeton, 1986), pp. 132–91, and F´elix, L’Averdy, pp. 135–80.

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causes of the French revolution.4 Even those historians who have been more sympathetic to that opposition have accepted that resistance to taxation was one of the defining features of the political history of the eighteenth century. Not surprisingly, the Estates of Burgundy were expected to give their consent to new taxation, and to a litany of other financial measures, from the ritualised extortion of buying out royal edicts to a massive borrowing programme on behalf of the king. Yet despite the weight of these demands, the Estates did not become a focus of resistance. The close control over their assemblies exercised by the governor was undoubtedly a contributory factor, but the nature of the local fiscal system was equally significant. No less important was the right of the Estates to bargain with the crown about taxation and to oversee its collection. The ability to manage their own affairs ensured that, whereas the monarchy and many of the other corps of the ancien r´egime were crippled by debts on the eve of revolution,5 the Estates of Burgundy were in rude financial health. This chapter will attempt to explain why. recovery Nothing can better illustrate the peace dividend enjoyed by the province than the simple statistics of the annual income and expenditure of the Estates for the first half of the eighteenth century (see figure 10.1). In 1715, the alcades estimated that the province spent some 7,049,751 livres, the highest total of Louis XIV’s entire reign.6 Thereafter the figures for both income and expenditure fell sharply, although the chaos engendered by John Law’s system makes the data from 1718 to 1724 of limited value. A more accurate picture is provided by the data running from 1726, when the value of the livre tournois was stabilised, until the outbreak of war in 1740.7 During a largely peaceful period, that was only interrupted by the brief War of the Polish Succession (1734–6), average annual income was 3.7 million 4

5

6 7

The debate about privileged opposition to the crown has been examined by: Swann, Politics and the parlement, pp. 27–34; W. Doyle, Origins of the French revolution (3rd edn., Oxford, 1999), pp. 45–53; and Kwass, Privilege and politics. The near bankruptcy of the crown was one of the principal causes of the collapse of royal power after 1787, and has been well documented. The no less parlous state of the corps of the kingdom has been emphasised by Bossenga, Politics of privilege, pp. 35–41, 126–30; Doyle, Venality, pp. 71–2; and McManners, Church and society, i, pp. 141–5. ADCO C 3049, fols. 348–50. For details, see: ADCO C 3049, fols. 348–50, 426–8, 503–5; C 3050, fols. 60–2, 134–5, 286–8, 349–50; and C 3304, fols. 12–13.

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9,000,000 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000

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Figure 10.1

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Annual income and expenditure of the Estates of Burgundy, 1715–65

livres and spending 3.4 million livres.8 Nor were there any great fluctuations in these figures, and spending predictably peaked at 4.68 million livres in 1735 at the height of the war. As the data in figure 10.1 are derived from the remarques of the alcades, they contain many imperfections, not least that the spending figures for the final year of every triennalit´e were nearly always incomplete.9 Their estimates nevertheless provide a good indication of the financial pressure on the province, and it was clearly less intense than during the traumatic years from 1688 to 1715. The Estates were able to capitalise upon this financial respite to put their affairs in order. As we have seen, their credit structure relied upon the king granting them the rights to levy crues on salt sold within the province, and to farm the octrois paid on goods travelling along the river Saˆone. By 1715, future revenues from these indirect taxes had been assigned to repay the provincial debt until 1732 and 1748 respectively. The improvement in the situation is quickly apparent when we look at the consumption of the octrois. During the final years of Louis XIV’s reign, they 8

9

The total income for the fifteen years from 1726 to 1740 was estimated at 55,957,940 livres, an average of 3,730,529 livres, spending in the same period was 52,048,366 livres, giving an average of 3,469,891 livres. This is a slight underestimate as the figures provided by the alcades for 1729 in particular were incomplete. The potential pitfalls contained in the remarques are discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

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had proved to be a remarkably efficient means of underpinning the credit of the Estates, and there is no better indication of the changed financial climate than the fact that they were rarely called upon before 1741. Only once, in 1727, did the crown oblige the Estates to borrow against the future revenues from the tax in order to pay for the suppression of unwanted offices.10 As a result, when France entered the War of the Austrian Succession, in 1741, the octrois had been granted until the end of 1750, an advance of nine years compared to a staggering thirty-three years in 1715. The octrois generated in the region of 200,000 livres annually, and by 1741 that represented a reduction in the province’s debt of approximately 4.8 million livres.11 More importantly for the province’s taxpayers some 240,000 livres in interest payments was no longer being added to the taille. Given the sharp decline in the advanced consumption of the octrois, it is somewhat surprising to see that there had been no comparable reduction in the debt assigned to the crues. In 1739, the crues had been granted until the end of 1761, a period of twenty-two years, representing a slight increase on the situation in 1715. This should not be allowed to disguise the fact that the financial position had stabilised. From 1724 until 1787, the ´elus maintained the exact ratio of twenty-two years between the actual year and that for which the crues were pledged. At every assembly of the Estates, the deputies voted a don gratuit of one million livres, which the king then reduced to 900,000 livres, and then successfully petitioned for a further three-year extension of their rights to the crues. The ´elus then borrowed the sum required at 5 per cent, which over the nineteen years prior to the crues actually becoming available produced interest charges of 855,000 livres that were added to the taille. Once the crues had finally been collected, they easily provided the 300,000 livres annually needed to reimburse the outstanding capital, and to cover the final interest payments of 30,000 and 15,000 livres respectively, producing the grand total of 900,000 livres that the Estates had paid in don gratuit some twenty-two years earlier. This rather dry arithmetical exercise demonstrates that after 1724 the Estates maintained a deliberate policy of borrowing to pay the don gratuit, preferring to levy the interest charges over nearly two decades and making no attempt to reduce the debt. In a sense, their position was justifiable. If the debt had been liquidated, the crown would have almost certainly seized the opportunity to increase its demands. The taillables thus contributed the 10 11

ADCO C 5366. According to the terms of the edict of January 1727 the Estates were paying for the suppression of unwanted offices of receivers of the octrois. These figures have been calculated on the basis of an annual income from the octrois of 200,000 livres over a period of twenty-four years, and are intended to offer an indication rather than a precise estimate.

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same sum in interest as they would have paid if the don gratuit had been levied immediately, and if they had not lost out others had the pleasure of gain. For those blessed with the means, and the opportunity, to invest in the provincial debt, principally the officers and members of the Estates and the local Burgundian elites, there was the happy prospect of a nineteenyear investment, with a guaranteed annual return of 5 per cent, and the comforting knowledge that their capital was secure. Not surprisingly, the credit of the Estates remained extremely buoyant. During the early years of the reign of Louis XV, there was a serious attempt to make lending to the Estates a provincial privilege. At the assembly of 1718, the alcades complained that the ´elus had been favouring courtiers, and a d´ecret was passed giving preference to Burgundians.12 The governor, the duc de Bourbon, later wrote to the ´elus demanding that they implement it, adding that ‘it is just that local people benefit’.13 In their remarques of 1742, the alcades repeated that argument, claiming that ‘it appears just that Burgundians have preference as the interest on their capital will not leave [the province] which will be a considerable advantage’.14 As the provincial debt expanded after 1740 such arguments would become increasingly redundant, and there would be enough borrowing to keep almost everyone happy. The tendency of the members of the Estates to treat the debt as if it were part of their own patrimony could only reinforce the confidence of investors. When John Law embarked upon his remarkable fiscal experiment, establishing a state bank and flooding the kingdom with paper money, one of the intended effects was a fall in interest rates. The ´elus were forced to reduce the rate offered on provincial rentes to 3 per cent in 1719, and to only 2 per cent for a brief period in late 1720 before Law’s bubble burst.15 As the crown sought to re-establish some kind of fiscal stability in the aftermath, interest rates were fixed at denier 50 (2 per cent). The members of the Estates were horrified. At their meeting of 1721, they demanded exemption, and in their subsequent remonstrances declared that rentes were ‘the principal commerce of Burgundy’.16 Their appeal was partially successful and the loan to pay for the don gratuit was floated at 5 per cent as in the past, but other borrowing was unaffected. The struggle to maintain higher than average interest rates was not the result of any difficulties in raising loans. As we have seen, if anything the 12 13 14 15 16

ADCO C 3049, fol. 362. ADCO C 3166, fol. 146, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 26 March 1719. ADCO C 3304, fols. 16–17. ADCO C 3166, fols. 201, 211; C 3354, fol. 8, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 29 November 1719; and C 3168, fol. 51, deliberation of the ´elus dated 5 November 1720. ADCO C 3330, fols. 74–5.

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reverse was true and they were oversubscribed. Instead, the Estates argued that ‘the province has no commerce, agriculture being insufficient for the subsistence of the whole, rentes are its only resource’.17 In other words, the Estates were seeking to protect a system that guaranteed a good return for them, regardless of the fact that they could almost certainly find the necessary funds at a lower interest rate. The losers in this arrangement were the taillables, who supported an unnecessarily heavy burden. That, in turn, reinforces an already strong suspicion that before 1740 the debt had been kept at an artificially inflated level, and that the ordinary taillables were being denied the relief that the crues and the healthier fiscal situation should have afforded them.18 In effect, they were paying to perpetuate the cushioned rentier existence of the province’s elites. t h e bu rd e n o f ta x at i on Once war returned to darken the fiscal horizon, the expenses of the Estates soared. Old taxes such as the dixi`eme were revived between 1734 and 1736 and especially from 1741 to 1748, and new ones were introduced, notably the vingti`eme in 1749. These taxes were accompanied by a variety of fiscal expedients in the classic form of ‘buy outs’ (rachats) of unwanted offices, and a new version of that old tactic, namely ‘patriotic’ contributions. Finally the Estates were obliged to develop a new role as a source of direct credit for the crown, borrowing millions of livres in the process. Unfortunately, after 1750 the alcades ceased providing regular annual breakdowns of estimated income and expenditure. However, those figures that are available do make it clear that both experienced sharp increases. During the War of the Austrian Succession, income and expenditure averaged 5.9 million and 5.3 million livres respectively.19 As figure 10.1 demonstrates, these averages disguise some pronounced fluctuations, with the years 1742, 1745 and 1748 standing out as those of greatest spending. The cause was not new taxation, but the loans that the Estates were obliged to raise on behalf of the king.20 Once the peace was signed these high rates were not maintained, and income and expenditure fell back quickly to their pre-war levels. Unfortunately, the evidence available after 1753 is sparse, although 17 18 19

20

ADCO C 3049, fol. 511. These were the terms employed by the alcades in 1724. In 1739, the alcades argued that the ´elus should use their ample surplus funds to cut taxation, rather than reimburse the debt, ADCO C 3050, fols. 372–3. ADCO C 3304, fols. 12–13, and C 3306, fols. 8, 23, 36. Total income for the period 1741 to 1748 was estimated at 47,685,948 livres, an annual average of 5,960,743 livres, total expenditure was recorded as 42,712,191 livres, or an annual average of 5,339,023 livres. A procedure discussed in detail below.

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3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

1,500,000

1,000,000

500,000

17

15 17 18 17 21 17 24 17 27 17 30 17 33 17 36 17 39 17 42 17 45 17 48 17 51 17 54 17 57 17 60 17 63 17 66 17 69 17 72 17 75 17 78 17 81 17 84 17 87

0

Figure 10.2

Taille levied in Burgundy, 1715–89

the figures from the years 1763–5, immediately after the Seven Years War, do suggest that the burden had increased substantially.21 Given the changed political climate after 1750, with the growing opposition of the parlements to the crown’s fiscal policies, it is important to examine why the Estates of Burgundy did not follow suit. Part of the explanation is to be found in their continuing success in bargaining with the ministry and in defending their own, and, to a certain extent, provincial interests without recourse to obstructionist tactics. By 1787, the duchy of Burgundy was, in theory, paying some 5,677,477 livres in taxation to the crown.22 Very little entered the royal treasury directly, and it was instead part of a more complex financial system that was ultimately connected to the broader credit structure of the Estates. From the perspective of the province’s taxpayer, however, that was largely immaterial, and the rates of taxation do tell us much about how effectively the Estates were able to defend their interests. During the reign of Louis XIV the taille had risen sharply, increasing by almost one third between 1688 and 1715.23 The eighteenth century would see no comparable rise, and as figure 10.2 demonstrates it was not until the 21 22 23

ADCO C 3306, fols. 125–6. See: ADCO C 4730, ‘Tableau des impositions et revenues de la province de Bourgogne en 1787’, and Bordes, L’administration Provinciale, p. 107. See chapter 6.

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1760s that the taille levied by the ´elus regularly exceeded two million livres, a ceiling that had first been breached as early as 1709.24 As ever, we need to remember that these were the taxes set by the ´elus from the comfort of their office in Dijon, and not the sums actually collected – although it is true that late payment rather than non-payment was the common pattern. One of the principal reasons for the comparative stability of the taille was the crown’s decision to leave the five taxes that composed it largely unchanged after 1715.25 Much of the movement in the amount of tax levied was the result of the fluctuation in the size of the provincial debt, or because of the cost of the public works or other projects of the ´elus. Thus, in 1788 and 1789, the taille rose dramatically as a result of the replacement of the corv´ee by direct taxation. If the king was prepared to leave the taille unchanged, there were plenty of other taxes for him to turn to. The capitation was levied continuously from 1701 until the revolution, and in Burgundy it revealed in microcosm the fiscal shortcomings of the ancien r´egime. In 1710, the king had forced the Estates to ‘buy off’ part of its contribution and the annual abonnement of the tax had been fixed at 600,000 livres in perpetuity, of which 420,000 livres was to be paid by the Estates.26 Despite the crown’s deserved reputation for bad faith that was still the case during the reign of Louis XVI,27 and there can be little doubt that the province as a whole had benefited from the original sacrifice of 1710. The second half of the eighteenth century, in particular, was a period of modest inflationary pressure, reducing the burden of a fixed sum like the abonnement. The growth of the population and the recovery of the economy from the extremely low base of 1710 would have accentuated these positive effects. Yet if Burgundian taxpayers were all blessed in some way, certain amongst them were doubly so. By the eve of revolution, the nobility was being assessed for the capitation at the far from princely rate of 31,000 livres, exactly the same amount as in 1710, and there are good grounds for believing not only that many nobles were undertaxed, but even that a sizeable number had never been taxed at all. When, in 1784, the chamber of nobility threatened to refuse ‘gifts and pensions’ to those who did not pay the capitation, the number of taxpayers increased by a third almost overnight.28 A further 24 25 26 27

ADCO C 3307, fols. 97–8, and C 4902. It was not until 1759 that the ´elus assessed the taille at 2,423,593 livres, thus breaking the previous highest total set in 1712. The only variations occurred when the king reduced the don gratuit to 800,000 livres because of harvest failure as in 1718, or to honour the arrival of a new governor as occurred in 1754. See chapter 6. The pays adjacents were liable for 180,000 livres. 28 ADCO C 3046, fols. 272, 289, and chapter 3. ADCO 1 F 460, fols. 125–6.

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sum of 77,090 livres was collected from officeholders, including members of the sovereign courts, which was a relatively modest amount given the presence of the Parlement and the Chambre des Comptes.29 The remainder was imposed on the taillables. The frequently parlous state of its finances meant that the monarchy was frequently tempted to break the promise made in 1710, or at least to circumvent it.30 The death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740 left the Estates in an exceptionally vulnerable position, and until 1754 the ministry took a far closer interest in the fiscal affairs of the province.31 Pressed for funds to pay for the War of the Austrian Succession, the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Orry, increased the abonnement of the duchy and comt´es to a total of 676,924 livres in 1742.32 The ´elus responded to the challenge with aplomb. They negotiated a deal with the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, who agreed that the increase would be funded by borrowing, using the proceeds of the octrois for 1753 as collateral. It was further stipulated that all taxpayers, including the taillables, would continue to pay ‘in the form and the manner stipulated by the arrˆet du conseil of 5 June 1717’, which had confirmed the original contract of 1710.33 The exercise was repeated annually until October 1745, when Orry suddenly announced that in future the additional capitation should be funded by taxation.34 All of the province’s taxpayers, especially the privileged, were threatened by the new policy, and the ´elus replied with a detailed memoir citing the various contracts between the Estates and the crown since 1710. They concluded with an offer to pay 1.2 million livres ‘on condition that it please His Majesty to renew the terms of the arrˆet of 5 June 1717’. The minister accepted, and the Estates received the rights to the octrois for the years 1757–61.35 This was not simply a victory for the privileged. As part of the terms negotiated by the ´elus, the king agreed to alienate the sum of 60,000 livres to cover interest payments during the intervening period, thus sparing the taillables an additional burden. It is a good example of how the ´elus could, on occasions, make the fiscal system work to the advantage of all. 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 125. In 1717, the duc de Noailles had considered raising the abonnement to 800,000 livres, ADCO C 3164, fol. 53. See chapter 8. ADCO C 3360, fol. 272, the ´elus to Orry, 9 January 1745; C 3354, fol. 102; and C 5574, Arrˆet du conseil d’´etat du roi, 24 November 1741. That arrˆet had confirmed the details of the buy-out of part of the capitation in 1710. ADCO C 3354, fol. 102, Orry to the ´elus, 4 November 1745, and C 5574, Arrˆet du conseil d’´etat du roi of 26 October 1745. ADCO C 5574, Arrˆet du conseil d’´etat du roi of 13 May 1746.

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Similar tactics were employed when the province was confronted by a new tax, the four sols per livre of the capitation, which was effectively a surcharge on the original tax – a much used device that would subsequently be applied to the vingti`eme.36 The ´elus were quick to respond, sending a deputation, headed by the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley de Mypon, to Versailles. Memoirs citing historical precedents were produced, and they were followed, predictably enough, by an offer of 1,200,000 livres to buy out of the tax for a period of ten years. The Estates were granted the rights to the octrois for 1762–7 and to a crue of 20 sols per minot until 1766, which was supplemented by an annual payment of nearly 25,000 livres towards the resulting interest payments from the pays adjacents. What this complicated package meant in reality was the reimbursement of the capital and of all interest charges by the end of 1767. The privileged paid nothing towards the cost of the four sols per livre, and the taillables contributed only a fraction of the real cost. It was an abonnement in all but name, and an almost identical arrangement was reached every ten years thereafter.37 The crown was, therefore, able to draw more from the province – although the relationship between the four sols per livre and the original capitation was tenuous to say the least. During the two war-torn decades after 1740, the capitation payments of the privileged remained stable. The members of the Parlement and Chambre des Comptes of Dijon together paid 47,601 livres in 1743 and 45,178 livres a decade later in 1753.38 The Seven Years War forced the crown to double the capitation in 1760 and the ´elus had no choice but to raise a further 282,693 livres in taxation.39 For once the privileged received a nasty shock. The contribution of the Parlement and Chambre des Comptes was set at 54,307 livres in 1761, and remained at the higher level for much of the next decade.40 Here we catch a glimpse of the pattern identified by Michael Kwass in Brittany and Normandy, with a pronounced rise in tax paid by the privileged.41 Fortunately for the Burgundian elites, as far as the capitation 36

37

38 40 41

See: ADCO C 5574, Arrˆet du conseil d’´etat du roi et les lettres patentes sur icelui of 17 March 1748; C 3354, fols. 128–9, Machault to the ´elus, 4 February 1748; C 3361, fols. 42–5; and ibid., the marquis de Bissy to the ´elus, 11 February 1748. The two sols per livre of the capitation had been levied in the pays d’´elections since 1705, and the new contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Machault, was determined to increase the tax and apply it consistently throughout the kingdom. These abonnements were preceded by the traditional haggling with the minister, see, for example, ADCO C 3354, fol. 200, Boullogne to the ´elus, 25 April 1758, and C 3358, fol. 225, Necker to the ´elus, 7 September 1788. The province paid 1.5 million livres in 1758, and 1.2 million livres in 1768 and 1778. 39 Ibid. The total was 320,000 livres for the g´en´eralit´e as a whole. ADCO C 5575. ADCO C 5576. The tax remained at this level for several years because the sovereign courts had taken the decision to spread the cost of the increase over a longer period. Kwass, Privilege and politics, pp. 62–116.

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was concerned, the increase was short-lived. By the reign of Louis XVI, the noblesse was once again paying 31,000 livres and the Parlement and Chambre des Comptes were assessed at 46,538 livres in 1785 and 42,895 livres in 1788, much the same as in 1710.42 t h e v i n g t i e` m e s If Burgundian taxpayers were sheltered from the worst effects of the capitation, they faced a more serious threat to their wallets in the form of the dixi`eme and, especially, its successor, the vingti`eme. After its suppression in 1717, the dixi`eme had been resurrected in March 1734 at the start of the War of the Polish Succession. When confronted by the original tax, the Estates had refused to contract an abonnement and responsibility for its collection had passed to the intendant.43 In 1734, they overcame their reticence and the ´elus negotiated an annual abonnement of 700,000 livres.44 That sum had been agreed on the basis of the rolls of 1717, and they could legitimately claim to have struck a good bargain, not least because it was the ´elus, not the intendant, who oversaw its collection. Abolished in 1737, the dixi`eme experienced a further renaissance with the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession. Orry demanded an increase in the abonnement to 900,000 livres, but the ´elus secured his agreement to provide assistance if tax revenues failed to cover the cost.45 As promised, the king abolished the dixi`eme at the end of the war in 1748. Any relief for taxpayers was short-lived because the recently appointed contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Machault d’Arnouville, had ambitious plans for financial reform, the centrepiece of which was a new levy, the vingti`eme.46 His tax broke new ground in a number of important respects. It was the first time that the crown had introduced a novel direct tax in peacetime, and it was to be levied on all of the king’s subjects, including the clergy, regardless of their privileges or social station. Moreover, Machault was determined to confront the pays d’´etats, which he suspected of paying less in taxation than the pays d’´elections.47 His bold attack on privileged interests produced howls of protests from those affected. The French church fought a highly 42 45 46

47

43 See chapter 6. 44 ADCO C 5808. ADCO C 5576. ADCO C 3360, fols. 208–9, the ´elus to Orry, 20 November 1741. ´ M. Marion, Machault d’Arnouville. Etude sur l’histoire du contrˆole g´en´eral des finances de 1749 a` 1754 (Paris, 1891), is still a very useful introduction. The works of F´elix, L’Averdy, pp. 59–68, and T. J. A. Le Goff, ‘How to finance an eighteenth-century war’, in M. Ormrod, M. Bonney and R. Bonney, eds., Crises revolutions and self-sustained growth, Essays in European fiscal history, 1130–1830 (Stamford, 1999), pp. 377–413, are essential reading. Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 230–8, has argued convincingly that the privileged fiscal position of the pays d’´etats was something of a myth.

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emotional and ultimately victorious campaign to keep its fiscal privileges, and the provincial estates of Brittany and Languedoc were to the fore in the struggle against the new tax.48 As the edict creating the vingti`eme was issued in May 1749, there was no immediate opportunity for the Estates of Burgundy to join the fray. Its next meeting was not due until 1751, and the government took advantage of the fact to treat directly with the ´elus. Predictably they responded by seeking to negotiate an abonnement, and the crown’s traditional partiality to the quick fix of a cash advance encouraged them to ignore Machault’s initial rejection of the idea.49 The ´elus attempts at persuasion fell on stony ground, and in September 1749 they were informed that an abonnement ran contrary to the king’s desire for equality and uniformity in the administration of the vingti`eme. Worse still, Machault declared that the tax would be levied by the intendant, who was to be supplied with copies of the rolls used to collect the dixi`eme without delay.50 The ´elus meekly complied, and by the time the Estates convened in 1751 the new tax was an established fact. There was no reference to the vingti`eme in the governor’s instructions, and no indication in the registers of the assembly of any belated opposition to its levy.51 In Burgundy, at least, Machault had triumphed and the crown had won a valuable opportunity to increase the fiscal burden, while reducing the inequalities that had arisen through the abonnement system. The contrˆoleur g´en´eral had certainly been aided by the absence of a strong governor during the minority of the young prince de Cond´e, but even so the Estates had proved a flimsy barrier against a determined minister. The intendant was thus able to impose the vingti`eme as he saw fit, and between 1751 and 1755 the tax produced, on average, 716,901 livres from the duchy and comt´es, not much less than the theoretically more onerous dixi`eme.52 By the time war broke out again in 1756, Machault was no longer in control of the royal finances and his successors were less rigorous in the pursuit of fiscal uniformity. After introducing a second vingti`eme in August 1756, Franc¸ois-Marie Peyrenc de Moras proved amenable to the idea of negotiating abonnements with the pays d’´etats and the ´elus seized the opportunity with alacrity. 48 49 50 51 52

The assembly in Languedoc was dismissed for the first time since 1629, Antoine, Louis XV (Paris, 1989), pp. 617–23. ADCO C 3361, fol. 71, the ´elus to Saint-Florentin, 6 June 1749, and ibid., fol. 73, the ´elus to Machault, 15 June 1749. ADCO C 3361, fols. 76–7, Machault to the ´elus, 9 September 1749, and C 3354, fol. 142. AN H1 120, dos. 1, fols. 9–13. ADCO C 3361, fols 248–52, Joly de Fleury to the ´elus, 18 November 1756.

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A deputation of permanent officials was sent to court with instructions to present the case for an abonnement of both vingti`emes. The deputies were equipped with precise details of the amounts raised by the tax since 1751.53 According to their estimates, the average yield was 716,901 livres, which included some 60,000 livres in fees paid to the treasurer general and the controllers of the vingti`eme, reducing the actual value of the tax to 657,000 livres, and it was on this basis that they proposed to bid. Realising that the contrˆoleur g´en´eral would be expecting a better offer, the deputies drew upon a variety of arguments. Predictably they cited the familiar sorry tale of terrible storms and hail that had destroyed crops and ruined the peasantry, but they also produced some more specific arguments. They claimed that assessments of the vingti`eme on vineyards were excessive, having been based upon the number of vines and their estimated production in a good year, when, in reality, harvests were frequently mediocre or worse. The deputies also attacked the vingti`eme on industry, which, despite its modest overall annual assessment of just 21,000 livres, undermined the already weak local economy and the efforts of the Estates to subsidise new enterprises. Finally, they argued that an abonnement, by transferring the administration of the vingti`eme to the chamber of ´elus, would result in a fairer tax distribution by encouraging peasants to appeal against the allegedly excessive original assessments of the intendant. With this confident restatement of their own administrative prowess, they concluded with an offer of 1.2 million livres for the two vingti`emes. The deputies in Paris received support from the prince de Cond´e, who wrote to Moras urging him to accept the province’s offer.54 Before deciding the cˆontrˆoleur g´en´eral consulted the intendant, Joly de Fleury, who admitted that the verification of the original declarations made by taxpayers in 1750 and 1751 was incomplete.55 The Estates would certainly not pursue this task, and so there were no grounds for believing that a substantial increase in revenue could be achieved. Joly de Fleury’s estimate of the net worth of the first vingti`eme was 660–680,000 livres, only slightly more than that of the ´elus, and he admitted that ‘if the Estates do not find a small profit they will prefer not to subscribe [to an abonnement]’. He added, ‘I know that the deputies have decided to offer you 600,000 livres . . . if you conclude at this price the Estates will be comfortable and the province will applaud’. Should Moras chose to reject their offer, the intendant warned him that the 53 54 55

AN H1 124, dos. 1, fol. 3, ‘M´emoire pour les e´tats de Bourgogne sur l’abonnement des deux vingti`emes’. Ibid., dos. 1, fol. 22, Cond´e to Moras, 28 November 1756. Ibid., dos 2, fol. 41, Joly de Fleury to Moras, 13 September 1756.

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deputies might raise their bid to 620,000 or 630,000 livres, but would go no higher. Undeterred, Moras stood firm successfully demanding 640,000 livres for each vingti`eme, which, together with the two sols per livre of the first, totalled 1,408,000 livres.56 It was a reasonable compromise, and the Estates had every reason to be pleased with the outcome, not least because the ´elus were once again firmly in control of tax collection, ceasing the enquiries and verifications that the privileged found so irksome. A series of military defeats obliged the crown to impose a third vingti`eme in 1760, and the ´elus lost no time in following the precedent of 1756. Deputies were despatched to Versailles, where they speedily contracted an abonnement of 1,800,500 livres for the three vingti`emes and the two sols per livre.57 These negotiations were concluded before the Parlement of Dijon had registered the relevant edicts, and a lengthy and bitter quarrel between the ´elus and the parlementaires was the unfortunate result.58 That political crisis may well have influenced government thinking when it next tried to increase the cost of the province’s abonnement. Whereas previous finance ministers had negotiated directly with the ´elus, the abb´e Terray sought the approbation of the Estates, and in the governor’s instructions of 1772 the iron man of royal finance demanded an increase of a fifth in the value of the two vingti`emes.59 The provincial commandant, La Tour du Pin, who presided at the assembly in the enforced absence of the prince de Cond´e,60 was understandably nervous about the possible reaction of the Estates, and he kept the relevant article in reserve until the assembly had completed the majority of its business. La Tour du Pin’s fears proved groundless, and the chambers voted unanimously to approve the increase. Once their deputies had informed him of their decision, the commandant declared that: in the light of the unanimous obedience of the Estates to the orders of the king, he was authorised by His Majesty to grant a simple increase of 165,000 livres in place of a fifth above the abonnement requested, which will produce a very advantageous final abonnement for the province.61

It was a vintage piece of political theatre, reminiscent of Louis XIV’s treatment of the Estates a century before, and, with France shaken by Maupeou’s 56 57 58 60 61

Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 104–5. The total included the two sols per livre of the first vingti`eme. ADCO C 3349, and D. Ligou, ‘Un impˆot en Bourgogne sous l’ancien r´egime: les vingti`emes’, Actes du 91e Congr`es des Soci´et´es Savantes (Rennes, 1966), 105. 59 AN H1 129, dos 2., fol. 20, Amelot to Terray, 21 May 1772. See chapter 9. He was in disgrace due to his opposition to Maupeou’s judicial reorganisation of 1771. ADCO C 3046, fol. 156. This produced a total of 1,474,000 livres, Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 105.

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judicial revolution of 1771, it was an astute way of winning back much needed support for the crown. When Necker revisited the question of the abonnement in November 1780, he avoided direct recourse to the Estates and simply increased the amount required to 1,556,500 livres annually.62 His successor, Joly de Fleury, had once been the intendant of Burgundy, and the ´elus were able to agree an advantageous abonnement for the third vingti`eme when it was revived in 1782. The new tax pushed the overall annual total for the three vingti`emes and the four sols per livre to 2,024,000 livres, and after the suppression of the third vingti`eme it stood at 1,556,510 livres in 1787.63 The final assembly of the Estates in November 1787 witnessed scenes of public bargaining about taxation reminiscent of the first decade of Louis XIV’s personal rule. In the governor’s instructions, the king requested an annual abonnement of three million livres for the two vingti`emes and the four sols per livre, of which 292,500 livres would be paid by the Mˆaconnais and a further 459,152 livres by the local clergy.64 It was further stipulated that work should begin on the verification of the relevant tax rolls. An accompanying letter from the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Lambert, explained that he expected a more equitable levy to raise revenues sufficient to offset the increase in the abonnement.65 To discourage opposition, the minister added menacingly that if the proposed arrangement was rejected the king would give orders ‘to ensure the collection in conformity with his edict of September last and with previous edicts and declarations’. This was a thinly veiled threat to transfer responsibility back to the intendant, and Lambert was presumably hoping to frighten the Estates into compliance. He would be disappointed. The third estate welcomed the idea of verifying the tax rolls, and then declared itself to be incapable of approving such a substantial tax increase.66 Instead, it proposed making remonstrances to the king, informing him of the impoverished state of the province, while urging the prince de Cond´e to mediate with the crown on its behalf. The clergy, on the other hand, accepted the abonnement with the proviso that the governor be asked to employ his good offices to obtain a reduction. Finally, the nobility voted to offer the king one million livres to ‘buy out’ of the increase altogether, suggesting that the interest and capital repayments should be added to the existing vingti`eme rolls. 62 63 64 65

This was the total for the two vingti`emes and the four sols pour livre, ADCO C 3356, fol. 123, Necker to the ´elus, 19 November 1780. Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 105, and ADCO C 3365, fol. 103, Joly de Fleury to the ´elus, 9 January 1783. ADCO C 3048, fol. 41. 66 ADCO C 3054, fol. 29. Ibid., fol. 43, Lambert to Cond´e, 27 October 1787.

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It is difficult to interpret the nobility’s stance as anything other than a rather desperate attempt to preserve its privileged position, and it failed.67 Obliged to change tack, it voted to offer an annual sum of 2.4 million livres, considerably less than that requested by Lambert. To their credit, the nobles finally accepted the need to begin ‘a precise evaluation of the property of the three orders . . . to establish a new base and a just proportion in the distribution [of taxation] and it will be carried out conforming to the said article without delay or interruption’.68 The deputies of the third estate seconded the offer of 2.4 million livres, warmly endorsing the principle of a general verification of the tax rolls. Only the clergy proved obdurate, invoking the authority of the General Assembly of the French Church, due to meet in May 1788, as the defender of their privileges and property. In November 1787, the Estates had rediscovered their old enthusiasm for bartering publicly with the crown, which, as it tottered towards its final collapse, was in no mood to resist. On receiving news of the province’s offer, Lambert wrote back to the prince de Cond´e announcing that the king would settle for 2.5 million livres.69 The three chambers reassembled and voted unanimously to accept the request ‘purely and simply’. In the twilight of the ancien r´egime, the Estates had proved capable of publicly negotiating an advantageous abonnement, and if the proposed verification had gone ahead then all of the province’s taxpayers would have finally benefited from their privileged membership of a pays d’´etats. The revolution would render these reforms redundant, and it is clear that throughout the eighteenth century the Estates had helped to ensure that the province’s fiscal privileges worked primarily to the advantage of local elites. The verification of the vingti`eme rolls begun by the intendant in 1751 had never been completed, and by the reign of Louis XVI the subsequent inequalities were so glaring that many within the provincial administration were arguing in favour of reform. Faced by a government perennially desperate for funds and theoretically sympathetic to notions of uniformity and equality, the Estates were understandably anxious to preserve the right of abonnement. At the Assembly of Notables of 1787, the abb´e de La Fare, ´elu of the clergy, delivered an impassioned defence of the privilege. He claimed that it was the existence of abonnements that had given the province the confidence to undertake ‘the celebrated enterprises’, which had astonished the people of France and attracted the admiring gaze of foreign monarchs.70 La Fare was referring to 67 70

68 Ibid., fol. 46. 69 Ibid., fols. 66–7. ADCO C 3048, fols. 44–6. ADCO C 3035, fols. 74–7, ‘Rapport fait a` la chambre du clerg´e par m. l’abb´e de La Fare’.

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the canals, roads and other public works constructed by the provincial administration which were, it is true, impressive. According to his argument, tax privilege could be justified in terms of public utility, but he also took the wise precaution of stressing the allegedly deleterious effects of indirect taxation on wine exports for the local economy. While not stating it explicitly, the abb´e had hit the nail on the head. The power to contract abonnements and to determine the form of taxation was one of the foundation stones of provincial independence, allowing the ´elus to oversee a crucial part of the fiscal system, thus preserving the political and financial independence of the Estates. e xt r ao rd i n a ry d e m a n d s a n d e x pe d i e n ts The Estates had proved themselves to be adept at reducing the impact of direct taxation after 1715, but the French monarchy was never short of fiscal expedients. One of Colbert’s more astute moves had been to transfer responsibility for funding the military ´etapes to the Estates, and between 1676 and 1714 an annual average of 284,250 livres had been spent billeting troops.71 In 1718, the Regency government sought to profit from the situation by proposing an annual abonnement of 150,000 livres in peacetime and 200,000 livres in the event of war.72 As the bishop of Autun noted, when recommending the plan to the assembled clergy, this seemed an excellent offer because at their peak the ´etapes had cost more than 600,000 livres.73 Once the governor had persuaded the chambers to permit the ´elus to contract an abonnement agreement seemed certain. Yet the ´elus subsequently proved wary, and over a decade later the governor’s instructions of 1730 still contained an article charging the Estates with responsibility for the ´etapes unless they accepted the terms and conditions offered in 1718.74 There was no abonnement at this, or any subsequent Estates, and initially it seems odd that an apparently generous offer should be rejected. The reluctance of the Estates almost certainly stemmed from an instinctive suspicion of permanent financial commitments. As for the ´elus, they presumably rejected an abonnement for fear of losing control of the administration of the ´etapes, almost certainly to the advantage of the intendant, something they were determined to avoid. Had the eighteenth century 71 72 73 74

See chapter 6. AN H1 99, fol. 116, ‘Projet d’instruction pour la prochaine tenue des e´tats de Bourgogne’. ADCO C 3031, fols. 71–2, and AN H1 99, fol. 103, duc de Bourbon to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, 22 May 1718. AN H1 107, dos. 2, fol. 5, ‘Instructions de Mgr le duc, 7 May 1730’.

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400,000

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Figure 10.3

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Cost of the military ´etapes in Burgundy, 1715–86

seen a repetition of the events between 1688 and 1715, with almost constant troop movements, they might have been forced to alter their stance. Fortunately for the province that was not the case, and the cost of the ´etapes regularly fell well below the levels of the proposed abonnement. As figure 10.3 demonstrates, it was only during the War of the Austrian Succession that the province regularly paid more than 200,000 livres, and the peace of 1748 ended the long cycle of wars in Italy that had required French armies to march south through Burgundy. Thereafter conflict was concentrated in the Empire or overseas, causing little disruption to the province. During peacetime, troop movements were even less of a problem and never cost more than the 150,000 livres offered by the crown in 1718. Whether by luck or judgement, the decision to reject the abonnement had by 1789 proved to be a sound one. Amongst the other military costs that the crown deflected on to the Estates was the payment of the ‘upkeep, clothing and other expenses’ of the militia.75 In 1726, that charge had been fixed at 52,000 livres in peacetime and some 200,000 livres in the event of war.76 In 1757, the Estates were dismayed to discover that the ´elus had agreed to an increase in the imposition 75 76

ADCO C 3045, fol. 140. ADCO C 3306, fols. 136–7. The remarques of the alcades of 1772 provide details of the amounts paid during the reign of Louis XV.

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to 344,726 livres. War had recently been declared against both Great Britain and Prussia, but the chambers of the nobility and the third estate were quick to point out that no such increase had been granted during the previous conflict of 1741–8. A unanimous vote in favour of remonstrances resulted, and these were presented to Louis XV during the voyage of honour of 1758.77 The government stood firm, citing the pressing needs of the state, and its success may well have emboldened it to seek a contribution towards the costs of the coastal militia that was sorely pressed by frequent British raids. The contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Bertin, first broached the subject in his correspondence with the intendant, Joly de Fleury, as he prepared the governor’s instructions for the assembly of 1760. Joly de Fleury was particularly well informed about the workings of the Estates, having served as the ´elu du roi from 1754 to 1758, and in a long and prescient letter to the minister he predicted trouble.78 He wrote: I must not hide from you, sir, that the proposition we shall be obliged to make in this respect will meet many objections . . . it is less the sum itself that will cause alarm, than to see the province subject for the first time to a new tax which appears completely foreign [to it].

Realising that an appeal for exemption on these grounds would cut little ice with Bertin, Joly de Fleury added that the Estates were convinced that they already contributed to the coastal militia as part of the existing levy of 344,745 livres. If the minister was determined to press ahead, the intendant felt obliged to inform him that modifications were required. In his draft edict, Bertin had indicated that the new tax would be levied on the capitation of ‘all his [the king’s] subjects, exempts et non-exempts, privileged et non-privileged’. The intendant urged him to reconsider otherwise ‘we will face insurmountable difficulties in the chamber of the nobility’ and subsequently the Parlement of Dijon. The danger of conflict could be reduced by simply granting the Estates the right ‘to impose this sum as they see fit’. Although Joly de Fleury did not spell it out, this would almost certainly result in the ´elus adding the necessary sum to the taille. In his reply, Bertin waved aside any claims of exemption from the tax, but significantly he was prepared to heed the intendant’s recommendation about its collection.79 Yet it was still with trepidation that Joly de Fleury and the comte de Saulx-Tavanes, who was presiding in the absence of the 77 78 79

ADCO C 3331, fols. 127–8. AN H1 126, dos. 1, fol. 8, Joly de Fleury to Bertin, 10 November 1760. Ibid., fol. 9 bis, Bertin to Joly de Fleury, 18 November 1760.

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prince de Cond´e,80 approached the Estates. Knowing that the new tax would provoke opposition, they deliberately refrained from presenting the article to the chambers until other royal business was complete.81 Delay had the additional advantage of reducing the size of the assembly, as many of the deputies began to drift away towards the end. The two men also took the precaution of speaking informally with the presidents and leading members of the three chambers, but even this was not enough. As the intendant noted in a letter to Bertin: I can not hide from you, sir, that we have run into many counter-arguments. All of the objections that I had anticipated were made, and many more besides, that we responded to as best we could.82

The deputies wanted information about the other pays d’´etats, whether they were contributing, and if so how much. To further complicate matters, several military officers, who were present in the assembly, reported that they had recently commanded the coastal militia and had discovered that the ‘new ordinances had not produced all of the benefits that were expected and that the costs incurred did not improve the quality of this militia’. In such an atmosphere, it was hardly surprising that Saulx-Tavanes and Joly de Fleury struggled to persuade the Estates to submit, and when the chambers finally relented they decided: to limit their consent to the imposition of the sum of 45,000 livres for this time only and they had not even wanted to grant this sum under the title of coastal militia, but as secours extraordinaire: it would have been impossible to overcome the resistance of the three chambers on these two conditions that they have unanimously added to their consent and I must not conceal [the fact] that they intended by this restriction to tie the hands of the ´elus for the years 1762 and 1763.

The Estates had thus voted the sum required, while making it very clear that it was for wartime purposes only. When we consider the comparatively trifling amount of money involved, the reaction of the deputies is particularly revealing. Neither the clergy, nor the nobility was likely to contribute much towards the cost, but the privileged orders had made common cause with the third estate against what they believed to be a novel and irregular imposition. The fears of the Estates about the crown’s intentions were seemingly borne out in 1762 when, despite the protests of the ´elus, the province’s contribution to the upkeep of the regular militia was increased to 80 81

The prince was with the army in the Empire. AN H1 126, dos. 1, fol. 24 bis, Joly de Fleury to Bertin, 2 December 1760.

82

Ibid.

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440,562 livres.83 Worse still, at the next assembly of the Estates, in November 1763, the crown demanded further annual payments of 45,000 livres for the coastal militia. As the war had ended in February 1763 the decision was highly contentious, and the chamber of the nobility was to the fore in leading the resistance. In its initial deliberation, the chamber declared that: it was impossible to grant anything towards the coastal militia, given that the province of Burgundy is, in virtue of its privileges, recognised as exempt from contributing; nevertheless the chamber of nobility, despite the terrible exhaustion of the people and their misery which is beyond all expression . . . has been unanimously of the opinion to grant the sum of 80,000 livres in the form of secours extraordinaire.84

In other words, they were offering 10,000 livres less than the king had requested and were refusing to recognise the legitimacy of an imposition for the coastal militia. Fortunately for the ministry, the prince de Cond´e was now presiding, and he used all of his charms to coax the nobility and the other chambers into softening their stance.85 After a second deliberation, the article was accepted unanimously and further protests were confined to the pages of the cahier de remontrances. When in 1766 the new contrˆoleur g´en´eral, L’Averdy, contemplated asking for a similar contribution, the intendant replied that in the light of previous experience it would be better if the matter was dropped.86 The minister was made of sterner stuff, and the demand for an annual payment of 45,000 livres was enforced without serious difficulty.87 Complaints continued to be voiced about the costs of the ordinary militia, albeit with less dramatic results. After repeated remonstrances the annual levy was reduced to 172,000 livres in peacetime, and was subsequently set at 349,937 livres during the War of American Independence.88 Without ever threatening to imitate the turbulent scenes enacted in Brittany, the Estates of Burgundy had proved themselves to be tenacious and reasonably effective defenders of provincial interests. New or increased taxation was never accepted without question, and it often proved possible to persuade the king to reduce his demands. Given the emotive nature of taxation, successive finance ministers preferred to employ the tried and trusted expedient of creating, or recreating, offices in order to persuade the Estates to pay for their suppression. During the reign of Louis XIV, 83 84 85 86 88

ADCO C 3362, fols. 131–2, the ´elus to Bertin, 11 December 1762. ADCO C 3045, fols. 106–7. AN H1 127, dos. 1, fol. 48, Cond´e to Bertin, 29 November 1763. 87 ADCO C 3007, fols. 37–8. AN H1 128, dos. 1, fol. 2, Amelot to L’Averdy, 10 June 1766. See: ADCO C 3306, fol. 136; C 3364, fols. 240, 292; C 3365, fol. 73; and C 3366, fols. 49, 99.

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this method had been ruthlessly exploited, raising millions of livres in the process. After 1715, the picture changed slightly and the number and nature of these ‘buy outs’ gradually diminished as the crown developed the habit of asking the Estates to borrow on its behalf. Even so, in 1723, 1735 and 1772, the Estates were obliged to purchase a variety of municipal offices, including those of the mayors, first bought in 1696, for the respective sums of 600,000, 820,000 and one million livres.89 The king used similar tactics to raise funds with a variety of indirect levies, such as those on ‘oils and soaps’ that were, in effect, subject to a form of abonnement.90 The procedure followed in the course of these ‘buy outs’ was a familiar one of behind the scenes negotiations and hard bargaining. In 1735, for example, the outbreak of the War of the Polish Succession tempted Orry to use the familiar ruse of creating new municipal offices. The contrˆoleur g´en´eral demanded one million livres, and the ´elus, in a series of conferences held with the duc de Bourbon and his secretary, Girard, during the voyage of honour, planned their strategy,91 eventually offering just 600,000 livres. During an interview with the intendant des finances, Baudrye, the ´elus were informed that Orry had subsequently reported to the cardinal de Fleury who ‘had found their offers insufficient’. Invoking the authority of the king’s venerable principal minister was clearly designed to intimidate the ´elus. They withdrew to confer anew with the governor and, on 4 April, ‘His Serene Highness wrote to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral informing him that he had persuaded the Estates to increase their offer to 750,000 livres, and that he believed that it was sufficient, albeit on the terms proposed by the Estates’.92 Orry replied that the king would be satisfied with 800,000 livres, and the deal was done with the Estates receiving their ‘conditions’ in the form of the rights to the octrois on the Saˆone for 1751 and 1752. The above example was a classic of its type. The crown had employed a familiar fiscal expedient, and the ´elus, aided by the governor, had negotiated a reasonably advantageous settlement. As neither the Estates, nor the ´elus, had the right to refuse the king the monies he demanded it was as much as could legitimately be expected. During the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the crown did alter its tactics slightly. After the crushing naval defeats of Lagos and Quiberon Bay, the duc de Choiseul came up 89

90 91

In 1723, the Estates paid 600,000 livres to buy these offices, and a further 800,000 livres was raised in 1735. The Estates were, in effect, paying to buy something they had already purchased on several previous occasions, see: ADCO C 3049, fols. 509–10; C 3311, fols. 47–62; C 3009, fol. 65; and 1 F 460, fol. 70. In the sense that they were ‘bought out’ at regular intervals throughout the period, ADCO C 3003, fol. 10, and 1 F 460, fols. 24, 42. 92 Ibid., fol. 62. ADCO C 3311, fols. 47–8, 61.

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with an ingenious method of rebuilding the fleet. In November 1761, he persuaded the Estates of Languedoc to offer the gift of a warship to the king, and then used their example of ‘spontaneous’ patriotic zeal to persuade the other great corps of the realm to follow suit.93 Choiseul had deliberately kept his own involvement in these carefully choreographed events secret, and his agent in Languedoc, the archbishop of Narbonne, played his part to perfection. According to Edmond Dziembowski, his stratagem was a great success: ‘from the beginning of December, the first free gifts commenced’ and prominent amongst them were the Estates of Burgundy.94 The official account would certainly appear to corroborate the idea of the Estates being swept along on a tide of patriotic euphoria. On 16 December, the bishop of Dijon wrote to the ministry on behalf of the ´elus offering an identical warship to the Estates of Languedoc and, more remarkably, proposing to use their own fees to pay the interest on the necessary loan.95 There was nothing spontaneous about such a superficially generous patriotic gesture. Instead, the bishop was responding to an earlier letter from the prince de Cond´e.96 Having been informed of events in Languedoc, the governor decided that: although Burgundy has not got a sea port . . . this argument must not prevent it from serving as an example to the other provinces; it is for that reason that I believe that, with the assembly of the Estates too distant, you can, sirs, issue a deliberation offering the king a warship of the same quality and armament as that supplied by Languedoc.

As the cost was some 700,000 livres this was a sizeable commitment, but in his concluding comments Cond´e sought to allay any fears: ‘the credit that Burgundy has always preserved by a wise administration, puts it in a position to raise the loan needed for this expenditure and I believe that I can assure you that it will be approved at the next Estates’. It is not clear whether Cond´e was acting on his own initiative, or after prompting from Choiseul. In his letter, the prince did note that the other pays d’´etats would almost certainly follow Languedoc, and by acting swiftly the province would create a favourable impression on the king. It was for this reason that the ´elus were obliged to pledge their own fees as collateral for the loan because their ‘gift’ would look rather tawdry if accompanied 93

94 95 96

The events have recently been examined by E. Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme franc¸ais, 1750–1770. La France face a` la puissance anglaise a` l’´epoque de la guerre de sept ans (Oxford, 1998), pp. 458–72. Ibid., pp. 467–8. AN H1 127, dos. 1, fols. 1–9, and ADCO C 3354, fol. 225, Choiseul to the ´elus, 5 January 1762. ADCO C 3362, fols. 115–16, Cond´e to the ´elus, 4 December 1761.

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by conditions. Fortunately for the ´elus they were not expected to make a personal sacrifice, and the contrˆoleur g´en´eral quickly assured them that financial aid would be forthcoming.97 The ´elus were thus permitted to borrow the money needed to build the warship, and the Estates were granted the rights to the octrois for the period 1775–9 in order to cover the interest charges and capital repayments.98 From the perspective of the Estates of Burgundy, the patriotic gift of 1761 had much in common with the old expedients of advancing the crown funds to ‘buy off’ unwanted edicts and it was financed in exactly the same way. As for the crown, once it had discovered a new source of funds, the temptation to exploit it further proved irresistible. After the crushing naval defeat of the Saints in 1782, this piece of patriotic theatre was repeated with precision. Cond´e pressed the ´elus into making a ‘spontaneous’ offer to finance a warship for the slightly higher price of one million livres.99 Following precedent, they pledged their own fees and were no doubt relieved to receive a further right to exploit the octrois and an additional crue on the sale of salt to cover the costs.100 Unlike the crown, the province was in rude fiscal health and it was not even necessary to add the interest charges to the taille, as they were paid by the ‘free funds’ of the Estates. French public opinion may have been enthused by a new patriotic ´elan after 1760,101 but the Burgundian ´elus had remained thoroughly businesslike. If they shared the new public mood, their patriotism had a distinctly parochial edge. The warship constructed in 1762 was named ‘La ´ Bourgogne’, and that of 1782 ‘Des Etats de Bourgogne’.102 No sooner had Choiseul been informed of their gift in 1762, than the ´elus petitioned him to appoint a Burgundian as its captain.103 The relatively underdeveloped seafaring tradition of a landlocked province meant that their project sank for want of an officer of the required grade. The Estates did, however, follow the fortunes of their warship with interest. When ‘La Bourgogne’ was involved in a naval engagement in April 1782, they noted with pride that it had been singled out for praise by the English admirals Rodney and Hood.104 If the episode was not quite the spontaneous display of patriotic fervour that some have assumed, it had at least engaged the attention of the Estates in a way that ordinary fiscal expedients could not. 97 99 100 101 102 104

98 AN H1 127, dos. 1, fols. 1–9. Ibid., fol. 120, Bertin to the ´elus, 21 December 1762. ADCO C 3306, fol. 156, and BMD MS 21537, ‘Observations sur une brochure intitul´ee: le manuel du bourguignon, ou recueil abr´eg´e des titres qui servent a` prouver les privil`eges de la province’. They received the octrois for the period 1795–9 and a cr¨ue of twenty sols per minot for 1789–92. As Dziembowski, Un nouveau patriotisme, has so eloquently argued. 103 ADCO C 3354, fol. 225, the ´elus to Choiseul, 5 January 1762. Ibid., p. 467. ADCO C 3053, fols. 43–4.

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Finally, the accounts of the Estates prepared during the last decade of the ancien r´egime reveal the existence of a substantial ‘buy out’ that says much about the self confidence of the provincial administration. In November 1786, the Estates paid the colossal sum of six million livres to the royal treasury to sanction the purchase of the ‘rights of brokers, measurers and inspectors of beverages and butcheries’ as well as the tax on ‘oils and soaps’.105 Quite remarkably they had also attempted to buy the comt´es of Bar-surSeine and Auxerre out of the jurisdiction of the Cour des Aides of Paris.106 The crown rejected this proposal, but the ´elus were permitted to buy the ‘rights of aides’ in the two comt´es. The ´elus justified their massive expenditure on the basis that: it was just to seize an opportunity to discharge the third estate of a tax that it bears alone for the payment of the abonnement. This abonnement being the equivalent to a tax on consumption, [it] seems by its very nature, that it must be paid by the three orders who are all in the order of consumers.107

The emphasis on fiscal equality was a further sign of a reforming current within the administration, although any celebrations amongst the members of the third estate were likely to be muted. As with the rights of aides suppressed in the comt´es these indirect taxes were to be re-established to the benefit of the Estates, thus providing the means to pay the interest and eventually to reimburse the capital. The debt was not expected to be repaid until the beginning of the next century, and until then the taxes would be paid as before. b o r row i n g a n d t h e p rov i n ci a l d e bt In 1778, the year in which France entered the War of American Independence, the debt of the Estates of Burgundy was estimated to stand at 6,397,489 livres.108 By 1784, a year after the conclusion of hostilities, the total had risen to 9,852,312 livres, and in November 1787, the last year for which meaningful figures are available, the debt amounted to 8,162,462 livres, to which should be added a further six million livres recently raised for the three ‘buy outs’ discussed above.109 A grand total of 14,162,462 livres was impressive, but was it a cause for alarm. The fact that the Estates had borrowed these sums at either denier 20 or 25 (4–5 per cent) is 105 106 107 108

Previously the Estates had paid a form of abonnement, ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 24. See: ADCO C 3241, fol. 429; C 3350; and C 3307, fols. 14–15. This was how the alcades interpreted their action in 1787, ADCO C 3307, fol. 15. 109 ADCO C 3307, fols. 12–15, 18. ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 86.

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a strong sign that it was not. The crues and octrois supplied other useful indicators of financial health. In 1787, the crues of forty and fifty sols per minot were pledged until the end of 1809, exactly twenty-two years in advance, a pattern that had remained unchanged since 1726. As for the octrois, they had been allocated until the end of 1799, thus consuming revenues for a period of twelve years. While hardly ideal, the situation still compared favourably with that of 1715, and as the credit structure had been functioning on these lines for a century there appeared to be little cause for concern. There was, however, a slight ambiguity about the status of 1.9 million livres borrowed to buy the ‘rights of aides’ in 1786. Rather than assign the interest payments and the reimbursement of the capital to the crues or octrois, this capital sum and the associated interest payments were to be repaid by halving the fees of the taille collectors, while still imposing the full ‘twelve deniers per livre for their collection fees’.110 It was estimated that if the taille was set at 2,280,000 livres or above, the 1.9 million livres borrowed would be repaid by the end of 1822. Even when the six million livres borrowed in 1786 are included, the debt at the end of the 1780s was not especially onerous. It had been accumulated over the years in order to fund the various ‘buy outs’, warships and other fiscal expedients described above. More importantly, there was widespread confidence in the probity of the provincial administration. By the 1780s, the octrois were producing an annual income of 270,000 livres, and the crues of forty and fifty sols per minot over 500,000 livres, which was supplemented by a further 60,000 livres for the additional crue of twenty sols.111 As before, that income was used to cover the debt, and it was supplemented by other sources of revenue. At the Estates of 1787, the chamber of the nobility appointed a committee to investigate the financial affairs of the province in detail. Its report was full of praise, noting that, in addition to the income from the octrois and crues, the province possessed considerable ‘free funds’ from the receipts of direct taxation levied in the province,112 amounting to approximately 300,000 livres for the triennalit´e of 1784–7.113 These revenues, together with their control of the tax system, ensured that every three years the alcades reported faithfully on the substantial reimbursements that the ´elus had affected. Thus in 1778, they announced that during the current triennalit´e (1775–8) 2,335,134 livres had been repaid. The 110 111 112 113

ADCO C 4730, ‘Observations sur les impositions de la Bourgogne’. ´ ADCO C 3306, fol. 220, and C 3452, ‘Etat de la situation de la recette g´en´erale des e´tats, au 12 Novembre 1787’. BMD MS 1189, fol. 146–7. This is confirmed by ADCO C 3452, ‘Etat de la situation’. Ibid.

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outbreak of war made the task of their successors more difficult, and they were only able to repay 959,516 livres between 1781 and 1784.114 Finally, in the period from 1785 to November 1787, they repaid a further 1,689,850 livres.115 These were by no means untypical figures, and throughout the century the Estates had preserved their reputation for sound financial management. It is far easier to find examples of creditors complaining that they had been reimbursed too quickly than not at all. If the Estates’ debts had had been restricted to those monies identified by the alcades as being for the affairs of the province, then it would be reasonable to assume that the finances were in good health. There were, however, other debts that need to be taken into consideration. In 1778, the Estates, urged on by the government, had finally committed themselves wholeheartedly to the construction of a network of canals.116 The Estates were permitted to borrow in order to finance these huge capital ventures, and by 1787 the alcades estimated that 6,890,000 livres had been raised, predicting that the total cost would exceed the original estimate of twelve million livres by at least 1.3 million.117 Any great engineering enterprise carries a risk of the costs spiralling out of control, and the means by which the venture had been financed was a further cause for concern. In December 1783, the king had issued letters patent allowing the Estates to borrow the sums required, but he had not provided an extension of the crues or octrois to ensure repayment. Instead, it was assumed that once opened the tolls on the canals would supply the revenue needed to repay the loans. During the intervening period, the ´elus decided that rather than increase the burden of the taillables interest payments ‘would be made on the loan itself’, that is to say they would borrow to pay the interest on their earlier borrowing.118 By the ordinary standards of the provincial administration, this was a remarkably carefree approach, and unforeseen expenses or delays would have wreaked havoc with their calculations. It would also have been interesting to know just how much revenue the Estates hoped to recoup from the tolls. Had the revolution not intervened it is probable that they would have faced some difficult financial choices. Any institution capable of borrowing millions of livres at interest rates of only 4–5 per cent was bound to attract the attention of the king’s hardpressed finance ministers. Under Louis XIV, the exploitation of financial 114 115 116 118

ADCO C 3306, fol. 220. These figures were calculated by a committee of the chamber of the noblesse, BMD MS 1189, fol. 143. 117 ADCO C 3307, fols. 17, 42–5. See chapter 11. ADCO C 3306, fol. 22. It is difficult to be sure if this was simply a result of over confidence, or a fear of the consequences of raising further taxation.

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16,000,000

14,000,000

12,000,000

10,000,000

8,000,000

6,000,000

4,000,000

2,000,000

0 1742 1744 1746 1748 1750 1752 1754 1756 1758 1760 1762 1764 1766 1768 1770 1772 1774 1776 1778 1780 1782

Figure 10.4

Annual borrowing by the Estates of Burgundy on behalf of the king, 1742–87

expedients was almost an art form, and in the final months of the Sun King’s reign his contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Desmarets, had stumbled across a new strategy for obtaining money by forcing the Estates to borrow two million livres directly for the king, allowing them to retain part of the proceeds of direct taxation to cover interest and repayment charges.119 The long period of peace that followed the king’s death meant that the practice was temporarily abandoned, but his successors had not forgotten the lesson. Once a new cycle of warfare began in 1740, the crown regularly obliged the Estates to borrow on its behalf. As figure 10.4 demonstrates, the number and size of these loans accelerated after 1756, and continued into the peaceful decade after 1763. It will not come as a surprise to learn that Necker pushed the system to its limits, and by 1784 the alcades estimated that the outstanding total of loans raised for the king stood at 29,519,378 livres.120 To cover the interest charges and repayment of this borrowing, the crown had alienated part of its revenues from the vingti`emes, capitation and other taxes with the result that very little left the province to swell the royal coffers directly. The Estates of Burgundy were thus raising taxes to cover the cost of lending to 119

See chapter 6.

120

ADCO C 3306, fol. 221.

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the crown, a pattern that was repeated in the other pays d’´etats and amongst many of the other corps of the realm.121 As nearly all the tax revenue raised in the province was to finance borrowing of one form or another it is clear that the Estates were burdened with debt. When looking at other institutions in a similar position, historians have talked of the crippling nature of the burden.122 Yet such an interpretation would have made little sense to members of the Estates, or to those who invested their patrimony into its rentes. When the alcades contemplated the issue of borrowing for the king in their remarques presented to the Estates of 1778 they declined to enter into details ‘because it does not interest fundamentally the province’. Their confidence derived from the king’s willingness to alienate sufficient funds from direct taxation to cover interest payments and the reimbursement of the capital.123 The intendant, Dupleix de Bacquencourt, shared their optimism and he informed Necker that: the situation of Burgundy is a happy one; reimbursements are made with exactitude and faithfulness, something that offers resources in the event that new loans are required, a total liquidation would soon be achieved if, as a result of a long peace, the state did not have need of secours extraordinaire nor the credit of the Estates.

The War of American Independence soon tempted Necker to put Dupleix’s theory to the test, with a series of massive loans totalling some sixteen million livres by the end of that year.124 Similar, if slightly less dramatic, demands were made throughout the war, and when the Estates convened again in 1784 the alcades decided to take a closer look at the effects of such ruthless exploitation of provincial credit.125 Firstly, they noted that, when ordered to raise loans for the king, the duty of the ´elus was to ‘see if the surety offered to the province by the king is free and sufficient and to ensure thereafter that the sums are used as intended’. In the circumstances, the ´elus could do no more, and as long as the king was prepared to continue alienating the proceeds of taxation the Estates had little to fear. Indeed, as the alcades remarked, the system could be presented in an even more positive light because: these types of loans . . . can not be prejudicial to the province and are even advantageous in certain respects, notably in that the interest is paid from the king’s 121 122 123

´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, pp. 730–5, and Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 220–4, provide other examples of a general practice. Bossenga, Politics of privilege, pp. 35–41, and Doyle, Venality, pp. 71–2. 124 ADCO C 4565. 125 ADCO C 3306, fols. 218–19. ADCO C 3306, fol. 204.

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share of taxation, and Burgundians having considerable sums [invested] in loans of this nature, it results that a part of the monies imposed for the king’s account remain in the province and circulate there: at present, Burgundians have more than 5,000,000 livres in these loans, which causes 250,000 livres to be paid and to circulate in the province that would otherwise be sent to the royal treasury.126

Looked at from the perspective of the Estates there was no cause for alarm, and by lending their credit to the king they provided a service that rendered them close to indispensable. As no one could have been expected to foresee a revolution, the only danger was from an unscrupulous, or desperate, contrˆoleur g´en´eral, prepared to demand loans without making provision for their eventual repayment. That would not occur before 1789, and when the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Lambert, suggested reducing the sums alienated to the Estates in December 1787 he retreated after stiff opposition from the ´elus.127 It was a typical example of how they sought to protect the creditworthiness of the Estates, and many other cases can be cited. In a royal declaration of February 1770, for example, the abb´e Terray decided to suspend interest payments on the provincial debt as part of his attempts to stave off government bankruptcy.128 Predictably, the ´elus protested, claiming that ‘until now the Estates of Burgundy has been equally jealous to fulfil its engagements vis-`a-vis the public as to give proof of its zeal for the king’s service’, acting ‘in a certain fashion as security for the king in these loans’. According to the ´elus, Terray threatened to destroy their credit, and they offered as proof their current struggle to find a sufficient number of subscribers for a new royal loan. Their protests were successful in the sense that the abb´e agreed to exempt the Estates from the terms of his declaration of 25 February, albeit ‘on condition that the resulting shortfall would be filled by the credit of the Estates’.129 The ´elus were thus obliged to contract further loans to prevent the crown from destroying their credit. Fending off the sharp practices of the contrˆoleurs g´en´eraux was not the only preoccupation of the ´elus. They were no less scrupulous when it came to preventing the rich and powerful from using the provincial fiscal system to their own benefit. The military commandant, the marquis de Gouvernet, discovered this to his cost in February 1786, when interceding on behalf of a relative who wanted an early reimbursement.130 Despite the 126 127 128 129 130

Ibid., fol. 219. ADCO C 3358, fol. 132, the ´elus to Lambert, 18 December 1787, and C 3307, fol. 86. ADCO C 3355, fol. 85, the ´elus to Terray, 4 April 1770. ADCO C 3363, fols. 55–6, Terray to the ´elus, 9 April 1770. ADCO C 3366, fol. 238, Gouvernet to the ´elus, 6 February 1786, and ibid., fol. 240, the ´elus to Gouvernet, 11 February 1786, for their reply.

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commandant’s eminence, his request was politely rejected. The Estates were also vigilant on matters affecting the provincial debt, and d´ecrets were frequently issued with the aim of ensuring good practice. During the regency and the early years of the reign of Louis XV, the Estates regularly ordered that 50,000 livres be added annually to the taille to cover the costs of rentes that had been contracted without funds being assigned for their reimbursement.131 As many of those attending the Estates had funds invested in the provincial debt, support for fiscal rectitude was hardly surprising. However, the massive expansion of provincial borrowing meant that the matter was of interest well beyond the frontiers of Burgundy. As the impressive scholarship of Rosenthal and Potter has shown, in the course of the eighteenth century Paris gradually replaced Dijon as the hub of the Estates’ financial system, and the Estates had become part of a national, even international credit network.132 After 1740, in particular, the scale of borrowing increased dramatically, reaching an annual average of 2.8 million livres during the 1770s.133 With their reputation for sound finance, the Estates had no difficulty finding investors from across the social spectrum, and great aristocrats as well as domestic servants are to be found in possession of their rentes.134 After 1740 Burgundians were no longer in the majority amongst lenders, although a relative decline was almost inevitable given the growth in the size of the sums involved. What Rosenthal and Potter have not revealed is whether the Burgundians preferred to place their money in the provincial debt, rather than that issued on behalf of the king. According to the alcades of 1784, locals accounted for only five million (17 per cent) of the 29.5 million livres raised for the crown.135 Yet Rosenthal and Potter have established that after 1740 Burgundians ‘never lent more than 30 per cent of the money borrowed by the Estates’.136 This suggests that they formed a higher proportion of those investing in the provincial debt, a hypothesis that is certainly supported by a glance at those listed as creditors in 1750.137 The officers and members of the Estates and the local robe nobility may, therefore, have preferred to place their money in the provincial debt, which was covered by the proceeds of the octrois and the crues. It was 131 132 133 134 136 137

See: ADCO C 3043, fol. 86; C 3049, fol. 352; and C 3050, fols. 19–20. Potter and Rosenthal, ‘Politics and public finance’, and their ‘The Burgundian estates’ bond market’. Potter and Rosenthal, ‘The Burgundian estates’ bond market’, 175. 135 ADCO C 3306, fol. 219 Rosenthal and Potter, ‘Politics and public finance’, 594–603. Rosenthal and Potter, ‘The Burgundian estates’ bond market’, 177. ADCO C 3198, fols. 683–803.

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not a purely academic distinction. These revenues had been part of the province’s relationship with the crown for generations, and the chances of the king changing matters were relatively slight. The debt contracted on behalf of the king, on the other hand, was a new development, only becoming permanent after 1742. It was guaranteed by the revenues from direct taxation, and, as we have seen, the temptation for the crown to renege on its agreement by suspending payments, or converting fixed term debt into rentes perp´etuelles, was stronger. It is, therefore, probable that the ´elus and the treasurer general connived in a system whereby Burgundian money was placed in the provincial debt. It was not a coincidence that the alcades always made a clear distinction between the debt of the Estates and that contracted on behalf of the king. Favourable treatment for Burgundians was also possible on account of the ability of the Estates to repay the debt. Any prolonged periods of peace, such as that between 1714 and 1736 or 1764 and 1778, allowed for substantial repayments, and in 1739 the alcades actually requested that, rather than use incoming funds entirely for that purpose, part of it be used to relieve the burden on the taillables.138 Repaying loans was never a serious problem and the ´elus had the choice of whom to reimburse first, and it was not a decision that was taken at random.139 Thus, in 1752, the ´elus received furious complaints from Chapeaurouge, conseiller d’´etat of the Genevan republic, about the proposed reimbursement of loans he, his family and associates had contracted with the Estates.140 They had no desire to see their capital refunded, and, more significantly, Chapeaurouge had letters signed by the recently deceased treasurer general, Chartraire de Montigny, ‘promising me that the Genevans who wished to contribute to this loan [of 1742] would be the last reimbursed. I showed them this at the same time as the draft contracts carrying this explicit clause that the principal could not be reimbursed for ten years’. The Swiss were not alone in wanting to leave their money invested for as long as possible, and the ´elus were careful to manipulate the system to their own advantage. In a deliberation of 1 February 1776, they noted that: 138

139

140

ADCO C 3050, fol. 373. They argued that the taillables should be helped ‘soit par la diminution des imposts ordinaires, soit en les employant a` la construction des chemins ou les communaut´es trop e´loign´ees ne peuvent travailler’. Rosenthal and Potter, ‘Politics and public finance’, 591, have argued that as tax or other revenues accrued ‘the treasurer of the Estates paid off the bonds by randomly selecting contracts’, this does not always appear to have been the case. ADCO C 4565, Chapeaurouge to secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley, 12 February 1752.

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in the reimbursements . . . we do not follow the order of the most ancient contracts; we allow certain creditors to benefit from a favourable interest rate for forty or fifty years, while we deprive others who scarcely have time to enjoy the [benefits], that this arbitrary choice suits, it is true, some of the inhabitants of this province, but it is prejudicial to the arrangements of many others, and it gives them cause for complaint.141

If all creditors of the Estates were equal in the sense of sharing a limited risk of default, some were more equal than others. By 1789, the Estates were far from crippled by debt, and they had protected their interests throughout the eighteenth century by continuing to provide a valuable service to the crown. As for the monarchy, despite its desperate financial situation, it had never seriously threatened to alter the fiscal relationship with the province, not least because it worked. Even the abb´e Terray, who fully deserved his reputation as the most draconian finance minister of the period, had drawn back from a plan to suspend interest repayments that risked shattering public confidence in the provincial credit structure. It would take the revolution of July 1789 to destroy the fiscal system. With the ashes of the Bastille still smouldering the ´elus were approached with plans for a ‘buy out’ of the four sols per livre of the capitation. Aware that the very existence of the Estates was menaced, the ´elus informed Necker on 24 July that: we are representatives of the Estates, we have their powers, but now that the representation of the three orders is attacked would it be prudent to claim a right of consent that only the continuation of the [present] constitution renders legitimate? . . . it is with much regret that we are unable to guarantee a loan that might be even more important to the government, in the present circumstances, than at any other time; it is with sorrow, that we refuse. No one can better appreciate than you [can] how much this costs us.142

By refusing to contract a new loan for a ‘buy out’ of the four sols per livre, the ´elus sounded the death knell of the old financial system and, a few days later, the night of 4 August, would do the same for the Estates themselves. The ´elus continued to oversee the administration for another year; thereafter the fiscal system and the debt would become the responsibility of the new d´epartements and above all of the state. The eighteenth century was a period of fluctuating fortunes for the finances of the Estates. A period of recovery after 1715 had supplied the foundations needed to weather the three great conflicts of the mid-century, 141

ADCO C 3229, fol. 206.

142

ADCO C 3359, fol. 45, the ´elus to Necker, 24 July 1789.

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and there was considerable continuity in the fiscal relationship with the crown. Both the Estates and the ´elus had sought to use their influence to reduce taxes, contract favourable abonnements and obtain some assistance, through the crues and octrois, for their payment. They undoubtedly achieved some notable successes, and if the principal beneficiaries were the members of the privileged orders, the ´elus were not always working in the interests of the privileged alone. Only during the period from 1740 to 1754 had the authority of the ´elus been seriously challenged. Profiting from the death of the duc de Bourbon, the crown had not only refused to sanction an abonnement for the new vingti`eme, but also passed responsibility for its collection to the intendant. It was a serious threat to the authority of the ´elus and to the coffers of the privileged, and the Estates proved incapable of mounting serious opposition. It was a sign of what a determined ministry was capable of achieving. Fortunately for the Estates, the crown was in a state of atrophy for much of the period after 1756. As the monarchy slipped ever deeper into its financial quagmire, they were able to reassert their authority and were arguably more confident and powerful during the reign of Louis XVI than ever before. Change had nevertheless occurred. Whereas Louis XIV had supplemented tax revenues with expedients, even extortion, his successors were obliged to employ less authoritarian tactics. Instead they followed a trail first blazed by Desmarets that involved obliging the Estates to borrow ever larger sums, while simultaneously alienating the proceeds from direct taxation to bolster their credit. Once Necker was let loose on the royal treasury, he rapidly pushed the system to its logical limits by allowing almost all of the revenues from direct taxation to be used to cover the costs of borrowing for the king. As the government never reneged on these agreements it worked to the advantage of the Estates, and the strength of their credit was demonstrated by their ability to raise ever-larger loans at rates of only 4–5 per cent. To talk of crippling debts is clearly not appropriate, and ultimately it would take a revolution to break the system. Clearly financial factors were important to the survival of the Estates, and historians are correct to stress that they continued to prosper in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because they were useful to the crown.143 Yet we should beware of assuming that it was purely a relationship of dependence. The nature of the ancien r´egime was such that neither French monarchs nor their ministers were prepared to attack the constitution of 143

As Collins, Classes, estates, and order, p. 285, has done.

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Burgundy, or the other pays d’´etats. Moreover, as the eighteenth century progressed, reformist ideas were increasingly sympathetic to the provincial estates and to the idea of reviving them elsewhere in the kingdom. The tide was flowing in the favour of provincial representation, and the Estates of Burgundy had little to fear. It would take a political upheaval of hitherto unimagined dimensions to bring about their fall.

chapter 11

An enlightened administration?

The eighteenth century has been depicted as the golden age of the intendants. By the reign of Louis XV the Fronde was just a distant memory,1 and, while conflicts with the parlements or other corporate bodies were not unknown, the intendants were an accepted part of the provincial scene. Firmly established in their g´en´eralit´es and supported by a numerous body of subdelegates the intendants were able to turn their attention to the welfare of the population. Ardascheff, in his classic study published at the beginning of the twentieth century, painted a glowing portrait of the enlightened intendant, who ‘by his culture, birth and education formed part of this “enlightened public” which was the true mouthpiece of public opinion’.2 Inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and by the contemporary concept of ‘bienfaisance’,3 the intendants promoted agricultural and economic development, attempted to tackle the problems of rural poverty, encouraged education and the arts and sought to diffuse the benefits of advances in medical knowledge.4 With administrators of the calibre of Turgot, Auget de Monthyon and S´enac de Meilhan, it is not difficult to see why their reforming efforts have attracted praise, and Maurice Bordes repeated many of the same arguments in his studies of the intendants during the reign of Louis XV.5 Whereas Ardascheff had claimed that they increasingly saw themselves as the representatives of the provinces in which they served, Bordes stressed their continuing fidelity ‘to their administrative traditions and to their 1 2 3 4 5

The recall of the intendants had been the one of the most prominent of the twenty-seven articles drafted by the Chambre Saint Louis, Moote, Revolt of the judges, pp. 148–9, 151, 158–67. Ardascheff, Les intendants, p. 179. The term could be translated as a concern for public welfare, or the common good. One of Ardascheff’s chapters was entitled ‘Les intendants et la “bienfaisance e´clair´ee”’, Ardascheff, Les intendants, pp. 211–325. ´ M. Bordes, ‘Les intendants e´clair´es de la fin de l’ancien r´egime’, Revue d’Histoire Economique et Sociale (1961), 57–83.

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centralising vocation’.6 Vivien Gruder reached similar conclusions, arguing that the intendants ‘initiated reforms to improve the quality of government and the conditions of life of the French people’.7 There has been no serious challenge to the reputation of the intendants within the pays d’´elections, and more recent works have continued to emphasise their reforming spirit.8 In Burgundy, and the other pays d’´etats, much of the local administration was in the hands of the provincial Estates, but did they follow the trail blazed by the intendants? The available evidence is mixed. Rebillon’s impressive study of the Estates of Brittany demonstrated that in the course of the eighteenth century their powers and jurisdiction expanded considerably.9 The results of this increased authority were disappointing, and after examining their efforts in the fields of, for example, agricultural improvement, the encouragement of industry and public works Rebillon concluded that they had produced only ‘modest results’.10 Marie-Laure Legay’s recent study of the Estates of Artois, Cambr´esis and Flanders confirms that the provincial estates were accumulating important new powers after 1750.11 She also notes the limited extent of their practical achievements, but argues that during the eighteenth century they were gradually transformed into administrative agents of the crown. To support her thesis, she highlights the similarity of the tasks performed by the Estates and the intendants, suggesting that by devolving authority in the pays d’´etats the crown was able to achieve its objectives, while deflecting much of the cost on to the provinces. For Legay, the Burgundian Estates appear as a good example of this process, and she describes them as ‘docile’, adding that they ‘appear to us rather paradoxically as an organ of the royal administration’.12 It is an argument that risks underestimating the degree of independence enjoyed by the Estates, especially through their control of the local fiscal system. They were also extremely active in the administrative sphere, and the following will examine if they succeeded in developing an alternative vision of an enlightened provincial government. re fo r m o f t h e ta i l l e For the majority of Burgundians, the fiscal system and above all the taille represented their most important point of contact with the administration 6 7 8 9 11

Ibid., 82–3. V. R. Gruder, The royal provincial intendants. A governing elite in eighteenth-century France (New York, 1968), p. 215. Touzery, La taille tarif´ee, 1715–1789. 10 Ibid., p. 763. ´ Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, especially, pp. 756–7 12 Ibid., p. 352. Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 288–324

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of the Estates.13 By the second quarter of the eighteenth century very serious allegations of abuse were being directed at the administration of the taille by the conseils des ´etats and, above all, by the alcades.14 In their censored remarques of 174215 the alcades declared that: it is certain that there is great inequality in taxation and as a consequence communities overburdened because the rolls of the inhabitants are false, in some [communities] several inhabitants are taxed under a single name, in others they do not include in the rolls of the taille those who should be assessed for modest sums of 5 or 6 livres or less.16

These complaints were typical of the period, and in a study of several villages in the bailliage of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine, Jean Richard found evidence to corroborate the claim that the taille rolls were being falsified.17 If the problems associated with the collection of the taille were widely recognised, the most commonly proposed solution also had a familiar ring. Time and time again, the alcades informed the Estates that: it would be easy to remedy abuse . . . by undertaking a general visit of all the communities in which note will be taken of the quality of the land (pays), the commerce practised [and] the number of inhabitants and their means.18

As the last recorded surveys of this type had been undertaken in 1690 and 1700,19 the need for an update was pressing, not least because the ´elus were still using the ‘proc`es verbal’ drafted some forty years before!20 Yet the repeated appeals of the alcades fell on deaf ears. Rather than order a general visit, all three chambers of the Estates rejected the idea, usually on the basis that it would be too costly,21 preferring instead to refer the problems of the taille to the ´elus ‘to give all their attention’.22 Having encountered yet another rejection on the grounds of cost, the alcades changed tack in 1733, and proposed that the Estates petition the king for permission to undertake nouveaux pieds de taille throughout 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22

A more detailed examination of the tax system is provided in chapter 7. For a selection of their remarques, see; ADCO C 3049, fols. 357–60 (1718); ibid., fols. 451–2 (1721); C 3050, fol. 140 (1730); and ibid., fols. 360–1 (1739). 16 ADCO C 3304, fol. 26. See chapter 8. J. Richard, ‘A propos d’une source documentaire: de “faux rˆoles” des tailles en Chˆatillonais (1741)’, Annales de Bourgogne 55 (1983), 34–8. The quote is from the remarques of the alcades written in 1730, ADCO C 3050, fols. 140–1, for similar examples see: C 3003, fol. 330 (1739), and C 3004, fol. 260 (1745). The general visit of 1690 is usually taken to have been the last, although something very similar was undertaken in 1700, see chapter 7. ADCO C 3050, fol. 140. ADCO C 3050, fols. 217–18 (1733); C 3050, fol. 361 (1739); and C 3004, fol. 260 (1745). This was their reaction in 1739, ADCO C 3003, fol. 330.

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the province.23 To conduct the operation, each town would choose ‘twelve assessors of each estate, and in the villages six, to execute this plan’.24 Perhaps seduced by the relatively inexpensive nature of the scheme, the Estates adopted the proposal and it was included in the remonstrances addressed to the king.25 In his official reply, Louis XV praised the ‘zeal and good intentions of the ´elus’, but rejected their demand on the basis that it threatened to cause more problems than it would solve. It is true that the principal aim of a nouveau pied de taille was to guarantee a fair distribution of the tax burden amongst the inhabitants of a given community, and it did not affect the actual amount of the tax for which that community was assessed.26 That would have been a laudable reform in its own right, albeit an imperfect one. Ensuring an equitable division of the overall tax burden could only be achieved by comparing the relative wealth of the towns and communities of the province as a whole, and to do that it was necessary to conduct a general visit. These objections may have been sufficient to provoke the royal veto, although it is likely that the crown was conscious that a positive response would annoy the Parlement of Dijon, which had long disputed the right to order a nouveau pied de taille with the ´elus. Rather than risk provoking a jurisdictional quarrel, the king preferred to protect the status quo. Thus, despite being well informed about the abuses within the administration of the taille, little progress was made in reforming them in the first half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the fact that general visits had still been conducted as late as 1700 suggests that the situation may well have deteriorated since the reign of Louis XIV. Fortunately for Burgundian taxpayers, the period after 1750 would bring a slow improvement in the fiscal system. In January 1751, the ´elus issued a deliberation forbidding alterations to the tax rolls, an abuse that had crept in either as a means of raising funds for local purposes, or of lining the pockets of the assessors.27 To ensure that their orders were heeded, the ´elus forced the receivers of the taille to check the amounts submitted by the tax collectors against the original rolls and to report any anomalies to Dijon. The ´elus also attempted to tighten their control over the receivers by appointing a commis in each bailliage (usually 23 26

27

24 Ibid. 25 ADCO C 3331, fols. 16–17. ADCO C 3050, fols. 217–18. These definitions were discussed in a memorandum written during the triennalit´e of 1775–8 when a similar scheme was considered, ADCO C 3350, ‘Observation sur la requˆete pr´esent´ee au roy par les e´lus g´en´eraux des e´tats . . . tendante a` revocation de l’arrˆet du conseil du 28 juillet 1776 qui annulle trois de leurs d´eliberations des 23 d´ecembre 1775, 10 janvier et 1 f´evrier 1776’. ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 21 January 1751. This was, in fact, a repeat of a measure first adopted during the reign of Louis XIV, see chapter 7.

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the local mayor) to oversee their use of contrainte solidaire.28 The aim was to end an apparently arbitrary practice whereby tax collectors, or the principal inhabitants of a community, could find themselves pursued by the receiver’s bailiffs without the authorisation of a judge or other competent authority. However, systematic reform would have to await the reign of Louis XVI. As we have seen, during the triennalit´e of 1775–8 the ´elus tried unsuccessfully to impose a whole series of measures designed to improve the fiscal system.29 Arguably their failure had as much to do with their aggressive and confrontational political style as the actual content of their policies, and once the dust had settled real progress was made. On 12 November 1781, the chamber issued a wide-ranging deliberation reorganising the administration of the taille. In their preamble, the ´elus acknowledged the very grave problems in the existing procedure based upon a system of ‘feux’ which, due to the failure to conduct general visits, no longer bore any relation to its original meaning of ‘hearth’. Instead, the number of feux varied every year and was nothing more than ‘a fraction of the total sum levied on the province’.30 In other words, the ´elus accorded each community a certain number of feux, varying from less than ten for a small hamlet to several hundred for a major town. Only when they had finished did they know the total number of feux, which they then used to divide the total of the taille, thus giving the monetary value of a single feu. Two main disadvantages flowed from this procedure. Firstly, when the tax of a particular community increased or decreased it was impossible to tell if the aim was to establish a more equitable division of the burden between communities, or to provide temporary relief because of losses incurred.31 The second serious problem stemmed from the fact that the actual value of the individual feu could not be established until the end of the process, which meant that: when intending to increase or reduce [the tax] of a particular community, it is never known if, in lowering or augmenting the number of its feux, we reduce or increase the total sum of its imposition, or, at least, it is not known if it is increased or reduced in the proportion that was intended. 28

29 30 31

Ibid ., deliberations of 23 November 1754, 3 January 1760 and 3 May 1766. The regulations were confirmed and slightly extended in a deliberation of 7 January 1765. The new commis were ordered to compile exact reports of the number and nature of the ‘contraintes’ employed by the receivers. See chapter 8. ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 12 November 1781. Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 147–63, offers a helpful analysis of how the system functioned and of the attempts to improve it. ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 12 November 1781, and C 3234, fols. 546–50.

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The system was a perfect recipe for confusion, and it certainly helps to explain why the administration of the taille was so frequently denounced. To remedy the abuse it was necessary to know the value of a single feu at the outset, and the ´elus, therefore, decreed that henceforth the total number of feux would be fixed at 100,000, and then sub-divided amongst the fifteen bailliages under their administration.32 Once informed of the value of the feu, the ´elus could make sound judgements about the effects of their decisions on individual communities. They also proposed making two tax rolls, the first setting the proportion of the overall burden to be supported by the communities in terms of feux and the second, in monetary terms, detailing any tax reductions accorded as the result of crop failures, or other natural disasters. Given the perennial nature of these problems in an overwhelmingly agricultural society, the chamber further stipulated that in future it would levy an extra hundredth of the total provincial taille assessment to cover the cost of these rebates. The advantage of such an approach lay in the fact that the whole province would now support the extra burden, rather than it being passed on to a few neighbouring parishes, as had previously been the case.33 Finally, to guard against the effects of inexperienced ´elus tampering with the fiscal system, the deliberation of 12 November 1781 contained a clause specifying that for the first two years of a triennalit´e the chamber would be bound by the taille roll (the first one setting the proportion of feux) of their predecessors.34 Any changes were to be implemented in the third year, when the ´elus would be able to act ‘in the light of the experience gained in the course of their administration’. The deliberation represented a considerable advance, and it has been described without exaggeration as ‘a successful reform, very modern in spirit’.35 Moreover, the Estates subsequently applauded the new system, and it formed part of a broader strategy of fiscal reform. On the same day, 12 November 1781, the ´elus issued a second deliberation ordering the compilation of an alphabetical list of all the towns and communities of the province.36 In the preamble, they again frankly admitted the shortcomings of existing practice, noting that the taille, capitation, vingti`eme and militia rolls were all drawn up according to different criteria. As a result, it was almost impossible to form a precise opinion about the burden supported by a particular village. The solution was to order that all of these 32 33 34 35

For example Dijon was assessed at 12,260 feux, Chalon-sur-Saˆone 10,635 and Avallon 5,452. This is the explanation of the alcades of 1784, they were vague about how the reduction of the tax on one community had affected the others before 1781, ADCO C 3306, fols. 223–4. ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 12 November 1781. 36 ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 12 November 1781. Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 113–14

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different levies, plus the corv´ee, would be apportioned on rolls drafted ‘on uniform districts consisting of exactly the same places’.37 If the deliberations of November 1781 were primarily intended to improve the working practices of the chamber of ´elus, that of 1 December 1783 was focused on the collection of the taille itself. The text was composed of over one hundred articles, and set out in precise detail the rules to be followed for the appointment of the assessors and the collectors of the taille, their duties, rights and obligations.38 While many of these points were not new, the deliberation was clearly intended to codify existing practice, and to reduce the scope for fraud by providing a fixed method and timetable for tax collection. One final example of how the provincial administration sought to improve the collection of taille is provided by the growing interest in the taille tarif´ee pioneered by, amongst others, the intendant of Paris, Bertier de Sauvigny, and the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, L’Averdy.39 The aim of the reform was to encourage fiscal equality by basing taille assessments on a more accurate survey of individual property and wealth. According to d’Orgeval, the first recorded use of a ‘tariff ’ in Burgundy was for the nouveau pied de taille conducted in Beaune in 1768, and the practice does appear to have become widespread during the reign of Louis XVI.40 By 1789, the ´elus were planning to introduce a ‘tariff-type’ to be employed in a province-wide programme of nouveaux pieds de taille that might well be described as a general visit by another name.41 They were also petitioning the crown for the application of an arrˆet du conseil of July 1766, with the aim of closing the legal loophole whereby wealthy taillables could only be assessed for the tax in their place of residence, despite the fact that they owned property elsewhere in Burgundy.42 As the ´elus were shocked to discover in February 1786, abuse, on this occasion in the form of false taille rolls,43 was never completely eradicated, but the reign of Louis XVI had produced improvements. Considerably less had been achieved in relation to the other direct taxes levied by the ´elus. As we have seen, the capitation was effectively a surtax on the taille, and the province’s privileged, especially the nobility, had benefited hugely from 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

The wording here is taken from the remarques of the alcades of 1784, but it encapsulates the spirit of the reform, ADCO C 3306, fol. 222. ADCO C 4730, deliberation of 1 December 1783. Touzery, La taille tarif´ee, and F´elix, L’Averdy, pp. 291–304. D’Orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne, pp. 10–12, 71–3. ADCO C 3843, and Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 116. ADCO C 3366, fol. 332–3, the ´elus to Calonne, 9 December 1786. ADCO C 3366, fol. 246, procureur syndic, Jarrin, to the receiver of Arnay-le-Duc, 16 February 1786.

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the system of abonnement.44 The alcades did raise the issue at the Estates of 1775, attacking the fact that the privileged paid less than a sixth of the total cost of the capitation, something that they described as an offence to ‘reason and equity’.45 These fine words would be repeated on several subsequent occasions without noticeable effect. Inequality was also one of the defining characteristics of the vingti`emes, and when the ´elus, led by abb´e de La Goutte, attempted to introduce reforms they were rapidly halted by opposition from the privileged. The defeated ´elus at least had the satisfaction of seeing reform of the vingti`emes return quickly to the political agenda. The governor’s instructions presented to the Estates of 1781 contained a specific request that the ´elus be ordered to use ‘the means that they consider appropriate to achieve the most equitable distribution of the abonnement of the vingti`emes’.46 The chambers of the clergy and the third estate responded enthusiastically, but the nobility made clear its objections to a ‘general verification’ behind which it saw the dreaded cadastre.47 As a result, the ´elus issued a deliberation on 28 January 1782, ordering the receivers to undertake a ‘a general census of vingti`eme rolls of the province, that is to say a record of all the changes in property ownership’.48 With the latent opposition of the privileged, backed by the Parlement of Dijon, progress was painfully slow.49 Frustrated by the non-cooperation of local tax assessors and municipal officers, the ´elus issued a further deliberation, on 11 February 1786, admitting that their census had produced ‘greater confusion than that it was supposed to remedy’ and appointing ‘commissioners’ from their chamber to oversee the work.50 By the next assembly of the Estates, in November 1787, the alcades were able to report that the work was advancing, and to make the remarkable observation that the province contained ‘property that is not taxed’.51 Although the beneficiaries of that oversight were not identified, it seems highly likely that they were from amongst the wealthier taxpayers. At the Estates of 1787, the winds of change finally proved irresistible and noble opposition to the principle of fiscal equality collapsed.52 This was more a sign of the changing political climate than any conversion on the part of the second estate, which 44 46 47 48 49

50

45 ADCO C 3306, fols. 177–8, remarques of 1775. See chapters 3, 6 and 10. AN H1 134, dos. 4, fol. 63, ‘Project d’instruction (1781)’, and ibid., fol. 68, ‘Observations sur quelques articles de l’instruction pour mm. les commissaires du roi a` l’assembl´ee des e´tats de Bourgogne’. ADCO C 3012, fols. 16–17. ADCO C 3365, fol. 26, the ´elus to the receivers of the taille, 13 February 1782. The Parlement had issued an arrˆet in 1768 blocking these verifications, and the crown was effectively encouraging the ´elus to ignore its opposition, AN H1 134, dos. 4, fol. 68, ‘Observations sur quelques articles de l’instruction’. 51 ADCO C 3307, fol. 28. 52 See chapter 10. ADCO C 3241, fols. 245–51.

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had defended its own pecuniary interests to the last. However, the presence of a reformist movement within the Estates should not be forgotten, and if it had made slow progress in breaking down the barriers of fiscal privilege its efforts had not been in vain. The final plank in the reform programme concerned the receivers of the taille, whose annual ‘treaties’ abb´e de La Goutte had unsuccessfully attempted to enforce to the letter. Any respite for the tax collectors was short-lived, and, in July 1779, the new ´elus sent a circular letter informing the receivers that their intention was to enforce ‘the ancient regulations concerning the collection of taxation’.53 They further requested that a monthly account of monies received for each of the different impositions be sent to Dijon for examination. The unwritten message for the receivers was clear, any arrears would have to be accounted for. It was, however, the deliberation of 18 December 1781 that really tightened the administrative screw. In their preamble, the ´elus referred to 1.4 million livres in tax arrears, attributing that backlog not to the plight of the poorer taxpayers, but to the delaying tactics of the better off.54 As for the receivers they had no excuse for not making their payments on time because their fees were intended to compensate them for the ‘advances that the difficulty of collection can force them to make’. The text repeated much of what the ´elus of 1775–8 had claimed in their suppressed deliberations of 1 February 1776 and 19 February 1777, and it laid down a series of strict guidelines for future tax payments. All taxes levied prior to 1784 were to be received before 1 November of that year, and those receivers who failed to comply risked losing their fees.55 As for taxes raised during 1784, they were to be paid in equal instalments, with a deadline of June 1786 for the final accounts to be presented to the treasurer general. He was, in turn, to present his accounts for the tax year 1784 in October 1786, and any unauthorised delays would result in the loss of fees. The pressure on the receivers was further increased on 1 May 1786 when the ´elus ordered them to maintain a daily register of the funds entering their caisse.56 As a result of these measures the usually critical alcades felt able to assure the assembled Estates, in November 1787, that payments were now being made on time.57 Some corroborating evidence 53 54

55 56 57

ADCO C 3364, fol. 175, the ´elus to the receivers of the taille, 14 July 1779. ADCO C 3452, ‘D´eliberation de mm. les e´lus g´en´eraux . . . qui r`egle les termes, o`u, a` l’avenir, les deniers de chacune des impositions de la province, seront vers´es a` la caisse generalle, par les receveurs particuliers’, 18 December 1783. ADCO C 3452, deliberation of 18 December 1783. ADCO C 3446, deliberation of 1 May 1786. The receivers were also obliged to send their regular monthly accounts to Dijon within seven days of the end of a given month. ADCO C 3307, fols. 32–3.

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can be found amongst the correspondence of the receivers themselves. In August 1785, Hubert Charles Languet de Livry, whose family had served at Arnay-le-Duc for over a century, sent a desperate requˆete to the ´elus explaining his failure to meet their deadlines.58 He claimed to have exhausted ‘all the legitimate means available to him’, and, as he was not the only receiver in distress,59 it suggests that the new regulations were beginning to bite. When examining the Burgundian fiscal administration in the eighteenth century it is not difficult to find fault. Despite the repeated efforts of the alcades, both the Estates and the ´elus proved unwilling to approve the general visit needed to root out some of the more glaring abuses in the administration of the taille. While it is true that the ´elus continued to sanction nouveaux pieds de taille, and could also call upon their own local knowledge and that of the receivers, it is possible that by mid-century tax collection was less equitable than during the reign of Louis XIV. The very real inequalities present in the distribution of the capitation and the vingti`emes were equally disturbing, with the privileged classes enjoying the fruits of the abonnement system and using their influence at Versailles and in the Parlement of Dijon to keep it that way. However, the Estates were not just concerned with defending privileged interests,60 and a reform movement was also present. Advances were made in the administration of the taille and in controlling the actions of the receivers, and by the reign of Louis XVI the issue of fiscal equality was gradually superseding that of administrative efficiency. p u b l i c wo rk s Travelling on the roads in Burgundy during the reign of Louis XIV was a hazardous business, and potholes, mud and highwaymen were all potential death traps for the unwary. The Estates were conscious of the problem, and the appointment of a qualified engineer in 1682 and the adoption of a series of reforming d´ecrets, especially that of 1688, promised to improve matters.61 The long and costly wars of 1688–97 and 1701–13 put paid to such hopes, but in 1715 the Estates reaffirmed the d´ecret of 1688 and authorised the drafting of a map outlining the principal routes for construction and repair. At the assembly of 1721, the Estates issued a new d´ecret codifying existing procedures, specifying the amounts to be spent on the various 58 59 60

ADCO C 3449, ‘Requˆete de Languet de Livry’, 5 August 1785. ADCO C 3366, fols. 174–6, abb´e de La Fare to Avirey, receiver of Semur-en-Auxois, 28 April, 1785, and the attached ‘Requˆete du sieur Champeaux d’Avirey aux e´lus’. 61 See chapter 7. The conclusion reached by Ligou, ‘Probl`emes fiscaux’, 124–7.

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highways and the rules for the awarding and verification of public works contracts. These worthy efforts were slow to take effect, and travellers during the first third of the eighteenth century soon discovered that Burgundy’s roads were paved with little more than good intentions. The ´elus regularly received angry letters from ministers at Versailles protesting about the state of the provincial highways, and no less a figure than the cardinal de Fleury described them as a ‘disgrace’ in October 1735.62 The governor also complained, in May 1731, that he was tired of hearing adverse reports about the state of the roads, and urged them to use whatever methods were necessary to improve them.63 Within the assemblies of the Estates the alcades added their voice to the chorus, arguing that the failure to enforce the d´ecrets of the Estates was the root cause of the problem.64 In their censored remarques of 1742 they went further, suggesting that lax administration allowed many works contracts to be issued without any formal public process of bidding.65 According to their calculations the provincial engineer had distributed contracts worth at least 100,000 livres in the period 1740–2, without inviting rival entrepreneurs to compete. The stench of corruption was in the air, and these suspicions seemed doubly justified by the fact that the provincial engineer, Morin, had recently been sacked amidst allegations of shoddy workmanship and graft.66 Under pressure from all sides, the ´elus had little choice but to try and improve matters. At an administrative level, they took the decision to divide the responsibilities of the engineer and his deputy, making each accountable for a section of the road network.67 More importantly, in May 1731, the ´elus decided to appoint commissioners from within the chamber, namely the treasurer general and the two secr´etaires des ´etats, to make regular inspections of the roads and to verify that public works had been satisfactorily completed before authorising final payments.68 The new system quickly took hold, becoming part of the already impressive administrative portfolios of the permanent officers, although we should also note that the 62

63 64 65 66 67 68

ADCO C 3360, fol. 126, Fleury to the ´elus, 15 October 1735. He was not alone in his complaints, see: ADCO C 3354, fol. 10, Dodun to the ´elus, 26 April 1723, and ADCO C 3360, fol. 35, Dodun to the intendant, La Briffe, 25 March 1726. ADCO C 3360, fol. 89, duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 2 May 1731. ADCO C 3049, fols. 429–30, remarques of 1721, and ibid., fols. 501–2, for those of 1724. ADCO C 3304, fols. 49–51. For a full account of the engineer’s disgrace, see Blin, ‘Le proc`es de Pierre Morin’. ADCO C 3177, fol. 73. The plan was drawn up after the chamber had received further complaints from the governor, ADCO C 3360, fol. 89, the ´elus to the duc de Bourbon, 6 May 1731, and ibid., Bourbon to the ´elus, 7 May 1731.

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´elus continued to visit sites themselves.69 These measures coincided with a more rigorous use of the corv´ee on the highways and a progressive increase in the sums spent on public works. At their meeting of 1715, the Estates had pledged an annual sum of 60,000 livres for the construction and upkeep of the province’s roads,70 in 1757 that rose to 100,000 livres,71 and in 1781 it was increased again to the impressive total of 200,000 livres.72 Moreover, these were only the official guidelines, and there is some evidence that the ´elus spent more.73 One of the great achievements of the reign of Louis XV was the development of a national road network, and the pressure for improvement in Burgundy was undoubtedly coming from the government in Versailles.74 Yet it would be misleading to suggest that the Estates were only reacting to the demands of the crown, and from the 1730s onwards a real enthusiasm was detectable. At the Estates of 1736, the traditionally critical alcades declared that ‘we can not praise the zeal and attention of the ´elus too highly . . . travellers no longer need fear, as in the past, setting out in the country even in the worst seasons’.75 Thereafter the remarques were effusive in their praise. In 1751, the alcades declared: ‘it is with genuine satisfaction that we see the roads of the province in a state of perfection that we owe to the care and attention of the ´elus’.76 Nor was this mere flattery. In May 1761, the new intendant, Jean-Franc¸ois Dufour de Villeneuve, informed the contrˆoleur g´en´eral that ‘in truth, the ´elus have until now made excellent use of their jurisdiction’, and even the legendary Daniel Trudaine, chief architect of the expansion of the kingdom’s road network under Louis XV, was impressed.77 The contrast with the earlier period could not be clearer, and the change of tone in the correspondence with the ministry is striking. Gone are the annual complaints about the disgraceful state of the roads in Burgundy, instead it was the ´elus who now wrote to Versailles bemoaning the poor condition of the highways in neighbouring provinces. As they informed Calonne, in February 1786, they observed ‘with displeasure that the g´en´eralit´es to which these roads lead offer neither commerce, nor travellers, the same facilities as our own’.78 More positively, the ´elus established regular contacts with 69 70 72 74 75 77 78

For a number of examples from 1750, see ADCO C 3198, fols. 45–6, 216, 467. 71 ADCO C 3006, fol. 81. This was at the request of the crown. ADCO C 3001, fol. 278. 73 ADCO 1 F 460, fols. 61–2. ADCO C 3047, fol. 99, and C 3048, fols. 82–3 Demands for increases in spending were usually part of the instructions of the governor that were presented to the Estates. 76 ADCO C 3306, fol. 33. ADCO C 3050, fol. 297. AN H1 126, dos. 3, fol. 57, Dufour de Villeneuve to Bertin, 23 May 1761, and ADCO C 3362, fol. 127, Trudaine to the ´elus, 13 October 1762. ADCO C 3357, the ´elus to Calonne, 11 February 1786. The remonstrances of the Estates are full of similar complaints after 1737, C 3331, fols. 47, 68, 79.

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the intendants of Champagne, Franche-Comt´e and Paris with the aim of coordinating their construction programmes and thus helping to overcome some of these problems.79 According to Saint Jacob, the results were impressive, producing ‘a network that was just about definitive, to which the nineteenth century added no more than minor junctions’.80 Success brought pride and confidence, and in 1754 the Estates began a campaign to have their jurisdiction over the highways, which had been renewed every three years since 1708, made permanent.81 The crown initially refused on the basis that such a privilege might lead to complacency,82 but the Estates continued to petition and their persistence was eventually rewarded in December 1785 when the king awarded the jurisdiction for ‘an indefinite period conforming to the wish so often expressed by the Estates’.83 If the main highways had predictably attracted the greatest attention, calls for the improvement of the minor roads (chemins finerots) were also voiced at the Estates from the mid-century.84 From the perspective of the ´elus, it was vital to have the same jurisdiction over the minor roads as the highways, but it took repeated remonstrances before the king was finally persuaded in December 1776.85 The crown’s reluctance to transfer the jurisdiction to the Estates resulted from a wholly justified fear of the likely reaction of the Parlement of Dijon.86 When the king’s decision was made public remonstrances flew back and forth, but it was the Estates that emerged triumphant and by 1789 their control over the administration of the province’s roads was complete. t h e c o rv e´ e a n d i ts v i ct i m s If the Estates could take pride in their achievement, the human cost was heavy. The great advances in road building were made possible, in part, by a more rigorous use of the corv´ee, with the ordinary people of the countryside performing forced labour on the main highways after 1727.87 It was 79 80 81 82 83 84 86

87

See: ADCO C 3363, fol. 215, Trudaine to the ´elus, 12 March 1774; C 3364, fols. 144–5, the ´elus to the intendants of Champagne and Paris, 31 December 1778; and C 3357, fols. 1–14. P. de Saint Jacob, ‘Le r´eseau routier bourguignon au XVIIIe si`ecle’, Annales de Bourgogne 28 (1956), 253–63, esp. 259. The alcades first suggested the idea, ADCO C 3306, fol. 43, but it soon became a feature of the cahier des remontrances. AN H1 126, dos. 3, fol. 57, Dufour de Villeneuve to Bertin, 23 May 1761. The terms employed by the alcades, ADCO C 3307, fol. 39. 85 ADCO C 3334, fols. 41–3. See, for example, the d´ecret of 1751, ADCO C 3005, fol. 73. The intendant, Dupleix de Bacquencourt, predicted trouble in his observations on the remonstrances presented by the ´elus in 1779, AN H1 133, dos. 1, fol. 20, ‘Observations sur les cahiers de Bourgogne (1779)’. For the details of the d´ecret regulating the corv´ee in Burgundy, see ADCO C 3003, fols. 4–6.

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unpaid, hard manual work and also extremely dangerous. In January 1750, Joseph Larmes of Tournus lost his sight when a mine exploded unexpectedly, and Marie Arbilly of Nuits-Saint-Georges lost her leg in an accident a few months later, the ´elus paying them seventy-two and sixty livres in compensation respectively.88 In the same year, Anne Nicolle, a young woman of twenty-three was crushed to death near Thorey, as were Jean Ternant and a mason named Ferrey.89 Both men left pregnant widows, one with six young children, the other with two, and they were offered compensation of eighty and one hundred livres, far from princely sums in their tragic circumstances. These examples were typical of the period,90 and not surprisingly the corv´ee was hated. Many within the Estates were understandably uneasy about the use of the corv´ee. In 1739, the alcades proposed a series of reforms designed to ‘lighten a yoke that the peoples . . . find extremely difficult to support’.91 Amongst their suggestions were limits on the number of days worked, exemption during times of sowing or harvest, payment for those obliged to labour more than two leagues from their homes and a reduction of the community’s taille. Criticism of the corv´ee surfaced intermittently thereafter, and, in 1769, the alcades went further. After attacking the system as unjust and ‘a real evil in itself’, they proposed that the Estates adopt a practice pioneered elsewhere in the kingdom, where the corv´ee had been replaced by a cash payment.92 The reaction was at best lukewarm, and the matter lapsed until the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI when the political situation was transformed. The new contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Turgot, had been one of the first to experiment with commuting the corv´ee into a cash payment when serving as the intendant of Limoges, and he intended to apply his measures to the whole of the kingdom.93 As a result, the governor’s instructions for the Estates of 1775 contained an article abolishing the corv´ee, and it was approved unanimously without great difficulty.94 Unfortunately for both Turgot and Burgundy’s corv´eables, Louis XVI dismissed his enlightened minister in May 1776 and the reform was put on hold. The ´elus did, however, make 88 90 91 92 93 94

89 Ibid., fols. 171, 175–6, 235–6. ADCO C 3198, fols. 126–8, 275. In their remarques of 1739, the alcades referred to the frequency of similar accidents, ADCO C 3050, fols. 356. ADCO C 3050, fols. 354–7. ADCO C 3306, fols. 141–2. For a discussion of some of the problems involved, see W. Doyle, The parlement of Bordeaux and the end of the old regime, 1771–1790 (London, 1974), pp. 231–48. D. Dakin, Turgot and the ancien regime in France (London, 1939), pp. 63–78. AN H1 131, dos. 2, fol. 6, ‘Projet d’instruction’, and ibid., fol. 38, Cond´e to Turgot, 18 May 1775, and ADCO C 3046, fol. 229.

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one decisive step, abolishing the use of the corv´ee on the military convoys passing through the province.95 They also invited members of the public to submit their own projects for a more general reform of the corv´ee in 1777, and the alcades kept up the pressure at the Estates of 1778, arguing that ‘everyone is convinced by experience that the method used for the last forty years to build the roads is vicious and must be changed’.96 In an age when drafting programmes of administrative reform was almost a national sport, the new ´elus received a predictably large quantity of contradictory advice.97 Unsure of how best to act, they compromised by doing nothing. It was not until February 1784 that a new set of ´elus took up the baton of reform, producing a long deliberation that was designed to lighten the burden of the corv´ee.98 Inspired by a spirit of rationalisation apparent in their other reforms, they divided up the various communities obliged to work on the highways into four sub-departments and thirty two ‘directions’ with the aim of giving them a fair share of the burden. Calonne replied encouragingly, suggesting that free bread rations be distributed to the corv´eables,99 and he soon unveiled more ambitious plans to abolish the corv´ee altogether.100 The ´elus persuaded him to refer the necessary orders to the next meeting of the Estates, which agreed to suppress the corv´ee from 1 July 1788 and thereafter to use private entrepreneurs appointed after a process of public bidding. The former corv´eables would now pay with their hard-earned cash rather than the sweat of their brows, and the ´elus would ‘tax, both for the maintenance of existing roads and for the construction of any new ones . . . a sixth of the taille and capitation of the taillables combined’.101 The privileged classes, which benefited most from the province’s handsome road network, clearly felt no obligation to pay for its upkeep. Worse still, the ´elus added insult to injury by enforcing the corv´ee in certain bailliages until the 1 July deadline, while simultaneously taxing the population for the costs of its replacement for the whole of 1788!102 The Estates of Burgundy had, therefore, proved capable of constructing a road network that could match anything achieved by the intendants. Yet 95 96 98 99 100 101 102

ADCO C 3679, deliberation of 9 January 1778. 97 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 62. ADCO C 3306, fol. 200. ADCO C 3366, fol. 33, the ´elus to the ministry and the prince de Cond´e, 16 February 1784. Ibid ., fol. 42, Calonne to the ´elus, 1 March 1784. ADCO C 3357, fol. 124, Calonne to the ´elus, 25 April 1786, and ibid ., fol. 155, 9 July 1786, for their reply. ADCO C 3048, fols. 76–7. This was one of the most common complaints of the rural population of Bar-sur-Seine in their cahiers de dol´eances of 1789, J. J. Vernier, ed., Cahiers de dol´eances du bailliage de Troyes et du bailliage ´ de Bar-sur-Seine pour les Etats G´en´eraux de 1789, 3 vols. (Troyes, 1909–11), i, pp. 493, ii, pp. 239–40, 252, 323.

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the dependence upon extensive use of the corv´ee, and the reluctance to replace it with an alternative system of cash payment before 1788, tarnished that achievement. As the ´elus controlled the tax system, there was nothing to prevent them from implementing the kinds of reforms pioneered by Turgot and advocated by the alcades. Their reluctance to do so led to the continuation of a harsh and unpopular institution that was a major cause of dissatisfaction with the Estates in 1789. c a n a l s a n d wat e rway s One of the crowning achievements of the ministry of the great Colbert was the construction of the Canal du Midi, but his efforts to build a Canal de Bourgogne had foundered. The dream lived on, however, and throughout the reign of Louis XV ministers and ambitious engineers sought unsuccessfully to revive the project.103 In 1775, the crown made a further effort at persuading the Estates to approve spending of up to 40,000 livres, but little was achieved.104 As one informed observer wrote a few years later, ‘His Majesty asked for nothing, and we paid nothing’,105 which implies that the Estates were no more enthusiastic in 1775 than they had been a century earlier. Three years later, however, the mood had changed, and in a d´ecret voted during the assembly of 1778 the Estates ordered the ´elus to petition the crown for the work to be accelerated.106 This time real progress was made, and the Estates used their reputation for sound credit to raise substantial sums to finance the project.107 Urged on by an enthusiastic governor,108 the Estates committed themselves to building the Canal de Bourgogne, connecting the Saˆone and Rhˆone with the Yonne and Seine between Saint-Jean-de-Losne and La Roche via Dijon, and two other waterways. Of these, the Canal du Centre was by far the most expensive and quickly advanced of the three,109 and was to run from Chalon-sur-Saˆone to Digoin in order to make ‘the junction of the two seas’ by the rivers Saˆone and Rhˆone with the Loire. The second, the canal of Franche-Comt´e, was to be built between Saint-Symphorien and Dole, 103

104 106 108

109

For a far from exhaustive sample of these projects, see: ADCO C 3176, fols. 202–3, 208–9; ADCO C 3362, fol. 187, Bertin to the ´elus, 5 October 1764; AN H1 129, dos. 1, fol. 3, ‘Projet d’instruction, 1772’; and AN H1 129, dos. 2, fol. 18, abb´e Terray to the ´elus, 13 May 1772. 105 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 107. AN H1 131, dos. 2, fol. 6, ‘Projet d’instruction’ (1775). 107 Well over twelve million livres by 1789, see chapter 10. ADCO C 3011, fol. 33. Cond´e was a keen backer of the plan to build the canal du Charolais, ADCO C 3364, fol. 197, Cond´e to the ´elus, 4 December 1779, and he urged the ´elus to begin work in 1779. They preferred to await the next meeting of the Estates, held in 1781, which gave the necessary authorisation. It was initially known as the Canal du Charolais.

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which would then continue to Strasbourg in order to link the Saˆone and the Rhine.110 Overseen by the impressive engineers of the Estates, Gauthey and Dumorey, and aided by the hard labour of royal troops, work advanced relatively rapidly. As the canals began to attract the attention of the wider French public and foreign dignitaries, provincial pride swelled correspondingly, and the Estates struck medals celebrating their achievement. Had the revolution not intervened, these projects would almost certainly have been completed, and the Canal du Centre was in fact opened in 1791, although the Canal de Bourgogne took much longer and was not inaugurated until the reign of Louis-Philippe. The Estates themselves would not live to tell the tale, but their achievement in sponsoring the construction of three canals during the reign of Louis XVI should not be underestimated. After showing considerable reluctance, the Estates had eventually been won over showing what they were capable of when sufficiently motivated. The contrast with events before 1775 was clear, and we should also note that the Estates of Brittany, which had similar powers, achieved nothing comparable before 1789.111 The management of the province’s rivers was another preoccupation of the ´elus after 1780. Pressure for action had again come from the centre, and the secr´etaire d’´etat, Bertin, initially asked the intendant to gather information on the state of the rivers.112 Once informed, the minister turned to the ´elus who launched the provincial engineer, Thomas Dumorey, on a voyage of discovery down the Saˆone from Gray to Lyon in August 1779. All sides agreed that the riverbed was in a lamentable state, with sandbanks, sunken trees and other obstacles a constant threat to boatmen, and the ´elus were keen to improve matters. However, before committing themselves to act, they demanded the same jurisdiction over the waterways as that they already enjoyed relative to the province’s roads. Both the ministry and the intendant were reluctant to cede these rights, but the ´elus stood firm citing ‘the most precious privilege that the province of Burgundy enjoys, that of implementing freely the enterprises conducted at its expense’.113 The importance of this point to the Estates cannot be exaggerated and the acquisition of new powers was intimately linked to their control of the fiscal system. The government eventually conceded the point and by letters patent of 25 January 1781 the 110 112

113

111 Rebillon, Etats ´ ADCO C 3306, fol. 234. de Bretagne, pp. 436–9, 763. A helpful introduction is provided by L. Blin, ‘La juridiction des eaux et forˆets sur la Saˆone transf´er´ee aux e´lus de Bourgogne (1781)’, M´emoires de la Soci´et´e pour l’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des anciens pays bourguignons, comtois et romands 31 (1972), 167–85. Ibid., 182.

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´elus were granted full administrative and jurisdictional competence over the Saˆone. Thereafter they were quick to act with the engineers dredging the river and repairing its banks and quays as well as investing over 200,000 livres in a bid to make the rivers Seille and Arroux navigable.114 If the interest of the Estates in the province’s waterways was rather belated they had at least produced some positive results. m i l i ta ry m at t e r s During the long wars of Louis XIV, the need to provision and pay for the military ´etapes had been a constant heavy burden. The eighteenth century brought something of a respite, and the ´elus continued to preside over the administration in much the same way as before with communities billeting troops and then receiving reimbursements from provincial funds.115 It was only during the War of the Austrian Succession that the numbers of men passing through the province threatened to reach the levels of the earlier period. In response, the ´elus decided to establish an ´etapier g´en´eral who would provide the food and lodgings required for a fixed fee, his profit being derived from his ability to supply these commodities more cheaply than the price of his lease.116 The secretary of state for war, d’Argenson, applauded their decision and a local entrepreneur, Jean Benoˆıt, was soon appointed.117 Many years before, Colbert had tried to persuade the Estates to adopt this method, and their failure to do so has been sharply criticised by subsequent historians.118 The results of the experiment were, however, disappointing. Benoˆıt began his nine-year lease in April 1747, and within months the ´elus were receiving complaints from the mayor of Bourbon-Lancy about the failure of the ´etapier to fulfil his obligations.119 Matters quickly deteriorated with similar reports reaching Dijon from the angry mayors of Auxonne, Mˆacon and Seurre in the Spring of 1750.120 According to Benoˆıt, the cause of the problem was the low value of his fee in a period when poor harvests had 114 115

116 117 118 119

120

ADCO C 3307, fols. 47–8. The Estates continued to argue about whether the ´elus or their local officials should oversee this process. In 1718, the ´elus were ordered to act themselves, ADCO C 3002, fol. 34, but in a d´ecret of 1724 responsibility was passed back to the receivers of the taille. ADCO C 3360, fol. 309, the ´elus to the comte d’Argenson, 20 December 1746. ADCO C 3354, fol. 116, d’Argenson to the ´elus, 31 December 1746. Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , pp. 153–63, was especially critical. ADCO C 3678, the mayor and echevins of Bourbon-Lancy to the ´elus, 22 May 1748. They claimed that neither Benoˆıt, nor his clerks had been seen since July 1747 and that the town was having to pay their bills. ADCO C 3198, fols. 197–8, 223–4, 270.

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led to soaring prices of basic foodstuffs, and he demanded compensation of no less than 312,526 livres.121 The matter was eventually settled before the royal council, which dissolved the lease between the Estates and Benoˆıt and awarded the latter an indemnity of 51,816 livres. This sorry tale concluded with the crown reaffirming that the ´elus would remain responsible for the administration of the ´etapes.122 It was against this background that the ´elus issued their deliberation of 30 December 1751 re-establishing the old system of ´etapes, albeit with an important modification. Henceforth the municipal authorities would have the choice of sending in their monthly claims for reimbursement as before, or of appointing a local ´etapier who would be responsible for the ´etape.123 Many towns did prefer to appoint a local ´etapier, whose potential for profit lay in providing the billet for less than the Estates were willing to pay per soldier, and the system appears to have worked relatively efficiently. A second deliberation of 28 December 1752 appointed the two secr´etaires des ´etats to act as special commissioners to oversee the functioning of the system. The voluminous correspondence of the ´elus contains only occasional grumbling from the local intendant about their actions.124 All of his complaints concerned the alleged insufficiency of the fees paid to the ´etapiers, a crime that in some eyes might have seemed more like a virtue. To billet the troops effectively, the Burgundian administration required accurate information about the numbers involved and the routes they were expected to follow. The government was frequently lax in this department and in both September 1785 and August 1788 hundreds of soldiers marched into Dijon unannounced.125 What made their arrival doubly vexing was the fact that the secretary of state for war, or one of his clerks, had sent the relevant instructions to the intendant, who, as the ´elus remarked, was often based in Bourg-en-Bresse. The crown had little excuse for these errors because throughout the period the Burgundian administration had attempted to regularise the system of ´etapes. In 1718, the Estates had remonstrated about 121

122 123 124

125

For the full details of this dispute see: ADCO C 3361, fols. 108–9, 111, the ´elus to Machault d’Arnouville, 13 August 1750; ibid., fol. 117, the ´elus to the intendant, Joly de Fleury, 7 December 1750; and C 3678, ‘Extrait des registres du conseil d’´etat’ of 14 December 1751. ADCO C 3678, ‘Extrait des registres du conseil d’´etat’ of 14 December 1751. Ibid ., deliberations of 30 December 1751 and 28 December 1752. I have found two examples of this, the first affecting the town of Seurre, ADCO C 3356, fol. 38, Dupleix de Bacquencourt to the ´elus, 23 January 1777, and Feydeau de Brou to the ´elus, 4 September 1781, and ibid., Rousselot to Feydeau de Brou, 8 September 1781, for the response of the secr´etaire des ´etats responsible. The second case concerns the parish of Laysbillot, near the frontier with Champagne, ADCO C 3357, fol. 61, Amelot de Chaillou to the ´elus, 19 March 1785. ADCO C 3366, fols. 200–1, the ´elus to S´egur, 17 September 1785, and C 3358, fol. 201, the ´elus to the comte de Brienne, 28 August 1788.

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the fact that three separate regiments had marched down the same route all stopping at different points, making provisioning extremely difficult.126 By 1766, the improvements in the provincial road network meant that the ´elus were in a position to propose a remedy, sending a memoir to the duc de Choiseul containing ideas for new military routes that would be faster and, therefore, cheaper.127 The imperious minister was not a man to suffer fools gladly, and it is instructive to note that he approved their suggestions a few weeks later.128 The exercise was repeated regularly thereafter, and in 1787 the chamber produced an impressive map illustrating the routes through the province and the sites of the various ´etapes.129 Finally, if the ´elus could claim to have dealt reasonably effectively with the traditional problems of the ´etapes, they were also confronted by periodic crises. During the War of the Austrian Succession, in particular, large numbers of Dutch prisoners of war were sent to Burgundy, and had to be securely lodged and fed by the administration.130 In 1783, a problem of a different sort presented itself, when French soldiers were employed to dig the Canal du Centre.131 The inhabitants of the region were none too pleased at the prospect of housing the troops, and the old lady in Paray-le-Monial who threatened to empty her chamber pot on the head of the first soldier to enter ‘chez elle’ presumably spoke for many.132 Local humour cannot have been improved by the activities of the military men when not engaged in their excavations, and the Estates were soon obliged to pay for a hospital to treat the effects of venereal disease. It was to counter these problems that the chamber agreed to pay for the construction of barracks in September 1783.133 In its response to the administrative problems posed by the presence or movement of the military, the chamber of ´elus had continued its traditional practice of reimbursing the individuals and communities affected by the passage of troops, and had experimented, not always successfully, with different methods of improving the system. More importantly, they had acted in much the same way as the intendants in the pays d’´elections by providing the government with information and even perceptive plans for the improvement of the system. 126 127 128 129 130 132 133

The complaint came from the alcades and was presented in the cahier de remontrances, ADCO C 3049, fol. 368. ADCO C 3362, fol. 236, the ´elus to Choiseul, 12 April 1766. Ibid., fol. 241, Choiseul to the ´elus, 4 May 1766. The secretary of state for war, S´egur, thanked the ´elus for their assistance in March 1784, ADCO C 3357, fol. 18. The map is reproduced in Lamarre, Petites villes, p. 307. 131 ADCO C 3365, fols. 200–1, 221. ADCO C 3677, d’Argenson to the ´elus, 25 July 1746. Ibid ., fols. 200–1, Durand, mayor of Paray, to Bernard de Chanteau, 14 August 1783. Ibid ., fol. 221, Bernard de Chanteau to the commandant of Burgundy, Gouvernet, 27 September 1783.

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Much the same could be said of their raising of the provincial militia which was another legacy from the wars of Louis XIV.134 Each year the ´elus received orders to assemble a body of recruits who were to be handed over to the intendant at agreed muster points. The actual drawing of lots was presided over by the receivers of the taille or the mayors, although the secr´etaires des ´etats and even the ´elus participated in the process.135 The ´elus were always anxious to preserve their right to raise the militia, and this could often bring them into conflict with the ministry. From the perspective of the secretary of state for war, orders to assemble a certain number of men were not open to dispute. The ´elus, on the other hand, were less likely to be intimidated than the intendants, and they regularly protested that the numbers required were too high on account of the miserable state of the province or some earlier precedent.136 Suspicion, possibly justified, that the ´elus were engaging in obstructionism produced a number of ministerial broadsides against their administration. One of the most common charges levelled against them was of carrying out orders to the letter by, for example, providing exactly the number of recruits demanded by the crown. Once illness and desertion had taken their toll Burgundy quickly dropped below its quota, to the obvious annoyance of the minister of war.137 Not that conflict was endemic, and the provincial administration frequently assisted the government in its task. The secr´etaire des ´etats, Bernard de Blancey, served for nearly fifty years as commissioner for the militia, acquiring immense experience and knowledge in the process. The chamber allowed him to act in its name, and he wrote regularly to the secretary of state for war offering advice.138 There is no doubt that the militia was detested, but it was the institution itself, rather than the means by which it had been raised, that attracted the ire of the ordinary people of the Burgundian countryside.139 ag r i c u lt u r a l i m p rove m e n t If French agriculture did not experience a revolution comparable to that in England, the need to improve the productivity of the land was still a burning issue throughout the eighteenth century, and it was given a fashionable gloss 134 135

136 137 138 139

Martin, Milice en Bourgogne, provides a helpful introduction. In 1730, the receivers protested in vain to the Estates about the financial and other costs involved, ADCO C 3604. In 1750, for example, the commissioners for the militia included the secr´etaire des ´etats, Bernard de Blancey, and the ´elu of the third estate, Edme Doublot, mayor of Montbard. For examples of their protests see: ADCO C 3173, fol. 139, the ´elus to the duc de Bourbon, 30 March 1726, and C 3360, fols. 236–8, fols. 236–8, the ´elus to d’Argenson, 3 August 1743. ADCO C 3362, fols. 79–80, mar´echal de Belle-Isle to the ´elus, 22 April 1760. ADCO C 3363, fols. 199–201, and ibid., fols. 259–60, Bernard de Blancey to de Muy, 19 April 1775. See chapter 12.

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by the economic theories of the Physiocrats. The intendants in many parts of France did their best to disseminate ideas and promote new methods, and they were frequently assisted by the presence of local agricultural societies.140 In October 1767, the ´elus received a letter from the procureurs of Provence asking whether these societies were required in the pays d’´etats.141 Although not opposed to the idea in principle, the ´elus replied that the Estates had not seen: such an institution as necessary in this province . . . given that the persons to whom they confide the administration of their affairs during their separation are always assembled, that any projects tending to the improved cultivation of the lands of the province are addressed to them, and besides they are authorised to spend funds allocated by the Estates for the encouragement of commerce and agriculture.

They concluded confidently that ‘we would ourselves ask for [an agricultural society in] Burgundy if by our constitution we did not find ourselves already in a position to enjoy the benefits that must naturally be the result’. The ´elus thus saw themselves as fulfilling the functions of a society of agriculture, and while their smug reaction smacks of complacency it is true that after 1750 there was real enthusiasm both within the Estates and the provincial administration for agricultural improvement. One of the greatest influences on the Estates was Varenne de B´eost, who served as secr´etaire des ´etats from 1752 until 1763.142 In 1760, he presented the Estates with a long memoir advocating the establishment of an agricultural bureau composed of ‘persons chosen in the different districts of the province to correspond directly with the chamber of ´elus’.143 He was given his way, and many of the ideas subsequently adopted by the Estates originated within their administration. As the overwhelming majority of those who attended the Estates were landowners, Varenne de B´eost and his collaborators had a receptive audience, and over the next decade the remonstrances presented to Louis XV were crammed with requests for legislation.144 In their petitions to the king, the Estates bemoaned the allegedly lamentable state of local agriculture and proposed a coherent programme of reform that might be described as a combination of consolidation and 140 141 142

143 144

Both Ardascheff, Les intendants, pp. 327–40, and Bordes, ‘Les intendants e´clair´es’, 63–4, made much of their efforts in this domain. ADCO C 3356, fol. 51, the ´elus to the procureurs of Provence, 5 October 1767. His career was cut short because of the Varenne affair, but he continued to advise the Estates in an unofficial capacity until the revolution, see chapter 10, and Saint Jacob, Les paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 339–43. ADCO C 3695, deliberation of 6 February 1761. His memoir has been discussed by Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 845–52. The remonstrances in question are housed in ADCO C 3332, fols. 42–5, 73–5, 76–80, 132–4, and have been analysed by Root, Peasants and king, pp. 105–54, to which the following is indebted.

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enclosure. In their remonstrances delivered in 1764, 1767 and 1769, they argued that throughout the province land was divided into a ‘multitude of tiny plots’, which prevented successful cultivation.145 To combat the problem the Estates requested that the king suspend the fees collected when property was exchanged between consenting parties for a period of three years, and that he issue an edict permitting enclosures.146 Finally, they petitioned for the introduction into Burgundy of the law of August 1761 which provided a period of tax exemption for those enterprising souls who drained marshes or cleared land that had been left uncultivated for at least twenty years.147 As enclosures would affect the rights of parcours, the passage of flocks to water or meadows, and of common pasture, they too attracted the attention of reformers, who wanted the practices abolished. Once that had been achieved, innovative farmers would no longer be subject to the tyranny of the three-field system and they would become the true masters of their own property. Finally, the Estates wanted to attack what they rather poetically described as ‘a vast abandoned continent’,148 namely the village common lands that they claimed were exhausted and ill tended due to overgrazing. Their solution was to divide these lands up into small plots and then distribute them equally amongst the inhabitants on the basis that possession encouraged good husbandry and investment. Taken together these demands formed an impressive list, and, after initial hesitation and consultation with both the intendant and the Parlement of Dijon, the crown issued most of the necessary legislation. A three-year moratorium on the taxes levied on property exchanges was granted in 1770 together with an edict permitting enclosures, and in 1774 provision was made for the division of common lands.149 Hilton Root’s authoritative recent account suggests that the results of all this legislative activity were disappointing, and a combination of practical difficulties and inertia on the part of the Burgundian peasantry left the traditional agricultural structure intact.150 Yet even if this was the case, we should not overlook the fact that the Estates had played an active part in the attempt to change local farming practices, and that they were acting broadly in accordance with contemporary economic and agricultural theory. If the Estates were generally concerned with the larger questions of agricultural development, the chamber of ´elus had the opportunity to put some 145 147 148 150

146 Root, Peasants and king, pp. 144–50. ADCO C 3332, fols. 42–3. The demand was made in 1764, ADCO C 3332, fol. 45, and referred to the arrˆet du conseil of 16 August 1761. The request was granted. 149 Ibid., pp. 124–5, 149–50. Quoted in Root, Peasants and king, p. 123 Ibid ., pp. 150–4. Saint Jacob, Paysans de la Bourgogne, pp. 347–404, was, if anything, even more pessimistic in his appraisal.

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of the theory into practice. In 1724, the crown had persuaded the Estates to fund the establishment of nurseries (pepini`eres) intended to produce saplings, especially of fruit trees, for free distribution to the peasantry.151 The ´elus were slow to act, and it was not until 1733 that the first nurseries were established in Dijon, Auxonne and Chalon. It would require renewed pressure from the alcades and above all from the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Orry, before the experiment was extended to the other bailliages of the province.152 The enterprising Orry also persuaded the ´elus to sponsor the cultivation of mulberry trees, whose leaves were the required nourishment of the silk worm.153 His aim was to make the kingdom self-sufficient in the production of raw silk, thus cutting out the need for costly imports, and despite being more familiar with the cultivation of the vine the ´elus complied. Teaming up with the legendary Burgundian naturalist, Buffon, they planted over 4,000 saplings in Dijon and Montbard.154 Once they had overcome their initial reluctance the ´elus warmed to the task of encouraging the nurseries and by 1750 a wide variety of fruit trees and mulberries were being delivered to all sections of the population.155 The Estates were generally supportive, passing a d´ecret in 1757 that ‘the trees be delivered free of charge and by preference to the people of the countryside’.156 Yet the results failed to match expectations, and by 1774 the ´elus were blaming the ‘sluggishness and torpor’ of their fellow citizens for their failure.157 The government clearly shared their pessimism, and a year later the Estates were asked to suppress the nurseries and to use the resulting economies to encourage other agricultural endeavours.158 Only the plantations of mulberries escaped the purge, and during the reign of Louis XVI the ´elus made serious efforts to promote their cultivation. An expert was hired from Languedoc to teach local pupils how to breed silkworms, publicity was disseminated through the local press and prizes were distributed to successful cultivators.159 Aware that the public was sceptical about the suitability of the mulberry to the cooler local climate, 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158

ADCO C 3043, fol. 66. The province’s attitude to the experiment has been examined by Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 841–3. ADCO C 3003, fol. 232. The Estates of 1736 tried to limit the extension of the nurseries on the grounds of expense. ADCO C 3362, fol. 201, Orry to the ´elus, February 1741. ADCO C 3360, fol. 223, the ´elus to Orry, 7 August 1742. The choice of Montbard was not accidental, it was part of Buffon’s own estate. ADCO C 3198, fols. 559–61. Bouchard’s claim, De l’humanisme, pp. 842, that only grands seigneurs benefited is incorrect. ADCO C 3006, fol. 31. ADCO C 3363, fol. 239, the ´elus to the intendant, Dupleix de Bacquencourt, 8 December 1774. 159 Bouchard, De l’humanisme, pp. 842–3. ADCO C 3010, fol. 16.

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the ´elus made a genuine, if not altogether successful, attempt to lead by example.160 If the crown had provided the initial impetus behind the creation of the nurseries, it had also been responsible for obliging the Estates to pay for the establishment of a royal stud (haras) in the province early in the reign of Louis XIV.161 That institution was still in existence, and being paid for, in the first half of the eighteenth century, and it attracted fierce criticism at almost every meeting of the Estates. In the remonstrances of 1722 the stud was described as ‘more onerous than useful’, and in the years that followed the invective was accompanied by a series of more specific allegations of abuse.162 What really annoyed the Estates was their obligation to pay for something that was beyond their direct control, and from mid-century they launched a campaign to be given full responsibility for the stud. Repeated remonstrances proved ineffective, but when they used their power over the purse strings, by refusing to pay the salary of the royal inspector,163 the crown relented.164 With effect from June 1766 the Estates became the proud owners of the stud, and they promptly revealed their intentions by tripling the amount spent over the next three years.165 When the opportunity arose to replace the royal inspector in April 1775, they were quick to underline their new authority by appointing a local candidate to replace him. Bertin initially rejected their choice on the grounds that he was insufficiently qualified.166 The ´elus successfully defended their right of appointment, refusing to accept that a ‘foreigner’, however well qualified, could hold a post paid for by the Estates.167 As with the roads and waterways, the various disputes over the stud demonstrated that control of provincial spending was crucial to the administrative independence of the Estates and only in extreme circumstances was the ministry likely to challenge the decisions of the ´elus. Yet despite their enthusiasm, miracles could not be performed overnight, and the stud proved more difficult to manage than the ´elus had anticipated. 160 161 162 163 164

165 166 167

The deliberation of 12 February 1785 cited by the alcades of 1787 makes clear that this was the intention, C 3307, fols. 52–3. See chapter 7. For a selection, see: ADCO C 3050, fols. 85–8, (1727); C 3330, fol. 75 (1729); C 3050, fol. 362 (1739); and C 3331, fols. 107–8, 125 (1749 and 1751). ADCO C 3332, fols. 23–5. The idea was first suggested by the alcades. See: AN H1 126, fol. 24, Joly de Fleury to Bertin, 2 December 1760; ADCO C 3006, fols. 329; C 3696, fol. 45, Cond´e to the ´elus, 28 February 1766; and AN H1 128, fols. 2, 15, Amelot to L’Averdy, 10 June 1766, and 22 July 1766. AN H1 128, fol. 15, Amelot to L’Averdy, 22 July 1766. ADCO C 3363, fols. 263–4, Bertin to the ´elus, 11 April 1775. Ibid ., fols. 265–6, the ´elus to Bertin, 27 April 1775.

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In February 1777, they sent Bertin a new plan designed to rescue the stud from its present state of ‘decay’.168 Their timing was particularly bad. The abb´e de La Goutte had already succeeded in alienating most of the ministry, and Bertin had not been spared his own share of vexation. In the spring of 1776, the ´elus had abolished the office of gardes ´etalons as part of their cost cutting drive, an action that the angry minister had quashed on 2 August.169 By admitting, in February 1777, that the stud was in crisis, the ´elus confirmed all of Bertin’s suspicions about their incompetence and that of their chosen inspector. As a result, he informed the chamber that he was sending ‘somebody intelligent to the scene to verify the facts reported to you’.170 It was a resounding vote of no confidence, and the mood within the Estates was also changing. In 1778, the alcades, who were generally effusive in their praise of La Goutte’s administration, produced a withering critique of the stud.171 In an effort to improve the quality of local bloodstock, the ´elus had bought stallions from Holstein, but when coupled with local mares they had produced miserable results. After investing nearly 400,000 livres in just twelve years it was a very poor return and the alcades proposed that no more horses be bought. Rather than heed this advice, the next intake of ´elus set about improving the system. In 1780, they established a new stud at Di´enay near Dijon, where they could supervise operations independently of the gardes ´etalons.172 Mares were imported, and prizes were established throughout the province for the best foals and fillies. Aware that the royal studs were experimenting with arab bloodstock, they began, in December 1779, what would prove to be a long campaign to borrow one of these stallions for Di´enay.173 Great was the excitement when the ´elus received word, in March 1784, that the Arab stallion, Le B´edouin, was on his way to Dijon.174 It is easy to imagine their disappointment when the beast actually arrived. According to secr´etaire des ´etats, Rousselot, he was ‘terribly thin, resulting from the tick’ and a variety of other ailments.175 As if this was not bad enough, the unfortunate Le B´edouin was ‘a bit short’ for the sturdy local mares, and if restored to health he would presumably have needed 168 169 170 172 173 174 175

ADCO C 3364, fol. 41, the ´elus to Bertin, 1 February 1777. AN H1 132, dos. 2, fol. 7, ‘Projet d’instruction’ of 1778. The arrˆet du conseil in question ‘´eman´e du d´epartement des haras’. 171 ADCO C 3306, fols. 201–2. ADCO C 3364, Bertin to the ´elus, 23 February 1777. A long explanation of their policy is provided in the remonstrances of 1782, ADCO C 3334, fols. 24–9. ADCO C 3364, fols. 205–6, the ´elus to the bishop of Autun, 21 December 1779. ADCO C 3357, fol. 15, Polignac to the ´elus, 9 March 1784. ADCO C 3366, fols. 48–9, Rousselot to Polignac, 3 April 1784. He was restored to health and was eventually auctioned along with the rest of the livestock at Di´enay in 1791.

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stilts to be of any practical use. The Le B´edouin’s shortcomings were a fine example of the practical problems involved in running the stud, but during the last decade of the ancien r´egime the ´elus continued to pursue their ambition to create ‘a new race of bloodstock in Burgundy’ and complaints about their administration were rare.176 The ambitions of the ´elus were not limited to the stud, and the establishment at Di´enay gradually began to assume the dimensions of a model farm. In 1786, they decided to order the importation of over 1,000 sheep from the Roussillon with the aim of keeping some for breeding at Di´enay while selling the rest at subsidised prices to local farmers.177 Contact was established with intendants known to be interested in such schemes, and with the comte d’Angiviller who provided some of the king’s prize Spanish flock for the provincial farm. To ensure that proper care was taken of their investment, the ´elus hired a shepherd from the Roussillon on a one-year contract to instruct local men in what was intended to be a free school of shepherding. Through these ventures the ´elus hoped to improve the volume and quality of wool production, stimulating agriculture and providing the raw materials for local industry. They were sufficiently pleased with the results to organise a second convoy of sheep in the autumn of 1787, and to extend their breeding programme by buying cattle for Di´enay at the same time.178 With such a keen interest in livestock, it is hardly surprising that the ´elus took advantage of developments in veterinary science. In August 1767, the provincial intendant, Amelot, wrote to inform them that the king had established a free training school near Charenton, suggesting that they send some students.179 The ´elus thanked him politely, noting that they had already done so, and by November 1770 the province employed five veterinarians.180 In addition to caring for the animals bought by the ´elus, they were regularly sent to the four-corners of the province to deal with outbreaks of disease. The system worked effectively with constant co-operation between the ´elus and the intendant, whose subdelegates were frequently the first to raise the alarm.181 176

177 178 179 180 181

The ´elus remained upbeat about their efforts, ADCO C 3365, fols. 98–9, the ´elus to Polignac, 4 January 1783, and I have not found examples of criticism from either the crown or the alcades after 1780. For details of this policy, see: ADCO C 3307, fols. 53–4, 131–2, and ADCO C 3367, fol. 31, the ´elus to Caze de La Bove, intendant of Grenoble, 6 March 1787. ADCO C 3357, fol. 162. ADCO C 3362, fols. 282–3, Amelot the the ´elus, 5 August 1767, and ibid ., fols. 283–4, 3 September 1767, for their reply. ADCO C 3363, fol. 67, Amelot to the ´elus, 16 November 1770. ADCO C 3357, fol. 46, Amelot to Chaillou to the ´elus, 4 December 1784, and ibid., fol. 209, the ´elus to Amelot de Chaillou, 27 December 1786.

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Forming a balanced judgement on the agricultural efforts of the Burgundian administration is difficult, not least because the relatively brief existence of the ‘model farm’ at Di´enay would make any extravagant claims on its behalf misleading. Local peasants were particularly hard to convince, and to the disgust of the ´elus the inhabitants of Di´enay and neighbouring parishes ‘damage, break and destroy the enclosures constructed at great expense, steal the wood from the fences and commit abuses that it is essential to suppress’.182 Despite these setbacks the Burgundian administration had demonstrated a capacity to encourage the kinds of agricultural improvements sponsored by the intendants in the pays d’´elections, and its activities looked considerably more professional in 1789 than at the beginning of the reign of Louis XVI. t r a d e a n d co m m e rc e Colbert had tried without much lasting success to establish thriving manufacturing ventures in Burgundy, and during the first half of the eighteenth century the Estates showed no inclination to repeat the experiment.183 To try and stimulate local enterprise, the crown added an article to the governor’s instructions in 1754 requesting that funds be voted for the encouragement of commerce and industry.184 Some 30,000 livres were voted for this purpose, and at every subsequent assembly the process was repeated. Once again pressure for action had come from the centre, and according to Lamarre the Estates never developed any great interest in the matter with the ´elus regularly leaving the money available unspent.185 Between 1754 and 1787, she estimates expenditure on genuinely industrial or manufacturing ventures at only 258,064 livres,186 a relatively small sum when compared with the amounts spent on, for example, the provincial stud. Yet these figures need treating with caution because the ´elus were simultaneously spending vast sums perfecting the provincial road network, clearing riverbeds and building canals, thus creating an economic infrastructure that could only benefit private entrepreneurs. Most of the investments made by the ´elus after 1754 were in the form of bounties, subsidies or loans to individuals and companies establishing new manufacturing ventures in the province. In 1756, for example, Simon 182 183

184 185

ADCO C 3334, fol. 27. The crown made the odd desultory effort to revive production at Seignelay using provincial funds, but the Estates showed no desire to act independently, see, for example, ADCO C 3170, fol. 53, the duc de Bourbon to the ´elus, 31 January 1723. AN H1 129, dos. 1, fol. 3, ‘Projet d’instruction’ of 1772. The comments of the intendant, Amelot, on this document provide a summary of events since 1754. 186 Ibid., p. 217. Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 217–18.

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Parigot and his partners proposed setting up a ‘manufacture of woollens’, which obliged them to borrow 63,618 livres, and they appealed to the ´elus for help.187 Having verified their accounts, the chamber agreed to pay 3,000 livres annually to cover the interest payments. Others benefited in a similar way, and the ´elus regularly provided interest-free loans to encourage investment after 1784.188 The factory established by Desfoss´es in Dijon during the early 1760s to produce cotton textiles received the most substantial aid.189 The city, the Estates and the crown all provided financial assistance, and by 1776 Desfoss´es claimed to employ more than 1,700 workers either directly or as spinners of cotton in towns as distant as Louhans or Nolay.190 The ´elus had taken a keen interest in the enterprise and had frequently petitioned the ministry on its behalf by demanding protection against cheaper cottons from Switzerland, or illegal imports that were threatening to undermine local production.191 Even when Desfoss´es and his partners stopped receiving subsidies after 1775 they could still count upon the support of the Estates, and in July 1786 the ´elus were protesting to Calonne about the unwanted interference of an inspector of manufactures in the affairs of the company.192 In addition to providing financial aid or petitioning ministers on behalf of local industry, the ´elus helped industrial development in other ways. After the discovery of what were believed to be rich deposits of coal near Montcenis in 1769, the ´elus received letters from the intendant and the secretaries of state, Bertin and Saint-Florentin, urging them to improve the roads connecting the site with the ports of the Saˆone.193 The provincial engineer was dispatched to investigate the likely costs, and the ´elus promised prompt action if the seams were as rich as had been claimed. In December 1771, they were confronted with a transport problem of another sort. Having invested in a factory producing bottles and glass near Roulle, the ´elus had decided to improve the surrounding road network, part of which ran through neighbouring Champagne. As a result, they tried, without success, to get the intendant of that province to lend his assistance.194 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194

ADCO C 3718, deliberation of 20 December 1756. An idea that won praise from the alcades, ADCO C 3306, fol. 241. For further details see, Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 218–20, and A. Le Roux, ‘Les industries textiles’, 5–33, especially 20–1. Leroux, ‘Les industries textiles’, 21. ADCO C 3363, fol. 272, the ´elus to the intendant des finances, Trudaine de Montigny, 14 May 1767, and ibid., fols. 284–5, 3 September 1767. ADCO C 3357, fol. 156, the ´elus to Calonne, 24 July 1786. ADCO C 3355, fols. 68–9, Amelot to the ´elus, 10 March 1769. ADCO C 3363, fols. 115–18, the ´elus to the intendant of Champagne, Rouill´e, 11 December 1771, and C 3356, fol. 2, 26 January 1772, for his reply.

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Finally, as with their agricultural projects, the ´elus established prizes to encourage competition, and hired specialists to teach new techniques.195 The employment of Marie La Ville to teach silk spinning was one example of a well-intentioned, if not altogether effective, effort to draw some benefit from the policy of covering large swathes of the countryside with mulberry trees. The ´elus were on more familiar ground when it came to defending the interests of the province’s crucial wine trade. Throughout the century, there were calls at the Estates for the enforcement of existing legislation preventing the local population from grazing their animals or planting vegetables and other crops in the vineyards.196 The uncontrolled planting of new vines was another perennial bugbear, and in 1754 the alcades suggested joining forces with the Parlement of Dijon to protect the quality of Burgundian wine. Here the interests of the local landowning elites were clearly engaged, and attempts to protect both the production and the marketing of wine were unsurprising. At the Estates of 1766, for example, a d´ecret was adopted ordering the towns to prepare memoirs listing the obstacles to the commerce of wine, so that the ´elus could seek the appropriate remedies from the crown during the voyage of honour.197 Similarly, throughout the period after 1772, the Estates revived their campaign for Burgundy, which was exempt from the aides, to be relieved of the burden of the droit de gros levied on wine travelling through regions subject to the aides.198 Internal customs duties were not the only target of their ire. The duties charged on Burgundian wines entering Great Britain and a number of German states were another concern of the ´elus, who petitioned the powerful secretary of state for foreign affairs, the comte de Vergennes, a Burgundian, to use his good offices on their behalf.199 Nor was fine wine the only local beverage to merit their protection. When the crown issued a law banning the production of the local spirit, the ancestor of the fiery marc de Bourgogne, the Estates successfully sued for its repeal on the grounds that it served medicinal purposes.200 Many have had cause to rue the decision. 195 197

198

199 200

196 ADCO C 3304, fol. 20, C 3306, fol. 45–6. Leroux, ‘Les industries textiles’, 11–12 The ´elus made sure that the memoirs were forthcoming, ADCO C 3362, fol. 258, the secr´etaire des ´etats, Rigoley de Puligny to the municipal officers of Burgundy, 28 November 1766, and ibid ., fol. 263, 18 December 1766. For examples of their efforts, see; ADCO C 3302, remarques of the alcades of 1772; C 3364, fol. 200, Necker to the ´elus, 17 December 1779; and C 3358, fol. 81, the ´elus to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, 20 August 1787. They had been protesting about this intermittently since the reign of Louis XIV, C 2982, fols. 19–21. ADCO C 3356, fol. 193, Vergennes to the ´elus, 24 January 1783, and ibid , fol. 218, 30 November 1783. The alcades also provided details of these events, ADCO C 3306, fol. 241. ADCO C 3050, fols. 89–91.

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Overall the results of the Estates’ investment in industrial enterprises was limited, but the argument that they should have been a source of capital employing provincial tax revenues to subsidise manufacturing industry is not particularly compelling. Making judgements about the likely success of a company, or a new industrial technique, was hardly the natural terrain of either the ´elus or the Estates. Yet despite lacking detailed specialist knowledge, the ´elus generally worked in harmony with the local intendant, using the funds at their disposal in a flexible way for subsidies and training. Moreover, it could be argued that the development of the means of transport and persistent lobbying for the local wine trade or new industrial ventures, were more substantial achievements than has usually been recognised. work s o f i n s t ru c t i o n a n d pu bli c u t il it y One of the most pressing problems facing the French government in the eighteenth century was how to deal with the growing number of the poor and destitute.201 The issue was regularly raised at meetings of the Estates of Burgundy, and many of the projects for industrial and agricultural innovation discussed above were intended to create employment and alleviate rural poverty.202 In 1764, however, the reformist ministry of L’Averdy adopted a more interventionist stance, deciding to establish d´epˆots de mendicit´e in every g´en´eralit´e in the kingdom.203 Beggars were the main targets of the new legislation, a group that was generally defined to include vagrants, and the d´epˆots rapidly ‘became the cornerstone’ of royal policy. The Estates had already pledged funds to establish houses of correction for unruly beggars in 1763, and although L’Averdy accused them of dragging their feet the ´elus had succeeded in establishing several d´epˆots by the end of 1766.204 The Estates dutifully voted a further 50,000 livres to support the scheme in both 1766 and 1769, but the severe economic crisis of 1770–1 raised problems of another sort. The d´epˆots were designed to deal with what was perceived as a criminal class, but it was widely accepted that many had fallen on hard times for want of work. As a result, in November 1770, the ´elus were ordered to establish workshops (ateliers de charit´e) to employ the 201 202 203 204

O. Hufton, The poor of eighteenth-century France, 1750–1789 (Oxford, 1974), provides the classic introduction. The attempt to teach silk and cotton spinning to rural women is a good example, Lamarre, Petites villes, pp. 218–19, and Leroux, ‘Les industries textiles’, 32. Hufton, The poor, pp. 226–7. The essential guide to L’Averdy’s ministry is F´elix, L’Averdy. For further details, see: ADCO C 3362, fol. 168, Bernard de Blancey to the mayors of the province, 28 July 1764; ibid, fol. 211, the ´elus to L’Averdy, 29 December 1764; and ibid ., fols. 237–8, 252, L’Averdy to the ´elus, 3 May 1766, and their replies of 11 May and 31 July 1766.

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able-bodied poor.205 The local administration revived the plan in 1774,206 pre-empting the measures of Turgot who ordered the ´elus to extend their scope in November of that year.207 By May of 1775 public work schemes had been organised at Dijon and in nine other towns of the province,208 but they proved incapable of coping with soaring grain prices caused, in part, by Turgot’s policy of free trade. On 18–19 May, Dijon was wracked by some of the most violent riots in its history, as angry crowds protested at the high price of bread. Despite this setback, the Estates remained attracted to the idea of public works projects, which dovetailed neatly with their attempts to stimulate economic activity in the countryside. They were less impressed by the results of the d´epˆots de mendicit´e, and called for their suppression in 1781.209 This was not simply a cost-cutting exercise, and in their remonstrances they requested that the 50,000 livres be used to fund the establishment of ‘public workhouses for the employment of the able bodied poor’ to be supervised by the ´elus.210 The crown wanted more information about the project before giving its approval and the ´elus decided to let the matter drop, and at both the Estates of 1784 and 1787 a further 50,000 livres was voted for the d´epˆots de mendicit´e.211 Recent experience suggested that little would be achieved, but the Estates were not alone in being unable to solve the problem of poverty. The Estates had played an honourable part in the campaign to secure the establishment of a university in Dijon, and thereafter they were charged with the costs of its upkeep.212 It had soon become a highly reputable institution of evident benefit to the province, and the Estates seemed content to rest on their laurels. When they were asked to subsidise the establishment of a school of mathematics and science in 1760 they refused.213 In 1767, ´ however, they did agree to fund the Ecole de dessein and with the backing of the governor the ´elus offered prizes for the best painter and sculptor.214 A generous four-year grant was also provided to send the two best pupils to study in Rome. Urged on by the prince de Cond´e, the Estates paid for the provision of public lectures in chemistry after 1775, and the list of these 205 206 207 208 210

211 212 214

ADCO C 3355, fol. 107, Amelot to the ´elus, 17 November 1770. AN K 569, fol. 16, Tour du Pin to the prince de Cond´e, 19 April 1775. ADCO C 3355, fol. 231, Turgot to the ´elus, 28 September 1774. 209 ADCO C 3047, fol. 25. ADCO C 3363, fol. 267, the ´elus to Turgot, 6 May 1775. ADCO C 3334, fols. 3–6. Hufton, The poor, p. 231, has noted that the pays d’´etats, especially Brittany and Hainaut, were reluctant to advance funds for these purposes, and this was clearly less of a problem in Burgundy. ADCO C 3048, fols. 26–7. 213 ADCO C 3045, fol. 188. ADCO C 2169, fol. 183, and C 3330, fol. 69. For further details, see: ADCO C 3306, fol. 247; C 3307, fol. 56, and C 3363, fol. 50, the ´elus to the prince de Cond´e, 11 January 1770.

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courses was rapidly expanded to include, amongst other things, anatomy, botany, natural history and mineralogy. If it is sad to report that courses in history were not amongst their number, individual scholars, notably the abb´e Court´ep´ee, did receive generous financial assistance to aid their research.215 Inspired by their own success, the ´elus agreed to pay for lectures in astronomy in November 1783 and to create an observatory in the tower of the governor’s residence in the logis du roi.216 Their new interest in the heavens was accompanied by the wise precaution of installing a lightning ´ conductor in the Palais des Etats. Despite some ill-founded complaints that these courses were ruining the local Academy of Sciences, they proved very popular and 24,800 livres was invested between 1776 and 1784.217 Nor was the funding confined to purely academic subjects. In April 1774, the ´elus asked local mayors and village cur´es to choose intelligent young women to participate in a month-long course of free instruction in midwifery.218 The women were paid twentyfour livres each to cover their expenses, and they were given a certificate of competence once they had completed their training. The midwifery course became an annual event, attracting women from across the province, and many were recalled for further instruction in later years.219 The scheme was not unique to Burgundy, as many of the intendants were sponsoring similar measures elsewhere, but it was a successful project of undoubted public utility. A concern for public well-being inspired some of the other projects of the ´elus. In 1751, the intendant, Joly de Fleury, had reported glumly that the Estates had preserved an ancient prejudice against maps because they believed ‘that it was wrong to reveal details about the interior of the province’.220 Such fears had been banished by the reign of Louis XVI and they were happily paying the fees of the cartographers.221 The ´elus were also keen to inform the public. In July 1784, for example, they printed and distributed pamphlets with the latest advice about how to treat bites by rabid animals or venomous snakes.222 As wolves were frequently a source of disease as well as a threat to peasants and their livestock, the ´elus continued their 215 216 217

218 219 220 221

ADCO C 3363, fol. 252, the prince de Cond´e to the ´elus, 23 December 1774, and C 3694. ADCO C 3365, fol. 221, the ´elus to the prince de Cond´e, 28 and 29 November 1783. ADCO C 3366, fols. 290–2. D. Roche, Le si`ecle des lumi`eres en province. Acad´emies et acad´emiciens ´ provinciaux, 1680–1789, 2 vols. (Paris, 1978), i, p. 121, noted that ‘Le rˆole des Etats provinciaux a e´t´e tr`es important . . . a` Dijon o`u l’assembl´ee assume tous les frais de l’enseignement organis´e par l’acad´emie’. ADCO C 3363, fols. 218–19, circular letter to mayors and cur´es, 21 April 1774. ADCO C 3364, fol. 55, and C 3367, fols. 32, 98. AN H1 120, dos. 1, fol. 1, Joly de Fleury to Trudaine, 3 March 1751. 222 ADCO C 3694, deliberation of 9 July 1784. Lamarre, Petites villes, p. 112–13.

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traditional practice of offering a bounty for every animal killed. The fee was sufficiently generous to tempt hunters to import the heads of dead wolves from neighbouring provinces in an unusual fraud that was denounced at the Estates of 1769.223 It prompted the alcades to propose the drastic solution of leaving a poisoned carcass outside every village at the height of winter. The Estates politely declined their suggestion. Finally, when dearth or economic crisis threatened, as it did in 1747, 1770–1 and 1775, the provincial administration was quick to act, usually in concert with the intendant and the Parlement of Dijon. In 1747, for example, a combination of bad harvests and the war in Provence prompted the ´elus to purchase grain.224 Their action earned a harsh rebuke from the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, who accused them of acting hastily and spreading panic in the process.225 To be fair to the ´elus their priorities were not the same as those of the minister, whose eyes were on the needs of the army, but quarrels of this type were rare. The crisis of 1770–1 saw the ´elus buying rice and then selling it at subsidised prices to every village in the province.226 Given the reluctance of the local population to eat this exotic dish, they also took the precaution of distributing recipes explaining how to cook it, suggesting that it be added to soup. As the storm clouds gathered in the spring of 1789, the ´elus were busily buying up grain in case of dearth. After 1750, the government was prepared to devolve a greater degree of administrative responsibility to the provincial estates. Rebillon interpreted this as a sign that they were winning a long-running battle against the centralising ambitions of the crown, while Legay’s recent study has suggested that they were being employed as part of that centralising process.227 There are a number of problems with these arguments. As we have seen, conflict was by no means a permanent, or even a common, feature of the relationship between the Estates of Burgundy and the monarchy, and they worked together amicably on a wide variety of issues. However, to persuade the Estates to act on, for example, the roads, waterways or provincial stud the king had to cede authority and jurisdiction. Once this had been acquired, much could be achieved because the ´elus controlled the fiscal system and had a far more developed tradition of administrative independence than their equivalents in either Artois or Brittany. Yet this very strength meant that they cannot simply be classified as agents of monarchical 223 225 226 227

224 ADCO C 3688. ADCO C 3306, fol. 144. ADCO C 3354, fols. 119–21, Machault d’Arnouville to the ´elus, 24 August 1747. ADCO C 3688, deliberation of 23 February 1771. ´ The arguments of Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, and Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, discussed above.

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centralisation. The Estates had their own interests and priorities and they were never going to match those of the crown exactly. Rebillon and Legay are, however, in agreement that during the eighteenth century the administrative efforts of the provincial estates produced only modest results. When examining the activities of the Burgundian administration in the same period it is undeniable that the list of failures is long. The refusal to act decisively on the issue of reforming the taille, to tackle the problem of fiscal inequality or to abolish the corv´ee stands out. It is also true that many of the projects sponsored by the Estates had only been taken up after the intervention of the crown. Yet if the shortcomings of the administration should not be overlooked, it would be misleading to ignore the existence of a reforming movement after 1750. During the reign of Louis XVI, fiscal reform moved to the top of the political agenda, and there were practical improvements in the functioning of the tax system to set against the obstinate defence of privileged interests that was also present. Unlike their counterparts in Brittany, the ´elus also proved capable of overseeing the construction of an impressive road network and of launching a programme of canal building that would probably have been brought to fruition had not the revolution intervened. Like the intendants in the pays d’´elections, the ´elus were attracted to the idea of promoting agricultural and even industrial development. After a slow start, they became enthused with plans to develop the provincial stud and to inspire the local peasantry with the example of the farm at Di´enay. Industrial ventures were less close to their hearts, but their efforts to develop means of communication and to lobby for local commercial interests, such as the wine trade, meant that the potential for economic development was greater in 1789 than ever before. Moreover, the willingness to support courses of public instruction in subjects as diverse as chemistry and midwifery was a sign that they perceived their role in ways that were comparable with the intendants and their projects of ‘bienfaisance’ which opened this chapter. We should not, however, become too carried away with the theme of an enlightened administration. Nearly all of the projects discussed above were paid for by the taillables alone, either directly through taxation or from the sweat of their brows. There is no doubt that the Estates and ‘our lords the ´elus’ had a high opinion of their own achievements; it is now time to consider the verdict of the Burgundian people themselves.

chapter 12

The coming of the French revolution in Burgundy, 1787–1789

Louis XVI’s decision to call an Assembly of Notables in February 1787 marked the beginning of a protracted political crisis that would lead to the summoning of the Estates General in May 1789 and a few weeks later to revolution.1 During the course of what has become known as the ‘pre-revolution’, government censorship collapsed and the kingdom was exposed to an unprecedented degree of political debate. The most contentious issue concerned the composition of the forthcoming Estates General, with a ferocious quarrel about whether it should meet in the same form as at its last assembly of 1614. On that occasion, voting had been by order, and it was easy to imagine that, if repeated, the clergy and nobility would vote together to protect their privileged interests, prevailing by a majority of two to one. The fear of such an outcome led the third estate to embrace an alternative formula, of doubled representation for themselves and voting by head, devised in the autumn of 1788 during an assembly of deputies to the revived provincial Estates of Dauphin´e. For an increasingly assertive third estate, the justice of its demands seemed incontrovertible, and it was incensed by the opposition of the nobility. In Burgundy, the issue had an additional resonance because of the obvious parallel with their provincial Estates. The question of how to reform them became a matter of great urgency, and for a few days in December 1788, it seemed possible that a common programme would be adopted. These hopes were dashed by the failure to resolve what one observer called ‘the unhappy question of whether we should vote by order or by head’.2 It left the Estates of Burgundy bereft of popular support in the hour of its greatest need. If voting procedures in the Estates General were a matter of national concern, there were other dimensions to the political debates surrounding the 1

2

The classic works are J. Egret, La pr´e-r´evolution franc¸aise, 1787–1788 (Paris, 1962); W. Doyle, Origins of the French revolution pp. 91–108; and B. Stone, The French parlements and the crisis of the old regime (Chapel Hill, 1986). E 642 bis, Lambert to Cortot, 30 January 1789.

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provincial estates. Since at least 1750, there had been growing public interest in reformed local government, with such luminaries as Montesquieu and the marquis de Mirabeau calling for the re-establishment of the provincial estates in the pays d’´elections.3 Not everyone was convinced by the virtues of the provincial estates, and the Physiocrats, in particular, proposed the creation of provincial assemblies. Many different models were suggested, but what they had in common was a desire to break away from the old medieval formula of the three estates and to recognise wealth and property, not simply social station. During the reign of Louis XVI a number of attempts were made to put these theories into practice. Necker established provincial administrations in Berry and Haute-Guyenne that he hoped would serve as a prototype for a broader programme of reform. Although the administrations survived his fall, they failed to arouse great enthusiasm. They did, however, provide proof that innovation was possible. Necker’s initiative was followed in 1787–8 by a far more ambitious scheme sponsored first by Calonne and subsequently Lom´enie de Brienne. Provincial assemblies were established in the majority of the pays d’´elections where they produced creditable if ultimately disappointing results.4 Their failure was, in large measure, attributable to the political crisis provoked by Lamoignon’s attempt to emasculate the parlements in May 1788.5 The provincial assemblies were found guilty by association with an increasingly discredited ministry, and there was a sudden resurgence of support for the re-establishment of provincial estates. Part of their popularity stemmed from the belief that they constituted a more effective barrier against the dreaded curse of ‘ministerial despotism’, and in Dauphin´e in particular their revival seemingly offered a new model for representative government.6 As ministerial and public opinion became increasingly favourable towards provincial self-government, the Estates of Burgundy had taken advantage of the changing climate to reinforce their own authority and administration. But how were the Estates and the chamber of ´elus viewed by Burgundians? Having enjoyed the privileged status so coveted by their 3

4 5 6

For an introduction to the history of the provincial assemblies see: Egret, La pr´e-r´evolution franc¸aise; P. Renouvin, Les assembl´ees provinciales de 1787. Origines, d´eveloppement, r´esultats (Paris, 1921); Jones, Reform and revolution, pp. 12–49, 139–66; Kwass, Privilege and politics, pp. 255–310; and C. Soule, ‘Une tentative d´emocratique en France a` la fin de l’ancien r´egime: les assembl´ees provinciales au XVIIIe si`ecle; origines et cr´eation’, Parliaments, Estates and Representation 15 (1995), 97–119. Jones, Reform and revolution, pp. 146–7, 155–6, and Renouvin, Les assembl´ees provinciales, pp. 214–32, 318–19, 385–99. Egret, La pr´e-r´evolution franc¸aise, and Doyle, Origins of the French revolution, pp. 91–108. Jones, Reform and revolution, pp. 142–56, and Renouvin, Les assembl´ees provinciales, pp. 326–49.

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compatriots throughout the eighteenth century, they were particularly well placed to comment upon the strengths and weaknesses of the Estates. Moreover, thanks to the excitement generated by the pre-revolutionary crisis, there is a rich collection of source materials, varying from the official deliberations of the Estates to the cahiers de dol´eances of the humble villagers of the province. Taken together they allow us to take a broad sample of public opinion, and to assess both the verdict of Burgundians on the Estates in 1789 and their hopes for the future. t h e t h e` s e pa r l e m e n ta i re In the course of the bitter Varenne affair, which so divided the Parlement of Dijon and the ´elus, the magistrates developed a powerful critique of the Estates and their administration.7 In a series of pamphlets and remonstrances, the parlementaires argued that the vast expansion of the institutional remit of the chamber of ´elus had far surpassed the capacity of its members.8 Well-intentioned clerics or nobles lacked the professional knowledge to run a demanding administration, forcing them to depend upon the advice of the permanent officers, headed by the treasurer general and secr´etaires des ´etats. According to the influential Burgundian magistrate, F´evret de Fontette, it was these allegedly unaccountable subordinates who alone controlled the provincial administration.9 As we have seen, the ´elus were considerably more active than the parlementaires liked to pretend, and the attempt to downplay their role was almost certainly part of a deliberate strategy. Attacks directed at the permanent officials were far less likely to antagonise the members of the Estates than those aimed at the ´elus, and when they did come in for criticism it was generally on the basis that they had exceeded the powers vested in them by the assembly.10 Had the opportunity arisen, the Parlement would have liked nothing better than to scrutinise the conduct of the provincial administration, and quarrels over their respective rights were a feature of the whole eighteenth 7 8

9 10

See chapter 9. Classic examples of this critique include: Joly de B´evy’s, ‘Le Parlement outrag´e’ of January 1761, BMD MS 778; Guenichot de Nogent, ‘M´emoire sur les d´em´el´es actuelles du Parlement de Dijon avec les e´lus g´en´eraux de la province de Bourgogne’; ADCO C 3349; the remonstrances of the Parlement of Dijon of 16 March and 7 July 1762; and, finally, the remonstrances written for the Cour des Aides of Paris by Lamoignon de Malesherbes, dated July 1763. ADCO C 3349, handwritten memoir entitled ‘Observations par m. de Fontette . . . r´eponse de m. le chancelier au nom du roy aux remontrances du Parlement de Dijon’. A good example is provided by the remonstrances of the Parlement of Dijon of 16 March 1762, ibid. The issue is examined in chapter 9.

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century. However, parlementaire attitudes to the Estates themselves were more complex. The recurring theme in their analysis of the institution was that it had lost its ancient powers and freedom, partly through the effects of ‘ministerial despotism’, but also because of its own mistakes. In his fiery pamphlet, Le Parlement Outrag´e, Joly de B´evy had declared that ‘the assembled Estates are no longer free in their suffrage, it seems that one demands of them far more than one consults’.11 To reinforce his argument he cited the case of a nobleman who had been expelled from a recent assembly and forbidden to reappear for having ‘said frankly his opinion on the abuses that he had observed in the administration’. Fontette shared similar sentiments about the loss of liberty, arguing that the Estates had once possessed the right to choose their ´elus freely: ‘today it is the governor and the ministry who nominates them, and the choice that the Estates appear to make is a pure formality’.12 He was, however, conscious that the Estates had contributed to their own eclipse, in part because of the infrequency of their meetings. In the course of his correspondence during the Varenne affair, he wrote: the Parlement has already said, and I repeat it. Why do the Estates only assemble every three years? Why are they not assembled each time that a new tax is to be levied? or rather why not wait until they are assembled before asking for their consent to taxation? It is for the Estates to reclaim their privilege[s], but while they do not, it will always be true to say that three people alone can not give a consent that belongs to the assembled nation.13

It was a cogent critique and not one designed simply to reinforce the authority of the Parlement because Fontette regularly repeated his wish that the Estates reclaim their rights, arguing that: the Parlement can only hope that the Estates of Burgundy will attempt in due course to regain the exercise of a privilege that they have so long neglected to make use of. The right of consent is one of the most important that this province has, and it is not prejudicial to the right of registration.14

Fontette was clearly hoping that the Estates would become more politically active, and by reasserting their rights curb the powers of the chamber of ´elus. The model of the Estates of Brittany, which was very much in vogue in the early 1760s, may have inspired his thinking, and there was 11 12 13 14

BMD MS 778, ‘Le parlement outrag´e’, fol. 11. ADCO C 3349, ‘Observations par m. de Fontette’. Ibid., and BMD MS 912, fols. 180–1, Fontette to Cl´ement de Feillet, 4 February 1763. The ‘nation’ he had in mind was the Burgundian one. ADCO C 3349, ‘Observations par m. de Fontette’.

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an abortive attempt to press for change at the Estates of 1763.15 Although interest in reform waned during the final years of Louis XV’s reign, the arguments advanced by the parlementaires were not forgotten and they would be revived with ever-greater insistence after 1774. internal critics It was the stormy triennalit´e of the abb´e de La Goutte that set the tone for the first decade of Louis XVI’s reign,16 with a series of controversial reforms dividing the chamber of ´elus. Although defeated, La Goutte’s ideas were a reflection of a wider current of opinion, and in 1781 the alcades produced a series of highly critical remarques that were in turn suppressed by the government. The central themes of the reforming campaign were the alleged shortcomings of the fiscal system. Inspired by La Goutte, the alcades produced a detailed plan for the reorganisation of tax collection based upon the principles of equality and uniformity. Predictably, they also directed their fire at the province’s fiscal officers, repeating the arguments that they were overpaid and were constantly in arrears. Nor did the Chambre des Comptes emerge unscathed. The ´epices charged by the court were denounced as excessive, and the old allegation that they were effectively paid twice for the same task when examining the accounts of the treasurer general and the receivers was repeated.17 These familiar gripes were accompanied by others, notably accusations of corruption in the administration of public works. Alongside these traditional complaints were others that reflected the political mood of the period. Perhaps inspired by the example of Necker, the alcades demanded the immediate publication of: exact and detailed accounts of the ordinary expenses of the province, and every year [the Estates] should put before the eyes of the province the picture of its expenses and its resources, its debts, its borrowing, its reimbursements, its receipts, and its expenditure, in this table the citizen will study his duties and obligations. He will see what the administration has done for him, [and] what he must do for it, the sacrifices imposed upon him will be accepted without demur.18

The alcades did not stop there because they were simultaneously pursuing an even more radical agenda. In their censored remarques, they drew attention to the large amount of expenditure of benefit to all that was paid for by 15 17 18

16 See chapter 8. See chapter 9. ADCO C 3302, ‘Copie de la minute des remarques des commissaires alcades . . . pour l’assembl´ee des e´tats ouvert le 6 mai 1781’, and 1 F 460, fol. 254. ADCO C 3302, ‘Copie de la minute des remarques’.

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the third estate alone. Amongst the items cited were the provincial stud, the abonnement contracted with the directeurs des postes and the costs of a variety of ‘buy outs’ negotiated with the crown.19 They added that ‘it is no less astonishing that the nobility and clergy grant alms and the third estate pays for them, it is a don gratuit to which all three orders must contribute’. Silenced in 1781, the campaign for fiscal equality would return with a vengeance after 1787. If issues of fiscal equality and control of the tax system tended to preoccupy the minds of would-be reformers, there were still echoes of the parlementaire critique of the Estates. In their remarques of 1781, the alcades admitted that there were limits to what the ´elus could achieve given the complexity of the tasks they faced and the limited amount of time at their disposal.20 Like the Parlement, they believed that the solution was to strengthen the power of the assembly, declaring that: the assembled Estates and not the administration must decide everything. It belongs to the Estates alone to increase expenditure which burdens the taxpayers whose interests are too often neglected, above all [those of ] the taillables, by working thus for the good of each class of citizens they will procure that of the province.

The author of an important unpublished memoir, the Administration de la province de Bourgogne consider´ee comme pays d’´etats, written just prior to the Estates of 1781, identified the alcades themselves as the key to reform. He cited the royal r`eglement of 1742 that had obliged them to secure the permission of the secretary of state before presenting their remarques to the assembly, and described it as ‘destructive of the province’s privileges and contrary to the natural liberty that censors must possess’.21 He believed that the alcades should be allowed to denounce malpractice without restriction, but the assembly of 1781 would reveal just how reluctant the crown was to hear their criticisms. Given the degree of interest in the reform of provincial government after 1774, it is surprising that the Estates were not given more scope to experiment with internal reforms. The explanation for that inertia undoubtedly resides in a combination of factors, including a certain institutional conservatism, the power of vested interests and the attitude of the governor. It is also possible that the prevailing intellectual climate, which tended to favour projects for provincial assemblies over those of estates, prevented ministers from seeing the potential for reform that undoubtedly existed. 19 20

Ibid., and ADCO 1 F 460, fols., 70–1, 127, 155–6. The author was insistent that all of the province’s taxpayers should benefit from the advantages of abonnements. 21 ADCO 1 F 460, fol. 205. ADCO C 3302, ‘Copie de la minute des remarques’.

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t h e e s tat e s o f 1 78 7 The presence of the ´elus and the governor at the Assembly of Notables of 1787 meant that the Estates of Burgundy did not meet until November of that year. Subsequent events would reveal that the public debate about reform and the establishment of provincial assemblies in the pays d’´elections had acted as a catalyst upon the thinking of the deputies who gathered in Dijon. In what would prove to be one of the most eventful assemblies for more than a century, the chambers engaged in a lively debate about the constitution of the Estates and the administration of the province. The chamber of nobility was determined to reassert its right to choose its ´elu in a free election,22 arguing that this prerogative had passed to the governor on a distant occasion when a split vote had required his intervention. The most serious obstacle to its ambitions was posed by the royal r`eglement of 1742, which reserved the appointment of the ´elus to the crown. To justify a rather belated attack on its contents, the nobles declared that it had never received the formal sanction of a deliberation in their chamber, adding that it would be impossible for them to alienate powers granted by the Burgundian dukes. The reaction of the other chambers was lukewarm to say the least. With a command of casuistry worthy of their calling, the clergy announced ‘that there was no reason at present to deliberate on this subject’, and then added a clause stating that by this they did not mean to prejudice their ‘own rights and privileges, nor those that are common to the other orders of the province’.23 More bluntly, the third estate replied that ‘its constitution and its particular regime did not permit it to participate in the petition of the chamber of nobility’. Such a disappointing response did not come as a complete shock to the nobility.24 The workings of the grande roue in the chamber of the third estate and the rotation amongst bishops, abb´es and doyens when choosing a clerical ´elu meant that the issue was less pressing for the other orders. Yet without their backing the chances of the nobles succeeding in their campaign were slight. Rather than abandon its campaign, the second order approached the governor directly, informing him that the offending article of the r`eglement of 1742 undermined the ‘basic rights of the provincial constitution’.25 Displaying his customary tact, Cond´e replied that he could not receive their deputation in his capacity as the king’s commissioner, but ‘as a prince of the blood, he was always disposed to converse with the 22 24 25

23 Ibid., fol. 32. ADCO C 3048, fols. 30–1. They had anticipated difficulties in persuading the other chambers, ibid., fol. 31. Ibid., fols. 37–40.

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gentlemen of the province about the affairs and interests of Burgundy’. He also had the good sense to warn the deputation that an appeal from their chamber alone stood little chance of succeeding, but the nobles insisted on petitioning the king. Louis XVI replied sternly, declaring that without the backing of the other orders such a request was ‘completely irregular and the nobility should not accustom itself to think that a deliberation of its own could carry weight in an affair affecting the entire body of the Estates’.26 Thrown back on to the mercy of the other chambers, the nobles sent them a copy of the king’s letter for consideration and a request that their demand be added to the cahier des remonstrances.27 This time the suggestion was approved, but any celebrations were likely to be premature – the Breton nobility had been petitioning the king unsuccessfully for the same privilege since 1772.28 Undaunted by the cool reception they had received over the issue of the ´elus, the nobility pressed forward on another front. Having noted that proposed reforms of the corv´ee and the vingti`eme were of a technical nature, ill-suited for discussion within the three chambers, they called for the establishment of: bureaux, composed of several members of each order, to discuss the different points [at issue], to summarise them, offer an opinion on the most effective means of attaining the object of the Estates and then to present it to the chambers.29

A seemingly laudable measure was rejected by the clergy and third estate on the basis that it was contrary to the ‘ancient constitution’. The nobles had made the mistake of presenting their reform as an innovation; had they searched in the registers of the Estates they would almost certainly have discovered the precedents needed to win their case.30 Suspicion of the motives behind the call for these bureaux perhaps accounted for the reticence of the clergy and third estate, and the nobles had made something of a faux pas by implying that they might examine the work of the alcades before it was presented to the chambers.31 Even so, the episode revealed how hard it was to persuade the members of the Estates to revise their traditional practices. Those changes that were implemented were on a comparatively modest scale. A call to double the time available to the alcades when preparing their remarques received unanimous approval.32 Support was also forthcoming 26 29 30 31

27 ADCO C 3014, fol. 15. 28 Rebillon, Etats ´ Ibid., fol. 55. de Bretagne, p. 75. For details see: ADCO C 3048, fols. 50–1; C 3014, fols. 9, 14; and C 3054, fols. 23, 36. There is no doubt that precedents did exist, ADCO C 3031, fol. 11–14, and chapter 3. 32 ADCO C 3014, fol. 37, and C 3048, fol. 99. ADCO C 3054, fol. 23.

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for a proposal to make details of the financial administration available for consultation before any deliberations on fiscal matters.33 Other d´ecrets revealed a strong element of continuity with previous assemblies. Calls for the Estates to be given complete authority over the appointment of their officers were repeated, and the receivers and other financial officials came in for predictable criticism.34 The nobility was again to the fore, presenting a series of proposed reforms, including the standardisation of the fees paid to their fiscal officers and the suppression of the receivers of Dijon and of the crues, whose duties were to be transferred to the treasurer general. Both the third estate and the clergy gave their cautious consent, urging the ´elus to act prudently and in such a way as to protect the interests of taxpayers and the honour of the province. If the nobility was particularly active in pressing for change, the deputies of the third estate were not far behind, and they had a very different agenda. Reviving the arguments of La Goutte and the alcades of 1781 they fought for fiscal equality not only relative to the administration of the capitation and vingti`emes, but also when it came to expenditure on items of general public utility.35 The deputies identified eighteen separate examples of charges paid solely by the third estate, including the costs of the voyage of honour, the upkeep of the provincial stud, provision for the poor, the gages of the staff ´ of the Palais des Etats and even the ‘fees’ of the captain of the porte de la noblesse’ . Having listed their grievances, they demanded that they be supported by the three orders and not the third estate alone.36 Christian charity proved no match for the charms of fiscal privilege, and the clergy voted against change. As for the nobles, they had the good grace to accept liability for paying their captain and the commissioners charged with verifying the proofs needed for entrance to their chamber, who were also funded by the third estate. However, they remained steadfast in their refusal to contribute towards the other items. Such stubborn defence of privileged interests would soon be seized upon by the new spokesmen of the third estate as evidence of the abusive nature of the provincial constitution and the unpatriotic sentiments of the nobility and clergy. Disagreement over the issue of fiscal equality offered an early indication of the nature of future conflict, but the efforts of the third estate were not in vain. There was unanimous support for further reform of the taille and the nobility was forced to agree to a verification of the vingti`eme rolls, the essential precondition of a more equitable distribution of the tax burden.37 33 35

34 ADCO C 3048, fols. 91, 109–10. ADCO C 3014, fol. 92, and C 3048, fol. 33. 36 Ibid., fol. 105. 37 See chapter 10. Ibid., fols. 26–9, 105–6, 110.

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The third estate also persuaded the nobility to back reform of the system of pensions paid by the Estates, the crucial article of which stated that ‘in future the unanimous consent of the three chambers would be required’.38 In keeping with the general clamour for more information, it was further stipulated that the three chambers would henceforth be provided with a complete list of the pensions paid in their name at the beginning of every assembly. As the prince de Cond´e presided over the closing ceremonies on 1 December 1787, he had good reason to be pleased with the outcome. The principal royal demands contained in his instructions had been met, and the potentially disruptive issues raised during the assembly handled without causing serious conflict or resentment. Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the last meeting of the Estates General of Burgundy had revealed signs of the crisis to come, with the nobility anxious to revive the existing provincial constitution and the third estate far more preoccupied with the campaign for fiscal equality. In November 1787, these questions had been debated within the traditional confines of the Estates, and without a great sense of urgency. The nobility dutifully added the demand for the free election of its ´elu to the cahier des remontrances, and the third estate had been happy to refer many of its recommendations on fiscal reform to the ´elus. The radical young avocat, Braine, writing from Semur-en-Auxois, was surely not alone in his opinion that the ‘Estates are therefore finished, without, it seems to me, having come close to fulfilling the hopes that their opening had raised’.39 Yet as the deputies dispersed, the monarchy was lurching into a crisis that would culminate, in May 1788, in another ill-fated attempt to break the power of the parlements.40 By August, the opposition to that policy had forced an increasingly discredited government to order the convocation of the Estates General of France. In doing so, Louis XVI permitted a public debate on the composition of the forthcoming national assembly, and created an opportunity for the critics of the provincial estates to come out into the open. l a p r e´ r e´ vo lu t i o n b o u rgu i g n o nn e During September 1788 Lamoignon’s judicial reforms were abandoned and their author disgraced, permitting the triumphant return of the parlements. The provinces of Dauphin´e and Brittany had been to the fore in thwarting 38 40

39 ADCO E 642, bis, Braine, fils, to Cortot, 6 December 1787. ADCO C 3048, fol. 69–71. Egret, Pr´e-r´evolution franc¸aise, pp. 103–314.

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the government, with the citizens of Grenoble and Rennes taking violent action against the troops charged with upholding royal policy. Yet the resemblance between the political situation in the two provinces was only skin deep. In Dauphin´e, the campaign to re-establish the provincial Estates produced a powerful alliance of nobles and leading members of the third estate, with a programme based upon free elections, consent to taxation and, crucially, double representation for the third estate and voting by head.41 For the Bretons, a comparable expression of provincial solidarity proved impossible. By the end of the year the nobility was at war with the bourgeoisie about the composition of the Estates, and all attempts at reconciliation failed. In May and June of 1789, the deputies of the third estate of Brittany were in the vanguard of revolution, forming the kernel of the legendary Jacobin club. Their noble compatriots, on the other hand, were so infuriated by the failure to elect the provincial deputies from within the local Estates that they refused to attend the Estates General altogether. Similar divisions surfaced in the Franche-Comt´e and the princes of the blood, who only a few months previously had been leading the chorus of opposition to Lamoignon’s reforms, issued a manifesto, in December 1788, denouncing the pretensions of the third estate. Their fears were well founded. News of the programme adopted in Dauphin´e had spread like a brushfire amongst the members of the third estate of the kingdom, providing an inspiration and a unifying ideology that cut across the traditionally parochial and corporatist lines of ancien r´egime France. When the Parlement of Paris issued its famous arrˆet in September 1788, insisting that the Estates General assemble in accordance with the most recent precedent of 1614, it lost much of its public credit almost overnight. Burgundy was not immune from the increasingly feverish political atmosphere. On 11 December 1788, Trullard, the procureur syndic of Dijon, addressed the town council on the virtues of the third estate: it is the third estate that supplies the soldiers and their pay; it is the [third estate] that makes the fields bring forth their harvest, commerce, the arts and manufactures flower, it adds value to property, even to that of the two other orders; in a word, it invigorates everything.42

He concluded with a resounding endorsement of events in Dauphin´e that was seconded by those present and by a stream of deputations representing 41 42

See: Doyle, Origins of the revolution, pp. 131–47, esp. 134–5; Egret, Pr´e-r´evolution franc¸aise, pp. 315–66; and Jones, Reform and revolution, pp. 152–6. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait des registres des d´elib´erations de la chambre du conseil de la ville et commune de Dijon, Jeudi 11 D´ecembre 1788’.

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the different corps in the city, who unanimously pledged their allegiance to the programme of doubled representation and voting by head.43 It was further agreed to address a ‘Lettre au roi’, arguing that ‘if we consult the essential law of men, reason, what would be the point of subjecting the representatives of twenty-two million souls to the representatives of three or four hundred thousand privileged ?’. While professing their admiration for the ancient nobility, the corps of Dijon asked rhetorically ‘but if the nobility no longer existed, would the state perish with it ? Would it lack defenders, would its power be extinguished?’.44 The response was clear, if unspoken, and even if the city’s third estate did not anticipate the abb´e Si`eyes by threatening to send the nobility back to their fabled Franconian forests, their growing self-confidence was unmistakable. A glowing reference to events in the United States was enough to complete the picture of a third estate no longer prepared to ‘count for nothing in public affairs’. As the first signs of an emerging political consciousness amongst the third estate of Dijon became public, a section of the local nobility intervened with the aim of leading reform of the provincial Estates prior to the election of deputies for the Estates General.45 The nobles formally assembled on 20 December, and subsequently claimed that their intention was to extend that invitation to all gentlemen and to representatives of the clergy and third estate.46 The comte de Vienne, the last representative of one of the most prestigious families in the province and a former ´elu, was elected president. That evening, Vienne proposed summoning the other orders, and, rather than twiddle their thumbs while they waited, the assembled gentlemen began to examine a memoir, drafted by the mayor of Flavigny, Gautherin, on behalf of the third estate, containing a list of their grievances on matters of taxation.47 Gautherin had identified no less than twenty-three charges that, while of benefit to all, were borne by the third estate alone. Most of these items had been identified by the third estate at the assembly of the Estates in November 1787, or had been present in the suppressed remarques of the alcades in 1781. Only a year earlier the nobility had treated these demands 43

44 45

46 47

A. Cochin, ‘La campagne e´lectorale de 1789 en Bourgogne’, in his Les soci´et´es de pens´ee et la d´emocratie. ´ Etudes d’histoire r´evolutionnaire (Paris, 1921), pp. 235–82. Cochin presents these events in terms of a preconceived plan by a small group of avocats, who effectively seized control of the third estate. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait des registres’. The nobles published their version of events in the ‘Extrait du proc`es-verbal de la noblesse de Bourgogne assembl´ee a` Dijon du 20 D´ecembre au 7 Janvier 1789’, in BMD MS 21537 (1). Cochin, ‘La campagne e´lectorale’, pp. 252–3, 274–6, interprets these events as part of a failed counter coup against the avocats by a relatively small section of the noblesse. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait du proc`es-verbal de la noblesse’, fols. 6–11. Gautherin had been appointed to compile this memoir after the Estates of 1787.

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with disdain, but in the new political climate of December 1788 it made a determined effort to win the support of the third estate. Embracing the principle of fiscal equality, the nobles agreed to all bar one of Gautherin’s twenty-three points, including a promise to pay an equitable share of the interest charges on the provincial debt, only refusing to pay for the gifts of wine traditionally dispensed to ministers and other powerful figures which they described as ‘an incredible abuse’ requiring suppression.48 Having renounced fiscal privilege, the nobles clearly expected to be welcomed as the natural champions of a movement of provincial regeneration, and over the next few days they set about compiling a more general programme. Moderate reform of the Estates was central to their strategy and it was quickly agreed that the intendant was superfluous to requirements, his commission was to be revoked and his remaining powers transferred to the ´elus. Predictably enough, demands for the right to elect their ´elu, which had dominated the debates of the chamber in 1787, were repeated.49 More controversially, the nobility called for the deputies of the third estate to be freely elected and not restricted to the venal office of mayor, as had been the case since the late seventeenth century. Finally, the independence of the Estates themselves was to be strengthened. Future meetings were to be of indeterminate length, depending upon the amount of business and its importance, and provincial matters would be dealt with first before consideration of taxes or dons gratuits. Costs were to be cut by suppressing the additional ‘gratifications’ paid to the ´elus, and by abolishing the sumptuous banquets that they were in the habit of providing. Once these reforms had been adopted, the Estates were to be convoked and deputies for the Estates General of the kingdom elected. This programme won the overwhelming support of those present and fifty-eight gentlemen signed their names alongside that of their president.50 Had the chamber presented these proposals to the Estates of November 1787 they would have appeared both bold and generous, but by December 1788 the third estate’s reserves of deference were rapidly running out. Enthused with the mantra of doubled representation and voting by head, the bourgeois elites of Dijon, headed by an influential group of avocats,51 were aiming for a much more radical transformation of the Estates. Conflict became focused around the issue of the provincial constitution. When presenting the 48 49 50

51

BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait du proc`es-verbal de la noblesse’, fols. 11–17, 26. Ibid., fols. 28–41. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Discours prononc´e par l’un de mm. Les secr´etaires de la noblesse, au nom de son ordre, a` l’assembl´ee des d´eput´es du clerg´e de la Sainte-Chapelle de Dijon, et de ceux des corps et communaut´es du tiers e´tat de cette ville, qu’elle y avoit invit´es, le 27 D´ecembre 1788’. fol. 8. Cochin, ‘La campagne e´lectorale’.

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noble programme to the representatives of the clergy and the third estate of Dijon on 27 December, Vienne declared that the nobility had assembled to preserve Burgundy from the ‘misfortunes threatening France’.52 Referring to the ancient constitution of the province, he added that ‘these ancient forms, consecrated by time, must remain as our forefathers have transmitted them, it is only necessary to reform the abuses that have crept in’. As the members of the third estate presumably felt their hearts sink at the prospect of Breton style rejection of voting by head, Vienne unveiled the Burgundian nobility’s solution to the problem. since time immemorial it has been customary in Burgundy to count votes by order and that two form a d´ecret and bind the third: the first part of this law is sound and is all the more so because taxes being distributed equally upon all the orders the interest becomes common: the second part appears to the assembled gentlemen to merit change.53

Their solution was to grant each of the chambers the right of veto, on the basis that a law that was bad for one order was bad for them all. On matters of great import they suggested appointing commissioners to work out a compromise that could be resubmitted to the chambers. Having unveiled the programme of the noblesse, Vienne concluded with an appeal for unity. While open to ideas of reform, the assembled nobles had stopped short of seeking to apply the Dauphin´e model in Burgundy. They nevertheless succeeded in rallying a section of the third estate to their side, splitting the corps of avocats in the process,54 and before finalising their position the deputies of the third estate requested further clarifications from the nobility on 28 December.55 As they deliberated, news of an inflammatory speech by the abb´e Dillon, doyen of the Sainte Chapelle, was spreading through the city. Dillon had warned the third estate not to overestimate the consequences of a renunciation of fiscal privilege by the clergy and nobility. He argued instead that ‘the members of the third estate are individually worth as much as them; united they are stronger; they are only obliged to join with the privileged orders [if ] their prerogatives founded upon natural law are restored to them; otherwise, not’.56 Printed versions of the text were accompanied by praise for a cleric who alone had dared to plead the 52 53 54 55 56

BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Discours prononc´e par l’un de mm. Les secr´etaires de la noblesse’, fols. 1–2. Ibid., fols. 6–7. Several pamphlets, written by local avocats, were published supporting their position, and are examined in greater detail below. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait du proc`es-verbal de la noblesse’, fols. 41–2. The noblesse was sufficiently disturbed by his discourse to include it in its self-justificatory proc`esverbal, ibid., fols. 74–81.

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cause of the third estate. However, in a dramatic twist entirely redolent of ancien r´egime politics, the abb´e subsequently informed the nobility that if his confr`eres displayed ‘a way of thinking diametrically opposed to mine, I would defend it with as much zeal as I would my own’.57 The age of revolutionary ideology would soon sweep the corporate mentality away, and despite his own magnanimity Dillon had given expression to the fears of many within the third estate. The issue of the veto became the principal obstacle to agreement, but there was no real enthusiasm for the idea, or for that of a commission to resolve future deadlock. Several corps expressed doubts about the planned reforms, and the avocats soon emerged as the chief tormentors of the nobility.58 They demanded doubled representation for the third estate, and, if the veto was exercised, a general assembly to vote by head with a two-thirds majority required to pass a disputed d´ecret. For the nobility of Burgundy it was a Rubicon, and one that it was ultimately not prepared to cross. Instead, it fell back on the argument that such a change would destroy ‘the ancient constitution of the province . . . since this modification renders illusory the vote by order and would limit the chamber of nobility to a fixed number of representatives; something that is contrary to the institution of the Estates that the nobility is determined to uphold’. A further row over terminology provided confirmation of the breakdown in relations between the nobility and the avocats. The lawyers had called for a plan to ‘reform the abuses of the constitution’, something that the nobles indignantly protested did not exist. Imperceptibly battle lines were being drawn, with the avocats winning at least the tacit support of the other bourgeois corps of Dijon, while the nobility’s stance was endorsed by the Parlement and Chambre des Comptes.59 Reconciliation proved impossible, and, on 6 January, the nobility published a strongly worded Protestation, blaming the pretensions of the avocats, a selfstyled ‘fourth order’, for the failure to achieve a united provincial front.60 According to the sixty-one nobles who signed the document, if they had accepted voting by head ‘there would only really be a single order in the state’. All they would have achieved through such a spurious unity would have been to ‘plunge their patrie into the chaos of the most dreadful democracy’. The nobility dispersed the next day with its dreams of leading a Burgundian political renaissance in tatters. Unlike its counterpart in 57 58 59 60

Ibid., fols. 79–81, abb´e Dillon to the nobility of Burgundy, 29/30 December 1788. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait du proc`es-verbal de la noblesse’, fols. 48–74, 101–4. Ibid., fols. 66–71, 85, and BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Extrait des registres du Parlement de Dijon (30 D´ecembre 1788)’. BMD MS 21537 (1), ‘Protestation de la noblesse de Bourgogne (6 Janvier 1789)’, fol. 3.

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Brittany, the Burgundian noblesse had proved willing to engage in a constructive debate with the third estate about reform of the Estates. Fiscal privilege had been renounced in unequivocal terms, and some progress had been made towards defining the composition of a more representative Estates. More importantly, the plan to keep voting by order, tempered by the use of a veto, offered a potential solution to the divisive conflict that so poisoned the political atmosphere in the spring of 1789. Despite the popularity of the Dauphin´e model, the third estate did not reject the proposal out of hand, and it was only on the issue of how to break the deadlock of a veto that an impasse had been reached. The noblesse refused to countenance the idea of voting by head, even in these more restricted circumstances and with the extra safeguard of requiring a two-thirds majority to pass a d´ecret. Mutual suspicion had played a significant part in the breakdown of negotiations. The nobles castigated the avocats for wishing to become a fourth estate of the realm, while many within the third estate shared the abb´e Dillon’s doubts about the practical effects of the renunciation of privilege. These obstacles were not necessarily insurmountable, but with the Estates General due to meet in May hopes of reaching a compromise were fading fast. t h e pa m ph l e t c a m pai g n After the effective collapse of government censorship in the autumn of 1788, Burgundian authors were quick to reach for their quills, and the resulting pamphlets added another dimension to the political discussions in Dijon at the end of December 1788. Many of these publications were inspired by those events and by the vexed question of voting procedure, but they also contained a wider critique of the Estates and their administration. Foremost amongst the early censors of the administration were the marquis de Cr´equi, a member of the Estates of Artois and a descendant of an ancient aristocratic family that had once served the Valois dukes, and the local nobleman, the vicomte de Chastenay. Cr´equi was an impassioned crusader on behalf of the provincial estates.61 He published a variety of tracts in the months preceding the revolution, including a pamphlet entitled De la Bourgogne. De ce qu’elle a ´et´e, de ce qu’elle est et de ce qu’elle sera. The pamphlet began with a classic exposition of the th`ese parlementaire, and came complete with suitably deferential references to Malesherbes’ remonstrances of July 1763 and the traditional characterisation of the ´elus as inexperienced and dependent upon their 61

Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 273–4, 379.

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permanent officials.62 Somewhat contradictorily, the pamphlet also contained allegations of abuse of power by these same ´elus, which suggests that it was composed with local assistance. Cr´equi claimed that the ´elus had offered ‘the king a warship of the first class, without being in any way authorised by the Estates, probably with the unique aim of making themselves pleasing to the government’.63 He was referring to the warship offered to the king in 1782,64 and it allowed him to argue that the ´elus had taken advantage of the infrequency of assemblies of the Estates. In theory, everything in the chamber of ´elus was decided provisionally, but: there is never an appeal, either because it is useless to protest against a tax that is already raised, or the form and short duration of assemblies of the Estates means that there is no time to investigate the administration of the ´elus.

For Cr´equi the summoning of the Estates General promised a bright new future for the provinces, ‘yes, their constitutions are going to be restored, that of Burgundy in particular will breathe new life; its Estates will be freed from the chains that the despotism of the ministers and their commis have imposed’.65 The main target of his ire was the r`eglement of 1742, which, he believed, had extinguished Burgundian liberty by removing the right of the nobility to elect its ´elu. Free elections were a key theme in his argument, and like other would-be reformers Cr´equi was anxious to extend that principle to the third estate. With what sounds like physiocratic zeal, he warmly welcomed the suggestion that merchants, farmers and other property holders should be enfranchised, declaring that ‘the whole body politic rests on this sacred title of property holder’.66 Finally, one of the more original suggestions of Cr´equi concerned the functions of the alcades. They too were characterised as the victims of ministerial despotism having been forced, since 1742, to present their remarques for official approval before their presentation to the Estates. Once the liberty to speak freely had been recovered the alcades would become: the rampart . . . of our constitution. One cannot help but admire an institution which brings us close to the great days of the Roman republic, where an esteemed citizen was freely chosen by the people to watch over the senators, contain the nobles, protect the plebeians . . . to form, if it is possible to express it thus, a living barrier against corruption and vice. 62

63

References are from a manuscript copy, BMD MS 2073, fols. 17–29. The authorship was attributed to Cr´equi by the lawyer Lambert, ADCO E 642 bis, Lambert to Cortot, January 1789. If this was the case, he had almost certainly been given assistance by some well informed Burgundians. 64 See chapter 10. 65 BMD MS 2073, fol. 27. 66 Ibid., fol. 29. Ibid., fol. 25.

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The optimistic tone of Crequi’s pamphlet was in many ways typical of a broad strand of opinion that was not just confined to the ranks of the nobility. For many reformers the key issue in 1788–9 was to re-establish the Estates in their ancient glory, free of ministerial interference, within the old framework of orders, ´elus and alcades. The success of the pamphlet can be gauged by the fact that a colleague of the influential Burgundian avocat, Cortot, seriously considered the possibility that a shortage of copies was caused by the direct intervention of the prince de Cond´e. He informed Cortot that it was astounding that in Dijon they were ignorant of such an important work, claiming that ‘it is an exact revelation of the disgraceful abuses and odious acts which reign in the administration of our province’.67 A desire to expose the alleged corruption of the provincial administration also inspired the vicomte de Chastenay. He was a former soldier, who had spent his retirement knocking the dust off ancient parchments as part of his self-appointed role as the ‘intrepid defender of the privileges of the province’, and ‘the scourge of the Cond´e’.68 In September 1788, Chastenay published a substantial pamphlet, the Manuel du Bourguignon, attacking the familiar targets of the r`eglement of 1742, the censoring of the alcades and the ´epices charged by the Chambre des Comptes. He also accused the ´elus of abusing their position to build roads for their own convenience and of presiding over an administration that spent eight times more on their construction than the provincial administration of Berry.69 Between them, Cr´equi and Chastenay had impugned the honour of the ´elus, provoking at least two former members of the administration into publishing detailed replies. In the anonymous, Emploi des impˆots perc¸us par la province de Bourgogne, the author declared his intention to correct the errors he had found in Cr´equi’s pamphlet. He then proceeded to provide exhaustive details of the expenditure of the Estates in 1782, the year in which the ´elus had presented the king with the warship that had so annoyed the marquis.70 It would be difficult to exaggerate the degree of precision in the Emploi des impˆots, and spending was itemised down to the last denier, from the 33,846 livres 3 sols 4 deniers received by the prince de Cond´e to the 67 68

69 70

ADCO E 642, bis, Lambert to Cortot, 30 January 1789. The work of H. Richard, ‘Le vicomte Franc¸ois de Chastenay, d´efenseur de la noblesse, 1788–1789’, M´emoires de l’Acad´emie des Sciences, Arts et Belles-Lettres de Dijon 130 (1989–90), 321–41, is an essential introduction to the vicomte and his ideas in the period. The full title was Manuel du Bourguignon ou Recueil abr´eg´e des titres qui servent a` prouver les privileges de la province, BMD I–6145, and Richard, ‘Chastenay’, 328. BMD 21537 (1), Emploi des impˆots perc¸us par la province de Bourgogne. The author referred to ‘la place que j’occupois encore en 1783 dans l’administration de la province’.

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16 livres paid to the gondoliers in the park at Versailles!71 After presenting his accounts, the author concluded: ‘you can . . . make what use you wish of my manuscript, of which I attest the exactitude. If changes have been made in the administration of Burgundy since I left it, I know not; I only state what I know well, very well’. The same tone of measured rebuttal of the accusations against the administration was present in the second pamphlet, entitled Observations sur une brochure intitul´ee: le Manuel du bourguignon, written by the marquis d’Argenteuil, ´elu of the nobility between 1778 and 1781.72 While sympathetic to calls for the strengthening of the powers of the Estates, he refused to believe that the administration was riddled with abuse. To prove his point, he devoted several pages to correcting what he maintained were errors or ambiguities in the work of Chastenay, particularly relative to the cost of pensions and other financial gifts paid by the Estates. D’Argenteuil also made a spirited defence of fiscal policy more generally, especially the ‘buy-out’ of the four sols per livre of the capitation in 1779 which Chastenay had attacked.73 As the 1.2 million livres paid to the crown was to be repaid using the proceeds of the octrois and the crue of twenty sols per minot, d’Argenteuil was able to prove that the interests of province had been well served. He also defended the ´elus for offering the warship in 1782, again making it clear that the king’s willingness to grant the octrois to cover the necessary borrowing had rendered the gesture comparatively painless. As we have seen, the Estates had been bound up in a complicated and ultimately far from disadvantageous financial relationship with the crown, and the defence mounted by d’Argenteuil had the ring of truth. The real scandal in the fiscal system of the Estates lay in its inequality, but neither Chastenay nor Cr´equi spilt much ink denouncing that particular abuse. Events in Dijon during late December 1788 came as a rude shock to the noble advocates of the revitalised Estates and to some traditionally minded members of the third estate. A small group of avocats, who had distinguished themselves in the battles against the judicial reforms of Maupeou and Lamoignon, shied away from the prospect of breaking their alliance with 71 72

73

One of the privileges of the ´elus when at court was to have the fountains of Versailles played in their honour, the fontainiers received 24 livres. Its full title was Observations sur une brochure intitul´ee: le Manuel du bourguignon, ou recueil abr´eg´e des titres qui servent a` prouver les privil`eges de la province, BMD 21537 (1). Richard, ‘Chastenay’, 325, n. 29, has established that d’Argenteuil was the author. BMD 21537 (1), Observations sur une brochure intitul´ee: le Manuel du bourguignon, fols. 18–23. Both authors refer to it as a ‘rachat’, although it more closely resembles an abonnement as it was repeated every ten years.

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the parlementaires and remained convinced of the virtues of the Burgundian constitution.74 Dijon was thus treated to a series of pamphlets designed to rally support for a revised form of voting by order. In a work entitled Une membre du tiers ´etat a` ses pairs, dated 26 December 1788, possibly written by the avocat, Xavier, it was argued that voting by head would be detrimental to the third estate.75 He justified this argument on the basis that, if the two privileged orders were united in their determination to pass a d´ecret contrary to the interests of the third estate, they would only need to ‘corrupt’ one member of that order to prevail. If, on the other hand, voting was by order, with unanimity required to pass that d´ecret, it would need more than half of the third estate to side with the privileged. Another to intervene in the debate was the vicomte de Chastenay who penned the R´eflexions d’un Franc-bourguignon du tiers ´etat in which he adopted the guise of a commoner alarmed by the political discord in Dijon.76 While prepared to admit that all were ‘citizens and French’, he nevertheless launched an impassioned defence of social inequality using arguments drawn overwhelmingly from the works of Montesquieu.77 For Chastenay, voting by head threatened the very existence of the nobility, and without the bulwark provided by the second order the monarchy would quickly degenerate into despotism. The same argument punctuated his later pamphlets,78 and, like many of his peers, a willingness to contemplate reform of the Estates was matched by a no less determined opposition to the formula of doubled representation for the third estate and voting by head. Instead, he too added his voice to the campaign in favour of a veto, calling upon his credentials as an antiquarian to claim that it was the basis of the ancient constitution which would be easy to prove if the relevant archives had not been lost in a fire.79 A number of other authors ventured into print 74

75

76

77 78 79

Cortot was the quintessential example of this attitude and his correspondence charts his progressive disillusion with what he believed was the dangerously radical stance of his younger colleagues, ADCO E 642. The wider movement is discussed by D. A. Bell, Lawyers and citizens. The making of a political elite in old regime France (Oxford, 1994), pp. 182–9. BMD 21537 (1), Un membre du tiers ´etat a` ses pairs. On this particular printed copy somebody has written ‘par m. Xavier avocat’. This is hardly compelling evidence, but Xavier was one of those to protest against voting by head in April 1789. The complete title was R´eflexions d’un Franc-bourguignon du tiers ´etat, sur ce qui s’est pass´ee a` Dijon entre la noblesse de Bourgogne, qui ´etoit assembl´ee, et l’ordre du tiers de la mˆeme ville, BMD 21537 (1). On this particular copy, the chevalier de Berbisey had written ‘par M. Frochot avocat, who was another of the group concerned by the radicalism of his colleagues. However, Richard, ‘Chastenay’, 333, has argued persuasively that Chastenay was the author. BMD 21537 (1), R´eflexions d’un Franc-bouguignon, fols. 2–6. BMD 21537 (1), Replique du franc-bourguignon, and Lettre de M. Chastenay, de Flavigny en Bourgogne, le 20 F´evrier 1789, a` l’auteur du journal g´en´eral de France. BMD 21537 (1), R´eflexions d’un Franc-bourguignon, fols. 38–40.

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both to challenge Chastenay and to ponder the issue of the veto.80 Most were critical of the idea, in one instance even going so far as to equate it with the notorious liberum veto that many held responsible for the political anarchy in Poland!81 Ultimately Chastenay and his fellow nobles failed to persuade the third estate of Dijon to rally to their side, and their vision of a provincial constitution restored to its former glory could not match the alluring prospect of the Dauphin´e model. The Burgundian nobility’s failure left it perplexed, even frightened, and as he considered the potential implications of voting by head Chastenay asked rhetorically: what demon enemy of France has blown this destructive poison into [our] spirits? Unhappy third estate open your eyes and reflect, do not allow yourselves to be carried away by a false hope of happiness and liberty . . . think of the common good, and do not attempt to crush the nobility, if you do not wish to be crushed in your turn.82

Unfortunately for the vicomte and those of his ilk, in 1789 the members of the third estate had their eyes collectively fixed on the perceived threat from the privileged orders, not the hoary old menace of ministerial despotism. The origins of the incredible success of the abb´e Si`eyes’ legendary Qu’est-ce que le tiers ´etat, published in January of that year, lay in the fact that he had given forceful expression to sentiments that had been agitating the third estate since the autumn of 1788. The nobility’s hopes of reforming the Estates of Burgundy had been swept away by this tide, and if change was to be implemented it would require a national solution to the simple, yet heavily loaded, question of whether voting was to be by order or by head. d i v i s i o n s h a rd e n Following the collapse of negotiations with the nobility, the representatives of the major corporations of Dijon assembled on 11 January 1789 to consider their response.83 All were agreed on the need to seek redress for the ‘injustices’ suffered by the third estate within the existing organisation of the provincial Estates, and the next few days were filled with meetings and 80

81 82

These included: La r´eponse au Franc Bourguignon, R´eponse aux r´eflexions d’un Franc Bourguignon par M. T. D. B. C. D. C. and L’anti-veto ou r´eflexions d’un citoyen, en opposition avec celles d’un Franc Bourguignon, partisan du veto, des pouvoirs interm´ediaires et rapportant tout a` ce grand mot de constitution. Richard, ‘Chastenay’, 334. 83 ADCO C 3475. BMD 21537 (1), R´eflexions d’un Franc-bourguignon, fols. 40–1.

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consultations as a committee sought to draft a full list of grievances. The result was the Requˆete au roi adopted by the various corps of the city at an assembly held in the university on 18 January.84 The text contained a ringing endorsement of voting by head for both the forthcoming Estates General and a reformed Estates of Burgundy. Yet alongside these predictable demands were a whole series of damning criticisms of the provincial Estates that shed light on why compromise with the nobility had proved impossible. Louis XVI was informed that the ‘regime of our Estates, Sire, is alarming by the countless vices that it is infected, by the oppressive abuses that result’.85 According to the authors of the Requˆete, the root cause of the problem lay in the absence of genuine representation. Absent from the ranks of the chamber of the clergy were the humble cur´es, whose contacts with ordinary people provided them with a particularly detailed knowledge of the state of the province.86 Nor was the nobility properly represented, as only those possessing a fief in the province and a pedigree of at least one hundred years standing could attend. Such restrictions meant that ‘this numerous, wealthy and enlightened class has no representation in the provincial assembly’. As the nobility had been continually tightening its requirements for entry to the Estates throughout the previous century, these were telling criticisms. Not surprisingly, the third estate was especially concerned by its own limited representation. Attention was drawn to the nefarious consequences of venality, which had ended any pretence of free election. If the principal towns had lost the right to choose their deputies to the Estates, the majority of the smaller towns and the people of the countryside had been completely excluded. There was an unwritten assumption running through the Requˆete au roi that such inequality was no longer justifiable. In their unreformed state, the Estates were depicted as a passive and largely ineffectual body, which spent more time upon ‘ruinously expensive festivities than useful works’.87 The third estate also drew the king’s attention to the r`eglement of 1742, which, they claimed, shackled the patriotic sentiments of the alcades. Similar arguments had long punctuated the writings of noble reformers, but where the two sides parted company was over the nature of the constitution. After reminding the king that in Burgundy the vote of two orders could bind the third, the third estate of Dijon declared: 84 85

ADCO C 3475, Requˆete au roi et d´elib´eration du tiers-´etat de la ville de Dijon du 18 Janvier 1789. 86 Ibid., fols. 5–7. 87 Ibid., fols. 10–11. Ibid., fol. 4.

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it is unhappily too true that the privileged orders have always regarded as their first prerogative, the right to exempt themselves from all [financial] burdens, calculate, if it is possible, how such a weapon in their hands has wounded the third estate. Such is this tyrannical regime which seems to have been conceived in hatred of the most numerous and the most useful portion of the nation; worthy image of the feudal aristocracy where it was born.88

Despite the undercurrent of hostility towards the nobility running through the Requˆete au roi, its authors did acknowledge the belated conversion of the privileged to fiscal equality. The offer of a veto was, however, dismissed as a self-serving attempt to block ‘any deliberations that it [the noblesse] considers contrary to its interests’.89 The composition and the conduct of the provincial administration was denounced in no less scathing terms. Rather than add another coat of varnish to the classic portrait of well-meaning ´elus hoodwinked by their permanent officials, the third estate attacked the representatives of the privileged orders. According to the authors of the Requˆete au roi, the fact that the ´elus of the clergy and the nobility had one vote each in the chamber meant that they could easily dictate its decisions. Taken on its own terms the argument was correct. As president of the chamber, the ´elu of the clergy had the deciding vote, which meant that in order to prevail it was only necessary for the privileged orders to coax one of the representatives of either the third estate or the Chambre des Comptes to join their number.90 Having established the theoretical dominance of the privileged, the authors of the Requˆete au roi concluded that the ´elus of the privileged orders were almost inevitably ‘the absolute arbiters of the administration. The order of the third [estate] only appears there via representatives, that it has not chosen, to receive [for] a second time the law’.91 Once published, the Requˆete au roi received a rapturous reception throughout the province.92 No less than sixty-two separate corporations pledged their allegiance to the Requˆete, and the third estate of several of the larger towns, including Avallon, Auxonne, Charolles, Montbard and Saulieu, adhered to it. Others preferred to address their own petition to the crown. On 9 February 1789, an assembly of the inhabitants of Aignay-leDuc listened to a stinging attack on the abuses which ‘flow from the vicious 88 90

91 92

89 Ibid., fol. 13. Ibid., fol. 7. Within the chamber, the ´elu of the third estate and the vicomte-mayeur of Dijon together had one vote as did the two deputies of the Chambre des Comptes. However, for their voice to count they had to be of the same opinion, otherwise they cancelled each other out, see chapter 5. ADCO C 3475, Requˆete au roi, fol. 9. The Requˆete was widely circulated to the towns and parishes of Burgundy, which were asked to send their own letters to the king.

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organisation of the Estates of this province’.93 After hearing the angry orator denounce the allegedly prodigious cost of the Estates, the inequality of the tax system and the abusive actions of the chamber of ´elus, the local citizens voted to add their voice to calls for reform on the basis of voting by head. Individual corps also joined in the chorus, and the Requˆete au roi composed by the avocats of Semur-en-Auxois was typical of the genre, declaring that in ‘the Estates of Burgundy, all is abuse upon abuse, excess upon excess, in the right and the fact’.94 The various letters and requˆetes sent to the king in the first weeks of 1789 were clearly part of the national campaign for voting by head, and they provide further evidence, were it needed, of how misguided the government’s reaction to that demand was. Within the pays d’´etats, there was an additional dimension to the battle, because it was expected that the provincial estates would meet in order to elect deputies and prepare lists of grievances for the Estates General. Now that they had discovered their political voice, the leaders of the third estate of Burgundy dreaded the prospect of the local Estates meeting in their unreformed state and promptly disenfranchising them. Consequently many of the petitions sent to the crown contained demands that any meeting of the Estates of Burgundy be held according to the model agreed in Dauphin´e. With the noblesse having already stated its opposition to such a programme, the early months of 1789 were filled with speculation about whether or not the provincial Estates would meet and, if so, in what form. Louis XVI did promise a noble deputation that a meeting would be held before the opening of the Estates General, but on 17 April that decision was reversed. The king informed the commandant of the province, Gouvernet, that ‘my attention is fixed primarily upon the troubles that would result from holding the Estates of Burgundy, in the midst of the spirit of division that I see, with pain, reign in this province’.95 The king, or more realistically his ministers, had interpreted the situation accurately enough. While never threatening to match the bitter and angry scenes enacted in Brittany, the nobility and third estate of Burgundy had been unable to follow the example of their compatriots in Dauphin´e. Through their inability to resolve the dispute arising from the question of whether voting should be by order 93

94 95

ADCO C 3475, ‘D´elib´eration des habitants du bourg d’Aignay-le-Duc (9 F´evrier 1789)’. Similar scenes were repeated elsewhere, see: ibid., ‘Extrait des d´elib´erations de la chambre de la police . . . de Chˆatillon-sur-Seine’, and Fontaine-l`es-Dijon, BMD 21537 (1), ‘D´elib´eration des habitans de Fontaine-l`es-Dijon, au sujet des abus de l’administration de la province, envoy´ee a` M. Necker, directeur g´en´eral des finances, le mardi 13 Janvier 1789’. Quoted in Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, pp. 507–13. ADCO C 3367, fol. 223, Louis XVI to Gouvernet, 17 April 1789.

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or by head, they also gave a warning of the seriousness of the crisis awaiting the forthcoming Estates General. t h e c a h i e r s d e d o l e´ a n c e s The failure to agree upon the future composition of their Estates meant that Burgundians were obliged to wait upon the verdict of the Estates General. That prospect was in itself divisive, and the corps of avocats in Dijon was split between those who believed that the national assembly could legislate on provincial matters and their opponents, who argued that the Burgundian constitution was paramount. Put simply, the latter group argued that: it is not for the Estates General of the realm to pronounce on the reform of abuse[s] that have slipped into the those of the duchy of Burgundy; it is for the people of the three estates of this province to decide in the general assembly of the Burgundian nation, that is to say the three orders which compose the nation.96

In effect, the third estate in Dijon was already debating the legitimacy of a renunciation of privilege comparable to that enacted on the night of 4 August 1789, and a minority was fearful of its likely consequences. However, the vast majority of Burgundians were unaware of these thorny constitutional issues, and with the wind apparently blowing strongly in favour of decentralised government they assumed that a reinvigorated provincial Estates would be part of the new political order. As a result, the population treated the preparation of their lists of grievances in the spring of 1789 as an opportunity to censor their existing administration and to propose means of reforming it. One of the most dramatic events of 1789 was the revolt of the cur´es, with the lower clergy gradually discarding their traditional deference for their ecclesiastical superiors in favour of solidarity with the third estate.97 The clergy of the diocese of Dijon assembled in late March, and signs of conflict within the order were quickly apparent.98 When asked by the third estate to accept the principle of voting by head in future sessions of both the national and provincial estates, the clerics initially agreed. However, the 96

97 98

‘Protestation des avocats au Parlement de Dijon’, quoted in Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, pp. 501–5. The protest was signed by at least twenty-four avocats, including Vireley and Morisot who were both conseils des ´etats. Recent discussions of this important development include: Aston, End of an elite, pp. 134–56, and McManners, Church and society, ii, pp. 703–44. BMD MS 1415 (mic. 59), ‘Proces verbal de l’assembl´ee du clerg´e du bailliage principal de Dijon (Beaune, Auxonne, Nuits, Saint-Jean-de-Losne) 30 Mars 1789’.

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aggrieved intervention of the local nobility forced first the suspension and subsequently the overturning of that decision in favour of vote by order. It was the first hint that the clergy had been listening to the constitutional debate, and, on 7 April, the cur´es struck a more decisive blow. According to the outraged former ´elu, the abb´e de Luzines, they passed a motion stating that the ‘cahier would be charged with a demand that henceforth the cur´es of the province be represented in the Estates of Burgundy in proportion to their number’.99 When Luzines and a group of senior clerics sought to block the motion their words were stifled by ‘constant jeers and catcalls’.100 Nor was the abb´e any more successful when it came to controlling the election of deputies to the Estates General, and, together with thirty-four others, he stormed out of the assembly before the votes were cast. It is likely that, as a former ´elu and a prot´eg´e of the prince de Cond´e, Luzines was expecting to be elected himself. If so, his hopes were dashed and Claude Merceret, cur´e of Fontaine-l`es-Dijon, was selected to make the journey to Versailles together with the bishop of Dijon. Luzines was left to lament the collapse of good order in his correspondence with the governor, and both men bemoaned the nefarious effects of allowing ordinary cur´es to gather in such numbers.101 Yet the disappointment of Luzines should not be allowed to disguise the fact that the bishop of Dijon had been elected without difficulty, unlike his counterpart in nearby Mˆacon who, when confronted by a phalanx of country cur´es, had withdrawn from the proceedings in disgust.102 Nor was the final cahier especially radical. On the issue of the provincial constitution, the diocese of Dijon favoured a largely conservative position; change was only to be affected by the local Estates legitimately assembled, and they favoured voting by order.103 At Auxerre, where the bishop was elected by the narrowest of margins, the clergy had little to say on local self-government beyond a general call for provincial estates to be established in the pays d’´elections.104 At Autun, on the other hand, the local clergy were treated to a virtuoso performance from their recently installed bishop, Talleyrand. An 99 100 101 102 103

104

ADCO C 3475, ‘Protestation, 7 Avril 1789’. Ibid. It should be noted that this was how Luzines interpreted events. For an insight into this correspondence see ADCO C 3475, Cond´e to abb´e de Luzines, 16 April 1789. McManners, Church and society, ii, p. 737. ADCO C 3475, ‘Cahier de l’ordre du clerg´e du bailliage principal de Dijon, et des bailliages secondaires de Beaune, Nuits, Auxonne et Saint Jean de Losne, contenant les instructions et les ´ pouvoirs, que donne le dit ordre a` ses d´eput´es aux Etats G´en´eraux convoqu´es pour le 27 Avril 1789’. BN Joly de Fleury 1044, fol. 304, ‘Cahiers des petitions de l’ordre du clerg´e du bailliage d’Auxerre’.

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aristocratic prelate with neither faith nor vocation, he spent the early months of 1789 in his episcopal city where he won admiration for his displays of piety.105 When the local clerics gathered to elect their deputies and draft their cahier, the bishop delivered a stirring speech outlining the shortcomings of the provincial administration, which he blamed firmly on the effects of ministerial despotism.106 Talleyrand’s praise of the alcades, attacks on the ´epices paid to the Chambre des Comptes and criticism of the lack of genuine representation, revealed that he had been following the Burgundian political debate as well as reading his breviary, and it was enough to seal his election. Overall, however, the impression from the surviving cahiers of the Burgundian clergy is one of relative indifference to the conduct of the provincial administration, and they happily limited themselves to general expressions of support for a more representative version of the old Estates. As we have seen, those nobles who had assembled in Dijon, or committed their thoughts to print, were enthusiastic supporters of revitalised Estates, but they had stopped short of accepting voting by head. More liberal sentiments are hard to find, and the only strong movement in favour of the position of the third estate came at the meeting of the nobles of Chˆatillonsur-Seine.107 There a real debate took place, and it was only by ‘a thin majority’ that support for voting by order was maintained. Elsewhere the situation was very different and the nobles of Dijon ordered their deputies to withdraw or abstain rather than vote by head in the Estates General.108 As the members of the second order in the provincial capital had already made their attitude towards reform of the provincial Estates clear, it is interesting to scan the cahiers of the other bailliages on the subject. The noblesse of Autun, Semur-en-Brionnais, Montcenis and Bourbon-Lancy also rejected voting by head, and ordered their deputies to the Estates General to reject any measures contrary to ‘the constitution of the province, as well as its rights, liberties and privileges; the Estates of Burgundy alone having the right to decide the changes which could appear necessary to them’.109 They 105 106 107

108

109

McManners, Church and society, ii, p. 740. A. de Charmasse and P. Montarlot eds., Cahiers des communaut´es du bailliage d’Autun pour les ´etats g´en´eraux de 1789 (Autun, 1895), pp. 353–83, esp. 360–3. Richard, ‘Nouveaux documents’, 69. These events were referred to in the correspondence of Cortot, ADCO E 642, bis, Lambert to Cortot, 3 March 1789. In his letter, Lambert claimed that eighteen or nineteen gentlemen had adhered to the position of the third estate. ADCO C 3475, ‘Cahier des pouvoirs et instructions remis a` messieurs Lemulier de Bressey et comte ´ de Levis, e´lus d´eput´es aux prochains Etats-G´ en´eraux, par l’ordre de la noblesse du bailliage de Dijon, le 8 Avril 1789’. Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 345, 350.

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had nothing to say about the provincial administration other than to demand the abolition of the intendancy and the transfer of its powers to the ´elus. The cahier drafted by the nobles of the Auxois was scarcely more forthcoming. They too defended Burgundy’s constitutional independence relative to the Estates General, even on matters of taxation, and wanted to dismiss the intendant.110 It was left to the nobles of Bar-sur-Seine to advance some more original ideas.111 They accepted the right of the national assembly to interfere in the internal affairs of the provinces, and suggested that ‘it would be worthy of the wisdom of the Estates General to forbid sumptuous feasts and gambling’.112 The nobles were also impressed by the midwifery courses subsidised by the ´elus and wanted the programme expanded. This rather curious choice of emphasis was the sum total of the commentary on provincial affairs by the admittedly small number of nobles resident in Bar-sur-Seine. However, the general absence of references to the Burgundian Estates in the cahiers of the province’s nobility was not altogether surprising. Many refused to accept that the Estates General had the right to interfere in their affairs, and a wide-ranging reform programme had been advanced during the meetings in Dijon only a few months before. Their failure on that occasion presumably contributed to their relative silence thereafter. Unlike those of their privileged counterparts, the cahiers of the third estate were brimming with comments, criticisms and ideas for reforming the Estates.113 It has long been known that many of the documents drafted in the small towns and villages of France were based upon those of the cities, or had been penned by the ubiquitous lawyers who provided much of the political leadership in 1789. Burgundy was no exception to this rule. The cahier of the third estate of Dijon has been described as a ‘model framework’,114 and numerous communities were content to list their local grievances and then ‘adhere’ to that of the provincial capital, or to those of other towns such as Autun or Semur-en-Auxois, on weightier issues.115 As 110 111 113

114 115

ADCO C 3475, ‘Noblesse du bailliage d’Auxois’. 112 Ibid. pp 467–8. Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, iii, pp. 460–70. The following is not based upon an exhaustive study of the vast corpus of cahiers produced by the third estate of Burgundy. Instead, it is an attempt to sample the concerns of the order relative to the Estates of the province using, in particular, the published documents for the bailliages of Dijon, Autun, Bar-sur-Seine and Semur-en-Auxois. It is likely that further investigation would confirm the predominance of the themes discussed below. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 249. For a number of examples, see: Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 12–13, 83, 93, 109, 152, 223, 230; Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, pp. 368, 380, 384, 425–7; and Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, ii, p. 496, iii, 346, 407, 417.

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we might expect, on matters pertaining to the provincial Estates the central thrust of these cahiers was for the adoption of the Dauphin´e model in Burgundy.116 It is also clear that the Requˆete au roi of 18 January, which had circulated widely within the province, provided the ammunition for many of the cahiers. Yet, without denying the extent to which the Requˆete and the cahier of Dijon served as templates for others, it is clear that the inhabitants of the small towns and the countryside had their own distinctive voice to add. Their grievances were more closely focused upon the actual practice of the provincial administration than the constitutional issues which so animated the bourgeoisie of Dijon. These rural cahiers are, therefore, an invaluable record of how ordinary Burgundians viewed the performance of their rulers. One of the most striking features of the cahiers is the relative absence of outright hostility towards the institution of the Estates. Rare are those like the community of Mesvre in the Autunois which called for their suppression, although in the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine a number of villages on the administrative frontier did ask to be reincorporated into the province of Champagne.117 An absence of any reference to the Estates was also comparatively rare, and, of sixty-five cahiers produced by the third estate of the bailliage of Autun, only four kept totally silent on the issue. In the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine only the village of Balnot-le-Chatel ignored the Estates entirely.118 There was, therefore, a general assumption, even desire, that the provincial Estates would play a central part in the new administrative structure, and communities were determined to secure their own participation. Countless villages called for the countryside to be represented in the Estates, as did the smaller towns such as Couches, which declared that ‘the parish contains at least 500 hearths and it pays heavy taxes, [it] will deputise directly to the provincial Estates’.119 Specific projects for reform of the chamber of ´elus were rare, and most were content to make a general request for better representation of the third estate. One notable exception was the cahier of Bourbon-Lancy.120 It 116 117 118

119 120

The cahier of Dijon is cited by Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, pp. 249–50. Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, p. 136, and Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, iii, pp. 310, 349–67, 411–18. They had been joined to Burgundy during the reign of Louis XV. Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 159, 173, 200, 209, and Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, iii, pp. 270–8. As R. H. Blackman, ‘Representation without revolution: political representation as defined in the general cahiers de dol´eances of 1789’, French History 15 (2001), 159–85, esp. 176, has noted, over 80 per cent of the general cahiers of both the nobility and third estate demanded provincial assemblies of some kind. Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, p. 57. Most villages were content to make a general demand for representation, for example, ibid., pp. 25, 32, 43, 49, 127, 169, 193. Ibid., pp. 295–328.

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proposed dividing each bailliage into districts, which would elect councils to oversee the administration in their locality, and then send deputies to the assemblies of the Estates. The aim was to create a new tier of government with a better understanding of the needs of the people, whose knowledge would subsequently be put to good effect by choosing the ´elus from amongst those who had served at district level. Other cahiers were less constructive in their criticisms. That composed by the villagers of Dracy-les-Viteaux in the Auxois was scathing in its condemnation of the ´elus, informing Louis XVI that ‘our province is administered by men who are called ´elus, but who assuredly will never be ´elus in the kingdom of heaven: only those who love justice will enter there, and it seems that the ´elus of Burgundy are ´elus precisely to commit iniquity’.121 The authors of the cahier cited the fire fund established by the chamber as an example of its uncharitable conduct because the sums distributed were raised directly from the taille. In angry tones they thundered: destroy therefore, Sire, destroy our ´elus, and put them in this world amongst the ranks of the condemned; forgive us these strong expressions, they are born of the just indignation which animates us, us and all the communities of poor Burgundy, unhappy victim of their tyranny.

Yet, even this seemingly damning verdict was followed by a more familiar appeal for reformed Estates with freely elected ´elus to replace them. Indeed the overall impression from the cahiers is that direct criticism of the ´elus was comparatively muted,122 and their personal qualities, or integrity, were rarely called into question. At most they were accused of not responding to the requˆetes submitted to them, especially those dealing with fiscal matters, and even these failings were often attributed to the incompetence or ill-will of their subordinates. What really incensed the third estate was the fiscal system, over which the ´elus presided, and protests against fiscal inequality appeared in one form or another in the vast majority of cahiers. Many repeated the earlier arguments about the third estate alone paying for works of public utility, which the villagers of Champrenault and Saint-Helier believed to have reduced a class born ‘poor and free’ to ‘about the same level as negroes’.123 The selfish motives of the privileged offered the most obvious explanation for fiscal inequality, and some went further, linking the abuse to a lack of 121 122 123

Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 404. For other examples, see: Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, iii, pp. 353, 384–6, 493. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 397.

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proper representation.124 Nor was it simply a case of complaining about the burden supported by the third estate alone. Attention was also focused upon the inequalities resulting from the collection of universal taxes, and, after providing a detailed breakdown of its vingti`eme payments, the village of Landreville asked: how could the administration of the ´elus of Burgundy have burdened a community with such a heavy load ? For years we have trembled to be the prey of an administration as vicious, arbitrary and tyrannical as that of the province to which we are joined.125

Landreville was part of the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine where hostility to the ´elus was particularly pronounced, largely on account of what the local inhabitants believed was their disproportionately high share of the common tax burden, and elsewhere criticism was generally less strident. Even so, there was clearly frustration and anger that the benefits of the abonnement system were not more evenly distributed.126 The actual administration of the fiscal system provided another source of discontent. It was widely believed that the ´elus had no knowledge of the communities they taxed and, more tellingly, that it was difficult to obtain a fair hearing for appeals against individual assessments. At its most extreme this resulted in the claim contained in the cahier of Pouillenay ‘that several individuals have not been discharged from the vingti`eme, even though they no longer possess the property on which it is levied’.127 Nor could they obtain redress because the requˆetes they sent to the ´elus were ignored. While grumbling of this type was quite common, it paled into insignificance when set against the outpouring of anger against the system of cotes d’office, whereby the ´elus were empowered to fix individual tax assessments by administrative fiat.128 Intended to protect communities from the tax evasion by the rich and powerful, the procedure had caused bitter conflict between the ´elus and the Parlement of Dijon throughout the eighteenth century. A closer look at why it attracted so much hostile commentary in 1789 is therefore helpful. 124 125 126

127 128

The village of Celles in the comt´e of Bar-sur-Seine was a particularly good example, Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, i, pp. 488–500. Ibid., iii, pp. 297–8. The villagers of Verley-sous-Dree in the Auxois expressed the matter succinctly, protesting that ‘nos vingti`emes sont abonn´es dans cette province, et que le peuple ne profite pas du b´en´efice qu’elle y fait’, Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 384. Ibid., p. 401. See: Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 12, 20, 26, 72, 120, 153, 181, 199, 240; Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 419; and Vernier, ed., Cahiers de Bar-sur-Seine, i, pp. 491–3, iii, pp. 253, 299, 322, 336, 346, 407.

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According to the authors of the cahiers, cotes d’office were ‘worthy of public execration’, ‘humiliating’ and decided by the ´elus ‘on the [basis] of reports that are made without examination and without knowing if they are true or false’.129 As the cotes were, in theory, more likely to be employed against the wealthiest in a community, it is possible that the volume of complaint reflects the prominence of these same figures in drafting the cahiers. However, the sheer volume of protest does imply that they were genuinely unpopular, and part of the explanation may lie in the manner in which the ´elus used their powers. When four inhabitants of Givry refused to present themselves for the corv´ee in 1729 they were taxed ‘by office’ as a punishment.130 Franc¸ois Vielard, on the other hand, received a cote d’office ‘of 20 livres for having shown disrespect to one of messieurs when he spoke to him about repairs of the roads’. A similar retributive element was present in more conventional cases. In May 1773, the ´elus had informed the intendant that the tax of a certain sieur Lantissier had been doubled ‘as punishment’ for having interfered in the preparation of the rolls.131 Finally, as the ´elus later admitted in a letter to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral of October 1788, ‘they believed it fair to force a little the first year, a cote [d’office], both to indemnify the community for the loss it had sustained during the period that the tax was too light, and to oblige individuals to declare their true means’.132 Attitudes and practices such as these presumably account for the numerous references to cotes d’office as ‘cotes of punishment’ in the cahiers, and they also suggest that the Parlement of Dijon was justified in claiming that it should hear appeals, not the chamber of ´elus. No assessment of the provincial administration was complete without an almost obligatory attack upon the receivers, and the cahiers of the third estate were no exception. The people of Uncey [le-Franc], were convinced that the ‘receivers of the taille grow fat on their sweat and they all become very rich by the revenues that they make from their place’.133 Similar sentiments were to be found in the cahier of March´eseuil which called for a cut in the fees paid to the treasurer general, and the abolition of the receivers, ‘these public leeches, fattened on the blood of the people’.134 The fact that 129 130 131

132 133 134

´ Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 111 (Issy-l’Eveque), 181 (Saint-Jean-le-Grand), 224 (Sully-en-Duch´e). For these and other examples, see ADCO C 4957, bis, fols. 3–34. ADCO C 3363, fols. 166–8, Amelot to the ´elus, 18 May 1773, and their reply of the same date. This was merely one incident in a long-running saga, and Lantissier was still contesting the matter in 1777, ADCO C 3364, fol. 95, the ´elus to Dupleix de Bacquencourt, 30 December 1777. ADCO C 3367, fols. 167–9, the ´elus to the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, 28 October 1788. Robin, Semur-en-Auxois, p. 421. Charmasse and Montarlot, Cahiers d’Autun, pp. 127–30.

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the same cahier contained a torrent of abuse against cotes d’office and the whole provincial administration, and was signed by J. Lantissier, does look suspicious. Yet even if the tone of these attacks was especially violent, it remains true that the abolition of the receivers, or at least a sharp cut in their fees, was one of the most common demands of the third estate. Amongst the achievements of the ´elus, constructing an efficient road network took pride of place, and there were few complaints about the quality of the provincial highways. Any critical references were reserved for the minor roads, which had only recently come under the jurisdiction of the ´elus, with demands that they receive a similar degree of care and attention. Instead, almost every cahier contained a denunciation of the corv´ee, regardless of the fact that it had recently been abolished. Ordinary Burgundians clearly dreaded the prospect of its re-establishment, and still felt it necessary to cram their cahiers with demands for its suppression, or commutation into a cash payment to be paid by all three orders. As we might expect, accusations of favouritism in the choice of priorities for public works or corruption in the distribution of contracts did occasionally surface. However, complaints were few in number and there was no great wave of denunciation against the conduct of the administration. Much the same could be said of the other tasks overseen by the ´elus. Nothing caused the inhabitants of the countryside more grief than the militia, ‘the tax dreaded most by the peasantry’, and the call for its suppression was almost universal.135 Yet the administration of the ´elus, who had always been responsible for the drawing of lots and the mustering and payment of the conscripts, escaped almost without comment. The general cahier of Autun, Montcenis, Semur-en-Brionnais and Bourbon-Lancy also contained an article calling for the suppression of the provincial stud which it claimed was of no public utility. The inclusion of this demand was rather curious given that only one of nearly one hundred known cahiers had advocated such a step, and that was the particularly venomous one from March´eseuil. Taken as a whole the cahiers of the smaller towns and villages of Burgundy were not charged with an overwhelming number of specific allegations of misconduct. The tax system, especially its inequalities, and the fiscal officers of the Estates had attracted the fiercest and most widespread criticism, and the need for reform was undeniable. Yet these understandable grievances 135

Ibid., p. 119. The phrase is taken from the cahier of Laisy in the Autunois and it was repeated in many others, suggesting it was chosen from a ‘model’ cahier. The hatred of the militia was, however, real enough and the Burgundian peasantry reacted in much the same way as their compatriots elsewhere.

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were not accompanied by calls for the suppression of the Estates, and the majority clearly believed that they could be reformed. Although there are examples of the administration being denounced as ‘vicious’ or ‘tyrannical’, they remain a minority, albeit not quite as small a one as the list of cahiers praising the ´elus! The general impression is of an institution which, while not much loved, was respected, and for all its faults was expected to play a part in the eagerly anticipated reform of the kingdom. In the twilight of the ancien r´egime, the Estates of Burgundy had been subject to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny by the inhabitants of the province. Projects for reform had surfaced within the Estates before August 1788 and in the wider province thereafter. What they had in common was a desire to strengthen the powers of the Estates by making them more representative and by increasing the authority of their assemblies and alcades. One of the principal objectives of this campaign was to impose a greater degree of control over the conduct of the chamber of ´elus, whose actions were increasingly felt to be arbitrary and unaccountable. In a sense, these arguments reflected a popular mood in which all existing authority was treated with suspicion and actual examples of misconduct were rare. As a result, even the fiercest critics of the provincial administration were quite happy to keep the existing institutional structure once it had been made more representative. It was the intendant, not the Estates or ´elus, who was seen as surplus to local requirements. On these grounds at least, it is possible to see how the privileged orders and the third estate might have united behind a programme of institutional regeneration because, if the provincial administration was far from popular, it was still seen as essential to local governance. What stopped such an alliance from forming was the vexed issue of voting in any revitalised provincial Estates. The Burgundian noblesse, while not as hidebound as its compatriots in Brittany, was determined to maintain voting by order, partly because it believed that this was a necessary barrier to despotism and royal interference, but also to preserve its own privileges and distinctions. The nobles were backward looking in the sense that they sought the restoration of an allegedly golden age before a perfect provincial constitution had been corrupted by the poison of ministerial despotism. The third estate, on the other hand, had initially been preoccupied with the issue of fiscal inequality, and the rejection of most of its demands by the privileged orders had undoubtedly created doubts about their motives. By the time the nobility finally embraced the principle, in the autumn of 1788, it was too late because the third estate was already emboldened by the winds of change blowing in from Dauphin´e. The proposal to introduce a veto offered hope

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that a Burgundian voting model might be created, but the nobility would not make one final gesture by agreeing to vote by head if the three orders were deadlocked. That failure stemmed from the political consequences of the social divisions embodied in the vexed question of voting procedure. It had paralysed the attempt to reinvigorate the Estates of Burgundy, and within a few months it would destroy the absolute monarchy.

Conclusion

t h e f i n a l ac t Once the Estates General opened in May 1789 provincial affairs faded from view as all eyes were fixed on the drama being played out at Versailles. The lethargy of Louis XVI soon ensured that the issue of voting poisoned the political atmosphere of the Estates General in much the same way as it had already done in Burgundy. Revolution was the result, and by the end of July the Estates General had been transformed into the Constituent Assembly, the self-appointed representative of the sovereign nation, charged with endowing France with a constitution. In the new political climate nothing was sacred, and on the night of 4 August the Assembly struck a decisive blow against what was already being described as the ancien r´egime. Intoxicated by patriotism, fear of the violence in the countryside, or too much wine, depending on personal interpretation, deputies flocked to the rostrum to renounce the rights of the corps and provinces of the kingdom in a veritable bonfire of the privileges. At a stroke, the constitution, rights and liberties of Burgundy were swept away, and with them went the justification for the existence of the provincial estates. Even at this late stage, it was not impossible that they could be preserved as part of a reformed local government structure based upon the old provinces. The wind was, however, blowing strongly in the direction of a new division of the kingdom founded upon the enlightened ideals of rationality and uniformity rather than ancient charters and tradition. The decisive debates took place in the early autumn, and, on 26 October, assemblies of the provincial estates were forbidden. A new system of departments, districts and cantons was officially approved in December 1789, and elections were held in July 1790 inaugurating the active life of a local government structure that was one of the most enduring legacies of the revolution. As the administrative edifice of the ancien r´egime came tumbling down, the prince de Cond´e was quick to join the e´migr´es, while the intendant of 400

Conclusion

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Dijon, Amelot, left Burgundy for Paris on 22 July 1789 and never returned. If the ´elus had been the dilettantes so frequently denounced by historians, they might have been expected to melt away. That they preferred to remain stoically at their posts until August 1790, grappling manfully with the immensely difficult task of governing in uncertain times when their own institution had been condemned, says far more about their real character both then and over the period of this study as a whole. The archives are brimming with the documents generated by the ´elus concerning taxation, including the new patriotic contribution, roads, canals and military ´etapes.1 Not for nothing did Daniel Ligou remark that from reading the registers of the Estates, one could be forgiven for believing that there had not been a revolution in France.2 A similar pride and determination to fulfil their duty animated the alcades, who assembled regularly during the spring of 1790 to produce a thorough collection of remarques for the triennalit´e of 1787–90.3 The result was a remarkably smooth transition from the old administrative world to the new, even if the ´elus were determined to hold on to power for as long as was legally permissible, much to the frustration of the commissariat charged with winding up the financial and other affairs of the Estates. The final bell tolled on 14 August 1790 when the vicomte de Bourbon-Busset, ´elu of the nobility, replied to a letter sent by the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, Lambert. He wrote: I have received the letter that you have done the honour of writing to the ´elus g´en´eraux on the 10th of this month, to which was joined the king’s proclamation of 8 August 1790, issued on the decree of the National Assembly of 10 July, ordering the revocation of the administration previously confided to the ´elus g´en´eraux of the duchy of Burgundy, comt´es and pays adjacents. I am with respect, sir, your very humble and obedient servant.4

As he laid down his quill after writing this simple letter of acknowledgement, Bourbon-Busset completed the final act in the long history of the Estates General of Burgundy. the es tat e s a n d a b s o lu t e m o n a rc h y : s o m e re f l e c t i o n s When, in 1842, the historian Th´eodore Foisset asked himself the rhetorical question: ‘what had the Estates of Burgundy become under Louis XV?’ he 1

2 4

D. Ligou, ‘La fin de la province de Bourgogne et le commissariat des d´epartements bourguignons, 1789–1791’, Annales de Bourgogne 49 (1977), 121–56, provides a more detailed study of the final months of the Estates. Further details can be gleaned from the remarques of the alcades prepared in 1790, ADCO C 3307, fols. 81–136. 3 ADCO C 3307, fols. 81–136. Ligou, ‘La fin de la province de Bourgogne’, 125–6. ADCO C 3367, fol. 419, Bourbon-Busset to Lambert, 14 August 1790.

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replied ‘a name’.5 It was an opinion shared by many subsequent scholars, and one of the principal aims of this study was to examine the legitimacy of such a damning verdict. As we have seen, the Estates of Burgundy, like those elsewhere, had no shortage of weaknesses. For all their prestige and glitter, the Estates were not a representative institution in any modern sense, and only a fraction of their respective social groups sat in the chambers of the three orders. While undoubtedly a disadvantage, it was hardly surprising in the context of the times, and it did not invalidate the role that the Estates performed. Far from being a medieval relic, the Estates remained a lively and active institution throughout the period after 1661. Without ever imitating the fiery scenes enacted in Brittany, the triennial assemblies were working sessions, and the crown and its representatives were regularly forced to use all of the arts of persuasion to ensure that financial and other measures were approved. Historians have often discounted the positive achievements of the Estates, citing the reiteration of their d´ecrets, or the remarques of the alcades, as evidence of chronic abuse within the administration. Grave problems undoubtedly existed, and the Estates were seriously handicapped by the rarity and brevity of their meetings. This made it difficult to maintain pressure on the ´elus, and it accounts, in part, for the need to repeat d´ecrets continually before their contents were absorbed into the routine of administrative practice. The willingness of the chambers to maintain that pressure was crucial, and by issuing and reissuing d´ecrets they were able to ensure that change did eventually occur. They were assisted in this process by the conscientious attitude of both the alcades and the province’s legal officers, whose remarques, while too often ignored, bear witness to the existence of a critical and reforming spirit within the Estates. During the early part of the reign of Louis XIV, the Estates had defended the privilege of holding triennial assemblies, presumably because they believed that it would limit the crown’s ability to increase taxation. If so, they were sadly mistaken. Rather than summon the Estates to approve its fiscal demands, the crown chose to negotiate directly with the ´elus, and the majority of taxation had been levied long before the Estates had an opportunity to raise their voice. Here lies part of the explanation for why Burgundy did not experience battles over new taxation comparable to those which occurred in both Brittany and Languedoc, notably when Machault d’Arnouville introduced his famous vingti`eme in 1749–50. To be fair to the ´elus, they were never subservient to the demands of the contrˆoleur g´en´eral, and plenty of hard bargaining preceded the agreement to buy out royal 5

Foisset, Pr´esident de Brosses, p. 204.

Conclusion

403

edicts, or to sign a new abonnement. Indeed, on occasion, they refused to contract abonnements altogether if they believed that the terms offered by the king were unattractive. By accident or design, the fact that the Estates were reduced to giving retrospective approval to many financial demands was a prime cause of their relative tranquillity once the crown began to introduce new forms of direct taxation after 1695. There were, however, a series of interrelated factors that account for the establishment of a relatively harmonious relationship. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Burgundian political landscape was the continuing status of the governor. The political rehabilitation of the Grand Cond´e in 1660 permitted the re-establishment of his rule in the province, and thereafter he and his descendants exercised a profound influence upon the affairs of the Estates. Patronage in the form of the right of appointment to key offices such as the treasurer general and secr´etaires des ´etats and even some of the ´elus meant that throughout the period it is possible to talk of the existence of a Cond´ean clientele. With powerful allies in key positions, the governor dominated the meetings of the Estates, and in his absence there was a network of loyal subordinates to keep him informed of events in the chamber of ´elus. For the Cond´e, the governorship brought substantial material rewards and also reinforced respect for their position in the social hierarchy. Yet they never treated it as a sinecure, and a real sense of dedication to their role, as well as affection for the rights and traditions of the Estates, was maintained by successive generations of the family. Only after 1740 was their influence challenged, and the position inherited by the prince de Cond´e in 1754 was, in theory at least, considerably weaker than that enjoyed by his father. In practice, the crown proved reluctant to enforce many of its own r`eglements, and the prince re-established much of his family’s old authority. If the Cond´e and the Estates both benefited from the relationship, the crown had no reason to complain. Successive governors proved to be effective managers of the Estates, and they contributed enormously to the quiescence of the province after 1661. The power of the governor in Burgundy was probably unique, and if this was the case the crown had overlooked a potentially valuable resource, especially in troublesome provinces such as Brittany. It is, however, beyond doubt that traditional interpretations, suggesting that the Estates were either broken by the absolutism of the Sun King or swept away by the new bureaucratic broom of the intendant, are mistaken. Instead, after 1661, Louis XIV and Colbert succeeded in ending the customary practice of haggling over the don gratuit and in reducing the tendency of the ´elus to

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procrastinate over its payment. That transformation was achieved because the monarch was prepared to offer tangible rewards for obedience, not least by reducing his demands if they were first met in full. Much the same policy was being pursued simultaneously in the other pays d’´etats, and by 1674 the king had obtained the public signs of conformity that he so craved. Yet, as we have suggested, it was the second half of his reign that brought the real challenge to his ability to manage the Estates, as new taxation, buyouts and other fiscal expedients rained down on the province. In the face of Louis XIV’s fiscal onslaught, there was no repeat of the truculence that had seen the Estates transferred to Noyers in 1658 nor was there a revolt such as that which shook Brittany in 1675. The harsh treatment inflicted upon the Bretons may well have had a sobering effect on potential dissidents, and the king’s increasingly autocratic behaviour, especially in time of war, reduced the scope for disruption still further. Another factor that should not be overlooked was the impact of venality. Although the governor had closely monitored elections, the deputies of the third estate could still claim a form of mandate, and they were generally to the fore in resisting increases to the don gratuit. After 1696, the mayors of the towns, who composed the chamber of the third estate, were nominees of the Estates, completely dependent upon the goodwill of either the governor or the ´elus. Their scope for opposition within the chamber was thus sharply reduced. With the third estate unlikely to pose a serious obstacle to royal demands much depended on the attitude of the nobility and clergy, and they had every reason to be satisfied with their lot. In Artois, Brittany and Languedoc, the Estates had played an important role in establishing Louis XIV’s ruling consensus, serving as the arena for the distribution of pensions and honours as well as the wealth extracted from the peasantry through the tax system. As we might expect, a similar pattern was detectable in Burgundy, and perhaps as much as one third of the Estates’ revenues found its way into the pockets of local elites. Most of the dons et gratifications accorded by the Estates went to a narrow group composed of the governor and his household, the ´elus and officers of the Estates, local dignitaries, notable military officers, the intendant and the first president of the Parlement, and ministers and their commis in Versailles. However, the circle of beneficiaries was widened by the tax system, and the officers of the Chambre des Comptes reaped a rich reward from their auditing of the provincial accounts. Finally, the provincial debt offered a coveted investment opportunity, and as Louis XIV’s wars required massive borrowing the governing elites profited handsomely. With the economy reeling from the effects of natural and man-made disasters,

Conclusion

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it was possible to lend to the Estates and receive an annual return of 5 per cent with almost no risk of default. Not surprisingly, the chance to lend to the Estates was highly prized, to the extent that some could seriously consider making it a Burgundian privilege. The Estates had proved themselves to be flexible and effective in their response to Louis XIV’s financial demands, proving that representative institutions could be a valuable partner for the absolute monarchy. The system of loans covered by the proceeds of the rights to the crues or the octrois on the river Saˆone, established between 1688 and 1715, endured largely unchanged until the revolution. The monarchy was happy to endorse the system because the credit of the Estates offered a precious resource that could be counted upon in even the most trying circumstances. As the debt expanded in the second half of the eighteenth century the practice of borrowing for the king became entrenched, and the credit network became increasingly cosmopolitan in nature. Yet the ´elus were still able to manipulate the system to favour local interests, not least by placing local money more advantageously, or by ensuring that Burgundians were the last to be reimbursed. The introduction of universal direct taxation after 1695 saw the Estates protecting the interests of the privileged in other ways. By contracting abonnements with the crown, the Estates helped the wealthiest inhabitants to avoid paying their fair share of the burden. The abuse was most glaring in the case of the capitation. Thanks to the deal struck in 1710, the contribution of the privileged remained static throughout most of the eighteenth century. More importantly, by allowing the chamber of nobility to administer its own affairs, the abonnement allowed some to avoid paying the tax altogether. The vingti`eme did briefly pose a more potent threat to privileged interests before it too became subject to an abonnement and a similar pattern of favouritism and inequality. No less striking was the practice of increasing the taille to pay for public works and other projects of general utility as well as to cover the costs of interest payments on the provincial debt. With such evident shortcomings, it is tempting to present the Estates as little more than a mechanism for the defence of privilege and the distribution of its spoils. In some ways, such a harsh conclusion appears to be merited, but it was not the whole story. Throughout the period, both the Estates and their ´elus sought to limit the fiscal burden supported by the province, and if the privileged were the principal beneficiaries they were not uniquely so. Moreover, during the reign of Louis XVI a genuine reform movement emerged that was committed to the principle of fiscal equality, and to curbing some of the perceived abuses of the administration. The

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ill-fated reforms of the abb´e de La Goutte were the most striking example of this phenomenon, and for a brief period during 1775–6 the province was treated to the spectacle of the ´elus attacking privileged interests, much to the horror of the Parlement of Dijon, the fiscal officers of the Estates and wealthy landowners. The fall of Turgot and the politically confrontational style of La Goutte and his allies meant that they were quickly defeated, and the alcades fared no better when they sought to revive his schemes in 1781. Yet their failure should not cause us to ignore the existence of a reformist movement that refused to remain silent about the inequalities perpetuated by the Estates. In November 1787, those campaigning for a fairer distribution of the tax burden, especially of the vingti`emes, finally triumphed, but by then the monarchy was already lurching into its terminal political crisis. Neither the Estates, nor the province’s taxpayers, would have time to reap the rewards. For much of the period under discussion, the degree of cooperation between the crown and the Estates is striking, and it is tempting to discount earlier interpretations such as that of Rebillon, whose study of the Estates of Brittany was based upon a seemingly constant struggle between the centre and the provinces.6 Overemphasising the degree of conflict risks distortion, but it would be misleading to remove it from the picture altogether. Louis XIV’s huge fiscal demands had by the end of the War of the Spanish Succession pushed the Estates of Burgundy to refuse a number of his demands. After the death of the duc de Bourbon in 1740, the crown issued a series of r`eglements that curbed the right of the Estates to appoint their officers as well as their ability to regulate their own administration and internal procedures. The challenge to provincial autonomy was underlined when the intendant, Joly de Fleury, bought the office of ´elu du roi. Without resorting to extreme measures, the Estates maintained a determined and largely successful campaign to reverse many of these decisions, and to expel the intendant. They could not, however, escape the tutelage of the crown entirely, and the triennalit´e of the abb´e de La Goutte (1775–8) revealed the limits of provincial independence. In the battle to overturn the arrˆet du conseil of 28 July 1776, that had quashed three deliberations of the chamber of ´elus, La Goutte and his supporters employed language reminiscent of that used by the parlements. Rhetorical appeals to the superior authority of the provincial constitution and to the historic rights of the Estates were an indication that the potential for a more serious clash existed. That threat was largely avoided, although it is clear 6

Rebillon, Etats de Bretagne, p. 455.

Conclusion

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that managing the Estates was becoming more difficult during the reign of Louis XVI. If the assembled Estates were more active than is usually thought, it remains true that their brief triennial gatherings meant that enormous power was concentrated in the chamber of ´elus. Traditionally historians have been scathing about the personal qualities of its members, assuming that the permanent officers were the real arbiters of provincial affairs.7 Such an argument is flawed for a number of reasons. In reality, many of the ´elus were distinguished individuals in their own right, often with considerable experience of administration. Moreover, like the permanent officers, they were frequently part of the governor’s client`ele or had deliberately cultivated his favour. Perhaps more importantly, attempts to divide the chamber into groups of incompetent amateurs and wily professionals result from a misunderstanding of the nature of ancien r´egime government and society. The senior clerics and aristocrats who served as the ´elus of the privileged orders were not expected to be masters of every administrative brief, and understandably they looked to the full-time officers for specialist advice. They also possessed attributes of another type, namely the ability to move comfortably at the very highest levels of the state and to gain access to the king, influential courtiers and ministers. Taken together the ´elus and their permanent officials formed an impressive team that in many ways mirrored the organisation of the government in Versailles, and it was well equipped to defend the interests of the Estates. When petitioning the ministry, the governor and the ´elus were indispensable and they were not easily ignored, while the permanent officers marshalled the evidence required to convince the premiers commis or maˆıtres des requˆetes to whom the king’s ministers turned for advice. As an extra precaution, the Estates continued to pay annual sums to ministers and commis alike, and to shower them with wine and other gifts to encourage their good offices. Finally, the growth of the provincial bureaucracy in Dijon and the modest professionalisation of its activities had much in common with comparable institutions such as the ferme g´en´erale providing further evidence of the continuing vitality of the Estates. The chamber of ´elus thus possessed immense authority, and although historians continue to repeat the old clich´e about the ‘all-powerful’ intendant in Burgundy such an assertion is unfounded. The ´elus were responsible for the overwhelming majority of fiscal and administrative tasks, and it was their powers, not those of the intendant, that were expanding as 7

Bouchard, ‘Comptes borgnes’, 26, was particularly damning.

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Provincial power and absolute monarchy

the period progressed. In his examination of the Estates during the reign of Louis XIV, Thomas was scathing in his condemnation of the ´elus, criticising just about every aspect of their administration.8 Examples of misconduct are not hard to find. Roads were built for the benefit of individual ´elus, there was favouritism in the distribution of the tax burden and the smell of corruption hung around the auctioning of the rights to farm the octrois or crues. While abuses were undoubtedly present, it is important to bear in mind that the behaviour of the ´elus was consistent with that of most public officials in the seventeenth century, including Louis XIV’s ministers. Moreover, there was some light in the gloom, and, urged on by the alcades and the d´ecrets of the Estates, general visits for reapportioning the taille were conducted in 1690 and 1700, and through the appointment of an engineer a start was made in systematising the administration of public works. To their credit, the ´elus also joined the more general campaigns, involving the governor, intendant and Parlement, to protect the province from the worst effects of the terrible famines of the 1690s and 1709–10. To provide a really rounded assessment of the Burgundian administration, it is, however, necessary to consider its activities after 1715, when a more propitious combination of climatic, economic and political circumstances offered an opportunity for reform. Once again, the results were mixed. Throughout the reign of Louis XV, the ´elus ignored the calls of the alcades to conduct a general visit of the taille, and change, when it came, was of a piecemeal nature. After 1774, the pace of reform accelerated and some impressive measures were implemented, notably the decision of 1781 to assess the taille on the basis of a fixed number of feux. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of both La Goutte and the alcades, nothing comparable was achieved relative to either the capitation or the vingti`emes, and they remained as glaring examples of inequality. The ´elus could, however, point to some positive achievements. The road network constructed after 1730 was second to none, although that success was tarnished by the failure to heed persistent calls for the reform of the corv´ee. When the Estates finally became convinced of the need for canals they threw themselves into their construction with all the fervour of converts. After numerous costly setbacks, some progress was made in promoting agricultural improvement, and the farm at Di´enay seemed to have a bright future. The Estates had also played a constructive role in the founding of the university of Dijon, and during the reign of Louis XVI they had began to encourage a wide variety of educational causes. Other examples could be added to this list, 8

Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV , passim.

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but it is clear that the ´elus had acted in more dynamic and effective manner than their counterparts in Artois or Brittany, and their administration bears comparison with that of the more enlightened intendants in the pays d’´elections. Indeed, once the difficult years of the interregnum of 1740–54 had been negotiated, the intendant of Burgundy became an increasingly marginal figure, and the administration of the ´elus flourished. By the reign of Louis XVI, the provincial administration was richer in terms of power and authority than at any time in its history, and it was rapidly accumulating new responsibilities, such as the jurisdiction over the stud or the province’s waterways. A similar process was occurring in the other pays d’´etats, and Legay has argued that in the course of the eighteenth century the provincial estates had been transformed into an arm of central government, replacing the intendants in the process. As she describes matters, one of the advantages for the crown lay in the fact that ‘the right of the Estates to administer the people being better established than that of the intendants, the state could more easily delegate to them unpopular missions peculiar to all centralisation’. No less important was the opportunity for the government to transfer ‘heavy, but necessary expenses for the modernisation of the state’ to the provinces.9 Legay is certainly correct to insist upon the general compatibility of royal and provincial interests, and, as we have seen, in terms of their aims and objectives the work of the Burgundian ´elus did mirror that of the intendants elsewhere. Her argument that the crown employed the provincial estates to achieve its centralising objectives is more problematical. To argue that the monarchy was single-mindedly pursuing a strategy of modernisation and centralisation risks imposing the same kind of assumptions upon the history of the eighteenth century that have already been found wanting for the reign of Louis XIV. While greater central control was undoubtedly an aspiration of many royal officials, they were also driven by more immediate concerns. The monarchy was motivated by the need for money, without which it would be impossible to pursue the military and diplomatic ambitions that were ultimately paramount. To gather those funds it was necessary to be pragmatic, and the pays d’´etats had something that the monarchy lacked, good credit. Moreover, in the case of Burgundy especially, the fiscal and administrative system worked, and the crown had no reason to meddle unduly in the affairs of the Estates. As a result, the province preserved a real degree of autonomy, and, as the eighteenth 9

Legay, Les ´etats provinciaux, pp. 516–17.

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century progressed, that position was strengthened by the growing interest in plans for revived provincial estates or new provincial assemblies. Nor were the Estates of Burgundy simply a substitute for the intendants, who were by their very nature tied to the world of Versailles, where most hoped for promotion to the coveted office of conseillers d’´etat or even the ministry. Several former intendants of Burgundy followed this path, and, after Bouchu, few had strong family ties to the province, or remained in the post for more than a decade. The ´elus and especially their permanent officials were under no such constraints, and, as many were close to the governor or expected to pursue long careers in the service of the Estates, they were unlikely to share the perspective of the intendants. The relative independence of the provincial administration meant that as new powers were acquired the ´elus were able to act upon them as they saw fit, and not necessarily as the crown intended. Nor should we forget that in most instances the Estates were anxious to augment their own authority, and actively campaigned for control of, for example, the royal stud, and the jurisdiction over the province’s waterways and road network. Once that had been achieved they had considerable autonomy, not least because of their control over how much was spent, and it was the ´elus or the Estates that decided what roads should be built, rivers dredged or entrepreneurs subsidised. If the crown’s decision to transfer more power to the provinces was part of a centralising agenda, it could be far from certain that the results would match its expectations. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that as the administrative responsibilities of the ´elus increased, so too did their vulnerability to the accusations of arbitrariness, even despotism, aimed at the intendants in the pays d’´elections.10 Their subsequent unpopularity was revealed in stark terms by the quarrels with the Parlement of Dijon, especially the infamous Varenne affair. Despite their own defence of fiscal privilege, the parlementaires were not directly implicated in the collection of taxation. Instead, they exercised the painless right to protest in the name of the taxpayer against the abonnements and other fiscal deals signed by the ´elus. The moral high ground was a convenient vantage point from which to pursue the Parlement’s unremitting campaign for the right to scrutinise the activities of the chamber and to increase its own jurisdiction, notably over the long disputed terrain of cotes d’office. These quarrels were an almost permanent feature of the eighteenth century, and there was never any real likelihood that the government would be confronted by a united provincial front 10

Here I am in full agreement with Legay.

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against its fiscal demands. Instead, the rival corps battled amongst themselves about their respective rights and jurisdiction. In the course of these disputes, both sides resorted to a variety of strategies, sending deputations to Versailles, writing remonstrances and pamphlets and seeking to mobilise popular support in Dijon. With brilliant avocats such as Varenne lining up against magistrates of the calibre of Charles de Brosses, the quality of the debate was high. Yet when it came to influencing the public there was only one victor, and before 1788 the Parlement could bask content in the knowledge that it had popular support. As for the ´elus, they could seek solace in the fact that the crown would generally throw its weight behind their cause, such was their importance to the provincial tax and credit structure. By the 1780s, ‘our lords the ´elus’ were busily carrying out their ever more extensive duties in a diligent and increasingly sophisticated way, and no doubt many amongst them believed that they were acting according to the finest contemporary principles of rationality and ‘bienfaisance’. Yet they were giants with feet of clay because they lacked popular support or a mandate, and as the issues of representation and equality came to the fore after 1787 the Estates were suddenly vulnerable. At their last meeting of November 1787, change was in the air and progress on reform of the vingti`emes in particular was made. However, the third estate’s demands that the privileged contribute towards the cost of projects of general utility was rejected, a decision that a year later would make the nobility’s renunciation of fiscal privilege seem deeply suspicious. Once Louis XVI announced his intention to summon an Estates General, Burgundy was swept up in the resulting political turmoil. The government’s ill-judged request for assistance in determining how that body should meet acted as a catalyst on thinking not only about representation at a national level, but also about the future composition of the provincial estates. As elsewhere, the principles advanced in Dauphin´e, of doubled representation for the third estate and voting by head, struck a chord with an influential section of the bourgeoisie, which was soon campaigning for their adoption in Burgundy. The noble opposition to these proposals was considerably less intransigent than that experienced in either the Franche-Comt´e or Brittany, and a series of reforms were proposed for future Estates, including the right of veto to allay the fears of the third estate. Had the nobles who assembled in Dijon in December 1788 and January 1789 been prepared to accept the principle of voting by head in the event of deadlock, then it is possible that a Burgundian voting model might have emerged to challenge that of Dauphin´e. It was not to be, and, amidst much recrimination, the nobles and the third estate of Dijon divided in early January.

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Despite their failure, the meetings held in Dijon revealed much about the attitudes of the nobility and the bourgeoisie of the province towards the provincial Estates, and their respective positions were reflected in the elections for the Estates General and in the cahiers des dol´eances. For the nobility, the aim was to restore the ancient constitution of the province to its former glory by throwing off the shackles of ministerial despotism, symbolised by the r`eglement of 1742, and by allowing free elections within a reinvigorated Estates. As for the third estate, it rejected the myth of an ‘ancient constitution’ of Burgundy, preferring instead to borrow the new voting model from Dauphin´e. It was, of course, the inability to resolve this issue that took precedence, but if we peruse the other demands of the three orders relative to the provincial Estates there was much common ground. There was almost unanimous agreement that the Estates should be preserved and strengthened, with emphasis placed upon more regular assemblies, free elections, increased scrutiny of the ´elus and their officers and reform of the tax system. Even when we turn to the cahiers drafted by the people of the countryside there is evidence of support for reformed Estates. As for the ´elus and their administration, they were subject to fierce criticism. Yet much of that hostility was of a rhetorical nature, and specific examples of misconduct were less prevalent than an invitation to prepare a list of grievances might lead us to expect. Ultimately, the majority of Burgundians believed that the Estates and their ´elus whatever their faults could be reformed. The revolution made these plans redundant, and once the Constituent Assembly had unveiled its new local government structure few tears were shed for the Estates which died unmourned, joining the Parlement, Chambre des Comptes and so many other corps in the institutional graveyard of the ancien r´egime.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Governors of Burgundy, 1661–1789 Louis II de Bourbon, prince de Cond´e (1660–70) Henri-Jules de Bourbon, duc d’Enghien (prince de Cond´e, 1686–1709) (1670–1709) Louis III de Bourbon, prince de Cond´e (1709–10) Louis-Henri de Bourbon (1710–40) Paul-Hippolyte de Beauvilliers, duc de Saint-Aignan (1740–54) Louis-Joseph de Bourbon, prince de Cond´e (1754–89)

Appendix 2 Intendants of Burgundy, 1661–1789 Claude Bouchu (1656–83) Nicolas Auguste de Harlay de Bonneuil (1683–8) Florent d’Argouges (1688–94) Antoine Franc¸ois Ferrand (1694–1705) Anne Pinon de Quincy (1705–10) Charles Trudaine (1710–11) Pierre Arnaud de La Briffe (1711–40) Franc¸ois Dominique de Barberie de Saint-Contest (1740–9) Jean-Franc¸ois Joly de Fleury (1749–60) Jean-Franc¸ois Dufour de Villeneuve (1760–4) Antoine Jean Amelot de Chaillou (1764–74) Guillaume Joseph Dupleix de Baquencourt (1774–81) Feydeau de Brou (1781–4) Antoine-L´eon Amelot de Chaillou (1784–9)

´ of the clergy, 1662–1790 Appendix 3 Elus 1662 Louis Dony d’Attichy, bishop of Autun Jean de Maupeou, bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone (Appointed after the death of Dony d’Attichy) 1665 Charles Maurice Le Tellier, abb´e of Saint B´enigne of Dijon 413

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Appendices

1668 Jean Morelet, doyen of the collegiate church of Notre Dame of Beaune and chanoine of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1671 Gabriel de Roquette, bishop of Autun ´ 1674 Claude Fyot de La Marche, abb´e of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1677 Abraham de Th´esut, doyen of the collegiate church of Saint Georges of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1679 Andr´e Colbert, bishop of Auxerre 1682 Armand de Quinc´e, abb´e of Notre Dame of La Bussi`ere 1685 Charles Andrault de Langeron, abb´e de Maulevrier, doyen of the collegiate church of Saint Georges of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1688 Henri F´elix, bishop of Chalon-Sur-Saˆone 1691 Annet de Constin Dumanadan, abb´e of Notre Dame of Fontenay 1694 Henry Emanuel de Roquette, doyen of the collegiate church of Saint Lazare of Avallon, abb´e of Reims 1697 Gabriel de Roquette, bishop of Autun ´ 1700 Claude Fyot de la Marche, comte de Beaujean, abb´e of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1703 Jean-Baptiste LeGoux, doyen of the cathedral church of Chalon-surSaˆone 1706 Charles Gabriel Daniel Thubi`ere de Caylus, bishop of Auxerre 1709 Annet de Constin Dumanadan, abb´e of Notre Dame of Fontenay Claude Louis de Marion de Druy, abb´e of Notre Dame of Rigny (After the death of Constin Dumanadan in October 1709) 1712 Henri Emanuel de Roquette, doyen of the collegiate church of Saint Lazare of Avallon, abb´e of Reims 1715 Charles Franc¸ois Hallancourt de Dromenil, bishop of Autun 1718 Edme Mongin, abb´e of Saint Martin of Autun 1721 Jean Bouhier, doyen of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1724 Franc¸ois de Madot, bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1727 Aim´e Franc¸ois Gagne de Perrigny, abb´e of Notre Dame of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine 1730 Gaspard Moreau, doyen of the cathedral church of Auxerre 1733 Gaspard de Thomas de La Vallette, bishop of Autun 1736 Aim´e Franc¸ois Gagne de Perrigny, abb´e of Notre Dame of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine 1739 Guillaume Perreney de Grosbois, doyen of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1742 Franc¸ois de Madot, bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1745 Dom Andoche Pernot, abb´e g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux 1748 Henri Franc¸ois de La Briffe, doyen of the Chapelle aux Riches of Dijon Guillaume Perreney de Grosbois, doyen of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon (Succeeded on the death of La Briffe) 1751 Claude Bouhier, bishop of Dijon 1754 Franc¸ois Trouv´e, abb´e g´en´eral of Cˆıteaux 1757 Guillaume Mathurin Dusert, doyen of the Chapelle aux Riches of Dijon 1760 Claude-Marc-Antoine d’Apchon, bishop of Dijon

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415

1763 1766 1769 1772 1775

Jean Marie DuChatel, abb´e of Notre Dame of Rigny Philibert de La Mare, doyen of Notre Dame of Beaune Louis Henri de Rochefort d’Ailly, bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Claude-Franc¸ois de Luzines, abb´e of Saint-Seine Antoine de La Goutte, doyen of the cathedral church of Autun, vicar general of Lyon 1778 Yves Alexandre de Marbeuf, bishop of Autun 1781 Claude-Franc¸ois de Luzines, abb´e of Saint-Seine 1784 Louis-Henri, abb´e de la Fare, doyen of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1787 Jean-Baptiste Duchilleau, bishop of Chalon-sur-Saˆone

´ of the nobility, 1662–1790 Appendix 4 Elus 1662 1665 1668 1671 1674 1677 1679 1682 1685 1688 1691 1694 1697 1700 1703 1706 1709 1712 1715 1718 1721 1724 1727 1730 1733 1736 1739 1742 1745

H´erard Bouton, comte de Chamilly H´erard Bouton, comte de Chamilly Claude de Thyard, comte de Bissy Louis de Pernes, comte d’Epinac Philippe Andrault, comte de Langeron, baron de Vaux Pierre Du Ban, chevalier comte de La Feuill´ee Gabriel de Briord, marquis de Senozan, baron de la Salle Claude-El´eonor Damas, duc de Pont-de-Vaux, marquis de Thianges Charles de La Tournelle Joseph de Xaintrailles Gabriel de Briord, marquis de Senozan Gilbert de Gadagne d’Hostun, comte de Verdun Franc¸ois de Choiseul, comte de Chevigny Armand de Madaillan de Lesparre, marquis de Lassay Louis de Foudras, comte de Demigny Antoine-Roland de Sercey, seigneur d’Arconcey Georges-Anne-Louis de Pernes, comte d’Epinac L´eon de Madaillan de Lesparre, comte de Lassay Claude de Thyard, comte de Bissy Ren´e-Constant, comte de Pons Louis de Vienne, baron de Chˆateauneuf Marie-Roger de Langheac, marquis de Coligny, seigneur de Chaseul Charles Henry de Saulx-Tavanes, marquis de Saulx Louis-Athanaze de Pescheperroux de Comminges, chevalier comte de Guitaut Charles-Louis de Montsaulnin, comte du Montal Antoine-Franc¸ois de La Tournelle, seigneur de Cussy Charles-Louis de Montsaulnin, comte du Montal (recalled after the death of La Tournelle) Nicolas de Chaugy, comte de Roussillon Claude-Elizabeth, marquis de la Guiche Anne-Claude de Thyard, Marquis de Bissy

416 1748 1751 1754 1757 1760 1763 1766 1769 1772 1775 1778 1781 1784 1787

Appendices Louis-Franc¸ois de Damas, marquis D’Anlezy Charles-Marie-Gaspard de Saulx-Tavanes, comte de Saulx ´ Etienne-Marie de Scorrailles Henri-Jules de Clermont, comte de Tonnerre Louis-Henri, comte de Vienne Philippe-Louis, marquis de Chastellux Franc¸ois-Louis-Antoine de Bourbon, comte de Busset Charles-Franc¸ois-Casimir de Saulx, comte de Tavanes Louis-Pierre de Jaucourt Jacques-Franc¸ois de Damas, marquis d’Antigny Edme Le Bascle, marquis d’Argenteuil Nicolas-Alexandre, vicomte de Virieu Georges-C´esar, comte de Chastellux Louis-Antoine-Paul de Bourbon, vicomte de Bourbon-Busset

´ of the third estate, 1662–1790 Appendix 5 Elus 1662 1665 1668 1671 1674 1677 1679 1682 1685 1688 1691 1694 1697 1700 1703 1706 1709 1712 1715 1718 1721 1724 1727 1730 1733 1736 1739 1742 1745

Jacques Grozelier, mayor of Beaune Pierre Bourguignet, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges Jacques Jannel, mayor of St-Jean de-Losne Benoˆıt Julien, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Franc¸ois Bretagne, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois Claude Lemulier, mayor of Montbard Georges de Guyon, lieutenant criminel of Avallon Nicolas Rielle, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine Pierre Barbier, mayor of Auxonne Buttard, mayor of Seurre Claude Billard, mayor of Auxerre Pierre Rabiot, mayor of Autun Simon Tribolet, mayor of Beaune Felix Sonnoys, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges Jacques de la Ramisse, mayor of Saint-Jean-de-Losne Antoine Noyrot, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Claude Lemulier, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois Henri Silvestre de la Forest, mayor of Montbard Claude Champion, mayor of Avallon Guy Jouard, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine Joseph de l’Estang, mayor of Auxonne Pierre Bretagne, mayor of Seurre Jean Baudesson, mayor of Auxerre Nicolas-Jean Barrault, mayor of Autun Pierre Gillet, mayor of Beaune Nicolas Pourcher, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges Pierre Martenne, mayor of Saint-Jean-de-Losne Louis-Franc¸ois Gauthier de Chamirey, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Jean-Baptiste Voisenet, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois

Appendices 1748 1751 1754 1757 1760 1763 1766 1769 1772 1775 1778

Edme Doublot, mayor of Montbard Antoine Champion, mayor of Avallon Franc¸ois Jouard, mayor of Chˆatillon-sur-Seine Jean-Franc¸ois de La Ramisse, mayor of Auxonne Claude Gouget Duval, mayor of Seurre Jean-Claude Baudesson, mayor of Auxerre Rouget, mayor of Bar-sur-Seine Benˆoit Jean de Gouvernain, mayor of Charolles Toussaint Roux, mayor of Autun Jean-Franc¸ois Maufoux, mayor of Beaune Jean-Baptiste Ligeret, mayor of Nuits-Saint-Georges ´ Etienne Gilles (after death of predecessor) 1781 Claude Martenne, mayor of Saint-Jean-de-Losne 1784 Franc¸ois Noirot, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1787 Philibert-Hugues Gueneau d’Aumont, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois

Appendix 6 Vicomtes-mayeurs of Dijon, 1661–1790 1661–3 1662 1663–4 1665–6 1666–9 1670–1 1672–3

Jacques de Frasans B´enigne Boullier (after death of Frasans) Pierre Guillaume B´enigne Boullier Jean Joly Jean Cattin B´enigne Boullier Pierre Monin (after death of Boullier) 1674–6 Benˆoit-Palamades Baudinot 1677–8 Pierre Monin 1679–80 Benˆoit-Palamades Baudinot 1681–3 Jean Joly 1684–6 Mathieu de Badier 1687–8 Jean Joly 1690–1 Franc¸ois Baudot 1692–3 Philibert Jeannon De la Loge (after death of Jeannon) 1694–1703 Franc¸ois Baudot 1703–11 Julien Clopin 1711–14 Nicolas La Botte ´ 1714–28 Etienne Baudinet 1729–31 Philippe Baudot 1731–49 Jean-Pierre Burteur 1750–62 Claude Marlot 1763–9 Nicolas-Claude Rousselot 1770–83 Guillaume Raviot 1784 Pierre Franc¸ois Gauthier 1784–9 Louis Moussier

417

418

Appendices

Appendix 7 Treasurer generals of the Estates of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Ancien

Alternatif

Antoine Bossuet (1652–71)

Thomas Berthier (1654–71)

Treasurer generals Franc¸ois Bazin (1671–84) Antoine Chartraire (1684–1709) Franc¸ois Chartraire de Biere (1709–28) Marc Antoine Chartraire de Montigny (1728–50) Denis Claude Rigoley de Mypon (1750–2) Claude-Jean Rigoley d’Ogny (1752–71) Antoine Chartraire de Montigny (1771–90)

Appendix 8 Secr´etaires des e´tats of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Ancien

Alternatif

Denis Rigoley (1661–72) Claude Rigoley (1672–1711) Denis Claude Rigoley de Mypon (1712–50) Jacques Varenne (1750–61)

Guillaume Despringle (1661–74) Benoˆıt Julien (1674–84) Jacques Julien (1684–1725)

Claude-Denis Rigoley de Puligny (1761–9) Nicolas-Claude Rousselot (1785–90)

Claude-Charles Bernard de Blancey (1725–75) Andr´e Jean Bernard de Chanteau (1775–85) Balthazar Girard de la Br´ely (1785–90)

Third office (1752–63) Antoine Varenne de B´eost and Andr´e Jean Bernard de Chanteau (1752–61) Jacques Varenne (1761–3) Office suppressed (December 1763)

Appendix 9 Procureurs syndics of the Estates of Burgundy, 1661–1790 Barth´elemy Moreau (1640–65) Pierre Durand (1665–91) ´ Etienne Baudinet (1691– )

Philippe de Requelyne ( –1673) Nicolas Guenichot (1673–91) Nicolas Guenichot fils, (1691–1706)

Appendices Gabriel Danot (1698–1712) Joseph Falanier (1712–21) Nicolas Perchet (1721–47) Jean-Bernard Perchet (1747–59) Virot (1759–76) Phillipe Joseph Jarrin (1776–83) Guillemot (1783–90)

419

Jean Derey (1706–10) Claude Mielle (1710–19) Jean Rouget (1719–50) Pierre Andr´e de La Poix (1750–69) Franc¸ois Joseph Jacquinot (1769–90)

Appendix 10 Conseils des e´tats, 1661–1790 Claude Thiroux (1661–84) Lazare Louis Thiroux (1684–97) Hubert Joseph Boillot (1697–1730) Jacques Varenne (1730–52) Toussaint Ballier (1752–70) Simon Virely (1770–90)

Philibert de La Marre (–1675) Bernard Grusot (1675–83)

Gabriel Guillaume (1660–1710)

Pierre Petit (1683–1712) Guillaume Raviot (1712–51) Jean Bannelier (1751–66) Jean-Marie Arnoult (1766–82) Andr´e Remy Arnoult (1782–90)

Franc¸ois Boillot (1710– ) Simon Ranfer (1757–89) Nicolas Morisot (1789–90)

Appendix 11 Alcades of the clergy, 1668–1790 1668 Barth´elemy Thiroux, chanoine of Saint Lazare of Autun Antoine Sabatier, chanoine of the collegiate church of Avallon 1679 Louis de Th´esut, chanoine of Saint Lazare of Autun Louis Franc¸ois Bretagne, prieur of Notre Dame of Valcroissant 1682 Petit, chanoine of Saint Georges of Chalon-sur-Sˆaone ´ Jacques Boutault, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1685 Denis Danchement, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Cluesque, of Notre Dame of Autun 1688 Girard, chanoine of Saint Georges of Chalon-sur-Sˆaone Buisson, chanoine of the Chapelle aux Riches of Dijon 1691 Ballard, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun ´ R´emond, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1694 Desplaces, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Corneau, prieur of Saint Jacques of Arnay-le-Duc 1697 Andr´e Loppin, chanoine of the collegiate church of Beaune Louis Robinet, chanoine of the cathedral church of Auxerre

420

Appendices

1700 Denis Danchement, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Franc¸ois de Tollede de Boissy, chanoine of the cathedral church of Auxerre ´ 1703 Bergerot, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon Louis Franc¸ois Bretagne, prieur of Notre Dame of Valcroissant 1706 Pierre Thibault, prieur of Saint B´enigne of Dijon ´ Bazin, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1709 Guillaume Feu, cathedral church of Auxerre Philibert de la Souche, prieur of Anzy-le-Duc 1712 D’Allencourt de Boullainvilliers, chanoine of Notre Dame of Beaune Robinet, chanoine of the Chapelle aux Riches of Dijon 1715 Blanchard, chanoine of Saint Georges of Chalon-sur-Saˆone ´ Tavault, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Auxerre ´ 1718 Hay, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Auxerre Jehannon, chanoine of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1721 Pasquier, chanoine of the cathedral church of Autun Baudenet, prieur of Salmaise 1724 Boucher, chanoine of the cathedral church of Auxerre ´ Joly Valot, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1727 Guinot, chanoine of the collegiate church of Beaune Carnot, of the collegiate church of Nuits-Saint-Georges 1730 M. de Maizi`eres, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun ´ Carrelet, chanoine of Saint Etienne of Dijon 1733 M. de Chavanac, chanoine of the cathedral church of Auxerre Baillyat, chanoine of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1736 Antoine Philippe de Chanrenault, chanoine of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon Gilbert Edme de Simony, prieur of Latrecey[-Ormoy-sur-Aube] 1739 Germain Cazotte, chanoine of the collegiate church of Avallon Claude Emonin, prieur of Saint Symphorien of Autun 1742 Abb´e Prouvais, chanoine of the cathedral church of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Abb´e Barbuot, chanoine 1745 Abb´e de la Goutte, chanoine of the cathedral church of Autun Beuverand de la Loyere, chanoine of the cathedral of Chalon-surSaˆone 1748 Abb´e Fevret, chanoine of the cathedral church of Dijon Abb´e Donnadieu, prieur of Moutiers 1751 Abb´e Espiard de La Cour, chanoine of the cathedral church of Dijon Abb´e Genreau, prieur of Notre Dame of Bonvaux 1754 Abb´e de la Goutte, chanoine of the cathedral church of Autun Dunoyer, chanoine of the cathedral church of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1757 Develle, vicar general of the diocese of Autun M. de Simony, chanoine of the Sainte Chapelle of Dijon 1760 Deplan [sic], chanoine, vicar general of the diocese of Autun Desplasses, prieur de Perrigny

Appendices 1763 Abb´e de la Goutte, prieur of Sainte Mognance Tisserand, chanoine of the cathedral of Chalon-sur-Saˆone 1766 M. du Fourneau de Fremont, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Violet, prieur of Vassy 1769 M. de Bonnal, vicar general of the cathedral of Chalon-sur-Saˆone Develle, prieur of Saint Laurent d’Hauteville 1772 Hemey, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Vautier, chanoine of Auxerre 1775 Develle, prieur of Saint Laurent d’Hauteville M. de la Goutte, prieur of Perrigny-sur-Loire 1778 Quarr´e de Monay, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Frappier, chanoine of the cathedral of Auxerre 1781 Pinot, prevot of the collegiate church of Autun Perretton, prieur of Saint-Laurent-l`es-Chalons 1784 Le Maistre, prieur of Perrigny-sur-Loire Joly, chanoine of the cathedral church of Dijon 1787 Abb´e de Grandchamp, chanoine of the cathedral of Autun Abb´e Clergier, prieur of Duesme

Appendix 12 Alcades of the nobility, 1662–1790 1662 Jacques de Thyard Antoine de Chaugy 1665 Daniel de Chatenay Antoine Damas 1668 Charles de Naturel Charles de La Riviere 1671 M. de Longueville Georges-B´enigne, comte de Trestondan 1674 Jacques de Chaugy Michel Bataille 1677 Lazare de Croisier Charles de Clugny 1679 Claude de Carbonnet Louis de Foudras 1682 Hector-Franc¸ois d’Aullenay, seigneur d’Arcy Antoine de Cl´eron-Saffres 1685 Louis de Clugny, comte de Grignon Pierre de Charg`ere du Breuil 1688 Gabriel du Montet Philibert de Croisier, fils 1691 Hugues de Mathieu Philippe Berbis 1694 Henri de Masset Louis de Clugny

421

422

Appendices

1697 Prudent Tabourot (substitute for Jean de Th´esut de Ragy) ´ Eleonor de Choiseul-Traves 1700 Guy Bernard de Montessus, comte de Rully Elie de Jaucourt, sgnr de Chazelle 1703 Charles de Clugny Claude-Marc de Fautri`eres 1706 Ren´e de Dr´ee Gabriel-Hector de Cullon 1709 Louis de Vienne Franc¸ois de Clugny 1712 Phillipe de Cronambourg Claude de Fautri`eres 1715 Comte de Bissy Jacques de la Cousse d’Arcelot 1718 Hugues Dubois, seigneur de Rochette et de Masoncle Hyacinthe de Berthet 1721 Louis-Victor Marlout Louis de Vienne 1724 Jean-Bernard de la Marre Jacques Comeau 1727 Antoine Morisot de Jancigny Charles F´evret 1730 M. de Massol, seigneur de Montmoyen Antoine-Franc¸ois de La Tournelle 1733 Antoine Dubois de la Rochette, fils Philibert-Joseph de La Fage de P´eronne, fils 1736 Claude-Joseph de Frasans Jean-Franc¸ois Petit 1739 Nicolas de Ganay Jacques, comte de Brancion 1742 Jean de Fromag`ere Pierre-Franc¸ois de Frasans 1745 Joseph-Andr´e de Bretagne Paul-Charles du Crest 1748 Claude-Joseph de Frasans Jean-Claude de La Salle 1751 Jean-Baptiste Fleutelot de Chazan Alexandre Humbelot de Villiers 1754 Antoine-Palatin de Beugre ´ Etienne-Marie Champion, seigneur de Nant-sous-Thil 1757 Jean-Baptiste Catin de Richemont Gabriel-Hector de Cullon, comte d’Arcy 1760 Claude-Franc¸ois de Maritain Pierre-Marie de Naturel 1763 Claude-Joseph de Frasans d’Avirey F´elix de Simony

Appendices

423

1766 Melchior Comeau de Pont-de-Veaux Raymond de Th´esut 1769 Gaspard-Pontus de Thyard Pierre-Franc¸ois-Hubert de Chastenay 1772 Louis de Cullon, comte d’Arcy Charles-Antoine Raguet de Brancion 1775 Claude-Philibert Bernard de la Vernette Guy-Louis Guenichon de Quemigny 1778 Jean-Baptiste-Th´eodore de Folin Pierre-Marie-Th´er`ese Dormy de Vesvre 1781 Marie-Franc¸ois-J´erome du Raquet de Montjay Antoine-Franc¸ois-Henri de Damas-Crux 1784 Franc¸ois de Fresne Franc¸ois-Louis de Cullon, chevalier d’Arcy 1787 Ferdinand-Alphonse-Honor´e, marquis de Digoine Marquis de La Garde-Chambonas

Appendix 13 Alcades of the third estate 1668–1790 Town/Comt´e 1668 1679 1682 1685 1688 1691 1694 1697

Claude Le Mulier ´ Etienne Mignot Claude Billard Claude de la Ramisse Claude Galochet Antoine de Montranbault Benoˆıt Noirot Jacques Boudye Franc¸ois Sauvageot Claude Billaud Jean Jacquet Pierre Mallevoix Lazare Rabyot Jean Jacquet Jacques Genalois Philibert de la Maure Jean de la Motte Antoine Magnien F´elix Sonnoys Alexandre de Repas Richard le Breton Christophe Pir´ee e´chevin (substitute for deceased mayor Charpy) Gilbert Bonncaut Thomas Saulnier

Semur-en-Auxois Noyers Auxerre Auxonne Taland Toulon Seurre Mirebeau Tournus Auxerre Marcigny Bar-sur-Seine Autun Paray-le-Monial Bourbon-Lancy Beaune Semur-en-Brionnais Mˆaconnais Nuit-Saint-Georges Viteaux Bar-sur-Seine Saint-Jean-de-Losne Montcenis Charolais

424 1700 1703 1706 1709 1712 1715 1718 1721 1724 1727 1730 1733 1736 1739 1742

Appendices Antoine Noyrot Antoine Duerot Marcel Chaillot Michel Potet Jean-Baptiste Nicolle Richard Breton Jean Nadault Pierre de Selle Philibert Seurre Claude Champion Michel Deuville Eustache Chanorier Guy Jouard Jean Clerc Franc¸ois Boudey ´ Joseph de l’Estang ´Etienne Lazare de Reigny Jean-Baptiste Geoffroy Pierre Bretagne Pierre Gilbert Claude Compagnot Jean Baudesson Guillaume Giraley Franc¸ois Boudey Nicolas Jean Baraut Franc¸ois Pernet Pierre Gillet Antoine Gay Hugues Foillard Nicolas Pourcher Jean-Baptiste Cudel Thourant Pierre Martenne Philibert Chailloux Louis Franc¸ois Gauthier L´eonard Giraud Thomas Saulnier Franc¸ois Nicolas Voisenet Claude Sauvage Claude Rh´ety Doublot Moret Fevre

Chalon-sur-Saˆone Verdun Mˆaconnais Semur-en-Auxois Arnay-le-Duc Bar-sur-Seine Montbard Noyers Charolais Avallon Saulieu Mˆaconnais Chˆatillon-sur-Seine Flavigny Bar-sur-Seine Auxonne Montr´eal Charolais Seurre Talant Mˆaconnais Auxerre Mirebeau Bar-sur-Seine Autun Marcigny Charolais Beaune Bourbon-Lancy Mˆaconnais Nuits-Saints-Georges Semur-en-Brionnais Charolais Saint-Jean-de-Losne Mˆaconnais Chalon-sur-Saˆone Montcenis Charolais Semur-en-Auxois Saint Laurent-l`es-Chalon Mˆaconnais Montbard Arnay-le-Duc Charolais

Appendices 1745 1748 1751 1754 1757 1760 1763 1766 1769 1772 1775 1778 1781 1784 1787

Claude Antoine Champion Andr´e Boyer Guy Compagnot Joseph Franc¸ois Jouard Jacques Dareau Pierre Franc¸ois Saulnier de la Noue Jean de la Ramisse Le Clerc Philibert Vaillon Gouges Duval Pierre Bethey Antoine Gueneau Jean-Claude Baudesson Jean Dumay Jean-Baptiste Rh´ety Le Texier Gay Baudesset Saulnier de la Noue Venot Louis Baudot Toussaint Roux Ressort Debrange Jean-Franc¸ois Maufoux Ressort Jean-Baptiste Ligeret Boyer Daugy Claude Martenne Feuchot Gautherin Franc¸ois Noirot Villebichot Philippot Gueneau Du May M. de Laval Daubenton Montillet Gay Champion Cudel Siringuet

425 Avallon Noyers Mˆaconnais Chˆatillon-sur-Seine Saulieu Charolais Auxonne Flavigny Mˆaconnais Seurre Montr´eal Talant Auxerre Mirebeau Mˆaconnais Bar-sur-Seine Bourbon-Lancy Viteau Charolais Montcenis Mˆaconnais Autun Arnay-le-Duc Louhans Beaune Arnay-le-Duc Nuits-Saint-Georges Noyers Mˆaconnais Saint-Jean-de-Losne Saulieu Flavigny Chalon-sur-Saˆone Talant Montr´eal Semur-en-Auxois Mirebeau Tournus Mˆaconnais Montbard Marcigny Bourbon-Lancy Avallon Semur-en-Brionnais Viteau

426

Appendices Appendix 14 Receivers of the taille in Burgundy, 1661–1789

Dijon Ancien Pierre Mille ( –1668) Philippe Loyson (1668–96) Antoine Midan (1696–1730)

∗

Alternatif

Triennial

Claude Jannon (1679–91)

Pierre Mille (1662–8) Philippe Loyson (1668–96)

Jean-Baptiste Jannon (1691–1702) Nicolas Seguin∗ (1702–52) Pierre Seguin de La Motte (1752–82) ´ Jean Edouard Cousin, p`ere (1782–9)

From 1730, the commission of receiver was held by a single individual.

Nuits-Saint-George Jean Belin (1653–79) Franc¸ois Bays (1679–94) Edme Lamy (1694–1731) Edme Seguin (1731–53) Edme Fabry (1753–80) Bernard Mollerat (1780–8) Mathieu Mollerat (1788–9)

Beaune Hugues Guyard (1659–72) Marc Bour´ee (1672–95) Lazare David de Beaufort (1695–1727) Joseph David de Beaufort (1727–40) Antide David de Beaufort (1740–53) ´ Etienne David de Beaufort (1753– )

Chalon-sur-Saˆone Ancien

Alternatif

Nicolas Petit (1660– )

Jacques Burgat ( –1690)

Single receivership (1679–1789) Jacques Burgat (1679–90)

Appendices

427

Jean Burgat (1690–1712) Jean Burgat, fils (1712–49) Claude Burgat de Tais´e (1749–51) Claude Petit (1751–64) Jean Burgat de Tais´e (1764–86) Franc¸ois Noirot (1786–9)

Autun Ancien

Alternatif

Triennial

Pierre Blanchet ( –1690) Jacques Ballard ( –1686) Simon Bussot ( –1679) Charles Blanchet Pierre Ballard (1686–1707) Georges Bussot (1690–1712) (1679–1702) Jean Pernot (1707–1712) Gabriel Bussot (1703–9) Andre Cheval de Fontenay (1709–12) Single receivership (1712–89)∗ Andre Cheval de Fontenay (1712–39) Lazare de Fontenay (1739–62) Anne Paul de Fontenay (1762–70) Marc Antoine Charles de Fontenay (1770– )

Semur-en-Brionnais Antoine LaMotte (1639–88) Philibert Dupuis (1688–1704) and Jean Courtin∗ (1688–1701) Franc¸ois Descombes (1701–14) Philibert Dupuis des Falcons (1714–15) Jean Perrin (1715–41) Franc¸ois Perrin de Precy (1741–8) Claude Perrin d’Arroux (1748–53) Jean Perrin de Precy (1753– ) ∗

Held jointly

Semur-en-Auxois Ancien

Alternatif

Le Boeuf ( –1666)

Jean Minard (1631–1662) Claude Minard (1662–6)

428

Appendices

Single receivership (1666–1789) Claude Forestier (1666– ) Jacques Manin (1691–1715) and Guy Salier ( –1702) Pierre Simon (commis) (1702– ) Denis Champeaux (1716– ) Denis Champeaux de Saucy (1758–71) Dennis Augustin Champeaux d’Avirey (1771– )

Arnay-le-Duc Ancien

Alternatif

Triennial

Claude Grillot (1661– )

Philibert Thibert (1661–1701)

Philibert Thibert (1661–1701)

Single receivership (1701–89) Charles Languet (1701–42) Claude-Charles Languet de Livry (1742–77) Hubert Charles Philippe Languet (1777– )

Avallon Charles Couchet ( –1684) Prix Deschamps (1684–1708) Joseph Deschamps (1708–52) Joseph-Guillaume-Augustin Deschamps de Charmelieu (1752–84) Joseph Deschamps de Saint-Brix (1784–9)

Chˆatillon-sur-Seine (la Montagne) Henry R´emond (1667– ) Daniel R´emond d’Etrochey (1680–1719) Claude Henry R´emond de Couchy (1719–24) Daniel R´emond d’Etrochey (1724–9) Joseph Franc¸ois R´emond (1729–55) ´ Etienne Thomas Marlot (1755–66) Commis Pierre D’Autecloche (1755–60) Jean de Charolles (1766–73) ´ Etienne de Charolles (1773–84) Bernard Fabry (1784– )

Auxonne Franc¸ois Suremain (1639– ) Jean-Baptiste Suremain (1686–1723)

Appendices Hugues Suremain de Flamerans (1723–63) Hugues Claude Suremain de Flamerans (1763–5) Daniel Louis Fidel Amand Bocquillon (1765–78) Collenot (1778–88) Louis-Ren´e-Fidel-Armand Bocquillon (1789)

St Laurent-l`es-Chalon Antoine and Guillaume de La Croix (1644–68) Guillaume Petit (1668–79) Claude Petit (1679–1727) Claude Petit, fils (1728–73) Louis Marie Poncet (1773–89)

Auxerre Prix Deschamps (1664–84) Jean Deschamps (1684–1708) Prix Deschamps (1708–12) Joseph Deschamps (1713–52) Joseph-Guillaume-Augustin Deschamps de Charmelieu (1752–84) Guillaume Gaspard Sapey (1784–9)

Bar-sur-Seine Nicolas Baudot (1641–74) Franc¸ois Bailly (1674–1706) Charles Bailly (1706–8) Nicolas Seguin (1708–14) Jean Moreau (1714–26) Belin (1726–7) Antoine Vautier (1727–51) Gabriel Vautier (1751–78) Claude Bernard Vautier (1778–89)

Charolais (1751–89) Adrien Claude Perrin de Gregaine (1745–52) Antoine Gouvillier (1752–82) Jean-Franc¸ois-Claude Gouvillier (1782–9)

429

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Index

abonnement(s) 140, 175–7, 183–4, 192, 204, 242–3, 252, 267–70, 275–6, 285–6, 302–11, 316, 328, 337, 339, 370, 395, 403, 405, 410–11 absolutism 2–3, 7–19 classic model of 2–4 revisionist historiography of 7–19, 23, 155, 173–4 Marxist historiography of 15–16 Academy of Dijon 39, 40, 362 agricultural societies 271, 351 Aignay-le-Duc 387 Aiguillon, Emanuel Armand de Vignerod du Plessis de Richelieu, duc d’ 263 alcades 53, 54, 67, 73, 81–2, 101, 130, 141, 167, 200, 228, 244, 278, 293, 320–2, 325–6, 337–9, 372, 373, 381–2, 386, 391, 398 and reform 201–2, 204, 212, 215, 235, 245, 251, 326, 332–3, 337, 338, 343–5, 353, 359, 363, 406, 408 censored remarques 234–6, 259, 261, 332, 340, 369–70, 376, 382 election of 122 of the clergy 60 role of 120, 122–4 social status of 120–2 their remarques 53, 81–3, 120–4, 133, 166–7, 178–82, 187, 194, 206, 228–9, 248, 258, 296–7, 299, 323–4, 341, 355, 372, 401–2 Alps, the 26, 30 Amanz´e, Louis comte d’ 86 Amelot de Chaillou, Antoine Jean 49, 51, 145, 241, 245–6, 255, 256, 356 Amelot de Chaillou, Antoine-L´eon 30, 49–50, 401 Andrault de Longeron, Charles 94 Angivillier, Charles-Claude de la Billarderie, comte d’ 356 Anlezy, Louis-Franc¸ois de Damas, marquis d’ 133 Anne of Austria 3 Antigny, Jacques Franc¸ois Damas, marquis d’ 249, 256

Antoine, Michel 5–6 Arbilly, Marie 343 Arcelot, Jacques de La Cousse d’ 122 Arc-en-Barois 75 Arc-sur-Thil 198 Ardascheff, Pierre 4, 330 Argenson, Pierre-Marc de Voyer de Paulmy, comte d’ 347 Argenson, Ren´e de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis d’ 20, 233 Argenteuil, Edme Le Bascle, marquis d’ 383 Argouges, Florent d’ 48, 207, 210–11 Arnay-le-Duc 27, 148, 339 Arnoult, Andr´e Remy 38, 119 arri`ere ban 69 Arroux, river 144, 347 artisans 33 village artisans 35 Artois 27, 162, 363, 409 Assembly of Communities (Provence) 21 Assembly of Notables (of 1787) 96, 310, 365, 371 ateliers de charit´e 360–1 Atlantic 36 Auget de Monthyon, Antoine Jean-Baptiste Robert 330 augmentation des gages 18 Autun 27, 30, 31, 38, 55, 57, 61–3, 74, 86, 100, 117, 145, 205, 223, 227–8, 251, 288–9, 391–3, 397 Autunois 30, 38, 225, 393 Auvergne 2 Auxerre 27, 28, 30, 31, 54, 57, 62, 75, 85, 95, 99, 147, 152, 209, 212, 221, 251, 282, 319 Auxerrois 30, 39, 62, 71, 75 Auxois (see also Semur-en-Auxois) 27, 30, 38, 222, 392, 394 Auxonne 27, 29, 31, 37, 38, 75, 99, 147, 179, 216–17, 226–7, 244, 347, 353, 387 Avallon 27, 31, 99, 121, 147, 387 avocat au conseil (of the Estates of Burgundy) 119, 236

447

448 avocat g´en´eral (of the Parlement of Dijon) 48 avocats 99, 104, 110, 116, 117, 119, 277, 377–80, 383–4, 388, 389, 411 Baigneux 85 Bailly, Charles 203 Balnot-le-Chatel 393 Bannelier, Jean 119 Barbier, Pierre 217 Bar-sur-Seine 27, 28, 42, 57, 195–6, 203, 216, 232, 242, 251, 282, 292, 319, 392–3, 395 Bart, Jean 70 Basire, Claude 144 Bastille, the 277, 283, 327 Baudesson, family 99, 151 Baudinot, B´enigne-Palamades 104 ´ Baudinot, Etienne 104, 146 Baudot, Franc¸ois 103–4, 199 Baudot, Phillipe 104 Ba¨uyn, family 114 Ba¨uyn, Prosper 198 Bazin, Franc¸ois 106–8, 205 Beaune 27, 29–31, 38, 39, 74, 85, 100, 145, 147, 223, 225, 249, 336 Beaurepaire, Jeanne Louise Denise de 70 B´eguin, Katia 10, 43, 108 Beik, William 11, 15, 16 and government of Languedoc 12, 14–15, 22, 220, 262 Benoˆıt, Jean 347–8 Berbisey, family 32, 104 Berc´e, Yves-Marie 7 Bernard, Jean 110 Bernard de Blancey, Claude-Charles 110, 152–3, 275, 288, 350 Bernard de Chanteau, Andr´e Jean 110, 116 Bernis, Franc¸ois-Joachim de Pierre, cardinal de 96 Berry 366, 382 Bertier, Thomas 106–7, 110 Bertier de Sauvigny, Louis Jean 251, 336 Bertin, Henri L´eonard 267, 270, 282, 284, 313–14, 346, 354–5 Besanc¸on 29, 280 Bien, David 17, 18 Billioud, Joseph 63 Billy 29 Bluche, Franc¸ois 7 Bocquillon, Daniel Louis Fidel Amand 244–6 Boillot, Franc¸ois 118 Boillot, Hubert-Joseph 117, 118 Boisguilbert, Pierre le Pesant de 176 Bonney, Richard 13, 17

Index Bordeaux 31, 36 Bordes, Maurice 330 Bossenga, Gail 17 Bossuet, Antoine 106, 117 Bossuet, Jacques-B´enigne, bishop 39, 106 Bouchard, G. 91–2 Bouchard, M. 89 Bouchu, family 190 Bouchu, Claude 47–8, 162, 237, 410 Boufflers, mar´echal de 218 Bouhier, family 32, 104, 108, 190 Bouhier, Jean 39, 270 Bouhier de Versalieux 289 Boullemier, abb´e 283–4 Boullier, B´enigne 103 Boulonnais 202 Bourbince, river 220 Bourbon, Louis de 99 Bourbon, duc de, Louis-Henri de Bourbon-Cond´e 43, 48, 50, 54, 84, 87, 94, 97, 98, 108, 231, 234, 236, 260, 264, 303, 328, 406 as governor of Burgundy 44–5, 80, 117, 173, 177, 204, 205, 217, 219, 230, 232–3, 244, 299, 316, 340 character of 231–2 distribution of patronage 100–1, 104, 108, 145, 149, 271 Bourbon-Busset, family 98 Bourbon-Busset, Louis Antoine Paul de Bourbon, vicomte de 129, 401 Bourbon-Lancy 347, 391, 397 Bourbonnais 28 Bourg-en-Bresse 270, 348 bourgeoisie 33–5, 375, 377, 379, 393, 411–12 rural bourgeoisie 35 Bourgogne, Louis duc de, dauphin 29, 136 Braine, avocat 293, 374 Bresse 27, 46, 47, 49, 97, 111, 224 Bretagne, family 121 Breteuil, Louis-Auguste Le Tonnelier, baron de 247 Briailles, comte de 71 Brie 38 Brionnais 30, 38, 227 Briord, Gabriel de 69, 97, 224 Brittany 1, 11, 15, 20–2, 27, 34, 67, 162, 202, 261–3, 278, 304, 315, 363–4, 374–5, 380, 388, 398, 402–4, 409, 411 Brittany affair, the 263, 280 Brosses, Charles de 39, 271, 285–6, 294, 411 Brulart, Nicolas 173, 266 Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc de 37, 353 Bugey 27, 49, 97 Buisson, Louis 282

Index Bureau des Finances (of Dijon) 54, 55, 103–4, 191, 239–40 Burgat, family 147, 150 Burgundy 1, 2, 10, 20, 21, 24, 26–30, 40, 53, 69, 70, 78, 95–6, 107, 114, 155, 162, 164, 170, 178, 202, 219, 231, 246, 255, 280, 282, 302, 306, 312, 331, 336, 341, 346, 349, 352, 375, 400, 404, 411–12 administrative structure of 27, 43, 50–1, 57, 144, 230, 263 agriculture 29–30, 37–8, 222–3 cattle and livestock 30, 37, 38 cultural life 39–40 economic development 35–9, 221 geography 28–30, 220 population of 30–1 trade and commerce 29, 37, 357–60 viticulture 29–30, 33, 37–9, 171, 222, 357–60 Butard, ´elu and mayor of Seurre 210 Cabrol, Jean 207–8 cahiers de dol´eances 75, 367, 412 of Bourbon-Lancy 393 of Dijon 392–3 of the clergy of Burgundy 390–1 of the nobility of Burgundy 391–2 of the third estate of Burgundy 392–8 rural cahiers 393–5 Calonne, Charles-Alexandre de 341, 344, 358, 366 Caloux, Pierre 218 Campbell, Peter 7, 8 canal building 138, 220–1, 345–7 Canal de Bourgogne 345, 346 Canal de Franche-Comt´e 345 Canal du Centre 120, 345–6, 349 Canal du Midi 15, 220, 345 capitation 49, 70–1, 107, 140, 154, 174–5, 177, 181–4, 195, 204, 206, 267–8, 275, 302–5, 313, 322–3, 335–7, 339, 344, 373, 405, 408 carnet des ratifications 83 Carrelet, Antoine 114, 238, 239 Catherine de Medici 110 Catholic Church 4, 18, 174, 295, 305 General Assembly of the French church 62, 96, 310 Catholic league 41 Chalon-sur-Saˆone 27, 29, 31, 38, 48, 55, 57, 62, 74, 86, 94, 99, 148, 150, 179, 207, 212, 218, 226, 251, 345, 353 Chalonnais 29, 200, 207, 227 Chamber of Justice 148, 244

449

Chambre des Comptes of Dijon 27, 32, 54, 69, 85, 93, 104, 105, 112, 113, 116, 127, 147–9, 180, 190–1, 197, 211, 223, 237, 238, 263, 303–5, 379, 387, 404, 412 critics of 203, 210, 259, 369, 382, 391 Chamillart, Michel 171–3, 212, 219 Chamilly, Bouton, H´erard comte de 97, 159 Champagne 28, 37, 213, 222, 342, 358, 393 Champion, family 99 Champion, Claude 121 Champrenault 394 Chanceaux 29, 54 Chantilly 43, 44, 48, 95, 104, 108, 109, 118, 119, 125, 148, 230, 250 Chapeaurouge, conseiller d’´etat of Geneva 326 Charenton 356 Charles II (of Spain) 154 Charles V 26 Charles le T´em´eraire, duke of Burgundy 26, 41 Charolais 30, 38, 195, 202, 225, 227 Charolais, Charles de Bourbon-Cond´e, comte de 233 Charolles 27, 28, 42, 57, 67, 75, 86, 144, 146, 160, 225, 245, 267, 387 ´ Charolles, Etienne de 150 Chartraire, family 43, 106–9, 112–15, 118, 190–1, 203, 247 Chartraire, Antoine 106, 108 Chartraire, Franc¸ois 108 Chartraire de Montigny, Antoine 107, 113, 249 Chartraire de Montigny, Marc Antoine 100, 106, 108, 112, 113, 232, 326 Chartraire de Mypon, Franc¸ois 206 Chartraire de Saint-Aignan, Anne-Madeleine 112 Chartraire de Saint-Aignan, Guy 108 Chastenay, marquis de 66, 153 Chastenay, Mlle de 152–3 Chastenay, vicomte de 380, 382–5 Chastellux, Georges-C´esar comte de 133 Chˆateaubriand, Ren´e de 64 Chˆateauneuf, marquis de 86, 201, 211 Chˆatillon-sur-Seine 27, 28, 31, 99, 121, 150, 152, 202–3, 211, 332, 391 Chˆatillonnais 30 Chaulnes, Charles d’Albert d’Ailly, duc de 10 Chaussinand-Nogaret, Guy 7 Cheval de Fontenay, Andr´e 227–8 Chevignard, Th´eodore 100 ´ Choiseul, Etienne Franc¸ois duc de 52, 316–18, 349 Choiseul-Chevigny, Franc¸ois comte de 98, 108, 190, 211, 224 Clautrier, Gilbert 114 Cl´ement de Feillet, Ambroise-Julien 284, 285

450

Index

clergy (see also Catholic Church) 35, 40, 53, 55, 57–9, 67, 68, 96, 305, 365, 370, 371, 376, 404, 407 abb´es 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 201, 371 abb´es g´en´eraux of Cˆıteaux 62–3, 84, 120 bishops 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57, 59–64, 77–9, 88, 89, 93–6, 99, 110, 115, 118, 120, 124, 127, 146, 168, 190, 207, 211, 221, 224, 242, 311, 317, 371, 390–1 revolt of the cur´es 389–91 village cur´es 35, 75, 362, 386 client`ele 9–12, 15, 23, 25 ´ Clugny de Nuits, Jean-Etienne Bernard de 51, 255 coastal militia 78, 313–15 Colbert, family 8 Colbert Andr´e 59, 95 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste 6, 11, 12, 92, 95, 135–6, 157–9, 162, 164, 169, 192, 213, 220–2, 237–8, 311, 345, 347, 403 Colbert, Nicolas 59 Collenot, receiver of the taille 246 Collins, James 15, 23, 262 Combourg 64 commandants 55, 67, 78, 87, 113 Committee of General Security 144 Cond´e, Bourbon-Cond´e family 10, 39, 50, 65, 66, 79, 87, 92, 107, 113, 115, 146, 280, 382 agents in Burgundy 43–4, 94 and voyage of honour 135–7 as governors of Burgundy 43–6, 231, 233 attitude to intendant 47–8 authority over Estates 59, 66–7, 81, 89, 148, 178, 236 household of 87, 94, 97–8, 107, 113, 404 opening of Estates 55–7 patronage and client`ele of 43, 47, 66, 92–5, 97–8, 100, 104–5, 108, 112, 116, 118, 121–2, 125, 143, 236, 237, 403, 407 voyage to Burgundy 54 Cond´e, Henri-Jules de Bourbon, prince de 44–5, 145, 227, 232 and assemblies of the estates 53, 62, 162, 164 and voyage of honour 135–6 as governor of Burgundy 44–5, 111–12, 168–9, 172–3, 175, 187, 200, 207–9, 211–12, 217–19, 223, 225–6 character of 44 patronage of 94–5, 97, 98, 190 relations with intendant 47–8 Cond´e, Louis II, prince de (Grand Cond´e) 3, 48, 93–4, 97, 112, 213, 403 and assemblies of the Estates 158–62, 221 as governor 44, 107–8, 156–7, 238 Cond´e, Louis III, prince de 44, 121, 188, 227

Cond´e, Louis-Joseph, prince de 45, 52, 94, 97–8, 116, 133, 153, 230, 233, 268, 290, 306, 308, 314, 382, 400 as governor 45, 50, 52–3, 59, 88, 104–5, 108, 119, 125, 231, 239–43, 249–50, 255, 260, 284, 287, 307, 317–18, 361–2, 390, 403 entry in Dijon 54 management of the Estates 52, 78, 257, 259–61, 288–90, 309–10, 315, 371–2, 374 patronage of 236, 247–8, 271 conseillers d’´etat 410 conseils des ´etats (of the Estates of Burgundy) 63, 81, 106, 113, 116–19, 126, 332 their remarques 81–2, 117, 194, 199, 223 Constituent Assembly 38, 400, 412 Conti, Armand prince de 93, 200 contrainte solidaire 34 contrˆoleur g´en´eral, office of 5, 48–51, 78, 79, 87, 114, 171, 188, 210, 214–15, 224, 239, 243, 318, 324, 341, 363, 396 Corley, Christopher 264 corporations 47, 385–7 Cortot 293, 382 corv´ee 145, 152, 336, 341–5, 364, 372, 396, 397, 408 cotes d’office 197–9, 265–7, 270, 276, 281–3, 285–6, 288, 292–3, 410 popular criticisms of 395–7 Couches 227, 393 councils, royal 2, 5, 116–17, 124, 136–7, 199, 254–6, 266, 287 Cour des Aides of Paris 27, 91, 289, 319 disputes with Estates 282–8, 292 Court´ep´ee, abb´e 38, 55, 362 Cr´ebillon, Prosper 39 Cr´equi, marquis de 380–2 crime 33 Croissy, marquise de 190 crues (salt tax) 148, 161, 163, 164, 168, 180, 185–8, 192, 204, 206–8, 235, 297–8, 300, 304, 318, 320–1, 325, 328, 373, 383, 405, 408 Cuiseau 63 Cuisery 63 Damas, family 32 Dauphin´e 21, 110, 366, 374–5, 378, 380, 388, 393, 398, 411–12 David, family 147–8 day labourers 35 Dent, Julian 11 d´epots de mendicit´e 360–1 Deschamps, family 147 Deschamps de Charmelieu, Joseph-Guillaume-Augustin 147 Desmarets, Nicolas 175–7, 183, 188, 201, 322, 328 Despringle, Guillaume 110

Index Dheune, river 220 Didier, mayor of Saint-Seine 146 Di´enay 355–6, 364, 408–9 Digoin 345 Digoine, marquis de 293 Dijon 27, 28, 32, 33, 42, 43, 49, 54, 58, 65, 72, 74, 75, 79, 82, 86, 91, 96, 97, 104, 108, 109, 113, 116, 119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 130–1, 135, 137, 138, 145–9, 153, 158, 165, 188, 195, 197, 201, 203, 205, 210, 212, 218, 223, 233–5, 242, 249, 251, 260, 268–70, 302, 325, 333, 338, 345, 347, 348, 355 and assemblies of the Estates 52–4, 80, 156, 227, 288, 371 and Parlement of 275, 279–82, 290 and the pre-revolution 375–80, 384–9, 391–3, 411–12 economy of 36, 38, 214, 353, 358 establishment of bishopric 58, 62 city council of 224 cultural life 39–40, 138, 208–9, 212–13, 223, 361–2 g´en´eralit´e of 27, 30, 46, 52, 69, 183, 218 population of 31 public opinion in 279–82, 290, 294, 411 riots 42, 53, 361 Dijonnais 29–30 Dillon, abb´e 378–80 dixi`eme 17, 154, 176–7, 183, 300, 305–6 Dole 29, 223, 345 don gratuit 80 Donnadieu, abb´e 121 Dony d’Attichy, Louis 61, 93 Doublot, Edme 133 Doyle, William 17 Dracy-les-Viteaux 394 Drouin de Vaudeuil, Pierre-Louis-Anne 283–5 Dubreuil de Pontbriand, abb´e 63 Ducrest, Jacques 70 Dufour de Villeneuve, Jean-Franc¸ois 341 Duindam, Jeroen 8 Dumont, Franc¸ois 89 Dumorey, Thomas 120, 151, 346 Dumouchet, Charlotte Franc¸oise 70 Dunkirk, Treaty of 159 Dupleix de Baquencourt, Guillaume Joseph 257, 323 Durand, Pierre 118 Durande, Jean-Edm´e 281–2 Dutch War 165, 166, 171, 182, 187 Dziembowski, Edmond 317 ´echevins 47, 54, 74, 100, 215–16 ´ecole de dessein 361 economy 35–9

451

edict of Nantes 15 ´ Effiat, marquis d’ 42 ´elu du roi 93, 102–3, 114, 126–7, 230, 232, 237–40, 260, 406 ´elus (of the Estates of Burgundy) 45, 46, 48, 49, 54, 67, 77, 81–2, 85–6, 89, 102–3, 105, 108–10, 113, 115, 120, 163, 166, 209, 255, 260, 263, 283, 371, 377, 392, 398, 404 administration of the corv´ee 343–5 administration of military ´etapes 213–18, 347–9 alleged corruption of 200–1, 207, 210–11, 228, 408 and agricultural reform 351–7 and canals and waterways 345–7 and economic development 356–60 and institutional rivalries 242–3 and mayors 100, 111, 144–6, 178, 241–2, 404 and patronage of the Cond´e 92–5, 97–8, 105, 118 and permanent officers of the Estates 93, 105–6, 116–17, 119–20, 124–6, 139–44, 151–3, 249–50, 381, 407 and provincial stud 354–7, 408–9 and public instruction 361–2 and public opinion 366 and receivers of the taille 144, 147–51, 201–3, 244–8, 251–2, 333–4, 337–9 and revolution 401 and tax farming 206–8 and the poor 360–1 and voyage of honour 135–7 and wolves 362 bargaining with the crown 168–9, 172–3, 175–7, 303–9, 316, 324, 402–3 clerical elections 59–60, 371 control of the fiscal system 181–5, 188–93, 195–206, 265–7, 298–9, 302, 307–8, 313, 320–1, 324–8, 395–6, 405–6 corporate pride 152–3 critics of 91–2, 128–34, 173–4, 194–5, 199, 219, 275–7, 279, 281–2, 294, 367–9, 375, 380–2, 388, 410–12 defence of provincial privilege 217, 256–7 deputies of the Chambre des Comptes 93, 105, 126–7, 131–2 ´elu of the clergy 51, 54, 61, 91, 93–6, 115, 126–7, 130, 237, 256 ´elu of the nobility 55, 67, 69, 91, 96–9, 111–12, 115, 128, 237 ´elu of the third estate 73, 99–103, 110, 121, 126, 130, 256 growing influence of 264, 409–10 levy of the militia 218–20, 350, 397 noble elections 67, 371–2, 377, 381 origins of 93

452

Index

´elus (of the Estates of Burgundy) (cont.) patriotic contributions of 317–18 petitions and requˆetes to 394, 395 power and authority of 91, 93, 101, 126, 137–8, 153, 194, 232, 236–7, 363–4, 407–9 preparation of remonstrances 134–7 quarrels with the Parlement 265–70, 272–7, 282–3, 286–93, 308, 367, 395–6, 410–11 reform of the tax system 291, 319, 332–9 reform of their internal administration 129–34, 230 relations with the ministry 50–1, 217–18, 234, 244, 252–7 relationship with the governor 145, 159, 213, 218, 232–3, 244, 250, 255–6, 271, 403 relationship with the intendant 46–50, 176, 218, 238–9, 311, 360 resistance to taxation 156–7, 171, 403 response to famine 223–8, 363 road building 209–12, 291, 340–2, 397, 408 scrutiny of 83–4, 123–4, 128–34, 312, 323, 402 their fees and emoluments 101–3, 105, 180 working practices 83–4, 126–8, 130–4, 229, 387 engineer-in-chief (of the Estates of Burgundy) 106, 119–20, 126, 139, 151, 346, 347, 408 appointment and duties 209–10, 236, 339–40, 358 England 350 ´ Epoisses 38 Espinac, Louis de Pernes comte d’ 221–2 Estates of Artois 24, 331, 380, 404 Estates of Brittany 20, 22–3, 64, 67, 68, 86, 137, 175, 178, 184, 262–3, 278, 289, 290, 295, 306, 346, 368, 404, 406 increased authority 23, 331 Estates of Cambr´esis 24, 331 Estates of Dauphin´e 365, 375 Estates of Flanders 24, 331 Estates General of Burgundy 19, 21, 23, 25, 27–8, 32, 39, 40, 42, 50, 51, 89–91, 104, 105, 115–16, 128, 194, 195, 203, 214, 223, 224, 235, 255, 260, 295, 311–12, 331, 363, 388–9, 401, 406, 412 accounts of 105, 166–7, 296, 300–1 and agricultural improvement 37, 77, 222, 351–7 and canals and waterways 321, 345–7, 408–10 and coastal militia 313–15 and don gratuit 42, 51, 60, 76, 77, 79, 81, 158–63, 168–70, 186–7, 191–2, 272, 298–9, 403–4 and economic development 220–2, 307, 357–60 and fiscal reform 77, 331–9, 405–6 and foundation of university 39, 223, 361, 408

and military ´etapes 347–9 and public instruction 361–2 and public opinion 279–82, 366–7 and rachats 171–4, 298, 300, 302, 315–16, 319 and reforms of abb´e La Goutte 249–55 and royal stud (haras) 354–7, 408–10 and the corv´ee 342–5 and the poor 360–1 and vingti`emes 306–11, 337–8 and wine trade 171, 174, 222, 307, 311, 359 archives of 140–1 attendance of third estate 73–4 authority of bishops 59 bargaining over taxation 157–65, 296, 301, 303–4, 310–12, 315–16 borrowing, credit and debt of 180–1, 186–93, 202, 295, 298–302, 319–28, 377, 405 chamber of the clergy 59–64, 76–7, 84, 88, 337, 371–3, 386 chamber of the nobility 64–71, 76, 88, 278, 302, 313, 315, 320, 371–4 chamber of the third estate 53, 55, 71–6, 88, 100, 158, 165, 313, 337, 371–4 clerical attendance of 58–9, 63, 73 clerical membership of 57–9, 63 clerks of 141–4, 153 closure of the Estates 88–9 convocation and timing of assemblies 42, 51, 159, 402 critics of 257–60, 380–3, 385–9, 391, 394–8, 410–11 d´ecrets of 82–4, 88–9 defence of rights and privileges 61, 199–200, 222–3, 244–8, 259 deputations of 277, 287, 294, 304, 306–8, 411 disputes amongst clergy 61–4 expenditure of 165, 167–81, 212, 213, 296, 300–1, 382–3 fiscal system of 155, 168–9, 191–3, 207, 263, 268, 297, 327–9, 383, 403–5 governor’s instructions 51–2, 60, 76, 77, 81, 88, 159, 160, 171, 221, 245–6, 257, 288, 306, 308, 309, 311, 313, 337, 343, 357 increasing authority 24–5, 260, 363–4, 409–10 institutional rivalries 27–8, 85, 242–3, 263–4, 286–93, 333 management of 257–9, 261, 290 membership of 32 noble attendance of 64 noble membership of 68–9, 386 opening ceremony 51, 53–7, 59 origins of 41 ‘patriotic’ contributions of 300, 317–18 pensions and gifts of 85–8, 135–6, 180, 235, 265, 374, 383, 404

Index permanent officers of the Estates 54, 55, 83, 85, 86, 105–20, 124, 126, 128, 138–44, 147, 151–2, 168, 190–1, 202, 234–5, 244, 271, 275, 340, 367, 404 plans for reform of 368–74, 376–80, 383–5, 391–4, 398–9, 412 preparations for 51–3 privileges and Burgundian constitution 41–2, 52, 138, 222, 241, 247, 256–7, 272, 274, 292–3, 371–4, 377–9, 384–7, 389, 391, 398, 400, 406, 412 procedures and protocol 76–81, 84, 88–9 r`eglements of 1742 and 1744 84, 87, 106, 230, 236–7, 245–8, 260, 370, 371, 381, 382, 386, 406, 412 relationship with the governor 43–6, 52–3, 59, 77–8, 80–2, 88–9, 92, 128, 163, 165, 192, 208–9, 230, 232–3, 241–2, 296, 370, 403 relationship with the intendant 46–50, 78, 103, 403 remonstrances of 81, 82, 84, 123, 131, 134–7, 165, 197, 206, 216, 219, 241, 246, 257, 316, 333, 351–2, 354, 361, 372, 374 requˆetes and petitions to 85–6, 198, 200 resistance to taxation 155–7, 177, 213, 305, 314–15 response to famine 223–8, 363 revenues of 181–2, 189, 296, 404 road building 209–13, 339–45, 357, 410 scrutiny of provincial administration 83–4, 204–6, 215–16, 228–9 supposed decadence of 20, 89, 92, 402 threats to 41–2, 230–1, 233–42 unrepresentative nature 21, 75, 386 voyage of honour 81, 123, 129, 131–2, 134–7, 160, 239, 241, 246, 255, 313, 316, 359, 373 work of the assembly 81–6, 402–3 Estates General (of France) 2, 96, 260, 291, 293, 365–6, 374–7, 380, 381, 386, 388–92, 400, 411–12 Estates of Languedoc 14, 15, 20, 23, 86, 137, 175, 220, 295, 306, 317, 404 fiscal management of 22 Estr´ees, comte d’ 190, 191 ´etapes 14, 51, 81, 109, 131, 138, 140, 144, 160, 161, 178, 194, 347–9, 401 and ´etapier g´en´eral 213, 347–8 cost of 169–71, 180, 216–17, 311–12 workings of 213–17 ´etats particuliers (see also Mˆaconnais, Charolais and Bar-sur-Seine) 28, 75, 85, 140, 195–6, 202, 242–4, 260, 263 Eug`ene de Savoie, prince 175

453

Fabry, family 150 Fabry, Bernard 149–50 Fabry, Edme 149 Fabry, Nicolas 206 famine 31, 53, 138, 154, 155, 174, 188, 194, 223–8, 363, 408 winter of 1709 226–8 F´elix, Henri 61 Fenouillot de Closey, avocat 119 ferme g´en´erale 6, 407 fermiers 35 Ferrand, Antoine Franc¸ois 29, 30, 57, 211, 224–6 F´evret, family 121 F´evret de Fontette, president 278–9, 283–4, 288, 367–9 Feydeau de Brou 49, 104 first president (of Parlement of Dijon) 55, 86, 134, 271, 277, 404 First World War 4 Flanders 26, 36 Flavigny 376 Fleury, Andr´e-Hercule, cardinal de 232, 233, 316, 340 Foisset, Th´eodore 401 Fontaine-l`es-Dijon 390 Fontenoy, battle of 236 Forest, Henri Silvestre de la 99, 130–2 Foudras, comte de 217 Fouquet, Nicolas 11, 174 Franche-Comt´e 28, 29, 34, 169, 226, 342, 375, 411 conquest of 29, 31, 208, 213, 223, 238 Franc¸ois I 2, 26 French revolution 3, 4, 23, 25, 57, 110, 118, 123, 142–3, 155, 248, 296, 302, 310, 364, 400–1, 405, 412 Fribourg 151 Fronde 3, 7, 19, 42, 93, 97, 108, 156, 166, 178, 213, 262, 295, 330 fundamental laws 22 Fyot, family 32, 104 Fyot de la Marche, Claude 96 gabelle 117 Gagne, family 32, 94 Gagne de Perrigny, president 275 Gagne de Perrigny, Aim´e Franc¸ois 94 Gallas, Matthias 29, 213 Garnot, Benoˆıt 46 Gautherin, mayor of Flavigny 376–7 Gauthey, Emiliand-Marie 120, 151, 346 Gauthier, Pierre-Franc¸ois 104 Gelyot, Jean 139, 141 Geneva 52, 107, 326 Genot, Jean 100 Gevrey 30

454

Index

Gex 27, 49, 52 ´ Gilles, Etienne 146 Girard 99, 268, 316 Girard, Claude 207 Girard, Louis 108 Girard de la Br´ely, Balthazar 110, 243 Givry 29, 396 Goussard, Jacques 198 Gouveau, clerk of the Estates 143 Gouvillier, family 245 governors (see also Cond´e family) 10–11, 13, 43, 51–3, 55–7, 59–60, 65–6, 68, 69, 74, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86–7, 105, 106, 110, 124, 144, 147, 151, 203, 220, 224, 238, 244 Grammont, comtesse de 190 Grand Cond´e, see Cond´e, Louis II, prince de grande roue 72–4, 86, 99, 121–2, 146, 371 Grandmont, Claude Charlotte de 191 Gray 29, 346 Gray, Thomas 40 Great Britain 313, 359 Grenoble 375 Grignon 85 Grillot de Predelys, Guillaume 131–2 Grosbois, abb´e 55, 133 Gruder, Vivien 331 Gueneau d’Aumont, Philibert Hugues 99, 101 Gueneau de Mussy, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois 76–7 Guenichot, family 119 Guenichot, Nicolas 117, 118, 172 Guillaume, family 119 Guyenne 2 Guyon, Georges de 99 Guyton, Antoine 100 Habsburg, House of 26, 28 Hague, the 97 Hainaut 36 Hamscher, Albert 13 Harding, Robert 10 Harlay de Bonneuil, Nicolas Auguste de 48, 192, 214–15 Haute-Guyenne 366 H´enault, Charles-Jean-Franc¸ois 291 Henri IV 41 Henshall, Nicholas 7 Herbert, Franc¸ois 142–3 Holstein 355 Holy Roman Empire 128–34, 169, 213, 312 hospitals and public health 47, 85, 191, 349 Huguenots 2, 8, 15 Hurt, John 13–14 Ile-de-France 28 inspectors of manufactures 6, 358

intendant of Burgundy 46–51, 55, 78, 86, 113, 115, 117, 164, 213, 218, 220, 224, 257, 307, 309, 311, 315, 346, 348, 350, 352, 358, 360, 363, 377, 392, 398, 403, 404, 410 power and authority 46–50, 175, 230, 252, 260, 305–6, 328, 407–9 and communities 46–7 relationship with the governor 47–8, 78, 230, 234–5 intendants 2–4, 10, 12–13, 17, 19, 24, 92, 144, 231, 276, 281, 294, 330–1, 342–4, 349–50, 357, 410 alleged despotism of 24 and assemblies of the Estates 51–2 enlightened administration 23, 330–1, 336, 351, 356, 362, 364, 409 limits of authority 12–13 their commissions 3 intendants of finance 6, 124 Italy 107, 213, 222, 226, 227, 312 Jacobin club 375 Jacquinot, Franc¸ois Joseph 118 Jannon, Jean-Baptiste 148 Jarrin, Philippe Joseph 143 Jaucourt, Louis Pierre comte de 70–1 Jesuits 284 Johannisberg, battle of 45 Joly, Jean 103 Joly, Jean-Barth´elemy 130–2 Joly de B´evy, Louis-Philibert-Joseph 273, 275, 277, 279, 281, 283, 288, 289, 294, 368 Joly de Fleury, Jean-Franc¸ois 51, 103, 114–15, 129, 230, 242, 307–9, 313–14, 362 as ´elu du roi 237–40, 313, 406 Jouard, family 99 Jouard, Franc¸ois 150, 152 Jouard, Guy 121 Julien, family 32 Julien, Benoˆıt 110, 135–6, 141 Julien, Jacques 110, 131 Jura, the 30 Kettering, Sharon 10, 11, 21 Kwass, Michael 17, 304 La Botte, Nicolas 130–2, 203 laboureurs 35 La Brosse 209–13 La Croix, Antoine de 203 La Fare, abb´e Louis-Henri de 94, 96, 133, 310–11 La Feuill´ee, Pierre du Ban, comte de 128, 129 Lagos, battle of 316 La Goutte, abb´e Antoine de 120, 243, 245, 248–59, 261, 337–8, 355, 369, 373, 406–8

Index La Marche, pr´esidente de 275 Lamarre, Christine 357 Lambert, Claude Guillaume 309–10, 324, 401 La Michodi`ere, B´enigne 108 La Michodi`ere, Claude 108 Lamoignon, Chr´etien-Franc¸ois de 274, 293, 366, 374–5, 383 Lamoignon de Malesherbes, Chr´etien Guillaume de 91, 93, 124, 126, 133, 153, 271, 284, 285, 287–9, 294, 380 La Monnoye, Bernard de 154 Lamy, family 150, 190 Lamy, Edme 148–9, 206, 208 Lamy, Thomasse 148 Landreville 395 Langhac, Marie Roger de, marquis de Colligny 97 Languedoc 11, 14, 15, 20, 21, 27, 61, 162, 180, 220, 262, 317, 353, 402 Languet, Charles 148 Languet, Guillaume 112 Languet, Odette-Th´er`ese 112 Languet de Livry, Hubert Charles 339 Lantissier, sieur 396, 397 La Ramisse, family 99 Larmes, Joseph 343 La Roche 345 La Rocheflavin, Bernard de 274 La Rochelle 2 Lassay, Armand de Madaillan de Lesparre, marquis de 97, 111–12, 122, 217 Lassay, Leon de Madaillan de Lesparre, comte de 130–2 La Tour du Pin de Gouvernet, Philippe-Antoine de 104, 308, 324, 388 La Tournelle, Antoine Franc¸ois de 121 Lauzun, duc de 191 L’Averdy, Cl´ement Charles Franc¸ois de 51, 240–2, 244, 248, 260, 284, 315, 336, 360 La Ville, Marie 359 Law, John 44, 79, 231, 296, 299 Le Creusot 37 Legay, Marie-Laure 24, 331, 363–4, 409 Legitimists 2 Le Goux, abb´e 94 Legouz, family 32 Legouz de Gerland, Benigne 39 Le Paige, Louis-Adrien 272, 283 Le Peletier, Claude 86, 168–9 Le Pelletier de La Houssaye, F´elix 79 Le Tellier, family 8 Le Tellier, Charles Maurice 95 Le Tellier, Michel 95 Ligeret, Jean-Baptiste 146

455

Ligny, chevalier de 70 Ligou, Daniel 75, 401 Limoges 343 Loire, river 220, 345 ´ Lom´enie de Brienne, Etienne-Charles de 366 Lorraine 26 Lorraine, Charles de, duc de Mayenne 41 Lort de S´erignan de Valras, Henri-Constance de 242 Louhans 358 Louis XI 2, 26, 27, 41, 247, 258, 272–4 Louis XIII 1–3, 14, 41, 166 Louis XIV 1–4, 7–8, 14, 16, 17, 19–20, 22, 28, 34, 39, 43, 47, 58, 61, 64, 65, 68, 73, 77, 93, 97, 106, 120, 128, 131, 134, 174, 178, 180, 184, 186, 199–201, 203, 223, 228, 233, 238, 263–4, 266, 278, 288, 295–7, 301, 309, 315, 321, 328, 333, 339, 347, 354, 402, 406, 408–9 and provincial estates 155–65, 168–9, 171, 177–8, 187–9, 191–4, 207, 216, 308, 403–5 and secretaries of state 8 and the parlements 13–14 and Versailles 8–9 collaboration with provincial elites 14–15, 19, 22, 155, 174, 230 distribution of patronage 8–9, 11, 19 governing style 7–8, 44, 136–7, 173 opposition to 19 personal rule 42, 87, 125, 197 use of propaganda 13, 208–10, 212–13 war and diplomacy 154, 165, 180, 182, 187–9, 213, 218, 231, 350 Louis XV 4, 24, 25, 45, 58, 59, 70, 73, 91, 141, 210, 230, 231, 233, 236, 244, 262, 289, 295, 299, 325, 330, 341, 345, 351, 369, 401, 408 and the Estates 237, 247, 313, 333 and the parlements 273, 275 weakness of 287 Louis XVI 4, 36, 40, 49–51, 55, 58, 70, 91, 95, 101, 107, 137, 141, 145, 153, 201–2, 204, 243, 244, 248, 255, 290, 295, 302, 305, 310, 328, 334, 336, 339, 343, 346, 353, 357, 362, 364, 366, 369, 394, 405, 407–9 and pre-revolutionary crisis 365, 374, 388, 400, 411 and the Estates 372 Louis-Philippe 346 Louvois, Michel marquis de 219 Low Countries 26, 97, 222 Lux, family 32 Luxembourg 26 Luzines, abb´e Claude-Franc¸ois de 94, 390 Lyon 28, 29, 36, 137, 211, 222–8, 282, 346 Lyonnais 11

456

Index

Machault d’Arnouville, Jean-Baptiste 113–15, 237, 238, 305–6, 402 Macheco, family 32, 104, 190 Mˆacon 27–31, 42, 57, 62, 67, 75, 86, 95, 282, 347, 390 Mˆaconnais 28, 162, 309 administrative structure 28 ´etats particuliers 28, 62, 110, 195–6, 242–3, 260, 263 Magna Carta 1 Maigret, pensioner of the Estates 70 Mailly-la-Ville 75 Mailly-le-Chˆateau 200 mainmorte (see serfdom) Maintenon, madame de 95 Mairetet, Alexandre de 150, 249, 253 maitres des requˆetes 124, 136, 407 Major, J. Russell 22–3, 155, 163 Malvin de Montazet, Antoine de 59 Marbeuf, Yves-Alexandre de 51, 59, 95, 145, 247 March´eseuil 396, 397 mar´echauss´ee 55, 179 Marie-Antoinette 96 Marie de Bourgogne 26 Marillac, Michel de 42 Marlot, Claude 114 ´ Marlot, Etienne Thomas 150 Marseille 31, 36, 227 Martenne, Claude 99 Masson, Simon Bernard 141, 142 Maufoux, Jean-Franc¸ois 100, 145, 249, 256 Maupeou, Ren´e-Nicolas-Charles-Augustin de 274, 275, 290, 308, 383 Maure, comtesse de 93 Maximilian of Austria 26 mayors 47, 49, 53, 74, 103, 105, 139, 151–3, 233, 347, 404 and venality 100, 111, 178, 192, 240–2, 316, 377, 386, 404 appointment of 100–1, 144–7, 236 duties of 100, 144–5, 206, 215–16, 218, 252, 350, 362 Mazarin, Guilio, cardinal de 3, 7–8, 12, 14, 96, 156 Mediterranean 36 Merceret, Claude 390 Mercurey 200 Mesvre 393 Mettam, Roger 7, 8, 13 Meursault 30 Micault, Jean-Baptiste 281 midwifery 362, 364, 392 militia 83, 109, 138, 140, 144, 152, 180, 194, 204, 218–20, 312–15, 335, 350, 397 Minard, Philippe 6

Mirabeau, Victor de Riquetti, marquis de 366 Miromesnil, Hue de 151 Mol´e, Mathieu-Franc¸ois 284–5 Mollerat, Bernard 149, 246–7 Monahan, Gregory 226–7 Mongin, Edm´e 94 Montagne (see Chˆatillon-sur-Seine) Montbard 37, 54, 99, 130–2, 211, 353, 387 Montcenis 27, 227, 358, 391, 397 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis Secondat de 366, 384 Montferrand, gentilhomme de la porte 69 Montmorency, Henri II, duc de 3 Moreau, Barth´elemy 118 Moreau, Gabriel Franc¸ois 242 Moreau, Gaspard 233 Morin, Pierre 120, 213, 340 Morvan, the 30, 227 Mousnier, Roland 9, 16 Moussier, Louis 105, 247 Murard, Alexandre-Franc¸ois de 284 Nancy 41, 94, 96 Nantes 31, 36 Napol´eon I 29, 120, 281 Napol´eon III 2 Narbonne 61 Narbonne, archbishop of 317 Natcheson, Beth 10, 43 national identity 1 Necker, Jacques 107, 152, 257, 309, 322–3, 327, 328, 366, 369 Negret, Joseph 63 Nicolle, Anne 343 Nivernais 28 Noailles, Mlle de 190 nobility 2, 15, 34, 105, 365, 370, 375–6 court aristocracy 4, 8–10, 16, 57, 124, 174, 407 of the robe 3, 12, 16, 124, 150–1, 248, 270, 325 of the sword 16 nobility of Burgundy 32–4, 66–7, 98–9, 121, 183, 278, 302–3, 336–7, 404 and pre-revolutionary crisis 376–80, 383–5, 388, 390–2, 398–9, 411–12 Noirot, family 99 Noirot, Franc¸ois 133, 150 Nolay 30, 358 Normandy 2, 304 North Africa 227 North Sea 26 Noyers 85, 156, 159, 404 Nuits-Saint-Georges 27, 29, 39, 74, 121, 146, 148–9, 246, 343 nurseries ( pepini`eres) 353–4

Index octrois (on the river Saˆone) 148, 176, 192, 204, 228, 316, 321, 325, 328, 383, 405, 408 administration of 206 and fiscal system of the Estates 168–9, 172–3, 175, 183, 185–9, 297–8, 303–4, 318, 320 octrois, municipal 173 Olivier-Martin, Franc¸ois 20 orators (of the Estates) 60, 67 Orgeval, Pierre d’ 92, 336 Orl´eans, Gaston d’ 3 Orl´eans, Philippe duc d’ 231 Orl´eanais 28 Orry, Philibert 303, 305, 316, 353 Outre-Saˆone 72, 74, 75 Pag`es, Georges 4 ´ Palais des Etats (of Burgundy) 39, 52, 54, 55, 57, 68, 138, 208–9, 243, 362, 373 Palatinate 165 Paray-le-Monial 349 Parigot, Simon 357 Paris 2, 26, 28, 32, 36, 38, 43, 99, 108, 119, 129, 131, 135–7, 157, 168, 209, 211, 222, 234, 244, 251, 255, 273, 282, 325, 342 Parker, David 12, 15, 16 Parlement of Dijon 27, 32, 34, 37, 39, 47, 51, 54, 55, 69, 85, 86, 94, 96, 104, 108, 110, 111, 117, 140, 147, 183, 185, 190–1, 197, 223, 253, 255, 271, 277, 303–5, 337, 339, 352, 359, 379, 406, 412 and armchair affair 264–5 and Maupeou reforms 290 and physiocracy 37 and provincial constitution 274 and union des classes 273, 275, 291 cooperation with Estates 134–5, 173, 224, 363, 408 criticism of Estates 275–7, 367–70 disputes with Estates 116, 137, 199, 241, 255, 263–70, 272–93, 308, 333, 342, 367–9, 395–6, 410–11 jurisdiction of 27 pretensions of 27, 271, 278–9 resistance to taxation 173, 267–9, 313 Parlement of Paris 13, 27, 109, 268, 273–4, 282–5, 291, 375 Parlement of Rennes 178 Parlement of Rouen 275 parlements 3–5, 17, 246, 268, 273, 283, 288, 293, 295, 301, 330, 366, 374–5, 406 right of remonstrance 3, 13, 163 Parrott, David 11 patronage, see client`ele paulette 18

457

Pavia 26 pays-adjacents 27, 28, 46, 52, 175, 304 pays d’´elections 16, 20, 21, 24, 28, 42, 144, 266, 276, 282, 294, 305, 331, 349, 357, 364, 366, 371, 390, 409, 410 pays d’´etats 12, 14–16, 19, 20, 27–8, 40, 48, 95, 125, 157, 164, 262, 268, 294, 305, 306, 310, 314, 317, 322–3, 329, 331, 351, 388, 404, 409 peasants 17, 34, 38, 39, 47, 174, 195, 197, 202, 218, 219, 228, 307, 352–3, 357, 404 celebrations 40 demands for representation 75 social divisions of 35 Perchet, Nicolas 118 Pernes, Georges-Anne de, comte d’Epinac 98 Pernes, Louis de, comte d’Epinac 98 Pernot, Dom Andoche 62–3 Perrault, Jean 108, 112 Perrier, Cl´ement 280 Perrin, family 148 Perrin, Claude 144, 202 petite roue 72–4, 121–2 Petit, family 147 Petit, Claude 148 Peyrenc de Moras, Franc¸ois-Marie 306–8 Ph´elypeaux, family 8 Philippe le Hardi, duke of Burgundy 41 physiocrats 37, 351, 366 Picardy 221 Pinerolo 225 Piron 39 Poland 385 Pontchartrain, Louis Ph´elypeaux de 48, 175, 192, 207, 223, 225 ponts et chauss´ees 6 bureau of 140, 141 Port-Royal 8 Potter, Mark 23, 191, 325 Pouillenay 395 Pourcher, Nicolas 121 poverty 33, 35, 360–1, 373 premiers commis 6, 12, 124, 136, 407 Prie, Jeanne Agn`es Berthelot de Pl´eneuf marquise de 232 princes of the blood 375 procureur g´en´eral (of the Parlement of Dijon) 134 procureurs 99 procureurs syndics (of the Estates of Burgundy) 85, 105, 116–18, 126, 129, 134–6, 143, 216, 224, 236 Provence 1, 11, 21, 28, 226, 351, 363 provincial administrations 366, 382 provincial assemblies 240, 366, 410

458

Index

provincial estates 2, 5, 13, 17–19, 23, 24, 161, 171, 175, 246, 374, 388, 400 as medieval relics 19, 20 debates about future of 366, 411 emergence of 22 growing authority 24, 331, 363–4, 409–10 in decline 21–2 unrepresentative nature 21 why they survived 23, 163–4, 239, 328–9 Prussia 313 public opinion 20, 25, 124, 292, 294, 330, 366 Pyrenees, peace of 158 Quarr´e, family 121 Quiberon bay, battle of 316 Quinc´e, abb´e Armand de 135–7 Rameau, Jean-Philippe 39 Ranfer, Simon 118 rapporteurs (of the Estates) 60, 67 Raviot, family 119 Raviot, Guillaume 104, 118 regency government 3 Rebillon, Armand 22–4, 331, 363–4, 406 Reboullet, dean of Cuisery 63 receivers of the taille 113, 114, 117, 129, 139, 144, 180–2, 189, 197, 204, 236, 270, 369, 373 commissions of 147, 249, 254 critics of 396–7 duties of 140, 144–5, 196, 206, 218, 227, 251–2, 350 right of appointment 236, 244–8 social background and kinship ties 147–51, 153 supervision of 201–3, 333–4, 337–9 Reims 40 R´emond, family 148, 150 R´emond, Bonaventure 211 R´emond, Daniel 202–3 R´emond, Joseph Franc¸ois 150 Rennes 375 Rhine, river 346 Rhˆone, river 29, 36, 345 Richard, family 102 Richard, Germain 130–2, 207 Richard de Ruffey, Gilles-Germaine 102–3 Richard, Jean 274, 332 Richelieu, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal de 2–3, 8, 12, 14, 42, 109, 220 Rigault, avocat 119 Rigoley, family 112–16, 118, 190 Rigoley, Claude 47, 48, 110–12, 135–6, 172, 175, 190, 200, 224, 226 Rigoley, Denis 110 Rigoley de Mypon, Denis Claude 112–14, 304 Rigoley d’Ogny, Claude-Jean 113, 115, 289

Rigoley de Puligny, Claude-Denis 116 Rigoley de Puligny, Jean 113–14 Riquet, Paul-Pierre 220–1 Rives, Paul 20 roads and highways 51, 81, 85, 119, 129, 138, 209–13, 339–45 Robinet, Louis 121 Rochechouart, Louis de 93 Rocroi, battle of 45, 97 Rome 233, 361 Root, Hilton 46, 47, 352 Roquette, family 94 Roquette, Gabriel de 93, 160, 190 Roquette, abb´e Henri Emanuel de 94, 101, 130–2, 217 Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent 23, 191, 325 Rouen 36 Rougeot, Jean 118 Rouillet, Antoine 120, 209, 211 Roulle 358 Roupnel, Gaston 214–15 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 39, 271, 285, 294 Rousselot, Nicolas-Claude 116, 146, 243, 247, 355 Roussillon 356 Ryswick, Peace of 154, 167, 182 Saint-Aignan, Paul-Hippolyte de Beauvilliers, duc de 45, 59, 87, 230, 233–5, 237, 265 Saint-Florentin, Louis Ph´elypeaux comte de 50, 80, 103, 118, 152, 153, 282 and Burgundian administration 50, 127–8, 146, 234–7, 244, 247 patronage of 143, 244 Saint-Helier 394 Saint Jacob, Pierre de 34, 35, 37, 47, 195, 342 Saint-Jean-de-Losne 27, 29, 74, 99, 345 Saint-Julien, Pierre de 41 Saint-Laurent-l`es-Chalon 148, 203 Saint-Martin-de-Vaulx 200 Saint Martin of Auxerre 63 Saint-Maurice, abb´e de 227 Saint-Seine 30, 146 Saint-Symphorien 345 Saints, battle of 318 Saˆone, river (see also octrois) 29–30, 132, 171, 217–18, 220, 226, 297, 345–7, 358 and commerce 29, 33, 52, 222, 226 Saulieu 27, 31, 198, 387 Saulx-Tavanes, family 32, 78, 98, 122 Saulx-Tavanes, Charles-Marie-Gaspard de, comte de Saulx 115 Saulx-Tavanes, comte de 78–80, 98, 264–5, 313–14 Sauvage, Claude 234 Savoy 225

Index secours extraordinaire 168–9, 178 secr´etaires des ´etats (of Estates of Burgundy) 47, 105, 109–16, 124, 126, 139, 236, 249, 271, 293, 351, 367, 403 bureaux of 139–40 duties of 129, 131, 135–6, 141, 152–3, 166, 340, 348, 350 fees and emoluments 109–10 price of office 109 secretaries of state 50–67, 82, 87, 124, 136, 147, 151, 215, 348, 350, 370 Seguin, family 150 Seguin, Edme 149, 206 Seguin, Nicolas 113–15, 148–9 Seignelay 221 seigneurialism 34 seigneurial reaction 34, 47 Seigny 85 Seille, river 347 Seine, river 29, 345 Semur-en-Auxois 30, 31, 33, 76, 85, 101, 103, 108, 211, 293, 374, 388, 392 Semur-en-Brionnais 227, 391, 397 S´enac de Meilhan, Gabriel 330 Senaux, Bertrand 61 Sens, Mlle de, princesse de Cond´e 146 serfdom 34 Seurre 29, 347 Seven Years War 45, 196, 240, 267, 295, 301, 304 Si`eyes, abb´e Emmanuel-Joseph 376, 385 Smith, Roger 43 state 1, 3–8, 25, 155, 327 Strasbourg 346 stud (see also Di´enay) 144, 222, 354–6, 370, 373, 397 subdelegates, of the intendants 12, 46, 49, 100, 144, 145, 218, 270–1, 330, 356 subsistance et exemption des gens de guerre 157–61, 168, 217 Suremain, family 147–8, 150 Suremain, Jean-Baptiste 227 survivance 116, 150, 244–6, 271 Swiss Confederation 28, 358 taille 21, 77, 85, 92, 107, 134, 140, 152, 156, 157, 168, 175, 176, 181–5, 189, 195–206, 216–18, 227, 249, 253, 266, 281, 298, 301–2, 313, 320, 325, 336, 343, 344, 394, 405 and contrainte solidaire 197, 253, 334 and general visits 196–8, 205–6, 251, 332–4, 336, 339, 408 and nouveau pied de taille 145, 198, 251, 265–7, 270, 286, 293, 332–3, 336, 339 assessors of 196, 198, 205, 333, 336 collectors of 196–7, 205, 250, 320, 334, 336

459

reform of 251–4, 291, 331–6, 364, 373 system of feux (hearths) 334–5, 408 Tallard, mar´echal de 98 Talleyrand-P´erigord, Charles Maurice de 390–1 Talmay 29 Talon, M. 114–15 Tanlay 201, 211 taxation inequalities of 70–1, 249, 302–5, 336–7, 364 Ternant, Jean 343 Terray, abb´e Joseph-Marie 241, 308, 324, 327 Th´esut, family 43, 191 Th´esut, Abraham de 94 Th´esut, Jean de 94, 191 Th´esut, Jacques de 94 Th´esut, Louis de 108 Th´esut de Ragy, Charles-B´enigne 48, 208 Thianges, family 32 Thianges, Claude-El´eonor Damas, duc de Pont-de-Vaux, marquis de 137 Thiard, family 98 Thibault, Dom Pierre 122 Thierry, Claude 139 third estate 55, 216, 319, 365, 370, 375 and pre-revolution in Dijon 375–80, 384–9, 391, 398, 411–12 Thiroux, Lazare Louis 118 Thirty Years War 3, 166, 192, 213 Thomas, Alexandre 2, 20, 163, 194–5, 214–15, 228, 408 Thorey 343 Thubi`ere de Caylus, Charles-Gabriel Daniel 95 Tocqueville, Alexis de 1–2, 4 and centralisation 1–2, 4 and provincial estates 20–1 Tournus 216, 343 treasurer general (of the Estates of Burgundy) 100, 105–9, 112–16, 124, 126, 133, 135, 166, 197, 202–5, 208, 227, 236, 244, 247, 253–4, 326, 338, 340, 369, 373, 403 critics of 235, 249–50, 367 fees and profits of 106–7, 180, 307, 396 tr´esoriers de France 55 Trouv´e, abb´e Franc¸ois 63 Trudaine, Daniel 341 Trudaine, Daniel Charles 284 Trullard, procureur syndic of Dijon 375 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques 53, 254, 261, 330, 343, 345, 361, 406 Turin 97 Uncey-le-Franc 396 Unigenitus, papal Bull 273 United States 376 University of Dijon 39, 118, 119, 223, 361, 386, 408

460

Index

Valois, dukes of Burgundy 26, 41, 57, 93, 98, 102, 272–4, 380 state of 26 Valromey 27, 49 Varenne, Jacques 113–16, 267–70, 291, 292, 294, 367, 368, 410 disgrace of 280–1, 286–90 early career of 270–1 quarrel with the Parlement 272–86 Varenne de B´eost, Antoine 271, 286, 351 Varenne de F´enilles 271 Vauban, S´ebastien le Prestre de 176 venality (see also mayors) 18, 216, 240, 404 Verdun, Gilbert de Gadagne d’Hostun, comte de 98 Verdun-sur-le-Doubs 29, 36 Vergennes, Charles Gravier comte de 51, 359 Versailles 3, 8–9, 12, 32, 39, 44, 48, 62, 87, 88, 96, 99, 103, 109, 110, 115, 124, 131, 137, 147, 153, 172, 224, 225, 234, 240, 242, 246, 257, 269, 280, 282, 286–7, 289, 308, 339, 341, 383, 390, 400, 404, 407, 410 Versoix 52 Viard de Quemigny, Claude 122 Vielard, Franc¸ois 396 Vienne, family 32, 98 Vienne, Louis-Henri comte de 98, 277–8, 282, 287, 376, 378 vicomte-mayeur of Dijon 48, 54, 55, 72, 74, 93, 103–5, 114, 126–7, 130–2, 150, 247, 256

Villeroy, family 11 Villeroy, mar´echal de 226 vingti`eme(s) 107, 242, 249–50, 267–8, 275, 300, 304–10, 322, 328, 335, 339, 373, 395, 402, 405, 408 bureau of 140, 143 reform of collection 252–3, 258, 337–8, 372, 406, 411 Voisenet, Jean-Baptiste 103 Volnay 30 Voysin, Daniel Franc¸ois 219 War of American Independence 37, 315, 319, 323 War of Devolution 159, 161 Wars of Religion 41 War of the Austrian Succession 195, 295, 298, 303, 305, 312, 347, 349 War of the League of Augsburg 69, 154, 155, 166, 170, 216 War of the Spanish Succession 70, 154, 167, 173, 182, 187, 193, 219, 295, 406 War of the Polish Succession 296, 305, 316 Whig school of history 1, 4, 20, 260 Wilkinson 37 Xaintrailles, Joseph de 97, 122, 190 Yonne, river 345 Young, Arthur 37, 38, 260