LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Lorenzo Bosi
School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent at Canterb...
124 downloads
1921 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Lorenzo Bosi
School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, UK
Sean Chabot
Department of Sociology, Eastern Washington University, Cheney, WA, USA
Paul Chaney
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK
Patrick G. Coy
Center for Applied Conflict Management, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA
David Cunningham
Department of Sociology, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA, USA
Gianluca De Fazio
Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Jan Willem Duyvendak
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Gregory M. Maney
Department of Sociology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY, USA
Edward J. McCaughan
Sociology Department, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA, USA
Trudi Nederland
Verwey-Jonker Instituut, The Netherlands
Maryjane Osa
Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
Kurt Schock
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA vii
viii
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Stephen Valocchi
Department of Sociology, Trinity College, Hartford, CT, USA
Stellan Vinthagen
Department of Peace and Development, Go¨teburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden
INTRODUCTION The title of this series, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, reflects the triple foci of its volumes. These three issues that are so central to the identity of this series – social movements, conflicts, and change – are also prominent features with regard to the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. Thus we open this 27th volume of the series with three papers analyzing various aspects of Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement, a social movement working for political and social change in a society marked by protracted conflict. The first paper, by Gregory Maney, innovatively analyzes the interrelationships between the Irish Republican Army’s campaigns of armed violence and the nonviolent civil rights movement. The literature on armed rebellions – while robust and quite well developed – has nonetheless suffered from the fact that there has been far too little cross-fertilization with other studies that have focused primarily on nonviolent movements for political change. It is as if the two approaches to social and political change seldom interact in the field or intersect on the ground. This of course is seldom true. In fact, nonviolent movements for political change and armed rebellions frequently coexist, overlap, feed off of each other, vie for prominence, give rise to each other, etc. For examples one need only think of the political unrest across much of Latin America from the 1970s to 1990s, the oscillating violent and nonviolent resistance to Israel’s occupation of Palestine, the long multi-dimensional struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and the troubles in Northern Ireland. Maney utilizes a rich array of methodologies to chart the sequences of violent vs. nonviolent contention vis-a-vis state responses of inclusion or exclusion during a critical 16 year period in Northern Ireland from 1955 to 1972. The author gathered an original set of data from 6 archives, 7 newspapers, and interviews with 19 key informants. Significantly, those interviewed were prominent participants in the nonviolent civil rights movement in Northern Ireland precisely during those stages of the movement when the armed rebellion was also most relevant. Maney employs political process theory to interpret the shifting sequences of contention in the divided society of Northern Ireland. He convincingly shows that armed rebellion contributed to the emergence of a policy oriented protest movement, and that that ix
x
INTRODUCTION
movement also contributed to the emergence of an armed rebellion. He constructs an original and dynamic model of contention sequences that is based on the ways that the political opportunity structure gives rise to one or another kind of oppositional movement. His model also helps explain how the respective forms of contention influence the rise and decline of each other, as well as how their respective trajectories and outcomes affect the structures of political opportunity for future movements. In this way, Maney also manages to highlight the complicated connections between agency and structure in the politics of contention. Consequently, students of both armed rebellion and of nonviolent political movements will find much of theoretical significance in this ambitious paper. Micro-mobilization has long interested social movements scholars. Quite a lot of good solid research has explored a series of questions associated with trying to understand why individuals participate in movements. Drawing on decades of earlier work, Bert Klandermans has recently hypothesized that ideology, identity, and instrumentality are especially salient factors in influencing individual participation choices. Lorenzo Bosi analyzes micromobilization in Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement, paying particular attention to how these three factors interacted to influence individual participation at the various stages of movement development in a deeply divided society. Timing is key to Bosi’s analysis. Why do individuals decide to participate when they do? How do we account for variation over time in an individual’s participation? Based on interviews with 27 prominent activists in the civil rights movement, supplemented by archival research, Bosi finds that in the early stages of the movement instrumentality concerns were particularly salient. However, as the movement developed and as the political context changed to include increased repression, identity and ideology came more to the fore in influencing micro-mobilization. I have paired the Maney and Bosi papers together as they are each based on solid empirical research that addresses the various stages of Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement. While these two papers complement each other in many ways, in other ways they offer alternative arguments and explanations for understanding how and why the civil rights movement shifted over time. There are, of course, still other ways to tackle the issues associated with the emergence and the waxing and waning of Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement. In our third paper on Northern Ireland, Gianluca De Fazio argues that the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s (RUC) confrontational approach to the civil rights movement contributed to the rise of violence and the armed rebellion. De Fazio creatively utilizes a previously untapped yet
Introduction
xi
rich data source to understand the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and its interaction with the police force: the minutes of evidence from police witnesses who gave testimony to the Scarman Tribunal of Inquiry (1969–1971). By offering a thick description of the complexities of police attitudes toward protesters in Derry/Londonderry, De Fazio establishes that while many RUC officers were antagonistic toward much of the movement, they nonetheless engaged in negotiations with protesters on a number of occasions, and apparently in good faith. Yet, these frequent contacts and interactions did not result in appreciably softer or less violent interactions with protesters. De Fazio argues that the lack of routinized and institutionalized interactions and channels of communication between police and protesters is largely responsible for this outcome. In section two of this volume, we continue our exploration of political opportunity theory and social movement mobilization with three more papers that address various aspects of that theoretical approach, but the focus is expanded beyond the Northern Ireland context. One of the most thoroughgoing critiques of political opportunity theory is that it has focused too much on structure while discounting, and in some cases even ignoring, cultural factors and agency. Empirical work like that of Gregory Maney’s on Northern Ireland is part of a growing body of research which attempts to correct this historic blind spot in theories of political opportunity and contentious politics. This historic tendency to highlight structural and political factors at the expense of cultural forces is also present in the scholarship of Gene Sharp and others who study the dynamics of nonviolent action. Our first paper in section two, by Sean Chabot and Stellan Vinthagen, is an impressive attempt to overcome these similar tendencies by forging a synthesis that attends to the cultural aspects of nonviolent politics even while also analyzing the politics of nonviolent cultures. An alternative view of power facilitates Chabot and Vinthagen’s focus on the normative as well as pragmatic dimensions of nonviolent opposition movements and on the dynamic interplay between cultural and political processes. More specifically, they highlight four aspects of what they call the ‘‘political cultures of nonviolent opposition,’’ namely cultural idioms, ideologies, emotional experiences, and organizational structures. They effectively apply this synthetic framework to analyze two social movements: the Indian independence movement led by Mohandas Gandhi, and today’s landless workers movement in Brazil. The structure/culture problem facing political opportunity theory is far from the only weakness in this approach to understanding mobilization issues. Maryjane Osa and Kurt Schock contribute a theoretical paper that
xii
INTRODUCTION
suggests that an equally serious problem with political opportunity theory is inadequate attention to how different state forms influence mass mobilization. This problem is due at least in part to the fact that political opportunity theory arose within and has been applied primarily to liberal democratic contexts, especially the United States and Western Europe. These origins have tended to obscure important questions regarding context. For example, in what ways does the form of a state, i.e. its relative placement on a continuum from democratic to non-democratic, structure the political opportunities facing oppositional movements? While political opportunity theory has been increasingly applied of late to sites of contention in non-democratic states, the specific differences in these mobilization contexts have been under specified and under theorized. Osa and Schock attempt to correct this through a careful exposition of what they convincingly argue are the relevant institutional differences between democratic and non-democratic mobilization contexts. They highlight elite divisions, changing repression levels, influential allies, media access, and information flows as the most critical factors that impact contention against the state differentially, depending on the form of the state. They also argue for the importance of social networks to oppositional movements in non-democracies. The authors contribute significantly to theory building by articulating a series of ‘‘sensitizing propositions’’ that would profitably inform future research. In addition, they identify eight issues arising from their re-conceptualization of the political opportunities model to which future research ought to attend. Constitutional reforms and structural changes in many different countries over the past 20 years have increased the political opportunities for women’s movements to work for the inclusion of gender equity in new constitutions and other governing mechanisms. While national or mass mobilizations relying on extra-institutional politics has often been an integral part of the women’s movement’s strategy, insider strategies that rely on a small number of institutionally well-positioned women activists have also been an important strategic choice, particularly when mobilizing structures are absent or diffused. The constitutional reforms undertaken in Wales in the 1990s and the debates they occasioned over devolution provided political and discursive opportunities for the women’s movement to make significant advances in gender equity in the field of Welsh politics. Paul Chaney’s research on constitutional reform and the women’s movement in Wales is based on over 250 interviews with participants in the reform and women’s movements, supplemented by participant observation and archival research. This triangle of rich data is analyzed to show that the Welsh women’s movement opted to utilize elite advocacy and various insider strategies, and that this
Introduction
xiii
approach resulted in substantive outcomes. These influential insiders recognized the discursive opportunities presented by governmental reforms where inclusiveness, democratization, and devolution were valued. They successfully advocated that gender equality ought also to be included. In fact, Chaney argues that these actions eventually led to the beginnings of ‘‘state feminism,’’ which in turn increased the potential impacts of the women’s movement itself. In so doing, Chaney’s research challenges the assumption that such elite-based insider strategies can be neither democratic nor inclusive. Section three of this volume consists of four papers which address issues associated with particularly robust arenas of social movements research: collective identity, ideology, and participation patterns. The movements examined in this section range from the Ku Klux Klan in Alabama in the 1960s, to the current patient’s health movement in the Netherlands, to the 1960s–1980s Mexican student movement and Chicano civil rights movement in the United States, to today’s progressive movement in Hartford, Connecticut. What these papers have in common is their focus on a series of interrelated issues central to understanding social movements from a culturalist point of view, i.e. the roles of collective identity, ideologies and social networks in mobilization. The section opens with Stephen Valocchi’s thick description of the identity talk of 30 participants in a variety of progressively oriented social movements in the greater Hartford, Connecticut area. Based on open-ended and often lengthy interviews, Valocchi also utilizes life history and narrative analysis to develop a typology of identity talk formed by three general cultural forces: ideologies connected to social movement culture, organizational resources, and biographical experiences with marginalization. He argues that each of these focused discourses about identity are in turn associated with different patterns of organizational affiliation and movement participation for the respective activists. This paper establishes that the identity talk of activists is shaped by a complex of largely cultural factors that go far beyond simply the context of collective action. As scholars have paid more attention to the cultural politics of social movements, the various nooks and cultural crannies of social movements are beginning to be identified, explored and analyzed. One area that has not received anywhere near its due, given its obvious significance, is the role that activist art and movement artists play in helping the movement communicate with and give meaning to participants and to general audiences. Art and artists are often influential in identity formation, in communicating alternative worldviews, and in articulating oppositional knowledge. As
xiv
INTRODUCTION
Edward McCanaugh shows in evocative detail, art and artists associated with the Mexican and Chicano social movements did more than simply reflect the social, cultural, and political changes facing their communities; the art also contributed to those changes, not least by helping participants and bystanders to think in new ways, including outside the grasp of hegemonic forces. Based on analysis of the form and content of 374 pieces of art, McCanaugh demonstrates that contemporaneous Mexican and Chicano social movements with some shared cultural heritages nonetheless portrayed themselves and the meanings of ethnicity, citizenship, nation, and gender in substantively different ways. McCanaugh argues that these differences are largely related to the differences in the national political economies within which each movement was formed. In the process, this paper adds substantially to our knowledge about Mexican vs. Chicano identity politics and their respective cultural productions. Movements associated with health and health care issues have by and large been quite understudied. This is unfortunate not least because of the host of interesting issues associated with identity concerns for health care patients and others with health problems. Dilemmas of identity representation are particularly pronounced for patient’s movements. For example, collective identities associated with being disabled persons may at the same time be a source of political power as well as an ongoing wellspring of oppression. What kind of collective identity projection will best serve the political and policy needs of movements of disabled persons? Among the many options is the embrace of the relatively fixed identity of ‘‘disabled,’’ or the more fluid civic identity of ‘‘full citizenship.’’ Each has potential pitfalls and promising benefits. Based on their inventory of the methods of interest and identity representation used by 300 Dutch organizations for the chronically ill and disabled, Jan Willem Duyvendak and Trudi Nederland argue that, at least in the Dutch context, the least productive approach is an either/or strategy where the patient identity and the civic identity are disconnected. This means that the real challenge is the fashioning of effective combinations of identity projection, combinations that are fluid enough to be responsive to particularized contexts. While we know quite a lot about why individuals join social movements, and while some of the studies in this volume also help refine our answers to these micro-mobilization questions, we know much less about why individuals join social movements which are reacting to threats to the status quo, as opposed to trying to change the status quo. The Ku Klux Klan is a prominent example of a reactive social movement. This volume closes with David Cunningham’s groundbreaking delineation of the salient factors that
Introduction
xv
impacted individual choices to join the Ku Klux Klan in north-central Alabama, more specifically in the Birmingham and Tuscaloosa areas, in the early 1960s. For data, Cunningham relies on 94 FBI interviews of Alabama Klan members in 1963 and 1964 conducted during two different bomb investigations. By comparing the demographic characteristics of these interviewees with the local white male population, and also with other previous studies on Klan membership, Cunningham first answers the important question of exactly who participated in the Klan during the era of the civil rights movement. Suffice it to say that there are some surprises here. Second, he also effectively shows that central and peripheral members of the Klan differ considerably and that both populations must be included if future studies of Klan membership are to be inclusive. Finally, Cunningham’s analysis establishes that relational contexts matter in particular ways in micro-mobilization. For example, social ties – especially those among family members – are important indicators of an individual’s receptivity to joining the Klan, as are the presence of institutional sites and social venues where mutually aggrieved parties may interact. Careful readers of this volume are likely to conclude that it is an uncommonly strong collection of theoretically rich and data-driven papers which address a series of interrelated questions that are at the forefront of today’s social movement scholarship. Political opportunity theory receives careful, empirically informed correctives from a number of quarters, and a synthesis is achieved between nonviolent action scholarship and the contentious politics school of research. Moreover, the roles of collective identities, ideologies, identity talk, art, biographies, social networks, police repression, and participation pathways are analyzed within the context of social movements in the United States, Mexico, the Netherlands, India, Brazil Northern Ireland, and in various non-democracies. As such, this is that rare collection which when taken together builds bridges between scholarship on social movements and on social conflicts, and in the process makes theoretical advances in each area in much needed yet creative ways. I thank Mary Anne Skinner, the Secretary of the Center for Applied Conflict Management at Kent State University, for her clerical assistance with this volume. In addition, I am heavily indebted to my research assistant, Douglas McKenzie, who essentially functioned as a managing editor and who excelled at each and every thing he was asked to do. Patrick G. Coy Series Editor
FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS AND BACK AGAIN: THE INTERRELATION OF REBELLION AND PROTEST IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1955–1972 Gregory M. Maney ABSTRACT Researchers have mostly studied armed rebellions and policy-oriented protest movements separately. This article argues that, by altering the structure of political opportunity facing insurgents, the two types of contention can facilitate one another’s emergence, particularly in divided societies with rigid ethnic states lacking legitimacy. As an illustration, the author examines ethno-nationalist contention in Northern Ireland between 1955 and 1972. Defeat of the IRA’s (Irish Republican Army) border campaign contributed to the liberalization of the policies of the Northern Ireland state. Republicans remaining active became receptive to new strategies. Republican organizations subsequently formed an integral part of a civil rights movement. The movement entailed nonviolent mass civil disobedience in the pursuit of equal citizenship rights for the Nationalist minority. A mixture of state concessions and repression contributed to the resurgence of armed Republicanism. The findings suggest
Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 27, 3–35 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(06)27001-0
3
4
GREGORY M. MANEY
the need for greater attention to the overlap and interaction between different goals and forms of political contention.
INTRODUCTION For the most part, social scientists have studied armed rebellions and reform-oriented, protest-reliant social movements separately (Goldstone, 1998). This academic division of labor can be defended on the heuristic grounds that contrasting goals and forms of contention produce distinct phenomena that emanate from different sources. Nonetheless, the analytical separation has minimized exploration of the possibility that the two phenomena are interrelated. Charles Tilly (2002, p. 24) notes such a possibility: ‘‘At first glance, violence may seem the antithesis of orderly public politics. At second glance, most public violence connects closely with politics in general.’’ Tilly further concludes that the connection is likely to be strongest in cases of ethno-national contention. This article argues that the consecutive emergence of armed rebellions and policy-oriented protest movements in the same society are not mere coincidences. Different explicitly stated goals and forms of collective action lead to different sequences of contention between insurgents, authorities, and non-state opponents. Because of their consequences for the structure of political opportunity facing insurgents, these sequences of contention encourage oscillation between reliance upon nonviolent forms of collective action in the pursuit of policy reforms, on the one hand, and violent forms of collective action in the pursuit of fundamental social transformation on the other. Such sequences are particularly likely in divided societies where states lack either the ability or the will to fully incorporate ethno-national minority groups into the polity.1 Historical and statistical analyses of ethnonationalist contention in Northern Ireland between 1955 and 1972 establish an instance where two different types of contention are interrelated. The case offers a preliminary illustration of the ability of political process theory to explain how policy-oriented protests contributed to the armed rebellion while, in turn, armed rebellion contributed to policy-oriented protests.
THEORY While at times underspecified and overextended (Meyer, 2003), the concept of political opportunity structure (POS) assists in identifying ways that
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
5
trajectories of contention alter the stated objectives and forms of collective action of insurgents. The POS entails the degree of receptivity or vulnerability of elites to organized extra-institutional challenges by those excluded from the polity (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982). Commonly identified dimensions of the POS include increased institutional access in previously closed polities, unstable political alignments, divisions among elites, the emergence of support groups and influential allies, and decreasing repression by a highly repressive state (Tarrow, 1994).2 Cross-national quantitative studies mostly report upside-down U curve relationships between both institutional access and regime repressiveness, on the one hand, and protest and political violence on the other (for a detailed review, see Maney, 2001). Consistent with these findings, research on ethno-nationalist mobilizations shows democratization as being positively related to ethnicbased protests and autocratization increasing armed minority rebellion (e.g., Scarritt, McMillan, & Mozaffar, 2001; Tejerina, 2001; Khan, 2003; Laciner & Bal, 2004). Political process theorists assume that changes in the political context prove more critical to the origins of social movements than static features of a political system. Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) suggest that mass mobilization alters the POS by prompting strategic responses from the state as well as organized opponents in civil society. When a state responds exclusively to extra-institutional collective action (e.g., arrests, censorship, assassinations, and bans of political parties), the POS closes. When the state responds inclusively (e.g., inviting movement leaders to participate in state decision-making bodies and making concessions to demands), the POS opens. Combining these insights assists in specifying ways that armed rebellions facilitate protest movements and vice versa. Sequences of contention associated with both protest and armed rebellion can produce movements toward middle-range levels of openness/closure in the polity (see Fig. 1). As escalating protests by social movements encourage political closure, the likelihood and intensity of armed rebellion increase in the face of increasing threat. Conversely, as the de-escalation of armed rebellion encourages openings, the likelihood and intensity of protest increase in the face of increasing opportunity. These dynamics are particularly likely in divided societies with high levels of ethno-nationalist mobilization. Because of their rigidity and lack of legitimacy, the responses of ethnic states to rebellion and protest tend to produce semi-open/closed polities. I now discuss these sequences of contention in greater detail, starting with sequences associated with armed rebellion.
6
GREGORY M. MANEY
Level of Mobilization Protest Rebellion
Closed
POS: Open
Fig. 1.
Contention Sequences and Political Opportunity Structures.
How Rebellion Can Lead to Protest The cessation of armed rebellion usually culminates in one of the three outcomes: (1) the outright defeat of insurgents, (2) a negotiated compromise between insurgents and the state, or (3) the deposition of previous elites and rule by the rebels. For different reasons, all three outcomes can contribute to openings in the POS, thereby increasing the likelihood that reform-oriented protest movements will emerge. Having successfully quelled or effectively minimized a rebellion, a victorious state has incentives to reduce both its coercive capacities and repressive activities. With its monopoly over the use of organized, collective violence restored, the state no longer requires a high level of coercion to maintain its rule. The budgetary strain of exorbitant military expenditures and the wrangling with elites over high taxation provide incentives for a reduction in repressive capacities (e.g., Skocpol, 1979; Wickham-Crowley, 1989). Moreover, during rebellions, states (particularly those with ostensibly democratic systems) frequently attempt to persuade the general population of their legitimacy. Upon defeating insurgents, states having pursued this discursive strategy will be apt to maintain it by displaying relative tolerance toward nonviolent forms of dissent. Such liberalization is likely to be accompanied by heightened levels of protest as the anticipated costs of open collective action decrease while its expected benefits increase (e.g., Osa, 2001; Almeida, 2003).
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
7
Political opportunities to affect social change through protest must be perceived by potential participants before social movements emerge. Ironically, the defeat of rebellion facilitates this perception by affecting the composition of those politically active among a subordinated social group. Failing to achieve their goals, those committed to violence as an instrument for pursuing social change will exit to the shadows.3 Other insurgents who are more agnostic regarding explicitly stated goals and forms of contention, however, will search for alternative ways to achieve their objectives. These individuals will be foremost among those recognizing opportunities for protest arising from the ashes of defeat. Like the defeat of an armed uprising, negotiated settlements with armed insurgents also encourage openings in the POS. Compromises frequently entail provisions that include the rebels and their supporters in the polity. By disrupting prior conflict and alliance systems among elites, the expansion of the polity presents new opportunities for protest. Elites previously unified in opposition to the insurgents may divide over the issue of their inclusion. Furthermore, former insurgents searching to expand their constituencies may readily embrace protest movements as a means to their own political advancement (Markoff, 1996; Almeida, 2003). Since negotiated compromises are rarely equitable, abundant grievances remain for political entrepreneurs to exploit as bases of mobilization (Kriesberg, 1998). Ironically, the political instability generated by the institutionalization of dissent creates opportunities for nonviolent, extra-institutional resistance. While states may attempt to restore stability through coercion, the cumulative costs of armed conflict coupled with fears of undermining the settlement encourage restrained responses to protest movements. While both the defeat of rebellion and negotiated settlements of armed conflict frequently result in the opening of the POS, can the same be said for instances of successful rebellion? Upon seizing power, some successful revolutionary movements have restricted institutional access and expanded the repressive arsenal of the state (e.g., the Soviet Union and Communist China). Nonetheless, in others instances, successful rebellions have generated political opportunities for protest. In Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran, successful insurgencies depended upon the formation of cross-class coalitions (e.g., Wickham-Crowley, 1989; Moaddel, 1993). Once the unifying solvent of a common enemy has disappeared, however, ideological differences, unresolved grievances, and conflicting socio-economic interests may unravel the coalition that existed during insurgency (Scarritt et al., 2001). As former rebels split and compete for popular support, the opportunities available to protest movements heighten.
8
GREGORY M. MANEY
The lack of legitimacy and rigidity of ethnic states in divided societies further increase the likelihood of protest in a polity opening in the aftermath of a defeated rebellion. Legitimacy entails popular consent to rule as reasonable, just, and in the interest of society (Mann, 1986; Barker, 1990). The defeat of rebellion presents an opportunity for a state to gain legitimacy with an ethno-nationalist minority. In turn, political openings in the aftermath of defeat encourage strategically oriented ethno-nationalist activists to test the limits of inclusion through policy-oriented protests. Potential nationalist insurgents face a win/win situation in that both inclusive and exclusive state responses to protest are likely to advance their objectives. Protests may prove successful in pressuring the state to increase institutional access, economic opportunities, and cultural recognition for the minority group. Newly gained forms of power, including democratic legitimacy, can be utilized on behalf of ethno-nationalist objectives. Yet the negative implications of this power shift for the national sovereignty of the dominant group typically result in ethnic states refusing to substantively concede political, economic, and cultural rights for the minority. Fully sharing power with an ethno-nationalist minority would undermine the logic and integrity of the nation-state. Whereas class-based states can incorporate elites from multiple ethnic groups, ethnic states can only incorporate elites from the ethnic group or nation that controls the state.4 By exposing the undemocratic and exclusive nature of polities dominated by one ethnic group, such refusals in the face of nonviolent protest generate high levels of domestic and international support for fundamental changes in sovereignty. In the process of draining legitimacy away from the state, protests enhance the legitimacy of armed ethno-nationalist insurgents. Nationalism also increases the likelihood of protest movements arising after negotiated settlements have led to the end of armed rebellions. Part of the intractability of ethno-nationalist conflicts can be explained in terms of the zero-sum assumptions frequently held by their participants. Separate ethno-nationalist groups want a State that solely reflects their identities and protects their interests. Seeing compromise as tantamount to national defeat, opponents of negotiated settlements will use provocative protests in efforts to destabilize if not collapse the peace process (Maney, Ibrahim, Higgins, & Herzog, 2006). In addition, many supporters of negotiated settlements also hold zero-sum assumptions. Peace agreements are not viewed as permanent compromises, but rather strategic means toward the eventual complete fulfillment of nationalist objectives (Gurr, 2000). Since renewed political violence would jeopardize the negotiated settlement, protest
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
9
becomes the primary extra-institutional means of generating leverage on behalf of deeply valued and as yet unfulfilled objectives. Victorious nationalist rebellions often leave in place the structural foundations of protest. In several divided societies, previously dominant ethnic groups have become minorities. The inversion of an ethnic stratification system simply reverses which group is included in the polity and which is excluded. Israel presents a case of a victorious armed nationalist rebellion. Within Israel, rising fortunes of the Labor Party have encouraged the formation of protest movements such as the Equality Covenant Movement in 1992 calling for a greater degree of political inclusion and social equality for the Arab/Palestinian minority. Overall, outcomes of armed rebellions that open the POS facilitate the emergence of protest movements. Conversely, by precipitating the closure of the POS, policy-oriented protest movements often create conditions that facilitate the emergence of armed revolutionary insurgencies.
How Protest Can Lead to Rebellion How the state and non-state opponents respond to social movements greatly affect the likelihood of armed insurgency. Kriesi, Koopmans, Dyvendak, and Giugni (1992) assert that states have dominant strategies in their responses to challengers. Past responses to social movements lock authorities into relying primarily upon exclusion, inclusion, or a combination of both to quell protest. I now examine each of these strategies and their likely affects upon subsequent goals and forms of contention. In their study of four Western European societies, Kriesi et al. (1992) found that new social movements were more likely to deploy violent forms of contention in states relying upon exclusion than in states relying upon inclusion. Exclusion can contribute to heavy violence in either one of the two ways. On the one hand, the high risks associated with protests can result in declining participation by less militant elements in the movement. As voices advocating limited reforms and nonviolent tactics disappear in the face of state provocation, forcible retaliation by more radical elements increases (Tarrow, 1994). On the other, by imposing sudden and dramatic grievances that threaten targeted further harm, severe repression of nonviolent protests and rapid institutional closure can both result in widespread support for armed rebellion (Zimmerman, 1980; Lichbach, 1987; Loveman, 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). When a large segment of society supports a challenger movement and concludes that the state cannot be
10
GREGORY M. MANEY
reformed through nonviolent means, intense rebellion is likely to follow (Goodwin, 1997; Goldstone, 1998; Toth, 2003). Extreme ongoing repression is likely to minimize protest (WickhamCrowley, 1989; Muller & Weede, 1990). Most states, however, do not possess either the extent of institutional closure or the extensive coercive capacities necessary to make exclusion a viable long-term strategy (Dix, 1984). In his study of protest waves in West Germany, Koopmans (1993) notes that the state deployed a double strategy for dealing with new social movements, mixing inclusive with exclusive responses. Like the exclusive strategy, a double strategy can sew the seeds of rebellion, albeit for different reasons. When the West German state combined concessions with repression, protest movements became radicalized as moderate elements exited to pursue newly opened institutional channels of recourse. In the process, movements became both more confrontational in their tactics and more vulnerable to intensive, targeted repression. As radicalized movements responded forcefully to coercion, escalating violence resulted in the decline of protest and the formation of paramilitary organizations conducting low-intensity insurgency campaigns.5 Overall, Koopmans’ findings suggest that the double strategy contributes to political violence by collapsing the middle ground of protest previously occupied by moderates and militants alike.6 Kriesi et al. (1992) note, in passing, that ethnic separatist movements engaged in significantly higher levels of violence than their new social movement counterparts. Several other studies have found a significant relationship between ethnic separatism and rebellion (Muller, 1985; Muller & Seligson, 1987; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Brown & Boswell, 1997). The impact of ethnicity on the interaction between protest and rebellion can best be explained in terms of how nationalism affects insurgents’ responses to state strategies. In terms of exclusion, the state already suffers from low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of those belonging to an ethno-nationalist minority. Coercive responses to nonviolent protests, therefore, more readily elicit support for armed rebellion. And just as coercion is viewed as unjust and unreasonable, members of an ethno-nationalist minority are also more likely to question the sincerity and substance of reforms. The same, however, cannot be said of many in the dominant ethnonationalist group who view inclusive state responses to challenger movements as dangerous if not treasonous. Counter-mobilization against challenger movements contributes to minority rebellion in two ways. First, those viewing reform-oriented protest movements and inclusive state responses to protests as having negative implications for their own authority, recognition, and claims will likely respond in violent opposition (Beissinger, 1998; Tilly, 2002).
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
11
Second, movement opponents attempt to pressurize states to shift their strategies away from inclusion and more fully toward reliance upon exclusion. When the dominant ethnic group segment of civil society is strong relative to the state, reforms are likely to be halted if not reversed while repression aimed at the challenger movement becomes more sweeping and intensive. Vigilantism and the renewed closure of the POS facing challenger movements produce higher levels of support for rebellion by further de-legitimating the state and reinforcing the belief that social justice for the ethnic minority group requires a change in territorial status (e.g., Tejerina, 2001). For these reasons, I expect a double state response to a challenger movement in a divided society to eventually give rise to intensive minority rebellion, dominant group vigilantism, and high levels of state repression. While both exclusive and double state strategies responding to protest movements facilitate rebellion, the same cannot be said for an inclusive state strategy. In a comparative study of Italy and Northern Ireland, Maguire (1993) found that the rapid implementation of reforms by the Italian state coupled with a restrained response to right-wing violence resulted in declining levels of political violence. Nevertheless, for reasons mentioned above, in most societies divided along ethno-nationalist lines, a state relying upon inclusion runs the risk of losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the dominant ethnic group. In this case, a high level of vigilantism becomes a serious possibility. Having developed a framework for interpreting the interaction between rebellion and protest, I now apply the framework to explain alternating forms and goals of ethno-nationalist contention in Northern Ireland between 1956 and 1972.
METHOD As a preliminary exploration of this topic, I have selected the case of contention in Northern Ireland between 1955 and 1972. Northern Ireland is distinct from most other Western European societies both in its neo-colonial status and in that ethno-nationalism constitutes the primary basis of mass mobilization. With recent political violence disproportionately involving ethnically divided societies, the case provides an important opportunity to assess the significance of ethnicity to the interaction between protest and rebellion. By encompassing a civil rights movement historically straddled by two rebellions, the period selected allows for an examination of not only how an armed rebellion might contribute to the origins of a protest movement, but also how a protest movement might sew the seeds of rebellion.
12
GREGORY M. MANEY
The analysis combines historical and quantitative methods. I drew upon a wide range of sources to construct both a detailed historical chronology and database of political events related to Northern Ireland. Sources used include six archives,7 seven different newspapers,8 and nineteen key informants9 (see Appendix A for a description of persons interviewed). A concerted effort was made to achieve balance by acquiring information from both state and non-state sources, from Nationalist and Unionist sources, and from sources based in different geographical locations. I supplemented these sources with a detailed examination of over 200 accounts of the period by scholars, activists, and government officials. The results establish an instance where minority protest and rebellion were causally inter-related phenomena (for a glossary of case-specific terminology, please see Appendix B).
RESULTS Ethno-Nationalist Contention, 1955–1972 Fig. 2 presents levels of minority rebellion (as measured by the number of deaths resulting from Republican paramilitary activities) and minority protest (as measured by the number of civil rights protests) between 1955 and 1964.10 Similarly, Fig. 3 presents levels of minority rebellion and protest between 10
# Events
8
6 Civil Rights Protests 4
Deaths by Republicans
2
0 55
Fig. 2.
57
59 Year
61
63
Minority Rebellion and Protest, Northern Ireland 1955–1964.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
13
300 250
# Events
200 Civil Rights Protests
150
Deaths by Republicans 100 50 0 65
67
69
71
73
Year
Fig. 3.
Minority Protest and Rebellion, Northern Ireland 1965–1974.
1965 and 1974.11 Together, the figures establish that nationalist rebellion both preceded and followed civil rights mobilization. Informally begun in 1955 and formally declared in 1956, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) launched a Border Campaign, seeking first to capture majority Nationalist border areas in the west of Northern Ireland and then to move eastward. The campaign involved raids on Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and British Army barracks; bombings of radio transmitters, railway tracks, and bridges; and ambushes of security patrols. At its height in 1957, the campaign resulted in nine deaths – seven IRA members and two RUC officers. In total, 19 people died either in preparing for or conducting the campaign. In addition, 204 suspected Republicans were prosecuted and 113 imprisoned by the Unionistcontrolled Northern Ireland state (Bell, 1997, p. 303). With the IRA formally ending its campaign in 1962, however, Republican political violence largely subsided for seven years.12 The year also brought the first civil rights protest related to Northern Ireland. The England-based Connolly Association sponsored a march from Liverpool to London to highlight the denial of civil rights to the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland. The following year marked both the emergence of a relatively moderate Unionist Prime Minister and the first civil rights protests in Northern Ireland. Drawing its support primarily from the Nationalist community, the movement challenged institutionalized sectarian practices that
14
GREGORY M. MANEY
disadvantaged the minority. The movement emphasized mass-based, nonviolent disobedience while deliberately avoiding the issue of partition. Nineteen sixty-eight witnessed the first mass civil rights marches. By the end of the year, the Northern Ireland state had announced unprecedented reforms in the electoral system, housing allocation, and policing. The following year witnessed intense rioting and renewed armed activities by Republicans. The last year of the analysis (1972) brought the highest level of politically related fatalities that Northern Ireland has seen. Most observers conclude that 1972 marked the end of the civil rights movement (e.g., NICRA, 1978; Devin-McAliskey, 1988; Farrell, 1988, p. 65). As Fig. 3 indicates, civil rights mobilization sharply declined after 1972. Both quantitative and historical evidence support the explanation for this alternation between rebellion and protest provided by the conceptual framework developed in the last section.
From Border War to Civil Rights Protest Events in Northern Ireland during the 1960s support the idea that the defeat of an armed rebellion can contribute to the emergence of a social movement by opening the structure of political opportunity. The Unionist-controlled Northern Ireland state (also referred to by the name of its parliament – Stormont) reduced both its repressive activities and coercive capacities. Even before the IRA announced the cessation of hostilities in 1962, Stormont released all Republicans interned during the campaign. The size of security forces provides another measure for regime repressiveness. Fig. 4 charts the size of security forces in Northern Ireland at the end of each year from 1959 to 1972.13 Prior to the eruption of widespread rioting in 1969, the strength of the security force reached its peak during the IRA’s Border Campaign. As it became apparent that the campaign would not succeed, Stormont reduced the size of its security force prior to the formal cessation of hostilities. With exception of 1966 – when rumors of a planned IRA invasion from the South during the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising resulted in a moderate increase in force strength – reductions continued through 1968. As Stormont became less repressive and less capable of being repressive, the potential costs associated with protests decreased. The defeat of the Border Campaign also brought about a greater receptivity among Unionists to creating room for Nationalists in the polity. Low levels of support for the IRA during the later stages of the campaign suggested that improved cross-community relations could bring a permanent
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
15
30,000
Size
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000 59
61
63
65
67
69
71
Year
Fig. 4.
Size of Northern Ireland Security Forces 1959–1972.
end to Republican violence. Nineteen sixty-two marked several unprecedented instances of cross-community contact. The all-Protestant fraternal Unionist organization, the Orange Order, accepted an invitation to engage in political dialogue by the all-Catholic fraternal Nationalist group, the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The Young Unionists invited the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party, Eddie McAteer, to speak at Queen’s University of Belfast. Young Unionist delegates also met with branch of Fine Gael, the second largest political party in the Republic of Ireland. The willingness of prominent Unionist organizations to engage in dialogue encouraged elites to pursue political accommodation. With the appointment of Terence O’Neill as Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister in 1963, the tone, if not the substance, of the Unionist government’s community relations policy changed. In keeping with the spirit of the ecumenism sweeping Western Europe, O’Neill held well-publicized visits to Catholic schools and spoke openly of ‘‘building bridges’’ between the two communities. The Prime Minister also issued a public statement expressing the government’s condolences at the passing of Pope John XXIII. The following two years witnessed moves to integrate Nationalists into the polity. In 1964, Stormont officially recognized the Republic of Ireland-based Irish Congress of Trade Unions. In January of 1965, O’Neill invited the Taoiseach (Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland) to Belfast to discuss matters of mutual economic interest. While intended to promote functional
16
GREGORY M. MANEY
cooperation between the two states, the meetings suggested a thawing of the cold war between Unionists and Nationalists. Responding favorably to O’Neill’s policies, the largest Nationalist party in Northern Ireland, the Irish Nationalist Party, declared itself the official opposition in parliament. The declaration signaled the willingness by most Nationalists to tacitly recognize Stormont’s legitimacy and to pursue minority grievances through institutional channels. The state’s inclusive strategy also yielded short-term electoral benefits. Supporters of ‘‘O’Neillism’’ did well at the polls during the general election in 1965. O’Neill himself received a vote of confidence as Prime Minister from the Ulster Unionist Council and the Grand Orange Lodge. Popular support for the government’s policies encouraged O’Neill to continue what Moloney and Pollak (1986, p. 121) term the ‘‘politics of the grand gesture – visiting Catholic schools, visits with nuns and priests, and entertaining Cardinal Conway.’’ The politics of the grand gesture, however, also invited protests by Nationalists (Costain, 1992). Stormont’s failure to engage substantively in reforms demanded by early civil rights organizations such as the Campaign for Social Justice made the regime vulnerable to allegations of hypocrisy. In December of 1966, the liberal Unionist editorial staff of the largest paper in Northern Ireland encouraged the government to make good on its promises: This is whether it is to give a practical demonstration of its capacity for democratic development or to remain an object of suspicion and hostility to those, at home and abroad, who are looking to it to follow the British tradition y The danger is that if his administration is left without initiative, Northern Ireland will be made to appear that it does nothing except when forced to. The many who have placed their hopes in Capt. O’Neill badly need a re-assurance if they are not to give way to disillusionment and possibly retaliation (‘‘Acts of Parliament’’ Belfast Telegraph, 12/07/66).
Some politically active members of the Nationalist minority recognized that the Unionist-controlled Northern Ireland state was not only vulnerable to allegations of hypocrisy, but also to intervention by the British government, which retained ultimate sovereignty over Northern Ireland affairs. By creating negative publicity both within and beyond Northern Ireland’s borders, protests using highly resonant civil rights frames and nonviolent forms of contention could place significant pressure on the British government to redress minority grievances if not revisit the ‘‘Irish question.’’ Key civil rights activists had their sights focused upon producing international publicity. An organizer of the first mass civil rights march from Coalisland to Dungannon, Austin Currie (1998, p. 16), writes: ‘‘A prime objective of the proposed civil rights marches was to publicise internationally injustices to
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
17
Northern Ireland and to force the British government to intervene to redress them.’’ Regarding the formation of a coalition of civil rights groups known as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in early 1967, a member of the Young Republican Association, Fionnbarra O´Dochartaigh (1994, p. 29) states: At long last the various strands of protest would be united under one leadership in an attempt to attract a global focus and bring pressure to bear upon the British government. At least that was the intention. We believed the mere exposure of sectarian malpractices in these six northeastern counties of Ireland would prove to be a major embarrassment for ‘the mother of all parliaments,’ [Westminster] both at home and abroad.
O´Dochartaigh played an important role in organizing the second mass civil rights march, held in Derry/Londonderry on October 5, 1968. Efforts by the Unionist state to bolster its legitimacy in the aftermath of a failed rebellion unwittingly contributed to the emergence of a civil rights movement. O´Dochartaigh was by no means the only Republican to participate in the early civil rights movement. By affecting the composition of those active in the Republican movement, defeat of the IRA’s border campaign heightened receptivity to protest. Defeat brought about a rethink in Republican circles. The process of revising strategy both reflected and contributed to the increasing prominence of leftists.14 In 1962 – the same year that the IRA announced the end of its campaign – the London-based Connolly Association published a pamphlet entitled Our Plan to End Partition. The document argued for mobilizing the British public against repressive, undemocratic Stormont laws. In so doing, the British government would also be forced to address the issue of partition. Led by a Marxist, Republican intellectual, Desmond Greaves, the Association had a major influence on a number of people who become leading figures in the civil rights movement (author’s interview with Anthony Coughlan). In 1964, the Wolfe Tone Society was established. Linking communists and (other) socialist Republicans, the Society operated as a think-tank for the movement. Members of the Society previously involved in the Connolly Association advocated a campaign to dismantle sectarian privilege in Northern Ireland (Feeney, 1974). Roy Johnston envisioned a revolution in stages. Once the sectarian privileges of Unionists were eliminated and democratic reforms set in place, a united and inherently anti-imperialist working class would achieve a united Ireland. More akin to Greaves, other WTS members such as Anthony Coughlan believed that by exposing sectarian injustices, a grass-roots campaign would force the British government to consider Irish reunification (Coughlan, 1966).
18
GREGORY M. MANEY
The Wolfe Tone Society put their ideas into action. In August of 1966, all WTS chapters met at a conference held in Maghera. Leading Republicans such as the IRA’s Chief of Staff, Cathal Goulding, attended (Sinn Fe´in, 1966). Those gathered decided to organize a broad-based meeting on civil liberties. Held two months later in War Memorial Building in Belfast, the conference led to the formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association in early 1967 (NICRA, 1978). NICRA became the main umbrella group for the civil rights movement. It would not be entirely accurate to portray the early civil rights movement as simply ‘‘old Irish nationalism in a new bottle’’ (see Smyth & Ellison, 1998). Certainly, non-Republican groups like the Campaign for Social Justice promoted civil rights as ends in and of themselves.15 Nevertheless, it would be equally inaccurate to deny that some key promulgators also saw the civil rights movement as a vehicle for pursuing the end of partition. Based on a combination of archival and secondary sources, I have identified sponsoring organizations for 226 civil rights protests taking place primarily but not solely in Northern Ireland between 1963 and 1972.16 Even with the Republican leadership’s concerted efforts to maintain a low public profile, 9% of civil rights events for which sponsors were identified were organized primarily by Republican organizations. When including coalitions of groups that Republicans participated in such as NICRA and the Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC), Republicans helped to organize 78% of civil rights events. By both reducing repression and increasing institutional access, the defeat of an armed nationalist rebellion fostered conditions conducive to the emergence of a civil rights movement. Republicans were among the first to recognize the possibilities for and advantages of nonviolent protest. Civil rights mobilization, however, set in motion a series of Unionist responses that culminated in the resurgence of armed rebellion. From Civil Rights to Civil War17 An analysis of political events in Northern Ireland supports the assertion that, in the context of a society divided along ethno-nationalist lines, a double state response to a minority-based social movement contributes to the emergence of both armed rebellion and vigilantism. Stormont responded to mass civil rights mobilization with a combination of repression and policy concessions. Under orders from the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs, William Craig, not to let the second mass civil rights march proceed
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
19
along its planned route to a place of major significance in Loyalist political culture, the RUC freely wielded batons and fired water cannons at civil rights demonstrators. Footage filmed by a RTE (state television for the Republic of Ireland) cameraman of peaceful protesters bludgeoned by the police rapidly circulated throughout the world’s television media, generating an outpouring of international criticism. For civil rights activists, the publicity surrounding the event underscored the efficacy of taking to the streets: Prior to the Derry march the civil rights campaign had attracted the support only of the politically conscious y But Bill Craig’s police force stamped the authenticity of NICRA as a broad movement on the heads of the people in Duke Street and on the hearts of the television public. (NICRA, 1978, p. 13)
Under pressure from the British government and a flurry of civil rights protests following October 5th, the O’Neill government responded by announcing a series of reforms on November 22, 1968. The package entailed concessions to civil rights demands regarding the electoral system, public housing allocation, and repressive legislation. While this double state response increased civil rights mobilization in the short-term, it ultimately contributed to the emergence of minority rebellion in two ways. First, reforms and repression hastened the departure of moderate elements from the civil rights movement. As repression intensified against the radicalized rump of the movement, civil rights protests turned increasingly violent. Some of those remaining active in the movement also became involved in rioting and incipient forms of rebellion such as Free Derry in the Bogside. Second, Stormont reforms triggered a violent backlash by Loyalists. Loyalist counter-mobilization, in turn, encouraged Stormont to shift toward a more exclusive response to minority insurgency. In the face of vigilantism, repression, and broken promises of reform, a large segment of the Nationalist population concluded that social justice would only come through armed struggle to end the partition of Ireland. I now review both of these affects of the double state strategy in detail. Institutionalization and Radicalization By promising an opening of the polity, the announcement of reforms created incentives for the institutionalization of Nationalist dissent. Both the DCAC and the NICRA responded to the reform package of late November 1968 by declaring moratoria on mass civil rights marches (Deutsch & Magowan, 1973).18 Two leaders of DCAC, John Hume and Ivan Cooper, outspokenly
20
GREGORY M. MANEY
opposed the ‘‘Long March’’ organized by the New Left student group, People’s Democracy (PD), from Belfast to Derry/Londonderry in early January of 1969, fearing the violence that did in fact take place (Akenson, 1973, p. 231). As violence against civil rights demonstrators and ensuing riots escalated, moderates felt that there was little to gain and much to lose by continuing street politics. Winning seats in parliament in February of 1969, both Hume and Cooper resigned from the DCAC leadership shortly thereafter. Along with three other members of parliament active in the civil rights movement, Cooper and Hume formed the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in August of 1970. The founders believed that the electoral arena provided the best forum for consolidating reforms and further advancing the civil rights agenda (author’s interview with Ivan Cooper). By leading to the exit of moderate elements, the state’s double strategy contributed to the increased prominence of more radical elements within the civil rights movement. While some in NICRA were wary of continuing street politics, New Left groups such as the PD, the Derry Housing Action Committee, and the Derry Labour Party advocated keeping up the pressure on Stormont to meet outstanding civil rights demands such as universal franchise in local government elections. With prominent moderates no longer participating in street politics, civil rights protesters became more vulnerable to intensive repression. In turn, as the use of force by Loyalist organizations such as the Loyal Sons of Ulster and by the Northern Ireland security forces escalated, those participating in civil rights events increasingly deviated from the previous agreement to protest nonviolently. In early January of 1969, Loyalists repeatedly attacked a civil rights march from Belfast to Derry/Londonderry organized by the PD. The attacks triggered intense rioting in Nationalist areas throughout Northern Ireland. Shortly thereafter, the Newry branch of the PD held a march to protest the attacks and the government’s failure to prosecute the offenders. According to Arthur (1974, p. 44), upon provocation by the RUC, the marchers became violent: ‘‘Seven police wagons were destroyed; eighteen people – including ten policemen – were injured; and twenty-four, most of them PD supporters, were arrested.’’ Republicans joined PD members in forcibly retaliating against repression. According to Adams (1988, p. 48) ‘‘republican stewards discarded their armbands, and turned with gusto on the RUC.’’ Consistent with these findings, a time-series regression analysis by Peroff and Hewett (1980) reports that civil rights reforms enacted between January 1968 and May 1971 were positively related to rioting in Northern Ireland.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
21
The increased prominence of radical elements of the movement led to the further departures of voices advocating nonviolent tactics and limited goals. On March 14, 1969, four members of the NICRA’s Executive resigned in protest of PD’s growing influence and the NICRA’s decision to hold marches protesting the Public Order (Amendment) Act.19 As student enthusiasm for civil disobedience waned in the face of mounting repression, the PD was reduced primarily to its Young Socialist core. The group and its kindred spirits increasingly advocated the establishment of an all-Ireland Worker’s Republic. During an interview with the New Left Review (1969, p. 17), PD leader Michael Farrell stated: ‘‘[W]e must reject the idea of Westminster intervening to secure reform in Northern Ireland. We do not want reform of Northern Ireland, we want a revolution in Ireland and we will not get that by any Westminster intervention.’’ Events soon presented opportunities to put revolutionary ideology into practice. In August of 1969, a Loyalist commemoration march in Derry/ Londonderry resulted in clashes between the RUC and residents of a Republican area known as the Bogside. With the assistance of prominent civil rights activists such as Bernadette Devlin, residents pelted the police with stones and petrol bombs. Barricades were erected in the Bogside as well as in Republican areas in Belfast. Both Republican and New Left civil rights activists assisted residents in maintaining these ‘‘no-go’’ areas. By forcibly restricting the entry of state security forces into Nationalist areas, ‘‘Free Derry’’ and ‘‘Free Belfast’’ constituted early manifestations of minority rebellion. Koopmans (1993) study of new social movements in West Germany suggests that the combination of institutionalization and radicalization resulting from a double strategy by the state results in a relatively low levels of paramilitary violence. In the context of a society divided along ethnonationalist lines, however, counter-mobilization by the dominant ethnic group further fuelled minority rebellion. Loyalist Counter-Mobilization In his study on political repression in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1975, White (1999) finds higher levels of repression against Republican paramilitary groups than Loyalist paramilitary groups. My research confirms this finding and additionally suggests that Loyalist mobilization against state concessions to the civil rights movement played an important part in escalating repression aimed at the Nationalist community. To many Unionists, the civil rights movement presented a serious threat to Northern Ireland’s political ties to Great Britain. Republican involvement cast an
22
GREGORY M. MANEY
ominous, dark shadow over the movement. In the words of one outspoken Loyalist opponent, ‘‘the civil rights movement was seen as a Trojan horse or stalking horse for Republicanism’’ (author’s interview with Clifford Smyth). A prominent official in the Orange Order at the time and later its leader, the Reverend W. Martin Smyth, stated that: ‘‘discrimination was not the main concern of the civil rights movement. Many in the movement were Republicans’’ (author’s interview). If most Loyalists held similar views, one would expect the civil rights movement along with state concessions to its demands to generate significant counter-mobilization.20 Fig. 4 charts levels of Loyalist violence between 1963 and 1969. Violent Loyalist events include cases of arson, assaults on civil rights demonstrators and state officials, bombings, death threats, shootings, and rioting. Mass civil rights mobilization in 1968 and 1969 sparked more Loyalist violence than rumors of a Republican invasion from the South surrounding celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising in 1966. While civil rights protests declined in 1970, Loyalist violence continued to escalate as a Republican paramilitary offensive and the dissolving of Stormont kindled fears of the British government ending partition (Fig. 5). Loyalist counter-mobilization modified the state’s double strategy, encouraging not only delays and backtracking on promised reforms, but also sweeping repressive measures against the Nationalist minority. By 350 300
# Events
250 200
Violent Loyalist Events
150
Civil Rights Protests
100 50 0 64
66
Fig. 5.
68 Year
70
72
Loyalist Violence, 1964–1972.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
Table 1. Year
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
23
Repression of Civil Rights Protests, 1967–1972.
Police Use Force
Reported Arrests
Reported Injuries
] Events
As % of year’s protests
] Arrests
Mean per protest for year
] Injuries
Mean per protest for year
1 7 15 2 2 10
14.3 11.9 21.4 4.2 8.3 13.2
2 92 131 9 5 47
0.29 1.56 1.87 0.38 0.21 0.87
0 103 401 0 0 103
0.00 1.75 5.73 0.00 0.00 1.94
Note: Riots after civil rights events excluded.
jeopardizing public order while providing opportunities for political gains by elites who supported them, Loyalist protest groups effectively pressured the state into responding repressively to civil rights mobilization. The threat to public order posed by promised Loyalist confrontations with civil rights marchers convinced even moderate Unionist cabinet ministers of the wisdom of first rerouting civil rights marches away from predominantly Unionist areas and then of banning such marches all together. Efforts by the police to enforce these policies resulted in the use of physical force against civil rights protesters. Moreover, Loyalist counter-mobilization against the civil rights movement and ‘‘O’Neillism’’ encouraged some politically ambitious cabinet members to take hard-line stances against the civil rights movement and any further concessions to its demands. As Loyalist counter-mobilization escalated, the state became more forceful in its response to the civil rights movement. Table 1 provides an indication of levels of repression aimed at the civil rights movement between 1967 and 1972. When compared to other years, the peak year of civil rights mobilization (1969) had disproportionate numbers of instances where police used force against demonstrators, arrests of protests, and injuries sustained during civil rights events. A post-Bloody Sunday resurgence in civil rights protests in 1972 was met with a re-intensification of repression. Escalating vigilantism and state repression encouraged a large segment of the minority to support armed rebellion to end partition. Republican Responses to Backlash In the face of both Unionist violence and Stormont’s failure to implement promised reforms, a growing number of Republicans active in the civil
24
GREGORY M. MANEY
rights movement became convinced that social justice could only be obtained through an armed struggle to end partition (White, 1989). In the words of the future leader of Sinn Fe´in, Gerry Adams (1986, p. 34): The civil rights movement had been looking for democratisation of the state, but the state had made abundantly clear the fact that it would not and could not implement democratic reforms. The movement had placed its demands on the state; it had not demanded the abolition of the state, nor a United Ireland. Now, however, with the reaction of the state and the intervention of the British army, the constitutional question had come to the fore and the whole existence of the Six County state stood in question.
Escalating violence against civil rights demonstrators and Nationalist residential areas produced a deep split within the Republican movement. While the Republican leadership remained committed to promoting reunification through nonviolent efforts to democratize Stormont, many in the rank and file started to listen to militarist Republicans who had exited to the political shadows after the border campaign. Having focused upon agitating on social issues and supporting the civil rights movement, the IRA found itself unprepared for military action. In riot-torn Nationalist areas, walls bore the slogan: ‘‘IRA – I Ran Away’’ (Arthur, 1984, pp. 123–124). Residents jeered known IRA men for their failure to defend their communities. In the words of one observer, ‘‘the men who brought the guns and were able to use them would have the key to the situation in the Catholic ghettoes, and the initiative elsewhere’’ (O’Brien, 1974, p. 177). As a result of a vote of no confidence in the Army Council, the Belfast unit stayed away from the annual Irish Army Convention (Sinn Fe´in, 1979). Even in their absence, the convention split over the leadership’s proposal for elected Sinn Fe´in candidates to take seats at Stormont and Westminster. For decades, Republicans had abstained from participating in a parliament they considered illegitimate. When the motion carried, those favoring a traditional and more militarist approach promptly formed the Provisional Army Council. Repression and rebellion soon fed off one another, producing an outward spiral of violence. After 1969, Nationalist riots became as commonplace as civil rights protests. Republican paramilitary activities increased exponentially during the early 1970s (see Fig. 2). Sweeping and indiscriminate repressive measures such as a curfew exclusively and forcibly imposed in a Republican area of Belfast in July of 1970, the mass internment of suspected Republicans starting in August of 1971, and Bloody Sunday where British soldiers fatally wounded 14 civil rights protesters in late January of 1972 – all led to widespread Nationalist rioting and heightened Republican
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
25
paramilitary activity. As many Nationalists concluded that only the end of partition could bring about social justice, civil rights mobilization effectively became a subsidiary component of minority rebellion: Thriving in the atmosphere of sectarian fear and buoyant with the Stormont Government’s failure to act on the civil rights demands, the Provisionals were able to once more identify the question of civil rights with the abolition of the state. Four years after the civil rights campaign had begun the old question of pulling down Stormont once more raised its head. (NICRA, 1978, p. 30)
While inclusive Unionist responses to the defeat of rebellion contributed to the emergence of the civil rights movement, their mixed responses to civil rights mobilization paved the way for renewed minority rebellion.
CONCLUSION Caution should be exercised when making generalizations based upon one case study. Nonetheless, political contention in Northern Ireland between 1955 and 1972 provides an instance where an armed rebellion contributed to the emergence of a policy-oriented protest movement and vice versa. The literature review in the theory section makes clear that similar sequences have occurred in several different divided societies, including societies with more than two ethnic groups. Comparative research combining quantitative and historical analyses will provide a better assessment of the external validity and frequency of identified sequences of contention that link rebellion and protest together. Such research can also point out additional sequences involving political processes noted in the literature but not present in the case examined here. The findings have important theoretical and applied implications. They suggest that armed rebellions and policy-oriented protest movements taking place within the same society cannot be fully understood in isolation of one another. While the emergence of both types of contention depend significantly upon the structure of political opportunity, their trajectories and outcomes can also significantly affect structures of political opportunities facing subsequent challengers. Shifting structures of political opportunities are likely to bring about changes in stated goals and forms of collective action. Armed rebellions in decline often contribute to opportunities for policy-oriented protest movements to arise. Conversely, protest movements in decline often contribute to threats that are conducive to the emergence of armed rebellion.
26
GREGORY M. MANEY
Demonstrating the sequential interconnection between rebellion and protest also highlights the interplay between structure and agency in political contention. The interactive unfolding of responses to actions taken by authorities, challengers, and their opponents engender new political conditions that, in turn, encourage the adoption of different goals and forms of contention. Just as the political context partly reflects conscious decisions made by individual political actors, these decisions cannot be fully understood without reference to their anticipated consequences within a given political context. The findings also provide support for the explanation offered for why violent ethno-nationalist mobilization has persisted at high levels over the last decade and a half despite overall declines in the number of open rebellions as well as incidences of paramilitary violence (Gurr, 2000). Ethnic states are caught between the contradictory logics of democratic legitimacy and ethnic nationalism. On the one hand, fully excluding an ethno-nationalist minority would violate the increasingly strong international norm of pluralist democracy.21 On the other, fully including the minority group in the polity could possibly lead to the establishment of a new nation-state exclusive of the identity and interests of the previously dominant ethnic group. Because of this possibility, comprehensive reform initiatives by an ethnic state often precipitate splits among power-holders and popular oppositional mobilization within the dominant group. These contradictions result in state responses to minority mobilization that encourage alternation in the goals and forms of minority contention. Anticipating these responses, strategically oriented minority insurgents alter their stated goals and tactics to maximize their mobilization potential. While the composition of active ethno-nationalist insurgents changes across political contexts, minority protests for political inclusion and social equality, on the one hand, and armed rebellions for national liberation, on the other, are better viewed as interconnected phases of nationalist mobilization rather than as distinct, unrelated types of contention. In terms of applied conflict transformation, the findings suggest that states should avoid responses to insurgents that result in a mixed POS. States committed to reaching political accommodation should rapidly implement promised concessions while avoiding sweeping, indiscriminate repressive measures that either spark rebellion anew or fuel violent countermobilization by suddenly and dramatically imposing grievances. While a mixture of concessions and repression in response to armed rebellion reduces political violence, the same double response to policy-oriented protests encourages political violence, particularly in divided societies where
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
27
states lack legitimacy. Zero-sum assumptions present formidable obstacles to the nonviolent institutionalization of dissent in divided societies. Both power-holders and insurgents must somehow demonstrate to their respective constituents that enhanced democratic legitimacy can simultaneously advance their respective nationalist agendas.
NOTES 1. Reilly (2001, p. 4) defines a divided society as ‘‘a society which is both ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purposes.’’ For the purposes of this study, I define ethnicity as both the construction of collective boundaries and the production of meanings using some combination of language, religion, culture, ancestry, class, or locality. Nationalism involves the mass mobilization of a social group in the pursuit of shared political objectives. These shared objectives include either the establishment or the maintenance of a state that, in its symbols, its practices and its territorial dimensions, both reflects and represents the nation (Flynn, 2000, pp. 19–23; O’Leary & McGarry, 1993, p. 3). Combining these two terms yields ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism entails the mass mobilization of an ethnic group in the pursuit of shared political objectives. Ethno-nationalist contention involves ethno-nationalism in a divided society. 2. Although Tarrow (1994, pp. 89–96) considers repression to be a static dimension, I treat it as a feature of the political system that changes over time. 3. Not all revolutionary insurgents exit contention (e.g., Ron, 2001). Insurgents who persist in using political violence in the context of an opening polity may even become targets of mass protest movements (e.g., Tejerina, 2001). 4. Consistent with the assumption of the relative rigidity of the ethnic state, Scarritt et al. (2001) find that African societies with ethnic minorities at risk experienced less democratization than those without minorities at risk. Moreover, they find that while worker-student protests were positively related to democratization, ethno-political protests were not. 5. For a similar movement trajectory in a very different political context (Colombia), see Zamosc (1989). 6. While inclusive responses to social movements may initially contribute to the formation of paramilitary organizations, adherence to a double strategy of inclusion and exclusion eventually reduced levels of support for revolutionary movements in Asia, Central America, and South America (see Bredo, 1986; Wickham-Crowley, 1989). 7. The archives searched include the American Irish Historical Society; the Political Collection at the Linen Hall Library; National Archive of the Republic of Ireland; Public Records Office (Great Britain); Public Records Office Northern Ireland; Hibernica Collection at Main Library of Queen’s University Belfast; and a collection whose curator wishes to remain anonymous. 8. The following newspapers were searched: Belfast Telegraph, Derry Journal, Irish News (Belfast), Irish Times (Dublin), Londonderry Sentinel, Newsletter (Belfast), and Times (London).
28
GREGORY M. MANEY
9. Key informants prominently participated in civil rights contention either during its early stages in the immediate aftermath of the IRA Border Campaign (ca. 1962) or during the later stages of the movement with the resurgence of armed Republicanism (ca. 1972). The timing of their participation increases the likelihood that respondents will be aware of connections between civil rights protest and armed Republican insurgency. Informants were also selected because of their variations in ideology, strategy, political organizational affiliation, age, ethnicity, class, geographical location, and institutional access. Capturing and conveying these differences within the civil rights movement as well as within its organized opposition increases confidence that findings are not an artifact of a biased sample. 10. Data for deaths resulting from the IRA’s Border Campaign come from Bell (1997), Hennessey (1997), and National Graves Association (nd). Figures for deaths by Republican since 1969 come from Sutton (1994). 11. Two extra years (1973 and 1974) were added to Fig. 3 to illustrate continuing decline in civil rights mobilization. 12. The death in 1963 involved an explosion in Cork located in the Republic of Ireland (National Graves Association, nd, p. 115). 13. Northern Ireland security forces include the Royal Ulster Constabulary (full time, full-time reservists, and part-time reservists), the Ulster Special Constabulary (through April 1970), the British Army (1969 onwards), and the Ulster Defence Regiment (March 1970 onwards). Data compiled using the Digest of Statistics, Northern Ireland, Irish Information Partnership (1987), and Barzilay (1981). 14. While vocal in their opposition to the new direction, militarist Republicans faded into the background until 1969. 15. Nor can the emergence of the civil rights movement be solely attributed to the failure of rebellion. Significant technological, political, economic, and cultural changes both within Northern Ireland and beyond its borders since World War II provided resources, organizational capacities, political opportunities, collective identities, and collective action frames that encouraged the emergence of a civil rights movement and contributed to its ability to procure unprecedented reforms from a reluctant Unionist regime. 16. Civil rights events are operationalized as events where participants call for nonconstitutional, state policy changes believed to be of benefit to the Nationalist population and/or the working class as a whole. Inherently destructive events such as riots, bombings, and shootings were excluded unless the source(s) explicitly indicated that civil rights issues or specific events related to civil rights events motivated participants. Events sponsored by either Provisional Sinn Fe´in or a postsplit republican organization with undetermined affiliation were excluded. 17. The sub-section title is inspired by O’Dowd, Rolston, and Tomlinson’s (1980) book, Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil War. 18. The NICRA subsequently extended the moratorium from April 24, 1969 to June 27, 1969. 19. The resignations reflected not only tactical disagreements but also ideological differences. These differences included whether to accept the government’s reforms and the pace of their implementation, whether Stormont should be democratized or abolished, and whether the movement should focus on justice for Nationalists or on justice for the working class, regardless of religious affiliation or territorial preference.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
29
20. In his autobiography, Terence O’Neill (1972, p. 111), wrote: ‘‘Any liberalminded person must admit that the Civil Rights movement brought about reforms which would otherwise have taken years to wring from a reluctant government.’’ 21. Nonetheless, as genocide in Rwanda illustrates, there are sequences where armed ethno-nationalist contention results in the complete exclusion of the ethnonationalist minority from the polity. Structurally, such sequences reflect severe imbalances of coercive and mobilization capacities between ethno-nationalist groups. Strategically, the sequences often entail provocation by an armed segment of the minority and/or manipulation by elites among the dominant group. See Maney et al. (2006, p. 192), Kuperman (2004), and Prunier (1995).
REFERENCES Adams, G. (1986). The politics of Irish freedom. Dingle: Brandon Books. Adams, G. (1988). A republican in the civil rights campaign. In: M. Farrell (Ed.), Twenty years on (pp. 39–53). Dingle: Brandon Books. Akenson, D. H. (1973). The United States and Ireland. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Almeida, P. D. (2003). Opportunity organizations and threat-induced contention: Protest waves in authoritarian settings. American Journal of Sociology, 109(2), 345–400. Arthur, P. (1974). The People’s Democracy, 1968–1973. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Arthur, P. (1984). Government & politics of Northern Ireland (2nd ed.). London: Longman. Barker, R. (1990). Political legitimacy and the state. New York: Oxford University Press. Barzilay, D. (1981). The British army in Ulster (Vol. 4, No.1). Belfast: Century Books. Beissinger, M. R. (1998). Event analysis in transitional societies: Protest mobilization in the former Soviet Union. In: D. Rucht, R. Koopmans & F. Neidhardt (Eds), Acts of Dissent: New developments in the study of protest (pp. 284–316). Berlin: Ed. Sigma. Bell, J. B. (1997). The secret army: The IRA. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Boswell, T., & Dixon, W. J. (1990). Dependency and rebellion: A cross-national analysis. American Sociological Review, 55, 540–559. Bredo, W. (1986). U.S. security: Potential of land reform policy support in the third world. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 14, 277–290. Brown, C., & Boswell, T. (1997). Ethnic conflict and political violence: A cross-national analysis. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 25, 111–130. Costain, A. N. (1992). Inviting women’s rebellion: A political process interpretation of the women’s movement. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Coughlan, A. (1966). Our ideas. Tuairisc, August 31, 7–10. Currie, A. (1998). Breaching the walls of injustice. Irish News, Souvenir Supplement, October 5, 16. Deutsch, R., & Magowan, V. (1973, 1974). Northern Ireland, 1968–1973: A chronology of events (Vols. 1–3). Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Devin-McAliskey, B. (1988). A peasant in the halls of the great. In: M. Farrell (Ed.), Twenty years on. Dingle: Brandon Books. Dix, R. H. (1984). Why revolutions succeed and fail. Polity, 26, 423–446. Eisinger, P. K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. American Political Science Review, 67, 11–28.
30
GREGORY M. MANEY
Farrell, M. (1988). Long march to freedom. In: M. Farrell (Ed.), Twenty years on (pp. 54–74). Dingle: Brandon Books. Feeney, V. E. (1974). The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. Eire, 9, 30–40. Flynn, M. K. (2000). Ideology, mobilization and the nation: The rise of Irish, Basque, and Carlist nationalist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. Goldstone, J. (1998). Social movements or revolutions? On the evolution and outcomes of collective action. In: M. G. Giugni, D. McAdam & C. Tilly (Eds), From contention to democracy (pp. 125–145). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Goodwin, J. (1997). State-centered approaches to social revolution. In: J. Foran (Ed.), Theorizing revolutions (pp. 11–37). New York: Routledge Press. Gurr, T. R. (2000). People versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Hennessey, T. (1997). A history of Northern Ireland 1920–1996. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan. Irish Information Partnership (1987). Irish information – Agenda: A database of facts and information on the Northern Ireland conflict and Anglo-Irish affairs (5th ed.). London: Irish Information Partnership. Khan, A. (2003). Baloch ethnic nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerrilla War to nowhere?. Asian ethnicity, 4, 281–293. Koopmans, R. (1993). The Dynamics of protest waves: West Germany, 1965 to 1989. American Sociological Review, 58, 637–658. Kriesberg, L. (1998). Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Dyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. G. (1992). New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 22, 219–244. Kuperman, A. J. (2004). Provoking genocide: A revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Journal of Genocide Research, 6, 61–84. Laciner, S., & Bal, I. (2004). The ideological and historical roots of the Kurdist movements in Turkey: Ethnicity, demography, and politics. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10, 473–504. Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31, 266–297. Loveman, M. (1998). High-risk collective action: Defending human rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. American Journal of Sociology, 104(2), 477–525. Maguire, D. (1993). Protesters, counterprotesters, and the authorities. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 528, 101–113. Maney, G. M. (2001). Transnational structures and protest: Linking theories and assessing evidence. Mobilization, 6, 83–100. Maney, G., Ibrahim, I., Higgins, G., & Herzog, H. (2006). The past’s promise: Lessons from peace processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Journal of Peace Research, 43, 181–200. Mann, M. (1986). The sources of social power: A history of power from the beginning to AD 1760. New York: Cambridge University Press. Markoff, J. (1996). Waves of democracy: Social movements and political change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
31
McAdam, D. (1982). Political process and the development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meyer, D. S. (2003). Political opportunity and nested institutions. Social Movement Studies, 2(1), 17–35. Meyer, D. S., & Staggenborg, S. (1996). Movements, countermovements, and the structure of political opportunity. American Journal of Sociology, 101, 1628–1660. Moaddel, M. (1993). Class, politics, and ideology in the Iranian revolution. New York: Columbia University Press. Moloney, Ed., & Pollak, A. (1986). Paisley. Swords: Poolbeg. Muller, E. N. (1985). Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence. American Sociological Review, 51, 47–61. Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1987). Inequality and insurgency. American Political Science Review, 81, 425–449. Muller, E. N., & Weede, E. (1990). Cross-national variation in political violence: A rational actor approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34, 624–651. National Graves Association. (Undated). The last post: The details and stories of republican dead. Dublin: NGA. New Left Review. (May–June 1969). People’s Democracy: A discussion on strategy. New Left Review, (55). Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (1978). We shall overcome: The history of the struggle for civil rights in Northern Ireland 1968–1978. Belfast: NICRA. O’Brien, C. C. (1974). States of Ireland (2nd ed.). London: Hutchinson. O´Dochartaigh, F. (1994). Ulster’s white Negroes: From civil rights to insurrection. San Francisco, CA: AK Press. O’Dowd, L., Rolston, B., & Tomlinson, M. (1980). Northern Ireland: Between civil rights and civil war. London: CSE Books. O’Leary, B., & McGarry, J. (1993). The politics of antagonism: Understanding northern Ireland. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone. O’Neill, T. (1972). The autobiography of Terence O’Neill. London: Rupert Hart-Davis. Osa, M. (2001). Mobilizing structures and cycles of protest: Post-Stalinist contention in Poland. 1954–1959. Mobilization, 8(1), 27–50. Peroff, K., & Hewitt, C. (1980). Rioting in Northern Ireland. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 593–612. Prunier, G. (1995). The Rwanda crisis: History of a genocide. New York: Columbia University Press. Reilly, B. (2001). Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ron, J. (2001). Ideology in context: Explaining Sendero Luminoso’s tactical escalation. Journal of Peace Research, 38(5), 569–592. Scarritt, J. R., McMillan, S. M., & Mozaffar, S. (2001). The interaction between democracy and ethnopolitical protest and rebellion in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 34(7), 800–827. Sinn Fe´in. (1979). Forward from 1966 – Presidential address of Tomas MacGiolla to the 61st Annual Ardfheis of Sinn Fe´in, November 27, Dublin: Sinn Fe´in.
32
GREGORY M. MANEY
Sinn Fe´in. (1979). The split. Republican Lecture Series ]1. Belfast: Sinn Fe´in Education Department. Skocpol, T. (1979). States and social revolutions. New York: Cambridge University Press. Smyth, J., & Ellison, G. (1998). Social movements, identity and ethnicity: The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland. Paper presented at the World Conference of Sociology in Montreal, Canada. Sutton, M. (1994). Bear in mind these dead: An index of deaths from the conflict in Northern Ireland, 1969–1993. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tejerina, B. (2001). Protest cycle, political violence and social movements in the Basque country. Nations and Nationalism, 7(1), 39–57. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Tilly, C. (2002). Violent and nonviolent trajectories in contentious politics. In: K. Worcester, S. A. Bermanzohn & M. Unger (Eds), Violence and politics: Globalization’s paradox (pp. 13–31). New York: Routledge. Toth, J. (2003). Islamism in Southern Egypt: A case study of a radical religious movement. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 35(4), 547–572. White, R. W. (1989). From peaceful protest to Guerilla war: Micromobilization of the provisional Irish Republican Army. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 1277–1302. White, R. W. (1999). Comparing the repression of pro-state vigilantes and anti-state insurgents: Northern Ireland 1972–1975. Mobilization, 4, 189–202. Wickham-Crowley, T. (1989). Winners, losers, and also-rans: Toward a comparative sociology of Latin American Guerilla movements. In: S. Eckstein (Ed.), Power and popular protest (pp. 132–181). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zamosc, L. (1989). Peasant struggles of the 1970s in Colombia. In: S. Eckstein (Ed.), Power and popular protest (pp. 102–131). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zimmerman, E. (1980). Macro-comparative research on political protest. In: T. Gurr (Ed.), Handbook of political conflict (pp. 167–237). New York: Free Press.
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
33
APPENDIX A Persons Interviewed
Name Ivan Cooper
Anthony Coughlan
James Doherty Roy Garland
Bobby Heatley
Ann Hope
Eamonn McCann
Conn McCluskey
Organizational Affiliation and Position(s) Held, 1955–1972 Chair of the Derry Citizens Action Committee, Stormont MP, and founding member of the Social Democratic and Labour Party Secretary of the Dublin branch of the Wolfe Tone Society and writer for its bulletin Tuarisc and the United Irishman Chair of the Irish Nationalist Party and Treasurer of the Derry Citizens Action Committee Officer in the Ulster Young Unionist Council, member of the Standing Committee of the Ulster Unionist Party, and member of the Belfast County Grand Lodge and the Grand Orange Lodge of Research Executive committee member of the Connolly Association, Chair of the subcommittee of Ireland of the Movement for Colonial Freedom, and member of the Belfast chapter of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Member of the Belfast Chapter of the Wolfe Tone Society and Treasurer of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Member of numerous organizations including the Irish Workers Group, the Derry Labour Party, Derry Housing Action Committee, and the Derry Unemployed Action Committee; Editor of the Irish Militant; Executive committee member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, and NILP representative to the Derry Citizens Defence Committee Co-founder and leader of the Campaign for Social Justice, Executive committee member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
34
GREGORY M. MANEY
APPENDIX A (Continued ) Name
Patricia McCluskey
Inez McCormack Kevin McCorry
Eamonn Melaugh
Fionnbarra O´Dochartaigh
Clifford Smith Rev. W. Martin Smyth
Edwina Stewart
Henry W. (Harry) West
Organizational Affiliation and Position(s) Held, 1955–1972 Co-founder and leader of the Campaign for Social Justice, Executive committee member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Member of the People’s Democracy and Newtownabbey Labour Party Chair of the Trinity College Dublin Republican Club, member of the Belfast Central Citizens Defence Committee, and paid organizer for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association Founder of the Derry Unemployed Action Committee, Secretary of the Derry Housing Action Committee, and Executive committee member of the Derry Citizens Action Committee Education Officer and Honorary Secretary of the Derry Unemployed Action Committee and the Derry Citizens Action Committee; Honorary Secretary of the Derry Housing Action Committee, the James Connolly Club, and the Young Republican Volunteer Association; Executive Treasurer of the Republican Clubs; Editor of the newsletters Reality and Spearhead Member of the Queens University Belfast Young Unionist Council Minister of Alexandra Presbyterian Church, Belfast. Deputy General Master of the County Lodge of Belfast and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. Member of the Ulster Unionist Council Secretary of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and Executive committee member of the Communist Party of Ireland Elected to Stormont and Westminster as a Unionist MP for Enniskillen, Minister of Agriculture from 1960 to 1967 and again from 1971 to 1972
From Civil War to Civil Rights and Back Again
35
APPENDIX B Glossary of Frequently Used Terms Loyalists – Militant Unionists. Loyalists are at the forefront of opposition to efforts among moderate Unionists to politically accommodate Nationalists. Nationalists – Persons who favor severing Northern Ireland’s constitutional link with Great Britain and political reunifying the thirty-two counties of Ireland. Mostly Roman Catholic, Nationalists form a minority of the population within Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland – Six of the thirty-two counties of Ireland constitutionally linked with Great Britain as part of the United Kingdom since the early 1920s. The other 26 counties of Ireland are known as the Republic of Ireland – declared a sovereign, independent republic in the constitution of 1937 and reaffirmed by an act of parliament in 1949. Partition – Political separation of Northern Ireland from the rest of Ireland; established under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the Anglo-Irish (Irish Free State) Treaty of 1921. Provisional Sinn Fe´in/Provisional IRA – After the split of the Republican movement in late 1969, persons opposing the official Dublin-based leadership and its policies formed the political party known as Provisional Sinn Fe´in and the paramilitary organization known as the Provisional IRA. From the early 1970s onwards, the majority of Republicans have supported these organizations known now simply as Sinn Fe´in and the IRA. Republicans – Militant Nationalists. Republicans are willing to achieve a united Ireland by force of arms and without the consent of Unionists. Stormont – The devolved, Unionist-controlled, regional parliament in Northern Ireland, formed in 1921. Dissolved by the British government in March of 1972. Unionists – Persons who favor retaining Northern Ireland’s constitutional links with Great Britain. Mostly of Protestant denominations, Unionists form the majority of the population in Northern Ireland. Westminster – The parliament of the United Kingdom. Under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Westminster has ultimate sovereignty in the United Kingdom. As a result, Westminster could override the decisions of Stormont.
SOCIAL MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION AND THE ‘‘TIMING’’ OF INVOLVEMENT: THE CASE OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT Lorenzo Bosi ABSTRACT Drawing on Bert Klandermans (2004) hypothesis that instrumentality, identity, and ideology are interacting motivations, which increase the likelihood of participation in social movements, this article examines why individuals joined the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement (CRM) during the 1960s. Analyzing data gathered from semi-structured interviews, newspapers, autobiographies, secondary sources, government and movement organizations documents, the empirical analysis indicates that the individuals’ motivations in the process of involvement in social movement activities differ over time. The accounts of former participants generally suggest that instrumentality provided a stronger initial motivation during the very early stage of the CRM. With the development of the movement and changes of the political context, the choice to participate rested – for the mass of individuals who decided to mobilize later in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 27, 37–61 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(06)27002-2
37
38
LORENZO BOSI
consequence of a ‘‘transformative event’’ – more on identity and ideology. The research underscores the importance of the ‘‘timing’’ of involvement in order to better grasp the causal justification of movement participation over time. Focusing on a deeply divided society, such as Northern Ireland, this research also broadens the comparative range of case studies in the field of collective action and enhances our understanding of how repressive measures by the establishment in relation to contentious politics in deeply divided societies mobilizes further the individual in social movement activities.
This article seeks to improve our understanding about why individuals join social movement activities. Protest participation is a complex, multifaceted, and continuous phenomenon (Hunt, 2000).1 Individuals’ efforts vary significantly across participants in relation to the intensity and type of involvement, the chosen repertoire of action within the movement, regional contexts, and the stage of development of the movement at the time of their entry. This last variable is the basis for the main argument of this article. Taking the ‘‘timing’’ of involvement firmly back into our accounts of contention can produce better causal justifications of movement participation over time. As such, I believe this article will offer an improved understanding of collective action as a dynamic and interactive process (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Bert Klandermans (2004) provides an integrated and multidimensional framework with three equally possible explanations of why people decide to become involved in social movement activities: (a) individuals may desire to change their socio-political system; (b) as socially related actors, individuals feel they belong to a group and may act in accordance when friends, colleagues, parents, and so on mobilize in movement activities; and (c) they may desire to express their own opinions, emotions, and ideological perspectives. In adopting an instrumental and longitudinal approach my intent in this article is to ‘‘assess the relative weight of all three motives in their effect on participation’’ (Klandermans, 2004, p. 362) at different stages of movement development. The qualitative analysis of this article is based on field research into the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement (CRM). It represents a fascinating single case study, even to those scholars of collective action who are not specialists in Northern Ireland politics, since most social movement theory
Social Movement Participation
39
stems from research into ‘‘stable’’ western democracies (McAdam et al., 2001). By deeply divided societies, I mean regions where regimes lack full legitimacy and are prone to widespread political violence, repressive establishments, and subcultural divisions based on socio-political cleavages that are neither closed nor pacified. The most intense period of civil rights mobilization in Northern Ireland was experienced during the autumn of 1968 (meetings, door-to-door canvassing, squatting, sit-downs, and marches), but a cycle of struggle continued up until the second half of the 1970s. In its early stages, at the beginning of the 1960s, the CRM was a ‘‘reformist’’, proactive movement claiming civil rights for the Nationalist minority by demanding rights for everyone. By October 1968, the ideology of the movement had shifted progressively to an exclusivist Nationalist stance as a result of interaction with the adverse and violent response of the Unionist establishment. This has generated the entry of a new wave of participants, mostly coming from the Nationalist community, who perceived as unjust the coercive repression of the CRM. In ‘‘stable’’ western democracies, repressive violence by the state often produces a polarization of the conflict, which is lethal to the fate of the movement. It drives people from the streets and ultimately draws collective mobilization to a close, because it is too costly and risky for most social movement participants (Olson, 1965; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). However, in deeply divided societies and in authoritarian regimes, coercive measures may contribute to an increase in the rate of movement participation (White, 1989; Olivier, 1991; Khawaja, 1993; McAdam et al., 2001; Almeida, 2005; Davenport, Johnston, & Mueller, 2005). In societies where low legitimacy is granted by most of the citizens to authorities, or just by a strongly inter-connected part, repressive measures set free ‘‘moral outrage and suddenly imposed grievances for individual regime opponents’’ (Almeida, 2005, p. 69). In determinate societies, for example Northern Ireland, Palestine, and South Africa under the apartheid regime, where there are dense social networks embedded in anti-systemic subcultures, repression functions as a catalyst for further protest. It raises the community’s political consciousness so as to mobilize further collective action by those individuals who were not previously involved (White, 1989; Olivier, 1991; Khawaja, 1993). State violence against peaceful protesters has the power, in the view of anti-systemic groups, such as ethno-nationalist minorities, to delegitimize the regime as non-democratic (Almeida, 2005), and ultimately, to reveal its hidden malign nature so much so as to justify further protest and even violence (White, 1989).
40
LORENZO BOSI
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORIES AND MICROMOBILIZATION Until the late 1960s, scholars interested in collective action studies had, for the most, described social movements as dangerous crowds of aggregated individuals, who act spontaneously, outside institutional channels and as a result of frustrated expectations when a wide process of social and cultural breakdowns, strains, or disruptions occur in a social system (Le Bon, 1960; Turner & Killian, 1957; Smelser, 1962). Collective Behavior theorists stress that social isolation, marginalization, relative deprivation, weak personalities, and atomization of participants can facilitate individual recruitment into social movement activity. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of theorists, who were often involved in or just more sympathetic to the movements they saw around them, explained micromobilization as a means to pursue political goals instead of the result of symptoms of strains (Tilly, 1978). Resource mobilization theorists consider that individuals in social movements are often highly organized, relatively well-integrated within society, and mostly act in accordance with their interests (McCarthy & Zald, 1973; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978). Movement participation, for this approach, is the result of individual cost–benefit calculations, ‘‘homo economicus’’ (Olson, 1965). From the early 1980s yet another approach to social movement studies helped to bring back ideology, symbolism, identity formation, and framing processes as potential causal factors that motivate individuals to movement participation (Snow & Benford, 1988; Melucci, 1989, 1996; Gamson, 1991). Grievances and identity boundaries, as well as resources and opportunities are, for this approach, socially constructed within a collective context. Potential activists are drawn into participation by the force of their ideas and by their identity. Since the 1990s, the collective action literature has also begun to rediscover and to take into serious consideration the importance of emotions (Jasper, 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001).
FACILITATORS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION: INSTRUMENTALITY, IDENTITY, AND IDEOLOGY In borrowing and integrating the contributions of previous collective action research, Bert Klandermans (2004) indicates the factors that may motivate
Social Movement Participation
41
individual participation in protest activities: instrumentality, identity, and ideology. Each of them might motivate participation interactively, together or independently, according to the single individual and at the moment of his/her mobilization.2 Such an approach has three advantages. First, it is flexible enough to allow three different motives to influence individual behavior. Second, it helps to discern what kind of motives contribute to successful involvement in social movement activities and why they do so. Third, it has a greater explanatory value than mono-causal explanations given that one motive on its own cannot adequately explain variations in individuals’ decisions to participate both across social contexts and over time. Instrumentality Aggrieved people and those who perceive a situation of injustice and discrimination mobilize only when certain conditions are met, regardless of their level of grievance. In order to participate, people must perceive that social movement protests may improve their situation. They need to expect that the costs and risks they bear in participating are functional to achieving some collective goals (Klandermans, 1984). Individuals may interpret that the conventional channels of political participation are closed to their aims and that an unconventional repertoire of actions could be more appropriate for making their voice heard in furtherance of their cause (Tilly, 1978). In this case, they need to have favorably constructed expectations of the outcome of the movement; otherwise they may decide not to participate. Movement leaders and organizations are primary sources in raising these expectations in potential participants. Leaders need to stress that the desired goal will be reached and that through struggle and mobilization there are realistic chances of success. They need to make effective use of the mass media to recruit non-affiliated individuals; indeed favorable reports convey the image of the movement as an effective political force. Furthermore, potential participants need to be persuaded that many other people will join the movement, that they have powerful allies regionally and transnationally, and that every single participant might increase the possibility of effecting the wanted change. Movement organizations and leaders are entrepreneurs of collective (identity, solidarity, and ideology) and selective incentives (economics, power, and status) (Oberschall, 1973); they enhance individual participation by making the benefits of mobilization outweigh the costs. A participant’s sense of personal efficacy is not only constructed by leaders or organizations, but it is also generated and shaped through a process of interaction between individuals. Embeddedness in loose activist networks
42
LORENZO BOSI
reduces the practical costs attached to participation, develops a collective self-understanding of what is socio-politically possible, and is instrumental in the circulation of information about ongoing activities. Past experience, primary socialization, and both formal and informal networks of interactions in everyday life encourage ‘‘individuals with an environment that facilitates recruitment to social movements but also because they are envelopes of meanings able to create a structure of meanings about the future commitment of individuals’’ (Passy, 2003, pp. 42–43). It is at this level that mutual solidarity emerges and the process of collective identity dynamically develops over time through a continuous process of interactions (Melucci, 1989, 1996; Hirsch, 1990). Identity Acting contentiously cannot only be explained with a view to the perceived costs and benefits; it necessitates some shared set of beliefs and also a sense of belonging. As different empirical studies have testified (McAdam, 1986; Della Porta, 1988; Laitin, 1995), a strong individual identification with a group and the presence of mutual trust increase the likelihood that she/he may take part in non-institutional tactics on behalf of that group. It is through collective agency and the construction of ‘‘we-ness’’ in submerged networks of everyday practices that movements motivate potential participants ‘‘to sacrifice self-interest in pursuit of a valued collective goal using a non-institutional tactic’’ (Hirsch, 1990, p. 252). Through a process in which people believe they are part of a collective community, socialize to a specific protest issue, and collectively define the situation as unjust, single individuals see their mobilization as reasonable and beneficial. The alignment of individual and collective identity is then necessary for participation. The provisional sense of communal solidarity, which is intertwined with the concept of collective identity, serves not only to define cognitively, morally, and emotionally the specific internal set of beliefs and shared sense of ‘‘we-ness’’, but also for the identification of ‘‘them’’ against which collective action is called. As Alberto Melucci (1996) notes, ‘‘without an identification of the adversary the protest will peter out in the occasional explosion of discontent or become reduced to a kind of marginal deviance’’ (p. 292). Ideology Individuals might also choose to participate in order to state their views and communicate their feelings. They want to express their anger in relation to
Social Movement Participation
43
experienced injustice (Gamson, 1991), or want to make known that they are morally outraged and disaffected with the authorities, which are held responsible for an unwanted situation. Mostly, structuralist and rationalist approaches have shown that individuals engage in collective action to enforce political change, but they have forgotten that through resistance and struggle, individuals manifest their own views, gain dignity in their lives, reject the subordination of their identities, and give grounds for pride (Klandermans, 2004; Goodwin et al., 2001). Even if the assessment of risks and rewards might deter engagement, potential participants might feel obliged to try to contribute to change the world, not participating would make them feel culpable in front of their loved ones and also in front of themselves as honorable and moral persons. For some individuals, the resources spent for a movement’s goal are like a religious commitment and a reasonable sacrifice; being aware that for their part they have shown their oppositional behavior toward the institutions and/or tried to change the unjust situation offers fulfillment. In contrast, not participating would lead to a bad conscience. Protesting in this sense becomes a goal in itself, it offers purpose and meaning to participants’ lives (Jasper, 1998). Being loyal or ideologically close to a system of values and beliefs functions as a collective incentive to motivate participation. Social movement actors work as the supply side of ideology, by inspiring the attribution of meaning for potential participants and public opinion. They are carriers of ideas, they help to define what is going on in a situation (‘‘diagnosis’’), to recognize possible strategies (‘‘prognosis’’), and to encourage individuals to mobilize (‘‘motivations for action’’) (Snow & Benford, 1988).
EMPIRICAL CASE AND DATA SOURCES The British royal assent of the Government of Ireland Act (December 1920) partitioned the island of Ireland into two political systems: an independent 26-county Irish Free State, since 1949 the Republic of Ireland; and a six-county Northern Ireland formally dependent on the United Kingdom, but with its own Parliament at Stormont in Belfast. The Northern Ireland socio-political system has been characterized from the early days, as a highly segmented and ‘‘divided regime’’ (Rose, 1971). It had two polarized political communities, which were almost completely socially and physically segregated (Rose, 1971; Feldman, 1991): the minority Nationalist (antipartitionist in political terms, mainly Catholic and roughly one-third of the population); and the majority Unionist (partitionist, mainly Protestant and
44
LORENZO BOSI
two-third of the population). The high level of decentralization and localization in the region was ‘‘rationally’’ organized to ensure Unionist hegemony even in areas where they constituted numerical minorities (McGarry & O’Leary, 1996).3 This was done predominantly through the ‘‘endemic’’ gerrymandering practice of re-drawing the electoral boundaries and the political control of housing allocation procedures, which once again underpinned gerrymandering. Furthermore, after 1945 the local government franchise in Northern Ireland remained restricted to ratepayers, which was not the case in the rest of the UK (Whyte, 1983). This situation was exacerbated by what was viewed as excessive surveillance by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in an atmosphere of political dissent (Ellison & Martin, 2000). Most Nationalists had a perception of being treated unfairly in the economic and political structure of the region (Cameron Report, 1969), in 1968 only 13% of this community thought there was no discrimination against them (Rose, 1971).4 By the early 1960s, the highly heterogeneous CRM network started to challenge the discriminatory aspects of the region by embracing a pro-active ‘‘reformist’’ civil rights framework with a potent rhetoric. Its initial aim was not to assimilate the collective agitation with a sort of Nationalist protest, but to legitimize the movement in the political system of the region through a civil rights framework capable of creating new political space by differentiating itself from the ethno-national cleavage.5 What past studies on the CRM have missed, to a large extent, is that the movement was first of all ‘‘politics by others means’’. Activists represented a wide range of political perspectives (the ‘‘revisionist’’ constructive Nationalist reformers, the laborists, the ‘‘new look’’ republicans, and the ‘‘new’’ leftists) (Purdie, 1990), all opposed the Northern Ireland political system and its sectarian dimensions, in particular the hegemonic structure of the Unionist establishment, but initially they also strongly criticized the Nationalist Party’s self-defeating ‘‘abstentionist’’ tactics (Irish Times, May 16, 1964). By 1968, the apathy and inadequate responses of the Northern Ireland establishment to the CRM’s demands on electoral, housing, employment, and policing reforms, together with the favorable international framework of contention of the late 1960s, moved the movement into the streets and to a radical change of its tactics (NICRA, 1978). The CRM’s leaders decided at this point to challenge the sectarianism and the political immobilism of the region in a symbolical way through marching in both Unionist and Nationalist areas (Currie, 2004). In this way they intentionally obliged the authorities to get involved in defending the marches, or openly supporting sectarianism in front of the new mass media and
Social Movement Participation
45
consequently undermining Unionist hegemonic control at a local and international level (McCann, 1974). Despite the fact that marches and demonstrations are considered to be conventional forms of action in ‘‘stable’’ western democracies, in Northern Ireland the CRM’s plan to march and demonstrate in both Unionist and Nationalist areas, to symbolize its antisectarian intent and in order to meet the media criteria of ‘‘newsworthiness’’ was perceived as territorial and confrontational and it was this which led to the State acting in the repressive way it did (Cameron Report, 1969).6 Most of the reluctance on the part of the Unionist establishment to integrate the demands for reform of the socio-political system, and its coercive overreaction together with a violent Loyalist countermovement to the CRM mobilization,7 resulted in a new generation of CRM protesters who lacked confidence in the institutions. This led in 1969 to a further radicalization of the repertoire of action and to a strong sense of communal conflict in the political system of the region. Once the Northern Ireland cycle of violence was set free, it reinforced communitarian polarization and segregation in the region, intensifying the grievances of the Nationalist community against the hegemonic and repressive state (O´ Dochartaigh, 1997). The CRM, initially an instrumental type of movement, progressively became more identity-based in the new interactive patterns of the region (Bosi, 2006). My study involves a methodologically pluralist approach: discourse analysis of interview data; content analysis of historical records (newspapers,8 government documents, autobiographies, and documents from movement organizations); and secondary source consultation. This ‘triangulation’ technique complements and remedies the weaknesses of these sources (validity and reliability problems) (Blee & Taylor, 2002), permits a better reconstruction of individual definitions of past participation, and allows to afford longitudinal analysis of social movements development. The 27 interviews were open-ended and semi-structured, lasting from 45 min to 2 h.9 I attempted to locate persons who were prominent in the historical records of the movement. At the end of each interview I asked for further names of former CRM participants who might be willing to answer my questions. The snowball effect was then fundamental to the sampling process. Despite attempts to the contrary, because this is historical research into events that happened more than 35 years ago, there is a generational overrepresentation in my representative sample in favor of the young activists of the time. I have tried to fill this gap through the use of archival, newspaper, and biographical material. Based on the experience of previous interviews and my progress in the research, I reshaped the interview guide, introducing different questions and topics. These consist of discussions
46
LORENZO BOSI
regarding former activists’ previous experience in political participation, the reasons that persuaded the interviewees to mobilize, the events surrounding their mobilization, the costs and benefits of being involved in social movement, and the personal consequences faced by the interviewees. During the interviewing process, scholars can gain an insight into former activists’ individual and collective visions of the world and of their collective identities, their perception of the costs and benefits of participation, and the symbolic and emotional dimensions of involvement (Della Porta, 1992; Blee & Taylor, 2002). Indeed, the semi-structured interviews that I have collected were a means to reconstruct participants’ micromobilization dynamics, rather than recall a possible objective truth about some particular event. In order to understand further the participants’ subjectivity and to analyze the structure of meaning, I used other sources such as personal memoirs and autobiographies of former CRM activists (Devlin, 1969, 1993; McCann, 1974; Farrell, 1988; McCluskey, 1989; O´ Dochartaigh, 1994; Currie, 2004; Johnston, 2006). They have also been useful as a further check in measuring the validity and reliability of the semi-structured interviews, which can possibly raise the problem of retrospective bias.10 I have also drawn on archival investigation and I have found valuable documentation on the CRM at the Special Political Collection of the Linen Hall Library in Belfast, the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), the Hibernica Collection at Main Library of Queen’s University Belfast, the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) Web Service (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/), and the Museum of Free Derry Web Service (http://www.museumoffreederry.org/).
FORMER CRM PARTICIPANTS’ VIEWS AS TO WHY THEY BECAME INVOLVED Since the Second World War, Northern Ireland has undergone a period of broad economic and social change. Like every Western country, it was influenced by Keynes’s theories on state intervention in the economy through British welfare reforms (McGarry & O’Leary, 1996). From the late 1950s and early 1960s, the interaction between regional social changes, the initial crumbling of the ethno-national cleavage and the important rise of conjunctural opportunities opened the possibility for an expansion of access and improvement in the resources available for collective action mobilization in the region.11 Pre-existing and emergent social networks saw in the Northern Ireland and international environment of the mid-1960s, the possibility of resolving grievances at reasonable costs. For these actors, the subjective
Social Movement Participation
47
evaluation of risks and benefits seemed favorable to a movement protest and activism was an expression of this willingness to take risks. Edwina Stewart, a militant of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (CPNI) at the time, recalls: ‘‘actually, in the 1960s as an activist of the CPNI, I began to see the growing of the Civil Rights Movement as the way forward to bring change in our society at affordable costs. For this reason I decided to actively be involved’’ (author’s interview). In the mid-1960s, confidence in a new sociopolitical departure was up both regionally and internationally. CRM leaders drew inspiration from televised accounts of the wider global movement of the 1960s: the Black civil rights campaign in the USA, the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the anti-Vietnam war campaign and the students’ movements all around the world (Farrell, 1988; Currie, 2004). It was in this broader context of radical-alternative ideas and environmental uncertainty that the CRM network saw the opportunity to adjust the regional political system by calling for: one man, one vote in local government elections; an end to gerrymandering; fair allocation of houses and jobs; the repeal of the Special Power Act and the disbandment of the B-Specials (NICRA, 1978).12 Monica McWilliams, at the time a young student from County Londonderry, remembers what facilitated her involvement in these terms: I mobilized for change in the country and to help to bring it about, I wanted a nonviolent movement to be involved in it. And also I had a great and strong identification with the Black Civil Rights Movement in America. And so it seemed to me, from my politics of the time that it was a radical movement that was raising right issues and that would be successful, I had absolutely no expectation that it would be anything other than successful. (Author’s interview)
What the interviewees overwhelmingly recall of those early days is the perception of the righteousness of the social movement and the belief of an inevitable victory. The hope for change in the political system of the region during the 1960s and the trust and confidence in the CRM network influenced many individuals to realize that change would not come through routine political processes, but only from a strong degree of commitment to collective action protest (author’s interview with Fred Heatley). Participating in the CRM’s activities was then interpreted mostly as a means to pursue political goals; it was mainly an instrumental action fulfilled by a sense of personal efficacy (Klandermans, 2004). Former CRM activists have assumed their generation as capable of particular ‘‘history making’’ potency at a regional and international level (McCann, 1974; Farrell, 1988; O´ Dochartaigh, 1994).13 Tony Kennedy, at the time a student at Queen’s University of Belfast, describes in these terms the fervor of his community of friends in the mid-1960s: ‘‘we were influenced by the belief of that time, that
48
LORENZO BOSI
if you were young enough and enthusiastic enough, you can change the world’’ (author’s interview). Most of the former participants whom I have interviewed consider their full interest in socio-political activities as an explanation of their later mobilization in the 1960s. John Gray and Joe Mulheron respectively recall: ‘‘I have always considered myself as a political animal’’ (author’s interview), ‘‘I would define myself as a political actor’’ (author’s interview). The role of previous political participation is a theme that runs intensely through my interviews. For example, Tony Kennedy recalls his decision to join the CRM in these terms: ‘‘I joined the Northern Ireland Labour Party when I was sixteen and then I joined the Young Socialists. I came from a non-sectarian background and from a left-wing analysis of what was happening in our society, the Civil Rights Movement was an obvious place where I would fit in, in what I believed’’ (author’s interview). For the most part, only previous politically committed activists participated at this stage of the CRM cycle of protest. Almost without exception, former participants stress in their accounts that they perceived the CRM as the most appropriate political actor capable of translating their political identity and ideals about social justice into a strong degree of involvement in social activity. The decision to participate was rarely taken in isolation, but jointly with others. It has developed in pre-existing networks of political affiliations. Feelings of identification to a group and processes of prior political socialization increased the possibilities of individual participation, even for the non-aggrieved, because of the loyalty base and of the communication links. The CRM activists were, in fact, often introduced to the movement by face-to-face interactions such as relatives, close friends, neighbors, patron–client relationships, and fellow members. Previous networks worked as ‘‘recruitment contexts’’.14 So, for example, Slan Fergus O’Hare, a Dublin undergraduate from West Belfast at the time, stresses how his relational connections were influential in him becoming involved in social protest: I got involved in the Civil Rights Movement when I was at college in Dublin. The Civil Rights Movement started in 1968–1969. I attended many of the demonstrations. I would come with some students from University College Dublin. I also knew quite a number of people who were active already in the movement; my younger sisters were actually more involved than I was, and my cousins as well. So that is how I started, through attendance at demonstrations and through the involvement of people that I knew. (Author’s interview)
The keys to the logic of those who decided to become involved at the early stages of the CRM that emerge from the empirical analysis are the assertion of dissatisfaction with the socio-political system of the time, the belief that
Social Movement Participation
49
the situation could have been changed at affordable costs through contentious protest and political activism. If for some participants becoming involved in social protest is the result of a process of socialization, which they have experienced in pre-existing sociopolitical networks, for others it might be a matter of conversion related to particular ‘‘transformative events’’ (McAdam & Sewell, 2001; Hess & Martin, 2006). Fundamental and catalytic events can help to set in motion the important processes of deep collective understanding and acknowledgment. The incidents which occurred at the second civil rights march on October 5, 1968 in Londonderry, or Derry as it is known to Nationalists, served as the immediate catalyst for the mass mobilization, a ‘‘decisive turning point’’ in Northern Ireland history (Devlin, 1993, p. 89) as well as a change in the trajectory of the CRM development. On October 3, 1968, William Craig (Minister for Home Affairs) banned the Londonderry CRM march under the Special Power Act, as well as two other marches convened by Loyalist organizations for the same day. Londonderry militants declared their intention to defy the ban (Belfast Telegraph, ‘‘Derry parade ban ‘will be defied’’’, September 4, 1968), as shortly after most part of the CRM did. Conn McCluskey (1989), one of the moderate leaders of the movement, recalls: ‘‘Mr Craig’s ban on the march changed the whole situation because it brought into the civil rights movement, opposition Stormont MPs, Queen’s University students, and a large number of Catholics who up till then had been tepid about civil rights’’ (p. 111). Leading the demonstration that day were Ivan Cooper, Eddie McAteer, Kevin Agnew, Paddy Devlin, Austin Currie, Gerry Fitt, and three Westminster Labour MPs. As with the first march from Coalisland to Dungannon, no Nationalist or Republican banners were displayed; at the head of the parade there was a blue banner on which was written: ‘‘Civil Rights March’’. The participants’ slogans, which revealed the socio-political character of their protest, were, as usual, simple and direct: ‘‘One man, one vote’’, ‘‘Free speech’’, ‘‘Class not Creed’’, ‘‘Class war, not Creed war’’, ‘‘The Proper Place for Politics is in the Streets’’, ‘‘Police State Here’’, ‘‘British rights for British citizens’’, ‘‘One family, One house’’, and ‘‘One man, One job’’. Niall O´ Dochartaigh (1997), in his account on the October 5th march, writes: as the crowd and the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary, the Northern Ireland police] came into confrontation in Duke Street, there was a ragged but violent RUC baton charge. Placards and then stones were thrown by some marchers as the RUC ‘punched, batoned and pursued civil rights demonstrators in a brutal and sickening display y of concerted violence’ (Derry Journal, 8/10/1968). Dozens of marchers had to be hospitalized and hundreds more were terrified and horrified by the police action. (p. 20)
50
LORENZO BOSI
What really happened on October 5th is still today a matter of controversy in the literature on the CRM, but what is in no doubt is that press and television reports showed some very damaging pictures of police ‘brutality’; images which later led to public outrage and the mobilization and radicalization of many regionally (Cameron Report, 1969) and internationally (Maney, 2000).15 As Denis Haughey, a young activist of the CRM at the time, remembers the mass media reports of those events served as an indirect channel of diffusion by giving political attention to the CRM’s agenda: The fact that when agitation started, it could be seen on television, you can actually see the demonstrations and the reactions of the police, and particularly the October 5 march in Derry when an enterprising RTE [Radio Telefı`s Eireann] cameramen captured moments of brutality, when the police batoned and brutalized peaceful unarmed civil rights demonstrators that galvanized public opinion in Northern Ireland on the Nationalist side, but also in Southern Ireland and also created a reaction in Great Britain and because those television pictures were carried in many other parts of the world the British government became concerned and embarrassed by all that. (Author’s interview)
What respondents express today about those unpleasant incidents are the alterations of emotions such as excitement and moral shock, idyllic moments, and shame. Ivan Cooper, at the time a leader of the Derry Citizens Action Committee, remembers: The 5 October is so vivid in my memory, which I will never forget. On the 6 October people were gathering in the centre of Derry, this never happened before, gathering on the streets; and I remember two priests coming up out of the Bogside, and they came to this crowd and they said: (claps his hands repeating the priests’ gesture) ‘‘mass benediction is in the church at six o’clock, get away to the church’’ (claps his hands again repeating the priests’ gesture) these people said ‘‘go away and fuck yourself father!’’, in other words a flame had been lit that was not going to be spent for some time. (Author’s interview)
Former participants consistently claim that anger and feelings of moral indignation were suddenly aroused. It was, in fact, in the course of these events that the CRM network expanded both numerically and visibly. The state repression was not as brutal and diffused as to suppress mobilization (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001) because of international constraints, among other factors; however, it was repressive enough to trigger popular anger and moral outrage. For Michael Farrell (1988), a radical leader of the CRM, October 5th sparked off ‘‘an explosion of energy, enthusiasm and vitality’’ (p. 56). It produced a process of emotional investments which enabled many more individuals to recognize themselves in the causes of the movement by blaming the Northern Ireland police for unjustified repression (Ellison & Martin, 2000). The majority dormant Nationalist community, with its sense of ethnic exclusion and its anti-system identity, recognized itself
Social Movement Participation
51
immediately through a process of identification with the CRM activists repressed by the police on the Londonderry march (Cameron Report, 1969). Fionnabarra O´ Dochartaigh, at the time a radical member of the CRM, recalls: If the State had ignored us, the Civil Rights Movement would have died in three or five months. The Unionists over-reacted, I was the happiest man in the world, things would have never been the same again, they killed the apathy inside the Nationalist community. We got a mass movement almost overnight. (Author’s interview)
October 5th and the management of backfire by the Northern Ireland authorities had the power of delegitimizing the political institutions of the region within the broad Nationalist community, as non-democratic (Cameron Report, 1969). The Northern Ireland establishment dealt with the CRM in the same way they had done for more than 40 years with previous opposition movements. For the Unionist establishment nothing had changed: the Nationalist community was perceived as disloyal and interested in overthrowing the State to create a united Ireland and their marches seen as pure acts of provocation. Retrospective reporting of my respondents describe the aftermath of the Londonderry march as the end of innocence for many of them. Slan Fergus O’Hare recounts the plight of most of the individuals who decided to become involved in the aftermath of those events as follows: When the Civil Rights Movement mobilized people at the start, they did it by educating and by propaganda work. This succeeded up to a point, but what really caused a mass mobilization was the reaction of the State to that mobilization. I remember that I was totally astounded when we were batoned by the police. I was amazed to see people batoned on television and then amazed to experience it myself. When we asked for, what we thought were absolutely normal rights, inalienable rights, we were met by force. So we started to ask ourselves why this was happening and we began to realize that we had touched on something that was bigger than what we had thought at the start y Arguably the movement grew as much as a result of the repression against the movement by the State as by what we were doing as activists. (Author’s interview)
As Paul Almeida (2005) writes in relation to social movement activism in authoritarian political environments ‘‘coercive state behavior breaks public convictions about expected state – civil society relations – especially when the repressive acts are way out of proportion to the types of demands and claims protesters pursue’’ (p. 69). The CRM at this stage drew deeply on emotions such as confidence and faith in the community, family ties, and heavy moral injustice against the Unionist establishment. A strong sense of community encouraged potential participants to mobilize in the CRM network (Cameron Report, 1969).
52
LORENZO BOSI
Paradoxically the regional policy of segregation made available selfcontained Nationalist neighborhoods, where dense interpersonal network structures of everyday social life were fundamental cultural resources in mobilizing new individuals in the activities of the CRM. They enabled potential Nationalist participants to translate their traditional anti-systemic political consciousness into collective action and offered moral support and encouragement in the process of individuals’ choice to participate. Contentious participation and antagonistic activities became peculiar to a community, which, in the main, traditionally did not condemn movement protest and illegal activities.16 In the words of Paul Arthur, a postgraduate at Queen’s University at the time: In Northern Ireland there never has been a tradition of non-violence; it was not natural to go out into the streets and allow yourself to be battered. For the Catholic community there was also a history of resistance against the state, violent resistance against the state. Most Catholics mobilized and turned progressively towards much more militant means as a result of the police and Loyalist violence. (Author’s interview)
Nationalist neighborhoods served as sites for identity construction and consciousness-raising, they became a space particularly favorable for collective action and for testing social relations and mutual trust (Feldman, 1991). Moreover, most of my respondents had personal connections through their relatives with past contentious events in the region. The familiar socio-political background was an important factor in stimulating potential participants to join the CRM protest, providing an environment in which certain ideas and values were able to prosper. Bernadette Devlin, later one of the leaders of the CRM, is an example: I was going about my life and the Civil Rights buses came, and push! I got on. But not as simple as that. My family background was very influential without me consciously knowing it at that time. My father was a trade union activist and he died when I was about nine, but my view on life has been very much shaped by him, my family’s social and economic position was very much reduced by my father’s death. So although I was a university student, my personal background was very strong workingclass Irish Republican. From my father I had personal experience of disadvantage and torture. y I was at the university unconsciously aware of all the inequality and injustices that were verbalized and articulated by NICRA. And so it made sense to me when someone verbalized and articulated these that I said yeah! That’s right, that’s where I need to be. I figured that out afterwards. But at the time, I did so because I was there. (Author’s interview)
The anti-sectarian inclusivist collective identity of the CRM’s first stage was now gradually replaced by an exclusivist Nationalist identity. The unique movement’s adversary became the Unionist establishment, the key issues
Social Movement Participation
53
passed progressively from civil rights reforms to the overthrow of the State and the subsequent unification of Ireland. As Gerry Adams (1988), today Sinn Fe´in President, remembers, in one of his recollections of that period: ‘‘the struggle for civil rights was developing into a struggle for national rights’’ (p. 48). The progressive changes in the collective identity of the CRM generated the mobilization of the most parts of the Nationalist community which had a feeling of absolute ‘‘injustice’’ and moral shock regarding the behavior of state security forces (Farrell, 1988; O´ Dochartaigh, 1994). A new wave of militants, who were framing ongoing events as ethnically motivated, joined in the CRM at this stage with the intent to fight back against the regional establishment coercive measures, to reject the perceived subordination of the Nationalist community and to retaliate and grow out of its perceived status of marginalized second-class citizens (McCann, 1974). Joe Mulheron, a young radical militant of the CRM from West Belfast, recalls: ‘‘the Civil Rights Movement helped to bring about the beginning of the end of the old system. Unionists lost their position in losing the control of the situation. We would never come back, never be second-class citizens again’’ (author’s interview). The movement developed a ‘‘defensive’’ response to a repressive state. Through the act of mobilizing and defending their communities, activists were asserting dignity, honor, instilling pride, and fostering an overwhelming sense of empowerment. Moreover, their socially and economically subordinate position increased their predisposition for disruptive protest and use of violence. Defensive resistance progressively became the main preoccupation of the movement, not only as a method to protect Nationalist neighborhoods from violent Loyalist attacks, but also in order to create and reinforce more solid patterns of solidarity and mutual support within these areas (Scarman Report, 1972). The aim was to indirectly increase activists’ commitment to the social movement network at a stage in which the reluctance to risk physical injury and social condemnation were possible reasons for disengagement.17 The CRM escalated its demands at this stage with the elaboration of an antipartitionist rhetoric and adopted a more militant repertoire of action where political violence for defensive reasons was not excluded.
CONCLUSION This analysis suggests that using Klandermans (2004) approach we can make further progress toward understanding the variation that occur over time with regard to individuals’ decision to participate in social movement
54
LORENZO BOSI
activities. This is a topic that has gone largely unexamined in the study of movement participation and which has tended to be mostly ahistorical in the sense that it did not take into account the development of collective action. Social movements are not stable or fixed phenomena, nor historical personages acting on a stage. They are dynamic sustained social constructions which change interactively over time (McAdam et al., 2001). They are shaped by the dynamic processes of state–movement interaction and also by the entry of new waves of militants which interaction generates. We cannot understand the correct causal justifications of movement participation over time unless we bring back the dimension of time to our studies of collective action. This would also help to a better grasp of the motivational factors that facilitate individual involvement in collective action. What emerges from the results of this empirical analysis on the Northern Ireland CRM during the 1960s is that the individual motivations to join collective action protest are very much related with the stage of the movement development and the political context in which the individuals operate. More specifically, the accounts of former CRM participants generally suggest that instrumentality provided a much more important initial motivation during the very early emergent stage of the collective mobilization. As the movement developed, the choice to participate rested, for the mass of individuals who decided to mobilize later, more on identity and ideology. Most of those participants, who mobilized during the CRM emergence, in the period before autumn 1968, were involved in previous political activities that encouraged identification with social justice in the region and shaped a feeling of collective effectiveness. What reinforced the CRM network at its earliest stage was the belief that changes and reforms were underway; they became convinced that through collective action and participation they could change the world and specifically the regional system. Retrospective reporting of many of my respondents has described the euphoria, the collective effervescence and the hope of those days in their accounts of past participation. Civil rights activists took a risk in demonstrating against the regional establishment in 1968, because they believed the prospect of success, regionally and internationally, was better than what they had so far seen in their lifetimes. A process of polarization and further radicalization followed October 5th, providing a catalyst for public action. CRM activists seized the moment to call for further political reforms in the region. Individual participation progressively became, in the aftermath of October 5th’s events, a way of affirming and developing existing identity loyalties and ideological perspectives; it was a struggle for recognition. The establishment repression generated a ‘‘transformative event’’ that changed the trajectory of
Social Movement Participation
55
the CRM and the motivations of why individuals joined its activities. In Northern Ireland between late 1968 and 1969, the majority of those inside the Nationalist community who were initially reluctant to become involved in protest activities massively resorted to contentious participation because establishment repression was felt to be unjust and they closely identified with the victims. The state reaction to the CRM’s first mobilization was deemed unreasonable by the entire Nationalist community. Protest activity turned out to be an expression of anger in response to experienced injustices and perceived long-standing patterns of political and economic exclusion. In becoming involved in social movement protest, new activists were not only fighting for a substantial change in the regional political system, but also to refuse their perceived subordination status and to build honor and assert their dignity. This qualitative research is investigative and does not have general application. However, I would argue that the indications from my case study are significant enough to merit future research, and comparisons, but not exclusively with other ethno-national divided societies.
NOTES 1. Modes of movement participation span a wide spectrum of activities. They may include: taking part in a meeting, petitioning, attending a mass demonstration, canvassing, occupying a building, contributing money, rioting, being a member of an underground organization, to mention only a few. For each kind of activity the perceived costs and benefits may differ significantly. On different individual levels of participation intensity, see Passy and Giugni (2001). 2. Klandermans (2004) sustains that instrumentality, identity, and ideology may also be fundamental in sustaining persistence and the enhancement of existing participation across time as well as in disengagement dynamics from participation. 3. I retain John Whyte’s (1983) judgment on the discrimination’s issue as probably the most accurate argumentation: ‘‘the picture is neither black nor white but a shade of grey y [But in the west of the province] the grayness of the picture y changes to an ominous darkness’’ (p. 31). 4. 1291 Northern Ireland citizens were interviewed between March and August 1968, prior to the outbreak of the civil rights demonstrations, through a multi-stage stratified random sample for a public opinion survey conducted by Professor Richard Rose (1971). 5. See for example the first pamphlet from the Campaign for Social Justice: ‘Northern Ireland – the Plain Truth’, published on February 5, 1964. It highlighted discrimination in employment, housing, and electoral practice in Londonderry, Enniskillen, Lurgan, and Dungannon. 6. Worldwide ‘‘social life is organized in spatial routines’’ (Sewell, 2001, p. 62), in Northern Ireland this is particularly true and important because of the physical segregation of the region (ethnic and class), streets in fact are culturally and
56
LORENZO BOSI
over-symbolically ‘‘sacralized’’ as particular kinds of places. In marching through Unionist and Nationalist areas the CRM network ‘‘desacralized’’ and ‘‘resacralized’’ public spaces in the region (Feldman, 1991). 7. In Ulster Loyalist political culture any movement supporting reforms for the region is a cover plan for the pursuit of the traditional Nationalist objective, the reunification of Ireland and for this motive has to be opposed with any means. 8. The following newspapers and magazines were searched: Belfast Telegraph, Derry Journal, Irish News, Irish Times, Newsletter, Fortnight, and Sunday Times. 9. With six exceptions (three of them were done by e-mail) all the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. I have made just a few ‘grammatical’ corrections to the quotations. Each interviewee has been contacted in order to confirm the accuracy of the quotation and they have explicitly asked that their real names be used in this and future reports. 10. The methodologically pluralist approach that I undertake in this research has sufficiently indicated that I can trust this data. For an extensive discussion of reliability and validity in oral sources, see Della Porta (1992). 11. The conjunctural conditions which facilitated CRM’s mobilization were: the changing nature of Anglo-Irish relations propitiated by the Sean Lemass ‘watershed’ in the Republic of Ireland, the Cold War ‘thaw’ process, the politicization of world political protest through the new mass and international media, the success of the Black Civil Rights Movement in the USA, the election of the Labour government in 1964 and student mobilization in the late 1960s (McGarry & O’Leary, 1996). 12. The Special Power Act (or Civic Authorities Act), of 1922, authorized the Minister of Home Affairs, in states of emergencies, to order indefinite arrests and internment without an imminent charge or trial, to command searching in private properties without a warrant, to issue curfews, to ban organizations, and to prohibit meetings and processions (Whyte, 1983). The B-Specials were part-time police officers without uniform but armed, they were overwhelmingly all coming from the Unionist community (Hunt Committee, 1969; Ellison & Martin, 2000). 13. The ‘‘history making’’ potency and the need to be part of history are factors which have not yet received enough attention from social movement scholars. Instead, I have found in my interviews with former participants that the need to be part of something, the need to say that they were there, no matter the consequences, were fundamental factors in instigating people to participate. Even those who later regretted their past involvement were honored and proud to have been part of those historical events and to have ‘changed’ the course of history. 14. A large part of material sustaining to what degree the CRM participants were involved in prior socio-political activism was discovered at the Linen Hall Library’s archive and at the PRONI. 15. As McAdam and Sewell (2001) remember us ‘‘it is not the event itself, but the importance that comes to be assigned to it in the immediate aftermath of the event that determines its transformative potential y [we should then] systematically study the process by which different communities make sense of them in the wake of the occurrence’’ (p. 112). 16. During the spring of 1968, only the 43% of the Nationalist community was unequivocally against the use of illegal demonstrations versus the regional regime
Social Movement Participation
57
(Rose, 1971, pp. 193–195). This percentage plummeted to 26% in the month after the Londonderry march (Sunday Times, October 1968). 17. While I have tried to analyze motives for people participation separately, they often combine in complicated ways. In fact, where some quotations are rightly positioned, others could have been repeated in these paragraphs several times because of the multiplicity of participants’ reasons for involvement.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This article was originally presented as a paper at the Irish Political Studies Association conference organized by the Queen’s University of Belfast, October 2005. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and especially Patrick Coy for their very helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. I want to also express my gratitude to the former participants of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement for consenting to be interviewed, giving their time, energy, and patience. Nobody is in any way responsible for my interpretations. Donna Lucas and Stephan Price have courteously helped with the language.
REFERENCES Adams, G. (1988). A Republican in the Civil Rights Campaign. In: M. Farrell (Ed.), Twenty years on (pp. 39–53). Brandon: Co. Kerry Dingle. Almeida, P. (2005). Multi-sectoral coalitions and popular movement participation. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 26, 65–99. Blee, K., & Taylor, V. (2002). Semi-structured interviewing in social movement research. In: B. Klandermans & S. Staggenborg (Eds), Methods of social movement research (pp. 92–117). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Bosi, L. (2006). The dynamics of social movement development: The Northern Ireland’s Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s. Mobilization, 11(1), 41–60. Cameron Report. (1969). Disturbances in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Cmd 532, HMSO. Currie, A. (2004). All hell will break loose. Dublin: O’Brien Press. Davenport, C., Johnston, H., & Mueller, C. (2005). Repression and mobilization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Della Porta, D. (1988). Recruitment processes in Clandestine political organizations: Italian Left-Wing Terrorism. In: B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, & S. Tarrow, (Eds), From structure to action (pp., 155–172). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Della Porta, D. (1992). Biographies of social movement activists: State of the art and methodological problems. In: M. Diani & R. Eyerman (Eds), Studying collective action (pp. 168–197). London: Sage. Devlin, B. (1969). The price of my soul. London: Pan Books. Devlin, P. (1993). Straight left: An autobiography. Belfast: Blackstaff.
58
LORENZO BOSI
Ellison, G., & Martin, G. (2000). Policing, collective action and social movement theory: The case of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign. British Journal of Sociology, 51, 681–699. Farrell, M. (1988). Twenty years on. Brandon: Co. Kerry Dingle. Feldman, A. (1991). Formations of violence: The narrative of the body and political terror in Northern Ireland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gamson, W. (1991). The social psychology of collective action. In: A. Morris & C. Mueller (Eds), Frontiers in social movement theory (pp. 53–76). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Goldstone, J., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state response in the dynamic of contentious action. In: R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. Perry, W. Sewell, S. Tarrow, & C. Tilly (Eds), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 179–194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goodwin, J., Jasper, J., & Polletta, F. (2001). Passionate politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hess, D., & Martin, B. (2006). Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events. Mobilization, 11(2), 249–267. Hirsch, E. (1990). Sacrifice for the cause: The impact of group processes on recruitment and commitment in protest movement. American Sociological Review, 55, 243–254. Hunt Committee. (1969). Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Cmd 535, HMSO. Hunt, S. (2000). Social psychology and narrative concepts: Explaining individual movement participation. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 12, 255–290. Jasper, J. (1998). The emotion of protest: Affective and reactive emotions in and around social movements. Sociological Forum, 13(3), 397–424. Johnston, R. (2006). Century of endeavour. Dublin: The Lilliput Press. Khawaja, M. (1993). Repression and popular collective action: Evidence from the West Bank. Sociological Forum, 8(1), 47–71. Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and participation: Social political expansions of resource mobilization theory. American Sociological Review, 49, 583–600. Klandermans, B. (2004). The demand and supply of participation: Social-psychological correlates of participation in social movements. In: D. Snow, S. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds), The Blackwell companion to social movements (pp. 360–379). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Laitin, D. D. (1995). National revivals and violence. Archives Europeenes de Sociologie, 36, 3–43. Le Bon, G. (1960). The crowd: A study of popular mind. New York: The Viking Press [first published in 1895]. Maney, G. (2000). Transnational mobilization and civil rights in Northern Ireland. Social Problems, 47(2), 153–179. McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to high risk activism: The case of freedom summer. American Journal of Sociology, 92(1), 64–90. McAdam, D., & Sewell, W. (2001). It’s about temporality: In the study of social movements and revolutions. In: R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. Perry, W. Sewell, S. Tarrow & C. Tilly (Eds), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 89–125). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Social Movement Participation
59
McCann, E. (1974). War and an Irish town. Harmondsworth: Penguin Book. McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1973). The trend of social movements in America: Professionalization and resource mobilization. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. McCluskey, C. (1989). Up off their knees. Galway: Conn McCluskey and Associates. McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (1996). The politics of antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland. London: The Athlone Press. Melucci, A. (1989). Nomads of the present: Social movements and individual needs in contemporary society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Melucci, A. (1996). Challenging codes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. NICRA. (1978). We shall overcome: The history of the struggle for civil rights in Northern Ireland, 1968–1978. Belfast: Northern Ireland Civil Right Association. Retrieved September 1, 2006 (http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/nicra/nicra78.htm). Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. O´ Dochartaigh, F. (1994). Ulster’s white Negroes: From civil rights to insurrection. San Francisco: AK Press. O´ Dochartaigh, N. (1997). From civil rights to Armalites, Derry and the birth of the Irish troubles. Cork: Cork University Press. Olivier, J. (1991). State repression and collective action in South Africa, 1970–84. South African Journal of Sociology, 22, 109–117. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Passy, F. (2003). Social networks matter. But how? In: M. Diani & D. McAdam (Eds), Social movements and networks (pp. 21–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Passy, F., & Giugni, M. (2001). Social networks and individual perceptions: Explaining differential participation in social movements. Sociological Forum, 16(1), 123–153. Purdie, B. (1990). Politics in the street: The origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff. Rose, R. (1971). Governing without consensus: An Irish perspective. London: Faber and Faber Limited. Scarman Report. (1972). Report of tribunal inquiry into violence and civil disturbance in Northern Ireland in 1969. Belfast: Cmd. 566, HMSO. Sewell, W. (2001). Space in contentious politics. In: R. Aminzade, J. Goldstone, D. McAdam, E. Perry, W. Sewell, S. Tarrow, & C. Tilly (Eds), Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics (pp. 51–88). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smelser, N. (1962). Theory of collective behaviour. New York: Free Press. Snow, D.A., Benford, R.D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. In: B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi, & S. Tarrow (Eds), From structure to action (pp. 197–218). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Turner, R., & Killian, L. (1957). Collective behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. White, R. (1989). From peaceful protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the provisional Irish Republican Army. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 1277–1302. Whyte, J. (1983). How much discrimination was there under the unionist regime, 1921–1968? In: T. Gallagher & J. O’Connell (Eds), Contemporary Irish studies (pp. 1–35). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
60
LORENZO BOSI
APPENDIX Quoted interviewees, their organizational affiliation, and positions held during the 1960s and now. Paul Arthur: student and postgraduate at Queen’s University, member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party and active in People’s Democracy, now Professor at Ulster University. Interview October 7, 2003 (Londonderry). Ivan Cooper: employed in the shirt industry, involved in the Young Unionists in the early 1960s, later secretary of the Londonderry branch of the Northern Ireland Labour Party. Chair of the Derry Citizens Action Committee, from 1969 Stormont and Westminster MP for the Social Democratic and Labour Party, now active in social activities. Interview January 24, 2004 (Belfast). Bernadette Devlin: student at Queen’s University, member of People’s Democracy, Westminster MP from 1969 for People’s Democracy, later member of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, now active in social activities. Interview July 29, 2003 (Dungannon). John Gray: journalist, activist in the Liberal Unionist Party, member of People’s Democracy, now librarian of the Linen Hall Library in Belfast and involved in socio-cultural activities. Interview September 30, 2003 (Belfast). Denis Haughey: secondary school teacher in South Tyrone, member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, Stormont MP for the Social Democratic Labour Party, now active in socio-political activities. Interview October 20, 2003 (Stormont). Fred Heatley: engineer, member of the Wolfe Tone Society, treasurer of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, now retired. Interview July 30, 2003 (Belfast). Tony Kennedy: student, member of the Northern Ireland Labour Party and active in People’s Democracy, now chief executive of Co-operation Ireland. Interview August 4, 2003 (Belfast). Monica Mc Williams: high school student, member of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, later MP for the Women’s Coalition, now president of the Civil Rights commission. Interview September 17, 2003 (Belfast). Joe Mulheron: student at Queen’s University, active in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, member of People’s Democracy and later of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, now owner of Sandino’s pub in Londonderry. Interview October 22, 2003 (Londonderry). Fionnbarra O´ Dochartaigh: unemployed, activist in the Republican movement in Londonderry during the 1960s, member of the Derry Housing
Social Movement Participation
61
Action Committee and the Derry Citizens Action Committee, founding member of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, now Civil Rights activist. Interview June 8, 2004 (Londonderry). Slan Fergus O’Hare: student at University College Dublin, member of People’s Democracy, now involved in socio-cultural activities. Interview February 19, 2004 (Belfast). Edwina Stewart: high school teacher in Belfast, member of the Communist Party of Northern Ireland and of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, now retired. Interview January 26, 2002 (Belfast). Paul Bew, Kevin Boyle, Anthony Coughlan, Jeff Dudgeon, Ann Hope, Roy Johnston, Rory McShane, Eamonn McCann, Paddy Joe McClean, David Morrison, Mike Morrisey, Bob Purdie, Brian Tipping, Claude Wilton, and Fergus Woods have also been interviewed, but not quoted in this article.
POLICE KNOWLEDGE REVISED: INSIGHTS FROM THE POLICING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND Gianluca De Fazio ABSTRACT The confrontational stance of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) against the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) was a central factor in the outbreak of political violence in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. The analysis of the RUC officers’ testimonies before the Scarman Tribunal of Inquiry discloses both the police knowledge and the pattern of interaction between police and protesters. The closed political opportunity structure (POS) for the CRM filtered in the police knowledge, proving it to be a thorough indicator of the state’s prevailing strategy towards challengers. Yet, even within a state firmly intolerant of mass dissent police can occasionally decide to cooperate with protesters. In Derry, the RUC was often willing to, and in fact did, negotiate with protest leaders, showing at times a remarkably flexible approach. However, the negotiations occurred haphazardly outside institutional channels, with unpredictable outcomes. Consequently, protest-policing styles failed to soften and conflicts to deescalate.
Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 27, 63–87 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(06)27003-4
63
64
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
In the second half of the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) started to mobilise the traditionally quiescent Catholic minority around the issue of political and social discrimination in Northern Ireland (Purdie, 1990). On August 24, 1968, the first Civil Rights march occurred from Coalisland to Dungannon, initiating a collision between the protest movement and the state that would eventually escalate into a full-scale brutal conflict. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), due to its material role in the control of the protest and its symbolic value for the Catholics as ‘‘a potent reminder of their exclusion from the state’’ (Ellison & Martin, 2000, p. 692), would become a crucial factor throughout the unfolding of these events. Its confrontational stance against the expression of public dissent had fateful consequences in terms of the radicalisation of the CRM’s repertoire of action, and more generally in terms of the escalation of the conflict (O´ Dochartaigh, 2005). In this paper, I will look into the police management of mass protest – one of the decisive aspects leading to the eruption of the politically motivated violence and eventually to the collapse of the fragile Northern Ireland state.1 I will argue that a social movements conceptualization in general, and a theoretical framework based upon the literature on protest policing in particular, offer new insights into the RUC’s response to the CRM in Northern Ireland. In fact, police action towards Civil Rights protesters has been very often interpreted through the partial lens of one or the other side of the conflict; a social movements research perspective will be able to produce a more disenchanting account of this highly contested issue. In doing so, I would like to query the assumption of the ‘‘Northern Ireland exceptionalism’’, its presumed incomparability and uniqueness (McGarry & O’Leary, 1995). This study is a test case of police agency, the examination of police knowledge and the pattern of interaction between RUC and CRM will reveal that even within a state firmly intolerant of mass dissent police can occasionally decide to cooperate with protest leaders.2 Indeed, the main contribution of this paper relates to the discovery of a mismatch between police attitudes and actions, calling into question the primacy of police knowledge (della Porta, 1998) as an explanatory factor of protest-policing styles. Analysis will rely upon sources previously untapped by social scientists – police officers’ testimonies before the Scarman Tribunal of Inquiry. The exceptionally rich amount of information contained in the Tribunal’s minutes of evidence will allow the disclosure of the sociological mechanisms that link the political system’s features with the police control of mass protests at the local level. The encounters between police and protesters are
Police Knowledge Revised
65
acknowledged to be a crucial variable in the explanation of the protestpolicing styles (Reicher, 1984), and ‘‘in Northern Ireland (y) much of the negotiation and confrontation between opposing forces has taken place at a local level.’’ (O´ Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 2) In addition, referring to the inherently local nature of Northern Ireland conflict, Whyte (1990, pp. 258–259) remarked how ‘‘areas only a few miles from each other can differ enormously – in religious mix, in economic circumstances, in the level of violence, in political attitudes.’’ Thus, following these insights, the paper will focus on the city of Derry/Londonderry as a case study.3 This was the city most heavily marked by discrimination in Northern Ireland, in which a Unionist local council governed a large Catholic majority (Lee, 1989, p. 420). It was also one of the first towns to experience the Civil Rights campaign and witness the reaction of the police. It was in Derry as well that the conflict with the police and militant unionists (Loyalists) led to the formation of Catholic no-go areas, where the British Army first had to intervene to halt Catholic riots in 1969.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THEORY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND The Partition of Ireland in 1920 ensured that the majority of the population of Northern Ireland was Protestant and Unionist (i.e. loyal to the union with Great Britain). While two thirds of the polity stood up for the union, the remnant third was Catholic and nationalist (i.e. adverse to British rule). The arrangement of a majority voting system in an ethnically divided society certified the systematic exclusion of the minority from the exercise of political power at the national level, where the Unionist Party ran the government for almost 50 years. A sizeable amount of concrete political decision-making operated quite autonomously at the local level, especially where housing, planning and education were concerned. At this level of administration too the Unionist party was able to govern towns with a Catholic majority, thanks to the ‘‘creative’’ gerrymandering of the constituency wards. During the 1960s, a slight improvement of the Catholic community’s economic conditions, together with a timid opening to political reform by the then Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill (Ellison & Martin, 2000) led on one hand to the formation of the first generation of educated middle-class Catholics, the early risers in the cycle of protest, and, on the other hand, to the establishment of a set of political opportunities to
66
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
protest and mobilise around the issue of discrimination.4 In the early 1960s, groups like ‘‘Campaign for Social Justice in Northern Ireland’’ produced and circulated detailed reports to expose the existence and the extent of housing and political discrimination in the region, and put on moderate protest activities such as writing letters of complaint to the Parliaments of Stormont and Westminster (Purdie, 1990). But this institutional and legalistic approach failed to produce any meaningful change in the Unionist policies. Thus, a loose and ideologically heterogeneous network of disparate groups comprising, among the others, NICRA, People’s Democracy and Derry Citizens’ Action Committee – the CRM network – ‘‘started to challenge these discriminatory and sectarian practices by embracing a proactive, ‘‘reformist’’, civil right message’’, and demanding ‘‘electoral, housing and policing reforms’’5 (Bosi, 2006, p. 42). In 1968, the CRM took to the streets and, clearly inspired by the US Black CRM, borrowed their aggressive tactics of direct political action, staging sit-ins, demonstrations, marches, rallies, and acts of civil disobedience. Notwithstanding the CRM attempts in their messages and repertoires of action to be (or at least to appear as) an anti-sectarian movement, it violently collided with both the reaction of the state authority and Loyalists’ counter-mobilisation. The ensuing political conflict quickly escalated into turmoil and civil disturbances, leading to the deployment in August 1969 of the British Army to prevent the descent into a civil war. With a few exceptions (e.g. Ellison & Martin, 2000; Bosi, 2006), social movements scholars have culpably neglected the study of the CRM in Northern Ireland. As the violent conflict was stretching endlessly out, academics concentrated on the study of terrorism, debating about the intractability of the problem and possible solutions. The CRM and the spirals of counter-mobilisation and radicalisation it had triggered have been scarcely investigated and often regarded as an epiphenomenon of the conflict itself. I believe that the too often ideologically laden academic debate about Northern Ireland will markedly benefit from the application of an approach capable of yielding disenchanting accounts of conflict issues. The aim of this paper is to address a particularly disputed terrain: the RUC’s response to the mass mobilisation of the CRM.
POLICING THE CRM When facing social movements, state authorities in democracies strain to fulfil contradictory obligations. On the one hand, states and governments
Police Knowledge Revised
67
are the targets of demands to redress the grievances of collective actors. By definition, collective movements operate outside institutional channels, employing alternative repertories of action such as marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, civil disobedience, and occasionally violent tactics. Violence can be strategically staged to further protesters’ causes (Gamson, 1975, p. 81); the ability to disrupt public order is in fact understood to strengthen a collective actor’s effectiveness (McAdam, 1983, p. 735). On the other hand, police have to guarantee and maintain public order when handling protest events, eventually sanctioning illegal or violent behaviour. In addition to preserving public order and securing the safety of bystanders and property, police in contemporary democratic states are also required to protect the citizens’ right to protest.6 Thus, the interaction between the police, ‘‘conceived as ‘‘street-level bureaucrats’’ who ‘‘represent’’ government to people’’ (Lipsky, 1970, p. 1, cited in della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 1) on one side, and the movements, on the other, is a central point of interest. In certain respects, the management and control of social protest and public order is a delicate test for, and measurement of, the democratic standards displayed by a state.7 Since the psychological reductionism of Gustave Le Bon (1895), publicorder theory has radically moved from the assumption of the irrational ‘‘madding crowd’’ (McPhail, 1991) towards a socio-contextual understanding of crowd behaviour and public disorder (for a review, Waddington & King, 2005). David Waddington and colleagues have developed a flashpoints model which identifies six general determinants of public disorder, involving the following levels of analysis: structural, political/ideological, cultural, contextual, situational and interactional (Waddington, Jones, & Critcher, 1989, p. 156). It is the latter level – the one examining the faceto-face relations between police and protesters – that is decisive, as it is ‘‘where public disorder actually occurs’’ (Waddington et al., 1989, p. 167) and where even a trivial incident can become a flashpoint capable of setting off a ‘‘fire’’. Disorder is in fact conceived as a form of interaction, in particular one where ‘‘all the other forms of communication have been exhausted’’ (Waddington et al., 1989, p. 167). Social movements scholars carried out a broad examination of police management of public order and protest. They departed from the conventional view that emphasises the inevitably repressive role of the police (Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003), and reckoned that the role of the state cannot simply be reduced to that of social movement opponent. Rather, it has to be analytically conceived as ‘‘simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organiser of the political system.’’
68
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
(Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995, p. 3) Extensive research revealed that, in the last 40 years, police forces in democratic states have shown an increasingly less repressive stance, less coercive tactics, more toleration of movements’ unconventional repertoires, and a resolute willingness to avoid confrontation with protesters (della Porta & Reiter, 1998, pp. 2–8). McPhail, Schweingrubber and McCarthy (1998) observed that in the USA there occurred a dramatic shift from the ‘‘escalated force’’ doctrine – involving a massive use of force by state police up until the 1960s – to the commitment to a ‘‘negotiated management’’ strategy. Broadly speaking, the enforcement of a protest-permit system has channelled and institutionalised the protest movements’ repertoires of action, allowing the police to intervene in public order situations on only a few occasions, and even then with a minimal use of force.8 Della Porta and Reiter (1998) devised an explanatory model aimed at capturing variation in policing styles in democratic Western countries. To explain why a particular pattern of policing styles has been adopted, they deem as pivotal the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) available in a country’s political system.9 Indeed, according to this model, protest-policing styles are influenced, first, by a stable structure of opportunities determined by institutional characteristics of the police, and the political and police cultures. Second, policing styles vary according to more contingent aspects of POS regarding configurations of power and debate in the public arena on the issue of protest policing. The influence of these opportunity structures on the adoption of protest-policing styles would filter through a basic intervening variable: police knowledge, i.e., police’ attitudes and stereotypes about protesters, and perception of their role in society (della Porta & Reiter, 1998, pp. 22–27). This variable is considered the critical intervening variable between the structure and agency: the institutional characteristics and the political system’s degree of openness find a concrete expression only when they are incorporated in the police knowledge (della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 10). Meyer and Minkoff (2004) insist that the theoretical framework of POS needs to be complemented with the examination of the sociological mechanisms, which mediate the influence of the systemic features at the agency level. Most research focused on demonstrating correlations between opportunities and mobilization, so far failing to illustrate how political opportunities concretely translate into collective action, in other words to specify ‘‘how they work’’ (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, p. 1463). From this point of view, the examination of police knowledge will provide a set of cognitive mechanisms helpful in explaining police responses to mass protest.
Police Knowledge Revised
69
Nevertheless, I claim that at least as important as police-protesters interaction between the police and protesters in situ (Reicher, 1984). This aspect is cardinal because it injects into the analytical model a dynamic factor. To be sure, I believe that the relation between POS and police knowledge is quite static, i.e., the political system sets the conditions for police knowledge to be shaped in a certain direction. However, when police and protesters actually face each other, the protest-policing styles are likely to be affected by these encounters. Indeed, the study of the dynamics of the protesters– police relationship has shed light on the recursive processes that lead to the escalation of political violence (della Porta, 1995, p. 57). Complementary to this, public-order research has shown that when the interaction between police officers and protest organisers is backed up by previous meetings, institutionalised through formal negotiation mechanisms and channelled towards a cooperative relationship, the potential room for violent encounters dramatically shrinks (Waddington, 1994; McPhail et al., 1998; Fillieule & Jobard, 1998). To sum up, I argue that police knowledge is significant in explaining protest-policing styles, functioning as a static indicator of the openness/ closeness of POS; however, it has to be always complemented with the appraisal of the mechanisms operating at the interactional level of analysis (Waddington et al., 1989), namely reviewing the police-protesters patterns of interaction, communication, and negotiation occurring before and during protest events. In fact, it will be shown that police actions may, under certain circumstances, substantially deflect from police knowledge. In 1922, the RUC replaced the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) – the Irish police – as the law enforcement agency for Northern Ireland, retaining the key features of their predecessors (Moore & O’Rawe, 1997, p. 268). Since its foundation in the nineteenth century, the fundamental role of the RIC in colonial Ireland was to subdue the rebellious population (Hillyard & Tomlinson, 2000, p. 394). This was reflected in its structural organisation, the main characteristics of which being its massive size, a highly centralised structure of control and command, and a heavily militarised outlook.10 In contrast to the British image of the civilian unarmed ‘bobby’, the RUC was based in barracks and armed with heavy equipment. The RUC epitomised a divided society model of policing (Brewer, 1991; Weitzer, 1995). Alongside the conventional policing duties, police in Northern Ireland bore a counterinsurgency responsibility (Hunt 1969, p.13), that is they were committed ‘‘to maintain public order, combat sectarian, intercommunal violence, and protect the state from subversive and violent opponents’’ (Weitzer, 1995 p. 10).11 RUC officers were overwhelmingly
70
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
recruited from the Protestant community and embodied a politicised police under direct political control from the Unionist Government, especially the Minister of Home Affairs, to which the Inspector General was subordinate.12 This led to ‘‘systematic bias in law enforcement, with members of the subordinate communal group policed more aggressively and punitively than members of the dominant group’’(Weitzer, 1995, p. 5). The response of the RUC to the CRM’s mobilisation was a harsh one. On 5th October 1968, a peaceful march in Londonderry was banned by the Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs for public order reasons. Police were determined to enforce the ministerial ban utilising all the means at their disposal, the images of their gratuitous use of violence being televised in the UK, Ireland, and elsewhere in the world. The hostile state reaction to the Civil Rights campaign, the ensuing and increasing lack of confidence in police authority by the Catholic minority, and the counter-mobilisation from the Loyalists, led to an escalation of the conflict in the streets. In the summer of 1969, the RUC ended up employing a full-scale strategy of crowd control, including the use – for the first time ever in the UK – of CS gas in Londonderry (Scarman, 1972, p. 76) and machine guns in Belfast (Scarman, 1972, p. 9). The security situation collapsed to such a point that in August the British government had to deploy the British Army as a peacekeeping force (Scarman, 1972). Furthermore, the British government urged the Northern Ireland Parliament to set up a Tribunal of Inquiry to investigate the civil disturbances that compelled the intervention of the Army.
DATA AND METHODS The minutes of evidence of the Scarman Tribunal of Inquiry form the empirical basis of this article. Soon after the British Army was deployed in August 1969, the Northern Ireland Parliament established a Tribunal of Inquiry to inspect the civil strife that had occurred in the previous months. The Inquiry was judicial in character, chaired by Lord Scarman, with power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to examine them on oath (Scarman, 1972, p. 2). The Tribunal conducted public hearings from September 1969 until June 1971, examining a large number of witnesses and persons directly involved in the events – most of them security officers from the Army, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the Ulster Special Constabulary. The final Report was published in April 1972. The Scarman Report is one of several official Reports,13 which inspected carefully the state of affairs in Northern Ireland, especially the causes of
Police Knowledge Revised
71
political violence and the RUC management of public order. Despite the richness of evidence gathered by the Scarman Tribunal of Inquiry, its hearings (35 volumes of transcripts) have barely been studied systematically for research purposes.14 In the voluminous literature on the ‘‘Troubles’’, this huge amount of material has gone almost entirely unnoticed by historians as well as by social scientists. The transcripts do not specify if the witness under examination was obliged to go to the Tribunal or offered evidence spontaneously. At any rate, every person giving evidence before the Tribunal was ‘‘entitled to the immunities and privileges of a witness before the High Court’’ and authorised to be represented by a counsel or solicitor (Scarman, 1972, p. 2). The Tribunal was particularly ‘‘concerned to ensure that persons, whose conduct was criticised in written statements furnished by those whom the Tribunal proposed to call as witnesses, should be given notice of the allegations against them and have a full opportunity, with the aid of legal representation if necessary, of dealing with them’’ (Scarman, 1972, p. 3). In this paper, I focus on a specific contentious sphere of action and locality, the RUC response to the Civil Rights protests in Londonderry. The minutes of evidence relating to the events that occurred in that city during July and August 1969 form the basis of analysis. In relation to those turbulent months, the tribunal interrogated 104 persons, 40 of which were RUC and USC officers. After reading all these testimonies for inclusion in the analysis, I selected the testimonies which presented at least one of the following items: (1) the officer’s perception and attitude towards the civil rights protesters; (2) reference to police self-image; and (3) accounts of the interaction between police and protesters. These criteria yielded a sample of 16 testimonies – accounting for 40% of all the interrogated officers in Londonderry. In terms of officers’ ranks, the testimonies selected were fairly representative, while the ones excluded did not display any systematic bias.15 The Scarman Report was written on the basis of all the data gathered during the Inquiry (including the testimonies I studied). My intention was not to search for brand new evidence about the civil strife that led to the Troubles. Rather, I aimed to exploit the sizeable amount of original information gathered for the final Report, especially police’ attitudes, judgements, and justifications for their behaviour (in other words, police knowledge). These minutes of evidence are valuable precisely because they allow the investigation of police’ attitudes – as well as the relatively unstudied story of the interactions between the RUC and the CRM. Since the data consist of formal hearings before a Tribunal of Inquiry, a discernible and blatant police bias against the CRM never surfaced. Indeed, statements
72
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
from police officers were the cautious deliberations of professional witnesses. Nevertheless, despite their caution, the statements of officers were revealing. From the analysis of these data, relatively coherent and consistent patterns emerge: shared attitudes, perceptions, and images among police officers, as well as recurring configurations of police-protesters relations.
POLICE KNOWLEDGE Protesters Stereotyping In situations of public disorder, police officers’ perceptions and attitudes toward protesters are the base of police knowledge (della Porta, 1998). The RUC officers on duty in Londonderry predictably claimed a stance of neutrality with regard to the conflicting communities and their respective assemblies of demonstrators: Q. What is your attitude towards the people of the Bogside [i.e. Catholics]? A. (y) Well, I do not know much about the people of the Bogside. Dealing with crowds that were hostile, I am sent them to do a job and I do it irrespective of whether they are from the Bogside or from the other side. (y) Q. Are you saying that you were neutral, that your attitude towards both of these crowds was much the same? A. It would be the same towards any hostile crowd. (Head Constable R. J. Wallace, day 28, p. 83; emphasis added)
Nonetheless, this allegedly neutral position of police was not always evident in the expressed views of police witnesses towards the civil rights protesters. As the Head Constable remarked: Q. Were you feeling as judicial as that when you wrote your report on this matter, Head Constable? A. I would say so. Q. Did you describe the people in Great James Street as thugs? A. That was the impression I got from that crowd. (y) Q. Had you previously in the day been dealing with Bogsiders in the Rossville Street area? A. That is correct. (y) Q. Do you describe them as savages in your report? A. I would think they were behaving like that. That does not mean that all the people in the Bogside are savages. Q. Did that not influence you in your attitude towards the people at the upper side of Great James Street? A. I would adjust my attitude to what I see taking place at a particular time. (Head Constable R. J. Wallace, day 28, p. 84; emphasis added)
The examination of County Inspector Corbett offers another example: THE CHAIRMAN: (y) this is the second time in the log that I have seen recorded a reference to ‘‘natives.’’ Here it is ‘‘Natives still coming down William Street.’’ Earlier on there was also a reference to natives (y). What do you understand is meant by that term?
Police Knowledge Revised
73
A: The local residents, as far as I could put it, I would say. THE CHAIRMAN: An unfortunate way of talking about them? A. It is, I quite agree. (County Inspector D. Corbett, day 9, p. 37)
Reflecting their colonial policing origins, RUC officers referred disparagingly to Catholic protesters as thugs, savages and natives, while the classic differentiation between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ protesters (della Porta, 1998), in Northern Ireland was framed in terms of the ‘‘responsible’’ and the ‘‘hooligan’’ component of the areas policed: I think there is a vast majority of decent responsible people in the Creggan [i.e. Catholic] area who had absolutely no fear of the police and would have assisted them in every way possible, but I think that they themselves were scared of the hooligan element who were present. (Head Constable A. McCabe, day 14, p. 43.)16
One of the effects of the RUC handling of the early civil rights campaign was to vastly mobilise the minority community; ‘‘complaints about discrimination quickly gave way to complaints about the RUC [y]; the response of the state [y] to Catholic mobilization was an issue capable of arousing far more anger and activism than the issues around which mobilization had begun.’’ (O´ Dochartaigh 1997, p. 310, cited in Ellison & Martin, 2000, p. 691) In other words, the initial focus of the protest shifted into the meta-issue of the RUC policing methods and practices (della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 28). The RUC, while on one side was apt to minimise the Catholic community’s alienation from the police, on the other side was ready to blame the ‘‘hooligan’’ element for it: Q. I want to turn to a more general question, Mr. Corbett, and that is the question of the relationship over the 12 months up to July [1969] approximately when you were last in Derry between the police and the people of Derry. Did you notice any deterioration? A. With responsible people certainly no deterioration, if anything an improvement. When I say ‘‘responsible’’ I mean responsible on all sides. With what one could only call the hooligan element I would agree that there probably was a deterioration. [y] But the general impression I had was that the responsible people still had the greatest confidence in the local police who had been here for many years. (County Inspector D. Corbett, day 10, pp. 9–10; emphasis added)
Protests and complaints about police conduct, when voiced, were the result of a political operation to mobilise anger against the RUC: Q. Do you not know that the situation in Derry at the moment is that there is an almost universal disapproval of the police on the catholic side? A. I do not frankly accept that it is universal. I think there are a great many who would be only too pleased to accept the police back and have them back on normal duty, and who I suppose are frightened to say so. Q. I appreciate the difficulties of business people, and so on, in relation to lack of
74
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO police, but you do not accept that among the most responsible people, the people with most to lose from the absence of the police, there is a feeling of resentment of the police, which is very wide in Derry? A. There is a certain amount of feeling of resentment, which to my mind has been engineered. (County Inspector D. Corbett, day 10, p. 15; emphasis added)
Denial of Grievances Implied in the attribution of the responsibility for the civil disorders on the ‘‘bad’’ protesters, is the denial of grievances voiced by the protesters. Ellison and Smyth (2000, p. 32) have pointed out the presence of a pervasive belief, especially among Unionists, that Northern Ireland before 1968 was a normal, unproblematic, pacified country, where police enjoyed good relations with both communities and no hints of a potential conflict between them existed. This belief is reflected in the witness testimony too: Q. You remained on in Londonderry until when? A. I remained on in Londonderry and was attached to Victoria Police Station, operating in that area, in the Bogside-Creggan area, until I left in 1963. Q. Were those happy years? A. Very happy years. (District Inspector M. J. Finn, day 17, p. 63) Q. Were you, prior to the 12th August [1969], aware of a very serious state of affairs in relation to the relationship between the people and the police in Derry? A. Well I was aware that, if I may say, they were not as happy as they had been during the time I spent as a District Inspector here. Q. Speaking of those days, I take it you would agree it was a pretty happy relationship between the police and the people? A. Yes, I was very happy during my service in Derry. (Deputy Inspector General R. E. G. Shillington, day 10, pp. 59–60)
If the ‘‘bad’’ protesters were to blame for the widespread strife, the mere onset of the CRM was seen as responsible for the apparently abrupt ending of this idyllic situation: Q. It must have been a grave disappointment to you, as a man who knew the City, to see what relations were like between the police and people in Derry on 12th, 13th and 14th August [1969]? A. It was a great disappointment to me, fair enough, but I had seen this thing working since June, 1968 – it was deteriorating all the time. Q. There was really a period from, some put the magic date at October, you put it earlier than that at June 1968, when things really deteriorated to a pitch where people were throwing petrol bombs at the police on the 12th August 1969? A. Yes, that is right. Why I say June is, in my estimation I reckon the whole thing started with the pulling out of a caravan across Hamilton Street to highlight the unsatisfactory housing conditions of one particular man, and that really is when street demonstrations as such started in Londonderry. (Head Constable E. Campbell, day 29, p. 60; emphasis added)
Police Knowledge Revised
75
Police Self-Image Another key aspect of the police knowledge concerns the images police have of their role within society. The interpretation of their function in a country’s social and political life, affects their response to public dissent (Winter, 1998). In a bid for legitimacy before a tribunal of Inquiry, senior RUC officers had to justify the employment of harsh methods on protesters, in this manner revealing what police felt was an appropriate response to political dissent. County Inspector Corbett outlined which duties police should fulfil in riot situations: Q. What at that time, firstly, was your attitude to police engagement in throwing stones at rioters? A. At that time, which is July, my attitude, regrettably, had been forced to change. A year ago I would have been entirely opposed, absolutely and entirely and unconditionally opposed. Regrettably, that view I have been forced to change, having seen the situation that the police were dealing with here, a situation that I do not suppose any, certainly no police force in the British Isles and possibly no police force in the world has been faced with, and bearing in mind one of the primary functions of the police is the protection of life and property, particularly the protection of the property. (y) Consequently, if the return – very occasionally is all it was ever done – of an occasion missile, if it does result in preventing excessive destruction I, as I say regrettably, am forced to consider it is justified. It is repugnant, it is undesirable, it gives an extremely bad impression, but if it saves life and saves destruction – excessive, perhaps should be added – excessive destruction of property, regrettably I feel it has been justified. (County Inspector D. Corbett, day 9, p. 30; emphasis added)
In another passage, C. I. Corbett revealed the police’s strategy to comply with the primary function of policing: Q. What was your policy in dealing with these riotous mobs on the occasions you have detailed in your evidence? A. Preferably to disperse them and to prevent a big enough regrouping. When I say ‘‘big enough regrouping’’, small groups will not start doing very serious damage. It is only when a very large group has gathered together that the serious damage is done. Therefore, the ideal policy from the point of view of protection of property, the basic fundamental police function, is to keep them dispersed. That prevents any very big gathering up. (County Inspector D. Corbett, day 9, p. 68; emphasis added)
County Inspector Mahon instead emphasised that ‘‘a policeman first of all regards the safety of public and his own safety may be unfortunately secondary but he must protect the public and the public peace.’’ (County Inspector G. S. Mahon, day 11, p. 15; emphasis added) The RUC appealed to an image of themselves as, above all, protectors of the public, its property and the public peace. To prevent the excessive destruction of property, even
76
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
the employment of tactics (such as stone-throwing) deemed as ‘‘repugnant’’ and ‘‘undesirable’’ is justified. Another theme regarding the police self-image involves its relations with the media. This tie is revealing, aiding comprehension of the level of connection of a police organisation with the public and the citizens. The policemen’s testimonies before the Scarman Tribunal display a certain degree of naivete´ in their stance towards the role of the media during violent encounters between police and protesters. They deny any influence from the presence of the media in their conduct and strategic choices: Q. I want to suggest to you that the difference in the police action between those two occasion, the one when they stood and waited where they were, being bombarded with stones, and the other when they made an entry into the Rossville Street area (y) was governed by the presence of television cameras in Waterloo place? A. To answer to this question shortly, I would say it was not governed by the television cameras in anyway. (County Inspector G. S. Mahon, day 11, p. 13) Q. (y) your attitude was dictated by the presence of television cameras at Waterloo Place. Can you tell my Lord and the Tribunal if there is any substance in such a suggestion from your point of view? A. Obviously that crosses your mind; as an officer in charge of men that thought must cross your mind. But that was not the underlying point that influence me. (District Inspector M. Slevin, day 12, p. 54)
The claim that police interventions were not affected at all by the media, albeit rigid and questionable, is not completely surprising. A police agency dedicated to performing its job regardless of external influences could, after all, be an indication of professionalism. But the point here is that RUC officers failed to further elaborate a position that would take into account the elementary ‘‘watchdog’’ role of the media, and therefore of the public: Q. And I want to suggest to you that the police were at least as concerned with their image before the television cameras and before the newspapermen who were assembled there as they were with keeping peace. A. The police interest is always, and I think should always be, the protection of life and property. We are not concerned with our image before a television camera. (County Inspector G. S. Mahon, day 11, p. 13)
Nowadays, in the era when Public Relation departments and spokespersons embody a fundamental component in all police presentational strategy (Mawby, 2002), these declarations sound, at least, unsophisticated. They seem to indicate a lack in the RUC’s professional culture of any reflection on, and strategy for, dealing with the media and, therefore, how to ‘‘win over’’ the public with regards to controversial events such as the policing of mass demonstrations. It is true that in the 1960s police forces throughout the world were not yet endowed of institutionalised PR skills. Yet, in the
Police Knowledge Revised
77
discussion section I will argue that the main explanation for this ‘‘media failure’’ can be found in the lack of accountability of the RUC.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POLICE AND PROTESTERS The degree of institutionalisation and formalisation of police authority consultations with protest organisers is an influential aspect for the control of violent behaviours by both ‘‘sides of the barricade’’ (Fillieule & Jobbard, 1998; Waddington, 1996). In the course of their testimonies, RUC officers provided valuable accounts of how this interaction occurred in Londonderry. Notwithstanding the adoption in the public arena of a seemingly confrontational approach towards the CRM, when facing the protesters in the streets the RUC demonstrated itself to be capable of a much more flexible, pragmatic and, at times, sophisticated approach. As a rule, both Civil Rights and Unionist protest organisers informally granted a stewarding scheme, striving to restrain their crowds and guarantee the peaceful unfolding of their marches and manifestations. The negotiation procedures between stewards and police officers often relied upon informal contacts arising on the spot: An example of what we had to do is this. A complaint was made to me that somebody had thrown a bottle and they said it was either from the top of a wall or it was by a policeman or else a policeman had seen a protestant throwing that and had taken no action. With the agreement of the stewards, we put two police, two Roman Catholic stewards, and two Protestant stewards on top of the arch and that prevented any further stone throwing from that area. (District Inspector W. J. Hood, day 13, p. 19; emphasis added)
In contrast with its repressive reputation, RUC had a very trustful attitude and relations with both Protestant and Catholic stewarding organisations. For example, the ministerial decision not to ban the Apprentice Boys’ Parade in Derry on the 12th August 1969 – notwithstanding robust signals for potential disturbances to happen – was basically determined, alongside political considerations, by the police’s belief that the stewarding arrangements made by Protestant demonstrators and civil rights leaders were reliable enough to ensure the avoidance of violent clashes (Scarman, 1972, p. 9). Unfortunately, this did not prove to be the case. At any rate, the police display of trust towards the stewarding organisations prior to a protest event was equally exhibited during problematic public order situations:
78
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO Q. Were the police authority (y) relying upon the efforts of civil rights stewards, or any sort of stewards, to contain the crowd in William Street and Waterloo Street? A. The police always depend on citizens to do their best to contain this type of thing. This is normal police practice. Q. May I take it (y) that you were simply depending on the general goodwill of people to see to it that no trouble commenced in William Street or Waterloo Street on that day? A. Largely yes. (District Inspector M. Slevin, day 12, p. 65; emphasis added)
In the negotiation process, the quest for contacts with the protest leaders was a relentless task for police officers, although not always successful: Q. (y) had there been any contact between police and people in the Bogside? Had there been any personal contact or attempts to resolve the situation by talk? A. To my knowledge the Deputy Inspector General had received a certain message (y) and as a result (y) he went to Rossville Street, (y) in the hope (y) that he might be met there by certain people who would be prepared to negotiate (y), but no one turned up. (y) He had press conference during that day and all this was with the intention of getting it made quite clear to the people that the police were prepared to negotiate. All that was requested was that this riotous conduct should cease, and that the police would certainly withdraw. (County Inspector G. S. Mahon, day 11, p. 57; emphasis added)
Nonetheless, there are several episodes when consultations with single wellknown civil rights leaders, like John Hume, succeeded to beget provisional stalemates of the ongoing violent brawling: Q. Did you have a conversation with him [Mr. Hume]? A. He had a conversation with me. First of all I said to him, ‘‘Can you do anything with this element to try and eliminate this type of thing?’’ He said, ‘‘I am doing my best, D. I. Could you, do you think, move that crowd?’’ and he pointed over to the nailings where there was another crowd shouting back, a small crowd shouting back. I said I would, of course, I would certainly move them on, and he undertook, as I say, to try and placate this element. I went over or instructed a Head [Constable] with a number of men to go over and they in fact spoke to those people, some of them moved on and some did not, but in fact they moved them, more or less pushed them on, got them moving on. (District Inspector M. Slevin, day 12, p. 51) Q. Did anything happen at half past nine approximately? A. At half past nine Mr. John Hume and a deputation from the barricade at North Street came down towards us and asked to speak to the person in charge. (y) Q. What did you hear Mr. Hume say? A. He said if the rioters did not attack the police, would the police not attack the barricade. Head Constable McCabe said that he was only interested in the defence of the station and he would not, nor would the police, attack the barricades. Q. What happened when that element was made by Head Constable McCabe to Mr. Hume. What did the delegation do? A. They went back to the barricades and obviously informed the rioters what had taken place. Q. When they did that, did the attacks cease on the station? A. No, there was a further attack on the station from Marlborough Hall and we were attacked there again as vicious as we ever were. Shortly after this attack Mr. Hume came
Police Knowledge Revised
79
back and apologised for this and stated that the message must not have got to all the rioters. (Sergeant R. D. Cardwell, day 14, pp. 27–28)
DISCUSSION Police knowledge is a relevant factor in the explanation of protest-policing styles. From the testimonies transpire three main aspects of police attitudes which are relevant for the discussion: their distinction between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ protesters, their failure to link their behaviours with Catholics’ mistrust, and the denial of media effects on their tactics. First of all, scanning the stereotypes about protesters – a recurrent, cognitive, and operational device across police forces (Waddington, 1994) – sheds light on police outlook and approach. Previous research has revealed how RUC officers regarded the CRM as ‘‘nothing more than IRA’’ (Ellison, 1997, p. 157; Ellison & Smyth, 2000; Ellison & Martin, 2000). This assertion is also supported by the Scarman Report (1972, p. 16): ‘‘the conduct which we have criticised was due largely to the belief held at the time by many of the police, including senior officers, that they were dealing with an armed uprising engineered by the IRA.’’ The Report itself suggested how this judgment seriously affected the RUC: ‘‘in dealing with an armed uprising, the usual restraints on police conduct would not be so strong, while more attention would naturally be given to the suppression of the insurgents than to the protection of people’s lives and property.’’ (ibidem) In the RUC’s testimonies this type of stereotyping did not transpire, but other categorisations emerged. Police routinely classify protesters either as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ (della Porta, 1998); RUC officers framed this distinction in terms of ‘‘responsible’’ vs. ‘‘hooligan’’ element in the community. In the testimonies, policemen openly blame the latter for sparking off public unrest in the streets, as well as for arousing the mounting alienation felt by the Catholic minority towards the police forces. This attribution of threat (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, p. 46) perfectly blended with another cognitive mechanism, the denial of protesters’ grievances, at least in two ways. On one hand, senior RUC officers, in particular, failed to appreciate the serious resentment displayed by Catholics towards their tactics. Confining this sentiment to a few radical activists, or denying it altogether, the RUC was not able to grasp the complaints expressed against their heavy-handed tactics. This lack of understanding prevented a strategic re-adjustment of the RUC approach towards
80
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
protesters. On the other hand, where the Northern Ireland polity was based on the discrimination and the political exclusion of the Catholics, the officers’ testimonies corroborate the view of a normal and trouble-free country, before 1968. It was the Civil Rights mobilisation and unprecedented repertoire of action that was charged for the disruption of this peaceful status quo. The analysis of the police–media relation, moreover, reveals how an insidious constitutive element of the RUC encouraged the unleashing of violent practices against peaceful demonstrators. Observing the officers disinterest for their public image in front of the media, I suggested earlier to consider the RUC’s lack of accountability. The Special Powers Act (1922) and other security legislation guaranteed police officers a virtual impunity when on duty, in fact, it was not possible to obtain judicial review for any misbehaviour by a constable (Ellison & Smyth, 2000, p. 24). Furthermore, before the implementation – with disappointing outcomes – of the Hunt Report’s recommendations in 1969, there did not exist an independent body for external scrutiny. In addition, there was no institutional mechanism through which to submit formal complaints against officers’ misconduct.17 As the likelihood of in-the-job trouble was minimal and external scrutiny not contemplated, why bother with the ‘‘image before a television camera’’?18 A major incentive for self-restraint when confronting protest was, therefore, severely enfeebled. This aspect is also consistent with the RUC’s self-image. Resembling the model named Staatspolizei by Winter (1998), or Police of the King by della Porta (1998, p. 245), the RUC interpreted its role as the ultimate defender of the state from all challengers. Officers focused on the protection of public welfare and peace, property and human lives; conversely, the safeguard of citizens’ rights (especially those concerning the sphere of freedom of speech and protest) was not even mentioned among the duties to be performed. The scrutiny of police knowledge unveiled some mechanisms instrumental in explaining the police response to the civil rights protest. Yet, the review of the interaction between police and protesters in Derry reveals rather counter-intuitive findings. So far, it has been pointed out that RUC officers had a very antagonistic orientation towards the Civil Rights mobilisation. This would lead one to expect a non-negotiable enforcement of the law using ‘‘escalated force’’. The surprise is that RUC did negotiate and seemed to do so in good faith. The finest example occurred on 16th November 1968, when a massive, 15,000-strong civil rights march threatened to defy a ministerial ban to enter Derry’s city centre. Unable to enforce the ban, the RUC ‘‘had secretly arranged with a member of the committee [the DCAC, the civil
Police Knowledge Revised
81
rights organisation in Derry] that they would permit a token breach of the police line and therefore of the ban. Thus, a few members of the committee climbed over the barriers, formally defying the ban. The crowd was informed of what had happened and then flooded around the cordon and into the city centre by other streets which had been left open.’’ (O´ Dochartaigh, 2005, p. 26) A brutal replication of October’s violent clashes was averted as a result of both the skilful stewarding arrangements and the pragmatic acknowledgement of the situation by the police, which ultimately led to a mutually suitable compromise to avoid violence. O´ Dochartaigh (2005, p. 270) underlines how ‘‘one of the most striking features of the early stages of conflict in Derry was the high level of contact and negotiation between the security forces and a wide range of forces in the Catholic community.’’ A formal and institutionalised scheme of interaction between police agencies and protest organisers is a vital factor to prevent the development of political violence and the escalation of conflict. So, why was this ‘‘well-established pattern of communication and negotiation’’ not able to secure softer policing styles towards the Civil Rights manifestations in Derry? The RUC officers’ testimonies before the Scarman Tribunal indicate that the often-sought contacts with the Civil Rights manifestants in Derry were all but solidly institutionalised or formally conducted. As nicely pointed out by O´ Dochartaigh (2005, p. 270), ‘‘the aims of these communications and negotiations tended to be quite limited, and the line between mutual signalling of intentions and fully fledged negotiations was often blurred. Arrangements to keep the peace were generally short-term and temporary, always subject to disruption if one side or the other decided it no longer suited its long-term aims, and was always limited by the fact that it was difficult for any party talks to provide absolute guarantees about behaviour on their ‘‘side’’.’’ The lack of legal procedures and institutional mechanisms to regulate the relationship between the police authority and the protest leaders in Northern Ireland generated the establishment of a pragmatic yet erratic model of interaction, which could not secure the avoidance of violent encounters during mass demonstrations. These findings suggest a rethinking of the RUC as a distinctively repressive police vis-a`-vis Civil Rights protest. Its approach appears far from being an anomaly in the context of 1960s contentious politics. At that time, US police agencies were facing the black insurgency and a new wave of student movement’s mobilisation, enforcing an ‘‘escalated force’’ strategy. The similarities of the latter with the RUC methods are striking. US police officers resorted to abrasive and confrontational practices that involved a considerable use of force; police agencies justified them because of their duty of
82
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
upholding law and order, and the safeguard of property and lives (McPhail & McCarthy, 2005, p. 4). The protection of the right to protest, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was on the contrary disregarded. Moreover, police exhibited scarce tolerance towards community disruption and the communication between police and protesters was undercover and exploitative (McPhail & McCarthy, 2005, p. 5). A comparison of the RUC’s management of mass demonstrations with other continental European police forces in the 1960s (e.g., della Porta, 1995) would swiftly expose the adoption of similar patterns of action. From this viewpoint, there would seem to be nothing unique in the Catholics’ mobilisation and the germane police reaction. In brief, there was nothing exceptional in the mass contention that occurred at the end of the 1960s: it was the fragile foundation of the Northern Ireland state and the consequent political settlement which let mass mobilisation and sectarian polarisation set off the breakdown of the political system.
CONCLUSION The analysis of the RUC officers’ testimonies has revealed a set of cognitive and relational mechanisms (Tilly, 2003) which are necessary to comprehend protest-policing styles. The closed POS for the Catholic minority clearly filtered into the police knowledge. This showed the typical cognitive mechanisms concerning the stereotyping of protesters, as well as: (1) an orientation towards a staunch defence of the state and the Unionist domination by all means; (2) a rejection of the minority’s claims about their grievances – initially the discrimination and then the repressive policing of Civil Rights protest; and (3) a disregard for both accountability and citizens’ rights to protest. This uncompromising mindset was unexpectedly offset in Derry by a dense model of interaction between police and protesters. RUC was often willing to – and, in fact, did – negotiate with protest leaders, staging at times a remarkably flexible approach. The intense talks between RUC officers and activists, since they were not backed up by institutional procedures, never crystallised into a predictable scheme. Thus, one of the most important relational mechanisms for the diffusion of the situation – the negotiation process between the police and protesters – did occur haphazardly, therefore protest-policing styles failed to soften and the conflicts to deescalate. This evidence calls into question the explanatory power of ‘‘police knowledge’’. RUC mindsets clearly reflected the blocked political opportunities in
Police Knowledge Revised
83
Northern Ireland. Statically typifying the POS, police knowledge operates as a thorough indicator of one state’s prevailing strategy before contentious collective actors (della Porta & Diani, 2005, p. 206), especially in contexts where the police enjoy scant autonomy from the Government. Yet, a comprehensive explanation of protest-policing styles must rely on the methodical examination of the police–protesters relational models. The appraisal of the interaction between RUC and civil rights leaders clearly shows that police behaviours may critically diverge from police perceptions/attitudes/images. Undoubtedly, a confrontational stance facilitates the adoption of harsh police methods, but, under certain circumstances, police might follow a pragmatic logic divorced from police knowledge, for example, opting for defusing the situation instead of pursuing law-enforcement. Constraints about the unfeasibility of enforcing a ban against an overwhelming crowd, for instance, induced senior officers in Derry to achieve an otherwise unthinkable compromise with civil rights campaigners. However, quite apart from contingent reasons of operational pressing, the broad RUC willingness to negotiate claims some explanation. Further research should identify under which political and situational conditions the police might consistently deflect from pursuing their prevailing strategy in public disorder contexts. As a final remark, it is important to stress that the application of a social movement perspective to Northern Ireland has been instrumental to underscore the similarities of its contentious processes in comparison with other contemporary Western countries. This should drive scholars to reconsider the alleged uniqueness of Northern Ireland and focus more carefully on the comparability of its contentious processes.
NOTES 1. In December 1920, the British government separated, through Partition, six counties in the north-eastern part of Ireland from the rest. While the southern part of the island became a free state, and ultimately, in 1949, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland remained under British rule. From a formal constitutional point of view, Northern Ireland was incorporated within the UK, but de facto became a largely semi-autonomous state in relation to the other provinces, endowed with its own parliament (Stormont), government and judicial system. 2. In Western police agencies, negotiations with activists turned into an ordinary public order practice only during the 1980s (della Porta & Reiter, 1998). 3. While unionists call it Londonderry, nationalists prefer the old denomination of Derry. I use both names interchangeably. 4. A review of the different accounts of the CRM appearance is in Dixon, 2001.
84
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
5. The most accurate description of the variegated ideological and social components of CRM is in Purdie, 1990. 6. For instance, this right in the USA is incorporated in the First Amendment Rights (McPhail et al., 1998 McPhail, Schweingrubber & McCarthy, 1998), while in West Germany it was fully acknowledged through a Federal Constitutional Court decision in 1985 (Winter, 1998). 7. This holds especially true in the context of a divided society such as Northern Ireland. The Independent Commission set up to reform the RUC after the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) acknowledges that ‘‘police have been identified by one section of the population not primarily as upholders of the law but as defenders of the state, and the nature of the state itself has remained the central issue of political argument’’ (Patten, 1999, p. 2). The politicised nature of policing in Northern Ireland is conspicuous also (or even especially) in the aftermath of the GFA, as ‘‘(t)he new political settlement is premised upon police reform, and the prospect of political stability depends upon police reform’’ (McGarry & O’Leary, 1999, p. 13). 8. Recent events as the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999, and in general, the policing of antiglobalisation movements at the beginning of the 21st century, seem to contradict this trend (Ericson & Doyle, 1999; Gillham & Marx, 2000; della Porta, Peterson, & Reiter, 2007). Moreover, the move toward less coercive and brutal protest-policing styles in the last 40 years appears to be challenged by an opposite trend that entails a certain degree of militarization within police forces, and hence a more paramilitary-style strategy of public order policing (for a discussion, see Jefferson, 1990; Waddington, 1999). 9. The basic assumption upon which the POS relies is that exogenous factors to social movements significantly affect their levels of mobilisation, repertoires of action, and outcomes. Tarrow (1994, p. 85) defines the POS as ‘‘consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure.’’ For a viewpoint that considers repression as a dimension of POS rather than a reflection of it, see McAdam (1996) and Tarrow (1998). 10. In comparison with England and Wales, where in 1924 there was one police officer for every 699 inhabitants, and Scotland, one for 751, in Northern Ireland the ratio was one constable for 169 people (Weitzer, 1995, p. 34). 11. After the Partition, Nationalist insurgent groups tried to jeopardise the very existence of the newborn state. Until the 1950s the IRA staged sporadic low-level terrorist campaigns. 12. While accounting for about 40% of the whole population, in 1969 Catholics represented only 11% of the constables. 13. Cameron Report (1969) and the Hunt Report (1969). 14. To the best of my knowledge, there are only a couple of academic studies (Drew, 1978; Atkinson & Drew, 1979) that examined small excerpts from this material to conduct conversational analyses within an ethnomethodological approach. 15. In detail, the testimonies – in descending rank order – concerned: one Deputy Inspector General, two County Inspectors, four District Inspectors, six Head Constables, three Sergeants, and no Constables. 16. To be fair, the recurrent distinction between ‘‘responsible’’ and ‘‘hooligan’’ is neither peculiar of the Northern Ireland context, nor monopolised by police officers: the Tribunal itself accepted and was keen to apply that type of labelling with ease.
Police Knowledge Revised
85
17. The issue of accountability is of paramount importance. Unfortunately here I do not have the space to elaborate further, but for systematic discussions see Patten (1999, pp. 22–39); McGarry and O’Leary (1999, pp. 97–114) 18. Police officers risk incurring two types of hassle: ‘‘on-the-job trouble’’, i.e., ‘‘problematic encounters, incidents and tasks that police officers are routinely called on to deal with’’; and ‘‘in-the-job trouble’’, which ‘‘arises from the officer’s relationship with the police and criminal justice bureaucracies and usually entails the need to account for one’s action and avoid the possibility of ‘‘comeback’’.’’ (Waddington, 1998, p. 119)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my supervisors at the University of Reading, Tank Waddington and Roberto Franzosi, for their invaluable encouragement and support with this project. Lorenzo Bosi, Andy Buck and the three anonymous reviewers have provided extremely helpful comments and advices on previous versions of this paper. Finally, thanks to Mel Steptoe for editing the final draft.
REFERENCES Atkinson, J. M., & Drew, P. (1979). Order in court: The organization of verbal interaction in judicial settings. London: Macmillan. Bosi, L. (2006). The dynamics of social movement development: Northern Ireland’s civil rights movement in the 1960s. Mobilization: An International Journal, 11(1), 41–60. Brewer, J. D. (1991). Policing in divided society: Theorising a type of policing. Policing and Society, 1, 179–191. Cameron Report. (1969). Disturbances in Northern Ireland. Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland. Cmnd. 532, Belfast: HMSO. della Porta, D. (1995). Social movements, political violence, and the state. A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. della Porta, D. (1998). Police knowledge and protest policing: Some reflection on the Italian case. In: D. della Porta & H. Reiter (Eds), Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies (pp. 228–252). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. della Porta, D., & Diani, M. (2005). Social movements. An introduction (2nd ed). Oxford: Blackwell. della Porta, D., Peterson, A., & Reiter, H. (Eds) (2007). The policing of transnational protest. Burlington: Ashgate. della Porta, D., & Reiter, H. (Eds) (1998). Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Dixon, P. (2001). Northern Ireland. The politics of war and peace. New York: Palgrave. Drew, P. (1978). Accusations: The occasioned use of members’ knowledge of ‘Religious Geography’ in describing events. Sociology, 12(1), 1–22.
86
GIANLUCA DE FAZIO
Earl, J., Soule, S. A., & McCarthy, J. D. (2003). Protest under fire? Explaining the policing of protest. American Sociological Review, 68(4), 581–606. Ellison, G. (1997). ‘‘Professionalism in the Royal Ulster Constabulary: An examination of the institutional discourse.’’ Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ulster. Ellison, G., & Martin, G. (2000). Policing, collective action and social movement theory: The case of Northern Ireland civil rights campaign. British Journal of Sociology, 51(4), 681–699. Ellison, G., & Smyth, J. (2000). The crowned harp: Policing Northern Ireland. London: Pluto Press. Ericson, R., & Doyle, A. (1999). Globalization and the policing of protest: The case of APEC 1997. British Journal of Sociology, 50(4), 589–608. Fillieule, O., & Jobard, F. (1998). The policing of protest in France: Toward a model of protest policing. In: D. della Porta & H. Reiter (Eds), Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in Western democracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Gamson, W. (1975). The strategy of social protest. Homewood: Dorsey Press. Gillham, P., & Marx, G. T. (2000). Complexity and irony in policing and protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle. Social Justice, 27(2), 212–236. Hillyard, P., & Tomlinson, M. (2000). Patterns of policing and policing patten. Journal of Law and Society, 27(3), 394–415. Hunt Report. 1969. Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland. Cmnd. 535, Belfast: HMSO. Jefferson, T. (1990). The case against paramilitary policing. Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Jenkins, J. C., & Klandermans, B. (Eds) (1995). The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Le Bon, G. (1895). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: T. Fisher Unwin. Lee, J. J. (1989). Ireland 1912–1985 politics and society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mawby, R. C. (2002). Policing images: Policing, communication and legitimacy. Cullompton: Wintan. McAdam, D. (1983). Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency. American Sociological Review, 48(6), 735–754. McAdam, D. (1996). Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions. In: D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy & M. N. Zald (Eds), Comparative perspectives on social movements. Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (pp. 23–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (1995). Explaining Northern Ireland. Broken images. Oxford: Blackwell. McGarry, J., & O’Leary, B. (1999). Policing Northern Ireland. Proposal for a new start. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. McPhail, C. (1991). The myth of the madding crowd. New York: A. de Gruyter. McPhail, C., & McCarthy, J. D. (2005). Protest mobilization, protest repression, and their interaction. In: C. Davenport, H. Johnston & . Mueller (Eds), Repression and mobilization (pp. 3–32). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Police Knowledge Revised
87
McPhail, C., Schweingrubber, D., & McCarthy, J. D. (1998). Policing protest in the United States: 1960–1995. In: D. della Porta & H. Reiter (Eds), Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in western democracies (pp. 49–69). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. (2004). Conceptualizing political opportunity. Social Forces, 82(4), 1457–1492. Moore, L., & O’Rawe, M. (1997). Human rights on duty: Principles for better policing – international lessons for Northern Ireland. Belfast: Committee on the Administration of Justice. O´ Dochartaigh, N. (2005). From civil rights to Armalites: Derry and the birth of the Irish Troubles (2nd ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Patten Report. (1999). Report of the independent commission on policing in Northern Ireland. Belfast: HMSO. Purdie, B. (1990). Politics in the streets: The origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackwell. Reicher, S. (1984). The St. Paul’s riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14(1), 1–21. Scarman Report. (1972). Violence and civil disturbance in Northern Ireland in 1969. Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry. Cmnd. 566, Belfast: HMSO. Tarrow, S. (1994). Power in movement. Social movements, collective action and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement. Social movements and contentious politics (2nd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waddington, D., Jones, K., & Critcher, C. (1989). Flashpoints: Studies in public disorder. London: Routledge. Waddington, D., & King, M. (2005). The disorderly crowd: From classical psychological reductionism to socio-contextual theory – The impact on public order policing strategies. The Howard Journal, 44(5), 490–503. Waddington, P. A. J. (1994). Liberty and order: Policing public order in a capital city. London: UCL Press. Waddington, P. A. J. (1996). The other side of the barricades: Policing protest. In: C. Barker & P. Kennedy (Eds), To make another world: Studies in protest and collective action (pp. 219–236). Aldershot: Avebury. Waddington, P. A. J. (1998). Controlling protest in contemporary historical and comparative perspective. In: D. della Porta & D. Reiter (Eds), Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in western democracies (pp. 117–140). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Waddington, P. A. J. (1999). Policing citizens: Authority and rights. London: Routledge. Weitzer, R. (1995). Policing under fire. Ethnic conflict and police-community relations in Northern Ireland. New York: SUNY Press. Whyte, J. (1990). Interpreting Northern Ireland. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Winter, M. (1998). Police philosophy and protest policing in the federal republic of Germany, 1960–1990. In: D. della Porta & H. Reiter (Eds), Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in western democracies (pp. 188–212). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
RETHINKING NONVIOLENT ACTION AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS: POLITICAL CULTURES OF NONVIOLENT OPPOSITION IN THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT AND BRAZIL’S LANDLESS WORKERS MOVEMENT Sean Chabot and Stellan Vinthagen ABSTRACT The emerging synthesis between nonviolent action and contentious politics studies has yielded important insights. Yet it also reproduces the dichotomy between politics and culture that continues to haunt both fields. Extending recent work by Jean-Pierre Reed and John Foran, our contribution introduces the political cultures of nonviolent opposition concept to forge a new synthesis, one that recognizes the politics of nonviolent culture and the culture of nonviolent politics. We apply our theoretical framework to two empirical cases, the Indian independence movement and the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil (known as Movimento Sem Terra or MST), and conclude with ideas for further research on political cultures of nonviolent opposition. Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Volume 27, 91–121 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0163-786X/doi:10.1016/S0163-786X(06)27004-6
91
92
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
INTRODUCTION As peaceful social movements continue to exert powerful influence on governments and societies throughout the world, scholars focusing on nonviolent action and contentious politics increasingly realize that they have much to learn from each other. Informed by previous attempts at synthesis, Kurt Schock’s (2005) Unarmed Insurrections breaks new ground in merging nonviolent action and contentious politics studies. While cross-fertilization started during the 1990s (Sommer, 2000; McAdam & Tarrow, 2000; Zunes, Kurtz, & Beth, 1999; Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; McCarthy & Kruegler, 1993), Schock is the first to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework based on key statements and debates in both fields. The purpose of our contribution to this volume is to extend – and where necessary revise – Schock’s work, and apply our own approach to the Indian independence movement and the contemporary landless workers movement in Brazil (Movimento Sem Terra or MST). Although we appreciate the analytical clarity and empirical applicability of Unarmed Insurrections, we also feel it reproduces serious blind spots in nonviolent action and contentious politics studies. In our view, both areas of research tend to rely on dichotomies between politics and culture, which constrain explorations of intersections between these domains. Following the perspective of Gene Sharp, the undisputed pioneer in the field, nonviolent action scholars generally base their theories on socialscientific distinctions between rational choice and ethical behavior, objective explanations and subjective interpretations, and especially strategic interests and moral values. Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action, for instance, states at the outset that he will focus on nonviolent action as a political technique rather than a cultural way of life: ‘‘[R]elationships between this technique and ethical problems, and between the technique and belief systems exhorting to nonviolent behavior, are for the most part not discussed here’’ (Sharp, 1973, p. vi, 1990, p. 2). His successors generally adopt the same theoretical perspective, treating ‘‘pragmatic’’ and ‘‘principled’’ nonviolent action as separate protest techniques, and politics and culture as separate domains (Schock, 2005, pp. 36–37; Burrowes, 1996, p. 100). Such binaries lead scholars to underestimate the culture of nonviolent politics, the politics of nonviolent culture, and connections between them. Although they now pay more attention to cultural processes than in the past, leading contentious politics scholars continue to build their arguments on categorical oppositions, treating culture as a mediator between political institutions and collective action (Williams, 1977, p. 99). Take, for instance,
Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition
93
the latest dynamics of contention model developed by Doug McAdam, one of the field’s most influential scholars. It assigns more importance to cultural mechanisms like identity formation and meaning-making than McAdam’s (1982) old political process model, but still conceives of them as setting the stage for organized political action and governmental reform – not as politically significant in their own right (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004, p. 211). While we recognize that politics and culture should not be conflated, we suggest that students of contentious politics should pay more attention to the interplay between these spheres of social life. We are not alone in raising this crucial theoretical issue. Particularly within the contentious politics field, scholars are increasingly contesting the structuralist bias of prominent figures like McAdam and his collaborators, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, challenging them to take the politicsculture nexus more seriously (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). In Rethinking Social Movements, for example, Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2004) initiate a debate about the mediation model of culture and include important statements from both sides of the argument (see also Reed, 2005; Duncombe, 2002; Mansbridge & Morris, 2001; Buechler, 1999; Alvarez, Dagnino, & Escobar, 1998). But while their collected volume confirms that the field is in flux, it does not offer a concrete alternative to the theoretical framework favored by researchers like McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly. In our opinion, the most promising recent work in this regard comes from JeanPierre Reed and John Foran (2002), who propose the new concept ‘‘political cultures of opposition’’ as a way to explore the fertile ground between politics and culture. As sociology of revolution specialists, Reed and Foran are on the margins of the contentious politics field, but we feel that their concept allows us to rethink linkages with nonviolent action scholarship, particularly in the cases of the Indian independence movement and the MST in Brazil. The following section introduces a new concept for studying nonviolent action and contentious politics, ‘‘political cultures of nonviolent opposition,’’ based on the theoretical efforts of Reed and Foran. This concept allows for a new synthesis that moves beyond current culture-politics dichotomies and relies on an alternative view of power. The third section examines the four elements shaping political cultures of nonviolent opposition – emotional experiences, cultural idioms, ideologies, and organizational structures – in the Indian independence movement led by Gandhi and the ongoing MST in Brazil. It suggests that some nonviolent social movements should be seen as both pragmatic and principled, both political and cultural, rather than either one or the other. To conclude, we show how the elements discussed in the previous section intersect and connect with specific political
94
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
cultures of nonviolent opposition, and suggest several areas for further research.
POLITICAL CULTURES OF NONVIOLENT OPPOSITION IN THEORY The theoretical framework developed by Reed and Foran (2002) is a solid basis for constructing a new synthesis of nonviolent action and contentious politics studies – a synthesis that does not reproduce the politics-culture binary. Reed and Foran’s concept of political cultures of opposition is innovative in several ways. First of all, it avoids the connotations of the conventional political culture concept, popularized by American political scientists during the 1960s, which aimed at categorizing entire societies as ‘‘traditional’’ or ‘‘modern,’’ according to the dominant institutions and values of Western democracies (e.g., Pye & Verba, 1965; Almond & Verba, 1963). In contrast, Reed and Foran (2002, pp. 338–339) seek to capture ‘‘the plurivocal and potentially radical ways of understanding one’s circumstances that various groups within a society sometimes articulate to make sense of the political and economic changes they are living through.’’ They emphasize, moreover, that each society – whether Western or non-Western – may contain multiple oppositional ways of understanding. Secondly, Reed and Foran move beyond the American sociology of culture tradition by incorporating the distinctive insights of scholars like Ann Swidler (1986), William Sewell (1985), Theda Skocpol (1985), and James Scott (1990) into one complex theoretical framework, and by emphasizing the oppositional potential of the amalgam of emotional experiences, cultural idioms, ideologies, and organizational structures. More specifically, Reed and Foran propose that emotional experiences, cultural idioms, ideologies, and organizational structures may come together in the form of political cultures of opposition, which in turn may allow broad coalitions of contentious actors (across class, race, and/or gender identities) to initiate and sustain social movements or revolutions (Reed & Foran, 2002, pp. 339–340). Fig. 1 displays how, in specific situations, political cultures of opposition draw on, and in turn shape, diverse cultural products and processes. The solid lines indicate direct relationships, while the dotted lines refer to more indirect linkages between ideologies and emotional experiences as well as between cultural idioms and organizational structures. All connections with the central element – political cultures of opposition – fluctuate and may be
Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition
95
Ideologies
Emotional experiences
Political cultures of opposition
Organizational structures
Cultural idioms
Fig. 1.
The Role of Culture in the Making of Social Movements and Revolutions.
reciprocal (Reed & Foran, 2002, p. 340; see also Foran, 2005, p. 21). Reed and Foran apply this framework to the Revolution in Nicaragua that led to the overthrow of the Somoza regime in 1979. They show, among other things, that the political culture of Sandanismo emerged from and affected a complex combination of cultural influences: (1) an ideological mixture of Marxism and Sandino’s writings; (2) folkloric cultural idioms of social justice, nationalism, democracy, and Christian values; (3) subjective experiences of dictatorship and exploitation as well as emotions of patriotic love, anger at the Somoza regime, and popular solidarity; and (4) organizational structures of the Sandanista Front for National Liberation (FLSN) and a broad multi-class alliance (Reed & Foran, 2002, pp. 351–360). This fluid and temporary amalgam of political-cultural forces helped catalyze and propel the Sandanista Revolution during the late 1970s. Building on Reed and Foran’s groundbreaking work, we propose the concept of political cultures of nonviolent opposition and suggest that it allows us to synthesize nonviolent action and contentious politics scholarship without perpetuating unnecessary barriers between political and cultural processes. While we accept the way Reed and Foran perceive politicalcultural dynamics, we focus on one particular form of collective struggle: nonviolent opposition. Before we proceed, therefore, let us clarify what we mean by nonviolence. Like Sharp (1973, p. 64), most contemporary scholars define nonviolence as the absence of intentional physical harm to other people and nonviolent action as a pragmatic technique for challenging authorities through indirect resistance or direct intervention. But such ‘‘negative nonviolence’’ only precludes visible and interpersonal violence; it does not target the
96
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
institutionalized forms of violence that are embedded in a society’s patterns of interaction and cultural practices. In contrast, we use the term nonviolent opposition to refer to ‘‘positive nonviolence’’ against structures of oppression – such as colonialism, economic exclusion, racism, homophobia, and sexism – that are deeply rooted in collective ways of life (Galtung, 1969, p. 183). Positive nonviolence combines love for self, other human beings, and communities, on the one hand, with nonviolent action campaigns against unjust laws, authorities, and institutions, on the other. It requires commitment to moral principles like (1) maintaining courage in the face of repression; (2) seeking reconciliation with, rather than defeat of, opponents; (3) attacking oppressive systems instead of oppressors; (4) accepting self-suffering without causing harm to others; (5) rejecting physical means of violence; and (6) retaining hope that social justice is possible. But it also promotes contentious interaction in public life according to specific strategic guidelines: (1) carefully research and analyze oppressive situations before organizing protest campaigns; (2) educate state actors and the public about the issues at stake; (3) prepare for the spiritual, mental, and practical challenges of nonviolent activism; (4) keep lines of communication with authorities, bystanders, and fellow activists open; (5) when negotiations fail, engage in nonviolent direct action by applying methods like mass marches, boycotts, and sit-ins; and (6) create alternative institutions and ‘‘beloved communities’’ in which social differences no longer produce structural violence and oppression (Bondurant, 1971; King, 1967; Shridharani, 1939; Gregg, 1935). Contrary to Sharp, therefore, we argue that the transformative potential of nonviolent opposition is greatest when moral principles and instrumental strategies, grassroots community building and dramatic protest campaigns, as well as cultural resistance and state-centered politics reinforce each other (see Reed, 2005, pp. 286–315; Duncombe, 2002, pp. 5–9; Buechler, 2000, pp. 163–164). Our approach to nonviolence and nonviolent opposition reflects an alternative understanding of power in the modern world. Social scientists commonly follow Weber in assuming that power derives from the legitimacy to use violence and coercion possessed by those controlling the state, who can ‘‘realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others’’ (Weber, 1946, p. 180). For example, Sharp (1973, p. 7) begins with the ability of individuals or groups to wield power ‘‘for political objectives, especially by governmental institutions or by people in opposition to or in support of such institutions.’’ He then argues that political power primarily relies on the consent of ordinary citizens, who can always decide
Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition
97
to withdraw their obedience and organize effective nonviolent action against tyrannical governments, if they have the necessary will, courage, and knowledge (Sharp, 1973, pp. 8–16, 25–32, 38, 1990, p. 3). Contentious politics scholars, in contrast, usually avoid the individualism and voluntarism of Sharp’s view and prefer structural theories of power emphasizing the struggle between dominant political institutions and mobilized protest organizations (see also Lukes, 2005; Vinthagen, 2005; Foucault, 2004; Burrowes, 1996; McGuinness, 1993; Martin, 1989). But they generally accept Weber’s notion that power is a zero-sum game in which one group’s gain is another group’s loss. We agree with Seth Kreisberg (1992), however, that power can also be a constructive force for personal growth, dialogue, cooperation, and liberation – a force that benefits individuals, groups, and communities throughout society. While the Weberian perspective highlights how the dominant have power over the dominated, our perspective emphasizes that positive nonviolence may transform oppressive situations into settings promoting power with, where people with different positions in systems of oppression ‘‘can fulfill their needs and develop their capacities not at the expense of others but by acting in concert with others’’ (Kreisberg, 1992, p. 84). Instead of taking for granted that the struggle for power necessarily involves irreconcilable conflicts between winners (oppressors) and losers (oppressed), therefore, we allow for the possibility that power can expand, enabling people and social groups with diverse national, racial, class, or sexual identities to work together toward common goals. Drawing on these alternative conceptualizations of nonviolence and power, we argue that political cultures of nonviolent opposition are meaningful when they transform human relationships defined by domination into human relationships defined by love, dialogue, and cooperation. The purpose of political cultures of nonviolent opposition, moreover, is not merely to take over control of states – and replace one tyranny with another – but to expand the power to promote social justice within states, between states and societies, within societies, and between societies. To illustrate the theoretical and empirical relevance of our concept, we will apply it to two cases that are usually studied separately. While the Indian independence movement is a common reference for students of nonviolent action, scholars generally do not consider the contemporary landless workers movement in Brazil (MST) to be a nonviolent social movement. But although MST activists do not use the same terminology as Gandhian activists, the analysis below demonstrates that their political culture of opposition is no less nonviolent in practice.
98
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
POLITICAL CULTURES OF NONVIOLENT OPPOSITION IN PRACTICE In our comparison of political cultures of nonviolent opposition in the Indian independence movement and Brazil’s MST, we do not claim to offer new evidence or comprehensive analysis. By applying and extending the theoretical framework proposed by Reed and Foran (2002), however, we provide new insights into the practical realities of the politics of nonviolent culture, the culture of nonviolent politics, and intersections between them. For each social movement, we will briefly illustrate how under certain circumstances emotional experiences, cultural idioms, ideologies, and organizational structures came together to produce a political culture of nonviolent opposition (see also Foran, 2005, pp. 18–24). As indicated in Fig. 1, linkages between emotional experiences and cultural idioms, and between ideologies and organizational structures, were more direct and visible than those between emotional experiences and ideologies, and between organizational structures and cultural idioms. Each element’s connection to the political culture of nonviolent opposition, moreover, was immediate and explicit. We emphasize, though, that the evolving relationships between elements – not the nature of each element in itself – and the ever-changing social contexts of these relationships enabled the formation of political cultures of nonviolent opposition. How actors actually constructed such relationships and responded to their social contexts was unpredictable and partly depended on their creativity and effort. We now turn to an empirical examination of these causal dynamics in our two cases. Emotional Experiences During the Indian independence movement, which grew into a nationwide phenomenon after World War I, the Indian population experienced the structural oppression of colonialism on a daily basis. But there was one transformative event – the massacre in Amritsar – that drew widespread public attention to the underlying brutality of British rule, inciting emotions of righteous anger and disgust at the imperial government among men and women from diverse religions, ethnic groups, and castes (Sewell, 1996). On April 13, 1919, British General Dyer, who had recently taken over military command in Amritsar, ordered his soldiers to open fire on a crowd of peaceful demonstrators, who had gathered in the park of Jallianwala Bagh to express support for the Anti-Rowlatt Bill campaign led by Gandhi, which
Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition
99
opposed restrictions on civil liberties (Fein, 1977, pp. 24–30; Furneaux, 1963, pp. 33–47). Dyer told his troops to aim at the areas where most people had congregated and particularly at the demonstrators who were desperately trying to climb over the walls surrounding the park. The firing lasted for about 6 minutes, killing hundreds of adults and children – mostly from gunshot wounds in the back – and injuring more than 1,200. The general refused to arrange for medical assistance after the massacre and later declared that he wanted to send a moral message to all Indian nationalists and show them that resistance against the British Empire was seditious and futile (Draper, 1985, p. 155). After this horrific event, the British Raj tried to contain the negative publicity in India and abroad by appointing Lord Hunter to lead a committee to investigate the matter. But to prevent a cover-up, Indian nationalists organized their own committee, with Gandhi as a prominent member, and published their own report. The Hunter Committee’s report resulted in Dyer’s early retirement, but it did not accuse him or other Punjab authorities of criminal misconduct (Fein, 1977, p. 184). The report of the Indian National Congress, in contrast, was a harsh indictment of General Dyer, the Punjabi government, and the British Viceroy. Based on verbal evidence provided by authorities, interviews with 1,700 witnesses, and dramatic photographs of the victims, it condemned the general for his ‘‘calculated piece of inhumanity towards utterly innocent and unarmed men, including children’’ and argued that the Viceroy ‘‘clothed the officials [in Punjab] with indemnity in indecent haste’’ (Draper, 1985, pp. 201–202). The emotional impact of the Amritsar massacre, the Hunter Committee’s failure to punish responsible parties, and the independent report by Indian nationalists on the political consciousness of the Indian population was dramatic, widespread, and lasting. In response to their feelings of anger and fear, people who had previously remained on the sidelines now joined the Indian independence movement in the hope of building a less oppressive society. Nationalist leaders who had earlier called for political reforms and dominion status now demanded complete autonomy from the British Empire. Motivated by indignation, Gandhi himself – like other prominent figures in India – publicly renounced his loyalty to the British Empire, returned the medals he had received for his contributions during World War I, and fully committed to the struggle to end British rule in India (Chabot, 2003, p. 50; Andrews, 1930, p. 230). The MST in Brazil fights structural oppression caused by economic marginalization, agrarian modernization, unequal distribution of land, and neoliberal globalization rather than colonialism. As with the Indian
100
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
independence movement, however, there is a transformative event in the MST’s history that has had a powerful influence on activists’ emotional experiences of social injustice and on the expansion of the social movement. On April 17, 1996, 1,500 MST activists were blocking a highway in the state of Para´, near Eldorado dos Caraja´s, to challenge the government’s refusal to settle families occupying land on the Macaxeira plantation. Late in the afternoon, 155 military police troops arrived at the site and surrounded the demonstrators. Then, around 4:30 p.m., they began firing on the unarmed crowd of men, women, and children with machine guns and rifles. The MST activists tried to run away, but by the time the shooting stopped hundreds of bodies lay on the road, with 19 dead and 57 seriously injured. The local media later quoted Mario Collares Pantoja, the military police’s commander on that day, as saying: ‘‘Mission complete. Nobody saw anything’’ (Branford & Rocha, 2002, p. 142). But the commander was not aware that someone had captured most of the violence on video camera. This footage later appeared on television and caused a public outcry in Brazil and abroad. Among other things, it showed that at least 10 of the dead activists had been executed with bullets in the head and neck, while 7 others had been killed with a machete. Several days later, moreover, a witness testified that local landowners had bribed the police to kill prominent MST leaders and end the protest campaign (Branford & Rocha, 2002, pp. 139–147; Wright & Wolford, 2003, p. 208). In response to the massacre of Eldorado de Caraja´s, the outrage of Brazilian citizens, and pressure by international human rights organizations, president Cardoso appeared on Brazilian television, calling for punishment of those involved and allowing the families on the Macaxeira estate to settle and set up the Formosa camp. But the federal government had little influence on state authorities in Para´, who continued to defend the position of the landowners and refused to assist survivors of the massacre. Initially, none of the landowners or military police officers involved faced legal repercussions. An internal investigation in 1996 by the Para´ state police found the 155 troops innocent, while a jury acquitted commander Pantoja and his superiors for lack of evidence in 1999 (Branford & Rocha, 2002, pp. 145–147). This decision was overturned, however, and in 2002 two of the responsible police officers received long jail terms (Wright & Wolford, 2003, p. 209). At first, the moral shock (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995) of the Eldorado de Caraja´s tragedy made MST activists sad and fearful of more brutal repression by military police troops and paramilitary forces hired by landowners. But, buoyed by growing support for landless workers and the MST
Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition
101
throughout Brazil, they translated their anger and anxiety into greater commitment to their struggle for land occupations, agrarian reform, and social justice than before (Branford & Rocha, 2002, pp. 144–147). Since 1996, MST activists have commemorated the anniversary of the massacre of Eldorado de Caraja´s and constructed several monuments to the memory of those who lost their lives (Wright & Wolford, 2003, p. 209). The emotional resonance of this transformative event remains a powerful force for the MST, as it continues to expand its activities and networks both within and outside of Brazil.
Cultural Idioms To channel and tap into popular emotions, participants in the Indian independence movement invoked folkloric language from India’s past. As the primary symbolic and political leader, Gandhi was particularly important in selecting and reinventing a broad range of Indian traditions with relevance for the struggle against British rule. Here we will just highlight four significant Hindu terms that Gandhi popularized and reinterpreted to draw upon and radicalize existing principles, beliefs, practices, values, and narratives. The first term, swadeshi, refers to a traditional way of life based on economic self-reliance, local production, and fulfillment of basic human needs. According to Gandhi, Western industrialization and modernization were fundamentally flawed, because they encouraged people to focus on selfish interests and widened the gap between rich and poor. With the familiar notion of swadeshi, he suggested that the rural village should once again become central in Indian society, because it would provide the largest proportion of the population – the wealthy as well as the destitute – with moral purpose, self-discipline, and means of survival (Hardiman, 2003, pp. 77–78; Terchek, 1998, pp. 112–114; Fox, 1989, pp. 46–47, 54–59). Without widespread access to employment and necessary material resources, the Indian independence movement would fail to bring liberation for the most oppressed people in the country. The second term, sarvodaya, emphasized commitment to serving the poor and marginalized – not just oneself or one’s family – as a way to promote public welfare. To put this traditional Hindu ideal into practice, Gandhi developed a social reform program that called on activists in the Indian independence movement to work toward stimulating Hindu–Muslim unity; fighting poverty, disease, and illiteracy; ending untouchability and the caste system; and improving the conditions of women. He devoted his life to such
102
SEAN CHABOT AND STELLAN VINTHAGEN
community-building activities and made clear that ending British rule would be meaningless without the inclusion and autonomy of all Indian citizens (Nojeim, 2004, pp. 110–119; Fox, 1989, pp. 42–44). The third term, aparigraha, reflected the common belief in Hinduism and other religions that the desire to own ever more property and material things was sinful and eventually produced violence. For Gandhi, leading a simple life based on autonomy, self-control, discipline, and hard work was the best way to prepare for the mental, physical, and spiritual challenges faced by participants in the struggle for national independence (Terchek, 1998, pp. 40–42; Fox, 1989, pp. 44–45). This meant that owners of land and capital should use their wealth for the benefit of society and provide for the social welfare of their workers (Hardiman, 2003, pp. 83–84). It also implied that both privileged and poor Indian activists had to learn how to overcome earthly desires – for prosperity, technology, food, sex, or glory – before they could contribute positively to the Indian independence movement (Nojeim, 2004, pp. 107–110). The symbol that synthesized these traditional ideas, and captured their practical significance, was khadi or hand-spinning. Gandhi argued that modern technology only contributes to social welfare when it allows the majority of people to work, meet basic human needs, and participate in decisions concerning labor conditions. Most Indians living under colonial rule, however, did not experience the benefits of the industrial machinery introduced by the British. Especially in the countryside, the number of unemployed and destitute was staggering, which undermined the nation’s sense of hope and community spirit. Gandhi felt that promoting khadi, a typically Indian production process, would allow the poor Indian masses to regain their sense of pride, take control of their material welfare, and help build a new society based on the autonomy of