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(A, B) is A B, i.e. 'if A then B', where the connection is that of a non-logical relevant conditional, e.g. a subjunctive conditional. (4)
(A, B) iff appropriate weakness;
A -*• B, where L is a genuinely relevant logic of or equivalently (for many such systems),
(5') <J>(A, B) iff there is a route from A to B licensed by natural deduction rules for L; or equivalently again, but less formally, in advance of explication of 'use of premisses', (5") <J>(A, B) iff there is a derivation (according to system L) of B from, or using, A. (5)-(5") take up the traditional characterisation of entailment in terms of which A -»• B iff B can be derived, or inferred, from A by valid rules. The issue is then: what constitute valid procedures? Values (5) - (5") are spelt out in detail in ABE for favoured exportative relevant systems, but similar syntactical methods extend to a variety of other relevant systems. And there are other syntactical explications which fulfil an analogous role and so likewise provide values of (j), e.g. the tableaux and Gentzen methods studied in subsequent chapters. More satisfying perhaps, there are semantical explications, the fundamental one, in terms of which sufficiency as deployed in (4) can be explained, being as follows:(6) <|>(A, B) iff for every (L-)situation or world a, when A holds in a then B holds in a; or, put differently, A is logically sufficient for B iff without exception A situationally guarantees B, or, differently again, iff A on its own without any other assumptions (which would be peeled off by suitable falsifying situations) guarantees B. Such semantical analyses, especially (6) itself, are the main object of subsequent investigations (from chapter 2 on). For all the main relevant systems studied Bennett's requirements are met, entailment ensures that the <}> relation obtains, but <|>(P & ~P» Q) is falsified for (weakly) irrelevant Q. The main charge, on which stricters always fall back, is that the standard relevant logics involve giving up the intuitively valid principle of Disjunc-
24
1.4 THE BURDEN OF PROOF AS REGARDS V1SJUNCTJVE SYLLOGISM
tive Syllogism. This is prima facie extremely implausible ....[Disjunctive Syllogism is] not to be rejected except on the basis of strenuous arguments (Bennett 69, p.205). Disjunctive Syllogism is not intuitively valid; it is easily falsified by inconsistent situations (as we explain subsequently in this chapter and show in detail in 2.9).1 Briefly, A & (~A v B) is not logically sufficient for B because in inconsistent logical situations both A and ~A may hold though B does not. Such logical situations are readily envisaged and described (see 1.7 and 1.8). But the antecedent of a valid entailment has to guarantee the consequent over all logical situations. A & (~A v B) does not so guarantee B. Hence Disjunctive Syllogism is not valid, as this intuitive argument shows. As to whether the argument sketched is strenuous enough for Bennett, we make no conjectures; but we do disapprove mildly of the transparent way in which Bennett, here and elsewhere in his defence of strict implication, has shifted the onus of argument. It seems to us that intuitively correct principles should have sound intuitive supporting arguments: that it is not that classical, or strict, implicational principles should be accepted until they can be knocked down, but that they should not gain accreditation without intuitive supporting considerations. Methodologically a principle of weakness, not the all too familiar principle of strength, should be adopted in assessing the correctness of logical principles (as reason indicates2, and we try to explain in chapter 3). Similar points tell against other attempts to reinforce the status quo that entailment is some brand of strict implication or its metalinguistic reformulation - by shifting the onus of argument to the opponents of strict implication. Although methodologically unsound procedures abound among defences of strict implication, Pollock 66 surely deserves some sort of prize for his effort. Pollock's overall argument takes the following lines:Firstly he tries, on the basis of Lewis's arguments, to shift the burden of proof: i) All the inferences in the derivations of the hard Lewis paradox are just too intuitive and 'obvious to be denied unless some very good reason can be given for their denial' (66, p.183). By i) intuition is supposed to show ii) 'there is a very strong prima facie case for thinking that the paradoxes of ... implication are logical truths' (p.183). iii) No philosophers have produced a reason as required by i), i.e. have undermined the "intuitive" case of ii). Therefore, Pollock concludes, iv) 'the paradoxes are in fact true principles of logic, surprising though they may be' (p.180; also p.195 and p.196); indeed, this is 'the only justifiable conclusion'! 1
We also show in Chapter 2 that Disjunctive Syllogism involves illegitimate suppression. At the same time we deal with Lewy's failed attempt to accurately locate suppression in Disjunctive Syllogism and show where Lewy's stimulating but thoroughly unsatisfactory discussion (in 76) goes astray.
2
And Lewis observed:
see footnote 1 p.36.
25
1.4 POLLOCK'S DEFENCE OF STRICT-IMPLICATION AS ENTAILMENT
Similar, invalid, arguments would have entrenched the Aristotelian theory of motion (before Galileo) and the Newtonian theory (before Einstein), and more generally are of great assistance to the establishment. But the fact that no investigators have so far upset a prima facie case hardly suffices for the conclusion drawn, unless the investigations have been suitably exhaustive. Pollock adduces no evidence that they have, merely claiming, without any requisite argument, what appears false, that he has examined the three most plausible arguments philosophers have located. Not only is the overall argument invalid, the premisses are also defective. If intuition has too commonly supported the argument for the paradoxes, it has also supported the feeling that there is something badly wrong with the paradoxes. In short, intuition commonly generates a conflict about what holds good for implication, and because it does, it does not produce such a very strong prima facie case for thinking that the paradoxes of implication are logical truths. (Compare other paradoxes: does the Liar paradox create a strong prima facie case for thinking that some statements are both true and false? That is not what is usually said.) Since intuition too commonly yields inconsistent findings about the logical truths of implication, on a strict account (consistencizing and applying Antilogism) one perhaps ought to hold also that the Lewis argument provides a very strong prima facie case for thinking that at least one of the premisses in each "intuitively convincing" Lewis argument is incorrect. It is a piece of history that this was the position taken by Nelson 30, Duncan-Jones 34, and other investigators, all of whom found the paradoxes more intuitively outrageous than certain of the premisses of the Lewis arguments. Pollock tries to circumvent this problem by denying that there is - or can be - anything intuitively wrong with the paradoxes. First he appeals to his own case, that he has 'no intuitive reaction to the paradoxes one way or the other*. How much is this case worth? The fact that students brainwashed by orthodox logic courses frequently have no reaction even to the paradoxes of material-implication hardly assists Pollock's case: many students could almost as easily be made flat-earthers. More to the point, for students of relevant logic the principles of Disjunctive Syllogism and Antilogism are not intuitively acceptable, for advocates of connexive logic other Lewis principles are unacceptable, yet Pollock does not relinquish the first premisses of his argument. Pollock is favouring strict intuitions over others: on what basis? Pollock contends, against intuitive rejections of the paradoxes, that 'a philosophical position cannot be refuted by an intuition that is not generally shared' (p.183-4). If so, it would seem that a philosophical position could not (perhaps even less) be so established, thereby undercutting Pollock's overall procedure which begins from intuitions which are "not generally shared". Pollock is sunk unless he can find some clear asymmetry between acceptance and rejection intuitions. He has two suggestions (p.183). One is that those who reject the paradoxical implications have defective intuitions, resulting from confusing implication with some other relation such as a meaning-inclusion one. The move fails to establish the requisite asymmetry because it can equally well be applied against those who accept the Lewis premisses; for example Anderson and Belnap have repeatedly argued that intuitive acceptance of Disjunctive Syllogism rests on a conflation of extensional and intensional disjunction (see especially 62). The second suggestion seems to be - and will have to be if it is to stand a chance of success - that we cannot have intuitions as to invalidity, but only of validity. The assumption is that complex validity can be determined by putting together elementary steps, but that we can never
26
1.4 THE METHOV OF OVERKILL, APPLJEV TO THE PARADOXES
be intuitively certain that by a suitably complex argument that some inference step will not be derivable. Setting partly aside the syntactical-semantical confusion, it is simply false that creatures never have correct intuitions of invalidity. Furthermore validity and invalidity are semantical considerations, often determined, not step by step, but by model-theoretic considerations; and an intuitive countermodel to an implication is enough for intuitive invalidity. There need be no intuition, or argument, about an unlimited number of steps or a tree path leading to the result. Pollock's picture is far too simple to handle evident intuitive data. The second suggestion, like the first, fails. It has become fashionable to follow up emphatic assertion - without any of the necessary supporting argument - of the intuitive validity of all the principles used in the Lewis paradox arguments with statements as to the innocence and sheer desirability of the paradoxes - what might be called the method of overkill. Thus, for example Hughes and Cresswell: ... we are inclined to go further: the "paradoxes" seem to us on reflection not to be tiresome (though harmless) eccentricities which we have to put up with in order to have the disjunctive syllogism, transitivity of entailment and the rest, but sound principles in their own right: a logic of entailment ought, for example, to contain some principle which reflects our inclination to say to someone who has asserted something self-contradictory, 'If one were to accept that, one could prove anything at all' - and the princ iple that (p.~p) entails q expresses this in just the way that a formal system might be expected to (68, pp.338-9).1 In rather similar vein Bennett contends that the hardest Lewis paradox is not 'something unpalatable which must be choked down because there is no convincing way of faulting the Lewis argument which supports it', but that 'the fact that [Lewis's] analysis generates the paradox is part of the case the overwhelming case - for the analysis' (69, p.198). But how this paradox is part of the positive case is never clearly revealed. The most we are 2 explicitly offered depends on a figurative connection of contradictions which conflict with 'the system of move licenses'. The 'positive merit in Lewis' analysis that it implies that each impossible proposition entails every proposition' is supposed to emerge in the following way according to Bennett: 'what the paradox says ... is that if you start with something conflicting with the system of move-licenses there is nothing you cannot arrive at' (69, p.218). When this is cashed out it can be seen to depend upon having already, quite circularly, adopted a strict system of inference rules. It has been unkindly remarked that Hughes and Cresswell were so little interested in alternatives to strict implication that they did not even trouble to get right the axioms of the one alternative to strict implication that they do specifically mention in the text of their appendix on entailment and strict implication, the system E. Axiom El for entailment should be ((p -*• p) -*• q) ->• q, not the special case presented (68, p.299), namely ((p -»• p) p) pWe will take up shortly a different respect in which paradoxes of the form that anything at all entails a necessary truth have been claimed, both by Lewis and by followers like Bennett and more reluctantly Lewy 76, to be essential to deductive reasoning, namely through the suppression of necessary truths they admit. Compare also Popper's use of paradoxes in characterising derivability.
n
1.4 THE PARADOXES ARE NOT INNOCENT OR HARMLESS
The same arguments which show that Disjunctive Syllogism is invalid also show that the paradox A & ~A B is not sound. And it is widely recognised as unsound and as counterintuitive. Correspondingly the inclination to say that someone who has accepted or is committed to some particular contradiction is bound to, or might as well, accept anything at all, is by no means widespread - for good reasons: There are many statements that dialecticians and others who accept certain contradictions will refuse to accept. More generally, we shall argue that a logic for entailment ought not, as a condition of adequacy, to contain paradoxes such as A & ~A B because it thereby precludes the investigation of non-trivial inconsistent theories (1.8). This is part of our case for claiming that the paradoxes are not simply tiresome eccentricities (or Don't Cares), but are, to understate the matter, positively harmful. The larger case (a beginning on which may be found in UL, §4) is that the paradoxes have done untold damage, especially in philosophy, where time after time they have subverted straightforward resolutions of philosophical problems. Thus it is not just false, it is decidedly misleading to make the common claim that the principle A & ~A B 'is at worst an innocent one: it could never lead us astray in practice by taking us from a true premiss to a false conclusion' (Hughes and Cresswell 68, p.338). The paradox is not innocent because of its effects in applications; and it can lead us seriously astray as we shall see: just as we can go wrong with material-implication (1.6) so we can go wrong, seriously wrong,with strict-implication. The semantical arguments which counter Disjunctive Syllogism and the negative paradox A & ~A -*• B also invalidate the positive paradox B A v ~A and the main disputed assumption in Lewis's "independent" argument for this paradox, namely the expansion principle B -*-. (B & A) v (B & ~A). For suppose B holds in an incomplete situation where neither A nor ~A holds. Then A v ~A fails to hold, and likewise (B & A) v (B & ~A) fails to hold; so the antecedents of the implications are not sufficient for their respective consequents; and the implications are falsified. (The details of such intuitive countermodels to the positive paradox principle and to Expansion will be elaborated and clarified in chapter 2.) Stricters commonly defend Expansion on the grounds that A and ~A exhaust the cases in every situation, so that there are 1
Lewis and Langford (32, p.252) make an analogous defence: the logical division of any proposition B with respect to any exhaustive set of other alternatives, A v ~A, does not alter the logical force of the assertion B. But on our account the division does alter the logical content. following in Lewis's footsteps, asks:
Bennett,
When we take a premiss and split it up into jointly exhaustive subpossibilities, are we arguing invalidly or "suppressing" something which needs to be explicitly stated? (69, p.230). The short answer is: Yes, the expansion argument is invalid; the further necessary premiss A v ~A has been suppressed, and without it the subcases are not exhaustive. But the larger issue which emerges, the inadmissibility of necessary premiss suppression, remains to be sorted out. Stricters are, all the same, a little uneasy about proofs using Expansion. The proofs have the air of clumsy legerdemain, not because they are sophistical, but because they are 'so unnecessary' (Lewis and Langford 32 p 252) ' p* (footnote continued on next page)
28
1.4 FAULTING, ANV CORRECTING, EXPANSION PRINCIPLES
no incomplete deductive situations. But all the evidence points to the fact that the evaluation of entailment requires that all situations be taken into account, including incomplete and inconsistent situations, where deduction and reasoning do not cut out. Semantical analyses of systems S2 and S3 reveal, through the situations admitted where entailments fail to hold (the so-called 'non-normal' or 'queer' worlds), that even the framework of strict implication allows to a limited extent for such situations. But of course strict implication does not go nearly far enough in this direction; for although it recognises situations where Identity, A -*• A, does not hold (in correctly rejecting the paradox B ->. A -»• A and such principles as A A A), it fails to observe that there are likewise situations where other laws of thought fail to hold, where in particular Excluded Middle, A v ~A, breaks down. Yet surely if A A can fail in some situations so can A v ~A. We shall find that it is easy to locate situations where Excluded Middle does fail, incomplete ones - and these serve to falsify Expansion. Unlike the negative paradox where the various relevant approaches are divided, several approaches join forces against Lewis's positive paradox argument in rejecting Expansion; relevant logics, conceptivism and connexivism all reject Expansion. Indeed the positive paradox argument - though according to Bennett (69, p.229) simply the contrapositive of the negative argument (it is not) - has not enjoyed anything like the reputation or plausibility of the negative argument. Lewis's independent argument is as follows:B -*•. B & A v. B & ~A (B & A) v (B & ~A) ->-. B & (A v ~A) B & (A v ~A) A v ~A B -»-. A v ~A
Expansion Converse Distribution by Simplification applying Rule Syllogism repeatedly.
The commonplace objection to this argument is that Expansion is false and should be corrected to B & (A v ~A)
B & A v. B & ~A
Corrected Expansion,
i.e. to a form of Distribution. This is a correction upon which conceptivism and connexivism agree with the relevant position; and it reduces the paradox conclusion to the principle B & (A v ~A) A v ~A, to nothing but a form of Simplification. Bennett, in his apologia for strict-implication, has endeavoured to come down heavily upon the commonplace objection. He charges (in 69, p.229) that resulting positions deny the widely accepted principle A & C + B, DC-OA + B
Necessary Premiss Suppression.
This is not true of connexivism. But it is true of relevant logics, which view necessity suppression as a widespread fallacy, as an extremely damaging principle which leads directly to paradoxes. For in virtue of Simplification, •B -* A -»• B at once results. So likewise the Lewis paradox and much more result, shortcircuiting the "independent" argument. Bennett contends, how(footnote 1 continued from previous page) And Bennett, though he first suggests (p.230), without any evidence at all, that Expansion is part of 'the common concept of entailment', then concedes that it may look odd. We suggest that Expansion is not part of the common concept - to the limited extent that there is such a common concept. Our evidence is circumstantial: part is the consensus among a variety of nonclassical positions that Expansion is invalid, and part is the fact Lewis's argument for the positive paradox has never carried the conviction that the argument for the negative paradox has, and that the step in the argument students regularly baulk at is the first expansion step.
29
1.4 DEFEATING THE LEWIS CARROLL ARGUMENT FOR SUPPRESSION OF NECESSARV TRUTHS
ever, that anyone who rejects Necessity Suppression totally is caught in an infinite regress, as Lewis Carroll found (and Lewy 76 makes the same, invalid, point)• For if Suppression is rejected every necessary assumption used in an argument must be stated and conjoined to the given premisses; but to this procedure there is no end. If this picture were right there could be no deduction in relevant logics since these prohibit necessary premiss suppression: but as there are deductions, the picture cannot be right. It is very far from right. The myth that deduction not merely permits, but requires for its very operation, the deletion of (conjoined) premisses when they are logically necessary, is embedded deep in the modal Weltanschauung; it is worth some detail to try to dispell it. Let us begin with the exportation-importation confusion that is one of the muddles underlying the assumption that conjoined necessary antecedents must be sometimes 'deletable without loss of validity' (Bennett 69, p.230). According to Bennett, As Lewis Carroll once showed, we cannot automatically declare Q -*• S to be false just because the derivation of S from Q rests upon, presupposes, or requires a necessary truth which is not a conjunct in Q; for this would commit us to denying every entailment statement. For example, the derivation of (2) [i.e. (Q & £) V (Q & ~P)] from A [i.e. Q & (P v ~p)] rests upon B: A D (2) ; and the derivation of (2) from A and B rests in turn upon C:
(A & B) 3 (2)
and so on backwards and outwards. The argument confuses 'resting upon' a premiss in the sense of being implied by a premiss, with its imported form, being conjoined with a premiss. Consider the example. The derivation of (2) from A applies Modus Ponens, not Material Detachment, and rests upon B' : A
(2) .
The derivation of (2) from B' and A "rests", for what it is worth, on C* : B' -»•. A + (2)
,
i.e. on a case of Identity: A -*• (2) A -»• (2), not on its imported form A & (A (2)) (2). Thus with C*, i.e. B' -*• B', the regress effectively terminates. All steps 'backwards and outwards' are cases of Identity, C' -»• C', C' -»• C' -»-. C' -* C', etc. There is thus no vicious regress, and no basis for conceding that Necessary Premiss Suppression is "sometimes valid". The Carroll argument does not show, what Bennett claims (69, p.230), that someone who denies that (1) -*• (2) [i.e. Expansion, using the commonplace objection] must say that necessary premisses are sometimes but not always deletable without loss of validity. But non-classical logicians will in any case admit that antecedents, whether necessary or not, are sometimes deletable without loss of validity, notably where the resulting implication is independently valid; e.g. B is deletable in A & B -*• A because A A is valid. This admission naturally does nothing to reinstate Expansion.
30
1.4 ADMISSIBLE SUPPRESSION, ACCORDING TO HOOKERS AND TO STRICTERS
Relevant logicians agree with stricters that Rule Exportation is inadmissible, that true (or even proven true1) antecedent conjuncts cannot be omitted from entailments without invalidity. Exactly the same holds for necessarily true components; but this the stricter denies: in stating a strict implication one cannot omit a merely true premise which is one of a set of premises which together give the conclusion; but one can omit a necessarily true premise. The omission of a premise which is a priori or logically undeniable does not affect the validity of a deduction; but the omission of a required premise which is true but not a priori leaves the deduction incomplete and, as it stands, invalid (Lewis and Langford 32, p. 165).2 Such an omission would, prima facie, leave the deduction incomplete, and so invalid, irrespective of the modal status of the omitted antecedent, and irrespective of whether it was known to be necessary or not. There is nothing special about necessarily true premisses that permits their omission. The stricter thinks there is, but much of his case relies on circularly appealing back to what is at issue, the positive paradox and the assumption that all statements entail ones that are necessarily true. Indeed the latter, e.g. DC -fi> D C, together with Disjunctive Syllogism, yields (in the framework of basic relevant logic) Necessary Premiss Suppression, as follows: A & C - > B - * ~ B - > ~(A H C) A & C B, DC -F ~B C, ~B -> ~(A & C) ~B ->. C & ~(A & C) -o ~B -> ~A A -> B
Rule Contraposition Paradox principle Rule Composition Disjunctive Syllogism, Rule Syllogism Rule Contraposition.
The hooker can similarly argue, using the positive material paradox C -*»D -»• C, that true premisses can be suppressed; and the stricter who mistakenly accepts Necessitation, C-^QC, everywhere can -likewise argue in this way to the (exportation) rule A & C - > B , C-fA^-B The rule is defective, and is defeated by any case where A and C jointly entail B but do not do so separately and C happens to be true (e.g. by the switches paradox presented above). So the stricter is right as against the hooker; but he is only part-way right, for what he says against the hooker's omission of merely true premisses can be duplicated for the omission of necessarily true premisses. That is, counterexamples and countermodels invalidating the Necessity Suppression Rule are readily devised. Inversely, what the stricter urges against those who reject the suppression of necessarily true premisses can be recast as castigation of those who reject the suppression of true premisses, whereupon the inadequacy of the case becomes evident, even to some stricters. Consider, for instance, Bennett's assertion (69, p.233) so adapted: Because in S3 and subsystems the Necessitation Rule: A DA is inadmissible. Entailments, though true, are not according to the systems necessarily true. Thus the stricter is committed to one of Quine's two dogmas of empiricism, that the necessary/contingent distinction can be made good. The relevant position need not depend on this distinction at all.
31
1.4 HOW STRICT SYSTEMS ERASE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION
Someone who thinks that ... validity may be lost by the deletion of - - - true premisses must presumably be muddling validity with educational or heuristic satisfactoriness. That is certainly not a claim Bennett would agree to, though it differs from his remarkable assertion only by deletion of the word 'necessarily' (where the three dashes occur). Furthermore it points out the way in which it would be argued, against Bennett, that in the necessary case there is no muddle: it would take almost precisely the lines along which Bennett should argue that in the truth case there is no muddle. To put it briefly, there is no muddle because validity requires a universal guarantee over all deductive situations: the deletion of a true, or necessarily true, premiss can easily undermine this guarantee (as the semantical analyses of chapters 2 and 4 will make very clear). What Bennett really wants to insist upon is not this warm-up point but that the suppression of necessary truths (and the corresponding negative suppression of logically impossible statements) which the paradoxes facilitate, is an inevitable feature of deductive reasoning, and ipso facto of applications of entailment within philosophy. It is on this sort of ground that the paradoxes are often claimed to be essential, and desirable, outcomes of a correct analysis of entailment (and this very likely covers what Bennett intended, in saying that the paradoxes are part of the case for Lewis's analysis, 69, p.198). The critical issue here, and also underlying Lewis's independent argument for the positive paradoxes, comes down to whether a distinction can be made between two roles for necessary entailment statements, an inference facilitating role and a conjoined premiss role (cf. Bennett 69, p.230 ff). Despite Bennett's doubts, such a distinction of roles can be drawn very easily, in both syntactical and semantical fashion. Syntactically the distinction is that between A -*-. B C and A & B -»• C with A an entailment (i.e. of the form D -*• E) ; and what permits inference is Modus Ponens, not Necessary Premiss Suppression. The requisite distinction is obliterated by all strict systems that have ever been seriously considered as offering analyses of entailment; for even in system S2° A -»•. B •*• C and A & B -*• C are interderivable where A is necessitated. Nonetheless the distinction between exported and imported forms is syntactically quite obvious and is clear from elsewhere, indeed not just from relevant systems but from weaker modal systems such as SO.5 which still maintains Lewis's definition of strict implication. Semantically, the distinction is that between situations conforming to an entailment (or principle of valid inference) and an entailment's holding in situations (see FD and UL). Once again strict systems erase this fundamental distinction in the case of necessary truths (so it is not altogether surprising that Bennett fails to see it); for necessary truths are supposed to hold everywhere.1 We can usefully adapt the distinctions between premiss roles in dealing with attempts that have been made to reinstate the material-conditional as the conditional and strict-implication as entailment. Consider, for example, the material case. Simons argues for intuitive recognition of that version of Exportation he calls 'conditional proof', namely: if A and B entail C then A entails that if B then C, by way of examples like the following:1
In S2 this result is only achieved by not asserting D(A A). That is, A -»• A can fail in some situations because the theory does not require that it is a necessary truth - and really cannot so require.
32
1.4 HOW WHEW EXPORTATION VIELVS A CORRECT RESULT IT IS OTIOSE
From the theory of universal gravitation (G) together with the initial condition that x is unsupported near the earth (U) it follows deductively that x moves towards the centre of the earth (C). This is to say (29) G, U therefore C is a valid argument. But "if U then C", the singular consequence of the lawlike generalisation is thereby established as a consequence. But if so, it seems to be established because (30) G, therefore if U then C is taken to be valid if (29) is valid (Simons 65, p.83). The mistake in this argument can be pinpointed in the word 'thereby1; for the point at issue is thereby assumed. Less obliquely, (30) is not established from (29), except incorrectly; but (30) may be established along with (29). The argument, which illustrates a method of avoiding "conditional proof" of wide applicability, namely an Instantiation method, is as follows:Firstly, G entails that, for every y, if y is unsupported near the earth then y moves towards the centre of the earth. Then (30) follows by Instantiation and Syllogism. Simon's more general argument for conditional proof in the sciences, from which he argues to the result that the conditional of the sciences is truth-functional, may be dealt with in the same way. The correct argument is not: T (Theory), A (antecedent) .*. C (consequent), so by "conditional proof": T if A then C; but T so (lawlike) generalisation: always if Ax then Cx, and so T if A then C. The incorrect exportation step is otiose. The Simons example also illustrates in a very elementary way more general features of the way in which relevant theories, such as relevant arithmetic and set theory, can operate without suppression of necessary truths; namely it is very often possible to prove relevantly what classically or modally is proved by suppression means or using paradoxes. For example, in standard relevant logics and many relevant theories it can be shown that Rule y of Material Detachment is admissible, that whenever both A and ~A v B are provable then B is also relevantly provable. Modally, of course, B results immediately by detachment from Disjunctive Syllogism, but this illegitimate step does not furnish a relevant proof of B. A relevant proof can however always be obtained by different, and legitimate means. The situation is familiar from mathematics and the theory of constructive proofs: often a theorem proved by indirect means can be proved (in a less controversial way) constructively. For instance, the whole of classical Peano arithmetic can be reworked intuitionistically. Relevant logics require not that valid arguments be constructive1 but that for an argument to be valid it conform to relevant standards. An argument which proceeds by suppression of necessary premisses will be admissible only if it can in principle be reconstructed relevantly or replaced by a relevant argument. A great many classical arguments are so reconstructible or replaceable (cf. investigations of relevant arithmetic). This is more 1
Constructive relevant logics where proofs conform both to relevant and to constructive standards can, of course, be designed: sentential parts of such logics are studied in chapter 6.
33
1.4 BENNETT'S CASE FOR THE POSITIVE LEWIS PARADOX IS UNCONVWCINGLV
CIRCULAR
than enough to refute the view that necessary premiss suppression is an inevitable feature of deductive reasoning. The strategy of replacing the Necessary Premiss Suppression, A & C
B, DC-0A->B
by the case of Modus Ponens, C ->•. A
B, C - P A + B
,
is just a very simple example of one way in which replacements can sometimes be effected. Bennett has, he believes, a case for the positive paradox 'which rests neither on Lewis's analysis nor on the second Lewis argument* (69, p.232). It is based on the feature of derivation and proof that we may at any stage in a proof introduce a previously proved statement, or, in the parallel informal case, that 'a necessary proposition is entitled to crop up anywhere in an argument without being explicitly related to anything that has gone before' (p.233). But contrary to what Bennett assumes, this is not a 'stronger truth' than 'that a necessary proposition is entailed by every proposition': it does not imply the paradox at all without further assumptions, such as that the procedure can be extended to hypothetical proof and a deduction theorem applied. Derivation and arguments of the line-by-line type introducing established statements are relevantly acceptable and do not lead to paradox (as chapter 4 will make plain). It is only if classically designed inference rules are erroneously reconstrued as representing valid arguments - they do not - that anything like Lewis's positive paradox is produced: the derived rule B-» A v ~A
,
of relevant logic E, for example, does not however represent valid argument in any sense. There are derivation rules, especially derived rules, which correspond to valid argument and derivation rules that do not. The logic of entailment distinguishes the cases, but there are other ways of doing so, e.g. natural deduction explications of proof from hypotheses, and explications of formal deducibility as distinct from derivation. Now Bennett does realise that it can be objected that the introducibility of a necessary proposition in an argument without loss of validity is not the same as the deducibility of a necessary proposition from any premisses (69, p.234); but he does nothing effective about meeting the objection. Instead, to erase the introducibility/ deducibility distinction, he appeals back to the strict analysis he is supposed to be defending: accordingly the "case" for the positive paradox reduces to an unconvincing circular one. The case for the strict paradoxes is, despite initial protestations, the strict theory itself. For Bennett simply accepts the Lewis thesis that arguments purporting to prove necessary propositions cannot be sorted out into valid and invalid simply on the basis of whether each nonpremise line is entailed by earlier lines (p.234). And this is simply to accept from the outset, what was to be defended, that necessary propositions are entailed by every proposition. There is no argument, but instead another piece of tournament philosophy: no argument, but another challenge. Bennett invites those who do not accept the amazing Lewis thesis to defend a rival position. But each different theory of entailment can furnish such a sorting of the arguments in question into valid and invalid, at least for sufficient range of cases, e.g. by use of canonical systems the challenge can readily be met (later chapters show how in detail).
34
7.4 THE MISTAKEN SUBSTITUTION PRINCIPLES STRICT-IMPLICATION SUPPLIES
Just as the framework of the material-conditional, classical logic, is inadequate to define a decent conditional, so, to turn now to the attack, the framework of strict-implication systems is inadequate to entailment. The basic trouble with strict-implication can be located in the substitution conditions it admits. (The key to the logical behaviour of a connective lies in its substitutivity conditions.) The equivalence which guarantees intersubstitutivity within strict implication sentence frames is strict equivalence, defined as strict coimplication thus: A 6-4 B =
(A -» B) & (B
A) .
For systems which include Feys' system S2° or Lewis's system S2 - the only strict systems ever seriously considered as offering an analysis of entailment - coimplication can be redefined: A M B = D f d(A = B). The upshot is that provable material equivalents are everywhere intersubstitutible in these systems, so that a great many undesirable implicational theses are immediately derivable. In particular, no discrimination in deductive power can be made between theorems, since any two have exactly the same set of consequences - something that is obviously false. Similarly no discrimination can be made between logically false statements: they all have the same set of consequences, namely everything. These disastrous results are magnified in theories based on entailment, such as theories of logical content and semantic information (as FD and UL explain in detail), e.g. all necessary truths have the same logical content, namely none, and convey the same information, again none. The worst manifestations, in purely entailmental terms, appear in the paradoxes - that a contradiction entails every statement and that any statement whatsoever entails each necessary truth. For any contradiction is strictly equivalent to B & ~B, and B & ~B entails B for arbitrary B; hence, by substitutivity, any contradiction entails B. Similarly using substitutivity, B entails, on the strict account, every necessary truth. These results can be traced back of course, to the fact that strict implication, as an analysis of entailment, amounts to necessary material implication. As in the case of material implication, however, it is not just that the analysis admits these paradoxes. There are several other principles admitted which (though analytic of course for strict implication) fail to hold when -3 is construed as entailment. The stronger the strict implicational system the more of these unwarranted and unwanted principles there are as theses. Because of these significant differences it is important that stricters tell us which system of strict implication it is that really captures entailment. But this most stricters are extraordinarily reluctant to do, even when they are informationally equipped to make a choice1 - perhaps for good, if rarely divulged, reasons. 1
This applies in part even to Lewis, who wrote in 1932, at a stage when he was still informationally unequipped to distinguish S2 and S3: Prevailing good use in logical inference - the practice in mathematical deductions, for example - is not sufficiently precise ... to determine clearly which of these five systems expresses the acceptable principles of deduction. (Lewis and Langford 32, pp. 501-2). (footnote continued on next page)
35
1.4 IMPLAUSIBLE "ENTAILMENT" PRINCIPLES OF SB
The few who do choose often plump for S51 which, despite its merits as an analysis of modal notions such as logical necessity, is hopeless as an analysis of entailment, containing some singularly undesirable principles. For example, Peirce*s "law" ((A ^ B) o A) => A, rightly rejected by all logics (such as intuitionistic logic) built on positive logic as an unsatisfactory implicational principle, reappears in an unconvincing modalised form in system S5 (but not in S4 or weaker systems) as ((A -f B) H A) A, where A is strict, i.e. of the form C -3 D. In fact S5 is distinguished as a strict implicational system from its rival S4 by the modalised Peirce "law" or one of its complications such as:(((A-?B)-JC)-JB)-i. A -J B (((A -J B) -3 C) B) B-iD-J. A W D (((A-3 B) C) B) -5. B -i D -?. E -i. A—? D (((AH ( ( (A
B ) - I C ) - J D ) -4. B D -3. A -3 D B) C)T3 D ) B - » D -3T. E . A-* D
Although none of these principles is evident2 or indeed at all plausible as an (footnote 1 continued from previous page) Apart from the limitation to the five systems S1-S5, this is a claim with which we have a good deal of sympathy (cf.chapter 3). Lewis's indecision, such as it was, was not to last. Already in Lewis and Langford (32, p.178) it is said: It is this System 2 which we desire to indicate as the System of Strict Implication; and by 1960 Lewis wanted to insist: I wish the system S2 ... to be regarded as the definitive form of Strict Implication (Preface to Dover Edition of Lewis 18). l The choice is often made on such insufficient grounds as strength, mathematical elegance and simplicity: cf. Lewis's astute observation (32. p.502): Those interested in the merely mathematical properties of such systems of symbolic logic tend to prefer the more comprehensive and less 'strict' systems, such as S5 and Material Implication. The interests of logical study would probably be best" served by an exactly opposite tendency. Occasionally however the choice is based, more satisfactorily, on the semantical structure of S5 and its logical theory of modalities. This points up the unfortunate historical conflation of entailment with modality, and how a very likely account of logical modality can lead to a most unlikely account of logical implication. 2
AS Prior (62, p.49) remarks of Peirce, p -»• q -*• p -»• p, itself: Its truth is not evident at a glance, but we might look at it this way: it means If p does not imply q without being true, then it i:s true. That is, it means Either p implies q without being true, or it is true. If p is true the second of these alternatives holds. And if p is false, then it does imply q (for COq = 1, whatever q may be) and of course does so without being true, so in this case the first alternative holds. (footnote continued on next page)
36
1.4 LEWIS SYSTEM S2 AMD OTHER MODAL AFFIXING SYSTEMS
like the system S3 that Lewis once favoured, has to be made. It is easily demonstrated (using matrices or a semantical analysis of non-normal modal systems, e.g. Kripke 65) that S3 has no theses of the form A -5 B. The focussing by Lewis of the choice of a correct (or as he would have said, acceptable) logic of deducibility on the systems S3 and S2 undoubtedly represented a vast improvement over most of what had gone before him, especially in the direction of the formalisation of the logic of entailment. Since S2 is, according to its author, 'to be regarded as the definitive form of Strict Implication' (Lewis 60) and since it provides the locus of much subsequent discussion of entailment, we exhibit the system in explicitly entailmental form, not in the usual modal form. Connectives -*• (symbolising Lewis entailment, i.e. Strict Implication), &, and ~ are taken as primitive, and further extensional and modal connectives are defined thus: A v B ~(~A & ~B); A a B - d £ ~A v B; A = B « D f (A = B) & (B => A) ; A B » D f (A B) & (B -*• A); DA ~A A; 0A » D f ~0~A. (A detailed discussion of the morphological structure of sentential entailmental systems may be found in 4.1.) The postulates of S2 in Lewis entailmental form are these:- A •* A (Identity) (A -*• B) & (B -*• C) A -»• C (Conjunctive Syllogism) A&B+A A&B+B (Conjunctive Simplification) (A -*• B) & (A C) A -»» B & C (Composition) A & (B v c ) (A & B) v C (Distribution: the scheme is not independent in S2) ~~A -»• A (Double Negation) A •*• ~B •*•. B -»• ~A (Contraposition) (A ~A) ~A (Reductio) A&B-+C->-. A&~C->-~B (Antilogism) A, A -*• B B (Modus Fonens) A, B A & B (Adjunction) A -*• B, C D-»B C •*•. A D (Affixing, or Becker rules). Other strict implicational systems of entailmental interest are these (the classification anticipates that we subsequently adopt in 3 for entailmental systems):Other Affixing Systems: These result by varying the axiom schemes for S2; e.g. Feys' system S2° results by deleting Reductio, or what perhaps surprisingly (and wrongly in the larger relevant context) is axiomatically equivalent: A & (A B) -»• A, (Conjunctive) Assertion. Another example is the relevant logic DL (of DCL, formulated without sentential constants) which results from S2 by deleting Antilogism; and yet another example is the relevant logic DK (of UL) which results from S2° by deleting Antilogism, i.e. from S2 by deleting both Antilogism and Reductio. The formulation of S2 given thus brings out sharply the key separation point between strict and relevant accounts of entailment, a point to which we will repeatedly allude (especially 2.6 ff), namely the principle of Antilogism and its outcome, Disjunctive Syllogism. It was this one major obstacle that kept Lewis forever out of the relevant paradise. (But really the unquestioned loyalty to Disjunctive Syllogism and its mates, such as Rule Antilogism, is part of the larger classical-modal psychosis which we subsequently analyse.) Hitherto the main concentration in relevant logic studies has been on analogues of the exportative affixing system S3, obtained by addition to S2 of one form of Exported Syllogism, i.e. A -*• B C -*• A C -*• B (Prefixing) , or A B B -»• C A -»• C (Suffixing), or of one of its modal equivalents, e.g. A-*B-*-. DA-*- []B (Necessity Distribution), or A -»• B -»-. OA -*• 0B (Possibility Distribution). Plainly both the Affixing rule and Conjunctive Syllogism are otiose in such exportative affixing systems. Other Exportative Affixing Systems. These include S30 - S2° + Exported Syllogism; S4 which adds to S3 any of the following schemes: B A -*• A, •(A -»• A), DA -*• CDA, OCA
38
1.4 A CLASSIFICATION OF MODAL LOGICS OF ENTAILMENTAL INTEREST
which adds to DK both forms of Exported Syllogism and A -*• (A -*• B) -»-. A -»• B (Absorption). (On formulations of modal systems, see Feys 65; for formulations of exportative affixing systems, see ABE p.340 ff.) The very close connection of Anderson and Belnap system E with Lewis system S3 can be brought out by a slight reformulation of S3. Take the formulation of S2 given, and replace Conjunctive Syllogism by its exported form, Suffixing, i.e. A B -»•. B -»• C A •* C, and Affixing by N-necessitation, i.e. A-fcA -*• B •*• B; so results S3. Now E is obtained simply by deleting Antilogism; i.e. there are formulations of E and S3 which are separated just by the principle of Antilogism.1 In the quest for a correct entailment system or group of such systems, it is important to look inside S2 and DK as well as beyond. So result two further classes of systems, both non-affixing systems:Replacement Systems. These systems result from affixing systems by replacing the Affixing rule by a Replacement rule, i.e. a rule of intersubstitutivity of provable coimplicants: A **• B, C(A)
C(B)
(Replacement or Substitutivity),
where C(A) is some wff containing zero or more occurrences of A as a well formed part and C(B) results by replacing zero or more of these occurrences of A by B. The affixing systems introduced are all replacement systems in that Replacement is a derived rule. The new class of systems of interest comprises replacement systems which are not affixing systems. Best known of these in the modal arena are the systems SI and Sl° which result from S2 and S2° respectively simply by replacing Affixing in the initial formulations given by Replacement. Relevant analogues of those systems result in a similar way from DL and DK. Non-replacement Systems; These systems dispense with replacement rules, and so characteristically lack--affixing rules also. Examples are provided, in the modal case, by systems in the vicinity of SO.5 and, in the relevant case, by Arruda-da-Costa P systems. The issues raised by these various different classes of systems, in particular the correctness or satisfactoriness of Replacement, of Affixing, and of Exported Syllogism, are taken up in chapter 3. The classes of systeas differ not only syntactically, but the difference is reflected in a deeper way semantically: the various semantical analyses are the main concerns of chapter 4 and later chapters. The criticisms already made and now to be made of modal affixing systems, and especially of preferred Lewis systems S3 and S2, extend, for the most part, to non-affixing systems. Although systems S3 and S2 avoid some of the worst of the paradoxes of normal strict implicational systems, e.g. Ackermann fallacies,2 they hardly offer a panacea. We set out criticism of these systems serriatim. 1
The analogues of a system obtained in this way are far from unique. For example, corresponding to S2 is not only DL but a system ES2 obtained from reformulating S2 with N-necessitation as an added rule by deleting Antilogism. ES2 retains the restricted Commutation principles of E while abandoning Exported syllogism principles.
2
Ackermann fallacies are inevitable in normal modal systems. The argument which proves this relies on the standard definition of normal for these systems, and takes the following semantical lines:Suppose where A B is a theorem, that p A -»• B is not valid. Then, presupposing details (footnote continued on next page)
39
1.4 RELEVANT CRITICISM OF SVSTEMS S2 AND S3
1) The systems still contain a great many undesirable principles as theses, the worst of which are of course the much advertised paradoxes of strict implication which occur in S2 in the forms: OB A B and A -3 B (in SI there are equally damaging T-forms of these paradoxes). Since every truthfunctional tautology is provably necessary and every truth-functional contradiction demonstrably impossible in S2 (and in SI) the familiar "independently provable" paradoxes already discussed emerge, and also typical irrelevant entailmental principles such as C ~t D A ~f A and C D A B where A -3 B is any theorem. But the systems also contain several principles independent of the paradoxes which, if not objectionable, are least very questionable. (We will question them, and reject them in chapter 3 where we present our case for concentrating on different entailment logics from the usually favoured systems E and NR.) For example, S3 and stronger systems share with relevant system E such theses as A -*• (B C) -*• D -»-. B C A D (Restricted Commutation) and (A -*• B) -»-. (A •*• B) C C (Restricted Assertion) . In S2 these counter-intuitive principles appear in rule form, and in both cases they lead to such defective theses as ((A A) -»• B) -»• B (Suppression) and, more generally, (D B) -»• B where D is a thesis, i.e. to the Anderson and Belnap rule of necessitation A NA where NA = ^ (A -*• A) -*• A. In these entailmental respects 53, like its relevant mate E, is too strong: but in modal respects S3 is too weak. 2) The elimination of the worst of the paradoxes of implication by non-normal modal logics is far from costless. For it is achieved only with the simultaneous elimination of apparent implicational truths. In particular, S2 and S3 lack the expected principles 0(A A) and D(A & B-^A); more generally they lack D(A -3 B) for each tautology A ^ B. The addition of any one of these principles takes S2 into modal system T (von Wright's M) and S3 back into 54, and thus leads to Ackermann fallacies. Yet surely the entailment A -*• A is necessarily true, and a satisfactory modal system should assert its necessity. 1 So emerges a serious dilemma for the stricter trying to choose the modal system that really captures deducibility, a dilemma which is a direct outcome of the erroneous strict conflation of entailment and modality (a conflation that is retained in systems like E). The rejection of incorrect entailment principles, e.g. the avoidance of Ackermann fallacies, limits the choice of acceptable modal systems for entailment to non-normal systems, whereas the retention of correct modal principles for logical necessity, such as D(A -> A) and DA -> QUA, forces the choice back to normal modal systems. Relevant logics escape this dilemma, most simply by observing a proper separation of entailment and logical modalities, which modal logics confuse. (footnote
2
continued from previous page)
of the semantics to be developed in chapters 3 and 6, for some normal world a, I(p,a) = 1 and I (A •*• B) = 1, whence for some normal world b, for which Rab, I(A,b) = 1 ^ I(B,b). But as A -»• B is a theorem and so valid, for every normal world if I(A,b) = 1 then I(B,b) » 1, which is impossible. Thus p -*•. A -»- B is valid, and so a theorem. 1
In this respect E appears to represent a substantial improvement upon S3, since D(A -*• A) (with • equated with N) is a thesis of E. However, as E c S3, N(A A) is also a thesis of S3. One of the troubles with S3 is, to put the point under discussion differently, that S3 admits of two nonequivalent accounts of necessity, • and N. In a satisfactory modal theory these accounts would coincide; however from the relevant viewpoint to be advanced neither account is satisfactory (see further, chapter 10). On the normalising effect of [D(A" => B), where A => B is a tautology, in SI, S2 and S3, see Feys 65, pp.99 and 127.
40
1.4 FURTHER FALLACIES TO AVOW
IN THEORIES Of ENTAILMENT ANP
COmTlONALlTV
3) The modal weakness of S2 and S3 can be exposed in another, equally damaging, way - through their Hallden incompleteness. A sentential system is Hallden reasonable iff, whenever A v B is a theorem with A and B wff which share no sentential parameter, either A is a theorem or B is a theorem. Hallden showed (in 51) that both S2 and S3 (and indeed a range of modal systems from SI through S3) are unreasonable in this sense, and argued that this revealed a serious semantic incompleteness in these systems, namely that there are no normal interpretations with respect to which the systems are complete. But strengthening S2 and S3 to remove this incompleteness leads back yet again, if the modalities are construed as genuine logical modalities, to normal modal system S4 (alternatively, under conventional construals of modalities, removal leads to S6 and S7). Yet again this problem is avoided by relevant analogues of the modal systems, which are (as we show in chapter 5) Hallden reasonable. In sum, there are severe problems with the non-normal strict implicational systems favoured as analyses of entailment, problems which are in each case overcome by analogous relevant systems. The most notable problems with strict implication, the validation of a great many undesirable principles, are an inevitable outcome of the fact the strict implication is a modal account of implication, which tries to account for two-place entailment connections in terms of a one-place modal connection in tandem with truth functions. Such a modal reduction cannot, of course, succeed with entailment; nor can it succeed for conditionals. Determination of adequate theories of entailment - and, so it will turn out, of conditionality - requires, to summarise then, avoidance of the following further fallacies:5 . The modal dependence fallacy. The fallacy is that of supposing"that whether A -*• B holds true sometimes depends just on the modal value (e.g. necessity, impossibility) of one of the components A and B - independently of any connection between A and B. Neither the implications a statement has, nor what implies a statement, are ever functions of the statement's modal values, of its impossibility, contingency or necessity. The Stalnaker and Lewis theories of conditionals commit the modal dependence fallacy as well as the truth copulation fallacy. A special case of the modal dependence fallacy is 6. The necessity suppression fallacy. The fallacy is that of taking A -> B as true where B is necessary. 7. The modal reduction fallacy. The fallacy is that of defining A -»• B as i(f>(A,B) where i is a (one-place) modal connective and 4>(A,B) is a truthfunction of A and B. More generally, neither entailment nor conditionality are modal. Any adequate account will meet this strong intensionality requirement; and this is the basic reason why the investigation of implication generally has to be in the area of the intensional beyond the modal, why - to state a central thesis soon to be advanced - it has to be ultramodal. § 5. Conditionals: the theory sought in contrast to extensional and modal attempts. The orthodox attempts at gaining an analysis of entailment - the metalinguist ic shift to avoid overt systemic introduction of modal and intensional notions, and the strict implication account in terms of modality - leave one with no satisfactory account of non-logical implication. Thus, given that our case against material-implication stands up, the problems of a natural implication, and of conditionals, are not satisfactorily resolved at all within the usual metalinguistic and strict implicational frameworks. Yet a great many
41
7.5 'IF' STATEMENTS, AMD WHV SOME NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THEM IS ESSENTIAL
implicational statements are not analytic, for instance the lawlike statements of science and everyday conditionals, and many conditionals are, as we have noticed, not implications: but such statements are commonly deployed in reasoning, e.g. in the empirical sciences, and in legal and ordinary arguments, and they have a logic, distinct from material-implication, which it should be the business of a full theory of implication to capture. In an effort to fill these lacunae there have recently appeared on the market various theories of conditionals, which are supposed to supplement the modal view and thereby overcome its acknowledged weaknesses on the conditionals front. Logical space is made for these theories, not by abandonment of the thesis that entailment is necessary implication but by the distinction of nonnecessary implication from the conditionality relation. The conditional connections these theories are intended to capture are supposed to be neither sufficiency relations nor extensional connections such as material-implication (cf. Stevenson 70, pp.28-29). So much is not in dispute: There certainly is a class of non-sufficiency conditionals, in common usage in natural languages, whose intensional analysis is an important logical matter. Although some have hoped that these conditionals could be defined enthymematically in terms of a satisfactory sufficiency relation, there is nothing to stop, and reason to encourage, their independent logical investigation. For, among other things, if enthymematic reducibility is to be established as distinct from just claimed, an independent account of -the class to be reduced needs to be given. There is not only a strong case for independent logical investigation of (non-sufficiency) conditionals - and conditionals are after all central in much everyday reasoning - but there is also a good case for jettisoning many former divisions and exclusions built into or presupposed by theories of conditionals. For example, there are semantical reasons for not trying to make the artificial and never satisfactorily determined or vindicated division of English conditionals into "counterfactuals" and "noncounterfactuals", where a "counterfactual" usage is not simply (a counterfactual) one where the antecedent is false, but 'one in which its antecedent is uttered in the knowledge, belief, or temporary supposition that it is false' (Cooper 68, p.291). Part of the argument is that there is no evidence that 'if' differs in semantical meaning when contextual conditions are so varied, and indeed evidence that it does not - just as there is evidence that the correctness of an implication cannot be determined from the truth- or modal-value of its consequence. Likewise there is a prima facie case for not separating out counterlogical or counterphysical conditionals, i.e. those with logically or physically impossible antecedents. Nonetheless it seems that any non-vacuous logical theory of conditionals is bound to exclude some natural language occurrences of if ; that is, it seems that there is no non-vacuous way of encompassing all occurrences of 'if' within a single uniform analysis. The argument, such as it is, is that any all-encompassing theory would be vacuous because any proposed thesis it contained could be defeated by a counterexample of sorts. Remember that in English 'if' can do duty for such connectives as 'whether', 'even if* and 'as if', as well as for 'if ... then'. The claim is that the intersection of the logical properties of these diverse connectives is null. Consider, to illustrate the inconclusive case-by-case method of confirming the claim, a few of the more likely or desired principles of an i^ of argumentative value. Firstly, consider detachment, i.e. Modus Ponens. This appears to fail in cases where 'if' can be replaced by 'whether', e.g. from "you see if you can turn the wheel" and "you can turn the wheel" we cannot validly infer "you see". Next, consider Identity, and let 'if' do duty for 'even if* in the intended
42
1.5 GENUINE CONDITIONALS SURVIVE THEN-TRANSFORMATION
sense where this makes a contrast, as in 'he is intelligent if crazy*. Then "he is intelligent (even) if he is intelligent" is not just weird but not true. Differently "I am wondering if 1 am wondering" is not always true. In the same way, by taking examples where 'whether* or 'even if' can be substituted for 'if', countercases to such basic principles as Conjunctive Simplification can be devised. No principles, it would seem, survive this sort of procedure. The procedure does indicate, however, the first kind of condition that should be used to restrict the class of genuine conditionals, namely that uses of 'if' where 'if' does duty for 'whether', 'even if' or 'as if' should be excluded (at least from the core theory). There is a simple linguistic test which shakes out many of the undesired cases, namely reordering and then insertion. The test, which we call then-transformation, is this: given 'A if B' reorder to 'if B, A' and insert then to obtain 'if B, then A'; finally ask whether the result makes sense or has the same sense as the original. Examples: 'if you can turn the wheel then you see' does not have the same sense (as qualified salva veritate tests will show) as 'you see if you can turn the wheel', and 'he is sound if unimaginative' does not have the same sense as 'if he is unimaginative then he is sound'. A necessary condition on a genuine conditional is that it should survive then-transformation. Genuine conditionals do appear to have a logic, even if the pure conditional logic itself is not of vast logical interest, consisting, as it seems to at bottom of Modus Ponens and Identity (such a logic is reviewed in 2.1 and subsequently in chapter 5: the minimal B conditional logic is in fact the pure implicational fragment of system B of chapter 4, and all its theorems are instances of Identity). But, rather like the parallel logic of deducibility, the interest and difficulty of a general conditional logic quickens when further connectives, such as those of the orthodox set {&, v, are introduced. Many principles that appear correct for an implicational logic fail for a general conditional logic - something to be expected since the I-C transformation (of 1.3) fails for many genuine conditionals. For example Contraposition which appears correct at least in some forms for implication (e.g. in the form: when A ->- B then ~B -»• ~A) fails for conditionals taken generally. Counterexamples to Contraposition abound: while "if you are tired then we will sit down" may be true "if we won't sit down then you are not tired" is commonly false; "if it rains then I'll take my umbrella" rarely ensures "if 1 don't take my umbrella then it doesn't rain"; and so on. The failure of Contraposition (especially for "temporal" if-thens) is indicative of the fact that conditionals do not in general meet sufficiency requirements: that the antecedent A of a true (or acceptable) conditional A •*• B is commonly not logically or naturally sufficient for the consequent B. When A is not sufficient for B, further background assumptions are involved in getting B from A, so that when ~B holds it may not be A that is negated but some of the further assumptions that lie in the background.1 But not all negation principles fail: 1
Syntactical enthymematic representation of the conditional A 3 B in the relevant framework as A & t -»• B, where t represents some background class of truths, shows up a technical reason for Contraposition failure. ~B D ~A would require ~B & t -»• ~A, that is it would depend on the rejected Antilogism. But the syntactical representation is of only limited value, since it sanctions irrelevance; it also happens to validate Augmentation.
43
7.5 THE PROBLEM OF THE WATERSHED PRINCIPLE OF AUGMENTATION
Double Negation, for example, appears to hold in both directions. Contraposition is not the only implication principle that is faulted when ordinary conditionals which do not pretend to offer sufficient conditions are countenanced. With conditionals, as distinct perhaps from implications and entailments, very many commonly accepted logical principles are up for reconsideration, and rejection. A critical issue in determining the general logic of conditionals is whether the rule Affixing holds; for the rule is a watershed principle in semantical analyses of implicational-conditional logics (as will become evident in subsequent chapters). An important test case for Affixing is provided by the principle A -*• C -*•. A & B -*• C
((Antecedent) Augmentation)
in combination with A & B -*• A; for were Affixing correct, Augmentation would result from Conjunctive Simplification. But according to recent logical wisdom Augmentation fails for the conditional relation. The case against Augmentation is two-fold; it tends to be based on intuitive counterexamples, these being backed up by various, incompatible, theoretical explanations drawn from the different theories that have emerged. A familiar counterexample (Stalnaker 68, p.106; Stevenson 70, p.27) runs as follows: there are cases where it is true that if you strike that match it will light without it being true that if you wet that match and strike it it will light.1 Another example is this: "If I walked on the ice, it would remain firm" could be true, while "if I walked on the ice and I wore 60 lb. boots, it would remain firm" is not (cf. Bennett 74, p.384). There are ways of explaining away examples like these; but there are, so Lewis, Bennett and others contend, too many examples for the dismissals to continue to look convincing. As almost always, the arguments for this kind of claim are not decisive. Bennett's argument, for example, makes the assumption that moves to explain away apparent counterexamples to Augmentation must treat conditionals as elliptical (or enthymematic), to be expanded, in determining the logic of conditionals, by further clauses conjoined to the antecedents. And it is true that there are then well-known difficulties about ever completing such clauses satisfactorily, since the background conditions to be incorporated are open-textured in several ways which defy complete linguistic description. But the strategems aimed at explaining away the counterexamples do not have to be of this sort; they can legitimately refuse to take up background or contextual conditions syntactically in antecedents.2 It is enough, presumably, to meet the "counterexamples" to contend that the conditions which falsify the conclusion of a deduction of A & B C from A C (to take an entailmental form of Augmentation), that is typically which guarantee A & B but falsify C, undermine the basis for, or are incompatible with, or background conditions for, A -*• C. Thus in Bennett's example, my wearing 60 lb. boots undermines (or in Adams' revealing terms, is incompatible with) the background or contextual conditions under which the conditional "If I walked on the ice, it would remain firm" is held true. This strategem, which we call the A-stratagem (after Adams 65), is of very general application, defeating, in its fashion not merely all counterexamples to Augmentation but also those to Conjunctive Syllogism and to other conditional principles that initial intuitive considerations might seem to reject (cf. p.10 above). 1
It is enough that there be appropriate cases to rebut an entailment or conditional. The fact that the Greenlite matches that Routley often has to use at Plumwood Mountain will light after being dipped in water does not count against familiar cases where non-waterproof matches are used. The fact does help expose however one of the background assumptions - that that match is non-waterproof - thereby emphasizing the non-sufficiency character of the connection. (footnote 2 on next page) 44
7.5 THE SEPARATION OF RULES FROM THESES IN THE LOGIC OF CONDITIONALS
On the other hand, there are, rather obviously, various difficulties with this sort of stratagem. For one, it is no longer possible to assess on their own untreated conditionals, conditionals that have been subject to no analysis or investigation1: to know whether a conditional holds one needs to know, so to speak, what is supposed to follow from it. And this makes conditionals virtually unassessible, and a great many ordinarily acceptable conditionals false - because otherwise, were they true, we could, by defeating background conditions, counter Augmentation. Given that Augmentation is to be rejected for untreated conditionals, and also for important subclasses of conditionals such as counterfactuals, given indeed that Augmentation is a "fallacy" (as D. Lewis puts it), an important question for formalisation arises: What forms of the principle are fallacious? The same difficult question arises also for other rejected principles, Contraposition and Syllogism. Granted that both conditional and entailmfental forms of Augmentation fail for conditionally, i.e. neither Antecedent Augmentation as formulated above nor its entailmental reformulation, A -* C A & B C (where distinguishes entailment), are correct, what of the rule form: A C —t>A & B -*• C? The rule is evidently separable from theses forms, and does not succumb to the counterexamples given to theses forms. It is noteworthy, for instance, that, despite Stalnaker's emphasis on the breakdown of Augmentation, the formal system Stalnaker arrives at admits the rule form. Similarly, though Hunter and Graves 73 consider Augmentation to be a principle which differentiates conditionality from entailment, they adopt principles (including Conjunctive Syllogism) which lead to the rule form of Augmentation.2 Thus an easy answer to the question about the rule form is that we can leave the matter open for the present: what fallacies there are, if any, are avoided by avoiding the theses forms. The distinction of rules and theses is important not merely with respect to the axiomatisation of the logic of conditionals, but also as regards the common claim that the failure of Transitivity (in conjunctive form) follows from the failure of Augmentation (Stalnaker 68, p.106; Lewis 73, p.32ff; Bennett 74, p.385). Unless entailment is erroneously identified with strict implication, this common claim is false. The assumption is that Simplification, A & B ->• A, being logically necessary, can be suppressed; so given Conjunctive Syllogism in the form (A & B A) & (A C) A & B C, Augmentation results (and similarly where the main connective is strengthened to an entailment). But such suppression of conjoined necessary premisses is inadmissible, and fallacious. All that the failure of Augmentation establishes against Transitivity is the failure of Suffixing (in thesis and rule forms), not the failure of Conjunctive Syllogism. Only the failure of the rule form (footnote 2 from previous page) Bennett has, it may be alleged, made the similar error - in assuming that background conditions can be taken up as antecedent conjuncts - to that he made in his "case" for the general suppression of necessary truths. 1
Thus heavy use of the A-strategem would violate our earlier methodological strategy.
2
The collapse of the original Hunter-Graves system does not detract from this point. For the point is correct for subsystems of the HunterGraves one.
45
7.5 THE FURTHER CASE AGAINST CONJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM, AND ITS DISSOLUTION
of Augmentation would undermine Conjunctive Syllogism, as it would undermine even Rule Syllogism, A B, B C A -»• C. Whether Rule Syllogism holds or not makes a substantial difference to the semantics of a logic (as will become evident in chapter 13); so the determination of exactly what is supposed to be rejected in conditional and counterfactual logics is not a merely idle matter. From this perspective the way the common rejection of transitivity is stated is rather sloppy, not to say misleading; thus, for instance, Stalnaker writes: '... the conditional corner is a non-transitive connective. That is, from A > B and B > C, one cannot infer A > C* (68. p.106). But in the usual way in which inference rules are stated (e.g. in Church 56) one is entitled to infer, in Stalnaker*s system C2, A > C from A > B and B > C (for when A > B and B > C are valid so is A > C). The claim intended is that A > B and B > C do not entail A > C; that there is, in this sense, no valid inference from the premisses to conclusion. The remaining case, directed against Conjunctive Syllogism is again twofold; arguments based on direct counterexamples, and more theoretical arguments from the analyses of conditionals proposed. We have already glanced at the sorts of direct counterexamples offered, and observed that there are conventionalist strategems by which they can be disposed of; and one stratagem will do, the A-strategem. Consider how this disposes of a counterexample to Syllogism from Bennett: If there were snow on the valley floor, I would be skiing along it; and if there were an avalanche just here, there would be snow on the valley floor; but it is false that if there were an avalanche I would be skiing on the valley floor — (74, p.385). According to the stratagem, the antecedent of the conclusion, that there be an avalanche, is incompatible with the truth of the initial premiss, because if there were snow from an avalanche I (or Bennett) would not be skiing along it. Insufficiency implications, such as conditionals are, are contextually-bound: they are true at best under present conditions, and when the conditions are changed, as by an avalanche, they fail. The apparent counterexample emerges only, so the A-strategem complains, by changing the contextual conditions as we go from premisses to conclusion. As we have observed, however, in the case of Augmentation, the A-strategem, may do too much; and there is, moreover, a good methodological case for a theory of (relatively) untreated conditionals. Furthermore if a general theory of untreated conditionals can be devised, we can then check the adequacy of reductions and likewise of strategems rigorously, and we can also investigate the particular logics of conditionals which satisfy given classes of conditions, e.g. contraposable conditionals, transitive conditionals, augmentable conditionals, to begin on a classification by logical principles of conditionals (cf. Rennie's procedure in the case of adverbial modifiers, in 74).1 The idea is that the logic of augmentable, contraposable conditionals, for example, will emerge as a special case of a more general conditional logic, in something the same way that the' theory of commutative groupoids comes out as a special case of the theory of groupoids. Similarly the logic of counterfactual conditionals, as a case of the logic of lawlike conditionals where the antecedent is false, will be a subcase of the logic of l The classification of conditionals by way of logical principles they satisfy is only one, among many, of the classifications that might be tried. Other classifications, most of them less than fully satisfactory, already occur in the literature, e.g. Goodman's classification in 55.
46
7.5 FAILINGS OF RECENT (IRRELEVANT) THEORIES OF CONDITIONALS
transitive augmentable contraposable conditionals, assuming (as we shall argue in chapter 8) that these properties hold for lawlike connections. The acceptance of Conjunctive Simplification separates main modal theories of conditionality from connexivism, a position with which, because of the rejection of Augmentation, they otherwise have a good deal in common. For the deletion and defeating features of the added antecedent in Augmentation is exactly what lies behind the connexivist critique of Augmentation, a critique which extends automatically to apply against Simplification (see chapter 2). It is not too surprising, then, that modern theories of conditionality are split by Conjunctive Simplification into two factions, a connexivist group (which includes Cooper 68, Stevenson 70, Downing, e.g. 61) and a non-connexivist group (which includes not only resemblance theorists such as Woods 67, Stalnaker 68 and Lewis 73 but many others, e.g. Hunter and Graves 73, Xqvist 71, Gabbay 73). Many of the recently proposed theories of untreated conditionals, whether connexivist or not, have the alleged virtue that they do not retain the faulty principles of Augmentation, Contraposition and Transitivity. But most of these theories are nonetheless defective, in that they incorporate principles which do not hold for conditionality, in particular relevance-violating principles. Thus they succumb, exactly like the theories they reject, to intuitive counterexamples. For example, the most publicised systems (American ones of course), those of Stalnaker and Thomason 70 and of D. Lewis 73 are badly irrelevant. Both the Stalnaker-Thomason system and Lewis's official logic of counterfactuals have as theses (and in rule form) the paradoxes: (~A -*• A) (B A), i.e. anything implies a conditionally necessary statement, and A & B A -»• B, thus any truth conditionally implies any other truth.1 In short, the theories provide no requisite connection between true antecedents and true consequents in a conditional or between any arbitrary antecedent and any necessary consequent: in such cases the accounts are every bit as fallacious as material-implication and strict implication, committing truth-copulation and modal-copulation fallacies. These systems also contain several other bizarre or undesirable principles - arising in part from the fact that they were obtained principally by working back from a possible world modelling to an axiomatic basis. For example, Stalnaker's system (investigated formally by Stalnaker and Thomason) includes the principle (A B) v (A -»• ~B) already criticised, the paradoxes (A -*• ~A) A -*• B (a principle which also rules out proper treatment of counterlogical conditionals) and A = (B =. A •*• B), and the dubious principle ~(A -»• ~A) A -*• B =. ~(A -* ~B) . In rejecting these theories we also reject the particular semantical and philosophical analyses in terms of which the acceptances and rejections of logical principles are justified. The worst faults of the semantics, the modal framework, we shall criticise, but the question of what can be salvaged from the extraordinary theories of neighbouring worlds and similar worlds which are written into the intended construal of the semantics, we postpone until we elaborate our own (ultramodal) theory of conditionals (at which stage resemblance theories are severely criticised). 1
~A -»• A B -»- A holds in all three Lewis systems, and A, in two systems.
47
A ->• B
7.5 THE INADEQUACY OF MODAL THEORIES
Other recently proposed theories of conditionals, especially those that are properly equipped with semantical modellings, are equally defective, both in terms of the principles they contain and as regards the underlying philosophical analysis. For example, according to Aqvist's 71 system a principle of connectivity: (A -*• B) v (B -*• A) , where B is of the form C •> D, holds, while according to Gabbay's 73 system, if A s B is a theorem, so is A •*• B, whereupon the full force of the paradoxes is immediate. One trouble with all these theories of conditionals is that they take as entailment, as the underlying logical implication, strict-implication - something we have already seen to be inadequate. But the basic trouble with these theories of conditionals - of which the adoption of strict-implication as logical implication is symptomatic - is that, like strict-implication they operate essentially within the possible worlds framework of modal logics, and so are subject to the inevitable deficiencies of such approaches, namely modal substitutivity conditions and ensuing paradoxes and sundry other unpleasantness. As customary, we say that an n-place connective $ is modal in the ith place iff whenever A B B is true (or A = B is a theorem) $(... A ...) iff $(... B ...). A functor is modal iff it is modal in each place, and a sentential language is modal iff all its connectives are modal.1 Possible world modellings are only adequate for modal languages. Modal notions have been raised to a position of excessive prominence in recent philosophy, partly due to the mistaken idea that the entailment connection, propositional identity, and conditionality are modal matters, and partly owing to technical limitations, that known semantical analyses - possible world semantics, and their metalinguistic correlates involving state descriptions succeeded at best for modal notions. This elevation of modal notions has done an enormous amount of philosophical damage, not merely in the case of entailment and conditionality, but with a range of other notions of major philosophical importance and interest such as evidence, confirmation, belief, knowledge, perception and obligation (see UL). It has even fostered the grossly mistaken, but widespread, idea that all intensional notions are modal or, if not, merely sentential (admitting replacement of no logical equivalents of any sort but only of identical sentences). The fact is that a great many notions fundamental in philosophy (including all those mentioned above and many more) are of more than modal strength: they are ultramodal intensional notions, which cannot be forced into the modal straitjacket without grave distortion and the generation of many gratuitous philosophical problems (as UL and BP explain). Most important here, none of the main notions we are seeking to explicate, namely entailment or logically necessary implication, law-like implication, and conditionality, nor any of the associated notions, such as propositional identity, are modal. All are ultramodal. Take implication. It is not a modal matter; for the substitutivity conditions required are stronger than modal, i.e. formally the truth (or provability) of A H B guarantees neither A -»• C iff B C nor C -*• A iff C -*• B. The ground we have already traversed shows this, and more. More generally, there can be no reinstatement, by patch-work repairs and qualifications from strict-implication and material-implication and similar purely modal and extensional notions such as the modern probability relation, of strict-implication or material-implication as satisfactory accounts of entailment and conditionality, and similarly there can be no constructions of satisfactory accounts from these elements. For such accounts always satisfy modal substitutivity conditions. This disposes of many proposed analyses (e.g. those of Adams 65, Stevenson 70, Geach 74). 1
These technical senses take up one (the main) traditional sense of 'modal'.
48
1.5 CHARACTER OF THE SOUGHT THEORY OF CONDITIONALS
So results a further condition of adequacy on theories of entailment and conditionality, the strong intensionality, or ultramodal, requirement, that adequate theories must be ultramodal. Just as strict-implication is insufficiently intensional to provide a satisfactory account of entailment, so, as we have now seen, modal accounts of conditionality, such as modal similarity theories, are likewise insufficiently intensional. Actually, as compared with implication and conditionality, which are fundamental notions in argumentation and reasoning and so central in philosophy and also in such more practical matters as the law, modal notions are of relatively slight importance. Through modal muddlement, however, which has taken entailment and conditionality as modal notions, the importance of modal notions and modal logics has been much exaggerated - though not of course to the extent that the importance of classical logic has. Modal befuddlement is not the only factor at work in modal-style analyses of entailment and conditionality. There is also the older, associated, assumption to be found in C. I. Lewis and in Burks' analysis of causal implication 51, but reappearing in Stalnaker and Thomason 70 and D. Lewis 73, that conditionality can, like implication, be correctly defined in terms of a oneplace connective (characteristically but not necessarily, modal), such as physical necessity or conditionally-defined necessity, in combination with truth functional connectives. Meyer has put the kibosh on this assumption (in 74b; adapted in ABE under the misleading title 'Relevance is not reducible to modality', since neither relevance nor modality are to the point). There is no need to appeal to the outcome of modal substitutivity conditions to show that genuinely two-place connectives such as entailment and conditional relations cannot be defined in terms of some one-place connective, modal or~ not, applied to a combination of truth functional connectives. That is, A ->• B cannot be defined as $$(A,B), where $ is a one-place connective satisfying a fairly minimal set of conditions and \|»(A,B) is some truth-functional combination of A and B.1 To begin, then, from the assumption that conditionality can be captured by simply adding a one-place connective to the logic of truth-functions, is to make a false start. Some of the newer systems of conditionals have implicitly recognised this limitation, that conditionality will have to employ genuinely two-place connectives. However they have persisted with the assumption that conditionals are nonetheless modal. This is false, as relevance considerations alone reveal in the case of natural language conditionals. Assembling the conclusions reached sets the shape of the general theory of conditionality sought. The theory will contain an irreducibly two-place conditionality connective which is ultramodal. The theory will be relevant, and ideally will be coupled with a relevant theory of entailment - certainly not with a strict one. The theory will, in its most general form (of 13), fail such principles as Contraposition, Augmentation and Transitivity, but validate such principles as Simplification. The theory should be underpinned by a semantical analysis preferably of a suitable philosophical cast. There are several hitches to this ambitious undertaking, to some of which we now turn, the main intellectual obstacle being the mistaken idea that any satisfactory theory must include a classical sublogic. 1
For the conditions required, see ABE, p.466, p.471. Note that system E can be replaced by any subsystem of RM3 which includes the basic logic of chapter 13; and accordingly that the argument applies both to the desired system D of deducibility, whatever its precise final form, and to that sought for conditionality.
49
7.6 DISTINGUISHING FORMS OF THE CLASSICAL DISEASE
§6. The classical hang-up; how one can go wrong with material implication, and why no classically-based logic can be adequate. The trouble with all the attempts, so far criticised, to produce satisfactory theories of conditionals and logical implication is that they are far too classical in orientation features which emerge, firstly, in the way they all proceed by adding to classical logic and aim to incorporate classical logic as an integral part,1 and, secondly, in the semantics where only classical-like possible worlds are admitted. For no such classical-type account is going to provide a tight enough connection of antecedents and consequents in conditionals or therefore to preserve relevance. Strict-implication and irrelevant conditionals, are both classical in a worlds way, in that each world used in their semantical analysis conforms to classical canons. It is from this classicalness that their main inadequacies stem. Classicalness is a persistent and widespread disease (which affects even relevant logicians who like the logical ease and "smoothness" of classical semantical corditions which involve no new or less familiar functions). It has resulted in a vast overemphasis of modal notions, and underlies attempts to provide modal analyses of a great many - sometimes, in extreme cases, all - intensional notions, though it is evident that many of these notions are bound to resist modal, or extended-classical, analyses. But in contrast with implication - which is the basic argument relation* and hence fundamental in philosophy - modality is much less important; it has assumed an exaggerated importance largely through defective accounts of implication and conditionals, which reduce them to modal notions and reduce coimplicational substitutivity conditions to modal interchange conditions. A much weaker claim is sometimes advanced in favour of classical logic or modal logic, than that they are adequate. It is claimed that even if material-implication [strict-implication] is defective as an implication [entailment] and perhaps needs some augmentation, classical logic is nonetheless correct and classical logic has to be included in any adequate logic of implication. Moreover, since one can not go wrong using classical logic, it provides a minimal working base, which there is a good case for using in controversial areas. It is, so to speak, a core logic with which one can comfortably rest. This is all too familiar bunk, which we will try to expose. The core-correctness claim may be weakened still further to: one can't go wrong with material-implication so long as simply figures as the main connective in inferences - which is all it is ever needed for. Even this latter assertion is of pretty doubtful correctness unless only very limited purposes are envisaged - certainly not formalisation of much of discourse as it figures in commerce and in newspapers and occurs on television, nor formalisation of the intensionally less rich mathematical discourse, where nonetheless second degree arguments and inferences with iterated implications occur. We will examine these stronger and weaker forms of the claim that one can't go wrong with hook together. First of all, we do not of course dispute the truism that classical logic is correct in classical contexts, i.e. 1
Modal logic is incorrect for the same reason, because it incorporates classical logic as an integral part of its structure, whereas a correct modal logic would be built on a relevant base. Similarly for modal conditional logic.
50
7.6 WAV'S OF GOING WONG
WITH CLASSICAL LOGIC
in those contexts where it is correct. But these contexts provide only a quite proper subclass of the contexts where some logic is needed, and where classical logic is supposed and intended to apply. There are then logical contexts which are not classical, and within these classical logic is incorrect (see also UL). Moreover while we agree that the & - v — theorems of classical logic though not doxastically compulsory - are true (for the extensionally-refined connectives of natural language that they consider), and accordingly should be theorems of any adequate logic of implication, it does not follow that classical sentential logic is correct, or should be included in every theory, or can never go wrong. Classical logic is only correct if it is coccoonised, if it does not assert too much more than the & - v — tautologies. It goes wrong all too quickly under needed and intended applications (as the counterexamples of 1.2 reveal). One can go wrong with classical logic in two main sorts of ways. One can go wrong interpretationally, by interpreting => as amounting to some sort of implication rather than as simply short-hand for an extensional combination (e.g., not-or)1, and one can go wrong in a deeper way by making the consistency and completeness assumptions of classical logic and their worlds. We deal with these ways of going wrong in turn.2 A common view - summarised in the slogan 'You can't go wrong with material-implication' - is that because => is truth-preserving it is safe to use for valid argument. The common view is well-represented in Lemmon (65, p.60): While admitting that this discrepancy [between ^ and if-then] exists, we may continue safely to adopt 'A => B' as a rendering of 'if A then B' serviceable for reasoning purposes, since, as will emerge ... our rules at least have the property that they will never lead from true assumptions to a false conclusion. Indeed how can any truth-falsity counterexample (i.e., where the antecedent is true and conclusion false) to any of these laws be possible, when these laws are laws of material-implication, which is, as everyone knows, truthpreserving? The truth-falsity counterexamples are possible firstly because A ^ B is at best a necessary, and is not a sufficient, condition for A -*• B. The truth-preserving properties of material-implication mean that one cannot find truth-falsity counterexamples - of an extensionally-admissible kind (i.e. one world examples) - to A -* B when A ^ B holds; but if A ^ B is only a necessary condition for A -*• B, one can find a truth-falsity counterexample to the main connective in A => (B •* C), when A = (B => C) holds. If B C is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for B -*• C, B C may be false when B a C is true. Hence one has only to find one of these cases to obtain a higher-degree truth-falsity counterexample to the main connective in A 3 (B -*• C) when A is true and A ^ (B ^ C) holds. (Exportation and Commutation may be countered in exactly this fashion: cf. 3.7 where counterexamples to Commutation are presented.) 1
The counterexamples of earlier sections all rely on intended interpretations of connectives, on the interpretation of extensional connectives in terms of natural language surrogates, and of and -3 as 'if-then* and 'entails' respectively.
2
In discussion of the first way we borrow heavily from V. Routley 6 7.
37
1.6 WHV HOOK IS MOT SAFE TO USE IN REPRESENTING CORRECT ARGUMENT
The second reason why counterexamples are possible - though not counterexamples of a one-world truth-falsity variety - is because, though A => B is true, A B is rendered false by a situation, distinct from the actual one which determines truth, where A holds but B fails to hold. Modal counterexamples to A -*• B, where A and B are both contingently true, are of this sort; a possible world is envisaged where A => B fails to hold. And the specific countercases to Disjunctive Syllogism (given in 2.9) are of this kind; though A & (~A v B) a B holds in the actual situation, deductive situations can be designed where A & (~A v B) holds but B does not. In the light of this, the common view, that because is truth-preserving it is safe to use for valid argument, or as a surrogate for correct conditionals, must be defective. First, the truth-preservation property of => does not show that it is safe unless it is assumed quite circularly that the only way an implication can be wrong is by having its premiss true and conclusion false in the actual situation, the real world, T. Second, o is not truth-preserving in the right sense to guarantee safety for valid argument. For it is not truth-preserving in the sense that if we substitute 'there is a valid argument from ... to ...' or is deducible from ...' or even 'only if' for all occurrences of '=>' in the laws of =>, what we obtain will continue to be true where the original => law was true. Similarly, once such a substitution is made, => can lead from true premisses to a false conclusion, as counterexamples show. Admittedly all the false conclusions are themselves about valid argument (or conditionals), but failure of this sort can not be discounted given the uses of deducibility in assessing responsibility. Nor is it an adequate defence against these counterexamples to claim that the supposedly false conclusions are always about valid argument and that since truth-preservation, as represented by =>, is all that is required for deducibility, they must not be false at all, but true, even if surprising. Such a defence is quite circular, for we can only decide whether a particular connective, say ij^, as claimed, adequate for valid argument, by substituting 'there is a valid argument from ... to — ' for '=>' and seeing whether the results continue to hold; hence we could not without circularity decide these results on the basis of what holds for the connective itself. (A similar objection applies to the claim that the material-implication paradoxes are not paradoxical for deducibility because they follow from the truth-table for =>.) A connective is only safe to use for valid argument if upon substitution of 'there is a valid argument from ... to ...' for all occurrences of the connective in its laws, the result continues to be true, i.e. if every law of the connective is also a correct law of valid argument. It must licence no methods which are not also methods of valid argument; but many of the principles discussed, which are => laws, do license methods which are unacceptable as methods of proof or valid argument.1 And thereby one is licensed to go wrong. 1
These points also destroy van Fraassen's curious claim that classical logic is correct for mathematical English (71, p.4). Insofar as mathematics relies on valid argument, its proper formalisation is not in terms of classical logic. While it is true that much of classical mathematics can be reformulated using classical logic, such a formalisation is hardly unique, and alternative formalisations using strict systems or even relevant systems can undoubtedly be devised. In fact classical mathematics uses only comparatively weak logical inference principles, few highly nested implications and nothing like the power of classical logic or stronger Lewis systems. Finally what 'the correct logic for a language' is remains a somewhat obscure matter; but what seems clear is that a language may have a variety of logics associated with it (see Routley 75, for further discussions of this issue).
52
1.6 THE PEEPER TROUBLE WITH CLASSICAL THEORIES: MATERIAL DETACHMENT
Even if the interpretation of ^ as any sort of implication or validargument indicator or conditional is given away entirely and = construed as no more than an extensional abbreviation (e.g. for not-or) classical logic and classically-based logics remain in real trouble. For there is a deeper way in which classical logic is wrong, and in which exponents can, and do, go wrong with classical logic. Even though all extensional tautologies are true, one can still go seriously wrong through assuming the unqualified correctness of the principle of Jfeterial Detachment: Y- Where A and A => B are theses, so is B, or, in application to theory c, through assuming its theory analogue: Yc. Where A and A => B hold in c, so does B. Classically, of course, yc is assumed not only where c is the class of all truths T but also for every theory (i.e. y is assumed to hold not just for the actual world but for mathematical and scientific theories). This is part of the (mistaken) assumption that classical logic is universally applicable, to every (scientific) theory, and that it is fundamental in reasoning. It has too often escaped attention that principle y is a fundamental component of classical logic and of all its patch-ups. Classical sentential logic, as ordinarily presented and understood, consists not just of and-ornot schemes, or some batch of these taken as axioms, but also of the rule of material detachment. The deeper trouble with classical systems lies in the unrestricted assumption of this rule - which would be correct were => indeed a sufficiency connective - in the assumption, that is, that y holds for any and every application of the logic, for every theory. Consider what happens when classical logic is applied as the underlying logic to a theory which is simply inconsistent but not trivial, in that not every proposition holds in it. Such theories are not just important, they are common: philosophical theories, logical systems, dialectical positions, and belief systems furnish a wealth of examples (detailed cases are set out in DCL and in Routley2 75). But the presence of material detachment excludes them, and trivialises every simply inconsistent theory, thus:- Since a simply inconsistent theory contains B and ~B for some sentence B, it also contains ~B v C, i.e. B C, for arbitrary sentence C. Hence by Material Detachment it contains C, and so it contains every sentence.1 That is, it is trivial. Exactly the same problem also arises from use of any implication, such as strict implication, which satisfies the principle of Disjunctive Syllogism, DS . A & (~A v B)
B.
For this principle yields, by Modus Ponens closure, y. Or, more directly, since ~B v C and B belong to the simply consistent theory, so, by DS and implication closure, does C. The limited applicability of the rule of Material Detachment emerges from the conditions necessary and sufficient for its correctness. We have already observed that simple consistency is a necessary condition for its correctness. For sufficiency, let c be a theory which is prime, i.e. whenever A v B e c either A e c or B e c, and simply (i.e. negation) consistent, i.e. for no A do both A and ~A belong to c. Then y holds at c, i.e. yc is correct. For suppose A e c and ~A v B e c. As A e c, ~A / c, by negation consistency. But, as c is prime, either ~A e c or B e c; so B e c.2 1
It is assumed that the theory meets certain quite minimal normality conditions - which will happen in main cases of interest. (footnote 2 on next page)
53
1.6 TYPES Of OBJECTIONS TO MATERIAL VETACHMENT
The first class of objections to Material Detachment, and derivatively to its thesis analogue Disjunctive Syllogism, centres, then, on the point that they obliterate a class of theories of considerable philosophical and logical interest. A second class of objections arises from this, namely that many other important theories may, for all we know, belong to this class (cf. Lukasiewicz 70). In particular, it may well be that some important mathematical theories fit into the category of simply inconsistent but non-trivial theories. Naive set theory is a prime candidate. It is certainly simply inconsistent, but it is only obvious that it is rendered trivial by paradoxes like Russell's when it is classically formalised. We now know that, on the contrary, naive set theory is non-trivial when given a suitable relevant formalisation - a far more appropriate formalisation of the intuitive theory than conventional classical ones (as EMJB explains; see also 4.2).1 (footnote 2 from previous page) The sufficiency conditions also indicate the line of a main strategy for proving that y is admissible for a given logic L, namely by showing that each L-theory c which keeps out D can be replaced by a prime simply consistent L-theory c' which keeps out D. The feat is accomplished, where it can be, by first expanding c, by Lindenbaum methods, to a prime L-theory c + . But c + will commonly be negation inconsistent, so the technique is to select a subtheory c' of c + with the desired properties. This can be done, in some cases, by splitting c + , or, what accomplishes the same, by metavaluation methods (as in Meyer 72). *Russell observed long ago (06) that any way of avoiding the logical paradoxes, as classically formulated, involves changing the logic (of set theory), and accordingly he went on to consider three important ways of amending the logic of sets. But what he did not consider was the obvious move of changing the underlying classical logic. Yet this was the change of logic that really should have been considered. The option opened up, of retaining all of highly appealing intuitive theories by adjusting the underlying, usually classical, logic presupposed for formalisation, raises some awkward questions for the dedicated pragmatist; for example as to whether to trade off little used sentential principles for the powerful unqualified abstraction thesis in a formalisation of set theory. But the classical hang-up most pragmatists have has blocked investigation of this attractive alternative. The abandonment of the unwarranted classical assumption that every simply inconsistent theory is trivial also raises other severe problems for pragmatism. For the pragmatist conception of logic which is supposed - in opposition to absolutist views on logic - to make the choice of underlying logic a pragmatic matter, in fact in the presentations of its leading exponents, assumes that classical consistency conditions must be met - otherwise revision in the light of recalcitrant experience could not play its assumed role. In short, the pragmatist view presupposes part of the absolutist position it is supposed to be rejecting. It is facile to try to meet this objection as Haack (74, p.36) and others do by trying to rule out simply inconsistent logics. Dialectical logics are formally viable, and are coming to be part of the logical scene: they cannot simply be ruled out of court as not 'logics'. Nor can they be dismissed on the grounds that they fail to discriminate valid arguments since an inconsistency entails everything. For such paradoxes of deducibility any worthwhile dialectical logic would repudiate.
54
1.6 GROUNDS FOR SCEPTICISM ABOUT MARKETED SET THEORIES
Set theory of adequate power may well be inconsistent. (No doubt consistent theories may be obtained by sufficient mutilation - simple type theory without an infinity axiom provides a familiar example - but so far these theories are far too underpowered to haul the classical mathematical train.1) Most important, any classical set theory that approximates closely enough to naive set theory to undertake its work is likely to be simply inconsistent. Marketed set theories don't approximate too well at all, and there is a chronic need for better set theories than the inferior goods we have so far been offered in the way of formalisations.2 The fact that Quine's theories appear in some respects better than most others is indicative of the situation. Marketed set theories don't however have to approximate very well for inconsistency to threaten. Indeed it seems to us that some marketed set theories - Quine's system ML is the most conspicuous example are quite likely inconsistent. So scepticism about set theory and set theoretical foundations for mathematics has some warrant. A trivial foundation for mathematics - which is all that classically formulated inconsistent set theory would provide - is hardly of much merit, and one does not have to go through the laborious circuit of set theory to provide it. The conventional classical reply is that if a theory such as set theory is simply inconsistent it might as well be trivial; simple inconsistency is hardly any better than triviality. This supposes that a theory which is simply inconsistent but not trivial is of no logical interest, an assumption we have already seen to be false. Abstract set theory, with abstract sets characterised in terms of the abstraction axiom, contains, as Cantor saw, inconsistent sets, and accordingly it provides a good prima facie3 candidate for a simply inconsistent theory; but that's no good reason for concluding that the theory is trivial. Thus universal use of classical logic in set theory is without justification. The situation with regard to various other parts of mathematics is scarcely better than the set theoretic situation (cf. DLS).U Other historical mathematical theories have also proved to be simply inconsistent, most conspicuously the theory of infinitesimals and the theories of calculus and analysis that this theory supported. It was not evident - it is still not obvious - that these theories were thereby trivialised - and under a dialectical formalisation the theories may well turn out to be viable, as historically they were thought to be. 1
With only a small increase in capacity, however, they are powerful enough to haul the main semantical train of subsequent chapters.
2
The classical story of what mathematicians do when they use intuitive set theory, of what they used to do before the paradoxes were discovered and continued doing afterwards, is largely mythology - there is the parable of the consistent subtheory, of the restricted domain of discourse where sets are well-behaved, and so on.
3
The case so provided is only prime facie because there can of course be consistent theories of inconsistent objects. Other considerations lead, however, in the case of set theory to the conclusion that the theory is simply inconsistent, especially the intuitive arguments for the logical paradoxes.
u
Furthermore, through classical set theoretic formalisation, much of the rest of modern mathematics has been contaminated by set theory. But really classical set-theoretic formalisation is too rough a device to capture subtler parts of mathematical argumentation and inference, and even at quite (footnote continued on next page)
55
1.6 LIVING WITH CLASSICAL LOGIC IS LIVING DANGEROUSLY AND IRRATIONALLY
Worse still, the consistency of a sufficiently rich classically formulated mathematical theory can never be classically assured, and so conventional use of Y can never be justified. As a result of the classical limitative theorems, and especially Godel's consistency theorem, classically based theories are forced into a completely untenable position. For let MT be any sufficiently rich classical theory, i.e. any classical theory in which every recursive function is representable. Most mathematical theories satisfy this requirement by virtue of including arithmetic. Then, by Godel's theorem, the consistency of MT cannot be proved using just methods of MT; any attempt to prove the consistency of MT in a non-question-begging way will lead to an endless regress through larger and larger, and increasingly suspect, theories. In short, a non-circular proof of the simple consistency of MT is classically impossible. But vindication of the use of y in MT requires a non-circular proof of the simple consistency of MT. Thus use of y can never be classically vindicated in the case of any sufficiently rich mathematical theory. Accordingly, too, use of classical logic in formulating such theories cannot be justified. There is indeed far too much complacency about formalisations, especially classical formalisations, of set theory and other substantial regions of the foundations of mathematics. The fact is that they are in dreadful philosophical and logical shape. A lot of glib and supposedly reassuring tripe is trotted out about how everything is alright - like the economic experts on an obviously ailing economy. But really the crisis in logic is far from over. It is simply that, like hyperinflation in some economies, people have come to live with it. The fact that one can live with crises, can live dangerously with classical logic (as van Fraassen is quite explicitly prepared to do: 71, p.5), is hardly a good reason for continuing to do so when the risks can be reduced as they can be giving up material detachment everywhere except where consistency can be established, that is in most places. There is no need to live in the shadow of possible disaster in the fashion of classical set theorists, and it is mostly irrational to do so. Nor can there be any doubt that allowing for the possibility that a set theory is a simply inconsistent non-trivial theory substantially reduces risks.1 Naturally where a version of Godel's theorem applies, risk cannot be entirely eliminated; but firstly, Godel's result has not been established for theories which are not classically based (see UL), and, secondly, there is good prospect that for such theories a non-Godelian strategy can succeed (for example, dialectical theories automatically escape the main impact of limitative theorems, since they admit the paradoxes, whereas the limitative theorems, and the scepticism they inject, are consequences of getting burnt by the paradoxes after their main fire has allegedly been extinguished). (footnote u continued from previous page) elementary levels creates distortion. (Consider, for example, the settheoretic representation of groups and semi-groups discussed in van Fraassen 71.) Too many logicians are prepared to tolerate this level of distortion, to accept isomorphisms for identities, etc. Probability considerations support this claim. Just as, to use a geometrical analogy, it is probable that isolated singularities remain isolated and do not connect with every point, so there is a considerable probability that isolated inconsistencies do not spread everywhere.
56
1.6 THE NEED FOR REASSESSMENT OF THE PLACE OF CLASSICAL LOGIC
In view of all this, and especially the severe limitations on the reliable applicability of the core classical rule of Material Detachment, and (as we shall see) the defensibility of dialectical theories, we believe that a reassessment of the place of classical logic in theory formulation is wanted. Classical logic was the first formalised logic of much scope on the scene and it remains by far the best developed. Practically all the extant formalisations of mathematical theories have been carried out on a classical basis not because classical logic was necessarily or obviously the best medium for all - or any - of these formalisations, but in part because of historical accident and vagaries and of conservatism of the educational process and in part because it alone was there. Nowadays classical logic, which has many powerful adherents, has consolidated its position and become entrenched,1 and much mathematical theory is being rewritten in terms of it. A comparison with the rewriting of history in terms that suit a new dominant ideology is not inappropriate. For it appears that the informal reasoning used in classical mathematics at least until the mid-century rarely2 or never deployed the excessive power of, or, for that matter, the paradoxical features of, material implication, and it also appears that most of the reasoning can be reset on alternative logical bases including relevant ones. It is our view that the importance of classical logic - which captured the market because first into it and because of its childish simplicity - has been grossly exaggerated. Given time and relevant effort it is our hope that history will in due course bear out our claim on this matter. What importance classical logic does have is in providing a simple model, and testing ground, for arguments that can then be re-engineered to extend to more adequate alternative systems.3 1
Thus rival logics are derisively dismissed as 'deviant' in (much of) U.S.A. and its intellectual satellites: elsewhere they are 'non-classical'.
2
If there were many such cases, which we doubt, they could be catered for in a relevant formalisation by additional mathematical postulates - the classical postulational bases having in any case a measure of indeterminacy.
3
We have already, impetuously, proposed relevant logics as candidates for the job from which we are arguing classical logic should be dismissed (see, e.g. UL). As a matter of history, relevant logics were not introduced merely for recreational or academic advancement, or demotion, purposes, but were intended as serious alternatives to classical logic and to such improvements on classical logic as modal logics. We certainly believe that relevant logics should, because of their unusual scope and range of other virtues, be very seriously considered as alternative logics. So it pained us to encounter Haack 74 - a whole book on alternative logics in which relevant logics get no mention. Of course recognition of relevant logics would have destroyed the organisational framework and several of the arguments of Haack's book. To begin with, relevant logics do not fit into S. Haack's oversimple classification (in 74, p.4ff) of alternative logics. For although all theorems of classical (sentential) logic are theorems of the main relevant logics studied (those including system G below), these relevant logics do not in general simply extend classical logic, but lack (except as an admissible extra in many cases) the characteristic classical rule of Material Detachment. Moreover non-trivial inconsistent extensions of the best relevant logics - the dialectical systems - no longer allow material detachment as an admissible addition. Thus relevant logics - with -*• considered, like the strict implication and necessity of modal logics, as a further connective beyond the standard set {&, v, ~} of classical logic - though they typically include classical logic as admissible, are not essential extensions of that logic. Doesn't that make relevant logics quasi-deviant logics on Haack's classifi(footnote continued on next page)
1.6 THE RATIONAL LOGICAL POLICY IS TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON CLASSICAL LOGIC
To sum up the main drift thus far:- Not even the residual claim made for classical logic - that classical logic will have to be part of any adequate logical system - is correct. On the contrary the residual claim is drastically mistaken. Admittedly the tautologies of classical logic are analytically true (though, as noticed, not compulsory, in that one doesn't have to believe them). Material Detachment is however an integral part of the classical scene, and this rule is formally unsatisfactory and becomes positively undesirable when investigating the consequences of philosophically and mathematically important theories which may be inconsistent. Then one can go seriously wrong using classical logic. One can, in short, go wrong with classical logic if one applies it in the wrong situations. And if one applies it to discourse concerning a range of worlds that are not classical such as inconsistent and paradoxical situations, then one is quite certain to go wrong: and so of course for any arbitrary situation there's a chance of going wrong. Furthermore for most theories of interest the requisite conditions for the application of classical logic cannot be classically established. Standard logic is not, ther, a device that one can apply with real confidence anywhere much beyond decidable theories. Only the completely unfounded, and classically unsupportable, presumption of correctness props up the universal application of classical logic, and a rapid - but impermissible - retreat towards pure logic is often attempted by exponents in the face of criticism. Rational applications of logical theories should include logical caution, which means dropping classical logic as a universal, or even extensively used, tool especially in investigations of consistency. For we do not check situations carefully to make sure they are not bugged by contradictions somewhere before applying logical reasoning - yet that is what the safe application of classical logic would appear to require. Moreover, even if, as is classically assumed, the world is consistent it is not generally safe to apply classical logic in investigating theories (which may diverge from the world). The rational course would seem to be to reduce risks and adopt a relevant logic (a thesis developed in detail in DCL). § 7. Dialectical logic, and the repudiation of the dogma that the world is consistent. So far we have been arguing against classically-based logics primarily on the grounds that there are non-trivial inconsistent theories which just cannot be discounted, and that, moreover, a great many of our other intuitive theories may, for all we know, be of this sort (and that classical theory prevents us from ever knowing otherwise). (footnote
continued from previous page)
cation? No, for the theorems of the common vocabulary with connectives &, v, ~ do not differ. But the matter of the choice of connectives of alternative logics and the comparison made with the connectives of classical logic is important, and, unfortunately for Haack's classification, the status of a logic is not invariant under choice of its formulation. For example, Lewis's systems are classed by Haack as extended logics. But should we consider Lewis's systems of strict-implication, as formulated in a quite standard way with connective set {&, v, =>} with = as a strict implication, as an alternative to classical logic (the way Lewis and others have thought of these logics), then Lewis systems are deviant logics on the Haack classification - not extended logics as Haack has it. Similarly relevant and intuitionist logics so considered are deviant logics, and so likewise are the very different connexive logics which contain decidedly non-classical theses and which should be separately classified. Accordingly the Haack classification is neither suitably stable under systemic formulation nor sufficiently revealing, and it is neither exhaustive or appropriately exclusive.
58
1.7 PARACONSISTENT LOGICS, ANV THE DIALECTICAL CRITICISM OF CLASSICAL LOGIC
The dialectical criticism of classical logic is much harsher. For according to it, there are true theories that are inconsistent, and thus the world T (considered as everything that is case, as the class of truths) is simply inconsistent. If so, classical logic cannot be reliably applied, even in its home (extensional) territory, to true theories: it is incorrect in a quite drastic way. The new dialectical criticism of classical logic and repudiation of the consistency of T is based on the development of paraconsistent logics. The new logical case reinforces the older intuitive case, in a quite remarkable way (as we shall see in 6.5), and furnishes many of its main theses. A paraconsistent logic is, at bottom, a logic which admits arbitrary contradictions without thereby being trivialised, i.e. a necessary condition for a paraconsistent logic is that it does not contain (as a derived principle) the spread rule: A, ~A -frB.1 Let us take this necessary condition to characterise weakly paraconsistent logics, so leaving it open what additional conditions have to be met by paraconsistent logics proper2 - just as we have characterised weakly relevant logics in terms of satisfaction of Belnap's weak relevance requirement and so far left open what additional conditions must be met by relevant logics (but this question is closed in chapter 3, where relevant logics are characterised as logics which are weakly relevant and conservatively extend distributive lattice logic). Since most positive logics would qualify as paraconsistent under the account we also require that the logics concerned should be sentential and contain as well as •*• a full stock of extensional connectives, typically &, v and 1
A less sweeping requirement that merits some investigation is that under which a logic admits some contradictory pair A and ~A of further theses without being trivialised.
2
Da Costa in a number of publications, particularly 74, has imposed further conditions on paraconsistent logics, and similarly Jaskowski has required that his discussive logics - which are paraconsistent logics - should meet further conditions. But some of these conditions are not formally tractable (and are too strong insofar as they are), e.g. that a paraconsistent logic should have an intuitive sense or that is should be sufficiently rich to formalise the bulk of useful sentential reasoning (Jaskowski 69, D'Ottaviano and da Costa 70), and others are undesirable, e.g. the condition that a paraconsistent logic should not contain the thesis ~(A & ~A). Some important dialectical logics have ~(A & ~A) as a thesis though for some B, B & ~B is also a thesis, e.g. the system DL of 6.5. Though the modern logical theory of formal inconsistent systems originated in Poland with Jaskowski - its roots go back to Lukasiewicz 70 - extensive development of theory has occurred in Brasil, and is to be found in the work of da Costa, Arruda and coinvestigators. The theory of formal inconsistent systems, or as they are now called, paraconsistent systems (the term 'paraconsistent* being coined by Quesada), has become very much a Latin American institution, and distinguishes Latin American logic in much the way that the identity theory of mind used to distinguish Australian philosophy. Important work on paraconsistent systems has also been done by Asenjo, Apostel, Priest, Routley and others (see DLS).
59
1.1 THE CLASSICAL FAITH (IN CH) CONTRASTED WITH DIALECTICAL HARDHEADEDNESS
It is evident that the classes of logics distinguished, weakly relevant and weakly paraconsistent logics, properly overlap. The relevant affixing systems (of chapter 3) generally fall into the overlap, but most of the systems studied in depth by da Costa are irrelevant (the P systems are an exception), while the original rigorous implication systems of Ackermann 56 are relevant but not paraconsistent since they contain the rule y.1 The usual irrelevant logics which all contain Disjunctive Syllogism are neither relevant nor paraconsistent. A dialectical logic is a paraconsistent logic that realises the potential that a paraconsistent logic allows for, that is, a dialectical logic is simply inconsistent as well as non-trivial, i.e. it contains contradictory theses.2 Thus dialectical logics are a subclass of paraconsistent logics, and relevant dialectical logics - those of main interest to us - of relevant paraconsistent logics. Let c be a situation that conforms to a dialectical logic. The semantics of relevant logic will reveal that such non-classical situations are easily supplied. Situation c upsets an application of y, namely yc. So much we have already seen. The additional dialectical thesis is that T is such a situation, and that so also are certain subsituations, such as c, of T. Hence, by the negation of the consistency hypothesis, yT is upset. There are three positions that can be taken with respect to the consistency hypothesis, CH, that the world T is consistent, and so three positions with respect to yT - positions which correspond to the three standard positions with respect to the existence of God. There are, firstly, theists or believers who accept CH, mostly as an article of faith. Such is the classical position, such also was Ackermann's position, and, so it appears, that of Anderson and Belnap. Secondly, there is the agnostic position, argued for as the rational position in DCL. Finally, there are atheists or infidels: such are thoroughgoing dialecticians (and the same dialectical position is argued for in UL and in DLS).3 l It is assumed in characterising paraconsistent logics that the extensions considered are closed under the rules of the logic: otherwise even classical logic could be paraconsistent. 2
0ur use of the term 'dialectical' has encountered a fair measure of criticism, partly because 'dialectical' and 'dialectic' have another important (related) sense, and partly because the links of dialectical logic with the enterprises of Hegel and the dialecticians have not been made sufficiently clear. But, firstly, our use of 'dialectic' falls squarely under the second part of the dictionary listings for the terms (see OED): dialectic, n (often in pi.) Art of investigating the truth of opinions, testing of truth by discussion, logical disputation; (Mod. Philos; not in pi.) criticism dealing with metaphysical contradictions 6 their solutions. For we are certainly concerned with the application of dialectical logic in resolving metaphysical contradictions (see below): this is the central reason for investigating them. (Jaskowski's discussive logics and paraconsistent logics are intended to tie in also with dialectics in the Greek meaning, i.e. as under the first part of the dictionary listing.) Secondly, Hegel and his followers do not have a monopoly on the use of the term 'dialectic' even if (footnote 2 and 3 continued on next page)
60
1.7 WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE QUESTION OF THE CONSISTENCY OF THE WORLD
For present purposes we do not need to settle the issues between consistency agnostics and consistency atheists, even if we could; it is enough to knock out the classical, theistic, position. What we shall do is to set out the seemingly powerful, and pretty impregnable, case that the agnostic has (adapting the argument from DCL) and in the course of presentation, indicate how it can be biased in favour of the dialectical position. We have seen that what is at stake is nothing less than the question of the consistency of the world T, that if the world is simply consistent (and also, as against the intuitionists, complete) then the classical position is correct, whereas if the world is inconsistent then the dialectical position is correct.1 Whichever is the case, however, the relevance position does not go wrong. This provides a major reason for claiming that the relevance position is more rational than the other positions, should it turn out that the matter of the consistency of the world cannot be definitively settled. But the question of the consistency of the world cannot be conclusively settled in a non-question-begging way - so at least the agnostic argues hence the keeping-options-open strategy of (non-classical non-dialectical) relevant logic is the rational one from a decision-making viewpoint. The rival positions of course contend that the matter can be settled, in their way - not perhaps definitively, but in the way that other high level theoretical hypotheses are settled. Here the dialectician has a point, as we shall see. What is at stake is not the absolute consistency or non-triviality of the world, or the logic or theory whose truth it reflects. All the positions can agree that the world is absolutely consistent - which is as well for them, since the absolute consistency of the world can be empirically verified. The statement, q , "R. Routley is cutting firewood at Plumwood Mountain on the (footnotes
2
and
3
continued from previous page)
they were responsible for the modern usage; and though it would be very interesting to apply logical and semantical methods to the explication of Hegel's philosophy, we are under no obligation to do so. We do believe, however, that the dialectical logics we have so far investigated have a direct and important application in clarifying the logic of Soviet dialectical philosophy (see DCL). 3
0ne of the fringe benefits of going dialectic is that one can no longer be condemned quite so easily for the occasional inconsistency in one's work. But of course we can make the classical plea that our position has changed - improved we should like to say - over time.
x
The dialectician can admit with the intuitionist that the world is incomplete, but the intuitionist cannot admit with the dialectician that the world is inconsistent; for intuitionistically, since A -*• B, A -+A •*•. A -*• B, whence —iA A -*• B and A & —|A -*• B, i.e. intuitionistic inconsistency implies collapse into triviality. Of course a minimalist who rightly rejects A -»• B can go some way with the dialectician. In general, minimalism is a relevantly rather more congenial position than intuitionism: if only however "minimal" logic had been based on a relevant positive logic instead of on Hilbert's positive logic (the so-called "absolute calculus").
61
1.7 THE CHARACTER OF THE CONSISTENCY HYPOTHESIS
afternoon of August 1, 1976", for example, can be empirically falsified by observing Routley in Brasil at that date. Hence q Q is false and q^ does not belong T. Therefore, T is absolutely consistent. It is often supposed that given the absolute consistency of the world, the (simple) consistency of the world is also proved, and the classical position thereby established. However the "proof" of simple consistency must depend on the special rule n.
A, ~A -o B
which transforms simple inconsistency into absolute. But this paraconsistencyexcluding rule is tantamount to rule y, even in weak sublogics of classical logic (e.g. in DML of 2.8), and is semantically equivalent to the assumption that T is simply consistent (given absolute consistency or non-degeneracy of the world). Hence the question is begged by rule n> since precisely what is at issue is rule y and the consistency of T. The question of the consistency of the world is not, it seems, empirically decidable. Nor i~ it a high level scientific hypothesis. It is a metaphysical thesis, but a perfectly significant one. Since it involves a universal claim to the effect, as canonical semantical modellings will show, that for every statement A exactly one of A and ~A belongs to T, i.e. holds true - it would appear that the dialectician is in a much stronger position to establish his claim than the classicist, since universal claims can be falsified in principle by a single counterexample. To establish his thesis however the classicist has to establish a claim that extends over all true theories, whether scientific, mathematical, evaluative, or whatever. Should a contradiction lurk deep in some still unpenetrated mathematical or other theory then the classicist is undone. Only a priori "evidence" that such a contradiction or inconsistency cannot occur would seem to exclude the possibility: thus the classical position if true is not empirically so in any simple way, no endless search is contemplated, nor would its results be relied upon. The dialectician, on the other hand, has the chance of falsifying the consistency hypothesis by a solitary counterexample. But, as any dialectician soon finds out, a simple falsification of the consistency hypothesis which would satisfy the opposition is not so easily achieved, as each alleged contradiction can be avoided, though often none too convincingly when the wider theoretical framework is remembered, by theoretical shifts (coupled with conventionalist strategems). In this way too it quickly becomes apparent that the consistency hypothesis is a very highly theoretical claim. Characteristically dialecticians have appealed to paradoxes to establish the inconsistency thesis. Hegel was, it seems, convinced both by the Kantian antinomies and by Zeno's paradoxes of motion; Soviet philosophers are more impressed by Zeno's paradoxes and invest heavily in the contradictions they observe in motion (which generalise to development). None of these cases are however decisive, and even if the classicists do not have really convincing solutions, say to some of Zeno's paradoxes, they do have alternative classical resolutions which so far get by. Much more convincing examples may be drawn from the logical and semantical paradoxes (this is the basis of the argument in UL against CH), but dialecticians have not generally made much appeal to such examples. Our case however is based, in the first place, squarely upon the logical and semantical antinomies and their like (self-referential arguments, including those of the limitative theorems). The arguments for the Kantian antinomies are conspicuously fallacious, and Zeno's arguments generally fail to convince. The antinomies we depend on have a different character: the arguments are convincing and are not conspicuously fallacious, if falla-
62
7.7 THE ARGUMENT TO INCONSISTENCY FROM PARADOXES
cious at all. The treatment of these antinomies within the framework of classical logic leaves an enormous amount to be desired, philosophically, linguistically, and mathematically. The artificial hierarchies of languages or types that classical semanticists appeared forced into, to avoid the catastrophic effect of semantical antinomies in combination with classical logic, are frankly unbelievable.1 One basic problem is that classical logic has to exclude deductive reasoning within and surrounding the antinomies, though it undoubtedly occurs (cf. the Prior-Mackie exchange, especially the initial paper, Prior 61). What has seemed especially puzzling is that paradoxical situations seem to be perfectly possible, in the sense that they could quite easily occur, and perhaps sometimes do occur. And this would make T inconsistent - which is one reason why attempts to dispose of the antinomies have exercised philosophers and logicians so extensively. Consider, for example, the policeman-prisoner situation, where the prisoner states only that everything the policeman says is true while the policeman, whose statements are otherwise unquestionably true asserts that whatever the prisoner asserts is false. Nothing stops such a situation from occurring indeed it could be arranged in a real-life courtroom situation.2 But no catastrophical breakdown would occur: legal reasoning could go on as before. And in fact such a paradoxical situation could go unnoticed. Paradoxes just do not spread and affect everything else: paradoxical situations do not have the logical features that classical analyses ascribe to them. The case for dialectical logic and the inconsistency of the world is not confined to that based upon "paradoxes" of one sort or another, of logic and semantics, of mathematics and physics. There are inconsistent principles in many legal codes which are valid (even if they are not said to hold true), and within the shadows of which legal reasoning takes place. To put it bluntly and without the detailed argument really called for: the prevailing law is sometimes inconsistent, yet deductive reasoning, incorporating the principles of the law as postulates, continues both within and outside the courts without being trivialised. Legal logic would accordingly appear to be dialectical logic. The argument we have outlined (more detail appears in UL and DLS) does not pretend to be entirely conclusive against the opposition, though the case seems to us very damaging. The classicist will insist of any such theory which contains a contradiction that it is not true, that it is (if perchance absolutely consistent) a non-standard theory distinct from the actual one which must be consistent. Thus counterexamples lead to a stalemate: the consistency hypothesis is not straightforwardly falsifiable or, the relevance position tries to insist, falsifiable at all. A useful example of the theory-saving methods of the classicist in the face of apparent inconsistency in nature is provided by Rescher 73, who, confronted by the incompatible actual states assumed by the Everett-Wheeler 1
The manifold deficiencies of the hierarchial approaches are well enough known: they are brought together, e.g. in Routley 66. The hierarchical approaches are not of course completely unavoidable classically; for every consistent, classically-based set theory will, in principle, yield an analogous protothetic; but these will typically be even less satisfactory than the set theory from which they derive.
2
How it is described is another matter, of course.
63
1.7 REASONS FOR REJECTING CLASSICAL THEORY-SAVING STRATAGEMS
theory of wave packet reduction in quantum physics, casts around for a difference of respect between the incompatible states in order to save the law of non-contradiction, and "locates", i.e. postulates, such a suitable distinguishing respect in a further time dimension.1 Rescher's difference-of-respect procedure (a method that goes back to the Socratic dialogues) thus offers further confirmation for the popular claim that a logical or mathematical theory2 can always be saved - at varying costs - by making sufficient changes or complications in scientific theories, since logical principles rarely confront empirical data in isolation and generally only do so rather indirectly in combination with other theoretical assumptions (as pragmatists have long pointed out). But though a non-empirical principle, such as the consistency hypothesis, never directly encounters the hard empirical data and can always be saved in one way or another, with greater or less cost, by changes elsewhere, the costs may be too high, and it may be better to give up the principle. A convincingly microphysical theory based on dialectical logic might provide such a reason. For success with theories based on classical logic has always been at the finite macro-level (as Br^uwer would have said): there is, in principle at any rate, no reason why classical logic should not go the way of Euclidean geometry satisfactory locally in regions of consistency, but globally defective. It should now be obvious that such a change would be perfectly possible; and persuasive evidence supporting the call for a conceptual revolution in logic, which queries the consistency hypothesis, is fast accumulating. If the consistency hypothesis is not straightforwardly falsifiable, it is far less readily verifiable. There is no easy or obvious way of surveying or sampling the class of true theories, particularly those yet or never to be discovered. Moreover by virtue of a by-product of the logical paradoxes, the situation appears to look still blacker for the classical position. Consistency is a logical matter, and if it can be established it will presumably be by logical means. Suppose, with a view to proving consistency, that the theory of T is formalised as far as it can be classically, and suppose that the truths of T included provide the principles of Peano arithmetic: then, according to Godel, the consistency of T is not incontrovertibly provable classically except by means at least as demanding as the resources of T (nor can they exceed the resources of T without appealing to falsehoods?). As we have observed (in §6), the same problem arises each time a reformalisation is attempted 1
To what extent the Everett-Wheeler theory can be satisfactorily constructed on the basis of a dialectical logic is an interesting question that takes us beyond the scope of the present venture. The same goes for questions as to whether such discredited theories as the classical theory of infinitesimals can be "satisfactorily" reformulated in the framework of dialectical logic, and the connected question of the extent to which the admission of inconsistencies at the infinitesimal level would help to resolve Zeno's paradoxes. For each of these theories, each of which leads to at least isolated inconsistencies at micro-levels, would demand a substantial amount of technical development before a worthwhile discussion could get off the ground.
2
An analogous, equally unsatisfactory, method in legal theory is to insist that there is an implicit priority ranking on laws, which, should a contradiction become manifest, the courts will explicitly determine. But what such post-hoc determinations really indicate is that before the consistencizing step, legal reasoning had been operating with inconsistent premisses.
64
1.7 THE MODAL STATUS OF THE CONSISTENCY HYPOTHESIS
aimed at incorporating outstanding truths syntactically and thus approximating syntactically to T. In short, the classicist can never conclusively establish his position; for, any formal proof of his hypothesis will use means at least as powerful and accordingly as questionable as his claim. Although we can be sure that the world is locally consistent for some regions we work in, like locally Euclidean (more exactly, there are consistent subtheories, like pure quantification theory, that we commonly use),1 globally we can have no such confidence, thanks to the fine dose of scepticism Godel's classical results inject (cf. 1.6). Therefore the question of the consistency of the world cannot be conclusively resolved classically in favour of the classical position, which was one of the theses to be argued. This in turn suggests the uncharitable proposition that belief in the consistency of the world is a mere act of faith, a part, so to speak, of the classical religion. While the belief may be an act pf faith for many people, it doesn't have to be quite so obviously one; for, the consistency hypothesis may be represented as part of a correct scientific theory, and overarching principles of sufficiently comprehensive scientific theories are in somewhat the same kind of epistemological plight as the consistency hypothesis. There can be good evidence for such theories even when they cannot be conclusively verified. The uncharitable proposition then rests on a false dichotomy between conclusive resolution or else a mere act of faith. Even so the comparison of CH with an overarching scientific principle does not, as already observed, stand up to too much examination: rather the hypothesis functions classically as an unfalsifiable metaphysical hypothesis. This takes us straight into one remaining puzzle, namely the modal status of the consistency hypothesis: is it a contingent statement, or a purely logical one, or something else again? For example, what seems to us more likely, synthetic non-empirical? It certainly does not appear to be empirical in the way that the deeper assumptions of physics such as invariance principles are. The alternative, on the simplistic classification that positivism so obligingly imposes, seems even less satisfactory, namely that the hypothesis is logical, and so if true analytic and if false logically false. The alternative does however have the virtue of grouping the consistency hypothesis with a range of other principles which raise similar epistemological problems, in particular the axiom of choice and axioms of infinity. The consensus that seems to have been reached regarding these principles is that we reason as far as possible without them, note carefully where they are used, try to establish whether or not they are essential where they are used, mark out those cases where they are essential, and so on. And the consensus view reflects a rational course of action, namely to minimize questionable logical assumptions. The same method would incline one to the relevance position to eschew the consistency hypothesis and to work, where consistency cannot be established, i.e. in most classical places, with a relevant logic or, at worst (as in 3.3), with some restriction of CH as a further explicit assumption - since this seems the rational course of action. But there are further factors that are not to be forgotten, in particular that, in contrast to the axiom of choice, there is a substantial dialectical case against CH. In fact 1
The official Soviet view is not dissimiliar; e.g., classical logic does apply in the case of simple, relatively stable objects and relations: see the discussion of Kedrov's position in Kline 53 p.84, and compare and contrast the intuitionist position on the areas where classical logic is correct and may be safely applied.
65
7.7 COROLLARIES
OF REJECTION
OF THE CLASSICAL
FAITH
the comparison of CH with the axiom of choice is in some ways misleading, and a better comparison is that (emerging from Rescher 73) with the principle of the uniformity of nature or that, hinted at above, with the assumption of the existence of God. Admittedly there are differences between these cases but the similarities are striking. In each case the assumption underpins the application of an extensive theory, classical logic, theories of induction and religions respectively; in each case the assumption is not, in its standard senses at least, an analytic one1, and would fail in its intended role if it were; in each case, however, it is extremely doubtful that the assumption is an empirical one - the assumptions being impervious to falsifying empirical evidence - yet in each case these are considerations, metaphysical arguments for instance, which incline many people to conclude that they are false; and yet in each case the assumptions can be maintained, despite all counter-considerations, and they can be bolstered or supported by a variety of expedients, by faith, by metaphysical arguments (invariably of a questionbegging cast), by the purchase of Kantian glasses (the wearing of which makes the assumptions part of one's perceptual scheme), or by other familiar political means, e.g. exhortation, persuasion, propaganda, repression, force, and so on. But we don't have the classical faith, we are not persuaded by the questionbegging classical arguments for CH, we don't wear Kantian glasses and, in any case consider the whole Kantian business fraudulent, especially as false assumptions can be enforced in this fashion, and we hope we can avoid classical thuggery, for lesser political means are not going to move us. The viability of dialectical logic has more corollaries than just the unseating of the consistency dogma, and curbing of classical logical imperialism. Several other classical projects and accounts are also upset. Firstly, for example, the classical idea, deriving from Hilbert, of absolute, i.e. nonrelative, simple consistency proofs by way of a modelling in the world has to be adjusted. Non-triviality may be so established, but to establish negation consistency it has also to be shown that a consistent subsituation of the world is selected. (Alternatively such proofs could be reconstrued as relative consistency proofs, showing simple consistency relative to T, for what that is worth.) Secondly, the familiar account of rationality which makes simple consistency a necessary condition of rationality in beliefs, theories, or actions has to be discarded. There is nothing in principle to prevent a dialectician's beliefs from being perfectly rational and reasoned, and a dialectical theory may be completely logical. The two issues, of rational inconsistent theories and rationally-held inconsistent beliefs are of course intricately connected: 2 for (so Routley 75 argues) an animal's beliefs constitute its theory as to how things are, i.e. as to part of T. The "framework of rational inquiry" thus extends beyond the consistent to dialectical theories and practices. Consistency imposes no Kantian (or Strawsonian) bound on rational inquiries. The same holds for intelligibility: intelligibility likewise is not bounded by consistency (see further 5.6). The rational intelligent person is not one who adheres to the consistency hypothesis but one who allows for the possibility at least that the world, though hopefully rational and intelligible 1
Forcing CH to be analytic takes us around the meaning-of-negation circuit that we shall go around in 2.8 and 6.5. Briefly, however, natural language negation is not so restricted in sense as to render CH analytic, and does not conform to classical exclusion principles.
66
1.7 THE PARACONSISTENT REQUIREMENT ON AN AVEQUATE THEORY Of ENTAILMENT
but possibly neither, is inconsistent, and who realises that inconsistency implies neither irrationality nor unintelligibility nor total disorganisation. To cope with the wide range of dialectical reasoning, both everyday and technical, an adequate theory of entailment, and likewise an adequate theory of conditionality, should be paraconsistent. Let us call this the paraconsistency requirement. It is a corollary that adequate theories cannot be simply extensions of classical logic, e.g. modal logics; and it will emerge that the requirement wipes out various apparent alternatives to relevant logics, e.g. certain conceptivist and non-transitivist positions. Since classical and modal logics are rejected as inadequate, the question is: what are the new logics of entailment and conditionality to be like?
67
2.0 TAKING THE ROAV TO SIMPLE DEDUCIBILITY ANV TO FIRST DEGREE ENTAILMENT
CHAPTER 2. DERIVABILITY> DEDUCIBILITY, AND TEE CORE OF ENTAILMENT. In this chapter we begin logically at the beginning, with the notion of deducibility in the absence of any sentential connectives, and then gradually add on connectives and complicate the class of formulae admitted until we arrive at the theory of simple deducibility (tautological entailment) and (early in chapter 3) at the first degree theory of entailment. We hope that in this way the reader will be led, ineluctably, to the first degree theory of entailment, the common core of all the good entailment logics studied in later chapters. The first degree is remarkably stable; it is the same for a surprising span of systems, and it leaves, so we shall argue, but little room for choice of rival candidates. That it to say, while there is, as we shall see in detail in chapter 3, a great deal- of room for debate as to the specific postulates of the higher degree of entailment, there is no such room for debate, in our opinion, at the first degree. We will nonetheless take time off to display some of the rival lower degree systems, to present semantics for them and to aid their case or, occasionally, to pour scorn on them. The chapter puts together in a self-contained and very elementary way results about deducibility and entailment many of which are known to the cognoscenti but which are not readily accessible or assembled elsewhere. §2. Semantical analysis of the deducibility relation j-f. In the absence of connectives there is a remarkably simple account of deducibility that wins almost universal acceptance among competing theories of implication: it is in fact precisely the classical theory of deducibility, which goes wrong only in its analysis of connectives and in its misguided attempt to reduce logical truth to deducibility (from null premisses). In order to facilitate comparison with the classical theory of deducibility, and for simplicity, we concentrate upon the case where the deducibility relation [•} is singular on the right. That is we, we consider primarily the form A 14^®, where A is a non-null sequence of wff of the logic L and B is a wff of L.
ff^ is
the deducibility relation with respect to logic L. For the most part the background logic L will be taken for granted, and ' |4j/ written simply ' [4 '. 'A (4 B' reads 'B is deducible from sequence (subsequently, set of wff) A' or 'A entails B'. Where A is a finite sequence, (A^,...,An) say, A f| B is equated with A^,...,An |4 B, and this sequence is read 'A^ and ... and A q entail Bf (cf. Smiley 59, p.235). So long as A is non-null the account of relevant deducibility - in the absence of specific sentential connectives - need not diverge at all from the classical (modal) account (see LC). That is, A |4 B is true in model M = <..., K,...,I>1 with K a set of worlds or situations and I a two-valued interpretation on K, iff whenever I(A,a) = 1 for every wff A in A then I(B,a) = 1 for every a in K. Then A |4 B iff A (4 B is true in every model. Thus the relevant account is exactly the classical account. 1
Allowance is made for additional items to go in M.
69
2.1 LOGICAL TRUTH DISTINGUISHED, AND THE PROPERTIES OF VEVUCIBIL1TY
It is evident that [4 can easily be extended to handle multiple expressions on the right - and we shall take advantage on occasions of the symmetrical form A |4 T. Then A ff T is true in M iff whenever I(A,a) = 1 for every wff A in A then I(B,a) = 1 for some wff B in F, for every a e K. Furthermore the definition is easily recast in terms of satisfaction upon using the following interconnection: an assignment of values at worlds satisfies A at world a iff it assigns value 1 to A at a. Then, as classically, A^,..., A^ |f B iff every assignment of values at each world a which satisfies each of A,,...,A at a also satisfies B at a. 1 n Where A is however null, the account begins to diverge from the classical account. Classically |4 B, i.e. B is a logical truth or logically valid, is equated with A f f B, i.e. B is true at every world in every model. But this account leads either to paradox or error according as the class of worlds considered is restricted to the logically regular ones (i.e. to "possible worlds" in one sense) or not. If not logical truths may fail to get verified, whence error ensues. A superior approach is to equate ff B with t ff B, where t is the truth constant, already mentioned, which satisfies the following interpretation rule: I(t,a) = 1 iff a is regular. And this approach, which will be exploited later, then reveals that t is avoidable. ff B is true in M - with M now of the form <•..0,K,...I>, where the set of regular worlds 0 is a subset of K - iff I(B,a) = 1 for every a e 0. A separate definition, in place of the classical reduction of ff B to A [4 B, is enough, then, to avoid paradoxes of deducibility such as that anything entails a logical truth.1 Finally, f f B iff f | B is true in every model. Several properties of the relevant deducibility relation are now derivable from the semantical account quite independently of whether any particular connectives occur or not (Smiley's list of properties, 59, p.236, is varied): Order properties: Reflexivity:
A |-f A
Transitivity:
If A |4 B and B, T ff C then A , T f4 C.
Substitutivity:
If A f f B and B f-f A then when A, A |-f C also B, A |-f C.
The property of substitutivity is derivable from transitivity. The order properties of |-f are really those of a partial order, since when both A |4 B and B |4 A, A and B are deductively identical. Hence too the more explicit formalisation of deducibility in algebra using the partial order < in place of |4But the cost of the explicitness is that a theory of identity is thereby presupposed. Set properties: Permutation:
If A , A, B, T |4 C then A, B, A, T ff C.
Repetition Omission:
If A, A, A f f B then A, A |4 B
Repetition Introduction: If A, A ff B then A, A, A f f B
1
And the simple avoidance of these paradoxes is of course highly desirable. The whole issue is taken up again in chapter 12 with the further discussion of the consequence relation - a basic relation for the algebras of logics.
7Q
2.1 AUGMENTATION v-6 SUPPRESSION;
ANV THE REPUDIATION OF SUPPRESSION
Premiss addition and deletion properties: Augmentation: Modus Ponens:
Iff A |j- B then C, A |j- B.1 If If- B and B ||- C then |f- C.
The latter property is the relevant cut-down of the usual classical property of suppression of logical truths. Thus although Augmentation or the addition of irrelevant premisses is validated, its classical mate, the suppression of logically true premisses, is not. That is, the following ridiculous classical property gets repudiated:(Positive) Suppression:
If |f- B and B, A |J- C then A |}- C.
For even if, in a given model, B holds in all regular worlds, still in other worlds C may only be deducible from A given B, i.e. B is essential even though logically true. In multiple formulation Positive Suppression, expressed more generally as: If if- B and B, A If- V then A if- T, is matched by its dual Negative Suppression: If C If- and A |f- T, C then A \\- T, where C |f- if C is a logical falsehood, i.e. C fails to hold at every regular world (i.e. classically ~C is logically true, i.e. holds at every regular world). The rejection of Suppression marks out clearly which of the two evident main classes of routes has been taken in avoiding a classical deducibility paradox, with an arbitrary B entailing a logical truth A, derived as follows (cf. Smiley again 59, p.246):A |J- A A, B If- A B ||- A
Identity Augmentation (and Permutation) Suppression
The mechanism of the negative paradox is exactly parallel but requires multiple formulation for its expression: D |f- D D ||- B, D D If- B
Identity Augmentation Negative Suppression,
where D is a logical falsehood. The other main option to the rejection of Suppression, within the framework of the deducibility theory offered, is the connexivist position (criticised in §4 and discussed again in §7), that of abandoning Augmentation. However the route of rejecting Suppression is far from uniquely determined: it does not, for example, distinguish a relevant logic approach from a Parry analytic containment approach. The differentiation of these approaches will turn on the semantical rules given for specific connectives, especially &, v and There remains a variant way of blocking the deducibility paradoxes which lies outside the framework of the classical theory since it involves changing the semantics for If- , the method of rejecting not merely Suppression but more generally Transitivity (of which Suppression can be seen as a degenerate case). This is one of the important preliminaries to investigate before semantical rules for specific connectives are introduced. The other, to which we turn first, is the matter of the axiomatic characterisation of the semantic relation of deducibility. We consider these in turn:*In the computing science literature this principle is called Monotonicity. While deducibility is certainly monotonic, there are inferential relations (e.g. those of inductive, analogic and probable reasoning) which are not, where inferences may break down when further premisses are added (e.g. because initial premisses are undermined). Such is the proper basis for nonmonotonic logics, which include connexive and various conditional logics.
71
2.2 AXIOMATISATION OF THE DEDUCIBILITY RELATION
§2. The axiomatisation of the relation \\- by a derivability relation [- , and the objection from Non-transitivism. Let L be a formal logic with denumerably many wff A, B, C Let A, T etc. be non-null sets of wff of L: in short the set properties of the intended relation will be built into the initial formulation. But a Gentzen-style formulation in which set properties required are explicitly listed could easily be designed. Each set A is countable. The sole formation rule of logic ML based on L and with the vocabulary cited, together with the symbol is: Where A is a wff and A a set of wff of L then I^A and A f^A are wff of ML. Much as before the subscript L is usually omitted, and where A = {B^,....B^}, A (- A is written B1,...,Bn f- A. A is derivable from A. Axiom scheme: Rules:
'A
A' is read:
The postulates of ML are as follows:
A {- A
From A (- B and B, T |- C derive A, T (- C (Transitivity, Cut). From A |- B and A £ T derive T |- B (Augmentation, Weakening). From
B and B (- C derive
C
(Modus Fonens).
Theoremhood of ML is defined in the usual sequential way. It is perhaps worth observing that f- A is a theorem of ML amounts to l-^. (fr A) and that ML L A B is a theorem of ML amounts to f ^ (A which corresponds to
More important, we do not need to see the formal structure in the object language-metalanguage way the system notation was chosen to suggest. Alternatively one might contend that one really has just one system ML with further unspecified formal objects (called obs) A, B, C, etc. and sets of these. Then the inner logic L drops out of the picture. (This type of approach, due to Curry 63, is adopted in the formalisation of distributive lattice logic below). Lemma 2.1 D € V iff T (- D. Proof. If D « r , then as Df-D, T, Df-D by augmentation, and so T |- D. For the converse it is shown by induction on proofs that if A [- D then D e A. Where the theorem is an axiom A = {D} so D e A. Moreover the rules that apply (Modus Ponens does not) preserve the property. That Augmentation does is immediate. For Cut, if A, T |- D then by one premiss D e T or D = B whence by the other premiss if D = B D e A. Hence D e A or D e T as required. Corollary ML is decidable. Proof. To decide whether T (- D is a theorem or not, enumerate T and begin checking through the sequences to determine in which D occurs. finitely many steps D will appear in one or other of T and T. Then r a theorem or not according as D occurs in F or in T.
_ T, and After [• D is
An ML model M, to be more explicit, is a structure & = <0,K,I> where K is a set of worlds, 0 is a subset of K, the regular worlds, and I is a bivalent interpretation function which assigns to each wff A at each world a in K just one of {1,0}, i.e. I(A,a) = 1 or = 0. A |- A is true in M iff whenever I(B,a) = 1 for B e A, I(A,a) = 1, for every a e K; and |-A iff I(A,a) = 1 for every a e 0. Finally, A f- A is valid iff A |- A is true in every model, and |- A is valid iff |- A is true in every model. Moreover, to connect with the semantical notions, A ff A iff A (- A is valid and ||A iff |-A is valid.
72
2.2 THE FIRST ADEQUACY THEOREM - FOR PURE VERJVABTLJTY AS IN ML
Adequacy Theorem 2.1. A |- A Is a theorem of ML Iff A |-f A, and |-A is a theorem iff |-f A. Proof. Soundness is established by induction over the length of proofs in ML. A f-A, the only axiom, is plainly valid, since if I(A,a) = 1 then I(A,a) 38 1 always; and direct verification shows that the rules preserve validity. Completeness is proved by the routine method of providing a canonical model. Let a theory c be any class of wff closed under (- , i.e. if A c c and A |- B then B e e . A theory c is normal iff whenever |-B, B e c. Define a canonical model M = <0 ,K ,I> as follows:~c c c K is the class of all theories; 0 is the class of all normal theories: and c ' c I(B,c) = 1 iff B e e for each wff B and each theory c. Suppose A is not derivable from A, i.e. A J-A. In order to show A is not deducible from A, i.e. ~(A |4 A), a simple Lindenbaum construction is first used. Let Aq,A^,...,An,... be an enumeration of the wff of L. Define a sequence of sets Aq, A^,...An,... inductively as follows:-
A^ ® A; if A |~Aq then
=
A u {A }, and otherwise A .. = A . Let a = u A . Then n n n+1 n n <w n (i) if D e a then A f- D, for each wff D. This is almost immediate from the construction of a;
it may be established by induction.
by the axiom scheme and augmentation. for D to belong to
If D e A^, then A f- D
Otherwise D = A^, for some i and in order
A |- D.
(ii) If a |- D then A |- D. (i) A |- D.
For if a |- D then by a lemma D e a, and so by
(iii): a is a theory. Let T be some subset of a and D some wff such that T |- D. D will be some element of the enumeration, say A^. It has to be shown that A
for then A^ e a as required.
Since T £ a and T |- A^, by augmentation,
a (- A^, for then A^ e a as required. Hence by (ii) A |- A.. Since A
A, by (i) A f a though A c a with a e K . As I (A,a) + 1 A |- A
is not true in M ;
~c
and so ~ ( A
14 A).
''
Suppose, for the other case, |-B is not a theorem. It suffices to find a normal theory a to which B does not belong. For then I(B,a) ^ 1, and so ~ |-| B. Let c be the class of all wff B such that |- B is a theorem. (in the degenerate case we are concerned with here c is null). Then c is a (degenerate) normal theory to which B does not belong. Corollary. ML is completely axiomatised by the sole axiom scheme and the rule Augmentation. For of the rules, only Augmentation is used in the completeness proof. In fact, in the narrow framework of ML, Modus Ponens is vacuous, and Cut is a derived rule, obtained thus:Given A |- B and B, T |- C, then by the first premiss B e A , i.e. {b} c_ A and so {B} u T c A u T , whence by Augmentation and the second premiss A, T |- C. Though there is very extensive agreement among the implicational camps as to the correctness - if classical incompleteness - of such a core theory of deducibility as ML captures, the agreement is not universal. For Augmentation is found objectionable by connexivists (for reasons we will outline first of all when conjunction Is introduced, since connexivist objections to Augmentation are put in terms of the conjunction of drone antecedents); and
73
2.2 THE ATTEMPT TO FAIL TRANSITIVITY OF ENTAILMENT
Transitivity is rejected under the von Wright-Geach method of diverting the paradoxes of implication. According to von Wright (57, p.181) A entails B, if and only if, by means of logic, it is possible to come to know the truth of A => B without coming to know the falsehood of A or the truth of B. The account1 was taken by its exponents to rule out transitivity of entailment; for example,to admit the premisses A & B -»• A, A & (~A v B) •*• B, etc., of the classic Lewis paradox argument but to reject the conclusion A & ~A -»• B. But critics were to point out both the many alternative construals of coming to know, in particular how one might come to know A & ~A B by the paradox argument using transitivity of implication, and also that both informal and technical accounts by von Wright and Geach were defective and failed to block not merely the Lewis paradox arguments but other equally damaging paradoxes (see ABE, p.215ff., Strawson 58, Bennett 59 and especially Lewy 76, pp.141-8). There are, then, formal explications of the von Wright-Geach account (none of them bearing a very good resemblance to the original, since epistemological features drop out) some of which defectively bring out transitivity and others of which fail transitivity.2 The account does not settle the issue of transitivity, then, and in a good sense the question of the correctness of transitivity is something to be settled prior to such an account - as condition of adequacy on a notion of entailment, as distinct from other notions such as obvious entailment, immediate inference, etc., 1
The account has antecedents in Russell, Johnson and Broad (as Lewy 76 observes in the two latter cases). What Johnson has to say on the paradoxes of implication is especially relevant to our subsequent criticism of Lewy, that Lewy has illegitimately converted what is satisfactory as ? necessary condition into a sufficient condition. According to Johnson (21, p.47): I believe that they [the paradoxes of implication] can all be resolved by the consideration that we cannot without qualification apply a composite and (in particular) an implicative proposition to the further process of inference. Such application is possible only when the composite has been reached irrespectively of an assertion of the truth or falsity of its components. In other words, it is a necessary condition for further inference that the components should really have been entertained hypothetically when asserting that composite.
Although Johnson is right about the necessary condition, the condition does not on its own provide, or effectively delineate, a resolution of the paradoxes: for example, it leaves the choice of ways of defeating the negative Lewis paradox almost entirely open. 2
There are serious formal difficulties in the main accounts so far presented. For example, that of Geach 74, an adaption of Smiley 59, depends on the decidability of the underlying classical logic on which the account is parasitic, and so will fail to extend from sentential logic even to quantificational logic. For other defects in Geach's theory see Dale 73 and Kielkopf 75a (the latter shows that the theory violates the paraconsistency requirement), Kielkopf 77, Briskman 75 (which shows that Geach is committed to Lewis-style paradoxes), and Iseminger 78.
74
1.1 THE OVERWHELMING CASE FOR TRANSITIVITY OF ENTAILMENT
It is evident that there are non-transitive restrictions of entailment, such as obvious entailment, and also that given such non-transitive notions a transitive notion can be obtained by taking the transizive closure. That is, let B- be some immediate deducibility-type relation which however is not transitive; then a transitive deducibility relation ff can be formed as the ancestral of B- . But it is this closure relation, not the immediate relation, which is what is ordinarily understood by deducibility, and it is the closure relation that we are interested in explicating. Moreover without the ordinary closure relation ('ultimate deducibility1 as Parry 76 calls it), much of the power of deducibility, and of the point of logic in applications, is lost. As Smiley (59, p.242) put it, in an emphatic statement: .... the whole point of logic as an instrument, and the way in which it brings us new knowledge, lies in the contrast between the transitivity of 'entails' and the non-transitivity of 'obviously entails' and all this is lost if transitivity cannot be relied on. To put the central point in terms of 'proof' or 'valid argument': a very conspicuous feature of proof is that a proof may extend over a substantial sequence of steps. Proof is characteristically carried by an implication or analogous (derivability) relation. Without the transitivity of this relation central, and immensely important, features of proof and deductive argument would be lost. The overwhelming case for the transitivity of entailment derives, then, both from the sense of 'entails' and from the properties of the cluster of notions analytically tied to entailment. By entailment is meant the converse of deducibility: since deducibility is transitive, so is entailment (for when R is transitive so is RC). One argument for the transitivity of deducibility is as follows: B is deducible from A iff there is, in virtue of the meaning of deducibility, a (valid) deductive argument from A to B, i.e. a sequence of elements beginning with A and ending with B each element of which is validly obtained from predecessors; in short there is a valid proof sequence beginning with A and ending with B. But such a notion of deductive argument or proof is automatically transitive: for if there is an appropriate sequence beginning with A and ending with B and another beginning with B and ending with C then there is of course one beginning with A and ending with C. The analysis of deducibility in terms of logical consequence yields the same result; then B is deducible from A iff B logically follows from A, i.e. iff, syntactically, there is a valid derivation of B from A, and iff, semantically, B holds in every deductive situation in which A holds. Both syntactical and semantical analyses ensure transitivity (as has been shown by way of ML). The same applies to every analysis of entailment based on inclusion; e.g. A entails B iff the logical content of B is included in that of A, i.e. c(B) _£ c(A). But inclusion is transitive; hence entailment is also. Given that logically necessary conditionals are entailments, the arguments for transitivity vindicate Conjunctive Syllogism, (A B) & (B C) -»•. A -*• C: they do not vindicate, however, the exported forms of this principle which feature prominently in the system E of "entailment". Arguments along similar lines, that is arguments from the sense and analytic connections of entailment, may be likewise used to vindicate other entailment principles, e.g. Identity and Modus Ponens. Analyses of entailment through inclusion, for instance, at once yield Identity.1 This is not to say that there are not relations closely related to entailfootnote continued on next page)
75
2.2 "THE CAMBRIDGE CASE AGAINST UNRESTRICTED TRANSITIVITY "
Marshalling these points in favour of transitivity serves to emphasize that no explication of entailment that rejects transitivity - in the form: if A B and B ->• C then A C, as a matter of logical necessity - can be adequate to capture the preanalytic notion. Transitivity is, in short, a requirement of adequacy on analyses of entailment. There is no sense of entailment - as distinct from restrictions of entailment, and as distinct from conditionality - in which entailment is not transitive, and accordingly there is no resolution of paradoxes of entailment by replacement of entailment by some non-transitive relation. As it has been supposed that there is, especially by recent Cambridge logicians, it is perhaps worth glancing at the source of this illusion: ... it is this. We want our knowledge that A entails B not to rely on any antecedent knowledge of the propositions involved. The relation between A and B we think we have in mind when we say that A entails B must not be based on the modal value of A or that of B. ... But what the paradoxes show is that entailment which tries to capture this idea, if it is really to work, will lack unrestricted transitivity (Lewy 76, pp. 124-5; cf. also p.128 bottom). The premisses have been granted (in the fallacy of modal dependence, 1.5); but Lewy's conclusion should be resisted: The paradoxes do not show any such thing (unless 'really to work' is seriously overworked). Every analysis of entailment which is paradox-free in a sense avoids the modal dependence fallacy; in particular relevant analyses do. So transitivity need not be sacrificed. There are two reasons why Lewy supposes that such an entailment relation 'must involve a restriction on transitivity'. The first is that all the other moves in the proofs we have discussed, or at least all the other moves in Lewis's first proof, are entirely valid (76, p.130). This is a large claim, which happens to be false (see especially 2.9). The second reason is that Lewy is thinking of proposals like those of von Wright, Geach and Smiley which do not merely offer avoidance of modal dependence as a necessary condition for entailment, but present it as a necessary and sufficient condition. Thus Lewy goes on at once to say (p.125) that Smiley's criterion attempts - unsuccessfully it soon turns out (p.130) - to formalise 'the basic idea' he is talking about. Smiley's proposal (in 59, to which Smiley is not committed) does restrict transitivity. It is as follows, where represents entailment in the sense of Smiley: A^,...An H" g® i^f A^ & ... & A^ z> B is a substitution instance of a classical tautology A^' & ... & A r ' => B' such that neither B' nor ~(A ' & ... & A ') is a classical tautology. (A definition 1 n which goes beyond the confines of sentential logic results upon replacing (footnote
1
continued from previous page)
ment which fail Identity. Non-reflexive (or non-stuttering) entailment, defined through entailment and non-equivalence (as A + B & ~(A B)), and corresponding to proper inclusion, fails Identity. It has turned out that there is a real point in studying implicational-type relations which fail Identity (always), namely in solving technical problems such as the P - W problem (see Martin and Meyer 80), and also in the analysis of progressive reasoning (cf. 11.2).
76
2.2 SOME TROUBLES WITH SMILEY "ENTAILMENT"
classical tautologousness by logical necessity, as Lewy observes.) The Smiley proposal, while (like Lewy's premisses) unexceptional as a necessary condition on entailment, is quite unacceptable as a sufficient condition. But when only its acceptable, necessary half is taken, transitivity can be retained. The argument for these claims is, in outline, as follows:Firstly, where A -»• B is a first degree entailment (cf. system FD belov^ then A HgB. (For proof details, cf. ABE, p.219.) This shows that Smiley entailment , [f „, taken as a necessary condition, is unexceptional from a relevant viewpoint and need lead to no violation of transitivity. Taken as a sufficient, as well as necessary, condition for entailment, however, Smiley entailment underwrites many defective principles: where A and B are contingent, Disjunctive Syllogism is readily established for such an "entailment"; though A & ~A B is out, (A & ~A) v (A & B) -*• B is not; and though A -*- B v ~B is put, A -»•. A & (B v ~B) is not, yet surely the latter is just as paradoxical, and generally undesirable, as the positive paradox. Classical logic is no base from which to start in the quest for a satisfactory account of entailment; and patch-ups like Smiley entailment, which work at best for first degree entailments (where entailment is the main connective, and so never iterated), and which treat only the most obvious symptoms of the paradoxes, retain too much that is classical - thus many of the implicational counterexamples of 1.2 ff. apply against Smiley entailment - and diverge from the classical only at the wrong places, on matters such as transitivity which entailment itself must satisfy. These points provide evidence that Smiley entailment does not capture an intuitive notion of implication. And later (p.137) Lewy 'submits that the criterion "captures" no intuitive concept', though his evidence is hardly 1 impressive. Lewy contends that the considerations that there is something very compelling about Smiley's criterion and that yet there seems to be no intuitive concept which the criterion captures - lend additional weight to [the] claim that the intuitive concept of entailment is inconsistent (p.137). This is all decidedly dubious. Given a little reflection Smiley's criterion is (as we have tried to show) not at all compelling; and it is just false that 'we all have the feeling that it does "capture" some intuitive concept'. Many relevant logicians do not have this feeling (cf. ABE, p.215 ff.). What the criterion does is to approximate, as a necessary condition, to a condition that is intuitively appealing, namely the avoidance of modal dependence fallacies. There would have to be something especially compelling and satisfactory about Smiley's criterion as a sufficient condition for entailment for additional weight to be lent in this way to Lewy's inconsistency thesis; for only in this way would Smiley's criterion support the intuition that entailment is not transitive, in contradiction to the intuition, for which there is good evidential support, that entailment is transitive. *The fact that it does not answer to one intuitive notion that has been suggested, namely obvious entailment, is hardly evidence for the general claim. Lewy's very nice demolition of the suggestion (made, e.g., by Bennett 69) that Smiley entailment reconstructs the idea of obvious entailment is however worth drawing attention to: it is in 76, p.136.
77
2,2 "THE INTUITIVE CONCEPT OF ENTAILMENT IS NOT CONSISTENT"
In Slim, Levy's "additional" case for the inconsistency of the intuitive concept of entailment does not stand up to examination. One of his main arguments for inconsistency hardly differs, and accordingly fares no better: it is (76, p.133): ... consider the following three propositions (1) S-necessitation [i.e. Smiley entailment] is a sufficient condition for "A entails B"; (2) Entailment is not unrestrictedly transitive; (3) It is not the case that (A & ~A) entails B. This triad is patently inconsistent; yet we feel a strong inclination to accept all the three propositions. ... each proposition brings out an intuition we have in the area, but these intuitions are inconsistent. We feel no inclination at all to accept (1); nor could Lewy's argument for (1) persuade us otherwise, unless we granted him - what is fallacious - the conversion of an A-proposition. Furthermore (1) has considerably less claim than (2) and (3) to be intuitively based; indeed we suspect that for very many philosophers (1) is not intuitively assessable at all, in view of the character of Smiley entailment and the way all substitution-instances of complex entailments have to be grasped in assessing (1). Thus (1) does not bring out an intuition most of us have concerning entailment: if, however, 'sufficient' in (1) were replaced by 'necessary' it would yield a proposition that many of us would be lead, by a proof, to accept. (The rest of Lewy's case for his thesis that 'our intuitive, that is pre-formal, concept of entailment is inconsistent' will be examined in 2.9.) §3. Adding conjunction: semi-lattice logic and holim. Fundamental though a derivability relation is, its separate logic is hardly exciting. To obtain more interesting logics where distinctive theses really occur and where rules like Transitivity actually do some work, some operations subject to axiomatic constraints will have to figure in L. In the absence of specific connectives in the sentential case for instance, the powerful deducibility machine merely idles. We begin adding, one at a time, extensional connectives to ML. In the case of logics which lack the undesirable portation principles (which combine importation and exportation), namely in implicational form A
(B -*• C)
iff
A & B -f C
(Portation),
there is definitely - for reasons that will slowly emerge - a preferred order in which standard extensional connectives can be added to the basic theory of implication or deducibility: namely conjunction comes first, disjunction second and negation last. This order also coincides, to a fair extent, with the way in which rival accounts of implication and entailment diverge from one another. Thus there is substantial agreement about the logical behaviour of conjunction within the restricted (lower degree) framework at which we are isolating issues; there is less agreement over disjunction principles, and less agreement still over negation, and moreover some of the disagreement over disjunction principles can be put down to disagreement over negation principles. Indeed negation is the watershed connective.
78
2.3 SEMI-LATTICE LOGIC AMP ITS SEMANTICAL ANALYSIS
Semi-Lattice Logic (SLL) adds to ML the following postulates for the conjunction operation: Axiom schemes:
A & 6 |- A
A & B |- B
A, B (- A & B
(Simplification) (Adjunction)
Alternatively Adjunction may be replaced by the derived rule of &-Composition: r, A j- B, r, A h c-f r, A |- B & C, i.e. if r , A B and r , A |- C (are theses) then T, A |- B & C (is a thesis); otherwise read: from I", A |- B and T, A (- C to infer T, A |- B & C, etc. (The rendition of rules and the theory of inference rules will be issues taken up again later, in 4 and 15.) The rule of &-Composition follows from Adjunction as follows:1. Hence 2. 3.
T, A, B |- A & B
By Adjunction, Augmentation.
If T |- A then r , B |- A & B,
by Transitivity and 1.
If T |- A then T |- B then T |- A & B, by 2 and Transitivity.
Conversely Adjunction follows using &-Composition from Identity and Augmentation (see Tl, §5). The semantical analysis of SLL reveals very clearly the intended sense of the connective &. The analysis is obtained simply by adding to that for ML the normal conjunction rule: I(A & B,a) = 1 iff I(A,a) = 1
and I(B,a) = 1.
A rule stated in this form is intended to hold generally, i.e. for every situation a in K and all obs A and B. Truth, validity and so on are defined on the same plan as for ML. Adequacy Theorem for SLL 2.2. A |- A is a theorem of SLL iff A H A, i.e. iff A |- A is SLL valid. Proof builds on the analogous result for ML. Thus soundness is simply a matter of verification of the new postulates, which is done by applying the &-rule. Suppose, for Simplification, that for a in I(A & B,a) = 1. Then, by the &-rule, I(A,a) = 1 and I(B,a) = 1. Hence both A & B |- A and A & B |- B are SLL valid. Suppose, for Adjunction, that I(A,a) = 1 and I(B,a) = 1, for a e K; then I(A & B,a) = 1, validating A, B |- A & B. For completeness it is enough to show (given adequacy of ML) that for a e K c , I(A & B,a) = 1 iff A & B e a. And this is shown as follows:I(A & B,a) = 1 iff I(A,a) = 1 = I(B,a), by the &-rule iff A e a and B e a, by induction hypothesis iff A & B e a, as the following arguments show:Suppose A e a and B e a. Then as {A, B} c a and A, B |- A & B, by closure A & B e a. Suppose A & B e a. Then as Ta & B} £ a and A & B J- B, by closure of a, A e a and B e a. Completeness proofs for more comprehensive systems containing conjunction (e.g. the systems of chapter 3) require that the theories used be closed under adjunction as well as |- , i.e. that whenever A e a and B e a then A & B e a. This requirement is satisfied by the theories of SLL, but in general closure under entailment (i.e. -*•) does not ensure closure under adjunction. The semantical analysis opens the way for various arguments for the conjunction postulates of SLL, all of them aimed at vindicating the normal
79
2.3 ARGUMENTS FOR ANV AGAINST THE NORMAL CONJUNCTION «/LE
conjunction rule for all logical situations. Most of these arguments begin from the assumption, usually enforced as analytic, that logically to say that A & B holds in a situation just is to say, or means the same as, that A holds and B holds.1 (Such an argument is developed in Routley2 75.) Alternatively the conjunction postulates of SLL may be argued for on the basis of intended interpretations of entailment. Take the logical sufficiency interpretation for example: as A is sufficient for A (i.e. A -*• A) , A and anything else B must also be sufficient for A (i.e. A & B •*• A), for the addition of further information in the shape of B cannot undermine A's sufficiency. (This assumes that the addition of B does not interfere with A and undercut its sufficiency, an assumption - written into the ordinary use of 'and' - that the smart connexivist will dispute.) Similarly when A is sufficient for B and also sufficient for C then it is surely sufficient for both B and C, i.e. for B & C. In an analogous way inclusion interpretations can be used to argue for the conjunction postulates; for example, as the logical content of B is part of the logical content of A & B, A & B + B . Such interpretations also underwrite such characteristic conjunction principles as Commutation (A & B •*• B & A) and Associativity (e.g. A & (B & C) (A & B) & C). But none of these arguments is without assumptions, and accordingly none is completely conclusive. Like everything else, each of the conjunction postulates can be disputed.2 Before entering the dispute, let us record agreements and disagreements between the implication camps over the very ordinary and basic conjunction postulates of SLL. They are accepted by classical, intuitionist, relevant, orthological, non-transitivist and conceptivist positions. The axioms are however rejected by connexivism, for much the same reason that the principle of augmentation of premisses gets rejected, for example that a consequent only follows from antecedents if the joint force of the. antecedents is used, or if there is some cogent way of using all the premisses, certainly not if an added premiss is irrelevant to the derivation of a conclusion, or if an added antecedent somehow undermines the initial antecedent. Tiius connexivism rejects both forms of Simp but retains Adjunction. Connexivism is not alone in the rejection of normal conjunction postulates: Adjunction has also been questioned, but on quite different grounds, by non-adjunctivists. Consider some of reasons that have been given for rejecting Adjunction: there are at least two of importance. Firstly counterexamples to Commutation are easily devised, and these reflect back, not on Simplification, but on Adjunction, which yields A, B ]- B & A. The counterexamples derive from cases where 'and' clearly functions as 'and then', e.g. "he pulled out to pass and he hit an oncoming car", which does not imply "he hit an oncoming car and [then] he pulled out to pass" in the temporal sense of 'and', though it does imply both "he pulled out to pass" and also "he hit on oncoming car". And this already begins to reveal that the temporal conjunction determinable 'and then1, 1
As the English 'and' used in the explanation is supposed to conform to analogues of the semi-lattice postulates, there is an element of circularity in the semantical rule. It is this, undamaging circularity, that makes the analytic entrenchment possible.
2
Just as anything can be believed or disbelieved, so anything, including the correct laws of logic, can be disputed. An argument for this, premissed on relevant logic, is given in Routley2 75; and see further EMJB. Nonadjunctive systems are investigated in chapter 13, when "conjunction" rules are varied.
80
2.3 REASONS THAT ARE GIVEN TOR REJECTING ADJUNCTION
which certainly occurs in English, is a restriction (and/then, so to speak) of the more general, and logically important, commutative conjunction. Thus temporal conjunction is a notion that can be captured later, in the stage of logical analysis when temporal operations and tensing are taken account of (e.g. in 8.1). But the initial, and characteristically logical, objective concerns the logical behaviour of conjunction unrestricted by temporal ordering requirements. A second reason of importance for rejecting Adjunction also succeeds in bringing out significant features of the normal logical conjunction which are commonly overlooked. According to holism, which does not dispute Commutation, the whole is sometimes more than the mere sum or assemblage of the parts: applied to conjunction the message is that A & B may say more than A says and B says, that, more precisely, the logical content of A & B may exceed the logical content of A together with that of B, i.e. in symbols c(A & B) £ c(A)u c(B). The systemic whole may exceed the sum of the parts of a system because, so it is said, of the interrelations of parts that emerge on assemblage and hence because of emergent properties of the system. Whether this is so or not (it depends on how the whole and parts are characterised and whether systemic relations are appropriately incorporated in the characterisation of parts), it is a little fanciful to link conjunctions of s