Realism and Dependence in Singapore's Foreign Policy (Politics in Asia Series)

Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy Singapore’s existence and success derive in part from its success in the domestic political arena and in part from the skilful management of a well-defined foreign policy with clearly identifiable goals and issues. A clear core of realist self-reliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading state that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence, both competitive and cooperative philosophies underpin Singapore’s foreign policy. In Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy, N.Ganesan charts the philosophical underpinning of Singapore’s foreign policy output and the institutions responsible for it and examines the importance of economic and defence diplomacy that are central to Singapore’s foreign policy output. It gives particular attention to the two most important regional bilateral relationships—with Indonesia and Malaysia—and how relations with its adjacent neighbours have influenced Singapore’s foreign policy. Combining first-hand research with excellent analysis, this volume provides a muchneeded report on the survival of a small state in the globalizing world. Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy is essential reading for academics in the field of Asian studies and Asian foreign policy, and will be of interest to scholars across a wide range of disciplines in the region and around the world. N.Ganesan is associate professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan. He has taught and published widely in contemporary Southeast Asian politics and foreign policy, and was previously at the department of political science at the National University of Singapore.

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Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy N.Ganesan

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 N.Ganesan All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-09976-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-35076-X (Print Edition)

Contents Acknowledgements

xi

Introduction

1

1 International relations theories and small states

4

2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, policy principles and policy arena

11

3 Singapore’s early policy output, 1965 to 1968

23

4 Singapore’s Cold War and post-Cold War policy output

36

5 Important regional bilateral relationships: Malaysia

49

6 Important regional bilateral relationships: Indonesia

70

7 Economic and defence diplomacy

87

8 Conclusion

104

Appendices

110

Notes

134

Bibliography

151

Index

158

Dedicated to my parents who made everything possible.

Acknowledgements This book is the outcome of the assistance and advice of many individuals. Hence I have benefited from the wisdom and generosity of numerous mentors and colleagues. My academic mentors include Harukiro Fukui, Dwight King, Gordon Means, Clark Neher, Michael Stein, Robert Taylor, M.Ladd Thomas, and Brantly Womack. Colleagues who have been a source of inspiration and support include Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Muthiah Alagappa, Amitav Acharya, Suzaina Kadir, Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Takashi Inoguchi, James Jesudason, Lam Peng Er, M.Ramesh, Hari Singh, Leo Suryadinata, Benjamin Wong, Michael Montesano, Alex Mutebi, K.S. Nathan, Jon Quah, Tanun Anuman Rajadhon, Raj Vasil, and Bob Catley who generously hosted me for six weeks at Otago University in 2001. At the institutional level I have benefited from support provided by the National University of Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and the Hiroshima Peace Institute. I am indebted to the Taylor & Francis Group for permission to reproduce sections from ‘Factors Affecting Singapore’s Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia’ that appeared in Volume 45, Number 2, pp. 182–195 of the 1991 issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals). I would also like to record my appreciation to the editors and reviewers at Routledge for attending to the manuscript diligently. Finally, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my wife, Wan Lee, for providing both moral and material support in the course of writing this book.

Introduction The island republic of Singapore, with a total land area of approximately 680 square kilometres and a population base of four million, is located at the southern tip of the Malaysian peninsula in Southeast Asia. It was colonized by the British in 1819 and became a part of the Straits Settlements, together with Malacca and Penang in 1826. As part of its preparation for independence, Singapore was granted internal self-government in 1959, and in September 1963, together with the states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo, it became part of the Federation of Malaysia. However, Singapore’s absorption into Malaysia was short-lived, and within a period of two years, in August 1965, Singapore declared its political independence. The terms of Singapore’s absorption into and expulsion from the Malaysian Federation (to be discussed later) were both complicated and ambiguous. The difficulties arising from lingering tensions with Malaysia and a generally hostile maritime Southeast Asia served to inform Singapore’s policy formulators on the vulnerabilities of the state’s independent existence. The limited land area, small population base and the relative absence of natural resources including potable water, has meant that as a country, Singapore is always concerned with political survival and national viability. Such concerns are sometimes cynically referred to as a ‘siege mentality’. This concern is also informed by Singapore’s status as the only Chinese majority state in maritime Southeast Asia—an area traditionally dominated by the Malayo-Indonesian peoples who also practise Islam. Hence, in ethno-religious terms, Singapore’s very presence is a regional anomaly that regularly invites scrutiny. It is arguable that Singapore’s very survival for the past forty years is astounding, quite apart from its prosperity and related achievements. This track record is attributable in no small measure to the People’s Action Party (PAP) government that first came into power with a majority in 1959 and its leader and Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. Whereas the PAP continues to rule Singapore within the framework of a dominant party system, Lee stepped down as Prime Minister in 1990 after thirty-one years, and assumed the position of Senior Minister in the Westminster-styled Cabinet. His successor, Goh Chok Tong, who replaced Lee Kuan Yew as Senior Minister in 2004 was only the country’s second Prime Minister. It is common knowledge that the PAP and its leaders regard opposition politics and checks on government as a waste of time and an obstacle to efficiently dealing with matters at hand. Instead, the PAP government has clearly articulated a preference for good government over regime types, much to the chagrin of many leaders, academics and journalists. Singapore’s existence and success derive in part from the PAP’s success in the domestic political arena and in part from the skilful management of a well-defined foreign policy with clearly identifiable goals and issues. A clear core of realist selfreliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading state that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence both competitive and cooperative philosophies undergird Singapore’s foreign policy. Accordingly, whereas Singapore’s preoccupation

Realism and interdependence in Singapore’s foreign policy

2

with vulnerability is an enduring feature of policy output, it is also arguable that cooperation and prosperity are better obtained through liberal arrangements. It is this aspect of Singapore’s policy output, most clearly expressed in its economic diplomacy, that is seldom paid sufficient attention. Rather, most writers focus on the vulnerabilities deriving from Singapore’s size, geographical location and related constraints that naturally inform the policy terrain of this microstate. Deriving from these adverse factors, however, are policies meant to augment the state’s limited endowments. Such policies, especially in the realm of economic and defence diplomacy, have been instrumental in enhancing Singapore’s ‘soft power’—the sum total of the country’s diplomatic goodwill. In this regard, Singapore’s foreign policy has been immensely successful. This book on Singapore’s foreign policy is divided into a total of seven chapters. Chapter 1 broadly surveys international relations theories, especially as they pertain to small states and their foreign policies. This chapter also contains a literature survey of the various writings on Singapore’s foreign policy and catalogues them on the basis of their approach or theoretical underpinning. Chapter 2 examines the bureaucratic organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore, and the state’s core values, policy positions and priorities. In addition, it identifies the major policy arena of the Singapore government. Chapter 3 examines the early period of Singapore’s foreign policy that is usually referred to as the survivalist phase. This period spanned the years 1965 to 1968 and was important in that the PAP government had to deflect a large number of internal and external threats to the state’s stability, internal cohesion and continuity. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, I examine Singapore’s foreign policy during the Cold War (1968–1990) and the post-Cold War periods (1990 to the present day). The reasons for this classification are the lingering effects of the Cold War in the Southeast Asian political subsystem as it pertained to developments in the Indochinese peninsula, in particular the Second Indochina War (1956–1975) and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (1979–1989). Since the PAP government was virulently anti-communist in its foreign policy, such a breakdown, which corresponds to developments in mainland Southeast Asia, is easily justified. Chapters 5 and 6 look at the two most important regional bilateral relationships for Singapore—those involving Malaysia and Indonesia. Both countries are immediately adjacent to Singapore and their internal political developments have always had a significant impact on Singapore’s perceptions and vulnerabilities. Besides, both the majority Malay-Indonesian peoples and the minority Chinese populations in these countries have transnational linkages to Singapore. For Singapore, both these countries comprise the immediate outer periphery of its political and policy environment. Economic and defence diplomacies are examined in Chapter 7. As mentioned above, Singapore is a major trading state and boasts the busiest port in the world. Hence the PAP government actively pursues economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy provides Singapore with high productivity and growth rates that sustain regime legitimacy through performance criteria, and enhances the country’s national viability and prosperity. Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, is meant to augment Singapore’s core security strategy of deterrence by engaging major and medium powers in military training and exchanges, collaboration in defence research and development, and establishing embedded interests in Singapore’s survival as well.

Introduction

3

Chapter 8 quite simply concludes the book. It brings the discussion on Singapore’s foreign policy to a close and full circle by relating the findings to the existing literature. The argument is made that whereas Singapore is a small and vulnerable state that is constantly vigilant, its policies have moved beyond realism and, in the past decade, have become informed by more cooperative neoliberal considerations. Such a policy is a natural extension of Singapore’s vulnerabilities having been assuaged by a credible deterrence strategy and effective defence diplomacy. In other words, Singapore’s realist foreign policy during the Cold War that was characterized by security considerations is increasingly being overlaid by neoliberal cooperative tendencies in the post-Cold War period. This development is a function of its more mature political identity, the maintenance of a credible deterrence strategy, and the requirements of a trading state whose prosperity is contingent on cooperative rather than competitive policy output configured in power terms.

1 International relations theories and small states The literature on international relations theory in the post-Second World War period was dominated by the realist school. Whereas the defeat of fascist Germany augured the potential for the emergence of collaborative conceptions of international relations, these were quickly dismissed as utopian and idealist. Hence realism and its derivatives dominated the study of international relations.1 The realist approach was interactive with the onset of the Cold War between liberal democracy and capitalism represented by the United States on the one hand, and communism, which was represented by the Soviet Union on the other. The US-inspired formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that grouped Western Europe into a collaborative and cooperative bloc, and the Soviet creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) that encompassed Eastern Europe, set the stage for a Eurocentric concentration of competitive power for the better part of the period from 1950 to 1970. Within this broad systemic arrangement, regional subsystems that reflected the larger picture evolved. The Communist victory over the Nationalist Kuomintang in China and China's subsequent involvement in the Korean War in 1950 was the start of Western post-colonial involvement in Asia. When nationalist movements in countries like Vietnam appropriated communism in the anti-colonial struggle for independence, the situation became more complicated. None the less, it reinforced the realist conception of international relations as essentially based on the competitive acquisition of power, often as an end unto itself. Ideological orientations and underpinnings quite simply grouped states on different sides of the bipolar ideological divide. An attempt by developing countries led by India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia to form a centrist Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1960s quite simply collapsed. Member countries had neither sufficient resources nor influence to attract a substantial following. Accordingly, both the superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, essentially pursued a competitive zero-sum game foreign policy output. Realism became both a theoretical approach and a selffulfilling prophecy. As an approach to the study and conduct of international relations, realism is eminently statecentric. It advocated the competitive pursuit of state power, which was in turn regarded as an amoral enterprise that enhanced the international standing of the state within an otherwise anarchic environment.2 The 1970s witnessed the onset of détente between the US and the Soviet Union and the gradual amelioration of bilateral tensions. This development was assisted in no small measure by the inability of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers to guarantee security, heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and China by the 1960s, and the domestic public pressure that was brought to bear on American foreign policy output.3 With détente came the possibilities of a movement

International relations theories and small states

5

away from the paradigmatic realist approach. Cooperative theories that emphasized the complex nature of interdependence between states subsequently became popular.4 China’s entry into the United Nations and the American rapprochement with the former facilitated a gradual movement away from Eurocentric political developments. The creation of a large number of newly independent states in Asia and Africa in the 1950s and 1960s also provided greater variety and breadth to the international political system. Détente was short-lived however, and in 1980, coinciding with Ronald Reagan’s appointment as US President, the Cold War was reinvoked, both ideologically and in terms of policy output. The theatre of conflict however shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Central America.5 Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 heralded the period now referred to as the post-Cold War era or the New International Order. Bipolarity dissipated, much of Eastern Europe freed itself from Soviet hegemony and the Soviet Union itself collapsed in 1991. The implosion of the Soviet Union was widely hailed as the death-knell for communism, and proof that after almost 150 years of ideological competition, liberal-democracy and capitalism had triumphed. Hence Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of The end of history’, the triumph and realization that the ultimate form of human organization, governance and economic transactionalism had been reached.6 In response to such enthusiasm, Samuel Huntington spoke of a third wave of democratization.7 International relations theories that had already gained some latitude away from realism in the 1970s began to explore greater possibilities for cooperative behaviour among states. Structural and institutional derivatives that emphasized the equal importance of non-state actors in international relations were spawned. Multilateralism was seen as both a process and a product, and this development in turn led to the greater resort to the use of international regimes to cope with many global problems that had by now become transnational in nature.8 Even within such theories, however, realism exerted a significant influence, whether in hegemonic stability theory or neoliberal institutionalism. Deriving from the European experience, the US regarded rule-based regimes as crucial to rein in recalcitrant states.9 However, there were also fears that such institutions and sanctions would provide opportunities for continued unipolar American hegemony of international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After all, even within a cooperative framework, power could be exercised through influence and rewards and control over the agenda and priorities deriving from it. The greatest impact of realism, however, is the entrenchment of the state as the fundamental unit of analysis in international relations. Whereas international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank have become more important, it is arguable that donors as well as recipients of aid remain individual countries. Interest groups and issues have also proliferated, and some of them, like the Green Movement, have become rather popular in the industrialized West, having metamorphosed from social movements to political parties. Similarly, the revolutions associated with globalization and information technology have made borders far more porous and governments far less capable of monitoring all types of trans-actions and communications. None the less, territoriality and sovereignty remain cardinal features of international relations and governments guard them jealously. Even when states have a strategic convergence of interests, they need to agree to act on it, and consent can still be withheld and governments still claim the legitimate use of force within a given territory.10

Realism and interdependence in Singapore’s foreign policy

6

Developments within the European Union provide a counter-intuitive trend, but even there, governments have refused to participate in the evolution of a common currency.11 The realist imprint on the study of international relations is therefore inescapable, whether it is in terms of power configurations or the centrality of the state in international relations. Traditionally, realist conceptions of power were predicated on the land area, population size, resource base, socio-economic development and military might of a country. These endowments in turn defined a country’s status within a power hierarchy or grid, ranging from superpower to small power. Within this hierarchy, states have sought to protect and further their interests through a variety of strategies. Such strategies have included alliances and balance of power to alignments, neutrality and isolation. Naturally, the policy option of a state is contingent on its interactive relations with other states within a policy arena and a preexisting political and policy landscape. Realist conceptions of state power and potential are naturally disadvantageous to small states that begin with a small size and population base. With rare exceptions, small states have not been influential in the international arena.12 Where such influence obtains it is likely to be within a regional arena, such as Israel in the Middle East. Even claims to such regional influence are invariably contingent on the blessings and support of a major power, in this instance the United States. Alternatively, small states may have acquired ‘soft power’ in a discrete policy arena or issue, like Norway and Sweden for their positions on intervention and conflict and New Zealand, for environmental consciousness. However, for the most part, realist theories view small states as essentially weak and vulnerable. Some of these vulnerabilities may however be compensated through a tranquil regional environment, adequate military deterrence, high levels of prosperity and development, and a combination of traditional realist deterrents such as treaties and alliances. Variants of realism such as neoliberalism and institutionalism disadvantage small states to the extent that they are also statecentric. However, there are a few important qualifiers that ameliorate the situation. First, neorealist and institutional variants acknowledge the utility of non-state actors in international relations.13 Such an acknowledgement compromises the exclusivity of states in the conduct of international relations, reducing vulnerabilities associated with a state’s standing in power terms. Second, since realist variants tend in the direction of cooperative rather than competitive behaviour, it does not seek to alter an existing power configuration. In such a scenario where all states regard each other as alike in terms of decisionmaking capacities, the vulnerability of small states is significantly reduced. In addition, the presupposition that states do not wish to engage in conflictual behaviour to enhance their power also restrains the larger states. Finally, an egalitarian decision-making scenario may actually enhance the status of a small state, since it may have a comparative advantage in certain issue areas in the negotiation process. Hence it is arguable that neorealism and liberal institutionalism are far more favourable in their treatment of small states. The so-called idealist school of the post-Second World War period would have been even more favourable to small states. Idealist theories always advocated cooperative behaviour and tended in the direction of supranational global governance.14 It is for this reason that early theorists from the school, in particular those that worked on Europe, tended towards federalism, transactionalism and integration. The emphasis was always on the gradual evolution towards globalism, especially through functional means.15 Within

International relations theories and small states

7

such a framework, realist competitive zero-sum game policy output is of no consequence. And since states are not naturally expected to enhance their power and move up the hierarchy, small states have little to fear from larger ones. In fact, if anything at all, small states will be advantaged by their ability to trade in their smallness for a large collective identity. Unfortunately for small states however, the idealist school has had little influence in the last half-century. Whereas neoliberalism and institutionalism share the philosophical preference for cooperation over competition, they are nowhere near advocating supranationalism. It may very well be that the European Union will eventually integrate and provide the demonstration effect and model for supranationalism in the twenty-first century. After all, the twentieth century witnessed the breakup of empires and the entrenchment of states. Similarly, the twenty-first century may yet yield another epoch in global political evolution. Given the current state of affairs and the profound differences between individual states however, such an evolution appears unlikely, at least for now.

Singapore’s foreign policy literature There has been a fair amount of literature detailing Singapore’s foreign policy since the time of the state’s independence in 1965. This literature may be categorized in a variety of ways. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an examination of Singapore’s foreign policy in its various forms, from the type of study to the issue areas involved, especially in terms of their focus, ideological underpinnings and the arena where policy is executed. Types of studies can generally be subdivided in turn into full book-length studies and monographs and chapters in books and journal articles. Of the book-length studies, the works of Bilveer Singh and Michael Leifer are the most substantive, with a clear and unambiguous focus.16 Singh’s earlier monograph and more recent book essentially detail the state’s core values and policy output.17 Naturally, the book is far more substantive and details some of the changes in Singapore’s foreign policy output in the post-Cold War period. Leifer’s book on the same subject with the subtitle Coping with Vulnerability traces the country’s political history from the time of its independence and embeds the study within a broader regional context. Leifer’s overarching theme is that the notion of vulnerability that is attendant on Singapore’s policy formulators is derived from the state’s difficult transition into independence, ensuing difficulties with Malaysia and Indonesia in the post-independence period and the psychological conditioning that these historical episodes have etched on the country’s policy elite, in particular Lee Kuan Yew, the country’s founding Prime Minister and senior statesman. Leifer’s central argument is that material progress and a credible deterrence strategy have not undermined Singapore’s preoccupation with vulnerability and national viability. Both Singh and Leifer essentially use a realist framework in their analysis of Singapore’s foreign policy output, although Leifer qualifies the approach by noting that Singapore is unusual in its understanding of vulnerability that perhaps does not provide insights into the general conduct of small states. Hence, Leifer would argue, the Singapore case provides little by way of generalizations on the behaviour of small states in the international arena. Singh would probably concur with Leifer’s conclusion. Apart from both these authors, Kawin

Realism and interdependence in Singapore’s foreign policy

8

Wilairat’s doctoral thesis also focuses on Singapore’s foreign policy during the early years of independence.18 Similarly, Ganesan’s doctoral thesis focuses on Singapore’s foreign policy within the regional context in ASEAN.19 Other than books, the subject matter is addressed in a variety of book chapters and journals. If the chapter appears in a book specializing on Singapore, it is likely that the chapter is general and holistic in its treatment of the subject.20However, if it appears as a journal article, it is more likely that the focus will be much more specific, with a clear central argument. Shorter pieces are therefore likely to be much more issue-specific. Issue-specific writings often deal with a particular strand of policy output. The issues that are commonly focused on include matters pertaining to trade policy and economic diplomacy—an issue central to Singapore’s foreign policy output as well as prosperity and national viability, as noted in the Introduction.21 Some of the writings have also focused on Singapore’s defence diplomacy—references to its defence policies, weapon acquisitions and alignments with large powers.22Such writings may also be focused on particular historical periods such as the Cold War era. Writings on defence policy tend to have a realist underpinning, given Singapore’s preoccupation with survival and viability, while writings on economic diplomacy invariably highlight the realities of complex interdependence for Singapore. Hence, whereas Singapore is a natural competitor in trade, commerce and manufactured goods, such competition can occur only within the framework of a mutually acceptable and liberal international trading regime. In other words, competition can exist only within the framework of cooperative protocol. Lesser works also often focus on Singapore’s bilateral relationship with a particular country. Such works would include a study of Singapore’s relations with major powers like the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Japan. Early writings tended to focus on the relationship with the United Kingdom, given Singapore’s British colonial heritage. More recent works have focused on the other major powers. The United States, China and Japan all have important trade and investment interests with Singapore. Whereas China’s relationship with Singapore was restrained in the past owing to its support for armed communist insurgency in the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the relationship has become more mutually beneficial in the 1990s, especially after the diplomatic normalization of the bilateral relationship in late 1990. Singapore now maintains important trade and investment interests with China. The same is true of Japan, although Japan is a greater investor in Singapore than vice versa. As for the bilateral relationship with the United States, both commerce and defence are important issue areas. Most of Singapore’s weapons purchases, especially for the air force, are from the US, and since 1990 when the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation (to be discussed in Chapter 6), the relationship between them has strengthened significantly.23 Other than the major powers, there is an important and focused literature that details Singapore’s bilateral relations with Malaysia, which have in the past been described as ‘special’ and ‘symbiotic’.24 This is hardly surprising, since Singapore was previously part of the Malaysian federation and the two countries share many common developmental concerns and designs. Arising from the dissipation of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, both countries also exhibit differences in a number of areas, ranging from the supply of potable water to threat perceptions. In addition, the mirror-image existence of the three

International relations theories and small states

9

major ethnic groups—Malays, Chinese and Indians—in both countries, albeit in different percentages, has led to transnational linkages and potential problem areas. Hence the bulk of the research on regional bilateral relationships is focused on Malaysia. Singapore’s relationship with Indonesia is also important in terms of geographical proximity and Indonesia’s proprietary claim to regional initiatives, in particular those emanating from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).25 President Suharto’s New Order government (1967–1998) and its cordial relationship with Singapore, particularly from 1973 to 1998, meant that the importance of the relationship was often not sufficiently studied. Political scientists tend to naturally work on conflictual rather than cooperative relationships. None the less, the post-Suharto Indonesian political leadership is clearly less enthused with Singapore and I suspect that herein lies a potential growth area. In any event, both Malaysia and Indonesia are extremely important in Singapore’s foreign policy output, which is why Chapters 5 and 6 of this book deal exclusively with them. To the extent that the Malay Archipelago forms Singapore’s immediate outer strategic environment, both of these relationships will continue to attract scholarly attention. Finally, there is also a growing literature on Singapore and its performance and position in the country’s major foreign policy arena. Whereas it is arguable that the United Nations and its affiliated organizations remain Singapore’s most important forum for policy output, especially as it pertains to relevant issues concerning small states and the settlement of disputes, much of the literature here has focused on Singapore’s policy output in regional fora like ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC).26 This development is probably because Singapore’s policy priorities and disputes are dealt with by diplomats rather than by academics.27 The significance of the UN and similar agencies is evident in Singapore’s high-profile lobby in the former on behalf of ASEAN over the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (1979–1989) for fear that such an occupation would set a precedent for the conduct of larger states in Southeast Asia and that small states would have no guarantees against such conduct. A second illustration of the importance of international fora is Singapore’s referral, together with Malaysia, of a territorial dispute where the Horsburgh Lighthouse is located to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration in 1994. The writings on Singapore’s performance in regional fora have either tried to identify Singapore’s position or policy priorities, or sought to explain a particular issue or outcome. The reason for such an emphasis is quite simply because Singapore’s level of development, absence of raw materials and an agricultural sector, and high reliance on the export of manufactured goods and trade, places it in a situation that is substantially different from most of its developing neighbouring countries. Hence Singapore’s position in regional fora may often be at odds with those of the other member countries. Out of such incompatibilities and ensuing frustration, Singapore sometimes appears to have a policy agenda that is at odds with its neighbours. This explains the reasons for Singapore’s declining enthusiasm and faith in the timetable and implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and APEC. Accordingly, since 2000, Singapore has independently negotiated bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with its major trading partners, much to the chagrin of its neighbours like Malaysia and Thailand.28 The major difference between this book and the literature cited thus far is that this book holistically brings together all the major factors that contribute to Singapore’s

Realism and interdependence in Singapore’s foreign policy

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foreign policy output. Such an examination in turn provides the necessary evidence for the central argument of this book that Singapore has outlived its archrealist outlook in foreign policy. Whereas the country remains small both in terms of land area and population size, there is a very real sense in which such smallness is compensated by its international linkages and presence. These linkages are in turn interactive with Singapore’s status as a major regional hub and trading state. Consequently, over time, the country has evolved a foreign policy that carefully combines realism with complex interdependence, notwithstanding the different philosophies underlying the approaches. After all, realism, with its emphasis on the centrality of the state in international relations, differs markedly from liberal institutionalist theories that give primacy to formal and informal webs of relations between states. Singapore appears to have successfully synthesized the competitive demands of realism with the complementary demands of liberal institutionalism.

2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, policy principles and policy arena This chapter identifies the manner in which Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is organized and rationalized as well as the country’s publicly stated policy principles and goals. In addition, it identifies the major arena where the country’s foreign policy is executed.

Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs When Singapore declared its political independence in 1965, it was no stranger to the international arena. The PAP government, and Lee Kuan Yew in particular, had cultivated a significant international constituency in the West. This was achieved partly through Singapore’s own strategic location and the large number of foreign diplomats whom it hosted and partly through Lee’s careful cultivation of a core group of friends and sympathizers abroad. The latter achievement was often a function of overseas visits, especially within the British Commonwealth after having assumed office in 1959. In this regard, the importance of an active and effective foreign policy was not lost on the PAP government immediately after independence. In 1965, the PAP government comprised an inner core that was responsible for matters of high policy. Apart from Lee, this core comprised Dr Goh Keng Swee who was noted for steering the country’s economic and defence policies, Dr Toh Chin Chye who was responsible for health, and S.Rajaratnam who was the PAP’s ideologue and foreign policy spokesman.1 It was Rajaratnam who was appointed the country’s first Foreign Minister—a position he held until 1980. He was succeeded by S.Dhanabalan (1981– 1988), Wong Kan Seng (1988–1994) and S.Jayakumar (1994 to 2004). At the time of writing, Singapore had diplomatic relations with 160 countries and maintained a total of twenty-six full missions and fourteen consulates abroad. It had also named twenty-one honorary consuls and twenty-one non-resident ambassadors and high commissioners based in Singapore.2 The Ministry’s desks are geographically demarcated and the major sections deal with North America, Europe, East Asia, ASEAN, the Middle East and Africa. The Policy, Planning and Analysis Directorate is generally tasked with policy formulation on a day-to-day basis. The Minister, who is part of the executive Cabinet comprising fifteen members at the time of writing, has overall responsibility over the Ministry. The present Minister, S.Jayakumar, also holds the ministerial portfolio for law. All major decisions involving Singapore’s foreign policy may be expected to have been discussed at Cabinet level. The Prime Minister, as the Chief Executive Officer, technically makes the final decision,

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albeit major decisions are usually arrived at consensually. Lee Kuan Yew, who holds the portfolio of Minister Mentor in the cabinet, is also involved in decision-making. Immediately below the Minister is the permanent secretary of the Ministry, the highest rank in the Singapore Civil Service. Whereas ministries used to have only a single permanent secretary in the past, it is now not uncommon to see two persons holding the same rank but assigned to different portfolios such as policy, development and administration. The permanent secretary may be assisted by normally up to two deputies and even more deputy assistant secretaries. Ranks below the third rung are quite common and are normally attained through seniority and competence. The upper echelons of the Singapore Civil Service draw from a pool of some 270 persons comprising the Administrative Service. Such officers are regarded as the best and brightest, and are often groomed from a very young age through the provision of prestigious government scholarships tenable at the best universities in the West. On their return, their career path is closely chartered and monitored through rotational deployments throughout the Civil Service and statutory boards.3 Hence it is often the case that senior bureaucrats in all ministries are from the Administrative Service. More recently, the Administrative Service has recruited middle managers directly from the private sector to replenish its talent pool. The Singapore Foreign Service does, however, also have a core of career diplomats who man the Ministry and regularly assume senior appointments, especially in overseas missions. In addition, the PAP government is able to second or attach persons from a variety of professions to represent the country in overseas missions. Singapore’s ambassador to France from 1986 to 1993, David Marshall, was Singapore’s first Chief Minister from 1955 to 1956 and subsequently a successful lawyer in private practice. Similarly, there are a large number of academics holding such ambassadorial appointments. Thus, for example, Chan Heng Chee in the US, Pang Eng Fong in the UK and Walter Woon in Germany are all academics on second-ment. In this regard it is arguable that the PAP government has achieved close compact and convergent interests with the civil service.4 In terms of its diplomatic missions abroad, Singapore regarded the Commonwealth countries as extremely important in the early years of independence, given its British colonial past and defence and trade linkages. Hence, for the first decade or so, Singapore placed much emphasis on maintaining good relations with the UK, Australia and New Zealand. From the mid-1970s, when the UK became less important in trade and defence matters and when its international influence weakened, the United States took priority. Among other Western industrialized countries, the relationship with France and Germany has strengthened significantly over the last decade. As for East Asia, Singapore did not normalize diplomatic ties with China until November 1990, after Indonesia had done so earlier in August 1990.5 This late recognition was in deference to regional sensitivities and to deflect charges that the country’s foreign policy was ethnically inspired. However, both China and Taiwan have always maintained Trade Missions in Singapore. The ability to host both nationalist China (Republic of China) and communist China (People’s Republic of China) simultaneously is a fairly rare feat of diplomacy, given communist China’s treatment of Taiwan as a renegade state and the former’s refusal to allow the latter any form of independent international diplomatic recognition. The difficulty is exaggerated in the

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case of Singapore, since it is an ethnic Chinese majority state and China generally expects such states to empathize with its position. The clearest evidence of the Chinese position on Taiwan was delivered to Singapore in a rather blunt fashion in July 2004 when it openly expressed outrage at the visit of Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister designate Lee Hsien Loong to Taipei. China unilaterally cancelled a number of bilateral initiatives and urged Singapore to take steps to repair the damage done to bilateral relations.6 Singapore, on its part, maintained that the visit was a private one and that it endorsed the ‘one China’ principle. However, China appeared unconvinced with the explanation and dismissed it.7 The embassy in Japan is also important, especially for commerce, since Japan is a major investor in Singapore. It should be noted, however, that Singapore’s first generation of political leaders, and Lee in particular, had some anxieties regarding Japan’s past history of militaristic behaviour in the region.8 Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia are regarded as very important missions. Such importance is a natural function of geographical proximity, historical linkages and mutual interdependence in many areas. Both embassies are especially important in monitoring the regional political pulse and the general feelings of the political elite towards Singapore. The reason for this observation is quite simply because Singapore is a regional anomaly in terms of its ethno-religious composition and level of socioeconomic development. Given the number of transnational linkages in several issue areas, close monitoring is regarded as crucial. In addition, Singaporean diplomats are expected to robustly defend the country’s interest in the local media and policy fora. Whereas Singapore maintains missions in all the countries in Southeast Asia, the others are not regarded with the same importance as Indonesia and Malaysia. Other than those mentioned explicitly, all of Singapore’s missions might be regarded as less important. However, it should also be noted that since 1999, Singapore has significantly expanded the number of overseas missions it maintains. This expansion is meant to allow Singapore wider representation and access to distant markets as well as source opportunities for trans-national production and commerce. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 has led to significant changes in the regional political landscape and some of these changes are not favourable to Singapore. Hence the PAP government has decided to diversify its linkages and deflect the challenges deriving from an unfavourable immediate regional environment.

Foreign policy principles and philosophy A quick examination of the foreign policy principles espoused by Singapore (see Appendix 2) reveals a number of issues. First, it is not underpinned by any particular philosophical doctrine or position. Rather, it reiterates Singapore’s constraints as a small state and almost immediately refers to the need to maintain a ‘credible and deterrent military defence’ to underpin its foreign policy. In other words, the constraints associated with Singapore’s size are acknowledged but at the same time are somewhat buttressed and overcome by a credible military deterrence. Most of the other statements identified as fundamental principles constitute a good neighbour policy and the establishment of mutually beneficial and reliable relationships

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with friendly states. In terms of the environment, the principles identify a firm commitment to ASEAN, Southeast Asia and the broader Asia Pacific region. There is also commitment to a liberal multilateral trading arrangement, the willingness to trade with any state and maintain an open market economy domestically. Finally, there is reference to support for and active involvement in international organizations. The Singapore government’s publicly stated policy priorities are therefore quite clear, and involve a commitment to the defence of territoriality and sovereignty, the maintenance of a tranquil immediate and regional environment through a good neighbour policy, the promotion of trade and arrangements related to it and support for international organizations. It is not difficult to substantiate the state’s espoused principles as reflected in a number of diplomatic initiatives. The credible deterrence policy is clear to see, and Singapore does maintain important bilateral relationships with its immediate neighbours and is generally committed to regional initiatives. In trade terms it has lobbied hard for AFTA and APEC, hosts the head-quarters of the latter in Singapore and hosted the inaugural conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999. In addition, it became a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2001. Hence to link policy output to principles is easily done. However, what I had in mind was a philosophical orientation or core values that Singapore subscribes to in policy articulation. The core values the country aims to preserve and promote in policy output may be identified as territoriality, sovereignty, internal political order and economic growth. Both territoriality and sovereignty are embedded within a realist conception of international relations that acknowledges states as the pre-eminent actors and by extension, a competitive view of relations between states. Internal political order can quite simply be described as the avoidance of transnational issues cultivating a domestic constituency or challenging the sovereignty of the state. It may also be used to maintain regime security as well as Singapore’s dominant political party system. The requirements of economic growth, which is in turn contingent on trade and investments are, however quite different in that internationally acceptable cooperative behaviour is required. Trade and prosperity have a liberal philosophical undergirding rather than a realist one. In this regard, it is arguable that whereas the primary philosophical thrust of Singapore’s foreign policy is eminently realist, the requirements of trade and prosperity demand a liberal cooperative approach as well.10 Philosophical discussions are anathema to the PAP government, whose immediate response will be that Singapore would undertake that which is necessary to obtain policy priorities. The PAP government has always denied that it is motivated by any philosophical predisposition and quite simply formulates policies in response to the state’s needs, although, from time to time, meritocracy is identified as one of its guiding principles, at least in relation to developmental policies. In fact, true to its statements, Singapore’s initial policy position in the aftermath of independence was one of nonalignment. It was a position that found favourable reception among the newly independent African and Asian countries, especially within the British Commonwealth. However, by the mid-1970s, Singapore became more realist and pro-Western in its orientation—a position it has continued to hold until the present day, notwithstanding the government’s illiberal position on issues such as press freedom, democracy and human rights.11

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The articulation of this position is largely attributable to the idiosyncratic imprint of Lee Kuan Yew. By the mid-1970s, Lee became convinced that the US was the only benign superpower that could ensure regional stability. Given the American involvement in Korea and Vietnam and its overwhelming power, Lee stoutly defended an American presence in the region, arguing that if it were not for American involvement in Vietnam, maritime Southeast Asia would not have been spared the revolutionary communist insurgency that ravaged Indochina.12 Within its own domestic policy context, Singapore regarded the twin threats of communism and communalism as the greatest threats to internal order. Hence the strident anti-communist position of the US found a ready ally in Singapore. Since the US had extensive trade and investment linkages with Singapore, it was easy to create a mutually beneficial relationship. However, there were and are exceptions to this generally realist and pro-Western orientation. The first of these exceptions concerns trade. As a general rule of thumb, Singapore is truly prepared to trade with any country in the world, regardless of its ideological predisposition or internal situation. Hence it should come as no surprise that Singapore had a sizeable trade volume with Vietnam during the Second Indochina War or that one can easily buy Cuban cigars in Singapore. Given the importance of trade to the domestic economy, the Singapore government has successfully established a trade policy that is effectively decoupled from its foreign policy. In other words, trade relations with other states, unless explicitly subjected to international sanctions and their enforcement, are essentially regarded as being outside the bounds of foreign policy. Such policies have in the past drawn criticism from neighbouring countries whose trade and foreign/defence policies tend to be interlinked. Thus, for example, Thai policy elite felt aggrieved during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that Singapore, despite denouncing the occupation in the international fora, continued to actively engage in trade with Vietnam. Similarly, when it was part of the Malaysian federation, Singapore felt aggrieved that Malaysia had demanded the closure of the Bank of China in Singapore.13 Despite being staunchly anti-communist in the 1960s, Singapore allowed for the reopening of the Bank of China after it became independent. The second exception involves situations that require the demonstration of regional solidarity or sensitivity. If a pro-Western and realist policy has the possibility of damaging important regional relationships, Singapore’s policy position may be more restrained or at least accommodative. Thus, for example, Singapore abstained rather than cast a vote against Indonesia for its occupation of Timor in the UN in 1975. In this instance, abstinence would have delivered the necessary message. Similarly, when Singapore formally established diplomatic ties with China in 1990, it was out of deference to Indonesia, which had severed diplomatic ties with the latter following an abortive coup that was attributed to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The PKI was accused of being linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The West, and in particular the US, had, after all, engaged China from as early as 1970 and supported its membership in the UN in 1972. Singapore also refrained from deploying combat troops to secure the peace for the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) following the 1999 Timorese referendum. The Indonesian military was clearly opposed to the fragmentation of Indonesia and there was sufficient evidence to suggest complicity between TNI (Tentera Nasional Indonesia—Indonesian National Army, previously referred to as ABRI—Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or

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Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) and pro-integration militia. Hence Singapore opted to deploy a field hospital and medical personnel. The third reason for exceptions is linked to the debates on Asian versus Western values. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the publication of Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s articles, Western countries, led by the United States, embarked on a foreign policy lobby for greater levels of democratization, press freedom and human rights in Asia. Since these developments came against the backdrop of the suppression of the democracy movement in Myanmar in 1988 and the Tienanmen incident in China in 1989, a large amount of Western pronouncements against authoritarianism were directed at Asia. However, Asia in the 1990s before the onset of the Asian financial crisis was prosperous against the backdrop of more than a decade of robust growth and confident of its own values. As a result, the debate became polarized between a number of Asian countries on the one hand, including China, Malaysia, and Singapore and the West, and in particular the United States. The Asian position, espoused by Singapore, was that liberal-democratic governance derived from a particular historical epoch, was suited to a particular type of people, took a long time to evolve and refine itself, and that it should not be grafted blindly on to non-Western societies that had different socio-cultural traditions and political norms.14 From time to time, these debates, which tended to be bifurcated and emotive, spilled over into foreign policy output on both sides of the spectrum. The final exception to the pro-Western rule has to do with situations that are viewed as threatening international political order or regime security. The clearest example of this exception occurred in 1989 and actually involved the US itself. The Singapore government accused the US Embassy in Singapore of encouraging political opposition against the PAP. Specifically, the charge was directed in relation to a prominent and outspoken local lawyer, Francis T.Seow, who at one time headed the Singapore Law Society. After a series of heated exchanges between both countries, Singapore announced the expulsion of the US Embassy’s First Secretary, Mason Hendrickson.15 Naturally, the US, in a tit-for-tat response, expelled the Singapore Embassy’s First Secretary in Washington, Robert Chua. In more recent times and in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the exceptions to Singapore’s pro-Western position are less observable. This is partly because the countries that celebrated Asian values and their role in economic development are in economic disarray, and many have borrowed heavily from multilateral institutions where the US wields enormous influence.16 It is also partly because regional political developments resulted in uncertainties regarding leadership succession in Malaysia and Indonesia, and the region has been wracked by ethno-religious and separatist violence that alerts Singapore to its vulnerabilities of size and corresponding inability to control the immediate external environment, leading to greater reliance on the US to provide for regional security. Finally, in a bid to reorientate its economy to become a major financial and information centre in Asia, Singapore has liberalized many of its previous press restrictions and the government has displayed greater tolerance for dissenting views in the 1990s.17

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Singapore’s major policy arena Singapore’s foreign policy is executed in a number of policy fora. The choice of the arena for policy output is naturally a function of the matter at hand, its relative importance and the target audience. Policy statements on issues regarded as crucial to Singapore’s interest and viability are normally executed at the UN and its affiliated organizations. Policy positions that have a much more regional relevance are naturally articulated in regional fora. The largest of the regional fora, especially for economic purposes, is the APEC forum. Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN remains the pre-eminent forum. ASEANinspired multilateral fora like the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), AFTA and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are also important. Beyond these regional initiatives, Singapore has also been active in promoting a number of initiatives that are meant to link ASEAN to the larger external environment. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asia-Latin American Forum (EALAF) are examples of such initiatives. Finally, it should be noted that difficult and contentious issues, especially with its neighbouring countries, are often dealt with at the bilateral level. The UN is undoubtedly Singapore’s pre-eminent international forum of choice. It is here that important principles deeply cherished by the state are articulated. The wide audience and the ability of Singapore diplomats to forcefully articulate their policy positions make the UN a natural choice. In this respect, Singapore’s diplomatic representation in New York and Washington are also regarded as important postings. The most important policy position for Singapore in the UN is the preservation of a state’s territory and its sovereignty. Two examples will suffice to prove this point. In the first instance, it was Singapore which led the diplomatic lobby in the UN against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. Since non-recognition of Vietnam’s occupation implied recognition for the previous government, the UN recognized the government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) as the holder of the international seat for Cambodia from 1979 to 1982. However, the DK government’s association with genocidal activities and the widespread international publicity given to it made the situation untenable.18 As a result of the negative publicity, ASEAN helped to dilute the identity of the Khmer Rouge, which represented the DK government. Hence two other non-communist factions—Son Sann’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Norodom Sihanouk’s Front de Union Nationale Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutrale, Pacifique et Co-Operatif (FUNCINPEC)—joined the Khmer resistance to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982. It was the CGDK which successfully held the UN seat for Cambodia until the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989 and the subsequent implementation of a UN-brokered peace plan.19 In the second instance, Singapore was forced to take a public position against the US in the UN General Assembly over the American invasion of Grenada in 1987. This was done despite the fact that vital bilateral economic and security interests were at stake. Singapore’s permanent representative to the UN, Tommy Koh, stated the country’s position:

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Mr. President, it is easy enough to demonstrate our adherence to principle when to do so is convenient and advantageous and costs us nothing. The test of a country’s adherence to a principle is when it is inconvenient to do so. I find myself in such a situation today. Barbados, Jamaica, the US, and the members of the OECS [Organization of Eastern Caribbean States] are friends of my country. It is extremely convenient for me to acquiesce in what they have done or to remain silent. To do so, however, will, in the long run, undermine the moral and legal significance of the principles which my country regard as a shield. This is why we must put our adherence to principle above friendship. That is why we cannot condone the actions of our friends in Grenada. The stand which my country has taken in this case is consistent with the stand which we have taken in other cases where the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states was also violated.20 (Tommy Koh, ‘Can Any Country Afford a Moral Foreign Policy?’, Government of Singapore, 1987) Generally, issues pertaining to the violation of territoriality and sovereignty in the international arena are addressed in the UN. Singapore also regards its active involvement and membership in the UN as being in its own interest, since the UN provides for the largest gathering of independent states. Hence membership and participation is important unto itself in validating the position on sovereignty. As noted above, in 2001, Singapore became a member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term. Of the regional fora, APEC, at the time of its inauguration in Seattle in 1993, was received with much enthusiasm in Singapore. A regional forum that was specifically devoted to trade issues and one with a footprint that included many of Singapore’s major trading partners was certainly a welcome development. The most visible signal of Singapore’s endorsement of the forum was the location of APEC’s headquarters in Singapore. However, some of the other member countries of ASEAN, in particular Malaysia, were not as enthused as Singapore.21 The reason for Malaysia’s disagreement with APEC was owing to its own formulation for regional economic cooperation, expressed in the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) that was subsequently watered down and named the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) cynically referred to as East Asia without Caucasians. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir had a vision to link Northeast and Southeast Asia for greater economic cooperation, as a response to the perceived evolution of trading blocs in North America (North American Free Trade Area—NAFTA) and Europe (European Union—EU). Accordingly, he was keen to exclude the non-Asian countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. It is in the light of such perceptions that Mahathir refused to attend the APEC meeting in Seattle, and Malaysia repeatedly warned other ASEAN countries that APEC’s success may be to the detriment of ASEAN.22 In any event, the enthusiasm with which the APEC forum was conceived has certainly dissipated, and whatever gains Singapore could have had from tariff reductions no longer seem viable. The general consensus is that the utility of APEC is suspect for its member countries at the time of writing.23

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As for the EAEG and EAEC, the US was clearly opposed to both fora. Pressure was also exerted on Japan not to support the fora. In addition, Indonesia, which has traditionally claimed a proprietary entitlement to the prescription of regional peace and order, was not enthusiastic about the Malaysian proposal.24 As a result of its primus inter pares status within ASEAN, Indonesia was able to deflect the EAEG and EAEC from serious consideration during ASEAN deliberations. However, it should be noted that since 1998, ASEAN has evolved a larger footprint in the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ grouping and, curiously enough, the inclusion of China, Japan and South Korea closely resembles the EAEG. The most recent initiative under-taken by this organization is a currency swap agreement to buffer ASEAN currencies against speculative attack.25 Of all the multilateral regional fora that Singapore participates in, ASEAN is by far the most important and there are a number of good reasons for this. First, maritime Southeast Asia, prior to the formation of ASEAN, was wracked by interstate tensions that boiled over into Singapore’s conception of vulnerability and viability. These tensions included the Indonesian military confrontation against the Malaysian Federation (1963–1966), the Philippine suspension of diplomatic ties with Malaysia and its territorial claim to Sabah in the island of Borneo, and Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965 (to be discussed in Chapter 3). In fact, the timing of ASEAN’s formation is instructive in that it was formed exactly a month after the formal agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, ending the former’s confrontation in August 1968. The changed attitude in Indonesian policy output was a direct function of the replacement of President Sukarno by Suharto in July 1967. Suharto decided to pursue a less confrontational and more cooperative policy towards neighbouring countries in the region.26 Indonesia’s membership and subsequent leadership of ASEAN from the mid-1970s to the time of Suharto’s fall from power in 1998 is directly correlated to the country’s domestic political developments. Despite being a founder member of ASEAN, Singapore’s initial response towards ASEAN was rather lukewarm. This attitude was understandable, given the difficulties it had faced in its bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia during the few years immediately preceding the formation of ASEAN. Hence, for about the first decade after its formation, Singapore’s dealings with ASEAN tended to be minimal and mostly symbolic.27 Its endorsement of the first major ASEAN initiative, the declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, was more symbolic than anything else. After all, the absence of foreign troops in the region, one of ZOPFAN’s articulated goals, would not have guaranteed Singapore’s independence and security. In addition, great powers could not be told what to do. Finally, both Thailand and the Philippines had bilateral security arrangements with the US that required a physical American troop presence in them. However, since ZOPFAN only had declaratory intent and required no particular effort‚ Singapore signed the document. Singapore’s interest in ASEAN as a policy arena only began after 1975. The immediate reason for this development was ASEAN’s growing pro-Western and anti-communist orientation and its attempt to manage the regional security environment. By 1975, the communist victory in Vietnam had led to the reunification of North and South Vietnam, and subsequently, both Laos and Cambodia became satellite states of Vietnam. In view of the changed regional strategic environment and congruent perceptions of external threat among its members, ASEAN undertook a number of initiatives to restore regional calm and order.

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Approximately a decade after its formation, ASEAN established a central secretariat in Jakarta. In addition, 1976 witnessed the signing of ASEAN’s two most explicitly political treaties.28 The first, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, sought to inform the external community that ASEAN member countries were committed to mutual aid and assistance. The second, The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which was explicitly aimed at Southeast Asian countries, mooted the idea that differences between countries in the region should be resolved amicably rather than through aggression. The ten-year-long Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that began in 1979 was ASEAN’s most severe test of its subsystemic relevance within the framework of regional dynamics associated with the Cold War. Accordingly, ASEAN’s most successful corporate policies are those associated with its diplomatic lobbying against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the United Nations. Singapore, as mentioned above, was at the forefront of this diplomatic lobby. The Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and the subsequent UN intervention to restore domestic political order deprived ASEAN of a high-profile international role in the 1990s. As a result, most of ASEAN’s initiatives in the 1990s tended to be inwardlooking. During the Fourth ASEAN Summit Meeting hosted by Singapore in 1992, member countries agreed to elevate the status of the ASEAN PMC to become the most important multilateral security dialogue. There was also endorsement of regional growth triangles as constituting ASEAN economic cooperation. Singapore, active in the Southern Growth Triangle that brought together the Malaysian state of Johor and the Indonesian Riau province within a collaborative framework (SIJORI—Singapore, Johor and Riau), was anxious for the endorsement. SIJORI was meant to provide for economic cooperation between countries with complementary endowments to achieve greater economies of scale.29 Singapore tended to provide investment capital and technical and managerial expertise while Indonesia and Malaysia provided land and labour. The scheme attracted a fair number of multinational corporations, especially to the Batam Industrial Park in Riau. A number of other such growth areas mooted by ASEAN were far less successful.30 A year later, in 1993, ASEAN announced its ambitious free trade area in AFTA that was to come into being over a period of fifteen years. The plan was for the implementation of Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) that would eventually lead to tariff rates of between 0.5 to 5 per cent among member countries. Subsequently, the time frame for AFTA was reduced by five years to 2003 and then by another year to 2002. The onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and its fall-out has made ASEAN member countries far more introverted and attentive to domestic economic and political matters. The will to implement the scheme has evaporated and a number of countries are either foot dragging on preparations for its implementation or significantly expanding the exclusion list of items to be exempted from the scheme. It is in recognition of the futility of the situation in APEC and AFTA that Singapore has opted to conclude its own bilateral FTAs with its major trading partners. Agreement was also reached in 1993 that ASEAN would host the region’s most formal security forum. Hence in July 1994, the ARF was created in Bangkok. It brought together all the members of ASEAN and their regular dialogue partners for an annual meeting to resolve security problems and undertake confidence-building measures (CBMs) and conflict prevention.31 Whereas most major regional conflicts had ended by

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this time, the dissipation of bipolarity and related developments had led to a number of serious differences between ASEAN states.32 In addition, the domestic political situations in Cambodia and Myanmar were violence-prone and unstable. It was hoped that the ARF, by incorporating the larger countries of the Asia Pacific such as the US, China, Japan, Korea and Australia, would eventually provide a formal multilateral channel for the resolution of difficult issues.33 All the major powers had their own reasons for participating in the ARF, although the US was clearly disappointed that the ARF did not adequately evolve into a rule-bound institutionalized arrangement. Singapore, consistent with its policy priorities of securing a tranquil regional environment, is an active participant of ASEAN and, as a rule of thumb, supports all ASEAN initiatives. Hence, despite its pessimism with AFTA and the lack of Indonesian leadership of ASEAN following the down-fall of the Suharto government in 1998, Singapore is actively involved in all ASEAN initiatives.34 In fact, prior to the entry of Myanmar into ASEAN in July 1997, Singapore, together with Thailand, was noted for its policy of favouring the active engagement of Myanmar rather than its isolation. However, when Thailand and the Philippines began to lobby for ‘constructive engagement’ to bring about domestic political change in Myanmar, Singapore, together with Indonesia and Malaysia, opted for the cherished institutional principle of non-interference.35 This position is hardly surprising, since such intervention would have violated the sovereignty principle that Singapore jealously guards. ASEAN is especially valued by Singapore for the familiarity and accommodation it has helped countries to achieve during difficult political transitions. Other than its activities within ASEAN, Singapore, in its foreign policy output, has consistently lobbied for ASEAN’s greater engagement with the world. As a result of such lobbying and initiatives arising from them, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was spawned.36 Headquartered in Singapore and with executives drawn from both regions on a rotational basis, ASEM was created to enhance interactions between the two continents, especially for the facilitation of trade and investments by Europe in Asia. ASEM also hosts educational and cultural exchanges, and works on a budget provided by its member countries. Another Singapore-led initiative was the East Asian Latin American Forum (EALAF) that was formed in 1999. Like ASEM, EALAF was meant to promote greater trade and exchange between two regions that have traditionally had little interaction with each other. In pushing for the formation of new regional organizations, Singapore views itself as a gadfly of sorts that hopes to awaken the sleepy regional horse. Such initiatives, however, are not always warmly received by the other members of ASEAN who sometimes regard Singapore as impatient and impudent and trying to fashion a role for itself that is at odds with its standing within ASEAN. Such views are sometimes publicly expressed, as in the case of Malaysia’s unhappiness with APEC, but more often than not privately aired, for fear of offending fragile Asian sensibilities and fraying relations. Notwithstanding the existence of numerous multilateral fora where Singapore executes its foreign policy, it is arguable that some of its most important policies, especially those involving the resolution of difficult or sensitive issues, are normally dealt with at the bilateral level. The reason for this position is simply to prevent political posturing and to prevent an issue from acquiring greater political significance than it merits and in the process spiralling out of control. Hence sensitive issues, especially those involving immediate neighbours, have traditionally been dealt with through quiet and contained

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bilateral diplomacy. In any event, regional multilateral fora like the ARF and the ASEAN High Council are either unused, unprepared or unwilling to mediate in difficult situations. The civil conflict in Cambodia, the political impasse in Myanmar and the transition to independence for Timor were all situations where such fora could have been used but were not. Apart from external fora, Singapore also employs a number of domestic agencies to articulate its trade and economic policies abroad. Government-created and directed statutory boards like the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Trade Development Board (TDB) maintain overseas representative offices in most major cities in North America and Europe. Such agencies are active in promoting trade and investments into Singapore and often recruit ‘foreign talent’ (a favourite domestic expression) to work in Singapore as well. Likewise, the Singapore Tourist Promotion Board (STPB) also maintains overseas representations to encourage travel to Singapore. Finally, the Singapore International Foundation (SIF) that was founded in 1991 is meant to update Singapore citizens resident abroad on domestic developments as well as to encourage an overseas constituency that is sympathetic and supportive of Singapore. The SIF programme includes the provision of volunteer work abroad in underdeveloped countries, offering financial scholarships and grants under the ‘Friends of Singapore’ programme, youth expedition projects for greater overseas exposure, and humanitarian relief programmes to assist countries that have suffered natural disasters. Singapore’s MFA, like the SIF, runs a number of international assistance programmes, and in 1992 established the Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP) to provide training courses and study visits for foreign personnel from less developed countries from the Asia Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean. The MFA’s Technical Cooperation Directorate coordinates the SCP. The two main types of training offered are on a bilateral basis with individual countries or on a third country basis, in collaboration with other developed or developing countries. The Singapore government’s clearly articulated position on foreign assistance programmes is that it is prepared to offer technical assistance and training rather than outright monetary awards. The reason for this position is the belief that proper human resource management provides the best avenue for long-term socio-economic development. On a regular basis, the Singapore government also provides the Singapore Scholarship and the ASEAN Scholarship for ASEAN nationals tenable at its local universities. The former is for undergraduate education while the latter is predominantly for postgraduate education. Recipients of these scholarships have no obligations to Singapore except to return to their countries of origin and contribute to their development. In sending its nationals abroad to do volunteer and relief work, the Singapore government hopes to emulate the US Peace Corps and win some measure of favourable international reputation. In subsidizing the training and skill requirements of less developed countries, Singapore would like to project a benevolent image of itself. In addition, scholars and professionals trained in Singapore would in turn build up a reservoir of goodwill for a small state that takes neither its sovereignty nor its viability for granted.

3 Singapore’s early policy output, 1965 to 1968 The survivalist phase Singapore’s foreign policy is unique to the extent that, even prior to independence, it had what has been described as foreign relations power.1 There were a variety of factors contributing to this power. Before achieving independence, Singapore had assumed a special significance for foreign governments as a diplomatic window to the region. As such, after the Second World War, many Western governments had opened consulates and commissions in Singapore and staffed them with senior diplomatic personnel. So, for instance, Singapore was the headquarters of the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia and ‘for other Commonwealth Commissioners with similar areas of jurisdiction.’2 Singapore’s strategic location in the middle of air and sea lanes into Southeast Asia contributed much to this foreign affairs power. It was assured of a large number of politically influential visitors to the region, many of whom established good rapport with the home government. Thus, prior to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, Singapore was already playing host to thirty foreign consulates.3 PAP leaders and especially Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew used the situation to Singapore’s advantage by developing contacts with political parties and organizations in Britain, Europe and Asia. The cultivation of an international constituency of political sympathizers and friends helped Singapore during the two phases immediately preceding independence—the home rule phase from 1959 to 1963 and the merger phase when it was part of the Malaysian federation from 1963 to 1965. Thus the PAP government was able to formulate policies and articulate positions in international relations for this international constituency, even though it was technically debarred from doing so.4 During the first phase, foreign policy was the exclusive domain of the British colonial government; during the second, it was the prerogative of the Malaysian federal government headquartered in Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysian Agreement, the Federation of Malaysia’s charter regarding rights of constituent states in the exercise of power, acknowledged only one authority in foreign policy decision-making, namely the government of Kuala Lumpur. However, there were three important loopholes that Singapore could have used, and successfully did, in the conduct of a seemingly independent foreign policy.5 Two of these were constitutional provisions for Singapore’s input into foreign policy. The first came in the form of a minority representation (three out of seven seats) in the Internal Security Council. The second was the British admittance of Singapore into the inter-governmental committee, a forum for consultation between Britain and Singapore that affected the latter’s foreign policy and defence. The final loop-hole came in the form of Singapore’s finance

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ministry’s autonomy with regard to technical assistance programmes and the state’s participation in international conferences on economic matters. Such participation also often had foreign policy implications. All these loopholes originally existed when the British granted Singapore home rule and were maintained in the 1963 federation. Negotiations with foreign governments after federation were technically supposed to have been cleared by the external affairs department in Kuala Lumpur. However, such clearance was sometimes a mere rubber stamp. Immediately after achieving independence in 1965, Singapore undertook to articulate its own independent foreign policy. A combination of both internal and external factors, however, complicated the process of policy formulation. In effect, the combination of both these factors was so potent as to call into question Singapore’s very survival as an independent state.6 It is in the light of such considerations that the period has been described as the survivalist phase.

Internal constraints on policy output The internal constraints on Singapore’s foreign policy output during the survivalist phase stemmed from the periods prior to political independence in 1965. The PAP, despite winning a clear majority in the 1959 national elections to form the government, was not united as a political party. Rather, although the leadership of the party comprised a group of Western-educated locals led by Lee Kuan Yew, many rank-and-file members were Chinese-educated and drawn from the working class. What began initially as political accommodation between the two groups to secure political victory and representation in the state legislature gradually evaporated, and by the early 1960s the PAP would not only undergo a fissure but be significantly challenged in the domestic political arena. In addition, the challenge was broad-based and extended well beyond the formal political process. From the time of its formation in 1954, the PAP had two distinct and clearly identifiable factions within it. The leadership of the party, which included Lee Kuan Yew and his inner core of ministers, were drawn from and represented what would then have been regarded as a progressive and perhaps elite segment of society.7 The elitism, was, however, tempered initially by Fabian socialism and an anti-colonial and anti-Western position of the group. Owing to its intellectual resources and ability to negotiate with the British colonial government, this group was able to lead the party and draw support from a broader working-class base. As for the mass base of the party, it was a different issue altogether. The larger membership of the party was differently socialized and obtained from a clear workingclass background. Many of these members were Chinese-educated and their political orientation was towards China and tended towards communism. In their anti-Western and anti-colonial attitude, however, this mass base found common cause with the Englisheducated elite of the party. Both segments of the PAP therefore achieved some measure of toleration and mutual accommodation for each other from the time of the PAP’s formation. Lee Kuan Yew’s legal representation and support for many of the more leftleaning members during their confrontations with the British colonial authorities also helped to strengthen the strategic alliance.8

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By 1961, two years after the PAP’s victory and formation of a majority government in the local legislature, the ideological and political differences between the two factions in the PAP became much more distinct and pronounced. This was reflected most clearly in the two by-elections that were held in 1961 when the PAP was defeated, despite its clear majority in Parliament.9 The Hong Lim Constituency’s by-election, where an ex-PAP MP ran as an independent candidate and soundly defeated the PAP’s candidate, was a telling sign that the PAP was not fully in charge of grassroots organizations and support.10 In 1961, a new issue made it more difficult for the two factions of the PAP to continue working together. This issue was the proposed merger of Singapore with the Federation of Malaya and the terms under which the merger would be achieved. The PAP leadership was anxious to merge Singapore with Malaya since it was thought that the island could not survive without a hinterland, and was too small and vulnerable to be granted independence by the British. The broader membership, especially the Chineseeducated, was unprepared for such a merger, fearing that Singapore’s Chinese majority would be eclipsed by Malaya’s Malay majority and that the Alliance government would deal more harshly with the communists and their sympathizers. The ideological and policy differences between the two factions came to a head in 1961 and the left-wing segment, led by Lee Siew Choh, broke off from the PAP to form its own independent political party in the Barisan Sosialis (BS—Socialist Front). From this time onward, Singapore’s political landscape changed significantly in that the PAP would be faced with significant competition in domestic politics. The BS had significant support in a number of constituencies through its strong network of control over the community centres, the Chinese-medium schools and labour unions and related organizations.11 During the 1961 referendum, Singapore’s decision to merge with the Malaysian federation became sealed, and this development was a turning point for the BS since Singapore’s domestic politics would henceforth function within a larger framework.12 In addition, Lee Kuan Yew and the Malaysian Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman were similarly socialized in the UK and had a reasonably good rapport with each other. However, it was Operation Cold Store, implemented in Singapore by the British colonial government in February 1963, before Singapore’s merger with Malaysia in September of that year which dealt a fatal blow to the BS. The British operation was meant to detain communist activists and subversives in order to stabilize Singapore’s domestic political situation prior to merger. The BS regarded the operation, which invoked powers of detention without trial, as being instigated politically by the PAP in order for the latter to secure domestic political dominance.13 Following merger, the relationship between the BS and the PAP became much more confrontational. The federation arrangement had a number of disadvantages for the BS. Its reliance on the support of its Chinese-educated constituency made it vulnerable to charges of chauvinism and support for communism. The British had just ended the Malayan Emergency that was in place from 1948 to 1960 to weaken the CPM and the Tengku was staunchly anti-communist.14 The Malaysian Alliance government that was a system of elite accommodation of the country’s major ethnic groups—the Malays, Chinese and Indians—also operated within the framework of Malay political superiority. In addition, the Tengku did most of his political bargaining and deals with the PAP, given its control of the Singapore legislature. For all of these reasons, the BS did not figure significantly in the politics of the federation.

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After Singapore’s independence in 1965, however, some of the advantages that accrued to the BS domestically could be better appropriated. However, such opportunities were in turn interactive with the political fortunes, accomplishments and restrictions of the PAP government. The BS, through its linkages to labour, Chinese-medium schools and community centres, was able to mobilize ground opinion against the PAP at the outset. This strategy was however contingent on the PAP’s own initiatives, with a majority government in place. The PAP was able to quickly seize the opportunity to weaken the BS through control of education, labour and the community centres. It promoted the English language in schools and reduced the status of Mandarin to a second language. It also adopted Malay as the country’s national language to achieve better accommodation with Malaysia and Indonesia. It formed the People’s Association (PA) in 1960 and brought all the community centres under its control.15 Finally, in order to weaken labour, it introduced industrial legislation that made strikes illegal, disbanded independent labour unions and introduced the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) as a peak organization to centrally coordinate and control labour activities.16 In October 1966, against the backdrop of declining political support and PAP initiatives to weaken its power base, the BS decided to boycott Parliament. Led by its leader, Lee Siew Choh, the thirteen BS MPs in the Singapore legislature stormed out of Parliament, and made known their intention to take the battle for democracy in Singapore to the streets.17 Despite having lost some legitimacy in Parliament, the PAP turned the opportunity to its advantage and further consolidated its position in politics and governance. The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back occurred in 1968 when the BS boycotted Singapore’s parliamentary elections. Arising from the boycott, the PAP managed to secure all the seats in the legislature and exercised a monopoly of power that was only broken by its defeat in the Anson constituency by-election in 1981. The BS gradually faded from the political scene when the PAP was able to deliver on its election promises and acquired greater political legitimacy, in particular through economic performance criteria. Over time, the PAP’s political monopoly also led to the evolution of a dominant party system in Singapore.

External constraints on policy output The internal constraints on Singapore’s foreign policy output were considerably less important than the external constraints. After all, the BS was only able to make domestic political governance more difficult for the PAP, and by 1968 even that obstacle was removed. Its opposition to the PAP’s preferred terms for merger with Malaysia also came to naught since the PAP won the referendum on its terms. In this regard, the BS was never really able to challenge the PAP’s foreign policy position or output. On the other hand, the external constraints that derived from Singapore’s interactions with Malaysia and Indonesia were significantly different. These constraints tested both Singapore’s independence and viability as a sovereign state.

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Singapore’s early relations with Malaysia From the time when it was first ‘founded’ by the British in 1819, Singapore had always been viewed as an extension of the Malay Peninsula. The Sultan and the Temenggong of the Malaysian state of Johor were in fact paid compensation for the British use of Singapore, and as early as 1826, the British combined the ports of Malacca and Penang with Singapore to form the Straits Settlements.18 Although Singapore became an important port and administrative centre for British control over Malaya, there was a very real sense in which Singapore’s political destiny was believed to be inextricably interwoven with Malaya. This linkage was even recognized by Japanese occupation forces during the Second World War. Hence, when Singapore became a crown colony in 1957 when the Federation of Malaya was first formed, it was generally understood to be a temporary arrangement. It is in the context of such a view that the British arranged for Singapore to be absorbed into the expanded 1963 Malaysian federation. However, despite its geographical proximity and historical association with Malaya, there were important distinguishing features between the two states. Outwardly, Singapore, like Malaya, had a Westminster-styled British parliamentary system. Yet there were important differences. Malaya’s Alliance government, which retained power after the formation of the federation in 1963, was eminently communal. Although it aspired to a measure of consociational political accommodation between the various ethnic groups, the political party representing the Malays—the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)—was the predominant political party within the coalition framework. UMNO’s president and deputy president automatically assumed the roles of prime minister and deputy prime minister respectively. The allocation of seats to the other ethnic parties—the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)—performed subsidiary and supportive roles. It was UMNO that determined the quantum of seats and the constituencies where the component parties of the Alliance government would compete, albeit UMNO tended to field Chinese candidates in urban constituencies with significant Chinese representation (e.g. Selangor, Perak and Penang). The Alliance government’s politics of elite accommodation within a communal framework with Malay supremacy was buttressed by a number of additional safeguards. Each state in Malaya had a sultan who epitomized Malay culture and customs, and once every five years, on a rotational basis, one of the nine sultans became the Agung or Supreme king.19 The Agung also served as the head of state. From the time of British colonization at the turn of the century, the Malays were also granted certain privileges in recognition of their status as the indigenous peoples who were different from the later Chinese and Indian migrants. Such privileges included land reservations that were set aside for exclusive Malay occupation and preferential treatment for education and employment opportunities within the Civil Service.20 These privileges were a direct function of the British rationalization for the colonization of Malaya—the protection of Malay religion and custom. By evolving preferential policies in favour of Malays towards independence, the British became locked into a position of administrative trustee-ship on behalf of the Malays. Added to the British policy of ethnically segregated administration

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through elite representatives from the different communities, Malaya evolved a communal political culture. The formation of the Alliance government was therefore a recognition of this reality within the framework of Malay supremacy. The natural Malay propensity to work in the Civil Service or the armed forces and the police gave them an added advantage and exposure to issues pertaining to governance and administration as well as political leverage that far surpassed their numbers in the country. Another important distinguishing feature of the Malayan political landscape was religion. Malays, both by constitutional and legal definition, were Muslims. Hence, if Malaya had a political culture that distinguished between the Malay majority and the other races, it could be similarly characterized religiously. Chinese and Indians were, in the main, non-Muslims. This consideration was not important for political purposes during Malaya’s pre-independence period. However, the federal elections of 1957 and the state elections of 1959 witnessed the political party, Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) campaigning on an Islamic platform and securing significant victories in the rural and religious states of Kelantan and Terengganu.21 This development forced UMNO to move away from being a secular party and, over time, to attend to a religious mandate as well. The party’s religious credentials were tempered by the Tengku however, who was an archetypical liberal English gentleman. This was the political context into which Singapore was absorbed as part of the Malaysian federation in 1963. The PAP, despite its familiarity with Malaysia’s communal political orientation and dynamics, was ill-prepared to function within it, and the differences between the Alliance/UMNO and the PAP became more and more pronounced over time.22 There were a number of factors that led to Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965, and it was this bitter experience that in turn set the tone for the two countries’ bilateral relationship in the former’s immediate post-independence period. Significant differences between the two governments included personality differences between the Tengku and Lee Kuan Yew. The former came from a privileged aristocratic background and tended to be more liberal and laid back in policy matters. He also tended to prefer the resolution of differences through private discussion rather than public confrontations. Lee, on the other hand, was industriously and consciously seeking new avenues to enhance Singapore’s standing, much to the chagrin of the Tengku. Lee also had difficulties with the leader of the MCA, Tun Tan Siew Sin, who accused the PAP of trying to usurp the role of the MCA in the federation. When there were differences of opinion between the two, the Tengku naturally took the side of the MCA, since it was a major coalition partner in the Alliance government. UMNO and the PAP also became political competitors during the 1963 Singapore and the 1964 Malaysian general elections. UMNO competed in three predominantly Malay constituencies in Singapore—Kampong Kembangan, Geylang Serai and Southern Islands—but lost in all three against the PAP. Emboldened by this venture, the PAP decided on a tit-for-tat competition in the 1964 Malaysian election, fielding a total of eleven parliamentary candidates. The PAP captured a single seat in Bangsar constituency in the federal territory through Devan Nair. This competition set the stage for UMNO and the PAP to regard each other as political rivals. There were a number of other more serious issues that spawned from this competition.23 UMNO’s competition with the PAP was couched in eminently communal terms, and the choice of constituencies and campaign slogans against the PAP made this strategy

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abundantly clear. The PAP, on the other hand, being neither pro-Malay nor Muslim in its membership and orientation, campaigned for a ‘Malaysian-Malaysia’ that in turn infuriated and frustrated the Malays, since it posed a direct challenge to their privileged status as indigenous peoples (bumiputras—sons of the soil). The outcome of both parties’ electoral campaign significantly raised the political temperature. In July and September 1964, Singapore was subjected to an outbreak of ethnically motivated riots between the Malays and the Chinese on Prophet Muhammad’s birthday.24 The largely Malay police force in Singapore was unable to cope with the riots, and British troops had to be recalled from the federation to restore order. Singapore’s PAP government blamed the ultranationalist faction within UMNO, and in particular Syed Ja’afar Albar for instigating the riots. The accusations and violence arising from this incident further charged the political situation.25 In May 1965, Singapore’s PAP hosted the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) which brought together all the opposition political parties in Malaysia for a meeting. This meeting is normally regarded as the point at which Malay nationalists within UMNO lobbied for Lee’s detention without trial under the Internal Security Act for threatening the peace. In the face of intense pressure from within UMNO, the Tengku was forced to act. Rather than detaining Lee, he handed the PAP an ultimatum to leave the Malaysian federation since Singapore’s security within it could no longer be guaranteed. It was under such circumstances that Singapore was ejected from Malaysia in August 1965.26 This historically defining moment became embedded in Singapore’s political history when Lee broke down while announcing the news of Singapore’s expulsion and called it a ‘moment of anguish’.27

Singapore’s post-independence relations with Malaysia, 1965 to 1968 Singapore’s turbulent bilateral relations with Malaysia continued into the postindependence period. In Malaysia, the Tengku faced challenges from within UMNO for having allowed Singapore to secede. Malay nationalist elements within UMNO also felt that the Tengku was being too accommodative to the other races, rather than asserting Malay political hegemony.28 The resistance to the Tengku eventually gathered momentum and, following the outbreak of the 1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia, the Tengku would be forced to retire from politics. One of the leading critics of the Tengku, Mahathir Mohammad, who was relieved of UMNO membership for his ‘breach of party discipline’, returned to the political scene after rehabilitation in 1974 and subsequently became the Malaysian Prime Minister from 1981.29 In Singapore, political independence was initially greeted with a certain amount of scepticism since there were some within the PAP who thought that Singapore would be unable to survive on its own. In the early days prior to independence, even Lee Kuan Yew had regarded an independent Singapore as ‘not viable by itself’.30 The reason for such pessimism was that historically, city-states had been unable to survive without a hinterland and a turbulent relationship with Malaysia made survival appear near impossible.31 In fact, in one of his earliest speeches at the Singapore Legislative Assembly, Singapore’s first foreign minister, S.Rajaratnam, echoed the sentiment that Singapore’s separation from Malaysia was unfortunate and only temporary:

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Talking about trade brings us to the most important aspect of our foreign policy, our relations with Malaysia. I have kept this to the last because our relations with Malaysia is of a special kind…. There is something unreal and odd about lumping our relations with Malaysia under foreign relations. But then some rather odd things do happen in the history of peoples and countries. All that we can do is to accept the oddity as something not of our making and try to make the best of an odd situation. Because the situation is odd, we should be more than careful to devise rational and intelligent policies with regard to Malaysia. In theory, i.e., in regard to the constitution, the relationship between us and Malaysia comes under the category of foreign relations. So we set up a High Commission as part of the necessary formalities between two countries, and the machinery functioned efficiently when on occasions the two commissions had to exchange formal diplomatic protest notes. However, constitutional forms are one thing and the hard facts of history, geography, economics and demography are another. All these later factors underline not the separateness or foreignness of the two territories, but the oneness of the people in the two countries. People on both sides of the causeway have not since 9th August even begun to treat one another as foreigners. And I do not think that they ever will. This is a hard fact…. Our foreign policy is based on an awareness of not so much the constitutional fact of what is real…the reality of the thing. The survival and well-being of Malaysia is essential to Singapore’s survival. Conversely, the survival of Singapore is essential to Malaysia’s survival…we in Singapore have to accept the fact that we and Malaysia are two sovereign states compelled to move, by different routes, towards the ultimate destiny of one people and one country. We have chosen our route towards this ultimate destiny even if we have to do so, now, as an independent and sovereign state. So one cannot talk of a foreign policy towards Malaysia in the same sense as we would in regard to other countries. It must be foreign policy of a special kind, a foreign policy towards a country which, though constitutionally foreign, is essentially one with us and which, when sanity and logic reassert themselves must once more become one. It must be a foreign policy based on the realization that Singapore and Malaysia are really two arms of one politically organic whole, each of which through a constitutional proclamation has been declared separate and independent.32 (S.Rajaratnam, ‘Evolving a Foreign for Singapore’, Government of Singapore, 1988) Rajaratnam’s speech set the tone for the establishment of a ‘special relationship’ between Malaysia and Singapore. The uniqueness of the relationship was reflected in a number of developments. After independence, Singapore chose to retain Malay as the national language and the national anthem continues to be in Malay. Immigration clearance for visitors to Malaysia was done at the Tanjong Pagar railway station in Singapore and the two countries introduced a restricted passport that was only valid for travel between

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them. The symbolic linkage between the two countries that Rajaratnam alluded to was reflected in the PAP’s own Cabinet line-up, which comprised a large number of Malaysians.33 Despite the outward appearance of cordiality and uniqueness, the bilateral relationship continued to be tense and, given the disproportionate size and endowments between the two countries, naturally worked in Singapore’s disfavour. Singapore’s reliance on Malaysia was quite extensive, even for food and potable water, and there is some evidence to suggest that the Tengku contemplated shutting off Singapore’s water supply if its government’s policies were detrimental to Malaysia’s interests.34 Naturally, there were a number of issue areas where differences were not easily resolved. Other than the political and policy differences between UMNO and the PAP, there were a number of economic issues that complicated matters as well. Such issues included the dissolution of joint-stock companies such as Malaysia-Singapore Airlines. It also included Singapore’s decision to introduce its own new currency—the Singapore dollar—as opposed to the Malaysian ringgit. In the early days of its introduction, Malaysia’s leading Malay-language daily newspaper, the Utusan Melayu, used to highlight exchange rate differences between the two countries as an indicator of Singapore’s national viability and progress.35 There were also important differences in the area of military defence. From the time of Singapore’s internal self-government in 1959, the British provided for Singapore’s external defence. When Singapore joined the Malaysian federation in 1963, it became part of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) until 1971. The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) that replaced AMDA in 1972 combine the UK and its exBritish territories of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore.36 The FPDA is the most formal defence arrangement signed by both Malaysia and Singapore and calls on member countries to consult each other in the event of an external threat to both countries. Notwithstanding such joint arrangements with Malaysia that were coordinated by the UK, Singapore gradually evolved significant policy differences with Malaysia. Arising from the merger with Malaysia, Singapore housed one battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment, which was in turn coordinated by the 4th Malaysian Infantry Brigade headquartered in Singapore in the immediate post-independence period.37 This was a cause for some concern, given the independent status of Singapore after 1965 and the ethnic configuration of the Malaysian troops. Malaysia also operated a training school for its navy—KD Malaya in Woodlands, Singapore, which was only decommissioned in December 1997 before its relocation to Johor. In 1967, against this backdrop and the British announcement of military withdrawal from areas east of the Suez Canal, Singapore decided to form its own defence force in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).38 Singapore’s initial request for such assistance was declined by both Egypt and India, which had good rapport with Malaysia in the British Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement. Subsequently, Israel was approached and it agreed to help set up the SAF. Israeli military advisers arrived in Singapore in the guise of Mexican agricultural advisers, given the sensitivity of the issue and the parallels that could be drawn between both countries. Singapore’s adoption of Israeli doctrine and training methods was not well received in Malaysia since the doctrine was premised on a number of unfriendly assumptions. First, the doctrine assumed a hostile external

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environment. Second, the Israeli doctrine of forward defence presupposed the occupation of adjacent territory to create the strategic depth required for warfare. This strategy invariably implied the occupation of Malaysian territory. A number of other analogies could also be made—that Singapore’s ethnic Chinese population felt the sense of siege which Israel’s Jewish population felt in the Middle East and that the Malay-Indonesian peoples were not unlike the Arabs. In view of all these sensitivities, Singapore ensured that the relationship with Israel remained unobtrusive. Given the high cost of maintaining a regular standing army, it also opted for a policy of national conscription of all males at the age of 18 for a period of twenty-four to thirty months, depending on the educational qualifications and rank of the soldiers. Its membership in AMDA as well as a clearly articulated policy of external threat aimed at Vietnam and common membership in a number of multilateral fora such as the Commonwealth, NAM and ASEAN also blunted perceptions of threat directed towards each other in the 1960s, 1970s and most of the 1980s. All in all, Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Malaysia in the immediate post-independence period tended to be rather tense. Whereas there was recognition of complementarity and common interests in a number of socio-economic areas that were in turn underpinned by historical relationships and transnational linkages, there were also political and economic issues that were regarded as competitive. Part of the reason why there were heightened tensions between the two countries was because of the previously lengthy period of interaction between the two, the manner in which Singapore gained its independence, and the residual anxieties and frustrations of both countries that spilled into the postindependence period.

Singapore’s early relations with Indonesia Singapore’s early relations with Indonesia were within the framework of its membership in the Malaysian federation from 1963. Accordingly, Indonesian perceptions of Singapore were part of a broader relationship with Malaysia. The relationship between the two countries began on a rather pessimistic note. This outcome was in turn determined by the Indonesian domestic political situation, the country’s general outlook towards regional matters and its antagonistic attitude towards Malaysia in particular. The Indonesian domestic political situation in the early 1960s was intensely factionalized and turbulent. Following the country’s achievement of independence in 1949 and the failure and collapse of parliamentary democracy in 1957, the country underwent a series of difficult political transitions. The first of these was the outbreak of regional uprisings by military commanders in the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. It took the Indonesian military two years before the uprisings—which received covert CIA support and funding—were suppressed.39 Following their suppression, in December 1959, President Sukarno argued that Indonesia, with its ethno-linguistic, religious and regional diversity, was not suitable for democratic governance. Accordingly, he suspended Parliament and ruled by presidential decree from 1960 to 1965, calling it guided democracy. In order to cope with the competing demands of dominant domestic political constituencies, he devised the slogan NASAKOM (Nasionalis—Nationalists, Agama—

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Religions and Kommunis—Communist) to balance the competing forces. Specifically, Sukarno and the military were suspicious of the Islamic constituency, given their involvement in the Darul Islam Uprising in Aceh shortly after independence in 1951 and its alleged involvement in the 1957 regional uprisings.40 He was however quite prepared to accommodate the nationalists and the communists within the political spectrum. After all, he was associated with Indonesian nationalism, having been part of the group that proclaimed Indonesian independence in 1945 following the Japanese surrender.41 In addition, he was sympathetic to the PKI and maintained good relations with China and the Soviet Union. By 1963, however, Sukarno is believed to have lost control of the domestic political situation and engaged in diversionary foreign policy against Malaysia. In terms of its post-independence regional foreign policy output, Indonesia always loomed large in maritime Southeast Asia. This was partly a function of Indonesia’s size and population base of almost 200 million. It was also partly a function of an Indonesian sense of proprietary entitlement to determine regional initiatives and order, and there was a certain amount of international recognition of this proprietary role42. As convener of the Afro-Asian Summit in Bandung in 1955 and later a founder member of NAM, there was some measure of international accommodation of Indonesian claims to Third World leadership in the 1950s and the 1960s. This dominant status in the Malay Archipelago was sometimes brought to bear on countries in maritime Southeast Asia. Thus, for example, prior to the formation of the Malaysian federation, Indonesia agitated for a North Kalimantan federation that sought to incorporate the states of Sabah and Sarawak in the island of Borneo. Following the declaration of guided democracy in 1960 and little by way of checks to his exercise of power, the idiosyncratic factor in foreign policy output became more pronounced. The anti-Western and anti-imperialist rhetoric increased significantly as Sukarno sought revolutionary means to raise Indonesia’s profile. It was within this broader landscape and developments that the British announced the incorporation of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore into an expanded Malaysian federation in 1963. Almost immediately, Sukarno announced a policy of military confrontation (Konfrontasi) against Malaysia and vowed to crush it (ganjang).43 Indonesia denounced the new federation as an imperialist plot to usurp its territories in Borneo and expressed outrage. Thus began the Indonesian military confrontation against Malaysia in 1963. It lasted for approximately three years until 1966, although it was only formally concluded in July 1967 in Bangkok, a month prior to ASEAN’s formation. The confrontation was never a large-scale military effort and came mostly in the form of cross-border raids and ambushes from Kalimantan into Sabah. Groups of between six to a dozen armed troops would infiltrate Sabah, mostly on short overnight missions for acts of sabotage and terror.44 There was a single engagement with Malaysian troops at Kota Tinggi in Johor and the detonation of a bomb in Singapore that led to the loss of civilian lives (to be discussed in the following section).45 Apart from such relatively minor engagements, the Indonesian military was unable to seriously threaten the peace. There were also deployments of Commonwealth troops from Australia, New Zealand and the UK under the terms of the ANZUK alliance and British guarantees to defend Malaysia under the terms of AMDA. None the less, the confrontation was serious in that it set the tone of regional relations for Malaysia immediately after the federation was formed. As mentioned above, the Philippines also severed diplomatic ties with Malaysia and laid

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claim to the state of Sabah.46 Singapore’s early relations with Indonesia after the former’s independence were therefore informed by Indonesian belligerence towards Malaysia.

Singapore’s post-independence relations with Indonesia, 1965 to 1968 Given Singapore’s unexpected independence from Malaysia and turbulent relations with the latter that led to its preoccupation with survival and viability, it is hardly surprising that Indonesia’s sheer size and population awed Singapore from the outset. The early relationship was partly insulated by Singapore’s stronger trade relations with Malaysia, although it should be noted that much illicit trade was conducted by rogue members of the Indonesian military via Singapore. Hence, from very early on, the Indonesian political elite has always accused Singapore of being a staging point for trade that circumvented tax and tariff requirements. In fact, this issue of the official trade statistics between the two countries has not been published until now and is traditionally regarded as sensitive information. The domestic political turbulence in Indonesia associated with the downfall of President Sukarno also partly sheltered Singapore from early bilateral dealings. However, aspects of the turbulence left an indelible mark on Singapore’s policy formulators. When news of the alleged PKI-sponsored coup against the Indonesian military was made public following the assassination of six senior generals on 30 September 1965 (Indonesian acronym GESTAPU), there were two major subsequent developments.47 The first of these was the restoration of calm by units of the Indonesian Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) led by major-general Suharto. This development gradually led to Sukarno transferring executive power to Suharto in March 1966 (Indonesian acronym Supersemar). This transition subsequently paved the way for Suharto to formally install himself in power and inaugurate the New Order (Order Baru) government in July 1967. The second development has to do with the manner in which the approximately three million members and twenty million sympathizers of the PKI, both ethnic Indonesian and Chinese, were systematically hunted and killed. It is estimated that up to half a million lives were lost during the two-year interval prior to the installation of the New Order government. The violence was perpetrated by elements of the Indonesian military as well as by Muslim youth groups. This episode led to the political persecution of the minority ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia, who were often denied the right to practise their culture and use their language for social and educational purposes. The success of some members of this Chinese community in later forging mutually beneficial business relationships with the Suharto government through lucrative state contracts, funding and monopolies also led to the community being targeted in times of political turbulence and change. Finally, in the aftermath of the abortive coup, Indonesia severed diplomatic relations with China and only normalized it in 1990. Arising from this experience, the Indonesian elite generally regarded ethnic Chinese with some measure of suspicion and, for a long time, regarded China as the source of external security threats.48 Whereas the Indonesian domestic political developments did not involve Singapore, it served to remind the PAP government that the country housed an ethnic majority that was generally viewed with disdain and suspicion in the immediate external environment. It also served to inform the PAP not to project itself as an ethnically Chinese state and to

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deal sensitively with diplomatic ties with China. After all, the most common frame of reference for identity and loyalty for Indonesians derives from ethnicity. Hence, the manner in which Singapore projected its state identity became extremely important. An incident that traced itself to the Indonesian confrontation served as the first trigger for Singapore’s strained relations with Indonesia. During the confrontation, two Indonesian marines had been arrested for setting off a bomb in a commercial building in Singapore’s Orchard Road. This incident led to the loss of three civilian lives. Arising from this incident, the Singapore government decided to try the marines for sabotage and loss of lives. The Singapore courts declared a guilty verdict and sentenced the marines to death. An emissary of President Suharto, who appealed for a stay of execution, was unable to persuade the PAP government. Accordingly, the two marines were hung in 1968. The Indonesian response to Singapore’s decision was immediate. Elements within the Indonesian military offered to lead a punitive expedition against Singapore and in the streets of Jakarta the Singapore Embassy was burned down by unruly mobs. President Suharto, exercising immense restraint, decided that he would turn a cold shoulder to Singapore and not deal with it. This decision was only revoked in 1973 after the Singapore Embassy in Jakarta laid much of the groundwork for a visit by Lee Kuan Yew.49 It was only in the aftermath of this visit and Lee’s symbolic sprinkling of jasmine flowers on the tombs of the executed marines that relations between the two countries began to normalize. Over time, Singapore evolved a comfortable working relationship with Indonesia, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s, until Suharto’s downfall in 1998.

4 Singapore’s Cold War and post-Cold War policy output In the immediate aftermath of the survivalist phase in Singapore’s domestic and foreign policy output, the country benefited from positive political developments in both the domestic and regional arenas. Domestically, the Barisan Sosialis’ decision not to contest the 1968 general election and the PAP’s parliamentary monopoly stabilized the situation. In the absence of legislative representation, and the PAP’s restructuring of labour and educational policies, the Barisan’s influence and network was undercut. The strategic convergence achieved between the PAP and the Civil Service also led to greater congruence between high and low politics in that the bureaucracy became a useful instrument in remoulding the domestic political culture.1 In addition, the state’s economic and socio-cultural achievements allowed the PAP to evolve greater performance-based legitimacy. Such achievements in turn consolidated the PAP’s claim to power and responsiveness to the demands of its citizenry. As for the immediate regional environment, the end of the Indonesian confrontation and Malaysia’s more cooperative attitude stabilized the situation. In this regard, Singapore evolved greater legitimacy as an independent state. The larger regional environment however underwent significant changes. The communist victory in Vietnam, and the American withdrawal of forces from Vietnam and Thailand unveiled new challenges. The spectre of expansive revolutionary communism engulfing the region from the Indo-chinese peninsula was regarded as a serious threat. ASEAN’s decision to deal collectively with the situation provided some respite for Singapore and especially Thailand. This decision allowed for the evolution of convergent internal and external threat perceptions for ASEAN member states. It also allowed for the achievement of greater familiarity and accommodation among member states, leading to domestic regime consolidation as well as efforts at socio-economic development for the relatively young states.

Singapore’s post-survivalist policy output, 1968 to 1990 It is arguable that Singapore’s post-survivalist policy output was determined almost exclusively by external developments. Two sets of contradictory developments provided the landscape against which policy considerations were obtained. The first of these was the more stable immediate regional environment in the Malay Archipelago. Over time, both Indonesia and Malaysia reconciled themselves to Singapore’s independent statehood. UMNO’s and MCA’s political elite after the Tengku became less involved and interested in Singapore’s domestic politics and developments. This disinterest was

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compounded by the fact that the 1969 racial riots in Malaysia provided a sufficient agenda for the channelling of resources and the recalibration of the communalist consociational model that developed after independence.2 This challenge overwhelmed the political elite and led in turn to a number of domestic political developments, in particular to a broader and more representative national government and the introduction of affirmative policies in favour of ethnic Malays with specific targets and time frames. In addition, given the racial nature of the violence, there were strong state-sponsored measures for the Malays and Chinese to achieve greater accommodation with each other. In view of this thrust, many of the anxieties deriving from the ethnic differences between Malaysia and Singapore became downplayed. Similarly, the changes in the Indonesian domestic political situation, in particular Suharto’s inauguration of the New Order government that ended confrontation against Malaysia, was more pro-Western and development-oriented. Whereas Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia did not thaw until 1973, the New Order government was much less aggressive towards Singapore. Indonesia-led ASEAN initiatives in dealing with the Indochinese political situation from 1975 also helped ease previous tensions. Hence the immediate regional environment was essentially tranquil in the 1970s and the 1980s. The larger regional political environment that included mainland Southeast Asia, however, became more turbulent and this was the contradictory development. It is common wisdom that after the formation and consolidation of ASEAN, the international politics of Southeast Asia was determined by developments in Indochina. In fact, given the low level and intensity of conflicts in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, many analysts would concur that the international relations of Southeast Asia was, for the most part, determined by developments in Indochina.3 Such an assessment of the situation was quite simply a function of the fact that the mainland countries, and in particular Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, harboured large and strong communist insurgency movements. In light of their spectacular military successes and threats to incumbent governments, they attracted both international attention and involvement. The Indochinese political situation dovetailed neatly into the larger international strategic environment. The communist victory in China in 1949 and the Korean War that occurred shortly afterwards alerted the US to the rising popularity and success of revolutionary communism in Asia. When the communists defeated the French colonists in Vietnam in 1954, and the country separated into two halves to reflect the domestic political reality that was akin to the Korean situation, the US gradually raised its levels of involvement to contain the spread of communism. This containment policy was executed through its regional strategic allies, Thailand and the Philippines. Conversely, the communists were aided by China and the Soviet Union. As a result of the involvement of great powers in Indochina, the intensity of the conflict became significantly exaggerated, especially in the 1960s. The conclusion of the Second Indochina War in favour of the communists in 1975 led to the reunification of Vietnam. This development, despite stabilizing the domestic political situation in Vietnam, threatened the anti-communist countries that were collectively grouped in ASEAN. Vietnamese political hegemony over Laos and Cambodia and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia from 1979 to 1989 further complicated matters. The new situation became complicated on two counts. In the first instance, the SinoSoviet contestation for power and influence was played out in Vietnam.4 The Vietnamese

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decision to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1978, Soviet access to Vietnamese naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay and the occupation of Cambodia significantly altered the regional political configuration of power and landscape. The American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 was quite simply replaced by a Soviet presence that China decreed a threat. Hence the traditional Cold War dynamics were replaced by a Sino-Soviet contestation for power in Southeast Asia. Not-withstanding this transformation in the dynamics, regional conflict and instability continued, albeit at a much lower level. All of these developments had significant implications for Singapore’s foreign policy, as an independent state, a member of ASEAN and as a state located in Southeast Asia. As a young and newly independent state, in the 1970s and 1980s, Singapore articulated a virulently anti-communist foreign policy. This aggressive policy was informed by the Malayan Emergency, CPM operations in Singapore, challenges to the PAP’s political leadership of Singapore, and its political contestation with Barisan. As a member of ASEAN, Singapore was expected to be involved in ASEAN-led initiatives to secure regional peace and order. This requirement was especially acute in view of the potential threat to Thailand’s sovereignty and security. Thailand’s security planners traditionally regarded the violation of Cambodian and Lao sovereignty as a threat, since both of these countries provided a buffer between Vietnam and Thailand. As a state located in Southeast Asia, Singapore was anxious for a stable regional environment since political instability typically affects small states more than larger ones. In addition, unforeseen spill-over effects (e.g. the exodus of ethnic Chinese boat people from Vietnam) could be used as a demonstration of Singapore’s policy principles and priorities as a Chinese majority state in the region. It was against the backdrop of such changes that Singapore articulated its policy output in the post-survivalist phase. Philosophically, during this period, Singapore continued to be driven by a realist orientation towards international affairs. There was a strong commitment to the enhancement of its sovereignty and territoriality. Over time, both of these core principles became accepted and were rarely challenged, and certainly not in a direct fashion as during the survivalist phase. It was also able to significantly consolidate state power, which is central to realism through an inclusionary and assimilative strategy towards all the ethnic communities. The lengthy tenure of the PAP government, its overwhelming control of state agencies and the monopoly over the mass media helped achieve this power in no small measure. The PAP’s track record of clean and honest government and its ability to deliver on economic growth further enhanced its legitimacy.5 As from the outset of independent statehood, its economic policies were decoupled from its foreign policy. The state’s heavy reliance on trade-generated revenue and its constant sourcing of manufacturing inputs and markets for its products drove trade policies. The strategy of military deterrence against potential aggressors was also strengthened significantly through national conscription of all eligible males and the procurement of more sophisticated military hardware and weapons systems. Growing prosperity allowed for greater budgetary allocations for defence. In terms of policy alignments and changes, following the political stabilization of its immediate operational environment in Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore sought a credible balance of great power presence in Southeast Asia. The disengagement of the UK from its previous colonies and significant reductions in defence commitments meant

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that the UK became a less reliable great power to guarantee regional peace. None the less, the formation of the FPDA in 1972 granted Singapore a measure of protection.6 The developments in mainland Southeast Asia caused some disquiet in Singapore and led to a number of initiatives in its relations with the great powers. From the late 1970s onwards, the Soviet Union was identified as the benefactor of Vietnam and, since the latter constituted a regional threat, Singapore was active in the condemnation of both countries as provocateurs of regional instability. Singapore was especially critical of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, since it had the potential to reorder interstate relations in Southeast Asia. It regularly issued press communiqués and statements condemning Soviet and Vietnamese ambitions in the region. The PAP viewed Soviet support for Vietnam and the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 as part of a larger strategy of consolidating its power and influence in Asia. The United States, on the other hand, was viewed as a benign power and one that was capable of tipping the regional balance of power favourably. However, the American decision to withdraw from Vietnam was viewed negatively as a precursor to its eventual detachment from the region. In the PAP’s view, only the US had sufficient influence and power to contain the growing assertiveness of the Soviet Union and even China. Apart from being an overwhelming power, the US was also a significant investor in Singapore, especially in the electronics industry. The PAP’s desire for investment from great powers was part of a broader strategy of achieving national viability by twinning its interests with those of friendly great powers. The synergies achieved from such congruence were worth much more than its economic implications. Hence, despite the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, Singapore always supported an American presence in the region to counter the influence of other powers whose intentions were regarded as suspect. Owing to the PAP government’s staunchly anti-communist outlook, Singapore’s relations with China were cautious. Although China, together with Taiwan, was allowed to establish trade missions in Singapore, it was to be a long time before formal diplomatic relations with China were established. Apart from being communist and supporting communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, China presented Singapore with a number of other problems. China claimed the right to represent ethnic Chinese all over the region in what was described as ‘people to people’ relations. This policy effectively allowed ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia dual nationality instead of being citizens in the country in which they lived. This claim was revoked by China only in 1975 and, even after that, it supported insurgency movements against incumbent governments. Until the disbandment of the CPM and the CPT in December 1989, this position vexed the Singapore government. As a matter of policy, Singapore citizens were barred from visiting China and other communist countries. Although Malaysia and Thailand normalized diplomatic relations with China in the mid-1970s, Singapore refrained from adopting the regional trend. The immediate reason for this position was the fear that such a policy would provide a demonstration effect to Indonesia that Singapore’s foreign policy was premised on ethnic considerations, a view it was anxious to avoid. As a result, despite reasonably cordial relations towards China in the 1980s, diplomatic recognition was not forthcoming. In fact, for so long as Indonesia did not normalize diplomatic relations with China first, Singapore was unable to do so. This policy position was the outcome of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s explicit promise to President Suharto of Indonesia as a goodwill and confidence-building gesture.7

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Other than Indonesia, regional countries like Malaysia and Thailand were more prepared to accommodate China. In Malaysia, Tun Razak, who replaced the Tengku as Prime Minister in 1970, was much less anticommunist than his predecessor. In addition, there was a significant domestic Chinese population that provided an added consideration. Thailand, on the other hand, established an informal strategic partnership with China following the American withdrawal from Vietnam. Thai policy planners regarded Vietnam as a security threat that they would be unable to manage without significant external support from a large power. Hence, between 1975 and 1989, Thailand and China were involved in this strategic partnership to contain Vietnam.8 This containment policy in turn allowed China a window of opportunity to establish goodwill with ASEAN that was equally threatened by Vietnam and supportive of Thailand to reduce its vulnerability towards Vietnam following the occupation of Cambodia. The policies of ASEAN members towards China were, however, nuanced, despite the show of solidarity towards Thailand and its status as a ‘front-line’ state against Vietnamese communism. Curiously enough, it was the new strategic equation in the region that allowed Singapore its greatest leverage in ASEAN and opened up new diplomatic opportunities in international fora. Singapore’s position towards Vietnam was not shared by Malaysia and Indonesia which regarded a strong Vietnam as capable of checking China’s power and influence in Southeast Asia.9 However, Singapore’s position was similar to Thailand’s which had played a key role in the American containment of communism in Vietnam. It was in fear of Vietnamese retaliation following the US withdrawal that Thailand sought an external ally. Hence both Singapore and Thailand had a strategic convergence of threat perceptions. None the less, ASEAN’s corporate policies towards Vietnam obtained from Thailand’s threat to its security rather than from Singapore’s position. The scenario however provided both ASEAN and Singapore opportunities within a wider geographical context. The two-pronged policy of denying Vietnam control over Cambodia was articulated on behalf of ASEAN through Thailand and Singapore. Thailand, together with logistical support from China, established border encampments for Khmer Rouge guerrillas to make regular forays into Cambodia to engage Vietnamese occupation troops. This policy was not without some cost to Thailand, since the fighting tended to spill over into Thailand from time to time. Such an engagement in June 1980 actually allowed Vietnamese troops to occupy a considerable swathe of Thai territory for some time before being repulsed. Singapore, on the other hand, led the diplomatic battle against Vietnam in the United Nations. The international community was sufficiently convinced to deny Vietnam its occupation of Cambodia. Accordingly, the Cambodian seat in the UN was held by the Khmer Rouge in the first instance from 1979 to 1982 and subsequently by a Khmer coalition from 1982 onwards before the UN-mandated intervention to restore the status quo ante-bellum. Both ASEAN and Singapore achieved high levels of international diplomatic recognition over the Cambodian issue and were for a long time associated with this platform.10 A number of international and regional structural changes converged in the late 1980s and changed the regional political landscape again. These changes, which were largely favourable in terms of conflict resolution in Indochina, brought new opportunities and challenges to the fore.11

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Singapore’s post-Cold War policy output, 1990 to the present day The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 which resulted in the dissipation of bipolarity in international relations provided the broadest structural framework for Singapore’s foreign policy formulation in the 1990s. The reverbera-tions of this event, which was partially pre-empted by the resolution of the Cambodian conflict, augured the greatest change for the regional strategic environment. The collapse of the hitherto overwhelming Indochina Security Complex paved the way for greater regional cooperation, albeit a reordered security environment deprived both ASEAN and Singapore of convergent threat perceptions and coordinated foreign and defence policies. Within the domestic political context, the PAP government, which had originally suffered significant declines in its domestic electoral support from the mid-1980s, was able to recoup its losses in the 1997 and 2001 elections.12 The most significant regional political development, namely the collapse of the Indochina Security Complex, was foreshadowed by domestic political developments in Thailand. In April 1988, the lengthy tenure of the Prem government (1980–1988) was brought to an abrupt halt when Prem resigned in the face of a no-confidence motion in the Thai Parliament. National elections were subsequently called and the leader of the Chart Thai Party, Chatichai Choonhavan, led the Thai government from August 1988 to 1991 when he was overthrown by a military coup. The significance of the Chatichai government was its reorientation of Thai foreign policy towards Vietnam. Dubbed the Indochina Initiative, Chatichai unveiled a new policy of cooperation towards Vietnam that was meant to turn ‘the battlefields of Vietnam into marketplaces.’ This new policy initiative totally undermined the most significant rationalization of the Indochina Security Complex—that Vietnam and its export of revolutionary communism presented a national security threat to Thailand.13 Vietnam’s withdrawal of its occupation force of some 140,000 troops in Cambodia a year later in September 1989 quite simply sealed the collapse of the Indochina Security Complex. This second development deprived ASEAN of its rationalization for an anti-Vietnamese policy output. Accordingly, spearheaded by Thailand, ASEAN and Vietnam eventually achieved mutual accommodation that was structurally reinforced and epitomized by Vietnam’s membership into ASEAN in July 1995.14 The Cambodian domestic political situation that was subjected to UN intervention gradually stabilized in the 1990s, despite bouts of violence between the Hun Sen government and the Khmer Rouge that refused to go into cantonment and surrender its weapons. A second round of violence between the Hun Sen government and the royalist forces of Norodom Ranarridh in 1997 eventually delayed Cambodian membership into ASEAN until April 1999, whereas Laos and Myanmar were admitted into ASEAN during the organization’s thirtieth anniversary meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July 1997. The collapse of the Indochina Security Complex, which was in turn interactive with the dissipation of bipolarity in international relations through the Soviet Union’s inability to sustain high levels of aid to Vietnam, also affected the standing of the great powers in relation to Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union ceased to be a major player in Southeast Asian politics, and the United States that had supported the Thai and ASEAN-led initiatives against Vietnam was subjected to regional expressions of nationalism in its disfavour. The most serious of such demonstrations occurred in the Philippines, where in

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1991 an emotionally aroused Senate terminated the Military Bases Agreement that had provided the US with air and naval facilities since 1947.15 Similarly, anti-American sentiments also ran high in Thailand where US economic pressures on copyright protection and agricultural subsidies for rice farmers in the late 1980s led to a deterioration in relations. The clearest expression of Thai unhappiness was the government’s refusal for Thailand to become involved in defence arrangements that would allow the US to project its forces in the Pacific after the closure of the Subic naval base in the Philippines. The greatest beneficiary of these structural and idiosyncratic changes was China, which expanded its political and economic goodwill in the region.16 Following the end of the Second Indochinese War in 1975 and throughout the Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia, Thailand had an informal alliance with China. This informal arrangement in turn allowed China greater diplomatic access and recognition among ASEAN countries. However, the Chatichai government’s Indochina Initiative significantly weakened the Thai-Chinese alliance. Growing rapprochement between Vietnam and Thailand resulted in a changed strategic environment which undermined China’s strategic utility for Thailand and ASEAN. Accordingly, China undertook a series of measures in the later 1980s and early 1990s to boost its regional diplomatic standing. The first of these measures was the Chinese government’s intervention in bringing about an end to organized communist insurgency in Malaysia and Thailand. In December 1989, in the southern Thai town of Hadyai, both the Communist Party of Malaya and the Communist Party of Thailand were disbanded. Guerrilla fighters from both insurgencies surrendered their weapons, were pardoned by their respective governments through an amnesty scheme arranged by China and were allowed to return to normal civilian lives. This gesture by China, which was largely symbolic since communist insurgencies in the later 1980s did not present incumbent governments with a credible challenge, was warmly welcomed in ASEAN. As a return and reciprocal gesture, Indonesia normalized diplomatic ties with China in August 1990 while Singapore followed suit after the Suharto initiative in November 1990 in fulfilment of an earlier promise to Indonesia that it would be the last country in Southeast Asia to establish diplomatic ties with China. This promise was meant to reassure neighbouring countries, especially those in maritime Southeast Asia, that Singapore’s foreign policy was not motivated by ethnic considerations. This string of developments effectively ended regional perceptions of China as sympathetic to and supportive of regional communist insurgencies. It also marked a regional turning point in ASEAN’s relations with China, albeit China’s motivations were at least partly strategic to overcome Vietnamese diplomatic efforts to normalize ties with ASEAN. A number of subsidiary issues, however, did not allow China to capitalize fully on its regional initiatives. The first of these was Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN in 1995. Together with Indonesia, Vietnam had external threat perceptions that were clearly directed towards China. This strategic convergence in the threat perceptions of ASEAN’s two largest members served to inhibit China’s diplomatic initiatives towards ASEAN.17 Second, beginning in the mid-1990s, China began to aggressively assert its territorial claims in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Chinese occupation of reefs that were simultaneously claimed by the Philippines and the construction of fortified structures and territorial markings in such reefs led to heightened tensions between the two countries. The Philippines clearly attempted to mobilize regional

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opinion in its favour through ASEAN.18 In the meantime, Indonesia, which had played host to a series of Canadian-sponsored workshops to defuse the tension, found itself increasingly placed in a partisan situation. The reason for this development was owing to the fact that after 1995, all competing claimants to the Spratlys other than Taiwan were collectively grouped in ASEAN and Indonesia’s leadership of ASEAN left its neutral credentials on the issue rather suspect. Another issue complicating China’s regional leverage was its close association and alignment with Myanmar in the aftermath of the latter’s suppression of its pro-democracy movement in 1988. China, which was in a similar international predicament following the Tienanmen incident of 1989, evolved a strategic partnership with Myanmar through the provision of valuable aid and investments as well as weapons to deal with political dissidents and ethnic insurgents. In exchange, Myanmar allowed China access to the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean, where it reportedly constructed a radar station in the Gulf of Tennasserim and a listening post in the Cocos Islands.19 These military intrusions into the Indian Ocean alarmed Thailand as well as India which maintains a large naval station in Port Blair in the Andaman Islands that is within eavesdropping distance of Cocos Island. Myanmar’s crackdown on its domestic democracy movement and the military junta government’s refusal to abide by the results of a 1990 national election also created problems for ASEAN at the diplomatic level.20 Following Myanmar’s membership into ASEAN in 1997, the European Union (EU) cancelled a series of ASEAN-EU meetings, while the US, which had imposed an economic and diplomatic embargo on ASEAN, extended the embargo annually. Hence China’s strategic alignment with Myanmar cost the former a measure of diplomatic goodwill. Finally, whereas the US and Japan are developed countries that provided aid and investments for the ASEAN region, China was generally a recipient rather than a provider of such aid and investments. Hence, whereas China provided investment opportunities for more developed ASEAN economies such as Malaysia and Singapore, it generally competed with ASEAN for such investments from the West and Japan. Given China’s significantly lower manufacturing and labour costs, over time, it began to compete directly with many ASEAN countries. It is for this reason that China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 is both a source of celebration and concern in the ASEAN region. The 1990s also enhanced Japan’s standing in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Traditionally Japan’s intrusion into Southeast Asia during the Cold War was limited to the economic sphere, owing to its self-imposed restraint in political and economic matters and the region’s memories of Japanese wartime brutalities. In the 1990s, however, Japan raised its regional profile significantly in a variety of ways.21 First, with the encouragement of the United States, Japan assumed a higher international profile. It made a significant financial contribution of US$13 billion for the US-led Gulf War against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991. In 1997, amid US concerns regarding the threat posed by China, it reinvigorated its mutual Defence Agreement with the US to allow it to provide logistical support for the latter in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in the Asia-Pacific. More recently, in 2001, against the backdrop of such international involvements, it provided three combat-ready ships in the US-led war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Finally, in 2003, Japanese troops were deployed in Iraq as part of the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’.

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Within the Southeast Asian region, Japan was a major financial contributor to the UNled peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in the 1980s. In recognition of this contribution, Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese diplomat, was appointed as head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Japan also provided significant aid for the reconstruction of Vietnam in the 1990s and offered its good services to broker the Cambodian dispute between Hun Sen and Norodom Ranarridh in 1997. Finally, Japan has been a ready donor to the maintenance of maritime and navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca. Such aid has come in the form of funding for maritime surveillance operations and pollution control in the Straits of Malacca. As a major trading nation, the bulk of Japanese shipping uses the Straits and, arising from such usage, Japan has contributed substantially to navigational safety. It has also sought to maintain cordial relations with Indonesia and Malaysia—the two countries that immediately border the Straits. Like China, however, Japan has suffered some setbacks in projecting a favourable international image of itself. One such setback is that the generation which suffered the Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia is still alive and mindful of Japan’s perceived ambitions for regional hegemony. A subsidiary issue deriving from such considerations involves claims for wartime reparations against ‘comfort women’ who were recruited as sex slaves to service Japanese soldiers. This issue is especially sensitive in Korea and the Philippines, for example. Finally, Japan is sometimes viewed by other Asian countries as being overly obliging and pliant to the dictates of the US. Two episodes well demonstrate such American influence over Japanese policy output. In the first instance, Japan was pressured into not supporting Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s idea of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) that was floated in the early 1990s as a potential competitor to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. In the second instance, following the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Japan succumbed to American pressure and reneged on its offer to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) with a capital contribution of US$100 billion.22 The AMF was meant to be, among other things, a regional solution to a regional problem. The significant structural changes in international relations associated with the postCold War period obtained some fundamental changes to Singapore’s foreign policy output as well. Perhaps the most significant philosophical change was the country’s movement away from its anti-communist rhetoric. However, even during the Cold War, it should be noted that Singapore’s virulent anti-communist position did not prevent it from maintaining substantial trade linkages with China and Vietnam. In this regard, PAP policy formulators have always argued that given Singapore’s heavy reliance on trade and the external environment for survival, trade and foreign policy have had to be decoupled—a position that is occasionally regarded as hypocritical by Singapore’s immediate neighbours. ASEAN-Vietnamese rapprochement in the late 1980s and the latter’s eventual membership in ASEAN in 1995 made the anti-communist position that was aimed primarily at Vietnam quite simply untenable.23 Notwithstanding the collapse of bipolarity and regional threats emanating from communism, Singapore continued to retain a generally realist out-look in international relations. Such an outlook was consistent with its statist conception of international relations—a position derived partly from previous threats to its territoriality and sovereignty immediately after independence and a dominant party state that left little

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space for the emergence of an independent civil society. The PAP’s realist core ideology was also retained as a result of Lee Kuan Yew’s continued involvement in the domestic political process as Senior Minister in the PAP cabinet after 1990 when Goh Chok Tong was appointed Prime Minister. The PAP’s second generation of political elite that became prominent in the 1990s was similarly socialized. In this regard, it is arguable that the liabilities deriving from a small land area and population base have always made national viability a serious political consideration. As noted at the outset, such a consideration is also informed by the significant difference in land area, population and resource base of its immediate regional environment in the Malay Archipelago. Within this realist core, a deterrence strategy serves as the most identifiable strand of foreign and defence policy. At the heart of this deterrence strategy is a policy of national self-reliance obtained through a credible military deterrence and a policy of total defence (to be discussed in Chapter 6). Deterrence is however insufficient unto itself for a small state with little strategic depth. Accordingly, a clear policy of alignment with the US— the only country regarded as having both overwhelming influence and power but also benign intent—has distinguished Singapore’s foreign policy output in the post-Cold War period. The US is viewed as having both economic and strategic interests in Singapore. The PAP government’s early pursuit of export-led growth attracted a large number of American multinational companies into Singapore. Such companies are especially well represented in the electronics and petro-chemical industries. Until today, the single largest private sector employer in Singapore is US-listed Seagate Technology.24 Singapore’s alignment with the US was demonstrated most visibly in a series of arrangements between 1990 and 2000 that allowed the US access to Singapore’s military facilities, rotational deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft and the location of the command and logistics arm of the Seventh Fleet (COMLOG WESTPAC) in Singapore. These arrangements were meant to facilitate the forward deployment of US forces in the AsiaPacific region following the Philippine Senate’s decision to terminate the agreements granting access to local facilities. The PAP government views the arrangements concluded with the US as mutually beneficial in maintaining Singapore’s sovereignty on the one hand, and assisting the US on the other. After all, a policy of military deterrence is also aimed at ensuring sovereignty. Accordingly, alignment with the US in the postCold War period is viewed as consistent with military deterrence and national viability. Singapore’s alignment with the United States in fact became more readily apparent after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. It was one of the few Southeast Asian countries, together with the Philippines and Thailand, to be a member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ with personnel deployed in Iraq after the US-led invasion to depose Saddam Hussein. It has significantly stepped up security cooperation with the US, especially in the area of maritime security that includes the prescreening of containers destined for US ports. The US Coast Guard and Singapore security agencies are also planning joint exercises to improve port security in Singapore and counter the threat of maritime terrorism, especially in the Straits of Malacca.25 Singapore’s enthusiasm for involving the US in maritime security in the Malacca Straits was initially rebuffed by both Malaysia and Indonesia. Both countries stated very clearly that they were capable of maintaining maritime security in their waterways as well as the Malacca Straits as littoral states bordering it.26 Finally, however, in a change of heart,

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Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to jointly patrol the Straits and assume a measure of collective responsibility.27 The initial response of Malaysia and Indonesia is however instructive in that they have been much more wary of the US than Singapore and have called the latter’s motives into question, especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both countries are Muslim-majority states where anti-US sentiment is always latent. In addition, the leaders of both countries would like to observe a measure of neutral foreign policy output and certainly dislike the idea of foreign troops in the area. Besides, both countries harbour lingering suspicions regarding Singapore’s attempts to seemingly gain leverage in regional affairs by aligning with and involving the US in security matters. It should be noted however that Singapore’s alignment with the US does not mean that policies between the two states are always compatible or congruent. In fact, there have been a number of very visible and fundamental differences between the two countries on policy issues. Such differences include the highly publicized diplomatic row between the two countries in 1988 over the PAP government’s allegation that the US Embassy in Singapore was encouraging the political opposition to contest in national elections against the incumbent government. In the ensuing actions, both countries evicted a senior diplomat each at short notice, with Singapore firing the first salvo.28 Similarly, in 1993, when American teenager Michael Fay was sentenced to a prison term that included six strokes of the cane for vandalism—a misdemeanour in the US—President Bill Clinton personally intervened to reduce the caning from six to four strokes, arguing that the punishment meted out was excessive and disproportionate to the crime. Typically, disagreements between the US and Singapore tend to be issue-specific and generally concern values that are differently regarded by both countries. Such issues have in the past included the nature and practice of democracy in Singapore, human rights, press freedom and the utility of ‘Asian values’ in the developmental process. To the extent that Singapore, together with Malaysia and China, was active in promoting ‘Asian values’ as inherently good, native to certain societies and conducive to economic development, it had a greater tendency to run afoul of the US that, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, pushed aggressively for the adoption of liberal democracy and capitalism by developing countries.29 Apart from alignment with the US, Singapore also regards a regional balance of power as inherently stabilizing. In this regard, it not only conceded that China and Japan had a legitimate claim to power and influence in the Asia-Pacific, but was prepared to encourage such a role. It should be noted, however, that Lee Kuan Yew continues to harbour lingering suspicions regarding Japanese ambitions in the region, having experienced the Japanese Occupation.30 It is for this reason that he observed how being supportive of the Japanese PKO Bill amounts to giving a liqueur chocolate to an alcoholic. The second-generation PAP leadership appears to be less reserved about Japan’s engagement of the region. The clearest evidence of Singapore’s desire for a regional balance of power is in its sustained engagement of China in the post-Cold War period. Both Singapore and Chinese political elite have paid numerous courtesy calls to each other’s countries and trade between the two countries has risen significantly.31 Singapore is also involved in a series of developmental projects in China that draw on the former’s experience and expertise. Such projects have included the Suzhou Industrial Park as well as a number of lesser

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projects in Hangchow, Shandong, Wuxi and Wuhan. Singapore is also interested in the continued engagement of China in the ARF, since Japan and the US usually have convergent positions on important issues. Reciprocally, Chinese political leaders have viewed Singapore’s domestic political environment and economic development as exemplary and worthy of emulation. Within the regional context, Singapore, together with Thailand, advocated a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ to deal with recalcitrant states. Accordingly, Singapore was at the forefront of advocating a policy of engaging rather than isolating Myanmar prior to the latter’s admittance into ASEAN in 1997. However, when the Myanmar military junta made little headway in negotiating a domestic political settlement with democratic forces and Thailand and the Philippines advocated ‘flexible engagement’—a veiled reference to intervention in domestic politics—Singapore reverted to the ASEAN policy of noninterference in the affairs of member states. This policy, which was also espoused by Indonesia and Malaysia, was quite simply a way for Singapore to assert its sovereign right to domestic decision-making and prevent the future invocation of a precedent deriving from the Myanmar situation. Malaysia, through its special UN envoy Razali Ismail, appears to have made some headway in nudging the Myanmar junta to positively engage the political opposition, although Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest since 2003 and the junta has convened a Constitutional Convention on its own terms. The 1990s was also characterized by Singapore’s adoption of a leadership role in ASEAN and related regional initiatives. For example, in 1992, when Singapore convened the Fourth ASEAN Summit Meeting, it was announced that preparations for AFTA would commence from 1993. Similarly, the ASEAN PMC was upgraded and given the status of a multilateral security dialogue. The establishment of the ARF in Bangkok in July 1994 was also a Singapore-led initiative.32 In fact, Singapore’s aggressive pursuit of multilateralism extended well beyond the ASEAN region. Its firm support for the APEC forum and its leadership in the establishment of ASEM and EALAF are also notable. In addition, it housed the APEC Secretariat from 1993 and also hosted the inaugural meeting of the WTO in 1998. All of these initiatives were driven by two specific motivations. The first was the realization that the demands of a major trading state required a more cooperative and collaborative framework, rather than realism that was undergirded by a competitive framework. In this regard it is arguable that beginning from the 1990s, Singapore’s realist outlook in international relations became increasingly tempered by the recognition that multilateral institutionalist prescriptions were becoming popular and were equally useful in asserting the country’s sovereign status.33 Additional motivations included the US preference for multilateral institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific, reflected in its enthusiastic support for APEC and its initial optimism over the ARF as well. However, there was also a negative motivation and this came in the form of a regional environment that was subjected to significant turbulence in the post-Cold War period. The resolution of the Cambodian conflict and the collapse of communism had led to the dissipation of carefully coordinated and convergent foreign and defence policies between ASEAN states. The altered security landscape provided ample opportunities for ASEAN countries to reappraise their security needs. The resulting effect was that many ASEAN countries that had traditionally been cordial towards each other increasingly became mutually suspicious of each other and a number of previously subsidiary issues rose to the fore and

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assumed magnified importance.34 Such issues included illegal migration and fishing, insurgency, territorial incursions and other non-traditional security issues. Singapore was not spared these regional readjustments and was in fact caught in a downward spiral in its bilateral relations with Malaysia. The first of these spirals occurred in 1988 and lasted until 1991, while the second spiral which began in 1996 has still not been completely resolved (to be discussed in Chapter 5). The unravelling of convergent policies in the 1990s was compounded by the Asian financial crisis that erupted in July 1997 with the Thai government’s decision to float the Baht. The ensuing contagion severely weakened political authority structures, degraded financial and economic performance, and led to the displacement of large segments of the domestic and foreign workforce. Such developments further strained relationships between countries that were disproportionately affected by the crisis or those that differed on the origins of the crisis and the remedies required.35 Since the crisis was correlated to a number of other issues (e.g. corruption and cronyism), debates on the origins and prescriptions for overcoming the crisis assumed ideological proportions. The situation was considerably worsened when the debates became conflated with state-led strategies for economic growth dubbed the Asian model that was in turn correlated to a number of other values.36 For defenders of the model, it upheld traditional patriarchal structures and values, thrift, hard work and political stability. For detractors, it upheld poor principles of political governance and corporate accountability. The Asian financial crisis significantly degraded Singapore’s faith in multilateral institutionalism by the late 1990s. Hence, whereas it was enthusiastic in espousing multilateralism in the early 1990s and signalled clear support for such initiatives, including a leadership role in some of them, the end of the decade led to a significant reappraisal of such commitment. In view of the country’s heavy reliance on trade and related matters, Singapore broke ranks with the ASEAN countries by 2000 and began negotiating its own Free Trade Arrangements (FTAs) with its major trading partners.37

5 Important regional bilateral relationships Malaysia Perhaps the greatest source of frustration to Singapore’s foreign policy formulators is the recognition that despite the immediate regional environment’s overwhelming influence on the country’s context for policy formulation, they have little or no leverage over it. Despite the impact of structural changes in international relations and the fluidity of ties between the great powers, Singapore’s immediate regional environment in the Malay Archipelago has been a major determinant of the country’s core policy values. Such influence derives from geographical proximity, historical interactions, transnational linkages, leadership perceptions and the country’s differing socio-economic texture and level of development. In this regard, it is arguable that the immediate environment is both a source of threat as well as opportunities. The diminution of threats through a credible military deterrence and skilful bilateral diplomacy and the appropriation of opportunities from the larger hinterland is invariably a function of leadership skills. Accordingly, Singapore’s management of the regional security environment, whenever it is possible, is often a function of deliberate and astute policy output. Apart from its inability to control the immediate environment, there are a number of other considerations in Singapore’s disfavour. Disproportionate endowments of land, population and resources tend to exaggerate the differentials between the countries. Singapore’s previous location within the Federation of Malaysia and its recent political independence in 1965 is also a source of some liability, since newly independent states invariably have their status challenged more regularly than do older ones. The liberal philosophical predisposition to sovereign equality between states is often subjected to considerations of size and power. Within the Malay Archipelago, for example, it is not uncommon for political elite and policy formulators in Indonesia and Malaysia to regard Singapore as fundamentally unequal. Within such an operational environment, the international relations maxim of equality between states does not obtain. In any event, larger and more powerful countries invariably exercise a wider array of both positive and negative instruments in the discharge of policy. Under the circumstances, Singapore’s negotiating position within the environment is not at par with those of its neighbouring states. Whereas political and socio-economic woes of Singapore’s immediate neighbours almost invariably have a natural spillover effect on the country, the converse does not obtain. In fact, domestic woes in Singapore may provide opportunities for neighbouring countries to leverage themselves against Singapore. The strategic importance of the Malay Archipelago is consciously observed by policy formulators, and Singapore keenly monitors developments in the area for their consequences on the state. The Malay Archipelago Complex, which had a decisive influence in determining Singapore’s perception of its neighbours in the 1960s, was

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fortunately overshadowed by developments in mainland Southeast Asia. In other words, ASEAN’s increasing attention to developments involving Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s offered some respite from the pressures of the immediate region and also allowed for the establishment of significantly higher levels of comfort through familiarity and accommodation. In this regard, the installation of Suharto’s New Order regime in Indonesia was perhaps one of the most important regional developments for Singapore. Despite initial turbulence in the bilateral relations with Singapore, Suharto developed a long-standing friendship with Lee Kuan Yew and worked within a cooperative and interdependent framework up until the time of his resignation from office in May 1998. The relationship with Malaysia, on the other hand, despite initial turbulence, benefited from a certain structural embeddedness. In the realm of foreign policy formulation, if one were to think of Singapore’s strategic environment in terms of concentric circles of strategic importance emanating outwards, the Malay Archipelago would certainly be primus inter pares. In invoking the analogy of a ship, PAP leaders are keen to point out that location is one constant that, unlike an anchor, cannot be lifted. Accordingly, due consideration has to be meted out to permanent fixtures. Another sign of the importance of the immediate environment is the skilful choice of diplomats chosen for postings in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. These destinations are regarded as important postings, both by the political and policy elite. As ambassadors, such diplomats play a key role in calibrating these bilateral relationships. The relationship between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia is also a little more complicated than two sets of bilateral relationships. The reason for this observation is that there is some amount of triangulation in the relationship between the three countries. Whereas it is unclear if such a triangulation is quite simply a function of misplaced perceptions or active strategic calculations, observers have noted attempts by political elite to triangulate the situation. Evidence for such triangulation includes, for example, Malaysian allusion to the Indonesians as a people of common stock and worldview (serumpun, serantau), Indonesian ex-president Abdurrahman Wahid’s call for Malaysia and Indonesia to teach Singapore a lesson by controlling the latter’s water supply, and Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s analogy of Singapore as a juicy nut between the proverbial nutcracker.1 On the basis of such statements, it is quite clear that political elite in all three countries in the relationship regard the situation as potentially triangular. Curiously, though, such pronouncements are almost always uttered during difficult times. In other words, when the three individual sets of bilateral relationships are healthy and well managed, such antagonistic pronouncements and analogies do not arise.

Singapore’s bilateral relations with Malaysia Ceteris paribus, Singapore’s relations with Malaysia constitute the most important bilateral relationship for the former. As mentioned above, this is partly a function of the imperatives of history and geography. The status also derives from complex interdependence and inadvertent as well as conscious competition in a number of areas. Whereas issue areas often overlap one another, there are also discretely identifiable issues. The treatment of issues discretely provides some parsimony in dealing with an

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otherwise complex web. Where issues are interrelated, such observations will be brought to bear in the ensuing discourse.

Political and security issues The appropriate starting point for political and security issues is perhaps the subject of a historical overhang in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. This overhang is derived from a pattern of historical association between countries and may positively or negatively colour relations between geographically proximate states. Such an overhang need not be unilinear and may indeed be subjected to fluctuations. Unless the correlation is discernibly positive or negative, it often tends to be issue-specific. In other words, certain issues cause negative vibes between states while others cause positive vibes. At specific historical conjunctions however, the relationship may be overwhelmingly positive or negative depending on the issues involved and their intensity. Such episodic conjunctions cast what is often described as an overhang in international relations. In the bilateral relationship between Singapore and Malaysia, this historical overhang is often negative and typically harkens back to the period between 1963 and 1965 when Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia. Since Singapore’s independence involved the fissure of a political federation, it is deeply etched in the political history of both states. A typical Malay Malaysian’s view of PAP leaders during this period would be the story of political mischief and ingratitude whereas a Chinese Singapore citizen would harbour views of attempted hegemony and injustice. In other words, depending on who calls the tune, the story is invariably one of the virtuous self and the stereotypical other.2 Since political elite in both countries went their separate ways and chartered different paths towards development, interpretive interactions between the two countries on what transpired during those two difficult years have always been fraught with fragilities. Mutual agreements not to reopen old wounds and a ban on the circulation of vernacular newspapers deriving from one country into that of the other have also capped public debates on these stereotypical images. None the less, social and political history being what it is, is often simplified and passed on through popular culture. This overhang was most clear in the minds of the PAP’s first-generation leadership who retired from the domestic political scene in Singapore in the 1980s, with the exception of Lee Kuan Yew. However, the overhang continues in a number of ways other than the popular culture suggested above. It also continues to exist in the post-1965 generation of political elite in both countries through the process of socialization. Thus, for example, Lee Kuan Yew’s son Lee Hsien Loong is currently Prime Minister in Singapore and two siblings of Malaysia’s then political elite, Syed Hamid Albar and Najib Tun Razak, figure prominently in the current Malaysian Cabinet. In fact, Hamid Albar is the son of Ja’afar Albar, the man whom the PAP government accused of fomenting the 1964 racial riots in Singapore through inflammatory speeches.3 Other than such personalities, the overhang is also located in a number of political structures. UMNO’s youth wing and its leaders, for example, have a history of championing Malay interests but have also been at the forefront of criticizing Singapore’s PAP government. In addition, Malaysia’s considerably more pluralistic political structures and parties often allow for anti-Singapore sentiments to be echoed by the political opposition like PAS.

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Whereas such expressions fall within the realm of the political for Malaysian political parties and interest groups, Singapore’s population, which is accustomed to a dominant political party with a virtual monopoly over political discourse, often fails to appreciate that such pronouncements do not necessarily have the blessing of the Malaysian government or UMNO. Whereas the Malaysian government has in the past allowed such sentiments to be aired publicly as a reflection of widespread negative sentiments against Singapore, it has also almost always intervened to arrest the situation if it poses a threat to law and order or fundamentally challenges foreign policy output. The historical overhang between the two countries is often symptomatic of and interactive with elite perceptions of each other’s countries. At the time of Singapore’s ejection from the Malaysian Federation in 1965, Malaysia still exercised sovereign control over eleven other states and two territories in Malacca and Penang. Within the larger scheme of things, Singapore was quite simply a small territory that had been severed from Malaysia at little cost to the larger federation. Singapore, on the other hand, despite its previously subordinate status within Malaysia, fended for itself against overwhelming odds and succeeded in creating a sophisticated, successful and sovereign city-state. Hence, in the minds of the PAP elite and Singapore’s citizenry at large, the country is sovereign and deserving of respect as an equal within a regional context. Similarly, for many in Malaysia, Singapore is but a small territory that previously used to be a part of a larger federation. Such differing perceptions of size and status have often clouded the relationship between the two countries, and diplomats from Singapore and Malaysia are known to speak of a relationship between an older and a younger sibling (abang-adik) when referring to Malaysian perceptions and treatment of Singapore.4 Together with the previously described overhang, such differing perceptions of selfworth are also known to cloud the bilateral relationship. Issues pertaining to territoriality and sovereignty in its various forms are another important political consideration in the bilateral relationship. Actual territorial disputes in the form of boundary demarcations are very few. In the past, Malaysia had complained that Singapore’s aggressive enlargement of its land area through marine reclamation continuously altered the midway line between the two countries in the Strait of Johor. Subsequently, however, the placement of buoy markers to demarcate the territorial waters in 1993 cleared up potential misunderstandings. Other than that, the most serious territorial dispute concerned Malaysian claims to a rocky outcrop that houses the Horsburgh Lighthouse, which commands the eastern entrance into the South China Sea. Singapore, which had administered the Lighthouse from the days of the British colonial administration in 1850, was clearly irritated by Malaysian claims to an important navigational instrument that was crucial to international shipping routes. Both countries attempted to resolve the dispute through bilateral negotiations but to no avail.5 Eventually, after three rounds of negotiations, both countries referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration in 1994. In the meantime, Singapore continues to administer the Lighthouse while the Police Coast Guard maintains constant vigilance around the facility. In an attempt to deter mischief, since Malaysian interest groups and opposition political parties have in the past threatened to land at the Lighthouse, Singapore also maintains a helipad and commando detachment at the facility.6

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There are a number of other issues correlated to sovereignty and territoriality that have dominated the bilateral political agenda in the 1990s. One of these is the issue of Malaysian ownership of some 200 hectares of land in three railway stations in Tanjong Pagar, Kranji and Woodlands, and land adjoining the railway tracks that run from Johor Bahru in Malaysia into Singapore that was constructed during British colonial times. This land, which is owned by Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM—Malayan Railways), has been the subject of an ongoing dispute since 1990 when Tun Daim Zainuddin, Malaysia’s exFinance Minister and a close confidante of Mahathir, signed an agreement with the Singapore government to jointly develop the land through a holding company (M-S Private Limited). The initial arrangement was for Malaysia to have a 60 per cent stake in the company while Singapore would retain the balance of 40 per cent. The agreement required KTM to vacate its premises from Tanjong Pagar in the first instance to a site along Upper Bukit Timah Road or, if it so desired, to an alternative site in Wood-lands. Also noted in the agreement was that if the former site was chosen the station should be economically built, since the final site should be in Woodlands. In exchange the Singapore government had first offered KTM a site of equivalent value in downtown Marina South, then later at Scotts Road, Bugis or Suntec City, to be included in the grid of Singapore’s own Mass Rapid Transit System as part of a broader framework for cooperation. Later, however, Mahathir reneged on the arrangement, arguing that the Malaysian Parliament was not supportive of the deal. In place of the previous arrangement, Mahathir indicated an interest in the railway being redeveloped to become part of a fast-track trans-Asian rail network from Kunming in China to Singapore. The Singapore government was unhappy with this turn of developments on a number of counts. First, it was unable to comprehend how a statesman of Daim’s standing could ink an agreement that could subsequently be retracted. Singapore elites, who are accustomed to a legalistic interpretation and enforcement of issues, were clearly flustered by the turn of events. If contracting parties to agreements, in particular governments, could vary the terms of reference over agreements, then the Singapore government stood to lose a large measure of credibility. That the land and the railway stations were to be left standing ante-bellum was also a cause for some concern since it implied Malaysian ownership of land cutting right through the heart of Singapore. The railway station and the adjacent land were also poorly maintained and an eyesore of sorts in spanking clean and meticulously planned Singapore. Finally, Singapore’s Land Transport Authority (LTA) was not keen on having high-tension overhead electric cables as part of the transAsian railway. It regarded the proposal as potentially dangerous, environmentally intrusive and aesthetically displeasing. The KTM land issue was seemingly resolved in a bilateral meeting between Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir in September 2001. The new agreement called for Singapore to give Malaysia an extra twelve plots of land in Bukit Timah and for the land in the Tanjong Pagar railway station to be exchanged for a plot of land at Shenton Way ‘at equal value, with payment for adjustments in or out’.7 However, this second agreement has also been suspended after later bilateral disagreements involving Malaysia’s supply of potable water to Singapore. The KTM land issue was indirectly tied to a second issue which developed in the late 1990s. Both Malaysia and Singapore had previously agreed to build a second link to augment an existing causeway linking the two countries in view of the heavy vehicular traffic that averaged 25,000 cars daily and 60,000 cars on weekends. Accordingly, a

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second link was completed in 1998, linking Gelang Patah in Johor with Tuas in Singapore. During this time, the Singapore government was also building a new Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) facility in Woodlands, near the border with Johor, with the aim of relocating these services away from the Tanjong Pagar railway station. Whereas Malaysia had previously agreed to the relocation exercise and even commissioned the Singapore government to undertake the construction of similar facilities for itself, it subsequently withdrew from the arrangement in 1998, opting to remain at Tanjong Pagar instead.8 Singapore protested that the relocation of its own CIQ facilities away from the earlier station would render Malaysia’s facilities without attendant legal jurisdiction. In view of this argument, Malaysia decided to continue operating its facilities in Tanjong Pagar while clearing formal CIQ requirements at its own check-point in Johor. It is likely that the Malaysian authorities inferred that their relocation from Tanjong Pagar would have allowed the Singapore government to proceed with the previously signed 1990 agreement to redevelop the KTM land on which Tanjong Pagar station sits. The Singapore government issued a statement that the KTM land issue and the CIQ issue were separate and that Malaysia’s relocation of its CIQ station would have no bearing on the KTM land. The Malaysian government originally appeared to have been unconvinced by the statement. None the less, under the broad-based agreement reached afterwards between the two countries in September 2001, Malaysia had agreed to relocate its CIQ facilities to Kranji when the new railway station is operational.9 This arrangement was also subsequently suspended with the deterioration of bilateral relations in 2002 and 2003. Another issue partially related to territoriality and sovereignty recently is the Mahathir government’s decision to replace the existing causeway linking the two countries with a bridge in the first instance and an underground tunnel as an altered proposal. In Mahathir’s words, the water between the two countries in the Strait of Johor ought to flow freely rather than remain stagnant on account of the causeway. Singapore was agreeable to the first proposal and offered to pay for half the cost of the bridge, albeit with some unease. The unease arises from the fact that the causeway has long served as the arterial link between the two countries and the pipes on the causeway have traditionally carried potable water from Johor for domestic consumption in Singapore. In fact, when the Japanese laid siege to Singapore during the Second World War, one of their strategies was to sever the water link to Singapore. Accordingly, the causeway has some symbolic significance for Singapore. The altered proposal of constructing a tunnel between the two countries was initially dismissed by the Singapore government as being prohibitively expensive but agreed to in the September 2001 agreement. For the time being, however, the causeway linking the two countries will remain until 2007. The Singapore government had also originally announced its unwillingness to share the cost of constructing a tunnel between the two countries.10 The most recent announcement on this issue is a report that the Malaysian government has temporarily shelved plans to build the said tunnel.11 The final issue involving sovereignty pertains to KD Malaya, a Malaysian naval base in Woodlands, Singapore, which had been carried over into post-independence Singapore. The development that upset Malaysia concerning KD Malaya was the hefty increase in rent for the seventy-two hectares of land that the naval base occupies.12 Previous rental adjustments had been made in 1972 and 1974, and a 1991 revision trebled

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the annual rent payable. The Singapore government explained that the rise was to keep pace with market rental rates, which had risen astronomically in the 1980s. As a goodwill gesture and an attempt to soften the impact of the increase, Singapore offered Malaysia a 20 per cent discount on the market rate and proposed that the steep increase be gradually implemented over a period of six years.13 A second option offered to the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) was reacquisition of the said site in exchange for a much smaller, five-hectare site, similar in size to the military installations of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), and to be built at Singapore’s expense. The RMN would, however, be required to pay the property tax for the site. The RMN, a tenant-at-will on the KD Malaya site in Woodlands, decided to forgo both options and vacate the site at the end of 1997. In place of the Woodlands site, the RMN eventually relocated to a new naval base of its own in Tanjung Pengelih, in Kota Tinggi, southern Johor. The vacation of KD Malaya effectively ended the physical presence of the RMN in Singapore—a legacy dating back to British colonial times. An issue unrelated to sovereignty but regarded by Singapore as the most important and strategic tie between the two countries is its reliance on Malaysia for potable water and much of its food. Singapore has signed three bilateral agreements to date with Malaysia allowing it to draw about half of its daily water consumption needs. The Water Agreement of 1961, which expires in 2011, allows Singapore to draw untreated water at the price of 3 Malaysian cents for every 4,500 litres. The Water Agreement of 1962, which expires in 2061, provides for Johor to supply 1.1 billion litres of water to Singapore daily. Both the 1961 and 1962 agreements were guaranteed by Malaysia under the 1965 Separation Act, which was subsequently lodged with the United Nations. Under the terms of the Linggui Dam Agreement of 1990, Singapore’s Public Utilities Board (PUB) built dams and a reservoir on a tributary of the Johor River. The final agreement allows Johor to buy back 159 million litres of treated water at 50 Malaysian cents per 4,500 litres, after the daily water allotment of 1.135 million litres that Singapore still receives. Collectively, the three agreements reflect the nature of Singapore’s reliance on Malaysia for water. The lodging of the Separation Act with the United Nations was meant to ensure that Malaysia would not renege on a binding contract, and demonstrates Singapore’s anxiety regarding a continued supply of potable water to meet its growing needs. Besides those agreements, in 1991 Singapore signed an accord with Indonesia allowing it to draw up to 4,500 million litres of water daily from the Indonesian island of Bintan in Riau province, thus helping to diversify Singapore’s sources of water. That agreement, however, has yet to be implemented owing to squatter occupation in water catchment areas. In the meantime, the Singapore government announced steep increases in water tariffs and a water consumption tax that doubled the price of potable water in 2000. In addition, a S$1-billion water desalination plant was originally scheduled for completion by 2003, and it is hoped that many citizens will come to appreciate water as a ‘precious and strategic resource’.14 Finally, Singapore has experimented with the treatment of raw sewage called Newater. As a result of this experiment, the Singapore government hopes to leverage itself while negotiating with Malaysia on the repricing of raw water. From February 2003, Newater was pumped into Singapore’s reservoirs to enhance the island’s water supply. A tender for the construction of a desalination plant has also been awarded. Typically, when tensions have arisen between Singapore and

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Malaysia, they have involved Malay calls to renegotiate the water agreements with Singapore to give more favourable terms to Malaysia.15 Occasionally, rhetorical calls are made in certain Malaysian quarters to sever the supply of water altogether. The most recent renegotiated agreement pertaining to Malaysia’s continued supply of water to Singapore was reached in September 2001 when Lee Kuan Yew made a second trip to Malaysia in as many years, the previous trip being in August 2000. Under the deal, which was part of a broad package to resolve outstanding bilateral issues, Singapore offered 45 Malaysian cents per 1,000 gallons daily, an increase of fifteen times the current price. In addition, it requested 100 million gallons a day of raw water between 2011 and 2061 at 60 Malaysian cents per 1,000 gallons.16 After 2061, Singapore will pay 60 Malaysian cents per 1,000 gallons, with the purchase price subject to revision once every five years. During this period, Singapore will be offered 100 million gallons daily of raw water and 250 million gallons daily of treated water through a joint venture between the Johor government and Singapore’s PUB. This new agreement, which also dealt with a bundle of other issues, had originally led to the mutual resolution of serious outstanding disputes discussed thus far, including the CIQ and KTM land issue. In 2002, however, the Malaysian government announced that the negotiation for the price of water would be decoupled from all other outstanding issues, at which point the Singapore government announced that all the concessions it had made in all the other issues were also no longer valid. The Singapore government’s willingness to pay a significantly higher cost for water in 2001 than it had previously paid reflects, among other things, Singapore’s reliance on Malaysia and its willingness to rationally negotiate differences for mutual benefit. Hence, notwithstanding the government’s rhetoric on the alternative sourcing of potable water for strategic diversity, a renegotiated pact with Malaysia was clearly regarded as favourable, although the agreement no longer obtains. None the less, notwithstanding such a strategic convergence of interests, Lee Kuan Yew has noted in his memoirs that should Singapore’s water supply be threatened, the state would not hesitate to secure its supply of water through armed force.17 In addition, the Singapore government has announced plans to build a privately owned and operated desalination plant with a capacity to produce 30 million gallons of potable water by 2005. The longer term plan calls for such treated sea water to supply up to 15 per cent of the country’s total potable water consumption needs by 2010.18 Finally, the Singapore government announced in 2004 that it will build its newest (and fifteenth) reservoir in Marina Basin by 2007. This new reservoir will use advanced membrane technology for water purification and raise the country’s water catchment area from the present half of the country’s land area to two-thirds.19 Within the broader framework of defence arrangements and alignments, Malaysia has always viewed Singapore with some degree of suspicion. During the period immediately before and after Singapore’s entry into the Malaysian federation, such anxieties derived from Singapore’s predominantly Chinese ethnic population and the linkages between such ethnicity and communism. It may be noted, for example, that one of the motivations for the Tengku’s agreement to admit Singapore into the said federation was the fear of communist insurgency emanating from Malaysia’s doorstep, encapsulated in the Tunku’s analogy of Singapore as a potential Cuba. Immediately after independence, following the Barisan Sosialis boycott of the Singapore Parliament from 1966 and the PAP’s

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strengthened hold on Parliament, such fears were assuaged. Lee Kuan Yew was, after all, an ally in the fight against communism, notwithstanding Singapore’s early leanings towards the Non-Aligned Movement. Lee’s ideological predisposition was however thought to be compromised by Singapore’s decision to set up the SAF under Israeli military assistance after a similar initial request was declined by India and Egypt, for fear of offending Malaysia. The Israeli doctrine of forward defence for the creation of strategic depth for warfare and the doctrinal assumption of a hostile external environment perplexed Malaysia.20 Yet, for the most part, during the Cold War and until the end of the 1980s, both countries had secured a measure of strategic convergence through ASEAN and related initiatives. Structurally, the most important stabilizer to the bilateral relationship was the expansion of the British-initiated and sponsored defence arrangements in AMDA. Similarly, the FPDA that replaced AMDA in 1972, after the latter had lapsed a year earlier, also continued to provide structural engagement and stability. The involvement of external powers, in particular Australia, which often performed a mediating role between the two countries, was also a useful stabilizer. However, such structural arrangements began to increasingly lose their utility and were unable to prevent the bilateral defence and strategic relationship from deteriorating in the late 1980s and 1990s. Part of the reason for this deterioration was the changed environmental security landscape that excluded communism as a threat to regional security, Singapore’s extensive modernization of the SAF, including the purchase of sophisticated weapon systems; its increasingly clear alignment with the US which involved the stationing of strategic personnel and equipment; and Malaysia’s own reappraisal of its defence doctrine which involved the movement away from counter-insurgency operations and towards conventional warfare. The disbandment of the CPM in December 1989 effectively ended threats arising from communist insurgency. Against this broader backdrop, the initial deterioration of bilateral ties began in 1988 with the Malaysian government’s announcement of the crippling of a spy ring and the arrest of seven persons, five Malaysian military officers and two ‘foreigners’, a euphemism for Singapore nationals.21 Following that episode, a number of other issues straining bilateral ties were brought to the fore, especially Malaysian allegations of airspace violations by Singapore aircraft and helicopters.22 Subsequently, Malaysia significantly reduced the low-flying area for Singapore military aircraft. The crisis point was reached when Malaysia unilaterally cancelled a joint naval exercise (Malapura) at the Lumut Tactical Training Centre in Perak in 1990. A joint tri-service exercise by Malaysia and Indonesia (Malindo Darsasa) in August 1991 which involved a large number of paratroopers, held with little notice at the Pulada camp in southern Johor, just 20 kilometres from Singapore during Singapore’s national day celebrations raised the ire of the Singapore government, which responded with an open mobilization exercise of its defence forces.23 Curiously enough, this period of tense relations between Malaysia and Singapore was somewhat offset by strengthened relations between Singapore and Indonesia. In recent years, Indonesia has allowed Singapore’s air force to use its airspace for training, which led to the construction of the Siabu weapons range in Sumatra for joint air training. Since 1990 there have been regular military exercises (Safkar Indopura), and in 1991, Singapore concluded the MOU to buy water from Bintan Island in Riau.

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Between 1992 and 1995, bilateral relations between Singapore and Malaysia remained reasonably cordial before relations began to deteriorate again in 1996. In June 1996, at a Foreign Correspondents’ Club meeting in Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew responded to a question regarding the possibility of a remerger with Malaysia by saying that such was indeed possible if Singapore could not sustain itself politically and economically. He noted, however, that such a development would be on Malaysia’s terms—a reference to policies favouring ethnic Malays. Lee then went on to say that a remerger would be easier if Malaysia implemented policies based on individual merit.24 It was not long before both the Malaysian political elite and the mass media highlighted Lee’s comments, which were probably meant as a warning to Singapore nationals not to take the country’s political stability and economic prosperity for granted. In fact, Singapore’s leaders have, on numerous occasions, stated that Singapore’s existence and well-being are functions of sheer will and determination to overcome insurmountable odds. Malaysia’s leaders viewed Lee’s comments differently—as an opening of old wounds in that differences in development plans were among the major issues between the PAP and Malaysian leaders at the time of political separation in 1965. It was also thought that Singapore was deliberately playing down Malaysia’s achievements and casting the country in a negative light by suggesting that its ethnic groups were not treated equally. From Kuala Lumpur’s vantage point, Singapore discriminates against its own ethnic Malay population.25 The second and more important dispute actually arose out of the political campaign leading up to the Singapore general election of January 1997. One of the opposition candidates was a lawyer named Tang Liang Hong, who was facing a lawsuit alleging that he had libelled Lee Kuan Yew and his son, Lee Hsien Loong, in comments made to a Hong Kong magazine, Yazhou Zhoukan, charging impropriety in the Lees’ purchases of luxury condominiums. As the election campaign gathered momentum, it became clear that the opposition received reasonably strong support in the Cheng San constituency that Tang was contesting. The ruling PAP, determined to take Cheng San, orchestrated a high-profile campaign, which included speeches by the prime minister. During the campaign, the PAP called Tang Liang Hong an ‘anti-Christian anti-English educated Chinese chauvinist’, a charge Tang denied. As allegations and insults were traded, the PAP announced that it was filing a number of lawsuits against Tang for defamation. Immediately after the election, Tang asserted that he was being harassed and that the PAP establishment was out to destroy him; subsequently, he fled across the causeway to Johor, from where he continued to attack Singapore leaders. The PAP, fearing that Tang would liquidate his assets before the settlement of the lawsuits against him, filed a Mareva injunction that legally bound governments internationally to freeze his and his wife’s assets worldwide. In doing so, however, the PAP team, led by Lee Kuan Yew, had to submit to open court hearings, and Lee’s now famous comments regarding the crime situation in Johor were made public. An affidavit, signed by the senior Lee, his son, and six other MPs, including the prime minister and his deputy, Tony Tan, identified Johor as a place ‘notorious for shootings, muggings and carjackings’.26 The lawsuits against Tang have since been heard in court and judgment made in favour of the PAP team for 7.175 million Singapore dollars. The award was reduced to 3.63 million Singapore dollars after Tang won an appeal in absentia.

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The Malaysian response to the disclosure was swift and furious. Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi called the remarks ‘callous’. He summoned Singapore’s acting high commissioner in Malaysia and gave him an aide-mémoire demanding that the Singapore government explain Lee’s statement, retract it, and tender an apology. Prime Minister Mahathir observed that ‘friendly relations with Singapore require considerable effort, and sometimes things are said and done which make it difficult to be friendly’.27 The most scathing criticisms of Lee cam from Zahid Hamidi, the UMNO Youth leader, who called Lee ‘uncouth and senile’. An UMNO Youth demonstration in Johor featured placards calling Lee an ‘evil spirit’ (hantu raya), ‘illegitimate child’ (anak haram), ‘senile’ (nyanyok) and ‘insolent’ (biadap), among other things.28 UMNO Youth has traditionally been the torch bearer of Malay nationalism. Apparently there was no unanimity within the Malaysian government regarding the appropriate response.29 In fact, when the row was at its peak, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, chairing a Cabinet meeting on 26 March 1997, reportedly endorsed a freeze in bilateral relations with Singapore.30 Prime Minister Mahathir, on his return from Tokyo, a day after the freeze was announced on 27 March, denied that there was a freeze, adding to old speculations that there was a rift between him and his deputy.31 For his part, Lee Kuan Yew acknowledged having offended Malaysian sensibilities and recorded his unreserved apology to Malaysia on two occasions immediately after his comments were made public. He instructed his legal counsel to remove the offending phrase from the affidavit. Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong noted that Lee’s comments were ‘offside’ (an analogy drawn from English soccer). The Malaysian Cabinet decided later, on 28 March, to accept Lee’s apology and announced its desire to normalize relations with Singapore, while noting its ‘regret that some members of the Singapore Government seemed to lack in insight and earnestness, even appear to trivialize what is at issue’.32 Calls were also made by Hamid Zahidi, the UMNO Youth leader, and Datuk Abdul Ghani Othman, the Johor Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) for Lee Kuan Yew’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, to tender an apology separate from that of his father.33 Just when it appeared as if the bilateral relationship had stabilized, Lee Kuan Yew’s publication of his memoirs during his seventy-fifth birthday celebrations in September 1998 reopened old wounds. Part of the reason for this observation is that whereas Lee noted in his introduction to the book that his motivation in publishing the memoirs was to accurately document historical developments pertaining to Singapore, Malaysian leaders regarded some of Lee’s candid observations about the Tengku, his successor Tun Razak, and the ex-MCA president Tun Tan Siew Sin, among others, as provocative and unwarranted. It was also felt that since those whom accusations were levelled against were no longer alive, a fair hearing and defence against the accusations were not possible, and therefore Lee’s observations were partial and uncorroborated. Further compounding the situation, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 significantly exaggerated the political and economic differences between the two countries (the latter issue will be discussed in the following section). Arising from such differences and Malaysian allegations regarding Singapore’s role in intensifying the crisis, it introduced a number of measures with clear political repercussions for Singapore. In the first instance, it withdrew from an FPDA exercise scheduled that year and announced a review of its external defence relations. In addition, beginning in September 1998, it banned access for

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flight overspace to all Singapore military aircraft, signalling a new low point in the bilateral defence relationship. It was only after Lee Kuan Yew’s resolution of the outstanding bilateral issues three years later in September 2001 that such flight overspace was reopened. In addition, fortunately for both countries, member nations of the FPDA pledged to reinvigorate the FPDA over a five-year period, expanding on the present routine of military exercises. They also agreed to broaden the scope of their security consideration to include new threats such as ‘terrorism, piracy and illegal immigrants’.34 Differences in political and security relations between the two countries is also a function of growing divergence in foreign policy output and preferences that began in the 1970s. Beginning then, those involved in Malaysian foreign policy-making expressed a strong desire for latitude in defining a clear Malaysian identity. For example, it was owing to Malaysian initiatives that in 1971 ASEAN endorsed the concept of Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). In addition, Malaysia formally established diplomatic ties with China in 1974, well before Indonesia and Singapore, which did not do so until 1990. Finally, since 1981, Malaysia, under Mahathir’s leadership, has clearly expressed a preference for a ‘Look East’ policy towards Northeast Asia for both economic leadership and political stability. Its earlier push for the EAEG in 1993 and the AMF with Japanese leadership in 1998 after the onset of the Asian financial crisis are but examples of such an orientation. Singapore, on the other hand, with its perception of threats firmly anchored in maritime Southeast Asia, especially after the dissipation of bipolarity and the collapse of the Indochina Security Complex, has increasingly aligned itself with the United States. An expansive Vietnam appeared especially threatening in the 1970s and 1980s while the potential evacuation of the US from the regional scene after the termination of its bases in the Philippines in 1991 precipitated such an alignment. The high point of Singapore’s alignment with the US was reached in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the two countries in 1990 and the subsequent Implementation Arrangements, which allowed for the stationing of the Logistics Command of the American Seventh Fleet (COMLOG WESTPAC) and F-16 fighter aircraft on rotational deployment in Singapore.35 An addendum to the MOU also allowed for large American warships, including aircraft carriers, to berth at the newly completed deep draught Changi Naval Base from 2000. In March 2001, the US carrier Kittyhawk anchored at Changi in the first docking and replenishment of its kind.36 Finally, it should be acknowledged that political leadership and initiatives deriving thereof are invariably important intervening variables that have the capacity to either intensify or resolve a potentially conflictual situation. In this regard, it should be noted that Mahathir was far more prepared to pursue an aggressive foreign policy compared to his predecessors. From attempting to reinvigorate Third World fora to criticizing hypocritical Western attitudes on issues such as deforestation, human rights, democracy and press freedom, Mahathir has clearly emerged as a champion of Third World causes. The diplomatic row with the United Kingdom when Mahathir first assumed the country’s leadership, and the one with Australia over his refusal to attend APEC’s inaugural meeting in Seattle in November 1993, when former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called him a ‘recalcitrant’, are well remembered by Malaysians. The country’s relative political calm and stunning economic performance since the 1980s have made Malaysia confident in its foreign policy dealings. Consequently, it was no surprise that

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Malaysian elites reacted so strongly to Lee Kuan Yew’s comments on the crime situation in Johor in the 1998 PAP affidavit. In fact, Malaysia’s special envoy to the United States, Abdullah Ahmad, noted: The recent experience should serve as a clear warning that Singapore could ignore its geopolitical and economic compulsions only at its own peril.’37 A second and less noticed development is that although the affidavit with the negative comments on the crime situation in Johor was signed by eight Singapore politicians, including Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and his deputy Tony Tan, only Lee Kuan Yew, and to a lesser extent Lee Hsien Loong, were subjected to Malaysian hostilities. On the basis of that distinction, probably far from a chance occurrence, it would be reasonable to infer that there was some attempt at singling out specific individuals to bear the brunt of the criticisms. The inclusion of the younger Lee may perhaps have been an attempt to associate him with the historical and emotional baggage that have in the past characterized Malaysian assessments of Lee Kuan Yew. In other words, both father and son are viewed as being inherently unfriendly towards Malaysia. The publication of the senior Lee’s memoirs in 1998 naturally exaggerated such perceptions. Goh Chok Tong, on the other hand, was appraised as being ‘rather nice, hinting possibly at the Singapore Government’s wish to resolve the crisis [fall-out from the 1998 affidavit] as soon as possible’.38 Notwithstanding Malaysian elite and media appraisals of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore nationals generally regard the senior Lee as deserving of respect for his experience, political judgement and contributions to the development of Singapore in the post-1965 period. In fact, the most significant bilateral agreements or resolution of problems have been initiatives led by Lee. Such was the case in 1990 before Goh Chok Tong assumed the prime ministership as well as the two occasions in August 2000 and September 2001 when the entire bundle of outstanding bilateral issues was almost resolved. In this regard, notwithstanding Malaysian criticisms of Lee, he has both represented Singapore and successfully negotiated the resolution of outstanding bilateral problems on a number of occasions. Accordingly, Lee’s political acumen and negotiation skills will be readily acknowledged by the Singapore government. It is perhaps during the post-Lee era that Singapore may face greater difficulty in resolving bilateral spats, when succeeding negotiators will command lesser respect and correspondingly perhaps accrue lesser leeway in their bundle of instruments to be brought to bear on difficult negotiations. For in Malay political culture, seniority and standing are important considerations in the negotiation process. Whatever the future may hold for future negotiators, it needs to be noted in drawing this section to a close that, in the final analysis, states do not make policies, statesmen do.

Economic issues Traditionally, economic relations between Malaysia and Singapore tended to be complementary rather than competitive. Such a situation was certainly true of the relationship until the 1980s and a number of reasons accounted for this. First, since Singapore had evolved alongside Malacca and Penang as trading ports to service the Malaysian hinterland, Singapore continued to perform this function for some two decades

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after its independence. In this regard, Singapore remained as the major exit point for Malaysian exports, in particular critical export items such as rubber and tin. Second, since Singapore invariably tended to be better developed and was able to offer better infrastructure and service-related support facilities, it accrued a natural advantage as a transshipment point. Third, Singapore’s own entrepreneurs invariably found Malaysia an attractive destination for investments where land and labour costs were significantly cheaper. In addition, Malaysia provided a social and legal framework not unlike that of Singapore where such entrepreneurs, especially those in the manufacturing sector, enjoyed a familiar operational environment. Beginning from the 1980s, however, there were a number of structural changes that were brought to bear on the relationship. The most serious of these was perhaps Prime Minister Mahathir’s desire for Malaysia to attain developed country status by 2020. Against the backdrop of political stability and double-digit economic growth for the 1980s, this vision was encapsulated and driven home forcefully by the phrase ‘Malaysia boleh’ (Malaysia can). As this broader plan evolved, much of the complementarity in the economic relationship between the two countries dissipated and the relationship became increasingly competitive. None the less, mutual interdependence between the two countries for trade and investment has continued unabated, as reflected in the most recent statistics.39 Much of the attraction for Singapore companies lies in the relative abundance of low-priced land and labour. Malaysia has been a traditional source of labour for Singapore, especially skilled and semi-skilled blue-collar workers for the construction and shipbuilding industries. Currently, approximately 60,000 Malaysians work in Singapore, many shuttling back and forth daily. As part of Vision 2020, Malaysia aggressively pursued a policy of the development of its infrastructural facilities and downstream industries obtaining from the country’s primary sector. Many such developments naturally cut into Singapore’s role as a provider of such services. In the area of infrastructure development, for example, Malaysia significantly upgraded its ports, especially those in the south of the country, in direct competition with Singapore. These included the ports of Pasir Gudang and Tanjung Pelepas in southern Johor and Port Kelang in Selangor. Malaysia was also able to capitalize on multinational interest in an ownership stake in these ports both for capital injection and efficiency. As a result, A.P.Moeller, the parent company of Danish-flagged Maersk Sealand International, bought a 30 per cent stake in Tanjung Pelepas in 2000 and relocated its transshipment hub from Singapore.40 Similarly, Hong Kong-listed multinational Hutchison Whampoa acquired a 30 per cent stake in Port Kelang in 2000.41 The most recent development in this area of competition, especially since Singapore has for many years now been the busiest port in the world, is the announcement by Taiwanese shipping giant Uniglory (previously known as Evergreen Lines) that it is relocating to Tanjung Pelapas.42 Such major movements, particularly since major shipping lines ‘carry’ their feeder services with them, and also because there are only some six major lines in the international market, pose a direct challenge to Singapore’s dominance in the global shipping industry.43 Another major area of competition is in air and road communications. Just as its ports have been rebuilt and upgraded, Malaysia has also significantly enhanced its status as an air travel and cargo hub. The newly opened M$5 billion Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Sepang overtook Changi International Airport in Singapore in terms of its

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ratings by air travellers in 2001.44 Singapore, on the other hand, in view of the downturn in the aviation and tourist industry arising from the 11 September terrorist incident in New York, announced the postponement of the construction of a third terminal for Changi airport. Malaysia’s upgrading of its Senai airport in Johor, curiously enough, attracts a large number of Singapore nationals, who travel by coach to Johor and then fly from there to take advantage of significant discounts in the price of air tickets. A series of highways, especially the North-South Highway, provide efficient road travel in Malaysia, and tentative plans to grid the KTM network to the trans-Asian railway line linking the country to China is also likely to enhance further infrastructural development. In a bid to develop its own downstream industries, tin and rubber are now processed and exported directly from Malaysia rather than through Singapore. Similarly, petroleum and timber are also processed locally in order to provide for more employment as well as revenue. Finally, in the area of electronics manufacturing, Malaysia has constructed a 750-hectare Multimedia Super Corridor, which has already attracted leading software multinationals such as Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, Rand McNally and Ericsson.45 Such investors are likely to channel some of their foreign direct investments from Singapore to Malaysia. It would also be fair to assume that Malaysia will in the future compete directly with Singapore in the electronics sector, which currently accounts for some 40 per cent of Singapore’s high-value-added niche manufacturing, particularly in the area of microelectronic chip manufacture and wafer fabrication. Malaysia’s development plans, then, are likely to be in competition with Singapore’s own plan, and competition also exists in the area of overseas investments. Both public and private companies compete for opportunities in countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, India and China. Finally, it should be noted that Malaysia and Singapore appear to have different plans for regional economic cooperation. Mahathir’s Vision 2020, which is tied to a ‘Look East’ policy, has also been a cause of some friction between the two countries. Malaysia’s preference for emulating the Japanese and Taiwanese models of development rather than those derived from the industrialized West has also placed Malaysia and Singapore on a collision course on a number of occasions. Malaysia’s preference for the EAEG in place of APEC in 1993 and warnings issued by Malaysia’s Trade and Industry Minister, Rafidah Aziz, that the endorsement of APEC over the EAEG risked fissuring ASEAN were clearly aimed at Singapore, which not only embraced APEC but hosted the organization’s headquarters as well.46 Similarly, Singapore remains apprehensive regarding Malaysia’s push for the countries of Northeast Asia to take a greater leadership role in Asian political and economic matters. As a major trading nation and one with a clear security alignment with the United States, Singapore’s preference is clearly the Western model of a liberal trading regime in economic matters to sustain its investments and trade, and overwhelming American power in security matters to compensate for its small size and perceived vulnerability in security matters. When the Asian financial crisis struck Southeast Asia in July 1997 following the devaluation of the Thai baht, Malaysia was affected more significantly economically than Singapore. Rather than opting for international institutionalist remedies through loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, Malaysia opted for a counter-intuitive regime of economic controls in 1998. Many of these controls were clearly aimed at Singapore and a number of them warrant mention. First, Malaysia

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banned the trading of its shares through offshore markets and immediately put an end to the Stock Exchange of Singapore’s (SGX) trading of Malaysian shares through its Central-Linked Order Book (CLOB) system. The suspension of CLOB froze the accounts of 172,000 Singapore nationals with a combined investment portfolio of some S$5.4 billion.47 Singapore investors were unhappy that the SGX was unable to respond in favour of its domestic clientele who had been paying a transaction fee for their trading of CLOB shares and there were numerous calls among disgruntled investors for the SGX to resolve the issue in a manner favourable to them.48 Caught in a bind, the SGX’s response was that it was merely a facilitator to the transaction of CLOB shares and in a similar capacity would arrange for the transfer of these shares into omnibus accounts at the Malaysian stock exchange. Eventually, the situation was resolved in 2000 when a Malaysian holding company, Effective Capital, was authorized to act as the transfer agent for shareholder accounts for an upfront fee.49 The entire episode led to many Singapore investors feeling aggrieved that their interests had not been protected and that influential businessmen with political connections in Malaysia had benefited at their expense. The shares were finally released for trading over a staggered period and on a percentage basis in order that the Malaysian market would not be flooded overnight through foreign shares leading to significant stock price erosion. While the entire matter was being played out in Singapore, Malaysia simply noted that the trading of its shares overseas was illegal, and that the SGX had been previously notified of the Malaysian position. Another ruling that irked the Singapore government was the Malaysian declaration that all Malaysian dollar (ringgit) holdings, both in liquid form and in the form of offshore deposits, would become null and void by December 1998. This ruling again placed immense pressure on Singapore’s financial system that held approximately M$10 billion in private and public funds. The entire amount was therefore forcibly repatriated at very short notice. According to the Malaysian government, this measure was meant to prevent speculative interest in the country’s currency and the charge that Singapore banks were offering significantly higher interest rates of up to 20 per cent on the ringgit, leading to the flight of domestic capital. Other measures introduced to prevent capital flight included staggered charges on the repatriation of revenue derived from stock and property capital appreciation within a three-year period which also hurt Singapore investors, given their extensive interests in these sectors. The third issue that strained relations between the two countries was the Singapore government’s refusal to allow Malaysian nationals to draw or repatriate their Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings from Singapore following termination of employment. Some S$2 billion had been deposited by Malaysian nationals who are unable to withdraw their compulsory savings and this was a source of some irritation to Malaysia since nationals of other countries are allowed to withdraw their savings after termination of employment. Singapore simply maintained that such a practice had existed since the postindependence period when Malaysian nationals were treated differently and that it saw no reason to disband the existing policy. This issue was initially resolved by Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to collectively settle the bundle of all outstanding bilateral issues in September 2001. Under the original agreement, Singapore was to have accorded Malaysian nationals similar treatment as other foreigners and to allow them to withdraw their CPF savings upon termination of employment. Such withdrawals were to take place

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over a two-year period beginning in September 2001.50 However, this agreement, as noted above, became unstuck in 2002 and the matter is currently being negotiated. The 1998 imposition of financial controls by the Malaysian government was also accompanied by deteriorating political and security ties. It may be remembered from the previous section, for example, that Malaysia also withdrew from FPDA exercises at the same time and imposed a ban on flight overspace for military aircraft from Singapore. Hence, after 1991, 1998 served as the second low point in the bilateral relations between the two countries. Given the extensive linkages between the two countries, it is not uncommon for both progress and tension to surface simultaneously in a number of issue areas. The difference between the earlier situation in 1991 and the later one in 1998 is that the earlier situation was accompanied by a significant enhancement of Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia. Such seeming triangulation of the bilateral relationship was certainly not forthcoming in 1998. The reason is perhaps owing to the fact that following Suharto’s resignation in May 1998 and Habibie’s ascendancy to the presidency, Singapore lost much social capital and goodwill in Indonesia.51 Habibie was clearly less favourably disposed towards Singapore, and policy formulators in Singapore must have calculated strategically that normalizing Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Malaysia would be far more prudent than triangulating the situation with Indonesia.

Social issues Many of the social issues in the bilateral relationship between Singapore and Malaysia actually derive from the structuration of society in both countries. The breakdown of the population in terms of percentages for the three dominant ethnic groups—Chinese, Malays and Indians—combined with the political predominance of different ethnic communities in both countries has led to a number of problems. Since Malays, who form the clear majority in Malaysia, are also Muslims, there is a religious angle to the differentiation process. The communalization of the political process in Malaysia has had definite repercussions for Singapore, although the PAP government constantly projects itself as a multiracial party with a universal mandate. It may be remembered from the earlier discussion at the outset, for example, that ethno-religious differences between UMNO and PAP were at the heart of many problems faced by Singapore during its failed merger with Malaysia. These problems were compounded by Malaysia’s ascriptive policy of furthering indigenous rights and development. Some of those tensions continue to haunt both countries where comparisons are common-place. Hence, it is not uncommon for Malay political elite and interest groups to take offence at remarks made by PAP leaders on the socioeconomic standing of the Malay community in Singapore. In addition, although the PAP practises universal norms in its recruitment and public policies, it often compares levels of deprivation and achievement across ethnic groups. In this regard, the PAP government does use ethnicity for differentiation and statistical purposes. Such comparisons and comments on ‘ethnically inspired’ values and liabilities provide a potent discourse for Malay elite where comments on ethnicity fall well within the realm of the political. Singapore’s seeming promotion of ‘Chinese values’, such as the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools that teach English and Mandarin at first language levels, the constant

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exhortation to recruit and train a Chinese intellectual elite and the annual ‘Speak Mandarin Campaign’, also appear to have weakened the state’s previous commitment to multi-ethnicity. Such policies have created a majority-minority mindset rather than an inclusive national image for a significant segment of the local Malay community.52 Since the situation is reversed in the case of Malaysia, in that the Malays form the overwhelming majority, cross-national comparisons of the well-being of ethnic communities is inevitable. Exaggerating the situation is the fact that Singapore Malays can easily claim citizenship in Malaysia and many Malaysian Chinese have likewise ‘migrated’ to Singapore. There are also a large number of Malaysian Chinese skilled and semi-skilled workers who cross the border to work in Singapore daily. Such ‘ethnic’ transnational linkages and interests have continued to haunt the Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relationship, albeit the level of tensions deriving from them are no longer as intense as they were in the post-independence period.53 This attitude is a reflection of the status of both countries as separate states as well as the reduced social interactions between the elite of both countries. Symbolic visits during the Chinese and Malay New Years continue to obtain in recognition of goodwill and mutual interdependence. Another source of irritation involving ethnicity pertains to military conscription in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Owing to inter-ethnic tensions and perceptions in both countries and with the possibility of a spill-over effect, the SAF appears to have consciously refrained from placing its Malay nationals in sensitive postings, particularly in the manning of heavy weapon systems and in the air force. This issue first received public attention when Lee Hsien Loong, in a widely publicized speech in 1988, acknowledged the situation, noting that the Singapore government did not wish to put ‘Malay loyalties to the test’. This statement, which carried with it the implication that Malay loyalties were potentially suspect and that the country had not discounted the possibility of waging war with Malaysia, was widely denounced.54 Similarly, in 2000, Lee Kuan Yew noted that it was not prudent to place a Malay in charge of a machine-gun section, again alluding to similar insinuations. Such pronouncements by the PAP elite have attracted resentment on both sides of the causeway. On the Singapore side, the Malay community appears outraged that it is not regarded as equal to the other ethnic groups, and that its loyalties remain suspect in the eyes of the PAP government.55 This sense of alienation is potentially damaging for Singapore’s multi-ethnic fabric. It also has the potential to be tapped by unscrupulous individuals and organizations with their own agendas like Islamist extremist groups. If comparisons between the status of similar ethnic groups constitute a potential problem for both countries, tensions between the dominant ethnic groups in a single country also have the potential to trigger a spill-over effect. In this regard, Singapore does not discount the possibility of ethnically inspired violence in Malaysia spilling over into Singapore and vice versa. This possibility is one of the major reasons why the newspapers of both countries are barred from mass circulation across borders and why elite forces from both countries maintain rigorous border check-points. Regular police cooperation and the sharing of intelligence on transnational crimes such as armed robbery, piracy, drug trafficking and smuggling have also allowed for high levels of cooperation between the enforcement authorities of both countries. Like ethnicity, religion provides another issue for potential bilateral problems. The Malaysian religious situation is complicated by the existence of an opposition political

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party with a religious platform and constituency—PAS. In the Malaysian national election in 1999, PAS secured the state of Terengganu over and above its resident stronghold of Kelantan. Malay voter support for UMNO declined dramatically after the arrest and detention of Mahathir’s ex-deputy Anwar Ibrahim.56 PAS is increasingly viewed by urban and rural Malay-Muslims as a viable alternative to UMNO. In the past, only the rural Malay community used to support PAS. However, beginning in the 1970s and in conjunction with the global resurgence of Islam, urban Malays have increasingly become more devout and socially conscious.57 Whereas in the past UMNO was viewed as a party that promoted Malay interests nationally, there is increasing resentment that the party only rewards office-holders within its ranks and favoured businessmen. Such perceptions became entrenched over revelations that party members and their relatives had been selectively rewarded with stock options and favoured businessmen were often rescued by state-led bail-out packages. Such charges have been levelled against highranking UMNO elite, including Mahathir himself, who has been accused of furthering his sons’ business interests. Especially contentious was the national petroleum company Petronas’ bail-out of Konsortium Perkapalan (Malaysian International Shipping Corporation—MISC) which belonged to Mirzan Mahathir. Such revelations and timely circulars aptly labelled ‘poison pen letters’ that are meant to tarnish the image of political office-holders and their competitors have regularly surfaced in Malaysia ahead of important elections. These allegations, some of which have been substantiated, have placed UMNO in a negative light. As a result of these developments, PAS has benefited from a surge in popularity for its call to lead an exemplary life using religion as a yardstick. The party’s leader Nik Aziz is widely revered by his followers in Kelantan for practising a humble and exemplary lifestyle. Fortunately for UMNO, there have been a number of incidents involving religious extremism in recent years that have worked to its favour. These include the Memali incident in Kedah in 1986 where a clash between religious extremists and police resulted in the death of fourteen people. In 1995, the government acted against the Darul Arqam sect with a following of over 100,000 members for preaching intolerance, and detained its leader Ashari Mohammad who subsequently repented his acts and apologized in a televised confession. Most recently, in 2000, the government confronted a group of religious radicals from the Al Ma’unah sect who had broken into a military armoury and stolen a large cache of weapons to wage war against the government. The last incident was by far the most serious and took many analysts and observers by surprise. None the less, to refute the claim that the government’s version of the story was not entirely compelling, the entire episode was re-enacted to satisfy doubters. Eventually, nineteen members of the cult were found guilty of armed rebellion against the state and treasonous behaviour, and three of the nineteen have been sentenced to death.58 During the stand-off against the military, the cult group had killed a policeman and a soldier who had been taken hostage. Hence it is quite clear that the Malaysian religious situation is complicated and that there is a clear linkage between religion and politics in the country. Whereas some of the Malay resentment against the high-handed and corrupt practices associated with UMNO have won sympathy votes for PAS, UMNO has in turn also been able to capitalize on the outbreaks of extremism by linking them to PAS. The clearest attempt at establishing such a linkage was the Malaysian government’s decision to detain Nik Adli, PAS chief Nik

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Aziz’s son, indefinitely under the Internal Security Act for having volunteered to fight alongside the Mujahideen in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. He was accused of ‘trying to overthrow Prime Minister Mahathir’s moderate, secular government and seeking to create an Islamic state linking Malaysia to Indonesia and the southern Philippines’.59 This fluid situation is likely to persist for some time. In Singapore, on the other hand, the state maintains regulatory controls over religion through a number of bodies and has even expressed its desire to integrate the Malay-Muslim madrasahs (Arabic-styled religious schools) lest the government’s conception of an inclusive national identity be eroded by ethnically inspired tendencies and developments.60 Perhaps the best example of how religious sentiments between the two countries can affect their bilateral relationship was borne out in 1987 when Singapore invited the then Israeli President Chaim Herzog for a state visit. The ensuing response from the region’s Muslim majority countries—Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia—was immediate and symbolically significant. All three countries withdrew their ambassadors for consultation but it was in Malaysia where the outpourings of unhappiness were the loudest and lasted the longest.61 There were a number of reasons for such a response. First, an invitation to a Zionist head of state was viewed as a provocation of Islam. Second, the small state of Israel is viewed as representing all that is abhorred in the Muslim world, including political violence against Palestinians and unjust occupation of territory in contravention of international codes of conduct. If a similar parallel was made with the Singapore situation, it too is thought of as having a siege mentality and a perceived hostile immediate environment in the Malay Archipelago populated by Muslims. Its adoption of Israeli military doctrine merely served to confirm such perceptions. In fact, the Malaysian protestations were so intense and sustained that the Singapore government, in a rare display of acknowledgement of indiscreet decision-making, noted that it would not have gone ahead with the visit had it known that the incident would lead to such strained ties with its neighbouring states. None the less, it noted, as a sovereign state, that it alone deserved the right to make decisions on matters of protocol. To conclude this section, it may be noted that ethnicity and religion continue to be important factors which condition the bilateral relationship between Singapore and Malaysia. Whereas Singapore subscribes to more universal policies in politics and administration, it has not entirely escaped the use of ethnicity for comparative purposes in issues ranging from drug addiction and divorce rates to educational achievement and income disparities. Such a discourse, which according to the PAP government is meant to promote mutual self-help, also provides for resentment and ill-will both domestically and within Malaysia. Malays, with rare exceptions, have been, after all, the most underprivileged ethnic socio-economic group. Such comparisons and comments on Malay loyalties have also invited scrutiny and criticism from Malaysia. Accordingly, it is arguable that social issues will have political repercussions as well. In this regard, in the perceptions of Malaysian elite and the public at large, all discourse is filtered through an ethnic lens. As difficult as this may be for Singapore, such is the reality of the situation. Singapore’s bilateral relations with Malaysia, in its various issue areas, do constitute an extremely important aspect of foreign policy output. In fact, it is sufficiently discrete to warrant separate consideration unto itself while acknowledging the linkages with a wider policy environment. The relationship, as once characterized by Lee Hsien Loong in Malay, is like that of the roots of the bamboo and the river (saperti aur dengan tebing).62

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There is much symbiosis and mutual interdependence, and an unhealthy situation in one country will certainly have a spill-over effect on the other. Political elites involved in negotiating difficult issues and tense situations between both countries have remained rational thus far, as indicated by the developments of 1991 and 1998, the two recent low points in the bilateral relationship. It is noteworthy that all difficult issues have been bilaterally resolved, with the exception of a single instance of overlapping territorial claims that was referred to the ICJ. Such an approach is preferred, since it prevents political posturing and the negotiation process from being subjected to pressures from interest groups. Multilateralism is not viewed as a viable option, although both countries, as noted above, sometimes triangulate the situation with Indonesia in order to achieve greater strategic leverage. Such triangulation has however become rather difficult since 1998 following the downfall of the Suharto government, since Indonesia has had to deal with the turbulence and violence associated with regime change and to cope with the fallout of the Asian financial crisis. In this regard, Indonesia’s introversion has led to the loss of its utility within a triangular relationship together with Singapore and Malaysia. Fortunately for Singapore, however, is the fact that Malaysia underwent leadership transition in October 2003. Mahathir Mohammad was replaced by his deputy Abdullah Badawi as the country’s fifth prime minister. It is generally thought that Badawi has a much more consultative style and is also much more tempered in his foreign policy pronouncements than his predecessor. Consequently, it appears likely that Badawi will be more amenable to negotiating differences with Singapore than Mahathir. The initial signs certainly seem to indicate that Malaysia-Singapore relations are likely to receive a boost from the leadership transition.63 The importance of political leadership in Malaysia and Indonesia in setting the tone and temper of bilateral relations with Singapore certainly cannot be exaggerated. In this regard, it may be remembered that Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia was also subjected to significant turbulence following the collapse of the Suharto government in 1998. B.J.Habibie, who succeeded Suharto, and Abdurrahman Wahid after that, were especially critical of Singapore. In fact, the situation only achieved a modicum of normalcy after Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced Wahid as President of Indonesia in 2001.

6 Important regional bilateral relationships Indonesia Indonesian political stability and leadership are crucial to the maintenance of a stable environment in Southeast Asia. This observation is as much a function of Indonesia’s overwhelming physical and demographic presence in the region as is the country’s perceived proprietary claim to regional political leadership.1 Within these objective realities the situation can be either positive or negative. In a positive situation, Indonesian hegemonic ambitions would be usefully channelled into a regional leadership role, not unlike its primus inter pares status in ASEAN. On the other hand, in a negative situation, the entire region could become politically turbulent, akin to the Indonesian military confrontation against Malaysia between 1963 and 1966. Countries in maritime Southeast Asia realized quickly into the post-independence period that Indonesian perceptions of its leadership role required explicit if not tacit recognition. Accordingly, Indonesia’s regional leadership role is rarely overtly challenged in maritime Southeast Asia. Two other dynamics are correlated to this regional leadership role. The first of these is domestic political stability and control. Arguably, it is difficult to maintain unified political control over a non-contiguous archipelagic state comprising some 17,000 islands. This geographical challenge is compounded by the ethno-linguistic and religious diversity that is characteristic of the country.2 Since Dutch colonial times, political authority and administrative power has emanated not just from the island of Java, but specifically the Javanese ethnic majority which comprises some 45 per cent of the country’s total population.3 The rich volcanic soils of the island sustained intensive and widespread rice cultivation that inspired Clifford Geertz’s book on agricultural involution.4 Whereas power and authority in Indonesia is centrifugal, there are equally important centripetal pressures deriving from the country’s diversity and historical baggage. To ensure compliance, especially in the peripherally differentiated and potentially rebellious provinces like Aceh and West Irian, Suharto’s New Order government often used blunt instruments such as brutal military suppression which only aggravated the situation.5 Indonesian nationalists are inspired and motivated to maintaining the territorial coherence of the state, albeit there may be disagreements over the correct policies to employ in securing that goal. However, weakened central power in Jakarta often threatens the cohesion of the state. Some such threats are a function of natural combustion while others are intentionally instigated in order to deny incumbent governments the legitimacy they are so anxious to procure.6 Hence suffice it to say then that Indonesian regional political leadership is closely correlated to domestic political order. The second dynamic is a derivative of the larger regional environment in Southeast Asia. As noted above, the region was subjected in the past to two security complexes that

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were reasonably discrete yet interactive to the extent that they were inversely proportional and determined the contours of regional political discourse and ensuing developments. In mainland Southeast Asia where the Indochina Security Complex operated until the late 1980s, Vietnam was measured with due regard to what was considered to be Thailand’s legitimate security concerns. Such a position had a number of other outcomes. Two of these were important for maritime Southeast Asia. The first was significant weakening of the Malay Archipelago Complex that attributed hegemonic ambitions to Indonesia. The second and perhaps lesser noted development is that ASEAN recognition of Thai security concerns constrained Indonesia’s political leadership of the organization. In other words, Indonesian proprietary claims to regional leadership may be intrinsically valid in maritime Southeast Asia but were certainly subjected to constraints within a larger environment. None the less, it was Indonesia that on behalf of ASEAN hosted the two rounds of the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) in 1988 which tried to unify the Cambodian factions including the Khmer Rouge as a prelude to UN intervention in Cambodia.7 Similarly, Indonesia offered itself as an honest broker to host the talks between China and ASEAN states which had competing claims over the Spratly Islands in the 1990s. Similarly, it was Indonesia that hosted the peace talks between the Ramos government in the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which led eventually to a cease-fire and political settlement in October 1996.8 Hence it is arguable that Indonesian proprietary claims to regional political leadership have received a good measure of regional endorsement as well. In fact, at the height of Singapore-Malaysia bilateral tensions in 1991, it was Suharto who, in a fence-mending symbolic mission, used the causeway separating the two countries to visit Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew. For the purposes of this book, however, the concern is with Indonesia’s political hegemony over maritime Southeast Asia, which, as mentioned above, is Singapore’s immediate operational environment. It is within this framework that Singapore’s bilateral relations with Indonesia are extremely important. Indonesia presents both promises and perils for Singapore individually, within the triangular relationship with Malaysia and larger multilateral institutions like ASEAN. In addition, a number of institutions outside Southeast Asia with a discernible ASEAN core like APEC further exaggerate Indonesia’s utility for Singapore. As in Chapter 5, Singapore-Indonesia bilateral relations are examined within broad thematic frameworks while acknowledging that such conceptual discretion understates the manner in which issue areas interact and often impinge upon each other.

Political and security issues Singapore’s bilateral relations with Indonesia, like those with Malaysia, suffer from a historical overhang. Although the Singapore government enjoyed cordial relations with Indonesia from the early 1970s onwards, the overhang is deeply embedded in the minds of foreign policy formulators. There is a real sense in which the overhang is reinvoked to inform policy when the domestic political situation becomes turbulent in Indonesia. This reinvocation is quite simply a function of the fact that the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy is strong in the case of Indonesia. In addition, the manner in

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which Suharto accumulated immense power in his person meant that his downfall in 1998 had implications for Singapore. Alternative constituencies were not cultivated because Suharto tolerated no dissent, and skilfully played off competing centres of power in personalities and institutions against each other. In fact, even as early as 1973, Singapore’s normalization of diplomatic ties with Indonesia came against the backdrop of extensive diplomatic manoeuvring and the arrangement for Lee Kuan Yew to visit Jakarta. The symbolic act of sprinkling flowers on the graves of the marines who were executed for sabotage in 1968 was a necessary submission to Javanese ritualistic requirements.9 Javanese kebatinan or customary culture is deeply infused with pre-Islamic animist and mystic practices. In fact, Suharto was a firm believer in kebatinan, and his political and symbolic actions were derived from them. Not only did he consult the equivalent of soothsayers or dukun regularly but he was also convinced that all power had to emanate from him. This unified conception of power is significantly different from Weberian-style rational legal norms where power is located in an office rather than in a person. In this regard, kebatinan invoked the norms of traditional power within the Weberian scheme of things.10 Even when relations with Indonesia were good, Singapore, like Malaysia and Brunei in maritime Southeast Asia, has observed a measure of political deference towards Indonesia. Whereas such deference may not be visible overtly, a number of incidents attest to its presence. Thus, for example, when Indonesia occupied Timor in 1975, Singapore was initially opposed to the occupation and contemplated voting against Indonesia. However, an abstention on the vote was finally regarded as constituting a sufficiently negative response.11 The latter position sufficiently communicated the Singapore government’s ire without invoking a more negative response. Such an act would have symbolically demonstrated sufficient resistance and was understood by the authorities in Jakarta. This altered position was in clear contravention of Singapore’s established policy position on matters pertaining to the sovereignty and territoriality of small states, a rationalization that was cited for its vehement position on Cambodia and the US invasion of Grenada. The second instance demonstrating such deference occurred in 1990 when Singapore, in fulfilling an explicit promise to the Suharto government, only normalized diplomatic ties with China after Indonesia had done so. Indonesian normalization took place in August 1990 while Singapore did the same some months later in November 1990. Both of these incidents demonstrate the existence of Singapore’s political deference towards Indonesia. Such deference is however neither total nor unconditional. When Singapore’s core principles are clearly threatened or compromised, it is unlikely to be forthcoming. Similarly, when the diplomatic and political leverage deriving from it is unclear or uncertain, it is unlikely to be observed. Thus, for example, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and its fall-out, Singapore extended a US$5 billion trade financing guarantee to Indonesia that was in turn pegged to IMF conditions for disbursement.12 Eventually, only a small fraction of the entire amount was released, notwithstanding negative pronouncements and pressures from influential Indonesian politicians. Another factor that has always influenced the bilateral political relationship is Indonesian preference for a measure of neutrality in foreign policy output. From the time of political independence in December 1949, Indonesia has advocated a neutral foreign policy, although in practice the president always had a measure of discretionary authority.

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Sukarno was clearly more allied with China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and Suharto articulated an alignment towards the industrialized West. None the less, the themes of neutrality and non-alignment are fairly strong in foreign policy output.13 The articulation of this position was demonstrated early on when Indonesia convened the Afro-Asian Summit in Bandung in 1955 and, together with Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, became a founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1960s. Since 1971 when Indonesia endorsed ZOPFAN as an ASEAN policy, it has stated constantly that it is fundamentally opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Southeast Asia and its policy formulators have made negative comments about Singapore’s hosting of American forces. In 1993 when Indonesia assumed the chairmanship of NAM, it attempted to reinvigorate the organization.14 Hence, like Mahathir in Malaysia, Suharto also projected the image of a progressive Third World leader. His seniority, both in terms of age and tenure of office, gave him added legitimacy to fulfil such a role. In this regard, Singapore was fortunate in that it had cultivated extensive and mutually beneficial ties with Indonesia despite differing policy positions between 1975 and 1988 over ASEAN policies towards Vietnam. Indonesia’s desire to form and lead ASEAN after 1967 was received with a measure of suspicion by Singapore at the outset. The reason for this suspicion was embedded in Singapore’s turbulent bilateral relationship with its immediately adjacent neighbours during its early survivalist phase. The strategic utility of an accommodative Indonesia was only realized after the conclusion of the Second Indochina War in 1975. Indonesia skilfully appropriated the opportunity to lead a reinvigorated ASEAN, and the 1976 Bali Summit Meeting which established ASEAN’s central secretariat in Jakarta ensured for Indonesia the structural permanence of its leadership. Fortunately for Singapore, such an arrangement also restrained Indonesia’s hegemonic ambitions, or rather, fruitfully channelled such ambitions within a multilateral institutional framework.15 In other words, the same ASEAN that Indonesia led allowed for the evolution of structured hegemonic stability. For small and potentially vulnerable states like Singapore, such an evolution was a positive regional development. Singapore and Indonesia also do not share the same perceptions of threat. In fact, no country in Southeast Asia and very few in the Asia-Pacific region have the political clout and military might to threaten Indonesia and, even if they could, for the larger countries like China, Japan and the US, Indonesia constitutes a pivotal state to come to terms with and influence rather than antagonize.16 The same is certainly not true of Singapore which is concerned with the fundamental question of national viability. From the time of the abortive alleged PKI-sponsored coup in 1965, Indonesian policy formulators have always been wary of China. Whereas Indonesia maintains a love-hate relationship of sorts with Australia, the former’s threat perceptions have always pointed towards China. Indonesia’s strategic convergence with Australia, which began after the two countries signed the now defunct Timor Gap Agreement of December 1989, was sealed in 1995 through a Mutual Defence Agreement. The immediate reason for the latter treaty was because Australia, in a 1993 strategic review of its defence doctrine, had downgraded Indonesia as a threat and instead identified China as a future source of potential threat. In addition, the US had then reinvigorated its defence arrangements with Japan and Australia, should the necessity to contain China arise in the future. Accordingly, it is quite clear that Indonesian policy formulators, as late as in the 1990s, identified China as

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the source of long-term threat and many senior officials within the TNI continue to think likewise. Singapore, on the other hand, maintained certain trade and travel sanctions against China in the 1960s and the 1970s. These sanctions were linked to China’s previous support for communist insurgency and its occasional invocation of people-to-people ties or ties between ethnic and overseas Chinese. However, Singapore’s strident anticommunist posture was essentially aimed at the Soviet Union and its perceived regional proxy, Vietnam. Hence, curiously enough, whereas there was clear evidence of Chinese support for communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, the most aggressive policy pronouncements against communism were those aimed at the Soviet Union. Other than the threat from communist insurgency, communalism was thought to pose a risk to state security. By extension and through trans-national linkages, such a threat pointed towards Malaysia and Indonesia. Hence, Indonesia and Singapore have fundamental differences over threat perceptions, particularly threats emanating from outside the region. In this regard, it should be noted that Indonesia did not necessarily view a strong Vietnam as a threat to regional security. Rather, it could blunt the threat posed by China since both countries drifted apart after 1975. It was such a worldview that led to Malaysia and Indonesia advocating the Kuantan Doctrine in February 1980 shortly after Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia began and China’s response to the occupation through its border war or punitive expedition against Vietnam in turn. Whereas China’s war with Vietnam was meant to reassure its allies, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Thailand in ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia viewed the situation very differently. This significant difference in threat perceptions between policy planners in Indonesia and Singapore is reasonably well known, though rarely publicly articulated. The bilateral defence relationship between Singapore and Indonesia is not as complicated as that between Singapore and Malaysia, albeit Singapore’s deterrence posture which is aimed at the immediate regional environment naturally factors the possibility of military hostilities with Indonesia. None the less, as noted above, beginning from the late 1980s, the bilateral defence relationship between the two countries has been significantly enhanced. In this regard, Singapore regularly conducts joint military exercises with Indonesia and the air forces of both countries engage in collaborative training at the Siabu weapons range in Sumatra that was built by Singapore.17 Bilateral defence cooperation is naturally subject to internal political calm in Indonesia, since the outbreaks of ethno-religious violence in places like Ambon, Maluku and Kalimantan often stretch the resources of the military. Accordingly, during times when the domestic political situation becomes turbulent in Indonesia, the prospect for defence collaboration is significantly weakened. The practice of ASEAN statesmen and senior military commanders paying courtesy calls on each other has also led to higher levels of regional security cooperation. Finally, such cooperation is naturally a function of Indonesian leadership perceptions and political will, an issue that will be discussed later in this section. In more recent times, three specific issues have strained the bilateral relationship between both countries, although these issues are often not publicly discussed or commented upon, for fear of damaging frail egos. The first of these issues is atmospheric pollution, a phenomenon that is referred to as the ‘haze’ in Singapore and Malaysia. Beginning from the mid-1990s, and especially after the onset of the Asian financial crisis,

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both public and private companies in Indonesia began to aggressively develop primary industries. One of the export items given priority was oil palm. Since proper clearing of primary forests is an expensive and time-consuming affair, many plantation companies simply began to burn these forests in order to clear the land for cultivation. Such burning was especially rampant in Sumatra and Kalimantan, which are home to large tracts of virgin forests. Such indis-criminate clearing created billowing smoke and set underground peat deposits ablaze. Wind and dry weather naturally worsened the situation. These fires regularly sent large amounts of smoke into neighbouring countries, especially Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. Some of the worst incidents occurred in 1997 when the Malaysian state of Sarawak recorded a Pollution Standards Index (PSI) reading of 800 in the extremely hazardous range and the entire state was forced to literally close up for ten days. Fortunately, Singapore suffered a lesser fate, and the PSI reading was only above 200 in the unhealthy range. The regularity with which this haze occurs annually naturally has an economic cost in the form of increases in respiratory ailments and associated medical costs, dislocations to air and sea travel and the tourist industry. The costs, if fully computed, would run into hundreds of millions of dollars.18 Singapore nationals who are unaccustomed to inconveniences beyond the control of the efficient PAP government brought enormous public pressure on the government to do something. Citizens in Brunei and Malaysia were similarly concerned whereas the Indonesian authorities in Jakarta where the haze never reached were initially reluctant to act. It was only after widespread publicity and pressure that ASEAN decided to deal collectively with the situation. On its part, Singapore provides daily or three-hourly PSI readings to its citizens when the air quality deteriorates and has offered Indonesia remote sensing data to identify ‘hot spots’ that are the actual sites of the fires. The provision of such data is meant to assist Indonesia in coping with the situation and identifying the companies responsible for starting the fires. Given the immobilism of ASEAN and Indonesia in particular to act on the matter, Singapore helped provide information for international and regional NGOs to highlight the problems and costs brought about by the haze.19 Malaysia has attempted to be more pro-active while respecting the ASEAN code of non-interference in the domestic politics of member countries, and has on occasions deployed up to 1,000 fire-fighters to help Indonesia put out the fires. The situation was so grave in 1997 that Suharto was eventually forced to issue a public apology to neighbouring countries affected by the haze. The second issue that has been the cause of some concern in Singapore is the growing incidence of piracy in Indonesian territorial waters since 1997. Within the Indonesian archipelagic state are a number of important shipping channels other than the Strait of Malacca. Especially important are the Lombok and Sunda Strait and the channels off Sulawesi and Kalimantan that have seen a greater incidence of international piracy. Some of these attacks are thought to involve elements of the TNI as well. In view of such attacks, both the international shipping community and major trading states like Singapore, Japan and the United States have increasingly expressed concern that piracy is not being sufficiently monitored and curbed in Indonesian territorial waters. The implications arising from such attacks are the loss of cargo, seafaring personnel and occasionally, entire ships. Increases in such incidents also significantly raise freight and insurance rates that negatively affect shipping in general.20 In response, ASEAN has created a regional centre for maritime surveillance in Malaysia, and the navies of

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Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have stepped up collaborative patrolling and intelligence gathering and sharing. The problem is however sometimes difficult to address since, without radio communication, attempts at piracy are difficult to interdict. Territorial and maritime jurisdiction also often means that unless cooperation is readily and hastily forthcoming, little can be done to prevent piracy. The third issue that has essentially surfaced in the bilateral relationship following the onset of the Asian financial crisis are suggestions by a number of Indonesian political elite and officials that Singapore should favourably consider the possibility of repatriating or extraditing Indonesian nationals resident in Singapore who have been accused of economic crimes. The reason for this request is because there was a large flight of both ethnic Chinese capital and businessmen from Indonesia in the aftermath of Suharto’s downfall to Singapore.21 Many such businessmen, including Liem Sioe Liong, have relocated to Singapore and the Indonesian government is anxious for them to be repatriated to answer charges of corruption. In the past, these businessmen or cukongs had a mutually beneficial relationship with Suharto, exchanging some of their wealth acquired through monopolies and unfair trading practices for state protection. They also maintained extensive linkages with senior officials to buttress their position. Now that post-Suharto governments are attempting to deal with corruption owing partly to international pressure and partly to convey a positive domestic image, such requests are seen as one way to bring those who had benefited unfairly under Suharto to justice. A lesser issue that is an occasional source of irritation between both countries is the incidence of maid abuse in Singapore. There are well over 100,000 such domestic helpers in Singapore and they originate primarily from Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The Singapore government metes out harsh penalties to employers who physically abuse their helpers with lengthy prison terms, fines and, in some instances, caning for men if the abuse is of a sexual nature. Indonesia and the Philippines actually assign their embassy personnel in Singapore to assist such helpers in distress. In addition, staffers from the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore often hold a watching brief during such abuse trials. Whereas bilateral tensions between Singapore and Indonesia have not arisen thus far as a result of maid abuse, it is a sensitive issue that is monitored closely by both governments. The final and perhaps most important variable governing political and security issues in the bilateral relationship is leadership. The importance of leadership, especially on the Indonesian side of the relationship, certainly cannot be overstated. Such importance derives from a number of reasons. First, Indonesia does not have the kind of structural linkages and historical association with Singapore that Malaysia had. Second, policy formulators in Singapore realized on the basis of their interactions with the Suharto government that leadership determined the tone and texture of the bilateral relationship. For example, the relationship was strained from 1968 to 1973 and cordial after 1973. Third, Indonesia is significantly unequal to Singapore in terms of power endowments, and as a result, Singapore is expected to grant a measure of political deference to Indonesia, as with the other countries in the Malay Archipelago. This importance is exaggerated by the willingness of great powers such as the United States, China and Japan to deal with Indonesia on its own terms. In this regard, with its large land area and population base, Indonesia is truly a pivotal state. Fourth, it is in Singapore’s natural interest for its immediate external environment to be secure. This interest is a clearly

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articulated policy position. As such, Indonesia, which occupies most of Singapore’s immediate regional environment, is a state to be dealt with on a regular basis. Ideally, the relationship ought to be one that is mutually beneficial. Fifth, within the region, Indonesia is home to a vast quantity of petroleum, and mineral and forestry resources. The Indonesian government has always expressed an interest in tapping these resources, albeit much of the wealth is lost to corruption. Singapore has in the past benefited from the exploitation of such resources and the trend is likely to continue. Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 5, there have been past attempts for countries involved in important bilateral relationships with Singapore like Malaysia and Indonesia to occasionally triangulate the situation. As such, Indonesia provides Singapore with a certain strategic utility. After all, among the three countries in this relationship, Indonesia ranks as the most important member since an alignment with it would yield the most advantageous arrangement. Given this primus inter pares status, however, Indonesia is more likely to be wooed by Singapore and Malaysia for an alignment rather than express a preferred choice for itself. Within such a strategic scenario, ceteris paribus, it is to Indonesia’s strategic advantage to maintain a degree of ambivalence in the relationship between both countries. The impact of Suharto on Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia provides the most compelling evidence of the importance of Indonesian political leadership in mediating the situation. Initially angered that he was not granted due deference for his personal intervention through an emissary to stay the execution of the two marines for sabotage in 1968, Suharto’s displeasure was immediate and long-lasting. The damage done to Singapore’s embassy in Jakarta and the lengthy five-year wait before diplomatic relations were normalized indicated how Suharto could treat slights to his person and accompanying requests. By 1973, it was clear that Suharto’s position in Indonesia had become much more firmly entrenched after a second five-year term as president was secured in 1972, a ritual that was to be repeated without contestation up to the time of his downfall in 1998. Under the circumstances, it was clear that Singapore, after overcoming the turbulence associated with the survivalist phase in the immediate post-independence period, still had to reconcile itself to its immediate environment and the most powerful country within it. Prior to Suharto, Sukarno’s penchant for keeping the revolutionary spirit (perjuangan) alive in Indonesian domestic and foreign policy output had already made it abundantly clear that the regional strategic environment was significantly conditioned by Indonesian political leadership. In this regard, Suharto’s willingness under the New Order government to seek strategic alignment with regional countries through its leadership of ASEAN was a welcome relief to Singapore. The New Order government’s commitment to national development (ketahanan nasional) and such development in turn leading to a more secure regional environment was a policy position that was congruent with those of Singapore and Malaysia. Such an approach reduced the political leverage obtained from potentially transnational issues, especially those pertaining to ethnicity and religion. Ethnicity had become particularly charged after the abortive PKI-sponsored coup and in the perceptions of many Indonesians, both at the elite and mass levels, Singapore constituted a Chinese-majority state that China could use to further its own strategic interests. Accordingly, it was as a result of Suharto’s leadership that the country’s bilateral relationship with Singapore became significantly enhanced. Occasional symbolic deference on the part of Singapore allowed for the evolution of a comfortable

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working relationship. The high point of the relationship was the much touted empat mata (four eyes) meetings between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto where formalities and protocol were done away with. Suharto’s leadership of Indonesia truly provided Singapore with the opportunity to stabilize the country’s immediate regional environment and the PAP government was acutely aware of the long-term gains of this unique opportunity. Domestic political consolidation, both for the PAP and Suharto in the 1970s and 1980s, also meant that business and policy priorities could be dealt with without domestic challenges. This condition was naturally more important for Indonesia than for Singapore, since the latter had already achieved a monopoly of the local legislative assembly by 1968—a situation that persisted until 1981. Within the operational rules of the neopatrimonial regime that existed in Indonesia, Suharto’s policy preferences were generally unchallenged. Accordingly, the entire bureaucracy of the state and its associated agencies were easily deployed to enhance the bilateral relationship. Such clear direction and certainty allowed for extensive trade and investment linkages. From the late 1980s, Singapore was able to capitalize on the cheap and abundant resources of land and labour in the Riau province and embarked on an aggressive policy of investments in Batam and Bintan islands.22 Security and defence relationships between senior officials also proliferated. Beginning from 1993 however, Suharto’s control of the domestic political situation began to weaken. The clearest evidence of this was ABRI’s nomination of Try Sustrisno for the deputy presidency ahead of Suharto’s own announcement—a seeming fait accompli. Earlier on, in 1988, Benny Murdani, as Defence Minister, had already been able to usurp independent power. In order to deflect challenges arising from the military, Suharto attempted two simultaneous strategies. The first was to weaken the military by cultivating an alternative Islamic constituency as a locus of power.23 The formation of the ICMI (Ikatan Cendiakawan Muslim Indonesia—Association of Muslim Intellectuals) in 1993 with Jusuf Habibie as the patron and Suharto’s pilgrimage to Mecca was the clearest indication of the first prong. The second prong involved the announcement of a policy of openness (keterbukaan) in order to deflect some of the popular pressures for political participation.24 However, unfortunately for Suharto, both strategies did not yield the positive political gains that he had envisaged. Habibie was widely disliked as the Minister for Science and Technology for making large capital investments in a number of pet projects that included the indigenous manufacture of a civilian aircraft through IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbangan Nusantara—National Aeronautical Industry). He also invoked the ire of ABRI by arranging to purchase and refurbish the entire East German navy. Finally, compared to many of the more influential personalities in ICMI such as Amir Santoso, Amien Rais and Nurholish Majid, he had little locus standi among Muslim intellectuals.25 As for keterbukaan, it became the harbinger of a nascent democracy movement that was spearheaded by intellectuals, journalists, labour activists and ex-ranking members of ABRI who had become critical of Suharto. This period witnessed the emergence of a number of civic groups that later became influential such as Forum Demokrasi, Petisi Limapuluh (Petition of Fifty) and SBSI (Independent Indonesian Labour Federation).26 The high point of Suharto’s unhappiness with keterbukaan was the abrupt closure of three influential magazines—Detik‚ Tempo and Editor—for publicizing scandals within

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the government. However, once Pandora’s box had been opened, it became difficult to reseal the lid. The 1997 Asian financial crisis provided the backdrop to the downfall of the Suharto government. The agreement to accept an international loan package from the IMF to the tune of US$40 billion obliged Suharto to under-take financial and economic restructuring. Part of this restructuring package involved the removal of state subsidies on essential items like rice, cooking oil, kerosene and gasoline. The outcome was widespread food riots in urban areas that eventually led to Suharto’s resignation. His deputy Habibie who succeeded him for a brief period until November 1999 was forced to vacate his office after national elections were called. Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, occupied the presidency for just under two years before financial scandals led to his eventual impeachment by Parliament. Wahid’s deputy Megawati Sukarnoputri who led the Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle (PDI-P—Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan) in the 1999 national elections eventually succeeded him. While Indonesia was undergoing all this political turmoil and uncertainty, its bilateral relationship with Singapore was a natural casualty. The adverse impact of political turbulence in Indonesia on its bilateral relationship with Singapore was exaggerated by a number of developments. First, Suharto’s immediate successors Habibie and Wahid were not positively predisposed towards Singapore. This perception was partly a function of the advice they received regarding Singapore, partly owing to certain previous pronouncements by Singapore elite on their suitability to lead the state and partly because, unlike Suharto, they had never evolved a lengthy working relationship with Singapore. On the other hand, Singapore, which had become accustomed to and familiar with Suharto, had not cultivated competing constituencies in Indonesian domestic politics. In any event, Suharto would have disallowed such cultivation. Accordingly, in the post-Suharto period, bilateral relations between Singapore and Indonesia became subjected to significant turbulence. Habibie, Suharto’s immediate successor, made his unhappiness with Singapore and the reasons for it known in a number of policy pronouncements. He began by noting that Lee Kuan Yew had made negative comments about his suitability for the deputy presidency when chosen by Suharto in 1998. He also noted that the Singapore political establishment had been late in congratulating him when he was made President and that he did not get warm and friendly feelings when interacting with Singapore elite.27 He then went on to make a number of accusations, including the observation that Singapore was a ‘racist’ state that prevented ethnic Malays from holding officer rank in the military. In July 1999, Habibie advised Singapore ‘to accept that it was an integral part of the region’ and that it could not avoid its shadow. He then went on to note that for Singapore to ignore its shadow meant living in ‘absolute darkness’. Singapore nationals, who were unaccustomed to such rhetoric, clearly realized that the post-Suharto political situation in Indonesia was to present significant challenges in its bilateral relationship between the two countries. Like Habibie, Wahid also expressed reservations about Singapore during an address to an audience of some 200 Indonesians at a closed-door meeting in the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore.28 Specifically, he expressed unhappiness that Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew had dismissed his suggestion to include East Timor and Papua New Guinea in ASEAN. Subsequently, he floated the idea of Singapore’s membership together with the

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two states, Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and the Philippines in a West Pacific Forum that Singapore apparently did not support. He then went on to note that Singapore could go its own way if it chose and that Indonesia could do likewise. Finally, Wahid expressed unhappiness with Lee Kuan Yew’s perception that he would not be in power for long. Both episodes regarding the degradation of Singapore-Indonesia bilateral relations involved indiscreet comments by senior Singapore politicians. Traditionally and especially immediately after the post-independence period, Singapore elite tended to be more politically prudent in dealing with the immediately adjacent neighbouring countries. However, on the back of economic and developmental success, some of that prudence had dissipated by the 1990s. Singapore also asserted its sovereignty much more. Flushed by success, its elite displayed what some regional elite regarded as unacceptable or unbecoming behaviour, especially since it came from a state that was hardly representative of the region in terms of its size and domestic contours. In the wake of the severe whiplash effect to such negative pronouncements of regional elite, Singapore has had to pay a price for its indiscretions. Fortunately for Singapore, both Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid were not in power for long. Otherwise, the bilateral relationship between the two countries would have deteriorated much more. In seeming triangulation of the bilateral relationship with Malaysia, Wahid complimented Mahathir for having stood up to Singapore. He also raised the prospect of Indonesia teaming up with Malaysia to control the supply of water to Singapore in order to teach it a lesson.29 Wahid also expressed unhappiness about Singapore’s appropriation of the patent for some 140 different types of rattan originating from Indonesia and Singapore’s constant advice for his country to master the English language in order to capitalize on the benefits of information technology. The entire episode and in particular Wahid’s threat to ally with Malaysia and threaten the flow of potable water to Singapore must have come as a shock to the policy elite. Whereas Singapore elite were familiar with Wahid’s mercurial character, his accusations and accompanying threats to teach Singapore a lesson must have evoked memories of Sukarno. In any event, the comments of both Habibie and Wahid made it abundantly clear that political leadership is an extremely important variable that mediates the bilateral relationship between Singapore and Indonesia. Wahid’s successor Megawati has thus far been taciturn in her comments regarding her perception of Singapore and Indonesia’s bilateral relationship with it. Notwithstanding the turbulence in Singapore-Indonesia bilateral relations that have accompanied the downfall of Suharto in Indonesia, it would be fair to note that it is in Singapore’s national interest to maintain a cordial relationship with Indonesia. Strategically, Indonesia is certainly far too important for Singapore to ignore. Accordingly, despite the recent turbulence in the bilateral relationship, it is to be expected that Singapore will work towards normalizing ties with Indonesia. It is in this regard that as a goodwill gesture, notwithstanding the pronouncements of Habibie and Wahid, Singapore, through the Red Cross and the SAF, has continued to provide humanitarian relief to Indonesia in the form of essential foodstuffs and medicines.30 After all, domestic political turbulence in Indonesia will augur a poor immediate regional environment for Singapore.

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Economic issues Although economic issues are important in Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia, trade statistics between the two countries are traditionally not published owing to Indonesian sensitivities. Such sensitivities derive from previous Indonesian charges that many of their products are sold to Singapore or exported through it without proper official declaration or payment of taxes. In other words, useful though Singapore may be as an exit point for Indonesian domestic produce, criticisms are often levelled against it for taking advantage of illegal trade. In this regard, it may be worthwhile noting that there is a certain amount of economic nationalism in Indonesia. Indonesia and its leaders often regard the country as being subjected to international economic exploitation, especially of its abundant natural resources. Hence, whereas Indonesia offers Singapore tremendous opportunities for trade and investments, Singapore is sometimes restrained by Indonesian perceptions and charges. Singapore’s trade with Indonesia was traditionally in the area of food-stuffs and the development of downstream industries that capitalized on Indonesia’s natural resources. In the past, vegetables and marine products dominated the Indonesian foodstuff trade, although in more recent years Singapore has accredited a number of pig farms in Bulan Island to supply the country with pork. The outbreak of the Nipah virus epidemic that led to the culling of a large number of pigs in Malaysia and Singapore’s search for an alternative proximate supplier led to the development of this trade. As for natural resources, Indonesian forestry products like rattan and timber and plantation crops like rubber and palm oil once dominated the bilateral trade. The sale of these products to or via Singapore provided Indonesian exporters with foreign exchange while allowing Singapore to expand its international trade and serve as a processing centre for Indonesian products. Downstream industries centring on the processing and export of rattan, timber and rubber were especially important in the 1960s and 1970s when Singapore was developing its light and labour-intensive manufacturing industries after the shift from import substitution to export-led growth. This initial reliance on the processing of regional produce and its re-export is what earned Singapore its negative reputation in Indonesia as a state whose growth was parasitic, deriving nourishment from the periphery, not unlike the geographer’s conception of a primate city. From the 1980s and 1990s, when the Indonesian domestic political situation stabilized and Singapore established a good rapport with the Suharto government, large-scale and capital-intensive investments were much more forthcoming. Many of these investments are in the islands of Batam, Bintan and Karimum that are geographically proximate to Singapore. These investments total some US$4.3 billion. Batam became the home of an industrial park which was gridded on to the southern growth triangle that involved Riau province in Sumatra, the southern Malaysian state of Johor and Singapore.31 The plan was to allow countries with complementary factors of production to pool their resources and achieve synergy in contributing to regional economic growth. Within this triangle, Singapore naturally provided capital, technology and management expertise either directly or by arranging for the involvement of foreign multinationals while Malaysia and Indonesia were tasked, in the main, with the provision of land and labour resources. Foreign multinationals in the electronics and semiconductor industries and Singapore’s quasi-public Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) were at the forefront of

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investments. In Bintan Island, Singapore GLCs invested heavily in tourism and infrastructure-related projects, with an eye to the regional tourist market. Some of these investments were subjected to harassment at the local level after the downfall of the Suharto government on charges that land had been forcibly appropriated at very low prices. The major Indonesian investor in Bintan, the Salim Group headed by Liem Sioe Liong, had fallen into disgrace after the events of 1998 and many of the group’s joint projects with Singapore were subjected to harassment. The Singapore government, alarmed at these developments, insisted that the Indonesian government uphold the credibility and guarantee its investments in Riau. Another major source of investments for Singapore is in the oil and gas industry. However, such investments are regularly subjected to foreign competition from major US and European multinational corporations. None the less, Singapore has recently built a 650 km pipeline to pump natural gas from the West Natuna field and a second pipeline to draw natural gas from the province of Jambi in Sumatra was due to come online in 2003.32 For Singapore’s policy planners, the eventual aim of sourcing natural gas from Indonesia is to meet its domestic electricity needs as well as to provide feedstock for the Jurong Island petrochemical complex. In order to facilitate and better manage its new investments, the Singapore government opened a new consulate in Riau province in 2001. Singapore investments in Indonesia’s gas industry is in direct competition with Malaysia where the national oil company Petronas has similar arrangements to procure gas from the West Natuna field and, through joint cooperation with Thailand, Malaysia is hoping to be at the centre of an ASEAN-wide power grid. Within the broader framework of regional economic cooperation, Singapore has far greater strategic convergence with Indonesia than with Malaysia. The former has consistently supported APEC and resisted Mahathir’s idea of the EAEG. In fact, it was Indonesia which downgraded the initial EAEG proposal and deferred its discussion within ASEAN. Since 1998 however, Indonesia has not been in a position to lead ASEAN or prevent Malaysia’s aggressive push to formalize the ‘ASEAN plus Three’ concept, which in essence involved the member countries of the original EAEG.33 Indonesian acceptance of Western-inspired economic multilateralism, however, does not necessarily extend into the security realm. Hence, whereas Indonesia regularly cooperates with Malaysia and Singapore on security matters and endorses the ARF as an appropriate arena for the resolution of regional security problems, it remains steadfastly opposed to foreign troop presence in Southeast Asia. This position is partly a reflection of its traditional neutral and non-aligned position in foreign policy and partly a desire not to allow foreign troop presence to compromise the significant political leverage it enjoys in maritime Southeast Asia as the dominant power. The Indonesian position on regional economic cooperation is also tempered by Indonesia’s significant reliance on international organizations and donor countries for developmental purposes. Specifically, until 1993, Indonesia received to the tune of US$5 billion annually from the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). In 1993, after IGGI’s chair Holland attempted to link aid to human rights issues that the Suharto government resisted, the group was reconstituted and renamed the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) without Holland as the chair. The CGI continues, on a regular annual basis, to provide Indonesia with about US$5 billion through a consortium of some fifteen donor countries for developmental purposes.

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The two other major international lending agencies to Indonesia are the World Bank and the IMF. Both of these agencies provided Indonesia with a US$40 billion aid package to rescue the country from economic and financial collapse after the onset of the Asian financial crisis. Among individual countries that significantly assist Indonesia on a bilateral basis are the US and Japan. Whereas the former’s motivations are economic and strategic, in particular the view of Indonesia as a pivotal state in maritime Southeast Asia, Japan’s motivations are economic and the security of the sea lanes of communication within Indonesian jurisdiction through which much of its maritime trade passes. Traditionally, unless the country is in an extra-ordinarily difficult situation, Indonesian policy elite prefer aid coming from countries like Japan and Taiwan that attach no conditions to such assistance. Western sources have tended to peg such aid to economic and financial restructuring, democracy, human rights and labour issues and various fundamental liberties. Broad strategic and developmental convergence between Singapore and Indonesia does not necessarily mean that the situation is not without its hiccups. As noted in the previous section, the tone and texture of Singapore’s bilateral relationship is invariably set by the political elite of both countries. Given the inequalities between the two countries in terms of power endowments, Indonesian elite naturally exert greater leverage than Singapore on the bilateral relationship. Apart from such leverage which has significantly degraded the bilateral relationship since 1998, a number of specific economic issues are also sources of concern. In more recent years, such specific issues have included Singapore’s anxieties that its significant investments in Batam, Bintan and Karimum in Riau province are subjected to political interventions. There were also fears that migrant Indonesian workers from the Outer Islands may bring with them ethnic rivalries, after an outbreak of such violence in Batam in 1999. On the Indonesian side, the view that Singapore’s development is parasitical and dependent on Indonesian resources is a fairly entrenched view. There is also unhappiness over ethnic Chinese entrepreneurial and capital flight from Indonesia to Singapore since 1998. Indonesian elite have also voiced concerns over Singapore’s financial dealings in foreign exchange and have occasionally accused Singapore of weakening the rupiah by allowing its trading offshore. Finally, notwithstanding Singapore’s goodwill gestures of extending food and medicines to Indonesia, some of the latter’s elite have in the past accused Singapore of being slow to respond to its call for financial assistance in 1998. Many members of the post-Suharto elite were of the opinion that the US$5 billion trade-financing scheme imposed conditions that were too difficult to fulfil and were geared to benefiting Singapore. In drawing this section to a close, it needs to be noted again that issue areas are interlinked and not discrete, and that political will and leadership has traditionally been the most important intervening variable in Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia.

Social issues There are far fewer social issues compared to economic and political issues in Singapore’s relations with Indonesia. Since there are far less structural, historical and social linkages between the two countries, many social issues do not necessarily have a

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direct bearing on the relationship as well. As with the Malaysian case, ethnicity is a major issue. Religion, on the other hand, is a lesser issue. Then there are a cluster of minor issues that have their origins in poverty and social dislocation. Ethnicity is perhaps the single most important social issue. The diversity of the Indonesian ethnic situation, compared to that in Malaysia and Singapore, is both an asset and a liability. It is an asset to the bilateral relationship to the extent that the heterogeneity of the Indonesian population has traditionally led to a high degree of tolerance for ethnic diversity within the country. The appreciation of cultural diversity is certainly a positive characteristic of Indonesian elite. The capital city Jakarta and the state’s major institutions and the TNI have always absorbed ethnic minorities, and Indonesia’s early leaders were convinced that any erosion of such appreciation had the potential to fragment the country.34 On the other hand, however, notwithstanding such an appreciation for diversity, the Chinese minority in Indonesia has traditionally been subjected to an admixture of envy and hostility. There are several reasons for such a perception and they mostly have economic and political origins. Economically, as skilful businessmen and entrepreneurs, they developed a comfortable and mutually beneficial relationship with those in power in exchange for physical safety and the protection of their businesses. However, they developed an equal reputation for unfair trading practices and monopolies, especially under Suharto’s New Order government. Suharto’s reliance on them in turn to raise capital and develop the country’s manufacturing sector meant that these businessmen became clearly identified with the regime, including all its negative practices. Ethnic Chinese control of the Indonesian economy was estimated at some 70 per cent of all businesses and transactions by 1998.35 For a minority that comprised only 3 per cent of the local population, their economic success became highly visible and resented. Hence, alongside envy, indigenous Indonesians (pribumi) resented ethnic Chinese in their country for amassing extraordinary wealth and alignment with corrupt politicians. Such association peaked during the Suharto era. Accordingly, when Suharto’s government fell in 1998, much anger was directed towards ethnic Chinese who fled in large numbers together with their wealth. The Indonesian Chinese, unlike the other ethnic minorities, were differentiated for a number of other reasons. First, their loyalty to the country was always held to be suspect owing to the early repatriation of funds to China and their initial unwillingness to acquire Indonesian citizenship. Second, unlike the case in the Philippines and Thailand, for example, they remained aloof culturally and did not assimilate into the host population. With rare exceptions, they generally did not adopt Islam.36 Third, as a minority community it was small compared to the case in Malaysia, was physically distinguishable and generally lived in urban areas. Fourth, given the negative sentiments expressed towards the ethnic Chinese following the abortive PKI-sponsored coup in 1965, they became generally disinterested in politics and concentrated on economic activities instead. As a result, there was very little Chinese political representation in Indonesia. In fact, after 1965, ethnic Chinese Indonesians were barred from using their language and practising their culture. As a result, many of them adopted indigenous names and converted to Christianity and, in particular, Catholicism.37 For all of these reasons, indigenous Indonesian perceptions of ethnic Chinese were very negative and highly charged. From time to time, such negative sentiments resulted

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in widespread looting and arson of Chinese businesses, the murder of ethnic Chinese men and the brutalization of women. Regimes and enforcement agencies that during good economic times benefited from the exchange relationship with ethnic Chinese often abandoned them during times of difficulties when they became convenient targets for the release of pent-up anger and frustration. Hence, during times of political turbulence and especially regime transition in Indonesia, there is a good possibility that such violence will be directed against ethnic Chinese. Indigenous Indonesian perceptions and motivations towards ethnic Chinese are therefore motivated by domestic considerations. Whereas such perceptions should not be a problem for Singapore, they are, since many indigenous Indonesians identify and have mental images of individuals and communities on the basis of their ethnicity. Singapore, as the only Chinese majority state in Southeast Asia, naturally attracts negative Indonesian sentiments simply on the basis of its overwhelming ethnic Chinese majority of 78 per cent of its population. Hence parts of Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid’s outbursts against Singapore derive from stereotypical indigenous predispositions. Unlike the Malaysian case, religion is not an important issue in the bilateral relationship between both countries. The generally syncretic nature of Javanese abangan Islam that combines elements of mysticism and animism is not strict and exclusive. Santri Islam is more purist but is generally restricted to parts of Java and the Outer Islands such as Sumatra and Aceh. Hence religion has little bearing on the bilateral relationship. Recently, however, Singapore’s identification of two Indonesian nationals as leaders of the Jemaah Islamiah organization and their involvement in terrorist activities has changed the situation. Indonesia’s slowness in cooperating with Singapore authorities in detaining the two leaders has clearly upset the Singapore government. To add insult to injury, one of the leaders sued Lee Kuan Yew in a Jakarta court for US$100 million for defamation. Although the suit was eventually thrown out since both Lee Kuan Yew and the Singapore Embassy in Jakarta enjoy political immunity, it demonstrated how little leverage Singapore could bring to bear on Indonesia. In addition, the entire episode highlighted the fact that Megawati has to accommodate a strong domestic Islamic constituency in order to retain political support. In this regard, Islam, which was carefully controlled by the New Order government of Suharto, has emerged as a significant political force in the post-1998 period. On the other hand, however, issues related to poverty and social dislocation also have a natural spill-over effect on the relationship. Such an effect occurs in the form of illegal migration from Indonesia to Singapore. As a much more socio-economically well-developed state, Singapore regularly attracts a large number of illegal immigrants and overstayers in the country, who come from as far away as China, India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Given Indonesia’s geographical proximity to Singapore, it is therefore natural to expect many more instances of Indonesian illegal immigrants during times of economic difficulty. Although Singapore’s borders are well monitored both by land and sea, it is not always possible to prevent such migrants from entering the country. Since 1998, after the onset of the Asian financial crisis, illegal migration has become a major problem for Singapore’s enforcement authorities and many Indonesians are involved in such activities. This issue is generally downplayed since it has the potential to fray bilateral relations, as in the case of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia.38

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In summing up this chapter, a number of things may be noted. Singapore’s bilateral relationship with Indonesia is an extremely important one, albeit the depth and scope of issues are considerably less than is the case with Malaysia. None the less, to the extent that Indonesia comprises a significant portion of maritime Southeast Asia and the Malay Archipelago Complex that is informed by the Indonesian military confrontation against Malaysia continues to exist, it remains a significant country to acknowledge. Regional political tranquillity, a clear objective of Singapore’s foreign policy formulators, cannot be obtained without explicit Indonesian endorsement. Such recognition gives Indonesia a certain leverage in the region. In fact, it is in recognition of such leverage that states in maritime Southeast Asia have traditionally accorded Indonesia a measure of political deference. Such deference is exhibited in the tacit agreement to allow Indonesia to lead ASEAN during the Suharto era and goodwill gestures such as the offer of fire-fighters from Malaysia to battle forest fires and Singapore’s delivery of essential foodstuffs and medicines to a neighbour in distress. These acts of goodwill are undertaken with the clear recognition that domestic political instability in Indonesia will make the immediate regional environment a difficult one, as in the 1960s when Sukarno opted for confrontation over cooperation. As in the case with Malaysia, Singapore’s difficult bilateral issues with Indonesia are resolved mutually and without much publicity. The Indonesian domestic political situation has been fluid since 1998 and there have been many changes in important personalities. Such fluidity has undermined Singapore’s previous rapport with Indonesia under the Suharto government. Both Suharto’s immediate successors, Habibie and Wahid, have articulated negative feelings towards Singapore. Megawati has been much more reserved about her pronouncements. Despite such difficulties, Singapore has attempted to expand its investment and political linkages with Indonesia. The multibillion dollar gas pipeline projects to West Natuna and Jambi and the establishment of a consulate in Riau attest to this expansion. Finally, as for the triangular relationship between Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, triangulation is typically attempted by the smaller states in the relationship. In this regard, Wahid’s outburst that Indonesia and Malaysia should control their water supply to Singapore to teach it a lesson is an anomaly. In addition, triangulation is useful only within a stable environment. The fluidity that has characterized Indonesian politics since 1998 makes triangulation difficult, since different elite may have different perceptions and preferences. It is probably for this reason that Singapore has been far more conciliatory towards Malaysia since 2000. Strategic imperatives require that Singapore have positive overall relations with at least one of its two immediately adjacent countries. Singapore’s political and policy elite are clearly anxious to avoid a replay of the country’s survivalist phase in policy output when relations with both Malaysia and Indonesia were strained. It was therefore not surprising that when Harvard Don Michael Potter was invited to Singapore to deliver a lecture, he promptly noted that deeper cooperation with Singapore’s immediate neighbours would yield significant economic benefits.39 The political benefits deriving from such an orientation were presumably too obvious to address.

7 Economic and defence diplomacy It is arguable that economic and defence diplomacy are perceived by the Singapore government as crucial to the survival and sustenance of the country. Economic diplomacy is meant to augment domestic capital and industry. It is a major source of investment and employment in Singapore. Such augmentation is intended to provide for the material aspirations of the country’s population—an important source of performance-based legitimacy for the PAP government. It is also intended to ensure Singapore’s national viability and sustainability in the long term, given the country’s early preoccupation with the theme of survival. Accordingly, economic diplomacy is meant to enhance Singapore’s continuity as an independent and prosperous state. Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, derives from a different philosophical motivation. Whereas economic diplomacy is meant to enhance viability, defence diplomacy is essentially a defensive enterprise. In other words, defence diplomacy is meant to allow the country a measure of strategic depth where none exists in terms of land area. Accordingly, although motivated by a deterrence strategy that may involve offensive or pre-emptive action, Singapore’s defence diplomacy is meant to preserve the country’s sovereignty and territoriality. Hence the motivation is defensive in the first instance. Both forms of diplomacy are central to Singapore’s well-being. They are also publicly articulated and supported by government policy pronouncements. Although both forms of diplomacy obtain for most states, their importance is exaggerated in the case of Singapore. In terms of objective considerations of size and influence and perceptional considerations of viability, both forms of diplomacy are viewed as fundamental to the state’s survival. Given their importance, the Singapore government employs a broad range of instruments to further economic and defence objectives, although philosophical presuppositions motivating such behaviour may not be consistent or congruous. After all, economic diplomacy derives from the tradition of complex interdependence and cooperation that tends towards liberal institutionalism. Defence diplomacy, on the other hand, is anchored well within a realist and state-centric orientation towards international relations. As a result, when both policies are placed alongside each other for comparative purposes, they may occasionally appear to be dysfunctional. On the other hand, these seemingly dysfunctional and contradictory policy pronouncements are easily reconciled by policy elite as necessary for the maintenance of both peace and prosperity. After all, peace is a necessary condition for the achievement of prosperity. In this regard, whereas the philosophical conditions that motivate economic and defence policies may appear self-contradictory, they are in actual fact interactive with each other. Hence peace allows for the pursuit of prosperity, and prosperity in turn allows for large defence outlays. Consequently, Singapore regards economic and defence policies as mutually interactive at the practical level rather than philosophically dysfunctional at the abstract level. It is

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the interaction between these two policies that has yielded the PAP government its successful cocktail prescription for national viability in the long term. In addition, trade and economic policies, with rare exceptions, are decoupled from foreign and defence policies. Such a decoupling, it may be remembered, was a central tenet of the PAP government’s early declaration on trade policies in the immediate post-independence period.

Economic diplomacy Singapore’s economy is unlike those of any other country in the region. It has several distinguishing characteristics that set it apart from the other Southeast Asian countries. Thus, for example, the primary sector is literally non-existent. It has no natural resources like oil, gas, minerals and metals– resources that exist in sizeable quantities in immediately adjacent countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Hence Singapore’s economy is essentially spread between the secondary and tertiary sectors. Traditionally, and especially after the 1986 restructuring of the economy, manufacturing accounts for approximately 25 per cent of the domestic economy while the tertiary sector accounts for the remaining 75 per cent. To complicate matters, revenue derived from external trade is three times the value of domestic manufacturing.1 On the basis of these broad terms of reference, a number of inferences may be readily made. First, there is a tremendous reliance on the global economy for sustenance. Such reliance occurs on a number of fronts. It includes extensive reliance on trade that is in turn contingent on the existence of a liberal trading regime. It also includes reliance on external sources for basic consumption needs such as food, water and fuel as well as reliance on an external market to absorb its manufactured products.2 Some 40 per cent of all manufactured products are related to the electronics sector which is in turn subjected to cyclical global demand and supply patterns. Second, the top-heavy sectoral spread places a unique demand on semi-skilled and skilled workers, professionals, and intermediate to upper-level management. It also places a burden on competing with much more industrialized countries in the tertiary sector while relying on their investments in the secondary sector. In addition, Singapore has to constantly deflect pressures from the immediate regional environment that offers far better economies of scale for factors of production. Land and labour in particular are cheaply and abundantly available in Malaysia and Indonesia. Capital and technology investments, over which Singapore had a significant advantage, no longer obtained from the mid-1980s. Changes in the international political economy allowed for the easy procurement of international investment and debt capital. Accordingly, the manufacturing industry in Southeast Asia easily exploited international capital as well as technology transfers. In addition, Asian-industrialized countries such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan were prepared to transfer technology without political or social preconditions. Hence, beginning from the 1980s to the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand significantly enhanced their manufacturing capacity and output through the cheap availability of capital and the relatively hassle-free transfer of technology. Related developments in infrastructure, particularly in Malaysia, also sapped some of Singapore’s early advantages that accrued

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from relatively more sophisticated and better developed hubbing facilities for air and seaborne tourism and cargo. A related aspect of Singapore’s peculiar economic structuration is its extensive reliance on foreign labour. In the immediate post-independence period, much of this reliance drew on geographically proximate Malaysia. It may be remembered, for example, that a significant portion of Singapore’s early political and policy elite came from Malaysia.3 As the economy expanded and became more developed, the traditional labour markets out-grew their utility and the country began to source for both semiskilled and skilled labour from different countries. Such recruitments are sometimes sector-specific. For example, sectors such as the marine and construction industries, which require large numbers of manual workers, typically source labour from Bangladesh, India and Thailand. The health, hospitality and domestic sectors normally source labour from China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

Internal initiatives The starting point for the discussion on Singapore’s economic diplomacy, given the country’s peculiarities, is its reliance on the international system for trade and investments. Although the Singapore government has a compulsory savings scheme in the Central Provident Fund (CPF) which allows for an almost automatic savings rate of 40 per cent of the country’s GDP, much of this saving is traditionally drawn on by the country’s workforce for its housing needs. The CPF, which in the past allowed for a 20 per cent retention of a worker’s salary, subject to a ceiling of S$ 1,200, was matched by an equal contribution from the employer. During times of recession, however, the employer’s contribution rate may be adjusted so as to obtain lower production costs. Such adjustments occurred in 1985 after the global recession and in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis. In 1998, for example, the employer’s contribution was halved to 10 per cent and then gradually raised to 12 per cent, and to 16 per cent in 2002. Owing to the domestic population’s heavy reliance on the CPF to meet mortgage payments for homeownership and expenses related to the post-retirement period, it is a rather politically sensitive issue. In addition, more recent liberalization on the use of the CPF has also allowed workers to draw on the fund for the educational needs of their children and approved investments in stocks, insurance and commodities. Similarly, the handsome financial reserves of the country that had exceeded US$100 billion is invested by the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC), rather than ploughed into domestic manufacturing. The external reserves, which are central to Singapore’s psychological well-being during times of economic and political turbulence, are jealously guarded. In fact, when Singapore introduced a directly elected president to serve a sixyear term alongside the prime minister, one of his most important responsibilities was identified as safe-guarding the country’s reserves.4 In this regard, the PAP government has publicly declared that it will disallow an incumbent government to draw down on the country’s reserves accumulated in the past. The exception to this rule is for matters of security and defence. All other withdrawals technically require presidential approval. Given such constraints, notwithstanding a high savings rate and significant reserves, Singapore has traditionally relied on external investments and in particular on those from

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foreign multinationals, for domestic production and employment. American, European and Japanese investments therefore figure prominently in the domestic economy. During the immediate post-independence period and especially after the British announcement to withdraw from areas east of the Suez in 1967, Singapore embarked on a rapid policy of export-led industrialization. This process was aided through the policy recommendations of Dr Albert Winsenius, a Dutch economist serving the United Nations.5 This policy thrust actively sought foreign investments with generous incentives and tax concessions. Consumer electronics, petro-chemicals and engineering products figured prominently in the initial investments in the 1960s and 1970s. From the mid-1980s, the focus shifted to computer-related peripherals and microelectronic chip manufacture while the 1990s witnessed a surge in electronic wafer fabrication industries. Most recently, the Singapore government has announced the strategic targeting of investments in the health and biomedical sectors. The government’s strategy in the choice of investment sectors is pragmatically motivated by Singapore’s relatively high production costs, compared to the immediate region. Accordingly, sectors and products are chosen for their high value-added worth. In other words, the manufactured product must have a sufficiently high profit margin in view of the relatively high costs of production. Hence the labour-intensive industries of the 1960s and 1970s are gradually being replaced by high value-added niche manufacturing. This policy naturally has the unintended consequence of creating structural unemployment for less skilled general workers.6 In order to cope with such structural unemployment, the Singapore government spends large sums of money to retrain and upgrade its redundant workforce.7 Whereas retraining is meant to allow such workers to move across industries or sectors, upgrading is meant to allow workers to achieve higher skill levels within an existing job. The NTUC (National Trades Union Congress), the government-sponsored peak labour union, offers income subsidies for workers enrolled in such schemes.8 There is also a strategic motivation in sourcing foreign investments. Such investments are meant to anchor foreign multinational capital in Singapore for purposes of enhancing national viability. After all, the more such capital becomes embedded within the local context, the greater the interest of major investor countries in seeing Singapore remain sustainable. This early strategic motivation continues to obtain up until the present, and a number of government statutory boards are explicitly committed to sourcing investments from abroad. The Trade and Development Board (TDB) and the Economic Development Board (EDB) are specifically tasked to solicit investments from abroad. Both organizations maintain international representative offices in major North American and European cities.9 Similarly, the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), which was initially tasked to provide production space and related arrangements in Singapore, ensures the availability of sufficient infrastructural support for foreign investments. Alongside foreign investments, the Singapore government has also nurtured a domestic production capacity by investing in selected strategic industries in order to make up for the shortfall in indigenous capital. Such investments, particularly those related to electronic investments (Singapore Technologies), the national airline (Singapore Airlines) and the port operator (Maritime and Port Authority), are part of the stable of Government-Linked Companies (GLCs). These GLCs provide employment and revenue for the country and also deepen the capitalization of the local stock market

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(Singapore Stock Exchange—SGX) when they become publicly listed. A holding company, Temasek, manages these investments. GLC involvement in the domestic economy is sometimes viewed as excessive and the political elite has sought to ‘privatize’ some of these concerns, although the net effect has been ‘corporatization’ rather than ‘privatization’, where government decisions continue to inform operational requirements and policy choices.10 Internally derived initiatives also include recalibration of the domestic economy on a regular basis. Since the country is small and the government has an overwhelming political mandate and representation, it is able to fine-tune the economy on a regular basis. The relatively small domestic private sector and the absence of adherence to a liberal economic ideology of non-intervention has allowed for this outcome. Hence the PAP government is able to determine the direction and sectoral spread of the economy on a regular basis. It is through such readjustment that the 1986 restructuring of the domestic economy was responsible for high value-added niche manufacturing. The decision to concentrate on electronic manufacturing also derived from such adjustments. As a result, curiously enough, as the Singapore economy attains a higher level of maturity, there have been greater attempts by the state to provide direction for economic activities. Since such direction invariably involves GLC-led strategic investments, there is a real sense in which the projected changes become a self-fulfilling philosophy of sorts. It is in line with providing such redirection for a new economy that the Singapore government has embarked on a number of recent initiatives in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. The most visible of such thrusts is in devoting more resources to the development of a larger domestic pool of specialists with skills in engineering and information technology. The country is regarded as being acutely short of professionals in both of these core areas to meet current and future needs. Information technology, in particular, is seen as providing a multiplier effect in the production process. In order to harness the benefits of information technology, the PAP government has invested heavily in such infrastructure, especially in the education sector.11 There are initiatives aimed at the creation of an intelligent city that is fully connected and wired up. In schools, beginning from elementary schools, students are exposed to computer software and hardware, and student-teacher ratios in the teaching process are often supplemented by student-computer ratios. The government has come to realize that the use of information technology must be facilitated from a young age to prevent the resistance to new technologies that often accompanies the ageing process. Perhaps one of the unintended consequences of such a policy is that the country suffers from the highest rate of shortsightedness (myopia) in the world. Most youngsters typically wear glasses by the age of 6 or 7. Other strategic initiatives include devoting a greater share of the GDP to expenditure on research and technology and developing a cluster of industries in the biomedical sciences. Research spending is generally seen as weak and small for Singapore’s level of development, especially when compared to other countries in the industrialized West and East Asia. Through the encouragement of research and development, the government also hopes to foster entrepreneurship and reinvigorate the private sector. As for the biomedical sciences, it is being developed as the fourth pillar of Singapore’s manufacturing sector, alongside the traditional pillars of electronics, chemicals and engineering. The government hopes that by 2010, the country will become established as a regional hub for

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clinical trials and drug development, with some fifteen international biomedical science companies calling it home.12 As part of a stimulus package, the government has invested more than S$1 billion in venture funding while venture capital committed to ‘incubate research’ had risen to above S$2 billion by 2001. In 2000, manufacturing output for the cluster was estimated by the EDB at S$6.4 billion.13 Broadly speaking, the biomedical sector will encompass industries in the pharmaceutical, medical device, biotechnology and healthcare services sector. Many of the initiatives associated with the ‘new economy’ require skills that are not readily available domestically. This shortage is partly a function of the country’s miniscule size and population base, relative underdevelopment of postgraduate education and, in some instances, the outward migration of such talent to the West. Besides, unlike Japan and Taiwan, the manufacturing process is not deeply embedded within the economy, with the requisite infrastructural support. In response to the situation, the Singapore government has a very deliberate and high-profile policy of attracting what is termed ‘foreign talent’—a reference to skilled professionals from abroad.14 In order to encourage such talent, the government offers a number of incentives such as subsidized housing and guaranteed placement of school-going children in the local education system. Such incentives are often supplemented by generous leave, relocation and repatriation benefits. Although the policy generally targets professionals and skilled workers with the requisite qualifications and experience, there is a general preference for the recruitment of Asians with such skills. This preference is to allow for easier assimilation into the domestic environment with minimal dislocation both to the host country and the families of such workers. In addition, Western (read Caucasian) skilled workers may find some local policies idiosyncratic and unduly interventionist, something that the PAP has never felt apologetic about. Foreign talent, together with lesser skilled blue-collared foreign workers, helpers in the health and hospitality sectors and maids who help with domestic household chores currently account for over a quarter of the Singapore population.15 In terms of sheer numbers alone and especially during times of poor economic performance, such imported labour has the potential to pose a political problem for the PAP government. After all, citizens vote, and foreigners, whether talented or not, do not vote.

External initiatives Another thrust of the Singapore government’s involvement in economic investments is in the area of external investments that generate revenue from abroad. Just as Singapore attracts investments from the industrialized West and Japan, the government makes strategic investments abroad, often in less developed countries. Such a policy was identified explicitly by the Singapore government when its second Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, assumed office in 1990. His blueprint for development entitled ‘The Next Lap Together’ proposed the idea of a ‘second wing’ by investing abroad for greater returns.16 Naturally, it was expected that geographically proximate investments within the Asian region would allow for easier penetration and easier monitoring. The policy was also intended to capitalize on a number of core skills that Singapore had acquired. Such skills included investments in industrial parks modelled after Singapore’s own JTC

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projects, constructing and operating ports where the PSA had acquired significant experience and developments related to infrastructure and tourism. It also included the purchase of foreign companies that had the potential for synergy with domestic industries for greater market share through a larger operational environment or footprint.17 Such external investments have been spearheaded by the GLCs for a variety of reasons. In the first instance, GLCs have a certain strategic advantage in that the negotiation process and subsequent investments in an unfamiliar operational environment are better leveraged through government initiatives. The Singapore government not only commands international credibility and an excellent financial reputation; it is also able to draw on the resources of the public sector in order to see its ventures through. The existence of significant red tape, which characterizes the business environment in countries such as China, India and Vietnam, can also be easily overcome through negotiations involving state agencies and political and policy elite. A governmental undertaking significantly reduces the risk attendant in such ventures. In addition, political will to see the projects through also implies a longer term commitment and sustainability to the venture. Such GLC-led investments have typically been capital-intensive with a longer turn-around time to achieve profitability. Singapore’s joint investment with the government of China in the Suzhou Industrial Park is a classic example.18 Its technologyrelated investments in Bangalore, India are another case in point. The Suzhou Industrial Park project in particular attracted much attention since it was projected as a bilateral venture with the Chinese government. Much publicity was given to the ethnic Chinese concept of ‘Guanxi’ or good interpersonal relations in forging successful business ventures in China. Yet, for all the fanfare and the huge investment in manpower, infrastructure and software, the Suzhou project became a source of intense embarrassment to the Singapore government. Not only did the project lead to a large loss of public capital but it also made it abundantly clear that power in China was diffuse. Hence assuming cooperation from Beijing filtered downwards in decision-making terms constituted a wrong reading of the Chinese political situation. In fact, to compound the embarrassment, the Suzhou municipal government built its own industrial park in close proximity and competition to the Suzhou project, much to the chagrin of the Singapore government. Eventually, even Lee Kuan Yew was forced to admit that the joint-venture Suzhou project ended up with domestic competition rather than special treatment.19 Eventually, he ended by sounding a warning to the Chinese government that it must change its ways, especially the ‘most pernicious problem of…corruption’.20 The resort to investments further afield than Southeast Asia in the 1990s were inspired by a number of developments. First, despite maintaining extensive investments in Malaysia and Indonesia, the Singapore government sought to lessen its dependence on the immediate environment.21 This strategic calculation was in turn necessitated by the saturated regional environment and political difficulties that emerged in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The political turbulence unleashed by the crisis in Malaysia and Indonesia, as noted in previous chapters, left the familiar regional environment considerably less receptive to Singapore. Second, and closely related to this reason, was the failure of multilateral economic regimes on which Singapore had pinned its hopes for trade liberalization. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the value of revenue derived from trade is three times the value of domestic production. Accordingly, a liberal international trading

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regime is necessary for Singapore’s continued prosperity. Whereas the early 1990s initially augured enthusiasm regarding such arrangements, such enthusiasm rapidly evaporated after the onset of the Asian financial crisis. The country’s steadfast commitments to such regimes were amply demonstrated in the early 1990s. It was Singapore that lobbied hard for the evolution of AFTA, which was to come into being by 2002 after the preparation period was steadily shortened from its initial implementation in 2008. Similarly, it strongly endorsed the US-inspired APEC initiative in 1993 and, as a gesture of its commitment, now houses the headquarters of the APEC Secretariat. It also hosted the inaugural meeting of the WTO in 1996 and even offered itself as an alternative venue in December 2001 when a similar conference was convened in Dubai after the 11 September terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. In fact, Singapore’s enthusiastic endorsement of APEC, in particular, was met with resistance from Malaysia. Why then did Singapore lose faith in such liberal regimes? The simple answer to the question is that the deadlines that were agreed upon for tariff reduction by developing countries in AFTA and APEC were not met, and after the 1997 crisis there was little evidence that they would come to fruition. Governments in the neighbouring countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were fighting for their own political survival. As a result, they often became introverted and significantly more nationalistic. In addition, there was far greater concentration on the export of primary commodities to rapidly earn foreign exchange rather than be concerned with tariff reduction for imported goods. Malaysia even went to the extent of imposing financial controls in September 1998 to prevent further degradation of its economy. The economic turmoil and political instability arising from the crisis lost Singapore not only goodwill and trade opportunities but also led to significant degradation of its own investments in these countries, especially Indonesia. Naturally, since the GLCs had spearheaded such external investments, they bore the brunt of the losses as well from their exposure. As a result of these negative developments in the late 1990s, the GLCs began to invest further outwards. Hence the resort to countries like China, India and Vietnam. These countries offered low production costs and substantially lower political risks as well. A correlated strategy of reducing the risk exposure while guaranteeing a healthy volume of trade was the negotiation of FTAs with its major trading partners in the West and Japan. The signing of such bilateral agreements was not without the loss of some diplomatic goodwill in the region, especially from Malaysia and Thailand. Prime Minister Mahathir, in particular, expressed the opinion that such arrangements bypassed existing mechanisms and also had the potential to flood the regional market with Western manufactured goods using Singapore as a window. However, given the structural peculiarities of its domestic economy, the Singapore government felt that the bilateral FTAs were the surest way of preserving its economic interests and security.22 This policy of suffering the region and yet driving it, as described by Michael Leifer, has been earnestly pursued since 2000.23 In drawing this section to a close, it should be noted that Singapore’s economic endowments are totally at odds with its performance. In order to overcome the state’s absence of natural resources, the PAP government has opted for export-led growth driven primarily by the country’s secondary and tertiary sectors. Traditionally, the country was able to benefit from its immediate outer periphery in the Malay Archipelago where land,

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labour and natural resources are in abundance, and indeed continues to do so. At the same time, however, in order to avoid over-reliance on the region, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it has sought out investment opportunities from beyond the region. The strategic policy of embedding foreign multinational interests in the country to ensure its continued survival and prosperity continues to obtain. Hence, both in terms of domestic economic policies and external investments, Singapore is deeply embedded within the international capitalist system. Accordingly, its economic performance and potential are determined to a large extent by the broad contours and dynamics of the international economy. The country’s reliance on trade further embeds it within the system. The shortage of indigenous capital has inspired extensive public sector involvement in the economy, an involvement that the government is consciously trying to relinquish. However, even without direct involvement, the PAP government, through a number of statutory boards, actively defines and implements economic policies. Such an involvement is at least partly motivated by the PAP’s desire to sustain national viability in the long term. Just as in the case of economic diplomacy, defence diplomacy is aimed at ensuring sustenance through an indigenous military deterrence capability.

Defence diplomacy The starting point for any discussion of Singapore’s defence policies is the traumatic manner in which Singapore gained its independence and the ensuing difficulties the country faced in the immediate post-independence period in its bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. The trauma deriving from this early survivalist period is deeply etched in the minds of politicians and policy-makers alike. There is a strong will in the PAP government’s determination to ensure Singapore’s survival as an independent and prosperous state. Crucial to this determination is its firm faith in a military deterrence capability. Given the country’s miniscule size within the immediate regional environment and vulnerabilities deriving from it, policy formulators have always regarded credible military deterrence as an essential foundation for the state’s viability. Such thinking is meant as much to make up for the inequalities of natural endowments as to provide it with greater leverage in articulating its sovereignty as an independent state capable of negotiating with other countries on equal terms. In this regard, Singapore’s defence policies provide the PAP government with positive psychological conditioning over and above a deterrence capability to defend the country’s national interests. Singapore’s defence policies are layered, and involve the use of a wide variety of instruments, from military deterrence to alliances and alignments. Accordingly, defence is conceived of in terms of a number of interlocking approaches that collectively cohere to provide a broad and effective umbrella. The core to this approach is a nationally conscripted citizen army that is augmented by a sizeable pool of trained reserves that can be mobilized at short notice. To make up for its deficiency in numbers, in terms of a regular standing army, Singapore also spends generously on procuring the most sophisticated weapon systems and platforms. Its defence expenditure, which in recent times has appropriated approximately 27 per cent of annual public expenditure, is certainly sizeable, even by international standards on a per capita basis.24 In fact, the PAP government has publicly articulated an upper ceiling of up to 6 per cent of the country’s

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GDP. Security and defence are regarded as so crucial to Singapore that the country’s elected president need not be consulted by Parliament in the event that previously accumulated financial reserves are used. Questions pertaining to large defence outlays are generally not raised in Parliament where the PAP maintains a near monopoly. Besides, policy formulation in Singapore is an elite-dominated affair that is rarely questioned or challenged. Most citizens appear to concur tacitly with the government’s pronouncements on matters of defence policy, at least in order not to attract the government’s ire. In addition, foreign and defence policies are either viewed as fait accompli or esoteric beyond the needs of daily living. Philosophically, Singapore’s defence policies are anchored by a realist core strategy of deterrence that views power in essentially competitive terms. Yet the government is sufficiently prudent to realize that it is neither able to define the regional distribution of power nor to restrain the actions of medium and great powers. Accordingly, domestic deterrence is augmented through support for a regional balance of power among the great powers. Such a balance is useful for Singapore on two counts. First, it negates the natural dispersion of power in maritime Southeast Asia which is traditionally determined by land area and population base. Such indigenous configurations naturally disadvantage Singapore. Second, an involvement of the major powers in the regional arena and a measure of balance among them would negate untoward unilateral tendencies. In addition, such involvement embeds the great powers in the region in the same way that foreign investments ensure Singapore’s continued survival. For example, in fiscal year 2004, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence had a budget allocation of S$8.62 billion, an increased annual allocation from the previous year, when all other ministries took a 2 per cent budget cut.25 Hence balanced attention to the region by the great powers is viewed as intrinsically good. Such a policy position, for example, is in stark contrast to that of Indonesia, which publicly articulates a preference for the non-involvement of external powers in the region. Over and above such a realist orientation, Singapore is also an active participant in neoliberal institutionalist arrangements that are aimed at mutual consultations and conflict prevention. The country’s active involvement in the ASEAN PMC and the ARF attests to this policy. In addition, Singapore maintains an active web of bilateral defence arrangements and regularly conducts joint exercises with regional countries. More recently, it has participated in the US-Thai annual defence exercise, Cobra Gold. In conceptualizing Singapore’s defence policies, it is useful to employ the broad breakdown of the previous chapter on economic diplomacy. After all, certain initiatives are exercised locally and obtain from domestic considerations and resources while others specifically target an external audience. The latter classification is not meant to describe countries which may become involved in a conflict with Singapore. Rather, it is a reference to the manner in which Singapore engages other countries in defence collaboration, especially in the areas of joint research, production and technology transfer. Whereas such internal and external initiatives are not entirely separable as in the case of economic diplomacy, it allows for a useful and systematic way of dealing with the issue at hand.

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Internal initiatives Singapore’s defence initiatives, especially at the local level, are deeply informed by an acute sense of vulnerability. This sense was as much a product of historical circumstances as it was an early perception that city-states which lack the support of an adjacent hinterland have historically never succeeded. Precedents deriving from the Greek citystates made this negative trajectory abundantly clear to the PAP’s first-generation elite. None the less, this historical reality was offset by a steely resolve to ensure Singapore’s continued viability in the long term. The more Singapore drifted apart from Malaysia and prospered into the post-independence period, the more this resolve permeated into domestic politics and policies. With the Barisan challenge effectively overcome by 1968, the PAP government’s monopoly of domestic politics that was in turn interactive with the emergence of a dominant party system, allowed for the unfettered implementation of policies. Central to this early notion of independent statehood was an indigenous defence capability. While contemplating such a capability, the PAP government was acutely aware that Singapore had neither the material resources nor the man-power to maintain a large professional standing army. The majority ethnic Chinese adage, as noted by Lee Kuan Yew in his memoirs, is that good metal is not used to make nails.26 Whereas the Malays were favourably disposed towards military service, ethno-linguistic and religious considerations deriving from the merger and subsequent separation with Malaysia made it difficult to mobilize a predominantly ethnically Malay army that maintained transnational linkages with Malaysia and Indonesia. Accordingly, Singapore opted for a citizen army modelled after Israel and Switzerland. The plan, however, ran into difficulties when India and Egypt, which were approached for assistance, declined the request. Offending Malaysian sensibilities was not regarded as prudent for countries that maintained common memberships and policy positions in organizations such as NAM and the Commonwealth. Hence Israeli assistance was eventually sought to establish the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in 1967.27 The choice of Israel was a difficult decision unto itself. First and foremost, Israel was not well regarded in the Third World then and Arab states denied Israel diplomatic recognition. Nasser in Egypt and Sukarno in Indonesia, who played key roles in NAM, were fundamentally opposed to Israel. The popular perception of the country was as an aggressor state in the Middle East that had the blessings of imperialist powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the Israeli doctrine of forward defence presupposed a hostile external environment and was premised on the occupation of adjacent territory to create strategic depth for warfare. The implications of such a doctrine were not lost on Malaysia and Indonesia. A number of other analogies could also be made. These included comparing Singapore’s external environment to that of Israel, populated by an unfriendly majority of Muslim peoples. Similarly, Singapore’s predicament was not unlike that of Israel where challenges to its sovereignty and territoriality were not uncommon. In view of all these considerations, it is hardly surprising that the Israeli team of military advisers, first dispatched to Singapore in 1965, wore the guise of Mexican agricultural advisers. This early precedent of maintaining a

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low-profile and unobtrusive bilateral relationship with Israel in defence matters generally continues to obtain. Similarly, the use of Israeli doctrine in training methods and tactical responses has continued, alongside the use of Israeli weapon systems, especially in missile and antimissile defences, portable and vehicle-mounted mortars and electronics, and avionic equipment and joint research. At the core of Singapore’s strategy is a policy of deterrence and defence based on power—primarily national power and secondarily that of friends and allies. For deterrence and defence, Singapore relies on a large citizen army of some 350,000 active and reserve soldiers. Male citizens are conscripted at the age of 18 to undergo active service for a period ranging from twenty-four to thirty months of full-time service and subsequent reserve service for about three weeks annually until the age of 40 or 50, depending on the rank. More recently, however, the Singapore government has announced that it will shorten the term of service to twenty-four months in light of a larger pool of eligible citizens from 2006 and the multiplier effect associated with the use of modern technology.28 The army is broadly organized into three combined arms divisions, each including ‘two infantry brigades, an armored brigade, an artillery group, combat engineer, signals and air defence battalions, and a divisional logistic support command’.29 There is also a rapid deployment division which includes airmobile and amphibious brigades, an independent armoured brigade, and two commando battalions that comprise the spearhead formations. There are a number of other second-line formations that are generally drawn from the reserves. SAF officers, in particular those who have held the prestigious SAF scholarship for tertiary education, also figure prominently in the PAP Cabinet.30 After early retirement, many such scholars are ‘seconded’ to head major statutory boards and GLCs. Together with this significant deterrence capability, the SAF is also armed with the most sophisticated and integrated weapon systems for all its three services.31 Major landbased equipment includes British centurion main battle tanks, French AMX-13 light tanks, and approximately 1,000 other assorted armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs). There are also both towed and motorized artillery systems, anti-tank weapon systems, artillery locating systems and heavy combat engineer equipment for rapid mobilization. The air force, with over 165 fighter aircraft, has an assortment of American fighter aircraft, including various models of F-16s, F-5s and A-4 Skyhawks, transport, reconnaissance and attack helicopters, E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft, midair refuelling tankers and unmanned aerial vehicles and drones. The navy and coastguard deploy frigates, missile gunboats, landing shiptanks, support vessels, fast-attack craft and submarines. There are outstanding orders for stealth frigates, fourth-generation attack aircraft and Apache-attack helicopters. Major equipment purchases and upgrades are traditionally from the US, Europe and to a lesser extent, Israel. The sizeable annual defence budget allows for sophisticated state-of-the-art procurements, and purchases are carefully integrated into existing platforms and generally well maintained. A high premium is placed on equipment maintenance and training. Some weapon systems are intentionally stored abroad after purchase for a number of reasons. Such reasons include unwillingness to introduce new technologies into the regional arena. Sometimes, such decisions are a func-tion of overseas export restrictions, as in the case of the advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) procured from the US. Occasionally, it is a function of self-imposed restraint for fear of igniting a

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regional arms race, as in the case of the advanced models of the F16 aircraft. At other times, training requirements and familiarization with the new equipment necessitate storage abroad, as in the case of the submarine purchases from Sweden. Finally, owing to the shortage of storage space and to facilitate the training of its troops abroad, the SAF regularly retains military equipment abroad. Such overseas detachments, especially for aircraft, are located in Australia, Brunei, France and the US. In the purchase of expensive and sophisticated weapon systems, the SAF is motivated by a doctrine of swift and massive power projection ability. Hence the emphasis on air superiority and mobile armoured units, while the navy has interdiction capabilities well beyond its territorial waters. Concurrently, whereas the SAF’s defence doctrine in the 1980s was to be a ‘poison shrimp’ that would give any predator a nasty stomach ache, by the 1990s the doctrine had evolved towards ensuring a swift and decisive victory. Given Singapore’s limited land area, and by extension lack of strategic depth, great emphasis is placed on power projection platforms and ability. Central to the core strategy of national self-reliance is also an indigenous capacity for producing small-calibre munitions, mortars, rifles and explosives locally. This capacity is coordinated by Chartered Industries, which is part of Temasek Holdings. Over time, this minimal capacity has been slowly expanded to include the manufacture of grenade launchers and an indigenous AFV—the bionix. In addition, Chartered Industries, through its stable of companies, is also involved in the refurbishment and upgrading of avionics equipment and weapon systems. Such production and upgrading abilities are now offered beyond the domestic market on a commercial basis. Singapore has also evolved an indigenous capacity for the design, research and development of defence equipment. This is coordinated by the Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and the Defence Science Organization (DSO) which established an office in Paris in June 1999. Both organizations are also extensively involved in collaborative research and production with a number of other countries (to be discussed in the following section). If upgrading the capabilities and operational readiness of the SAF is a major thrust of Singapore’s security policy, there is a simultaneous attempt to mobilize all national resources in the event of the outbreak of military conflict. First launched in the late 1980s and called Total Defence’, this policy seeks to impress upon the domestic population that for a small country such as Singapore, the complete mobilization of all resources, civil and military, is the only way to deal with extraordinary situations, whether natural or created.32 Accordingly, Total Defence includes a number of issue areas—civil defence, social defence, and economic and psychological defence. Such an integrated web of defences is meant to cater for a holistic internal defence capacity based on the Swedish model. Since all segments of society are likely to be affected by an outbreak of conflict, the reasoning goes, so will all citizens have to contribute towards the security of the state. However, it should be noted that with the exception of civil defence, all the other forms of defence are generally regarded as esoteric. Civil defence, on the other hand, is more successful simply because hardware resources such as ambulances and fire-engines have been colour coded and redesignated. Similarly, personnel involved in civil defence are clearly distinguishable by their dark blue uniforms. A number of other provisions have been made in line with the concept of Total Defence. Such provisions include the installation of an island-wide early warning system that is tested monthly for operational readiness. It also includes the construction of bomb

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shelters for all new housing developments, as well as those constructed by the private sector. On a regular basis, the government conducts rationing exercises for food and water and emergency drills for fire and bomb evacuations. Such exercises are sometimes announced ahead of time, and sometimes carried out spontaneously, with attendant inconveniences, to simulate a crisis situation. Finally, the government has also encouraged a policy of requisitioning and mobilizing civilian resources, including land and sea transport. Such practices are sometimes held in conjunction with the mobilization of military reserves to achieve civil-military synergy. The most recent initiatives in instilling a national awareness of Singapore’s defence requirements have been guided tours of training programmes and equipment and live-firing exercises for employers. The day when Singapore fell to invading Japanese forces during the Second World War, namely 15 February, is also observed as an important national occasion when reserve military personnel report for work in uniforms and publicly recite an oath of allegiance to the state. Over and above this internal core of national self-reliance, Singapore also maintains an alliance arrangement and a clear policy of alignment with the US. As for the alliance arrangement, after achieving political independence in 1965, Singapore continued to be a member of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), a legacy of negotiated independence from Britain. The alliance was meant to ward off joint external threats for Malaysia and Singapore and was useful in countering the Indonesian confrontation. With the phasing out of AMDA and the British withdrawal from areas east of Suez in 1971, a successor organization, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), was formed. The FPDA, which also includes Australia and New Zealand, is still in effect. Although the FPDA is only a consultative arrangement, it enhances Singapore’s security in several important ways. It knits Singapore into the Western security system and provides for airtraining arrangements through the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) headquartered in Butterworth, Malaysia. It also constitutes a basis for developing a defence relationship with Australia. In fact, Australia, through the FPDA, has often played a mediating role between Malaysia and Singapore, especially when the bilateral relationship is subjected to turbulence. Beyond membership in the FPDA, Singapore has aligned itself increasingly with the United States. Singapore’s almost militant anti-communist position and its strong diplomatic support for the US, particularly during the Vietnam War, allowed for the evolution of a special bilateral relationship. Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew has stated repeatedly that the US is a benign super-power that can protect the interests of vulnerable states from the hegemonic ambitions of extra-regional as well as regional powers. Accordingly, Singapore signed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) with the US in 1990 that allowed for the hosting of the Logistics Command of the US Seventh Fleet (COMLOG WESTPAC). Additional Implementation Agreements and an Addendum also allowed for the rotational deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft in Singapore and berthing and supply facilities for large US warships at the Changi Naval Base from 2000. The US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and its escort and supply ships berthed at Chang in March 2001.33 At a much more informal level, Singapore regularly plays host to senior defence officials from the region and beyond. Although it is by now common practice for senior defence officials of ASEAN countries to routinely visit their counterparts in other

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member countries, especially at the time of assuming and relinquishing their appointments, Singapore makes special efforts to cultivate such relationships. It also regularly confers military honours and medals on such officials for fostering good defence relations and trains senior foreign military officers in its Singapore Command and Staff College (SCSC).34 Extensive bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia have also been consciously nurtured as part of Singapore’s security policy. Since the early 1980s many contentious issues have been dealt with at the bilateral level. Bilateral channels are important, too, because ASEAN does not include contentious bilateral issues on its agenda. Quiet bilateral diplomacy has instead been the instrument of choice. Singapore regards its membership in ASEAN as a key element of its international security policy. In the context of Southeast Asia’s political history and its division, in the 1970s and 1980s, into a communist Indochina and a non-communist Southeast Asia, Singapore’s membership in ASEAN was helpful in deflecting the communist threat. More significant is that ASEAN provides an institutional framework within which Singapore can manage relations with its two immediate neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. Up until the time of the downfall of Suharto’s New Order government in 1998, it was conventional wisdom in Southeast Asia that Indonesia was primus inter pares in ASEAN. Less noticed was the restraining effect of ASEAN on Indonesian ambitions for regional hegemony in the past thirty years. Furthermore, almost three decades of interaction have led to a fair measure of ease among member states that allows multilateral problems such as piracy, smuggling, illegal immigrants and pollution to be addressed cooperatively. In this regard, multilateral fora like ASEAN have a strong normative component in institutionalizing cordial relations among geographically proximate states. This institutional approach is not antithetical to Singapore’s deterrence strategy; rather, it is meant to perform a complementary function.

External initiatives In view of its limited land area, the SAF has sought regularly to train its troops abroad. As more and more land gives way to urban construction and housing, the greater is the need for such collaboration. Such collaboration, with other countries and often on a bilateral and commercial basis, is over and above the exercises in which the country’s forces participate on a regular and passing basis in the case of the navy. Traditionally, there are two forms of defence collaboration that Singapore undertakes. The first form involves training overseas, with all the necessary military equipment stationed abroad to facilitate such training. The second and more recent thrust is in the area of joint research, design, and production of military equipment and munitions. A number of countries host SAF troops for training exercises regularly. These include the Republic of China (Taiwan) where the SAF deploys troops for infantry as well as heavy weapon training. Heavy or support weapons are a reference to armour, artillery and combat engineer vocations. More recently, Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, have provided the large areas required for the training of support weapons. These countries are especially useful for brigade and divisional level exercises. Troops are also dispatched regularly to Brunei and Thailand for anti-guerrilla and jungle warfare training. These countries, which are geographically proximate to Singapore, allow the SAF to train

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unobtrusively under existing bilateral arrangements. The air force regularly trains in a number of bases in the US, including Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico, the ‘Peace Prairie’ Detachment in Grand Prairie, Texas, and the McConell Air Force Base in Kansas. Other than the US, there are also air force detachments in Brunei and New South Wales, Queensland, and Western Australia in Australia and Carzaux in France. Similarly, the navy maintains and trains sailors at the Submarine Project Office in Karlskrona, Sweden.35 Singapore also maintains collaborative research, design and development programmes with Australia, France, Israel, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In order to indicate the seriousness of such collaboration, Singapore also maintains joint technology funds with France, Israel and Sweden.36 A few examples of such collaboration will illustrate the nature of Singapore’s involvement in such projects. Thus, for example, Singapore established chemical defence research and development with Sweden by collaborating with the Swedish Defence Research Establishment. After such collaboration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Singapore now operates a chemical defence laboratory which undertakes research in the ‘detection, protection, and decontamination of chemical agents’.37 Through collaboration with the US navy, the SAF has acquired the expertise for explosive storage technology. Similarly, through collaboration with the US army and the US Defence Threat Reduction Agency, it has acquired the technology for large-scale explosive testing. Underground ammunition storage technology was acquired through collaboration with Scandia National Laboratories. All of these collaborative efforts were used in the design and development of ammunition facilities at the Changi Naval Base and the underground ammunition storage depot in Mandai.38 Singapore’s defence collaboration with Israel is in the area of electrooptics, training simulators and anti-tank missiles. The missiles in particular were developed with sophisticated television guidance technology which extends the missile’s range significantly. The collaboration with France is primarily in the area of stealth technology, and today, apart from Germany and the United Kingdom, Singapore is France’s third largest partner in defence research and development collaboration.39 It is in view of such extensive collaboration that Singapore established a Defence Technology Office in Paris in 1999. A similar office has also been established in Washington, DC in the US. All of Singapore’s collaboration in defence research and production is coordinated by the Defence Technology Group (DTG) that was renamed the Defence Science Technology Agency (DSTA) in 2000, and the Defence Science Organization (DSO) whose National Laboratories was corporatized in 1997. Corporatization has enabled the DSO to establish collaborative links with local and foreign research establishments. The launch of Temasek Laboratories in 2000 which brings together the collaborative efforts of the DSO and the National University of Singapore (NUS) is another example of the Singapore government’s efforts to harness the benefits of research and development for the SAF. The DSO, with a total pool of more than 600 scientists and engineers, is the single largest research and development organization in Singapore. By 2000, Singapore had appropriated 4 per cent of its annual defence budget for research and development, in the hope that new technologies will provide a needed advantage and multiplier effect in the event of the outbreak of conflict in this land- and population- scarce country.40

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In bringing this section on Singapore’s defence diplomacy to a close, it should be noted that Singapore’s policy-planners employ a wide range of instruments to defend Singapore’s interests. Such instruments, that nourish and sustain the state’s strategic interests and survival, range from the use of existing bilateral and multilateral channels to shore up familiarity with senior defence personnel in the region to the establishment of strategic linkages abroad. Such strategic linkages are meant to compensate for some of Singapore’s inability to meet the training requirements of the SAF. They are also used to jointly develop engineering and research technologies in defence. However, at the core of Singapore’s defence strategy is a policy of national self-reliance that draws on its essentially conscript citizen army. Such reliance also extends to the ability to domestically manufacture munitions, small arms, and designing and upgrading weapon systems. This indigenous defence capacity is viewed as crucial to national survival and viability. Other arrangements such as the FPDA and alignment with the United States are meant to augment the country’s core capabilities.

8 Conclusion Singapore’s political independence in 1965, its subsequent survival within a difficult regional environment in the immediate post-independence period and ensuing prosperity is both unique and informative. It is unique to the extent that internal self-government was carefully negotiated by the PAP government with the United Kingdom prior to merger with Malaysia in 1963. Its subsequent fissure from the Malaysian federation in 1965 also stands out as a rare example in international relations, where such fissures are typically accompanied by conflict. Hence it is arguable that notwithstanding some domestic political challenges, the transition to independence was reasonably smooth, compared to many other Third World countries in Asia and Africa. Yet fortuitous circumstances alone do not a successful state make, especially one as small, dependent and vulnerable as Singapore. The PAP government which had been in power in 1959 deserves much of the credit for astutely ensuring Singapore’s continued existence and prosperous development. The leadership and personality of Lee Kuan Yew, together with a core group of able first-generation politicians and bureaucrats, steered the country well into the 1980s, before the smooth transition to a second-generation leadership that culminated in Goh Chok Tong assuming the Prime Ministership from Lee Kuan Yew in 1990. Lee Hsien Loong, Lee Kuan Yew’s son and Deputy Prime Minister, succeeded Goh as Prime Minister in August 2004. From then on, Lee Kuan Yew’s new designation is Minister Mentor (MM) while Goh assumed the position of Senior Minister (SM) from the elder Lee. Lee Kuan Yew’s lengthy tenure in office, firm control of the domestic political situation, interventionist style and strong record of performance-based and electoral legitimacy have left an indelible imprint on Singapore. It is therefore hardly surprising that for many observers, little distinction exists between Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP and Singapore. In light of the unique circumstances surrounding Singapore’s emergence as an independent state, it may be argued that Singapore’s past provides little by way of comparative value to assess or guide other small states. Social scientists would therefore regard Singapore’s development as useful for purposes of a configurative case study but obtaining little external validity for higher level comparative theorizing. Yet I suspect that the Singapore story is illustrative of how a small vulnerable and dependent state can survive and prosper. The policies pursued by the PAP government in the postindependence period may provide valuable clues to how success can be seemingly engineered. Central to this engineering is significant domestic political support, credible deterrence to maintain sovereignty and territoriality as a state, and to achieve a good measure of economic and political embeddedness in the region and beyond. Naturally, regional tranquillity and a sympathetic international community are also prerequisites. In assessing Singapore’s foreign policy over the past thirty-five years, one can reasonably surmise that there is a strong realist streak in policy output. This streak is as

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much a function of the manner in which political independence was unexpectedly thrust upon the state, and its initially turbulent bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, as the PAP’s determination for the country to succeed as an independent state. Hence the obsession with the theme of survival in the first instance and national viability subsequently. What natural endowments were unable to confer in terms of geographical size, population and resources, was quickly made up in terms of international embeddedness and a credible military deterrence. These policies obtained the power requisite for the preservation of territorial integrity and sovereignty. A clear and committed policy of internal self-reliance was quickly established through a citizen army. Homeland defence was also ensured through large and sustained defence expenditure that sought to create a multiplier effect through the acquisition of sophisticated military hardware. Domestic defence production of munitions, research and development, and collaboration with a number of countries further buttressed the credibility of its deterrence policy. Some purchases and defence doctrines are a cause of concern to immediately adjacent neighbouring countries, but Singapore has skilfully deflected criticism by not identifying any adversaries publicly. Eventually, Singapore’s continued membership in the FPDA gridded the country into the Western security system. In addition, since 1990, after signing an MOU with the United States, Singapore has had a clearly discernible alignment policy. In fact, Singapore currently has the strongest security relationship with the US in Southeast Asia, notwithstanding the presence of traditional US allies in the region, such as the Philippines and Thailand. In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center on 11 September, and the uncovering of extremist Muslim activities domestically and in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, this security relationship is likely to become significantly strengthened. Whereas the US reinvoked its Visiting Forces Arrangement with the Philippines in May 1999, and acceded to President Gloria Arroyo’s request to destroy the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, its engagement of the Philippines is likely to be much less intense and sustained than that with Singapore. As for the US involvement in the annual Cobra Gold bilateral military exercises with Thailand, Singapore has now become an active participant of that exercise as well. Finally it should be noted that both the Philippines and Thailand have, in the past, suffered bouts of nationalist sentiments expressed in anti-American terms. The Singapore policy process, on the other hand, is totally impervious to domestic pressures and entirely elite-dominated. Foreign and defence policies, in particular, are exempt from such considerations. This realist orientation was certainly a hallmark of Singapore’s foreign policy output during the survivalist phase of policy output (1965–1968) as well as during the Cold War that lingered in Southeast Asia till the late 1980s. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have made Singapore wary on the one hand. Tensions with Malaysia and Indonesia rose significantly. However, such developments that would have further entrenched Singapore’s early realist streak were mitigated by a number of factors. The emergence of multilateral fora in the 1990s like APEC and the ARF tempered the realist streak through recourse to multilateral institutionalist channels that downplayed the state-centric nature of realism. Equally compelling were the demands of a major trading state. The competitive philosophical thrust of realism evolved to exist alongside a policy of complex interdependence that was premised on more cooperative principles. Accordingly, it may

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be argued that Singapore’s foreign policy exhibited a synthetic admixture of realism and neoliberal institutionalism. Although Singapore eventually resorted to signing FTAs with its major trading partners on a bilateral basis from 2000, it was a recourse borne out of frustration at the non-fulfilment of the terms of AFTA and APEC rather than a return to state-centric realism. The 1997 Asian financial crisis significantly weakened regional multilateral institutions and made states more inward-looking to attend to immediate domestic matters. Neither the crisis nor its fall-out was of Singapore’s making. In this regard, the recourse to FTAs was a responsive policy rather than a deliberate one.1 A number of domestic economic initiatives also signalled, or at least envisaged, policy output within the framework of complex interdependence. Singapore’s restructuring of its economy which was undertaken in 1986 has led to the country becoming a major manufacturer of electronic products. These products, of which electronic wafer fabrication is the most recent initiative, account for some 40 per cent of domestic manufacturing. The country has also embarked on major initiatives in information technology, and research and development of manufactured products. The desire to become a global hub in the biomedical and pharmaceutical industries is also a clearly coordinated policy thrust. Over and above these initiatives, the government’s desire to make Singapore a major financial centre requires functioning within the framework of international institutions and norms. Finally, as a major trading state where trade revenue is valued at three times the revenue derived from domestic sources, Singapore is clearly compelled to function within the framework of complex interdependence. The country’s unequivocal commitments to multilateral trading regimes such as the WTO provide clear evidence of this cooperative policy. During the early period of Singapore’s development after separation from Malaysia, trade was so important that the country clearly articulated a policy of decoupling trade from foreign policy. Hence it was no surprise that the country continued to trade with Vietnam during the 1970s and 1980s, despite being a harsh critic of Vietnamese policies in mainland Southeast Asia, especially in acting as a proxy for Soviet strategic interests and the advancement of revolutionary communism. Such decoupling is, however, less observable now, and two major factors account for the policy reversal. First, beginning in the 1980s and led by the United States, the imposition of economic sanctions against countries perceived as violating international norms of good conduct has led to the evolution of significantly enhanced monitoring regimes. Such regimes have consistently applied international pressure against countries such as Iran, Iraq, Myanmar and North Korea by enforcing sanctions. Accordingly, Singapore, as a major trading state, has been forced to comply with such regimes. Second, Singapore has come to realize, especially after having overcome its initial trauma of survival, that complex interdependence requires the observation of international norms. Put differently, the country is anxious to avoid the negative publicity associated with violating international requirements of good conduct. Such violation, at this point in its development, will cost the country too much in terms of the diplomatic goodwill or soft power that it has accumulated over the years. As for the fora where Singapore’s foreign policy is articulated, as noted in Chapter 2, there has been a significant strengthening of the country’s diplomatic representation abroad. Most notably, this has included membership in the UN Security Council from 2001. Given the importance of the country’s immediate regional environment, bilateral fora are extremely important, especially for the resolution of difficult and contentious

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bilateral issues with Malaysia and Indonesia. These fora allow for the quiet resolution of issues that have the potential for diplomatic posturing and spinning out of control. The reason for this observation is quite simply the fact that domestic politics and issues in Malaysia and Indonesia are regularly contested, unlike the case in Singapore where PAP elite maintain almost exclusive authority. Alongside bilateral fora, regional fora like ASEAN and APEC are also important. The former is important for its regional representation and inclusiveness as well as its ability to evolve and control the pace and agenda of multilateral regimes like AFTA and the ARF. It is equally important in instituting familiarity and accommodation among member countries. Finally, ASEAN, at least until the collapse of Suharto’s New Order government in Indonesia in May 1998, restrained Indonesia’s hegemonic ambitions in maritime Southeast Asia. This restraint was achieved through allowing Indonesia de facto leadership of ASEAN that in turn appeared to satisfy its sense of proprietary entitlement to order regional relations. As for APEC, whereas Singapore’s enthusiasm for it has waned despite hosting the secretariat, at the time of its inauguration by President Clinton in Seattle in 1993, the organization clearly exhibited great potential. In this regard, unfortunately for Singapore, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 has severely weakened the resolve of regional organizations to implement policies that were previously agreed upon, especially in promoting trade through gradual tariff reductions. For its miniscule size, Singapore’s role in regional multilateral fora has been extremely aggressive. It was responsible for lobbying hard for AFTA in 1993 and, together with Thailand, for the ARF in 1994. Similarly, it was Singapore which undertook the initiative to set up ASEM and EALAF. In this regard, it is evident that Singapore is actively involved in regional fora that have a bearing on the evolution of the regional political and economic landscape. In addition, it is keen to link the region to the major economic and political centres of the world. Some measure of pre-emptive planning and active lobbying is involved in undertaking such initiatives that are aimed at gridding the region within a global framework. Presumably the positive spill-over effects include the enhancement of trade and the entrenchment of the country’s independence and sovereignty. As noted in Chapter 3 and throughout this book, the PAP government has not taken national viability for granted even after almost forty years of independent statehood. The PAP’s political leadership of Singapore and the elite nature of the policy formulation process in Singapore have undoubtedly made the task of articulating a clear and consistent foreign policy much easier. Not only do most citizens of the state view foreign policy as too esoteric, but also, more importantly, the PAP’s track record of performance-based criteria and recent landslide victory in the 2001 national election has provided the government with significant political legitimacy. Such legitimacy which is in turn interactive with the continuation of a dominant party system in the country in the foreseeable future affords it the luxury of certainty that is the envy of many governments, both in the developing and developed world. Such certainty has also allowed the PAP to argue for the importance of good governance over regime types. By playing up global and regional uncertainties and the narrow margin for error in policy formulation, the PAP is also able to impress upon the citizens of the state that the current political system and its attendant peculiarities is a function of necessity rather than choice. None the less, it has to be acknowledged that astute political leadership has been a cardinal feature of the

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Singapore success story. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that such leadership is evident in foreign policy formulation as well. Hence the popular adage that states do not make policies, statesmen do. Singapore has clearly survived and prospered well beyond the predictions of most political analysis from its traumatic thrust into independence in 1965. The PAP’s firstgeneration leadership, and Lee Kuan Yew in particular, can indeed truly claim credit for the state’s development. The party’s second-generation leadership led by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had publicly articulated a desire to hand over the reins of power to a third generation by the expiry of the current government’s mandate in 2007. Accordingly, in August 2004, Lee Hsien Loong replaced Goh as Singapore’s third Prime Minister. Lee Kuan Yew, as Senior Minister since 1990 and Minister Mentor since 2004, continues to maintain significant input into policy matters, and foreign policy is no exception to this general observation. His meeting with Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia in 2001 to resolve a bundle of outstanding bilateral issues provides the clearest evidence of his input and involvement. Beyond the elder Lee, the PAP appears to face little threat by way of political and policy contestation in the short and medium term. As a result, the current trajectory of foreign policy output looks set to continue. After having examined Singapore’s foreign policy, it is tempting to pose James Rosenau’s classic question: Of what is this an instance? Clearly, the circumstances surrounding Singapore’s independence, survival and development are unique and cannot be replicated. At the same time, I do believe that the Singapore experience yields a number of interesting lessons for small, vulnerable and independent states. Such lessons include the development of a credible strategy of military deterrence to overcome the liabilities of natural endowments. Such a strategy is crucial in ensuring sovereignty and territoriality within a broader regional environment. Formal alliances and alignments, even in a post-Cold War environment, can also buttress the deterrence strategy. In this regard, neutrality in foreign policy remains an elusive option for weak and vulnerable states. Two other lessons appear to be seemingly replicable. The second lesson is to establish certain embeddedness within the international capitalist system through trade and investment policies that have been generally described as economic diplomacy in this book. The third lesson, which is perhaps the equivalent of an independent variable, is a core group of dedicated political elite. That leadership has been a crucial variable in the Singapore situation certainly cannot be overlooked or exaggerated. As to whether leadership alone is sufficient in building on success remains a moot point in the political science literature where the elite are still viewed as fallible and prone to excess. Hence the general Western preference for transparent procedures and accountable institutions over personalities. By way of a conclusion, it should be noted that Singapore’s situation is not without challenges. Such challenges are likely to derive from the immediate regional environment in the short and medium term. Its bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia may be subjected to considerable turbulence. Similarly, the level of competition in economic and infrastructural development will also become keener. Malaysia, in particular, with its vision of becoming a major regional air and sea hub, will provide significant competition to Singapore. In dealing with the immediate regional environment, Singapore’s developmental course may be tested. The PAP government, which is accustomed to

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political predictability in the domestic arena, has no such control over the regional situation. Herein lies the greatest paradox of Singapore’s foreign policy output. For the impact that regional developments have on Singapore, the country and its elite has no control over domestic political developments in Malaysia and Indonesia. This helplessness must be cause for a more sober appraisal of the country’s success.

Appendix 1 Singapore’s overseas representations in alphabetical order High Commissions

Embassies

Australia

Argentina

Luxembourg

Bangladesh

Australia

Mongolia

Canada

Belgium

Myanmar

Cyprus

Brazil

Nepal

Fiji Islands

Cambodia

Netherlands

Ghana

Chile

Oman

India

China

Panama

Kenya

Czech Republic

Peru

Malaysia

Denmark

Philippines

Maldives

Egypt

Poland

Mauritius

France

Portugal

Namibia

Germany

Russian Federation

Negara Brunei Darussalam

Greece

Saudi Arabia

New Zealand

Holy Sees

Slovak Republic

Nigeria

Hungary

Spain

Pakistan

Indonesia

Sweden

Papua New Guinea

Ireland

Switzerland

South Africa

Iran

Thailand

Sri Lanka

Israel

Turkey

Swaziland

Italy

Ukraine

United Kingdom

Japan

United Arab Emirates

Zimbabwe

Jordan

United Mexican States

Kazhakhstan

United States of America

Korea

Uzbekistan

Kuwait

Vietnam

Lao Republic

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Permanent representations European Communities—Brussels; United Nations—Geneva; United Nations—New York Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore Website address: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/overseas/frame_overseas.htm Accessed 10 June 2001.

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Appendix 2 Singapore’s fundamental principles of foreign policy • As a small state, Singapore has no illusions about the state of our region or the world. • We need to maintain a credible and deterrent military defence to underpin our foreign policy. • We must promote and work for good relations with our neighbours in all spheres. • We are friends with all those who wish to be friends with us. • We stand by our friends who have stood by us in times of need. • We fully support and are committed to ASEAN. • We work to maintain a secure and peaceful environment in and around Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region. • We must work to maintain a free and open multilateral trading system. • We are ready to trade with any state for mutual benefit and will maintain an open market economy. • We will support and be active in international organizations such as the UN.

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Appendix 3 Declaration of ASEAN Concord Indonesia, 24 February 1976

Source: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat Website address: http://www.aseansec.org/golek.html Accessed 5 January 2002.

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The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand: REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations; ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states; UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields; DO HEREBY DECLARE: ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political stability: 1 The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience. 2 Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. 3 The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples. 4 Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress. 5 Member states shall take cooperative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies. 6 Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences. 7 Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit. 8 Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations. AND DO HEREBY ADOPT The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN cooperation. A POLITICAL 1 Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary. 2 Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

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3 Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible. 4 Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible. 5 Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation. 6 Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty. 7 Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions. B ECONOMIC 1 Cooperation on basic commodities, particularly food and energy (i) Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country’s needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the acquisition of exports from member states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and energy. (ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in the production of basic commodities, particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region. 2 Industrial cooperation (i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional requirements of essential commodities. (ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the member states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment. 3 Cooperation in trade (i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves. (ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long-term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states. (iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in ASEAN industrial projects. (iv) Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers. (v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the field of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export

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products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports. 4 Joint approach to international commodity problems and other world economic problems (i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading systems, the reform of international monetary systems and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order. (ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilization and increase of export earnings of those commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including bufferstock schemes and other means. 5 Machinery for economic cooperation Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to: (i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of governments of member states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation; (ii) review the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation; (iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing regional development; (iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member governments. C SOCIAL 1 Cooperation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well-being of the low-income group and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration. 2 Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts. 3 Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies. 4 Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs. D CULTURE AND INFORMATION 1 Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states.

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2 Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship. 3 Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer collaboration among national institutes. E SECURITY Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests. F IMPROVEMENT OF ASEAN MACHINERY 1 Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat. 2 Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness. 3 Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN. DONE, at Denpasar, Bali, this Twenty-Fourth Day of February in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six.

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Appendix 4 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976

Source: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat Website address: http://www.aseansec.org/golek.html Accessed 5 January 2002.

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The High Contracting Parties: CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together; ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule or law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations; DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971; CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation; BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony; SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows: CHAPTER I: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES Article 1 The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. Article 2 In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles: (a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (b) The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; (c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; (e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; (f) Effective cooperation among themselves. CHAPTER II: AMITY Article 3 In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

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CHAPTER III: COOPERATION Article 4 The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest. Article 5 Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, nondiscrimination and mutual benefit. Article 6 The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other states as well as international and regional organizations outside the region. Article 7 The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance. Article 8 The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. Article 9 The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions and policies.

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Article 10 Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party. Article 11 The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, sociocultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities. Article 12 The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation or solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia. CHAPTER IV: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Article 13 The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations. Article 14 To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony. Article 15 In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation. Article 16 The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude

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the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance. Article 17 Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. CHAPTER V: General Provision Article 18 This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory state. It shall be open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia. Article 19 This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the governments of the signatory states which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and the instruments of ratification or accession. Article 20 This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation. IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals. DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

Appendices

124

Appendices

125

Appendix 5 Top ten Singapore trade partners in 2003 Ranking

Country

Imports (S$ million)

1 Malaysia

37,537.7

2 USA

31,060.2

3 Japan

26,808.3

4 China

19,276.3

5 Taiwan

11,263.0

6 Thailand

9,587.1

7 South Korea

8,637.4

8 Germany

8,455.8

9 Saudi Arabia

6,823.4

10 Philippines

Ranking

Country

4,920.6

Exports (S$ million)

1 Malaysia

39,672.4

2 USA

33,460.1

3 Hong Kong SAR

25,116.2

4 China

17,638.2

5 Japan

16,875.4

6 Taiwan

12,011.8

7 Thailand

10,710.7

8 South Korea

10,550.2

9 Australia 10 Netherlands Source: International Enterprise Singapore Website addresses: http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/mqstats/ess/aesa68.pdf&

8,148.1 8,042.7

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126

http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/mqstats/ess/aesa63.pdf.

Appendices

127

Appendix 6 (a) Defence expenditure (Southeast Asia) Defence expenditure US$/m

US$/per capita

% of GDP

1985

2002

1985

2002

1985

2002

Brunei

390

253

1,739

741

8.0

5.2

Cambodia

n.a.

87

n.a.

6

n.a.

2.5

Indonesia

3,674

6,245

23

29

2.8

3.7

196

14

54

3

7.1

0.8

Malaysia

1,748

3,260

112

145

3.8

3.6

Myanmar

1,475

2,837

40

58

5.0

5.0

633

1,511

12

19

1.4

2.1

Singapore

1,567

4,334

613

1,010

6.0

5.2

Thailand

2,296

1,730

44

27

4.0

1.5

Vietnam

2,079

2,286

34

29

2.6

7.1

Laos

Philippines

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2003–2004 (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).

(b) Arms deliveries to Southeast Asia (1993–2000) Arms deliveries to Southeast Asia (1993–2000)/US$m 1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Indonesia

104

56

188

886

443

Malaysia

313

964

830

498

Myanmar

151

113

155

Singapore

151

261

Thailand

162

Vietnam

22

1998

1999

2000

Total

388

783

700

2,848

333

354

1,224

400

4,516

278

333

320

332

n.a.*

1,682

221

554

498

942

632

n.a.

3,259

443

1,217

774

525

333

418

n.a.

3,872

91

221

278

165

188

178

n.a.

1,143

Note * n.a.=figure unknown. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001–2002 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Appendices

128

Appendix 7 Source: Information collated from Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City (London: Tauris Academic Press, 2000a), pp. 259–263. ARMY Major army equipment • 80–100 Tempest (modernized Centurion) MBTs. • 150 AMX-13SM1 light tanks. • Approximately 1,000 other AFVs: 450(+) M-113 (to be reduced) and 300 M-113 Ultra, 300(+) Bionix 25 and Bionix 40/50 (being delivered), 22 AMX-10PAC90, 22 AMX10P, 250 V-150/V-200 Commando. • 108 155mm howitzers: 18 FH-2000, S2 FH-88, 38 M-71S. Older 155 mm artillery (16 M-114 and 45 M-68) may have been retained in storage. • 37(+) LG1 Mk1 105 mm light guns. • 12 160 mm and 50 120 mm mortars. • Artillery locating systems, including AN/TPQ-36 and −37 radars. • Anti-tank weapons: NT-S Spike and 30(+) Milan missile systems, 200 Carl Gustav 84mm recoilless rifles; Armbrust rocket-launchers. Major Combat Engineer equipment includes 12 M-60 AVLB armoured bridge-layers, Leguan tactical bridges, M-728 CEVs and 36 FV1805 CETS. AIR FORCE RSAF personnel number 13,500, comprising 3,000 regulars, 3,000 NSFs and 7,500 NS men. RSAF flying units operate from four air bases and one other location in Singapore: Tengah Air Base •

111 Squadron

E-2C

(AEW and control)

•

140 Squadron

F-16A/B/C/D

(air defence and strike)

•

142 Squadron

A-4SU/TA-4SU

(strike)

•

145 Squadron

A-4SU/TA-4SU

(strike)

Murai Camp (near Tengah Air Base) •

128 Squadron

Malat Searcher 2 (UAV) Malat Scout (UAV)

Appendices

129

Chukar III (target drone)

Paya Lebar Air Base •

122 Squadron

C-130H, KC-130B/H

(transport and tanker)

•

141 Squadron

RF-5S, F-5T

(reconnaissance and training)

•

144 Squadron

F-5S/T

(air defence and strike)

•

149 Squadron

F-5S/T

(air defence and strike)

•

Flight Test Centre

Sembawang Air Base (helicopters) •

120 Squadron

F-5S/T

(transport)

•

123 Squadron

AS550A2 Fennec

(reconnaissance and training)

•

124 Squadron

AS550A2 Fennec

anti-armour

•

125 Squadron

AS332M Super Puma

(transport and SAR)

AS532UL Cougar

(transport)

CH-47D

(transport)

•

127 Squadron

Changi Air Base •

121 Squadron

Fokker 50

(maritime patrol and transport)

Overseas detachments Approximately one-third of the RSAF’s aircraft are deployed for training overseas on a long-term basis. The main training detachments are: • 120 Squadron Detachment, Brunei (UH01H0) • 136 Squadron, Oakey Queensland (AS32M and AS532UL) • 130 Squadron (Flying Training School), Pearce, Western Australia (S211) • Flying Grading Centre, Tamworth, New South Wales • 150 Squadron Cazaux, France (A-4SU and TA-4SU) • 425th Fighter Squadron, Cannon AFB, New Mexico (F-16C/D) • Detachment with 22nd Air Refuelling Wing, McConnell AFB, Kansas (KC-135R) Missile and radar units Air Defence Systems Division controls the RSAF’s missile and radar units through its three subsidiary brigades: Divisional Air Defence Artillery Brigade (DAB)

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130

• 3 Air Defence Battalion (equipped with RBS70 and Igla SAM, Super Giraffe radar: attached to 3rd Division) • 6 Air Defence Battalion (RBS70 SAM, Super Giraffe radar: attached to 6th Division) • 9 Air Defence Battalion (RBS70 SAM, Super Giraffe radar: attached to 9th Division) • 18 Air Defence Battalion (Mistral SAM, P-STAR radar: attached to 21st Division) Air Defence Brigade (ADB) • 160 Squadron (Oerlikon 35 mm AA guns: headquartered at Seletar, with detachments at air bases) • 163 Squadron (I-HAWK SAM; based at Lim Chu Kang) • 165 Squadron (Rapier SAM and Blindfire radar: based at Lim Chu Kang) • 201 Squadron (FPS-117 radar and mobile operations control centre: based at Gombak) Air Force Systems Brigade (AFSB) • 203 Squadron (military element of Singapore Air Traffic Control Centre, Changi, operating Thomson-CSF LORADS II and Westinghouse AN/ TPS-43 radar systems) Major air force equipment • 165+ combat aircraft (including 42 overseas); 42F-16C/D (24 in the USA), 7 F-16A/B, 60–70 A-4SU and TA-4SU (18 in France), 40F-5S/T, 8 RF-5S; 5 Fokker 50 Enforcer. An additional 20 F-16C/Ds are on order. • 4 E-2C AEW and control aircraft. • 4KC-135R tanker aircraft (two to remain in USA). • 5 C-130H, 1 KC-130H and 4 KC-130B transport, tanker and ELINT aircraft. • 4 Fokker 50 transport aircraft. • 69 helicopters; 18 UH-1H (transport), 19 Super Puma (transport and SAR), 12 Cougar (transport), 6 CH-47D (transport), 10 AS550A2 Fennec (armed reconnaissance and training); 10 AS550C2 Fennec (anti-armour). Of these totals, 5 UH-1Hs are based in Brunei, 12 Super Pumas and Cougars in Australia and some of the CH-47Ds in the USA. There are also 8 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters and 6 CH-47SDs on order. • 27 S211 basic trainers (in Australia). • 40 Malat Searcher Mk2 UAV and 24 Chukar III target drones. A small number of Malat Scout UAV may also remain in service. NAVY The RSN’s vessels are organized into type-based squadrons, most of which are grouped into two Flotillas (constituting the Fleet) and Coastal Command: • The First Flotilla operates six SeaWolf-class (FPB-45) MGBs (185 Squadron), six Victory-class (MGB-62) MCVs (188 Squadron) and six Fearless-class APVs (189 Squadron). • The Third Flotilla operates one ex-Royal Navy LSL and two Country-class LSTs (being replaced in 191 Squadron by five new Endurance-class (LSTs), six ramp-powered

Appendices

131

launches and a hundred or more ‘fast craft’ (landing craft) (195 Squadron). 192 and 193 Squadrons operate requisitioned CR vessels when mobilized. • Coastal Command deploys six Resilience-class PVs (182 Squadron), four Bedok-class (Landsort) MCM vessels, a driving support vessel and fast boats (194 Squadron). The command also includes the NDU and Giraffe 100 radar sites at Bedok, Pedra Branca, Raffles Lighthouse, Sultan Shoal and St John’s Island. The Submarine Project Office at Karlskrona in Sweden and 171 Squadron, under HQ Fleet in Singapore, operate the navy’s A12-type submarines, which will eventually total four. During 2000, these boats began to transfer to Singapore, although the training arrangement with Sweden is likely to continue into the long-term.

Appendices

132

Appendix 8 Foreign officers at the Singapore Command and Staff College (1997–2001) 2001

Brunei (2) Cambodia India Indonesia New Zealand Philippines South Korea United Kingdom United States

2000

Australia Brunei Malaysia Thailand United States

1999

Brunei France Indonesia Philippines United States

1998

Australia Brunei Thailand Turkey United Kingdom

1997

Brunei Indonesia New Zealand

Appendices

133

Papua New Guinea Philippines United States Source: Ministry of Defence website at http://www.mindef.com.sg/. Derived from news releases about SCSC courses from 1997 to 2001, cited in Mark Lim ShanLoong, Singapore's Defence Diplomacy (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Department of Political Science Honours Thesis, 2002), pp. 81–82.

Notes 1 International relations theories and small states 1 For a comprehensive study of the evolution of international relations theory, see Robert J.Lieber, Theory and World Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1993). 2 The classic study of realism is Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (6th edn) (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976). 3 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) made conventional nuclear deterrence obsolete and ineffective—a victory of the dying over the dead! The Sino-Soviet Conflict is studied in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962). 4 See e.g. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, Power and Interdependence (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1989). 5 The clearest evidence of this shift was the aggressive American engagement of Iran, Iraq and Libya in the Middle East and support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. 6 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 7 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 8 See James A.Caporoso, ‘International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations’, and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, International Organization 46, 3 (summer 1992): 599–632 and 561–598 respectively. 9 The best study of regime theory is Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes (7th edn) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Press, 1993). 10 The 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 1997 Kyoto Summit epitomized multilateral initiatives on global environmental security. George W.Bush’s decision to disregard the Kyoto protocol is an example of how great powers can violate multilateral security arrangements with impunity. Similarly, the US decision to test and deploy missiles in outer space is in contravention of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) treaty. 11 See e.g. Denmark and UK rejected the idea of a common European currency. 12 See e.g. Robert Keohane, ‘Liliputian’s Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics’, International Organization 23 (1969): 291–310, and David Vital, The Survival of Small States (New Jersey: Fair Lawn, 1971). 13 See the collection of essays contained in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), and David A.Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 14 See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Chicago, IL: Quandrangle Books, 1966). 15 Philippe Schmitter, ‘Three Neo-functional Hypotheses About International Integration’, International Organization 23, 1 (winter 1969): 161–167, and Ernst B.Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, International Organization 34, 4 (autumn 1970): 607–646. 16 Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy (Jogjakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999), and Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000).

Notes

135

17 The earlier monograph is entitled Singapore: Foreign Policy Imperatives of a Small State (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 1986). 18 Kawin Wilairat, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: A Study of the Foreign Policy System of a CityState (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1975). 19 N.Ganesan, Singapore’s Foreign Policy in ASEAN: Major domestic and bilateral constraints in ASEAN (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1989). 20 See e.g. Obaid Ul-Haq, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Jon S.T.Quah (ed.), Government and Politics of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), and Linda Lim, ‘Singapore’s Foreign Policy’, in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1990). 21 See Amitav Acharya and M.Ramesh, ‘Economic Foundations of Singapore’s Security’, in Garry Rodan (ed.), Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993); M. Ramesh, ‘Economic Globalization and Policy Choices: Singapore’, Governance 8, 2 (1995): 243–260; Christopher M.Dent, ‘Singapore’s Foreign Economic Policy: The Pursuit of Economic Security’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, 1 (April 2001): 1–23; and Philippe Regnier, Singapore: City-State in Southeast Asia (London: Hurst, 1987). 22 See Bilveer Singh and Kwa Chong Guan, Singapore’s Defence Industries (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1990); Tim Huxley, ‘Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance’, Pacific Review 4, 3 (December 1991): 204–213, and Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000b). 23 See Bernard Lim, Hock Kwang, ASEAN Security Cooperation: Singapore’s Offer of Military Facilities to the United States (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Department of Political Science Academic Exercise, 1992). 24 See e.g. Chin, Kin Wah, ‘The Management of Interdependence and Change Within a Special Relationship’, in Lau Teik Soon and Azizah Kassim (eds), Malaysia and Singapore: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1992); N.Ganesan, ‘Factors Affecting Singapore’s Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 45, 2 (November 1991): 182–195, and ‘Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Some Recent Developments’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 25, 1 (spring 1998): 21–36; and Datuk Abdullah Bin Haji Badawi, Malaysia-Singapore Relations (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 1990). 25 See e.g. Barry Desker, What Singapore can Learn from Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993), and the collection of essays contained in Bilveer Singh and Lau Teik Soon (eds), Singapore-Indonesia Relations: Problems and Prospects (Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 1992), and Sunil Kumar S.A.Pillai, Singapore-Indonesia Relations, 1980–1990 (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Department of Political Science Academic Exercise, 1991). 26 See e.g. Seah, Chee Meow, Singapore’s Position in ASEAN Cooperation (Singapore: Chopmen, 1979), and N.Ganesan, ‘The Role of ASEAN in Singapore’s Foreign Policy’, in Paul Roddell (ed.), ASEAN in the New Millennium, forthcoming. 27 Notwithstanding this general trend, a number of Singapore’s senior diplomats and politicians have contributed to the debate on Asian values. See Bilahari Kausikan, ‘Asia’s Different Standard’, Foreign Policy 39, 92 (autumn 1993): 24–41; Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West’, Foreign Affairs 72, 4 (SeptemberOctober 1992): 10–14, The Pacific Impulse’, Survival 37, 1 (spring 1995a): 105–120, The Pacific Way’, Foreign Affairs 74, 1 (January-February 1995b): 100–111; and Fareed Zakaria, ‘Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew’, Foreign Affairs 73, 2 (March-April 1994): 109–126. 28 The reservations were expressed by Thailand and, in particular, Malaysia, which reportedly fears an influx of foreign manufactured products in the region via Singapore (The Nation (Thailand), 27 February 2000). More recently, the Malaysian Trade and Industry Minister,

Notes

136

Rafidah Aziz, has stated that if tariff concessions were part of the FTAs, then, such arrangements ‘go against AFTA rules and that cannot be done’ (Straits Times (Singapore), 6 July 2000). None the less, countries which were previously critical of Singapore’s seemingly exclusive bilateral trade agreements, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have themselves gone on to sign such agreements. See ‘Thai PM slammed over Australia pact’, Sydney Morning Herald (6 July 2004).

2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, policy principles and policy arena 1 Singapore’s key decision-makers in the immediate post-independence period are identified in Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds), Lee’s Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard (St. Leonard’s, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1999a). 2 For a listing of Singapore’s overseas missions, see Appendix 1. 3 A statutory board, unlike the Civil Service, is created by an Act of Parliament. Its mandate is usually extremely focused. Directors of such boards are government nominees, and their funding and jurisdiction are also obtained from the government. Many such boards were introduced immediately after independence. Thus, for example, the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Housing and Development Board (HDB) are prime examples. At the time of writing, there were a total of eighty-nine such boards. 4 See Khong Cho Oon, ‘Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 117. 5 The Indonesian decision to normalize diplomatic relations with China is studied in Leo Suryadinata, ‘Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough’, Asian Survey 30, 7 (July 1990): 682–696. 6 See ‘Lee’s trip undermines basis for bilateral ties’, People’s Daily, 21 July 2004, and ‘Lee’s Taiwan trip tightens tensions’, People’s Daily, 23 July 2004. 7 See the interview with China’s Ambassador to Singapore in ‘I hope the dark clouds in the relations will disperse soon’, Straits Times, 23 July 2004. 8 Lee, Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), pp. 53–60. 9 See N.Ganesan, ‘Singapore: A Realist Cum Trading State’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998b), pp. 579–607. 10 Peter Katzenstein makes this point in ‘International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States’, International Organization 30, 1 (1976): 1–45. 11 See Daniel Bell et al. (eds), Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995). 12 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 102–103. 13 C.M.Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819–1988 (2nd edn) (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 285. 14 The tensions between Asian and Western values are examined in Denny Roy, ‘Singapore, China and the Soft Authoritarian Challenge’, Asian Survey 34, 3 (1994): 231–242. 15 See Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, pp. 106–107. 16 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are cases in point. 17 The Singapore government controls the local and foreign mass media through the Newspaper and Printing Presses Bill (1974) and its Amendments (1977 and 1988). Foreign publications

Notes

137

viewed as engaging in Singapore’s domestic politics may be banned, gazetted or restricted in their circulation to a specified number of copies. Such publications also have to place a fmancial deposit with the government and to have their licences renewed annually. In the past, both the magazines Asiaweek and the Far Eastern Economic Review have been subjected to sales quotas. 18 See David P.Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991). 19 ASEAN initiatives in dealing with the Cambodian Conflict are detailed in Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict’, Journal of International Affairs 46, 2 (winter 1993): 439–467. 20 Cited in Tommy Koh, ‘Can Any Country Afford a Moral Foreign Policy?’, text of a speech delivered at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 18 November 1987, p. 10. 21 See the statement by Rafidah Aziz, Malaysia’s Trade and Industry Minister, in the Straits Times (Singapore), 24 March 1994. 22 For a dissenting view on the utility of APEC see Helen Nesadurai, ‘APEC: A Tool for US Regional Domination?’, Pacific Review 9, 1 (1996): 31–57. 23 See John Ravenhill, ‘APEC Adrift: Implications for Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific’, Pacific Review 13, 2 (June 2000): 319–333. 24 The Indonesian perception of its dominant status in Southeast Asia is well documented. See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. xiv. See also Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). 25 Straits Times, 17 February 2001. 26 Leo Suryadinata, Indonesian Foreign Policy Under Suharto (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), ch. 5. 27 N. Ganesan, ‘The Role of ASEAN in Singapore’s Foreign Policy’, in Paul Roddell (ed.), ASEAN in the New Millennium, forthcoming. 28 See Appendices 3 and 4. 29 See Amitav Acharya, Transnational Production and Regional Security: Southeast Asia’s Growth Triangles’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, 2 (September 1995): 173–185; Pushpa Thambipillai, ‘The ASEAN Growth Triangle: The Convergence of National and SubNational Interests’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, 3 (December 1991): 299–314; and Donald E.Weatherbee, The Foreign Policy Dimensions of Subregional Economic Zones’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, 4 (March 1995): 421–432. 30 A Second Northern Growth Triangle involving Penang in Malaysia, Aceh in Indonesia and southern Thailand came to naught because of political disinterest and security considerations involving insurgency and separatism, especially in Aceh. The final growth area dubbed the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) which was also stillborn was to have included Maluku and Sulawesi in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and Brunei. 31 The ARF is studied in detail in Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 32 N.Ganesan, ‘Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN’, Security Dialogue 25, 4 (December 1994): 457–468, and Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999). 33 N.Ganesan, ‘ASEAN and its Relations with Major External Powers’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 2 (August 2000): 258–278. 34 See Anthony Smith, Strategic Centrality: The Role of Indonesia in ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). 35 ‘Don’t discard fundamentals’, Straits Times (Singapore), 25 July 1998.

Notes

138

36 Lam, Peng Er, ‘Singapore’, in Richard Baker and Charles Morrison (eds), Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000 (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2000b), p. 157.

3 Singapore’s early policy output, 1965 to 1968 1 See Peter Boyce, ‘Policy Without Authority: Singapore’s External Affairs Power’, Journal of Southeast Asian History 10 (March 1969): 87–103. 2 Ibid., p. 87. 3 Ibid. 4 See Obaid Ul-Haq, ‘Foreign Policy’, in Jon S.T.Quah (ed.), Government and Politics of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 277–278. 5 Boyce, ‘Policy Without Authority’, pp. 88–90. 6 The best study of this traumatic period on the Singapore government is by an indigenous scholar, who also popularized the phrase ‘the politics of survival’. See Chan, Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival 1965–67 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971). I have somewhat extended the characterization up until 1968 owing to Singapore’s tensions with Indonesia which spilled over beyond the conclusion of the latter’s military confrontation in 1967. 7 For a description of the composition of the PAP and the factions within it, see C.M.Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819–1988 (2nd edn) (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), ch. 8. 8 The most significant of such representations was for eight detained members of the PAP accused of fomenting labour-related problems against the British government in 1959. All eight were subsequently released following the PAP’s 1959 electoral victory. See Quah et al. (eds), Government and Politics of Singapore, pp. 50–51. 9 The by-elections were held in the constituencies of Anson and Hong Lim. In 1981, the Worker’s Party repeated the victory at the Anson constituency by-election twenty years later. 10 Ong Eng Guan, who resigned as the PAP’s representative, defeated Jek Yuen Thong, the PAP candidate, by a wide margin. Jek would later hold the ministerial portfolio for culture in the PAP’s line-up. 11 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 277–278. 12 The referendum actually excluded the possibility of Singapore remaining independent and only offered different terms within the framework of merger. Quah, Government and Politics of Singapore, p. 154. 13 A total of 107 people were detained during Operation Cold Store and the number included senior Barisan activists and leaders. See Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 273–274. 14 See Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: Hurst, 1975), and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989). 15 Shamsul Haque, ‘A Grassroots Approach to Decentralization in Singapore’, Asian Journal of Political Science 4, 1 (June 1996): 64–84, and Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 275– 276. 16 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, p. 276. 17 N.Ganesan, ‘Democracy in Singapore’, Asian Journal of Political Science 4, 2 (December 1996): 63–79, and Stanley Bedlington, Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 229–231. 18 The Sultan of Johor received an annual payment of (Straits dollars) $5,000 while the Temenggong received a lesser amount of $3,000. See Turnbull, A History of Singapore, p. 9.

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19 The Malayan federation of 1957 comprised nine states with hereditary rulers and two territories in Malacca and Penang. 20 See Gordon P.Means, ‘Special Rights as a Strategy for Development: The Case of Malaysia’, Comparative Politics 5 (1970): 29–61. 21 The classic study of Malay politics is John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS (Singapore: Heinemann, 1984). 22 See e.g. Lau Teik Soon, ‘Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Crisis of Adjustment, 1965–68’, Journal of South east Asian History 10 (March 1969): 155–176, and R.S.Milne, ‘Singapore’s Exit From Malaysia: The Consequences of Ambiguity’, Asian Survey 9, 3 (March 1966): 175–184. 23 See Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 279–283. 24 See Michael Leifer, ‘Communal Violence in Singapore’, Asian Survey 4 (October 1964): 1115–1121. The riots left thirty-three people dead and over 600 with injuries. 25 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), pp. 553–569. 26 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, pp. 284–285. 27 See Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998). 28 R.S.Milne and Diane K.Mauzy, Singapore: The Legacy of Lee Kuan Yew (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 60–61. 29 The Tengku was adamant on Mahathir’s expulsion from UMNO following the latter’s loud and public protests against the Tengku’s leadership. Mahathir was subsequently politically rehabilitated by Harun Idris and Hussein Onn and readmitted into UMNO. See Gordon P.Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 83–84. 30 Turnbull, A History of Singapore, p. 288. 31 See Leszek Buszynski, ‘Singapore: A Foreign Policy of Survival’, Asian Thought and Society 29 (July 1985): 128–129. 32 S.Rajaratnam, text of an untitled speech delivered at the Singapore Legislative Assembly, 17 December 1965. See also ‘Evolving a Foreign Policy for Singapore’, text of a talk delivered at the Institute for Policy Studies, Singapore, 12 July 1988, pp. 4–7. 33 The majority of the Cabinet were from Malaysia. See Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds), Lee and His Lieutenants (London: Routledge, 1999b), and Turnbull, A History of Singapore, p. 289. Dr Goh Keng Swee, Dr Toh Chin Chye and S.Rajaratnam, members of Lee’s inner circle, were also from Malaysia. 34 The clearest evidence of this position is contained in a confidential telegram dispatched by Anthony Head, the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, to the British High Commissioner in Canberra on 9 August 1965, the day when Singapore declared its political independence. In it, Head noted, ‘Tunku said that if Singapore’s foreign policy was prejudicial to Malaysia’s interests they could always bring pressure to bear on them by threatening to turn off the water in Johore.’ Austrdian Archives A1838/33 3006/10/4. 35 Interview with S.Rajaratnam, October 1988. 36 See Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974). 37 See Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000b), p. 8. 38 For an elaboration of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the SAF, its operational doctrine, strength and organization, see Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City (London: Tauris Academic Press, 2000a). 39 See e.g. Audrey Kahin and George T.Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995).

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40 On the role of Islam in Indonesian politics see Suzaina Kadir, ‘The Islamic Factor in Indonesia’s Political Transition’, Asian Journal of Political Science 7, 2 (December 1999): 21–44. See also Tim Kell, The Roots of Achenese Rebellion, 1989–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995). 41 This proclamation by Sukarno and Hatta was ignored by the international community, although Indonesian nationalists, who are rarely challenged for the interpretation of their own political history in the region, subscribe to it. Actual independence was secured in December 1949 following a conference convened at the Hague. 42 See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. xiv. 43 See Donald Hindley, ‘Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives’, Asian Survey 4, 6 (June 1964): 904–913. 44 Detailed discussion of these acts may be found in Jamie Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982). 45 Of the two infantry regiments based in Singapore, one was deployed in Johor and the other in Sebatik Island off Sabah. See Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City, p. 6. 46 See Michael Leifer, The Philippine Claim to Sabah (Hull: Hull University Monograph Series, 1966). 47 The classic study of the Indonesian military is Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). 48 See e.g. Robert O.Tilman, The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). 49 See the memoirs of Singapore’s Ambassador to Indonesia during this period—Lee Khoon Choy, An Ambassador’s Journey (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1993a).

4 Singapore’s Cold War and post-Cold War policy output 1 See Khong Cho Oon, ‘Singapore: Political Legitimacy Through Managing Conformity’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 108–135. 2 The classic study of this event is Goh Cheng Teik’s The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971). The reconfiguration of the consociational model is addressed in Karl von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972). 3 Barry Buzan, ‘The Southeast Asian Security Complex’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 10, 1 (June 1988): 1–16. A refinement of the concept which disaggregates the mainland and maritime security complex may be found in Muthiah Alagappa, ‘The Dynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia: Change and Continuity’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 45, 1 (May 1991): 1–37. 4 The Sino-Soviet strategic rift, which began in the late 1950s following the failure of Mao Zedong’s ‘Great Leap Forward’, is examined in Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1962. 5 Thus, for example, Singapore’s GNP per capita rose from US$1,500 in the mid-1950s to US$10,000 by the end of the 1970s. Between 1960 and 1981, Singapore’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.2 per cent. 6 See Chin Kin Wah, The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974). 7 The Indonesian decision to normalize ties with China and the implications for Southeast Asia is studied in Leo Suryadinata, ‘Indonesia-China Relations: A Recent Breakthrough’, Asian Survey 30, 7 (July 1990): 682–696.

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8 See Sukhumphand Paribatra, From Enmity to Alignment: Thailand’s Evolving Relations with China (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1987). 9 Justus van der Kroef, ‘ASEAN, Hanoi, and the Kampuchean Conflict: Between “Kuantan” and a “Third Alternative”’, Asian Survey 21, 5 (May 1981): 515–535. 10 ASEAN initiatives in dealing with the Cambodian Conflict are detailed in Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict’, Journal of International Affairs 46, 2 (winter 1993): 439–467. 11 See Hari Singh, ‘Prospects for Regional Stability in Southeast Asia in the PostCold War Era’, Millennium 22, 2 (1993): 279–300. 12 In 1997, the PAP government raised its share of the national vote to 65 per cent from the 61.2 per cent it had garnered in the 1991 elections. It also regained two of the four seats in Parliament which it had previously lost to the opposition. In 2001, the PAP government secured 75 per cent of the national vote and returned eighty-two out of the eighty-four candidates to Parliament. 13 See Katharya Um, ‘Thailand and the Dynamics of Economic and Security Complex in Mainland Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, 3 (December 1991): 245–270. 14 See Hari Singh, ‘Understanding Conflict Resolution in Cambodia’, Asian Journal of Political Science 7, 1 (1999): 41–59. 15 Jovito R.Salonga, The Senate that said No (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1995). 16 For a recent survey of the Asia-Pacific, see Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Paciftc 1945–1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), and Thomas J.Christensen, ‘China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, International Security 23, 4 (spring 1999): 467–492. 17 See N.Ganesan, ‘ASEAN and its Relations with Major External Powers’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 2 (August 2000): 258–278. 18 See Lee Lai To, ‘ASEAN and the South China Sea Conflicts’, Pacific Review 8, 3 (August 1994): 531–543. 19 See Bertil Lintner, ‘Arms for Eyes’, Far Eastern Economic Review 156, 50 (16 December 1993): 26, and ‘Enter the Dragon’, Far Eastern Economic Review 157, 51 (22 December 1994): 22–24. 20 See e.g. Kay Möller, ‘Cambodia and Burma: The ASEAN Way Ends Here’, Asian Survey 38, 12 (December 1998): 1087–1104, and Jürgen Haacke, The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the “ASEAN Way”’, Pacific Review 12, 4 (1999): 581–611. The EU’s initiative in this regard was the poor attendance at the December 2000 ASEAN-EU Summit in Vientiane which was attended by only three EU ministers. In addition, member countries of the EU lobbied the International Labor Organization (ILO) to call on its member countries to consider imposing sanctions on Myanmar for using forced labour in November 2000. The ILO’s decision was generally viewed as a precursor to an expansion of the existing regime of sanctions. Since then and especially after the May 2003 violence in Dipeyin between the pro-junta Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) and supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), sanctions have been strengthened to include an economic embargo. Both the US and the EU closely coordinate this policy of sanctions. In 2004, the EU appeared adamant in excluding Myanmar from the ASEM Summit Meeting while ASEAN is lobbying for its inclusion in light of the EU’s own expanded membership to include East European countries. 21 Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan’s Search for a Political Role in Southeast Asia’, Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 40–55. 22 See Lam Peng Er, ‘The Asian Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Regional Order: Opening Pandora’s Box’, The Journal of Pacific Asia 6 (2000a): 57–80.

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23 Hari Singh, ‘Vietnam and ASEAN: The Politics of Accommodation’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, 2 (1997): 215–229. 24 Seagate Technology employs approximately 12,000 workers in its electronic manufacturing industries in Singapore. 25 Malcolm Brown, ‘Singapore, US to step up maritime security cooperation’, Channel News Asia (6 July 2004), and ‘Singapore confirms U.S. proposal for joint maritime patrols’, Jakarta Post (21 May 2004). 26 Farrah Naz Karim, ‘Talk to Malaysia, Singapore told’, New Straits Times (7 April 2004); Ravi Nambiar, ‘Najib: No to foreign forces’, New Straits Times (6 June 2004), and Melissa Goh, ‘Malaysia, Indonesia rule out joint patrols in Malacca Straits’, Channel News Asia (1 July 2004). 27 K.C.Vijayan, ‘Jakarta’s joint-patrol proposal “welcome”’, Straits Times (21 June 2004), and ‘Jakarta, KL, S’pore navies to coordinate Malacca patrol’, Jakarta Post (20 July 2004). 28 See Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, London, Routledge, p. 106. 29 For a sampling of such pro-Asian views see Kishore Mahbubani, ‘The Pacific Way’, Foreign Affairs 74, 1 (January-February 1995b): 105–120, The United States: Go East, Young Man’, Washington Quarterly 17, 2 (spring 1994): 5–23, and The West and the Rest’, The National Interest (summer 1993): 3–12. 30 See Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 53–60. 31 The volume of bilateral trade between Singapore and China amounted to S$36,914.5 million in 2003. 32 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, pp. 134–136. 33 N.Ganesan, ‘Singapore: A Realist Cum Trading State’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Conceptions of Security: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998b), pp. 589–607. 34 See e.g. N.Ganesan, ‘Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN’, Security Dialogue 25, 4 (December 1994): 457–468, and Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999). 35 For example Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad blamed the contagion on the rapid inflow and outflow of foreign investments, alluding to a Western conspiracy and pointedly identifying the Jewish financier George Soros as responsible for the crisis. 36 See Linda Weiss, ‘Developmental States in Transition: Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, not “Normalizing”’, Pacific Review 13, 1 (March 2000): 21–56, and Helen E.S.Nesadurai, ‘In Defence of National Economic Autonomy? Malaysia’s Response to the Financial Crisis’, Pacific Review 13, 1 (March 2000): 73–114. 37 See Trish Saywell, ‘Going It Alone’, Far Eastern Economic Review 163, 49 (7 December 2000): 82.

5 Important regional bilateral relationships: Malaysia 1 See Straits Times, 27 November 2000. 2 I am indebted to James Jesudason for this clever phrase. 3 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), pp. 551–569. 4 See S.Jayansankaran, ‘Bridge Over Troubled Waters’, Far Eastern Economic Review 163, 40 (5 October 2000): 26–28.

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5 See R.Haller-Trost, Historical Legal Claims: A Study of Disputed Sovereignty over Pulau Batu Puteh (Pedra Branca) (Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, 1993). 6 See Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000b), p. 126. 7 Straits Times (5 September 2001). 8 See ministerial statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor S.Jayakumar, in Parliament on 31 July 1998. Singapore Government Press Release, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts. 9 Straits Times (5 September 2001). 10 Straits Times (6 September 2001). 11 Straits Times (29 September 2001). 12 Straits Times (17 May 1997). 13 Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s response to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s unhappiness regarding the altered arrangements for KD Malaya was carried in the New Straits Times (16 March 1997). 14 Straits Times (11 June 1997). 15 The Star (14 March 1997). 16 Straits Times (5 September 2001). 17 See Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First—The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Times Media, 2000), p. 276. 18 As reported in the Straits Times (22 March 2001). 19 Alexis Hooi, ‘Newater high-tech for city reservoir’, Straits Times (22 June 2004). 20 See Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore, p. 7. 21 Straits Times (18 February 1990). 22 The Star (5 September 1990). 23 This deterioration of ties is documented in N.Ganesan, ‘Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Some Recent Developments’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 25, 1 (spring): 28–29. 24 See Frank Ching, ‘Malaysia-Singapore Ties Strained’, Far Eastern Economic Review 159, 39 (26 September 1996): 39. 25 Utusan Malaysia (14 March 1997). 26 See ‘Close Encounters’, Asiaweek 23, 12 (28 March 1997): 26–27. 27 Ibid. 28 S.Jayasankaran and Murray Heibert, ‘Politically Incorrect’, Far Eastern Economic Review 160, 13 (27 March 1997): 16, and New Straits Times (13 March 1997). 29 Roger Mitton, ‘Youth Wing’s Odd Couple’, Asiaweek 23, 17 (2 May 1997): 28. 30 The Star (27 March 1997). 31 Alejandro Reyes and Roger Mitton, ‘Sparks over a “Freeze”’, Asiaweek 23, 14 (11 April 1997): 29. See also Roger Mitton’s interview with Mahathir in ‘I am still here’, Asiaweek 23, 18 (9 May 1997): 32–39. 32 As reported in Straits Times (29 March 1997). 33 The Star (19 and 21 March 1997). 34 Straits Times (31 October 2001). 35 See Bernard Lim Hock Kwang, ASEAN Security Cooperation: Singapore’s Offer of Military Facilities to the United States (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Department of Political Science Academic Exercise, 1992). 36 International Herald Tribune (23 March 2001). 37 See Abdullah Ahmad, ‘On bumiputra guanxi and being good neighbours’, Sun (20 April 1997). 38 ‘Lee Kuan Yew has lost touch’, says Samad. New Straits Times (15 March 1997). 39 Malaysia has always been one of Singapore’s top three trading partners together with the United States and Japan. In 2000, for example, the volume of trade between the two

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countries amounted to S$76,953.8 million and the investment flow from Singapore into Malaysia amounted to S$ 12,266 million. More recently, in 2003, Malaysia was Singapore’s foremost trading partner, both for imports and exports (see Appendix 5). Most of Singapore’s investment in Malaysia, typically up to 50 per cent or more, has traditionally been in the geographically proximate state of Johor. 40 S.Jayasankaran and Trish Saywell, ‘Heading for A Collision’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 164, 50 (20 December 2001): 46–48, and Business Times (26 July 2000). 41 S.Jayasankaran, ‘Port Call’, Far Eastern Economic Review 163, 34 (24 August 2000): 56. 42 Straits Times (17 January 2002). 43 Straits Times (16 December 2001). It was reported that Malaysia is aggressively seeking to reroute the 30 per cent of its cargo which uses Singapore’s port facilities back to its own ports. 44 The findings were part of a survey of 412,000 passengers by Skytrax, an airline and air-travel research company based in Britain. See International Herald Tribune (24 April 2001). 45 Straits Times (26 April 1997). 46 Straits Times (24 March 1994). 47 See Lam Peng Er, ‘Singapore’, in Richard W.Baker and Charles Morrison (eds), Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000 (New York: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2000b), p. 151. 48 For a sampling of the expressions of outrage, see Letters to the Editor of The Business Times (7 March 2000). 49 At a 1.5 per cent service charge of the value of the stocks traded and for the migration of some 156 counters, Effective Capital grossed a profit of S$135 million. The Business Times (7 March 2000). 50 Straits Times (5 September 2001). 51 See Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, p. 144. 52 See ‘The Malay community: winning hearts and minds’, Straits Times (26 July 2004). 53 An example of such comparisons were the comments made by Lee Kuan Yew in March 2001 that Singapore’s education system needed to integrate the races rather than divide them through separate schools as in Malaysia. The comments drew a swift response from UMNO Vice-President Muhammad Taib who branded the comments unfair and insensitive. See Berita Harian Malaysia (15 March 2001). 54 See N.Ganesan, ‘Factors Affecting Singapore’s Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 45, 2 (November 1991): 182–195. 55 The arrest of fifteen Malay-Muslims in Singapore in December 2001 under the Internal Security Act for planning acts of sabotage against US interests and military personnel has complicated the inter-ethnic relationship. Since Malays are invariably Muslims, the community and its religious activities, in particular deviant ones, have been brought to the fore. See Straits Times (12 and 13 January 2002). 56 Thus, for example, it is estimated that only some 55 per cent of the Malay electorate voted for UMNO compared to the 65 per cent it had achieved in the 1995 general election. Fortunately for UMNO, Badawi’s replacement of Mahathir as Prime Minister of Malaysia in October 2003 has led to significantly greater Malay support for UMNO, including the recapture of Terengganu from PAS. Badawi, unlike Mahathir, is viewed as a much more religious, honest and moderate leader. See N. Ganesan, ‘Malaysia in 2003: Leadership Succession with a Tall Shadow’, Asian Survey 44, 1 (January/February 2004): 70–77. 57 See Santha Oorjitham, ‘A Matter of Personal Faith?’, Asiaweek 26,40 (13 October 2000): 32–33. 58 International Herald Tribune (28 December 2001). 59 The Asian Wall Street Journal (12 December 2001). 60 See N.Ganesan, ‘Issues in Governance’, in Yap Mui Teng (ed.), Perspectives 2001 (Singapore: Times Academic Press for the Institute of Policy Studies, 2001b), pp. 58–71.

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61 See Michael Leifer, ‘Israel’s President in Singapore: Political Catalysis and Transnational Politics’, Pacific Review 1, 4 (1988): 341–352; and N.Ganesan, ‘Islamic Responses Within ASEAN to Singapore’s Foreign Policy’, Asian Thought and Society (1988): 125–134. 62 See Lee Hsien Loong, ‘Singapore and Malaysia: Managing a Close Relationship’, text of a speech delivered at the Harvard Business School Alumni Club of Malaysia Dinner, Hilton Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, 20 July 1988. See Singapore Government Press Release No. 35/Jul 15–1/88/07/20. 63 See e.g. Balan Moses and Ravi Nambiar, ‘Pak Lah and Goh: We’re buddies’, New Straits Times (25 January 2004); M.Nirmala, ‘Weekend visits raise comfort levels’, Straits Times (26 January 2004); Helmi Yusof, ‘The relaxed route to better ties?’, New Straits Times (28 January 2004); and Audrey Quek, ‘KL-S’pore bilateral ties good, says Abdullah’, New Straits Times (13 July 2004).

6 Important regional bilateral relationships: Indonesia 1 Charles Morrison and Astri Shurke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Small States (Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 224. See also Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. xiv. 2 Indonesia has well over 200 distinct ethno-linguistic peoples. 3 Other than the Javanese, the Sundanese are another major group comprising some 15 per cent of the population. All other groups, including the larger ones such as the Sumatran Minangkabau, Achenese, Ambonese and Chinese, have a maximum 4 per cent or lesser representation each in the population. Hence, although the Javanese do not constitute a clear majority, their percentage representation far surpasses those of the other groups. The Dutch colonial administration created an elite class of Javanese bureaucrats called the Prijaji which in turn allowed for ethnic Javanese to control administration even before the independence period. See Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979). 4 Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). 5 The Achenese, heirs to an old and proud Islamic heritage, have traditionally resisted central authority, from the Dutch colonial administration to authority emanating from Jakarta in the post-independence period. The earliest resistance to central authority came in the form of the Darul Islam rebellion in 1951. Apart from military suppression and associated brutalities, the Achenese are also angry that the revenue deriving from the rich Arun gasfields, which contributes to some 4 per cent of Indonesian GDP, is appropriated entirely by the central government. See Tim Kell, The Roots of Achenese Rebellion, 1989–1992 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), and Jose Manuel Tesoro, ‘On Mecca’s Front Porch’, Asiaweek 24, 37 (18 September 1998): 58–59.

Other areas associated with resistance include West Irian, which was annexed by Indonesia in 1963, and newly independent Timor, which was occupied in 1975. Between 1957 and 1959, during the time of the PRRI-Permesta Revolts, Sumatra and Sulawesi also resisted central authority. The CIA-sponsored PRRI-Permesta Revolts is documented in Audrey Kahin and George Kahin, Subversion as

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Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: The New Press, 1995). 6 Politically instigated violence, especially in territories such as Ambon, Malukus and parts of East Java, is often attributed to the shadowy manoeuvres of allies of Suharto in the post-1998 period. In local parlance, the shadowy manoeuvres are sometimes thought to be analogous to the stylized Wayang Kulit or shadow play, where cut-out figures or puppets are moved behind a white cloth screen to the accompaniment of voices and gamelan music. The wayang is inspired by the Hindu epics, Ramayana and Mahabharatha. Traditionally, with the exception of developments associated with regime change, Indonesian culture is diverse and tolerant, as reflected in the national slogan Bhinekka Tunggal Ika—Unity in Diversity. 7 See Justus M.van der Kroef, ‘Cambodia: The Vagaries of Cocktail Diplomacy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, 4 (March 1988): 300–320. 8 For a detailed account of the Indonesian involvement in the conflict see Patrick Ee Aik San, A Ripe Moment: A Comparative Study of the GRP-MNLF Negotiations under the Aquino and Ramos Administrations (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Southeast Asian Studies Programme, Honours Thesis, 1997). 9 See Lee Khoon Choy, Diplomacy of a Tiny State (Singapore: World Scientific, 1993b), pp. 262–264. 10 See e.g. Benedict O.Anderson, ‘The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture’, in Claire Holt (ed.) Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 1–69. 11 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, p. 66. 12 Sunday Times (2 November 1997). Significantly, President Suharto had announced earlier an aid package from Singapore totalling US$10 billion. 13 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983). 14 See Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), pp. 172–179. 15 See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia In ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994). 16 See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds), The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W.Norton, 1999). 17 For a listing of Singapore’s bilateral defence exercises with Indonesia see Bilveer Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited: A Study of Singapore’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy (Jogjakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1999), pp. 322–323. 18 Straits Times (23 and 24 October and 26 November 1997). See also John McBeth, ‘Trial by Fire’, Far Eastern Economic Review 160, 42 (16 November 1997): 16–22. 19 See e.g. James Cotton, ‘The “Haze” over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement’, Pacific Affairs 72, 3 (autumn 1999): 331–351. 20 International Maritime Bureau Report, London (24 January 2000). 21 See Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, pp. 142 and 144. 22 In 1998, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced that Singapore had investments totalling S$4 billion in Batam and Bintan, and that Singapore banks had an additional S$4 billion exposure in Indonesia. See Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, p. 144. 23 See Michael Leifer, ‘Uncertainty in Indonesia’, World Policy Journal (winter 1990–1991): 137–157. 24 Jacques Bertrand, ‘False Starts, Succession Crisis and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia’, Pacific Affairs 69, 3 (autumn 1996): 319–340. 25 For a discussion of the factions within ICMI see Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 75–121. 26 N.Ganesan, ‘Appraising Democratic Developments in Post-Authoritarian States: Thailand and Indonesia’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 28, 1 (spring 2001a): 2–17.

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27 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, p. 142, and Singh, The Vulnerability of Small States Revisited, pp. 270–272. 28 Straits Times (27 November 2000). 29 Ibid. 30 Lam Peng Er, ‘Singapore’, in Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2000, p. 150. 31 See e.g. Pushpa Thambipillai, ‘The ASEAN Growth Triangle: The Convergence of National and Sub-National Interests’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 13, 3 (December 1991): 299–314; Donald E.Weatherbee, The Foreign Policy Dimensions of Subregional Economic Zones’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, 4 (March 1995): 421–432; and Amitav Acharya, Transnational Production and Regional Security: Southeast Asia’s Growth Triangles’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, 2 (September 1995): 173–185. 32 John McBeth and Trish Saywell, ‘Gas Gateway’, Far Eastern Economic Review 164, 7 (22 February 2001): 54–55. 33 On the loss of Indonesian leverage in ASEAN see Anthony Smith, Strategic Centrality: Indonesia’s Changing Role in ASEAN (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000). 34 Thus, for example, the choice of Bahasa Indonesia, a language native to the minority Sumatran Minangkabau community rather than Javanese, was meant as an integrative gesture. 35 See e.g. Wang Gungwu, Don’t Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2003). 36 Indonesian timber tycoon Mohammad ‘Bob’ Hassan was one of the few ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam. 37 The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta is often viewed as being closely associated with Indonesian Chinese and Catholicism. This view is a function of the background of the leading scholars associated with the Centre and its Chairman, Jusuf Wanandi, whose brother, Sofyan Wanandi from the Gemala Group, was the spokesman for the ethnic Chinese business community. 38 Indonesian illegal immigrants in peninsular Malaysia alone exceed well over a million people. In the past, such immigrants were employed cheaply in labour-intensive economic activities such as plantation agriculture and construction. However, since the Asian economic crisis, Malaysia has systematically detained these immigrants, demolished their squatter colonies and deported them to Indonesia. The numbers of illegal immigrants and overstayers in Singapore vary from year to year. On average, since 1998, the numbers have ranged between 15,000 to 30,000 persons annually. 39 Straits Times (3 August 2001).

7 Economic and defence diplomacy 1 Total external trade in 2000 was S$470 billion, or nearly three times the national GDP. 2 The importance of the external environment for Singapore’s prosperity historically is documented in Philippe Regnier’s Singapore: City-state in Southeast Asia (London: Hurst, 1987). For a discussion of Singapore’s reliance on the international economic system, see Christopher Dent, ‘Reconciling Multiple Economic Multilateralisms: The Case of Singapore’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, 1 (April 2002): 146–165, and Amitav Acharya and M.Ramesh, ‘Economic Foundations of Singapore’s Security’, in Garry Rodan (ed.), Singapore Changes Guard: Social, Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 134–152.

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3 Kevin Tan and Lam Peng Er (eds), Lee and his Lieutenants: Singapore’s Old Guard (St Leonard’s, NSW: Allen & Unwin), Introduction. 4 See Linda Low and Toh Mun Heng, Singapore’s Elected Presidency as a Safe-guard for Official Reserves: What is at Stake? (Singapore: Times Academic Press and Institute of Policy Studies, 1989). 5 Regnier, Singapore, pp. 50–51. 6 Structural unemployment became an important domestic issue after the Asian financial crisis. The most seriously affected are those in the 40 to 65 age group, where only 20 per cent of the cohort possesses tertiary education. See Business Times (22 August 2001). By 2002, structural unemployment peaked at approximately 3.5 per cent of the national workforce and in December 2003 it reached an unprecedented 5.9 per cent—the highest such rate in the post-independence period. 7 In his 2000 National Day Rally Speech, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced the establishment of a Lifelong Learning Endowment Fund with a capital outlay of S$500 million. Over time, the fund will be boosted to S$5 billion to yield a training fund of S$200 million annually. The fund was launched in 2001 by the Manpower Ministry and the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore. See Straits Times (13 January 2001). 8 The scheme offers a subsidy of up to 50 per cent for monthly incomes of S$2,000 or lower. 9 The most recent of such offices was established in Houston, Texas in 2002 to service the southern United States. 10 The earliest recommendations for the government to divest its investments in the GLCs was made by the Public Sector Divestment Committee (PSDC) in 1983. The PSDC recommended that the Singapore government’s stake in forty-one companies be partially or completely privatized over a decade. The report also recommended that the government reduce its stakes in the GLCs to 30 per cent of the total value. While efforts have been made by the government to pare its stake in selected GLCs such as the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), Keppel Corporation and Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), much more clearly needs to be done. In May 2002, Singapore’s newly established Economic Restructuring Committee (ERC) made similar recommendations; see Straits Times (31 May 2002). Most recently, the Temasek Charter, which was announced in July 2002, seeks to retain GLCs that are internationally competitive while selling off peripheral and non-strategic investments. 11 See ‘Building an E-Inclusive Society’, speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the launch of the National IT Literacy Programme, 23 June 2001, Woodlands Regional Library, Singapore. Government of Singapore, 2001a, Singapore Government Press Release, Media Division, Ministry of the Information and the Arts. 12 The biomedical hub includes the Tuas Biomedical Park, the Biopolis at Buona Vista Science Hub, and the Institute of Chemical Sciences at Jurong Island. Institutes focusing on bioengineering and bioinformatics are currently in the pipeline. 13 Straits Times (11 June 2001), and Business Times (6 August 2001). 14 Straits Times (25 August 2001). For example, Singapore nationals comprise only some 20 per cent of all researchers in biomedical engineering institutes. 15 In 2000, population statistics indicated a domestic working population of 2.09 million people, out of which 612,200 were foreign nationals, comprising 29.2 per cent of the total workforce. See Government of Singapore, 2000a, Singapore Census of Population 2000. In support of its policy of recruiting foreign talent, the Singapore government announced that such talent had boosted economic productivity by 37 per cent during the period 1991 to 2000. 16 See Goh Chok Tong, The Next Lap Together (Singapore: Singapore Professional Centre, 1991). 17 Such recent strategic acquisitions have included Singapore Telecom’s (Singtel) purchase of Australian telephone operator Optus, Singapore Airline’s (SIA) purchase of British carrier Virgin and a 25 per cent share of Air New Zealand and Neptune Orient Lines’ (NOL)

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purchase of American President Lines. More recently, there have also been investments in the banking sector in Indonesia and Thailand and in the telecommunications sector in Indonesia and India. 18 Since the 1990s, Singapore has identified China as perhaps the single most important country in Asia for present and future economic engagement. The government has various schemes in place to assist individuals and corporations to invest in China. Conversely, it has offered itself as the gateway for Chinese exports into Asia. See speech by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at New Economy Singapore Conference, 2 August 2001, Singapore. Government of Singapore, 2001b, Singapore Government Press Release, Media Division, Ministry of Information and the Arts. See also Straits Times (8 and 10 August 2001), and Business Times (26 September 2001). 19 Barry Porter, ‘Singapore drops control of Suzhou park’, South China Morning Post (29 June 1999), and Foo Choy Peng and Barry Porter, ‘Suzhou: Sino-Singapore bid fails test’, South China Morning Post (30 June 1999). 20 Jasper Becker, ‘China must change, warns Lee Kuan Yew’, South China Morning Post (30 September 1999). 21 Malaysia is the exception to this rule. In 2003, for example, it was ranked as Singapore’s most important trading partner when the value of imports from and exports into Malaysia were totalled. See Appendix 5 for the ranking of Singapore’s top ten trading partners in 2003. 22 See Singapore’s rationalization of FTAs in the Opening Statement by Professor Tommy Koh, Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large, at the initial Plenary Meeting for US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement negotiations, Government of Singapore, 2000d, 4 December 2000, Washington, DC. 23 Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy, ch. 5. 24 See Appendix 6 for defence expenditure and arms deliveries to Southeast Asia, expressed as a percentage of GDP and in comparative terms. 25 David Boey, ‘More funds to keep SAF at cutting edge’, Straits Times (16 March 2004). 26 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First—The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Times Media, 2000), p. 33. 27 Ibid., p.30–31. See also ‘A deep, dark, secret love affair’, Ha’aretz (16 July 2004). 28 ‘Why NS stint can be shorter…’, Straits Times (16 June 2004). 29 Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City (London: Tauris Academic Press, 2000a), p. 258. 30 Such officers in the present Singapore Cabinet include Lee Hsien Loong (Prime Minister and Finance Minister), George Yeo (Minister for Information and the Arts), Teo Chee Hean (Minister for Education), and Lim Hng Kiang (Minister, Prime Minister’s Office). 31 See Appendix 7 for a listing of Singapore’s military hardware. 32 Tai Yong Tan, ‘Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion’, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 33 International Herald Tribune (23 March 2001). 34 See Appendix 8 for a list of recent foreign trainees at the SCSC. 35 Huxley, Defending the Lion City, pp. 260–263. 36 See Government of Singapore, 2000c, ‘Defence Technology: Building a National Capability through Global and Local Partnerships’, keynote address by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Dr Tony Tan, at the launch of Temasek Laboratories on 6 September 2000, Singapore, p. 4. 37 Ibid., p. 5 38 Ibid. 39 Singapore is particularly interested in acquiring stealth technology for its navy and has signalled an interest in purchasing French Lafayette-class frigates.

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40 Tan, ‘Defence Technology’, p. 4. The multiplier effect provided by defence technology is reiterated in Government of Singapore, 2000b, Tony Tan, ‘Securing Our Future’, text of speech delivered at the launch of ‘Defending Singapore in the 21st Century’, 15 February 2000, SAFTI Military Institute, Singapore.

8 Conclusion 1 Singapore signed an FTA in June 2002 with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). See Sunday Times (30 June 2002). Since then, it has gone on to sign similar bilateral trade agreements with most of its major trading partners, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.

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Index Afghanistan 44 Ahmad, Abdullah 70 airport developments 72 Akashi, Yasushi 50 Albar, Hamid 59 Albar, Ja’afar 33, 59 alliances 116, 126 anti-communism 16, 22, 29, 43, 45, 51, 85, 117 A.P.Moeller (company) 72 Arroyo, Gloria 122 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 19, 24, 54, 125 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum 10–11, 15, 19–21, 24, 54, 70, 73, 82, 95, 109, 123–5 Asian financial crisis (1997) 15, 18, 23, 51, 55, 68–9, 73, 80, 84, 86, 88, 91, 96, 99, 104, 106, 109– 10, 123, 125 Asian Monetary Fund proposal 51, 69 Asian values 53 Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 10, 15, 19–24, 36, 41–51, 54–5, 57, 65, 69, 73, 81–95, 112, 117–18, 124 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 11, 23, 54, 109, 123–5 ‘ASEAN plus Three’ structure 21, 95 ASEAN Scholarship 25; Declaration of Concord 130–5 Aung San Suu Kyi 54 Australia 65, 70, 85, 115–18 Aziz, Nik 77–8 Aziz, Rafidah 73 Badawi, Abdullah 67, 80 Bank of China 17 Barisan Sosialis (BS) 28–30, 41, 43, 65, 112–13 Besar, Johor Mentri 68 bilateral relationships 24, 110, 116-18, 123–6 Cambodia 10, 17, 19, 22–4, 43–7, 50, 55, 82, 84 capital flight 74, 88, 97 Central-Linked Order Book (CLOB) system 73 Central Provident Fund (CPF) 74, 103–4 Chan Heng Chee 13 Chartered Industries 115 Chatichai Choonhavan 47–8 China 4–5, 9, 14, 17–18, 39, 43–54, 69, 84–6, 90, 108–9;

Index

159

see also ethnic Chinese Chinese values 76 Chua, Robert 18 city-states 34, 59, 112 civil defence 116 Civil Service of Singapore 13, 41 civil society 51 Clinton, Bill 53, 125 Cold War 5, 51, 65, 123 Commonwealth countries 13, 16 communism 4, 17, 28–9, 41–2, 48, 65; see also anti-communism confidence- building measures 23 conflict prevention 112 conscription 36, 44, 111, 120 constructive engagement 54 core values 15 corporatization 105, 119 corruption 88–9, 98, 108 Customs, Immigration and Quarantine (CIQ) facility 61–4 defence capability 5, 36, 44, 51–2, 65–8, 86, 113–20, 122–3 defence collaboration 118–19 defence diplomacy 3, 101–2, 110–12, 119 defence expenditure 143 defence procurement 144–8 Defence Science and Technology Agency 115,119 Defence Science Organization 115, 119 democratization 2, 17–18, 53, 96 Dhanabalan, S. 12 diplomatic relations 12–15, 19, 46, 56–7, 83, 124, 128; seealso defence diplomacy; economic diplomacy East Asia-Latin American Forum (EALAF) 19, 24, 54, 125 East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) and Caucus 20–1, 51, 69, 73, 95 Economic Development Board (EDB) 24, 105, 107 economic diplomacy 3, 101–3 Effective Capital (company) 73–4 Egypt 36, 65, 113 elites and elitism 27–8, 42, 56–9, 76–7, 92–3, 96–7, 102, 111, 123-6 ethnic Chinese 98–9 ethnic divisions 75–9, 97 European Union 6–7, 49 export-led growth 52, 104, 110 Fay, Michael 53 Five-Power Defence Arrange-ments (FPDA) 35, 44, 65, 68–9, 116, 120, 122 flexible engagement 54 foreign policy of Singapore: constraints on 27–30; general features of 2–3, 12–19, 24, 26–7, 34–5, 56–7, 69, 122–7; literature on 8–11;

Index

160

merger phase (1963–5) 26; principles and philosophy of 15–18, 129; survivalist phase (1965–8) 1, 27, 41, 44, 89–90, 100, 110–11, 123 forward defence 113 France 14, 115, 118–19 free-trade agreements 11, 23, 55, 110, 123 Fukuyama, Francis 5, 17 Ganesan, N. 8 Geertz, Clifford 81 Germany 14, 119 Goh Chok Tong 1, 51, 57, 68, 70, 107, 121, 126 Goh Keng Swee 12 good neighbour policy 15 Gorbachev, Mikhail 5 government-linked companies (GLCs) 105–9, 114 Green Movement 6 Grenada 19–20, 84 growth triangles 22, 94–5 Gulf War (1991) 50 Habibie, Jusuf 91 Habibie, B. J. 75, 80, 91–3, 99–100 Hamidi, Zahid 67–8 haze 86–7 Hendrickson, Mason 18 Herzog, Chaim 78 Horsburgh Lighthouse 10, 60 human rights 17–18, 53, 70, 96 Hun Sen 47, 50 Huntington, Samuel 5, 17 Hussein, Saddam 52 Hutchison Whampoa 72 Ibrahim, Anwar 68, 77 idealism in international relations 7 illegal immigration 117 illegal trade 94 independence for Singapore (1965) 1, 27, 29, 33–4, 56, 110, 116, 121 India 36, 65, 108–9, 113 Indochina Security Complex 47, 69, 82 Indonesia 3, 10, 14, 17, 21–3, 37–42, 45–9, 52–4, 57, 66, 69, 75, 79–100, 112, 116–17, 123–7; claims to regional hegemony 82, 85, 100, 124-5; Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) 96; relations with Singapore on economic issues 94–7; on political and security issues 83–93; on social issues 97–100 information technology 106, 123 institutionalism 7, 11, 54–5, 101, 112, 118, 123 internal self-government for Singapore (1959–63) 1, 26–7, 35 International Court of Justice 10, 60, 79

Index

161

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 73, 84, 91, 96 international relations theory 4–6; see also institut-ionalism; realism Iran 124 Iraq 124 Iraq War (2003) 50, 52 Islam 99 Ismail, Razali 54 Israel 6, 36, 65, 78–9, 113–14, 118–19 Japan 9, 21, 30, 49–53, 96 Java 81, 83 Jayakumar, S. 12–13 Keating, Paul 70 Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM) 60–4 Koh, Tommy 19–20 Korean War 4, 42 labour supply 71, 76, 95, 102–3, 107 Laos 22, 43, 47 leadership, political 89, 93, 125–6 Lee Hsien Loong 14, 59, 67, 70, 76, 79, 121, 126 Lee Kuan Yew 1, 8, 12–16, 26–9, 32–4, 40, 45, 51, 53, 57–61, 65–70, 74–6, 83, 90, 92, 99, 108, 113, 117, 121,125–6; publication of memoirs (1998) 68, 70 Lee Siew Choh 28, 30 Leifer, Michael 8, 110 liberal institutionalism see institutionalism Liem Sioe Liong 88, 95 Mahathir, Mirzan 77 Mahathir Mohammad 20, 33, 51, 60–2, 67–73, 77–80, 84, 93, 95, 110,126 maid abuse 88 Malaysia 3, 9–11, 14, 17, 20–4, 34–7, 41–2, 45–8, 52–70, 85–7, 95–6, 99–100, 123–7; Federation of, Singapore's participation in (1963–5) 1, 26–32, 58–60, 65, 75, 121; relationships with Singapore on economic issues 71–5; on political and security issues 58–71; on social issues 75; Singapore's special relationship with 35, 116–17 Al Ma’unah 78 Marshall, David 13 Memorandum of Understanding between Singapore and the US (1990) 9, 69, 117, 122 migration 107, 117 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Singapore 12–15, 25, 42 Mohammad, Ashari 78 multilateralism 54–5, 79, 123–5 multinational companies 52, 95 Murdani, Benny 90–1 Myanmar 17–18, 23–4, 47, 54, 124

Index

162

Nasser, Gamal Abdul 113 National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) 29, 105 nationalism 4, 81; economic 94 neoliberalism 3, 7, 123 neutrality 126 New International Order 5 New Zealand 6, 116, 118 Non-Aligned Movement 4, 36, 65, 84 non-interference in internal affairs, doctrine of 54, 87 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 4 North Korea 124 Norway 6 nuclear deterrence 5 Operation Cold Store 29 Othman, Datuk Abdul Ghani 68 Pang Eng Fong 13 People’s Action Party (PAP) 1–3, 12–15, 18, 26–35, 39–47, 51–3, 57–9, 65, 67, 75–9, 87, 90, 101– 7, 110–13, 121–7 Petronas 77 Philippines, the 21–3, 43, 48–9, 52, 123 piracy 87–8, 117 pollution 86–7, 117 Potter, Michael 100 Prem Tinsulanonda 47 pro-Western orientation 16–18, 22 racial tensions 42 Rahman, Tengku Abdul 29, 32–5, 42, 45, 65, 68 Rajaratnam, S. 12, 34–5 Ramos, Fidel 82 Ranarridh, Norodom 47, 50 Reagan, Ronald 5 realism in international relations 3, 5–8 11, 15–17, 44, 51, 54, 101, 111, 122–3 religion 31–2, 75–9, 99 research and development 106, 119, 122 Rosenau, James 126 Salim Group 95 sanctions against countries 124 Second World War 50 Seow, Francis T. 18 September 11th 2001; attacks 52, 72, 109, 122 siege mentality 1, 79 Sihanouk, Norodom 19 Singapore Co-operation Programme 25

Index

163

Singapore International Foundation 24–5 Singapore Scholarship 25 Singh, Bilveer 8 small states 6-7, 11, 15, 56–7, 105, 107, 115, 122, 126 soft power 2, 6, 124 sovereignty 6, 15–16, 19–20, 23, 51–4, 59–63, 83–4, 101, 111, 122, 125–6 Soviet Union 5, 43–7, 85 Spratly Islands 49, 82 state power 6– 7 Suharto, General 10, 21, 23, 39–40, 42, 45, 48, 57, 75, 80–4, 87–92, 95–100, 117, 124 Sukarno 21, 37–9, 84, 90, 113 Sukarnoputri, Megawati 80, 91–3, 99–100 supranationalism 7 Sustrisno, Try 90 Suzhou Industrial Park 108 Sweden 6, 115, 118 Switzerland 113 Taiwan 14, 45, 96, 118 Tan, Tony 67, 70 Tang Liang Hong 67 technical assistance programmes 25, 27 technology transfer 103 Temasek Holdings 114–15 Temasek Laboratories 119 Thailand 17, 21–3, 41–9, 52, 54, 82, 118, 123, 125 Toh Chin Chye 12 Total Defence’ 115–16 tourism 24, 95 Trade Development Board 24, 105 trade and trade policy 15–17, 44, 51, 94, 102, 109, 123–6, 142 training 105; military 118–19 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-east Asia 136–41 Tun Razak 45, 59, 68 Tun Tan Siew Sin 32, 68 Uniglory 72 United Kingdom 13, 35–6, 44, 118 United Malays National Organization (UMNO) 31–5, 42, 59, 67–8, 75–8 United Nations 5–6, 10, 17–22, 46–7, 50, 63, 82, 104; Security Council 15, 20, 124 United States 9, 13–22, 42–53, 69, 96, 115–17, 122–3 value added 104–6 venture capital 106 Vietnam 17, 19, 22, 36, 41–3, 46–51, 57, 69, 82, 85–6, 109, 124 Vietnam War 16, 117 Vision 2000 71, 73

Index

164

Wahid, Abdurrahman 57, 80, 91–3, 99–100 Warsaw Treaty Organization 4 water supplies 35, 57, 61–5, 93, 100 weapon systems 114–15, 120 Weberian theory of power 83 Wilairat, Kawin 8 Winsemius, Albert 104 Wong Kan Seng 12 Woon, Walter 13 World Bank 6, 73, 96 World Trade Organization (WTO) 15, 50, 54, 109, 124 Zahidi, Hamid 68 Zainuddin, Tun Daim 60–1 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 21–2, 69, 84