Regimes in Southeast Asia: An Analysis of Environmental Cooperation (VS Research)

Henriette Litta Regimes in Southeast Asia

VS RESEARCH

Henriette Litta

Regimes in Southeast Asia An Analysis of Environmental Cooperation

VS RESEARCH

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

Zugl. Dissertation der Freien Universität Berlin, 2011

1st Edition 2012 All rights reserved © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012 Editorial Office: Dorothee Koch | Jens Meisenheimer VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften is a brand of Springer Fachmedien. Springer Fachmedien is part of Springer Science+Business Media. www.vs-verlag.de No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Registered and/or industrial names, trade names, trade descriptions etc. cited in this publication are part of the law for trade-mark protection and may not be used free in any form or by any means even if this is not specifically marked. Cover design: KünkelLopka Medienentwicklung, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-531-18482-1

Contents

Contents ..............................................................................................................5 List of Tables ..................................................................................................... 9 List of Figures .................................................................................................. 11

I Introduction ................................................................................................ 13 1 Observations, Questions, Relevance ......................................................... 13 2 State of Research ....................................................................................... 16 3 Map of Argument and Outline .................................................................. 18 II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation ....................... 27 1 Environmental Situation and Development ............................................... 27 2 Six Exigent Transnational Environmental Problems ................................. 28 3 Typical Characteristics of Developing Areas ............................................ 32 3.1 Socio-Economy .................................................................................. 32 3.2 Environmental Governance ................................................................ 33 4 ASEAN – A Distinct Feature of Southeast Asia ....................................... 34 5 Regime Creation ........................................................................................ 38 5.1 Assumptions and Expectations ........................................................... 38 5.2 Identified Regimes ............................................................................. 42 III Regime Theory ......................................................................................... 45 1 Regimes and International Relations ......................................................... 45 2 Definition .................................................................................................. 46 3 Functions ................................................................................................... 47

6

Contents 4 Evolution of (Environmental) Regime Theory .......................................... 47 5 Regime Effectiveness (dependent variable) .............................................. 50 5.1 Definition of Effectiveness ................................................................. 50 5.2 Analytical Dimensions ....................................................................... 52 5.2.1 Impact Effectiveness: Problem-solving ....................................... 52 5.2.2 Institutional Effectiveness: Behavioral Change ........................... 52 6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables) .................................... 53 6.1 Actors and the International System ................................................... 54 6.2 Premises of Regime Creation ............................................................. 55 6.3 Configuration and Interplay of Variables ........................................... 56 6.4 Variable 1: Problem Structure ............................................................ 57 6.4.1 Benign and Malign Problems ...................................................... 57 6.4.2 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs ............................................. 58 6.4.3 Game-theoretical Constellations ................................................. 61 6.5 Variable 2: Problem-Solving Capacity ............................................... 64 6.5.1 Compliance Mechanisms ............................................................ 65 6.5.2 Available Resources .................................................................... 67 6.5.3 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity ............................... 68 6.6 Alternative Theoretical Approaches ................................................... 69 6.6.1 Relative Gains and Hegemonic Power ........................................ 69 6.6.2 Learning Effects and Epistemic Communities ............................ 72 7 Hypotheses - Overview ............................................................................. 74

IV Methodology .............................................................................................. 75 1 Case Study Research ................................................................................. 75 2 Case Selection ........................................................................................... 77 3 Measurement Strategy ............................................................................... 79 4 Operationalization ..................................................................................... 81 5 (Un)expected Difficulties .......................................................................... 85 5.1 Definitorial Ambiguities ..................................................................... 85 5.2 The Inevitability of Making Causal Statements ................................. 85 5.3 Debated Measurement Parameters ..................................................... 86 5.4 Data Sorrows ...................................................................................... 87 V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution .................................... 89

Contents

7

1 Introduction to the Problem ....................................................................... 89 1.1 Haze Pollution .................................................................................... 89 1.2 Demand for Cooperation .................................................................... 93 2 Problem Structure ...................................................................................... 95 2.1 Problems of Negative Externalities .................................................... 95 2.2 Problem Complexity .......................................................................... 97 2.3 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs .................................................... 99 2.4 Results: Actors’ Constellations ........................................................ 103 2.4.1 Position of Actors in the Haze Regime ..................................... 103 2.4.2 Problem Malignancy ................................................................. 105 3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime ............................................... 108 3.1 Composition of the Haze Regime ..................................................... 108 3.2 The ASEAN Agreement and its Predecessors .................................. 109 3.3 The Problem of Indonesia’s (non-)Ratification ................................ 112 3.4 Provisions of the Agreement ............................................................ 113 3.4.1 General Provisions .................................................................... 113 3.4.2 Institutional Arrangements ........................................................ 114 3.4.3 Proposed Measures .................................................................... 115 3.5 Compliance Mechanisms ................................................................. 116 3.6 Available Resources ......................................................................... 119 3.7 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity .................................... 123 4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness ...................................................... 125 4.1 Actual Performance Compared to Collective Optimum ................... 126 4.2 Actual Performance Compared to No-Regime Counterfactual ........ 133 5 Case Summary ........................................................................................ 137 VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong .................................... 139 1 Introduction to the Problem ..................................................................... 139 1.1 Mekong: The Mother of Rivers ........................................................ 139 1.2 Socio-Economy of the Riparian Countries ....................................... 141 1.3 Demand for Cooperation .................................................................. 143 1.4 Thematic Scope of Analysis: Hydropower Development ................ 145 2 Problem Structure .................................................................................... 146 2.1 Problems of Common Pool Resources ............................................. 146 2.2 One, Two, Three Regimes? .............................................................. 147 2.3 Problem Complexity ........................................................................ 149 2.4 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs .................................................. 150

8

Contents 2.4.1 Upstream-Downstream Asymmetry .......................................... 150 2.4.2 Economic Importance of the Mekong ....................................... 152 2.5 Results: Actors’ Constellations ........................................................ 156 2.5.1 Position of Actors ...................................................................... 156 2.5.2 Problem Malignancy ................................................................. 158 3 Problem-Solving Capacity ...................................................................... 161 3.1 Composition and Development of the Mekong Regime .................. 161 3.2 Institutional Set-up ........................................................................... 163 3.2.1 Statute of the Mekong River Commission ................................ 163 3.2.2 Organizational Structure ............................................................ 164 3.3 Determinants of Effectiveness .......................................................... 167 3.3.1 Compliance Mechanisms .......................................................... 167 3.3.2 Available Resources .................................................................. 170 3.3.3 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity ............................. 173 4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness ...................................................... 177 4.1 Actual Performance Compared to Collective Optimum ................... 177 4.2 Actual Performance Compared to No-Regime Counterfactual ........ 183 5 Case Summary ........................................................................................ 186

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion .......................................... 189 References ..................................................................................................... 201 1 Monographs, Chapters and Journal Articles ........................................... 201 2 Documents, Reports, Multimedia ............................................................ 212 3 Newspapers ............................................................................................. 215 4 Interviews ................................................................................................ 216

List of Tables

Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11 Table 12 Table 13 Table 14 Table 15 Table 16 Table 17 Table 18 Table 19 Table 20 Table 21 Table 22 Table 23 Table 24 Table 25 Table 26 Table 27 Table 28

Land Use in Southeast Asia Growth Rates of GDP 2002-2008 Intra/Extra-ASEAN Trade as Share of Total Trade 2009 Human Development Index for Southeast Asia 2009 First Democratic Elections Environmental Regimes in Southeast Asia Configuration of Scores for Different Regimes Characteristics of Malign and Benign Problems Six Steps in Case Study Research Real-World Distribution of Cases Overview of all Variables and Operationalization Active Fires Detected in Indonesia in 1999 Summary of Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires Proportion of Land Area Covered by Forests Position of Countries in the Haze Regime Status of Ratification of the Haze Agreement Proposed Measures from the ASEAN Haze Agreement ASEAN Implemented Measures to Combat the Haze Key Figures for the Mekong Countries Upstream-Downstream Position of Mekong Countries Country (Province) Area within the Mekong Basin Dams on the Mainstream Mekong Position of Countries in the Mekong Regime Income and Expenditures of the MRC 1998-2007 Comparison of Staff at MRC Sec. in 1965 and 2007 Executive Agents / CEOs of the MRC 1957-2010 Signature/Ratification of Intern. Environ. Agreements ASEAN Measures of Environmental Protection

30 36 37 39 41 42 56 58 76 78 82 91 95 99 105 111 127 133 142 151 152 154 158 171 172 173 191 196

List of Figures

Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Figure 8 Figure 9

Possible State Positions Payoff Structure in Prisoners’ Dilemma Payoff Structure in Coordination Game Three Measurements of Regime Effectiveness Total Number of Hotspots in Indonesia 1997-2008 Org. Chart for Haze-related Activities at ASEAN Map of the Mekong Mekong River Commission Structure MRC Secretariat Organizational Structure

61 63 64 81 92 120 139 164 166

I Introduction

1 Observations, Questions, Relevance Research on environmental cooperation is flourishing worldwide and many initiatives and projects are being planned and implemented. Environmental analysis has moved from a niche of “low politics” to a most relevant research field in “high politics”. Debates on distribution in a world of scarce resources touch questions of national security to a substantial degree. Extreme weather and natural catastrophes can be devastating for countries and trigger social conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1994; Luterbacher & Sprinz 2001, 7). Southeast Asia is interesting due to its special status as a developing region with young statehood and a history of European colonization. In the eleven countries of the region1 – the State of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam – there are mixed political systems most of which are not democratically organized. The level of stability and of economic performance is extremely different among the countries in the region. So is the heterogeneity in terms of religion, ethnicities, tradition, culture, landscape, climate, and vulnerability to environmental risks. Rapid economic development has created dynamism and wealth in Southeast Asia. However, at the same time, the region has become dirtier, less ecologically diverse, and more environmentally vulnerable. Environmental degradation is one of the biggest problems for the countries in Southeast Asia. Though Southeast Asia’s environmental problems are manifold, they all show one similarity: they are all consequence of a manmade process. The major problems of the region are habitat loss, pollution, desertification and climate change. These environmental threats were mainly caused by “population growth, demographics, trade pressures, political instability, perverse incentives, economic performance, poverty, inadequate law enforcement, poor protection standards and 1

This book will use the well-established short names of the countries: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_1, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

14

I Introduction lack of awareness” as stated in ASEAN’s Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development (ASEAN 2002, 28).

Furthermore, governance weaknesses in Southeast Asian countries have aggravated the problem. Environmental risks do not only pose an immense danger for the people and ecosystems in Southeast Asia, they are also a type of problem that no country can solve on its own. Many environmental problems in the region are transnational by nature, like air and water pollution, deforestation, catastrophes and oceanic fisheries, and necessitate interstate cooperation in order to develop sustainable solutions. This book is not only inspired by the described social relevance of the topic but also by a theoretical interest. Regime creation does not follow an automatism of demand results in supply. The mere prevalence of transnational environmental problems does not necessarily trigger regime creation. Demand is only the starting point. More important is the constellation of interests among all involved actors. Conflicting interests might hinder cooperation as well as hugely diverging capabilities. When faced with transnational problems states always have two possibilities, they can either engage in cooperation with each other to solve problems, or they can decide not to do so. States are not obliged to cooperate. In international law the most basic principle is that states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent. A “state need not enter into a treaty that does not conform to its interests” (Chayes & Chayes 1993, 179). Regimes are purely voluntary agreements. If states decide to enter cooperation, they must have a common interest. Regimes are not created by third parties but by the stakeholders themselves. Thus, the involved state parties have the power to design a regime that will serve their purpose. However, they need to agree on a common design among themselves. These findings suggest that regime creation follows a logic of interest. The questions why regimes are created and why some of them are effective have been discussed predominantly in the sphere of Western, industrial countries. The hypotheses that have been derived from branches of regime theory have seldom been tested under non-Western conditions. In other world areas it is not clear whether existing indicators of regime creation and effectiveness can be applied. Is the logic of regimes inherently different in developing areas? A glance at Southeast Asia shows that five environmental regimes have been created over the years: The ASEAN Agreement on the Establishment of the Centre for Biodiversity, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and the Mekong River Commission. While this number might appear very low on first sight, it is nevertheless remarkable. The region Southeast Asia

1 Observations, Questions, Relevance

15

is part of the developing world; its countries are characterized by attributes of weak state capacities: there are no skilled personnel to come up with innovative ideas for problem solutions and no money to implement these ideas. In addition, the region had been entangled in intra-regional conflicts and wars during the twentieth century. Its countries had been closer to the former colonial dominators than its direct neighbors. Mutual hostility and ignorance had been the main features of regional cooperation. Until the late 1990s, the majority of academic publications on regional integration in Southeast Asia, especially through the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, had labeled this development a failure. Only for a few years now have scholars started to differentiate among cooperation deficits and successes and come to a more balanced – or even positive – result. Lastly, among the five created regions, some have an extremely malign problem constellation and put a huge burden on some of its members. Thus, under these circumstances it is highly astonishing to find as many as five formal regimes on environmental issues in Southeast Asia. How can we explain this finding? What were the driving forces of regime creation? How do weak state capacities and intra-regional tensions come into play? What role is there for ASEAN? This book will analyze the observed regimes. Why has regime creation occurred in these cases? What can these cases tell us about the general pattern of regime creation in Southeast Asia?2 In the case that a regime is created, it is assumed that the involved parties have succeeded in balancing and coordinating their mutual interest and build a strong basis for cooperation. The created regime is distinct and is designed very carefully to make it work. Can one expect that once actors’ have agreed to establish a regime for a common problem, the very regime will be effective? If not for this expectation, why else should states engage in regimes? However, the five regimes and the few available studies that evaluate the performance of them reveal that regime effectiveness in these cases is assessed very skeptical. This, again, is a puzzling observation since it contradicts my expectation: Since regime creation overcame stumbling blocks like conflictual constellations and developmental constraints, it is assumed that a strong interest in the effectiveness of the regime exists in these cases. Part of the skeptical analysis might be due to a confusing application of the concept of regime effectiveness. Researchers mean different things when they evaluate effectiveness. In many studies a clear definition is lacking. Often, researchers refer to the actual degree of envi2

It would also be highly interesting to analyze why certain potential regimes have not been created. However, the non-occurrence of a phenomenon can never be fully explained and is always object for speculation. Necessary conditions for the non-occurrence cannot be seriously distilled.

16

I Introduction

ronmental problem-solving when they make statements about effectiveness. However, environmental problems are complex and their solution requires resources and time. It is quite easy to state that a regime is not effective if the environmental problem is still there. An evaluation of the problem-solving aspect of effectiveness is difficult to conduct and can ideally only be conducted in retrospect. But effectiveness is not only problem-solving (although this is the ultimate goal of all regimes). From a social science perspective it is much more interesting to analyze institutional effectiveness. With this I mean the propensity of a regime to induce behavioral change among the involved actors. Behavioral change is a proxy to problem-solving and can be analyzed more realistically than problem-solving can be. Thus, regime effectiveness has to be measured more systematically with a clear definition of the term and clear values for high and low levels of effectiveness. However, for now, let us assume that the five regimes indeed show a low level of effectiveness. If there were no serious will and effort to solve an environmental problem in joint initiative, the default option would logically have been the no-creation instead of the creation of an ineffective regime. Why, then, have they been created at all? It becomes clear that the questions of regime creation and effectiveness are closely entangled. They influence each other. Explaining one without the other will only give partial information. In fact, explaining one will inevitably touch the question of the other. Thus, an integrated approach will be used. 2 State of Research I argue that questions of regime density and effectiveness in Southeast Asia have not been dealt with systematically. They represent, however, relevant questions in light of pressing problems of environmental degradation on the practical political side, and relevant in terms of testing existing theoretical assumptions in a non-Western setting. There is abundant literature on specific environmental problems in Southeast Asia. In general, this literature is policy-oriented and atheoretical. Various organizations from the region and from abroad regularly publish reports on the state of the environment (ASEAN 1997b; ASEAN 1997a; UNEP 2001; ASEAN & ADB 2001; WRI 2002; UNEP & Earthscan 2002; ASEAN 2002; Weltbank 2003; UNEP 2004; ASEAN 2004; UNESCAP 2006; ASEAN 2006c; ADB 2007). All these reports however do not offer theoretically informed insights on regime effectiveness. They can only serve as an information base to build upon. In general these reports focus on macro-conditions to explain the shortcomings of environmental protection like the rapid rate of industrialization, poverty and economic dependencies that prevent innovations. Be-

2 State of Research

17

sides these reports, there are three other publication types that explain the high level of environmental degradation. First, in a number of edited volumes researchers claim that the colonial heritage, the slow and uneven development and disempowerment of people (especially local and rural people) are responsible for a high degree of degradation (Parnwell & Bryant 1996; Hirsch & Warren 1998b; V. King 1998; Straub 2001; Greenough & Tsing 2003; Harris 2005; Connell & Waddell 2007). These case study collections offer an immense source of in-depth knowledge on various issues. However, the respective edited volumes mostly lack a coherent theoretical embeddedness and also a red line between the single cases. Second, researchers refer to an institutional failure of the respective institution that has been created or assigned to solve the problem. ASEAN’s soft mode of governance that relies on unanimous decisions and complete consensual discussion outcomes has often been criticized and made responsible for shortcomings in effective outcomes in various fields of engagement (Kahler 2000; Acharya 2001; Kwa & Tan 2001; Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama 2002; Beeson 2004). Cotton (1999, 331) writes that “conventional ASEAN modalities have proved a severe disappointment”. Similarly, Rosenberg (1999) regards the existing ASEAN system as a stumbling block for effective problemsolving in the case of water pollution in the South China Sea. Rosenberg’s main argument is that the prevailing ASEAN system is not effective but that ASEAN has difficulties to initiate reforms on its own. In the case of the Mekong, Jokinen argues that the main problems of the Mekong River Commission are its lack of adequate funds to finance projects and its inability to settle disputes between the member states (Jokinen 2001). Backer and Menniken argue that the spirit of national boundaries is manipulating the work of the Mekong River Commission while its Secretariat has no real power on its own (Backer 2006; Menniken 2007). John Dore argues that the ineffectiveness of policy making in the Commission is due to its top-down decision-making style without public participation (Dore 2003, 424). Third, a considerable number of publications identify the problem structure as the key variable to explain regime ineffectiveness. Here, different interests of the stakeholders are analyzed. For the case of air pollution many authors trace the problem back to the country in which the forest fires occur: Indonesia. As long as Indonesia does not solve regulatory problems within its territory, the ASEAN regime cannot be effective. A number of economists and lawyers have analyzed the political issues of decentralization in Indonesia leading to a lack of accountability, of forest concession policy that is manipulated by state officials and of the legacies of the thirty year long authoritarian rule in the country that enforced the emergence of corruption and nepotism (Tay 1998; Tan 1999; Barber & Schweithelm 2000; Quah 2002; Atje & Roesad 2004; Christianty & Atje 2004; Christianty et al. 2004; Tan 2005; Perdana & Friawan

18

I Introduction

2007). A stream of argument for the case of the Mekong regime runs quite similar. Here, it is China that is dominating the agenda. China is the most upstream country and is not member of the Mekong River Commission. Thus, China does not feel obliged to discuss its plans with the others. These countries, however, have to cope with all the negative externalities that China sends down the river (Binh 2006; Osborne 2006; Dore et al. 2007). This book aims to combine existing field knowledge and expertise with a theoretically guided regime analysis. Regime theory has been engaged in developing hypotheses about the effectiveness of environmental cooperation between states. Literature on environmental regimes has been developed for more than thirty years now. It concentrates on generating hypotheses mainly about regime creation, effectiveness and the influence of transnational actors. The generated hypotheses, however, have mostly been applied to the context of Western industrial societies. Therefore, this book aims to make use of existing regime theory hypotheses and apply them to explain regime effectiveness in the Southeast Asian context. Only two publications could be identified that combine regime theoretical assumptions with an environmental case study in Southeast Asia. Both projects deal with the sustainable use of the Mekong River. Ellen Backer (2006) analyzed the low level of effectiveness in the Mekong regime with a focus on three hypotheses building upon the works of Arild Underdal: The riparian countries have different and diverging preference that makes cooperation hard. The regime itself is weak due to a lack of competence, funding and skills. And last, the most important riparian, China, is not part of the regime. Timo Menniken (2007) has similar premises. He focuses on the role of China that he characterizes as the “Rambo” in game theoretical language. Menniken comes to a more nuanced conclusion about effectiveness in that he distinguishes two regimes: one with the members of the Mekong River Commission and one other that combines the MRC and its engagement with China. Effectiveness in the first regime is given to a certain degree. The second regime has no impact at all. My dissertation builds upon these studies, especial the one from Menniken. 3 Map of Argument and Outline The pressing urgency of transnational environmental problems in Southeast Asia will be outlined in Chapter 2. Aim of the chapter is to understand the problem and embed it into key characteristics of the region. Southeast Asia shares many characteristics of developing areas such as massive industrialization, urbanization, governance weakness and fragile statehood. In addition, states are entangled in conflicts with each other and have problems in overcoming long-

3 Map of Argument and Outline

19

standing hostilities from the twentieth century. European colonization has enforced a regional setting in which the neighboring states ignore each other and only concentrate on exchange with their colonial powers. This resulted in longstanding hostility of neighbors and ignorance of mutual concerns. Thus, states in the region care about nothing more than their individual well-being. These characteristics nurture the expectation that regime creation is a very unlikely option – no matter how high the demand for them is. Nevertheless, five regimes have been created against my expectation. Regimes are defined as a patterned form of cooperation that involves more than two states and that obtains genuine rules and decision-making processes. Two points may contribute to explain regime creation. First, the existence and successful work of the regional organization ASEAN, that encompasses all countries in the region, may trigger positive spill-over effects. Cooperation within the framework of ASEAN has gained momentum over the last years. The organization is engaged in all policy fields and increasingly interested in adopted common rules and standards. ASEAN has not only incorporated the former Communist countries Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam into the organization but also contributed to peaceful and productive cooperation among the Southeast Asian neighbors in general. Second, all countries in Southeast Asia are actively engaged in international environmental regulation. They take part in international meetings and are signatories of all relevant international agreements and treaties. That means, they appreciate efforts of joint problem-solving and are familiar with the mechanisms of environmental regimes. These two points in particular underline the necessity to analyze the logic of regime creation and effectiveness in Southeast Asia. Thoughts and arguments of this book derive from regime theory mainly. Chapter 3 delivers an introduction to the universe and development of regime analysis. Regime analysis is divided into three major schools of thought, Neorealism, institutionalism, and Cognitivism. Each of these schools delivers a coherent picture about the structure of the international system, the behavioral patterns of actors, and thus about the functioning of regimes. I share the notion that regimes can have an important function in delivering governance services in issue areas in which no other instance is available or responsible as Institutionalists argue. However, as Breitmeier, Young and Zürn (2006, 2) have stated, regimes “offer no panacea” for all kinds of explanations. In many cases regime creation fails or existing regimes act completely ineffective. It is more the general idea of an institutionalization of governance efforts that strengthens the concept. Neorealism argues that regimes only come into existence if there is a hegemon that fosters its creation. Consequently, every regime is dependent on power

20

I Introduction

and engagement of that hegemon for its existence and performance. If the hegemon looses strength so does the regime. For each created regime in Southeast Asia, a hegemonic power would need to be identified that fostered the creation. It will be shown, however, that there is no obvious hegemon, especially not an environmental one. The region encompasses very different nations. Some are very small but economically potent (Brunei, Singapore), some are gigantic in size but not in power (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines), some have high growth rates but are still catching up (Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam). In sum, there is no single country that could dominate the region. In contrast, the countries in the region guard nothing more than their national sovereignty. Non-interference is the most sacred principle in all foreign affairs. Any tendency of exercising influence of one country over another is not tolerated. Therefore, it is assumed that the regimes that do exist in the region have been created without the initiation and power of a hegemonic state. Neorealism also argues that states are mainly concerned with relative gains impeding cooperation efforts. This argument is also seen skeptical. As a result of long-standing colonial rule countries in the region are rather ignorant to each other than competitive. Thus, taking a Neorealist perspective one must argue that environmental politics is such a hot field that here (and only here) states are extremely concerned about relative gains. Usually, Neorealists argue that only security politics is such a high politics. They do not regard environmental concerns as relevant for the national security. Thus, it is not plausible why the relative gains argument should apply here. Cognitivists argue that the existence and strong influence of epistemic communities will enhance regime creation and effectiveness. This is a strong argument that has been tested and confirmed in many case studies. However, these studies all take place in the realm of the developed, industrialized world. In these settings, political systems are mostly democracies and non-state actors have strong influence on agenda-setting or decision-making processes. In Southeast Asia, as an example of a developing region, most countries are not organized as democracies. Decision-making processes are mostly top-down, secret and executive-level-focused. Non-state actors have no access to the political sphere and do not exercise political power. Thus, it is strongly assumed that the influence of epistemic communities in Southeast Asia is very low. Only if the presence and influence of epistemic communities were a necessary condition for regime creation, then their marginality would be an important indicator. However, I consider this fact a structural condition of developing countries, especially if they are organized in authoritarian political systems. Epistemic communities support regime creation but regimes can also come into existence without them. Thus, the arguments of Cognitivist thinking are not very plausible.

3 Map of Argument and Outline

21

I argue that only an interest-based explanation derived from the Institutionalist school can explain the empirical observations. States have costs and benefits in every potential regime. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) argue that cooperation is only possible if expected benefits are higher than expected costs. However, cooperation involves more than one actor; thus, there are many different expected costs and benefits. Each potential regime has a specific constellation of interests among all parties. This constellation of interests can be more favorable for cooperation or less. It is necessary to model all actors’ interests in order to find out about the chances for regime creation (game theory will be used for that). In his case study on Fisheries Management Arild Underdal (1980) analyzed the negotiation process leading to the establishment of the regime. He used game theoretical approaches to model the different interests of all involved actors and defined their positions as pushers or laggards of the regime in order to define regime outcomes. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) have further subdivided actors’ positions in pushers, laggards, intermediates and bystanders. Underdal’s research on actors’ constellations has been continued by Ronald Mitchell (1994, 2003, 2006). Mitchell (2006, 72) identifies the variable of problem structure as decisive for the measurement of regime effectiveness. The constellation of all involved actors, their interests and positions as well as the perceived possibilities to solve the problem mainly determine the effectiveness of regimes. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the higher the interests of all parties correlate with each other positively, the higher the chances for effectiveness (since all parties then share the same notion of expected benefits). Moreover, there is a second determinant for effectiveness: although I said that the very fact of regime creation implies effectiveness this argument needs further qualification. Due to the already mentioned reasons creation implies a certain level of effectiveness (voluntary regimes, actors themselves design regime, serious engagement). However, a superficial look at the world of regimes shows that not all existing regimes are equally effective: some are more, some are less. There are more regimes in total than effective regimes. It seems that regime creation is a lot easier than implementation of its provisions. Correlation of interests is only one part of the explanation. The second determinant is the regime design. Does the created regime have the capacity to solve the problem? Based upon earlier work of Oran Young (1980, 1983, 1989; Osherenko & Young 1989). Young and Gail Osherenko (1993, 13) discuss their concept of “institutional bargaining” in their case study of the Polar region. Core of the concept is the importance of a number of variables that contribute to regime creation, among them participation of relevant stakeholders, equity of decisions, equal sharing of burdens, transparent modes of decision-making and agreed-upon compliance mechanisms. The concept of institutional bargaining has been widely used and also been incorporated

22

I Introduction

into the study of regime effectiveness. Arild Underdal and a number of leading colleagues have edited widely cited theoretically grounded volume on Environmental Regime Effectiveness in which they complement earlier insights on problem structure with an intensive discussion of the second determinant, which is the actual problem-solving capacity of the regime (Miles et al. 2002). It is argued that three determinants of regime design can enhance regime effectiveness. First, compliance mechanisms need to be specific and focus on enforcing implementation rather than sanctioning non-implementation. Second, procedural rules need to be designed in a way that benefits and burdens are distributed equally among the parties. Also, decision-making procedures should follow qualified majority voting instead of strict unanimity. Third, there need to be enough skilled personnel to envision provisions and solutions. The material capacity of the regime needs to be sufficient to carry out projects or monitoring. Member states need to be capable of implementing rules. Factors typical for the developing world like limited state budgets and a lack of skilled personnel impede the realization of benefits. Even if countries are willing to comply with a regime and implement its resolutions, they may not possess the material, personnel, or intellectual capacity to implement. States must possess the scientific, political, economic, and administrative capacity to understand the threat; participate in creating the global regime; and then implement and ensure compliance with the regime’s principles, norms, and rules. Country-specific factors such as the wealth of a country, the domestic institutional structure, and the political strength of environmental non-state actors vis-à-vis major polluting industries influence the degree of regime effectiveness. These hypotheses from Institutionalist regime theory will serve to answer the questions that I have elaborated earlier. Furthermore, two hypotheses from the other schools of thought will also be included in the model. These hypotheses will be briefly analyzed in the case studies chapters as control variables. A control variable is similar to the independent variable only that the control variable is not the main focus of the research. A control variable is part of the explanatory model in order to make sure that the assumed relationship between independent and dependent variable(s) is valid and that the observed value of the dependent variable(s) is not caused by other factors (in this case by the control variable). Throughout the book, the role and importance of ASEAN for cooperation in the region will be touched upon. Especially the first case study will encompass a detailed analysis of ASEAN’s function in the haze regime. The author assumes that the long-standing cooperation within the framework of ASEAN has a positive effect on further cooperation in the region. While it is true that ASEAN has long been accused of stagnating and only agreeing on the least

3 Map of Argument and Outline

23

common denominator instead of adequate solutions, ASEAN has undergone some organizational reforms. Especially in the fields of intra-regional trade and dispute settlement the organization has achieve considerable effects. Also, ASEAN has adopted a charter stressing the common fate of the region and the willingness to engage in regional well-being. Therefore, I assume that there is trust-building and learning in the region. ASEAN has achieved a large variety of cooperation agreements on various topics among the member countries. The countries have agreed to cooperate permanently under the ASEAN framework and seek mutual solutions for regional problems. More than four decades of ASEAN cooperation have contributed to learning, reliance and trust-building among the member countries. The assumption of ASEAN’s positive effect does not derive from regime theory but from integration theory. The assumption is not core to this book and does apply only to the first case study. However, the author is aware of a probably significant role of this institutional cooperation. Methodological questions will be addressed in Chapter 4. Two regimes will be analyzed as case studies. In a first research step I aim to define how effective these two regimes are. Effectiveness will be conceptualized as institutional effectiveness referring to the capacity of the regime to induce behavioral change of the involved actors. To focus on institutional effectiveness, in contrast to problem-solving effectiveness, has the advantage of enabling the researcher to distill factors endogenous to the regime. This link is much harder to establish when focusing on problem-solving effectiveness since the solution of an environmental problem might have many reasons that are exogenous to the existence of a regime. Three different measures are necessary to define effectiveness according to a model introduced by Underdal et al. The actual performance of each regime will be operationalized as the level of compliance with the regime’s provisions of all involved actors. This measure will be compared to the collective optimum. This second measure will be operationalized as the overlap between the goals of all involved members. Actual regime performance is also compared to another measure: the no-regime counterfactual. This third measure will be operationalized as the positions and actions concerning the problem of all involved members before regime creation took place. In a second research step I aim to identify the relevant determinants for regime effectiveness for both cases. The chosen determinants derive from regime theoretical assumptions and will be used to explain the seemingly low level of effectiveness in both cases. The problem structure consists of each country’s vulnerability to environmental damage and its expected costs to abate this damage. Both selected cases deal with the environmental problem of pollution. In one case it is air pollution, in the second case it is water pollution. To operationalize the values vulnerability and abatement costs some statistical data has to be

24

I Introduction

gathered. Vulnerability will be measured in determining each country’s share of the resource and its strategic position to affect other countries to use the resource. In order to assess the abatement costs for each country it needs to be determined how important the economic activity for each state is that leads to environmental damage. In both cases, the countries at stake make use of the respective resources (water of the Mekong, forests) for economic purposes. The degree of usage and importance of the resource for the national economy differs among the countries involved. The higher the economic importance of the resource the higher are also the expected abatement costs. In extreme cases, a national economy could break down without the possibility to use the resource. Countries will be grouped according to their estimated dependency on the respective resource. A second indicator affects the abatement costs. This is the general government capacity of each country. Countries in developing regions generally show a low level of government capacity. Often, they lack financial means to implement and monitor rules as well as they lack skilled personnel to coordinate processes. Many times there are no environmental agencies at all or with sufficient expertise to solve a problem. Thus, if a country has a low capacity abatement costs also rise. To operationalize the three determinants of problem-solving capacity, the created regimes will be looked at. It will be analyzed what kind of compliance mechanisms and procedural rules each regime has established. In order to measure the available resources and competencies of each regime, the respective regime agency has to be analyzed. In the two cases these are the Environmental Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat and the Mekong River Commission Secretariat. It will be analyzed how many resources they devote in terms of financial assets, time and personnel, to solve the problem. It will be assessed how much actual decision-making power is vested in each regime agency in contrast to the power that rests with the member states. In my first case study, in Chapter 5, the Southeast Asian countries’ joint attempts to combat transboundary air pollution are analyzed. The environmental problem at stake involves an extremely conflictual interest constellation. Nevertheless, the regime came into existence. Although the problem touches almost all eleven countries, the problem-solving efforts concentrate around Indonesia, as the causing state, and its neighboring countries, as the negatively affected states. This case study is a problem of negative externalities with defined roles of the involved parties: some are affected by pollution, some are causing it. The roles that the involved states obtain define their position in the game and therefore their interest in the regime. These different interest constellations of culprit and victim states will be analyzed. Over the last two decades, ASEAN has established a number of institutional arrangements to solve the problem. The

3 Map of Argument and Outline

25

strongest instrument is a legally binding treaty, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. It will be shown that the provisions of the treaty are well-intended but too weak and vague to be effective. Furthermore, the organizational structure of monitoring and implementation of measures is assessed critically. ASEAN has not devoted much funds and personnel to tackle the problem systematically. However, the organization has succeeded in keeping the problem on the agenda for over twenty years now and engages in a plethora of activities to combat the problem. My second case study deals with a problem of joint resource management across borders. In Chapter 6 I will analyze the regime about the management of the Mekong River. Six countries are riparian to the Mekong (China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Viet Nam). They have different interests in using the resources of the river. In some cases, the interests are colliding. These different interests explain the countries’ different positions towards regime creation. Additional to the different needs of the countries, the six countries have vastly different capabilities to realize their interests. Stronger countries tend to ignore efforts of joint regulation while weaker countries prefer a common effort. Another structural aspect of this case study is interesting. As rivers float downwards the countries on the more upper position of the Mekong have a strategically better position: the river is cleaner, there is more fish, resources are rather untouched and dirt will float downwards. The country at the most upward position, right at the source of the Mekong, is China. China is also the country with the highest material capability. The constellation of the six riparian countries is thus highly conflicting and uneven. China takes the position of the Rambo ignoring all regulatory efforts. The established regime does not include China and is thus inherently weak. However, it will be shown in the chapter that the regime has succeeded in building up an epistemic community that influences behavior of decision-makers. The last chapter discusses cross-cutting features of both case studies. Its aim is to distill similarities and differences to enable reflection on the underlying question of regime creation and effectiveness in the region. It will be shown that both case studies share important parameters that influence regime creation and effectiveness. Both show a malign problem structure that is the result of countries’ egoistic politics of economic development. Nevertheless, in both cases a regime was created jointly. The two regimes have a high sophistication in presenting solutions for urgent environmental problems. Both regimes share an intensive reflection on the root causes of the problems at stake. The level of activities to combat the problems is extremely high. However, both regimes remain ineffective. The good intentions are not enough. The conflicting interests of the involved actors in each regime derive from typical constraints of developing

26

I Introduction

countries like an export-dominated economy, a high rate of poverty and unstable political systems. In both cases, the involved actors have neither succeeded in incorporating important actors into the regime nor in balancing against the strong interests of important actors. Additionally, typical features of Southeast Asian cooperation patterns, known as the ASEAN way, hinder the establishment of effective regimes. Lastly, although epistemic communities play a distinct role in shaping the respective agenda of the regimes, epistemic communities are treated with strong skepticism from the perspective of political leaders. The Southeast Asian style of decision-making is still dominated by closed circles of executive-level members. Procedures are highly formal and access to the circle is only granted according to status and rank. The importance of epistemic communities might grow in the future with rising levels of income, higher education and the emergence of urban middle classes in Southeast Asia.

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

1 Environmental Situation and Development The region of Southeast Asia encompasses three percent of the world’s total land area. The region has a total population of about 558 million; that is 7.7 percent of the world’s total population. Southeast Asia’s population is estimated to grow to 650 million in the year 2020. Southeast Asia in general is densely populated, with about 125 people per square kilometer (world average is 43) (ASEAN 2006c, 8). Eleven countries belong to the region: Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam in the North, Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore in the middle, the Philippines in the East, Myanmar in the West, and Indonesia and East Timor3 in the South. Overall, Southeast Asia extends about 3,300 kilometers from North to South and 5,600 kilometers from East to West with an area of 4.3 million square kilometers. All countries except for Laos have a coast. The region lies approximately between 25 degrees northern and ten degrees southern latitude. The coastlines of Southeast Asia border the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. Tropical monsoons greatly affect the climate in bringing in typhoons but also dry winds and rainfall. Inland water bodies like the Mekong River provide the riparian countries with freshwater resources, transportation, and hydropower. Temperatures are constantly high year round (due to the proximity to the equator), and differences between daily maximum and minimum temperatures are small. Temperatures only drop at higher elevations. The region encompasses two climatic zones. First, the equatorial zone covers maritime Southeast Asia (Malayan archipelago consisting of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and East Timor). In the equatorial zone there is rainfall throughout the year. Prolonged dry periods are absent. The vegetation is ever-wet and evergreen tropical forest as well as rain forest. Second, the intermediate tropical zone covers mainland Southeast Asia (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam). Here, the rainfall pattern is governed by monsoons. There is a constant alternation of rainy and dry seasons. 3

East Timor has only existed since 2002. The country is not a member of ASEAN. Data is largely lacking so that I neglect the country.

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_2, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

28

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

The intermediate tropical zone consists of monsoon forests and generally fertile grounds. Southeast Asia’s environment and natural resource endowments are unique, diverse and rich. The region has a tremendously long coastline with a vastly diverse marine and coastal habitat. Southeast Asia is a region with a rich flora and fauna and with various ecological “hot spots” (Elliott 2004, 178). The region hosts many unique species and a large diversity in fish stock. The region obtains many natural resources, most notably oil, timber, rubber, and sugar. Resource extraction and trading has always been one of the most important economic pillars. European powers colonized the countries in Southeast Asia mainly because of the high availability of natural resources. Colonial rule introduced European science and technology in terms of increased resource extraction and resource management. Each colonial power, however, introduced its own system of resource use and management, which means that there was a high level of “regional unevenness” (Bryant 1998, 49). The colonial powers integrated the region into a globalizing capitalist economy. Yet such integration has not taken place “naturally” but, rather, has been linked to political processes that have prompted Southeast Asia’s emergence as one of the key natural resource regions in the world. The role of colonial rule in promoting resource exploitation and environmental change was very far-reaching in that it resulted in political and administrative transformations that have “conditioned resource exploitation and environmental change to the present day” (Bryant 1998, 6). 2 Six Exigent Transnational Environmental Problems The predominant environmental picture of Southeast Asia is one of degradation and decline. There is a high prevalence of diverse environmental challenges in the region (see UNEP 2001; ASEAN 2002; UNEP & Earthscan 2002; UNEP 2004; UNESCAP 2006; ASEAN 2006c). Despite ecological and economic diversity, many environmental problems are sufficiently widespread and transnational in character that they should be understood as shared across the region. ASEAN has recognized in its 2009 East Asia Summit, “that there is an urgent need to enhance our cooperation to effectively respond to natural disasters which have increased in frequency and intensity over the last twenty years“ (ASEAN 2009).

The six most pressing transnational environmental problems will be presented in this section: Southeast Asia has a huge potential for ecological disasters. The geo-physical and climatic conditions unleash a number of natural hazards on a

2 Six Exigent Transnational Environmental Problems

29

regular basis. The most common are typhoons, floods, earthquakes and tsunamis, landslides, volcanic eruptions, droughts and wild fires (ASEAN 2006c, 8). Not all countries are affected equally, but there is not a single country in the region that is spared from all of these hazards. The Philippines and Viet Nam are especially vulnerable to tropical storms and typhoons. For 2007 the Munich Re Group observed 5,900 destroyed, 52,400 flooded houses and 82 fatalities due to heavy storms in the Philippines (Munich Re 2007, 3). A total of 110 flood events were registered in Asia in 2007 with a death toll of almost 7,000. Indonesia was among the countries that were most severely hit. Viet Nam regularly suffers from flash floods and landslides resulting in destroyed houses and dozens of dead people. Sumatra (Indonesia) is very vulnerable to seismic activities and outbreaks of earthquakes. The countries in Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam) are especially vulnerable to droughts causing a severe shortage of rice and other agricultural products. Munich Re (2007, 14) concludes its analysis with the observation that the trend towards increasing numbers of catastrophes in Southeast Asia continues. Air pollution levels in Southeast Asian cities are amongst the highest in the world, “producing serious human health impacts and affecting aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems” (UNEP & Earthscan 2002, 221). Urban air pollution is significant in major cities such as Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila, Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City and Kuala Lumpur, cities which all show a “semipermanent blanket of smog most of the time” (Boomgaard 2007, 274). Air pollution mostly originates from vehicles, industrial burning or forest fires. Forest fires have been a major cause of air pollution. The fires of 1997-98 exemplify transnational pollution par excellence, as the area affected by air pollutants had spread to more than 3,200 kilometers East to West, covering six Southeast Asian countries and affecting about 70 million people. Commercial land clearing for oil palm and timber estates is contributing to as much as 80 percent of all fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Schweithelm et al. 1999, 135). Fires have become more frequent, more intense, and larger (Schweithelm & Glover 1999, 4). In Southeast Asia land conversion is seen as an important contribution to economic development. The use of land for industry and rice cultivation has led to major clearances of existing forestland. For the last forty years peat swamps have been converted into palm oil and pulp and paper plantations on a large scale in the region. Forest degradation caused by heavy logging makes forests more susceptible to fire. Water quality in lakes, rivers and coastal areas is deteriorating. The region’s lakes and rivers are among the world’s most degraded (Boas 2002, 105). Contamination is caused by the discharge of wastewater from domestic, industrial and agricultural sources (UNEP 2001, 25; UNEP 2004, 35). Additionally, oil spills and other contaminants from shipping and other maritime activities

30

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

contributed to the contamination of coastal waters and deterioration of marine and coastal ecosystems (UNEP 2001, 6; ASEAN 2006c, 38). Large-scale dam construction on the Mekong and other Southeast Asian rivers negatively impacts water quality (ADB 2004, 12/13; Osborne 2004, 19; Hirsch 2007, 237). There are major concerns that the dams might increase the flow fluctuation and decrease the normal flow of nutritious sediments crucial for fisheries and agriculture production (Dore et al. 2007, 79). Southeast Asia is one of the most heavily forested regions of the world (UNESCAP 2006, 289). About 45 percent of the total land area (203 million hectares) is under forest cover compared to less than 30 percent on a global average (ASEAN 2006c, 56). About half the countries of the region have more than 50 percent of their land area under forest cover. The region contains about 35 percent of the world’s mangrove forests (ASEAN 2002, 24). However, the existing vastness of forests is not enough to meet the growing needs of the increasing population and domestic wood shortages are beginning to appear. Primary forests have been depleted during the twentieth century due to fuel wood harvesting, commercial logging, forest fires, land clearance for agriculture, infrastructure, and settlements (Dauvergne 2001, 13). Southeast Asia has the fastest rate of deforestation in the world. Latest available figures show an average deforestation rate in the region of 1.35 percent, whereas the world average is 0.2 percent annually (ASEAN 2006c, 56). Since forests are huge deposits of carbon dioxide, their well-being is highly relevant for a stable balance of the worldwide climate (Lee 2008). Table 1: Land Use in Southeast Asia Land Use Forests and woodland Agriculture Pasture Other uses, including urban areas

% of total Land Area 53 21 4 22

Source: ASEAN 2002b, 26.

There is a huge international demand for all kinds of forest products from Southeast Asia, most of all for timber and pulp and paper. Europe and North America, but especially countries like China, India and Japan have a huge demand for wood and forest products in general. Additionally, the demand for plantation products like palm oil has increased exorbitantly over the last ten years. Mixing palm oil with diesel constitutes bio-diesel for which there is a strongly growing demand worldwide (Everson 2007, 30). However, as more

2 Six Exigent Transnational Environmental Problems

31

land is needed for new crops and growing palm oil plantations, new land has to be cleared. Massive land clearance results in an environmental paradox: While providing environmentally friendly fuels to the world, countries in Southeast Asia are clearing forests and emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The greenhouse effect of destroying forests to produce palm oil will be more significant than the benefits that can be derived from switching to bio-diesel (Everson 2007, 32; Guerin 2007; MacKinnon 2007; Agence France Press 2008). Southeast Asia is home to about half of the world’s terrestrial and marine species (UNEP 2001, 4). “Indonesia is thought to support more species, with more endemic species, than any other country in the world” (UNEP & Earthscan 2002, 131). Indonesia is among the top five countries in the world with over 300,000 plant diversity (UNEP 2001, 20). Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are mega diversity countries with 80 percent of the global biological diversity (UNEP 2004, 52). Some of the last remaining intact expanses of mangroves occur in Southeast Asia. The region encompasses around 30 percent of the world’s coral reefs (UNEP 2004, 52). However, land conversion, climate change, pollution and unsustainable harvesting have resulted in a huge loss of habitat and species. High rates of deforestation have had a negative impact on biodiversity. Forest resources are increasingly exploited for international trade. Pollution from shipping, discharge of toxic wastes has adversely affected the marine environment. About half of the region’s wetlands are subject to moderate or high levels of threat from logging, agricultural conversion, mining, oil exploration and pollution (Elliott 2004, 183). Loss of the natural habitat of species has led to an increase in the number of threatened animals and plant species. About 24 percent (1130) of mammals and twelve percent (1183) of bird species are currently regarded as threatened (UNEP & Earthscan 2002, xxi). Southeast Asia has a coastline of 173,000 kilometers and a sea area of over 4.4 million square kilometers (UNESCAP 2006, 292). Southeast Asia has an estimated 2,500 fish species (ASEAN 2002, 34). Marine fisheries have exploded with the introduction of modern fishing methods and expansion of fishing activities. The coastal countries in the region are significant producers of fish. They account for more than 15 percent of global fisheries trade (ASEAN 2002, 34). As a consequence, since the 1990s, fish stocks have reached full exploitation and overfishing has threatened diversity and quantity. Fish stocks have fallen by 50 percent. To enlarge their catch, fishermen throw explosives and chemicals into the water (UNEP 2001, 29; ASEAN 2006c, 48). Coastal and marine ecosystems have degraded significantly in the past 30 years. For example, about 80 percent of coral reefs in the region are of high risk of degradation.

32

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

3 Typical Characteristics of Developing Areas 3.1 Socio-Economy Until the middle of the twentieth century, environmental degradation was largely due to poor farming methods, such as slash and burn agriculture as well as to colonial expansionist land practices, and foreign invasions and mineral exploitation (UNEP 2001, 43). Then, the region’s changing political economy and modes of production, the region’s changing demography, and the increasing economic and resource pressures from outside have contributed to environmental degradation. Land resources and terrestrial ecosystems are under increasing stress due to the growing population and the extension of agricultural land into forest and other ecologically sensitive areas. The demand for natural resources is insatiable. Everything is made into money. Rivers are overfished, forests are burned down, and wild animals are hunted and sold. While subsistence lifestyles, which remain heavily dependent on the direct exploitation of natural resources and environmental services, still constitute the basic means of survival for over half Southeast Asia’s population it is the ongoing industrialization that is the main reason for degradation: increasing rates of consumption, growing urban populations, rapid increases in energy demands, and resource- and wasteintensive industry (Elliott 2004, 179). Over the past 30 years, the region has gradually moved towards a “consumer society, with rapid rates of urbanization and westernization as well as population increase” (UNEP & Earthscan 2002, 43). Peasants are storming the cities in search for work, leaving the cities with catastrophic transport, housing and waste disposal problems. The rural poor transformed into the new urban poor, living in city slums. Inadequate sanitation and water treatment contributes to diseases. Industrial wastes have contaminated drinking water leading to problems as diarrhea and typhoid. Southeast Asian’s urban population is growing immensely. In 2010, the three megacities Jakarta, Manila and Bangkok have reached populations of 15.4, 19.6 and 12.2 million respectively. Southeast Asian economies face a number of challenges to sustainable growth, social development, and poverty reduction. While all countries have improved their fiscal performance, spending on social and physical infrastructure has lagged. Institutional reforms still remain a big challenge. Key priorities should be improving the provision of infrastructure, water, and transport, including an adequate regulatory framework for private sector participation, and enhancing the delivery of public services (ADB 2007, 41). Vulnerability to natural disasters and the rising incidence of communicable diseases, such as avian flu, poses another important challenge. This underscores the importance of “build-

3 Typical Characteristics of Developing Areas

33

ing into the planning and budgeting processes precautions to mitigate the effects of natural disasters and to manage them once they occur” (ADB 2007, 42). 3.2 Environmental Governance Governments in Southeast Asia lack the capacity to fight environmental degradation. Protection of the environment is a costly and time-consuming effort. The countries’ socio-economic situation is precarious, which has implications for how the environment is managed. Governments in the region often regard economic development and environmental protection as a zero-sum game. The general attitude of Southeast Asian countries has been to grow first and clean up later. Economic policies subsidize the use of dirty fuels, pesticides and fertilizers. Rapid industrialization has proceeded against a background of poor environmental management. Until today, legislative initiatives and action plans have had “limited success in halting or overcoming environmental degradation” (Elliott 2004, 179). The policy failure has two key reasons: a lack of expertise and resources and a weakness of governance. Effective environmental agencies with legal authority to impose significant sanctions on polluters still have to be created. Generally, the environmental sector is “under-funded and under-staffed” (UNEP 2001, 51). Often, environmental ministers only have a restricted mandate (in contrast to other ministers). Even more often, there are no competent administrators in the field of environmental protection. The available bureaucracy is not cohesive, technocratic, pragmatic and goal-directed. Also, there is inadequate compliance and enforcement of national and regional obligations. Political measures often lack accountability, transparency, education and information. The channels of communication do not work well. Despite the fact that some nations adopted environmental regulations, they were ineffectively designed and inadequately implemented. Too often countries neither monitor nor enforce standards and regimes. Both the institutional capacity and the political will to enforce implementation are lacking. Policy-makers also play a role in the degradation processes. Corruption and bribery often dominate decision-making. Natural resources have become a convenient currency for governments in pursuit of political objectives. A lifestyle of sustainability is almost completely unknown to Southeast Asians. Wasteful use of resources is seen as a sign of prosperity. On the other hand, poor people desperately try to make use of resources to sell them. Nature and environment is not regarded as a precious commonality. Problems of degradation are supposed to be solved by other people. The public is not putting pressure on the politicians to implement environmental policies. Public discussions about environmental

34

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

problems and measures are rare. There is a general lack of responsibility and ownership for the environment. 4 ASEAN – A Distinct Feature of Southeast Asia Southeast Asia has created a long-standing, multipurpose regional organization (ASEAN) that facilitates cooperation among all the region’s states and has achieved quite a few cooperation successes in its forty-three years of existence.4 When ASEAN was founded in 1967, the driving force was not a common commitment to a “project” like Europe’s desire of fostering peace and prosperity. The establishment of ASEAN was motivated by the fear of Communist aggression and influence in the region by Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia (Stubbs 2004, 217). Indonesia’s new president Suharto (president 1967-1998) was the strongest advocate of the establishment of an anti-Communist organization. Governmental purpose for ASEAN was to establish a loosely organized security association, founded by the “free bloc” Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. ASEAN was designed by the heads-of-state of the founding five countries. These countries were all authoritarian political systems. Thus, it is not surprising that the structure of ASEAN emphasized nothing more than the principle of absolute non-interference in domestic politics. The elite had made bad experiences with liberal democracy after the wave of decolonization in the 1940s and 1950s, because they built their polities copying the former colonial powers’ political systems. Authoritarian regimes developed and their leaders, most of all in Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, aimed at securing their domestic powers with the help of ASEAN in which the principle of absolute non-interference became the central pillar. The participating rulers aimed at securing their power by the establishment of ASEAN. Traditional regionalism in Southeast Asia has been elite-centered and politically illiberal. Authoritarianism was the element of convergence in ASEAN despite enormous diversities. The mutual assurance of non-interference was the best guarantee of achieving this goal. Rüland analyzes the process of early integration in the same vein, in that it was not “a process of sovereignty pooling, but more one of resource pooling for the sake of strengthening the capacities of the region’s nation states and their ability to balance by institutional (not military) means perceived power disequilibria inside and outside the region” (Rüland 2006, 87).

4

For a detailed historical analysis of the establishment of ASEAN see Stubbs 2004, 216-233.

4 ASEAN – A Distinct Feature of Southeast Asia

35

Until the recent past, ASEAN’s history of cooperation had been evaluated critically. The region is notorious for its reluctance of mutual cooperation and its long-standing mistrust. As a legacy from European colonial domination, states regarded their national sovereignty as a supreme value. Interference in allegedly domestic affairs or compromised cooperation is a behavioral option that Southeast Asian countries try to avoid. However, many similarities in the economic and political development after independence (mid-twentieth century) have tied the region together and made cooperation more likely to happen. In its early years of existence, there were not many expectations for ASEAN except for the containment of Communism. During the first decade, ASEAN’s performance showed only limited achievements and the level of cooperation within ASEAN was minimal (Phatharodom 1999, 237; Nicolas 2005, 3). The founding declaration of ASEAN, the so called Bangkok Declaration laid out the goals of economic, social and cultural cooperation; however, interests were too divergent for establishing common economic or social regulations (ASEAN 1967). The first high-ranking meeting of heads-of-governments only took place nine years after ASEAN’s establishment in 1976. ASEAN has often been attributed a systemic weakness due to its non-existing long-term vision. While Europe’s integration was driven by the idealism of a peaceful, unified continent, Southeast Asia was attributed a strategic pragmatism of cooperation in which the egoistic realization of national goals prevailed over the joint commitment to a common project. With the breakdown of Communism, the central reason for the existence of ASEAN had vanished. However, ASEAN still exists. The observed strategic pragmatism of Southeast Asia’s integration should not be evaluated in a negative way. It is a process of well-thought calculations, of continuity, of functional cooperation and of rather long time horizons. From the mid-1970s on, ASEAN developed with considerable pace. It established a framework for negotiations for border conflicts, a topic of foremost interest in the region. In 1971, ASEAN declared the region as a “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” (ASEAN 1971; Wanandi 2006). It expanded to economic and trade liberalization issues, enabling a better bargaining position for the ASEAN states at GATT meetings. Since the early 1980s, when the demands of economic globalization gained momentum, the Southeast Asian regional integration process started to intensify (Nicolas 2005, 3). Economic rates of transaction continued to deepen throughout Southeast Asia. Growth rates in Asia have exploded and continue to rise. The region received highest numbers of FDI from Japan, the US and Europe. Most of the countries have also developed substantially during the last forty years. The three former Communist countries Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam have made impressive progress in terms of economic development and growth rates during the past ten years. Growth rates in Asia

36

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

have exploded and continue to rise. Especially the former Communist countries Viet Nam and Cambodia have high growth rates due to comprehensive economic reforms and massive foreign investments. Table 2: Growth Rates of GDP 2002-2008, in % per year

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

2002 n.a. 6.2 4.5 5.9 4.4 12.0 4.4 4.2 5.3 7.1

2003 n.a. 8.6 4.8 6.1 5.5 13.8 4.9 3.1 7.1 7.3

2004 n.a. 10.0 5.0 6.4 7.2 13.6 6.2 8.8 6.3 7.8

Y e a r 2005 n.a. 13.4 5.7 7.0 5.2 13.2 5.0 6.6 4.5 8.4

2006 n.a. 10.4 5.5 7.3 5.9 n.a. 5.4 7.9 5.0 8.2

2007 n.a. 9.5 6.0 6.8 5.4 n.a. 5.4 6.0 4.0 8.3

2008 n.a. 9.0 6.3 6.5 5.7 n.a. 5.7 5.5 5.0 8.5

ASEAN

4.8

5.3

6.5

5.6

6.0

5.6

5.9

Country

Source: ADB 2007, 349.

In contrast to Europe, economic integration in Southeast Asia is driven by the private sector and its efforts to increase efficiency by building supply chain networks and exploiting economies of scale from division of labor and specialization. Until 2010, the ASEAN member states signed or ratified more than 330 treaties and agreements in issue areas ranging from security assurances, environmental cooperation and trade agreements to the protection of cultural heritage (ASEAN Treaties 2010). ASEAN has contributed impressively in terms of economic transactions and cooperation intensity (Wanandi 2006, 85-87). The most important driving forces of regional integration are the urge for industrialization and the emergence of middle classes with demands for more effective problem-solving. Intra-regional trade is constantly growing and the recently operative ASEAN Free Trade Area has boosted imports and exports among the member countries. Existing data shows that intra-ASEAN trade activities has a share of almost 25 percent of ASEAN’s total trade (see Table 3). Of course, 25 percent is still far away from EU’s 75 percent. Yet, if one takes the troublesome development of the region into consideration, this figure is quite impressive. ASEAN’s slow increase in intra-regional trade can be traced to the process of creating a free trade area. Although ASEAN formally established the ASEAN Free Trade Area, AFTA, in 1992, it has only been operative from 2007 on.

4 ASEAN – A Distinct Feature of Southeast Asia

37

Table 3: Intra- and Extra-ASEAN Trade as Share of Total Trade 2009, in % Country

Intra-ASEAN 25.8

Extra-ASEAN 74.2

Cambodia

23.6

76.4

Indonesia

24.5

75.5

Laos

83.7

16.3

Malaysia

25.7

74.3

Myanmar

51.6

48.4

Philippines

20.7

79.3

Singapore

27.3

72.7

Thailand

20.7

79.3

Viet Nam

17.6

82.4

ASEAN

24.5

75.5

Brunei

Source: http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table18.pdf.

It took a long time for the member states to agree on the economic sectors that were to be included in the free trade zone. Finally, by the end of 2004, eleven sectors were selected in which all tariffs and trade barriers were to be removed within the coming five to eight years. Since 2007, the economic community of Southeast Asia with the free trade zone at its core is one of the strongest pillars of ASEAN. The strictly kept consensus principle for all ASEAN decisions, that has surely slowed the process of integration, has contributed immensely to stabilize a very high rate of acceptance of all decisions among the member states. With the high acceptance rate also comes the high willingness to implement ASEAN decisions into national law. This side effect of the ASEAN way should not be underestimated. The organization has truly transformed from a loosely organized association of mutual security declarations to a multipurpose regional organization. In November 2007, the heads of states of the ASEAN member countries signed a constitution, which aims to strengthen the attempts for regional unity in Southeast Asia (ASEAN 2007a). Environmental protection is a prominent issue on the agenda of diverse ASEAN meetings. ASEAN regularly publishes state of the environment reports. ASEAN’s annual reports dedicate substantial sections to the achievements and goals in the environmental domain. A growing number of scholars evaluate the development of ASEAN over the last forty years as a story of success (Haacke 2003; Nabers 2003; Stubbs 2004; Milliot 2005; Schmiegelow & Schmiegelow 2007). The declaration of an ASEAN Charter striving for unity in diversity, the action plan for an economic union

38

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

until 2015 and the restructuring of the ASEAN Secretariat point to a development in the region that could lead to a union (Litta 2009). In sum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plays an important role in supporting regional cooperation. Even more, it is the blue print for regional cooperation. It proves that regional cooperation is important and beneficial for all involved countries in the long run. 5 Regime Creation 5.1 Assumptions and Expectations Regimes are a patterned form of cooperation between states (authoritative for the regime definition: Ruggie 1975, 570; Krasner 1983a, 2; Keohane & Nye 2001 [1977], 19). Regimes can take the form of written or customary international law, cooperation agreements between states, or organizations. Common to all regimes is the existence of formal or informal norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures (Krasner 1983a, 2). Basic assumption is that regimes represent engines for behavioral change of states and develop a dynamic of their own. Regimes mediate, constrain, or influence behavior and thus induce policy change that can lead to problem-solving (Young & Zürn 2006, 121). States always have two options: they can create environmental regimes to solve problems or they can choose not to do so. Given the high prevalence of transnational environmental problems in Southeast Asia my question is, do the states in the region create regimes to solve the problems or not? My initial expectation is that states in Southeast Asia prefer not to create regimes since there are strong stumbling blocks. First, the existence of a large amount of pressing transnational environmental problems does not imply regime creation at all.5 There is no automatism between demand and supply. Of course, a high demand can be a huge stimulus for regime creation, but additional reasons need to be given. Second, Southeast Asia is part of the developing world. The countries have multiple governance problems and have a generally low standard of living. Poverty rates are high and budgetary constraints make improvements hardly realiz5

Research on regime creation confirms that there is no automatism between the demand for cooperation and the creation of cooperation regimes (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994, 78). By no means can it be concluded that regimes will arise automatically (Osherenko & Young 1989, 241). “It would be wrong to assume, however, that the universal rhetoric of ecological interdependence translates readily into effective international action” (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992, 47).

5 Regime Creation

39

able. The lack of education results in a relatively low number of skilled people in public administration. Awareness of environmental problems and the willingness to solve these is very low. Third, the level of development in the eleven Southeast Asian countries is very different. Although they all count as developing countries, differences among the eleven are blatant. While the tiny states of Singapore and Brunei represent examples of fully-developed states with a busting economy and high levels of growth and prosperity6, there are other countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines that have a medium economic performance and a plethora of governance problems (corruption, mismanagement, failed implementation efforts). Table 4: Human Development Index for Southeast Asia 2009 Country Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam Iceland [highest] United States Germany Sierra Leone [lowest]

Index 30 131 107 130 63 132 90 25 78 105 1 12 22 177

Source: UNDP 2009, 229-232.

Furthermore, there is another group of countries that are in an early stage of development and lack basic provisions for life for parts of the population (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nam). These extremely diverging levels of economic development hinder the prospects of cooperation. Trade among such divergent countries is often not profitable and sometimes not even wanted. Either poor countries cannot afford certain imported goods or richer countries do not need simple products from the poorer countries. The rate of transaction between the Southeast Asian countries had been marginal in the early time after indepen6

Brunei and Singapore can be found on the top among European countries in the Human Development Index, see Table 3.

40

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

dence (mid-twentieth century). These differences make it hard for the countries to agree on common steps to solve transnational environmental problems. Fourth, shared democratic values function as a facilitator and catalyst of cooperation. Democratic values foster cooperation and enable the realization of common goals. In pluralistically organized societies, “[a]rticulate voluntary groups, led by bureaucratized but accessible elites, compete with each other more or less rationally for political power and social status. The population is mobilized and participates in this process through affiliation with mass organizations” (E. Haas 1961, 374).

Statehood in Southeast Asia is young and governments, in general, are not stable. Long-term projects have small chances to be enforced and implemented. William Case diagnoses “leadership turbulence” in the region that has shaped the shaky political history of the countries since their emancipation of colonial rule (Case 2004, 92). It can be said that all countries in the region (except for Myanmar) belong to an intermediate regime category that is located on a range between hard authoritarianism and consolidated democracy. He defines two predominating political systems types, “pseudo-democracies” and “low-quality democracies” (Case 2004, 75). In a pseudo-democracy, although elections are regularly held they have no substantial function. Civil liberties are constrained and opposition parties’ work is disturbed massively. Low-quality democracies offer more in terms of liberal participation and electoral contestation; however, there is government’s control of the media, manipulations in campaigning, executive abuses, shadowy business relations, judicial weaknesses, corruption, and policy ineffectiveness. Executive-level abuses and frequent turnovers, institutional rivalries and deadlocks, bureaucratic and judicial corruption, and electoral irregularities contribute to state inefficiencies and policy ineffectiveness which, while hardly conductive to entrenched elites seeking to expand their interests, enable them nonetheless to safeguard something of their standings. The political development of Southeast Asia after colonial independence is rich of autocratic rule, transitional struggle and military interference.7 Most striking examples were Thailand’s suspension of its constitution together with a ban of elections and parties in 1958; Indonesia’s revocation of its democratic constitution in 1959; Singapore’s security sweep against the opposition in 1963; Malaysia’s declaration of emergency rule after ethnic rioting in 1969; and the Philippines’ imposition of martial law in 1972. Recent examples are the violent conflicts 7

The autocratic political systems, which were established after the abolishment of colonial rule created a strong political elite in the executive branch. Most prominent autocratic leaders that came into power soon after colonial independence were Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), Mahathir Mohamad (Malaysia), Suharto (Indonesia), and Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines).

5 Regime Creation

41

during the democratic elections in East Timor (2002), the military coup in Thailand (2006), and the violent break down of the monks’ uprising in Myanmar (2007). Table 5: First Democratic Elections Country Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand East Timor Viet Nam

Date ----1999 ------1986 --1992 2002 ---

Source: CIA 2007.

Authoritarian elites in Southeast Asian countries were occupied with more or less the same goals: striving for rapid industrialization, securing non-interference from their neighbors and reconfirming strong trading relationships with the former colonial powers (Hing 1999, 104). These goals do not include a strong and dedicated regional cooperation but rather it enforces competition or even mutual indifference among the nation states. Although most countries in the region proclaim to be democratic, there is no country that can be labeled a liberal democracy (democratic elections with free and fair multiparty contests; human rights and freedom of expression; and the rule of law) (Croissant 2002). When looking at the eleven countries, there are only four that can be identified as having had democratic elections that marked the starting point of a transition from an autocratic rule to democracy: the Philippines in 1986, Thailand in 1992, Indonesia in 1999, and East Timor in 2002. In sum, there are rather strong arguments that would imply a preference of no-regime creation in Southeast Asia. Among all presented arguments I argue that governance weakness in the countries is the strongest point. Thus, my expectation towards regime creation is very modest. The creation of five formal regimes in Southeast Asia is therefore a puzzling observation.

42

II Demand for and Supply of Environmental Cooperation

5.2 Identified Regimes Table 6: Environmental Regimes in Southeast Asia Created by ASEAN CAM, LAO, THAI, VN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN

Regime Name Agreement On The Conservation Of Nature And Natural Resources (1985) (entered into force in 1999) Mekong River Commission (1995) (entered into force upon establishment) Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) (entered into force on 29 November 2003) Agreement on the Establishment of ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (2005) (entered into force on 28 October 2008) Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (2005) (entered into force on 16 May 2009)

Source: material from the databases www.ecolex.org; http://faolex.fao.org; www.aseansec.org/ratification.pdf.

Five environmental regimes can be observed in Southeast Asia. Four of the five regimes have been created by ASEAN and are targeting all member countries due to the broad problem scope. Only the Mekong River Commission is an exception. It deals with a specific issue and is of interest only to the riparian countries. A second categorization is important. Two of the five regimes are organizations, three are agreements. It is more tangible to analyze organizations because there are visible structures: a location with real people. Regimes in the form of agreements are more difficult to grasp. Here, it is important to analyze the agreement text and trace forms of implementation of the listed provisions. In many cases, there is at least some form of material organization like a desk office. This is the case for the Disaster Management and the Haze Agreements, not so for the Conservation Agreement. The ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources is the oldest environmental agreement in the region. Its goal is to maintain essential ecological processes, life-support systems, preserve genetic diversity, and ensure the sustainable utilization of living resources. The scope of the agreement is extremely broad and its provisions are kept very general. No concrete measures have evolved out of this agreement. There are no institutional mechanisms and no provisions for implementation. It is a declaration of good will. The Mekong River Commission (formerly: Mekong Committee) was founded in 1957 by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam for the management of the Mekong River and its resources as well as for transboundary concerns (flood control, navigation, hydropower). The Mekong River Commission is an international organization. Currently, about 130 people are working at the

5 Regime Creation

43

Secretariat. One of the biggest obstacles in realizing the organization’s goals is the fact that two of the six riparian countries are not member of the MRC: Myanmar and China. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution has the goal to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution resulting from land or forest fires. The ASEAN Haze Agreement entered into force on 25 November 2003. The Agreement is a full-fledged treaty regime with legally binding obligations. The Agreement has been signed and ratified by eight of the ten ASEAN member countries. However, one of the two countries, that have not ratified the Agreement, is Indonesia, the country that is mainly responsible for causing dangerous haze. Within the Environment Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat there is a desk that handles all haze related issue. However, ASEAN only gets active in cases of haze outbreaks. It does not substantially engage in prevention since there are no sufficient personnel. The ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity is an international inter-governmental organization established by ASEAN through an agreement signed by the ASEAN governments on 27 September 2005 that entered into force in 2008. Its main task is to facilitate cooperation and coordination among ASEAN member countries on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the region. All ten ASEAN countries are signatories of the Agreement. The Centre has been formally launched with the signing of the Agreement in 2005. However, it has been operative for two years only. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response provides ASEAN’s framework for the development of operational procedures to respond collectively and rapidly to disasters. The Agreement includes provisions of relief assistance, expedited customs and immigration clearance. The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response was signed in 2005 and entered into force in 2009. A unit within the ASEAN Secretariat was installed to monitor and implement the provisions of the Agreement. This chapter observed a high prevalence of transnational environmental problems in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, it has delivered arguments to support the expectation of a preference for no-regime creation to solve these problems. Summarizing the results there are strong points arguing against the creation of regimes. The existence of five formal regimes is therefore treated as a puzzling observation.

III Regime Theory

1 Regimes and International Relations In International Relations there are multiple forms of cooperation between different actors. The broad term cooperation encompasses phenomena ranging from ad hoc agreements to elaborate treaties (Breitmeier 1996, 19). Some scholars avoid the term regime in their analyses and use broader terms like “international treaties, regulations, institutions, agreements” (Brown Weiss & Jacobson 2003); “cooperation between states” (Neumayer 2001) or “treaties” (Mitchell 1994) in order to be more inclusive and circumvent definitorial difficulties. Regimes are a specific form of cooperation: “Regimes are examples of cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can take place in the absence of established regimes” (Haggard & Simmons 1987, 495).

It has become quite common in the field of International Relations to group regimes under the heading of international institutions. The definitions of regimes by Keohane (“institutionalized patterns of cooperation”) and Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (“major type of international institution”) exemplify this categorization (Keohane 1983, 1989; Hasenclever et al. 2000, 3). Basic assumption is that behavior in the international system is being increasingly institutionalized. International institutions are the “rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement those rules” (Bernauer 1995, 351). Regimes can take the form of established organizations (like WTO, UN, ASEAN) or of rules and regulations without an existing organizing body (like the SALT and Kyoto Regime). Regimes are intentionally and deliberately constructed. Only sovereign states can be members of regimes. Parties carrying out actions governed by a regime may also be other (private) entities. In fact, the forces leading to the establishment of regimes are in many cases actors other than states like interest groups, transnational communities or private companies. Thus, although members to regimes can only be states, part of regimes as an analytical concept are also the “numerous actors who bring those components to life” (Mitchell 2002b, 61). Since there is no governing authority in the international system capable of making and enforcing rules, regimes have been esta-

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_3, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

46

III Regime Theory

blished to fill this lacuna. Sovereign nation states have the capability to make and enforce rules through their monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force (Weber 1993 [1919], translation HL). Without such monopoly collective action in the international system has to rely on cooperative behavior and compliance to the rules and regulations. Therefore, it is highly interesting to study what kind of mechanisms states have established for themselves in order to reach collective goals. 2 Definition If a regime is not necessarily accompanied by an organization with a postal address, how do I know a regime when I see one? Since the 1970s, scholars have started to define the phenomenon of regimes. John Ruggie (1975) was the first scholar who describes regimes as “sets of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states“ (Ruggie 1975, 570).

Hedley Bull (2002 [1977], 54) refers to the importance of rules and institutions in international society where rules refer to “general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways”. In their joint book “Power and Interdependence”, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2001 [1977], 19) define regimes as “sets of governing arrangements” that include “networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects”. While Bull and Keohane/Nye focus their definitions on the role of rules and interdependence, Oran Young (1980, 332) defined regimes as “social structures” building upon Ruggie’s 1975 article. A number of scholars have followed this definitorial stream. Young and Michael Zürn (2006) formulate a definition of regimes as: “social institutions created to respond to the demand for governance relating to specific issues arising in a social setting that is anarchical in the sense that it lacks a centralized public authority or a government in the ordinary meaning of the term” (Young & Zürn 2006, 121).

Scholars in the “social structures” tradition stress the importance of knowledge and learning processes through a regime. The regime as such represents an engine for behavioral change and develops a dynamic of its own. Regimes come to have an independent impact on outcomes and behavior (they are not only variables between causal variables and outcome). Regimes and behavior are inex-

3 Functions

47

tricably linked. Every regime is an “attitudinal phenomenon” (Puchala & Hopkins 1983, 62).8 3 Functions The primary function of regimes results from the anarchical structure of the international system and the condition of pervasive uncertainty that governs the behavior of states. Since world politics lack central authoritative governmental institutions, a major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of mutually beneficial agreements among governments (Keohane 1989, 106; Young & Zürn 2006, 121). In other words, regimes function to facilitate finding a solution for collective problems in a specific policy field (Breitmeier 1996; Zürn 1998, 632). The means how to reach a solution is to impact on the behavior of the participating states. Regimes create shared expectations about appropriate behavior and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue-area, regimes help states (and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security (Hasenclever et al. 2000, 3). By reducing uncertainty regimes help states to reduce security dilemmas and to achieve collective gains. They facilitate cooperation by signaling the parties’ commitment to an ongoing relationship, hence lengthening the shadow of the future. They generate information, increase transparency, and facilitate reciprocity (Bernauer 1995, 364). Regimes affect which issues move on and off agendas (Puchala & Hopkins 1983, 62). The fundamental raison d’être of regimes is to “cause people to do things they would not otherwise do” (Mitchell 1994, 425). 4 Evolution of (Environmental) Regime Theory Neorealism was the dominant theory of international relations in the post-World War II time, or in Ruggie’s words “the heavy guns in postwar America be8

The most influential and commonly used definition of regimes comes from Stephen Krasner who does not regard regimes as social structures but as a rather neutral framework: “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983a, 2). The popularity of Krasner’s definition probably stems from the tangibility of the aspects of a regime. Krasner shares a moderately Neorealist position that subordinates regimes to underlying power capabilities. However, he acknowledges that under specific circumstances and in non-security related policy fields, regimes may assume a life of their own and impact on behavior and outcomes (Krasner 1983b, 357).

48

III Regime Theory

longed to the realists” (1998, 4). Neorealism questioned the importance of rules and norms as a constraint on state behavior. The subfield of international organization, and particularly the study of regional integration, was not big. Ernst Haas was the leading representative of integration studies; however, he was also almost the only one. In his theory of European integration (neofunctionalism) he predicted, as early as 1958, the economic and political unification of Europe (E. Haas 1958, 1961). Haas also argued that cooperation among leaders of welfare states (like in Europe) is more extensive since these leaders share values and norms. However, neofunctionalism did not “travel well beyond Western Europe” (Ruggie 1998, 6). The field remained closely tied to the study of formal organizations, missing a range of state behavior that nonetheless “appeared regulated or organized in a broader sense” (Haggard & Simmons 1987, 491/492). In his seminal article on the consequences of technological progress Ruggie (1975) laid the foundation of regime theory. He claimed a “single history” (1975, 557) of mankind which means that globalization processes have increased global interdependence in that “changes taking place in one segment of international society will have consequential repercussions in all others”. Ruggie assumed an anarchical international system in which, however, “the area of unpredictability of state behavior is limited, complex relations are pursued within sets of mutual expectations, and jurisdictional competencies are allocated to a variety of actors other than states. In other words, international behavior is institutionalized. Institutionalization, as sociologists have defined it, is said to coordinate and pattern behavior, to set boundaries which channel behavior in one direction as against all others which are theoretically and empirically possible” (Ruggie 1975, 559).

Drawing on sociological and organization theory, Ruggie suggests that international institutionalization could take the form of epistemic communities and regimes as well as formal organizations. He comes up with the definition of the term “regime,” which he refers to as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie 1975, 570). Environmental regime analysis evolved as a response to mounting international concern about threats to environmental quality since the 1970s. Technological innovations, population growth, environmental catastrophes and growing disparities between the global north and south led to an increased awareness of environmental risks. A series of environmental catastrophes added fuel to the environmental fire in the 1960s: thalidomide caused congenital deformations in babies, supertanker Torrey Canyon grounds in the English channel and caused massive oil spill along France’s picturesque northern coast, Swedish scientists charged that the death of fish and other organisms in thousands of the country’s

4 Evolution of (Environmental) Regime Theory

49

lakes resulted from the long-range transport of air pollution from Western Europe (UNEP & Earthscan 2002, 2). Global environmental concerns gained their first international climax with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. For the first time in history a global conference was entirely dedicated to the combat of environmental degradation on a global scale. In the following of the Stockholm conference, the United Nations established a special agency for environmental concerns, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). From the late 1970s on, environmental movements began to spread in Europe and North America. More than half of the 140 multilateral environmental treaties adopted since 1921 were concluded after the 1972 UN Conference (Keohane et al. 1993, 6; Zürn 1998, 625; Chasek et al. 2006, 2). Throughout Europe, “green” parties were founded fighting against nuclear waste and environmental degradation. Although, having existed as a policy field since the 1970s, environmental regime analysis only gained recognition among International Relations in the late 1980s with the exception of a few scholars who worked earlier in the field (Underdal 1980; Young 1980). Publications in this field start from the mid1980s on with the exception of a special issue of International Organization on “International Institutions and the Environmental Crisis” in 1972 (coinciding with the UN Conference on the Human Environment which is considered by most analysts to be a milestone in international environmental politics). Especially influential in the field have been the early works of Underdal (1980) about the negative impact of laggards on cooperation achievements, of Young (1989) about the general dynamics of regime creation, and of Peter Haas (1990) about the importance of epistemic communities in the establishment of regimes. Prominence of the field grew after the end of the Cold War (since security politics seized to dominate all research and cooperation among states established as a viable field of growth). The end of the Cold War made scholars increasingly aware of the importance of ideas, norms and information. Furthermore, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 brought real-world impetus to the debate. Especially the focus on global climate change rose to become the focal point of research. Today, global climate change and ozone depletion in particular and other environmental topics in general belong to the most carefully analyzed issues in International Relations. Thomas Bernauer (1995) delivered a coherent and parsimonious definition of environmental regimes as: “sets of international regulations and organizations that were intentionally established by preexisting actors (states) through explicit, legally or politically binding, international agreements in order to regulate anthropogenic sources of negative externalities affecting the natural environment” (Bernauer 1995, 352).

50

III Regime Theory

5 Regime Effectiveness (dependent variable) 5.1 Definition of Effectiveness According to Chambers Dictionary effective means to be “successful in producing a result” (Chambers 2006, 478). The American Webster’s College Dictionary as well as the British Concise Oxford English Dictionary refine this definition with the qualification “producing a desired or intended result” (Webster's 1991, 426; Soanes & Stevenson 2006, 456). What is regime effectiveness? Is it compliance with the regime rules? Is it the level of implementation of regulations stipulated by the regime? Is it the attainment of the goals stipulated in the regime rules? Is it the achievement of desired outcomes with the least costs? Is it the peaceful agreement between stakeholders with different preferences? Is it the achievement of values as fairness, justice, stewardship and equal participation? Or is a regime only effective if the quality of the environment is improved? Existing research projects juggle with at least a dozen different definitions so that PhD students are left with the “impression of profound confusion” in the field (Underdal 2004, 28). The same label is used for different meanings like efficiency, sustainability or equity. The study of regime effectiveness “lacks a common and precisely defined core“ that is used among scholars (Underdal 2004, 29). This book shares the assumption of Institutionalist and Cognitivist scholars that regimes can be effective.9 However, a “healthy skepticism regarding the ability of international institutions to solve environmental problems“ should also be kept in mind since by far not all regimes have proved to be beneficial to environmental protection (Keohane et al. 1993, 17). Every regime has an effect. In the worst case, regimes can have negative effects (Levy et al. 1993, 397). Four different effects of regimes can be distinguished: internal and external as well as direct and indirect effects (Mitchell 2002a, 508). Internal, or intended, effects refer to effects that occur inside the issue area in which they are embedded. They are part of the regime strategy. External, or unintended, effects are externalities that are unforeseen. External effects can be of substantial importance for regime performance. Direct effects are linked to the regime by short causal chains. Indirect regime effects occur via the interplay of causal chains and a number of intervening factors. All four types of effects can either be helpful to solve the problem or make it worse. To have an effect does not automatically mean to be effective. While regime effects encompass all types of effects, the study of regime effectiveness exclusively deals with intended effects. Therefore, 9

I concur with the statement “The debate about whether international regimes matter is essentially over” (Young 2004, 3).

5 Regime Effectiveness (dependent variable)

51

effectiveness is a subset of the broader category of regime effects. The heading “regime effects” summarizes questions of regime effectiveness, “intended and issue-area-specific outcomes of the regime”, and of regime consequences, “more general impacts of the regime, whether intended or unintended, issuearea specific or general” (Zürn 1998, 632). Different dimensions of effectiveness can be grouped in the threefold typology of output, outcome and impact following David Easton’s work (Easton 1965, 351-352). The study of outputs, which directs attention to matters like the promulgation of regulations designed to operationalize rules and the development of policy instruments intended to guide the behavior of key actors, appeals to lawyers and political scientists who are typically concerned with matters of implementation and compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). The analysis of outputs is relatively straightforward. However, it is also the least important dimension of the three (Young 2008, 19). Outcomes, by contrast, involve measurable changes in the behavior of regime members and those subject to their jurisdiction. Researchers whose intellectual roots lie in the behavioral sciences generally prefer to direct attention to the outcomes associated with regimes (Levy, Young, and Zürn 1995; Young 1999b). Impact characterizes the actual improvement of the environment. It is constructed as the “contributions regimes make to solving the problems that lead to their creation in the first place“ (Young 2004, 12-13). I also share the view of Miles et al. who define output, outcome and impact as subsequent stages in a causal chain, one leading to the next (Underdal 2002b, 6-7). For the further analysis I will cut down the dimensions of effectiveness into only two categories: Institutional and impact effectiveness. Institutional effectiveness encompasses Easton’s output and outcome category. Impact effectiveness covers Easton’s third category. Impact effectiveness refers to the actual improvement of the environment. Institutional effectiveness encompasses all factors of institutional setting that might lead to a change of behavior of involved actors. While solving the environmental problem is the ultimate goal of any regime in this field, behavioral change is the means to achieve this goal (Skaerseth et al. 2006, 105). However, “[i]f compliance and even behavioural modification is achieved it may not necessarily mean a great deal” (Vogler 2000, 175). Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) also share this insight. Even perfect compliance is not a sufficient condition for effectiveness (Underdal 2002b, 6).

52

III Regime Theory

5.2 Analytical Dimensions 5.2.1 Impact Effectiveness: Problem-solving Impact effectiveness is an indicator of real-world environmental improvement. Since regimes emerge in response to particular problems, effectiveness ultimately focuses on the degree to which a regime eliminates this problem. “Whatever the merits of studies that focus on implementation, compliance, and goal attainment, we are ultimately concerned with problem solving” (Young 1999b, 254). For the problem-solving dimension it is crucial to define the goals of the regime exactly. Is a specific problem to be solved entirely or mitigated to a certain degree? The status of the problem before the establishment of the regime has to be identified. Is there a change observable in the environmental problem that can be traced back to the regime? Problem-solving seeks to establish a causal relation between the regime and the biophysical environment. Therefore, the measurement of impact is crucial: “The biophysical environment is influenced by an almost uncountable number of factors” (Backer 2006, 9). The impact of a regime can be determined only in retrospect. Most of the time there are no sufficient data to be able to make statements on the improvement of the environments. Sometimes regimes motivate actors to take action, so that a regime appears effective, but actual problem-solving had little to do with the regime. Great caution is required when attempting to infer impact from data about output. Such problems are acknowledged by Keohane, Haas and Levy (1993, 7) who therefore suggest to “focus on observable political effects of institutions rather than directly on environmental impact”. 5.2.2 Institutional Effectiveness: Behavioral Change Institutional, or outcome, effectiveness refers to the creation of principles and norms through the regime. Example is the collection, systematization and dissemination of data on an environmental issue. Outcome effectiveness analyzes internal regime results. The degree to which contractual obligations are met, the achievement of outcomes with the least costs, the production of values such as fairness, justice, stewardship and participation are examples for institutional effectiveness. Conventionally, institutional effectiveness analyzes the structure of the regime (rules, procedures, compliance mechanisms, etc.). In this book not only the structure will be analyzed but also the given conditions that led to the creation of the regime. The constellation of involved actors’ interests and the shared understanding of the problem plus its solution are regarded as an import-

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

53

ant function of institutional effectiveness. One of the main regime functions is to approximate different interest constellations. Thus, institutional effectiveness refers to the regime’s capacity to induce behavioral change of involved actors (Young & Levy 1999, 1). Effective regimes can change the behavior of actors, their interests, the policies and performance of institutions. Behavioral changes are changes in the cognitive setting of the involved actors, mostly measured in the level of implementation and compliance of the regime’s rules and obligations. “International treaties and regimes have value if and only if they cause people to do things they would not otherwise do” (Mitchell 1994, 425). A change of behavior can best be observed in the level of compliance to the regime rules indicating the willingness of members to adjust their behavior to the recommendations of the regime. “Observance of rules is the most commonly used measure of regime effectiveness” (Vogler 2000, 166). Compliance is used as an indicator to describe changes in the cognitive settings of involved actors (Jacobson & Brown Weiss 2003, 1). “We use ‘compliance’ to describe those instances when an actor’s behavior conforms to an explicit rule of a treaty” (Chayes et al. 2003, 39). Compliance in international relations is the rule, noncompliance rather the exception (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992, 23; Mitchell 1994; Chayes et al. 2003, 40). States comply because of their broader concern with their reputation and their long-term interest in a rule-governed international system. Non-compliance can stem from the “calculated pursuit of self-interest” of actors; but most of the time non-compliance is due to the incapacity of national governments to adhere to and implement the rules (Vogler 2000, 169). Three types of behavior can be distinguished: compliant, non-compliant, and ambiguous (Chayes et al. 2003, 40). Once the type of behavior is identified the question is whether this type of behavior is treaty-induced or coincidental? People often consider compliance as binary – a state’s behavior either did or did not conform to regime rules; Young’s definition of “behavior-changing effectiveness” however urges us to consider not only treaty implementation and compliance, but also situations in which actors undertake positive behavioral change but fall short of full compliance, comply with the spirit but not the letter of the treaty, or undertake positive behavioral change that exceeds treaty-mandated standards (Mitchell 2001, 224). 6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables) Common problems need collective action. The coordination of collective action between states is difficult to realize. Actors’ interests might collide causing a collective action dilemma. Collective action dilemma means that by realizing

54

III Regime Theory

one actor’s interest, the realization of another actor’s interest is impeded (Schelling 1978). States’ willingness to engage in binding arrangements might not be high. Rational state actors may try to free-ride on institutional successes without paying the price for implementation and adaptation (Olson 1998 [1965]). Authors like Mancur Olson (1965), Garett Hardin (1968) and Elinor Ostrom (1990) have analyzed the potential of institutions to solve dilemmas of collective action. Regime theory is an attempt to examine the capacity of institutions to solve these kinds of problems. Research on regime creation asks the questions under what conditions regimes arise, how long the process of creation takes, and whether there are differences among international regimes (P. Haas et al. 1993; Young & Osherenko 1993; Rittberger 1995a)? The analysis of regime effectiveness has to answer two questions: do regimes matter and how does a regime become effective (P. Haas 1989; P. Haas et al. 1993; Young 1999a)? The main argument of regime theorists is that regimes have an independent impact on the behavior of actors (Bernauer 1995, 354). 6.1 Actors and the International System The international system is characterized by its anarchical structure. There is no monopoly of force in the international system. In the words of Keohane, Haas and Levy, ”world government is not around the corner“ (1993, 4). Under the premise of anarchy states are free to seek cooperation or not. State actors are conceptualized as equal actors. Although non-state actors might play a role in defining a state’s preference, states are still the main actors. Only states can create regimes. Especially in the setting of developing countries, civil society actors are very weak and mainly excluded from decision-making processes. States guard their sovereignty as a supreme value. Often, states are organized in an authoritarian political system that gathers all decision-making powers in the executive branch. States are rational actors that seek to maximize their gains and minimize their costs. Rationality means that states possess “consistent, ordered preferences, […] and calculate costs and benefits of these preferences” (Keohane 1984, 27). Each state tries to maximize its own utility function atomistically meaning that “their utility functions are independent of one another: they do not gain or lose utility simply because of the gains or losses of others” (Keohane 1984, 27). The modern, globalized world is characterized by a high level of interdependence and institutionalization. In many issue areas one state alone is not able to solve a problem. Only joint efforts can help to solve a problem. The potential choice of non-cooperation is becoming rare for states. Thus, regimes play a vital role, they matter (Bernauer 1995, 376). However, interna-

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

55

tional institutions are still far from being as relevant as domestic institutions are due to the strong effects of international anarchy. 6.2 Premises of Regime Creation Regimes arise because equal actors voluntarily agreed to establish a regime (Keohane 1983, 146). Regimes arise when “self-interested parties engaged in interactive decisionmaking approach a problem in contractarian terms and seek to coordinate their behavior to reap joint gains” (Young & Osherenko 1993, 11). Actors in the international system do not have access to perfect information. The search procedures for alternative solutions are limited and actors’ preferences vary. The world is highly complex, and ad hoc, individualistic calculations of interest cannot possibly provide the necessary level of coordination. Thus, it can make sense for states to seek cooperation. Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984) is a reply to the theory of hegemonic stability in that regimes arise not because of the power of hegemons but because there is an economic demand for the establishment for regimes since the international system is an “imperfect market”. States choose to cooperate with other states when the Pareto-optimal outcome of certain actions is not possible unilaterally, or in other words, states choose to create a regime if they cannot solve a problem on their own. Regimes have specific characteristics that can be conducive to joint problem-solving. The advantage of cooperation is a reduction of costs for all parties and an increase of gains for all. Keohane (1983, 154) summarizes that regimes are advantageous if they “improve the quantity and quality of information available to actors; or reduce other transaction costs”. Agreements function according to an ad hocistic mode, they involve high levels of uncertainty and high transaction costs (Keohane 1989, 108). Regimes create a legal framework that establishes liability for action. Only because of these shortcomings of agreements between states, there is a demand for the establishment of international regimes. Reiterated games and lengthening the shadow of the future, that means the anticipated consequences, increases the likelihood of cooperative solutions and explain the persistence of the regime and compliance with its injunctions (R. Axelrod & Keohane 1985). Regimes tend to be durable, since they make a reputation for rule-governed behavior a valued asset in future interactions. Modifications occur when a regime becomes dysfunctional. Once the advantage of a regime to solve a problem has been established, the central question is how to organize cooperation under the condition of international anarchy (Oye 1985). According to Oye (1985, 3/4), there are three strategies to achieve cooperation: altering payoff structures (moving payoffs to CC by for example bilateral issue-linkage or multilateral

56

III Regime Theory

institutionalization), enhancing reciprocity (iteration, shadow), keeping the number of players small. States confronting strategic situations that resemble single-play games are “constantly tempted by immediate gains from unilateral defection, and fearful of immediate losses from unrequited cooperation” (Oye 1985, 12). Axelrod (1984) argues that strategies of reciprocity have the effect of promoting cooperation by establishing a direct connection between an actor’s present behavior and anticipated future benefits. Cooperative behavior rests on calculations of expected utility. This may decrease as the number of involved actors increases. Main criticism on regime theory from the camp of Neorealism is the ignorance of relative gains (Grieco 1988). Indeed, regime theory is ambiguous in this regard. It is not entirely clear under what conditions states seek relative or absolute gains (summary of debate in: Baldwin 1993). Keohane and Martin (1995, 44) argue that the importance of relative gains is “conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favors offense or defense”. 6.3 Configuration and Interplay of Variables Table 7: Configuration of Scores for Different Regimes Effective Regime Mixed Regime

Problem structure Benign State of knowledge: good Benign / malign

Problem-solving capacity High Scores are intermediate or

Ineffective Regime

Malign State of knowledge: poor

Scores are a combination of positive + negative values Low

Source: bases roughly on Miles et al. 2002, 63+309.

My basic assumption is that different configurations of the two variables, problem structure and problem-solving capacity, will lead to different stages of regime effectiveness. Table 7 summarizes the specific assumptions connected to the two variables, based upon the work of Edward Miles et al. (2002). Problem structure and problem-solving capacity are not mutually independent factors, there is a strong interplay between these variables (Underdal 2002b, 14). Negatively correlated interests can favor consensual decision-making rules or influence distributional procedures of the established regime. Also, positive learning processes in the regime and trust-building successes can transform malignly perceived problems into benign ones. The variable of problem-solving capacity

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

57

is usually seen as the more interesting one for social science analysis since it can be “deliberately manipulated by decision makers” whereas the type of problem is a rather static variable (Underdal 2002b, 3). Problem-solving capacity is furthermore interesting because there is much controversy about determinants of capacity to solve environmental problems. Many case studies have distilled determinants that might be working, but there is no crosscutting agreement among the scientific community. In contrast, much is known about what factors contribute to problem malignancy. Actors’ interests, their perceived costs and benefits of cooperation are strong and determining factors of their position towards bargaining and regime forming. 6.4 Variable 1: Problem Structure 6.4.1 Benign and Malign Problems The first determinant for regime creation and effectiveness is the problem structure and the consequences resulting from it. Ideally, the stakeholder countries share a common understanding of the problem, its causes and suitable solution approaches. Such a benign problem constellation would at best require some efforts of coordination among actors in order to reach a common goal. However, many environmental problems are extremely complex and require in-depth scientific understanding (Levy et al. 1993, 410). If problems are very intricate and complicated, more intellectual capital and energy are needed for solution finding. Knowledge about the problem needs to be created, gathered and analyzed. Problem causes are often multicausal and propositions for specific solutions are diverging. Sometimes it is not even clear whether there is a solution to a problem at all. The international system only provides imperfect information between actors that stimulates uncertainty and mistrust. High degrees of uncertainty about the problem, especially about the potential costs to solve it, might be a hindrance of cooperation. On the other hand, uncertainty about potential future risks without a regime might also be supportive of regime creation (Zürn 1998, 630). It is assumed that the thicker the veil of uncertainty, the easier it will be for parties to approach the problem under consideration as an integrative exercise and the more likely a cooperative outcome will be (Zürn 1998, 629). Uncertainty makes fixed preferences impossible. Although uncertainty might be an important factor, states try to calculate or estimate their risks of cooperating and of not cooperating. Each stakeholder state develops its own position towards the goals and conditions of cooperation. The constellation of interests of all participating actors is important since different constellations influence the likelihood

58

III Regime Theory

of success and determine the role of other factors. Governments must show a sufficient degree of concern for the problem at stake so that states will decide to devote resources. If all involved actors have congruent positions on how to solve a problem the chances for regime creation and effectiveness are rather high. However, most of the time actors have diverging positions. If there is a high number of stakeholders and heterogeneity of their preferences actors’ interests are negatively correlated causing a collective action dilemma. Miles et al. divide the political nature of the environmental problem into the two categories benign and malign problems. In benign problems actors’ interests correlate positively with each other. In contrast, if problems are malign interests collide and costs and benefits of the problem solution are asymmetrical. In reality, high complexity of environmental problems and political malignancy often interact (Underdal 2002b, 16). Malignancy is aggravated if cleavages among the actors are cumulative rather than cross-cutting. In cumulative cleavages regime members have consistent positions “so that those who stand to win (or lose) on one dimension also come out as winners (or losers) on the other dimensions as well“ (Underdal 2002b, 19/20). However, “Regimes can have a fair amount of success in dealing also with malign problems“ (Underdal 2002a, 435). To achieve effectiveness, malign problems need to be tackled with a regime of high problemsolving capacity or with special incentives for cooperative behavior like issuelinkages or financial aids. Table 8: Characteristics of Malign and Benign Problems Malign

Benign

Incongruity (in particular relationships of

Coordination (synergy or contingency rela-

competition)

tionships)

Asymmetry

Symmetry or indeterminate distribution

Cumulative cleavages

Crosscutting cleavages

Source: Underdal 2002a, 21.

6.4.2 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs According to Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994, 80) there are four possible positions for states: pushers, intermediates, draggers, and bystanders. Victim countries push for joint regulation among all stakeholders. Intermediates have incentives to participate in a regime but are not willing to shoulder the costs, draggers oppose joint regulations, and bystanders have little ecological interest but take more ambitious positions than draggers because of the low costs of abatement. In a small regional setting like the Southeast Asian one (ten countries) only a

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

59

small number of states can participate in a regime. Therefore, the constellation of different positions among the involved nations is of utmost importance. If, for example, only three countries are involved in an environmental problem and one is a pusher and another country is a dragger, no matter the category of the third country, regime creation is unlikely. These positions result from two factors: vulnerability and abatement costs. Vulnerability characterizes the degree to which states are affected negatively by environmental problems. The uneven distribution of environmental vulnerability is a main obstacle to cooperation efforts (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992, 42). Costs describe the efforts needed for a country to abate negative consequences and thus to fulfill the provisions of a regime. It is assumed that countries weigh their costs and benefits from the regime. Regime creation becomes more unlikely the higher the expected costs for a state are. Basically, states are skeptical about cooperation, because it entails a reliance on other states and their adherence to regime provisions. “Governments always need to compare the risks they run by being outside a regime with the risks they run by being within one” (Keohane 1989, 122). States overcome this hesitation if the expected gains from a regime exceed the expected costs. This reduces uncertainties about the positive impact. States calculate their costs and benefits on the basis of the state’s preferences and capacity. States are more inclined to participate in environmental protection when the costs of compliance are relatively minor. A country’s capacity to abate environmental problems influences its propensity to seek international environmental regulation. The greater the expected costs, “the more reluctant a country should be to support international regulations (other factors being equal)” (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994, 80). States are not equally affected by environmental problems: some countries are victims of environmental damage, others are producers of damage, and some countries are both. A country’s individual position towards a specific environmental problem defines the country’s preference towards problem-solving. This position results from a country’s capacity and willingness to abate environmental problems. In general, environmental protection is a costly matter. From a short-term perspective abatement costs exceed the benefits from protection. Sustainable environmental protection only unfolds its (economic) benefits in the long run. The problem of time lag between necessary costs and usable benefits impedes countries’ willingness to engage in regimes. “Negotiations must be convened, policies agreed to, and treaties formally ratified by governments – and by enough governments so that the treaty can enter into force and be effective, treaty implementation initiated, and policy implemented effectively over a long enough period of time to impact the environmental problem” (Downie 2005, 73).

60

III Regime Theory

National interests are a resultant from domestic bargaining processes (Moravcsik 1997). Keohane, Haas and Levy have empirically substantiated that major source of decision-making derive from “variations in the degree of political pressure brought to bear on the issue by governments responding to domestic political agitation” (Keohane et al. 1993, 14). In non-Western non-democracies such two-level games can typically not be observed. However, here, a different domestic constraint is important. In (Western) democracies regime effectiveness is also determined by domestic constraints. National governments are not entirely free to formulate policy positions. “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain independent, yet sovereign” (Putnam 1988, 434).

Factors typical for the developing world (to which Southeast Asia belongs) like limited state budgets and a lack of skilled personnel impede the realization of benefits by skyrocketing the costs. Even if countries are willing to comply with a regime and implement its resolutions, they may not possess the material, personnel, or intellectual capacity to implement (Young 1992; Mitchell 2002a, 509; Jacobson & Brown Weiss 2003, 10). States must possess the scientific, political, economic, and administrative capacity to understand the threat; participate in creating the global regime; and then implement and ensure compliance with the regime’s principles, norms, and rules. Country-specific factors such as the wealth of a country, the domestic institutional structure, and the political strength of environmental non-state actors vis-à-vis major polluting industries influence the degree of regime effectiveness (P. Haas 1990, 58; Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992, 30). The domestic capacity of weak governments to comply with an agreement can be strengthened via a transfer of technical assistance and general aid (Neumayer 2001, 132). Keohane and Marc Levy have edited a volume dedicated to the analysis of financial transfer possibilities to less developed countries in order to enhance environmental protection. Their empirical findings show that environmental degradation especially takes place in less developed countries. These countries need what the authors call financial transfer institutions for the environment that are defined as “sets of rules, typically linked to one or more international organizations, established to govern a flow of funds from richer to poorer countries to achieve specific environmental purposes” (Keohane 1996, 5). However, the establishment of such institutions of financial transfers is extremely difficult. Moreover, the environmental problem

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

61

might be the result of a highly important economic activity of a state. If the state’s economy is dependent on the conduction of this activity it is highly unlikely for a regime to become effective. Regime effectiveness would then be equal to economic ruin (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994, 78). Especially economic constellations in developing countries might fall under this category. Here, state economies are often based on few pillars. Mostly, these states rely on the exploitation and export of natural resources. The demand for natural resources is growing immensely worldwide. Countries in developing countries both profit from exporting goods and also suffer from non-sustainable exploitation. Figure 1:

Possible State Positions

Abatement costs

Vulnerability Low

High

Low

Bystanders

Pushers

High

Draggers

Intermediates

Source: Sprinz & Vaahtoranta 1994, 81.

6.4.3 Game-theoretical Constellations In order to understand the collective behavioral dynamics of regime creation and effectiveness the different state positions in every attempt to establish a regime have to be put into relation with each other. Only by establishing this relational link we can make assumption about the consequences of having a certain number and quality of “pusher”, “dragger” and other countries. Game theory can be used to examine patterns of collective action in that it models the constellation of actors’ interests and resulting behavioral options. Game theory has been used to explain how cooperation can evolve under anarchic conditions that lack supranational authority to enforce compliance (on game theory in International Relations: Snidal 1985a). One of the major contributions of game theory is the explanation of conditions under which regimes might arise as an instance of cooperative behavior, and it can also suggest the conditions conductive to stable compliance (Haggard & Simmons 1987, 504; Neumayer 2001, 123/124). Core assumptions of game theoretical approaches are that all aspects of decisionmaking can be captured by utility-relevant costs and benefits; all actors maximize a utility function; actors decide rationally, taking into account all available information; there is a unitary actor; and that the unitary actor is faced with a well-specified payoff matrix. In game theory there are two different strategies: cooperation or defection. Given two players there are four different combi-

62

III Regime Theory

nations: mutual cooperation (CC), mutual defection (DD), unilateral defection (DC), and unrequited cooperation (CD). Domestic processes affecting payoff structures, as mentioned previously, are blackboxed as exogenous. This has been criticized as missing an important determinant of regime effectiveness (Kydd & Snidal 1995, 113). Critics also argue that the rational actor assumption is inappropriate because coherent pursuit of a unitary national purpose is often thwarted by domestic interests. The ”two-level game“ approach of Putnam and others is a way to apply game theory consistently with the impact of domestic politics (Putnam 1988). The so-called situation-structural approach tries to model actors’ constellations in situations in which actors’ positions interfere with each other causing a collective action dilemma (Rittberger & Zürn 1991, 173; Zürn 1992). Elsewhere this approach is labeled game-theoretic (Haggard/Simmons) or interest-based (Osherenko & Young; Sprinz & Vaahtoranta). The situation-structural approach presupposes the ubiquity of conflict in international politics. Conflict is defined as a situation in which ”two or more actors pursue incompatible goals or choose different forms of behavior in a conflict situation“ (Rittberger & Zürn 1991, 166). The outcomes of conflict situations can be predicted by modeling payoff structures. “The structure of the situation has to be determined by the analyst by providing answers to three questions: (1) Who are the most important actors in the issue area? (2) Which behavioral options do these actors perceive for themselves? (3) Which outcomes from among a larger set do the actors prefer?“ (Rittberger & Zürn 1991, 181 fn 12).

According to Rittberger and Zürn (1990, 1991), three types of situations are relevant for conflict management: Rambo games, dilemma games, and coordination games. First, in a Rambo game non-cooperative behavior is preferred by at least one actor. The Rambo game is a special case of a so-called deadlock game. Not all actors’ interests might be equally important. As Weiss and Jacobson have argued, regime effectiveness is partly determined by characteristics peculiar to individual state parties if these state parties are in some way important or even dominant actors with regards to the solution of the problem (Jacobson & Brown Weiss 2003). A regime might be helpless to act in case that one dominant state actor is not consenting to the rules. Regime creation and effectiveness are completely dependent on the Rambo player (Rittberger 1995b, 1718). A Rambo state can dominate the negotiation process, dictate the rules to be adopted or even has the freedom to neglect all rules without facing serious negative consequences. A Rambo position might result from large asymmetries in power and material capabilities among the stakeholder states. Two behavioral options are possible: to balance against the Rambo or to approach the Rambo

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

63

state by making concessions. The Rambo player can afford not to cooperate and still get his most favored outcome. Second, in dilemma games cooperation might be the collectively optimal outcome. However, actors still have an incentive to defect because of information scarcity and uncertainty. Therefore, it is likely that actors choose the sub-optimal outcome of mutual non-cooperation. The so-called „Prisoners’ Dilemma“ is the classic game-theoretic example of this type in which there is a need to coordinate behavior to achieve optimal outcomes (Stein 1983, 121-123; R. Axelrod 1984, 7). In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, each state prefers mutual cooperation to mutual non-cooperation (CC>DD), but also successful cheating to mutual cooperation (DC>CC) and mutual defection to victimization by another’s cheating (DD>CD). This results in the following preference structure leading to a sub-optimal outcome: DC>CC>DD>CD. In dilemma situations the collective optimum is not a Nash equilibrium and is thus inherently unstable. A Nash equilibrium is an outcome from which no actor has an incentive to deviate provided no one else deviates. There are incentives for both actors to deviate from the collective optimum, although both will lose if they follow these incentives. Figure 2:

Payoff Structure in Prisoners’ Dilemma State B

State A

C

D

C

3, 3

1, 4

D

4, 1

2, 2

Source: Snidal 1985, 927.

The solution for the dilemma game is the establishment of mutual trust by iterating the game, in other words by establishing a secure institutional setting that will sanction cheating. In dilemma situations regime creation is likely if exogenous factors exert a favorable influence (benign problem structure, density of transactions, normative-institutional environment, number of actors). Only when actors will rely on the non-defection of other actors they will also choose to cooperate. That means that actors need to engage in confidence-building activities in the form of reciprocity or changed beliefs to overcome mistrust and enhance regime creation (R. Axelrod & Keohane 1985, 250; Kydd & Snidal 1995, 116-117; Rittberger 1995b, 17). This might take a while: “In dilemma-type situations international regimes are most often established only after a lengthy process of interaction characterized by ‘tit-for-tat’ strategies on both sides” (Rittberger & Zürn 1991, 173). In the coordination game, there are no preferences for cooperation or non-cooperation applicable for all actors like in the

64

III Regime Theory

Prisoner’s Dilemma. The opposite applies: The involved actors have opposing preferences. Some actors favor cooperation while others prefer non-cooperation. Thus, there are always two possible preference structures in these games: CC>DD>CD>DC and DD>CC>DC>CD. It becomes clear that there is no optimal solution for this game since the preference structures are opposing. The collective action problem is that neither state can choose its best policy without knowing what the other intends to do, but there is no obvious point at which to coordinate. Figure 3:

Payoff Structure in Coordination Game State B C

State A

D

C

4, 3

2, 2

D

1, 1

3, 4

Source: Snidal 1985, 932.

There is no solution that would accommodate the preferences of all actors (CC and DD are not compatible). Thus, a new solution has to be crafted in which all actors have to make concessions. Processes of common harmonization are typical (List & Rittberger 1992, 99). If harmonization is successful the payoffs are Pareto optimal constituting a Nash equilibrium. In that case (cooperation is achieved) there is no need for enforcement because neither state has any incentive to depart from the coordination point. Coordination of behavior may also be necessary in situations characterized by perfect harmony of interests out of three reasons: there may be more than one collective optimum, there may be multiple routes leading to a collective optimum, or the complexity of the problems is so high that contradictory decisions might be made by mistake (Underdal 2002b, 20). Payoff structures may be perceived differently among states due to uncertainty and complexity which may lead to hesitation towards cooperation or even free-riding according to Downie (2005, 74). 6.5 Variable 2: Problem-Solving Capacity The institutional setting of a regime is the second important determinant for regime effectiveness. Institutions are significant with regard to individual and collective behavior (Young 1992, 160). Institutions are more than static frameworks for action, they are actors in their own right that deliver independent input to the regime. The more a regime possesses actor capacity the bigger its in-

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

65

stitutional effectiveness. Institutions as actors need a minimum of coherence, autonomy, resources, and external activity in order to function (Underdal 2002b, 27). Institutional features vary among international regimes which results in different levels of effectiveness (Underdal 2002b, 23). Different regimes require different designs. One size does not fit all. However, there are some parameters of regime design that all regimes need to enforce effectiveness. Three different variables are selected to analyze the problem-solving capacity of a regime: compliance mechanisms, mandate and resources, and procedural rules. 6.5.1 Compliance Mechanisms Compliance means that actors’ behavior conforms to an explicit rule of a treaty (Chayes et al. 2003, 39). Compliance is not automatically caused by the treaty’s rules about it. Compliance and non-compliance can both be treaty-induced and externally-induced. The main question is what kind of compliance mechanisms does a regime need in order to strengthen compliance (Zürn 1998; Jacobson & Brown Weiss 2003)? The choice of specific compliance mechanisms depends on the detailed nature of the regime. General declarations can be useful for generating a broad base of acceptance (momentum) but their necessarily vague and general language makes it difficult to assess the subsequent record of states and to enforce compliance (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992, 25). Explicit mechanisms and detailed sanctions can hinder cooperation but on the other hand, wellchosen compliance mechanisms can enforce implementation, monitoring and thus effectiveness. Regimes engage in monitoring and promote reevaluation of state interests (Levy et al. 1993, 398). It is more effective to coerce compliance than to deter violation (Mitchell 1994, 454). Monitoring of efforts can make a big difference in effectiveness as Keohane, Haas and Levy (1993, 16) have substantiated in their collection of case studies. Chayes and Chayes (1993, 176), pioneers of compliance research, argue that ”compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of interests“. In 1995, they developed a framework of managerial compliance that is opposed to the more traditional enforcement of sanctions approach. In a later publication (2003, 41) the authors iterate their claim that the concentration of sanctions for violations is basically “a waste of time“. Basic assumption of the managerial approach is that all involved states are engaged in a common enterprise and there is a general willingness to solve a problem (Chayes et al. 2003, 49). Of course, non-complying behavior can be a result of a calculation of costs and benefits as Neorealists argue. Sometimes states enter into an agreement to appease a domestic or international constituency but have

66

III Regime Theory

little intention to comply with the treaty’s provisions (Chayes & Chayes 1993, 187; Schimmelfennig created the term rhetorical action for this kind of strategy Schimmelfennig 2001). However, this is the exception not the rule. Basic knowledge of international law is that ”almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time“ (Henkin 1979, 47). ”We believe deliberate treaty violations are the dramatic, but rare, exceptions rather than the rule“ (Chayes et al. 2003, 41). According to Chayes and Chayes (1993, 188), non-complying behavior has three root causes: ambiguity and indeterminancy of treaty language, limitations on the capacity of parties to carry out their undertakings, and the temporal dimension (necessary transition periods) of the social and economic changes contemplated by regulatory treaties. Especially in developing countries scientific, technical, bureaucratic and financial scarcities hinder compliance (Chayes & Chayes 1993, 194). According to the so-called managerial school (Chayes / Chayes, Mitchell, Young) strategies to solve problems of non-compliance are improved dispute resolution procedures, technical and financial assistance, and increased transparency. Stronger sanctions are not seen as a solution. Other scholars are skeptical about the optimistic views of the managerial school. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996, 380) argue that “most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement”. Thus, compliance is the rule in many cases. But whether the regime itself has actually contributed to the level of compliance is totally open. When high compliance rates occur, they are attributed to shallow treaties that involve little “depth of cooperation” (Downs et al. 1996, 383). Therefore, compliance research should also keep its focus on the design of potent sanctions for noncompliance. The level of compliance also depends upon the transparency of regime rules and procedures (Mitchell 1994, 445; Chayes et al. 2003, 43). Transparency means “fostering the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of regular, prompt, and accurate regime-relevant information” (Mitchell 1998, 109). Transparency varies in degree across regimes, within regimes, and over time. Transparency can lead to public pressure. Transparency in the form of naming and shaming is increasingly being used as a sanction for non-compliance. Transparency permits actors to coordinate their behavior, it reassures actors and it deters actors contemplating non-compliance, in short, transparency is “crucial for the effectiveness of international regimes” (Mitchell 1998, 109; Chayes et al. 2003, 43; Jacobson & Brown Weiss 2003, 10). Yet many regimes fail to create high levels of transparency: governments and non-governmental actors regularly fail to monitor or report on their own behavior, the behavior of other actors, or the state of the problem these regimes seek to resolve. “Transparency is manipula-

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

67

ble via the regime’s information system – the actors, rules, and processes by which the regime collects, analyzes, and disseminates information” (Mitchell 1998, 110). Often, this transparency is not given, either because of shortcomings of the regime or of unwillingness to provide by relevant actors. Regimes can increase transparency by enhancing the incentives and capacity actors have to contribute to a particular regime’s transparency (Young 1992). Jacobson and Brown Weiss (2003, 543) create the phrase “sunshine methods” as a strategy to enhance transparency by bringing the behavior of parties into the open for appropriate scrutiny of reports, publications and other regime outputs, and by involving the local community. The level of compliance also depends on the nature of the regime rules. Non-binding soft law obligations can strengthen compliance. Usually, soft and hard law is discussed separately or is presented as an evolutionary process from soft to hard law (Abbott & Snidal 2000). In the environmental realm most treaties are rather soft (Bodansky 2001, 203). Soft law can be defined as “international norms that are deliberately non-binding in character but still have legal relevance, located in the twilight between law and politics” (Skaerseth et al. 2006, 104). In fact, soft law is not a true form of law (Birnie 1992, 53). Examples are resolutions by international organizations; international plans of action, or codes of conduct. Hard law consists of legally binding obligations. Hard law is defined by a certain degree of precision and delegation of authority to third parties for interpreting and implementing the law (Abbott & Snidal 2000). Studies have substantiated that non-binding institutions often perform better because they are more flexible and less prone to raise concerns about noncompliance (Underdal 1980). Advantage of soft law is obviously that no domestic ratification is necessary. Soft law regimes can facilitate and encourage cooperation instead of sanctioning of violators. It is easier to reach agreements on substantively ambitious soft law due to its “greater flexibility” with respect to governmental participation, decision-making processes and sectoral reach (Skaerseth et al. 2006, 118). It is not true that binding rules are negotiated more thoroughly, involve more credible commitments, and are often accompanied by more stringent procedures for verification, review, and response. However, nonbinding soft law requires “high-level political engagement and special institutions that review and focus on national performance” (Victor 2006, 97). 6.5.2 Available Resources The level of regime effectiveness is influenced by the material endowment of the regime. How many resources are dedicated to the regime and the fulfillment

68

III Regime Theory

of its provisions? Are there enough skilled personnel to develop solutions and make propositions? Does the regime have the financial assets to become active on its own, design programs and projects to implement policies? The presence of skilled personnel is not a constant variable, it grows with time; thus, regimes tend to become more effective over time given a sufficient resource base and mandate. Skilled personnel can lead to more effective results and thus strengthen the actor capacity of the regime. Successful projects may lead to the reproduction of it and the reinvestment of funds. Thus, an investment in a regime’s resources will pay back with time. 6.5.3 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity In International Relations it is common to use consensus as the default decisionmaking procedure. This enhances the chances to reach agreements since states to not feel antagonized. However, since the consensus rule provides each regime party with a strong veto instrument, this rule may lead to the “law of the least ambitious party” (Underdal 1980, 1998) meaning that “collective action will be limited to those measures that are acceptable to the least enthusiastic party“ (Underdal 2002b, 25). In problem constellations in which the interests of actors collide (malign problems) consensus rules may make agreement between parties impossible. Regimes might remain superficial or declaratory only. In contrast, majority rules may lead to more ambitious regulations (Breitmeier et al. 2006, 114-115). However, decisions may only be accomplished “at the cost of sacrificing the interests of significant actors“ (Underdal 2002b, 26). Research within the framework of the International Regimes Database (2006) has found out that consensus decision-making procedures do not always result in the law of the least ambitious, making the assumptions for me more ambiguous: “A number of regimes that rely on consensus (e.g., the regime for the protection of stratospheric ozone) have performed well in terms of the criterion of problem solving; even the use of a unanimity rule (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty System) turns out to be compatible with problem solving under some conditions“ (Young 2008, 23).

Regime effectiveness is also determined by the allocation of benefits and resources. Case research has substantiated that allocation and distribution need to be realized in an equitable manner among all regime participants (Young & Osherenko 1993; Zürn 1998). Also it has been shown that countries often pay overwhelming attention to clearly perceivable distributional issues and are only a little concerned about the rather abstract notion of Pareto-efficiency that dominates economic reasoning (Neumayer 2001, 131). Complicated formulas for

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

69

the allocation of the burden of abatement, that can theoretically achieve efficiency, are “hopelessly unrealistic and would never be agreed upon in real negotiations” (Neumayer 2001, 133). Regime effectiveness also depends on the level of competencies that states put into the hands of a regime. Does the regime have its own decision-making capacity for important matters? 6.6 Alternative Theoretical Approaches 6.6.1 Relative Gains and Hegemonic Power Until the 1980s, the dominant theory of international relations was Realism. Realism derives from the philosophical ideas of mainly Thucydides, Machiavelli (1532) and Hobbes (1651). In his classic book on Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau (1985 [1948], 16, 25) attempts “to detect and understand the forces that determine political relations among nations” and to find out what a program of action for world peace must be like. International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power, which is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience. Morgenthau contends that all politics, domestic and international, is focused on keeping, increasing or demonstrating power (Morgenthau 1985 [1948], 42). The theory of Realism was reformulated as Neorealism in the 1970s by Kenneth Waltz and others. Neorealism shares core premises of Realism; but the crucial difference is the focus on the anarchical structure of the international system instead of the nature of mankind. According to Neorealism the international system consists of functionally symmetrical, power-maximizing states. The position of states is determined by the distribution of material capabilities. State preferences derive directly from the anarchic structure of the international system. Since there is no central authority, the world is a self-help system in which states regard each other as potential threats (Jervis 1978, 167). Thus, the fundamental problem of world politics is that of uncertainty about the behavior of other states (Waltz 1979). According to Neorealist thinking states seek at a minimum “their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz 1979, 118). It is only rational for each state to mistrust each other and to avoid binding cooperation. There is “little room for trust” among states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 11). Given Neorealism’s understanding of anarchy, that there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, it is argued that not well-being of states is the key interest but survival (Grieco 1988, 498; Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 10). States are caught in a security dilemma which Jervis defines as the “means by which a

70

III Regime Theory

state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others” (Jervis 1978, 169). All politics is a zero-sum game in which states aim to maximize their gains relative to the gains of their opponents. The possibilities for cooperation are small, and regimes are expected to be weak. Conflict is the dominating variable, not cooperation. “Adherents of a structural realist orientation see regimes as a phenomenon whose presence cannot be assumed and whose existence requires careful explanation” (Krasner 1983a, 10). Cooperation among states has strong limits, mainly it is constrained by “the dominating logic of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate” (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 9). Neorealists contend that institutions are insignificant compared to states, that existing institutions (like the UN) are weak, and that powerful states dominate organizations. Regimes, according to Waltz, are only an unimportant shadow of the underlying power capabilities that sustain them (Waltz 1979, chap. 5, 6). Neorealists maintain that “institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior” (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 7).

Institutionalists overestimate the power of institutions only because they misconstrue anarchy and its consequences. Basically, they construct actors as atomistic who fear nothing more than cheating. If institutions can overcome this fear, cooperation can help to solve problems. This assumption is simply wrong. Grieco (1998, 487) argues that states are positional and worry about other states’ gains much more than about their own. The relative gains problem will “eschew cooperation even though participation in the arrangement was providing it [state party, HL], or would have provided it, with large absolute gains” (Grieco 1988, 499). The key determinant of regime creation is the distribution of power. Within Neorealist theory, regime creation is explained by the theory of hegemonic stability in that power concentration in one dominant state leads to strong regimes, and fragmentation of power leads to regime collapse (Waltz 1979; Keohane 1980; Krasner 1983a; Keohane & Nye 2001 [1977]). The theory of hegemonic stability links regime creation and maintenance to a dominant power’s existence and the weakening of regimes to a waning hegemon. “The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it” (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 13). Core premise is that the anarchic structure of the international system pushes the emergence of a hegemonic power to serve as a quasi-authority. The theory of hegemonic stability says that power concentration in one dominant state leads to regimes. The degree of international cooperation is directly proportional to the degree to which one actor dominates international politics. It is

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

71

assumed that a bipolar distribution of power and also a relatively symmetrical power distribution are enhancing factors for regime creation. Gilpin even regards the existence of a hegemonic power as the necessary condition for regime creation. Hegemony is grounded on the “capacity of the hegemon’s economy to respond flexible to international market shifts” (1987, 77). There are two strands of the theory. One strand sees the hegemon as a benign force, the other constructs hegemony as a coercive form of rule. Charles Kindleberger contended in 1973 that the maintenance of free trade requires a “benevolent despot” to provide certain institutional public goods. Thus, the hegemon not only enforces a stable global order for its own benefits, much more, the existence of hegemonic power will benefit all and especially the weaker members of the international system (Snidal 1985b, 582). Thus, other states will welcome leadership and seek to take a free-ride on it. Political power can be used to secure optimal outcomes for the system as a whole and as a service of the public good for example in the form of state interventions. This version is based on a presumption that many cases of international cooperation are positive-sum games, and that all states may benefit from cooperation, even though they are leery about initially participating, out of fear of non-reciprocity (Keohane 1980; Kindleberger 1981; Krasner 1983a). The coercive strand argues that hegemony is used by the hegemon to promote its own interests. Regimes arise when power is used to enhance the values of specific actors within the system and increase individual payoffs. This version regards all international relations as being inherently conflictual because all states seek to gain control over other states (Gilpin 1975). In both cases does the demise of a hegemon lead to regime collapse. It suggests that “under conditions of declining hegemony there will be a weakening of the regimes” and vice versa (Krasner 1983a, 15). For my Southeast Asian cases I claim that the theory of hegemonic stability is not of explanatory power. In Southeast Asia there are no clear hegemonic powers. The eleven states belonging to the region are either small or internally weak. Moreover, as argued before all cooperative behavior in the region is characterized by consensual decisions and the strict adherence to the rule of unanimity. Statehood in Southeast Asia is rather young and the scars of colonial external domination are still visible. Aversion against any form of influencing another country is a pillar of foreign policy behavior of these states. Thus, a state that aims to fulfill the role of a regional hegemon would be treated with high skepticism and probably be isolated and balanced against. In this scenario, the transformation of one state to a hegemon is very unlikely. Neorealist thinking has been criticized heavily for its definition of regimes as epiphenomenal. In many cases it has been shown that changes in power structures of states have not led to changes in international regimes (Keohane 1989,

72

III Regime Theory

101). As a consequence, some Neorealists began to acknowledge that under circumstances that are not purely conflictual, where individual decision making leads to suboptimal outcomes, regimes may be significant (Krasner 1983a, 9). For security-related issues, however, Neorealists adhere to their position that regimes do not play a role. This has been heavily criticized by instiutionalists and tested negatively in empirical studies (R. Axelrod & Keohane 1985, 227). The question nowadays however is, whether environmental threats develop in a way that is security relevant for states or not? 6.6.2 Learning Effects and Epistemic Communities Cognitive approaches in International Relations do not share the positivistic, rationalistic epistemology of Neorealist and Institutionalist theories. Cognitivism challenges the logic that anarchy makes states “like-units” and forces states into the state of self-help and competition for survival. Also, Cognitivism asserts that, cooperation is not guaranteed when the games among self-interested actors are iterated, but when other practices redefine the agents’ interests themselves. According to Cognitivism, actors do not have fixed exogenous preferences but rather endogenous, dynamic variable preferences which result from knowledge, beliefs, learning processes and perception (P. Haas 1990, 68). While behavior in rationalistic theories is driven by utilitarian calculations according to the so-called logic of consequentialism, it is the logic of appropriateness that is applied here (March & Olsen 1998). The behavior of actors in the international system is driven by normative commitments. Further, it is assumed that reality is not a fact but a construction: “Reality is not directly accessible, and our interpretation of events is processed through filters, including those of prior experience and expectations” (P. Haas 1990, 52). Meaning is attributed to material structures only by “the social context through which they are interpreted” (Checkel 1998, 326). In Cognitivism, the interaction between agents and structure is made central. They are mutually constitutive (Checkel 1998, 326). Alexander Wendt, one of the most prominent scholars in this tradition considers the international system as a social construction. Wendt acknowledges the existence and importance of anarchy in the international system. However, in contrast to Kenneth Waltz’ Neorealist theory, Wendt (1992) completely changes the meaning of anarchy: “Anarchy is what states make of it”. Wendt introduced shared ideas and knowledge as independent variables offered a totally different explanation. Wendt argues that (1) the character of international life is determined by the beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures, (2) not only state beha-

6 Theoretical Assumptions (independent variables)

73

viors but also states identities and interests are constructed by the international system, (3) unlike a single logic of anarchy resulting in the “self-help” states system, there is no inherent logic of anarchy because what gives anarchy meanings are the kinds of agents who interact there and the structure of their relationships, which depends on the discursive social practices that reproduce or transform each agent’s view of Self and Other, (4) processes of interaction can reproduce and transform systemic structures, especially by way of cultural change which involves the emergence of new forms of collective identity. Power and interest have to be reclaimed from materialism by showing how their content and meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. Cooperation is determined by perception and misperception, the capacity to process information, and learning. Knowledge, beliefs and ideology, including the knowledge provided by regimes, can alter actor interests. Knowledge can transcend ideological cleavage lines. Ernst Haas (1980, 367/368) defines the importance of knowledge to “serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal”. Knowledge and values not only affect power and operate as determinants of interests, they also play a more direct role in regime creation (Young & Osherenko 1993, 19). Knowledge lays the foundation of a shared understanding of the specific problem, its causes and possible solutions. Thus, a scientific and political consensus enhances the probability of regime creation and effectiveness (Levy et al. 1993, 422). Production, diffusion, and institutionalization of scientific knowledge are important steps to enforce the effectiveness of international environmental regimes (Jasanoff 2003). Cognitivists see knowledge underpinning all action – even how states perceive each other is shaped by a web of meaning. Cognitivism focuses on the way policy makers understand themselves, one another, and the issues they face, and the way those understandings evolve through interaction and learning. State policy makers are highly motivated, active learners, consciously seeking out expert advice and using it to help navigate around uncertainties in their environments. Cognitivism opens the blackbox of the state and analyzes different actors. NGOs play an increasingly prominent role in international institutions, “participating in many activities – negotiation, monitoring, and implementation – traditionally reserved to states” (Raustiala 1997, 719). The increasing influence of non-state actors on international politics has been studied intensively (seminal research: Princen & Finger 1994). Cognitivists argue that epistemic communities affect agendas and lead to regime creation (Ruggie 1975). “An epistemic community is a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values” (P. Haas 1990, 55).

74

III Regime Theory

Transnational beliefs are enabled through communication that fosters international regimes. Knowledge-based groups have a strong influence on actors’ preference because international politics is increasingly complex and interdependent. Advances in science and technology make it hard for political decisionmakers to make the right decision. Thus, Cognitivism aims to analyze the effects of experts and knowledge-based communities on governmental learning and the development of new state objectives (P. Haas 1990, 52). Since regimes mainly arise under conditions of uncertainty, epistemic communities mainly create shared understanding of problems, their origin and possible solutions (P. Haas 1992). Epistemic communities are significant forces not only in creating the shared understanding but also in communicating this understanding to relevant policy makers. Epistemic communities and networks help to diffuse information and trigger decision-making processes (Raustiala 1997, 726). They help to identify the national interest (P. Haas 1992). 7 Hypotheses - Overview H1

Transnational environmental problems are conflictual in that actors’ interests are negatively correlated causing dilemmas of collective action that result in low effectiveness. [benign and malign problems]

H2

If countries are affected negatively by environmental damage they push for regime creation; however only under the condition that the perceived costs for abatement are lower than the perceived benefits. [vulnerability and abatement costs]

H3

A regime that focuses on sanctioning non-cooperative behavior is less effective than a regime that focuses on reinforcing cooperative behavior in the form of positive rewards. [compliance mechanisms]

H4

A regime that is not equipped with sufficient degrees of decision autonomy, adequate financial assets, and skilled personnel cannot attain the regime’s goals. [mandate and resources]

H5

Regime members are antagonized by a regime’s unequal membership rules and allocation of benefits / burdens resulting in low levels of effectiveness. [procedural rules]

H6

Regime creation and effectiveness is contingent upon power interests of hegemonic states. Low levels of effectiveness result from a lack of hegemonic leadership in a specific issue-area. [Neorealism]

H7

Low regime effectiveness is the consequence of a lack of knowledge transfer and learning processes in a regime and the marginalization of expert groups in the decision-making processes. [Cognitivism]

IV Methodology

1 Case Study Research Five regimes have been identified in Chapter 2. These regimes form the center of analysis. What led to the creation of these regimes? How do they function? In how far are they effective? The case approach can help to answer these questions. Case study research clearly dominates regime analysis in the environmental field (most prominent: Underdal 1980; Osherenko & Young 1989; P. Haas 1990; P. Haas et al. 1993; Young & Osherenko 1993; Mitchell 1994; Victor et al. 1998; Young 1999a; Miles et al. 2002; Brown Weiss & Jacobson 2003; R.S. Axelrod et al. 2005; Chasek et al. 2006). The great depth of analysis and quality of knowledge gained from case studies are two of the most important arguments in favor of using this method. “Case-studies have provided considerable evidence that certain regimes have influenced behavior” (Mitchell 2002b, 61). Very good collections of cases can be found in Institutions for the Earth (P. Haas et al. 1993), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments (Victor et al. 1998), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (Young 1999a), Environmental Regime Effectiveness (Miles et al. 2002), and Engaging Countries (Brown Weiss & Jacobson 2003). However, the case approach is not without alternatives. There are many voices that criticize the case approach. Single case studies may deliver information about a specific case but not about general mechanisms. When using exclusively qualitative methods, there are “inherent problems of generalizability” due to the small number of cases (Mitchell 2002b, 59). Cases from different projects are seldom comparable because of different analytical parameters. Most of the research efforts that try to compare cases are constrained by the absence of a real comparison. This results in generalizations from cases that do not guarantee the internal validity of the design (Breitmeier et al. 2006, 10-11). Mitchell and Bernauer (1998, 25) argue that case studies have a “weaker foundation for generalization” because it has to be proven that all conditions in the case(s) studies look sufficiently like the conditions in a larger population of cases. And finally, it is not possible to confirm or reject theories from case studies. Until recently, quantitative analysis has been largely absent from efforts to study the effects of regimes. However,

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_4, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

76

IV Methodology

quantitative analysis is a very useful complement to qualitative approaches, sometimes only quantitative analysis can bring desirable results (since variation is not always there when you only look at few cases). Quantitative approaches are more capable in answering comparative questions that are central to general regime research programs. Most important condition for the quantitative approach is the availability of at least as many observations as independent variables. Even better is a five to 20 times higher number of observations in comparison to the independent variables. However in reality, there is not enough data or the data collection only starts with the establishment of a regime. Also, quantitative methods have been criticized for gaining too little knowledge and detail about specific features of regimes and cases. Pioneers of quantitative regime research are Helmut Breitmeier, Oran Young and Michael Zürn. They (2006) have introduced a large data protocol for comparing the effects of environmental regimes. There are a number of research efforts at the moment that aim to move from case to more quantitative research in order to focus on the identification of causal links. Controversies among qualitative and quantitative researchers obscure the fact that both methods demand similar care in designing and conducting empirical research. Although I appreciate the advantages of quantitative research focusing on variation-finding causal relationships, in the research setting of Southeast Asia employing the case approach is especially beneficial since environmental regimes have not been studied intensively yet and there is still not much information available. Thus, it makes much sense to engage in generating in-depth case knowledge (Mitchell & Bernauer 1998, 5). Mitchell and Bernauer have proposed a framework of six steps of a solid case study research (see Table 9). The framework is a useful tool that I will apply although it derives from the perspective of theory-testing variation-finding research. Table 9: Six Steps in Case Study Research Task 1. Identifying an important theoretical question 2. Developing hypotheses and identifying variables 3. Selecting cases 4. Linking data to propositions 5. Examining correlations and causal pathways 6. Generalizing to other cases Source: Mitchell & Bernauer 1998, 9-10.

The research questions have been laid out in the Introduction and analyzed in Chapter 2. Hypotheses to explain my empirical puzzle have been derived from regime theoretical assumptions in Chapter 3. Steps three and four will be discus-

2 Case Selection

77

sed in this chapter. Step five forms the core of my empirical analysis and will be dealt with in the upcoming two chapters. Since only two cases will be analyzed, a generalization is not conducted. Rather, both cases will be compared and cross-cutting findings analyzed in Chapter 7. It will be explained in that chapter why a comparison of my two cases makes sense and what the benefits are following Lijphart’s (1971, 1975) recommendations on comparative case studies. 2 Case Selection The objective of this book is to explain an empirical puzzle with propositions from existing regime theory. So-called disciplined-configurative case studies that aim to understand particular cases that are interesting to explain the empirical puzzle will be conducted in order to determine the factors that led to the creation of these regimes and that led to a certain degree of regime effectiveness. The focus clearly lies on the empirical side of the research. Theory is used as a tool for explanation. The cases are a given fact. Their number and performance represents the core of the research. It is not the goal to identify variation among the cases by inferring from the cases to theory. Rather, the identified five cases represent the very research puzzle. Therefore, case selection, hotly debated in many research methods publications (Eckstein 1975; G. King et al. 1994; Yin 1994; Mitchell & Bernauer 1998; George & Bennett 2004), needs no big explanations: I pick what I observe. The universe of cases consists of all instances in which under the condition of a high prevalence of transnational environmental problems a regime has either been created or not. We have an unknown number of cases in which no regime has been created and five cases in total in which a regime has been created. Thus, there are three categories of cases to choose from: the hypothetical cases of no-regime creation, cases of regime creation in which the regime is not effective, and cases of regime creation in which the regime is effective. Since it is not advisable to analyze non-events (or in this case non-regimes) there are five cases left. The qualification of effectiveness is an important determinant. In Chapter 2 I argued that two of the five regimes have only entered into force very recently and thus do not yet unfold a capacity to change behavior and outcome (Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity; ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response). An analysis of these two regimes would not bring substantial insight. For an analysis of effectiveness a regime needs to be existent and functioning for quite some time. Statements about regime effectiveness should ideally be made in retrospect to a regime (Underdal 2002b, 6). However, in reality this is

78

IV Methodology

hardly possible. Most of the environmental problems that exist are extremely complex and cannot be solved easily. Therefore, cooperation efforts are longstanding or even permanent. Thus, what I will do is to evaluate the regime even before the regime goal has been attained. That means, that full effectiveness is not achieved and only a tendency towards regime success can be observed. The longer the regime has existed and worked towards attaining its goals and the more consistent the regime members and rules are, the more adequate can a judgment of tendency be. However, it is clear that tendency involves a certain degree of speculation. Thus, only three regimes are left for analysis. In the case of these remaining three regimes we do not know whether they are effective or not. Whether they have succeeded in influencing and changing actors’ behavior or not, is open for analysis. Table 10: Real-World Distribution of Cases Outcome Cases

no regime X

ineffective regime Y (five)

effective regime Z (five)

Source: own assessment.

I have decided to analyze only two of the three regimes. I decided that the Agreement On The Conservation Of Nature And Natural Resources (ASEAN 1985) will not be part of the analysis. Let me explain this decision. This agreement is ASEAN’s oldest regime in environmental matters. It was adopted as early as in 1985. However, ratification and entering into force took more than fourteen years. In 1985, only six countries were members to ASEAN and it is quite puzzling that no entering into force could have been achieved among such a small group of countries. The agreement is ASEAN’s first legal discussion about environmental issues. Its adoption was meant to have signaling character. However, the provisions of the agreement are extremely weak. The agreement does not contain specific issues. It deals with environmental degradation as such. Provisions are kept declaratory, aspiratory and visionary. The agreement has not resulted in any observable specific action. Parties to the agreement are not obliged to fulfill specific obligations. There is no agency within ASEAN that is monitoring progress (progress that is not defined in the agreement). It is not possible to assess the impact of this agreement. It cannot be linked to specific outcomes. I see this early agreement as a declaration of good will. In sum, two regimes will be analyzed in this book. The first case is the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and the second case is the Mekong River Commission. These cases represent two different types of transnational environmental problems. In the case of haze pollution, we face a

3 Measurement Strategy

79

problem of negative externalities in that one country is the source of pollution and another country becomes victim to it. In the case of the Mekong, we deal with an allocation and distribution problem of a shared natural resource. Socalled disciplined-configurative case studies that aim to understand these particular two cases that are interesting to explain the empirical puzzle will be conducted in order to determine the factors that led to the creation of these regimes and also to a certain degree of regime effectiveness. 3 Measurement Strategy When I define “to be effective” I define the level of achievement of a desired regime effect. Earlier I defined effectiveness as behavioral change of the involved state actors measured in the form of compliance (Chapter 3). A regime is thus effective when behavioral change has reached a level of X. Ideally, X is identical with the complete achievement of the desired effect. But also inferior stages can be labeled effective. In the social sciences problems are complex and solutions are almost never absolute. Thus, it is common to assume that “to be effective” means to move towards the desired effect even without reaching it completely. Also, a regime can be effective even without moving towards the desired effect, just by retaining the status quo. This statement would however imply that a non-existence of the regime would mean the deterioration of the problem whereas the regime can guarantee the status quo and prevent to cause more harm. It is therefore of utmost importance to define a clear threshold for achieving the label of “being effective”. To conduct this analysis I chose a comparative approach. Comparative work increases opportunities to assess the influence of a particular design feature both to other features and to factors outside the control of negotiators (Mitchell 2006, 74). In sum, we need three measurements to identify the level of effectiveness: the desired regime effect has to be identified (this is commonly labeled as the collective optimum of a regime), the threshold at what point a regime can be labeled “effective” has to be put and justified, and third, the actual performance of the regime has to be analyzed. The actual performance captures the actually achieved degree of the desired effect. Analyses comprise the level of compliance and implementation of regime rules since the establishment of the regime. Have changes occurred since the regime was created? What are the concrete steps taken by the regime members? The collective optimum is operationalized as a collective cost minimum (Pareto optimum), combining abatement and damage costs. “Whenever we are dealing with collective decisions that can be made only through agreement, the appropriate notion of collective optimum is the Pareto frontier. This frontier is reached

80

IV Methodology when no further increase in benefits to one party can be obtained without thereby leaving one or more prospective partner(s) worse off” (Underdal 1992, 233).

An outcome is Pareto efficient, or on the Pareto frontier, if there is no other outcome such that at least one actor is better off and none is worse off. The smaller the gap between the actual performance and the collective optimum, the more effective is a regime. However, the analysis of effectiveness has to be complicated due to an important consideration. An important question for the analysis of regime effectiveness is whether the observed behavioral change is actually caused by the regime? Sources of effectiveness can be endogenous (attribute of the arrangement itself) as well as exogenous (broader contextual conditions within which arrangements operate). In many cases, observed results reflect the combined effects of regimes and external factors operating at the same time (Young & Zürn 2006, 134). The separation of variables that are endogenous and exogenous to regimes is one of the most crucial steps in the analysis (Mitchell 1994; Bernauer 1995, 369; Young 2001, 100; Mitchell 2006; Young & Zürn 2006, 136). Thus, any research agenda should dedicate some of its energy to separate institutional drivers from other drivers (and to understand how these two drivers interact). A link between the desired effect and the regime needs to be established. At best, this link is a causal one (Young & Levy 1999, 16). Such a link can be established with a similar comparison. This time, however, I do not compare the regime’s actual performance with the optimal solution but with a hypothetical scenario of a situation without the regime, a counterfactual (Keohane et al. 1993, 18). Would the effects be the same without the regime or would there be changes? The no-regime counterfactual is established as a Nash equilibrium of a game (applying game theory) and a collective cost minimum for all countries involved in the regime. It basically derives from a political-economic costbenefit analysis. The state of affairs that existed right before the regime was created is the starting point of analysis. Moreover, we also need the “the set of consequences that would have flowed from a continuation of the previous ‘rules of the game’ (at times t+1..t+n) or what would have happened under a ‘no-regime’ condition” (Underdal 1992, 235/236).

Helm and Sprinz (2000, 634) suggest to conduct standardized interviews since “the assessment of the counterfactual should be undertaken on the basis of the best knowledge available in a particular field”. Also, it is common to use previous arrangement or larger context analyses in order to construct a development within the context of the non-establishment of a regime. Expert interviews and the analysis of negotiation material from the time of the regime creation

4 Operationalization

81

help to construct more or less accurate parameters. In sum, two measurements are necessary in order to establishment a link between the observed behavioral change and the existence of the regime: the actual performance of the regime is compared with a situation in which no regime had been created for the solution of a problem. The bigger the gap between the no-regime situation and the actual performance of the regime, the higher the probability that effectiveness is causally linked to the existence and performance of the regime. Looking at Figure 4, high regime effectiveness means to move the cursor of actual performance as much as possible to the right-hand side in the Figure 4. Figure 4: Three Measurements of Regime Effectiveness no regime

actual performance

collective optimum

Source: adapted from Underdal 1992.

This measurement strategy, comprising of the actual performance, the noregime counterfactual and the collective optimum, is called the Oslo-Potsdam solution. This umbrella term summarizes research of Underdal (1992), Helm, Sprinz (1999, 2000) and Hovi et al. (2003). “Most basically, evaluating the ‘effectiveness’ of a cooperative arrangement means comparing something […] against some standard of success or accomplishment” (Underdal 1992, 228). Underdal introduced this technique. He compared the actual performance (AP) to the no-regime (NR) to measure whether regimes matter, and furthermore compared the actual performance (AP) to the collective optimum (CO) to measure whether and to what extent a particular problem is solved by the existing regime (Underdal 1992, 231; Hovi et al. 2003, 75). There are two different scaling techniques of doing of comparing: relating AP to NR / AP to CO, or combing all three.10 4 Operationalization Theoretical propositions have to be translated into measurable data as accurately as possible guaranteeing the highest possible amount of construct validity (Mitchell & Bernauer 1998, 18). Usually, proxies are used to serve this purpose. A 10

Detlef Sprinz and Carsten Helm were the first to combine all three measures (Sprinz & Helm 1999; Helm & Sprinz 2000). According to their calculus regime effectiveness is the actual performance minus the no-regime counterfactual (potential for improvement over the noregime) divided by the collective optimum minus the no-regime counterfactual (realized degree of improvement by way of the regime) (Helm & Sprinz 2000, 637).

82

IV Methodology

proxy is not an altogether accurate translation but an approximation with greatest fit. Proxies allow observable statements. However, they do not capture the full conceptual richness of the variables. Table 11 sketches all variables, their range of values and the data used to define their specific values in a schematic overview. Table 11: Overview of all Variables and Operationalization Type

Specific Variable

Dependent variable

Regime effectiveness • Actual performance • Collective optimum • No-regime counterfactual Problem structure • Vulnerability

Independent variable 1

• Abatement costs Independent variable 2

Problem-solving capacity • Compliance mechanisms

• Procedural rules

Control variable 1 Control variable 2

• Mandate and resources Hegemonic stability Epistemic communities

Values low/high regime compliance low/high compliance as a Pareto optimum for all regime members low/high no regime compliance

small/large share of resource; strategic/non-strategic position low/high economic importance of resource for national economy low/high capacity for reform vague/concrete; hard/soft law sanction/managerial; closed/transparent; unequal/equal participation; consensus/majority; power in favor of laggards/pushers weak/strong actor capacity; low/high availability of resource present/absent at time of creation; constant/varying with regime dev. not present/well integrated

Data reports, own estimates, secondary documents on regimes, interviews

Reports on environment (UNEP, etc) Statistical macro data (ADB, WB, ASEAN) Regime docs

Regime docs Regime docs; interviews data, interviews, secondary docs Regime docs, secondary docs, interviews

Source: own considerations.

The range of values is needed to define in advance what kind of evidence is needed to falsify each selected hypothesis. Thus, all hypotheses “can be shown to be wrong as easily and quickly as possible” (G. King et al. 1994, 100). However, the author is well aware of the fact that these values seldom take a clear

4 Operationalization

83

position on a “yes” or “no” scale but rather float in a continuum between the two extreme ends. It is the task of the researcher to make informed interpretations and assessments of the observed values in case they are ambiguous. In a first research step I aim to analyze in how far the claim of previous research is true that both regimes show a low level of effectiveness. Effectiveness will be conceptualized as institutional effectiveness referring to the capacity of the regime to induce behavioral change of the involved actors. Three different measures are necessary to define effectiveness according to a model introduced by Underdal et al. The actual performance of each regime will be operationalized as the level of compliance of all members with the regime’s provisions and with its overall spirit. The collective optimum is operationalized as the construction of a compliance scenario in which compliance is modeled as a Pareto optimum. This means, that I construct a point of compliance that is equally beneficial for all regime members, or in Pareto slang: it leaves no player worse off. Although the collective optimum is imagined it can be modeled according to the Pareto logic. This unfortunately cannot be said about the no-regime counterfactual. Here, a situation of compliance without the existence of a regime needs to be imagined. The positions and actions concerning the problem of all involved members before regime creation took place constitute the operationalization of the no-regime counterfactual. In a second research step I aim to identify the relevant determinants for regime effectiveness. The chosen determinants derive from regime theoretical assumptions and will be used to explain the seemingly low level of effectiveness in both cases. Here again, proxies will be used to transform theoretical assumptions to measurable units. The variable problem structure consists of the country’s vulnerability to environmental damage and its expected costs to abate this damage. Both selected cases deal with the environmental problem of pollution. In one case it is air pollution, in the second case it is water pollution. To operationalize these two values statistical data will be gathered. Vulnerability will be measured in determining each country’s share of the resource and its strategic position to affect other countries to use the resource. For example, a country has a large share of the Mekong and is located at the upstream flow of the river. Since rivers flow downwards, this country has a favorable strategic position. Pollution and other harm to the river that an upstream country causes will flow down the Mekong. This country thus has a very low vulnerability to environmental damage. On the other hand, a large share of the Mekong and a downstream position means a very high level of vulnerability. A similar logic will be applied to the second case study. Haze pollution is caused by forest fires. Thus, countries either have large stocks of tropical forest or they do not. If a country does not have tropical forests, haze pollution cannot be caused. Thus, countries

84

IV Methodology

with tropical forests are more vulnerable to haze pollution than countries without forests. However, air pollution does not stop at national borders. Thus, haze can also occur in a country that is itself not a cause of haze. It suffers from negative externalities. Thus, countries that neighbor other countries with large stocks of tropical forest are also vulnerable. The highest level of vulnerability occurs for a country that itself has large stocks of tropical forest and as well neighbors a country with a large stock of tropical forest. In order to assess the abatement costs for each country it needs to be determined how important the economic activity for each state is that leads to environmental damage. In both cases, the countries at stake make use of the respective resources (water of the Mekong, forests) for economic purposes. The degree of usage and importance of the resource for the national economy differs among the countries involved. The higher the economic importance of the resource the higher are also the expected abatement costs. In extreme cases, a national economy could break down without the possibility to use the resource. Countries will be grouped according to their estimated dependency on the respective resource. A second indicator affects the abatement costs. This is the general government capacity of each country. Countries in developing regions generally show a low level of government capacity. Often, they lack financial means to implement and monitor rules as well as they lack skilled personnel to coordinate processes. Many times there are no environmental agencies at all or with sufficient expertise to solve a problem. If a country has a low capacity abatement costs also rise. Macro data about economic performance and political stability from various sources (World Bank, United Nations, GTZ) is used to rank the countries according to their capacity. To the three determinants of problem-solving capacity (compliance mechanisms, procedural rules, mandate and resources), the created regimes with their specific rules and stipulations will be looked at. It will be analyzed what kind of compliance mechanisms and procedural rules each regime has established. Are the chosen mechanisms of compliance focusing on sanctions to punish violators or on rewarding compliers? Are there concrete compliance mechanisms at all or only declaratory clauses? What are the rules of participation in the regime? Are costs and benefits distributed in a rather equitable manner? In order to measure the available resources and competencies of each regime, the respective regime agency has to be analyzed. In the two cases these are the Environmental Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat and the Mekong River Commission Secretariat. It will be analyzed how many resources they devote in terms of financial assets, time and personnel, to solve the problem. It will be assessed how much actual decision-making power is vested in each regime agency in contrast to the power that rests with the member states.

5 (Un)expected Difficulties

85

Lastly, let me explain how I will measure the two control variables, hegemonic stability and epistemic communities. As Neorealism argues there must be a hegemon to trigger regime creation. Therefore, I am looking for a strong state that has the power to coerce or convince other countries into regime creation. To identify such a state I need to examine all countries’ position before the event of regime creation and also examine the negotiation processes leading to regime creation. Only such an analysis of discussions can reveal the bargaining power of each involved state. In addition, hegemony is characterized by material and immaterial capabilities that exceed average capabilities of states putting one state in the position to be dominant. Thus, if Neorealism holds true I expect to observe huge capabilities in the form of economic power, military strength and overall potency with one regime member. Cognitivists argue that the existence and tight integration of strong epistemic communities foster regime creation and effectiveness. Here again, the analysis of negotiation processes leading to regime creation will deliver clues whether or not expert groups were included in discussions. It will be examined whether past and ongoing meetings of regime parties have incorporated epistemic communities. Open platforms that invite experts, as it is argued, enhance regime effectiveness. 5 (Un)expected Difficulties 5.1 Definitorial Ambiguities Critics of regime theory (mainly from the Neorealist camp) argue that the concept of regimes is “obfuscating and confusing instead of clarifying and illuminating, and distorting by concealing bias instead of revealing and removing it” (Strange 1983, 337). There are dozens of different and contradicting definitions of regimes. People mean different things when they use the term. Especially the research about regime creation and regime effectiveness has produced a plethora of explanatory models. These models are not integrated into a larger and consistent model of regime theory. Thus, the field remains scattered. This criticism is appreciated and cannot be wiped out by the author. However, the definition of the term that I chose to use is clearly laid out in the theoretical chapter. It builds upon the “social structures” school and connects well to this research strand. 5.2 The Inevitability of Making Causal Statements There are many pitfalls in the analysis of regime effectiveness. Tracing back changes in behavior to the existence and/or operation of regimes necessitates

86

IV Methodology

causal statements. There is a need to establish causal links between those observable outcomes and regimes. In 1998, Zürn claimed that all research about institutional design is not backed by research designs that permit causal inferences. As typical in many research fields in the social sciences the “generation of theoretical propositions has outpaced their operationalization and testing” (Mitchell 2002a, 501). Theories are tested through single cases with insufficient attention to variable definition, case selection and generalizability. As a result, researchers have not produced generalizable answers as to what types of institutions are more successful than others under specific conditions. The two case studies that are going to be analyzed will be scrutinized in such a detailed manner that the author will be in the position to make some causal claims about the determinants of effectiveness of the respective regimes. However, these claims will not be generalized. 5.3 Debated Measurement Parameters The definitions of collective optimum and no-regime counterfactual have provoked a vivid debate (Young 2001, 108-117, 2008, 21/22). Especially the noregime counterfactual is extremely difficult to measure since counterfactual analysis as such is “fraught with difficulties and pitfalls” (Hovi et al. 2003, 79). Bernauer (1995, 360) criticizes that the counterfactual component “introduces an element of more or less informed speculation”. Helm and Sprinz (1999, 2000), however, consider counterfactuals indispensable for causal inference. Causation requires some form of counterfactual argument. Indeed, Biersteker (1995, 317-8) argues, “any causal claim requires some form of counterfactual analysis”. This is exactly what distinguishes causation from correlation (Elster 1978, 175). Another criticism of the Oslo-Potsdam solution is that in game theory it is often the case that games have more than one Nash equilibrium. Which one will be taken as the basis for analysis? Also, it is hard to define objectively what is collectively optimal. A definition will always be too narrow. Finally, the actual performance parameter runs the danger of being too narrow. It is probably not enough to reduce the analysis of the actual performance of a regime on manifest behavior only. When neglecting factors like social learning and improved understanding of the problem structure you risk an undervaluation of the effects of regimes. Underdal (1992, 236/237) acknowledges that the analysis involves “impressionistic judgment” and should be tested for reliability by interviewing experts to check whether they share one’s evaluation.

5 (Un)expected Difficulties

87

5.4 Data Sorrows One crucial point in every research project is the availability of sufficient and reliable data. Here, I quickly reached the limit of available information about the two case studies. Although there is a plethora of article and books about both regimes and both have a well-organized website, these sources could only be used as a first encounter to the cases and not as sufficient material to answer my research questions. Websites were delivering facts and figures, however, not always up-to-date and also often with restricted access. Often, articles were of technical nature, specializing in fire prevention techniques or dam construction. They either lacked an academic question or concentrated exclusively on regime ineffectiveness in the form of problem-solving. After having analyzed all available material (online and in Berlin) I took the opportunity to become a guest researcher in Southeast Asia for six months. Being on-site in Singapore had two major advantages. First, databases focusing on Southeast Asia became available to me offering a huge broadband of new secondary sources, conference papers and edited books. Second, I was able to conduct a certain number of expert interviews with different regime stakeholders. These interviews were intended to fill the data gap that still existed and also to gather opinions and estimates about regime effectiveness questions from different perspectives. Especially the second point helped me to define the level of regime effectiveness for both cases. Interviews were conducted in English, in a semi-structured manner, recorded on an mp3 device, and transcribed fully. Complete documentation can be made available upon request. During the interview process usual problems of this method occurred. First, interviews were cancelled and no substitute could be found for the interview. Second, during interviews I realized that the interviewed person is not knowledgeable enough or not willing to answer any of my questions in a meaningful way. Third, the information that I received during interviews is not reliable or even has objectively been proven wrong. These three problems (not enough interviews, the wrong people, no good information) should not be marginalized. However, for the course of my dissertation, I decided that the conducted interviews are still of good value. The mentioned problems did not occur in many cases. The interviews that I conducted were assessed as a success in gaining more knowledge and insights. I could use the networks of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore to identify relevant interview partners from different stakeholder groups. My interview requests were predominantly welcomed and taken very seriously. During the interviews I attempted to give a seriously interested and well-informed impression so that interviewees granted me as much time as possible and were also availa-

88

IV Methodology

ble for follow-ups via telephone or email. Moreover, the purpose of the interviews is only to underline already existing evaluations and to fill data gaps. Therefore, information from interviews could be included whenever it was suitable, and could be neglected in other cases. In some cases it even made sense to include objectively wrong statements or political judgments from interviewed people. These statements are clearly marked and serve the purpose of enhancing the understanding of different stakeholder groups in the respective regimes.

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

1 Introduction to the Problem 1.1 Haze Pollution Haze is an atmospheric phenomenon where dust, smoke and other dry particles obscure the clarity of the sky. It is a severe form of air pollution, consisting of clouds of thick smoke. Haze pollution is a cause of forest and land fires. When fires are not suppressed quickly and adequately, a dangerous smoke haze can develop and rise into the atmosphere. When smoke gets suspended in the atmosphere, it is called haze. The produced haze is an air-borne mixture of pollutants including particulate matter, large amounts of carbon dioxides and other gases that contribute to global warming like sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, methane, hydrocarbons, methyl chloride, polycyclic and other chemicals. Particulate matter comes from a variety of sources. Particles larger than 2.5 micrometers come from sources such as vehicles driving on unpaved roads. Fine particles (less than 2.5 micrometers) result from “fuel combustion in motor vehicles, power plants and industrial facilities, residential fireplaces, woodstoves, wildfires, and forest burning” (ASEAN Haze Website). Haze poses an enormous danger to human and animal health as well as to vegetation. Inhalation of the particulate matter can cause severe damage to the respiratory system. When inhaling particulate matter, these are retained in parts of the respiratory system (Barber & Schweithelm 2000, 18). Transboundary haze pollution is a recurring phenomenon in Southeast Asia due to the region’s enormous deforestation activities (Rosenberg 1999, 125; Tacconi 2003, 5). The almost annual episodes of haze usually occur in February/March and July to October. These are the hot and dry seasons that create ideal conditions for forest and land fires. Haze increasingly occurs in peatlands (Atje 2008). Peatland is boggy, abandoned land with acid grounds consisting of partly decomposed vegetable matter. Peat is a natural container of large amounts of organic carbon. With every fire taking place on peat ground carbon that has been locked into the ground since thousands of years is released (Everson 2007, 29). Sixty percent of the world’s tropical peatlands are found in Southeast Asia covering an estimated area of approximately 22 million hectares. Drainage and

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_5, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

90

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

unsustainable management practices have made peatlands vulnerable to fire. Annually, in Indonesia 2000 million tons of CO2 is emitted; 600 million tons is caused by decomposition of dry peat (a process that will continue until all peat has disappeared) and 1,400 million tons is lost through annual fires. Peatland fires are the most difficult to suppress, they usually produce very thick smoke haze and release very high amounts of carbon. Primary hotspots of haze pollution are peatland forests in Indonesia. But also Malaysia has been source of haze production. A uniquely comprehensive overview of Southeast Asia’s forest fires, its vegetation, climate, historical development of agriculture, the occurrences of fires, and measurement techniques of haze pollution and costs is provided in an edited volume by Peter Eaton and Miroslav Radojevic (2001). Hotspots of haze can be spotted by satellites or aerial surveillance. Computers identify rising surface temperatures and trigger alarm. The responsible agency for monitoring describes that if the relevant monitoring devices detect significant hotspot activities on the ground, accumulation of dense smoke haze near the hotspots coupled with persistent dry weather and prevailing winds then they will alert the responsible agency at ASEAN for action (Yap 2008). The countries’ capacities to suppress fires or monitor haze hotspots might be sufficient in times of “normal” weather, but when it comes to extreme weather conditions there is nothing that can be done to combat the haze. Fire suppression is very hard since there is no natural rainfall and the flames are spreading extremely rapid. In addition, heavy winds contribute to the spread of fires and also of dangerous smoke haze in the atmosphere. General climatic developments with regards to global warming and the increasing occurrence of extreme seasons (long dry periods, short wet seasons) put a severe constraint on governmental capacity to combat the haze. The most dangerous periods for the creation of fires and haze are the occurrences of El Niño. El Niño is an anomalous warming of surface water in the eastern equatorial Pacific that causes a massive seesawing of atmospheric pressure and global climate changes (Everson 2007, 32). Rainfall is delayed, crops are adversely affected, and storms occur where they should not. El Niño related droughts occur every two to seven years in Indonesia with varying intensity (Schweithelm & Glover 1999, 5). All haze crises since 1980 correlated with the occurrence of El Niño (Hariri 2008). According to scientists, the frequency and intensity of El Niños are on the increase. Until the 1980s scientists estimated an occurrence of El Niño every five or six years. Now, scientists speak of a frequency of two or three years. This would entail a permanent threat for the governments in the region and a permanent need to be prepared for immediate action. This truly exceeds the capacities of states like Indonesia (Wibisono 2008). There was a weak El Niño in early 2005, and another event between in late 2006 and early 2007 (Yap 2008). A next El Niño

1 Introduction to the Problem

91

could be expected in 2010 (Hariri 2008). The danger of haze is also stronger during intermonsoon seasons, which bring periods of prolonged droughts. Annual mean rainfall in Indonesia has decreased by two to three percent across the country during 1900-1999 while at the same time the annual mean temperature has increased by 0.3 centigrade.11 Forest fires have started to constitute a serious problem with the beginning of agricultural industrial development in the region at the turn of the twentieth century. Tens of millions of hectares have been converted to agriculture. Much of the remaining forest has been logged in recent years. Fires have become more frequent, more intense, and larger. Forest degradation caused by heavy logging also makes forests more susceptible to fire. Plantation owners set fires regularly to clear land (Schweithelm & Glover 1999, 6). The Indonesian NGO WALHI led investigations in the field that have corroborated that there is a strong correlation between the plantation areas and the areas in which fires occur (Indonesia & UNDP 1998, 19; WRI 2002, 56; Surya 2008). Commercial land clearing for oil palm and timber estates is contributing to as much as 80 percent of all fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Schweithelm et al. 1999, 135). “The jungle is dense and often without roads. Rather than struggle with heavy clearing equipment, managers find it easier and cheaper to set fire to the area” (Choong 1997). In periods of drought, these fires are quick and effective; however, the danger of uncontrollable fires is also extremely high. In fact, it is estimated that as much as 80 percent of the disastrous 1997-98 fires were set by plantation concessionaires and other landowners (Dudley et al. 1997, 11; Tan 1999, 826). The example in Table 12 clearly shows the strong correlation between fire outbreaks and plantation sites. Table 12: Active Fires Detected in Indonesia in 1999 Location of Fires Big plantations (>100 ha) Small agricultural fields Logging area Forests Others

Sumatra 116 89 25 35 11

Kalimantan 16 15 2 7 4

Total 132 104 27 42 15

% of all Active Fires 41.3 32.5 8.4 13.1 4.7

Source: Eaton & Radojevic 2001, 86.

More than 40 percent of all fires in the year 1999 broke out within plantation land. Therefore, haze has to be regarded as a man-made disaster instead of a 11

A comprehensive overview about the working mechanisms and effects of the El Niño phenomenon is given in Harger (2001).

92

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

natural one (Cotton 1999, 335; Quah 2002, 429; ASEAN 2006c, 86). Analysis of causes and proposal of solutions must concentrate on this link. The problem of haze pollution is definitely not solved. Regular satellite images show undiminished numbers of fire hotspots in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Figure 5: Total Number of Hotspots in Indonesia 1997-2008

107255

104563 71264 62145

49721 48443 29539

25433

49995

31648 32575

11771 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: Web Fire Mapper 2008.

Data from the Web Fire Mapper12 confirm the pertinence of permanent fire dangers in the region. Environmental NGOs like WWF collect data on locations and extent of outbreaks of large fires every year. According to their data collection the situation has not improved (Hariri 2008; Wibisono 2008). There are outbreaks of fires and development of haze pollution every year (Klingshirn 2008). “WALHI’s investigations show that companies have been burning every year. This is not changing or getting better” (Surya 2008). But since two years fires and haze are mostly happening in very remote areas and are thus not detected or published (Prasiddha 2008). Media coverage on haze pollution generally has declined. Only huge catastrophes can generate public interest (Surya 2008). These facts lead me to the conclusion that ASEAN’s attempts to manage the haze problem are not effective in the sense of problem-solving. It has not 12

The Web Fire Mapper (http://firefly.geog.umd.edu/firemap) documents fire hotspots worldwide. It is offered by the Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) project that is located at the University of Maryland, USA. It is funded by NASA. FIRMS has access to NASA’s satellite images. In late 2009, FIRMS became part of the operational monitoring systems at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

1 Introduction to the Problem

93

contributed to improve the haze situation and get closer to haze prevention. In general it can be stated that the severity of all haze crises since 1997 has been diminished by favorable climatic conditions like heavy rainfall and short dry seasons (Atje 2008; Kusumo 2008; Wibisono 2008). The link to the performance of the ASEAN regime is hard to establish. Weather data is rather easy to collect and the favorable climate conditions are a hard fact. Whether ASEAN’s claim that at least some of the improvement is also due to better coordination and functioning early action (Prasiddha 2008) is true, cannot be substantiated. Perhaps, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the haze regime in terms of problem-solving. ASEAN itself is doubtful whether the measures achieved so far are sufficient to deal with a normal amount of hotspots (Prasiddha 2008). It is completely open what will happen in a year of little rain, hot temperatures and El Niño winds. 1.2 Demand for Cooperation Haze has been referred to as one of “Asia’s worst man-made environmental catastrophe” (Choong 1997). It poses immense danger to human live, ecosystems integrity and economic stability. There were always haze crises in Southeast Asia. Some written reports document haze crises from the 1960s on but alarming is the increasing frequency since the 1980s (Eaton & Radojevic 2001, 202). Major haze episodes took place in 1982-83, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997-98, 1999, 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. The goal of cooperation to combat the haze is to prevent fires and the subsequent production of haze. During most severe crises, the thick dangerous haze has traveled beyond the borders of the country that caused it (Indonesia) to Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Thailand. The countries affected by haze have a high interest in preventing haze that intrudes their territory. Indonesia also has an interest to cooperate because the country is not capable of managing the fires and haze on its own. Otherwise, fires would be suppressed before producing dangerous haze that can travel to other countries. Thus, Indonesia will cooperate in order to receive assistance. The most severe haze catastrophe of 1997-98 exemplifies the necessity to cooperate (systematic overview in: Springer 2002). This crisis was one of the worst and had been declared a global disaster by the United Nations (Ooi et al. 2002, 140). Some call the 1997 haze the “worst environmental disaster of the 20th Century” (Glover & Jessup 1999). The fires were exacerbated by droughts that were caused by most severe El Niño event ever recorded (Salim 1999, xi). The year 1997 has had the largest annual jump in global atmospheric CO2 on record. Indonesia had the worst fires. It suffered the worst drought in 50 years.

94

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

But it was not a natural phenomenon, like El Niño, that has mainly caused the haze, rather ”human carelessness and greed” can be made responsible for the number, scope and gravity of the fires in Indonesia (Schweithelm & Glover 1999, 5). The intensity of 1997 fires was directly related to the intensity of logging (BAPPENAS & ADB 1999, Annex 1: 7-9; ASEAN & ADB 2001, 41). Although it had been illegal to use fire to clear land since 1993 in Indonesia, law enforcement had not been pushed through (Springer 2002, 291). Tens of thousands of hectares had produced enough smoke to create a blanket of haze that spread hundreds of kilometers in all directions. Fires grew and finally reached drained peat swamps where fires burned beneath the surface long after aboveground fires had exhausted their fuel supplies. Even as the fires burned out of control into surrounding forests, peat swamps and agricultural lands, plantation owners and farmers started new fires to take advantage of the extremely dry conditions (Barber & Schweithelm 2000, 8). The rain season in 1997 was very short and by mid-January 1998 there were hundreds of new hotspots. Neighboring countries began to fear a return of the haze and were not reassured by the Indonesian government’s weak efforts to prevent or extinguish the new fires.13 Efforts to fight fires were hampered by increasing water scarcity because the drought caused surface water to dry up and the groundwater level to sink below the reach of wells. In mid-April 1998 a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination team estimated that sustained rain provided the only hope of extinguishing the fires completely (Barber & Schweithelm 2000, 9). Finally, heavy rain came in May and eased the situation. However, drought conditions returned in fall 1998 with new fires. Ten million hectares of forest and other land burned in Southeast Asia (Springer 2002, 291). Fifteen percent of Indonesia’s total area of logging (54 million hectares) burned away. For months, dense haze affected some 70 million people in the region. The fires resulted in many thousand cases of hospitalization. Airports in Sumatra and Kalimantan were closed for extended periods. Tourism revenues dropped significantly. Respiratory diseases occurred. During the peak weeks of the haze catastrophe the level of air pollution in Sumatra and Kalimantan was considered to be “hazardous to human life” (Tan 1999, 826). Despite these dramatic dangers for human health and life the haze also destroyed about five million hectares of land and forest in Indonesia and therefore heavily affected the integrity of the ecosystem, animal life and basis for human livelihood. The total costs of the disaster including forest and plantation destruction, health costs, disruption of transportation, lost tourist earnings, loss of species, deterioration of 13

Forest fires were a low priority for the Indonesian government that was more concerned with countering the effects of the economic crisis that prevailed in 1997.

2 Problem Structure

95

water supplies, and increase in greenhouse gases were estimated at USD 9.3 billion (WRI 2002, 55; UNESCAP 2006, 292). Table 13: Summary of Economic Costs of the 1997-98 Fires, in USD million Estimated Economic Losses min max mean Sector Agriculture Farm crops Plantation crops Forestry Timber from natural forest Lost growth in natural forest Timber from plantations Non-timber forest products Flood protection Erosion and siltation Carbon sink Health Transmigration, buildings and property Transportation Tourism Fire-fighting costs TOTAL

2.431 319

2.431 319

2.431 319

1.461 256 94 586 404 1.586 1.446 145 1 18 111 12 8.870

2.165 377 94 586 404 1.586 1.446 145 1 49 111 11 9.726

1.813 316 94 586 404 1.586 1.446 145 1 33 111 12 9.298

Source: BAPPENAS & ADB 1999, 28.

2 Problem Structure 2.1 Problems of Negative Externalities The problem of haze is a problem of negative externalities. The basic idea behind the concept is that an externality exists when a person makes a choice that affects other people that are not accounted for in the market price. In economic terminology, externalities are examples of market failures, in which the unfettered market does not lead to an efficient outcome. A positive impact is called an external benefit, while a negative impact is called an external cost. Producers and consumers in a market may either not bear all of the costs or not reap all of the benefits of the economic activity. The existence of externalities results in outcomes that are not socially optimal. Those who suffer from external costs do so involuntarily, while those who enjoy external benefits do so at no cost. In our case study, haze pollution is the externality, “where certain groups (in this case, business conglomerates and

96

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

some corrupt officials) reap benefits without paying the costs” (Lee 2008). Many countries are involved in the ecologically disastrous activity of rain forest degradation and deforestation in Southeast Asia. However, it is only Indonesia that has used the tool of fire to such a tremendous extent to conduct this activity that this activity has led to frequent episodes of transboundary haze pollution. Indonesia has the largest amount of tropical forests and other land that is susceptible to fire and is located dangerously close to neighboring countries. Thus, in this case study Indonesia is the source of the negative externalities. Its neighboring countries, Malaysia and Singapore, are immediately affected countries. Other countries in the vicinity like Brunei and Thailand are also potentially affected by the haze threat. The dilemma for the affected states is that the activity that causes the negative externality takes place within the jurisdiction of another state and is thus out of their reach. International law has tried to regulate the problem of negative externalities for states in the form of the customary law of state responsibility. However, state responsibility for environmental damage is still debated from case to case. Many environmentalists hold that the principle of state responsibility for transboundary pollution, as declared in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, is now a norm of customary international law (Tay 1998, 202). To cause damage to other countries is considered to be a breach of international law. States are supposed to avoid negative externalities and to compensate for the damage they cause to other states. States are supposed to terminate the activity that led to the occurrence of externalities (Gehring & Jachtenfuchs 1993). Principle 21 from the 1972 Stockholm Conference (one of the most important foundations of modern international law): “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” (UN Doc. 1972).

Principle 21 later became Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. To prevent damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond national jurisdiction has been accepted as an obligation by all states (ICJ 1995). This element of environmental protection reflects customary international law according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ 1997). Clearly visible are two conflicting rights: sovereign use and do no harm. Effective environmental protection thus means to limit what a state does on its own territory – a taboo within the statecentered international system (Downie 2005, 72). Therefore, the realization of Principle 21 and Principle 2 is extremely difficult. There is also the principle of

2 Problem Structure

97

”good neighborliness“ in Article 74 of the UN Charter. It refers to social, economic and commercial matters, but has been extended to environmental matters by rules promoting international cooperation (Sands & Peel 2005, 53). It applies particularly to activities carried out in one state that might have adverse effects on the environment of another state or in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The commitment to environmental cooperation is reflected in many international agreements and is supported by state practice. ”In general, the obligation includes commitments to implement treaty objectives or to improve relations outside a treaty or in relation to certain tasks“ (Sands & Peel 2005, 53). According to international lawyer Allen Tan (1999, 854/855), state responsibility and liability for Indonesia under international law for the 1997-98 fires can clearly be made out because Indonesia failed to “exercise its due diligence obligation to prevent and punish the activities of its private citizens who were deliberately setting fire”. In sum, it has to be stated that existing international law has not helped to mitigate the haze problem. When analyzing problems of negative externalities the source country naturally plays a dominant role. In such cases, as Weiss and Jacobson (2003) have argued, regime effectiveness is determined by characteristics peculiar to individual state parties if these state parties are dominant actors with regards to the solution of the problem. Effectiveness of all efforts to combat the haze are mainly influenced by internal conditions in Indonesia (Tan 2005, 650). Thus, the analysis of problem structure in this section will cover much material on Indonesia and only some material on the other countries. 2.2 Problem Complexity The haze problem is caused by a variety of factors. Traditional agricultural practice, vested business interests, lack of fire suppression capacities and unfavorable climatic conditions are some of the many factors that may lead to haze. In order to be effective a regime needs to tackle all of these causes systematically and in conjunction with each other. This is not an easy task. Still, the haze problem is not considered as a complex problem. Scientific complexity, referring to the absence of a scientific consensus about the problem, its causes and possible solutions, might have two effects on a regime. It might hinder cooperation in case that scientific knowledge is diverging largely and offering conflicting analyses and solutions. On the other hand, it might enhance cooperation. If there are no scientific facts about the causes of the problem and no tested solutions, countries might prefer to cooperate in order to create a scientific grounding.

98

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

In this case study there is a shared understanding of the problem, its causes and possible solutions. Indonesia has long denied the connection of large plantation estates and fire location sources. The government used to blame small and traditional farmers of having set the fires without estimating the potential risk of doing so. Small farmers have even been persecuted by the state. This has definitely changed. All ASEAN countries that have dealt with the haze problem have confirmed that most of the fires have been started by large plantation owners in order to clear forests either for preparing more land for crops or for selling the timber from the cut forests. All stakeholders also agree on the importance of regulation, monitoring, and law enforcement for preventing the haze as well as modern and quick structures of fire suppression to combat already existing fires and haze. What makes the regime still ineffective is the implementation of proposed measures. In the theoretical part it has been argued that the level of uncertainty might contribute to regime performance. If there are no verified solutions for a complex environmental problem countries might choose cooperation instead of inaction in order to tackle the problem. The results of not doing anything are known and it is estimated that cooperation will yield some result that improves the situation. In the case of haze pollution the level of uncertainty is rather low. It is quite clear what steps are to be taken and what the results would be. It is not like other environmental problems for which there are no tested solutions and only simulations or speculations about how to effectively deal with them. Haze is a manmade problem and it can be solved by human action. All studies on the haze, and there is no shortage of them, identify the same root causes and recommend more or less the same steps towards solution. Causes of haze are fires that were set deliberately by plantation owners. The recommended solutions are stricter law enforcement and monitoring of zero-burning in Indonesia. Thus, uncertainty was definitely not a reason for countries to participate in the haze regime. It is assumed that all involved actors knew about the problem, its causes and possible solutions when entering into negotiations to create the haze regime. In sum, the regime is not driven by the challenge to reduce complexity and crystallize a feasible solution. Countries knew what to expect from the regime and from the other countries. Upon this knowledge countries chose either to participate or not, like Indonesia. In this constellation of high scientific consensus and low levels of uncertainty the focus of analysis clearly lies on the political considerations to create the regime and make it effective.

2 Problem Structure

99

2.3 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs In contrast to the scientific point of view the political complexity is very high. Problems of negative externalities naturally imply an asymmetry in actors’ constellations. An externality has a source, a country causing it, and a scope of distribution, countries being affected by it. Thus, the involved actors in the haze regime have different positions. In Southeast Asia, haze mostly comes from Indonesia. Only to a much lesser degree does haze also arise from forest and land areas in Malaysia. In our case study all actors are vulnerable to haze pollution to a certain degree because the causing state, Indonesia, does not externalize the entirety of negative effects from its actions but is also negatively affected by it. The degree of vulnerability differs hugely among all involved countries. Vulnerability to haze pollution is an aggregate measure of two components: proximity and importance. Abatement costs are the costs necessary to stop the negative externality and the costs necessary to stop the activity as such. Only Indonesia, the country causing the haze, can engage in preventing the haze problem. The other countries, those that are affected but that are not source to the problem, can only engage in combating the negative effects of already broken out haze crises. The analysis of abatement costs corresponds with the second measure of vulnerability: vulnerability increases with the country’s dependence on the activity in question and so does the abatement costs. Abatement costs are higher if the activity is of high importance for the national economy. Table 14: Proportion of Land Area Covered by Forest 1990

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

2005

%

%

59.4 73.3 64.3 75 68.1 59.6 35.5 3.4 31.2 28.8

52.8 59.2 48.8 69.9 63.6 49 24 3.4 28.4 39.7

Total Forest Area in ´000 km2 2,8 104,5 885 161,4 208,9 322,2 71,6 too few 145,2 129,3

Source: UNDP 2007; ADB 2008, 97.

First, haze pollution is a result of forest fires. The more forests there are and the denser and more remotely located they are, the bigger the danger of fire out-

100

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

breaks and untimely suppression efforts. The more proximate in geographical terms one country is located to a country in which fire and haze outbreaks have occurred, the more vulnerable this country becomes of being affected by negative haze consequences. The higher these three measures are the more vulnerable a country is to haze pollution. Not all countries have a similar stake at the regime. In mainland Southeast Asia, comprising of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam, haze pollution has only occurred to a minor degree. The countries also possess large amounts of tropical rain forests, but due to the different and wetter climate the vegetation is different and the land is much less susceptible to fires than in Indonesia and Malaysia. Large plantations with growing demand for more land are few. Thus, these countries show a rather low level of vulnerability and have rarely been touched by haze crises. However, it has to be noted that this situation might change. Due to climate change, bringing more extreme weather to the region, and to growing economization of forests and forest products in mainland Southeast Asia, this sub-region might become more vulnerable to haze pollution in the future (ASEAN 2006c, 89). In 2002, Viet Nam had a first serious outbreak of forest fires (ASEAN 2002, 38). Furthermore, fire-fighting capacity and knowledge about sustainable forest management hardly exist in these countries so that potential haze outbreaks would be devastating. As most haze crises have occurred in peninsular Southeast Asian, mostly in Indonesia and Malaysia, these and their neighboring countries, mostly Brunei and Singapore, play a key role in the haze regime. After Brazil and Congo, Indonesia has the largest stand of tropical forest in the world. At the same time, the rate of deforestation is the highest on the globe. The Philippines that also belong to the group of insular countries are not vulnerable due to the country’s isolated island position in the Pacific. Second, both vulnerability and abatement costs are contingent upon a country’s economic importance of the activity in question. Thus, the more a country relies on the export of forest products and other products that are cultivated on huge plantation grounds, the more vulnerable it becomes to fire catastrophes as a result of vested business interests and the more money it has to invest in abolishing the activity. There is a huge demand for all kinds of forest products from Southeast Asia, most of all for timber and pulp/paper especially from countries like China, India and Japan (Atje 2008; Klingshirn 2008). Countries in Southeast Asia are attractive suppliers because of the high availability of resources and the low costs for production and processing. The countries have adapted their economies to this huge demand – they are trying to supply more and more. This has led to a vicious circle of exploitation and dependency. Dauvergne (1997, 2) analyzed, that it is mostly international corpora-

2 Problem Structure

101

tions, markets, consumption, and trade practices that “cast an oppressive shadow that constrains Southeast Asian decisions“. High consumption rates and the desire for cheap goods in the industrial countries have definitely contributed to the persistence of fires (Dudley et al. 1997, 12). As long as the international demand for forest and plantation products remains high, the practice of deforestation and land clearance by fire will continue since the countries in Southeast Asia depend on revenues from exports. Although forests once covered large tracts of the whole region, today only Myanmar, Malaysia and Indonesia count as major timber and forest product exporters (Rosenberg 1999, 124). Not much is known about the economic activities of the military dictatorship Myanmar. Satellite images of the country substantiate the assumption that the country is cutting down much of its rain forest. Furthermore, it has been found out that timber is massively exported to China. The country surely has no intent or interest in obeying the rules of the haze regime. But since there are no costs for Myanmar at the moment the country chose to ratify the ASEAN Haze Agreement. Myanmar is member of the regional organization ASEAN and its behavior during the last ten or so year has shown that the country has a certain interest in keeping a somewhat good relation with its neighbors. It is, however, completely unclear how Myanmar would act in case of a massive haze outbreak in its territory. Malaysia has been source of reported haze occurrences. However, the last severe crisis in the country took place more than 25 years ago (1982-83). Since then, the country has engaged in fire prevention rigorously. Malaysia took serious efforts in implementing and enforcing zero-burning laws from the 1990s on. Their efforts have been labeled effective and the non-occurrence of haze crises substantiates this claim (ASEAN 1999). Indonesia is experiencing one of the highest rates of tropical forest loss in the world and the highest deforestation rate in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is the world’s third largest source of greenhouse gas emissions due to deforestation (UNDP 2007, 158). Within the next twenty or so years 98 percent of the rainforests of Indonesia will be gone, “little more than a footnote in history” (MacKinnon 2007). Forest cover declined from 63 percent of Indonesia’s land area in 1973 to 49-55 percent of land area only 20 years later (Eccleston & Potter 1996, 60). 40 percent of all Indonesian forests were lost since the 1950s. In total numbers, the Indonesian forests shrunk from 162 million to 98 million hectares (WRI 2002, xi). Today, more than half the country’s forests, some 54 million hectares, are allocated for timber production (WRI 2002, 4). Deforestation was not only accelerated by plantation land growth but also by two other factors. First, concessions have been granted in Indonesia relatively cheaply and without many obligations. Many plantation owners have never started to grow crops on newly-bought land. Instead, they used their concessions to cut down the forest

102

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

and sell the timber. Timber extraction remains a most lucrative endeavor. The result is an abundant area of clear-cut forests that is neither used for plantations nor being reforested (Erwidodo & Astana 2004, 11). As a result, Indonesia is full of unproductive, wasted plantation land that is privately owned and cannot be made productive. Efforts by the Indonesian government to solve this problem have been ineffective until today (Erwidodo & Astana 2004, 15). Second, in the 1970s, a governmental transmigration program began to resettle people from the densely populated main island of Java onto the forest frontiers of the country’s larger and less populous islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. This resulted in large-scale land clearances on formerly forest-covered and uninhabited areas. Commercial forest use in Indonesia started with the establishment of President Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in Indonesia in 1966 to escape state bankruptcy. For 30 years now the Indonesian government has followed its goal to expand the forestry sector every year. The sector has grown out of control of the government’s supervision. One agricultural crop is of special importance. Palm oil has been one of the most dynamic sources of Indonesia’s foreign exchange earnings (Erwidodo & Astana 2004, 7). Global usage for palm oil, in the food industry, farming, chemicals, and for detergents, increased by 70 percent since 1995 (Everson 2007, 28). Eighty-three percent of all oil palm comes from Indonesia and Malaysia (MacKinnon 2007). Malaysia is the largest, Indonesia the second largest supplier of palm oil in the world. The production of palm oil has grown remarkably since the late 1960s. The area of palm oil plantations has increased from 106,000 ha in 1967 to 3.2 million ha in 2000 (Erwidodo & Astana 2004, 7). Most of the plantations are located on Sumatra and Kalimantan. The government supports plantations with subsidies and other incentives. It allocated 9.1 million hectares of land for oil palm in east Kalimantan alone, all of this was cleared using slashand-burn14 (Everson 2007, 28). Market pressure from outside is extremely high (Atje 2008; Surya 2008). Palm oil mostly goes to India and China. It is also increasingly requested in Europe and North America since it is considered to be a “bio crop” that can be processed to bio-diesel. Palm oil is the cheapest and most efficient crop to produce bio-energy. The high awareness about climate change and clean energies has skyrocketed the demand for all kinds of “bio” products (Guerin 2007; MacKinnon 2007). A 2003 EU directive mandates that all member states use bio-fuel for 5.75 percent of all fuels by 2010 and increase that ratio to eight percent by 2015 (Guerin 2007). The increasing demand results in an environmental paradox: While providing environmentally friendly fuels to 14

The so-called slash-and-burn agriculture consists of cutting and burning of forests or woodlands to create fields for agriculture or pasture for livestock, or for a variety of other purposes. It has been used by small farmers and shifting cultivators for hundreds of years.

2 Problem Structure

103

the world, Indonesia is increasingly clearing forests and emitting carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. The greenhouse effect of destroying the equatorial forests to produce palm oil will be more significant than the benefits that can be derived from switching to bio-diesel (Everson 2007, 32; MacKinnon 2007; Agence France Press 2008). Concerns in Europe about the adverse environmental impact could threaten the palm oil industry massively. Europe might switch to import products from other regions (Guerin 2007). The Indonesian branch of WWF sees some market capacity for clean products that do not involve burning, like Germany, Europe, and North America. The market for products where burning was involved could close in the future (Wibisono 2008). Jakarta is increasingly aware of the dangers but the central government is unable to regulate land clearances and to prevent continuing illegal logging. Indonesian president Yudhoyono has declared bio-fuels as the “key engine of future economic growth” (Guerin 2007). The expansion of palm oil plantation is probably the largest single commercial force behind deforestation. At the moment, more than 6.4 million hectares of land is filled with palm oil crops producing more than 100 million liter of palm oil per year. The island of Sumatra is completely filled with plantations so that companies have now started to use land on the islands of Kalimantan, Papua and Sulawesi as well. 2.4 Results: Actors’ Constellations 2.4.1 Position of Actors in the Haze Regime Upon identification of the two categories, vulnerability and abatement costs, I can define the position each involved actor will take in the haze regime. The countries that are most vulnerable to haze pollution are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei. These countries either have been source to haze outbreaks themselves or border a country that has frequently been source of haze incidents. However, Indonesia is less vulnerable than the other three since the country is also reaping economic benefits from forest fires. The other countries only have to deal with the negative effects while Indonesia has a share in the negative effects as well as in the positive ones. Indonesia’s interest in solving the haze problem is ambiguous. The countries in mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam) have a certain amount of interest in the haze regime. Their vulnerability is low today but could increase rapidly. Thus, these countries could potentially also develop rather high abatement costs in terms of combating transboundary haze pollution. The Philippines are not vulnerable because they do not border any other country and thus cannot

104

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

be affected by externalities and cannot cause externalities for others. Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are not sources of haze pollution but are negatively affected by haze from Indonesia. They cannot engage in haze prevention since the problem takes place in the jurisdiction of another country. However, they are left with the costs that each transboundary haze catastrophe brings across the border. Their only remedy is to increase pressure on Indonesia to find a way to stop the problem and to offer coordinated help in order to keep haze crises under control. This makes these countries strong advocates, pushers, of the haze regime. Singapore is a city-state without agriculture and forest and Brunei only has a small amount of forests and has never been a source of a reported haze episode. Malaysia obtains huge reservoirs of tropical forest but has succeeded in effective zero-burning policies. Still, the country has an ambivalent role in the haze game since it reaps profits from Indonesia. Malaysia has been accused to facilitate legal and semi-legal imports of Indonesian forest products. The country is reportedly engaged in timber smuggling activities and refuses to take legal action against the problem. Moreover, many of the big plantation companies on Indonesian ground that are accused of using fire to clear land are owned by Malaysians (Everson 2007, 31). From the 34 biggest plantation groups that operate in Indonesia Malaysian consortiums own seven.15 Therefore, Indonesia still does not feel fully responsible for the haze problem. Malaysia is publicly blaming Indonesia for causing haze and being inactive in solving the problem while at the same time the country is exploiting Indonesia (Surya 2008). Malaysian firms are clearly benefiting from haze (Atje 2008). For these two reasons, Malaysia could be attributed to have an interest in ongoing fires. The country profits from receiving the forest products and can externalize the negative effects (being blamed publicly) to a certain extent (not the health effects). Therefore, in case the haze regime becomes effective Malaysia might switch its supporting position for a more hesitant one. But until now, the country is preoccupied with minimizing the negative effects of haze pollution. It is still a pusher for the haze regime due to the fear of negative externalities. The last actor in the game, Indonesia, is the key player. Whereas affected states have a clear interest to prevent and stop all activities that might lead to the haze, Indonesia has different interests. The occurrence of haze is strongly linked with business interests of plantation owners who use fires to clear land for agricultural purposes. Agricultural production and export of goods is beneficial for the country’s economy. Therefore, Indonesia also has an interest in maximizing the positive economic effects of land clearance. Although the country itself is highly affected by negative aspects of haze pollution and has suffered substantially by haze outbreaks, it 15

Indonesia itself holds 18 companies; the rest is spread in ownership.

2 Problem Structure

105

has been shown in the previous section that Indonesia has extremely high abatement costs to solve the problem. The country lacks sufficient material funds and skilled personnel to organize and implement early action in case of fire incidents. Also, the country is completely unable to enforce existing laws on the prohibition of fire. Corruption, lacking knowledge, insufficient willingness and the seduction by large profits hinders the establishment of sustainable forest management in the country. These gigantic deficits and the incredibly high number of measures necessary to improve the situation are perceived to be much higher than the costs the country has to bear in each case of haze outbreak. Thus, Indonesia is remaining inactive and hopes that the weather will stay favorable and prevent new incidents of severe haze pollution. This makes the country a dragger in the haze regime. Table 15: Positions of Countries in the Haze Regime Pusher Intermediate Bystander Dragger

Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam Philippines Indonesia

Source: own assessment.

2.4.2 Problem Malignancy As argued in the theoretical chapter for many problems in international affairs different states have different interests. Many times interests are not in perfect harmony but are conflicting among all involved actors (Rittberger & Zürn 1991, 166). If all involved actors had congruent positions on how to solve a problem the chances for regime creation and effectiveness were rather high. In our case of transboundary haze pollution we have identified four different positions of all involved actors. Three countries are pushing in favor for the haze regime, one country is hindering the effective implementation of the regime, five countries have a mixed position (not pushing strongly but also not opposing), and one country has no stake in the issue. Although more countries seem to be in favor of the haze regime in numerical terms, the problem is that the one country opposing the regime is the key player in the game. As problems of negative externalities are problems with highly asymmetrical distributions of costs and benefits this one country, Indonesia, is of utmost importance for the regime. Naturally for problems of negative externality not only costs and benefits are distributed asymmetrical but also cleavage structures are highly cumulative instead of crosscutting. This would be different if all involved state actor were sources of

106

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

haze pollution and receivers of it at the same time. This would represent a mutual problem. States are causing a problem and are also affected by other states causing a problem. However, here the problem is not one of mutuality. The roles of all involved state actors are clear: one is causing the problem, others are affected by it. Thus, cleavages are not spread equally among the actors. Cleavages remain static and cumulative in that winning or losing on one dimension also means to win or lose on all other dimensions. Only the degree of negative affection varies from crisis to crisis. If Indonesia remains a dragging force, the other countries (even if all other countries would be strong pushers) remain powerless. This fundamental conflict causes a dilemma of collective action for the haze regime. No effective implementation can be reached without Indonesia. However, it has also been argued that Indonesia has a certain interest to solve the problem. For once, it also is affected negatively by the costs of haze catastrophes and surely cannot afford a high frequency of haze outbreaks on its territory. Second, Indonesia has an interest to control the policy of plantation owners who set fires in order to clear land. Indonesia knows that it has to protect its forests in order to secure a stable ecosystem. It also sees that it does not reap much of the profits gained by setting fires because many plantations are owned by foreign companies that ship the profits away. And third, Indonesia has a strong interest in keeping good relations with its neighbors. The country also has no interest in causing dramatic health and economic damage to its neighbors. Indonesia has a long-term interest to maintain strong and friendly relations with its neighbors. The country is a founding member of ASEAN and has engaged in improving neighborhood relations during the last forty years. ASEAN is constantly deepening its cooperation in various issue-areas. Causing haze pollution on a frequent basis would definitely damage Indonesia’s reputation among the ASEAN member states. Especially after the country’s democratic revolution in 1998 it has been engaged in establishing good neighboring relations. These three aspects inspire me to claim that the interests of the involved actors are not completely incongruent. There is a certain consensus in favor of stopping activities that might lead to haze pollution. The problem to make more of this consensus is that only one country, namely Indonesia, has to take all efforts alone. This puts the country under severe stress. Following the situation-structural approach in game theory, our case study falls in the category of a coordination game (without distributional conflict). It is not a dilemma game since these games presuppose that all actors have more or less the same situation and do not reach the cooperative optimum only because of uncertainty and lack of information. The information of our case study so far could indicate the existence of a Rambo game with Indonesia playing this part. Undoubtedly Indonesia is the dominant actor. Indonesia even has the freedom

2 Problem Structure

107

not to participate in the haze regime and neglect all regime rules. However, I argue that the haze problem still is not a Rambo game. Two crucial points can substantiate my claim. First, a Rambo actor can do as she pleases without facing serious negative consequences. It is true that there are no hard sanctioning remedies to keep Indonesia from causing haze pollution. It is a sovereign country and can act autonomously on its territory. However, this does not mean that Indonesia is completely free in its actions. I have argued earlier that the country is firmly embedded in the structures of ASEAN. Thus, the country can definitely not risk damaging its reputation by causing haze pollution to be suffered from other neighboring countries. Furthermore, whenever haze pollution has occurred Indonesia has been in urgent need of foreign assistance in order to suppress fires and pay for the damage. Therefore, not only the reputation among neighbors is of utmost importance but also the standing in the international community. Second, for Rambo actors there is nothing to be gained from cooperation. The Rambo actor will get her most favored outcome without cooperation (while all other actors need cooperation to reach their collective optimum). This does definitely not apply to Indonesia. Although the country profits from quickly cleared land and large amounts of sold forest products, it also has tremendous costs when haze crises break out. The occurrence of haze pollution is definitely not a preferred outcome for Indonesia. The country would profit much more from well-regulated forest management and law enforcement. The preferred outcome is something in the middle: keeping economic benefits from plantation products high while at the same time avoid crises of haze pollution. Thus, Indonesia has a certain interest in cooperation. I argue that the haze problem in Southeast Asia is a coordination game. There is an overarching consensus among all actors to avoid future haze crises. However, actors are discordant about how to achieve this goal. While the pro-regime countries aim at emergency assistance and sustainable forest management in Indonesia, Indonesia itself is unable to initiate important governance reforms and is blaming Malaysia for silently profiting from the haze without paying the price. Indonesia’s preference is a clear policy change in Malaysia as well as more financial aid from other countries. Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei’s preference is to initiate and support extensive governance reforms in Indonesia in order to prevent haze pollution in the long run. Thus, there is no obvious solution to accommodate these different preferences. A new consensus among all actors has to be identified. In sum, what we are dealing with is a problem of negative externalities with only one source (Indonesia). This problem is characterized by a high asymmetry of costs and benefits among the involved actors and by cumulative cleavage structures. The source country of transboundary haze pollution is the dominant actor in the regime. If Indonesia chooses to drag, no improvement can

108

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

be expected. This makes the problem a malign one in which the chances for effective cooperation are low. Indonesia’s economic dependence on foreign trade with forest products and its extremely high abatement costs regarding fire suppression and sustainable forest management put a severe strain on all efforts to tackle the problem of ongoing transboundary haze pollution. However, I argue that the problem is not strongly malign. Indonesia is not completely opposed to efforts to combat haze pollution. Interests among the involved actors show a certain degree of consensus about the positive effects of solving the problem. There are elements of congruity that do not preclude an agreement. Thus, the problem is situated somewhere between being moderately and strongly malign. As argued in the theoretical chapter, it is not impossible to deal successfully with malign problems. To achieve effectiveness, problems of malign nature need to be tackled with a regime of high problem-solving capacity or with special incentives for cooperative behavior like issue-linkages or financial aids. It is these aspects that will be analyzed in the next section. 3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime 3.1 Composition of the Haze Regime Core of the haze regime is the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution that was adopted in late 2002 and entered into force roughly one year later (29 November 2003). The regime has no organizational structure behind it. Monitoring of the Agreement’s provisions is embedded into existing structures of ASEAN. The Environment Division of the Socio-Cultural Cooperation Department at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia has been issued responsibility for the Agreement. Many activities by ASEAN before and after the adoption of the Agreement will also be included in the analysis of the regime. The activities before the adoption of the Agreement were clearly helping to formulate the concrete provisions of it. The activities that have been undertaken after the Agreement’s adoption either result directly from the Agreement’s provisions or can be seen as indirect consequences of it. Thus, I regard the haze regime as more than just one Agreement. It is a multitude of activities of ASEAN with a legally binding treaty at its core.

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

109

3.2 The ASEAN Agreement and its Predecessors The two important documents, the 1995 Cooperation Plan and the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan, as well as the establishment of the Haze Technical Task Force were significant milestones on the way to the ASEAN Haze Agreement. Many of the provisions and ideas laid down in these documents and the strategies to monitor and implement projects have been incorporated into the Agreement. The stated objectives to suppress fires more effectively as well as to prevent their outbreak in the long run can be found in all documents. However, the two mentioned documents are still rather a crisis response strategy than a strategic document on sustainable ecological management. Although transboundary haze pollution had been a recurring problem since the early 1980s, ASEAN took up the topic on a much later date. The 1990 Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development was the first ASEAN declaration to mention transboundary pollution, in that it called for “harmonisation of transboundary prevention and abatement practices” (ASEAN 1990). “Haze” pollution was mentioned explicitly in an ASEAN resolution in 1992 for the first time. In the 1992 Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development, the member states declared to aim to “[…] undertake to develop and implement specific programmes relating to: haze caused by forest fires, air and water quality management, natural resources and environmental accounting, environmental economics, trans-frontier parks and other protected areas, a regional network for biological diversity conservation and protection of the marine environment in ASEAN seas” (ASEAN 1992).

Concrete activities undertaken by ASEAN to combat the haze have always taken place in response to haze outbreaks in the region. It took the major haze crisis in Indonesia in 1994 to trigger first action to combat the haze. The transboundary environmental disaster of that year had led to the adoption of the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution (ASEAN 1995). Malaysia was the driving force of the plan mainly because the hazardous haze coming from Indonesia affected the country the most. The Plan attempted to develop a common ASEAN air quality index and a common fire-danger rating system. The Appendix of the Cooperation Plan contains a proposal for the establishment of a Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF). The HTTF comprised of senior officials from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Measures included the demarcation of critical areas of fires, identification of critical periods, organization of proper data collection and making available of satellite data, and development of a proper monitoring system. The 1995 Cooperation Plan has failed largely due to the lack of implementation (Tay 1998). There have been no con-

110

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

crete steps on implementation and no compliance mechanisms. Only few concrete changes in Indonesia’s logging practices since the 1995 accord can be observed (Dauvergne 1997, 8; Rosenberg 1999, 138). “What is noteworthy in this document is the avoidance of any mention of the promotion of forest conservation or protection as a means of minimizing the generation of smoke” (Cotton 1999, 343). The Haze Technical Task Force is also lacking specific operational directives. Thus, the whole endeavor remained ineffective. The Haze Task Force has done little in integrating environmental concern into Indonesia’s economic planning and management, improve institutional mechanisms, or widen public participation. The ineffectiveness of the Haze Technical Task Force can mainly be traced back to the principle of non-interference into other country’s affairs which has often stymied the Task Force’s efforts (Rosenberg 1999, 138). As a new initiative, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Haze adopted the establishment of a Regional Haze Action Plan, RHAP for the purpose of designing new operational guidelines for the 1995 Cooperation Plan (ASEAN). The RHAP contains three major components, namely, prevention, to be coordinated by Malaysia (training of firefighters), mitigation, to be coordinated by Indonesia (implementation of the zero-burning technique), and monitoring, to be coordinated by Singapore (hotspots, air quality index, amount of land burnt) (Rosenberg 1999, 141; ASEAN 2002, 36/37; UNESCAP 2006, 299). The primary objectives are to prevent forest fires through improved natural resource management policies and enforcement, to establish operational mechanisms for monitoring land and forest fires, and to strengthen regional land and forest fire-fighting capability, implementation of zero-burn and controlled burn policies, disaster relief efforts, research and development, and the establishment of a trust fund (Provision 4) (ASEAN & ADB 2001, 60; ASEAN 2002, 43; Florano 2004, 2). The Action Plan is a non-binding agreement. In 1997 the adoption of a soft law instrument was probably the only option. It hurried the adoption relieving countries from complex ratification processes and compliance pressures. It gave time to gather more knowledge for a binding treaty (that was already being discussed) and it gave ASEAN the flexibility to pilot-test and adjust the recommended measures. During the 1997 financial and haze crisis there were calls for more open debate, especially coming from then-foreign minister in Thailand Surin Pitsuwan (now Secretary-General of ASEAN). Indonesia’s crisis management was publicly discussed. There was agreement that the problem originates in Indonesia and that it was Indonesia’s major responsibility to resolve (Rosenberg 1999, 139). Many ASEAN countries felt increasing pressure from international agencies, the scientific community, and popular environmental movements at home and abroad to pursue sustainable development policies. Previously, ASEAN countries had frequently “defended their right to use their natural

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

111

resources to further economic development, as did the industrialized countries before them” (Rosenberg 1999, 139). Only recently have environmental groups started to resist this view. The Regional Haze Action Plan represented a genuine regional effort in Southeast Asia of dealing with a transboundary. The Action Plan provides a forum to raise issues, define the problem, and set criteria and standards for a solution; a way to formulate prevention and remedial policies; a mechanism to set targets and timetables for implementing solutions; and an ability to ensure compliance through annual reviews and financial incentives. However, it must be admitted that it took a major environmental catastrophe to move ASEAN to act. Furthermore, the measures of the Action Plan do not go to the roots of the problem but only recommend measures on fire-fighting, monitoring, information dissemination and the like. The Action Plan does not single out Indonesia as being responsible for the haze in order not to antagonize the country. The question of international legal liability is not asked. There was no institutional support for the prioritization of environmental law and policy making in ASEAN, related to the ASEAN aversion to strong regional institutions. Also, the costs of sustainable environmental protection were expected to be gigantic. Towards the end of the 1997-98 haze crisis activism on haze-related topics blossomed throughout the region. With the support of international funds and also with the help of a new emerging willingness to actively engage ASEAN countries, a number of small and large-scale projects were launched. However, all of these measures did not help to prevent new fire outbreaks in the following years. Finally in 2002, the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution represented a new effort to combat the haze problem. The 2002 ASEAN Haze Agreement strives to fill the lacuna of the previous documents and represents a more comprehensive strategy. Table 16: Status of Ratification of the Haze Agreement as of 22 December 2010 Country

Ratification / Approval

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

27 February 2003 24 April 2006 not ratified 19 December 2004 3 December 2002 5 March 2003 1 February 2010 13 January 2003 10 September 2003 24 March 2003

Deposit of Instrument of Ratification / Approval with the Sec-Gen of ASEAN 23 April 2003 9 November 2006 not ratified 13 July 2005 18 February 2003 17 March 2003 4 March 2010 January 2003 26 September 2003 29 May 2003

Source: http://haze.asean.org/hazeagreement/status.

112

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

Its provisions stress the need to monitor fire activities, improve fire-fighting capacity and ultimately to prevent the outbreak of future fires. It is a full-fledged treaty regime with legally binding obligations. The Agreement was adopted in late 2002 and entered into force on 29 November 2003. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam have become party to the agreement. The state that has yet to ratify is Indonesia. The adoption of the Agreement itself is noteworthy. The fact that the Agreement was adopted and brought into force relatively swiftly signals a strong willingness of ASEAN to engage in an issue of transboundary concern and deal with it in a “more formalistic manner, entailing, for the first time, legal rights and obligations for member states” (Tan 2005, 649). The serious willingness of ASEAN member states to engage in this rather Indonesia problem expresses an unprecedented appreciation of regional interconnectedness. For all its weaknesses and inability to guarantee state compliance, there is at least one modest benefit that the Agreement has engendered. This is the expression of the collective expectation (albeit, a non-enforceable one) among the ASEAN states for effective action to be taken to combat future forest and land fires (Tan 2005, 721). 3.3 The Problem of Indonesia’s (non-)Ratification Indonesia has decided not to ratify the agreement. Indonesian officials say that the country has made great progress in curbing forest fires and does not need a regional haze agreement (Pathoni 2008). The benefits from the treaty are claimed to be much smaller in comparison to the gigantic costs of compliance. Moreover, the Agreement is not subject to reservations (Art. 30), which means that once a country ratifies the Agreement it is bound to comply with all existing provisions. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s signature would be an important symbol to express the country’s acknowledgement of the problem and its serious will to solve it (Prasiddha 2008; Wibisono 2008). It could be assumed that Indonesia will receive more assistance from other countries upon ratification (Wibisono 2008). Some segments of the Indonesian polity have recently signaled support for the agreement (Lee 2008). The Indonesian Minister of the Environment has stressed his commitment to get the ratification (Prasiddha 2008). At the moment, however, the agreement is stuck in the Indonesian parliament and waits for approval. Many parliamentarians want to make ratification contingent upon Malaysia’s pending signature on a ban of illegal logging. Malaysia is one of the biggest importer of Indonesian timber and probably the biggest profiteer of forest fires. However, they refuse to engage in a serious fight against illegal logging. Thus, Indonesia has the feeling that once it ratifies the Agreement it will

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

113

officially confirm that the country is solely responsible for haze pollution. Many Indonesian officials do not share this view and attempt to direct some of the blame to Malaysia (Anish 2008). Nevertheless, although not having ratified the treaty Indonesia has actually implemented many of its provisions. The country has acknowledged the “benefit to act and follow the ASEAN spirit of cooperation and they are eager to overcome the problem” (Prasiddha 2008). Indonesia has an interest to improve its actions against haze pollution because they have caused their neighbors many troubles. By implementing the Agreement’s provision Indonesia shows good political will. This is highly valued in ASEAN meetings. The atmosphere in ASEAN meetings has improved over the last years. Whereas Indonesia’s neighbors had exercised finger pointing in the late 1990s, countries are now focusing on cooperation and long-term prevention measures. ASEAN member states have understood how complex the situation in Indonesia is and are willing to engage in assistance (Prasiddha 2008). Latest efforts to convince Indonesia to ratify the Haze Agreement were conducted in 2006 during the most severe haze crisis since 1997. For about two months thick haze clouds from fires on Borneo and Sumatra disrupted flights and triggered health warnings in Singapore and Malaysia. The two neighboring countries made financial help to combat the crisis contingent upon Indonesia’s ratification of the treaty. Only with the country’s ratification would a regional coordinating centre for all haze activities be able to be established (Karmini 2006). President Yudhoyono promised to sign but nothing happened. 3.4 Provisions of the Agreement 3.4.1 General Provisions The ASEAN Haze Agreement aims to “prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a result of land and/or forest fires which should be mitigated, through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation” (Art. 2).

Articles 4 to 9 obtain a number of non-binding general obligations. Parties should cooperate to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution and control sources of fires (Art. 4,1). Parties are obliged to respond promptly to requests for information and consultation when fires originate from within their territory (Art. 4,2). Most significantly, state parties “shall take legislative, administrative and/or other measures” to implement their obligations (Art. 4,3).

114

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

Parties shall undertake measures to prevent and control activities related to land and/or forest fires including developing and implementing legislative and other regulatory measures (Art. 9). These and further measures (Art. 16) encompass more or less the same tools that the 1995 Cooperation Plan and the Regional Haze Action Plan has listed before. These provisions are broad and well intended and include important measures. However, nothing on sanctions or penalties can be found. Therefore, these articles do not differ substantially from the existing soft law regulations. 3.4.2 Institutional Arrangements The ASEAN Haze Agreement aims to operate with six different institutional arrangements: a Co-ordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (Art. 5,1), a supervisory Committee (Art. 5,3), National Monitoring Centres (Art. 7 and 8), a Conference of the Parties (Art. 18,1), a Secretariat (Art. 19), and a Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund (Art. 20). The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control is the main hub for all haze related activities. Its task is to facilitate all kinds of technical cooperation between the member states (Art. 16,2). In detail, it shall receive, consolidate, and analyze data from the National Monitoring Centres of the member states (Art. 8,2) and then provide member states with assessments based upon the received data (Art. 8,3). Establishment and maintenance of databases on available fire experts, experts for training, education, awareness raising, available equipment and technical facilities in the member states, and on donor states and organizations are the two responsibilities of the Centre. A Committee composed of representatives of national authorities of the parties shall oversee the operations of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre. It functions mainly as a supervisory board for all important decisions. National Monitoring Centres shall be designated by each party to undertake regular monitoring on fire prone areas and general environmental conditions (Art. 7,2) and to communicate regularly to the Co-ordinating Centre (Art. 8,1). The National Monitoring Centres are responsible for providing the Co-ordinating Centre with all necessary information on fire and the environmental situation. These Monitoring Centres can be located at national or regional state agencies or other relevant units. The Conference of the Parties shall hold annual meetings of the member states in which progress on implementation is reviewed and evaluated and in case to “take such action as is necessary to ensure the effective implementation” (Art. 18,3). The COP rotates between the member states and is convened in conjunction with the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (Prasiddha 2008). The Confe-

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

115

rence of Parties shall consider reports and other information that may be submitted by a party directly or through the Secretariat, and consider and adopt protocols and any amendments. The COP can also establish subsidiary bodies or any additional action as may be required for the implementation of provisions and thus for the achievement of the objectives of the Agreement. For organizational support, a Secretariat of the Agreement is to be established. The Haze Secretariat has the function to arrange for and service meetings of the Conference of the Parties and of other bodies established by this Agreement, to transmit to the parties notifications, reports and other information received in accordance with this Agreement, to consider inquiries by, and information from, the parties, and to consult with them on questions relating to this Agreement, and to ensure the necessary coordination with other relevant international bodies and in particular to enter into administrative arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of the Secretariat functions (Art. 19,2). The structures of the ASEAN Secretariat will function as Secretariat to this Agreement (Art. 19,3). The Agreement proposes the establishment of an ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund. The Fund is to receive voluntary contributions made by the state parties (Art. 20,4). The Fund is also open to external contributions (Art. 20,5). The ASEAN Secretariat under the guidance of the Conference of Parties shall administer the Fund (Art. 20,3). 3.4.3 Proposed Measures Measures to combat transboundary haze pollution in the Agreement encompass activities of risk assessment, prevention, preparedness, emergency response, deployment of people, equipment and material across borders, as well as technical cooperation and scientific research. Monitoring of fire-prone areas and hotspots shall be conducted by the National Monitoring Centre of each country (Art. 7). The ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre is responsible for the assessment of risks and strategies (Art. 8). Proposed measures to prevent the outbreak of fires and haze (Art. 9) include the development and implementation of legislative and other regulatory measures as well as programs and strategies to promote zeroburning policy to deal with fires. Furthermore, local fire management and firefighting capability shall be strengthened. Public education and awarenessbuilding campaigns shall be conducted. Local communities with their indigenous knowledge on fire prevention shall be incorporated in all efforts of fire management. The Agreement proposes that each member country develops Standard Operation Procedures for the case of emergency in order to ensure preparedness and early action (Art. 10). Parties shall ensure that appropriate

116

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

legislative, administrative, and financial measures are taken (Art. 11). One of the most important pillars of the Haze Agreement is the significance of technical cooperation between the parties (Art. 16). Mobilization and exchange of all kinds of necessary resources need to be guaranteed and practiced smoothly and timely. Standardized information on technology, personnel, techniques and know-how needs to be available for all parties. Relevant trainings, education and awareness-raising campaigns, in particular relating to the promotion of alternative land clearing methods, shall be conducted frequently on all relevant levels. The Haze Agreement urges the parties to develop affordable techniques on controlled burning particularly for shifting cultivators and small farmers, and to exchange and share experiences on these practices. Fire-fighters need to be trained with newest insights and techniques at the local, national and regional level. The parties shall support scientific and technical research programs related to the root causes and consequences of transboundary haze pollution and the means, methods, techniques and equipment for fire management (Art. 17). 3.5 Compliance Mechanisms In the theoretical section it has been argued that sanctions for non-compliant behavior might be inadequate to foster regime effectiveness. Instead, Chayes & Chayes’ model of “managerial compliance” has been presented as a useful tool to organize compliance mechanisms for international regimes. The managerial model sets its focus on the positive rewards for compliant behavior. Having the specific cooperation context of Southeast Asia in mind, this model could be of use in our case study. Since the countries in the region guard nothing more than their national sovereignty they would never engage in punishing another country for non-compliance or would never allow to be punished by other countries. Instead, a focus on how to strengthen compliance could circumvent the taboo zone of national sovereignty. There are no provisions in the Agreement about sanctions for noncompliance with the provisions of the Agreement. Automatic compliance is assumed. Compliance will be rewarded with good neighborhood relations and assistance in crisis situations. The association has always avoided spelling out sanctions for non-compliance in order to keep a good spirit of cooperation. Article 25 states that parties shall “transmit to the Secretariat reports on the measures taken for the implementation of this Agreement in such form and at such intervals as determined by the Conference of the Parties”.

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

117

The COP specifies the frequency and content of the reports but does not provide any measures for non-compliance. A close examination of the Agreement’s provisions reveals well-known patterns of the ASEAN decision-making style resulting in a lack of enforceability (Ooi et al. 2002, 141; Quah 2002, 432; Tan 2005, 650). Provisions are generally well crafted but lack the capacity for implementation. ASEAN has always left all aspects of implementation to its member states. Under no circumstances does the association want to interfere into the domestic affairs of its members. It rather leaves it completely open how to interpret provisions and also how to implement them into domestic legislation. It is understandable that ASEAN has chosen to follow this tradition in our case of haze pollution since especially this problem is structured so delicately that sanctions would only target Indonesia and thus antagonize the country altogether. Thus, ASEAN has engaged in voluntary cooperation and has offered specialized assistance based on the cooperating countries’ expertise and/or capabilities. The Agreement does not address the root causes of the fires (natural resource management, land tenure conflicts, crony capitalism, mega-development projects, illegal logging in protected areas, and rampant corruption in all levels of government). The Agreement concentrates on technical solutions. Thus, even if Indonesia were to fully comply with the treaty’s obligations, these are but immediate and short-term measures, which do not address the long-term fundamental problem of unsound forest management in Indonesia. This would have antagonized Indonesia in such a way that cooperative efforts would have been blocked completely. However, the complete surrender of strong, legally enforceable norms might render efforts of regime effectiveness impossible (Tan 2005, 649). Especially when having in mind that ASEAN had engaged in various steps to combat haze pollution before it adopted the agreement. There have been quite some soft law regulations and action plans. These have not contributed to solve the problem. Haze crises have occurred with high frequency ever since. In this regard it is puzzling why the new agreement has not taken a step further and has not incorporated some enforceable provisions into its body. One could even go so far and ask why such a treaty was necessary at all? Would Indonesia’s ratification bring any change? Can the problem of transboundary haze pollution be solved at all by the Agreement? Drastically expressed, the ASEAN Haze Agreement is a document of good ideas and good will. On the one hand this can be seen as a major weakness of the treaty since it leaves the affected countries empty-handed. On the other hand, the catalogue style of measures might help their implementation. The treaty encompasses a sound collection of appropriate measures. The usefulness to implement these measures is obvious also for Indonesia. The proposed measures in the Agreement can be taken out of the legal document and be put in a non-

118

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

legal environment. Indonesia could then start to work on the implementation of single or more measures without being stuck to the legal Agreement. In other words, compliance with the ASEAN Haze Agreement can be strengthened by abandoning the treaty. Exactly this has happened in reality. The chances for Indonesia’s signature are rather low and this will not change any time soon. Nevertheless efforts at ASEAN meetings since 1997 have never ceased to persuade Indonesia to agree to specific measures. Indonesia, although refusing signature, has always been invited to share its progress and profit from other countries’ input. Today, meetings of the Sub-regional Ministerial Steering Committee, the most important forum on haze topics, focus on Indonesia’s progress. A list of measures has been prepared and Indonesia regularly reports on progress to implement these measures (Prasiddha 2008). The list is called Indonesia’s Comprehensive Plan of Action on Forest and Land Fire Control. What it really is, is a reformulated catalogue of measures stemming from the Haze Agreement – without mentioning it. Indonesia’s Plan of Action was adopted at an ASEAN workshop in 2006 (ASEAN 2007b). The Plan of Action consists of four sections: prevention, suppression, early warning, and transboundary cooperation. The First Meeting of the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution held on 9 November 2006. It endorsed Indonesia’s Plan of Action in dealing with Transboundary Haze Pollution. The MSC also agreed with Indonesia’s proposal that Member Countries of the MSC may, through the Central Government of Indonesia, wish to adopt one or more fireprone districts/regencies for enhancing capacity to deal with land and forest fires (ASEAN 2006b). Indonesia has started implementation on the following measures (ASEAN 2007c). Thirty-five fire-prone districts have developed their respective action plans; a budget to support the implementation of Indonesia’s Plan of Action and for the Panel of ASEAN Experts is set up; a monitoring and law enforcement system has been put in place on the provincial level (Riau); law enforcement is implemented in the fire-prone areas as a deterrent for both individuals and plantation companies; task forces have been set up in Kalimantan and in Sumatra to closely monitor the fire and haze situation; a Presidential Decree is currently being drafted to implement the national action plan on sustainable management of peatlands, with efforts focusing on rehabilitation of degraded peatlands and water management. Indonesia estimates that it needs USD 215 million to implement all provisions. A minimum of ten percent is supposed to be generated from foreign donations. Singapore and the Asian Development Bank have already signaled their willingness to donate. Other countries in the region support the plan and try to help Indonesia to realize its provisions, for example to stock the Haze Control Fund with a minimum of money. 700 billion Indonesian Rupiah (USD 72 million) have been mobilized to implement

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

119

the Plan of Action until 2007 (ASEAN 2007c). In 2007 as compared to 2006, the number of hotspots in Sumatra and Borneo could be reduced by 51 percent due to wetter weather and also to Indonesia’s implementation efforts (ASEAN 2008a). Indonesia aims to reduce the number of hotspots by another 50 percent in 2009, 75 percent in 2012 and 95 percent in 2025, with the 2006 figures as the baseline (ASEAN 2008a). The budget for haze-related activities was elevated to more than 800 billion Rupiah (USD 83 million) in 2008 (ASEAN 2008a). New and more concrete actions are taken by Indonesia in 2008 to implement its Plan of Action. Ten governors in Sumatra have secured their commitment to save ecosystems in Sumatra. Hotspots are monitored regularly. There is a daily monitoring of particle matter PM10 in Riau; maps of burnt areas have been produced; business activities are under close surveillance; an awareness campaign for land and forest fire control, zero-burning, community-based fire management have been launched in various fire-prone districts; the Central Kalimantan Act no. 58/2008 regarding guidelines for land clearing by community has been enacted; and technical assistance and incentives, e.g. seedlings, equipment and herbicides have been provided to farmers practicing zero-burning (ASEAN 2008b). However, the plan is mostly of a very technical nature. It describes the need for specific equipment, the development of early warning systems, and potential locations for air quality measuring stations. It does not address the root causes of the fires and does not propose any action to eradicate these. In 2007 and 2008, the Ministry of Forestry has allocated its entire haze budget (USD 31 million) to fire suppression efforts (including the payment of the rent of helicopter). However to obtain real and sustained achievement in addressing forest and land fires in a longer term, the first approach needed is to focus on prevention measures that can minimize the risks of destructive fires. Therefore, like the ASEAN Haze Agreement, the Plan of Action is also a myopic catalogue of crisis response measures. 3.6 Available Resources The haze regime consists of measures to combat transboundary haze pollution that are laid down in different documents, most of all in the ASEAN Haze Agreement. There is no separate “haze organization” that dedicates its efforts to eradicate the problem. In contrast, the haze regime is embedded in existing structures of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. The ASEAN Secretariat has four departments. The Environment Unit, which is responsible for haze related topics, belongs to the Socio-Cultural Department. There are only a handful desk officers working in the Environment Unit. The Unit is headed by

120

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

Dr. Raman Letchumanan, a respected and renowned expert in the field. In general, environmental topics are not the most prominent ones to be discussed at ASEAN. Therefore, resources available for environmental issues are scarce. The Department head Dr. Anish (2008) frankly admits that “environment is always the last topic to be discussed”. Especially since the economic downturn of 2008 environmental topics have lost much of their weight. Only discussions about international climate change have made it to a higher rank on the ASEAN agenda due to international coverage and engagement. However, most environmental issues are left to be managed at the national level. They are not considered to be matters of region-wide importance (Anish 2008). In general, ASEAN is a very weak actor in financial terms. Each member state contributes one million US Dollars for the annual budget on the Secretariat. Projects have to be financed by member states’ voluntary donations or international assistance. ASEAN seeks collaboration from the international community in further developing and implementing initiatives (ASEAN 2002, 53). Figure 6: Organizational Chart for Haze-related Activities at ASEAN ASEAN Secretariat

ASEAN Summit

AMME

AMMH

CSU

abolished

abolished

Conference of Parties

Environment Unit later: Co-ordinating Centre

Committee

MSC

TWG Mekong

ASOEN TWG Haze Haze Control Fund HTTF abolished

ASOEN HTTF AMMH CSU

ASMC

Panel of Experts

ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment Haze Technical Task Force ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze Coordination and Support Unit

AMME TWG MSC ASMC

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment Technical Working Group Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee ASEAN Meteorological Center

Source: own graph based upon ASEAN documents and interviews.

The Environment Unit is not dedicated exclusively to the problem of haze. It is responsible for all kinds of environmental issues in the region, like the research and publication of State of the Environment Reports, the initiation and implementation of environmental projects (clean cities, peatland strategy, biodiversity centre, etc) and the implementation of international environmental agreements in the region. In short, all issues pertaining to environmental cooperation in

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

121

ASEAN fall under the purview of the Environment Unit. This unit services working groups, senior officials and ministerial meetings as resource person and rapporteur as well as assists ASEAN bodies by providing substantive inputs in the planning, implementation and monitoring of various cooperative projects on environment undertaken by them. It provides support for the institutional bodies. It coordinates the implementation of regional activities and programs. It ensures coordination among activities of other sectoral areas to promote synergy and avoid duplication (ASEAN 2002, 48). It promotes coordination among ASEAN bodies and programs and those of dialogue partners and other international organizations in terms of resource mobilization, program implementation and institutional linkages (ASEAN 2002, 48). There is no special haze subunit within ASEAN. The Haze Technical Task Force that was established in 1997 was abolished upon entering into force of the Haze Agreement in November 2003. A website (http://asean.haze.org) for information dissemination and daily watch of hotspots was set up with the help of the Asian Development Bank in 1999. The website collects daily update from the ASMC on the fire and haze situation in Southeast Asia with hotspot and smoke haze maps together with satellite images, monthly weather and haze outlook forecasts, haze modeling, and a large collection of haze-related documents and reports. Although it was requested in the Agreement, ASEAN has not yet established a Coordinating Centre for haze related activities (Art. 5,1). The Environment Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat still functions as the interim ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre. It becomes clear that the capacity to deal with the haze problem is rather small. ASEAN’s most important field of action is the organization of meetings and not the production of results. The most important meeting is the Subregional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC). It consists of the environmental ministers from the five most affected countries namely Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The MSC aims to “oversee the implementation of concrete actions to address land and forest fires and the resulting transboundary haze pollution” (ASEAN 2006a). A technical working group is supporting the Committee. The MSC and its technical working group now focus its work mainly on the implementation of Indonesia’s Plan of Action. The MSC was established in November 2006. It has met four times between November 2007 and April 2008. The meeting schedule is now changed to once a year (Prasiddha 2008). A second technical working group was established in September 2007 by the ASEAN environmental ministers with the intention to develop a subregional action plan for the Mekong region (TWG Mekong) (ASEAN 2007b). The TWG for the Mekong countries is directed by the COP. Due to climate change and generally more extreme weather conditions the Mekong countries

122

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

could also face an escalation of hotspot activities (ASEAN 2008c). This measure can be seen as a positive step of long-term preventive measures. Best practices, information, preventive measures will be concentrated on. Thailand chaired the TWG Mekong for the first two years. The ministers already agreed on a sub-regional agreement – which has not been realized yet. Also, the TWG was supposed to come up with a sub-regional action plan. But it did not happen. An action plan requires a lot of consent and communication. Instead, they came up with a list of key activities to be implemented within one year. However, there is no monitoring capacity for this goal. And actually, there has only been one workshop of the group. Basically, the TWG is about sharing of experiences among the Mekong countries and also between the Mekong countries and Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In case of haze outbreaks in the Mekong region, a crisis can be expected since these countries are lacking almost everything. All Mekong countries except for Thailand do not have any capacity to fight forest fires, in early warning, suppression, hotspot detection, alternative methods, training and establishing policy units, or drafting regulations (Prasiddha 2008). The TWG Mekong has not improved the situation so far. There is also a funding problem for the Panel of Experts. The Panel has only been deployed three times in crisis situations without producing any mentionable results. Furthermore, there have been three meetings for establishing their operational guidelines about meetings and activities (Prasiddha 2008). The organization of each meeting in terms of funding poses a big problem for ASEAN since there is nominally no fund available for the Panel. As requested in the Haze Agreement a Haze Control Fund has been established. The account is administered by the Environment Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat. The Conference of Parties of the Haze Agreement has established financial rules for the Haze Fund. The money is supposed to be used for emergency actions in case of fire outbreaks (e.g., for fire-fighting). Recently the COP agreed to finance a training course on enforcement and persecution of open burning. This is a training course for relevant actors working in the field of law enforcement (Prasiddha 2008). Information about the amount of money available in the Haze Fund is not open for public. Since funding is always a big problem at ASEAN it can be assumed that the Haze Fund does not dispose of considerable amounts of money (Anish 2008). When the COP adopted financial rules for the Fund during its session in 2007, a first initial amount of USD 500,000 was set as a target (ASEAN 2007c). Contribution to the fund has started thereafter (ASEAN 2007b). The desk officer for haze related topics in the ASEAN Secretariat only admitted that until now five member states have donated some money. Indonesia has not contributed to the fund.

3 Problem-Solving Capacity of the Regime

123

3.7 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity Each crisis situation of transboundary haze pollution offers two options for the affected countries for action: a confrontational or a consensual approach. The neighboring countries chose to engage in a consensual approach to end the crisis and solve the haze problem. The supremacy of consensus is the major framework of all haze cooperation. Decisions in ASEAN forums are being made exclusively by consensus. This decision is absolutely congruent with ASEAN’s cooperation history. High levels of informality, consensual decision-making, avoidance of legalization and strict adherence to politeness, non-intrusion and restraint from direct confrontation characterize cooperation in Southeast Asia. Personal trustful relationships among key actors are crucial for successful negotiations (Klingshirn 2008). ASEAN has often been attributed a systemic weakness due to its institutional underdevelopment. From its establishment in 1967 until today, ASEAN has been a classically intergovernmental form of cooperation with a decentralized structure. Principles of dialogue and consultation dominate cooperation (Stubbs 2004, 223). The organization’s modus operandi, known as the “ASEAN way”, describes the preference for informality, consensus-seeking based on consultations, quiet diplomacy, aversion to high levels of institutionalization, sovereign equality, non-interference, non-involvement of the association in the resolution of bilateral disputes, and mutual respect (Haacke 2003, 59). The ASEAN way underlines the primacy of political pragmatism, especially the avoidance of the use of force. These principles are codified in the 1976 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation” (ASEAN 1976). Most decision-making forums are extremely hierarchical and closed for outsiders since there is a hesitation about new, unknown actors. In the rare cases that nongovernmental actors are allowed to present their agenda on ASEAN meetings they have to leave the room immediately after their presentation; even if the entire meeting was organized by the NGO (Goehler 2008). In such a context of total consensus, state responsibility would not be pointed to Indonesia. Rather, the ASEAN way would imply to look for a consensual solution to the problem, which would accommodate all stakeholders’ interests and would avoid blaming a country. During the most severe haze crisis in 1997-98 Indonesia had accepted a kind of moral (public apologies) but not legal responsibility (Tay 1998). There were only careful, diplomatic responses from affected neighbor states. Indonesia has not been called upon by its neighbors to bear state responsibility and to incur international liability for the damage caused to others. This response is puzzling, given the tremendous costs of the fires. It clearly reflects the soft ASEAN way of dealing with problems and is also probably due to the fact that Indonesia suffered from extreme economic hardship in 1997. Any effective haze regime in

124

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

Southeast Asia would avoid concepts like state responsibility and the distinction between culprit and victim states. National sovereignty is an important aspect in the Agreement. All ASEAN member states have always guard their sovereignty with all their power. They are extremely hesitant to express more than mild criticism of other countries’ in the region for fear of being criticized themselves. A columnist from the Economist concludes that unless ASEAN is prepared to “impose sanctions on errant members, as the European Union can on its rule-breakers, South-East Asia may be forever stuck in a haze“ (Economist 2006). At the very beginning of the ASEAN Haze Agreement the topic of national sovereignty is discussed with a clear statement. The Agreement affirms the sovereign right of nations to exploit their resources as long as it does not harm other states (Art. 3,1). The agreement is ambivalent in regards to concessions to state sovereignty. An ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control is to be established to facilitate cooperation and coordination (Art. 5,1). However, the Centre shall work on the basis that the national authority designated by state parties will act first to put out any fires (Art. 5,2). “The national authority has the discretion to declare a state of emergency, and when it does so, may then make a request to the ASEAN Centre to provide assistance” (Tan 2005, 665/666). National Monitoring Centers shall be designated to take appropriate measures to monitor fires and initiate immediate action (Art. 7). However, monitoring activities may be undertaken in accordance with the respective national procedures (Art. 7,2). The Haze Centre is obviously meant to serve more as a resource basis and organizational hub than as the leading coordinating agency. Assistance can only be rendered with the consent of the requesting or receiving state (Art. 12,3). If a state refuses to collaborate there is nothing the other states can do even if the consequences of haze pollution are affecting them. Requests of assistance can be handled through the Co-ordinating Centre or directly between requesting and assisting party (Art. 12,1). That means that also here ASEAN has no real authority in this matter. The national states can handle their problems themselves without interference of the regional level. Furthermore, it is not ASEAN and the Coordinating Centre that shall exercise the overall direction, control, coordination and supervision of the assistance but the requesting party since the requested activity takes place on its soil and under the country’s jurisdiction (Art. 13,1). Article 27 describes the mechanism for dispute resolution. ASEAN follows its traditional non-confrontation approach. Disputes “shall be settled amicably”. There are no provisions to settle disputes by recourse to international courts or arbitration tribunals, as it is usual the case in other relevant treaties. Also, there is no mentioning of compensations for victim states.

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

125

In sum, the nation state rules about the procedures, there is nothing that victim states can do. Explicit concessions to state sovereignty would have brought the Agreement to fall right away. ASEAN generally enjoys a reputation as one of the most credible regional organizations. However, the question is, whether ASEAN can contribute to solve the complex haze problem. ASEAN is weak because of its “diplomatic philosophy” (Quah 2002, 432). The ASEAN approach is based on consensus and absolute non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. This has resulted in problems of monitoring and enforcement of haze activities. Furthermore, domestic priorities prevail over the needs of the region, with drastic consequences for cooperation between the states and for mutual confidence and effectiveness. The effectiveness of ASEAN measures suffers from weaknesses in monitoring, assisting, and ensuring state compliance that are endemic to the ASEAN way and its preference for non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, non-binding plans instead of treaties, and central institutions with relatively little independent initiative and resources. Although the association acknowledges that the haze is not the result of a natural disaster but stems from “direct human interference” (ASEAN 2002, 58), it is hardly possible for the organization to put pressure on single countries like Indonesia. Change of the ASEAN way is coming along only very slowly. The current Secretary-General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan, has brought new dynamics into the association. He wants to restructure the Secretariat from a bureaucracy to a more proactive think tank (Goehler 2008). Departments of the Secretariat have been remodeled according to lines of functionalism, reflecting ASEAN’s pillars of economic, political and socio-cultural regional integration. New personnel are being recruited for all units of the four new departments. Recruitment aims to find the most skilled personnel from the member countries rather than fulfilling countries quotas. However, recruitment efforts will take some time since it is sometimes not easy to recruit qualified personnel from the less developed member states. A positive spirit of reform and a serious commitment to improve the administration can clearly be detected (Goehler 2008). 4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness In the theoretical chapter it has been argued that three measures are necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of a regime. The actual performance of the regime has to be compared with a collective optimum in order to reveal how big the gap between goals and reality is. To define the collective optimum for a problem of negative externalities is complicated. The involved countries have distinct roles.

126

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

Indonesia is causing the problem; neighboring countries are negatively affected by it. With these distinct roles come distinct interests. Therefore, a collective optimum that includes the interests of Indonesia is very limited. It is probably not much more than the actual performance. Without Indonesia the collective optimum for the haze regime would be a completely different one. The gap between the regime’s performance and its collective optimum would be huge since the negatively affected states would aim at long-term and comprehensive solutions. With Indonesia still refraining from ratifying the Haze Agreement, the country can pick and choose which provisions to implement and which ones not. Furthermore, the actual performance of the regime needs to be compared with the hypothetical situation of a no-regime. This second comparison can substantiate whether the regime itself is responsible for a change or not. For the first comparison the gap between the two measures should be as little as possible. For the second comparison the gap should be as big as possible. Only if that holds true the regime is effective. Each of the three measures has to be defined precisely. In the beginning of this chapter it has been stated that the effectiveness of the haze regime in terms of problem-solving has been low. There are still fires and haze every year. Only the fact that there have been favorable weather conditions for the last three years has contributed to a temporary mitigation of the problem. As I have argued in the theoretical chapter problems are solved via the behavioral change of actors. This may take a long time. Therefore, regime effectiveness will be conceived of and measured as behavioral change of the main actors. The main question to be answered is whether the haze regime has induced an attitudinal change of actors? Behavioral change will be analyzed in the level of compliance with regime provisions. 4.1 Actual Performance Compared to Collective Optimum The Haze Agreement contains 35 measures to combat the problem of haze pollution (see Table 17). Many of these measures have also been part of the 1995 Cooperation Plan and the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan. Most activities started in the course or in the immediate aftermath of the haze crisis in 1997-98. The 2002 Agreement represented a second strong impetus for action. Many new initiatives have been launched in 2003 or later. The Agreement, in contrast to previous documents, not only focuses on policy measures but also proposes the creation of an institutional framework for coordination and organization. It will be analyzed in how far the actors comply with the proposed measures. Article 5 calls for the establishment of a Coordinating Centre as well as for a Committee overseeing the work of the Centre. Both institutions have not been

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

127

created. Therefore, the main task, the assessment of risks (Art. 8,3) cannot be conducted. Article 19,1 calls for the establishment of a Secretariat to administer haze activities. Table 17: Proposed Measures from the ASEAN Haze Agreement Art. 5,1 Art. 5,3 Art. 7 Art. 8,3 Art. 9.a Art. 9.a Art. 9.b Art. 9.c Art. 9.d Art. 9.e Art. 9.e Art. 9.f Art. 9.g Art. 10,2 Art. 11,1 Art. 16,1.a Art. 16,1.b Art. 16,1.c Art. 16,1.d Art. 16,1.e Art. 16,1.e Art. 16,1.f Art. 16,1.g Art. 16,1.h Art. 16,1.i Art. 17 Art. 17 Art. 18,1 Art. 19,1 Art. 20,1 Art. 25 Annex Annex Annex Annex

Establishment of ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Establishment of Com. to oversee the operation of the ASEAN Centre Designation of National Monitoring Centers Assessment of risks and strategies through ASEAN Centre Development and implementation of legislative and other regul. measures Development of strategies to promote zero-burning policy Dev.of other appropriate policies to curb activities that may lead to fires Identification and monitoring of fire-prone areas Strengthening of local fire management and firefighting capability Public education and awareness campaigns Strengthening of community participation in fire mgmt Utilization of indigenous knowledge in fire prevention and management Enforcement of legislation to control burning and prevent using fire Assurance of preparedness in case of risk; Standard Operation Procedures Assurance of appropriate legislative, admin., financial measures are taken Mobilization of appropriate resources within and outside the Parties Standardization of reporting format of data and information Exchange of inform., expertise, technology, techniques and know-how Provision of training, education and awareness-raising campaigns Dev. of techniques on controlled burning particularly for small farmers Exchange of experiences on controlled burning practices Facilitate exchange of experience & information among enforcement authorities of the Parties Promotion of markets for biomass and for disposal of agricultural wastes Development of training programs for firefighters and trainers Strengthening of technical capacity of Parties to implement Agreement Cooperation with appropriate international organizations Promotion of research programs on root causes and consequences of haze and the means, methods, techniques and equipment for land and/or forest fire management, incl. firefighting Establishment of a Conference of the Parties (review and evaluation) Establishment of a Secretariat (facilitation, coordination) Establishment of a ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund Transmission of regular reports about progress to the Secretariat Establishment and maintenance of list of experts Establishment and maintenance of list of equipment and tech. facilities Establish. and maint. of list of experts for training, education, awareness Establishment and maintenance of list of contact with donor states / org.

Source: own assessment.

-/+ -/+ + -/+ + + + -/+ -/+ + -/+ -/+ -/+ -/+ + -/+ + + + + + +

128

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

The Secretariat has not been created either. Instead, a desk within the Environment Unit of the ASEAN Secretariat’s headquarters is responsible for hazerelated matters besides other tasks. Institutional capacity to organize, supervise and monitor haze activities is extremely low. A Conference of Parties (Art. 18,1) has been realized. The member countries have met six times until now in order to discuss progress. The National Monitoring Centers (Art. 7) to provide data and information have not been designated by all member states yet. Simulation exercises have been conducted to identify the roles of the NMCs in monitoring and assessments. Articles 9.a,g call for rigorous law enforcement. Since 1997 it is illegal to use fire for land clearance. However, the government is powerless towards vested business interests and has failed to implement laws and monitor enforcement (Choong 1997; Atje 2008; Surya 2008). There are no sanctions for burning. Although the Indonesian Government claims that several bigger companies have been punished by the law (Kusumo 2008), NGOs in the field do not see any improvement (Surya 2008; Wibisono 2008). Usually, there are no witnesses to be able to convict companies, and big companies have good lawyers to bring about a mild (or no) sentence. WWF analyzes that for companies in Indonesia, “forest fires are not considered as a heavy crime or felony. Just fire” (Wibisono 2008). One of the cornerstones of the measures is the promotion of zero-burning methods (Art. 9.a). In 2003, ASEAN has produced a comprehensive document about guidelines for zero-burning practices based on best practices. Best practices of the described techniques come from Brunei and Malaysia who had been implementing zero-burning policies since 1998 (ASEAN 1999). The guidelines have proved to be a viable first step but implementation has lagged behind. ASEAN is engaged in organizing workshops to promote zero-burning practices to plantation and timber companies. However, these workshops are not many in number and extent. One has been conducted in summer 2005, another one a year later. Therefore, NGOs are right when claiming that they are left alone in the field. ASEAN Ministers recognized the need for guidelines on controlled burning, where “zero-burn techniques could not be practiced, especially by smallholders, farmers and shifting cultivators” (ASEAN 2003c). Guidelines were published and controlled burning techniques have been implemented and promoted through pilot and demonstration sites in Indonesia. However, beyond demonstration sites no large-scale implementation has taken place. Monitoring and enforcement are largely lacking behind. Only one training (2002) for investigators and prosecutors to provide knowledge and skills on effective fighting against open burning and procedures for investigation and prosecution has been conducted so far. Setting fires is still the cheapest and easiest way to clear land

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

129

(Hariri 2008; Surya 2008; Wibisono 2008). Until today, governments in Southeast Asia have not provided rural farmers with alternative, and also cheap, techniques of land clearance or incentives to stop the burning as it is called for in Article 16,1e (Lee 2008). NGOs help to improve the understanding and applicability for alternative land clearing methods like cutting, chopping, making pant beds, clearing and slashing without burning (Hariri 2008; Surya 2008; Wibisono 2008). From the side of the Indonesian government not much has been done. The Ministry of Environment claims to be also engaged in promoting alternative methods in local workshops, however, upon questioning which methods could replace the cheap and easy slash-and-burn, the responsible communications functionary could not remember what they were promoting (Kusumo 2008). Article 9.b also calls for the development of policies to curb activities that may lead to fires. Three central remedies are envisioned: the reform of the allocation of concessions and of property rights for small farmers as well as a comprehensive peatland strategy. In Indonesia, all primary forest is owned by the state. Responsible for the allocation and monitoring of concessions is the Ministry of Forestry. Their policy is intransparent and soaked with collusion, corruption and nepotism (Christianty & Atje 2004, 5). Concession rights are neither monitored, controlled nor enforced. Many companies that obtain concessions are not interested in building a plantation but are planning on clearing the land and selling its timber. The land, millions of hectares, is lying idle (Erwidodo & Astana 2004, 1). A still unresolved problem is the security of land tenure. Under the Suharto rule, many small-scale loggers, especially indigenous populations, were expropriated (Dauvergne 1997, 66). Tenurial rights of millions of forest-dwellers were steadily subordinated to the interests of a relatively small number of logging and industrial plantation companies and state enterprises (Brunner et al. 1999, 5; Klingshirn 2008). Although now laws have been passed that recognize the rights of indigenous forest dwellers, the eviction of them without compensation continues unabated (UNDP 2007, 159). As a consequence, local people often treat forest land carelessly. There is evidence of a “higher risk of fires in areas of unclear boundaries between community territories” (Tan 2005, 711). Small-scale farmers are probably responsible for 20 percent of forest loss in Indonesia (WRI 2002, 24). Thus, there is a need for proper spatial planning. Another centerpiece of the measures is the development of sustainable peatland management. Fires often break out on peat soil because peat ground is very susceptible to fire. Due to the structure of the soil, these fires are extremely hard to extinguish. Therefore, in 2003, ASEAN had developed a Peatland Management Strategy (ASEAN 2003a). It primarily focuses on the following 4 objectives, namely to enhance awareness and knowledge on peatlands; to address

130

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

transboundary haze pollution and environmental degradation; to promote sustainable management of peatlands; and to enhance and promote collective regional cooperation on peatland issues (ASEAN 2003c). ASEAN has started activities like pilot and demonstration sites to rehabilitate and sustainable manage peatlands. These initiatives have been financed by Global Environmental Facility of the UN and the ASEAN-Australian Development Cooperation Program. Development of national action plans is still lacking behind. Therefore, implementation of the Strategy on the ground is largely absent. The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre is the main tool of scientific data communication between ASEAN and the member states (Art. 16,1.c). ASMC is providing satellite data on hotspots and fires as well as general climate data interpretations for ASEAN meetings. The ASMC also provides exact hotspot locations for countries upon request (Prasiddha 2008). It is the main monitoring tool for fire prone areas (Art. 9.c). Funding for the ASMC comes from Singapore. The ASMC was established in 1993 and is embedded in the Singapore Meteorological Service. Its purpose is to facilitate the development of weather prediction models and related research and development programs. Articles 9.d and 16,1.h of the Haze Agreement ask for a strengthening of local fire-fighting capacity. This request had been formulated before: in the aftermath of the 1997 haze catastrophes. In 1998, an initiative to create two subregional fire-fighting arrangements for Kalimantan and Sumatra was launched (ASEAN 1998a). Simulation exercises on the regional level involving actual mobilization of resources across borders have been conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2007 (ASEAN 1998b; ASEAN 1998c). However, the situation did not improve. Indonesia is only moving slowly towards quicker and more effective fire suppression mechanisms. Inadequate personnel, inadequate training and poor budgets limit what forest regulatory agencies can do. There is a general lack of technology to disseminate information on early warning, hotspot development, and actual fire outbreaks. Equipment for fire management and fire-fighting is inadequate or lacking. Only recently, fire brigade units have been installed on the local level in fire-prone areas. In addition, the Ministry of Forestry’s unit of forest fire has a central fire brigade under their supervision with offices in almost every province. These are employed for bigger haze and fire crises (Wibisono 2008). However, many plantation companies still do not have their own fire detection and suppression systems although they are required to. There is still a lack of early fire detection and fire suppression systems (Prasiddha 2008). The two neighboring countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, are the most active ones in providing assistance and to help implement the provisions of the Haze Agreement. The two countries followed the proposal of Indonesia to “adopt” a specific Indonesian province that is very fire-prone and en-

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

131

gage in intensified cooperation and support with that region. Singapore agreed to adopt the Jambi (it is closest to them) province and Malaysia Riau (also the closest). Singapore trains the Jambi officials to interpret satellite imageries and develop a fire rating system. Indonesia and Singapore are currently implementing a joint program on sustainable peatland management (ASEAN 2008b). Malaysia is providing equipment and technical assistance for air pollution monitoring in malfunctioning monitoring stations in the province Riau. Also, Malaysia is conducting regular fire-fighting trainings in that province. Malaysia indicated that it will assist Indonesia with capacity building by undertaking a number of projects, including working with plantation companies to implement zeroburning practices, conduct peatland management activities and other preventive measures (ASEAN 2007c). Indonesia and Malaysia are currently installing an air quality monitoring station in Riau, are testing pilot projects on rehabilitation of degraded peatlands in the same regency, and are conducting a stakeholders’ seminar on zero-burning techniques (ASEAN 2008b). How ASEAN interprets the implementation of public education and awareness-building campaigns (Art. 9.e) is rather puzzling. Showcasing ASEAN’s various initiatives to combat the haze in international forums are listed as an effective remedy. Also, the launch of a haze website (1998) is seen as public education. Although the website is accessible to a wide public the information about hotspots and fire developments are rather technical. The website does not thematize root causes of haze and does not promote and teach alternative burning techniques. Much of the data online is classified or not accessible for the public. Two proposed measures from the Agreement have been blatantly ignored until today, the community participation in fire management and the utilization of indigenous knowledge in fire prevention (Art. 9.e+f). Only pilot project have been conducted to strengthen the community participation and to promote and utilize indigenous knowledge and practices in fire prevention and management. A community-based model at the village level using indigenous practices of fire management has been developed. Some new pilot projects with indigenous people are planned under the supervision of the UN’s Global Environmental Facility. Decisions are still made top-down in a bureaucratic manner. Implementation on the ground is often not monitored. Many fires break out in remote areas. In these cases, it would be most helpful to establish a working cooperation with local groups. Article 11,1 calls for the assurance of appropriate legislative, administrative and financial measures to be taken. Two ministries are involved in haze politics in Indonesia: the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of the Environment. Both have limited resources. Especially the Ministry of Environment is

132

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

weak, understaffed, overcentralized, and suffers from a lack of resources, technical capacity and legal authority. There are no special units for forest fires on the local level (although the Ministry of Environment claims the opposite). Furthermore, local activists claim that inter-agency coordination does not take place (Wibisono 2008). Communication is insufficient and often delayed, especially when fires break out in remote areas. Immediate action takes a long time since Indonesia still conducts a highly centralized approach to the problem (WRI 2002, 58). Response to fires often comes too late. Decisions made by agencies are not implemented by the sectors and the regions. Another problem is that both ministries only have capacity for immediate action during crises not for longer-term prevention measures like zero-burning enforcement. They only function as a coordinating body in times of crisis and can trigger immediate action and calls for further help. In general, ASEAN’s efforts to organize cooperation have been more effective than its efforts to implement measures on the ground. As proposed (Art. 10,2), Standard Operating Procedures for monitoring, assessment and joint emergency response have been adopted in 2006 in order to ensure preparedness in crisis situations. These SOP promote standardization of the reporting format of data and information among the member states. An online inventory of firefighting resources of all member countries has been collected and put online in order to facilitate mobilization of appropriate resources in case of crises (under a secure intranet link). The website is used to promote the exchange of relevant information, expertise, technology, techniques and know-how (Art. 16,1.c). It provides daily updates of haze and fire situation, situation reports submitted by member states during critical periods, fires and haze news, a document center, a database of events, a database of ASEAN projects, and the already mentioned inventory of fire-fighting resources. As called for in the Annex lists of experts on haze, on training, and on potential donor countries and organizations have been compiled on the Haze Website and are available upon request. When it comes to the usability of these lists, however, there is a huge gap between theory and reality as will be illustrated by the list of experts. The Panel was established in 2005. This group of currently 29 mostly Indonesian experts with various backgrounds was established in order to provide quick and sound assessments of crises situation and to recommend adequate action to be taken (ASEAN 2005b). The Panel should “provide recommendations to facilitate immediate response and effective mobilisation of resources in the region. The Panel consists of experts from member countries with various technical expertise and background. They will be mobilised during potential or impending critical periods to gather latest information on fire-and-haze situation on the ground, and recommend

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

133

the type and scope of resources that need to be mobilised to mitigate the fires and haze“ (ASEAN 2006c, 113).

The Panel conducted simulation exercises on the deployment and mobilization procedure and has been engaged in field assessments. In real crisis situations the Panel has only been deployed three times during the dry season in 2006. Funding is the main obstacle to a more timely deployment. A problem is funding (Art. 16,1.a). The Haze Control Fund has been established (Art. 20). Contributions are voluntary (Art. 20,4) and rare. The amount of money in the Fund is disclosed. The interviewed desk officer of the Environment Unit at ASEAN confirmed that there is not much in the fund so that many projects will not reach the stage of implementation (Prasiddha 2008). Thus, capacity is limited. The effort to strengthen cooperation with international organizations (Art. 17) to receive assistance is not proceeding. Two conferences on haze pollution have been organized to strengthen partnerships with international agencies. They have not resulted in more than a dozen new pilot projects. Table 18: ASEAN Implemented Measures to Combat the Haze 1995 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 2002 2002 2003 2003 2005 2006 2006

Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution Haze Technical Task Force abolished in 2003 Regional Haze Action Plan first Ministerial Meeting on Haze abolished in 2003 launch of haze website sub-regional fire-fighting arrangements in Indonesia separate haze unit within ASEAN Secretariat (CSU) abolished in 2003 World Conference on Haze Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution publication of guidelines to implement zero-burning policies adoption of Peatland Management Initiative establishment of the Panel of Experts conference on promoting Haze Agreement and donations sub-regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) plus two Technical Working Groups

Source: own compilation based on ASEAN documents and interviews.

4.2 Actual Performance Compared to No-Regime Counterfactual I have come up with three points that assess the state of affairs in the hypothetical situation that ASEAN has never been active on the haze problem. These

134

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

points will lead me to the conclusion that the regime does not make a big difference. The content and nature of the proposed measures has not changed over time, especially not between the pre- and post-Haze-Agreement time. It does not look like there has been a change of mind of the main actors or that new scientific findings occurred in the meanwhile. First, the problem we are dealing with is a problem of a potential environmental disaster. Disaster prevention is the main objective of the regime. If prevention is successful, we have a non-occurrence of haze, if it is not, we have occurrence of a haze event. Non-occurrence, however, is a non-event. Therefore, it is extremely hard – if not impossible – to detect the causal reasons for this. Haze might be absent because of a successful regime but also because of other reasons, like a strong rain season. What can be observed is an existing correlation between favorable weather and non-occurrence of haze as well as unfavorable weather and occurrence of haze. This might lead to the conclusion that the haze regime has not contributed to problem-solving. Second, since 2002 Indonesia refuses to sign the Haze Agreement. The ASEAN Haze Agreement is the centerpiece of ASEAN’s efforts to combat the haze; it is the core of the haze regime. If the main player in this game has decided not to participate in the Agreement, the question is, what is it worth at all? If that would not be enough, the other states, mainly Malaysia and Singapore, have concentrated their efforts on bilateral assistance with Indonesia. Seven years after the ceremonial adoption of the Haze Agreement, the participating states have stopped to work towards Indonesia’s signature. Alternative methods to improve the haze situation are sought for. And these methods mainly encompass bilateral actions between neighboring states. Thus, it appears as if the haze regime does not play a role. Of course, this strong statement is not entirely true. It has to be noted that the recent bilateral actions are partly being coordinated by ASEAN. At least, ASEAN frequently discusses these actions. Also, the measures that are proposed and implemented in Indonesia by Malaysian and Singaporean help reflect the measures from the Haze Agreement. Third, almost all action that ASEAN or its member states have initiated to combat the haze problem resulted from outbreaks of haze. Action has always been a reaction to a crisis that could not have been prevented. The behavior of actors is thus characterized by cycles of action and inaction. This has been the case before the creation of the haze regime and also after. A documentation of ASEAN statements about the haze substantiates this claim. The 1990 Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development was the first ASEAN declaration to mention transboundary pollution, in that it called for “harmonisation of transboundary prevention and abatement practices” (ASEAN 1990). “Haze” pollution was mentioned explicitly in an ASEAN resolution in 1992 for the first

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

135

time. In the 1992 Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development, the member states declared to aim to “[…] undertake to develop and implement specific programmes relating to: haze caused by forest fires, air and water quality management, natural resources and environmental accounting, environmental economics, trans-frontier parks and other protected areas, a regional network for biological diversity conservation and protection of the marine environment in ASEAN seas” (ASEAN 1992).

The 7th Meeting of the ASEAN Environment Ministers of 1997 coincided with the dramatic peak of the haze crisis in mid-September 1997. The Meeting was hosted by Indonesia. Indonesian President Suharto opened the 7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment in Jakarta by expressing his concern about the consequences of the haze. President Suharto “expressed Indonesia’s most sincere apologies to the communities of neighbouring countries who have been disturbed by the forest fires” (ASEAN). In provision four of the joint press statement, the Ministers “were pleased with the fact that the traditional ASEAN spirit of co-operation, solidarity and understanding had continued to prevail even during the most difficult haze period” (ASEAN). The Meeting concluded with noting that “the Indonesian Government is doing its best to prevent and control the haze situation and appreciated the understanding, assistance and cooperation of ASEAN member countries in addressing this problem” (ASEAN).

The resulting declaration, the 1997 Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development, mirrors the general helplessness and resort to broad statements. ASEAN member states felt: “Deeply concerned that the world is gripped by the anxiety caused by fires, floods and typhoons, and that the ASEAN region is not spared from the threat of these natural disasters; [… and are further] concerned on the ecological, economic, health and political impacts brought about by transboundary pollution caused by land and forest fires” (ASEAN).

The haze problem is also mentioned in the Hanoi Plan of Action that was adopted in December 1997 (ASEAN). Despite the Plan of Action’s function as being the concrete and tangible instrument of implementation of ASEAN’s Vision 2020, it only lists three provisions to combat the haze problem. It strives for the implementation of the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution with particular emphasis on the Regional Haze Action Plan by the year 2001. It also aims at strengthening the ”ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre with emphasis on the ability to monitor forest and land fires and provide early warning on transboundary haze by the year 2001”. Finally, the Hanoi Plan of Action endorses

136

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Research and Training Centre for Land and Forest Fire Management by the year 2004. The 2004 Vientiane Action Programme is the most comprehensive collection of implementation measures on the environment. It mentions the problem of haze in a subsection of section three. The VAP starts out to exclaim its goal to prevent transboundary haze pollution “as a result of land and/or forest fires through concerted national efforts and intensified regional action and international cooperation, pursued in the context of sustainable development and in accordance with the provisions of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” (ASEAN 2004).

Three concrete steps on how to achieve this goal are presented. First, “appropriate measures to set in place legislative, administrative and/or other measures to implement the relevant preventive, monitoring, and mitigation measures under the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” are to be undertaken. Second, an “ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control to effectively implement the provisions of the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” is to be operationalized. Third, the “ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund to provide the required resources for regional and national level action” should be established (ASEAN 2004).

With these three measures, the VAP does not go beyond the provisions of the 2002 Agreement itself. ASEAN only reiterates the already agreed-upon measures. This is a clear sign for the lack of implementation one year after the Agreement has entered into force. The VAP does not specify the modalities on how to reach the fulfillment of these three measures and what institutional bodies are responsible for fulfillment and for monitoring. During the Eleventh ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 ASEAN expressed its concern about the annual occurrence of the haze and its negative impact on the region. The member states recognize the need to further intensity and undertake coordinated action. They note with satisfaction the “concerted action taken by ASEAN Member Countries during the recent severe haze episode by mobilizing personnel, aircraft and equipment to suppress the fires and stand ready to provide such assistance during critical periods in the future” (ASEAN 2005a).

Efforts of neighboring countries of Indonesia to help, like Singapore who provided satellite pictures and Malaysia who provided fire-fighters and equipment were appreciated during ASEAN meetings (ASEAN 2005c). The year 2006 experienced a severe recurrence of haze resulting from forest fires in Indonesia. 1,496 hotspots in Sumatra and 2,075 hotspots in Kalimantan were reported in October of that year. Frustration among the affected countries has been rising

5 Case Summary

137

constantly. The helplessness of ASEAN was expressed in the 2006 Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development. They expressed their “serious concern over the recurring transboundary haze pollution which was aggravated by the extended drier weather condition during El Niño years, and resolve to further enhance preventive, monitoring and mitigation efforts to address land and forest fires” (ASEAN 2006a).

By the end of 2007, and inspired by the festivities of ASEAN’s fortieth anniversary, ASEAN sought to strengthen its activities in the field of environmental protection. In the Singapore Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (ASEAN 2007d), the member states declared to “intensify regional and international cooperation” as well as to “adopt a holistic approach” (Provisions 2 and 3). ASEAN declares to “implement measures and enhance international and regional cooperation to combat transboundary environmental pollution, including haze pollution, through, among other things, capacity building, enhancing public awareness, strengthening law enforcement, promoting environmentally sustainable practices, as well as combating illegal logging and its associated illegal trade” (Provision 6).

The member states called upon the international community to “participate in and contribute to afforestation and reforestation, and to reduce deforestation, forest degradation, and forest fires” (Provision 10). ASEAN promotes regional forest initiatives such as the ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative, the “Heart of Borneo” conservation plan, the Asia Forest Partnership and the AsiaPacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation as well as global efforts such as the Global Initiative on Forests and Climate, and Indonesia’s Forestry Eleven Forum initiative (Provision 27). 5 Case Summary Until the catastrophe of 1997 haze was widely seen as a natural disaster that appears like an earthquake does. A link between forest management practice and the outbreak of fires has not been established. This has definitely changed post-1997. There has been a clear behavioral change of Indonesia as well as of the other relevant actors. However, it was not the regime that induced the behavioral change but the occurrence of crises situations. Massive haze outbreaks were the driving forces of regime creation. Since 1997, waves of contra-haze activism have been correlated with haze occurrences. Compliance and implementation efforts have been intensified since 1995. Especially since the tremendous haze crisis in 1997 the level of activism has been growing expon-

138

V Case Study One: Transboundary Haze Pollution

entially. However, the level of compliance is mixed. While work on almost all of the proposed measures has already started, some of it remains superficial or piecemeal. In many cases, compliance with the provisions has only produced guidelines and standard operating procedures. No tangible action to implement these guidelines has followed suit. All measures concentrate on short and medium term remedies; none is seriously targeting the root causes of haze pollution. No single measure targets the existing economic exploitation of forest products in Indonesia. The haze problem is a problem of negative externality. Compliance to the regime provisions is thus always contingent upon the consent of Indonesia. Malaysia, Singapore and other countries can only make offerings to Indonesia. As a consequence the haze regime relies almost exclusively on one state party for meaningful compliance and implementation. The regime’s capacity to fulfill the objective of ameliorating or even resolving the haze pollution problem is contingent upon Indonesia’s willingness to cooperate. The asymmetrical structure of the problem makes it hard to achieve a mutually consensual agreement. Indonesia has a strong economic interest in producing enough wood to export. At the same time, the country cannot afford the outbreak of huge haze crises. Thus, cooperation with Indonesia always needs to balance economic needs and cost fears in order not to antagonize the country. This makes the haze problem malign in character. For a problem like the haze one it is extremely difficult to design an effective regime. The ASEAN Haze Agreement has not succeeded in representing an effective regime. The Agreement is very vague in terms of compliance mechanisms, actor capacity, available resources and effective voting procedures. On top of that, Indonesia is the only ASEAN country that has not signed the Agreement yet. As a consequence, the party countries, mostly the relevant actors Malaysia and Singapore, have begun to detach cooperation with Indonesia from the Agreement. Although the measures proposed in the Agreement are still valuable in terms of problem solving, the Agreement itself has become an unspeakable word. Nevertheless, the haze regime cannot be called epiphenomenal. The haze regime produced a regional platform to discuss and assess a truly national problem. Very untypical for Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has opened up for debates and reform suggestions of its fire-fighting capacity, its forest politics, and law enforcement remedies. Although haze almost exclusively occurs in Indonesia, today, nobody would seriously doubt the problem’s entitlement to be dealt with at the regional level. This is the most important achievement of the haze regime.

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

1 Introduction to the Problem 1.1 Mekong: The Mother of Rivers The Mekong is the world’s twelfth largest river. From its source in the Tibetan mountains to its merging into the South China Sea the Mekong is 4,350 kilometers long. It flows through the Yunnan province of China down to the Golden Triangle, the border region of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, notorious for its production of opium. The River flows down almost 300 kilometers along the border of Myanmar and Laos. Figure 7: Map of the Mekong

Source: http://www.japanfocus.org/data/mekong-map.jpg.

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_6, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

140

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

Where Thailand begins, the Mekong turns east and flows right through Northern Laos and continues south alongside the Thai-Laotian border. The river then enters Cambodia from Laos and flows through the entire territory of the country. Below the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh, the Mekong divides into two branches – the Hau River and the Tien River – and continues further through Southern Cambodia. Finally, the Mekong reaches its delta in Viet Nam and drains into the South China Sea through nine river mouths known as the “nine dragons” (Nguyen 2007, 1). The Mekong River basin is the dominating geophysical structure in mainland Southeast Asia. In China, the Mekong is called Lancang Jiang, which means “turbulent river”, in Thailand it is called Mae Khong (mother of waters), and in Viet Nam it has the name Cuu Long (river of the nine dragons). The most southern tip of the Mekong is known as the Ca Mau Peninsula and is covered by jungle and mangrove swamps. The Mekong area encompasses 40,000 square kilometers. The Mekong rises at the height of 5,100 meters in Eastern Tibet. Within the Chinese province of Yunnan the Mekong drops 4,500 meters down before leaving the country. From the Mekong’s entry into Laos on the river is described as lower Mekong (only 500 meters to fall until it reaches the sea). The Mekong is characterized by its enormous differences of water level and flow behavior between the dry (January to April) and the rainy season (July to October). While during the dry season the Mekong has a discharge of 2,000 m3 per second, the discharge swells to as much as 60,000 m3 per second during the rainy season. Navigation on the Mekong is difficult because of these extreme flow variations and the presence of rapids and waterfalls. The Mekong is of international significance as a hotspot of aquatic biodiversity. Only the Amazon River basin has greater diversity of plant and animal live (UNDP 2007). More than 1,200 species of fish inhabit the Mekong. Only very few species of them are already commercialized. The Mekong is like no other river in the world home to extraordinarily large fish like the giant carp, the giant catfish or the giant pangasius. The Mekong had also once been home for freshwater dolphins, but this species is hardly seen anymore. The vegetation in the Mekong region comprises of forests, grasslands, flooded forests, mangroves, and wetlands. The largest wetland in the region is the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia that is directly connected to the Mekong. Tonle Sap is the biggest freshwater reserve in the entire region of Southeast Asia. It is often referred to as the beating heart of the Mekong (Hirsch 2007, 228). Tonle Sap Lake has become a UNESCO biosphere in 1997. The Mekong disposes of abundant natural resources like water, forests, fish stock, biodiversity, timber, minerals, and energy that contain the potential of huge wealth generation (ADB & UNEP 2004, 50). Most of the natural resources can be found in Myanmar, Thailand and Viet

1 Introduction to the Problem

141

Nam. The energy resources of the region are still relatively underused. Hydropower is strongest in Yunnan, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam. Coal exists in Yunnan and Viet Nam. Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam have considerable gas resources. Oil is found in all countries of the region. Above all, the Mekong River basin is a fertile ground for rice cultivation. The ecological condition of the Mekong and its surrounding ecosystem has not been preserved in a satisfactory way. The increasing economic use of the resources of the Mekong put the river’s ecosystem under growing pressure. As the Mekong’s wetlands are being converted to agricultural land, a lot of indigenous species of plants and animals disappear. In general, good arable land is scarce because of the high population density. New technology and intensified farming to feed the growing population means increased fertilizer and pesticide use (ADB & UNEP 2004, 98). Water quality is deteriorating (Ringler 2001, 47). The development of large hydropower sites, canalization and other navigation improvements in the upper basin, and illegal cross-border trade in timber, wildlife, endangered species pose significant dangers to the ecosystem of the Mekong region. Massive deforestation in order to cultivate land has already affected the region’s ecology. Present data estimate that forest cover has shrunk from 50 (1970s) to 27 percent (2004) in the region (ADB & UNEP 2004, 124). If deforestation continues there is a vital danger of water decline in the lower Mekong, which will dramatically reduce the fertility and usability of the soil. 1.2 Socio-Economy of the Riparian Countries Fish and rice are the two most important agricultural products at the Mekong basin. The Mekong River basin is one of the most productive inland fisheries in the world. Fifty-one percent of the total GNP of the Mekong River basin is made of fisheries (Menniken 2006, 14). Some 150,000 to 200,000 tons of fish are brought to the market annually. Another 100,000 tons are consumed within the region. There is an annual catch of 1.5 million tons in the lower Mekong basin (Osborne 2004, 17). Farmers in the Mekong basin produce enough rice to feed 300 million people a year. Especially the Mekong delta in Southern Viet Nam is an extremely important area for rice cultivation. Thailand and Viet Nam are the world’s largest and second largest exporters of rice. The average annual rainfall in the lower basin is just enough to sustain rice cultivation. Every year with less than average rainfall poses a vital danger. Despite the richness in biodiversity and natural resources the region remains largely poor. In fact, the Mekong countries are some of the poorest in the world. A large proportion of the 70 million people in the Mekong basin area

142

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

have their existence grounded in daily livelihood struggles. The region is largely agricultural with a low level of industrial development. The riparian countries are highly dependent on the natural resources of their countries, most of all of the Mekong, in order to make a living. The common pool of resources that the river offers is being used of increasingly to develop large-scale fisheries, improve navigation routes, generate hydropower and divert water to irrigate agricultural fields. Table 19: Key Figures for the Mekong Countries Population in million Cambodia Lao PDR Myanmar Thailand Viet Nam Yunnan

14.4 5.9 57.7 65.8 85.2 42.4

Annual growth in % 10.2 7.5 n.a. 4.8 8.5 n.a.

GDP p. capita in USD 606 829 233 3732 828 n.a.

HDI Rank 2009 137 133 138 87 116 n.a.

Source: ADB 2008; UNDP 2009.

Eighty percent of Cambodia’s workforce is in the agricultural sector (ADB & UNEP 2004, 9). Rice is Cambodia’s main agricultural product. The Cambodian people are heavily dependent on the Mekong’s resources. Seventy percent of the Cambodian population’s annual animal protein intake comes from fish caught in the Mekong and the Tonle Sap River (Osborne 2004, 2). Only Japanese and Icelanders consume more fish per capita than Cambodians (Wain 2004, 49). Economic development is still a big challenge for the country that is recovering from the devastating years of the Khmer Rouge terror regime 1975-1978. The country is lacking basic infrastructure, education and skilled people. Also, existing land mines put a considerable constraint to the country’s agricultural productivity. Since the country’s accession to the WTO in 2004 trade is improving and growth rates look positive (considering the country’s start from zero). Laos is one of the poorest countries on earth and is, together with Cambodia, the most backward country in the Mekong region. Lao’s economy is largely resource-based. The agricultural sector employs about 85 percent of the labor force (ADB & UNEP 2004, 19). The Mekong is essential for the Laotian economy since it represents Lao’s prime trade route. Recent growth rates indicate that there is some progress. The manufacturing sector is growing, showing a 16.8 percent share of the GDP. Despite Myanmar’s abundance in natural resources, its people are very poor. It is estimated that as much as seven million people have no means to sup-

1 Introduction to the Problem

143

port their basic subsistence (ADB & UNEP 2004, 21). The country lacks basic infrastructure. Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries account for 60 percent of the GDP. Myanmar is accused of implementing its agricultural production with forced laborers throughout the country. It is estimated that Myanmar has the slowest growth rate in Southeast Asia but it is difficult to access statistical data from the country. Thailand is the wealthiest of the Mekong countries. Thailand is a resourcerich and export-oriented economy. The abundant availability of natural resources built the foundation of Thailand’s impressive economic growth. Thailand is the world’s largest exporter of rice. The levels of agricultural production are constantly declining and are representing little more than 50 percent of GDP. Viet Nam’s economic growth has been the highest in the world during the last decade. Market-oriented reforms have been initiated by the Communist party in the 1980s and were given impetus by the end of the US embargo in 1994 and the WTO accession in 2007. The poverty rate has fallen from 58 percent (1993) to 19.5 percent (2004) (UNDP 2007, 100). Despite the considerable growth, Viet Nam is still a low-income country. Sixty-nine percent of Viet Nam’s labor force is found in the agricultural sector. The Mekong River delta is the rice basket of the country, producing half of the country’s rice and an even larger share of fisheries and fruit products (UNDP 2007, 100). There is a constant shortage of water for irrigation during dry seasons. Yunnan belongs to one of the poorest regions in China and concentrates on agriculture. Yunnan has a per capita GDP of only USD 586 (Diokno & Chinh 2006). Between 80 and 95 percent of Yunnan’s workforce is found in agriculture. Agricultural production is dominated by subsistence crop, rice, wheat and tobacco (ADB & UNEP 2004, 13). The Yunnan province is in the midst of a process of rapid industrialization and power generation directed from Beijing. 1.3 Demand for Cooperation More than 200 river systems in the world are shared by two or more countries. These rivers are common pool resources for the riparian countries. A common pool as such does not require cooperation. However, if the common resource becomes scarce it does. Until the twentieth century the Mekong was almost undeveloped. Each riparian country made use of some of the resources for its own necessities. There were no collaborative undertakings for the exploitation of the common pool resource. Population had been low except for some areas in Thailand and Viet Nam. The countries focused their economies on subsistence agriculture. Fish in the Mekong and areas for rice cultivation were plenty and

144

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

healthy forests around the river guaranteed a stable ecosystem. Floods and droughts were permanent threats to the harvest of the people but in general there were enough resources for the people. And due to the similar economic structure of the countries, there were no conflicts about the realization of different goals: all countries required fish and water for irrigation. Things changed with an increased globalization of trade and an ongoing economic development. Population in the Mekong region grew considerably, demanding more resources from the river. Also, rice and fish became primary goods for exports and were demanded in vast amounts from the world market. For China, the Mekong region is an excellent southern gateway for influence and trade. China sees the upper Mekong primarily as a source of hydropower and as a trade route. Laos uses the Mekong as trade route and for hydropower to export. Thailand needs the Mekong to irrigate its dry land in the upper east of the country. Cambodia needs the Mekong because of its richness in fish. Viet Nam needs the Mekong for water to support the rice crops in the delta. Only Myanmar does not show much interest in the Mekong since the country disposes of abundant rivers and lakes within its territory. Some of the countries’ interests in the Mekong and its resources are clearly conflicting. While Viet Nam and Cambodia need a constantly high water discharge to provide water for rice paddies and to support the fish, Thailand, Laos and Yunnan aim to remove water from the Mekong in order to realize hydropower projects and to use the water for irrigation of dry agricultural regions. Conflicts are fought about allocation and equitable sharing (Sithirith 2007, 16). With more and more resources taken from the Mekong every year, the ecosystem in and around the river lost its ability to fully recover before the next harvest or catch, ultimately resulting in fewer fish and land for agriculture available. The riparian countries also realized that the potential of the biggest economic development is the mainstream Mekong. National-wide projects on tributaries of the river were lucrative too but the mainstream flow entailed the best prospects for development in terms of navigation improvement, irrigation schemes and hydropower. Development undertakings on the mainstream, however, require the coordination between all riparians. For these reasons it has become existential for the Mekong countries to commonly adjust their policies regarding fish catch, water quality monitoring, irrigation for rice cultivation, flood prevention, etc. Trade and investment among the riparians is constantly increasing. Especially the accession of Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam to ASEAN in the mid-1990s have helped to foster regional rapprochement (Binh 2006, 69). Trade liberalization and foreign investment supported the development of the formerly closed economies of the Mekong countries. Especially the coastal regions were drawn rapidly into the global economy. With increased openness the region has also become increasingly interdependent (Hirsch 2007, 232). During the past

1 Introduction to the Problem

145

years, water moved up on the agenda of the countries in the region because of scarcities, droughts, floods, pollution, interstate competition, and international initiatives. 1.4 Thematic Scope of Analysis: Hydropower Development There is a vast variety of resources in the Mekong that impact differently on the environment of the river. I decided to concentrate further analyses on the topic of hydropower development. Hydropower is the “single most important endeavor” (Menniken 2007, 109). It has the highest growth potential and biggest profit gains. High oil and gas prices and concerns over climate change have intensified the focus on hydropower as a renewable technology.16 Dams provide hydroelectric power, and thus, political and economic power. The Mekong contains huge potential for energy supply. It has been estimated that the total hydropower production capacity of the Mekong is 30,000 megawatts (13,000 megawatts for the mainstream and 17,000 megawatts for the tributaries of the Mekong), more than enough to meet the expected demand in the coming decade (MRC Website). Only 4,450 megawatt has been developed to date, comprising of 1,600 megawatt in the lower Mekong basin and 2,850 megawatt in the upper basin. The Mekong River Commission has set up a Mekong Basin Hydropower Development Strategy in order to develop hydropower to “meet the need for economic development in a way that fully recognizes the requirement to safeguard ecosystems and social interests” (MRC Website). However, hydropower development is a “super-sensitive issue” because of the multiple side effects of large dams (Dore 2003, 428). From the 1950s on, international donor countries and organizations have fostered the construction of dams as a means to economic development. For decades hydropower had been the ideal of industrialization (Greacen & Palettu 2007, 95). Dams can contribute massively to flood prevention by halting the river flow during the rainy season (ADB 2004, 37). Dams can help to increase fertility by providing river flow during the dry season (Hori 2000, 253). Control of the river flow also increases the number of fish in a reservoir. Thus, the catch grows dramatically due to the existence of the dams. Dams improve navigation and increase irrigation opportunities. They are a pollution-free form of renewable energy (Dore et al. 2007, 85). Yunnan, where the Mekong has its source, is the most virulent supporter of hydropower development. China argues that hy-

16

Energy can be generated through the swelling and then releasing of huge water masses.

146

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

dropower dams will not affect the water quality but will bring benefits to downstream countries: additional irrigation, flood control, and electricity. One the other hand, structural interventions into the river can have huge negative effects (ADB 2004, 12/13). An assessment of large dams by the World Commission on Dams in 2000 substantiated that they have large impacts on rivers, watersheds, and aquatic ecosystems (World Commission on Dams Report 2000). In particular, the construction of large dams can add to the “disruption of the Mekong Basin’s ecosystem” (Osborne 2004, 37). Catching fish becomes more difficult as fish are getting smaller due to changes in the water (temperature, chemicals) (ADB & UNEP 2004, 96). Also, fishermen increasingly use chemical fertilizers to enlarge their catch (Osborne 2004, 19). Sudden releases of water through dams may affect and alter river banks and fish stock, fish may not be able to swim upstream anymore, and water has different temperatures (Backer 2006, 2). Fish migration and breeding can be affected negatively. Fish eggs can be destroyed by the higher flow of the river and the retreating shorelines. There is also a danger of land collapse at dam sites; this danger is aggravated by the fact that geological data about sites do not exist in many cases. In China there has been a history of dam collapses since the early days of dam construction. Most severely, in 1975, 60 dams collapsed, causing 100,000 people to lose their lives (Osborne 2004, 15). Until today, many international actors who engage in the Mekong region, among them the World Bank, are still seen critical due to their past involvement in large dam projects (Osborne 2004, 36; Greacen & Palettu 2007, 98/99). A social side effect of dam construction is the necessity to relocate people and villages. Resettlement and compensation schemes for people have often been inadequate, impoverishing millions of people (Ringler 2001, 58; Dore et al. 2007, 85). To avoid negative effects of large-scale dams, hydropower development should be realized as an interdisciplinary project linking technical aspects with environmental and socials one. However, most of the times dams are constructed as engineering tools. The World Commission on Dams has listed best practices for dam construction (World Commission on Dams Report 2000, Chapter 9), however, these are not employed at the Mekong. 2 Problem Structure 2.1 Problems of Common Pool Resources The Mekong and its resources are a common pool. The commons is a term for all spaces that are not private property and to which basically every person has

2 Problem Structure

147

open access (Vogler 2000, 3). All riparians can make use of the waters. No country can be excluded from usage. One of the earliest and most influential publications about the management of common pool resources came from biologist Garrett Hardin (1968). His article on the “Tragedy of the Commons” was the first systematic analysis about problems that nation states can only solve in cooperation with each other. In fact, the idea of the tragedy of the commons can be traced back to the writings of David Hume (1740). Hume’s scenario was a traditional agricultural commons, a pasture open to all. Hardin transferred Hume’s ideas to the problems of the twentieth century. He pictured two herdsmen on an open pasture who try to keep as many cattle as possible (Hardin 1968, 1244). The “tragedy” comes to existence since each herdsman seeks to maximize the gain with his cattle. This causes an overexploitation of the pasture that reduces the future capacity of it for both herdsmen. It will always make sense for the individual herdsman to overgraze the pasture because the gain (individual) will outweigh the cost (shared by all). The water resources of the Mekong are consumptive (in contrast to public goods like air). In other words, when water in one end is diverted from the river, a reduced or altered amount of water is available for others. In our case of hydropower development one might think that this resource is not consumptive since the total amount of potential energy in the Mekong does not shrink with every new dam. Each riparian country can construct as many dams as she like. However, as I have described earlier, dams may have strong negative side effects. While one state is gaining energy another state is negatively affected by side effects of dam construction. In general, there are two possibilities to solve such commons problems. First, common property could be turned to private property. Second, an external authority (for example a state or an organization) could intervene to enforce good behavior. This authority would be modeled according to Hobbes’ Leviathan: it can coerce compliance because the participants all agreed upon the rules (Hobbes 2002 [1651]). We are talking about the Mekong regime. 2.2 One, Two, Three Regimes? The Mekong River Commission is the center of the Mekong regime around which expectations converge. Its members are Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam. It is the organization that had been exclusively created for managing the common pool resources of the river. The statute of the MRC reads as such: “To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and

148

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong tourism, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and mutual benefits of all riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that might result from natural occurrences and man-made activities“ (Mekong River Commission 1995, Article 1).

However, the Mekong River Commission does not include all six riparian countries and is not the only actor in the field. Until now, Myanmar and China have decided to abstain from participation in the MRC. While Myanmar can be neglected due to its non-existing interest in Mekong politics, China is a very strong actor that influences the Mekong politics massively. The four members of the MRC might coordinate their behavior as much as they like, China can still do what she wants and has to be dealt with. Thus, one might think that there are two regimes: the MRC on the one hand and the MRC plus China on the other hand. I argue that it is more fruitful to combine these two regimes to one. In my understanding a regime is more than just the written rules of an organization. It has formal and informal, written and unwritten rules. For more than sixty years now (since the initial establishment of the Mekong Committee) the riparians are dealing with China as a non-member. The four member countries know very well that China is an influential actor due to its power, size and position on the river (the most upstream country). Decisions within the MRC, I argue, do take into account the position that China might express. Decisions within the MRC can be seen as a reaction to Chinese politics, a balance against Chinese decisions or anticipation thereof. If the four MRC countries did not take China into account, they know that their decisions would not unfold much power. This is what I consider the most important unwritten rule of the Mekong regime. The Asian Development Bank and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have both started development projects for the Mekong countries and are now cooperating jointly under the term ASEAN-Greater Mekong Sub-regionChina program. As the name suggests, China participates. I do not consider the ASEAN-GMS-China program to be a regime on its own. Rather, it is a project platform that lacks formal requirements of a regime like actor capacity, organizational body and formal membership. No rules of cooperation have been established (Jokinen 2001, 219). It functions as a “catalyst” of project identification and implementation (Than 2006, 143). Controversial issues are not dealt with. Money comes from the ADB. Participating countries do not have to contribute. Projects are selected according to their beneficial infrastructural character for the riparians. Thus, it is not surprising that Myanmar and China are participating: there are no negative effects and no compromises needed.17 What has to be 17

There are dialogue sessions among the six riparians and also summits on a regular basis in order to discuss longer-term lines of development. However, none of these structures are of binding character.

2 Problem Structure

149

admitted is that projects of the ASEAN-GMS-China program do influence the politics of the MRC. The easy availability of funds for large-scale projects and the non-binding form of cooperation have contributed immensely to the program’s success and have put the MRC under pressure. The MRC is in dire need of funding from international donors, among them the ADB. The ASEANGMS-China program is directly challenging the MRC’s mandate and its financial fundament (Jokinen 2001, 225). The ASEAN-GMS-China program has taken over hydropower projects from MRC. In the mid-1990s there has been great frustration about this hijacking of the MRC’s original mandate. The MRC’s self-image is that of the grande dame of all Mekong cooperation because its existence is exclusively dedicated to this purpose. It has to react to the ongoing success of the ASEAN-GMS-China program and to regain supremacy and credibility. The fact, that there is now a first partnership arrangement between the MRC and the ASEAN-GMS-China program substantiates my assumption that the MRC acknowledges the existence and importance of this actor (ADB 2004, 38). The analysis of the Mekong regime will show whether the MRC also attempts to imitate some of the successful methods of the ASEANGMS-China program into its own work. In sum, I argue that there is one Mekong regime consisting of the MRC and its behavior towards China and the ASEAN-GMS-China initiative. 2.3 Problem Complexity Hydropower development is a complex endeavor. The construction and functioning of large dams triggers a broad variety of intended and unintended effects. Energy generation is only one of them. However, although being complex, hydropower development is a well-studied field. The interplay of different ecological and engineering factors is known and side effects on the environment of the river and its basin are clear. In the 1950s, when the United Nations initiated the establishment of the Mekong Committee, the situation was a different one. The multiple, and often negative, side effects of large-scale dam construction were not studied much and not taken into account during construction projects. Dams were associated with purely positive effects. Thus, there was a certain level of uncertainty – but this was not the trigger for the regime. Unknown, or unwanted, side effects were ignored; or it was hoped that the positive effects would be much greater than the negative ones. The Mekong regime was not initiated by the urge to study scientific reactions of hydropower development. The different effects of hydropower development are valued differently among the actors. Some countries regard the con-

150

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

struction of dams rather positive others feel threatened by them. In other words, dams may be both, part of the solution and of the problem. The World Commission on Dams has tried to establish guidelines in order to balance positive and negative effects of dam construction (World Commission on Dams Report 2000, Chapter 9). However, these guidelines are not followed in the Mekong region. In sum, there is no shared understanding of the problem. The six riparian countries have conflicting views on the merits and dangers of hydropower development in the Mekong. Scientific complexity, referring to the absence of a scientific consensus about the problem, its causes and possible solutions, is not high in this case study. Available information is valued differently among the actors. Uncertainty about the effects of dam construction is not given and thus is not a driving force for countries to participate in the regime. The problem is the conflicting usage of dam construction among the riparian countries. The constellation of high scientific consensus and low levels of uncertainty in this case study leads me to the conclusion to focus on the non-scientific considerations of the regime in order to explain its level of effectiveness. 2.4 Vulnerability and Abatement Costs Each riparian country attempts to make use of the vast resources of the Mekong. Some of these actions cause externalities to other riparians. In this section the two determinants of the countries’ positions, vulnerability towards environmental damage caused by dam construction and abatement costs for this environmental problem, will be analyzed for all six countries. According to their level of affection on these two determinants the countries can be grouped and put into relation to each other. Vulnerability defines in how far a country depends on the common pool resource and how much the country is affected by other countries’ undertakings into the Mekong. Abatement costs define the specific costs necessary to combat environmental damage. Due to the fact that both measures correlate strongly with each other they will be analyzed commonly in this section. The strength of both variables is mainly governed by two factors, the upstreamdownstream position of each riparian country and the economic importance of the Mekong for the respective countries. 2.4.1 Upstream-Downstream Asymmetry Since rivers are not static but follow their flow from upper regions towards a delta, the location of riparians defines their interests and possibilities of water

2 Problem Structure

151

usage. In the case of the Mekong there is a sharp asymmetry between the upstream and the downstream riparians. The flow direction of water always goes from up- to downstream. Countries that are located on the upstream part of the river obtain a strategically better position than countries on the downstream parts. Because of the flow direction the upstream countries can intervene in the river’s resources as they please. Downstream countries, however, have to bear the externalities of upstream intervention and also only have available what upstream countries left them. If there is a strong fishery upstream, the downstream countries might have a smaller catch. If upstream countries build dams, the flow is slowed down and the temperature downwards might sink and also fish might be affected. Upstream countries are much less vulnerable to other countries’ interventions into the river. They also have few if any costs to abate damage because the damage floats down the river. In sum, the more downstream a country is located the higher is its vulnerability to damage and are potential abatement costs. China and Myanmar are clear upstream countries. Laos has a small upstream share (at the border to Myanmar). From the Golden Triangle on (border of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) we speak of downstream Mekong. That means that Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam are all downstream countries. However, sometimes it is also argued that northern regions of Laos and Thailand could be considered as upstream since the elevation and flow velocity are still high. Also, Thailand’s self-image is that of a most strategic upstream country. Thailand and Viet Nam have some upstream share when we include the tributaries into the calculation. These are, however, by far not as effective as mainstream locations for hydropower. Table 20: Upstream-Downstream Position of the Mekong Countries Yunnan Myanmar Thailand (tributaries) Thailand (mainstream) Laos Viet Nam (tributaries) Viet Nam (mainstream) Cambodia

upstream upstream upstream downstream upstream (300 km) downstream (1600 km) upstream downstream downstream

Source: own assessment.

The upstream Mekong countries are in the position to externalize negative effects of their interventions in the river. The downstream countries have to live with the consequences. This “upstream mentality” (Sithirith 2007, 6) has caused much damage to cooperation behavior and to the environment of the Mekong.

152

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

For example, Thailand diverts water from Mekong to its Chao Phraya River in order to increase the availability of water for agriculture in Thailand’s driest and most underdeveloped region. Chinese dam projects cause a constant lowering of water levels in Laos, which affects the country’s economy massively (Osborne 2006, 231). It is obvious that the downstream countries function as pushers for coordinated intervention while the upstream countries try to secure their autonomy (Backer 2006, 18). At present there is more conflict than cooperation (Sithirith 2007, 20). 2.4.2 Economic Importance of the Mekong This variable is comprised of two factors: each country’s share of the Mekong and each country’s economic dependency of the resources of the river. Both factors interact with each other. The countries that have a large share of the Mekong basin within the countries’ territory also tend to make more use of the river’s resources. With higher shares of the Mekong and its river basin, each country also increasingly relies on exploiting the resources for the survival and wellbeing of its people. The range among the six riparian countries is considerable: Almost the entire areas of Laos and Cambodia lie within the Mekong basin. On the other extreme, only two percent of Myanmar’s territory touches the Mekong basin. Table 21: Country (Province) Area within the Mekong Basin, in % Cambodia Laos Myanmar Thailand Viet Nam Yunnan

86 97 2 36 20 23

Source: own calculation.

The other three countries lie in between these extremes. How important is the availability and exploitation of resources of the Mekong for each country? Is the country’s economy or even the survival of its people strongly dependent on the river? The more dependent a country on the resources is the more it becomes vulnerable to interventions of other countries’ undertakings into the river and has higher costs. For Cambodia and Laos the resources of the Mekong are existential for the countries’ economies and the well-being of its inhabitants. With 17.7 million hectares of land Cambodia is the smallest of all riparian countries. The country

2 Problem Structure

153

is relatively flat and much of its land area is taken up by a shallow basin centered on the Tonle Sap Lake, which is Southeast Asia’s largest freshwater resource. 86 percent of Cambodian territory lies with the Mekong basin. The country in general, and the Tonle Sap ecosystem in specific, are hotspots of biodiversity. Out of the total 1,200 fish species that can be found in the Mekong, 500 are located in Cambodia, and 300 in the Tonle Sap Lake alone. Cambodia needs to protect the hydrological integrity of the Tonle Sap by ensuring sufficient reverse wet season flows from the Mekong into the Lake. Negative effects of dam construction would have the most impact on Cambodia due to the country’s large dependency on fisheries. The country is dependent on fuel-driven generators and would benefit from hydropower development (Stoett 2005). In terms of hydropower development, little has been realized and in general, the country’s potential is not very big due to its flat nature (Greacen & Palettu 2007, 110). Moreover, Cambodia lacks qualified personnel and financial resources to construct dams. Only one medium-scale dam for hydroelectricity exists today (Molle 2007, 13). This is due to Cambodia’s status as a latecomer among the Mekong countries because of its political turmoil and is at the beginning of substantial investments in water resources. China is investing in the construction of four hydropower plants in Cambodia two of them on the mainstream Mekong (Lim 2008, 10). Laos is the only country in the region without access to a coast. The country is rugged and mountainous. Only four percent of Laos’ total land area is arable (ADB & UNEP 2004, 17). For Laos the Mekong is of utmost importance. The Mekong mainstream and tributaries drain as much as 97 percent of Laos’s territory, running all through the country from North to South. Drainage from the waters of the Mekong is existential for the agriculture of the land. Laos has the highest water availability in the region in per capita terms due to its small population size und the existence of a large number of river tributaries (Thailand is the opposite). The Mekong is also the most significant route for navigation since there is no elaborate alternative transportation system. The country possesses a technically exploitable hydropower potential of 26,000 megawatts, much of it has not been realized (ADB & UNEP 2004, 19). Laos depends on international investment to develop her hydropower resources (Backer 2006, 45). Electricity from hydropower represents Lao’s most important export product (Menniken 2006, 15). This explains why Laos has the greatest density of hydropower development projects. The country has been selling hydropower to Thailand since 1971 (Osborne 2006, 240).18 18

Thailand has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Laos about buying 3,000 megawatt of hydropower in 1996 (Backer 2006, 41).

154

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

Table 22: Dams on the Mainstream Mekong Name Gongguoqiao Xiaowan Manwan Dachaoshan Nuozhadu Jinghong Ganlanba Mengsong Pak Beng Luang rabang Xayabouly Paklay Sanakham Pak Chom Ban Koum Lat Sua Don Sahong Stung Treng Sambor

Status Planning stage Under construction Operational Operational Planning Stage Operational Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage Planning stage

Country location China China China China China China China China Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos Cambodia Cambodia

Source: http://www.mrcmekong.org/ish/map.htm.

Myanmar, in contrast to Cambodia and Laos, does not need the Mekong’s resources due to the availability of sufficient alternative freshwater resources in the country. Myanmar is the largest country in the Mekong region. The country is endowed with large freshwater and marine resources and significant deposits of minerals including oil and gas (ADB & UNEP 2004, 21). It possesses abundant fishery resources due to its 2,800 km coastline (1,930km of which is uninterrupted) and 8.2 million hectares of inland water bodies. Myanmar is one of the richest areas of natural resources in the world (ADB & UNEP 2004, 22). Not much is known about hydropower development in Myanmar. The country has a considerable potential for hydropower development. Myanmar itself is not in need of the energy produced by dams. The few dams that exist in the country – and that have been built with forced labor – are producing energy for export to Thailand, China and India (Greacen & Palettu 2007, 106). The Kingdom of Thailand occupies a strategic geographic situation right at the heart of mainland Southeast Asia. Thailand is the richest country in the Mekong region and has established economic sectors different from agriculture. The 36 percent of the country that are within the Mekong River basin are also used for rice cultivation. However, this land area is not as fertile as other parts of the country and considered peripheral for Thailand’s economy. Although Thailand is relatively wealthy, much of the Thai territory bordering the Mekong

2 Problem Structure

155

is among the poorest and least developed of the country, a fact that has been attributed to the shortage of water in the region (Menniken 2007, 108). The demand for electricity is biggest in Thailand. As the first country in the region, Thailand has exhausted most of its potential for hydroelectric development. The country has only limited potential and can only generate about four percent of needed power from hydrological sources (APEC 2007, 186/187). The Thai parts of the mainstream Mekong are not suitable for dam projects. Thailand wants to engage in a “regional power grid for regional power trade” by buying electricity from other countries in the region, most of all from Laos (Backer 2006, 41). Critics say that Thailand is casting its shadow economy of environmental destruction and degradation on its neighbors. Thailand sees itself as the most important player in the Mekong River Commission and also as the only country that can afford to build dams without joint efforts. For Thailand, cooperation is an option not a necessity. Viet Nam is a coastal country with a very narrow shape. Viet Nam has a large coastline of 3,260 kilometers that borders the Gulf of Tonkin in the North, the South China Sea in the East and the Gulf of Thailand in the Southwest. Two major rivers flow through the country: the Red River in the North and the Mekong in the South. About 20 percent of Viet Nam lies within the Mekong basin. The Mekong delta is the country’s most densely populated area that is inhabited by 17 million people (Backer 2006, 49; UNDP 2007, 100). The delta covers 39,000 square kilometers and produces significant amounts of rice. Thanks to the two major rivers and the large coastline, Viet Nam is blessed with abundant species of aquatic life. Viet Nam’s rapid growth has pushed the country to the limits of its arable land. Loss in biodiversity, soil erosion, and degradation of water quality are relatively new problems for the country. Due to market pressures farmers are obliged to deliver more goods to the markets. And as the population grows, more and more products are being requested. This leads to an enormous increase in the use of fertilizers and pesticides for fishing and rice cultivation – leaving the Mekong with increasing levels of pollution. Viet Nam’s primary concern is maintaining the quality and quantity of water it needs for its delta (Stoett 2005). Viet Nam is very concerned about the Chinese hydropower projects since they could alter the salinity of the water, affecting the rice production dramatically. On the other hand, the country engages heavily in large hydropower projects – however, not on the mainstream Mekong. The country generates about 35 percent of all power from hydrological sources (APEC 2007, 206/207). Today, Viet Nam sees itself as the second major power in the Mekong region and has shown an interest in buying hydropower from Laos and China. The Yunnan province is an area in the extreme southwest of China. It lays south of the Yun Mountains – hence the name. Mild climate and fair weather

156

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

characterize the subtropical setting of Yunnan. Yunnan is the eighth largest province in China. Ninety-four percent of Yunnan’s land area is classified as mountainous. Thus, there is only little arable land for agriculture. Twenty-three percent of Yunnan lies within Mekong basin. There are over 600 rivers and lakes in Yunnan. Yunnan possesses large reserves of natural resources. Yunnan is famous throughout China as tourist area due to its unique highland plateau landscape and the lush tropical scenery. However, on the other hand, it is also one of the most undeveloped and poorest provinces. It lacks far behind the economic progress of the East coast of China. However, it has the strategic advantage of being very proximate to Southeast Asia, which is favorable for trade and exchange. Yunnan is the most important strategic player in the region since it controls 21 percent of the basin and is the most upstream country. China’s goal is to double hydropower capacity by 2010 (Dore et al. 2007, 55) and by that to lessen its dependency on coal (energy security). China also considers the huge benefits of exporting hydropower to other countries. China already possesses 50 percent of all the world’s large dams (more than 22,000) (Menniken 2007, 109). The highest concentration of hydropower plants and projects in China can be found in Yunnan province. The Yunnan landscape consists of steep valleys and gorges – an ideal geography for the construction of dams. Yunnan has 24 percent of China’s hydropower potential (Dore et al. 2007, 58). Yunnan already provides ten percent of China’s hydropower (Dore et al. 2007, 65). As Yunnan is increasingly industrializing, the construction of dams is enforced with highest priorities (Hori 2000, 210). China aims to build a gigantic cascade of eight dams on the Mekong in Yunnan.19 They will produce 14,700 megawatt of energy for the country (ADB & UNEP 2004, 15). Out of the eight dams, three have been finalized (Manwan, Dachoashan and Jinghong) and one is under construction (Xiaowan). The Xiaowan dam at the Mekong with an estimated capacity of 4,200 megawatts will be the second largest dam in China (after the Three Gorges Dam). And it will be the world’s tallest dam structure: With its 300 meters the Xiaowan dam will be as high as the Eiffel Tower. 2.5 Results: Actors’ Constellations 2.5.1 Position of Actors Summarizing the results from the analysis of vulnerability and abatement costs, a strong upstream-downstream cleavage emerges. China is the dominating actor 19

Manwan, Dachoashan, Xiaowan, Jinghong, Gonguoqiao, Nuozhadu, Ganlanba, and Mengsong.

2 Problem Structure

157

in this game. The country is not only located at the most upstream position; it also generates huge amounts of hydrological energy causing considerable negative externalities for the remaining five countries. China is able to externalize damage and is not affected by interventions in the river of the other countries due to the flow direction. Moreover, the huge hydropower generation projects in Yunnan are not even damaging the province itself – at least not substantially since the Mekong basin in Yunnan is sparsely populated and the clear source of the Mekong is close by so that the river is able to regenerate from interventions. Therefore, the Yunnan province (and China) has no interest in joint river management. Yunnan is a dragger with regard to the regime. Furthermore, in this first picture of actors’ constellations the four lower basin countries form a unity of negatively affected downstream countries. They all have to bear the damage and costs that China is throwing down the river. They are victims of Chinese infrastructure and energy politics. This position of the four countries is expressed in their joint effort of river management within the organizational structures of the Mekong River Commission. With regard to the upstream actor China, all four Mekong River Commission countries are downstream actors. All four countries are in the position to cause externalities to each other. Interventions into the river affect all four countries. Therefore, the urge for joint regulation among this group of four is likely to be rather strong. However, there are also differences among the countries regarding position and economic power play. Thailand and Laos share some upstream parts of the Mekong close to the Golden Triangle region. Also, Thailand and Viet Nam have very strong tributaries of the Mekong that come from upper levels and can be used for hydropower projects. Through these upstream tributaries the two countries gain some upstream strength with regard to Cambodia and Laos that do not have such elevated tributaries. Therefore, Thailand and Viet Nam have a more favorable river position. Although Laos obtains some upstream parts of the river, the majority that flows through its territory is downstream. Cambodia is the country that has the least favorable position regarding hydropower since the Mekong flows through flat land and no elevated tributaries can be used either. With regard to vulnerability we have two different clusters this time: Cambodia and Laos have a rather high vulnerability, whereas Thailand and Viet Nam have a low level. For Laos and Cambodia the resources of the Mekong are not only important but are existential for the countries’ economy. These two countries build their entire economy on exploiting the resources of the river. Damage caused to the river is dramatic for these two countries. Thailand and Viet Nam in contrast have a more diversified economy. Environmental damage on the Mekong also hurts these two countries but to a lesser degree than it does in Laos and Cambodia. Thailand’s economy is increasingly abandoning agriculture in favor of manu-

158

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

facturing and services. Thailand is the most developed of all countries in the Mekong region. It has the capacity to develop and implement infrastructure projects on its own. Thailand’s self-image is that of a power player in the Mekong region that has the option of cooperation but not the necessity. Thailand would rather see the MRC as a facilitator than as a body imposing regulations (Backer 2006, 42). Its commitment to the organization remained “lukewarm at best” (Jokinen 2001, 217). Viet Nam has a second large river, the Red River, that delivers resources for the country. Viet Nam is rapidly developing and envisions its future as a center of growth and economic diversity. However, the country’s dependency on natural resources is still present. Viet Nam’s major income source stems from rice cultivation. Viet Nam often shows an “arrogant attitude towards difficult issues within the MRC and particularly concerns raised by Cambodia” (Backer 2006, 50). In sum, the most vulnerable and poorest countries in the Mekong region, Cambodia and Laos, take the position of regime pushers. Viet Nam is also in favor for joint river management but is also ambivalent about joint decisions due to the country’s own rapid development. Thailand is the most skeptical country towards cooperation since its position is the most powerful. Thailand can achieve its goals also without cooperation; therefore the country is rather dragging further joint regulation. The last of the riparians, Myanmar, has no stake in the Mekong. Its position is not very important since the country only possesses two percent of the river on its territory. Table 23: Positions of Countries in the Mekong Regime Pusher Intermediate Intermediate – Dragger Bystander Dragger

Cambodia, Laos Viet Nam Thailand Myanmar Yunnan (China)

Source: own assessment.

Myanmar is a bystander of the regime. Also, the country has strong economic ties with China and surely tries to keep a good relation with China. On the other hand, Myanmar is also member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, to which the other riparians belong. Therefore, in order to maintain stable relations, Myanmar has to keep a neutral position regarding the Mekong politics. 2.5.2 Problem Malignancy As so often in International Relations the involved countries have different positions in the game. Therefore, the problem is malign, an unfavorable precondi-

2 Problem Structure

159

tion for cooperation. Not all are pushing for the regime. Moreover, the countries do not only have differing interests, they also have different possibilities to achieve their goals: some are in better positions than others to exploit the common pool resource Mekong. In addition, actors’ interests are negatively correlated causing a collective action dilemma. There are four countries more or less in favor for joint river management (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam), one country standing by (Myanmar) and one other country strongly dragging all regime efforts (China). Although the clear majority of actors are pushing in favor of the regime, it is the one dragging country that is most important. China’s strategic position on the top of the river and its enormous infrastructure project of dam construction leave all the other countries with no means to take influence in China’s behavior. Prospects for cooperation between all six riparians are minimal if at all present. Since China can realize all of its interests without consultation of the other riparian countries it is highly unlikely that the country seeks participation in a binding regime. Two countries are clearing pushing for the regime (Cambodia, Laos) whereas Viet Nam is slightly and Thailand a little bit more hesitant towards the joint and consensual river management. The geopolitical location of the four countries is a significant determinant of regime effectiveness. The two upstream countries Laos and Thailand are less committed to the regime than are Cambodia and Viet Nam as the two downstream countries. However, a second geopolitical dimension is also important. The countries (Laos, Cambodia) that have a higher share of the Mekong basin passing through their territory are more committed than the countries (Thailand, Viet Nam) that only have a small share. However, the prospect for cooperation among these four is much better since none of them is able to realize all of its interests without consultation with the others. The problem structure of the Mekong can even be considered to be badly malign because of one other reason. The most powerful country of the six riparians, China, is not a member state of the Mekong River Commission. In how far China complies with the regime’s principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures without being member to the regime’s organization will be examined in this chapter. Many studies on the Mekong regime have attributed China’s non-participation as the main reason for the lack of effectiveness (comp. Cheong 1998; Hori 2000; Osborne 2004; Stoett 2005; Backer 2006; Binh 2006; Osborne 2006; Dore et al. 2007; Menniken 2007). What is interesting about the Mekong regime is that the four riparian countries are affected by the actions of one another and therefore have a strong desire to cooperate – except for China (here I neglect Myanmar due to its marginal position). China is not dependent on other riparians’ decisions or consent. China can pursue unilateral actions as it pleases and externalize negative effects to the other (down-

160

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

stream) countries. There is thus a sharp asymmetry between the upstream and the downstream countries. In this specific setting, this asymmetry has made China – in the terms of regime theory – a geophysical and socioeconomic Rambo. As long as it is possible for China to realize gains and externalize negative effects it is very unlikely for China to become a member of the Mekong River Commission. The absence of China in the MRC is a classic free-rider problem. The country cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefits of a collective resource, but it has little incentive to contribute voluntarily to its protection (Ostrom 1990). The other countries in the region are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a coordination problem with a conflict about the cost distribution. They do not know what China is doing next. The country’s potency combined with its strategic position at the most upstream part of the Mekong leave no doubt to attribute China the label of a hegemonic superpower in addition to its title as the Rambo of the game. China’s possibilities to act and to implement its interests are almost unlimited. The country dictates resource politics at the Mekong and leaves the other riparians in the position to react. The theory of hegemonic stability can be employed in this case study. China pursues its interests with or without a regime. It participates in cases that are beneficial (GMS) and chooses not to cooperate in other cases (MRC). Its participation in the ASEAN-GMSChina program can be seen as a strategy to position itself as a benevolent superpower of the region. It sponsors infrastructural projects all over the Mekong region and suggests the impression of equal cooperation and coordination of projects among the riparians. However, until today, the region carries lots of historical baggage. Border disputes disrupt the relations between Thailand and Cambodia. China has started to get involved in the region and influence politics regarding the Mekong. Viet Nam and especially Thailand try to dominate decisions in Laos and Cambodia, countries that are considered to be weaker. The “old battlefields have not been completely transformed into marketplaces” (Binh 2006, 65). In 2004, the Mekong region suffered from a protracted dry season and received only poor levels of rainfall. This resulted in sharply low levels of water in the river. In fact, it was the lowest level in Laos ever in history. The size of the fish catch dropped by 50 percent compared to 2003 and posed a viable danger to the wellbeing and lives of the people. Although all four member countries of the MRC did not officially complain to China, it was an unspoken fact that the severity of the situation was partially caused by Chinese authorities who have limited the flow of water out of the dams in Yunnan province with full knowledge that this would aggravate the crisis situation even more (Osborne 2004, vii).

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

161

3 Problem-Solving Capacity 3.1 Composition and Development of the Mekong Regime The ideas of an integrated Mekong management go back to the 1940s. After the Second World War the United Nations and its regional sub-organization, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, later: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ESCAP) were striving for the reconstruction of the region. Economic development of the developing world was the mantra of that time.20 In order to avoid only piecemeal projects and to involve the riparians in a sufficient way, ECAFE decided to set up a permanent Committee in the Mekong region. In 1957, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam signed the Statute of the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin (“Mekong Committee”) under the supervision of the United Nations (Mekong Committee 1957). The two other riparian countries, Myanmar and China were not part of the Committee. Myanmar was not interested in participating. China was excluded because it was not a member of the UN at that time. The “Mekong Project” was the largest single development project that the fledgling United Nations organization had started. The Mekong Committee planned to realize economic development through the construction of large-scale dams throughout the river. The manipulation and control of water flows would allow improving navigation on the river, to produce hydropower, to prevent floods and provide water for irrigation – in brief to foster the rapid industrialization of Indochina. To realize its plans, the Mekong Committee had to collect information since not much was known about the Mekong. The establishment of a comprehensive data collection about the Mekong can be considered the MC’s main achievement. The Viet Nam War in the 1970s and the power seizure of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975 interrupted cooperation. The Mekong Committee only engaged in minor projects. It took until the end of the Cambodia-Viet Nam War in 1991 to revitalize cooperation. In 1995, a new international organization, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was created (Mekong River Commission 1995). The MRC is a follower of the Mekong Committee from 1957. The membership remained the same. However, in contrast to the Committee, the MRC is not a UN-body but a full-fledged international organization. The goal of the MRC is to promote an effective management and development of water resources and environmental protection, fisheries and agriculture concerns, as well as for transboundary concerns (flood control, navigation, and hydropower) of 20

Economic development was also considered to be an effective remedy against the rapid spread of Communism in the developing world.

162

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

the lower Mekong basin. The Mekong River Commission sees itself not only as a platform for the coordination of development projects but also as a guardian of the resources and ecosystems of the Mekong. While the Mekong River Commission is the longest standing and undoubtedly a very important actor, two other actors are worth mentioning who came into the region in the early 1990s, the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program of the Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation. In 1992, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) launched a cooperation program called the Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program. The ADB is key player in the region. The Mekong program’s overarching objective is poverty reduction. Improved transport, in the form of dams, roads and river navigation, would break the isolation of inhabitants in the rural areas, leading to higher income and better living standards (Sithirith 2007, 29; Lim 2008, i). The program has no organizational body and does not require formal membership. In contrast to the MRC, it includes all six riparian countries. ASEAN’s involvement with the Mekong region goes back to a time when Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam where not yet members of the association. The goal of ASEAN’s involvement was to link the non-Mekong and Mekong members of ASEAN together for the first time in order to enhance cooperation in the region and also to foster peace and stability in the Indochina Peninsula. In December 1995, ASEAN officially declared its Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (MBDC). Two big infrastructure projects were proposed: the East West Corridor and trans-Asian railways (Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-BangkokVientiane-Kunming). Both are currently under implementation. When the four countries, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Viet Nam, finally joined ASEAN the mode of cooperation changed. ASEAN sought stronger cooperation with the GMS and became a partner for joint infrastructure projects. Now, the two initiatives increasingly merge and run under the label of ASEAN-GMS-China cooperation. China’s commitment is rather strong. From being a recipient of project funding from the ADB China has recently transformed into being a benefactor for the region. It set up a USD 20 million poverty reduction fund and spent USD four billion building highways in Southeast Asia.

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

163

3.2 Institutional Set-up 3.2.1 Statute of the Mekong River Commission The Mekong River Commission (MRC) was created on 5 April 1995 (Mekong River Commission 1995). It is a follower of the Mekong Committee from 1957. The membership remained the same. The establishment of the MRC in 1995 is historically noteworthy given the difficult situation of the four countries, the deadlocked negotiations in the early 1990s and the voluntary self-obligation of the states to start cooperation on a new fundament in 1995.21 The Preamble refers to this fact in noting the “unique spirit of cooperation and mutual assistance that inspired the work of the Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin and the many accomplishments that have been achieved through its efforts“.

The Mekong River Commission is not a body of the United Nations, as was the Mekong Committee. It is a full-fledged international organization and may enter into agreements and obligations with international communities and donors. The MRC has “significantly greater power and authority than its predecessor” (Hori 2000, 332). Since 1996, Yunnan province (China) and Myanmar have been dialogue partners. Goals of the MRC are presented in the founding Agreement: “To cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber floating, recreation and tourism, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and mutual benefits of all riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that might result from natural occurrences and man-made activities“ (Mekong River Commission 1995, Article 1).

21

With the end of the Cambodia-Viet Nam war in 1991 the Mekong Committee hoped to be revitalized by its four initial member countries. However, Thailand held a skeptical position regarding Cambodia’s re-admittance because decision-making rules might have been changed and competencies widened, which endangered large-scale dam projects in Thailand. Moment of escalation was when Thailand threw the CEO of the Mekong Committee out of its country in 1992 in the middle of heated debates about the future of the Mekong cooperation. Probably, if not for the UN-efforts, it might as well have happened that the Committee would have disintegrated and vanished. Five reasons can been seen as critical in achieving success. First, Thailand and Viet Nam had an interest in maintaining amicable relations in the post-Cold War era. Second, planned Chinese reservoirs were expected to augment the critical dry-season flows in the Mekong. Third, international development agencies were willing to assist the Mekong cooperation technically and financially. Fourth, UNDP provided important negotiation assistance for the drafting. Fifth, the Mekong Agreement is a framework document that contains general principles and procedures for the cooperation in water allocation, but does not actually allocate water among the four member states.

164

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

In comparison with the former Mekong Committee, the mandate of the MRC was widened considerably, “from issues directly connected with the Mekong to the overall development of the whole Mekong basin” (Jokinen 2001, 215). For the time period 2006-2010 the MRC strives for the realization of four goals: the promotion of sustainable development, the enhancement of regional cooperation, the strengthening of basin-wide environmental monitoring and impact assessment, and the strengthening of capacity and knowledge base of the MRC bodies (MRC Website). 3.2.2 Organizational Structure Figure 8: Mekong River Commission Structure as of 30 November 2010

Cambodia

Laos

Thailand

Viet Nam

National Mekong Committees member country agencies

Council member country delegate at cabinet level

Donor Consultative Group

Joint Committee member country delegate at head of department level

Dialogue Partner Meeting

Secretariat administration, technical support, coordination

Source: adapted from MRC Website.

The Mekong River Commission consists of three main bodies, the Council, the Joint Committee, and the Secretariat as well as some sub-bodies. The Council is the highest body of the MRC. It consists of one delegate at ministerial or cabinet level per member country and meets annually. The Council decides on political directives (in the form of constitutional organ) and is the first instance of conflict resolution. The day after the annual meetings of the Council, the Donor Consultative Group meets with the Council and negotiates funding and strate-

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

165

gies of enlarging the donor community. The Joint Committee is the executive organ of the Council. It is responsible for the implementation of the Council’s directives and the planning and realizing of specific projects. The Joint Committee consists of one delegate from each member country. The Committee meets biannually. After every the meeting, there is a Meeting with Dialogue Partners, Myanmar and China, in order to exchange information and inform these countries officially about all policy decisions on an annual basis. The Mekong Secretariat carries out the actual work. It is responsible for technical and administrative coordination. It implements policy decisions, delivers data and material that is sought for by the Council and Joint Committee. The Chief Executive Officer of the Secretariat (CEO) is responsible for the day-today operations of around 130 professional and general support staff (MRC Website). Besides the CEO there are four co-CEOs who are deputed from the four member countries. Furthermore, an Assistant CEO is also appointed. He or she is of the same nationality as the Chair of the Joint Committee and serves a one-year term (MRC Website). The Secretariat consists of five divisions. The MRC Secretariat has two headquarters, one in Phnom Penh and another one in Vientiane. The National Mekong Committees in each member state function as a connecting link between the MRC and member states. The National Mekong Committees (NMC) are separate units in ministries or state agencies. They collaborate closely with the Joint Committee. The principle implementing agencies of the MRC programs and projects are the line agencies of the riparian countries. The common practice of the last decade of cooperation within the MRC has established that the Mekong Secretariat is responsible for preparation, finance and supervision of projects. The National Mekong Committees facilitate the coordination between Secretariat and line agencies and enforce implementation (Ringler 2001, 85). 3.2.3 Sectors of Engagement The Mekong River Commission is active in different sectors and levels. The Secretariat has a strategic planning division in which the mid- and long-term projects are developed and discussed. The so-called Basin Development Plan is the main policy document that delineates future projects and coherent strategies for the Mekong for a considerable time span. Its goal is the collection of data, development of scenarios and the provision of potential programs and projects (Mekong River Commission 1995, Chapter II). The Water Resource Management focuses on regulating the use of water from the Mekong. It oversees and conceptualizes how and how much water can be used. The goal of an integrated

166

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

water resource management is the implementation of a common transboundary water policy, which is mutually beneficial and maintains the ecological balance of the basin. Interestingly, this program was called “Water Utilization Plan” until last year. Figure 9: MRC Secretariat Organizational Structure as of 30 November 2010

CEO

Tech Coordination Unit

Finance & Administration Section Internal Cooperation & Communication

Office of the CEO

Planning Division

Environment Division

Tech Supp Division

Operations Division

Basin Development Plan Progr.

Environment Programme

Information & Knowledge Progr.

Agriculture, Irrigation, Forestry

Mekong Integr. Water Res. Mgmt

Climate Change & Adaptation

Flood Mgmt & Mitigation Progr.

Fisheries Programme

Drought Mgmt Project

Navigation Programme

Human Resources Division Section

Initi. on Sustainable Hydropower

Source: adapted from MRC Website.

The new term is a tribute to international activism on integrated water resource management that goes beyond pure economic utilization but also focuses on ecological aspects. The Environment Division is the newest in the Secretariat. It is supposed to represent an ecological counter-balance to the more socioeconomically oriented BDP. It aims at implementing international conventions (Wetlands, Agenda 21, Biodiversity, Endangered Species) as well as at adhering to the ecological status quo and the prevention of further harm to the environment. The division supports awareness raising campaigns and controls proposals for their environmental “fit”. The Technical Support Division might well be the most important unit within the Secretariat. Here, the complex databases are managed and expanded. Data on geography, ecosystems, natural systems, soils, climate and much more are analyzed and categorized. Mathematical tools are being developed and used to support planning and decision-making. It is a place for the epistemic community. The Operations Division supervises all ongoing and planned projects on the Mekong and its river basin. The work is concen-

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

167

trating on four different sectors: agriculture, fisheries, navigation and hydropower. The Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower is the most important sector of engagement. Here again, a re-naming has taken place. Until a year ago, this unit was called Hydropower Programme (Mekong River Commission 2001). Now, the unit gives credit to critical voices of dam construction. Until recently, the unit concentrated on the identification and assessment of possible sites for dams. It conducted impact analysis of dams in long-term development scenarios. Now in addition to these tasks, the Hydropower Initiative conducts research to improve understanding of the natural processes in the river system and their consequences, analyzes cumulative impacts of various development scenarios. On request, specific studies and statement documents are provided to explain hydropower projects. Also, the river’s hydrology, environmental health and productivity are being monitored on a regular basis. 3.3 Determinants of Effectiveness 3.3.1 Compliance Mechanisms Instead of being a set of rules, the 1995 Agreement is an agreement to agree, full of general principles, declarations and expressions of intend. There are only few binding obligations and no sanctions for non-compliance. Compliance is automatically assumed or at least hoped for. In a typical Southeast Asian manner, sanctions for non-compliance are missing and articles that would otherwise be called rules are listed under principles in order to keep the low level of institutionalization and avoid skepticism of signatories. For example, the “do no harm” principle, or in the language of the Agreement, the “Prevention and Cessation of Harmful Effects” is listed as a principle (Article 7). In general, member states shall abstain from implementing projects that affect the environment of another member state in a negative way. While this general principle is abstract enough to require the definition of a principle, the second half of Article 7 could also be read as a rule: “Where one or more States is notified with proper and valid evidence that it is causing substantial damage to one or more riparians from the use of and/or discharge to water of the Mekong River, that State or States shall cease immediately the alleged cause of harm until such cause of harm is determined in accordance with Article 8“.

The question is what happens if a country does not cease immediately the alleged cause of harm? The Agreement does not list any possible sanctions for

168

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

non-compliance with the provisions of the document (Sisowath 2006, 131). It is left completely to the good will of the member states to effectively cooperate. The MRC has an institutionalized mechanism for conflict resolution. Article 34 mandates that “the Commission shall first make every effort to resolve the issue”. It is first the Joint Committee and – if not successful – the Council that shall deal with the conflict issue (Article 18.C and 24.F). However, it is left completely open in what way this conflict resolution is to be carried out. Decision-making in the Joint Committee and in the Council is organized in a consensual, unanimous way. I assume that the issue at conflict is to be discussed and decided upon by all members in consensus. However, the Mekong River Commission is no supranational organization. In legal terms it does not have jurisdiction over conflict resolution because it “has no authority to make political decisions for the region” (Sisowath 2006, 129). Decisions that are binding for the member states cannot be made by the MRC. Internal conflict resolution thus might rather function as a way to stabilize the spirit of cooperation and minimize conflict. The second article on conflict resolution, Article 35, takes reference to the strictly international character of the Mekong River Commission. The Article represents a state-of-the-art framework for conflict resolution in international relations. If the Commission does not succeed in resolving the conflict, “the issue shall be referred to the Governments to take cognizance of the matter for resolution by negotiation through diplomatic channels within a timely manner, and may communicate their decision to the Council for further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out such decision. Should the Governments find it necessary or beneficial to facilitate the resolution of the matter, they may, by mutual agreement, request the assistance of mediation through an entity or party mutually agreed upon, and thereafter to proceed according to the principles of international law“.

The incorporation of Article 35 into the Agreement clearly underlines the desire of the member states to connect to standards of international law. However, as far as 2010 no case of conflict resolution with reference to Article 35 has taken place. This can be interpreted in a positive way. The Mekong River Commission has so far succeeded to minimize conflict and solve problems of cooperation internally. Issues are discussed intensively before decisions are taken in order to make sure to guarantee a full approval rate. A rather negative interpretation would mean that Article 35 is nothing more than a rhetorical reference to international law standards. It has never been intended to make use of it. The ASEAN Way of managing difference – mainly bilaterally and behind closed doors – prevails in the Mekong regime (Menniken 2007, 169). The regime is heavily deficient in the development of hard and sanctionable rules. This is why the Mekong River Commission has been accused to be nothing more than a “toothless guardian” (Wain 2004). Only two principles of

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

169

the Agreement have been transformed into legal rules. The principles for usage of the Mekong are delineated in a remarkably detailed manner in Articles 5 and 6. Member countries are granted the right to divert water from the Mekong. The MRC makes no official statement about the quantity or quality of projects. However, all diversion projects are linked to a specific degree of cooperation. When water is diverted from a tributary of the Mekong the Joint Committee shall be notified of the action. When it comes to the mainstream Mekong, the principles of communication are more sophisticated. During the wet season the Joint Committee is to be notified of water diversion from the Mekong basin of a member country. When diversion is taking place in a basin between countries, there shall be a prior consultation aiming at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee. During the dry season the MRC attempts to apply even stricter principles of cooperation: intra-basin use shall be subject to prior consultation. And any inter-basin diversion project shall be agreed upon by the Joint Committee. These principles have successfully been transformed into legal rules in 2006. Article 6 manages the MRC’s policy toward the maintenance of flows on the mainstream Mekong. Due to water diversions for irrigation purposes, dam constructions and river widening for navigation, the flow of the Mekong had been altered in the past. Flow alterations have led to unpredictable conditions for fisheries as navigation due to sudden changes of flow velocity and water level. Consequences are not quite clear however it is feared that flow alterations might harm the ecological balance of the river. With Article 6 the MRC declares its goal to maintain the current flow at the status quo level. The Article does not explicitly define the allowed quantity of flow alteration; it sticks to the formulation of “acceptable minimum”. Ultimately, it thus adopted the view of many critical voices that have expressed their concerns over the years that flow alterations will impact the environment in a negative way. As a consequence of this Article the MRC should, at least in theory, concentrate its projects on the wet season when water diversion does not impact the flow due to the large amount of available water. There are no sanctions for non-compliance to these rules. In sum, the lack of binding rules and the non-existence of sanctions in the Agreement reflect typical behavioral patterns in interstate relations of Southeast Asian countries. The preference for high levels of informality strengthens trustbuilding and reduces the mutual anxiety of relative losses among the participants. The principle of “good will” in terms of compliance, however, also means that compliance takes place in situations in which countries expect more gains than costs and does not take place in situations in which countries expect to be worse off than before. As a general rule, procedures are very detailed when there is common agreement and they are rather vague when much is at stake. The MRC is doomed to proceed with small steps and uncontroversial projects.

170

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

Longer-term projects with relatively high costs and delayed profits are hardly possible. More than 50 years of cooperation have contributed to peace and stability in the region but the lack of implementation resulted in a lack of impact. Menniken (2007) labels the Mekong regime’s behavioral pattern as “cooperative non-implementation”. Another aspect is interesting. China is not part of the MRC and does not need to comply with the rules of the 1995 Agreement. However, the four member states present a number of incentives in order to make China comply with some of the cooperation principles. These unwritten compliance mechanisms are the only anchor of cooperation between the MRC and China. The MRC has incorporated cooperation with China into its institutional set-up. First, it has explicitly included the possibility for China to become a member (Article 39) as a sign of good will of cooperation. Second, it has incorporated regular dialogue sessions with China. At these sessions, the MRC shares sensitive information with China and thus acknowledges the country’s importance. China is granted access to all relevant information that is available through the MRC Secretariat and in return provides 24 hourly reports of water levels during the flood season (Menniken 2007, 170). In return, the MRC hopes to receive relevant information on infrastructural projects from the Chinese delegation, which does not always work. China is a regional superpower. The MRC countries have understood that they can only approach China if they perform as a unitary actor. China is generally interested in Southeast Asia and sees itself increasingly as a regional benefactor contributing money to infrastructural projects. The incentive to be on good terms or even cooperate with Southeast increases with the increasing significance of the countries, thus the self-presentation as the MRC. These strategies of the Mekong River Commission have succeeded in initiating cooperation with China. However, this should not be overestimated since China is well aware of the huge power imbalance between itself and the MRC. It rather sees occasional cooperation as a nice add-on and investment in social capital. 3.3.2 Available Resources Donor contributions are the most important pillars of the Mekong River Commission’s financial fundament. The level of donor contributions had been stable for a long time. The United Nations, that had established the Mekong Committee 1957, paid most of its bills, including the administrative costs. A strong sponsor for projects had also been the USA. As long as the US was directly involved in Indochina, the Committee could rely on funds and technical support. In 1975, funds from the United States were embargoed as Communist regimes

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

171

took over in Cambodia, South Viet Nam and Laos. From the late 1970s on, UN agencies (mostly UNDP) and Nordic countries substituted support from the US. At the end of the 1980s, some 60 percent of all costs of the Mekong Secretariat were covered by UNDP contributions. Until 1992, the Mekong cooperation received USD 50 million by UNDP per year. After the end of the Cold War, contributions dropped dramatically since the rationale for funding – threat of Communism – was gone. The level of contributions fell to around USD ten million per year (1998: USD 8 million). By the late 1990s, even UNDP got weary with no visible results. The financial crisis came to a head in 1996-1998 when donor contribution fell to USD four million (Jokinen 2001, 231). In 2004, the donor grants for MRC projects stabilized at USD 14 million. Today, the activities of the Mekong River Commission are funded mainly by UNDP, the World Bank, ADB, the European Commission, Australia, USA, Korea, Japan, New Zealand and a considerable number of West and North European countries of which Denmark is the biggest contributor (Mekong River Commission 2007). The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), largely a World Bank enterprise, contributes funding toward the Mekong River Basin Water Utilization Project and the Mekong River Basin Wetland Biodiversity project. Donors’ funding is conducted on the basis of their preferred programs. This results in extreme imbalances between financial possibilities of specific projects. Table 24: Income and Expenditures of the MRC 1998-2007, in USD million 1998 Donor contribution Riparian contribution Revenue Total income Project expenditure Admin expenditure Total expenditure Fund balance

1999

2000

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

7.68 10.27 8.56 0.53 0.92 0.78 1.28 1.32 1.13 9.48 12.55 10.47 10.23 9.3 12.13 2.95 2.41 1.85 13.44 11.71 13.99 9.06 9.84 6.22

11.45 1.09 0.08 12.62 12.52 2.15 14.66 5.04

10.23 12.9 13.75 10.93 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.16 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 11.2 13.93 14.86 12.21 9.78 8.87 11.13 10.9 2.02 1.76 1.88 2.07 11.84 11.18 13.03 12.97 4.404 7.15 8.98 8.22

20.02 1.63 0.05 21.7 12.3 1.93 14.23 15.85

Source: Mekong River Commission 1998-2007.

The riparian countries’ contribution only amounts to USD 1.6 million per year (in 2007). The four member countries have committed to provide the funding of the MRC’s core activities by themselves by 2014. In general, donor funds are decreasing. And with the small self-funding of the MRC there is a danger of marginalization. In comparison, the ASEAN-GMS-China program receives far more resources than the Mekong River Commission could have ever hoped to command. Especially the Japanese government is contributing to the program in providing more than half of its financial requirements (ADB 2004, 40). USD 40

172

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

million have been spent for technical assistance and another USD 465 million have been granted as loan assistance for seven infrastructural projects so far (Sakai 2000, 15). The total cost of all ASEAN-GMS-China program projects has been more than USD one billion. The Mekong River Commission is lacking skilled and knowledgeable personnel. There are not enough funds to establish an efficient bureaucracy since the donor contributions are limited to projects and not to the organization itself. Generally, staff at the Secretariat is increasing because of the increasing project density. The staff is composed of riparian and international experts, the former seconded by governments the latter commissioned by donor agencies or competitively recruited (Menniken 2007, 142). In the first decades of cooperation employees of the MRC have almost exclusively been international experts. The countries at the Mekong were too backward to be able to provide skilled professionals for project management and engineering tasks. This has changed. The number of riparians has grown as the figures in Table 25 show. However, it is still a challenge for the four riparians to provide enough experts. The programmatic sectors of engagement require a deep expert knowledge. Education institutions in Laos and Cambodia are not able to provide education in these fields. For Thailand and Viet Nam the situation looks slightly better. Positions shall be spread among the four countries in an equal way (Article 33). This is way the Mekong River Commission has initiative a so-called Junior Riparian Professional Program in 2002. Young professionals from the four member countries conduct a traineeship at the Secretariat during which they learn the basics of each sector and the mode of operation of the organization (MRC Website). Table 25: Comparison of Staff at MRC Secretariat in 1965 and 2007

riparian professionals international professionals general support total staff

1965

2007

6 13 5 24

48 15 68 131

Source: MC 1965 Annual Report; MRC 2007 Annual Report.

The most important person at the Mekong River Commission is its CEO. Although the decision-making powers still rest in the competencies of the member states, it is the CEO that gives the MRC a face and an opinion. The CEO is the contact person for the member states’ governments, the donors and the dialogue partners. Throughout the history of 60 years of cooperation there have been inspiring leaders and less inspiring ones. Especially during the time of the blockade (1980s until 1995) the position was not very popular since not much could

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

173

be done in the MRC. Until 1995 the term was five years with a possible extension of another five. Table 26 shows that the term in office has rarely been exhausted. During the 1980s the MRC has seen a lot of Executive Agents coming and going. With the establishment of the Mekong River Commission in 1995 the terms of reference for the CEO were changed. The terms in office were shortened to three years with a possible extension of another three. However, this has not helped to make the position more attractive. Table 26: Executive Agents / CEOs of the MRC 1957-2010 Term in Office 1959 – 1969 (Nov) 1969 (Dec) – 1980 (Jun) 1980 (Jul) – 1983 1983-1987 1988-1990 1990-1995 1995-1999 (Aug) 1999 (Oct) – 2004 2004 (Jul) – 2007 2008-2010 2011 –

Name C. Hart Schaaf W. J. van der Oord Bernt Bernander Galal Magdi Chuck Lankester Jan Kamp Yasunobu Matoba Jörn Kristensen Olivier Cogels Jeremy Bird N.N. (Call for Applications)

Title Executive Agent Executive Agent Executive Agent Executive Agent Executive Agent Executive Agent CEO CEO CEO CEO CEO

Source: own compilation from diverse documents.

Table 26 shows that the extension has never been revoked. Another factor is interesting. The CEO has never come from a riparian country. Sixty years ago this made sense since the Mekong Committee was a body of the United Nations. Thus, the UN also made the choices. By that time it was probably not possible to find a qualified leader within the region. However, this unwritten policy has persisted over time. The problem of qualification is still virulent in Southeast Asia. But in the year 2010 it should be possible to identify a riparian expert for this position. Currently – surprisingly – the MRC is again recruiting a new CEO. This time, for the first time in history, the person has to be a riparian national. It should strengthen the position of the MRC with a riparian CEO. 3.3.3 Decision-Making Rules and Actor Capacity The 1995 Agreement persistently makes reference to the supreme authority of state sovereignty of the member countries. The MRC itself does not possess any power to enforce or implement its projects. Decision-making ultimately rests with the member states. States in Southeast Asia have been very sensitive when it comes to state sovereignty. Foreign occupation, regional hostility and domestic struggles have been factors that can be accounted for the sacrosanct prin-

174

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

ciple of sovereignty. Under no circumstances ever, states do interfere in other state’s affairs. Development plans of other MRC member countries are not criticized or commented on. Article 4 of the 1995 Agreement is dedicated to the supremacy of state sovereignty. The founding member states are emphasizing that the created institution does not have decision-making powers that substitute, circumvent or supersede the sovereignty of the member states. National interests dominate decision-making rules. The member states are not willing “to adjust to common policy recommendations” (Backer 2006, 56). The member countries are unwilling to make concessions to the regime and to sacrifice even tiny bits of their national sovereignty. This hesitation and reluctance is probably rooted in the history of the four countries. There has long been a high level of high external interference, constant political turbulence, and numerous conflicts with neighbors. The fact that the MRC is “strongly owned by the Mekong countries themselves” as former MRC CEO stated in 2005 is generally seen as a positive trade of the organization (MRC Website). To a large extent “the MRC itself remains marginalised from the national decision making processes of its members” (Dore 2003, 425). Policies are mainly decided by the National Mekong Committees, with the MRC only playing a facilitation role. These line agencies dominate the decisionmaking processes and veto project proposals. Their preferences are national ones. Although being the powerhouses of the MRC, the National Mekong Committees are not mentioned in the Agreement, which gives much room for interpreting their role. This leaves much room for informality and closed decision-making processes. The mandate, roles, and function of the NMCs are not defined in the 1995 Agreement. Consequently, “the national governments decide upon the organization, responsibilities, and functions of their respective NMCs” (Ringler 2001, 85). The NMCs are the most powerful actors in the MRC. All decisions have to be made by unanimous vote. The representatives of the NMCs do not hesitate to make use of their right to veto. The MRC has some difficulties in project coordination at the national level due to conflicts between the Secretariat and the National Mekong Committees. The divisions suffer from a bad flow of information. The member country delegates often put their national interest before the interest of the MRC. Thus, institutional and policy reforms were often impeded by this mentality. The NMCs are the “genuine preservers of national sovereignty” within the MRC (Menniken 2007, 143). The Mekong River Commission has no competencies in decision-making. Actor capacity of the MRC cannot be found in decision-making. If at all, there is a symbolic capacity of the MRC to act and initiate projects. All institutions of the MRC are strictly intergovernmental in character. All decisions are made in unanimity. Of course, there is the explicit possibility to opt out of the MRC (Ar-

3 Problem-Solving Capacity

175

ticle 40). All four member states have an equal share in providing funds and votes. Also within the Secretariat, positions are filled according to national quotas. Besides the CEO there are four co-CEOs who are deputed from the four member countries. This can be seen as a mechanism to acknowledge national sovereignty. The Secretariat consists of five divisions, four of which are headed by a member country national. A hot issue of debate was the location of the MRC headquarters. The MRC Secretariat was first located in Bangkok (where the headquarters of the Mekong Committee were). It was then decided to install the headquarters at a location on the Mekong. The Secretariat first moved to Phnom Penh in Cambodia (1999), and then to Vientiane in Laos (2004) with an agreement to switch between these cities every five years. Due to this logistical and financial absurdity it was finally decided (2009) to entertain two permanent headquarters, one in Vientiane and one in Phnom Penh – which is still absurd to a certain degree. It has to be noted that expert groups did not play any significant role in creating the Mekong regime. Not even stakeholders from the Mekong region were the main actors. Rather an external force, the United Nations, triggered the creation of the MC. Rationale of the Committee was supposed to initiate the biggest modernization project of the whole region. At that time, modernization meant industrial development, which resulted in large dam constructions. Water resources development and management was regarded as a purely technical matter (Imamura 2007, 1). The politics of big projects that were decided upon in closed governmental circles continued for the first two decades. During the early times of the Mekong Committee the general attitude towards dam construction plans was very positive if not enthusiastic. Very few doubted the necessity and pointed to possible negative effects of these projects (Hori 2000, 157). Cooperation at the Mekong Committee, in general, focused on engineering projects and only technical aspects. However, as early as in 1962, the report Economic and Social Aspects of Lower Mekong Development analyzed the socio-economic aspects of the proposed development programs and criticized the one-sided focus of the Mekong Committee (Hori 2000, 85). Although, the MC had itself initiated this report and invited the renowned geographer Professor Gilbert F. White from the University of Chicago its implications remain ignored and have not been implemented. The one-sided emphasis on technical questions remained the dominating characteristic of projects. From the late 1960s on, studies on social aspects of development began to appear. Especially the large-scale displacement of people and entire villages for the construction of dam sites and thus the impoverishment was increasingly criticized (Hori 2000, 167). As a result, a new norm was created. The norm that large-scale infrastructural projects cause wide social consequences that must be tackled. A second norm emerged

176

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

in the late 1980s and early 1990s resulting from the rising of the worldwide environmental movement. Large-scale dams do not only cause huge social effects but have also strong environmental impact on the ecosystem of the river. Both norms are internalized by the Mekong regime. The MRC has a strong environmental unit. Also, in 2000 it hired a first expert on social development. Today, the Mekong River Commission admits on its website: “Over the last 50 years, much has been learned about dams and their impacts” (MRC Website). Especially the top-down model of operation that largely ignored the input of civil society actors and academics were heavily criticized and led to reforms within the Mekong River Commission. The MRC’s approach to development has been very traditional or conservative in concentrating on data collection and infrastructure construction. “Environmental, social and cultural aspects of development had been neglected” (Jokinen 2001, 219). Reforms were then initiated as a response to outside pressure. It was again the UNDP that took the lead in guiding the process. Communication within the MRC was improved and the incorporation of NGOs and expert groups was fostered. In general, the MRC has developed and implemented a remarkable platform for epistemic community exchange in “bringing together policy- and decision-makers, scientific experts, international donors, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders in a regular and quite institutionalized fashion” (Menniken 2007, 159/160). Discussions with the epistemic community help to create common problem perceptions and also converging views about suitable solutions. Water experts from all over the world are regularly invited to share opinions or evaluate projects. Knowledge about locations, settlements, and traditions is being used. However, the incorporation of epistemic communities and local groups has clear limits in the Mekong regime. The incorporation of local knowledge only works at a micro level. Upscaling is often not possible because this local knowledge is very situation-sensitive and does not fit into other settings (Molle 2007, 31). Also, it has to be noted that governments and MRC functionaries are skeptical about the value of local knowledge. These professionals with specialized knowledge question the validity and usability of local expertise. Local knowledge has been ignored under the assumption that local people do not know anything (Koma 2007, xvi). All large-scale projects of the MRC are still engineering projects (dams and irrigation schemes) that focus on technical implementation. “The problem is that these actors (especially engineers) often do not want to listen to the people who are going to use this technology” (Koma 2007, xvi). Molle (2007, 28) criticizes that many projects include a “good deal of naïve social engineering”. Not only large-scale projects of the MRC but also of the GMS program of the Asian Development Bank have provoked heavy criticism. The GMS program has been accused of largely non-participatory processes,

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

177

non-transparent and inequitable decision making. Big projects have provoked conflicts with local stakeholders and finally antagonized international investors. “The approach of the ADB and its shareholders has been the subject of increased scrutiny by Mekong Region civil society actors” (Dore 2003, 422). Consequently, from the late 1990s on the GMS program began to concentrate on smaller projects and to involve additional actors and stakeholders in the decision-making or preparation processes. Today’s projects put a special emphasis on governance and information sharing. “Governance is a high priority with stakeholders, with disclosure and transparency of information, and in measures to strengthen GMS mechanisms and processes” (ADB 2004, 39). Traditionally, the Mekong regime has relied on external professionals and best practices instead of building its own capacity to learn and negotiate (Dore 2007, 204; Imamura 2007, 6). Grassroots movements and NGOs in the Mekong region are observable, however, their existence does not mean that they have a voice in the process; this is a development yet to come. There is also the fear that processes might be paralyzed by uncompromising NGOs (Molle 2007, 32). Although NGOs have gained importance in the region in curbing the tendency for unrestrained exploitation of resources, their influence has not reached the decision-making processes of governments (Azimi et al. 2001, 2; Sithirith 2007, 21). Decisions are still dominated by top-down orders and closed discussions among the governmental officials (Greacen & Palettu 2007, 121). They resist more participatory approaches due to a fear to lose control, challenge their legitimacy or deny their competence (Molle 2007, 33). This decision-making culture reflects Southeast Asian traditions, the so-called ASEAN way and also the predominance of authoritarian political systems in the region. Without democracy in the riparian countries it is hard to realize democracy in water governance. 4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness 4.1 Actual Performance Compared to Collective Optimum The different countries in the Mekong regime have diverging strategic positions; some are more powerful than others. Even worse, China is the overarching dominator of the game. Can there be a collective optimum in such a situation? The collective optimum of the Mekong regime has to be constructed as a Pareto optimum for all riparians22, in other words: which ideal situation can be constructed that leave no party worse off? Would it not always make more sense for 22

Riparians are Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Viet Nam and China. Myanmar will be neglected.

178

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

China to abstain from any collective efforts of coordination? Thus, one might think that it will always make sense for China to secure the status quo so that the country is not bound by a regime. I argue that there can be a collective optimum including China. This scenario comprises of three parameters. These will be explained and compared to the regime’s actual performance. First, the role of China and the MRC member countries behavioral strategy towards China is crucial. Membership of China in the MRC is not part of the collective optimum. China has absolutely no interest and incentive to become a formal member of the Mekong River Commission. It cooperates with the organization in cases that are considered beneficial and abstains from cooperation in other situations. There are sufficient informal channels of cooperation and bilateral agreements as well as the formal dialogue sessions with the MRC. From the perspective of the four member countries of the MRC it also makes more sense to cooperate with China as a non-member. If China were a member it would obstruct decisions on infrastructural projects. Due to the strict adherence to the principle of consensual decisions, there would be a great danger of stalemate within the organization. One might then argue that China as a member would be forced to deliver more information and share data on projects. However, as the national line agencies dominate cooperation and dictate the course of the MRC it is not likely that China could be forced to do so. The four countries that are members of the MRC also do only share the information they want to share. Close cooperation with China is desired but its special role as a regional hegemon with a strong interest in large infrastructural projects has to be acknowledged. Besides being the dominator, China has an interest in establishing good relations with its neighbors. The country regards itself as a benevolent superpower of the region and tries to invest strategically into infrastructure of potential trading partners. In general, it can be stated that forms of non-binding participation of China in Mekong related matters is increasing. China participates in the Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Sub-region Program (from 2004 on, before it was only Yunnan) and is strongly committed to this regional cooperation (Binh 2006, 71). Its commitment to the GMS initiative is rather strong. From the first GMS summit in 2002 on, the Chinese not only sent the Yunnan province representative but always the Chinese Premier Minister (Lim 2008, i). The commitment focused especially on the North-South Corridor to improve transport (Kunming to Bangkok). From being a recipient of project funding from the ADB China transformed into being a benefactor for the region (Lim 2008, i). It hosted a GMS summit in 2006 and set up a USD 20 million poverty reduction fund in ADB. China spent USD four billion building highways connecting Kunming with different parts of the GMS. Since 2006, China has removed ta-

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

179

riffs for more than 200 items from its Southern neighbors Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. The governments of these countries see the Chinese commitment as an opportunity (Lim 2008, 13). The GMS cooperation is an example of successful cooperation between China and ASEAN countries, leaving past animosities behind. The GMS program of ADB is regarded as a China-ASEAN-ADB joint effort. At the 2008 Summit, the Chinese Premier Minister Wen proposed to form a unified power market in the region (Lim 2008, 4). “Rather than viewing it as a catalyst for development, some Western and local observers called the increasing presence as a ‘Chinese invasion’. They also accused Chinese-backed projects of damaging the environment” (Lim 2008, ii+12).

Criticism comes from international NGOs and local groups (Lim 2008, 13). Cooperation between the MRC and China is still in the fledgling stages. China is not a member country of the Mekong River Commission, and there are no signs that this will change anytime soon (Osborne 2004, 7). China attends the annual meetings of the MRC with the dialogue partners and also sends observers to the Joint Committee sessions. China also voluntarily shares information with the MRC, however not on dams but only on water levels. The issue of dam construction is too sensitive to be discussed at the dialogue sessions. Information on Chinese plans for dams cannot only be gathered via informal meetings. This avoidance to deliver information at the official dialogue sessions indicates that China acknowledges the forum as an official platform and thus means that the MRC is regarded as an important and relevant actor (see Menniken 2007, 155). Although China refuses to closely collaborate with the MRC, the country is strongly interested in receiving development funds and information on the plans of other riparian countries. “China is motivated to be an observer at the MRC because she wants to be on good terms with her neighbours” (Backer 2006, 53). In April 2002, China signed an agreement on the provision of hydrological information on the Mekong (Agreement on the Provision of Hydrological Information on the Lancang/Mekong River in Flood Season). In this agreement, which has been operational since 2004, China agreed to provide the downstream countries with information on water levels every 24 hours during the flood season (MRC Website; Backer 2006, 10+53). In return, China does not receive information (not that it needed any from the MRC). The country sees itself increasingly in the (self-attributed) role of a regional superpower and benefactor and tries to behave friendly in public. China has an interest in the region and fosters economic development through infrastructure projects. Menniken (2007, 155) argues that

180

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong “China is mastering the art of dangling the carrot in front of the donkey very well, which means that every little piece (of information, of influence, of power) it relinquishes, only serves the overall purpose of remaining in the driving seat”.

The country is cleverly stocking on trust and credibility for future purposes. Game-theoretically it is a win-win situation. However, in general, common principles except for the data sharing purposes have not been established. The socioeconomic and geophysical hegemony of China is so overwhelming that it is hardly possible to establish principle that China could not easily dispose without further notice. China has no interest in binding cooperation. Due to the fact that China has began to justify its dam building plans in front MRC settings it can be said that it has acknowledged the existence and legitimacy of the MRC and established a (small) cooperative basis with it (Menniken 2006, 127). However, when it comes to the sensitive issue of dams, China does not show any cooperative attitude. China has obviously no interest in sharing of information or even consultation regarding its plans for dam construction. China has never consulted the downstream countries in relation to its dam building programs. Information was only shared by China in the aftermath of construction. China is able to externalize all negative effects, since only the downstream countries will suffer from changes in the riverine ecosystem (Dore 2003, 430). China seems unimpressed by its neighbors concerns and continues with its construction plans. China continues to use the river as she pleases. “[…] it was clear then and now that China had no intention of allowing its own plans for the Mekong to be affected by the interests of other riparian states” (Osborne 2006, 224). Second, for establishing a collective optimum it is essential to identify whether there is a commonly shared principle of cooperation efforts. The most fundamental principle of the Mekong regime is the fact that the Mekong and its basin are a shared natural resource. Acknowledgement of this principle is important for all riparians. Resources of the Mekong are becoming scarce. Thus, it is highly relevant to coordinate interventions into the river. This applies for the MRC member countries as well as to China. Interventions into the river and its surrounding ecosystem have consequences for all riparians. The acknowledgement of this principle is basic for the existence of the Mekong regime. Pareto optimal decisions can only be made relying on it. Transboundary cooperation is the only way of mutually beneficial water governance. Egoistic water politics would always leave one or more riparians worse off. Projects that would antagonize one riparian would not be pursued. This implies a certain level of coordination and communication. The riparians need to share information about their plans as well as coordinate the implementation of plans. Since annual report 2001 does the MRC see itself as “learning organization” and emphasizes the

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

181

integration of local knowledge and the improvement of livelihoods of the Mekong people. The Mekong regime delineates its principle of cooperation as to “cooperate and promote in a constructive and mutually beneficial manner in the sustainable development, utilization, conservation and management of the Mekong River Basin water and related resources for navigational and non-navigational purposes, for social and economic development and the well-being of all riparian States, consistent with the needs to protect, preserve, enhance and manage the environmental and aquatic conditions and maintenance of the ecological balance exceptional to this river basin“ (Mekong River Commission 1995, Preamble).

In listing “sustainable development”, “utilization” and “conservation” in the same line, the MRC tries to balance the goal of development with environmental standards. Article 2 of the Agreement states that cooperation should focus on “joint and/or basin-wide development projects”. This statement feeds the assumption that the MRC regards the Mekong region in a holistic manner. The whole basin comprises of six countries and involves cooperation beyond national boundaries. Somehow, a process of norm internalization has taken place that led to a behavioral change with the main actors. The norm of holistic problem-solving in form of transboundary cooperation has gained grounds within the Mekong regime and has led actors to change their pattern of thinking from national to transboundary problem-solving – at least in theory. In reality, the claim of holistic cooperation has not transcended from the MRC to the member countries, and not at all to China. National projects still constitute the absolute majority of all projects. Transboundary projects have not increased over the years. The four MRC member countries do not adhere to the principle in that single countries undermine the cooperation by unilaterally cooperating with China. For example, Thailand and Viet Nam, want to buy electricity from dams in Yunnan that they are criticizing within the MRC. Laos and Thailand signed navigation deals with China putting the MRC’s mandate and its authority under question (Menniken 2007, 156). Trust is vital for cooperation between the Mekong countries; it is not sufficiently existing: “But in the Mekong region today, the practice of avoiding controversial topics is more of a rule than an exception especially when it comes to transboundary issues” (Imamura 2007, 6). There remains a significant gap between the rhetoric and reality of Mekong cooperation when it comes to data sharing and general access to information (Dore 2003, 434). The Chinese dam cascade on the Mekong has been labeled a “textbook case of bad environmental governance” (Dore 2003, 431). It was a process completely non-transparent, with no information sharing and no involvement of the public. China expressed an explicit disinterest in cooperation. Thus, it was a complete failure of MRC and civil society to engage with China in a meaningful way. However, the Mekong River Commission has existed (in different form) for more than sixty years now. In the region,

182

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

is considered to be a serious actor for the concerns of the Mekong. It has become the legitimate representative of all transboundary concerns of the Mekong. Existence of such a long time and organizational expansion underline this assumption. The MRC in general has contributed positively to political stability and decrease in hostility in the region (Molle 2007, 26). In addition, the shared norm that a common approach to the Mekong resource pool is needed is reflected in the MRC’s efforts of establishing a knowledge center. The member countries of the Mekong River Commission share a common pool of knowledge about the Mekong. The MRC itself is a data collection and analysis center. Thus, estimations and assessments about development projects are gained from a common pool of knowledge. The countries have the same data pool for estimating chances and risks for the basin as such, other countries and their own country. Since its establishment, the MRC has developed rich databases and powerful mathematical tools. These are most useful for planning small and large infrastructural projects and assessing side effects. Third, optimal in terms of decision-making would be the guarantee of veto privileges for all riparians. Communication and coordination might not always prevent egoistic projects. Thus, all countries need to have the right to veto projects. However, this rule would only be applied for big projects on the mainstream Mekong that have anticipated consequences for other countries. Veto rights mean nothing else than decisions by consensus. This is the traditional rule for all Southeast Asian cooperation and connects to all existing decision-making rules in other regional forums. Conflicts resulting from vetoes should be solved. Internal discussions among the stakeholders might solve the problem in a first step. If no agreement can be found, conflicts may be referred to third-party mediation, as it is standard in international law. Rules and procedures need a certain level of specificity, above all compliance. Otherwise, compliance and noncompliance cannot be separated and thus behavioral change cannot be induced. However, being specific also means to be bound. In Southeast Asia, countries are traditionally reluctant to binding rules. Possibilities of informal negotiations and back room consensus finding are important pillars of cooperation. Specific binding rules might develop antagonism against cooperation in general. Rules of cooperation in the Southeast Asian context always remain nebulous to a certain extent. It is hard to identify the tipping point before rules turn from being flexibly semi-concrete to completely arbitrary. Interdependence is surely recognized but transboundary cooperation has not been enabled. The only standard of behavior worth mentioning is the accepted practice of prior notification of projects to the other member states. Compliance in the case of notification is very high. Consultation and agreement have not been taken place although some ongoing development efforts might

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

183

qualify as major interventions. When China is included the only behavioral norm is the participation of China in the annual dialogue sessions. Principles and norms are rich. However, rule development remains deficient and slow. Only procedural rules are fairly developed. Rules concerning content can only be found in the water utilization programme. In Article 2 the member countries agree to develop further rules for water utilization. This, indeed, has happened. Five rules have been adopted or at least negotiated: procedures for data and information, for monitoring existing water uses, for notification, consultation and agreement, for the maintenance of flows for water quality. The most “impressive and differentiated” (Menniken 2007, 165) set of rules has emerged in the field of formalizing cooperation on water allocation (Article 5). Based on Article 5 and further developing it, there are now clear rules for notification, consultation and agreement in the event of a major intervention into the River with transboundary impacts. 4.2 Actual Performance Compared to No-Regime Counterfactual In order to find out whether the established Mekong regime has an impact on behavior or is epiphenomenal the regime has to be compared with a hypothetical situation of no-regime. In this case a proxy for this scenario is chosen: the predecessor of the Mekong River Commission, the Mekong Committee that existed between 1957 and 1991. Although membership had not always been the same23 both organizations are still comparable since their mission has been similar. The Mekong Committee had a narrower scope, and concentrated its actions mainly on engineering, and the development of hydropower. In early days of cooperation, the member countries and donors were enthusiastic about the prospects of large hydropower development project (Backer 2006, 56). This has clearly changed. Hydropower has its risks and therefore the MRC is now focusing on many other issue areas and development plans. However, there are only few achievements that have led to change in the member states’ domestic policies (Backer 2006, 58). In its founding agreement, the Mekong River Commission emphasizes “social” and “economic” development, which marks a clear learning effect from the previous Mekong Committee that focused on economic development projects and hoped that positive social spill-over effects would follow. Whenever the principles of cooperation are mentioned in the 1995 Agreement, the MRC always links developmental utilization with environmental protection. Both are 23

Cambodia left the Mekong Committee in 1976.

184

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

equally important objectives. This fact can also be interpreted as a good balance between the tensions of upstream and downstream positions. Whereas upstream countries have more and more valuable possibilities for economic development, the downstream countries have greater risks of environmental degradation. Putting both values, development and protection, as supreme principles is trying to solve the upstream-downstream conflict and fulfilling claims of both camps. The balanced language is undoubtedly stemming from former mistakes and shortcomings of the Mekong Committee that focused too much on development. It can also be seen as a reflection of zeitgeist. Drafting of the Agreement took place in the early 1990s, not long after the Earth Summit (1991) that popularized the term sustainable development. The “do no harm” (Article 7) principle also stems from international law debates. Both principles are incorporated all program lines of the MRC and are operationalized in almost all projects. Adherence to both principles can hinder implementation and evokes criticism since proponents and opponents of a project find themselves confirmed by the existing principles. Menniken (2007, 154) calls this the “cooperative nonimplementation” dilemma of the MRC. The most important norm for countries’ actions is the avoidance of unilateral intervention in the river management (Menniken 2006, 120). This clearly represents a paradigmatic change in comparison to earlier stages of cooperation. This norm derives from the principle of “reasonable and equitable use” (Mekong River Commission 1995, Article 5). For the four member countries it has become increasingly difficult to act unilaterally. The norm has been internalized. It follows the logic of appropriateness. However, as mentioned before, the norm internalization does not include the relationship of MRC countries with China. Here, basically, everything is possible. In general, the norms for behavior are strong enough to prevent conflict in that they reduce unilateral acts, criticism of other state’s projects and balance interests. However, they are too weak to “allow for the development of commonly accepted implementation guidelines” (Menniken 2007, 159). Communication-based strategies are on the increase and are added to the mere rational logics of actions. There is a correlation between the growing importance of shared norms. Each member country is mandated to inform the others of activities that are likely to affect the flow of the Mekong in a significant way. However, this does not mean that projects are in need of mutual approval. In fact, the MRC narrowed its mandate in comparison to the mandate of the Mekong Committee. The Joint Declaration of 1975 had required the member states to secure prior consent for all water diversion projects. The MRC on the other hand reduces this requirement to projects that involve water diversion from the mainstream during the dry season only (Ringler 2001, 83). “The previous Mekong River Agree-

4 Assessment of Regime Effectiveness

185

ment of 1957 provided downstream countries with a veto to any upstream development project. However, Thailand as an upstream state pressed for and obtained removal of the veto right of downstream country and replaced the right with a ‘prior notification’ in the 1995 agreement” (Sithirith 2007, 42). The 1995 agreement is a clear reflection of the dominating upstream mentality. A consensus between the four member countries was only possible with this narrow mandate. Still, Thailand refused to sign the “Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement” at a council meeting in 2004 (Backer 2006, 41). Projects for use of water require either prior notification or prior consultation, but the parties have no right to veto any development project (Backer 2006, 36). The most striking difference between Mekong Committee and River Commission is the role of China. China did not play any significant role until the 1990s. The country was economically backward and closed. The Yunnan region was largely agricultural and the Mekong provided local peasants and fishermen with daily life products. Thus, the Mekong Committee did not have a position toward China. China was not considered a regional hegemonic power. Other actors like the Asian Development Bank or ASEAN were not yet present in the field. The Communist-Capitalist divide precluded joint efforts. Underlying power configurations that dictated the terms of cooperation made the MC ineffective. However, the self-image is that of the only existing and thus only legitimate actor for all Mekong matters. This image has continued until day although different actors have entered the game and changed the rules completely. This discrepancy between self-image and actual power characterizes the work of the Mekong River Commission: it is broad in communications and declarations and small in actual projects (mostly data collection and knowledge platforms). The quality of data collection and dissemination is probably the most significant achievement of the Mekong River Commission (Backer 2006, 57). Data collection is more efficient within the MRC because it is not driven by external actors (UN etc.) but by MRC itself. By now, the MRC has established as a learning institution that includes experts from various fields (not only engineering) in its discussions and forums. The common pool of knowledge in form of the extensive and up-to-date data collection makes the MRC a most valuable partner for cooperation. When looking at the huge MRC headquarters in Vientiane with growing numbers of employees and projects, retrogression to a preregime state seems very unlikely now. The achievements in data collection and epistemic community platforms represent a logic of appropriateness to assess the MRC as the legitimate actor. The development of the water use of the Mekong would have taken another path if not for the cooperation of the riparian countries. The early-on adopted principle of unanimous decision-making has fostered compromises and com-

186

VI Case Study Two: Common Use of the Mekong

monly accepted solutions (Menniken 2006, 136). Without the MRC, each country would pursue its own development plan for its strip of the Mekong. Over the years, reliability of expectation in mutual behavior has increased among the four MRC members but also with regard to their behavior toward China. However, this positive assessment only holds true when limiting the analysis to the four member countries of the MRC. As soon as China is included, it has to be stated that the effects of cooperation are at best marginal. There are still much more projects that are implemented on a national or sub-national level and do not involve the MRC. Positive effects through cooperation are not given as well as negative effects through non-cooperation are increasing in the form of tensions and conflicting water usages. In general, there is the attitude to avoid bigger, river-wide projects in order to avoid conflicts among riparians with the consequence of a blatant lack of a coherent river-wide resource strategy. One could have hoped that the projects that are being implemented on the river – although not beneficial to the environment – would be mutually beneficial for the riparians economies so that the countries eventually can invest in environmental protection. However, this hope is proven wrong by reality. First of all, despite the cooperation efforts since 1957 there are hardly any joint projects on the river. Especially the sector of hydropower development is lacking a joint approach. Second, the projects there have been realized are negatively correlated with each other. In other words, they harm each other instead of bringing joint benefits. 5 Case Summary The Mekong River and its basin is a common pool resource with six riparian countries. Coordination among these countries has become necessary because the river’s resources are becoming scarce and because projects by riparian countries are harming each other. These conflicts have become most visible in the hypersensitive field of hydropower generation through large-scale dams. The different positions of the riparians result from two factors: the country’s position on the river (upstream or downstream) and the country’s potential to realize hydropower projects. Countries that are located on the upstream part of the river obtain a strategically better position than countries on the downstream parts. Downstream countries, however, have to bear the externalities of upstream intervention and also only have available what upstream countries left them. To find a common interest of the riparians, upstream and downstream positions have to be weighed. This is especially difficult since China is not only the most upstream Mekong country but also the geophysical and socioeconomic superpower in this game. Compared to China, all other riparians are downstream (and

5 Case Summary

187

thus strongly affected by negative externalities) and weak. A common position is highly unlikely with this badly malign problem structure. A joint river regulation will only work with a strong regime. The established regime is weak in terms of compliance mechanisms, available resources and actor capacity. Regulations are very vague and lack sanctions for non-compliance, personnel and financial resources are decreasing and decisions are made at the national level. There are different actors and institutional settings involved, most importantly the riparian countries, the ASEAN-GMSChina program and the MRC. Membership is different and so are mandate, norms, rules and procedures. Behavior of all actors in these settings is different. Most potency to induce behavioral change has the Mekong River Commission. It is a permanent endeavor to tackle the Mekong’s problems and obtains explicit rules and regulations. However, China is not a member and can thus not be bound by MRC’s decisions. Furthermore, it has a number of important institutional weaknesses. Compliance is automatically assumed or at least hoped for. In a typical Southeast Asian manner, sanctions for non-compliance are missing and articles that would otherwise be called rules are listed under principles in order to keep the low level of institutionalization and avoid skepticism of signatories. The lack of binding rules and the non-existence of sanctions in the Agreement reflect typical behavioral patterns in interstate relations of Southeast Asian countries. The preference for high levels of informality strengthens trustbuilding and reduces the mutual anxiety of relative losses among the participants. As a general rule, procedures are very detailed when there is common agreement and they are rather vague when much is at stake. The MRC is doomed to proceed with small steps and uncontroversial projects. Longer-term projects with relatively high costs and delayed profits are hardly possible. Second, donor funds are decreasing. And with the small self-funding of the MRC there is a danger of marginalization. Third, neither the MRC nor the ASEAN-GMS-China program possesses recognizable forms of actor capacity. Power to enforce or implement projects lies exclusively within the realms of state sovereignty. Decision-making ultimately rests with the member states. Policies are mainly decided by the National Mekong Committees, with the MRC only playing a facilitation role. These line agencies dominate the decisionmaking processes and veto project proposals. Their preferences are national ones. Although being the powerhouses of the MRC, the National Mekong Committees are not mentioned in the Agreement, which gives much room for interpreting their role. This leaves much room for informality and closed decision-making processes. In sum, the regime has not succeeded in creating a transboundary understanding of joint resource management.

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

The last chapter will reflect on differences and similarities of the two cases. From a more general perspective it is interesting to compare some parameters of the two cases. Based upon such a comparison it is attempted to make statements on general regime features in Southeast Asia and on the applicability of regime theory in the context of the developing world. At first sight, the environmental problems dealt with appear to be very different. One is a problem of negative externalities involving countries of archipelago Southeast Asia. The second is a problem of common pool resource management involving countries of mainland Southeast Asia. Looking deeper into the subjects, these differences vanish. In both cases we have the existence of a common pool resource: air and water. While the involved countries are engaged in activities within their national borders, these common pool resources transcend national boundaries. Therefore, all national action causes externalities, mostly negative ones. Moreover, all involved states in each case have specific roles with fixed capabilities. These roles and capabilities put countries in either more favorable positions to exploit the common pool resource or more unfavorable ones. For example, China has a more favorable position because it is located on the most upstream position of the Mekong. From this position, the Mekong is not only more exploitable, even more; all negative externalities will float down the river. Another example is Indonesia. The country possesses huge amounts of tropical forest that it can be used for agricultural or industrial purposes. Negative externalities from burning the forest can be externalized, however not to the fullest. Indonesia itself is at the same time victim and profiteer of its self-produced air pollution. Different types of regimes have been established to manage the respective problems. In the case of haze pollution, the regional organization ASEAN has taken over leadership. ASEAN member states have formulated and ratified a treaty to combat transboundary haze pollution. Responsibility to oversee the treaty and its progress lies within the ASEAN Secretary. In contrast to the haze regime, an international organization was founded to manage the waters of the Mekong. The Mekong River Commission is a full-fledged international organization that has existed for more than fifty years. Its staff counts more than 100 professionals who work in the organization’s headquarters or in national contact

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6_7, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

190

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

offices. The MRC is highly specialized and accumulates a gigantic expertise about the Mekong and its resources. It is interesting to note that the MRC was founded with the support of an international organization. The presence and work of international organizations in Southeast Asia is of special importance. In the context of developing areas, external actors often contribute to the fulfillment of tasks that would otherwise be managed by the state. Financial means, skilled personnel and longstanding experience are the assets that they bring to the region. Also, countries in Southeast Asia have long regarded environmental protection as a stumbling block to economic modernization. As a consequence, it was the task of international organizations that triggered first environmental projects and raised public awareness for these issues. In both cases the problems are malign, which means that interests of the involved countries are conflicting. In both cases the protection of the environment conflicts with the realization of economic profits. Since regimes are voluntary agreements between states it is surprising to observe regime creation in malign constellations. Obviously, the involved countries acknowledge the necessity to cooperate. In the case of the haze regime the necessity results from the occurrence of huge catastrophes that cause unbearable costs. In the Mekong regime, acknowledgement of the necessity for sustainable water management was supported by an external force, the United Nations. The rhetoric of both regimes supports my assumption that environmental protection has become the leading opinion. Written documents, conducted interviews and transcripts from forums and conferences substantiate this claim. Both regimes clearly have a detailed understanding of the problem at stake, its causes and suitable solutions. Both regimes are very strong in the development of output material in the form of operating procedures and rules. The number and sophistication of such documents are enormous. From the 1980s on, the publication of a number of ASEAN declarations on environmental concerns and intends can be witnessed (1984 Bangkok, 1987 Jakarta, 1990 Kuala Lumpur, 1992 Singapore). All of these measures were purely non-binding and represent instances of procedural voluntarism. Their language is broad and non-committing. For example, ASEAN states that its member countries “[…] adopt the principle of sustainable development to guide and to serve as an integrating factor in their common efforts” (ASEAN 1987). The association “strives for”, “aims for”, “promotes”, “ensures”, “works closely, “exchanges”, and “jointly develops” diverse measures on harmonization of standards and practices of environmental protection (ASEAN 1984; ASEAN 1987; ASEAN 1990; ASEAN 1992). However, these early declarations showed a first sign of willingness to engage in common problem-solving (Elliott 2003, 38). The existence of this material suggests a detailed problem knowledge of the people involved. Crafting of documents is a high

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

191

priority. The behavior of Southeast Asian countries in international environmental arenas is quite similar. Here, one can observe an increasing participation in crafting, signing and ratifying of international regimes. This behavior is visible through the numerical listing in Table 27. For example, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is signed or ratified by seven out of ten countries, the Convention of Biological Diversity (nine), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (seven), the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (ten), the Convention to Combat Desertification (ten), the Plant Protection Agreement for the Southeast Asia and Pacific Region (eight), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (nine). Table 27: Signature / Ratifications of International Environmental Agreements Treaty (Agreements and Conventions) Establishment Of The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Establishment Of The Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission Network Of Aquaculture Centres In Asia And The Pacific Organization For Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation Cartagena Protocol On Biosafety Convention On Biological Diversity Fishing & Conservation Of Living Resources Of The High Seas International Trade In Endangered Species Of Wild Fauna and Flora Persistent Organic Pollutants Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Conservation Of Migratory Species Of Wild Animals Control Of Transboundary Movements Of Hazardous Wastes Liability Of Operators Of Nuclear Ships Wetlands Of International Importance Combat Desertification, Particularly In Africa Prevention Of Pollution From Ships Prevention Of Pollution Of The Sea By Oil Protection Of New Varieties Of Plants Regulation Of Whaling Civil Liability For Oil Pollution Damage International Fund For Compensation For Oil Pollution Damage Conservation And Management Of Marine Turtles Montreal Protocol Plant Protection For The Southeast Asia And Pacific Region United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change

Sign.

Ratif.

-7 --2 -1 -5 ---2 --------6 3 1 1

4 -5 1 5 9 2 7 5 2 1 6 -4 10 2 1 2 2 5 3 --7 8

Source: Mitchell 2002-2009.

Of course, it is doubtable whether this high participation is matched with a similarly high rate of domestic implementation of treaty provisions or only a lip service. Within the region, the gap between proposed measures and implemented measures cannot be exaggerated. This deficit can be traced back to features of

192

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

the countries in the region on the one hand, and features of the created regimes on the other hand. The haze treaty and the statute of the Mekong River Commission represent weak legal provisions that neglect sanctions or other compliance mechanisms. It is left nebulous, how the regime goals can be implemented. Both regimes do not seem to be strong actors in themselves. Typical for Southeast Asia, both regimes have no decision-making competencies. Decision power lies within the nation-states. National prerogatives are dominating the process. In the Mekong regime, policies are decided by the National Committees, with the MRC only playing a facilitation role. A similar scenario is present in the haze regime. The ASEAN Secretary functions as a purely administrative facilitator with very little staff working on the issue. The countries in Southeast Asia belong to the developing world. Typical features of developing countries are high rates of poverty, low levels of education, economic monoculturalism, dominance of export economy and unstable political systems. Environmental protection requires huge investments, and positive results only show after a substantial period of time. In contrast, economic profits from unsustainable activities are quick and easy. There is a huge demand for forest products and energy from other countries and regions like China, India and Europe. Countries in Southeast Asia are too weak to remodel their economies in order to reduce their dependency on exports. These countries have an absolute will to develop and modernize. This is the prime goal of all economic activities. Environmental protection is seen as a stumbling block to industrialization and thus not enforced with rigor. The 1984 Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment paid tribute to this perceived dilemma for the first time: “CONSIDERING that the task of integrating environmental protection concepts into national development planning represents one of the most complex tasks ever faced by governments of the region;” (ASEAN 1984).

With the time moving on and an increase in environmental concerns the zerosum perspective on economy versus ecology was – at least on paper - abandoned: ASEAN considers that “economic growth and environmental management are inseparable and crucial to sustaining and further improving the quality of life of the people of ASEAN” (ASEAN 1994).

The ASEAN leaders view the protection of the environment and the sustainable use and management of natural resources as essential to the long-term economic growth and social development of their countries and the region.

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

193

“No longer does ASEAN separate financial from commercial and investment concerns, nor the environment and social concerns or science and technology from the demands of economic growth” (ASEAN 2002, 1).

The 2004 Vientiane Action Programme expresses the twin-goal of ASEAN in that the association strives to “[e]ffectively address global environmental issues without impinging on competitiveness, or social and economic development based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility” (ASEAN 2004).

The political systems in the region are not very conducive for environmental protection. Although the types of systems differ considerably it was said that most of the political systems are unstable and lack significant features of good governance such as the rule of law, effective law enforcement, anti-corruption measures and the protection of minorities. Pursuing long-term projects is many times not an option for political leaders since success needs to be visible rapidly. There is inadequate compliance and enforcement of national and regional obligations. Political measures often lack accountability, transparency, education and information (UNEP 2001, 65). The channels of communication do not work well. Despite the fact that some nations adopted environmental regulations, they were ineffectively designed and inadequately implemented. Too often countries neither monitored nor enforced standards and regimes. Both the institutional capacity and the political will to enforce real implementation of the policies are lacking. Policy-makers also play a role in the degradation processes. Corruption and bribery often dominate decision-making. Resources have become a convenient currency for governments in pursuit of political objectives. Natural resources are treated as commodities. Governments share the attitude of ignoring environmental problems. For a long time, policy makers ignored environmental impacts of economic development. A lifestyle of sustainability is almost completely unknown to Southeast Asians. Wasteful use of resources is seen as a sign of prosperity. On the other hand, poor people desperately try to make use of resources to sell them. Nature and environment is not regarded as a commonality. Problems of degradation are supposed to be solved by other people. The public is not putting pressure on the politicians to implement environmental policies. Public discussions about environmental problems and measures are rare. There is a general lack of ownership and responsibility for the environment. Finally, statehood in Southeast Asia is young. Often, governments are not stable and are often forced to resign. Long-term projects have only small chances to be enforced and implemented.

194

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

Malignity of the problem structure also results from historical legacies of the region. In the case of the Mekong regime conflicts among the regime members are virulent. These conflicts are a legacy from the time of colonial domination. The countries of Southeast Asia and of Europe have a long history of relationship with each other. Both regions have conducted diplomatic and trade relations long before Europe began to unify and even long before Europe began to colonize Southeast Asia (Forster 1999, 743). European trading ties with Southeast Asia date back to the sixteenth century (Elson 2004, 16). In the nineteenth century, the trading relations evolved to European colonial dominance of the region. From the European point of view, the change from trading ties to colonial rule was a logical step. The rise of modern capitalism and the rapid industrialization in Western Europe increased Europe’s demand for resources and products like tin, rubber, sugar and oil dramatically. Southeast Asia began to adapt its economies in order to supply the insatiable European hunger for Asian resources. Colonial control enabled Europe to streamline the Southeast Asian economies according to their industrial needs (Berger 2004, 31). The legacy of colonial domination has had a long lasting effect on regional integration in Southeast Asia (Elson 2004, 17). First, colonization ended the traditional forms of hierarchy in Southeast Asia. The plethora of traditional hierarchical forms and systems was transformed into different colonial entities. Between the 1870s and the beginning of the twentieth century, a whole new system was created, consisting of six territorial states: British Burma, independent Siam, French Indochina, Spanish Philippines, British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies (Elson 2004, 18). Not only did the number of states in the region shrink, but also the creation of the new state entities modeled according to European statecraft, meant the establishment of fixed borders as well as internal and external state sovereignty (Elson 2004, 19). Second, with the processes of decolonization that started in the middle of the twentieth century, the former colonies became independent states. State formation followed the legal principle of uti possidetis meaning that colonial borders were kept as the new borders of the independent states. In mainland Southeast Asia pre-colonial structures were sometimes adhered to. The borders of the ancient Burmese kingdom more or less became modern Burma and the different peoples in Indochina were grouped into the three independent states, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, for example. In Archipelago Southeast Asia, states were built on more arbitrary principles: The creation of gigantic Indonesia, consisting of approximately 20,000 islands, and the split of the island of Borneo between Malaysia and Indonesia are just two examples. The new borderlines caused tensions between neighboring countries. Third, independence from colonial rule meant emancipation from external powers. These young countries guarded their newly achieved independence as a

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

195

supreme value. Therefore, it is not surprising that one can observe a clear reservation towards regional integration and limiting sovereign competencies in Southeast Asia. The states are still in the process of state and nation building and their political systems are unstable and prone to change. Robert Jackson’s term “quasi-sovereignty” to describe general features of statehood in the Third World could be attributed to the countries in Southeast Asia (Jackson 1995). Until state-systems are stabilized, integration in a regional setting cannot be expected. Even the integration process of the EU is regarded with reservation, due to the European countries’ compromised sovereignty. Fourth, Southeast Asian countries maintain stronger cooperation with partners outside of the region, especially with their former colonial rulers. Trade and business was almost exclusively conducted with the former colonial power. Multilateral and regional cooperation was a pattern of behavior completely unknown for the countries. Thus, it can be concluded that the period of European colonial domination in Southeast Asia created an altogether new region, one with a “fundamentally diminished sense of regional identity and belonging” (Elson 2004, 28). It is interesting to observe that regime creation in both cases has happened without a clear leadership of one pushing country, with other words, no hegemonic force has triggered and supported the creation. In the respective chapters I have identified “pushing” countries, however, these only push as long as it does not cost too much. In the case of haze pollution, Singapore and Malaysia are directly affected by haze and thus push for the regime to solve the problem. However, they are only willing to spend a small amount of money on firefighting capacity and minor projects. The ASEAN Haze Fund is largely empty. Also, Malaysia is still reaping profits from its plantation companies operating on Indonesian soil. In the Mekong case, Cambodia and Laos are the regime pushers, but only because they need the resources to survive. Both countries are also involved in bilateral trade agreements with China and other countries to sell energy – without the consent of the Mekong regime. Thus, the level of egoism is rather high. The countries in the region regard each other with hesitation and skepticism. The regime is only accepted as long as it does not do much harm to the members. Regime theory argues that important actors need to be part of the regime. This has not been proven right. The most important countries are Indonesia and China for the respective regimes. Both are not formal members of agreements resulting from the regime. However, they obtain the keys for problem solving. It has been argued that the inclusion of these actors into the respective regimes would not help its cause. Inclusion would swap the balance of each regime to such an extent that no serious decision-making was possible anymore. These countries would be enabled to block major decisions. The only possibility for

196

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

each regime to unfold at least some power is to balance against these strong actors. In both cases, this strategy has been only partly successful. The ratifying countries of the ASEAN Haze Agreement tried to balance against Indonesia in the post-1997 period. They overdid and antagonized Indonesia by publicly blaming the country. No progress was achieved. Only during the last ten years, the lead countries Singapore and Malaysia started to pursue subtler balancing strategies to be able to include Indonesia. Table 28: Year 1977 1981 1983 1984 1984 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992 1994 1994 1995 1997 1997 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2003 2004 2005 2005 2006 2007 2007

ASEAN Measures of Environmental Protection Measure ASEP I Manila Declaration on the ASEAN Environment ASEP II Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment Declaration on Heritage Parks and Reserves Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development ASEP III Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development Bandar Seri Begawan Resolution on Environ. and Development Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment (SPAE) 1994-1998 Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development Vision 2020 Regional Haze Action Plan Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA) 1999-2004 Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment (SPAE) 1999-2004 Environmental Education Action Plan 2000-2005 Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) 2004-2010 Agreement on the Esta. of the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development Singapore Declaration on Environmental Sustainability Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and Environ.

Type action plan policy statement action plan policy statement policy statement agreement policy statement action plan policy statement policy statement policy statement action plan action plan policy statement vision action plan action plan action plan action plan agreement policy statement policy statement action plan agreement agreement policy statement policy statement policy statement

Source: own collection on the basis of http://environment.asean.org/ and http://www.aseansec.org/.

The Mekong countries have the self-image of being the benign block against Chinese aggressive dam politics. However, in reality things look different. Although the Mekong River Commission has an official communication with China and some standard operating procedures, all four countries entertain bilateral

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

197

agreements with China through which they profit individually. Thus, the four countries undermine their own balancing strategy. Besides weaknesses that result from the problem structure there are weaknesses of institutional cooperation in Southeast Asia that appear in both case studies. The weaknesses of Southeast Asian cooperation on the environment can be summarized in five problem fields: problems of soft diplomacy, problems of implementation and compliance, problems of capacity, problems of economic development, and problems of political willingness. In general, environmental cooperation has reflected Southeast Asian leaders’ preference for weak or soft regionalism. These soft measures have almost always resulted in deficient implementation and enforcement of measures, and ultimately in ineffectiveness of environmental protection. Despite the large amount of policy statements and action plans not much has improved in the region (see Table 28). The availability of “sufficient material resources and expertise” is a huge problem (Elliott 2003, 45). The ASEAN Environment Fund, proposed by the ASEAN ministers of the environment in 2003, has never been established (ASEAN 2003d; ASEAN 2003b). Much of the funding for cooperative measures does not come from the countries themselves but is dependent on external donations. Often priority is not given to environmental protection but to corporate interests. Although ASEAN is a most promising regional organization, the deference to sovereignty is high and the regional institutionalization low. In terms of economic cooperation, the European Union (at that time European Community) had long been a role model for ASEAN. However, when the common goals of the European countries became visible, Southeast Asia immediately ceased to mirror their experiences. The more the European states have cooperated and integrated, it became clear for the ASEAN states, that such an integration would heavily touch the question of national sovereignty and put the supremacy and monopoly of the member states in great danger (see Dosch 1996, 105). ASEAN is a classically intergovernmental form of cooperation with a decentralized structure (see M. Haas 1979, 425). Principles of dialogue and consultation dominate cooperation. Institutions with clearly defined rules and procedures are evolving slowly. Its modus operandi, known as the “ASEAN way”, describes the preference for informality, consensus-seeking based on consultations, quiet diplomacy, aversion to high levels of institutionalization, sovereign equality, non-interference, non-involvement of the Association in the resolution of bilateral disputes, and mutual respect (see Haacke 2003, 59). Richard Stubbs defines three features of the ASEAN way (Stubbs 2004, 223). First, noninterference is the supreme doctrine of action. Power is understood to mean that others refrain from intervening in domestic affairs. Second, negotiations at ASEAN are characterized by consultation and consensus, by informal discus-

198

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

sions, by social trust and by social obligations. Third, the ASEAN way underlines the primacy of political pragmatism, especially the avoidance of the use of force. These principles are codified in the “Treaty of Amity of Cooperation” in 1976 (see Caballero-Anthony 2003, 198). Within this framework, the behavior of political leaders is characterized by flexibility, pragmatism, personalism and egotism (see Rüland 1996, 80). The decision-making style in ASEAN has not developed towards majority decisions, institutionalized procedures, or delegation to supranational institutions. ASEAN’s soft mode of governance that relies on unanimous decisions and consensual discussion outcomes has often been criticized and made responsible for shortcomings in effective outcomes in various fields of engagement (Kahler 2000; Acharya 2001; Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama 2002; Beeson 2004). The informal ASEAN mode of decision-making is responsible for its inability to tackle critical problems. ASEAN has difficulties to initiate reforms on its own. Usually, it takes major environmental disasters to trigger action, like in the case of massive haze pollution or of the tsunami. ASEAN does not devote many resources to its environmental unit. No decisionmaking competencies can be found at the ASEAN level. Implementation and monitoring of provisions is left to the good will of the member states. The listed remedies in the four ASEAN regimes are comprehensive, coherent and wisely chosen. They clearly reveal the existence of a knowledge-based understanding about the problem, its cause and adequate solutions. The problem analysis and the sophistication of proposed measures are impeccable. However, it is left completely open how the proposed measures should be translated into action. A closer examination of the agreements’ provisions reveals well-known patterns of the ASEAN decision-making style resulting in largely deficient material obligations and lacking enforceability. Provisions are generally weak and lack the capacity for implementation. The so-called ASEAN way does not serve well in dealing with environmental challenges. Effectiveness suffers from weaknesses in monitoring, assisting, and ensuring state compliance that are endemic to the ASEAN way and its preference for non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states, non-binding plans instead of treaties, and central institutions with relatively little independent initiative and resources. In sum, it is doubtable whether these regimes are anything more than paper tigers. Regional integration in Southeast Asia proceeds without a pan-Southeast Asian vision. It is a technical step-by-step process from bottom to top which might appear slow. The common denominator of all ASEAN member countries is small, and for each discussion item it takes a while to find a consensual decision. In contrast to Europe, in which core states dominate the agenda and velocity, the slowest member defines the velocity in Southeast Asia (Kuroda 2007). Therefore, the rate of adaptation is very high. The tension between unity and diversity, between different

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

199

levels of development and between different opinions is a tension that exists in both regions. To cope with this tension, Southeast Asia has chosen the way of gradualism: cooperation is often limited to very small fields and marches forward with a slow speed (Schmiegelow & Schmiegelow 2007, 11). The former Secretary-General of ASEAN (until 2007), Ong Keng Ong, describes ASEAN’s modus operandi “not as the most popular, most effective way to achieve ambitious goals but as the least common denominator” (Ong 2007, 34). While studying the regional integration in Latin America in the 1960s, Ernst Haas came to the conclusion that the assumed mechanism of incrementalism has failed (E. Haas 1967, 335). Here, in Southeast Asia, however, incrementalism appears to be the ruling principle. Public awareness and local activism in Southeast Asia is increasing. Growing awareness and activism for environmental concerns results from external political pressures, international environmental concerns, international conditionality, and locally felt consequences of degradation (Clad & Siy 1996, 52). Since the 1980s, especially in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia environmental NGOs “have mushroomed in number and diversified in character” (Hirsch & Warren 1998a, 7). Local environmental groups have emerged as partners in development and conservation activities, “performing a multitude of roles including education and environmental awareness raising among the public” (UNEP 2001, 83). They have been successful in putting environmental topics on ASEAN’s agenda. NGOs have been articulating open criticism against governmental weaknesses in environmental protection. Increasingly, Southeast Asian countries face mounting international environmental market pressure. International pressure can influence domestic environmental policy. It is not surprising that public officials are worried that this pressure may limit the ability of their economies to export (see Rock 2002, 7). The pressure is growing with rising incomes, better education and the emergence of an urban middle class. Epistemic communities play a certain role in pushing for regime creation and improvement in both cases. Although decision-making processes in Southeast Asia are structured along closed circles of governmental officials, expert groups have contributed to push the problems. In the haze regime the growing level of activism is most obvious. In the middle of the dramatic haze crisis of 1997 a system change took place in Indonesia. The militant authoritarian regime was overthrown by a democratic revolution. Before 1997, there was a lack of domestic public pressure due to the small number of educated urban middle class, the omnipresence of the authoritarian government, the censored media, the absence of independent organizations in civil society, and the strong patrimonial networks between high-ranking government and military officials and big business. With the democratic revolution pressure from media, donor agen-

200

VII Comparison and Reflection: a Conclusion

cies, and international organizations grew. Public opinion increasingly condemned the behavior of the plantation owners. In 1998, “NGOs in Jakarta played an unprecedented role in influencing public opinion and policy through the mass media” (Barber & Schweithelm 2000, 13). They contributed substantially in shaping public opinion and influencing policy makers. After 1998, scientific journals were flooded with articles on the haze. These publications have definitely helped to establish a consensus among scientists, activists and also governmental officials about the root causes of the haze problem and adequate solution strategies. Today, the scientific evidence about causes and functioning of haze is widely acknowledged. The haze problem is now one of implementation. In the case of the Mekong regime it took some decades to acknowledge the valuable input of epistemic communities. The politics of big projects that were decided upon in closed governmental circles continued for the first two decades. Cooperation at the Mekong Committee, in general, focused on engineering projects and only technical aspects. From the late 1960s on, studies on social aspects of development began to appear. Especially the top-down model of operation that largely ignored the input of civil society actors and academics were heavily criticized and led to reforms within the Mekong River Commission. In general, the MRC has developed and implemented a remarkable platform for epistemic community exchange (Menniken 2007, 159). Discussions with the epistemic community help to create common problem perceptions and converging views about suitable solutions. Water experts from all over the world are regularly invited to share opinions or evaluate projects. Local knowledge about locations, settlements, and traditions is being used. However, one should not be overly optimistic about the role of epistemic communities. Grassroots movements and NGOs are observable. Their existence does not imply a big voice; this is a development yet to come. There is a fear that processes might be paralyzed by uncompromising NGOs. The incorporation of local knowledge only works at a micro level. Upscaling is often not possible because local knowledge is very situation-sensitive and does not fit into other settings (Molle 2007, 31). Also, it has to be noted that political leaders are skeptical about the value of local knowledge. Often, validity and usability of local expertise is questioned. Although NGOs have gained more importance in curbing the tendency for unrestrained exploitation of resources, their influence has not reached the decision-making processes of governments. Decisions are still dominated by top-down orders and closed discussions among the governmental officials. They resist more participatory approaches due to a fear to lose control, challenge their legitimacy or deny their competence. This decision-making culture reflects Southeast Asian traditions, the so-called ASEAN way and also the predominance of authoritarian political systems in the region.

References

1 Monographs, Chapters and Journal Articles Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization 54 (3), pp. 421-456. Acharya, Amitav. 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia. London and New York: Routledge. Atje, Raymond and Kurnya Roesad. 2004. Who Should Own Indonesia's Forests? Exploring the Links Between Economic Incentives, Property Rights and Sustainable Forest Management. Economics Working Paper 076, Jakarta: Centre for Security and International Studies. Axelrod, Regina S., David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig, eds. 2005. The Global Environment. Institutions, Law, and Policy. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics 38 (1), pp. 226-254. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Backer, Ellen Bruzelius. 2006. Paper Tiger Meets White Elephant? An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Mekong River Regime. FNI Report 15/2006, Lysaker: Fridjof Nansen Institute. Baldwin, David A., ed. 1993. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press. Barber, Charles Victor and James Schweithelm. 2000. Trial by Fire. Forest Fires and Forestry Policy in Indonesia's Era of Crisis and Reform. Washington DC: World Resources Institute. Beeson, Mark, ed. 2004. Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan. Berger, Mark T. 2004. Decolonizing Southeast Asia: Nationalism, Revolution and the Cold War. In Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics and National Differences, edited by Mark Beeson. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 30-49. Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might Learn More. International Organization 49 (2), pp. 351-377. Binh, Nguyen Phuong. 2006. Geopolitics and Development Cooperation in the Mekong Region. In The Mekong Arranged & Rearranged, edited by Maria Serena I. Diokno and Nguyen Van Chinh. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 65-88. Birnie, Patricia. 1992. International Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs. In The International Politics of the Environment. Actors, Interests, and Institutions, edited by Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 51-84. Boas, Morten. 2002. The Asian Development Bank and Environmental Diplomacy: Limits to the Technocratic Consensus. In International Environmental Cooperation. Politics and Diplomacy in Pacific Asia, edited by Paul G. Harris. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, pp. 105131. Bodansky, Daniel. 2001. International Law and the Design of a Climate Change Regime. In International Relations and Global Climate Change, edited by Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 201-219.

H. Litta, Regimes in Southeast Asia, DOI 10.1007/978-3-531-94276-6, © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH 2012

202

References

Boomgaard, Peter. 2007. Southeast Asia. An Environmental History. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC CLIO. Breitmeier, Helmut, Oran R. Young and Michael Zürn. 2006. Analyzing International Regimes. From Case Study to Database. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Breitmeier, Helmut. 1996. Wie entstehen globale Umweltregime? Der Konfliktaustrag zum Schutz der Ozonschicht und des globalen Klimas. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Brown Weiss, Edith and Harold K. Jacobson, eds. 2003. Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Brunner, Jack, Frances Seymour, Nathan Badenoch and Blake Ratner. 1999. Forest Problems and Law Enforcement in Southeast Asia: The Role of Local Communities. Conference Paper for Mekong Basin Symposium on Forest Law Enforcement, held in Phnom Penh, 14-16 June 1999. Bryant, Raymond L. 1998. Resource Politics in Colonial South-East Asia: A Conceptual Analysis. In Environmental Challenges in South-East Asia, edited by Victor T. King. Richmond: Curzon Press, pp. 27-52. Bull, Hedley. 2002 [1977]. The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Caballero-Anthony, Mely. 2003. The Regionalization of Peace in Asia. In The United Nations and Regional Security, edited by Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu. London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 195-211. Case, William. 2004. Democracy in Southeast Asia: How to Get It and What Does It Matter? In Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences, edited by Mark Beeson. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 75-97. Chasek, Pamela S., David Leonard Downie and Janet Welsh Brown. 2006. Global Environmental Politics. 4th ed: Westview Press. Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. On Compliance. International Organization 47 (2), pp. 175-205. Chayes, Abram, Antonia Handler Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell. 2003. Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective. In Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, edited by Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 39-62. Checkel, Jeffrey T. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics 50 (2), pp. 324-348. Cheong, Gerard. 1998. Bothers with Borders? Natural Resource Management in the Mekong River Basin. In Vanishing Borders: The New International Order of the 21st Century, edited by Boon-Thong Lee and Tengku Shamsul Bahrin. Aldershot et al.: Ashgate, pp. 215-230. Christianty, Linda and Raymond Atje. 2004. Policy and Regulatory Developments in the Forestry Sector since 1967. Economics Working Paper 077, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Christianty, Linda, Raymond Atje and Kurnya Roesad. 2004. Decentralization and the Forestry Sector: Opportunities and Challenges. Economics Working Paper 080, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Clad, James and Aurora Medina Siy. 1996. The Emergence of Ecological Issues in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia in the New World Order, edited by David Wurfel and Bruce Burton. London: MacMillan, pp. 52-73. Connell, John and Eric Waddell, eds. 2007. Environment, Development and Change in Rural AsiaPacific. Between local and global. London and New York: Routledge. Cotton, James. 1999. The "Haze" over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement. Pacific Affairs 72 (3), pp. 331-351.

References

203

Croissant, Aurel. 2002. Von der Transition zur defekten Demokratie. Demokratische Entwicklung in den Philippinen, Südkorea und Thailand. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag. Dauvergne, Peter. 1997. Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Dauvergne, Peter. 2001. Loggers and Degradation in the Asia-Pacific. Corporations and Environmental Management. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Diokno, Maria Serena I. and Nguyen Van Chinh, eds. 2006. The Mekong Arranged & Rearranged. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press. Dore, John, Yu Xiaogang and Kevin Yuk-shing Li. 2007. China's Energy Reforms and Hydropower Expansion in Yunnan. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 55-92. Dore, John. 2003. The Governance of Increasing Mekong Regionalism. In Social Challenges for the Mekong Region, edited by Kaosa-ard Mingsarn and John Dore. Bangkok: White Lotus, pp. 405-440. Dore, John. 2007. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPS): Unfulfilled Potential. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 197-226. Dosch, Jörn. 1996. Die ASEAN - Kooperations- und Integrationsleistungen. Perspektiven. In Kooperation, Regionalismus und Integration im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum, edited by Guido Eilenberger, Manfred Mols and Jürgen Rüland. Hamburg, pp. 103-120. Downie, David Leonard. 2005. Global Environmental Policy: Governance through Regimes. In The Global Environment. Institutions, Law, and Policy, edited by Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, pp. 64-82. Downs, George W., David M. Rocke and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization 50 (3), pp. 379-406. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Eaton, Peter and Miroslav Radojevic, eds. 2001. Forest Fires and Regional Haze in Southeast Asia. Huntington, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Eccleston, Bernard and David Potter. 1996. Environmental NGOs and different political Contexts in South-East Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In Environmental Change in South-East Asia. People, Politics and Sustainable Development, edited by Michael J. G. Parnwell and Raymond L. Bryant. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 49-66. Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In Strategies of Inquiry. Handbook of Political Science. Vol. 7, Political Science: Scope and Theory, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, pp. 79-138. Elliott, Lorraine. 2003. ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation: Norms, Interests and Identity. The Pacific Review 16 (1), pp. 29-52. Elliott, Lorraine. 2004. Environmental Challenges, Policy Failure and Regional Dynamics in Southeast Asia. In Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences, edited by Mark Beeson. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 178-197. Elson, Robert. 2004. Reinventing a Region: Southeast Asia and the Colonial Experience. In Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences, edited by Mark Beeson. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 15-29. Elster, Jon. 1978. Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds. Chichester and New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Erwidodo and Satria Astana. 2004. Agricultural-Forestry Linkages: Development of Timber and Tree Crop Plantations Towards Sustainable Natural Forests. Economics Working Paper 078, Jakarta: Centre for Security and International Studies.

204

References

Florano, Ebinezer R. 2004. Regional Environmental Cooperation without Tears or Fear: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan. Conference Paper for International Environmental Governance, held in Paris, 15-16 March 2004. Forster, Anthony. 1999. The European Union in South-East Asia: Continuity and Change in Turbulent Times. International Affairs 75 (4), pp. 743-758. Gehring, Thomas and Markus Jachtenfuchs. 1993. Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage. Towards a General Liability Regime? European Journal of International Law 4 (1), pp. 92-106. George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2004. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Gilpin, Robert G. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert G. 1975. U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation. New York: Basic Books. Glover, David and Timothy Jessup, eds. 1999. Indonesia's Fires and Haze. The Cost of Catastrophe. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Greacen, Chris and Apsara Palettu. 2007. Electricity Sector Planning and Hydropower. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 93-125. Greenough, Paul and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, eds. 2003. Nature in the Global South. Environmental Projects in South and Southeast Asia. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism. International Organization 42 (3), pp. 485-507. Haacke, Jürgen. 2003. ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: A Constructivist Assessment. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3 (1), pp. 57-87. Haas, Ernst B. 1980. Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes. World Politics 32 (3), pp. 357-405. Haas, Ernst. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. London: Stevens. Haas, Ernst. 1961. International Integration: The European and the Universal Process. International Organization 15 (3), pp. 366-392. Haas, Ernst. 1967. The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America. Journal of Common Market Studies 5 (4), pp. 315-343. Haas, Michael. 1979. Asian Intergovernmental Organizations and the United Nations. In Regionalism and the United Nations, edited by Berhanykun Andemicael. New York: Dobbs Ferry, pp. 397-445. Haas, Peter, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, eds. 1993. Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Haas, Peter. 1989. Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organization 43 (3), pp. 377-403. Haas, Peter. 1990. Saving the Mediterranean. The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press. Haas, Peter. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organization 46 (1), pp. 1-35. Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. Theories of International Regimes. International Organization 41 (3), pp. 491-517. Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162 (3859), pp. 1243-1248. Harger, J. R. E. 2001. Climate, El Nino, Drought and Fire. In Forest Fires and Regional Haze in Southeast Asia, edited by Peter Eaton and Miroslav Radojevic. Huntington, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., pp. 9-22.

References

205

Harris, Paul, ed. 2005. Confronting Environmental Change in East and Southeast Asia: Eco-politics, Foreign Policy and Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan. Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger. 2000. Integrating Theories of International Regimes. Review of International Studies 26 (1), pp. 3-33. Helm, Carsten and Detlef F. Sprinz. 2000. Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (5), pp. 630-652. Henkin, Louis. 1979. How Nations Behave. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press. Hing, Lee Kam. 1999. Europe and Southeast Asia: A Malaysian Perspective. In Europe and Southeast Asia in the Contemporary World: Mutual Influences and Comparisons, edited by Franz Knipping, Piyanart Bunnag and Vimolvan Phatharodom. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 103-117. Hirsch, Philip and Carol Warren, eds. 1998b. The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia. Resources and Resistance. London and New York: Routledge. Hirsch, Philip and Carol Warren. 1998a. Introduction: Through the Environmental Looking Glass. The Politics of Resources and Resistance in Southeast Asia. In The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia. Resources and Resistance, edited by Philip Hirsch and Carol Warren. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-25. Hirsch, Philip. 2007. Civil Society and Interdependencies. Towards a Regional Political Ecology of Mekong Development. In Environment, Development and Change in Rural Asia-Pacific. Between Local and Global, edited by John Connell and Eric Waddell. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 226-246. Hobbes, Thomas. 2002 [1651]. Leviathan, or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1994. Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. International Security 19 (1), pp. 5-40. Hori, Hiroshi. 2000. The Mekong. Environment and Development. Tokyo et al.: United Nations University Press. Hovi, Jon, Detlef F. Sprinz and Arild Underdal. 2003. The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, Response, and the Road Ahead. Global Environmental Politics 3 (3), pp. 74-96. Hurrell, Andrew and Benedict Kingsbury. 1992. The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction. In The International Politics of the Environment. Actors, Interests, and Institutions, edited by Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1-47. Ikenberry, G. John and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. 2002. Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2 (1), pp. 69-94. Imamura, Masao. 2007. Introduction: Water Governance in the Mekong Region. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 1-8. Jackson, Robert H. 1995. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jacobson, Harold K. and Edith Brown Weiss. 2003. A Framework for Analysis. In Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, edited by Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 1-18. Jasanoff, Sheila. 2003. Contingent Knowledge: Implications for Implementation and Compliance. In Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords, edited by Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 63-87. Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30 (2), pp. 167-214.

206

References

Jokinen, Janne. 2001. Reconstructing the Mekong River Commission. In Institutions, Livelihoods and the Environment. Change and Response in Mainland Southeast Asia, edited by Andrea Straub. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, pp. 211-242. Kahler, Miles. 2000. Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case. International Organization 54 (3), pp. 549-571. Keohane, Robert O. 1980. The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977. In Changes in the International System, edited by Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, pp. 131162. Keohane, Robert O. 1983. The Demand for International Regimes. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 141-171. Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 1989. The Demand for International Regimes. In International Institutions and State Power. Essays on International Relations Theory, edited by Robert O. Keohane. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, pp. 101-131. Keohane, Robert O. 1996. Analyzing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions. In Institutions for Environmental Aid. Pitfalls and Promise, edited by Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 3-27. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001 [1977]. Power and Interdependence. 3rd ed. New York et al.: Longman. Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security 20 (1), pp. 39-51. Keohane, Robert O., Peter Haas and Marc A. Levy. 1993. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions. In Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 3-24. Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. The World in Depression. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kindleberger, Charles P. 1981. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides. International Studies Quarterly 25 (2), pp. 242-254. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. King, Victor, ed. 1998. Environmental Challenges in South-East Asia. Richmond: Curzon Press. Koma, Yang Saing. 2007. Preface. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. xv-xvii. Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 355-368. Krasner, Stephen D. 1983a. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-22. Krasner, Stephen D. 1983b. Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 355-368. Kuroda, Haruhiko. 2007. Neue Muster der Integration. Internationale Politik 11, pp. 36-41. Kwa, Chong Guan and See Seng Tan. 2001. The Keystone of Worldorder. The Washington Quarterly 24 (3), pp. 95-103.

References

207

Kydd, Andrew and Duncan Snidal. 1995. Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes. In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker Rittberger. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 112-135. Levy, Marc A., Robert O. Keohane and Peter Haas. 1993. Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions. In Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, edited by Peter Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 397-426. Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political Science Review 65 (3), pp. 682-693. Lijphart, Arend. 1975. Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research. Comparative Political Studies 8 (2), pp. 158-177. Lim, Tin Seng. 2008. China's Active Roles in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: A "Win-Win" Outcome? Background Brief 397, Singapore: East Asian Institute. List, Martin and Volker Rittberger. 1992. Regime Theory and International Environmental Management. In The International Politics of the Environment. Actors, Interests, and Institutions, edited by Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 85-109. Litta, Henriette. 2009. Unity in Diversity. Southeast Asia’s Slow Path to Regional Integration. In Europa jenseits seiner Grenzen, edited by Ingolf Pernice, Benjamin von Engelhardt, Sarah Krieg, Isabelle Ley and Osvaldo Saldias Collao. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 129-153. Luterbacher, Urs and Detlef F. Sprinz. 2001. Problems of Global Environmental Cooperation. In International Relations and Global Climate Change, edited by Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 3-22. Machiavelli, Niccolò. 2005 [1532]. The Prince. Oxford: Oxford University Press. March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International Organization 52 (4), pp. 943-969. Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19 (3), pp. 5-49. Menniken, Timo. 2006. Konflikt und Kooperation am Mekong. Internationale Politik an grenzüberschreitenden Wasserläufen. Berlin: Lit Verlag. Menniken, Timo. 2007. Hydrological Regionalism in the Mekong and the Nile basin. International Politics along Transboundary Watercourses. Doctoral Thesis. Freiburg: University of Freiburg. Unpublished. Miles, Edward L., Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skaerseth and Elaine M. Carlin, eds. 2002. Environmental Regime Effectiveness. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Milliot, David M. 2005. Asia-Europe Meeting on the International Stage. In Paths to Regionalisation. Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, edited by Sophie Boisseau du Rocher and Bertrand Fort. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, pp. 128-144. Mitchell, Ronald B. 1994. Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. International Organization 48 (3), pp. 425-458. Mitchell, Ronald B. 1998. Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes. International Studies Quarterly 42, pp. 109-130. Mitchell, Ronald B. 2001. Institutional Aspects of Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness. In International Relations and Global Climate Change, edited by Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 221-244. Mitchell, Ronald B. 2002a. International Environment. In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons. London et al.: Sage, pp. 501-515. Mitchell, Ronald B. 2002b. A Quantitative Approach to Evaluating International Environmental Regimes. Global Environmental Politics 2 (4), pp. 58-83.

208

References

Mitchell, Ronald B. 2003. International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Features, Formation, and Effects. Annual Review of Environmental Resources 28, pp. 429-461. Mitchell, Ronald B. 2006. Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3), pp. 72-89. Mitchell, Ronald B. and Thomas Bernauer. 1998. Empirical Research on International Environmental Policy: Designing Qualitative Case Studies. Journal of Environment & Development 7 (1), pp. 4-31. Molle, Francois. 2007. Irrigation and Water Policies: Trends and Challenges. In Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong Region, edited by Louis Lebel, John Dore, Rajesh Daniel and Yang Saing Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 9-36. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization 51 (4), pp. 513-553. Morgenthau, Hans J. 1985 [1948]. Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf. Nabers, Dirk. 2003. The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN + 3. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 3 (1), pp. 113-136. Neumayer, Eric. 2001. How Regime Theory and the Economic Theory of International Environmental Cooperation Can Learn from Each Other. Global Environmental Politics 1 (1), pp. 122147. Nicolas, Francoise. 2005. East Asia and Western Europe: Between Regionalisation and Globalisation. In Paths to Regionalisation. Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, edited by Sophie Boisseau du Rocher and Bertrand Fort. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International, pp. 3-7. Olson, Mancur. 1998 [1965]. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 8th ed. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. Ong, Keng Yong. 2007. Der Langsamste bestimmt das Tempo. Internationale Politik 11, pp. 26-35. Ooi, Giok Ling, Simon S. C. Tay and Yue Choong Kog. 2002. Environmental Agreements in Southeast Asia: Balancing Economic Interests and Regional Politics. In International Environmental Cooperation. Politics and Diplomacy in Pacific Asia, edited by Paul G. Harris. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, pp. 133-146. Osborne, Milton. 2004. River at Risk. The Mekong and the Water Politics of China and Southeast Asia. Working Paper 02, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy. Osborne, Milton. 2006. Mekong. Turbulent Past, Uncertain Future. 2nd ed. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Osherenko, Gail and Oran R. Young. 1989. The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. World Politics 38 (1), pp. 1-24. Parnwell, Michael J. G. and Raymond L. Bryant, eds. 1996. Environmental Change in South-East Asia. People, Politics and Sustainable Development. London and New York: Routledge. Perdana, Ari and Deni Friawan. 2007. Economic Crisis, Institutional Changes and the Effectiveness of Government: the Case of Indonesia. Economics Working Paper 102, Jakarta: Centre for Security and International Studies. Phatharodom, Vimolvan. 1999. Aspects of Early ASEAN-EC Relations, 1967-1992. A Thai Perspective. In Europe and Southeast Asia in the Contemporary World: Mutual Influences and Comparisons, edited by Franz Knipping, Piyanart Bunnag and Vimolvan Phatharodom. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 237-248. Princen, Thomas and Matthias Finger. 1994. Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global. London: Routledge.

References

209

Puchala, Donald J. and Raymond F. Hopkins. 1983. International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 61-92. Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization 42 (3), pp. 427-460. Quah, Euston. 2002. Transboundary Pollution in Southeast Asia: The Indonesian Fires. World Development 30 (3), pp. 429-441. Raustiala, Kal. 1997. States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions. International Studies Quarterly 41, pp. 719-740. Ringler, Claudia. 2001. Optimal Allocation and Use of Water Resources in the Mekong River Basin: Multi-Country and Intersectoral Analyses. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. Rittberger, Volker and Michael Zürn. 1990. Towards Regulated Anarchy in East-West Relations: Causes and Consequences of East-West Regimes. In International Regimes in East-West Politics, edited by Volker Rittberger. London and New York: Pinter Publishers, pp. 9-63. Rittberger, Volker and Michael Zürn. 1991. Regime Theory: Findings from the Study of 'East-West Regimes'. Cooperation and Conflict 26 (4), pp. 165-183. Rittberger, Volker, ed. 1995a. Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rittberger, Volker. 1995b. Research on International Regimes in Germany. In Regime Theory and International Relations, edited by Volker Rittberger. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3-22. Rock, Michael T. 2002. Pollution Control in East Asia. Lessons from Newly Industrializing Economies. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Rosenberg, David. 1999. Environmental Pollution around the South China Sea: Developing a Regional Response. Contemporary Southeast Asia 21 (1), pp. 119-145. Rüland, Jürgen. 1996. Politische und sozio-kulturelle Aspekte von Kooperation und Integration im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum. In Kooperation, Regionalismus und Integration im asiatischpazifischen Raum, edited by Guido Eilenberger, Manfred Mols and Jürgen Rüland. Hamburg, pp. 73-92. Rüland, Jürgen. 2006. Southeast Asia: New Research Trends in Political Science and International Relations. Südostasien aktuell 25 (4), pp. 83-107. Ruggie, John Gerald. 1975. International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends. International Organization 29 (3), pp. 557-583. Ruggie, John Gerald. 1998. Constructing the World Polity. Essays on international institutionalization. London and New York: Routledge. Sakai, Kazu. 2000. Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. In The Greater Mekong Subregion and ASEAN. From Backwaters to Headwaters, edited by Kao Kim Hourn and Jeffery A. Kaplan. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, pp. 13-21. Salim, Emil. 1999. Foreword. In Indonesia's Fires and Haze. The Cost of Catastrophe, edited by David Glover and Timothy Jessup. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. xi-xiii. Sands, Philippe and Jacqueline Peel. 2005. Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century: Sustainable Development and International Law. In The Global Environment. Institutions, Law, and Policy, edited by Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, pp. 43-63. Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55 (1), pp. 47-80. Schmiegelow, Michèle and Henrik Schmiegelow. 2007. Der Weg zur Asiatischen Gemeinschaft. Internationale Politik 11, pp. 8-16. Schweithelm, James and David Glover. 1999. Causes and Impact of the Fires. In Indonesia's Fires and Haze. The Cost of Catastrophe, edited by David Glover and Timothy Jessup. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 1-13.

210

References

Schweithelm, James, Timothy Jessup and David Glover. 1999. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations. In Indonesia's Fires and Haze. The Cost of Catastrophe, edited by David Glover and Timothy Jessup. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 130-143. Sisowath, Doung Chanto. 2006. Region within a Region: The Mekong and ASEAN. In The Mekong Arranged & Rearranged, edited by Maria Serena I. Diokno and Nguyen Van Chinh. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 121-140. Sithirith, Mak. 2007. Cooperation in the Mekong River Basin. A Reflection of Cambodia's Experiences in the Development of the Mekong Region. Series Resource Politics and Cultural Transformation in the Mekong Region 4, Chiang Mai: Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development. Skaerseth, Jon Birger, Olav Schram Stokke and Jorgen Wettestad. 2006. Soft Law, Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of International Environmental Norms. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3), pp. 104-120. Snidal, Duncan. 1985. Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes. American Political Science Review 79 (4), pp. 923-942. Snidal, Duncan. 1985a. The Game Theory of International Politics. World Politics 38 (1), pp. 25-57. Snidal, Duncan. 1985b. The limits of hegemonic stability theory. International Organization 39 (4), pp. 579-614. Springer, Allen L. 2002. Indonesian Forest Fires: Internationalizing a National Environmental Problem. In International Environmental Cooperation. Politics and Diplomacy in Pacific Asia, edited by Paul G. Harris. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, pp. 291-315. Sprinz, Detlef F. and Carsten Helm. 1999. The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept. International Political Science Review 20 (4), pp. 359-369. Sprinz, Detlef F. and Tapani Vaahtoranta. 1994. The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental Policy. International Organization 48 (1), pp. 77-105. Stein, Arthur A. 1983. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 115-140. Stoett, Peter. 2005. Mekong River Politics and Environmental Security. In Confronting Environmental Change in East and Southeast Asia: Eco-politics, Foreign Policy and Sustainable Development, edited by Paul Harris. London: Earthscan, pp. 167-182. Strange, Susan. 1983. Cave! hic dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 337-354. Straub, Andrea, ed. 2001. Institutions, Livelihoods and the Environment. Change and Response in Mainland Southeast Asia. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Stubbs, Richard. 2004. ASEAN: Building Regional Cooperation. In Contemporary Southeast Asia. Regional Dynamics, National Differences, edited by Mark Beeson. New York/London: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 216-233. Tacconi, Luca. 2003. Fires in Indonesia: Causes, Costs and Policy Implications. Report No. 38. Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research. Tan, Alan Khee-Jin. 1999. Forest Fires of Indonesia: State Responsibility and International Liability. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (4), pp. 826-855. Tan, Alan Khee-Jin. 2005. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution: Prospects for Compliance and Effectiveness in Post-Suharto Indonesia. N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 13 (3), pp. 647-722. Tay, Simon S. C. 1998. South East Asian Forest Fires: Haze over ASEAN and International Environmental Law. Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 7 (2), pp. 202-209. Than, Mya. 2006. Intra-Regional and Cross-Border Economic Cooperation. In The Mekong Arranged & Rearranged, edited by Maria Serena I. Diokno and Nguyen Van Chinh. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press, pp. 141-170.

References

211

Thucydides. 1989. The Peloponnesian War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Underdal, Arild. 1980. The Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the NorthEast Atlantic. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press. Underdal, Arild. 1992. The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness'. Cooperation and Conflict 27 (3), pp. 227-240. Underdal, Arild. 1998. Introduction. In The Politics of International Environmental Management, edited by Arild Underdal. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-11. Underdal, Arild. 2002a. Conclusions: Patterns of Regime Effectiveness. In Environmental Regime Effectiveness, edited by Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skaerseth and Elaine M. Carlin. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 433-465. Underdal, Arild. 2002b. One Question, Two Answers. In Environmental Regime Effectiveness, edited by Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steinar Andresen, Jorgen Wettestad, Jon Birger Skaerseth and Elaine M. Carlin. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 3-45. Underdal, Arild. 2004. Methodological Challenges in the Study of Regime Effectiveness. In Regime Consequences. Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies, edited by Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 27-48. Victor, David G. 2006. Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3), pp. 90-103. Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds. 1998. The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Vogler, John. 2000. The Global Commons. Environmental and Technological Governance. 2nd ed. Chichester et al.: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. Wanandi, Jusuf. 2006. ASEAN Future Challenges and the Importance of an ASEAN Charter. ASIEN Juli (100), pp. 85-87. Weber, Max. 1993 [1919]. Politik als Beruf. 10th ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of it. The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46 (2), pp. 391-425. Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publishing. Young, Oran R, ed. 1999a. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. Young, Oran R. 1980. International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation. World Politics 32 (3), pp. 331-356. Young, Oran R. 1983. Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes. In International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 93-114. Young, Oran R. 1989. The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment. International Organization 43 (3), pp. 349-375. Young, Oran R. 1992. The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables. In Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, edited by James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 160-194. Young, Oran R. 1999b. Regime Effectiveness: Taking Stock. In The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, edited by Oran R. Young. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 249-279. Young, Oran R. 2001. Inferences and Indices: Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Global Environmental Politics 1 (1), pp. 99-121.

212

References

Young, Oran R. 2004. The Consequences of International Regimes. A Framework for Analysis. In Regime Consequences. Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies, edited by Arild Underdal and Oran R. Young. Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 3-23. Young, Oran R. 2008. Institutions and Environmental Change: The Scientific Legacy of a Decade of IDGEC. In Institutions and Environmental Change. Principle Findings, Applications, and Research Frontiers, edited by Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King and Heike Schroeder. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 3-45. Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko, eds. 1993. Polar Politics. Creating International Environmental Regimes. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Young, Oran R. and Marc A. Levy. 1999. The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. In The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms, edited by Oran R. Young. Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, pp. 1-32. Young, Oran R. and Michael Zürn. 2006. The International Regimes Database: Designing and Using a Sophisticated Tool for Institutional Analysis. Global Environmental Politics 6 (3), pp. 121143. Zürn, Michael. 1992. Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Anwendungen des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. Zürn, Michael. 1998. The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current Research. World Politics 50 (4), pp. 617-649.

2 Documents, Reports, Multimedia ASEAN Haze Website. Online at http://asean.haze.org [accessed on 31 December 2010]. ASEAN Secretariat and Asian Development Bank. 2001. Fire, Smoke, and Haze. The ASEAN Response Strategy. Jakarta: ASEAN. ASEAN Secretariat. 1967. Bangkok Declaration. Adopted on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat. 1971. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration. Adopted on 27 November 1971 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1976. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Adopted on 24 February 1976 in Denpasar, Indonesia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1984. Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment. Adopted on 29 November 1984 in Bangkok, Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat. 1985. Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. Adopted on 9 July 1985 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, entered into force in 1999. ASEAN Secretariat. 1987. Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development. Adopted on 30 October 1987 in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1990. Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development. Adopted on 19 June 1990 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1992. Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development. Adopted on 18 February 1992 in Singapore. ASEAN Secretariat. 1994. Bandar Seri Begawan Resolution on the Environment and Development. Adopted on 26 April 1994 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. ASEAN Secretariat. 1995. ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution. Adopted on June 1995 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1997a. ASEAN Vision 2020. Adopted on 15 December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

References

213

ASEAN Secretariat. 1997b. Hanoi Plan of Action. Adopted on 15 December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1997c. Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development. Adopted on 18 September 1997 in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1997d. Media Release. 1st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Haze. Released on 23 December 1997 in Singapore. ASEAN Secretariat. 1997e. Media Release. 7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. Released on 18 September 1997 in Jakarta, Indonesia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1998a. Media Release. 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 4 April 1998 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. ASEAN Secretariat. 1998b. Media Release. 4th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 19 June 1998 in Singapore. ASEAN Secretariat. 1998c. Media Release. 5th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 30 July 1998 in Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 1999. Media Release. 8th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 26 August 1999 in Singapore. ASEAN Secretariat. 2002. ASEAN Report to the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Jakarta: ASEAN. ASEAN Secretariat. 2003a. ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative. ASEAN Secretariat. 2003b. Media Release. 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. Released on 18 December 2003 in Yangon, Myanmar. ASEAN Secretariat. 2003c. Media Release. 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 4 March 2003 in Siem Reap, Cambodia. ASEAN Secretariat. 2003d. Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development. Adopted on 18 December 2003 in Yangon, Myanmar. ASEAN Secretariat. 2004. Vientiane Action Programme. Adopted on 29 November 2004 in Vientiane, Laos. ASEAN Secretariat. 2005a. Chairman’s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit. Released on 12 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 2005b. Joint Communique on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Released on 27 September 2005 in Makati City, Philippines. ASEAN Secretariat. 2005c. Statement of the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment. Released on 17 August 2005 in Penang, Malaysia. ASEAN Secretariat. 2006a. Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development. Adopted on 10 November 2006 in Cebu, Philippines. ASEAN Secretariat. 2006b. Media Release. 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. Released on 10 November 2006 in Cebu, Philippines. ASEAN Secretariat. 2006c. Third ASEAN State of the Environment Report 2006. Jakarta: ASEAN. ASEAN Secretariat. 2007a. Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Adopted on 20 November 2007 in Singapore, entered into force on 15 December 2008. ASEAN Secretariat. 2007b. Media Release. 10th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. Released on 7 September 2007 in Bangkok, Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat. 2007c. Media Release. 12th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. Released on 1 March 2007 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. ASEAN Secretariat. 2007d. Singapore Declaration on Environmental Sustainability. Adopted on 20 November 2007 in Singapore. ASEAN Secretariat. 2008a. Media Release. 4th Meeting of the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Released on 8 April 2008 in Putra Jaya, Malaysia.

214

References

ASEAN Secretariat. 2008b. Media Release. 6th Meeting of the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Released on 22 October 2008 in Phuket, Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat. 2008c. Media Release. 11th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment. Released on 9 October 2008 in Hanoi, Vietnam. ASEAN Secretariat. 2009. Chairman’s Statement of the 4th East Asia Summit. Released on 25 October 2009 in Thailand. ASEAN Secretariat. 2010. Intra- and Extra-ASEAN Trade 2009. Online available at http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table18.pdf [accessed on 31 December 2010]. ASEAN Secretariat. 2010. Table of ASEAN Treaties: Agreements and Ratification 2010. Online available at http://www.aseansec.org/Ratification.pdf [accessed on 31 December 2010]. Asian Development Bank and United Nations Environment Programme. 2004. Greater Mekong Subregion Atlas of the Environment. Manila. Asian Development Bank. 2004. The GMS Beyond Borders. Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program 2004-2008. Manila: ADB. Asian Development Bank. 2007. Asian Development Outlook 2007. Growth Amid Change. Manila: ADB. Asian Development Bank. 2008. Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2008. Manila: ADB. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 2007. APEC Energy Statistics 2005. Tokyo: APEC, Energy Working Group. Azimi, Ali, Will Knowland, Jeremy Carew-Reid, Ivan Ruzicka and Anthony Zola. 2001. Environments in Transition. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Viet Nam. Manila: Asian Development Bank. BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency) and Asian Development Bank. 1999. Planning for Fire Prevention and Drought Management Project. Jakarta. Central Intelligence Agency. 2007. World Factbook. Online available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/vm.html [accessed on 31 December 2010]. Chambers. 2006. The Chambers Dictionary. 10th ed. Edinburgh: Chambers Harrap Publishers. Dudley, Nigel, Jean-Paul Jeanrenaud and Sue Stolton. 1997. The Year the World Caught Fire. WWF International. International Court of Justice 1995. Nuclear Tests II. ICJ Report 306. International Court of Justice 1997. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. ICJ Report para. 29. Mekong Committee, Interim Mekong Committee and Mekong River Commission. 1957-2007. Annual Reports. Bangkok et al. Mekong Committee. 1957. Statute of the Committee for Co-ordination of Investigations of Lower Mekong Basin. Adopted on 31 October 1957 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in response to the decision taken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Mekong Committee. 1965. Annual Report. Bangkok, Thailand. Mekong River Commission. 1995. Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. Adopted on 5 April 1995 in Chiang Rai, Thailand. Mekong River Commission. 1998-2007. Annual Reports. Phnom Penh/Vientiane. Mekong River Commission. 1998-2007. Income and Expenditure taken from Annual Reports. Vientiane, Laos. Mekong River Commission. 2001. Hydropower Development Strategy. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Mekong River Commission. 2007. Annual Report. Vientiane, Laos. MRC Website. Online at http://www.mrcmekong.org [accessed on 31 December 2010]. Munich Re. 2007. Natural catastrophes 2007. Analyses, assessments, positions. Asia version. Munich.

References

215

Nguyen, Huu Ninh. 2007. Flooding in Mekong River Delta Viet Nam. Report No. 2007/53. New York: Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme. Soanes, Catherine and Angus Stevenson. 2006. Concise Oxford English Dictionary. 11th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. State Ministry for Environment Republic of Indonesia and United Nations Development Programme. 1998. Forest and Land Fires in Indonesia. Impacts, Factors and Evaluation. Jakarta: State Ministry for Environment Republic of Indonesia. United Nations Development Programme. 2007. Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. New York: Human Development Report Office. United Nations Development Programme. 2009. Human Development Report 2009. New York: Human Development Report Office. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 2006. State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific 2005. Economic Growth and Sustainability. UN Publishing. United Nations Environment Programme and Earthscan. 2002. Global Environmental Outlook 3. Past, Present and Future Perspectives. London: UNEP. United Nations Environment Programme. 2001. Asia-Pacific Environment Outlook 2. UN Publishing. United Nations Environmental Programme. 2004. Environmental Indicators South East Asia. UNEP Publishing. United Nations. 1972. Document A/CONF.48/14, p. 118. Webster's. 1991. Webster's College Dictionary. New York: Random House. Weltbank, ed. 2003. Weltentwicklungsbericht 2003. Nachhaltige Entwicklung in einer dynamischen Welt. Institutionen, Wachstum und Lebensqualität verbessern. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. World Commission on Dams. 2000. Dams and Development. A New Framework for DecisionMaking. London and Sterling, VA. Online available at http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdreport.pdf [accessed on 31 December 2010]. World Resources Institute. 2002. The State of the Forest. Indonesia. Washington DC: WRI.

3 Newspapers Agence France Press. 2008. Indonesia's Palm Oil boom Takes Environmental Toll. Agence France Press, 1 April 2008. Choong, Tet Sieu. 1997. Scorched Earth. The reckless torching of Indonesia's forest lands is one of the greatest man-made calamities of modern times. Asiaweek, 10 October 1997. Everson, Rowena. 2007. Haze? You Ain't Seen Nothing Yet - The Real Story Behind the Singapore Haze. Singapore Business Review, 28 February 2007. pp. 28-32. Guerin, Bill. 2007. European Blowback for Asian Biofuels. Asia Times, 8 February 2007. Online available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IB08Ae01.html [accessed on 31 December 2010]. Karmini, Niniek. 2006. Indonesia Urged to Ratify Treaty on Haze. The Washington Post, 13 October 2006. Online available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/13/AR2006101301108.html [accessed on 31 December 2010]. Lee, Poh Onn. 2008. Indonesia Must Act Now. Straits Times, 24 July 2008. MacKinnon, Ian. 2007. Palm Oil: The Biofuel of the Future Driving an Ecological Disasters Now. The Guardian, 11 April 2007. Online available at www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/apr/04/energy.indonesia [accessed on 31 December 2010].

216

References

Pathoni, Ahmad. 2008. Indonesian lawmakers set to reject ASEAN haze pact. Reuters, 14 March 2008. Online available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/ idUKJAK6937420080314?sp=true [accessed on 31 December 2010]. The Economist. 2006. Stuck in a Haze. The Economist, 14 October 2006. Wain, Barry. 2004. River at Risk. Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 August 2004.

4 Interviews Anish, Kumar Roy. 2008. Director of the Bureau for Resources Development, ASEAN Secretariat. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 11 December 2008. Atje, Raymond. 2008. Research Head of Department of Economics, Centre of Strategic and International Studies. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 16 December 2008. Goehler, Daniela. 2008. Technical Advisor of the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme (ReFOP), GTZ. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 15 December 2008. Hariri, Dedi. 2008. Forest Fire Coordinator, WWF Indonesia. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 11 December 2008. Klingshirn, Ulrich. 2008. Country Representative, Hanns Seidel Foundation Indonesia. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 17 December 2008. Kusumo, Johny P. 2008. Assistant Deputy for Community Institution and Community Role, Ministry of Environment Indonesia. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 12 December 2008. Prasiddha, Riena. 2008. Desk Officer Haze in the Environment and Disaster Unit, Bureau for Resources Development, ASEAN Secretariat. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 15 December 2008. Surya, Teguh. 2008. Head of Advocacy and Networking Department, WALHI Indonesia (Forest Protection NGO). Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 12 December 2008. Wibisono, Iwan. 2008. Forest Climate Policy Coordinator, WWF Indonesia. Interviewed in Jakarta, Indonesia on 11 December 2008. Yap, Chui Wah. 2008. Meteorological Officer, National Environment Agency Singapore. Interviewed in Email correspondence on 28 November 2008.