Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups As a Factor of Terrorist Behavior

PSYCHOSOCIAL STRESS IN IMMIGRANTS AND IN MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS AS A FACTOR OF TERRORIST BEHAVIOR

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 40

ISSN 1874-6276

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior

Edited by

Michal Finklestein Projects’ Coordinator, The Community Stress Prevention Center, Kiryat Shmona; The Department of Social Work, Zefat Academic College, under supervision of Bar–Ilan University, Israel

and

Kim Dent-Brown School of Health and Related Research, University of Sheffield, UK

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior Kiryat Shmona, Israel 1–3 April 2007

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-872-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008930491 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

v

Preface This book represents the proceedings of a NATO Advanced Research Workshop entitled: Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior. The meeting that led to this book was multifaceted. The assembly of experts enabled the discussion of varied attitudes from fresh and frank points of view, never previously brought together in dialogue. The book deals with the universal phenomenon of immigration in the light of globalization and the double messages of host countries, that on one hand encourage immigration and on the other hand have not made up their minds about the rights and obligations of newcomers in a country. Creating a theoretical link between concepts and terms allied to immigration and terrorism is based on my practical evidence from the last 8 years, worldwide. We do hope that the contributions by the participants will lead to more understanding and shed more light on the etiology of terrorism and on what has to be done to prevent it. We hope this will enable us to address the underlying issues that lead to the lethal actions which have led to the loss of the lives of so many innocent people. We are honored and proud to have edited this book. With the financial support and encouragement of NATO in April 2007, a special group of international authorities in the fields of terrorist behavior and psychosocial stress in immigration and minorities, gathered in Tel Hai, upper Galilee, in Israel. The participants in this meeting included experts from psychology, psychiatry, political science, social science and criminology related to immigration. Our mission was to discuss and understand more comprehensively the relationship between immigration and terrorism. Learning more about psychosocial stress in immigrants, who arrive in a new country and have expectations that are not met, would highlight new angles that policy makers have not previously attended to. In practical terms, we hoped that the discussions might lead towards interventions that will reduce the threat of terrorism. Immigration has been a channel for individuals to improve their lives by moving to a new country. However in the era of globalization, the consequences of these individual actions at the level of the society and the state can sometimes present problems. What is it that leads a tiny minority of immigrants to become involved in terrorism? Perhaps policy makers in the Western world, which encouraged immigration, could not foresee that the manual workers whom they had welcomed would raise a new, intelligent, sophisticated second generation who were exposed to their parents being humiliated and degraded. Looking at this aspect, research will lead to new understandings and new actions. The paradox about the actualization of economical solutions for immigrants vs. the lack of integration and unexpected rejection in the host country, leads to the growth of a second generation that develops more critical attitudes, sometimes including hostility, anger and alienation towards the host country that opened its gates to the immigrating blue collar workers. In 2005 I met Prof. Mooli Lahad in his office in Kiryat Shmona, Israel, and we discussed the issue of terrorism. Prof. Lahad who is PhD. Psychology, Human & LifeScience, Tel Hai Academic College and President of the Community Stress Prevention Center is a well known authority on conflict and its human consequences. We agreed that (1) we should investigate whether antisocial behavior in deprived populations of

vi

immigrants and minorities, in the western world may stem from psychosocial stress, and (2) we should look for new ways, attitudes and perceptions that may lead to a change in coping with these realities. We realized that combining knowledge between social scientists studying immigration, refugees and minorities, and scientists who study terrorism and criminology, might yield integrated knowledge. Prof. Lahad has been working with NATO and has faith in their open mindedness. It was his suggestion that we apply to NATO to support a meeting that would examine the knowledge about the links between psychosocial stress in immigrants and minorities and terrorism behavior and how this knowledge might pave the way to guide policy makers to improve the situation of immigrants and minorities and reduce the threat of terrorism in partial segments of these populations. The organizers of the workshop are very grateful to Prof Lahad for his suggestion, and to NATO for their agreement to fund the Advanced Research Workshops through the Security Through Science Programme. Dr. Michal Finklestein Haifa, 2007

vii

Acknowledgements The NATO Advanced Research Workshop and the resulting book were the major undertakings that called upon the generosity and wisdom of many people. We wish to acknowledge, first, the encouragement of this project by NATO’s Security Through Science Programme and particularly Professor Fernandous Caravello Rodrigues, Programme Director of Human and Societal Dynamics in the Threats and Challenges Section at NATO’s World Headquarters. We wish to thank Professor Mooli Lahad, the president and Mr. Alan Cohen, both from the Community Stress Prevention Center (CSPC) for the early and steadfast support in the idea of the workshop. Thanks to MCTC AND ministry of foreign affairs for the assistance in recruiting the contributors in the ARW, via Israeli embassies. Thanks to Professor Stevan Hobfoll, the Distinguished Professor and Director, Summa-KSU Center for the Treatment and Study of Traumatic Stress, Ohio, who offered a generous and invaluable advice in devising the programme and completing the project. His inspiring ideas and great conversations were a great help to bring this book to actualization. We must gratefully thank Ruvie Rogel from CSPC, for organizing the workshop. He deserves much credit for the management of innumerable details of the project under challenging conditions. The meeting would not have been possible without the kind staff of CSCP, Hagoshrim Hotel and Tel Hai Academic College, most especially Micky Laron, the producer of this ARW who provided the setting and technical support that facilitated our hard work. Last but not least, he book would not have been possible to be published without the devoted research assistant, Shira Meir. Thank you. Thank you all.

This page intentionally left blank

ix

Principal Contributors Alvanou Maria, Ph.D. Professor of Criminology-Hellenic Police Academy Terrorism Expert, ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, Catholic University of Milan, Italy

Amro Rateb, M.A. Director, General, Horizon Strategic Studies, Amman, Jordan

Balaban Natalia, M.A. Investment, Innovation and Modern Technologies Center, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

Besevegis Elias, Ph.D. Professor, The Department of Psychology, University of Athens, School of Philosophy, Athens, Greece

Campani Giovanna, Ph.D. Professor, University of Florence, Department of Education, Italy

Canneti-Nisim Dafna, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, School of Political Science University of Haifa, Israel

Daly Oscar, Ph.D. Department of Psychiatry, Lagan Valley Hospital, Lisburn, Northern Ireland

Dent-Brown Kim, Ph.D. Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Psychological Therapies, University of Sheffield, UK

Dokter Ditty, Ph.D. Roehampton University, School for Human and Life Sciences, Arts therapies division, UK

Eckert Roland, Ph.D. Professor, University of Trier, Germany

x

Finklestein Michal, Ph.D. Projects’ Coordinator, CSPC, Kiryat Shmona, Lecturer in The Department of Social Work, Zefat Academic College, under supervision of Bar–Ilan University, Israel

Gmaj Katarzyna, M.A. Program coordinator, research fellow, The Center for International Relations, Warszawa, Poland

Hobfoll Stevan, Ph.D. Distinguished Professor and Director, Summa-KSU Center for the Treatment and Study of Traumatic Stress, Ohio, USA

Kimchi Shaul, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, Department of Psychology, Tel Hai Academic College, Israel

Rochelio Alonso, Ph.D. Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Paseo de los Artilleros s/n, Madrid, Spain

Solomon Zahava, Ph.D. Full Professor, Head of The Renata Adler Memorial Research Center for Child Welfare and Protection, Tel Aviv University, Israel

van de Put Willem, Ph.D. Director, HealthNet TPO, The Netherlands

Victoroff Jeff, M.D. Associate Professor of Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry, University of Southern California, Keck School of Medicine, CA, USA

xi

Introduction Immigrants and Immigration: A Duality of Acceptance and Rejection Mooli LAHAD1, PhD. Psychology, PhD. Human & life science It seems as though in the 21st century the term “immigrant” has become a synonym for troubles, poverty, social unrest and fears of the alien, extreme violence, terrorism and competition. More than that, there is a false equation between certain ethnic groups of immigrants and terrorism. However when we talk about immigration and immigrants we need to remember that many countries, if not all, owe much of their progress to the waves of immigrants throughout history that helped shape, change, challenge and develop those places they arrived in. Some of these immigrants became leaders, innovators, scientists, and even helped these societies to survive genetically by mixing new genes and preventing genetic deterioration. I can’t imagine one incident of immigrants arriving at the shores of existing lands that were not mixed with fears troubles and difficulties .Yet what this book is trying to look into is a modern phenomenon, no longer a “melting pot” The latter was a process by which the ancient kingdom of Assyria ruled, by mixing and exiling whole populations as a means to control them but also to make sure they “absorb” the culture and norms of the ruling state. A process that made the king of Persia Xerxes thousands of years ago so concerned when his advisor Haman said to him: “Then Haman said to King Xerxes, “There is a certain people dispersed and scattered among the peoples in all the provinces of your kingdom whose customs are different from those of all other people and who do not obey the king's laws; it is not in the king's best interest to tolerate them. If it pleases the king, let a decree be issued to destroy them, and I will put ten thousand talents of silver into the royal treasury for the men who carry out this business.” (Esther chapter 3 verse 8–10) Immediately the fear of the alien was provoked and the unequivocal decree was issued Dispatches were sent by couriers to all the king’s provinces with the order to destroy, kill and annihilate all the Jews—young and old, women and little children—on a single day, the thirteenth day of the twelfth month, the month of Adar, and to plunder their goods. A copy of the text of the edict was to be issued as law in every province

1 Professor Mooli Lahad PhD. Psychology, PhD. Human & Life Science. Tel Hai Academic College, President the Community Stress Prevention Center, www.icspc.org.

xii

and made known to the people of every nationality so they would be ready for that day. (Esther chapter 3 verse 13–14). This is but one of the documented cases of suspicious against a minority of immigrants. The first incident is narrated in Exodus chapter one verse 9–14. Let us be reminded that these were the same immigrants whose brethren (Joseph) helped the Egyptians, a few generations earlier to build a national system of storage of food as a means against the ultimate threat of existence: starvation and drought. Then a new king, who did not know about Joseph, came to power in Egypt (1:9). This new King Pharaoh sees the numbers of the new immigrants, becomes suspicious and his xenophobia rises. “Look,” he said to his people, “the Israelites have become much too numerous for us. Come, we must deal shrewdly with them or they will become even more numerous and, if war breaks out, will join our enemies, fight against us and leave the country.” So they put slave masters over them to oppress them with forced labor, and they built Pithom and Rameses as store cities for Pharaoh. The immigrants’ reaction wasn’t slow in coming: But the more they were oppressed, the more they multiplied and spread; And the ruling people escalated their reaction So the Egyptians came to dread the Israelites and worked them ruthlessly. They made their lives bitter with hard labor in brick and mortar and with all kinds of work in the fields; in all their hard labor the Egyptians used them ruthlessly. (Exodus chapter 1 verse 10–14) Let’s look again into Esther's story. The fear of the immigrant is so strong that s/he has to hide their identity: Esther had not revealed her nationality and family background, because Mordecai had forbidden her to do so. (Esther, chapter 2 verse 10). What can we learn from these historical citations? Those immigrants are torn between their wish to integrate and their need to protect their identity and are thus seen as a threat. I am not an expert in the field but I wish to argue that in my mind the liberal approach of “let them keep to their old customs” was not only because of openness and multiculturalism but also as a result of several forces: 1- the reluctance to invest in the newcomers – the melting pot meant government investment in education and other services to make the immigrants change, 2- the feeling that the host culture is so strong everybody wants to be absorbed by it. 3- the naïve laissez faire The results, like as in many other examples of laissez faire is that this approach was interpreted by the newcomers as an uncaring, superior, uninterested and neglecting approach leaving them like the children in Bowlby’s studies with a feeling of abandonment and with all the known pathologies of neglect The outcome is to be expected: consequent on the lack of a caring ‘parent’ figure, we see high level of psychological problems (internalizing the aggression) for example amongst the younger immigrants as we learn from a recent survey in Israel (almost twice as many young immigrants are psychiatric patients as their proportionate number in this age group) or directing the anger outside toward the neglecting power (for example the riots in France in 2005 and 2007) And in the absence of the authentic parent figure, so the warm bosom of brotherhood, religion and extremism is a place that offers a different sense of belonging, a sense of feeling special: alternative attachment figures of the “stronger and wiser”.

xiii

The many articles in this book shed light on these assumptions and offer a clearer understanding of the forces pushing immigrants toward a hostile position toward the hosting states or pulling them into the culture education and norms whilst maintaining their identity. One thing is very clear, even with raising awareness of the potential link between immigration and terrorism – it is not the majority of immigrants that take part in the anti social activities. It is a tiny minority who cast a shadow over the entire group. It is also possible to assume that it is the presence of modern media and communication, which makes these forces look so vast and powerful. Perhaps it is the sophisticated means to communicate over thousands of miles in few milliseconds that makes this threat so visible and its potential collaborators appear so well linked. This book makes an attempt to study the process by which such terrorist groups develop, profiting from the failure to integrate but also study the processes accompanying successful absorption of those who manage to integrate and keep their culture. I would encourage the readers of the book to explore a new way of reading by writing to the authors, discussing the issues in the book by creating internet forum and by proposing to the various authors possible joint research opportunities. Prof. Mooli Lahad Kiryat Shmona, 2007

This page intentionally left blank

xv

Contents Preface Michal Finklestein

v

Acknowledgements

vii

Principal Contributors

ix

Introduction. Immigrants and Immigration: A Duality of Acceptance and Rejection Mooli Lahad

xi

Part 1. Immigration in the Era of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities Chapter 1. “You Just ‘Gotta’ Love Baseball.” The Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security 3 Stevan E. Hobfoll Chapter 2. Violent Events and Collective Identity Roland Eckert

16

Chapter 3. Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece Elias Besevegis and Vassilis Pavlopoulos

23

Chapter 4. Trauma and Loss: The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel Michal Finklestein and Zahava Solomon

35

Part 2. Immigration as a Risk Factor vs. a Potential of Post Traumatic Growth Chapter 5. Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants Rateb Amro

63

Chapter 6. Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West Katarzyna Gmaj

71

Chapter 7. Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism Giovanna Campani

78

Chapter 8. Consequences of Illegal Immigration on the Economic and Social Situation in Moldova Natalia Balaban and Sergiu Galitschi

95

Part 3. Varied Perceptions, Ideological Attributes, and Factors of Terrorism in Immigrants and Minorities Chapter 9. Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain Rogelio Alonso

109

xvi

Chapter 10. Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues Maria Alvanou Chapter 11. “One Man’s Terrorist Is Another Man’s Freedom Fighter” – The Northern Ireland Perspective Oscar Daly Chapter 12. Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism Shaul Kimhi and Daphna Canetti-Nisim

122

128 136

Part 4. Melting Pot vs. Multiculturalism and Preventive Interventions: Will Understanding of Deprived Rights of Immigrants and Minorities’ – Lead to Less Terrorism? Chapter 13. Communication and Social Engineering: Addressing Terrorism and Social Suffering Willem van de Put

155

Chapter 14. Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’ Ditty Dokter

168

Chapter 15. Territory, Migration and Conflict: What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations Jeff Victoroff

179

Chapter 16. Afterword Kim Dent-Brown

190

Executive Summary Michal Finklestein

192

Subject Index

205

Author Index

209

Part 1 Immigration in the Era of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-3

3

Chapter 1 “You Just ‘Gotta’ love baseball.” The Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security Stevan E. Hobfoll Kent State University and Summa Health System Kent, Ohio,U. S.

Overview This chapter explores the pathways to integration versus alienation for immigrants. Beginning with the metaphor of the “love of baseball” in the U.S., which has long been a standard for immigrant acceptance as being an American, the chapter focuses on the demands on both the society to allow a pathway of integration and for immigrants to pursue integration for immigrant success. There is not a single successful pathway. Rather, there are several pathways that have proven successful and several that have proven unsuccessful. The stressful challenges that are both real and perceived that face immigrants are then explored with special attention to Muslim integration in Europe and in the U.S. The consequences of failure of Muslim integration for social unrest and as consequence terrorism are considered. The chapter also considers the role of external forces in the case of Muslim integration as pressure for religious Jihad is intermixed politically in combination with the social problems of successful integration.

The Love of Baseball as a Metaphor for Cultural Integration: The Consequences of Not Playing the Game for Social Distress and Terrorism Immigration of Muslims to the West comes at a time when there is worldwide cultural upheaval between the Muslim and non-Muslim world, what Huntington (1993) [1] called the “clash of civilizations.” These Muslims have often immigrated as guest workers, or with second class status for poorly paying menial jobs. They have entered a Europe with a history of hostility toward non-Europeans and non-Christians, and where there is an absence of traditions of immigrant absorption as fully-fledged citizens. This has further occurred at a time of the post Soviet-era breakup and subsequent upheaval that has further flooded Europe with available low-cost labor, as well as having created several areas of military conflict.

4

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

With a rise in the call for religious Jihad against the West, Muslims are often treated with suspicion and look with suspicion on their host country in terms of both their internal and foreign policies concerning Muslims and Muslim countries. Added to this is an unpopular war that the United States and Great Britain have waged in Iraq, which has only further flamed feelings of persecution and discrimination against Muslims, whatever the ideals or intent of that conflict. This chapter will examine the risk of social unrest in general and terrorism in particular, among Muslims in Europe, primarily, and to a secondary extent, in the United States. This is based, in part, on the Conservation of Resources (COR) theory [2, 3, 4], a motivational stress theory that may be applied at the sociological level. Immigration has never come easy, not for the immigrant and not for the host country. By definition, there are bridges that must be crossed and obstacles that must be overcome. Typically immigration is voluntary, but that does not mean that it is not done under duress. Economic, social, and political pressures drive immigration and in the best case they occur when immigrants have a good fit with the needs of the host country, are welcome, and have not left dire or traumatic circumstances. In many cases, however, the host country is ambivalent about immigrants, or there exist portions of the host country’s population that are ambivalent or even quite negative and rejecting. Immigrants are often leaving their country of origin due to lack of economic opportunity, outright economic failure, social or political unrest, or marked social or political upheaval. The difficulties immigrants encounter range from simple aspects of recreating traditional foods and a semblance of their past culture from the Old Country to finding safety and eking out a living in a hostile new environment. This difficult transition has often led to unrest and social and political upheaval in the New Land. This is particularly likely when immigrants arrive during a time of social and political upheaval as was the case of the wave of Irish immigration escaping the potato famine and coming to the United States during the American Civil War. Called on to serve when the wealthy could buy out their draft obligation, circumstances led to one of the most terrible periods of riots the United States has ever seen. By the end of a week of turmoil, federal troops had to be called in from fighting the Confederacy to take back the city of New York from the rioters. By the time the riots were quelled, the rioters had killed many innocent Blacks and many Irish were killed by police and federal troops [5]. Baseball as the All-American Game Much has been written about baseball as the “all-American game,” both as a metaphor and as an actual pathway toward integration of immigrants in America [6]. The “you just gotta’ love baseball” standard is a reasonable one for both the host country and the immigrants coming to their new home. Implied in the “you just gotta’ love baseball” standard are two principles. The first principle is that the host country must set reasonable criteria for acceptance of immigrants. It must be an attainable standard in a relatively brief period of time. If becoming “truly American” or “truly German” or “truly French” means being entirely language fluent, fully acculturated, and looking and dressing like the host country’s inhabitants, it will require a generation or more in favorable circumstances. Of course, if being from the host country from time immemorial is the only standard for acceptance, as some would interpret to be the case for many European nations, then no behavioral change or amount of time will qualify individuals as accepted citizens.

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

5

The “just gotta love baseball” standard instead implies that immigrants are required to deeply love something that Americans love, as well as their wanting to make their home in America. They can still speak Yiddish, or Italian, or Spanish, at least at home and in their own neighborhoods, but they have to know enough English to argue about their team, and read the paper to know what is going on. It can even be read in the Yiddish or Italian newspaper, but they must be up to date, in touch with the news… and love their team and hate the teams they are supposed to hate. Said another way, the host country must set up a reasonable pathway for acceptance of immigrants, for considering them to now be Americans. The “just gotta’ love baseball” standard also implies a second principle that is incumbent upon immigrants. They must accept “enough” of what it means to be American and strive toward it—not everything, but an amount that shows clear dedication. They have to come not only wanting economic well-being, but to want reasonable cultural integration. This was so critical for immigrant groups in the United States that when a representative of the immigrant community became a star of the game, he became a cultural icon of that ethnic group. Hank Greenberg was the star for Jewish Americans, Joe Dimaggio the star for Italian Americans, and Jackie Robinson was the star for African Americans (although for African Americans they were hardly new immigrants, but they were seeking full social acceptance during the Civil Rights movement) were heralded by their respective immigrant communities with fanfare that knew no boundaries. This principle implies that immigrants want to become a part of the American fabric, they are not temporary residents, but want their place “at the game.” Again, these two principles were actually played out through the love of baseball in the United States [6], but it is the metaphor that matters. There has to be a reasonable route of commitment to cultural ideals that leads to social acceptance and immigrants have to travel that route. The standard of adoption of basic cultural traditions was posited during the great period of immigration in the United States at the turn of the last century by the Chicago School of Sociology [7]. They argued that immigrants are at risk of violating or having poor fit with the 1) roles, 2) morals/traditions, and 3) place (i.e., lacking place) in the host country. They come with roles that do not fit or even clash with the available roles in their adopted land. Often they both lack their old roles and are in limbo as to new roles. Given that roles govern much of behavior, they are at risk for behavior that is considered unacceptable. Immigrants bring their own morals and traditions, but these often clash with the traditions of the new culture. Thus, the male dominated culture of much of the Arab world in which women are sheltered at home, places men in groups on the street and in cafes, which is culturally inconsistent with modern Western society. This further clashes with women from the host country who are outside of the home, but at risk of being viewed as immodest and acting unacceptably brazen by Arab immigrants. Further, the tradition of female modesty keeps Muslim women at home or veiled if in public, which is seen as a direct clash with hard won advances of the women’s liberation movement [8]. Finally, there exists a lack of place for Muslims in Europe. Like many immigrant groups they find housing that is crowded, inconvenient, and often lacking in full public services. These areas have become further ghettoized when immigrants arrive in large numbers, further challenging place. Without full or near-full employment opportunities for low-skilled labor, immigrants further lack place at work. This is especially troubling when lack of place includes lack of good schools and

6

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

encouragement for education for movement into better paying jobs. This ghettoization of Muslims has not occurred in America, which is in striking contrast to Europe in, for example, le banlieue de l'Islam suburbs in France, the name given to the suburban Muslim enclaves around Paris. Indeed, the only near Arab concentration in the U. S. (Dearborn, Michigan with about 30% Arab) is an affluent Detroit suburb with political clout, hardly a ghetto. Further, and basic to the Chicago School’s model, was the hypothesis that economic opportunity and advancement was the key engine for change in the successful absorption of immigrants. This change in economic base, of course, also implies that cultural bridges have been crossed. However, it is often the product of work of excessive hours and creation of small businesses where family size can be used as an asset to gain family financial strength. It is questionable to what extent these opportunities have been available in Europe for Muslims as they have in the United States. This is, in part, a product of the degree of skills that immigrants have on arrival, their ability to link to previously arrived immigrants from their communities who may or may not have formed an economic base, and the openness of the new economy and school system. The Speed and Course of Transition Follows Several Potential Pathways The transition of immigrants to their new homeland can follow several potential pathways. These pathways are important not only as descriptors, but also because they have meaning for both the host country and the immigrant. In part, these paths are the product of opportunity and fit, but they also represent paths that both the host country and the immigrant group find more or less acceptable. Assimilation and immersion may be an ideal for the host culture, the immigrant group, for one but not the other, or for neither. These pathways are important because certain segments of the Muslim community and of the host communities are advocating for, or creating the conditions that will ensure two of the paths that are either historically linked with poor success or with outright militant rejection by the host country. Further, the final path is one that is historically linked with great social unrest and will predictably include terrorist actions by at least fringe elements of the Muslim community. Assimilation-immersion The first route is that of assimilation-immersion. For this route, immigrants are expected to lose their cultural identity, language, and linkages. They are expected to have no remnant of their former past in the extreme, or to have this past private in the more moderate case of, say, France [9]. This was the American ideal in many ways and was fostered by a high rate of intermarriage between ethnic groups. So, Henry Ford demanded it of his workers and actually taught classes in Americanism that included home visits by company officials to check that the home met the standards of America. These were argued as being based on hygiene and adaptation of the family to their new land. But in reading their literature, one quickly gets the sense that it was not considered hygienic to have the smell of garlic in the air, and there was much ethnic discrimination in Ford’s philosophy [10]. There was probably stronger religious discrimination during this period of American absorption than discrimination related to culture of origin and this fostered a path to assimilation for most immigrant groups as

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

7

long as they were willing to assimilate and keep their religion a private matter. This path is decidedly not the one advocated by Muslim immigrant groups [11] , nor is it considered to be the social-psychologically optimum path [12]. Blending The second path is one of blending without losing traditions, although traditions certainly tend to weaken over time. This is a common one for successful immigration. The immigrant group lives near places of worship and places of work, but does not ghettoize. Again, this was easy in America, because with many immigrant groups coming simultaneously, the poor places offered were offered to all who came. Jane Adams Settlement House in Chicago was a model and she later received a Nobel Prize for her work that served a rainbow of immigrant groups [13]. So, this path allows for intermixing, while preserving cultural traditions. It is a workable pathway for the first generation, and allows for enough familiarity for the second generation not only to blend, but to succeed. Within this pathway, the immigrant group gains political and economic power and can fight discrimination and gain advantages for the group through wielding of this power. The blending path can be seen reflected in the absorption of Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrant groups in the United States during the first half of the 20th Century, who clung to ethnic neighborhoods at the same time that they intermixed with the greater America. This attempt may also be seen in Muslim women wearing of a hijab, the head scarf that covers their hair as a sign of modesty and Islamic identity, but allows them to otherwise dress in a Western and even stylish manner so that they may blend. Separate co-existence The third path is one of separate co-existence. It includes the possibility of success, but what might be called “success under suspicion” as the immigrant and the host citizenry remain separate. Examples of this include Chinese and Korean communities in many large cities in the United States. The immigrant group carves out an area for their community and often works and lives within that community. It is possible to be born, live and die in such communities without ever knowing the host country’s languages and without ever adopting their norms of behavior. At its best, this pathway includes a full array of opportunities and cultural wealth in terms of schools, religious institutions, and banking and commerce. Unfortunately, the pathway of separate co-existence also occurs when the greater culture does not accept and will not absorb the immigrant group or where the immigrant group has deep suspicions or discomfort with the greater culture. In the former circumstances the greater culture insures the continuation of this state through undermining immigrant success and policies that do not break the pattern of poor fit and its consequent poverty. The nature of this pathway is one in which respect is not offered, jobs are not available, and both host and Immigrants retain great suspicion and separateness. The pathway of separateness is one of the pathways chosen for and by Muslims in many European cities. The separateness path is also one that can be seen to be taken by Muslim women who wear the niqab, or full veil and covering. Even as they walk in society, they announce their separateness. The wearing of the niqab is also a sign of protest through

8

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

separateness. For example, it is often worn in Britain as a sign of protest of government policies vis a vis the Arab world [14]. That the niqab is a sign of separateness can be seen in Western-leaning Arab states as well, where the niqab has often been discouraged or even outlawed. For instance, state television stations in Egypt have banned newscasters from wearing the garment, and a leading Egyptian University followed suit with its own ban [15]. Revolution The final pathway is one of revolution. This pathway is often an outgrowth of the separateness pathway, and a sign of its failure. It may be violent or non-violent, but it uniformly risks violence. It may occur because the host country demanded separation of the immigrant community and blocked their access to resources and integration, as in the militant outgrowth of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States (once again, acknowledging that African Americans are not immigrants any more than those who came on the Mayflower are immigrants. Their immigration to the U. S., of course, came through slavery, but the example still serves the point here). Alternatively, in this pathway the immigrant group demands that its laws become the law of the land, or at least the law of their world within the host country. To some extent, this was what occurred with Europeans coming to the United States in the early decades of the 20 th Century, as socialist views were brewing in Eastern Europe, in particular. Their socialist/communist ideologies were met with rejection that sometimes took the form of police brutality and imprisonment [16, 17]. However, this was not evidenced in any one ethnic group, although Jews were perhaps over-represented in aspects of the labor movement [18]. For Muslims demanding that Sharia law govern them, or even greater Europe in the sense of becoming the law of the land, is a revolutionary demand. It is the type of path that is seen by the host culture and its institutions as treasonous and a perversion of the welcome mat of the host country toward the immigrant; no matter that the welcome mat may, in fact, offer a rather limited welcome. The dangerous slippage of the pathway from separation to revolution and militancy can be seen in a recent survey of Muslims in Great Britain [19]. Almost a quarter of British Muslims said the 7/7 London bombings were justified because of the British government’s support for the war on terror. Further, young Muslims were about twice as likely as those over aged 45 years to justify the 7/7 attacks. In a perversion of all known evidence and logic, 45 percent believed that the 9/11 WTC attacks were a conspiracy between the United States and Israel. Most revealing, a third of those questioned said they would rather live under Sharia law in the UK than British law and 28 percent hoped for the UK to become a fundamentalist Islamic state. Sixty-two percent said free speech was not a protected right [20]. Those who could be described as revolutionaries by these standards constituted 9 percent of those surveyed and separatist were represented by 29 percent. Clearly, the first two pathways are the most likely to fit the “just gotta love baseball” criterion. However, the first path is unacceptable for many ethnic groups who wish to take pride in their heritage, be respected for their heritage, and pass traditions to future generations. The third pathway, fulfills a need to take pride in one’s heritage and passing traditions to the next generation, but is one that usually is accompanied by limited economic and educational opportunities. The separateness suggests it will not easily fit the “you just gotta love baseball,” criterion which means that the host culture will not consider it a sincere attempt to adopt the new country and

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

9

its traditions. And, of course, the host country will ignore its limiting access to “the game” by immigrants. It also is likely to lead to ongoing social unrest due to the mutual suspicion it is likely to foster. It also may be linked to the final revolutionary pathway, which will almost always lead to militancy on the part of some members of the immigrant community toward the host country (meaning terrorism) and of the host culture toward the immigrant community.

Conservation of Resources (COR) Theory What is assumed in much of the discussion to this point in the chapter and, indeed, in society when it considers immigrants’ integration in the host country, is that adjustment is all a matter of choice. COR theory instead suggests that these pathways are largely a matter of resources, those that the immigrant group hopes to obtain and those that the host country allows, encourages, or limits them in obtaining. The basic tenets of COR theory [2,3,4] are explicated next and applied to the problem of immigrant absorption and the relationship of a failure of such absorption to social unrest and terrorism. The basic tenet of COR theory is that individuals strive to obtain, retain, foster, and protect that which they value. Therefore, people are directed to cultivate resources even when stress is not occurring. When threat of resource loss or actual loss occurs, people mobilize resources to offset, limit, or reverse impending or actualized loss. COR theory argues that because resource loss meant a threat to survival in evolutionary history and due to social conflict and issues of territoriality we are tuned to be in a defensive mode regarding resource protection and fear of loss. This loss sensitivity is a primary axis for the problem of the immigrant and for the host culture toward the immigrant. This is especially the case as emphasized as early as by Park et al., [7] in the 1920s, because immigrants lack place, have poor fit on traditions, and often do not have recognized skills in their adopted land. Further, because of the break with family and connections, they lack the network of ties that might help further the process of resource acquisition. For Muslims moving to Europe or the U.S., they are also exiting an honor and clan/tribal society and entering an individualistic, merit-based society with markedly different rules concerning the commerce of both economic and social resources. To the extent that countries screen out those who do not have recognizable skills or business acumen, they will receive Muslims with much better fit as Western education and individual entrepreneurship will have better fit with Europe and the U.S. economic and social structures. This can be seen, for example, in the successful absorption of mainly Christian Arabs, as well as Muslims, in the United States, where few single men without economic means or education have been allowed to immigrate. In contrast, an entirely different population was absorbed into France due to their colonial history in North Africa, or in Germany where Turks were specifically targeted for guest worker status in menial jobs. Resources are defined as those things that are centrally valued or that are a means of obtaining that which is centrally valued. One way to group them is as follows: 1. Object Resources (e.g., transportation, shelter, material goods) 2. Condition Resources (e.g., support system, employment, marriage) 3. Personal Resources (e.g., job and social skills, mastery, self-esteem)

10

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

4. Energy Resources (e.g., credit, money, knowledge) Stress then, according to COR theory, occurs in circumstances that represent a threat of loss or actual loss of resources required, or the end points that are necessary, to sustain the individual - nested in family - nested in tribe. That is, individuals are sensitive to their own resource needs, those of their family, and those of their tribe. It follows that stress occurs in the following three instances: 1. when resources are threatened with loss 2. when resources are actually lost 3. when there is failure to adequately gain a return on resources following significant resource investment. The circumstances of loss are especially poignant for immigrant groups. They have often immigrated due to major loss, typically have to leave much behind, and have difficulty fitting with the demands of the new country that will allow them to make the necessary gains that are demanded of them. Many Muslim immigrants will, therefore, already be experiencing much psychological distress. To the extent they face prejudice, unemployment, and poor neighborhood conditions, their view of the world will be one where psychological pain will easily be translated into blame toward the host country and its citizens. COR theory would predict high levels of depression, anxiety disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder and associated social disorder as a product of this combination of personal and social-structural circumstances. Add to this that Muslims do not have the tradition of seeking mental health services, and at least one avenue for partial remedies of these concerns are cut off. For Muslims in Europe and in the U. S., the issue of their governments’ foreign policy vis a vis the Arab world, and the consequences of that policy, furthers their sense of resource loss. This is fueled by concepts of international Jihad, which provides a specific interpretative filter for seeing events and how to respond to them. This is embodied in Muslims’ sense of perceived favoritism towards Israel in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, and more recently the Iraq war, led by the U. S. and Britain. This leads to a loss of sense of power and control, honor, and sense of social justice. It is not the intent here to argue whether these wars are fair and whose side is politically correct (if there is such a thing in Realpolitik). Rather, the point is that this is how these situations are widely perceived by Muslim immigrants. Further, after the attacks on the World Trade Center in the U. S., and the subsequent Madrid and London bombings, Muslims in Europe and in the U. S. feel an increased sense of being distrusted; another loss of a key resource, especially for immigrants who are striving to be accepted in their new lands. COR theory highlights several key principles that help to illuminate the economy of resource loss and acquisition and its social consequences. Principles of COR Theory There is not room here to explicate all of the principles of COR theory, but several key principles are necessary to understand and predict immigrant success versus failure and consequent social unrest. They are: 1. Resource loss is disproportionately more salient than resource gain

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

11

2. Because we rely on resources to offset losses AND because stress results from loss, at each iteration of the cycle there are fewer resources to rally in defense. Hence, initial loss begets future loss, making immigrants with depleted resource reservoirs particularly vulnerable. This means that the loss cycles experienced by Muslim immigrants will accelerate in strength and momentum. The issue of momentum of stress reactions is often overlooked, but is critical here because this translates to speed of social change and in this change, social unrest. Hence, protests can turn to militant action and suicide bombing, seemingly “out of nowhere.” It is not coming “out of nowhere,” but out of rapid social change due to the rapidity of resource loss cycles. As the cycles increase in strength, they are harder to slow or reverse. Our research has focused more on individuals’ reactions to such stress, but when examined on a social level we find increases in ethnocentrism and support for extreme violent political action [21]. The society in turn says to immigrants, “pick yourselves up by your own bootstraps,” but immigrants lack the bootstraps to reverse their experienced loss cycles. In such circumstances, where people lack practiced coping repertoires due to the newness of the demands and lack of traditional coping repertoires due to the newness of their experience with a culture or new circumstances (e.g., terrorism, disaster), they will turn to media and community leaders. These, most likely, will be leaders and media who speak their language and side with them. This often means blaming someone else. With a lack of European-trained religious leaders, Europe has imported religious leaders who at times come with radical, anti-European, anti-Western ideas [9]. Many religious leaders will not politicize the experience of immigrants, but others will see this as an important part of the agenda of international Jihad, and its deep-seated mistrust of the West. Such distrust will obviously lead to militant and separatist ideologies that will, at best, contribute to continued separatism. It may also move some of those who hear this message to the revolutionary pathway of demand for Muslim rule of law or outright militant action to bring this about through terrorist activity. The FALLS Model COR theory has also expanded on a set of principles that explain how individual and broader societal processes interact in resource gain and loss cycles, and it is this mesosocial level that this chapter turns to next. This has been termed the FALLS model [4], FALLS being an acronym for: •Fitting •Adaptation •Limitations •Leniency •Selection The FALLS model will be briefly elucidated next, as it aids an understanding of the processes at work that limit Muslim adaptation to Europe in particular. Fitting of resources means that resources do not just “fit” demands. Rather, they often need to be molded or altered to fit. The distance of resources of immigrants to new demands make this fitting more or less difficult. Hence, many Muslim immigrants

12

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

have an entrepreneurial background and immigration authorities may even select and reject on this basis. The skills implied in entrepreneurship do require basic financing and an openness to allow Muslim business, but entrepreneurs tend to be creative and may bridge gaps and obstacles. However, many immigrants have neither entrepreneurial skills nor education that fits Western demands. If workers are needed, skills training can help ramp up the abilities of an immigrant work force, as can be seen with the rise of Hispanic immigrants in business in the U.S. from lawn maintenance to law [21]. Unfortunately, past years have seen high levels of unemployment in Europe and discrimination that does not promote educational advancement of Muslims [23]. Even in their own lands, the fitting of resources to new economies for Muslim men may be difficult. Recent years have seen a rapid, remarkable increase in advanced education among Muslim women in Tunisia [24], with great numbers entering medicine, law, and teaching despite traditional Muslim standards being practiced by these women and in the culture, generally. But at the same time, the percent of Muslim men receiving higher education is falling. We do not know what obstacles are experienced by Muslim men that might prevent their fitting their resources to new educational demands. Clearly, the U.S. experience, with the vast majority of Muslim immigrants obtaining university education (58%, whereas the national average is 25% [24], suggests that it is not an impermeable set of obstacles, but obstacles are clearly there nonetheless, as will be addressed when we consider the Limits construct in the FALLS model. One significant obstacle for Muslim men and women in their Western adjustment is the inability to reshape the all important resource of honor, which is central to their cultural heritage. Immigrants, almost by definition, have a lower status in their new society and the misfit of resources means that further potential opportunities for honor are blocked. Added to this, what is seen as the Western dishonoring of Arab values toward women, when France tells Muslim women that they cannot have their heads covered in school, wearing the hijab [8], and there is little further opportunity for transformation of this precious resource. The issue of women cannot be overstated as a central aspect of resource misfit. For traditional Muslims, women are to be covered, modest, and subservient. For Europe and the U. S., women’s esteem is based on being equal - obtaining economic, social, and sexual equality. There is little transformation or reshaping of resources that can bridge this gap. As stated by a leading British secular Muslim, Imran Ahmad, “The veil is so steeped in subjugation; I find it so offensive someone would want to create such barriers. It’s retrograde.” [13]. and it should be pointed out that many Muslim countries banned extreme covering as part of achieving rights of women. Adaptation, Limitation, and Leniency Adaptation is a process of successive approximation, not an outcome. It is boundaries by expectations on the part of the immigrant and host cultures. It is seldom accomplished in one generation. Those immigrants whose goal is to adapt will experience an uphill process. However, to the extent adaptation is rejected as a principle (by immigrant or host cultures), conflict will arise. That is to a large extent what is occurring. Thus, adaptation becomes blocked due to two principles that explain structures that impact the translation of resources to register further resource gain and to protect against resource loss: limitations and leniency.

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

13

Limitations mean that resources of those who are disenfranchised have reduced currency. Their dollar is not a dollar. Hence, immigrants must often literally pay higher prices for goods and housing. The standards they must meet for entrée into the workforce similarly requires a higher set of standards. In the case of some closed unions or closed avenues of work, these limitations may be absolute, allowing no entry whatsoever. Limitations take many forms. A job skill must be “licensable,” people with accents, or certain accents may not be accepted for certain kinds of work, and young people may be forbidden from some neighborhoods where work might be more available. The phenomena of DWB “Driving While Black” in the United State is an example of this, whereby Black men are stopped, harassed, and often arrested for being Black in the wrong place at the wrong time [26]. A similar phenomenon is perceived to occur for young Muslim men in Europe [27, 28]. To limit social unrest and to keep the implied and expressed promises given to immigrants, a society must actively seek to correct limitations. Often this must take the form of affirmative action, which meets with conservative anti-reaction. But, most affirmative action is merely the correcting of social-structural limitations. This leads us to the issue of Leniency. Many individuals of a host country recognize prejudice and discrimination toward immigrants. What they are less able to recognize is that they themselves are treated by the system with leniency, meaning they advance even when not meeting the full standards for advancement and their legal and social infractions are overlooked. In this regard, positive status confers extra value to resources. Hence courts, jobs, and universities treat those of higher status with greater leniency. This has been termed the “glass escalator,” such that people who have status rise without apparent effort. Also implied in the glass escalator concept, is the idea that the social-structural forces that foster these phenomena are subtle. So, immigrants may not be blocked by prejudice, but may not “qualify” as others have been treated with leniency and fill positions and are excused hardship. So, Italian Americans easily enter construction trade unions dominated by other Italians, it is not that they better use their tools, and Episcopalians are overrepresented in most senior positions at Fortune 500 companies, despite no known cultural business advantage of such WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) paragons. The processes of limitations and leniency operate subtly and unsubtly through the process of Selection. Immigrants will select into certain roles, the host culture will select individuals for certain roles, and certain roles will be prohibited outright. This is a two-way interactive process. Jews were long denied entry into the trades or land ownership, so they became traders and doctors. They were selected by Christians and landowners to collect taxes and to be moneylenders, because they were literate and the New Testament forbade usury by Christians, so Jews became moneylenders and bankers. The Irish in the U. S. were denied work and rejected as Catholics, so they organized and took controlling positions in government, police, and firefighting forces in many major U. S. cities [29]. Jews’ literacy and the organizational ability of the Catholic Church and the experience of discrimination in their homelands may have readied Jews and Irish for immigration. Time, and much of those hard times, has also passed since Jews and Irish were new immigrants in the U.S. For Muslims, the process of selection in terms of where they are not allowed is widespread in Europe. Muslim immigrants’ own fitting of their resources for selection into entrée points into European society and its workforce may be too new and Muslims may lack the resources that allow for getting a good foothold into these societies and economies.

14

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

Conclusions As a final standard, nations not only demand adaptation, but the willingness to sacrifice for the host nation. This may prove the ultimate test for Muslims in Europe, as nations will only tolerate a “guest” under limited conditions and for a limited time. This will challenge both Muslim separateness and militancy, as it will demand the standard in the end of “you’re either fully with us, or you’re against us.” In the end, baseball is only a game. The threat of Islamic terrorism and the interpretations of Islamic Jihad toward the West are so great as to result in a cultural rift that will not inevitably be tolerated. Before this kind of judgment occurs, the logic in this chapter would predict increased militancy and terrorism in Europe. It will occur whatever solution Israel and Palestine come to as it reflects a view of the West by many Muslim immigrants, and of these immigrants by the West, that limit acquisition, retaining, protection, and fostering of resources.

References [1] Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72, 22-49. [2] Hobfoll, S. E. (1988). The ecology of stress. Washington, DC: Hemisphere. [3] Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources: A new attempt at conceptualizing stress. The American Psychologist, 44, 513-524. [4] Hobfoll, S.E. (1998). Stress, culture, and community: The psychology and philosophy of stress. New York: Plenum. [5] Bernstein, I. (1990). The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [6] Boxerman, B. A., Boxerman, B. W., & Abramowitz, M. (2006). Jews and baseball: Entering the American mainstream, 1871-1948 (Vol. 1). New York: McFarland. [7] Park, R., Burgess, E. W. & McKenzie, R. D. (1925). The city: Suggestions for the study of human nature in the urban environment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [8] Werbner, P. (2007). Veiled interventions in pure space: Honor, shame and embodied struggles among Muslims in Britain and France. Theory, Culture, & Society, 24(2), 161-186. [9] Masci, D. (2005). An uncertain road: Muslims and the future of Europe. The Pew Research Center. Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=60 [10] Meyer, S. (1980). Adapting the immigrant to the line: Americanization in the Ford factory, 1914-1921. Journal of Social History, 14, 67-82. [11] Modood, T., & Ahmad, F. (2007). British Muslim perspectives on multiculturalism. Theory, Culture & Society, 24(2), 187-213. [12] Lafromboise, T., Coleman, H. L. K., & Gerton, J. (1993). Psychological impact of biculturalism: Evidence and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 395-412. [13] Adams, J. (1912). Twenty years at Hull House. New York: Macmillan [14] Perlez, J. (2007, June 22). Muslim’s veils test limits of tolerance in Britain. New York Times, p. A1, late edition. [15] Murphy, D. (2006, November 8). From Tunis to Tehran, the great veil debate. Christian Science Monitor. [16] Avrich, P. (1991). Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [17] Nelles, W. (1920). Seeing red: Civil liberty and law in the period following the war. New York: American Civil Liberties Union. [18] Liebman, A. (1979). Jews and the left. New York: Wiley & Sons. [19] The Evening News, The Edinburgh Paper (2006, August 7). 7/7 bombings ‘justified’ say a quarter of British Muslims. [20] Basham, P. (2006, August 14). Many British Muslims Put Islam First. CBS News Retrieved June, 22, 2007 from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/14/opinion/main1893879.shtml

S.E. Hobfoll / Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security

15

[21] Hobfoll, S. E., Canetti-Nisim, D., & Johnson, R. J. (2006). Exposure to terrorism, stress-related mental health symptoms, and defensive coping among Jews and Arabs in Israel. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 74, 207-218. [22] U. S. Department of Commerce (2006). Hispanic-owned firms 2002, 2002 Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners. Retrieved June 28, 2007, from http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/sb0200cshisp.pdf [23] Silberman, R., Alba, R., & Fourneir, I. (2007). Segmented assimilation in France: Discrimination in the labour market against the second generation. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30(1), 1-27. [24] Borowiec, A. (2005, June 8). Tunisia Leads Fight for Women's Rights in Arab World. The Washington Times. [25] Tarantolo, D., & Strum, P. (2003, June 18). Muslims in the United States: Demography, beliefs, and institutions. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, conference proceedings. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1427&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id= 15883 [26] Buerger, M. E., & Farrel, A. (2002). The evidence of racial profiling: Interpreting documented and unofficial sources. Police Quarterly, 5, 272-305. [27] Bowen, J. R. (2006, January/February). France’s revolt: Can the republic live up to its ideals? Boston Review. Retrieved June 29, 2007, from http://bostonreview.net/BR31.1/bowen.html [28] Gohir, S. (2006). Understanding the other perspective: Muslim and non-Muslim relations. Birmingham, UK: Muslim Voice UK. [29] Greeley, A. M. (1993). The Irish Americans: The Rise to Money and Powerr.

16

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-16

Chapter 2 Violent Events and Collective Identity Roland Eckert University of Trier, Germany Abstract: Conflicts arise and, no matter what they are about, turn violent if there are no institutions within which they can be conducted by other means. Such unregulated conflicts intensify the process of establishing unambiguous collective identities, which appear to safeguard personal integrity and dignity. This is a precondition of successful terrorism. What are the links between migration and violent conflict? In some cases the connection is obvious, especially when native people in a country with high immigration feel threatened. Among migrants, migration can lead to both relativization and radicalization of ethnic or communal identity. The return to specific traditions to "blood and belief, faith and family" (Huntington) is only one option among others, mostly caused by perceived fraternal relative deprivation (Runciman) of the group they belong to. The escalation toward violence and terrorism among activists is caused by the experience (or imagination) of humiliation and victimization (Montville). "Religion and violence are seen as antidotes to humiliation" (Juergensmeyer). Bloody events confirm − like unquestionable "base sentences" − an overwhelming reality of friend and foe and therefore are decisive for further escalation. Long term prevention therefore should hinder and avoid humiliating and violent events.

"Even regional conflicts have the potential to draw nuclear powers into a global holocaust"... Mack 1990, 125 Decaying state structures and ongoing civil wars in many parts of the world show, as at the time of Thomas Hobbes, that the state’s monopoly on the use of force is a necessary (though not sufficient) precondition for peace and freedom. September 5th, 1972 (when the Israeli Olympic team was attacked by an PLO commando in Munich), and September 11th, 2001, made clear once and for all that the use of political force by nonstate agents has extended its threat through global networks into the industrialized nations of the West. The main form taken by this force is terrorism, whose specific mechanisms and motivations therefore demand analysis. This cannot contribute to a short-term remedy but could perhaps facilitate long-term prevention.

Terrorism, Collective Identity and their Mutual Reinforcement Terrorism is part of a strategy of “asymmetrical warfare” that avoids open battle with the powers of the state or occupation forces while at the same time challenging them to

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

17

strike back. As such it represents an attempt to trigger waves of solidarity and support within population groups of which the protagonists claim to be the avant-garde [1]. Since the late 1960s terrorism has become increasingly internationalized and has been financed by private business and through fund-raising [2]. Yet the logic of action has remained the same: the immediate goal of this strategy is not “victory” but rather spreading fear and terror (which in some cases may indeed cause the enemy to retreat). The success of terrorist movements depends firstly, on whether they can win sympathy or even solidarity among specific segments of the population -- i.e. whether they command or can attract collective solidarity -- and secondly, on recruiting terrorists, a process that involves transformations of the subjective identity of these actors. Generally speaking, the engendering of collective solidarity as a background and precondition for terrorism and the transformation of the identity of those prepared to act as terrorists do not usually precede conflicts but form an integral part of the process in question. The creation of collectives and the transformation of identities are closely linked, but they may diverge. Terrorism in Germany in the 1970s, for example, was successful in transforming the identity of the protagonists but failed to harness collective solidarity because people expressed sympathy not with world revolution but with the state under attack [3]. How do the engendering of collective solidarity and the transformation of identities work? Two processes in particular can be used to cement imagined communities. Firstly, symbolic boundaries can be ideologically reinforced by essentializing the corresponding group affiliation [4] (“true” Germanness, the “pure doctrine”, “hindutva”); and, secondly, such boundaries become more powerfully evident as a result of conflicts, especially life-threatening conflicts with other communities. In such conflicts, individuals are reminded in existential and allencompassing terms of their protection by and solidarity with a collective, even if they would previously only seldom have considered themselves part of it, or only in certain situations. In this light it is not simply collective identities with divergent traditions that generate conflicts; it is also conflicts (whatever their object) that generate or are used to radicalize collective identity [5]. German nationalism emerged during the FrancoPrussian wars, Kurdish nationalism arose as a result of the central state’s definition of the Kurds as “mountain Turks.” As Marx argued, class consciousness is not linearly related to class structures as such, but constitutes itself in concrete conflicts (in his case between workers and capitalists). How does this happen? Conflict reinforces one dominant collective identity (among many others which people usually have) by means of fear and hope. Psychologists of perception speak of a heightening of contrast that takes place under conditions of stress. And the greater the fear, the more important it is to know which side someone is on. Neighborhoods and circles of friends are swiftly cleansed of potential enemies. Realms of good and evil are defined. Contrary to what Carl Schmitt (1933) [6] believed, the distinction between friend and foe is not the “essence of politics,” but a consequence and an instrument of conflict aggravation. Although at first there may be issues where compromise is possible (such as access for an ethnic or religious group to civil service or recognition of a minority language), ultimately what is at stake is the “essence” of the collective identity, which seeks out its own concrete signals and conflict scenarios on this basis. This results, for example, in Ayodhya being posited as the birthplace of a Hindu god as a way of entering into symbolic and real conflict with Muslims. The more energy and time invested in such an idea, the “holier” the idea becomes, the higher the cost in human life will be, and the more difficult de-

18

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

escalation will be to achieve. This is how groups are formed that are held together by collective solidarity, a capacity for suffering, and a readiness to perpetrate violence while engaging in a “cosmic struggle” [7]. Not all members of a potential collective take part in this process of essentialization of the communal identity at the same time and in the same way. A range of different interests emerge, such as those of war profiteers, whose social standing and material situation are nourished by the state of conflict. Their interests will often clash with those of former notables whose business depends critically on peace. They may also differ from other sympathizers with the collective living elsewhere, who contribute significantly to the financing of such movements even though their everyday life is not affected, as shown by the funding of the IRA by Americans of Irish origin. But participation patterns cannot be reduced to economic interests, and therefore the question of identity transformation remains. Sacrificing one’s life to a cause is hardly rational, but it can become rational if there is no other option, which may often be true in the case of child soldiers and juvenile attackers [8]. Sacrificing one’s life becomes entirely rational [9] if one has identified totally with the religious, revolutionary, ethnic, or national collective in question [10]. This can take place in two ways: firstly, training can lead to this kind of total identification, especially in juveniles [11]. However, I consider a more important influence to be humiliation and the experience of victimization and violence by the other side: “religion and violence are seen as antidotes to humiliation” (Juergensmeyer 2000: 187) [7] . “In many of the cases ... not only have religion's characteristics led spiritual persons into violence, but also the other way around: violent situations have reached out for religious justification” (Juergensmeyer 2000: 161) [7]. Both violence suffered and violence perpetrated change a person’s worldview. And this happens not only via personal experience but also by perception when people are affected, with whom solidarity is felt. They do so by posing inevitable questions: questions which have no clear answers, for one and the same experience can generate thoughts both of self-assertion via revenge and thoughts of nonviolence. Nevertheless, the former will be the more probable outcome, at least as long as there is no external judicial body to which either side can appeal and which is willing to help. This is because: "...ethno-national groups that have been traumatized by repeated suffering at the hands of other groups seem to have little capacity to grieve for the hurts of other peoples, or take responsibility for the new victims created by their own warlike actions." (Mack 1990, 125)[12]

Migration, Relative Deprivation and Violent Conflict So what are the links between migration, collective identity and violent conflict? In some cases the connection is obvious, especially when native people in a country with high immigration feel threatened. In Germany, the arrival of five million immigrants between 1988 and 1992 allowed fears of an overwhelming foreign presence to be stirred up, giving rise to xenophobic attacks [13]. The state-sponsored transfer of population groups from Java to South Kalimantan sparked the ensuing ethnic rebellion. Israel’s settlement policy in the "territories" is likely to have similarly aggravating effects in the Middle East.

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

19

Things become more complicated when we attempt to analyze the way migrants themselves contribute to ethnic and inter-communal conflict. There are certainly many Irish people in the United States, Hindus in Britain, Kurds in Germany, and Muslims around the world who support their ethnic or religious movements even if these are violent ones. But these are the same people who have learned to operate with different identities, adapting to various situations and focusing their ethnic or religious identity on the corresponding holidays and festivals. But precisely this “sectioning off” of ascriptive identity is ambivalent. The inherent process of abstraction from conventional everyday culture can lead to both relativization and radicalization of communal identity. Migration creates a life situation that poses many questions without prescribing specific answers. While the first generation is occupied solving practical problems and believes often in return to homeland. In the second generation this questions become urgent. One of the possible answers is a radicalization of group affiliation. In terms of cultural theory, this can be interpreted as a phenomenon of the selectability of meaning: not only can social positions be reached via achievement, but also ascriptive elements of personal identity such as gender, religion, and ethnicity become subject to individual choice – at least in terms of meaning for the individual. Via the media, via television, and via the Internet, a global market in identity models has been established. The attribution of existential meaning to ascriptive identities is then often an act of choice in this field, even though there are reasons for this choice. According to one estimate, only a minority of North African immigrants in France are practicing Muslims. At the same time, this group includes a considerable number of Islamists. Their fundamentalist development is due precisely to their removal from local and family traditions and their independent interpretation of the Koran. Similar causes have been documented for the emergence of the fundamentalist Caliphate movement in Germany [14]. In this light, it is not just the continuing existence of archaic group affiliations that jeopardizes the triumph of Kant’s vision of a cosmopolitan society — rather, thoroughly modern processes of selectable identity susceptible to radicalization in and via conflicts, are what pose a threat to world peace. Huntington’s concept of a “clash of civilizations” has not been confirmed. Increasing contact between cultures leads to a range of reactions, of which the return to specific traditions, to “blood and belief, faith and family” (Huntington 1996: 126) [15] is only one option among others, and not necessarily the dominant one. Moreover, fundamentalism in most cases is not violent (Marty and Appleby 1991: 814) [16]. Conflicts do not simply result from this return to traditional values. They may have quite different causes, including the collective struggle for land, for water, or for a share in the state’s exploitation machinery, as well as conflicts over public morals and cultural hegemony. When they lead to perceived (or imagined) fraternal relative deprivation (Runciman), the threshold is likely to be crossed.

Conflict and Event Conflicts, however they arise and whatever they are about, turn violent if there are no institutions within which they can be conducted by other means. Such unregulated conflicts [17, 18] intensify the process of establishing unambiguous identities, the construction of friend and foe, of good and evil. Contrary to what Huntington believes,

20

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

in the beginning it is not the shift to traditional identities that produces conflicts, but conflicts which produce (among other things) a reduction in the diversity of identities to those that appear to safeguard personal integrity and dignity – and these can (but need not) be fundamentalist ones. This happens or is planned and actively generated by “events,” especially bloody ones. In conflict and violence research it is generally assumed that conflict events (and the violent behavior exhibited in the corresponding situations) could be predicted (or at least explained after the event) from attitudes if only one were able to localize precisely enough which attitudes entail a propensity to violence. Then we should be able to recognize the conditions under which the hiatus inhibiting action is overcome. Here I shall not go into the psychological discussion about the (partial lack of) connection between attitude and action (on this see Estel 1983, 154–57, Esser 2001, 239-257) [19, 20]. Rather, I want to point out an opposite assumption: namely, that it is not so much attitudes that produce violent events, but violent events that produce new attitudes. What leads to attitude shifts via the mechanism of “outrage” is conflict involving collective identity and its representation in events (generally disseminated via the media). “Events” – no matter who produces and selects them and turns them into news – function in the everyday selection of information as unquestionable “base sentences” of people’s assumptions about “reality,” and thus produce a “new” reality in the way described by the Thomas theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” They set new "frames in the sense of Tversky and Kahneman“(1981) [21]. Events may give rise to new cognitive maps and symbolic realities, which are then more than the sum of their previous parts. To cite some notable examples of this: the assassination of August von Kotzebue by a nationalist student almost two hundred years ago contributed to the constitution of a new reality, that of the “Holy Alliance”; while the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s response to an assassination brought about the collapse of the multiethnic monarchies of pre-1914 Europe. The shooting of Benno Ohnesorg forty years ago caused the membership of the German left-wing students’ organization, the SDS, to increase exponentially and popularized the Marxist-Leninist theory that capitalism led inevitably to fascism, which was the ideology of left terrorism in the 1970s. As also happened in the United States after students were shot dead at Kent State University, the quantified shift in attitudes in broader academic circles followed the events rather than preceding them. By the same token, Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland (1973) reignited the civil war. After the unforeseen end of the Cold War, the coincidence of net immigration to Germany between 1988 and 1992 of around five million people (ethnic Germans from the former Eastern Bloc, refugees, and asylum seekers) and an employment crisis (triggered by advances in microelectronics) set in motion a xenophobic movement in Germany that we are still dealing with today. When the Allensbach polling institute finds that today 83 percent of Germans associate Islam with terrorism, that is not necessarily a reflection of traditional intolerance in Germany, but also has to do with crimes that have been committed in the name of Islam and which are – doubtlessly illogically and politically incorrectly – ascribed to the Muslims in a generalized way. The escalation of the controversy about the Danish Muhammad caricatures shows how quickly even constructed events can contribute to the formation of attitudes. Terrorism is the attempt to set not only political agenda but new frames in perceiving or constructing reality. Critical situations have occurred more recently, too. In recent years police raids have been carried out after Friday prayer in the streets around mosques under the guise

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

21

of searching for “criminal Islamists” and justified by the threat of Islamist terrorism. Little has ever been found, but it does not bear imagining what shifts in attitudes would have occurred and what friend/foe stereotypes would have been generated if a death had occurred on one side or the other in the course of these operations. It is to be hoped that both the Muslims and the security forces will manage to remain level-headed. Conflict and violence research often quantify attitudes in order to explain the outbreak of violence. In this way it often turns a blind eye to the critical situations themselves. But these situations are the point where political options have a real chance of determining the subsequent course of events. Therefore we should take up the question of the causal relationship between events and attitude formation. Existing identities can lead to conflict, but conversely conflicts, whatever they are about, construct new identities. One can criticize the way events (and not sociological statistics) generate interpretations of how the world works, and one can in particular brand as prejudice the generalization of individual cases to collective perceptions of friend and foe. But that is simply the way things happen. As long as prejudice research ignores the significance of “events” and regards prejudices primarily as causes rather than effects, it will be running the risk of itself generating prejudices. Terrorism is not the expression of specific cultural attitudes (be it Basque, Irish, Tamil, Chechen, Hutu, or Saudi), it is primarily a means of extreme political struggle which transforms every culture in a violent direction. The reciprocal legitimating of violence ultimately creates a stable cultural pattern on both sides. This leads to the question of how democratic and legal procedures can be protected against attitudes caused by bloody events. Terrorism is both a consequence and a cause of differences between communities radicalized by unregulated conflicts. In legitimizing violence, we may observe a “consumption” of various ideologies: nationalist, socialist and now religious ones. Juergensmeyer summarizes thus: “My own conclusion is that war is the context for sacrifice rather than the other way round” (Juergensmeyer 2000: 169) [7] . For these reasons, entering into the spiral of revenge, even if it is sometimes unavoidable for selfdefense, is hardly a promising approach. It is scarcely possible to regulate all conflicts, much less so if they are protracted. Yet in the long term the fight against terrorists will only succeed if it proves possible to halt the radicalization of the communities whose avant-garde the terrorists claim to be. Avoiding and preventing bloody events are efforts to this end. This is not a pacifistic argument, this is a strategic one.

References [1] Waldmann, Peter (1998): Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht. Munich: Gerling-Akad.-Verlag. [2] Hoffman, Bruce (2002): Terrorismus – der unerklärte Krieg. Neue Gefahren politischer Gewalt, 4th ed. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. [3] Eckert, Roland (1978): “Terrorismus als Karriere.” In: Geißler, Heiner (ed.): Der Weg in die Gewalt. Munich, Vienna: Olzog. [4] Wetzstein, Thomas A., Reis, Christa & Eckert, Roland (1999): “Die Herstellung von Eindeutigkeit – Ethnozentrische Gruppenkulturen unter Jugendlichen.” In: Dünkel, Frieder & Geng, Bernd (eds.): Rechtsextremismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Mönchengladbach/ Godesberg: Forum Verlag, pp. 139– 176. [5] Eckert, Julia (2003): The charisma of direct action: power, politics and Shiv Sena. Delhi, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [6] Schmitt, Carl (1933): Der Begriff des Politischen. Hamburg: Hanseatischer Verlag.

22

R. Eckert / Violent Events and Collective Identity

[7] Juergensmeyer, Mark (2000): Terror in the mind of God. The global rise of religious violence. Berkeley/ Los Angeles/ London: University of California Press. [8] Reuter, Christoph (2004): My Life Is a Weapon. A Modern History of Suicide Bombing. Princeton / Oxford (Princeton University Press). [9] Wintrobe, Ronald (2006): Rational Extremism. The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). [10] Berghoff, Peter (1997): Der Tod des politischen Kollektivs. Politische Religion und das Sterben und Töten für Volk, Nation und Rasse. Berlin: Akad.-Verlag. [11] Elwert, Georg (2003): “Charismatische Mobilisierung und Gewaltmärkte. Die Attentäter des 11. September.” In: Sack, Detlef and Steffens, Gerd (eds.): Gewalt statt Anerkennung? Aspekte des 11.9.2001 und seiner Folgen. Frankfurt am Main./ Berlin/ Brussels/ New York/ Oxford/ Vienna: Peter Lang Verlag, pp. 55–76. [12] Mack, John E. (1990): The Psychodynamics of Victimization among National Groups in Conflict. In: Volkan, Vamik., Julius, Demetrios, Montville, Joseph (eds.): The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol. I: Concepts and Theories. Lexington: Lexington Books, pp. 119-129. [13] Eckert, Roland (2002): “Hostility and Violence Against Immigrants in Germany.” In: Freilich, Joshua D., Newman, Graeme, Shoham, S. Giora & Addad, Moshe (eds.): Migration, Culture Conflict and Crime. Dartmouth: Ashgate, pp. 211–222. [14] Schiffauer, Werner (2000): Die Gottesmänner. Türkische Islamisten in Deutschland. Eine Studie zur Herstellung religiöser Evidenz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. [15] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996): The Clash of Civilizations. Remaking of World Orders. New York: Touchstone. [16] Marty, Martin E.; Appleby, R. Scott (1991): “Conclusion: An Interim Report an a Hypothetical Family.” In: Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott (eds.): Fundamentalisms observed. Chicago / London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 814–842. [17] Dubiel, Helmut (1992): “Konsens oder Konflikt – die normative Integration des demokratischen Staates.” In: Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.): Staat und Demokratie in Europa. 18th scientific congress of the German Political Science Association, Opladen, pp. 130-137. [18] Hirschman, Albert O. (1994): “Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft.” In: Leviathan: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 293–304 [19] Estel, Bernd. (1983): Soziale Vorurteile und soziale Urteile: Kritik und wissenssoziologische Grundlegung der Vorurteilsforschung. Opladen. [20] Esser, Helmut. (2001): Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Band 6: Sinn und Kultur. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. [21] Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel (1981): The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. In: Science, no. 211, pp. 453-458.

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-23

23

Chapter 3 Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece Elias Besevegis1 and Vassilis Pavlopoulos National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece

Abstract. The purpose of the present study was to explore the acculturation patterns of immigrants in Greece in relation to their economic and psychological adaptation. The following research questions were examined: How do immigrants adapt to the host culture? How do they deal with the multiple pressures and challenges of “culture shock”? What is the relationship between acculturation strategies and the quality of adjustment? The sample consisted of 601 immigrants (43% women) from 35 nationalities who resided in urban and rural areas in the host country (mean length of stay: 8 years). Results indicated that levels of adaptation varied according to the cultural distance hypothesis, with immigrants from Europe and the Balkans doing better than immigrants from sub-Sahara African and Islamic countries. Most immigrants chose to integrate (46%); 21% assimilated; 25% were separated; and 8% reported an individualistic profile. Acculturation strategies were related to the quality of adaptation, i.e. integration and assimilation yielded the most positive outcomes and separation the most negative. Length of stay in the host country had an indirect effect on adaptation through the acculturation variables. Implications of findings for policy making are discussed. Keywords. Acculturation, adaptation, immigration

Introduction Population movements within or across nations, societies or cultures have been as old as the history of human kind. In the light of advances in communication pathways and the tendency towards globalization, immigration represents a major challenge for many societies as well as a controversial issue involving legal, economic, demographic, educational, social and psychological aspects, to name but a few. In the psychological literature, the term “acculturation” has been used to summarize the phenomena which are related to immigration and intercultural contact in plural societies ([1]; see also [2], for an in-depth review). Early conceptualizations 1 Corresponding author: Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, School of Philosophy (office 504), National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 15784 Athens, Greece; E-mail: [email protected]. The empirical findings presented in this chapter come from a research project that was funded by the Hellenic Immigration Policy Institute.

24

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

considered acculturation as a unidimensional, bipolar dimension in which the individuals are confronted with the opposing pressures of their ethnic group towards cultural maintenance, on the one hand, and of the host society towards assimilation, on the other. Recent research, however, has shown that ethnic involvement and hostnational involvement tap two separate, relatively independent dimensions in the course of acculturation. The latter is viewed as a developmental process as well as an Intergroup – rather than an interpersonal one [3]. Adaptation refers to the sociocultural and psychological (attitude and behavior) changes that result from acculturation. It is argued that the study of the acculturative processes is necessary in order to better understand findings from research on immigration, which are often inconclusive or even contradictory [4]. In a 1918-2003 review, Rudmin (2003) [5] describes more than 100 taxonomies of acculturation constructs. A widely used framework is provided by Berry [1, 6]. This includes country level as well as psychological variables. Psychosocial mediators or moderators of adaptation are traced among factors that existed before immigration (e.g., structural elements of the country of origin or sociodemographic characteristics of individuals) and among factors that emerge during acculturation (e.g., length of stay in the host country, group stereotypes, perceived discrimination). In this process, two questions are of specific interest for immigrants: (a) how important is it to maintain heritage culture and identity? and (b) how important is it to maintain contact with larger society? The combined answers to the above questions result in four acculturation strategies, namely integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalization. From the perspective of the larger society, these correspond to multiculturalism, melting pot, segregation, and exclusion, respectively. The purpose of the present chapter goes beyond a detailed description of Berry’s model of acculturation. It is sufficient to note here that, despite various reservations (see for example the commentaries on Berry’s target article in Applied Psychology: An International Review [1]) and proposed modifications (e.g., [7]), Berry’s bidimensional model has been influential, inspiring a large number of studies. There is now enough evidence that acculturation patterns are related to adaptation. For example, the best outcomes have been widely reported for integration and the worst for marginalization while assimilation and separation strategies are usually placed at an intermediate level [1, 6]. The study of the complex interactions of acculturation with context variables, such as cultural diversity, types of constituent groups, attitudes, and government policies, is a real challenge in current psychological research on immigration. The present study Greece has been sending immigrants all over the world for the most part of the past century. This situation started to change in the early 1970s when some of these emigrants for various reasons came back to their homeland. In the late 1980s a large number of immigrants, mainly from Albania but also from other neighbouring countries of former communist regimes, entered the country. This transition from an emigration to an immigration experience is evident in the number of immigrants, which quintupled in the 1990s [8]. According to the national census of 2001, immigrants account for 7% of the total population, but the proportion of undocumented immigrants is calculated to be of similar size [9]. Moreover, about 100,000 immigrant children and adolescents are enrolled in Greek schools [10]. These numbers do not include Pontian

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

25

remigrants of Greek origin from the former Soviet Union, who are given full citizenship status and are estimated to number about 160,000 [11]. This study is part of a larger project of the World Bank and it was assigned to the University of Athens through the Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (www.imepo.gr). Its purpose was to examine adaptation in relation to acculturation patterns of immigrants, thus addressing an issue not adequately covered in the Greek psychological literature. Previous research has focused on immigrants of the Diaspora returning to Greece (e.g., [12, 13]). Also, a number of recent studies examined the levels of competence in immigrant children (e.g., [14]) and adolescents (e.g.[15]) but not in adult immigrants, as it was done in the present study. So, our research questions and the respective hypotheses were formatted as follows: (a) What is the level of adaptation of immigrants in Greece? Data collected for this study allowed for the examination of two domains of adaptation, i.e., socioeconomic and psychological. Since there was no control group of native Greeks, this question was examined across ethnic groups of participants. Levels of adaptation were expected to vary in accordance to the cultural distance between countries of origin and the Greek society [16]. (b) What strategies are adopted by immigrants in order to deal with the multiple challenges of acculturation? Variable-focused (correlations) as well as personfocused techniques (cluster analysis) were used to answer this question. Based on theoretical and empirical grounds, integration was expected to be the most popular strategy. However, assimilation or even separation may be quite frequent, either because of the assimilative policies of the Greek state [16] or due to negative attitudes towards immigrants [17]. (c) What is the relationship between acculturation strategies and immigrant adaptation? In general, integration and even assimilation were expected to yield the most positive outcomes [1, 6]. A similar (positive) trend was expected between adaptation and length of stay in the host country [18]. These relationships were explored through variable-focused (correlational) analyses. A structural equation model that specifies relations between acculturation and adaptation was also tested.

Method Participants A total of 601 immigrants coming from 35 countries took part in the study. Their mean age was 35 years and their mean length of residence in Greece was approximately 8 years. They lived in 7 different areas, both in the mainland (56% in the greater Athens metropolitan area) and on the islands, thus covering an ecologically valid dispersion throughout the country. Women represented 43% of the whole sample. Immigrants’ mean education level was slightly above the middle of a 7-point scale ranging from 1=“incomplete Primary” to 7=“post-graduate degree.” Participants were approached through their ethnic associations in different parts of Greece, in State immigration offices, through non government organizations, or after personal contact. The basic demographic characteristics of participants are presented in Table 1. In this table, countries of origin were grouped into 8 clusters on the basis of geographical

26

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

and cultural proximity. Almost half of the sample (46%) were from Albania; 15% came from other Balkan countries, mainly Bulgaria, but also Romania, Serbia, and FYROM; 18% came from the former Soviet Union or eastern Europe; 8% were from Islamic countries (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran or Pakistan); 8% were sub-Sahara African (e.g., from Congo, Ethiopia, and Nigeria); 3% were from Asia (China, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh); 1% were from Latin America (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela) and the Philippines; finally, 4 individuals were from western countries (USA, Germany, Sweden). These proportions roughly represent the corresponding distribution of ethnic origin of immigrants in Greece [8]. The great diversity in the demographic profile across ethnic groups should be noted. For example, women represent about two thirds of the Balkan immigrants while almost all sub-Sahara African participants are men. The latter are evidently the youngest group; they also have the lowest level of education and the shortest length of stay in Greece. The Latin Americans have the highest mean age and length of stay. Western and eastern Europeans are the most educated. This variation reflects an ecological reality but, on the other hand, it hinders attempts to disentangle important demographic factors that may account for the similarities and differences across ethnic groups of immigrants. This point will be further addressed in the Discussion section. Measures and Procedure Data collection was done through structured interviews by means of a questionnaire for the coding of answers of the respondents. Questions, which were in the most part defined by the World Bank research project, referred to demographic information, immigration motives, decision making regarding immigration, the participants’ economic, professional and social status before and after immigration, as well as various aspects related to the everyday immigration experience, e.g., evaluation of pros and cons of immigration, plans for personal and professional development. Selected pieces of the above information, which were relevant to the aims of the present study, were coded into two domains of adaptation, namely socio-economic and psychological, on the basis of the acculturation literature and previous research (e.g. [19, 3]. Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants Country of Origin

Female

Age (yrs)

Length of Stay (yrs)

Education Level

%

Mean

Mean

Mean

Ν

Albania

277

39.4

35.2

9.4

3.6

Former USSR and Eastern Europe

108

66.7

36.3

7.0

4.4

Balkan countries

89

69.7

38.0

6.2

3.8

Islamic countries

50

14.0

36.5

10.4

3.8

Sub-Sahara African countries

46

2.2

24.5

1.7

2.6

Asia

20

10.0

30.1

5.0

4.1

Latin America and the Philippines

7

57.1

43.6

14.6

4.3

Western countries

4

50.0

33.5

14.0

5.8

601

43.1

35.0

7.9

3.8

Total

Note. Education level was measured on a 7-point scale, from 1=“incomplete Primary” to 7=“postgraduate”.

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

27

Economic aspects of immigration are considered to be part of sociocultural adaptation that involves the ability of the individuals to deal with daily issues in the host country. Examples of this facet in the questionnaire were: “my economic condition has improved since I moved in this country”, “what is your occupational status? [work vs. unemployed]”, and “do you plan to get your own job in the future?” Psychological adaptation refers to perceived levels of psychological functioning as well as to subjective and physical well-being. Representative items of this aspect in this study were: “are you satisfied with your life in this country, as compared to your initial expectations?”, “I have more freedom and opportunities in this country than in my country of origin”, and “I am isolated from my family members”. Questions were coded into dichotomous variables (1=“yes or agree”, 0=“no or disagree”). Positive responses to items with negative content (e.g., decline in occupational status, loss of skills) were given a negative sign (-1). Answers for each domain were then summed up to form the two adaptation indices. An additional set of questions referred to the frequency of contact with compatriots and the Greeks, as well as to the frequency of use of native and the Greek language. Responses to the above questions were intended to tap the two dimensions of acculturation, i.e., ethnic and host-national involvement [1, 6]. Ratings were given on a 5-point scale, from 1=“hardly ever” to 5=“almost always”. All interviews were taken on a personal basis. Greek, English, Albanian, and Russian versions of the questionnaires were available for those immigrants who preferred to write down the answers in one of the above languages.

Results Levels of immigrant adaptation The information provided by means of the questionnaire of the World Bank was assigned into two domains of immigrant adaptation, namely socio-economic and psychological, as described in the Method section. The socio-economic adaptation index consisted of the following items (percentages in parentheses correspond to positive responses): occupational status: work vs. unemployment (78%); monthly savings of at least €50 (62%); current work status: permanent vs. part time (61%); improvement of financial status after immigration (53%); plans for professional development (49%); general improvement of economic condition (41%); improvement of occupational status (23%); decline in occupational status (15%); and decline in financial status (13%). The psychological adaptation index comprised the following items: acquired new skills (82%); level of satisfaction as compared to level of expectations (63%); ability to provide family support (37%); lost skills (34%); immigration viewed as personal development (29%); isolated from family members (27%); lost networks of social support (25%); enhanced freedom and opportunities (22%); perceived discrimination (16%); and general health problems (4%).

28

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

Socio-economic adaptation had a mean score of 3.0 (SD=1.9) with a valid range from -2 to 7. The mean of psychological adaptation was 1.7 (SD=1.4) with a valid range between -3 and 5. These two scores of adaptation domains are not directly comparable since they derive from different measuring scales. So, their transformed zscores were used in further analyses.

Figure 1. Position of immigrant groups on the socio-economic and psychological domain of adaptation

The position of ethnic groups of immigrants on the socio-economic and psychological adaptation indices is displayed on Figure 1. In this figure the positive correlation between the two domains of adaptation is evident2, i.e., higher levels of socio-economic adaptation are related to higher levels of psychological adaptation. Individuals from Albania, Romania, western countries, and former USSR had the highest scores. The Serbian group did better in the psychological rather than in the socio-economic domain. The position of Asian, Latino, and Russian immigrants was slightly below the grand mean. Sub-Sahara Africans and, to a lesser extent, participants from Islamic countries clearly had the worst adaptation outcomes of all ethnic groups under study. This picture was confirmed in direct statistical comparisons3: immigrants from sub-Sahara Africa, Islamic countries, and Serbia scored the lowest on socio-economic adaptation; moreover, sub-Sahara Africans had the lowest means on psychological adaptation, followed by immigrants from Islamic, Asian and Latin American countries, even after controlling for length of stay in the host country.

2 The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between socio-economic and psychological adaptation indices equals to .33 (p<.001). 3 Two one-way analyses of variance were conducted with each of the two adaptation indices as dependent variable and with country of origin as independent factor. Results were significant for socio-economic adaptation, F(7, 592)=15.32, p<.001, and for psychological adaptation, F(7, 592)=2.41, p=.019. Means were adjusted using length of stay in the host country as a covariate. Post-hoc Bonferroni test was used for multiple comparisons between pairs of means.

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

29

Acculturation strategies Acculturation was measured on the basis of answers to four items rated on a 5-point scale (see Method): frequency of contact with ethnic group, frequency of contact with the larger (Greek) society, frequency of use of ethnic language, and frequency of use of the Greek language4. The transformed z-scores of the ethnic contact and language use and of host-national contact and language use were then aggregated to provide two dimensions of acculturation, i.e., ethnic orientation and host-national orientation, respectively. These two scores were found to have a significant negative correlation5. This suggests that immigrants with a stronger involvement towards the Greek society tended to be less involved with their own ethnic culture. Figure 2 shows the positions of ethnic groups of immigrants on the two dimensions of acculturation. Participants from Russia and Eastern Europe scored high on both dimensions, which indicates an integrative approach. Immigrants from Balkan countries generally tended to assimilate, i.e., they had high scores on host-national orientation and low scores on ethnic orientation. Immigrants from sub-Sahara African, Islamic, and Asian countries fell into the separation section, with high scores on ethnic orientation and low scores on host-national orientation. Latinos were placed in the middle point of the two dimensions. It is noteworthy that no ethnic group fell into the marginalization section by exhibiting low scores on both ethnic and host-national orientation.

Figure 2. Position of immigrant groups on the ethnic and host-national orientations of acculturation

Cluster analysis (using Ward’s method) of the two dimensions of acculturation for the whole sample largely replicated the above pattern. Four clusters were extracted, the 4 Participants reported higher contact with their compatriots (M=3.77, SD=1.22) than with members of the Greek society (M=3.51, SD=1.30), t(595)=3.63, p<.001. They also tended to use their ethnic language (M=4.18, SD=0.94) more frequently than the Greek language (M=3.77, SD=1.27), t(595)=5.62, p<.001. Note, however, that all respective means are above the middle of the 5-point measuring scale, which generally indicates frequent contacts and language use of both countries of origin and settlement. 5 The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between ethnic and host-national orientation was .22 (p<.001).

30

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

profile of three of them clearly corresponding to Berry’s acculturation strategies: assimilation (21% of immigrants), integration (46%), and separation (25%). The fourth cluster (8% of immigrants) combined relatively low scores on ethnic and host-national contact with high scores on ethnic and, especially, host-national language use. Instead of marginalization, this cluster may be indicative of either individualism or diffusion. The naming of this group remained to be clarified in further analyses associating acculturation with adaptation (see Results below and Discussion). Length of stay in the host country correlated positively with host-national orientation and negatively, though at a lower degree, with ethnic orientation6, i.e., the longer participants stayed in Greece, the more involved they tended to be with the Greek society and the less involved with their ethnic culture. In addition, the percentage of integration increased over time (from 31% for 1-5 years of stay to 52% for more than 10 years of stay) while the opposite was true for separation (from 50% for 1-5 years of stay to 8% for more than 10 years of stay)7. Relations between acculturation patterns and immigrant adaptation The effect of acculturation strategy on the two adaptation indices was tested, controlling for length of stay in Greece8. Results were significant for both socioeconomic and psychological adaptation. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that separated immigrants scored significantly lower in the two analyses. The means for the remaining three acculturation strategies did not differ significantly from each other, although integration and assimilation had the highest scores and individualism/diffusion was placed around the grand mean.

Ethnic

-.27

.71

ACCULT Host-national

.82

.56

Socioeconomic

.58

Psychological

ADAPT

.55 Length of stay in Greece Figure 3. Structural equation model specifying relations between acculturation, adaptation, and length of stay in the host country

6 The respective correlation coefficients were as follows: length of stay in Greece X host-national orientation: r=.45, p<.001; and length of stay in Greece X ethnic orientation: r=-.13, p=.002. 7 The chi square test for the association of time spent in the host country (1-5 years, 6-10 years, and more than 10 years) with the four acculturation strategies was significant: χ2(6, n=601)=121.77, p<.001. 8 Two one-way analyses of variance were conducted with each of the two adaptation indices as dependent variable and acculturation strategy as independent factor. Results were significant for socio-economic adaptation, F(3, 596)=16.39, p<.001, and for psychological adaptation, F(3, 596)=14.16, p<.001. Length of stay in the host country was included as a covariate to adjust group means. Post-hoc Bonferroni test was used for multiple comparisons between pairs of means.

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

31

A structural equation model was also designed, that specifies relations between acculturation and adaptation. In this model two latent variables were used to account for acculturation and adaptation, respectively. As expected, acculturation was positively related to host-national orientation and negatively related to ethnic orientation. The latent adaptation factor was positively related to the socio-economic as well as to the psychological domain. The path from acculturation to adaptation was also significant. The fit indices for this solution were satisfactory. However, the data seemed to provide best support for the model when length of stay in the host country was included for the prediction of acculturation9. The optimal model is presented in Figure 3. An alternative model, with length of stay in the host country predicting adaptation, was rejected because the respective path coefficient was not significant and the fit statistics for this solution were far from acceptable. Thus, length of stay in the host country proved to have an indirect, rather than a direct, effect on adaptation through the mediating role of acculturation.

Discussion The present study aimed at exploring adaptation levels, acculturation patterns, and the relationship between acculturation and adaptation of adult immigrants living in Greece. As it was hypothesised, such a relationship was confirmed. Adaptation was found to correlate positively with host-national involvement and negatively with ethnic involvement. Moreover, the acculturative strategies of integration and assimilation had the most favourable outcomes, while separation was related to low levels of adaptation, independent of country of origin and controlling for length of time in the host country. These results are in line with previous research (e.g., [1, 6]) suggesting that psychological processes involved in the course of intercultural contact may mediate the effect of sociodemographic factors on immigrant adaptation. According to the social identity theory [20], integrated individuals may have access to resources from both their ethnic in-group as well as the larger society in a way that protects them from self-threatening experiences in social comparisons. Assimilation can also be adaptive since it facilitates contact with the dominant culture [19]. The acculturation strategy of separation, in particular, calls for special attention in this study. Not only it corresponded to 1 in every 4 participants, but it also produced the worst outcomes in what concerns adaptation. It is argued that ethnic orientation can be adaptive during the first phases of living in a new country [3]; a strong sense of belonging to an ethnic in-group may buffer the negative effects of acculturative stress and perceived discrimination. In the long run, however, strong attachment to one’s compatriots may prove to be maladaptive. Separated immigrants will face difficulties in their attempt to establish contact with members of the host culture and to acquire basic social skills such as learning the host language or getting a job [21]. This point may have serious implications, not only for immigrants but for the host society as well since the implementation of a specific acculturation pattern is a two-way process, rather than a personal decision based on free choices of individuals. A mutual accommodation [22] may be missing in the Greek society, which is required for more adaptive strategies to be attained by immigrants. This stresses the need for interventions and 9 The fit indices for the optimal model were as follows: χ2(4, n=601)=7.07, p=.132, CFI=.99, RMSEA=.036.

32

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

policies towards multicultural orientation, where the larger society will adapt its institutions to take into account the needs of cultural groups and thus enhance intergroup contact. The present study was based on a widely accepted theoretical framework, such as Berry’s model of acculturation. In addition to that, our research design did not impose the use of specific acculturation profiles but allowed for them to emerge empirically. This led to replication of three (out of the four) well-known strategies of Berry’s model. Instead of marginalization, a pattern of behaviour was revealed that is characterized by low frequency of contact with both groups and, at the same time, adequate use of both languages. In their interactive model of acculturation, Bourhis and his colleagues (1997) [7] have argued that the dissociation from sense of belonging in a particular group may not inevitably result in a state of cultural alienation; on the contrary, it could be typical of individualistic values. These immigrants wish to achieve personal goals and to do well in the host country. In more recent work on immigrant youth, Berry et al. (2006) [6] have found a diffused pattern, which resembled marginalization and had the worst outcomes in adaptation terms of all acculturation strategies. Evidently, this profile does not match the fourth acculturation cluster in our study since these immigrants were, on average, adapted adequately well. Thus, the term ‘individualism’ was preferred to ‘diffusion’ and to ‘marginalization’ for this group. The above do not suggest that marginalization is not at all existent in our sample; rather, it could be typical of certain individuals, but not of entire groups. The findings discussed so far were mainly based on person-focused techniques, where groups of immigrants are studied on the basis of their preferred acculturation strategies. Variable-focused analyses, on the other hand, examine relationships of acculturation dimensions (i.e., ethnic and host-national involvement) with various outcomes. This approach yielded results that were somewhat less expected according to our hypotheses and the relevant literature. Orientation towards the Greek culture proved to be a stronger predictor of immigrants’ psychological adaptation than ethnic orientation. Previous research has shown that ethnic involvement, rather than hostnational involvement, is supposed to have a positive effect on subjective well-being (e.g., [6, 3]). In the structural equation model that we tested, ethnic involvement had a negative, though indirect, effect on adaptation. Moreover, assimilation and integration yielded equally positive outcomes although they differ in the frequency of contacts with compatriots. These results could be attributed to limitations in the measurement of the variables under study, mainly due to the ready-made tool that we employed. Some amount of variation in the operational definitions of acculturation and adaptation is evident across researchers. Alternatively, our findings may derive from the assimilative tendencies existing in Greece at the levels of group attitudes and government policies [23]. In line with the results of this study, recent research has shown that involvement in the host culture, but not ethnic involvement, contributes in the prediction of academic competence of immigrant youth in Greek urban schools [24]. As Chryssochoou (2004) [25] pointed out, acculturation does not take place in a social vacuum, which means that in-group vs. out-group pressures on individuals are not symmetrical. This is especially true for countries, like Greece, that have experienced the transition from single-culture society to multiculturalism only recently. Apart from the acculturation variables, two demographic factors were found to substantially contribute to immigrants’ well-being, i.e., country of origin and length of stay in the host culture. The effect of country of origin appears to confirm the cultural distance assumption [26]. Extending the similarity-attraction hypothesis [27] in

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

33

acculturation research, it suggests that perceived similarities between culture of origin and culture of contact are generally related to higher levels of sociocultural adaptation. In our study this was true for psychological adaptation as well. Triandafyllidou (2000) [16] argues that a hierarchy of “Greekness” is constructed in the political discourse where the levels of inclusion to or exclusion from one’s in-group are shaped on the basis of qualities such as ethnicity and religion. This may explain why immigrants from European countries and the Balkans displayed high levels of adaptation in our study. On the other hand, individuals of Islamic and Asian origin living in Northern Europe have been found to experience more sociocultural difficulties than immigrant groups that were perceived to be “less distant” [3], as was the case in this study. Length of stay in Greece revealed an interesting pattern of relationships: it was positively related to integration and negatively related to separation; also, it was related to adaptation but only through the mediating effect of the acculturation variables. These findings can be explained in the light of the contact hypothesis [28] in social psychological research and they have serious implications for policy making. It has been shown that mere contact is not enough to reduce negative stereotypes; instead, certain prerequisites need to be met in order to promote positive group attitudes, such as equal status of participants, conditions of co-operation and clear institutional support for integration policies. The limitations of this study are in a way inherent to most of the immigration research. They mainly have to do with sampling, variable selection and generalization of findings. First, participants were not randomly selected; it is plausible to claim that undocumented immigrants are confronted with far more adversities [9] but they are also more difficult to reach for practical reasons. Second, the inclusion of additional variables, such as identification to one’s ethnic group, levels of acculturative stress or perceived discrimination, might have a differential impact in our findings. Therefore, reasonable caution is necessary in generalizing the above conclusions across ethnic groups, cultural backgrounds, and time sections. The dynamic nature of immigration processes calls for the need to incorporate such contextual variables in the research design as well as in the interpretation of results.

References [1] Berry, J.W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 46, 5-68. [2] Sam, D.L., & Berry, J.W. (Eds.). (2006). The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [3] Ward, C., Bochner, S., & Furnham, A. (2001). The psychology of culture shock (2nd ed.). Hove, UK: Routledge. [4] Baubock, R., Heller, A., & Zolberg, A. (Eds.). (1996). The challenge of diversity: Integration and pluralism in societies of immigration. Aldershot, UK: Avebury. [5] Rudmin, F.W. (2003). Catalogue of acculturation constructs: Descriptions of 126 taxonomies, 1918-2003. In W.J. Lonner, D.L. Dinnel, S.A. Hayes & D.N. Sattler (Eds.), Online Readings in Psychology and Culture (Unit 8, Chapter 8), (http://www.wwu.edu/~culture), Center for Cross-Cultural Research, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington, [6] Berry, J.W. (2006). Contexts of acculturation. In J.W. Berry, L.S. Phinney, D.L. Sam & P. Vedder (Eds.), Immigrant youth in cultural transition (pp. 27-42). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. [7] Bourhis, R.Y., Moïse, L.C., Perreault, S., & Sénécal, S. (1997). Towards an interactive acculturation model: A social psychological approach. International Journal of Psychology, 32, 369-386. [8] Greek National Statistical Service (2001). Population census 2001. Athens, Greece: General Secretariat of National Statistical Service. [also available at http://www.statistics.gr]

34

E. Besevegis and V. Pavlopoulos / Acculturation Patterns and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece

[9] Fakiolas, R. (2003). Regularising undocumented immigrants in Greece: Procedures and Effects. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 29(3), 536-561. [10] Gotovos, A., & Markou, G. (2004). Remigrant and immigrant students in the Greek educational system. Athens, Greece: Ministry of Education. [in Greek] [11] Emke-Poulopoulou, E. (2005). Social and economic consequences of remigration in Greece. In A. Papastylianou (Ed.), Cross-cultural pathways: Remigration and psychological adaptation (pp. 41-86). Athens, Greece: Ellinika Grammata. [in Greek] [12] Georgas, J., & Papastylianou, A. (1993). Acculturation of Greek immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Albania: Psychological processes of adaptation. Athens, Greece: General Secretariat of Greeks Abroad. [in Greek] [13] Georgas, J., & Papastylianou, A. (1996). Acculturation and ethnic identity: The remigration of ethnic Greeks to Greece. In H. Grad, A. Blanco & J. Georgas (Eds.), Key issues in cross-cultural psychology (pp. 114-127). Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger. [14] Kolaitis, G., Tsiantis, J., Madianos, M., & Kotsopoulos, S. (2003). Psychosocial adaptation of immigrant Greek children from the former Soviet Union. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 12, 67-74. [15] Motti-Stefanidi, F., Pavlopoulos, V., Obradovic, J., Dalla, M., Takis, N., Papathanassiou, A., & Masten, A.S. (in press). Immigration as a risk factor for adolescent adaptation in Greek urban schools. European Journal of Developmental Psychology. [16] Triandafyllidou, A. (2000). The political discourse on immigration in southern Europe: A critical analysis. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 10, 373-389. [17] Dimakos, I.C., & Tasiopoulou, K. (2003). Attitudes towards migrants: What do Greek students think about their immigrant classmates? Intercultural Education, 14(3), 307-316. [18] Berry, J.W., Phinney, L.S., Sam, D.L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 55, 303-332. [19] Ward, C. (1999). Acculturation and adaptation revisited. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 30, 422442. [20] Tajfel, H. (1978). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of Intergroup relations (pp. 6176). London: Academic Press. [21] Nesdale, D., & Mak, A. (2003). Ethnic identification, self-esteem and immigrant psychological health. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 27, 23-40. [22] Berry, J.W. (2006). Contexts of acculturation. In D.L. Sam & J.W.Berry (Eds.), The Cambidge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology (pp. 27-42). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [23] Shamai, S., Ilatov, Z., Psalti, A., & Deliyianni, K. (2002). Acculturation of Soviet immigrant parents in Israel and Greece. International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 30(1), 21-49. [24] Motti-Stefanidi, F., Pavlopoulos, V., Obradovic, J., & Masten. A. (in press). Acculturation and adaptation of immigrant adolescents in Greek urban schools. International Journal of Psychology. [25] Chryssochoou, X. (2004). Cultural diversity: Its social psychology. London: Blackwell. [26] Babiker, I., Cox, J., & Miller, P. (1980). The measurement of cultural distance and its relationship to medical consultations, symptomatology and examination performance of overseas students at Edinburgh University. Social Psychiatry, 15, 109-116. [27] Byrne, D. (1971). The attraction paradigm. New York: Academic Press. [28] Allport, G.W. (1954/1979 Ed.). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-35

35

Chapter 4 Trauma and Loss: The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel Michal Finklestein, Ph.D. and Zahava Solomon, Ph.D.

Abstract .The objectives of our study were to assess the exposure of three groups of Ethiopian refugees to stressful and traumatic events at three time points: pre-, peri- and post-migration to Israel. The consequences of exposure to cumulative traumatic events such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were examined at all three time points and in each group. In addition losses during migration and complicated grief were examined in each group. We found significant differences between the groups in exposure and PTSD symptoms. While the three groups did not differ in grief reactions, significant differences were found between those who lost first-degree relatives and those who lost second-degree relatives, in Complicated Grief Reactions. The results are discussed in light of the unique characteristics of the cumulative trauma and traumatic losses among Ethiopian refugees. Keywords: Immigration, Ethiopian refugees, cumulative trauma, PTSD, Traumatic loss, Traumatic grief, complicated grief reactions

Introduction Y. was a 24 year old, university student and one of my most devoted research assistants (M.F.). She arrived in Israel with her family from Ethiopia, via Sudan, at the age of five. She could not recall any memories of the suffering during that journey. However, she suggested that I meet her brother and hear the story of her family. He told me the family story, as she was about four years old when they left Ethiopia. During the harsh

36

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

journey she became very sick, with no access to medical treatment. A few times, at some of the places where they stopped, he even dug a grave for her, because some of the worried members of the family said she was going to die and not survive the torturous journey. Other family members were afraid that if she died they would have to leave her body, or, if the authorities discovered it, they would send them back to Ethiopia. He never gave up, however, and carried her all the way, determined to save her life. When they arrived at the refugee camp in Sudan, he sought medical treatment for her. Upon her arrival in Israel, she was hospitalized for 6 months, but could not remember anything. He never talked with her about their ordeal, as it was too painful, he said, with tears in his eyes. Israel is a country composed of many different groups of immigrants, and thus the subject of immigration has caught the attention of many researchers. The priority of immigration is embodied in the Israeli state legislation, as the “Law of Return” and is specified in Israel’s Declaration of Independence. Every Jew, young or old, healthy or sick, rich or poor, has the right, at any time, to settle in Israel and become an Israeli citizen. The constant flow of immigrants into the country has created a unique society, a major part of which consists of either first or second generation refugees and immigrants with many Israelis having personally experienced the role of the State of Israel as the guarantor of their survival. The saga of the immigration of Ethiopian Jews is unique in the sense that they are the only black African community belonging to the Jewish religion, which has immigrated into a mostly “white” society [1]. The Jews of Ethiopia, who retained their links to Judaism as a separate ethnic group, have faced religious rejection and growing economic oppression in their land of origin, during the last 300 years. For hundreds of years they called themselves the “Beta Israel” (the House of Israel). They practiced a biblical form of Judaism and rejected Christianity and its tenets. However, there was a controversy about the linkage of the Ethiopian Jews to the rest of the Jewish people. During the years immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel, no attempt was made to bring them to Israel. The Israeli government, which had nurtured connections with Ethiopian Jewry since the 1950s, presented an ambiguous position regarding their immigration, because of problems concerning their religious recognition as Jews, their social and medical status, and also due to external politics. But, at the beginning of the 1970s, the chief rabbinate of Israel issued a religious edict recognizing the Beta Israel as Jews [2]. Only at the end of the 1970s, as a result of the extreme political, economic and social changes that took place in Ethiopia, resulting in the deterioration of the situation for Jews there, was a decision made by the Israeli government to bring them to Israel. In the 1970s, the Ethiopian regime prevented the Jews from organizing themselves and they were exposed to ethnic persecution and political detention. Such factors represented the “push factors” in this migration. The “pull factors” were derived from their connection to Judaism, as they perceived the immigration to Israel as an actualization of an ideal and a dream. The Ethiopian Jews’ choice to immigrate to Israel and improve their lives also influenced their motivation [3]. During the period 1980-2006, about seventy thousand Ethiopian Jews left their native land and immigrated to Israel in three main waves. Each wave of this immigration was marked by complicated, yet different, stressful events [2, 4].

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

37

The process of leaving their homeland and arriving in the new country, entailed tragic events, such as violence, abduction, the need to hide, transition camps, being separated from family members during escape, and death of family members. The “Moses” immigrants who arrived in Israel in the early 1980s displayed strong religious and ideological orientation. They did not hide their Jewish identity or their yearning to immigrate to Israel. Many lived close to the Sudanese border and were driven by their desire to reach Israel; they fled with other non-Jewish refugees from war- torn, famine-ridden Ethiopia, to reach Sudan. The Israeli security forces (Mossad) were involved in their immigration to Israel via Sudan. Many refugees died en route and the survivors suffered hunger and disease and were the victims of human atrocities. On their arrival in Israel some were in poor physical health and approximately 17% required immediate hospitalization [3]. The permission of the Sudanese government to allow the Jews entry into their country was conditional on prohibition from publishing details of it in the media. But in 1985, a mistake by Israeli diplomats and journalists, who gave a detailed briefing to the local and foreign press, caused the cessation of permission for this immigration. The “Solomon” immigrants, in contrast to the “Moses” immigrants, were less inclined to declare their Jewish identity openly. They were more immersed in general Ethiopian society, and some of them had Christian spouses. They too intended to leave Ethiopia, but in 1985 their immigration was banned because of the publicity leak, and thus the “Solomon” group was trapped for seven years in transit camps, under appalling conditions. Consequently, the Israeli government had them airlifted to Israel in a twenty-four hours Israeli Defense Forces Operation in 1991. The “Family Reunion” immigrants began arriving in Israel in the last wave, in 1993. The vast majority of them were converts (falashmura) who had left Judaism, or whose parents or grandparents had. As such, they were initially rejected by the Israeli religious authorities and were forced to wait, many for over ten years, in refugee camps, where they suffered from hunger, poverty and illness, until their immigration was approved [5]. Many members of this group received their permission to emigrate, following continuous requests for family reunion by their relatives in Israel. However, when the “Family Reunion” immigrants eventually arrived in Israel, the immigrants who had arrived in earlier waves received them with a somewhat cold shoulder. They criticized the “Family Reunion” immigrants for their so-called opportunistic approach, which caused them to convert their religion for reasons of comfort. I (M.F.) first met the Ethiopian immigrants, in 1996, in the caravan sites of Neve Carmel and Hazrot Yosef in the north of Israel. Since 1991, the Israeli Immigration authorities brought many of these immigrants to the caravan sites, intended as transitional housing. Some have stayed there for quite a few years. I was requested by the social welfare agencies to carry out group-intervention with vulnerable segments of the population there. I questioned myself, were the stressful events that they experienced traumatogenic? What were their psychological reactions, following exposure to extreme stressful events? Were they at increased risk for PTSD? What were the rates of traumatic losses, the various types of complicated grief reactions following the losses, related to circumstances and closeness to the deceased? This experience nurtured my determination to write my dissertation about the Ethiopian immigrants in Israel.

38

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

The present study is based on my dissertation supervised by Prof. Zahava Solomon, Head of the Adler Center, Tel-Aviv University, Israel. We assessed the traumatic events and losses these immigrants had experienced and their implications. In this chapter we shall present the findings of our study attesting to the psychological toll taken on the Ethiopian Jews by their immigration into Israel. More specifically, the following three issues will be described: (1) The experiences of the stressful events in their country of origin, Ethiopia, the trauma and losses during migration, in Sudan, or in the refugee camps in Ethiopia and the severe living difficulties post migration, in Israel. (2) The implications of cumulative trauma and traumatic-loss in PTSD and traumatic grief reactions. (3) The relationship between PTSD and complicated grief reactions. Only a few studies have assessed the relationship between the stressful events characterizing this immigration, and the immigrants’ mental adjustment [6, 7, 8]. These have examined some of the sources of traumatic stress that related to immigration, and their effects on psychosocial adjustment,[3]. Arieli and Ayche (1993) [9] found that 30% of the immigrants who came via Sudan died on the way. They also found high levels of psychopathological reactions among “Moses” immigrants six years after their arrival, more specifically, arousal responses such as increased psychomotor activity (11%) and sleep disturbances (29%). These reactions were found to be associated with the level of traumatic experiences en route [9, 10]. Prior to our study, there was very limited knowledge about the differences between the three groups in the rate of exposure to trauma and PTSD. Moreover, although there was evidence of traumatic loss events during migration [3], no empirical study had assessed the effects of these losses (i.e. grief reactions) among the survivors. The present study aims to fill this gap.

Traumatic events in immigration Forced immigration occurs when people flee their homes in the wake of a man-made or natural disaster (e.g. war, revolution, persecution, or flood) for a country that will host them and offer them a better chance of survival [11]. This process is fraught with highly stressful experiences. Studies have shown that stressful events during refugees’ forced migration can occur pre-, peri- and post-migration and may differ in their intensity and duration [12]. In the pre-migration phase, individuals may be exposed to stressful life events including ethnic persecution, starvation, political arrest, torture, threat to life and loss of life of family members. The peri-migration phase begins with the flight of the refugees from their homes and ends with arrival in their new country. Many refugees experience loss of property, forced separation from relatives and friends, dangerous escapes, having to run for their lives, witnessing the death of a family member and having to leave the deceased en route [13]. Peri-migration experience may include staying in refugee camps, lack of food and inadequate shelter. In the post-migration phase, many refugees report more difficulties in their new country than in the one they left, such as unemployment, poverty, loss of social status, loneliness, language difficulties, culture shock and concern about family members they left behind. After the initial hopes fade away, many realize that life in a richer and more technologically

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

39

advanced society is difficult, particularly for refugees who appear distinct (i.e. accent, skin color) [14, 15, 12, 16]. The participants in our study, from the three groups, gave similar testimonies about their stressful experiences prior to immigration. We learned from them about situations of illness with no access to medical care, mass death of close family members, political detention, arrest, torture by Ethiopian authorities and ethnic persecution because they were Jewish and openly declared their wish to emigrate to Israel. Regarding peri-migration traumatic events, we learned that the “Moses” immigrants were exposed to more traumatic events during migration compared to the other two groups. Most of the “Moses” refugees who escaped via Sudan were exposed to severe threats to their life, human atrocities such as kidnapping, torture, murder of friends or family members, rape and forced separation from relatives [3, 17, 18]. One of the participants told us his story: “My brother, his wife and their children were murdered on the way and I had to run for my life and didn’t help to bury them”. The stories that we heard from the “Solomon” and “Family Reunification” immigrants about the traumatic events during migration were different. Most of them stayed in refugee camps in Ethiopia, and thus did not suffer experiences like the Moses group [19]. However, we heard this painful story from a woman who arrived in the “Solomon” immigration and participated in our study. She told us: “I had to stay a whole year with twelve people in a tiny room, while my little daughter got sick and died”. We heard a description from a man who arrived in the “Family Reunification” immigration. He told us: “The Israeli authorities would only give an immigration permit for me and my wife. They would not give an immigration permit to my wife’s parents. I did not want to leave them behind in Ethiopia so I had to stay several years in the refugee camp, suffering poverty and illness”.

Have the Ethiopian refugees who came to Israel arrived on a safe shore? Once in Israel, post migration, many immigrants from all three groups faced language difficulties, unemployment, religious and social discrimination, as well as culture shock, collapse of the hierarchic structure in their families, and a loss of their traditional community systems [20, 21, 22]. We heard some of these experiences when we interviewed the participants in our study. Many told us about their feelings of discrimination and rejection by the authorities representing the Rabbinate. Others told us about their lack of social integration, difficulties in finding jobs and in learning the Hebrew language. We found that the “Family Reunification” immigrants experienced more severe post migration difficulties than the other groups and reported greater exposure to lack of social integration and to personal and emotional stress. One of the Moses immigrants said: “I had many dreams about Israel but I am very disappointed. The religious authorities did not accept my conversion, which led me to protest against the government”. Another woman we interviewed said: “We feel here, in Israel, the same as we felt in Ethiopia, rejected. I feel no one wants to get near me because I am black”. A participant in the study, from the “Family Reunification” immigration told us: “In Israel my children were sent away to boarding schools, I could not find a job so I had no money to buy a house”.

40

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

My experience expanded after I carried out a group intervention in the caravan sites. The first group was of orphans raised by their elder brothers or sisters (M.F.). Some of them lost both parents in Ethiopia, due to illness or murder. Their elder siblings, occupied with their own survival in the new country as young adults, who also had the task of caring for their brothers or sisters, were unable to discuss the pangs of longing for their parents, nor did they conduct ritual mourning ceremonies according to the culture and tradition of the Ethiopian Jews. An Amharic- speaking interpreter assisted me and we discussed the traumatic circumstances of the parents’ death. The younger orphans began to express their emotions, relive painful memories, using experiential methods of drama, clay work and drawing. Another group was of grandmothers who were raising their orphaned grandchildren. The intergenerational relations created conflicts and undermined the ability of the elderly women, who were the significant figures for the youngsters, to cope (M.F.). I began to question and search for deeper understanding about the experience of trauma and loss and its consequences, in the three groups of Jewish refugees from Ethiopia. In order to answer these questions we investigated 3 groups of Ethiopian immigrants. Our initial sample consisted of 600 Ethiopian immigrants to Israel, drawn from the national registry of the Ministry of Interior (200 in each group). This sample was derived from a cluster sample of 14 urban municipalities where large numbers of Ethiopian immigrants live. This method was used to obtain similar numbers of immigrants from each of the three waves of immigration, with equivalent numbers of men and women and stratification by age: 30-36, 37-43, 44 -50. This sample is representative of the adult population of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. The mean age of the study participants was 39.84 years. More than half, 257 (53.9%), were males; 220 (46.1%) were females. There were 165 Moses immigrants, 169 Solomon immigrants, and 144 Family Reunification immigrants. The three groups were comparable with respect to age and proportion of married respondents, but differed significantly in literacy levels and the proportion of widows. Four hundred and seventy-eight people agreed to participate, resulting in a response rate of 78%, with no significant group differences. In order to carry out an intercultural study we had to work with interpreters. Amharic speaking Ethiopian-born, Israeli undergraduate students were recruited and served as interpreters, becoming very devoted to the study. They took part in groupmeetings, facilitated by me (M.F.), for support and containment of their emotional reactions while listening to so many painful stories. Disclosure of the trauma and collecting data from the participants was emotionally taxing and not in accordance with Ethiopian culture. The research assistants made phone calls to all the prospective participants, asking them if they would agree to take part in the study. Speaking in Amharic, they explained that the aim of the study was to learn about the difficulties of Ethiopian immigrants. Those who agreed to participate were asked whether they preferred to be interviewed in Hebrew or by an Amharic interpreter and whether they would rather be interviewed at home or in a public place, like a community center. Data were collected following the approval of the Human Use Helsinki Committee of Tel Aviv University. Participation was voluntary, and all participants were asked to sign an informed consent before beginning the interviews. Each participant signed two versions of the form, one in Hebrew and one in Amharic, and the version in the preferred language was left for him/her.

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

41

Our respectful approach towards the participants, by giving them this option of choice was important for their feelings of self-esteem and mastery; it helped to build trust and aided the process of data collecting. The female research assistants administered the questionnaires to the female participants, and male research assistants to the male participants, due to the gender separation regulations of the Jewish Ethiopian culture. These gender separation rules are based upon the rigid gender-based division of labor and social gathering of men and women, strictly observed in the Ethiopian family. When we administered the questionnaires, which deal with personal issues, we were careful to do it in a way that did not break the gender-based separation rules. Most of the questionnaires were administered orally (416, 81%), and about a fifth (61, 19%) were read and completed by the participants on their own.

Measuring exposure to traumatic events In order to evaluate exposure to trauma, in the three time points- pre, peri and post migration, we employed three questionnaires in this study, which inquired about typical traumatic and stressful events experienced by the Ethiopian refugees. The questionnaires were translated from Hebrew to Amharic, using back translation. All the scales were culturally adapted in consultation with bilingual Ethiopian professionals. A questionnaire based on Part I of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ), obtaining accurate information on the survivor’s experiences was administered [23]. Regarding pre migration trauma, we asked the participants to indicate whether they witnessed or experienced stressful events in Ethiopia, before leaving their homes, in their country of origin. These included events such as “imprisonment”, “combat”, “pressure of the government to change political ideas”; personal stress, such as “death of parents”, “death of a relative”, “ill health without access to medical care”; social stress, such as “forced separation from family members”, “ethnic persecution” and “poverty”. We found no differences between the groups, in their level of exposure to personal stressful events. We heard testimonies from participants in the study. A participant from the Moses immigration told about her father, who was arrested and tortured in prison. Participants from the Solomon and Family Reunification immigrations spoke about ethnic persecution by Christian neighbors, and the bullying towards Jews at school in Ethiopia. As can be seen in Figure 1, no difference was found between Moses (71%), Solomon (80%) and Family Reunification (80%), in level of exposure pre migration to personal stress and in exposure to political stress - Moses (45%), Solomon (44%) and Family Reunification (47%). However, significant difference was found between the groups in exposure to stressful social events, where Family Reunification were exposed to higher rates of social stress (89%), than Moses (79%) and Solomon (74%). Part I of the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ), obtaining accurate information on the survivor’s peri migration trauma was administered [23]. We asked the participants to indicate traumatic experiences they had witnessed, experienced or heard, during migration (between the time they left their homes in Ethiopia until the time of their arrival in Israel). These included lack of basic needs and security, such as “lack of food, water, shelter”, “dangerous life conditions in the refugee camps“, “being close to death”, “ill health without access to medical care”; Life threatening events, such as “combat situation”, “pressure of the government to change political ideas”, “unnatural death of a

42

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

Figure 1. Rates of exposure to Pre-Migration Stressful Events

family or a friend”, “murder of a family member or a friend”, “serious injury”, “imprisonment”; victim of human atrocities, such as “lost or kidnapped”, “torture”; forced separation from family and from others. When we administered the questionnaire, the participants had a strong desire to give testimony about their experiences and appreciated recognition of their survival by the interviewers. One of the participants told us about being a helpless witness of an assault by robbers on the young women with whom he went on the trek, in Sudan. A participant from the Solomon immigrants told me (M.F.) about her parents and children, who left with the Moses immigration while she had to stay alone, spending seven years in a refugee camp in Ethiopia. A participant from the Family Reunification immigrants told about the harsh situation, living in the crowded refugee camp in Ethiopia, without food.

Figure 2. Rates of exposure to Peri-Migration Traumatic Events

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

43

We found differences between the groups in exposure to peri migration stressful events. Moses immigrants were exposed to higher rates of lack of basic needs and personal safety (89%), compared to Solomon immigrants (73%) and Family Reunification (73%); Moreover, Moses immigrants (43%) were exposed to higher rates of atrocities than Solomon immigrants (30%) and Family Reunification (34%); similarly, Moses immigrants (49%) were exposed to higher rates of life threatening events, compared to Solomon immigrants (30%) and Family Reunification immigrants (34%); in addition, Moses immigrants (43%) were exposed to higher rates of forced separation from family members than Solomon immigrants (29%) and Family Reunification immigrants (33%). Most of “Moses” refugees who escaped via Sudan were exposed to more severe traumatic events than Solomon and Family Reunification immigrants [19]. In order to assess post-migration living difficulties, we employed a questionnaire created for the current study on the basis of Steel and Silove’s [13] Postmigratory Living Problem Checklist, which lists a range of problems typically reported by refugees. We asked the participants about problems they had experienced in Israel since their arrival (e.g. “racial discrimination”, “worries about family back in Ethiopia or about family members who live far away in Israel”, “rejection by Israeli society or by the religious authorities in Israel”, “unable to find work”, “poverty”, “loneliness”, “death or disaster in the family, in Israel or in Ethiopia”, “sickness of the respondent, or of a family member in Israel”, “language difficulties” and “feelings of not belonging”). There were differences between the groups in post-migration difficulties. The Family Reunification group suffered more difficulties than Moses or Solomon immigrants. Significant differences were also found among all three groups studied in post migration emotional stress. Family Reunification immigrants had higher scores (76%), followed by Moses (69%) and Solomon immigrants (52%). “Family Reunification” immigrants were exposed to the highest degree of post migration living difficulties, perhaps due to their shorter time in Israel, (at the time that the study was carried out), lack of Hebrew language, and lack of adequate adjustment to Western industrial occupational skills.

PTSD in migration Since the early 1990s, there has been an increasing awareness of the traumatogenic nature of the refugee experience. Refugee studies have shown high levels of psychopathology, such as anxiety, depression, and somatic complaints [24,25, 26].

44

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

Figure 3. Rates of exposure to Post-Migration severe living difficulties

Rates of PTSD among refugee populations have been reported to range from 15% amongst the Cambodians in Thailand-Cambodia border camps [23] through 51% amongst refugees in Australia [26] and up to 90% among Vietnamese political detainees arriving in the USA [27, 28]. Several studies have assessed the mental health of the Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. Arieli and Ayche [10] found evidence of chronic posttraumatic symptoms such as increased psychomotor activity (11%) and sleep disturbances (29%) that were found to be associated with the level of trauma experienced en route. To assess PTSD symptoms in the Ethiopian immigrants we employed the HTQ [23] based on the DSM-III-R [29] and DSM-IV [30] symptom clusters in PTSD: reexperiencing traumatic events, avoidance and psychic numbing, and physiological arousal. We added a final question that queries the presence of clinically significant distress or impairment in social and occupational functioning (F criterion), in accord with the DSM-IV-TR criteria. The HTQ measures symptoms associated with the diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). A principal feature of the HTQ is its careful consideration of the specific cultural setting in which it is used. Cross-cultural research suggests that assessment of psychiatric illness should begin with phenomenological descriptions of folk diagnoses or culture-specific symptoms, which can then be compared to Western psychiatric criteria. Nevertheless, in recent years the diagnosis of PTSD has been increasingly applied to refugees from different backgrounds.

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

45

"Moses" "Solomon"

90

"Family Reunification"

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

PTSD

Hyperarousal cluster

Avoidance cluster

Intrusion cluster

Figure 4. Rates of posttraumatic symptoms: Intrusion, Avoidance and Hyper arousal, among Moses, Solomon and Family Reunification immigrants.

We found PTSD symptoms among all three groups, with Solomon immigrants showing the least intense symptoms, and the Moses immigrants the most intense. Overall, the above findings indicate that with regard to PTSD, there was a significant difference between Moses and Solomon immigrants, with the intensity of posttraumatic symptoms being higher in the Moses than in the Solomon immigrants, and that there was no significant difference between the Moses and the Family Reunification immigrants. We found that the percentages of participants who endorsed PTSD symptoms in each group were: 15% in the Solomon group, 27% in the Family Reunification group and 28% in the Moses group. PTSD rates were significantly lower among Solomon immigrants than the other two groups. Both intrusion symptoms (66.1%, 77%, 76.9% respectively) and avoidance symptoms (71.5%, 85.4%, 85.3% respectively) were significantly lower in the Solomon than the Moses and the Family Reunification immigrants. The prevalence of those who met symptom criteria for PTSD in our sample is higher than the prevalence of PTSD symptoms (9.2%) in a nationally representative population sample in a study that examined the psychological impact of ongoing terrorism in Israel, in 2002 [31] and is also higher than the prevalence of those with symptom criteria for PTSD (13.7%) in a sample of immigrants who arrived in Israel from Ukraine, following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster [32]. The groups did not differ in hyper arousal. As can be seen in figure 1, rates of intrusive symptoms, and avoidance symptoms in the Moses immigrants were similar to the rates in the Family reunification immigrants. However, Moses immigrants were significantly higher than the other two groups in “exaggerated startle response”.

46

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

The pathogenic impact of stressful events in immigration and PTSD The finding that the rates of PTSD symptoms differed between the groups was of particular interest. Several explanations are offered for this phenomenon. Maybe the pathogenic impact of the peri-migration events in the “Moses” group was similar to the pathogenic impact of post-migration difficulties in the “Family Reunification” group. Most of the “Moses” refugees who escaped via Sudan were exposed to severe threats to life, human atrocities, and forced separation from relatives, while the “Solomon” and “Family Reunification” immigrants stayed in refugee camps in Ethiopia during their migration, and thus did not suffer such experiences [19]. “Family Reunification” immigrants were exposed to more post migration difficulties such as: lack of social integration, personal and emotional stress, language difficulties and lack of adequate adjustment to Western industrial occupational skills. Perhaps the “Family Reunification” group was more vulnerable than the other two groups as they had no Jewish ideological and religious orientation, like “Moses” and “Solomon” immigrants and were also strongly rejected and refused by the Israeli religious authorities. Cultural differences in posttraumatic symptoms A second explanation could relate to the differences among the groups in the clusters of posttraumatic symptoms (intrusion, avoidance, and hyper arousal). Our findings, that in the three groups, levels of avoidance were higher than levels of hyper-arousal, are consistent with an epidemiological study conducted in Ethiopia, among traumatized refugees in their own country [33]. In addition, the findings are partially consistent with a cross-cultural study [34], which revealed high levels of avoidance and intrusion in a Mexican-Hispanic sample, and a high level of hyper arousal in USA non-Hispanic participants, following exposure to similar hurricanes. The Mexican-Hispanic population originated from a non-western society while the USA non-Hispanic population originated from a western society. One possible explanation for this finding is that avoidance and hyper arousal may be highly determined by cultural affiliation. PTSD may be higher in cultures that promote avoidance as a general approach to managing stress [35, 36, 37, 38]. We speculate in our findings, that higher “startle” symptoms, amongst “Moses” immigrants may be attributed to their longer duration in Israel, having acquired more “Western culture” responses, such as tending to report more symptoms of arousal.

Cumulative trauma and PTSD The question is asked about the impact of cumulative trauma. What are the relations between the number of the traumatic events at three time points and the rates of PTSD symptoms? Is it that the more traumatic events experienced, the more damage is reflected in the measures used to assess psychosocial distress? In order to answer these questions we examined the unique cumulative contribution of stressful events over time to PTSD. We performed a series of stepwise regressions, with intensity of PTSD as the dependent variable. This technique permits the assessment of a number of potentially useful predictors and isolation of those few that contribute most to the variance of the dependent variable (See table 1).

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

47

Table 1. Intensity of Exposure to Traumatic Events in each group of immigration Group

Step

Variable

Beta

R2

Moses

1

Post Migration Difficulties

*** 0.46

*** 0.21

Solomon

1

Post Migration Difficulties

*** 0.31

*** 0.17

2

Peri –Migration Trauma

*** 0.27

1

Post Migration Difficulties

*** 0.35

2

Peri –Migration Trauma

*** 0.32

Family Reunification

*** 0.27

The findings show differences among groups in the impact of the cumulative exposure to trauma pre-, peri-, and post-migration. In “Moses” only post-migration difficulties contributed to posttraumatic residues, while in the “Solomon” and “Family Reunification” immigrants, both peri-migration trauma and post migration living difficulties have contributed uniquely to the intensity of PTSD. These findings are consistent with other studies of refugees, who experienced cumulative-trauma resulting in long-term sequelae in the USA, Australia, and in Europe [14,25, 26, 27 37]. The explanation of this phenomenon may relate to the “recency” effect (39, 40). As opposed to the other groups, the relations between cumulative trauma and post migration difficulties in “Moses” immigrants may reflect heightened vulnerability to the subsequent recent post migration difficulties, as a result of increased sensitivity related to the stress that followed peri migration traumata. Apparently, during migration, the “Moses” immigrants were able to contain their distress. We may speculate that their ideology, faith and hopes of arriving in Israel gave them the power to carry on and kept their psychological defenses intact. Hope and faith can enhance psychological defense mechanisms, which may become a powerful force safeguarding mental health. By shifting perceptions and thoughts in a positive direction, faith, hope and ideology may improve the capacity to dissociate from negative emotional stimuli. The stressful experiences they encountered during their immigration did leave a substantial emotional mark, which depleted them of their resources. Once they arrived in Israel, post-immigration difficulties were added to the prior stress they had experienced, and triggered the onset of post-traumatic psychopathology. It is possible that the recent difficulties taxed their psychological resources heavily and became the “last straw” that inflicted more damage than the trauma during migration. We suggest that there is more synergistic interaction between peri migration trauma and post

48

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

migration difficulties, in “Moses” immigrants. For example, the original trauma during migration might intensify the symptom effects of post migration recent trauma and recent trauma might prevent the reduction of peri migration trauma symptom levels.

Traumatic loss The theoretical literature emphasizes the difference between loss and traumatic loss [41]. Traumatic loss is a concept relating to an event in which a person is bereaved of a loved one that died suddenly, in a horrific way. Contrary to a natural death occurring at an old age, traumatic loss may be accompanied by terror-threat and helplessness [42]. Freud (1920/1956) [43] focused attention on the fact that profound mourning arising from the loss of a beloved person brings with it feelings of painful depression and a loss of interest in the outside world, and shows that grief and mourning are part of a healing process. Lindemann (1944) [44] indicated in his studies, among some of the bereaved he investigated, that he found various types of difficulties post loss of loved ones. Bowlby (1980)[45] conceptualized the response to loss traversing four stages: shock and numbing, searching for reunion with the deceased, disorganization and reorganization, expressed in the evolution of new ways of dealing with the changed reality. More recent theoreticians have investigated the differential circumstances of the loss and the bereaved in developing varied response to loss [42, 46]. Studies that were directed at comparing bereavement reactions across different groups have shown that difference in circumstances of loss affected consequent grief reactions differently. Also, factors such as degree of relation to the deceased, affected the levels and patterns of the grief. Bereaved parents were identified as more vulnerable than bereaved spouses or adult children who lost their parents [47, 48]. In a situation of disaster, the bereaved are preoccupied with the traumatic event, which they experienced, overlying the capacity to grieve for the lost person who died in the disaster. The bereaved might suffer double psychological burden, dealing with both psychological processes. Traumatic loss in refugees would involve the survivor’s physical injury, witnessing the death of close ones in horrific circumstances, without being able to either save them, or bury and mourn the ones that died and were left behind. The relationship between life-threatening trauma and psychological stress in refugees has been extensively studied in recent times [8, 26, 28]. However, the role of traumatic loss in generating psychological disorders in refugees has attracted a few studies. Many Ethiopian refugees who arrived in Israel were exposed to the death of family members during migration [49,3]. However, no empirical study has investigated the traumatic losses and their consequences experienced by the three groups of refugees. The types of traumatic losses in the Ethiopian immigrants are related to the circumstances of the loss of life and emphasize the layers of stress and trauma, such as violent killing of family members, to which the Ethiopian immigrants were exposed during migration and the level of relationship of the deceased with the family. In order to assess the traumatic losses, we employed the questionnaire measuring traumatic loss and traumatic grief, The Texas Revised Inventory of Grief (TRIG)[46]. The TRIG contains a set of questions about the relation of the deceased person to the bereaved. Participants were asked about loss of relatives during migration. Many reported the loss of more than one relative. We asked sensitively each participant to indicate just one of the deceased relatives and respond to the relationship with him/her. It is important to note that those suffering the double impact of loss and trauma have to be offered, both

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

49

clinically and in terms of research participation, a skilled, soundly based and sensitive assessor who is cognizant of the reactive processes, the sensitivity of the time and the individual nature and timing of response. One of the men, a father, who participated in the study, told us that he had lost a brother, a sister, his wife and his elder son. It was very difficult for him to decide whom to choose and relate to in the study. He decided that he would talk about his son. In the middle of the interview, he said he would like to move back and talk about his wife. He felt this was a situation that enabled him to share his longing and bereavement reactions towards her. Interviewing on this part was taxing emotionally for both the interviewee and the interviewer. 367 of the 477 participants (77%) who were given the TRIG reported loss of family members during migration. When we interviewed the participants about traumatic losses, we took into account that survivors of physical injury and death may have witnessed their close ones get hurt without having been able to save them. Sometimes they were compelled to escape, unable to mourn their dead family members and friends, left behind, unburied. Our findings about the experiences of loss of our respondents varied. We found two distinctive groups. The first included 194 participants, who lost a first-degree relative (i.e. father, mother, son, daughter). Of them, 92 respondents had lost one or both parents, while 102 did not lose parents. The second group, 173 participants, lost a second-degree relative. We found significant relationships between the wave of immigration and the characteristics of the traumatic losses during migration. Eighty two percent of the “Moses” immigrants, 78% of the “Solomon” immigrants and 70% of the “Family Reunification” immigrants reported incidents of loss of family members during their migration. Twenty five percent of all respondents lost first-degree relatives, who were not parents: thirty percent of “Moses” immigrants, seventeen percent of "Solomon" immigrants, and thirty four percent of “Family Reunification”. Of all the respondents who reported the loss of a relative, 26% lost one or two parents. We discovered that the percentage of orphans in the “Moses” immigrants (16%) was lower than “Solomon” (31%) and “Family Reunification” immigrants, (34%). The traumatic losses of parents in the “Family Reunification” immigrants are similar to those of the “Solomon” immigrants. Presumably the survivors of the “Moses” immigration came to Israel and received proper medical care, whereas the “Solomon” group remained in Ethiopia for another seven years in a refugee camp. Also, there was a high rate of morbidity and death in the camps. Perhaps at that time more fathers from the “Solomon” and “Family Reunification” immigrants were killed in the civil war in Ethiopia. It may also be that the Israeli government was aware of the hardship facing the orphans who lost their fathers and awarded them immigrant permits; or perhaps more orphans applied to come to Israel and in so doing, improved their lives.

Traumatic grief The recent theories about traumatic bereavement have been related to the interpersonal impact of loss and proposed to refer to elements of sudden and horrific shocking encounters, in addition to the loss. For the bereaved a sudden unexpected loss, going against the normal expectable life trajectory, deserves consideration as a traumatic bereavement. It is suggested that the use of the term traumatic grief will be restricted to events that would independently be classified as trauma [50, 51]. Findings from an

50

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

empirical study, which compared grief reactions following a natural death and reaction following traumatic loss, found that a life-threatening event and loss led to a traumatic grief reaction [42]. According to the literature, cognitive intrusive reactions following traumatic loss are characterized by preoccupation with the traumatic event. In a natural death the preoccupation is with the deceased. The emotional intrusive thoughts following a traumatic loss involve anxiety related to the event. However, for the bereft of a natural death, the emotional intrusive thoughts are related to the abandonment anxiety. The avoidant reactions for a traumatized person are concerned with talking about the event, and for the bereaved, avoidance is for the absence of the deceased. As for over-arousal, the trauma casualty focuses on the threat of the danger he/she was exposed to in the course of the event. The bereaved reaction focuses more on examining the deceased [41]. Another empirical research reported combined reactions of traumatic loss where participants were exposed to both loss and trauma simultaneously. In these cases the grief reaction and traumatic reaction overlapped [52]. In these kinds of cases there is difficulty in overcoming the grief, which leads to its coincidence in the processing of the trauma. Although social rituals exist at the time of grief, there are no special grief rituals for traumatic life events. This situation forms the potential for pathological grief and severe chronic depression [53]. This way of departing from the deceased does not allow visiting the grave, sit Shiva (according to the Jewish religious tradition, it is the time of people who come to support the bereaved) and thus the bereaved families might be deprived of their resources of support.

Traumatic grief in Ethiopian Jews There are three partly overlapping stages when experiencing loss: the gradual separation from the person who died, acceptance of the loss and adjustment to a new reality [47]. The first stage of bereavement is characterized by shock responses and denial of the loss and is sometimes followed by a feeling of emotional numbness. The second stage starts with cognitive and emotional awareness of the loss. This stage is characterized by dwelling on both the lost individual and death, together with an intense level of distress, expressed cognitively, behaviorally and socially. In the third stage, gradual integration of the meaning of the loss occurs. While many of the manifestations of bereavement, such as memories, longing and loneliness continue to be part of the mourner’s world, there is less distress and pain than in the previous stage [45]. The literature testifies that the severe circumstances surrounding migration, for some of the Ethiopian refugees, were concomitant with threat to their own life and cases of death. For some of the survivors, who had to escape without burying their dead family members according to tradition, these stressful events provoked guilt reactions. However, no empirical study to date has examined the connection between these terrible losses and traumatic bereavement reactions in the Ethiopian refugees [49]. When we speak of a community such as that of the Ethiopian Jews, we cannot relate to the topic of loss and mourning for the individual Ethiopian immigrant without first relating to the specific content and style of mourning ritual in their community, as understood within the framework of the universal process. The Ethiopian Jews in Israel, who moved from one culture to another, preserved only some of their mourning rituals. Our first experience with the specific style of their

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

51

cultural mourning was in the facilitation of group work with the orphan children who were raised by their elder siblings, in the Neve Carmel Caravan site, in 1996. The impression of the local Social Welfare Agency director was: “They do not seem to grieve. It seems they are dancing, eating and bringing money to the mourning family. They never talk about the dead person”. When we began to work with them, it became important for us to respect their rituals of bereavement. The unique Ethiopian Jewish ritual is structured by three universal phases. In the first, the deceased moves from the world of the living to that of the dead. This takes place during the first hours after the death. In this phase the deceased’s body is already perceived as impure. All members of the enlarged family, neighbors and acquaintances are obliged to participate in the funeral. Participating in the funeral represents the departure from the dead. The second phase, transition, begins after the seventh day of the death, when all are invited to a feast that may last until all members of the community have taken part and prayed together for the soul of the deceased in the world of the dead. This is an opportunity for those who could not be at the funeral to participate in the rituals. The third phase is of re–incorporation. This is the period when the deceased’s status is redefined and he takes his place in the world of the dead. The bereaved person, in the world of the living, must reorganize in order to fulfill the functions that previously were performed by the deceased. The traumatic circumstances of losses during migration prevented many of them from carrying out the traditional rituals of the mourning and fulfilling their obligations to the deceased [49]. We saw an example of that when we conducted our study. One of the interviewees requested us to watch a video film that he had taken in Ethiopia. He had videoed the scene when he was looking for the remains of the body of his dead brother that was left en route, near the border between Ethiopia and Sudan, while the family escaped. Video filming the respectful burial was part of the commemoration of his brother’s life. For him, watching the video with us, of the traditional ritual that ensures an honorable passage from the world of living to that of the dead, was also helping him, as a bereaved person, to fulfill his duty to his lost, loved and respected brother. The immigration of the three groups of Ethiopian Jews and their descendents entailed cumulative trauma and involved a process of loss and mourning in many of these refugees [49]. Other previous studies of refugees have documented traumatic events, including losses and deaths that often occurred in horrific circumstances or conditions that would be expected to lead to severe grief reactions, which unlike normal grief are complicated [54, 55].

Complicated grief reactions Complicated grief has been described as the intensification of the normal bereavement to the level where the person is overwhelmed and resorts to maladaptive behavior, or remains incessantly in a state of social dysfunction, without progression of the mourning process towards completion [51]. In addition, complicated grief refers to the response of the individual irrespective of the external situation and is a separate diagnostic entity from traumatic bereavement. When individuals experience a traumatic loss, in the circumstances of traumatic events, and adjust poorly to the death of their loved ones, a complicated grief reaction might develop. Other potential risk factors for complicated grief are the death of a working age adult that would produce a greater life

52

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

disruption than the death of an older adult, who may have been less actively involved in the day-to-day “business’ of the family and whose death might therefore be considered more “natural”. Also the level of family relation to the deceased affects the adjustment of the bereaved to the death (i.e. spouses would likely experience greater levels of grief emotion than would other no blood relatives, such as sister-in law). Another risk factor may be the non-attendance at the funeral of the deceased, by missing the social support that the funeral provides. Regarding complicated grief reactions, the literature identifies three main kinds of complicated grief reactions, which are deviant from the norm (which is a resolved grief reaction). Lack of grief is expressed by denial of the grief. Delayed grief reaction is in which separation distress is slow to emerge, and there is a significant gap between the time the loss occurred and the reaction to the loss. This gap varies and may last from a few weeks to a number of years after the loss. Prolonged grief is that in which distress over the loss is not satisfactorily resolved and is expressed by intensively high depression and guilt feelings. Additional symptoms that do not diminish over time may also be manifested [46]. Reports about the frequency of complicated grief reactions in varied communities are not consistent. It is argued that in clinical populations, delayed grief reactions to loss are 10-15%, while the rate of absence of grief reactions is lower (5%). On the contrary, in a community sample, there was no evidence of these two reactions mentioned above. Delayed grief reaction is typically expressed by a delay of more than two weeks of the distress of separation, while lack of grief reaction is expressed by the delay of distress related to the separation from the deceased. The feeling of loss of the object, a sense of longing and a lack of acceptance of the loss, may last for as long as twelve months after death [47] .In order to define a specific grief reaction as complicated, there is a need to point out that it is related to difficulties in emotional and psychosocial adjustment. As for the relations between socio demographic characteristics and grief reactions, relevant factors include the circumstances of the loss and the level of relation of the deceased to the bereaved [46]. Complicated grief is likely to be common among refugee populations exposed to war trauma. Deaths often occurred in horrific circumstances with killings being witnessed by the surviving family, conditions that would be expected to lead to posttraumatic symptoms and sever grief reactions. However, only a few empirical studies in refugees have focused on the antecedents of complicated grief reactions and their relationship to PTSD [55]. We wanted to examine the complicated grief reactions among Ethiopian immigrants in Israel who lost family members during migration. In order to evaluate the complicated grief reactions among Ethiopian immigrants in Israel, we employed the Texas Revised Inventory of Grief (TRIG), which measures grief following bereavement. The Hebrew version of the questionnaire [56] and all the scales were culturally adapted in consultation with bilingual Ethiopian professionals. The respondents were asked in the first part, which taps their past behavior “to think back to the time the person died” in answering eight items that sample a variety of life events that might be disrupted by grief (i.e. “after this person died I found it hard to get along with certain people” or “After this person’s death I lost interest in my family, friends, and outside activities”). In the second part, respondents were asked to indicate their present feelings, thoughts, memories, opinions and attitudes about the

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

53

person’s death (i.e. “I still cry when I think of the person who died” or “I hide my tears when I think about the person who died”). Following the recommendations of Faschingbauer et al., [46] the TRIG provides information regarding respondents’ progress through the various stages of grief. A typology of 4 various types of grief adjustment patterns, were produced. High and low scores were above and below the 50th percentile, respectively on each part. The median scores of the two parts, in the current sample were 3.13 in the past, 3.54 in the present. In addition, the median scores of the two parts were calculated in each one of the groups. Low scores, that were under the median, on both scales, in the past and in the present, implied lack of grief reaction . High scores on part one (past disruption) and low scores on part two (present grief level), implied acute resolved grief, since they had apparently grieved and resolved their grief. Low scores on part one and high scores on part two, implied delayed grief reaction. High scores on part one and high scores on part two implied prolonged grief.

Complicated grief reactions in Ethiopian Jews The results in the current study indicate that complicated grief reactions were found more among orphans than in participants who lost first-degree relatives, who were not parents. More complicated grief reactions were found among participants who lost a first degree relative than in participants who lost a second-degree relative. We examined the patterns of complicated grief reactions among immigrants from Ethiopia who experienced traumatic loss of close family members during migration to Israel. The findings of the current study showed that patterns of prolonged grief and lack of grief reaction (38%) are the two most frequent reaction types among the research participants.11% of the participants were found to suffer delayed grief reactions and 12% expressed resolved grief. These results may be explained by the two-track model [57, 58], which is related to loss, trauma and grief reactions. Track I represents the evaluation of functioning and response of the bereaved to the traumatic loss. Track II is an in-depth analysis of the relationship of the bereaved with the deceased. The bifocal approach enables us to relate to the trauma and the loss from both perspectives simultaneously. Maybe some of the Ethiopian refugee survivors were occupied simultaneously with the elaboration of their traumatic experiences and could not resolve the grief of their loved ones, who died in those traumatic circumstances. The explanation about complicated grief reactions among the Ethiopian immigrants may be attributed to varied aspects. They did not carry out the ritual bereavement ceremonies for their beloved in the past. Therefore, perhaps the pattern of prolonged grief reaction in the present has turned the survivors into a living and continuous memorial for the deceased as though the bereaved may feel guilty for surviving and not being able to save the deceased. If memories of the deceased arouse guilt it is difficult to resolve the grief and relations towards the deceased [59]. The prolonged grief reaction may also be explained by the term of continuing bonds, according to which many bereaved mourners continue to be in touch with the deceased and these reactions are not necessarily pathological. The relations with the deceased and his representations continue to exist as a defined focal point for the mourner, both consciously and unconsciously and do not necessarily

54

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

replace contact with living people but rather may function as something additional [56, 57]. Another explanation about lack of grief reaction among Ethiopian immigrants in the current study may be related to the fact that some of the bereaved are the survivors of traumatic events, where lives of others were lost. In such situations the bereaved might have been preoccupied with their own survival and therefore would not have come to terms concurrently with their loss. Therefore grief work is not taking place in a chronological way, adapted to the time of the event, as usually happens under less complicated circumstances [42]. According to the literature, delayed grief reaction is determined when there is a significant gap between the time of the loss and the beginning of the grief reaction. According to the results of the current study, in situations where the individual is exposed to loss and trauma at the same time, the posttraumatic reaction may negatively affect the process of grief that may be distorted [41]. In addition, as the data were collected retrospectively maybe the participants might have found it difficult to remember their grief reactions in the past. In the "Moses" immigrants, the losses in Sudan were in circumstances of traumatic events, as they did not carry out traditional loss ceremonies and separation from the deceased. We speculate that the complicated grief reactions in the “Family Reunification” immigrants are related to the fact that many of them lost their parents when they were young children when the bereavement ceremonies were not meaningful to them. Only years later, when they became emotionally mature could they experience the process of bereavement. One of them said: “When my father died I was young and didn’t understand anything. Now I need him and I realize how much I miss him.”

Relations between PTSD and grief reactions in Ethiopian Jewish refugees Although complicated grief is likely to be common among refugee populations, there have been only a few studies investigating the traumatic antecedents and correlates of complicated grief in refugees and the relationship of that symptom pattern with other common disorders such as PTSD [56]. The rates of PTSD in our study were 23.06%. Among the participants in the study (n=367), 88% reported complicated grief reactions. The question asked is whether these findings testify differences, overlapping or reciprocal relations between these two research entities? We wanted to examine overlapping relations and discover how many participants who were classified as posttraumatic and also experienced complicated grief reactions. Altogether 110 participants from the whole sample had PTSD, which is 23.06%. Ninety of them answered the grief questionnaire. 73 of them (81.11%) reported complicated grief reactions. That is, 81% of the participants with posttraumatic reactions also had complicated grief reactions. Maybe in the Ethiopian refugees there was an overlap between those who reported posttraumatic reactions and those who reported complicated grief, as many of them experienced life threat and loss, at the same time, as the survivors witnessed violent death of the members of their families while being in mortal danger themselves. Normal grief can combine distressing moods and turbulent, even confusing thoughts. It is assumed that equilibrium will return eventually as a result of the mourning process, but extremes that may impair functional capacities to a

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

55

psychopathological degree may occur. Complicated grief may include intrusive images, severe pangs of emotion and neglect of adaptive activities at work and at home. Because of this range from normal to abnormal distress after loss, debate between various researchers dealt with the possible inclusion of complicated grief as a mental disorder and whether there is a place to give this mental reaction a distinguished psychiatric classification similar to posttraumatic stress disorder. While the termination of exposure to traumatic events and their effect received legitimacy and appeared as a clinical syndrome in important diagnostic manuals such as the DSM, the relation to bereavement reaction was as to a normal human phenomenon which is expressed by the tendency to cope adaptively with the implications of loss events, without developing functional mental and physical disorders. Although traumatic grief reactions may be a risk factor of mental and physical morbidity, the bereavement process and symptoms associated with traumatic events were pushed aside and did not appear as a legitimate diagnosis in the DSM [60, 61]. Conceptually PTSD is represented as being distinct from complicated grief in that the former arises from lifethreatening event and the latter from loss of a loved one. In its fourth edition the DSM [30] recognized the phenomenon of complicated grief but its relation to it is somewhat ambiguous. Grief is included in the category which indicates: “When grief over a loss, usually of a loved one, does not meet the criteria for any of the mental disorders but is a focus of clinical attention, it can be classified under this category of "other conditions" [59, 62]. Others claim that because of the idiosyncratic nature of the grief process, creating such a diagnosis is problematic as it can lead to labeling and pathologization of various reactions of mourners [63]. In the current study a comparison took place between the intensity of late grief reaction in relation to the initial grief of the participants. This method is compatible with the relation of the literature to complicated grief reactions by the use of normative definition, which compares the reactions of individuals to loss and traumatic loss according to their context, society and culture [43]. The findings in the current study demonstrate the difficulty in defining a specific grief reaction as complicated. The population of immigrants from Ethiopia is unique and therefore their reactions of resolved grief should not be taken as representative of people who have experienced loss and have finished the process of mourning. Neither should the manifestation of absent grief reaction be taken as reflecting the absence of full occupation with loss and what it involves, but representing changing tendencies along a period of time in relation to a specific group. We may speculate that the high frequency of complicated grief reactions reflects the processing perception of grief work by acknowledging that these processes are uniquely compatible with the attributes of the losses among Ethiopian immigrants. Maybe it is socially desirable among these immigrants to emphasize that they are still mourning. Another possibility is that the term “complicated grief” is problematic and does not represent the process of grief that is manifested by cultural patterns many years after the loss.

56

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

Figure 5. Rates of relations between PTSD and Complicated Grief

Conclusions Employing acceptable statistical measures in the current study on refugees, shows that this immigration entails suffering and stress regarding cumulative trauma and traumatic losses. We may conclude that although the refugees have arrived from the same country, they are not all alike and differ in their exposure to stressful, traumatic events, traumatic losses, and difficulties pre, peri and post migration and they suffer diverse posttraumatic symptoms and complicated grief reactions. The current study is unique in its daring to confront a challenge in the field of research with a population that is hard to reach. The study also took the challenge of validating measures of the Ethiopian Jewish refugees’ trauma and posttraumatic symptoms that have previously been the subject of ethnographic research, but have never been examined empirically. As a high proportion of this population is illiterate, the assistance of the Ethiopian born, Amharic speaking, Israeli students, may have led to a high response rate in data collecting. Also, the assistance by these student interpreters, who had themselves, experienced the same ordeal as the participants in the study, might have taxed them emotionally. However, it might also have given them legitimacy to relate to their own posttraumatic residues and grief reactions. Moreover, students from academic institutions in the general host society may create an intercultural bridge between the immigrant refugees and the members of the host society and build trust in the participants of the study. This assistance enabled the participants to tell their stories of traumatic experiences and losses, in their own language, in a very safe and empathic setting. The Israeli host society and immigration authorities have a challenge in using the information and knowledge about traumatic experiences and traumatic loss and its implications in psychosocial dysfunction and psychiatric morbidity in the current study

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

57

for the benefit of these refugees. Mental health professionals that provide diagnosis, prevention and intervention services in this population, should also take into account culture-bound symptoms. Providing appropriate early interventions according to differential needs in these immigrants may have the potential to limit long-term morbidity. The findings of the current study challenge us to identify factors and mechanisms that support resilience and prevent vulnerability. These factors could educate the development of intervention programs, and promote successful integration in the host society, as well as increase the well being of Ethiopian refugees and immigrants in general.

References [1] Schwartzman, O., 1999, The Solo Parent Ethiopian Family: Influence of the Support System and the Sense of Coherence on the Sense of Personal Welfare, final project submitted as part of the Master's degree requirements, University of Haifa, School of Social Work. [2] Youngmann R., Zilber N., Kaveh N., Zere, M., Workneh, F. Bekele, Y., & Giel, R.(2002) Development of a culturally sensitive psychiatric screening instrument for detecting emotional problems among Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. Harefuah, 141:10–16. [3] BenEzer, G. (2002). The Ethiopian Jewish exodus. London: Routledge. [4] Israel Government Year Book (2006). Central Bureau of Statistics, 57. Hemed printing [5] Kaplan, S., & Rosen, H. (1993). Ethiopian immigration in Israel: Between preservation of culture and invention of tradition. The Jewish Journal of Sociology, 31, 35-47. [6] Andermann, L. F. (1996). Ethiopian Jews meet Israeli family physicians: A study of cultural somatization. Transcultural Psychiatric Research, 33, 333-345. [7] Ratzoni, G., Ben Amo, I., Weizman,T., Weizman, R., Modai, I., & Apter, A. (1993). Psychiatric diagnoses in hospitalized adolescent and adult Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. Israeli Journal of Medical Science, 29, 419-421. [8] Schreiber, S. (1995). Migration, traumatic bereavement and trans cultural aspects of psycho-logical healing: Loss and grief of a refugee woman from Begameder country in Ethiopia. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 68, 42-135. [9] Arieli, A. (1988). Persecutory experience and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder among Ethiopian immigrants. In E. Ghigier (Ed.), Grief and bereavement in contemporary society (pp. 70-76). London: Freund Publication. [10] Arieli, A., & Ayche, S. (1993). Psychopathological aspects of the Ethiopian immigration to Israel. Israel Journal of Medical Science, 29, 411-418. [11] Ben-Sira, Z. (1997). Immigration, Stress and Readjustment. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger/Greenwood [12] Orley, J. (1994). Psychological disorders among refugees: Some clinical and epidemiological considerations. In A. J. Marsella, T. Borneman, S. Ekblad, & J. Orley (Eds.), Amidst Peril and Pain: The Mental Health and Well-Being of the World's Refugees (pp. 193-206). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. [13] Silove, D., Sinnerbrink, I., Field, A., Manicavasager, V., & Steel, Z. P. (1997). Anxiety, depression and PTSD in asylum-seekers: Associations with pre-migration trauma and post-migration stressors. British Journal of Psychiatry, 4, 351-357. [14] Crescenzi, A., Ketzre, E., Van Ommeren. M., Phuntsok, K., Komproe, I., & de Jong, J. T. V. M. (2002). Effect of political imprisonment and trauma history on recent Tibetan refugees in India. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15, 369-387. [15] Lie, B. (2002). A 3-year follow-up of psychosocial functioning and general symptoms in settled refugees, Acta Psychiatria Scandinavia, 106, 415-425. [16] Silove, D., Steel, Z., McGorry, P., Miles, V., & Drobny, J. (2002). The impact of torture on PostTraumatic Stress Symptoms in war-affected Tamil refugees and immigrants. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 43, 49-55. [17] Itzhaky, H., Levy, D. (2002). Contributions of Self-Esteem and Gender to the Adaptation of Immigrant Youth from Ethiopia. Journal of Social Work Research and Evaluation, 3(1), 33-46.

58

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

[18]Youngman, R., Minuchin-Itzigsohn, S., & Barasch, M. (1999). Manifestation of emotional distress among Ethiopian immigrants in Israel: Patients and clinical perspectives. Trans cultural Psychiatry, 36, 45-63. [19] Zera, M. (2000). SRQ-E: A culturally sensitive psychiatric screening instrument for Ethiopian immigrants in Israel. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Bar Ilan University, Israel. [20] Lerner, Y., Mirsky, J., & Barasch M. (1994). New beginnings in an old land: The mental health challenge in Israel. In A. J. Marsella., T. Bomemann., S. Ekblad & J. (Eds.), Amidst Peril and Pain: the Mental Health and Well-Being of the World's Refugees (pp.153-189). Washington DC: American Psychological Association. [21] Nahmias, J., Greenberg, Z., Berger, S. A., Hornstein, L., Bilgury, B., Abel, B., & Kutner, S. (1993). Health profile of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel: An overview. Israel Journal of Medical Science, 29, 338-343. [22]Youngman, R. (1994) Coping processes of Jewish Ethiopian students in Israel. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. [23] Mollica, R.F., Caspi-Yavin, Y., Bollini, P., Troung, T., Tor, S., & Lavelle,J. (1992). The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire: Validating a cross-cultural instrument for measuring torture, trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder in Indochinese refugees. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 180, 111-116. [24] Hollifield, M., Warner, T. D., Lian, N., Krakow, B., Jenkins, J. H., Kesler, J., Stevnson, J., & Westermeyer, J. (2002). Measuring trauma and health status in refugees. The Journal of the American Medical Association, 288, 611-621. [25] Van-Velsen, C., Gorst-Unsworth, C., & Turner, S. (1996). Survivors of torture and organized violence: Demography and diagnosis. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9, 181-193. [26] Steel, Z., & Silove, D. (2000). The psychosocial cost of seeking and granting asylum. In A. S. Shalev, R. Yehuda & A. C. McFarlane (Eds.), International book of human response to trauma (pp.421-438). New York: Academic/Plenum [27] Kinzie, J. D., Boehnlein, J. K., Leung, P. K., Moore, L. J., Riley, C., & Smith, D. (1990). The prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder and its clinical significance among Southeast Asian refugees. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 913-917. [28] Mollica, R. F., McInnes, K., Pham, T., Smith Fawzi, M. C., Murphy, E., & Lin, L. (1998a). The doseeffect relationships between torture and psychiatric symptoms in Vietnamese ex-political detainees and a comparison group. Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease, 186, 543-553. [29] American Psychiatric Association. (1987). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed. revised). Washington DC: Author. [30] American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed). Washington DC: Author. [31] Bleich, A.; Gelkopf, M. & Z. Solomon (2003). Exposure to Terrorism, Stress-Related Mental Health Symptoms, and Coping Behaviors among a Nationally Representative Sample in Israel. The Journal of the American Medical Association 290: 612-620. [32] Cwikel J.G., Goldsmith J.R., Kordysh E., Quastel M. & Abdelgani A. (1997). Blood Pressure among Immigrants to Israel from areas affected by the Chernobyl Disaster. Public Health Reviews 25(3-4): 317-335. [33] de Jong, J. T. V. M., Komproe, I. H., Van Ommeren, M., El Masri, M., Araya, M., Khaled, N., van de Put, W., & Somasundaram, D. (2001). Lifetime events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in 4 post conflict settings. Journal of the American Medical Association, 286, 555-562. [34] Norris, F. H., Perilla, J. L., & Murphy, A. D. (2001). Postdisaster stress in the United States and Mexico: A cross-cultural test of the multi criterion conceptual model of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110, 553-563. [35]Marsella, A., Friedman, M., & Spain, H. (1993). Ethnocultural aspects of PTSD: An overview of issues, research and directions. In J. Oldham, A. Tasman & M. Riba (Eds.), Review of Psychiatry (pp. 157181). Washington DC: American Psychiatry Press. [36] McCall, G., J., & Resick, P., A. (2004). A Pilot Study of PTSD Symptoms Among Kalahari Bushmen. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 165, 445-450. [37] Pole, N., Best, S. R., Metzler, T., & Marmar, C., R. (2005). Why are Hispanics at Greater risk for PTSD? Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 11, 144-161. [38] Mollica, R. F., McInnes, K., Poole C. & Tor, S. (1998b). Dose-effect Relationships of trauma to symptoms of depression and post-traumatic stress disorder among Cambodian survivors of mass violence. British Journal of Psychiatry, 173, 482-488. [39] Solomon, Z., Mikulincer, M., Flum, H. (1998). Negative life events, coping responses, and combatrelated psychopathology: a prospective study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 973, 302-307

M. Finklestein and Z. Solomon / The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel

59

[40] Yehuda, R., Kahana, B., Schmeidler, J., Southwick, S. M., Wilson, S., & Giller, E. L. (1995). Impact of cumulative trauma and recent stress on current post traumatic stress disorder symptoms in holocaust survivors. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152, 1815-1818. [41] Raphael, B. & Martinek, W. (1997). Assessing traumatic bereavement and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. In J.P. Wilson & T.M. Keane (Eds.), Assessing Psychological Trauma and PTSD (pp. 373395). New York: The Guilford Press [42]Middleton, M., Raphael, F.B., Burnett, P.F., Martinek, N. (1997). Psychological distress and bereavement. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 185, 447-453. [43] Freud, S. (1920). Beyond the pleasure principle. Standard Edition, 19, (pp. 3-66). London: Hogarth Press. [44] Lindeman, E. (1944). Symptomatology and Management of Grief. American Journal of Psychotherapy 151: 155-160. [45]Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss. Loss, sadness and depression. New York: Basic Books. [46] Faschingbaur, T.R., Zisook, S. and DeVaul, R. (1987). In S. Zisook, (Ed.), Biopsychological aspects of Bereavement(pp.11-124). Washington DC:American Psychiatric Press. [47]Shuchter, S.R. & Zisook, S. (1993). The course of normal grief. In M.S. Stroebe, W. Stroebe, & R.O. Hansson (Eds.). Handbook of bereavement, (pp.23-43). New York: Cambridge University Press. [48]Wilson, J.P. & Raphael, B. (Eds.) (1993).International handbook of traumatic stress syndromes. New York: Plenum Press. [49] Minuchin-Itzighson S. & Hanegbi, R. (1989). “Loss and Mourning in the Jewish Community: an Anthropological Psychological Approach”. In (Ed.) Chigier, E. Grief and Bereavement in Contemporary Society. London: Freund, Vol 3, pp.61-69. [50]Rubin, S., Malkinson, R. & Witztum, E. (2000). Loss, Bereavement and Trauma: An overview. In (Eds.)Malkinson, R., Rubin, S., & Witztum, E. Traumatic and Non Traumatic Loss and Bereavement. Connecticut. Psychosocial universities Press, pp.5-40 [51] Prigerson, H.G., Rosenneck, R.A. and P.K. Maciejewski (1999) Criteria for Traumatic Grief and PTSD. Br J Psychiatry 174 : 560–561. [52] Pynoos, R.S.; Nader, K.; Fredrick, C.; Gonda, L. and M. Stuber (1987). Grief Reactions in School Age Children following a Snipe Attack at School. The Israel Journal of Psychiatry and Related Sciences.24(1-2): 53-63. [53] Lifton, R.J. (1991). Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima. USA: University of North Carolina Press. [54]Eisenbruch, M. (1990). The cultural bereavement interview: a new clinical research approach for refugees. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 13, 715-735. [55] Momartin, S., Silove, D., Manicavasagar, V. & Z. Steel (2004). Complicated Grief in Bosnian Refugees: Associations with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression. Comprehensive Psychiatry 45(6): 475-482. [56] Ginzburg, K.; Geron, Y. and Z. Solomon (2002). Patterns of Complicated Grief among Bereaved Parents. The Journal of Death and Dying 45(2): 119-132. [57]Rubin, S., Malkinson, R. & Witztum, E. (2003). Trauma and bereavement: Conceptual and clinical issues revolving around relationships. Death Studies, 27. 1-23. [58] Malkinson, R., Rubin, S., & Witztum, E. (2006). Thereapeutic issues and the relationship to the deceased: Working clinically with the Two-Track Model of Bereavement. Death Studies, 30 (9), 797815 [59]Prigerson, H. G., Bierhals, A.J., Kasel, S. V., Reynolds, C.F., Shear, M.K.,Day, N., Beery, L.C., Newsome, J.T. & Jacobs, S. (1997). Traumatic Grief as a risk factor and physical morbidity. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154, 616-623. [60]Melhem, N. M., Day, N., Shear, K., Day, R., Reynolds, C.F., K., & Brent, D. (2004). Traumatic grief among adolescents exposed to a peers suicide. American Journal of Psychiatry., 161, 1411-1416. [61]Prigerson, H. G., Frank, E., Kasel, S. V., Reynolds, C.F., Anderson, B., Zubenko, G.S., Houck, P. R., George, , C. & Kupfer, D., J. (1995). Complicated Grief and bereavement-related depression as a distinct disorders: Preliminary empirical validation in elderly bereaved spouses. American Journal of Psychiatry, 152: 22-30 [62]Horowitz, M. J., Siegel, B., Holen, A., Bonano, G.A., Milbarth, C. & Stinton, C. H. (1997). Diagnostic criteria for complicated grief disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154, 904-910. [63] Lister, E . (1998). Comments on diagnosis including symptoms of turbulent grief. American Journal of Psychiatry, 155, 1305-1306.

This page intentionally left blank

Part 2 Immigration as a Risk Factor vs. a Potential of Post Traumatic Growth

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-63

63

Chapter 5 Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants Rateb Amro Horizon Strategic Studies, Amman, Jordan Abstract. The Middle East is a crossroad for three continents and is one of 'hottest' zones in the world. Since the early years of the last century, after more than eighty years of conflict and three main wars, the Arabs and the Jews have endured bitter trials and tribulations. As a result of the military conflicts, around one million Palestinians were forced to leave their homes, properties and country, and seek refuge elsewhere. The current article focuses on the situation of the Palestinian community in Jordan- which has taken Jordanian citizenship at the early fiftiesfrom political and economic points of view while discussing security issues. However, since the state as refugees experienced by Palestinians since 1948, and in addition the continual Israeli occupation since 1967, the issue of the refugees did not come to an end . The importance of the Refugee Question is emphasized as one of the major elements of stability in the Middle East. It is argued, that without settling this issue-which cannot be suppressed neither by force nor by neglect- the Middle East would continue to be unstable.

Introduction Historically, the Middle East is a crossroad for three continents, and is one of 'hottest' (metaphorically, the political/security situation) zones in the world. This region has become more vital for the interest of world’s groups and powers, while exogenous factors often affect the area. Wars and instability in the region have taken their toll on its resources as well as on the smooth continuity of the efforts for its development. Since the early years of the last century, and after more than eighty years of conflict and three main wars, the two peoples, Arabs and Jews, have endured bitter trials and tribulations during the journey of history. The Middle East peace process is now almost thirteen years old. Its first tentative steps began along the path to peace, taken at Madrid in October 1991. At that time, peace was a barely imaginable goal, lying far in the distance, clouding those initial efforts. There was no sense of trust or partnership between the parties, as the burden of the painful history weighed heavily on all. In 1992 Israelis and Palestinians began secret negotiations outside the framework of the Madrid conference negotiations being held in Washington DC, which were

64

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

leading nowhere. The Israeli government had earlier refused to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but they found that no progress could be made in Washington, and so it was decided to pursue a separate channel in secret, under the sponsorship of Norwegian mediators. The Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) was the result of these negotiations, paving the way for the Middle East Peace process. In this document, both sides recognized the rights of the other to exist as a people within the borders of Palestine/Israel, and committed themselves to negotiating a permanent settlement and to improving relations between the two peoples. The agreement provides a framework for a solution, rather than a solution. It made possible a peace treaty with Jordan. Now that the Treaty of peace between Jordan and Israel has been concluded, with all the good will that is manifesting itself in the work to produce more than 30 protocols and agreements by July 99 (with the common Agenda, the Oslo DOP, the Washington Declaration, the Cairo and Paris Agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the Wye Treaty, the Sharm El-Sheikh Treaty, and finally the Oslo summit) , touching on the question of refugees, Jerusalem, water, borders and settlements, the question is asked – is the Middle East on the threshold of a new era? Is the Middle East still the same or is a new Middle East being formulated? From a purely bilateral angel, so far, the Jordanian - Israeli perspective is bright and promising. The reality of the 'present' becomes less bright and more complex on the thorny issue of the Palestinian Refugees of 1948 and Displaced Persons (D.Ps) of 1967.

Rise of the Palestinian Refugees Problem In the briefest historical detail, the demographic structure of Palestine since the beginning of the last century has changed dramatically. As a result of the military conflicts that took place. Around one million Palestinians were forced to leave their homes, properties and country, and seek refuge elsewhere. Most of those refugees were small landowners, traders, farm workers and laborers. The main bulk arrived at neighboring Arab countries, mainly Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and thousands of others were dispersed all over the World. However, a good portion of the refugees moved to the West Bank and Gaza strip. It is our viewpoint that upon the refusal of Israel to implement UN Res. 194 for 1948 item II, which called for the Return of the Refugees and compensation of those who cannot return, the prospects for a quick settlement to the refugee problem soon diminished, and the plight of the refugees grew worse. According to the UN definition, a Palestinian refugee is: “A person whose residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948, and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and means of livelihood” (UN General Assembly, Official Records, Ninth session supplement No17A, Doc)

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

65

Present state of Refugees Since the state as refugees experienced by Palestinians since 1948, and in addition the continual Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967, the issue of the refugees did not come to an end [1]. It is regrettable that after sixty years of commendable efforts by the Palestinians, host countries, Donor Countries and UNRWA, the living conditions of the Refugees and particularly those in the camps have not radically improved. Furthermore, as Palestinian perceive events, the disruptions caused by wars, as well as restrictions imposed by Israel in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, have added to the Refugees’ difficulties, and caused frustration as their efforts to improve their own conditions did not yield change. Approximately one-third of the registered refugees live in camps at neighboring Arab countries, which are partially served by UNRWA, and host countries as well, at different levels of service. It should be noted that the housing in the camps are no longer made up of tents and makeshift huts.

The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan

Political Considerations It is only appropriate within this context, that I limit myself to the Palestinian community in Jordan (but not Refugee, nor Displaced Person), a community that has taken Jordanian citizenship at the early fifties. Nevertheless the Palestinian community in Jordan, was given, and is still given the right of choice in restoring their Palestinian citizenship, whenever new realities on the ground could be created within the context of implementing peace agreements between host countries and Israel. It is only proper, too, that I limit my remarks to one host country, which is my country: The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Palestinian community in Jordan is approximately less than half of the population of the country [1.2.3]. At the same time, it is a typically Jordanian community, but nevertheless, it is also typically Palestinian community. The aspiration towards a Palestinian home on the soil of Palestine is there; the dream of return is there. However, they do not manifest these feelings, in any manner against them being Jordanians, as they are part of the political situation in Jordan [1,4]. Some of them have taken positions like prime ministers, ministers, senators, parliament members, officers, etc. Jordan hosts in 13 camps the largest number of Palestinian refugees outside Palestinian territories [1,2] who fled their homes in 1948, and after 1967 war from the West Bank. In these camps many of the residents are originally refugees from 1948. UNRWA registered about 2 million Palestinian refugees living in Jordan, in 2005, out of a population of approximately 6 million Jordanians. The high number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin whose relatives live and suffer in the Palestinian territories makes

66

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

Jordan particularly affected by the daily events and tragedies that occur in these territories [2,3]. With two-thirds of the Palestinian people still living as refugees, Palestinian nationalism remains, at its roots, a Diaspora movement born and bred in refugee camps and is animated by the desire to recover lost homes and belongings [5], from the Arab point of view. The sense of injustice at being evicted from their land pervades Palestinians' national consciousness and has defined their struggle even more than the desire to establish an independent state. The Palestinian refugee's community in Jordan has maintained its integrity and dignity due to the special management by the late King Abdullah the first, of the first Palestinian exodus to Jordan [1,2,6], according to the Palestinian point of view [2]. His management became subject to worldwide appreciation. This humane and practical management, which included the granting of full citizen rights and duties enhanced, rather than weakened, the Palestinian aspiration for return. It is my strong belief that when almost half the population of Jordan is restless because of expectations of a solution for their final identity and status, then real stability in Jordan, socially, economically and politically will always be compromised. These people are entitled, through hard work of all the parties, to choose for good, and within the context of phased and final settlement, the identity and citizenship they like to maintain, and choose to reside either in Jordan or in the Palestinian Entity (hopefully future state) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Whenever possible and mutually agreed in their original homes, in the Palestinian point of view. In addition, these people are entitled to choose other alternatives like acquiring host country citizenship or residing in a third country [7]. If I may make an analogy, I would think of the Jewish community of New York or California who are at one and the same time U.S. and Israeli citizens. The Jewish community, however, in the U.S. or any other country, can always choose to live in Israel and enjoy their Israeli citizenship in application of Israeli Law of Return of 1950. This option has proved only to be theoretical especially for the Jewish community of the U.S. whose 'return' to Israel is viewed by the Arab world as almost non-existent. The spiritual and emotional value of belonging to a home is, nevertheless, great and cherished by both Israeli and U.S. citizens as well as by the Palestinian community in Jordan. The historic, social and political relationship that has strongly bound Palestinians and Jordanians, places the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the top of Jordan's political priorities as one of its most critical national interests. The problem of refugees was shared by every Jordanian; the 1988 decision to serve administrative and legal ties with the west bank, did not mean a severance of links within the one Jordanian people, nor did that decision mean that Jordan would give up its support for the prime Arab cause that is Palestine. This situation underlines the urgency and absolute necessity for the Kingdom to be fully and aggressively engaged in the pursuit of a peaceful settlement to the Palestinian problem as it had throughout for more than six decades since its independence. The refugee problem, a vital Jordanian concern and interest, is considered as one of the country's most important issues in the final status negotiations. Jordan hosts 41% of Palestinian Refugees and 90% of Displaced Persons (D.Ps). However, Jordan's legal standing interests and legitimate concerns should not be ignored. Jordan cannot be expected to consent to unacceptable solutions on Refugees and D.Ps, or to enforce such solutions on its citizenship, and must therefore have a central role in the political and

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

67

economic settlement of this problem, which should recognize the right of refugees and D.Ps in Jordan to return, and be adequately compensated. Security Considerations The important dimension of a special value in handling the question of the Palestinian community in Jordan is that of security. Both Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan believe that the stability of each country in the region, particularly that of Israel, and its bordering countries, including what may be in the coming future, a Palestinian State, is an integral component of the peace we hope to achieve. A peace that is conductive to normal and warm relations. Such a peace must at least provide security for Israelis and Palestinians alike. Only then will extremists on both sides be deprived of the support that keeps violence alive. From the Palestinian point of view, it is no exaggeration to say that millions of lives are at stake, yet while our attention is being focused in one direction, the real trust buster may lie somewhere else. For half the 20th century and now into a new era, the Arab – Israeli conflict brought instability and danger to the region and have worldwide implications, it has a devastating effect across the pages of history, what is left is record of failure, moral and political. I believe it is time to open a new page and write a new future. Violence creates violence. Hatred leads to more hatred. This evil spiral has to broken by brave people like you. There are people, on either side of the conflict who has the courage to overcome the evil pattern that has characterized the area for so long, in order to make a new beginning, where confidence to compromise is given the seat of honor. You may understand, more than others, that this region is indivisible. Events in this region have a profound impact on nations near and far, in goodwill, shared responsibility and mutual respect. The difficulty is that the quest for Palestinian independence, may lead to Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian and Arab interdependence, which is a quest for freedom, justice, equality, democracy, ecological sanity and economic development. But this quest at the present time is very much interdependent with the first steps of achieving security for Israelis as well as for Palestinians. I keep remembering that between the time that de Klerk and Mandela signed the agreement in South Africa and the time they were ready for elections, some of the bloodiest events happened there. But the two parties had vision, the courage and patience to continue together and through this they were able to make the miracle that we can see today. I think that a miracle is possible here, and I think all our dreams are achievable if we work together and take a little bit of the price that is required to make the long-term visions come through and get difficulties that the short term is providing. Economic Considerations This brings me to a second regional challenge - the challenge of development. Experience indicates that economic development can lead to security and prosperity [3,4]. Reports show that per capita income has actually shrunk in the Palestinian refugee camps during the last 20 years. One of every five Palestinian Refugees lives on less than $2 a day, and in the labor force, one of seven is unemployed. The youth, who are more than sixty percent of the population, can be especially influenced and affected

68

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

by this reality. When young people lose hope they can turn to apathy or violence. Therefore, it is most important to solve this problem. Nevertheless so many of those Refugees succeeded to be an effective part of the economic situation, and play a major role in developing Jordan. The sons and daughters of Palestinian Refugees in the country received good education [4,8] and were employed in the rich Gulf States; their transfers of money payments created capital and became an integral post of the country’s economic activity. We look at ourselves in the wish to create our own future, but our friends around the globe can also make a vital contribution. When the international community supports those of who are engaged in reform and development, it will help to create a climate of justice and hope the necessary environment for security in the region and the world.

Jordanian Vision Given that the Middle East is a volatile region, Jordan attaches high importance to a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli-conflict. Meanwhile, the dangers of the escalation of violence in Palestinian territories are not limited to Jordanian-Israeli bilateral relations, but also extend to Jordan's domestic and national interests. The continuation of the current situation will have dangerous regional implications that will undermine previous accomplishments. Jordanian-Israeli relations are stable, but their further development is linked to progress on other tracks. For Jordan, the achievement of comprehensive peace is a matter of national security. For us in Jordan, the crisis in Palestine is very near; from part of Jordan at night, you can see the light of Jerusalem. Every day people of Jordan know the suffering that is going on there, and we experience the destructive regional impact of the conflict [9]. Jordan has been a leader in the search for peace. For decades, we have taken the risks that peace requires and we are committed to help in achieving a real resolution. We have a genuine interest in advancing the peace process, especially on the Palestinian-Israeli track. Jordan views the lack of peace as an external and an internal threat. Successive immigration waves have altered the demographic balance in Jordan, Nevertheless it was successful, and played a major role in building Jordan economy. Hence, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is in Jordan’s strategic interests. Final status issues and others have far reaching implications for Jordanian security. We believe that peace is not just the responsibility of a government, it is the responsibility of all of us, and we all have to contribute the best we can to a peaceful solution. In this case the solution is not as abstract concept, but a durable peace that the governments, the Israeli and the Palestinians will have to accept, and the governments of the other Arab countries should also endorse and contribute to the process. The relations between Jordan and Israel since 1994 are in a stalemate. We who believe in peace, must now succeed, not only for the sake of those who are suffering from this relentless cycle of pain and violence, but for the sake of the world that we live in, a world that is indivisible, a world that must achieve peace and justice if it is to be open and free. Clearly, a lasting peace in the Arab – Israeli conflict is a core requirement, and we must go further, we must offer real hope to the young minds of

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

69

today. To accomplish this, we must trust and devote ourselves individually and collectively, to build a better future for the coming generations. In our view, no other conflict has cast such long shadows on our globe, or has been used to cause such division, or has promoted such bitterness. The time has come to put a stop to the long and hateful cycle of violence. The 21st century has opened billions of minds to the possibilities of a better life freedom, prosperity and hope. We, the people of the middle east, partake of a special heritage: from our soil, the Levant faith in One God, the united believe of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, took roots and spread across the world. A new reality that will be taking roots in the Middle East today can also impact the world. If we succeed and success will require efforts from all of us, this may be a century in which billions of people will have an access to the world’s promise. Let us resolve, once and for all and reject the claims of terror. We must not allow opportunists to provoke a clash between civilizations. Above all, we must firmly reject their false claim, that humanity can be slaughtered in the name of the one God, the Merciful and the Compassionate. Our vision is that of a long lasting peace in this area, a comprehensive peace that includes Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and all Arab countries around us; a peace that creates regional institutions, to uphold its security requirements, as well as its political requirements, and allows an economic region to grow, and to prosper. After 60 years it should be clear to both the Israelis and the international community, that absorption of the Palestinians outside Palestine, in particular those who are registered refugees and D.Ps. is a “non - option“. Just as the Israelis see themselves as separate unique people who can only live in Israel, the Palestinians see themselves as distinct people whose identity is so inherently connected to Palestine. In the Palestinian views, Palestine is the only place they are willing to settle permanently. It has to be re-emphasized that the Refugee Question is one of the major five elements of stability in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, it is the most critical and vital one at all. Without settling this issue-which cannot be suppressed neither by force nor by neglect- the Middle East would continue to be unstable. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a complex one. It has historical, cultural, national, geographic, demographic, humanitarian legal, regional and political elements. This explains why the Palestinian Question affects the whole Middle East, where the Refugee issue is one of its major constituents.

References [1] Lapidot, R. (2002). The Aspects of the Palestinian Refugee Question. Jerusalem Letter 485. Retrieved October 5 from http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp485.htm [2] Chatelard, G. (2004). Jordan: A Refugee Haven. Migration Information Source, Retrieved October 5, 2007 from http://migrationinformation.com/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=236 [3] Chatty, D.; Crivello, G. and G. L. Hundt (2005). Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of Studying Refugee Children in the Middle East and north Africa: Young Palestinian, Afghan and Sahrawi Refugees. Journal of Refugee Studies 18(4): 387-409. [4] Zehr, M. A. (2005, May 25). Schools Serve Generations of Palestinian Refugees. Education Week, vol. 24, page 8. [5] Knudsen, A. (2005). Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. Journal of Refugee Studies (18): 216-234. [6] Journal of Palestine Studies 33(1)

70

R. Amro / Palestinian Refugees in Jordan as a Successful Example of Immigrants

[7] Cainkar, L.; Abunimah, A. and L. Raei (2004). Migration as a Method of Coping with Turbulence among Palestinians. Journal Of Comparative Family Studies 35(2): p. 229. [8] Khawaja, M. (2004). The Extraordinary Decline of Infant and Childhood Mortalilty among Palestinian Refugees. Social Science & Medicine 58(3): p. 463 [9] Smilansky, G. (2007). Palestinian Refugee Camps: Graveyards of Peace. Yale Israel Journal 7. Retrieved October 5, 2007, from http://www.yaleisraeljournal.com/summ2005/smilansky.php

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-71

71

Chapter 6 Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West Katarzyna Gmaj The Center for International Relations, Poland1

Abstract. In this article some important issues faced by Poland as a country hosting asylum seekers are pointed out. It also describes factors influencing process of asylum seekers’ integration to the hosting society. Peculiarity of the Polish situation is constituted by the nationality of asylum seekers. Since 2000 Russian citizens of Chechen origins have dominated the flow and they constitute approximately 90% of applicants for refugee status. Almost none of them is left without any form of international protection - majority is granted tolerated stay. For majority of Chechens Poland is the first safe country on their route to Western Europe. Therefore they apply for refugee status here but they treat it only as a transfer country. Keywords. Asylum seekers, Chechens, tolerated stay.

Introduction In this article I would like to point out some important issues faced by Poland as a country hosting asylum seekers. I will also describe factors influencing process of integration to the Polish hosting society. Integration as a bilateral process decreases ethnic tensions - receiving community and immigrants are less prone to give in to extremist influences. Though, it is crucial for stable solution to the difficult economic, social and psychological situation experienced by those under international protection. Integration means adopting receiving society values and norms and maintaining the ethnic ones. Immigrants become an integral part of a larger societal framework simultaneously keeping the sense of belonging to an ethnic group. Integration refers to growing institutional participation and is not a one-dimensional process. It involves both immigrants and hosting society members[1]. Peculiarity of the Polish situation is constituted by the nationality of asylum seekers. Since 2000 (beginning of the war in Chechnya) Russian citizens of Chechen origins have dominated the flow. They constitute approximately 90% of applicants for refugee status[2]. Almost none of them is left without any form of international protection -majority is granted tolerated stay. 1

The article is written thanks to the cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States within the project “Transatlantic Security Challenges and Dilemmas for the European Migration Policy”

72

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

Due to tensions in Reception Camps, Chechens are separated from other nationals applying for international protections. Males are exposed to stress since they are supposed (cultural expectation) to maintain numerous families. Victims of tortures or rapes and those who have spent a long time in hostile environment, often do not (cannot) rely on psychological aid. Expectation of economic success is a factor leading to integration. In Polish case refugees and those with tolerated status miss that incentive. Asylum Seekers of Chechen Origin in Poland As it was already mentioned in the summary, peculiarity of the Polish situation is born of the fact that the nationality of asylum seekers - since 2000 – after the beginning of the second war in Chechnya Russian citizens of Chechen origin have dominated the flow. They constitute approximately 90 % of applicants for refugee status. 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Source: Office for Repatriation and Foreigners data, 2005 Figure 1. Number of refugee applications in the years 1994-2003 In 2004 8 100 persons applied for refugee status. In 2005, 6 860 persons applied for refugee status, the majority (6 244) was constituted by Russian citizens of Chechen origin. 335 persons were granted a refugee status and 1 822 a tolerated stay which is a complementary form of protection. This form of protection puts them in some kind of a ”vacuum”. In 2006 there were 7,088 persons applying. As a result vast majority of foreigners granted with refugee status or tolerated stay in Poland in 1991-2006 are Russian citizens of Chechen origin. Majority of them is granted tolerated stay. According to Amnesty International (Report on Human Rights, 2006), Polish authorities do not comply with international regulations – the Geneva Convention, 1951. Rejecting applications for refugee status and granting tolerated stay status instead, they place these, who gain this form of international protection in a disfavored position in comparison with these, who are granted with refugee status.

73

Citizenship

% in total

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

Number of persons 2006

Foreigners Total:

2048

100,0

the most numerous citizenships 2015

98,4

Iraqi

9

0,4

Belarus

5

0,2

Sri Lanka

4

0,2

Afghanistan

3

Russia

Total :

2036

0,1 99,4

Source: Office for Repatriation and Foreigners data, 2006 Table 1. Number of persons whose applications for refugee status were rejected and instead they were granted with tolerated stay Tolerated Stay and its Consequences for Chechen Asylum Seekers On the basis of tolerated status its holders gain access to Polish Social Assistance on the same basis as Polish citizens do. They receive the same benefits as Poles do. They obtain: right to work without a work permit, access to social aid and family benefits, right to state (free of charge) education on primary and secondary level. However, persons with the tolerated stay do not receive Geneva travel document and do not participate in the Individual Integration Program (IIP) that is offered to refugees only. IIP is implemented on the local level (county). It is elaborated individually by each recipient with the assistance of a social worker from the family assistance center. Unfortunately, even those who are refugees and who participate in these programs do not really succeed. These programs are not effective – very few refugees are genuinely adapted into Polish reality. It is extremely difficult to contact a successful IIP with a program staff member. In Warsaw for example, there are only two social workers assisting about 100 refugees. In 2005 each third IIPs (56 of 196) was interrupted since refugees decided to leave Poland looking for better opportunities in wealthier Western European countries. Also vast majority of Chechen refugees who benefited from the individual integration program left Poland due to problems with finding employment and housing. Many Chechens with tolerated stay decide to reopen the refugee status procedure to gain access to reception facilities and basic assistance. They prolong their stay in refugee centers, where they try to organize their social life. Although not all of them represent the same level of religiosity. Some of them express their need to participate in religious activities. For that purposes refugee centers are facilitated with rooms, where they can pray. They also organize lessons of Arabic language and religion (Islamic) for boys. Children participate in traditional dance lessons. A social worker in one of the

74

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

refugee centers in Warsaw gave an example of encouraging Chechen inhabitants to participate providing security in the Center. Referring to traditional structure they created a council of elders, which helps to solve problems arising in a Chechen community and evolves in creating social life in the Center. There are also cases that families, without hope for receiving the refugee status and expected subsequent stabilization decide to return to these parts of Chechnya, which are less destroyed by the war or to other parts of Russia, where they have at least a chance for some kind of stabilization and starting self–reliant life. In Poland they do not see favorable environment for starting new life. They are entitled to cash allowances but they lack language skills, they also miss specialized social support. It is hardly possible for them to find employment allowing maintaining family of 5-6 members. It must be stressed that population of asylum seekers in Poland is very young – about half of it constitute individuals under 18, each fifth asylum seeker is under 4 years of age.2 A family with five or six children is not an exception. Sometimes a man has an obligation to look after not just his wife and children but also widowed female relatives and their children. Observations prove that men often decide to work in a shadow economy. Tolerated status requires renewal of residence permit every 12 months, which is a discouraging factor for employers. Furthermore, many Chechens lack employment experience in western, peaceful environment, since they used to earn means for family maintenance in USSR and during the war time. Moreover, their skills and experiences do not help them to adapt to Polish labor market, which is not favorable even for Polish employees. Women’s’ participation in labor market constitutes a distinct problematic question. In the reality of contemporary Poland both spouses work in order to provide means for their household. In Chechens’ case, encouraging female participation in labor market encounters not only cultural but also very practical barriers – it is impossible to run a family life with an absence of working mother. As a consequence Chechen families are forced to live in poverty and poverty is a crucial factor for social exclusion not only for immigrants but also for hosting society. In practical terms, as it was described above, gaining tolerated status results in leaving the refugee center and starting self-dependent life in not a favorable environment. Another disadvantageous and burdensome consequence of this status is that one is entitled to apply for the settlement permit after 10 (instead of 5) years. This temporary state is not an incentive for integration. On the other hand it causes stress and uncertainty which may also result in serious health problems. It is observed that majority of asylum seekers are not motivated to learn Polish language. Social workers from refugee centers point out that those, who treat Poland as a transit country are not motivated since they know that in a short time they will start their live outside of Poland. They complain about the poor quality of support for asylum seekers in Poland in comparison to other EU countries. They openly express eagerness to join their relatives and friends in other states. However there are Chechens who want to settle in Poland. For them communicative knowledge of Polish, not to mention fluency, a very difficult aim to achieve, due to embarrassment they feel in the classroom. They also have problems memorizing , which can be justified by traumatic war experiences and psychological damages following these experiences.

2 Office for Repatriation and Foreigners data, 2005. Population of recognized refugees is also young: each forth refugee is under 4 years and more than half is under 18.

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

75

Educational Challenges Experience shows that many schools do not have any long-term strategy concerning immigrants’ children presence in their classes. In Poland access to education is based on territorial division - registration as an inhabitant of the local community. As a consequence some schools were “over flooded” by residents’ of refugee centers’ children. For teachers it meant an incredible pedagogical effort, for which they were usually not prepared. For Chechen children it meant creating ethnic enclaves inside schools and for Polish pupils far less teachers’ attention. There were even cases that Polish parents decided to transfer their children to other schools since they were concerned with deteriorating level of education provided to their children. As a response to these worrying effects refugees’ children started to be directed to schools, which were not assigned to the area of the refugee center but still not too far away from the center. Westward orientation of Chechen asylum seekers and of those under international protection in Poland results in lack of parents’ interest in children’s education. In order to prevent this situation, families were encouraged by cash equivalents paid only to those parents whose children attended school. As a result, school year 2005/2006 was very successful – more than half of refugees’ children attended Polish schools. However, this tool was not effective in terms of increasing parents’ and children’s motivation to learn. A social worker inquired in one of Warsaw refugee centers and estimated that only one of five families staying in the center is seriously involved in their children educational progress. In other center, also in Warsaw, a social worker emphasized that only half of the children registered in schools in the school year 2006/2007 were promoted to the next class, mainly due to too many absences. The temporary status of stay is not the only factor affecting motivation for education. Cultural conditioning is crucial. In Chechen family the role of husband and father is very strong. Consequently, children progressing in schools and women integrating faster than men undermine male position in the family structure. That can even lead to inner family conflict, especially, when the man is not successful in providing family maintenance. In that sense, children are not motivated but hampered by their parents. Another discouraging factor is the young age of couples starting their own family. Paradoxically, girls are in more privileged situation than boys. Those last are supposed to achieve vocational training and start earning money. Girls are more often allowed to continue learning in secondary schools, unless they have younger siblings and need to support their mothers in housekeeping and looking after children. Polish education system is based on cooperation with parents. In case of Chechens this cooperation is not an easy task to achieve and, as it was demonstrated above, language is not the biggest obstacle. School headmasters and social workers elaborate channels for communication, most often involving Russian language teachers. Polish schools are not prepared in advance to deal with foreigners, especially refugees’ children. Although, in general, there are no obstacles in providing education to refugees’ and asylum seekers’ children. It seems that the issue of immigrants’ children presence in mainstream schools is still considered as a future challenge. The legal framework for providing free of charge education to refugees’, asylum seekers’ and immigrants’ children, in general, on the basic school and gymnasia (lower secondary school) level is satisfying. However, the main obstacle is financing. Polish system of education permanently lacks money and faces serious problems on a national level such as permanent reform of educational system and its consequences on one hand and

76

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

violence among pupils, drugs on the other. Therefore a very limited in numbers immigrants’ presence in mainstream schools is still considered as a future challenge. Chechen children often start their attendance at school unexpectedly during ongoing school year. That results in another significant consequence – neither Polish pupils (and their parents) nor the teachers and headmasters are prepared in advance to deal with immigrants’ children, who often have very particular needs.3 Unfortunately, sometimes it leads to unnecessary misunderstandings and conflicts. Furthermore, as a result of their previous experiences, those children very often have gaps in education. They do not speak Polish, their culture and behavior differ from Polish colleagues’ lifestyle. That can result in unintentional exclusion of Chechen children. The aim of the article is to tackle problematical issues. However it should be emphasized that it is also possible to find positive examples of educational progress done by Chechen pupils. They pass final exams in lower secondary school and attend secondary school. Among Chechen refugees there are also university students. Security Issue Regarding security issue, according to the official statements of the Office for Repatriation and Aliens4 persons under international protection are not any threat for state security and public order. Crimes are committed inside ethnic/national communities and their not more intense or different in character in comparison to the Polish society. There are also no signs of conflicts or tension among residents of refugee centers and Polish local communities. There was however one disgraceful Police antiterrorist action undertaken in refugee center in Lublin in December 2005. Responding to information about explosive materials kept in this center armed and masked Policemen enter the building in early morning. They arrested three males, who were released due to lack of evidence and threaten children and pregnant women. One of them was in danger of miscarriage. Final Remarks on Chechens Presence in Poland and on Future Challenges Permanent employment and reasonable salaries or economic prosperity are important factors leading not only to immigrants’ but also hosting society members’ full participation in the society. Poland is not perceived as a destination country by majority of asylum seekers because they face the same problems as Polish citizens: • lack of social housing5 • scarce financial resources for social benefits • difficulties accessing specialized medical service • low salaries in comparison to costs of maintenance These are some factors which discourage from undertaking integration effort. Especially, for those who suffer from health and psychological disorders caused by 3 It is mentioned in interviews with representatives of teachers’ trade unions, Mazovian School-Board and NGO, and social workers in refugee centers. 4 Since July, 2007 the Office for Foreigners is the central authority competent with granting to aliens refugee status, asylum, tolerated stay and temporary protection . It replaced the Office for Repatriation and Aliens. 5 Even if the local community make a huge effort and provide a flat to the refugee family it make be a source of bilateral misunderstanding. For example offering a one room flat to the family where the man is responsible not only for his wife but also for mother and sister is useless as they cannot sleep in one room together.

K. Gmaj / Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the Highway to the West

77

their experience. Those who do not know the rules of Western liberal democracy and economy, who do not posses interpersonal skills so important in contemporary world. We shall realize that when Poland enters Schengen zone, which is now planned for 1st January 2008, when checking points on the western Polish borders disappear we can expect that individuals granted with tolerated stay will leave Poland looking for better opportunities. They will join their families who are already staying in old EU countries. For majority of Chechens Poland is the first safe country on their route to Western Europe. Therefore they apply for refugee status here. According to the Dublin Regulation6 accepted by Poland in May, 2004, asylum seekers can apply for refugee status only in one country so they apply in Poland but they treat it only as a transfer country. Polish society’s attitude towards refugees and asylum seekers is favorable - 2/3 of Poles believe that we should accept their settlement or long stay in Poland. But these humanitarian declaration is not followed by genuine readiness to support them in their searching for work (16 percents of respondents) and to providing Polish language teaching to them (8 percents)7. Therefore we should support Chechens in a way, which does not result in social tensions, especially on the local community level. Actions focused on asylum seekers should be proceeded by educational activities targeted into Polish society in order not to waste that openness. Due to the historical reasons (Poles were also oppressed by Russians for many years and undertaken numerous actions to fight against Russian predominance) we feel deep sympathy and goodwill towards Chechens. Even now refugees can benefit from spontaneous civic involvement of Polish citizens, who as volunteers help them to learn Polish language, to arrange everyday activities or to help children in school duties. Chechen asylum seekers are supported by Polish non-governmental organization - the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights and the Polish Humanitarian Organization are biggest among them. Of course we still need more actions concentrating on introducing refugees and asylum seekers into local communities and teaching them how to act in their everyday life. However, at the moment majority of Chechen asylum seekers is westward oriented. Due to it they treat Poland just like a stop on their way not like a place for settlement. References [1] J. W. Berry, Acculturation: A comparative analysis of alternative forms. In R. Saluda and S. Woods (Eds.), Perspectives in Immigrant and Minority Education, New York: University Press of America, 1983. [2] K. Iglicka, The Impact of the EU Enlargement on MigratoryMovements in Poland, 2005, www.csm.org.pl, pp.13-15.

6 It regulates which member state of European Union is responsible for examination of refugee application according to its national law and is obliged to take back its applicants who are irregularly in another Member State. Its aim is to avoid situations where refugees were shuttled from one Member State to another, with none accepting responsibility, or to prevent multiple or simultaneous applications. As a consequence of this regulation in 2004 Poland took back 353 persons - Office for Repatriation and Aliens data. 7 According to opinion poll ordered by United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees conducted on the beginning of July, 2006 (representative probe of 1000 Poles).

78

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-78

Chapter 7 Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism Giovanna Campani University of Florence, Italy

Introduction My contribution to the debate on the topics raised by the Workshop (the social stress of immigrants as a possible cause of terrorism) is based on selected literature in the field of sociology of migration. In the first part of the paper, I consider the issue of integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe, showing how controversial the same concept of integration is. I then analyze how the integration of Muslim minorities has become a highly politicized matter all over Europe, raising questions about the forms of recognition that should be granted by the European states to immigrant minorities in order to allow them to keep their religious and cultural specificities in the frame of European laws and values. Muslim minorities have been extremely visible, because of their political mobilizations on various topics (marches by French citizens of North African origin, called “beur”; demonstrations against the Salman Rushdie’s book “Satanic Verses” in the UK; debates and manifestations demonstrations on the veil issue in France and Italy; strong participation in the anti-war movement in the UK…). The predominant reactions of the European public opinion to Muslims’ requests have gone from suspicion to the clear hostility, legitimized by political groups –generally at the right or the extreme right, as the Front National in France, the British National Party (BNP), the Northern League in Italy, who consider Muslims in general as a threat to European culture and organize demonstrations or counter-demonstrations to oppose the opening of mosques, the recognition of Muslim feasts in schools1, the authorization of veil in public offices etc. The negative attitude of European public opinion towards Muslims in general is not a consequence of the 11th of September, even if it has become stronger afterwards. In 1997 a report titled Islamophobia: a Challenge For Us All by the Runnymede Trust, an organization founded in 1968 to challenge racism and promote multi-ethnicity in the 1

The latest is the Italian former Minister of the Berlusconi Government, Roberto Calderoli, who has organized a “pig day” to protest against the opening of a new Mosque in Bologna (Repubblica, 14th of September 2007). The same man became famous because he went to television with a tee-shirt showing the Danish drawings, during the Danish cartoons crisis. The result of his action were big anti-Italian demonstrations in Lybia (where Italian television is largely watched) and 11 deaths during the attack on the Italian consulate in Bengazi…

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

79

UK2, defines for the first time the concept of Islamophobia, drafting its eight main characters. In the second part of the paper, I question the connexion between Islamophobia and the development of an Islamic fundamentalist political movement at world level. In fact most researches tend to show that the radical fundamentalist ideology is followed only by a tiny minority of Muslim immigrants in Europe, – first and/or second generation, according to the countries - represented by a limited number of organizations. The majority of Muslim immigrants are strongly against terrorism and condemn 9/11 [1, 2, 3, 4]. Reasons for Islamophobia must also be sought inside European societies, where in spite of official discourses on tolerance immigrants and strangers (not only Muslim ones) are “constructed” as “deviants”, “criminals”, “enemies”, a threat to “security”. In order to clarify the phenomenon, I analyze briefly Bauman’s work on immigration and security [5]; I consider the theory of “moral panic” as a combination of reality and social construction. Without denying the reality of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as a world phenomenon, the social construction of Muslims in Europe as “terrorists”3 is extremely dangerous not only in respect to social cohesion: the growing Islamophobia4 in Europe makes the fight against the terrorist challenge more difficult. In fact, the Islamophobic approach does not make any distinction between a minority of fundamentalists (among whom, we count as well “autochthonous” Europeans, converted to Islam), who reject the “West” and the “system” in total, and the majority of the immigrant Muslim population, who are against terrorism5 and could react against it, but who also demand the recognition of their specificity and respect for their opinions. This confusion provokes resentment among the general Muslim population hostile to terrorism and largely contributes to produce the “social stress” that is evoked as topic of the Workshop. Finally, in the last two paragraphs, I present briefly two pieces of research on Muslims in Europe in which I have taken part in. The first one was done in the UK about the participation of young Muslims to the alter global movement and especially the Stop the war coalition. The second study, done in Italy, looked at the participation of young Muslims to associative life in general. The researchers show how young Muslims participation in social movements is an answer to immigrant communities’ isolation and is an expression of a double Muslim/European identity. Radical political points of view on world conflicts (rejection of the Bush administration policy and of the “USA imperialism”) do not coincide at all with ideology of jihadism or support for

2

(www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf). Basques should then as well be accused of terrorism because of ETA! 4 On the 18th December 2006, in Vienna, the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia has presented the Report “Muslims in the European Union: discrimination and Islamophobia.” It contains the existing data on discrimination of which Muslims are victims in the labour market, education and housing. Islamophobic acts go from simple verbal threats to attacks on persons and properties. The Report presents a long list of actions, from physical aggression up to arson. “Such behaviours are illegal. It is consequently necessary to produce a political guide to deal with the problem. Assuring equal treatment to all Europeans, independently from their origin. “ the director of the EUMC has declared, see http://eumc.europa.eu 5 Surveys done among the Muslim population in the UK in November 2001 showed that 81% considered the attack on the Twin Towers to be unjustified. (ICM Press Release 14 November 2001 http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2001/today-muslims-poll-nov-2001.htm) 3

80

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

terrorism6. Both researches show the complexity of the issue concerning these young people’s identity, which is simultaneously European and Muslim.

Muslim immigrants’ integration in Europe There is no doubt that after the 11th of September, the participation of immigrants or people of immigrant origin in terrorist attacks in Spain or in the UK, and the discovery of cells of Islamic fundamentalists ready to enter action in various European countries have raised a lot of emotion all over Europe. Scholars of different disciplines sociology, psychology, and political sciences - have tried to understand the causes of these actions and the motivations of terrorists, looking also at their personal histories. These facts have further encouraged the development of a common sense that accused Muslims of being unable to integrate into Western, liberal, modern societies because of their culture7, adding the equation between Muslims and terrorists which has been legitimized by the media and by the discourses of some political activists, generally at the extreme right of the political landscape. Media and simplistic political discourses establish as a “self-evident fact” automatic links between causes (for example the Islamic culture) and effects (the participation in terrorist movements). This type of discourse ignores the possibility that social realities are the product of complex interactions and processes of definition and significations8. Any such generalisation can only be a stereotype. The migratory trajectories of Muslims vary according to the different European countries: Muslim presence dates back to more than fifty or sixty years in the UK and France, where various generations are present, while it is relatively recent in Italy, Spain and Greece, which have become immigration countries only during the eighties of the past century. The most important arrivals of Muslims into Europe are part of the so-called postcolonial migration. After World War 2, migratory flows of Muslims, directed towards Centre-Northern Europe have been strongly influenced by colonial links. For France, the areas of reference were the Maghrebian countries, particularly Algeria, for the United Kingdom, the Indian Sub-continent, for Holland, Indonesia and Suriname. Germany, which did not have a strong colonial past, became the destination for Turkish immigrants, thanks also to previous links between the Prussian and the Ottoman Empires. These are mainly flows of low-qualified workers and of a small percentage of intellectuals and students. It is important to notice, that, during the fifties and the sixties, that is the first phase of post-war migration to Europe, immigrants were mainly 6 For example, the attack ob the Twin Towers can be perceived as terrorism and strongly condemned, but not the insurgency in Iraq or the actions of the Hezbollah in Lebanon or of Hamas in Palestine. 7 The borders of modernity and of West are very fluid: there are niches that reject modernity inside the socalled western world and there are niches of post-modernity in the non-western world…Just to give an example: the opposition to the teaching of the evolution in some USA states because of the Christian fundamentalists is certainly not an example of modernity…in the national museum of Lhasa, Tibet-China, on the contrary, the Darwinian theory is clearly shown and children of the Tibetan schools go to visit it and learn the theory of evolution…Is not the acceptance of the scientific knowledge is a clear sign of modernity? Then the Tibet is certainly more modern than a few United States where evolution cannot be taught in schools… 8 This approach ignores also that in many countries of the Muslim Arabic world, the local identity cannot be reduced to an Arab Islamic culture, as some power discourses or fundamentalist discourses tend to do. Take for example the Maghrebian identity: it is the expression of a culture rich in Berberian, Jewish, Andalusian, Turkish, Italian, Spanish and French elements that appear in music, architecture, cooking, dialects [6].

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

81

considered “workers” and little attention was paid to their religious faith. The same idea of integration of these migrants was by the way neglected, given the fact that they were not supposed to settle in Europe. It is only from the late seventies and the eighties that immigrants begin to settle in Europe. During this time the settlement process for Muslims began: “the activation of the Islamic belonging as one of the main sources of a strong identity, both on the personal and the collective level, in connection with the need of finding roots in the urban areas.” (Massari, 2006, p.39) [7]. In the perspective of a permanent settlement, religious buildings were opened. The interaction with public administrations, health and social services and schools also became more and more frequent. In this interaction, the first requests to have the possibility of living according to the Islamic religion rules were made. The settlement of the immigrant populations has forced the European countries to think and to implement integration policies. But, what does integration mean? In the early 1960s, two Italian sociologists, Francesco Alberoni and Roberto Baglioni, defined the concept of integration thus: “Integration must be a reciprocal exchange of human experiences on the psychological level, it must be a cultural exchange from which a larger and more mature experience may emerge and must represent an insertion of the immigrant in the new social structure as a vital and functional part that makes the whole richer” (Alberoni and Baglioni: 1965, 26) [8]. The two sociologists differentiated ‘integration’ from ‘cultural assimilation’: in the integration process, a reciprocal exchange takes place at the level of the individuals, while the social structure is enriched by the presence of immigrants. These ideas focus on the exchange, but this exchange takes place inside an institutional frame defined by the hosting state. Philosophies of integration – and political discourses - reflect a broader framework of national identity politics and are deeply rooted into the national order of things. Integration policies reflect an integration ‘model’ – they have a normative aspect, proposing a type of interaction between two populations to be implemented. Consequently, if integration is more a norm than a theoretical notion, can indicators scientifically measure it? Do not indicators also depend on the political model of integration? Moreover, integration is a lengthy, dynamic process that extends to different spheres of social life and has multiple dimensions: cultural, social and economic. Immigrant groups that are well integrated from the economic point of view can preserve key cultural specificities: it is the case, for example, all over Europe, of diaspora groups, such as the Chinese communities. Other groups can be culturally integrated, because of previous anticipatory socialization (Alberoni, Baglioni, 19659) [8] , but can have economic difficulties (it is the case, for example, of the “culturally close” Albanians in Italy or Greece, and, more recently, of the European, Christian 9 The most important contribution of the quoted Italian sociologists Alberoni and Baglioni as regards the future developments of sociology of migration was the notion of ‘anticipatory socialisation’, which they used to describe the processes immigrants experience in their trajectories from the areas of origin towards the industrial society. ‘Anticipatory socialisation’ means that, before leaving their country, immigrants obtain information on the societies where they are about to go to and consider these societies as ‘models’ of what should be life today. Consequently, immigrants are ‘prepared’ to the integration processes that take place in the receiving society: they become adapted to the new society because this is the ‘dominant model’, while the one they have been socialised in is considered to change or to disappear. The notion of ‘anticipatory socialisation’ has recently been used to understand processes of integration for some groups of foreign immigrants in Italy, as, for example, the Albanians and the Tunisians. The phenomenon does not necessarily produce the same effects as it did in the 1960s.

82

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

Rumanians). For all these reasons, some scholars consider integration as a “nebula concept” [9] 10. In fact, whatever definition or model of integration we can choose, integration is a collective process, shared by the whole population, both the natives and the immigrants: it has to do with a general model of living together. When difficulties arise, these come from both sides. A conflict concerning the countries of settlement and the ones of origin of the immigrants affects the integration processes: it was the case for Algerians in France during and after the conflict there; it is the case for the participation of the UK in the war in Iraq. Consequently, given the ambiguity of the concept of integration, the issues raised by the Muslim presence in Europe vary according to the historical periods and the national contexts. Moreover, most researches on the Muslim communities in Europe do not describe them as a monolithic reality: on the contrary, the Muslim presence is characterized by a great internal pluralism [10]11. This is because of different factors: “the various national origins, the various interpretations of Islam, to which they make reference, the different organisations that, referring to these interpretations, tend to structure Islam in Europe.” (Cesari, Pacini, 2005, p. XI) [10] In this variety, groups supporting Islamic fundamentalism (which is also a complex concept) are a tiny minority. In this complex panorama, the level of integration of Muslims in Europe can vary within the same Muslim population, some groups or individuals being integrated and some others no, according to the indicators chosen.

Muslims’ mobilizations and integration processes in the UK, France and Italy. In this paragraph, we will briefly summarize the main “political” issues that have been raised during the processes of settlement and integration in the two old immigration countries: the UK and France; and in a new immigration country, Italy. The United Kingdom It is precisely in the United Kingdom that a few young boys of the second generation Muslims have shifted towards terrorism, creating suspicion and fear against the allMuslim population. According to the last census in 2001, Muslims represent around 1.5 million people, around 2.7% of the population, settled in the great urban areas of London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford and Leeds. The majority of them come from Pakistan (42.5%) and Bangladesh (16.8%), in less measure from India (8.5%), while the rest has its origins in the Balkans (7,5%), as Bosnians and Albanians, and Africa (6,5%), mainly Somalis and Nigerians (Peach 2005). It is the youngest population among the minority groups, one third being between zero and fifteen years, and only the 10% over sixty years (against the 18% of the total population). 10

As an Italian expert has declared during a recent research on indicators of integration: “The concept of integration is difficult because the models that we had before are all failing. Before that they were considered as good. Each model has, however, some good things. Let’s take the English model. Focusing the autonomy, including the religious one, of the religious groups. Then it has appeared that this must be compatible with common norms; probably this had been neglected. Or the French model, on the contrary the focus is on the common norms. This model underestimates the needs of a certain diversification. Each model has good aspects” (Interview with Franco Pittau, Caritas, Rome, reported in Campani, 2006, p.36) [11]. 11 [10].

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

83

As noticed in the previous paragraph, Muslims arrived in the UK in the fifties and sixties, as part of a post-colonial migration, for work purpose. Their goal was not initially settlement; in fact they kept for long time the myth of return and strong links with their countries of origin [4]. In the first phase of migration, identifying themselves as workers, they took part in the trade unions and left-wing politics. For example, the Indian Workers Associations contributed to the fight for the rights of the immigrant workers and politically organised their members in support of the Labour Party. It is only after the seventies that the Muslim communities, in their process of settlement, started to address to the British authorities, first at local level, then at national level, a certain number of requests in order to raise the possibility of living according to the Islamic religious rules. These requests concerned for example the teaching of Islamic religion in schools, the presence of halal food in school and factory restaurants, the enlargement of the crime of blasphemy to the Islamic religion, at the same level as for Christianity. This request became particularly important after the publication of the Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses . It was, by the way, the mobilisation about this book that contributed to give visibility to the Muslims in the British society (Werbner 2002). Without entering in the merit of the question, there is no doubt that, from the side of the Muslim communities, this mobilisation appeared first of all as a demand for recognition. For British and European public opinion, it appeared, on the contrary, as a manifestation of intolerance and fundamentalism presenting a challenge to the policies of multiculturalism, chosen by the United Kingdom to deal with immigrants. In fact, since the eighties, a long period of negotiation started between the representatives of the Muslim communities and the national and local authorities of the European countries. A negotiation which is still going on around various topics (Muslim schools, rejection of mixed sex education, sharpie tribunals...etc…). In the UK, hostility to Muslims did not start on the 11th of September, but it has become worse since. After the introduction of the Terrorism Act in 2001, there has been a growth of 302% of the cases of Stop & Search12 of Muslims, compared to 230% for blacks and 112%for whites between 2001 and 200313. The Muslim community in the UK is far from being homogeneous and is rich with numerous associations and movements. The most important is Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), a moderate organisation close to the Labour Party14. Other organisations are the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (MPGB). Founded in 1997 by Kamal El-Helbawy, European speaker of the “Muslim Brothers”, the MAB’s goal is “to promote and spread the principles of a positive interactions between Muslims and all the other elements of the British Society. ” MAB wants to bring Muslim values inside the British society, creating a collaboration dialogue. Through local committees MAB promotes campaign on different questions (from the retirement of British troops in Iraq to the protest against the French law against wearing the veil).

12

This is carried out to search for drugs, weapons, stolen objects. Cfr. The Indipendent 22/11/2004 “Islamophobia makes British Muslims fell increasingly “isolated” in their own country” 14 Following the London attacks, in July 2005, the 19th of July, the Muslim Council of Britain was invited to Downing Street as representative of the Muslim community to create a task force to encourage mediations to oppose the development of fundamentalism in the communities (The Guardian, 19/07/2005 “Blair plea to Muslim leaders at n° 10 meeting”) 13

84

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

The Muslim Parliament presents a political, not a religious platform. Its main campaigns have focused on the rejection of the Antiterrorism Act, seen as result of a discrimination process against Muslims and against forced marriage, in collaboration with the Institute of Muslim Women. In fact, many Muslim women’s associations have also developed in the UK. In the last paragraph, we will analyse the participation of young Muslims alter-global and Stop the war movement. France It is in France that the highest number of Muslims in Europe is settled: estimates, referring to people coming from Islamic countries speak of around five million people, the majority from Maghreb (First Algeria, then Tunisia and Morocco), many of whom have French nationality. In fact, in the French integration model, the nation is a universal entity that includes not only the “ethnic French”, but all the people who, living in France, accept the republican principles of society. It is the republican model of integration. Referring to the children of the immigrants from Maghreb (a third and even a fourth generation is present in France), terms as “young people of foreign origin” or “of North African origin” are often used, while similar expressions are rarely used for young people of Italian, Spanish or Portuguese origin. This shows the suspicion concerning the allegiance to France and to the Republic by the Muslims, because of the references to Islam (while the Republic is secular), but also because of the colonial past (the Algerian war). In fact, the condition of the descendents of the Muslim immigrants is difficult in terms of housing and jobs. Confined in the peripheral areas, they are two or three times more likely to be unemployed than other young French people. The demand for recognition by the second and third generations of Maghrebian origin has taken various forms, according to the periods. It took the form of a secular movement during the eighties: this was the beur movement, whose goals were the universal fight against racism, the participation in political national and local life and the civic rights for those excluded from French society, parked in the ghettos of the peripheral areas15. Associations of a religious type started in the nineties, questioning the monopoly of the secular Arab elite [10] in the political arena. They represent a very scattered and differentiated movement, questioning the republican separation between the public sphere and the private one, the only one where religion is legitimized. This movement is fuelled by the national controversy about the veil in school, which, started in the eighties and has continued for over fifteen years, until the approval of a law in 2004, prohibiting the religious signs (first of all the veil) in the public schools. It is however far from being hegemonic in a community, which is extremely inhomogeneous. The riots in the peripheral areas –banlieues-, which exploded during the fall of 2005, would be the result of a contrast between the socialization in the French society and the socio-economic exclusion. As O.Roy (2002)[12] has written, the situation in the peripheral areas has more to do with: “the ethnicization of a space of social exclusion than with the creation of a religious ghetto. The culture of the young beurs is an urban Western subculture and not an importation from the Middle East.” (Roy, 2002, p.62) [12]. 15 The movement was strongly encouraged by a Catholic priest from Lyon. The leader of the anti-racist movement that emerged from the “Beur marche”- Touche pas a mon pote (Don’t touche my friend)- from Lyon to Paris, was not a Maghrebian. Harlem Désir was a Guadaloupéen. His references were the Black Americano civic rights movement. By the way his name came from Harlem, the New York Black area…

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

85

The definition “Muslims” doesn’t correspond, in fact, to a homogeneous cultural community. The French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997) [1], in L’Islam des jeunes, proposes and ideal-typical classification of the young French declaring themselves Muslims: -The Islam of integration that fills the emptiness provoked by the end of great social utopia and the disillusion with the French republican model. They claim a Muslim-French or French-Muslim identity, as sounds the slogan of the Union of the Young Muslims (Union des Junes Musulmans): “French yes, but also Muslims; -The Islam of exclusion concerns those who react to the social exclusion by renouncing participation in French society in the name of transcendent rules and finding shelter in an Islam seen mainly as religion of the submission to God: -The radical Islamism is definitely a minority phenomenon, which sees in the opposition to the Western society, the only way towards rescue. This minority typology is however overrepresented by the media. It must be stressed that since 2003, a Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) is charged to institutionalise the forms of the religious practices. Italy With the arrival of immigrants, in the eighties, Islam became the second religion in the previously mono-religious country of Italy. Today Muslims (immigrants and Italian converted16) are estimated between 700,000 and 1 million people. Most important national groups of Muslims are the Moroccans and Albanians, followed by Tunisians and Senegalese. Maghrebians, mostly from Morocco and Tunisia, represent the central group for Muslim immigration in Italy (around 30% of Muslims in Italy is made up of Moroccans), and are divided into Arabs and Berbers, both Sunni groups. Other Muslim national groups are Senegalese, Egyptians, Bengali, Albanians (16% of the Muslim total), Bosnians, Kurds, and Roma from the Balkans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Somalis, and Iranians etc. Each national group may display different Islamic beliefs: many Senegalese are part of the Muridiya confraternity [13], a Sufi confraternity; Iranians and some Iraqis are Shiite; Moroccans, Tunisians, Egyptians are Sunni; Bosnians and Albanians express a very secular Islam17; among Roma, coming from the Balkans, there is an important Sufi component. The increase “visibility” process “in the physical and symbolical space” (Gritti, 2001, p.29) [2] dates back only twenty years. The first Italian mosque was opened in Catania in 1980: the Libyan government financed its construction. From the nineties onwards, the visibility process increased: “New mosques are opened; aid and funding arrive from foundations; nearly everywhere, in the public space, signs of the Muslim presence appear.” (Gritti, 2001, p.29) [2]. Public opinion and the media first ignored this process; then a negative reaction began inside Italian society. In a few years, 16 The converted Italians should be approximately 70.000, according to estimations, but it is extremely difficult to verify such number. 17 National origins are important to understand how Islam is practiced. Albanians, who are considered at the 70% Muslims have experienced a Communist regime, which taught State atheism. Even Albanians who consider themselves Muslims have a secular idea of Islam. Many Kurds are Alewiti, who have an open view about the women’s condition and a secular idea of Islam; among Kurds and Berbers the pre-Islamic tradition is not completely forgotten and is sometimes rediscovered as an identity mark. Senegalese do not go to the mosque very often. They practice Islam inside their brotherhoods.

86

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

Muslims, the Muslim community and the Muslim religion became the object of violent verbal attacks by some Catholic bishops and of aggression, not only verbal but also physical, by some Italian political parties like the Northern League. Hostile religious and political forces accuse Muslim immigrants of “structural” inability to integrate, because of some characteristics ascribed to Islam, as misogynous, intolerant and retrograde. Islam is described as eternal and monolithic, mostly oriented towards the past and unchangeable in its essence, whose “natural” properties are fanaticism, traditionalism, irrationalism and obscurantism (Gritti, 2001, p.35)[2]. As in other countries, in Italy too, Muslim immigrants are extremely diversified 18. Researches show the existence of typologies of Muslims, who live their religion and practice it in different ways, both individually and collectively [14, 15, 16, 17, 3, 2, 18, 19, 20]: spiritual interpretations of Islam, which do not require rituality, rigid respect for the five pillars, combination of religion and tradition, communitarian activities are just some of the multiple forms the “Islams” of Italy express. Multiple actors represent Muslims in Italy. Organisations, associations, religious or national groups, brotherhoods defend different points of view on religion and politics; they have different references and support outside Italy: official Islam of the countries of origin, brotherhoods, and political movements… Diversity and divisions have not helped Muslims in establishing, with the Italian State, a legal “Agreement”, for guaranteeing the free expression of their religion and assuring the State necessary support to implement the right to religious practice (help in building the mosques, presence of halal food in schools, holidays, etc….). Such an agreement is, in fact, both for Muslims and for the Italian State, a complex task: Muslim organisations are not united (some forces are accused of being too radical and even jihadist) and the Italian State is influenced by political forces hostile to a recognized Islamic presence. Magdi Allam (2001) [18] talks of 214 Islamic religious places in Italy, distinguishing between Mosques19; Islamic cultural centres, which have structures and an organization able to offer, apart from cultural activity, cultural information, social assistance and institutional mediation (around 30); Islamic centres which have cultural activities, Koran teaching courses and religious practices (around 80); and finally, just religion places. Each mosque or centre has a different religious – and also political - orientation. The fact that each mosque has a specific orientation depends on the Islamic confessions: Sunni, Shia, and Sufi. The different beliefs, already, represent a wide range of religious ways of life in the general framework called Islam. Another difference depends on the political orientation, in the sense of the attitude to political Islam. Some mosques have a more indirect, moderate political position; others are considered close to fundamentalism.

18 According to Gritti (2001 [2]), in Italy it would be more pertinent to speak about “Islams”, using the plural, and not of “one” Unitarian Islam. 19 The most well known mosque in Italy is the one of Monte Antenne in Rome, officially open on June 1995, thanks to the support of the city of Rome, which gave a piece of land, and to the financial support of Saudi Arabia. This mosque is the biggest in Europe, able to welcome 2000 people. The project of the Mosque of Rome date back to 1974, but it took over 20 years to be finished. The costs for the building of the Mosque have been paid by Saudi Arabia through the League of the Islamic World, a Saudi organisation which has three goals: assuring the support of Islam at the international level, mainly where Muslims represent a minority, to promote Islamic mission with the non Muslim and to control the type of Islam which is practiced.

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

87

Andrea Pacini (2000) makes a precise analysis of the typologies of Islam which is expressed in the different forms of organisations and initiatives existing in Italy: initiatives which are more or less directed by Muslim states or that refer somehow to the official Islam of the states, religious brotherhoods and movements which unite strictly the religious dimension to the political dimensions. Pacini admits that at local level, in local initiatives, it is common to find combinations, supra-positions, synergies between one level and the other, one organisation and the other. Pacini’s analysis shows the different conflicts existing between the initiatives supported by the States and the political Islam, which the States try to counter-act, but also between the States (for example between the Saudi royal dynasty and the Moroccan dynasty for the control of the Mosque of Rome)20. It should not be forgotten however; that the majority of the Muslims in Italy do not go regularly to the mosque or to Islamic cultural centres and have a quite secular attitude to religion. Practising can be a matter of personal engagement (praying five time a day, eating halal food, respecting Ramadan…) more than going regularly to the mosques or the Islamic cultural centres. This is what appears from different researches, which have been done in Italy, which show the predominance of personal interpretations of Islam, identified with spiritual values.

Security, immigrants and “moral panic” We have seen that in various European countries, the growing visibility of Muslims and their demand for recognition of religious practices have become political matters and have raised hostility long before the 11th of September. Muslims are a component of immigration, which is also object of negative reactions: “Extra-European immigrants who come to Europe to look for asylum and work are seen as threatening aliens…(…) There is a growing trend in Europe, to give responsibility of all the socioeconomic problems –unemployment, lack of housing, criminality, welfare- to the immigrants, who are deprived of “our moral and cultural values”, simply for the fact that they are among us.” (Stolcke, 2000, p. 158-159) [21]. The hostility towards immigrants is largely a “constructed phenomenon” –not dependant on the objective “threat” represented by immigrants- that, according to some scholars, is a product of the post-modern condition and the change in the perception of security and risk. In his book, The loneliness of the global citizen (2000)[5], Zigmut Bauman analyzes the concept of security, considering three dimensions: security, certainty, safety , which are the conditions of self-security and self-confidence. The lack of one of these components provokes a sense of insecurity; or, it is upon the conditions of self-security and of self-confidence that the capacity of acting and thinking in a rational way depends. (Baumann, 2000, p 25)[5]. The lack of one of these components provokes a sense of insecurity, nourishing “the anxiety, the search for a scapegoat and the aggression.” (Ibidem, p.25). The lack of existential security is a 20 Pacini gives an interesting example of the differences of affiliation among mosques in Italy. In Turin, Pacini says, near two mosques ruled by imam close to the Muslim brothers, there is a mosque (or better a prayer room) ruled by a Moroccan imam of wahabi tendency (close to the Islam represented by Saudi Arabia and the Saudian family), and one, recently opened, for Afghans and Pakistanis close to the Islamic movement of Jama’at al-islami.

88

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

consequence of the development of economic liberalism that produces the perception of a precarious existence; the lack of certainty depends from the difficulty in understanding the reality, of foreseeing the events and putting them in an ordered understandable process. Finally safety has to do with the personal and individual dimension of security that concerns the body and its extension, as the family members and the personal goods and properties. These three images of security overlap necessarily. Individuals, alone or collectively, are not able to oppose to deep causes of precariousness, uncertainty and insecurity that arise every day, in a time of globalization. Bauman considers as causes of insecurity, the new world disorder, characterized by the end of clear divisions, natural borders, of clear interests and political strategies; universal deregulation, because of the irrationality and the moral blindness of the market competition; freedom without limits guaranteed to capital and finance, but denied to persons; the weakness of social networks of trust, (…), the image of a fragmented reality… Western societies are going through a phase of transition where trajectories of social mobility and redefined, traditional representative systems are in crisis, individual and collective identities are questioned. Given that the governments cannot promise their citizens “a secure existence and a certain future”, they can be harsh against threats that are close and visible as immigrants at the borders or in the cities: collective uncertainties are reduced to private worries that can find a political answer in the policies of law and order. Immigrants are the easy scapegoat of these policies. Another interesting theory clarifies the mechanisms of construction of immigrants as scapegoats: the moral panics. S. Cohen theorized the concept of “moral panic” in his famous book Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and the Rockers (1972)[22]. He analyzed how an event of young people looting generated a strong social reaction, because of a campaign set up by the media, and of the harsher action by police. Cohen used the term “moral panic” to indicate the overwhelming reaction of the media, the public, the social control agencies to a case of youth criminality. For moral panic, the author defines: “A condition, an event, when a person or a group of persons begin to de defined as a threat to some values or interests of the society: its nature is presented in a simplified way and stereotyped by the media; moral barricades are erected by editors, politicians religious people and other thinkers/intellectuals; recognized experts pronounce their diagnosis and suggest possible solutions. (…) Sometimes the subject that has provoked the panic is relatively new; in other cases it existed before, but it becomes central. Sometimes the panic is forgotten and just something is left in the collective memory; in other cases, it can last longer and produce changes even in the ways how a society perceive itself.” (1972, p. 9)[22]. Finally, the reaction of a society to some events depends upon the perception of these facts as a threat to some “positions, status, interests, ideologies and values” (Cohen, 1972, p. 191)[22]. The interesting aspect in a situation of moral panic is that we face a reality that is partly objective, but partly socially constructed (through the media, public opinion, the organizations of social control, political institutions). Islamic fundamentalism is certainly a political threat: however, the common sense that today presents Islamic fundamentalism as a “natural character” of the Arabic culture or, worse, of the Arab people, ignores the political strategies used to mobilize by different political agents, the political discourses, the historical memories, the great variety of the contexts, the shifting identifications of the individuals. There are no serious studies, at the moment,

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

89

showing that Muslims in Europe are at special risk for being recruited by fundamentalist terrorist cells. In any case, as for other terrorisms, it can be defeated by political means and not through the stigmatization of a people. What researches show is that there are problems of drop out from schools and of deviant behaviours among second generation immigrants all over Europe. As far as crimes are concerned it should be looked carefully at some specific areas and at some specific crimes –mainly connected with drug addiction, drug selling, trafficking, prostitution, rape… The equation Muslims-terrorists is a discourse tending to create moral panic used by some politicians for their political purposes.

Young Muslims in the Uk and in Italy: political participation and identity In this last section, we give voice to some young people belonging to the second generation of Muslims in the UK and in Italy interviewed during two research studies done in the last four years. From the interviews it appears that the fact of being Muslim is an identity which it is impossible to get rid of, because –independently from the personal auto-identification- it depends much from the “look” of the other. Even young Muslims who are not openly engaged in activities –either in secular associations or in mosques- are touched by the general climate of suspicion that sometimes concerns even close persons, as the friends. In the UK, the research –done by the University of Rome, Antimo Farro and Emmanuele Toscano in collaboration with the University of Florence- had as object the immigrants’ participation to the alter-global movement and has especially focused upon the Stop the War movement and the London Social Forum of October 2004. The coalition Stop the War was founded the 21 September 2001 during a public meeting to which more than 2000 people took part at the Friends Meeting House in London21, after the attacks on the twin towers in New York and the reaction of the Bush administration that declared “war on terror”. It is, in fact, to this war that the name of the coalition refers. The organisations that have become members of the coalition is: Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Respect! Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), plus some Muslim organisations as the already mentioned Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (MPGB). Other organisations as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) at the beginning took part in STOP the War constitution, but then they preferred the external support because of an orientation considered too extremist (they are close to the Trotskyism) and the critics to the Labour Party, to which the MCB is close . The results of the research tend to show that young Muslims –especially young women- take part into these movements in the attempt of being at the same time Muslims and British, as a reaction to the hostility they have been victims of after the 11th of September and an answer to the risk of auto-isolation of the community. After the 11th of September, the discrimination became very strong, and the reaction of the young people is to participate more, to become more visible, instead of hiding themselves. This is for example the opinion of two young women interviewed, activists of STOP the War: “We have become aware that we are darker, different. Our parents were immigrants who had come here to work. We, the second generation, born, grown and 21

Cfr. http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php4?article_id=1520

90

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

educated in the UK, have never perceived ourselves as immigrants, but as British. Or, after the 11th of September, press has started to come here, in Birmingham, asking the Muslim population. Are you British? Are you Muslim? I consider it very offensive” (interview with a young woman, activist of the coalition Stop the war, London) “My father, my brothers and all the men of the community were more calm than the women after the political crisis provoked by the 11th of September and the war in Afghanistan. They didn’t want to raise the voice in front of the aggressions, because they thought they would have been more attacked if they criticized the government, but I wanted to do something.” (Interview with a young woman, speaker of Stop the War of Birmingham). Taking part in the movement breaks the isolation and creates new solidarities. The initiatives against the war can in fact be part of a general movement that see Muslims and non-Muslims fighting against “neo-imperialism”, the predominance of the U.S.s.... Young Muslims feel that they can radically criticize the politics of the government of Tony Blair to follow Bush in the war in Iraq, without being isolated from the British society. On the contrary, they fight against the war together with the progressive British: “Muslims don’t consider this war as a war to Islam: they are aware of its neoimperialist character and they are aware that their force comes from the alliance with other people.” Says another young activist (boy) interviewed. Among these “other people”, there is certainly the association Respect, part of Stop the war coalition, founded by an ex-Labour party member and active in the social forum. Respect is a political party founded in 2004 by the former Labour Member of Parliament George Galloway, expelled by the Labour Party for his positions against Blair’s choice to go to war against Iraq. An alternative to the Labour Party, the coalition Respect has organized its electoral campaign in 2005 on the question of peace and in defence of the Muslim community, victims of racist and islamophobic aspects. Respect has a great support among the Muslim communities. As young Muslim woman interviewed declares: “I am proud of what Respect is doing for the Muslim community.” Respect considers that cultural and religious differences have to be highly respected and has brought this idea inside Stop the war. An example of this is given by the day of mobilization against the war of the 18th of November 2002, period of Ramadan. In that occasion everybody had the possibility to pray, thanks to a moving char where an imam was praying and a big tribune for the imam in Trafalgar Square. Another Muslim activist young woman remembers this event: “A great participation of Muslims was foreseen: In order to be sure that this presence would be compatible with the religious rule. For this a great tribune was set up in Trafalgar Square, so that at the moment of praying an imam would have gone there. (…) A Muslim prayer in the centre of London! Someby was unhappy, but if I think that, if we really want terrorism to be isolated, the only way is to make Muslims feel part of this movement. It is what happened. They have succeeded in integrating Muslims and their needs inside the demonstrations. This has been symbolic, important and very nice!”22. The presence of women is one of the most interesting aspects of the movement, but it is in general the younger generation who want to express itself without being considered “traitors” to the receiving country. The movement against the war has represented for British Muslims the occasion for asserting themselves in the double 22

Cfr. www.mabonline.info/english/modules.php?name=About, “The MAB, when and why?”,

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

91

subjective dimensions of British citizens and Muslims, and, at the same time, opposing themselves to Islamophobic aggression, insisting on their condemnation both of terrorism and of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. They found consequently the way to escape the isolation where the extreme right forces wanted to force them. From their opposition to terrorism and war, they enlarge progressively their discourse of opposition, joining other new global topics. Says another activist –a boy: “ The United States impose their choices on everybody on the planet. We are against this domination…there is a space for alternative in terms of trade, equal trade, markest, in cultural terms, in every sector…I see in the Muslim participation in the movement the concrete possibility to contrast the United States, proposing an alternative, with other forces who want the same…We are the only ones who can be an obstacle to the American domination. “ Young Muslims in the UK and in Italy have much in common: their frustration with the assimilation Muslim-Terrorist and their double identity. As a young boy says: “My friends sometimes “forget” that I am of Arabic origin and some heavy words escape…or they ask me what do I think about terrorists as if they did not know me or they didn’t know the answer…it is as if they wouldn’t talk with me but with a foreigner, a “Muslim”…” (Selim, 18 years, Egypt) “I am very sensitive from this point of view: one day a friend…I do not even know why we have ended up to talk about this…but he started to say that Muslims are all terrorists…I have asked him to notice that this is impossible, that in the world there are other types of terrorism, as in Spain…but he, nothing, he continued in his idea…and when, at the end, he had fallen in contradiction, has concluded:” With all that the television shows…” (Jassira, 20-Syria-Tunisia) This stereotyped image that is imposed on the young people –a real stigma- is in complete contradiction with the awareness young people have about the differences of the conception and the practices of the Islam according to education and social class. They are perfectly aware that there is not just one Muslim identity. “Look, culture and education have a great influence on religion. Look…the type of education my parents have received, in comparison to what I have received in the Italian schools- this influences the mentality. For example, let’s look at the role of the woman…for my mother, who went very little to school, a Muslim woman who wears the hjiab should not be too much in public, going out, doing sport…for me it is just the opposite, in a society that perceives Muslim women negatively, these have to take all the rights, to go, to work…to show that we are like the others…”(Karima, 24, Morocco) The same Karima insists that men who make heavy comments on women who do not wear the veil are the ones who are not cultivated and come from rural areas. The interviews show that these young people develop “identity tactics and strategies in order to take some distance from the role that the surrounding milieu tends to force on them. “ (Frisina, 2005). They tend to present themselves with a double –or even triple- identity, and it is only when the Islam is seen in negative terms, as a threat, that they react insisting on their Arab-Muslim identity: “Problems change, we grow up, even our identity changes. Already now, I feel myself more Italian than Moroccan…maybe in ten years I will feel completely Italian…or I will look at the European citizenship.” (Karima, 24 Morocco) “When they ask me who I am, where am I from, I say I am in-between…Italian and Egyptian…but if I am provoked…then I say I am Egyptian and Muslim…”(Fahima, 17, Egypt)

92

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

According to the sociologists Annalisa Frisina:”Islam is perceived by these young people as one of the references, but certainly not the only one. In comparison with their parents, it is not only question of “right to difference” (mosques, cemeteries, etc…), but right to equality, even remaining Muslims. The question of the citizenship is crucial…” (Frisina, 2005, p.156)

Conclusion The conclusion of the paper is that, if peaceful societies, having a high level of social cohesion combined with the recognition of cultural pluralism, are a goal for liberal thinkers, the main obstacles to implement them do not lie in cultural differences, but in political conflicts. General conflicts taking place at world level may influence the behaviour of the immigrants. Eventually, this has always been the case: for example, during World War 2 for Italians and Germans in the USA and in Canada, during the Algerian war for Algerian immigrants in France, and so on… Migration often represents a conflicting double system of “allegiance” (the sending and receiving country) migrants have to cope with. This complex process should however be recognized and analyzed in socio-political terms and through socio-political categories, avoiding any stigmatization of cultures, religions23 and /or “civilizations”24. Discrimination of immigrants in social life and labour market represents of course a main source of “social stress”, which can encourage deviant behaviour and radicalization. However, deviant behaviour can take extremely various forms –for example organized crime25 or, more often, petty criminality-; it does not necessarily 23 I am personally extremely critical of theories referring to clash of civilizations, because, in my opinion, they are based on an ambiguous overlapping between cultures, religions and civilizations. Religions have much larger spheres of influences than just one culture: they are often developed in one culture, but they tend to go beyond the borders of their own culture and to expand, adapting themselves to the new cultures. As the Italian sociologist of religions, Enzo Pace, writes, a religion represents much more than a culture [23]. As for the concept of “civilization”, numerous researches show that it is a historically constructed concept (see for example [24]).Consequently I tend to share the critical point of Hardt and Negri, who speak of “bizarre historical identities called civilizations” [25]. Moreover, borders of civilizations shift and are defined according to the historical contexts. What are the borders of the Western “civilization” and the ones of the socalled “Muslim world”? Where do we put Albania and Bosnia, Muslim countries of Europe? According to Hardt and Negri (2004), the pretended “clash of civilizations” are in fact global conflicts between nation states and blocs that are not any more justified in ideological terms but rather in cultural-religious terms: “Islam-West”. The Islamic fundamentalist trans-national movement is certainly an important phenomenon of our time. It is not however the only religious or ethnic fundamentalist movement existing in the world, even if the actions perpetrated have been particularly spectacular and murderous, from the 11th of September in New York to the 11th of March in Madrid. 24 I was writing this article, when the news of a fundamentalist cell ready to bring attacks to American targets in Germany was made public, composed by two Germans converted to Islam and a Turkish German resident. In relationship to this fact, the Herald Tribune has written: “ The German plot is another remainder that hatred comes in all nationalities. The two suspects are German who converted to Islam and, acting out of a pronounced hatred to the United States, went off to Pakistan for training. (…) To some officials, all this demonstrated the recruitment prowess of Al-Qaeda. But it is more likely that the two Germans and their Turkish accomplice. Were seized first by a pathological hatred of the United States, and then sought out the rhetoric of Islamist extremism, just as their predecessors in the Baader-Meinhof gang had affected the trappings of radical Marxism.” (Herald Tribune, Tuesday, September 11th, 2007, p. 8). I fully agree with this analysis, reminding as well that terrorism is certainly not a practice specific to Islamic fundamentalism… 25 The development of criminal organizations as the “mano nera” or the “mafia –cosa nostra” by the Italians in the USA at the end of the XIXth century can be read partly as a reaction to the discrimination of which new immigrants were victims (of course many other factors should be also considered). On the contrary, the

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

93

lead to terrorism. This is the same for radicalization that can be maintained at the political debate level, without shifting towards terrorist acts. Cultural stigmatization is, however, part of the social stress imposed on immigrants, as even the small research I present on second generation Muslims in Italy shows. As we have seen, the mobilisation of the Muslim communities in Europe has much to do with the social and political participation for the recognition of a specific identity that coincides with religion (and with religious practices) and for being accepted both as Europeans and Muslims. Opposed to “assimilation”, Muslims seek nevertheless to be integrated into European societies. Questions raised by Muslim minorities challenge multiculturalism, minorities’ rights and also secularization in nation states where religion is separated by political power and is a private affair. However, the issue of secularization doesn’t concern only the Islamic religion26. The hostility of which Muslims are victims is not, by the way, necessarily producing a will to separate and shift towards Islamic fundamentalist ideology: on the contrary, it can encourage participation in movements where they can express their opposition to USA and British policy together with European militants. As a UK Muslim activist of the Stop the war movement says: “This country is their home, The effort of islamic institutions should go even more in a direction of moderation in order to show young people that a right apprenticeship of their own religion is not contradictory with the concept of belonging and citizenship of the nonmuslim society, where they have chosen to build thier lives. “ 27. Intercultural and inter-religious dialogues, as well as free and rich political debates, are the best answer to prevent the shifting of immigrant Muslim communities in Europe towards radical fundamentalist positions justifying or even in favour of terrorism.

References [1] Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997), in L’Islam des jeunes, Flammarion, Paris [2] Gritti-Allam, 2001, Musulmani in Italia, Guerini, Milan [3] Campani, G. (2003), Perché siamo musulmane, Guerini, Milan [4] Blaschke, Anwar, Sanders, (2004), State policies towards Muslim minorities in Sweden, Greart Britain and Germanys , Parabolis, Berlin [5] Bauman Z. (2000), La solitudine del cittadino globale, Feltrinelli, Milan [6] Freund, W. (1989) La grande torture des esprits au Maghreb, « Le Monde diplomatique », July 1989. [7] Massari, M. (2006), Islamophobia, La paura e l’Islam, Laterza, Bari [8] Alberoni, F. Baglioni: (1965), L’integrazione dell’immigrato nella società industriale. Il Mulino, Bologna [9] Golini, A.: 2006, L’immigrazione straniera: indicatori e misure di integrazione.Il Mulino, Bologna. [10] Cesari, J., Pacini, A. (2005), Giovani musulmani in Europa, Fondazione Agnelli, Turin [11] Campani, G. (2006) Indicators of integration in Italy, paper [12] Roy, O. (2002), Global Muslims. Le radici occidentali del nuovo Islam, Feltrinelli, Milan [13] Schmitt di Friedberg O. (1994), Islam, Solidarietà e lavoro. I muridi senegalesi in Italia. Fondazione Agnelli, Turin [14] Allievi, S./Dassetto, F.: 1993, Il ritorno dell’Islam. I musulmani in Italia, EL, Rome

terrorist actions of the Italian anarchists –for example Cafiero in France- responded to an ideology that saw in the anarchy a way to reach a better world. 26 For example, in Europe, Catholics and in the USA Protestants tend as well to challenge secular states on abortion and gay marriages. It is clear that the perception of blasphemy is certainly different: even if the Catholic authorities were quite mad about the book, “Da Vinci Code”, they didn’t burn the books in a square as some religious authorities did in some Islamic states… 27 Cfr. www.mabonline.info/english/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=545

94

G. Campani / Immigration in Europe, Security, Terrorism

[15] Allievi S. (1996), L'Islam in Italia: profili storici e sociologici, Quaderni di diritto e di politica ecclesiastica, EDB, Bologna. [16] Allievi, S. (1997),”Muslim minorities in Italy and their image in Italian media” in VERTOVEC, S. & PEACH, C. (eds), Islam in Europe: the politics of religion and community, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.211-223 [17] Allievi, S. (1999), I nuovi musulmani, Edizioni Lavoro, Rome [18] Allam, M., Gritti, R (2001), Islam Italia, Guerini e Associati, Milan [19] Allam F., (2001) L’islam contemporaneo in Europa e in Italia fra affermazione identitaria e nuova religione minoritaria, in Zincone G., Secondo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna [20] Saint-Blancat, C. (19959, L’islam della diaspora, Edizioni Lavoro, Rome [21] Stolcke V. (2000), “Le nuove frontiere e le nuove retoriche culturali dell’esclusione in Europa”, in Mezzadra S., Petrillo A. (a cura di), I confini della globalizzazione. Lavoro, culture, cittadinanza, Manifestolibri, Roma. [22] Cohen S. (1972), Folk Devils and Moral Panics: the Creation of Mods and Rockers, MacGibbon & Klee, London. [23] Pace E. (2007), Religioni nella Babele della globalizzazione, paper [24] Liauzu, C. (1992), Race et civilization, Anthropos, Paris [25] Hardt and Negri (2004), Multitude, New York.

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-95

95

Chapter 8 Consequences of Illegal Immigration on the Economic and Social Situation in Moldova Natalia Balaban, Sergiu Galitschi

Abstract. There are 3 different categories of illegal movement of people across borders- Illegal immigration, human smuggling, and human trafficking- and each of these concepts have quite different legal and political consequences. Poverty and warfare contribute to the rising tide of migration, both legal and illegal. Smuggling and trafficking 'employs' millions of people every year, and leads to the annual turnover of billions of dollars. The current study examines the existing situation (with regard to legal and illegal immigration) in the Republic of Moldova. Migration stream coming from Moldova is estimated as 10000 people a month, mainly to Europe, and mostly motivated by poverty. Both negative and positive consequences of the immigration are discussed, with regard to the political, economical and social aspects of the phenomenon.

Introduction It is important to make a careful distinction between illegal immigration, human smuggling, and human trafficking which are nested, but yet different, concepts. This distinction is relevant because these different categories of the illegal movement of people across borders have quite different legal and political consequences. Human smuggling and trafficking have become a world-wide industry that 'employs' every year millions of people and leads to the annual turnover of billions of dollars. The flourishing smuggling routes are made possible by weak legislation, border controls, corrupted police officers, and the power of the organized crime. Naturally, poverty and warfare contribute to the rising tide of migration, both legal and illegal. The current study describes the existing situation and emerging trends with regard to immigration (legal as well as illegal) in the Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova, the second smallest former Soviet republic, declared its independence on August 27, 1991, recognized by more than 170 countries worldwide, is member of UN, Council of Europe and WTO.

96

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

Problem of immigration In general, illegal migration seems to be increasing due to the strict border controls combined with the expansion of the areas of free mobility, such as the Schengen area, and the growing demographic imbalance in the world. The more closed are the borders and the more attractive are the target countries, the greater is the share of human trafficking in illegal migration and the role played by the national and transnational organized crime. The involvement of criminal groups in migration leads to trafficking and thus to victimization and the violation of human rights, including prostitution and slavery. Illegal migration is a subcategory of international migration. Its distinguishing feature is the legal status that is defined by the rules adopted by national governments and intergovernmental organizations. The illicit status of migrants also has consequences for the mechanisms of cross-border movement and the personal position of migrants. In other words, illegal migration cannot be separated either from the larger dynamics of the global economy nor the policies pursued by governments. Thus, although legal and illegal immigration differ in many crucial respects, they are both located at the interface of international economic and political systems. Smuggling and trafficking Licit and illicit aspects of international migration can be depicted as a set of concentric circles. The largest circle covers all aspects of international migration, including illegal migration. Human smuggling is a special case of illegal immigration, while human trafficking is a subcategory of smuggling. The Protocols define smuggling as 'the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident'. In that sense, the smuggling of individuals violates the rights of the state, while human trafficking amounts to the violation of human rights. Trafficking refers to the 'recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraught, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose exploitation'. The main forms of exploitation are prostitution, forced labour, slavery, or the removal of organs. Women’s Trafficking

It is widely known, both inside Moldova and abroad, that the country faces an acute problem of trafficking in women for sexual exploitation, a practice that involves serious human rights violations. The exact number of these women, who according to non-governmental organizations are tricked and sold into prostitution, remains unknown, but some insights into the scale of the problem can be gained from official programs assisting returned victims of trafficking. Between January 2000 and May 2003, a total of 1,056 victims of trafficking were repatriated to Moldova with the

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

97

assistance of the International Organization for Migration, according to the IOM counter-trafficking office in Chisinau. Most of the women had been lured abroad with false job promises and then had to work under life-threatening conditions in brothels in Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and Albania. A few had also returned from western European countries. Women are typically recruited through "tourist companies" or "employment abroad agencies" (some of them even with official licenses) that violate the law. Relations are established through personal contacts or newspaper ads. Women are then deceived and tricked into working as waitresses or barmaids, but are later abused, sold, and enslaved. Women are recruited mainly in the countryside, where they are first paid some $100 to come to Chisinau. They are later sold abroad for $300. The price goes up along the way, and when they are sold from Bucharest, the price is about $1,000. Many of the women are trafficked to and through Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo, with Timisoara in Romania being the main transit point. As detected cases show, women are "ordered" (one recent case concerned an "order" of 50 women for bars in Istanbul) and promptly delivered on demand. Little is known about the organizational structure of these trafficking rings. Groups work together loosely and treat women as "commodities." It is unlikely that groups recruiting and selling women in Moldova can exert any control over them in the destination countries. However, there is clearly a chain of cooperation, from source to transit to destination countries, as part of the tactics to force women into submission and prostitution. Threats against the victims' families back home are one such tactic. Thus, information on family members (names, addresses, etc.) is passed on from Moldova to the traffickers at the destination country, who can use this information to blackmail and threaten trafficking victims. Conversely, information and orders to carry out threats against the family back home can also be passed the other way from the destination country to Moldova. On a note related to trafficking and other illegal activity, while there has been practically no significant immigration to Moldova, in recent years the country has emerged as a transit country for illegal migration to the West. The lack of control over the country's external border with Ukraine in Transdniestria leaves about 200 km of uncontrolled and, in effect, open border. No figures are available on how many people find their way through this permeable area and continue onward to the West. In other parts of the country, between 4,500 and 6,000 persons are apprehended annually at the country's external borders.

Realities of Life and Perspectives of Moldovian Immigrants Migration stream coming from Moldova is estimated as 10000 people a month, mainly to Europe. 47% of Moldavians emigrants are evidently presented by women at the age from 16 to 64. Emigration is a social resource, including, in emotional sense as well, an essential number of the citizens of Moldova: thinking about departure, better life, earnings, the possibility to buy a house, gain confidence represents a long-wished by a Moldavian citizen aim. The reverse estimation shows how emigration, as it is, represents the element of social impoverishment, mainly for young generation, as far as the rejection of school is observed (diffusion of illiteracy), getting higher education is felt as

98

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

unnecessary, more than that, university is more and more apprehended as “a parking lot” for the unemployed or for those who are not able to go abroad at the moment. Working niches, occupied by Moldavian citizens in Europe, are in the spheres of building industry, house-keeping, agriculture, public catering, hotel keeping, junior medical personnel or nurses, machinery-building industry and small enterprises as a whole, though all the jobs are performed by the people with education, even higher education, which could allow them to get a job of a different kind. Advantageous conditions are granted by getting legalization, the possibility of which depends on the legislation of each European state; those people who live in the country illegally, risk very much - they live in the constant fear of departure, which promises great troubles in accordance with European legislation It so happens, particularly in Italy and France, that a Moldavian citizen captured by the police because of his illegal stay in the country, in order to avoid being escorted back to his own country, asks for political asylum, and gets a temporary residence permit which does not give him a possibility to get a job; he has to wait until the country, to which inquiry was made, takes a decision, which in most cases is negative. The request for political asylum is only a way to avoid deportation from the country, which does not solve the problem of illegal stay on the territory. Such system is widely used today by the Romanians in Italy, the number of illegal residents in which is estimated as about 100000. An emigrant from Moldova has good possibilities to proceed a social road in Europe, as the nature of a Moldavian is in harmony with the nature of a European, where abilities, character and devotion are valued. The prevalence of Romanian criminal organizations over the Albanian ones, which is observed now, reveals against and against participation of the citizens of Moldova. Support in integration comes from strong solidarity of Moldavian Diasporas in foreign countries, because on the territory of the country of residence a strong spirit of cooperation, mutual help, and support in a difficult situation reveals. The Moldavians unlike the Romanians and the Ukrainians, have not formed stable forms of congregation, recognized just in certain places, which could be more effective and, which is important, could render a good deal of support to newcomers. You can often meet Moldavian citizens living in barracks, under the bridges or in extremely poor conditions, because, in spite of the fact that they have a job and residence permit, they cannot afford to pay a rent. Renting an apartment in a European country is about 600-800 euro a month, for the dwelling space 60-70 square meters, where no less than four people live and share the rent. To this sum it is necessary to add daily expenses for food, which cannot be less than 15 euro and at least 10 euro for other needs; so, it is easy to estimate that 900 euro a month is needed for living expenses, the rest of the money is send home from the expected salary of 1200-1500 euro. This is possible in case of an adequate job. One can earn more, but here we come to the sphere of exploitation when working time exceeds 7 hours a day. The situation is different for nurses, taking care of elderly people, where woman earn from 800 to 1000 euro, accommodation and meals included. Seasonal jobs are considered to be profitable, particularly in the sphere of catering, but not in agriculture. Effective help comes from charity organizations of Catholic Church, distributed all over Europe; they offer such kinds of help as canteens, centres of trust, protection of right in the sphere of labour, legal support on legalization or other procedures connected with getting residence permit, getting a job, teaching a foreign language. It

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

99

often happens that Moldavian citizens, particularly in Italy, get help from Catholic Church charity organizations. Of cause, an emigrant from Moldova suffers hardships, because he often has to pay a debt for an entry visa to criminal organizations or illegal agents. More than that, it is necessary to add persistent demands of money that come from the rest part of his family on the territory of Moldova.

Push Factors The demand for emigration is very high and in about all the cases its real and indisputable motivation is poverty. Migration phenomenon really exists in both legal and illegal aspects. Moldova nowadays is experiencing a difficult economic situation, which puts the population into obvious condition of poverty. Inner causes of such life of the country are connected with the collapse of the former Soviet Union and with the lack of consecutive actions directed to the economical development of the region. This, together with outer causes, mainly connected with the political development of all Europe which will make Moldova a new dividing border between United Europe and Eastern Europe in 2007, makes one understand the state of uncertainty experienced by Moldavian people. Recent statistics has revealed that 50% of today’s population lives under subsistence level, 38% are in unstable condition, 10% live well and do not face problems, and 2% are represented by the rich men. To these figures it is necessary to add mass exodus which has enveloped 25% of the population that immigrated to other countries, mainly European ones, either legally or illegally. As it has been estimated emigration from the country makes up about 10000 Moldavian citizens a month. Social discontent is a reality, which the population reveals through a number of alarming signals, such as distrust of the politics, in the whole and to the state administration in particular; the conviction that the only thing that works is corruption on all levels; fear that the present-day country does not have future; the assurance that it is only emigration that can solve the problems, in other words, there is a generally accepted opinion that one should leave Moldova, by any means. The problems grow with the growth of uncertainty and worry for the future, and also when people get information about the prosperity of their compatriots abroad, which is not always true, who brag about their money and wealth, without realizing its really insignificant amount. Social process in Moldova takes the course which is peculiar to a poor, but economically developing countries, where the profits are distributed unfairly, thus the poor get poorer, while the rich get richer. Economic benefits, gained from money transfers, that is, the money which Moldavian citizens living abroad send periodically to their families, do not give prosperity to everybody, but just to few people. Most often this money is spent for paying the debts accumulated in the past or for paying taxes, buying habitation or starting some minor business, that is why global economical planning which would mean development is out of the question. To all these factors can be added: high level of distrust of the banking system, uncertainty in confirmation of law in the sphere of investment great influence of corruption.

100

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

Negative consequences of Illegal Immigration on Economic and Social Life in the Country Economic. Economic effects can be positive in the short run, but they are at the same time negative in the long-term prospective. While low qualified migrants are usually part of short-term and seasonal migration, highly qualified workers are prone to longterm or permanent migration, this process being known as ‘brain-drain’. Programmers, scientists, doctors, musicians and many others are often highly qualified if compared to average qualification of foreign country’s nationals. This is why many countries even launch official recruitment initiatives to attract high-skilled workers, thus enriching the professional capacity of the country. For Moldova as a sending country however, it results in a major devastation of labour market and overall disqualification of labour force, which in turn does not at all favour any economic development in the long run. Political. Labour migration can be considered in terms of external and internal political risks [25]. In terms of external political risks, labour migration affects negatively the relations between sending and receiving countries. Most Moldovan migrant workers stay in the country of destination on illegal conditions, either having overstayed their visas or having no work permission. Taking into account rather big number of Moldovans in certain countries, such as Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Germany, one can assume that there are few chances for Moldovans to be welcomed and respected by locals, especially by those unemployed. Apart from significant disturbances that migrant workers create on receiving country’s labour market, criminal issues arise, including racket, increase of criminality, trafficking of drugs and women. In turn, language barriers and illegal situation makes it extremely difficult for migrant workers to become integrated into foreign environment. These factors altogether undermine the image of Moldova and its citizens. Internal political risks. Having stayed abroad for a relatively long period of time, migrant workers change dramatically their views, values and social position. They become pro-active, independent and ready to assume risks. At the same time they become alienated in their home country and do not take part in local political processes, having no interest to vote and take decisions. As a result, non-migrant population, most of it being the older generation longing for their communist past, become more influential. It threatens the process of democratisation and hampers the removal of ideological barriers between Moldova and its western neighbours. However, one of the worst aspects of labour migration is the phenomenon of human trafficking. It is only this process, which is negative in all respects, social, political, cultural and economic. Social. The social effect of labour migration is vast. Families are separated for a long period of time. Long absence of spouses has negative impact on relationships, sexual behaviour and quite often creates conflicts within the family. Since families are often broken, children’s views and values are also affected. Trafficking in women, in which field Moldova holds leading positions among CIS countries, and which is becoming a national tragedy, aggravates the situation. In the long run such a complicated environment has numerous negative effects: changing moral principles in the society, decreased birth rate, affected genotype and overall modification of demographic structure. Disintegration of family Migration process of today brings mainly to

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

101

the crisis of the institution of the family that is why the family pays the bitterest price for poverty and social loneliness. It is necessary to make a preface which comes from the historical past of Moldova: the family experienced a dim period in the time when the state was being formed, in connection with which new generation have not received effective experience or model as far as the question of family unity are concerned, as well as the question of upbringing, respect to the parents, defence of human life. A lot of leaders in the spheres of economics and politics, as well as simple citizens, including the youth, grew up in incomplete families. The present-day society and the institute of family in particular, pay for that historic-political vacuum. Most often, a figure inside the family, living far from home, is a woman, a mother. The absence of a woman is inevitably a strong element of dissociation, which brings to slowing down child upbringing and to the lack of supervision for the rest part of nuclear family; it also brings to the growth of alcoholism.Failure to return a woman to the family or complete alienation of children or a parent left in Moldova is also observed. It is interesting to read a report of a Moldavian woman, who, for a long time, has been living in one of the European countries, who writes to the lawyer claming that she does not recognize a boy whom she abandoned at the time of departure, as her child.The only figure that could perform a linking role inside the family and that always remains weak, is an elder relative, either a grandfather or a grandmother, to whom a difficult role of upbringing children is committed, and who is often in the state of argument with younger generation. The younger generation is very often exposed to temptation of getting consumer sendings, which come from a parent in emigration, they have a great demand for independence and for the desire to follow the emigrated parent; they are tempted by material well-being which comes to the family. Thus, the family faces some situations which do not let it perform a real upbringing role. Abandon of underaged Discontent of the minors is vividly seen and its causes are numerous: the collapse of the family, the lack of stimulus to school education, the crash of educational methodology, the refusal to study and diffusion of illiteracy, attractiveness of well-being and consumer sendings. Thus, a squall of social temptations that make the process of upbringing more difficult comes down on a teenager. The minor is in the state of crisis, but the structures which are aimed to perform upbringing functions are in the state of even greater crisis – they are family and school. What can be demanded from a child who lives together with elderly grandparents, whose parents have either emigrated or divorced or live in poverty? School is at the same situation; it does not stimulate education and is not able to support teaching stuff, which, because of extremely low salaries, prefers to emigrate. When a minor suffers refusal or isolation, he is compelled to act by his own, practice self-upbringing without having good examples, which are substituted by sendings from a far-away society of well-being. The collapse of the category of young generation represents a dramatic situation for Moldavian society, which risks to be left without the future, the children of the country can be left to the mercy of fate, doomed to loneliness and emigration. To this the state of poverty should be added, which begets humiliation and sufferings, which limits the child in choice, feeds the society with dreams, plans, wishes. The child is attracted by the neighboring society from which he gets consumer sendings, the temptation to which is difficult to resist.

102

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

There is such a phenomenon on Moldavian streets as homeless children. Here we have to distinguish two notions – “street children” and “the children of the street”. There are no “street children” in Moldova, but are “children of the street” there Discontent of elderly people Elderly people represent the most suffering and unprotected social category which experiences physical, as well as inner suffering and worry; they gave much for the others, for their own country, but now they are compelled to beg a piece of bread and charity. They are often called “veterans”, and they are men and women who devoted themselves to their country, they created the history of Moldova and paved the way to the people. Nowadays aged people feel themselves abandoned. They live on miserable income, they do not have a necessary minimum for food, even family refuses them. The sight of elderly people queuing in different canteens, a lot of which are arranged by Catholic Church, must give rise to deep thinking and understanding of their difficult social position. We are speaking about patient men and women, who are deserving, humble, almost submitted. On their faces, where years of suffering left their traces, the history of Moldova is written. But we must be able to read the plea for help and support on those faces, the last embrace of hope, which is addressed, with sadness and respect to those who give them hot meal, footwear, clothes, medicine and everything they need. Naturally, the conditions of an elderly person living in the capital or its suburb differ from the conditions of an elderly living in outlying regions. The latter live in villages, where, in spite of the equally poor conditions, a big support comes from social solidarity. Sex – tourism This topic demands firmness and decisiveness and here we should expose earnest criticism towards a big number of foreigners who come to Moldova with the only aim to experience a period of sex-tourism. Such situation must be firmly accused and all the state structures and all those who love Moldavian people must take an active part in the struggle with it. Sex-tourism is based on an abused and unacceptable belief that an East-European woman can be used as a thing for personal delight and entertainment. Thus, foreigners from different countries, such as Turkey, Italy, Germany, or Balkan countries come to Moldova, buy girls for a few days, use them only for sex and after being contented return them to poverty. To struggle with sex-tourism means to glorify a Moldavian woman, the richness of her soul, her inner force, her courage and readiness to sacrifice for the sake of the family. Lots of Moldavian women in Europe perform jobs that demand great devotion in order to support their families and do it meekly in full assurance that they do it for the good. At the same time tourists of easy sex use Moldavian women, defy their dignity and freedom, and sell their beauty, leaving them the scars of sufferings which are never effaced by means of useless handful of money. The answer to such humiliation and injury could be the awakening and the courage of legislation. Brain Drain If remittances are the major benefits of migration from the point of view of the source countries, the loss of human resources—particularly highly skilled people—is the most serious cost. The market for advanced skills has become truly a global market, and the most dynamic industrial economies are admitting—sometimes even recruiting—significant proportions of the highly trained professionals from poor countries. The loss of skilled people imposes several different kinds of costs on their countries of origin. The most obvious is perhaps the cost of the education itself, which

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

103

in almost all cases has been heavily subsidized by the state. The emigration of the educated thus represents a transfer from the poor country to the rich. There are also fiscal costs associated with the brain drain, in that the country of origin loses the tax revenue that these potential high-learners would have paid into the national coffers. Losses of highly skilled professionals may, in the extreme case cripple entire institutions and sectors of an economy.

Positive consequences of Immigration Economic. In the short run outflow of labour is rather favorable for the domestic economy. Sending the excessive unused labour away from home in fact eases the burden of domestic unemployment. People who left Moldova feed their families, again easing the pressure on budget expenditures. But the most important positive effect, and this is the case for all sending countries, is workers’ remittances and transfers, both in the form of hard currency and in kind. According to recent estimations of the National Bank, migrant workers send back home around 257 mln US dollars in the year 2002, the amount being comparable to the national annual revenue. It has also been identified that each of those employed overseas sent home by bank transfer 1,100 US dollars, which means that considerable part of their income stayed abroad or was brought home in cash, and therefore not accounted for. Actual inflow of hard currency to Moldova must be even higher. In terms of monetary policy, higher supply of foreign currency on the domestic market helps to protect national currency. And this is why the NBM leads favoring policy in this respect, placing no restrictions on import of hard currency into the country. These resources are mostly used for consumption, but investment is also stimulated to some extent, which inevitably contributes to the development of economy. And in broader terms, as long as domestic economy is as poor as it is now, the Government will not be interested in implementing the restrictive policy towards labour migration. Money transfers, or the money which the emigrant sends to his family, represent a really great economic profit for Moldova. The negative aspect of this profit comprises the fact that emigration is considered to be the only possibility to prevent poverty, hence the reality of the situation in Moldova is that emigration solves the problem of one person, but it speeds the process of social impoverishment. The capital city of Chisinau's literally hundreds of money exchange offices, in a country with essentially no tourist trade, indicate the importance of remittances to the Moldovan economy. The standard currencies exchanged in all these offices are US dollars and Euros, but most offices also have rates for Russian, Romanian, and Ukrainian currency. Some also exchange the currencies of Switzerland, Turkey, Sweden, and, less often, a few other European countries. This inflow of remittances makes itself apparent in urban living standards that often appear higher than the official statistics. Most of the money inflow is used for consumption or the acquisition of apartments, with little going into investment. The high cash inflow, because it is spent almost exclusively on imports, has led to years of low inflation (below 10 percent) and stable exchange rates, although prices are cyclical (higher in the winter, when money from cyclical work abroad arrives and agricultural goods become scarce). Many returning migrants buy apartments in Chisinau – in 2002,

104

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

the prices for apartments shot up by 59 percent. There are widely varying estimates of the scale of these remittances. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, official transfers (mostly through Western Union, whose offices can be found everywhere in the country) amounted to $223 million, or 15 percent of GDP in 2001. However, it is likely that these official transfers represent only a fraction of the total amount of remittances. In interviews with returned migrants and family members of current migrants, the "courier system" was usually named as the preferred option for transferring money. Such money couriers (trusted people who physically carry money across borders) operate from destination countries with large Moldovan migrant communities. The main rationale for using money couriers instead of wire services is the high fees charged by the latter. Commission fees at Western Union vary between four and 22 percent, depending on the amount of money transferred. They also require legitimization (an official ID card or passport) for amounts exceeding Ђ1,100. In contrast, charges for courier services amount to one to three percent of the cash transferred. Moreover, there are also transfer services for goods, with trucks delivering goods from destination countries back home for pick-up by designated beneficiaries. Popular goods for transfer are clothes, baby supplies, electronic devices, and cars. While it is hard to quantify the scale of these transfers, total (official and unofficial) remittances are estimated by some to be as high as twice the official GDP. Social. As we have already mentioned, labour migration is not only the consequence of poverty, it is also the result of democratization of the former Soviet states, of internationalization and integration in Europe. Having gained the independence, openness of the country has not been given as granted, gradual development of international trade and migration were the main levers for that. Upon return to Moldova, even for short-term stay home, migrants bring in international tendencies and new ideas back home and contribute to the development of the society.

Conclusion As most of the countries Moldova is subject to both immigration and emigration of labour. the alarming outflow of Moldovan labour to foreign labour markets, has been steadily growing for the last 5-6 years. In terms of international position in migration Moldova is a net exporter of labour, a country that without any control expels its excessive labour force to the foreign labour markets. Low living standards, limited possibilities of employment and other problems have resulted in a mass migration of Moldovan citizens to various countries of the world. According to various estimations there are around 600,000-1,000,000 Moldovan workers employed abroad, although official statistics says this number does not exceed 234,000. In the last 5-6 years Western vector of migration has become predominant, main countries of destination being Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal), the Balkans and Germany. The major part of migrant workers is employed in hard, lowskilled and low-paid sectors. At the same time, less intense outflow of high-skilled labour produces a heavy negative impact on Moldovan labour market and economic development in general. The effects of labour outflow for Moldova are, as for any country, both positive and negative. From one point of view, it is rather favorable for the governing authorities. Labour emigration is a short-term solution to such burning issues as

N. Balaban and S. Galitschi / Consequences of Illegal Immigration

105

unemployment, excessive labour and lack of income sources in many families. In fact, it means passing the burden to other governments’ shoulders. In the long run however it undermines both the local labour market and the development of domestic economy in general. The main tragedy for Moldova in terms of emigration is trafficking in women. Two thirds of migrant women are involved in sex industry, often on the edge of slavery, living in unbearable conditions and not receiving the amount of money they were promised to. Upon return, most of them are incapable of reintegrating into normal life. This is why they tend to come back on track with prostitution. Some antitrafficking campaigns are already implemented by civil society, but more extensive approach is needed, from the Government in particular. A lot should be done in order to establish cooperation with European countries in the field of labour migration. Recent cooperation experience with Italy and Portugal is a successful example, and such efforts should be continued. However, as far as illegal transit migration is concerned, the Transnitrian conflict remains a source of anxiety and instability for the whole Southeastern European region. A break-through is needed in the process of conflict settlement in order to establish a respectful image for Moldova in Europe.

References [1] Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings seen as a security problem for EUROPE”. W. Bruggeman, IOM Conference on Combating Human trafficking, 19 September 2002 [2] “Migration and protection of citizens’ interests”. “Nezavisimaia Moldova”, June 2002 [3] Report presented by Angelina Apostol, Deputy Minister of Labour. Continuous Expansion of trafficking in Human Beings. September 2000. [4] Tu si Migratia”. Information bulletin of the State Migration Service, December 2002.Golos Naroda newspaper, No 38, 25 October 2002 [5] UNDP, National Human Development Report, Republic of Moldova. 2000, UNDP. [6] UNICEF, Poverty and Welfare Trends in Moldova over the 1990s. Country paper. Background paper prepared for the Social Monitor (2002). 2002, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre: Chisinau. [7] International Organization for Migration (IOM): "NGOs in Combating Trafficking in Women in the Republic of Moldova," Chisinau, August 2002 [8] Image of Republic of Moldova abroad L.Bulat, A.Tolstogan, T.Valcu [9] www.reginapacis.md

This page intentionally left blank

Part 3 Varied Perceptions, Ideological Attributes, and Factors of Terrorism in Immigrants and Minorities

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-109

109

Chapter 9 Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain Rogelio Alonso Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain

Introduction On March 11, 2004 Spain suffered its worst terrorist attack ever. On that day, now known in Spain as 11 M, Islamist fundamentalists killed one hundred and ninety two people injuring hundreds after ten bombs went off in four different trains full of commuters during the morning rush hour. These terrorist attacks and the collective suicide of seven of those responsible for them weeks later, on April 3, 2004, when Spanish police surrounded the flat where some of the men involved in 11 M were hiding, exposed the prominence that the jihadist movement had reached in the country. Spain, which as far back as 2001 had been described by judicial authorities as the ‘main base of Al Qaeda in Europe [1] as a result of the activities of Islamist radicals during the previous decade, had also become a target of violence. The evolution of jihadism demonstrated the extent to which the country had turned into a hub for the recruitment and radicalisation of individuals prepared to commit terrorist attacks in Spain and further away. Over the last ten years almost two hundred people have been accused by the Spanish judiciary of being involved in terrorist activities related to Islamic fundamentalism, most of them being Muslim immigrants. This paper will analyse the main patterns in the process of radicalisation and recruitment evident in the networks of jihadist terrorists that have emerged in the country so far. Relying on research based on interviews with significant informants, including members of the security forces and intelligence services, as well as open secondary sources and judicial reports, the author will examine the process of radicalization and recruitment of the main cells dismantled in Spain. The paper will explore dominant factors and currents in the process of mobilization of individuals whom over the last decade have joined groups involved in spreading and defending the jihad.

110

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

The process of indoctrination and proselytising As in the case of other terrorist expressions, those who are sympathetic to religious extremism and terrorism in the name of Islam represent a small but a significant minority disaffected with the country in which they live. The analysis of the information available so far allows for some general conclusions about the sociodemographic profile of these individuals and their processes of radicalisation. To this extent, data relating to 188 persons who were imprisoned in Spain between 2001 and 2005, under suspicion of involvement in Jihadist terrorism, showed that most of those engaged in these activities were men born between 1966 and 1975, aged from 26 to 40 at the time of their arrest, and mostly in possession of legal immigration documentation. Among this group, seven out of ten prison inmates originated from the Maghreb, 69 of them being born in Morocco and 67 in Algeria. Individuals of Syrian and Pakistani origin constituted a minority within the group, of whom only eight individuals were Spanish nationals [2]. As can be inferred from this analysis, the limited access to certain sources prevents a more systematic appraisal of a wider sample of individuals, a shortfall which is also evident when attempting to examine the factors leading to the radicalisation of jihadist terrorists in the country. Nonetheless, the assessment of a wide range of sources provides quite a clear picture of the evolution of jihadism in Spain indicating that the process of radicalisation and recruitment generally follows some discernible patterns that will be explained below. First of all it should be pointed out that irrespective of the origin of the radicals a common denominator emerges. A neosalafist ideology advocated by Islamist extremists constitutes an ever present pattern that homogenises the diversity of profiles that can be appreciated when analysing their process of radicalisation. A radical interpretation of Salafism, that is, neosalafism, which advocates a global jihad as well as the unification of the Muslim world and the setting up of a new caliphate, appears as a key variable that has allowed different individuals to get submerged into the subculture of violence required to pursue terrorist actions. The consolidation of this subculture of death has very often occurred under great influence from individual manipulation carried out by Islamist extremists. Spiritual leaders or other relevant figures exerted decisive influence on individuals who at certain points have decided to participate in extremist activities espousing a violent ideology like the one referred to. Those leaders usually identified places and clusters for the socialisation of potential recruits which enabled the radical doctrine to spread. Some of the mostly young and male recruits were targeted by extremists but others were recruited through personal contact, often by chance. Ideological indoctrination preceded active involvement in terrorist activities, the influence of peers constituting a very relevant factor in their process of radicalisation as it seems to be in other terrorist cases too. Very often potential recruits were exposed to videos, books, songs, speeches and other sources available through the World wide web that justified the use of violence and the jihad; places such as mosques, prisons, Islamic institutions as well as other social and sports meetings becoming propitious for these types of activities which provided an environment for some to gravitate to terrorism. It was through the engagement in this gradual and regular process that the commitment to the cause deepened also leading to

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

111

involvement in training and fundraising, both inside and abroad, strengthening solidarity bonds among those being radicalised.

How and where did the radicalisation take place? These patterns can be clearly appreciated when analysing numerous episodes of radicalised individuals and also in relation to those responsible for perpetrating the terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 in Madrid. The availability of more information on this particular episode, in which a large number of individuals participated, allows for a more elaborated discussion of an example that reveals representative patterns that are also evident in other cases. The terrorist cell responsible for the 11 M attacks did engage in similar processes of radicalisation and recruitment as other extremists. Certain individuals were in charge of planning the recruitment of newcomers who were attracted into their clusters following a structured and organised procedure, as can be inferred from the explanation provided by one of those who acquainted some of the terrorists involved in the 11 M atrocity [3]. In his statement to Judge Juan del Olmo, the magistrate responsible for the investigation, this informant admitted to meeting different members of the group involved in perpetrating the terrorist attacks in Madrid. He recalled encountering at various occasions key radical Islamists such as Sarhane Ben Adbelmajid Fakhet, nicknamed the Tunisian, Moutaz Almallah Dabas, Hicham Tensamani –iman of the town of Portillo in Toledo- and Mustapha Maymouni. These figures considered themselves to be members of a group which they would refer to as ‘the brothers of the martyrs’. Membership of this group would entail regular meetings in order to discuss issues related to Islam as well as the reasons behind the death of ‘Muslim brothers’ in areas such as Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya and Iraq. The religious advice of imam Hicham Tensamani was often sought by members of the group, particularly by Sarhane the Tunisian, in order to strengthen the link between the grievances of Muslims that featured so prominently in the indoctrination process and the response with which they should be met. The staged process of recruitment and radicalisation meant that terrorist actions were not discussed at every single meeting. In fact, attendants of these meetings understood that those issues would be later discussed at smaller groups once the leaders of the group had identified, through various conversations, those individuals who would be open to more radical stances and once a certain degree of trust had developed among themselves. Videos were also watched at the meetings arranged by the group with the intention of reinforcing the view of a victimised Muslim community, as it was the case with the film recorded at a training camp in Afghanistan which showed youngsters of different nationalities who had travelled to that country to find their death. By resorting to these means, the group developed ideological solidarity bonds with other Muslims who were losing their lives in areas such as Afghanistan and Chechnya, to the extend that they would insist on calling themselves the ‘brothers of the martyrs’(Ibid pp1212-1213). Such an association with ‘martyrs’ who were regarded as ‘the vanguard of the Muslim nation’ enhanced the attractiveness of the offer to approach and join the group. An example provided by the wife of Mouhannad Almallah Dabbas, one of the individuals charged with taking part in perpetrating the terrorist attacks in Madrid, illustrates how the recruitment and radicalisation process developed. In her testimony to the judge she recalls how different men were brought home by her husband in what

112

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

seems to be an attempt to lure them into the group. These visitors would watch videos and would listen to religious songs extolling the jihad. One of these songs was used as background music in a video that portrayed military training at a training camp in Afghanistan. This type of music would be constantly listened by Mouhannad at home and while driving around, being also used for recruitment and indoctrination purposes, as it would suggest the fact that numerous copies of tapes containing that kind of songs were frequently made. Mouhannad’s brother in law was one of the individuals brought to the house with the intention of being attracted into the group. He was shown a video in which ‘infidels’ forced a Muslim family to commit obscene acts. The video also contained pictures of a ‘Chechen martyr’ who was led to burial, as well as photographs of Osama Ben Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Ibid pp. 1216-1217). Books about Ben Laden were also used in the process of radicalisation and indoctrination, the Al Qaeda leader, commonly referred by them as ‘the emir’ (Ibid, p. 1222) not being the only figure that was seen as iconic for the group of radicals. Abu Qatada, the London based religious leader of Palestinian origin who was later on arrested under suspicion of being involved in terrorism, was a close friend of the Almallah brothers. Abu Qatada was regarded by the two brothers as the Al Qaeda ambassador in Europe. Amer Azizi was also seen as a ‘hero’ by members of the group because of his courageous escape from Spain when the police was about to arrest him and his decision to ‘combat’ in Afghanistan (Ibid, pp. 1218-1219). Another religious leader, imam Hicham Tensamani, was also seen as an influential figure to whom several individuals were taken in order to listen to his views in the belief that this would encourage them to join the group. Therefore, relevant figures like the ones alluded to provided role models for the newcomers exerting very useful influence on them. These leaders organised the proselytising and indoctrination of potential candidates, some of whom would join them in their efforts to expand and defend Islam, around different locations. The assembly places that have been mentioned so far were not the only ones were the activists gathered together. The terrace located at the M 30 mosque, the main mosque in Madrid, was also frequented by key figures such as Sarhane the Tunisian and Mouhannad Almallah Dabbas and other individuals who would regularly get together in the afternoons, particularly since October 2003 when their daily meetings would last from 17.00 to 21.30 [4]. Previous to these meetings, as far back as 2001, other encounters took place among radicals who would get together at various flats with the intention of recruiting and radicalising other individuals, mostly youngsters, some of which would be contacted at different mosques. These centres provided the opportunity for exchanges of opinions about Islam, enabling the recruiters to approach individuals whose open views seemed to be amenable to more radical inputs. It should be remembered that radical speeches would also be pronounced at some mosques, as the judiciary report on the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Madrid demonstrate when referring to a talk held in 2002 which focussed on the ‘jihad against the enemy in order to liberate not only the Palestinian territories but all Arab territories’ (Ibid, p. 1236). Thus some of the youngsters would be approached after prayers, being subsequently invited to watch videos containing speeches of religious leaders such as, for example, the Palestinian Abu Qatada or the Saudi Taham. Invitations to meetings would also follow these approaches. According to a police informant who also took part in several of the meetings held by one of the groups involved in these activities, at some point of the recruitment and

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

113

indoctrination process leaders identified numerous geographical contexts in which the jihad could be practised. Although Afghanistan or Chechnya remained countries of great significance and symbolism for those willing to practice jihad, violence was also acceptable and possible at other locations without requiring volunteers to travel away from their country of stay (Ibid, p. 1225). In fact, one of the radicals involved in the group explained as far back as 2002 that it was not necessary to travel to Afghanistan in order to engage in jihad since this could be done in Morocco and Spain (Ibid, p. 1235). Moreover, some of the radicals would constantly refer to Spaniards as Jews, depiction they would use in order to justify robberies and other crimes against Spanish citizens. In addition to this, violence against ‘incredulous governments’ in places such as Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, countries who were not led by ‘good Muslims’, was also justified. The justification of such a violent course of action was also found in different fatwas recited by heart by the attendants to these meetings. (Ibid, p. 1226). As a result of these mechanisms jihad was regarded as a duty of every Muslim as long as ‘infidels’ remained in control of lands ‘invaded’ and ‘taken from Muslims’. The experience in Spain so far suggests that the process of radicalisation is very often led by charismatic leaders. As regards the cells that took part in the March 11 attacks, Mustapha Maymouni and Sarhane Ben Addelmajid were seen with considerable respect being regarded as authority figures. The statement provided by one of the police informers who regularly engaged with them is particularly revealing of the variables used in these radicalisation processes led by them. The former would frequently recite verses and songs extolling the jihad while the latter would follow him with very emotional and enthusiastic statements encouraging the practice of jihad. Such a violent course of action was justified by appealing to the example of women who in the time of the prophet had followed the jihad themselves, leading him to question the courage of the men who were listening to him should they not do the same as the women had done. The information provided to the police and the judiciary by some of those involved with the group suggest that the process of radicalisation and recruitment was structured around two types of leadership, spiritual and organisational, which was exerted by Maymouni and the Tunisian respectively (Ibid, p. 1231). This dual leadership was also careful to guide the process of radicalisation and recruitment, as demonstrated by the warnings of Maymouni to one of the attendants at the group’s reunions. Following one of these meetings, Mustapha Maymouni privately congratulated one of the men present at the gathering for his bright personal views as expressed on issues related to the practise of jihad. He nonetheless warned him of the danger of ‘scaring’ some of the members present at the gathering since the majority of them lacked a good religious preparation, therefore requiring a slow indoctrination process, particularly in relation to the duty of jihad. Having said that, Maymouni went on to offer him the personal contacts that could assist him in his preparation, religious and otherwise, in order to properly follow the jihad (Ibid, p. 1234).

The rationale behind the radicalisation process Findings at the site of the suicide killings in the Madrid suburb of Leganés, in April 2004, proved very revealing of the ideology espoused by the terrorists and the means used to strengthen their ideological and personal commitment to their violent cause

114

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

(Ibid, pp. 436-450). After the explosion Spanish police managed to reconstruct files contained in a computer found at the bomb site which included texts criticising the Saudi Arabian government for not being part of ‘the community of believers’, as well as all non Islamic governments, which were described as ‘infidels’. Other files contained several references to significant shuras from Qur‘an which were interpreted as legitimisation of violence against ‘Allah’s enemies’, as well as a video which described the nineteen terrorists who killed themselves on September 11 as ‘examples of mujahideen that should be followed’ and ‘valuable young men who have changed History’. The legitimisation framework required by all kind of terrorists, irrespective of their ideology, was also evident in the rhetoric used by Islamic fundamentalists in Spain, as other police findings corroborated, among them a file found in a computer at the house in Leganés containing a text entitled: ‘Terrorism: its meaning and its situation from the Islamic point of view’. The author of the text distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorism. Whereas the former was to be directed against people that could cause ‘harm to humanity’, the latter was seen as the violence inflicted by Israel towards Palestine, the United Nations embargo on Iraq, and the USA intervention in Afghanistan. The computer material discovered by investigators exposed how a combination of factors commonly present in the motivational framework of others terrorist groups constituted very relevant variables of use for the radicalisation and recruitment process in this particular context. In fact the sources exposed a variety of considerations ideological, utilitarian and emotional, as well as the reinforcement of social and group identities- that could explain the rationale behind the terrorists involvement in the group, also representing key elements in their radicalisation and recruitment process. As a way of example, the analysis of the propaganda material used by Islamist radicals reveals a portrayal of terrorism as a useful and necessary means of achieving the objectives pursued by jihadists, not unlike other terrorist groups, also representing an honourable and prestigious response that would provide personal and collective gains for those who practised it, as the following sample illustrates. Numerous imams’ speeches were found, some of them praising the violence that had made possible the ‘moral defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan’. Others complained about ‘the fall of the Islamic world as a result of Israel’s occupation of Palestine’, also denouncing Saudi Arabia for welcoming USA troops, or the USA attempts to ‘erode the Arab culture and identity’, thus stating that ‘the only way out for a society that has lost everything is jihad’. The moral justification of terrorism was strengthened by rhetorical questions such as: ‘Is it alright to kill a Palestinian but not an American?’; or Osama Ben Laden’s response advocating Jihad: ‘Would it be fair to tell the lamb to stay still while the wolf is about to eat it?’. The reinforcement of such a course of action was provided by pieces produced by Abu Qatada in which he fiercely extolled the jihad and criticised those who didn’t follow it. Therefore, not only was terrorism rationalised as necessary and useful in tactical and strategically terms, but also as a reward, since ‘those who fall in the name of God and their nation, do not die, because they remain alive with God’. The legitimacy of jihad was also reasserted through the advantageous comparison with a conflict spots such as Iraq, pictures of terrorist attacks against the US army in the country being a very common feature, as well as photographs and references to Aiman Al Zawhari, some of them taken from Al Jazeera. One of the computer files consisted of a summary of an Al Jazeera programme on the Al Qaeda leader broadcast in January 2004 in which he provided ample justification for jihadism and attacks on

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

115

‘tyrant governments’, ‘the crusaders against the Muslim world’ and those who ‘have invaded the Muslim territory’ (Ibid, p. 498). This material was complemented by frequent access to World wide web chats associated to radicalism that contributed to encourage the use of violence in a way which was perfectly and carefully justified through the narratives summarised above. Documents containing instructions for the use of explosives to perpetrate terrorist attacks at public locations such as restaurants, markets, stations or buses, as well as information about how to behave under police arrest were also logged through these chats by this group of Islamist radicals. The analysis of life patterns of Islamist activists in Spain expose characteristics shared by members of other terrorist groups throughout the world. Common factors can be appreciated when comparing the recruitment processes of religious and secular organisations [5, 6] variables which are also evident in the individuals who participated in the terrorist attacks perpetrated in March 11 in Madrid as well as in those jihadists arrested before and after the massacre. Structural, motivational and facilitational factors merged in their process of radicalisation and recruitment. Most of them were part of a closed community of activists poorly integrated in Spanish society who were kept together by a radical ideology. It is clear that terrorism is a group phenomenon in which individuals are greatly influenced by group dynamics [7]. The dynamics that influenced these terrorists approaching and joining the jihadist movement do not differ extensively from the experiences of other participants in the jihad [8]. As with previous experiences of recruitment into social movements, the network channel is the richest source of movement recruits [9] constituting a key issue in the Spanish case, one in which a social and family set of connections facilitated such a process. As a result, it can be argued that the genealogy of Islamic terrorism in Spain is one of interpersonal links strengthened by kinship and friendship through which social and group cohesion has been fostered. These networks enabled contacts and relationships to the extent that police and judicial investigations in Spain have been able to establish strong connections between some key Islamist figures who were arrested at the end of 2001 and subsequently sentenced in 2005 and those individuals who participated in perpetrating March 11 as well as others involved in the preparation of various terrorist attacks. In fact the major setback suffered by the network of Islamist terrorists when at the end of 2001 relevant leaders and operatives were arrested by Spanish police could have seriously influenced the process of radicalisation and recruitment of other activists. Such a strike against the infrastructure of the network could have triggered a strong feeling of revenge which would have materialised in the terrorist campaign initiated in March 2004 which was fortunately interrupted by police successes, since other targets and attacks had been planned by the perpetrators of 11 M [10]. In September 2005 a total of eighteen men were sentenced by the Spanish National Court after magistrates found them guilty of membership and collaboration with Al Qaeda. Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, nicknamed Abu Dahdah, the leader of what has been termed as the Spanish cell of Al Qaeda, was sentenced to twenty seven years in prison accused of leading a terrorist organisation and conspiring to perpetrating the 9/11 attacks in the United States in 2001. The judicial verdict stated that the men found guilty had engaged over a prolonged period of time, which in some cases went back as far as 1995, in activities of indoctrination and proselytising, financing terrorist cells in different countries all over the world, as well as recruiting mujahideen in order to send

116

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

them to conflict spots in Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia and Afghanistan. Different methods were used for those purposes, among them the distribution of propaganda contained in magazines produced by Islamist terrorist organisations such as the Palestinian Hamas or the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armeé (GIA) and Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). This type of literature, together with Osama Bin Laden’s speeches and other sources which justified and encouraged the jihad, was on some occasions handed in to regulars outside the main mosques in Madrid. At that stage of the process of radicalisation the World wide web also constituted a rich source for those willing to spread a radical Islamic ideology, visits to sites dedicated to advocating violence being a constant pattern in the behaviour of those who were convicted in Spain over the years as a result of their association with Islamic terrorism. Video tapes of the so called mujahideen would also circulate among members of the cells, some of them former combatants in conflict spots such as Bosnia and Chechnya who, on their return to Spain, would continue their commitment to the neosalafist cause by searching for financial support for other ‘brothers’ in those areas, as well as by engaging in the indoctrination and recruitment of newcomers. During that period, the world wide web was also used by Islamist radicals in Spain with the intention of recruiting sympathisers, as demonstrated by the sentencing of Ahmed Brahim, whom the attorney accused of Al Qaeda membership. In April 2002 Brahim, of Algerian origin, was arrested and subsequently sentenced to ten years imprisonment by the Spanish National Court after being accused of setting up a web page aimed at spreading the jihad and attracting newcomers to the cause of Islamic fundamentalism including those who would be willing to become ‘martyrs’ [11]. The current international political scenario has undoubtedly provided a very fertile ground for newcomers into the global jihad, the war in Iraq offering strong motivational arguments for many individuals who may want to join in such a movement. As can be deduced from the propaganda material used by jihadist terrorists in Spain, Iraq has had an impact in their radicalisation. Nonetheless, police and judicial investigations indicate that the commitment to jihadism which is now so evident in Western Europe does precede the conflict in Iraq and even the intervention in Afghanistan which is also often identified as another explanation for the growing importance of Islamist terrorism in today’s European context. It should be remembered that Islamist terrorists had already targeted Europe long before the intervention in Iraq. Previous terrorist attacks had been foiled as a result of good intelligence and effective police work, as demonstrated by plots aborted in London, Strasburg or Rome, where the United States embassy had also been targeted. Moreover, as it has already been pointed out, some of the men responsible for carrying out 11 M had been committed to jihadism even before the war in Iraq broke out, leading judicial authorities as far back as 2001 to define Spain as ‘the main base of Al Qaeda in Europe’. The Situation and Trends Report produced by Europol in 2003 warned of the risk faced by Spain in the following terms: ‘Various terrorist groups comprising the so-called Islamic World Front, under the leadership of Al Qaeda, as well as the advocates of internationalisation of Jihad on a global scale, continue to pose the greatest threat to our interests as well as to the interests of the other EU Member States. The Spanish Government’s support of the military intervention in Iraq by the United States and its Allies constitutes without doubt a further risk factor for Spain, even though it might not be the most decisive or dangerous one’ [12]. It should be emphasised that the report did not regard Spain’s support for the intervention in Iraq as

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

117

‘the most decisive or dangerous’ risk factor exposing the existence of a terrorist threat in advance of the Iraqi conflict. The explanation lays in the fact that, as investigators learnt from various informers, some radicals had a mind for jihad since at least 2001. A point corroborated by several members of the Spanish intelligence service interviewed by the author who emphasized how since 2002 one of the suicide terrorists, Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid, frequently referred to the need to apply “Islamic justice”.

Group dynamics and interpersonal links Friendships and family bonds have been of great relevance in linking different subgroups in the network of sympathisers and activists, thus facilitating common patterns of radicalisation and recruitment to develop. To this extent police investigations have confirmed the close relationship between various networks of activists illustrating how significant interpersonal links became in order to bring newcomers and strengthen the group cohesion, as one event may illustrate. Three years before the terrorist attacks in Madrid took place, some of the main Al Qaeda figures in the country attended a Muslim wedding held in the capital between a Spanish woman and a Syrian man. Three of the leaders of the organisation, including Abu Dahdah, shared a table with Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, alias the Tunisian, one of the seven suicide terrorists who killed themselves in the outskirts of Madrid in April 2004, who acted as a translator during the wedding. Sarhane the Tunisian was married to the sister of Mustapha Maymouni, a close associate of Abu Dahdah and a very influential individual in the Al Qaeda network. It is around these authority figures that ideological and social bonds were knit in the years before the terrorist attacks were finally perpetrated in Madrid. Different mosques in the city enabled contact between individuals but did not represent the main meeting points where they gathered and conspired, other places such as restaurants, hairdressers and flats being preferred for those purposes. The quarter of Lavapiés, with a great affluence of immigrants, provided some of these meeting points. A restaurant called Alhambra, the public phone booth Nuevo Siglo -owned by Jamal Zougam, another individual closely linked to the main Al Qaeda cell in Spain and the group who perpetrated 11 M-, and Abdou’s hairdressers were all situated in the same street and only meters away from each other. It was at these places that members of the cell regularly met. The back of Abdou’s hairdressers was were the radicals purified themselves with water from Mecca and a place were they used to meet for prayers since they did not wish to attend the local mosque which was controlled by a Pakistani who upheld an interpretation of Islam they did not agree with. In the privacy of these locations the exaltation of the jihad took place, collectively endorsing the activists their radical views of Islam with literature and video footage which portrayed a victimised Muslim community as well as the violent and bloody response to their grievances that mujahideen inflicted on their enemies. This ritual contributed to strengthening the ‘culture of death’, also evident in other suicide terrorists, which makes martyrdom appear as the right thing to do [13, 14]. It is revealing that a copy of one of those video tapes used as a means of indoctrination and of reassuring their beliefs was found in different locations when house searches of Al Qaeda suspects took place even before the terrorist attacks in Madrid were perpetrated.[15]. The tape, titled Islamic Jihad in Dagestan, showed the brutality of mujahideen against Russians. The video featured prominently Abdelaziz

118

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

Benyaich and his brother Salaheddin, alias Abu Mughen, both dressed in combat fatigues leading a group of mujahideen in Chechnya [16]. The Benyaich brothers had befriended Jamal Zougam in Tanger where all of them came from. Abu Mughen, who lost an aye fighting in Bosnia, became an iconic and venerated figure for the members of the Spanish cell and was welcomed in their homes when he needed refuge, as he did when he was operated on his eye at a Madrid clinic in March 1999. Both brothers were later arrested and sentenced for their participation in the attacks in Casablanca in May 2003 when Islamist terrorists killed 45 people. Another of the Benyaich brothers, Abdalla, was also involved in the jihad and died in Afghanistan while American troops chased Bin Laden. Mohamed Fizazi, a religious figure imprisoned after the Casablanca killings who is serving a thirty year prison sentence for his alleged involvement in that terrorist attack, is regarded by police as somebody who greatly influenced youngsters like Zougam and the Benyaich brothers who shared the same background[ 17]. The relevance of kinship in the jihadist structure is highlighted by the involvement of several group of brothers such as Rachid and Mohammed Oulad, both killed in the collective suicide of April 2004, Moutaz Almallah Dabbas and Mohannad Almallah Dabbas, as well as Abdelgani Chedadi and Said Chedadi, the later arrested before 11 M and the former in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, both of whom run a shop just a few meters away from some of the main regular meeting points of Islamist radicals such as Restaurante Alhambra and Zougam’s public phone booth, both located in a popular neighbourhood of Madrid. Abdelkhalak Chergi and his brother Abdelhak were also arrested and interrogated under the suspicion of being involved in the preparation and financing of the terrorist attack. In addition to these family ties cousins were also involved in the cells behind the terrorist attacks. As a way of example, Hamid Ahmidan, charged with ‘membership of terrorist organisation’ in April 2006, is the cousin of Jamal Ahmidan, nicknamed the Chinese, one of the seven suicide bombers who killed themselves in Leganés, on the outskirts of Madrid. A run down house outside Madrid also offered a meeting point where the radicals behind the 11 M terrorist attacks socialised and reinforced their ideological commitments through the hatred and dehumanization of westerners encouraged by the means already outlined. It was owned by Mohammed Needl, imprisoned in Spain while awaiting trial since 2001 for his alleged involvement with the Spanish Al Qaeda cell and his leader Abu Dahdah. The house had been rented by Mustapha Maymouni before he was sentenced for his involvement in the Casablanca attacks and later on by Jamal Ahmidan, the Chinese, through the intermediary Sarhane, the Tunisian. The secrecy of the shack outside Madrid was used to prepare the bombs used on March 11. It was also the place were some kind of celebration took place on March 21 shortly after the terrorist attacks had shocked Spain. On that Sunday some members of the terrorist cell and their families gathered together for a barbeque. In fact, as the judicial investigation revealed, it was quite common for the group to get together at a country location in the Madrid province where for the last couple of years some of those involved in the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Madrid used to play football, swim in the river, cook and pray [18].

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

119

Radicalization in prisons The type of personal connections described above have also been present in other groups of radicals, as revealed by the dismantling of a cell in Ceuta in late 2006. According to security sources, the radicalisation of some of the leaders of this cell took place inside the jail and through personal contact with radicals involved in another network engaged in the preparation of the infrastructure required to send jihadists to Iraq [19]. In fact, prisons have also constituted an important place for the radicalisation of some of the individuals involved in terrorism in Spain as evidenced by the dismantling of a cell in a jail located in Salamanca in the autumn of 2004. Prison experiences seemed quite influential in the radicalisation process of some of those who took part in the 11 M attacks, particularly that of Jamal Ahmidan, nicknamed the Chinese. Born in Tetuan, Morocco, in October 28, 1970, he arrived illegally in Spain in 1990 and got involved in petty crime and drug smuggling. He was married to a Spanish woman and was the father of an eleven year old boy when he died. Police sources believe his marriage with a drug addict was primarily aimed at legalising his situation in the country. He spent time in prison between 1992 and 1995 and after his release was detained at least nine times for forging documents and trafficking drugs. In 1999 while he was held at a detention centre in Madrid were illegal foreigners were kept before being sent back to their country, the Chinese started a fire aided by an Algerian internee in an attempt to break out. When he went back to Morocco in 2000 he was sent to prison for three years for drink driving and running over a man while driving under the influence. His time in prison is regarded as a key period in his life where he radicalised himself becoming a religious fanatic. His brother Mustafa says that Jamal gave up smoking, heroin, cocaine and alcohol, although he did not change the way in which he had earned his living up until then. Shortly after being released in 2003 he acquired the explosives used on 11 M exchanging them for drugs and a considerable amount of money. He also managed to acquire weapons and ammunition through his contacts in the Spanish criminal world. At the same time he became a regular at the mosque in the Villaverde quarter of Madrid, where he would listen to the preaching of a radical imam, Samir Ben Abdellah, who shared with Sarhane the Tunisian strict views about Islam. Imprisonment was also a key period for Allekema Lamari, born in July 10, 1965 in Alger, and another of the suicide terrorists. According to the Spanish intelligence service, while in prison after being sentenced for membership of a terrorist organisation his radicalisation deepened even further becoming fully committed to take revenge for his imprisonment which came to an end in 2002. Before that he came into contact with Rachid Oulad Ackcha, born in Tetuan, Morocco, on January 27, 1971 and another of the seven suicide terrorists. In 1998 Rachid was sentenced to four years in prison after being found guilty of drug trafficking. According to prison officers who met Rachid, during the initial stages of his imprisonment he was not regarded as religiously radicalised but rather as a ‘normalised inmate with quite a low profile’ (Author’s Interview). Nonetheless, there was a three months period in which he was in the same prison, Madrid III, as one of the relevant figures involved in 11 M, Allekema Lamari. Some intelligence sources argue that this period could have proved decisive in Rachid’s process of radicalisation.

120

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

Conclusion This paper has outlined the main patterns discernible in the process of radicalisation and recruitment of individuals who have been associated with jihadist terrorism in Spain. Although the majority of the Muslim community in Spain considers itself well integrated in Spanish society, widely rejecting the use of violence [20], a small minority of members of this community does espouse a radical ideology which condones the use of terrorism. A Pew Research Survey published in June 2006 pointed out that 16 % of Spanish Muslims ‘sometimes’ justified violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam, whereas according to 9 % of those polled the use of violence was ‘rarely’ justified, while 69 % considered that such a course of action was ‘never’ justified. At the same time, 16 % expressed ‘a lot or some confidence in Ben Laden’, with just 12% of Spanish Muslims saying that ‘many or most of the country’s Muslims support Al Qaeda and similar groups’ [21]. The support for this extremist views is a result of a process of radicalisation undertaken by individuals who in some occasions will end up resorting to violence. The analysis of the background and profiles of jihadist terrorists in Spain reveals that their radicalisation and recruitment process was influenced by religious, cultural, social, economic and political factors. The importance of these factors varies according to the individuals but a common thread can be appreciated since all of them espouse a radical neosalafist ideology based on a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Such an ideology did enable the strengthening of a subculture of violence that has provided the framework for violent actions which are also justified on rational and emotional grounds. Imams and other charismatic leaders have played a pivotal role in the process of radicalisation of jihadist terrorists in Spain. The specific grievances and personal experiences of victimization which seemed to be absent from the lives of many jihadist terrorists in Spain were brought directly to them by prominent figures, thus enabling the process of radicalization through the intense socialization and indoctrination that followed. Charismatic leaders such as Mustapha Setmariam, Amer Azizi or the Benyaich brothers, who had fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya, were of key relevance in the process of socialization providing role models of ‘brothers’ who had sacrificed their lives for others. world wide web provided an essential tool in the process of indoctrination and consolidation of the ‘subculture of death’ that would predispose them to violence. The relevance of charismatic leaders who do attract newcomers into the jihadist cause is still evident in the Spanish context. In December 2006 Spanish police arrested in the Spanish town of Ceuta, located in North Africa, several men under suspicion of being about to plot terrorist attacks after having followed a deep process of radicalization. Two of the suspects were the brothers of Hamed Abderrahaman Ahmed, the Spanish citizen who spent two years in Guantanamo, where he confessed to Spanish police that he had received arms training at a Taliban camp in Afghanistan, later on withdrawing this confession. On his release from Guantanamo he has become a charismatic figure who is seen with considerable respect by youngsters susceptible of being radicalised, as police sources indicate. Furthermore, the return of individuals who have travelled to Iraq, where they have received arms training, some of them taking part in terrorist actions in the name of Islam, is also creating role models for new radicals in Spain [22]. Despite the lack of widespread legitimisation for suicide terrorism within Spanish society, intelligence

R. Alonso / Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain

121

sources have corroborated that a minority of individuals do regard with great respect and admiration those who embraced ‘martyrdom’, the seven suicide terrorists being considered as courageous men and even as role models. There is concern about the fact that certain individuals are being inspired by what they regard as the moral superiority of the suicide terrorists who killed themselves in Madrid and that of other ‘brothers’ engaged in jihadism.

References [1] Al Qaeda convirtió España en la base principal de su red en Europa’, José María Irujo, El País, March 3, 2002. [2] ‘Hacia una caracterización social del terrorismo yihadista en España: implicaciones en seguridad interior y acción exterior’, Fernando Reinares, Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano, Nº 34/2006, available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/929.asp [3] Juzgado Central de Instrucción Número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, Sumario Nº 20/2004, Madrid, Auto, April 10, 2006, pages 1212-1213. [4] Juzgado Central de Instrucción Número 6, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, Sumario Nº 20/2004, Madrid, Auto, April 10, 2006, p. 1219 [5] Fernando Reinares, Patriotas de la muerte. Quiénes han militado en ETA y por qué. Madrid: Taurus, 2001 [6] Rogelio Alonso, Matar por Irlanda. El IRA y la lucha armada. Madrid: Alianza, 2003; Rogelio Alonso, The IRA and armed struggle. London: Routledge (forthcoming). [7] J.M. Post, K.G. Ruby, and E.D. Shaw, ‘The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25, 73-100, 2002. [8] Marc Sageman, Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. [9] Social networks and social movements: a microstructural approach to differential recruitment’, David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher Jr., and Sheldon Ekland-Olson American Sociological Review, 45, 1980, pp. 787-801. [10] Fernando Reinares, ‘Al Qaeda, neosalafistas magrebíes y 11-M: sobre el nuevo terrorismo islamista en España’, Fernando Reinares and Antonio Elorza (ed.), El nuevo terrorismo islamista. Del 11-S al 11-M, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2004, pp. 36-37. [11] El Correo, April 4, 2006 and Siglo XXI, December 6, 2005, at http://www.diariosigloxxi.com/noticia.php?ts=20051206112122 [12] Terrorist Activity in the European Union: Situation and Trends Report (TE-SAT) October 2002-15 October 2003, Europol, 3 December, 2003, p. 37. [13] Ami Pedhazur, ‘Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism- A Comment’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16, 2004, pp. 841-844 [14] and Ami Pedhazur, Suicide Terrorism. London: Polity. [15] Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 005, Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001 E, September 17, 2003. [16] Juzgado Central de Instrucción Nº 005, Madrid, Sumario (Proc. Ordinario) 0000035/2001 E, September 17, 2003, pp. 86 and 289. [17] El País, May 15, 2005. [18] El País, August 3, 2005 [19] La célula terrorista de Ceuta controlaba una de las principales mezquitas”, M. Sáiz- Pardo and J.C. García, El Correo, December 19, 206. [20] La comunidad musulmana en España se siente adaptada y rechaza la violencia’, J.A. Rodríguez, El País, November 24, 2006. [21] Europe’s Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view each other’. Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey, June 2006, pp. 4, 25, 26. [22]‘El ‘caballo de Troya’ de Al Qaeda’, José María Irujo, El País, December 17, 2006.

122

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-122

Chapter 10 Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues Dr. Maria Alvanou Criminologist-Senior Analyst, ITSTIME Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies- Universitta’ Cattolica Sacro Cuore di Milano, Italy

In recent years Italy has undergone a significant transformation from being a principally emigrant country into becoming an immigrant one. The foreign labour force that entered Italian soil has been indispensable for accelerating and sustaining the country’s economic development during the last few years. This does not mean that the transformation has taken place completely smoothly, without social strains and problems. Especially after the September 11, Madrid and London events, the socialization of Muslim communities in Italy has been an issue from all perspectives: social, legal, religious etc. This presentation aims to highlight some focal points about issues faced by Islamic population in Italy.

Statistical facts and data: Italy as an immigration country With immigration waves entering the country- mainly for working purposes- the aappearance of new minority ethnic and religious groups started. As a result today Muslims constitute the second largest religious community in Italy [1]. With a total population of 700,000, 40,000-50,000 of them (including 10,000 Christians converts) are full Italian citizens with regular rights and obligations, approximately 610,000615,000 have a “regular status,” and the legal right to reside and work in Italy, while around 80,000-85,000 are “illegal migrants” without residency or work permits. Muslims are concentrated mainly in the regions of Lazio, Lombardia, Campania, Sicilia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna1. They constitute just above one percent of the total population and about 36 percent of the immigrant community2. According to 1 These estimates have to be considered with caution. For more information on Italian converts to Islam, see [2]. 2 The Italian census agency (Istat) has recently released figures from the 2001census that put the number of legally resident foreigners in Italy at 987,363. This figure is considerably lower than the estimates of federal agencies and immigration experts. This in part reflects the fact that the figures include only those immigrants who have registered their residency with city hall. This is clearly a subset of those immigrants with residence permits (on which the Ministry of the Interior estimates are based). The lower figure may also be the result of the notorious difficulties of census-counters to document the presence of foreigners and other marginalized individuals.

M. Alvanou / Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues

123

current estimates, persons coming from traditionally Muslim countries are actually the fastest growing immigrant group3 and the majority of them are immigrants who have arrived within the past 10 to 20 years and have no Italian citizenship.

Political Discourse about Islam and Muslims in Italy Despite the strong liberal and democratic foundation of Italian society, political forces have debated in the political arena regarding the issue of Islam as a new religious reality for Italy. First of all, a ban on building new mosques was proposed by the rightleaning coalition and generally the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has expressed more than once its concern about the rhetoric of Northern League, that could be characterized by some as Islamophobic [3, 4]. Especially after September 11, Italy’s engagement in Iraq, the bombings in London and Madrid, plus the on-going threat declarations by Al-Qaeda, issues as the building of mosques and the wearing of the burqa by women have been publicly associated with concerns about terrorism. Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has made a statement that the western civilization is “superior” to Islamic one, though he did try to correct his political mistake, by saying later that Islam is a “great religion,” and it must not be “criminalized” because of “the violent actions of certain groups that use criminal methods to promote a political agenda”4. Also, Cardinal Biffi proposed a law restricting immigration permits to enter Italy only to Christians.

Media and Intellectual Discourse about Islam The press and the media world have played their own role regarding how Muslims are perceived by Italian society. The famous late journalist Oriana Fallaci with her book “La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio” (Rage and Pride)5, a fruit of the terrible attack our world underwent on September 11, supported the notion that the West is superior to Islam, Muslims “multiplied like rats” in western countries, they are “vile creatures, who urinate in baptistries.” Her book caused turbulence in Italian society and a lot of polemic discussions, yet its arguments were accepted as serious and valid by part of the society. The important feature was that Fallaci, a left wing human rights advocate, would now take such a strong stance against a group of population which she believed was dangerous for the survival of the western liberal, democratic and civilized world. The Fallaci phenomenon has to be associated with the general media coverage of Islam that turned out to be more negative since September 11 and linked Islam with extremism and violence [6, 7, 8].

3 In the period from 1995 to 2000, the Muslim population increased from 30.4 to 36.8 percent of the total immigrant population. In the same period, the percentage of Christians among immigrants decreased from 56.4 percent to 48.2 percent. However, this trend is likely to be reversed by increasing immigration from Central and Eastern Europe. See [1]. 4 Berlusconi’s statements were widely reported in the newspapers. Later the former Italian PM claimed that his words had been taken “out of context” and also paid a visit to the principal mosque in Rome. It must be noted that on other occasions, Berlusconi has expressed a great appreciation for Islamic civilisation. See, e.g. [5]. 5 [4]. The article was later developed into a famous book.

124

M. Alvanou / Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues

Islamic Practice and Problems In Italy there are more than 300 Islamic places of worship, and a third of them can be considered proper mosques, like the Grand Mosque of Rome, built in 1995. Building and establishing places of worship has not been carried out without problems. An example of opposition by local authorities to mosque building can be found in Naples, where Church and local residents did not want an Islamic place of worship to be built, despite the 2 million Euros granted for this project by the regional authorities [9]. More over, while most political parties have not supported bans on any type of Muslim clothing, and the Vatican has agreed on its part with this position, the Northern League has led a campaign against the wearing of burqa by women. It must be noted that the burqa issue, apart from an Islamic and religious matter, is indeed considered by many as a problem mirroring the human rights, freedoms and personality of women oppressed by Islamic traditions. Nevertheless, the Drezzo case has been criticized at least as strange, since a convert wearing the burqa was convicted and fined according to fascist-era laws against wearing masks in public.

Criminal Justice Issues A lot of ink can be spilled and there are theories developed from the most prominent Criminological schools analyzing why immigration is linked with criminality. While the subject could not be put forth now, there are some astonishing facts and figures that speak on themselves, even to those who are not expert criminologists and lawyers. 14% of prison population in Italy is Muslim, and 98% of them are foreign nationals [10, 11]. It must be noted that Italian prisons are the most overcrowded in Europe, with an occupancy level of 131,5%.

Labour Market and Housing Issues Researches have shown that immigrants of Moroccan heritage can face substantial discrimination in employment6. They are clustered in low-skilled positions paid with low salaries. Further more, they are experiencing difficulties in obtaining skilled positions, despite sufficient professional and linguistic qualifications that some of them have. Of course labour is connected with housing in the sense that people that are underpaid and poor stay in certain city zones. Muslims (especially immigrants, not native converts) tend to live in overcrowded conditions in substandard housing. Unfortunately studies have shown a trend of discrimination in landlord attitudes7, meaning that people of immigrant origin are charged often higher average rents than native Italians are. Also, in some cases landlord can seem reluctant to rent and give their properties to Muslim immigrants. 6 The Constitution stipulates equal treatment for citizens and foreigners in the field of employment. Law 286/98 also prohibits various forms of discrimination against citizens or immigrant workers and provides for a partial reversal of the burden of proof in cases involving discrimination against workers by employers. 7 Law 286/98 guarantees equal treatment of citizens and legal non-citizen residents in access to housing and other public services.

M. Alvanou / Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues

125

The Italian State and Islamic Religion In Italy, according to the Constitution and the law, formal freedom of religion is guaranteed8, but there exists a special status-privilege appointed to the Catholic Church, through a concordat with the Italian government. The lack of clear Islamic leadership structure has prevented the State from establishing a relevant or any kind of agreement for Islam as a religious entity. There has been put an extra dilemma for the Italian State, given the many sects that exist inside Islam: once it recognizes one of the groups as representing the entire Islamic community, with powers to appoint Imams, administer money contributed to religious denominations, etc., other groups may refuse to recognize that group’s representatives. This can lead to animosity and problems within the Muslim communities themselves.

Muslim Organizations in Italy There is a large number of Muslim organizations increasingly active in Italy, articulating their concerns and putting forth demands such as: free practice of religion, permission to open mosques, State agreement (intesa) with the Muslim community. The most important are the following: UCOII (Union of Islamic Communities in Italy) is actually the largest Muslim federation. It influences around 50 mosques across the country, it has a network all over Europe and it provides support for the “international Muslim brotherhood”. This organization has sought recognition from the EU Parliament as a confessional minority in Europe supporting “not individual but collective integration.” The Centro Culturale Islamico is represented by ambassadors of Islamic States and it is a spiritual and social focal point, with strong educational role. The Association of Italian Muslims (AMI) and Coreis includes Italian citizens who are converts, it is self-financed and tries to promote inter-culturalism and tolerance inside the Italian society. Apart from the above mentioned groups and official organizations there are a number of independent groups founded and centring their activity around local mosques.

Islamic Education Issues By Italian law, no legal obstacles may be placed to impede full and equal access to education for Muslim children and youth [12]. On the contrary, there is legal provision for a general policy of full integration. Despite that, there is shown by studies a lower than average attendance and achievement, and higher drop-out rates among immigrant children. Little systematic research has been conducted on the problems experienced by individual Muslim students in schools, but there is some empirical evidence that they experience certain difficulties. For example, according to studies carried out in Modena, Turin, Brescia, Bologna, Genoa, Bari, Padova, Arezzo and Ravenna, about 1/3 of immigrant pupils expressed a wish for separate education for members of the 8

Constitution, Art. 19, Art. 3.

126

M. Alvanou / Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues

same group. Among pupils of North African origin, 46.5% of the boys stated that they feel uncomfortable in the “freedom” of Italian schools9. From the Muslim side, the criticism of the education system is that Italian State schools do not manifest a sufficiently inter-cultural approach. So though the Catholic religious education is a mandatory part of the school curriculum, little information is given about other religions, and images of Islam in the text books are distorted and sometimes inaccurate. In addition, there is no consideration of dietary requirements of Muslim pupils, who have to follow special kind of diet according to their religious requirements. While a lot of the above arguments can be debated, the truth remains that until now there have been no legally-accredited Islamic schools established and no special courses organised for Muslim pupils in public schools, despite requests from Muslim representatives and parents10.

Security, Immigration and Anti Terrorism Issues Italy has ratified long ago all the principal international legal instruments for combating discrimination and protecting minority rights and human rights. The country’s constitution, one of the more liberal in Europe, orders for equality under law and equal social status without distinctions on sex, religion etc. Under the imminent threat of a major terrorist hit against the country, special and new laws have been enacted in Italy and some of the new provisions have been criticized as restrictive and discriminatory. Such an example are usually considered the following: immigrants who apply for a residence permit must be finger-printed, there has been a reduction of the period of validity for residency permits from three to two years, those over 18 years old are excluded from the family reunification program with their families and the residency permit is withdrawn in case of loss of one’s job. Italian immigration law today tightly controls entry and stays of immigrants in the country and an additional law in 2003 increased penalties for illegal immigration, created more temporary detention centres and limited even more family reunification

Some concluding remarks From a historical point of view Italy has first met Islam under the flag of a religious and military enemy. Patriotic fights that are celebrated as national days speak about the struggle of Italians against the Umma. But since then, a lot of years have passed and today’s presence of Muslims in Italy has different causes and conditions. There is a need to balance between the majority’s rights and the traditional historical and religious 9

About 1000 students took part in the survey. See [13]. Through several interpellanze parlamentari during the so-called “question time,” the issue of an “illegal” Muslim school in Cremona was raised by MPs, who alleged poor conditions at the school. Alfredo Mantovano, undersecretary of State for Home Affairs, replied that there were 30 children of school and preschool age who attended this school in order to obtain a certificate recognised by consular authorities but not by the Italian Ministry of Education. See [14]. Some Muslim countries though have established schools in Italy: there is an Egyptian-funded school in Milan, a Tunisian-funded school in Mazara del Vallo and two Libyan-funded schools in Rome. 10

M. Alvanou / Muslim Communities in Italy and Social Stress Minority Issues

127

definition of Italy and the rights of the Muslim newcomers. One can see Muslims (immigrants and converts) as a threat to security and order, especially if one is influenced by the murderous and terrorist activity of some jihadists. Unfortunately extremistic Islamist cells planning to destroy the country that fosters them have been detected in Italy and they have even been connected to mosques and Imams. On the other side, one can also see today’s situation as an opportunity not to alter and destroy the long standing identity of Italy, but to enhance the country’s cultural reality. What is certain is that while security, public order and safety need to remain the priority, respect to the lives and rights of Muslims must not be neglected either.

References [1] Caritas, Immigrazione, dossier statistico 2001: Rapporto sull’immigrazione, Rome: Nuova Anterem, 2002 [2] Allievi, S. I nuovi musulmani, Rome: Edizioni Lavoro, 1999 [3] European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (“EUMC), Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001, Vienna, 2002 [4] Fallaci, O. “La rabbia e l’orgoglio”, Il Corriere della Sera, 29 September 2001 “Immigrati nel mirino, Europa e centristi i nemici” , Corriere della Sera, 24 June 2002 [5] “Berlusconi: profondo rispetto per l’Islam”, Il Giornale, ”, 3 October 2001 [6] Marletti, C. ed., Televisione e Islam. Immagini e stereotipi dell’Islam nella comunicazione italiana, Turin: RAI – Nuova ERI, 1995 [7] Siggillino, I. ed., I media e l’islam), Bologna: Editrice missionaria italiana, 2001 [8] Momanji Kebati, K. “Il ruolo dei media nella rappresentazione collettiva dell’islam” in Gritti R. and Allam, M. eds., Islam, Italia. “Chi sono e cosa pensano i musulmani che vivono tra noi?”, Milan: Guerini, 2001 [9] Williams, D. “Public Funding for New Mosque Splits Naples,” International Herald Tribune, 13 May 2002 [10] Barbagli, M. Immigrazione e criminalità in Italia, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1998 [11] Pastore, M. “Lo straniero e la legge penale”, in Produzione normativa e costruzione sociale della devianza e criminalità tragli immigrati, Quaderni ISMU, n. 9, 1995 [12] Zincone, G. ed., Secondo rapporto sull’integrazione degli immigrati in Italia, Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione degli Immigrati, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001 [13] G. Giovannini, L. Queirolo Palmas, eds., Una scuola in comune. Esperienze scolastiche in contesti multietnici italiani. [14] Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta n. 98, 14 February 2002

128

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-128

Chapter 11 “One Man’s Terrorist Is Another Man’s Freedom Fighter- "The Northern Ireland Perspective Dr Oscar Daly Lagan Valley Hospital, Lisburn, Northern Ireland

Introduction At no time, and nowhere, is the title of this paper more apt than in Northern Ireland at present where the Deputy First Minister, a senior member of the ruling Executive, is a former Chief of Staff of the IRA. (The Irish Republican Army, or IRA, a paramilitary group which has now disbanded, had, as its aim, the unification of Ireland, North and South, through violent means.) The civil violence which took place in Northern Ireland, from the late 1960s until relatively recently, is colloquially known as “The Troubles”. Depending on one’s viewpoint the violence was part of a war of independence, a terrorist campaign or wanton criminality. How one uses words and language usually reflects how one views “The Troubles”. Indeed, individual and community perceptions have played a very large part in the perpetuation of the intra/inter community violence. This paper considers some of the issues which have contributed to individuals resorting to violence rather than democratic politics. The paper examines those who have used violence to pursue a Republican agenda.

History Depending upon one’s viewpoint, Northern Ireland, and the island of Ireland itself, has experienced intra/inter community violence for 80, 300 or over 800 years, since English mercenaries first invaded Ireland in the 12th century. In the early 1920s, after the war of independence, Ireland was divided into the 26 county Free State (which later became the Republic of Ireland) and the 6 county Northern Ireland State, which remained part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. While the vast majority of the population in the Republic of Ireland were Catholic and Nationalist in perspective, the majority within Northern Ireland were of the Protestant faith, people who supported the continuing link with Britain. However, a significant minority within Northern Ireland (about one third at the time of partition)

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

129

were Catholic and Nationalist whose aspirations were for a United Ireland, to be brought about through peaceful, democratic means in contrast to the violent Republican ethos. (The term Northern Ireland itself is not met with universal acceptance. Some, primarily those from a Republican background, prefer the term North of Ireland or the occupied Six Counties. Others, from the Unionist background, often use the term Ulster although Ulster, an ancient province of Ireland, has 9 counties, 3 of which are within the Republic of Ireland.) The most recent phase of conflict within Ireland began in the late 1960s. Influenced by the civil rights movement in America and student demonstrations in Paris, many young Catholics (and a number of likeminded Protestants) formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) and began protesting, demanding equal rights for all. Sectarian violence erupted leading to a re-awakening of the dormant IRA.As with most events in Northern Ireland there are different perspectives on what is said to have happened. While the vast majority of commentators would agree that the initial civil protests were a legitimate form of protest, some from the Unionist tradition would argue that the IRA infiltrated, or indeed helped form, the Civil Rights Association using the Association as a vehicle for insurrection against the government in Belfast.

“A Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People” Sir James Craig, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, never actually said what is often quoted. What he did say, in 1934, was: “All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State.” Those in the ruling Unionist party argued that they were merely responding to the views held within the Republic of Ireland which, following independence, had fostered a very strong Catholic ethos, subsequently enshrined in the Republic of Ireland Constitution of 1937 in which the Catholic Church was given a special position. Unfortunately, Northern Ireland continues as a sectarian, sub divided society. Many young people prefer to live in unmixed religious areas and attend separate schools. Large numbers of people are unwilling to use shops or leisure centers located across the religious divide. Many of those who grew up in the 1970s and 1980s in Northern Ireland would have had no other experience except conflict with or separation from “the other group”.

Terrorism As with most other language, the term terrorism has a moral loading when used in Northern Ireland, and perhaps elsewhere. Terrorism can be defined as ideologically motivated violence used to intimidate populations/government in furtherance of political/social objectives. As can be seen from this definition, terrorism is a tool which can also be used by governments and many Nationalists and Republicans would argue that the British government has been involved in state sponsored terrorism, primarily through collusion with Loyalist paramilitary groups. There are a number of different aims and purposes of terrorism: a) to create fear/anxiety/panic/helplessness; b) to demonstrate the impotence of the authorities; c) to provoke government responses; d) to use the media to highlight the relevant cause,

130

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

to give justification to this cause and to heighten the fear of those being terrorized. Each of these aims and purposes has, to a greater or lesser extent, been fulfilled by Republican violence. The belief that the IRA were using the media to further their cause led to both the British and Irish governments banning spokesmen for the organization from using the media, as stated by the British Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, “to deny them the oxygen of publicity”. Over the years of the Troubles, the pattern of violence has changed significantly. The initial street violence and burning of houses, which led to the greatest migration of populations in Western Europe since the Second World War until the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, was replaced by indiscriminate bombing, gun battles in the streets and sectarian murders, one incident almost inevitably being used as justification for equally violent revenge. The type of violence again changed in the latter part of the 1970s, targets for the Republicans being much more selective, primarily members of the security forces and Protestants suspected of being members of the Loyalist paramilitary groupings. This much more targeted violence continued until the ceasefires in the 1990s. It has now been accepted by most, including those from a Unionist background, that there was discrimination against the Catholic population. Those Unionists who accept this occurred, may argue about the extent but, up until the late 1960s, local corporations decided who would be allocated public housing, people could only vote in local elections if they were householders and, through the process of gerrymandering, the local Unionist ruling class ensured they controlled power, even in areas where there was a clear Nationalist/Catholic majority. There was also discrimination in allocation of employment, Catholics being significantly more likely to be unemployed than Protestants. This was what has been described to me as “structural violence”. Social factors Various factors can be considered to have played some part in the decisions made by those who ultimately joined the Republican paramilitary groups. For the purposes of this paper these have been divided, somewhat artificially, into social and personal/individual factors. One common reason for violence is revenge. Such revenge can operate at the level of the individual but also at a community/societal level.

Table 1

Social Factors Revenge Pseudospeciation Structural violence Cohesiveness of Society

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

131

Distance is a factor which can make it easier to perpetrate violence, e.g. the pilot who drops a napalm bomb cannot see the results. He might recoil with horror if asked to pour petrol over a child yet this can cause the same injuries. Distance can also be psychological, mediated by the human capacity for treating others as less than human. Pseudospeciation is the psychological tendency to maintain one’s own superiority by supposing that other groups are inferior. This leads to the forming of out groups which are viewed as alien, less human and treated with contempt. Such groups get blamed for society’s ills and scapegoated. Perhaps the best example of Pseudospeciation in recent history is that of the Nazis and Jews. Fear is closely related to Pseudospeciation and Pseudospeciation is related to myth, e.g. the rumor of an International Jewish conspiracy dedicated to the overthrow of the existing order in the 1920s and 1930s was taken very seriously, and not just by the emerging Nazi party in Germany. Each Nation/group/tribe tends to see themselves as the chosen ones. The group invents or adapts a historical and morale rationale for its exclusiveness. The culmination of moral righteousness and territoriality of identity is a dangerous, combustible mix. Within the Republican community in Northern Ireland, the attitude towards the British forces, including those locally recruited, Loyalist paramilitary groupings and, to an extent, ordinary Protestants, can be seen to have elements of Pseudospeciation. (It must be said that the same also applies to the Unionist/Loyalist community.) The feeling of being socially disregarded, discriminated against in terms of education, employment and housing and having little hope that the situation may change, can lead to significant resentment , another driving force towards violence. This is more likely to occur in large, urban areas and has been seen intermittently, in recent years, in different cities throughout Western Europe. In smaller communities individuals tend to be recognized as individuals and, at least, they feel they exist which is clearly better than feeling that one is nothing. In the 1960s Northern Ireland was one of the most deprived regions in Western Europe and discrimination was increasingly felt by those of the Nationalist population. Although Northern Nationalists would not have viewed themselves as disadvantaged compared to their co- religionists in the Republic of Ireland, the disadvantage, relative to their Protestant neighbors, was keenly felt. At the onset of the Troubles Northern Ireland society, both Catholic and Protestant, was comprised of very close knit, cohesive communities. The strong networks and balance within communities led to a siege mentality at the start of the Troubles. Given the nature of the widespread sectarian violence at this time, such an attitude was not unreasonable. However, as the IRA campaign began, the community cohesion and sense of being besieged made it easier for individuals to join the IRA and more difficult for those against violence to speak out, such utterances being considered indicative of betrayal of the community.

132

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

Individual factors Table 2 Individual factors Defensive Reaction to excessive State violence Offensive Nature/nurture Social conscience/political activism Age and social background Status as paramilitary Romantic idealism Personal choice

When the sectarian violence began in the late 1960s, the dormant IRA was not in any position to defend the Catholic community and was an object of derision. Graffiti on gable walls included “I RAn away”. Soon, however, many young Republicans joined the IRA in order to defend their community against the sectarian attacks being carried out by Loyalists, sometimes supported by members of the police and auxiliary police service, and, on many other occasions, with the police force not actively involved but turning a blind eye. When the British Army was first deployed on the streets of Belfast, and then elsewhere in Northern Ireland, the soldiers were viewed by the Catholic population as their protectors against the Loyalist gangs and, in the eyes of the Catholics, the discredited police force. Within 12 months or so, because of the heavy handed, one sided nature of many of the Army operations, the attitude of the Catholic population changed and many more joined the IRA to defend their community against the British Army. (It has frequently been argued that the British Armed Forces have been the best recruiters for the IRA, e.g. their actions on Bloody Sunday in Derry in 1972 when 14 civil rights protesters were shot dead is believed to have led to so many young Catholics wanting to join the IRA that those leading the IRA had difficulty in coping). Some older Republicans then saw the near anarchical situation as an opportunity to resume the fight for an independent, 32 county Ireland and, from that point on, those joining the IRA were more concerned about “National freedom”, for many, a romantic, emotional ideal upon which many activists probably did not reflect maturely to any great extent. For each individual who joined the IRA one should consider the nature/nurture argument. Many would have had a strong Republican background, relatives in

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

133

previous generations having been IRA members, in some cases imprisoned and killed. Such individuals might have had the opportunity to hear of tales of previous campaigns from older relatives, such tales incorporating the notion that there was still “unfinished business”. Others who joined the IRA had no such family pedigree. Many, indeed, had relatives who had previously served with the British forces, for years throughout the Troubles a family secret to be kept hidden with a stigma similar to that of leprosy, mental illness or tuberculosis. For individuals without a family background of Republicanism, it was often the individual’s own personal experiences, or the experiences of those close to him/her, which culminated in a decision to join the IRA. For some it was not personal experiences but the experiences of the community which were crucial. Some activists would argue that the decision to join the IRA was based on a social conscience, a form of altruism or political activism. This would apply to relatively few individuals, particularly those who joined in the early years of the Troubles who were older, more mature individuals, as most recruits to the IRA would have joined still in their teenage years, at a time when social conscience would be fairly rudimentary and labile. For some whose educational attainments were poor and whose employment prospects were not very good, joining the IRA would have been a means of bolstering self esteem and attaining some degree of status within their community. Others who might have had a propensity to violence could have viewed IRA membership as a legitimate (at least within parts of their own community) means for engaging in violence. While some individuals from the middle/professional classes joined the IRA, the vast majority of members would have been from a working class background. As invariably occurs in conflicts worldwide, it is from such backgrounds that most victims also come. Most who joined the IRA, particularly after the early Troubles, did so while still in their teen years. At such a time they would have been impressionable and idealistic, full of the invulnerability of youth. They would have been unable to see the likely outcome of their involvement – being imprisoned or killed. Over time, and with increasing experience, some of these individuals would have been gradually exposed to greater degrees of violence with a much smaller number ultimately progressing to the taking of life. IRA members would have had different levels of personal involvement, the majority not being involved in the actual killing of people. For every activist willing, and able, to take a life, there would have been very many more involved in supporting roles, again with differing levels of involvement. When one looks at these differing levels of involvement, many factors are involved but much more so at an individual level. It is not clear what allows one individual to take a life and another not to act in such a manner. It has often been said, usually by politicians or other lay commentators, that those involved in paramilitary violence were “mad”. What research evidence there is available would suggest that this clearly is not the case. Lyons and Harbinson examined 100 murderers in the early 1980s, comparing those convicted of paramilitary related crimes with those convicted of non paramilitary crimes. Those incarcerated for paramilitary murders were far less likely, to suffer from mental illness or mental disorder more broadly defined, to have a family history of mental illness or to have taken alcohol prior to committing the murder, the latter finding indicating that the paramilitary related murders were less emotionally laden.

134

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

It has been said that all those who joined the IRA and became actively involved in paramilitary violence were volunteers who received education and training after joining the movement. On the other hand, it has been argued that, given the young age of most IRA recruits, they were enlisted when idealistic and impressionable and subsequently indoctrinated, a relatively easy task given the willing subjects. Were they individuals who joined the IRA to right wrongs they had witnessed and understood or were they individuals seduced by the “paramilitary godfathers”? As is usually the case in Northern Ireland, what one believes is, at least partly, dependent upon one’s background. For any one individual any number of the factors listed above, and to varying degrees, could have played a part in the decision to join the IRA. It is interesting to note that most of those in NICRA chose the path of democratic politics, many of the NICRA leaders going on to form the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), until recently led by Nobel Laureate, John Hume. It remains unclear as to why some individuals joined the IRA while others with similar backgrounds and experiences did not. Ultimately, it comes down to individual choice, about which we still know very little.

Conclusion For each individual prepared to use violence in furtherance of Republican objectives, there are different social and personal factors which may have influenced the individual’s decision to act in such a manner. Nonetheless, it does remain unclear as to why some individuals decided to join the IRA and others did not and why some individuals in the IRA progressed to take life and others did not. How IRA members now view themselves, and the reasons they joined the IRA, is retrospective and subjective. How much rationalization and justification is there for what they believe was a just war, a righteous cause for which no apology is necessary? For each individual, whatever the influence of social and personal factors, it ultimately comes down to individual choice, for which consequences the individual must accept personal responsibility.

Selected Bibliography [1] Alonso, Rogelio. The IRA and Armed Struggle. Rutledge, New York, 2007 [2] Armour, WF. Ulster, Ireland, Britain. Duckworth Press, 1938. [3] Bishop, Patrick and Mallie, Eamonn. The Provisional IRA. Corky Books, 1987. [4] Boyd, Andrew. Holy War in Belfast. Pretani Press, 1987. [5] Beresford, David. 10 Men Dead. The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike. Grafton Books, 1987. [6] Daly, Oscar. Northern Ireland: The Victims. British Journal of Psychiatry 175, 201-204, 1999. [7] English, Richard. Armed Struggle: the History of the IRA. MacMillan, 2003. [8]Erikson, E.H. Youth, Identity and Crisis, Norton, New York, 1968. [9] Feeney, Brian. Sinn Finn: one hundred turbulent years. O’Brien Press, 2002. [10] Foster, Roy. Modern Ireland: 1600-1972. Penguin Books, 1988. [11] Kelly, Henry. How Stormont Fell. Gill and McMillan, 1972. [12] Lyons, H.A and Harbinson, H. J. A comparison of political and non political murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-1984. Medicine Science and the Law, 26, 193-197, 1986. [13] Maloney, Ed. A Secret History of the IRA. Penguin Press, 2002.

O. Daly / The Northern Ireland Perspective

135

[14] O’Doherty, Malachi. The Trouble with Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA. Blackstaff Press, 1998. [15] Taylor, Peter. Provos: the IRA and Sinn Finn. Bloomsbury, 1997.

136

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-136

Chapter 12 Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism Shaul Kimhi1 Tel-Hai-Academic College, Israel Daphna Canetti-Nisim2 School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel

Abstract: Minority groups are very common throughout Western society, mainly as a result of massive immigration during the last century. These groups have developed their own identities due to a variety of social factors. Even though ethnic identity plays an important role in evoking many human perceptions, rarely have ethnic identities been analyzed for their effects on attribution of responsibility to terrorism. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that the way people understand ethnic relations and analyze causal relationships plays a crucial role in their willingness to denounce or support violent acts of terrorism. Members of minority groups tend to approve of terrorism more often than not. Perpetrators who are members of the majority tend to be seen as more detestable. We test these hypotheses using evidence from an original experiment involving 308 adult Israelis (166 Jews and 142 Arabs) conducted in 2005 at the height of the Palestinian uprising. Respondents were randomly assigned to three groups, each of which was presented with a terror attack scenario: a) a Jewish perpetrator; b) a Palestinian perpetrator; c) a neutral perpetrator (Asian). Arabs tended to denounce terrorist acts less than Jews; Jewish perpetrators were perceived to be abhorrent. These findings suggest that ethnic identity plays a crucial role in the way one attributes motivations and values to terrorism. Key words: Middle East, Perceptions of Terrorism, Ethnicity, Religion, Attribution Theory.

Introduction When are people ready to call an act of killing a terrorist attack? In the discussion on terrorism and its effects on societies, following the attacks on the United States, Spain, Great Britain, and other nations [1], little has been said about the pivotal role inter1

Corresponding Author: Shaul Kimhi, Ph.D., Senior lecturer, Tel Hai Academic College, Department of Psychology, Upper Galilee, 12210, Israel. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 Daphna Canetti-Nisim, Ph.D., Rice Family Foundation Visiting Professor, Council on Middle East Studies, The MacMillan Center and Department of Political Science, Yale University, and Assistant Professor School of Political Science, University of Haifa

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

137

ethnic relations have on the resilience of these societies and on prospects of tranquility. We assume that that the willingness or refusal of members of different ethnic identities to refer to attacks against people of other ethnic identities as acts of terrorism has a crucial effect on the prospects of peace. Thus, this study is an attempt to understand whether and when individuals are willing to denounce a terrorist act as such, or otherwise excuse it. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been involved in an intractable conflict with the Arab countries, and with the Palestinians, in particular. Therefore, both fear of war and terror, and hope for peace have continually been a reality for Israeli citizens. However, since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, the level of threat and fear to the citizens has become extremely high. Terror has become a concern experienced on a daily basis [2]. For the first time in the history of the conflict, all militant Palestinian factions simultaneously initiated suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Violence has claimed the lives of more than a thousand Israelis [3] and three thousand Palestinians [4]. This study explores possible psychosocial implications of life under conditions of ongoing terrorism and how it might affect individuals' willingness to call a shooting attack, a terrorist act. Coming on the heels of arguments [5] and empirical studies of other researchers [6], we look into the way in which members of two ethnic identity groups (Arabs vis-à-vis Jews in Israel), both living under threat of terror or its actuality, interpret its causes by means of attribution styles, and their attitudes or levels of denunciation of terrorism. To put the main research question in a straightforward manner, we are examining how different groups of people might call an attack, made by someone from rival ethnic identity groups, a "terror act" which should be denounced, or interpret this same action, made by someone from their own ethnic identity group, as a legitimate political activity, such as an act in a fight for freedom or in self defense? Attribution Style and Attitudes towards Terrorism and Terrorists Little empirical research has been done on applications of attribution theory to the understanding of terrorist attacks of one's own ethnic identity group, as well as of the rival group. This study investigates a question perhaps not encountered previously: how differences in ethnic origin are reflected in the convergence of style of attribution and attitudes towards three scenarios of terror attack: the perpetrator is a Jewish Israeli, or a Palestinian, or an Asian. Accordingly, we draw on the framework of attribution theory [7], by means of an experiment embedded in a questionnaire to be analyzed by a series of variance analyses. Heider [8] contended that humans are not simply observers of events and behaviors. Rather, they are motivated to understand the causes of what they see and experience. Heider's [8] efforts and those of others [9] have given rise to attribution theory, and his legacy is still very much evident in current research [10]. Since its inception, attribution theory has been used to understand how people infer the causes of other people's behavior, and the responses of people to threatening or stressful life events. The way people explain the causes of success and failure is one of the most frequently examined issues in social psychology [11]. According to Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale [12], causes may vary along three dimensions: locus, stability, and globality. The locus dimension differentiates between internal causes—personal characteristics that link the outcome to the actor's

138

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

self-worth—and external causes—environmental factors that reduce personal responsibility for the outcome. It seems that this dimension is most used in research [5]. The stability dimension differentiates between stable causes-factors that remain the same over time and may lead to the same outcome in the future—and unstable causesfactors that fluctuate over time and their effects may not be repeated over time. The global dimension differentiates between global causes-factors that lead to the same outcomes in different situations—and specific causes-factors that are limited to a specific situation. The current research uses these three dimensions of causes. A vast body of research in political psychology considers the issue of how individuals attribute responsibility for behaviors and events, and focuses on the issue of blame [13]. Basic to the study of disasters and other life crises are questions about how victims and observers make sense of the event [5]. Attribution theory, which describes how and why people ascribe causes to events and behaviors can provide a useful framework for helping researchers in their quest to understand how and why victims and observers respond as they do to cataclysmic events. In spite of its clear potential for guiding research, prior to the events of 9/11, surprisingly few studies looking at disaster and nearly no studies of terrorism have used an attribution perspective. While other negative life crises have been studied, cataclysmic events such as disasters and terrorist attacks possess distinctive features that set them apart from other types of trauma Recently there have been studies which regard terrorism as a trauma, and hence, its effect on individuals' mental health and political views [2]. Studies have dealt with attribution and political violence, in general [14], and other studies, with attribution and terror attacks [15]. The horrors of 9/11 have inspired quite a few studies on terror related attributions and perceptions. Yet by and large, these studies look at perceptions of Arab individuals (e.g., Palestinians vis-à-vis Lebanese) regarding terror attacks directed at Western societies [16]. Distinct from other works, this study focuses on attributional style of respondents of two ethnic identity groups (Israeli Arabs vis-à-vis Jews) in response to three terror scenarios illustrating the same action by different perpetrators (a Jew who lives in the West Bank, a Palestinian who lives in the West Bank, a hypothetical Asian, which serves as a neutral perpetrator scenario). In particular, our point of departure and the focal interest of our study is terror related style of attribution (external vs. internal, temporary vs. stable, local vs. global). These three types of attributions represent two categories of reasoning for the act of terror: external, temporary, and local signify roots of the act that are related to the environment/circumstances, while internal, stable, and global signify those rooted in the individual terrorist. To study how the way individuals view terrorism is influenced by the ethnicity of the attributor and/or the ethnicity of the terrorist, Jewish and Arab respondents were randomly presented with a treatment and a control in the form of a story describing a terrorist attack. Who Attributes What, When, and How? The main assumption underlying this study is that Jewish Israelis perceive themselves as the core target of Palestinian terrorism [17]. Consequently, they might see the victims of other Israeli ethnic identity groups as an unintended result of a terror attack. Moreover, this perception might be strengthened by other terror attacks against Jewish targets all over the globe (e.g., Turkey, Argentina, and France). We thus argue that the majority of Jewish Israelis are sensitive to terrorists regardless of their nationality or ethnicity, and have negative perceptions regarding any kind of terrorism,

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

139

including Jewish terrorism. Similar to the strategic logic underlying most terror attacks, particularly suicide terrorism – to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions [18], Palestinians have always legitimized their use of terror by referring to the Israeli occupation and to other political causes [3]. Based on this rationale, and on empirical findings regarding Arabs' perceptions of terrorism [19], given Israeli Arabs' growing sense of identification with Palestinians [20], it may be assumed that Arabs in Israel might be less disapproving of terror, and their attribution style might be less negative, as compared to Jewish Israelis. Relying on the idea of the "ultimate attribution error" [21], which was introduced into the intergroup literature, respondents will attribute more positive, situational causes to the acts of an perpetrator from their ingroup, and more negative, personal ones to the acts of an perpetrator from an outgroup. We have specified three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: regardless of the ethnic identity of the perpetrator, Jewish respondents will attribute more internal, global and stable causes, and will denounce terror more, compared to Arabs. Hypothesis 2: regardless of ethnic identity, we expect differences in attribution style and in level of denunciation of terrorism, between the three scenario groups. Specifically, the Jewish perpetrator will be characterized by more nuanced internal, global and stable attribution of causes and will receive more denunciation compared to the two other perpetrators. The Palestinian perpetrator will be characterized by more external, local and unstable attribution of causes and will receive less denunciation, compared to the two other perpetrators. The Asian perpetrator will be somewhere in the middle, between Jewish and Arab perpetrators regarding attribution of causes and level of denunciation of terrorism. Hypothesis 3: we expect that members of both majority and minority ethnic groups will attribute more internal, global and stable causes, and more denunciation to the perpetrator from the rival and the neutral ethnic identity group, and more external, local and unstable causes, and less denunciation to the perpetrator from their own ethnic identity group.

The Sampling and the Sample The sample consists of 308 students, randomly selected, from three different institutions of higher education in Israel (a major university and two academic colleges). An informed consent was attached to the questionnaire that described the main goal of the study, assured the anonymity of the participant and gave the student the right not to take part or to discontinue participation in the study at any time, for any reason. The students read the letter and signed it. All the students in these classes, who were present at the university on the day the questionnaires were distributed, were asked to complete them; the majority (90%) agreed. The participants were Jews (166) and Arabs (142) students. Additionally, most of the students are under the age of 25 (M=25.52, s.d=6.06); the majority define themselves as of average economic status (on 1-5 scale, M=3.20, s.d=.88) and most of them defined themselves as either secular or traditional (on 1-4 scale, M=1.49, s.d=1.29).

140

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

Study Design and Tools The present research is an experimental design [22]. Jewish and Arab students were randomly assigned to three groups. Each of them received an identical questionnaire except for one difference: each group was presented with identical hypothetical scenarios describing terror/shooting attack events. The only difference between each of the scenarios was the origin of the perpetrator: Israeli Jew, a Palestinian and perpetrator from central Asia (country not specified). We used a structured questionnaire drawn from several measures and it was completed by most participants in about 25 minutes. The questionnaire included measures of religious affiliation, terror attack scenario, attribution style, level of denunciation of terrorism, and demographic information regarding participants’ educational status, income, age, and gender. Measures were tested in pilot studies carried out among Israeli students. Where necessary, modifications were made in accordance with the findings. Ethnicity was measured based on religious affiliation. Respondents were asked to define themselves according to two categories: Israeli Jewish vs. Israeli Arabs. Violent attack scenario was based on a manipulation in which respondents were presented with scenarios describing shooting attack events. As explained earlier, the three scenarios differ only in terms of the ethnic origin of the perpetrator (Israeli Jewish, Palestinian and non-specified Asian). The wording of the scenario was as follows: During the summer of 2004, a severe shooting attack took place in the West Bank (Scenario A and B, or in a country in central Asia (Scenario C). In the late evening, a group of three individuals hid near a road. One of the three opened fire on a civilian car, that happened to be passing at that moment. As a result of the shooting, one citizen: an Israeli (A), a Palestinian (B), an Asian (C), was killed and two others were injured (one very seriously and the other, moderately). A few weeks later, security forces revealed that the shooter was: an Israeli from a nearby settlement (Scenario A), a Palestinian from a nearby refugee camp (Scenario B), an Asian from a small village who belonged to a minority group in conflict with the majority in this country (Scenario C). We measured attribution style by the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) [23] which measures three attribution dimensions. It is frequently used in attribution research and has been found to have broad cross-cultural applicability [24]. Our 6-item 3-dimensional measure was adapted from the ASQ in the following manner: (a) instead of the 12 different hypothetical events, we used three hypothetical scenarios; (b) each scenario was followed by three questions from the ASQ, and in addition, there was one more question for each of the dimensions. These additional questions ascertained whether the cause of the attack was internal/external, global/local, and permanent/temporary [25]. Namely, each of the three attributional dimensions was measured by two items. Scales items were coded on a 7-point scale: 1 denoting the least agreement with the item and 7, the most agreement. For instance, 7 denote a personality related attribution (as opposed to society related). Internal reliabilities (Cronbach's Alphas) were similar for all the three dimensions – external vs. internal (α=.60); stable vs. unstable (α=.63); global vs. local (α=.61). Yet scales with two or three items typically produce lower alphas [26]. For the purpose of analysis, scales were composed of the item means. Level of denunciation of terrorism was measured by questions recently used by scholars looking at the attitudes of Arabs in the Middle East towards terrorism [27], we

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

141

used a 3-item measure to tap the level of denunciation of terrorism: whether the described perpetrator: a) was a terrorist/freedom fighter; b) was innocent/deserved the maximum punishment; c) deserved full support/full condemnation, for his act. Scale items were coded on a 7-point scale: 1 denoting the least agreement with the item and 7 the most. For instance, 7 denotes high approval of terrorism and 1 denotes high denunciation of terrorism. Internal reliability in the current study was high (α = .84). For the purpose of analysis, scales were composed of the item means.

Data Analysis Given the possibility of both direct effects as well as interaction effects of ethnic origin, and the terror scenario, on the main constructs in our study, a GLM Univariate Analysis (ANOVA) model was created for each dependent construct – three model testing for the effects on attribution styles, and one testing for level of denunciation of terrorism (a total of four models). Guided by the hypotheses, in Model 1, ethnic origin and scenario manipulation affect external versus internal attribution style, in Model 2, ethnic origin and scenario manipulation affect global versus local attribution style, in Model 3, ethnic origin and scenario manipulation affect stable versus unstable attribution style, and in Model 4, ethnic origin and scenario manipulation affect level of denunciation of terrorism. For further clarification we have graphed each of these four models. It is worth noting that preliminary analyses of our data showed that sociodemographic indicators (e.g., level of religiosity, income) do not play a major role in the studied process. Hence, we have decided to specify our models while excluding them.

Results Four models of univariate analysis of variance (see Table 1) reveal the following picture: Ethnic identity effects tested whether there were differences between Jewish and Arab respondents in styles of attributions and level of denunciation of the attack beyond the three scenarios. Completely consistent with Hypothesis 1, results show significant differences in all three styles of attribution and level of denunciation of terrorism. Jews, compared to Arabs, attributed – beyond the three type of perpetrators – more internal causes (Jews: M=4.59, s.d=1.36; Arabs: M=4.91, s.d=1.36); more global causes (Jews: M=2.61, s.d=1.16; Arabs: M=3.28, s.d=1.33); more stable causes (Jews: M=3.31, s.d=1.25; Arabs: M=3.72, s.d=1.48); and more denunciations terror attacks (Jews: M=1.57, s.d=.91; Arabs: M=3.01, s.d=1.54) (see Table 1 and Figures 1-4).

142

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

Table 1: Univariate analysis of ethnic group, scenarios and their interaction, on 3 attribution styles and level of denunciation of terrorism. Ethnic Scenario manipulation N M SD F Eta2 group Dependent variable: Internal (1) vs. External (7) attribution style 1.24 4.83 54 Palestinian perpetrator 1.39 4.35 57 Jews Jewish perpetrator 1.42 4.60 55 Asian perpetrator 1.36 .042 4.59 2.66* 166 total Full model .013 1.41 4.07* 5.26 50 Ethnic group Palestinian perpetrator .023 1.61 3.62* 4.83 43 Scenario Arabs Jewish perpetrator .005 .98 .83 4.63 49 Ethnic x Asian perpetrator Scenario 1.36 4.91 142 total Total Palestinian perpetratora 104 5.04 1.34 Jewish perpetratorb 100 4.56 1.50 Asian perpetrator 104 4.61 1.22 Dependent variable: Global (1) vs. Local (7) attribution style 1.64 2.55 54 Palestinian perpetrator 1.24 2.76 57 Jews Jewish perpetrator 1.06 2.51 55 Asian perpetrator .073 4.76*** Full model 1.16 2.61 166 total .068 22.04*** Ethnic group 1.47 3.43 49 Palestinian perpetrator .002 .23 Scenario 1.11 3.14 43 Arabs Jewish perpetrator .004 .56 Ethnic x 1.27 3.32 49 Asian perpetrator Scenario 1.33 3.28 141 total 1.41 2.94 103 Total Palestinian perpetrator 1.22 2.96 100 Jewish perpetrator 1.21 2.86 104 Asian perpetrator Dependent variable: Stable (1) vs. Unstable (7) attribution style 1.21 3.29 54 Palestinian perpetrator 1.13 3.17 57 Jews Jewish perpetrator 1.39 3.45 55 Asian perpetrator .060 1.25 3.82** 3.31 166 Full model total .021 6.38** Ethnic group 1.67 3.87 49 Palestinian perpetrator .031 4.89** 1.55 3.17 Scenario 43 Arabs Jewish perpetratorb .010 1.58 1.06 4.05 Ethnic x 49 Asian perpetratorc Scenario 1.48 3.72 141 total Total Palestinian perpetrator 1.47 3.56 103 Jewish perpetratorb 1.32 3.17 100 c 1.27 3.73 104 Asian perpetrator Dependent variable: Level of denunciation of terrorism (1 denounce, 7 support) .66 1.47 54 Palestinian perpetrator 1.18 1.56 57 Jewish perpetrator Jews .76 1.73 55 Asian perpetrator .91 .310 1.57 166 26.98*** total Full model a 1.55 105.92*** .260 3.52 49 Ethnic group Palestinian perpetrator .036 5.61** Scenario 1.46 2.33 43 Arabs Jewish perpetratorb .050 1.39 7.86*** 3.09 49 Ethnic x Asian perpetratora 1.54 3.01 141 Scenario total Palestinian perpetratora 103 2.41 1.58 Total Jewish perpetratorb 100 1.89 1.36 Asian perpetratora 104 2.37 1.29 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 a, b, c Post Hoc Scheffe indicate significant difference only between groups with different letters within each cell.

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

143

Effects of the identity of the perpetrator tested whether there were differences among the three scenarios (Jewish, Palestinian and Asian perpetrators) in styles of attributions and level of denunciation of the attack, beyond the two ethnic identity groups. As expected (Hypothesis 2), regardless of ethnic identity, respondents attributed more internal and stable causes to the Jewish perpetrator, and denounced the Jewish perpetrator to a greater extent, as compared to Palestinian and Asian perpetrators (see Table 1 and Figures 1-4). More specifically, there were three significant scenario effects. First, external versus internal style of attribution (Jewish perpetrator: M= 4.56, s.d=1.50, Palestinian perpetrator: M=5.04, s.d=1.34, Asian perpetrator: M=4.61. s.d=1.22). Post Hoc Scheffe indicates significant (p<.05) differences between Jewish and Palestinian perpetrators. Second, stable versus unstable style of attribution (Jewish perpetrator: M=3.17, s.d=1.32, Palestinian perpetrator: M=3.56, s.d=1.47, Asian perpetrator: M=3.73. s.d=1.27). Unlike our hypothesis, the Asian perpetrator was accorded more unstable causes than both the Jewish and the Palestinian perpetrators. Post Hoc Scheffe indicates significant (p<.05) differences between the Jewish perpetrator and the Asian perpetrator. Third, level of denunciation of terrorism (Jewish perpetrator: M=1.89, s.d=1.36, Palestinian perpetrator: M=2.41, s.d=1.58, Asian perpetrator: M=2.37. s.d=1.29). Post Hoc Scheffe indicates significant (p<.05) differences between the Jewish perpetrator and both Palestinian and Asian perpetrators. However, scenario effect explains only 2% to 4% of these variables. These results present partial support for Hypothesis 2.

External

5.4

5.2

5.0

4.8

4.6

Scenario Palest. perpetrator

Internal

4.4 Jewish perpetrator 4.2 Jews

Asian perpetrator Arabs

Figure 1: Ethnic group, scenario manipulation and external vs. internal attribution style

To further examine the effect of ethnic identity of the perpetrator within each ethnic identity group, we advanced ONEWAY ANOVA which indicated that Jews did not change their attribution of causes and denunciation of terrorism, regardless of the perpetrator's identity. For Arabs, however, the results indicated two significant differences among the three scenario groups (see Table 1); stable versus unstable style of attribution (F=4.61, p<.01), and level of denunciation of terrorism (F=7.54, p<.000). Post Hoc Scheffe tests indicate significant differences between those respondents who

144

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

were assigned to Jewish and Asian perpetrators regarding stable versus unstable attribution, and between the Jewish perpetrator and the two other perpetrator scenarios regarding level of denunciation of terrorism (see Table 1). Put differently, Arabs were willing to denounce the Jewish perpetrator, but not the Palestinian one.

Local

3.6

3.4

3.2

3.0

2.8

Scenario Palest. perpetrator

Global

2.6

Jewish perpetrator 2.4 Jews

Asian perpetrator Arabs

Figure 2: Ethnic group, scenario manipulation and global vs. local attribution style

Interaction effects tested for significant interaction between ethnic identity (Jews and Arabs) and scenario (Jewish, Palestinian and Asian perpetrators) in styles of attributions and in level of denunciation of the attack. Results run rather counter to Hypothesis 3; no significant interaction effects were found in any of the three scenarios regarding attribution style. Yet there was a significant interaction effect regarding level of denunciation of terrorism.

Unstable

4.2

4.0

3.8

3.6

3.4

Scenario Palest. perpetrator

Stable

3.2

Jewish perpetrator 3.0 Jews

Asian perpetrator Arabs

Figure 3: Ethnic group, scenario manipulation and stable vs. unstable attribution style

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

145

Further scrutiny shows that the illustrations of the manipulations tested are illuminating. As seen in Figure 1, with regard to the Jewish and Palestinian perpetrators, Jewish and Arab respondents employed the same attribution style (internal vs. external cause): Jews attribute more internal causes compared to Arabs who attribute more external causes to both Jewish and Palestinian perpetrators. Yet with regard to the Asian perpetrator, both Arabs and Jews are located somewhere between internal and external attribution. Figure 2 reveals a different picture. Regardless of the ethnic origin of the perpetrator, Jews employ a global style of attribution, whereas Arabs employ a local one. Yet again, a different picture appears in Figure 3. Jews tend to employ a stable style of attribution to all perpetrators, while Arabs tend to employ an unstable style to the Palestinian and Asian perpetrators, but a stable type of attribution to the Jewish perpetrator. Figure 4 reveals the tendencies regarding levels of support/denunciation of terrorism. Jews are clearly against terrorism, regardless of the identity of the terrorist. The greatest denunciation is given to the Palestinian perpetrator, but the differences between the perpetrators are miniscule. Arabs are somewhat ambivalent, yet the greatest amount of legitimacy is given to the Palestinian perpetrator.

Not denounce

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

Denounce terror

2.0

Scenario Palest. perpetrator

1.5

Jewish perpetrator Asian perpetrator

1.0 Jews

Arabs

Figure 4: Ethnic group, scenario manipulation and Level of denunciation of terrorism

The results may be recapitulated in a threefold statement. First, Israeli Arabs were more ambivalent towards perpetrators, more so than the Jews. Arabs saw the main root cause of the perpetrator's behavior in the situation and not in internal personal causes, and they barely denounce these assaults. Second, beyond ethnic identity, respondents were more willing to refer to the Jewish perpetrator as a terrorist, compared to either the Palestinian or the Asian perpetrators. By and large, respondents attribute more internal and stable causes to the Jewish perpetrator and also denounce his/her action to a greater extent in comparison to the two other perpetrators. Three, significant interaction effect was found only in the level of denunciation of terrorism. Generally speaking, the respondents did not alter the course of their attribution style either for the Jewish perpetrator scenario or for the Palestinian perpetrator scenario.

146

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

Table 2: Correlations matrix of research variables

Variables 1. Ethnic group 2. Scenario 3. External vs. Internal 4. Global vs. Local 5. Stable vs. Unstable 6. Level of denunciation of terrorism *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Independent variables 1 2 -.008 .117* -.127* .261*** -.028 .150** .051 .503*** -.010

3

4

5

.059 .019 .092

.257*** .308***

.212***

On the whole, the role played by both ethnic identity (Arabs vis-à-vis Jews in Israel) and perpetrator's identity (a Palestinian, a Jewish or an Asian perpetrator) differed for attribution style and for level of denunciation of terrorism. Specifically, ethnic identity of the respondent and the perpetrator explained only a minute percentage of the explained variance of attribution style (less than 10% of the variance), while these same variables explain a large percentage of the explained variance in the level of denunciation of terrorism (30% of the variance). Moreover, a glance at the correlations among variables (see Table 2) further supports our claim; correlations between ethnic identity and attribution style run from .12 to .26, while the correlation between ethnic identity and level of denunciation is more than double (.50).

Discussion The goal of this study was to look at some psychosocial implications of life under conditions of ongoing terrorism as exists in Israel, and to some extent, in other societies in the West. We studied the way in which people who live under long term actual or threat of terror, are willing to call a violent act of killing a "terrorist" act. We do so by looking at the resulting attributions and attitudes regarding terrorism. This study offers a new and novel look at the way ethnic identities play a role in the willingness of people to attribute terrorist characteristics to a violent act of killing by perpetrators of different ethnic origin. This question was approached within the framework of attribution theory [8] and tested by means of a scenario presented to the respondents within a questionnaire. Results obtained by a series of variance analyses showed that: a) Arabs tend to identify with terrorism to a greater extent than the Jews. They see the causes of terror in the situation, rather than in the person. b) In comparison to the two other perpetrators, the Jewish perpetrator is highly condemned. At the same time, respondents attribute more internal and stable causes to the Jewish perpetrator. c) A significant interaction effect of ethnic origin and terror scenario was found only for level of denunciation of terrorism, and none regarding attribution style. Why do Arabs attribute more external causes (i.e., blaming it more on the situation than on the perpetrator) to terror attacks compared to Jews and why do they denounce them less? As most of the terror attacks in Israel have been carried out by Palestinians against Jewish Israelis, it would be more difficult for the Israeli Arabs (i.e., Palestinian Israelis) to condemn the acts of their siblings, and view perpetrators as terrorists [29]. As elsewhere, justification for terrorism is that terror is a result of the occupation, and

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

147

is an attempt to pressure the occupiers to make concessions [30]. On the other hand, we assume that Israelis tend to see themselves as victims of vicious terror and, and as a result of their difficult experiences, they denounce terror, regardless of where it occurs and who the perpetrators are. Overall, it seems that our findings lend credence to the well-known notion of "one terrorist is another person's freedom fighter" [31]. However, caution is called for. Israeli Arabs in our study did not express unquestionable support for terrorism, but they denounce it to a much lesser extent than the Jews. An attempt to compare the evidence of our study to those of others is somewhat hazardous because it would appear that no other studies have compared attitudes of Arabs and Jews in an exact similar way. Studies have looked at the support for terrorist organizations and violent acts against powerful nations among different groups of Arabs in the Middle East. By and large, these studies show great levels of support which are generally explained in terms of a social dominance struggle (as opposed to clash of cultures struggle) [32] or by a general reaction to collective threat and fear [33]. Hadad's [20] data reveal that approval of suicide operations is more pronounced among Lebanese than Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. In Israel, our findings may seem to run counter with those of Shamir and Shikaki [34] who studied whether definitions of political violence as terrorism are tainted by self-serving motivations. They found that Israeli Arabs judge most acts of violence as terrorism. Israeli Jews (and Palestinians) perceive an international norm largely divergent from their own point of view, inflating world judgment of their own acts of violence as terrorism and underestimating world judgment of the other side's violence. However, they seem to be in agreement with the study by Zaidise, Canetti-Nisim, and Pedahzur [35]. Controlling for other variables, they found that Arab Muslims demonstrate higher levels of support for political violence, namely, they approve of the use of violent means to affect political decisions. It should be kept in mind however, that in previous cases, the theoretical foundation as well as the hypotheses testing are quite different than those underlying our study. Why did the respondents attribute more internal and stable causes to the Jewish perpetrator (i.e. blame it on the perpetrator rather than on the situation), and highly denounce the Jewish perpetrator? Why did our Jewish respondents not differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup perpetrators, while our Arab respondents did differentiate between them – as would have been expected by the ultimate attribution error- [26]? Two lines of explanation may be offered. One could be related to the different attitudes of Arab respondents toward the Jewish perpetrator – whom they highly denounce, and the Palestinian perpetrator – of whom they avoid denunciation. The other rests on the notion that the Jewish perpetrator was perceived as a person who fights against Palestinians and whose actions are against the Israeli law. Thus, perpetrators are not supported by the majority of their own people. As such, the Jewish perpetrator evokes negative feeling in the hearts of respondents who tend to denounce the attack more than that of the other two assailants (the Palestinian and the Asian) who might be seen as fighting for national causes. Some support for that line of explanation may be linked to the widespread negative attitudes towards the 1980s Jewish Underground in Israeli public opinion [36], as succinctly expressed by Rabbi Yoel Ben-Nun [37]. To some extent, our findings show some similarity to those of Henry et al. [38]. They argue that identification with terrorist organizations is a product of counter-dominance, but most important for the present discussion, that these relationships depend on the dynamics of the conflict and the status of the perpetrators.

148

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

How can the minute explained variance for attribution style and the high percentage of explained variance for level of denunciation of terrorism be explained? One possible explanation is a methodological one: low alpha reliability of attribution style. Since each attribution style was measured by only two items, there was not enough variance in attribution style both among Jews and Arabs (regardless of the scenario). On the other hand, there was large variance in terms of level of denunciation of terrorism. Another possible explanation is to suggest that when people are asked about their attitude toward terror attacks that have taken the life of a civilian, it is easier for them to decide where they stand on this issue, compared to questions regarding theoretical motivations of the perpetrator, where they might feel that they "do not know" the answer (i.e., what the main motive of the perpetrator was). By and large, based on our study, we submit that individuals actually differ in the way they view terror much more than they differ in the way they ascribe motivations to terrorists. As in any study, there are certain limitations that should be noted. One potential limitation of the study concerns questions of generalization stemming from the use of a relatively small student population. Students might differ from other adults as they tend to be more aware of political and social issues than the general public, and by and large, they are likely to be more liberal in many ways. At the same time, students usually hold a variety of attitudes, largely correlated with the field of study [39]. In that respect, our sample consists of respondents of different schools of higher education as well as a large number of areas of study specialization. For the most part, studies dealing with social psychological constructs show almost no differences between results based on student samples and general population samples [40]. Moreover, the use of such samples confers certain advantages [41]. It facilitates the use of large, multiple-item scales required to assess psychological constructs at reasonable levels of reliability and validity, which would otherwise be difficult and costly to administer to a large nationally representative sample. It also enhances internal consistency by a priori limitation of the number of confounding variables. Lastly, since the extant literature on attribution style employs student samples, the use of a student sample here facilitates cross-cultural comparisons. However, due to this potential limitation, caution should be considered regarding the generalization of our study, and more research is needed in order to back up our results. Another limitation could be the fact that the study was carried out among Jews and Arabs in Israel. The question of whether and how this selection, and the fact that Israeli society has been distressed by the intractable conflict with its Arab neighbors [42], might affect the relationship under examination has not completely been exhausted. Possibly, the recent extension of the terror threat to other Western societies has limited the discrepancy between Israel and these societies. The fact that the scores on additional constructs were well within the ranges found elsewhere, and that the tendencies revealed support those previously reported [45], could very well imply that the relationships found in this study may be generalized to other countries. The finding that the Asian perpetrator scenario did not really play the control condition role that was assigned to it runs counter to our initial prediction. Apparently, looking at the attribution of causes and level of denunciation of terrorism attributed to the Asian perpetrator, our respondents did not perceive him to be a neutral perpetrator, between Jewish and Arab perpetrators. Yet to some extent, external vis-à-vis internal style of attribution might serve as the exception to the rule here. One way to explain this is to argue that, unlike the two other scenarios (Jewish and Arab perpetrators) which are very realistic in the Middle East, the Asian perpetrator scenario was not

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

149

perceived to be real enough. Such a gap may result in different levels of reference (attribution style and attitudes) by the respondents who found it difficult to compare the Asian scenario with the other two. Put differently, our respondents were inconsistent regarding an actual scenario attack vis-à-vis a theoretical one [43]. We believe, however, that before additional relevant conclusions are drawn, more empirical work, examining laboratory and real terrorism is desired. The issue of how people perceive terrorism was approached from numerous theoretical perspectives: terror management theory [44], social dominance orientation [37], just world theory [45], and attribution theory [46]. We believe that empirical studies that look into individual perceptions of acts and perpetrators of terrorism, are still far and between. We believe that one way to continue this line of research is to replicate this experiment in diverse, multi-ethnic societies, particularly those which were hit by actual or threats of violence and terrorism (e.g., USA, Spain, England). Further, studies should attempt to answer in greater detail the questions of why people of different ethnic identity groups view terrorism in different ways, and of when these positive perceptions regarding terrorism may result in actual participation in acts of terrorism and political violence. As this study shows, ethnic identities play an important role in stirring the perceptions of individuals living in the shadow of violence and terrorism and further study of the effects of ethnic identities should advance the attribution of responsibility to perpetrators of terrorism research program. We strongly believe that a deeper understanding of the perceptions of people of different ethnic origins may lead to an enhanced ability of governments to prevent inter- ethnic violence and terrorism. Perceptions of terrorism as a legitimate tool to redress individuals' distress are reversible. This change in world order may not occur in a span of days, but is feasible.

References [1] Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2005). After 9/11: Is it all different now? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(2), 259-277. [2] Hobfoll., E.S., Canetti-Nisim, D., Johnson, J.R. (2006). Exposure to terrorism, stress-related mental health symptoms, and defensive coping among a nationally representative sample in Israel. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 74, 207-218. [3] Erlich, R. (2006). The battle for hearts and minds – The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian confrontation as a case study. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C. S. S). Retrieved March 16, 2006, from: http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/i_p_conflict_e.pdf. [4] Bar-Tal, D. (2004). The necessity of observing real life situations: Palestinian-Israeli violence as a laboratory of learning about social behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 677-701. [5] Yates, S. (1998). Attributions about the causes and consequences of cataclysmic events. Journal of Personal & Interpersonal Loss. 3(1), 7-25. [6] Shamir, J. & Shikaki, K. (2002). Self-serving perceptions of terrorism among Israelis and Palestinians. Political Psychology 23 (3), 537-557; Sidanius, J., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Levin, S. (2004). Arab attributions for the attack on America: The case of Lebanese subelites. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology. 35(4), 403-416; Small, A. D., Lerner, S. J., & Fischhoff, B. (2006) Emotion Priming and Attributions for Terrorism: Americans’ Reactions in a National Field Experiment. Political Psychology 27 (2), 289-298. [7] Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley; Robins, R.W., Mendelsohn, G.A., Connell, J.B., & Kwan, V.S.Y. (2004). Do people agree about the causes of behavior? A social relations analysis of behavior ratings and causal attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 86, 334-344. [8] Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley [9] Jones, E.E., & Davis, K.E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, p. 219–266).

150

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

New York: Academic Press; Kelley, H.H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. L. Vine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 14, p. 192–241). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; Kelley, H.H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28, 107–128. [10] Gilbert, K. T. (1998). Ordinary personology. In: D. T Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, p. 89-150). New York: McGraw-Hill; Ross, L. (1998). Comment on Gilbert. In: J. M. Darley & J. Cooper (Eds.), Attribution and social interaction (p. 53-66). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association; Robins, R.W., Mendelsohn, G.A., Connell, J.B., & Kwan, V.S.Y. (2004). Do people agree about the causes of behavior? A social relations analysis of behavior ratings and causal attributions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 86, 334-344. [11] Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social cognition. New York: McGraw-Hill. [12] Abramson, L.Y., Seligman, M.E.P., & Teasdale, J. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, p. 49–74. [13] Javeline, D. (2003). The role of blame in collective action: Evidence from Russia. American Political Science Review, 97(1), 107-121; McGraw, K.M. (2001). Political accounts and attribution processes. In: J. H. Kuklinski (Ed.). Citizens and politics: Perspective from political psychology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 160-197; Gibson, J.L., & Gouws, A. (1999). Truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Attributions ob blame and the struggle over apartheid. American Political Science Review, 93, 501-517. [14] Sabucedo, J.M., Casal, M.R., & Fernandez, C.F. (2002). The construction of discourse which legitimize terrorism. Psichothema, 14, 72-77; Sabucedo, J.M., Blanco, & De La Corte, (2003). Beliefs which legitimize political violence against the innocent. Pshcothema, 15, 550-555; Vala, J., Monteiro, M., & Leyens, J.P. (1988). Perception of violence as a function of observer's ideology and actor's group membership. British Journal of Social Psychology, 27(3), 231-237. [15] Anthony, K., Rosseli, F., & Caparvan, L. (2003). Truly evil or simply angry: Individualism, collectivism, and attributions for the events of September 11th. Individual Differences Research, 1(2), p. 147-157; Nelson, L.J., Moore, D.L., Olivette, J., & Scott, T. (1997). General and personal mortality salience and nationalistic bias. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 884-892; Sabucedo, J.M., Casal, M.R., & Fernandez, C.F. (2002). The construction of discourse which legitimize terrorism. Psichothema, 14, 72-77; Sadler, M.S., Lineberger, M., Correll, J., &Park, B. (2005). Emotions, attributions, and policy endorsement in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 249-258; Sidanius, J., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Levin, S. (2004). Arab attributions for the attack on America: The case of Lebanese subelites. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 35(4), 403-416. [16] Haddad, S. (2004). A comparative study of Lebanese and Palestinian Perceptions of suicide bombing: The role of militant Islam and socio-economic. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 45, 337-363. [17] Bar-Tal, D. (2004). The necessity of observing real life situations: Palestinian-Israeli violence as a laboratory of learning about social behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 677-701; BarTal, D., & Sharvit, K. (in press). Psychological foundations of Israeli Jews’ reactions to Al Aqsa Intifada: The role of the threatening transitional context. In V. M. Esses & R Vernon (Eds.) Why neighbours kill: Explaining the breakdown of ethnic relations. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. [18] Pape, R. A., (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science Review. 97(3), 343-361. [19] Sidanius, J., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Levin, S. (2004). Arab attributions for the attack on America: The case of Lebanese subelites. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 35(4), 403-416; Levin, S., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Sidanius, J. (2003). Social dominance and social identity in Lebanon: Implications for support of violence against the West. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 6, 353-368. [20] Jamal, A. (2004). Between homeland, nation, and state: Patriotism among the Palestinian minority in Israel. In Ben-Amos, A., & Bar-Tal, D. (Eds.)(2004). Patriotism: Homeland love [Patriotism: Ahavat Hamoledet]. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, p. 399-453 [Hebrew Al-Haj, M. (1997). Identity and orientation among Arabs in Israel: a state of a dual periphery. State, Government, and International Relations 41-42, 103-122; Al-Haj, M. Katz, E. & Shay, S. (1993). Arab and Jewish attitudes toward a Palestinian state. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(4), 619-632. [21] Pettigrew, T. (1979). The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport's cognitive analysis of prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, 461-476. [22] Mintz, A., & Geva, N. (1993). Why don't democracies fight each other? An experimental study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37(3), 484-503. [23] Peterson, C., Semmel, A., Baeyer, C., Abramson, L.Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Seligman, M.E.P. (1982). The attributional style questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6 (3), 287-300.

S. Kimhi and D. Canetti-Nisim / Inter-Ethnic Groups and Perception of Terrorism

151

[24] Peng, Y., Shu-hua, S., & Li, L. (2005). The relationships between college students' attributional style, self-efficacy and subjective well-being. Chinese Journal of Clinical Psychology, 13(1), p. 42, 43-44; [25] Seligman Martin, E.P. (1995). Explanatory style. Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum. [26] Krosnick, J.A. and Fabrigar, L.R. (2001) Designing Good Questionnaires: Insights from Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. [27] Sidanius, J., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Levin, S. (2004). Arab attributions for the attack on America: The case of Lebanese subelites. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 35(4), 403-416; Haddad, S. (2004). A comparative study of Lebanese and Palestinian Perceptions of suicide bombing: The role of militant Islam and socio-economic. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 45, 337-363. [29] Shavit, A. (1998). The citizen Azmi [Haezrach Azmi]. Haaretz. May 29th [Hebrew]; Makover, S. (2000). We are a time bomb [Anachno petzazt zeman]. Maariv. June 23rd [Hebrew]. [30] Pape, R. A., (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science Review. 97(3), 343-361; Pearlman, W., (2002). Suicide bombers not the only martyrs…Israel creates many more. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 1, p. 14. [31] Ganor, B. (1998). Defining terrorism – Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter? The Interdisciplinary Center for Counter-Terrorism Policy, The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzlia.. Retrieved April 7, 2006, from: http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=49 [32] Levin, S., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Sidanius, J. (2003). Social dominance and social identity in Lebanon: Implications for support of violence against the West. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 6, 353-368; Sidanius, J., Henry, P.J., Pratto, F., & Levin, S. (2004). Arab attributions for the attack on America: The case of Lebanese subelites. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 35(4), 403416. [33] Pettigrew, T. (2003). People under threat: Americans, Arabs and Israelis. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 9(1), 69–90. [34] Shamir, j. & Shikaki, K. (2002). Self-serving perceptions of terrorism among Israelis and Palestinians. Political Psychology 23 (3), 537-557. [35] Zaidise, E., Canetti-Nisim, D. & Pedahzur, A. (2007) Politics of God or politics of man? The role of religion and deprivation in predicting support for political violence in Israel. Political Studies (in Press). [36] Pedahzur, A. (2003). The Israeli Response to Jewish Extremism and Violence: Defending Democracy. Manchester: Manchester University Press. [37] Hazofe. Retrieved April 11, 2006 from: http://www.hazofe.co.il/%5Cweb%5Cnewsnew%5Ckatava6.asp?Modul=24&id=42748&Word=&gilay o=2666&mador. [38] Henry, P.J., Sidanius, J., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (2005). Social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and support for intergroup violence between the Middle East and America. Political Psychology, 26, 569-583. [39] Weller, L., & Nadler, A. (1975). Authoritarianism and job preference. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 6, 9-14. [40] Pentony, J.F., Peterson, K.S.E., Phillips, O., Leong, C., Harper, P., Bakowski, A., Steward, S,, and Gonzales, R. (2000). A comparison of authoritarianism in The United States, England, and Hungary with selected nonrandom samples. European Psychologist 5: 259–268. [41] Laythe, B., Finkel, D.G., Bringle, R.G., and Kirkpatrick, L.A. (2002). Religious fundamentalism as a predictor of prejudice: a two-component model. Journal for the Scientific study of Religion 41: 623– 635. [42] Bar-Tal, D. (2004). The necessity of observing real life situations: Palestinian-Israeli violence as a laboratory of learning about social behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 677-701.. [43] Johnson, J.T., Jemmott, J.B., & Pettigrew, T.F. (1984). Causal attribution and dispositional inference: Evidence of inconsistent judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20(6), 567-585. [44] Yum, Y.O., & Schenck-Hamlin, W. (2005). Reactions to 9/11 as a function of terror management and perspective taking. The Journal of Social Psychology, 145, 265-286. [45] Van Zomeren, M., & Lodewijkx, H.F.M. (2005). Motivated responses to 'senseless' violence: Explaining emotional and behavioral responses through person and position identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35, 755-766. [46] Sadler, M.S., Lineberger, M., Correll, J., &Park, B. (2005). Emotions, attributions, and policy endorsement in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 249-258; Sabucedo, J.M., Casal, M.R., & Fernandez, C.F. (2002). The construction of discourse which legitimize terrorism. Psichothema, 14, 72-77.

This page intentionally left blank

Part 4 Melting Pot vs. Multiculturalism and Preventive Interventions: Will Understanding of Deprived Rights of Immigrants and Minorities’ - Lead to Less Terrorism?

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-155

155

Chapter 13 Communication and Social Engineering: Addressing Terrorism and Social Suffering Dr. Willem van de Put HealthNet TPO, Netherland

Introduction The world of complex crises and the search for the right response to the suffering of people living through them is changing in many ways. This process started right after the end of the Cold War, but accelerated after ‘9/11’. The ‘security agenda’ now dominates, and the complexity of actual and potential conflicts in the world is often simplified to an overall concern about terrorist attacks. The fact that the source of danger is perceived to be in political Islam complicates matters even more: a new distinction is taking shape against a background of globalization, secularization and ecological insecurity. Traditional international relief and development collaboration is now questioned on its principles by some of the populations on the receiving end, while faith-based NGOs from the Islamic world enter the field of relief and reconstruction. Questions of security, but also of identity and modernity, thus reshape the traditional domains of international development collaboration and humanitarian work. As an international agency working on the edge of humanitarian relief and structural development, we need to ask ourselves questions. If we offer relief or reconstruction, than what are we offering? How do we deal with populations that have terrorists among them? Can we distinguish between victims and perpetrators? Are we used by powers that we do not understand? How do we justify our approach and interventions, now that many have decided not to accept our excuse of neutrality any longer? And can we still help people, or help communities? In this chapter I want to discuss some possible answers to these questions. The issues at require reflection on many levels, from philosophical considerations to political decisions to direct interventions aimed to help people in distress. I want to briefly discuss the underlying values of the international ‘aid world’, and compare them with the view on suffering and focus on ‘people at risk’ that is dominant in western biomedicine and public health models. Then I will attempt to put the recent growth of anti-western thought into a framework of understanding. This should help in clarifying an agenda that we may explicitly use in our interventions. In a search for common ground we need to be transparent in our motives. This requires various forms of communication – of which I will give some practical examples. I will end by arguing

156

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

that communication is not only the most important means to get any results, but also the very goal of the work we try to achieve.

Change in the international agenda Ten years ago the need for a shift in the organisation of an international response to the needs of people living in crises was already seen. In its Human Development Report for 1994 the United Nations Development Programme recorded only three wars between states in the period between 1989 and 1992, while documenting seventy-nine instances of intra-state conflicts over the same period. In 'complex political emergencies', wars are fought with conventional weapons and strategies of ethnic annihilation and population explosion. Proliferation of small arms and land mines, coupled with low intensity warfare tactics, resulted in an estimated 95% of civilian casualties in these conflicts [1]. After ‘9/11’, political Islam has been defined as part of the problem, and a ‘war on terror’ has been defined as a necessary response by (some) western governments. Faced with the horror of the civil casualties, be they the target of violence that defines itself as either terror or anti-terror driven, governments, international organisations, development agencies, and relief and humanitarian NGO’s are struggling to find an effective response. Uncomplicated humanitarianism is no longer an option. The ‘humanitarian enterprise’ reached is height in the nineteen nineties. After the end of ideology as proclaimed by Fukuyama (1989), humanitarian action became an outlet for those that would have joined political pressure groups some years earlier. In this ‘ideological void’, the humanitarian enterprise flourished. Nobody could be against the noble idea of bringing relief to those in need, because, as a French humanitarian said, "It's the idea that people are not made to suffer"1. A general, non-specific ideal of human solidarity replaced ideological, politically motivated action. Humanitarian action included the need for adventure, media attention, and modern technological, logistic ‘power’ that the traditional work on poverty eradication lacked. As David Rieff says: “Relief brings proximity, action, and has aspects of heroism when one would go into a war-zone to save lives of innocent civilians. No more analysis was asked for” [2]. The prestige of humanitarianism turned it into a political force that had an appeal to both the general public and political power, which turned into a perverse situation where ‘governments saw that humanitarianism could be used as a fig leaf for all kinds of political agendas’ [2]. In other words, humanitarian relief became an excuse for lack of political action. The Balkan wars, the Rwanda genocide, and more recently Darfur are good examples of how the response of the international community has been reduced to humanitarian relief. It has taken a painful long time to realise the simple truth that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. Since relief goods have been used to strengthen terrorist movements, humanitarianism has lost its innocence. It is increasingly difficult to separate victims from perpetrators. Impartiality and neutrality no longer hold as criteria for access. In order to reach a population in distress, one is forced to negotiate with local powers that have completely different values. So what is to be done? 1

Conversations with David Rieff: http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Rieff/rieff-con3.html

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

157

Apart form these political considerations, there is another problem. The claims to impartiality, neutrality and independence that lie at the heart of humanitarian relief are closely related to an understanding of human suffering as an individual matter that needs to be eradicated. All individuals have a right to shelter, food, and medical assistance – nobody should suffer. But whereas everybody agrees that suffering needs to be alleviated, the ideology that’ men should not suffer’ is not shared. Suffering is a central element of understanding life in many, if not all, religious believes. For some, people are made to suffer, for many, suffering gives life meaning.

Populations in distress HealthNet TPO implements programmes in some 18 low-income countries under stress, such as Afghanistan, Congo and Sudan. The goal of the programmes is to help people cope with their own health situation. They are survivors of war, genocide and long-term repression. They suffered rape, torture, and hunger. Beloved ones have been killed, houses are lost, and culture has been destroyed. Many of these people have fled, sometimes many times in their lives. They find themselves living in strange communities – communities where they do not belong, and where people cannot simply be trusted. In all these groups, problems of identity, community, participation and exclusion exist. Life in Rwanda, Burundi, East Congo and Cambodia has been ripped apart at the family level: the terror has literally entered the family. The Khmer Rouge taught people not to mind about each other: the Angka (organisations) would take care of all. The Hutu-Tutsi divide was brought into families of ‘mixed marriage’, and fathers killed their own children. Rape has evolved from a weapon of terror into a common trait of social life in East DRC. According to the United Nations, 27,000 sexual assaults were reported in 2006 in South Kivu Province alone. In other places, such as South Sudan, the Dinka’s maintained a strong sense of community, defending themselves to all others as a tight group. Kosovars and Afghans did the same. For these people, outside threats caused the family to retreat into what is seen as the last security zone, a strict interpretation of tradition. And this often includes a rigid interpretation of rules, up to a level where Afghan women experience that the age-old traditional restrictions in women’s behaviour (purdah) have now come to an enormous problem of domestic violence throughout Afghanistan. Individuals and communities are thus targeted by violence and terror. And both individuals and communities have to find ways to cope. It is important to realize that in many non-western cultures people experience themselves not so much as an individual in the Western sense of the term but more, as Roland in Ramanujam [3] states, as a ‘family-self’; a concept that is based on the “relational model which envisions intense emotional relationships within the family”. The ‘conservative impulse’ (Marris: Loss and Change) suggests that man cannot survive without some framework of meaning to help predict the course of events. Any system will do, as long as it identifies experiences in a way that enables people to attach meaning to them. And there are no shared criteria as to what constitutes ‘meaning’. A new group that emerged in Kivu, called the ‘Rastas’, gives a scary example. They are described by victims as ‘a mysterious gang of dreadlocked fugitives who live deep in the forest, wear shiny tracksuits and Los Angeles Lakers jerseys and are notorious for burning babies, kidnapping women and literally chopping up anybody

158

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

who gets in their way.’ (New York Times, Jeffrey Gettleman, October 7, 2007). These so-called Rastas appear to have been part of the Hutu militias who fled Rwanda after committing genocide there in 1994, but now it seems they have split off on their own and specialize in freelance cruelty. Survivors have reported to have been kept as sex slaves, tied to a tree, only to be untied for a few hours each day to be gang-raped. Overall in Kivu brutality towards women is reported to have become ‘almost normal’ – but the Rastas appear to be a special group that has build a new way of life on systematic abuse. It may well be that a psychological assessment at the individual level would show that the men who belong to this extreme group do relatively well. Would we therefore want to see the behaviour of the Rastas as an example of post-traumatic growth? Probably not. We feel something needs to be done about their behaviour. Little action is actually undertaken, since there is no group that has both the power and the interest to stop the Rastas. But would such a group be available, they would have no difficulty in legitimizing their intervention on the basis of international law. Rastas exist as long as there is no local law enforcement, and as long as they do not target western interests. The more problematic issue is with those people that hold a belief that is more than an ad-hoc coping style. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we work with the Pasthun, who are devout Muslims. The Pashtun area is also the base of some of the most wanted international terrorist groups. The Taliban represented the people’s will when they stopped the shameless decadence and abuse of the warlords in 1995. But soon they implemented acts of terror themselves in the power struggle that was ended by the invasion in October 2001. The Pashtun remain devout Muslims. Among them are former Taliban, and in order to provide something useful for the population in these areas, we need to be ready to question both their assumptions of what life is about as our own.

Is there common ground? We have principles. We believe the world to be one ‘global community’, where we act as global citizens; we believe that there is a minimal consensus possible concerning the universality of ‘human dignity’; and we believe that we have the right to critical reflection. However, as western aid-workers we often think we understand people who live in very different realities. More importantly, we bring a moral, though often unconscious, judgement as to what problems need priority, and what coping styles are to be seen as ‘good’ or’ bad’ in these other communities. We base these assumptions on ‘public health’ or ‘evidence-based interventions’, but we only have a very limited evidence base to build our case on. This normative approach has been questioned before [4], but since the war on terror it can no longer be ignored. There are many fields where there is deep misunderstanding between the individual-oriented, problemsolving, mechanistic worldview that is presented by the international community and the traditional, community-oriented, religious worldview that recipients of western interventions may have. This is not the place to explore this too far. Important for an understanding of the role of communication is only that there is this gap. As an illustration of how easy misunderstanding comes about, we may look at what is a dilemma for the interventionist, but perhaps less so for the community in need of assistance.

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

159

It is one thing to look at the distress that is caused by the Rastas, it is another thing to look at what has caused the existence of such a group. In working with populations that suffers the brutality of gangs like this, we have to make choices. Shall we focus on the individual person that needs help? Or should we aim at prevention, the population approach? The ‘high risk strategy’ makes us screen the individuals who are at risk, in order to help those that need help immediately, while trying to prevent others from deteriorating. This has obvious advantages: it leads to appropriate interventions for the individual, it helps to motivate both the person at risk and the interventionist, and it seems a cost-effective use of limited resources [5]. The population strategy on the other hand can be summarized as an attempt to shift the distribution of exposure, to prevent the actual situation that causes harm from occurring in the first place. De Jong [ref] has described this as primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, in which primary prevention would include the population strategy. Primary prevention at the level of the society, group and family includes a range of interventions and mechanisms such as early warning systems, economic reconstruction, addressing root causes of problems, conducting research for advocacy, conflict prevention, transitional justice, and so on. Of course, ideally one should follow all strategies at the same time. Victims of violence need assistance, and the cause of harm needs to be eliminated. But there are limited resources, and we need to make the best possible use of them. This seems to lead to diabolic choices: in using our resources, should we bypass the obvious victims and their needs, in order to make an attempt at something as vague as social engineering? How can we pretend to even be able to do so? I venture to say that this is not necessarily a dilemma. If we analyze what has gone wrong in our mutual understanding in the first place, and then seek common ground with the community, there is an approach that may include both the population-oriented prevention model and the necessary attention for those individuals that need specific help.

Inclusion, exclusion and ‘Meaning’ We only need to think of western-made disasters and terror in recent times to realize that the problem of meaning is extremely relevant to the west. The holocaust has been seen as the horrible end of the ‘project of modernity’. This ‘project of modernity’ in the west included secularization, rationalization, scientific progress, and disenchantment. Medicine and biotechnology have made enormous progress, but the loss of meaning has led to many exaggerated claims of knowledge and control in the western world. Problems need to be solved, and they need to be solved immediately. The world is seen as a place that can be controlled and understood – but has no more meaning. For many, this process was seen as little less than an end to civilization. The diagnoses of Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault and Derrida leave little to hope for. But there are ideals of the enlightenment that might be worth saving. The process of modernity and the growing use of rational and critical reflection are not the same thing. The main assumption for Habermas [6] is that the project of modernity can be redeemed. Habermas’s task is to strengthen the ‘project of modernity’ by reconstructing it through his distinctive theory of communication. It can be seen as an attempt to overcome the pessimism of late modernity, by resolving the dilemmas of subject-centred reason in the paradigm of communicative action. In shared structures of discourse ethics we can find a common foundation for faith in the human future. Only a

160

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

West, as Habermas says, that has more to offer than the ideology of consumerism, only a West that revives its universal normative ideal of self-determination and formal equality as means to allow differences in culture and personality will be able to overcome the deep-rooted resentment of (especially Arab and Muslim) non-Western peoples at having been materially expropriated and culturally corrupted. It is these points of departure that we try to implement in cross cultural work. The ‘Rastas’ are a group of young men who have chosen to break away from their original setting, and to define themselves in a new way. Examples like this can be found in gangs of child-soldiers, but also in street gangs in the Western world. These groups share their definition of themselves as outcasts, as not belonging to society. Others, such as islamists, also deny attachment to western society. These are issues of ‘exclusion’ and ‘meaning’. The equity problem is no longer neatly divided between nation states, the ‘west and the rest’, but is settled in a much more complex form within nations.2 Poverty leads to exclusion – but not only poverty does that. Exclusion has become the term for people who are not allowed to participate in a society of their choice. Immigrants in western countries may feel this, but there is also a generation from middle classes in countries with growing economies, that feel excluded from western society. Among them are the perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks. In Pakistan and Afghanistan radical, fundamentalist elements in society are among the populations we work for. We have continued working in Afghanistan when it was under Taliban rule. In Cambodia, we have worked with the last groups who were part of the Khmer Rouge in the North West of the country, who had lived for thirty years under Khmer Rouge rule. In Mozambique, we were confronted with Renamo ‘left-overs’ when we implemented our programmes there. These experiences have helped us understand better how interventions mean different things to different people.

Interventions and their setting

Trauma and society Psychosocial stress has only recently been identified as an area of intervention in the humanitarian world. There is debate as on what constitutes effective interventions , but there is also growing consensus on what can usefully be done. On 14 September 2007, international humanitarian agencies have agreed on a new set of guidelines to address the mental health and psychosocial needs of survivors as part of the response to conflict or disaster conflict or disaster3. The guidelines have a clear focus on social

2 The ‘Katrina’ disaster in New Orleans showed how huge gaps in access to care and support were linked to income inequality. Income inequality has been climbing steadily in the USA,, with more than 50% of income going to the top 20% of households, 37 million people living below the poverty line, and 45.8 million lacking health insurance (US Census Bureau. Income, poverty and health insurance coverage in the United States 2004. www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf 3 See http://www.who.int/entity/mental_health/emergencies/guidelines_iasc_mental_health_psychosocial_june_20 07.pdf

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

161

interventions and supports. They emphasize the importance of building on local resources such as teachers, health workers, healers, and women’s groups to promote psychosocial well-being. They focus on strengthening social networks and building on existing ways community members deal with distress in their lives. This may be seen as stressing the importance of a population-based approach, which may be more effective than a high-risk individual approach [ref Galeo]. Many researchers trying to understand the effects of traumatic events upon a population have pointed out that individual psychological trauma is not the main concern within war-affected communities. Self reported concerns include impaired psychosocial functioning, family conflict, sadness and isolation resulting from the loss of social networks, spouse abuse, distress related to the experience of poverty and the inability to provide for one’s family, psychosis, substance abuse, sadness due to separation from loved ones, grief associated with the death or disappearance of family members, and distress regarding the lack of opportunity to engage in culturally important rituals of bereavement [7, 8, 4]. These concerns are about relationships; about the way people constitute a community. And these concerns exist in the midst of political developments, where everybody experienced multiple trauma, and where the future is insecure. One way to address societal issues is to talk about these issues. That requires a shared understanding, some basic common ground. “People would not have anything to say to each other if they were not different, but they would not understand each other if they were not the same” (Arendt 1958: 155) [9]. Constructing a shared reality is the challenge that lies at the heart of any relationship. The relationship between helpers and those that need help is as ‘therapist-client relationship’ part of the generic curricula for psychosocial workers – as it is for others working in care. As Frank & Frank explored the power of "healing rhetoric" as a central element in healing, one needs to share a view on what constitutes a meaningful life in order to provide any useful help.4 In whatever way that common understanding is to be reached, communication is involved. Communication takes many forms. Terror is not new – it has always been an instrument of power for the powerless, as well as an instrument of intimidation and warfare. In the view of Louise Richardson, terrorism "simply means targeting civilians for political purposes" [10]. According to Richardson, the characteristics of terror include violence, and especially the use of violence to send a message with often symbolic significance to an audience that is not always the same group as the victims of the terrorist act. Terrorism targets civilians, in order to communicate their political aims to a wider audience. Terrorism is communication. The essential aspect of communication is that it is at the very core of the western project of modernity. Communication in the sense of critical reflection, communication as asking questions, and communication as a practical interaction are essential to reach common ground, and also essential to explain why we believe in the power of critical reflection. Through communicative action we can search for a correct and shared, local understanding of human suffering – and what to do about it. The communication strategy of terrorism needs to be met by another communication strategy.

4

Frank and Frank (1991) Persuasion and Healing: a comparative study of psychotherapy.

162

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

Community based interventions HealthNet TPOs projects are focused on health. Health is a function of social context, and poor health is often a function of poverty. The communicative approach tries to do more than only respond to symptoms. By focusing on transferring knowledge and skills, HNI aims at improved health conditions, by increased local action and local responsibility. Building a system of care adds to building the potential for breaking the cycle of conflict. The means is by assisting people to tackle public health problems themselves, in the midst of unstable situations - and thereby creating more stability. People have a clear need for health in unstable areas. And there is a clear need for healthy people to turn unstable areas into more stable areas. The relation between our health and our ability to live as we would like seems clear enough. The issue is not the ability to live forever, but the capability to live ‘the good life’. The good life may be difficult to define, but only too many people know what the bad things in life mean. As Tolstoi, author of War and Peace, says in the opening sentence of Anna Karenina: “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”. Unhealthy societies are all unhealthy in their own way. Health is contextual. We may not know what we want from life, but most of us know very well what we do not want from life: poverty, misery, illness, suffering. If we want to avoid these, health is an important subject to work on. In this sense, working on health is a way to work on the better life in a broader sense. Health and peace are related in many ways. There cannot be ‘sustainable health’ without peace. There cannot be sustainable peace’ without health either. That is exactly why the two concepts provide an entry point in facing complex crises and the question on how to break through the circular causality one often finds there. Peace and health are both a means to another end (the ‘good life’) as ends in themselves. The broad interpretation of ‘health’ as used by the WHO sees health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’. Health is a goal to be attained as a contribution for ‘leading a good life’. Without getting into subtle philosophical debates as to what constitutes a good life, health is generally seen as one of the essential elements, necessary conditions for leading a good life – whatever different people in different cultures think a good life is. Health is on the other hand a means to facilitate the good life. It takes healthy people to build a healthy society. Where societies need to be rebuild after disaster, or, more complex, after war, or, even more complex but increasingly more relevant, during war, the people that are supposed to do the rebuilding are often not in the best physical and mental shape to come to lasting, sustainable, well-functioning results. And even if they would be, they often find themselves in circumstances that do not allow access to all the information and experience that is currently available. Care, as in Health care In assisting in the (re)building of health care system the emphasis is on care. Without denying the importance of economic factors in building up sustainable systems, the fact that people work together to achieve a lasting impact and get a system functioning should not be underestimated in a post- or chronic conflict situation. A precondition for any operational social system is element of trust, and in creating the ground for trust people make steps towards rebuilding a healthy society.

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

163

The emphasis on care should not be misunderstood. To really understand what care means in a given context, one has to come to terms with the essentials for what constitutes a community in which care can be given. The concept community can mean different things. It can be “people with common interests living in a particular area”, or “the area itself”, or “an interacting population of various kinds of individuals (as species) in a common location” or “a group of people with a common characteristic or interest living together within a larger society”. The key concepts are common characteristics, common interests, and being a group within larger society. Common interests presuppose a mutual benefit that is seen as such by the members of a group, and a community is shaped by the ability and motivation of people to work together in reaching that benefit. In anthropology, the term community is often used for a tight social unit, in which the members have a strong sense of belonging and solidarity. When mutual benefit is taken as a point of departure, rather than moral notions of what constitutes ‘the good’, the effect is often that real ‘report’ is made between the international agencies representatives and the local population. Based on an idea of mutual benefit that makes sense to the local population one can start building relationships that amount to a tangible ‘good’ for the people that want to participate. These are fundamental steps to build up a minimal trust between people. That trust, in turn, is the basis for social rehabilitation that is so often the key to breaking the cycle of conflict. The advantage of working through the health sector is that the vulnerability of the sick is a universal. Every society has created ways of dealing with health problems, and in the rituals that often semi-consciously surround the practical care one finds the basic elements of trust and communal life. Health is a necessary condition for (re)building communities - and community is a necessary condition for building health. In conflict studies 'resource mobilisation' is an alternative to what is known as 'frustration-aggression' theories of violence. Resource mobilisation, as an approach, emphasises the ability of any given goal-oriented or discontented group to act, rather than their underlying motives or frustrations. To quote L. Kriesberg [11] 'Rather than stress the discontent that people feel as the basis for revolutions, violence, and other forms of conflict behaviour and social movement activity, they stress...ability...to act. They argue that dissatisfaction is prevalent; whether or not people try to do better, their lot depends on their ability to do so rather than on their level of dissatisfaction...In examining interaction between adversaries, their relative mobilisation of resources is especially important.' For Oberschall, mobilisation 'refers to the processes by which a discontented group assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals' .The process-orientation of this approach is all important, and may be seen on varying levels or in stages; for Himes [12], active power must be delivered and injected into a social relationship (to achieve goals) in two steps: the identification, discovery and control of accessible resources; and extracting and transforming potential power to active power. In our projects we strive to come to an integrated analysis of local social and cultural complexities, health indicators and an impact assessment. “If it is accepted that development is itself a 'turbulent and often conflict producing process,...there is a need to strengthen people's capacities to cope with and survive future shocks and crises. In the same way that gender analysis has become mandatory for many agencies, "conflict analysis" may also need to become an integral part of assessment, design, and monitoring” [13].

164

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

We need to be aware of local resilience as well as local vulnerability, and in projects we need to be able to select those resources that are best equipped to take responsibility to act for their fellow people, those resources that make a difference. HNI is severely limited in what it can do, and it needs to be able to select the most effective entry. Interventions aimed at systems of care contribute to peace building. The Institute for Multitrack Diplomacy gave several distinct interpretations of 'peace-building' [14]. The concept itself is defined as 'creating the tangible and intangible conditions to enable a conflict-habituated system to become a peace system.' They further stipulate three types of peace-building approaches: political, structural, and social. HealthNet TPO aims at social peace building, which is about relationships. It deals with feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and skills as they are held and shared between peoples, individually and in groups. It is about building a human infrastructure of people who are committed to engendering a new culture, a 'peace culture', within the social fabric of communal and inter communal life. In conclusion we will present some examples of our work in Afghanistan.

Experience in Afghanistan HealthNet TPO has been working continuously in Afghanistan since 1993. We have chosen an approach that takes the Taliban authorities, as well as the local population, serious as partners in a discussion on how health issues should be tackled. From the start, the focus was on direct involvement of communities and relevant local leaders in building up a health system that is truly owned by the population. The quality of the services provided in the system enables it to compete with the privatised health sector. The difference with the private sector is that people and communities are encouraged to take responsibility. There is something to be nurtured in a village health centre - people have built it themselves, they are expected to provide housing to health staff, and they pay. There is need for interaction amongst the villagers in thinking about the common good - in this case health. In the target area, this often-difficult discussion has led to a number of exceptions to the general rule in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Women were allowed to work in the health sector in Nangahar, women and girls had access to public health care, and there was attention for specialised health care for women and children. Discussing the rules of the Taliban with the local leaders and various focus groups helped to find breaches in harsh Taliban law for the benefit of health for the population. Discussion groups with (sometimes non-Taliban) community leaders in the villages, long talks in the evenings rather than the international style ‘office meetings’, a shared history of the effects of religious struggle between project implementers (of which some were from North Sudan) and counterparts, have all helped to build trust between implementers and beneficiaries. The projects offered a good illustration of what is sometimes called the increased opportunities for change in health systems in a post-conflict, or transitory, situation. Discussions with on the one hand medical professionals and on the other 'people in charge' (such as the dean of the medical faculty and the director of MOPH for the Eastern Zone, people in the MOPH in Kabul) showed that one can use the common sense of the leaders to tackle the resistance to new methods and systems from the professionals, who appear to be rather rigid

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

165

followers of rules and regulations from the former health system. On the other hand, some of the more political leaders have their pursuit for personal gain in common with their counterparts of other creed in other countries - a problem which was shown on all levels from villages to the ministry of health in Kabul. It is difficult to phrase the question about working in Afghanistan in the right way. The 'impact-intention debate' seems to apply. If we want to work effectively for the population, we cannot avoid minimal consent with local authorities. The more so when we want to build models which can be used by the authorities to take their responsibility for, in our case, health care. This goal would be in line with our views of state responsibility, and they are not necessarily the same as the Taliban hold. Are we adding to the power base of the Taliban by effectively relieving them of their tasks in creating sustainable health care systems? Should we take a long term view, and aim to prevent health systems from total collapse? Is working with local authorities the same as supporting the Taliban government? The history of Afghanistan suggests a deep-rooted resistance against forced change ('modernization'). If we really want to contribute to 'enabling people to make their own decisions', then here is a classic example of philosophical puzzles that have never been fully resolved, such as tolerance for intolerance, universality of values, and relative human rights. Luckily, that does not prevent the possibility to take a clear position. The values of the Taliban do not comply easily with international conventions - they comply better with values held in Sudan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The interpretation and strict enforcement of these values differs between the countries, and all have changed over time. None of the countries have changed their rigid stance in total isolation. Communication is not only essential for change – that much is clear. More important is that people in Afghanistan demand communication. The fate of women is clear, and in the women self-help groups there are very clear formulations of a demand for change. On closer view, the Afghan population consists of many different peoples with many different believes. That is yet another practical, goal oriented argument to keep dialogue with the Taliban open. The option for dialogue without intervention (without assistance programs) seems less realistic. And there is no historical record of forced compliance with 'universal human rights' by isolation - as is again proven at this moment in Europe. HNI has built relationships with the present and past authorities. Through these relationships authorities on all levels are repeatedly reminded of the responsibility for health - for men and for women. The relationship offers a chance for a considerable group of professional to keep up their standards and experience. We keep communicating with the Taliban, and we repeat the message that our views are different from theirs when it comes to human rights, gender issues, and responsibility. Then there is another, more idealistic argument to keep working in Afghanistan. If we stand for an open society, where people are able to speak out and take their own decisions, then we should not shy away from complicated situations. There is a need for dialogue here. The international values should be presented and discussed with the values prevalent in Afghanistan. The presence of NGOs can help in offering people a chance to have their voice heard - not so much, in the HNI case, in international media, but in local meetings and discussions on how to deal with very practical issues. Important moral issues are

166

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

always very practical in the end (access to health care for women, defining responsibility in a community) and need to be discussed until there is mutual understanding between the Afghans and the international community.

Conclusion What is the contribution made towards peace in these projects? For the moment we are looking at processes that fit in a simple logical analysis. Warfare is essentially linked to the disruption of social life, social life is built upon trust, trust is the condition sine qua non for functioning social services. In working with people one tries to rebuild social life. That requires trust. Trust requires understanding of local way of living together and how they have been disrupted. One can take different entry points in working with the local people. Health, education, rural development - many things need to be done. There is a place for international agencies because the local population cannot be expected to rebuild what has been shattered while (often) in state of shock, having no access to relevant experience, and most of all, while they are in need of whatever constitutes a bridge between the chaotic present and some more organized past and future. International aid workers may put themselves in a position where they are this bridge. Ensuring that the responsibility is in the end with the people themselves, they may play the ‘midwifery’ role in the Socratic sense, or in more fashionable terminology, they can be the counselor that helps the client to help her/himself. This requires a modest position, where the context is seen as more important than preconceived blueprints. Modesty is not only realistic; it is also a methodological imperative. The projects that openly state that conflict prevention or peace building are to be seen as their output are rarely taken serious by the population themselves. A clear insight in local definitions of mutual benefit, of reciprocity is an absolute must. As is the realization that one has to make choices. It won’t do to just claim a neutral and impartial stance, and start building trust with the aim to bring overall and general peace. When conflict and its devastating effect on the fabric of social life is taken seriously, simple solutions do not apply.

References [1] ODA 1996. Conflict Reduction Through the Aid Programme. London. ODA, October 1996. The ODA was renamed DflD and made a ministry in its own right following the Labour victory in the British elections, Mat 1997. [2] Rieff, David: A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis [3] Ramanujam, B.K. (1992) Implications of some psychoanalytic concepts in the Indian context. [4] Summerfield, D. (1999). A critique of seven assumptions behind psychological trauma programmes in war-affected countries. Social Science and Medicine, 48, 1449–1462. [5] Rose Geoffrey, (2001) Sick individuals and sick populations. International Journal of epidemiology 30:427-432 [6] Habermas, J (1981) The Theory of Communicative Action, London: Beacon Press [7] Bracken, P. J., Giller, J. E., & Summerfield, D. (1995). Psychological responses to war and atrocity: The limitations of current concepts. Social Science & Medicine, 40, 1073–1082.

W. van de Put / Communication and Social Engineering

167

[8] de Jong, J. (Ed.). (2002). Public mental health, traumatic stress and human rights violations in lowincome countries. Trauma, war, and violence: Public mental health in socio-cultural context (pp. 1–91). New York: Kluwer. [9] Arendt, Hannah (1958) The human condition. Chicago: University Chicago Press. [10] Richardson, Louise: What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat. [11] Kriesberg, L. 1973. Social Conflicts. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, p.91. [12] Himes, J. 1980. Conflict and Conflict Management. Georgia: University of Georgia, p. 81. [13] Adams, M and Bradbury, M. 1995. Conflict and Development. Organisational adaptation in conflict situations. Oxford, Oxfam. Discussion paper 4. [14] Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy 1996. 'Peacebuilding through Collaborative Action' Washington DC.

168

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-168

Chapter 14 Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’ Ditty Dokter, PhD Arts and group analytic psychotherapist. Senior lecturer Roehampton University School of Health and Human life Sciences; Arts therapies professional lead HPT Mental Health NHS trust, UK This chapter will outline how the stresses of migration and acculturation impact on immigrant mental health and how this can be exacerbated or ameliorated by the host community. In the first section I will describe the UK context in relation to migration. The second section connects the external world with the individual internal world through a psychosocial group relations perspective and relates this to the acculturation stress of the immigrant. The final section looks at ways of addressing the mutual isolation, distrust and projections of the ‘immigrant’ and ‘host’communities. First I will outline my understanding of the main concepts. Migration has historically been bound up with conquest and warfare. European colonialism was crucial to promoting substantial intercontinental migration, which laid the grounds for the particular racial and ethnic hierarchies which still characterise the post-colonial world. Ethnicity is a construct denoting collectivity and belonging, race is an aspect of ethnic phenomena; processes which divide people into different communities with clear boundaries between them [1]. In recent history, ideas about ethnicity have tended to converge with the related territorial notions of ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’. All ‘imagined’ communities [2], where in the members’ minds lives an imagined communion, even with those they do not know. Ethnicity describes a sense of commonality transmitted over generations by the family and reinforced by the surrounding community. It is more than race, religion or national and geographic origin and it involves conscious and unconscious processes that fulfill a deep psychological need for identity and historical continuity. An ethnic group is made up of those ‘who conceive of themselves as alike and who are so perceived by others. When looking at ethnicity there can be an assumption that people fit a particular paradigm, denying the complexity. A particular ethnic group tends to be a combination of a multitude of cultural groups with a widely varied heritage [3]. There is no research link between terrorism and mental ill health, in fact political murderers in comparison to non-political murderers show less incidence of mental illness; 16% rather than 58% [2]. The definition of terrorism is problematic, the goals might be legitimate, the means to achieve them not. The goals of achieving recognition and combating discrimination may be particularly relevant to migrants. Migrants struggle with the sense of alienation produced by migration. The stresses of

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

169

acculturation may produce mental ill health in some, alienation in others, possibly a terrorist response in a small minority. The small minority does tend to receive tacit community support of a much wider group, who agree with the goals, even if they are not prepared to take the extra step towards terrorist action . Understanding the stresses of acculturation for migrants over various generations may allow us to suggest interventions to ameliorate alienation processes. An understanding of the host community is as important as an understanding of the immigrant community. In the following section I will outline the UK context of migration and ethnicity.

The UK context; the external world of the UK immigrant The - not - so- United Kingdom has a long history of migration [4] and over the centuries has found different ways of responding; from assimilationist to pluralist [5]. The post war migration to Britain from the Caribbean and South Asian subcontinents, while based upon imperial ties, was very much driven by the economic imperative of re-building a war shattered economy [6]. Racial discrimination in employment was and remains widespread, even after it was outlawed [7, 8, 9]. Discrimination has also been identified in the education, housing [10] and criminal justice systems [11]. Immigration policies in Britain have had an adverse effect on race relations in Britain, both by the way they have been presented by politicians and the way that has been reported by the media. This has both reflected and reinforced UK public perception of migrants and ethnic minorities: “ A significant section of the UK public remains opposed to immigration, critical of existing minority communities and hostile to asylum seekers claiming refuge in the UK “ (Spencer 1998: 91). In a context of migration and discrimination our self identification is affected. Our national identity is a primary form of identity available to us [12]. As we know cultural identity does not always take the form of national identity. The notion of a single national identity is not tenable if identity implies a distinct, homogenous, common culture marked by common values, shared understandings and loyalties. The single identity concept is often explicitly embraced by UK politicians when arguing for assimilationist and controlling policies [5]. The reality of a society with many class, race, region / country variations and inequalities is very different. The insecurity of post imperial British national identity was reinforced by its ambivalence about EU membership / citizenship. Migration has historically affected Britain’s concept of national identity. The Act of Union between the three nations in 1707 incorporated a strong emphasis on confessional allegiance (Protestantism) and allegiance to the monarch. Early 1905 saw the first legislation to restrict migration to Britain. The transmogrification of empire into Commonwealth resulted in a 1948 British nationality Act, which created two categories; British subjects and citizens of Commonwealth countries, not incorporating a uniform set of rights. The erosion of commonwealth citizenship was fuelled by the ‘host’ hostility to immigration, resulting in various examples of legislation over decades. This influenced a racialised / racist understanding of national identity [4]. British national identity still stresses the dominant religion (school assemblies, Education Act) and allegiance to the monarch (citizenship ceremonies, Asylum and Immigration Bill) in the 21st century. Racism is now expressed under the discourse of culture. Ethnicity, religion, language and

170

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

customs are held to render immigrants inassimilable. Post modernist research stressing multiple identities in a multi since the 2005 London bombings. However, the essentialist understanding of ‘white majority’ identity may lead to a greater essentialising of ethnic minority identity, especially second and third generation migrants. They on the one hand experience assimilationist pressure, on the other hand discrimination and secondary citizenship rights from the host society. As a result they may withdraw into an essentialist self identification. In a British national context which stresses confessionality as a major aspect of identity, the religious identification may help ‘essentialise’ a plural identity. In the next section I will outline the processes involved.

The impact of globalisation on identity What is happening in the UK needs to be considered within its global context; the impact of globalisation on societal structures. As a psychotherapist and mental health researcher I am coming at this from a psychosocial group relations perspective [13]. I have outlined the external factors influencing immigrant mental health, but want to use this perspective to show how these external factors influence a person’s internal world. Individual human beings engage in the process of meaning making. It is this functioning of human minds that make the human collective possible. The collective group mind is hypothesised as a mental construct that comes from our human need to belong and to establish a psychological unity with others. As members of a society we are part of a more complicated group that lacks clear boundaries. Society is a transitive proces continually undergoing change. Studying societies from this group-as-a-whole perspective leads to thinking about societal ‘culture’; taking as a given multiple different cultures and sub-cultures. Culture develops from the interrelatedness of the members of a society and the societal holding environment. The external and internal worlds of members of societies are in continual interaction: what goes on in the minds of the members of a society is partly reactive to what happens around them, but also proactive. The ideas and ways of thinking about societies influence the way they act upon their surroundings to bring about change in them. The influence which culture exerts on the developing personality are of two sorts: - influences derived from the culturally patterned behaviour of the individuals towards the child - influences derived from the patterns of behaviour characteristic of the society lived in by the observation and or instruction of the individual A holding parental environment is, from the psychodynamic perspective, crucial for personality development, with basic trust as the main component. We relate in the same way to the societal holding environment. The ideas of members of societies and members’ ways of thinking- the internal holding environment- influence the way they act upon their external holding environment to bring about change. The various identities that we take will affect our perceptive filters, as will the holding environments we are part of. The internalised multiple experiences will result in a construct of the society in the mind of the individual. The way that is perceived will determine the societal culture as, whatever their view, members of the society will

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

171

adopt forms of behaviour that they feel are appropriate to them under the circumstances they perceive are imposed on them by their holding environment. Society is at the same time evidenced by ‘sameness and continuity’ and ‘changing dynamic processes’. Globalisation has impacted so that change has become predominant over sameness and continuity. The subsequent coping with continuing change results in a loss of identity, failing paternalistic leadership resulting in splitting, displacement and scapegoating of ‘the other’. Members of societies continue to experience them as being in a continuous state of flux. This causes disturbance, because such an environment does not provide the continuity, consistency and confirmation we as individuals require. The ensuing disintegration means a retreat into individualism on the one hand, and the members of the society acting as if the other is totally bad and deserving of whatever fate s/he might be considered to merit. The mainly patriarchal leadership is considered by members of societies to be failing to provide a containment, so that they seek alternative forms of leadership. Members of societies are left with a feeling of powerlessness and an inability to exert influence over their lives. The increased uncertainty in society is displaced through projecting / scapegoating the other; often the immigrant, resulting in demonisation of ‘the other’ This means a mutual projection of the host community members and the immigrant community members, leading to mutual scapegoating and withdrawing into isolationism and non-relatedness. For the ‘host’ community members in the UK context, the already existing insecurity about identity is exacerbated by the changes brought about by globalisation. For the immigrant community members the insecurity about identity exacerbates the acculturation stresses and insecurity around identity caused by migration.

The internal world of the immigrant; divergent identities? There are several factors influencing ethnic identity [14, 15]: - migration experience (its timing, first/second/third generation, single or as a group, reasons for / expectations of migration, expectations of return - ethnic make up of the neighbourhood (reinforced or not) - upward mobility (chances for / distance from original class and values) - socio-economic status (changes between pre migration socio economic status and post migration) - educational achievement ( greater expectations of second generation) - intermarriage (differential generational expectations) - strength of continuing political and religious ties - language spoken ( reversals of parent-child roles in first generation, first or second languages in second generation) - race (experiences of racism, ‘passing as majority or not’) - life cycle influences For the purpose of this chapter I focus particularly on the effect of migration on mental health. UK immigrant communities have been shown to have poorer levels of both physical and mental health [16], while often accessing health services to a lower degree. This picture can vary in different countries, reinforcing the likelihood of host community impact [17].

172

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

Variables influencing the individual immigrant’s health are: Pre-migration: - personality of the migrant - life experiences - cultural background - reasons for leaving the old environment - reasons for moving to the new location During migration: - Stress of moving Post-migration: - attitude of environment to the migrant: state policy, pressure to acculturate, economic opportunity - homogeneity of immediate environment - fullfillment of expectations and aspirations - personality of migrant Once the immigrant develops mental health problems, their access to treatment can further exacerbate an already existing alienation. There is research available to show that there are significant barriers to minority ethnic groups seeking and successfully accessing services. Furthermore they are much less satisfied with services once contact is made [18, 19]. The reasons for the dissatisfaction tend to be because of cultural stereotyping in assessment and recommendations for treatment ( e.g. higher levels of compulsory admission for certain ethnic groups [20, 21]. Patients from all minority ethnic groups are more likely than white majority people to be misunderstood and misdiagnosed; more likely to be prescribed drugs and ECT rather than talking therapies, such as psychotherapy and counselling (Wilson 1993 for service user views). Cultural perceptions of therapy apply and can make access to psychological therapies difficult [22, 23]. The effect of not accessing treatment may result in untreated mental health problems in the first generation and an exacerbated effect on the next generation. Intergenerational transmission of trauma and its effect on mental health has been well documented, be it for Holocaust survivors or refugees. However, the risk factors for children of parents with mental health problems to develop problems in their turn is high [24]. Mental health problems related to the effects of migration have been shown to affect at least three generations [24]. Some of those relate to cultural transition, others to racism and discrimination. Racism has always been a part of the experience of migration. For some time it has been known that to be black in Britain is to be exposed to a variety of adverse stimuli, which can add up to a serious mental health hazard [25, 26]. The mental health problems are not simply a consequence of geographical and cultural dislocation, the adjustments and inevitable stresses of migration [3]. An important issue is the ongoing response of and to the white host society, its values and institutions [27]. Refugees and asylum seekers come with their own particular set of problems and needs [3, 23, 28, 29, 30].

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

173

For most immigrants the poor social conditions and loss of cultural identity have a detrimental effect on psychological health. If this results in psychiatric illness the psychosocial problems can easily be lost sight of. The experience of migration and discrimination in housing, employment and everyday life are frequently expressed by patients not as conscious complaints, but symbolically, in the structure of their illness [25]. The way people express their disease is also strongly influenced by their cultural background. This background is not a static, given entity, but a changing interacting one, depending on individual and family circumstances. For example, someone's distress may be connected to a lack of a sense of belonging, not feeling at home anywhere, de-culturisation as opposed to acculturation. As stated, acculturation stress is due to variables pre, during and post migration: akin to pre, peri and post flight traumas in refugees. In this chapter I concentrate particularly on the post migration acculturation stress, but want to emphasise that secondary trauma can be caused by pre migration / flight discrimination and oppression re-enacted in the host society in the discrimination experienced there. The quashing of pre-migration hopes of life improvement can be a major cause of depression; the secondary traumatisation can exacerbate already existing PTSD symptoms. The specific stresses of migration are due to stresses in cultural transition. Factors influencing that transition are the goals of migration and their realisation, the availibility of support systems and the degree of harmony between cultures; changes in language, religion, education and lifestyle. Typical problems with transition are isolation, enmeshment and disengagement. Three solutions to divergent value systems are isolation in the own subculture, immersion in the main stream or integration of the two. The reaction of the host country plays a crucial role here [23]. The perception of the UK as host country is influenced by the relationships of colonialism and its legacy. Race and ethnicity are two of the categories evolved to explain lived relationships. These relationships emanate from different territorial arrangements and migration across the world. Conquest and colonialism marked some communities out as dominant, others as subjected and subordinate. Linked to such power disparities between different ethnic, racial and national groups has been the formation of ideas in which dominant groups identify themselves as different from the subordinate. This type of thinking involved ‘representations of the Other’ and a self perception as a civilising influence leading backwards people to enlightenment, modernisation and economic development, or in more present parlance ‘democracy’[13]. Thanks to migration, the divisions are now within UK multi cultural society, not just between nations or territories This leads to an exposure of inequality within one imagined unified society, making visible the hierarchy inherent in the different UK citizens. Especially second and third generation migrants experience alienation when asked for a statement of loyalty and belonging, while experiencing the reality of inequality. This inequality shows in a variety of ways. In housing: overcrowding is a reality for 47 % of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain (3 % of whites). Young members from ethnic minorities are three more times likely to be homeless. In health: Afro-Caribbeans are 12 times more likely to be diagnosed a schizophrenic. In criminal justice: 10 % of the UK population is from ethnic minorities (there is enormous geographical difference in the regions), but 24 % of women in prisons are from an ethnic minority, 15 % of all prisoners are black. In employment: the unemployment rates among young people are twice the white unemployment rate for black (including

174

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

Afro Caribbean, African and black other census categories), Pakistani and Bangladeshi 16 to 24 year olds. The figures concerning criminality can be used to reinforce the stereotype of the barbarian other, while the incidence of mental health problems in the prison population is remarkably high. Lack of treatment, already common for black and minority ethnic clients, is exacerbated if they are in the prison system. Both mental ill health and the social problems the immigrant experiences can lead to a poor self image and ‘victim’identity. Past political movements have stressed the importance of empowerment to move beyond victim identity. The danger of looking at the relationship between mental health and immigration is that the blame can easily be laid with the victim, if the impact of the host society is not considered. The splitting as a result of experienced threat to identity may result in both immigrant and host community member resorting to an essentialising of identity, as I will show in the following section.

The dangers of ‘essentialising’ identity Post modernism has critiqued the essentialising of ethnic identity, wanting to show the diverging experiences of the groups and individuals concerned. It also critiqued the perception of racialised minorities as victims and stressed the cultural and political history of resistance [31]. Identities change as the discourse about ethnic relations change . Modood’s work [6, 32] showed how religion played a role in identifying identity in Britain. From Black (political affiliation), to Pakistani (ethnic pluralist orientation) to Islamic: ‘any oppressed group feels its oppression most according to those dimensions of its being which it (not the oppressor) values the most (Modood 1992: 54) [32]. Religion became the focus for racism, but also a source of pride and self assertiveness for supporters of Islam. Events outside the UK (the strengthening of traditional Islam) also contributed. Internal relations in migrant ethnic communities are often influenced by changes in class, gender and ethnic power relations in the country of origin [33]. The interplay of all these factors means that the identity of the post colonial subject can be confused, but has available a multiplicity of identities related to territoriality and migration. It is in the availability of choice amongst multiple identities, that the possibility for change lies. If both the host society and ethnic minority members can let go of the ‘essentialist’ notion of identity, the possibility of multiple belongings starts to occur and the opportunity for interrelatedness, rather than mutual demonisation can be considered. It is a seductive thought for members of all societies to consider themselves ‘the best’, but the danger is that they may also view the world from a monocular perspective. We are constantly in grave danger of ‘splitting’ and developing the ‘other’, which is seen as not like us and not such a good place to be [13]. By virtue of their characteristic sameness and continuity, societal cultures normally provide containment for their members. This enables a reflective capacity to exist, allowing people to see both good and bad in others, even though they may be different. However, when the change dynamics dominate (as they do at present), there may be a lack of containment. Societies’ members feel hopeless and isolated, experiencing disintegration and threat to their identity. Primitive defense mechanisms such as splitting are deployed, wherby we see ourselves as totally good and the other as totally

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

175

bad. When we enter into this primitive process we tend to idealise, to an excessive degree, our own society, our values and our religion. This excessive idealisation is a good indicator that we are in a process of splitting. The attraction of this process is that we feel love and commitment to our culture. This moral goodness, however, only exists by splitting off all aggression onto others. We only maintain our idealised feelings at the expense of acts of hatred and aggression against others whom we regard as evil. A danger is that the idealisation of beliefs on which the societal structures are based becomes so extreme that revisiting or a re-interpretation becomes impossible. Any attempt to explore values, beliefs and religion are experienced as treason ( i.e. idealisation of Democracy vs idealisation of Islam). The result of this is that both sides add to their differences by each believing and acting on their stereotypes of each other [13]. Identification and appreciation of boundaries is helpful because we make meaning out of our experiences. Experience is at the boundary of the two worlds- external interaction and internal interpretation. A problem with boundaries is that they can become fixed structural conceptions that prevent learning. Difference is at the heart of intercultural understanding. As human beings we have a strong proclivity to turn difference into polarisation and splitting. Splitting can lead to displacement, the USA comes to represent the domination of ‘the West’, all immigrants come to represent Islamic terrorists / Al Qaeda. The phenomenon of scapegoat formation is a manifestation of the displacement of aggressive impulses against the substitute object, which seems less fraught with (real or imagined) danger than the real expression. This needs to be addressed on both an individual and societal level if intercultural conflict is not to develop even further into fixed split positions of misunderstanding. Splitting off militant Islamic terrorists from the wider Muslim society, as splitting of IRA terrorists from the Irish society does not provide an answer. Seeing those terrorists as a small group representing a larger group and expressing something on the whole group’s behalf may provide a better way of addressing the problem. Both sides experience a threat to ‘their way of life’, their identity. It is not only immigrants who are a threat to security within Europe / NATO. The ‘host’ society itself is too, in regarding the other as a split off object, capable of threatening our idealised way of life. The effect of terrorism is that our emotions are aroused to such a degree that we become incapable of thinking. We are scared by the feelings and locate them in the bombers, who are then demonised. If we are not careful we stereotype all Muslims. Faced with an awareness of highly murderous events and threats to personal safety members of society split off all hateful feelings and locate them in the bombers and those suspected of being bombers. The result is that fixed inflexible notions about individuals and groups result in their demonisation. The associated emotions block the ability to think and understanding becomes a near impossibility [13]. Our fear of the other and the threat of bombings result in the experience of a threat to our (idealised) way of life, preventing us from seeing the effects this way of life is having on others. Having a common enemy (the bombers) helps us to suppress our guilt and to assert our right to the preservation of our way of life. Yet in a strange way this understanding of self can also lead to an understanding of the bombers, who may be seen to assert their right to the preservation of their way of life [13]. Understanding relationships seems a vital development if we are to make progress. It is not simply a matter of knowing the ‘other’ better that will result in a better relationship. Bateson (1979) describes two people relating as two monocular visions (like two eyes operating separately), together they give a binocular vision. The nature of relationship is a

176

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

mutual recognition of samenes and difference that results in this binocular vision. The resolution to the Northern Ireland stand off and splitting between the unionists and the republicans was a willingness to talk to each other in the light of knowing the many murders that had been committed on both sides and the close losses of important others experienced on both sides . For the individual immigrant the possibility of a multiple identity and being heard by ‘the other’ may prevent the isolationist and essentialist splitting between us and them. For the host society member an awareness of the own identity and a willingness to hear and understand the other and question ones own beliefs,assumptions and idealisations, may allow a meeting and greater experience of security and basic trust.

Steps towards amelioration: arts approaches to conflict and dialogue Examples of arts therapies’ initiatives that have facilitated such meetings are community drama projects in Northern Ireland [34], community based work with the displaced in Mozambique and other projects using arts approaches to address conflict [35]. All these projects are case studies, not research based. They could , howerver, be seen as potential pilot models for actual research to be initiated. A way of both sides hearing the others’ narratives was created by a community drama project in Hull in northern England, one of the identified dispersal centres for UK asylum seekers. The dispersal areas are often in areas of social deprivation exacerbating social tensions and racially motivated violence. A community group made up of ‘host’society and asylum seeker members met to create a dramatic re enactment of some of the life flight stories of its asylum seeking members, as well as re enacting life experiences of host community members. This resulted in a performance that shared the stories with the wider community, providing an opportunity for greater understandings of both sides. The experiences of a music therapist in Northern Ireland and a dramatherapist in Mozambique with respectively traumatised community members of a civil war and the internally displaced could be considered for facilitating intercommunity dialogue. Sutton (2000) emphasises that the threat to security in war makes survival of primary importance. Music may take the role of lament or a container for anger. She gives an example of musicians in Mostar, Bosnia, performing in a community centre “ a local band would produce music on behalf of the whole community. It was perhaps an acknowledgement of common experience in the wider social setting: on the one hand a public sytatement of shared experience and feeling” (Sutton 2000: 66) [36]. Scott-Danter (1998) trained theatre groups in Mozambique in social research techniques and participatory forum theatre. She stresses the decreased trust and individualism, the loss related to killed and maimed family members and the disconnection in instruction of societal values after civil war and displacement. The actors worked with the local communities to invite themes and stories; a central theme emerged of a lack of trust and poor community relations between community members hindering any community initiative. A play was developed around the theme and performed, where audience members could contribute to the narrative of the play and showing scenes of community life past and present, finding different ways of resolving dilemmas. The play facilitated community dialogue and understanding of the different perspectives

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

177

Access to health services for migrants who are severely traumatised [36, 22], something often perceived as a drain on resources for the host community, may prevent transgenerational transmission of trauma . This may then prevent alienation across generations, with the second and third generation having to cope with what the first generation was unable to express.

Conclusion Locating the problem in the relationship between community members rather than in ‘the other’ may help us facilitate a coming to terms with the effects of gobalisation, without repeating past historical patterns of oppression, exploitation and discrimination; thus perpetuating our societal as well as individual traumatic pasts. By entering a dialogue without essentialising identity, multiple identities become possible, thus reducing alienation and segregation. Some minority groups may still use terrorist means to achieve their goals, but the wider segregated community’s tacit support base will be undermined, thus decreasing the opportunities for terrorism.

References [1] Anthias F and Yuval-Davis N (1993) Racialised Boundaries. London, Routledge [2] Anderson B (1991) Imagined communities. London: Verso [3] Dokter, D. 1998b. Being a Migrant, Working with Migrants. In Arts Therapists,Refugees and Migrants. D Dokter. ed. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers [4] Cesarani D (1996) Citizenship and nationality in Britain. In D Cesarani and M Fulbrook (eds) Citizenship, migration and nationality in Europe. London, Routledge [5] Parekh B (1998) Integrating minorities. In T Blackstone, B. Parekh & P.Sanders (eds) race relations in Britain. A developing agenda. London: Routledge [6] Modood T (1998) Ethnic diversity and racial disadvatage in employment. In T Blackstone, B. Parekh & P.Sanders (eds) Race relations in Britain. A developing agenda. London: Routledge [7] Smith D J (1977) Racial disadvantage in britain. Harmondsworth: Penguin [8] Brown C and Gay P (1985) Racial discrimination: 17 years after the Act. London: Policies Studies Institute [9] Noon m (1993) Racial discrimination in speculative applications: evidence from the Uk’s 100 top firms. Human Resource management Journal 3(4): 35-47 [10] Karne V (1997) “Ethnic penalties” and racial discrimination in employment, education and housing: conclusions and policy implications. In V Karn (ed) Employment, education and housing among ethnic minorities in Britain. London: ONS [11] Bucke T (1996) Ethnicity and contacts with thew police; Findings from the British Crime Survey. Research findings no.42. London: Home office [12] Poole T (2003) National identity and Citizenship. In L M Alcoff and E Mendieta (eds) Identities. Race, class, gender and nationality. Oxford: Blackwell [13] Stapley L F (2006) Globalization and terrorism. Death of a way of life. London: Karnac [14] McGoldrick M, Giordano J and Pearce J K eds(1996) Ethnicity and family therapy. New York, Guilford press [15] Lambert M J ed (2004) Handbook of psychotherapy and behavior change. 5th edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons [16] Bhugra D, La Grenade J & Dazzen P (2000) Psychiatric inpatients’ satisfaction with services : a pilot study. International Journal of psychiatry in Clinical practice 4 : 327-332 [17] Furnham A and Bochner s (1994) Culture Shock. Psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments. London, Routledge [18] Callan A & Littlewood R (1997) Patient satisfaction : ethnic origin or explanatory model ? International Journal of social psychiatry 44 (1) 1-11.

178

D. Dokter / Immigrant Mental Health; Acculturation Stress and the Response of the UK ‘Host’

[19] Commander M J, Cochrane R, Sashidaran S P, Akilu F & Wildsmith E (1999) mental health care for Black, Asian and White patients with non-affective psychoses: pathways to the psychiatric hospital , inpatient and after care. Social psychiatry and psychiatric epidemiology 34 (9) 484 – 491. [20] Sashidharan S P (1993) Afro-Caribbeans and schizophrenia; the ethnic vulnerability hypothesis reexamined. International review of psychiatry 5; 129-144. [21] Bhui K (2002) Racism and mental health. London, Jessica Kingsley pubs. [22] Dokter D ed (1998a) Arts therapists, refugees and migrants. Reaching across borders. London, Jessica Kingsley Pubs [23] Dokter, D. 2000a. Sticking a Plaster on the Flood. Working with Asylum Seekers. Prompt, British Association for Dramatherapists Newsletter, Summer 2000, pp 19 – 20 [24] Department of Health (2004) Celebrating our cultures: mental health promotion in the Irish, AfroCaribbean and South Asian Communities. London: DH publications [25] Littlewood R & Lipsedge M (1997) Aliens and Alienists . Ethnic minorities and psychiatry. London, Allen & Unwin [26] Mental Health National Service Framework (1999) London: Department of Health www.info.doh.gov.uk/mhrt/mhrtweb [27] Kareem, J. and R Littlewood . 1992. Intercultural Therapy. Oxford: Blackwell Publications [28] Dokter, D. 2000b. Intercultural Arts Therapies Practice – the Issue of Language. In EXILE Artstherapists and refugees: Research conference proceedings Dokter, D. ed. Hertfordshire University Press [29] Papadopoulos, R. ed 2002. Therapeutic care for refugees. London; Karnac Books [30] Blackwell, D. 2004. Counselling and Psychotherapy with Refugees. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers [31] Gilroy P(1987) There Ain’t no Black in the Union Jack. London: Routledge [32] Modood T (1992) Not easy being British. Stoke on Trent: Trentham Books [33] Bradley H (1996) Fractured identities. Changing patterns of inequality. Cambridge: Polity press [34] Hickson A (1997) Jacques and his master: working with oppression and marginalisation. In S Jennings (ed) Dramatherapy theory and practice 3. London: Routledge [35] Liebann M ed (1996) Arts approaches to conflict. London: Jessica Kingsley Pub [36] Sutton J (2000) Aspects of music therapy with children in areas of community conflict. In D Dokter (ed) EXILE. Arts therapists and refugees. University of Hertfordshire press.

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-179

179

Chapter 15 Territory, Migration and Conflict: What Might Work to Improve Muslim/nonMuslim Intergroup Relations Jeff Victoroff University of Southern California Keck School of Medicine, US

Abstract. Europe faces a crisis. A combination of immigration and differential birthrates is rapidly increasing the proportionate Muslim population at the very time when Muslim/non-Muslim relations are globally strained. Double-edged rejection separates these groups, with mutual fear, distrust, negative feelings and even hatred escalating tensions and distress. It is theoretically plausible that violent jihad against the West may be causally linked to these poor inter-group relations. If so, earnest programs to improve those relations would be expected to reduce the risk of political violence. Sixty years of applied social psychology research has suggested specific interventions that measurably reduce prejudice and improve inter-group relations in the short term. However, there is an astonishing gap in our knowledge: we don’t know what works to improve relations in the longterm. This paper summarizes the available evidence and proposes an urgent research agenda to find the optimum ways to improve Muslim/non-Muslim relations in Europe. Keywords: Terrorism, immigration, prejudice, Muslims, Europe, contact hypothesis

Introduction In Von Hippel’s recent review titled, “The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths,” the author urges a re-appraisal of the global counterterrorism effort. She emphasizes the need for attention to diaspora populations, for reducing humiliation, and for enhancing dialogue between the Western and Muslim worlds. She states, “It is often argued that the hijackers became radicalized in European and American cities precisely because they felt marginalized and excluded, and experienced prejudice” [1]. One must approach this statement with caution. Yes, it is undeniable that Muslim/non-Muslim intergroup relations are strained, if not terrible, throughout the world. Yes, survey research indicates that a substantial proportion of Muslim European residents support terrorism. Yes, it is plausible that people who feel the scourge of discrimination will become angry and may be more open to ideologies and

180

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

behaviors that are hostile to their perceived oppressors. But very little empirical research has been done determining whether, and to what degree, the poor intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are causally associated with radicalization and terrorism. Still less research, if any, has tested the hypothesis that interventions to enhance intergroup relations will diminish the risk of radicalization. In this chapter, I will briefly explore the historical background of the mash of civilizations currently occurring in Europe. I will describe some of the evidence of poor intergroup relations, and the reasons why such hostile relations might favor radicalization. I will conclude by outlining a practical research program to test the hypothesis that positive intergroup contact will measurably reduce radicalization.

Historical Background Prior to the second Battle of Vienna in 1683, it was unclear whether European territory would be primarily under Muslim or Christian control. Even up to the end of the Ottoman Empire, there existed some question about the legitimate territorial expectations of Muslim peoples. However, with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and recognition of the boundaries of the secular state of Turkey, whatever dreams some Muslims might have harbored regarding worldwide dominion faded into history. Rather than continued leadership in science, medicine, astronomy and architecture, the broad Islamic community lost its intellectual, economic, and military authority and most Muslims nations stumbled into second and third world status. The early 20th century discovery of oil reserves, combined with the invention of the internal combustion engine, led to economic resurgence for a handful of Middle-Eastern nations. However, wealth was concentrated in the hands of elites who often ruled with oppressive measures. Following World War II, Europe was in a shambles. The infrastructure and manufacturing base was severely eroded. There was a desperate need for young, fit, unskilled labor to assist in reconstruction. But the war had deprived many countries of healthy young adult males. In one of history’s major human migrations, young men from Middle-Eastern countries moved to Europe for the construction and factory jobs that were begging for employees. Many of these immigrants were Muslim. The post-World War II Muslim diaspora was not entirely due to the attraction of employment and social benefits. While the lure of jobs pulled men north, conditions in their native lands also pushed them out. Civil unrest, economic disadvantage, poor social mobility, over-crowing and restrictive citizenship and inheritance laws gave nonelite families, especially second and third sons, little motivation to stay. At that moment in history, there was relatively little Arab nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism driving an identity movement that might dissuade young men from plunging into the Western social milieu. And since they typically traveled without wives, the fear of social contamination of their very-protected women was not salient. Like many young male Mexican and Central American migrants coming to the United States today, they crossed borders alone for a better life and, in doing so, served a vital manpower need. (See table 1.) But such all-male migrations never last long. The desire for sexual relations and family life guaranteed efforts to bring Muslim women, and sometime children, to the gradually growing Muslim enclaves of Europe. Citizenship laws, family reunification laws and laws governing migration of new spouses from arranged marriages varied from country to country, but, during the 1950s and 1960s,

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

181

there existed a certain liberalism that favored the growth of more demographically balanced Muslim communities. Table 1: 1950s: 1st generation immigrants (mostly post-colonial) arrive to help rebuild Europe after WWII Country immigrants

Primary national/regional identity of post-war Muslim

England France Germany Netherlands

Indians and Pakistanis North Africans Turks Indonesians

Three major changes occurred in the 1970s. First, the 1973-4 oil crisis that merely led to long lines at gasoline pumps in the United States led to a major economic downturn throughout Europe. Building projects were cancelled. Growth was stagnant. Unemployment mushroomed. And the European decision to create generous social welfare states began to reveal its dangers: unemployed workers demanded benefits that depended on a non-existent fully employed population. The second event also occurred in about 1973. Up until that time, European women gave birth, on average, to more than 2.1 children. This is the replacement rate—the fertility rate a population must sustain or it will diminish. In 1973, for the first time in recorded history, European women began to give birth to so few babies that fertility fell below the replacement rate. Fertility continued to plummet until stabilizing at 1.5 children per woman in about 1995. Yet Muslim women in Europe and elsewhere had (and continue to have) much higher birth rates than their non-Muslim neighbors. (See table 2.) As a result of these differential birthrates and continued in-migration, the nonMuslim population of Europe has been falling for decades while the Muslim population has been rising rapidly. The actual Muslim population of most European nations is unknown due to legal restrictions on asking religion in census programs, but estimates put the current number between 15 and 20 million, or four to five percent of Europe’s total population. Moreover, Islam is by far the world’s fastest growing religion, and projections suggest a continued proportionate increase in the global Muslim population. Table 2: Comparative Fertility Rates (Source: CIA Fact Book) Country England France Germany Italy Algeria Egypt Pakistan Saudi Arabia Senegal Somalia

Fertility Rate 1.66 1.84 1.39 1.29 1.89 2.83 4 4 4.38 6.76

182

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

In 1980, 30% of the world was Christian and 16.5% was Muslim. In 2025 we expect the Christian proportion to drop to 25% and the Muslim proportion to nearly double to 30%. Whether or not one accepts Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations, there is definitely a mash of civilizations in modern Europe: the close proximity and competitive pressures of the rapidly growing Muslim diaspora community crushed into finite territory with a threatened, aging population of Europeans of European ancestry. The third 1970’s event that changed the relationship between European hosts and Muslim immigrants was the 1979 Iranian revolution. When the Western-backed Shah was deposed and Islamic leaders took over, Muslim religious identity and pride was elevated worldwide. Muslim women increasingly wore headscarves in secular Turkey, Germany, England, and France. At the same time, rising rates of unemployment left young men with little to do. One way to pass the time and seek refuge was mosque attendance. Setting aside the degree of fundamentalism, which varied greatly, religiosity blossomed under these circumstances and later generation immigrants are known to be much more religiously observant and conservative than their parents. Petro-dollars flowed in from wealthy Middle-Eastern states, supporting Islamic community centers and places of worship. The 1991 Gulf War, despite Arab support, revived the concerns of Muslims in Europe about Western domination of the Middle East. And then the terrible attacks on Bosnian Muslims by Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs during the implosion of Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1991-5, and the West’s very slow response, was an even more provocative historical event, giving young Muslims throughout the diaspora community more reason to feel isolated and threatened. These events, combined with religious mandates to remain pure and separate from infidels and their corrupt lifestyles, fueled and increasingly withdrawn and angry stance dividing the Muslim diaspora communities of Europe from their hosts.

The Backlash The backlash against immigrants in general, and Muslims in particular, was evident by the mid 1970s and grew angrier during the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, the French government refused work permits for half a million mostly Algerian immigrants in the 1970s. As documented in the distinguished Runnymede Trust Report of 1997, Islamophobia had gained a strong foothold in Europe, both East and West, well before September 11 of 2001 [2]. Competition for scarce jobs and cheap housing along with the growing religious conservatism of second and third generation immigrants fueled resentment and fear. The terrorist attacks of the early 1990s, the first Gulf War, and the large scale attacks of 9/11/01 (in the U.S.), 3/11/04 (in Spain), and 7/7/05 (in the United Kingdom) greatly exacerbated the underlying prejudices and discriminatory behaviors of non-Muslims toward Muslim immigrants, especially in Western Europe. Due to a combination of economic changes, social changes, and military conflicts abroad, intergroup relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe have become tense, strained, even hostile. In France, for example, public schools militated against headscarves as inconsistent with the principle of separation of church and state. The “war of the veil”

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

183

(la guerre du foulard) began on the tenth anniversary of the Iranian revolution when three Muslim girls in the town of Creil wore headscarves to school, and this battle continues to define the conflict between pressure to assimilate and resistance to loss of religious identity [3]. As of 2005, 78% of French, 54% of Germans and 51% of British people declared that banning headscarves is a “good idea.” Partly due to discriminatory housing practices, partly due to choice, many European cities have become divided into Muslim and non-Muslim enclaves. Differences in access to education and jobs have led to second-class status for many Euro-Muslims, even in countries with liberal citizenship laws. Right wing xenophobe parties began to gain favor in the 1980s and have continued to do so, riding a wave of popular antiimmigrant sentiment. Even Britain’s Labour party supported restrictive immigration and detention laws after 9/11. Both guest worker and family reunification programs have been progressively curtailed. A recent high-technology example: in 2007 the French government passed a bill to require genetic testing to confirm family membership of those applying for reunification. As a result of this confluence of historical, economic and demographic events in Europe and elsewhere, Europe faces a dilemma. With its aging population and its massive social welfare programs, someone must work to support the aging pensioners. Falling fertility means that only immigrants can fill the worker void. But most young Muslims lack the education and skills to do modern post-industrial jobs and antiimmigrant sentiment means that modern Europe essentially declares, “We need you, but we don’t want you.”

Current Attitudes In a telephone survey released in 2006, Muslims in four European nations were asked, “What do you consider yourself first? A citizen of your country or a Muslim?” [4]. With the exception of France, the overwhelming majority of these European Muslims embraced their religious identity ahead of their national identity. In fact, this religious identification is higher than that reported by Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, or Indonesia. These data tell us that European Muslims tend to hold strikingly different attitudes regarding national loyalty compared with non-Muslim Europeans. The typical young Muslim living in Western Europe identifies himself as belonging to a far-flung ummah not bound by geography. According to Pew surveys in 2006, most Euro-Europeans (77% of British, 76% of French, 82% of Germans, and 66% of Spaniards) are very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in their own countries [4]. Many tend to hold that Muslims are fanatical, violent, and disrespectful of women. For example, 41% of French, 32% of English and 60% of Spanish people consider Muslims “violent.” Consistent with the impression of self-imposed isolation and the data on religious rather than nationalist identities, most non-Muslim Europeans (64% of British, 53% of French, 76% of Germans, and 76% of Spaniards) perceive Muslim immigrants as wishing to remain separate from their host societies. And very large numbers of EuroEuropeans (43% in the U.K., 33% in France, 345% in Germany and 71% in Greece) believe that the answer to reliving societal tensions is to stop immigration. These negative attitudes are mirrored among Muslims. Pew surveys indicate that high proportions of Muslims in consider Euro-Europeans to be selfish, arrogant, greedy, immoral and violent. For instance, 30% of Muslims in France and 57% in

184

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

Britain regard Euro-Europeans as “immoral.” Perhaps most important for measuring the threat of home-grown terrorism, a surprisingly high proportion of Muslims in Europe regard terrorist attacks on innocent civilians to be “sometimes” or “rarely” justified. (See Table 3.)

What is the Relationship Between Poor Intergroup Relations and Political Violence? It is one thing to document that Muslim immigrants and non-Muslims in Europe are living parallel lives in discrete enclaves, divided by discrimination, prejudice, anger, hostility, suspicion and mutual rejection. It is another to posit that prejudice is a risk factor for terrorism. The Pew surveys, for example, report rates of support for suicide bombing but do not link those responses to queries about the experience of racism or mistreatment. However, there are several reasonable theoretical bases for the conclusion that hostile intergroup attitudes promote political violence. One theoretical link originates with the Kerner Report—a report commissioned by the President of the U.S. in the summer of 1967 after a series of race riots struck fear in the heart of the nation. Far from blaming the African Americans who participated, the Kerner Commission cited 12 “deeply held grievances” as the cause of these outbursts of political violence. At what they called the “first level of intensity” were police practices, unemployment, and inadequate housing. Further down the list of identified grievances came “Disrespectful white attitudes,” Discriminatory administration of justice, and “discriminatory consumer and credit practices.” In other words, the Kerner Report points to multiple grievances by a beleaguered repressed community, explicitly including prejudice, as the impetus for one of the U.S.’s most dramatic recent periods of internal collective aggression. These identical grievances arguably explain the subsequent rise of the Black Panthers terrorist group. The link between minority grievances and violence might be considered emblematic of the Frustration Aggression hypothesis, which considers both individual and collective aggression to often be reactions to blocked ambitions [5]. Second, the 2001 summer riots in the UK towns of Oldham, Bradford, and Burnley—in which primarily Pakistani-origin Muslim youth were involved in collective aggression against the white establishment-- have been similarly linked to frustration and rage secondary to persistent discrimination.

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

185

Table 3: Support for Suicide Bombing among European Muslims (Source: Pew 2006) “Violence against civilian targets in order to defend Islam can be justified…”

British French German Spanish

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

15 16 7 16

9 19 6 9

70 64 83 69

Don’t know 6 1 3 7

Third, the denial of material prospects by discrimination may help promote radicalization. As Coolsaet put it, …they are confronted with a number of real obstacles, in particular discrimination on the job and the real estate market and educational deficiencies…Many embrace Islam as their new identity, thereby interpreting it in concordance with their own life experiences…They form the hard core of radical groups of Salafist Islamists and rapidly radicalize into self-declared local vanguards of the world wide jihad… [6]. But a somewhat larger conceptualization of prejudice is called for. While prejudice against Muslims may cause frustration, fuel rage, and help pave the route to radicalization, there is also prejudice by Muslims against Westerners. The academic question that is not well studied is: “If two peoples are prejudiced against one another, does that promote radicalization and militant violence? In particular, if a subdominant group perceives itself as the subject of unfair treatment, will a subgroup of that group be more prone to commit aggressive acts against the dominant group?” Several lines of evidence suggest that the answer is yes. For instance, early research on radicalization demonstrates that young people are moved toward militant tactics and attitudes when violent social control is imposed. While this research was initially done in the U.S. and helped explain how excessive force by authorities led to an expansion of radical student protest behaviors, it is theoretically reasonable that the observation of the U.S.-led invasions, occupations, and brutalization of civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq is perceived by European Muslims as excessive social control violence against their subdominant group of identity, and would therefore push a subset of young people toward radical responses. Another line of evidence is the psychology of attribution. As Pettigrew proposed in 1979, when members of one group witness negative behavior by members of another, the first group attributes that behavior to internal factors—moral failings. Thus, both large scale collective behaviors (the west’s attacks on Muslim states) and small scale personal behaviors (Western infidels’ violation of behavioral dictates of Islam) probably persuade a least some European Muslims that (1) Westerners are immoral and (2) Westerners are less worthy of empathy and conventional moral restraints against harming others. The tape recordings of a failed bomb plotters against the popular London nightclub the Ministry of Sound in 2006 suggest how this condemnation of Western life-style can undermine restraints on violence: one defendant allegedly said “no one can even turn round and say ‘oh they are innocent’ – those slags dancing around” [quoted in 7]. The “immoral” behavior of white infidel dancers—males and unmarried, unescorted females acting in sexually provocative ways-- moves them from the protected category of innocent civilians to the category of fair game in a militant struggle.

186

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

In one of the most explicit formulations of the relationship between prejudice in Europe and radicalization to modern Islamist terrorism, Trujillo et al. described how the combination of prejudice and social identity favors radicalization in jihadist groups based in western societies and helps them justify their own behaviors [8]. And finally, as Claude Moniquet, Director General of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center stated in his testimony before the United States House of Representatives Hearing of the Committee on International Relations / Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging threats (2005): “The lack of integration and racism lead to some Muslims feeling excluded from the society in which they live” [9]. Failed integration in Europe, according to multiple theoretical links and limited expert observations, is a direct cause of radicalization. It is important to acknowledge that it is premature to conclude that failed integration and mutual prejudice accounts for a significant proportion of the variance in radicalization among European Muslims. Further large-scale survey research is needed to examine possible correlations between perceived prejudice and radical ideology. Indepth life history analyses of known terrorists may reveal whether they perceive themselves to suffer more discrimination or feel more anti-Western prejudice than do non-terrorists. More needs to be known about the interaction between (a) prejudicial attitudes, (b) vulnerability to charismatic influence, (c) inciting world events, (d) influential radical leadership, and (e) specific contact with radicals via direct or virtual networks. At this point, it is merely advanced that poor intergroup relations may reasonably be considered as one risk factor for radicalization. If this is true, might there be effective interventions?

European Efforts to Address the Dilemma Multiple initiatives are underway intended to enhance integration and reduce conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe. Some initiatives simply involve efforts to document discriminatory behavior or civil right violations, such as the work of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF) or the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Other efforts strive to promote dialogue, such as the Council of Europe’s expert colloquies and Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project (e.g., 10). Yet other initiatives involve legislation to punish discriminatory behaviors in employment, housing, or banking. Some initiatives are intra-national, for example a number of programs in Germany to improve relations with the large Turkish-origin minority, or the community introduction programs in Swedish municipalities. More ambitious projects are being evaluated for possible international adoption—as for example various proposals being formulated by the eight-nation research consortium, “The European Dilemma” (dilemma/eu). Yet one vital element is surprisingly rare amidst this outpouring of wellintentioned social engineering: an effort to discover what works. That is, awareness of the problem of failed integration and anti-immigrant (and especially anti-Muslim) prejudice is high, yet there has been virtually no systematic effort to actually test the efficacy of any of the proposed solutions. Several small scale, short-term experiments have been conducted, investigating whether interventions to reduce prejudice and improve intergroup relations will measurably do so. But not one of these promising first steps has demonstrated that a given program actually and lastingly reduces conflict and improves relations.

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

187

Prejudice Reduction: Origin and Evolution of the Contact Hypothesis By the late 1940s, pioneering social scientists were turning their attention to the problem of racial prejudice. Gordon Allport’s seminal book, The Nature of Prejudice (1954/1979) was a watershed moment [12]. Allport laid out the emotional, developmental, cognitive, and cultural roots of prejudice. As well, he described the first efforts to do something about the problem. Allport’s main point: under the right circumstances, contact between rival groups leads to accommodation, liking, and integration. Based on his review, Allport concluded that optimum contact to reduce prejudice is not so much a matter of the setting (residential, occupational, or recreational), as the special combination of features thought to produce a meaningful effect: (1) Equal status for all program participants, (2) Pursuit of common goals, and (3) Institutional sanction, or encouragement by respected authorities. Since the publication of Allport’s book a massive body of empirical work has been assembled examining what prejudice is and what to do about it. Sherif’s Robber’s Cave experiment in 1961 was a milestone, but many researchers have subsequently conducted better controlled experiments designed to test Allport’s hypotheses and theorists have debated the circumstances most likely to improve intergroup relations and reduce conflict. It would be an understatement to comment that controversies have arisen. Some authorities argue that prejudice is best reduced if people are urged to give up their group identities and see the commonality of mankind. Others argue just the opposite, that only by preserving the comfort of ingroup identity can people feel ready to accept the other. Pettigrew suggested a synthesis of this work and a reformulation of the contact hypothesis (1998b). He conceived contact as a process rather than an event—a change that takes place in stages over time. In Pettigrew’s model, initial contact provokes anxiety; but positive contact with the other group serves to reduce that anxiety and allows liking to occur. If the contact is established over time, the liking can be extended to other members of the outgroup. If the contact is optimal, a shift in identity may take place overcoming ingroup/outgroup differentiation. When and if a common ingroup identity emerges, optimal prejudice reduction occurs. Pettigrew candidly stated that many groups fail to achieve the final step. The question is, what is the best way to optimize the chances of success? In a meta-analytic review of 515 studies involving 713 population samples and 1383 tests, Pettigrew and Tropp showed there was a significant effect size for prejudice reduction. While the mean effect size of r = -.21 might be considered modest, the effect size was actually higher among the most rigorously conducted projects and most robust when measured by direct observation. Many different observations conducted in laboratories, schools, residential settings, recreational activities, or travel yielded evidence of benefits. Some types of contact work better than others. The least likelihood of meaningful results came from travel programs. Outside of the laboratory setting, the largest effect sizes were found for recreation based (r = .299), work-based (r = .224) and schoolbased (r = .213) interventions. However, since youngsters showed larger effect sizes than adults, recreation and school-based interventions with young people seem to be the best bets. Contrary to received wisdom, not all of Allport’s much cited four conditions were predictors of efficacy. Indeed, only one of those conditions significantly correlated with improved intergroup relations: institutional support. In other words, authority sanction predicts success better than any other single factor

188

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

(Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Note, however, that virtually none of the 515 studies in this metaanalysis evaluated the impact on prejudice beyond one month. It is reasonable to inquire whether long-term changes can occur. If two groups regard each other with deep suspicion, and sometimes hatred, can those attitudes change? One way to examine that question is historically. In the 1950s, prior to a wave of social legislation including the Voting Rights Act, the Right to Work laws, and the Brown vs. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that mandated school desegregation, various measures of prejudice between African Americans and Caucasians were very high. Housing, schools and jobs were largely segregated. Intermarriage was almost unheard of. By the mid-1990s, the same measures indicated a major shift. had occurred. For example, in 1962, 40% of white survey respondents opposed segregationist laws and 12% approved intermarriage. By 1934 years later-88% of respondents opposed segregationist laws and 65% approved intermarriage. The good news, therefore, is that: (1) Sixty years of applied social psychological research demonstrate that carefully designed interventions reduce prejudice and intergroup hostility. (2) Historical evidence demonstrates the possibility of very large-scale long-term trends overcoming prejudicial attitudes. The bad new is that we truly do not know what interventions work in the long term to overcome prejudice. It would be presumptuous to assume that the programs that have demonstrated the largest effects in small-scale short-term experiments will demonstrate any effects over several years. It would also be presumptuous to propose that any number of small social psychological experiments, no matter how efficacious, will change society. These caveats notwithstanding, there are several reasons to believe that determining effective prejudice reduction measures in small experiments can help produce the societal level change that is needed. One is the extended contact effect. Research shows, for example, that if a person participates in a contact experiment and discovers liking for those in the outgroup, that person may persuade others. This potentially multiplies the force of a small intervention. A second relevant concept may be the tipping point: if enough small experiments demonstrate the virtues of contact, and sufficient media coverage occurs, this could be part of a general change in the social behaviors that are regarded as appropriate. A third potential influence of smallscale studies on society is the potential for those in power to heed science. This occurred, for example, in the deliberations regarding school desegregation in the U.S. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court cited the results of social psychology experiments demonstrating that “separate-but-equal” education disadvantaged blacks in ruling that desegregation must be forced on an often unwilling national populace. Prejudice is obviously only one part of the complex equation of intergroup conflict, but it may be a key factor in one of the 21st century’s most dangerous problems—the radicalization of young Muslim immigrants in Europe. Prejudice reduction is one part of successful integration. Thus, research to determine the most effective prejudice reduction interventions may serve the cause of integration and might even may prove to be one of the most effective counterterrorism strategies. Therefore, I propose that resolving Europe’s dilemma and preventing its deadly potential long-term global sequelae requires a serious effort to determine the best ways to reduce prejudice between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim European citizens. It remains a subject for empirical research whether such prejudice reduction--measured by scales of perceived oppression, sense of inclusion, and liking--is correlated with

J. Victoroff / What Might Work to Improve Muslim/Non-Muslim Intergroup Relations

189

immunity to radicalization and reduction in terrorism. It is not clear to what degree even an optimum program can be scaled up to produce society-wide influence. These important hypotheses urgently need to be tested. It is high time we invest in a rigorous examination of what will work to achieve this historically vital goal. Proceeding from this observation, one wants to identify the specific contact interventions that work best. Evidence exists that people formulate their political attitudes in adolescence. Therefore, prejudice reduction interventions with adolescents may both be easier to accomplish and offer more lasting social benefits. Educationbased and recreational programs have possibly the best results. Thus, one experimental model would be to compare the efficacy of the best-regarded educational intervention with the best-regarded recreational intervention. Long-term follow-up would determine which of these interventions is most worthy of incorporation into EUwide policy initiatives. We are not defenseless in the face of this dilemma. More than half a century of research has equipped us with a potent armamentarium of counterterrorism tools that have yet to be employed. These tools are knowledge about intergroup tensions, the ability to figure out what is most likely to reduce those tensions based on rigorous research, and the authority to inform policy. As Trujillo et al. [8] advised: A sensible way forwards is to implement preventative policies based on educational processes. Thus…real integration will be promoted, and the coexistence and respect towards different cultures will be facilitated. These polices will be crucial to prevent radicalization processes and to help diminish the terrorist threat [8]. The first step toward actualizing such policies is the duty of devoted social scientists: to figure out what works.

References

[1] [2] [3] [4]

von Hippel, K. (2002). The roots of terrorism: Probing the myths. The Political Quarterly., 73, 25-39. The Runnymede Trust (1997). Islamophobia: A challenge for us all. London: The Runnymede Trust. Malik, I.H. (2004). Islam and modernity. London: Pluto Press. Pew Global Attitudes Project. (2006). The great divide: How Westerners and Muslims view each other. Released June 22, 2006. Available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/253.pdf. [5] Dollard, J., Miller, N.E., Doob, L.W., Mowrer, O.H., Sears, R.R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press. [6] Coolsaet, R. (2005). Between al-Andalus and a failing integration. Europe’s pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al-Qaedaa era. Egmont Paper 5. Brussels: Academia Press. [7] Mirza M, Senthikumaran, A., Ja’far, Z. (2007). Living apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism. London: Polity Exchange. [8] Trujillo, H. M., Moyano, M., León, C, Valenzuela, C.C., González-Cabrera, J. (2005). El radicalismo islamista en las sociedades occidentales: Prejuicio, identidad social y legitimación del terrorismo. / Islamist radicalism in Western societies: Prejudice, social identity and the legitimation of terrorism. Psicología Conductual Revista Internacional de Psicología Clínica de las Salud, 13, 311-328. [9] Moniquet, C. (Director General of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center. Testimony, April 27, 2005, Hearing of the Committee on International Relations/Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats. United States House of Representatives. [10] Etienne, B. 2002. Establishing links between religious communities. In Council of Europe steering committee for culture, intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention project. Strasbourg 07-09/2002. DGIV/CULT/PREV-ICIR(2002)3E. [11] Dilemma/eu 2006. Available at www.multietn.uu.se/research/eu_dilemma/eu. [12] Allport, G.W. 1954/1979. The nature of prejudice (25th anniversary edition). Cambridge, MA: Perseus

190

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-190

Chapter 16 Afterword When I was reading through the drafts for this book as they came in from authors, I was struck by the range and variety of form and content. This mirrored the range of NATO countries, the Partner countries and those from the Mediterranean dialogue nations. The countries represented at the Advanced Research Workshop in April 2007 included those from whom refugees and economic migrants have come, and those to whom they have gone. Fully industrialized first world nations were represented, alongside some still struggling to develop. Countries were represented who have recently fought bloody wars with one another. The Workshop attendees included people of many faiths: Christian, Muslim, Jewish and others, and of no professed faith. It was a remarkable event for the diversity of its attendees and for the good nature and warmth of its proceedings. The diversity of the Workshop is reflected in the diversity of the contributions you have just read. When the chapters started coming in, my co-editor Dr Finklestein and I took the deliberate decision not to impose a uniform structure on to authors. So we received work in the form of theoretical papers, historical reviews and reports of empirical studies alongside contributions, which were more, like essays, polemics or emotional appeals from the heart. We decided to interfere as little as possible with each contribution, valuing the diverse range of voices and not wishing to impose a dull uniformity on what had been a lively and spirited Workshop. There was only one area where I perceived near unanimity, and it was one, which surprised and encouraged me. It would have been easy for a Workshop with this rather forbidding title to have concentrated on migrants and minorities as a problem to be solved or a difficulty to be overcome. It would not have been a surprise if the proposed technical solutions to the ‘problem’ were based on containment, control, intelligence gathering and the application of laws and security apparatus. Or at least, it would have been unsurprising if the contributions were ranged in opposition to one another, representing perhaps ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ camps. Instead the voices at the Workshop seemed to be in harmony across these themes: • The overwhelming majority of migrant and minority community members pose no threat to host societies. • Migration appears on balance to benefit host countries: the only disadvantages seem to accrue to the countries, which migrants depart from. • Traditional ‘melting pot’ models for dealing with migration, and the optimistic ‘multiculturalism’ models, which replaced them, each, have

K. Dent-Brown / Afterword

191

features, which may contribute to inter-community stress, rather than reducing it. • The double standard of host countries in welcoming labour from migrant minorities, while seeing the minorities themselves as a problem, has been insufficiently recognized. • Simplistic narratives of ‘otherness’ (especially as employed by the mass media in all countries) further contribute to misunderstanding and tension. One helpful model to understand the relationships between minority and majority groups may be to remember the tendency of most individuals and groups to the problem in the ‘other’, and therefore that the solution must come from expecting (or forcing) the ‘other’ to change. The problem with this on a societal (or individual) scale is twofold. First, it ignores the fact that the other very likely sees the problem as residing in those from the majority (evidenced by racism, lack of economic opportunity, misunderstanding or disrespect for customs). Second, it gives justification to the majority or host community to act out its suspicions in the form of legal sanctions, hostile news reports, increased surveillance and so on. These two consequences promote (or even cause) the kind of resentment, frustration and, ultimately, opposition of which the minority was accused in the first place. This remarkable harmony among contributors is unlikely to be a chance artifact, or a coincidence of selection for the workshop’s attendees, for example. More likely it reflects the relative freedom of researchers and academics to attend to the nuances, shades and grades rather than to the black and white demanded (for understandable reasons) by journalists and politicians. We are very grateful to NATO for having given us the support and the freedom to develop our ideas in this way. Over twenty years ago I was a tiny cog in the NATO machinery: commanding an infantry platoon in the British Army, on exercise to defend against the perceived threat from across the Iron Curtain. At that time my tasks from NATO would have been very simple, very black and white: defend this position, repulse that attack. Nowadays I have changed from an infantry officer into a university researcher: my tasks are much less easy to define: NATO has supported me and my colleagues in a much more complex task than it gave me then. I take it as a hopeful sign that, where I once carried a weapon to try and ensure peace and security, the NATO Science for Peace and Security programme has given me instead the opportunity to edit this book. Not quite swords into ploughshares, but perhaps rifle into computer keyboard! I am very grateful to NATO for the opportunity. Dr Kim Dent-Brown

192

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-872-4-192

Executive Summary Finklestein Michal, Ph.D. The Community Stress Prevention Center (CSCP), Kiryat Shmona; The Department of Social Work, Zefat Academic College, under supervision of Bar–Ilan University

Introduction NATO’s Advanced Research Workshop on Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior invited a world – renowned group of academic and field professionals to discuss and present the following objectives: 1. To share findings and insights knowledge accumulated by professional authorities in the Western and non-western world regarding the Risks and Opportunities of Immigration in the Era of Globalization. 2. To understand and discuss the factors that lead to the Process of Radicalization of Immigrant Population, 3. To share experience in integration of immigrants and refugees in variety of societies 4. To initiate a taskforce for the purpose of establishment of projects and studies, which might challenge the development of pathways to behavior of terrorism The First Symposium, about Immigration in the Era of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities, was followed by a round table discussion and chaired by Prof. Stevan Hobfoll, Distinguished Professor and Director, Summa-KSU Center for the Treatment and Study of Traumatic Stress, Ohio, USA. His Keynote lecture about: “You Just ‘Gotta’ love baseball” included his theoretical perspective on The Ecology of Stress of Immigration and the Consequences for Security. He presented the exploration of the pathways to integration versus alienation for immigrants. As he said, there is not a single successful pathway. Rather, there are several pathways that have proven successful and several that have proven unsuccessful. The stressful challenges that are both real and perceived, that face immigrants are explored with special attention to Muslim integration in Europe and in the U.S. The consequences of failure of Muslim integration for social unrest and as consequence of terrorism were considered. He talked also about considering the role of external forces in the case of Muslim integration as pressure for religious Jihad is intermixed politically in combination with the social problems of successful integration. The second Keynote speaker was Prof. Roland Eckert, from The University of Trier, Germany, presented after him, his Keynote lecture about: Migration, Relative Deprivation and Terrorism: Violent Events and Collective Identity. In his presentation he emphasized his understandings, that conflicts arise and turn violent if there are no institutions within which they can be conducted by other means. Unregulated conflicts

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

193

intensify the process of establishing unambiguous collective identities, which appear to safeguard personal integrity and dignity. This is a precondition of successful terrorism. Among migrants, migration can lead to both relativization and radicalization of ethnic or communal identity. The return to specific traditions to "blood and belief, faith and family" is only one option among others, mostly caused by perceived fraternal relative deprivation of the group they belong to. The escalation toward violence and terrorism among activists is caused by the experience or imagination of humiliation and victimization. "Religion and violence are seen as antidotes to humiliation". Longterm prevention therefore should hinder and avoid humiliating and violent events. The third Keynote lecturer was Prof. Elias Besevegis from The Department of Psychology, University of Athens, Greece who presented a study of Acculturation and Adaptation of Immigrants in Greece. The purpose of the study was to explore the acculturation strategies of immigrants in Greece in relation to their economic and psychological adaptation. Acculturation strategies were related to the quality of adaptation, i.e. integration and assimilation yielded the most positive outcomes and separation the most negative. However, this general pattern differentiated across ethnic groups. Length of stay in the host country was related to more adaptive acculturation strategies and to better quality of psychosocial adjustment. The above findings are discussed in the light of the acculturation literature. Dr. Michal Finklestein, CSCP and The Department of Social Work, Zefat Academic College, under supervision of Bar Ilan University, presented her keynote lecture about the study she carried with Prof. Zahava Solomon, Adler Center, Tel Aviv University, Israel, on Trauma and Loss: The Experience of Ethiopian Immigrants in Israel. According their empirical study, employing acceptable statistical measures in studies of refugees, the results demonstrated suffer and stress, following cumulative trauma and traumatic losses. They concluded that refugees who arrive from the same country of origin, may not be of one piece. They may differ in exposure to stressful, traumatic events, traumatic losses, and sever difficulties, pre, peri and post migration and also may report diverse posttraumatic symptoms and complicated grief reactions. Their unique study confronted the challenge of research in a population that was hard to reach and also the challenges of validating measures of refugees’ trauma and posttraumatic symptoms that were only investigated before by Ethno graph research, and were never examined empirically. As high proportion of this population is illiterate, the assistance of Israeli university students, born in Ethiopia, who spoke Amharic, may have lead to a high response rate in data collecting. The assistance by these student interpreters, who experienced the same ordeal as the participants in the study, taxed them emotional toll. However, it is also gave them legitimacy to elaborate their own posttraumatic residues and grief reactions. Moreover, these students from academic institutions in the general Israeli host society created an intercultural bridge between the immigrant refugees and the members of the host society. This assistance enabled the participants to tell their stories of traumatic experiences and losses, in their own language, in a very safe and empathic setting.

194

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

Two workgroups followed the round table discussion. The first, chaired by Prof. Zahava Solomon, Head of Adler Center, Tel Aviv University, Israel, dealt with Immigration as a Potential of Post Traumatic Growth. The first presentation was by Dr. Tanja Wunderlich, Program Officer, Immigration and Integration, The German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, Berlin, Germany who described the German Marshall Fund of the United States and gave an overview of the Immigration and Integration Program. According to her overview, international migration has risen to the top of the global policy agenda and questions of immigration control and integration rank among the most pressing political issues on both sides of the Atlantic. As the scale, scope and complexity of the issue has grown, states and other stakeholders have become aware of the challenges and opportunities. Europe and the United States have seen a clear trend in the political and public discourse that links immigration issues more closely to a wide range of other policy areas. This includes 1) security issues, ranging from stepped-up border controls and stricter admission procedures to more requirements in the naturalization procedures; 2) economic issues, which include questions of the undocumented labour force, admission of high-skilled workers, labour mobility within the EU, or the role of remittances for trade and development; 3) social policy and integration of immigrants, particularly on the local level, as an issue of social inclusion, diversity management, communal relations, anti-discrimination policies and education. Rateb Amro, who is the Director General and Founder of Horizon Strategic Studies institute from Amman, Jordan was the second presenter and discussed the issue of the Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, as a Successful Example of Immigrants. The Palestinian community in Jordan is at one and the same time, a typically Jordanian community. But nevertheless, as typically Palestinian, they have The aspiration towards a Palestinian home on the soil of Palestine. It is hard to separate the miserable plight of the Palestinian refugees, the experience of being a refugee and the culture that grew up around it served as a basis for the consciousness of exile from the land of their birth- the loss of the country, house, lands, landscapes familiar from childhood, and family graves- alongside the hope of returning to their homes. The second and third generations have inherited this experience, a powerful emotive load that grows ever stronger amid crushing poverty and degrading conditions in the refugee camps. The claim to the right of return has to be seen against this complex historical background. The Palestinian refugee community in Jordan has maintained its integrity and dignity due to the special management by the late King Abdullah the first of the first Palestinian exodus to Jordan. His management became subject to worldwide appreciation. This humane and practical management, which included the granting of full citizen rights and duties enhanced, rather than weakened, the Palestinian aspiration for return. It is my strong belief that when almost half the population of Jordan is restless because of expectations of a solution for their final identity and status, then real stability in Jordan, socially, economically and politically will always be compromised. These people are entitled, through hard work of all the parties, to choose for good, and within the context of phased and final settlement, the identity and citizenship they like to maintain, and choose to reside either in Jordan, the Palestinian Entity (hopefully future state) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or whenever possible and mutually agreed, in their original homes.

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

195

The third presentation was carried by Katarzyna Gmaj, M.A., Doctoral student, who is a Program Coordinator and a Research Fellow in The Center for International Relations, Warsaw, Poland. She talked about the Chechens in Poland – Life in a Vacuum or on the highway to the West. According to her presentation, integration to the host society decreases ethnic tensions. Integration is crucial for stable solution to the difficult economical, social and psychological situation experienced by those under international protection. Peculiarity of the Polish situation consists in nationality of asylum seekers. Since 2000 (beginning of the war in Chechnya) Russian citizens of Chechen origins have dominated the flow. They constitute approximately 90% of applicants for refugee status. Almost none of them are left without any form of international protection -majority is granted tolerated stay. Due to tensions in Reception Camps, Chechens are separated from other nationals applying for international protections. Males are exposed to stress since they are supposed (cultural expectation) to maintain numerous families. Victims of tortures or rapes and those who spent a long time in enemy environment, often do not relay on psychological aid. Expectation of economic success is a factor leading to integration. In the Polish case refugees and those with tolerated status miss that incentive. The session was closed by the presentation of Ruth Bar-On, from SELAH, An Israeli Crisis Management Center. She presented the Experience of her NGO with dealing in issues of Immigration and Terror. A multi-dimensional program of longterm support has been developed over the last fourteen years of experience of the Israel Crisis Management Center, in supporting over 15,000 immigrant victims of terror. Among SELAH's volunteers are trauma survivors who reach out to help the newly bereaved and injured. These volunteers, former recipients of SELAH, offer a unique perspective based on their own personal struggle with tragedy. There is evidence that contact with a person who has "been there," suffered a similar trauma and is now helping others, may promote hope in being able to find meaning again and therefore can facilitate post-traumatic growth. From their/our experience, the effectiveness of the program is based on the immediate on-site response, cooperation with other agencies dealing with trauma, the culture-sensitive and individualized approach, breaking through isolation and engendering a sense of belonging and meaning. The second workgroup dealt with Psycho-Social Stressful Events as Risk Factors in Immigration and was chaired by Prof. Giovanna Campani, from the Department of Education, University of Florence, Italy. She gave her presentation about Forms of Discrimination and Complexity of the Context. The migratory landscape in the European Union, considering the various contexts, the difference between post-colonial migrations, temporary migrations and new immigrations. The paper focus the so-called “mediterranean model” and the development of irregular migrations in the Southern European countries. It will then distinguish between immigrants and refugees and between settled minorities of immigrant origin and new labor migrations. It will then be developed the issue of a socalled second generation that is still at risk of exclusion in the European schools. The various forms of discrimination that can affect the complex reality that is called

196

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

“immigration in Europe”: settled communities having obtained the nationality of the settlement countries still suffer of forms of discrimination in terms of racism, prejudices, absence of “recognition” (in the sense of the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor), both in the European countries that practiced “assimilation” policies (as France) and in countries that have tried to implement forms of “multiculturalism” (which was never a global policy as it was in Canada). In new immigration countries, like Italy and Spain, the main issue is the condition of irregular migrant, which makes any settlement project impossible and is a form of exclusion from various aspects of social life. European Union policies fighting discrimination seem at the moment unable to deal with such a complex issue. On the other side, it is much more in relationship to “petty criminality” (drugs, robberies, prostitution, rape...) that some immigrant population can represent a problem than in relationship to “terrorist behavior”. The second presenter was Natalia Balaban, who is an International Affairs Adviser, from the Investment, Innovation and Modern Technologies Center, Moldova. She talked about the consequences of illegal immigration on the economic and social situation in Moldova. She talked about 3 different categories of illegal movement of people across borders- Illegal immigration, human smuggling, and human trafficking. Each of these concepts have quite different legal and political consequences. Poverty and warfare contribute to the rising tide of migration, both legal and illegal. Smuggling and trafficking 'employs' millions of people every year, and leads to the annual turnover of billions of dollars. Migration stream coming from Moldova is estimated as 10000 people a month, mainly to Europe, and mostly motivated by poverty. Both negative and positive consequences of the immigration were discussed, with regard to the political, economical and social aspects of the phenomenon. The next presenter, Mr. Bassem Eid, who is the founder and the director of the Palestinian Human Rights monitoring group (PHRMG) based in East Jerusalem (PHRMG). He discussed in his presentation the issues of Xenophobia towards Migrants. According to his understanding, people leave their countries because of different reasons, to improve their economy, their education, or their quality of life. The way the media presents migration increases the general fear towards it, which sometimes leads into discrimination, racism, hate, hostility and xenophobia. Human rights of migrants are compromised when racism and xenophobia arouses, and this leads to attacks on the migrant population that can end in terrorism. He cited: “Xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylumseekers, constitutes on of the main sources of contemporary racism”. The increase of these feelings of fear, hate and xenophobia by the governments and media, incites the violations of humans rights such as the right of liberty, of movement and security. It is important to analyze carefully the measures that are being taken so the possible solutions do not lead to more human right’s violations.

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

197

Dr. Julia Mirsky from Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, closed the session with her lecture about Risk Factors for Psychological Distress and Deviant Behavior among Adolescent Immigrants in Israel Psychological, familial and social factors may render adolescent immigrants at risk for psychological distress and behavioral disorders. Adolescents’ immature dependency needs may render them vulnerable to their parents’ disorientation and loss of parental competence that occurs in migration. This, topped by the loss of a peer-group, that is most significant in adolescence and is inevitably lost in migration, may produce psychological distress. The mastery adolescents have over their bodies and actions allows for the channeling of their emotions and distress into behavior and may lead to conduct disorders and deviant behavior. Statistical data will be presented to illustrate the over-representation of immigrant adolescents in the population of adolescents in distress and in risk in Israel. Narrative testimonies will be presented to illuminate the experiences of immigrant adolescents at risk, of their parents and teachers. On Saturday, 28 April 2007 the Keynote lecture was about The Process of Radicalization of Immigrant Population, chaired by Dr. Boaz Ganor. He is the Founder and Executive Director of The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. He is also the Deputy Dean, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. He talked about Homegrown Terrorism and the Global Jihad Modus Operendi”. He was followed by Dr. Katharina von Knop, Germany, George C. Marshall Center Program on Terrorism and Security Studies; Jebsen Center for CounterTerrorism Studies, Flechter School, Tufts University, Berlin, Germany. She talked about Social Stress Factors and their Impact on Radicalization of Muslim Groups in Germany After her Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis, Lecturer in International Relations, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece presented his studies about Asian Muslims in Greece: The Prospects of Radicalization. In his paper he examined Asian Muslim migrants in Greece and the prospects of radicalization. Due to its geographical position, Greece is a ‘stopover junction’ for many Asian Muslim migrants on their way to Europe. In addition, Asian Muslim communities in Greece have been taking shape over the last three decades, since the first Pakistanis appeared in the 1970s, to be followed by Bangladeshis, Kurds, Iranians, Arabs, Afghans etc. It is estimated that at present the total number of Asian Muslims in Greece amounts to no less than 250,000-300,000. Overall, Asian migrants remain aliens to Greek society and share numerous grievances about the attitude of Greek public authorities, notably of the police. As a result, at this stage the social integration prospects of Asian migrants in Greece appear to be extremely limited. Drawing on fieldwork, the paper examined the social and economic status of Asian Muslims in Greece, their religious and political organization, their attitude towards Greek authorities, Western countries and Israel. Mr. Yoram Schweitzer, M.A., Researcher of International Terror, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University, Israel closed this session and talked about: Immigrants and Islamic Minorities – a Cornerstone in Al Qaeda's Perceptions and Practices The lecture considered the exploitation by Al-Qaeda and its

198

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

affiliated groups and networks of the multifaceted dilemmas and grievances of immigrants as well as those of Islamic minorities in their host countries. Its implementation is intended to create new cadres for what they perceive to be a zero sum game that will eventually help them to promote their goal of spreading Global Jihad. Within this context, the presentation included the organization's ideology, world perception, and practical policy, which assist the organization in the recruitment and operation of individuals and groups in the Islamic Diaspora. Two workgroups followed the round table discussion. The first workshop was about Varied Perceptions and Factors of Terrorism in Immigrants and Minorities, Chaired by Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova, from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and from the Institute of World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia. She talked about the Islamicized Ethnoseparatist Terrorism and ‘Ethnic’ Organized Crime in Russia: The Limits of the Linkage. The highly negative perception of Islamicized ethnoseparatist terrorism that has dominated Russian public opinion since the late 1990s – early 2000s has affected broader public attitudes towards ethnic minorities, especially of the North Caucasian origin. That linkage was reinforced by the role that the so-called ‘ethnic’ organized crime (professional criminal associations of specific ethnic backgrounds) played in supporting militancy and terrorism. Indeed, militant non-state actors of ethnoseparatist/Islamist bent engaged in terrorist activities actively cooperate with organized crime in Russia, especially, but not exclusively, with the so-called ‘ethnic crime’. But while terrorists and criminals, especially of the same ethnic background, may be tied by clan/patronage networks and even create a symbiotic relationship (particularly in the North Caucasian region itself), their interests may often collide, especially outside the region. For instance, tough measures undertaken by authorities in response to terrorist attacks impede business activity by the Chechen Diaspora in Russia and some Chechen organized crime groups operating outside Chechnya have in fact withdrawn support from armed separatists over the last few years. The second presentation was carried by Dr. Rogelio Alonso, from the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain, about the Jihadist Terrorism and the Radicalization Process of Muslim Immigrants in Spain. On April 3, 2004 seven people committed suicide in Leganés only weeks after Jihadist terrorists killed in Madrid a hundred and ninety one men and women injuring hundreds. The suicide terrorists killed themselves when their flat was surrounded by police forces, who were investigating the 11 M massacre in the Spanish capital. It is believed that the seven suicide terrorists were themselves involved in perpetrating and preparing the March 11 attack. This paper will analyse how and why the seven immigrants from the Maghreb became the first suicide bombers in Western Europe related with the current networks of international terrorism. The paper will also look at the main patterns in the process of radicalisation and recruitment evident in the networks of jihadist terrorists that have emerged in the country so far. Thus the causes and consequences of the involvement of Muslim immigrants in terrorist related activities in the country over the last two decades will be assessed. The session was closed by Dr. Maria Alvanou, Member of Research Team, Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies (ITSTIME), Department of Sociology, Catholic University of Milan, Italy. She talked about Jihadi

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

199

Socialization as an Answer to Minority Problems for Muslims in Italy. The Servizi per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare has recently stated that “in Italy there are cells ready to strike” and investigations, which indicate that Italy has become a platform for al-Qaeda associated terrorist operations in Europe and Iraq. At least five young Muslims recruited in northern Italy are believed to have carried out suicide operations in Iraq over the last three years. The country due to its key geographic position among Western Europe, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and North Africa, became the landing place for millions of immigrant Muslims who arrived as working hands during the ‘80s and ‘90s. To “first generation” matters like prayer space and prayer time during work, other issues have been added today like demands for Islamic school education, the phenomenon of islamophobia after 9/11 etc. The presentation focused on the way that Jihadists exploit the social stress that Muslim immigrants face in Italy, stemming from everyday practical issues, religious, immigration law and integration problems to recruit sympathizers and operators for their terrorist cause. The second workshop discussed the topic of Immigration, Minorities and Ideological Attributes of Terrorism. The workshop was chaired by Dr. Oscar Daly, from the Department of Psychiatry, Lagan Valley Hospital, Northern Ireland who named his presentation: “One Man’s Terrorist is Another Man’s Freedom Fighter” The Northern Ireland Perspective. From his point of view, for each individual who was prepared to use violence in furtherance of Republican objectives, there are different social and personal factors which may have influenced the individual’s decision to act in such a manner. Nonetheless, it does remain unclear as to why some individuals decided to join the IRA and others did not and why some individuals in the IRA progressed to take life and others did not. Similarly it is unclear how IRA members now view themselves, and the reasons they joined the IRA, is retrospective and subjective. How much rationalization and justification is there for what they believe was a just war, a righteous cause for which no apology is necessary? For each individual, whatever the influence of social and personal factors, it ultimately comes down to individual choice, for which consequences the individual must accept personal responsibility. The next presentation was carried by Dr. Shaul Kimhi, Tel Hai Academic College and Dr. Daphna Canetti-Nissim, Haifa University, Israel, about: Terrorism in the Eyes of the Beholders: Inter-Ethnic groups and Perception of Terrorism. Minority groups are very common throughout Western society, mainly as a result of massive immigration during the last century. These groups have developed their own identities due to a variety of social factors. Even though ethnic identity plays an important role in evoking many human perceptions, rarely have ethnic identities been analyzed for their effects on attribution of responsibility to terrorism. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that the way people understand ethnic relations and analyze causal relationships plays a crucial role in their willingness to denounce or support violent acts of terrorism. Members of minority groups tend to approve of terrorism more often than not. Perpetrators who are members of the majority tend to be seen as more detestable. We test these hypotheses using evidence from an original experiment involving 308 adult Israelis (166 Jews and 142 Arabs) conducted in 2005 at the height of the Palestinian uprising. Respondents were randomly assigned to three groups, each of which was presented with a terror attack scenario: a) a Jewish perpetrator; b) a Palestinian perpetrator; c) a neutral perpetrator (Asian). Arabs tended to denounce terrorist acts

200

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

less than Jews; Jewish perpetrators were perceived to be abhorrent. These findings suggest that ethnic identity plays a crucial role in the way one attributes motivations and values to terrorism. The Symposium about Melting pot vs. Multiculturalism: Directions of Preventive Interventions in Immigrants who Follow Militant Jihad took place on Sunday 29 April 2007. The Symposium was chaired by Dr. Willem van de Put, Director Health Net TPO, Netherlands, who talked about Integration and Exclusion: Migrants and the Need for Local and International Community Ties. HealthNet TPO implements health programmes with populations in distress in some 18 low-income countries (including Afghanistan, Congo and Sudan), and is active in Holland in physical and mental health of migrants and refugees. His paper questioned the relations between these different target populations and their home society. Some migrants had an option to come to a country of choice in order to improve their lives; others felt they had migrate to any higher-income countries; and there are those that fled violence and war and find themselves relocated in a strange place. In all these groups, problems of identity, community, participation and exclusion exist. Fear for loss of cultural identity by some is fed by anger of others who find themselves excluded from full participation. This results in different of reactions: while some tend to overemphasize the need for integration, others underline the need for an own identity, and others again turn to fundamentalist and extreme views. In order to address psychosocial needs in these communities, we find it useful to redefine notions of positive coping styles and perceptions of change in culture and tradition. This requires development of stronger links between migrants and their home society, and also to rethink what integrations means in the new society. The paper examines these ideas in the light of fifteen years of experience in psychosocial work with populations in distress.

The second keynote lecturer was Dr. Ditty Dokter, a psychotherapist from Roehampton University, School of Human and Life Sciences and HPT Mental health NHS Trust, UK. She talked about Immigrant Mental Health in Interaction with the UK Host Society; Her This paper looked at stresses resulting from the experience of migration and acculturation in the ‘host’ country. The experience of migration and discrimination differs for people at different life stages and across different generations. The response of the ‘host’ society interacts with the experience of the immigrant. Current emphasis on integration, in both legislation and the media, can result in further alienation when accompanied by a host response of discrimination. Her paper discussed the various factors that influence cultural self-identification. Some examples were given about approaches, which facilitate a dialogue across cultural difference and allow the migrant to acquire bi-culturality. The difference in experience for refugees and ‘voluntary’ migrants are highlighted and the connection between alienation, metal health problems and the role of psychosocial interventions to prevent alienation and retaliation concludes this paper. The next keynote speaker was Prof. Anne Speckhard, from Georgetown University Medical Center, The Department of Psychiatry, Brussels in Belgium. She talked about: Radicalization to Militant Jihad amongst First to Third Generation Immigrants in Europe. Her keynote lecture was about: Radicalization to the militant jihad among first to third generation immigrant communities in Europe has become increasingly a threat

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

201

to national security within and outside of Europe. This population faces unique stressors and a distinct call to the militant jihad – occurring over the Internet, in mosques, and in informal meetings, study groups and chat rooms. France, UK, Belgium, Italy all play the roles of hubs of terrorist activity and countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Pakistan play an interactive role with the radicalization occurring within Europe. The motivations for entering the terrorist trajectory within Europe is explored as well as current efforts for prevention and de-radicalization. Two workgroups followed the round table discussion. The first, chaired by Dr. Renata Miljevic-Ridicki, Assistant Professor, Teachers Faculty, Zagreb University; Crises Intervention Team, Society for Psychological Assistance, Croatia, dealt with The Struggle of Immigrants, the “Hewers of Wood and Bearers of Water” in Europe, to Conserve Self- Dignity and Self- Esteem Resources. She gave her presentation about refugees in Croatia. The war in Croatia begun in 1991 and the war activities lasted until 1995. 25% of Croatia's sovereign territory was occupied. Some 250,000 people from the occupied areas were forced to flee into the unoccupied part of the country. When the intensive fighting began in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nearly 250,000 people found shelter in refugee camps in Croatia. As in Croatia, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina started when the JNA (Yugoslav National Army, which had a pro-Serbian orientation) attempted to occupy its national territory. At the height of the refugee crisis in Croatia the number of Croatian citizens who had fled from occupied areas of the country and refugees from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina residing in Croatia totalled about 700,000 - around 15% of the population of the newly-founded state. After the war, there was additional problem – returnees to Croatia. In 1998 the Government of Croatia adopted the program for the return and accommodation of displaced persons, refugees and resettled persons, but there are still some problems in practice to be resolved. The second presentation about “Struggle of Immigrants: Media Not Helping”, was carried by Ceylan Akman, M.A., Program Assistant, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Turkey. The growing distress within the Western societies associated with security threat fosters the ties among in-groups and strengthens their ties to their national identities. In return, the hostility against out-groups, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities is enhanced. Above all, media through which the masses see the world surrounding them stimulates the prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups. Deprived of their rights and rejected socially and culturally by the rest of the society, ethnic minorities struggle to preserve their dignity and gain their self-esteem. My presentation will provide examples of print media pieces and movies that deliberately discriminate against immigrants or ethnic minorities and will focus on the way this has impact on the interaction between in-groups and out-groups. The third presenter was Bernhard Meissner, Diplom-Psychologist, International School Psychology Association (ISPA), Germany. His presentation was about: Social Stress of Members of Minority Groups in Germany. He gave a short overview about the situation of immigration and immigrants/minority groups in Germany, according to the experience of the author as a school psychologist. Different groups are exposed to different stress factors according to the country from which they come, why they came and how they are integrated or individually inclined and/or capable of integrating into German society. There are several official and NGO efforts and programs to help immigrants and children of immigrants especially to learn German. These efforts vary

202

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

in different German states. A growing awareness of the danger of terrorism can be noticed. Different political groups want to deal with imminent or apparent dangers more or less strictly. The second workshop was chaired by Dr. Jeff Victoroff, M.D. He is an associate Professor of the Clinical Neurology and Psychiatry, University of Southern California, Keck School of Medicine, CA, USA. The topic of the workshop was about: Does Understanding the Relations between Deprived Rights of Minorities and the Complexity of Integration - Lead to Less Terrorism? Dr. Jeff Victoroff talked about: Territory, Migration, and Conflict: What Might Work to Improve Muslim/non-Muslim Inter-Group Relations? According to his view, Europe faces a crisis. A combination of immigration and differential birthrates is rapidly increasing the proportionate Muslim population at the very time when Muslim/non-Muslim relations are globally terrible. Double-edged apartheid separates these groups, with mutual fear, distrust, negative feelings and even hatred escalating tensions and mutual distress. Some evidence suggests that violent jihad against the west may be causally linked to these terrible inter-group relations. If so, then earnest programs to improve those relations would be expected to reduce the risk of political violence. Fifty years of applied social psychology research has suggested specific interventions that measurably reduce prejudice and improve inter-group relations in the short term. However, there is an astonishing gap in our knowledge: we don’t know what works to improve relations long-term. This paper summarizes the available evidence and proposes an urgent research agenda to find the optimum ways to improve Muslim/non-Muslim relations in Europe and across the globe.

Research Recommendations NATO should consider including psychosocial studies in the efforts to investigate modifiable causes of terrorism. Several topics for research are proposed: 1. To study the less visible radicalization agents, as much attention has been paid to work and monitor with those who are visible radicals, while radicalization agents are often less visible 2. To ask members of the minority groups and immigrants themselves to carry a research. 3. Relate to factors affecting women as members of minority groups and immigrants groups due to the dual prejudice and oppression in participating in global jihad. 4. Identify existing brief programs of self-esteem, hope and community building, identify schools in areas of deprivation or marginalized communities, and implement those programs for 11-14 years old and evaluate the efficacy of each. 5. Map the particular age group, as seen particularly at risk of potential radicalization particularly. 6. Carry a longitudinal mapping of migrants and investigate how the relationship with the country of origin maintains personal relationship over time and affects the acculturation. 7. Carry a follow up study in the first and second generation of immigrants in a transnational study, particularly of refugees, based on interviewing the communities involved with focus of interviews on installation of hope.

M. Finklestein / Executive Summary

8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

203

To identify differences in acculturation strategies, between the different migrant communities, transnational and the factors of ethnic identity involved. To measure changes in attribution and attitudes of migrant youngsters, pre and post migration, their perception of ethnic identity both of the country they are migrating to and the country they are migrating from and look at alterations and the factors involved in that. To compare different types of communication and it’s impact on attitudes regarding minority groups and immigrants. To use popular movies, in order to touch up on the stereotypes. To employ elements of crisis management, both intervention and prevention in Europe, US and Israel and use programs in the schools and look at the margins especially. To investigate the immigrants who resort to terrorism and identify the crucial points of why they resort to terrorism, To concentrate on research of success stories, look to those who don’t resort to terrorism alongside with the success stories on the governmental side in prevention of terrorism.

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

205

Subject Index Acculturation

xv, xvi, 23, 29, 34, 77, 168 strategies 30, 31 Adaptation 6, 11, 12, 14, 23–28, 30–34, 167 Al Qaeda 109, 112, 114–118, 120, 121, 175 Al-Aqsa Intifada 137 Arab-Israeli-conflict 68 Assimilation-immersion 6 Asymmetrical warfare 16 Attribution styles 137, 141, 142 Baseball xv, 3–5, 8, 14 Basques 21 Bin Laden Osama 116, 118 Blending 7 Bloody Sunday 20, 132 Brain Drain 102 Chechens xv, 71–77 Educational Challenges 75 Christianity 69, 83 Civil Rights Movement 129 Clash of civilizations 3, 14, 19, 92, 182 Cold War, the 20, 155 Collective Identity xv, 16 Conflict analysis 163 Conservation of Resources (COR) Theory 4 Cultural Integration 5 Cumulative Trauma 38, 46 Darfur 156 Dehumanization 118 Diaspora 81, 94, 179, 180, 182 Discrimination 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 24, 27, 31, 33, 39, 79, 84, 89, 92, 124, 126, 130, 131, 168–170, 172, 173, 177, 179, 184–186 in employment 124 DSM 44, 55

Ethiopian Immigrants xv “Family Reunification” Immigrants 40, 41, 43, 45–47, 49, 54 “Moses” Immigrants 37, 40, 41, 43, 45–49, 54 “Solomon Immigrants” 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 58 Ethnicity 19, 33, 78, 138, 168, 169, 173 European Colonialism 168 Fallaci Oriana 123 FALLS Model, The 11 Freedom Fighter xvi, 128 Frustration-Aggression Theory 163 Fundamentalists 8, 19, 20, 79, 80, 89, 92, 93, 120, 160 Gaza strip 64 Geneva Convention, the 72 Genocide 157, 158 Ghettoization 6 Globalization xv, 1, 23, 88, 155 Grief 35, 48, 52, 55, 57, 59, 193 acute resolved grief 52 delayed grief reaction 54 lack of grief reaction 52–54 prolonged grief 53 Gulf War 182 Halal food 83, 86, 87 Harvard Trauma Questionnaire 41, 58 Health care 162 HealthNet TPO 155, 157, 164 Hijab 7, 12 Holocaust, the 16, 159 Humanitarian action 156 Imams 87, 90, 111, 112, 119 Immigrant Groups Europe xv, 3–6, 8–14, 20, 23, 26, 29, 33, 34, 71, 77–82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92–94, 95, 97–99, 104–109,

206

112, 116, 121, 123–126, 130, 131, 165, 175, 177, 179–184, 186, 188, 189, 192, 196 France xii, 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 78, 80, 82, 84, 92, 93, 98, 138, 181–183 Greece xv, 23–26, 30–34, 80, 81, 100, 183 Israel 35, 193 Italy xvi, 78–82, 85–87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 98–100, 102, 104, 105, 122–127, 181 Jordan 63 Poland 71 Spain 80 UK xvi, 8, 14, 15, 33, 34, 78–80, 82–84, 89–91, 93, 168–171, 173, 174, 176, 184 USA 26, 79, 80, 92, 93, 114, 149, 160, 175 Immigrant Mental Health xvi, 168 Ingroup/Outgroup Differentiation 187 Integration 3, 4, 8, 9, 23–25, 30–33, 50, 71–74, 76, 78, 80–82, 84, 85, 93, 98, 104, 125, 173, 186–189, 192 Intergroup Relations 179, 184 IRA 18, 121, 128–135, 175, 199 Islam 6, 14, 20, 69, 79, 82, 84–87, 90–94, 110–112, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 125–127, 150, 151, 155, 156, 174, 175, 181, 185, 189 Islamophobia 78, 79, 83, 93, 127, 182, 189 Jihad 109, 110, 112–118, 179, 185 Judaism 36, 69 Leniency 11–13 Maghreb 84, 93, 110 Mental problems xii Middle East, the 18, 63, 64, 68, 69, 84, 136, 140, 147, 148, 151, 182 Migration Illegal Immigration xv, 95, 100 Peri Migration Trauma 41 Post-colonial 80, 83 Post-Migration Difficulties 43, 46, 47 Pre Migration Trauma 41 Modernization 165

Moral Panic 79, 87–89 Multiculturalism xvi, 153 Muslim Parliament 83, 84, 89 states 87, 185 Women 84 Nationalism 17, 66, 180 Nationality xii, 71, 72, 84, 138, 168, 169, 177 NATO 175 Niqab 7, 8 Northern Ireland 20, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 176 The Troubles 128 Occupation, Israeli 63, 65, 139 Occupational status 27 Palestinian Refugee camps 67 Palestinians xv, 63–70, 137–139, 146, 147, 149, 151 Pluralism 33, 82, 92 Post modernism 174 Prejudice 10, 13, 21, 34, 150, 151, 179, 184–189 Pseudospeciation 130, 131 PTSD 35, 38, 43–46, 54, 57–59, 173 Symptoms 35 Racism 78, 84, 171, 172, 174, 184, 186 Radicalization 16, 19, 21, 92, 93, 109, 120, 180, 185, 186, 188, 189, 193 Ramadan 87, 90 Rastas 157–160 Religion Freedom of 125 Religious leaders 11, 112 Religious practices 85–87, 93 Republic of Ireland 128, 129, 131 Resource mobilisation 163 Resources Loss of 10 Revolution 8, 17, 182, 183 Rushdie, Salman 78, 83 Rwanda genocide 156 Salafism 110 Separate co-existence 7 Sharia law 8 Social Legislation 188 Stereotypes 21, 24, 33, 175

207

Stress

4, 9–11, 14, 15, 17, 31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 55, 58, 59, 72, 74, 78, 79, 92, 93, 149, 157, 160, 163, 167, 168, 173 Taliban 120, 158, 160, 164, 165 Terrorism Aims and purposes of 129 Attitudes towards 137 Individual factors 130 Islamic 14, 115, 116 Social Factors 130

Terrorist attacks 80, 109, 111, 112, 114–118, 120, 137, 138, 150, 151, 155, 160, 182, 184 Trafficking 89, 95–97, 100, 105, 119, 196 Women’s Trafficking 96 Traumatic Grief Reactions 38, 55 Traumatic Loss 38, 48–51, 53 West Bank 64, 65, 66, 138, 140 World War II 180 Xenophobia 79, 127, 186

This page intentionally left blank

Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

209

Author Index Alonso, R. Alvanou, M. Amro, R. Balaban, N. Besevegis, E. Campani, G. Canetti-Nisim, D. Daly, O. Dent-Brown, K. Dokter, D. Eckert, R.

109 122 63 95 23 78 136 128 190 168 16

Finklestein, M. Galitschi, S. Gmaj, K. Hobfoll, S.E. Kimhi, S. Lahad, M. Pavlopoulos, V. Solomon, Z. van de Put, W. Victoroff, J.

v, 35, 192 95 71 3 136 xi 23 35 155 179

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank