Representation and Expression

Representation and Expression: A False Antinomy Carol Donnell-Kotrozo The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Winter, 1980), pp. 163-173. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8529%28198024%2939%3A2%3C163%3ARAEAFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism is currently published by The American Society for Aesthetics.

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Representation and Expression:

A False Antinomy

THEMETHODOLOGY of art history does not include a theoretical examination of traditional issues and problems. This has largely been the function of philosophical aesthetics. Such a neglect of theory is especially perplexing considering the radical shifts in the conventional perspectives of art history that are likely to occur. ,4 case in point is Morris Weitz's illuminating discussion of mannerism.' A further example is provided by post-impressionism which poses problems for both the art historian and the aesthetician who might be concerned with the relationship of representation to expression in art. While the philosopher seeks general principles to govern the usage of these terms, the empirically-minded art historian focuses on the particulars of various historical situations. Thus, the post-impressionists offer a specific case of the larger issue of representation versus expression in the sense that there is no uniform interpretation of Ckzanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin. Art historians have equivocated for decades as to the correct placement of this problematic late nineteenth-century movement. Do they fall within the boundaries of realism and naturalism as representational styles, or do they align with the subjective expressionists of the twentieth century? T h e lack of a firm foothold for this group of artists is still of persistent concern to art historians. T o avoid a fatal fall into the CAROLDONNELL-KOTROZO is associate professor of Humanities at Arizona State University

clutches of nineteenth-century representational styles, they have generally preferred a more forward-looking interpretation of the post-impressionists in keeping with their concepts of evolutionary progress in style, a progress that seems mysteriously to propel its way through history, yet with a clarity and a logic befitting an order-seeking discipline. T h e standard historical view of postimpressionism as proto-expressionism is fraught with insuperable difficulties, many of which stem from errors of omission. Because the discipline of art history is intractably negligent in acknowledging the position of aestheticians on the issues of representation versus expression, it is still perpetuating outmoded concepts reflective of the dualistic language of the nineteenth century. Christine McCorkel has noted the general distrust of all theorizing common to art history after World War 1.2 In the United States, this anti-philosophical mood parallels the logical empiricists' repudiation of metaphysics and denotes an attempt to restrict art historical inquiry to "objective" considerations of concrete evidence. T h e theoretical poverty of art history reflects the assumption that theoretical "speculation" is irrelevant to the creation of a factual world of perfect order. It is ironic that in its search for a refinement of methods for defining and dealing with historical facts, art historians have ignored the efforts of aestheticians to investigate and clarify the usage of such terms as representation and expression. T h e

DONNELL-KOTROZO

inconsistency and imp~ecision with ~ \ h i c h these terms are utilized in an art histoiical context is indicative of a lack of understanding of the nature of aesthetics and its allegetll) tulempil ical ii jx tori rx stern builtling For example, H . XV. Tanson in "The Art Historian's Comments" contrasts tlie liistorical methodology of his discipline with the generalized theoretical approach of aesthetics and conclutles that "the lalues of art historians may be molded by contemporary artistic production but not, so far as I an1 aware, b) aesthetics " 3 A look at the history of the term, representation, and associated concepts such as realism, impressionism, and ~iaturalism as they are applied to post-impressionism should reveal the erroneous assumptions and groundless clualism that have been peipetuated by contemporary art historical criticism. T h e example of the post-i~npressionists will also s e n e as a paradigm case of the exigency of adopting a theoletical solution to an art historical dilemma. I propose to counter the complaint of art historiails that aesthetic theories, though logically defensible, have not been tested against the works tl-tenlselves as a measure of their theoretical validit\. Contrary to the scepticism of art historians, the issues of aestlietics are genuinely of mutual concern. T h e prevailing vieu of post-impressionism as a boundary-breaking revolutionary art movement ste~nslrom the artists' common rejection of irupressionirm and nat~ualisrn, two diverse st)les that shared the belief that one's knowledge of tlie norld rvas limited to those aspects of leality that the obserler experienced empiricall) . .Although the artists of the post-impressionist movement were grappling with the relation betmeen tlie natural and the practical worlds and felt there to be an intimate connection between art and nature, it was not in terins of the strict model-cop) relationship of scientific naturalism. IYith naturalism and impressionism, ,irt had come to adopt the scientific method as the artist concentrated on reproducing tile ~vorldas if neutrally obserletl, relinquishing subjective and emotional connotations. This conception of neutral or objection vision is a testimony to the influ-

ence of the positivistic philosophy of the mid-nineteenth century. Although it is likely that artists and theorists alike misconstrued some aspects of the new philosophy, their assumptions have been held by art historians to tlie present day. Baudelaire, in his "Salon of 1859," contrasts two kinds of truth sought by two divergent kinds of art: T h e inlnlense class of artist5 . . . can be d i ~ i d e d into two quite distinct camps: one type, who calls himself "lbaliste" . . . and ~ v h o m rve, in order t o characterize better his error, shall call "positiviste." sa)s: "I \$-ant to represent things as they arc." And the other type, "l'irnaginatif," s a y : "I !\ant to illuminate things with my spirit and project their reflection upon other spirits."'

Cei tainly this is an oxersimplification of tlie theory of positilism in ~vhicli Baudelaire distinguishes the truth of a mechanical realism (associated with the photograph) from that of a human, subjective encounter with nature. However, this divorce of the "absolute truth" of external reality and the fantasies of the imagination is found in other later critics of the period such as Eugene Fromentin, Roger hlarx, Armand Silvestre, and Theodore Duret. (A sampling of twentieth-century art historians releais siinilar attitudes: John Rewald, Linda Nochlin, and H. R. Rookmaaker among others.) T h e artists a110 came to be known as impressionists modified this positivistic doctrine, s o m e ~ h a tchanging tlie emphasis in painting from the naturalist's photographic imitation of reality as an expression of mechanistic ~nateria!ism to an anal>sis of what they believed to be retinal perception in its multiple variations, particularly in terms of the light effects found in nature. T h e impressionist painter continued to accept the basic presumptions of naturalisn~; but attempting to rely upon the raw data of visual experience, his intention was to record lisual impressions as exactly seen and to capture with accuiacy and immediacy what was considered to be the optic experience of realit). T h e representation of nature changed but was still equated with a standard of objective accuracy, a norm of true perception.

A False Antinomy

Impressionism, however, carried the seeds comes the subjective antithesis of the natuof disintegration within its own theories, as ralist's or impressionist's objectivity. (Clive many painters within the movement came Bell, identified with the same aesthetic creed to see that the depiction on canvas was more as Fr.), loathed the impressionists' "scientific than the simple recording of pure "inno- pretentions" as being the ultimate degradacent" visual sensations of the perceptual tion of imitative art.)' Because the natusurface of the world. Despite the popular ralists and impressionists represented the view that the passage from impressionism standard of photographic accuracy in paintto symbolism and post-impressionism was a ing at this time, it was believed that the radical and traumatic event, it was consis- post-impressionists could offer only a distent with contemporary developments in torted representation of reality by compariphysiological psychology which was already son. Partly, then, as a result of the positivistic beginning to break down the positivistic distinction between subject and object theories of late nineteenth-century critics through an emphasis upon the experience of and theorists, and partly because of Bell's the observer and by the assertion that the and Fry's emphatic formalism which so-called facts of reality were not absolute." eschewed all interest in representation, the Art, like normal visual perception, came to post-impressionists were credited with a be seen as a process of organizing sensory radical emancipation of the artist from the elements into some degree of meaningful entire tradition of representational art which previously sought to capture if not rival formal patterning. This new awareness of perception as pat- nature in paint. Fry was greatly mistaken to believe that terning, and of the formal elements of art as an integral part of the artist's representation artists such as the post-impressionists were of his visual impressions of reality is the consciously altering their natural vision of hallmark of the post-impressionist revolu- "objective" reality to express "subjective" tion. T h e term, post-impressionism, was emotions. Although he is correct in assuming coined by Roger Fry to describe the shift that art should not be judged by its scienfrom the representational art of impres- tific accuracy in rendering undigested sensesionism (based upon an imitation of some data, he falls into error when he inlplies aspect of natural appearances) to a new that any deviation from scientific naturalism tradition based upon a more subjective involves intentional distortion or subjective analysis of reality and upon intentional acts expressionism. For example: of expression. Fry declared the movement 1:an Gogh's pictures are not the least like o u r "the greatest revolution in art that had pictures. T h e i r origin is different . . . Vincent's taken place since Graeco-Roman Imprespaintings are pure self-expressions . . . His vision of nature is distorted into a reflection of . . . sionism became converted into Byzantine inner condition? formalism," a remark reflective of his hypermetropic attitude toward subject matter in Systematic attempts to reconcile or explain painting (which he felt must invariably the old dichotomy of representation versus compromise formal considerations.)6 expression appear in various guises in T h e term, post-impressionism, is accurate twentieth-century asthetics. Before examinsofar as it is descriptive and has the addi- ining some of the representative theories, it tional benefit of being emotively neutral. is relevant to undertake a brief excursion Fry's alternative term for these artists who into some further semantic probler~ls incame chronologically after impressionism, volved in a discussion of post-impressionism. expressionists, has proved to be more controversial in that it suggests a value-laden T h e Fallacy of Naturalism interpretation that is in accord with the dualistic position of the mid-century posi.4n old and problematic preoccupation of tivists in which objectivity and subjectivity aesthetics has been the relationship of art are irreconcilable. Post-impressionism be- to "life." At one time, representation had

DONNELL-KOTROZO

been defined by the imitation theory according to which art is understood as the "faithful, literal duplication of the objects and events of ordinary experience."g T h e art object lvas associated ~ v i t hthe cognitive and descriptive elements of the visible world and its value was derived primarily from the degree of verisimilitude it displajed in relation to the object imitated. T h e nineteenthcentury concept of naturalism is d e r i ~ a t i v e ot the older imitation theory. 'The term has met with several objections concerning its narrow application and its limitations as a norm of descripti~eaccuracy in art.lo There is a great deal of confusion and misinterpretation of the concept, not only in regard to philosophic naturalism, but in regard to its relationship to similar terms suffering also from widespread misuse (such as realism and representation). Realism refers more properly to ~ i s u a l foims derived from the direct experience of the actual in e~eryday life as exemplified by the art of Courbet, Rlillet, or Daumier. Naturalism as used by art historians usually refers to an uncritical or seemingly unemotional manner in ~vhichthe forms of reality are rendered, as though to convey meie fact~ialinformation (as in the military paintings of Detaille, the fastidious detail of hleissonier, the trompe-l'oezl illusionism of Peale or Harnet, or the more contemporary photographic images of Close-Focus Realists like Richard Estes or Chuck Close). T h e acceptance of ilat~iralism as a norm for representational accuracy in art forces one to draw the distinction bet~veenan art which is descriptive of reality and an art which expresses personal feelings or attitudes totvard nature." iVhen many critics and artists began to react to the positivistic interpretation of nature in the late nineteenth century that was felt to reduce the creative possibilities of art to a s l a ~ i s himitation, the term natu ralism took on derogatory association5 implying the inhibition of artistic freedom. It was felt that the new currents in art such as post-impressionism and symbolism valued more the "inner" nature of reality rathe1 than its surface appearance apprehended passive11 through the senses. Thus, those

~ v h orejected naturalism nevertheless failed to understand that an artist need not be naturalistic in order to represent reality according to valid (albeit not merely "objective") perceptions. Rather, they upheld the dualistic proposition that the language of objective reality is naturalistic, that truth is scientific and value-free, and that there is an unbridgeable ontological dichotomy between the subjective and the objective, between values and facts. IlThen mechanical vision is regarded as the "objective" component of perception (of pure sense-data) and is sepaiated from the "subjective" or interpretative component, it implies the acceptance of a materialistic reality and denies the possibility of a repiesentational reality suffused ~ v i t hexpressive value. As a result, the concept of distortion is requiied in order to explain formal adjustments of "normal" vision and its transposition into the medium of paint on a two-dimensional plane. Any liberties taken with "factual" and "objective" reality appear as deviations frorn what was now considered to be the most accurate mode of representation ot nature possible (even if that mode was despised and rejected). Thus, on the basis of such a theory, it nas assumed that an artist ~ v h odid not comply with the scientific mode of transposing apparently had other "subjective" or "expressive" aims in mind. Such assumptions and such a narrow conception of naturalism as a standard of representation ill art gave rise to an aesthetic theory that failed entirely to take into account the basic aims of post-impressionism whose fundamental representational interests became obscured by the prevailing dualistic distinction bet~veenrepresentation and expression. Nevertheless, ternis such as expressionisnr, symbolism, and synthetism, arose as alternative theories to justify the post-impressionists' a ~ e r s i o nto a positivistic reality and to account for what was taken as "the flight into what is subjective and detached frorn the outer ~vorld."12 Synthetism is closely associated with the name of Emile Bernard, ~ v h o sought to simplif) form and color for the sake of rnore forceful expression in painting. H e advocated a kind of simplified hand~vritingby

A False Antinomy which he endeavored to capture the symbolism inherent in nature. T h e role of the imagination was paramount in attaining the new aesthetic sensibility. T h e works of the post-impressionists, and most particularly Gauguin and the School of Pont-Aven, seemed to embody the new independence of nature in line with Bernard's ideas on the simplification of modes of expression. Other artists and critics, in correspondence with the contemporary movement in literature, preferred to use the term synibolism although there are basic similarities between the two concepts. Its strongest nineteenth-century proponents were Maurice Denis and Albert Aurier. T h e symbolists regarded internalized experience as providing an escape from the materialistic culture that surrounded them, and they wished to embody that experience in art. Their concentration upon the expression of emotion generated from within led them to criticize impressionist art and to deride it as materialistic because of its apparent preoccupation with the pure impression, the sensory response to the external environment. T h e post-impressionist's association with symbolism may stem from this common rejection of impressionism, however exaggerated the separation may have become between these various contemporary and in many ways interlocking movements. T h e idea of distortion became a self-conscious means of artistic expression for the symbolists:

of representation is to risk ambiguity and semantic imprecision. Although many art historians persist in collapsing the boundaries between naturalism and the broader category of representation in their discussions of nineteenthcentury art, there have been various attempts in aesthetics to integrate representation with theories of expression. LVhen representation is associated with traditional imitation theories emphasizing "illusion" or verisimilitude to an objective reality and when expression is linked with a. retreat into subjective emotionalism or ego-projection, such a dualistic polarity do-s not readily admit of any logical fusion. However, despite philosophical differences the theories of Langer, Arnheim, and Gombrich share a common concern with modified definitions of representation and expression which allow for an integrated framework that best describes the situation of a majority of styles in the history of art including the transitional movement of post-impressionism. A glance at several more contemporary theorists will provide an indication of future directions for resolving the problem currounding the logical usage of these terms. While the nineteenth century accepted a positivistic conception of nature, it was also in the nineteenth century that critical research into the intimate constitution of matter and the exploration of the human mind by psychological experiment resulted in the proposition that the so-called facts of reality were not absolute. Psychological T h e 'distorted'-or, as we ~vould be more intheorists such as fimile Littrk, Theodale clined to sav today, 'abstracted'-formal elements Ribot, and Hippolyte Taine, as well as o f line, color, shape and so on become the means o f converting the particular sensation or emotion others (such as the "psychophysicists" Gustav into a concretely manifest 'idea' ( t o use Aurier's Fechner and Carles Henry), concluded that t e r m ) , a realized image o f generalized meaning.l3 the observed nature of external "objective" phenomena is a product of human conRepresentation and Expression in sciousness and depended upon the method Modern Aesthetic Theory of observation of the perceiving subject. T h e application of related ideas to art T h e legacy of the nineteenth century has been a rather restrictive view of the nature has been the contribution of E. H. Gomof representation and a linguistic distinction brich whose Art and Illusion14 draws inspirbetween representation and expression that ation from the radical reorientation of all should more properly be seen as a separation traditional ideas about the human mind of function between naturalistic depiction brought about by modern psychology. T h e and expression, the extremes of a continu- "sense-data" theory of perception rrllicli um. T o equate naturalism with the concept posits a mind in which sense-data are de-

posited and processed is deflated and replaced with a more relativistic conception of perception in which the active contributions of the mind (synthesizing, organizing, selecting, integrating) obviate the possibility of passive reception of sense impressions from reality. Perception depends upon the basic structure of the mind and upon past knowledge and expectations based upon known experiences. 1170rks of art are also dependent upon these factors. Thus, if there is no pure vision of reality (the "innocent eye" theory), the theories of the impressionists are invalid in purporting to capture the true nature of visual experience. If all seeing is interpreting, there is no neutral naturalism, no direct artistic revelation of what we see unmediated by any perceptual judgment. There have been subsequent critical assessments of Gombrich's views centering upon his faulty equation of representation and illusion. Gombrich also suffers froin lapses of logical consistency when he seems to treat Constable as a norm of representation in art and speaks of "matching" reality as a possible form of "making" it. Kelson Goodman offers a contemporary reappraisal of representation as denotation which is independent of any requisite resemblance to reality. Goodman accepts and clarifies Gombrich's sound contention that the history of styles in art is the product of a system of classification, of characterizing objects according to conventional systems that are standard for a given culture or person at a given time (Gombrich's "schema"). Thus, realism or naturalism is not a matter of any constant or absolute relationship between the system of representation employed in a picture and the standard system. T h e fact that the traditional system is taken as standard probably accounts in my view for the erroneous assumptions about post-impressionism when measured against such a standard in the mid-nineteenth century. Goodman's statenlent "a picture looks like nature often means only that it looks the way nature is usually painted," 1 5 could be reversed to elucidate the problem of postimpressionism in which a novel, unconven-

tional style was not accepted as a perspective nature simply because this was not the way that nature Ivas customarily portrayed. Gornbrich, in tandem with Goodman, thus offers a concept of representation that allows for the unique vision of the postimpressionists rvho are nevertheless the antithesis of naturalism. TI'hether or not the artist intended to depict the appearance of nature is not always relevant.16 If reality cannot be perceived in its actuality, and if there are countless alternative systems of representation and description, then there is insufficient reason to believe that an artist cannot depict reality with flattened space, simplified form and color, or distinguished by emphatic outlines or geometric fragmentation. 1Irhether intentional or not, the post-impressionists' depiction of reality in these terms has become as valid and as con1:ncing a manner totlay as the naturalistic mode no doubt had been to the positivist. It is simply a question of acquiring familiarity with new relationships between forms and space as the prerequisite for accepting new art styles as genuine perspectives on nature. (In essence, life imitates art.) T h e issue of intentional distortion nlust be reexamined in this new context, not as a deviation from naturalism, but as the necessary process of transformation that reality inevitably undergoes in order to be reproduced in any given medium and as the consequence of diverse culturally conditioned standards of representational accuracy. (Goodman states that an innovating representation "may bring out neglected likenesses and differences, force unaccustomed associations, and in some measure remake our world.")l7 If all art involves subjective interpretation because of the fundamental nature of perception as well as the denlands of a medium,l"t remains to clarify the relationship of representation to expression. Can expression, in the light of the evidence remain distinct from representation? Is there a logical dissimilarity between correspoudences to nature on the one 11,lnd. ;ulcl the deliberate reassenlbling of 'irtistic elenlent\ in the interests of expression on the o t h e ~ ? 011

A False Antinomy

A critical analysis of the appropriate application of terms such as expression or expressionism in propositions about post-impressionism will reveal that no such radical dissimilarity exists. Traditionally in art history, expression is taken to be the logical antithesis of representation in that a predominant intention to embody personal feelings in material form is felt to compromise the intention to depict a visual experience of reality. T h e art historical term, expressionism, was invented to emphasize the contrast between an art which was based on purely visual impressions (e.g., impressionism) and a new movement which sought, instead, the intentional expression of ideas and emotions. (This could be achieved by the exploitation of visible subjects to accentuate their symbolic or emotive character.) Because of the apparent personal nature of post-impressionism, many critics found such a theory applicable to their art. This distinction is unacceptable and reflects, as with the concept of naturalism, a presupposed dichotomy between the subjective and the objective components of experience. Furthermore, it suggests an uncomfortable fusion of expression and emotional catharsis. An examination of the issue compels the assertion that the postimpressionists' dislike of the literal rendering of objects practiced by the naturalists and impressionists, does not necessarily imply an anti-representational intention on their part or an interest in emotive effusion. Even if the artists themselves should have misconstrued the nature of representation it would still not entail an accurate designation of these artists as expressionists by contemporary standards. T h e traditional expression theory in aesthetics reenforces this error and, if it is to be upheld at all, is perhaps better suited to describe the situation following the postimpressionists such as the German expressionists or the abstract expressionists who sought the deliberate and intentional creation of works which embody or objectify feeling. IVhereas the post-impressionist artist might also seek such embodiment in the

forms and images of reality, the avowed expressionist completely negates an adherence to external perception and retreats consciously into a subjective dimension deemed more "real." Thus, if a work of art can no longer be conventionally (publicly) accepted, according to conceptual and perceptual habit as a possible perspective on reality, it is not a representation. T h e criticism of the expression theory centers around the locus of anthropomorphic qualities projected into ~vorksof art, i.e., whether emotive qualities can be traceable to features of the medium, the subject matter, or "in virtue of what an artist does in a work." 19 Such criticism also concerns the contention that uses of anthroponiorphic predicates are 1netaphorical,20 and can be discerned by attending to the work in question even when it presupposes something about the artist. T h e shift of attention from a preoccupation with the artist (in theorists like Veron, Ducasse, and Collingwood) to a concentration upon the work itself is an attempt to free the older theory from the misassumption that a necessary link exists between the qualities of a work and certain mental states of an artist. (It is interesting that such a problematic correlation is reestablished by Guy Sircello who states that although expressive properties may be ascribed to works of art, they cannot be detected by attention to the work itself.) Advocates of the expression theory, however, perpetuated a necessary but illogical split on the level of analysis between emotional expression as a product of projection or intentional acts and the work which presents it, despite the fact that on the level of experience a work does not display such a division. How then can a reconciliation be attained between incompatible attitudes toward the same work of art? T h e expression theory will not stand u p against the fact that "subjective" phenomena do not always exist independently of an "objective" context. Thus, just as it is true that the perception of reality is the product of a human perspective which includes one's subjective nature as well as culturally conditioned values, and

that expression as a consequence cannot be divorced from the work of art which is based on that reality, so it is true that the embodiment of reality in a work of art must necessarily become something other than a literal equivalent or a mere corollary to a prior "act" of perception or expression. Attempts to redefine expression in terms of formal embodiment in a work itself can be seen in the theories of Susanne Langer and Rudolf .4rnheim. According to Susanne Langer art is basically an illusion or semblance in the sense that it abstracts from the multiple perceivable qualities in reality and must translate this abstraction into terms permitted by a medium.21 As such it becomes a metaphorical image which she calls "presentational symbolism." lITe might discard here the debatable theory that art is a product of the intuition whose purpose is to "set forth directly what feeling is like" because her conception of feeling as "living form" is too generalized, and it is speculative as to whether or not the cognitive value of art lies solely in the exposition and elucidation of the nature of feeling. TYe might, however, consider the validity of her designation of art as "expressive form," as "a visible, individual form produced by the interaction of colours, iines, surfaces, lights and shadows, or whatever entered lnto a specific work." 22 This helps to clar fy why representational art can be so varidble in appearance (as with naturalism a r d post-impressionism.) T h e elements of a work are not independent constituents, eat h individually expressive. Expression is bound u p with the totality of the visual elements.23 Rudolf Arnheim offers a specific application of the idea that expression in art is "transmitted to the eye with powerful directness by the perceptual characteristics of the compositional pattern . . . . I t is indispensable as to a precise interpreter of the idea the work is meant to express . . . . Seither the formal pattern nor the bubject matter is the final content of the WOI 4 of art . . ." 24 In other words, every work of art is expressive of something beyond so-called objective reality in the sense of passively observed material objects. Expression is a fundamen-

tal fact of perception whether in art or in life. Because perception is the product of a subject's interaction with an object, every experienced reality is necessarily expressive.25 1Irhile contemporary aestheticiana have voiced various objections to Langer's and Arnheim's versions of the expression theory, it nevertheless appears that many valiant efforts to distinguish representation and expression as linguistic categories have not unequivocally proved that they are always mutually exclusive types of art. A great deal of the problem can be resolved by noting the semantic confusion over terms like "expression," denoting artistic acts, and "expressiveness," denoting properties of artworks. \lThile most expression theories of art seem to succumb variously to the fallacy of projecting too great a degree of specificity of emotional representation, one can avoid this dilemma by postulating a logical relationship between the structure of the formal elements of a work of art and its expressive dimension. Artists like Van Gogh, Gauguin, or Cezanne do not express feeling states about reality in an art object such that the work is merely the qualitative analogue of those states. T h e expressiveness of their ~vorkdoes not exist independently of the artist's medium or the particular schema of his personal style. Style is a product of the artist's subjective interaction with objective reality in the case of representational art and although a work may well emerge from an intended "act of emotional expression" (in a different sense of the term), it is not thereby symptonlatic of that act, nor does knowledge of such an act affect our perception of the work. T h e aesthetician and art historian would find it more fruitful to direct their attention to the expressive object in Langer's and .irnheim's senses of the term in order to avoid perpetuating the inadequacies of the more traditional expression theory ~ r h e t h e r in its attribution of feeling states to the creating artist or in its 11)postization of affective states inhering in nonsentient works of art. I am attempting to make the same kind of argument for the visual arts that has frequently been made about music:

A False Antinomy Let us grant, then, that music-sadness is different from life-sadness, and that whatever the psychological causes o f the felt similarity may be, it is the music-sadness and not the lifesadness that the music evokes . . . . T h e expressiveness o f the music is dependent on neither the experiences o f the artist nor the experiences o f the audience.26

Most recent theories of expression have carefully delineated the concept from representation, but they do not conflict with my proposition about the merger of the two ~vould-bedivergent kinds of art which is to take them a step further. Nelson Goodman associates representation with denotation and expressi~nwith converse denotation or "possession" such that the crucial difference between the usage of the terms is not "a difference in domain" as rnuch as "a difference in direction." In fact, although the terms are distinct and run in o k o s i t e directions in terrns of the logical relationship of the picture to the things it represents and to the things it expresses, they are intimately related modes of symbolization. The dichotomy of representation and expression is a linguistic -distinction, but clearly not an essential one, applicable as convenient labels to such extreme instances as naturalism and German or abstract expressionism although it is often just a question of degree. Goodman's distinction points more properly to different aspects of the same work of art. T h e representational content of Ckzanne's M t . Sainte-Victoi~e is (denotes) the actual mountain in southern France. he ex~ressivecontent (is denoted by) the style or form by means of which the scene is depicted and the metaphoric designation of these forms as emotive. T h e question of a possible fusion, hinted at but not adequately discussed by Goodman, depends upon the nature of the artistic style (e.g., post-impressionism) and the manner in which it is perceived. Richard Wollheim's criticism of Goodman's thesis, that for all its neatness, his formula does not give us anything that we can look on as a final resolution of the traditional questions about representation and expression,27 also applies to the work of Alan Tormey.28 However, Tormey's clarification of the usage of the term, expression, L L

has resulted in a widening of the gap between expressive objects and artistic acts and intentions in keeping with my position on the post-impressionists. I t is his contention that all forms of the expression theory lean too heavily upon anthropomorphic predicates with reference to an artistic personality. H e prefers to distinguish between the expressive properties of a work and represented expressions within a work. For example, Bernini's David represents David-expressing-intense-determination, but the work itself is not necessarily (although it may be) expressive of intense determination. Thus, a kind of reconciliation is achieved between representation and expression in the sense that the representational arts can make expressive comments on their represented c0ntent.~9I interpret this as a nonliteral kind of artistically mediated expressiveness to which we erroneously ascribe the intentional acts or private states of persons, but which can more properly be seen as attributes of the perceptual surface of a work. Tormey illustrates expressive ambiguity as an inherent feature of most if not all works of art in the sense that a ~vorkmay express various kinds of properties (such as tenderness, yearning, or nostalgia) which seems to eliminate the possibility of a definitive reading of the work in terms of specific artistic intentions. Tormey's greatest insight for the purposes of this paper is the effort to prevent the expression theory from treating all of the cognate forms of "expression" as terms whose logical behavior is similar. T h e particular mistake he notes is the assumption that the existence of expressive qualities of an art work implies a prior act of expression. He guides us into reasserting the fact that expressive qualities of an art work remain, irresolutely, statements about the work. In the analytic tradition, Tormey thus clarifies but does not reverse aspects of the modified expression theories of Langer and Arnheirn whose focus of attention was on the form of the work in exclusion of the creating artist.30 I have argued here for the correct categorization of post-impressionism and for the correct interpretation of its meaning based

upon contemporary theories regarding the nature of representation and expression. I have also argued conversely that an integration of these concepts, rather than a strict opposition, is now mandatory for aesthetics in the light of the evidence provided by the art movement. Expression is a fundamental component of representation, and only a theory that takes this relationship into consideration is applicable to the history of art in general, and to the post-impressionists in particular.

' Morris Weitz, "Style and Genre," C o n t e t n p o ~ c ~ i y Philosophic T h o u g h t , Perspectives in Education, Religion, and the Arts, vol. 3, ed. Howard Kiefer anti hfilton hfunitz (State University of New York Press, 1976). Christine hlccorkel, "Sense and Sensibility," T h e Journal of '4esthetics and Art Criticisn~,tol. XXXIT', no. 1 (Fall 1975), 35-50. 3 H . W. Janson, " T h e Art Historian's Comments," Contemporary Philosophic T h o u g h t , Perspectives in Education, Religion, and the .-lrts, pp. 295-311. Charles Baudelaire, "Salon de 1859," Escrits S U I . l'art, vol. 2, ed. Yves Florenne (Paris, 1971), pp. 36-37. Richard Shiff, "The End of Impressionism: A Study in Theories of Artistic Exprei-ion," T h e Art Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 4 (1978), 388-89. 'John Ingamells, "Cezanne in England 19001930," T h e British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 5, no. 4 (October 19G5), 344. From Roger Fry, Vision and Design (1923 edition, p. 15, ~vrittenin 1917). ' Ibid., p . 347. Roger Fry, Vision and Design (New York, 1924), p . 184. Similarly: "Ckzanne has realized his ea11.r dream of a picture not only controlled but inspired by the necessities of the spirit, a picture which owes nothing to the data of any actual vision." Roger Fry, CCzanne (Next. York, 1927), p . 77. Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of A l t Criticism (Boston, 1960), p. 110. lo Thomas hlunro, "hleanings of 'Naturalism' in Philosophy and Aesthetics," T h e Jozlrnal of Aesthelics clnd Art Criticism, vol. XXIX, no. 2 (Winter l960), 133-37. " hlonroe Beardsley defines representation as a elation between a design and objects and events in reality as distinct from the evocation of feelings by the design. Deviations from nature are deenletl "distortions" which implies an opposition to a kind of norm of representational accuracy. Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics (New York, 1958). l2 H . R , Rookmaaker, Synthetist Art T h e o r i e ~ (Amsterdam, 1959), p. 72. l 3 Shiff, p . 364. T h e "idea" as an objective entity is postulated: " T h e Symbolist was seen not as intuitions or emotions out into a world of unive~sal

knottledge and experience. W h a t Denis, Aurier, Kahn and others called subjective and objective distortion are fused if the artist's personal vision presenting an internalized subjective experience of a n objective world, but as bringing his personal (his 'ideal') is in immediate correspondence with an image of universal expressive power (the 'Idea') -the individual artist would feel a n d express what all can feel and come to k n o ~ v .In such a case, the a r t of the individual imprcssion would merge with the art of the u n i ~ e r s a lsymbol." Ibid., p. 364-65. " E . H . Gombrich, Art and Illz~sion:A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, 4th ed. (London, 1972). l5 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis, 197G), p. 39. Similarly "Representation is . . . disengaged from perverted ideas of it as a n idiosyncratic physical process like memory, a n d is recognized as a symbolic relationship that is relative and variable." Ibid. p . 43. ''Although it does not constitute a complete argument because of the debate over artistic intentions and the Intentional Fallacy, recourse to statements by the post-impressionists can document the view that they did consider themselves as painters of the appearance of nature (albeit not in impressionist terms). I t is the evidence of the paintings themselves and their ability to be perceived in a certain manner, however, that suggests a strong case for "expressive representation" not mimetic representation, nor pure expressionistic distortion. Goodman, p . 33. Note the similarity to Rudolf Arnheim's statement that "imagination is sometimes misunderstood as the invention of new subject matter . . . actually the achievement of artistic imagination could be lescribed more correctly as the finding of new form for old content . . . rather than distorting reality, imaginative forin reaffirms the t ~ u t h . " Rudolph Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception (Uni~ersity of California Press, 1966). p. 141. " T h e representation of the work of art offers a structural equivalent of the experience that gave rise to it, but the particular concrete form in which that equivalent appears cannot b e derived only from the object. I t is also determined by the medium." Arnheim, p. ix. Guy Sircello, "Expressive Properties i n Art." Philosophy Looks clt the Arts, ed. Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia, 1978). 2o Sircello mentions that Goodman's theory of expression seems to depend rather heavily on the opinion that uses of anthropomorphic predicates are metaphorical. 21 "Imitation of other things is not the essential power of images . . . the true power of the image lies in the fact that it is an abstraction, a symbol, the bearer of an idea . . . An image . . . abstracted from the physical and causal order, is the artist's creation." Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form, A Theory of Art (New York, 1953), p. 47,

A False Antinomy Ibid., p . 128. "A work of art is a single, indivisible symbol . . . I t is not, like a discourse . . . composite, analyzable into more elementary symbols . . I t can never be constructed by a process of synthesis of elements because n o such elements exist outside it. They only occur in a total form." Ibid., p. 369. 24 Arnheim, p. 436-438. 26 "Expression can be descrited as the primary content of vision . . . if expression is the primary content of vision in daily life, the same should be a11 the more true for the \ray the artist looks a t the world. T h e expressive qualities are his means of communication. They capture his attention, through them he understands and interprets his experience, and they determine the form patterns he creates." Ibid., pp. 430-31. 28 John Hospers, " T h e Concept of Artistic Expression," Problenzs i n Aesthetics, ed. IClorris It'eitz (London, 1970), p p . 232, 242. See also 0.I(. Bowsma, " T h e Expression Theory of Art," .Jesthetic& and Language, ed. It'illiam Elton (New York, 1954), who similarly releases expression in music fro111 the bondage of anthropomorphic emotion-connotation predicates. 22

23

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2' " T o associate representation with denotation and expression with converse denotation (or 'possession,' as Goodman calls it) is not to give their sufficient conditioiis: at best, it is to give their necessary conditions. Or, to p u t it another way, Goodman's thesis, as so far unfolded, may bring out the difference, or a very important difference, between representation and expression, but it does not exhibit the nature of either." Richard Wollheim, On Art and the ,?find (London, 1973), p. 292. 2S Alan Tormey, T h e Concept of Exfiression (Princeton University Press, 1971). 291bid., p. 139. Also: "It will be convenient to refer to the properties denoted by predicates of this sort as "expressire" properties. T h u s , a work expressive of anguish till be sa'd to have the "expressive" property anguish rather than simply the property anguish, the modification serving both to indicate affinities ~ r i t hinstances where 'anguish' has unqualified application and to obviate absurdities engendered by taking art to exhibit fullblooded sentient states." Ibid., p. 127. '"Alan Tormey's theory of language ~ r h i c hopposes the absolute separation of "descriptive" and "expressire" linguistic components corroborates the nondualistic position of this paper.