Renewing Meaning: A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach

Renewing Meaning

This page intentionally left blank

Renewing Meaning A Speech-Act Theoretic Approach

STEPHEN J. BARKER

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Stephen J. Barker 2004 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-926366-3 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

To My Parents

This page intentionally left blank

PREFACE Frege created a paradigm that is centrally important to how meaning was understood in the twentieth century. It includes the now familiar distinctions of sense and force, of sense and reference, of concept and object, the conception of sentence-meaning as residing in truth-conditions, and the view that semantics is a normative enterprise distinct from psychology. Most importantly, it proposes that the syntactic and semantic forms of modern logic, quantification theory, underpin the meanings of natural-language sentences. Frege's paradigm might seem to be a permanent fixture in semantic theory. Nevertheless, in this book, I undertake to overthrow it. I offer an alternative that rejects the sense/ force distinction, truth-conditional semantics, anti-psychologism, and, most importantly, the idea that quantification theory has anything to do with the structure of reference and generality in natural languages. The framework I describe is a speech-act-based approach to meaning in which semantics is entirely subsumed by pragmatics. I call this framework the speech-act theoretic approach, or STA. In STA, meaning resides in syntax and pragmatics; the familiar creatures of semantics, such as propositions or truth-conditions, have no role to play in semantic theory. STA conceives of sentence-meanings not as propositions but as speech-act types. It conceives of word-meanings not as objects, functions, or properties, but again as speech-act types. Pragmatic phenomena one would expect not to figure in semantics, such as pretence, enter into the logical form of sentences. STA offers a compositional semantics by showing how speech-act types combine together to form complex speech-act types. Moreover, the syntactic structures that STA invokes are not those of quantifiers, open sentences, variables, variablebinding, and so on. Rather they are structures specific to speech-act forms. This new kind of syntax explains why surface grammar has the form it does, and views logical form as closely aligned with it—an explanatory virtue lacking in standard treatments. Isn't a speech-act approach doomed to circularity? It appeals to speech acts. These are underpinned by intentions, and intentions have contents, which in turn must be explained by semantics. My reply to this charge is that intentions have contents, but they are of a different and more primitive kind than the contents of thoughts. The relation of intention to fully-fledged thought is that intentional states provide the simple, representational foundation for a superstructure of speech acts and modes—a superstructure that far outruns the expressive power of that foundation. In STA, semantics is a branch of psychology: psychology and semantics cannot be prized apart. How do we account for the

viii

PREFACE

normative aspect of meaning? STA proposes an expressivist reduction of the normative. The word is prior to norms; norms are not prior to words. In outline then, according to this book, a natural language—a system of thought—is an emergent entity that arises from the combination of simple intentional structures, articulated symbolic media, and certain non-representational cognitive states. It is embedded in, and part of, a world devoid of normative facts qua extra-linguistic entities. The system's structures have little in common with those found in formal languages based on Frege's paradigm. Finally, the world, in which the system is embedded, is a totality of particular states of affairs. There is no logical complexity in re; the world contains mereological complexity only. Some of the core structural proposals for this book emerge from my Ph.D. thesis, submitted in 1995 at the University of Melbourne. But there have been many developments since then. I would like to thank the following people who have helped me in many and varied ways: John Bigelow, Thomas Bull, Phil Dowe, Maite Escurdia, Karen Green, Allen Hazen, Richard Holton, Lloyd Humberstone, Terry Horgan, Max Kölbel, Bill Lycan, Oskar Manhal, Samir Okasha, Graeme Oppy, Graeme Rhook, Rupert Sumerton, Mario Gomez Torrente, Elvira Schnabel, Brian Weatherson. I owe a particular dept of gratitude to Patrick Emerton, with whom I have engaged in a lot of discussion about the contents of this book, and other things besides, and who read earlier drafts of this work. I thank two anonymous OUP readers for their comments, the OUP Philosophy editor, Peter Momtchiloff, and Rebecca Bryant and Hilary Walford. I thank John Gorvett, who read through the final draft of this work. I gratefully acknowledge the support of UNAM, where I was a postdoctoral fellow, and the Australian Research Council for support at Monash University, where I was a postdoctoral fellow, and at the University of Tasmania. I thank the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nottingham for their support. I thankfully acknowledge Kluwer Academic publishers for permission to reproduce sections of ‘E-type Pronouns, DRT, Dynamic Semantics and the Quantifier/Variable-binding Model’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 20/2 (1997), 195–228.

CONTENTS Concepts and Symbolism Introduction: The Frege Model and Beyond 0.0 Preliminaries: The Frege Model 0.1 Between Designation and Speech Acts 0.2 Truth and the Varieties of Assertion 0.3 Semantics as a Friend of Grammar 0.4 Intention as a Foundation for Semantics 0.5 Outline of the Book PART I. MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC 1. A Path into Formal Pragmatics 1.0 Introduction 1.1 The Semantic Conception of Truth (SCT) 1.2 Anomalies for SCT 1.3 The Pragmatic Conception of Truth (PCT) 1.4 Proto-Assertions and Repertoire Rules 1.5 Modes of Interpretation 1.6 Permissibility and Supposition 2. Sentence-Meanings as Proto-Acts 2.0 Introduction 2.1 Logically Simple Sentences: Semantics Meets Metaphysics 2.2 Sentences as Signs for Complexes 2.3 Adverbial Modification and Higher-Order Complexes 3. Moods, Modes, and Logical Compounds 3.0 Introduction: The Roles Propositions Play 3.1 Farewell to the Sense/Force Distinction 3.2 Proto-Act Embedding 3.3 Negation as an Adverb

xii 1 1 4 8 17 19 21 27 27 27 29 39 45 51 58 63 63 65 73 75 80 80 81 85 89

x

CONTENTS

3.4 Indicative Conditionals as Implicatives 3.5 Truth-Bearers and an Expressive Theory of Truth PART II. BEYOND QUANTIFICATION 4. Proto-Referring Acts and Proper Names 4.0 Introduction: Grammar and Proto-Referring Acts 4.1 Repertoire Rules and Denotative Techniques 4.2 Proper Names and Referential Trees 4.3 Proper Names as Anaphors 4.4 Names Used Without Belief 4.5 Public Proper Names: Types Defined by Trees 4.6 General Terms and Semantic Interpretations 5. Unifying Noun Phrases 5.0 Introduction: Descriptive Noun Phrases as α- and β-Terms 5.1 Indefinite and Definite Descriptions: α-F and αD-F 5.2 Functioning Indefinitely 5.3 Uniqueness Implications and Truth-Value Gaps 5.4 Referential and Attributive Uses 5.5 Every: αU-F 5.6 Generics and Adverbs of Generality 6. Plurals and Pronouns 6.0 Introduction: Plurals as β-Terms 6.1 Definite and Indefinite Plurals 6.2 Collective, Distributed, and Cumulative Readings 6.3 Quantitatives and Universal Plurals 6.4 Pronouns 6.5 Grammatical and Logical Form PART III. THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS 7. Intentional States and Natural Representation 7.0 Introduction: Fear of Reproduction 7.1 The Natural-Representation System: Basic Features 7.2 Tracking and de re Logical Complexity

92 99 109 109 110 116 118 122 125 132 134 134 141 145 148 152 155 158 162 162 164 165 172 175 183 187 187 192 196

CONTENTS

7.3 From Representational Intentions to Proto-Acts 7.4 Communicative Intentions and Commitment 8. Logical Complexity and Semantic Normativity 8.0 Introduction 8.1 Logical Constants and Cognitive States 8.2 Validity, Entailment, and Expressivist Reduction 8.3 Causation, Cognition, and Semantics PART IV. GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND THE ENTANGLEMENTS OF DISCOURSE 9. Scope and Complex Noun Phrases 9.0 Introduction: Explaining Scope Relations 9.1 Predicates and Predicate-Application 9.2 Scope and Universal Noun Phrases 9.3 Scope and Indefinite Descriptions 9.4 Explaining Any 9.5 Adverbs of Generality and Indefinite Descriptions 10. Troubles for the Quantifier–Variable-Binding Model 10.0 Introduction: Donkeys 10.1 D-type Pronouns 10.2 Implicit Situation Quantifiers 10.3 Discourse Representation Theory 11. Domesticating Donkeys: STA on Generality and Anaphora 11.0 Introduction: A Solution 11.1 Relatively Simple Donkey Anaphors 11.2 Mimicking Variable-Binding 11.3 Anaphors Unbound 11.4 Relative Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora 11.5 If-sentences 11.6 Adverbial If-generalities 11.7 Loosening Double Binds References Index

xi 198 203 206 206 207 215 220 225 225 226 231 237 244 248 252 252 255 260 264 281 281 282 285 288 291 294 299 305 310 317

CONCEPTS AND SYMBOLISM Advertising U utters a string and intends to behave in the way characteristic of a speaker Σ who, following certain repertoire rules, has something designative or communicative intention. A(S)pro Proto-assertion of S: the act of uttering S and advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex and (b) to defend a cognitive property Π. A(S)pro is reportive if Π is the representational intention (a). A(S)pro is expressive if Π is a cognitive state, which S represents. A(S)pro/dox Doxastic grounding of A(S)pro: U has the advertised intention (b). A(S)pro/M-Pro Mode of interpretation of A(S)pro: U intends to be recognized as lacking the intentions advertised in A(S)pro, and uses A(S)pro for some other communicative purpose. A(S)pro/var A variable interpretation of A(S)pro: U intends that A(S)pro function as a template or proxy for particular proto-assertions. R(T)pro Proto-referring act: the act of uttering a term T and advertising an intention to denote an object. R(T)pro/dox R(T)pro is doxastically grounded. U intends to be recognized as possessing the object-denoting intention advertised. R(α-F)pro The core proto-referring act of any singular descriptive noun phrase: an F, the F, that F, every F, any F, one F, etc. R(β-F)pro The core proto-referring act of any plural descriptive noun phrase: some Fs, the Fs, those Fs, Fs, any Fs, etc. R(α-F)pro/var A variable interpretation of R(α-F)pro: U intends that R(α-F)pro function as a template or proxy for particular proto-acts of the form R(T)pro, where A(T is F)pro is permissible for U. Pred(V__)pro A predicative proto-act: the proto-act performed with the utterance of a predicate expression V__. This is an open proto-assertion. The act in which U utters V__ and advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, F〉, where x is an as yet unspecified entity, and a communicative intention.

Introduction: The Frege Model and Beyond 0.0 PRELIMINARIES: THE FREGE MODEL The theoretical framework that currently informs most thinking about linguistic meaning is one whose roots lie with Frege. Frege invented modern logic—quantification theory—originally to understand mathematical language, but his invention was soon bent to the task of constructing semantic theories of natural languages. The central goal of naturallanguage semantics is the systematic account of sentence-meanings and semantic contents—the content that results from the application of a sentence's linguistic meaning to a context. The framework Frege instigated, the Frege model, analyses semantic content in terms of mapping relations between words and world-parts—objects, properties, relations, and so on—employing as an integral part of such mappings the structures of quantification. Without doubt many beautiful and powerful theories have been developed using the resources of the Frege model. There is great hope that the right semantic theory of natural language will be derived using them. This book, however, begs to differ. It urges that the Frege model should be set aside in the pursuit of semantic theories of natural languages. Instead, a quite distinct kind of framework is needed to understand natural languages. This is one in which mapping relations between words and world, although present, do not determine the contents of sentences or their parts, and where quantification theory has no place in the analysis of reference and generality in natural languages. Let me explain. The three characteristic theses of the Frege model are F1 to F3 F1: The theory of meaning is comprised by two distinct enterprises: semantics and pragmatics Semantics analyses the intrinsic properties of semantic contents—their nature and their structure; pragmatics deals with the linguistically relevant extrinsic properties of semantic contents. So pragmatics talks about the uses of semantic content—say, in sentences with differing forces, as in orders, questions, assertions—and the fixing of semantic content—the way in which propositions are assigned to sentences by speaker intention, context, or practice.1 Pragmatics, speech-act structure,

1

So pragmatics and speech-act theory are taken to describe such matters as: (i) the types of deployment of semantic content by speakers in various kinds of speech acts (the differing forces, in the sense of assertions, orders, questions, etc.); (ii) the secondary, non-literal, communications that can arise from the deployment of semantic content in specific ways (the theory of conversational implicatures, indirect speech acts, etc.); and (iii) the conditions to be met by contexts underpinning phenomena such as indexicality, allowing the context-dependent assignment of semantic content to sentences. See Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Searle and Vanderveken (1985) for (i); Grice (1967) for (ii); and Sperber and Wilson (1986) for (iii). We can also subsume under pragmatics any theory specifying the conditions to be met by speakers' cognitive states when speakers associate with their sentences one set of semantic contents rather than another. See Lewis (1975a).

2

INTRODUCTION

conversational practice, and so on have nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of semantic content. F2: The semantic contents of sentences are properly characterized solely in terms of the possession by sentences and their constituents of designative properties or mapping relations—properties such as: denoting objects, sets or properties; being assigned sets of possible worlds or functions; expressing Fregean senses; or possession of truthconditions. F3: In natural languages, like English, reference and generality—the operations of phrases of the form every girl, a man, most cats, adverbs such as usually, always, and pronouns that interact with such phrases—are analysed by using quantification theory: the semantic apparatus of quantifiers, variable-binding, and value-assignment. In their purest forms Frege-model theories are truth-conditional theories of either a truth-theoretic or model-theoretic kind. Most recent and current semantic theories—whether they are micro-theories about particular constructions such as conditionals or adverbs, or macro-theories—are truth-conditional in this sense.2 Alternatives to the pure form of the Frege model are: verificationist or epistemic theories, which see meaning as closely associated with practices of verification or conditions of correct assertion, or which see theories of meaning as associated with theories of understanding; and conceptual role semantics, in which semantic contents are constituted by inferential patterns that speakers are disposed to engage in.3 I call these partial rejections because they are largely rejections of F2; they offer a different kind of interpretation of what the properties are that characterize semantic content. They certainly offer no challenge to F3. Moreover, I count as theories falling within the Frege model non-standard interpretations of quantification theory such as substitutional quantification, anti-realist semantics, game-theoretic semantics,4 and extensions of quantification theory designed to

2

I cannot list all theories conforming to the Frege model. Among the general formulations are the following paradigm cases of truth-conditional semantics (either Tarskian or model theoretic): Lewis (1972), Montague (1974), Dummett (1981), Davidson (1984b), and Lycan (1984). Less paradigmatic are the formulations of Dummett (1976), Hintikka (1983 , 1996), the Situation Semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983), and the Discourse Representation Theory of Kamp and Reyle (1993).

3

Use-theories of the first kind are associated with the classical verificationism of the Vienna circle, and with latter-day theorists such as Dummett (1976 , 1981). Conceptual role semantic systems are: Sellars (1954), Harman (1973 , 1982), and Brandom (1994).

4

For the basic intuitionistic interpretation, see Dummett (2000); for the substitutional interpretation, see Kripke (1976); and for the game-theoretic interpretation, see Hintikka (1983 , 1996).

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

3

cope with discourse semantics, such as Discourse Representation Theory or Dynamic Semantics.5 All these approaches affirm the framework of quantifier– variable-binding structure. For them, generality in natural languages is ultimately quantificational. They embrace F3. Another class of semantic theories are use-theories, which emerge from the work of the later Wittgenstein. Their most promising form is that of communicative theories. Communicative theories appeal to intersubjective, communal practice and conventions, and see semantic contents as speech-act potentials.6 Communicative theories are often presented as the alternative to truth-conditional semantics. They are only a partial rejection of the Frege model, since they accept quantification theory in one form or another. Current thinking about communicative theories is that they are radically flawed. They fail to explain compositionality: how it is that a potential infinity of sentential contents is generated from a finite primitive vocabulary and finite set of semantic rules. Communicative theories seem unable to do this, because they focus on communicative acts involving whole sentences, but say little about the content of sub-sentential units, or words. When they attempt to redress this fault, they fall into the idioms of the Frege model. They are forced, it seems, to ascribe to sub-sentential units semantic roles of designating or mapping onto world-parts, and to conceive of sentence truth- or correctness conditions as derived from their constituents—conceived of as possessing such roles—being combined in rule-governed ways. In short, the Frege model reaffirms itself. If there is any argument that seems to make an overwhelming case for the Frege model, it is the argument from compositionality.7 What then of my opening paragraph's bold pronouncement of an alternative to the Frege model? The alternative I propose takes on some of the communicative theorist's insights about sentential speech acts. But it deals with the inherent flaws that such theories have had hitherto by providing a new theory of speech acts—of both sentential and sub-sentential kinds. This solves the compositionality problem. Roughly, the approach contends: (a)

We should admit, as the Frege model affirms, that designative properties—such as denoting objects or properties, or representing facts—can be possessed by sentence-parts and sentences. Sub-sentential units, referring terms, such as names and descriptions, and general terms, can denote world-parts. Moreover, we should admit that the denotations of complex

5

As in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) and Kamp and Reyle (1993).

6

See Austin (1962), Bennett (1976), Strawson (1964 , 1971), Grice (1969 , 1971), Schiffer (1972), and Alston (2000).

7

See Platts (1979) for a neat general criticism of the programme with respect to the issue of compositionality. I think these doubts still have great force, and apply to recent theories, for example, Alston (2000).

4

INTRODUCTION

(b) (c)

grammatical strings are often determined by the denotations of their parts. Contra the Frege model, however, we should deny that the meaning of such units resides in the possession of designative properties, like denoting an object or property, and so forth. Rather, the meaning of a sentence, phrase, or word is a well-defined, conventionally associated, speech act. The association of such a speech act with a string ψ does not imply that ψ denotes or represents a world-part. However, the speech act has as part of its content the concept of ψ's denoting or representing something. The proposed theory preserves the effect of the designative mechanisms that provide compositionality in the Frege model but puts these, as it were, in an entirely conceptual realm. At the same time, the approach does not merely reproduce on the speech-act level the semantics structures of the Frege model. It provides instead a new way of viewing the relation of surface syntax to semantic interpretation. The result is a semantics that firmly repudiates F1 to F3.

The account that puts these ideas into action is the speech-act theoretic approach or STA for short. The rest of this introduction sketches out how this three-part plan is put into action to produce a speech-act alternative to the Frege model—an alternative in which speech acts, far from merely presupposing semantic contents, constitute such contents.

0.1 BETWEEN DESIGNATION AND SPEECH ACTS Any semantic theory has some general picture of the world in which it sees language embedded. My exposition of STA begins with its commitments about non-linguistic reality. STA accepts an ontology of objects and properties and relations. The world also includes as parts situations: objects instantiating properties or relations. Situations are worldparts just as objects, and indeed, properties are. I prefer the neutral, technical term, complexes to denote such worldparts, since situations is employed in other semantic theories to denote possible states of affairs. Complexes are world-parts: parts of the actual world and not mere possibilia.8 They are mereologically complex entities—they have the complexity of part and whole. They are not logically complex entities; there are no complexes that are negative, universal, conditional, or disjunctive. So there are no negative facts such as snow's not being black. The world viewed extralinguistically has no lacks in it; it is a logical plenum. There are also no facts

8

Russell (1918) uses the term complex for actual, situation-like entities.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

5

of totality, for example, that all humans have DNA. Of course, there are negative and universal facts in the linguistic sense: truths that are negative or universal. But no world-part corresponds to these sentences, which is negative or universal. Complexes are also mind-independent extralinguistic entities; they are not pale shadows of sentences, propositions, or thoughts. In sum, the world is a fusion of mind-independent, extralinguistic complexes—that is, objects in combination with properties and relations, which lack any logical complexity in re.9 I now move into STA's claims about the designative relations between language and world. STA—following the Frege model—holds that both sentences and certain sentence-parts such as singular and general terms are, as part of their semantic function, capable of designating world-parts. Roughly, STA holds that general terms such as red or bite can denote properties and relations. Singular terms such as redness, the relation of being next to, George Bush, snow's being white can denote, respectively, properties, relations, material objects, and complexes. (The singular term snow's being white denotes the complex of snow's being white, which I represent by 〈snow, white〉.) STA proposes further, perhaps a little more controversially, that sentences can represent. What sentences represent, when they represent something, are complexes—STA's situations. That is, by virtue of linguistic rules and context, and the fact that there is a complex of a certain form, say 〈P〉, S represents 〈P〉. Thus, by virtue of the linguistic rules of English and context, and the existence of a complex 〈snow, white〉, a token of Snow is white represents the complex 〈snow, white〉. Overall STA accepts the following theses about designative relations. (a) (b)

Names, referring terms, general terms can denote objects, properties, relations, and complexes. Sentences can represent complexes.

Several comments are in order here. First, as I use the terms, there is no intrinsic difference between denoting and representing. Both are instances of the same basic relation: standing for. I distinguish them only to indicate that in one case—denoting—I mean sentence-parts standing for things, and in the other—representation—I mean sentences' standing for complexes, which are actual and not merely possible entities. I use the term designate in the neutral sense of standing for. So denoting and representing are instances of designation. Designation in general is an intention-dependent relation. It is because speakers use sentences and words with certain intentions, and the world is a certain way, that speakers' sentences or words designate various world-parts.

9

STA is a theory then that invokes a certain structured ontology of the world. In that respect it is like Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) or the Situation Semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983). Unlike Situation Semantics, STA's complexes do not come in logically complex varieties.

6

INTRODUCTION

Secondly, in putting forward (a) and (b), I am not proposing that the meaning of a sentence or term resides in its designating something; that is the way of the Frege model. This obviously will not work anyway, given what I have said about complexes. False sentences like Snow is black are meaningful but represent no complex, since there is no complex of the form 〈snow, black〉; snow does not instantiate blackness. Fictional names, like Pegasus, I submit, are meaningful but denote nothing. Rather the proposal made in (a) and (b) is that referring terms and sentences have designative functions; a term or sentence, if it designates anything, designates a certain kind of world-part. All terms and sentences are associated with the function of designating objects and complexes. However, they do not have to do so to be meaningful. For example, the logically simple sentences Snow is white and Snow is black are meaningful and associated with the function of representing complexes, but, as a matter of fact, only the first represents a complex. Meaning resides not in designating something but in a specific kind of speech act being associated with a syntactic string. Thirdly, STA, as noted above, rejects the existence of logically complex complexes; there are no negative or universal complexes. The negative sentence Snow is not black is meaningful and true. But there are no negative complexes. So how does its content relate to the function of representing complexes? The answer to be developed below is briefly this. Logically complex sentences are in the business of representing complexes, but what they represent are speaker cognitive states, which are themselves complexes—they are speaker-internal world-parts. However, the speaker is not reporting the existence of these complexes but expressing them. In short, the function of representation is present, but deployed in a completely different way from its function in the case of logically simple sentences. Fourthly, in proposing (b) above, it is not being affirmed that sentences function semantically like singular terms for complexes. Snow is white and snow's being white both designate the same complex, but they have entirely distinct discourse functions, and consequently entirely distinct meanings. In STA, there is more to meaning than designative function. In STA, then, sentences and referring terms have designative functions, but their meanings are not defined by their possession of designative properties—as F2 proposes. Instead, the meanings of sentences and referring terms are speech-act types that are partly identified through intentions to designate. What are these meaning-bestowing speech acts? STA allows it to be the case that under certain circumstances speakers utter terms and sentences with designative intentions, performing acts such as: (i) (ii)

the act of uttering ‘snow’ and intending to denote a substance of a certain kind; the act of uttering ‘Snow is white’ and intending to represent a complex of the form 〈x, y〉, where snow denotes x and white denotes y.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

7

These kinds of acts are ways in which speakers can use language with the goal of designating parts of reality. Uttering words with intentions to designate things is an important kind of use of language, but such acts are not the speech acts that, according to STA, determine meanings.10 The speech acts fixing meanings are of a more subtle, though not unrelated, character. They are called proto-acts. A proto-act is an act in which a speaker U utters a string, be it sentence, term, or predicate, and presents herself as having an intention or intentions of some kind. Presenting oneself as having an intention—or advertising such an intention, as I also call it—is intentionally to conduct oneself in a way characteristic of a speaker who, appealing to certain linguistic rules, has an intention of that kind. Thus U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉 if and only if U intentionally goes through the behaviour characteristic of someone who, following certain rules, has that representational intention. So in uttering ‘Snow is white’ consciously as part of a language U commands, U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, y〉, where snow denotes x and white denotes y. Likewise in uttering ‘snow’, consciously as part of a language U commands, U presents herself as intending to denote a substance of a certain kind. She engages consciously in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker who, following certain rules, intends to denote a substance of a certain kind. The linguistic rules alluded to here are what I call repertoire rules, rules that determine for speakers what they can do if they have certain designative (representational or denotational) purposes. So, it is a repertoire rule in English that, if a speaker Σ wants to denote the property white, she can utter ‘white’ in order to achieve that goal.11 In advertising a designative intention, there is no implication that the speaker has the intention she advertises. Nor is advertising an intention pretence. Proto-acts are neutral between possession of an intention and pretence. What I call basic, sincere use of a proto-act is that where U has the intention she advertises and intends her audience to believe she has it. Insincere use is where U advertises, lacks the intention, but desires her audience to believe she has the intention. Pretence is advertising the intention, lacking it, but intending one's audience to recognize that one lacks the advertised intention. In STA, proto-acts are ultimately the core acts through which a compositional semantics is built. They can form the basis of a compositional semantics because they can embed in other proto-acts, and because they can undergo various kinds of rule-governed interpretation or modes. A proto-act using a sentence or term falls under a mode when the proto-act is used not with the purpose of

10

I use the term referring primarily to mark the speech act of making an utterance with the intention that it denote something. Denoting , as proposed above, picks out the relation holding between a word and some part of the world. It is a species under the genus designative relations .

11

I use Σ, rather than U, for the arbitrary speaker in specifications of repertoire rules.

8

INTRODUCTION

designation but for some non-designative purpose, one that can be conventionally signalled by the morphology of the sentence or term. Linguistic meanings and semantic contents of sentences are proto-act types of certain kinds, at certain levels of abstraction, which may be modified by certain modes. To describe this kind of account in more detail, I need to investigate another dimension of speech acts—one that shows how meaning in STA is further prised away from designation. We can gain an understanding of this dimension by looking at the nature of assertion.

0.2 TRUTH AND THE VARIETIES OF ASSERTION It might seem, given the notion of proto-acts I have introduced, that sincerely asserting that snow is white is just uttering a sentence S—say Snow is white—and advertising an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉, and actually having that intention. On this view, correct assertions are successful acts of representation. Thus assertion of Snow is white is correct because Snow is white represents the complex 〈snow, white〉. So understood, correct assertion is correspondence. If that were the case, STA's ontological commitments would be inconsistent. Assertions of Snow is not black are correct, so on the correct-assertion-as-correspondence view that would entail that the sentence Snow is not black represents a complex, presumably, a negative one. But STA professes to eschew negative complexes. Assertion then cannot be about intending to represent complexes, nor can correct assertion be successful representation of a complex, if STA is to maintain its rejection of logically complex complexes. Assertion is more subtle. Certainly, assertion involves advertising intentions to represent complexes. In asserting that snow is white by uttering ‘Snow is white’ U advertises an intention to represent a complex of a certain form. But what makes an utterance of a sentence an act of assertion is a further communicative intention. The communicative intention defining assertion is that U intends her utterance to have a certain perlocutionary effect: her audience H will come to believe something and or act in a certain way.12 Say that U defends a commitment to a cognitive property Π—like believing or intending something—if and only if: (i) the audience H believes she, U, possesses a commitment to Π and (ii) H either accepts, confirms, or rejects a commitment to Π in her own case. Acceptance, confirmation, and rejection are epistemic attitudes, roughly: coming to believe on the basis of testimony, recognizing pre-existing

12

Grice (1957) and Schiffer (1972) give perlocutionary-act theories of assertion. Altson (2000) refutes their theories. The kind of theory I put forward below is immune to Alston's criticisms.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

9

belief, and believing that something is not the case. For U to be committed to Π means, roughly, that, were U to aim to be explicit about her every intention, belief, and desire, she would, at some stage, instantiate Π. (I say more about these concepts below.) With this idea of defending in mind, I propose that assertions are kinds of stance-takings in which U utters S advertising an intention to represent a complex with the purpose of defending a commitment to a certain cognitive property Π. Assertions come in varieties according to what Π is. I consider first the most straightforward kind of assertion: reportive assertion. In a report, U utters a sentence, advertising an intention to represent how things are, and intends to defend commitment to that representational intention. More precisely, reporting is an act of the form below: Report: U utters S and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉; and (b) intends, in performing (a), to defend commitment to an intention of the form advertised in (a): namely, intending to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉13 So, in uttering ‘Snow is white’, in a standard assertion, U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉, and intends to defend commitment to that intention. A report then is a stance-taking with respect to a commitment to representing how things are. A report is evaluated according to acceptance or rejection of that commitment. Thus an audience H responds true or false to U's assertion about snow depending on whether H accepts the commitment property—intending to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉—or rejects it.14 If all assertions were reports, then STA's theory of assertion would amount to the simple theory stated above that assertions are just utterances with intentions to represent complexes and speakers would judge assertions to be true just in case they judged them to represent reality. But not all assertions have the form of Report. There are assertions that are not reports. Rather, they are expressions

13

If U utters S advertising an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉 along with a communicative intention, as in Report , it is convenient to say that U is asserting that P. This way of speaking is somewhat misleading, however. In advertising an intention to represent a complex of a certain form U always has a certain specification of the complex in mind. In using the 〈P〉 format we leave that out.

14

A drawback of Grice and Schiffer's perlocutionary accounts of assertion is that they require sincere assertors that P to intend that their audiences believe that P. But then, as Alston (2000) points out, this requirement rules out U's sincerely asserting that P when she believes her audience will not be persuaded by her utterance. Report does not have this problem, since it requires only that U intend that her commitment be engaged with: either accepted or rejected. This weaker condition still treats as irrational cases in which one asserts sincerely but has no intention that one's commitment be engaged with. Thus asserting ‘I don't care if you believe me or not: it's on the third floor’ is a Moorean paradox, for STA assertions are essentially directed towards audiences. If so, soliloquies must be treated as assertions directed towards the speaker herself.

10

INTRODUCTION

of cognitive states.15 An expressive assertion of a cognitive state is an act in which U advertises an intention to represent her possession of the state and intends, not to defend her representational intention, but to defend the state itself. The distinction I have in mind here between reporting and expressing a cognitive state is illustrated by the two sentences (1) and (2): (1) (2)

I have a strong belief that it is raining. It is probably raining.

(1)'s standard utterance is a report about possession of a cognitive state: a belief state of a certain strength. (2)'s standard utterance is an expression of a state of the same kind. The distinction between reporting and expressing is brought to light by the distinct grounds upon which H judges (1) and (2) to be true. H judges (1), as uttered by U, to be true just in case she thinks U has the state. H judges (2) to be true just in case she judges that she herself, H, has the state. When U reports her state, others judge that her assertion is true if and only if they believe that U has the state. When U expresses her state, others judge her assertion to be true if and only if they believe they have the state. In the case of (1), H judges true if and only if she thinks U has represented reality by her sentence, but not in the case of (2). In both cases, however, H's judgement of truth expresses her acceptance of the property Π defended by U. Let me show this in more detail. Reporting a cognitive state is just like any other report, the distinguishing mark being the complex is itself a component of U's cognitive system. (1) has the structure below: (1*) U utters ‘I have a strong belief that it is raining’ and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes strongly that it is raining〉; and (b) intends to defend a commitment to an intention of the kind advertised in (a): to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes strongly that it is raining〉. An audience H replies ‘true’ to U's performance of (1*), just in case H too is committed to the sort of representational intention advertised: intending to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes strongly that it is raining〉. In brief, H judges U's utterance of (1) to be true just in case, H believes U believes strongly that it is raining. Expressing a cognitive state is something else. The general structure of an expressive assertion is given below: Expressing a congnitive state X U utter s and (a) advertise an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, possesses X〉; and (b) intends to defend commitment to possessing X.

15

The word expressing is used technically in this book. I will not be providing a theory of expressing in the sense of expletives, or in the sense of speech acts in which thanks, appreciation, regret, etc, are expressed.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

11

Utterance of (2) is an instance of expressive assertion. It has the structure: (2*) U utters ‘It is probably raining’ and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes strongly that it is raining〉; and (b) intends to defend commitment to believing strongly that it is raining. Both (1*) and (2*) involve the same primary act (a) above, but combined with different communicative intentions (b). In uttering (2), U has the communicative intention of defending commitment to possessing the state itself—namely, believing strongly that it is raining—rather than to the intention in (a). This explains the different evaluative reactions of audiences to U's utterances of (1) and (2). An audience judges (1) true just in case she believes U has the belief state, because to accept the Π-property U defends in (1) is to accept an intention to represent that U has the belief state. U judges (2) true just in case H believes she herself is committed to a belief state of the same kind, because to accept the Π-property U defends in (2) is to accept a belief state of this kind. In the case of (1), agreement about the commitment property Π defended issues in agreement about how things are because Π is representational. In the case of (2), agreement about the property Π defended does not issue in agreement about how things are: Π in (2) is not representational. A degree of belief is a degree of inclination to intend to represent reality; it does not actually represent reality as being a certain way. In sum, in reportive assertions truth entails that a sentence represents reality, in expressive assertions truth does not entail representation, but truth-predication works the same way in both cases; it is the expression of acceptance of commitment properties Π defended by the speaker U. I give many other illustrations of reporting as opposed to expressing in the course of this book. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the reporting/expressing distinction for STA. Three important theses flow immediately out of this analysis of reportive as opposed to expressive assertion, which will be recurrent themes in this work. (i)

The real objects of our truth-predications are assertions. (1) and (2) have distinct truth-conditions, but what determines those distinct truth-conditions are the different communicative intentions conventionally associated with them, and that is a matter of assertion. I dub this view about truth PCT, or the pragmatic conception of truth. One might object that PCT cannot explain the embeddability of truth-apt sentences; assertions cannot embed, but truth-apt sentences can, as in Either snow is white or Tarski is wrong. But in fact there is no deep problem here. In PCT, assertions do not get embedded. What gets embedded is the proto-act—in the sense of §0.1—that is, the proto-assertion. A proto-assertion is an act in which

12

INTRODUCTION

(ii)

(iii)

a speaker advertises an intention to represent how things are and advertises a communicative intention. So in uttering ‘Snow is white’, in a standard assertion, U (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉, and (b) advertises an intention to defend this kind of intention. If she actually performs an assertion, she has the (b) intention. If U's assertion is sincere—she really believes snow is white—she has the (a) intention as well. PCT contrasts with another, indeed the orthodox, view about truth, which I dub the semantic conception of truth, or SCT. According to SCT truth-apt sentences gain their truth-aptness independently of any use they have in assertion; they are simply sentences semantically correlated with propositions, where propositions are understood as wholly distinct from speech acts. In short, PCT says truth-apt sentences are parts of assertions defined by specific purposes; SCT says they are sentences correlated by semantic rules with propositions whether asserted or not. STA accepts PCT. In judging U's assertion of (2) to be true, we are not judging that she has successfully represented reality. Rather our judgements of truth are expressions of agreement about acceptance of cognitive properties Π. Truth, according to PCT, does not as such reside in a sentence's possessing content that corresponds to how things are. (1) and (2), I shall argue, are sentences that, by virtue of rule-based meaning, convey the same information about how things are: the speaker U has a certain probability state. But they disagree about truthconditions. So truth is not about conveying correct information about how things are. To understand truthattribution we need to look at purpose and communicative intentions. SCT, in contrast to PCT, takes truth to be correspondence. Truth-bearers cannot be understood formally in terms of mappings and word-world functions in abstraction from the cognitive states of speakers. To understand what truth-bearers are we have to look at communicative purposes. Semantic structures are not merely abstract structures that speakers grasp, but structures they realize. Semantics is psychologistic.

According to STA the reporting/expressing distinction is a deep one and highly significant for understanding how languages work—so I will refine it and these three consequences as we go along. According to STA, the reporting/ expressing distinction is central to our understanding of logically complex sentences: utterances of logically complex sentences involve speakers expressing cognitive states. Thus, just as utterances of It is probably raining are expressions of subjective probability states, utterances of Snow is not black, Either snow is white or Tarski is wrong, Every cat is furry are likewise expressions of cognitive states. We now see how STA deals with the puzzle about representative function of sentences described above. Logical sentences represent speaker cognitive states and not mind-independent reality. But they do so expressively in the way

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

13

that (2) is used to express a probability state, and not in the way that (1) is used to report a state.

0.2.1 Proto-Acts, Modes, and Objectivity The notion of a proto-act and the pragmatic conception of truth, PCT, with its conception of the expressing/ reporting distinction, are two core elements of STA. A third element, central to STA, is that of a mode of interpretation of a proto-act. I now explain what this is. If we restrict ourselves to assertions, there are two basic types of proto-acts: proto-assertions and proto-referring acts. Referring is an act of uttering a string and intending to denote an object of a certain character. Unlike assertions, which involve intentions both to represent and to defend, referring acts do not have the second communicative intention built into them. Proto-referring is simply advertising an intention to denote. In standard assertion, a speaker U performs a proto-assertion, and has at least the communicative intention she advertises. But this is by no means the only way in which a proto-assertion may appear in discourse. There are many uses of proto-assertions in which U lacks the intentions she advertises, where U wants her audience to recognize this fact. For example, in sarcasm, U performs a proto-assertion—U utters ‘Fred is such a genius’, advertising an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈Fred, genius〉, and a corresponding communicative intention—but U lacks the intentions she advertises. She has rather another purpose: roughly, to communicate that a condition of the opposite kind obtains in Fred's case. Matters hold similarly with metaphor and other rhetorical forms. Such rhetorical forms are modes of proto-assertion. In general, to perform a proto-assertion under a mode is to utter a sentence S, advertising intentions to represent and communicate, but lack such intentions, intending instead that the proto-assertion be taken by one's audience as having some other purpose than simple assertion. That a proto-assertion is under a mode is either to be deduced from context, as in sarcasm, or indicated lexically. (I describe instances of the latter below.) Proto-referring is a neutral act that, like proto-assertion, can be used in different ways. Standard referring acts are those where U utters a noun phrase N performing a proto-referring act—let us write this as R(N)pro—and has the intention she advertises (and indeed may intend to be taken by any audience as having that intention). Standard proper names are an example of this type of interpretation. But there are many other noun phrases M, say, which, when uttered by U in a proto-act R(M)pro, are such that U intends to be taken as not having the denotative intention. These involve modes of interpretation just like those mentioned earlier in the case of proto-assertions. A proto-referring act on

14

INTRODUCTION

a mode of interpretation is a speech act in which R(M)pro is performed, but U signals that it is not the purpose of R(M)pro to enable an object to be denoted; rather U has some other purpose in mind. An illustration of this is utterances of fictional terms. In using Ahab, in discussing Melville's fictional text, U performs a proto-act R(Ahab)pro but lacks a denotative intention, and, moreover, intends her audience to recognize the fact that she lacks the intention. In STA, the concept of a mode in conjunction with the notion of a proto-act, and the reporting/expressing distinction are the tools through which semantic theory is constructed. I now show how they come together to provide an analysis of utterances featuring logical complexity. I give two brief illustrations of how this works for sentential compounds and for sentences featuring universal noun phrases, every F. Take sentential compounds first. STA claims that sentences embedded in logical compounds are uttered in proto-assertions under modes. Thus, in uttering sentences of the form Either S1 or S2, If S1 then S2, It is not the case that S1, U performs proto-acts with the embedded sentences S1 and S2. U's proto-assertions are under modes in these cases, since, in uttering S1, S2, U lacks the intentions she presents herself as having. (Moreover, unlike the cases of irony and metaphor, U signals linguistically through the connective that her proto-acts have a mode.) The utterance of the whole compound is itself a proto-assertion; compounds are then compound proto-assertions. However, such compounds are expressive assertions—in the sense defined above. In uttering a compound as a whole, say Either S or R, U expresses her possession of a commitment state with respect to the performance of the embedded protoassertions: A(S)pro and A(R)pro. Explaining exactly what this commitment state is will be carried out in the main body of this work. There we will see that the cognitive states expressed are not merely dispositions to make certain inference moves, as some forms of conceptual role semantics propose,16 but something else. They are cognitive states that involve ultimately the manipulation of simple pre-linguistic representational structures—I discuss this in §0.4 below. Consider now logical complexity as introduced by universal noun phrases such as every cat in Every cat purrs. The following is a somewhat simplified version of the final analysis of such cases, but it does for illustrative purposes. Every cat is used to produce a proto-referring act; that is, U utters an expression every cat with the surface grammar of a term, and in doing so presents herself as intending to denote a particular entity from the cat class (as she would in fact be doing in a standard referring act, such as that produced using the string Pixel the

16

See Brandom (1994). Conceptual role semantics is committed to a type of holism, which STA is not. It also needs to provide an account of what expressing in the relevant sense is. Here there is a problem analogous to that faced by the expressivist about value—see Jackson and Pettit (1998).

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

15

cat, say). But, of course, U lacks this intention, and it will be recognized by any audience competent in the use of the determiner every that she lacks it. Instead, U's proto-referring act using every cat—R(every cat)pro—has another, appropriate and well-understood, mode. Consider a class (we shall call it RC) of standard referring acts {R(cat1), R(cat2), …, R(Pixel), …, R(cati)}, which has exactly one element for every element of the cat class. Though grammar and form mark U's act R(every cat)pro as an act of presenting an intention to denote a particular cat, her act is instead understood as standing in for all members of RC—a class of referring acts each of which really does pick out some particular cat. In other words, the proto-referring act R(every cat)pro is a proxy referring act, standing proxy simultaneously for many standard referring acts. We might say that the proto-referring act R(every cat)pro ranges over standard referring acts in something like the way a variable is said to range over a domain of potential values. In combining every cat with the predicate purrs to form Every cat purrs, U expresses her state of being committed to the predicate purrs applying to all the value range proto-acts of R(every cat)pro. Here again U is performing an expressive assertion of a cognitive state. U is not reporting on some mind-independent feature of the world; there are no facts of totality in an extralinguistic sense. It may be a little hard to see just what the advantages of this account over quantificational approaches are. The advantages become apparent only when we look at the fully developed theory and at a range of cases including syntactically more complex cases such as Every friend of every cat kissed every dog. According to the developed version of the theory, in such sentences, U performs a type of proto-act with the whole utterance that has a kind of template structure, whose syntactic form is: α-friend of α-cat kissed α-dog. This form indicates the structure of the particular assertions about which U has universal commitments. (Though here the different orders of the evaluative signals introduced by the three every-determiners—the different scope relations—affect interpretation.) It is here that the structure of surface grammar enters into the semantic form in a way that quantification treatments cannot match. This feature also enables STA to provide an adequate account of how pronouns function in natural languages, something that quantificational treatments are unable to offer. Restricting ourselves to literal declarative utterances for the moment, the hypothesis defended in STA is that a natural language like English divides its utterances into reportives and expressives as follows: Reportives: simple subject/predicate sentences, basic uses of singular and plural definite and indefinite descriptions: The F is G, An F is G, The Fs are G, Fs are G.

16

INTRODUCTION

Expressives: logical compounds: Either S or R; negations: T is not F; modals: T might be F; universal noun phrases: Every F is G; adverbs of generality: An F is always G, Fs are usually G; and quantitatives: Most Fs are Gs. This scheme will need some qualifications in the course of the book. In particular, there is the status of the basic definite and indefinite descriptions and the status of plurals. Moreover, this taxonomy of reportives and expressives redraws the boundaries of what is called logically complex. Frege-model theories treat sentences of the form Fs are G, as in Cats are furry, as logically complex sentences—with quantifiers in their logical forms. STA does not treat them as logically complex. In STA, such sentences convey general information, but do so in a fundamentally different way from the way in which such information is conveyed by sentences like Every cat is furry. The expressives displayed are not the only expressives. I defend, in addition, the thesis that many predicates, such as is true, exists, is identical to N, form expressive utterances.17 It might seem that this whole expressivist approach to logically complex sentences is flawed in that it fails to explain how logically complex sentences can be objectively true. Surely, goes the objection, logically complex sentences are true by virtue of mind-independent fact.18 STA holds that uttered de dicto logically complex sentences do not describe mindindependent, de re, logically complex states of affairs in the world, but rather merely express cognitive states of the speakers. How does STA allow for objectivity? The objectivity of logically complex truths is not their correspondence to features of the world; they are not true by correspondence to extralinguistic reality.19 But they are not true by virtue of community or intersubjective agreement either. The identities ‘S’ is true = ‘S’ is what my peers believe or ‘S’ is true = ‘S’ is ideally assertable are false. Rather is true is an expressive predicate. Assertion of ‘S’ is true is an expression of agreement, of sharing cognitive states, with creatures whose cognitive systems are directed towards faithful representation of a world. That ideal of faithful representation, however, involves only representing through logically simple sentences. The world out there to be represented is one entirely devoid of logical complexity in re. In short, the truth of logically complex sentences is constrained by the extralinguistic world but not directly—by actually representing logically complex world-parts—but indirectly,

17

There are shades of the Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1922) in STA. In the Tractatus , the meaning contribution of logical constants somehow transcends the world and is shown in their symbolic form.

18

STA's position on logically complex sentences is analogous to expressivism in metaethics, according to which value-statements do not report upon special facts of value or on speakers' attitude states but are expressions of morally relevant attitudes. See e.g. Blackburn (1984), Gibbard (1990), and Jackson and Pettit (1998). See Barker (2000) for a sketch of an expressivist semantics.

19

STA rejects the idea that logically compound, true, sentences are made true by structural features of the world such as logically complex situations. See Russell (1918), Barwise and Perry (1983), and Armstrongs (1989), who argue for the need for logically complex situations in semantics.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

17

by expressing those cognitive states that are integral parts of systems directed towards objective representation.20 STA's expressivism about the logical entails the renunciation of another commitment of Frege model. This is antipsychologism. It is held by many semantic theorists that the facts of meaning are normative facts, which cannot be natural. Frege located thoughts, senses, in a third realm. But STA proposes a type of expressivism about the normative. There are no semantic, normative facts, if by facts we mean extralinguistic entities.

0.3 SEMANTICS AS A FRIEND OF GRAMMAR Such are STA's leading ideas and their applications to analysing the structure of assertions and, by extension, other kinds of illocutionary acts. I propose that we have enough structure to construct semantic theories without any of the features, F1 to F3, characteristic of the Frege model. Semantic contents are proto-assertion types, at a certain level of abstraction. Effectively, the roles that propositions play in Frege-model theories can be played by proto-assertion types and more generally proto-illocutionary-act types.21 A compositional semantics of sentences correlated with proto-illocutionary acts is also possible. Proto-acts are able to do this because they can embed and undergo transformation through modes. Proto-assertions have constituents: further proto-assertions or various kinds of sub-sentential proto-acts. So the proto-assertion type expressed by T is G—where T is a name and is G a simple predicate—has acts corresponding to T and is G that combine in certain ways. Likewise a complex noun phrase like every F—a proto-act under a certain mode with a certain combinatorial capacity—is a constituent of the proto-act correlated with Every F is G. In short, linguistic rules can be described that (a) govern proto-acts—rules regarding the conditions under which a speaker advertises a certain representational, denotative, or communicative intention—and (b) govern the results of combination of proto-acts to form complex speech acts. STA makes essential use of designative relations like denoting and representing, but it does not propose that meaningfulness is constituted by words entering

20

The cognitive states expressed by logically complex sentences are not themselves logically complex states; they have only mereological complexity. I accept, as a general, causal methodological postulate, that all genuine causation and dispositionality involve only mereologically complex relata. This is to say that causal explanations that seem to refer to logically complex states of affairs, such as omissions, negative states of affairs, or universal facts or disjunctive facts, can always be reduced to explanations featuring only logically simple states of affairs, even if these do feature mereological complexity.

21

Proto-assertion tokens do not have to be public; proto-assertions can be carried out mutely. For STA, thought tokens are real-time production of signs, in some medium—which may be a private inner one—combined with intentions.

18

INTRODUCTION

into such relations and designating world-parts. Instead, it appeals to these relations in defining concepts of proto-acts, which do constitute meanings. Moreover, STA does not attempt to reduce designative concepts or properties and relations to speech-act concepts or properties and relations. Rather it envisages new roles for them. (i) Designative concepts are used in analysing speech acts, as indicated above. (ii) Designative properties and relations, like denoting, may be used in explaining the success of certain uses of language. For example, some types of referring acts will be called successful when the term used denotes a particular object, and some assertions will be called successful or true when the sentences used in them represent how things are. The compositional semantics that STA offers differs in a crucial respect from Frege-model theories; it is not mere duplication at the speech-act level of structures and procedures in Frege-model theories. Frege-model theories—owing to adherence to F3—make a distinction between grammatical and logical form. The grammar of noun phrases such as every F and an F—noun phrases associated with generality—indicates that they are types of referring terms. But attributing a semantic function like denoting to them is not feasible, it seems. The Fregean methodological move is to ignore the dictates of grammar and attribute a completely different semantic function to these expressions: the function of quantification. The methodological principle illustrated here is: F4: A semantic function can be attributed to an expression Ω as the meaning of Ω even though Ω's surface grammer associates Ω with a different semantic function. Grammar is often misleading about semantic structure. Russell's ‘paradigm of philosophy’—his theory of descriptions, appearing in 1905, some decades after Frege's groundwork—was indeed a paradigm of Fregean semantic theorizing. This methodology has been very fruitful. Loosening the grammatical constraints on semantic form has given theorists the freedom to solve problems of meaning for specific sentence types. But such local successes—bought at the cost of ignoring grammatical form—have negative consequences when a more comprehensive perspective is taken on the sentences concerned. The disparity between grammar and meaning returns with a vengeance when attempts are made systematically to link local theories—developed hitherto for specific sentence types. Discourse, pronouns, and generality are an example. Discourses like that below are unanalysable using quantification structures—or so I shall argue: (3)

If a woman marries a man, she enters into a legal contract with him. He usually profits from it more than she does.

STA, in contrast, analyses such discourses with ease. This is, in part, because STA rejects F4 and treats surface grammar as integral to semantic structure.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

19

STA offers a very strong affirmation of the role of surface grammar that falls out of its conception of proto-acts and interpretations. Summed up: Grammar: The grammar of an expression E is never in conflict with its meaning. Grammar has the semantic role of indicating the basic proto-act type that the speaker U is performing in uttering E, where the proto-act type corresponding to the token U performs in uttering E is one determinant of E's meaning. In STA, all uttered declaratives—whether embedded in compounds or issued separately—are proto-asserted. The indicative mood is the unfailing indicator of proto-assertion. Similarly, all uttered noun phrases, Jane, she, the girl, a girl, every girl, and so on, are uttered in proto-referring acts, as grammar indicates. The differences between names, definite descriptions, indefinite descriptions, and universal noun phrases are to be accounted for by the structural, interpretative variations on the proto-act in each case. Expressions may have the same grammar, for example, the girl, a girl, and every girl, and so involve the same basic proto-act. But how the primary proto-act is interpreted in each case differs—a fact indicated by the distinct determiners: the, a, and every. Grammar is not misleading, but it is also not totally informative, since it does not by itself tell us what the interpretation of the proto-act is.22

0.4 INTENTION AS A FOUNDATION FOR SEMANTICS The problem of compositionality is not the only kind of objection to a speech-act-based semantics. There is another, which I call the reproduction problem. STA treats semantic content as speech-act structure. But speech acts require intentions and intentions content. Intentional content cannot itself be speech-act structure—or otherwise STA is circular—so it must be some other kind of content. It might seem that the content of intentions must be as rich and complex as that of natural-language sentences themselves. If that is so, speech-act structures are redundant, since sentence-meanings can be characterized directly in terms of whatever structures fix the content of intentions. So STA is untenable; an intentional semantics reproduces at the level of intentional states all the content it tries to explain at the level of sentences.23 The reproduction objection fails. The speech-act structures described by STA rest ultimately upon capacities to form intentions, and these in turn

22

I do not deny that now and then there are isolated cases in which surface grammar is misleading. What I deny is that natural-language grammar is systematically misleading, as F4 claims.

23

One can raise the same kind of reproduction objection against J. Fodor's language-of-thought hypothesis (1975).

20

INTRODUCTION

involve intentional states with representational properties of a pre-linguistic kind. But these pre-linguistic representational properties are highly impoverished compared with the expressive potential of thoughts qua speech-act structures. So there is reproduction, but only of a very limited kind. I now explain how this is so. Intentional states have representational properties by virtue of: (i) intrinsic properties of subjects' cognitive systems—whether these be physical, higher-order functional or some other kind of properties is not relevant here; (ii) subjects' being embedded in an environment in a particular way. The representational properties of intentional states are natural or pre-intentional representative properties. They do not themselves depend upon having intentions, since they are the preconditions for forming intentions. Words and sentences of natural languages in contrast are capable only of intention-based representational properties. The designative properties that words and sentences can possess depend in part upon the speaker U's possessing a natural-representational system, an NR system, with representational properties, or, as I shall call them, tracking properties.24 However, the NR system, its expressive power, is significantly weaker than that of any natural language it supports. I give one major reason why now—others will emerge in the course of the book. English exhibits de dicto logical complexity; it contains logical constants as items in its primitive vocabulary. However, the NR system exhibits no logical complexity. It has nothing corresponding to logical constants amongst its basic representational elements. Logically complex sentences, as we have seen, are used to express cognitive states. These states in many instances are dispositional states to manipulate proto-acts. Having such states ultimately requires having an NR system, but there is no thought in the system that translates the thought conveyed by Either S or R. That is because the thought conveyed by Either S or R is neither a thing represented nor an act of representing. It is, rather, a complex expressive speech act with communicative intentions, an act that requires the bringing-together of representational and dispositional capacities in combination with the manipulation of grammatically structured strings.25 In short, the picture that emerges is that the intentional states of the NR system provide the simple, representational foundation for a superstructure of speech acts and modes—a superstructure that far outruns the expressive power of that foundation.

24

I am alluding to the distinction between basic and derived intentionality—see Searle (1983). I am, however, re-expressing that distinction as one about representational content. G. Fodor (1987) offers an analysis of pre-linguistic, natural representation.

25

J. Fodor (1975 ; 1998 : ch. 6) contends that mentalese sentences of the language of thought can potentially express any thoughts that can be conveyed by natural-language sentences. Grice's intentionalist approach to meaning (1957) assumes that thought contents of natural-language sentences correspond to contents potentially possessed by intentional states. STA rejects such views.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

21

0.5 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK It should now be evident how, at least broadly, there might be a theory that denies theses F1 to F3, but we might have reservations about how deep and thoroughgoing the denial is. This can be shown only within the body of this essay. It will be seen that the characteristic structures of quantifier, open sentence, variable-binding, and even variable itself, do not appear, either on the surface or in underlying structures. The rest of the book is in four parts. In Part I, Making Semantics Pragmatic, I provide a detailed sketch of the STA framework as it applies to whole sentences. Chapter 1 puts forward the two leading ideas: the reporting/expressing distinction and PCT, along with the concept of proto-acts and modes. I motivate PCT by examining a number of anomalies for the semantic conception of truth and truth-bearers, or SCT, that naturally emerges from the Frege model's thesis, F2. The anomalies for SCT concern a class of sentences: epistemic adverbials and modals—sentences such as It might be raining, It is probably snowing conveying information about epistemic states; sentences featuring implicature-operators such as even, but, and therefore; declarative sentences with non-assertoric force; and non-declaratives, such as imperatives. I argue that these sentences are used to perform expressives speech acts, and I provide a theory of them in terms of PCT. I use the notion of proto-assertion and mode to analyse rhetorical forms of speech: irony, metaphor, and approximation. Chapter 2 begins with defending the idea that sentence-meanings are proto-illocutionary-act types. Chapter 2 deals with logically simple sentences. A commitment to properties as the potential denotata of predicates is defended, though one that does not require that all meaningful predicates denote. Complexes are analysed and the slingshotargument is deflected. The main semantic thesis is that pairs like The bull is mad, the bull's being mad are both capable of representing complexes, but they differ in discourse function. Thus sentences represent just as referring terms do, but differ radically in discourse function. A theory of adverbial modification is offered that confirms the thesis that simple sentence are capable of representing complexes. Adverbials are logically simple sentences pace Davidson (1966). Chapter 3 deals with more complex sentences. STA's analysis of mood-modified sentences, as in triples like Fred is leaping, Is Fred leaping?, and Fred, leap! is offered. Here STA denies the Frege model's distinction between sense and force. I explain the possibility of proto-assertion embedding and outline the expressivist analysis of logical compounds. A further issue discussed is embeddability of non-literal content and non-truth-conditionally relevant content in logical compounds, as in: If France is hexagonal, South America is triangular.

22

INTRODUCTION

Either the moon is the mother of the heavens or Venus is. Either Misha went but left early, or he didn't even go. If, as one can argue, approximative and metaphoric interpretations of sentences are pragmatic interpretations—then we have the embedding of non-literal, but truth-conditional content in the first two cases above. The third involves the embedding of conventional implicature content produced by but and even.26 STA has no problems of explaining these possibilities in terms of proto-assertion embeddability, but they are anomalous for the Frege model. Expressivist analyses of the truth-predicate, the existence-predicate, and identity are also provided. In Part II, Beyond Quantification, I enter into sub-sentential terrain. The goal is a general treatment of both grammatically singular and plural noun phrases. Chapter 4 outlines the general theory of proto-referring acts. It then puts forward a theory of proper names. The theory is neither direct referentialist nor descriptivist. The meaning of a proper name—its contribution to the meaning of simple subject–predicate sentences in which it is a constituent—is a proto-referring-act type. Employing ideas from Kripke (1980) and Devitt (1981, 1996), I propose that the type corresponding to a given token name is the protoreferring-act-type all of whose tokens are nodes in a certain referential tree. The structure of referential trees is partly analysed through proposing that proper names function in an anaphoric manner. The theory is perfectly neutral on denoting, non-denoting, and fictional names. Chapter 5 outlines a unified analysis of descriptive noun phrases. Descriptive noun phrases are divided into singular and plural. Singular noun phrases the F, an F, every F, any F, and one F are analysed grammatically as constituted by what I call α-terms, α-F, corresponding to a proto-act R(α-F)pro. Superscripting is then introduced to indicate alternative uses and interpretations of the basic act R(α-F)pro for each kind of descriptive noun phrase. The same holds for plurals, and what I call β-terms. α- and β-terms differ by designative function: singular as opposed to plural designation. The rest of Chapter 5 deals with the singular descriptive phrases. Analysis of adverbs of generality, such as usually and invariably, is also provided, furnishing a unified account of both particular and generic uses of an F. In Chapter 6 I examine plural descriptive phrases: β-terms. I also provide an initial discussion of how pronouns, both relative and anaphoric, function. Anaphoric pronouns are treated perfectly uniformly in STA. There is no semantic difference such as that between unbound and bound pronouns as postulated in some Frege-model accounts.

26

I argue that conventional implicatures qua conventional implicatures can enter into the scope of logical operators in Barker (2000 , 2003). See Blakemore (1987), Carston (1988), and Récanati (1989) for arguments that implicature cannot enter into logical form.

THE FREGE MODEL AND BEYOND

23

In Part III, Pre-Linguistic Representation and the Emergence of Semantics, I deal with the foundations of an intention-based semantics: the representational properties of intentional states. A hypothetical system of pre-linguistic representation and cognitive states is described. The goal here is to show how, in principle, STA is not committed to reproduction—in the sense of §0.4. The result demonstrates how semantic structures can emerge as an advance in content on a fundamentally simpler system. Chapter 7 describes the pre-linguistic, natural-representational, or NR, system in so far as it underpins the denotative and representational intentions of simple sentences. I provide a description of how the NR system structures the intentions underpinning proto-acts. Chapter 8 deals with the cognitive states expressed by de dicto logically complex sentences, such as negations, disjunctions, universal noun phrase sentences, and adverbs of quantification. I also articulate more clearly STA's expressivism about semantic norms and its psychologism: the account of how sentences express cognitive states is integral to the semantics that STA gives of them. Part IV, Grammar in Motion and the Entanglements of Discourse, elaborates further on the analysis of reference and generality and demonstrates how, in STA, surface grammar is the guide to semantic structure. Chapter 9 elaborates upon STA's treatments of indefinite descriptions, universal noun phrases, and negation. It analyses scope relations between all three. A theory of any is offered that is unified, unlike any theory I know, and compositional.27 Relative clause modification, as in Every dog that likes barking, and complexes phrases such as the friend of every girl are analysed with ease. That is, none of the usual syntactic transformations required in a quantificational system to get at logical form is needed. The initial investment into the structures of proto-act and mode has one of its pay-offs here. A central problem for theories of reference and generality is pronouns, in particular, donkey pronouns, as in discourses like (3): (3)

If a woman marries a man, she enters into a legal contract with him. He usually profits from it more than she does.

In Chapters 10 and 11 I compare the prospects of Frege-model theories and STA of dealing with such relatively complex discourses. Chapter 10 develops a general argument that the quantifier–variable-binding approaches available within the Frege model are unable to analyse a whole class of donkey pronouns. I call this the double-bind problem. I demonstrate its effects on two major approaches to anaphora—E- and D-type pronoun theory

27

See Hintikka (1996) for some recent discussion of any and compositionality.

24

INTRODUCTION

and Discourse Representation theory—but the conclusions apply to other approaches.28 Chapter 11 provides STA's general analysis of donkey pronouns. The account of pronouns is completely unified; one simple rule effectively applying to all. Various locutions interact with the apparatus of generality in English, the most interesting being if. It is very difficult within a quantificational framework to see how if-clauses could function in any unified way, both in singular cases—the indicative conditionals much studied by philosophers—and in general ifsentences, where if-clauses interact with phrases expressing generality.29 STA provides a unified treatment of if.

28

See Neale's D-type pronoun approach (1990), which works within a Russellian framework; the Dynamic Semantics of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991); the Discourse Representation Theory —or DRT—of Kamp and Reyle (1993).

29

See Lewis (1975b), Kratzer (1986), and Kamp and Reyle (1993). See also Barker (1997b) for a discussion of reconciling commitments about singular indicatives and commitments about general indicative conditionals, assuming standard quantificational frameworks.

PART I Making Semantics Pragmatic

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 1 A Path into Formal Pragmatics 1.0 INTRODUCTION The path into a formal pragmatic account of semantic content for a natural language is opened up by two ideas: (i) the concept of a proto-act and mode; and (ii) the pragmatic conception of truth—PCT. I begin my articulation and defence of STA by concentrating on (ii). According to PCT, truth-bearers are assertions and truth does not reside in correspondence to reality; two sentences can, by virtue of rule-based meaning, convey the same information about how things are but differ in truth-conditions.30 This is so because assertions come in expressive and reportive varieties. PCT is opposed to SCT—the semantic conception of truth—which entails that sentences meeting purely semantic conditions are truth-apt, and that sentences conveying the same information about how things are have identical truthconditions. In this chapter I argue that PCT is superior to SCT by demonstrating that a significant class of sentences is anomalous for SCT but not for PCT. That will lead us halfway into STA and set us up nicely to understand the other ingredient of STA: proto-acts and modes.

1.1 THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH (SCT) Let us suppose that propositions are assertion-independent entities; they are not speech acts. Say that a sentence S encodes a proposition «P» just in case linguistic rules (plus context) correlate «P» with S in an assertion-independent manner; the correlation holds whether S is asserted or appears embedded in a logical compound. The Frege model's basic conception of truth, SCT, is the dual thesis view: SCT (i) (ii)

30

A truth-apt sentence S is a declarative sentence S encoding a proposition «P». S is true iff what S says, «P», corresponds to how things are.

I am not alone in contending that truth can be made sense of only if it is posterior to assertion. See Dummett (1959).

28

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

SCT captures the idea that the conditions rendering a sentence S truth-apt are independent of assertion and that if S is true it is so by virtue of how things are with reality. We can see how various Frege-model theories articulate this idea, depending on how they construe proposition, saying and how things are, and correspondence. Consider first Frege-model theories that are realist about propositions. There are theories that treat propositions as extralinguistic entities like sets of possible worlds or states of affairs.31 A sentence S encodes a proposition «P» just in case the rules, plus context, determine that S stands for, is a sign for, «P». Alternatively, the rules plus context specify that S is true if and only if «P» obtains. What obtains means depends on what we mean by proposition. If «P» is a set of possible worlds, then obtains means that the actual world is a member of «P». If «P» is a structured state of affairs, with objects, properties, or relations as parts, then obtains means «P» has the form of a fact in the actual world. On this general conception of propositions, S's truth resides in its correspondence with reality in the sense that S is true just in case «P» obtains. A classical Fregean picture construes «P» as a thought or sense. By virtue of its correlation with a thought, a sentence S is truth-apt. S denotes the true or the false by virtue of facts of correspondence involving set-theoretic relations holding between objects in the world and concept-extensions, where the relevant objects and concepts are denoted by constituents of S. Some Frege-model theories propose that propositions are linguistic entities, such as interpreted semantic representations, deep structures or sentences in the language of thought that correspond to the interpreted logical forms of the English surface sentence, or structured meanings.32 On such views, sentences are true just in case these linguistic entities represent reality. Alternatively, the idea of correspondence is captured by the idea that T-sentences of the kind below hold for each sentence S encoding «P»: T: S is true iff R, where R is a metalanguage specification of what says. In short, the sentence S itself, or its object language interpretation R, specifies how things are. There are those theorists, such as Davidsonians, who deny the reality of propositions. For Davidsonians, to say that a sentence S encodes a proposition that P is just to say that linguistic rules and context specify that S is true if and only if P—where P translates S.33 Such theorists accept T as a specification of correspondence.

31

Thus, for the possible-worlds approach, see Stalnaker (1984) and Lewis (1986a); for the situation approach, see Barwise and Perry (1983); and for neo-Russellian approaches, see Kaplan (1977), Salmon (1986), Soames (1987), Crimmins (1992), and King (1996).

32

For the structured meaning approach, see Lewis (1972) and Cresswell (1985b). For neo-Fregean approaches, see Forbes (1990).

33

See e.g. Davidson (1984b) and Lycan (1984). This approach appeals to the relation of translating but provides an account of that relation that does not appeal to propositions as objects; rather it appeals to interpretative constraints of fitting a truth-theory to a speaker's linguistic activity.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

29

SCT is common ground for debates about truth. For example, both realists and anti-realists about truth accept SCT. Anti-realists do not dispute the correspondence conception of truth; rather, they propose an anti-realist interpretation of the concept of being-the-case (Dummett 1963). Minimalists, such as Horwich (1990), who think that our grasp of the truth-predicate resides in affirming all instances of the T-schema, accept SCT.34 SCT is compelling if we accept the idea that semantic content has some intimate connection to truth. Either we analyse semantic content through truth itself or we see truth as the property sentences have by virtue of being meaningful and the world being a certain way. That might make SCT seem a kind of platitude. But in fact it is a substantive thesis, one, I suggest, we should reject. SCT entails as a corollary the thesis Agree: Agree: If two declarative sentences S1 and S2 convey, by virtue of rule-based meaning, bodies of information about how things are, and that information is the same, then S1 and S2 agree in their truth-conditions. If two sentences convey information in a meaning-rule-based way, then they encode the same propositional contents; so, by SCT, they agree about truth-conditions. I argue below that a class of phenomena in natural languages—what I call expressive, non-factual, or non-reportive uses of sentences—falsify Agree. These sentences include (i) sentences featuring epistemic modal auxiliaries and epistemic adverbs; (ii) sentences with conventional implicatures; (iii) declarative sentences used non-assertorically; and (iv) non-declarative sentences. Such sentences are anomalies for SCT. In contrast, PCT, as sketched in §0.2, explains the relation of content to truth in these sentences.

1.2 ANOMALIES FOR SCT I begin with those sentences in English—which may employ modal auxiliaries and certain adverbs—whose role it is to convey information about speakers' epistemic states. Some examples are There might be life on Mars, There must be life on Mars, There is, perhaps, life on Mars, and There is probably life on Mars. Such sentences are truth-apt on their epistemic readings, but they seem to lack truth-conditions in the sense defined by SCT. That is because, I contend, such sentences involve an expressive use of language that is inexplicable given SCT. I concentrate on subjective probability statements to make my case, but the moral is a general one.

34

Some Frege-model theorists treat propositions themselves, rather than sentences encoding propositions, as the bearers of truth. (See Bach 1999 and Neale 1999 .) This alternative has no bearing on what I argue below. I therefore consider only the thesis that truth-bearers are sentences encoding propositions.

30

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

A speaker U can utter (1) below to convey that she has a strong degree of belief that there is life on Mars: (1)

There is probably life on Mars.

On this interpretation, (1) is truth-apt and can embed—for example, Either these samples are organic, and so there is probably life on Mars, or they are not. Thus, it seems, we must accept that SP below holds. (1)'s semantic content is given by the proposition displayed: SP: (1) uttered by U encodes «U strongly believes that there is life on Mars». If we accept SCT, however, utterances of (1) are true just in case U has the probability state specified; utterances of (1) are reports about U's own state. Such a theory cannot be right. For example, it renders dialogues like (2) irrational: (2)

JONES.

SMITH.

There is probably life on Mars.

True! There is probably life on Mars.

Given SP, Jones produces the truth-bearer (3), and Smith the truth-bearer (4): (3) (4)

There is probably life on Mars encodes «Jones strongly believes that there is life on Mars». There is probably life on Mars encodes «Smith strongly believes that there is life on Mars».

(3) and (4) are semantically distinct truth-bearers. By SCT, Jones and Smith are each making a report about their own epistemic states—they are talking about different states of affairs—but Smith's use of true assumes they are talking about the same state of affairs. SCT treats dialogue (2) as analogous to (5): (5)

JONES.

SMITH.

I strongly believe there is life on Mars.

True. I strongly believe there is life on Mars.

But (2) is not a case of talk at cross purposes, like (5). To explain the rationality of (2), proponents of SCT need to reject SP. They need to find a proposition that both Jones's and Smith's sentences encode, which enables there to be a common truth-bearer about whose truth both Jones and Smith agree. Some candidates are: (6) (7) (8)

«Jones and Smith both strongly believe that there is life on Mars». «A well-informed person strongly believes that there is life on Mars». «The contextually accepted evidence probabilizes that there is life on Mars».

Two arguments show that Jones and Smith cannot be making reports with such contents. First argument: assuming their utterances encode (6), would a third party H overhearing their utterances judge them true or false just in case H

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

31

believed (6)? Surely if H believed that there was no life on Mars she would judge their utterances false, even if she judged that (6) obtained. The same holds for (7) and (8). So (6) to (8) cannot be the encoded propositions.35 Second argument: if any of these are propositions encoded by Jones's and Smith's sentences in the dialogue that is encoded by (1), then they are analytically equivalent to (1). On that assumption, the following substitution argument can be given to show that the hypothesis that they are correct paraphrases must be false. Suppose that Jones asserts (9): (9)

It follows from the fact that these samples contain organic material that there is probably life on Mars.

Now (10) to (12) are derived by replacing the consequent of (9)—a sentence of the form (1)—with sentences encoding (6), (7), and (8): (10) It follows from the fact that these samples contain organic material that we strongly believe that there is life on Mars. (11) It follows from the fact that these samples contain organic material that a well-informed individual strongly believes that there is life on Mars. (12) It follows from the fact that these samples contain organic material that the evidence accepted in this conversation probabilizes that there is life on Mars. The ground that would make (9) true would not make (10) to (12) true.36 (10) to (12) fail to preserve the assertability properties of (9). So the substituted sentences are not truth-conditional equivalents of (1). This failure to preserve assertability cannot be explained by some peculiar intensional feature of these contexts. The result is in fact a puzzle, if we accept SCT and thus Agree. If two sentences encode the same proposition then, by Agree, they must have the same truth-conditions, and so be substitutable in such contexts.37

35

With respect to (7), what does appropriately informed individual mean? If it means, one knowing all the facts, then we simply cannot judge when Probably-S is true in situations of partial knowledge. So, appropriately informed must mean something falling short of omniscience. Perhaps it means: the well-educated person of my cultural group . But again this does not fit in with the actual practice of truth-evaluation of probability statements. Suppose someone in the eighteenth century asserts ‘There is probably life on the moon’. Is this individual asserting that the belief-states of well-educated eighteenth-century individuals assign high probability to there being life on the moon. Perhaps some well-educated eighteenth-century individuals did not believe that there was life anywhere but on earth, but that would not make the individual's utterance false. On the other hand, do we as twenty-first-century people judge this statement to be true? No. If we went back in a time machine to debate with this person, we would say ‘In fact you are wrong, there is no life on the moon’.

36

(10) to (12) are true only if the fact that the samples contain organic material entails that certain epistemic states—Jones and Smith's belief state, or the well-informed individual's belief state, or that defined by the conversational context—contain the belief that the samples contain organic material. (9) does not require any such thing for its truth. One can assert (9) and consistently deny any such entailments.

37

Why not suggest that (1) is a sentence encoding multiple propositions: (See Bach 1999 and Neale 1999 for discussion of such kinds of sentences). One might suggest that (1) encodes «There is life on Mars» and «I strongly belief that there is life on Mars», where the first is the principle proposition. This will not work, since one could clearly assert (1) but not be willing to assert that there is life on Mars. But on the multiple-proposition proposal, one would have to believe that there was life on Mars.

32

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

I submit that, if we think of truth and truth-conditional content as SCT requires, we shall be unable to say what facts about the world sentences like (1) are about. (1)'s truth-conditions are ineffable.38 This is good reason to suspect that SCT cannot be right. Instead, I suggest that (1) conveys information about the speaker's degrees of belief, but somehow the equivalence below is false: E: U's utterance of There is probably life on Mars is true iff U believes strongly that there is life on Mars. Note that the problem set by E's falsity is not generated by realism about propositions as the semantic contents of sentences. We can pose the same problem for SCT without such realism. (1) above and (13) below convey exactly the same sort of information about how things are with the speaker; nevertheless, they differ in truth-conditions: (13) I believe strongly that there is life on Mars. By Agree, (1) and (13) should have the same truth-conditions, but do not. This is a problem for SCT, whether or not a robust conception of propositions is accepted. It seems that proponents of SCT need to explain the falsity of E—that is, provide an analysis of the distinction between expressing and reporting, and so explain the semantic difference between (1) and (13). Here are proposals about how friends of SCT might attempt to do that (though these fail). One thought is to deny that sentences like (1) are really propositional in any sense at all. This is bad on two counts. First, sentences like (1) convey information about speakers' degrees of belief. Secondly they are truth-apt. A better thought is that sentences like (1) encode propositions differently from how they are encoded in (13). Suppose that propositions are structured entities and that sentences can bear distinct syntactical relations to those structures. The sentences (1) and (13) both encode the same proposition, but (13), we propose, explicitly represents the proposition—by having constituents corresponding to the constituents of the proposition—whereas (1) does not. Could this explain why they differ in truth-conditions, why (1) expresses a state, whilst (13) reports a state?39 It seems not. If the only difference is syntactic, why is (1) not simply an abbreviation of (13)? They should agree on truth-conditions.

38

That (1) conveys information about objective probabilities is manifestly a bad interpretation, since Jones's evidence may not equip him at all to make any judgement about objective probabilities of life.

39

This is an adaptation of a suggestion in Alston (2000), who attempts to account for the difference between assertions and other illocutionary acts by the idea that assertions involve explicit representations of propositions.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

33

Is there some difference in the sign–content relation in the case of expressive content? Think of propositions as states of affairs. One might suggest: Truth-Condition: «P» is a truth-condition for S iff S is a sign1 for «P». Expression: «P» is expressed by S iff S is a sign2 for «P». But this looks doomed since there would appear to be no distinct form of sign relations between sentences and states of affairs. Treating truth as primitive to illuminate truth-conditions and some other primitive property Ω to illuminate expressing is no better: Truth-Conditions: U utters S intending that it be true iff «P» obtains. Expression: U utters S intending that S be Ω iff «P» obtains. What would Ω be and how would it differ from truth?40 A final response is simply to treat our practice with probability statements as irrational; dialogue (2) is just an instance of talking at cross purposes. But this will not do. First, it is methodologically suspect, and, secondly, it fails to explain why; whereas (5) is obviously irrational, (2) does not appear to be so despite the fact that they are meant to encode the same propositions. I conclude that subjective probability statements are genuine anomalies for SCT. Indeed they are just one member of a class of such anomalous statements, the class of epistemic adverbials and modals: sentences including There might be life on Mars, There must be life on Mars, and so on. The anomaly is that sentence pairs such as (1) and (13) are correlated with the same state of affairs, but, whereas in one case, (13), that state of affairs is the topic of utterances of the sentence, in the other, (1), it is not the topic. The topic/non-topic distinction is pragmatic, rather than semantic in the strict sense of the Frege model, and moreover effects truth-conditions. So truth-bearers cannot simply be sentences encoding propositions as SCT states.

1.2.1 Conventional Implicature Epistemic adverbs and modals are not the only prima facie cases of literal, but non-reportive speech produced by utterance of declarative sentences. Another class of cases is constituted by sentences bearing conventional implicatures.

40

Hew Price (1988) offers an account of subjective probability statements according to which they are non-factual. That means they are used to convey information about states of mind about which it does not make much sense for audiences to dispute. But this type of account of the factual/non-factual distinction in discourse fails, since (1) and (13) convey information about exactly the same states of mind, but one is reportive and the other expressive. Another proposal by Price (1990) is that the distinction between reportive and expressive utterances is captured in the distinction between sentences governed by rules of representation, and those governed by rules specifying that a speaker can utter them when she has certain subjective states. On this view, sentences like (1) are governed by the second kind of rule. But this account will not tell us what the common truth-bearer is in discourse (2). Jones utters his sentence using the when-rule, and so does Smith, but what are they agreeing about?

34

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Implicature-operators are particles like even, but, nevertheless, therefore, too, and so on. Such operators have rule-governed meanings, but do not appear to be truth-conditional at all—see Grice (1971) and Blakemore (1987). The sentences below feature implicature-operators in italics: (14) Even Granny is drunk (15) It is female and therefore has an XX chromosome. (16) Fred went. And Jane went too. In uttering (14) the speaker U is reporting that Granny is drunk and implicates through even that: (a) for U there is a subjective probability scale in which (Granny is drunk) has lower probability than (N is drunk) for any N in some contextually determined class; (b) others are drunk. Moreover, U signals that the probability scale in (a) and belief in (b) are shared by, or uncontroversially acceptable for, her audience.41 In uttering (15), U indicates that her having an XX chromosome is entailed by an earlier sentence that is accepted as true by participants in the dialogue. Utterance of (16) carries an implicature that an assertion of a sentence N went is salient and accepted. Implicature-bearing sentences can come within the syntactic scope of logical operators and, moreover, semantically interact with such operators: (17) If there was beer at the party, then everyone, even Granny, would have got drunk. (18) Either it is female, and so therefore has an XX chromosome, or male, and so has an XY chromosome. (19) If Jane went, Fred went too. In (17) the implicature that others got drunk follows from the antecedent of (17) plus further background information. In (18), the salient premiss accepted as true whose presence is indicated by therefore is It is female, which is a conjunct in the first disjunct of (18). In (19), the dialogically salient sentence, accepted as true, whose presence is indicated by too, is the antecedent of the conditional.42 As implicatures embed, it follows that sentences with implicature-operators encode the propositions that are their implicata. By SCT, then, such implicata are components of the truth-conditions of sentences that have implicatureoperators. But implicatures are not truth-conditional. That is shown when we look at implicature-bearing sentences whose conventional implicatures fail. Take (20): (20) Even Mother Teresa was pious.

41

See Jackson (1987), Barker (1991), and Lycan (1991). There could be some disagreement about whether this is the right theory in terms of detail. But the details do not matter for the point about to be made.

42

I provide a detailed discussion of semantic embedding of implicatures, and most of the other points about implicature discussed in this section, in Barker (2003).

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

35

Proponents of SCT should find (20) puzzling. If U, in a meaning-rule-based way, is conveying the information that Mother Teresa is pious and that she, U, has a certain probability scale, then, assuming U is judged to be sincere, an audience should count (20) to be true. That is because, by SCT and Agree, (20) is truth-conditionally equivalent to (21): (21) Mother Teresa—amongst others—is pious and I find her being so comparatively surprising. But instead we find (20) incorrect or defective, because, apparently, we, the judges of (20), reject the subjective probability scale that U has. In this respect, (20) is like an epistemic adverbial, as described above. It might be objected that, in uttering (20), U is also conveying the information that the probability scale she has is uncontentious—that is, it will be possessed by others or easily acceptable. But, in that case, by SCT, (20) is equivalent to (21) plus a conjunct about the probability scale generally being accepted. If so, (20) must be false. But, again, this is not our reaction. Clearly we find (20) unassertable, but we are not willing to assert It is false that even Mother Teresa is pious. Similar comments apply to other implicature-operators. Take: (22) Australia is a continent. Therefore, I am a human. (23) Jane was the only one who went. Jane went too. (22) is unassertable, but not false. The defectiveness of (22) is not like that of the sentence: That Australia is a continent entails that I am human. This is obviously false, whereas (22) is simply odd. (23) is similarly unassertable but not false. It is not like asserting Jane and others went, which is obviously false given that Jane was the only one who went. Defenders of SCT have sought to explain away the phenomena of implicature. One idea is that implicature is simply vague or underdetermined truth-conditional content. But our reactions to such implicature-bearing sentences is not the same as our reactions to vague or indeterminate sentences.43 Another is that implicature is

43

Jackson and Pettit (1998) believe, a priori, that the only explanation for why implicature is non-truth-conditional content is that implicature particles such as even and but —the case they consider—lack clear-cut linguistic rules; there are no clear data about assertion for even -sentences, or but -sentences pertaining to their implicature contents, only thoroughgoing semantic indecision. But Jackson and Pettit's semantic indecision theory of implicature cannot be right. Our reaction to (20) is that it is defective owing to even 's committing the speaker U to something we reject—namely, that Mother Teresa is a marginal case of piety. So, even if the general meaning of even is a mess, here, at least, U's commitment is, for us, clear. But, in rejecting the commitment, we, nevertheless, do not pronounce (20) false . That, however, is what we would have to do, if, as the semantic indecision theory proposes, the difference between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional content were just determinateness of commitment. It is no good replying that this just shows that even is truth-conditional in U's idiolect. We, as interpreters of (20), are employing the rules of semantic interpretation of our idiolect, according to which U is committed to something that does not obtain. However, we refrain from judging the utterance false. Dummett (1981 : 86) also tries to palm off implicature as a kind of semantic deficiency.

36

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

truth-conditional but of a certain non-standard kind. This is proposed in Bach (1999), but this, as I have argued elsewhere, fails.44 To conclude, implicature is an anomalous phenomenon if we accept SCT. Implicature-bearing sentences, although containing components that are reports and so standardly truth-conditional, contain other parts that are not reports. (20) and (21) are, in this respect, counterexamples to Agree; they convey the same information about how things are but differ on truth-conditions. Implicatures are another case of non-topical, unreported, content.

1.2.2 Declaratives Used Non-Assertorically Consider the following dialogue: (24)

JONES.

I am going to order you to do something, Smith.

SMITH.

What's that, Sir?

JONES.

You're going to leave on that boat tomorrow.

SMITH.

But that is false, Sir. I am leaving tonight.

In (24), Smith's response That is false is inappropriate. It indicates that Smith has misunderstood Jones's utterance. Jones's utterance is just not up for truth-assessment, despite uttering a meaningful indicative sentence. On SCT, a truth-bearer is a sentence encoding a proposition. Jones's sentence is a truth-bearer since it is a sentence that encodes a proposition. It must then be truth-apt, but it is not, since the attribution of falsity is clearly inappropriate. So SCT must be wrong. A proponent of SCT might defend it by suggesting that SCT captures the semantic content of truth and falsity claims, but that such a theory needs to be supplemented by a theory of the pragmatics of the use of the truth- and falsitypredicates. Thus Smith in employing is false uses a semantic conception falsity-predicate, but, because the purpose of Jones's utterance is not to utter a truth, even though his utterance is false, asserting that it is false is contextually inappropriate. The problem with this response is to establish why it really would be inappropriate. According to SCT, Jones's purpose in uttering his sentence is to get Smith to ensure that the sentence is true. Given that the sentence is taken to be either true or false by both interlocutors, what is wrong with Smith's remark that it is in fact false? That would be a neat way of conveying that he cannot go tomorrow. Indeed, it is hard to see how uttering ‘That is false’ would not be entirely appropriate assuming SCT (or the corresponding thesis for falsity). The pragmatic defence of SCT looks shaky. Perhaps another idea is that there are two senses of the word true and false; true and false are ambiguous. One disambiguation, true1 and false1, is captured

44

See Barker (2003) for a more detailed treatment of these matters.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

37

by SCT. Jones's utterance is false1. The other disambiguation, true2 and false2, is not captured by SCT. Jones's utterance is not false2.45 But is there any evidence that true is ambiguous in this way? I think not. True in English is true2. As for true1, it may of course be a theoretical concept useful in semantic theory, but it does not deserve the name true.

1.2.3 Mood and Truth This brings us to the question of mood. We have so far been examining use of sentences that are declarative in mood. SCT talks about declarative sentences S and the conditions they have to meet to be truth-apt. But what does SCT imply about the truth-aptness or non-truth-aptness of non-declarative sentences? Of the three sentences below, only (25) seems to be truth-apt, while (26) and (27) are apparently not truth-apt sentences: (25) George will leap. (26) Will George leap? (27) George, leap! SCT says that truth-apt sentences are just declarative sentences encoding propositions, so why are (26) and (27) not truth-apt? One answer is that they lack declarative syntax and so are not truth-apt. But that cannot be right; rhetorical questions are truth-apt but lack declarative syntax. Take this dialogue: (28)

JONES. Brown is out there trying to sell suntan lotion on a winter's day. I mean really! Who is going to buy 15 plus when it's 15 below? SMITH. True. Who is going to?

In this case, Jones has produced a truth-bearer with a sentence in the interrogative mood. Non-declarative syntax is no bar to a sentence's being truth-apt. Perhaps some will be unconvinced. Smith is really applying true to the answer Nobody is going to buy 15 plus. But this reply fails. A speaker U may ask a question and want her audience H to recognize that there is a certain answer. But it does not follow from this that H, guessing the answer, can correctly use true as a response. In short, there is something about rhetorical questions that makes true an appropriate response. This boils down to admitting that they are truth-bearers after all. Another idea is to deny that non-declaratives have any propositional content. But this will not do, since they obviously do. Price (1988), in pondering the imperative mood, notes that the force of standard utterances of (27), performed as orders, will correspond to a state of affairs such as that U intends that George will make «George leaps» the case, or that, by virtue of U's utterance, George is

45

See Stenius (1967), who introduces something like this distinction.

38

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

now obligated to make «George leaps» the case. Thus, there are declarative sentences—(29) and (30)—that describe the state of affairs corresponding to the force content of imperatives: (29) I intend that George will make «George leaps» the case. (30) By virtue of my utterance George is now obligated to make «George leaps» the case. We now have the problem that the declarative sentences describing the force content convey the same information about how things are. So, why do they not have the same truth-conditions? A more sophisticated response than simply pointing to syntax or denying that non-declaratives have propositional content is to admit that, although non-declaratives are correlated with propositions, they do not encode those propositions, as is required for truth-aptness according to SCT. A necessary condition for a sentence's encoding a proposition «P» is that S's correlation with «P» is something that can survive embedding in logical compounds. But imperatives and interrogatives, it might be argued, cannot embed, so they cannot encode propositions. There are two problems with this embeddability-criterion response. First, the empirical premiss that non-declaratives never embed is false. Take: (31) If this coin is tossed, how likely is heads? (32) If it is raining outside, why it is that we cannot hear the rain? As far as I can see, our answer to (31) should be a value equal to the conditional probability Prob(the coin lands heads/the coin is tossed). If (31) is a question with conditional content, it is then a question about the probability of a conditional. The only way to explain the answers we provide to (31), then, is to assume that Prob(if S1, S2) = Prob(S2/S1). But, as Lewis (1976) shows, this leads to a contradiction. So (31) cannot be a question with conditional content. It seems it must be a question within the scope of an if-clause. (32), uttered inside a sealed room with general silence, cannot be a question with a conditional as content, as in Why is it that (if it is raining outside, we cannot hear the rain)?. That is because the answer to this question is simply that there is silence, since that is the explanation of the correctness of the conditional If it is raining outside, we cannot hear the rain. But the answer that U looks for in uttering (32) is about the explanation of the silence under the assumption of rain. The second problem with the embeddability-criterion response is that embeddability cannot be a condition on truthaptness, for rhetorical questions cannot embed but are truth-apt. Instead of attempting to explain away non-declaratives and their non-truth-aptness, we might attempt to explain it. Within the Frege model there have

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

39

been attempts to do this. There is Davidson's paratactic account of mood (1979). According to Davidson, an order Leap! is analysed as a pair of indicative sentences: (33) You will leap. That's an order. According to Davidson, such sentence pairs are not processed as conjunctions, and so truth cannot be predicated of them. So we explain how non-declaratives are never candidates for truth; they are implicitly non-conjunctive sentence pairs. But such an account is dubious on several counts. First, it is not obvious that non-conjoined n-tuples of sentences cannot be said to be true. Why cannot a speaker reply true to a long discourse, thereby communicating that the total is true. There are sentences with dual content that are not conjunctions but that still allow truth-predication, such as implicature-bearing sentences like Even the best philosophers get confused. Finally, how does the paratactic analysis deal with rhetorical questions? Another response is that of Lewis (1972). He boldly claims that directives possess truth-conditions. According to Lewis, they are paraphrasable as performatives of the form I order you to leap, which Lewis claims are truth-apt. As far as I can see, this just amounts to biting the bullet and admitting that imperatives and interrogatives are anomalies for SCT but ones that semantic theories should tolerate on the alleged grounds that only theories accepting SCT provide systematic, compositional semantics.

1.3 THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH (PCT) That completes my description of the evidence against SCT: adverbial and modal epistemics; implicature; non-asserted declaratives; and non-declaratives. I am not suggesting that the case against SCT is absolutely compelling, just that it faces significant anomalies. The case is strengthened only by the existence of an alternative, PCT—as outlined in my Introduction—which faces none of these difficulties. According to PCT, truth has nothing as such to do with correspondence or correct representation of a sentence meeting purely semantic conditions. Rather, all discourse is representational—uttered sentences always convey information about how things are—but it is only by looking at speaker purposes that speakers combine with such acts that we discern truth-aptness. PCT denies Agree; sentences can convey the same information, in a meaning-based way, about how things are but differ in truth-conditions. That is because, according to PCT, truth-bearers are assertions and assertions come in two forms: reportive and expressive assertions—acts defined by distinct purposes.

40

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Assertion on PCT is a bipartite act in which a speaker utters a sentence advertising an intention to represent a complex of a certain form in combination with an intention to defend a certain associated commitment property—as described in §0.2. Schematically: Assertion: U utters S and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉 and (b) intends to defend commitment to an assertion-relevant cognitive property Π. Depending on what Π is, the assertion is either reportive or expressive, as defined in §0.2. Roughly, in a report, Π is the property of being committed to intending to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉. If the assertion is expressive, then the complex U presents herself as intending to represent has the form 〈U, has X〉 and the commitment property Π is to intend to defend possession of the state X. On this picture, the falsity of Agree follows because two sentences can involve the same representational contents—they convey the same information about how things are—but differ on communicative purposes, and so differ on truth-conditions, since truth-bearers are assertions. (1) and (13) of §1.2 are an example of this, as I show in a moment. I now articulate this theory of assertion by applying it to the puzzle cases. Below I deal with adverbial and modal epistemics, implicature and mood. I postpone dealing with the puzzle of non-asserted declaratives until §1.5.1.

1.3.1 Adverbials and Modals Again Let us return to the probability statements and a comparison of (1) and (13), which are There is probably life on Mars and I strongly believe that there is life on Mars. The assertions produced by such utterances on PCT are analysed as follows, (13) having the structure of the report Prob1, and (1) the structure of the expressive assertion Prob2: Prob1: U utters 'I strongly believe that there is life on Mars' and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, strongly believes that there is life on Mars〉; and (b) intends to defend a commitment to the intention in (a)—namely, to represent the obtaining of 〈U, strongly believes that there is life on Mars〉. Prob2: U utters ‘There is probably life on Mars’ and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, strongly believes that there is life on Mars〉; and (b) intends to defend a commitment to possessing the state [strongly believing that there is life on Mars]. In both Prob1 and Prob2, a sentence is uttered in which an intention to represent a complex of the same kind is advertised—as in (a)—but distinct communicative intentions are displayed. Prob1 involves defence of a representational intention,

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

41

Prob2 defence of the probability state represented. The correct responses of an audience in a dialogue are therefore distinct. In the case of Prob1, H can properly say ‘true’, just in case she confirms commitment to: intending to represent a complex of the form 〈U, strongly believes that there is life on Mars〉—that is, just in case H believes U has the probability state. In the case of Prob2, H properly says ‘true’ just in case H confirms that she, H, has the probability state. How do these results relate to truth-bearers and the respective rationality and irrationality of dialogues (2) and (5) in §1.2? Dialogue (2)—JONES. There is probably life on Mars. SMITH. True! There is probably life on Mars—presented us with the problem of finding a common truth-bearer to which both Smith and Jones apply truth. Assuming SCT's conception of truth-bearers as sentences encoding propositions, we could find no truth-bearer, since we could find no proposition that both utterances could encode, fixing truth-conditions of the right kind. However, assuming PCT's conception of truth-bearers as assertions, we have no problem. The truth-bearer, I submit, is just the assertion type Prob2, where we think of ‘U’ as a variable. Jones and Smith both token instances of this type. To be more precise, a truth-bearer is an assertion type at a level of abstraction at which it still specifies a definite commitment. Prob2, with ‘U’ treated as a variable, specifies a definite commitment: commitment to the property [strongly believing that there is life on Mars], which is a determinate property Π. Jones and Smith's agreement is about being committed to having that property. Hence they token assertions both of which invite an audience to commit, or not, to having that property: being in a certain kind of subjective probability state. In general, truth-bearers are identified not by propositions, but by properties to which commitment is displayed. In contrast, dialogue (5) is an instance of talk at cross purposes. PCT explains this with its account of truth-bearers as assertion types. In (5) we find no assertion type that both Jones and Smith token that specifies a definite commitment. Both Jones and Smith token instances of Prob1, where again ‘U’ is taken as a variable. But Prob1 taken this way does not specify a definite commitment. It specifies a commitment to intending to represent a complex of the form 〉U, strongly believes that there is life on Mars〉 where ‘U’ is a variable. So no definite commitment property has been specified, since no value has been assigned to ‘U’. In other words, in dialogue (5), Jones produces an instance of Prob1 where ‘U’ is assigned Jones, and Smith tokens an instance where ‘U’ is assigned Smith. The commitments of their assertions are distinct. They talk at cross purposes. But in (2) they do not, since the commitments of their respective assertions are identical. In short, the move from SCT to PCT is to move from individuating truth-bearers by appeal to propositions, as defined in §1.1, to individuating them by appeal to commitments whose objects are certain properties. Both reportive and

42

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

expressive assertions are rightly called assertions because they both comprise purposes of defending such properties. What I have said here carries over to other expressive utterances, such as There might be life on Mars. In uttering such modals, U assertively expresses her possession of the epistemic property: possessing a belief-state whose content is consistent with There is life on Mars. Our response ‘true’ is based on whether we have a state of the same kind.46 In uttering ‘There must be life on Mars’, U expressively asserts her possession of the epistemic property: possessing a belief-state that entails There is life on Mars. And so on. Epistemic expressives are, if true, not true by virtue of how things are. The whole model of correspondence as articulated in SCT fails here. In denying the correspondence conception of truth, it is not being implied that they are true by virtue of subjective states of agreement. That too is a type of correspondence. Truth is not about mirroring how things are. Rather the truth-predicate is the device we use to express agreement about the assertive commitment properties of utterances. Note, however, that, when the commitment property of an utterance is a representational one—as it is in the case of a report—possessing the commitment property implies belief in the correspondence of the sentence with reality. In short, something like correspondence truth holds for reports. The error of SCT is the mistake of treating all utterances as reports. Note finally how Agree of §1.1 is falsified. (1) and (13) both agree about the information they convey about the world—U has a certain subjective-probability state—but they differ in truthconditions because they differ in communicative purpose.

1.3.2 Implicature as Presuppositional Expression The next class of puzzle cases for SCT were implicature-bearing sentences. Implicata are propositional contents, but implicature is not truth-conditional. In uttering ‘Even Granny got drunk’, U reports something but also implicates a state of surprise, and so on. In uttering ‘Therefore S’, U asserts that S, and implicates something. Implicature-bearing sentences of these kinds are dual-content utterances: one component truth-conditional, the other not. If implicatures are non-truth-conditional, that means, on PCT, that the implicature component of such dual-content utterances involves a communicative

46

Though a qualification is needed here. We judge U's statement that there might be life on Mars true, if we ourselves, thinking we have reasonable appreciation of the facts, are in a belief-state consistent with there being life on Mars. If, for example, I take myself to be ignorant of anything about Mars's potential for life, I will be inclined to withhold judgement. I might respond ‘Why ask me? I am not qualified to judge’. Thus, when called upon to express epistemic states of these kinds, we operate under the constraint that our states should be the results of reasonable appreciation of the domain in question. This does not mean that might -statements are reports about what adequately informed persons believe. The substitution argument, given in §1.2 , refutes that hypothesis.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

43

intention that is not assertoric. The non-assertoric communicative intention characteristic of implicature can be deduced from what theorists have observed about the discourse function of implicature operators. Following Blakemore (1987), implicature-operators are devices guiding speakers in the reception, transmission, and processing of information embodied in assertions (and other illocutionary acts like questions or orders). In that sense, implicata are taken for granted as background content. That leads quickly to a theory of the non-truth-conditionality of implicature. An implicature-bearing sentence, like S, therefore R, has a truth-condition, that R and S, and an implicature that R follows from S given BU, U's background of already accepted proto-assertions. In uttering ‘S, therefore R’, U performs two acts: Assertive Component: U utters S and R reporting something (as in Assertion). Implicative Component: By attaching therefore to R, U (a) advertises an intention to represent that she is in state ι: believing that S in BU entails R; and (b) intends that H, in processing the report that R, appeal to her, H's, possession of the same kind of state ι: [believing that S in BH entails R]. Likewise, in the case of a sentence like Even T is F, as in Even Granny is drunk, we have: Assertive Component: U utters ‘T is F’ reporting something (as in Assertion). Implicative Component: By attaching even to T is F, U (a) advertises an intention to represent that she is in state ι: finding (T is F) comparatively surprising for some class of individuals, and believing others in that class are F; and (b) intends that H, in processing the report that T is F, appeal to her, H's, possession of the state ι. In implicating, U advertises an intention to represent a cognitive state, but her purpose is not that her state be accepted—taken on board as potentially new information—or confirmed or possibly rejected. U is not defending the state. Rather U is in the business of expressing that something be taken as given so that she can get on with the business of defending assertoric commitments. The function of implicature is as background information. Because implicature does not employ assertoric communicative intentions, implicature is not truth-conditional. This is despite the fact that implicata are propositional contents in the sense that one can report what implicature contents are. To respond with true or false to implicated content is to mistake the whole enterprise in which the speaker is engaged. Compare: R, therefore S and R, S, and I believe that R entails S. The second reports what the first implicates. Both have U advertising an intention

44

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

to represent a complex, U's possession of a belief state, but differ with respect to communicative intentions. The sentences convey the same information about how things are but differ in truth-conditions—Agree is false. This is perfectly intelligible if we treat truth as posterior to assertion as PCT suggests and allow for non-assertoric communicative intentions. To conclude: implicature illustrates again the principle that representation is not linked directly to truth, as SCT proposes. Truth is not about correspondence to how things are. Rather, the truth-predicate is a device used to express our confirmation that we possess certain (assertoric) commitments.

1.3.3 Non-Assertive Illocutionary Acts I now move onto the puzzle of mood. As demonstrated in §1.2.3, SCT was unable to explain the non-truth-apt status of orders and questions. In contrast, PCT explains why utterances of imperatives to perform orders, or directives in general, are not truth-apt. Standardly used imperatives have the form: Directive: U utters ‘H, F!’ and (a) advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, desires that H sees to it that H Fs〉; and (b) intends that H believe that U possesses this desire. The communicative intention (b) above is not assertoric. Assertive purposes are characterized by the defence of commitments; the communicative intention (b) above is not of this kind. U's audience is not being invited to confirm or possibly reject a similar desire in her own case. Assertions are democratic in that they open up space for dispute. Imperatives are autocratic; they pre-empt dispute.47 For this reason, directives, and likewise questions, are not truth-apt. This is despite the fact that imperatives are correlated with propositional contents in the sense that they convey information about how things are. The purpose to which the representational act (a) in Directive is put is not an assertive one.

1.3.4 PCT's Conception of Truth-Bearers In sum, then, PCT, the pragmatic conception of truth, makes the following claim about truth-bearers. The objects of truth-evaluation are assertion types at a level of abstraction at which they specify definite commitment properties or they are token assertions. Assertions comprise a representational component—an act of advertising a representational intention—and a communicative purpose: that of defence of a commitment property.

47

Why does a language like ours allow for orders rather than merely reports about audience-directed desire states? The order, unlike the assertion, pre-empts dissent.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

45

This account of truth-bearers is a step towards formal pragmatics: STA. We have prized truth away from semantics in the pure sense. The picture that emerges about truth and content is one in which illocutionary acts across the board convey information about how things are, but differ in communicative purposes. They are truth-apt only if the purposes are ones of defending commitments. In short, all discourse is representational, but what gives it its diversity is purpose, the uses of representational acts. There is an objection, however. It is perhaps natural to think of sentences that are truth-apt as embeddable. Thus in Either S1 or S2 we think of the token disjuncts as truth-apt. However, these tokens are not asserted. If so, truth-apt sentences cannot be asserted sentences. STA can respond to this objection simply enough. In uttering Either S1 or S2, U does not perform embedded assertions with utterances of S1 and S2; nevertheless, the evaluation of the whole disjunction is in terms of the assertion types associated with S1 and S2. So STA denies that the token disjuncts are truth-apt as such. That idea will be elaborated and defended when compounds are examined in Chapter 3.

1.4 PROTO-ASSERTIONS AND REPERTOIRE RULES The pragmatic conception of truth-bearers I have just presented is a big step towards a formal pragmatic theory of content. (The full articulation of PCT is left until §3.5.) The next step is the concept of proto-acts and modes—as described in §0.2.1. Assertions are acts of the form described in Assertion in §1.3. An assertion is a bipartite act comprised by (a) uttering a sentence and advertising, or presenting, an intention to represent a complex of a certain form, in combination with (b) a communicative intention. The component (a) is a proto-act. As defined in §0.1, proto-acts are acts of advertising intentions of certain kinds. The intentions are designative and communicative. The proto-act (a) is an act of advertising a representational intention. An assertion comprises another proto-act: that of advertising a communicative intention. Thus an assertion comprises two proto-acts: Proto-representational act: U utters S advertising an intention to represent a complex. Proto-communicative act: U utters S advertising the purpose of defending a commitment property Π. So, in uttering ‘It is probably raining’, U advertises an intention to represent that she has a certain subjective probability state, and the purpose of defending possession of that state. The combination of the two is the proto-assertion, in

46

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

this case a proto-expressive assertion. In uttering ‘I strongly believe that it is raining’, U performs the same protorepresentational act but with a different proto-communicative act. The combination of the two is the proto-assertion, in this case a proto-reportive assertion. If U really is asserting in either case, she possesses the communicative intention that she advertises, though not necessarily the representational intention; she may be insincere but still assert. It will be convenient for the discussion below to represent the structure of proto-assertions and indeed standard assertions that employ them. Let S be any sentence. I represent a proto-representational act by REP(S)pro. I represent a proto-assertion performed by uttering S—the act REP(S)pro along with the proto-communicative act—by A(S)pro. If U performs A(S)pro and has the communicative intention she advertises, the proto-act A(S)pro has what I call a doxastic ground. I represent this as A(S)pro/dox. In general we then have: Standard Assertion: U asserts, literally, that P by uttering S iff (i) (ii)

U performs a proto-assertion A(S)pro (of either a reportive or expressive kind)—that is, U performs (a) the proto-representational act REP(S)pro, and (b) advertises the intention of defending a cognitive property Π; U has the intention (ib.)

In other words, U utters S and advertises two intentions: (a) to represent, (b) to defend, where U has the defensive intention. What follows now is an explication of the notion of proto-acting through the notion of a repertoire rule.

1.4.1 Repertoire Rules Sentential proto-acts are acts of uttering sentences advertising representational or communicative intentions. But what exactly is advertising or presenting an intention? Proto-acts come in simple and complex forms. I deal with the simple case first—that qualification will be understood until otherwise indicated. To perform a proto-act with a sentence is to advertise a representational or communicative intention. To advertise a representational or communicative intention is—as suggested in §0.1—to utter a sentence with an intention to act in a manner characteristic of speakers who, following certain rules, have such a representational or communicative intention.48 The rules I have in mind here are what I call repertoire rules—a term I adopt from Grice (1971). Repertoire rules are rules that specify what a speaker is permitted to do in order to achieve any particular representational or communicative goal she might have. Let us first consider

48

Let me stress that presenting herself and advertising are technical terms. They do not mean that the speaker feigns having the intention.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

47

representational goals. The following are representational repertoire rules in English, which specify what a speaker Σ can do if she desires to represent complexes with certain forms: RR1: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉, then she may utter the sentence Snow is white and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that snow is white).49 RR2: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈Socrates, wise〉, then she may utter the sentence Socrates is wise and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that Socrates is wise).50 These rules tell a speaker what she can do in order to achieve a certain designative purpose, in these cases, purposes of representing complexes. There is no implication that for any given complex whose obtaining a speaker might wish to represent there is only one way for the speaker, using the language L, to carry out that task. The repertoire rules can be thought of as expressively complete. If Σ wants to represent the complex 〈P〉, then Σ can utter S and achieve that goal, if 〈P〉 obtains. The phenomenon of indexicality complicates our representation of particular repertoire rules. For example, I saw him as uttered by U at time t is true just in case the denotation of I saw the denotation of him. The corresponding repertoire rule is: RR3: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈O, saw T 〉, where O is she, herself, Σ, and T an individual demonstratable by Σ in her vicinity, then Σ can utter ‘I saw him’ and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that 〈O saw T 〉 obtains and her terms denote as she believes). In short, take any complex capable of being represented in the language, then there is a repertoire rule that tells a speaker what she can do if she desires to represent that complex. I have called these repertoire rules. But we should call them, more precisely, rule theorems. That is because we can naturally see these particular repertoire rules as derivable from more general rules. That is, RR1 and RR2 can be thought of as derived from the more general rule RR4: RR4: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈T, F 〉, then she may take a term Γ that Σ believes to denote T, and a term Φ that Σ believes to denote being F and utter ‘Γ is Φ’ and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that 〈T, F 〉 obtains and her terms denote as she believes).

49

I use Σ for the arbitrary speaker referred to in repertoire rules.

50

I stress again that, if a sentence represents a complex, then that complex must obtain, so, if Σ's intention is to be successful, then the complex must obtain. I assume that these intentional contexts are transparent. The particular conceptions that the speaker has of the constituents of the complex are not important.

48

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

This derivation assumes that there are repertoire rules for constituents of sentences, such as referring terms. These rules would say that, if a speaker desires to denote an object x with a certain character, then she may utter a certain type of expression and will ceteris paribus achieve her goal. I shall discuss such denotational repertoire rules in Chapter 4. For the moment we have only to know of their existence rather than characterize them in detail. Some repertoire rules are to do with speakers' intending to represent their own cognitive states. So, for example, we have two rules: RR[Prob1]: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈Σ, strongly believes S 〉, then Σ can utter ‘Probably-S’ and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that 〈Σ, strongly believes S 〉 obtains). RR[Prob2]: If a speaker Σ wants to represent a complex of the form 〈Σ, strongly believes S 〉, then Σ can utter ‘I strongly believe that S’ and achieve that goal (assuming in fact that 〈Σ, strongly believes S 〉 obtains). In short, there is a whole class of repertoire rules, which speakers exploit in order to represent their cognitive states, which are required components of expressive assertions or of reports. Assertions contain a representational component: the advertising of a representational intention. They also contain a communicative component. Repertoire rules also underpin the communicative component. Consider assertions constituted by utterances of: (34) I strongly believe S. (35) Probably-S. Both involve core representational acts in which the same complex, about speaker subjective probability, is represented. They differ in that (34) is uttered in a reportive assertion and (35) in an expressive assertion. This is a rulebased feature of these sentences; there is a repertoire rule that holds that, if a speaker wants to represent a probability state and defend that representational intention, she can utter (34). There is another rule that, if a speaker wants to represent a probability state and defend that kind of state, she can utter (35).

Comments 1. Exploitation of mutually known repertoire rules is the basis of communication. In a communicative context in English, U can utter ‘Snow is white’ and intend to act as someone does who, following RR1, intends to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉. If H knows that speakers with representational intentions use such a rule, she can infer that U is intending to act as someone does who follows that rule. Moreover, H can infer from the fact that U wants H to infer something about her intentions—for example, that U intends H to believe that

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

49

she intends to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉, and, given the declarative form of her utterance, intends that H either accept or reject that representational intention. If this occurs, then the basis for communication has been laid down.51 2. Literal meaning is fixed by the repertoire rules. For example, it is a repertoire rule theorem that, roughly, if a speaker Σ has an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈snow, white〉 and wants to defend commitment to that intention, then she may utter a sentence of the form Snow is white and achieve her goal. This fact entails that, if U utters ‘Snow is white’ with the intentions corresponding to this rule, she is using the sentence with its literal content. 3. Being able to perform proto-assertions requires having certain knowledge. To perform a proto-assertion that P, U must be knowingly employing the repertoire rules in some language L. U might know, for example, that Du kennst das Land wo die Citronen blühen is a German sentence, and so know that in uttering it she will display herself, to a German speaker, as someone does who intends to represent a certain complex. But U will not be performing a proto-assertion, unless she knows what repertoire rules she is activating. That requires that she grasp the form of the complex the speaker hopes to represent, and the type of communicative purpose associated with that sentence. To know this requires knowing at least some German.52 4. Repertoire rules are not essentially shared rules; they are basically rules for a particular speaker's idiolect. This account makes no assumptions at all about speakers sharing common practices within some linguistic community. 5. I have claimed that, where U asserts that P, U proto-asserts that P, and U does that just in case U intentionally engages in a verbal behaviour characteristic of a speaker who intends to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉 and has a certain communicative intention, using the repertoire rules of L. This is right in one sense, but wrong in another. What makes for the differences are the different things we can mean by content of an assertion. Take the triple of utterances, (*) I love Cicero, performed by Cicero, (**) Tully loves Cicero, and (***) Cicero loves Cicero. These could all be said to be proto-assertions in which the speakers present themselves as intending to represent the same complex, but the resulting assertions have different contents, at least on one disambiguation of that term, and so then must the corresponding proto-assertions. To account for the sense on which they express assertions, and thus proto-assertions, with different contents

51

The basic conception of communication is found in Bach and Harnish (1979).

52

Indeed, knowing the language L could be modelled in terms of knowing which verbal acts constitute means of carrying out representational and communicative intentions in L; knowing L is to know L's repertoire rules. That means the speaker has assimilated the core repertoire rule axioms and has an ability to generate repertoire rule theorems. If so, knowing the language could in part be characterized as the speaker's ability (potentially) to perform all the proto-acts that could be used in communication situations using L.

50

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

we have to take into account the constituent proto-referring acts. Thus, the second utterance (**) has the structure: U utters ‘Tully loves Cicero’ and advertises intentions (a)

(i) to denote by Tully the object x:x is called Tully &… (ii) to denote by Cicero the object y:y is called Cicero &… (iii) to represent by the concatenation of Tully, Cicero, and loves a complex of the form 〈x, loves y〉; (b) defend commitment to the intention (iii).

So (**) has a different structure from the acts performed in uttering (*) and (***). In the case of (*) it is because an indexical is used. In the case of (***) it is because of a different name. These differences in referring terms are the basis for these differences of content.53 Nevertheless, for convenience, I shall abstract away from these matters, and simply propose that in uttering S and proto-assertion that P, as in uttering ‘Snow is white’ and proto-assertion that snow is white, U presents herself as intending to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉—that is, 〈snow, white〉. 6. Repertoire rules are, apparently, rules. My specification of them employs the modal auxiliary may indicating a normative component. But how is this reconciled with the naturalistic stance of STA? In Chapter 8 I show how repertoire rules are construed non-normatively.

1.4.2 Proto-Illocutionary Acts Assertions are a sub-class of illocutionary acts, which also include questions, orders, and promises. Proto-assertions are a subclass of proto-illocutionary acts. Proto-illocutionary acts in general are comprised by two components: an advertised representational intention and an advertised communicative intention. So, to give an example, in performing an order, by uttering ‘leap!’, U performs a proto-illocutionary act that is doxastically grounded: Leap! (i) (ii)

U utters ‘leap!’ and advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U desires that H sees to it that she leaps〉; (b) to make H believe she, U, possesses the desire in (a); U has the intention (ib).

The proto-act, which we can represent as O(leap!)pro, is the act in (i).

53

I note that speakers have capacities to fix in mind the form of the complex that they intend to represent, without there being any such complex or indeed, an abstract entity, a possible complex, in existence. This is the issue of the structure of the intention-encoding system, discussed in detail in Part III . The nature of the x s and y s employed above is explained there.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

51

Note that I have characterized the desire U expresses as the desire that H see to it that she leaps. Generally, in uttering ‘F!’, U expresses the desire that an audience see to it that she Fs. A better characterization of the desire is that H see to it that A(B Fs)pro is performable as a correct assertion. This takes into account the possibility that orders have ironic, metaphoric, or approximative contents. I discuss this issue below.

1.5 MODES OF INTERPRETATION We are now set to introduce the next significant concept necessary in the development of the apparatus of protoassertion and interpretations in STA. That is the notion of a mode of proto-assertion. As will be revealed later, this concept is central to the semantic purposes to which STA plans to put proto-assertions. Assertions can take interesting rhetorical forms: sarcastic, ironic, or metaphoric. If U asserts something sarcastically, that Fred—who for U is manifestly moronic—is a genius, U performs a proto-assertion, but lacks the intentions she advertises, but it could be said that U makes an assertion, indeed, in some sense. We might say similar things for metaphor. In asserting that the church is a rock, metaphorically, U has no intention to represent the complex that the church is a rock and the purpose that an interpreter take on that representational intention. Nevertheless, U makes an assertion; it is just not a literal one. The framework of proto-assertion can readily enough be adapted to explain the structure of these acts. Take the case of sarcasm. In sarcasm a speaker utters a sentence S expressing a content but intends to convey the contrary of that content. This rough idea can be conceived of, more precisely, as a use of proto-assertion, as follows: Sarcastic Assertion: U asserts sarcastically that P by uttering S iff (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(S)pro but lacks the advertised intentions; U advertises intentions (a) to represent her belief that a complex of the form 〈Q〉, contrary to one of the form 〈P〉, obtains; and (b) to defend the state in (a); U has the intention (iib).

In sarcasm, instead of the audience interpreting the speaker U as having the intentions she advertises in performing A(S)pro, it is taken that U lacks these intentions. U is doing something with the proto-assertion other than conveying her literal belief that P. What she is doing is given in the three-step structure above. (Compare this with the two-step structure of Standard Assertion.) There is the basic proto-act (i), then a further proto-act in which U presents herself as having an intention to put the proto-assertion to some use, that use being to convey that the contrary is the case. Then, finally, there is an intention that the

52

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

audience believe that U has this complex intention. So we have a type of doxastic grounding with respect to the complex proto-act given in (i) and (ii). Clearly we must distinguish interpretation from doxastic grounding, since sarcastic utterances, just like literal assertions, can be insincere. U may assert sarcastically that Fred is a real genius, even though U thinks Fred is rather smart.54 We can represent the structure of a sarcastic assertion as follows. Call (ii) of Sarcastic Assertion the sarcastic interpretation. I shall represent this through a subscript I—for ironic. U's act of performing the proto-act A(S)pro on a sarcastic interpretation is represented by A(S)pro/I-pro—that is, (i) and (ii) of Sarcastic Assertion. This act then receives a doxastic base, expressed as A(S)pro/I-pro/dox. That means U is to be taken as having the intention associated with A(S)pro/I-pro. This is the outermost intention advertised, that corresponding to (ii) above—namely, that U really intends to commit herself to a complex obtaining which is the contrary of what she presents herself as intending to represent in performing A(S)pro. I do not claim that the above is a perfectly adequate account of sarcasm. It is really a member of a family of types of rhetorical use including facetious utterance, irony, hyperbole, and types of echoic quotational uses—see Sperber and Wilson (1986). To give an adequate account we would need to broach a number of issues, including that of the evaluative implications that sarcastic assertions carry. Typically, in the sarcastic utterance ‘T is F’, F is some property on a scale of properties the obtaining of which is ranked according to desirability. This is the biting nature of sarcasm. Our concern here is not with these further matters, but with basic speech-act structure. One issue of some importance is that there is no linguistic rule for sarcasm. There is no linguistic rule involving a sign used to signify U's sarcastic intention. One might think that exaggerated voice stress is such a sign. U utters ‘He is so smart’. Is U not following a rule that says, if Σ seeks to express something ironically, Σ can voice stress so? Not at all. Rather, sarcasm, and ironic use in general, involve exploiting repertoire rules that have nothing to do with irony at all. In detecting sarcastic intent, audiences depend upon context, and disparity between semantic interpretation and known background belief. Take voice stress again. There is a rule for voice stress in connection with particles like so. It is the repertoire rule roughly expressible as: RR[Intensify]: If Σ wants to convey that O has a property F to a certain high degree, then Σ can employ so and apply voice stressing, as in O is so F.

54

Note how invoking proto-assertion is doing work here. We might attempt to analyse sarcastic assertion just by using the notion of a sentence, encoding a proposition «P», being uttered in conjunction with a commitment to the contrary to «P». This treatment does not capture the feeling that in some sense U is asserting that Fred is a genius, or at least pretending to. The analysis Sarcastic Assertion does this.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

53

A speaker U who uses so and intends to act as someone does who follows this rule is interpretable as being sarcastic if, given the context, it is manifestly obvious that U cannot have any intention to represent that O has F to a high degree. Irony is the general practice of inversion: presenting oneself either verbally or otherwise as believing that P when it is manifestly obvious that one does not. Equally, sarcasm and irony involve not the misuse of rules, but merely new and more sophisticated uses that emerge from the primary repertoire rules. Repertoire rules are not contravened. No convention is broken. That is because repertoire rules say only what a speaker Σ can do if she has a certain intention. They do not say that, if Σ does something, Σ must have some intention. Thus, the rule for intensification does not say that, if a speaker S employs so voiced stressed, as in O is so F, Σ really intends to represent that O has F to a high degree. No rule can take that form. There is no convention that, when followed, indicates, infallibly, that the speaker has any speech-act intention. There are, in other words, no rule-governed linguistic signs that the speaker is being sincere.55 Another use to which proto-assertions can be put is, arguably, metaphor. A metaphoric assertion comprises a structure of proto-assertion interpretation and grounding identical to that of ironic assertion. This is: Metaphor: U asserts metaphorically that P by uttering S iff (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(S)pro (but lacks the intentions advertised); U advertises intentions (a) to represent her belief that a complex obtains whose form is metaphorically modelled by the form of 〈P〉; and (b) to defend the state in (a); U has the intention advertised in (iib).

In a metaphor, say Romeo's uttering ‘Juliet is the sun’, Romeo has no intention to represent that Juliet has the property of being the sun. Rather, he signals that he lacks this intention, and rather seeks to convey that a complex of the form 〈Juliet, F〉 obtains, where F is a property associated with being the sun by his language community. (This is what it is for the form of a complex to be a metaphorical model for another.) The audience must determine which property F is. F could be, in the case of Romeo's metaphor, leaving aside the context of the play: Unbearable to look upon or Life-giving. Metaphor entails that, in asserting metaphorically, U does not have an intention to represent (literally) how things are; the primary proto-assertion (i) is not doxastically grounded. It may be objected that not all metaphor involves failure to produce literal assertion. For example, Donne writes ‘No man is an island’.

55

See Davidson's debate with Dummett. Dummett (1959) thinks that irony and lying are flouting the conventions of assertion, since Dummett thinks these are conventions about being sincere. Davidson (1984a) does not. The analysis of sarcasm in terms of repertoire rules and proto-assertions is in agreement with Davidson.

54

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Do we not plausibly interpret Donne both as intending to represent that no man is an island and as conveying metaphorically that something is the case? Certainly, what Donne says is, if taken literally, true. Which is simply to say that the proto-assertion he performs, A(No man is an island)pro, can be used to perform a literally true assertion. However, to the extent that we interpret Donne's proto-assertion as having a metaphoric mode, he is taken as lacking the intention he represents himself as having. Indeed, it may be that Donne desires that an audience sense both interpretations, one that has the form of Metaphor, and one that has the form of Standard Assertion. It may be that metaphors always involve either category errors or truisms. But, when they involve the latter, it is not the case that the speaker in making the metaphoric utterance is also asserting the truism. Metaphor, I propose, has the same general structure as sarcasm. We represent a metaphorical proto-assertion as A(S)pro/M-pro, where M is the mode of interpretation, and the act with doxastic ground as A(S)pro/M-pro/dox. My analysis involves separating, again, mode of interpretation—the formation of a complex proto-act—and a doxastic base. As with sarcastic assertions, metaphoric assertions can be insincere; it is not given that U has the intention to convey metaphorically that something is the case. The distinction between doxastic ground and interpretative mode is also required if we are to explain more complex interpretations. For example, there are those assertions described by Grice (1967) that are ironic metaphors. U could utter ‘Juliet is mud’ intending to communicate (ironically) that she is far from being mud. Here a complex (metaphoric) proto-act A(S)pro/M-pro—an act in which U presents herself as conveying something metaphorically—receives an ironic interpretation, written A(S)pro/I-pro/M-pro—U presents herself as intending to convey the opposite of the content of A(S)pro/M-pro—which then receives a doxastic base, whereby U is to be taken as having this last complex speech-act intention. I represent the whole act as A(S)pro/M-pro/I-pro/dox. Another mode of proto-assertion is approximative assertion. If I say that a certain baby crocodile is a metre long, I am almost certainly saying something false if by metre I mean the length fixed by the standard in Paris. We might propose, as a way of accommodating such approximative modes of speech, that is a metre = has a length identical to some degree of approximation to the standard. In that case, the term metre varies in its extension from context to context. This seems to be Lewis's view (1978). This strikes me as an unattractive analysis. It seems unattractive to say that the predicate hexagonal as used for features of material objects means has a shape approximating a perfect hexagon, rather than having a certain geometrical shape. I think we have a notion of literal truth according to which such utterances are not literally true, in the way that metaphors are not literally true. But on Lewis's account they would be literally

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

55

Fig. 1.1

true, since they assert that something approximates to a certain standard. They are capable of truth, but of a non-literal kind.56 An alternative is that we treat metre as univocal—it is simply used to pick out whatever length is the length of the standard in Paris. We then propose a mode of assertion approach to deal with approximation. On this view, an approximative assertion has the structure given below: Approximative Assertion: U asserts approximatively that P by uttering S iff (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(S)pro (but lacks the intentions displayed); U advertises intentions (a) to represent her belief that a complex obtains whose form is approximated by the form 〈P〉; and (b) to defend a commitment to a state in (a); U has the intention (iib).

So, sentences such as France is hexagonal should be treated as involving a univocal predicate but with an approximative mode of proto-assertion. Approximative modes may very well be a pervasive mode, in that many of our descriptions of the external physical world may be correct as proto-assertion only under the approximative mode.

Summary Let me sum up these proposals about proto-assertions and their modes. The interpretation of a proto-assertion has three elements. (i) (ii) (iii)

The core simple proto-assertion A(S)pro. Modes of interpretation: U may be taken as performing A(S)pro/M-pro and A(S)pro/M-pro/N-pro for modes M and N, and so on. Doxastic grounding: possession of the outermost speech-act intentions displayed in A(S)pro or A(S)pro/M-pro or A(S)pro/M-pro/N-pro, and so on.

We can represent degrees of complexity—using the examples at hand—as shown in Fig. 1.1. For a proto-assertion A(S)pro to be the main clause act in a self-standing

56

See Sperber and Wilson (2002) for a recent discussion of approximatives, disputing Lewis's analysis.

56

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

assertion, A(S)pro must have an assignment of interpretations that ends in a doxastic ground.

Comments 1. It might be submitted, in objection to all this, that the use of proto-assertions in modes of interpretation would undermine repertoire rules above—like RR1 and RR2 from §1.4.1—on which the possibility of proto-assertions and their interpretations depend. Not so! As long as it is clear when a speaker is exploiting the repertoire rules for purposes other than expressing beliefs, they will not be degraded. 2. Just as there is no rule for sarcasm, there is no linguistic rule for metaphor. How then can speakers perform complex acts like ironic metaphors like Juliet is mud as uttered by Romeo? The answer is that, in the case of A(S)pro/M-pro, U is engaging in the behaviour typical of someone who has an intention to represent something metaphorically. That is, where U = Romeo, U does the following: (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs a proto-act A(Juliet is mud)pro. It involves a category error or a truism. U is not expressing anyone else's view—it is not a type of indirect quotation—nor is U denying its literal content.

If (i) to (iii) hold, then U is engaging in the behaviour characteristic of someone intending to represent something metaphorically. Given that U = Romeo, the metaphoric content is not something that Romeo can be taken as believing. Since he is not reporting the metaphoric belief of another speaker, it follows that the best interpretation of his proto-assertion is that it is sarcastic or ironic.57 Obviously simple proto-acts are based on repertoire rules in a way that the complex proto-acts we have looked at are not. Nevertheless, we can still say that the speaker is engaging in a verbal behaviour characteristic of someone with certain intentions, although, in the complex cases, it is not a matter of merely following rules. Rather it is the result of U's employing certain repertoire rules in a certain context. So, in the case of sarcasm, U appeals to RR[Intensify] in a context in which it is clear that U lacks the belief that O has F to a high degree. That is the constitutive basis for her performing the complex, ironic, proto-assertion.

57

Again, we can ask the question, posed in n. 25, of whether we can understand irony and metaphor by just appealing to the notion of a speaker uttering sentences and encoding propositions, without invoking proto-acts. Ironic metaphor might be a problem. At best the account might propose: (i) U utters S encoding φ; (ii) U signals that she lacks any intention to convey that φ is the case; (iii) U signals that she intends to be taken as believing the opposite of the content that she might have expressed metaphorically by uttering S . Why does this seem not right? Irony involves a speaker engaging in certain behaviours from which typically one can infer ω, but in fact intending that ω is not the case. But the account above does not respect this basic idea, for U is not engaging in the behaviour typical of someone who intends to represent something metaphorically. To admit that U were, would just be to admit that she was performing a type of proto-act.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

57

1.5.1 Rhetorical Questions, Unasserted Declaratives, and Performatives Some non-assertoric illocutionary acts are modes of proto-assertions. Orders performed by utterances of declarative sentences are an example. Here we go back to the puzzle of non-asserted declaratives—dialogue (24)—discussed in §1.2.2. Jones produced the sentence You're going to leave on that boat tomorrow as an order. As such it is not truth-apt. Jones is performing a proto-assertion on a mode with a non-assertive purpose. Jones's act has the following form: Non-Assertoric Declarative (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(S)pro (but lacks the intentions advertised). U advertises an intention that H believe U desires that H see to it that a complex of the form 〈P〉 obtains. U has the intention advertised in (ii).

The intention in (ii) is advertised in the same way in which a metaphoric intention is advertised—that is, by context. Another mode of proto-assertion that generates non-assertions is performatives. Take the case of performatives. In uttering (36), (36) I bet $10, U is not making an assertion. U is not defending commitment to an intention to represent 〈U, bets $10〉. That would make a factual report about her own betting activity. Rather U's purpose is that H come to believe that U intends to bring about by virtue of her utterance that she has placed a bet. U's act has the form: (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(I bet $10)pro (but lacks the intentions advertised). U advertises an intention that H believe U intends to bring about by virtue of her utterance that U has bet $10. U has the intention advertised in (ii).

The communicative purpose in performatives is not an assertoric one. So they are not truth-apt. I note, however, that, in performatives, U often represents correctly the state of affairs brought about. So, in this case, U represents the complex kU bets $10l. But correct representation is not sufficient for truth. Rather, what is required in addition is the purpose of defending the commitment property of intending to represent. Hence performatives are not truth-apt.58

58

Performatives come in all sorts of forms and there is a considerable literature on them, which cannot be canvassed here—see Austin (1962), Bach and Harnish (1979), and Lycan (1984 , 2000). The problematic character of performatives is often presented this way. On the one hand, they appear not to be assertions, since they are doings. On the other hand, they appear to be assertions because the speaker is saying something that describes her act—see Cohen (1964). As should be evident, STA resolves this tension. The fact that the speaker correctly represents her act does not imply that her utterance is truth-apt or an assertion: an assertoric intention is required as well, but this is missing.

58

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Rhetorical questions, in contrast to the modes above, are truth-apt. They are assertions that are modes of protoillocutionary acts that are not proto-assertions. Take a simple case. U utters ‘Who would do that?’, conveying that only a fool would. U performs a proto-question Q(Who would do that?)pro, an act in which (a) U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U desires that H informs U of the x satisfying {would do that}〉, where U advertises (b) the purpose that H believe she has the desire in (a). The rhetorical question is a mode of this act, as in: Rhetorical Question (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs Q(Who would do that?)pro (but lacks the advertised intentions). U advertises the intention of defending commitment to the belief in the obvious answer: that a person who satisfies {would do that} is a fool. U has the intention (ii).

This is truth-apt because the communicative purpose is an assertoric one. There are other related puzzle cases explained by STA. U might make an assertion by uttering ‘I think we need to address world poverty’. H replies ‘true’. U is not reporting about her own belief state, but providing instead an expressive assertion. The state she defends is the belief that we need to address world poverty, which is described by her sentence. H replies ‘true’ expressing her acceptance of that kind of state in her, H's, own case.

1.6 PERMISSIBILITY AND SUPPOSITION Modes, evidently, are of central importance to STA; indeed, as we shall see, STA treats most semantically complex operations in natural languages through modes. I now link the concept of mode to another concept: permissibility. Let a dialogue be any episode of speech such as a conversation or a speaker engaging in soliloquy. Dialogues are, ideally, cooperative, rational, and goal-directed ventures. A proto-assertion A(S)pro is permissible in a dialogue D at time t just in case all speakers in D at t allow token performance of it. A sufficient condition for permissibility in terms of modes is given in SUFF: SUFF: If a proto-act token A(S)pro is performed on some mode, A(S)pro/…/M-pro′, at time t in D, then, if the commitment associated with the outermost mode M is believed, and the commitment is conversationally apt, the token A(S)pro, and similar tokens on the same interpretation are allowed or permissible. SUFF falls in line with the idea that dialogues are purpose-directed enterprises and modes correspond to purposes to which proto-acts are put.

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

59

Modes correspond to the kinds of purposes for which speakers employ proto-acts A(S)pro. No account of proto-acting and modes can hope to describe all the purposes to which A(S)pro can be put. The range of purposes is as varied and rich as the range of interests of speakers and the ingenuity of speakers in creating new language games. Straight doxastic grounding, irony, metaphor, ironic metaphor, and approximation are some core, salient cases. But there are many others. For example, if a speaker is performing spontaneous lyrical poetry, U produces proto-acts A(S)pro′, but what are the conditions of permissibility? Perhaps that all members believe that U is sincerely giving vent to some range of authentic emotions. For example, U cannot quote other work. On the other hand, we might imagine other very specialized games. A condition of permissibility in a particular conversation might be that speakers begin sentences with N and say something abusive to other members of the conversation in a Russian accent. Although a completely comprehensive theory of modes cannot be given here, I will in the course of this book offer descriptions of a number of possible modes of proto-assertion that correspond to important linguistic functions. I now consider the case of supposition, since it is a function of central importance to understanding natural languages.

1.6.1 The Suppositional Mode SUFF describes a sufficient condition for permissibility. But is the condition a necessary condition for permissibility? Does the permissibility of a token A(S)pro just mean that A(S)pro is performed in an act A(S)pro/..M-pro/dox where the commitment of the outer mode M is believed? There are reasons to think not. An analogy will help. Suppose a bouncer is on the door of an exclusive club. The bouncer follows certain rules with respect to permitting entry to members of the public. If a would-be patron x is willing to pay $100, or is a celebrity, or is a club regular, then the entry of x must be permitted. These conditions are sufficient for permitted entry. They are, however, not necessary conditions for permitted entry. The bouncer has a certain discretionary power. He can allow entry to x if he wants to see what allowing entry to x will do for the mood of the club. The bouncer can permit entry to see what the consequences of permitting entry are for a given x. In short, permissibility of entry does not entail that any of the substantive sufficient conditions for entry mentioned above hold. We might see something similar with respect to the permissibility of proto-assertions. It could be that participants of a dialogue D at t do not have the right beliefs to deem the proto-assertion A(There is life on Mars)pro permissible qua doxastically grounded act. U and participants in D at t might allow its performance not because it has some other interpretation, and participants believe the commitments on that interpretation hold. However, they may allow performance

60

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

of A(There is life on Mars)pro for another reason; they want to determine what the verbal consequences of allowing its performance are. Verbal consequences refers to the proto-assertions that would be rendered permissible by the permissibility of A(There is life on Mars)pro and other proto-assertions accepted at the time of utterance. I suggest that, if participants do this, they are supposing that there is life on Mars, or, as we might say, they are allowing for the sake of argument that there is life on Mars.59 Suppositions involve an intersubjective aspect, as we shall see. To begin, I abstract away from the intersubjective and consider a speaker U in isolation. If U supposes S, then U performs a proto-assertion A(S)pro where the use to which A(S)pro is put is the goal of determining what further proto-acts follow as permissible from A(S)pro and proto-assertions U already accepts—which express U's background beliefs and perhaps other suppositions U has made. Call this set of background proto-acts BU. Thus, in supposition, U performs A(S)pro′, advertises representational and communicative intentions, but lacks them. Instead, U performs A(S)pro so as to be able to display other illocutionary acts I(R)pro whose permissibility follows from that of A(S)pro and other accepted proto-assertions in her background state BU. So, in introducing a supposition that S, U instantiates the rule SupUS—supposition of S for U. The rule implies that U's token acts I(R)pro are counted permissible just in case their permissibility is entailed by the set of proto-assertions counted as permissible by U, BU + A(S)pro. Below→is entailment: SupUS: Tokens I(R)pro are permissible in D at t iff BU + A(S)pro → (I(R)pro is permissible) If U's modified state BU + A(S)pro entails the permissibility of I(R)pro, that is, if (i) below holds, (i)

BU + A(S)pro → (I(R)pro is permissible),

then U, if she desires, performs a token I(R)pro. She utters ‘Suppose S. Then R’. The simplest case of supposition is that, where the supposed sentence is just a simple indicative sentence, S, and A(S)pro has no mode of interpretation. Given it is a simple proto-assertion, then its permissibility has exactly the same verbal consequences in BU as the permissibility of a doxastically grounded act,

59

The very possibility of supposition depends upon the idea that permissibility is allowability for which SUFF articulates sufficient but not necessary conditions. If permissibility always required that A(S )pro be performed in an act A(S )pro/../M-pro/dox where the commitment for the outer mode M was believed, then U could not allow performance of A(S )pro as a type of experiment, through stipulated permissibility, to determine consequences thereof. It does not follow from this that there are no constraints on supposition. For example, in supposing that the King of France is bald, it must already be accepted that there is a King of France, but this may not be accepted, so supposing that the King of France is bald will not then be permissible. I will not go into details about suppositional presupposition here—but see Barker (1995 , 1996).

A PATH INTO FORMAL PRAGMATICS

61

A(S)pro/dox. Effectively, in a supposition of a simple proto-assertion A(S)pro′, the stipulation of the permissibility of A(S)pro plays the role normally played by a doxastic ground for A(S)pro. In short, A(S)pro′, stipulated to be permissible in the sense described above, has the same logical powers in BU as A(S)pro based on a doxastic ground. Thus, if the doxastically grounded proto-act A(S)pro/dox and BU entails the permissibility of I(R)pro/dox′, then a consequence of the stipulated permissibility of A(S)pro in BU is that I(R)pro is permissible in the state BU plus the stipulated A(S)pro.60 The permissibility of I(R)pro is one of the verbal consequences in this sense of the supposition. U may then perform the act I(R)pro with the intention of displaying instances of proto-acts that follow as permissible from A(S)pro and BU. Such performances of I(R)pro are what we might call conditional proto-acts: proto-illocutionary acts, proto-assertions, or otherwise, performed in the scope of a supposition—that is, with the rule SupUS in place.61 We can think of supposition and conditionality as modes of proto-assertion. Let us represent A(S)pro on a suppositional interpretation as A(S)pro/S-pro′, and I(R)pro on a conditional interpretation as I(R)pro/C-pro. A(S)pro/S-pro in BU entails the permissibility of I(R)pro/C-pro just in case acceptance of the commitments characteristically generated by I(R)pro/dox follow from the permissibility of A(S)pro in BU. Standard hypothetical proofs like Suppose Socrates is Greek, Greeks are wise; So, Socrates is wise are cases where the commitment of the consequent supported by the supposition is a core assertive one. Cases like Even George, assuming this is a surprising fact, got drunk, are ones where the supported commitment is not a core assertive one, but one that arises from an implicature. Suppositions may ground the permissibility not merely of protoassertions but also of other types of proto-illocutionary acts, like questions. In Suppose there is life on Mars. What form will it take? we can see that the commitment of question, that there is life on Mars, is grounded upon the supposition. In short, the question takes a conditional form. See Barker (1995) for discussion of these cases.

1.6.2 Intersubjectivity I have so far discussed suppositions for the speaker U considered in isolation. But suppositional proofs are intersubjective affairs. In introducing a supposition into a dialogue D at t, say through a directive—Let us just assume for the moment that S—U requires her audience to instantiate a property: being in Bx + A(S)pro. If the

60

We might say that in simple supposition U is simulating a belief state that P, at least with respect to the verbal consequences of belief. Not all features of a belief state are simulated. For example, if U believes that P, a typical causal consequence is that U believes that she believes that P. The latter is not a logical consequence of the former. This is fortunate, since If S, I believe that S is not generally correct.

61

This is not the conditional assertion of Jeffrey (1961), Belnap (1973), McDermott (1996), etc.

62

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

directive is accepted, U and her audience have now introduced suppositional frameworks, each for their own state Bx. In utterance of Suppose S. Then R U implicates her acceptance of the suppositional framework, that her proto-act A(R)pro is in the scope of BU + A(S)pro. Because she implicates this state, the audience H evaluates U's act A(R)pro from within her own state, BH—that is, BH + A(S)pro. If H rejects A(R)pro within her state BH + A(S)pro′, then H rejects H's utterance from within U's state BU + A(S)pro. This type of intersubjectivity is the same kind that is exhibited by epistemic modals and adverbials and implicature statements like S, therefore R—see §§1.3.1 and 1.3.2. In uttering ‘He is an Englishman. He is therefore brave’, U implicates that she believes that He is an Englishman in BU entails He is brave. H responds not by consulting U's state BU, but her own BH. The point of such exchanges is that U and H can thereby critique each other's inferential practices and the contents of their respective states BU or BH. The same goes on with suppositional proof.62

Comments 1. What is the interest of such an account of supposition? The interest is that it explains what supposition is. Other accounts do not. Supposition is typically taken as primitive or only gestured to metaphorically. So Ramsey (1931) speaks of supposition in terms of adding S hypothetically to a stock of beliefs. But what is adding? At best, it is a metaphor pointing towards a substantial account that Ramsey and his followers do not give. Mackie (1973: 98) suggests that supposition can be understood in terms of activities of ‘constructing, contemplating, or examining a possible world’. But what exactly are these activities? Part of the interest of proto-assertion and modes thereof is that it provides a substantial account of what this activity is, central to hypothetical reasoning. 2. Of course, this raises the issue of the relation of supposition to conditionals. Clearly, following the spirit of the Ramsey test—the proposal in Ramsey (1931) that we evaluate indicative conditionals according to a type of hypothetical reasoning—we could say that an indicative If S1, S2 is assertable for U just in case the supposition A(S1)pro/S-pro grounds in BU the conditional assertion A(S2)pro/C-pro. The question is, what does U semantically do in uttering If S1, S2? One suggestion is that the speaker performs a type of compound proto-assertion. U utters S1, and by attaching if signals that her proto-act is suppositional. U's utterance of S2, with if S1 prefixed, is a conditional protoassertion. Indeed, this is the suggestion that will be pursued below, but it brings in matters about the embedding of proto-acts, which are left until §3.4.2.

62

Suppositions, like presuppositions, are elements of conversational score, in the sense of Lewis (1979). If it is supposed that S , this fact is a feature or structure of the conversation for a certain stretch of time. It may be a subtle interpretative matter to know when one is in play or not.

CHAPTER 2 Sentence-Meanings as Proto-Acts 2.0 INTRODUCTION The term sentence-meaning is ambiguous. It can mean the linguistic meaning or character of a sentence; the meaning shared by all tokens of I am hungry.63 It can also mean semantic content; the content that a fully interpreted token of I am hungry has, that allows it to express a determinate thought. Sentence-meaning may connote illocutionary act. Utterances of the sentences Are you hungry?, You, be hungry!, and You are hungry differ with respect to the kind of illocutionary acts performed, these being questions, orders, and assertions respectively. The Frege model—at least in its classical form—affirms that sentence-meanings in the first two senses—linguistic meaning and semantic content—are characterized by semantics, which is a distinct theoretical enterprise from pragmatics, which characterizes sentencemeaning in the third sense.64 In contrast, according to the speech-act-theoretic approach to meaning, STA, sentencemeanings in all three senses are characterized by speech-act structures; the three kinds of sentence-meanings are speech-act types at different levels of abstraction. So pragmatics, the theory of speech-act structures, subsumes semantics as a particular sub-domain. Semantics is a kind of formal, abstract pragmatics. In STA, sentence-meanings in all these senses are act types of certain kinds: utterances of grammatically structured strings whereby representational and communicative intentions are advertised. The presentational natures of protoacts—the fact that proto-acts can be performed even though speakers do not have the intentions they advertise—give them the flexibility to function as meanings, both sentential and sub-sentential. Proto-acts are not self-standing, complete acts that are the end products of the combination of prior contentful constituents. Rather, proto-acts are constituents of completed acts. Proto-acts can then function as the building blocks of a theory of meaning. That means there are sub-sentential proto-acts, but, as we shall see in Part II, such postulation is unproblematic. There is no ontological consideration barring act types from functioning as meanings. Their doing so is commensurate with a use-theory of meaning. According to a use-theory, the meaning of a sentence is the way the sentence

63

Character is Kaplan's term (1977).

64

Davidson (1984b) and Lewis (1972) are non-classical Frege-model theories in that they attempt to assimilate force and mood to truth-conditional semantics—see §1.2.3 .

64

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

is used. Assuming sentence use is intentional action, a sentence's use is the act type characteristically performed in uttering the sentence. In STA, the act type is the proto-act type; the act of uttering a grammatical string and intending to engage in a behaviour characteristic of a speaker who, appealing to certain repertoire rules, has certain purposes. There are many purposes, so many act types. STA then has a rich array of acts from which to construct meanings. STA allows for untokened types since speech-act types are not primitive objects. They are fixed by some finite set of token acts plus the rules that inform them. There is also no limit on the number of proto-acts. For example, we can claim that, for every real number, there is a proto-assertion that affirms it has a certain property. By this we just mean that, for each real number, our language either has a term denoting it or can be extended so as to contain one, and so consequently will contain the corresponding proto-assertion.65 Meaning theory, according to STA, is not about describing truth-conditions of sentences—as proposed by some Frege-model theories. Meaning theory is about describing speech-act structures. This chapter begins the defence and development of this approach to meaning. It begins with logically simple sentences—sentences like Earth is round, Paul loves Bob—the simplest kinds of sentences there are. For STA, logically simple declarative sentences are sentences whose associated proto-assertions are reportive proto-assertions. They are reportives. Logically complex declarative sentences are ones whose semantic interpretations are expressive proto-assertions or, in the case of if-sentences, protoimplicatives.66 Logically complex sentences express cognitive states that are commitments about the correctness of certain proto-assertions. Sentences that Frege-model theories normally take to be logically complex may, in STA, be included in the class of logically simple sentences. STA shifts the boundaries of taxonomy, though it must be admitted where the line is between logically simple and logically complex is ultimately not such an interesting issue, since the term logically complex does not pick out any fundamental, or explanatory, semantic property. Logically simple sentences in STA, reportives, extend beyond simple subject– predicate sentences such as Earth is round with simple singular terms as grammatical subjects. There are higher-order complexes—complexes that have complexes

65

The idea of language extensions is the technique that theorists use to account for quantification over non-denumerably infinite domains of entities. See Kripke (1976) and Evans (1977). Another concern is that the thesis that assertion types are truth-bearers means STA falls into a kind of idealism; STA, one might claim, cannot account for the truth of sentences like There might have been no intentional creatures but still truths about the world . I think this is false because by truths about a world we just mean what is true in the descriptions we fashion in this world of a possible world. Here I invoke Kaplan's distinction between context of interpretation and context of evaluation. Our sentences are interpreted in this world but evaluated in actual and non-actual possible worlds.

66

I shall let the qualification declarative be understood from now on. Not all logically complex declarative sentences correspond to expressive assertions. For example, if , as I argue in §3.4.2 , is an implicature-operator. So if -sentences correspond to presuppositional expressives.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

65

as constituents. According to STA, adverbial modification and certain kinds of presuppositions are those devices used in the representation of higher-order complexes: sentences like Max spoke quickly and Alba was happy in Mexico City. Such sentences are logically simple sentences, since they involve no modes. Adverbial modification is a type of sentence construction in which the fact that sentences have designative functions, that they can represent complexes, is exploited. Effectively, sentences can function like singular terms for complexes. Within STA, sentences featuring definite descriptions, such as The boy drank the beer, are also logically simple. This is maintained because, according to STA, definite descriptions are genuine singular terms. Very controversially, STA also includes simple sentences using indefinite descriptions in the logically simple class as well. That view, and how it is articulated within the STA framework, is examined in Part II. Simple subject–predicate sentences with plural noun phrases of the form the Fs are also simple, in the same sense, since these do not employ modes. Such sentences are discussed in Chapter 6. In this chapter I confine myself to the basic semantic features of reportive utterances—excluding the intricacies of their constituent noun phrases, which are left until Part II. I focus on their contact with reality, the metaphysics of, and representation of, complexes. I relate these matters back to the general theses about meaning stated above.

2.1 LOGICALLY SIMPLE SENTENCES: SEMANTICS MEETS METAPHYSICS As proposed in §0.2, simple declarative sentences are sentences that in literal, self-standing utterances produce reports about reality, in the sense defined in Report. Where an utterance of S constitutes a report, and that report is true, S represents a complex. This is unlike logically complex sentences, whose standard utterances are, if-sentences aside, expressive assertions. Their truth-conditions, if they have any, are not fixed by the existence of a complex that U presents herself as intending to represent. In other words, the complexes represented by true logically simple sentences are topics. They are what the assertion is about. U utters S intending to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉, with the communicative intention of defending that representational intention. In logically complex sentences, the represented complex is not the topic. U is not defending an intention to represent the complex, but rather, the cognitive state represented. One might say that a correspondence theory of truth holds for simple sentences—simple sentences correspond, when true, to complexes—but correspondence truth does not hold for logically complex sentences. This is not to say that truth means something different in these two cases. The truth-predicate has

66

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

exactly the same function, but, owing to the differing nature of the communicative intentions in reportive assertions and expressive assertions, truth has distinct implications with respect to representation. (I say more about this in §3.5.) Where S is simple, S's truth implies that S represents a complex 〈P〉. But the converse does not hold; S's representing 〈P〉 does not imply that S is true. The reason is that the conditions that have to be met by S to be representing-apt do not entail that S is truth-apt. The condition for representing-aptness is simply that S is uttered with the intention to act in accordance with a repertoire rule of the appropriate kind. The relevant repertoire rule specifies that, if a speaker S wants to represent a complex of the form 〈P〉, then she can utter S, and, if a complex of the form 〈P〉 obtains, she will succeed. So, simply performing the proto-act A(S)pro—utterance in accordance with the repertoire rule—is all that is required for S to be representing-apt. However, truth-aptness requires that S be uttered as part of the act A(S)pro/dox in which U has a communicative purpose.67 Hence, because A(S)pro can be performed without A(S)pro/dox being performed, S can represent 〈P〉, A(S)pro is performed, and 〈P〉 exists, but the token S is not true per se. It is not truth-apt, since A(S)pro/dox is not performed. I emphasize that it is not essential to the meaningfulness of a simple sentence that it is truth-apt, or that it represents any complex. An analogy is with proper names. A name's being meaningful does not require that it designates an object, according to STA. Just as there can be empty names—meaningful but designationless—so there can be empty sentences—meaningful but designationless; they represent nothing. What is required for meaningfulness in both cases is that a proto-act is performed. Simple sentences have a designative function: to represent complexes. This means that, by virtue of the rules of use associated with them, if they represent anything, they represent complexes.

2.1.1 Structure Take a simple sentence of the form T is F—as in Tony is Greek. The syntactic constituents are a noun phrase T, a general term F, and a copula. The copula, ..is.., is the linguistic expression of the function of concatenating terms to form an expression capable of representing a complex. We might represent ..is.. as [..] is [..], where the gaps are for noun phrase and general term. On this grammatical analysis, a simple proto-assertion A(T is F)pro has the speech-act structure below: (1)(a) (i) U utters ‘T’ advertising an intention to denote by T the object x: x is called T &…

67

Recall the discussion of performatives in §1.5.1 . In a performative, say utterance of I bet $10 , U succeeds in representing a complex; U's betting $10. But U's act is not true, since she lacks the requisite communicative intentions.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

67

(ii) U utters ‘F’ advertising an intention to denote by F the property y: y is called F &… (iii) U concatenates T, F, and is and advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, y 〉. (b) U advertises an intention to defend the intention advertised in (iii). (1), as a description in a metalanguage of the act that U performs in uttering ‘T is F’, contains what look like variables x and y, which are bound by quantifiers in the scope of the respective operators in (i) and (ii).68 These expressions do not have to be taken this way. In Chapter 7, where the intentional states are described in some detail, I give another account of what such expressions are, on which they are not variables. There is an alternative way of parsing simple sentences. We can see a simple sentence T is F as resulting from the combination of T and a predicate is F. The string is F is an unsaturated grammatical unit, representable as [..] is F. On the semantic level, a predicate corresponds to an incomplete proto-assertion: A([..] is F)pro. Think of A([..] is F)pro as derived from the proto-assertion A(T is F)pro by removing the proto-act R(T)pro. The act Pred (is F)pro is the act in which U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, F〉, where x is an as yet unspecified entity, and an intention to defend that representational intention. Which is to say, in uttering ‘is F’ U engages in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker S who has an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, y 〉, where y is denoted by F and intends to defend that intention. A speaker can advertise an intention of this form but can have such an intention only by actually selecting a term and combining it with the predicate is F. We represent the structure of a proto-assertion on this parsing through the tree structure (2)—Pred(is F)pro = A([..] is F)pro (see Fig. 2.1). In combining T with is F, U supplements the predicate, the open proto-assertion A([..] is F)pro. Thus A(T is F)pro/dox is an act in which U combines R(T)pro with Pred(is F)pro supplementing the predicate. According to STA, predicates do not as such have a denotative function.69 They involve rather the combination of a concatenative expression and a denoting

68

Taken as variable, these variables have occurrences in (iii), where they are not syntactically bound by the quantifiers in (i) and (ii). We have an instance of quantifying-in . See the earlier discussion in §1.4.1 , comment 5, in which this problem was deftly avoided by describing the proto-act in terms of a single presenting-an-intention -operator. That earlier description did not show the true constituent nature of the atomic proto-assertion but was a useful presentation for the discussion being undertaken there.

69

Frege accepted, indeed invented, the doctrine of incomplete expressions and proposed in addition that they denote unsaturated entities: Fregean concepts, which cannot be denoted by singular terms. The doctrine apparently leads to paradox. We cannot after all talk about concepts, since that requires denoting them with singular terms; the concept of a horse is not a concept. I think the doctrine is simply incoherent. Dummett (1981 : 212–17) thinks something like the Fregean doctrine can be defended. Others think it puts in doubt the idea that predicates denote. (See Wright 1998 .) I think this is right. It is constituents of predicates that denote, the general and singular terms that make them up, as proposed in the main text.

68

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Fig. 2.1

expression, the latter being a general term. In predicates formed from simple adjectives, the constituent structure of the predicate is clear. So is red comprises the concatenative expression [..] is [..] and the general term red. In the predicate phrase sleeps, as in George now sleeps, the structure is not explicit. In this case, there is a denotative constituent, which denotes an event type—a property of spatio-temporal regions—but there is no explicit syntactic marker distinguishing it from the concatentative function. STA is committed to a realist construal of general terms in predicates; they have a designative function—they are signs for properties. It is important to see, within the broader context, why STA is committed to realism about properties in this sense, rather than some form of nominalism, according to which general terms carry no ontological commitment. On a nominalist view, the proper use of general terms and predicates in meaningful sentences does not require that we conceive of them as having any denotative function.70 Predicates, or general terms, do not denote properties; they are satisfied by objects. We think of predicate-use as bearing some relation to facts of resemblance between things. So for every predicate there are things that resemble each other, perfectly or imperfectly, where such things individually satisfy the predicate, but the predicate, or general-term constituent, does not denote any property. STA must reject this route to nominalism. Nominalism is available only if we take notions of truth and satisfaction to be prior to sentence- and predicate-meaning. But on STA they are not; in STA meaning is not truth-conditions. Rather meaning is characterized by reference to proto-acts. A proto-act involves a speaker advertising designative intentions, so STA must appeal to a prior notion of designation. That means attributing a designative function to constituents of predicates that are general terms. General terms then possess a designative function; they can denote, and, if they do, they denote properties—though it is not required for their meaning that they do so. A key distinguishing characteristic of simple sentences is that they are reportive. They correspond to reportive protoassertions. But they have another

70

For example, Quine (1953), in ‘On What There Is’, takes this nominalist line. T is F is equivalent to (∋x )[T = x & F[x ]). Variables introduce ontological commitment, but use of predicates, as such, does not. Hence Quine can make a neat distinction between ideological commitment, arising from use of predicates, and ontological commitment, arising from use of variables. But this is possible only through a prior primitive concept of satisfaction.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

69

related feature distinguishing them from logically complex sentences. Simple sentences satisfy the following designative compositionality principle, DP: DP: The thing designated by an expression is a function of the designata of its constituents and their mode of combination. In STA, DP holds for logically simple sentences. So the thing that T is F designates, if it designates at all, is a complex of the form 〈O, F〉 where T denotes O, and F denotes the property F. DP fails for sentences whose semantic interpretations are expressive proto-assertions—as described in §§0.2 and 1.3. Thus, in uttering ‘Probably-S’, U succeeds in representing a complex of the form 〈U, strongly believes S 〉. But the complex represented is not a function of the denotations of the constituents of the sentence. In STA, logically complex sentences are expressives, and so DP does not hold for them. The fact that DP is not generally valid does not imply that STA renounces compositionality; it just means compositionality in STA takes a different form. It is a matter of speech-act structure.

2.1.2 Complexes and Properties A central ontological commitment of STA is to complexes. What are complexes? In this book, I shall say little in answer to that question. I assume that the world has parts; these include entities made up of objects, properties, and relations in combination. Combination is understood as instantiation; complexes comprise objects instantiating properties and relations. Complexes exhibit no in re logical complexity, only mereological complexity. They are extralinguistic and mind independent. Beyond that I say little about them. The project in this book is to see how far semantics can be built on the idea of the world containing parts that are situation-like. The goal is not to provide a metaphysical account of what objects, properties, complexes, and instantiation are. Here my strategy is not far removed from that given by Wittgenstein (1922). It is important to realize that the concept of complex is not conceptually dependent on the notion of truth. For example, complexes are not just true propositions. If they were, STA's aspirations of providing an account of sentence-meaning through proto-assertion would be barred. Complexes are factlike or situation-like, extralinguistic parts of the world.71 The particular view that STA takes is that complexes are world-parts made up of objects, properties, and relations in combination. Complexes possess mereological complexity but no logical complexity; there are no logically complex complexes: negative, disjunctive, or universal. Complexes are also structured independently of human cognitive

71

That the world contains such entities is proposed in the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983) and historically by many philosophers, for example, Wittgenstein (1922) and Russell (1918).

70

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

activity.72 That does not mean language-users are forced to describe the world using certain categories. Instead, the world itself offers a vast plurality of categories, and language-users can decide amongst those suiting their interests. The notions of fact and state of affairs in semantics have suffered from various attacks, including, perhaps most cogently, the infamous slingshot-argument—as Barwise and Perry (1983) call it—used by various authors with the aim of undermining the explanatory appeal to such entities.73 The slingshot-argument has no force against STA, and I will not rehearse it here. For one thing it relies on the premiss that logically equivalent sentences necessarily pick out the same facts or complexes. But that must be false according to STA. The sentences Snow is white and Snow is white and either love is good or not are logical equivalents. But according to STA they represent, if they represent at all, completely different complexes; Snow is white will represent a speaker external state 〈snow, white〉, but Snow is white and either love is good or not will represent a speaker internal cognitive state. The logical equivalence of these two sentences does not depend upon their having the same representational properties.74 Properties are parts of complexes. Again, in this book, I shall remain largely neutral on what they are. Perhaps properties are universal-like entities, or set-theoretically defined entities. Perhaps material objects are property bundles, trope fusions, or mereological fusions of basic physical parts. Perhaps we should understand instantiation as a relation, analysed set-theoretically or through mereology, or primitively, or not as a relation at all. I remain largely neutral on these matters. The speech-act theoretic semantics developed is neutral with respect to what metaphysical theory one defends with respect to the ultimate constituents of complexes. It is not entirely neutral. I express a preference for the view that properties are universal-like entities in the sense that they are located where the entities are that instantiate them.75 They are not set-theoretic entities like intensions. If properties are universal-like, they can either be perfect resemblances, or perfect or imperfect resemblances. It might seem that our choice must be the second.

72

Here I do not mean causal independence , since many complexes causally depend upon human activity. Rather, I mean that the metaphysical constitution of complexes, qua existing things, is independent of human thought.

73

See Barwise and Perry (1983 : 24–6). See Church (1956) and Davidson (1967) for uses of the argument. Neale (1995) presents a review and analysis of a range of slingshot-arguments. Taylor (1985), Oppy (1997), and Donaho (1998) defend states of affairs against the argument.

74

The historical reasons for rejecting complexes and sentences bearing relations of correspondence to them are complex and interesting. In addition to those already suggested in the main text we have: the mysticism clothing the idea in the Tractatus ; debates by positivists in epistemology of comparing language with the world; semantic holism; the idea that appeal to correspondence in the present sense is non-explanatory; worries that it commit us to some untenable form of metaphysical realism; Quinean doctrine of indeterminacy and inscrutability of reference.

75

See Armstrong (1978) for the classic modern work on universals. Lewis (1983), contra Armstrong, defends a set-theoretic approach to properties.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

71

That is because most ordinary predicates cannot be taken to denote perfect resemblances: universals proper. Many ordinary predicates are vague, and family likeness concepts do not seem to correspond to universals—namely, things that specify necessary and sufficient conditions for being of that type. Nevertheless, one might defend the perfect-resemblance theory rejecting the assumption in the argument just given that to be meaningful a predicate has to fulfil its characteristic designative function, and actually denote a property. When predicates denote, they denote perfect resemblances; but a large class of meaningful predicates simply fail to denote. But this is not a semantic defect. Human interests in language use, it might be claimed, are often served with non-denoting predicates; many simple sentences are used correctly even though they fail to represent complexes, since their predicates fail to denote. Use of vague predicates, one might contend, is an instance of this. If we think of vagueness as semantic indecision, then for STA that amounts to proposing that the vague predicate F in T is F fails to denote a property, since none has been defined. So no complex is represented, even when language-users count T is F as having been correctly used. Because STA is not a designative theory of meaning, it allows for some autonomy between designation and predicate meaning. So vague sentences can be fully meaningful—they involve speakers advertising intentions to represent complexes—but are designatively empty. On this view, ordinary language utterances using vague predicates function under a mode of interpretation in the sense of §1.5. The mode is a type of approximative or fictional mode. On that mode, the proto-act A(T is F)pro is not counted permissible if and only if a complex 〈T,F〉 is represented, but if and only some other purpose is served. The key to explaining the nature of this mode would be to describe the purposes to which A(T is F)pro is put. I will not attempt to develop this alternative view here. I just flag it as one possibility that a future development of STA might take. (It is in fact the one I favour.) The official position of STA will be to accept the idea that properties are resemblances, be they perfect or imperfect. That delivers vastly many more properties than there would be if we accepted the more austere theory that properties are perfect resemblances. But the ontological inflation brings some degree of simplification.

2.1.3 The Class of Logically Simple Sentences What comprises the class of simple sentences in a language like English? STA does not stray far from the surface in identifying the class; nearly all grammatically subject–predicate sentences, taken singularly, are semantically simple. That means they are utterances of S with advertised intentions to represent a complex, and a reportive communicative intention, and no other semantic structure, leaving

72

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

aside modes of interpretation, such as metaphor, irony, and approximation. So, to give some examples, the following are grammatically simple sentences, and that fact is honoured by STA: (3) (4) (5)

The Mona Lisa is coloured. Germany invaded France. Beethoven's 5th has four movements.

In uttering these sentences the speaker U advertises an intention to represent, indeed to picture, a complex of a certain form. It is another matter whether or not U actually intends to represent a complex in each of these cases, or, even assuming U does have the intention, whether or not U ever successfully represents a complex. Perhaps, as mooted in the previous section, there are no complexes around to be represented by these sentences. It may be that properly speaking invaded France, although a genuine predicate in form, and perfectly meaningful, is always performed in a contentful proto-referring act—its representational component does not denote any property. That may be because we hold the metaphysical view that there are no higher-level properties of this kind. Cannot predicates be deceiving as to their semantic structure? Often a predicate has a perfectly simple grammatical nature but has been introduced through an explicit definition using logical constants. Some putative examples of this are: (6) (7) (8)

Fred is a bachelor. This emerald is grue. Jane is absent.

Thus, bachelor =df not married and male, grue =df green and observed before 2000 or blue and observed thereafter, and absent =df not present. As will be revealed, these are cases that have a type of logical simplicity; they are not disguised conjunctions, disjunctions, or negations. Such sentences involve an operation that I call topicalization. Explaining what this operation is depends upon providing STA's account of logical complexity and the language of intention. It is, therefore, left until Chapter 9, when logically complex predicates are discussed.76 As noted above, STA reserves the term logically complex sentence for sentences whose semantic interpretations are expressive proto-assertions or proto-implicatives. Sentences featuring prepositional phrases such as to Mary in Fred gave a present to Mary are logically simple. The complexity they introduce is not logical. It will be argued in §2.3 that such phrases allow for the representation of higher-order complexes, complexes that have as constituents, complexes.

76

Is not the logical complexity of a predicate relative to what we arbitrarily choose to be the simple predicates? Not according to STA. Grue is logically complex, and not green , simply because, assuming colours exist for the moment, green corresponds to a property, whereas grue does not. This goes with the realism of accepting that the world is a totality of complexes (states of affairs), lacking in any de re logical complexity, whose constituents can potentially be designated by words.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

73

Somewhat daringly, STA proposes that adverbial modification, as exhibited in sentences such as Jane spoke quickly, comprises semantic structures of exactly the same kind. I deal with these types of constructions also in §2.3.

2.2 SENTENCES AS SIGNS FOR COMPLEXES STA holds that all sentences have a designative function: to represent complexes. So simple sentences have a designative function: to represent complexes.77 Representation and denotation are just species of designation. Thus, the simple sentence (9) and the gerund phrase (10) designate the same thing, assuming they designate anything at all—namely, a complex of the form 〈T, F〉: (9) T is F — Fred is pink (10) T's being F — Fred's being pink78 Utterances of both (9) and (10) involve the same basic act of advertising an intention to designate a complex. The difference is that, in uttering (9), U advertises a communicative intention, but, in uttering (10), U does not. Consequently, (9) and (10) have distinct discourse functions. U cannot utter a referring term like Fred's being pink just by itself, since no purpose has been defined.79 An audience H might look and see that Fred is pink, and so gain information, but H would be compelled to ask ‘What about it?’ This is because uttering ‘Fred's being pink’ carries no communicative intention and so in itself lacks a discourse purpose. In contrast, in uttering ‘Fred is pink’ U advertises the same intention to represent a complex, but U also advertises a communicative purpose: that of defending a commitment. (9) and (10) also differ significantly with respect to grammar. The grammatical type of an expression is a matter of two factors: (a) its basic designative function; (b) its capacity to combine with other expressions to form new grammatical expressions. Two expressions can agree on (a) but differ on (b). (9) and (10) are a case of this; both possess the same designative function, but they differ in combinatorial power. (10) can combine with predicates, designating a topic about which something is said. (9) cannot combine with predicates. Although sentences never combine with predicates, this does not mean they cannot function as subject terms. I argue below that in adverbial modification the sentence that is modified

77

But let me stress again that logically simple sentences and logically complex sentences function semantically in quite distinct ways with respect to how the basic representational function they share is utilized.

78

That (9) and (10) co-designate is supported by the following counterfactual condition. We accept the counterfactual Were it not for T's being F, the sentence ‘T is F’ would not have been true and, conversely, Were the sentence ‘T is F’ not true, then T's being F would not have been the case . The truth of the counterfactuals is explained by the hypothesis that the phrase and the sentence co-designate.

79

One might answer ‘Fred's being pink’ to a question What revolts you most about the colour scheme? Here the phrase is really an incomplete utterance of Fred's being pink revolted me most .

74

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

functions effectively as a subject term. In this case it combines with an adverb or prepositional phrase, rather than a predicate. In STA, then, sentences and singular noun phrases both possess designative function, but differ in discourse function and combinatorial power.80 Since noun phrases lack built-in communicative purposes, referring acts using them have to be constituents of speech acts that do have built-in purposes: illocutionary acts or vocative acts.81 This failure of singular terms to be self-standing does not mean that sentences are semantically more basic than noun phrases. In STA, the fundamental phenomenon is designation, which is neutral between sentences and singular terms. The core of their difference is only a matter of communicative purpose.82

2.2.1 Representation The thesis that proto-assertions are sentence-meanings gives rise to the worry that STA is circular. STA claims that sentence-meanings are proto-act types, acts in which speakers advertise intentions to represent complexes and achieve communicative goals. Here the concept of representation is appealed to. Is not a theory of meaning meant to explain representation, and, more generally, designation? There are several points of reply here. First, the belief that this is circular is based on the erroneous assumption that a sentence's being meaningful will reside in its entering into a representational relation to a complex. But entering into such a relation is not, according to STA, what the meaning of a sentence rests in. STA is not a designative approach to meaning. It is, as already urged, a use-theory. The meaning is the act itself: the act in which the speaker presents herself as having certain intentions. In defining that act, the protoact, STA invokes the concept of representation. But, to repeat again, STA does not envisage the meaning of a sentence as residing in its representing a complex or a merely possible state of affairs. Another matter is whether STA should provide an account of what representation is. Even if STA treats representation as primitive, it is not necessarily a bad thing. STA appeals to two kinds of representation: intentionbased representation—that into which linguistic expressions can enter—and pre-linguistic natural representation. Providing an account of the latter is largely an issue of cognitive science. In the case of intention-based representation, matters might be slightly different. Perhaps something illuminating can be said about it without

80

Frege, of course, treats sentences as singular terms for truth-values.

81

Vocative acts are, for example, uses of names to attract the attention of audiences. STA is deflationary about the Fregean slogan, that a name only has meaning in the context of a sentence.

82

STA rejects the thesis that complexes, the world-parts corresponding to sentences, cannot be named: Russell (1918), Wittgenstein (1922), and Mellor (1995) hold these views. Such views, I think, arise from thinking erroneously that designative function determines grammar.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

75

treading onto the domain of some special science. But I shall not attempt any analysis of designative relations here.83

2.3 ADVERBIAL MODIFICATION AND HIGHER-ORDER COMPLEXES The complexity of the world is mereological complexity: the complexity of part and whole. Humans have capacities to represent parts of the world that are instances of the various kinds of part–whole complexity that there are. We have seen that simple subject–predicate sentences can represent complexes of certain kinds. But there are other kinds of complexes: higher-order complexes. The constructions in natural language specifically equipped to represent these world-parts are prepositional and adverbial constructions. These constructions are instanced by the temporal, locative, and causal constructions, as in: Q when P Fred went when Jane went. Q where P Fred went where Jane went. Q because P Fred went because Jane went. There are also constructions featuring prepositions, as in Jane buttered the toast with a knife in the kitchen. There are also adverbs proper, as in Jane buttered the toast quickly. My claim is that a proper understanding of the semantics of these sentences will not discern hidden logical complexity in these sentences.84 The simple answer of how STA avoids a hidden apparatus is that its treatment of sentences as designators allows adverbial constructions to be analysed as predications, not unlike simple subject–predicate sentences. I say more of this below. The linguistic challenge with respect to these adverbially modified sentences was seen in part by Davidson (1966). Though, I shall argue, not fully. The central issue is to explain inferences like: (11) She buttered the toast with a knife. So, she buttered the toast. According to Davidson, the best explanation of the validity of such inferences is that sentences featuring event verbs such as buttered involve, semantically, existential quantification over entities, events. So, the adverbially modified sentence in (11) is, in terms of its logical form, analysed: (12) (∃x) (Buttering-toast [x] & Occurs-with-a-knife [x]).

83

Brandom (1994) offers a semantics in which representation is not meant to play any explanatory role. He is a deflationist about representation. STA's position is firmly antideflationist.

84

See Lycan (2003) for a quantificational treatment of temporal adverbs. There is also, of course, Davidson's quantificational treatment, which I will look at in a moment.

76

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

We then explain the validity of the inference in (11) as a case of conjunctive simplification. What Davidson neglects to notice is that the argument generalizes. Adverbial modification is certainly not restricted to subject–predicate sentences with action or event verbs. Effectively, any atomic sentence, featuring a predicate expressing event, state of process, can be adverbially modified. Take sentences involving paradigmatic state-expressing predicates, such as is green, is sullen, is a director. These predicates can be subject to adverbial modification: (13) The gecko's skin was green in the garden. It was pink in the parlour. (14) He was sullen with Victoria, but gay with George. (15) She was a director by dint of hard work. We also have the inferences: (16) The gecko's skin was green in the garden. So it was green. (17) He was sullen with Victoria. So, he was sullen. (18) She was a director by dint of hard work. So, she was a director. Faced with these facts, it seems we need to extend Davidson's quantificational proposal across the board.85 Any simple sentence is apt for adverbial modification and so must be associated with entities of which events are only one species. The genus we are looking for is that of complexes, which divides into events, processes, and states. In general, for any S, where S is simple, the adverbial modification of S is analysed (∃x)(x is the complex associated with S & x is F), where F is the property introduced by the adverb. This argument confirms one of STA's central commitments. If any simple sentence can always be subject to adverbial modification, we have evidence that such simple sentences are always associated with complexes. But does STA have to assume Davidson's style of account? Certainly it would not be acceptable to the general methodological principles underpinning STA, since it treats surface grammar as systematically misleading. It is also unacceptable, since it invokes the concept of existential quantification, which STA rejects, as we shall see in Chapter 5. Finally, it is unattractive, because STA has a much simpler theory. According to STA, simple sentences are signs for complexes. They are just like noun phrases and in particular gerund phrases in this respect—see §2.2. There is no fundamental difference in designative function between a gerundive noun phrase, T's being F, and the simple sentence T is F. If so, an account of adverbial modification can be constructed exploiting this feature of atomic sentences. The view is that, for a large class of cases, adverbial modification involves nested

85

This makes Davidson's attack on facts (1969), worldly correlates corresponding to sentences in general, somewhat ironic, given that the general possibility of adverbial modification requires some kind of sentence–fact correlation.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

77

Fig. 2.2

proto-assertion. This idea is best explained through simple illustrations. On the nesting view, (19) has the structure (20): (19) The gecko's skin was green in the garden. (20) A(A(The gecko's skin was green)pro in the garden)pro. In (20) we find one proto-assertion, A (The gecko's skin was green)pro nested in another, (20) itself. The subject term of the main proto-assertion is, effectively, the sentence The gecko's skin was green. Simple sentences are signs for complexes; if true, they represent complexes, where representation is a species of designation. If so, they can be used as subject terms, though, admittedly, this use is restricted. In (20) the adverbial modifier in the garden then combines with the sentence. The overall semantic result is a further proto-assertion, whose content is that the complex denoted by the nested sentence The gecko's skin was green obtains in a certain spatial location—namely, in the garden. We have nested representation, as in Fig. 2.2. The second proto-assertion has no verb. We simply have a simple prepositional phrase in the garden. The claim is, however, that the role normally played by a verb is played by the concatenation of the sentence The gecko's skin is green with the phrase. There is no limit on the number of adverbial modifications a given sentence may exhibit. If there is more than one adverbial modifier, what is the nature of the nesting of proto-assertions? Take (21): (21) Tim spoke to Tom quietly in the park? One proposal is that the nesting is cumulative, as in (22) below. Alternatively, the nesting might be noncumulative—there is only one level of nesting and the object of adverbial modification is always the initial atomic assertion—as in (23): (22) A(A(A(A(Tim spoke)pro/… to Tom)pro/… quietly)pro/… in the park)pro/…. (23) [A1, A2, A3] (A(Tim spoke)pro/… to Tom)pro/… quietly)pro/… in the park)pro/…. (In (23) [A1, A2, A3] signifies that there are three constituent proto-assertions, which are not nested hierarchically.) I think it is best to go for (23). It is the

78

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

Fig. 2.3

non-cumulative approach that mimics most closely Davidson's quantificational treatment, since the latter treats the event corresponding to the atomic sentence as the subject of predication. The structure of (21) is shown in Fig. 2.3. The non-cumulative approach also explains the content equivalence of (21) and Tim spoke quietly to Tom in the park and Tim spoke quietly in the park to Tom. There are no discernible differences in semantic content, although there may be (conversational) pragmatic differences. On this account, adverbial sentences are logically simple. The only semantic operations present in them are those pertaining to singular terms and predication. So, for example, taken on its non-general reading, Jane drank when Fred drank contains an atomic sentence Jane drank, with a temporal adverbial modifier, the concatenation of when Fred drank. The latter contains a singular term when Fred drank, which is a singular term that can be used to denote a time, and the concatenation operation, which can be used to represent the higher-order complex that 〈Jane, drank〉 is contemporaneous with 〈Fred, drank〉.86 (Within STA, descriptive phrases such as when Frank drank are genuine singular terms.) To conclude, the phenomenon of adverbial modification confirms the thesis that simple sentences are associated with complexes. Moreover, the general elegance of the nested proto-assertion account of adverbial modification confirms the thesis that simple sentence are signs for complexes in the sense promulgated by STA.87

86

87

This sentence has a general reading. Jane drank when Frank drank can be used to assert something about the drinking habits of both in the past. On this reading, the protoassertion A(Jane drank when Frank drank)pro has a mode of interpretation, a generic one. Such modes are discussed in Chapter 5 . There are alternative theories of adverbial modification, and, indeed, alternative treatments within the STA framework, but I will not engage in any comparison here. See Cresswell (1985a) for an alternative to Davidson's account, and Taylor (1985) for a further articulation of the Davidsonian theory.

SENTENCE-MEANINGS AS PROTO-ACTS

79

Can logically complex sentences undergo this sort of adverbial modification? It seems as if they cannot; Fred was not present in the garden can hardly be interpreted as a sentence in which not is in the scope of in the garden. That could suggest that there are no worldly correlates represented by negative sentences, or that there are, but they lack location. STA's position (§3.2) is that logically complex sentences do not have the designative function of representing worldly complexes; rather their designative function is to represent complexes that are states of the speaker's cognitive economy, which are expressed by the speaker.

Conclusions Meaning theory is the description of proto-act types. I have attempted in this chapter to clear some space for this conception by examining aspects of logically simple sentences. STA is a theory that embraces fully the idea that sentences and sentence constituents have designative functions. But meaning does not reside in designating something. Simple sentences can represent complexes, but do not acquire their meaning from doing so. Rather, for sentences, it is a matter of advertising two sorts of intention, representational intentions and communicative intentions. The price of this kind of account is that we are realists about properties; general terms in predicates have designative functions. We pay this price because truth is not a concept that can be appealed to in explicating meaning. Truth in STA is a property of assertions. Proto-assertions are the semantic contents of declarative sentences. But proto-assertions are not truthapt as such. In short, truth is not a semantic property.

CHAPTER 3 Moods, Modes, and Logical Compounds 3.0 INTRODUCTION: THE ROLES PROPOSITIONS PLAY According to the Frege model, the semantic interpretation of a declarative sentence is a proposition—as characterized by SCT in §1.1. Propositions play three main theoretical roles in Frege-model theories. They are: (i) the contents common between mood-modified sentences; (ii) the entities whose encoding by sentences allows those sentences to embed and be operated on by logical constants; (iii) the entities whose encoding by declarative sentences enable them to be truth-apt. We have already looked at (iii) in the discussion of SCT and found it wanting. I now focus on (i) and (ii). The sentences (1) to (3) below differ only by grammatical mood, declarative, imperative, and interrogative, respectively: (1) (2) (3)

George is leaping. George, leap! Is George leaping?

Orthodoxy suggests that (1) to (3) are derived by the same underlying grammatical entity—a mood-neutral sentence—that undergoes three distinct grammatical transformations. That grammatical surmise suggests that (1) to (3) share a common content. The common content is the proposition ≪George is leaping≫ encoded by the moodneutral sentence. The content differences between (1) to (3) reside in the illocutionary acts assigned to each—assertion, order, and question. These acts comprise a force—assertoric, directive, or information requesting—combining, in each case, with the proposition ≪George is leaping≫. The three forces correspond to the different purposes to which the common proposition is put in fully-fledged speech acts; they are three uses of the content ≪George is leaping≫. Such is the standard account of sense and force. (See Stenius 1967.) The second role (ii) that propositions play is being the content common to both asserted declarative sentences and embedded declaratives. The validity of (4) below depends on its being the case that the asserted and unasserted tokens of Snow is white have the same semantic content, and similarly for Tarski's favourite substance is white: (4)

If snow is white, Tarski's favourite substance is white. Snow is white. So Tarski's favourite substance is white.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

81

The hypothesis that they encode propositions as their semantic interpretations secures that fact. Once we treat encoded propositions as semantic contents, then it is a short step to the conclusion that truth-bearers are sentences encoding propositions: role (iii) that propositions play. We accept the semantic conception of truth or SCT. STA rejects these three theses of the Frege model. First, the semantic interpretation of a declarative sentence is a proto-assertion. In this respect, proto-assertions are like propositions. However, proto-assertions do not play all the roles that propositions play in Frege-model theories. First, with respect to role (i), there is no mood-neutral propositional meaning in STA. The semantic interpretation of (1) is a proto-assertion-type, which utterance of (1) tokens. However, no proto-assertions are tokened in uttering (2) and (3). Rather, the semantic interpretations of (1) to (3) are three distinct kinds of proto-illocutionary acts. STA then rejects the sense/force distinction as understood in the Frege model. Nevertheless, STA does not renounce a compositional semantics. It explains how the contents of (1) to (3) are systematically built up from their constituents. That semantics is presented in §3.1. STA accepts that proto-assertions can play the second role played by propositions in Frege-model theories: role (ii). The content that is common to both asserted and embedded tokens of Snow is white in (4) above, is the proto-assertion. Proto-assertions are embeddable. Logical operators such as if take proto-assertions as their arguments. In §3.2 to §3.4, I explain how proto-assertions can embed and provide STA's account of the basic structure of logical compounds, which is an expressivist analysis. The third role for propositions in Frege-model theories is not one played by proto-assertions. As already argued in Chapter 1, it is assertions that are bearers of truth: proto-assertions that are doxastically grounded. In short, the Frege model proposes that the same fact, that S encodes a proposition ≪P≫, renders S both semantically contentful and truth-apt. In STA, by contrast, S's association with a proto-assertion renders it semantically contentful, and its association with an assertion type renders it truth-apt. In §3.5 I provide a further articulation of this account truth.

3.1 FAREWELL TO THE SENSE/FORCE DISTINCTION STA rejects the sense/force distinction enshrined by the Frege model. STA rejects the idea that (1) to (3) above are the same sentence undergoing mood transformations, that each of (1) to (3) encodes some common sentential meaning—the one correlated by the mood-neutral sentence of which all are grammatical variants.

82

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

What then is STA's treatment of the three sentences (1) to (3)? As will become clear below, (1) to (3) are three possible syntactic orderings of the constituents George, is, and leap. As a result of the differing combinations of such constituents, U, in uttering (1), (2), or (3) produces three different illocutionary acts. The structure of the three acts is as below: (1*): A(George is leaping)pro/dox (i) U utters ‘George is leaping’ advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈George, leaps〉; and (b) to defend commitment to the representational intention (ia). (ii) U has the intention (ib). (2*): O(George, leap!)pro/dox (i) U utters ‘George, leap!’ advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, desires that George sees to it that A(George is leaping)pro/dox is correct〉;88 and (b) to make George believe she possesses this desire. (ii) U has the intention (ib). (3*): Q(Is George leaping?)pro/dox (i) U utters ‘Is George leaping?’ advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, desires that H affirm or deny A(George is leaping)pro/dox 〉; and (b) to make H believe she possesses this desire. (ii) U has the intention (ib). Fig. 3.1 gives a clearer idea of the general structure of these three illocutionary acts. The first row comprises the protorepresentational acts, plus the forms of the complexes U advertises herself as intending to represent. These acts correspond to the (ia)-components in the acts above. (The symbols Φ and Γ are specifications of the respective conditions desired, as given in (ia) of (2*) and (3*).) The second row comprises the proto-illocutionary acts, the (i)components. The third row comprises the doxastically grounded acts—the completed illocutionary acts—which are the (i)- and (ii)-components together. In examining this figure, we see that there is no common sentential proto-act. The proto-representational acts differ. The proto-illocutionary acts differ. The illocutionary acts differ. There is no place for the idea of a common propositional content combining with three distinct forces. In (2*) and (3*), U expresses desires that an audience render correct or verify the act, A(George is leaping)pro/dox. But, just because (2*) and (3*) feature expression of such desires, it does not follow that A(George is leaping)pro is a constituent of those acts. Indeed, it cannot be. The mood of (2) and (3) means that

88

By correct here I mean objectively permissible—that is, permissible for someone with perfect information.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

83

Fig. 3.1

U does not engage in the behaviour characteristic of someone with an assertive communicative purpose. So U cannot be performing A(George is leaping)pro. So this is not a common act. But surely, one might object, (1) to (3) are constructed from a mood-neutral sentence that has undergone transformation by three distinct mood modifications? Is this not shown by the fact that (1) to (3) exhibit the same grammatical constituents? These grammatical constituents are combined to form sentences. And, one might think, word order has no bearing on representational or propositional content. So, a common mood-neutral sentence, and thus a common sentence-meaning, must be present. This argument fails because the assumption that word order has no representational significance can be rejected. Word order is representationally significant. The sentences (1) to (3) are the results of combining a noun phrase, T, copular is, and predicate F in three different ways—admittedly the copula is missing in (2). In each case, U advertises an intention to represent a different kind of complex. Assuming successful representation, the kind of complex represented in each case is given as below—‘∩’ signifies concatenation: (1#) T (2#) T (3#) Is

∩ ∩ ∩

is ∩ F represents 〈T, F〉. F represents 〈U, desires that H see to it that A(T is F)pro/dox is correct〉. T ∩ F represents 〈U, desires that H verify A(T is F)pro/dox〉.

Evidently, the constituents of the complexes represented do not always correspond to constituents denoted by the terms T or F. The complex in (2#) is a desire state about a proto-assertion. There is no constituent in that state that is the denotation of T or of F. So the function taking us from T∩F to the complex represented is not one that is merely sensitive to the designations of T and F. Instead, it is sensitive to the proto-acts in which they are performed. So, the compositionality involved is not one in which the designation of an expression is a function of the designations of its parts. The principle of designative compositionality, DP of §2.1.1, fails here; DP states that the designation of a complex expression is a function of the designations of its parts and their mode of combination. Rather, the compositionality is one

84

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

in which the designations of an expression can sometimes be a function of the speech-act structure of its parts. That accords with STA, for which meanings are speech-act structures. The complex represented in (1#) is quite distinct in character from that represented in (2#) and (3#). If we accept the pragmatic theory of truth, PCT, and the reporting/expressing distinction, the shift in representational content does not imply a shift in topic in the sense of what the utterances are about. Reports—utterances of (1)—are about what they represent. But expressives—utterances of (2) and (3)—are not about what they represent. STA's account of mood-modified sentences is perfectly compositional. Compositional semantics does not require the idea of the force/sense distinction, as is often assumed. What it requires is a different form of the compositionality principle and the reporting/expressing distinction.89 In STA there is then no common stock of thoughts—the propositional contents—that are shared by fully interpreted sentences across moods. The thoughts, properly speaking, are the proto-illocutionary acts. My discussion of interrogatives has so far restricted itself to whether-questions like (3). There are other kinds of questions. The question performed by utterance of Who is that girl? is: Q(Who is that girl?)pro/dox (i) (ii)

U utters ‘Who is that girl?’ advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, desires that H supply a term T where A(T is that girl)pro/dox is permissible for H〉, and (b) to make H believe U possesses this desire. U has the intention (ib).

Evidently, the term T must meet certain conditions for answers to be adequate. A(T is that girl)pro/dox must be informative—that is, meet U's informational needs. This question contains an interrogative pronoun whose use involves a proto-referring act: R(who)pro. In this act, U advertises an intention to denote

89

In the case of imperatives we might doubt the sentential analysis altogether. An alternative proposal is that, in uttering ‘George, leap!’, U is not performing a sentential speech act with George, leap! Instead, U performs two distinct illocutionary acts. The first is a vocative speech act , the utterance of George , the function of this being to draw attention of hearers. The second act is the production of the imperative, performed in uttering ‘leap!’ In uttering ‘leap!’, qua imperative, U utters a predicate, leap , advertising an intention to denote a property, and also, given the imperative form, advertising an intention to represent a desire state, as specified in (2*). This is simply to say that F uttered in the right context can represent a desire state. This two-part analysis of imperatives is confirmed by the fact that the name of the audience cannot be used in an uttered declarative when that declarative is used to perform an order. I cannot say ‘George will leap’ to George. This is highly non-standard. But I can say ‘George, leap!’, indicating that in uttering the second I am not uttering the first. The two-part analysis is also confirmed by the fact that we can prefix questions thus: George, who is leaping? Clearly, this is not a sentence, suggesting that George, leap! is not a sentence.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

85

an x that is denoted by some other noun phrase whose ostensible denotation is a person. This is the function that who has when used as a relative pronoun, as in T is the person who is F. (See §6.4.) Another feature of questions and orders is that they can have non-literal content. U might ask ‘Is the sun the father of the heavens?’, in a metaphoric mode. In this case, U desires that H affirm or reject a proto-assertion interpreted metaphorically: A(The sun is the father of the heavens)pro/M-pro/dox. What is the exact structure of the question in this case? The proto-question itself is not under a mode, as in the case of rhetorical questions—see §1.5.1. Rather, the question has the form of (3*) above, except the proto-assertion about which U desires to be informed is interpreted to be a metaphoric one. That is just what taking the question non-literally amounts to.90

3.2 PROTO-ACT EMBEDDING The semantic interpretation of a sentence S is that entity correlated with S by linguistic rules and context as its literal content, which accompanies S in all its token uses, both in self-standing illocutionary acts and when S is embedded. In the Frege model, the proposition ≪P≫ encoded by S constitutes S's semantic interpretation. Since encoding ≪P≫ is an assertion-independent matter, S's encoding ≪P≫ occurs in self-standing assertions of S and in compounds, say in Either S or R. This picture of semantic interpretation, we have already seen, encounters some difficulties with nondeclaratives. Non-declaratives look as though they are embeddable, at least as the consequents of conditionals, and so appear to encode propositions, but they are not truth-apt—contrary to the Frege model's conception of truth, SCT. The task for the Frege model is to explain away either the (limited) embeddability of non-declaratives or their nontruth-aptness. The Frege model does not obviously succeed in either task. A third, more desirable, option would be to explain their limited embeddability and non-truth-aptness. The Frege model fails to do that as well. STA, however, can take this third option. In STA, the semantic interpretation of S is the proto-illocutionary-act type I(S)pro that utterance of S tokens. So, wherever S is uttered, be it in self-standing illocutionary acts I(S)pro/dox or embedded in say if R, S, U performs a protoillocutionary I(S)pro. If S is declarative, the illocutionary act I(S)pro is the proto-assertion A(S)pro. Proto-illocutionary acts, and proto-assertions in particular, must be capable of embedding. And they are. Take proto-assertions. Proto-assertion is defined

90

Similarly, for irony. One can ask ‘Who was so smart to have done this?’, intending to be understood sarcastically. Orders can also be ironic: Be really good! , uttered by Doctor Evil.

86

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

independently of standard sincere assertion; U can perform A(S)pro without the latter being part of a standard assertion A(S)pro/dox. For example, there are modes of proto-assertion—such as irony and metaphor. These facts about use of proto-assertions leave open the possibility of other uses in which, perhaps, the sentence S, though proto-asserted, is syntactically connected to other sentences, as in compounds. Proto-assertions in compounds are such a use. In uttering ‘Either S1 or S2’, U utters S1 advertising both a representational and a communicative intention; U performs A(S1)pro. The fact that U also utters the sentence concatenated with either … or does not affect the matter. How can U perform a proto-assertion under such conditions—that is, intend to engage in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker with complex-representing and communicative intentions? Does not the characteristic behaviour of a speaker with a complex-representing and a communicative intention involve by definition self-standing utterance? It does not. A behaviour characteristic of someone with complex-representing and communicative intentions is just the concatenation of certain meaningful terms—for example, a singular term and a predicate with a declarative mood. Performing such behaviour can be done whether or not there are any other terms before or after the concatenated terms. It is the intrinsic features of the behaviour, rather than any relational ones—being embedded or not—which fix it as being a characteristic behaviour of someone who, following certain repertoire rules, intends to represent a complex and intend that act to have a communicative purpose. So this behaviour can appear embedded within a broader sentential context.91 So in uttering ‘Either S1 or S2’, U meaningfully utters S1 and S2 and so performs A(S1)pro and A(S2)pro. In performing these acts, U lacks the complex-representing and communicative intentions. This is just as in a mode of interpretation, like, irony. In a sarcastic assertion, with the structure A(S1)pro/I-pro/dox, U performs A(S1)pro but lacks any intention to represent a complex of the form, 〈P1 〉. The same holds in the compound case. Moreover, in uttering the compound, U also conveys some commitment about the embedded proto-assertions, a commitment of a broadly logical nature. Logical constants of the sentential kind operate on proto-assertion types. The latter may be logically simple or complex. So proto-assertion types are fit to be the objects upon which logical connectives operate when they form compound

91

Consider counterfactual conditionals, as in If she were here now … The string she were here now must be uttered in the performance of a proto-assertion. But it might be objected that such a sentence is never used in self-standing speech acts. True, it is not! How can it then be an instance of the behaviour characteristic of a speaker with certain intentions? The sentence She were here now is a string in which the speaker concatenates subject and predicate. Of course, this sentence has a further syntactic transformation effected upon it, involving a syntactic tense shift. But that, I suggest, does not affect the fact that an instance of the behaviour characteristic of someone following a repertoire rule has been performed. The same holds for sentences in the interrogative mood, etc.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

87

sentences, a role played by propositions in the Frege model. Moreover, if proto-assertions can embed, then nothing in principle prevents non-assertoric, proto-illocutionary acts from embedding. We have seen that non-assertoric protoillocutionary acts, like proto-orders or proto-questions, can embed, though in a limited way, primarily as the consequents of conditionals. STA can explain this limited embeddability. In short, STA can take the third desirable option canvassed above: explaining how non-declaratives are, generally, not truth-apt, but nevertheless have limited embeddability. I now sketch how embedding works in some detail. My aim is not so much to establish a logic for the connectives as to show that a formal pragmatic theory like STA explains the semantic structures of logical compounds better than do Frege-model theories, which portray logical connectives as propositional operators functioning truth-conditionally. I begin with binary connectives, like either … or, then negation, and then if.

3.2.1 Binary Connectives Let S1 * S2 be schematic for S1and S2, Either S1or S2, or Neither S1nor S2. An assertion of such a compound is not a reportive assertion: a report about the obtaining of a (logically complex) complex in the world. Rather, utterance of S1 * S2 is an expressive assertion. U expresses a cognitive state Δ, where Δ is a commitment of some kind with respect to performing the proto-acts A(S1)pro/…, and A(S2)pro/… on doxastic grounds. In a conjunction S1and S2, Δ is the state of being committed to performing both A(S1)pro/…/dox and A(S2)pro/…/dox. In a disjunction Either S1or S2, one might hazard that Δ is a standing disposition to perform A(S1)pro/…/dox, given recognition of the negation of S2 and vice versa. I leave matters somewhat sketchy at this point, since a proper analysis of the cognitive states expressed by logically complex sentences can be given only after we have said something about the structure of cognitive states that underpin speech acts—a topic dealt with in Chapter 8. The expressed commitment states Δ are ones with respect to the performance of proto-assertions, A(S1)pro/…/dox and A(S2)pro/…/dox. As indicated by the dots, these proto-acts may already have modes of interpretation prior to being embedded in the compound; the proto-acts might be interpreted ironically, as in A(Si)pro/I-pro, metaphorically, A(Si)pro/M-pro, approximatively, A(Si)pro/A-pro, and so on. Examples of such embedding are: (5) (6)

Either the moon is the father of the heavens or the sun is. Neither South America nor Australia is hexagonal. France is.

In uttering the disjuncts in (5) and (6), U performs proto-assertions under modes. For example, (5)'s first disjunct has the form A(The moon is the father of the

88

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

heavens)pro/M-pro. None of these complex proto-assertions is doxastically grounded. Instead U, in uttering the disjunctions, expresses a complex commitment state Δ with respect to performing the disjunct proto-assertions on doxastic grounds. (5) and (6) show that embedded sentences can have pragmatic interpretations of a rhetorical nature. Embedded sentences can also carry non-truth-conditional meaning generated by conventional implicature operators, like even, but, therefore: (7)

Either she dislikes him but nevertheless dates him, or she dates him because she dislikes him.

(7) features the embedding of a non-truth-conditional content introduced by the embedding of conventional implicature-operators nevertheless. The implicature content, qua implicature content, is entering into the scope of the connective either … or.92 That means that the proto-act embedded has the dual nature characterized in §1.3.2 that implicature-bearing sentences have. The speech act produced by utterance of first disjunct of (7) is a protoassertion—roughly A(She dislikes him and dates him)pro—combined with a proto-presuppositional expressive produced by attaching nevertheless—the implicature being that the expectation that she does not date him, given her disliking him, fails. The compounds (5) to (7) illustrate the fact that the logical connectives in English do not function as operators on literal, purely truth-conditional contents. They are not propositional connectives, as the Frege model proposes. The advantage of STA—which allows proto-acts to embed—over a purely truth-conditional approach is that STA explains these cases as possibilities falling within the normal use of connectives. Frege-model theories must treat these cases as metalinguistic—see Horn (1989). Somehow the sentences in the scope of the operators are being mentioned rather than used. (5) to (7) are really sentences about the assertibility of the mentioned disjuncts. This is an implausible theory, which I have criticized elsewhere.93 In the cases examined, the embedded sentences are used. Assertions of compounds of the form S1 * S2 then have the speech-act form: STA(*): A(S1 * S2)pro/dox (i) U performs A(S1)pro/…, A(S2)pro/… (but lacks the advertised intentions). (ii) By concatenating * with S1 and S2, U advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, has Δ〉, and (b) to defend a commitment to possessing Δ. (iii) U has the intentions (iib).

92

See Barker (2003), where such forms of embedding are discussed in detail and the thesis that implicature is non-truth-conditional content. See the earlier discussion in §1.2.1 .

93

See Barker (2003). I also attack there the view that somehow in these cases pragmatic contents get transformed into truth-conditional contents in the embedded state.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

89

The binary sentential compounds are assertions expressing commitment states Δ with regard to doxastically grounded proto-assertions—that is, truth-bearers. This account of compounds explains how it is that doxastically grounded proto-assertions, assertions, are the truth-bearers, even though truth-bearers never appear embedded in compounds.94 One interesting, perhaps, radical feature of STA is that the schema for compounds, STA(*), has the same general form as that for a proto-assertion on a mode of interpretation. Compare STA(*) with the schemas in §1.5 for metaphor, sarcasm, and approximative assertion. The semantic structure of logical compounds is essentially the same kind exhibited by metaphor or irony.95 There is difference in detail. In logical compounds: there is an operator indicating that U has a certain mode in mind; and the form of the mode of interpretation is different; it is what we call a logical one. In uttering ‘S1 * S2’, U performs a certain compound proto-act, A(S1 * S2)pro, a proto-act that could be embedded in some further context, say a disjunction or a conditional, in which case it would not be doxastically grounded. Take (8): (8)

Either you will pay, or neither you nor she will enter.

In (8), A(Neither you nor she will enter)pro is embedded. Utterance of the whole disjunction expresses U's commitment state Δ with respect to the embedded proto-acts, doxastically grounded. (Again, I have not said what Δ is.) The basic semantic structure of sentential compounds is easily explained by STA; indeed it does so better than the Frege model. The thesis that assertions are truth-bearers can be reconciled with the fact that assertions as such do not embed in compounds: compounds have embedded proto-assertions as parts, but are expressions of commitments about the corresponding doxastically grounded acts: assertions.

3.3 NEGATION AS AN ADVERB Frege-model theories typically treat negation as a sentential operator. In terms of surface grammar, some uses of not confirm that theory—for example, Not many people were there. But most standard uses of negation do not look sentential—for

94

There might be some doubts about STA(*) in connection with and . It might seem that in uttering ‘S1 and S2 ’ U performs the proto-acts A(S1 )pro/… and A(S2 )pro/… on doxastic grounds. If so, an assertion of a conjunctive sentence simply involves U's performing two proto-assertions: A(S1 )pro/…/dox and A(S2 )pro/ …/dox . In this case, and merely connects doxastically grounded proto-assertions, with or without modes. This would be to view and as a pure speech-act connective. There is no illocutionary act over and above the constituent proto-assertions except the signal that the proto-assertions are connected appropriately within a discourse.

95

Just as modes of proto-assertion involve a type of pretence, so do compounds.

90

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

example, I do not smoke. STA respects surface grammar and does not treat not in I do not smoke as a sentential operator. Let me represent a negation in general as T not V__, where T is a noun phrase and V__ a predicate. An assertion A(T not V__)pro/dox is an expressive assertion, in which U's possession of a state N is expressed, this being a certain kind of commitment with respect to the performance of A(T V__)pro/dox. I shall go into some detail about N in Chapter 8. Specifying N requires saying something about the language of intention. For now I confine myself to this sketch. If U is in state N, she is constrained, in a certain way, not to perform A(T V__)pro/…/dox. It is not merely a state of not being disposed to perform A(T V__)pro/…/dox, since that state can underpin doubt, as well as the judgement that T not V__ expresses. N is a state stronger than merely not being disposed to perform A(T V__)pro/…/dox. We might specify N, succinctly, as one in which U is not disposed to perform A(T V__)pro/…/dox, where in addition U is constrained, by internal cognitive conditions, to cease all epistemic search procedures for verifying A(T V__)pro/…/dox, although U is not epistemically indifferent. In contrast, in a state of doubt, U can simultaneously undertake procedures for verifying A(T V__)pro/…/dox.96 The assertion A(T not V__)pro/dox has the structure: STA(not): In performing A(T not V__)pro/dox (i) U utters ‘T not V__’ and advertises intentions: (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, has N 〉; and (b) to defend commitment to possessing N. (ii) U has the intention (ib). On this conception of negation, T not V__ is not constructed by not combining with a sentence T V__, encoding a propositional content. Negations are not sentential compounds. There is no embedding of a proto-assertion, as we find in the binary connectives. Instead, the concatenation of T ∩not ∩V__ is used to represent the complex 〈U, has N 〉. This is not a denial of compositionality. If T ∩not ∩V__ represents a complex, the complex it represents is a function of meaning of the terms in T ∩not ∩V__ and their mode of combination. This is just as the complexes represented by mood-modified sentences are functions of their constituent terms plus word order—as we saw in §3.1. Negation is typically thought of as a truth-conditional operator in the sense that not in T not V__ can be thought of as corresponding to a function from the truth-condition of T V__ onto a new truth-condition. But, in fact, investigation

96

One might interpret the present proposal as a cashing-out of the idea that negation should be understood in terms of the speech act of denial. The state N expressed by negative sentences is not a speech act. Frege (1952 : 115–35) and Dummett (1981 : 316–17) criticize such views for failing to explain the embeddability of negations in logical compounds. This is not a problem for the STA account. When T not V __ is embedded, the expressive proto-act, and not the assertion, is embedded.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

91

shows that not is not a purely truth-conditional operator. (The same discovery was made in the case of binary connectives in the last section.) Consider the following: (9) I don't like cricket. I really hate it, (10) I don't like cricket. I love it. (11) It is not that she likes him but, nevertheless, finds him unattractive. She likes him because she finds him unattractive. (12) The church is not a rock. The point of a negation, A(T not V__)pro/dox, is to express U's N-state with respect to the doxastically grounded protoassertion A(T V__)pro/…/dox. That N-state may hold in U because U objects to A(T V__)pro/…/dox on truth-conditional grounds. (9) is an example of that. But the N-state may hold in U for other reasons. For example, U's objection may be to the conversational correctness of performing A(T V__)pro/…/dox. This occurs in (10). Asserting ‘I like cricket’, when one knows that one loves it, involves flouting maxims governing good conversation.97 Or the N-state may hold in U because U judges A(T V__)pro/…/dox to be infelicitous due to the failure of an implicature carried by the sentence. Thus in (11) the implicature arising from nevertheless makes assertion of She likes him but, nevertheless, finds him unattractive infelicitous.98 Finally, there is (12). In this case, U expresses an N-state with respect to the proto-assertion on a metaphoric interpretation: A(The church is a rock)pro/M-pro. The metaphor is inapt for U.

3.3.1 Epistemic Adverbs We have seen that STA does not assimilate not to sentential connectives such as either … or or indeed to constructions of the form It is not that …99 Rather not functions grammatically more like a mood modifier. A closer parallel is epistemic adverbs and models.100 I have already given an analysis in §1.3.1 of subjective probability statements that involve the adverb probably. Such adverbs modify copulas; they are not sentence-operators. They do not take embedded proto-assertions as their semantic scopes. That means that in performing an assertion of the form A(T definitely V__)pro/dox U does not perform a proto-assertion of

97

That is the Gricean (1967) maxims. In this case, the maxim is that of quantity.

98

Again, the implicature is not a component of the assertion per se . Rather it is an implicative act that accompanies the assertion—see §1.3.2 . In (11) the sentence negated is It is that she likes him but, nevertheless, finds him unattractive . Negation has adverbial syntax.

99

In the case of It is not the case that S we have a confusion of part with whole. Not is a constituent of this construction; we find here a negation of It is the case that S .

100

We saw in §2.3 that some adverbs function in terms of nested representation. There are also adverbs of generality—or adverbs of quantification as Lewis (1975b) dubs them—which I discuss in Chapter 5 .

92

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

the form A(T V__)pro/dox. Thus, for example, Jane is definitely drunk has the structure below: Definitely: In uttering ‘T definitely V__’ (i) U utters ‘T definitely V__’ and advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, has a belief state in which the epistemic grounds for performance of A(T V__)pro/dox are strong〉; and (b) to defend the state in (a). (ii) U has the intention (ib). Thus, U expresses a commitment about the proto-assertion A(T V__)pro/dox, although U does not have to perform that proto-assertion as such. We can provide a structurally similar account of epistemic adverbs such as perhaps and necessarily. The structure and contents of these kinds of sentential adverbial sentences are just like the structure and content specified in Definitely except for differences in the respective commitment properties. These are: (perhaps) 〈U, has a belief state B such that, on some consistent extensions of B, U is disposed to perform A(S)pro/dox 〉. (necessarily) 〈U, has a dispositional state to perform A(S)pro/dox based purely on theses of logic (and natural law). These are all instances of expressive assertion.101

3.4 INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS AS IMPLICATIVES The most interesting and complex binary connective has yet to be discussed in this chapter: the indicative conditional if. A theory of if-constructions is important to a complex theory of generality—as will be shown in Part IV. I therefore offer a sketch of a theory of indicative conditionals here, which will be extended to the general case in Chapter 11. Indicatives are puzzling sentences if we accept the Frege model's conception of sentence content and truth-aptness, SCT. They are puzzling from such a perspective because indicatives, as will be revealed, are expressive utterances of the same type as sentences with conventional implicatures. If-sentences are implicatives.102 Below I show what the puzzles are and then describe STA's positive account.

101

Modal auxiliaries might, could, ought on epistemic readings introduce structures of the same kind. So, for example, Jane might be drunk has a structure and content like that of Jane is perhaps drunk .

102

Jackson (1987) defends the view that indicatives are dual-content sentences, having the truth-conditions of material implication plus an implicature about conditional probability. This is not the view that STA defends.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

93

3.4.1 SCT and Indicatives The problematic character of indicatives begins with the fact that their use conditions are given in terms of conditional probability as follows—see Adams (1975), Lewis (1976), Appiah (1985), Jackson (1987), and Edgington (1991, 1995). Below, h is a high value: Adams: If S1, S2 is assertable for U iff Prob(S2/S1) ≈ h. Assume that indicatives are reports about how things objectively are, like Fred is a human. Also assume, for the moment, SCT of §1.1. It seems reasonable to propose that the degree of assertability of an indicative conditional is equal to its probability of truth, as suggested by Stalnaker (1968); we accept: Stalnaker: The probability of If S1, S2's truth equals Prob(S2/S1). But Lewis (1976) shows that Stalnaker entails a contradiction. So indicatives cannot be reports about how things objectively are in any straightforward sense. I will not reproduce Lewis's proof here, but provide instead a simple argument that arrives at the same conclusion: that Stalnaker is false. Take Gibbard's Sly Pete example (1981). Say that Sly Pete is playing poker with Stone. Pete has the weaker hand but he is an infallible player. He never loses when he calls. Say that Zack sees that Pete has the weaker hand and that Jack is told that Pete is infallible. Zack and Jack have correct information. Both leave the room before the hand is played and then, independently, Zack says (13) and Jack says (14) to Jones: (13) If Pete called he lost. (14) If Pete called he won. Suppose we are Jones thinking about (13) and (14), and we assume Stalnaker. Both (13) and (14) cannot be true. So either Zack or Jack is wrong. Now the following principle holds: Error: If U asserts S reporting that P, but ≪P≫ is not the case, then U has made some error in arriving at a warrant for S; some premiss in an argument U accepted for S is false, or U made some error in reasoning from those premisses to S. Given Error, either Zack or Jack has made an error in his ground for the indicative he asserts. Zack's and Jack's grounds are conditional probability states, so one of these states must be based on incorrect information. But in fact neither is. There is no error in the probabilistic reasoning that either engages in and both reason from correct information. The informational states of Zack and Jack are partial—they did not have all the information pertinent to the situation—but not being omniscient is not an error. It follows, given Error, that Jack and Zack cannot be

94

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

reporting anything; they are not producing utterances capable of truth and falsity. If so, Stalnaker must be false.103 Various hypotheses suggest themselves in response to this conclusion. One is to deny Adams by defending the thesis that indicative conditionals are material implications. Qua material implications, (13) and (14) are true because the common antecedent of both is false. But, since it is far from obvious that we judge both (13) and (14) to be true, this is not an entirely satisfactory response.104 Indeed, there is a more serious problem with the material-implication analysis. It entails that indicatives encode propositions and so have probabilities but not those given by Stalnaker. Rather the probability of an indicative is the probability of the material implication. But these are the wrong probabilities, so the material implication analysis must be false. Take the following questions about probabilities of outcomes of bets made on roulette wheel spins, where there is a 50 per cent probability that Jones will bet on 35: (15) How likely is it that Jones won, if he bet 35? (16) How likely is it that either Jones won or did not bet? The answer to (15) is unequivocally 1/37, assuming a fair wheel. The answer to (16) is 19/37. On a materialimplication analysis the question posed in (15) is equivalent to that posed in (16). So, one answer to (15) should be 19/ 37. But that is simply false. Indicatives then cannot be material implications. It might be objected that (15) does not contain an embedded indicative. But that is awfully weak, since the question posed in (15) could be rephrased as a dialogue. Frank said this: If Jones bet 35 he won. How likely is that? The answer can only be 1/37, and in this case Frank's sentence is an indicative.105 Another theory about indicatives keeps Adams and admits that Jack and Zack cannot be faulted on their grounds, so concludes that utterances of indicative conditionals are not reports; there are no conditional propositions, and so no probabilities of conditionals. This is the view of Adams (1975), Appiah (1985), and Edgington (1991, 1995). This approach needs to tell us what semantically

103

Some like Pendleberry (1989) and Lycan (2003) attempt to argue that one of the pair, Zack and Jack, is wrong. I think their arguments are unconvincing.

104

To account for the fact that (13) and (14) are not apparently co-assertable, material-implication theorists supplement their account with a Gricean (1967) theory of conversational pragmatics. Jackson (1987) has argued cogently that such approaches fail. See Barker (1997b) for a response.

105

There are more sophisticated defences of the material-implication hypothesis, but they face the same problem about probabilities. Jackson's theory (1987) proposes that If S1 , S2 is truth-conditionally equivalent to (S1 ⊃ S2 ), but carries a conventional implicature that constrains its assertion so as to accord with Adams. Stalnaker is nevertheless not true, since the probability of truth of an indicative is the probability of the material implication. But we have just seen that, if indicatives have probabilities, they are not those of material implications. So Jackson's theory fails. Jackson's theory invokes conventional implicature, which is non-truth-conditional propositional content. But, as we have seen, SCT entails that there is no such content.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

95

goes on when a speaker utters an indicative. Edgington (1995) suggests that U is conditionally asserting S2 on S1. She takes this to mean that U utters ‘If S1, S2’ intending that it be true if (S1 & S2), false if (S1 & ¬ S2), and otherwise lacking in truth-value. But this will not work. Take questions of the form If he bet, he won. Is that true? This has two readings on the conditional assertion view: If S1, is it true that S2? or Is it true that if S1, S2? If we take the second reading, then, as the conditional lacks truth-value if S1 is false, one legitimate answer is He always wins when he bets. But how should I know about this case since I don't know if he bet or not! This is legitimate because, if I am ignorant of S1's truth-value, I am compelled to say that I do not know if the conditional If S1, S2 is true or not, even if I think S1 necessitates S2. But as a type of response this is very odd.106 I conclude that the conditional-assertion approach, so defined, fails. Nevertheless, the conditional-assertion account is heading in the right direction. Another way of articulating the concept of conditional assertion is the idea that an utterance of an indicative If S1, S2 is the utterance of S2 in the scope of a supposition of S1. (See Mackie 1973.) STA interprets this idea in terms of modes. Indicatives are performances of a proto-act A(S1)pro in the scope of a suppositional interpretation of A(S1)pro. So indicatives utilize the structures underpinning suppositional proofs as described in §1.6.2. There is clearly a connection between uttering an indicative, If S1, S2 and performing a hypothetical proof: Suppose S1Therefore, S2. The STA proposal effectively identifies the two cases. STA's theory holds that, in uttering ‘If S1, S2’, U implicates by if attached to S1 that a supposition of S1 is in place, and implicates by attaching if S1 to S2 that she is producing a proto-act, A(S2)pro, in the scope of that suppositional framework.

3.4.2 STA on Indicatives Implicature, as we have seen, introduces a certain kind of intersubjective structure. Say that S* is a sentence S, modified by an implicature-operator *, where S's semantic interpretation is the proto-act I(S)pro. In uttering a sentence S*, U indicates that she accepts a state, ι, which her audience should take up in processing or evaluating the relevance of her, U's, performance of I(S)pro—see §1.3.2. Thus, in uttering ‘Even Granny got drunk’, U reports that Granny got drunk and indicates this is improbable for her, U, and that her audience should appeal to the same subjective probability state in judging the relevance of U's assertion that Granny got drunk. Something very similar occurs with indicatives.

106

Jeffrey (1961) and McDermott (1996) propose that If S1 , S2 encodes a proposition and has a truth-value if S1 is true, and, assuming it has a truth-value, is true just in case S2 is.

96

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

In uttering ‘If S1, S2’, U produces a token A(S2)pro in the scope of her suppositional state, BU + A(S1)pro, and implicates that she accepts this framework.107 That means H evaluates U's production of A(S2)pro, not in terms of U's framework, but in terms of her own, H's, state, BH + A(S1)pro. If, in the evaluation, H cannot allow performance of A(S2)pro, that means U and H disagree either about logic or about the content and structure of their respective states BU and BH. This is not unlike what goes on in straight assertion. Say Jack and Zack believe Pete called. Zack asserts ‘Pete lost’. Do you, Jack, evaluate Zack's utterance by looking at his state BZack? No, you look at your own state BJack, and discover that A(Pete won)pro follows as permissible. So you assert ‘Pete won’. More or less the same thing occurs in indicatives but transposed to hypothetically modified states, BZack + A(Pete called)pro and BJack + A(Pete called)pro. I illustrate this using the Sly Pete example as discussed above. Say Zack says ‘If Pete called, he lost’, believing rightly that Pete has the weaker hand. So Zack produces an utterance implicating he accepts the framework based on BZack + A(Pete called)pro. Zack indicates he accepts (i) below, through his performance of A(he lost)pro: (i)

BZack + A(Pete called)pro → (A(he lost)pro is permissible).

Imagine you are Jack judging Zack's utterance of If Pete called, he lost. Do you look to see whether (i) holds? Not at all! You evaluate Zack's utterance by examining your own state BJack and BJack + A(Pete called)pro to determine if (ii)

BJack + A(Pete called)pro → (A(he lost)pro is permissible).

In the Sly Pete case, you, as Jack, discover that this is not the case, since you believe that Pete is infallible. For you the following holds: BJack + A(Pete called)pro → (A(he won)pro is permissible). You assert ‘If Pete called, he won’. That is, you, Jack, produce A(he won)pro, implicating that it is performed within the scope of the state BJack + A(Pete called)pro. Zack, in turn, evaluates the production of your proto-act, A(he won)pro, from within his suppositional framework. He rejects it from within his framework. Thus Zack and you, Jack, disagree about the performability of A(Pete lost)pro and A(Pete won)pro within your respective frameworks. Zack and you are in disagreement, not about conditional facts—there are no such facts—but about background acceptance states, BJack and BZack. As in the straight-assertion case,

107

As described in §1.6.1, U's acceptance of the framework means that for her the discourse rule or condition SupUS below holds: SupUS: Tokens I(R)pro are permissible for U at t iff BU + A(S1)pro → (I(R)pro is permissible).Here I(R)pro is an illocutionary act.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

97

you seek resolution by comparing your states. You discover that they have partial information about the case, as described in the story. In sum, an indicative If S1, S2 is comprised by two acts, 1 and 2 below: 1. 2.

U performs A(S1)pro (but lacks the advertised intention) and implicates through if her acceptance of the state BU + A(S1)pro. U performs A(S2)pro (but lacks the advertised intention) and implicates by attachment of if S1 that A(S2)pro is performed within the scope of the supposition.108

On this account indicatives are not truth-apt utterances. The responses of audience H to U's utterance of If S1, S2, such as That is true, That is false, and That is probable, are not responses to the whole utterance of If S1, S2 but rather suppositionally grounded proto-assertions performed by H within her own suppositional framework. They are performances of proto-acts, A(That is true/false/probable)pro, where H implicates her acceptance of the state BH + A(S1)pro. In short, theorists of the indicative who have taken indicatives to be truth-apt have mistaken a conditional truth-evaluation for a straight truth-evaluation of a conditional.109 The performability of If S1, S2 for U, roughly, goes by the degree of Prob(S2/S1)—Adams above holds—or, in other words, A(S2)pro is permissible in BU + A(S1)pro just in case the conditional probability for U is high. However, the thesis Stalnaker—which holds that the probability of If S1, S2 equals Prob(S2/S1)—is not entailed. If S1, S2 as a whole lacks any probability, since it is not truth-apt. STA explains probability judgements—for example, responses to questions like (15) above: How likely is it that Jones won, if he bet 35? In (15), the proto-question Q(How likely is it Jones won?)pro is the scope of the supposition. The protoquestion has the structure below: U utters ‘How likely is it Jones won?’ advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, desires that H verify form some x, A(x is the likelihood that George won)pro/dox〉; and (b) to make H believe she possesses this desire. The permissibility conditions for a question of this form are as follows. (i) Jones has bet 35. (ii) U is in the right social position relative to H to make informational

108

109

I emphasize, as I did in the discussion of supposition in §1.6.1 n. 31, that this account of indicatives does not validate in general the schema: If S1 , then I believe that S1 . The state BU + A(S1 )pro is like a simulated belief state in some respects but not others. It does not have as content what U would believe if U believed S1 , since U would typically believe I believe that S1 . (See Van Fraassen 1980 : 503.) The proto-act A(I believe that S1 )pro is grounded in the state BU + A(S1 )pro if the latter entails the former's permissibility. The permissibility of A(S1 )pro does not entail that of A(I believe that S1 )pro . Technically, If S1 , S2 is a sentence S2 carrying a complex implicature operator If S1 . That does not mean that If S1 , S2 is truth-conditionally equivalent to S2 . That kind of response assumes SCT —see §1.1 . As uttered within If S1 , S2 , the sentence S2 is not truth-apt. S2 is not uttered as part of a doxastically grounded protoassertion. When we say That is true to a conditional, we are uttering ‘A(S2 )pro/dox is true’ conditionally.

98

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

demands of this kind of H, and H is capable, in principle, of undertaking such requests. We shall take it that the context is one where (ii) is already accepted by U, (i) is not, but is rather delivered by the supposition that Jones has bet 35. Thus the following holds. BU + A(Jones bet 35)pro → (Q(how likely is it Jones won)pro is permissible). If the audience H accepts that the proto-question is permissible within the scope of the suppositional state BH + A(Jones bet 35)pro, H is under some obligation to provide an answer, which is to say, to provide an answer within the scope of her own suppositional framework. In this case, H produces the answer A(1/37 is the likelihood that Jones won)pro. In short, U replies: ‘If Jones bet 35, it is 1/37 likely that he won.’ A familiar problem for treatments of indicative if is embedding of conditionals. Take (17): (17) If Pete is infallible, then if he bets, he will win. In (17), the consequent of an indicative is itself an indicative conditional, which is a complex proto-implicative act. In uttering (17), U implicates that her act A(If he calls, he will win)pro is performed within the scope of BU + A(Pete is infallible)pro. In uttering (17), U is displaying some of the proto-acts that follow as permissible within the framework BU + A(Pete is infallible)pro. U indicates that for her the following holds: (iii) (iii) (iv)

BU + A(Pete is infallible)pro → (A(If he bets, he will win)pro is permissible). holds, just in case (iv) is: [BU + A(Pete is infallible)pro] + A(he bets)pro → (A(he will win)pro is permissible).

In other words, if we add two successive suppositions, that of Pete is infallible and that of he bets to BU, then, if the permissibility of A(he will win)pro follows, then (ii) holds. U will produce (17). Indicatives lack objective correctness conditions. Although both Zack's and Jack's indicatives are not co-assertable, neither made an error in reasoning or ground. There is no reason why indicatives should have objective-correctness conditions. Indicatives are expressions of epistemic states modified by supposition. They are not reports about reality. That then is STA's account of indicative if-sentences. The account explains simple if-sentences across moods, the probabilistic features of indicatives, their

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

99

relation to supposition, and embeddability. There is clearly more that can be said about the adequacy of such a theory, but I will not undertake that here.110 I will display one further virtue of this approach to if in Part IV. STA's account can be used to analyse general if-sentences. General if-sentences—sentences like If a man beats a donkey, he usually feeds it as well—are a topic of some complexity, since they challenge simultaneously our understanding of generality, reference, and conditional-constructions. There is no unified account of if across the singular/general divide available within the Frege model.111 STA, however, provides one.

3.5 TRUTH-BEARERS AND AN EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF TRUTH Sentential compounds are one kind of sentential context in which declarative sentences get embedded. Sentences featuring that-clause constructions form another. Such sentences are important, since that-clauses are one of the means through which truth is predicated of truth-bearers. In STA, assertions, and not proto-assertions, are truth-bearers. Truth is a pragmatic notion. Declarative sentences can be embedded as subordinate clauses using the complementizer, that, as in (18): (18) It is true that snow is white. In this case, the proto-assertion embedding has the form: (19) A(It is true that A(snow is white)pro/…)pro/… According to STA, that combines with the complement sentence S to form a referring term, that S. In uttering ‘that S’, U advertises an intention to denote the doxastically grounded proto-assertion type A(S)pro/…/dox, the type corresponding to the token proto-act, A(S)pro/…, which U actually performs in the embedded position. Many types correspond to any particular token. A that-clause in a standard truth-ascription of the form It is true that S denotes that assertion type all of whose tokens are assertions comprising sentences with the same semantic content. Semantic contents in STA are proto-assertion types. In, §4.6. I characterize what such types are after I have said more about the semantic contents of referring terms.

110

How does the theory account for the indicative/subjunctive distinction? See Barker (1995) for a sketch of an answer. The STA theory also explains the semantics of only if (Barker 1993) and even if (Barker 1994).

111

See Lewis (1975b) for the argument, assuming a quantificational treatment of generality.

100

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

STA has no difficulties explaining the embedding of sentences with all sorts of non-literal or non-truth-conditional interpretations; thus: (20) It is true that Juliet is the sun. (21) I believe that, if the coin is tossed, it will land heads. (22) I believe that even the best philosophers can get confused. (20) involves the embedding of a proto-assertion on a metaphoric interpretation. (21) is a conditional, which lacks truth-conditions altogether. Finally, (22) is the embedding of a dual-content illocutionary act: an assertion in combination with an implicature act, introduced through even. In each case, the that-clause denotes the doxastically grounded proto-illocutionary type corresponding to the tokened act. It should be apparent that within STA objects of belief can be proto-illocutionary acts. But STA is not committed to the thesis that every state we might call a belief state has proto-illocutionary acts as objects. It is rather that the thoughts denoted by that-clauses such as (21) and (22) are simply not captured by anything non-linguistic, like a set of possible worlds. A natural language with its speech-act structures is an essential advance in thought-potential over the pre-linguistic representational systems underpinning intentionality. (These matters are dealt with in some detail in Part III.) Objects of belief are not truth-apt entities per se. (21) and (22) are counterexamples to that theory. In (21) the whole construction is not truth-apt and in (22) a significant component of it is not.

3.5.1 ‘Is true’ as an Expressive Predicate This brings us to the question of the semantics of sentences featuring the predicate is true. I have argued that the discourse function of the truth-predicate is to express confirmation of an assertive commitment property Π. I propose then a theory that treats is true semantically in just these terms. Below 풰 confirms [A(S)pro/dox] means that U confirms the assertive commitment property of A(S)pro/dox. In which case: Expressivist Theory of Truth: ‘S’ is true U uttersc “S” is true' and advertises intentions

(a) (b)

to represent a complex of the form 〈U confirms [A(S)pro/…/dox]〉; to defend commitment to confirming [A(S)pro/…/dox].

Truth-bearers can be assertions of either a reportive or an expressive kind. Why not propose a descriptive theory of truth, rather than an expressive one, according to which true denotes a property Φ of truth-bearers and an utterance of ‘S’ is true is a report that A(S)pro/dox has the property Φ? The property Φ cannot

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

101

be a property such as correspondence, since truth-bearers that are expressive assertions are not true by virtue of corresponding to reality. But why not propose that Φ is just the property a truth-bearer A(S)pro/dox has if and only if R, where R is the disquotation of S? I reject such a disquotational account since I do not think the T-schema is valid. I argue in Barker (2003) that there are many cases where U is committed to ‘S’ is true but not to S. Such cases are those where S is a dual-content sentence with both an assertive and implicature component, where the latter fails, such as Even Mother Teresa was pious. So is true lacks the disquotational property, pace Horwich (1990). The T-schema holds only for sentences whose semantic contents are proto-assertions, lacking implicature components.112 STA's expressive account of truth does not imply the validity of the T-schema. U can express her acceptance of the assertoric commitment associated with a sentence, say, Even Mother Teresa was pious, by asserting its truth, without the sentence itself being assertable for U because she rejects its implicature commitment. Given this expressive semantics for the truth-predicate, we might think that the false-predicate would function as follows. Utterance of ‘S’ is false expresses U's rejection of A(S)pro/…/dox. That is—in the sense of §3.3—U is in an Nstate with respect to A(S)pro/…/dox, and so is willing to assert not-S. Things are not so simple. Not all negations imply falsity. Thus metalinguistic negations are not false. Take: (23) I do not like cricket, I love it. (24) She does not hate him but dates him nevertheless. She dates him because she hates him. In affirming (23) and (24), U is not committing herself to the falsity of the sentences I like cricket and She hates him but dates him nevertheless. Both are true. In uttering (23) and (24), U is expressing N-states—see §3.3—which concern the rejection of the proto-assertions involved, A(I like cricket)pro/dox and A(She hates him but dates him nevertheless)pro/dox, for pragmatic reasons. These are that the first is not informative, that the second's implicature condition is not met. There is no rejection of the core commitment properties of the assertions. U is not excluding the commitments to the properties: Intention to represent 〈U, likes cricket〉 Intention to represent 〈She, hates him〉 〈She, dates him〉 For this reason, the negated sentences in (23) and (24) are not false. In general, A(S)pro/dox is judged false iff U is committed to A(Not-S)pro/dox on a semantic

112

For this reason, STA rejects Strawson's account (1950b) according to which utterance of ‘S’ is true brings with it a commitment to asserting S .

102

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

reading; U excludes commitment to the core commitment property of A(S)pro/dox. Thus, we have: Expressivist Theory of Falsity: ‘S’ is false U uttersc “S” is false' and advertises intentions (a) to represent her commitment to possession of an N-state with respect to the core assertoric commitment property of A(S)pro/dox; and (b) to defend commitment to this state.

We must reject a descriptive theory of negation for the same reasons as we do a descriptive theory of truth.

3.5.2 Objective and Subjective Truth-Conditions PCT rejects correspondence truth. Some truth-bearers are reports, and a kind of correspondence truth holds for them. But truth-bearers can also be expressive assertions, and here there is no question of correspondence truth. There is no property of truth, let alone one that relates a sentence to reality by correspondence. Within expressive assertions there is distinction between expressives with objective truth-conditions and those without objective truth-conditions. Instances of the latter kind include epistemic expressives, such as There is probably life in Mars, or There might be life on Mars—as discussed in §§1.2 and 1.3. Epistemic adverbials and modals have the following puzzling feature. Suppose that, for U, There might be life on Mars is assertable. It is perfectly consistent with this sentence being assertable for U that U believes that it is 50 per cent likely to be life on Mars and 50 per cent likely to be lifeless. U can affirm that it is 50 per cent likely that a speaker H possessing an epistemic state acquainted with all the facts would judge her utterance, There might be life in Mars, rightly to be false. But the following seems to be a correct principle: Ideality: If U judges that it is N per cent likely that, in an epistemic state that is right about all the relevant facts, S will be judged false, then U is committed to judging that S is N per cent likely to be false. Given Ideality, U can judge that there is a 50 per cent likelihood that There might be life in Mars is false. But then U cannot assert it after all, which contradicts our initial assumption. Evidently, we must reject Ideality. Ideality holds for assertions that are reports. The truth of reports implies a type of correspondence. Thus if U reckons that a person in an ideal state is likely to judge a report that S is false—and S is true if and only if a complex 〈P〉 obtains—then U will judge it unlikely that 〈P〉 obtains, and that consequently S is unlikely to be true. U will then judge S unassertable for her. The line of reasoning fails for expressive assertions. That is

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

103

because the biconditional used in the argument for Ideality—that S is true if and only if a complex of the form 〈P〉 obtains—does not hold for them. Expressive assertions do not necessarily have objective truth-conditions. In making that claim I am not suggesting that all expressive assertions lack objective truth-conditions. Most, those featuring logical operators of the standard kind, have objective truth-conditions; Ideality holds for them. Thus Ideality holds for negations, disjunctions, conjunctions, and universal noun phrase-generalities—sentences of the form every F V__—and so on. The reason this is so lies in the commitment properties associated with the truth-bearing proto-assertions. The commitment properties of epistemic modals and adverbials are commitment properties that one can possess whilst recognizing that informationally superior epistemic states may lack them. The commitment properties of standard logical compounds do not have this character. Take N-states. If U predicts there is a 50 per cent probability that an ideal speaker will not be in an N-state, then U cannot really be in that state. Defending commitment properties that lack objectivity still makes rational sense as a practice once we look at the point of epistemic modals and expressives. The point of such assertions is that they are guides to action. The very point of such utterances requires that they fail the test in Ideality.

3.5.3 Other Expressives I have proposed that we should accept the theory that the truth- and falsity-predicates have an expressivist semantics. There are other predicates and predicate-formers that deserve such treatment, such as exists and is identical to. Exists does not denote a property. So utterances of Fred exists cannot be treated as reports. That is a reason to treat such utterances as expressive assertions. Thus, we might accept: Exist: U utters ‘T exists’ and advertises intentions: (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes T denotes〉; and (b) to defend a commitment to believing that T denotes. Issues of existence are just issues about the denotation of terms and Exist makes this transparently clear. It may be wondered how these accounts apply to cases without names, as in There exists a man with pink eyes. STA treats indefinites as referring terms, which is to say their utterance always involves the performance of a certain kind of proto-referring act. (I deal with these matters in Chapter 5.) Another possibility is an expressivist treatment of identity statements. Say that the syntactic position x in a sentence __x__ is a simple context if and only if the contribution made by a referring term T with semantic content χ in the position x in __x__ is χ. In short, if the content of T is, say, R(Nom)pro[τ]—the

104

MAKING SEMANTICS PRAGMATIC

speech-act type defined by a referential tree in the sense of §4.5—then, if x in __x__ is simple, the syntactic, morphological, or descriptive features of the term T do not enter into the speech-act content of __T__, only its type R(Nom)pro[τ] does. Examples of simple contexts are x is happy and x kissed every frog. An example of a context that is not simple is Jane believes that x wrote 풰 ysses.113 I treat identity statements expressively as follows: Identity: U utters ‘T is identical to N’ and advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈For U, every simple context __x__ is such that the sentences __T__ and __N__ have the same content〉; and (b) to defend the state represented. Identity statements are not reports about reality. There is, then, no identity relation in the world. Identity does not assume that the terms in identity statements in fact denote. For example, the semantic contents of fictional terms is given by speech-acts of the form R(Nom)pro[τ]; hence the concept of a simple context is defined for them. There may be some concern about how Identity explains sentences like There is a number that is identical with itself. STA treats indefinites as referring terms—Chapter 5—so there is no problem here.

Conclusions This finishes my basic defence of the idea that proto-assertion types can function as sentence-meanings. The core idea behind the semantic proposal articulated in Chapters 2 and 3 is this. Repertoire rules that say what speakers can do in English if they have certain designative and communicative desires fix, more or less, proto-illocutionary acts, I(R)pro, in which speakers advertise representational and communicative intentions. The meaning of a sentence is simply the proto-act type that can be performed using that sentence, different levels of abstraction distinguishing what we call linguistic meaning and semantic interpretation. Proto-illocutionary acts have combinatorial capacities, so can combine with each other and with modes to form more complex acts. There are interesting structural differences between proto-illocutionary acts, and proto-assertions in particular, and propositions as conceived of by the Frege model. We shall see more of these differences when we enter into the realm of the sub-sentential. This is the task of Part II. Finally, STA is in a position to explain the limited embeddability of non-declarative sentences. The task of explaining this was raised at the

113

In STA, proto-referring acts R(T )pro appearing within the that -clauses of opaque belief attributions of the form O believes that __T __ that are referentially opaque have a specific speech-act structure. U performs R(T )pro on a proxy interpretation; U is a speaker proxy for O. U is speaker proxy for O just in case U's acts of speech are taken as having the content they would have if performed by O herself. In this case the morphology of T is relevant to the logical form, so such contexts are not simple. (See Barker 1994 .) The status of other apparently opaque contexts, such as modal contexts, cannot be examined here.

MOODS, MODES, AND LOGICAL COMPOUNDS

105

beginning of §3.2. Non-declaratives can appear in the consequent position of indicatives, but not in antecedent position. They can appear in conjunctions and disjunctions in a limited way. They cannot appear in negations. In STA, there is nothing in principle barring embedding of non-declaratives. Explanations come down to details of particular cases. I will look at two cases—indicatives and negations. Indicatives. Consequent-position is acceptable, because non-declaratives have permissibility conditions and so can fall within the scope of a supposition. Antecedent-position is not acceptable, because the permissibility of non-declaratives cannot be stipulated so as to ground other acts in the way required. That is because non-declaratives cannot feature in arguments as premisses, and, if given its suppositional function, produces what is effectively an argument context. Negations. Negation is not acceptable since in negations U expresses her rejection of a speech-act in which a cognitive property is defended. Non-declaratives do not involve advertising intentions to defend cognitive properties.

This page intentionally left blank

PART II Beyond Quantication

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 4 Proto-Referring Acts and Proper Names 4.0 INTRODUCTION: GRAMMAR AND PROTO-REFERRING ACTS Sentences are a basic grammatical category in a natural language. Noun phrases are another. Noun phrases include a semantically diverse class of expressions: names, demonstratives, definite and indefinite descriptions, pronouns, universal noun phrases, and abstract nouns like blueness and man.114 We group these expressions together as noun phrases because they overlap significantly with respect to surface grammar. The factors that mark them as sharing grammar is that they have the same potential to combine with other expressions to form grammatical expressions; they have the same combinatorial capacities. A noun phrase is an expression M such that: NP Grammar

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

M can appear in sentences of subject–predicate form; it can combine with a predicate or be a constituent of a predicate. M can appear in term position in complex terms, as in the G of M and M of the G. M can combine with relative clauses, as in M that/who is G. M can be the antecedent of pronouns.

NP Grammar does not hold exactly for all noun phrases; (iii) does not hold for relative and interrogative pronouns like that and who. These are, however, the only exceptions.115 In the Frege model, this shared grammar has no semantic significance. The Frege model divides noun phrases into two distinct semantic kinds: singular terms and quantifiers. (See Neale 1990.) STA, by contrast, offers a theory in which shared grammar is reflected directly in basic semantic function. The fundamental tenet of STA is that the grammar of an expression signifies the proto-act with which that expression is invariably uttered. Noun phrases come in two grammatical forms: singular and plural. STA takes this grammatical distinction seriously.

114

Gerund phrases—phrases such as George's being stupid —fall within the class of definite descriptions; they are equivalent to definite descriptions of the form the being stupid of George . (Here I follow Neale 1990 .) They have the designative function of denoting complexes—see §2.2 .

115

The claim made here is consistent with the idea that specific types of noun phrases—e.g. proper names, demonstrative or definite descriptions—have syntactic features over and above their shared noun-phrase grammar.

110

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

Semantically, singular noun phrases are associated with singular denotation: the denotation of one object. Plural phrases are associated with plural denotation: the simultaneous denotation of multiple objects. Thus a phrase the boys plurally denotes, if it denotes at all, certain boys.116 U is not denoting a set or a fusion of individuals. This difference in designative function corresponds to a difference in proto-acts. According to STA, all utterances of singular noun phrases—George, a boy, the boy, that boy, every boy, any boy, and so on—are acts in which U performs a basic kind of proto-referring act: utterance of a term advertising an intention singularly to denote an object of some character. The semantic interpretation of any tokens in this class are all variations on, and specific kinds of use of, this basic act type. All utterances of plural noun phrases—The Beatles, some girls, the girls, those girls, girls, any girls, and so on—are acts in which U performs a basic kind of proto-referring act: utterance of a term advertising an intention plurally to denote objects of some character. The semantic interpretation of plural noun phrase tokens are variations and uses of this basic proto-act type. In STA, sentences have proto-illocutionary acts—for example, proto-assertions —as their semantic contents. The constituents of proto-illocutionary acts are proto-referring acts, amongst other kinds of proto-acts—such as those associated with predicates and relative clauses. The compositional semantics that STA offers is based on the idea that proto-referring acts combine with other sub-sentential proto-acts to form complex proto-acts, including protoillocutionary acts. In what follows, I introduce the notion of a proto-referring act—the act of uttering a string and advertising a denotative intention—which is ultimately based on the notion of a repertoire rule, just as was the case for protoassertions. I then sketch out STA's account of the semantics of proper names, enabling us to gain a picture of STA's conception of singular referential thought. The basic idea is that the semantic interpretation of a token proper name is a proto-referring-act type individuated by the referential tree in which it is a token node. That account explains the basic cognitive and semantic properties of proper names in a way that is neutral on whether they denote or not.

4.1 REPERTOIRE RULES AND DENOTATIVE TECHNIQUES The concept of a proto-referring act, like that of a proto-assertion, is grounded in the concept of a repertoire rule—see §1.4. A repertoire rule is a rule that tells a speaker what she can do in order to achieve certain, broadly designative, or

116

There is a plurality of theories about the semantics of plural noun phrases. For a survey and critique of some, see Oliver and Smiley (2001).

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

111

communicative, purposes. A proto-act is an act in which U advertises, or presents herself as having, an intention; U intentionally engages in a behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who, following repertoire rules, has a designative or communicative intention.117 So the key to understanding proto-referring acts is the repertoire rules governing such acts. In the case of noun phrases, the repertoire rules are concerned with the particular purpose of denoting something. Such repertoire rules fix what we might call denotative techniques. If a speaker wants to denote an object, using terms in English, she can do certain things, or show herself disposed to do certain things, with the aim of achieving that goal. Denotative repertoire rules come in two kinds: singular-denotative rules and plural-denotative rules. I now look at singular rules, and begin with the case of names. Names are associated with two repertoire rules. One for introducing a name, the other for continuing use of a name. I will describe these in some detail below, but for now, the main repertoire rule of a name, that of continuance of use, is given below: RR[Name N]: If a speaker Σ wants to denote an entity x already denoted by prior tokens of the expression N, and Σ seeks to secure denotation though the fact that x is so denoted, then Σ can utter another token of N and will achieve her purpose, if the earlier tokens denote. So in uttering a token of Aristotle as a name, U intends to behave in the manner of a speaker following RR[Name N]. Note that RR[Name N] tells us what a speaker can do if she wants to achieve her goal. It does not say she will achieve her goal. That depends upon whether the antecedent referring term Aristotle denotes. It also depends on other matters. There may be a range of prior tokens of Aristotle, ones for the philosopher, and ones for the shipping magnate. Which one does U intend? To answer that question we have to consider other types of referring term. Take definite descriptions. Singular definite descriptions, phrases of the form the F, are terms that can be used to pick out entities based on their uniquely satisfying descriptive contents. That is a somewhat controversial claim, which will be defended in §5. I let it stand undefended for now. Let {..F..} be a set of predicates including F. {..F..} may simply be {F}. The repertoire rule for a definite description the F is, very roughly, the following. RR[the F]: If Σ wants to denote an object x that she believes uniquely satisfies {..F..} and Σ wants to achieve this through x's uniquely satisfying {..F..}, and wants the set {..F..} to be established prior to the processing of the whole utterance in which her act of denoting appears, then Σ can do this by uttering an expression of the form the F.

117

I use Σ, rather than U, to refer to a speaker in general in repertoire-rule specifications.

112

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

According to RR[the F], definite descriptions are those devices we can use to denote objects by utilizing the prior denotative success of general terms, such as F. As with RR[Name N], RR[the F] does not guarantee success in denoting an object. If a speaker U employs RR[the F], she appeals to a set {..F..}. For her act to be conversationally felicitous, her audience H must, through context and conversational cues, be able to ascertain the members of {..F..}. RR[the F] does not treat descriptions like the man used to denote some particular man as essentially improper. Rather, it is built into the semantics of definite descriptions that they should be used incompletely this way.118 The clause in RR[the F] about processing touches on the presuppositional nature of definite descriptions. I clarify this matter in §5.1. Use of definite descriptions can aid speakers in using names in combination with another technique, though not peculiar to any type of noun phrase; this is the rule of descriptive apposition. RR[Apposition]: If Σ wants to denote an object x that is denoted by a token term T and Σ believes that x uniquely satisfies {..F..}, then, Σ can juxtapose the F to T, as in T, the F, with the goal of signalling that the terms co-designate. A token N can be combined with, say, a description the F, to denote a thing co-designated by the two expressions in apposition. And so on. Thus, U, in uttering, say, Aristotle, the philosopher, intends to act as someone does who, following these two techniques of denotation, has an intention, namely, the intention of denoting an object that is denoted by certain prior tokens of Aristotle and is a philosopher. Consider next the repertoire rule for an anaphoric pronoun: RR[Anaphor]: If Σ wants to denote an object x that is denoted by a token referring term T and the token T is salient and of masculine gender, then Σ can utter ‘he’ in order to achieve her purpose. So in uttering an expression as an anaphoric masculine pronoun, U utters ‘he’ intending to behave in the manner of a speaker following RR[Anaphor]. A particular token pronoun he may be such that there are several candidate antecedent noun phrases. Which one does she intend as the antecedent? To distinguish, U brings RR[Apposition] to bear. U may place the first guy in apposition with he, as in he, the first guy, and signal co-designation thereby and so indicate which antecedent U has in mind for he. In sum: names are those devices speakers can use to denote objects by appeal to prior denotative success of tokens of the name type. Definite descriptions are

118

In Frege-model theories of descriptions, incomplete descriptions are either treated as elliptical—the audience infers from the context the more detailed description that the speaker has in mind—or, assuming Russell's theory of descriptions, the domain of quantification is restricted. (See Neale 1990 : §3.7.) In STA, as we shall see, incompleteness is built into how descriptions function.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

113

those devices that speakers can use by appeal to prior denotative success of general terms, such as F. Anaphoric pronouns are those devices in which denotative purposes can be achieved through the prior denotative success of noun phrases. There are other kinds of repertoire rules, and the repertoire rules described here for names and definite descriptions will need refinement. I have described above singular denotative repertoire rules. But there are also plural versions of such rules. They are the obvious plural denotative counterparts, ones where speakers seek to fulfil purposes of plural denotation, rather than singular denotation. (I look at plurals in some detail in §5.0.2 and Chapter 6.) Repertoire rules are the basis of proto-acts: acts in which speakers utter strings advertising certain designative or communicative intentions. In a proto-referring act, U utters a term with the grammar of NP Grammar, and advertises an intention to denote an object with certain properties. The general type-description of such an act is: Singular Proto-Referring Act: U performs an act of proto-referring with an expression Γ just in case U utters ‘Γ’ and intends thereby to engage in a behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who, following the repertoire rules of object denotation in L, intends to denote an object x: x uniquely satisfies {..F..}.119 I represent a proto-referring act by R(Γ)pro, where Γ is any noun phrase. The set {..F..} is the referential content of U's act. If Γ is a name, such as Freya, then F is Denoted by earlier tokens of ‘Freya’. Of course, U will possess a more specific referential content, which she can indicate through some of the devices described above. Relative clauses, as in clauses of the form who V__, where V__ is some verb phrase, can be used to make content explicit. (I discuss their mode of function in Chapter 6.) Another way of making referential content explicit is by presenting oneself as disposed to perform proto-acts. Clearly we accept: [Manifest]: If a speaker Σ utters ‘Γ’ and intends to denote an object x satisfying {F1, F2 …}, then Σ is disposed to perform, either overtly or mentally, proto-assertions of the form A(Γ is F1)pro, A(Γ is F2)pro, and so forth. Thus, a speaker in presenting herself as disposed to perform proto-assertions in which Γ is a constituent, shows that her proto-referring act has a certain referential content. The total range of such proto-assertions constitutes U's theory about Γ.

119

In Singular Proto-Referring Act , the phrase an object x: x is uniquely satisfies {..F.. } is in the scope of intends . Proto-referring act attribution sentences, like the above, are extensional contexts. The expression x , which is employed in such sentences, is not to be explicated in semantic terms as a variable—as noted in §2.1.1 . In the canonical representation of intentions, no variables are used. I show this in Chapter 7 , where I describe the structure of speech-act intentions.

114

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

4.1.1 Proto-Referring Acts and Modes A proto-illocutionary act, say a proto-assertion, is a bipartite act; it comprises both (a) a proto-representational act—advertising an intention to represent a complex—and (b) a proto-communicative act—advertising an intention to defend a cognitive property (§1.4.) A proto-referring act has only the first component (a). It is essentially the utterance of a phrase and the advertising of an intention to denote something. For this reason, proto-referring acts are subordinate or dependent. (See §2.2.) A referring act needs to be part of an act that possesses a communicative intention, by being part of either an illocutionary act or a vocative use of a noun phrase. To take the second case, in directing her utterance of Bruce towards a sun-tanned beer-sipping individual in her presence, U performs a protoreferring act and advertises the purpose of gaining that individual's attention. Her utterance of the noun phrase is selfstanding.120 Advertising of communicative intentions, although rule-based in the case of sentences, is never rule-based in the case of noun phrases. Proto-referring acts, as with proto-illocutionary acts, can be used for many different purposes. Take the case of a name. U may utter ‘N’ and perform a proto-act R(N)pro, and have the intention she advertises and, moreover, intend that her audience believe she has the intention. U's act is doxastically grounded. I represent grounding as: R(N)pro/dox.121 U may use the name N sincerely, or U may lack the denotative intention she advertises, but still want her audience to believe she has it; U uses N insincerely. Or, more interestingly still, U can utter ‘N’ performing a proto-referring act and make it manifestly clear that she lacks the intention she presents herself as having because she believes the name is empty or is agnostic about its denotation and wants to communicate that fact. Say, she utters ‘Pegasus does not exist’. That is what we might call pretending to intend to denote.122 I represent U's utterance of N on such a non-doxastic interpretation as R(N)pro/non-dox. We have then three cases, sincere use of a name, insincere use of a name, and pretence. But there is a common structure behind all the cases. Whether or not U's name token denotes anything, or U intends to denote anything, or U wants to make it clear that she lacks an intention, U, the speaker, performs a primary core act, the precondition for sincerity, insincerity, or pretence: the act of advertising a certain denotative intention. U performs A(N)pro.

120

A pervasive view is that words have meaning only within the context of a sentence, or that the smallest units of communication are utterances of sentences either explicitly or implicitly. I reject this view.

121

Thus, in R(N )pro/dox , U performs R(N )pro in conjunction with a recognitional intention of the kind that underpins non-assertoric illocutionary acts, such as orders—see §1.3.3 . R(N )pro/dox cannot be performed as a self-standing act, since mere recognition of the intention does not issue in any response for the audience, unlike the case of an imperative, where there is an instruction in the offing.

122

That speakers engage in pretence in using names they know to be empty is suggested in Walton (1973) and Evans (1982).

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

115

Proto-assertions, as we noted in §1.5, can have rhetorical modes such as irony and metaphor, but also logical ones such as supposition. Proto-referring acts are also subject to such rhetorical and logical modes. The proto-act R(Γ)pro—in which U advertises an intention to denote an x uniquely satisfying {..F..}—has a mode of interpretation just in case (a) U intends her audience to recognize that she lacks the denotative intention advertised; and (b) U intends to deploy R(Γ)pro for some non-denotative purpose. For example, noun phrases such as definite descriptions can be used with various non-literal interpretations. Romeo might utter ‘the sun’ intending to denote Juliet, in which case Romeo utters ‘the sun’ advertising an intention to denote a person who uniquely satisfies {..Sun..}. Instead Romeo intends to denote someone who has properties associated with literally being a sun—namely, being such as to dominate the visual field. Romeo performs R(the sun)pro in the metaphoric mode.123 Sarcastic and approximative modes are also possible. Such rhetorical moods are counted as non-literal interpretations. Some modes of proto-referring are rule-based and literal. It is built into the meaning of the noun phrase that its utterance comprises performance of a proto-referring act under a mode. Universal noun phrases, every F, are an example of this, discussed in Chapter 5. The concept of a proto-assertion presupposes the designative relation of representing. Likewise, the concept of a proto-referring act presupposes the designative relation of denoting. As already noted, representing and denoting are the same kind of relation. (It is convenient for expositional purposes to distinguish them—see §0.1.) The fact that proto-acts are defined through designation brings no commitment that all expressions invariably succeed in designating something, or that their meaning resides in designating. Nor, in the case of noun phrases, is the meaning of a noun phrase always linked to having a particular descriptive content. In STA, the meaning of a noun phrase is always a proto-referring-act type of a certain kind. I provide a firm idea of what these types are by the end of Part II. Under what conditions does a referring term denote? A referring term denotes if and only if (a) it is denotation-apt; and (b) its descriptive content meets certain conditions. Regarding (a), denotation-aptness is just like representationaptness of sentences (§2.1). Denotation-aptness requires only that a proto-act be performed, not that U actually have an intention. If U performs the act R(the largest spaghetti eating rhino in the world)pro but lacks the intention she advertises, then, if it turns out that there is a largest spaghetti eating rhino,

123

Of course, U's act will have other referential content, which may function literally. Romeo's token act R(the sun )pro/M-pro/dox will be used with other referential content—used to identify the person who is being thought of metaphorically in this way. That may be: {..Person who is metaphorically characterized as identical to the sun by Romeo ..}.

116

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

then U has succeeded in denoting it. Condition (b) is the question of what fixes the denotation of a denotation-apt term. As will be revealed, STA offers a kind of descriptive theory.

4.2 PROPER NAMES AND REFERENTIAL TREES I now analyse in STA's proto-act terms a centrally important kind of noun-phrase type: proper names. In what follows, I am chiefly concerned with the semantic content of a name, the contribution that Madonna, say, makes to the semantic content of, say, Madonna sings. The semantic content of the latter is, in STA, a proto-assertion type. The semantic content of the name is a constituent of this proto-assertion type. It is a proto-referring-act type of a certain kind. What is that act type? The proposal that STA puts forward is based in the work of Kripke (1980). Kripke introduced the idea that a standard proper name denotes an object in virtue of a denotative-chain or d-chain connecting it to the object. A d-chain is a social–historical chain whose links are speaker temporal stages with specific causal relations (of inheritance) holding between stages. D-chains terminate with baptismal speakers (perceptually) interacting with the denotation. Kripke's conception gives rise to at least two lines of theoretical development. First there is direct referentialism: names are just tags for objects with no other meaning than denotative meaning. D-chains secure or fix denotation but do not enter into the specification of semantic content. A second development is Devitt's (1981, 1996) non-Fregean sense theory: the meaning of a name is a property, not the property of denoting a particular object, but the property of being in a particular network of d-chains. The first direct-referentialist approach will not work for STA because of its appeal to denotations. However, a modification of Devitt's account can be fitted into the STA framework of proto-acts. First, we need the right notion of a d-chain network. A referential tree is the tree structure formed by the d-chains that converge to a certain source, the source being (baptismal) speakers who introduce a new name, or those speakers responsible for a change of meaning. I represent a tree in Fig. 4.1, where nodes represent token name uses stretched out through time. Nodes in the tree—the particular letters T, B, and so on, which represent token uses of referring expressions—are not restricted to phonemic–graphemic name types, nor are they restricted to languages. Nodes may include uses of definite descriptions. Trees may issue in objects, which their source speakers referentially demonstrate, or they may not, in which case the names involved are empty. The concept of a referential tree is used by STA to make the following proposal. The semantic content of a proper name is the proto-referring-act type

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

117

Fig. 4.1

all of whose token proto-referring acts are nodes in a particular tree. Thus the semantic content of Madonna, for the singer, is that proto-referring type all of whose tokens form a referential tree, which, in fact, converges on a particular individual, the voice behind classics such as Like a Virgin.124 Intimately connected to this treatment of names is the idea that names are akin to anaphoric pronouns. Anaphoric pronouns always form referential chains. Name tokens then form extended referential-chains.125 These chains form trees that converge on sources. Just as we look to the source of an anaphoric chain to determine what the semantic content of an anaphoric pronoun is, so we do likewise with names. Anaphoric pronoun tokens have the same semantic interpretation just in case they are links of the same anaphoric chain. We say something similar for names. Name tokens have the same semantic interpretation, if they are nodes of the same referential tree. The semantic interpretation of a name is the proto-referring-act type defined by a referential tree. What does a speaker do for her token to be a node in a tree? Roughly, U uses N so as to conform to her earlier use of N, to denote whatever she denoted with her last use. This is implicit in the repertoire rule RR[Name N]—see §4.1.

124

Devitt proposes that the sense of a name is the property of belonging to a certain network of d-chains. Devitt's network of d-chains is a subclass of the total class of d-chains that constitute a tree. For example, the names Phosphorus and Hesperus were introduced under distinct observational conditions and speakers used them in such a way that employments of Phophorus depended only upon earlier uses of Phosphorus and employments of Hesperus on earlier uses of Hesperus . These networks are then two distinct denotational pathways that define the senses of the two names. Devitt thinks that assigning d-chain networks as name senses solves the problem of the informativeness of identity statements; the problem of semantic opacity of belief reports. This is untenable. See Bertolet (1999).

125

Effectively, then, what I propose is an anaphoric interpretation of the Kripkean idea. Kripke (1980 : 163) proposes ‘the ordinary speaker intends to use the name the same way it was transmitted to him’. This is perhaps a gesture towards the anaphoric idea. Evans (1973) seems to toy with the anaphoric idea, but dismisses it due to a lack in motivation for privileging intentions to denote what earlier users denote and worries about how one might plausibly realize the idea. Brandom (1994) also proposes a form of the anaphoric account.

118

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

In §4.3 I outline the anaphoric conception by first examining belief-based use of names, or names whose users think they denote. This enables us better to characterize repertoire rules governing names, and explain how d-chains emerge as types of extended trans-conversational anaphoric chains. In §4.4 I generalize this account to cover names used both with belief and without belief, as in fictional names. In §4.5 I restate STA's semantic thesis about names and demonstrate its explanatory value.

4.3 PROPER NAMES AS ANAPHORS Let us consider belief-based use of names. The broad features of the anaphoric conception are these. In using a token name Aristotle with an intention to denote an entity, U intends to denote whatever was denoted by certain earlier tokens of the lexical type Aristotle. (By lexical type I mean a type defined by a specific grammatical, phonemic–graphemic form.) The earlier tokens may be tokens produced by other speakers or by U herself at an earlier time, if she is a mature user of the name. Names are like specialized anaphors. The tokens of a given lexical type, say, Smith, may denote many different objects, just as tokens of the pronoun he may potentially denote any object denotable by a masculine noun phrase. In using a name, U has to keep track of which Smith just as U has to keep track of which he. In a long dialogue, U may occasionally tag her anaphors, with descriptions, to make it clear which noun phrase is the antecedent. U may say ‘He, the first guy, punched him, the second guy’. The same holds for names. In the case of names—on the anaphor model—U keeps track of token names forming nominal anaphoric chains through the files or dossiers that she naturally builds up in using names. Let us say U has two files, Φ1 and Φ2, for the names Aristotle, Φ1 recording information about a philosopher, Φ2 about a shipping magnate. The files form two idiolectic name types, Aristotle[Φ1] and Aristotle[Φ2]. These are types that specify particular tokens of Aristotle, which U groups according to her dossiers. In uttering a token of Aristotle, say in a philosophical discussion, U intends to denote whatever she denoted with her last tokens of the idiolectic type Aristotle[Φ1]. U may have no recollection of when she last used Aristotle in this way, but U has the correct conviction that she did utter tokens in this way. The descriptive content of the file is not what is important to denotation. Its role is just to make available the right antecedent tokens upon which U can base her new intention to denote. In using Aristotle, the philosopher, U does not intend to denote, simply, the x: x uniquely satisfies {Aristotle, Philosopher}. What is primary and essential is that U intends to denote the thing denoted by her last tokens produced from the file that lists the information {..Philosopher..}.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

119

The description is used to isolate a file; it plays no direct role in denotation.126 U succeeds in denoting just in case the earlier tokens denote, whether or not the descriptive material {..Philosopher..} is true of the object. Many links in a d-chain—nodes in a tree—are speaker temporal stages belonging to the same speaker. But nominal anaphoric chains can span speakers, as do pronominal anaphoric chains. Nominal anaphoric chains are extended from a speaker H to speaker U by U's encountering H's use of a name N—be it in text or speech—and by U incorporating N into a file. U constructs her own idiolectic type N[Φk] whose first file entry is, say, {Denoted by ‘N’ as used by H, …}. As U continues to employ N, the content of the file Φk may change, becoming much more complex, or, with time, eroding. Obviously, mature users of names may not have any recollection about when they acquired N, but their later speaker stages are causally connected to earlier speaker stages that did record this information. The chain escapes their recollection, but it is there. These remarks enable us to specify the conditions under which two speaker stages, Ui + 1 and UI—temporal stages of speakers using tokens at ti +1 and ti, where ti + 1 is after ti—are consecutive links in a d-chain, or nominal anaphoric chain. I describe below the special case where the speaker stages use the same lexical type N—nothing special hangs on that: DC: Ui + 1's use of a lexical type N and Ui's use of N constitute consecutive nodes in a d-chain—that is, a nominal anaphoric chain, iff either: (a)

(b)

Ui + 1 and Ui are speaker stages of the same person and (i) Ui's uses of N are tokens of an idiolectic type N[Φk]; (ii) Ui + 1 has a correct memory trace of having used N before as an idiolectic type N[Φk], although U may not have a specific perceptual memory of having done so; (iii) Ui + 1 has the intention to denote by N the x: x is denoted by the earlier tokens of N[Φk]. Ui + 1 and Ui are not speaker stages of the same person and (i) Ui's uses of N constitute tokens produced in some context C (speech or text); (ii) Ui + 1 has a correct memory trace of having perceived these tokens N in C; (iii) Ui + 1 has the intention to denote by N the x: x is denoted by tokens N in C.

Over all, DC requires that d-chains are maintained by intentions to denote, but the causal element in the link has not been eliminated. Speaker stages within the same speaker must be causally connected, through memory traces for the case of intra-speaker transmission, as in DC (a), and through perceptual contact for the case of inter-speaker transmission, as in DC (b).

126

This is consistent with the fact that I use in apposition Aristotle and the philosopher , indicating thereby co-designation.

120

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

DC provides us with an account of d-chain transmission. How do chains get started? Paradigmatically, chain creation begins with speakers who consciously baptize an entity with a token of some lexical type. I call such speakers baptismal source speakers. To be a baptismal speaker a ceremony is not required, though one can be present.127 Speakers aim to secure denotation of an object either demonstratively, through perceptual interaction, or descriptively—for example, Evans's Julius (1982), which is to denote whoever invented the zipper. A speaker's utterance of N demonstratively or descriptively for O is baptismal just in case U lacks any intention to denote, through a DC (a)/(b)-chain, what was denoted by earlier tokens of N through some existing file Fk. Her denotative intention is purely demonstrative or descriptive. Thus, say U dubs her child Dallas. U knows that the lexical type is used to denote a city and indeed other people. She has the idiolectic types: Dallas[Φ1], Dallas[Φ2], and so on. But in using Dallas demonstratively for her child she does not intend to denote what was denoted by her earlier tokens of these idiolectic types. Rather U is creating a new file, say Φm. Having created Φm and an idiolectic type Dallas[Φm], she then introduces the name Dallas, so used, to others, setting up DC (a)/(b)-links. These new users create their own files in turn and their own idioletic types. The speakers who get to know the child O, called Dallas, will use the term Dallas demonstratively as tokens of their own idiolectic types. These speakers are perceptual speakers but not source speakers, since they are only successfully reidentifying O, through demonstration and DC (a)/(b)-chains that link their speaker stages back to the source speaker stage that performed the baptismal act.

4.3.1 Denotation and Change of Denotation On this account of d-chains, a token N as uttered by Ui + 1 denotes O just in case Ui's token uses of N denote O. And that occurs just in case the source speaker's demonstrative or descriptive acts pick something out. One might doubt, however, that intentions can be the basis of denotation in this manner. Take this case. U employs Bush intending to denote her octogenarian neighbour who bears that name, rather than the President. Nevertheless, the context justifies her audience H in interpreting U as denoting the President. Which person has U denoted with her token Bush? One might argue contrary to the intention-based account that she denotes the President. Conclusion: context fixes denotation, not intentions! STA's intention-based account can respond to this. U's token Bush has denoted both persons. It denotes the neighbour because, in using Bush, U situates herself by her intentions in a tree, whose source is the neighbour. It denotes the President because in listening H effectively performs, in thought, a proto-act

127

See Devitt (1981) for an extensive discussion of baptismal ceremonies.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

121

with the same token, and situates herself in a tree whose source is the President. Thus, the token Bush denotes different things relative to the two distinct intentional structures, that supplied by U and that supplied by H. We call the second denotation the denotation, because it is the contextually justified one. The speakers who determine ultimately what a name denotes—the source speakers—are not simply the baptismal source speakers. Some speakers inadvertently bring about a new interpretation for a lexical type N as the result of misidentification of an object. They are source speakers for a new referential tree, not by intent, but by error. Consider a group of users of Madagascar, which in their mouths denotes a coastal region of Africa—here I adapt Evans's example (1973). Later speakers, by error, start using it for the island off the coast. Take the initial perceptual speaker who goes wrong. Her assertions of This is Madagascar are false, her demonstrative uses of Madagascar, pointing at the island, are incorrect. However, go further on in time, when more and more speakers use Madagascar demonstratively for the island. At some stage perceptual speaker stages become correct users, source speakers, for a new public name denoting the island. Why does this change occur? One might consider several accounts here.128 The one I favour is the following. Take the initial mistaken speaker. She is already a competent user of a name, Madagascar, for the coast, and uses that name through the idiolectic type, say, Madagascar[Φ1]. She uses Madagascar demonstrating the island, but intends also to denote the thing denoted by prior tokens of her idiolectic type Madagascar[Φ1]. Some of her earlier tokens may have been demonstrative uses directed towards the coast, or ones where she was connected by d-chains to other perceptual speakers who used Madagascar demonstratively for the coast. As we go further on in time with the new incorrect use of Madagascar, we find that speakers using Madagascar demonstratively for the island are such that many of their recent perceptual speaker antecedents—to whom they are linked by d-chains—are demonstrating the island. If we go further still, that number increases. The later the time, the further back we have to go to find d-chain antecedent perceptual speakers who are in touch with the coast. There is then an accumulation of immediate or recent perceptual speaker acts demonstrating the island. At some stage, owing to the cumulative weight of antecedent perceptual speaker stages using Madagascar for the island, the use of Madagascar is effectively indistinguishable from the mature use of a baptismally introduced name in which perceptual speakers reidentify the denotation. We count such stable, entrenched, perceptually based use as sufficient for creating d-chain source speakers.

128

Evans (1982) thinks that the denotation will be the entity that is the dominant causal source of the information associated with the name. Kripke (1980) toys with a descriptive approach according to which the description the island becomes associated with the name, and people intend to denote by the description rather than through the chain. Neither strikes me as a generally viable solution.

122

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

4.4 NAMES USED WITHOUT BELIEF I have provided in DC and my discussion of source speakers an account of name use in the belief-based case. This gives us a fairly secure grasp of the denotative techniques associated with names, and thus of the repertoire rules for names. There are two rules for names: the mid-chain use, covered roughly by RR[Name N], and baptismal use. The mid-chain use is: RR[Name1 N]: If a speaker Σ wants to denote by a token expression an object already denoted by prior tokens of a name whose phonemic–graphemic form is N, and to which Σ has appropriate perceptual or memory connection, then Σ can utter ‘N’ with the goal of achieving her purpose. Obviously, a rule like RR[Name1 N] needs to be used in concert with the apposition rule RR[Apposition]—see §4.1—in cases where the earlier tokens of N that U has access to are parts of a number of different d-chains. Thus to isolate the tokens that are the antecedents of her token N, U can attach a description, as in N, the philosopher. Use of apposition through a descriptive phrase enables U to isolate the intended earlier tokens, whether they are tokens of an idiolectic type, defined in part by the description, or name tokens produced by another speaker in a certain context.129 The other rule that speakers use with names is that which they employ if they are baptismal source speakers. This is RR[Name2 N]: RR[Name2 N]: If Σ wants to introduce a means of denoting x, which will be carried on by later speakers purely through anaphoric means, then she can utter ‘N’ intending to denote a demonstratively or descriptively specified object x where, in uttering ‘N’, she herself lacks any anaphoric intention to denote objects denoted by prior tokens of N. Without doubt, RR[Name2 N] is an oversimplification, but it captures the core idea that U introduces a name not as a one-off device—say a descriptive phrase that might denote by its descriptive content—but as something that may be fixed initially by description, but thereafter is to be used anaphorically.130 Such are the repertoire rules for a name. They fix what it is to perform a nominal proto-referring act. In uttering, say, ‘Franca’, U utters a certain name just in case in uttering ‘Franca’ U intends to behave in the manner of a speaker following RR[Name1N], or RR[Name2N], where N is Franca. U can perform such nominal proto-referring acts whether or not U believes that her tokens of Franca denote. U's use of Franca may have a doxastic interpretation, R(Franca)pro/dox—if

129

I stress again that apposition can be used to isolate token names and the nominal anaphoric chain the speaker wants to enter into, but this does not require that the description is true of the object. U can isolate the chain, and denote an object, without the description being true of the object.

130

See Evans (1982 : 373–5) for discussion of names as being terms that are not one-off referring terms.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

123

U intends her audience H to believe she has the denotative intention she advertises—or a non-doxastic one, R(Franca)pro/non-dox—if she intends H to believe she lacks the intention. With this account of nominal proto-referring acts, we are now in a position to provide a general account of d-chains that does not assume that speaker stages at nodes have denotative intentions. Thereby we generate an account that covers fictional use of names.131 Roughly, for speaker stage Ui + 1 and a temporally antecedent stage Ui to be consecutive members of a chain, conditions of the same kind as DC must hold except that the speaker stages, instead of intending to denote, must merely advertise intentions to denote. For example, DC (a) should become the following—matters hold very similarly for DC (b): (a)

Ui + 1 and Ui are speaker stages of the same person and (i) Ui's uses of N are tokens of an idiolectic type N[Φk]; (ii) Ui + 1 has a correct memory trace of having used N before as an idiolectic type N[Φk]; (iii) Ui + 1 advertises the intention: denote by ‘N’ the x: x is denoted by the earlier tokens of N[Φk].

The difference here is in (iii). The key act is advertising an intention to denote what earlier tokens denoted. U performs that act by uttering a token N in accordance with instances of the rule RR[Name1N] and rules such as RR[Apposition]. Non-doxastically grounded nominal proto-referring acts can have just as rich a referential content as doxastically grounded ones. Take, for example, the technique of thought expression embodied in [Manifest], discussed in §4.1: [Manifest]: If a speaker Σ utters ‘Γ’ and intends to denote an object x satisfying {F1, F2 …}, then Σ is disposed to perform, either overtly or mentally, proto-assertions of the form A(Γ is F1)pro, A(Γ is F2)pro, and so on. A speaker, in displaying herself to be disposed to perform proto-assertions in which R(T)pro is a constituent, shows that her proto-referring act has a certain referential content. Thus one might ask what U means by Moby Dick. She could reply with A(I am talking about Moby Dick, the white whale about whom Melville writes)pro or A(By ‘Moby Dick’ I mean whatever I was talking about last time I used ‘Moby Dick’)pro, and so on. These answers are proto-assertions that have non-doxastic grounds—U lacks the intention to represent any complex by her utterance or to denote an object by Moby Dick, and intends that her audience recognizes this. In other words, U undertakes behaviours characteristic

131

Some theorists might be taken as holding the view that in using names meaningfully speakers always intend to denote—e.g. Meinongians. Kripke (1980 : 163) proposes that in the fictional case speakers intend to refer fictionally , but does not explain fictional reference. STA rejects both of these views.

124

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

of speakers who intend to denote entities denoted by earlier tokens of idiolectic name types. Thereby she bestows referential content on her token performances of R(Moby Dick)pro, which enables her to participate in a referential tree, just as she does with belief-based use of names. This account of mid-stream name use in terms of proto-acts is still a causal account. Even where U lacks the intention to denote with Moby Dick, she will have a specific memory trace of certain earlier tokens that are part of the chain. U will have the correct conviction that she has uttered, or thought, this name before on a specific interpretation—namely, that given in her idiolectic files. Securing which tokens will depend in part upon the descriptive content—just as it does for the doxastic case. So, in uttering ‘Moby Dick’, and indicating her disposition to perform A(Moby Dick is a whale)pro, U indicates the sort of file she is associating with her token and so picks out an idiolectic type Moby Dick[Φk], for some file Φk. In this case, the file does not record beliefs. In sum, mid-stream use of fictional names is characterized by DC (a) and (b), with the modification that the speaker stages must merely advertise rather than possess denotative intentions. This leaves us with the question of how speakers introduce fictional names. The author of the text in which a fictional name N first appears is engaged in pretence. Primarily, the author pretends to be someone she is not: the narrator. The narrator may not exist. The narrator is someone who is presented as competent in the use of the fictional names in the text. So the author, in using N in her text, is pretending to be a person x who participates in a referential tree, performing with her tokens of N acts that are nodes in that tree so that the tokens of N in the text form d-chains in that tree. The proto-acts R(N)pro the author performs in her text and those she performs when not in author mode—not pretending to be the narrator—are different in structure. When she is in author mode she is pretending to be x, advertising intentions to denote an object by N. Pretending to be x means taking on x's supposed beliefs. So the author in this pretence mode cannot say ‘N does not exist’. When the author is not in author mode, when, say, she is thinking about, or discussing, her literary creation, she is like anyone using N; she is herself advertising intentions to denote an object by N. In this mode she can say ‘N does not exist’. (I say more about negative existentials in §4.5.2.) Think of a novel as a complex proto-assertion type whose parts are tokened when someone reads a physical text. The tokenings of the text function as the ground for source speakers. It is contact with the text, reading it, and contact with those who have read it that generate the referential tree. The author's own uses of the term N may pre-date the finished text, since she advertises intentions to denote what is talked about in the finished text.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

125

4.5 PUBLIC PROPER NAMES: TYPES DEFINED BY TREES Led by the anaphor analogy, we have developed an account of name use. In using a name, U performs a protoreferring act, appealing to repertoire rules like RR[Name1N] and RR[Name2N], and thereby situates herself in a nominal anaphoric chain, whose structure is described by (generalized) DC. How do these matters relate to the semantic content of a name? Take the referential tree associated with any given token name. It is the structure formed by all the d-chains, unrestricted to language, that converge to a certain source τ. The tree fixes a certain proto-referring-act type—the proto-referring-act type whose tokens are nodes in the referential-tree. I call this type ‘R(Nom)pro[τ]’.132 In which case, STA's account of names, STAN, as briefly sketched in §4.2, is: STAN: The semantic content of a name N—its contribution to the semantic content of a sentence—is the speechact type R(Nom)pro[τ], of which the proto-act R(N)pro is a token. In accord with the general thrust of STA, STAN is a special kind of use theory. R(Nom)pro[τ] defines a use type. This act type characterizes the use type found in token names that are nodes of a tree whose source is τ. Take the source acts first. If we focus on the idea that meaning can be a type of use, source proto-acts have significant structural features. This should be clear from the discussion of the repertoire rule RR[Name2N]. As described, these source proto-acts are complex speech acts involving the initiation of a practice. To discern their meaning, do not look to the denotations of such acts—they may not denote. Nor look to the descriptive contents that may be used in demonstrating the intended denotation of the name—these give us no indication of the status of the source proto-act as a source act. Look rather to the features of use, the functional features, as described in RR[Name2N]. The tree also contains non-source user stages, the bulk of the tree. These involve proto-referring acts that are connected, anaphorically, to the source acts. Source acts and non-source acts then, altogether, constitute a type of use of a lexical type N. That, I suggest, is our meaning, the type R(Nom)pro[τ]. Is STAN plausible? I hope to show it is by demonstrating how STAN provides the basis of an account of public namehood, understanding, denotation, translation of names and thought identity arising through name use.

132

In the expression ‘R(Nom )pro [τ]’, τ; indicates the source, and R(Nom )pro the proto-act type. I use Nom because token acts in the tree may have different phonographemic forms.

126

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

4.5.1 Public Names Names have a feature that is not shared by pronouns, or not often. This is the notion of a public name. By name we can mean lexical type, idiolectic type, but also public name: Paderewski, for the pianist–politician, or Pegasus for the mythical horse as opposed to Pegasus for the e-mail system. Public names, in this sense, are arguably like other public words—for example, common nouns such as bank, quark, or phlogiston. That speakers can utter tokens of them is important in communicating, since part of what language-users do is to ensure that they utter tokens of the same public-name type—or more generally the same public-word type. Public names are lexical types relativized, not to speaker files, but to something else. Let us call it a public interpretation. (Note that pronouns are used this way, occasionally. Take He for god.) What is a public interpretation, the thing that unifies a certain class of tokens of a lexical type N as tokens of a particular public name? The simplest answer is the type R(Nom)pro[τ]. Clearly, a public interpretation cannot be a denotation, since not all public names denote. Nor can it be a description, since not all users of a public name, as we have seen, associate it with the same description. Nor is it sufficient similarity or family likeness of descriptive content, as proposed by Jackson (1998). Even where speakers share descriptive contents, they are not necessarily using the same name if the histories of their tokens are different. Say U1, as a child, is introduced to the name Aristotle by speakers denoting the philosopher and is told that Aristotle is a philosopher, a Greek, and a lover of the good life. U1's uses of Aristotle denote the philosopher. But, at some stage t*, U overhears the sentence Aristotle was a shipping magnate. She comes to believe falsely in the truth of Aristotle was a shipping magnate. Say U2 as a child is introduced to the name Aristotle by speakers denoting the shipping magnate, and is told that Aristotle is a shipping magnate, a Greek, and a lover of the good life. U2 succeeds in denoting the magnate. But, at some stage t*, U2 overhears Aristotle was a philosopher. She comes to believe falsely Aristotle was a philosopher. U1 and U2 associate the same descriptive content with Aristotle after t* but utter different public names, since they denote different objects. If so, sameness or similarity of descriptive content cannot fix the identity of a public name. One might attempt to defend descriptivism by proposing that U1 and U2 token acts differ with respect to descriptive content since they intend to denote what they denoted by their earlier tokens, and they will identify themselves differently. But, in fact, they may not. And, even if they do, why would this not be sufficient similarity to warrant the same-name judgement? One response to the problem of finding a public interpretation is to reject the whole idea of public names. One can discern such a position in Burge (1973), who claims that names are common nouns—where N means thing called ‘N’—and individual uses involve demonstratives, as in that Paderewski and this

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

127

Pegasus. Burge's position strikes me as implausible. Although we use names like common nouns, as in All the Smiths step forward please!, we do it with other terms as well, such as pronouns—Will all the hes step forward! or It is a he and not a she. Such uses are not strong evidence for the common-noun theory of names or pronouns. Moreover, common nouns translate. If I am a Spanish man, then, in claiming in Spanish Soy hombre, I am committed in English to I am a man. But, if my name is Estéban, I am not compelled to say I am Stephen in English. I may say I am an Estéban but not a Stephen. But I cannot say I am an hombre and not a man. Similarly, Leonardo da Vinci is not, after all, Leonard of Vinci. It is a historical fact about English that we have chosen not to use the cognate Leonard to denote Leonardo, whereas the French have used the French cognate. It also just seems to be a fact about our thinking that we do group together token lexical types as instances of a type.133 We group together uses of common nouns like bank, quark, and phlogiston. Indeed, we have essentially the same problem for many common nouns, thought of as public words, as we have for public names. What fact determines that certain tokens of the phonemic–graphemic type phlogiston are all instances of the same common-noun type? What is the public interpretation of the common noun? It is not the phonological–graphemic type, since phlogiston may have several uses. It cannot be a denotation, since it does not denote. Nor can it be common descriptive content shared by all users of the noun. The hypothesis that it is similarity of content is susceptible to the same sort of thought experiment just given for Aristotle. So Burge's route does not deal with the more general problem of public common nouns. The Burgean dissolution of the problem of public names fails. Where do we go from here? STA provides a solution. A public name is a lexical type relativized to a referential tree.134

4.5.2 Understanding, Denotation, Thought Identity, and Negative Existentials What is it to understand a public name N? Merely being able to token N and denote an object, once off, is not sufficient. Overhearing a name, I may use it and intend to denote what others denoted, and succeed. However, I am not a competent user of the public name, only a deferential user, in Evans's sense (1973).135 As a new speaker I have few resources with which reliably to communicate,

133

This is just the social character of names commented on in both Kripke (1980) and Evans (1982).

134

Evans (1982) seems to have the idea of public names as delineated by what he calls name using practices , though my referential trees will be given a greater level of precision than his notion. Evans does not contemplate the thought that name meaning lies in the practice itself.

135

Again this is another difference with anaphoric pronouns. These differences do not undermine the analogy that, in terms of basic denotative technique, names are used anaphorically.

128

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

disambiguate, and produce coherent thoughts over time with the name. What are these capacities? Communicating, disambiguating, and producing diachronically coherent thought involves establishing whether speaker stages, be they interlocutors or stages of the same speaker, are with their respective name tokens talking about the same thing or not. Speaker stages talk about the same thing just in case their token acts R(N)pro are tokens of the same type R(Nom)pro[τ]. (Note that we, the language theorists, in claiming that U1 and U2 are talking about the same thing, perform the protoact A(U1 and U2 in uttering ‘N’ are talking about the same thing)pro. This act carries ontological commitment to N's denoting anything only if the proto-assertion is doxastically grounded. In cases where we, the theorists, believe N is empty, our proto-assertion will be non-doxastically interpreted. It will be correct just in case U1's and U2's tokens are on the same tree.136) Being able reliably to communicate, disambiguate, produce diachronically coherent thoughts—the difference between deferential and competent speaker—involves no qualitative difference in knowledge. No special information or acquaintance with the entity is required. The difference is quantitative. It is the degree of stability and reliability of U's capacities to enter into a tree and token instances of the type R(Nom)pro[τ] and link these with speaker tokens of others. Part of this is building up rich idiolectic files. Hence we often measure name competence by the speakers' knowing who knowledge. Rich files allow reliable capacities to locate tokens as instances of one type R(Nom)pro[τ] or another, since this involves exchanging information about file descriptions, in the hope that there is descriptive overlap. For some names, in some communities, this is simple—for example, Clinton with the widely shared file content, in the West, of Former President of USA. But in other communities this might not be generally effective. The capacities underpinning competence are independent of whether names denote or not. If there is understanding in the denoting case, surely there is in the non-denoting case. The facts determining understanding in the denoting case were expressed independently of the fact that the tree's source issued in a denotation; the facts concern ability to enter trees, and trees are not essentially fixed by denotations. Your faith that you are a competent user of Homer is stronger than your faith that he ever existed. The type R(Nom)pro[τ] is aptly called the meaning of a name in view of its centrality to name denotation, translation, and thought content. This is evidently so for denotation. We can talk of public-name tokens denoting and public-name

136

As far as I can see, recognizing that origins of use may fix aboutness even in the absence of denotations goes back to Moore as noted by Evans (1982) and Blackburn (1984) —though Evans does not seem to recognize the interest of this, whereas Blackburn does. See also Donnellan (1974). None of these writers considers the idea of a theory of meaning based on these ideas.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

129

Fig. 4.2

types denoting. They denote whether the speech-act type R(Nom)pro[τ], which defines their tokenhood and typehood, issues in an object source or not.137 When name tokens are translated, it is in virtue of their being judged to possess the same meaning. The thing about translation is that it is not essentially denotation bound. The hypothesis that R(Nom)pro[τ] constitutes public-name meaning explains why translation sometimes goes by denotation and sometimes not. We translate my token of Atlantis and Pierre's of L'Atalante because ultimately they are on the same referential tree. There is no issue of denotation. But sometimes denotations are important. For example, two names, N and B, get introduced independently by distinct tribes or groups of individuals who have no contact with each other, forming two trees, as displayed in Fig. 4.2. The fact that all the instance of N and B converge is indicated only by the fact that the same object is converged upon—that is, denoted. In this case, the identification of the referential tree and thus the type R(Nom)pro[τ] does depend upon the denotation. In which case, in translating a token of N by T we appeal to denotation. Related to this first case but perhaps more problematic is that where there are two distinct name-using groups who have no social contact and whose names fail to denote, represented in Fig. 4.3. Neither object nor shared branches bring about unification. In this case, is it possible that N can be translated as B and visa versa? Certainly, this can occur where the source speakers of the respective referential trees for N and B introduce the names essentially through descriptions and those

137

This does not imply the ontological priority of R(Nom )pro [τ] with respect to a denotation, since—as in the case of non-baptismal source speakers for the Madagascar example in §4.3.1 —objects themselves play a role in fixing source speakers for trees. It simply means that the facts that isolate the type R(Nom )pro [τ], and that therefore fix a public name, also settle the matter of whether the name has a denotation or not.

130

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

Fig. 4.3

descriptions agree in content. (Note that in admitting this we are not proposing that all users of N and B are familiar with these descriptions.) We might also imagine the following example. Two tribes introduce names for god. We might translate N and B as god. But what guides the translation? Such names are like descriptive names where the descriptions are fixed by the canonical texts—in this case religious ones—governing ultimate use of the names. Not everyone will know the content of these texts. The meaning of these names may be vague to the extent that there is disagreement about what constitute the canonical texts, or what is the correct interpretation of these texts. So, to that extent, the translation relation shall be vague. Closely related to the issues of translation are those of thought identity. The meaning of a name is the contribution it makes to the thought expressed by a subject–predicate sentence in which it features. This is true on one disambiguation of the word thought. Thought in this sense just means the propositional meaning of a sentence. Typically, a direct referentialist theory of names would say that this content is just the denotation of the name, a descriptivist, a description. For STAN, it is the type R(Nom)pro[τ]. The advantage of this approach is seen most clearly in the case of group attributions. Let group A be diverse individuals contemplating sentences of the form Atlantis is wonderful and translations thereof. Let group B be diverse children over time contemplating sentences of the form Father Christmas is wonderful and translations thereof. Take the complex attribution (1): (1)

All group A speakers had the same thought, (i), that Atlantis was wonderful. This was different from the thought had by all children in group B, (ii), that Father Christmas was wonderful.

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

131

(1) can be true, on one disambiguation of same thought, even though the individuals spoken of do not share conceptions of Atlantis and Father Christmas, nor the same language. So Tom, in the second group, in uttering ‘Father Christmas is great’, expresses the same thought, in the required sense, as Pierre in the same group who utters ‘Le Père Noël est formidable’. We need then an account of thought-identity that explains this attribution. How can such diverse individuals all have (i) as their thought, which is different from the thought (ii) had by another set of diverse individuals? The issue boils down to what the semantic contributions of the names are. We need Atlantis and Father Christmas in the attribution (1) to contribute different contents where these contents in each case is accessible to each member of the respective groups. It cannot be denotations, since both Atlantis and Father Christmas fail to denote—leaving aside the hypothesis that they denote Neinongian non-existent objects. It cannot be descriptions, for not every person in either group will associate the same description with the terms. (We might suggest the description the bearer of ‘Father Christmas’—prompted by Katz (1994). But that will not do, for, amongst other problems, some thinkers in the class do not use the English term Father Christmas, but Le Père Noël.) Nor can they be senses or modes of designation, as standardly understood, since there are no such objects that thinkers in the group who believe (ii) all associate with Father Christmas and translations thereof. One response is that there really is no thought in common; there are just similar thoughts. Certainly there is a disambiguation of the term thought on which the individuals in group A each have a different thought. They have different conceptions. But these conceptions are all different conceptions of something. We can group these conceptions together as a class, which really brings us back to our current problem. STAN has no trouble explaining (1). The content contributed by the names in (1) are respectively R(Nom)pro[τ1]—the type whose tokens all converge on source τ1 for the Atlantis-tree—and the type R(Nom)pro[τ2]—the type whose tokens all converge on source τ2 for the Father Christmas-tree. Another issue concerning thought content for which STAN provides a satisfying solution is the problem of negative existentials. How do we analyse (2) below? (2)

El Dorado does not exist.

The name El Dorado, on its city of gold interpretation, is fully meaningful. It is no less meaningful than George Bush for the President. In uttering (2), U tokens El Dorado, performing thereby a proto-assertion, A(El Dorado)pro/non-dox, which is a node in a certain referential tree. As proposed in §3.5.3, existence statements are expressive assertions. In uttering ‘El Dorado exists’, U expresses her

132

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

commitment to the belief state that El Dorado denotes. Negation in turn is expressive. Thus (2) involves U's expressing her rejection of the assertoric commitment of A(El Dorado exists)pro/dox. On STA's account, there is nothing in being corresponding to a negative existential. In the case of (2), there is no mysterious subsisting object, denoted El Dorado, nor a negative fact.

4.6 GENERAL TERMS AND SEMANTIC INTERPRETATIONS The same sorts of arguments that lead to a referential-tree account of public names can be used to argue for a similar treatment of public interpretations of many common nouns that appear in predicates. Natural-kind terms, such as copper, phlogiston, kryptonite, jade, involve linguistic distribution of labour in the Putnamian sense. In using these terms, speakers' acts form d-chains back to sources, these being the proto-acts of experts who introduce such terms or the activities of fiction writers. We need to introduce a generalized DC-style treatment of the d-chains, since not all users of such terms believe that they denote. Thus at some stage users of phlogiston were divided into those who used it believing it denoted and those using it believing it did not. But both performed proto-referring acts, acts in which they presented themselves as intending to denote a substance. Similarly, most users of kryptonite have no intention to denote a substance; they only present themselves has having such intentions. In this case we can tell here a similar story about proto-referring-act types fixed by sources for these common-noun (natural-kind) terms. Considerations pertaining to issues such as understanding, translation, and disambiguation almost exactly parallel to those adduced in the case of proper names can be brought forward to argue that the meanings of such expression are such source-based protoreferring-act types. One might doubt that this proto-act treatment can apply to all cases. Take simple adjectives like red. It seems inappropriate to treat red's meaning as the proto-referring-act type fixed by a certain tree source. If there is a tree source here, it might be ancient and largely irrelevant. Nearly all speakers—save the visually impaired—are perceptual speakers who have the same core file content, the phenomenal concept of red. What is important in the case of red is its denotation, to which nearly all competent users have perceptual access. Even granted all this, we can still count the meaning of red to be a proto-act type. After all, in communicating, speakers in using red advertise denotative intentions. They perform proto-acts. In the case of red, we fix the proto-referring-act type that is its meaning not through a referential tree, but simply through its denotation or the concept. Equipped with the STA's referential-tree-based analysis of both names and general terms, we are now in a position to say more about what the semantic

PROTO-REFERRING ACTS AND PROPER NAMES

133

content of a simple sentence is, according to STA. Take a sentence like Madonna is singing. The proto-assertion type that is its semantic content is specifiable as follows: ‘Madonna is singing’—semantic interpretation

(i) (ii) (iii)

Assertion-type: Utterance of A(NP VP)pro, advertising intentions (a) to represent a complex and (b) to defend an intention of the (a)-kind. NP: Assigned Meaning—R(Nom)pro[τ]. VP: Constituent General Term—R(G-term)pro[Γ].

Let me explain. Part (i) specifies the general form of the act. It is a report with a certain phrase-structure grammar. Part (ii) specifies the meaning attached to the noun phrase. This is a certain nominal type. Part (iii) specifies the generalterm constituent of the verb phrase and its assigned meaning. It is another type specified by another source. It is not built into this assigned semantic interpretation that Madonna or sing denote. Who knows? Madonna might be a fiction created by a sinister record company, and there may after all be no property of singing, since there may be no genuine unity underpinning the activities that we call singing, assuming that it is even a definite class of activities.138 STA is pragmatic about what we call semantic interpretation. If we as interpreters have slightly different interests, we may specify something slightly different as the semantic interpretation of a sentence. We may want to include more syntactic specification, name form, or idiolectic files are part of the content.139 The important thing to emphasize here is not that any of these choices is the right one, but that STA has the resources to account for what we are picking out with each choice.

138

This again depends upon our theory of properties. As noted in §2.1.2 , STA as developed in this book remains neutral on these matters. It may be that large chunks of ordinary discourse just fail to make denotative contact with reality, even though predicates used are meaningful.

139

If our interest is explaining opacity in belief reports, then we will want to add these further specifications to the type. It is generally felt that, to explain opacity, a theory of attitude ascriptions needs to appeal to Fregean or neo-Fregean sense or modes of designation. STA can fit in various proposals in the literature about what these things are. See Forbes (1990), Richard (1990), Devitt (1996), and many others. It also has its own proposal, given in Barker (1994). That is the theory of proxy speech acts described in §3.5.3 , n. 26.

CHAPTER 5 Unifying Noun Phrases 5.0 INTRODUCTION: DESCRIPTIVE NOUN PHRASES AS α- AND β-TERMS We now turn to descriptive noun phrases. Descriptive noun phrases form a large and semantically diverse class, which includes: the F, that F, an F, any F, one F, some F, no F, every F, the Fs, some Fs, most Fs, and Fs. These phrases share the same basic term grammar, specified in NP Grammar—see §4.0. According to STA, this means that, in uttering any of these phrases, U performs a proto-referring act. The semantic interpretation of the phrase, in each case, is a proto-referring type, which may have some specific mode of interpretation. Consider Fig. 5.1, which represents some of our target class of noun phrases. I have arranged these phrases according to a grammatical order, which roughly reflects the semantic function that STA attributes to them.140 The horizontal rows divide the descriptive noun phrases into two general kinds, according to grammatical number: singular and plural. As noted in Chapter 4, in STA, the grammatical distinction between singular and plural corresponds to a distinction in the basic kinds of proto-acts performed in uttering such phrases. In uttering any of the singular descriptive phrases in the first horizontal row, U advertises an intention to denote singularly an object of a certain character. In uttering any of the plural descriptive phrases in the second row, U advertises an intention to denote plurally objects of a certain character. In short, all the acts in each row share a basic proto-act. They are all elaborations on this act. We can represent this idea syntactically by the proposal that all the singular noun phrases are α-terms, α-F, which is a basic determiner α-combining with a nominal phrase F. So, in uttering any singular descriptive phrase, U performs a proto-act, R(α-F)pro. All plural noun phrases are β-terms, β-F, which is a basic determiner β-combining with a nominal phrase F. So, in uttering any plural, U performs a protoact R(β-F)pro. What are α-terms and β-terms? It is no accident that in the figure the indefinite descriptions are at the extreme left of each row. The bold hypothesis of STA is that in the singular case the core term, α-F, is an F. In the plural case, the core term, β-F, is some Fs. All descriptive noun phrases are semantic elaborations on indefinite

140

These phrases are only the simple descriptive noun phrases . They are unmodified by relative clauses, as in the F that is G . These will be discussed when relative pronouns are discussed in Chapter 6 .

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

135

Fig. 5.1

descriptive noun phrases. In order to clarify this idea, I now describe the basic semantic workings of an F, the α-term: α-F. According to STA, α-F is a referring term. Meaningful referring terms in STA do not have to denote, nor do sincere speakers using them have to utter them with intentions to denote. (Contrast this with the situation for standard Frege-model theories.) What makes an α-term like a donkey a referring term is that it has a denotative function. It can be used with an intention to denote, which is to say, U always utters it in a proto-referring act: an act in which U advertises an intention to denote an object. So in uttering ‘a donkey’ in (1) and (2) below, U performs the same basic proto-referring act with a donkey: (1) (2)

I saw a donkey. I did not see a donkey

In (1), U employs the indefinite a donkey to denote some specific donkey. Whereas in (2) U does not use it with any intention to denote. Nevertheless, in both cases, U performs the same basic proto-act, R(α-donkey)pro. The contents of basic proto-referring acts are fixed by repertoire rules, which define denotative practices (§4.1). The repertoire rule associated with the α-term α-F, or an F, is: R{α-F}: If Σ wants to denote an object x that she believes satisfies {..F..} and Σ wants to achieve this through x's uniquely satisfying {..F..}, then Σ can do this by uttering an expression of the form α-F. A proto-act is an utterance of a token that is intended to be an instance of the sort of behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ with a certain type of denotative intention. So the proto-act R(α-F)pro is characterized thus: R(α-F)pro: U utters α-F advertising an intention to denote the x: x uniquely satisfies {..F..}—that is, U intentionally utters α-F and engages in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote an x such that x uniquely satisfies {..F..}, for contextually determined {..F..}.

136

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

The token a donkey in (1) above is a performance of R(α-donkey)pro and, in particular, an instance of direct use of the rule RR{α-F} to denote an object. U intends to denote a particular donkey, so her act is doxastically grounded. In this case, the predicate is a component of the referential content of the indefinite; the referential content of U's act is {..Donkey, Seen by U..}. Incorporation of the predicate as part of the referential content of the indefinite proto-referring act is a characteristic of such simple uses of indefinites, but not a general characteristic of all uses of indefinites. In (1), a donkey denotes an object by virtue of that object's uniquely satisfying the content {..Donkey, Seen by U..}. That is a controversial idea in the light of Donnellan's distinction (1966, 1978) between referential and attributive uses of descriptions. I will look into this issue in due course. In (2), U performs the same kind of proto-referring act, R(αdonkey)pro, but lacks any intention to denote, and R(α-donkey)pro simply has its lexically given referential content {..Donkey..}. Her act is not doxastically grounded.141 This proto-act conception of indefinites based on the rule RR[α-F] is the basis of a unified account that treats all uses of indefinites, including generic uses. The theory of α-terms is not merely a theory of indefinites, however. It also grounds an account of descriptive noun phrases across the board. All singular descriptive noun phrases are indefinites—that is, α-terms. The proto-act common to all utterances of singular noun phrases is R(α-F)pro. Thus we analyse the F, that F, one F, every F, and any F as α-terms with added meanings that account for their distinct uses. An analogy is useful here. We analyse each of the conjunctions formed by and, but, and nevertheless into a truth-functional conjunction & with some added meaning in the second and third cases. Thus S1and S2, S1but S2, and S1nevertheless S2 are analysed as (S1 & S2), (S1 &b S2), and (S1 &n S2) respectively, where the superscripts symbolize the different added meanings in each case. I am proposing the same thing for descriptive phrases. Just as U, in uttering sentences like S1and S2, S1but S2, and S1nevertheless S2, performs a common proto-act A(S1 & S2)pro, in uttering descriptive noun phrases like an F, the F, that F, every F, U performs a common act R(α-F)pro. U produces α-terms, α-F, with different superscripts.

5.0.1 Singular Indenites as α-Terms Let us see how this idea applies to definite descriptions first. STA rejects the orthodox Russellian analysis of definite descriptions according to which they are quantifiers. Definite descriptions are genuine referring terms. That definite descriptions are referring terms does not mean that their possessing a semantic content depends on their denoting an object or having predicates denoting a property. For example, a token use of the phlogiston by some eighteenth-century

141

Frege-model theorists would see sentences like (2) as confirming the existential-quantifier treatment of the indefinite. But the confirmation here presupposes a conception of referring terms that STA rejects.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

137

chemist possesses a semantic content, but neither the whole description nor the predicate phlogiston denotes anything. Rather, the semantic content of the F is a proto-act type of a certain kind. The type in this case is a proto-referring-act type with R(α-F)pro at its core. The F is α-F plus an added meaning. I represent the added meaning by a superscript D, so that the F is analysed αD-F and the act type is R(αD-F)pro. Roughly speaking, the function of the superscript D in αD-F, or the F, is to impose a kind of presupposition on a token use of α-F. The F presupposes reference to an object, whereas an F—α-F tout court—does not. Basically D in αD-F introduces the requirement that the referential content {..F..} of the token act R(α-F)pro is established prior to the processing of the sentence in which R(α-F)pro appears. Definite descriptions have presententially determined referential content, whereas indefinites have sententially determinable referential content. To give an example, in uttering, (3)

I saw the donkey,

U tokens an act R(αD-donkey)pro, so tokens R(α-donkey)pro, where D signals that the referential content {..Donkey..} of her token act R(α-donkey)pro is processed prior to the whole utterance. That means that informational factors already in play must enable the audience to recover the information in the set {..Donkey..}. This is quite unlike the case of the indefinite in (1), where no such requirement is imposed, and H is free to construct the set {..Donkey..} from materials in the sentence itself: as in {..Donkey, Seen by U..}. In short, U's production of the F is analysed as an act in which U appeals to the rule RR{α-F}—given above—and a special rule for the superscript D. So R(αD-F)pro is analysed as the core proto-act R(α-F)pro in combination with a further advertised intention derived from the superscript. Consider now demonstratives. Demonstratives, such as that guy, are like definite descriptions in that they have presententially determined referential content. They are terms of the form αD-F. But they have an added constraint on their use. The constraint is that a predicate in {..F..} must express information about the perceptual circumstances. This captures the idea that the demonstrative that F requires that both U and H take themselves to be in potential perceptual contact with the denotation. Let the added constraint be represented by a superscript dem. So that F is αD-F plus dem. It has the form αD/dem-F.142 Consider now what I call quantitative terms. In the singular case there is only one F, as in (4). (4)

142

I saw one donkey.

There are many non-demonstrative uses of that donkey , as in I saw that donkey again today . I think these are discourse variants on standard demonstratives. The extra content in the set {..Donkey ..} to which the speaker is appealing is recoverable not from the perceptual context, but from the discourse context.

138

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

Unlike definite descriptions, a singular quantitative does not have pre-sentential determination of referential content. (4) is not like (3), or I saw the one donkey, which require prior establishment of referential content. Nevertheless, singular quantitatives are more than mere α-terms. As we shall see, in employing one F U is not only appealing to the rule RR {α-F} but also expressing a commitment that the number of entities denoted by the particular token α-F is one. The quantitative noun phrase one F is analysed α1-F with superscript as 1, which indicates that added commitment. Universal noun phrases like every F introduce a new order of variation on α-terms. In a sentence like (5) below, U cannot be taken as having any intention to denote a donkey using every donkey; nevertheless, it is the claim of STA that U is employing an α-term, α-donkey: (5)

I saw every donkey.

In (5), U tokens R(α-donkey)pro but her act has a mode of interpretation. It has a variable interpretation. On that interpretation, U utters an α-term, α-donkey, advertising an intention to denote an x: x uniquely satisfies {..Donkey..}, but U signals she lacks this intention. Instead, U's purpose in performing R(α-donkey)pro is that it be a proxy for, or stand in for, particular proto-referring acts of the form R(T)pro, which ostensibly pick out donkeys from a certain, contextually determined, class. U in uttering (5) is expressing a commitment to the predicate Pred(I saw)pro holding of all such acts. The act R(α-donkey)pro plays a vital role here. It indicates the form of acts about which U expresses a commitment. In short, every F is an α-term, α-F, plus a superscript U, indicating that U's proto-act R(α-F)pro has this universal, generic mode of interpretation just described. So, every F is αU-F. Finally, there are descriptive phrases of the form any F, which I have labelled universal 2. Such phrases are puzzling creatures. Take: (6)

She saw any donkey.

(6) cannot function as a self-standing assertion. However, it can appear embedded, as in: (7) (8)

If she saw any donkey, she soon forgot about it. Jane didn't think that she saw any donkey.

Any-phrases exhibit so called negative polarity; to be used correctly, they need to be in contexts like negative ones. Anyphrases also exhibit a type of universality. One can substitute all terms T denoting a donkey for any donkey in (7) and (8) salva veritate. On the other hand, any-phrases are not universal noun phrases like every donkey. Substitute every donkey for any donkey in (7) and (8)

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

139

and truth is not necessarily preserved. Neither are they pure α-terms. (6) shows that. My hypothesis, which takes some background work to articulate, is that any F is α-F plus a superscript Ind. So any F is analysed as αInd-F. The added superscript Ind has the role of indicating that the context in which the token act R(α-F)pro appears is a certain kind of context—I call it an indifference context. Roughly speaking, if R(α-F)pro is in an indifference context, then the speech-act structure of the sentence in which α-F appears determines that U lacks any intention to denote with α-F, and there is substitutional indifference; any T such that T is F is true can be substituted for α-F. (7) and (8) are indifference contexts. A self-standing utterance like (6) is not. Because indifference contexts require a theory about negativity and indefinites, I postpone analysis of any until §9.4.

5.0.2 Plural Indenites as β-Terms That completes my sketch of the unified treatment of singular descriptive noun phrases to be given below. I offer something similar for plurals. I submit that plural phrases, some Fs, the Fs, those Fs, two Fs, few Fs, most Fs, Fs, no Fs, and any Fs, are all variations on a basic descriptive phrase, β-F, where β-F is the common grammatical unit. This unit is the plural indefinite description itself. All utterances of plural phrases involve performance of a core proto-act R(β-F)pro. Definites, demonstratives, quantitatives, and generics are different ways in which a β-term β-F is refined by an added meaning. I represent the added meanings by superscripts. To see how this works, consider plural indefinites or β-terms. According to STA, if a β-term denotes certain objects, the xs, it does so by virtue of the xs being the unique satisfiers of the set of predicates {..F..}.143 The repertoire rule governing β-F is similar to that governing α-F. RR{β-F}: If Σ wants to denote simultaneously multiple objects x that Σ believes satisfy {..F..} and Σ wants to achieve this through the xs' satisfying {..F..}, then Σ can utter an expression of the form β-F with the aim of achieving her goal. That rule fixes the character of the core proto-act, which is: R(β-F)pro: U utters β-F and intentionally engages in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote xs that uniquely satisfy {..F..} for contextually determined {..F..}.

143

There is some complexity here with respect to how {..F ..} uniquely picks out x s. First there are issues to do with the referential and attributive uses of descriptions—discussed in §5.4 . Secondly, in the case of plurals, there are issues to do with distributed and collective predication. I discuss these matters in Chapter 6 .

140

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

I analyse phrases of the form some Fs as singular indefinite descriptions. The two terms α-F and β-F differ only in the respect that one employs the concept of singular denotation, the other that of plural denotation. All plural phrases deploy a basic core proto-act, R(β-F)pro, with superscripts supplying meaning modifications as already indicated. First there are plural definite descriptions, as in the Fs. These are analysed as βD-F. The superscript D does the same job here as it does in singular definite descriptions. It indicates that the referential content {..F..} is presententially determined. Demonstratives, as in those Fs, are analysed as βD/dem-F. Quantitative noun phrases such as two Fs are plural counterparts of one F—analysed α1-F. They are analysed β2-F, β3-F, and so on, where the numerals are superscripts. Again, the superscripts enable U to express a commitment to the number of entities denoted by the token β-term. The quantitatives few Fs and most Fs are analysed: βf-F and βm-F. The superscripts f and m in this case indicate that certain relations of proportion have to hold with respect to relevant predicate. Unlike singular universal 1 noun phrases like every king, universal or generic plurals, such as kings in Kings rule, do not employ the superscript U. They are not β-terms on a mode of interpretation. Rather, they are variants on βD-F.144 They involve an added superscript g, as in βD/g-F. The superscript g signals that there are certain strictures on the referential content {..F..}. There are then two forms of quantitative generality in English: the form instanced every F; and the form instanced by plurals. In contrast to universal 1 plurals, universal 2 plurals, phrases of the form any Fs, work the same way as their singular counterparts; they have the form βInd-F. The unified treatment of descriptive noun phrases is summed up in Fig. 5.2. The figure is meant to display the fact that all descriptive noun phrases are variants on α-F and β-F. One class of noun phrases so far not mentioned is generic uses of indefinite and definite descriptions, as in The/a dodo is a curious creature. I analyse these generics as indefinite and definite proto-referring acts—R(α-F)pro and R(αD-F)pro respectively—under modes not unlike those conventionally associated with universal noun phrases every F. All the descriptive noun phrases we have discussed possess referential content {..F..} that may include content over and above F. The referential content {..F..} is an interpretative matter. Take the basic repertoire rule for an α-term, RR{αF}. The rule is that, if Σ desires to denote x, satisfying {..F..}, then Σ can utter α-F. This is conversationally acceptable if the extra predicates Σ appeals to, if any, are salient for her audience. Σ can make these explicit through relative clauses, as in The F that is G. (I discuss relative-clause modification in §6.4.2.)

144

Such phrases do not have determiners in their surface grammar. I shall treat them as having a type of implicit determiner.

141

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

Fig. 5.2

In what follows I sketch out how the proposed scheme works for singular indefinite descriptions, α-F, definite descriptions αD-F, and universal noun phrases, αU-F. I will give no consideration to αD/dem-F. In Chapter 6, I examine plurals and pronouns.

5.1 INDEFINITE AND DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS: α-F AND α -F D

According to STA, indefinite and definite descriptions are both α-terms. Definites differ from indefinites only by their carrying an extra meaning component introduced by a superscript D. I now explain what the function of D is. Evidently, an F can enter into intra-sentential and inter-sentential anaphoric chains, such as: (9)

A hippo is in the backyard. It is fat.

In (9), it is anaphoric on a hippo. On STA, in uttering it, U advertises an intention to denote the entity denoted by a hippo, and, indeed, has this intention. U intends to denote by a hippo a particular hippo.145 The particular hippo U intends to denote is revealed by consideration of the pronoun it and the content of It is fat. The latter sentence might be paraphrased by (10) or, with the use of apposition, (11) below: (10) The hippo in the backyard is fat. (11) It—the hippo that is in the backyard—is fat.

145

STA does not treat the pronoun in (9) as unbound anaphor since a hippo is not a quantifier, according to STA; it is simply an α-term α-hippo . Chastain (1975) argues that cases like (9) show that indefinites sometimes function as singular terms. STA's line is that they always function as referring terms.

142

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

In (11), U advertises an intention that it denotes what The hippo that is in the backyard denotes. In (9), U advertises an intention to denote what a hippo denotes. This suggests that the referential content of R(a hippo)pro/dox in (9) is {..Hippo, In the backyard..}. Here is the puzzle. In uttering ‘a hippo’ in (9), U performs a proto-referring act of the form R(α-hippo)pro, in which U advertises an intention to denote an x that uniquely satisfies the contextually given {..Hippo..}. Somehow, the proto-act R(a hippo)pro in (9) has acquired extra referential content over and above its lexically given content {Hippo}. The indefinite has gained this referential content in the sentence. Indeed, the materials in the sentence have contributed to its content. It must be that, in some uses of an F, the referential content set {..F..} includes the predicate with which an F is combined. Its referential content is determined in the sentence, or, more precisely, determined in the proto-illocutionary act in which it appears.146 I am not suggesting that R(an F)pro always gains content from the predicate. For example, where an indefinite is in the scope of negation, as in (2), it does not. (I say more about this below.) We can say that indefinites have sententially determinable referential content. This is to say that indefinites do not presuppose the establishment of any referent prior to their use in a sentence.147 Definite descriptions in contrast differ from indefinites in precisely this respect. The F is an α-term, α-F. In performing R(the F)pro, U utters an α-term, α-F, and so engages in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote an x such that x uniquely satisfies {..F..}. The information D carries about U's use of the α-term pertains to the presuppositionality of definite descriptions. Definite descriptions presuppose in some sense the establishment of reference to an object. So, in uttering ‘The King of France is bald’, U can be said to presuppose that there is a king of France, which means, at the very least, that it is to be taken for granted by her audience H that there is a king of France. The role of D is to indicate that this presuppositional condition holds. In STA's terms, the presuppositional condition is simply the fact that the referential content {..F..} of R(the F)pro is determined independently of U's performing the proto-assertion in which the F is a constituent. So in The King of France is bald, the referential content {..King of France..} is determined independently of the fact that U predicates baldness of the King of France's purported denotation. I say that the F has pre-sentential determination of referential content. Let {..F..}pre be the content associated with

146

147

So the affirmative act in which a predicate V __ is attached to an F conveys simultaneously the predication of V __ ness of the entity ostensibly denoted by an F , and the determination of the content of R(an F )pro as {..F, V __..}. Of course, use of an F presupposes reference to F s. Hence if s of doubt like George is a mongoose, if in fact there are any such things as mongooses . But this is another matter.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

143

R(the F)pro independently of its processing in an assertion. If so, D's contribution is as follows: D-rule: The function of D in αD-F is to signal that R(αD-F)pro's referential content {..F..} is simply {..F..}pre; {..F..} is established independently of, and prior to, establishment of the content of the proto-assertion A(__the F__)pro. Thus, proto-assertions of An F V__ and The F V__ are, respectively: U performs A(α-F V__)pro wherein U, in uttering ‘α-F’, advertises an intention to denote an x uniquely satisfying a contextually given {..F..}. U performs A(α-F V__)pro wherein U, in uttering ‘α-F’, advertises an intention to denote an x uniquely satisfying a contextually given {..F..}, where {..F..}pre = {..F..}. That is the whole semantic story of the difference between an F and the F. It might seem that STA bestows a trivial analytic content on the assertion A(An F is G)pro/dox, this being The F that is G is G. But such a view misconstrues the crucial difference between an F and the F. If R(an F)pro had pre-sententially determined content {F, G}, then A(An F is G)pro/dox would have this analytic content. But R(an F)pro acquires its content only in the proto-assertion. So, in uttering An F is G, U is not unpacking, analytically, information brought to the sentence through an F. STA's conception of indefinites and their relation to indefinites explains neatly the discourse (12) below: (12) A hippo is in the backyard. The hippo (in the backyard) is fat. In (12), there is a type of anaphoric reference from the definite description back to the indefinite. The indefinite in (12) introduces reference to an object without presupposition, and the definite continues on with reference to that object, but with presupposition. However, compare (12) with the discourse (13) below: (13) A hippo is in the backyard. *A hippo in the backyard is fat. (13) is defective. It might seem that STA's account of indefinites cannot explain this. The rule for using indefinites, RR{α-F}, does not forbid U's uttering α-hippo in the backyard with the intention of denoting an object x that uniquely satisfies {Hippo in the backyard}. So, it is not built into the semantic rule for α-F that the referential content {..F..} must include content over and above {..F..}pre—the content associated with an F prior to its processing in the sentence. So STA's theory of α-terms fails, it seems, to explain why (13) is defective, and so fails to explain all the facts about use of indefinites.

144

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

The difficulty here is easily dealt with by supplementing STA's semantic account with the following principle of conversational pragmatics: Discourse Rule: Where it is salient to an audience H that {..F..}pre uniquely picks out an entity, then U cannot use an F with the intention of denoting the entity. Discourse Rule explains why (13) is defective. But why accept this rule? Discourse Rule is not a semantic rule. Rather, it follows as a consequence of more general pragmatic principles, Grice's maxims (1967) governing conversational practice. The maxim germane to the use of indefinites is that of quantity, which counsels a speaker to be as informative as possible in situations in which her purpose is to provide information. If I know that Nigel is in Warsaw, then replying to a question about his whereabouts with He is either in Warsaw or Krakow is misleading, since I could have asserted the informationally stronger sentence He is in Warsaw.148 The maxim of quantity is relevant to our use of an F, since, in situations where U believes {..F..}pre uniquely picks out an entity, use of an F as opposed to the F violates the maxim. That is because the F carries the information that {..F..}pre is uniquely denoting, whereas an F does not carry this information. Take the discourse: JONES. What are you looking at? SMITH. I am looking at a machine designed by my father. JONES. Your father has designed a few machines? SMITH. Just one. This one! Smith has been somewhat misleading in his first response, a machine designed by my father. This carries a conversational implicature that Smith's father has invented other machines, which is not the case. Nevertheless, Smith succeeds in denoting something with the indefinite, the unique satisfier of {Machine designed by my father}. Here the referring expression Smith should have employed was a definite description. This would have satisfied Discourse Rule, since the definite is an α-term with an added informational factor that {..F..}pre is uniquely specifying. Discourse Rule is not a semantic rule that governs all uses of an F. It applies only to cases where an F is used with an intention to denote. In sentences of the form There is an F or There exists an F, use of an F is legitimate even though U knows that {..F..}pre uniquely picks out a denotation. Discourse Rule does not apply here, since an F is not used with an intention to denote in these contexts. Take the following case. (14) A hippo is in the backyard. There is a hippo in the backyard.

148

The maxim of quantity is defeasible under certain circumstances—see Jackson (1987).

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

145

(14) features harmless repetition of content. In the second sentence, U conveys the information that the term a hippo in the backyard denotes. Use of a definite, the hippo in the backyard, would have been incorrect. I proposed in §3.5.3 that existence claims are expressive assertions. So the second sentence of (14) has the speech-act structure (15): (15) : U utters ‘There is a hippo in the backyard’ and advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, believes a hippo in the backyard denotes〉; and (b) to defend a commitment to this state. U uses a hippo in the backyard without any denotative intention, even though she advertises one, and she knows this token denotes. So Discourse Rule does not apply. The point of constructions of the form There is an F and There exists an F is to introduce reference to an object rather than presupposing it. So use of the F in such positions is infelicitous. A striking set of cases is: (16) (17) (18) (19)

*A current US president is here. The current US president is here. There exists a current US president. *There exists the current US president.

(16) is defective, (17) is fine. Discourse Rule prohibits (16) because an F is used with an intention to denote with the knowledge that {..F..}pre uniquely specifies an entity. In contrast to (16), (18) is fine because (18) is an expressive context in which a current US president is not used with an intention to denote, hence Discourse Rule does not apply. (19) is defective because There exists … has the role of introducing reference to an object without presupposition.149 I note that it is not obvious how an existential-quantifier analysis of indefinites could explain these features of use.

5.2 FUNCTIONING INDEFINITELY Why should there be referring expressions with the properties of pure α-terms? The basic uses of indefinites in simple subject–predicate assertions are either (i) to introduce reference to some particular object—call this the object-introduction role; or (ii) to classify some already identified object as a member of some class—call this the type-identification role.

149

There are legitimate uses of There is the US president , as in There is always the US President , but these uses carry a non-existential meaning.

146

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

Cases of object introduction are sentences like (20). A case of type-identification is (21): (20) I saw a hippo today. (21) Frank is a hippo. Object introduction occurs when U employs an indefinite description to introduce reference to an entity O as a new subject of discourse. These are cases where there is no singular term such as a proper name or definite description already available to both speaker and audience in the conversation that can be used to refer to O. Indefinite descriptions can perform the object-introduction role because they have sententially determinable referential content. To introduce reference to an object, U needs to make an assertion of the form A(__T__)pro in which T denotes the object, and where use of T cannot presuppose the establishment of its referential content. An F can play the role of T, for, prior to utterance of the sentence __an F__, R(an F)pro need not have its referential content established. Performance of A(__an F__)pro can function as an assertion in which reference to an object is introduced. A(__an F__)pro is simultaneously a statement of fact and a determination of the content of R(an F)pro, so that, after accepting the assertion, H has at his disposal a referring term for an object, where before he had none. In contrast, type-identification uses of an F occur in assertions of the form A(T is an F)pro/dox, which are structurally identity statements. However, unlike ordinary identity statements, they convey merely the information that T is a member of the Fs. In an ordinary identity statement A(T is N)pro, where both R(T)pro and R(N)pro have pre-sententially determined content, the communication is—to ascend semantically—that the two terms T and N, which have some specific content attached to them prior to the identity statement, denote the same individual. But, in A(T is an F)pro, R(an F)pro does not have determinate referential content prior to the assertion, and in the assertion it has only the content {F, Identical to T}. Consequently, the only informative component of A(T is an F)pro is that T is a member of the Fs. This theory allows for the expressivist treatment of the is of identity proposed in §3.5.3. U in these statements is assertively expressing her commitment to co-designation of the terms concerned.150

5.2.1 Content Augmentation Sentential determination of referential content occurs in sentences like I saw a hippo. But it does not always occur. In I did not see a hippo, there is no sentential

150

Take A girl living in my house is an aviatrix . In this case R(a girl living in my house)pro has an object-introducing role and R(an aviatrix)pro has a type-identification role.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

147

determination of R(a hippo)pro's content. Here a hippo is not used with the intention of denoting anything. This does not affect the sentence's meaningfulness. In STA, singular terms can be meaningful without denoting anything. In this case, U still performs the proto-act R(a hippo)pro, an act in which U advertises an intention to denote x uniquely satisfying a contextually determined {..Hippo..}. It is just that U lacks any denotative intention. It is not built into the use of α-F that there is sentential determination. It is not a formal, semantic rule but a purely pragmatic phenomenon. In general the following holds. Sentential Determination Sentential determination of the content of R(an F)pro occurs in an assertion A(An F V__)pro if and only if the interpretation of the protoassertion requires that V__ is a component of the referential content of {..F..} of R(an F)pro.

If a simple proto-assertion, A(An F V__)pro, has a doxastic ground, then U is taken as intending to defend an intention to represent a complex. Given that all complexes are world-parts, it follows that the proto-assertion must have determinate content and so the content of R(an F)pro must become determinate, since it is treated as denoting.151 If so, it must have a referential content that is intended uniquely to individuate an entity. By Discourse Rule, an F cannot denote simply by virtue of the presentential referential content of R(an F)pro. It follows that the predicate in A (An F V__)pro must be a component of R(an F)pro's content; U is interpreted as intending to denote the x satisfying {.. F, V__..}. I have just described the simple cases of an F appearing in a simple doxastically grounded proto-assertion. Matters hold similarly for rhetorical interpretations of A(__an F__)pro. In a doxastically grounded metaphoric assertion, A(I was touched by a cosmic force today)pro/dox, U intends to convey her commitment to the existence of a complex for which the simple proto-assertion provides a model—see §1.5. The content of the proto-assertion must be determinate and so R(a cosmic force)pro's content must be determinate. The antecedents of indicative conditionals represent a more subtle case of sentential determination. In If a wombat kissed Wanda, it left no trace, there is sentential determination; it is anaphoric on a wombat and has the referential content The wombat that kissed Wanda. In A(if a wombat kissed Wanda)pro, the proto-assertion A(A wombat kissed Wanda)pro is stipulated to be permissible. As proposed in §1.6.1, in a supposition of a simple proto-assertion A(A wombat kissed Wanda)pro, the stipulation of the permissibility of A(A wombat kissed Wanda)pro plays the role normally played by a doxastic ground for A(A wombat

151

With regard to A(__an F __)pro on an interpretation, we can talk of the proto-assertion both before and after the process of determination. Before, there is the lexically based proto-assertion , which has indeterminate content. After the determination there is a proto-assertion that has determinate content.

148

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

kissed Wanda)pro. If so, a wombat gains referential content just as it does in the doxastic grounding case, as described above. In embracing the idea of sentential determination of content, STA does not abandon compositionality. If we appeal to meaning in the sense of speech-act structure—as STA demands—we see that the content and speech-act form of an assertion A(An F V__)pro systematically depends upon the content and speech-act form of the lexical act R(an F)pro and R(V__)pro. In other words, to reveal compositionality we need to abandon any attempt to describe content in terms of designations—which is to be expected if STA is adopted.

5.3 UNIQUENESS IMPLICATIONS AND TRUTH-VALUE GAPS If indefinite and definite descriptions are both α-terms—which differ only in the respect that the D-rule of §5.1 applies to definite descriptions—then indefinite descriptions have a uniqueness requirement to the same extent that definite descriptions do. STA accepts the principle below, where __an F__ is a simple subject–predicate sentence with an F in either subject or predicate position: UI: By virtue of its semantic content, an assertion of __an F__ carries the commitment that there is one and only one object that satisfies {..F,__..}. Some will view UI as absurd. Is it not an established fact about an F that NUI holds? NUI: By virtue of its semantic content, an assertion of __an F__ carries the commitment that there are one or more satisfiers of {..F, __..}. NUI is entailed by the standard Frege model, analysis of an F—that is, the existential-quantification analysis, or the (∃x)-analysis. We might discern evidence for NUI and against UI in discourses like: (22) I saw a hippo today. In fact, I saw several. But adducing (22) to falsify UI is no better than adducing the fact that we can use descriptions such as the hippo when it is known that there are many hippos to falsify the thesis that definite descriptions introduce uniqueness implications. In discourses like (22), U has some particular hippo in mind but has failed to make the extra referential content salient; U is involved in a type of on-line editing. This is confirmed by discourses like I saw a hippo today. In fact, I saw several. But this hippo, the first I referred to, was the fattest hippo I have ever seen.152

152

Obviously, we might attempt to analyse such sentences in terms of the (∃x )-analysis and the notion of an object that is raised to salience by the use of the indefinite description in the manner suggested by Kripke (1977).

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

149

Another argument against UI is that we can reply affirmatively to questions like (23): (23) Is there a prime number greater than 1000? With (23), U expresses a desire that H confirm that assertions of the form A(There is a prime greater than 1000)pro/dox are correct. H's affirmative reply is confirmation of there being one or more assertions of this form. The fact that there are many of them does not conflict with NI, since the proto-act R(a prime number)pro in each of these assertions will possess a different overall referential content. Further empirical investigation shows that it is not the thesis UI that is in trouble, but NUI—and thus the (∃x)analysis that entails it. Assuming that we know that Australia has many ocean beaches, assertion of (24) is defective; one would rather assert (25): (24) Australia has an ocean beach. (25) Australia has some ocean beaches. Why is (24) defective? Arguably, because it carries the signal that there is one and only one Australian ocean beach. There is a clear meaning difference between an F and some Fs. We would not count (25) false if Australia turned out to have only one ocean beach. If so, the (∃x)-analysis should hold that both an F and some Fs express existential quantification, and so agree with respect to truth-conditional meaning, but differ by virtue of conventional meaning nevertheless. That difference, being non-truth-conditional, could plausibly be conceived of as a matter of conventional implicature. Thus the (∃x)-analysis needs to concede that UI is right, but reject it as a truth-conditional thesis. It must accept UI as a correct thesis about an F's conventional implicature. More evidence that the (∃x)-analysis needs to concede that UI is right comes from indefinites and pronouns. On the (∃x)-analysis, There is an F has the same semantic content as One F or Fs exist or There is at least one F. However, we have the following test that indicates these equivalences are false: (26) A soldier, or soldiers, died here. He, or they, rest in this tomb. (27) At least one soldier died. He, or they, rest in this tomb. (28) A soldier died here. *He, or they, rest in this tomb. (28) is defective, but on the (∃x)-analysis it should not be, since it is just like asserting (26) or (27). Defenders of the (∃x)-analysis could respond with the suggestion that this is a superficial matter of grammatical number. But that is disconfirmed by acceptable discourses such as Jane gave money to each girl. They were pleased—which involve a grammatically singular antecedent and plural anaphor.

150

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

Another piece of evidence comes from comparing (29) and (30) below: (29) Jane saw a hippo yesterday. The hippo Jane saw yesterday was black. (30) Jane saw at least one hippo yesterday. *The hippo Jane saw yesterday was black. (29) is fine but (30) is defective. Assuming uniqueness implications for singular definite descriptions, but no uniqueness implications for indefinites, the (∃x)-analysis cannot explain why (29) should be fine and (30) defective, because, according to it, both are semantically identical. This suggests that UI is correct. To conclude, NUI is in trouble, and so is the pure (∃x)-analysis of indefinites. The (∃x)-analysis needs to supplemented by a theory according to which an F carries a conventional implicature by virtue of which UI holds. This, of course, is not an entirely happy situation for the (∃x)-analysis, since the Frege model, its natural home, espousing as it does SCT, cannot make any sense of conventional implicature—see §1.2.153

5.3.1 Truth-Value Gaps For STA's theory of indefinites, UI is not merely a matter of implicature. It is a thesis about truth-conditional content. In (24) above, an ocean beach fails to denote. Given that it is highly implausible to suppose that (24) is false—assuming the facts about Australia and ocean beaches—STA must conjecture that (24) lacks truth-value. But what is the nature of this truth-value gap? Standard assertions of sentences like (24) are reports: acts in which U advertises an intention to represent a complex of a certain kind, where U defends that intention. In the case of (24) the representational intention U defends is: (31) Intention to represent a complex of the form <x, has y>, where Australia denotes x and y uniquely satisfies {Ocean Beach possessed by Australia}. Such a representational intention could fail for two kinds of reasons: existential failure—there is no complex of this form whatsoever, since there are no ocean beaches in Australia; or uniqueness failure—there are many ocean beaches in Australia. The actual case is uniqueness failure. My suggestion is this. We judge reports containing terms with existential failure to be false; we judge reports

153

The (∃x )-analysis also faces problems with anaphoric chains such as A hippo is in the backyard. It is fat —discussed in §5.1 . If we treat a hippo as a quantifier, it cannot be a variable bound by it, since it is outside the quantifier's syntactic scope. Thus it is an unbound anaphor. Various Frege-model accounts try and explain these sorts of cases: Evans (1977) and, more recently, Neale (1990) and Ludlow and Neale (1991). See also the Dynamic Semantics of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), and the Discourse Representation Theory of Kamp and Reyle (1993), which abandon features of classical quantification theory. These approaches fail. I argue this below in Chapter 10 . See also Barker (1997a).

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

151

containing terms with uniqueness failure to be truth-valueless. Thus a sentence like Australia has a redwood forest is false because of existential failure, but (24) lacks truth-value. Within STA, the same conditions on falsity and truth-value gaps hold for sentences with definite descriptions. Our reactions to sentences with definite descriptions seem to bear this out. Take: (32) Captain Cook saw the Australian ocean beach. (33) Captain Cook saw the Australian Redwood forest. In processing (32) we are inclined to ask, which one? Without resolution, (32) lacks truth-value. (33) is just false.154 If (24) and (32) are to come out truth-valueless, then we need to be careful in how we understand falsity in STA's terms. As proposed in §3.5.1—in judging a report to be false, U expresses her rejection of the report's (defended) representational intention. That would seem to mean that we must judge (24) and (32) false, since we reject the representational intention advertised in both cases; we are not disposed to form that intention, despite taking ourselves to have all relevant information. Evidently, if (24) and (32) are not to come out false, this account requires modification. Here's how. Our discussion shows that the representational intentions defended in reports can be rejected under two conditions: (a) (b)

The intention is rejected on grounds of uniqueness failure. The intention is rejected on grounds of existential failure.

If (a) holds, the intention is not irredeemable. It can always be sharpened, by adding content to the offending referring term, so that it does represent a complex. For example, with (31) above, we can add some predicate to {Ocean Beach possessed by Australia} and gain a correct representation. If (b) is the case, there is no way of adding content to the intention to achieve representation. My contention is this. Rejection of a representational intention that can be sharpened, (a), is not counted sufficient for a falsity judgement. But a rejection of an intention that cannot be sharpened is counted as sufficient for a falsity judgement. If false ties in with human interest, then it is explicable why this is so. We are not keen totally to reject representations that are approximations to reality. From now on, I shall assume this qualification on the nature of rejection in negation.

154

It would be odd to assert, It's false that you saw the Australian ocean beach; there are many . Perhaps Captain Cook did not see the Australian ocean beach; there are many , with voice stress as indicated, is acceptable. But this is so-called metalinguistic negation —see Horn (1989) —and is non-truth-conditional. (See §3.3 .) On the other hand, asserting ‘You didn't see the Australian Redwood forest; no such thing exists’ is perfectly acceptable as a clearly truth-conditional negation.

152

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

In sum, failure to denote, per se, does not itself generate a truth-value gap.155 It is, rather, the failure of terms in simple sentences to denote in a certain way: failure of uniqueness. In making the claim that (24) and (32) lack truth-value, there is no implication that they fail to express thoughts or fail to be grammatical. They are perfectly grammatical, thought-expressing, sentences. The tendency to link truth-value gaps to some kind of semantic failure comes from adopting SCT, the semantic concept of truth—see §1.1—in which truth-bearers are sentences encoding propositions.156

5.4 REFERENTIAL AND ATTRIBUTIVE USES STA accepts descriptivism about denotation. When definites or indefinites denote an object O, they do so through O's uniquely satisfying referential content associated with the F or an F. There are strong arguments that descriptivism is wrong. Donnellan (1966, 1978) introduced the distinction between referential and attributive uses of descriptions. Definite descriptions, it is claimed, can be used in two different ways. In attributive uses of the F, a speaker U means to speak only about an entity—whoever or whatever—that uniquely satisfies {..F..}. In the referential use, U employs the F to pick out an entity that is causally connected in the right way to U and her audience H. Evidence for the distinction is given by such examples as this (from Kripke 1977). Looking at the mutilated corpse of Smith, U remarks ‘Smith's murderer must be insane’. In this case, U employs Smith's murderer—the murderer of Smith—attributively. U intends to speak about whoever or whatever satisfies the description. But suppose that, in the courtroom for Jones's trial for the murder of Smith, Jones's wild behaviour shocks U, prompting her to assert ‘Smith's murderer is insane’. In the latter case, an audience H—convinced that Jones is not the murderer of Smith—might reply ‘He is not Smith's murderer’. The anaphoric relations between H's use of he and U's use of Smith's murderer indicates that a referential use is in place; U is not merely aiming to talk about an entity satisfying the description. The conclusion of the Donnellan-type argument is that descriptivism holds only for a subclass of descriptions: attributive uses. It does not hold for referential uses, since in these cases U appeals to causal conditions to secure denotation. In fact this conclusion does not follow. As we have seen in Chapter 4, names

155

Strawson (1950a) assumes it does, as does a lot of the literature on presupposition. (See Lycan 1984).

156

See Dummett (1963) for some discussion of this. Dummett equates truth-value gaps with anti-realism. That equation involves appeal to SCT , the semantic conception of truth, which STA rejects. Truth on that conception means correspondence, falsity failure in correspondence. Truth-value gaps mean deficiency either in sentence semantic content or in reality. Dummett seeks to delineate areas of discourse in which the second condition can hold. These are areas of discourse in which realism does not hold sway.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

153

denote through causal chains—of a socially mediated kind—but there is no refutation of descriptivism for names. We see this when we make a distinction between two kinds of referential content associated with names. Speakers use names anaphorically—§4.2. The denotative technique is to exploit earlier successful denotation of name tokens in a referential chain. The referential content U employs to this end with her name token N has the form {Denoted by earlier tokens of ‘N’,…}. Call this chain-fixing content. U's token name N denotes an object O by virtue of this content. Moreover, U's token N denotes O by description; U's token denotes O because O uniquely satisfies {Denoted by earlier tokens of ‘N’, …}. Pure descriptivism is at work. The second kind of referential content associated with names is theory content. This is the referential content garnered from predicates of proto-assertions that express U's theory about the purported object of denotation. Only a subset of theory content, chain-fixing content, has a role in denotation. Descriptions have more flexibility in their use than names. They can be used through a referential chain, the way in which names are used: referentially. But they can also be used independently of any chain: attributively. In both cases descriptivism holds. In referential uses of descriptions, U is taken to be a node in a referential chain, or d-chain—as described in §4.3—directed to a source. In this case, her token description denotes by virtue of its chain-fixing content; it is referential content of the form {Denoted by earlier tokens of ‘N’, …} or {Currently demonstrable entity of such and such category}. On a referential interpretation, it is the chain-fixing content of R(the F)pro, and not any extraneous theory content, that is active in securing the denotation, if any, of the descriptive phrase the F. It may be that the referential content, so construed, does not include F itself—F being merely a component of theory content. Thus, it is possible to claim The F is not F, where F is only a part of theory content. Where the F has a referential interpretation, then, if the F denotes, it still does so by uniquely picking out an entity. That is because, if the F denotes, on a referential interpretation, it is a node of a tree, and so denotes just in case the nodes lower down in its referential chain denote, which is to say it denotes just in case its chain content uniquely specifies an object. Attributive interpretations are a different matter. In this case U does not conceive of her act as a node in a referential tree. Rather, U is employing all the descriptive resources at her disposal to fashion a content {..F..} that she intends uniquely to pick out an entity. Denotation is again achieved through descriptive uniqueness. The referential/attributive distinction does not challenge descriptivism; it does not correspond to a distinction between non-descriptive and descriptive uses of descriptions. Rather, the referential/attributive distinction corresponds to a distinction between anaphoric uses of descriptions, analogous to the

154

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

anaphoric character of names—the referential uses—and one-off uses—the descriptive uses.

Summary of α-terms: Denite and Indenite That completes my sketch of how definites and indefinites function, leaving aside generic uses. The main features of αF and αD-F are these. First, grammatically singular definites and indefinites are α-terms α-F that have a singular denotative function. That is, if α-F denotes O, then it does so uniquely: {∀x: x? ≠ O}¬(α-F denotes x). The referential content is some set of predicates {..F..}. The denotative role of {..F..} is that, if α-F denotes O, then O satisfies {..F..} and (∀x)(x satisfies {..F..} → (x = O))—modulo remarks about referential uses of definites. Definites are subject to the D-rule, which is simply the stricture: {..F..} = {..F..}pre. Whether α-F is definite or indefinite, if α-F is a constituent of a report A(__α-F__)pro/dox, then, if α-F fails to denote owing to existential failure, the report is false; if α-F fails to denote owing to uniqueness failure, the report lacks truth-value. This summary should show that definites and indefinites are basically the same, save the application of the D-rule. In specifying how descriptions denote—see the specifications of denotational uniqueness and the denotative function of {..F..}—we employ concepts pertaining to negation and universality. A capacity to use definite and indefinite descriptions, however, does not presuppose grasp of these concepts; the speaker does not have to be able to use not and every. Rather, the capacity to use referring expressions depends upon prior capacities to embody a pre-intentional representational system that underpins intentional content. Chapters 7 and 8 will describe this system and these very capacities. The semantic contribution of a definite or indefinite description to the semantic content of the sentence featuring that description is the relevant proto-act type it tokens. If the description is used referentially, then the semantic content is similar to that possessed by a name. It is a proto-referring-act type defined by a referential tree—see §4.5. However, depending on interpreters' interests, more fine-grained semantic contents may be assigned to descriptions. If the description is used in a proto-referring act with a rhetorical mode, then the semantic content of the description may feature that mode—see §4.1.1. Denotation as such is not a component of semantic interpretation. Rather, certain evaluative outcomes may require that a definite description the F denotes, but this is not generally demanded.157

157

I mention briefly adjectival uses of predicates in descriptions. In uttering ‘the gold box’, U presents herself as intending to denote an entity that satisfies {..Box , Gold ..}. How do we explain phrases like the non-existent, flying horse ? U advertises an intention to denote an x that satisfies {Horse, Flying, Non-existent }. Nothing satisfies that description because no entity satisfies Non-existent . U lacks the intention, which is to say that R(the non-existent flying horse )pro is under a mode.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

155

5.5 EVERY: α -F U

I now move on to universal noun phrases, every F. Structurally, every F is an α-term, α-F modified by U, as in αU-F. In uttering ‘every F’, U utters an α-term, α-F, so U performs R(α-F)pro, and thus U engages in a behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote an object x that uniquely satisfies {..F..}. The superscript U signals that U lacks the intention she displays herself as having and is performing the proto-act for some purpose other than object denotation. U's proto-act R(α-F)pro is under a mode. The nature of this mode is best introduced through reflecting on another theory of universal noun phrases: Kit Fine's theory (1985) of arbitrary objects. According to Fine, general noun phrases can be names for arbitrary or generic objects. So every man can be thought of as a name for a representative or generic object—an arbitrary man. Arbitrary objects stand in for particular objects that are in the value range of the arbitrary object. A sentence Every F is G is true if and only if every object in the value range of the arbitrary object denoted by every F is G. The theory adopted by STA interprets this idea on the speech-act level. Instead of treating the denotation of a universal noun phrase as generic, it treats the proto-referring act R(α-F)pro as generic—that is, the role of U is to signal that R(α-F)pro is interpreted as a representative for members of a class of referring act types. That is, in performing R(α-F)pro, U engages in a behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote an object x such that x uniquely satisfies {..F..}. In performing this act, U has no denotative intention. Rather, her act is a template indicating a range of proto-referring acts. These acts are of the form R(T)pro—where T has the form of a singular term—that have as a component of their referential content the content {..F..}. We might say that R(α-F)pro is interpreted so as to range over particular proto-referring acts—R(T)pro—analogous to the way that a variable is said to range over a domain of potential values. To give an example: the noun phrase every cat in Every cat purrs is used in a proto-referring act in which officially U presents herself as intending to denote an entity uniquely satisfying {..Cat..}. However, R(α-cat)pro functions, not by actually being an act in which a specific cat is denoted—U has no denotative intention—but by standing in for, being a proxy for, members of a class of particular proto-referring acts that contain {..Cat..} as components of their referential content. In other words, R(α-cat)pro functions as a template for such acts. In uttering every cat, U utters an α-term and performs R(α-cat)pro. As U combines the α-term with a predicate purrs, to perform a proto-assertion A(α-cat purrs)pro, the superscript U not only imposes a variable interpretation on the protoact R(α-cat)pro, but also, because of its combination with the predicate Pred(purrs)pro, a variable interpretation upon the whole proto-assertion A(α-cat purrs)pro. That is, in uttering Every cat purrs, U performs a proto-assertion

156

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

A(α-cat purrs)pro that has a mode of interpretation. The mode is a variable one according to which A(α-cat purrs)pro is a proxy for members of a class of proto-assertion types of the form A(T purrs)pro, where R(T)pro is in the value range of R(α-cat)pro. So the whole proto-assertion A(α-cat purrs)pro is interpreted as a type of variable act, ranging over valuerange proto-assertions of the form A(T purrs)pro. Finally, as with all logically complex sentences—if-sentences aside—utterances of Every cat purrs are expressive assertions—see §0.2.1. In uttering ‘Every cat purrs’, U expresses a cognitive state of some kind. That cognitive state, I suggest, is one of being committed to the permissibility of proto-assertions of the form A(T purrs)pro, where U accepts A(T is a cat)pro is permissible. The permissibility for U of A(T is a cat)pro may be secured in two ways. A(T is a cat)pro may be doxastically grounded—U is committed to A(T is a cat)pro/dox—and so is committed to A(T purrs)pro/dox. Alternatively, A(T is a cat)pro is suppositionally grounded, and U is committed to A(T purrs)pro on a conditional interpretation. More generally, the commitment state expressed by A(Every F V__)pro/dox is E. E: Being committed to the permissibility of value-range proto-assertions of the form A(T V__)pro/…, where A(T is F)pro/… is permissible for U.

E includes reference to modes—indicted by dots—to allow for the possibility of assertions such as A(Every child here is a seagull)pro/dox, in which U employs a metaphor, or other mode of interpretation. In the example given, a protoassertion with a metaphoric interpretation, A(α-child is a seagull)pro/M-pro falls within the scope of every. It receives a variable interpretation and U expresses an E-state, which is a commitment to value-range proto-acts of the form A(T is a seagull)pro/M-pro, where A(T is a child here)pro is permissible for U. In sum, the structure of a universal noun-phrase sentence is STA(every): In performing A(Every F V__)pro/dox (i) (ii) (iii)

U performs A(α-F V__)pro/…—but lacks the advertised intention—her act being a proxy for value range proto-assertions of the form A(T V__)pro/…, where A(T is an F)pro/… is permissible for U. Through every, U advertises (a) an intention to represent her possession of the state E; and (b) the purpose of defending commitment to possessing E. U has the intention in (iib).158

Compare STA(every) again with other modes of assertion given in §1.5 such as Sarcastic Assertion or Metaphor, or with logical compounds—§3.2. There is

158

Naturally enough, in A(Every F V __)pro , the referential content of every F is {..F ..}. This may be {F } or include other predicates. Value-range acts are restricted accordingly.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

157

the same structure of proto-assertion, signal of lack of primary intention, and signal of mode of use. STA's account not only allows modes within the scope of every. It also allows every to take within its scope conventional implicature-operators and epistemic modals, as in sentences like (34) and (35). (34) Everyone here works hard even on Sundays. (35) Every player was given a clue that probably enabled her to find a solution. In (34), the value-range proto-acts have the form A(T works hard even on Sundays)pro. They have a truth-conditional component and a non-truth-conditional, implicature component. So value-range acts are permissible for U just in case U accepts the commitment properties for both the truth-conditional component and implicature component. In (35), the adverb probably on a subjective reading falls within the scope of every; probably does not have wide scope. I proposed in §3.5.2 that proto-assertions of the form A(__probably__)pro/dox lack objective truth-conditions. The value-range proto-assertions for (35), then, lack objective truth-conditions. This is not a concern for STA, if the commitment property of (35) has the form E. Both (34) and (35) are problematic, however, for standard satisfaction treatments of quantification. For example, we cannot express the truth-conditions of (35) in terms of satisfaction of the open sentence x was given a clue that probably enabled her to find a solution. Doing so presupposes that the open sentence can, as an objective fact, be true-of entities in the domain. It cannot.159 STA easily explains cases in which the things being quantified over are non-existent. Take Every one of them is non-existent: El Dorado, Atlantis, Shangri La. The value-range proto-assertions have the form A(El Dorado is non-existent)pro, A(Atlantis is non-existent)pro, and so on. There is no need to introduce special entities for the value-range terms to denote. The meanings of the value-range terms are given in terms of the types R(Nom)pro{τ} for each τ that is a referential-tree source. There is a source, τ1, for the El Dorado myth, τ2 for the Atlantis myth, τ3 for the Shangri La myth. The types are then individuated without reference to denotations. A concern for this type of account—and for allied accounts such as substitutional quantification160—is the existence of true generalizations comprising quantification over indenumerably infinite domains. Obviously there will not be enough names or singular terms used in the language to denote every object in the domain. However, STA's generic speech-act theory does not require that a language L have a singular term available for every object in the domain

159

See Barker (1997b) for a brief discussion of cases like (34).

160

Frege's account as presented by Evans (1977) is also prone to this worry.

158

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

of objects the generality talks about. Rather, the commitment is that every extension of L in which a new term is introduced denoting an object in the domain should be such that the corresponding singular assertion holds. It is not required that any particular speech act in the value range actually has been performed, or be known to have been successfully performed.161 That is the basics of STA's account of universal noun phrase sentences. I develop this in more detail in Chapter 9, where I examine scope relations. (Readers can skip to there directly, if they are interested.)162

5.6 GENERICS AND ADVERBS OF GENERALITY Both singular definite and indefinite descriptions can be used generically. U may use the cat, and clearly have no intention to denote a particular cat, as in The cat is a four-legged furry creature. U speaks generally. U may utter ‘a cat’ and lack any intention to denote a particular cat—or make an existential claim that there exists a cat, as in A cat is usually born blind. U speaks generally. It might seem that these uses of definites and indefinites represent totally different uses from the particular uses so far discussed, and that they cannot be captured in a unified account. That is not so. STA offers a unified account of definite and indefinite descriptions in the following sense: the phrases an F and the F are, in all their token instances, always uttered in proto-acts of the same kind: R(α-F)pro and R(αD-F)pro. What we find in generic uses are the acts R(α-F)pro and R(αD-F)pro under a mode of interpretation similar to that found in universal noun phrases. Take indefinites first and the sentence: (36) A cat is usually furry. (36) is true just in case most cats are furry. (36) features an adverb, usually, which fixes the generic interpretation of (36). The latter could be replaced with, say,

161

STA's treatment of universal noun phrases differs syntactically from a standard substitutional quantificational approach or SQA. I note that STA's semantic framework offers a way of defending SQA against objections made by Van Inwagen (1981). Van Inwagen points out that, according to SQA, Every F is G is a metalinguistic claim about names and substitution cases. But, if it is not a metalinguistic statement, what then is the proposition conveyed by the sentence? Van Inwagen sees no candidate. SQA is committed to a kind of ineffability thesis about the content of sentences of the form Every F is G. Given that he accepts SCT , this should be unsurprising. See again the discussion of SCT in the Introduction and Chapter 1. STA can provide an answer. Assertions of Every F is G are expressive assertions in which U expresses her commitment to a disposition to accept substitution instances. It is not a metalinguistic report about such a disposition.

162

I have discussed only one kind of universal noun phrase: every F . I conjecture that no F , as in no hippo , is a negative universal noun phrase. Thus, No hippo drinks milk is analysed as Every hippo does not drink milk.No hippo is an α-term, like every F , which also introduces a small scope negation. (Negation in the scope of universal noun phrases is discussed in Chapter 9.) There is also each F. I currently have no theory about how each F differs from every F.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

159

invariably or rarely. The truth-conditions would then be that all cats are furry or few cats are furry. In the literature, such adverbs are called adverbs of quantification. (See Lewis 1975b). In STA, I call such adverbs adverbs of generality, or AGs, since Lewis's term assumes that generality in natural languages is quantificational. In (36), the indefinite a cat is the argument of the AG usually. That is, the variable-act R(a cat)pro is a primary, lexical act that is interpreted variably. I symbolize this by a subscript var, as in R(a cat)pro/var. R(a cat)pro/var has the structure: (i) (ii)

A proto-act R(a cat)pro with referential-content: {..Cat..}. The act R(a cat)pro is interpreted as a proxy for particular referring acts R(T)pro, such that A(T is {..Cat..})pro is permissible for U.

In uttering (36), U expressively asserts her possession of a certain cognitive state, regarding the value-range protoassertions. What is that state? I suggest that the commitment state is a variation on that which I proposed for universal noun phrases, E above. It is generally: G: Based on the permissibility of A(T is F)pro, U has an inclination of degree n to perform A(T V__)pro. The proposal with G is that, if U has merely the information provided by A(T is F)pro, and no other information about T, U has a degree n of inclination to perform A(T V__)pro. In other words, based on the information that T is F, U has a certain subjective probability state that T V__. So, assuming U has only the information that T is a cat, U has degree n>1/2 inclination to affirm that T is furry. How does this capture the fact that (36) is truth-conditionally equivalent to Most cats are furry? In G, U indicates that for her the information that T is a cat provides a degree n > 1/2 degree of faith that T is furry. That can only be because U is committed to most cats having the furry feature. In short, the commitment properties associated with A cat is usually furry and Most cats are furry are such that, where a rational speaker has one commitment, she will have the other. Overall then an assertion of the form A(An F N-ly V__)pro/dox, where N-ly is an AG, has the structure: STA(Generic): In performing A(An F N-ly V__)pro/dox (i) (ii)

U performs A(α-F V__)pro—where U's act is proxy for value-range proto-assertions of the form A(T V__)pro, where A(T is an F)pro is permissible for U. Through N-ly, U advertises intentions: (a) to represent her possession of the state G; and (b) to defend her commitment to possessing G.

160

UNIFYING NOUN PHRASES

(iii)

U has the intention in (iib).163

In a proto-act of the form A(An F N-ly V__)pro, where the proto-act R(an F)pro is the argument of N-ly, R(an F)pro does not have sententially determined content. It does not have the referential content {F, V__} such that the entities in the value range of R(an F)pro would be referring acts R(T)pro with referential content {F, V__}. If that were so, then sentences like An F rarely V__ would be contradictions.164 That R(an F)pro lacks sentential determination of referential content does not mean an F is being used in some new way in conflict with its basic, lexically given, meaning. It is not built into the meaning of indefinites that they gain referential content in the sentence. That is only the outcome of certain uses of R(an F)pro—see §5.2.1. On the other hand, not all indefinites that are in the scope of an AG are arguments of the AG. In A sloth usually lives in a tree, a sloth is the argument of usually, but a tree is merely within its scope. Here the second indefinite R(a tree)pro does have sententially determined content. The value-range proto-assertions have the form A(T lives in a tree)pro, where R(a tree)pro has the referential content {Tree, Lived in by T}. So the value-range acts of R(a tree)pro, as it appears in A(A sloth usually lives in a tree)pro/dox, has sententially determined referential content: it is proxy of particular acts of the form R(a tree)pro in value-range acts that have sententially determined referential content. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, where I examine scope relations and relative-clause modification. From now on, I use bold type to indicate that an indefinite is the argument of an AG. It should be apparent that there is a close relation between assertions of the form A(Every F V__)pro/dox and A(Always/ invariably an F V__)pro/dox. Both express generic assertions whose acceptability conditions are defined in terms of commitments to value-range proto-assertions. However, there are significant differences with regard to assertability conditions. Contexts in which every can be used are not necessarily contexts in which always and invariably can be used. Compare: (37) (38) (39) (40)

Every yuppie likes money. A yuppie invariably likes money. Every chicken was sold yesterday. *A chicken was invariably sold yesterday.

163

G allows operators, like epistemic modals, that make no contribution to objective truth-conditions to appear within the scope of AGs. Consider (i), in which may has an epistemic reading:(i)A cat suffering a neurosis may lick itself incessantly.U is not expressing a real possibility of licking behaviour arising in each neurotic cat. The world may be deterministic so that in many neurotic cats there is no propensity at all to lick. If so, U cannot be committing herself to the objective correctness of all assertions of the form A(T may lick itself incessantly)pro/dox, where T is a neurotic cat. That is because there are no objective correctness conditions for such assertions; they lack truth-makers. So the commitment U expresses in (i) cannot be one regarding the objective correctness of value-range assertions. Fortunately, G does not require value-range acts to have objective correctness conditions.

164

It would then have the content An F that V__ rarely V __.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

161

The defectiveness of (40) results from the fact that adverbial generalities, unlike universal noun-phrase assertions, express commitments about tendencies or laws that have been repeatedly manifested. The facts conveyed by the valuerange proto-assertions of an adverbial generality must be viewable as manifestations of some tendency, disposition, or law. (40) is defective because its value-range proto-assertions cannot be viewed this way, given that we are concerned only with the contingencies of one day's chicken vending.

5.6.1 Denite Generics Definite descriptions can also be interpreted generically. Take: (41) The cat is a furry beast with a capricious nature. (41) has the same tripartite structure described above of proto-act, variable interpretation plus expression of commitment. R(the cat)pro has a variable interpretation ranging over particular acts of the form R(T)pro. There are differences, however, between definites and indefinites when they are arguments of AGs. Consider: (42) The boy in a family is always the favourite in the family. (43) *A boy in a family is always the favourite in the family. (42) has a uniqueness signal not carried by (43). If I say ‘the boy in X’, given that the requires pre-sentential determination of reference, then, if R(the boy in X)pro does not carry extra-theory content, use of the boy in X implies that there is one and only one boy in X. If so, value-range proto-acts of R(the boy in a family)pro in (42) are proto-referring acts of the form R(T)pro, in which, ostensibly, the object denoted is the unique boy in a family. This is not the case in (42), in which the value-range acts R(T)pro involve the, ostensive, denotation of boys in families.

CHAPTER 6 Plurals and Pronouns 6.0 INTRODUCTION: PLURALS AS β-TERMS In the previous chapter, I provided an overview of the semantics of α-terms: expressions comprising a core term, α-F, with added meanings signified by superscripts. In this chapter I deal with plurals and pronouns. Plurals, as noted in §5.02, employ β-terms. The core act in any proto-referring act using a plural descriptive phrase is the proto-act R(βF)pro. Each kind of plural descriptive phrase corresponds to a core proto-act R(β-F)pro in conjunction with a particular rule of interpretation. The simplest kind of β-term is the plural indefinite description. We analyse some cats and cats, used indefinitely, as β-cat. A plural definite description the cats is just the term β-cat combined with the D-rule of §5.1: βD-F. And so on. This chapter sketches out the basic semantic story for β-F, βD-F, universals βD/g-F, and quantitatives β2F,β3-F, … —see Fig. 5.2. The story about plurals mirrors much of what was set out in Chapter 5, but with some surprises. The nature of plurals raises two significant issues. The first is this. β-terms operate just like α-terms except that, whereas α-terms have a singular denotative function, βterms have a plural denotative function. In performing R(α-F)pro, U utters α-F and advertises an intention to denote the unique object that satisfies the referential content {..F..}. In performing R(β-F)pro, U utters β-F and advertises an intention to denote simultaneously all objects that satisfy the referential content {..F..}. If the plural term the cats denotes, then the cats denotes simultaneously the objects, C1, C2, …, Cn, which satisfy the referential content {..Cats..}. This means that the cats denotes C1, the cats denotes C2, …, the cats denotes Cn. Plural denotation is not singular denotation of a set or fusion of objects. It exhibits a distinct type of denotative relation: denoting simultaneously. According to STA, this distinction between singular- and plural-designative function also applies to sentences; sentences have a designative function—they represent complexes. They can represent singularly or represent plurally just as noun phrases can. The singular/plural designative function of sentences explains the distinction between collective and distributed readings of predication. In a collective reading, say The kids are scattered around, a property, being scattered around, is predicated irreducibly of the kids without holding of each. Here the sentence singularly represents a complex. In a distributed reading, say The kids each have a pet, the predication

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

163

is distributed to each child denoted. The sentence plurally represents complexes, each involving a child and a pet.165 STA's ability to explicate the collective/distributed distinction confirms STA's contention that sentences are signs for complexes. They can be singular or plural signs. (Adverbial constructions, as we saw, provided a similar kind of confirmation—see §2.3.) Such matters lead us to the second issue. In STA, a universal plural such as (1) below, has the semantic status of a simple sentence: (1)

A(Cats are furry)pro.

(1) is a reportive proto-assertion. U advertises an intention to denote, simultaneously, all the things satisfying {Cats} and simultaneously predicate of them that they are furry, and the purpose of defending that intention. The proto-act structure of (1) is entirely distinct from that of (2) to (4), below: (2) (3) (4)

A(Every cat is furry)pro. A(Cats are invariably furry)pro. A(A cat is invariably furry)pro.

(2) to (4) are expressive proto-assertions. In (2), U performs a proto-assertion under a mode and expressively asserts a commitment to a cognitive state of the kind E described in §5.5. (3), as shall be revealed, involves a mode of protoassertion, that characteristic of adverbs of generality, or AGs, as discussed in §5.6. (3) is related to, though not semantically identical to, (4).166 In §0.2.1, I proposed that a logically complex assertion is an expressive assertion in which U expresses possession of cognitive states, these being commitments to further proto-assertions. On that definition, (1) is a logically simple sentence, whilst (2) to (4) are logically complex. Nevertheless, (1) can enter into many patterns of logical inference similar to those into which (2) can enter. Take Cats are furry. This is a cat. So this is furry. Within Frege-model theories, such an inference would be characterized as universal instantiation. But in STA this inference is of the same kind as My cats are furry. This is one of my cats. So this is furry and Werner's cat is furry. This is Werner's cat. So this is furry. According to STA, the main premisses in each case lack logical constants (at least on the current definition). I deal with plurals in some detail in §6.1 to §6.3. My aim is to show that STA, unlike Frege-model approaches, provides unified treatments of the linguistic phenomena, in which surface grammar is integral to semantic interpretation. The rest of the chapter addresses itself to pronouns, both anaphoric and relative.

165

Plural representation has nothing to do with the variable interpretation of proto-assertions, which we find in universal noun-phrase sentences.

166

As we shall see, proto-assertions of the form A(All cats are furry)pro possess a different structure from both (1) and (2) to (4).

164

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

Understanding pronouns is central to grasping how the apparatus of reference and generality functions in natural languages. STA offers a perfectly uniform analysis of anaphoric pronouns across the board: so-called pronouns of laziness, so-called bound-variable pronouns, and so-called donkey pronouns, pronouns neither lazy nor bound.167

6.1 DEFINITE AND INDEFINITE PLURALS Plural descriptive phrases are β-terms. In uttering a plural description, U performs R(β-F)pro: R(β-F)pro: U intentionally utters β-F, and so engages in the behaviour characteristic of a speaker Σ who intends to denote xs that satisfy {..F..}. If it denotes at all, plural β-F denotes a plurality of objects: O1, O2, O3, … —though this may simply be one object. R(β-F)pro possesses a referential content {..F..}, the denotative role of {..F..} being that β-F denotes all O1, O2, O3, … that are satisfiers of {..F..}. Reports featuring β-F are not subject to truth-value gaps, as are reports with α-F, since there is no issue of β-F being empty owing to uniqueness failure. Indefinite and definite plural descriptions are two basic kinds of β-terms: β-F and βD-F. Take: (5) (6)

Some cats purred. The cats purred.

(5) contains a plural indefinite description some cats and (6) contains, as a subject term, a definite plural description the cats. If both (5) and (6) are true, they represent complexes. In both cases, some cats and the cats denote simultaneously certain cats. The difference is that the D-rule—see §5.1—applies in the case of the definite description. The act, R(βcat)pro, U performs in uttering ‘the cats’ in (6) has pre-sententially determined referential content. The content {..Cat..} is meant to be determined prior to processing the content of the proto-assertion in which R(β-cat)pro appears—in the symbols of §5.1, {..Cat..} = [..Cat..]pre. In contrast, the act R(β-cat)pro, performed in uttering (5), has sententially determinable content; the contextually determined set {..Cat..} is not established prior to the assertion's content being determined. In (5), it is sententially determined and becomes {..Cat, Purrs..}. As with the singular indefinites, it is not required that the referential content of a plural indefinite is sententially determined; in

167

Aside from this note, I will not discuss plural names. Sentences with such names, such as Fran and Tia painted a house , can feature collective predication (§6.2), thus cannot be reduced to conjunctions, as in Fran painted a house and Tia painted a house . In STA, if two strings possess the same designative and discourse functions, and can combine them. Hence and can combine sentences, predicates, and referring terms.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

165

the scope of a negation, for example, no sentential determination takes place—see §5.2.1.168 We need to employ the concepts of negation and universality in specifying the function of β-terms. As affirmed in the case of α-terms (§5.4), the capacity to use plural definite and indefinite descriptions does not presuppose grasp of these concepts in the sense of requiring linguistic competence with the use of not, every, and all. Rather, the capacity depends upon the structure of the pre-intentional representational system that underpins intentional content. U's ability to token plurals depends on her ability to denote plurally, which in turn—given that denotation has derived intentionality—depends upon a speaker U's prior pre-linguistic capacities to track objects plurally—see §0.4 and Chapter 7.

6.2 COLLECTIVE, DISTRIBUTED, AND CUMULATIVE READINGS Plural referring terms introduce the possibility of three kinds of predication: collective, distributed, and cumulative predication. We find collective readings in sentences such as: (7) (8)

The cats formed a circle. The cats are scattered about.

In (7) and (8), a property is predicated of certain cats without it holding of each of the cats. One might be tempted to analyse the prediction here in this way. The cats denotes, singularly, an object that is a fusion or mereological sum of cats and a property is predicated of this fusion. Perhaps this works for (7); the cats denotes a cat fusion that has a circular shape. But this fails for (8); the cat fusion would have to have the property of having parts that are scattered about. However, as Rayo (2002) points out, this just reintroduces the notion of collective plural predication—namely, the parts of the fusion are scattered about. How does collective predication work semantically? If a sentence The Fs V__a G, as in The boys built a car, is read collectively, then, whereas the Fs simultaneously denotes objects O1, O2, O3, …, On, the sentence represents one and only one complex; it singularly represents a complex. The complex represented has the form below, where B is the object denoted by a G and R the relation: 〈[O1, O2, O3, …, On], R B〉

168

Some article-less plural noun phrases are indefinites. Take (i) They are men and (ii) I saw men, lots of them, heading toward the tunnel . In §5.2 , I proposed that an F as in He is a king can have an object-identification role. In (i), we have an object-identification use of men. Men in this case is indefinite. (ii) contains an object-introduction use of men on an indefinite reading.

166

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

This is the structure of a multi-object complex. I assume that relations, in the ontology of English and related languages, do not have any intrinsic number. So the complexes below can all contain a common relation R, the relation expressed by V__: 〈[O1, O2, O3, …, On], R B〉 〈[O1, O2], R B〉 〈O2, R B〉 Take the relation of giving. Giving can be by one or more people, of one or more objects, to one of more recipients. The complexes below are all complexes containing the relation of giving: 〈[Toby, Jane] gave [Pete, Micky], [10 dollars]〉 〈[Toby] gave [Pete, Micky], [10 dollars]〉 〈[Toby] gave [Pete], [10 dollars, a free pass]〉 We group them together as instances of complexes featuring the same relation. This non-essentialist treatment of relations is inimical to the usual treatment of them in formal languages in which relational-expressions are strictly numbered, as in 2-place, 3-place, or n-place relations.169 There is no metaphysical constraint that requires that relations have this character.170 An example of distributed predication is (9) below: (9)

The boys ate a pizza each.

(9) conveys that for each boy there was a pizza that he ate. This is a distributed reading, since the property of eating a pizza is to hold separately of each boy. This is not so obvious if we take away each. The boys ate a pizza fairly clearly has a collective reading. How does distributed predication work semantically? STA has an elegant answer. Just as we find singular and plural denotation in referring terms, we find singular and plural representation in sentences. If a true sentence S is used in a report A(S)pro, then, if S has a collective reading, U presents herself as intending to represent singularly a complex—the intention is that S represents one and only one complex. Distributed predication involves plural, or simultaneous, representation of complexes—it is intended that S plurally represents complexes of a certain form.

169

One formal treatment of predicates in the context of plurals is to introduce the mechanism of variable addicity. See Morton (1975). Of course, formal languages can be developed in which there are plural variables. See e.g. Boolos (1984).

170

One might think the reduction of relations to ordered n-tupples of objects is a strong metaphysical argument for essentialism. I hold out the possibility of a non-reductive treatment of relations, and so I resist this sort of argument.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

167

In distributed readings of a sentence, The Fs V__, U's combining the Fs with V__ constitutes plural representation. Our target sentence (9) above has the form: (10) The Fs V__a G (each). In distributed readings there are two constituents that plurally designate: the plural noun phrase and the whole sentence. So we have: (11) The Fs plurally denotes, O1, O2, O3, … On. (12) The Fs∩V__a G plurally represents, 〈…〉1, 〈…〉2, … 〈…〉n. If (11) holds, then The Fs denotes O1, The Fs denotes O2, and so on. Similarly, if (12) holds, then The Fs∩V__a G represents 〈…〉1, The Fs∩V__a G represents 〈…〉2, and so on. Applied to (9), then the following conditions hold, where the Bis denote boys, and the Pis denote pizzas: (13) The boys denotes B1. The boys∩ate a pizza represents a complex 〈B1, ate P1 〉. The boys denotes B2. The boys∩ate a pizza represents a complex 〈B2, ate P2 〉. ..... The boys denotes Bn. The boys∩ate a pizza represents a complex 〈Bn, ate Pn 〉. Thus (9) plurally represents 〈Fred, ate a pizza〉, 〈Timbo, ate a pizza〉, and so on. How does a pizza function in (9)? A pizza is an indefinite description. So R(a pizza)pro has sententially determinable referential content. Given that the boys simultaneously denotes B1, B2, …, Bn, (9) is akin to a simultaneous assertion of the sentences B1 ate a pizza, B2 ate a pizza, …, Bn ate a pizza, where R(a pizza)pro has the referential contents {Pizza, eaten by B1}, {Pizza, eaten by B2}, …, {Pizza, eaten by Bn}. The predicate ate a pizza is predicated simultaneously of the boys. So R(a pizza)pro carries all these interpretations simultaneously. By virtue of its sentential determinability of referential content, a pizza functions, effectively, as a plural term. It denotes simultaneously P1, P2, …, Pn. It therefore functions as a plural term, not by virtue of its lexical nature, but by virtue of two facts: indefinite descriptions can gain determinate referential content through predication; and the predication in (9) is plural.171 Another kind of reading of plural sentences is a cumulative reading. Consider: (14) The boys ate pizzas.

171

(9) is equivalent to a sentence of the form Each boy ate a pizza . Why should English have these distinct means of conveying the same information? The answer is that distributed forms like (9) provide flexibility for mixing collective and distributed readings, as in The girls arrived late, they (each) took a shower, then they ate sushi (together) . Here we find three pluralized conjunctions. The first and third have collective readings. Between them is a distributed reading. The function of each in (9) is adverbial. Each here signals that the sentential representation has a plural form, involving representation of complexes, one for each entity denoted by the subject plural denoting term.

168

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

Assuming (14) is true, it plurally represents complexes of a certain character and pattern. The complexes represented must each involve a boy or boys, drawn from those denoted by the boys, who are in the eating-relation to entities denoted by the pizzas. Moreover, each boy and each pizza denoted is a part of some complex represented by the sentence. If (14) is uttered with the intention of plurally representing complexes meeting these conditions, it has a cumulative reading. Many distinct patterns of complexes satisfy these conditions. For example, an array of n complexes, where n is the number of boys, each involving one boy eating a pizza, would do so. So would a smaller number of complexes, some involving collective eating of a pizza and others not, such as the complexes below: 〈[B1, B2, B3], ate P1 〉 〈B4, ate P2 〉 〈[B1, B4], ate P3 〉 The possibility of cumulative readings follows from the fact that sentential representation can be plural and the fact that relations lack intrinsic number.

6.2.1 Sentential Representation and Plurality In STA sentences are signs for complexes. They have the designative function of representing complexes. Both singular sentential representation and plural sentential representation—which give rise to collective, distributed, and cumulative readings—are possibilities emerging from the basic complex-representing function of sentences in combination with the singular or plural denotation of their constituent noun phrases. The basic representational function of a sentence, say, a subject–predicate sentence with two noun phrases, is encapsulated thus: SR: T V__N represents the complex(es) 〈x(s), R y(s)〉 such that x(s) are the denotation(s) of T and y(s) are the denotation(s) of N. The schema SR is neutral as to whether the constituent noun phrases or the sentential representation is singular or plural. We derive different readings by determining their denotative number. If the noun phrases are singular then there is a unique x and y denoted. This reading has the structure: Singular reading: T V__N represents the unique complex of the form 〈x, R y〉 such that: x is denoted by T and y is denoted by N and R by ‘V__’. If in SR the subject term T of T V__N is plural, but N and the sentential representation remains singular, T V__N will have a collective reading. In which case: Collective reading: T V__N represents the unique complex of the form 〈[x..], R y〉 such that: (a) x.. and y are denoted by T and N, and R is denoted by V__; (b) each x denoted by T is a constituent of the complex 〈[x..], R y〉. If the sentential representation is plural, then the sentence has a distributed reading.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

169

Distributed reading: T V—N represents all the complexes of the form 〈x, R y〉 such that: (a) x and y are denoted by T and N, and R is denoted by V__; (b) each x denoted by T and y denoted by N is a constituent of at least one complex 〈x, R y〉. If both noun phrases in SR are plural, then, if the sentential representation remains singular, we again have a collective reading. For example, the sentence The boys scattered the sheep has such a reading. However, the sentential representation may be plural. If so, the sentence has a cumulative reading, as follows: Cumulative reading: T V__N represents all the complexes of the form 〈[x..], R [y..]〉 such that: (a) x.. and y.. are denoted by T and N, and R is denoted by V__; (b) each x denoted by T and y denoted by N is a constituent of at least one complex 〈[x..], R [y..]〉. I note that U can intend to perform acts that have such representational conditions of adequacy, without possessing a full conception of these conditions in the sense of possessing the concepts enabling her to describe them. This is fortunate, since being able to describe these conditions, or represent them, would require that the pre-intentional representational system that underpins the formation of speech-act intentions—the NR system—would possess logical constants, negation and universality. However, it lacks these. (In Part III, I discuss the NR system.) The NR system possesses states that singularly and plurally represent complexes. However, the content of these states is logically simple, just as, for example, a representation standing for a single object is logically simple, despite the fact that in specifying its character as a representation—the fact that it uniquely picks out an object—we employ a logically complex vocabulary. Advertising intentions with these sorts of representational structures is not the only component of proto-assertions with plurals. There is also the advertising of commitments to defend commitment properties. Where the sentential representation is singular, as in a collective reading, U advertises one and only one commitment to representation. So in uttering ‘The boys ate a pizza’ U presents an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈[B1, B2, …, Bn], ate P〉, and advertises an intention to defend that representational intention. In contrast, if the sentential representation is plural, then U advertises a plurality of commitments. So in asserting ‘The boys each ate a pizza’ U advertises simultaneously (a) intentions to represent complexes of the form 〈Bj, ate Pj 〉, with denotations specified accordingly, and (b) associated commitments to defend each such representational intention. The proto-assertions A(The boys ate a pizza)pro and A(The boys each ate a pizza)pro are reports. Expressive proto-assertions with plurals are treated similarly. The predicate is true forms expressive proto-assertions—see §3.5.1. In, say, A(These assertions are true)pro, U advertises simultaneously (a) intentions to represent commitments to the

170

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

assertive properties of the denotations of these assertions, and (b) commitments to defend such commitment states. The doxastic grounding of this proto-assertion is that U possesses these (b) commitments. Suppose we do not think that sentences represent complexes. How then do we analyse the various readings that sentences with plural noun phrases can have? Within the Frege model, we can analyse them in terms of quantificational structures using plural variables as follows. (15) below is a collective reading, (16) a distributed reading, and (17) a cumulative reading. Below, xx, yy, and so on are plural variables, x ≺ yy means x is one of the yy, and xx ≺ yy means that xx are amongst the yy: (15) The boys ate a pizza. ∃yy(∀x(x ≺ yy ↔ Boy[x]) & ∃z(Pizza[z] & Ate[yy, z])). (16) The boys each ate a pizza. ∃yy(∀x(x ≺ yy ↔ Boy[x]) & ∀z(z ≺ yy → ∃w(Pizza[w] & Ate[z, w]))). (17) The boys ate the pizzas. ∃yy(∀x(x ≺ yy ↔ Boy[x]) & ∃zz(∀w(w ≺ zz ↔ Pizza[w]) & ∀u(u ≺ yy → (∃vv(u ≺ vv & vv ≺ yy) & ∃s(s ≺ zz Ate[vv, s])))). The drawback of such an analysis is that the logical forms bear little relation to surface forms. (15) to (17) are very similar in structure. They differ on the surface level only by the different kinds of noun phrases in the predicate position. Yet they produce structures that are quite different in nature and that bear little resemblance to surface form. STA, by contrast, provides a unified treatment in which surface grammar plays a role in semantic structure.

6.2.2 The Geach–Kaplan Sentence STA's treatment of cumulative readings allows for a simple treatment of the Geach–Kaplan sentence, which has no first-order quantificational analysis (Boolos 1984): (18) Some critics only admire one another. Phrases like one another are plural referring terms that are anaphoric; they refer back to an antecedent in the same clause. So (18) is equivalent to Some critics only admire those same critics.172 Treatment of some critics and one another as plural referring terms allows us to analyse (18), through routine application

172

One another is, nevertheless, grammatically singular. Is this not against the dictates of STA, which treats grammar as the unfailing guide to speech-act function? It is. But STA really, as emphasized in the Introduction, is against global attribution of grammatical–semantical form mismatch. There are local cases of mismatch—formulas or reciprocity such as one another and each other are examples.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

171

of a standard theory of only. Only, as Lycan (1991) says, is a floater; it can take up various positions in a sentence: Only Granny voted, Granny only voted. Only can take different constituents of the sentence within its scope as its focus. Let [only] (__N__) be a sentence with only taking up some position inside (__N__) where N a noun phrase that is the focus of only. The following schema holds: ONLY:

[only] (__N__) is true iff all things x distinct from N are such that ¬(__x__), and (__N__).

N can be singular or plural. Distinct here means that there is no overlap in objects denoted. So, Only Fred voted conveys that all persons distinct from Fred did not vote, and Fred voted. Only the cats got sick conveys that all things, in some contextually determined class, distinct from the cats, did not get sick, and the cats got sick. If so, (18) is analysed simply by applying ONLY under the assumption that the focus of only is the plural noun phrase one another—here my x/y subscripts indicate anaphoric chains: (19) Some criticsx are such that, for thingsy distinct from themx, theyx do not admire themy, and theyx admire themx. The expressions some criticsx, them/yx, thingsy, and themy are plural-denoting expressions. Crucial to understanding the paraphrase (19) is the function of negation. The semantic role of not is to allow the speaker U to express her rejection of the assertive commitment property of the assertion she is negating (see §3.3). If the assertion is effectively a simultaneous assertion, as it will be in the plural case, then, as negation applies to assertions, not applies to all the protoassertions simultaneously produced. In (19), U negates the proto-assertion A(theyx admire themy)pro/dox, which is a simultaneous assertion. The assertive commitment properties of A(theyx admire themy)pro/dox are commitments to intend to represent complexes of the form 〈x, admire y〉. Thus U expresses her rejection of all these intentions through not. Consequently, U is not prepared to concede that anything denoted by theyx admires anything denoted by themy. So, the implication is that no person outside of the persons denoted by some critics is admired by the denotations of some critics. Furthermore, in the second conjunct, theyx admire themx, U plurally represents all complexes of the form 〈x1, admire x2 〉, where x1 and x2 are denoted by theyx. This analysis captures the assertability conditions of (18).173

173

Some philosophers propose analyses of Geach–Kaplan sentences in terms of branching quantifiers (Barwise 1979). Representations using second-order logic and plural variables can also be given (Boolos 1984). STA's approach, however, is the only approach that explains surface grammatical features.

172

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

6.3 QUANTITATIVES AND UNIVERSAL PLURALS Quantitatives are noun phrases like two Fs, three Fs, many Fs that introduce implications about number.174 Such noun phrases are β-terms with superscripted meanings pertaining to quantity—see §5.0.1. They are all plural-referring terms. Indefinite quantitatives of the form n Fs, as in two Fs and three Fs, are represented as β2-F and β3-F. In uttering ‘__n Fs__’, U performs a proto-assertion A(__n Fs__)pro, which has a dual content, a reportive-assertion component, equivalent to A(__some Fs__)pro, and an expressive-assertion component, in which U expresses her commitment to the number n applying to the denotative concept {Denoted by this token of ‘β-F’}. For example, in uttering ‘Two cats are outside’, U performs a report with the same content as A(Some cats are outside)pro/dox but U also expressively asserts her possession of the state of being committed to applying two to the denotative concept, {Denoted by this token of ‘β-cats’}. So U reports that some cats are outside and expresses commitment to their number being two. Such uses of indefinite quantitative phrases exhibit sentential determination of referential content. The lexical content of R(two cats)pro is {..Cats..}, but in the assertion it is {..Cats, Outside..}. So the assertion transmits the information that there are two things satisfying this referential content. In sum, an assertion of the form A(__n Fs__)pro/dox, say on a collective reading, has the structure: (i) (ii)

U utters ‘__n Fs__’ and advertises (a) an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈… [O1, O2, …, On] …〉, where the Ojs are Fs; and (b) an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈U, possesses the cognitive state [applying n to the concept: {Denoted by this token of ‘β-F’}]〉. U's purpose in uttering ‘__n Fs__’ is to defend commitment to the intention (ia) and the cognitive state given in (ib).175

The singular quantitative one F is a singular version of n Fs. In performing A(__one F__)pro, U performs A(__α-F__)pro and expressively asserts her possession of the state [applying one to the concept: {Denoted by this token of ‘α-F’}]. An audience H applies true to A(__n Fs__)pro just in case H confirms she has a commitment to a representational intention and cognitive state of the same kind that U advertises. A quantitative sentence __n Fs__ is true if and only if exactly n Fs satisfy (__x__); otherwise it is false.176

174

The most plausible proposal within Frege-model theories is to treat them as generalized quantifiers. (See Barwise and Cooper 1981 .)

175

The structures for distributed and cumulative readings are obvious variations on this content specification.

176

Thus, where audience H thinks that there are more than n F s satisfying (—x— ), then H affirms that some F s satisfy (—x— ) but rejects the number commitment.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

173

Quantitative terms such as few Fs, many Fs, or most Fs function in exactly the same way as numerical quantitatives but signal quantity by class-size comparison. Thus, most Fs is a β-term, β-Fs, that has an added superscript, m, as in βm-F, such that, in performing A(βm-F)pro, U expresses her commitment to the belief that the number of entities denoted by the token β-F is greater than half the number of Fs. So, in uttering ‘Most cats purr’, in which the referential content of R(most cats)pro is {..Cats, Purr..}, U advertises an intention to represent plurally complexes of the form 〈C, purrs〉, where C is a cat. U also expresses her belief state that the number of objects denoted by her token β-term most cats is more than half the number of cats. So, given that U is denoting cats that purr, U signals that these objects are in number more than half that of cats.177 I propose that all is also a quantitative of exactly the same kind. So in uttering ‘All of the cats purr’, in which the referential content of R(all of the cats)pro is {..Cats, Purr..}, U advertises an intention to represent plurally complexes of the form 〈C, purrs〉, where C is a cat. U also signals that the number of objects denoted by her token β-term all of the cats is equal to the number of cats.178 How would STA cope with cases like Most of these cities don't exist, where U is talking about: El Dorado, Atlantis, Shangri La, …, and Sydney? There might be a worry here about how we count the cities. We cannot count denotations. Counting names might produce the wrong results if one of the cities, Sydney, had many names. STA has no problem. We count cities here by the proto-referring act types defined by referential trees—as described in §4.5. Each token proto-referring act, R(El Dorado)pro, R(Atlantis)pro, R(Shangri La)pro, …, R(Sydney)pro is an instance of a proto-referring act type defined by a tree, converging on a certain source.

6.3.1 Universal Plurals and Adverbs of Generality According to STA, terms such as cats in (20) below are generic plurals; they are β-terms subjected to the D-rule (§5.1) along with a further constraint, represented by superscript g. They have the form βD/g-F—see §5.02: (20) Cats are furry. In uttering (20), the term cats simultaneously denotes all cats. A proto-assertion A(Fs V__)pro is generic just in case (i) the sentence has a distributed predicative

177

This last analysis assumed that the sentential representation in Most cats purr was plural. Most -sentences can also feature singular sentential representation and so have collective readings, as in Most cats are scattered about in the northern hemisphere , which has a collective reading.

178

Quantitative determiners such as all and most can also combine with mass terms, as in all gold or most meat . In this case the function of the quantitative determiner is very similar to its role in the plural case. I assume that mass terms such as gold have a singular denotative function. They are α-terms. In assertion All gold glitters , the referential content of R(all gold )pro is {..Gold, Glitters ..}, and U advertises an intention to denote a complex of the form 〈G, glitters〉, where G is a mass of gold. U also signals that the token α-term, all gold , denotes 100% of the mass denoted by gold .

174

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

reading—it involves plural sentential representation; (ii) it is intended that each F satisfies the predicate {V__} by virtue of dispositional, lawful, or analytic necessity; and (iii) there is no implicit restriction of the referential content of R(Fs)pro—it is simply {F}. The role of the superscript g in βD/g-F is to indicate that these conditions are imposed upon use of βD-F. In English, the definite article cannot normally be used in generic plurals, unlike other European languages. Use of the definite article, as in A(The Fs V__)pro, signals that the statement is not generic; one of the conditions, (i) or (ii) or (iii), does not hold. We cannot assert ‘The cats are furry’ to convey that cats are furry. Nevertheless, we can use the Fs to denote the whole class of Fs. Take: (21) The Dinosaurs were extinct by 65 million BC. (21) is not generic; neither of the conditions (i) nor (ii) holds. The predication in (21) is collective and the complex represented is a brute historical fact. In §5.6 I sketched STA's account of how adverbs of generality, or AGs, combine with indefinite and definite singular descriptions, as in A cat is usually furry. AGs can also interact with plurals. Take: (22) Cats are usually furry. In (22), the AG usually combines with a proto-assertion of the form A(Cats are furry)pro. This is a proto-assertion featuring plural sentential representation. So, in the concatenative act Cats∩are furry U advertises simultaneously: (a)

intentions to represent complexes of the form 〈Oi, furry〉, where Oi is denoted by Cats, and (b) associated commitments to defend such intentions.

The proto-assertion A(Cats are furry)pro is under a mode of interpretation. U lacks any of the intentions of the form (b). Instead, through usually, U expressively asserts her possession of a commitment state to a degree n > 1/2 inclination to undertake any given (a)/(b) pair.179 Assertions of sentences comprising generic plurals and predicates, such as (20), are reportive assertions; they are not expressive assertions. They are, in STA's terms, logically simple sentences—see §6.0.180 But assertions with AGs like (22) above are logically complex. This contention is confirmed by the way not interacts with generic plurals. Compare (23) with (24): (23) Cats are not furry. (24) Cats are not invariably furry.

179

Generic statements taken in a certain way, such as Birds fly , have the property that they are not falsified by bird instances that are non-flying. So, the fact that penguins do not fly does not falsify Birds fly . Two options for explaining this, which will not be explored in this book, are, first, that Birds fly involves an implicit non-universal AG such as typically , as in Typically birds fly . Secondly, there is the proposal that, in Birds fly, bird is restricted to typical birds. So Birds fly is interpreted Typical birds fly .

180

Contrast this view with that of Dummett (1981 : 93), according to whom such phrases are really predicates.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

175

Knowing that some cats are furry, and others not, we assert (24) rather than (23). (23) implies that no cat is furry, (24) does not. We have already explained how the negation works in the case of simple plural assertions—see 6.2.2 above. A(Cats are furry)pro is effectively a simultaneous assertion, so negation applies to each singular assertion. Thus (23) implies that no cat is furry. (24) lacks the implication that no cat is furry. This is due to the presence of invariably. Negations express rejection of assertive commitment properties. The assertive commitment of A(Cats are invariably furry)pro/dox is to the cognitive state of possessing a degree n > 100 per cent inclination to accept any simultaneously displayed commitment properties. The negative sentence (24) then expresses rejection of this assertion commitment. U can reject this state but still hold that many cats are furry. Quantitative terms such as two boys can combine with adverbs of generality, AGs, as in (25): (25) Two boys together are usually trouble. STA easily copes with (25).181 In (25), the proto-act R(two boys)pro has a variable interpretation in the same way in which R(a boy)pro in A boy is always trouble has a variable interpretation. As proposed in §5.6, if the indefinite, in this case two boys, is the argument of the AG always, then it lacks sentential determination of referential content. Nevertheless, in the proto-referring act, U presents herself as intending to denote dually objects. U lacks this intention, but, given the variable interpretation of the proto-act, the value-range acts will be particular proto-referring acts in which U advertises intentions to denote dually objects. Thus the value-range proto-acts for (25) have the form A(These two together are trouble)pro, in which R(these two)pro is a value-range proto-referring act directed towards particular boys.182

6.4 PRONOUNS STA provides a unified treatment of descriptive noun phrases, singular and plural. This unified treatment spans the singular/general divide. The unifying thread is the proto-act structure, R(α-F)pro or R(β-F)pro, that attends all uses of

181

In the Frege model, two boys is a quantifier expression. We might paraphrase (25)—using techniques devised by Berman (1987) —as Most minimal situations in which there are two boys are parts of larger situations in which there is trouble . (We need the idea of larger situations to allow for the fact that the trouble may extend beyond the minimal situation of the two boys.)

182

Another example of a variable interpretation of a plural proto-referring act is No Fs . If U asserts ‘No cats were here’, U performs a proto-assertion of the form A(β-cats were here )pro , which has a variable interpretation, and U expresses her rejection of all value-range proto-assertions of the form A(Ts were here )pro , where R(Ts )pro is a plural proto-act picking out things supposed or believed to be cats.

176

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

noun phrases. The differences in meaning between the various descriptive noun phrases is explained by the different rules of interpretation imposed upon the core proto-acts. I now consider another category of noun phrases: pronouns. Pronouns can be anaphoric, relative, interrogative, demonstrative, and reflexive. In this book the main object of study will be anaphoric and relative pronouns. Any comprehensive account of reference and generality needs to account for these two kinds of pronouns. STA offers a unified treatment of anaphoric and relative pronouns in terms of core proto-acts and interpretations. Again this is to be contrasted with the disunified treatments on offer with Frege-model theories. Frege-model theories fail to provide unified treatments because they fail to provide unified treatments of noun phrases.

6.4.1 Anaphoric Pronouns I begin with anaphoric pronouns. Pronouns have term-grammar and for this reason their utterance involves the performance of proto-referring acts—see §4.0. In uttering an anaphoric pronoun, he/she/it/they, U advertises an intention to denote by the pronoun an object or objects already denoted by some salient noun phrase. The repertoire rule for anaphoric pronouns is: RR[Anaphor]: If Σ wants to denote something that co-designates with a noun phrase N already in use and salient, then Σ can utter ‘he’/‘she’/‘it’/‘they’ and will achieve her goal if her beliefs are correct. Given RR[Anaphor], we characterize the link between a pronoun and its antecedent thus: Anaphor: A pronoun π uttered by U is anaphoric on a noun phrase N iff U in performing R(π)pro can be interpreted as presenting herself as intending to denote the thing(s) denoted by the token use of N. Anaphor essentially sums up the whole function of anaphors. The proto-act structure of pronouns is very simple. Using the principle Anaphor and the general thesis that noun phrases are always performed in proto-referring acts, STA provides an entirely unified treatment of anaphora. As shall be argued in some detail in Chapter 11, the anaphoric chains displayed below are all treated in essentially the same way: (26) (27) (28) (29)

Frank is happy. He is rich. I met a rich guy. He was happy. Every yuppie likes the lifestyle he leads. If a woman marries, she enters into a legal contract with a man. He usually profits more from it than she does.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

177

Fig. 6.1

Fig. 6.2

(30) I saw some rich guys. They were happy. (31) Kings are invariably cruel. They are rendered sadistic by power. The anaphoric chain between a pronoun π and its antecedent N is a speech-act structure, represented by Fig. 6.1 (Ad. Int. Co-Den. abbreviates advertises an intention to co-denote). Here π and N can be singular or plural. The proto-act of advertising an intention to co-denote is itself a proto-act and thus open to modes of interpretation, as we shall see. What constitutes the fact that U in uttering π is advertising an intention to co-designate in this way? Simply, that U utters π in accordance with the rule RR[Anaphor] as applied to the context. Application of the rule will have the consequence that U is disposed to substitute for R(π)pro a proto-referring act with the same referential content as the antecedent R(N)pro or to substitute for R(π)pro a proto-referring act whose referential content specifies more explicitly the anaphoric connection, such as R(the thing we have just spoken about)pro. So, in the case of Frank is nice. He likes chocolate, U is willing to substitute Frank, or, say, the guy we are talking about, for he. Or in Every yuppie loves the lifestyle that he leads, U is willing to substitute for he the description the yuppie. Of course, U cannot substitute every yuppie, since it introduces another generic evaluation signal into the utterance. However, the proto-act R(every yuppie)pro has as its core proto-act R(α-yuppie)pro with referential content {..Yuppie..}. U can therefore substitute the definite description in place of the pronominal act R(he)pro. Consider how this works in a bit more detail. The structures in (26) and (27) are represented by (26A) (see Fig. 6.2) and (27A) (see Fig. 6.3). In both cases the antecedent and anaphoric referring acts are doxastically grounded. U advertises an intention to co-denote, and indeed has this intention. In (27A), R(A rich

178

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

Fig. 6.3

guy)pro has sententially determined referential content; it gains the content {..Rich guy, Met by U..}. So, the anaphor, R(he)pro can be replaced by a proto-act featuring a definite description with the same referential content: R(the rich guy I met)pro.183 Anaphoric chains function whether or not participants believe they are denoting anything with the referring terms they use. We can see this neatly in the dialogue below: U1: (believer) Pegasus will fly. He will do aerial tricks. U2: (non-believer) He won't. He does not exist U1 utters ‘Pegasus’ advertising an intention to denote an entity with a certain character. U's proto-act has a certain referential, chain content, {Denoted by such and such earlier tokens}, and further theory content {..Horse, Winged..}. (See the discussion of names in §4.4.) U1 utters ‘he’ intending to act as someone does who intends to denote something following the repertoire rule RR[Anaphor] applied to the token Pegasus. U presents herself as intending to denote what is denoted by her token of Pegasus. In this case, U1 has the intention she displays herself as having. In contrast, U2 performs an anaphoric proto-referring act in uttering ‘he’, so U2 presents herself as intending to denote what U1 denotes by Pegasus. U2 lacks this intention. Nevertheless, advertising the intention is enough to secure the anaphoric chain. U2 might also have uttered ‘he, the horse’, to make the anaphoric link explicit. In doing so, U2 would have been intending to act in the manner of a speaker Σ who intends to denote an entity following RR[Anaphor] in combination with the rule for apposition, RR[Apposition] of §4.1. In short, the anaphoric chain is constituted by proto-acts that are ultimately neutral on whether the speakers have denotative intentions or not. The parallel with referential chains for names should be clear.

183

The D-type approach to donkey pronouns (Evans 1977 ; Neale 1990) accepts an existential quantifier treatment of indefinites and analyses pronouns like that in (27) as proxies for definite descriptions. STA predicts why that theory has the limited validity it possesses. I say more about D-type theory in Chapters 10 and 11 .

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

179

Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Matters are slightly more complicated in the case of (28). In (28), as Anaphor dictates, in uttering ‘he’, U presents herself as intending to denote the thing denoted by the antecedent term, in this case the α-term α-yuppie, which is the core component of every yuppie. U lacks this intention, since U has no denotative intention is using every yuppie. Rather, the proto-referring acts R(a-yuppie)pro and R(he)pro have variable interpretations, in the sense defined in §5.5. I represent these interpretations thus: R(a-yuppie)pro/var and R(he)pro/var. So, the anaphoric proto-referring act has a variable interpretation, represented in Fig. 6.4. The variable interpretation means that U's proto-referring act goes proxy for particular anaphoric relations of the form (see Fig. 6.5). In other words, the value-range assertions of the core proto-assertion found in A(Every yuppie loves the lifestyle that he leads)pro have the form A(T loves the lifestyle that he leads)pro. (29) contains complex anaphoric chains that are comprised by proto-referring acts on variable interpretations in exactly the same way. (I discuss the details of this kind of chain in Chapter 11.) The other sentences (30) and (31) feature plurals. The anaphoric chains here are just like those described in (26) and (27), but the terms involved are β-terms rather than α-terms. I emphasize that, unlike standard approaches, STA makes no distinction between pronouns that are C-commanded by their antecedents and those that are not. C-commanding is the usual criterion for a quantificationally bound anaphor—roughly, N C-commands π if and only if π is in the same clause as N.184 Thus, he in (28) is C-commanded by every yuppie and so can be treated as a bound variable, but the pronouns in (27), (29), (30) are not C-commanded by their antecedents. They must be treated in a different way. Hence, the standard Frege-model analysis distinguishes anaphors that function like bound variables and those that do not.

184

See Neale (1990) for a discussion of C-commanding and a standard approach to bound and unbound anaphors according to this criterion.

180

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

Analysing these anaphoric relations at all, let alone uniformly, is no trivial task. (29) in particular involves complexity that no current account employing quantificational and variable-binding structures can explain. I show this in Chapter 10. The ability to explain such anaphoric relations with ease, and with uniformity, is a strong argument for the STA approach.

6.4.2 Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses Relative pronouns, which, that, who, like anaphoric pronouns, have term grammar. In uttering a relative pronoun, ρ, U performs a proto-referring act, R(ρ)pro. The defining feature of relative pronouns is that they appear in relative clauses, as in the boy who can enjoy invisibility, truths that we hold self-evident, which form complex descriptive phrases. In uttering a complex description, say of the form of (32), (32) the F who V__, U performs two proto-referring acts R(the F)pro and R(who)pro. U also performs a subordinate proto-assertion, A(who V__)pro. Thus, an assertion of the form (33a) below is constituted by two assertions: the main-clause assertion (33b), and the subordinate assertion (33c): (33) (a) A(The F who V__ is H)pro/dox. (b) A(The F is H)pro/dox. (c) A(who V__)pro/dox. That the relative clause who V__ is proto-asserted follows from the fact that it has the grammar of a declarative sentence.185 The dependent proto-assertion A(who V__)pro is open to the same range of interpretations as any other proto-assertion. So, it can be interpreted doxastically, metaphorically, or conditionally. For example, in The girl who is the sun approaches, as uttered by Romeo, the relative-clause proto-assertion A(who is the sun)pro has a metaphoric interpretation.186 The claim that U is proto-asserting with such relative clauses should not be too startling a claim, given STA's views about embedded proto-assertion in logical compounds. On the other hand, STA goes further in the case of relative clauses with its claim that such clauses can be doxastically grounded. Indeed, unrestricted relative clauses are just like assertions. Take Bruce over

185

Of course, where the relative pronoun is the object-term of a verb, we have the word-order characteristic of the interrogative mood, as in who likes fruit , etc. Such wordorder inversions do not stand in the way of a sentence's being proto-asserted. It does mean, however, that word order is ambiguous.

186

Assertions of the form A(which is G )pro/dox are dependent . They are necessarily embedded in other assertions, because the content of the relative-pronoun referring-act R(ρ)pro is always (at least partially) dependent upon the content of R(N )pro , where N is the term in apposition to ρ.

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

181

Fig. 6.6

there, who incidentally was working last year as a gigolo on the Côte d'Azure, is going to sing tonight. Phenomenally, the relative clause here appears to be asserted.187 Like anaphoric pronouns, in uttering a relative pronoun ρ, U performs a proto-act R(ρ)pro and so advertises an intention to denote what is denoted by another noun phrase. In this case the noun phrase is that with which it is in apposition. In the phrase (32) above, the F is in apposition with who, and so U presents herself as intending to signal that the entity denoted by who is the entity denoted by the F. Structurally then, the phrase (32) contains the signal, as indicated in Fig. 6.6. The purpose of setting up this anaphoric chain—at least in the case of restrictive clauses—is to augment the referential content of the main noun-phrase proto-act R(the F)pro. Definites often carry referential content over and above their explicit descriptive content. Relative clauses are a means of indicating what some of that content is. Definite descriptions have pre-sententially determined referential content—see §5.1. That means that, unlike indefinite descriptions, their referential content is determined prior to the processing of the main or principle clause of the sentence in which they appear. In the case of (33a) above that is (33b). On the other hand, definite descriptions can gain referential content from subordinate or auxiliary clauses. This is what we find in relative clauses. Thus, in (32), R(the F)pro is performed in conjunction with utterance of the relative clause who V__. The latter provides a type of auxiliary proto-assertion, A(who V__)pro, through which R(the F)pro gains the extra referential-content V__. In which case, R(the F)pro has the content {..F, V__..}. As R(who)pro is in apposition with R(the F)pro, the former gains the referential content of the latter. The content and structure of a proto-assertion, say, A(The girl in my class likes philosophy)pro, is represented by (34) (see Fig. 6.7). (34a) shows the embedded assertions. (34b) displays the advertised intention to co-denote with the girl and who. (34c) displays the referential content that R(the girl)pro acquires. In short, the role of the subordinate assertion is to bestow referential content on R(the girl)pro.

187

That proto-assertions can be compound in this way naturally implies a position whose equivalent in the Frege model is the view that some sentences can express more than one proposition. (See Bach 1999 and Neale 1999 .)

182

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

Fig. 6.7

Fig. 6.8

Relative pronouns have sententially determinable referential content, as do indefinites. This is confirmed by certain uses of relative clauses. Take constructions such as Whoever was there made no sound. In this case, R(whoever)pro is a protoreferring act with the content {Being there}. Structurally the form is given by (35) (see Fig. 6.8). In other words, in (35), we have nested proto-assertions: the embedded proto-assertion, A(Whoever was there)pro fixes the referential content of R(whoever)pro through sentential determination of referential content. The proto-referring act R(whoever)pro then does double duty as the subject proto-referring act both of the embedded clause and of the main clause. I have described the case of restrictive relative clauses, cases like (32) in which a descriptive phrase is restricted in its referential use. There is no essential difference between restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses in STA. Some non-restrictive cases are: (36) Fred, who is outside, is my uncle. (37) The man in the corner, who, incidentally, is looking a bit sick, is the prisoner. In the case of (36), the proto-act R(Fred)pro is already determined. We nevertheless have augmentation of theory content of R(Fred)pro simply for the purpose of supplying further collateral information. Similarly in (37), R(the man in the

BEYOND QUANTIFICATION

183

corner)pro is already determined. The difference is that, in restrictive cases, the reason for introducing the clause is to supplement the descriptive content of R(the F)pro to generate determinacy.188 Pronouns can combine with relative clauses. Thus: (38) He who stands before you is none other than your long lost uncle. (39) He who laughs last laughs best. In (38), he and who are in apposition. The speaker thereby presents herself as intending to co-denote. (38) contains the dependent proto-assertion A(who stands before you)pro. Therefore, R(who)pro gains the referential content {Person, Stands before you}. Therefore, in uttering he, U presents herself, effectively, as denoting that thing. The whole proto-assertion and its constituent proto-acts are naturally taken as having simple doxastic grounding. (39) has the same structure, but the whole proto-assertion has a variable interpretation. In performing R(he)pro U presents herself as intending to denote a male object that laughs last. This act has a variable interpretation. U expressively asserts a commitment to all the value-range instances of the variable proto-assertion being correct.

6.5 GRAMMATICAL AND LOGICAL FORM That completes my outline of STA's treatment of descriptive noun phrases and related constructions. In its analysis of noun phrases, STA respects surface grammar in accordance with the principle, Grammar, of §0.3. STA's account of generality explains why English has the surface grammar it has. Surface grammar is the guide to underlying proto-act structure, which is the backbone of semantic interpretation. The semantic interpretation of a sentence is not some other sentence in a logical language attached to the surface sentence by rules of transformation. It is instead a dynamic interpretative structure that uses the surface form itself as a part. Surface grammar provides proto-act structure, upon which modes of interpretation can be imposed. So, for example, every F is essentially an α-term, α-F, plus interpretative restriction, symbolized by superscript, U, that is, αU-F. Its α-term grammar indicates U performs the core proto-act R(α-F)pro. The particular form of the determiner every indicates the presence of the superscript U, and consequently a mode of

188

Plural descriptions can also be modified by relative clauses, as in The girls who are in my class are philosophers and Kings who are cruel are unhappy. Who has both singular and plural grammatical number. In these cases, R(who )pro functions plurally; who plurally denotes objects. It has to, since, through apposition, U presents herself as intending to codesignate with the plural descriptive phrase. Relative clauses can have both distributed and collective readings: the girls who formed a circle … —collective, most boys who own a car … —distributed.

184

PLURALS AND PRONOUNS

interpretation. STA is not a quantificational approach to generality. It makes no use of the concept of a quantifier or of variable-binding. This analysis of noun phrases provides unified treatments of phenomena across the board: the singular noun phrases, plurals, with the attendant treatment of predication, pronouns. It explains in a natural way the interaction of noun phrases, both plural and singular with particles like negation and adverbs of generality. STA's treatment of noun phrases is markedly different from Frege-model approaches. Frege-model theories distinguish between singular terms and quantifiers. Names and demonstratives are placed in the singular-term class. Universal noun phrases and indefinite descriptions are placed on the side of the quantifiers. Definite descriptions are in a disputed class—see Neale (1990). The logical form of a sentence, according to the Frege model, is a structure in a formal language, whose syntax may bear little correspondence to the surface sentence of which it is the interpretation. (See, for example, (15) to (17) above.) We are left with the question of why English and other natural languages have the surface grammars they have. Failure to reply here casts doubt on the claim that logical form has been uncovered.189 Of course, one can usually produce a quantificational formula whose truth-conditions match those of the target (declarative) sentence. But this is simply to show an equivalence. Nothing follows about logical form. The closer alignment between semantic structure and surface grammar in STA has pay-offs. As I show later, STA can explain complex anaphoric chains in English that are intractable by the Frege model's quantifier–variable-binding approaches—see Chapter 10. STA also allows for a unified treatment of locutions relevant to the operators of generality and anaphora, such as if-clauses—see Chapter 11. In contrast, Frege-model theories seem to be confined to piecemeal theories of constructions for limited domains.

189

There are frameworks in which closer alignment of semantic structure and grammatical form is attempted. Lewis (1972) discusses a Montague-style assimilation of quantified noun phrases to terms. See also Barwise and Cooper (1981). But I think these approaches are forced and unsatisfying, and still leave surface grammar unexplained.

PART III The Emergence of Semantics

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 7 Intentional States and Natural Representation 7.0 INTRODUCTION: FEAR OF REPRODUCTION Parts I and II of this book have sketched out the general STA framework. It is now time to turn to some foundational issues. STA seeks to account for semantic content in terms of intentional states. So it must give an account of intentional states that does not appeal to the notion of semantic content. But there is the objection—the reproduction problem described in §0.4—that the contents of intentional states must, to do their job of underpinning proto-acts, possess all the syntactic and semantic properties of the very things we are seeking to explain: semantic contents. In short, the content of proto-acts are reproduced at the level of intentional states. The problem of meaning is merely postponed. Let me articulate one aspect of this objection. Proto-asserting involves advertising intentions. Intentions, or intentional states, have objects—their contents—that cannot be proto-assertions themselves, so they must be something else, say, states of affairs, or sets of possible worlds—propositions as the Frege model understands them. (See §1.1.) So each proto-assertion must have as part of its content a state of affairs, a proposition-like thing. So why not appeal to that proposition as the meaning of the sentence rather than the proto-act, since we find it reproduced at the level of intentions? We should go directly to the propositions themselves as the sentence-meanings. The reasoning behind this conclusion is, as should be apparent by now, misguided. Semantic content in STA resides in proto-act types, the production of words in combination with intentions to behave in a certain way. Proto-act structure is something intentional states themselves cannot possess. The contents of intentions may be things like state of affairs, or sets of possible worlds, but these entities are not sentence contents. To think so is just to accept the semantic conception of truth, or SCT—see Chapter 1—according to which the semantic content of a sentence is the proposition it encodes, where propositions are entities like state of affairs. STA rejects SCT. For STA, contents are proto-illocutionary acts. The latter are not mere speech-act counterparts of propositions. For example, protoassertions have a representational component: a constituent proto-representational act in which a speaker advertises an intention to represent

188

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

something. They also have a communicative component: the advertising of a communicative intention. Differences in communicative intentions explains the differences between the illocutionary acts of reportive assertion, expressive assertion, presuppositional expression—as found in implicature—and directive expression—as found in orders. (See §§1.3–4.) The result is a pluralistic conception of the relation of content to truth, PCT, in which truth does not reside in correspondence. PCT entails the falsity of SCTs main corollary, Agree—which states that sentences conveying the same information about how things are have the same truth-conditions. (See §1.1.) Agree's falsity means that the same assertions can convey, by virtue of literal meaning, the same information about how things are but differ in truthconditions. To put all this in a nutshell, PCT entails that the semantic content of sentences is not their representational content, whereas the content of intentional states is their representational content. The semantic content of surface sentences simply cannot appear at the level of intentions. The reproduction problem is an artiefact of thinking in terms of SCT. Of course, STA does not give up on the notion of sentences' having representational functions. STA is doggedly designative in the sense that all utterances involve advertising representational intentions. It just denies that the semantic content of an utterance resides in its entering into a relation of representation with something. Semantic content is several steps removed from representation. A semantic content is the act of deploying a protorepresentational act in a certain way. But there is still a residual worry. Could it not be that the intentions needed to perform proto-acts are somehow just as rich as the proto-acts themselves? This concern is unfounded.190 The natural-representation structures of intentional states are much simpler than the semantic contents and structure of surface sentences. This is partially because of a central semantic distinction in STA; that between reportive uses of sentences and expressive uses. Proto-illocutionary acts of a natural language divide into two classes: reportive proto-assertions using logically simple sentences; and expressive proto-illocutionary acts, which include logically complex utterances. Simple sentences are capable of representing worldly, speaker-external complexes. In performing sincere, doxastically grounded proto-assertions such as A(T is F)pro/dox or A(The Fs are G)pro/dox, U has the intentions described below: U intends to represent by T is F a complex of the form . U intends to represent by The Fs are G a complex of the form <[O1, O2, …], G>. For U to be able to possess such intentions, her intentional system must be capable of naturally representing complexes of the form or .

190

Even if this were true—and it is not—there is a lot of evidence that the apparatus of proto-acts, modes, and reportive and expressive illocutionary acts has a lot of virtues in explaining natural-language semantics. There would not necessarily be any warrant to abandon that approach to semantics.

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

189

So, just as surface sentences can represent complexes, intentional states must be able naturally to represent, or track, complexes and their constituents—objects, properties, and relations. Thus at least some of the structure of simple sentences is reproduced at the level of intentional content. Although this representational aspect of simple sentences is reproduced, not all the structural features of simple sentences are. Intentional states lack constituents corresponding to proper names. They have structures that correspond to some of the basic functions of definite and indefinite descriptions, but not to all their functions. Moreover, intentional states do not always have constituents corresponding to surface predicates. It is not required that for every use of a meaningful predicate V__ there is an intentional state tracking a property. Many meaningful predicates may simply lack denotative constituents. These facts will become apparent when the natural-representation system is described in some detail. The expressive acts, such as expressive assertion, form the other class of proto-illocutionary acts. In STA, utterances of logical compounds are expressive assertions or presuppositional expressives. Their utterances are used to express commitment states with respect to constituent proto-acts. Just as logical compounds do not represent logically complex complexes, so these cognitive states do not track logically complex features of reality; there are no such complexes to track. Logical commitment states are states that do not track at all. In uttering logically complex sentences, speakers advertise intentions to represent their own states. We need then to allow intentions of the form below, where D and E are meant to denote the cognitive states expressed by utterance of Either S1 or S2 and Every F is G, respectively: U intends by uttering ‘Either S1 or S2’ to represent the state D. U intends by uttering ‘Every F is G’ to represent the state E. Evidently, then, intentional states must have constituents capable of tracking speaker internal states like D and E. But these tracking constituents do not function like the logical constants either … or and every. Rather, if anything, they function as namelike entities tracking mereologically complex states. Surface sentences have de dicto logical complexity, but intentional states do not. There are no tracking constituents that function like logical constants. In sum, the natural-representational system lacks much of the syntactic complexity of English. The intentional states underpinning use of logically complex sentences lack logically complex content.191

191

One response to the problem of reproduction might be that STA is in error in accepting representationalism, the thesis that in uttering sentences a speaker is always advertising an intention to represent . It might be urged that we should accept some kind of non-representationalist use-theory of connectives, in which their meanings are characterized by uses of the compounds in inferences. See Dummett (1959) and Brandom (1994). Thus representationalism does not hold for logically complex sentences, so there is no reproduction problem for them. Unfortunately, a use-theory, assuming SCT of §1.1 , falls right into subjectivism about the logical. On the use-theory, the meaning of and is a type of use. One of a number of equivalent ways of characterizing that use is as follows. Where U utters ‘S1 and S2 ’, U commits herself to asserting S1 and S2 . So utterances of compounds express normative states possessed by the speaker; they are not reports about the possession of such states. However, SCT cannot make sense of the reporting/expressing distinction. There is, then, the threat that logical compounds become subjective reports about speakers' commitment states, which they are not. (See §1.2 .)

190

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

There are two further concerns about reproduction. The first is a residual worry about what kinds of psychological states intentions are. To intend, it might seem, is to have a belief and desire combination of some kind.192 Believing and desiring are states involving relations to entities potentially denoted by that-clauses. Such entities are reasonably theorized to be either propositional contents themselves or propositional contents in combination with entities like modes of designation.193 So in appealing to intentions, is not STA circular? Basically STA's response here is to accept a type of pluralism about belief states and objects of belief. Belief states come in two general kinds: (a) (b)

states whose objects are proto-illocutionary acts of a certain class: namely, assertion-types and implicative utterances, which include the proto-acts corresponding to if-sentences; states realized in the pre-linguistic natural-representation system.

In class (a), we find a diverse class of objects of belief. Some objects of belief are truth-apt—for example, assertions; others are not—for example, conditionals. Some are literal, some not—for example, metaphors. States of the form (b) are what I call doxastic tracking states. I describe them in some detail below. Doxastic tracking states are belief states that can be possessed by creatures lacking any public natural language. Dogs have beliefs in some sense. Dogs do not have sophisticated belief states of the kind (a); they do not use symbols, so lack natural languages or anything like them. But dogs can possess belief states of the kind (b). STA's contention is that part of a human's ability to develop a language is to have belief states of the (b) kind. Such states underpin capacities to develop speech-act intentions. But the structure of these belief states is radically simpler than kind-(a) beliefs, whose existence they make possible. This is because, as already noted above, the structure of the natural-representation system is much simpler than the system of proto-acts. Another issue for the possibility of a speech-act semantics is the nature of designation. Words are capable of entering into designative relations—denotation and representation. Do intentional states themselves enter into these relations? I say no.

192

For example, Davidson (1978) analyses intending in this way.

193

Thus attitudes could be Russellian propositions, roughly, states of affairs, in combination with modes of designation that are specific to speakers. See e.g. Richard (1990) and Crimmins (1992).

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

191

Sentences and their constituents enter into relations of designation that are intention-dependent relations; they depend partly on speakers having certain intentions. The representational properties of intentional states do not depend upon there being intentions around; their intentionality is basic. Intentional states exhibit pre-intentional representational properties: representation not based on prior intention.194 To distinguish intention-based representation from preintentional, I have called the latter tracking. Intentional states are structured cognitive states in which parts of the world—properties-relations objects, complexes—are tracked. In sum, linguistic expressions can enter into relations of designation, which is an intention-based relation. Designation has for its condition of possibility pre-intentional representation, or tracking. There is no reason to think, a priori, that intention-based designation and tracking are the same relation. Indeed, if we think of one explaining the other, they must be distinct. It follows from the above thesis that the surface sentences of English do not bear any relation that corresponds to translation to the representations in the intentional language. The former can represent and denote, but items in the natural-representation system, or NR system, can only track. STA faces no problem of reproduction. Instead, the picture STA presents us with is of a natural language as a syntactical–morphological system with complex speech-act-theoretic properties that is based upon, and realized through, speakers possessing a system of natural representation, an NR system, of a much simpler nature. In this chapter and the next, I describe the basic structures of the NR system. In doing this I am engaged, partly, in a speculative exercise; what I say about the NR system is partially invention, since working out its real nature is a task for cognitive science. What is the point of such an undertaking? It is to show that, in principle, STA is not bound to reproduce within the NR system all the syntactic and semantic structures of English surface sentential forms. However, not all will be speculation. The claims about logical complexity are not. Reasonable a priori arguments can be given for the general character of the states that underpin use of de dicto logically complex sentences. The present and following chapters have another goal. That goal is to display STA's psychologism. I have spoken much of repertoire rules and commitments. Are these not irreducible normative notions? If so, how can STA claim to be psychologistic? The answer is that the repertoire rules and commitment states are not normative as such. With the right background setting, they can be viewed as entirely natural phenomena.

194

I am appealing to the notion of derived and original intentionality. See Searle (1969).

192

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

7.1 THE NATURAL-REPRESENTATION SYSTEM: BASIC FEATURES I begin with the elements making up the natural-representation system, or the NR system. For convenience, I treat it as language-like, and so possessing a type of syntax. This is because structure is conveniently represented syntactically. The NR system, contains, as primitive vocabulary, the following items—these will be explained as we proceed. I call these tracking symbols: occurrent-object symbols: τ, γ, ζ, … occurrent-property/relation symbols: Π, Γ, Z, … singular complex-symbol determiner: { … } property and relation constants: F1, F2, …, G1, G2, …, R1, R2, … To explain what these symbols are we need to explain how they combine. The unit of significance in the NR system is the complex symbol, a state that can track a complex. Some examples of well-formed complex symbols are: (1) (2) (3)

{τ, F1}. {τ R γ}. {τ, F5} G2}.

(1) tracks a complex in which the object tracked by τ has the property tracked by F1. (2) tracks a complex in which two objects bear a relation tracked by R to each other. (3) tracks a higher-order complex, in which the complex tracked by {τ, F5} has the property tracked by G2. Complex-tracking symbols may or may not track complexes. The narrow content of a complex-tracking symbol—its function thought of separately from whether or not it tracks a complex—is simply its causal role in the NR system. Whether it tracks a complex or not depends upon whether the cognitive system is embedded in the right way in an environment. If {τ, F2} fails to track a complex, then it is not that we must think that it is correlated with an abstract state of affairs, which would correspond to a complex, if indeed there were one to be tracked. Consider now the constituents of {τ, F2}. The tracking symbol τ, when it is tokened, tracks one and only one object, if it tracks at all. Tokens of the type τ will track different things in different episodes according to the different complextrackers with which it combines. τ does not function like a variable in the sense that in a representation, say, {τ, F2}, it ranges over a domain of objects, which are potential values of variable assignments.195 Rather it functions like a temporary name. Property constants, on the other hand, F1, F2, …, track one and only one universal, property or relation, in a context invariant way.

195

There is, in fact, no place at all for the orthodox concept of a variable in the STA system.

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

193

Seeing in slightly more detail how tracking symbols function is best done by looking at how an occurrent-object symbol τ tracks an object O. Assume that redness, cubicalness, and metallicness are all genuine properties. Say that O is an object that is red, cubical, and metallic and that it is the unique object in the world to fit this description. Then, where, Fred, Fcubical, and Fmetallic are tokens tracking, redness, cubicalness, and metallicness, respectively, the tokens of τ in the ensemble of complex symbols below track O: (4)

{τ, Fred} {τ, Fcubical} {τ, Fmetallic}.

The object tracked by τ in (1) is the unique entity that is red, cubical, and metallic. A token of τ will track an object just in case it is part of an ensemble like (4), which, as a whole, uniquely specifies an object. If this condition is met, then the constituents' complex symbols {τ, Fred}, {τ, Fcubical}, and {τ, Fmetallic} themselves track complexes—that is: 〈O, red〉, 〈O, cubical〉, and 〈O, metallic〉. In short, the NR system is governed by a certain holism; a token occurrent-object symbol tracks an object O just in case it is embedded within a concatenation of complex symbols that, as an ensemble, track complexes into which the object O uniquely enters. Or, in other words, each complex symbol in (4), for example, {τ, Fred} tracks a complex 〈O, red〉, just in case that complex symbol is in an ensemble in which τ tracks O. Suppose that U intends to bring something about—say, that she eats the apple next to her. Strictly speaking, her intention is to bring about the complex comprising her eating of an entity, which is an apple next to her. She does not intend to bring about the complex that there is an apple next to her. Thus the tracking state fixing the content of her intention, the ensemble (5) below, (5)

{τ eat γ} {τ, Fself} {γ, Fapple} {γ, Rnext τ},

needs to be divided into two parts: a pure intentional part—intending that a certain event of eating occurs—and another part that is directed towards tracking the complex regarding an apple being next to her. Call this second state a doxastic tracking state. We can mark the division of the ensemble into these two cognitive roles by rendering in bold the tracking symbols that comprise the doxastic state: (6)

INTEND: {τ eat γ} {τ, Fself} {γ, Fapple} {γ, Rnext τ}.

Intentional and doxastic tracking states have distinct directions of fit.196 When a token of a tracking symbol {…} is a part of pure intentional content, there is a world–state fit; the world must fit the state in which {…} is tokened. That means that the tokened state causes, in the right way, U's bringing-about of the complex. So, in the apple example, if U manages to eat the apple, then U's tokened tracking state—the component not in bold in (6)—is causally responsible for

196

See Humberstone (1992) for a discussion of direction of fit.

194

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

U's eating. When a token of a tracking symbol {…} is tokened as a doxastic tracking state, the token state has state–world fit; the state must fit the world. That means, roughly, that the world causes the tokening of {…}. So, in the apple example, the apple's being beside U or perhaps some other epistemically relevant complex causes the tracking state that is the emboldened component of (6). Consider now speech acts. In order to have intentions to denote and represent through uttering token surface expressions, the NR system must contain tracking symbols tracking utterance tokens. The tracking symbols for token English expressions are ordinary words flanked by emboldened quotations marks ‘…’, as in ‘Fred ’, ‘the boy’, ‘it’. The NR system also contains relational constants that track the intention-based designative relations: denotation and representation. In the case of singular denotation and representation, these tracking symbols are DEN and REP. So the NR system contains a vocabulary enabling it to track designative relations holding between English sentences and parts of the world. What does U have to do in order successfully to intend that her token referring term N denotes an object O? U must successfully track O through the NR system and correctly use the term N. That means using N in accordance with its repertoire rule. Here is an illustration of how this occurs in the case of a simple denotative intention. Say U intends to denote by the cube the x uniquely satisfying {red, cubical, metallic}. Her intention is structured thus: (7)

INTEND: {‘the cube’ DEN τ} {τ, Fred} {τ, Fcubical} {τ, Fmetal}.

Such an intention is successful if the doxastic component uniquely specifies an entity O—tracked by τ—that is red, cubical, and metallic and U's use of the term the cube conforms to the repertoire rules. Suppose that the entity O is dubbed Fred by users of U's language, which forms a referential tree converging on O. Say U employs a token Fred as a node of this referential tree. In using Fred in this way, U intends to denote what was denoted by her earlier token uses of Fred or those of another speaker—see §4.2. The content of U's denotative intention is represented as below (here ‘Fred’0 tracks U's current token of Fred and ‘Fred’1 tracks U's last use or uses of Fred or those of another speaker): (8) INTEND: {‘Fred’0 DEN τ} {‘Fred’1 DEN τ} (chain-fixing content). {τ, Fsphere} {τ, Fpink} (theory content). The intentional content of U's intention comes in two parts. (Here my discussion builds on the account of names given in Chapter 4 and the distinction between chain-fixing content and theory content introduced in §5.4.) The first part—chainfixing content—corresponds to U's utilization of a denotation chain. Her token Fred denotes just in case she succeeds in tracking her earlier tokens and they denote. U's intentional content also has another component—theory content.

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

195

This is purely ancillary to denotation. U will invariably have a theory about the object denoted, but this content has no role in fixing denotation as such. (8) shows that names such as Fred do not correspond to tracking symbols. U's capacity to use a name resides in the fact that she keeps an idiolectic file, in which Fred is mentioned, and which initiates intentional contents of the kind described in (8). But no tracking symbol translates Fred. In general, the NR system lacks tracking constants for objects. (Perhaps it has tracking constants for the body, person, or self that has the system.) It has tracking constants only for properties and relations. Moreover, not every predicate in the natural language, whether it denotes or not, will have a tracking constant corresponding to it. That is because many predicates employ general terms whose use is connected to linguistic distribution of labour, which effectively gives them the same status as proper names—see §4.6. Say that U is a sincere, but mistaken, user of Phlogiston. The content of her intention on some occasion of use of Phlogiston is: (9) INTEND: {‘Phlogiston’0DEN Π} {‘Phlogiston’1 DEN Π} (chain-fixing content). {Π, Fliquid} (theory content). In this case, the belief-content component denotes no property. Consider now the structure of the representational intention that a speaker has in uttering sincerely a simple sentence. Say U asserts sincerely ‘Fred is wooden’, Fred having the interpretation given in (8) above. U's representational intention has the structure below (doxastic content is in bold): (10) Fred is wooden INTEND: {‘Fred’0 ∩ ‘is wooden’ REP {τ, Γ}} (i) {‘Fred’0 DEN τ} {‘Fred’1 DEN τ} …(ii) {‘wooden’ DEN Γ} {Γ, Fwooden}(iii) Thus, U performs three acts. (i) is a concatenative act; U intends to represent a complex of a certain form. The particular complex intended is given only through supplementation by the acts (ii) and (iii). If (ii) and (iii) are successful, U denotes objects; then (i) will be in the running to be a successful representation. Given that (10) is a report, (10) is true just in case {τ, Γ} in the ensemble (11), tracks a complex: (11) {τ, Γ} {‘Fred’1 DEN τ} {Γ = Fwooden}. The ensemble (11) is the extraction of the belief-based component of the NR representation in (10). It is the doxastic tracking state. A doxastic tracking state is part of the cognitive ground for a sincere doxastically grounded proto-assertion. The tracking state's content does not match the content of the proto-assertion it underpins. At most, it roughly corresponds to the

196

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

content of one of the proto-assertion's components: the proto-representational component. There is also the communicative component of a proto-assertion. This too will have its own cognitive ground. (I postpone my discussion of this until §7.4.) In the case of, say, logically complex sentences, there is even less correspondence between the underpinning tracking state and the content of the assertion. The NR-system state in this case tracks a speakerinternal complex, a cognitive state—see the discussion above in §7.0. The cognitive state cannot play the semantic role that the proto-assertion plays, which involves the expression of that state. English contains plurally denoting expressions. The singular/plural distinction is a distinction with respect to designation. It therefore has its tracking correlate in the NR system. The NR system must contain tracking symbols for plural denotation, and representation. Let these be τP, {…}P, and so forth, and let DENP track the plural denotation relation. Plural tracking symbols work by simultaneously tracking. Thus, {τP, cube}P tracks all and only those complexes that are some object being cubical. In a toy universe in which there are several cubes, {τP, cube}P tracks 〈Frank, cubical〉 and 〈George, cubical〉, where Frank and George are cubes. Under the same circumstances {τ, cube} tracks nothing, since there is no unique cubical object. Consider U intending to denote with the definite description the cubes. In this case U has the state: INTEND: {‘the cubes’ DENP τP} {τP, cube}P.

In this plural case, {‘the cubes’ DENP τP} is a singular complex tracking symbol with a plural object-tracker τP. That is OK. This complex tracking symbol tracks a multi-object complex with parts: an object, a token utterance of the cube, and all those entities tracked by τP. We might represent this complex in English by The token ‘the cubes’ plurally denotes the cubes. Finally, STA is now in a position to explain what the apparent variables, the xs and ys, are in the metalinguistic descriptions of the structure of proto-acts that have been given in Parts I and II. As promised, they really are not variables in the semantic sense of the Frege model. Instead, they are occurrent-object symbols of the NR system. STA does not use variables in its semantics at any level.

7.2 TRACKING AND de re LOGICAL COMPLEXITY According to my description of the NR system, a token τ tracks, if it tracks at all, one and only one object. A token {τ, F} tracks, if it tracks at all, one and only one complex. Moreover, both track by virtue of an object O uniquely satisfying F. The token {τP, F}P tracks, if it tracks at all, all objects that satisfy F. And so on. Evidently, in describing how the NR-system states track objects and complexes,

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

197

we use a logical vocabulary—we say, for example, that one and only one object is tracked by a particular symbol. There is, however, no commitment here to the idea that there is any de re logical complexity—logical complexity in the world—underpinning the possibility of tracking. We do not have to postulate that the world contains negative facts or facts of totality.197 Suppose that U's cognitive system plurally tracks entities of a certain kind, say the dogs that are U's pets, Dog1, Dog2, and Dog3. In that case, a token tracking symbol in U's NR system, say a token of τP, tracks Dog1, tracks Dog2, and tracks Dog3. Nothing like a fact of totality has to be tracked as a precondition for this to be the case. Rather, what makes U's tokening of τP a plural tracking of this kind is a dispositional fact about U's cognitive state embedded as it is in the world. The fact is expressed by a counterfactual. If there had been another entity satisfying the condition of being Dog and 풰 's pet, it would have been tracked by the token τP. If any of Dog1, Dog2, or Dog3 had not satisfied the condition, it would not have been tracked. No other entity satisfying the condition is tracked by τP. A speaker U has no concept of tracking. The speaker lacks any concept of how the NR system symbols function. Instead, tracking capacities are what allow her to have concepts.198 On the other hand, a speaker who uses a language like English has concepts of intention-based semantic properties, such as representation and denotation. The NR system has tracking constants for these relations, these being DEN and REP. Whenever T denotes O, then NR system tokens track O. In this sense, the denotative capacities of English rest firmly on the tracking capacities of the NR system. Indeed, one might think that all the interesting work is done by the tracking capacities; once objects are tracked, denotation is just a matter of using expressions according to repertoire rules. This might lead to the thought that we should skip intentions and let NR representations be the underlying semantic representations of English sentences. On this view, English sentences either do not have semantic properties as such, but are linked to tracking symbols that do, or they inherit these properties in some way. This objection assumes a Frege-model designative conception of semantic interpretation that STA rejects. It is true that all designative relations between words and reality depend completely on tracking relations, but the claim of this book is that English semantics is not designative. The semantic features of English do not

197

We might ask if singular tracking is more basic than plural. Singular tracking may be explicated causally or in terms of counterfactual dependencies of certain kinds. See G. Fodor (1998 : ch. 6) for an account of representation in terms of causal co-variation. We might also invoke evolutionary history as proposed by teleosemantic accounts—see Millikin (1984). Perhaps plural tracking can be explicated in terms of singular tracking. This strikes me as a real question, but one that I will not pursue here.

198

We might say that tracking symbols are concepts. Just as we make a distinction between belief states that are states with proto-acts as objects and those that are couched in the NR system—see §7.0 —we might do the same for concepts. There are speech-act-based concepts and tracking-symbol concepts.

198

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

depend upon expressions having designation, but rather on their being performed in proto-acts, in which the concept of designation is relied upon. Thus the fact that tracking is the backbone of all denotation is not an objection to STA.

7.3 FROM REPRESENTATIONAL INTENTIONS TO PROTO-ACTS I have described the structure of denotative and representational intentions. STA's core proposal is not that semantic content resides in speakers' possessing designative intentions or communicative intentions. It resides instead in speakers' advertising such intentions. How are proto-acts conceived from the point of view of the NR system? I first answer this question with respect to proto-representational acts. I discuss communicative intentions and protocommunicative acts in §7.4. Consider first, proto-referring acts. We have been using descriptions such as the following to characterize such acts. (12) R(T)pro: U utters ‘T’ and intends to perform a token that is an instance of the type of verbal behaviour characteristic of an arbitrary speaker Σ who following a repertoire rule intends to denote an object x that satisfies uniquely {..F..}. (12) describes the content of the intention that U must have if she performs a proto-referring act. How is this to be analysed with respect to the NR system? On the present hypothesis, it must be content, given that it is intentional content, that is realized in the NR system. The problem is that the content in (12) is expressed by terms such as behaviour characteristic of an arbitrary speaker. This phrase contains an indefinite description on a variable interpretation, in the sense of §5.6. But the NR system, by hypothesis, lacks tracking symbols corresponding to such phrases. Moreover, the content in (12) contains a rather complex set of concepts. The danger of reproduction looms. Is there some way of providing a simpler characterization of the intentional content of a proto-act? There is. We find it by looking more closely at repertoire rules, or, rather, at what it means for repertoire rules to be rules for a particular speaker. That a speaker U possesses a certain repertoire rule is just a dispositional fact about U.199 Suppose a repertoire rule specifies that, if U has a desire to denote a certain object x in a certain manner, she can utter a string X (in the hope of

199

It might be thought that this belies the fact that they are rules . They are normative and not mere causal regularities. STA's position is that linguistic normativity, like all normativity, is to be treated in terms of an expressivist model. On this view, there are no special irreducible facts about norms, but only dispositional states and the motivational states of speakers to influence the behaviour of other speakers, and indeed, themselves. This view is developed in some detail in Chapter 8 .

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

199

achieving her goal). Her possessing this rule amounts to her having a dispositional state: if U has a desire to denote a certain object x with a certain character, she is disposed to utter X.200 One way of conceiving of acting in accordance with the rule, thought of as a dispositional state, is that the dispositional state constituting possession of the rule is a causal factor in U's production of X. Take the rule for an anaphoric pronoun, RR[Anaphor], which says that, if a speaker wants to denote an object denoted by a salient token of masculine noun phrase, she can utter he. Let the dispositional state that is U's possessing the repertoire rule be DRR[Anaphor]. Take a case where U, possessing a desire to denote the entity denoted by a token masculine noun phrase N, seeks to fulfil that desire by acting through the rule. In that case, I propose, the dispositional state DRR[Anaphor] is a causal factor in the utterance of he. We have then the following causal structure: (13) The dispositional state DRR[Anaphor] in combination with U's denotative desire and relevant background conditions Ψ cause U's utterance of he. There are three causal factors in (13): the dispositional state DRR[Anaphor]; the denotative desire, which triggers manifestation of DRR[Anaphor]; and factors Ψ, which will be whatever other causal factors relevant to the chain involving the first two factors. In this case, given that a denotative-desire triggers manifestation of DRR[Anaphor], U can be said to intend to denote by he the x that is denoted by an antecedent noun phrase N. Let us also suppose that, in uttering ‘he’, U also intends that her act be so caused. U is, after all, a competent speaker who is conscious of her own linguistic activities. She is aware, at some level, that she acts according to repertoire rules, that her acts are in part the results of certain dispositions, and that other speakers have similar dispositions. So, in uttering ‘he’, anaphoric on antecedent N: (14) U's act of uttering ‘he’ is caused by DRR[Anaphor]—DRR[Anaphor] is one causal factor—and U intends her utterance to be so caused. In which case, U can be said to advertise an intention to denote an object x denoted by N. U intends to act as others do, who, possessing a denotative desire, utter an expression. In terms of our NR system, she presents herself as having the intentional state INTEND: {‘he’ DEN τ} {‘N’ DEN τ}. I have just described the case of proto-acting where U has a denotative desire. What of cases where she lacks any such desire? The key to generalizing the dispositionalist notion of repertoire rules and proto-acting is to recognize that states like DRR[Anaphor] can cause utterances, such as utterances of he, without being triggered by denotative desires. So DRR[Anaphor]'s causal powers are not restricted to the manifestation conditions given in (13), in which DRR[Anaphor] is

200

By desire to denote a certain object x , I mean an all-out reason to do so. By disposed to utter X I mean that, if U has chosen a language to communicate in, which is underpinned by the particular disposition in question, U will, ceteris paribus , utter X . U's utterance may just be sub-vocal utterance. U does not have to manifest the disposition by public utterance.

200

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

triggered by a denotative desire. What are the other causal pathways through which DRR[Anaphor] can cause utterance of he? I propose that what can trigger it to manifest itself is a desire that utterance behaviour be caused by DRR[Anaphor]. Which is to say, (15) can hold: (15) DRR[Anaphor] in combination with U's desire that DRR[Anaphor] cause utterance of he and relevant background factors Ω together cause U's utterance of he. In one case, (13), DRR[Anaphor] causes the utterance through the triggering causal factor that is U's denotative desire. In the other, the case (15), DRR[Anaphor] causes the utterance through the triggering causal factor of another kind of desire, U's desire that DRR[Anaphor] be a cause of the utterance. We can conclude that the proto-referring act is the structure common to both cases, which is that DRR[Anaphor] is a cause of the utterance and U intends it to be so. Thus the proto-act in the case of the pronoun is (16): (16) R(he)pro: U's act of uttering ‘he’ is caused by DRR[Anaphor] and, moreover, she intends it to be so caused. (16) specifies what the speaker does in performing A(he)pro, without implying that the NR system possesses an intentional content of the complex kind given in (12) above. I now generalize. Let DRR[…] be any repertoire rule disposition, or RR-disposition, of the form if 풰 has a desire to denote a certain object x such that x is F, she is disposed to utter string X. In terms of NR system, we can express this dispositional generality holding of U as follows. Let ɛ be an occurrent-object symbol that tracks expressions of English; it is a metalinguistic tracking symbol. The RR-disposition DRR[…] is: (17) If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ DEN τ} {τ, F1} …, then U is disposed to utter X. (17) just says that, if U is in the specified intentional state, she is disposed to do something. The proto-act R(X)pro in which U utters X and presents herself as having a certain intention is that act described below: (18) R(X)pro: U's act of uttering X is caused by DRR[…] and, moreover, she intends it to be so caused. Thus where U performs a proto-act of the form R(X)pro, U presents herself as being in the state INTEND: {‘X’ DEN τ} {τ, F1} …. Given (18), and the assumption that all intentions require content to be realized in the NR system, there is still a content to be encoded. But it is a simple one. That is: (19) INTEND: {DRR[…] causes utterance of ‘X’}.

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

201

In short, the NR system needs tracking symbols for token utterances (which we have assumed it needs anyway) and tracking symbols for RR-dispositions. But none of these assumptions requires attribution of de dicto logical complexity to the NR system, just extra tracking symbols in the lexicon.201

7.3.1Proto-Representational Acts I will now attempt to give an idea about how these elements come together within a proto-representational act, the component (a) of a proto-assertion—see §1.4. A basic proto-representational act, say REP(Suz admires herself)pro, has a structure that is fixed by the application of a set of repertoire rules and thus a set of RR-dispositions. In this case, five RR-dispositions, those below, come into play. These are to do with: [1] the concatenation of the subject noun phrase and the predicate; [2] the concatenation of the predicate former and object noun phrase to form a predicate; [3] the noun phrase Suz, [4] the pronoun, and [5] the predicate former. I specify these as follows: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

DRR[Concat1]: If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ REP {τ, Πγ}} …, U is disposed to perform an act of the form NP1∩[VP_NP2]. DRR[Concat2]: If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ REP Πγ} …, U is disposed to perform an act of the form VP_∩NP2. DRR[Suz]: If U is in an intentional state of the form, INTEND: { ɛ DEN τ} {‘Suz’1 DEN τ} …, U is disposed to utter ‘Suz’. DRR[herself]: If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ DEN τ} {‘Suz’ DEN τ} …, where Suz is feminine noun phrase occurring in the same clause, U is disposed to utter ‘herself ’. DRR[admires]: If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ DEN Π} {Π = Fadmires}, U is disposed to utter ‘admires’.

The first, DRR[Concat1], is a general concatenative RR-disposition that causes the combining of a noun phrase NP1 with a predicate VP_NP2 containing a noun phrase NP2. In the utterance Suz admires herself, an instance of this rule is employed in which Suz is combined with admires herself. DRR[Concat1] is only causally active in concert with the causal production of the other RR-dispositions. A similar story holds for DRR[Concat2]. Here Πγ is a tracking symbol for a relational property. The joint causation of these RR-dispositions is structured as in Fig. 7.1 below. Figure 7.1 shows how speech involves events organized into event parts that have their own proximal causes, these being RRdispositions.

201

It may be that not all intentions involve encoding in the NR system. Fine-grained intentions characteristic of intentions to denote do. But some intentions may involve complex dispositionally based capacities without representation.

202

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

Fig. 7.1

Figure 7.1 gives the lexical proto-act, the proto-act considered merely as based upon the repertoire rules. This is the act U performs in uttering ‘Suz admires herself ’ when we restrict our attention to the RR-dispositions. As such its structure, thought of as a type, is a linguistic meaning. This lexical proto-act needs interpretation to form a fully interpreted proto-assertion. In the present case, interpretation is chiefly a matter of establishing the interpretation of Suz. In terms of STA that amounts to determining which antecedent tokens of the name Suz, defined by an idiolectic file, U is tracking. These tokens fix which referential tree U's token use of Suz is on. (See Chapter 4.) Figure 7.1 is essentially the structure of a basic subject–predicate proto-representational act. A structure like Fig. 7.1 is produced in utterances of sentences of the form Fred kissed Jane, The boy kissed the girl, The boy kissed a girl, Every girl kissed Jane, and He kissed her. That is, any sentence with a certain subject–predicate grammar. What differs between each case is the nature of the RR-dispositions being brought to bear. I now illustrate a case that features definite and indefinite descriptions and universal noun phrases. The core pro-assertion that is common to utterance of The girl saw a cat, Every girl saw every cat, and so on is a lexical proto-assertion whose proto-representational act is REP(α-girl saw α-cat)pro. This act has the form given in Fig. 7.2. In Fig. 7.2 there are repertoire rules pertaining to the use of definite and indefinite descriptions, as in: DRR[α-girl] If U is in an intentional state of the form INTEND: { ɛ DEN τ} {τ, Fgirl} …, U is disposed to utter an expression of the form α-girl.

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

203

Fig. 7.2

That is, if U has a denotative intention of the kind indicated, she is disposed to utter an α-term. In fact, this α-term will always be a definite, indefinite, or demonstrative description. It will never be every girl, since such phases are never used with intentions to denote. Nevertheless, expressions of the latter have the form of α-terms, terms used according to repertoire rules of the type given above. It is for this reason that U, in uttering ‘every F’, utters an α-term, α-F, and so performs a proto-referring act with a certain content. (See the discussion of Chapter 5.) To conclude, U advertises a representational intention of the form I by uttering S just in case: (i) U utters S; (ii) U possesses a set of RR-dispositions that are causal factors in U's utterance of S; (iii) U intends these dispositions to cause utterance of S; and (iv) these RR-dispositions have the property that, were U actually to possess I, then, owing to her possession of these RR-dispositions, U would be disposed to utter S.

7.4 COMMUNICATIVE INTENTIONS AND COMMITMENT I have provided an account of the intentions and cognitive states underpinning proto-acts when these are protorepresentational acts; acts of presenting intentions to designate—denote or represent. But proto-assertions involve more than this. They also involve the advertising of intentions to defend intentions or cognitive state of various kinds. In performing a report A(S)pro/dox, U (a) advertises

204

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

an intention to represent a complex of a certain form and (b) intends to defend an intention of the kind displayed in (a). There are several issues that need clarification here. First there is an issue about belief states. In performing a proto-assertion on a doxastic ground, U's communicative intention is to defend her commitment state (before H). A component of the intention to defend a commitment is an intention, or desire, that H believe U possesses the commitment property. Thus, being able to perform an assertion requires that U be able to formulate intentions regarding her audience's belief states. We saw above, in §7.0, that STA is pluralist about belief states. There are basically two kinds of belief states: those with proto-illocutionary acts of certain kinds as their objects; and those realized in the NR system. I call the second kind of belief state doxastic-tracking states. The intention U possesses in performing an assertion—the intention that H believe U has a certain commitment state Π—is an intention about H's forming a doxastic tracking state. We could represent this intention thus—where self is the tracking symbol for the speaker herself: INTEND: {Audience, Token {Self, Possess Π}}. Return now to proto-representational acts discussed in §7.3.1. Take the proto-act with the structure given in Fig. 7.2 from the last section and suppose that there is no superscripting of the α-terms: the proto-act is A(a girl saw a cat)pro. Say that the proto-act is doxastically grounded. That means U has an intention of the form displayed above. Π in this case is a commitment to a representational intention. H can determine the form of that intention by reconstructing it from the proto-act structure of Fig. 7.2, which she deduces from the syntax, lexical form, and context of U's utterance of A girl saw a cat. This structure indicates what the RR-dispositions are, which in turn indicate the types of intention assembled. H can reconstruct what U's advertised intention is. Given that both terms are pure indefinites, H assigns referential contents as required to the constituent acts.202 The second issue regarding communicative intentions is that, in performing an assertion, U also intends H to accept, confirm, or reject possession of that property Π. Accepting, confirming, rejecting are complex kinds of epistemic states. We can analyse the first as coming to develop a commitment to Π. Confirmation is recognizing an already existing commitment state. Rejection of Π is defined in terms of exclusion states—the sorts of states expressed by negation. These are characterized in Chapter 8. There is then nothing in principle standing in the way of our conceiving of the NR system as possessing the resources of formulating intentions in which these kinds of states are tracked.

202

On the other hand, the two α-terms might both be universal noun phrases; the sentence is Every girl saw every cat . In this case, the interpretation phase involves the nesting of variable interpretations and generic evaluation signals carried by the phrases. I look at the structure of such interpretations in §9.2 .

INTENTIONS AND NATURAL REPRESENTATION

205

I note that there is no reason to suppose that speakers must have a theoretical grasp of acceptance or rejection in being able to formulate such intentions. They just need minimal capacities to track these sorts of states. We see from the above that proto-acts can be relatively complex. They require the bringing-together of intentions in a complex way. But speakers are not required to be conscious of these complex intentions. They are causal factors in utterance that speakers do not have to be fully conscious of. Speech-act complexity is just causal complexity.203 Finally, there is the issue of commitment. A keystone of STA's account of truth-bearers, PCT, is the notion of commitment property. U utters S, presenting an intention to represent a complex, and defends a commitment either to that representational intention or to a cognitive state, which in fact she represents. What is commitment? Commitment is not entailment. Entailment cannot be used to explain what assertions are, since entailment is a relation between assertions, according to STA. Alternatively, we might propose that commitments are just irreducible normative facts that supervene upon patterns of natural facts. I am unhappy with that idea as well. The nature of commitment will be explored in some detail in the next chapter. There it is revealed that commitment is not an intrinsically normative relation.

203

An objection to Gricean intention-based theories of meaning is that speech acts presuppose intentions that are too complex for speakers to have knowledge of. See Lewis (1975a) for a reply.

CHAPTER 8 Logical Complexity and Semantic Normativity 8.0 INTRODUCTION I have provided an admittedly hypothetical account of how the intentional contents underpinning basic protoassertions and interpretations thereof are realized in the system of natural representation, or NR system. This chapter extends that discussion in two ways. First, I examine the character of the cognitive states that are expressed by logically complex sentences. I need to demonstrate that STA's account of de dicto logical complexity—logically complex sentences—carries no unwanted commitment to logical complexity in re: logically complex world-parts. Secondly, I explain the normative objectivity of our use of logically complex sentences. Connected with this is the issue of semantic norms. STA is committed to the idea that meanings are not intrinsically normative; STA is psychologistic. With respect to the first issue, I have already given a sketch of the proposed treatment of logical constants in §0.2, which I expanded in Parts I and II. Sentences divide into logically simple sentences, whose standard self-standing utterances are reportive assertions, and logically complex sentences, whose standard self-standing utterances are either expressive assertions or, in the case of if, presuppositional expressives. The cognitive states expressed in the first class, the expressive assertions, fall into two general kinds: (i) exclusion states—those that are expressed by negations and disjunctions; and (ii) dispositions to performance of proto-acts—those that are expressed by sentences with universal noun phrases, quantitatives, adverbs of generality. (If-sentences involve the expression of complex discourse states that do not have any simple cognitive states corresponding to them.) Exclusion states and dispositional states are entirely lacking in natural representational content. They do not track. So, a fortiori, they do not track logically complex worldparts. I characterize both exclusion states and plural tracking states in §8.1 to §8.3. The second concern of this chapter is objectivity and normativity. STA is psychologistic. There are no irreducible semantic norms. Rather, linguistically normative language is explicated through the intersubjectivity built into STA's account of illocutionary acts, in particular, in the notion of defending commitments. Hints of this have already been given in STA's expressivist account of the

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

207

truth- and falsity-predicates. Thus normativity arises through expressive modes of speech. The word comes first, then norms. In the context of such discussion, this chapter finally offers an account of commitment, a non-normative cognitive treatment, which is added to the naturalistic treatment of repertoire rules, given in the previous chapter.

8.1 LOGICAL CONSTANTS AND COGNITIVE STATES In §3.3, I proposed that, in uttering ‘T did not V__’, U expresses her possession of a state N, the state of excluding performance of A(T V__)pro/dox. U excludes performance of A(T V__)pro/dox just in case: (i) U is unable to sincerely perform A(T V__)pro/dox; (ii) U has no inclination to engage in epistemic search procedures for verifying A(T V__)pro/dox, and (iii) U is not epistemically indifferent; she is interested in representing how things are. I now make this idea more precise by reference to the NR system. In the discussion below, I suppose for convenience that there are colour properties such as red, pink, and blue. Consider mastery of a basic concept like red, which, I assume, is a pre-verbal capacity. Mastery of red is to be characterized not with respect to abilities to use linguistic terms but with respect to abilities to recognize the presence or absence of phenomenal properties by utilizing the pre-verbal system of representation provided by the NR system. Pre-linguistic concepts require abilities to track worldly things. U's possession of the concept of red implies that U has the capacity to track complexes such as O's possessing the property red. So the NR system must feature tracking constants, like Fred and Fblue, and capacities to token complex symbols, such as {τ, Fred} caused under appropriate conditions by worldly complexes.204 Mastery of colour concepts also entails being able to recognize colour absences, say, under standard conditions. The states that underpin the latter capacities are certain regularities governing representations in the NR system. These are what I call exclusion laws. An example of such a regularity is this—here Extoken{ … } means that U is excluded from tokening the complex-tracking symbol { … } in the doxastic tracking module: (1)

Tokening {τ, Fred} ⇒ Extoken{τ, Fblue}.

An exclusion state Extoken{ … } is not simply the state of lacking any disposition to token { … }. If the system lacks information about whether an object O is blue or not, it is not disposed to token {τ, Fblue}, where τ tracks O. Extoken { … } is not the state of being unable to token { … } owing to information lack—that is,

204

I am not supposing necessarily that there will be representors for colours corresponding to our ordinary colour concepts. But for simplicity, so as to explain the principle, I shall assume this.

208

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

doubt about { … }. Rather Extoken{ … } is the state of not being disposed to token { … } along with the recognition that the system is in an informationally adequate state. That means that the cognitive system, although generally disposed to undertake search routines to gain information about the world, is not disposed to determine whether { … } can be tokened. If U's system is in search mode for determining whether {τ, Fblue} can be tokened as a correct representation, U's system is in doubt about {τ, Fblue}. But, once it enters the state Extoken{τ, Fblue}, the search routine ceases. To continue is to be in doubt. This does not mean that the system in Extoken{τ, Fblue} cannot undertake search routines for determining whether other tracking symbols, such as {τ, Fred}, are tokenable. (1)

(2) (3)

then conveys the information that if the system tokens a tracking symbol of the form {τ, Fred}, where τ tracks O, the system is constrained not to token a tracking symbol of the form {τ, Fblue}. This means that, if the system tokens {τ, Fred} tracking kO, redl, then it is constrained not to represent that O is blue. Tokens of {τ, Fred} and {τ, Fblue} cannot both obtain, given the exclusion laws. We expect other regularities defining more or less the incompatibilities that hold between the colour tracking constants, as in: Tokening {τ, Fred} ⇒ Extoken{τ, Fyellow}. Tokening {τ, Fblue} ⇒ Extoken{τ, Fred}.

We can assume that exclusion laws hold for all basic primary and secondary properties. They express the incompatibility between something's being red and its being blue, something's being circular and something's being square, something's being straight as opposed to bent. And so on. Exclusion laws will have other forms. For example, consider a creature searching a house for a cat. It searches each room in the house. In each search, it undertakes perceptual sweeps, but its NR system tracks no symbols of the form {ξ, Fcat}. One could imagine that there are exclusion laws to the effect that, where a sweep is undertaken and no symbol of the form {ξ, Fcat} is tokened, the system goes into an exclusion state, Extoken{ξ, Here} {ξ, Fcat}, where Here tracks the location. That is: (4)

Perceptual sweep not tokening {ξ, Fcat} ⇒ Extoken{ξ, Here} {ξ, Fcat}.

In short, this law captures the idea that an epistemic procedure, carried out under certain circumstances, generates an exclusion state of a certain kind, which records what we would call an absence of a property instantiation. Tokening of an exclusion state such as Extoken{τ, Fblue} can be caused, through exclusion laws, by the tokening of contrary tracking symbols such as a token of {τ, Fred}. But Extoken{τ, Fblue} can be tokened in a system when no such contrary token tracking symbols are tokened. Here the exclusion state lacks a canonical ground. It might be that a creature learns that certain fruits may have a range of colours but not the colour blue. So the creature may be in a state Extoken{τ, Fblue}, where τ tracks the inside of a particular unopened fruit, but tokens no contrary tracking symbol,

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

209

since it has no information about what the colour of the fruit's inside actually is. Thus a system's being in Extoken{ … } does not mean that it tokens canonical grounds for the exclusion state. Rather, the exclusion state is a type of prediction that there are tracking symbol types, {M1}, {M2}, …, which if tokened by the system would track worldly complexes and exclude, through exclusion laws, tokening of { … }—that is, which would be canonical grounds for the state Extoken{ … }. What of the correctness of the exclusion laws themselves? We could imagine a creature that had pathological exclusion laws. Say that tokening {τ, Fred} caused it to go into an exclusion state of the form Extoken{τ, Fround}. Why is this exclusion law pathological? Because there are things that are both red and round. On the other hand, does (1)'s correctness follow from the fact that a system has tracking concepts for the properties of blue and red and these are never encountered in experience? Behind this question is the thought that one can ground exclusion laws, metaphysically, by contending that correct exclusion laws are just those that correlate with de re incompatibilities, such as that an object's instantiating redness is incompatible with its instantiating blueness, where these incompatibilities are irreducible modal features of nature. STA rejects this idea. First, introducing the idea of such natural modal features would require negative complexes. Blueness excluding redness is just blueness necessitating the absence of red. We have absences of properties, the very things that the expressivist treatment of the logical is meant to avoid. Secondly, utterances of sentences such as Being red, it must not be blue are not reports about modal features of reality, but expressive assertions. They are statements in which U expresses her commitment to certain exclusion laws; de re incompatibilities are not required to explain the content of such modal statements. Thirdly, it is hard to see how de re incompatibilities explain the natural emergence of exclusion laws in cognitive creatures. Their emergence is to be explained by evolutionary theory and cognitive science, which do not appeal to empirically transcendent modal facts.205

8.1.1 Exclusion and ‘Not’ The thought now is that a capacity to use logical negation is based upon a system's prior capacities with respect to exclusion states and laws. Where U tokens {τ, Fred} then, she is constrained through the exclusion laws from tokening the symbol {τ, Fblue}. Given the relation between tracking states and doxastically based proto-assertions, U is excluded from performing A(T is blue)pro/dox. The proposal about negation is that, in sincerely uttering ‘T not V__’, U expresses that she is in a state excluding performance of A(T V__)pro/dox—write this as EXperf A(T V__)pro/dox. This is the state N, as foreshadowed earlier. The repertoire rule for negation is

205

I reject then the need to provide an analysis of incompatibility between contraries of the kind advocated by Katz (1990).

210

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

that, in English, if a speaker Σ wants to assert expressively her possession of the state EXperf A(T V__)pro/dox, then she can achieve her goal by uttering ‘T not V__’. So the structure of A(T not V__)pro is: STA (Neg): U utters ‘T not V__’ and advertises intentions (a) to represent a complex of the form 〈U, has EXperf A(T V__)pro/dox〉, and (b) to defend commitment to having EXperf A(T V__)pro/dox.

The state N, like any exclusion state, can be canonically grounded, grounded by token tracking symbols and exclusion laws. Tokening {τ, Fred} is a canonical ground for EXperf A(T is blue)pro/dox. But N can also be caused by other states. For example, speaker H sincerely utters ‘T is not blue’ in U's presence. So U recognizes that H is expressing possession of the state EXperf A(T is blue)pro/dox. U may believe H and come to affirm ‘T is not blue’. U's belief in H's words is constituted by her willingness to bring into being in herself, without a canonical ground, the counterpart of H's state—that is EXperf A(T is blue)pro/dox or N. U may then utter ‘T is not blue’ and express possession of the N-state. U's being in N is not merely her not being disposed to perform A(T is blue)pro/dox. Unlike this latter state, being in N has the immediate consequence that U ceases all search modes for grounds for A(T is blue)pro/dox. If U had been seeking to determine the performability of A(T is blue)pro/dox, she would now stop, based on H's words. To the extent that being in an N-state means enquiry stops in this sense, N-states, like states of the form Extoken{ … }, are types of predictions that there are tracking symbols that, if tokened, would track complexes and be canonical grounds for EXperf A(S)pro/dox. In describing the state N, I have used negation. However, N is not intrinsically negative. There is an appropriate level of description at which only simple sentences are used in describing N, since N is logically simple. I assume that all cognition is ultimately causal and that all causal relations are between logically simple, though often mereologically very complex, relata. I discuss this assumption below in §8.3. A speaker U does not have to be able to conceptualize the state N. U simply has a capacity to recognize when she is in it and, correlatively, a capacity to intend to represent that state through use of not.206

8.1.2 Objectivity, Irrationality, and Contradiction How do we understand the objectivity of negative assertions? First, as noted above, exclusion laws are not merely unconstrained psychological facts about speakers.

206

STA's treatment of negation is related to Price's account (1990). However, Price's account invokes a concept of rejection that is based on a primitive concept of incompatibility. He also fails to provide an adequate account of expressing —see §1.2 n. 11. Finally, he does not deal with the issue of embedding at all.

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

211

Any cognitive system is directed towards successful tracking of complexes and, in particular, its exclusion laws are directed towards this end as well. The exclusion laws are constrained by perceptual input. There are exclusion laws like (2) and (3) because, in part, entities that are blue and red all over are never perceptually encountered.207 Secondly, negative assertions are not merely subjective reports about possession of N-states; they are expressive assertions of them. They are therefore intimately connected to intersubjectivity. In negative utterances, speakers defend and intend others to confirm or reject possession of exclusion states. Agreement or disagreement is about possession of commitment properties. Thus compare: (5) (6)

George is pink and I am committed to rejecting that George is pink. George is pink and George is not pink.

The pair (5) is merely an instance of pragmatic contradiction. (6) is a logical contradiction. STA explains the difference between a mere pragmatic contradiction like (5) and a logical contradiction like (6) by the fact that that their assertions possess distinct kinds of communicative intention. The assertions in (5) are reports, those in (6) are a report and an expressive assertion respectively. In asserting (5), U defends committment to intending to represent a complex of the form 〈George, pink〉 and to intending to represent that her, U's, state excludes commitment to that intention. U's assertion is irrational but not contradictory, since an audience can affirm (5) to be true, as uttered by U, without irrationality. The commitment properties are not intrinsically incompatible. In contrast, both U and H, in agreeing that (6) is true, commit themselves to intending to represent 〈George, Pink〉 and to possessing an exclusion state, excluding commitment to intending to represent 〈George, Pink〉. The commitment properties are intrinsically incompatible. That is the basis of our judgement that (6) is a contradiction. The conflict in commitment that arises from judging the assertion to be true is not merely a speaker-relative matter. Most of us have inconsistent beliefs. It is quite possible for U to be committed to asserting S, but to have other beliefs that entail not-S. Thus U can be committed to an exclusion state EXperfA(S)pro/dox but at the same time perform A(S)pro/dox or be committed to performing it. There should be nothing puzzling about this per se. What happens in such cases is that U gains information from two distinct sources, one part committing U to performing EXperfA(S)pro/dox and the other part committing U to A(S)pro/dox. Overall, U is committed to neither. Rather, U's overall cognitive system contains subsystems of information that in each case generate the commitment. In short, it cannot be the case that

207

Some exclusion laws might be hard-wired—that is, innate.

212

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

commitment to an exclusion state EXperf A(S)pro/dox prevents sincere assertion of S. It is, therefore, not ruled out that U can assert S but express commitment to an exclusion state excluding that assertion. There is no contradiction in supposing this.208 I note finally that STA's account of negation does not rule out supposition of contradictory sentences. U can utter, coherently, ‘Suppose S and not-S’. In this case, U presents herself as committed to the assertive cognitive property Π of A(S)pro, but also presents herself as committed to excluding possession of Π. I suggest that suppositions of known contradictions proceed, in part, by waiving the normal restrictions disallowing assertion of contradictions. Effectively, speakers supposing a known contradiction feign ignorance of the fact that the sentence is a contradiction. There is independent evidence for this contention, given the nature of supposition itself. (See Barker 1995.)

8.1.3 Disjunctions and If-Sentences U's capacity to use not in English is based on the capacity of her cognitive system to develop exclusion states. Exclusion states also feature in the cognitive capacities underpinning use of other logical constants, such as either … or. In uttering Either S1 or S2, U performs two embedded proto-assertions A(S1)pro and A(S2)pro and expresses her possession of a cognitive state D. I proposed in §3.2.1 that the state D might be that state in which U commits herself to performing A(S2)pro/dox, given her rejection of A(S1)pro/dox, and vice versa. I think this is not entirely acceptable. Where U accepts S1, she is committed to accepting Either S1 or S2, for any S2. On the present proposal about D, this means that believing S1 requires U to be committed to performing A(S2)pro/dox, given rejection of A(S1)pro/dox, and vice versa. But one might doubt that belief in S1 gives rise to any such commitment. I prefer the following alternative proposal regarding D.D is the state of being in an exclusion state with respect to tokening a certain kind of joint state, the state of excluding performance of A(S1)pro/dox and excluding performance of A(S2)pro/dox. Just as there are exclusion laws of the kind I have described in §8.1, there are exclusion laws excluding exclusion states, and other kinds of higher-order exclusion states. More precisely, in terms of the abbreviations I have introduced to characterize NR-states, the state D is: Extoken [EXperf A(S1)pro/dox and EXperf A(S2)pro/dox].

In uttering ‘Either S1 or S2’, U expressively asserts her possession of this state; U's state excludes the tokening of a state of the form [EXperf A(S1)pro/dox and

208

Who knows! If Priest (1987) is right, there are some true contradictions.

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

213

EXperf A(S2)pro/dox]. Effectively, this approach trades on the thesis that Not (not-S1 and not-S2) is equivalent to Either S1 or S2.209 The other basic kind of sentential connective is if. Use of if-sentences requires grasping relatively sophisticated structures. U must be able to engage in a practice of stipulating the permissibility of a proto-assertion where the purpose of that stipulation is to determine the verbal consequences of the permissibility of that proto-assertion—see §3.4. Without doubt these are complex properties of discourse. Basic competence in use of if cannot require possession of concepts of all these properties. My suggestion is that, in being able to use if-sentences, U has a grasp of a practice not radically different in kind from the grasp she has of the communicative dimensions of assertion, discussed in §7.4. In the case of grasping supposition, U must be able to engage in certain practices of make-believe that are constrained in a certain way. Part of U's grasp of suppositions is that she is allowed to perform proto-assertions, A(S1)pro, without doxastic grounding and then perform others, A(S2)pro, if they satisfy certain grounding conditions.

8.1.4 Generality In the Frege model, logical constants conveying generality are the quantificational component of a language. STA rejects quantification, replacing it instead with a theory of proto-assertions and modes of interpretation. STA also redraws the boundary between the logically simple and the logically complex. As already revealed in Chapter 6, for STA, sentences featuring singular and plural definite and indefinite descriptions containing only logically simple predicates are logically simple sentences. Locutions conveying generality then come in two categories, as below: Logically Simple Plurals: The Fs are G, Fs are G. Logically Complex, Mode-based Expressives: Universal noun phrase sentences—Every F is G; sentences modified by adverbs of generality or

209

There is, however, an objection to this proposal about D. Disjunction on the present account is a negative context, and so should, it seems, exhibit negative polarity; it should allow any F to be used—see Horn (1989). Compare:(i)Either she ate something or drank something.(ii)It is not both the case that she did not eat anything and did not drink anything.(ii)*Either she ate anything or drank anything.Assuming and the present proposal, (i) has the same basic semantic form as (ii). (ii) features use of any, which is allowed by the negative context. However, any cannot be used this way in a disjunction, as (iii) shows. Thus the present proposal cannot be right. The reply is that, although D is a state involving exclusion of exclusion states, disjunctions do not contain as constituents negative proto-assertions—A(S1)pro plus a signal that an N-state holds. We find such negative proto-assertions in (ii) but not in (iii). But it is such negative proto-assertions that generate negative polarity contexts.

214

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

AGs—An F is usually G, Fs are always G, Fs are invariably G; Quantitatives such as Most Fs are G.

Strictly speaking, the plurals in the first group are just like simple subject–predicate sentences such as T is G, where T is a singular term. The cognitive states expressed in generalities are various kinds of dispositional and commitment states. The state expressed in universal noun-phrase assertions of the form A(Every F V__)pro/dox is E below—see §5.5—and that expressed in assertions featuring AGs of the form A(An F usually V__)pro/dox is G—see §5.6. E: Being committed to the permissibility of value-range proto-assertions of the form A(T V__)pro/…, where A(T is F)pro/ … is permissible for U. G: Possessing an inclination of degree n to perform A(T V__)pro/… based on the permissibility of A(T is an F)pro/….

Quantitatives, such as Most Fs are Gs and All Fs are Gs, are dual-content sentences; they have a reportive component and an expressive assertoric component. In uttering ‘Most Fs are Gs’, U performs a plural proto-assertion A(The Fs are Gs)pro, but lacks the intention. The expressive component involves U expressing her possession of a certain cognitive state Q below: Q: Being committed to the belief that m >n/2, where n applies to the denotative-concept [Denotation of βD-F] and m applies to [Denotation of βD-{F,G}].

Here βD-{F,G} is a definite description with referential content {F,G}. In short, the commitment is to the belief that the number m applying to the concept the Fs that are Gs, and the number n applying to the concept the Fs, have a certain relation. In all these cases, U's commitment state is metalinguistic. But U's assertion is not metalinguistic. U's utterance of Every F V__ is an expressive assertion of her state; it is not a report about that state. In order to be able to token such states, the NR system needs to be able to recognize tokens. That is, it needs concepts of utterance forms. That does not mean that it grasps abstract objects in any irreducible sense. Rather it means that there must be a module in the linguistic system that can recognize instances of types. State Q requires grasp of number concepts. Number concepts are bound up with counting, and counting with totalities. When U counts, U puts objects in one-to-one correspondence with natural numbers. In finishing her count, U has counted all the objects. Does this mean that number concepts presuppose the existence of facts of totality, and thus logical complexity in the world? I think not. Counting presupposes an ability to use plural noun phrases, which requires a capacity to track plurally objects.

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

215

8.2 VALIDITY, ENTAILMENT, AND EXPRESSIVIST REDUCTION In the last few sections, I have attempted to describe the cognitive underpinnings of logically complex sentences in English. But how do the cognitive states and speech-act structures I have described relate to issues of truth-conditions and the validity of arguments that employ logically complex sentences as premisses? A full account of the use of the logical constants requires that we specify what sorts of powers are possessed by the cognitive states Π expressed by logically complex sentences. That means specifying what the cognitive roles of such states are. The question of what their roles are can be taken in two sorts of ways. First, we might ask of any given state Π possessed by U what states are the causal consequences of being in Π, assuming the ideal functioning of U's cognitive system. Alternatively, we might ask what other states are permissible, what states ought U token, if U is in Π. These two questions are clearly separate questions. The first is a question of fact, of causal regularity, a question about the cognitive structures U instantiates. The second is a question of value or norms; given that U is in Π, what other states is it right for U to be in? It might seem that a semantic theory, a theory of truth-conditions and inference, is primarily concerned with the second question and not with the first question. In STA, however, matters are not so clear-cut. The substantial questions of explaining the truth-conditions that sentences have and the entailment relations into which those sentences can enter boil down to the answers given to the first question. STA is thoroughly psychologistic. It combines that psychologism with a type of expressivism about semantic norms. I now explain. Let us first dwell on the sorts of answers we might give to the first question about cognitive powers of the states Π expressed by logically complex sentences. Consider a system that tokens a state {τ, Fred}. An NR system, operating ideally, functions according to (7): (7) Tokening {τ, Fred} ⇒ Extoken{τ, Fblue}.

This means that, if a system tokens {τ, Fred}, then an ideal system is committed to tokening Extoken{τ, Fblue} in the sense that, if prompted with the cognitive task of tokening {τ, Fblue} or not, it enters into this state as a causal consequence of being committed to tokening {τ, Fred}. By commitment here we mean merely what is causally derivable, assuming the system is working according to its ideal abstract specification. In other words, to be committed to a certain state Π2 by being in Π1 is just for it to be the case that one follows computationally from the other. If the system carries out causal operations according to its ideal functioning to Π1, then it derives as a causal consequence P2.

216

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

In a similar vein we could propose the following as commitment laws that characterize the ideal cognitive functioning of the system: (8) (9) (10) (11)

[Tokening A(S1)pro/dox] ⇒ Extoken[EXperf A(S1)pro/dox]. [Tokening A(S1)pro/dox] ⇒ Extoken[EXperf A(S1)pro/dox and Experf A(S2)pro/dox]. [Tokening A(S1)pro/dox] ⇒ Tokening A(either S1 or S2)pro/dox. [Tokening A(Fs are G)pro/dox and A(T is F)pro/dox] * Tokening A(T is G)pro/dox.

(8) specifies that a state in which U is committed to performing A(S1)pro/dox is one in which she is committed to excluding the exclusion of A(S1)pro/dox. It is also a state, according to (9), that commits her to excluding the joint state of excluding performance of both A(S1)pro/dox and A(S2)pro/dox. (10) and (11) specify commitment laws, concerning performance of proto-acts, which clearly correspond to what we take to be valid inference rules. In characterizing the cognitive systems of a speaker, including her NR system, we could map out ideal commitment laws as above, and characterize thereby the ideal causal or functional consequences of cognitive states. Functionalists, who think mental states are just computational states, would accept such a system as characterizing functional states constituting the architecture of the mind. Having outlined ideal function in this way, we might take ourselves to have answered the first question above about cognitive role, function, and power. But, that would leave the second question unanswered. Given that U is in one of the states specified in the left-hand sides of (8) to (11), ought she, on the basis of the left-hand states, be in the righthand states? Are these ideal causal commitment laws right? What is this question of rightness? We could propose that the question of rightness is the question about whether such laws are necessarily correctness preserving. That, of course, would accord with an orthodox conception of entailment. An orthodox conception of entailment is that one proposition entails another just in case in any possible world in which the first is true, the second is. Or, to take the corresponding notion of validity, an argument is valid just in case it is necessarily truth preserving. We might easily generalize such notions, by substituting correctness for truth and speaking of cognitive states rather than propositions. In short, to say that certain exclusion or commitment laws are right is to say they are necessarily correctness preserving. I dispute this conception of rightness. First it assumes some notion of objective correctness. Do the states expressed by subjective probability statements or if-sentences have objective correctness conditions? I think not. So, given that such sentences can enter into valid arguments, an account of rightness cannot assume objective correctness. Secondly, even restricting ourselves to states that

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

217

do possess objective correctness conditions, I dispute that statements of the form Law (10) is right are statements about laws possessing necessary correctness preservation. I do not doubt that such laws could have the property of being valid in this sense. My dispute is that such statements as Law (10) is right are analysed as reports of this kind. My objection is that such an analysis fails to explain the normative force of such utterances. The central function of reason is to persuade, and persuasion uses inference forms, which must, at some stage, be acted upon as basic. In saying that such laws are necessarily correctness preserving we appeal to reason itself in backing up that claim.210 For example, we believe (10) is right because we believe that S1 entails Either S1 or S2. We assert the entailment because we believe that Either S1 or S2's has certain truth conditions, in particular, Either S1 or S2 is true if S1. But then on what grounds do we affirm that Either S1 or S2 is true if S1? The obvious reply is that it is a consequence of the meaning of Either S1 or S2 that S1 is sufficient for its truth. But we arrive at that conclusion only by reasoning as follows. Either S1 or S2 is true if and only if either S1 or S2. So, if S1 then Either S1 or S2 is true, and if S2 then Either S1 or S2 is true. That is, we demonstrate that it is a consequence, but only by appealing to the very connectives in question or at the very least some connectives. We cannot escape the fact that in persuasion, in entering into the normative realm, we depend upon the brute fact that we operate in a certain way with the connectives. In persuading others of the claim of necessary truth-preservation, we engage in reasoning producing sequences such as: (12) S1. Therefore either S1 or S2. Such expressions of inference are either accepted or not. The point is simple. Reasons come to an end at some point and that means relying upon brute facts of use. The real question is, given that reason depends ultimately on brute facts of use, how does the normative element emerge from such brute facts? STA can answer this question through its expressivist treatment of normativity. The brute facts of use, as far as I can see, are simply the commitment laws such as (8) to (11) that govern our cognitive systems at any point in time. In uttering (12), U produces a proto-assertion A(Either S1 or S2)pro/dox, where a causal antecedent of that production is A(S1)pro/dox. U indicates that, for U, a commitment law of the kind (10) above holds. U, through therefore, is expressing possession of the state that (10) is lawful for U. She implicates that she possesses this state—namely, she intends that an audience should appeal to her possession of a similar state in processing her performance of A(Either S1 or S2)pro/dox. In short, as proposed in §1.3.2, therefore is an implicature particle—a presuppositional

210

This is a well-known fact. See Dummett (1973) for why this is not important in the justification of deduction, at least when this is understood as not involving persuasion of a deductive sceptic.

218

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

expressive. The present proposal is to analyse the implicature introduced by therefore as follows: Therefore: In uttering ‘R1, R2, …, Rn Therefore S’, U, through therefore, expresses her possession of the state 〈λ is lawful for U〉, where λ is:

[Tokening [A(R1)pro/dox, A(R2)pro/dox … A(Rn)pro/dox]] ⇒ Tokening A(S)pro/dox. Audiences accept utterances of the form under analysis just in case they take themselves to possess a state of the same kind; they are governed by the same law. Phenomologically, this is experienced by U and by H by its being the case that a certain inference form is intuitively compelling for U and H—in the sense proposed by Peacocke (1987). Having provided this expressivist analysis of therefore, we provide a similarly expressivist analysis of rightness. Our cognitive laws (8) to (11) above are all instances of cases of being in a cognitive state Π2 as a causal consequence of being in a state Π1. The normative claim that such sequences are right is then analysed thus: Right: Being in P2 as a consequence of being in P1 is right:

U utters this sentence and advertises intentions: (a) to represent her possession of the state that [Tokening Π1 ⇒ tokening Π2] is lawful for her; and (b) to defend commitment to this state. Rightness judgements of the form Law (10) is right are expressions of states that are the corresponding commitment laws. In short, what grounds rightness judgements are just facts about how our cognitive systems work, but rightness judgements are not reports of these facts but expressions of them. It is the intersubjectivity inherent in expressive utterances that is the source of objective normativity in claims of rightness. The source is not the mind-independence of any fact that is reported on, such as necessary truth-preservation. It follows from this expressivist analysis of semantic normativity that the substantial work in semantics is about seeking to determine what the cognitive powers of states Π are. That means answering the first question articulated at the beginning of this section. Why is a disjunction A(Either S1 or S2)pro/dox true if one of its disjuncts is? That explanation is simply this. Our judgement that A(S1)pro/dox is true is an expressive assertion of the state of being committed to performing A(S1)pro/dox. But in such a state we are cognitively committed to a state of the form D, given that our cognitive systems operate in terms of laws like (9). But possession of D is just what is expressed by assertion of ‘Either S1 or S2’ is true. This claim about cognitive states is the basis of a claim about truth-conditions because we are prepared to say that (10) is right. We are prepared to assert expressively possession of the state of (10)'s being lawful for us. To say

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

219

‘Either S1 or S2’ is true if S1 is true amounts to asserting that it is right for a speaker U to assert Either S1 or S2 if U believes S1. In STA entailment, rightness, and validity have no explanatory roles in semantics. Semantics is a branch of psychology and cognitive science. Explanations in cognitive science are carried out by appeal to cognitive states and their causal or computational properties.211

8.2.1 Inferentialism, Holism, and Historicism STA's account of the logical connectives is not an inferentialist account. It does not propose that the meaning is just a commitment to certain kinds of inferences. This is the proposal in Conceptual Role semantics—see Sellars (1954), Harman (1973, 1982), and Brandom (1994). The conceptual role approach identifies the meaning of connectives with standing commitment states to inferential use of the connectives. Conceptual role semantics is naturally associated with some form of holism. The meaning of a connective is fixed by its interaction with other connectives.212 Another feature of inferentialism is that explanation of the validity of inference rules is trivial. The validity of double-negation introduction, that It is not that T did not V__ can be inferred from T V__, is not explained by the prior meaning of the connective not. Rather the inference rule is simply a rule of use fixing the meaning of the connective. According to STA, connectives are used to express cognitive states, and these are commitment states, of various kinds, to assertions. These states have nothing necessarily to do with inference. Take negation and exclusion states. An exclusion state does not make reference as such to inferences using negation—for example, It's not that S is not the case can be inferred from S, or vice versa. Rather, if we look at the states expressed by negation and disjunction, they are states excluding assertion with an epistemic dimension. Similarly, an indicative conditional, If S1, S2, is used to express presuppositionally a relation holding between suppositionally and conditionally interpreted proto-assertions. It makes no reference to the inference form of modus ponens. However, expressive generalities, it could be claimed, are such that their expressed states are dispositions to inferential acts. STA preserves the intuition that logically valid sentences are ones that are so by virtue of prior meanings of the connectives involved, though this claim needs some qualification. According to STA, the meaning of a logical constant is,

211

There are theorists like Katz (1990) who argue against psychologism and naturalism, by appeal to the so-called naturalistic fallacies that naturalism in ethics allegedly faces. I think the purported naturalistic fallacies are dissolved by a robust expressivism in our understanding of normativity. The sort provided here.

212

The facts of inferential use are meant to fix the meaning of connectives. But the facts of use involve use of the connectives as meaningful. There is then a type of circularity here. There are those who might be willing to live with that. I am not.

220

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

roughly, its role in the advertising of intentions to express certain kinds of cognitive states. Those cognitive states have certain essential properties. They are those specified in §8.1: states of exclusion, discourse states, and dispositions to perform proto-acts. Those states have, in addition, certain causal–cognitive powers, which are defined by the commitment laws into which they enter, some of which were specified above. But it is an open question whether we should think of the causal powers of cognitive states as essential properties of the cognitive states. It may be that the same cognitive state Π, say the exclusion state of negation, has slightly different causal powers in different cognitive systems, but it is the same state in each case. Given that validity of inference patterns in STA is ultimately based on the causal powers possessed by cognitive states, it follows that valid inference does not hold purely by virtue of the meanings of the connectives as such. In saying that a certain inference pattern is right, we are expressing commitment to cognitive states possessing certain causal powers. On the other hand, STA is able to make sense of the thought that deviant or alternative logics are not necessarily employing logical constants with different meanings. Those logicians who accept disjunctive syllogism and those who do not, are not necessarily disagreeing about the meaning of either … or or not. They are instead disagreeing about their causal powers.213 At any point in the history of reason, speakers have certain patterns of inference that they accept. Which is to say they act in accordance with such principles and urge others to do so. But it is a historical fact that there are some inference patterns employed rather than others. Reason is historically conditioned, but at the same time relativism is false. To say an inference pattern is valid is not to assert that it is accepted by members of my linguistic or cultural community. It is to assert expressively commitment to a certain commitment law.

8.3 CAUSATION, COGNITION, AND SEMANTICS In the course of this chapter, I have described a range of cognitive states that are, according to STA, the states whose possession is expressed by U's uttering logically complex sentences. I accept the causal–methodological postulate that the relata of causal relations are logically simple complexes—entities that lack any de re logical complexity but that contain mereological complexity. Cognitive states are such relata, and so are logically simple.214 Nevertheless, as theorists we specify these states

213

So Quine (1970) in his critique of deviant logics is wrong. See Haack (1996) for some attempt to provide a response to Quine. STA also opens up the way to pluralism about logical consequence, in the sense of Beall and Restall (2000).

214

Lewis (1986b : 189–93) proposes, controversially, that there are omissions, negative events, and these can cause. Mellor (1995) thinks there are disjunctive facts, and these can cause. See Dowe (2001) for an attack on the idea of negative states and their elimination in causal explanations. STA's theory of cognitive states appeals to dispositional states of speakers. But dispositional states are not logically complex. We may admit that they are just their categorical bases or that there are simple, dispositional properties—see Mellor (2000) for a survey of theories of dispositions.

LOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND NORMATIVITY

221

using de dicto logically complex language. Take the N-state. We specify the N-state using negation; part of being in N is not being disposed to perform A(S)pro/…/dox. That might prompt the thought that the N-state itself features some irreducible negativity and so we must recognize logical complexity in re. We should resist this thought, however. The de dicto logically complex sentences we use to describe cognitive states are adequate descriptions of these states but they are not made true by them. In this respect, they are like sentences such as There is not a Dodo presently alive and This frog will snap at every small black thing flying past it. These are perfectly adequate descriptions of reality, but not made true by the reality they describe. For example, the first sentence is made true by the conjunction of all the facts about particular animals, and the fact that these are all the facts about animals. The second fact is a universal fact. But nothing in reality corresponds to such a fact. So it must be a true sentence that we have invoked to explain the original sentence, one, in turn, lacking a truth-maker. (See Russell 1918.) The general picture that emerges then is of an intention-based semantics, which presupposes prior intentional contents and thus a pre-linguistic representational system underpinning the intentional contents. But this underlying system has a much simpler nature than the semantic properties being explained. The problem of meaning then is not postponed, it is substantially simplified. The causal–cognitive states contain no intrinsic logical complexity. So, STA provides the way open to a reductive explanation of speakers' grasp of the logical features of the natural languages they use. STA is wedded to psychologism. There are good reasons for such a marriage. Formal semantics in itself, whilst revealing about certain structural features of meaning, cannot be the whole story. A formal theory may tell us: Not-S is true-in-L iff Π is not true (where P translates S).

This is not trivial, but does not tell us much. Our acceptance of such truths is what a theory of negation should explain rather than being the theory itself. If we thought that the world was made up of logically complex parts, then we might think a theory of negation would explain what these are. But the world contains no such parts; it is a logical plenum, a plurality of facts (complexes) lacking logical complexity. If so, how do we explain the role of negation, but avoid falling into unsatisfying axioms such as the above? One might think an assertability semantics would provide satisfaction. I think this is not the case, because assertability, as a kind of primitive, cannot elucidate meaning. Sentences can have identical conditions of assertability but differ in

222

THE EMERGENCE OF SEMANTICS

semantic content. Take, (1) There is probably life on Mars and (13) I believe strongly that there is life on Mars from §1.2. Both are assertable for U just in case U believes she has a strong degree of belief that there is life on Mars. One might object that (1) is assertable just in case U has a strong degree of belief, and (13) just in case U believes she has. I will not argue about this here, but, even if it were true, how would the concept of assertability elucidate the difference between (1) and (13)? Assertion must be analysed, and the way to do that is to embrace, as I have argued, STA's conception of assertion, and the reportive/expressive distinction. With that framework in place, we need to treat logically complex sentences in expressive terms. But this is to accept the psychologism of STA.

PART IV Grammar in Motion and the Entanglements of Discourse

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 9 Scope and Complex Noun Phrases 9.0 INTRODUCTION: EXPLAINING SCOPE RELATIONS The attitude of the Frege model to surface grammar is that, in the semantic domain of reference and generality, surface grammar is systematically misleading and certainly not integral to semantic interpretation. In contrast, STA promises to provide an account of reference and generality in which surface grammar is not misleading, indeed, where it is the template for the semantic interpretations assigned to sentences. We have seen in Part II that STA lives up to this ideal with its treatment of noun phrases in relative isolation from each other and from other logical constants like negation. But what of interactions between noun phrases, as in Every girl kissed a cat, or the scope relations in Every boy danced with every girl or An Australian was not allowed in, and so on? One of the great achievements of Frege's quantification theory is that it explains such scope relations through the different syntactic relations that quantifiers can bear to each other or to particles like negation construed as a sentential operator. What kind of an account can STA give of scope relations? This chapter provides the answer. The essence of the account of scope lies in STA's idea that logically complex sentences express cognitive states. In uttering (1)

An Australian was not allowed in,

U expresses commitment to one of two possible cognitive states—corresponding to the two readings of the sentence: the reading on which negation has wide scope; and that on which the indefinite has wide scope. Semantically, the proto-assertion A(An Australian was not allowed in)pro comprises the combination of a proto-referring act (2) with a predicative act (3): (2) (3)

R(an Australian)pro. Pred(was not allowed in)pro.

The two types of cognitive states that U can express by uttering (1) correspond to two types of application of (3) to (2). I call these internal and external application of a predicate, or predicative act, to a noun phrase, or proto-referring act. If U utters (1) and expresses commitment to the internal application of (3) to (2), then the negation has wide scope; U basically expresses an exclusion state of the

226

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

form Experf A(An Australian was allowed in)pro/dox. On the other hand, U can utter (1) and express commitment to the external application of (3) to (2). In this case, the indefinite has wide scope; it is a topic of which a negative condition is predicated. U's assertion is paraphrased as An Australian was such that she was not allowed in. In short, the different readings of sentences like (1) are not accounted for by distinct syntactic relations in an underlying logical form, but through structural differences in the commitment states expressed by the sentence. The approach is based on two ideas: (i) logically complex sentences are expressives; and (ii) sentences with more then one logical constant, say not and every, or with an indefinite description and some logical constant, introduce complexity into the form of the expressed cognitive state. In this account, STA sticks to its guns about surface grammar. Surface grammar is always a guide to the proto-acts—the proto-referring act and the predicative act—with respect to which U expresses a commitment state. The chapter proceeds as follows. In §9.1 I provide an account of logically complex predicates, and develop the concept of internal and external predicate application. In §9.2 I apply this account to universal noun phrases, explaining scope relations and relative-clause constructions. §9.3 follows with a treatment of indefinite descriptions and scope relations. Here STA's theory that an F is α-F proves its mettle by accounting for the quantifier-like behaviour of indefinites in some sentential contexts. Examination of such contexts then leads to a theory of any in §9.4, which, as promised in §5.0.1, is an α-term, α-F, with an added rule of interpretation. Finally, in §9.5 I consider indefinites in interaction with adverbs of generality. Apart from displaying the general viability of the STA approach, the discussion sets us up for the account of pronouns and generality to be given in Chapter 11.

9.1 PREDICATES AND PREDICATE-APPLICATION I proposed the theory in §2.1.1 that a predicate Pred(V__)pro, as in Pred(is red)pro or Pred(hit the dog)pro, is an open protoassertion. That is: Pred(is red)pro = A([..] is red)pro.

We think of the open proto-assertion as derived from the proto-assertion by removal of the subject term. In combining T with V__, U supplements the open proto-assertion A([..] V__)pro. This simply means that, in combining the two, U performs the proto-act A(T V__)pro/dox. What kind of act is an open proto-assertion? In uttering ‘is red’, U advertises an

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

227

Fig. 9.1

intention to predicate of an unspecified entity the property denoted by red. In other words, U advertises an intention to represent a complex of the form 〈x, Red〉, where x is unspecified. To possess an instance of this intention U must introduce a noun phrase T. By concatenating T with is red U advertises an intention that T denote the entity x. In which case, U may possess a complex-representing intention of the form she advertises. Some predicates are logically complex; the definitions fixing their meanings use logical constants. Examples thereof are negative predicates such as was not present, is unclear, is heterological, or disjunctive predicates such as is grue, or universal predicates such as ate every tortilla or is universally loved. We need to analyse the structure of such predicates for the theory of scope relations given below. Take negation first. Negation is not a sentential operator—see §3.3. It is adverbial. Predicates of the form Pred(not V__)pro are open negative proto-assertions, represented thus: A([..] not V__)pro. So, in uttering ‘is not pink’, U advertises an intention to represent her possession of the state of excluding the supplementation of the predicate Pred(is pink)pro by an unspecified proto-referring act. That is, U presents herself as expressing her possession of an open N-state.215 The structure of a negative proto-assertion of the form A(T did not V__)pro is represented by (4) (see Fig. 9.1). We can now think of sentences of the form T did not V__ as exhibiting two distinct kinds of scope relations between the term T and not. In performing A(T did not V__)pro, U expresses possession of a certain commitment state. We can characterize this commitment state as a commitment to the predicate Pred(did not V__)pro applying to the act R(T)pro. But, as noted in §9.0 above, there are two ways in which a complex predicate can apply to a noun phrase. These are internal and external application, which I represent as: R(T)pro

∩in

Pred(not V__)pro

R(T)pro

∩ex

Pred(not V__)pro.

215

In general, we think of T did not V __ as expressing the state Experf A(T V __)pro/dox —the state of being constrained not to perform A(T V __)pro/dox in the sense defined in §8.1 . Given that A(T V __)pro/dox is an act in which U combines R(T )pro with Pred(V __)pro , the state U expresses in uttering ‘T did not V__’ is Experf {R(T )pro ∩ Pred(V __)pro }. The state expressed by the predicate is the unsaturated form of this state, which is got by removing the subject proto-act, as in Experf {[..] ∩ Pred(V __)pro }.

228

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

In which case, in uttering ‘T did not V__’, U can be interpreted as either of the following: Expressing commitment to: R(T)pro Expressing commitment to: R(T)pro

∩in ∩ex

Pred(not V__)pro. Pred(not V__)pro.

I now explicate these two kinds of application. Below, I say a proto-referring act supplements a predicate just in case the proto-act takes up the empty noun-phrase location in the predicate, qua open proto-assertion. Let me first define the notion of internal application for any logically complex predicate Pred(___)pro, where ___ might be did not V__ or V__every G, and so on. In uttering a sentence T___, for any noun phrase T, U expresses commitment to the internal application of the predicate to proto-act R(T)pro, just in case she expresses a commitment to the state that is expressed when the predicate is supplemented by the proto-act: Internal: U's utterance of T___ expresses a commitment to R(T)pro R(T)pro's supplementing Pred(___)pro.

∩in

Pred(___)pro iff U expresses commitment to the state expressed by

To illustrate, take the case where Pred(___)pro is Pred(is not human)pro. Then, in uttering Fred is not human, and expressing commitment to the internal application of Pred(is not human)pro to R(Fred)pro, U expresses a commitment to the state expressed by supplementation of Pred(is not human)pro by R(Fred)pro. In this case, that means that U expresses commitment to an exclusion state Experf A(Fred is human)pro/dox. So the proto-act R(Fred)pro falls within the operation of negation. External application is something different: External: U's utterance of T___ expresses a commitment to R(T)pro ∩ex Pred(___)proiff U expresses the commitment that there is a term B where R(B)pro is a topic that can be uttered so as to be anaphoric on T such that Pred(___)pro internally applies to R(B)pro.

By topic I mean a self-standing term that can enter into intra-sentential and inter-sentential anaphoric chains. So, in uttering ‘Fred is not human’, U expresses commitment to the external application of Pred(is not human)pro to R(Fred)pro just in case she is committed to there being a term B, where R(B)pro is a topic, which can be anaphoric on R(Fred)pro such that Pred(is not human)pro internally applies to R(B)pro. The term Fred itself can play the role of R(B)pro, but there are other terms—for example, a pronoun he anaphoric on Fred. In this case, the proto-referring act R(Fred)pro has wide scope with respect to negation. We might paraphrase the content of U's utterance as Fred is such that he is not human.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

229

There may not appear to be any significant difference between internal and external application for sentences of the form T did not V__, where T is a standard singular term. And indeed there is not, since a standard singular term already has the status of a topic, and the difference between internal and external application boils down to treating explicitly R(T)pro as having topic status.216 However, as sketched in §9.0 above, the difference is highly non-trivial within the case of sentences in which indefinites combine with negation. That is because an indefinite R(an F)pro does not always function as a topic. Thus, choosing to read A rather drunk Australian was not permitted to enter internally or externally becomes a choice over whether to treat the indefinite as a topic or not. That is not a trivial matter. I say more about this in §9.3. Another kind of logically complex predicate is that featuring every. Take an assertion of the form A(T V__every G)pro/dox. Let the variable interpretation of a proto-act, R(α-G)pro, be represented by var, as in R(α-G)pro/var. A(T V__ every G)pro/dox has a tripartite structure: A Proto-Assertion: U performs A(T V__α-G)pro. A Variable Interpretation: The act A(T V__α-G)pro is given as standing in for particular value-range assertions of the form A(T V__N)pro where R(N)pro is in the value range of R(α-G)pro/var. It has a variable interpretation: A(T V__α-G)pro/var. Commitment Expression: U expresses a commitment to perform A(T V__N)pro where U accepts the permissibility of A(N is G)pro.

In the variable act A(T V__α-G)pro/var, the constituent speech act R(α-G)pro has itself a variable interpretation—written R(α-G)pro/var—since it must range over the value-range acts of the form R(N)pro/dox, these being, as it were, the instantiating terms. (See §5.5.) Take the completed proto-assertion, A(T V__every G)pro and convert this into a predicate by removing R(T)pro, producing A([..] V__every G)pro, and thus Pred(V__every G)pro. So the predicate is loved by everyone expresses Pred(is loved by everyone)pro.217

216

We do find external application in sentences like Not being rich, I take my holidays in Geelong . In this sentence, utterance of not being rich is the production of a predicate. In uttering the whole sentence, U expresses a commitment to the external application of the predicate to the proto-act R(I )pro . Predicates formed by negative prefixes, such as unconcerned , disinterested , and predicates like absent , impose an external application interpretation on subject–predicate sentences in which they feature. More about that below.

217

As proposed in §5.5 , in uttering ‘T V__every G’, U expresses an E -state, a commitment to performing A(T V __N )pro , where A(N is G )pro is permissible for U. Thus, in the case of a predicate V __every G , U expresses an open E -state—analogously to our proposals about negation and open N -states. An open E -state is the state of being committed, for a yet to be specified term [..], to performing A([..] V __N )pro , where U accepts the permissibility of A(N is G )pro .

230

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.2

We can now represent the structure of A(T V__every G)pro by (5) (see Fig. 9.2). In uttering ‘T V__every G’, U expresses her commitment to one of the following states: Expressing commitment to: R(T)pro Expressing commitment to: R(T)pro

∩in ∩ex

Pred(V__every G)pro. Pred(V__every G)pro.

In the first case, U expresses commitment to the state expressed by the term's supplementing the predicate—that is, by the term's taking up the empty noun-phrase location in the predicate. In the second case, U commits herself to there being a topic R(B)pro, which is anaphoric on R(T)pro, and to the state expressed by supplementing the predicate with R(B)pro. Again there is no difference between expressing commitment to internal and external application in the case where R(T)pro is a simple noun phrase with built-in topic status. But matters differ for indefinites. More about that below. The concepts of uttering a sentence with a logically complex predicate and expressing commitment to the internal or external application of predicate to term is central to STA's analysis of scope.218 There is another important component to the analysis. This is to do with how logically complex noun phrases, in subject position, are conceived of as combining with predicates. Here our principle concern is with universal noun phrases, such as, to take the simplest case, every F, as in Every F V__. As should be evident from the preceding discussion—and §5.5—the speech-act structure of A(Every F V__)pro/dox has a tripartite form: A Proto-Assertion: U performs A(α-F V__)pro. A Variable Interpretation: The act A(α-F V__)pro is given as standing in for particular value-range assertions of the form A(T V__)pro where R(T)pro is in the value range of R(α-F)pro/var. It has a variable interpretation: A(α-F V__)pro/var.

218

It might seem that the concept of an open proto-assertion reintroduces structures of the Frege model. STA does not use that concept as did Frege. Frege treated open sentences as entities containing variables, which range over domains of entities, and be bound by quantifiers. STA does not do this, as shall become evident. STA is not retreating to the quantifier–variable-binding model of generality, which is central to the Frege model.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

231

Fig. 9.3

Commitment Expression: U expresses a commitment to performing A(T V__)pro, where U accepts the permissibility of A(T is F)pro.

A proto-act with this structure is the result of combining Pred(V__)pro with R(every F)pro, as in (6) (see Fig. 9.3). In performing the whole proto-assertion, U expresses a commitment state of the kind described above. It is important for our representation of scope relations to give this an analysis in terms of predicate application. In uttering Every F V__, U expresses a commitment state with respect to the application of Pred(V__)pro to R(every F)pro. Let us call this the standard application of a predicate to a universal noun-phrase term, or αU-term (§5.0.1), in subject position.219 Put in a nutshell: In uttering Every F V__, U expresses commitment to R(every F)pro ∩SA Pred(V__)pro, iff U expresses a commitment performing A(T V__)pro, where U accepts the permissibility of A(T is F)pro.

Thus, to give an example, Every goat munched is analysed as an act in which U performs a proto-assertion A(α-goat munched)pro and expresses a commitment to R(every goat)pro ∩SA Pred(munched)pro—that is, to performing acts of the form A(T munched)pro, where U accepts the permissibility of A(T is a goat)pro.

9.2 SCOPE AND UNIVERSAL NOUN PHRASES We are now in a position to apply this theory of predicate application to the analysis of scope relations. In this section, I examine scope relations and phrases of the form every F. Several kinds of scope relations concern us here. We have the issue of scope relations that arise in sentences like (i) to (vi) below. (i) (ii) (iii)

219

Multiple universals Every F V__every G. Relative-clause modification Every F that is G, V__. Functional phrases The F of every G V__.

Is this internal or external application of a predicate to a subject term? The correct reply is neither. It is not internal, because the predicate part Pred(V __)pro does not define the form of the assertion into which every F is a part; every F in subject position imposes an interpretation on the whole proto-assertion. It is not external because every F cannot function as a topic in the required sense.

232

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.4

(iv) (v) (vi)

Predicate logical complexity Every F is either G or H. Interaction with indefinites Every F V__a G. That-clauses Every F is such that it V__.

I will consider (i) to (v) below. (vi) is delayed until §11, since it involves pronouns. Take a sentence of the form Every F V__every G, which contains a subject-positioned α ∪ -term and a predicatepositioned one. The standard grammatical structure is (7) (see Fig. 9.4). In uttering Every F V__ every G, I submit, U performs a proto-act A(α-F V__α-G)pro and expresses a commitment to the standard application of Pred(V__every G)pro to R(every F)pro—that is: U expresses commitment to R(every F)pro F)pro is permissible for U.

∩SA

Pred(V__every G)pro—namely, a commitment to performing A(T V__every G)pro, where A(T is

That captures what we take to be the truth-conditions of such sentences. In this case, every F has wide scope with respect to every G. In short, STA's analysis of the scope relation is simply that U is expressing a commitment of this kind.220

9.2.1 α ∪ -terms and Relative Clauses Universal noun phrases can be modified by relative clauses. So there are sentences of the form Every F that V__ …, as in Every yuppie who lives in Melbourne wears silk. It was proposed in §6.4.2 that assertions of singular sentences with relative clauses are compound proto-assertions. In an assertion A(α-F that V__ …)pro, the clause that V__ is proto-asserted, functioning like an auxiliary assertion that adds referential-content to R(α-F)pro. It does this through the fact that α-F and that are referring terms placed in apposition so that in uttering both U presents herself as intending to co-designate with them. The result is a compound speech act (8) (see Fig. 9.5; Ad. I. Co-Den. abbreviates advertises an intention to codenote). In (8), the proto-act R(α-F)pro has its content

220

I note that one might imagine an interpretation with reverse scope relations. Nothing in STA rules that out. But, as an imposed rule holding in English, this does not occur. The general rule about syntactic scope is that α ∪ -terms in subject position take wide scope over—they dominate—α ∪ -terms in predicate positions.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

233

Fig. 9.5

Fig. 9.6

Fig. 9.7

augmented beyond its lexically given referential content {F}. This is because, given that U presents herself as codesignating with α-F and that, and that U performs A(that V__)pro, in performing R(α-F)pro, U presents herself as intending to denote an entity x satisfying {..F, V__..}. When the α-term, α-F, receives a superscript interpretation, U, as in Every F that V__, because R(αU-F)pro has this extra referential content as described, its value-range acts are accordingly restricted. This works as follows. The interpretative structure for Every F that V__ is (9) (see Fig. 9.6). The value-range acts are acts R(T)pro, where A(T V__)pro is permissible for U. In other words, there has been a restriction of value-range acts; they are not merely acts R(T)pro that have {F} as a component of their referential content; they must also have the content V__. To give an example, Every yuppie who smokes has the structure (10)—(10a) being the variable act and (10b) the value-range acts (see Fig. 9.7). The

234

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.8

Fig. 9.9

result is a complex αU-term Every yuppie who smokes, which has the same content as Every smoking yuppie. The question now is how do we understand the semantic combinatorial capacities of the term Every yuppie who smokes? Take Every yuppie who smokes loves Whisky. This is analysed in (11) (see Fig. 9.8). In this utterance, on one level, U combines α-terms, performing thereby a proto-act of the form A(α-yuppie who smokes loves Whisky)pro. This act has a mode of interpretation of course. U expresses a cognitive state. The following holds: U expresses a commitment to R(every yuppie who smokes)pro ∩SA Pred(loves Whisky)pro—namely, a commitment performing A(T A(who smokes)pro loves whisky)pro, where A(T is a yuppie)pro and A(who smokes)pro are permissible for U.

In short, in the standard assertion of a sentence like Every yuppie who smokes loves Whisky, U performs a basic protoassertion and expresses commitment to the standard application of the predicate to the noun phrase.

9.2.2 Every-Phrases in Relative Clauses Universal noun phrases can enter into relative-clause modification in another way; a phrase of the form every brick can be embedded in the relative clause, as in The girl who broke every brick got a prize. The interpretation structure of phrases of the form the F that V__ every G is given in (12) (see Fig. 9.9). At level

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

235

Fig. 9.10

(12c), we find a proto-referring act and a logically complex predicate. These combine at level (12b), the mode of combination being external application. I submit that, in relative clauses, logically complex predicates apply externally to relative pronouns. The reason for this is that relative pronouns need to function as topics to do their job in the content augmentation of descriptive phrases. Thus, in performing A(that V__ every G)pro, U presents herself as expressing: A commitment to R(that)pro ∩ex Pred(V__every G)pro, namely a commitment to performing (that V__N)pro, where A(N is G)pro is permissible for U.

The final stage in Fig. 9.9, level (12a), is the combination of this subordinate proto-assertion A(that V__every G)pro with R(the F)pro. The result is that the referential content of the definite description proto-act R(the F)pro is augmented; it gains the referential content {F, V__every G}. In other words, the combination with the relative clause has the same effect as adjective modification by a complex predicate. That is, the man that conquered every mountain and the every mountain conquering man, involve simple descriptive phrases gaining referential content, but through distinct means.

9.2.3 Complex Descriptions with Functional Expressions I now turn to phrases such as the father of every girl, every friend of every boy, as in the father of every girl kissed every mother. Our concern here is phrases of the form αx-F of αy-G, where x and y are superscripts. When one or both of the superscripts is U, such phrases have two distinct readings. The two distinct readings are determined by the two grammatical programmes for such phrases given in (13) (see Fig. 9.10; I leave out the superscripts). Programme (13) is one in which a determiner α-.. in isolation combines with a general property term F of α-G. Programme (14) (see also Fig. 9.10) is one in which a complex but open noun phrase, α-F of … combines with a term α-G. Take the case of the F of every G, as in the friend of every boy. We have (15) and (16) (see Fig. 9.11; here underlining represents the distinctness of the readings in the complete proto-act). Programme (15) corresponds to the reading in which the F of every G is particular, as in the friend of every boy, used to pick out a particular person who is a friend to each of a bunch of boys. Programme (16) corresponds to the generic

236

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.11

reading of the phrase the friend of every boy, used to pick out each friend of each individual boy.221 Programme (15) is understood thus. The proto-referring act R(F of every G)pro comprises an act R(F of α-G)pro/var, ranging over particular general terms of the form R(F of N)pro, where A(N is G)pro is permissible for U. This act combines with a determiner the to form the act R(the F of every G)pro. In this case, U advertises an intention to denote x satisfying {F of every G}. That is, U presents herself as intending to denote x satisfying {F of N1, F of N2, …}. The noun phrase as a whole has the same combinatorial power as a simple definite description R(the F)pro. Programme (16) is understood as involving the combination of an open proto-referring act R(the F of…)pro with a generic proto-act R(every G)pro. In this case, the latter dominates the whole phrase. The result is a generic act, as indicated in (16). This is analysed, as a variable act, R(the F of α-G)pro/var, with value-range acts of the form R(the F of N)pro. The whole is a noun phrase with the same combinatory power as every F; it combines with a predicate, as does any universal noun phrase, R(every F)pro. So, for example, in uttering The friend of every boy kissed every mother, U performs a proto-assertion of the form A(The friend of α-boy kissed α-mother)pro and expresses the cognitive state: A commitment to R(the friend of every boy)pro ∩SA Pred(kissed every mother)pro—namely, to performing A(The friend of N kissed every mother)pro, where A(N is a boy)pro is permissible for U.

This provides use with the right assertability conditions for these sentences. There are more complicated cases of such phrases—as, for instance, every friend of every boy. Nevertheless, the same basic principles provide the required results. In sum, in sentences with such compound noun phrases we find: (i) the interpretation of a complex noun phrase as indicated; and (ii), with respect to the proto-assertion as a whole, the expression of a cognitive state to do with the application of the predicate to the complex interpreted noun phrase.

221

The two readings are marked by stress, as in the—friend-of-every-boy , as opposed to the-friend-of—every-boy .

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

237

Fig. 9.12

9.2.4 Universal Noun Phrases and Negation Universal noun phrases interact with negation. A sentence of the form Every F did not V__ has two readings depending upon whether negation has narrow or wide scope relative to every F. The sentence Every girl did not go is perhaps most naturally interpreted as a negation of Every girl did go. But, if circumstances are right, it can be read with negation having narrow scope. For example, U might assert, ‘It was not the case that any girl went. That is, every girl did not go.’ Here U's assertion clearly has a negation-narrow-scope reading. The explanation for these two possible readings is given through the tree structure (17) (see Fig. 9.12). In (17), R(every F)pro combines with a complex predicate. There are two modes of predicate application: the standard application, for R(every F)pro as described—in which case every F has wide scope; and internal application—in which case negation has wide scope. These are, respectively, cases where U utters the sentence and expresses either: A commitment to R(every girl)pro permissible for U.

∩SA

Pred(didn't go)pro—namely, a commitment to performing A(T did not go)pro, where A(T is a girl)pro is

or: A commitment to R(every girl)pro

∩in

Pred(didn't go)pro—namely, a commitment to an N-state of the form Experf [A(Every girl did go)pro/dox].

These interpretations correspond to the two truth-conditional readings of this sentence.

9.3 SCOPE AND INDEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS Indefinites, as proposed in Chapter 5, are pure α-terms. This means that the proto-act U performs in uttering an F is R(α-F)pro—U advertises an intention to denote an object x that satisfies {..F..}. In uttering a sentence, A boy lept, U's act R(a boy)pro has its referential

238

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.13

content {Boy}, but this is augmented to {Boy, Lept}. (Again, it is not obligatory that indefinites sententially gain referential content—see §5.2.1.) I now examine how indefinites combine with universal noun phrases and negation and show how, depending upon scope relations, the indefinite R(an F)pro gains referential content or not. I begin with interactions with universal noun phrases. The two basic kinds of universal sentences with indefinites I consider here are of the form Every F V__a G and An F V__every G. Both have two readings. A standard quantificational treatment explains the distinct readings as the results of different scope assignments—syntactically understood—to the universal and existential quantifiers discerned in the sentences. STA explains the differences as the results of different modes of application of the predicate to the noun phrase. Consider first cases of the form An F V__every G, as in: (18) A girl solved every problem. One reading—the indefinite has wide scope—is paraphrased as A girl is such that she solved every problem. The second reading—the universal noun phrase has wide scope—is paraphrased as For every problem there was some girl or other who solved it. In terms of quantifiers we have: (∃x)(Girl[x] & (∀y)(Problem[y] ⊃ Solved[x])), (∀x)(Problem[x] ⊃ (∃y)(Girl[y] & Solved[x])).

In STA, the two readings are the result of cognitive states with distinct structures being expressed. First, take the structure (19) (see Fig. 9.13), representing the proto-act structure of the sentence. The two distinct interpretations are fixed by U's expressing a commitment to either external or internal application of predicate to the noun phrase: (20) R(a girl)pro

∩ex

Pred(solved every problem)pro.

(21) R(a girl)pro

∩in

Pred(solved every problem)pro.

As proposed in External of §9.1, in expressing a commitment to an external application of a predicate Pred (V__)pro of a proto-act R(T)pro—as in (20)—U expresses her commitment to R(T)pro's being a topic of which a condition—expressed by the predicate—is meant to hold. Intuitively, it, the topic, is something about which things can be said. That means it can enter into inter-sentential anaphoric relations. Thus, the intended interpretation of (18) as

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

239

(20) is an interpretation on which, by uttering ‘A girl solved every problem’, U expresses: (22) A state of being committed to there being terms B such that R(B)pro is a topic, where A(B solved every problem)pro/dox is permissible for U and R(B)pro is anaphoric on R(a girl)pro. > It should be evident how (22) corresponds to the paraphrasing A girl is such that she solved every problem. The interpretation, however, is not identical to the paraphrasing. The interpretation is the use of the sentence to express the state (22). As described in §5.2.1, indefinites have sententially determinable referential content. Given that R(a girl)pro must be capable of entering into an anaphoric relation with a topic R(B)pro, the indefinite gains referential content. That means that R(a girl)pro must be a topic itself—that is, a term that can enter into inter-sentential anaphoric relations itself. It has the referential content {Girl, Solved every problem}. Or, in other words, the referential content is {Girl, Solved N1, Solved N2, … }, for all value range R(N)pro/dox of R(every problem)pro. That completes the analysis of the first, indefinite-widescope, reading of (18). On the second reading of (18), U expresses a commitment to (21), the internal application of Pred(solved every problem)pro to R(a girl)pro. The structure of this interpretation is such that we think of the indefinite term as there in the beginning of the construction of the proto-assertion. The construction is: A Proto-Assertion: A(α-girl solved α-problem)pro. A Variable Interpretation: A(α-girl solved α-problem)pro/var. Commitment Expression: Commitment to performing A(α-girl solved N)pro, where A(N is a problem)pro is permissible for U.

In this construction, R(α-girl)pro gains a variable interpretation. Abstractly, we can represent the structure of this act as (23), (24) being the form of the value-range acts, where R(N)pro is an act in the value-range act of R(α-problem)pro/var (see Fig. 9.14). The thing to note here is that the token act U performs, R(α-girl)pro, has a variable interpretation—level (23b)—with referential content {Girl, Solved α-problem}. So it functions as a template act for particular acts of the form R(α-girl)pro—as in (24b), which are constituents of value-range assertions of the form (24). Owing to sentential determinability of referential content, the particular acts R(α-girl)pro have the content {Girl, Solved N}.222

222

It is important to compare indefinite proto-acts R(α-F )pro that are variable by virtue of entering into the interpretative scope of expressions like every G , and those that are variable in virtue of being the arguments of adverbs of generality—see §5.6 —or finally those that are variable by virtue of being components of universal noun phrases, as in (23) and R(α -problem )pro . When an F is the argument of an adverb of generality, say, usually , it is the lexical act that plays a variable role. The act R(α-F )pro/var has the referential content {F } and value-range proto-acts of the form R(T )pro/dox , which have at least this content. The indefinite here lacks any sentential determination of referential content, as was discussed in §5.6 . This just reflects the general fact that, depending upon the use to which R(an F )pro is being put, it may or may not gain sententially determined referential content. (I will consider these again below.) In (23) R(α-problem )pro , as a component of the universal noun phrase, also lacks sentential determination of referential content. I render α-problem in bold, as in α -problem , to indicate that its content is not sententially determined.

240

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.14

Fig. 9.15

9.3.1 Indenites in Predicate Position We have just examined indefinites in subject position of sentences of the form An F V__every G. I now look at cases where the indefinite is in predicate position, as in Every F V__a G, such as: (25) Every girl solved a problem. First there is the case where the indefinite has narrow scope, on which it has a variable interpretation. The grammatical structure is shown in (26) (see Fig. 9.15). Structurally this involves one and only one interpretation, and that is

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

241

Fig. 9.16

standard application, as defined in §9.1 above. Thus, in uttering Every girl solved a problem, U performs a proto-act A(αgirl solved α-problem)pro and expresses: A commitment to R(every girl)pro girl)pro is permissible for U.

∩SA

Pred(solved a problem)pro— namely, a commitment to performing A(T solved a problem)pro, where A(T is a

On this reading, R(a problem)pro receives a variable-interpretation. The alternative reading of (25) is that in which U intends to pick out a particular problem that is solved by every girl. This is a difficult reading to attain with (25), since a distinct, non-standard, grammatical programme is intended. That is given in (27) (see Fig. 9.16). With the programme in place, a particular reading is possible of the same kind as that described above.223

9.3.2 Indenites and Negation An obvious place in which indefinites fail to gain sententially determined referential content is within the scope of negation. Consider an assertion like (1) again, that is: (1)

An Australian was not allowed in.

(1) has two readings corresponding to the relative scope of the indefinite with respect to negation. The two readings are paraphrased as It is not the case that an Australian was allowed in, and An Australian was such that he was not allowed in. These are rendered in terms of quantifiers as ¬(∃x)(Australian[x] & Allowed-in[x]), (∃x)(Australian[x] & ¬Allowed-in[x]).

223

Take simple definite descriptions—that is, definite descriptions that lack any constituents that are anaphoric on every F . Unlike the case of A girl solved every problem , which is capable of two interpretations, The girl solved every problem has one and only one interpretation with respect to the interaction between the girl and every problem . That is the reading according to which one and only one girl is such that she solves all the problems. The reason why there is only one reading here is because R(the girl )pro has presententially determined referential content.

242

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.17

How does the STA proto-act treatment account for these cases? The overall semantic structure of (1) is given in (28) (see Fig. 9.17). There are two interpretations of U's proto-assertion according to whether she expresses (29) or (30). (29) A commitment to R(an Australian)pro (30) A commitment to R(an Australian)pro

∩in ∩ex

Pred(was not allowed in)pro. Pred(was not allowed in)pro.

The state (29) is an N-state of the form: (31) Experf A(An Australian was allowed in)pro/dox. If U's utterance of (1) is taken as expressing (31), U's proto-act token R(an Australian)pro lacks sentential determination of referential content. The proto-referring act gains no content over and above its pre-sentential content {..Australian..}. It certainly does not gain the content {Australian, Was-allowed-to-enter}. That there is no determination of referential content just follows from the pragmatic rule underpinning sentential determination of referential content, Sentential Determination given in §5.2.1. So R(an Australian)pro remains undetermined. That there is no sentential determination does not mean that there is some new use of an indefinite—say an indeterminate use—or a quantifier use. Rather, we simply do not have sentential determination or full construction of the speech act that goes on if the assertoric environment is right; we have only the primary lexical act plus whatever implicit content it may have. Its determinate completion through the interpretative phase is obstructed owing to the peculiar nature of the N-state U expresses on this reading of the sentence. On the second reading of (1), U expresses that the combination of predicate and indefinite constitutes external application. In this case, in uttering (1), U expresses: (32) A commitment to there being terms B, where R(B)pro is a topic, such that Pred(was not allowed in)pro internally applies to R(B)pro, and R(B)pro is anaphoric on R(an Australian)pro. On this reading, the indefinite R(an Australian)pro gains referential content, {Australian, Not-allowed in}. One might roughly paraphrase (1) on this reading

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

243

Fig. 9.18

as An Australian was such that he was not allowed in. That completes the analysis of the two readings of (1) on the STA model.

Comments: 1. It is worth noting that (indefinite) wide-scope readings of sentences of the form An F did not V__ or T did not V__an F are often difficult to maintain. Passives like (1) are better than sentences in the active voice where an F is in subject position, as, for example, (33), which is worth comparing with (34) and (35): (33) A wombat did not break through the hedge. (34) There was a wombat that did not break through the hedge. (35) One wombat did not break through the hedge. (33) is most naturally read as having negation with wide scope. We prefer (34) if we are to express the idea of a particular individual not breaking through the hedge. (34)'s structure is (36) (see Fig. 9.18). In (36), the indefinite description R(a wombat)pro combines with a relative-clause proto-assertion. The relative-clause proto-assertion involves U advertising an intention to defend a commitment to an external application of Pred(did not break through the hedge)pro of R(that)pro. (See the discussion of relative clauses and external application in §9.2.2.) So R(a wombat)pro gains the referential content as indicated at level (36c). In uttering the main clause, U expressively asserts her possession of a state of believing that a wombat, with this associated referential content, denotes—see §5.1.224 (35) is another matter. Use of one allows more easily for a wide-scope interpretation of the indefinite. This is despite the fact that an F is a term of the form

224

The standard quantificational analysis treats There was an F as an idiomatic lump, translated by the existential quantifier. STA does not, enabling it to explain the difference in readings between (33) and (34).

244

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

α-F and one F is a term of the form α1-F—see §5.0. The difference is the signal about number. This is enough to make the indefinite-wide-scope interpretation easier. The superscript indicates that the context is one about How many? U can be interpreted as answering a question of the form How many wombats did not break through?, in which negation has narrow scope. The question prescribes an answer of the form N wombats did not break through on an indefinite-widescope, negation-narrow-scope, interpretation. Thus replies like (35) have this feature determined for them by context; they are naturally read with negation having narrow scope. 2. The final interesting case is that of existence. Take: (37) One of these guys does not exist. U's utterance of (37) can naturally be taken to be an expression of a commitment to the external application of Pred(does not exist)pro to R(one of these guys)pro. In that case, U expresses commitment to there being terms, R(B)pro, in an anaphoric relation to R(one of these guys)pro such that U is committed to Experf A(B exists)pro/dox. On this reading, R(one of these guys)pro has topic status but, of course, is intended to lack any denotation. Topic status does not require doxastic grounding.

9.4 EXPLAINING Any We are now ready to explain the peculiar semantic properties of a somewhat challenging particle any. STA is able to provide a unified and compositional semantic account of how any F functions, which, as suggested in §5.0.1, is an αterm, α-F plus superscript Ind. In a proto-assertion of the form A(__not_an F__)pro, where negation has wide scope, there is a type of substitutional indifference with respect to the term an F. Whatever nominal proto-act R(T)pro/dox that has at least F as a component of its referential content can replace R(an F)pro and truth will be preserved. Thus (38) below entails all sentences of the form George did not see Ti, where Ti ostensibly denotes a hippo: (38) George did not see a hippo. Thus, owing to the free rein on substitution, proto-acts of the form A(__not_ an F__)pro where negation has wide scope mimic universal noun-phrase proto-assertions of the form A(Every F is such that__not_π__)pro. This does not mean that an F is a universal quantifier or functions as a universal noun phrase with wide scope. Proto-acts of the form A(__not_an F__)pro in which negation has wide scope are instances of a general kind of sentential context that exhibits this sort of

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

245

substitutional indifference with respect to an F. I call such contexts indifference contexts. A proto-assertion A(S)pro, with αF as a constituent, is an indifference context if and only if: Indifference Context: The interpretation of R(α-F)pro in A(S)pro is one in which

(a) (b)

R(α-F)pro lacks a doxastic ground; there is substitutional indifference; if a token R(T)pro with referential content {..F..} replaces R(α-F)pro in A(S)pro, the result is acceptable.

We have seen how this works in negative contexts (__not_α-F__) in which negation has wide scope. R(α-F)pro lacks a doxastic ground and there is substitutional indifference. There are other types of contexts that are indifference contexts. For example, if U utters ‘Was there a person left in the house?’, then, as proposed in §3.1, U expresses a desire state that H affirm or deny A(There was a person in the house)pro/dox. Here there is an indifference context. R(a person)pro lacks a doxastic ground and, if R(T)pro/dox has the content {..Person..} as a component of its referential content, it can replace R(a person)pro, producing an acceptable question. U is committed to asking ‘Was T in the house?’ for any R(T)pro with F as a component of its referential content. Indifference contexts are a relatively widespread phenomenon. It is not surprising then that there is an expression that signals the fact that a context has this property. This is the job of so-called negative polarity items like any. An indefinite an F in the scope of negation can always be replaced by any F. So, Fred did not see a hippo can be rephrased: (39) Fred did not see any hippo. Any F is an α-term, α-F, with an extra component of meaning—represented through an added superscript Ind—as already suggested. Any F is αInd-F. The superscript Ind signals that the context in which α-F appears is an indifference context. In essence this theory of any is: Any-Theory: A proto-act R(any F)pro has the structure R(αInd-F)pro; it is an α-term, R(α-F)pro, with an added superscript Ind signalling that the context in which R(α-F)pro appears is an indifference context.

Thus the following are also cases where any is used correctly: (40) Was there any person left in the house? (41) Tan is capable of excelling in any academic field. We have already seen how the interrogative (40) contains an indifference context. Uttering (41) involves expression of commitment to its being the case that A(Tan excels in an academic field)pro is consistent with the description of Tan's capacities. (41) is an indifference context. Substitute any singular term

246

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

denoting an academic discipline for the indefinite and the result is an acceptable assertion.225 Any is useful in signalling scope relations, for it indicates that α-F falls within the operator that is creating the indifference context. Compare (41) with Tan is capable of excelling in an academic field. This is naturally read as having the indefinite with main scope. But one might also take it as having narrow scope.226 Any-Theory requires that any F—that is, R(αind-F)pro—is correctly tokened in A(S)pro only if the latter will be an indifference context for R(α-F)pro. The importance of this point can be highlighted through the following examples: (42) Every chicken was sold yesterday. (43) Any chicken was sold yesterday. In a situation where (42) is true, (43) will not be acceptable. Any is not appropriate in (43), despite the fact that, where T is any term denoting a chicken from the intended class of chickens, T can replace any chicken in (43) and generate a truth. The reason that (43) is not correct is that there is no indifference context generated by (43)'s speech-act structure. To see that, remove the ind superscript from any and consider the proto-assertion: (44) A(α-chicken was sold yesterday)pro/dox. (44) is not an indifference context. It is a standard doxastically grounded proto-assertion in which R(α-chicken)pro is doxastically grounded and has sententially determined referential content {..Chicken, Sold yesterday..}. What (42) and (43) show is that the orthodox doctrine that any F is ambiguous between existential and universal readings is false. Here is another type of case that illustrates a related point. Say a lottery is being organized and there are 100 tickets, with 100 people each buying one ticket. In this case, consider: (45) (46) (47) (48)

Every person is such that it is unlikely that she will win. It is unlikely that T1 will win. It is unlikely that T2 will win … It is unlikely that anyone will win. It is unlikely that someone will win.

The truth of (45) and (46) does not entail the truth of (47). (47) entails (48), since any F is an indefinite. But (48) is false, so (47) must be false. And (47) is false. (47) entails (45) and (46), but not vice versa.

225

We also have the interesting case of the antecedents of conditionals, as in If any boy jumped, he was killed , and certain consequent positions, Any girl will bungee-jump, if she has the chance . I shall leave discussion of this until Chapter 11 , where indefinites and anaphora in if -sentences are discussed in detail.

226

A token act R(α-F )pro may lack a doxastic ground, but it does not follow that it is in an indifference context where use of any is appropriate. Take If you give Tan some bait, he will catch a fish . In this case, R(a fish )pro lacks a doxastic ground, but the context is not an indifference one.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

247

This shows that the ambiguity doctrine, that any F is ambiguous between existential and universal readings, is false. On that view, (47) would have a reading on which it was equivalent to (45). But it does not.227

9.4.1 Compositionality Finally we address the issue of compositionality. Any-sentences are often held up as sentences in which semantic compositionality is contravened—see Hintikka (1996). Take: (49) It is not the case that we saw anyone. (50) We saw anyone. Where (49) is true, (50) is not false. It is defective or even ungrammatical. Compositionality, it seems, has been contravened, since the truth-conditions of (49) do not seem to be a function of the content of its constituents. But, according to STA, this argument is unsound. STA accepts the compositionality principle that the speech-act contents of meaningful strings are functions of the speech-act contents of their parts and mode of composition. (49) and (50) do not flout that principle. In STA's terms, (50) has the speech-act content below: (i) (ii)

A(We saw someone)pro. The additional signal that (i), or the proto-act in which (i) is embedded, generates an indifference context.

The additional signal (ii), which arises from the superscript Ind carried by any, is a non-truth-conditional component of sentence content. If we consider (50) as an isolated sentence, its non-truth-conditional signal, (ii), does not hold, since (50) itself does not generate an indifference context. Consequently, (50) is defective. It is not false. Indeed, given that use of any signals that U lacks any complex-representing intention, (50) is not a truth-apt sentence. But how can (50) lack truth-aptness, but (49) be truth-apt and indeed true? The short answer is that the operator it is not the case that is not a truth-functional semantic

227

It might seem that the following cases are a problem for Any-Theory:(i)A wombat did not trample the hedge(ii)*Any wombat did not trample the hedge.(i) is presumably an indifference context on the reading on which negation has wide scope. If so, it seems, (ii) should have an acceptable reading. But it does not. The right response is that we need to supplement Any-Theory with an account of how any-sentences are processed. In processing an any-phrase, the indifference context must be indicated by some verbal markers immediately before or after the noun phrase in which any is located. This is satisfied when negation precedes the any-phrase. It is also satisfied if the verb has a specific form, e.g., the conditional. In A blow with that sort of force would be dangerous, the indicator of the indifference context, the main verb, comes right after the any-phrase. Neither of these conditions is met in the case of (ii).

248

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

operator. It is false that It is not the case that S is true if and only if S is false. (This should be obvious in the light of §3.3's discussion of negation.) In uttering (49), on its standard non-metalinguistic interpretation, U performs A(We saw anyone)pro and in addition expresses that she is in an N-state. U excludes the assertoric commitment of A(We saw anyone)pro/dox. Being able to exclude the assertoric commitment of A(We saw anyone)pro/dox does not require that (50) could, in principle, be performed sincerely and truly, since the role of the embedded proto-assertion is just to display a type of intention to which U excludes commitment. To conclude, STA provides a unified and perfectly compositional treatment of any F unlike any other semantic account in the literature.

9.5 ADVERBS OF GENERALITY AND INDEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS Adverbial generalities can contain more than one indefinite description, as in A cat usually seeks a mate. Where N-ly is an adverb of generality, or AG, a proto-assertion of the form A(An F N-ly V__)pro comprises three elements—compare this with the tripartite structure of universal noun-phrase assertions given in §9.1: A Proto-Assertion: A(An F V__)pro. A Variable Interpretation Signal: U signals A(An F V__)pro's variable status: it stands in for particular assertions A(T V__)pro, for valuerange R(T)pro. Commitment Expression: U expresses a commitment to the state that, based on the permissibility of A(T is F)pro, U has an inclination of degree n to perform A(T V__)pro.

In every adverbial generality there is always one referring term that is the argument of the AG. This, as noted in §5.6, can be an indefinite or definite description, or a pronoun. When an indefinite is the argument of N-ly, say in A(An F N-ly V__)pro, the referring act R(an F)pro has a specific structure. It is a variable referring act R(an F)pro/var that has sententially undetermined content. That is, the variable-act R(an F)pro/var is a lexical act that is interpreted variably. It is comprised by: (i) (ii)

a proto-act R(an F)pro with referential-content {..F..}; a signal that R(an F)pro stands in for particular referring-acts R(T)pro, where A(T is F)pro is permissible for U.

This means that the referring acts in the value range of R(an F)pro/var are particular referring acts purporting to denote particular Fs.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

249

Fig. 9.19

The generic assertion may contain other indefinite descriptions that are not arguments of the particular AG N-ly. Consider An adult human usually has a mate. Here an adult human is the argument of usually but a mate is not the argument of any AG. Where R(α-F)pro is not the argument of the AG N-ly, R(α-F)pro has sententially determined referential content, unlike the argument. This fact is displayed in the structural diagram (51) (see Fig. 9.19), where bold type indicates that an adult human is the argument of usually. The second indefinite has sententially determined referential content—it has variable interpretation but has gained content from its proto-assertion context—whereas the first, being the argument of usually, has not gained sententially referential content. The referential content of the respective proto-referring acts is displayed at level (51c)—the variable interpretation level—and at (51e)—the level of value-range acts. Usually signals that U's degree of inclination to perform A(T has a mate)pro, based on the permissibility of A(T is an adult human)pro, is greater than ½.

9.5.1 Relative Clause Modication Indefinite descriptions that are the arguments of adverbs of generality—just as in the case of universal noun phrases—can be restricted by relative clauses. Restrictive relative-clause constructions go largely as they do for αUterms, as described in §9.2.1. Consider: (52) A dog that's a collie is usually intelligent. The relevant speech-act structure of (52) is given in (53) (see Fig. 9.20). (53a) and (53b) indicate the anaphoric relation that holds between α-dog and that

250

SCOPE AND COMPLEX NOUN PHRASES

Fig. 9.20

at the level of acts interpreted variably. (53d) indicates the same structure in the value-range acts. (53c) indicates the value-range assertions. In other words, R(a dog)pro/var ranges over referring acts that purport to refer to particular dogs that are collies—which accords with the meaning of (53). As in the case of universal noun-phrase sentences—see §9.2.1—the relative-clause assertions, for example, A(that is a collie)pro/var, in compound adverbial generalities are variable assertions, their role being merely to impose more referential content on the argument referring act R(α-F)pro/var.228

Final Comment In this chapter I have attempted to show that STA can match the Frege model in accounting for scope relations between logically significant expressions in natural language. The Frege model offers a syntactic analysis in terms of quantification theory. That approach involves often tortuous translation of surface forms into underlying quantificational logical forms. STA's approach is an interpretative approach in which surface grammatical structure is integral to semantic

228

I have not discussed temporal AGs, such as occasionally, as in Fred gets sunburned occasionally. One proposal is that the argument of occasionally is the proto-assertion A(Fred gets sunburned)pro. This has a variable intepretation. Its value-range acts are particular proto-assertions, A(Fred got sunburned)pro, in which particular occasions of sunburning by Fred are represented. The commitment is that such acts pick out complexes that have a certain temporal arrangement; they occur at a frequency that is the contextually given as occasional. An example like (i) below involves nested generality.(i)A Queenslander invariably gets sunburned occasionally.In (i), invariably has wide scope and occasionally narrow. The argument of invariably is a Queenslander. The argument of occasionally is as above. This variable assertion, which is in the scope of invariably, is A(A Queenslander gets sunburned occasionally)pro/var. This has value-range assertions, which are themselves variable—namely, A(T gets sunburned occasionally)pro/var, where R(T)pro is in the value range of R(A Queenslander)pro/var.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

251

interpretation. Essential to STA's analysis is the claim that logically complex sentences are expressives; their utterance constitutes either expressive assertion or presuppositional expressives (if they are if-sentences). Scope relations are explained by the expression of cognitive states that are themselves commitments to the combination—in either external, internal, or standard application—of the complex noun phrases and predicates partially displayed in the surface grammar of the sentences.

CHAPTER 10 Troubles for the Quantier–VariableBinding Model 10.0 INTRODUCTION: DONKEYS In the last two chapters of this book we will be concerned with the topic of anaphora in interaction with universal noun phrases, adverbs of generality, relative-clause and if-clause constructions, indefinite and definite descriptions. The main purpose is to allow for a comparison of the quantifier–variable-binding semantic framework of the Frege model and STA's proto-act interpretational approach to reference and generality. The latter is a genuine alternative to the quantifier–variable-binding framework. STA offers a treatment of reference and generality, in which quantifier–variable-binding structures are not appealed to. STA does not posit variables—syntactic entities that range over domains of objects. Consequently, it does not posit quantifiers—that is, expressions that combine with open sentences. Some of the structures posited by STA are analogous to structures in quantification. For example, proto-acts interpreted variably are analogous to variables in quantification theory in that they can be said to range over entities, speech acts. But here we find, at most, an analogy, and a tenuous one. In this chapter I outline what I take to be a key challenge facing the quantificational approach to reference and generality. This is the topic of anaphoric pronouns, and, in particular, so-called donkey pronouns. My goal is to show that, although quantification approaches can make significant inroads into analysing such phenomena, they fail, indeed systematically fail, to explain a significant range of pronominal structures. Moreover, the likelihood of a solution to these problems within a quantificational framework seems dim. STA's proto-act interpretational approach, in contrast, encounters no such difficulties.

10.0.1 Problems with Donkey Pronouns A central component to any theory of referential generality in English is the topic of pronouns—how pronouns interact with expressions that introduce some kind of generality into a sentence. Assuming a quantificational framework, one might think that pronouns anaphoric on noun phrases associated with generality, such as every F or an F, are variables bound by the quantifiers

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

253

introduced by these phrases. The type of sentence that seems to represent a paradigm instance of a pronoun bound by a quantified noun phrase is (1) below, in which we can treat the pronoun he, anaphoric on every guy, as a variable bound by the quantifier introduced by every guy: (1)

Every guy owns a car that he polishes.

However, one soon encounters cases of pronouns anaphoric on noun phrases introducing generality that challenge this idea. These sorts of cases are what have come to be called donkey anaphors. Some examples are: (2) (3) (4) (5)

George saw a donkey. It had long ears. Every boy who owns a donkey beats it. If a boy owns a donkey, he beats it. Usually, if a boy owns a donkey, he beats it.

In (2) the pronoun it cannot be treated, given a standard semantics, as a variable bound by a donkey—understood as an existential quantifier—because it is outside a donkey's syntactic scope. One might be tempted to treat (2) as conjunctive, as George saw something such that it was a donkey and it had long ears. But this fails for other related cases. For example, (6) below, assuming we treat one donkey as a type of existential quantifier, cannot be analysed as Just one donkey was such that George saw it and it had long ears: (6)

George saw just one donkey. It had long ears.

Our analysandum implies that one and only one donkey was seen by George. The analysans does not imply this.229 Matters hold similarly for (3) and (4). One might be tempted to ignore, indeed, massacre, surface form and treat (3) and (4) as: (7) (8)

Every donkey is such that every boy who owns it, beats it. Every donkey and every boy is such that, if he owns it, he beats it.230

If we leave aside the cavalier tramping on surface grammatical form, there are several objections to this treatment. One is that, in order for these sentences to have the right truth-conditions, the if-construction in (4) must be interpreted as material if. I think that the evidence is overwhelming that material implication is a bad theory of if—see §3.4.1.231

229

See e.g. Evans's discussion (1977).

230

I note that retaining the existential reading will not work; we get the wrong truth-conditions. So we need to export and chance the quantifier. (7) and (8) are the standard analyses offered by Geach.

231

In the classical Geachean (1962) and Quine (1960) approach all pronouns are treated as bound variables, but this is done at the cost of treating many indefinite descriptions as universal quantifiers with different scope positions from those indicated by their surface grammar. The classical approach also says little about inter-sentential anaphora, as in (2), and more complicated cases.

254

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Another problem is that this exportation strategy does not work well with cases like (5). Consider the result: (9)

Every boy is such that every donkey is such that usually, if he owns it, he beats it.

(9) does make sense. It has one reading: that boys owning donkeys beat them most of the time, say, every weekday. This is one reading of (5), but (5) has another reading: that most donkey–boy owning pairs are cases where the boy member beats the donkey member. (9) does not have this reading. To see this, compare (5) with (10) and its exportation analysis (11): (10) If a girl has a happy childhood, she usually has a happy life. (11) Every girl is such that, usually, if she has a happy childhood, she has a happy life. (10) means that most girls with happy childhoods have a good life. But (11) does not capture this; indeed, strictly analysed, it is nonsense. (11) is true, if every girl satisfies Usually if x has a happy childhood, x has a happy life. But that means that, where Jane is a girl, the following must be true: If Jane had a happy childhood, she usually had a happy life. This is nonsense. Jane cannot usually have had a happy life.232 In the light of these difficulties, no current theories assume that a standard quantificational framework can be maintained along with the thesis that all pronouns anaphoric on noun phrases associated with generality are bound by those phrases. So what are the alternative accounts? There are a number of candidates. Two leading proposals are the following: (a) (b)

The D-type pronoun approach, emerging out of Evans (1977), which finds its most sophisticated current defence in the D-type theory of Neale (1990). The Discourse Representation Theory, or DRT, of Kamp and Reyle (1993), which emerges out of Lewis's work (1975b) on adverbs of quantification.

These are not the only approaches in the literature, but they are the ones I shall examine here. They are exemplars of what can be done with the quantificational framework. Although these theories have much merit, I argue that both fail to account for a range of intra- and inter-sentential anaphoric relations. What is striking is that they break down in a similar way for the same class of anaphors. The anaphors in this class are ones that span distinct sources of generality. An example is given in (12): (12) If a girl graduates from Harvard, she gets a job. It is usually a good one.

232

Perhaps we can take usually to be quantifier over possibilia—that is, Janes in other possible worlds. Jane usually has a happy life would mean Most Jane counterparts have happy lives. Unfortunately, the sentence does not have this as a reading, at least, not ordinarily.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

255

Sentences like (12) give rise to what I call the double-bind problem. Analysed in quantifier terms, (12) contains distinct quantifiers Q1 and Q2—in (12) always and usually—which are meant to bind variables x1 and x2 respectively. The analysis of the anaphoric relation involved requires that a constraint hold on permissible value assignments to x1 and x2. But this constraint blocks the successful functioning of one of the quantifiers. I call this the double-bind problem, since it is as if one variable needs to be bound by more than one quantifier. I argue below that the double-bind problem is a significant anomaly for the two theories under consideration and I suggest that other approaches adopting a quantifier–variable-binding model of anaphora and generality are likely to encounter it also. The argument is developed below as follows. In §§10.1 and 10.2 I examine D-type approaches. The key challenge for D-type theory is to deal with the problem of excessively strong uniqueness implications—I describe this problem below. Two solutions seem to be available. Neale's numberless description approach (1990) and Heim's implicit quantifier approach (1990) derived from Berman (1987). I argue that these approaches are empirically inadequate, the second encountering the double-bind problem. In §10.3 I examine DRT—in its Kamp and Reyle (1993) guise. I argue that a double-bind problem emerges for DRT. I then describe the general nature of the double-bind problem in the last section.233 The STA framework, not being quantificational, does not encounter the double-bind problem. It provides an adequate and entirely unified treatment of anaphora. That is demonstrated in Chapter 11. Moreover, it achieves this within a unified treatment of if-sentences.

10.1 D-TYPE PRONOUNS The classical D-type approach to anaphora adopts a standard semantic treatment of indefinite descriptions and universal noun phrases. Donkey anaphors, for example, the emboldened pronouns in (13) and (14) below, are conceptualized as pronouns anaphoric on, but unbound by, their quantified noun-phrase antecedents: (13) A donkey is outside. It has long ears. (14) Every man who bought a donkey vaccinated it. In a D-type approach such pronouns are analysed, roughly, as proxies for definite descriptions constructed from the material of the antecedent clauses. Roughly, in

233

This chapter reproduces much of Barker (1997a). I do not consider dynamic semantics, specifically, the Dynamic Predicate Logic (DPL) of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991). See Barker (1997a) for a discussion thereof.

256

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

say (13), it is proxy for the donkey that is outside, so (13) becomes A donkey is outside. The donkey that is outside has long ears. In (14) it is proxy for the donkey that he buys, where he is bound by every man, so (14) becomes Every man who bought a donkey vaccinated the donkey that he bought. I begin my discussion of the D-type approach with Neale's articulation of it, defended in Neale (1990) and Ludlow and Neale (1991). Let [an x: Fx] be an existentially quantified noun phrase and [an x: Fx] (Gx) an antecedent clause of an anaphor α. Then α, in being an anaphor for [an x: Fx], goes proxy for a definite description the x: Fx & Gx. On Neale's account, (14) is to be analysed as (141), which corresponds to the English sentence (142): (141) [every x: man (x) & [a y: donkey (y)] (bought (x, y)] ([the y: donkey (y) & bought (x, y)] (vaccinated (x, y)) (142) Every man who bought a donkey, vaccinated the donkey that he bought. As is well known, this sort of analysis encounters the problem of unwanted uniqueness implications. The definite description in (142) carries a uniqueness implication that each man who bought a donkey bought only one donkey. However, it is disputable whether this is a genuine implication of (14). (14) might be true if some of the men who bought donkeys bought several and vaccinated them all. Neale has three strategies for dealing with the uniqueness problem. One response he endorses weakly as a possibility—see Ludlow and Neale (1991)—is to embrace the uniqueness implications as genuine features of the meaning of such sentences. Some donkey sentences do seem to have uniqueness implications built into them—for example, Every man who has a daughter thinks she is the most beautiful girl in the world.234 But one very soon encounters donkey sentences for which this response cannot work. Conditionals are an intrasentential example. In (15) she is anaphoric on a girl but outside its syntactically defined scope: (15) If a girl is brought up in Australia, she learns to swim early. On the D-type account described here so far, she is proxy for the girl who is brought up in Australia. But then (15) carries a very obviously unacceptable uniqueness implication that there is only one Australian girl. An inter-sentential example is (16) below: (16) Every Swiss male must do military service. He is required to do so by law. He is anaphoric on but unbound by every Swiss male. If this is to be treated as D-type, as Neale thinks it should—see Neale (1990: 139)—then he cannot be a proxy for a description like the Swiss male.

234

This sort of sentence is considered by Cooper (1979).

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

257

Neale canvasses two other possible solutions to the problem—see Ludlow and Neale (1991: 197–8). These are (a) hold that donkey pronouns can be proxies for numberless descriptions; or (b) hold that there are hidden quantifiers in the offending sentences. In §§10.1.1 and 10.2 I examine the solutions (a) and (b) in turn. I will demonstrate that neither of these proposals works, so that, as a general strategy, the D-type approach does not look promising.

10.1.1 Numberless Descriptions Numberless descriptions are, as the name suggests, descriptions that do not carry semantical number implications, unlike singular definite or plural definite descriptions. Numberless descriptions, according to Neale, are expressed in English by locutions like whoever is fatter than George. These are descriptions that are not meant to carry any commitment to the number of individuals who satisfy x is fatter than George. Thus, (i)

Whoever is fatter than George weighs a lot,

is true if and only if, all the persons fatter than George, be there one or more, weigh a lot. Let whe x: Fx be a numberless description. In which case (ii) holds: (ii)

[whe x: Fx](Gx) is true iff there is a thing or things that is/are F and all things that are F are G.

Neale's numberless description account is to suggest that unbound pronouns anaphoric on quantified noun phrases may as context demands be taken as proxies either for definite singular descriptions or for numberless descriptions. (15) then is interpreted as (151) and in English (152): (151) If [an x: girl x] (brought up in Australia x), then [whe x: girl x & brought up in Australia x] (learns to swim early x). (152) If a girl is brought up in Australia, whatever girl who is brought up in Australia learns to swim early. (152) no longer carries the unwanted implication and indeed seems to capture correctly its truth-conditions, for the consequent in this case is true if and only if there is a girl or girls in Australia and all of them learn to swim early. The problem in (16) can likewise be fixed by construing he as proxy for the numberless descriptions whe x: Swiss male x. (See Neale 1990: 139.) Unfortunately the numberless description proposal does not always work. Anaphors in antecedent clauses of conditionals represent a problem case. Take: (17) If a theory is classical, then, if it is inconsistent, it is trivial.

258

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

(17) is a well-formed, true, compound if-generality.235 The two emboldened pronouns are linked anaphorically to the indefinite description a theory in the first antecedent clause. According to the numberless description proposal, the first it goes proxy either for a singular or for a numberless definite description. So (17) has two readings: (171) If [an x: theory x] (classical x), then if [the x: theory x & classical x] (inconsistent x), [the x: theory x & classical x & inconsistent x] (trivial x). (172) If [an x: theory x] (classical x), then if [whe x: theory x & classical x] (inconsistent x), [whe x: theory x & classical x & inconsistent x] (trivial x).236 (171) is not appropriate, because it brings in an incorrect uniqueness implication. (172) cannot be correct, because its second if-clause proposition is equivalent to (18) The classical theory or all the classical theories is/are inconsistent. In which case, the second if-clause amounts to supposing that, in effect, all classical theories are inconsistent—that is, none of them is consistent—an absurd supposition and not what is being supposed at all in (17). If this were correct, (19) would be right: (19) If a theory is classical, then, if it is inconsistent, all classical theories are inconsistent. (19) has no reading on which it is true, but on the present hypothesis it does, since the second if-clause has a reading on which it is equivalent to (18). That is, (19) is meant to have a reading on which it is equivalent to If a theory is classical, then, if the classical or all the classical theories is/are inconsistent, then all classical theories are inconsistent. A response to this problem is to deem (17) misleading as to its real semantic form. The claim is that conditionals like (17) have conjunctive antecedents and so (17) is better rendered as If a theory is classical and it is inconsistent, it is trivial. In this case, the second pronoun can be interpreted as a variable bound by the existential quantifier. This response might be grounded on the alleged equivalence below: (p → (q → r)) ↔ ((p & q) → r).

235

I assume for now, without argument, that adverbial if -generalities are truth-apt. It turns out that, although if is merely am implicature operator, adverbial if -generalities are, in fact, truth-apt according to STA. I explain how this might be so in §11.6 .

236

I assume that the second anaphor it in (17) has the contents given here, on a charitable interpretation of Neale's theory. Neale does not deal with anaphors in complex chains like this. My discussion of Neale's theory focuses on the first pronoun only.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

259

The mere fact of a purported equivalence of this kind, however, would not be sufficient justification in itself for the claim that sentences like (17) really have as their logical form (p & q) → r. Moreover, there are compounds like If S, then R only if H or If S, then R even if H, where a conjunctive analysis looks implausible, but which still create the same problem. Take the following: (20) If a theory is paraconsistent, then, even if it is inconsistent, it can still be interesting. Owing to the presence of even, there is no conditional of the form If S and R, H that preserves the meaning of these compound conditionals.237 Even if we accepted the conjunctive paraphrase response in the case of compound ifsentences like (17), there are conditionals in which basically the same anaphor interpretation problem arises but which are not compound: (21) If a theory is inconsistent, it is not necessarily trivial. If it is classical, it will be. But if it is paraconsistent, it won't be. (22) Consider a classical theory. If it is inconsistent, then it is trivial. (21) and (22) involve inter-sentential anaphoric chains. The numberless description approach gets these sentences wrong. Thus, in (21), the second conditional—(21b)—has, on Neale's analysis, two readings: (21b1) If [the x: theory x & inconsistent x] (classical x), [the x: theory x & inconsistent x & classical x] (trivial x). (21b2) If [whe x: theory x & inconsistent x] (classical x), [whe x: theory x & inconsistent x & classical x] (trivial x). Both totally distort the intended sense of the second conditional. In (21b1) the supposition is that the unique inconsistent theory is classical; in (212) it is that whatever inconsistent theory is classical, which is tantamount to the supposition that there are inconsistent theories and all inconsistent theories are classical. Unbound pronouns anaphoric on universal noun phrases give similar problems to those just detailed in the case of indefinites. Take (16) above. As noted, he must be construed as a proxy for the numberless description: whe x: Swiss male x. But now consider cases where an if-clause is introduced: (23) Every Swiss male must do military service. If he is over 21, he must also be a member of the reserve.

237

It may be objected that, for instance, even if -conditionals are not really conditionals. However, the best theory about even if -conditionals is that they are conditionals modified by a particle even . See Barker (1991) and Lycan (1991). Other cases are sentences like If a theory is inconsistent, it follows that it is trivial only if it is classical and If a theory is inconsistent, it is bound to be bizarre, especially if it is paraconsistent .

260

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

The problem is obvious. He on the numberless account is proxy for a numberless description so that the if-clause comes out as if whatever Swiss male is over 21. This misrepresents the content of the if-clause in (22). We are not supposing in (23) that (in effect) every Swiss male is over 21. In conclusion, Neale's numberless description proposal appears not to be a general solution to unwanted uniqueness implications.

10.2 IMPLICIT SITUATION QUANTIFIERS The second approach to the uniqueness implication problem is to discern in cases like (15) an implicit situation quantifier. This type of theory is pursued by Berman (1987) and explored in Heim's defence (1990) of an E-type approach, which is close to a D-type approach. According to the implicit quantifier theory, a classic donkey sentence like (24) involves an implicit adverb of quantification (an AQ) that binds an implicit situation variable: (24) If a man buys a donkey, he vaccinates it.238 The truth conditions of (24) come out as: For every minimal situation s in which there is a donkey bought by a man, there is an extended situation s* that is the vaccinating of the unique donkey in s by the unique man in s. A minimal situation corresponding to the sentence A man buys a donkey features one man buying one donkey. An extension s* of a situation s is a situation having s as a part. Thus (24) on this analysis can be true in a context where there are men who buy more than one donkey, since for each donkey bought by a man there is a distinct minimal situation s. Keeping things at a very informal level, let an AQ combine with an if-clause to form a unary restricted quantifier [AQs : if-ω] that takes an open sentence ψ as argument and binds a situation variable s in ψ. In which case, [AQs : if-ω] (ψ) is true iff N minimal situations satisfying ω satisfy ψ.

On this account, (24) is translated: (241) [Alwayss : if-(a man buys a donkey in s)] (∃s* [the unique donkey bought by the man in s is vaccinated in s*]). Following this basic model, we can now return to the problematic cases above. On the implicit AQ approach, (17) is interpreted as having the structure: [alwayss : if-φ] ([alwayss* : if-γ] (ω)).

238

In this chapter I shall use Lewis's term adverbs of quantification for the expressions such as always, usually . These are called adverbs of generality in other chapters.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

261

That is, [alwayss* : if-γ] is in the scope of [alwayss : if-φ], the full translation being: (173) [Alwayss : if-(a theory is classical in s)] ([Alwayss* : if-(the classical theory in s is inconsistent in s*)] (‘s**[the unique classical inconsistent theory in s* is trivial in s**])). (173), it would appear, gives us the right truth-conditions for (17). There is no uniqueness implication problem. However, (173) has a worrying feature. For each situation s that satisfies (a theory is classical in s), there will be at most one extension of it s* that satisfies (the classical theory in s is inconsistent in s*). In other words, for each s that is a theory's being classical, the (restricted) domain of the quantifier, [Alwayss* : if-(the classical theory in s is inconsistent in s*)]

is reduced to one situation. The quantification is, in short, otiose.239 This empty quantification generates no unwanted consequences in (173) because the implicit AQ is a universal quantifier. But one might expect there to be sentences in which this feature leads to difficulties. And, indeed, this expectation is fulfilled by cases like (25), where the embedded AQ is not universal: (25) If a donkey is vaccinated, then if it has vitamin deficiency, it usually faints. In terms of the implicit situation-AQ approach, (25) is analysed as: (251) [Alwayss : if-(a donkey is vaccinated in s)] ([Usuallys* : if-(the unique donkey in s has a vitamin deficiency in s*)] (∃s**[the unique deficient donkey in s* faints in s**])). In (251) the same unsettling feature of (173) is exhibited. For each s satisfying (a donkey is vaccinated in s), the (restricted) domain of quantification of the second quantifier, [Usuallys*: if-(the unique donkey in s has a vitamin deficiency in s*)],

is confined to one situation. This is by virtue of the fact that each s that is the vaccinating of a donkey maps onto at most one extension s* that is the being vitamin deficient of the donkey vaccinated in s.

239

Matters are not improved by replacing (173) by:(A)[Alwayss: if-(a theory is classical in s)]([Alwaysg: if-(the classical theory in s is inconsistent in g)](∃g*[the unique classical inconsistent theory in g is trivial in g*])).In (A), the gs are not given as necessarily being extensions of the ss. (A) still causes problems, however. For every s that is a theory's being classical, there is still only at most one g, which is that theory's being inconsistent. So the same empty quantification occurs.

262

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.1

Because of this feature, (251) gives the wrong truth-conditions. Take a context where all the vitamin-deficient vaccinated donkeys, except Pedro, faint. (25) is true in this context. However (251) is false. For (251) to be true, for each s that satisfies (a donkey is vaccinated in s), if there are extensions s* satisfying (the unique donkey in s is deficient in s*), then most of such s*s must have extensions s** in which the donkey faints. But, where s is Pedro's being vaccinated, and s* is Pedro's having a vitamin deficiency, there is no appropriate extension s** in which he faints. So (251) is false.240 It is clear that the analysis (251) of (25) introduces an unwanted dependency of the second quantifier on the first. Yet at the same time it would appear that this dependency is unavoidable if the anaphoric chain is to be modelled in terms of the implicit-situation quantifier approach. The problem can be represented schematically, as shown in Fig. 10.1. The two variables s and s* are such that permissible assignments to s are in a (partial) one to one mapping s ↠ s* onto permissible values assigned to s*. But this interferes, as we have seen, with the operation of the second quantifier. I call this predicament the double-bind problem. It would appear that the implicit situation quantifier approach must appeal to the response used by the numberless description account above, which I dubbed the conjunctive paraphrase response. According to it, (25) should be paraphrased as If a donkey is vaccinated and it has a vitamin deficiency, it usually faints. I suggested above that the conjunctive paraphrase response sits ill with compound if-sentences that feature even if, only if, and especially if-clauses. However, I shall not press the point here. The double-bind problem uncovered in the case of (25) reappears in inter-sentential examples. This is easily shown.

240

Note that matters are just as bad if (251) is replaced with the analysis (i) below:(i)[Alwayss : if-(a donkey is vaccinated in s)]([Usuallyg : if-(the unique donkey in s has a vitamin deficiency in g)](∃g*[the unique deficient donkey in g faints in g*])).In (i) g does not have to be an extension of s. (i) is worse than (241) because it gets the truthconditions wrong in two ways. First, because g does not have to be an extension of s, (i) will come out true in circumstances where vitamin-deficient donkeys never faint when actually vaccinated but always faint in some other circumstances. That is wrong. Secondly, the same problem noted for (241) emerges here anyway, which a little reflection will show.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

263

Because it appeals to a standard quantificational apparatus, the implicit quantifier approach cannot account for intersentential anaphoric chains straightforwardly. For example, directly applied, the analysis of the first two sentences in (21)—(21a) and (21b)—would go as follows—note that (21a), If a theory is inconsistent, it is not necessarily trivial, is a negated universal adverbial generality, as in (21a3): (21a3) ¬[Alwayss: if-(a theory is inconsistent in s)] (∃s*[the unique theory in s is trivial in s*]) (21b3) [Alwaysf: if-(the unique theory in s* is classical in f) ] (∃f *[the unique inconsistent theory in f is trivial in f*]). The problem is that, in order to secure the inter-sentential anaphoric link, (21b3) must have the description in bold, which contains a variable s*. However, s* must be interpreted as bound by the AQ in (21a3), but evidently it cannot be so bound, given a standard semantics. As Heim (1990) suggests, a refined D-type approach can make use of the treatments of modal and quantificational subordination found in, for example, Roberts (1989). I will discuss Roberts's work in more detail below when DRT is scrutinized. But briefly now, it seems at least possible to deal with cases like (21) by simply accommodating the antecedent clause of (21a3) as part of the background assumptions for (21b3), so that on this new accommodation analysis the second sentence (21b) of (21) comes out as (21b4) (where f is an extension of s): (21b4) [Alwayss : if-(a theory is inconsistent in s)] ([Alwaysf: if-(the unique theory in s is classical in f)] (∃f*[the unique inconsistent theory in f is trivial in f*])). This deals with the problem of binding. However, it comes at a price. (21b4) introduces the kind of compound ifsentence that was recently found to be problematic. (214) is like (173). (21b4)'s truth-conditions happen to be correct. But change the inter-sentential example slightly and the double-bind problem reappears. Take: (26)

(a) (b)

If a donkey is Andalusian, it is well behaved. If it likes farmers, it is usually perfectly placid.

In this case, accommodation of the if-clause of (26a) into (26b) produces: (26b1) [Alwayss : if-(a donkey is Andalusian in s)] ([Usuallys*: if-(the unique Andalusian donkey in s likes farmers in s*)] (∃s**[the unique Andalusian donkey in s* is perfectly placid in s**])). (26b1) has the same structure as (251) and so produces the wrong truth-conditions, as is readily confirmed.

264

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

At this stage, it might be thought (or hoped) that something like the conjunctive paraphrase response suggested for (25) might be available for (26). That is, (26b) has a paraphrase—(27)—that a D-type approach can successfully analyse: (27) If a donkey is Andalusian and it likes farmers, it is usually perfectly placid. Could not some variation of the accommodation approach be applied to (26b) so that it generates a semantic representation for (26b) of the type that corresponds to (27)? I will not linger on this question here. First, it is not clear how this could be done in a motivated way. Secondly, I show below in my discussion of DRT and the double bindproblem it faces that there are inter-sentential cases in which the sentence containing the anaphor has no paraphrase that can be successfully analysed by DRT or by the D-type approach, so that, even if some kind of paraphrase treatment of (26b) were possible, it would not work for these cases. I conclude, then, that the D-type approach is in a parlous state.241

10.3 DISCOURSE REPRESENTATION THEORY I now consider the prospects of the second general approach to donkey anaphors to be considered here. Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). This approach emerges out of Lewis (1975). In this paper, Lewis analyses the type of generality introduced by what he calls adverbs of quantification, such as always, usually, sometimes. (His adverbs of quantification are my adverbs of generality or AGs.) For example, a generality like Usually, if an F is G, it is H involves an adverb of quantification that combines with the if-clause to form a unary restricted quantifier [Usually: if an F is G], which combines with an open sentence (it is H). That is, the generality is not comprised by an open if-sentence prefixed by a quantifier; rather the if-clause functions merely as a quantifier restrictor. Such sentences have the truth-conditions: [Always/usually/sometimes …: if an F is G] (it is H) is true iff all/most/some … assignments of values to the free variables in An F is G that satisfy An F is G satisfy it is H.

Note that, in this theory, indefinite descriptions in such sentences—an F above—function as variables rather than as existential quantifiers. So, the generality is more perspicuously represented as [Always/usually/sometimes …: if x is G]

241

These conclusions also bear upon Chierchia's restricted D-type approach (1992).

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

265

Fig. 10.2

(x is H), where permissible assignments of values to x must assign entities that are F to x.242 DRT generalizes Lewis's idea about indefinites functioning in such contexts as variables. STA proposes that indefinites are always variable-like. Indeed, names, pronouns, definite and indefinite descriptions are all treated as discourse referents, which basically function like restricted variables. A name, for example, is a discourse referent that has one and only one correct assignment—namely, what we would call its referent. Texts like Nerida saw a donkey. It was sad are analysed as types of conjunctive existential quantifications. It is true, as a whole, just in case there is some assignment of values to the discourse referents on which the text comes out true. This basic idea then is extended to more complex cases. I now sketch out the approach of basic classical DRT, in particular, its formulation in terms of Kamp and Reyle (1993)-style DR Structures—DRSs.243 The truth-conditional analyses provided by classical DRT are perhaps not the most desirable—they face certain problems that I shall not discuss here.244 But they are the simplest, more complicated versions not having any advantages with respect to the problems I examine. In DRT, the semantic representations of sentences are given by DRSs. The basic text above, Nerida saw a donkey. It was sad, is represented in Fig. 10.2. The DRS is true with respect to a particular model just in case there is an embedding function F into it. F will be such a function just in case its assignments of values to the discourse referents verify the DRS.

242

There is some evidence that Lewis is right about such indefinites. Take If a cat eats vegetable some time, it gets sick then . Now the antecedent sentence is not a truth-apt sentence. One could not ask Is that true? with respect to the antecedent. If, however, the indefinites were existential quantifications, then it would have to be treated as truth-apt. Now, unless we export the indefinites, the only explanation that seems to be available is that the indefinites are functioning like variables. We also have to distinguish between if clauses. Sometimes they function as components of a conditional—indicative or counterfactual—and sometimes as variable restrictors.

243

I expect that the Heim (1988) approach will face the same problems.

244

I will not describe a version of DRT that attempts to deal with proportion problems or with ∀- and ∃-readings in the sense of Chierchia (1992).

266

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.3

Fig. 10.4

In a simple donkey sentence like (15) above, the DRS describing its semantic content is (153) (see Fig. 10.3). Indefinite descriptions and pronouns introduce discourse referents, which are variable-like entities. The discourse referents have conditions on them that assignments of values must satisfy. The if-construction introduces a complex relation between simpler DRSs, as in (153). The identity y = x represents the anaphoric relation in (15). The DRS (153) is true with respect to a particular model just in case there is an embedding function F into it. F will be such a function just in case all extensions F′ of F that verify the DRS, the first box, in which x is introduced—call this Kx—have extensions that verify the DRS, the second box, in which y is introduced—call this Ky. It is easy to see that this makes (15) equivalent to a universal quantification: all girls brought up in Australia learn to swim early. Moreover, it is clear that this treatment of (15) is in accord with Lewis's account of adverbs of quantification and if-constructions. Let us now revert to the anaphoric chains considered in §10.1. Take first an intra-sentential anaphoric case like (17): (17) If a theory is classical, then, if it is inconsistent, it is trivial. DRT can, it seems, successfully analyse (17) as (174) (see Fig. 10.4). The truth-conditions supplied by (174) would appear to be correct. (174) is true in a model just in case there is an embedding function F such that all extensions F′ of F verifying Kx are such that they have extensions G verifying the conditional DRS. G verifies the latter just in case all its extensions G′ verifying Ky have extensions H verifying Kz. Although (174) provides the right truth-conditions, in effect, the same unsettling feature found in the D-type (173) analysis of (17) is found in (174). Because,

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

267

Fig. 10.5

in Ky, y = x, it follows that for a given G all its extensions G′ verifying Ky are identical—that is, all assign to y what G assigns to x, which is what F′ assigns to x. The quantification introduced by the second arrow is then restricted to one case: for each G, the single G′ verifying Ky. This does not cause any difficulties in (174), because the quantification is universal, but it does in other cases. Take a compound if-sentence—like (25) from §10.2—that has a non-universal AQ: (28) If a donkey is Andalusian, then, if it is farm-bred, it is usually miserable. Given its surface form, it seems DRT should represent (28) as (281) (see Fig. 10.5)—here the box in which usually appears is like * but requires only that most extensions of an embedding function verifying the left box have extensions verifying the right, rather than all. It is easily shown that (281) gives the wrong truth-conditions. Unlike (28), (281) is false in a situation where one farm-bred Andalusian donkey, Pedro, is happy, though all others are sad. Thus, an embedding function F verifies (281) just in case all its extensions F′ that verify the DRS in which x is introduced—Kx—have extensions G verifying the complex DRS—call this Kusually. A function G verifies Kusually just in case most of its extensions G′ verifying Ky have extensions H verifying Kz. (281) has the same unsettling feature as (174). In (281), owing to the fact that, in Ky, y = x, all G′s extensions G′ that verify Ky assign the same object to y, the object that G assigns to x. Hence, for any G, all G′ are the same. This fact causes problems in the circumstances described above. Where an F′ verifies Kx by assigning Pedro to x, there is no extension G of F′ verifying Kusually. Choose any G that extends F′.G assigns Pedro to x. But, to verify Kusually, most of its extensions G′ verifying Ky must verify Kz. But there is only one G′ verifying Ky, and this assigns Pedro to y. But then it has no extensions H verifying Kz. So, (281) is false.245

245

Note that I have specified the truth-conditions for (281) with reference to an extension G of F′ as in:F verifies (281) iff all its extensions F′ verifying Kx have extensions G verifying Kusually, where G verifies Kusually iff most of its extensions G′ verifying Ky have extensions H verifying Kz.The notion of extension of a function in DRT is normally required to take care of cases where a new DRS introduces new discourse referents. In (281), the new discourse referents in Kusually are introduced only in the subordinate DRSs, Ky and Kz. This means that it is possible to simplify the truth-conditions of (281) by cutting out reference to the extension G of F′ as in:F verifies (281) iff all its extensions F′ verifying Kx are such that they verify Kusually, where F′ verifies Kusually iff most of its extensions F″ verifying Ky have extensions H verifying Kz.I note that these alternative truth-conditions are just as problematic as the first.

268

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.6

It is worthwhile examining how exactly DRT gets itself into trouble. Compare (28) and (281) with a non-compound case like (29): (29) If a donkey is Andalusian and it is farm-bred, it is usually miserable. DRT's analysis of (29) is (291) (see Fig. 10.6). Take the same situation in which (281) was evaluated. An embedding function F verifies (291) just in case most of its extensions F′ verifying Kx have extensions G verifying Ky. Here the extensions F′ of F may differ in what they assign to x, and so not all the F′s are identical. Moreover, for every Andalusian farm-bred donkey d there is an F′ verifying Kx in which x is assigned d. As all donkeys d except Pedro are miserable, all the F′s have extensions G verifying Ky, except that case in which Pedro is assigned to x. So (291) is true. The analysis (291) exploits the feature of indefinites that in DRT they introduce new discourse referents that do not have identity relations imposed on them linking them to earlier discourse referents. But this feature disappears when, as in (28), the if-clause does not contain an indefinite but instead contains a pronoun anaphorically linked to an earlier indefinite. The problem in (28) is a double-bind problem in the sense of §10.2. If (28)'s surface grammar is taken seriously, and the DRT account of generality is embraced, then (28) contains two noun phrases, a donkey and it, that introduce discourse referents x and y linked by identity but that are bound by different quantifiers, as in (Fig. 10.7). Compare this with the joint D-type implicit situation-quantifier analysis and Fig. 10.1 and note the structural parity. Evidently, DRT must submit that compound if-sentences like (28), (25), and (17) are misleading as to their underlying semantic form. Again the conjunctive paraphrase response, discussed in §10.1.1, looms as the attractive way out; (28) should be paraphrased as (29), and (291) should be thought of as (28)'s semantic interpretation.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

269

Fig. 10.7

I will not rehearse my objections to this response. I show below that, as in the case of D-type theory, the double-bind problem reappears for DRT in inter-sentential cases. Moreover, as promised at the end of §10.2, I show that, although some problematic inter-sentential cases are such that the sentence containing the anaphor is renderable into a paraphrase that is tractable by DRT—and so there is still some hope of a DRT analysis—there are other cases in which no such paraphrase exists.

10.3.1 Modal Subordination The inter-sentential anaphora like (21) and (26) with which I shall be concerned in this section present an initial problem for DRT—leaving aside any of the thoughts just aired above—in that they constitute discourses where pronouns introduce discourse referents whose antecedents are inaccessible—the pronoun antecedents are in subordinate DRSs in different sentences.246 The most promising strategy for dealing with these inter-sentential cases is an application and extension of the approach proposed by Roberts (1989) in her discussion of modal subordination. In what follows, I take her treatment as my model. Modal subordination is the phenomenon in which modal operators create contexts of interpretation for sentences appearing later in a discourse. Background motivations aside, the modal subordination treatment of sentences like (30) below, in which will is the operative modal, divides into two types of analyses: (30)

(a) (b)

If Sophie has bought a book, she will be home reading it. It will be a spy-thriller.

The first approach Roberts considers—the insertion approach—analyses (30) as (301) (see Fig. 10.8). In (301), the DRS corresponding to (30b) is simply inserted into the DRS corresponding to (30a), as indicated. (I use an ↠ to link subordinate DRSs; Roberts uses a small box.) The other analysis is the accommodation approach, which I considered briefly in the case of D-type pronoun theory with respect to (21) and (26) above. In DRT, the accommodation approach analyses (30) as (302) (see Fig. 10.9). On the accommodation approach, the if-clause in (30a) becomes an accepted proposition,

246

See Kamp and Reyle (1993) for a discussion of this notion.

270

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.8

Fig. 10.9

which may be thought of as a component of conversational score for some stretch of the conversation, to which distinct DRSs can be affixed, as in (302). Roberts (1989: 697–700) prefers the accommodation approach to the insertion approach because it appears to have more generality—it can deal with certain non-conditional cases. But she appears to hold that both insertion and accommodation approaches are equally adequate accounts for if-sentence cases. Moreover, Roberts suggests—as do others, such as Asher (1993)—that the accommodation approach represents the form in which cases of inter-sentential anaphora that do not involve explicit modals should be treated within a DRT framework. (Although what exactly motivates the application of the approach in these cases is

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

271

Fig. 10.10

less straightforward.) I will assume this is correct—accommodation (or insertion) represents the best strategy for DRT to deal with complex inter-sentential cases. Do these approaches provide an adequate account of inter-sentential anaphora? Unfortunately, they do not. As forecast, the double-bind problem uncovered in the previous section re-emerges here. It does so in two types of case, which differ in how plausible a conjunctive paraphrase response looks. (26) is an example of the first type of case, which I repeat here: (26)

(a) (b)

If a donkey is Andalusian, it has a good disposition. If it likes farmers, it is usually perfectly placid.

Whether (26) is treated in terms of accommodation or insertion, the resulting truth-conditions are wrong because of a double-bind problem. On either analysis, a DRS of the type represented by (281), one corresponding to a compound ifsentence containing an embedded if-sentence with a non-universal AQ, appears in the analysis. For example, in the accommodation approach, the result is (31) (see Fig. 10.10). The lower DRS in (31) attributes the wrong truth-value to (26b) in a situation where one Andalusian donkey, Pedro, contrary to the norm, likes farmers but is irascible. What of applying some form of paraphrase response to (26)? As noted in §10.2, one might express the content of (26b) as (27): (27) If a donkey is Andalusian and it likes farmers, it is usually perfectly placid. DRT can successfully analyse (27). The question is what theory will systematically deliver a DRS corresponding to (27) as the interpretation of (26b)? Obviously, neither accommodation nor insertion will do so. But what theory could? I will not dwell on this question here, for, even if there were such a theory,

272

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.11

it would not help DRT. In (26) there is at least a paraphrase of (26b)—(27)—which DRT can analyse. In the second class of cases I consider below, there are not even such paraphrases available. The double-bind problem looks really inescapable. In order to lead the discussion in this direction I begin by investigating some simpler inter-sentential examples in which, although the insertion approach is still viable, the accommodation approach fails owing to a new type of difficulty unrelated to the problems uncovered so far. I then go onto the more complex case in which the double-bind problem appears again. Consider in terms of the accommodation approach (32): (32)

(a) (b)

If Sophie wins, she will give the money to a charity. It will be a worthy one.

Because the antecedent NP of the anaphor in (32b) is in the consequent of the conditional—(32a)—rather than in its antecedent, the simple accommodation approach—the affixing of the if-clause content of (32a) to (32b)—cannot be employed. Rather, the content corresponding to the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional (32a) needs to be accommodated as in (321) (see Fig. 10.11). (I presume this is correct—Roberts does not discuss this sort of case. (But see Asher 1993: 78–9.) The problem with the analysis (321) is that the accommodated material in Kx,y,z misrepresents the content of the anaphor in (32b). I argue for this as follows. A general need that speakers have is explicitly to express an anaphor's content when the need arises. Definite descriptions seem (generally) to be the

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

273

device for expressing a given anaphor's content—a definite description can be inserted in apposition to the anaphor signalling thereby its content and also its antecedent.247 (Embracing this view is not tantamount to putting forward a semantic thesis, a D-type pronoun account. I am merely describing a practice—the existence of which is empirically verifiable—whilst remaining neutral about its ultimate semantic underpinnings.) Following this suggestion, in (32b) the anaphor has the content given below: (32b1) It—the charity she will give the money to, if she wins—will be a worthy one. Thus, if in mid-sentence, a speaker were asked what he or she was referring to by it in uttering (32b), then The charity she (Sophie) will give the money to, if she wins would be a legitimate answer. (Of course, the speaker is not using the description de re but de dicto.) An account of the anaphoric chain in (32) should explain how it in (32b) has the content indicated in (32b1). (Or, in other words, it should explain the intelligibility of (32b1).) But, the accommodation analysis—(321)—cannot do this. On (321), there is no conditionality built into the content of it, for it's content is captured by a conjunction of simple conditions all within a DRS, Kx,y,z, corresponding to an if-clause. So it, according to (321), has the same conjunctive content as the anaphor it in: (33) If Sophie wins and gives the money to a charity, it will be a worthy one. The lower complex DRS in (321) corresponds to (33). The content of it in (33) is not the charity she will give the money to, if she wins—rather its content is the charity to which she gives some money which she wins, where this italicized sentence expresses a conjunctive condition, which is assumed in the conversation to obtain. An example involving counterfactuals should make clearer the structural difference to which I am referring. An accommodation analysis must treat (34b) below as in effect (34c), but this is quite wrong: (34)

(a) (b) (c)

If Tory had won some money, she would have bought a donkey. It—the donkey that she would have bought if she had won some money—might have been Andalusian. If Tory had won some money and had bought a donkey, then it—the donkey that she would have bought if she had won some money—might have been Andalusian.

There is certainly a change of content from antecedent to anaphor in (34c).

247

These descriptions do not have to be grammatically singular. So issues of uniqueness implications do not arise here.

274

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.12

In (32), the anaphor in (32b) does not have conjunctive content—(32b) does not have a paraphrase of the form If __ & __ an F__, it will be H—so the accommodation approach fails. In contrast, the insertion approach does capture the (conditional) content of the anaphor it in (32b). Consider (322) (see Fig. 10.12). In (322) the discourse referent r is the semantic representation of the anaphor it in (32b). By virtue of r's identity with z, it inherits z's content that is simply the charity to which Sophie will give money if she wins. That is, Give-to(w, y, z) is within the modal operator, which, in turn, has an ifclause—bearing the assumption—attached to it. I now turn to a case where not only does the accommodation approach fail for the same reasons that it fails in (32), but the insertion approach also fails because it generates a double-bind problem. The case is (35) below, which again features a pronoun whose antecedent—as in (32)—is in a consequent clause of an earlier if-sentence: (35)

(a) (b)

If a girl graduates from Harvard, she gets a job. It is usually good.

Consider first the accommodation approach, which is (351) (see Fig. 10.13). Again, like (321) with respect to (30), (351) misrepresents the content of the anaphor it in (35b). (351) does not deliver it's intuitive content, which is displayed through the definite description in (36): (36) It—the job a girl gets if she graduates from Harvard—is usually good.248

248

Let me stress that concerns about uniqueness are beside the point. (24) could be rephrased in terms of a plural description and the same problem would remain: The job (or jobs) a girl gets, if she graduates from Harvard is (are) usually good . Similarly, standard DRT encounters difficulties with proportion problems in the case of non-universal adverbs of quantification. Again, I think these issues are orthogonal to the issues under scrutiny here.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

275

Fig. 10.13

Rather, according to (351), the content of the anaphor it in (35b) is identical to the content it would have if it were in (37): (37) If a girl graduates from Harvard and gets a job, it is usually a good job. The content of the anaphor in (37) is conjunctive and not conditional. Evidently, (37) cannot be the content of (35b). If it were, (38) would make sense—that is, the conditional content in (36) could be inserted into (37), in apposition to the pronoun: (38) If a girl graduates from Harvard and gets a job, then it—the job a girl gets if she graduates from Harvard—is usually good. In (38) there is a noticeable tension between the fact that it is anaphoric on a job, which entitles it to have only conjunctive content, and the fact that the content in apposition is conditional—a content that implies that a girl's graduating from Harvard inevitably issues in her getting a job. The accommodation approach then misrepresents (35b) in the same way in which it misrepresents (32b). What then of an insertion approach? Here an initial quandary appears. In DRT, AQs are meant to introduce box splitting—a lefthand DRS introducing discourse referents with imposed conditions, and then a right-hand box. But in (35b) there is no condition available for a left-hand box—the relevant NP being a bare pronoun. However, a little thought suggests that the content for the left-hand box can be the identity relation between discourse referents, which corresponds to the anaphoric relation between it and a job—that is, r = y, as in (352) (see Fig. 10.14). Unfortunately, (352) generates the double-bind problem and so gives the wrong truth-conditions. In a situation where all the 2001 girls graduating from Harvard get good jobs save one, who gets a bad job, (35) is true, but (352) will be false.

276

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.14

It would appear then that both accommodation and insertion approaches break down in the case of (35). Moreover, any approach to anaphora that might have dealt with cases like (35b) by reducing them to forms like (37) will fail here because of the lack of a paraphrase of the form If __ & __ an F__, it is usually H. Must it then be concluded that (35) is intractable for DRT?249 One avenue that might seem to offer hope of cracking (35) in DRT's terms is this. In the inter-sentential cases (35), (34), and (32), definite descriptions were introduced whose role was to capture the content of anaphors. It might be asked how DRT analyses the sentences that are derived by substituting the definite description for the pronouns in each case. For example, applying this to (35), the sentence containing the definite description is (39): (39) The job that a girl gets if she graduates from Harvard is usually good. The thought is that, if these sentences can be analysed successfully in DRT, then the type of analysis used—whatever it is—can be transposed to inter-sentential cases. I show now that there is no hope in this direction. Sentences like (39) are just as problematic as their inter-sentential cousins. The double-bind problem again manifests itself, though in a slightly different form.

249

It might be thought that the following approach is a workable alternative to the accommodation and insertion approach. The suggestion is that, in (35b), the discourse referent corresponding to it takes its values from a set whose members satisfy certain conditions derived from (35a). The set would be:{x:x is a job got by a girl who has graduated from Harvard.}This analysis, however, imputes to the anaphor it a content that is equivalent to the content attributed to it by the accommodation approach. That is, the anaphor is simply taking as values things that are jobs got by a girl who has been at Harvard. The conditional content element is again lost.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

277

10.3.2 DRT and Denite Descriptions DRT, it seems, is committed to the following thesis about the semantic role of definite descriptions-(see Kamp and Reyle 1993): DD

(i) (ii) (iii)

A definite description the F introduces a discourse referent x with the condition F(x) imposed on it. Relative clauses in combination with the F impose further conditions on the discourse referent x. The F imposes a uniqueness requirement on permissible value-assignments to x.

DD (i) claims that, like indefinites and anaphors, definite descriptions introduce discourse referents. DD (i) would appear to follow from the fact that an F, it, and the F can all be anaphorically linked, which would appear to entail, given that DRT treats an F and it as introducing discourse referents with imposed conditions, that the same treatment should carry over to the F. Similarly, in so far as DD (i) is accepted, the role of relative clauses vis-à-vis definite descriptions would seem to be the same as their role vis-à-vis indefinites. So (ii) must hold. DD (iii) is the new element. Kamp and Reyle (1993) suggest that the uniqueness condition may be articulated in either a Russellian manner or a Strawsonian one. They do not attempt to develop a theory in full detail and I know of no extended treatment.250 The uniqueness condition's articulation would presumably comprise placing extra conditions on value-assignments that ensure unique satisfaction of appropriate conditions. I will not dwell on this here, for the discussion below will not depend upon how exactly uniqueness is articulated. There are many sentences with definite descriptions confirming DD. Let the x, the y, … be the discourse referents introduced by definite descriptions that have the uniqueness condition—however this is to be articulated—built into them. In a case like Every boy was paired with the girl with whom he had arrived, the analysis is shown in Fig. 10.15. This DRS supplies the right truth-conditions. An embedding function F verifies it if and only if all extensions F′ of F verifying Kx have extensions G that verify Ky,z.G must be such that the values assigned to y uniquely satisfy the three conditions in Ky,z, where z is identical to some object assigned to x. On the other hand, there are cases in which DD encounters difficulties. Here I turn to sentences like (39) above. There seems to be no way of treating (39) while assuming DD. According to DD, in (39), the job introduces a discourse referent the x that has two conditions placed on it: job (x) and the condition expressed by the relative clause. If these dictates are followed, the result is (391)

250

Though Kadmon (1990) presents basically a Russellian style analysis within DRT.

278

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

Fig. 10.15

Fig. 10.16

(see Fig. 10.16). However, (391) cannot be the semantic interpretation of (39). (391) is equivalent to the claim If a job is the subject of acts of getting by each and every one of the girls who graduate from Harvard, then it is a good job, which is quite incorrect. The problems DRT faces with (39) and (35) are at core the same problem: a double-bind problem. This is seen when the DRT analysis (391) is compared with the insertion analysis (352). These are simply two different outcomes of the same struggle between two AQs over discourse referents related by identity conditions. In (352) the universal quantification element associated with the main box-splitting construction has main scope, and thus renders otiose the operations of the second AQ usually. In (391) the outcome is the converse; usually has main scope and binds the x, but then the x cannot interact in the right way with the (universal) quantificational element associated with the ifconstruction. Instead, the if-construction is demoted to a condition that particular values of the x must verify.

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

279

Other cases in which the same problem arises are: (40)

(a) (b) (c)

The job that Tory will get, if she graduates from Harvard, will be a good one. The job that a Harvard graduate gets is usually good. A Harvard graduate usually likes the job that he or she has.

(40) corresponds to inter-sentential examples like (32) and (34). In (40a) the definite description does not have to be taken on a de re reading. There may be no particular job, which is good, which, if Tory graduates from Harvard, she will get. But DD allows only a de re reading. According to DD, the job introduces the x with imposed conditions job (x) and Tory will get (x), if she graduates from Harvard. (40a) and (40b) show that the problem is not restricted to cases with ifsentence relative clauses.251 I conclude that DRT, like the D-type pronoun approach, is faced with significant anomalies.

10.3.3 The Double Bind I have argued that the D-type approach and DRT fail to account for a range of inter-sentential anaphora. Moreover, I have argued that there is a pattern to their respective breakdowns—namely, the double-bind problem. What general conclusions can be drawn from these results? It strikes me that the double-bind problem is not specific to the two approaches considered here but may in fact be encountered by other approaches that seek to understand anaphora and generality in terms of variable-binding and quantifiers. Consider a quantifier–variable-binding account of sentences of the form of (a)/(b) below—of which (35) is an instance: (a) (b)

If an F is G, it Vs an H. It is usually R.

It seems to me that such an account must accept (i) to (iii) below: (i) (ii) (iii)

251

The anaphor it in (b) is bound by the quantifier usually or is associated with a variable that is so bound. The quantifier usually is in the scope of a universal quantifier Q, and Q has wide scope with respect to (b). Q binds a variable x in (b) that is connected to the anaphora it in such a way that value-assignments to x determine to some extent the semantic value of it.

Note that some intra-sentential cases without definite descriptions are also a problem for DRT: If a girl graduates from Harvard, she gets a job, which is usually a good one . In this case, the relative clause is not restrictive.

280

TROUBLES FOR THE QUANTIFIERlVARIABLE-BINDING MODEL

The crucial task for a semantic approach is to articulate the relation between it and x referred to in (iii) in such a way that it is tight enough to secure the anaphoric relation but still loose enough not to constrain unduly the quantification of usually. I cannot profess to have shown that any theory embracing the quantifier–variable-binding model will invariably find itself unable to deal with this balancing act. However, I think it is evident that achieving this balance may be a significant challenge.

CHAPTER 11 Domesticating Donkeys: STA on Generality and Anaphora 11.0 INTRODUCTION: A SOLUTION I now outline STA's account of anaphoric pronouns and generality. The account is an entirely general and unified treatment of anaphoric pronouns and their interactions with locutions expressing generality—universal noun phrases and adverbs of generality—relative clauses and if-sentence constructions. STA solves the double-bind problem, as illustrated in the previous chapter. It also supplies a unified treatment of if-sentences that spans the singular/general if divide. STA's account of pronouns is unified in that it does not countenance a distinction between bound and unbound pronouns with distinct kinds of semantic apparatus in each case. As claimed in §6.4, the core of STA's theory of anaphoric pronouns is based upon the following core repertoire rule, which governs their use: RR[Anaphor]: If Σ wants to denote an object x that is denoted by a token noun phrase N and the token N is salient, then Σ can utter ‘she’/‘he’/‘it’—depending on the gender of N—in order to achieve her purpose.252 So, in uttering an expression as an anaphoric feminine pronoun, U utters ‘she’ intending to behave in a manner of a speaker following RR[Anaphor]. The proto-act performed in using an anaphoric pronoun is: Anaphor: A pronoun π is anaphoric on a noun phrase N iff U in performing R(π)pro can be interpreted as presenting herself as intending to denote the thing(s) denoted by the token use of N. The structure of an anaphoric chain for any noun phrase, be it a name, definite or indefinite, universal noun phrase, is given in Fig. 11.1 (the bracketed Ad. Int. Co-Den. is short for advertise an intention to co-denote). In §6.4 I presented a picture in which the different kinds of anaphoric phenomena are explained by appeal to this core structure. Pronouns that take noun phrases, of any kind,

252

The noun phrase N may itself be a pronoun. One can use he to denote what was denoted by an earlier token of he .

282

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.1

as antecedents are all cases in which this same structure holds. No syntactic constraints are imposed on its being realized. As with proto-acts generally, it is subject to modes of interpretation. If the antecedent is an indefinite α-F used in a proto-act R(α-F)pro with a variable interpretation—see §5.6—then the anaphoric proto-act will have a variable interpretation. Below in §11.1 I show how this works for basic donkey anaphors with indefinite antecedents. I then proceed to donkey anaphors featuring universal noun-phrase antecedents (§11.2) and those governed by adverbs of generality (§§11.3–4). After that, in §11.5, I examine anaphors in interaction with if-clauses and the double-bind problem. Here an account of if is given, basically that sketched in §3.4.2, that treats if-sentences across the singular/general if-sentence divide in a unified way.

11.1 RELATIVELY SIMPLE DONKEY ANAPHORS The simplest kinds of donkey anaphors are those with non-generic, indefinite descriptions as the antecedents.253 On STA, the anaphoric relation in (1): (1)

George saw a donkey. It was happy.

has the structure given in (2) see Fig 11.2. Assume that (1) is uttered in a simple assertion. The indefinite descriptive proto-act R(a donkey)pro has undergone sentential determination of referential content. It has the content given at (2c). In using the pronoun it, in accord with Anaphor, U advertises an intention to denote the entity denoted by the antecedent noun phrase—the indefinite description. U's proto-act R(it)pro has, by virtue of that relation, the referential content {Denoted by ‘a donkey’}. STA explains why the D-type approach to such pronouns—see §10.1—approximates to reality; it in such circumstances appears to have the content of the donkey that George saw. That is because, given that it is taken to denote what a donkey denotes, U and H will, typically, believe that it will denote the entity denoted by the definite description the donkey that George saw. But even in these simple cases—leaving aside the difficulties outlined in §10.2—the D-type

253

The D-type approach—see §10.1 —conceptualizes these as pronouns anaphoric on but unbound by existentially quantified noun phrases.

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

283

Fig. 11.2

approach does not match reality perfectly. The phenomenon of pronominal contradiction—as Neale (1990: 201) dubs it—shows this. Strawson (1952) and Donellan (1978) discuss examples like this: U: A man fell in front of the Eastwood train this morning. H: He did not fall, he was pushed. He is anaphoric on a man. If, as proposed by the D-type approach, H's token of he is a proxy for the descriptive material drawn from U's sentence, then H's utterance is equivalent to The man who fell in front of the Eastwood train this morning did not fall—in which the apparent commitments of the definite description conflict with the main-clause assertion. Neale (1990: 201–4), by his own admission, has no solution to the problem. I will not explore how the D-type analysis might escape this difficulty. I show instead that there is no difficulty for STA. H's act R(he)pro has the referential content {Denoted by U's token ‘a man’}. Moreover, H interprets U's token of a man is referential, which means—as sketched in §5.4—that H conceives of U's proto-act R(a man)pro as being a node in a referential tree whose source is a particular object. Consequently, U does not take the particular descriptive content {Man, Fell in front of the Eastwood train this morning}, which U's act acquires, as essential to its denotative success. Rather it is some specific chain-fixing content that is essential to its denotative success. In short, H is able to secure the anaphoric relation and at the same time dispute the descriptive accuracy of U's implicit predication of the entity denoted that it fell in front of the train.

11.1.1 Pronouns and Negation Negation raises some issues about indefinites and pronouns that are worth examining. Although indefinites in the scope of negation have undetermined

284

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.3

referential content—as we saw in §9.3.2—they, nevertheless, can enter into certain kinds of anaphoric chain. Take (3): (3)

Ernesto did not shoot a donkey that had a farmer on it.

Utterance of (3) expresses U's commitment to excluding the combination of R(Ernesto)pro and Pred (did shoot a donkey that had a farmer on it)pro in an assertion. The latter complex predicate is understood as an act containing a particular constituent proto-act structure including a relative-clause proto-assertion and an anaphoric chain, as in (4) (see Fig. 11.3). In performing R(it)pro, U presents herself as intending to denote the entity denoted by a donkey. In both cases, U lacks the intention she presents herself as having and R(a donkey)pro lacks sententially determinated referential content. But this does not prevent U from performing the proto-acts constituting the anaphoric relation. Although indefinites in the scope of negation can enter into intra-sentential anaphoric chains, they cannot enter into inter-sentential ones. Consider: (5) (6)

Frank did not see a hippo. *He heard it. Frank did not see a hippo. *He did not hear it either.

The second sentence in both cases is defective. In performing R(it)pro, in (5) and (6), U advertises an intention to denote the entity denoted by a hippo. The latter does not denote. R(a hippo)pro simply has the referential content {Hippo}. So R(it)pro lacks determinate referential content. It suffers from uniqueness failure. But uniqueness failure generates a truth-value gap in A(He heard it)pro/dox—see §5.3. Hence (5) is defective. Matters hold similarly for (6).254 It might seem that there are some non-defective inter-sentential anaphoric chains in which the antecedent is an indefinite in the scope of negation. Take (7), which is not defective and in which it seems to be anaphoric on a bathroom: (7)

254

Either there is not a bathroom here or it is well hidden.

Contrast Frank did not kill a hippo. He did not wound one either . I take one here to be the determiner one as in one hippo. Hippo is understood. We are not dealing with a pronoun of laziness, just laziness. We find the same thing in Nuala caught a hippo. Jacinta caught two, and Ribaldo six , where two and six cannot be construed as pronouns of laziness.

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

285

It seems reasonable to propose, however, that in (7) it is not anaphoric on the token a bathroom in the first disjunct. Rather, the second conjunct has an implicit conjunct, there is a bathroom here, and it is anaphoric on this token.255

11.2 MIMICKING VARIABLE-BINDING Universal noun phrases can be the antecedents of pronouns, as in: (8)

Every yuppie woman loves the lifestyle that she has.

The orthodox Frege-model treatment of (8) takes she to be a variable bound by a universal quantifier expressed by a noun phrase every yuppie woman. On STA, the anaphoric relation between every yuppie woman and she, as with all such relations, has the constitution given in Anaphor. In performing R(every F)pro, U performs an α-term proto-referring act, R(α-F)pro. In performing R(she)pro, U advertises an intention to denote the entity denoted by α-yuppie woman. U lacks this intention, given that α-yuppie woman denotes nothing. Instead, R(she)pro has a mode of interpretation; it has a variable interpretation. That is, utterance of she in (8) has the structure: Proto-Act: R(she)pro—U presents herself as intending to denote the entity denoted in R(α-yuppie)pro. Variable Interpretation Signal: U's proto-act R(she)pro is understood as proxy for particular acts R(she)pro in which U advertises intentions to denote the object denoted by T in value-range acts R(T)pro of R(α-yuppie)pro/var. I represent the structure of a statement of (8) as (9) (in Fig 11.4). The variable-assertion in (9a)—more explicitly, A(αyuppie woman loves the lifestyle that she has)pro/var—goes proxy for value-range acts of the form at (9c). The anaphoric act at (9b) is proxy for value-range acts with the form given at (9d), which are constituents of particular acts of the form (9c). In performing (9) U expresses her disposition to perform value range (9c) where she accepts the permissibility of A (T is a yuppie woman)pro. In (9), R(α-yuppie woman)pro and R(she)pro enter into the anaphoric relations. But this does not license substitution of the first expression for the second in (9). Doing so would yield Every yuppie woman loves the lifestyle that every yuppie woman has, which means something completely different. The mere fact that U utters a term M and presents herself as intending to denote the thing denoted by N does not authorize substitution of N for M. That would be to ignore all

255

(7) has the variation Either there is no bathroom here or it is well hidden . The proposed solution for (7) is strongly indicated here.

286

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.4

the other speech-act structural differences there may be between utterance of N and M. The pronoun she in (9) is uttered in R(she)pro/var. This is a variable referring act and not a generic referring act. In contrast every yuppie woman is uttered in a generic referring act.

11.2.1 Translations from the Predicate Calculus At this stage we can address the question of how English, according to STA, expresses the content of interpreted formulae of the first-order predicate calculus in which a sentential operator falls within the scope of quantifiers. An example is: (10) (∀x)(∀y)(F[x, y] * G[x, y]). We might deal with this question by looking at the translation of formulae like (10) into English. One might suggest: (11) Every x is such that every y is such that if x bears F to y, then x bears G to y. Despite a certain inelegance, (11) is intelligible for those trained in reading the predicate calculus using English paraphrases. However, from the point of view of surface grammar, it must be admitted that (11) is a curious construction. The curiosity is in the use of the expression x. x seems to be ambiguous in (11). As it appears in the noun phrase every x, the expression x functions as a nominal phrase. That is, every, being a determiner, combines with phrases such as mouse to form noun phrases like every mouse. So, x here must be functioning like object does in every object. On the other hand, all the other occurrences of x in

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

287

Fig. 11.5

(11) appear to function as anaphors and not like nominal phrases at all, since they combine with no determiner.256 To conclude, we can accuse the direct paraphrases into English of quantificational formulae of being grammatically misleading, since they require an ambiguity, between nominal phrase and anaphor, in the expressions x and y. One could not say that the predicate calculus codifies a certain fragment of English, if by that we mean that we can translates its formulae directly into correct English sentences. Rather this remark can be taken to mean only that, in some tendentious sense, the logical form of certain English sentences is being captured. Despite its tortured use of x and y, (11) appears to be something we can understand. Perhaps we have just learned, from first-year logic courses on, to assimilate the ambiguity just described. Or, it may be we are implicitly reading (11) in a slightly different way. The reading of (11), in which the ambiguity described above is lacking, might be: (12) Everything, x, is such that every thing, y, is such that if x bears F to y, then x bears G to y. In this case, thing is the nominal phrase combining with the determiner every. The xs and the ys all the way through can be treated as dummy names. Consider the first x in (12). In uttering everything, x, U utters two terms in apposition, and so presents herself as intending to co-designate with these terms. The latter occurrences of x are uttered by U in the type of proto-act characteristic of name use. U presents herself as intending to denote what was denoted by the earlier instances. So we have anaphoric chaining as in (13) (see Fig. 11.5). This complex act is interpreted variably. (12) then contains a complex variably interpreted proto-assertion standing in for particular value-range proto-assertions of the form below: (14) A(T, x, is such that N, y, is such that, if x bears F to y, then x bears G to y)pro. The speaker is committed to performing acts of this form, where she accepts A(T is a thing)pro and A(N is a thing)pro. In claiming that English does not have any direct translations of any predicate calculus formulae, in the sense of direct paraphrases, we are not imposing any

256

There are, of course, plural referential forms that combine with x s and y s, as in For all x and for all y, if x bears F to y, then y bears G to x . I will not analyse these here.

288

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.6

restriction on the expressive power of English. English nearly always has semantic counterparts, sentences that on the right interpretation will have the same truth-conditions as formulae from the predicate calculus. For example, (10) has the same truth-conditions as (15) in English: (15) Every thing that bears F to another thing also bears G to it. But the truth-conditional equivalence does not mean that (15) has the same semantic structure as (10). Truthconditional equivalence does not imply syntactic and semantic structural identity. (15), unlike (10), is articulated in terms of relative-clause structures and pronominal relations to be described in §11.4 below. We are now in a better position to understand such that-constructions, as in Every yuppie is such that—she—. The overall structure of these sentences is given in (16) (See Fig. 11.6). The structures here have already been explicated above.

11.3 ANAPHORS UNBOUND I have so far specified STA's treatment of pronouns, which in Frege-model theories would be treated as bound variables. To show how STA deals with pronouns anaphoric on instances of every F but outside the bound-anaphor class, we need to emphasize the correctness of the following principle: Variable Interpretation Requirement (VIR) If π is a pronoun in a proto-assertion A(—π—)pro and π is anaphoric on a term φ performed in a variable act R(φ)pro/var, then, if the use of π is to be

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

289

Fig. 11.7

permissible, R(π)pro must sustain a variable interpretation, and, therefore, so must A(—π—)pro. To say that A(—π—)pro sustains a variable interpretation is just to say that A(—π—)pro is a constituent of a correct generic assertion—an assertion with generality introduced by a universal noun phrase or adverb of generality. VIR will be illustrated below. The simplest instances of pronouns π conforming to VIR are assertions of the form A(Every F—π—)pro, where π is anaphoric on every F. The condition in VIR is satisfied, since every F imposes a variable interpretation on the whole proto-assertion A(α-F—π—)pro in which π appears. So this use of π, which is anaphoric on every F, is permissible, since the proto-assertion in which π appears, A(α-F—π—)pro, sustains a variable interpretation. VIR does not insist that the proto-act in which π appears, A(—π—)pro, be the same proto-assertion in which the generic term φ, the antecedent of π, is located. Consider the inter-sentential anaphoric chain in (17): (17) Every soldier is armed. He is ready for combat at a moment's notice. Given that the antecedent of he is a universal noun phrase whose utterance involves performance of R(α-soldier)pro/var, the act R(he)pro must sustain a variable interpretation and so the whole proto-assertion in which it appears must sustain one as well. That requires that the second sentence, in (17) be interpretable as a generic assertion of some kind. And, indeed, the second sentence can sustain such a reading. It has more or less the same structure–content as The soldier is ready for combat at a moment's notice. For this reason, the inter-sentential anaphoric chain is not defective. The relevant structural features are given in (18)—here I represent the generic interpretation that the second proto-assertion has through the subscript G-pro (see Fig. 11.7).257 In this case, the second sentence in (18) can be interpreted as a type of generic-assertion. Thus, value-range proto-assertion pairs corresponding to (18) are utterances of (19) T is armed. He is ready for combat at a moment's notice,

257

Note that, in my representation of the proto-assertion, I do not introduce a generic subscript G-pro , since the generic interpretation is understood by the presence of every professor .

290

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.8

where R(T)pro is in the value range of R(α-soldier)pro/var, and R(he)pro has the referential content {Denoted by ‘T’}. A requirement for a generic reading of a sentence is that the particular value-range proto-acts, in so far as they are performed as assertions, can be seen as manifestations of some general tendency, or law—see §5.6. The second sentence in (17) meets these conditions. It is, in fact, a generic assertion functioning in terms of an implicit AG—with the effect of always. Defective cases of unbound anaphora, like (20) below, are incorrect, because the second sentence does not meet these conditions: (20) Every professor got drunk. *She made a fool of herself. In (20) she in the second sentence is anaphoric on every professor. This means that R(she)pro must be interpreted variably as in (21) (see Fig. 11.8) and thus the containing proto-assertion must be interpreted generically. However, A(She made a fool of herself)pro cannot sustain a generic reading. This is not for any syntactic reasons as such. First it lacks any explicit sign of generality, such as in each case. Secondly, the sentence She made a fool of herself cannot be interpreted as containing an implicit AG, such as always. That is simply because, under the circumstances, the particular value-range protoassertions, A(She made a fool of herself)pro, cannot be viewed as manifestation of any general law or tendency. This is confirmed by the fact that the definite description in The professor made a fool of herself is not readily interpreted generically given the context in which Every professor made a fool of herself.258

258

Compare STA's approach here with other treatment of defective cases. Evans (1973 : 220) attempts to explain the awkwardness of texts like (20) as the result of semantical number mismatch. This explanation is at loggerheads with cases like (17)—see Neale (1990 : 137)—which are perfectly fine but have the same semantical number mismatch. D-type theory allows cases like (17) but cannot explain why (20) is defective. DRT seeks to explain the infelicity in (20) by introducing a rule about anaphoric reference—namely, that discourse referents in embedded contexts must be accessible to pronouns in contexts coming after the embedded context, if the anaphoric chain is to be acceptable—see Kamp and Reyle (1993 : 169). However, (17) features an inaccessible context. An acceptable reading of (17) can be explained by appeal to a modal subordination approach, which is simply a technique of pasting discourse representations from the first sentence in (17) into the second—see §10.3.1 . But, if modal subordination can provide an acceptable reading of (17), why is there not an acceptable reading for (20)?

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

291

Indefinites in the scope of universal noun phrases can enter into inter-sentential anaphoric relations, which have the form: (22) A(Every F … a G …)pro/dox A(—π—)pro/G-pro/dox. These cases are governed by VIR; they are perfectly acceptable as long as A(—π—)pro/G-pro/dox is acceptable. There are both acceptable and unacceptable instances, as in: (23) Each student wrote an essay. In each case, it was over two thousand words. (24) Each student wrote an essay. *It was over two thousand words long. (23) is acceptable because the second assertion sustains a variable interpretation through the presence of in each case, whereas the second assertion in (24) does not—hence its defectiveness.259 In a standard semantics, a pronoun's being anaphoric on another pronoun or noun phrase in a generic context is—in the core case—constituted by the expressions concerned being bound by the same quantifier. In STA, that a certain pronoun is anaphoric on another pronoun or noun phrase is a fact about interpretation of the relevant referring acts independent of their interaction with vehicles of generality.

11.4 RELATIVE PRONOUNS AND DONKEY ANAPHORA Universal noun phrases can combine with relative pronouns to form sentences that may feature donkey anaphors. The classic type of basic donkey anaphor is given in (25): (25) Every yuppie who owns a Porsche waxes it. We have assembled all the elements needed to describe STA's account of sentences like (25): universal noun phrases, relative pronouns, indefinites in the scope of universal noun phrases, as given in Chapter 9, and now the general account of anaphors. We can display the relevant components of the structure of (25) in (26) (see Fig. 11.9). Basically, the compound variable assertion in (26a) stands in for assertions of the form given in (26c). The complex of variable acts at (26b) stand in for acts of the form given in (26d), which find themselves in particular proto-assertions of the form (26c). In uttering the whole sentence, U expresses a commitment to perform acts of the form A(T waxes it)pro, where it

259

We find something very similar in Every girl kissed a boy. In each case, the boy kissed by the girl was on the football team . The act R(the boy kissed by the girl )pro has a variable interpretation.

292

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.9

is anaphoric on a Porsche, which appears in a proto-act of the form A(who owns a Porsche)pro, permissible for U, where T and who are in apposition.260

11.4.1 Uniqueness Implications and ∃-readings At this point we should return briefly to concerns about uniqueness implications and donkey anaphora. I noted in §10.1 that a basic D-type pronoun approach to donkey anaphors is such that an assertion (27) A(Every F that Vs a G—π—)pro/dox, is equivalent to an assertion of the form (28) A(Every F that Vs a G—the G Ved by x—)pro/dox, where x is bound by every F. This analysis generates the unwanted uniqueness implication that each F that Vs a G Vs at most one G. It might be thought that STA faces the same problem, since indefinite descriptions carry uniqueness implications—see §5.3. This is not the case, for consider (25), whose value-range proto-assertions have the form (29): (29) A(T (who owns a Porsche), waxes it)pro. (29) contains R(T)pro in the value range of R(α-yuppie)pro/var, and R(a Porsche)pro in the value range of R(a Porsche)pro/var. Now there is no reason to think that for

260

According to the D-type approach the analysis of (25)—leaving aside the quantificational framework—is Every yuppie who owns a Porsche waxes the Porsche that he owns . STA can again explain why this approximates to the reality. The pronominal act R(it )pro will typically carry the extra referential content {Porsche, Owned by thing denoted by ‘ αyuppie’ }. In the above sentence, the pronoun is replaced by a definite description—with relative clause—whose associated referring act has this content.

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

293

every R(T)pro there is only one value-range proto-assertion of the form (29). Suppose that T in R(T)pro picks out yuppie Nathan who owns two Porsches, a pink one and a puce one, and waxes both. If so, there are two value-range acts that are instances of (29): (30) A(Nathan (who owns a Porsche that is pink), waxes it)pro. (31) A(Nathan (who owns a Porsche that is puce), waxes it)pro. These are value-range acts because they contain indefinites R(a Porsche)pro that fall into the value range of R(a Porsche)pro/var, since they contain as a component of their referential content {..Porsche, Owned by Nathan..}, for a value-range act R(Nathan)pro. This fact allows STA to explain sentences like: (32) Every girl who owns a donkey owns two other donkeys. The same technique of considering value-range proto-assertions of the form A(T—who owns a donkey that is F—owns two other donkeys)pro, where F is some extra content, will work here. Sentences like the following form another troubling case: (33) Every man who has a daughter thinks she is the most beautiful girl in the world. One can understand what an utterer of (33) is attempting to communicate. But in uttering (33) any aim U has at literal truth is clearly being sacrificed in the interests of this communicative purpose. Utterance of (33) assumes (falsely) that every man who has a daughter only has one daughter. (33) is comparable to Every man thinks his daughter is the most beautiful girl in the world, which also assumes that each man has a daughter, and which is acceptable to the same degree that (33) is. I suggest that (33) is related to another phenomenon: the possibility of ∃-readings in the sense of Chierchia (1992). Take: (34) Everyone who had a hat wore it to the game. (34) can be asserted where it is expected that some people have more than one hat but it is not expected that they wore every hat that they had. As in (33), literal truth is sacrificed in the interests of a communicative purpose. (34) communicates that the property of hat ownership by a person leads to their wearing of a hat. This is communicated through (34) by allowing the assumption (which is false under the circumstances) that everyone who had a hat had only one hat.261

261

So, as far as I can see, it would be an error to introduce a semantic analysis—as Chierchia (1992) does—or a speech-act theoretic (structural) analysis of the peculiarities of (34). The analysis should be purely at the level of conversational pragmatics, as I have suggested.

294

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.10

11.4.2 Adverbs of Generality STA handles straightforwardly both inter-clausal and inter-sentential donkey anaphors involving adverbs of generality. The speech-act structure of anaphoric chains in generic assertions is a variablization of the speech-act structure of anaphoric chains in particular assertions. Just as in the particular case there is no need for antecedent and pronoun to be in the same assertion, there is similarly no such need in the generic case. Moreover, the anaphoric relation is constituted independently of any relation the anaphors have to particular AGs. The only constraint on setting up a variable anaphoric chain is that the pronoun and antecedent must appear in assertions that are themselves determined to be variable—that is, VIR holds. I give a simple example of this. Take (35): (35) A man who owns a donkey always beats it. He usually beats it on a Sunday. I represent the speech-act structures associated with the bolded noun phrases in (36) (see Fig. 11.10). The complex of variable acts at level (36b) ranges over complexes of token acts—as displayed in level (36d)—which appear in particular proto-assertion pairs—as in (36c). The evaluation commitments emanate from two distinct AGs, always and usually. The combined effect of these is that, with respect to any such pair of value-range proto-acts, U expresses commitment to performing the first member of the pair, where A(who owns a donkey)pro is permissible for U, and an n >50 per cent inclination to perform the second member based on that information.

11.5 IF-SENTENCES We have still to tackle the more complicated cases of anaphoric relations that generate double-bind problems—see Chapter 10. To deal with these we need to

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

295

Fig. 11.11

provide some account of how if-clauses function. We have seen that Lewis's variable assignment-restrictor theory of ifclauses (1975b) issues in the double-bind problem. So what alternative account is there? Indeed, what account can combine with STA's treatment of noun phrases and generality? The answer is STA's own account of if, which I described, in §3.4.2, for the special case of indicative if-sentences. Below, I describe how this theory applies to both singular and general if-sentences and then combine it with the account of anaphors to provide a theory of anaphoric relations spanning if-clauses. The result not only resolves double-bind problems, but also provides a unified treatment of if-sentences that covers the singular/general if divide. The account of if proposed in §3.4.2, built on the account of supposition developed in §1.6. On this account, in uttering If S1, S2, U performs two proto-acts that may already carry modes of interpretations, A(S1)pro/…and A(S2)pro/…. The first, A(S1)pro/…, has a suppositional mode, A(S1)pro/…/S-pro. This is signified by the attachment of if with S1 to form if S1. The second, A(S2)pro/…, has a conditional mode, A(S2)pro/…/C-pro, which is signified by the attachment of if S1 to S2 to form If S1, S2. In Fig. 11.11 I specify the basic grammatical structure of an if-sentence, on the left, and, on the right, the compositional speech-act structure based thereupon—here ‘∩’ represents the concatenation of proto-assertions within a compound proto-act. According to the STA account—and herein lies its unity—all if-sentences, singular and general, have this structure. The thing that determines the differences of meaning between singular and general if-sentences is the interpretation of the embedded proto-assertions. Before I embark on clarifying and defending that claim, I need to reiterate what suppositional and conditional interpretations are. Supposition, as proposed in §1.6.1, is the act in which U performs a proto-assertion A(S1)pro/…where the use to which A(S1)pro/…is put is the goal of determining what the strict verbal consequences of the permissibility of A(S1)pro/…are in BU—the set of utterances accepted by U at that moment in the conversation. Thus, in a supposition, U presents herself as intending to represent a complex of a certain form, but lacks this intention, intending instead to be allowed to perform A(S1)pro/…so as to be able to perform other speech acts whose permissibility follows from that of A(S1)pro/…and proto-assertions permissible in the state BU

296

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

of her currently accepted sentences. Those other speech acts include conditional assertions,—namely, proto-assertions A(S2)pro/… performed so as to display instances of proto-assertions that follow as permissible, given the content of BU, from the permissibility of A(S1)pro/…. U implicates that her proto-assertion is in the scope of the supposition. This means that audiences interpreting her utterance evaluate the permissibility of the proto-assertion from within their own suppositional frameworks. I showed in §3.4 how this account explains the basic uses of singular indicative conditionals and if-sentences. The STA account fits perfectly into the Ramsey Test for the evaluation of indicative utterances. According to that test, indicatives are evaluated by U as follows. U adds hypothetically S1 to her set of beliefs and determines whether S2 is present in the hypothetically altered state or not. The STA account offers a speech-act structural translation of that idea. Thus, defending STA's account is closely allied to defending the Ramsey Test, which I will not attempt to do here. Note, however, that, unlike a material implication treatment of indicatives, the Ramsey Test model is one with considerable empirical support. Thus the structural account given in Fig. 11.11, above, where A(S1)pro and A(S2)pro are simple proto-assertions, issues in a plausible theory of indicatives, the Ramsey Test model. My claim is that adverbial if-generalities—as in If a man owns a donkey, he invariably beats it—are cases where the protoacts A(S1)pro/ and A(S2)pro/ receive a variable and a generic interpretation respectively, as in A(S1)pro/var and A(S2)pro/G-pro, before they receive suppositional and conditional interpretations respectively. Thus simple singular indicatives have the form (37) and adverbial if-generalities have the form (38): (37) A(if S1)pro/S-pro ∩ A(S2) pro/C-pro. (38) A(if S1)pro/var/S-pro ∩ A(S2) pro/G-pro/C-pro. If this theory can be sustained, then STA provides a compositional and unified treatment of if-sentences across the singular/general divide.

11.5.1 Simple If-Generalities Before we broach the topic of adverbial if-generalities, we need to examine anaphoric relations in simple if-sentences. That is, inter-clausal anaphoric relations in indicatives. Take if-sentences of the form (39): (39) If a donkey is in this room, it is not braying. These are just simple indicative conditionals with an antecedent–consequent anaphoric chain. Nevertheless, (39) has a type of generality; substitution of terms denoting particular donkeys for a donkey in (39) preserve correctness.

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

297

To understand (39), we first need to explain the relevant semantic properties of A(—an F—)pro under a suppositional interpretation. In a simple suppositional assertion, A(—an F—)pro/S-pro, the proto-assertion A(—an F—)pro is stipulated to be permissible as a ground for further speech acts. If it is to function as a ground for further speech acts, and A(—an F—)pro has no further mode of interpretation, it follows that, in performing A(—an F—)pro/S-pro, U must be interpreted as presenting herself as having a determinate intention to represent a complex. Therefore—as set out in §5.2.1—R(an F)pro gains determinate referential content. So R(a donkey)pro in (39) gains the referential content {..Donkey, In this room..}. The stipulation of the permissibility of performing A(—an F—)pro —in the conversation—is simultaneously the stipulation of the permissibility of performing R(an F)pro with determinate content and the permissibility of U's presenting herself as having a certain determinate denotative intention. In which case, there can be no question of U's having a denotative intention. So there can be no objective answer to the question which F U is referring to. It follows that the assertion type A(—an F—)pro/S-pro exhibits substitutional indifference generated by its speech-act structure. (See §9.4.) This means that an F can be replaced by any F and simple if-generalities can always have the form: (40) If any donkey is in this room, it is not braying. It is this substitutional indifference that is the source of the generality of these conditionals. Thus the apparent universal quantification behaviour of an F in a simple if-generality is a product of the assertive context's being suppositional and thus stipulative. This is no different from the case of negation, discussed in §9.3–9.4.)262 We now return to (39) and its anaphoric chain, which has the structure (41) (see Fig. 11.12). The proto-act, R(it)pro, has the referential content {Denoted by ‘a donkey’}. But of course it acquires extra theory-content: Donkey, In the room. That U is performing an act with this referential content is manifested by the fact that U might replace it by—or place into apposition with it—the phrases the aforementioned donkey, the donkey, that donkey, or the donkey in the room. Her use of these phrases would be manifestations of the anaphoric relation. Consider modus ponens. If U affirms (39), and then asserts ‘A donkey is in the room’, then she is committed to asserting ‘It is not braying’, where the latter is true just in case the thing denoted by a donkey is not braying.

262

It is shown by the example of simple if -generalities that a context's being one in which there is substitutional indifference is not the same thing as its being one in which R(an F )pro fails to gain determinate referential content. Wide-scope negations are cases where there is no sentential determination of referential content—see §9.3.2 .

298

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.12

STA has no difficulties dealing with complex intra-sentential and inter-sentential anaphora involving simple ifsentences. Take this relatively complex example—similar cases were discussed in §10.3.1: (42) If Tory wins, she will get a car. If it is second-hand, she'll feel cheated. But if it isn't, she'll be ecstatic. Note first an important structural fact about the anaphoric chains in (42). The pronoun it in the last sentence is anaphoric on a car and not on the pronoun it in the second sentence. The second pronoun can be expressed as it, the car that she will get, if she wins, and not the car that she will get, if she wins, which is second-hand. There is a simple reason for this. The supposition introduced by the second if-clause, if it is second-hand, is no longer in force in the final sentence. On the other hand, the supposition introduced by the first if-clause, if she wins, is in force. Take then the final if-sentence in (42). Given that the pronoun it is anaphoric on a car, U advertises an intention to denote the thing denoted by a car and also the thing that is the car that Tory will get if she wins. Consider the result of replacing the pronoun by this latter description. The result in this case is: (43) If the car that Tory will get if she wins isn't second-hand, she'll be ecstatic. (43) is slightly awkward but intelligible. The crucial issue for STA, or any theory, is the analysis of the complex if-clause in (43). Its structure is given in (44) (see Fig. 11.13). The act R(the car)pro gains its extra referential content through the relative clause. Note, however, that the relative clause proto-act, A(that Tory will get)pro, is conditional on supposition of she wins. This has the effect that use of the noun phrase R(the car)pro, although possessing Got by Tory as part of its referential content, does not presuppose that Tory gets a car; it presupposes only that she gets a car if she wins. This is in contrast to a phrase like the car Tory will get when she wins.263

263

The analysis (44) preserves the intuitive presuppositional structure of (43). (43)'s if -clause proto-assertion—A(the car that Tory will get if she wins isn't second-hand )pro —presupposes that, if Tory wins, she will get a car. In other words, the relative clause in (44) is effectively equivalent to an autonomous assertion of the form If Tory wins, she will get a car .

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

299

Fig. 11.13

11.6 ADVERBIAL IF-GENERALITIES In this section I describe the account of adverbial if-generalities, sentences like (45) whose general form is given in (46), where N-ly is an adverb of generality or AG: (45) If a dog is a collie, it is usually intelligent. (46) If— an F—, — N-ly— π—. If we follow the model of if-sentences, suggested in §11.5, sentences of the form (46) have the grammatical and speech-act structure given in Fig 11.11. That is, their overall structure is: (47) A(—an F—)pro/var/S-pro

∩

A(— N-ly— π—)pro/C-pro.

In (47), the if-clause is not in the scope of the adverbial of generality N-ly. Rather N-ly is in the scope of the if-clause. The structure of the if-generality is that of an antecedent proto-assertion A(—an F—)pro receiving a variable interpretation prior to its suppositional interpretation, and a proto-assertion A(—p —)pro receiving a generic interpretation through N-ly.264 Overall, the variable proto-assertion is suppositionally interpreted, and the generic protoassertion is in the scope of that supposition. I now explain in more detail how this works. Take the antecedent first. The antecedent clauses of adverbial if-generalities have an interpretation on which it makes no sense to ask whether they are true or false. With respect to If a dog is a collie, it is usually intelligent, the antecedent A dog is a collie as it appears in the sentence does not have a reading on which it makes sense to ask if it is true or false. STA explains this fact by proposing that

264

Note that, in my representation of the proto-assertion, I do not introduce a generic subscript G-pro , since the generic interpretation is understood by the presence of N-ly .

300

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.14

such antecedents are proto-assertions on variable interpretations. That is, they are proto-assertions A(—an F—)pro, with the structure given below: Proto-Act: U performs a proto-act A(—an F—)pro. Variable-Assertion: U signals the variable status of A(—an F—)pro—it stands in for value-range acts A(—T—)pro where R(T)pro is in the value-range R(an F)pro/var. The term an F, which is the antecedent of the pronoun that is the argument of N-ly in the consequent clause, is such that R(an F)pro/var does not have sententially determined content—it is a lexical proto-act interpreted variably. In other words, an F functions as if it were itself the argument of N-ly. It may be that A(—an F—)pro/var contains other indefinites; however, these will have sententially determined referential content—see the discussion in §9.5. Variable proto-assertions are associated with no communicative intention and so fail to be truth-apt. Although lacking any truth-condition, the variable proto-assertion can enter into the scope of if.265 When if combines with a sentence S, U performs A(S)pro/ … and signals that the permissibility of this act is stipulated for the purpose of determining the verbal consequences of that permissibility. Exactly the same holds when if combines with a variable assertion. That is A(—an F—)pro/var/S-pro is an act where: Variable Supposition: U performs A(—an F—)pro/var and signals that this act's permissibility is to be stipulated so as to be able to perform other speech acts whose permissibility follows from that of the permissibility of A(—an F—)pro/var and other accepted sentences in BU. Thus, on a suppositional interpretation of A(a dog is a collie)pro/var, U is given permission to perform an act with the structure of (48) (see Fig. 11.14). (48) is an act in which U performs a proto-assertion that is given as standing in for

265

For example, if -sentences according to STA lack truth-conditions but can enter into the scope of if , as in If the glass will break if it is dropped, it is fragile .

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

301

Fig. 11.15

value-range proto-assertions as in (48d). There is no commitment about the performance of the value-range acts. There is no communicative intention and so no question of truth.266 Given that an act of the form (48) is stipulated to be permissible as a supposition, U is then permitted to perform other proto-acts whose permissibility follows from that of the variable proto-assertion, given other accepted sentences in BU. In particular, if U believes collies are, typically, intelligent, then the proto-assertion A(It is usually intelligent)pro—where R(it)pro/var bears an anaphoric relation to R(a dog)pro/var—follows as permissible in BU. By itself, the assertion A(It is usually intelligent)pro/dox is not permissible in BU, since R(it)pro/var lacks content. But, adding the if-clause, assuming the anaphoric relation between a dog and it, the pronoun gains content and the proto-assertion becomes permissible. (49) (see Fig. 11.15) gives some of the relevant speech-act structures. (49a–b) gives the general speech-act structure of the if-generality focusing on the anaphoric chain. (49c–d) gives the speech-act structure of the value-range acts. With respect to the pairs of acts (49c), U expresses a commitment to an n-degree inclination to perform the second member of the pair, based on the permissibility for U of the first member. A point about this analysis need emphasizing. The sentence It is usually intelligent is produced in the scope of if-clause. The proto-assertion A(It is usually intelligent)pro has a conditional interpretation. The content of the act R(it)pro, and thus the acceptability of the proto-assertion, depends on the presence of the supposition. Nevertheless, in performing A(It is usually intelligent)pro, U expresses her commitment

266

Consider explicit suppositions introduced by directives. These can involve what appear to be variable assertions, as in Say that a number is odd! Here A number is odd does not have an interpretation on which it can be thought of as true or false.

302

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

state as described in the last paragraph. U can do so because the if-clause is used essentially to add content to the pronominal proto-act R(it)pro. U assigns truth to the consequent clause of (45), It is usually intelligent, if and only if she assigns truth to (50): (50) A dog that is a collie is usually intelligent. Because U, in sincerely uttering (45), really has the intention to defend the commitment property of its consequent, the latter is unconditionally true or false. We can say that (45) as a whole has the truth-conditions of (50), despite the fact that if makes no truth-conditional contribution to (45). (45) and adverbial if-sentences generally are truth-apt sentences carrying implicatures introduced by if-clauses. In assertion of (50), the relative-clause assertion A(that is a collie)pro/var— a permissible variable assertion by virtue of its grammatical location—has the same content as the antecedent variable assertion in utterance of (45). Thus both A(that is a collie)pro/var and A(a dog is a collie)pro/var/S-pro perform the same function of supplying content to a referring term, which is the argument of an AG, by bringing into play a permissible variable assertion.267 The role that I have just described played by if-clauses plays in adverbial generalities like (45) falls out of a unified treatment of if. The semantic function of if in all contexts is to implicate that the sentence within its scope is supposed. The same is going on here. What generates the peculiarities of if's role in cases like (45) is the fact that the protoassertion in the scope of if has a variable interpretation, and the role of the if-clause is to add content to a protoreferring act in the consequent. For this reason adverbial if-generalities are truth-apt—unlike if-sentences—despite the fact that if functions purely as an implicature operator.

11.6.1 Embedded If-Clauses I now examine how STA treats those complex intra- and inter-sentential anaphora that are problematic for semantic theories of generality accepting

267

Compare the structure of adverbial if-generalities with when-generalities. Consider:(i)When George goes out, he usually/sometimes gets clobbered by mud.Unlike the ifclause in adverbial if-generalities, the when-clause is in the scope of the AG. The when-clause forms a temporal referring term that is the argument of the adverb, so it is a variable proto-referring act R(when George goes out)pro/var. There is, therefore, a significant structural dissimilarity between when-generalities and if-generalities. Nevertheless when- and if-generalities have the same acceptability conditions, because in, say,(ii)If George goes out, he usually/sometimes gets clobbered by mud,the if-clause merely provides referential content for the referring act corresponding to an implicit temporal referring term in the consequent adverbial assertion. As a result the consequent assertion of (ii) is almost identical in structure to the assertion (i).

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

303

Fig. 11.16

the quantifier–variable-binding model. First consider compound adverbial if-generalities like (51) below—(17) in §10.1.1: (51) If a theory is classical, then, if it is inconsistent, it is trivial. According to STA, both if-clauses express suppositions of variable assertions. The indefinite a theory and the two its are anaphorically linked. The structure of the anaphoric relation is given in (52) (see Fig. 11.16). In this case, the commitment introduced in the consequent generic assertion is as follows. With respect to the triples at level (52c), U is committed to performing A(it is trivial)pro, where A(T is classical)pro and A(it is inconsistent)pro are permissible for U, given the anaphoric connections as indicated. This supplies us with the right acceptability conditions, since (51) is equivalent, truth-conditionally, to: (53) A theory that is classical and that is inconsistent is trivial. Again, in claiming that (51) has the same truth-conditions as (53), I am not proposing that they have the same speech act, and thus semantic structure. They do not. What we find is convergence of distinct speech-act structures onto the same truth-conditions, which is to say, there is redundancy of a certain kind in English.268 Note that in (51), as displayed in (52), the anaphoric relation involves one pronominal chain with one noun-phrase antecedent and two pronouns. The second pronoun it is anaphoric on the first pronoun it. That is because we have

268

There are other sentences that have the same truth-conditions as (51), for example:(i)If a theory is classical and inconsistent, it is trivial.(ii)Suppose a theory is classical. Suppose, furthermore, that it is inconsistent. Then, it is trivial.In proposing that (i) has the same acceptability-conditions as (51) I am not proposing that (51) has the semantic form of (i)—which is the conjunctive paraphrase response rejected in §10.1.1. A sentence like If a theory is inconsistent, it follows that it is trivial only if it is classical has no equivalent in a conjunctive form. Utterance of It is trivial in (ii) is a proto-assertion on a conditional interpretation with the same structure as that in (i).

304

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

a genuine embedding of suppositions and so the second supposition is in the scope of the first. It is because of this that there is accumulation of content in the second anaphor. In uttering the second it, U presents herself as intending to denote an entity that is denoted by the first it. But pronoun sequences do not have to work like this, as we saw in §11.5.1 with respect to (42). Take another example: (54) If a theory is inconsistent, it1 is not necessarily trivial. If it2 is classical, it3 will be. But if it4 is paraconsistent, it5 won't be. In this case, it 1 is anaphoric on a theory. it 2 is anaphoric on a theory, and not on it 1. That is because the second sentence introduces a second supposition. The pronoun it 4 is not anaphoric on it 3 nor on it 2 but on the first it 1. This is because the supposition introduced in if it 2 is classical is no longer in operation when the if-clause if it 4 is paraconsistent is used to introduce a supposition. The treatment that STA gives for compound if-generalities like (51) carries over to compounds with non-universal AGs such as usually. Take: (55) If a donkey is Andalusian, then, if it is farm-bred, it is usually miserable. The anaphoric chain structure in (55) is the same as that for (52) above. The last it, which is the argument of the AG usually, is associated with a referring act R(it)pro/var, which has the same speech-act structure as the last it in (52).

11.6.2 Comparisons On the STA account, assertion of compounds like (51) and (55) comprise three proto-assertions: two suppositional (variable) assertions and one conditional generic assertion. Only the latter carries with it a generic evaluation signal rendering it truth-apt. To view the matter in terms of adverbs of generality, or AGs, there is in (51), according to STA, only one AG, as in: If a theory is classical, then, if it is inconsistent, N-ly it is trivial. Compare here the D-type approach—assuming an implicit quantifier analysis—or DRT, as described in Chapter 10 with respect to (51)—(17) in § 10.1.1. These accounts, as noted in Chapter 10, impute two AGs to (51), as in: N-ly1 if a theory is classical, then, N-ly2 if it is inconsistent, it is trivial. Both accounts must impute this structure because these theories construe non-singular if-clauses as quantifier restrictors, so, given that the examples feature embedded if-clauses, there must be a quantifier associated with each clause. This analysis, as demonstrated in Chapter 10, generates the double-bind problem. The AGs N-ly1 and N-ly2, treated as quantifiers by the standard approaches, bind variables x1 and x2 respectively, but the analysis of the anaphoric relation

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

305

Fig. 11.17

requires that a constraint hold on permissible value-assignments to x1 and x2, which, inevitably, vitiates the successful functioning of one of N-ly1 and N-ly2. In sum, STA avoids the double-bind problem in cases like (51) and (55) by dispensing with the need for more than one source of generality. However, this is not the general form of the solution adopted by STA to double-bind problem cases. As I show now, there are more complex double-bind cases where STA cannot deny that there is more than one AG interacting with the anaphoric chain in the context. The obvious case where this will have to be admitted is that where the anaphoric chain is inter-sentential. I look at this now.

11.7 LOOSENING DOUBLE BINDS We now enter into the territory of those anaphoric relations involving multiple generality that give rise to double-bind problems. Consider first an inter-sentential case like (56)—this inter-sentential case was considered in §10.2, labelled there as (26): (56) If a donkey is Andalusian, it is well behaved. If it likes farmers, it is usually perfectly placid. On STA the structure of the anaphoric chain in (56) is (57) (see Fig. 11.17). (57) contains two adverbial if-generalities. Two generic commitments are expressed. We can describe these as follows. The quadruple of value-range protoassertions at level (57c) are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

A(T is Andalusian)pro. A(it is well behaved)pro. A(it likes farmers)pro. A(it is perfectly placid)pro.

306

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.18

The generic commitment expressed in the first adverbial if-generality in (57) is that, where (i) is permissible for U, U has degree n = 1 inclination to perform (ii). The second commitment is that, based on the permissibility for U of (i) and (iii), U has a degree n > ½ inclination to perform (iv). The upshot of this is that (56) comes out truth-conditionally equivalent to A donkey that is Andalusian that likes farmers is usually perfectly placid. Moreover, U's commitment states will be correct ones, in a situation where all Andalusian donkeys are well behaved, and, of those that like farmers as well, most are perfectly placid. STA can provide the right truth-conditions for (56). To recall the type of situation that demonstrated how the quantificational analysis breaks down, take that where all Andalusian donkeys are well behaved and those that like farmers are all perfectly placid save for Pedro. In this case, the STA analysis predicts correctly that the pair in (56) is true. There is nothing preventing the antecedent of an anaphor in an adverbial if-generality being a universal noun phrase. Take the case discussed at the end of §10.1.1 with which Neale's D-type theory had difficulties—this was (23) in §10.1.1: (58) Every Swiss male must do military service. If he is over 21, he must also be a member of the reserve. He is anaphoric on every Swiss male. In which case, there is a variablized structure of the form (59) (see Fig. 11.18). This means that the value-range assertions are of the form: (i) (ii) (iii)

A(T must do military service)pro. A(he is over 21)pro. A(He must also be in the reserve)pro.

Proto-assertions like (i) are the value-range proto-acts of the first universal, noun-phrase sentence. Those like (ii) and (iii) are those of the second. Again, the if-clause's role is not to enter into the scope of the implicit AG but rather to add content to the anaphor—namely, the content {Is over 21}. U expresses commitment to all instances of (i), where A(T is a Swiss male)pro is permissible for U, and, where a given (i) and (ii) are permissible for U, U is committed to performing (iii).

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

307

Fig. 11.19

11.7.1 Double Binds I now turn to inter-sentential cases that generate a particularly tight form of the double-bind problem. The chief example discussed at the end of §10.3.1 of such double-bind generating assertion pairs was (60) below—this was (35) in §10.3.1. (60) (a) If a girl graduates from Harvard, she gets a job. (b) It is usually good. I argued that there was no way of treating cases like (60) in terms of accounts based on the quantifier–variable-binding model. There is, however, no problem for STA. We can represent the relevant structural features of (60) by (61) (see Fig. 11.19). There are two sources of generality and so two sets of commitments, which pertain to the value-range proto-assertions at level (61c), rewritten below: (i) (ii) (iii)

A(T graduates from Harvard)pro. A(she gets a job)pro. A(it is good)pro.

The expressed commitments are, with respect to any given triple: from (60a) a commitment to performing (ii), where (i) is permissible for U; and from (60b) a degree n > ½ inclination to perform (iii), based on the permissibility of (i) and (ii) for U. In this account, the conjunction (60) is true just in case all girls graduating from Harvard get jobs, and in most cases these are good jobs. Which is correct. The problem of analysing (60) is closely related to the problem of analysing the generic assertion whose argument term is a definite description, as in: (62) The job that a girl gets if she graduates from Harvard is usually good. (We saw in §10.3 that Frege-model quantificational theories could not make sense of such sentences.) (62) carries the same commitments as (60) but packaged differently: All girls graduating from Harvard get jobs, and in most cases these

308

GRAMMAR IN MOTION AND DISCOURSE

Fig. 11.20

are good jobs. I now explain these two commitments. STA's analysis of (62) and, in particular, the complex relative-clause construction in (62)'s antecedent clause is given in (63) (see Fig. 11.20). The value-range proto-assertions in Fig 11.20 are the same as in (61) but arranged differently using different semantic forms. First, we have A(the job is good)pro—somewhat interrupted by hyphenation in (63c)—which corresponds to A(it is good)pro in (61c). The two protoassertions, (iv) (v)

A(that T gets)pro A(she graduates from H)pro

in (63c) correspond to (ii) A(she gets a job)pro and (i) A(T graduates from Harvard)pro in (61c). In (63), U expresses a degree n > ½ inclination to perform A(the job is good)pro based on the information given by the permissibility for U of (iv) and (v), assuming the proto-referential relations indicated. (Roughly, the information is that the job is T's and T has graduated from Harvard. (The idea of permissibility of proto-assertions like (iv) may appear untenable. But these are just relative clause proto-assertions.) Utterance of (62) brings with it another commitment: Girls graduating from Harvard always get jobs. This commitment is simply the commitment, which U expresses, to (v), where (iv) is permissible for U.

Conclusion That completes the account of generality and reference. STA can analyse those sentences and anaphoric chains that give rise to the double-bind problem for Frege-model theories based on the quantifier–variable-binding model. What brings about a satisfactory treatment of these cases is that STA envisages the constitution of an anaphoric chain as independent of facts about which noun phrases and pronouns in the chain are arguments of adverbs of generality.

DOMESTICATING DONKEYS

309

STA has also provided a unified treatment of if across the singular/general-if divide. It should be noted that the apparatus of generality and anaphora introduced by STA cannot be employed by standard truth-conditional theories of if to achieve the same result. An essential part of the account given above is that the antecedent sentences of adverbial if-generalities express variable assertions. But orthodox, Frege-model, theories cannot make much sense of the whole idea of a variably interpreted proto-assertion. This is neither a truth-apt assertion nor an open sentence whose variable is to be bound by some quantifier. A variably interpreted proto-assertion is an entity entirely off the conceptual map drawn by the Frege model.

REFERENCES Adams, E. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Dordrecht: Reidel. Alston, W. P. (2000). Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Ithaca, NY: Cornell. Appiah, A. (1985). Assertion and Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, D. (1978). A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Asher, N. (1993). Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Austin, J. (1962). How To Do Things With Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bach, K. (1999). ‘The Myth of Conventional Implicature’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 22: 327–66. —— and Harnish, R. (1979). Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Barker, S. J. (1991). ‘Even, still and Counterfactuals’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14: 1–38. —— (1993). ‘Conditional Excluded Middle, Conditional Assertion and Only if ’. Analysis, 53: 254–61. —— (1994). ‘A Pragmatic Approach to that-clauses and Quotation’. Paper presented at the 1994 Australian Association of Philosophy Conference. —— (1995). ‘Towards a Pragmatic Theory of “if ”’. Philosophical Studies, 78: 185–211. —— (1996). ‘Parsing if-sentences and the Conditions of Sentencehood’. Analysis, 56: 210–18. —— (1997a). ‘E-Type Pronouns, DRT, Dynamic Semantics and the Quantifier/Variable-Binding Model’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 20: 195–228. —— (1997b). ‘Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals’. Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 195–211. —— (2000). ‘Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?’ Analysis, 60: 185–211. —— (2003). ‘Truth and Conventional Implicature’. Mind, 112: 1–33. Barwise, J. (1979). ‘On Branching Quantifiers in English’. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 47–80. —— and Cooper, R. (1981). ‘Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 8: 47–80. —— and Perry, J. (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Beall, J. C., and Restall G. (2000). ‘Logical Pluralism’. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 475–93. Belnap, N. (1973). ‘Restricted Quantification and Conditional Assertion’, in H. Leblanc (ed.) Truth, Syntax and Modality. Dordrecht: North-Holland Publishing Company, 48–75.

REFERENCES

311

Bennett, J. (1976). Linguistic Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berman, S. (1987). Situation Based Semantics for Adverbs of Quantification, University of Massachusetts. Occasional Papers in Linguistics, 12. Bertolet, R. (1999). ‘Meaning, Cognitive Significance and the Causal Theory’, in J. Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor: Pedagoska Falculteta, 175–88. Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Blakemore, D. (1987). Semantic Constrains on Relevance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Boolos, G. (1984). ‘To Be is to Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Values of Some Variable)’. Journal of Philosophy, 81: 430–49. Brandom, R. (1994). Marking it Explicit. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Burge, T. (1973). ‘Reference and Proper Names’. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 425–39. Carston, R. (1988). ‘Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Conditional Semantics’, in R. Kempson (ed.), Mental Representations: The Interface between Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 155–82. Chastain, C. (1975). ‘Reference and Context’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 194–269. Chierchia, G. (1992). ‘Anaphora and Dynamic Binding’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15: 111–83. Church, A. (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cohen, L. (1964). ‘Do Illocutionary Forces exist?’ Philosophical Quarterly, 14: 118–37. Cooper, R. (1979). ‘The Interpretations of Pronouns’, in F. Henry and H. Schnelle (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, 10. New York. Academic Press. Cresswell, M. (1985a). Adverbial Modification. Dordrecht: Reidel. —— (1985b). Structured Meanings. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Crimmins, M. (1992). Talk about Beliefs. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Davidson, D. (1966). ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’, in N. Rescher (ed.) The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; repr. in Davidson (1980). —— (1967). ‘Truth and Meaning’. Synthèse, 17: 304–23; repr. in Davidson (1984b), 17–36. —— (1969). ‘True to the Facts’, Journal of Philosophy, 66: 748–64; repr. in Davidson (1984b), 37–54. —— (1978). ‘Intending’, in Yirmiahu Yovel (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Dordrecht: Reidel; repr. in Davidson (1980), 84–102. —— (1979). ‘Moods and Performances’, in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Dordrecht: Reidel; repr. in Davidson (1984b), 109–21. —— (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —— (1984a). ‘Communication and Convention’. Synthèse, 59: 13–17; in Davidson (1984b), 265–80. —— (1984b). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Devitt, M. (1981). Designation. New York: Columbia University Press. —— (1996). Coming to our Senses. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

312

REFERENCES

Donaho, S. (1998). ‘Are Declarative Sentences Representational?’ Mind, 107: 33–58. Donnellan, K. (1966). ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’. Philosophical Review, 77: 281–304. —— (1974). ‘Talking of Nothing’. Philosophical Review, 83: 3–31. —— (1978). ‘Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphora’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 47–68. Dowe, P. (2001). ‘A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and “Causation” by Omission’. Australian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 216–26. Dummett, M. (1959). ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141–162; repr. in Dummett (1978), 1–24. —— (1963). ‘Realism’. Read at Oxford University Philosophical Society in March 1963 and first printed in Dummett (1978), 145–65. —— (1973). ‘The Justification of Deduction’. Proceedings of the British Acadamy, 59: 201–32; repr. in Dummett (1978), 290–318. —— (1976). ‘What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 67–137. —— (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth. —— (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language (2nd edn.). London: Duckworth. —— (2000). Elements of Intuitionism (2nd edn.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Edgington, D. (1991). ‘Do Conditionals have Truth-Conditions?’, in F. Jackson (ed.), Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 176–201. —— (1995). ‘On Conditionals’. Mind, 104: 235–329. Evans, G. (1973). ‘The Causal Theory of Reference’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 47: 187–208. —— (1977). ‘Pronouns Quantifiers and Relative Clauses (I)’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7: 777–97. —— (1982). The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fine, K. (1985). Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Fodor, J. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Crowell. Fodor, G. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. —— (1998). In a Critical Condition: Polemical Essays in Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Forbes, G. (1990). ‘The Indispensability of Sinn’. Philosophical Review, 99: 535–65. Frege, G. (1952). ‘On Sense and Reference’, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlieb Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 56–78. Geach, P. (1962). Reference and Generality. Ithaca, NY: Syracus. Gibbard, A. (1981). ‘Two Recent theories of Conditionals’, in W. Harper et al. (1981), 211–47. —— (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Grice, P. (1957). ‘Meaning’. Philosophical Review, 66: 377–88. —— (1967). ‘Logic and Conversation’. William James lectures at Harvard, printed in J. Searle (ed.), Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989, 22–40. —— (1969). ‘Utterer's Meaning and Intentions’. Philosophical Review, 78: 147–77.

REFERENCES

313

Grice, P. (1971). ‘Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning’, in J. Searle (ed.), The Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 117–37. Groenendijk, J., and Stokhof, M. (1991). ‘Dynamic Predicate Logic’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14: 39–100. Haack, S. (1996). Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. —— (1982). ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’. Notre Dame Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28: 252–6. Harper, W., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce G. (1981) (eds.). Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance and Time. Dordrecht: Reidel. Heim, I. (1988). The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. New York: Garland. —— (1990). ‘E-type Pronouns and Donkey Anaphora’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 13: 137–77. Hintikka, J. (1983). The Game of Language: Studies in Game-Theoretic Semantics and its Applications. Dordrecht: Kluwer. —— (1996). The Principles of Mathematics Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press. Horn, L. R. (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Horwich, P. (1990). Truth. Oxford: Blackwell. Humberstone, L. (1992). ‘Direction of Fit’. Mind, 101: 59–83. Jackson, F. (1987). Conditionals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1998). ‘Reference and Description Revisited’. Philosophical Perspectives, 12: Language, Mind and Ontolology: 201–18. —— and Pettit, P. (1998). ‘A Problem for Expressivism’. Analysis, 58: 239–51. Jeffrey R. (1961). ‘On Indeterminate Conditionals’. Philosophical Studies, 14: 37–43. Kadmon, N. (1990). ‘Uniqueness’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 13: 273–324. Kamp, H., and Reyle, U. (1993). From Discourse to Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Kaplan, D. (1977). ‘Demonstratives’, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 481–563. Katz, J. (1990). The Metaphysics of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. —— (1994). ‘Bearerless Names’. Philosophical Review, 103: 1–39. King, J. (1996). ‘Structured Propositions and Sentence Meanings’. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 496–521. Kratzer, A. (1986). ‘Conditionals’. Chicago Linguistics Society, 22: 1–15. Kripke, S. (1976). ‘Is there a Problem with Substitutional Quantification?’, in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 325–419. —— (1977). ‘Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference’, in P. French, T. Uehling Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 6–27. —— (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

314

REFERENCES

Lewis, D. K. (1972). ‘General Semantics’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language. Dordrecht: Reidel, 169–218. —— (1975a). ‘Languages and Language’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. VII. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–35. —— (1975b). ‘Adverbs of Quantification’, in E. Keenan (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2–15. —— (1976). ‘Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities’. Philosophical Review, 85: 297–315 —— (1979). ‘Score Keeping in the Language Game’. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 339–59. —— (1983). ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–77. —— (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1986b). Philosophical Papers, 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ludlow, P., and Neale, S. (1991). ‘Indefinite Descriptions: In Defense of Russell’: Linguistics and Philosophy, 14: 171–202. Lycan, W. G. (1984). Logical Form and Natural Language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. —— (1991). ‘Even and Even if ’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14: 115–50. —— (2000). Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. —— (2003). Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McDermott, M. (1996). ‘On the Truth of Certain “If ”-Sentences’. Philosophical Review, 105: 1–37. Mackie, J. (1973). Truth, Probability and Paradox. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mellor, D. H. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge. —— (2000). ‘The Semantics and Ontology of Dispositions’. Mind, 109: 757–80. Millikin, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Montague, R. (1974). Formal Philosophy—Selected Papers by R. Montague, ed. R. Thomason. New Haven: Yale University Press. Morton, A. (1975). ‘Complex Individuals and Multi-Grad Relations’. Nôus, 9: 309–18. Neale S. (1990). Descriptions. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. —— (1995). ‘The Philosophical Significance of Gödel's Slingshot Argument’. Mind, 104: 761–825. —— (1999). ‘Colouring and Composition’, in K. Murasugi and R. Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 35–82. Oliver, A., and Smiley, T. (2001). ‘Strategies for a Logic of Plurals’. Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 289–306. Oppy, G. (1997). ‘The Philosophical Insignificance of Gödel's Slingshot Argument’. Mind, 106: 121–41. Peacocke, C. (1987). ‘Understanding the Logical Constants: A Realist's Account’. Proceedings of the British Academy, 73: 105–29. Pendlebury, M. (1989). ‘The Projection Strategy and Truth-Conditions of Conditional Statements’. Mind, 98: 179–205.

REFERENCES

315

Platts, M. (1979). The Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Price, H. (1988). Facts and the Function of Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— (1990). ‘Why “not”?’ Mind, 99: 221–38. Priest, G. (1987). In Contradiction. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Quine, W. V. (1953). From a Logical Point of View. New York: Harper & Row. —— (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. —— (1970). Philosophy of Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: Prentice Hall. Ramsey, F. (1931). Foundations of Mathematics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Rayo, A. (2002). ‘Words and Objects’. Nôus, 36: 436–64. Récanati, F. (1989). ‘The Pragmatics of what is Said’. Mind and Language, 4: 295–329. Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roberts, C. (1989). ‘Modal Subordination and Pronominal Anaphora in Discourse’. Linguistics and Philosophy, 12: 683–721. Russell, B. (1905). ‘On Denoting’. Mind, 14: 479–93. —— (1918). ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, in Logic and Knowledge. London: Allen & Unwin, 177–281. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege 's Puzzle. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Schiffer, S. (1972). Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— and Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sellars, W. (1954). ‘Some Reflections on Language Games’. Philosophy of Science, 21: 204–28. Soames, S. (1987). ‘Substitutivity’, in J. J. Thomason (ed.), On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 99–132. Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. —— —— (2002). ‘Truthfulness and Relevance’. Mind, 105: 583–632. Stalnaker, R. (1968). ‘A Theory of Conditionals’, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 98–112. Repr. in Harper et al. (1981), 41–55. —— (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Stenius, E. (1967). ‘Mood and Language-Game’. Synthèse, 17: 254–74. Strawson, P. (1950a). ‘On Referring’. Mind, 59: 320–44. —— (1950b). ‘Truth’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 24: 129–56. —— (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory. London: Methuen. —— (1964). ‘Intention and Convention in Speech Acts’. Philosophical Review, 73: 439–60. —— (1971). Logico-Linguistic Papers. London: Methuen. Taylor, B. (1985). Modes of Occurrence: Verbs, Adverbs and Events. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Van Fraassen, B. (1980). Review of B. Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (Basil Blackwell), in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 497–511.

316

REFERENCES

Van Inwagen, P. (1981). ‘Why I do not Understand Substitutional Quantification’. Philosophical Studies, 39: 281–5. Walton, K. (1973). ‘Pictures and Make Believe’. Philosophical Review, 82: 283–319. Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. Ogden. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Wright, C. (1998). ‘Why Frege did not Deserve his Granum Salis. A Note on the Paradox of “The Concept Horse” and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates’. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 55: 239–63.

INDEX Acceptance: 8–9, 204–5 Adams, E. 93, 94 Adverbs: and embedded proto-assertions, 76–9; and higher-order complexes, 76–9; and logical simplicity, 76–9; modifying logically complex sentences, 79; See epistemic adverbials and modals Adverbs of generality (and of quantification): 158–61, 174–5, 249, 248–51, 294, 299–309; naturalistic reduction of, 198–201, 203 Advertising: 7, 12, 46, 86, 110–11, 113, 123, 155; and repertoire rules, 110–11, 122–3, 177, 198–201; See pretence Agree: 29, 31–2, 42, 44, 188 α-terms: 134, 136–9, 173 n14, 202–3, 233–5; See descriptive noun phrases all: 173; and mass terms, 173 n14 Alston, W. P. 3 n6, 3 n7, 9 n14, 32 n10 Anaphor: 176, 281, 285 Anaphoric chains; 171, 177–8, 281–2, 284; and implicit situation-quantifiers, 260–4; and negation, 283–5; and substitution, 177, 285–6; and variable interpretations, 179, 282, 285–91; dummy names, 287; for DRT, 265–6; Frege model on, 179; inter-sentential, 256, 259, 262–76, 289–91; intra-sentential, 256, 258–9; mimicking variable-binding, 285–8 Anaphors: 176-80; and repertoire rules, 112, 176, 281; bound and unbound, 179, 252–5; donkey anaphora, 252–80, 282–5, 291–4; STA's unified treatment of, 281–2; See also pronouns, and names Any F/any Fs: and if, 297; as a species of α-term or β-term, 138–9, 141, 244–7; supposed ambiguity of, 246–7; supposed challenge to compositionality, 247–8; STA's unified treatment of, 245; See substitutional indifference Appiah, A. 93, 94 Apposition: 112, 122–3, 183 n24, 232–3 Armstrong, D. 16 n19, 70 n13 Asher, N. 270, 272 Assertability conditions: against assertability semantics, 221–2 Assertion: analysis of, 8–11, 40, 45–6; assertion types, 41, 44; assertion types as objects of belief, 190; assertive contents identified by Π-properties, 41; as truth-bearers, 11, 39–42, 81, 89; expressive, 10–11, 102–3, 169–70; not defined in terms of truth, 8–11; reportive, 9–11, 63–4, 65–6, 102–3; reportive/expressive distinction, 9–11, 41–2; simultaneous, 171, 175; See proto-assertion Austin, J. 2 n1, 3 n6, 57 n29 Bach, K. 29 n5, 31 n8, 36, 49 n22, 57 n29, 181 n23

Barker, S. J. 16 n18, 22 n26, 24 n29, 34 n13, 36 n15, 60 n30, 61, 88 n5, 88 n6, 94 n17, 99 n23, 101, 104 n26, 133 n26, 150 n14, 157 n20, 212, 259 n9 Barwise, J. 2 n2, 5 n9, 16 n19, 28 n2, 69 n9, 70, 70 n11, 171 n9, 172 n10, 184 n25, 255 n5

318

INDEX

Beall, J. C. 22-n10 β-terms: 134, 139–41 162, 164–75; See plural descriptive noun phrases Belief: objects of belief, 100, 190, 204–5; See doxastic tracking states Belnap, N. 61 n32 Bennett, J. 3 n6 Berman, S. Bertolet, R. 117 n11 Blackburn, S. 16 n18, 128 n23 Blakemore, D. 22 n26, 34, 43 Boolos, G. 166 n5, 171 n9 Brandom, R. 2 n3, 14 n16, 75 n21, 117 n12, 189 n2, 219 Burge, T. 126 Carston, R. 22 n26 Chastain, C. 141 n6 Chierchia, G. 264 n13, 265 n16, 293 n10 Church, A. 70 n11 Cognition: and causation, 198–205, 215–21 Cognitive states: as lacking de re logical complexity, 17 n20, 210, 220; as underpinning proto-acts, 198–205; those underpinning logically complex sentences 6, 14, 64, 90, 156, 159, 172–3, 255–6, 189, 206, 209–10, 212–14, 225–6 Cohen, L. 57 n29 Commitment: 9; natural expressive reduction of, 203–4, 215–19 Commitment/cognitive laws: 216–18 Commitment property: 40, 100–1, 102–3, 210–11, 214; See Πproperty Common nouns: 126–7; See general terms Communicative intentions: 8, 9–11, 40–1, 187–8, 211; and truth, 44–5, 57; non-assertoric, 41–2, 44; complexes: 4–5; as designations of true logically simple sentences, 47; as mind-independent constituents of reality, 5, 69–70; conceptually prior to truth, 69; higher order, 64–5; lacking in logical complexity, 5–6, 69; structure of complexes 69–71, 165–6 Compositionality: 7, 81, 148; and the argument against speechact based semantics, 3; defined in terms of designation for simple sentences, 69, 83; speech-act theoretic treatment of, 3, 64, 69, 81, 83–4, 90, 110, 219–20 Concepts: 197, 197 n9 Conceptual role semantics: 2, 14 n16, 16 Conditionals: See if-sentences Conjunction: 87–8, 89 n7 Conventional implicature: 33–6, 96–7, 150; also analyzed as presuppositional expression, 206, 217–18, 251; and semantic indecision, 35; embedded in logical compounds, 34; STA analysis of, 43–4 Concatenation: 67–8, 83, 88, 166–7, 201–3 Conventions: and sarcasm, 52, 53; no convention for sincerity, 53

Cooper, R. 172 n10, 184 n25, 256 n6 Cresswell, M. 28 n3, 78 n25 Crimmins, M. 28 n2, 190 n4 Davidson, D. 2 n2, 28 n4, 39, 53 n26, 63, 70 n11, 75, 76 n23, 190 n3 Defending: analysis of, 8-9; and assertoric purpose, 40, 44; and implicature, 43 Denotation: 2, 5, 115; and intentions, 120–1, 193–5, 197; and proto-referring, 115; and tracking, 193–8; singular, 134–5; plural (simultaneous) 134–5, 139–40, 162–3, 168–70 Denotative (d)-chains: 116, 118, 122–3, 132, 153 Denotative-aptness: 115 Denotative desires: 199–201

INDEX

Devitt, M. 116, 117 n11, 120 n14, 133 n26 Descriptive noun phrases: 22, 134–6;; definite descriptions: αDF (singular) 15, 111–12, 136–7, 154; and DRT, 277–9; and repertoire rules, 112; complex, 235–6; contrast with indefinites 143; D-rule, 143, 148, 154, 173; generic uses of, 158, 161, 236; incomplete, 112, 112 n5; referential and attributive distinction, 152–4; See presentential referential content; definite descriptions: βD-F (plural): 15, 140, 164–8; contrast with singular definite descriptions, 141–5, 154; generic plurals, 140, 173–4; indefinite descriptions α-F (singular): 15; and pronominal contradiction, 283; and referential/attributive distinction, 283; as a-terms, 134, 136, 154, 145–6; as referring terms, 135–6, 141 n6; functioning plurally, 167; generic uses of, 140, 158–60, 248–9, 290; in relation to anaphora, 141–2, 143, 149, 150 n14, 252–80; object-introduction/ type-identification functions, 145–6, 165 n4; scope relations with respect to negation, 225–6, 241–4; scope relations with universal noun phrases, 237–41; variable interpretations of, 159–60, 248–9; uniqueness implications, 148–50; uniqueness implications and anaphora, 256, 292–3; See sentential determination of reference; indefinite descriptions β-F (plural): 134, 150, 164–5, 170–1; quantitatives α1-F, β2-F, β3-F, etc: 164–5, 170–1, 214; one F, 137–8, 243–4; two Fs, three Fs, etc, 140, 172–3, 175; most Fs, 140, 173, 214; unified treatment of, 175–6; universal (descriptive) noun phrases αU-F: 138, 155–8, 179, 214; and functional expressions, 233–7; and relative clauses, 232–4; contrast with quantification treatment of, 157, 158 n22, 238; scope relations, 229–40 Descriptive theory of reference: 152 Designation: 3–4, 7; dependence on intention, 5, 191, 197; designative function, 5, 22, 135, 168–9; designative relations, 5, 7, 17–18, 115, 194; non-deflationism about, 74–5, 75 n21; relation to meaning, 4, 17–18, 83–4, 115 Direction of fit: 193–4 Discourse function: 6; referring terms and simple sentences, 73–4 Discourse Representation Theory (DRT): 254, 264–79, 290 n7 Disjunction: 87–89, 212–13, 216–19; expressive analysis of, 87–9 Disposition to perform: 199 n11; RR-dispositions, 199, 201–3 Donaho, S. 70 n11 Donnellan, K. 136, 152, 283 Double-bind problem: 255, 262–4, 268–9, 275–80, 305–9 Dowe, P. 220 n10 Doxastic grounding: 46, 52, 55, 82–3, 88–9, 114, 122–3, 136, 195–6 Dummett, M. 2 n2, 2 n3, 2 n4, 27 n1, 29, 53 n26, 67 n7, 152 n17, 174 n16, 189 n2, 217 n7 Edgington, D. 93, 94, 96 Embedding: 11; of conventional implicature, 21–2, 88, 98, 157;

319 of non-literal content, 21–2, 87–8, 100, 157; of proto-acts, 7, 85–7, 99–100; of proto-illocutionary acts, 85, 87, 104–5; See relative clauses

320

INDEX

Entailment: 215–19 Epistemic adverbials and modals: 21, 29–33, 91–2; expressive analysis of, 40–2; puzzling nature of, 30–2, 102–3, 221–2 Evans, G. 64 n2, 114 n9, 117 n12, 121 n15, 122 n17, 127, 127 n20, 127 n21, 128 n23, 150 n14, 157 n21, 178 n19, 253 n1, 254, 290 n7 Every F: See descriptive noun phrase (universal) Exclusion: exclusion laws, 207–9, 210–4; exclusion states, 206; See negation, rejection Existence: 173, 178 Exists (as an expressive predicate): 16, 103, 145, 154 n18 Expressing: 9, 10 n15, 10–11; See assertion Expressivism: 206–7, 220–1; about semantic norms, 206–19; See logical complexity, sentences, truth Fine, K. 155 Facts: 4–5 Falsity: 9, 101–1–2, 151 Fiction: See names Fodor, J. 19 n23, 20 n24, 20 n25, 197 n8 Force: 80–85; rejection of the force/sense distinction, 81–5 Forbes, G. 28 n3, 133 n26 Formal language: 184, 221; as translation of natural languages, 286–8 Frege, G. 67 n7, 74 n18 Frege model: 1-3; attitude to surface grammar, 18, 109, 170, 183–4, 225; Frege-model theories, 2 n2, 184; STA rejection of, 21 Geach–Kaplan sentence: 170–1 Geach, P. 253 n2, 253 n3 General terms: 5, 132–3, 236; against nominalism, 68 Generality: and plural noun phrases, 140, 163; generic interpretation of proto-acts 14–15; logically simple and complex, 213–14; See adverbs of generality, quantification Gibbard, A. 16 n18, 93 Grammar: and logical form, 18–19, 76, 83, 134, 170, 183–4, 286–7; as guide to proto-act structure, 18–19, 109–10, 134, 170, 180–1, 183–4, 226 Grice, P. 2 n1, 3 n6, 8 n12, 9 n14, 20 n25, 34, 46, 54, 91 n10, 94 n17, 144 Groenendijk, J. 3 n5, 24 n28, 150 n14, 255 n5 Haack, S. 220 n10 Harman, G. 2 n3, 219 Harnish, R. 49 n22, 57 n29 Heim, I. 255, 260, 263, 268 n15 Hintikka, J. 2 n2, 2 n4, 23 n27, 147 Holism: 219–20 Horn, L. R. 88, 151 n15, 213 n6 Horwich, P. 29, 101 Humberstone, L. 193 n7 Idealism: 64 n3 Identity (expressive analysis of): 16, 103–4 If-sentences: 85, 92–5, 213; adverbial if-generalities, 253–4,

264–5, 299–305; and conditional assertion, 63, 95, 96–9, 296; and donkey anaphora, 253–4, 256, 257–63, 294–304; and probability judgements, 94–5; and supposition, 63, 96–9, 295–6; as implicatives (presuppositional expressives), 95–9; indicative if-sentences, 92–9, 296–9; speechact structure of, 97, 294–6, 299; unified and compositional treatment of, 99, 281–2, 294–304

INDEX

Illocutionary acts: 50–1, 82–3; See proto-illocutionary acts Implicature-operator: 34; See conventional implicature Intentions: and circularity of STA, 190; and logically complex content, 20, 154, 169; and the NR system, 20, 169; and the reproduction problem, 19–20, 187–90, 198; denotative intentions, 7, 13, 113, 135, 194–6; representational intentions, 7, 9, 169, 195–6; underpinning semantic contents, vii–viii, 19–20; See advertising (an intention) Interpretation: See mode of interpretation Intersubjective agreement: 16 Intersubjectivity: 62, 95, 206–7, 210–12, 218; See objectivity Jackson, F. 14 n16, 16 n18, 34 n12, 35 n14, 92 n13, 93, 94 n8, 126, 144 n9 Jeffery, R. 61 n32, 95 n19 Kadmon, N. 277 n22 Kamp, H. 2 n2, 3 n5, 24 n28, 24 n28, 150 n14, 254, 255, 265, 269 n18, 277, 290 n7 Kaplan, D. 28 n2, 63 Katz, J. 131, 209 n2, 219 n8 King, J. 28 n2 Kratzer, A. 24 n29 Kripke, S. 2 n4, 64 n3, 116, 117 n12, 123 n18, 127 n20, 148 n13, 152 Lewis, D. K. 2 n1, 2 n2, 24 n29, 28 n2, 28 n3, 38, 39, 54, 62 n33, 63, 70 n11, 91 n13, 93, 99 n24, 159, 184 n25, 205 n14, 220 n10, 254, 260 n10, 264 n5, 265 n14, 266, 295 Logical complexity: and cognitive states, 207-10; and the reportive/expressive distinction, 12–13, 15–16, 20, 64, 163, 206; and the reproduction problem, 19–20, 188–9; de dicto, 16, 20, 189, 220–1; de re incompatibilities, 209; de re/in re, viii, 16, 196–7, 220–1; redrawing the boundaries of, 16, 64–5, 174–5, 213–4; See sentences Logical constants: 14, 86, 88, 163, 206, 219–20; causal powers of, 215–20; connectives, 87–9 Ludlow P. 150 n14, 256, 257 Lycan, W. G. 2 n2, 28 n4, 34 n8, 57 n29, 75 n22, 94 n16, 152 n16, 171, 259 n9 Mackie, J. 62, 95 McDermott, M. 61 n32, 95 n19 Mellor, D. H. 74 n20, 220 n10 Meaning: 6; different senses of sentence-meaning, 63, 81; in relation to truth-conditions, 64, 68; representation not required for meaning, 66; sentence-meanings as proto-acts, 63, 85, 104, 110; truth and satisfaction posterior to meaning, 68; use-theory of and STA, 63–4, 125; wordmeanings–as speech-act types, vii, 6, 63, 110, in relation to denotation, 154–See Frege model Metaphor: See mode of interpretation Millikin, R. 197 n8 Modes of interpretation: 7–8, 13–15, 51–6, 58–9, 180; approximative mode, 54–5, 115; complex, 54; metaphoric mode, 53–4, 85, 115, 115 n10; of proto-assertions, 14,

321 51–6; non-assertoric modes thereof, 57; of proto-referring acts, 14–15, 115, 212; proxy, 104 n26; sarcastic mode, 13, 51–3, 85 n3, 115; suppositional mode, 59–61, 95–9, 297; vague sentences under a mode, 71; variable mode, 138, 155–6, 159, 174–5, 178, 229, 230–1, 248–9

322

INDEX

Montague, R. 2 n2 Mood: and truth, 37-9; significance of, 19, 80–5 Moorean paradox/pragmatic contradiction: 9, 211 Morton, A. 166 n5 Names: 5, 110, 116–32; and anaphors, 117–18, 118–20; and denotation, 5, 111–12, 118–19, 120–1; and descriptive content, 126, 195; and fiction, 6, 14, 123–4; and files, 118–20, 123, 195, and nominal proto-referring act types, 122–3, 125, 126–32; and referential trees, 110, 116–18, 125, 127, 173; and repertoire rules, 111; empty names, 128, 129–31, 157, 178; nominal anaphoric chains, 119; source speakers, 120–1, 125; STAN, 125, 131; understanding, 127–8 Natural language: viii, 1 Natural representation (NR) system: 20, 189–91, 192–8, 207–10; and logical complexity, 20, 154, 169, 196–8, 199–201; and the emergence of semantic content, 20, 191 Neale, S. 24 n28, 29 n5, 31 n8, 70 n11, 109, 109 n1, 112 n5, 150 n14, 178 n19, 179 n20, 181 n23, 184, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258 n8, 260, 283, 290 n7 Negation: 89–91, 174–5, 209–10, 221; and exclusion states, 209–10, 219; as an adverb, 89–90, 227; expressivist treatment of, 90–1, 209–10; natural reduction of, 207–10; N-states, 90–1, 204–10, 213 n6, 221, 227, 242; scope relations, 225–8; so called metalinguistic negation, 91, 101 Negative existentials: 131–2, 244 Negative facts: 4–5 Negative polarity: 138, 213 n6, 245 Normativity: vii–viii, 198; See expressivism Noun phrases: grammar, 109–10; singular/plural, 109–10; See descriptive noun phrases Objectivity: of correctness, 98, 160 n24, 216–17; of logic, 210–2; of truth, 102–103 Oliver, A. 110 n3 Oppy, G. 70 n11 Orders: 81-84; and truth, 36–9, 44, 50–1 Peacocke, C. 218 Pendlebury, M. 34 n16 Performatives: 57; puzzling nature of, 57 n29; STA analysis of, 57 Permissibility: 58–9, 82 n1, 156–7 Perry, J. 2 n2, 5 n9, 16 n19, 28 n2, 69 n9, 70, 70 n11 Pettit. P. 14 n16, 16 n18, 35 n14 Π-property: 8–9, 11; See commitment property Platts, M. 3 n7 Plural noun phrases: and collective, cumulative, and distributed readings, 162–3, 165–70; See denotation, representation Pragmatic Conception of Truth (PCT): 11–12, 39–40, 79, 188, 205 Pragmatics: 1-2: formal pragmatics, 27, 63, 187; scope and limits of, 1–2, 63

Predicates: as incomplete proto-assertions, 67, 226–7, 230 n4; being supplemented in concatenation, 67, 68 fig. 2.1, 226–7; internal and external application, 225–6, 228–30; logically complex, 72, 227–30; standard application of, 231 Presenting oneself as intending: See advertising

INDEX

Pretence: vii, 7, 114, 124; and logically complex sentences, 89; and modes of interpretation, 51–2, 89 Price, H. 33 n11, 37, 210 n3 Priest, G. 212 n5 Pronouns: 127, 175–83; D-type, 178 n19, 254, 255–60, 273, 282–3, 290 n7, 292 n9; interrogative, 84–5; relative, 85, 180–3, 291–4; See anaphora Proper names: See names Properties: as constituents of complexes, 70–1; nature of, 70–1; sparse theory of, 71 Propositions: Frege-model conceptions of, 80–1, 85; propositions and SCT, 12, 27–9, 85 Proto-acts: 7, 13, 134–5, 198–205; as backbone of semantic interpretation, 19, 187–91; proto-assertion types, 81, 133; natural reduction of, 198–205; proto-assertions, 11–12, 17 n21, 85–6–complex, 55–6, incomplete, 67, simple, 55–6; under a variable mode, 300–1– proto-communicative acts, 45–6, 114, 203–5; proto-illocutionary acts, 50–1, 82–3, 85, 104; proto-implicatives, 72; proto-referring, 13, 109–10, 113, 135–6, 176; proto-representational acts, 45–6, 82–3, 114, 198–203 Proto-act type: 124, 125, 132 Psychologism: 12, 17, 191, 206, 215, 219, 221 Quantification: 2–3, 252–80; and the Frege model, 2–3, 170, 213–4; quantification and indefinite descriptions, 145, 148–50, 241, 243 n10; STA's rejection of, 21, 150, 225–6; translations of predicate logic formulae, 286–8 Questions: 82–5, 97–8; rhetorical, 37, 58, 85 Quine, W. V. 68 n8, 220 n10, 253 n3 Ramsey, F. 62 Rayo, A. 165 Realism: 69–70; about logical determinateness, 72 n14 Récanati, F. 22 n26 Referential content: 113, 123–4, 137, 140, 155, 160, 164, 167; and chain-fixing content, 153, 178, 194–5; and relative clauses, 181–2, 232–5; presentential determination of referential content, 137, 142–3, 161 164–5; sentential determination of referential content 137, 142, 146–8, 164–5, 172, 176–8, 239, 242–4 Referential trees: 116–17; See names Referring acts: 7, 13; See proto-referring Referring terms: 5, 135; and proto-referring, 135 Rejection: 8–9, 151, 204–5; See exclusion, negation Relative clauses: 180–3, 232–5; in adverbial generalities, 249–50; in relation to complex descriptive phrases, 180–3, 232–5; in relation to sentential determination of referential content, 243; non-restrictive, 182–3; restrictive, 180–3 Repertoire rules: 7, 46–50, 110–13; and communication, 48–9; and conventions, 49; and designation, 197; and knowledge, 49; and literal meaning, 49; and proto-acts, 7, 47–9, 56, 113; for proto-assertions, 47–8, 52–3, 210; for proto-

323 referring acts, 49–50, 110–13, 122–3, 135–6, 139–40; naturalistic reduction of, 50, 198–201

324

INDEX

Representation: 5, 45; analysis of, 74–5; intention-based representation, 20, 74–5, 191; plural sentential representation, 162–3, 166–7, 173–4; pre-intentional representation, 20, 191; relation to meaning, 74–5, 187–8; representingaptness, 66; sentence's representing complexes, 5, 39 Reporting/expressing: 6, 9–13, 13, 15–16, 188–9; See reportive assertion, expressive assertion Restall, G. 220 n10 Reyle, U. 2 n2, 3n5, 24 n28, 24 n29, 150 n14, 254, 255, 265, 269 n18, 277, 290 n7 Richard, M. 133 n26, 190 n4 Rightness: 216–19 Roberts, C. 263, 269, 270, 272 Russell, B. 4 n8, 69 n9, 74 n20, 221 Salmon, N. 28 n2 Sarcasm: See mode of interpretation Schiffer, S. 3 n6, 8 n12, 9 n14 Scope relations: 225–51 Searle, J. 2 n1, 20 n24, 191 n5 Sellars, W. 2 n3 Semantic conception of truth (SCT): 12, 27–8, 80–1, 152, 152 n17, 187–8; and correspondence, 27–8; anomalies for, 29–39, 85, 92–5, 158 n22 Semantics: vii–viii: and speech-act reduction of: vii, 3–4, 85, 187; semantic content, 8, 85, 99–100, 125, 187–8; semantics as a branch of pragmatics, 12, 63, 221; truthconditional semantics, 2 Sentences: logically complex, 6, 15–16, 86, 156; and objectivity, 16–17; contents as expressive acts, 156; logically simple, 64–5, 71–9; as logical subject terms, 73–4; as reportives, 64–6; contrast with referring terms, 6, 73; representation of complexes, 6, 16, 73–5; structure of, 66–9; the simple/ complex distinction, 15–16, 206 Sentential Determination: 147, 242 Sincerity: 7, 12, 52, 54; and referring acts, 114 Singular terms: difference from simple sentences, 73–4; and Frege's context principle, 74 n19, 84 n2; See names, referring terms Sling-shot argument: 21, 70 Smiley, T. 110 n3 Speech acts: vii Speech act types: vii, 81, 99–100; as abstracta, 64 Speech-act Theoretic Approach (STA): vii–viii; as contrasted with the Frege model, 3-4; general nature of, 14, 15–16, 17, 79; ontological commitments of, 5–6, 8 Soames, S. 28 n2 Sperber, D. 2 n1, 52, 55 Stalnaker, R. 28 n2, 93 Stenius, E. 37 n16, 80 Stokhof, M. 3 n5, 24 n28, 150 n14, 255 n5 Strawson, P. 3 n6, 101 n25, 152 n16, 283 Subjective probability statements: 11–12

Substitutional indifference: and any 139, 244–5; and negation, 244–5; and if-clauses, 297 Substitutional quantification: 2, 158 n12 Supposition: 59–61, 213, 295–6; STA analysis of (stipulated permissibility), 60–1, 105, 156, 213; supposition of variable proto-assertions, 300–1; See if-sentences Suppositional proof: 61–2 Taylor, B. 70 n11, 78 n25 That-clauses: 99–100, 104 n26

INDEX

Thought: and mentalese, 20; in relation to proto-acts, 20, 130–1 Topics: 33, 65, 84, 226, 228–30, 235, 239, 244 Topicalization: 72, 229 n2 Tracking: 20; and plural denotation, 196; doxastic trackings states, 190, 193, 195–6, 207; See intentions, NR system Truth: 9-12; and correspondence, 11, 12, 39, 65–6, 101, 102; and reportive assertions, 65–6; and truth-makers, 16 n19; conceptually posterior to assertion, 27, 44; gaps, 150–2; not correct representation, 57, 66, 188; the expressive predicate is true, 11, 44, 100–2; T-schema, 101; See pragmatic conception of (PCT), semantic conception of (SCT), objectivity Truth-aptness: 36–9; according to PCT, 39; according to SCT, 27 Truth-conditions: 11, 12, 32–3, 87–8, 90–1, 188, 215, 218, 247, 288; and SCT, 29 Truth-bearers: See assertion Vanderveken, D. 2n1 Van Fraassen, B. 97 n21 Van Inwagen, P. 158 n22 Value-range acts: 156, 157 Variable Interpretation Requirement (VIR) 288, 291, 294 Variables: 50, 67, 113 n6 292 n6, 264–6; indefinites descriptions treated as variables, 264–5; STA rejection of, 21, 192 n6, 196, 252 Vocative acts: 74 n19, 84 n2, 114 Walten, K. 114 n9 When-generalities: 309 n16 Wilson, D. 2 n1, 52, 55 Wittgenstein, L. 3, 5 n9, 16 n17, 69 n9, 74 n20 Wright, C. 67 n7

325