Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City

PUBLISHED IY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDOE

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o Cambridge UniYenity Press 1987 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and 10 the provisions of relevanl collective I~nsing qreemenls. no reproduction of any part may take place withoul the wrillen pcrmiuion or Cambridge University Press.

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Firsl published 1987 First paperback edition 2002

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A (ala/ogut rtcordfor Ihis book is aWJi/ab/r from 1M Brilish Library Library of Congr,n Cala/op/llg III Pub/iral/oll do,a Herman, Gabriel. Ritualised friendship and the Greek city. BibiiOiraphy. Includes index. I. Greece - Social life and customs. 2. Friendship - Greece. I. Tille. DF78.H47 1986 302.3'09495 86-4211 ISBN 0521 32541 2 hardback ISBN 0 521 52210 2 paperback

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CONTENTS page

List of tables List of figures Preface Abbreviations

IX XI XIII

1

1 INTRODUCTION 2

IX

RITUALISED FRIENDSHIP

1 2 3 4 5 6

Definition The Evidence Features Shared With Kinship Features Shared With Friendship The Cross-Cultural Perspective Social Status

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THE CIRCULATION OF RESOURCES

1 The Pattern of Exchanges 2 The Good Gift and the Bad 3 Natural Products 4 Valuables 5 Troops 6 Estates S

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1 The Etiquette 2 Preliminaries 3 Supplication 4 The Initiation Ritual 5 Continuity

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ENCOUNTER AND INITIATION

73 75 82 88 97 106

OBLIGATIONS: HEROIC AND CIVIC

1 'What Alkibiades Did and Suffered' 2 The Nature of the Obligation 3 Services 4 Xenia and Proxen;a VII

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Contents

5 Followers, Factions, and the City 6 Treason and Patriotism

142 156

CONCLUSION

162

APPENDIX A:

Xenoi. Idioxenoi. and Doryxenoi APPENDIX B: Xenia, Proxen;a. and Citizenship APPENDIX C: Networks during the Peloponnesian War

166 176 179

Bibliography Indexes

185 196

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TABLES 1 2

3

85 99 109

Supply of Natural Products Cyrus' xenoi Grants of Landed Estates

FIGURES 1 1a

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3 3a 3b 4

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6

The xenos as a foster-father Attic red-figure vase. Paris, Louvre G186. Woodcut: JHS I (1880) 138 fig. 4, reproduced by permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library 24 Attic black-figure vasco London, British Museum 8620. Drawing: P.V.C. Braur, Centaurs in Ancient Art (Berlin, 1912) fig. 25 24 Attic black-figure vase. Naples, Musco Nazionale, Collezione Santan-gelo 160. Photo: Fotografia Foglia 25 Attic red-figure vasco Paris, Louvre G3. Photo: Chuzevillc 25 27 Ritual services Attic red-figure vase. Palermo, Musco Nazionale V 702 (1503). Photo: Hirmer Fotoarchiv Social status Antiochos of Commagene shaking hands with Apollo. Gaziantep Museum. Photo: Jorg Wagner 37 Antiochos of Commagene shaking hands with Herakles. Eskikale. 37 Photo: British Institute of Archaeology, Ankara A non-Hellenic institution? 51 Relief from the throne base of Shalmaneser III. Nimrud. M.E.L. Mallowan, Nimrud and its Remains Vol 2, p. 444. Photo: Courtesy of Lady Mallowan The ritual handshake 52 Attic black-figure vase. London, British Museum 8226. Photo: Courtesy of the Trustees Communal symbo/on 53 Right hand of bronze, bearing an inscription. E. Babelon, CAtalogue des bronzes antiques de fa bibliotheque nationale (Paris, 1895) no. 1065. Photo: Bibliotheque nationale IX

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List of Illustrations

Consubstanriality Scythian gold object. Leningrad, Hermitage. Photo: Hermitage Terracotta symbola from Athens 8 8a-c Terracotta plaques. Athens, Agora Museum. Photo: American School of Classical Studies at Athens: Agora Excavations 8d Terracotta plaque. Athens, Agora Museum. Drawing: IG 12 916 Ivory symbolon 9 Ivory object. Palermo, Museo nazionale. Photo: Museum Persian symb%n 10 Persian pot. London, British Museum. Photo: Counesy of the Trustees 11 Proxenia and xenia Athenian decree in honour of Oiniades. Athens, Epigraphical Museum 6796. Photo: TAP, Athens The city as xenos 12 Relief. Athens, Acropolis Museum 2994. Photo: TAP, Athens The demos mourns a proxenos 13 Gravestone from the Kerameikos cemetery. Photo: DAI, Athens The proxenos as a foster-child 14 Relief. Athens, Acropolis Museum 2994. Photo: TAP, Athens Xenia and treason 15 Two ostraka from Athens I5a A. E. Raubitschek, Charites, Festschrift Lang/ott (Bonn, 1957), 240 15b G.A. Stamires and E. Vanderpool, H~speria 19 (1950) 390

55

62 62 64 67

133

134 136 137

158 158

PREFACE This book owes its origin to a sudden realisation that a ubiquitous and pervasive aspect of Greek civic life had somehow been left out of modern accounts - an aspect which I have come to call 'ritualised friendship'. But how was one to grasp this elusive phenomenon? The clue came from a book which was not, strictly speaking, about the Greek city: Sir Moses Finley's The World of Odysseus. I am very grateful to Sir Moses for having encouraged me to pursue this idea and for having supplied, as the supervisor of my doctoral dissenation, unequalled inspiration and criticism. To those familiar with his work, my indebtedness to him must be evident from every page of this book. Moreover, on one issue - the 'historicity' of Homeric societymy findings proved to be so consistent with his views that I have decided, after serious consideration, not to refer to rival interpretations. I also owe a special debt of gratitude to three friends, Dr Peter Garnsey, Professor Richard Saller and Professor Brent Shaw, who in numerous helpful discussions over sustained periods exercised a crucial influence on my thinking. My warm thanks go to the examiners of the dissertation, Dr Paul Cartledge and Professor Frank Walbank, for saving me from several errors and for making many valuable suggestions. Thanks are also due to teachers, colleagues and friends, both from home and abroad, for comments and reactions which made it easier for me to reconsider certain issues: Professor Moshe Amit, Professor David Asheri, Professor David Cohen, Professor Arnaldo Momigliano, Dr Simon Price, Professor Israel Shatzman, Professor Anthony Snodgrass and Dr Dorothy Thompson. As usual, none of them is to be blamed for my errors. For help in improving the text, which was far beyond editorial, I am greatly indebted to Jane Kenrick. For help in operating Phoenix, I would like to thank Dr Miri Rubin and Dr Platon Tinios. Last, but not the least, I should express my deep appreciation to my wife Ora for her patience during four-odd years which for her, I know, were not the easiest. My studies in Cambridge have been made possible by generous grants from the Hebrew University, Jerusalem (the Philip and Muriel Berman Fellowship) and Darwin College, Cambridge, of which I became a member. I also had the honour of being elected to a Leo Baeck Scholarship, an Aylwin Cotton Fellowship, and a Humanitarian Trust grant, awards which in difficult times made it possible to continue the research. Finally, I would

XI

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Preface

like to thank the Faculty of Classics, Cambridge, for a grant to prepare the typeSCript for press.

}trusalmt September 1985

G.H.

1 INTRODUCTION Two mighty heroes of the Homeric Iliad, Diomedes and Glaukos, were about to engage in fierce combat when they suddenly came to recognise that. their grandfathers were bound by xenia. Xenia (xen;e, xe;ne;e or xe;n;e in various dialects) was the Greek term for a social institution which, in the absence of a familiar parallel, historians today render by the awkward neologism 'guest-friendship'. Diomedes was pleasantly surprised at the revelation, drove his spear into the earth, and spoke to his former rival in a friendly tone, saying, among other things: ...Therefore I am your friend and host (xeinos phi/os) in the heart of Argos; you are mine in lykia, when I come to your country. let us avoid each other's spears, even in close fighting. There are plenty of Trojans and famed companions in battle for me to kill, whom the gods send me, or those I run down with my swift feet, many Achaians for you to slaughter, if you can do it. But let us exchange our armour, so that these others may know how we claim to be guests and friends from the days of our fathers (xeinoi patroior). I

Later on, in the Classical world of the cities, diametrically opposed views could be pronounced on precisely the same issue. In the course of a Spartan campaign in Asia Minor in 394 B.C., the Persian satrap Pharnabalos reproached King Agesilaos of Sparta for having ravaged his private estates. He complained that Agesilaos had breached the duties of friendship. For he, Pharnabazos, had been a friend and ally of Sparta, had provided her with money, and had fought on the side of Agesilaos against a common enemy. Agesilaos should have repaid him with favours instead of wronging him. The thirty Spartiatae who accompanied Agesilaos were filled with shame at hearing this rebuke. Agesilaos, however, by a stroke of diplomacy disclaimed all personal responsibility and pleaded force ma;eure: I think you know, Phamabazos, that in the Greek states, also, men become xenoi of one another. But these men, when their states come to war, fight with their fatherlands even against their xenoi, and if it so happens, sometimes even kill one another. And so we today, being at war with your king, are constrained to regard all that is his as hostile; as for yourself, however, we should prize it above everything to become friends (Phi/ot) of yours. 2 Iliad 6.224ff., rranslared by R. Lattimore, The Iliad of Homn' (1951). 2 Xenophon, HellnriC4 4.1.34-5; unless stared orherwise, all translations a~ adapted from the loeb serino I

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Only very rarely do ancient records offer such a point of vantage from which to observe perceptions of social obligations in worlds as different yet as intimately interconnected as the world of the epic poet and the world of the Greek city. Crudely, the contrast can be stated thus: Diomedes and Glaukos could exercise the rights and duties of guest-friendship freely. Agesilaos and Pharnabazos could not; they had to take into consideration a third, intrusive and disturbing factor, the polis. A more refined explanation of this contrast will introduce us to a set of problems inherent in the civic system from its very beginning and yet almost totally ignored in modem historical research. That the obligations of guest-friendship should be set above all other obligations was for the epic poet a part of the natural order of things. It was this assumption which allowed him to construct the situation that appears implausible to us: Diomedes and Glaukos would be friends, but their associates could continue fighting; they would avoid each other in battle, but might kill each other's fellow-warriors. There was nothing strange or immoral about this. For the poet, adherence to the code of guest-friendship was a supreme manifestation of the hero's free exercise of prowess. There was, in his world, neither overlord to demand feudal allegiance, nor communal group to claim social responsibility. The hero, the supreme pinnacle of a small social pyramid, was under no involuntary obligation to anyone; the guest-friendships he contracted were his own private affair. But the community tamed the hero, and transformed him into a citizen. The citizen was an entirely new creation - a social type subjected to compulsory regulations. It was this power of the community to restrict individual action that provided Agesilaos with his excuse. Agesilaos invoked the communal principle, the doctrine that obligations towards the community should override all other obligations. Civic obligations had come to take priority even over guest-friendship: xeno; who were citizens had to fight on behalf of their cities even at the risk of killing each other. This was an obligation of a totally different, hitherto unknown order. For, unlike the obligations of guest-friendship, which arose only from morality, civic obligations were legally enforceable. And guest-friends who were citizens could sometimes find themselves accused of treason, brought to trial, banished or executed. The one-time hero thus became trapped in a severe conflict - a conflict which could only be resolved by means of painful compromises. We are dealing not with isolated and peripheral exceptions, but with patterns recurring at the very heart of the civic system, conflicts from which ideas flowed and actions evolved. Both Agesilaos' argument, claiming prior-

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ity for the civic principle, and Phamabazos' bitter reproach, drawing its justification from a code of personal loyalty, find echoes in numerous examples from the world of the Greek polis itself. A few well-known cases will serve to demonstrate this proposition and pave the way for the formulation of the main arguments of this study. Perikles in 431 B.C. foresaw the Spartan invasion of Attica and thought it necessary to reassure the Athenian assembly that his personal bond of xenia with King Archidamos of Sparta would not be harmful to Athenian interests. He anticipated that the Spartan king might ravage most of Attica but spare his own estates, either as a favour to a xenos or as an act of malice intended to stir up prejudice against himself among the Athenian demos. To avoid such embarrassment, and a possible public scandal, which in turn could have jeopardised his position of leadership, Perikles converted his private estates into public property. 3 The other side of the coin - the dilemma which confronted King Archidamos - has not left such clear traces in the historical record. But, as we shall see (Section 5.5), it could not have been very different from the dilemma of his Athenian partner, even if his answer to it was somewhat different. Indeed, patriotism and guest-friendship would sometimes appear as antithetical principles structuring the dialectics of political rivalries. Demosthenes, for example, while priding himself on having preferred the common interest of Greece to the gifts and xenia of Philip of Macedon, accused Aeschines of having put his (that is, Aeschines') xenia and philia with Philip above the fate of the city." Two competing moral systems were involved: one archaic and pre-political, and the other stemming from the polis structure. It was by no means clear which one would exercise the stronger appeal on the minds of the citizens. Aeschines alleged - or perhaps insinuated that Demosthenes was guilty of an impious crime: in the name of the city, Demosthenes had arrested, tortured and put to death one of his own xenoi, a man whose only crime was to have come to Athens to purchase goods for the queen of Macedonia. Demosthenes retorted by saying that as a matter of fact the man was a Macedonian spy; by executing him, he had merely "held the city's salt as more important than the table of his own xenos". If we are to believe Aeschines, the citizens and foreigners in the assembly raised a cry of protest at this remark: the duties of guest-friendship were deemed more

, Thucydidcs 2.13. • Dmlosrhencs 18.109 (0,. Ih~ Crown) and 19.248 (De Fatsa ugatio,.e); d. Dmlosthmcs 18.284.

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binding than those of citizenship. 5 The law of Athens would seem in this respect distinct from the morals of its inhabitants. Is this a safe inference? Certainty is impossible: it cannot be ruled out that Aeschines, when commenting on the protest of the crowd, was lying. But there are other signs pointing to the same conclusion. Much still remains obscure about the fifth~entury treaty between the small Locrian states of Oeanthea and Chaleon concerning the procedures by which the citizens of Chaleon were to be judged in Oeanthea. 6 But one section of the inscription is sufficiently clear to allow a compelling interpretation. It provides that if the officials (xenodikai) trying the suit of a foreigner (xenos) from Chaleon disagree, the foreigner can select a new body of men from among the Oeantheans. Only one restriction is imposed on his freedom of choice: he may choose neither a proxenos of his own community nor a guest-friend (widioxenos) of his own to act as judges in his trial.? These men were excluded since, clearly, they were believed to be prejudiced in the foreigner's favour on account of their special relationships with him. And such favouritism was incompatible with the principles which governed communal life. Outside the city, or before the city arose, it was one of the most sacrosanct duties of a xenos to succour his partner in distress or misfortune. But now this duty clashed with the communal principle of justice, and the community had to assert its precedence lest its essential principles be subverted. The archaic morality of guest-friendship could not be reconciled with communal justice. The same conflict between old and new, individual and community, morality and law, guest-friendship and citizenship, would manifest itself in different guises in different situations. The Athenian Xenophon was invited by a guest-friend, the Boeotian Proxenos, to join the forces of Cyrus the younger and to become Cyrus' friend. But Socrates warned Xenophon that by becoming a friend of Cyrus, Xenophon might bring upon himself accusations of betrayal from his fellow-citizens. For Cyrus was known to have given the Spartans aid against Athens. Xenophon's dilemma could only be resolved by consulting the oracle at Delphi. In the end, of course, Xenophon joined Cyrus, and it was through this friendship that he became involved in

, Aeschines 3.22"·5 (Again't CU,iphorr) and Demo5thma 19.189·90 (D~ fa/sa Lqa·

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the adventures described in the Anabasis. But it was also because of this friendship that he was later exiled from his native Athens. 8 Even worse was the fate of Ismenias, the leader of the anti-Spartan faction in The~s. In 382 B.C., the Spartan Phoibidas, acting in concert with Ismenias' political rivals, effected a coup d'etat in Thebes and set up a government friendly to Sparta. But Phoibidas' action proved the cause of embarrassment for his home government. For one thing, the coup was an improvised move, carried out without authorisation from the Spartan po/is. For another, the forceful occupation of another state constituted a violation of the King's Peace of 386 B.C. of which Sparta herself was a signatory and according to which all Greek states, small and great, were to be autonomous. The occupation, however, proved of great practical value to Sparta, and these considerations had somehow to be brushed aside. A justification was therefore concocted post-factum. The Spartan assembly first let itself be persuaded by Ismenias' Theban opponent, Leontiades, that Thebes had been hostile to Sparta in the past, and that Ismenias was mainly responsible for this. This made it morally possible for the Lacedaemonians not to withdraw their garrison from Thebes and to bring Ismenias to trial. They set up a jury composed of three Lacedaemonian judges and one from each of the allied states. The charges brought against Ismenias were as follows: "that he co-operated with the barbarians; that he had become a xenos of the Persian to the detriment of Greece; that he had received a share of the money which came from the King; and that he and Androkleides were chiefly responsible for all the trouble and disorder in Greece". 9 The defence made by Ismenias failed to persuade the court; he was pronounced guilty, and put to death. Once again, the contrast with the Diomedes-Glaukos encounter is revealing. In the circumstances of that world, a similar incident would have been inconceivable. Even if we allow for a certain amount of idealisation and poetic distortion, we must concede that none of the factors involved in Ismenias' execution is present in the Homeric poems. Not only are they missing, but all we know of Homeric society would militate against any assumption of their existence. Any argument for the implausibility of the Diomedes-Glaukos episode would therefore have to demonstrate the exis• Xmophon. Anabasis J.1.4H.; d. Diogenes Laertius 2.58 (= Anthologia Palalina 7.98), quoting what appears to be a Corinthian funerary ~igram: "Albeit the countrymen of Kraunus and Kekrops condem~ thee, Xmophon. to exile on account of thy friend (philos) Cyrus. y~ hospitable Corinth wtlcomed thtt' For different interpr~ations of these pas· sages in modem research. sec below p. 15. n.14. 9 Xenophon. Hel/mic4 5.2.35. Whether or not Ismmias was guilry is irrdnoant to tht present argument.

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tenee in that world of a concept of communal interest; of a notion that the community is more important than the individual; of a principle of individual responsibility and accountability; of an agency capable of making and enforcing communal resolutions; and finally, of moral criteria by which guest-friendship can be judged to be 'bad'. In the world of the polis, such factors were actively involved in the shaping of events; in the world of the epic poet, they were totally absent. Homeric heroes seemed so completely assured of their dominance, and Homeric communities so completely paralysed in their helplessness, that effectual criticism of the former by the latter was totally out of the question. The transition from one world to the other was effected by a radical change in social organisation and the concentration of power. In brief, the rulers of the Homeric age were supplanted by self-regulating communities. But this change did not amount to a wholesale transformation. Both inside the city and even more outside it, older social groupings and archaic ideals maintained themselves alongside the new ones with remarkable tenacity. Our incidents form only a very partial reflection of this heritage. The evidence from the age of the cities is in fact replete with similar cases appearing under different guises. To explain the entire process we must formulate a theory which, by means of one simple assumption, will make sense of the hundreds of apparently disparate instances. The theory I propose is this. When during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. the contours of the city-state were gradually drawn, the ancient world was criss-crossed with an extensive network of personal alliances linking together all sorts of apolitical bodies (households. tribes, bands, etc.). The city framework superimposed itself upon this existing network - superimposed itself upon it, yet did not dissolve it. And when the city finally became established as the dominant form of organisation, dense webs of guest-friendship still stretched beyond its bounds. Overtly or covertly, guest-friendship continued to act as a powerful bond between citizens of different cities and between citizens and members of various apolitical bodies. And by this persistence in the age of the cities, it became involved in actively shaping the value system of the polis and in formulating some of its most basic concepts and patterns of action. It is the aim of this study to explore the various facets, ramifications and consequences of the co-existence of the political communities and the archaic network of personal alliances. Several topics are brought into discussion in order to make this possible. Each follows logically from the one before, and draws on evidence from the period between Homer and the

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gradual conquest of the Greek world by the Romans. Some of these topics are so richly documented, and the documentation itself is sometimes so repetitive, that I see no point in citing all the evidence: my generalisations rest therefore on examples which I assume to be typical. Other topics are overlooked in modern research, and, if necessary for the argument, I produce a collection of the relevant material (see mainly the Appendices). In some rare cases I exceed the chronological boundaries defined above and refer to examples from the Roman world: there are no good grounds to believe that guest-friendship underwent significant changes even in this period. Below I outline the main topics. With one notable exception,1O what has traditionally been labelled in modern scholarship as 'guest-friendship' is beset with misapprehensions. I argue that xenia can be located within the wider category of social relations known to anthropologists as 'ritualised personal relations'. It will then appear that details which in the absence of a suitable model have bttn divorced from each other (for example, the ritual of initiation, the naming of one's son after one's xenos, the exchange of resources across political boundaries) are in fact different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. What emerges at the end of this enquiry is a social institution with clear boundaries, well-defined rules, and a remarkable degree of internal cohesion - an institution which appears at first sight queer and implausible but ceases to be so once we view it in the light of similar institutions from other cultures. Indeed, to contemporaries this institution seemed selfevident even to the extent that they employed it as a metaphor for expressing their perceptions of the world. One of the side issues pursued throughout this study is the logic underlying this symbolism (see mainly the Figures). I then explore the interaction between the city and guest-friendship at the level of ideas. Some of the most basic concepts of the city-state emerged out of the superimposition of the communal structure upon the pre-state networks of guest-friendship. For example, when seen from the perspective of the community, gift-exchange with an outsider - the essential characteristic of guest-friendship - could appear as bribery. The antithetical notion of abstinence from accepting gifts became the mark of the ideal citizen. To turn this negation of heroic virtues into a term of praise and to offer communal interest as a new standard of individual morality was probably one of the most significant victories of the community over the hero. The hero, however, remained in some respects untamed. The external ties of guestfriendship acted as a repository of heroic values, and disillusioned aristoc10

Finley (19n) looff.

8

Introduction

rats could always trust a friend abroad for assistance in their political struggles and refuge in defeat. Such behaviour, of course, appeared from the communal point of view as 'treachery'. Unlike its modem counterpart, however, the ancient concept of treachery was backed by a 'positive' ethos. The acts for which Alkibiades became known as the archetypal traitor in history were in fact consistent with the archaic, pre-state ideals of guestfriendship. Paradoxically, too, it was this archaic institution which provided the city with a model of its relationships with the outside world. The concepts, outlook and symbols of guest-friendship were transferred from the personal level to the level of the whole community and, invested with new meanings, they provided the city with a framework for interacting with foreign individuals and communities. Guest-friendship served as a device for the promotion of the material and political interests of the elites engaged in it. Individuals integrated into politically separated communities exchanged substantial amounts of wealth and performed significant services for each other. Once we reveal the dynamics of these networks, it becomes apparent that the elites of the ancient world were not confined to the boundaries of their immediate communities (whether this be a city, a tribe, a petty kingdom or a Persian satrapal court). On the contrary, they participated at one and the same time both in these networks and in their immediate communities. Power, prestige and resources that could be acquired through one system could readily be transferred to the other, and at times the horizontal ties of solidarity which linked together the elites of separate communities were stronger than the vertical ties which bound them to the inferiors within their own communities. Outside the city, guest-friendship functioned as a major device in the formation of the ruling circles of the great territorial empires. The Persian syngeneis, Macedonian hetairoi, and Hellenistic philo; were all composed of a narrow core of kin and a wide periphery of guest-friends drawn from an astonishing variety of localities. I explore the process of their recruitment, the structure of the new groups to which they gave rise, and the networks of agents through which they exercised their influence on the Greek city. I finally argue that the attacks of these groups on the Greek city were prompted by and large by the desire to satisfy the personal interests of the guest-friends involved in these groups. To be able to identify guest-friendship in its manifold manifestations, I propose to employ a rigorous definition. This definition will have to meet three requirements: first, it must encompass all the variants of the archaic bond - variants of which xenia is but one example; secondly, it must

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separate xenia from other, seemingly similar institutions, some of the qualities of which it shares; and, lastly, it must enable us to make controlled comparisons with similar institutions in other cultures. It is mainly in order to meet these requirements that it becomes necessary to introduce the concept of ritualised friendship.

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RITUALISED FRIENDSHIP 2.1 DEFINITION For analytical purposes ritualised friendship is here defined as a bond of solidarity manifesting itself in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate social units. This definition encompasses the most distinctive features of the institution and supplies criteria for postulating its existence even if it is not named explicitly in the evidence. Ritualised friendship will accordingly be assumed to exist either between people styled by one or several of the characteristic designations which are described in detail below, or between people originating from separate social units engaged in an exchange relationship of some duration. Excluded are relationships between strangers that involve payments for goods and services - as, for example, those between merchants and their customers, or mercenary soldiers and their employers. People trading specific goods and services for payments would hardly classify their relationship as one of friendship. I Transactions of ritualised friendship were supposed to be carried out in a non-mercantile spirit; from the point of view of the partners, they appeared not as an end in itself but as a means for creating a moral obligation. These salient features, as well as some more specific attributes of ritualised friendship, will gradually be elucidated and further specified. But first, to gain an initial understanding of the institution, we start with an examination of the terminology applied to the people involved in it. Three groups of terms can be distinguished: (a) xenos, idioxenos and doryxenos; (b) phi/os, hetairos, epitedeios, anankaios and oikeios; (c) syngenes and euergetes. The semantic range of these words is sometimes extremely wide; 'xenos', for instance, in addition to 'guest-friend', can mean 'foreigner', 'stranger', 'guest', 'host' and 'mercenary soldier,.2 In this study only the functioning of I For an emphatic assertion of this principle, see Dem05thenes 18.51-2 (On the Crown): "Is Aachines Alexander'. hirding (l"O6(1)l~. or Alexander's xmos"? and Xmophon. Agni"''" .....: "For had he (i.e. Agesila05) been in the habit of Idling favours (tl yciQ bWAtl la~ x6(K~ or raking payment for his benefactions (JUa6oU tUfqyhfl), no one would have felt that he owed him anything."

1 See BoIkestein (1939) 87-8 and Whikhead (19n) 10-1. For its (uncmain) t"tymology, see Benveniste (1969) voU, 87-101; H. Frisk, G,~chiscMI nymologi.che. Vlorterbuch vol.2 (Heidelberg, 1970), I.V. ~fi~; Gauthier (1973); Hihbrunner (1978); and Taillardat (1982).

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these words as interpersonal designations will be considered. The procedure is justified by the fact that the participants manifestly classified the different meanings of the same words in different mental compartments. Mostly, linguistic usage allowed for no ambiguity between, say, xenos as 'guestfriend' and xenos as 'stranger'. Once we are familiar with the implicit codes and rules of ritualised friendship, it will become apparent why this should have been so. Thus delimited, the words listed above imply special relations of friendship, trust, loyalty, reciprocity, and mutual aid between the people they characterise. However, only xenos and its rare derivatives, idioxenos and doryxenos,J refer invariably to individuals originating from different social units. This fact is highlighted by the curious propensity of ancient writers to indicate the provenance of the actors. It is as if they considered their provenance inseparable from their personalities. Thus, it appears that a xenos, whether he came from a citY, tribe, ethnos, or some other social unit, always had a group identity distinct from that of his partner. In other words, each individual in a xenos-dyad was an outsider with respect to his partner's group. In the extant sources, no two people with the same group identity are ever referred to as xenoi (Appendix A).4 To call an insiderfriend a xenos seems to have amounted to a contradiction in terms. 5 In prehistoric times, it was probably the family group which defined this conceptual line of demarcation between 'inside' and 'outside'. In the world of the epos, it was the locality or the group of subjects. In the Greek world of the cities, it was the city boundary. Within Athenian territory, friends who came from different demes, tr;ttyes, or tribes, would call each other

No significant difference in uuge can be d~ected between xmos and idioxmos. The prdix of idioxmos places ~rhaps a special emphasis on the private nature of tht" bond distinguishing one's own xmoi from the xmoi (or prOXnfOl) of the group to which one belonged (d. Welles (1934) 334 and Serve (1926) 62ff.). The word doryxmos appears mainly in tragedy, and this fact, together with contradictory explanations given by kxicographers and in scholia, suggests that the precise meaning of the term (xmoi acquired in war, spared enemit"S turned into xmoi?) had been forgonen. For a collection of the noidence, see E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus, Agammrrrorr (Oxford, 1950) vol.lI, 395. Hereafter, I shall assume that whatnoer I say about xmos also holds good for idioxmos and doryxmos. • This generalisation emt"rgn from the examination of all the pasS2gt"S listed in Appendix A in which the panners are styled xmoi, idioxmoi or doryxmoi, and their social origin is tra~ble. Even the fictitious cases conform to this general pattern. J This fact is not recognised in modem literature, and the term xmos is so often mistranslated that it might be impractical to argue in each case for the interpretation adopted here. Instead of 'guest-friend', we may find 'guest', 'host', and 'stranger'. Most frequently, however, x~"'os is rendered as 'friend', thus obscuring the distinction that the Greeks drew between friends who were aliens and friends who were fellow-citizens. 1

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philoi, hetairoi, or epitedeioi, never xenoi. 6 This fits in with the gloss of the word by a lexicographer from late antiquity. A xenos, says Hesychius, is a friend (Philos) from abroad.? Indeed, the idea of strangeness combined with friendship is built into the assumptions of the actors. Diomedes' glee when he says UI am your xeinos philos in the heart of Argos; you (i.e. Glaukos) are mine in Lykia...", and erito's suggestion to Socrates, if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have there xenoi who will make much of you and protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you",8 are typical of the whole institution. A further regularity must be remarked upon in this context. The insideroutsider dichotomy with respect to the partners' own social units was the only one deemed necessary for a friendship to qualify as xenia. This dichotomy might have coincided with or cut across other wider, real or imaginary group divisions. A quick glance at the provenance of the xenoi listed in Appendix A will suffice to show that xenia relationships could exist between members of different Greek cities; between members of Greek cities and members of Greek ethne (for example, Macedonians, Epirotes); between Greeks and non-Greeks (for example, Persians, Lydians, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Romans);9 and finally, between different non-Greeks. Thus, I see no way of pinpointing significant differences between cases in which the bond was confined within the Greek world, it extended beyond it, or it was located entirely outside it. Xenia, in all these cases, seems to have followed an identical pattern. Furthermore, the non-Greek partners seem to have shown as profound an understanding of this pattern as the Greek. There are thus no good reasons why xenia should be regarded as an essentially Greek institution. 10 By contrast with the xenos words, the terms included in categories (b) and (c) above can relate to friends of the same or of different social origin. The wider semantic range of these words stems from differences in emphasis. More precisely, when a speaker wished to stress the rights and obligations of ritualised friendship, the more formal xenos words would be used. U •••

, For example. Dmlosthmn 50.21 (Againsl Po/ycks): Apollodoros of Oineis and Apollodoros of Leontis; Aeschines 2.73 (0" Ih~ Embauy): Chares and Kqlhi50phon, each from a different trilt)ts of Pandionis. When. in 43 I B.C.• the population of Attica came to Athens, they are said nnucydides 2.17.1) to have ~ provided with dlelter by friends (Philo,) and relatives (oilteio,). not guest-friends (xmo,). , Hesychius, S.v. ~d'Y<><;: 6 cVro;~ ~o..<><;; d. s.v. ~tv<x: ...ot bt 10U~ MO ~f:V{a~ +O-ou~. and S.v. ~~: 6 bn;f:Vou~. • Iliad 6.224-5; Plato, Crilo 4Sc. • For an interesting mockrn parallel- Moslems and Jews becoming partnen to Christians in godgarenthood relations - ~ Hammd (1968) 88. I As argued. for example, by Gauthier (1973). I know of no study which might throw light on the institution from a non-Greek point of view.

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When the emphasis was on the sentiments that were supposed to prevail between xenoi, words from categories (b) and (c) seem to have been preferred. For our purposes, people with the same group identity who are styled by anyone of the terms included in categories (b) and (c) do not qualify as ritualised friends. On the other hand, an Athenian and a Spartan, for example, or a Milesian and a Persian, do qualify, even if in the surviving documentation they are not styled by any of these terms (provided, of course, they meet the other requirements of the definition). Four of the words included in categories (b) and (c) assumed a highly technical meaning in specific historical contexts. The followers of the Macedonian and Hellenistic rulers came to be known, respectively, as hetairoi and philo;. In a very similar fashion, syngenes and euergetes, the Greek renditions of Persian words, II became honorary titles bestowed upon classes of dignitaries in the Persian court. Both in this context and in some Hellenistic courts where the term survived, syngenes was applied to people unrelated by blood to the rulers, in fact to complete strangers. l l Borrowed from the ordinary routines of living, these terms were consciously turned into titles signifying the status of the title holder at court by reference to his degree of amity with the king. These ruling circles, as we shall see, were to a large extent made up of ritualised friends.

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2.2 THE EVIDENCE Judged by the standards of comparable ancient institutions (as, for instance, marriage), ritualised friendship is copiously documented. Irrespective of the literary genres in which they are cast, most of the sources have one important feature in common: their writers were typical products of the fully fledged city-state. Consciously or subconsciously, they employed the norms and values of the civic ~stem in order to represent their universes. The world of ritualised friendSh1p is thus recreated through the eyes of people embedded in the rival civic system. This may in part explain why the processes by which powerful princes gave up hostilities, exchanged precious objects, and committed themselves to mutual allegiance, exercised such a fascination for them. Indeed, numerous self-contained digressions are given over to these events: the exotic, combined with the archaic, provides an excellent literary theme. But there is more to it than that. For the accounts of II Sec Wicschofer (1980) for the linguistic problem (the nlng~la; of the kin!lt. (allt"d orosarrga; in the Persian language. according to Herodotus 8.35) and for a list of the Persian rulers' philo;, xmoi, and ~ung~lai. 12 Cf. Atkinson (1952) 214 and Gauger (19n).

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ritualised friendship are linked to some of the most decisive stages of Greek history: the Ionian revolt, the Persian invasion, the imperialism of Athens and Sparta, the rise of Macedon, the Hellenistic monarchies, and, finally, Rome. It was the search for the sources of these great events that led historians back to the moment at which the alliances were formed. Small wonder, therefore, that the accounts of ritualised friendship were reinterpreted in the light of these events. Actions which had been fortuitous when performed seemed thus to acquire a new meaning in view of their outcome; and unrelated events appeared as links in a larger scheme. Miraculous reversals of personal fortune were intertwined with these stories, and served as yet another source of fascination. They tell us how enemies became friends, the poor grew rich, and nonentities assumed high status. The need for explanation was so acute that if the evidence was lacking it seemed necessary to invent it. Hence the occurrence of fictitious (or quasifictitious) accounts like those of Syloson, Darius and the cloak. 13 For all their fantastic elements, however, these stories have important evidential value: they show that, according to the writers' expectations, co-operation between these powerful men could only have taken place if there existed between them previous relations of trust. And ritualised friendship was the only alternative to marriage for generating trust between aliens. Of all the civic writers, Xenophon merits special attention. First, Xenophon was a participant-observer: he concluded several alliances of ritualised friendship in person. Secondly, throughout his lifetime he acquired an intimate knowledge of both systems which form the subject of this study. Born, reared and educated in the most refined of civic environments, he left Athens at the instigation of a xenos, the Boeotian Proxenos. Most of the rest of his life he spent away from his native city, under the protective care of two formidable foreign friends: briefly (40211 B.C.) under Cyrus of Persia, and for about thirty-five years under Agesilaos of Sparta. Thus it came about that the clash between the norms of conduct inherited from the cityless past and those imposed by the city reproduced itself in Xenophon's own fortunes. Xenophon was expelled from Athens on account of his friendship with Cyrus; he was recruited by Agesilaos thanks to that friendship; and he fought in the battle of Coronea side by side with Agesi-

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laos against his own native City.14 No doubt, he had many of the experiences which he attributes to other historical figures in his writings. In none of the literary accounts is the lengthy process through which ritualised friendship was concluded and sustained over time reproduced in its entirety, nor are its various stages evenly documented. Polybius devotes a great deal of space to the encounter between Neon and Antigonos, but has only a few words on the exchanges between Brachylles and the Macedonian royal house. Herodotus similarly expatiates on the story of the cloak but only refers briefly to Syloson as a tributary vassal of Darius. Nor are all the aspects and elements of the interaction that took place in reality mentioned. Their presence or absence in each story depends to a large extent upon the aims, biases, literary tastes, and moods of the writers. For instance, it is almost beyond doubt that Neon and Antigonos Doson became xeno;; yet Polybius does not think this detail worth mentioning. Xenophon, on the other hand, can write at length of the ritual which turned Agesilaos and Pharnabazos' son into xeno;.15 We gain a clearer perception of the relation between what is recorded and what in fact happened if we compare our evidence with a phenomenon which is essentially similar but which is documented from a different perspective. Greek states used to confer honours and privileges upon people who benefited them in one way or another. The list of these honours and privileges, as well as a short description of the benefactions, were inscribed on stone and set up in public places. Relying on such evidence, M.B. Walbank was able to assemble the whole possible range of elements recurring in the transactions between the city and its benefactors in all the fifth-century Athenian decrees (elements such as proxenia, euerges;a, ges enktes;s, etc.) and then note those elements that are present in each individual decree. 16 In studying xenia, we cannot follow a similar procedure. What we have are not the texts of agreements enclosed, like proxeny decrees, within a stereotypical framework, but subjective, impressionistic accounts of a lengthy process of human interaction. Indeed, only very rarely

14 Cf. above, p.... A different view 50metimn argued for in modem research - that Xmophon was banished for reasons other than his friendship with Cyrus, or that at Coronea he did not fight against his native city - seems to me ultimatel)' to stem from a reluctance to believe that such events were likely to happen. Concerning Coronea, for example, P.J. Rahn (in G.S. Shrimpton and D.J. McCargar (eds.), ClauiaJl Contributions. Studi~s in Honour of Malcolm Francis McGr~gor (New York, 1981) 103-20) ignores Xenophon's constant preoccupation with loyalty and patriotism, and don not take into account his obvious tendency to underplay his own part in the battle. Rahn then suggests that Xenophon ob~rved tht" battlt" as a by-stander but did not take an active part in it. IS Polybius 20.5-6; Xenophon, H~lImica 4.1..19, sec Section 3.4,pp.S8ff. 16 M.B. Walbank (1978), especially the catalogues at 9-23.

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were the actual terms of ritualised friendship set down in writing. I? As the evidence stands, we simply have no way of telling what the relation is between the elements of ritualised friendship that were used in actuality and those which seemed to the writers worth recording. Tabulation, accordingIy, is out of the question. Apart .from such self-contained stories, we can catch brief glimpses of particular aspects of the process from scattered episodes where ritualised friendship plays a secondary role, and from general statements concerning the rights and duties of xenoi. 18 Such details, if fitted cumulatively into a suitable framework, can yield important information. To contemporaries, ritualised friendship appeared as an institution marked by its own distinctive features. To be sure, only a few of these features were sui generis. With respect to ideology, linguistic usage and actual practice, ritualised friendship overlapped to a great extent with two tangential categories of social relations, kinship and friendship. Thus, an account of the similarities and differences which existed between these institutions can offer important insights into the nature of the institution. The features shared with kinship are considered first.

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The Greeks seem to have believed that, apart from relatives by blood and marriage, the family was also related through its head to a special category of people who were more than 'friends' yet somewhat less than 'kin'. These were the xenoi abroad, and though it must have been perfectly clear that they were not kin in the proper sense of the term, the relationship in some respects resembled kinship. The most important feature xenia shared with kinship was the assumption of perpetuity: once the rites establishing the relationships were completed, the bond was believed to persist in latent form even if the partners did not interact with one another. This assumption

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17 ~ for exampk. the symbolorr from Sicily. recording a bond of xmu, between a Phoenician and a Greek and his descendanrs (/G XIV.279. d. Section 3.4 and Fig. 9. p.64); the so-called 'Hannibal's covenant' (Polybius 7.9) recording a "sworn treaty of frimdship and goodwill; we shall be friends (phi/oIlS). kinsmen (oiknollS). and brother'S (ad~/phOfU). on the following conditions....•. As suggested by Bickerman (1952) 8. the strange, ungrammatical assembly of Greek words might hide an unknown Punic idiom. For some Roman parallels. ~ Badian (1958) I t-12 and 154-5. For written records of ritualised friendship from the ancient Near East, see Munn·Rankin (1956). No similar written records of HdJrew bn;Ih have survived (Bickerman (1950) 26). II Like. for example, Menandtt's one·liMr (Mcmos';choi. ed. A. Meineke. Nagmmta Comico",," G,tI~co",," (1841) vol. IV, 357, line 615), "00 honour to your xmos and you will acquire a good philos". or Stobaeus' maxim (3.9 p.J58) "A xmos is a just man differing not only from a citizen but also from kinsmen".

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had two practical manifestations. First, the bond could be renewed or reactivated after the lapse of many years, a variety of symbolic objects serving as a reminder. Secondly, the bond did not expire with the death of the partners themselves but outlived them and passed on, apparently in the male line, to their descendants. As the case of Glaukos and Diomedes shows, here, too, a symbolic reactivation of the bond was necessary. (The mechanism of this feature of ritualised friendship is described in detail in Section 3.5.) The partners involved in ritualised friendship - and through them, their families - were presumed to be bound by mutual affection. This affection, however, imitated the outward manifestations but not the inward spirit of kinship: ritualised friends were not supposed to love each other, but to behave as if they did. Nowhere does this emerge more clearly than in the case of Polykrates of Samos and Amasis of Egypt, two men who had never met. When the Egyptian ruler heard about the inescapable good fortune of his Samian xenos, he renounced the xenia so that "when some great and terrible mishap overtook Polykrates, he himself might not have to grieve his heart for a xenos".19 Genuine feelings could no doubt result from such simulation. For example, Pindar's description of himself and of Thorax, his Thessalian xenos, as "loving and beloved" has a palpable ring of sincerity.IO But, as revealed in a casual remark in Isocrates' Aegineticus, affection was not indispensable for a relationship to endure: Thrasyllos ... had inherited nothing from his parents; but having b«ome the xnros of Polemainetos, the soothsayer, he became so intimate (oike;os) with him that Polemainetos at his death left him his books on divination and gave him a portion of the property which is now in qurstion. 21 The underlying assumption here is that xenia need not be accompanied by affection: the external forms of xenia would not in themselves have been enough for Polemainetos to bequeath the property to Thrasyllos. For that to happen, the further element of real emotional involvement was necessary. This conventional display of emotions crops up in the sources in a fashion somewhat unexpected. When the Egyptian raid of the Cretan ex-nobleman (in fact, Odysseus in disguise) failed and he was in danger of losing his life, the Egyptian king, whose territory he had invaded, warded off the attackers, set him on his own chariot, and "took him weeping to his home". 22 When Klearchos, the Spartan mercenary commander, was prevented by his sol19

20

21 22

Ht"rodotus 3.43. Pindar, Pythian 10.66. lsocratn 19.5. Odys~ 14.279; d. Section 3.3 ~Iow.

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diers from fulfilling his obligations to his xenos, Cyrus, he stood before them and "wept for a long while".23 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the sentiments of these people were structured differently from ours. Whether genuine or feigned, the affection displayed was that of kinsmen. This is made clear above all by the counesy terms of reference by which ritualised friends would address each other. In pan at least, these terms were drawn from the kinship terminology. King Seuthes, for example, promised Xenophon - even before seeing him face-to-face - that if he should bring the army to him, he would not only treat him in all ways as a friend (phi/os) and a brother (adelphos), but would even give him estates. 24 The pretence was that xeno; were like kinsmen, and their behaviour was therefore expected to imitate kinship roles. "Xeinos'\ said Telemachos to Mentes, the guestfriend of his father (in fact, the goddess Athena in disguise) "you speak these things with kindly thought, as a father to his son tt. 2S Pindar, the lyric poet, extolled his guest-friend, Hiero of Syracuse, for being adored like a father by his own xmo;.26 Polybius seems to have tried to give vent to his true sentiments when he related that he himself and the young Scipio Aemilianus "came to feel a mutual affection which could truly be compared to that of father and son, or of kinsmen of the same blood".21It is, in the light of this, not difficult to understand why 'father', 'brother', and 'grandfather' should have become one of the reciprocal appellations used within the entourages of Persian and Hellenistic rulers. 28 As for the terms of affection in general, it should be noted that their range was wider than that of their counterpans in modem societies, and at the same time they were less specific to anyone panicular type of relationship. In the Homeric world, in Adkins' words, "every relationship from sexual passion to guest-friendship, relationships whose differences we should emphasise much more than their resemblance, is denoted by phi/otes".29 This does not seem to have changed significantly in later times, and even in the classical age kinship, and what we translate as 'friendship', were consistently regarded as variations of the same underlying principle. Xenophon, for example, could identify the strongest phi/ia; as those which unite parents to children, children to parents, wives to husbands, hetairo; to heta;ro;.30 Xenophon, A"abas;s 1.3.2. 2S Odyssey 1.301-8. Xenophon. A"abas;s 1.2.25. 16 Pindar, Pythiarr 3.11. l ' Polybius 31.25.1. There is no explicit reference to "m;a between the two. 11 Patn: 1 Maccabees 11.3 t, Josephus, ]twish A"tiq"itws 13.126, 12.148i adelphos: OC IS 138i pappos: Xenophon. Cyropudi4 1.4.26. For the ancient Near Eastm1 paraJlel- the employment of 'fraternity', 'paternity', 'sonship' between allied rulen - see Munn-Rankin (1956) 16ff. 'Fraternity' does not Ittm to have been consistently used here to cknote relationships between tquals. nor 'sonship' and 'paternity' for relationships between untquilis. n Adkins (1963) 36. The examples he cites are Odyssey t 0.336 and Iliad 3.354. .10 Xenophon, H;ero 3.7. 1.1

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3 Features Shared With Kinship

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For Aristotle, the untranslatable terms hetairia, oikeiotes, and syngeneia were various forms (eide) of philia,31 and the remark he made elsewhere, that "xenia is the firmest of all philia i" ,Jl fits in with this general recognition. This, of course, does not mean that friends or guest-friends thought of themselves, or were thought of, as kinsmen. What it does show is that the perceptual boundaries drawn between the different categories of positive relationships were not as rigidly delineated as they are in modem societies. The principles of kinship and friendship could be denoted by partially overlapping - rather than mutually exclusive - classificatory terms. The system of ideas was such that no contradiction was involved in calling real kin by words used most commonly for friendship, or conversely, in calling a friend by words derived from kinship. Another feature in common with kinship was the custom of naming. As a Christian father would name a son after his godfather, so a xenos would name a son after his own xenos. Three variations of the practice stand out. First, a man could call a son by the actual name of the xenos (whether at binh or at some later stage is unclear). It is this custom which accounts for the names of Alkibiades, son of Kleinias, of Athens, and of Endios, son of Alkibiades, of Sparta. 33 The succession of names through two generations is represented in the diagram. Kleiniu. - - - - - - - - - - - JCetto; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Alkibiades. son of Alkibiades by inheritance son of Endios : [Athens] : [Sparta] I I

I I

Alkibiades. - - - - - - - - - - JC~"o; - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Endios. son of Kleinias by inheritance son of Alkibiades [Athens] [Sparta)

Mostly, it is difficult to trace such successions because of lack of explicit evidence such as this. But names of second-generation xenoi are evident in many cases in which the alliance involved a Greek and a non-Greek. For example, the Greek Theokles named a son after the Egyptian pharaoh, Psammetichos; Gorgos, brother of the Corinthian tyrant Periander, also named a son Psammetichos; an Athenian (Alkmeonid?) named a son after the Lydian king Croesus; and the Odrysean king Kersobleptes named a son

Aristotle. Rhetoric 2.1381b 29. d. F.thica Nicomachea 1161b 12-17. Aristotle. Mapa Moralia 2.12111 46. The doubts as to the genuineness of this work do not impair its evidential value. H Thucydides 8.6.3. where it is expres...ty stated that Alltibiades is a Spartan name. Cf. Wallace (1970) 197 n.2 for the ancestry of the relationship. JI

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10Iaos. 34 Within the Greek world itself, the practice must have been even more widespread. Thucydides believed that it accounted for the spread of the Hellenic name as a result of which the whole COU'l,ry came to be known as Hellas: Before the time of Hellen, the son of Deukalion, the name did not exist at all, and different parts were known by the names of different tribes... After Hellen and his sons had grown powerful in Phthiotis and had been invited as allies into other states, these states separately and because of the connections (homilia,) with the family of Hellen began to be called 'Hellenic' .lS Ritualised friendship was thus responsible for the first hellenisation in history. This practice of naming might also account for homonyms found in different cities. In the case of Alkibiades and Endios, the third generation Athenian Alkibiades and the second generation Spartan Alkibiades can be differentiated only by the name of their cities and by their patronymics. 36 But if naming was reciprocal, that is, if both panners named a son after the other, then even the patronymics were identical. Such a possibility must always be taken into consideration when dealing with homonyms. Thus Liches, son of Arkesileos, appearing in the archon list from Thasos from the year 398 B.C., need not be, as has recently been suggested, identical with the Spanan Lichas, son of Arkesilaos, known from Thucydides. 31 The two might be xenoi from alternative generations (see diagram). Parallels of such homonyms - if not homo-patronymics - may be found in Plutarch and Arketilaos - - - - - - - - - : [Spana) I

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- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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lichas, - - - - - - - - - - - - x~o; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Arkesikos, son of Arkesilaos by inheritance son of Liehes : [Spana) : [Thasos) I

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Arkesilaos, - - - - - - - - - - - xmo; - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Liches, son of lichas by inheritance son of Arkesileos [Spana) [Thasos) Pummerichos: Meigs and Lewis (1969) no.7, d. ~Iow Section ".5 t Croesus: the from AnavyS10S with the inscription ~Iow (LH. Jeffery in the A,,"ual of the British School at Athens 57 (1962) 1.....) and with Herodorus 6.125 (where the chronology is impossible) for the possible origin of the name; GorgO': FGrH 90 F 59 (Nikolaos of Damascus); lolaos: Syll.-' 195. lS Thucydides 1.3.2, translated by Rex Wamer. .~ The (Spanan?) Alkibiadn who made a dedication to Apollo in Delphi is likdy to be an anc:ntor of Endios (SEG 27.135). )1 Pouilloux and Salviat (1983). J4

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J Features Shared With Kinship

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Homer: Archias the Athenian and Archias the Theban are explicitly defined as xeno;; and the two Homeric Aiantes - Aias son of Telamon, from Salamis and Aias, son of Oileus, from Locris - were xeno; too, if judged by their mutual conduct. 38 A series of further examples (to be treated in Section 5.4 and Appendix B) will show that the custom was far more widespread than is normally thought. The second variation was the naming of a son not by the name of the xenos himself but by the name of his city or geographic area. This can best be illustrated by the case of Thessalos, the son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratos, named thus, presumably, after a Thessalian xenos; by the case of a son of the Athenian Kimon, called Lakedaimonios; and by the case of the Spartan Libys, brother of Lysander, named thus after an ancestral xenos, Libys, ruler of Cyrene. 39 The pattern of this variation can be elicited from Thucydides' remark concerning Hellen cited above. For names could circulate both ways: from a geographic area to its inhabitants and hence to xeno; - and vice versa. The third variation was the calling of sons by compound names bor· rowed from the domain of ritualised friendship. Typical examples would be names such as Xenophon, Proxenos, Philoxenos, and the Iike. 40 Though clearly rooted in ritualised friendship, and intended no doubt originally to conjure up its rights and duties, the custom in historical times must have been dissociated from the institution itself. I see no way of establishing a

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.\8 Plutuch. P~/opidas 10 and Iliad 1.l101. Pouilloux and Salvi:u (1983) ignore this possible explanation and, assuming that liches from the Thasian archon list and the Spartan Lichas known from Thucydides refer to the same man (a poMibility which cannot ~ ruled out), infer that Thucydides was :alive and wrote :after ]91 B.C. But if one lichas was a secondgeneration Spartan xmos, and the other a third·generation Thasian :xmos - a possibility which is chronologically compatible with the details - then, as pointed out by Cartledge (1984), the conclusion is far less compelling. For objections on other grounds to the views of Pouilloux 3nd Salviat, and for the names Lichas and Arkesilaos (or their dialectical variations) in other cities, sec Bull. Ep;gr. (1984)..Jl4. J9 Thess.alos: Thucydides 1.20.2. 6.55.1 and Aristotle, Th~ Athtn;an Constitut;on 17.2. d. Herodotus 5.46.1 for a Spartan homonym; lakedaimonios: Thucydides 1.45.2. IG 12 400, d. Plutarch, Cimon 16 and Pmcl~s 29; Libys: Diodorus Siculus 14.13.5, cf. Xenophon, H~II~""a 2.4.28. Further examples: Thucydides 3.52.5 (a Plataean p,o:unos of Sparta, called Lakon); Thucydi
U

22

Ritualised Friendship

correlation between these names and the standard practices of ritualised friendship. Finally, it should be noted that this pattern of nomenclature remained throughout an optional and sporadic practice: people could well be xnro; and not name a son after a partner. Yet, as we shall see, awareness of the practice can offer imponant clues in tracing the networks of ritualised friendship. A funher feature which ritualised friendship shared with kinship was the establishment of a potential link of mutual protection and help not only between the partners themselves but also between the partners' closest associates. Above all, xeno; were expected to show a measure of protective concern for each other's offspring. On two occasions in the course of his service as trierarch, Pasion's son Apollodoros was given vital assistance by the xenoi of his father. 4 t Pausanias of Spana rescued the concubine of a Persian magnate from the hands of Greeks engaged in slaughter and spoliation on the ground of her being the daughter of Hegetorides, a xenos of his from CoS. 42 Surely, this was a time-honoured practice, already recognisable in its fully fledged form in the epos. Priam's son Lykaon was once captured by Achilles and offered for sale in Lemnos. The lord of Lemnos had already given a price for him when Eetion of Imbros, a xenos, ransomed Lykaon "a great price he gave", comments the poet - and set him free. 43 Sometimes, the principle of protection would be carried to extremes, and a xenos assumed the role of a foster-father for his partner's son. In plays by Euripides, Orestes, son of Agamemnon, was brought, following the treacherous murder of his father, to Strophios, ruler of Phocis, a xenos of Agamemnon's house. Strophios nurtured Orestes together with his own son, Pylades. The two young men were xnro;, and Pylades was described as like Orestes' brother."" This is a pattern which can be recognised in real life. Kraugis of Megalopolis died when his son Philopoimen was still a child. But opportunely, a xenos, Kleandros of Mantinea, took responsibility for the rearing and the education of the orphan. 4s In somewhat later times, the hellenised Jewish prince Antipater is said to have concluded relations of philia and xenia with other dynasts, and in panicular with the king of the Demosthenes 50.18 and 50.56 (Against Polycles). Herodotus 9.76.3. 4) lli4d 2 t .42. 44 Euripides, Ekara 83 and Ore$tes 1015, where Pylades is called loa6~ civfJ(). This fictitioul example il the only inStan~ which might indicate that one'l pla~ of origin, rather than permanent abode, was the crucial factor determining one'l Itatus al xenos: Orestes and Pylades were reared from early childhood in Phocil, but were xmo; in virtue of Orestes' Argive origin. 4J Polybius 10.22 and Plutarch, Philopomlnr t. Cf. Plutarch, Aratus 3.1 for a similar story about Aratul of Sicyon. I discuss further evidence on this topic in Sccrion S.4. 41 41

3 Features Shared With Kinship

23

Arabs, "to whom he had entrusted his children when making war on Aristobulus u • 46 Foster-parenthood was often romanticised - in panicular when projected into mythology (Fig. la-d). But it must have been generally recognised that it was primarily intended as yet another device for cementing the alliance. For example, according to Aeschines, in 367 B.C. the Athenian general Iphikrates was implored to assist the Macedonian royal house against a pretender by vinue of his having been an adopted son of Amyntas, father of Philip. Aeschines purports to reproduce verbatim the appeal which he himself made to Philip several years thereafter: Then ... your mother Eurydike sent for him [i.e. Iphikrates], and ... put your brother Perdikkas into the arms of Iphikrate5. and set you upon his knees - for you were a little boy - and said: "Amyntas, the father of these little children, when he was alive, made you his son, and enjoyed the friendship of the city of Athens; we have a right therefore to consider you in your private capacity as a brother (adelphos) of these boys, and in your public capacity a friend (phi/os) to US".47 An astonishingly similar incident is preserved in Lysias· 18th oration. After the downfall of Athens in 403 B.C., Diognetos of Athens, brother of Nikias the general, is said to have approached Pausanias, the victorious Spartan general, with a theatrical gesture: ...as soon as the Lacedaemonians and Pausanias had arrived at the Academy. he (i.e. Diognetos] took the son of Nikeratos (Nikeratos was the son of Nikias) and us (i.e. the children of Eukrates, another brother of Nikiasl. who were children. and laying him on the knees of Pausanias, and setting us by his side. he told Pausanias and the others present the tale of our sufferings and the fate that had befallen us and called on Pausanias to succour (~9ijoaL) us in vinue of our bonds of philia and Junia. and to do vengeance upon those who maltreated us. 48

These children were apparently not brought up in Pausanias· household, but the fact that gestures reminiscent of the duties of foster-parenthood were employed indicates how deeply ingrained an element of the institution foster-parenthood was. Sometimes, variations of the practice are encountered. Logbasis of Selge was a synethes (i.e. a co-dwelling intimate) and xenos of the Hellenistic prince Antiochos Hierax, and acted as a foster-father not to Antiochos' own child but to the daughter of Mithridates of Pontus, whom Antiochos held hostage. Once again, the practice is painted in the brightest of colours: logbasis, according to Polybius, brought up the young lady as his own 46

4'

JoscphU5.J~h Antiquities 14.122. d. The J~h War 1.181. Aeschines. (On the Embtwy) 2.28. The inaccuracies in the account - Philip was at that

time hostage in Thebes - do not affect my argumt'flt. 48 I.ysias 18.10 (Property of Nicias' Brothn).

24

Ritualised Friendship

a

b

fiB. la-cl The ~ as • foster-father Apollodol'Ol' account of the story of Pel~us and Oliron (3.13.3-6), ...hen compared WIth ritualiled friendship as rtCOIlsuue:ted from non-mythical sources. revals that the practices prescribed by the institution underwent only minor distortions when projected nto mythology. I paraphrase the relevant passages. Believing a false: accusadon, Akastos desened his friend, Peleus, while asleep on Pelion, and hid his magic sword in cow's dung. On aminltt Peleus was caught by the centaun dwelll"l there, and would have perished jf he had not been saved by Charon, who .Iso ratored him his S9iord. FollOWIng this euerge$ia, Chlron ~ mcd the role of n ideal xetOS: he provided Peleus with • due as to how to leize and marry Theda. the sea D)'IIlph whO was constandy metamorphosing herself; he acted, a IOrt of sponsor at their wedding on Pelion (Fig. 2, p. 27), and gave Peleus an ashen-spear a. a present (a prodigaous weapon which he would later bequeath to h • son, Iliad 16.140ff.); finally, when, becaUIe of • disagreement over the use of malPCt Thealleft

J Features Shared With Kinship

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Peleus, Chiron received the child she bore to Peleus, fed him on the innards of wIld animals, and named him Achilles (by an absurd etymology, Achilles could mean "non·li,,-': the inf t had nut pu his lips to the b£e&sr). As In real life, me relationship was here started by an euergesia and, once established, involved services of a ritual and a practical nature: giving adviet, sponsoring a wedding, giving .. present, foster-parenthood, naming, and, throughout, boetheia. The paintings above represent different venions of the apparently solemn occasion on which the Infant wai placed under the' centaur's tutelage (for further examples, see Brommer t 1960) 249-50). In other words, the fabulous elements of the myth rested on a scaffold that matched the categories of rcallife. It waS probably by appeal to chis real rcfCl"ent that the vase painten hoped to conjure up the entire myth. For the traditional view of the practice as leducation', el. H.-I. Marrou, Histoire de /·iducation dans '·antiqHiti (Paris, 1948) 36fl. With nne 11-12 at 51 Ii for its emulation by the city, see Fig. 14 (p. 137).

26

Ritualised Friendship

daughter and treated her with special kindness. 49 Indeed, the duties of foster-parenthood seem to have engendered a sense of responsibility which did not cease even if the child and the actual (or potential) foster-father lived apan. Some of lsocrates' orations and letters seem to have been written, not, as is usually thought, in the formal tone of a master to a pupil, but rather in the paternal tone of a xenos conscious of his responsibilities. so Special forms of intervention were however sought not only with regard to rearing of children but also in other life crises. Xeno;, in brief, were expected to perform certain ritual services for each other. Satyros of Athens, for example, undertook at considerable cost to himself to provide the daughters of a deceased xenos, Apollophanes of Pydna, with dowries and give them in marriage. SI Similarly in myth, the wise centaur Chiron appears as a sponsor at the wedding of Peleus, his xenos, and Thetis, the sea nymph (Fig. 2). Other types of ritual service concerned death. It seems to have been the duty of a xenos to look after the earthly remains of a dead panner and celebrate his memory. Xenophon, for instance, made a votive offering and dedicated it in the treasury of the Athenians at Delphi, inscribing on it his own name and that of the deceased Proxenos. "For Proxenos was a xenos", he explained tersely. 52 The connexion between this passage and a dedication made by a Xenophon in Attica is uncenain,SJ but a grave-stele bearing the inscription - "This is the grave of Promathos, a man who loved his xenos" _54 might well have been set up by a xenos abiding by his duties. The poet Simonides of Ceos seems to have been motivated by a similar sense of responsibility, when, along with the famous epigrams he composed over the tomb of the Spanans who fell at Thermopylae, he set up at his own expense an inscription for the Acamanian diviner Megistias "for the sake of

xenia".ss .9 Polybius 5.74 wirh Walbank (1957·82) voU, 600. Funher evidence on thil custom is disamed in S«rion S.2. For parallels in the ancient Near East and in medieval vassalage, see Weinfeld (1970) and Marc Bloch (1961) 224ff. so 2. Nicocks, a treatise on the duties of monarchs written to Nicodes of Cyprus from lsocrates as a 'gift' from a friend abroad; l...mer 6, To 1M Childrm ofJason, making reference to the orator's JCnlUJ with Jason and Polyalko (presumably jason's wife, d. n.75 below) and to an invitation on their part to come and reside with them in Thessaly; Letter 7, To TimothtlU, the son of Klearchos, lsocrates' JCnlOS in Heracle2 Pontica. In this context should also ~ mentioned l.ctkr 8. addressed to the rulers of Myrilene. written by boerares on behalf of one Apor, instrUCtOr in music of the children of Aphart\l$. Aphareus was the son of Hippial of EJil and adoptive son of lsocrates (D1onysiul of Halicamassus, ISOCJ'al~s 18). .U Demosthenes 19.192·5 (De Falu ugfftiorre), d. Diodorus Siculus 16.55. Jl Xenophon. Anabasis 5.3.5. Cf. allO ApoIlodorus, 8ib/iolMCff 2.S.4 for the burial of the centaur Pholos by his XnlOS, Herakln. SJ M.Th. Mirsos and E. Vanderpool in H~spma 19 (1950) 25·6 and 391. J4 Pfohl (1967) no.l0. ss Herodotus 7.228.4. Callimachus, Epigr«m 2a seems to be an epitaph written for Hera· IdeitOl, a urlOS from Halicamassus. For the adoption of this custom by the city, sec Section S.4 and Fil. 13, p.136.

3 features Shared With Kinship

27

Fig. 1. Ritual ervices Red figure vase, now in Palermo (CorpJU Vasorum Antiquorum pls.29-30), showing Peleus, his would-be wife Thetis, and his benefactor, protector and friend - the wise centaur Chiton. It is not clear whether Peleus is here presenting Thetis to Chiron or a xmos, like a Chlron is giving his blessing to the matrimonial union. In either ChIj,.ba,D godfather, is sho~ to be inyolvcd in the ritual events of his partner's life.

The circle of protegis could be widened to include other family members, and even dose frieods. J~son, anxious to send hi$ wife, Medea, away, could thus promise her that his xeno; abroad would bestow benefits on her.s6 Crito offered his friend, the condemned Socrates, the chance to flee to Thessaly and be placed under the protection of Cnto's xenoi there. S? Lykon of Heraklea sought in Athens the aid of his xenos, Archebiades, and of Archebiades' phi/oi. s8 And the Parian xenoiof an anonymous Aeginetan (by naturalisation, not birth) acted as a keeper of the fonunes of the Aeginetan·s friends. 59 The quesnon of who one's closest associates were was apparently open to different interpretations. It is more than likel)" that it was the mechanical extension of this principle to the whole citizen body that gavr rise to the institution of proxeny: a man', fellow-citizens becarne, by vinuc of their common citizenship, the proteges of his xenos. 6O Another feature by which ritualised friendship mimicked kinship cons. Euripides, 57

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Plato, Crito 45c.

s. DemoKhcna 52.3 and 52.21 (Ag"inst Callip","). lsocrates 19.18 (A~g;If~';cus).

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60

I explore this proposition in Sccrion S.4.

Ritualised Friendship

28

cems the nature of the services that the partners were expected to render each other. The extraordinary thing is that these services were not restricted to a narrow range of their affairs. To be sure, normally ritualised friends would help each other solve some of the trivial problems of daily life by, for example, lending money or supplying practical advice. The span of the interactions was in these cases short. But sometimes - and this seems to be the ideal purpose of the institution - they were supposed to assume responsibility for the whole range of each other's affairs. In crisis or in extreme adversity, a ritualised friend acted as a haven of refuge for his unfonunate partner. This was no ordinary hospitality, ancient style or modern. Besides shelter and food, the host undertook to take care of the welfare of his panner, material and spiritual- to feed him at his table and maintain him in his household, as if he were a foster-child. Agesilaos is even said to have catered for the homosexual love affairs of a xenos (the son of the Persian Pharnabazos who was staying with him), and the Boeotian Proxenos likened his guest-friend Cyrus to his own patris, his fatherland. 61 But the best illustration of the spirit in which this duty was conceived is supplied by a fragment from a lost oration by Lysias. An Athenian, speaking in the law court on behalf of his xenos' son, explained charmingly that:

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Kephisodotos, the defendant's father, was a xenos of mine, gentlemen, and when we were in exile, I and any other Athenian who wished to, enjoyed his hospitality in Thebes, and received many favours at his hands in public and in private before returning to our own city. Now that these gentlemen have suffered the same misfortunes as we, and have come in exile to Athens, realising that I have a huge debt of gratitude to repay (~6.tl.V x6{>t.v), I have taken them so completely into my family (oirt~ ol)(d~ a~o,,~ "n£6t;OJ&TJV) that no visitor without prior knowledge would know which of us was the owner of the housc. 62 The unfortunate man lived thus in his host's care and under his protection, and so did his kin and friends. Owing to the great demands that such a practice put on the resources of the partners, it is hardly surprising that it was mostly confined to the very rich: the Great King of Persia, the petty rulers at the fringes of the Greek world, the Macedonian and Hellenistic monarchs acquired special fame for being able to provide services of this kind. Dozens of city decrees survive honouring individuals for having bene-

.. Xmophon, H~Jltn;ca ".1.40 and Arrabasu 3.1.... 62 Lylias, fragrmnt 78 (Thalheim) - Dionyliul of Halicamanul, 1S4J~ 6. In a similar fashion, king Archidarnos, after flmng in 222 R.C. from Spana for fear of KJromenes, found refuge in the hou~ of a xmos, Nikagofll of Messme. Nikagoras is said to have "gladly received him in hil houK and provided for his wants" (Polybius 5.37.2).

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4 Features Shared With Friendship

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fited a city or a special group of citizens while 'spending their time' with a ruler. 63 Thus, in several ways rituali~d friendship mimicked aspects of kinship relations. Yet it was not kinship in the proper sense of the term. Real kinship is given: it follows from birth. Ritualised friendship was an acquired relationship. It thus somewhat resembled kinship through marriage, since in both marriage and ritualised friendship a ritual act was deemed necessary to create a bond of affinity between unrelated individuals. But at this point the similarities stop. For, as we shall see in Section 5.3, ritualised friends performed for each other services which lay mostly outside the sphere of kinship obligations. Acting at one and the same time as quasi-kin and allies, they provided what can best be described as supplement to the potential of the family group. 2.4 FEATURES SHARED WITH FRIENDSHIP

Ritualised friendship also resembled friendship in some respects. Yet it was not friendship in the normal Greek sense of the term. Friendship in the Greek states bound together individuals partaking of the same social system and sharing similar values. Confidence was generated through a lengthy process of interaction and gradually developing intimacy, and the resulting relationship was sustained - or disrupted - through permanent interaction. A good illustration of this process may be gleaned from a pseudoDemosthenic passage: Nikostratos, whom you see here in coun, men of the jury, was a neighbour of mine in the country, and a man of my own age (he/ikiotes). We had long known each other (yv~~ J1tv JIOl dXE) but after my father's death, when I went to live in the country, where I still live, we had much more to do with one another, since we were neighbours (geitones) and men of the same age (helikiota,). As time went on we became very inrimate (oikeios); indeed I came to feel on such intimate terms with him (oikeios) that he never failed to win any favour he asked of me... 64 Ritualised friendship, by contrast, was concluded between persons who originated from different, and at times, drastically dissimilar social systems, and who had no previous record of social intercourse. Intimacy was established not through a lengthy interaction, but abruptly, as in marriage, 61 Many such instances will ~ mcounrered in this study. I here list only a few examples. Persia: Thucydides 8.6.1 (KaJligeitos of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus living at the court of Phamabazos). Petty rulers: lsocrarn 17.3 (Trapevticus) (Sopaios, a Greek, staying with Saryros. king of Bosporus). For Macedonia and the Hellmisric monarchies and for the technical term l)&.(1T~V xQ()6 nv&, 5C'C Herman (1980181). IA (Demosthenn) 53.4 (Again" Nicostratus).

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through a ritual aet. 6S Funhermore, once the friendship had been established, the partners were expected to render each other assistance not while living together, but while dwelling at a distance from each other. When Aristotle suggested that friendship between aliens, xenia, was the firmest of philiai, it was this aspect of separateness that seemed to him to be critical. In an attempt to rationalise what probably circulated as a popular proverb, he observed that xenoi, unlike philo;, have no common object for which they dispute with one another. Friends, on the other hand, who are at the same time each other's fellow-citizens, compete for superiority and engage in violent dispute. As a result, he adds gloomily, they cease to be friends. 66 Aristotle's observation may serve as a convenient staning point for a more systematic elucidation of the differences between ritualised and civic friendship. Civic friends were related to each other not merely through friendship but through a whole array of other roles. Besides friendship, they had rights and obligations towards each other by virtue of their common panicipation in formal institutions and in numerous informal groups and ties, which together made up the city's social texture. 61 In addition, there was the role of the polis itself: fellow-citizens would be linked together by abstract, intangible rights and obligations even if not bound together by personal ties of attachment. As a result of all these factors, the opponunities for friction and conflict were greatly increased. Hence, Aristotle's pessimistic remark about the termination of friendships. But this dense involvement had imponant consequences for the dynamics of civic friendship. The sheer intensity and extent of the interactions could become instrumental in compelling the fulfilment of obligations. People interdependent through several spheres of activity could use the sanctions available through one type of interdependence to enforce another. And, as a last reson, they could even set in motion the city's legal machinery. The employment of such coercive means might seem self-evident in other complex societies. But it must be borne in mind that in the Greek city this was a recent innovation. The polis, unlike the inchoate groups that preceded it (or the contemporary inchoate groups outside it), could lay down and enforce formal rules regarding personal relations. As a result, the individual was constrained not only by the implicit dictates of pre-political morality, but by the explicitly formulated rules of the city. The elements of the ritual are explained in Osaptcr 3. 66 Magn4 Moralia 2.121h 46. •, Cf. finley (1983) 82. 6$

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A single example will suffice to illustrate how these peculiarities of civic friendship operated. Demosthenes· father at his death had to secure the perpetuation of his family household until his eldest son, the future orator. reached maturity. The old Demosthenes appointed guardians for his children, two nephews and an old friend. He bestowed valuable gifts on them, arranged for his widow to marry one of them, and treated them as his friends and kin. As the orator himself explained years later, "His thought was that, if he should unite these men to me by closer ties, they would look after my interests the better because of this added bond of intimacy (oikeiotesr·. 68 The strategy was designed to multiply and intensify the ties of dependence between the guardians and the family, but, alas, it proved inadequate. The guardians abused their powers and deprived their wards of their property. In this predicament, however, the young Demosthenes was able to seek redress with the aid of the city's judicial machinery. He won the case, and the guardians were ordered to pay damages. 69 Thus, although 'friendships' could be terminated, obligations would be fulfilled. These aspects of civic friendship contrast sharply with their counterparts in ritualised friendship. Xeno; lived far away from each other, and this physical separation lent the institution its most distinctive feature. Although attempts were made to multiply, as Demosthenes· father did, the ties of interdependence, in most cases the framework of xenia remained the only channel through which co-operation was carried out. Unless they came together to form a new group (as, for instance, in the case of the permanent followers of rulers), xeno; could not bring direct social pressure to bear on one another. Nor did they have at their disposal a formal enforcement agency which could be brought into play if obligations were disregarded. The communities in which they Jived were not pan of larger organisations and were mostly at war, or at least in a state of mutual hostility. Operating outside the framework of social order which fettered the citizen, ritualised friends could not rely on appeals to external authority. 2.5 THE CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The pattern of social relationships outlined above is not peculiar to the ancient Greek world. Institutions displaying similar features occur in other societies. The mere observation of similarities, however, could be as misleading as it might be helpful. A comparative perspective can offer real insights only if the features to be compared are closely defined and the units 61 •9

Demosrhenes 27.5 (Against Aphobos I) . The fact mar rhey did nor pay docs nor affect my argummr.

32

Ritualised Friendship

of comparison are rigorously delimited. More specifically, then, the problem that presents itself is this: how, in each society, can these institutions be isolated from others into which they shade, and, once isolated, be built into a comparative framework so as to bring out similarities and differences? A classificatory system has been proposed by Pitt-Rivers. He envisages a whole spectrum of social relationships marked by a common principle, that of 'amity'. Amity, "the moral obligation to feci - or at least to feign sentiments which commit the individual to actions of altruism marks off these relationships from other, non-amiable social relationships. The sphere thus delimited represents one side of a universal dichotomy by which, from an egocentric point of view, one's social universe is divided into friends and enemies. Within this amical sphere five sub-categories are identified: 'real' kinship, adoptive kinship, ritual kinship, ritualised friendship, and friendship unritualised (sec diagram).70 U

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The two intermediate categories, 'ritual kinship' and 'ritualised friendship', are particularly relevant for our purposes. The concrete relationships included in these categories share two major characteristics. First, the panners involved are in each case predominantly (but not unexcep' tionally) non-kin - people who come either from different social units (villages, tribes, nations), or at least from different families. Secondly, their relationships are conceived in terms of kinship. There are, admi!'!t:~;y, differences in the degree to which the kinship element is manifest in panicular instances. Yet, as the diagram itself shows, the distinction between 'ritual kinship' and 'ritualised friendship' is virtually insignificant. The fundamental element common to all these institutions is thus the extension of the kinship principle to non-kin. The virtue of Pitt-Rivers' typology is that it makes it possible to accommodate within a single analytical framework a whole range of institutions which have hitheno seemed unrelated: the different variations of blood-brotherhood, godparenthood, and bond-friendship. It came into 10

Adapted from Pin-Riven (1973) 96. For the concept of 'amity',

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5 The Cross-Cultural Perspective

33

being as a reaction against earlier attempts at classification that were based on the kind of ritual needed to enter into a relationship: baptism to become a godfather, blood rituals to become blood-brothers, and the exchange of all sorts of sacra to become bond-friends. 71 For Pitt-Rivers, it is not the ritual technique but the role achieved through the enactment of ritual that is the essential typological criterion. These simulated roles are marked by characteristics shared with kinship. Yet, the people described by these characteristics do not identify themselves with their real counterparts. In spite of idealistic statements to the contrary,72 a blood-brother does not think of himself as a real brother, nor does a godfather regard himself as a father. The essence of the relationship is a fiction - 'as if' the incumbents were brothers, parents and friends. This conceptual distinction corresponds to important practical distinctions. For the partners in the relationship cannot, for the most part, assume real kinship roles: a blood-brother is not a substitute brother, nor is a godfather a surrogate father. In terms of their place and function in the total network of social relations, they are all rather special kinds of friend. In other words, real and simulated roles are complementary, not interchangeable. Only to a very limited extent d~ the range of their duties overlap. I propose in this study to view xenia as another instance of such ritualised relationships.73 The institution fits the general pattern: it existed between non-kin - indeed, complete strangers - and, as demonstrated in Section 2.3, ':'1 The best iIIustr:uion of this principle is Tegnaeus (1952), who inclucks within a single analytical framework a wide range of past and present societies on the sole account of their pr.1ct1sing some sort of .1l1iance through blood ritual. An identical principle is applied by Gudeman (1971) in a cross-cuhural study of compadralgo. Explicitly, the methodology is upheld by Davis (1977) 226-32 and 236·8. For earlier anempts to break away from such typologies, see Eismstadt (1956) and Pin· Rivers (1968). 12 Everywhere in popular thought ritualised relationships tend to be pr~nted as somehow stronger and more sacred than kinship ties. The central African Aundc, for example, commonly '·contrast blood·brotherhood with kinship, extolling the first in comparison with the second" (Evans-Pritchard (19.13) 399). In the tribal societies studied by Tegnaeus, it is likewise assumed that "blood·brotherhood is something greater than blood· relationship" (Tegn.1et1s (1952) 13 and 66). Similarly, a godparent is often thought to be more imponant than the rul parent. The explanation Biven for this in a modem Greek village wa5 that "through the parents the child is born into t~ world of the flesh, through the godparent it is born into the world of the spirit" (Du Boulay (1974) 163; d. Gudcman (1971) for a study of compadra:.go as a 'spiritual' tie). This should be compared with the Homeric lines "A man needs no grut grasp of things to understand that a xeinos and hilut~s (suppliant) is no less precious than a brother" (Odyssry 8.545-6), and with Aristotle's explanation, based probably on a popular proverb, that "xmia is the firmest of all phi/iai" (Mapa Mora/ia 1211a 46). For the relationship betwttn Junia and hiketeia, ~ below, ~etion 3.3. ?J The mixture of kinship and friendship elements makes it impos~ible to fit Junia neatly into either of Pitt-Rivers' categories of ritual kinship or ritualised friendship. I have d«ided to call the institution 'ritualised frkndship' (rather than 'ritual kinship') because th~ kinship dement is not implied in its Greek name, in the way that it is with godparenthood and blood·brotherhood.

34

Ritualised friendship

it was structured by a system of ideas mimicking kinship relations. Apan from these basic features, xenia displays characteristics that are in pan analogous to those of other ritualised relationships, in pan without parallel in other cultures. The imponance of viewing the Greek institution in this broader context is twofold. First, it shows that the conceptual distinction between kinship, friendship and ritualised friendship exists in societies outside the one under examination. It thereby inspires some confidence that the proposal to treat xenia as a specific, relatively autonomous, domain of social life is not arbitrary. Secondly, it allows us, on the basis of a coherent analytical framework, to make controlled comparisons with ritualised relationships in other cultures. Throughout this study I shall try to show that this view of xenia will help to bring into focus cenain aspects of the institution which cannot otherwise be seen. 2.6 SOCiAL STATUS

Ritualised friendship appears as an overwhelmingly upper-class institution. The people involved in it belonged to the elites of the ancient world - to a small minority renowned for their wealth and identified by high-sounding titles such as 'hero', 'king', 'tyrant', 'satrap', 'nobleman', 'general', 'politician'. People of humbler standing are significantly rare. 74 Non-free men are absent altogether. And women are extremely rare. There are remarkably few references to male-female alliances - the xenia between Hekabe, Queen of Troy, and Polymestor, ruler of Thrace, being the most explicit one 75 but there is no sign of an alliance involving two women. Jason's suggestion

'4 For example, ThemilOn in Herodotus 4. 1S4 was an mrporos; Polemainetos in lsocrates 19.5 (Aqirrn;cus) and Megistias in Herodotus 7.228.4, rrumtm; Satyrot of Athens, the xmos of Apollophanes of Pydna (Imnosthmes 19.193-4 (De Falu ugatwne)), was a comedian. It should be noted that these were all itinerant profeslions and exttpt for the mtporos all were ·r~ble'.

Euripides, Hecuba 710. The case of Mania of Dardanul and Phamabazos (Xenophon, Hellmiu 3.1.11 ff.) is presumably another instance of man-woman alliance. though t~ word xmos does not appear in the text; and so seems to be that of lsocrates and the wife of Jason of Pheru. Polyalko (Isocrates, ultn 6.1). unainty is impossible. but, as argued by G. Mathieu in the Rude edition of lsocratel (vol.lV (1961) 169), the circumflex of noAuoAxo~ found in the Urbinas codex, as against the almost impossible noAUQxovc; in others. seems to favour noAUaAxciJ, not nol~ as the nominative of the name of lsocutes' xmos. For a different interpretation of the genealogy (Polyalkes, a brother or eldest son of Jason) and for a summary of earlier views. see H.D. Westlake, Theswly ;n the Fourth Cnrhlry 8.C. (London, 1935) 68.

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to Medea to send her to his xenoi abroad implies that the family's connexions with xeno; were in fact monopolised by the husband. 76 The lower we descend on the social ladder, the less common ritualised friendship becomes. Crito's suggestion to Socrates that he seek refuge with his [Crito's] xeno; in Thessaly implies that he, Socrates, did not have xeno; there. Conversdy, Andocides' bragging "I have formed xenia; and philotetes with kings, with states, and with individuals too",77 was the mark of the aristocrat. Made in the name of Pasion, the metic-banker turned into citizen, a similar claim probably smacked of the upstart. 78 A"ivisme was also involved, according to Demosthenes, in Aeschines' friendship with Philip. Now that Aeschines has become Philip's xenos, the former clerk, "the son of Glaukothea the tambourinist", parades in the agora in the company of other aristocrats, apes their manners, and looks down on ordinary people. 79 The conclusion thus imposes itself that the story told by the wretched beggar (Odysseus in disguise) about his sojourn in the court of kings was intended as proof of his noble origins - a quality which would put him on a level with the suitors. 8o Only when both partners enjoyed an equally elevated social standing was the relationship in harmony with its ideal image. Polybius thus relates in a reverential tone that Philopoimen, scion of noblest Arcadians, was brought up by Kleandros, a xenos of his father, and the noblest of Mantineans. 81 And, when the anonymous Siphnian aristocrat (in )socrates' Aegineticus) wished to impress the jury with the similarity between himself and one Thrasylochos, he said: "we had the same philoi and xeno;".82 Such a deeply ingrained element of ritualised friendship was equality, that when the semihellenised ruler of Commagene, Antiochos I, wished to give publicity to his

Euripides, M~dea 613. n Andocides 1.145 (0" tM M)'stnies); d. lysia.s 6.48 (Agamst A"doddes), where Andocides' bragging is maliciously invnted: "But for all his wulth, and the power in his pounsion, the xenos of kinp and tyrants ...". 71 Demosthmes 50.56 (Against Polycks). As an ex-II ave, Pasion must have lacked 'ancestral guest-friends'. Demosthmes 19.314 and 295 (De Faha LeRatimu), and 18.284 (0" tM Crown). Cf. 19.225. where Pythokln. since his visit to Philip, is said to rum .1Side whenever he m«~ the orator. For Pyrhokles' aristocratic pedigree and the phr3se loa PalVtOV n\&xAfl. see Davi~ (1971) no.12444. 10 Odyssey 14.19tff. I. Polybius 10.22.1; d. Pausanias 8.49.2 and Plutarch, PhiJopomten 1. In thil context we should perhaps mention again the Jewish prince Anripatu, whose riK to power was attributed, among other things, to his forming "relations of philia and xenia with other dynasrs" (Josephus, }ewnh A"tiquities 14.122). 12 lsocrates 19.10. 76

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Ritualised Friendship

own divine qualities, he set up a series of monumental reliefs commemorating himself as the xenos of gods and heroes (Fig. 3a,b).8.1 However, the possession of xeno; was not only a status symbol but also, and chiefly, an asset of real value. The worth and power of a man both within his community and outside it was in a sense in direct proponion to the number of xenoi attached to him. It is no mere coincidence that the great figures of ancient history, men such as Cyrus, Alkibiades and Agesilaos, crop up persistently in the sources as having an unusually high number of xeno;.84 True, xenia was but one of the ways these powerful individuals forged bonds outside their own communities. The other was marriage, and both devices could, and indeed did, serve as political alliances. But there can be no doubt that strategically xenia was the more advantageous. First, if judged by the example of Athens, the freedom to marry outside the community was in the Greek states to some extent restricted. In Athens, following Perikles' law of 45110 both parents had to be citizens if their children were to receive citizenship; else they would be classified as bastards. 85 By contrast, we know of no state-imposed regulations designed to discourage the conclusion of x~n;a;. Like ritualised relationships in many cultures, xenia was surrounded by an aura of sacrosanctity. Secondly, the number of alliances a man could forge through marriage was confined to the number of his marriageable close kin (children, sisters). By contrast, the limit to the number of xenoi that he could possess was set only by the number of individuals with whom he could interact. These are perhaps the reasons why in some cases, where both xenia and marriage were used simultaneously, marriage was regarded as the complementary and subordinate device. Hiero of Sicily, for example, is said to have concluded a pact of xenia with Pyrrhus of Epirus, reinforcing it (and not vice versa) with a marriage (epigamia) between Hiero's son and Pyrrhus' daughter. 86

For the role of the handshake in concluding me alliance, see S«tion 3.3 and Fig. 5, p.52. See Appendix A. In Autocratic rulen were of course free of such inhibitions. See Gernet (1953) for marriage alliances of tyrants and Seibert (1967) for those of Helleniltic rulen. •• Pausanial 6. t 2.3. The textual problems involved in this passage (which do not affect my argument) are discussed by P. leveque, PyrThol (Pans, t 957) 68Off. Thil and 101M other examples (e.g. the ~ace treaty betw«n the lydians and Medes, reinforced by a marriage betwem the rulen' familin (Herodotus 1. 74); 0iM'US giving his daughter to ~lIerophon (1IUu1 6. t 92); Omtn' lister Electra marrying Pylades, Orestes' xmol (Euripides, Electra 1241 and t 340)) show that, unlike some ~do·relationships in other cultures (certain types of godparenthood and blood-brorherhood, d. Tegnaeus (1952) and Gudeman (1971 )), xmUJ did not create an incest taboo preventing the creation of real kinship relations. I)

14

6 Social Status

a

37

b

Fig. 3a,b Social ltatu , Relief steles made of basalt lava, found in Sofraz Kay, showing Antioc:hos I, King of Commagene (66-64 B.C.), engaged in a ritual handshake (dn;os;s) with a ApolloHeliOi and b Her.Id~. In a series of monumental reliefs (see J. Wagner in Anlik Welt 6 (1975) 51·9 for funher examples), Anriochos posed as the x~nos of Sods and heroes. The reliefs could not have conveyed their meaning (that Antiochos was on a level with his divine parmers) if the belid that xenia implied equality was not widespread. Indeed, in the insaipuon below relief a (SEG 26. 1623), one of the epithets of Antiochos js 'THEOS'.

Within the narrow elite group from which the large- majority of ."enoi were drawn, one's formal status, birth, or official position was of relatively little impon~nce. What mattered most was the po~ession of a quality which the other needed, and that IS why, an fact, a bond of ritualised friendship did not necessarily involve ~xaet social ~uals. Ther~ is, in this respect, a marked Incongruity between image and reahty. In spite of possible de facto inequalities, the terminology and ethos remained those of friendship, and friendship, as a common proverb had it, meant equality.17 Agamemnon and 87

AriltOd~. E.thIUJ Nic0m4chea 8.IIS1bS and Politics l.1281blO.

Ritualised Friendship

38

Idomeneus were thus called hetairoi; Odysseus, ruler of Ithaka, and the wretched beggar from Crete (in fact, Odysseus in disguise), were xeinoi patroioi;88 also xenoi were Xerxes and Pythios, or Eteokles, King of Oaxus, and Themison, the Therean trader. 89 Both Archidamos and Agesilaos, kings of Spana, had as their xeno; the followers of leading politicians in Phlius. 9O In the world of Odysseus, in a not dissimilar fashion, "Agamemnon, the most powerful of the many rulers among the Hellenes, had as his guestfriend in Ithaca not the king, Odysseus, but one of the non-ruling aristocrats, Amphimedon".91 And when Herodotus wished to point out the special status that the Arabians enjoyed in the Persian empire, he said that, unlike the other subdued peoples, the Arabians were xeno;. not inferior subjects. 92 This possible incongruity between ideal and reality was skilfully exploited by the Attic orators. Subordination. flattery, and abject servitude, they would claim, were masquerading as friendship and equality. 93 These slanderers, however, had to resort to paraphrases to express the demeaning practice since the language itself contained no words to designate unequal partners. When, in the beginning of the second century B.C., formal ranks were introduced within the ruling circle of the Ptolemaic kings, the notion of gradation could only be expressed in a cumbersome terminology: from among the syngeneis; from among those equal in honour to the syngeneis; from among the first philo;; from among those equal in honour to the first philo;; from among the philoi; from among the archisomatophylakes; from among the diadochs. 94 In sum, the Greek language did not give rise to a pair of hierarchical status designations analogous to the Roman patronus-c/iens or the medieval dominus-vassus. Polybius, trying to interpret for his Greek public what the Romans would have called patroni and c/ientes, could not find a more suitable term than philoi. 9s

II

Odysuy 17.522.

I'

lIiM14.266; HuodoNl 7.29 and 4.154.

Xenophon, Htlkrti,,, 5.3.13; d. Cyropudi4 5.1.3 for the asymmetrical xmi4 berwtcn Abradatas of SU5a and the King of Bactria. .. Finley (1917) 103, rderriul to Odyssey 24.114. '1 HerodoNs 3.88. •) Demosthenes 18.50-2 (0" tht e'O","); Aeschinn 3.66 (Agai,.,' Ctt$;Pho"). ... Cf. Atkinson (1952) and Mooren (1975) 2. The ranks are cited in desccndinS order. For the seemingly &ns yariegated nomendature of me Sdeucid kingdom, see Walbank (1984a) 71·2. •, 'J'he tmn served Polybius to render both (theoretically) egalitarian ho$,,;IitmI and inqalitarian patrOI'INS-clierrs bond. Only much I.trr writrn (Dionysiul of Haliamassus and Plutarch) transliterated the Larin terms into Greek or equated patro,,; with f'rOsta'ai 'hd clatn with ptlalai. Cf. Edlund (19n) 132. 90

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No status distinctions being available, the quality of the benefits exchanged remains the single clearest indication of the partners' relative wealth, power, and status. 96 Using these benefits as an index, it is possible to draw up a crude typology of relative statuses. Egalitarian types of exchange tended to take place in cases where neither partner enjoyed an overwhelmingly powerful position in his own social unit. Apollodoros the Athenian, for example, when short of money as trierarch, borrowed from the xeno; of his father in Tenedos. 91 It is a reasonable guess that Apollodoros' father, Pasion, performed services of a similar nature through his banking establishment in Athens. Even when one of the partners moved into the household of the other, the relationship could be assumed to rest on equality and reciprocity. However, relative status might alter in the course of the interaction. If initially it had been a relationship of equality, in the course of time it could have shaded off into a relationship in which one partner attained a position of strength, the other a position of weakness. In other words, a horizontal tie linking together social equals may have been transformed into a vertical patron-client bond. Goods then would tend to be repaid by services, protection by loyalty, and willing co-operation turned into coercive dependence. 98 Throughout Greek history, there were three distinct types of role in which a man who was both a client and a ritualised friend could perform services for his patron. (a) A client might be installed, or confirmed, by his patron as a ruler in his own social unit. According to Herodotus, for example, Xerxes made Theomestor, a Samian, tyrant in Samos as a reward for having fought well on the Persian side in the battle of Salamis. 99 Theopompos relates that Philip of Macedon had established Thrasydaios, the Thessalian, as a tyrant over his own people. loo Syennesis, King of Cilicia, was on the other hand allowed to continue ruling Cilicia as Cyrus' subordinate. 101 (b) A client might serve his patron in his own social unit without concentrating superior power in his hands. Such was the case of numerous citizens of the Greek cities acting as agents of Persian, Macedonian, and Hellenistic rulers. (c) A client might be transferred into his patron's social circle and become a member of his entourage. As such, he might either be assigned resources securing him a certain degree of independence, or he might be left totally deprived of unmediated access to These bmdits are analysed in Chapter 4. Demosthents 50.56 (Aga;"sI Pol1cks). ,. For a similar evolution obKrvtd in the Roman hospitium. d. Badian (1958) 11-12. " Herodotus 8.85.3. 100 FG,H 115 F209. 101 Xenophon. Arrabasis 1.2.26-7. 96

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power and resources. Both possibilities can be exemplified by the career of Histiaios of Miletus. Darius first sent Histiaios to build a fortress in Thrace. But, when he was forewarned that the fortress might be used as a base against himself, Darius summoned Histiaios to the coUrt and turned him into a counsellor. Barred from independent access to power and resources, Histiaios would be left entirely at his patron's mercy. 102 102

Herodotus 5.23". d. 5.35.

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3 ENCOUNTER AND INITIATION 3.1 THE ETIQUETTE

In a picturesque and apparently fictitious tale, Herodotus relates that Syloson, banished from Samos by his brother Polykrates, arrived in Egypt with Cambyses' invading army in 525 B.C. Syloson happened to be in the market place of Memphis wearing a purple cloak when he was approached by Darius, as yet an undistinguished officer in Cambyses' retinue. Darius took a fancy to the cloak and proposed to buy it. Prompted by a divine inspiration, Syloson gave the cloak to Darius for nothing. Darius was delighted to accept the generous offer. Syloson, however, regretted the loss of the precious object and blamed his foolish good nature for it. But years later, hearing that Darius had succeecu:d to the throne, he went to Susa proclaiming that he was one of the king's benefactors (euergetes). At first Darius could not remember any Greek benefactor. But when Syloson recounted the story of the cloak Darius recognised him at once and made him an extraordinary offer. He said that since Syloson had made him a present when he had as yet no power, he would now bestow on him boundless gold and silver. The gratitude (charis) for Syloson's act should be equal to what he would have owed, now that he was powerful, in return for a great favour. Syloson said that he did not want either gold or silver, and requested instead that Samos might be conquered and handed over to him. This was accomplished, and Syloson became ruler of Samos as a tributary of Persia. t Ritualised friends belong to different worlds, and one of the major problems facing ancient writers was explaining how their paths came to cross. Explanations range from fortuitous conjunctions of circumstances through premeditation and design to supernatural guidance. Odysseus and Iphitos met in rather pedestrian circumstances in the house of a common friend in Messcne: Odysseus came on behalf of his father to claim a debt that the demos owed him; Iphitos came in search of animals he had lost. 2 The encounter between Pausanias and Xerxes, on the other hand, was, according to Thucydides, a matter of cold-blooded calculation. It was made possible by an incident that occurred some time before the Spartao regent lost favour with his fellow-citizens. When the Greek allied forces commanI Herodotus 3.139 If. In paraphrasing this and some other nories, I generally omil details which are irrelevant to 1M underlying putern which I wish to uncover. 2 Odyssry 21. 14-23.

41

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Encounter and Initiation

ded by Pausanias took Byzantium, certain 'friends and kinsmen' (philoi kai syngmeis) of the Great King were captured in the city. The Great King would undoubtedly have paid a substantial sum for their ransom. But Pausanias surreptitiously set the captives free, pretending to the allies that they had escaped from him. This was the first act for which the king owed him gratitude (charis). Pausanias explained in a letter that his act was meant to please the king, and, proposing to marry his daughter, he suggested making Sparta and the rest of Greece subject to him. Thereupon Xerxes replied that for the release of the captives a store of gratitude was laid up for him for ever in his house, and accepted Pausanias' proposals. He said that he would put at Pausanias' disposal as much money and as many soldiers as were necessary to fulfil his promise. At this point of the story, we lose track of the exchanges between the two men. But there are good grounds for suspecting that Xerxes kept on heaping resources and precious gifts on Pausanias. For how else can we account for what his fellow Spartans perceived as a tactless display of wealth and an un-Greek display of boundless ambition?.3 To Polybius, it seemed as if the friendship between Anrigonos Doson, King of Macedonia, and Neon, the hipparch of the Boeotian federation, were contrived by divine providence. Antigonos was sailing on a military mission towards a city in Eastern Locris when, owing to exceptional climatic circumstances - some scholars suspect a seismic disturbance - his vessels settled on the land. The situation was further aggravated by the appearance of a cavalry force led by Neon. Boeotia was in those days subservient to Macedonia as a result of a whole series of military blunders and political miscalculations. But a powerful internal opposition, spurred on by the memory of the glorious days of Leuctra, was seeking ways to throw off foreign rule. When Neon's forces besieged the trapped vessels, the Macedonians had good reason to fear the worst. But Neon curiously deflected the course of events from its predictable conclusion. For, contrary to everybody's expectations, he spared the Macedonians and allowed them to continue their voyage. The other Boeotians, we are told, approved of Neon's conduct, but his Theban countrymen were not pleased with it. Antigonos, for his part, was very grateful to Neon. Years after the event, he conquered Lacedaemon and nominated Neon's son, Brachylles, as epistata, thus repaying the good deed (euergesia) that Neon had rendered him. This, comments Polybius, was but the first step in the aggrandisement of the fortunes of Brachylles' house. Subsequently, both Antigonos and Philip kept J

Thucydidn 1.128.30.

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1 The Etiquette

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on supporting Brachylles and furnishing him with moneyt whereby Brachylles managed to crush almost all opposition and to compel everybody to side with Macedon.'A uniform pattern of ideas underlies these encounter stories t a pattern common to historians as dissimilar in other respects as Herodotus t Thucydides and Polybius. Two strangers (not necessarily enemies t it must be stressed) are first brought together. The prospect of a violent exchange looms over the encounter. Violence is averted t however t mostly against common expectations t by some generous gesture. This gesture t together with certain rituals t serves as a kind of triggering event which brings about a reversal: strangeness and enmity are replaced at a stroke by warm intimacy. And t if we are to believe the ancient authors t the friendship that results from this consists not only of external formalities t but of genuine sentimental attachment and large-scale co-operation. Whatever the reality that lay behind these stories, it is clear that the authors had a stereotypical pattern in their minds which t ultimatelYt must have been abstracted from the actual practices of the ancient world. We must infer the existence of a stylised etiquette t made up of ceremonials, a technicallanguage t and a whole series of ritualistic devices. In other words t there was in the ancient world a code of manners and a context of ideas which governed, and by modem standards made uncommonly easy, the conclusion of alliances between enemies and strangers. It is the availability of this code, coupled with a certain conception of man's place within his own group, that explains some crucial episodes in Greek history - episodes which seem paradoxical and nonsensical from a modern point of view. How is it that King Demaratos, deposed from the throne and forced to flee Sparta, went to Persia, where Darius at once "received him royally and gave him lands and cities"?s Herodotus recounts this as if it were one of the most natural of things. Similarly, Thucydides, in his digressions on the fate of Pausanias and Themistokles, takes for granted the availability of such options. What was sensational was not so much the pact of friendship with the national enemy as the abrupt downfall of these eminent men, who were venerated beforehand as heroes in Greece. Nor were these exceptional occurrences. In a detailed study, 337 Greeks have been identified as having maintained extensive ties with Persian kings or satraps in the period before Alexander. 6 Some of these individuals were central figures in Greek history, quite apart from their Persian involvement. Besides those already mentioned 4

S 6

PolybiU5 20.5.6. Herodotus 6.70.2. Hofsrett« (1978).

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Encounter and Initiation

in our study, they include such figures as Peisistratos the tyrant, his son Hippias, Mihiades, Kallias, Lysander, Alkibiades, Antalkidas, Iphikrates and Evagoras of Cyprus. And the same pattern was to repeat itself in later times probably with even greater intensity. When the kingdom of Macedonia was about to engulf most of the Greek mainland, Theopompos complained that Philip's most trusted aids, his hetairoi, were men who had rushed to his side from very many quarten; some were from the land to which he himself belonged, others were from Thcssaly, still othen from the r~t of Greece, selected not for their supreme merit; on the contrary, nearly every man in the Greek or barbarian world of lecherous, loathsome or ruffianly character flocked to Macedonia and won the tide of 'Philip's hnairoi'.' Near the end of the third century B.C., the popular philosopher Teles could produce a seemingly paradoxical argument in favour of going into exile. Most of these exiles, he implied, deserve no pity. "For some of them rule cities on behalf of kings, are entrusted with nations, and receive large gifts and contributions".8 Teles' 'kings' were the Hellenistic rulers to whom the Greek cities had lost their independence. In shon, throughout Greek history the possibility was always there of creating new alliances or renewing old ones, even if this meant cutting across boundaries of group enmity. Two peculiar features of this code of conduct are worth pointing out: its being constrained by moral, rather than institutional, sanctions; and its transcending political as well as cultural barriers. It is thus idle to classify, as modern writers sometimes do, some of the elements of this etiquette as 'Greek'. 'Persian'. 'Oriental', or even 'Roman'. Allowing for slight variations in detail, they formed part of a set of conventions stretching beyond ethnic boundaries. It is not hard to recognise in this the vestigial remains of those primitive conditions in which behaviour was govemed by custom, and in which what groups there were had not yet developed particularistic rules of conduct. Thus, what we have here is an elaborated version of the private peace treaty. Its matrix is a system of thought which assumes that interaction between strangers necessarily takes the form of untrammelled violence. The code provides for an acceptable alternative to this. Rather than being killed or suffering a humiliating defeat, opponents are given the honourable option of becoming allies, subdued enemies of becoming followers. 3.2 PRELIMINARIES

In real life, encounters between would-be ritualised friends were greatly 7 FG,H 115 F224 • Arhenaeus 4.1678. • Tele$, ed. O. Hense rrubin~ 1909; 2nd edn.) 23; my rranslation.

2 Preliminaries

45

facilitated by the extraordinary geographical mobility of the Greeks. The reasons for being abroad varied enormously. A man could conclude a pact of ritualised friendship while fleeing his community as an exile. But he could also do it in a public capacity, as envoy, colonist, or military leader. Sometimes, friendships were concluded while one of the partners travelled abroad for pleasure, or in the pursuit of an itinerant profession (for example, traders, soothsayers, actors). The role of the pan-Hellenic festivals should also be noted. In his typically pious tone, Isocrates remarked that, Having proclaimed a truce and resolved our pending quarrds, we come together in one place, where, as we make our prayers and sacrifices in common. we are reminded of the kinship (syng~neia) which exists among us and arc made to feel more kindly IOwards each other for the future, reviving old x~niai and establishing new ones.' Many of the xeno; whose praises were sung by Pindar had no doubt been acquired in such circumstances (Appendix A). But war provided by far the most common context for the conclusion of friendships. Greek authors seem to take it for granted that the commanders of joint contingents should be xeno; to each other. Of Cyrus' Greek generals, Klearchos, Proxenos, Sophainetos, Sokrates and Aristippos are explicitly named Cyrus' xeno;; friendship with the rest is assumed. Isagoras of Athens and King Kleomenes of Sparta are said to have become xeno; during the joint siege they mounted on the Peisistratids. lO Special attention is given to friendships with leaders of potentially hostile forces. Agesilaos and Pharnabazos' son became each other's xeno; when their respective armies had just stopped fighting. II When Syennesis submitted to Cyrus, it was clear that he thereby deserted Cyrus' enemy and his own ally, Artaxerxes. 12 Finally, the competitive gift-exchange that took place before the great invasion of Greece between Xerxes and Pythios, the wealthy Lydian, is portrayed as a sublimation of hostilities, the aggressive aspects of which have not escaped Herodotus' notice: Pythios' son would soon be cut in two as a result of an inappropriate petition that Pythios made to the king. U The physiC21 proximity of the would-be partners was not always a necessary condition for the establishment of friendship relations. Geographical distances could be surmounted by sending embassies, and rulers who resorted to this device behaved exactly as if they had concluded an Isocrates 4.43 (Panegyr;cus). Cf. l.ewis (1977) 47, for the suggestion that the X('1f;a ~ttn Perikln and Archidamos originated when Periklcs' famer Xanthippos 2nd Archidamos' gr2ndf:uher Lrorychldas served as foint commanden of the Grttk net't in 479 8.C. I Xenophon, Htllmica ".1.29ff. n Xenophon. Anabasis] .2.23ff. J] Herodotus 7.27-9 and 38-9. 9

10

46

Encounter and Initiation

alliance personally. Cambyses' envoys did not say that they would like to conclude a poliriC21 or military alliance with the Ethiopians, but that their master wished to become the Ethiopian king's phi/os and xenos. Similarly, the Indian king had reportedly sent Cyrus (II, the Great) the following message: III desire to be your xenos, and I am sending you money, and if you need more, send for it". 14 Once the parties were brought within geographical proximity, the first contacts had to be made. This could prove especially troublesome if the groups to which they belonged were in a state of hostility. A proof of renunciation of violence was first required, and only then could negotiations concerning friendship start. The main elements of such a rapprochement are illustrated by the preliminaries of the Agesilaos-Phamabalos conference in

394 B.C.: Now there was a cemin Apollophanes of Cyzicus, who chanced to be an old uno! xmas of Agesilaos also. This man, accordingly, said to Agesilaos that he could bring Phamabuos to a conferen~ with regard to establishing friendly relations (n£Ql ~(u~). And when Agesilaos heard what he had to say, Apollophanes, after obtaining a truce (spondas) and a pledge (dexiafl) brought Phamabazos with him to a place which had been agreed upon, where Agesilaos and the thirty Spartiatae with him were ... awaiting them... And first they [Agesilaos and Phamabazos) gave each other greeting
What needs emphasis here is the extraordinary profusion of trustgenerating devices, each fulfilling different functions and each bearing distinct, and highly pregnant, designations. To the devices appearing in Xenophon's story - the mediator, spanda;, dexia, and the greeting - we may add the oath, pista (or p;ste;s), and euergesia. We may now consider these devices in some detail. Mediators, preferably intimates of both sides, provided the inirial reassurance that friendship was feasible, and took the first steps for entering into negotiations. Apollophanes was the common xenos of Agesilaos and Phamabalos. He communicated the parties' mutual intentions and secured

.4

Herodotus 3.21 and Xenophon. CyroP4~u, 6.2.1. Cf. Herodotus 3.39 for the xmu, between Polykratn of Samos and Amasis of Egypt. For rM UK of xmu, as a political treary (mainly) in rM Homme world, see finley (1917) 100. for analogous usn of the Roman hospititmt, see Mommsen (1864) 339 n.26.1n a fashion vny similar to xmia, compattmit4s in the Middle Ages served as a means of establishi"l political allianca. O\arlemape, for instance, "found it impouible to conceptualise his mationship with the pope orner than as a fHKtImt comp4tnmtatis" (Bennet (1979) S). In rM ancient Near East. "political marionships bctwem allied rulen we~ conceived of as OM of kinship. either of ·fra~mity·, ah"tJmI, albN""". or of father and son" (Munn-Rankin (1956) 76). Hannibal's 'covenant' with Philip V (Polybius 7.9) probably «hoes this a~t practice (Bickerman (1952». U Xenophon. Htllnrica 4.1.29·31.

2 Preliminaries

47

pledges of non-hostility. Agesilaos' xenia with Pharnabazos' son had probably been arranged by Phamabazos himself. Cyrus' meeting with Syennesis, whose territory he invaded, had been arranged by the latter's wife, Epyaxa. She won over Cyrus and received pledges from him. It had been rumoured that Cyrus had had intimate relations with her. 16 After Cyrus' death, it was Menon, the Thessalian, whom Klearchos sent to Ariaios in a futile attempt to bring him over again to his side: Menon and Ariaios were xeno;. 17 The negotiations between Pausanias and Xerxes were conducted through the mediation of Gongylos the Eretrian. 18 Such sporadic contacts turned into widespread practice in the Hellenistic age. Powerful 'friends' would use their strategic position at court in order to establish connexions between their overlords and their kin, friends, and guest-friends from the Greek cities. 19 This act of 'bringing together', 'introducing' or 'recommending' someone to a future friend or protector was denoted by a technical term, synistanai, which applied in such cases with remarkable regularity. Xenophon himself had been recruited to Cyrus' expedition through the intermediary of Cyrus' xenos, the Boeotian Proxenos, and became Cyrus' phi/os after being 'introduced' to him by Proxenos. 20 The young man from the kingdom of Bosporus (for whom (socrates composed his Trapez;ticus) had been introduced to Pasion, the Athenian banker, by one Pythodoros, a Phoenician. 21 And Eumenes is said to have sent all his brothers to Rome in 180 B.C., hoping thereby, among other things, to recommend (systesatl them to his personal phi/oi and xenoi and to the senate. 22 A spectacular act of euergesia, a 'good deed' or a 'favour', could at the same time serve as a declaration of non-hostility and a first step towards the " Xmophon, Anabasis 1.2.12 and 1.2.26. •, Xl'11Ophon. Anabasis 2.1.5. II Thucydides 1.128.6 and Diodoms Siculu5 11.44.2. According to Diadems Siculus 11.56, Themisrokl"' safe refuge at (he Persian (oun had been KCUred by one lysitheides, who was at the same rime 2 philos of Xerxes 2nd an iJioxmos of Theminokles. According to another lare version (P1utuch, Thmristokles 26.1), Themistokles' xmos was Nikogenn of Aqae, "(he wealthiest man in Aeolia, and well acquainted with the P~sian magnat" of the int~ior". For the confusion con~ming the ~nonaliry of this xmos, see HofstdtC1' (1978) nos. 205 and 233. I ' This is one of the services for which members of the philoi circle were honoured in the ciries, d. Herman (1980/1). 20 Xenophon, Anabtnis 3.1.8 and 6.1.23, d. Diogmes laertius 2.49·50. .ll lsocrates 17. 4 (T'aproticus), d. Demosmmes 52.4 (Agairut CaJlippus) for the 'introduction' of one K~hisiacks, a resident of Skyros, to Pasion by the Athenians Aristonous and Ardlebiaoo, the xmoi of Kephisiada. 22 Polybius 24.5.3, d. 33.18.2. See Gdzer (1969) 69 for the analogy with commmJa,~. further examples: AC'SChinn 2.1S4 (On th~ Embassy) (Demosthenes to Arinophann of OIynthus); boaate5t Letl" 7, by means of which lsocrates himself introducN a philos, Autokrator, to Timotheos of Heraclea. an anc"tral xmos. I am told that the mo
48

Encounter and Initiation

establishment of relations of solidarity. 23 It could thus become a most suitable vehicle conducive to the crystallisation of ephemeral contacts into permanent bonds. Be it a well-timed service. the saving of one's life. or a most valuable gift. euergesia could serve as an almost perfect substitute for the other trust-generating devices. The essential features of the concept can be inferred from the concrete situations to which it was applied. Its built-in assumptions are a certain short-term sacrifice of self-interest on the part of the benefactor; a state of helplessness on the part of the beneficiary; and the establishment. in consequence of the interaction between these complementary opposites. of a sacred bond of trust between the panners. A sudden reversal of attitudes is presumed to take place thereby. the beneficiary repaying the benefaction with a display of gratitude (charis).24 For. in this world. a benefaction - a favour accepted or imposed - is like a debt: it must be repaid at all costs. Ancient accounts make it impossible to tell whether this sense of duty was a reflection of actual sentiments. or an enactment of cultural conventions. But there can be no doubts regarding the moral duties that were thought to be associated with euergesia. Here. unlike in Judaeo-Christian morality. the good deed was not an end in itself. an act of uncalculated. altruistic generosity for which perhaps heavenly. but never earthly. rewards were expected. 25 On the contrary. euergesia was unabashedly recognised as a secular strategy in the conduct of interpersonal relations. The benefactor put the beneficiary in a state of indebtedness. from which state the beneficil \ Various forms of ru~g~sia are the regular prdudn to pam of friend.,hip. The Spanans sent to Sardis to buy gold. Croesus, rather than selling, mack a frtt gift (dotm~) of it to them. This ftln'8tsia led to a pact of xenia Mtween Cronus and the Spanans (Herodotus 1.69). See Karavites (1980) for exampln of ru~g"iai in Htrodotus and Thucydidn. l4 An interesting parallel can be found in mo
2 Preliminaries

49

ary could only redeem himself by a display of submission and loyalty - and that was all there was to it. "The recipients of gratuitous benefits are always glad to do good services (hyperetous,) to their benefactor in return for the kindness they have received ... ", said Xenophon of the beneficiaries of his hero, Agesilaos. 26 One of the moral precepts attributed to Kleoboulos of Lindus, one of the Seven Sages, was that "one ought to benefit (euergetein) a friend, so that he may be more a friend, and to make an enemy into a friend".27 Plato considered euergesia equivalent to kinship ties in securing loyal supporters. He remarked that whereas Dionysius of Sicily failed to manipulate his kin and friends from abroad, Darius succeeded therein, even though his colleagues (koinonoi) were neither his brothers nor were they reared by himself; they were merely his associates in crushing the Mede and the Eunuch - his ritualised friends, in our terms. 28 Never, in the concrete examples, is the hope of divine retribution attached to a good deed. Darius installed Syloson as client-ruler in Samos since he owed this to him for an almost forgotten euergesia. And Antigonos, when an appropriate opportunity offered itself, repaid Neon's euergesia by nominating Neon's SOn as an official in his own service. After Diomedes and Glaukos had rediscovered their affiliation through xenia, they leapt down from their chariots and "clasped each other's hands and pledged their faith" (XEt{Xl~ t'uUliA
Xmophon, Ag~s;laus 4.4. Diogen~ Lurrius 1.91.

1I Plato, U"" 7..1323; d. Xenophon, Cyropa~dia 8.7.13, where ~~rgt!s;a is SImilarly regarded as the b6t strategy for a mon2rch fO win faithful frimds. 29 Iliad 6.233.

so

Encounter and Initiat;on

territory. The Greeks, however, reassured them that they would not do any harm. Then, The Macronians asked whether they would give pistis to this effect. The Greeks replied that they were ready both to give and receive pista. Thereupon, the Macronians gave the Greeks a barbarian lance and the Greeks gave them a Greek lance, for the Macroniaru said that these were p;sta; and both sides called the gods to wimess. JO

The whole process was given a technical name in Greek, pist;n /abe;n ka; douna;, pista poieisthai, or p;steuestha;: to pledge one's faith. As a result of this, the partners became each other's p;stoi, and their mutual relationship was henceforth governed by the principle of pistis, fidelity. Ritualised friends were by definition pisto; to each other. "Pylades", says Orestes in Euripides' Electra, "I consider you the first. man in loyalty and loving !;tvov t'tJ1O(), and guest-friendship unto me" (xWtov VOJ1£too xal "being in the pistis of the king" was one of the standard qualities ascribed to the philo; of the Hellenistic rulers. J • Abstract concepts, personal attributes and concrete objects are thus conceived of as somehow sharing of a common substance. For, in the world of ritualised friendship, as in the world of Odysseus, "every quality or state had to be translated into some specific symbol, honour into trophy, friendship into treasure, marriage into gifts of cattle".32 And we may add: trust into ritual objects. Pista were usually objects of little intrinsic value, but of immense symbolic significance. Being imbued with the personality of the giver, they were thought to exercise a binding force upon the personality of the recipient. The gods, approached through oaths and libations, were called to bear witness that this transfusion of fidelity had indeed been effected. The term dexia in the sense of 'pledge' was abstracted from the ritual handshake. Indeed, the handshake was deemed so characteristic an element of the process that ancient anists used it as a visual symbol for the whole of the alliance (Figs. 4 and 5, d. Fig. 3a,b, p.37, and Fig. 12, p.134).J3 The handshake has two universally accepted functions: it can serve either as a greeting sign, or as a symbol of solidarity - a pledge against resort to arms. Cyrus the Great at his death is said to have entrusted the provinces to his children. With a handshake (tWv 6E;uirv !~
"O-ov

Xmophon, Anabasis 4.8.7. It is true that the partnen are here 8J'Oupi. not individuals, shall let that the practice was in both cases almost identical. .H EUripidn. Ekct1a 82, d. TaiU.rdat (1982) for further examples. for rM Hdlmistic terminology, d. Herman (198011). )0

but

Wt

J2

finl~

(l9n) 123.

H Se-e Ntumann (1965) for funher examples of vase paintings. Some kind of mreot)'ped gesture involving bodily contact also seems to have been practised in OrMr ritualised relationships. Christian godpamnhood~ for inslllntt, involves a ritual embrace.

2 Preliminaries

S1

faithful friend, the Skythian Amorges, their philos, wishing them all good if they abided by the pact but imprecating curses upon tbe first to strike his friend:'" There can be no doubt that it was thi5 second funaion of nonaggression that the anaent anists chose to illustrate. For two claspU'lg hands mutually nullify each other's aggressive potennal. The arms must be transferred to the inept lefts~ and this serves as a further proof of pacific intentions. It was from this function of the handshake that the symbolism was derived. For the act of greeting itself, however, a set of altogether different gestures was reserved. Phamabazos and Agcsilaos first gave each other greeting (Xa£Q£LV xQO(J£inav) and only then did Phamabaws hold out his nght hand (rliv bt;..civ xQO'tdvQVto~) and Agcsilaos hold out his to meet it (UvtUtQOVtE'VE). Similarly, Dlomedes and Glaukos had long been engaged in conversation when they ~prang from their horses and "clasped

Fig. 4 A non-Hellenic iOltitudon? Shalmancser III, King of Assyria shaking hands with me King of Babylon, probably Marduk-zakir-shWl'i. ShalmaneKr helped the Babylonian king suppress a rnolt and confirmed his position on the throne of Babylon. Ninth ~entUry B.C., from the throne-base of Shajmaneser III at Nimrud (d. M.E.L Mallowan, Nimrud and its Rnna;lfs (London, 1966), yol.!. 444ff.). The similarity between thiS and the Greek gestures In Figs. J, 5 and 12 is striking. Note the objects held in the right hands ot Ih~ followers, presumablt intended to be exchanged a, Jifb. 34

FG,H 688 (Kresias) 1=9.

52

Encounter and Initiation

ro

0i: Q) ..... ro

~

"'0

Fig. 5 The rituJ laandshakc Attic black figure amphon, simt century B.C., repraentil18 Herakles and the ISood' centaur, PholOle Pholos alone of all the centaun made Heraldee his xmOl and protected the hero against his fellow-eentaun (ApoIIodo1'Ol2.5.4). Note the contnst between the (reversed) I)'mmetry of the claspins hands and the dissimilarity of body contoun: xmoi arc mansen who through a ritual act become IloVlnl friends'. Of all the elements of mls rimal (a solemn declaradon, an exchange of gifts), the handshake (daiwis) lends itlelf most easily 10 vitu rcpracntauon. Basically, JeJCiosu i• • symbolic declaration of peaceful intenriona. For two clasping rights nullify each other's agrellive potential; the arms, of nec:esairy, have to be tr sferred to the inept left hands. Here, as a tunher sign of peaceful intentions, Heraklcs' lion skin is taken off and carried on the end of Ihe dub. Hennes, the god of medialon, havil1l brou(!hl about the encounter, siu down to take a rest. For further variations on the theme, see Brommer (1960) 135-8; Neumann (1965)

each other's hands". But nowhere does the logic underlymg this symbolic interaction receive a more dramatic illustration than in a famous scene from Roman history. When Popdius Laenas met King Antiochos IV in Egypt,lS

IS

Polyblul 29.27.

Q) ..... .c

0' .a:

>-

0.

o

U

53

2 Prel,minar,es

Antiochos greeted the Roman commander orally from_ a distance and held out his daia.. Popilius. however, did not return his own dexia, the conventional ign of friendship (nj~ cl>ll(a~ mMh)l1a) as. Polybius calls i~ but handed him instead a copy of the Senatus Consultum which bid the king withd.raw from Egypt. Cle•.rly, the Roman commander was apprehensive that a premature e:kchange of dexiai would have- committed them to a friendly interaction. Only when, finally, Antiochos opted for ignominious I

ro

.\: OJ 4-J

ro

~ "C

OJ

4-J

.c

.-en L-

>a. o

U

Fig. 6 Communal symbolon Right hand of bronze with two broken fingers, bearing the insaiption "S""OO/o" with the Velaunians" (IG XIV.2432, probably second cenlUry B.C., found in tht' south of Fran«;e). The ling wmmunity is unknown (M. Guarducci, Epigra(", G,~ca yol.2 (Rome, 1969) 583, sugests Massalia', nor do we have any due s to who the Vclaunians were. It seems, however, beyond reasonable doubt that the allaance between the contracting communines was conceived in terms of ritualised friendship. 5""00/0,, 'Should here be undemood u something like rreat)' of friendship': the community has borrowed the device from the context of the private agreements of ritualised friendship. I

S4

Encounter and Initiation

friendship instead of honourable, but suicidal, hostility, did Popilius and his suite grasp him by his right hand and gr~t him warmly. For this is a world in which it is a virtue to respttt pledges, and a shame to violate the obligations they impose. "I received and gave the dexia" said Cyrus of Orontas, the friend who betrayed him, meaning thereby that Orontas pretended faithfulness but in reality allied himself to Cyrus' enemy. And Aeschines accused Demosthenes of murdering his own xenos, a man to whom he had given his right hand. 36 As the pista, so the dexia could be given concrete representations. Of Kotys, the ruler of the Paphlagonians, it is said that he disobeyed the command of the Great King, even though it was sent along with dexia. Following Cyrus' death at Cunaxa, we are told, certain Persians kept encouraging the Greeks, "bringing dexiai to some of them from the King that the King would bear them no ill-will because of their campaign with Cyrus against him or because of anythi~g else in the past":\7 Though no hand-tokens have survived from the Achaemenid empire, it is possible to infer that some objects (not necessarily in the shape of hands) were used in cases where no face-to-face confrontation was possible (Fig. 6). As in the case of the p;sta, all that was needed was the mutual agreement of the parties to invest some object with this function. 38 Unlike these objects, however, the whole institution of pledge-giving does not seem to have been confined to any specific society. The Arabians, says Herodotus, perform the pistis by means of a blood ritual, the Nasamones and the Skythians by drinking blood from the hand of the other party (Fig. 7):\9 The ritual technique may vary from place to place, but the underlying system of beliefs is one. Herodotus knew perfectly well what the~ exotic people were doing; the question which he tried to answer was how. .l.3 SUPPLICATION

Another preliminary ritual n~ds special attention since it presupposes a situation essentially different from the ones described above, yet can lead to .ko Xmophon Anabasis 1.6.7; A~hines 3.224 (ARainsl Ctniphon); Sophocln, Phi/okl~tes 813 (Philoktetes saying Neoptolemos f~)J.f Xf'~ x{onv), d. 1398. J1 Xenophon, Agesi/aus 3.4, and Anabasis 2.4.1; for the Roman world, set, for example, Tacitus, Hislori~s 1.54 (the lingoncs, according to their ancient custom, sent to dw Roman l~ons as prnmts d~XI'iU. hasp;ti; insigne), and Nepos, Dalamn 10.1. J' Sherwin-White (1978) suggests that hand-tokens similar to those which survive from the Sassanid pmod might have bttn in use in the Achaemenid period. 'Bronze hands' Sftm to have been known in Rome, d. Piganiol (1959). .\ . Herodotus 3.8, 4.172.4 and 4.70 with 1.74.6, where the word! ho,kion and horkia are uKd apparently as synonyms of pisl;s. For a complThensive study of blood rituals, see Tegnaeu5 (1952).

S5

Fig. 7 Consubstantiality Golden ornament, possibly a Skythian version of • symbolon, found in a barro~ frorn Kul-Oba near Panticapaeum, fourth or third century B.C. The barrow contained the body of a semi-heUeniscd Skythian ruler (d. M.1. Rosto~ff, Iranians and Gre~ks in South Russia (Oxford, 1922) 110ff.). The object offen a splendid visual representation of the Skythian blood ritual (horkion) described by Herodotus (4.70): .....they rake blood from the panies to the agreement by making a little hole or cut in the body with an awl or a knife, and pour i( mixed with wine into a great canhenware bowl, wherein they then dip a scimitar and arrows and an axe and a javelin; and when this is done the makers of the ho,kion tht:mSCIves, and the most honourable of their followers, dnnk of the blood after solemn imprecations". As observed by V. Schiltz (in Compt~s Rmdu$ d~ "Ac"dbnie d~s Inscriptions eI B~Uu-Umu (1975) 450), the artist has found a most original way to convey the Idea of fraternity acquired through consubstantialiry: the profiles of the two men drinking from the same rhyron merge into eam other in such a way as to crelte the illusion of a single large face teen from the front. Note also Herodotus' assumption that such rituals take place between 'big men' surrounded by followm..

a similar conclusion. The. best illustration of this contrast comes from a scene in the Odyssey. According to one of the fictitious stories that the Cretan stranger (in fact, Odys5Cus in disguise) told the swmeherd Eumaeus. he once landed with his trusted friends (hetairaI) in Egypt.. His friends set out at oner wasting the fields, carrying off women and children, and slaymg

56

Encounter and Initiation

the men. However, the news had reached the city ncarby, and in no time they found themselves surrounded by a superior force of footmen and chariots. No one had the spirit to stand up to the enemy, and thus some of Odysseus' friends were killed, others carried off as captives. In this predicament, a sudden inspiration from Zeus made Odysseus adopt a different strategy. Rather than fighting back, he doffed his helmet, dropped his shield, threw away his spear, and went to the chariot of the Egyptian king, clasping and kissing his knees. What happened then might again appear to modern eyes as something truly unexpected. For the Egyptian king, who~ territory had been invaded, did nothing less than protect the leader of the invaders from his own men. As Odysseus would later recount, ...he rescued me and took pity and seated me in his chariot and took me, weeping, homeward with him; and indeed many swept in on me with ash spears straining to kill me, for they were all too angered, but the king held them off from me, and honored the anger of Zeus Protector of Strangers (Xenias), who beyond others is outraged at evil dealings. The sequel presents an even more surprising reversal of the initial situation: following his salvation, Odysseus could claim that There for seven years I stayed and gathered together much substance from the men of Egypt, for all gave to me. 40 No technical terms appear in the text to denote the social institutions conditioning this behaviour. Yet there can be little doubt that the ritual which saved Odysseus' life was what the Greeks called hiketeia, and that the bond consequently forged between Odysseus and the Egyptian king was xenia. Supplication occurred in the Greek world in an amazing variety of situations - to be sure, without necessarily leading to xenia. Gods supplicated other gods; humans - gods; women - men; slaves - rulers. The suppliant, unlike the xenos, could belong to the same political unit as the person supplicated, or to a different political unit; he could be a member of the same social class, or of a different social class. But, whatever the variations, one common feature always underlay the suppliant's behaviour: that he went through "a series of gestures and procedures that together constitute total self-abasement" .41 It is precisely this that sets off hiketeia from the preliminary rituals described in the previous section. ") come in front of you as a hi/utes and give myself over to you as your slave (douJos) 40

Odyssey 14.279ff., translated by R. Lanimore, The Odyssey of Homer (1967).

4. Gould (1973) 94, who furnishes the ~It available collection of evidmce on hihu;a;

also Pedrick (1982). Here I single our only exampl~ which are explicitly linked with

1ft

XnfUJ.

3 Supplication

57

and ally (symmachos)t" said Gobryas to Cyrus; and this should be contrasted with the Indian king's message to Cyrus quoted above: ... desire to be your xenos... ".'u In the first case t one person approaches another from a position of temporary inferiority; in the second t from a real or pretended equality of power relations. Other differences follow therefrom. The exchange of dexia and pista is a ritualistic abdication of hostilities; hiketeia is a ritualistic admission of defeat. 4 .1 To be sure t euergesia too involves a loser - or t at least t a person badly in need of help - but the initiative for euergesia comes from the stronger partner; in the case of hiketeia t the initiative comes from the defeated partner; hiketeia could be described as a solicited euergesta. A later text referring to the mythical past is worth quoting in full in this context t since it seems to point to ritual warfare as the possible origin of this stereotypical behaviour. "What is a dOT)'xenos?" rspear-guest-friend\ literally translated}t asks Plutarch t and by way of answer he recounts a story which in outline at least deserves serious consideration: In days of old the Mcgarid used to be settled in village communities with the citi7.cns divided into five groups... Although the Corinthians brought about a civil war among them ... none the less, because of their fair-mindedness, they conducted their warS in a civilised and a kinsmanly way (syngenikos). for no on~ did any harm at all to the men working in the fields, and when anyone was captured, he but needed to pay a certain specified ransom; this his captor received after they had set him free, and did not collect it earlier; but he who took a prisoner conducted the man to his house and, afrer sharing with him salt and food, sent him home. He, accordingly, who brought his ransom, was highly regarded and continued thenceforward to be a friend (phi/os) of his captor; and, as a consequence of his capture by the spear, he was now called doryxenos. But anyone who failed to pay the ransom was held in disrepute as dishonest and faithless (adikos, apistos), not only among his enemies, but also among his fellow-citizens .....

Plutarch is admittedly a poor source for archaic Greek history. Nevertheless, the faCt remains first, that the Greeks in Classical times did usc the word doryxenos;4S secondly, that whatever else we know of hiketeia, and, for that matter t xen;a t fits into this pattern; and t finally, that neither the recruitment of a defeated enemy into the social group of the victor, nor the prescription of rigid rules of mutual behaviour between vietor and vanquished, is unfamiliar to scholars of primitive societies. 46 Plutarch's story is probably idealised t but it is not devoid of heuristic value. ·42

X~nophon, Cyropa~dia 4.6.2 and 6.2.1.

4' Odys~us' action

in stripping off his arms in the passag~ cited above should ~ compared With the armed figures shaking hands in Figs. 3a,h, 4, 5, 12 and with the encounter bttw«n Diomedes and Glaukos. .... Plutarch, MoraJia 29SB·C. .. < Though its specific sense was probably forgotten, d. ahove, p.II n.3 . .." Cf. Pitt-Ri"'ers (1968) 409 and Sahlins (1974) 207. Many scattered examples may also he f(lund in P. Bohannan (ed.), LAu' tJnd Warfare (Austin and London, 1980).

58

Encounter and Initiation

We shall return later to this conceptual association between stranger, host, suppliant and guest-friend (Section 5.2). Suffice it to conclude at the present moment that the rituals described in the previous sections all served to diminish an initial hostility. Strangers randomly brought together, or 'introduced' to each other by a common friend, made alternative uses of devices such as dexia, pista, euergesia and hiketeia in order to establish peaceful relations. 3.4 THE INITIATION RITUAL None of the elements so far described was sufficient in itself to convert strangers into friends. What they created was a mere temporary bond, a relationship established for a special purpose. They could thus serve partners in a variety of other relationships, not necessarily within the context of xenia, To conclude a pact of friendship, further devices were needed. And, the closer we come to the crucial moment at which the transition from one state to another was effected, the more specific to ritualised friendship these devices become. Nowhere do we find a fully rounded account of such a ritual. In the sequence of the Agesilaos-Pharnabazos conference, however, we probably have something which comes very close to it: And Phamabalos mounted his horse and rode away, but his son by Parapita, who was still in the bloom of youth, remained behind, ran up to Agesilaos and said to him: "Agesilaos, I make you my xmos". "And I accept you". "Remember, then", he said. And immediately he gave his javelin (palton) - it was a beautiful one - to Agesilaos. And he, accepting it, took off and gave to the boy in return a splendid set of trappings (phalara) which Idaios, his secretary, had round his horse's neck. Then the boy leapt upon his horse and followed after his father,4? The picture emerging from this might be completed by three Homeric scenes: the initiation ritual between Odysseus and Iphitos, and two renewal rituals - those between Diomedes and Glaukos, and Telemachos and Mentes. 48 I shall use these accounts to reconstruct the initiation ceremony and to decode the logic of its symbolism, drawing on whatever else we might hear of one or another element of the ritual from other sources. 47 Xenophon, Htllttt;ca 4.1.39. If Agnilaos and PhamabalOs ~re xmo; (which we cannot know for ttnain), this is also a renewal ritual. Ody~ 21.11-42; Iliad 6.119-236; Odyssry 1.11.5ff. The laner simply mimic the main features of the initiation process. For a renewal ritual.as s«n through the eyes of a Roman, see Cunius 6.5.1-S (involving Anabazos,.a hOSpt5 of Philip 11, .and Alex.andn). A parallel from the Old Testament is 1 Samutl 18.1: "So Jonath.an and D.avid made .a solemn compact (btT;Ih) btcau~ tach lovtd tht other .as dearly as himself. And Jonathan stripped off me cloak he was w~ring and his tunic, and gne them to David, t~her with his sword, his bow, ~nd his belt". See also 2 Samuel 1.26, where David in his lament over Saul and Jonathan calls Jonathan 'my brother'. h is interesting to note that the two men bt-Iongtd to different tribts; D.avid came from Judah, Jonathan from Benjamin.

4.

4 The Initiation Ritual

59

-The ritual was made up of a complex combination of symbolic elements which were enacted in a sequence. The whole range of possible elements included a declaration, an exchange of objects, feasting, and again, the taking of oaths. Both the declaration and the exchange were indispensable for the validity of the alliance. The feasting and the oaths were optional. The whole process could be sealed by an exchange of yet another type of object, the symbo/on. Agesilaos' and the Persian boy's solemn pronouncements "I make you my xenos" and "I accept you" echoed the standard initiatory declaration employed by would-be ritualised friends. The formulary nature of this declara'\ tion is shown by the fact that it was not essentially affected either by the diversity of the situations in which the pronouncements were made or by the gaps in time between the periods from which the evidence comes. Diomedes, having rediscovered the link between his own and Glaukos' lineages, reaffirmed its unbroken validity: "I am your xei,ws phi/os in the heart of Argos, you are mine in Lykia...... 49 In a similar fashion, Mentes, once he and Telemachos had recognised the affinity inherited from their fathers, had reiterated the initiatory formula: "xeino; patroioi do we declare ourselves to be of old..... :~o In the underworld, Agamemnon reminded Amphimedon: "I declare that I am your xeinos":~1 In a very similar fashion Xerxes, having been offered lavish hospitality and most valuable gifts by Pythios the Lydian, declared that " ... in return for this I give you these privileges (gerea): I make you my xenos.".52 And, as we have seen, the same set of words could be applied in non-face-to·face situations, when a ruler wished to contract an alliance through the intermediary of messengers. 53 Such declarations of intention seem to be a central element in most ritualised personal relationships. In the tribal societies studied by Tegnacus, the partners proclaim themselvcs in the course of the blood ceremony each other's 'brothers', 'foster-brothers', 'cousins'. The surviving treaties of 'fraternity' 'paternity' and 'love and friendship' between the pctty rulers of the ancicnt Near East in the second half of the second millennium B.C. incorporate what are probably written versions of such dedarations:S4

.'1

Iliad 6.224-5 .

~l) ;ElVOl

b·olltlA.Olv 1tatQWlO\ rllx0j.l£O'dval l; QQxtl<;. Odysse,' 1.187-8. Odyssey 24.114. u Hrrodotus 7.29.2. H Abovr. pp. 4S -6. H Tegnarus (1952); Munn-Rankin (1956) 76; Wrinfrld (1973). It may be of interrst to note that an almost id~ntical formula may be found in the mrdirvaJ cerrmony of homaRe. "Sire, jr devien vostre hom", said rhe would-be vusal, 3n~ thr lord would reply: "Je '..os recoif rt pran a homr" (Ganshof (t 964) 73, quoting from thr Etabli.ssmJerru de Saint Louis 1I.19}. •

H

Encounter and Initiation

60

No less important an element in forging the alliance was the exchange of a highly specialised category of gifts, designated in our sources as xenia (as distinct from xenia, the term for the relationship itself) or dora. It was as important to give such gifts as to receive, and refusal to reciprocate was tantamount to a declaration of hostility. Mutual acceptance of the gifts, on the other hand, was a clear mark of the beginning of friendship. lbe epic poet says so explicitly: in return for the formidable bow, Odysseus gave Iphitos a sword and a spear, to be "the first token of loving guestfriendshi p u.55 To Herodotus, the conclusion of an alliance and the exchange of gifts appeared as two inseparable acts: Polykrate5, having seized the government in Samos, "concluded a pact of xenia with Amasis king of Egypt, sending and receiving from him gifts (dora)u.56 The exchange of these gifts differs significantly from other types of gift-exchange both within the context of ritualised friendship and outside it. First, rather than being delayed, the counter-gift followed promptly upon the gift. Having declared each other as xenoi, the Persian boy gave Agesilaos his beautiful javelin; the Spartan king accepted it, and gave in return (aneowx£v) a splendid set of trappings. Dlomedes and Glaukos exchanged armour in token of renewal of their inherited xenia, whereas their grandfathers, Oineus and Bellerophon, exchanged a belt and a golden drinking cup. 57 The poet does not specify what the gifts were that Telemachos meant to bestow on Mentes, but he reassures us that they were "very beautiful, ... such a gift as dear xeinoi give to xe;noin • 58 Secondly, gift and counter-gift were expected to be commensurate, not surpassing each other in value. Indeed, the idea of counter-giving was u ~ ~t'vooimlc; X{M>OXTl6t~ Odyssey 21.35. The frequent rendering of xmia as 'gifts of hospitality' seems in view of this unjustified. Suidas s.y. ~tv"ov glosses me term simply as "gift given by xnroi·'. and the con~te example'S examined below leave no doubt that xmia symbolised the entry into (or. as we shall see. the perpetuation of) ritualised fritndship. not the durin of hospitality. For the word Ixnrwial with a possibly similar IftlSt in the Linear B tablrts, lee Killen (1985). J6 Htrodotus .1.39.2 (sec Fig. 4, p.St. for the gifts held in the hands of followers in a scene from the ancimt Neu ust). An exception to this regularity is Iliad 7.287U: ~fter fighting a duel. Aias and Hcktor exchange a sword and a war belt - not in or
I"stitutt of Classical Studits 31 (1984) 1-8. $7 $I

Xmophon, Helltn;ca 4. J.39; Iliad 6.2 t 9·20. Odyss~ 1.311-13.

4 The Initiation Ritual

61

expressed by words implying reciprocity: what one received and what one gave were expected to be equal. A system of thought that assumes such equation faces a difficulty when confronted with departure from the norm, and the poet, faced with such an instance, was bound to resort to divine intervention: "but Zeus ... stole away the wits of Glaukos who exchanged with Diomedes the son of Tydeus armour of gold for bronze, for nine oxen's worth the worth of a hundred".s'J Clearly, the value of the gifts should have been equal. lbirdly, assuming that gifts have at once a symbolic and a use-value, the initiatory gifts are located somewhere between gifts that are valueless but have a high symbolic significance (as, for example, the symbola discussed below), and those possessed of immense use-value but which are of no special symbolic significance (as, for example, the estates given as gifts within the context of guest-friendship, Section 4.6). The initiatory gift served both as an object and a symbol. Odysseus could have taken to Troy the bow he received from Iphitos, but he preferred to leave it at home "as a remembrance of his beloved guest-friend". 60 He would carry it with him only on his own domains. It is this bow which, by a sudden shift of emphasis from symbolic to use-value, supplied the plot of the Odyssey with a link without which the final denouement would have been impossible. Megcs' thick corselet, on the other hand, was explicitly designed to be worn in war. The hero's father, Phyleus, received it from a xenos, Euphetes of Ephyra. Passed on from father to son, the corselet now saved Meges' Iife. 61 Goods of commensurate worth and utility were thus simultaneously exchanged, and it is probably this feature of xenia which has prompted some historians to regard these gifts as forerunners of foreign trade. 6l In strictly economic terms, no douht, the circulation of goods produced in different societies was effeCted. This, however, was carried out in ways different from the sort of exchanges implied in 'barter' and 'trade'. For the exchange was not an end in itself, but a means to another end. Nothing like a supply and demand situation, nor profit-making, was envisaged. Nor were the objects exchanged needed by the partners. They fulfilled a psychological need, the need to translate every state or quality into a symbol. 6 .l In genuine trade transactions the articles are devoid of such symbolism, and their exchange marks the end of the relationship. The gift of initiation, on the other hand, was meant to symbolise the establishment of obligations which, ideally, would last for ever. ~9 Iliad 6.234-6.

Odyssey 21.40. '" Iliad 15.525ft. In rhi~ ca~. as in rhe' compact bdwee'n D~vid and Jonathan, the' countergift is unknown. 62 Bolk~tcin (1939) 219, with Iirer~lure. For gifts exch~ngC'd within the framework of xt'n;a ahe'r the nrablishment of the relationship, which form far bt"rter candidares for foreign rrade, ~ Chaprer 4. ", Cf. Finley (1977) t 23. #,{J

62

F.ncOIwter a"d I",ti,lt,cm

-----,

-X{VPET AI"eN

~ ,

'.' . '.. i .,

.

'.' ......~ ,'.'

,.

.....

a

h

(

d

Fig. 8a-d Terracoua symbol.. from Athens hrms a, h, and c were found in 1950 in tht' Agora in a rubbish pit, along with broken ponery from the late fifth century B.C. hem d (= 1(; IZ 916) came w light in IIP8 in the excavations at the Dip)·lon. The production of these symho[a Involvrd thrre stages. On cia)' plaques of the size of a domino thr leurring was first painted; the plaques were thcn cur irregularly in two; finally, they were firrd. The rrsuhing objects were such that any given half would join only its onginal mate. Such objects were so familiar in Athrnian life that a srrirs of complt:x philosophical ideas could be rxprrssed by refrrrnce to them. for example, according to the humorous theory of creation auributrd to Arisrophanes, "Each of us is a mere symbo[mr of a man, the result of a bisection, like the flat fish, two out of one, and each of us is prrpetually in search of his corrrsponding symbo/on" (Plato, Symposium 1') 1d). The underlying idea is that of complemcntary opposites: rlthrr wuhour the other is incomplete. Aristorlr quotrs Empedoclrs in saying that "in thr male and in the female therr is as it might be a symbo[mr" (De Generatione Animalitmr 722h 10). It does not serm possible ro tell whether the present objects were designrd for xtnoi or whether, as suggrsted by H.A. Thompson (in Htsperia 20 (1951) 51-2 with pI.25c), thry reprrsent some adaptation of this original function to a similar (so far unknown) need of thr Athrnian government. HAI.IMOS and XS YPETAION arr deme namrs, but l.EO (b and c, reverse) nerd not be an abbreviation of thr tribal name LEO(NTIS): as POL in a and c (obverse), l.EO could be an abbreviation of a personal namr. The rrading of thr Iruer traa's in a (reverse) as ERE(CHTHEIS) srrms insrcurr. In sum, until further evidence comes to light, thr comhination of personal and deme names cannot br rxcludrd as a possiblr oyrrall rxplanation. As it was not uncommon for Athrnians negotiating transactions with strangers to Identify thrmsrlvrs b)' drmr names (in the bottomry loan contract in Drmosthenes .H.1O (Against Lacritrts), for rxample, the jOint Irndrrs identif)· themsdves as Androkles Sphettios and Nausikratrs Kaf)'stios), the objects could well be s)'mbola used for idrntification brtwern frirnds and d("prndanrs of xtno;. The small hole at the middle of d suggests that the oblect could be attached to a string and worn.

>-

D-

O ~)

4 The Initiation Ritual

63

It will by now have become apparent that gifts of initiation were unusual. even extraordinary, objects, each with a provenance and a history of its own which the heroes were fond of recounting. 64 They served, in a sense, as an expression of their position in society, for the identity of a man of the upper classes was determined by his relation to kin and quasi-kin abroad. In the course of time, these attributes must have become more differentiated and specialised, giving rise to yet another type of gift, the symbo/on, the only function of which was to prove one's identity. This evolution seems to have taken place somewhere in the archaic age: the concept was unknown to Homer, and in his world the special attributes of the gifts fulfilled the function of identification. 65 In the classical language, on the other hand, the meaning of symbo/on was so familiar that several metaphorical usages could be derived from it. 66 Symbola were by now not unusual precious objects, but articles of negligible intrinsic value, bearing an explicit mark of their usc. Pieces of bone, coins, tablets or similar objects would he broken irregularly or cut into halves, each party taking one. (Sec Fig. 8a-d for the illustration of the principle.) When, after the lapse of some time, the xenoi (or their descendants or dependants) met, the test of whether they were directly or indirectly related through xenia would be whether the halves joined exactly. Where they did, the relationship could formally be renewed and the obligations inherent in it fulfilled. 67 A still more elaborate version of the same idea is represented by a splendid ivory plaque from Hellenistic Sicily (Fig. 9). One side is carved in the shape of two clasping hands, the most conspicuolls visual symbol of the relationship. The other bears an inscription which tells us what the use of the ohject was: to remind its owner of the pact of xenia which Imylch, son of lmilcho, a Phoenician, and Lyson, son of Diognctos, a Greek, concluded. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that xeno; resorted to such devices as a matter of regular practice. The paucity of similar objects in the 6-4 For ~x3mple. Odyssey 4.613-18, repe~ted in 15.111·19 (th~ mixing bowl, the' work of Hephaistos, which Mentlaos reaived from Phaidimos, king of the Sidonians). Mege!l' corstlet and Odys5a1s' bow mmtioned above had similar historie!l. The token given by Proitos to Bcllerophon (Iliad 6.168) is not, as sugge~ted by Mommscn (1864) 338, a symbolon, sinc~ Bdlerophon did not produce ir ~s a me'ans of identifIcation on his arrival in Lykia. Only after he had bttn entertained for nine d~y~ by the l.ord of l.)'kia W3!1 h~ asked whether he bore a token from Proitos. The object was thus designed to carry ~ message unintelligible to its carrier - a message to kill him. fob Cf. Gauthier (J 972) 65·6, who made this observation. "7 For example, Euripides, Ht'lena 291 and rhe scholio" to Euripid~s. Af~dt!a 613: "S)'",OOIon: people who entered into rcl~rionships of xenia u~d to cut a pi~ of bone in rwo and keep one hal( th~msdyes and leave the oth~r with their partn~rs, 50 that if they or their friends or relatives should have <X'Casion to visit them or v;u t/trsa, they might bring the half with them and renew the xenia". See further Gauthier (1972) 52ff.

6'

64

Encountn and Initiation

ro

·C

..,Q) ro

~

'0

..,Q) .£:.

--en>'-

co

U

x 't-~~-t' 1\ x W N 0 ( A" 0 c X 1\ W poe 1

I M Y 1\

'N 10 E n 0 H CAT 0

n poe

1\

yew

raCt., € N I A N N raC'a;

010 rN HToYkAITWNErrONWN

Fig. , Ivory .,.boIon Record of an alliance of x."iIl between a Phoenician and a Greek. IvOl')' plaque from the Hellenistic period (2nd century B.C.), found in Lily cum. It was intended to remind its owner that one "Imylch, son of Imilcho, [surnamed] .nibalos Chloros, conduded a (pact of) xenia with LylOn, son of Diognetos, and his descendants" (IG XIV. 279, with o. Mason in Snnitial26 (1976) 93-8). The descendants or dosat laoaates of Imylch or Lyson could produce this .",.boI011 as a reminder or proof of the original compact. The -bad' grammar suggests that the present text was inscribed by the Phoenician panner.

4 The Initiation Ritual

65

archaeological record can in part be explained by the availability of a more sophisticated device, unknown to the Homeric world - the letter. Apollodoros communicated his request to his father's xmo; in Lampsacus through grammata, which a friend of his, in need of help, was (0 deliver them. 6K A letter very similar to this does in fact survive, and yields a fascinating glimpse into the operation and psychology of ritualised friendship. It was written by Isocrates, the Athenian orator, to one Timotheos, ruler of Heraclea, whose father Klearchos had apparently been a pupil and a xenos of Isocrates. The letter opens with some courtesies and flattering comments on Timotheos' rule. But towards its end it becomes obvious that it was in fact intended to recommend its bearer, Autokrator, to the attention of Timotheos, and to renew, at the same time, the xenia between Timotheos' and Isocrates' houses. 69 Such letters, no doubt, would be as good a proof of identity as a symbo/on. But the paucity of symbola could also be attributed to the very persistence of the original practice in classical times: in effect, any object marked by distinctive attributes could serve as a symboJon. All that was needed was an exchange and the parties' mutual consent to invest an object with this function. The norm is thus probably reflected by the case of Demos, son of Pyrilampes, who received a golden cup as a symbo/on from the Great King. 70 As Demos needed cash for a trierarchy, he offered to give the cup to Aristophanes as security in return for a loan of sixteen minae. When they both got to Cyprus (Aristophanes was elected ambassador to Evagoras, Demos was supposed to sail there as a commander of a warship), Demos would redeem the cup with a payment of twenty minae. The redeeming would be made possible by the fact that "on the strength of that symboJon he would command plenty of goods and also money all over the continent [i.e., Asia Minor]". What was meant by this is made clear by some analogous passages in which a person seeks the help of another person known to him only indirectly through networks of ritualised friendship. 7 I In precisely the same fashion, the Great King's friends and dependants would now help Demos financially, thanks to the special connexions which he would be able to prove with the king.?2 The Persian court had probably ". Demosthenes 50.18 (Agai"st Polycles), d. Diogmes Laenius 8.87 for rhe letten of introduction born by Eudoxos of Cnidus ro NC'ktab~nis of Egypt from Agnil~os of Spana. ", lsocrarrs, utter 7.13. 70 lysias 19.25 (0" the Property of Aristopha1tes). 71 For instance, Euripidn, Medea 613-4; Plaro, C,ito 45b-c; Demosrhen~ 50.18 and 56 (A~a;"st .2

Polydes) .

Th~re is a catch in this interprdation: how could Demos usc th~ symbolo1t 15 a device for

raising money al' long as it was in Aristophane!'i' possession? I do not know the suspect some trick was implied by the speaker.

~nswer,

but I

66

Encounter and Initiation

reserved and publicised a special set of objects - Xenophon's timia - the bestowal of which conferred some of the privileges of being in the king's favour. 7J Several splendid vases, some bearing Xerxes', others Anaxerxes', name in Old Persian, Elamite, Akkadian and Egyptian hieroglyphs (some found in Halicarnassus, others in Susa) clearly correspond to such descriptions (Fig. 10).74 The exchange of such objects sufficed to seal the relationship. A common meal might have been desirable, but was by no means indispensable for the alliance to acquire validity. 7.~ Iphitos was murdered before he and Odysseus could share a table, and Agesilaos and Pharnabalos' son, or Diomedes and Glaukos, had no opponunity at the time to do so. Yet, on the other hand, "the table of one's xenos" (xenike trapeza) became a metaphor for the sacred nature of the bond; and the terms homositos, homotrapezos, and homospondos, "one who consumes the same food", or "sits at the same table", or "participates in the same libations" became marks of high regard at the cOUrts of autocratic rulers. Wishing to point out the monstrosity of Demosthenes' crime (i.e. the tonure and execution of his xenos, Anaxinos of Oreas), Aeschines suggested that this was no ordinary homicide. It was much worse, the killing of a man with whom Demosthenes had eaten, drunk and poured libations at the same table. 7ft This is what turned his execution into an asebema, a crime against the gods. For what the eating, drinking and libations achieved was a further reinforcement of the bond. There is an essential notion in human cultures that the possession of a common substance is the basis of a mystical bond. And, in most rites of incorporation or communion, consubstantiality through eating and drinking is an everrecurring theme (see, for example, Fig. 7, p.55).n Through these rites the gods were invoked as witnesses, and thus the feasting rituals merged with the hospitality rituals. In consequence, the xenos-stranger, as the xenosguest-friend, became the protege of Zeus Xenios. We shall return to the consequences of this identification in Section S.2. ,-' Xmophon, Anabasis t .2.27: "a horw with 3 gold-mounted bridlc, a gold necklace and bracdds, a gold dagger and a Pcrsian robt-". In his sp«ch ro thc noblest of Persians before the invasion, Xerxes is similarly said ro have promised rhar "whosoevcr comes with his army bnt equipped shall receivc from me such gifu as are rcckoned ti",iotata among us" (Herodotus

7.8). , .. Cf. R.G. Kcnt. Old Persian (Ncw Haven. Conne\.'ticut, 1953) 115, XVs and AVs. For orher, unmarkcd, pots and utdacts which might havc migrated from place to place as gifl" wnr from onc rulcr to another, we' Coldst'nam (1983). " On the significance of the common mc~1 as a de-vice crearing solidarity, s« Finley (t 977) 145-6; Gould (1973) 79·80, Murray (1983a) and (1983b). 76 Aeschin~ 3.224 (Against Ctesiphon). " Cf. Van Gmnep (1960) 29; Finley (1977) 123 ff; Pitt-Rivers (1973) 94.

'The Initiation Ritual

67

Fig. 10 Peni'.n symbolon Vase of alabaster, panly broken, bearing Xerxes- name in Old Persian, EJamire, Akkadian, and in Egyptian hieroglyphs. Achaemenid period. II betokened conneXIOf}lI "'ith the Great King. Xenophnn could Iso have had in I'I'lipd objccr such as this when he CQmmented: ··WhO$e gifts a~ so readily recognised a!) SQme of those which the king gives, such as bracelets, necklaces and horses with gold-stUdded bridles? For, as everybody knows, no one there is ever allowed to have such things except those to whom the king has given them"' (CyropaedUJ 8.2.7). These royal symbola served both as a marie of the prestige anaching to their owner ,.nd as serviceable proofs uf one"s being placed under the ~ing's protection. The latter peculiarity might have conferred practical advantages in life. For exampl~ ~n the strength of such a symbolon th~ Athenian Demos, son of Pyrilampes, hoped to receive a loan or a gift from other proteges of the Great King who were previously unknown to him (d. abov~ p.6S). (I am grateful to Dr Susan Sherwin-White for drawing my anenrion to this object.)

68

Encounter and Initiation

The relative scarcity of documentation describing this ritual should by no means be taken as indicating its lack of importance. The ceremony belonged to one of those basic facts of existence which need not be questioned or described. By contrast, Herodotus' accounts of the blood rituals were probably inspired by their very oddity. The medieval rites of vassalage, the centrality of which is beyond dispute, are also relatively poorly documented. 78 But if direct documentation is in short supply, the significance and frequency of the ritual of xenia seem to be confirmed by the terminology itself. As pointed out already, the term xenos was consistently applied to people originating from different social units (Appendix A). However, the terminology followed only indirectly from the fact of separateness; most immediately, the term xenos resulted from the ritual act by which the two persons bestowed the title on each other. This is made clear by the declaration formula itself - "I make you my xenos" - and by terms such as "making one one's phi/os and xenos" or "becoming one's xenos" formulae which are probably shon-hand references to initiation ceremonies. 79 Why, then, was the ritual necessary? Students of social relations have encountered notorious difficulties in formulating a satisfaCtOry definition of 'ritual'. There are now as many definitions as there are theories, but none seems to have won general acceptance. Interpretations of particular instances of ritual vary, therefore, with the conceptual frameworks through which they are approached. Unless one accepts certain assumptions as axiomatic, the criterion by which one can tell whether one theory is better than the other is its ability to interpret a larger number of data by making simpler assumptions. An interpretation of the rites of initiation is therefore offered in the light of a theory which best meets this criterion - the theory which was laid down by Van Gennep at the beginning of the century. It must be stressed that some interpretation of the ritual is essential. Judged by the amount of attention devoted to it, by the refined vocabulary in which it was expressed, and the number of metaphorical usages to which it gave rise, the ancient peoples were doing something which, to them at least, appeared extremely significant. What? Before trying to answer this question it is helpful to introduce a metaphor ,. Cf. I~ Goff (1980) 240. Iliad 4.266; Herodotus 4.1 54.3, whe~ rhe term u~ is ";(l{)OA~V btl ;dVlO; Xenophon, AMb,u;s 1.2.3 and 7.1.8, in which case Xenophon is speaking about himself; Aeschines 3.224 (Aga;".st Cus;phorr); lsocrates 4.43 (Parrt'gyr;cu.s) and 19.5 (Aegirrtticu.s)i Pauunias 4.4.8; Plutarch, Solon S.2. 7'9

5 Continuity

69

used by Van Gennep to describe the perception of social boundaries in primitive mentality: A society is similar to a house divided into rooms and corridors. The more the society resembles ours in the form of civilisation, the thinner are its inner panltions and the wider and more open are its doors of communication. In a semi-civilised society, on the other hand, sections are carefully isolated and passage from one to another must be made through ceremonies which show exrensive parallels to the rites of territorial passage... 80

The ritual, then, could be viewed as effecting a breakthrough in the psychological barriers of strangeness and hostility - a passage through Van Gennep's 'partitions'. Admittedly, this argument is to some extent circular: we infer the 'partition' mentality from the frequent practice of ritual; there does not seem to be an independent way of ascertaining its existence. But Van Gennep's vision receives further confirmation if we extend our framework to the cross-cultural category of 'ritualised relationships' (above, Section 2.5); in all these relationships, with a few exceptions, there is an initial coincidence of 'strangeness' and 'ritual,.81 The techniques used are, in this respect, unimportant; it is immaterial whether the ritual consists of the baptism of a child, the mixing of blood, the chewing of a common substance, or the exchange of some 'sacred' object. What matters is that everywhere a drastic change in the relative position of the partners is envisaged. The partitions of strangeness that are broken through are at once replaced by a pretence of friendship and excessive familiarity: everywhere a new bond is being instituted through which goods and services flow and co-operation is effected. The ceremony initiating relations of ritualised friendship can thus be viewed as a veritable rite de passage.

3.5 CONTINUITY

One peculiar feature of the rites of initiation was, as we have seen, to bind together not only the participating individuals, but also their respective lineages. For ritualised friendship was thought to outlast the individual actors and, conspicuously mimicking kinship ties, pass on to their descendants. Thus, a person could die, but the role of xenos could not. Leach's general observation that "An enormous amount of human ritual... is focussed around this central problem of asserting continuity in defiance of Van Gennep (1960) 26. CE. S«tion 2.5. I 5ay 'iniri~I', since riruali~d relarionships arC' rC'markably fluid, and in the course of rime both the conceprion of barriers and the need for ritual mighr change. Cf. Gluckman (1962) and Pin-Rivers (1968) 412-1.l. 10

III

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the threat of mortality"81 probably deserves more attention than it has generally been accorded. In real life, this metaphysical continuity needed constant fostering, lest it be forgotten. People would keep a record of both their inherited and their personally acquired xeno;. The information concerning this, together with whatever objects were originally exchanged, would pass from fathers to sons, serving as a reminder of the initiation ceremony.8.l It is the sons' perspective on the ritualised-friendship stemma which is reflected in the technical term patrikos xenos. 84 Sons would sometimes reinforce this continuity by occasional exchanges of gifts or hospitality. Nevertheless, the link could be forgotten, and then a renewal ceremony was necessary to reaffirm the original compact. 85 The need ritualistically to renew the bond shows that the relationship was thought to persist independently of individual actions or wishes. The fact that neither they themselves nor their fathers had ever seen each other before did not prevent Diomedes and Glaukos from recognising their mutual obligations. All that was needed was a reiteration of the rites of initiation. In a similar case, Darius had forgotten about the bond which tied him to Syloson; but, when reminded of it, he suddenly reassumed the role of generous friend. 86 Antigonos Doson nominated Brachylles as an official in his service in repayment for the good deed done to him by Brachylles' father; the favour owed was assumed to have devolved from father to son. 87 Finally, (socrates' estrangement from his xenos, Klearchos, on account of the cruelty of Klearchos' rule, brought the relationship to a low ebb but did not put an end to it. After Klearchos' death, Isocrates could therefore propose to Timotheos, Klearchos' son, to renew their former ph;lia and xenia (avaV£OUJ,lEVOC; 'ri}v epl1£av xat ~EV£av): paraphrasing closely the ritual declaration, Isocrates said that he would "accept [Timotheos) hack n (at b·Moblxof1ol.).88 And this was an ever-recurring pattern. The inference must be that the renewal ritual was intended to reinvigorate a formal tie which had fallen into disuse hut had not been abolished. 12

Leach

11.1

The actors throughout s«m to havc th~ most vivid recollcctions of thc smallest details of

the

(t 972) 316.

tv~nt .

... See Appendix A. last column, for a list of inherited relationships. This hereditary e1cment is not prCSC11f in all ritualised relationships. • ~ ~ technical ~m is nvavroUo6al, thc spectrum of which is somctiJnn wider than 'to renew'; if can also lignify 'to rehear~" or 'go ovcr verbally'. d. L. Robe", Htllnr;ca 1 (1940) 96 n.S. For 'renewal' within the context of ritualised friendship, sec Thucydides 1.3.1.4 (with phi/ill); lsocratet 4.43 (Parfegyr;cus); Polybius 33.18.2; Scho/iorf to F.uripioo. Mtd~a 613 (2.17S Schwam); Cu"ius 6.5.1-5 (hosp";u,,,). Herodotus 3.140. ., Polybius 20.5.12. lsocrafes. utter 7.13.

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.5 Continuity

71

The question thus arises: Was there any formal way in which this continuity could be broken? Theory must be separated from practice. In practice, the obligations of ritualised friendship could certainly be ignored. One could leave the bond unactivated until it fell into abeyance; one could fail to provide much-needed assistance; and one could even inflict injury on a partner. In all these cases interaction would in practice stop. But, was there any formal act by which the imagined continuity could be disrupted? The available evidence does not easily lend itself to interpretation. 'The Cretan ruler Etearchos, we are told, made one Themison, a Therean trader, his xenos with a vicious purpose in mind. He first exacted an oath from Themison that he would perform for him whatever service he desired, and then bid him take his own daughter and throw her into the sea. Themison was very angry at this most improper suggestion, and dissolved his xenia with Etearchos. In a similar fashion, Amasis, King of Egypt, is said to havc dissolved his xenia with Polykratcs of Samos. 89 Such tcrms as thesc, as well as analogous terms occurring within the framework of the relationships between proxenoi and the city they represent,90 and the fact that a disruption ceremony might be necessary in cases where the termination of the relationship involved economic settlements, seems to suggest that such ceremonies were indeed available. I know, however, of no source which might indicate of what they consisted. Parallels from other ritualised relationships suggest that such ceremonies tend to mirror in reverse, although not in perfect symmetry, the original initiation ceremonies. If applied to our case, this would mcan that the commitment to become each other's xenos was withdrawn, and the gifts of initiation returned. However that might be, it seems clear that the rupture ceremony did not involve a spectacular act similar to the feudal 'throwing of the rod' (exfestucatio) or the Roman 'breaking of the tessera' (tesseram confringere), by which the whole idea of stoppage could metaphorically be expressed. 91 And it seems certain that it was only seldom used. If it were common, Perikles would surely have resorted to it to disclaim his compromising involvement with King Archidamos. All Perikles did, however, was to remove his estates from the context of obligations affected by xenia; technically, Perikles and Archidamos continued to be xenoi. This fits in with what we know about public attitudcs to

Herodotus 4.154.4 and 3.43.2, d. Plutarch, Moralia 151F; the verb is dialuein, which is also used to C'Xprns diYor~, d. Syll.l 364, lin~ 58. For the use of dialu~in for dissolving philia, d. Hyperides 5.21 (Agamst Dmwsthmes). 90 See, for example, Thucydides 5.43 wirh Daux (1937) concerning Alkibiades' renew~1 of fJTOxmia with Spina. 91 Cf. Mommsen (1864) 343; Marc Bloch (1912); i.e Goff (1980). 19

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such procedures in other ritualised relationships: in most cases the disruption of the sacred bond entails disgrace. 92 I have outlined in this chapter the symbols, techniques and devices which served to convert strangers and enemies into friends and intimates. It appears from this outline that only very little has changed in this respect following the emergence of cities; the rituals used by Greek citizens show remarkable similarities with the rituals which had been used by Homeric heroes and non-Greek 'big men'. In other words, the outer shell of ritualised friendship survived almost intact into the world of the city. But not so its substance. The entire fabric of social relations was now different, and ritualised friendship became entangled in social and economic formations which before did not exist. Of necessity, it affected them and was affected by them. To gain a clearer perception of these transformations, we turn to the material aspect of the relationship. '2 Cf. Gudeman (1971) 59; Hammel (1968) 79; Tegnaeul (1952) 74. In Hispanic America, many ~Ie acquire more compadratgO ties than they can maint2in. As the tie cannot formally be broken, the solution lies in maintaining superficially correct relariomhips with most, but developing effective exchanges with only a few (Foster in Schmidt et a!.. Ns. (1977) 22).

4

THE CIRCULATION OF RESOURCES 4.1 THE PATTERN OF EXCHANGES

In one of his fiercest outbursts of civic righteousness, Demosthenes accused the various classes in the Greek cities of unpatriotic behaviour. He said that each class was in its own way undermining civic independence: the notables (gnorimoi) entrusted with political leadership took bribes, pretending that this was nothing but xenia, hetairia, and philia with Philip; the demos, rather than punishing these notables and putting them to death, regarded them with admiration and envy and wanted to become Philip's friends too. Demosthenes then continued by saying that it was because of this attitude that the Greek states had succumbed to their enemies. The Olynthians, for example, insofar as they had refrained from the practice, had successfully withstood attacks by Sparta. But when some of them began to accept bribes (dorodokein, i.e. from Phillp], when the populace (hoi pallo;) was so stupid, or, let us say, so unlucky, as to give more credence to those persons than to patriotic speakers, when lasthenes had roofed his house with timber sent as a present from Macedonia, and Euthykrates was keeping a large herd of cattle for which he had paid nothing to anybody, when one man returned home with a flock of sheep and another with a stud of horses, when the demos, whose interests were endangered, instead of being angry and demanding that these men be punished, stared at them, mvied them, honoured them, and thought them fine fellows, ... then ... nothing could save them. I This is such a slippery piece of evidence that it seems at first sight hopeless to try to reconstruct the reality behind it. Does the orator skilfully inflate an insignificant practice, or does he relentlessly expose an otherwise suppressed, large-scale activity? No immediately obvious clue is available by which to choose between the alternatives. Nor docs the frequent recurrence of similar allegations in ancient sources (mainly the Attic orators)2 necessarily validate their truth: studies of witchcraft and gossip indicate that widespread charges and calumnies often mask a relatively innocent reality. Small wonder, therefore, that no balanced view exists in modem research either of the prevalence of bribery in the ancient Greek city or of its impact on the lXmosrhenes, 19.259·66 (Dt" Fa/5a Lt"gat;orrt), d. Diodorus Siculus 16.54. Apart from rhe insrances referred ro in this Chaprer, s« Davies (1971) 133-5 for references ro Demosrhcnes' dorodoltia, and Sre. Croix (1981) 609 n.58 for a lisr of pas,ages cont~ining accusarions. For Philip 11'5 policy of bribery, s« Hammond and Griffirh (1979) 210ff. For the 'venality' of cirizrn'generals, sec Pritchett (1974) vol.lI, 126·32. I

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social and economic status of the parties involved. Views oscillate between a more-or-less total acceptance of accusations like those pronounced by Demosthenes and serious doubts as to whether bribery played any special role at all in the extension of the power of the bribe-giver (whether he be Philip or some other powerful figure in the world of dynasts and kings).·l In this Chapter, I endeavour to show that it is in fact possible to arrive at a more realistic assessment of this 'external bribery'." Once we separate value judgements from actuality, it becomes apparent that the practice was all-pervasive. Indeed, it was one of the deeply entrenched features of the ancient world, in relation to which the practices inaugurated by the polis were but a frail novelty. Upper class individuals who were integrated into politically separated communities circulated between themselves substantial amounts of wealth and performed significant services for each other. This circulation of wealth did not coincide with the formal channels of interaction that existed between these various communities. But it did coincide to a large extent with networks of ritualised friendship. Unravelling the pattern of these networks will bring into perspective a feature of ancient society which, however central, is all too often forgotten, and has never, to my knowledge, been systematically explored. For it will then become apparent that the elites of the ancient world were not confined within the boundaries of their immediate groups (whether a tribe, a petty kingdom, a Persian satrapal court, or a polis) but participated in an extensive system of alliances outside the groups to which they belonged. This external involvement constituted a potent factor in the definition of their aims and in the formation of their outlook. First, it affected their social and economic standing within their own groups: for power and prestige acquired through one system could readily be transferred to the other, and their social status inside the group could be improved by means of resources secured from the outside. Secondly, it enhanced their potential for geographic mobility; for, as in the world of Odysseus, "one who had a xenos abroad had an effective substitute for kinsmen, a protector, representative and ally. He had a refuge if he were forced to flee his home, a storehouse on which to draw when compelled to travel, and a source of men and armS if drawn into battlett..s Finally, it facilitated the formation and growth of new organisations, which } Cf., for example, Lewis (1977) 143 and Davies (1981) 66ff. who bt-lieve rhe accuutions; CawkweJl (1963) 204, who minimisn the effter of bribt-ry. For a position dose to me one raken in this study, see Perlman (1976); Ste. Croix (1981) 298·9; Schuller in Schuller ed. (1982) 9·17. .. Bribes givm within the city framC'work, such as paymmrs to individual ciriuns for mrir votes, wtrt subject to altoFther difftrtnt mechanisms and thus fall outside the scope of this study. For rhis distinction, see Finl~' (1983) 83·4. , Finley (1977) 102.

2 The Good Gift and the Bad

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in the long run proved even more successful than the polis itself. The evidence regarding these organisations has not yet been examined in a comprehensive perspective. But even a cursory glance at the material reveals a regularity which transcends chronological differences and ethnic boundaries: throughout Greek history, ritualised friendship appears as one of the building blocks of the Persian, Macedonian, and Hellenistic ruling circles.

4.2 THE GOOD GIFT AND THE BAD

In Classical and Hellenistic times two types of word could be used to designate the notion which we commonly render as 'bribe'. The first, and most common, consisted of variations, derivatives and combinations of the words for gift: doran, dorea, dorema, dorodokia, etc. The second type consisted of words such as chremata (money), misthos (reward, wage). In both cases, the words were subordinated to verbs expressive of actions such as giving, receiving, accepting, persuading. 6 What is remarkable about these words is their ambiguity. For they signify at one and the same time the concept of bribe and the (to us) logically oppo~d concepts of 'gift't 'money' and 'reward'. In other words, there was in the Greek language no vocabulary of bribery distinct from that of gift-exchange itself; the same set of words served to denote both practices. The question therefore arises: How could the doron-gift be distinguished from the doron-bribe? How could the preferred meaning be distinguished in use? The answer, as illustrated by a piece of rhetoric from Hyperides' speech against Demosthenes, seems to be that the choice was in each case dictated by the context: You give full permission, gentlemen of the jury, to the orators and generals to reap rewards. It is not the laws which grant them these privileges but your tolerance and generosity. But on one point you insist: your interests must be furthered, not opposed, with the money they receive. Now Demosthenes and Demadcs, from actual decree'S passed in the city and from proxeniai, have each received, I believe, more

than sixty talents, quite apan from Persian funds (basilika) and the money sent from Alexander. If neither of these sources suffices for them, and they have now accepted dora which threaten the city's life itself (literally: dora against the body of the city], can we doubt our right to punish them?'

As here, it is invariably the principle of community which serves as a point of reference; the 'gift' shades off into the 'bribe' when contrasted with the notion of communal interest. A few outstanding examples, drawn from An analy!is of the words for 'giEr' in Homeric and Classical Greek may be' found in (1951) and (1968), vol.2. 65·79. As these studies take the etymologiC'S of the' words as [heir point of depanurr, the' concept of bribt- eludes their grasp. 7 Hyperidn 5.25 (Against Dcnwslht'rft's). 6

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a variety of situations, will suffice to show that this usage was indeed the norm and not the exception. And the~ could be supplemented by the examples given in the Thesaurus Graecae Linguae, s.v. doron, dorea, dorodo/(ia, which follow the same pattern. In the fifth and fourth centuries, the Attic orators had frequently tried to win the sympathy of democratic juries by alleging against their opponents: this man has accepted dorea against you. 8 At the beginning of the third century B.C., the citizens of Chersonese had taken a collective oath not to accept dorea to the disadvantage of the city and the citizens. 9 Even the word dorodokia - the only one of the gift words unknown to Homer - meant basically "acceptance of dora". 10 To transform it into "the acceptance of a bribe", it had to be qualified. For example, we are told that King Leotychidas led a Lacedaemonian army to Thessaly. But, when he might have subdued all the country, he took a great bribe (tbO>{X>b6x'lOE Q{rfUQLOV noll6v) and withdrew from Thessaly. For this betrayal of communal interests, he was tried, banished from Sparta, and his house destroyed. I I Even if this clash with public interest is not explicitly stated, its very existence is implied by the context denoted by the words. Demosthenes alleged, for example, that Kallias, son of Hipponikos, "was said to have taken dora on embassy". 12 These dora were bribes since, as the orator him~lf explained later, a man entering into the service of the community was expected to be adorodoketos, that is, to abstain from gift-exchange. In sum, it was virtually impossible to make reference to the concept of bribery in the Greek language without implying the notion of communal interest. Autocratic rulers could only receive gifts, not bribes. For all their dislike of tyranny, HerodotuS and Aristotle could not conceive of the monies that Peisistratos, the Athenian tyrant, received from 'friends' abroad as bribes. IJ Nor did Demosthenes ever accuse Philip of Macedon of receiving bribes. Gift-exchange presupposed autocratic rule in much the same way as bribery presupposed a political community. Nowhere is this more evident than in the oath Sworn by the Athenian nine archons "not to accept dora on account of their office", believed to have originated in the days of Akastos, the first archon of the new regime which usurped the functions of the Codrean basileia. 14 • DiMrchus 1.40 (Against Dmtosthnr~s); 2.1 and 25 (Agai"st Aristogiton); Hyperidcs 6.10 Dnnades, 0" the Twtlvt Years 21. • SyU.) 360. 10 C£., for example. Xtnophon. Anabasis 7.6.17. II Herodotus 6.72, d. 6.82 for similar accusations against Kleomenes. and Thucydidts 2.21.1 for accusarions againsr Pleisroanax. son of Pauuniu. u Demosthmn 19.273 (D~ Falsa Legatio"e) It Herodotus 1.61; Aristotle. Th~ Athnrian Co"stitution 15.2-3. 14 Aristotle. Th~ Athnr;an Co"stitutio" 3.3 and 55.5. (M",~ral Sp~e,h);

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In itself, all this might seem insignificant, since a sense of opposition to communal interest is also implicit in the modern concepts. The modern concepts, however, contain a further important ingredient - the notion that bribe-taking is condemnable in itself; that it is an absolute wrong, a sin, even if it ;s not opposed to the communal welfare. This sense of wrong derives from ideologies, ethical or religious, which originate outSide the political sphere. In the ancient world, by contrast, it seems that there were no ideological spheres outside the political with which bribery could come into conflict. Two considerations lend some validity to this argument. Take first the moral connotations of the words. In a study of corruption in modern states, one author has complained that there are no 'neutral' words to express the idea since moral disapproval is automatically implied in all the available terms: 'bribe' can only be a 'bad' word. IS In the Greek language, by contrast, not only were there no neutral words for bribery, but such terms as were available carried agreeable overtones. The predominant attitude is reflected in Telemachos' suggestion to Mentes: "But I beg of you, wait a little longer, eager though you may be to depart; stay to bathe and enjoy good cheer and be given a gift (doron) to take aboard triumphantly, something precious and very beautiful 10 remember me by, a true affectionate parting gift from me, such as dear xeinoi give to xeino;". 16 The value of the gift was unabashedly recognised as an index of the attachment between giver and recipient, When, for example, Xenophon visited the Thraclan king Seuthes, a Greek living at the court tried to encourage him to bestow a gift on the king thus: "For I am quite sure," he said, "that the greater the gifts you bestow upon this man, the greater the favours that you will receive at his hands". l7 Outside the communal sphere, then, the gift is implicitly 'good', Secondly, consider the word adorodoketos, customarily - but misleadingly - translated as 'incorruptible'. If it had meant 'incorruptible' in the modern sense, how could it have been possible to praise CIVic office-holders for having discharged their duties in an adorodoketos fashion? IS Such characterisations in honorific decrees would have been ludicrous, offensive, and out of keeping with a document intended to confer glory. Likewise,

• S Stirling (1968) 49. •" Odysst')· 1.309-13; d. Grierson (t 959) for a similar attitude to gift-giVing in the mC'dieval dark ages. 17 XC'nophon, Anabasis 73.20 . •1 For C'xampk, IG II 2 lB, line 12; J. Crampa. l.ab,aunJa: Th~ Crull Insc"ptions (Lund-Stockholm t 969- 72) no. 4.1.

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how could Thucydides extol Perikles for being adorotatos (a synonym of adorodoketos), and contrast him with individuals who, in order to satisfy their own private ambitions and greed, promoted policies detrimental to the state?J9 This could hardly have been a bland term denoting a tnon-sin' or 'non-offence'. Quite the contrary, adorodoketos embodied a positive virtue, a veritable prescript for ideal behaviour. The full import of the term becomes clear only in the context of the battle of ideologies between heroic and civic virtues. In the process of remodelling the hero to the standards of communal life, the polis had to replace the ideal of personal fidelity, of which the gift was the clearest mark, with the counter-ideal of obedience to communal rules. Adorodoketos thus came to denote a feature of the ideal citizen - a virtue manifesting itself in a willingness to show more regard to communal rules than to personal obligations. To turn this negation of heroic virtue into a term of praise and offer communal interest as a new standard of individual morality was probably one of the most significant victories of the community over the hero. Thus, while lavish gift-givings had been the mark of heroes and kings,20 abstinence from gift-exchange became the mark of the good citizen. The modern and ancient notions of bribery are therefore only very partially comparable categories. They refer to different fragments of reality; they are stored in different mental compartments; and they have different overtones and reverberations. For in the Greek city, bribery was a recent 'invention" conceptually only very slightly separate from archaic giftexchange. A brief contrast between the position of the people engaged in gift-exchange in Homeric and civic societies may elucidate this point. In Homeric society, gift-exchange waS the chief method of organising the supply of goods and structuring social relations. Gifts flew in all directions, but of particular importance were gifts exchanged between the heads of different noble households. For one thing, it was this exchange that enabled the circulation of wealth across household lines, introducing indispensable extraneous commodities (metals, for example) into the otherwise closed

., Thucydides 2.65.8-9; d. 2.6O.S, where Perikln identifies himKIf IS a patriot (phi/opolis) and lupnior to the influence of money. for Xmocratn' refusal of a gift from Antipater. see Di08tnes Lamius 4.8. Of Socrates, the latter author writes (2.25): "He showtd his contempt for Archelaos of Macedon and Scopal of Cranon and Eurylochos of l...an,u by refusing to acr:J't their presents or to go to their court". 2 Cf. Xmophon's o~rvation "lavish gift-giving (polydoria) among the kings continues even to this day" (CyropMdia 8.2.7), and Thucydides' complaint, evidently using the civic practice as the norm, that with the Odrylian kings "it was not possible to accomplish anything without giving gifts" (Thucydidn 2.97.2).

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economy of the oikos. 21 For another, "the whole of what we call foreign relations and diplomacy, in their peacdul manifestations, was conducted by gift-exchange".12 These vital transactions were supported by a moral code which portrayed the practice in an exceedingly favourable light. The central message of the code was simple: a man's gift-giving capacity, or his willingness to abide by the obligations imposed by the gift, was a measure of his moral quality. Immoral behaviour consisted of not giving, or of breaching the obligations emanating from the acceptance of a gift. Deserting an ally for the sake of a greater gift might have given the notion a pejorative shading,23 but such an evaluation was a reflection of the point of view of a deserted partner - of a social equal, not an inferior or subordinate. No criticism emanating from the lower levels of the social pyramid was conceivable. 24 The polis, having inherited this mentality from the stateless past, had to reconcile it with one of its most central, though unverbalised, doctrines. Briefly, this doctrine held that the polis was an organic whole, the different members of which were strictly interdependent. Private actions were now everybody's business, and had to be judged good or bad not by standards set by powerful lords but by utility to the polis as a whole. Even justice came to be defined as "that which is to the common advantage".25 The many thus claimed priority over the individual, and deemed themselves justified in coercing him into compliance with their norms. On these assumptions, a gift-exchange with an outsider quickly came to be viewed as a mark of misguided solidarity. For outsiders were by definition enemies, and a nexus with an enemy might become a threat to the whole community. Hence the easy association between bribery and treason: ..... whenever, men of Athens, 21 Odysseus, for instance, is said to have amassed in the court of Pheidon, king of Thesprotians, so much bronze, gold and iron as to suHi~ to sustain ten whole gtonerations after him (Odyssey 14.324-5). Cf. Odyssey 4.129-30. 14.285-6 and the complaint of Ishi-Adad to Isme-Dagan in a letter from the Mari archive: "And you send me this miserable amount of Ie-ad! ... What is lacking in your house that a brother cannot gram the wish of. brother?" (G. Dossin, Correspo"d~nu de lasmah-Addu, yol. V of Archives Royales d~ Mar; (Paris, 1952), no.20). 22 Finley (19n) 66. 23 Cf., for example. the remark ThemislOkles made to the Corinthian general "Nay. you of all men will not desert us; for I will give you greater dora than the king of Medes would send you for deserting your allies" (Herodotus 8.5). 24 Hesiod's complaints against the "gift-
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you see any man taking bribes, you may be sure that he is also a traitor", says Demosthenes,26 and Dinarchus makes the same point even more forcefully: " ... don't you realise that to take bribes in order to betray the city's interests is one of the greatest crimes causing the most irreparable harm to the cities?"27 There was thus an ideological conflict focussed around the practice of gift-exchange, between the old and the new, and also between the polis and the a-political world outside it. For there can be little doubt that the polis was the exception, and the outside world the norm. There, nothing had changed. Persian potentates, for example, seem never to have grasped that the Greek city did not obey the rules of gift-exchange. Repeatedly, they seem to send monies to leading Greek politicians in the name of 'friendship" being apparently unaware that the noble practice had there become an offence punishable by death. 28 This association between the exchange of goods and services and friendship is important for analytical purposes. For goods can also be exchanged outside the context of friendship, and the two types of exchange are mutually opposed. Crudely, the distinction is this. Outside the context of friendship - in trading relationships, for example - the exchange is a short-term, self-liquidating transaction. Once the benefits are obtained, the social relationship is terminated. The transaction does not create moral involvement. By contrast, within the framework of amiable relations (kinship, friendship, ritualised friendship), exchanges have a long-term expectancy. Gifts beg counter-gifts, and fulfil at one and the same time a number of purposes: they repay past services, incur new obligations, and act as continuous reminders of the validity of the bond. Non-reciprocation is in this context frequently interpreted as a relapse into hostility. The significance of the distinction for our purposes is this. The simple trading of benefits was certainly practised in the ancient world, and may have been important. But we hear remarkably little of it. What we hear of repeatedly are the exchanges between partners who were morally involved. The vast majority of attested cases of gift-exchange were conducted within the framework of relationships that, ostensibly at least, were both warm and expected to last. It may now be possible to define what type of evidence might indicate the extent and frequency of the circulation of wealth within networks of ritualised friendship. Two guiding principles can be set out. First, the distinction ~mosthenes 19.268, d. 258 (Dt Falsa Legaticmt). Dinarchus 2.7 (Against A,istogitorr). 11 The famous caKS are that of Arthmios of Zelea, Kallias of Athens and Timokrares of Rhodes, for which see Hofstetttr (1978) nos. 53, 168 and 326. 26

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between 'gift' and 'bribe' is irrelevant for our purposes since the 'good' and the 'bad' gift are the same practice seen from different moral standpoints. For an assessment of the scale of circulation of wealth, the evidence relative to both bribery and gift-exchange will have to be considered. Secondly, only traditional exchanges will be taken into account. There must be, in the sources, either an assumption of amicable relationships, or a chain of giving and counter-giving: the simple trading of benefits docs not qualify. The goods which changed hands (or were temporarily pooled) under the name of 'gifts' can be reduced to four major categories: natural products, valuables (in the form of money or precious objects), troops and estates. The non-material services which are less easily quantifiable can profitably be classified under three headings: ritual services, private services and services carried out within the context of political institutions. These will be considered in Chapter 5. It should be conceded that such a classification is to some extent artificial. First, the networks of ritualised friendship combined within anyone relationship goods and services of different quality. It was the potential for effecting these combinations that rendered the exchanges so rewarding and the relationships so efficacious: one party would be able to provide what the other needed and, moreovcr, when he needed it. Secondly, the classification covcrs most, but not all the goods and services exchanged. One important item which cannot be accommodated within either category is that of slaves, and it might briefly be considered here. It is hard to form an estimate of the extent of the practice, but the following incident, recounted by Demosthenes, together with similar accusations levelled against Philokrates, might indicate that it was not uncommon. He fAeschines] related an incident which, he said, had filled him with deep indignation. On his journey home Ii. e. from Philip] he met Atrestidas fan Arcadian] travelling from Philip's court with some thirt)· women and children in his train. He was astonished, and inquired of one of the travellers who the man and his throng of followers were; and when he was told that they were Olynthian captives whom Atrestidas was bringing away with him as a gift (dorea) from Philip, he thought it was a terrible business, and burst into tears.2'J What probably outraged Aeschines was that the enslaved people were Greek citizens, not that slaves were given as a gift. Despite these difficulties, however, classification is necessary both in order to highlight the economic level at which the transactions were conducted and as a preparatory step towards the exploration of the other themes of this book. 1.9 ~mosthenrs 19.305-6, d. 309 (De Fa/sa Legatione) and Diogenes Larrtius 2.53 for the present of captivr slavrs sem to Xrnophon by Phylopidas thr Spartan.

.-

C"I I-

>o

0-

U

82

The Circulation of Resources 4.3 NATURAL PRODUCTS

The information available on the circulation of natural products along networks of ritualised friendship is scanty and deliberately distorted. The direct evidence consists of a few statements made in the law courts by people trying to slander opponents and improve their own public image. Timber and grain figure most prominently. Andocides, for example, pleading after a period of exile for his reinstatement as a citizen of democratic Athens, boasted that during the oligarchic coup of 411 B.C. • at once proceeded to supply your [democratic] forces in Samos with oar-spars ... since Archelaos was my ancestral xmos and allowed me to cut and export as many as I wished ... 30

In the same speech, Andocides also made vague hints about having secured for the city a supply of grain from Cyprus. 31 In a speech by Dinarchus, Demosthenes was accused of having received a thousand medimni of wheat a year from the tyrants of Pontus in return for bronze statues which he set up in their honour in the agora. 32 Other examples come from the Demosthenic corpus. Demosthenes himself alleged that Philokrates and Aeschines had received, among other things, timber and grain from Philip, and accused the Olynthian notables of having accepted timber and livestock from the Macedonian monarch. 33 Finally, Timotheos, the Athenian general, is said to have received a gift of timber from Amyntas, king of Macedonia. 34 The question is this: Can we form a more adequate estimate of the scale and frequency of such transactions? In other words, were these exceptional occurrences, or regular practices? Furthermore, is the magnitude of resources mentioned in these passages a wild exaggeration, or some reflection of reality?3s What we sec in these passages is, in my view, merely the tip of an ice~rg. In communities professing egalitarian ideologies, people are reluctant to give publicity to benefits they exclusively enjoy - in particular when scarce products are involved. Indeed, the statements cited above were not voluntarily made but arose in situations of conflict between individual recipients Andocides 2.11 (On his Return), d. Mriggs and l.ewis (1969) no.91. Andocidn 2.20. .u Dinarchu~ t.43 (Against Dmrosthents). n Demosthenes 19.114. 145 and 259·66 (De Falsa ugationt). )4 lnmosthenrs 49.26 and passim (Against Timoth~s). H A thousand medimni of wheat would have sufficed to feed 200 ptOple for an entire y~ar. There is no way to estimate the amount of timber Anchines rt«ived, but it is worth pointing out that one man was therrby enabled to provide for the needs of an entire army by mNns of ,~sou,us controlled by a singlt outsidn-friend. )0

,) I

.-

C"I I-

>o

0-

U

3 Natural Produc.ts

83

and the community: some were accused of receiving these benefits, Others boasted about sharing them out, but no one would freely admit to being a recipient. Fear and desire to conform combined to make people underplay their foreign connexions. Theophrastos' picture of one of his characters may have been typical of the prevailing atmosphere: Moreover, he (the Pretentious Man] may well say that he has no less than three letters from Antipater [one of Alexander's successors] requesting his attendance upon him in Macedonia, and albeit he is offered free export of timber he has refused to go; he will not lay himself open to denunciation. 36 This tendency may indeed account in large part for the sparse literary documentation. But there are important considerations which might shed a different light on the phenomenon. It is no mere coincidence that Macedonia is often associated with gifts of timber, and the Pontic regions with gifts of grain. For it can hardly be doubted that rulers rich in certain resources employed their surpluses in exchange for what they themselves needed and in order to win over friends and supporters. When the young man from the kingdom of Bosporus (Isocrates' client in the Trapezitic.us) set out to see the world, he was provided by his father with two ships of grain presumably intended both as a primitive form of money and as a means for winning over friends. l7 Personal relations of dependence are most likely to flourish in situations in which each party can provide benefits highly rewarding to the other at a low cost to himself. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the surpluses of autocratic rulers, coupled with the chronic shortages of grain and other natural products in the Greek cities, provided an ideal context for the creation and consolidation of such ties. Hints which might lend support to this reasoning can be elicited from civic decrees. Philippides the Athenian, a lengthy inscription informs US,38 secured through intervention with King Lysimachos a gift of grain for faminestricken Athens amounting to 10,000 Attic medimni. The inscription, unlike the literary passages, docs not say that Philippides had privately received grain from Lysimachos. But one needs to credit Philippides, a part-time courtier and part-time agent of Lysimachos,J9 with an unusual degree of self-restraint in order to believe that he did not receive a share of the scarce product. Inscriptions of this kind in fact shed light on the last phase of the process - the sharing out of resources - referred to in the literary passages. .16

J7

l1trophrastos, Characttrs 23 .... lsocratrs 17.4.

~II 5).11.' 374.

,q ct. Shear (1978) 49.

84

The Circulation of Resources

We need to digress in order to form an idea of how the different phases are interrelated. The process of network building, the different aspects of which we see in the sources, involved several stages. First, a relationship of trust was established (or inherited) by a community member and an outsider in the fashion described in Chapter 3. Secondly, a chain of givings and counter-givings began. These included both symbolic gifts that were mere luxuries and articles of real use-value. 4O The goods acted as a catalyst for the consolidation of the bond. For each one of the partners, being differently situated in the social structure and commanding access to different types of resources, was in a position to supply what the other needed. Thus, modest gifts gave way to large-scale co-operation, and the value of the shared resources became an expression of the degree of confidence between the two men. The outcome was the conversion of an initially moral relationship into an economic partnership in which both parties had a vested interest. The more resources the two parties commanded, the easier, and more desirable, it became to extend the partnership. This could be done either by merging the networks of ritualised friendship in which each one was separately involved, or by recruiting new allies and dependants. Ritualised friendship thus became a formula for bringing together a wide variety of people of different social origin, and provided links in elaborate chains of horizontal and vertical integration (made up, as we shall see, of kin, friends and ritualised friends). The more resources a man commanded, the more extensive his network became. Small wonder, therefore, that the most frequently attested networks radiated from the three great centres of wealth of Greek history - the courts of the Persian, Macedonian and Hellenistic autocrats. It is against this background that the honorific decrees should be considered. These are resolutions voted by the assemblies of different cities in honour of individuals who interceded with a foreign ruler (or with the ruler's subordinates) and thereby secured the provision of vital goods for a city. Obliquely, these documents yield a rare glimpse into the operation and power structure of friendship networks. The fragment of the network revealed consists usually of three, and sometimes five (or more) men: the For example: two silver baths and two tripods of gold given by Polybos of Th~ (Egypt) to the Spartan Menelaos, and "a golden distaff and a silver basket with wheels to it and with rims finishrd off with gold" (Odyssey 4.129-32>; the fabulous horse Boukephalas, given to Alexander by a xtnos of the family, Demararos of Corinth (Diodorus Siculus 17.76; according to Plutarch, Altxa"der 6, the horse was offered to Philip by Philoneikos the Thessalian); the golden plane tf'« given, reportedly, by Darius to the father of Pythios the Lydian (Herodotus 7.27); the great many presents (dorta,) Isoc'ntn admitted to having received from Nikokles, King of the Salaminians (Isocrates 15.40 (""'idosis)). 40

85

3 Natural Products

mover of the decree (a citizen of the honouring city); the honorand (either a citizen or a foreigner); the man, or group of men, who directly controlled the resource supplied; and finally, the ruler to whom the former was subordinated, In cases where the honorand is credited with direct access to the ruler himself, the chain is reduced to three links. Some typical examples are listed in Table 1. 4 • Table 1. Supply of Natura/I'roducts through Networks of Ritualised

Friendship Rdrr~nce

oty, dare 5yll.' ]07

Mo\'erof
( I;1S0S.

.3.16-.123 B.C.)

OG/S4 [Nrsos. c..llS B.C.I 1(; II! 401 [Athrns. 323-319 B.C.) S)·II. l 367 IAthens. 286/S B.C.I (with Shrar (1978)64 for thr datr) IG 11 1 655 [Athrns, 285i4 B.C.I (with Habichr (1979) 52 for thr datr) 5yll.' 374 [Athrns. 283/2 B.C.I (with Habicht

Unknown

Unknown

Epicharmos

Honorand(s) from ... Gorgos. MlOniull (lasos) Thrrsippos [Nesos?1 ... son of Mrtrodoros (Cyzicusl Zenon [Unknown)

Subordin:ur of rul~r

Ruler(s) Alexander

'Satraps'

Anripalrr, Kleitos

Important MacC'donians

Unkno.....n

Ptolemy I

Simonidrs

T.mo ... [Athrns?1

Audolron

Nikeratos

Philippides [Athrns

Lysimachos

Eucharrs

Kallias

Ptolemy I

(1979) 99 for

thr date) SEC 28.60 [Athrns. 270/69 B.C.) IG XII.8.156 ISamorhrace. 228-225 B.C.)

IArhrn~)

Phi ...

Hippomrdon (Sparr:!j

Ptolrmy III

4' Thr drcrrrs arr nor numrrous. but thry form parr of a much largrr body of inscriptions which display the sam~ pattern (th:H is. securing 3 'brnrf3etion' for a cit)' b)' interceding with a ruler), but which I~v~ rhr narurr of thr services unm~nrioned. Thrr~ are good reasons to bdirv~ rh:!t som~ of thr5C unspc.'cific in~riprions concral thr provision of similar goods. Srr Herman (1980/1).

86

The Circulation of Resources

There is, in these decrees, a remarkable discrepancy between acts, ideologies and interests which is by no means apparent from the general tenor of the texts. Take first the 'benefactions' - the acts for which the honorands were awarded the honours. Gorgos and Minnion restored to the demos of lasos a valuable fishing ground that had (presumably) been confiscated by Alexander's philoi. Thersippos of Nesos, the honorand from Cyzicus whose name is lost, and Zenon, Ptolemy's general, interceded with their superior friends for the dispatch of grain. Hippomedon of Sparta, Ptolemy's general in Thrace, had granted the right to export grain from the territories under his sway:42 The case of Philippides and of Kallias of Athens is unusual since each of them secured, through intervention with their ruler-friends, not merely the supply - or, shall we say, the non-withholding - of grain, but its provision, as a gift, in substantial quantities (10,000 and 20,000 medimni, respectively). Secondly, take the explanations given in the decrees themselves of the motives of the benefactors. Philippides is said to have "spent much money from his own private resources and rendered his account according to the laws, and he has never said or done anything contrary to [the interests of) the democracy". The other great benefactor of Athens, Kallias of Sphettos, overtly an official in Ptolemy's service, "allowed his own property to be confiscated in the oligarchy so as to act in no way in opposition either to the laws or to the democracy which is the democracy of all Athenians".") Finally, consider the interests. In remarkable contrast with the motives ascribed to the benefactors, the operations involved in the provision of these resources can, in my view, best be explained on three assumptions. First, that these people formed part of extensive networks of friendship alliances, from which all reaped substantial benefits. Secondly, that the service to the city was, from their own point of view, but one more move in this private exchange of benefits. And finally, that the benefits which one (or several of them) hoped to acquire in return for the service done to the city were not, as commonly thought, the honours recorded in the inscriptions (though these might have been important), but the winning over, from within the city population, of followers, allies and supporters. I shall now try to offer an explanation of the first two propositions. A demonstration of the third must wait until Section 5.5. The first proposition is not difficult to demonstrate. The language of the decrees suggests either friendly relationships or relationships of subordina42 4.\

Cf. Gauthirr (1979). Philippides: SylJ.3 374, linn 48-9; Kallias: Shear (1978) 6, lines 80-2.

J Natural Products

87

tion between the honorand and the ruler controlling the resources. 44 It is thus clear that the two men had material interests in common. On the other hand, the nature of the connexion between the mover of the decree and the honorand is not so clear from the surviving documentation. Apart from accusations, the truthfulness of which it is impossible to test, the evidence is practically lacking. This must either mean that there was no connexion at all between the honorands and the movers of decrees - that, in other words, the Greek city managed to suppress this form of 'corruption' - or else that it was carried into practice in such a manner as not to leave a mark on the historical record. Certainty is impossible, but several considerations tend to favour the latter view. In democratic Athens, putting up motions for the gratification of private interests would have been an offence. The people involved would therefore have strong reasons to conceal their relationships. The case of Archedemos, in Xenophon's words, "an excellent speaker and a man of affairs, but poor", shows how a man could act on behalf of another man within the city'S institutional machinery.4J Crito, the Athenian aristo· crat, was plagued with actions by lower-class blackmailers. On the advice of Socrates, he won over Archedemos with gifts and shows of courtesy. Archedemos came to regard erito's house as a haven and treated him with great respect. He soon found out that Crito's blackmailers were not without blemish, brought 'counter-suits' against them, and compelled them to withdraw their actions and pay compensation. Crito's many friends now begged Archedemos to become their protector (phylax). Archedemos did so happily, "and so there was peace not only for Crito but for his friends as well". As a result of this, Archedemos became one of Crito's philoi and was respected by Crito's other philoi. It is not stated that Archedemos put up motions in favour of his patron's xenoi,46 but it is a reasonable guess that he could have done so and thus camouflaged the entire network. For an honorific decree would not reveal any connexion between such a mover and the honorand. A partial confirmation of this comes from the negative example of Stratokles. When, under the rule of Demetrios Poliorketes, the political institutions of Athens were reduced to nominal status, the movers of decrees apparently did not think it necessary to conceal their relationships with the honorands. In the period 307-301 B.C., Stratokles of Diomeia, a member of the richest and most notable families from his deme, proposed and carried through about twelve motions for different friends and proteges of For the analysis of thr terminology, d. Hrrman (1980/1). Xrnophon, Mttmorabilia 2.9.3-8; ser C:llhoun (1913) 48-9 and Connor (t 971) H n.l for furthrr details on rhr Archrdemos affair. 46 We know at least of Criw's Thessalian x~oi from Plato, Crito 45c. 44 4S

88

The Circulation of Resources

Demetrios. 4' No such consistent, blatant instances of 'corruption' can be observed in the inscriptions from the period in which the assembly was sovereign.48 For a demonstration of the second proposition, we go back to the Archelaos-Andocides case. In return for the opportune supply of timber, the city may have granted Andocides an honorific decree similar to those included in our list. But from such a decree it would have been impossible to deduce what emerges from the speech Andocides delivered before the Athenian assembly: that Archelaos had mobilized his own resources simply in order to render help to a xenos; and that Andocides supplied the timber to the Athenian army with one purpose in mind only - to pave the way for his reinstatement as a citizen. In other words, when once, by a rare coincidence, the motives that lay behind a benefaction become accessible, they turn out to be totally self-regarding. The inference must be that the mutual exchange of benefits between ritualised friends might well be reflected in the sources as a beneficial act in favour of a city. In the context of ritualised friendship, the possession of grain, timber, and other natural products was in some respects advantageous. and in others not. On the one hand. some rulers commanded more of such products than they could consume, even to the extent of being able to supply the needs of entire civic populations. On the other, the sheer bulk of these products made them difficult to transport and their specific nature prescribed a relatively narrow range of uses. Homeric heroes, like the young man from the Bosporus. were probably always handicapped by these difficulties. But within a century or two, a new means of exchange was to appear on the scene - a device which was both easy to transport and could be put to a multiplicity of uses: money. 4.4 VALUABLES

When Xenophon made the mythical Indian king send Cyrus the message: "I wish to be your xenos. and I am sending you money, and if you need more. send for it", he was inspired by one of the most common practices of 47 Thr decrttS a~ lisrrd in Osbomr (1981·3) Yo!.lI. 121 n.495. For the wulth and the liturgic record of Stratoklt'1' family, ~ Davi" (1971) no. 129.18. • 1 A good example of what might havr been thr pattern in this period concerns Demacks and Hyperidn. In 3.38 B.C., Demadn managed to carry through an award of proxmy to a close associate of Philip II (/G III 240). We do not know thr background for the grant, but when Demacks further propowd to brstow a proxeny on Euthykrates, the Olynthian comman· dfr who in 348 B.e. betrayed Olynthul to Philip {DemO$thenes 8.40 (On tnt Cht,sontstt); 19.343 (De Falsa ugat;o"I)~ Diodoru5 Siculus 16.53), he met with the violent opposition of Hyperidn (F,agmmt 19).

4 Valuables

89

ritualised friendship.49 In all periods of Greek history, it is taken for granted that ritualised friends would supply each other with money. The spirit in which the act of giving was conceived was stereotypically rigid: one ought to give generously, lavishly, and unconditionally. It was in particular this aspect of the etiquette which captivated the imagination of writers accustomed to more modest standards. Croesus of Lydia, like a character in a fairy-tale, is said to have made the Athenian Alkmeon a gift of as much gold as he could carry away at one time on his person....~() Darius, as we have seen, offered Syloson "boundless (apleton) gold and silver". 51 Xerxes, in his famous letter to Pausanias, said to the Spartan King: "Let neither night nor day keep you idle in the performance of your promises to me, nor let them be hindered for want of gold or silver to spend". 52 And finally, of Philip of Macedon it was said that he kept offering presents to the Theban ambassadors Ubeginning with captives and the like, and ending with gold and silver goblets",-B Some of these statements are clearly fictitious, others arc probably exaggerated. It is, however, hard to tell whether the exaggeration was on the part of the actor or the story teller. For the pretence of giving away 'boundless' amounts of wealth could imply one of two things. The amount of money one person is willing to bestow on another may be a sign of the degree of trust he places in him. This is, surely, the message conveyed in the passages listed above. But such a promise could also have a very different meaning: that a person, the giver, is willing to recognise the power of the recipient over him. The gift thus becomes a mark of submission, a form of blackmail voluntarily paid - a tax, in its embryonic form. For example, Pythios, the wealthy Lydian, declared his intention to contribute all his fortune - Utwo thousand talents of silver, and of gold four million Daric staters lacking seven thousand" - for Xerxes' war against Greece. uAIi this I U

49 Xrnophon, C)'ropaedia 6.2.1. The phrasr srrangdy rchocs thr corrrspondrncr of rhr petty rulrrs of rhr a",.;rnt Near E.ast of the S(cond millrnnium B.C. A frw rxtra~"ts from onr of the T~II·d Amarna letters, wrirten by an Ass)'rian to an E.gyptian ruler, will suffice ro show this: "To N:lphur ...• (grut king]. king o( F.gypt. my hrorhrr. speak! Thr words of Ashur-uballit, king of (Assyrial, gre:lt king. ),our brnthrr. May it br well wirh you, your f:lmily. and your land. ... I hayr dispafchrd ro you :IS a pe:lcr offrring :I beautiful ro)·al ch:lrior (from among rhose) rhat I (mysdf) driy~ and two whit~ horses I am in the procr~.. o( building a new palace. Send mr rnough gold to derorat~ it pro~r1y If yOll are seriously disposed towards frit'nd~hip. send much gold! It is all in thr (amily (lit. "It is your famil)''')1 Writ~ mr wh:lt yOll (your~Jf) nrrd and it will be supplird ... (A.K. Grayson. Ass)',ian Roya/lnsc,iptions (Wirsbadcn, 1972) yoU. 48·9). (0 Herodotus 6.125. Thr fair ends wirh Croesus' doubling the amounr. q IIrrodoru!l.1. 140. n Thm:ydidl"S 1.129.3. H Demosrhenes 19.139 (De ""a/sa Legalione). d. [)Iodorus Siculus 16.55. It

90

The Circulation of Resources

freely give to you," he said. "For myself, I have a sufficient livelihood from my slaves and my farms".S4 When Syennesis, King of Cilicia, was forced to desert his former ally, Artaxerxes, and go over to Cyrus' side, "he gave Cyrus a large sum of money for his army", clearly, as a mark of the status of protege which he assumed. 55 It was, according to Xenophon, as a result of numerous similar incidents of self-surrender (together with treasures and cities) that Cyrus the younger acquired a following greater than any of his contemporaries. 56 In this respect, again, the sums involved must have been enormous. The Odrysian king Sitalkes, reports Thucydides, exacted from his subjects a revenue of about four hundred talents of tribute (pharos) in coin, as well as a similar amount in giftS (dora) in gold, silver and articles for household use. n The latter must have come from lesser chieftains or acephalous communities who surrendered themselves to Sitalkes' authority. 58 Passages pertinent to transfers of money between ritualised friends are so numerous that it would be pointless to enumerate them all. w Furthermore, examples abound in which monetary transactions are not explicitly mentioned but which cannot be understood unless the transfer of substantial sums is assumed. Therefore, rather than compiling a list, I shall try to examine in a more detailed fashion some cases which may throw light on other aspeCts of wealth circulation. In Aristotle's The Athenian Constitution, it is stated of Peisistratos, the Athenian tyrant, that after his second exile from Athens, First he settled in the r~ion of the Thermaic Gulf at the place called Rhaecelus; from there he proceeded to the district about Pangaeum, where he got money and hired soldiers; then he went to Eretria. It was only in the eleventh year that he tried to recover his rule by force, with the support of many others, in particular the Thebans, lygdamis of Naxos, and the knights (h;pp~;s) who controlled the government at Eretria. After winning the battle of Pallenis he occupied the city, deprived the people of their arms, and this rime secured the tyranny firmly. Also he captured Naxos and installed lygdamis as its ruler. 60 HrrodofUs 7.28. Xenophon, Anabasis 1.2.27. Xc also Herodotus 3.13 for the sdf-impoKd taxes and gifts paid as a mark of submission to CambYKs by the people of Libya, Cyrenr, and 8arca. H, Xenophon, Anabasis 1.9.12. J7 Thucydides 2.97.3. JI For gifts as tax~s in the Hom~ric world. Sr~ Finl~ (1977) 96. For obligatory giftl (dora) as distinct from taxn (phoroi, taRa;) in the Penian empire, d. Herodotus 3.89 and 97. For the whole issue of th~ gift elemenr in me Penian taxation system, ~ Andreades (1933) 89·108; O. Murray in Historia 15 (1966) 142·S6~ Hornblow~r (1982) 156ff.~ and Cook (19R.l) Ch. VIII. ~9 Thr incidents of 'rxtunal bribery' referred to in Sc-crion 4.2 would fall in rhi! catrgory u

U

roo.

15.2-3, adapted from me translarion by P.J. Rhodn, mondsworth. 1984). Cf. Hrrodutus 1.61. 6()

Tht Arhm;an Const;tution

(Har-

4 Valuables

91

Admittedly, this cannot be considered as a particularly accurate account of Peisistratos' movements. 61 But what matters for our purposes is not so much the details themselves as the expectations and assumptions according to which the writers organised and interpreted the pieces of information available to them. Checked against similar accounts derived from better sources, the story fits perfectly into the pattern of ritualised friendship relations. On close inspection two, by familiar standards unusual, points stand out: the variety of sources from which Peisistratos received assistance abroad/,l and the high sums (in money and kind) he was given. The whole pattern of action makes sense only if we posit, on the part of the people involved in these networks, an expectation that the momentary sacrifices they made would in the long run be reciprocated. Indeed, it can be stated almost as a general rule that exchanges conducted within the framework of ritualised friendship were marked by exceedingly long-term credit. In the case of deposed rulers or citizens aspiring to become rulers, their helpers could hope for a return only after, and if, the persons helped had been reinstated to positions of power in their own social unit. Peisistratos, after his return to power, fully repaid his debt to Lygdamis by seizing Naxos and appointing Lygdamis ruler. In the case of Hippias, the enterprise failed: the massive operation started by Darius to restore him to his position as tyrant in Athens was frustrated by Greek resistance at Marathon. Xerxes bestowed monies and goods first on Demaratos and afterwards on Pausanias and Themislokles, clearly hoping that one day, when the right opportunity offered itself, they would fulfil their promise and help him subjugate Greece. But nowhere do we find a clearer detailed illustration of this long-term mechanism than in the case of Klearchos and Cyrus the younger. Klearchos came to Cyrus after he had been exiled from Sparta and condemned to death for civic insubordination. Cyrus made him his xenos and gave him ten thousand darics. Upon receiving this sum, Klearchos did not, in Xenophon·s words, "turn his thoughts to comfortable idleness", but used it to recruit an army and make war upon the Thracians (the enemies against whom he had beforehand fought on behalf of Sparta). He defeated them in battle and plundered them from time to time. The Hellespontine cities who had suffered at the hands of the Thracians sent him money and support for his troops in token of their gratitude. This idyll could probably have lasted for a For the diffrrences bctwrcn Hrrodotus' and Arinodr's vrrsions of the srory, scr P.J. A C,()mm~ntary on the Amtotelian Athena;on Po/iteia (Oxford 19~ 1) 207-9. 61. To l1uace, Macedonia, Thessaly. Eretri:l, and Naxos (through Lygdamis) which appear in this p3ssagr wr should add Argos: onr of Pri!iistr3tos' wivrs was an Argivr woman (Hrrodorus 5.94). 61

Rhodr~,

92

The Circulation of Resources

long time, but, when Cyrus' summons came, Klearchos at once took the soldiers and set out, in order that, as Xenophon makes him explain, "if he (i.e. Cyrus) had need of me, I might give him aid in return for the benefits I had received from him".6J Neither the sheer coincidence of events nor the prospect of sharing mutual benefits are adequate to explain such closely co-ordinated cooperation between people who, we must bear in mind, as strangers, were predisposed to treat each other as enemies. To understand such sustained, complex, and long-term efforts, the operation of a further feature of ritualised friendship must be assumed: the confidence it inspired that the other side would be morally committed to reciprocate. This confidence acted as a kind of primitive insurance system, increasing the likelihood that engagements would be kept and obligations honoured. Coupled with the fabulous wealth of the parties, it explains why, in the examples adduced above, we never hear of 'payments' or 'loans'. Ritualised friends heading entire social units bestowed favours on each other relying on the probability that when the need arose the favours would be repaid. We need to go down one or two steps in the social ladder to encounter transactions of a different type. In the course of the year 362 B.C., Apollodoros the Athenian, son of Pasion, the wealthy banker, discharged one of the most exacting duties that the community could impose on its rich members. Apollodoros had the command of an Athenian naval vessel for an entire year and bore the cost of the operation out of his own pocket. This specific trierarchy, as it was called, was beset with particular misfortune. Apollodoros, however (if we are to believe the truth of what he said), not only succeeded in extricating himself from a series of predicaments, but even managed, at great personal cost and considerable self-sacrifice, to accomplish an exemplary term of service. His triumph was only marred when at the end of his term Polykles, his replacement, would not relieve him of his command. As a result, Apollodoros was compelled to bear the cost of an additional four months service a burden for which he seems to have been unprepared. Several attempts at raising money failed, and the sailors kept asking for payment. However, in this emergency, Apollodoros managed to borrow from two of his father's xeno; in Tenedos and pay the sailors their provision money. The reasons Apollodoros gave for his success are revealing: ... for on account of my being Pasion's son, and the fact that he was connected by ties of xt"ia with many, and was trusted (p;steutht"a;) throughout the Greek world, I had no difficulty in borrowing money wherever I needed it.6'4 4) 64

Xmophon, Anabasis 1.3.3, d. 1.1.9 and 2.6.4-5. Drmosrhenes 50.56 (Aga;nst Polycles).

4 Valuables

93

We do not know the specific details of Apollodoros' loan transactions, but the examination of analogous cases permits us to establish the range of possibilities. It seems that loans within the context of ritualised friendship tended to be without interest and without security. The reason for this was that loans constituted but one item in the circulation of favours and counter-favours that tied the partners together. Repayment was not therefore subject to strict accountability, and could be made not only in cash but also in gifts or opportune services. Earlier in the course of the same trierarchy, Apollodoros sent Euktemon, his pentecontarch, to Lampsacus, giving him money and letters to the xenoi of his father, bidding them, evidently, to help Euktemon hire soldiers. It is not difficult to see in this a partial repayment of a loan that Pasion made the xenoi from l.ampsacus.6~ Not even in the case of Nikostratos (Nikostratos claimed that he had borrowed from xenoi in order to ransom himself from captivity, and that it was stipulated in the agreement (syngraphai) that he should repay the loan within thirty days or be indebted for double the amount) do the harsh conditions turn the transaction into an economically profitable business. The clause was merely intended as a safeguard for lenders either short of cash or having a low opinion of Nikostratos· credit. If it had been common for xeno; to lend at interest, it is hard to see how Nikostratos could have failed to add this detail to his already long list of misfortunes. 66 Indeed, professional loans and loans carried out within the context of xenia are sometimes conceived of as antithetical notions. A good illustration of this comes from an incident the evidential value of which derives from a statement not self-consciously made. Speaking before the Athenian jury, the young man from the kingdom of Bosporus expressed his indignation at having had to endure without protest that Hippolaidas, a xenos and epitedeios, borrow from Pasion the banker. 67 The argument derived its force from the implicit understanding of the jury that if the young man had money, he would have made Hippola·idas a friendly loan. In fact, this was merely an effective roundabout way of saying that he was totally impoverished. Loans between xenoi thus conformed in some respects to the wider category of friendly loans, the underlying ethical principles of which were aptly summarised in the Problems attributed to Aristotle: "Where a loan is involved, there is no friend; for if a man is a friend he does not lend hut ~~ Drmosrhrnn 50.18. I~m()srhrnr!il 53.10 (Against Ni(ostralus). for Nlkosrraros' mrrhod of raising Ihr monry, ~r finley (1952) 83(f. 3nd Millrn (1983) 48. ,,-:0 lsocrarrs 17.38 (T,apeziliws). ..t>

94

The Circulation of Resources

gives" .68 Professional money lenders could lend at interest to strangers: many of Pasion's clients were non-citizens. Some citizens could occasionally lend at interest to other citizens who were friends or relatives. 69 But the majority of loan transactions in fourth-century Athens - and hence, presumably, in the whole of the ancient world - involved interest-free loans. The reason for this was that the partners to these transactions were tied by kinship, friendship, or ritualised friendship, and philia was the underlying principle of this primitive credit system. 70 In more general terms, however, the pattern of financial aid between xenoi was subject to pressures and risks somewhat different from those exercised on friends belonging to the same social unit. For xenoi could help each other in ways in which philoi could not. The most significant service, in this respect, was that of acting as keeper of one's property abroad. 71 For fear of revolutions, invasions and punishments at home, and from a desire to establish a base abroad, wealthy individuals must frequently have resorted to this device. 1l Two cases may be considered in some detail. Some Siphnian aristocrats living in Aegina had at the beginning of the fourth century transferred a large portion of their pro~rty to Paros to ~ kept there by the xenoi of one of them (the speaker in Isocrates' Aegineticus). The reason for this move emerges from an indirect comment: "we thought that the island was by far the safest".1J This, however, proved to be a serious misjudgement, for a foreign invasion causing general upheaval (the details of which are unclear) took place precisely in Paros. When all believed that their property was lost, the speaker sailed to Paros by night and got his friends' money out at the risk of his life.'"

It,

IArisrotlel, Prob/mas 29.2, 950a28 with Fmley (1952) 85. " lsaeus 11.42·3 (On tht F..statt of Hagnias): Arschines 1.97 (Against Timarchus): Demosthenes 27.9 (Against Aphobos I). 70 I borrow the rypology and thr rxamples of citizens Irnding at internt from Millen (1983), a study based on almost nine hund~ loan transactions. 71 Instances of individuals tran5frrring or keeping a share of or thr wholr of theIr property abroad are tOO numerous for all to br lis~. It will br enough to refer to Themisrokles, who had monies
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4 Valuables

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Another instance emerges from Isocrates' Trapeziticus. The young man from the kingdom of Bosporus, son of a powerful official in the king's service, came to Athens and deposited part of his money at Pasion's bank. In the meantime, however, his father back home was suspected of plotting against the throne and arrested. Orders were sent from the king to the citizens of Pontus residing in Athens to bring the young man home and take possession of his property. In this predicament, the young man appealed to Pasion for help. 7.~ To prevent the confiscation, the two men devised an ingenious plot. They would surrender to Satyros' agents the money whose existence was publicly known, but would deny the existence of the funds deposited with Pasion. Moreover, they would try to create the impression that as a result of the surrender of the money the young man had become totally impoverished. 76 The young man, as he later explained, proceeded to act in accordance with the terms of their agreement: ...1, in the presence of many listeners, had denied that I possessed anything. and everybody had seen that money waS being demanded of me and that I was acknowledging that I was indebted to others aI50. 17

Pasion took advantage of the golden opportunity and after a while flatly denied the existence of the money deposited with him. It was this denial that led to the suit for which Isocrates composed the speech on the young man's behalf. For the purposes of our analysis it is immaterial that Pasion, unlike the Parian xenoi, did not restore the property entrusted to him. Even real kinship ties do not provide a perfect safeguard against breach of obligations. The significant point is that the mores of ritualised friendship could be believed (first by the young man himself, then by the Athenian jury) to provide sufficient assurance that obligations between strangers would be honoured even in the absence of contractual guarantees (documents, witnesses, securities). The context of ritualised friendship thus makes it easier to understand how long-term. complex economic transactions could take place between strangers before contractual devices and enforcement agencies (such as those provided by the polis) came into existence. This point

7~ Alrhough ir is nor srarrd rxplicirly rh3r rhe two w~rr xeno;, rhr phras«>log}' used ro describe rhrir rdarionships luv~s little room for doubr: ..... for I was on such inrim3r~ rrrms wirh him rhar I had thr grearnr confidence in him, nor only in matters of monry, bur In rve7thing ds~ as w~II" (17.6). 7 t 7.8. This pretence' berra)'s rh~ fal"t that rh~ financial dralings betw~n rhr two mrn followed thr pattrm of frirndly, inrrrt$r·fr~ loans, in spirr of Pasion's being a professional bankrr. 77

17.8-9.

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The Circulation of Resources

cannot, of course, be illustrated by contemporary evidence. 78 But the story about the Thesprotian king Pheidon, showing the Cretan Beggar (Odysseus in disguise) the great wealth that Odysseus, his xenos, gathered for himself (Ubronze and gold and iron that men had long toiled over - enough to sustain ten whole generations after him") and entrusted to Pheidon for keeping, however exaggerated, points to the possibility of such transactions in the Homeric age. 79 And scattered references in Classical sources to xenoi acting as joint lenders 80 or to a xenos bequeathing his property and professional secrets (in divination) to his panner 81 might give some idea of the range of transactions rendered possible by this bond of solidarity. Valuables circulating between ritualised friends became thoroughly intertwined with the workings of the civic system. Pasion's son, Apollodoros, as we have seen, was able to complete his trierarchy by virtue of monies borrowed from his father's xeno;.82 The case of Aristophanes, the son of Nikophemos, of Athens, suggests a more intricate variation of the same entanglement. The following episode can be reconstructed from Lysias' 19th Oration. In the year 390/89 B.C., envoys from Cyprus arrived in Athens to ask for assistance against the Persians. The assembly voted them a small fleet. But the envoys still lacked money to purchase arms and to hire light infantry and personnel for the ships. It is at this juncture that Aristophanes stepped in. He gave all his fortunes and all the monies he could borrow to the city to make up the missing sums - five talents, if we are to believe the speaker. 8J Aristophanes' motives are stated in a fashion which suggests that there was nothing exceptional about this donation: What man, think you, who was ambitious of glory, and was re~iving lenets from his. father that told him he would lack for nothing in Cyprus, and had been elected 71 The evidential value of two stories which look back to the mythical past (that of Glaukos, the righteoUs Spanan, and the Milesian (Herodotus 6.86££.), and of Polycharn of Mnsmia and Euaiphnos of Sparta (Pausanias 4.4.4££. and Diodorus Siculus 8.7)) is impaired by a strong moral ising tone and by the fact that they probably reflect the outlook nOf of a single age but of successive periods, each one ~modellin8 the story according to its own i
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ambassador (prtsbtutts) and was about to sail to Evagoras, would have Idt behind anything that he possessed, and not have rather gratified that ruler by supplying everything he could, with a view to recover more?fl4

The details might be confused and exaggerated, but the nexus of thought is clear: Aristophanes was, presumably, Evagoras' xenos - his father lived in Cyprus and had property there. When it was found out that the Athenians lacked the funds to provide the fleet with arms and soldiers, Aristophanes ensured that he was elected ambassador to Evagoras by making this considerable outlay. For this generous act he was no doubt honoured - the speech is replete with references to his 'love of honour' - and his credit must have riscn. However, the outlay clearly did not fall within the modern economic category of 'conspicuous expenditure': Aristophanes was not trading his wealth for prestige. For, as stated in the passage, "he supplied everything he could, with a view to recovering more". Unmistakably, he hoped to be more than fully repaid either directly with counter-gifts or economic concessions by Evagoras, or indirectly, out of the military operations which he would conduct together with him, making use of the Athenian fleet. U A bizarre juxtaposition of the private and public sector", as Veyne would have it, but, contrary to Veyne's assumptions, the financing of the fleet did not rely ultimately on property owned by the benefactor inside the city but on booty wrested, with the aid of xenoi, from outside. 8~ Quantification is impossible, but some similar cases, St. and the examples considered in Section 4.3, suggest that the practice was by no means unusual. Briefly, there must have been a fair degrtt of coincidence between those involved in xenia networks and those described by Davies as members of the liturgical c1ass. 87 4.5 TROOPS

In his book on Greek mercenary soldiers, Parke made the correct observation that Cyrus' raising of the Ten Thousand, "was distinguished only by Lysias 19.18. 8.S Verne (1976) passim. For a criticism of his virws, see F. Millar in TL'; 24 March (19i8) 356, and J. Andreau, P. Schmitt, A. Schnapp (1977). 86 l~mosthenes 5.8 (Orr Iht Ptact) (Neoptolrmos, an agrnt of Philip In Arhens. was accu~d of having gonr to Macedonia "to collet.-r sums owing him there which he might spend on liturgies hereto); Theophrastos, CharacltrS 23.5 (rhr 3ssumption th3t thr recipirnt of thr right to uport timber from Macedonia is a great ~nda~:tor); $)'1/.) 374. lill('$ 40-51 (rhr contributions made by Philipptdn, Lysimachos' frirnd, to public scn·icn). For the so-called ob·horrornn donations - tM convrnrion whr~by wealthy citizms drC'ted to ma~srraciC'S contributed to mr public snvices under thrir chargr - s« Jonr~ (1940) 167-8. Vrynr (1976) 214-16, and Srr. Croix (1981) JO.~-6. 1:- Davies (1971) Introduction. 114

98

The Circulation of Resources

the magnitude of the forces which he employed and the height of ambition at which he aimed". The precedent which, according to Parke, rendered the undertaking unremarkable was the employment throughout the fifth century of Greek mercenaries by Persian satraps to serve as bodyguards, fulfil garrison duties and occasionally carry through a revolt against the Great King. 88 But, once we ignore for a moment the Greek-Persian context and focus our attention on the structure and composition of Cyrus· army, it becomes apparent that Parke's observation has a much wider validity. In fact, Cyrus adhered to a trend which on a lesser scale and with minor variations makes its appearance in all periods of Greek history. The fundamental pattern is accurately mirrored in mythical tales: a powerful ruler (or nobleman) calling his guest-friend(s) to arms to carry out a task for which his own forces are inadequate. 89 What was thereby effected was the pooling of military power and the temporary extension of the parties' fighting potential. A story from Herodotus might serve here as a useful paradigm. Croesus, King of Lydia, being hard-pressed by Cyrus of Persia, and realising the inadequacy of his own forces, called upon his friends and allies - Amasis, King of Egypt, Labynetos, King of Babylon, and the whole of the Spartan community - to fulfil their pledges and send troops.9O Xenophon's Anabasis yields a detailed picture of how such merging of forces was carried out. The army with which Cyrus the younger hoped in 401 B.C. to overthrow the Persian throne consisted of about thirteen thousand soldiers raised in different parts of the Greek world. The soldiers were probably first trained by the recruiting captains (some in actual skirmishes and looting operations) and then brought to Sardis, whence the march was to start. The principles in accordance with which the entire host was organised are extremely significant for our purposes. For the contingents each commander brought with him were not broken up, regrouped and placed under a hierarchic chain of command: Cyrus did not bring with him an alternative skeleton of staff officers. Instead, as Table 2 shows, they retained their recruiting commanders, original composition and surprisingly unequal numbers of men. Consequently, the vast host, in Roy's words, "formed not one army, but several Parke (1933) 23. .. For example. th~ Ic-gend of the 'Scven against Thd>n' (Sophodt'S, Oedil"" iJl C%nus 1300ff.); that of Rhesus (llUu1 10A.H, 495 and the play by Euripides); or that of Pririthoos and Thneus (PlutlrC'h, Thnft4. 30ff.). 90 H~rodotus l.n. Croesus p~umably had treaties of xenia Ira; S),,"mach,a with Amasis and labyn~tos in the same way as he had with Sparta (1.69). Cf. Euripides, Rhesus 335. where Rhesus, rul~r of Thrac~, is said to have come morc as a xenos than a J)""machos, and th~ aphorism, quoted by Herodotus, (hat "annin are th~ most proper gift (doran) in Penia" (9.109). I.

5 Troops

99

separate armies",91 and the captains were not so much officers as semiindependent chieftains. The link which held the whole army together was the relationship between the captains and Cyrus. Table 2. Cyrus' xcnoi Commanckr

Relationship

Contingents

Xenias (Arcadia)

not mentiontd

4000 hoplitts

Xenias deserted at Myriandus

Klearchos (Sparta)

xenos

The ~hasts were Thracians; rhe archers wert Cr("fans~ the cavalry were Thracian

Proxl"tlo~

xmos

I 000 hoplir~ 800pehasts 200 archers 40ca\'alry 1.500 hophtes

Remarks

500 gymnetae

(Boeotia] Menon [TMssaly)

not mentioned

] 000 hoplitn .500 pehasts

Sophainctos ISrymphalus)

xenos

1000 hoplirC'S

Agias (Arcadia)

not mentiontd

1000 hoplir~

Sokratcs (Achaea)

xmos

500hoplit~

Chcirisophos (SP3rt2]

not menrioned

700 hoplircs

Cheinsophos jomcd Cyrus '" Cilieia

Pasion lMC'gara)

nor menrioned

.'00 hoplircs .100 pdtasts

Pasion dCSC'rted at Myriandus

Sosis

not mentioned

300 hoplites

The pelrasN we-re Dolopt"S, Aunians and Ol,'nthians

[Syracu~)

Aristippos ~nt Menon In his stead

Aristippos [Thnsaly) Klcanor (Arcadia)

not mentiontd

Unknown

Pythagoras [Sparta)

not mentioned

35 ships

Tamos (Egypt)

not menrioned

Over 25 ships

For T amos, S« Gomme et al. (1981) voJ. V, 74

Not only were the captains probably all Cyrus' xeno; - we may legitimately assume that those not designated so in the Anabasis were xeno; too but they had become his xeno; prior to the start of the march. We encounter Xenias from Parrhasia (Arcadia) in Cyrus' service as early as 405 B.C. acting as the commander of the three hundred Greek hoplites who accompanied him to Susa. Xenias must have been the beneficiary of some sort of ql

Roy (1967) 292.

100

The Circulation of Resources

estate in Tral1es (Caria), where he kept his wife and children. To Sardis, he came at the call of Cyrus, bringing with him 4000 hoplites from the Ionian cities, where he had lately served as the supreme commander of the garrison. 92 We have already traced in a different context the exchanges between Cyrus and the commander of the second largest contingent, the Spartan exile Klearchos. 93 It need only be added here that Klearchos was the only Greek to whom Cyrus had confided the real aim of the campaign. He was also the only one allowed to attend the trial of Orontas. As a result of the numerous favours shown him by Cyrus, in the course of time Klearchos became a sort of first among equals. The other prominent Spartan, Cheirisophos, one of the 'equals' in his state, arrived with his 700 hoplites on board 35 ships led by yet another countryman, Pythagoras. It may be that this force was sent as part of the official aid Sparta gave Cyrus to oust his brother Artaxerxes. Yet it has to be pointed out that Cheirisophos is said to have responded to Cyrus' private summons (J.l£tan£r.utto~ uno KUQOU)94 precisely as did some other of Cyrus' xeno;; and that these hoplites were not Spartan citizens but probably Peloponnesian mercenaries. 95 Thus, it is by no means clear whether the two Spartiates seized the opportunity of the official support for Cyrus to come privately to his aid, or, vice versa, secured official aid as a favour to a xenos. We are left uninformed about the precise details of the relationship between Cyrus and the Theban Proxenos. But both the fact that, once called upon, he came immediately bringing with him two thousand soldiers, and his reference to Cyrus, his xenos, as a sort of nourishing fatherland (patr;s) , 96 indicate that exchanges of considerable favours took place between the two men even before the campaign. Pasion, the Megarian, and Sokrates, the Achaean, had both assisted Cyrus in the siege he mounted on Miletus as a diversion just before the start of the march. Pasion, like Xenias, must have had an estate in Tulles. Sosis the Syracusan is otherwise unknown, and so are Sophainetos of Stymphalus and Kleanor of Arcadia. But the exchanges between Cyrus and his ThessaHan xenos, Aristippos, assume, interestingly enough, the pattern of reciprocity observed in connexion with the Peisistratids. Aristippos, hard pressed by his opponents at home, came to Cyrus and asked him for two thousand mercenaries and three months' pay. Cyrus gave him, most generously, about ql

X~nophon. A"abasis 1.1.2; 1.4.8; 1.2.3~ 1.2.1.

" Section 4.4. ".. X~nophon. Anabasis 1.4.3. 'IS Roy (1967) 300; Cartledge (1979) 272. 96 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.2.3; 3.1.4.

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four thousand mercenaries and six months' pay.91 When Cyrus thought the time had come to begin the march, he sent word to Aristippos to effect a reconciliation at home and send him the army which he had. Aristippos, for reasons unknown, did not come personally but sent Menon in his stead with one thousand hoplites and five hundred peltasts only. We hear of no expression of dissatisfaction on the part of Cyrus for this seemingly unequal . . reciprocation. What thus emerges with sufficient clarity from these scattered remarks is, first, that the history of the relationships between these men and Cyrus followed the pattern of encounter and initiation described in Chapter 3. The fact that most came from different social units suggests that, if the relationship was not inherited, the pact of xenia resulted either from an euerges;a or, more likely, from an Cintroduction' by a common xenos (d. Section 3.2, pp.47ff.). Secondly, the bond was so strong, and the prospects of profit so good, that when the call to arms reached them they at once abandoned what they. had been engaged in and responded promptly - without even knowing, it must be stressed, the real aim of the expedition. The attempt to overthrow the Persian throne appears therefore as just another episode in the course of the exchange of benefits between xeno;. This basic practice of merging forces commanded or raised by xeno; crops up with slight variations in all periods of Greek history. Some outstanding examples will be considered here. For the Homeric period, it is true, "we are left in rather complete darkness about the way the Achaean army was put together". 98 But this refers mainly to the recruitment of insiders. Agamemnon, when calling upon his guest-friend, the nobleman Amphimedon, to help him urge Odysseus to go to Ilion, was in fact following a common practice of recruitment among outsiders. Amphimcdon, who did not himself command sufficient numbers of soldiers, provided an avenue of approach to the more formidable Odysseus with whom Agamemnon had, so far, no formal ties. 99 Such a procedure will suffice to explain one aspect of the composition of the Achaean and Trojan armies - made up, as they were, of contingents headed by captains bound together by ~rsonal ties of attachment. The earliest non-literary evidence comes from the year 593/2 B.C. The relevant lines of the inscription, scratched on the colossal statue of Rameses II in Nubia, are as follows: When King Psammetichos came to Elephantine, tho~ who sailed with PsammeCf. Roy (1967) 298 for the textual problem! involved in this passage. " Finley (1977) 102-3. 99 Odyssty 24.115ff.

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The C;rculation of Resources

richos son of Theokles wrote this; and they came above Kerkis as far as the river allowed; and Potasimto had command of those of foreign speech and Amasis of the Egyptians. 100

Psammetichos son of Theokles cannot but be the son of a Greek who became a xenos of Psammetichos I, and, in conformity with the custom of name exchange, called his son after the Egyptian ruler. Psammetichos II, the present Pharaoh, now availed himself of the services of his hereditary xenos in order to increase the levy for his Nubian expedition. The Greek Psammetichos had brought with him his own ritualised friends - the individuals who had signed their names on the statue below: a man from Teos, two from lalysos, another from Colophon, and two of unknown ethnic origin. In all probability, these men had each commanded a small force and regarded themselves as peers. IOI Thus it becomes fairly certain that these Greek men were not, as commonly thought, 'mercenaries in Egyptian service', but aristocrats called upon to fulfil their duties as xeno; - a demand which in view of the prospects of plunder must have appeared by no means unattractive. The same underlying principle can be detected in Darius' Skythian expedition. The Greek generals who served as heads of various contingents were the tyrants of the Greek cities in Asia Minor: Miltiades the Athenian, now tyrant of Chersonesc; Histiaios, tyrant of Miletus; Daphnis, tyrant of Abydus; Hippoklos, tyrant of Lampsacus; Herophantos, tyrant of Parium; Metrodoros, tyrant of Proconnesus; Aristagoras, tyrant of Cyzicus; Ariston, tyrant of Byzantium; Strattis, tyrant of Chios; Aiakes, tyrant of Samos; Laodamas, tyrant of Phocaea; and finally, Aristagoras, tyrant of Cyme. 102 The difference with respect to the former cases is that the voluntary bond of xenia is here reinforced by formalised relationships of subordination and superordination: the one-time xeno; had become Darius' clients and, at the same time, the rulers of the Greek cities. A final, eloquent example is provided by the commanders of the forces under Ptolemy IV Philopator at the battle of Raphia (218 B.C.): Eurylochos of Magnesia commanded a body of about thrtt thousand men known as 100 Translartd by Meigs and Uwis (1969) no. 7. For 593/2 B.C., ratMr than 591, as the date of the inscription, SC'e J.D. Ray in ProcuJings of tht CAmbriJgt Philological Soc.tty n.s.28 (1982) 85. 101 1M description of their position with respect to Psammetichos - "those who sailed with Psammetichos son of lMoklts" - contrasts sharply with the phrase used for the rdationships betw~ the other leaders and their forces: "Potasimto led those of foreign speech and Amasis the Egyptians". The use of the abbreviated hypocoristic name in the sixth signature ("Pa(m)bis of Colophon with Psammata", instead of the formal "PsamrMr1chos"), poin" to relationships of dose familiarity between the two men, d. A. Ikrnard and O. Masson in RtvW des il"dts grtcq"es 70 (1957) 20. 102 Herodotus 4.1.38. S« funner Hofstetter (1978).

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5 Troops

the Royal Guard; Sokrates the Boeotian had under him two thousand peltasts; Phoxidas the Achaean, Ptolemy the son of Thrascas, and Andromachos of Aspendus exercised together in one body the phalanx and the Greek mercenaries, the phalanx twenty-five thousand strong ~ing under the command of Andromachos and Ptolemy, and the mercenaries, num~ring eight thousand, under that of Phoxidas. Polykrates (of Argos) undertook the training of the cavalry of the guard, about seven hundred strong, and the Libyan and native Egyptian ho"e; all of whom, numbering about three thousand, were under his command. It was Echekrates the Thessalian who trained most admirably the cavalry from Greece and all the mercenary cavalry, and thus rendered most signal service in the battle itself, and Knopias of Allaria too was second to none in the attention he paid to the force under him composed of three thousand Cretans, one thousand being Neocretans whom he placed under the command of Philon of Cnossus. They also armed in the Macedonian fashion three thousand Libyans under the command of Ammonios of 8arce. The total native Egyptian force consisted of about twenty thousand heavily armed men, and was commanded by Sosihios, and they had also collected a force of Thracians and Gauls, about four thousand of them from among settlers in Egypt and their descendants, and two thousand lately raised elsewhere. These were commanded by Dionysios the Thracian. 10 .1

This morley group, in other words, consisted of ritualised friends who, like Darius' client-rulers, had been absorbed into Ptolemy's permanent entourage - the philo; circle - and of some ritualised friends from abroad responding to the call to arms. To the former category belonged, for example, Sosibios and Ptolemy son of Thraseas, a man whom we shall soon encounter as a recipient of a landed estate in Antiochos' service; to the latter, Andromachos of Aspendos and Polykrates of Argos, two men who, in Polybius' words, had recently arrived from Greece and in whom the spirit of Hellenic martial ardour and fertility of resource was still fresh, while at the same time they were distinguished by their origin and by their wealth, and Polykrates more especially by the antiquity of his family and the reputation as an athlete of his father Mnasiades. 104

Andromachos and Polykrates were thus not homeless mercenary commanders, but res~etable citizens of their cities. The inevitable question arises: Why were these generals strangers of such diverse origin? The answer seems to be that these men were possessed of a quality which could not be found in plenty within any single social unit: the ability to recruit and command armies. It was this attribute, combined with their wealth and power, which made them such invaluable assets to their allies. Not only could they lead their own countrymen, but they were capable of 10) 104

Polybius 5.64. For further details on the generals, ~ Walbank (1957-82) YoU, 589-92. Polybius 5.64.5-7.

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The Circulation of Resources

commanding troops raised outside the social groups to which they belonged. Klearchos of Sparta, it will be remembered, recruited Thracians and Cretans. Menon the Thessalian brought with him Dolopes, Aeanians and Olynthians. In the whole of Cyrus' army, more than half were Arcadian and Achaean hoplites, but there were only three Arcadian captains and one Achaean, the rest being drawn from almost every part of the Greek world. los Furthermore, men of this stamp were capable not only of recruiting and commanding professional soldiers, but of mobilising the manpower and resources of entire social units. The story of Histiaios of Miletus and Darius might sound naive and exaggerated, but it in fact reflects the logic of a normal practice. Darius gave Histiaios an area in Thrace in return for an euerges;a. Histiaios started fortifying the place at once. Darius' general, Megabyzos, then made a mild criticism of his royal master's careless generosity: Sire, ... you have given a clever and cunning Greek a city to build in Thrace, where are forests in plenty for ship-building, and much wood for oars, and mines of silver, and much people both Greek and foreign dwelling around, who when they have a champion (prostates) to lead them will do all his behests by day or by night. 106

Heroes, prostatai, stratego;, as they were called, these army leaders seem to have been drawn almost exclusively from a narrow aristocracy of warriors defined by upbringing, training, a certain aristocratic style, a fighting ethos, and, most important, wealth. A further variation of the pattern may be observed in cases where a citizen availed himself of the services of a xenos abroad in order to promote public interests at home - a practice which, to judge by the number of scattered references, was not uncommon. We find, for example, the Spartan general Brasidas in 424 B.C. commanding 1500 Thracian mercenaries. IO? In 428 B.C., the Athenian Asopios is said to have raised an army from all the Acarnanians. 108 Cyrus' veterans were recruited by the Spartan Thibron, a general who, in 399 B.C., "gathered troops from the Greek cities in the mainland". 109 These scraps of information do not tell us precisely how such forces were put together, nor is it claimed here that it could only have been done with the aid of ::teno;. What can be suggested is that these are the typical situations in which xeno; would be of help. They could supplement a Cf. Parke (1933) 28. 106 Herodotus S.23. This is again a permanent topos. Polybius. for example, said that the Palestinian cities of Skythopolis and Philoteria could supply armies with .11 their necessities OUf of their ,hor" (5.70.5). 107 Thucydides 5.6.4. 101 Thucydides 3.7.... 109 Xcnophon, HtUm;C4 3.1.5. 101

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citizen-general's forces with forces of their own; they could supply food, payment to the troops, information, connexions, guidance, and so on. A passagc from Thucydides gives what could bc a magnificd version of the pattern. In 413 B.C., the Athenian generals Demosthenes and Eurymedon were hcading for Sicily with an army which they gathered from Corcyra and the mainland. They crossed the Ionian gulf and put in at the lapygian islands called the Choerades, and took on board 150 lapygian javelin-throwers of the Messapian tribe. Then, after they had renewed an old friendship (phi/ia) with the local ruler. Artas, who had provided the javelin-throwers, they went on and reach~d Metapontum in Italy. I 10 Insofar as the practice was not thought to endanger communal welfare, it was not only tolerated but even enthusiastically approved. A good example comes from the career of the Athenian general of noble binh, Konon. In (socrates' words, no sooner had Konon and Evagoras, ruler of Cyprus, met one another than "they esteemed each other more highly than those who before had been their intimate friends (oikeious)". III After the battle of Aigospotamoi, Konon, the only Athenian general who was on alert, found refuge with Evagoras. Each of them separately and the twO of them together bestowed great benefits on Athens, to the extent that Evagoras was given Athenian citizenship. When the Spanans were ravaging Asia Minor, Evagoras and Konon advised the Persian king how to wage war against them most efficiently. The Persians took their advice, and the Spartans were defeated in the naval battle off Cnidus (394 B.C.). Following this defeat, continues (socrates, the Spartans lost their supremacy, the Greeks regained thcir freedom, and Athcns recovercd some of its old-time glory. He then adds: And although all this was accomplished with Konon as commander, yet Evagoras both made the outcome possible and furnished the greater pan of the army. In gratitude we [the Athenians] honoured them with the highest of honours and set up their statues where stands the image of Zeus the Saviour, near to it and to one another, a memorial both of the magnitude of their benefactions and of their mutual friendship (tile; epL)Jae; tile; 1tQOe; Oll~AOU; ). III As in the ca~ of the other goods and services circulating between ritualised friends, here, too, each system was at times indispensable for the proper functioning of the other.

110

yi~ III III

Thucydidcs 7.33.4. I ~t out in a forthcoming paper the arguments against the prevailing that the phi/ia here rden to a trut)· ~tween Artas and Athens. (socrates 19.53 (Atgi"el;cus). (socrates 9.57 (Evagoras).

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The Circulation of Resources 4.6 ESTATES

Before the final engagement with Anaxerxes' forces, Cyrus the younger exhorted the leaders of the Greek contingents, saying, among other things: Well, genrlemen, my father's realm extends towards the south to a region where men cannot dwell by reason of the heat, and to the north to a region where they cannot dwell by reason of the cold; and all that lies between these limits my brother's philoi rule as satraps. Now, if we win the victory, we must put our philoi in control of these provinces. I fear, therefore, not that I shall not have enough to give to each of my philoi, if success attends us, but that I shall not have enough philoi to give to. 1l3

Even if we doubt, as some Greeks did, the sincerity of Cyrus' promise, we can be sure that in spirit it was impeccable. Ever since the appearance on the scene of the great territorial empires, it had always been the policy of victorious rulers to assign newly conquered territories to dose friends (or, alternatively, to make the heads of vanquished units friends). The number of princely kinsmen being inadequate for the task, and centrally controlled bureaucracies and armies being as yet non-existent, what other means were there to attain control over an ever-growing number of subjects, and over ever-expanding territories? The Macedonian and Hellenistic empires did not differ in this respect from the Persian. Philip II gave to his 800 hetairo; from abroad so much land that, according to a good contemporary source, they derived more income from it than the richest 10,000 Greeks. 114 Alexander the Great, once in Asia Minor, declared that uall the land around is mine", I 15 and set about distributing it to his closest friends. His successors followed suit: in the Hellenistic age, being a phi/os of a king was almost synonymous with being in possession of an estate on the king's land. Nor was the practice restricted to successful conquerors. The scattered documentation reveals that lesser rulers, too (men of the stamp of Seuthes of Thrace, Satyros of Bosporus, Evagoras of Cyprus, Dionysius of Sicily), were in the habit of granting estates to friends from abroad. 116 It seems therefore Xmophon, A,.abasis 1.7.7; for a similar policy attributed to Cyrus the Gmt and Artaxerxes I, see Xenopoon, Cyropaedia 8.6.5 (..... to many of his philoi he gave (fOOmt) houses and servants in the various states which he had subdu~d. And even to this day those properties, some in one land, 50fM in another, continue in the possession of the descendants of those who then received them, while the owners themselves reside at court"), and Diodorus Siculus 11.71.2 (..... with respect to the satraps then in office, those who were hostile to him he dismissed and from his philo, he chose such as were competent and gave the sarrapies to 1U

them"). 114 FG,H 115 (Theopompos) F 2258. IU OGIS 1. 116 Seurhes: Xenophon, AMbasis 7.3.2 (Alkibiades had a fortrns in the Chersonese probably given by Seuthes, Xenophon, HellmiC4 1.5.17; 2.1.25 and lysias 14.26 (Aga,nst Aidbilltks»; Satyros: lsocrates 17. 3 (T,a~VI'CU$) (Sopaios ruler of extensive territory); Evagoras:

Andocides 1.4 (QIr the Mystmes); Dionysius: Diodorus Siculus 14.7.... In this context we

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that we are dealing not with a policy adopted by a particular ruler to solve a particular problem but with a feature inherent in the very structure of these groups. The policy thus po~s the following questions: Why did autocratic rulers need to incorporate foreigners into the circle of their supporters? Why did they have to effect this incorporation through grants of landed estates? And, finally, what was the role of ritualised friendship in all this? To be able to answer these questions, a brief survey of the practice in the Persian, Macedonian and Hellenistic empi res is necessary. It must be stressed at the outset that the documentation is sparse and extremely uneven. Apart from a few generalised statements of the kind cited above, the evidence consists of casual remarks in literary sources on the one hand, and short-sighted, albeit magnified, references to specific grants in inscriptions and papyri on the other. It is frequently impossible to tell why a grant was made, in what ways it was supposed to serve the grantee, and what aims the grantor hoped to achieve thereby. Nevertheless, allowing for a certain margin of error, it may be possible to establish several general categories. Having done so, it will become possible to test the evidence against comparable material from feudal Europe. First, it is necessary to draw a distinction between extensive areas given to a friend to rule as a 'province' and the usually smaller territorial units given him as a source of economic support. From the point of view of the paMners both could appear as 'gifts' given by friend to friend, and both could stretch over vast territories. 117 But the provinces quickly became instruments of imperial administration and hence acquired qualities which overshadowed their original character as gifts. Here, the analysis is restricted to estates given as a source of income. Only very rarely can we infer why a grant was made. Histiaios of Milerus received Myrcinus in the Edonian land in return for the euerges;a of preserving the Danube bridge during Darius' Skythian campaign. 118 We do not know why Phylakos the Samian was given the land, but we are told that he was among the Great King's euergetai. 119 Demaratos the Lacedaemonian 117

Mania's principality (Xenophon, Hell~ica 3. I. .off.) s«ms to have been an extended

fid (Cook (1983) 178). According to Diodorus Siculus 19.75.1, Asandros, ruler of Carla, bcin~ h:ard pressed in war, came to terms with Antigonos by agreeing to transfer to him all his soldiers, to leave the Greek cities autonomous, and to hold as a dorea the satrapy that he had formnly held, remaining a steadfast friend (bebaios philos) of Antigonos. III Ht"t'odotus 5.12, 4.139. 119 Ht"t'odotus 8.85. should also mention the lycian dynast Gergis boasting in a verse inscription from the end of the fifth century of having taken many acropoleis and of having given them to his syrrgm,is as a part of his kingdom (Meigs and lewis (1968) no.93 and J. Bousqu~ in Comptes Rendus de I'Acadlmie des Inscriptions et Btllts-uttrts (1975) 139).

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The Circulation of Resources

r~ceived

Teuthrania and Halisarna from X~rxes as a gift (doran) for participating with him in his ~xpedition against Greece, and Gongylos of Eretria Iik~wis~ r~ceived four cities as a gift (doran) for having been the only Er~trian to side with the Medes. 120 Lykon th~ Athenian was given "cities and territories" for having betrayed to the Great King the rebellious satrap Pissouthnes, his form~r master. III In an anecdote pres~rved in Athenaeus but attributed to Duris of Samos, Alexander is said to have given Pnytagoras, among oth~r pr~sents (doreas), a fortr~ss which he himself asked for. III In two other cases, much vaguer r~asons are given. Cyrus the Great is said to have granted sev~n cities to Pytharchos of Cyzicus because h~ was a philos.l 23 And Antiochus I of Syria ~xplained in a public letter why he had presented one Aristodikides of Assus with a hug~ domain in these terms: "because he, as our phi/os, has furnished us his services with all good-will and enthusiasm".I24 What emerges from this survey is a strong link b~twe~n ritualised friendship and the grant of estates: th~ partners are consistently portrayed as 'friends' engaged in an amicable exchange of 'favours' (dora, euergesiai, charites are th~ recurring words). Hence, by the logic of ritualised fri~ndship, the granting of a land~d estate fdl within th~ larg~r category of favour. This hdps to clarify the ~volution of th~ word dorea - which became the technical name for a c~rtain type of landed estate, best known from Hellenistic Egypt. Originally signifying any type of goods or s~rvices given to establish peaceful rdations with a strang~r, th~ word came to mean one specific type, the landed estat~. Finally, in the cont~xt of the centralised administrations of the Ptolemaic ~mpire, dorea came to denote the status of th~ land itself. It thus became applicable to a whole category of domains on the king's land, a category singled out for specific treatm~nt on account of the amicable relationship between the king and the grant~e. 125 In spite of the friendly tone of the explanations mentioned above, it would be a mistake to accord th~m too much cred~nc~. Ritualised friendship could serve as an explanation of motiv~s precisely because it suggested disint~rest~dness in the form of gifts given freely, without exXenophon, Htlltn;ca 3.1.6; he w:as banished from Eretria on that account. fCrH 688 (Ktesias)F 15 p:ara. 52. 111 Athmaeus 4.167c = FCrH 76 F 4 (Duris). The remarkable Biblical parallel is I Samuel 27.5-6: "David s:aid to AchiKh King of G:ath, 'If I stand w~1I in your opinion, grant me a place in one of your country towns where I may settle. Why should I remain in the royal cities of your mainty?' Achisch grante'd him Zikl:ag on that day...... 12' fCrH 72 (Agathokles of Cyzicus) F6. 124 Welles (1934) no. 11. I2J The eviden« is sp«1fic to Egypt, d. Rostovtuff (1922) 43, but there are good reasons to Mlieve that a simil:ar process took pla« in the other empires. 110

121

6 Estates

109

pectation of return. ll6 The courteous language of ritualised friendship could conveniently be harnessed to disguise real motivations. The nature of the ancient evidence is such that real motivations are seldom allowed to shine through. We must now penetrate beyond the word and observe the concrete variations that it served to veil. Using the density of settlements and the degree of cultivation as an index, it is possible to distinguish three, not mutually exclusive, types of domain: cities, estates, and what can be labelled 'uncultivated areas'. In Table 3, an attempt has been made to apply this classification to all the cases of doreai known in some detail from the Persian, Macedonian, and Hellenistic empires. Table 3. Grants of l.a"ded Estates 127 (a) The PersIan Empire, 560-330 B.C. Reference

Gr.mror

FGrIl471 F6

Cyru\ I

Hdt.6.70;

l);JrJU\

I

Xen.llell. 3.1.6 Hdr.6.41

Hdr. 5.11; 2.1--4; 124 Hdr.5.37.1

Danu\ I

D.ariusl Darius I

Rc-cipiC'nr Pyrharcho\ ICyzicus)

7 C:UIt"\

Dcmar3ros ISparral

Uno,peclflecJ; I Clr>'

MerlOchos, son of Mihiadcos I Arhc-ns)

2 Cltlt'~

Hisriaios IMllc-rusl

I esr.are; I l'lr)'

KOt'S

I

--..)

>-

Q..

CIt>·

IMyrilenel Thuc.1.08

Xerxes I

Themisroklcos IArhensl

::v

.'-J

.l clues

1241 This is a fearure which encour:aged rh~ making of puns on dorta;. In :a comIC fragmenr from rhe rhird cenrury S.c. (PhOt'1licides, in T. Kock, Com,corum Att;corum Fragmtnta

(uipzig, 1888), vol.lll, no ..133), a man (presumably a wuuld·bco l,h,/m) 1'\ uld rn h.:IVt' pr~tended to a courtnan that h~ would receiv~ a dorea from a king. Bur rh~n she complaJnrd:

"Now b«au~ of rhis dorea of which I am r.pc:aking rhis scoundrel h:ad me a whole year for norhing (dorean»". 127 The rable draws on the following works. Pnsia: Sre. Croix (1972) Uff, (1981) 151ff; Kienau (1973) 257ff.; lewis (1977) 54ff.; Brianr (1982) 291ff.; Hornblower (1982) 143ff.; Cook (1983) 167ff. Macedonia: Hammond and Griffith (1979) 66Off.; Kienasr (197.') 257ff. He~/t1fist;c monarchies: Rosrovttdf (1922) :and (1941) sec Index, S.\·. Dorta;; C. Prtaux, L 'F.conom;t royale des LAgides (Brus~ls, 1939) 20ff.; Wipszycska (1961); Kre1s'ilg (1977) and (1978); Worrte (1978); Funck (1978); Sre. Croix (1981) 119ff.; Davlcos (1984). Egyprian dorea-hol&rs :are only Iisred if rhe receipr of a landed ~rare can readily M inferrc:-d from rhe pap)·ri. For:a more complere lisr, s« rr vol.lV, 10061-10108. For a unique gr:anr in Homerseven ciricos offered by Agamemnon ro Achilles (Iliad 9.149-56 ;;; 9.291-8) - sec M.1. Finley, 'Humer and Mycen:ae: property :and renure' in Finley (1981) 2n-.ll.

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The Circulation of Resources

110 Reference

Xen.lltli. 3.1.5; Anab. 7.8.8, 17;

Grantor

Recipienr

Typ~

Xerxes I

Gongylos (Eretria]

4-5 cities

Hdt.8.85

Xerxes I

Phylakos (Samos]

1 city(?)

Hdt. 8.136.5.21

Xerxes

Amyntas 'of Asia'

I city

Dem.23.141-2

Ariobarzanes

Philiskos [Abydusl

1 city

FGrH 688 F15 (52)

Darius II

lykon

Ciries and

Thuc.l.128

lAlhnls)

Arr. AMb. 1.17.8;

Memnon

Darius III?

(Rhod~]

Dem. 23.154,157;

eSlafes

Estates and cities

Polyaen.4.3.5; Strabo J .3.5

(b) Macedonia to 336 B.C. Reference

Recipimt

Grantor

Type

Hdt.5.94

Amyntas

Hippias [Athens)

1 city

Syll..J 332

Philip II

Polemokrates [Elimiotis?]

2 estates

Syll. J 332

Philip II

Koinos (Elimioris?l

1 estate

lXm. 19.314; d. 18.41

Philip II

Aeschines (Athens]

(Dem.] 7.32

Philip II

Alexander (of Epirus?1

Grantor

Recipienr

Estat~in

Boeotia 3 cilies

(c) Th~ Hellenistic monarchies Reference

Type

Syll.) 302

Krateuas

Aristomenes [Unknown]

Estat~

SylU 332

Alexand~ III

Ptolemy (Unknown]

1 ~tate

Syll.J 332

Cassander

Perdikkas [Elimiotis?)

4 (Slates

Welles (1934). nos. 10-13

Antiochos I

Aristodik ides (Assos]

Unspecified; I eslate

SMdis 7 (I). no.l

Anrigonos I{?)

Mntsimachos [Unknownl

testate

S4rdis 7 (1), no.l

Anriochos III

Pytheosand Adrastos [Unknown]

1 estate

.

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6 Estates

OGlSH

Fischer (1979)

111

Ptolemy III

Ptoltmy~on

I CIt)'

Antiochos III

of lysimachos IUnknownl Ptolemy son

1 ~rate

ofThra~:n

(Unknown] Apoll on i<><; ICuial Nikanor (Unknown) K:allixeno!> (Unknown)

PP IV.l0064

Ptolemy II

PPIV.IOO91

PP IV, 10087

Ptolemy II, III orlV? Ptolemy III

PPIV.10107

Ptolemy IV

Chry~rmos

Ptolemy III :and IV Ptolemy III

IUnknown) Sosiblos IAlexandrial Senthcus IEg)'ptl

PPIV,10100 PPIV.l0097 PPIV.l0061

PPIV.l0068 rPIV.l00n

PP IV.10087a

Ptolemy III andlV Ptolemy II or III? Ptolemy IV Unknown

Agarhokl~

2 estatt"!i I csr;lte I estate

I esr.are I estate 1estate

IMacedonian) Dikaiarchos IUnknown) Kom:anos IUnknownl

-

8J

I ~tate

(Unknown) Aristol~os

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--..)

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I costate

~

VI

I estate

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Briefly, the terms 'city' and 'cities' refer to populated areas converging upon one or several urban ~ttlements. These areas had an economic and social life and a history of their own prior to becoming a gift. Once they were convened into dorea;, the grantee became the city's ruler. The term archon, however, which is sometimes used in this context, should not be misconstrued. The recipient of a dorea became not a civic magistrate but a virtual despot. The territory, with all its population and wealth, was given him as a source of income to suppon himself and his followers, to raise troops, and, most important, to pay taxes to the overlord. Among the recipients of doreai from Persian satraps and kings there may have been some who exercised their rule benevolently. But, from the middle of the third century B.C. comes a document which yields a gloomy picture of the system. This is an inscription preserving an exchange of letters between Ptolemy II Philadelphus and Telmessus in Lycia, a city just recently incorporated into the Egyptian ruler's external domains. It is possible to infer from it the

112

The Circulation of Resources

moves that preceded the correspondence with a fair degree of certainty. A royal phi/os had probably seiz.ed the city with the intention of petitioning the king to grant him the city as a dorea. J28 The city officials, anxious to prevent this, dispatched an embassy who successfully interceded with the king: Ptolemy had graciously exempted the community from being made a dorea. In the covering letter, the community resolved to praise the monarch and set up an altar in his honour, to the effect that Uno one may ask for the city of T e1messus, or the villages or anything belonging to the territory of Telmessus to be given as a dorea from any king or queen or dynast whatsoever under any pretext". 129 The exemption, however, did not last for long. In a Telmessian decree from the times of the next Ptolemy (III Euergetes), a certain Ptolemy, son of Lysimachos, was hailed as benefactor for remitting an unpleasantly long and varied series of taxes. In all probability, Ptolemy, son of Lysimachos, ruled Telmessos as a recipient of a dorea from Ptolemy Euergetes. 130 The cities given away in this way must have been numerous. The statement that Eumenes of Cardia gave the cities of Cappadocia to his philoi may not carry much evidential value, as it is preserved in Plutarch alone. 131 But the scale of the practice emerges with unmistakable clarity from the peace treaty imposed by the Romans on Antiochos III in 188 B.C. Polybius records that it had been stipulated that "if any of the cities which Antiochos has to give up have bttn given by him to others, he shall withdraw from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them".1.l2 It is thus likely that the practice was widespread. An 'estate,1J3 was an artificially created economic unit comprising cultivated territories as well as a subject population living in villages. In the Hellenistic age, some of these estates were taken over from the Persians, others were no doubt newly created.' A grantee could hold several territories at once. Mnesimachos' dorea in Sardis consisted of villages, hamlets and A similar attempt is recorded in an inscription from Samos dated 246-243 8.C. Some of the most notable philo; of Antiochos I had appropriat~d lands ~Ionging to Samian cirizms. Thanks to the intercession of Boulagoras, an eminent Samian cirizcn, with Antiochos, the property was restored (SEG 1.366). Such restorations must have been exceprional: Boulagoras is praised, among oth~r things, because, since the restoration of the lands, "none of the subordinates of Antiochos ever tri~d to lay claim to what belonJed to the citizens". u, Worrle (1978) 202. I am ht:avily indebted to this anicle for the collection of the Hellenistic cyiden~. 130 OGIS 55. It cannot be ruled out that lysimachos was a xmas of Ptolmay of Egypt and named his son after him. For the discussion of the identity of Ptolemy son of lysimachos, see Rostovtzeff (1922) 4S n.50 and (1941) vol.l, 336. 131 Plutarch, Eu",mts 10. I J2 Polybius 21.43.18. 1U For the technical name ous;a, which is sometim~s used in this regard, see Kreissig (1977) 10 and (J978) 40ff. 121

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non-contiguous pieces of land scattered over several units of royal administration. 1.14 The Egyptian doreai, attested through the papyri from a different angle, do not seem to have departed from this pattern. What I call 'uncultivated areas' refer to territories lacking cultivation but not populations. Clearly, such territories were given to a grantee with the intention that he convert them into estates. A good example is a plot of 2000 plethra of land given by Antiochos I to a certain Aristodikides of Assus. 135 This land, as observed by Kreissig, was no ousia, but just 'land between'. To endow it with a minimal degree of administrative unity (and, presumably, facilitate the recruitment of labourers), Aristodikides would have to join it to the territory of a Greek city. To form some idea of the ties of dependence that dorea; created between the grantor and grantee, it is necessary to find the answer to the following questions: What kind of hold did the recipient acquire over the domains? What obligations did the possession of the dorea impose? And finally, by what rules were these obligations regulated? The question of hold may be considered first. The most important document in this respect is the inscription recording the confirmation of four estates in the ownership of a certain Perdikkas, son of Koinos. 136 Two of these domains were originally given by Philip II to Perdikkas' grandfather, Polemokrates of Elimiotis. The background was conquest: newly acquired territories were presumably distributed by lot between the heta;ro;. Philip's grant carried full ownership: Polemokrates and his descendants were empowered to own, give away and sell the estates. A third estate was given by Philip to Koinos on the same conditions. A fourth estate was given by Alexander the Great to one Ptolemaios. Perdikkas son of Koinos inherited the three estates granted by Philip to his father and grandfather and bought for money the estate granted by Alexander to Ptolemaios. In the inscription, King Cassander confirmed that all four estates belonged to Perdikkas son of Koinos on the original conditions: Perdikkas was free to own, give away or sell the estates. So, unmistakably, dorea here carries full ownership. No similar evidence is available from the Persian empire, but we know of at least two doreai which were in the grantees' possession for at least twO generations. We find the sons and widow of Gongylos the Eretrian ruling the five cities Gongylos received from Xerxes more than ninety years after Cf. Kreissig (1977) 10. IJS Welle~ (1934) nos. 10-13. I)" Syll. ., .H2. Cf. R.M. Errington in Journal of Hellmic Studitos 94 (1974) B; Hammond :and Griffith (1979) .167. 1\4

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the grant was made. 137 In the same period, the descendants of Demaratos ruled the two cities that Demaratos was given by Darius. 138 It thus seems possible that either the estates were given in full ownership or that by some coincidence they were not reclaimed by the four (in the case of Demaratos, five) successive Persian kings during this period. It does not seem possible to arrive at a clear-cut conclusion on the basis of such evidence alone. But the fact that two of Gongylos' cities, Myrina and Gryneion, appear among the tribute-paying members of the Delian League, points again to the possibility of holding a dorea without being formally attached to the grantor. U9 And that, again, suggests full ownership. Undeniably, a powerful ruler, Persian, Macedonian or Hellenistic, could revoke a dorea at whim whatever the precise terms of the grant. Yet the theoretical question of grant in full ownership or grant in temporary possession represents a significant difference for the psychology of the relationship, and hence for the practical exercise of the ruler's powers. The very limited evidence examined so far suggests that in this period full ownership was the rule. The question is, was this custom discontinued in the Hellenistic age, as has been claimed ever since Rostovtzeff? 140 The answer seems to be that in the Hellenistic world there was no uniform practice. Kings basically regarded their whole empire, including doreai given away, as their personal property. In practice, however, some doreai were given away on certain stipulated conditions, and others in full ownership. The former case is exemplified by a clause in the Mnesimachos inscription foreseeing a possible reclamation of a part of the dorea by the king; 141 the latter by the dorea of Ptolemy son of Thraseas near Skythopolis in southern Syria, which included both villages given in possession (egktesei) and villages given in full ownership (eis to patrikon).142 Clearly, there was no unified practice. The second question, what obligations did the possession or ownership of the dorea impose, may quickly be answered. It involved the payment of Xenophon. Artabasis 7.8.8; 8.17. u, Xenophon, Htllmic.a 3.1.6. u, O. Ste. Croix (1972) 39. lotO Rosrovtzeff (1922) 48, who saw dore,,; as "not hereditary but personal holdings, usually aMOCiated with the high position occupied by the holder in the military or civil administration of the kingdom.... Cf. Kreissig (19n) 10: Uland given err aphtm goes into the possession, but not the ownership, of th~ receiver". 141 "If the king on account of Mnnimachos shall take away from Anemis the villages, the allotments (Itleror1 or any other pan of fa hypolt.timmtl...". Cf. Atkinson (1972) 61, who regards the contract as a "sale of possessio of royal land, special conditions being insened in 137

the contract itself to provide for the contingency of resumption of the land by the King". •42 landau (1966) II.lVa, lines 22-3, with Fischer (1979) for emendations and mort recent bibliography.

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taxes to the grantor but it did not create obligations of service, military or other. To be sure, the grantee, when called upon, did come with his men to assist the king in fighting. And it frequently happened that he went on embassy for the king or promoted the king's interests in his own city. But these services were not performed in return for the dorea. The doreai were a means of providing the recipient with maintenance - which, no doubt, indirectly facilitated the performance of services. They even made it possible for the grantor to become an absentee landlord, entrust the management of a dorea to a manager, move to the court, and become a member of the central administration. But nowhere is the performance of services for the king made a condition of the reception of the do rea. The duties of the recipient were left vague and unspecified. They were neither the duties of a tenant nor those of an administrator. Predominantly, they remained the duties of friendship. So, in order to proceed further, and see how the interplay of goods and services, personal relations and administrative rules structured these societies, we must find oUt what these duties consisted of.

5

OBLIGATIONS: HEROIC AND CIVIC 5.1 'WHAT AlKIBI ADES DID AND SUFFERED'

It is not hard to see why Alkibiades should have entered history as the archetypal traitor of all time. Until the expedition to Sicilyt he seemingly deployed all his talents and all his wealth in the service of his native cityt Athens. But when t in 415 B.C. t he was implicated in a supposed plot against democracy and was recalled from SicilYt he fled to Sparta, Athens' bitter enemy, and made recommendations about how best to inflict injury on Athens (by sending an expedition to Sicily and establishing a post at Decelea in Attica). When Sparta had taken full advantage of this valuable advice, more betrayals of Athenian interests followed. In 412 B.C., Alkibiades went on a mission to Ionia on Sparta's behalf and persuaded many cities allied with Athens to revolt. This seriously impaired the war effort since it not only reduced Athens' fighting potential but also the volume of tribute which financed it. Then Alkibiades effected yet anothert seemingly impossible volte-face. Realising that he had become suspect to the Peloponnesians on account of a personal rivalry, he withdrew to the court of the Persian satrap Tissaphernes t became Tissaphernes' adviser t and advised him how to inflict damage on the Peloponnesians (namely, by cutting down the rate of pay of their navy). FinallYt by virtue of his good connexions t Alkibiades was not only accepted back into his native Athens t but was even elected to the prestigious office of strategos. Not that extraordinary acts of treason are unknown in history. But there is something altogether unique about treason in the Greek city t both as an idea and a practice. For Alkibiades was merely emulating a pattern which, to a lesser extent t was present in the careers of men such as Hippias, Demaratos t Themistokles, Pausanias, and t as we shall see t in scores of less impressive careers in Greek history. To judge by modern standards, what is unusual about these men is the remarkable ease with which they could ally themselves with the enemies of their immediate groups; the astonishingly high positions they could secure whenever they changed sides; the devotion they showed to the party they were allied to at anyone time; and their effecting all these tergiversations not only without the slightest compunction but with an apparently unwavering belief in their Own sense of justice. A few typical excerpts from some of the most widely used manuals of

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Greek history will show that this pattern of action is only poorly understood. In Bury's History of Greece, first published in 1900, Alkibiades was introduced as "a young man of high birth, brilliant intelligence, and no morality". As his schemings gradually came to be revealed, new epithets emerged, "profane and unstable" and "renegade" being the most significant ones for our purposes.· To Laistner, Alkibiades' morality became understandable only in contrast with that of Kimon: " ... whereas in Kimon an iron sense of duty and profound love of his country were the guiding influences of his public life, in Alkibiades self-interest was throughout his career the overmastering passion. His youthful extravagances and arrogant disregard of every convention were condoned as high spirits by a public fascinated with his personal beauty... .,2 Published in 1936, this might at first sight appear a belated return to the naivete of the previous century. But very much the same evaluations are encountered again and again in works published since. According to the history of Greece by Burn, which appeared in 1966, Alkibiades "was rich by inheritance, but his extravagance would have strained any fortune. He set out to aggrandise himself, and the morality of the means was no object. An aristocrat, he heartily despised the people, though naturally he flattered them in public. His natural party would have been the conservatives; but they mistrusted him. Many respectable people disapproved of his morals"·) This picture is by no means confined to the English-speaking world. E. Will, for instance, also takes something like Laistner's 'overmastering passion' to have been the mainspring of Alkibiades' actions: "Divinement beau, prodigieusement intelligent, d'une lucidite politique qui I'apparente a Themistocle, Alcibiade ctait toutefois rebelle a cet esprit de sou mission a la tradition et aux lois qui etait encore Ie ciment de la cite et faisait la dignite du citoyen. On a doute qu'il flit un produit de I'enseigncment des sophistes, mais, s'il est certain que I'individualisme et I'ambition sans scrupules se passent d'un tel enseignement, il apparait evident que I"esprit nouveau' avait souffle sur Alcibiade.,,4 No attempt will be made in this study to vindicate Alkibiades: moral judgements often preclude historical understanding. But it will be argued that characterisations such as these reflect the normative assumptions of the modern, narional centralised state; and that they constitute a misrepresentation of the manner in which ideas and actions were interrelated in antiquity. , The epithets a~ unchanged in rhe subsequenr edirions of rhe b()ok published, since 1951, by R. Meiggs. 1 M.L.W. laismer, A History of the Crnlt World {rom 479 to 323 8.C. (london, 1936) 118. 1 A.R. Burn, Tht Pelican History of C,etce (Harmondsworth, 1966) 282. 4 Ed. Will, u mondt grtc tt I' orient (Paris, 1972) voU, 342.

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Once we reconstruct the system of ideas of ritualised friendship, it will become apparent that Alkibiades was operating consistently with values which were not only traditional but, within cenain social spheres, even highly respectable. Indeed, from the perspective of the people participating in these spheres, it was civic morality which appeared new and disreputable. 5.2 THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION

Every single utterance related to xenia is permeated with an intense sense of duty. And these duties are conceived of in astonishingly uniform terms: it is as if everyone recognised how a xenos should behave in each specific situation. Clearly, this recognition flowed from an ethical code implicitly shared by all members of society. For we witness no attempts at formulating or systematising it; at no stage in Greek history did ritualised friendship undergo anything like the incorporation of the code of godparenthood into church legislation, or the crystallisation of the feudal bond into the 'contract of vassalage'. 5 The intricate transformation of moral principles into explicit regulations never advanced beyond the occasional drafting of a treaty, or the coining of an aphorism. This state of documentation is highly significant for our attempt to reconstruct the obligations of ritualised friendship. For what we are left with is not a written code or an inventory of duties, but actions in the name of xenia and comments made on these actions. Three stories will serve as an introduction to the matter. Since the references to the duties are incidentally made, and since similar conceptions emerge from scores of other stories, there are no good reasons to doubt that what we have here was the nonn, not the exception. The first example is intertwined with the Ionian revolt of 499 B.C. Megabates, the Persian general charged with the seizure of Naxos, discovered that a watch was absent on a Myndian ship under his command. As punishment for this negligence, Megabates bade his guards find Skylax, the captain of the ship, and bind him in such a fashion that his head was outside the oar-hole of the ship and his body inside. When word was brought to Aristagoras of Milerus about this, he at once came to the aid of Skylax, his xenos, and pleaded with Megabates for his release. When Megabates proved impervious, Aristagoras released Skylax himself. This overt challenge to his authority so enraged Megabates that he forewarned the Naxians of the impending invasion, thereby frustrating the whole operation. It was, according to Herodotus, for fear that on account of this failure he would be $

Marc Bloch (1961) 219; Ganshof (1964) 80; Mintz and Wolff in Schmidr er al. (eds.) Goody (1983) Chapter 9.

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deprived of his lordship of Miletus that Aristagoras began to plan the revolt against the Persians. 6 The second incident is told us by Thucydides. In 424 B.C., the Spartan general Brasidas set out for Thrace with seventeen hundred Peloponnesian hoplites. Upon his arrival at Heraclea in Trachis t Brasidas sent a request to his xenoi in Pharsalus to escort him and his army through Thessaly.' The xeno; came at once and the march proceeded. Thucydides' comments on the problem of crossing foreign territory are important for an understanding of what followed. In the first placet says Thucydides, it was not easy to traverse Thessaly without an escort t especially with an army. SecondlYt crossing the territory of neighbours without their consent was generally looked upon with suspicion by all the Greeks. ThirdlYt the commoners (plethos) in Thessaly had always been on good terms with Athens (and therefore inimical to Sparta). Thucydides notes that if Thessaly had been under democratic rule (;sonom;a) and not in the hands of a few powerful men (dynasteia)t Brasidas would have been unable to go forward. Even SOt Brasidas was confronted by some Thessalians from the democratic faction. They tried to prevent him from going further t asserting that t in proceeding against the consent of the whole community, Brasidas was violating accepted conventions (adikein). At this point, the xenoi escorting Brasidas intervened, pleading for understanding. They said that if the inhabitants of the country were unwilling t they would not conduct the march any further; it was merely that Brasidas had unexpectedly arrived in their land and they were escorting him

since they were his xeno;. The opposing Thessalians apparently accepted the invocation of this moral duty as partial justification of the transgression and allowed the march to continue. Our last incident t recounted by Xenophon, took place during Cyrus' march against his brother Artaxerxes. When it became apparent to the Greek soldiers that they had been tricked into an attempt to overthrow the Persian throne t they threatened to discontinue the march. Klearchos wept for a long while before the soldiers and then spoke as follows: Fellow soldiers, do not wonder that J am distressed at the present situation. For Cyrus became my xenos and not only honoured me, an exile from my fatherland, in various ways, but gave me ten thousand darics. And I, receiving this money, did not lay it up for my own personal use ... but I proceeded to expend it on you. First, I wmt to war with the Thracians ... Then, when Cyru5' summons C2me, I took you with me and ~t out, in order that, if he had need of me, I might give him aid in return (or the benefits I received from him. But you now do not wish to continue the Herodotus 5.33-5. 7 The word Thucydide1 U!e5 is ep;t~d~;o; in 4.78.1. xtno; in 4.78.4. That Brasidas (like Ptrdikkas in 4.132.2) had XnlO; in Thnsaly, Thucydid~ assumes that his readen would take for granted. 6

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march with me; so it seems that I must either betray you and continue to make use of Cyrus' friendship (philia), or prove false with him and remain with you .... A conspicuous common feature of all these episodes is the invocation of xenia in order to advocate a certain course of action. The invocation was in each case provoked by a rival premise: obedience to a higher authority in the case of Aristagoras; infringement of territorial sovereignty in the C2se of Brasidasj and an instinctive sense of self-preservation on the part of the mutinous soldiers. It is precisely the gravity of these premises that throws into relief the intensity of the sense of duty inherent in xenia. The implication is that this sense of duty, which has been ignored, or at best misinterpreted in the modern literature, was held by contemporaries as high in the scale of values as these rival considerations. The conception of xenia as an institution is another characteristic emerging from these incidents. There existed in the ancient Greek world a form of behaviour appropriate to xenia in much the same way as there was one appropriate to kinship and friendship. The idea was that through the rites of initiation the personalities of the actors and their roles as xeno; became inseparably fused; that. as a result, they became bound by mutual obligations; and that actions, attitudes and modes of conduct towards each other flowed from these roles. It was in the name of xenia that Aristagoras released Skylax, or that the Thessalians escorted Brasidas. The incident with Klearchos shows that the ideas embodied in the institution might well diverge from the ideas entertained by its incumbent. For we may doubt the truth of what Klearchos said. Transparently, he thought it to be to his own personal advantage to continue the march. To the soldiers, however, he addressed himself not as a self-seeking personality but as the victim of social necessity: they had to continue the march since he was bound by his role. The fact that the soldiers yielded indicates the power of this emotional appeal. A society which has elaborated the conception of such an institution will differ from one in which it is absent. The institution provided a channel of interaction for individuals who by descent and primary attachment belonged to different groups and who could not otherwise have co-operated 'naturally'. Historians in antiquity seem to have attached great importance to this fact. Without Aristagoras' rescue of Skylax, Naxos would probably have been taken. Without the assistance of the Thessalian xenoi, Brasidas' march probably could not have been carried out. Without the option of the emotional appeal to the rights and duties of xenia, Klearchos might have been unable to continue the march. Whether an abstract idea or a concrete • Xmophon, Anabasis 1.2.3-5.

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relationship, xenia could have a powerful effect on the general course of events. The ethos of xenia revolved around tht twin poles of idealism and instrumentality. It called, on the one hand, for unconditional loyalty, honesty and devotion even at the cost of self-sacrifice. Satyros of Athens, for instance, rather than choosing a precious gift, asked Philip of Macedon for the daughters of a deceased xenos, Apollophanes of Pydna. "It will bring me no gain", he was made to say, "for I shall provide them with dowries and give them in marriage; and I shall not permit them to suffer any treatment unworthy of myself and their father". The sptech is said to have been met by such outburst of applause from the other guests that Philip granted the request, even though Apollophanes was one of the murderers of his own brother. 9 On the other hand, expectations of reciprocity - whether immediate or delayed, whether in goods or in services - were built into almost every single utterance or gesture connected with the institution. "For Cyrus became my xenos, and not only honoured me ... but gave me ten thousand darics...", Xenophon made Klearchos say, and the debt Klearchos owed Cyrus for the money was inseparable from the debt he owed him as a xenos: he repaid both by putting himself at Cyrus' service. In this world favours accepted generated a strong sense of indebtedness, and had to be repaid with even more pressing urgency than monetary debts. There was thus a constant oscillation between giving and receiving, helping and being hdptd - an oscillation that made for the perpetuation of the bond. Where continuous exchanges were lacking, the relationship was likely to fade: (socrates, for example, in his letter to Timotheos, felt it necessary to apologise for asking Timotheos a favour even though he never made a request to Timotheos' father. lo The most valued forms of repayment were those which aimed at the benefactor's most pressing needs. The Greeks had a special word for this, boetheia. "You will best serve your friends (phi/oi) if you do not wait for them to ask your help, but go of your own accord at the crucial moment to lend some aid (tv loie; xalQOiC; ~'l9fJC;)", advised Isocrates to Demonikos, II and an incident from Herodotus may show how such acts of boetheia were carried out in practice. In the midst of a war between the Lydian king Alyattes and Thrasyboulos, the tyrant of Miletus, a third ruler, Periander, tyrant of Corinth, learnt what reply the oracle from Delphi had given to Alyattes. Thereupon he dispatched a messenger to

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Thrasyboulos, "so that his xenos should be forewarned and make his plans accordingly". 12 Saving or sparing a xenos, ransoming him from captivity, providing him with shelter and food were the most frequent manifestations of boetheiai. lJ It is customary to attribute these acts to a sentiment of warm humanity. But, I suggest, the picture is more complex than that. In all societies, ordinary favours can be repaid with counter-favours of commensurate magnitude. Not so favours of extraordinary magnitude; these create what has been called an 'unrepayable debt': An un repayable debt is one given in time of extreme need at great cost. Saving a life creates an un repayable debt ... Acknowledgment of the existence of such a debt means that the indebted ally cannot break the alliance, and must always be ready to respond to a call for aid, unless he can repay with a favour that is itself of such 'unrepayable' magnitude that it cancels out the initial debt. I.

An ambiguity thus springs to mind whenever we read of spared enemies. Did the generous act arise from general considerations of humanity, or was it part of a cunning strategy designed to enlarge - or strengthen - the circle of loyal followers? Following the capture of Thebes in 335 B.C., for example, Alexander's troops are said to have razed the city to the ground and enslaved the Theban survivors (including women and children) making an exception for priestesses and those who were the xeno; of Alexander and Philip and proxeno; of the Maceclonians. IS No definite answer is possible, but in interpreting motivations on such occasions there should be an awareness of the alternatives. Whether altruistic or cynically calculating, xenia exercised a constraining effect on behaviour. To public opinion, it often appeared irresistible. Thucydides, for example, reports a popular belief according to which Themistokles put an end to his life when he realised that it was impossible for him to fulfil his promise to the Great King. 16 Another indic2tion comes from a Herodotus 1.20-22. Aristotle seeml again to have echoed a popular view when he dncribed the bestowal of favours and assistance <xaq£oao6m Kat ~L) on friends (philo.). JUnt-friends (XnlO,), and comrades (hetairai) al the gnatnt of plealures (Politics 2.1263b6). His funher comment, that "a condition of this il the private ownership of property", is another indication of the upper-class bias of the institution. 14 land~ in Schmidt d at (eds.) (19n) xvii. For a dncription based on first-hand observation, 1ft Douglas (1960). Some ancient examples: Histiaios and Koes sparing Darius' bridge (Herodotus 9.97); Xenagoras of Halicamassus saving the life of Maliltes. son of Darius (Herodotus 9.107); Neon sparing the trapped Antigonos (Polybius 20.5-6). U Arrian, Anabasis 1.9.9 and Plutarch, AI~xQ1fd" 10.11. Cf. Uvy 1.1.1 for Aeneas and Antenor being spared lI~tUJti iur~ hospi'i;. 16 Thucydides 1. 138.4. d. Herodotus 5.35.1 for Aristagoral' inability to fulfil hi5 promite to Artaphrenes. 11

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legendary story. Herodotus tells us that Themison, the trader from Thera, was not aware when he made a pact of xenia with Etearchos, ruler of Oaxus, that he had undertaken to drown Etearchos' daughter. Torn between his duty as a xenos and general considerations of humanity, Themison enacted a mock-drowning of the young lady. The bizarre scene is clearly intended as a kind of expiation ceremony for the obligation which Themison was forced to ignore. 1 , A more realistic example comes from Polybius. The Spartan king Archidamos, fleeing from the other king of Sparta, Kleomenes, took refuge with a hereditary xenos, Nikagoras of Messene. When Kleomenes held out an offer of reconciliation, Nikagoras acted as a mediator. However, at the meeting between the two rulers, Kleomenes treacherously put Archidamos to death, sparing Nikagoras. Polybius' description of Nikagoras' psychology is revealing: "To the outside world, Nikagoras pretended to be grateful to Kleomenes for having spared his life, but in his heart he bitterly resented what had occurred, for it looked as if he had been the cause of the king's death". When the right opportunity offered itself, Nikagoras absolved himself by cunningly implicating Kleomenes in a plot which ended in his death. 18 To what extent in general people yielded to such constraints seems impossible to tell. Men at all times seck to reconcile self-interest with social norms, preferably disguising the former by the latter. But the picture becomes somewhat clearer if we focus our attention on violations: what happened when a xenos ignored his duties? About the only surviving poem of Timokreon of Rhodes contains bitter accusations against lbemistokles the Athenian. The precise context escapes us, but it is clear that Themistokles accepted money not to restore Timokreon from exile to his native Rhodes even though Timokreon had been his xenos. In other words, Themistokles preferred self-interest to duty and withdrew his support precisely when it was most needed. The enraged Timokreon called Themistokles a liar, cheat and traitor (pseustan, adikQ1" prodotan) and imprecated curses upon him. 19 The Trojan Hektor was seemingly guilty of a far lesser offence - he abandoned his xenos, the Lykian Sarpedon, to the Achaeans - yet was still liable for rebuke. The Lykian Glaukos impugned his heroic prowess in retribution - "How, then, 0

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Herodotus 4.tH. Polybius .5.37-8.

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Timokreon, fragment 1; d. Adkins (1972a) 94.

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hard-hearted, shall you save a worse man in all your company... ?" - and threatened to withdraw the Lykian army from Troy.20 There were other ways, too, in which the need to conform with the duties of xenia was impressed on men's minds and dominated their consciousness. When Aeschines charged Demosthenes with the murder of his own xenos, he called the deed an asebema, an impious crime, appealing thereby to a whole array of mystical beliefs. 21 The horror inherent in xenoktonia - a loaded word, the connotations of which can never fully be rendered by the phrase 'murder of a guest-friend' - can be illustrated by the crimes with which it was associated. Drawing a favourable contrast betWeen the polis and the states of old, Isocrates asked: Did there not abound in them [i.e. the states of old) murder of brothers and fathers and xt1loi; matricide and incest and begetting of children by sons with their mothers; feasting of a father on the flesh of his own sons... 22

Hesiod's Inferno was only slightly less terrifying. Doing wrong to a xenos is here grouped together with cheating and stealing for gain's sake, lying with one's brother's wife, offending against orphans, and abusing one's father. Zeus himself is said to punish such criminals. 21 The breach of obligations was a sin not only against the contracting party himself but also against the gods. When Herakles murdered his xenos, Iphitos, in his own house, the poet branded him as "damnable" (schetlios), not paying due respect to the gods and the rules of hospitality. In consequence of this murder Herakles was afflicted with a disease which could only be cured by working off his guilt as a slave in the service of Omphale, queen of the Lydians. 24 A similar offence was committed by Polymestor, ruler of Thrace, in the Euripidean play Hecuba. Polymestor betrayed the role of foster-father and killed Polydoros, the son of the Trojan Priam and Hecuba, for the gold he carried with him. Hecuba in her grief is made to appeal to the duties of xenia (nou bLxa ;tvorv;), and refer to the murder as a sacrilegious deed. 2S In Diodorus' history, Agathokles is said to have suffered a terrible lO Iliad 17. 140ff.; Themiltokles and Hektor broke the minimalisr ckmand not only of xnria but perhaps of all amiable relationships in simple cultures: that people involved in 'positive' relationships should help each o~r as much as possible and never injure each othn. On the 'norm of reciprocity', Itt GouldMr in Schmidt tt al. (eds.) (19n) 28·42. II Anchines 3.224 (Against Q~s;pho"). u lsocrates S. 122 (To Philip). U Works ad Days 32()'4, d. Aristophanes, Frogs 147ff. for a parody of this. l4 Odys~ 21.26·8; Sophocles, Trach;"ia~ 68·72, 248·54, 274-6 (with Kholia); Apollo· doros 2.6.2·3; Diodorus Siculus 4.31.5·8. Cf. Finley (1981) 116·17 for the implications of the myth in a different context. Ij Euripides, H~cuba 710ff.

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punishment for the murder of his own phi/os and xenos, Ophellas of Cyrene: ...for in the same month and in the same day on which he murdered Ophelia!' and took his anny, he caused the death of his own sons and lost his own army. And what is most peculiar of all, the god (ho theos) like a good lawgiver (nomothe'~s) exacted a double punishment from him; for when he had unjustly slain one friend, he was deprived of two sons, those who had 1>«n with Ophcllas laying violent hands upon the young men. 26 In fact, the central plot of the Iliad - the abduction of Helen - revolves around a similar sin. "You defiled me, wretched dogs·', said Menelaos to the Trojans, "and your heart knew no fear at all of the hard anger of Zeus loud-thundering, the xenos' god, who some day will utterly sack your steep city".27 The abduction was a sin in itself and constituted, no doubt, an offence against hospitality, too, but it was also - and, I suggest, chiefly - a breach of guest-friendship. That is why, at the first encounter with Alexandros, Menelaos addressed himself to the supreme deity as a betrayed xenos:

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Zeus, lord, grant me to punish the man who first did me injury, brilliant Alexandros, and beat him down under my hands' srrength that anyone of the men to come may shudder to think of doing evil to a kindly host (xeinodokon), who has given him friendship.211 Xenophon's Anabasis furnishes an even more realistic account of such a betrayal. Tissaphemes first made Klearchos his ritualised friend (homotrapezos). This gave Klearchos sufficient aSSurance to bring all the Greek generals to a conference with the Persian satrap. But then Tissaphernes treacherously murdered them all. The comment later made on this by a he Tissaphernes did not even reverence Greek participant is revealing: Zeus xeniosj instead, having become Klearchos' homotrapezos, he made that very act the means of deceiving and destroying the generals".29 When the same Tissaphernes deceived Agcsilaos, the Spartan king claimed that by violating the oath Tissaphernes had made the gods enemies of his side and allies of the Greeks..l O Glaukos' threat to withdraw the Lykian contingent and Menelaos' actual revenge were typical. Apart from the sanction of public opinion and apart I i •••

26 Oiodorus Siculu5 20.70.3-". Nore rhar Agarhokles' sons are envisaged ro be in Ophellas' enrourage. 1.7

Iliad U.623.5. Iliad 3.351-4, d. Plurarch. Moralia 970. Zeus

35 rhe proreetor of strangers, guest· friends. and supplianrs figures in dOlen! of passages; for example, Thcognis 143-4; Odyssry 9.266-7; 14.56; 14.414; Iliad 13.624; Plato, lAws 72ge ff., 953r, 950b; Charonda~ In Stobaeus 2 p.IS!; Anchylus. F.umm;d~s 269-15; see furrher Gould (191.\). 2«1 Xenophon, A"abasis 3.2.4, d. 2.5.27. }() Xenophon, Hellnr;cQ 3.4.11.

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from an internalised sense of duty there was no agency outside the framework of the relationship capable of enforcing obligations. The partners themselves provided the sanctions. A man's whole moral personality was in this respect at stake. Being left in the lurch was interpreted as an affront to honour, and if one party ignored his obligations the other was not only freed from all obligations but saw it as his own duty to punish the offender. On the occasion of the soldiers' mutiny (in the course of the march of the Ten Thousand),Jl Klearchos confessed to the soldiers both his shame for having let Cyrus down and his fear that Cyrus might have seized and punished him. But then, he employed Cyrus' desire to punish as an argument against the mutiny itself: And remember that while this Cyrus is a valuable friend (ax;os ... phi/os) when he is your friend, he is a most dangerous foe (echthros) when he is your enemy (polemios); furthermore, he has an armament - infantry and cavalry and fleet - which we all alike see and know about". 32 In most cases this desire for revenge coincides admirably with calculations of expediency. In other words, it is by no means clear whether it is the reason for, or a justification of, an action. Only myth elevates the duty of revenge to a more idealised plane: Proteus, king of Egypt, had to punish the Trojan Alexandros on account of a wrongful act that Alexandros committed not against himself, but against his own xenos, the Spartan Menelaos.JJ It was the entire institution of xenia, not merely his own private interests, that Proteus was thus made to defend. Not always nor everywhere, to be sure, was it possible to inflict such punishments. But there were Other devices at hand by which xenoi could exert pressure on one another. When, during the march of the Ten Thousand, Xenias and Pasion deserted, Cyrus, contrary to common expectations, declared that he would not pursue and maltreat them. But he reminded the generals that the wives and children of the deserters were held under guard in Tralles. This veiled allusion to the families of the generals themselves (presumably also maintained as 'guests' on Cyrus' various estates) served no doubt as a tactful warning against further desertions. Indeed, the courts of rulers in antiquity swarmed with the children of lesser rulers,34 and this, I suggest, was another adaptation to ulterior purposes of the foster-parenthood implied in xenia (Section 2.3). The whole institution, U

Xenophon, ANabasis 1.3fE. n Xmophon, AtUJbasis 1.3.12. J) Herodotus 2.114-15. 34 In the Macedonian and Hellenistic coUI't'St this custOm became formalised and the sons of nobles brought up with the royal princn (Syrttrapha'1 came to be known as Royal Pages (basiliio; fHJiJ~s). Cf. Serve (1926) J 7ff.; Kienast (1973) 28ff.; Walbank (1984b) 227. JI

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as reflected in the sources, is thus Janus-faced. Adrastos, son of Gordias, of Phrygia, was banished by his father on account of a fratricide but taken into the household of Croesus the Lydian by virtue of a friendship between the two families. He lived there a princely life until his tragic killing of Croesus' son. 3.~ Not so charitable, however, was the treatment of the son of Kersobleptes, King of the Odrysai. Kersobleptes was first defeated by Philip, then forced to surrender parts of his realm to other states and to hand over his son to Philip. The Athenian Aeschines, who years later visited Philip's court, defined the boy's status as 'hostage' /ft but there are good grounds to believe that in a different context the boy would have appeared as a foster-son: for we know of two sons of Kersobleptes by the names of lolaos and Poseidonios - names received, presumably, from Macedonian foster-parents.-" Thus, the simulation of familiarity, rituals, sacred roles, divine sanctions, gifts and services as well as blackmail and extortion were all involved in generating obligations and sustaining the institution of xenia. The binding character of these obligations cannot be illustrated by reference to any familiar modern parallel. But the analogy of other ritualised relationships is suggestive. For example, an Andalusian motto says: "You can refuse your compadre nothing; all that is yours is his".38 "Great is the weight of the bond-friendship in this land", say people in Tikopia, one of the Solomon islands, and the anthropologist who has described the institution explains: "The obligation to honour the bond is of a moral order, and a betrayal by a saa bond-friend is condemned as wrong by folk who hear of it,,:19 Among the central African Azande, "Open failure to fulfil the obligations of the pact brings upon a man not only magical retribution but also public censure. He becomes an object of contempt to his neighbours and a shame to his kinsmen". 40 Regarding Mexican compadrazgo, it has been remarked that H Herodotus 1..14-45. The same impression is conveyed by Xenophon's expressl)' rropagandist stattment that" All the sons of the noblest Persians are brought up (paid~uo"tai) at the king's court. There one may learn discretion and sdf-control (sophrosyn~) in full measure, and nothing that is base can be either heard or seen" (A"abas;s 1.9.3.). .\6 Aeschines 2.81-2 (0" the Embassy). For further examples, see Aymard (1954) and Amit (1970) 143ff. " Syll.·' 195. The two other sons of Kersobleptes had Thracia n names, Medistas and Tert'S. For an lolaos serving as a bodyguard of Alexander IV, see IG 11 2 561. with SEG 26.86 and Bull.Epigr. (1978) 145. Cf. also Demosthenes 19.230 (D~ Fa/sa ugalione), where Phrynon is accused of having !lent his son to Philip even before he reached adulthood. This, of course. does not mean that children could not be employed as hostages, like those sent by Peisistraros (0 lygdamis (Herodotus 1.64). .18 Pin-Rivers (1973) 102. .1 9 Firth (1936) 263. 40 Evans-Pritchard (1933) 387.

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this connexion obliges the compadres and comad,es to hospitality and honesty and all sons of good offices towards one another; and it is wonderful how conscientiously this obligation is kept to, even by people who have no conscience at all for the rest of the world. A man who will cheat his own father or his own mother will keep faith with his compadre. 41

These parallels prove neither that xenia was immune to breaches (which, as we have seen, it was not), nor even that in these societies there was a correspondence between acts and ideal statements. What they show, in my view, is that strikingly similar conceptions are present in other societies; and that mostly, these conceptions belong to a framework of relationships created by means of a ritual act between persons not related by blood. If we see the norm of loyalty created by xenia as a particular variation within this spectrum, then at least some of the difficulties concerning Alkibiades will disappear. 5.3 SERVICES

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It will already have been observed that actions performed in the name of xenia were not limited to any particular sphere of human activity: ritualised friendship did not have a 'medium' of its own. It manifested itself partially in any of the conventional categories of 'warfare', 'diplomacy', or 'trade', but was not fully contained in any of them. It embraced a range of cooperative acts as wide as one could possibly find in any human society: xeno; could be found providing each other assistance - and, it should be noted, substantial assistance - in solving family affairs; in avenging personal grievances; in lending money; in offering shelter, refuge or asylum; in ransoming each Other from captivity; in achieving political power; in subverting governments; and overthrowing empires. The reason for this was that ritualised friendship acted both as a substitute for and above all a complement to kinship roles. The range (if not the intensity) of the exchanges carried out between xeno; was thus wider than that between kinsmen or close intimates. Apparently, there was no limit to what a xenos could do for another. Yet one type of human activity is conspicuously absent from the list: low-class activities most immediately concerned with getting a livelihood. To be sure, xeno; did provide each other with grain and some other necessities of life. But they were not dependent for their survival on such provisions. Ritualised friendship was concerned with extracting spoils for people situated high above the subsistence level. The services they dispensed belonged to those 41

Minn and Wolf in Schmidt et al. (eds.) (19n) 1.

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upper-class pursuits to which, to use Veblen's language, "a degree of honOur auaches".42 The broad classificatory terms by which they arc denoted show this: euergesia, charis, boetheia - concepts which, in marked contrast with the universally despised banausic activities, were treated with automatic approval and admiration. 'Services' within the context of ritualised friendship should thus be understood as acts within the limits of what was deemed honourable and consistent with the aristocratic self-image. Even within these limits, however, the list comprises a variety not easily amenable to classification. For one thing, all types of service could be found within the framework of one single relationship. For another, even a service performed within a clearly defined sphere impinged on other spheres. Nevertheless, the services flowing between ritualiscd friends can be grouped into ritual services, services restricted mainly to the private domain, and those which mainly affected the public (d. Section 4.2, p.Rl). These distinctions have the double advantage of introducing some order into this bewildering variety and enabling us to see how the evolution of the civic system was related to nctworks of ritualised friendship. In what follows, I make only a shon reference to services already mentioned in other contexts but describe in some detail services not encountered so far. Ritual services. Into this category fall (a) services mimicking kinship relations: foster-parenthood, the seuing up of funerary stones, the provision of dowries, the bequeathing of property (Section 2.3), revenge (Section S.2); (b) bestowal of symbolic gifts (Section 4.2); (c) the composition of epitaphs, poems and of other literary pieces designed to express one's emotions towards one's xenos and spread his renown (Section 2.3). Pindar points to an explicit link between xenia, love, and the duty to sing a xenos' praise. 4 .1 It should not thus come as a surprise that a considerable portion of his poems were written in honour of xenoi; nor could it be a matter of coincidence that the Agesilaus and Cyropaedia were expressly written for the glorification of the two great xenoi of Xenophon's life, Agesilaos of Sparta and Cyrus of Persia..... Private services. Here belong chiefly: (a) acts of opportune intervention (boetheia) such as ransoming from captivity, providing shelter and maintenance, giving hospitality; (b) lending money or acting as a keeper of one's property; (c) giving expert assistance. The ability to provide the service stems in this last case from a skill or profession that a person had acquiredVehlen (1970) 21-2. Pindar. N~m~an 7.90-2. 44 For a striking parallel in the COntext of bond-friendship in a simple tribe. see Firth (1936) 269((. 42

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physicians, writers and artists loom large in this category - rather than from his possessions or his advantageous position in the social structure. Political services. Through these services, civic institutions and networks of ritualised friendship became thoroughly intertwined. An examination of this aspect of ritualised friendship yields a surprising picture. The elites of the ancient world, as we have seen, were engaged in a massive work of co-operation and exchange across political boundaries. The items they traded, however, included not only private goods and private services but also the interests of their entire communities: as it will be demonstrated in Section 5.5, civic affairs were frequently subordinated to the private interests of ritualised friends. In other words, to contemporaries these networks often appeared as organisations of supply for the individuals involved in them rather than for the cities to which the individuals (or one of them) belonged. Thus, the horizontal ties which linked the elites across political boundaries appear at times stronger than the vertical ties which bound them to their inferiors within their own communities. To substantiate this claim, a reassessment of some key concepts is necessary. In what follows, I hope to show that when ancient writers wrote of proxeno;, epitedeioi and philo; in other cities, they meant something different from what is customarily thought. Proxeno; may be considered first.

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5,4 XENIA and PROXENIA The proxeny is by far the most copiously documented political institution of antiquity. It is attested by thousands of inscriptions on stone or lead stemming from a geographic area roughly coterminous with the Greek world and covering a temporal span from the seventh century B.C. to the second century A.D. Proxeny decrees are remarkable documents, for which it is hard to find parallels in other cultures. Irrespective of the time or place of publication, they display a series of features in common. The grantor of a proxeny decree is always a community, mostly a city but sometimes a civic subdivision or cult association. The grantee, the recipient of the title of proxenos (and of some other titles and privileges which go with it), is always a stranger, an outsider. This general rule does not allow for exceptions. In all known proxeny decrees, the grantee originated invariably from communities distinct from those which granted the title. 45 In

4'

Cf. Marek (1984), me catalogues at 8·118. The dmri#toPf of the recipients is never

omitted from the decrees.

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other words, no citizen could ever become a proxenos of his own community. This distinction between 'inside" and 'outside' persisted even after the grant of proxeny. For the grantees were expected to further the interrsts of the granting community either in their own communities or in a place which (in relation to the granting community) constituted 'abroad'. An explanatory note to a fourth-century oration illustrates this well: "Proxenoi are those who in their own fatherlands look after [the affairs of] other cities". 46 Concrete examples show that, as with xenia, this regularity did not allow for exceptions. Some proxeny decrees are extremely short and uninformative, others are long and contain a host of minute details. But whatever their length, they are set out within an extremely rigid stylistic framework: with rare exceptions, epigraphists have no difficulty in classifying an inscription as 'proxeny'. Most decrees contain an introductory clause identifying the communal agency issuing the document; a middle clause naming the recipient and describing the acts by virtue of which he was given the honour; and a final clause listing the honours and privileges which he would be given in return. A good example of a typical decree (Fig. 11) would be this inscription from Athens: Gods Resolved by the Boule and the People, Antiochis held the prytany, Eukleides was Secretary, Hierokles presided, Euktemon was Archon [=40817 B.C.]. Dieitrephes made the motion: Since he is a good man, Oiniades of Palaiskiathos, to the city of the Athenians, and zealous to do whatever good he can, and is of benefit to [any) Athenian who comes to Skiathos, commendation shall be given him and he shall be recorded as proxeno$ and euergetes of the Athenians, and his descendants [as well); and that he be not harmed shall be the responsibility both of the Boule, whichever is in office, and of the generals and the Athenian governor in Skiathos, whoever he may be on each occasion. This decree shall be inscribed by the secretary of the Boule on a stel46 Scholion to Aeschines 3.138 (Against Ct~s;Pho,,). See Marek (1984) 393 for other lexicographical definitions.

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e of marble and shall be set up on the Acropolis. He shall also be invited for xenia to the Prytaneion for tomorrow.·'

Proxenia was not known to Homer; only xenia was. And xenia, as demonstrated in this study, was an essentially private institution. The earliest document containing the term proxenos (more precisely, proxenwos), dates from the last quarter of the seventh century B.C. It is a funerary monument erected by the people of Corcyra for one Menekrates of Deanthea (LocriS).48 In the verse epitaph inscribed on the stone, the Corcyraeans called Menekrates "a dear proxenos of the demos" - thereby marking a new departure. Its significance lay in the representation of a collectivity of people as an individual person wielding authority and conducting international diplomatic activity (ef. Fig. 12 with Fig. 5, p.52, for the appropriation of the visual symbolism of xenia by the city). Once established, this pattern was to persist until the disappearance of the institution some eight centuries thereafter: the proxeny will remain throughout this period an agreement between a community of people personified as a single individual, and a 'reaP individual outsider. Revolutions, as opposed to invasions, are seldom capable of bringing about a total rupture with the past. Earlier forms are mostly remodelled, renamed, and re-adapted to suit new circumstances. The institution of proxeny was not, I suggest, exceptional in this respect. The earlier institution was xenia; the new circumstances were the self-conscious communities of the city-state; and the result was proxenia. In other words, proxenia was a communal invention using as a model xenia. 49 Someone must have hit upon the idea of supplying the newly constituted communities with a device similar to that which served the lords at whose expense the community had gained power. We can even catch a glimpse of an intermediary stage between the xenos-xenos and the city-proxenos stage which might have facilitated the invention: powerful individuals, preferably rulers, would IG I' 110, adapted (excludang lines 26·31) from the tran,lanon in C.W. Fornara, Archaic to the End of tilt Pdopo"ntsia" War, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983) no. 160. The format of the translation imitat~ as clowly as possible the format of the original; hence the unconventional hyphenation. 411 Meiggs and Lewis (1969) no.4. 49 Marek (1984) 387 challens" the traditional view (for a summary of which, see Gschnit· zer (1973) 632) and denies any ronMxion betwttn proxeny and what previous scholars called Gastrecht on the grounds that 'hospitality' nlcompassn a range of dutin tOO narrow to have given rise to the all-purpose proxeny. But if we repla« 'hospitality' with 'rituali~ friendship', then thne difficulties disappear. 47

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Athenian decree from the year 408n B.C. granting the ritle of proxmos and euerget~ to Ointades of Palaisldathos (lG IJ 110 = M.B. Walbank (1978) no.87). Proxeny decrees provide a good evidence of how proxntia evolved from xnt,a: the m:ual declaration of xenia (". make you my .lreJ'los") is somewhat modified ("he shall be rec:orded as pro~eno$ and ~rgete$ ~f the Athenians") but tM- underlying belief IIllt if cre~ttS a pseudo-kinship relationship remains uncharaged (proxnria, like xenia, is thought to pass on to the descendants) Funher, the pre-state, ritual declaration is incorporated within a new formulary framework - eloquent evidence of the Clry's political insritutions - and derives irs binding force not from a mystical uttcran~ but from an explicit resolution of the demos.

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sometimes be made philoi, xenoi and ~uergetai of enrire communities. 50 The polis carried this custom one step further by formalising it as proxenia and by integrating it into its political procedures. That this was, indeed, the evolutionary process followed is shown by the analogies between xenia and proxenia: the points of resemblance are simply too many and too manifold to be fortuitous. Cities, like xenoi, performed ritual services for their proxenoi: a city commemorating its deceased proxenos with a tombstone and a verse-epitaph (Fig. 13) mimicked a Xenophon or Simonides doing iust the same for their own xeno; (Section 2.3, p.26). Cities, like xenoi, envisaged the establishment of a quasi-kinship relationship that devolved automatically upon the descendants and was theoretically unbreakable. 5 I Cities, like xenoi, imagined themselves to be protectors and foster-parents of their own partners and of their partners· offspring (see Fig. 14, and d. with Figs. 1a-d, pp.24-5).Sl Proxen;a also imitates xenia in being an all-purpose relationship: a proxenos was a general assistant who could be called upon in case of need and whose duties were unspecialised: above all, he was an euergetes, a benefactor. 53 Finally, the proxeny decree itself is an elaborate, written version of the ritual of initiation between xeno;. For what are the privileges conceived of as gifts (doreal1 given by a city to a proxenos, if not a communal version of private giftexchange? What is the meaning of the underlying sequence of the key concepts (present explicitly or implicitly in hundreds of decrees) - that erte"gl's;a cngcndcrs :I wish to confer :I cha,.is equivalcnt to the eue"gett!mQ JO For ~xamplt. Odyssry 9.18 (Ody~us, xmos of rhe pt,aucian~); Pindar, Pythian 9.82

(Amphirryon, xmos of the Spartans); Herodotus 1.22 (xenia and sym",achia ~ecn AlyatttS and the Mile5ians); Herodotus 6.34 (Miltiades d~ a good deed for the Dolonci and is invit~d to becom~ th~ir tyrant); H~rodotus 1.67 (th~ agathoergoi of Spana). d. Diodorus Siculus 11.18.1·2; H~rodotus 3.88 (Darius. xenos of the Arabians); Herodotus 1.69 (Cronus. xmos 01 the Spartans); Herodotus 8.120 (Xerx~s condudes a xenia with th~ city of Abd~ra); Herodotus 7.116 (Xerxes, xtnos of the Aanthian~); Herodotus .1.55 (Archias. xmos of Samians); Herodotus 5.63,90,91 and Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution 29.4 (th~ P~isistra­ tida~ of Athens. xeno; of th~ Spanans); Thucydides 1.]]6 (Th~mistokles. euergelts of Corcyra); Xenophon, HelleniC4 6.5.4 (Ag~~ilaos. patriltos phi/os of the Manrin~ans); X~nophon. Cyropaedia 3.3.4 (Cyrus. euergetes of the Armenians). H Daux (1937); Gschnitl~r (1973) 687; Ma~k (1984) 161. The rechnical t~rm for h~redit­ ary proxeny (patrios proxenia. for ~xample. Syll. J 503) imitates patrilte xenia. Kallias' speech in Spana (Xenophon. Hellenica 6.3.4) provides a good example of the beli~f in this continuity: "Men of l.aceda~mon. as regards the position I hold as your proxmos. I am not the only member of our family who has held it, but my father's father received it from his father and handed it on to his descmdants". H Examples abound of decrees stipulating protective clauses and threatening to punish those who cau~ harm to a proxmos: IG I) 19; 27; 65; 156; 162; 164. In IG (12 111 (36312 B.C.). Athens stipulated that the newly constituted government of Ceo! exccure the man responsible for the death of an Athenian proxmos. H Euergetes as an honorary tirle. like proxmos. was also to some extent incompatible with citizmship: in Gr«ce at large (but not in Asia Minor) it rended to be bestowed on foreigners only; see Moretti (1977) and Vqne (1976) 192.

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Fig. 13. The dftDOI moums a pro1CettOS Athenian grave monument for Pythagoras of Sclymbria (IG 1 :J 1154 - M.B. Walbank (1978) no. 9, ~ 460-450 B.C.). The rihlal obligation of %mol to bury and commemorate a dead partner (Section 2.3) was taken over by the city and applied to its relationshipl with proXerlO~ The verse epitaph inscribed on the rectangular baR of the stele tells us that Pythagoras of Sclymbria was buned in Athcnl at public CXpeDlC' because of has own and his ancestors' excellence (a,~u) as proxmoi.

if not that the private etiquette of reciprocity had been transferred

to the

communal level? And finally, what is the meal (xbtra) to which the city invites its proxeno; if not an institutionalised 'fenion of the feasting which sealed guest-friendships?s" ... In chis maintained~

1Upec"''t roo, the distinction between citizens and fompen wu meticulously hononnds awarded citizenship were inYited to dftprtorr: prourroi and non-cilizen

honorands, to xhri4, d. Henry (1983) 262·75.

4 Xenia and Proxenia

137

fig. 14 The proxcnfM as 1& fOlte~-ehild Relief above an Athenian draee (c. 430-415 B.C.) recording a grant of proxeny to

Proxenid~ son of ProxcnOl, of Cnidus (lG I,) 91 - M.B. Walbank fl978l no.64).

The female figures represent the patron-goddesses of Cnidus and Athens, Ancmis on the left and Athena on the right. The honorand Proxenidcs appears as a foster-child placed by has real parent under the tutelage of the foster-parent. A comparison with Fag. la-d, p.24-S, will show Ihe samilarilics Wllh xmia.

Apan from these superficial similarities, however, [here are mor~ profound points of intersection between proxen;a and xenia. There were only two ways in which a foreigner could become a proxenos: he could mherit the title, or he could be recommended to it by an inda~idual. To be sure, the extut sources convey the Impression of a third way, which can be illustrated by the Case of Nymphodoros of Abdera. Thucydides tells us that the Athenians made Nymphodoro$ their proxenos since he was a confidant and father-an-law of Sitalkes, King of Thracians, whom the Athenians wished to bnng into an alliance. This, however, should not mislead us into believing that the mitiative for the award of proxeny came from the

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Athenians as a whole. What happened in practice was, presumably, that an Athenian friend of Nymphodoros supplied the officials in power with the necessary information about Nymphodoros' connexions. Upon realising the advantages that might accrue to Athens from such a move, the officials indeed set in motion the political machinery for awarding the proxeny, and only this aspect of the affair is recorded by Thucydides. In brief, for a stranger to become a proxenos, he needed a mediator who enjoyed the citizens' confidence and who could recommend him to those in power. 55 If he inherited the title, he had to be recommended too: proxenia, like xenia, lasted for ever theoretically, but had always to be renewed in practice. 56 The most natural candidate to make such recommendations was a man who was at one and the same time a citizen and a xenos. I propose to defend this view by showing that a series of considerations, each of which is in itself inconclusive, in fact fall together to form a coherent picture. But first a methodological note is appropriate. It seems to me misleading to approach the problem through proxeny decrees alone: their capacity to convey in· formation is limited by their stereotypical framework; unlike the literary sources, they cannot tell us about the bargaining and manipulations that preceded a grant. Like marriage certificates today, they reduce a complex of human affairs to a banal formula. To gain a three·dimensional view of the process, other kinds of evidence must be brought into the discussion and sometimes given more weight than the decrees themselves, even if in quan· titative terms they are less impressive. The first argument involves a logical exercise. It is true that we have no detailed information about the 'communal revolution'. But we know this much: that the pre·political world was interlaced with a network of xenia alliances binding the elites of different communities together; that the community constituted itself as a final authority by reducing the power of these elites and by incorporating them into the citizen body; that the community devised a new institution by which to regulate its relationships with the outside world, the proxeny. The question then arises: How was proxenia related to xenia? There are two possible alternatives: either the community established a formal, impersonal and official tie with individuals JS Nymphodoros' mediation: Thucydides 2.29. For the peculiarity of Sparta in this rnpect - che appoinrmenr of Spamn citizens as proxmo; of foreign communities by the Spartan kings themselves (Herodotus 6.57.2) - see Mosley (1971 b). J6 There is a mealins differma between the renewal procedures in the two contexts: xmUl was renewed by means of a ritual aet (d. Section 3.4); proxmi4 by means of a public resolution. Cf. Marek (1984) 161 for examples of rmewal clauses in proxeny decrees; Daux (t 937) for Alkibiadcs' proxmy chat was renounced but remained valid nonethdm (Thucyelides 5.~J .2).

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abroad, or it simply harnessed the existing private ties of xenia for its own interests. The first hypothesis would mean that the administrative machinery of the Greek state somehow prefigured the rational and impersonal bureaucracies of the modern age, and has to be discarded at once. Even in historical times, Greek states displayed a basic mistrust of ties which were formal, temporary and official: time and again, they included in their embassies people who already stood in some warm and enduring relationship with the persons to be approached. 57 It is unlikely that things were organised differently at a time when the city, the citizenship and the whole notion of community were still in their embryonic form. On the other hand, what could be simpler than to use existing private connexions for public purposes? The model that presents itself, therefore, is this: in order to extend their power abroad, communities first conducted affairs with a foreigner through the intermediary of one who was both a citizen at home and a xenos of the foreigner; next, they made this foreigner into a proxenos, bringing him into relations of mutual obligation and dependence with the community itself, independently of his private bonds of xenia. Thus it came about that networks of proxen;a; roughly coincided with the networks of xenia; to which they owed their origin. If the appointment of proxeno; were independent of xenia networks, it would be hard to explain why there are sometimes several proxeno; of the same city in another city..~8 The multiple proxenies must have corresponded to the multiple ties of xenia between the citizens of the respective cities. The next consideration is linguistic. The argument is that to the users of the language it simply seemed self-evident that proxen;a implied xenia. A passage from the 15th oration in the Demosthenic corpus can illustrate the whole pattern. In order to gain an understanding of the usage, a short outline of the events leading up to the incident is appropriate. The revolt of Rhodes against Athens in the early 60s of the fourth century constituted a serious blow for Athens, all the more so since at the time of the revolt Rhodes was under democratic rule. The rebellious democracy, however, did not survive for long. In 355 B.C., cenain oligarchs, actively supported by Mausolus, the powerful potentate of Caria, overthrew the regime and set up an oligarchy. The coup was followed by the most commonplace practice of Greek politics, the banishment of defeated rivals. Two years after these events, in 353 B.C., we encounter the banished democrats in Athens. The 51

Cf. Perlman (1958) 187; Humphreys (1978b) 100-1.

.u For example, Ari~ophanes, Birds 1021; Euripides, Ion 55 1, 1039 and ~ndromach~

1103; Welles (1934) no.3, para.S (of Teas in lebedos); Thucydides 3.2.3 (of Athens in Mytilene); Thucydi
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very men who beforehand instigated the secession of Rhodes from Athens now appealed to Athens for help. Not surprisingly, the response of the Athenians was chilly. It was Demosthenes who tried to induce his countrymen to adopt a different course of action. Wishing to persuade the popular assembly to help the Rhodians to return to their city, Demosthenes said, among other things: I should never have made this proposal, had I thought that it would benefit the Rhodian democrats alone, for I am not a proxmos of the men, nor is any of them privately my xmos."

What Demosthenes meant to say thereby was that his proposals to help the exiles stemmed from genuine concern for the Athenians' welfare, not from private obligations or from an expectation of benefits. The casual nature of the remark betrays the built-in expectations that proxenia and xenia went hand in hand. Some other examples also show that the one followed from the other. But the clearest indication comes from rhetorical figures. Reviling his arch-enemy Meidias, Demosthenes once said: Is there a vote on? Meidias of Anagyrous is put forward as a candidate. He acts as a proxmos of Ploutarchos (nAo'VtciQxou ~£v2i). He knows all the secrets; the city is too small for his aspirations. 60 The technical impossibility of a man being another man's proxmos is here skilfully exploited to convey a package of ideas which can only be unravelled by a cumbersome paraphrase: Meidias of Athens and Ploutarchos, tyrant of Eretria, are known to be xeno;; 61 Meidias manipulates this xenia for private gain by sacrificing the city's interests (i.e. by revealing its secrets to Ploutarchos); to make the malpractice appear acceptable, Meidias conducts his manipulations under the guise of proxenia. 62 The oxymoron would have been pointless if proxen;a did not imply xenia. The final considerations are founded on statistical probability. In Appendix B, an attempt has been made to relate grants of proxenies and of citizenship of the classical age to existing ties of ritualised friendship. It seemed advisable to include grants of citizenship for two reasons. First, because they carry the idea of proxeny one step funher: they not only " IXmosthenes 15.15 (For th~ LiMrly oftM Rhodi4ns). a., for similar usage!, Too (1933) no.34, lines 11-12, discussed above, p.4; FGrH 392 (Hermailaos of Chios) F6; Pau5anias 3.8.4. 60 Dm10sthenn 21.200 (Against MMias); my translation. " It is explicitly stated in Demosthmes 21.110. For the background of the incident. see Brunt (1969). '2 Further example!: Aeschine!2.191 (On t"~ E",baSlY) (Demosthenes betrays the intern" of the city to Thebes, whose proxnros he is); Dcmosthmes 18.82 (0" 1M era"",) (Anchines aets as a ·proxenos· of ambassadon who come from Philistides of <>reus and Kleitarchos of Eretria).

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convert the grantees into ext~rnal allies but effect their actual incorporation into thr communal group. Secondly, citizenship grants were relatively rare: for thr approximatively 94 rpigraphicaJly attrstrd grants of proxeny in fifth-crntury Athens, there are only 6 ~pigraphically attc:sted grants of citizenship.b) If, indeed, xenia ties tum out to undrrpin the grants of these much more jealously guardrd prerogatives, we might rxpect a similar mechanism to apply to the grant of proxenies. In identifying ties of xenia, use has been madr of the attributes of the bond drscribed in the prrvious chapters. Thry include: (a) the explicit mention of xenia or philia between individuals belonging to diffrrent communities; (b) rderences to thr exchange of benefits betwern thr grantre and a contemporary citizen (or between their ancestors); (c) naming (as described in Section 2.3, p.19ff.). By using these pointers, 23 cases have been identified in which it can be said with varying degrees of certainty that the proxeny or citizenship had been secured through the intervention of a citizen-xenos (Appendix B). As compared with thr hundreds of surviving decrees honouring forrigners, this figure might seem to argue for the insignificance of xenia ties. Funher thought, however, suggrsts that thr contrary might be the case. To havr a fair comparison, the analytical groups should be cardully idrntifird, and M.B. Walbank's collrction of grants of proxc:nies from fifth-century Athens may offer a useful sampling base. The 94 grants included in this study may be dividrd into two categories: 84 grants attested only epigraphically,64 and 10 attested both rpigraphically and in litrrary sources (or only in thr latter).65 It might at first sight seem ho~lrss to try to infer ties of xenia from proxeny decrees alone. But even in the inscriptions included in this first category there are three in which thr namr of the grantre points to a possible citizen-xenos. 66 Given the facts that, first, two people could well be xeno; without resorting to the custom of naming; secondly, that there might be other cases of homonymity which, brcause thry do not belong to such prominent citizens, escape our attention; and thirdly, that in 38 out of thr 84 inscriptions included in this catrgory thr name of the grantee is illrgible 67 - thrre is a fairly high number. In a fourth 6_' Cf. M.B. Walbank (1978) nos. 1·94 with Osborne (1981-83) nos. 1·6. some of which are collective grants. For the whole period c. 420·140 B.C., Osborne has collected about 118 grants of Athenian citizenship; grants of proxmy for the same period come c10~ to one thousand. 64 Nm. 3·4. 6·17.19·29.31-44.45 (but d. p.252). 46. 48·59, 61·5, 67·9, 71·89, 91-4. 65 Nos. 1.2,5, 18. 30.47. 60. 66, 70, 90. 66 No. 11. a Thespian called Athenaios; no.32. Nikias of Crete. presumably a xmos of the Athenian general; no. 74, Thoukydidn of Pharsalus, prnumably a x~"OJ of the historian's family. 67 Nos. 10. 13. 20, 21, 23. 26, 28, 31. 33-7, 40·2, 44, 5 I, 53·9,62.69. 71, 72, 76, 77, 79. 83. 84. 89. 92, 93. 94.

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inscription from this category, it is possible to infer from the content itself the existence of a hereditary relationship between the honorand, Apollodoros of Selymbria, and the proposer of the rider, Alkibiades. 68 Indeed, the suspicion that xeno; were involved in securing the grants is confirmed if we move to the second category - grants attested also (or only) in literary sources. Here, there are only 4 cases out of lOin which the meagre literary evidence does not point to a possible xenia connexion. 69 It is therefore hard to accept Marek's conclusion that most of the proxeny grants served the political interests of the community and were largely independent of private interests.'o Communities no doubt perceived it to be to their own advantage to make use of the connexions of their influential citizens; and it also seems clear that the grantees did benefit the communities either directly - by giving a gift or performing a valuable service for the whole community - or indirectly - by helping out their own xenos in a situation in which he represented communal interests.'1 There was thus a cenain element of symbiosis between public and private interests. In general, however, we shall see that the interests of xeno; only rarely coincided with civic interests: structurally and inherently, they were opposed to them.

5.5 FOLLOWERS, FACTIONS AND THE CITY

We can test this claim through the evidence of Thucydides. Thucydides is an especially valuable source for our purposes since by every conceivable criterion the polis-system achieved in his lifetime the peak of its evolution. The kings of the mythical age, the petty chieftains of the dark age, as well as the tyrants of the archaic age, had all disappeared from the scene. And the days had not yet come when Hellenistic monarchs controlled the cities' destinies through their network of agents. Most communities in Thucydides' time were independent of extraneous powers (unless subjected by force) and expressed their collective will through "institutions which subjected even the most powerful men to formal organs and rules of authority".72 And yet, even in these circumstances, the interplay between ritualised friendship and the civic system was far from negligible. •1

No. 86.

" Nos. 30, 47. 60. 66. In nos. 1.2,5, 18, 70 and 90. the xnrilJ is evident from the literary sources, 1ft Appendix B. Marek (1984) 134. ,. For example, when Byzantium admitted the winning Spanan gmeral. l.ysander. in 40S B.C., thole Byzantines who had beforehand betrayed ~ city to Alkibiadcs went to Arhms and were given citizenship (Xenophon. H~lInr;c4 2.1.3). 12 Finley (1979) 90, his italics.

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The conflict between the community and powerful individuals forms a theme running through Thucydides' history from beginning to end. It is unnecessary to present all the examples here. For a pattern to emerge, it will suffice to examine a selection. Three xenoi-dyads are singled out: Perikles of Athens and King Archidamos of Sparta; Alkiphron of Argos and King Agis of Spana; and, finally, Alkibiades of Athens and Endios of Sparta. We may stan with Perikles and Archidamos. There is, in Thucydides' history, a story of a strange incident which has not so far received a satisfactory explanation. 73 It concerns the first invasion of Anica by the Peloponnesians in the year 431 B.C.: Here [in Oenoe, Attica] the Peloponnesians prepared to make an assault and sp~nt much time with nothing to show for it. For this Archidamos was severely criticised. Even during the period leading up to the war people had thought him weak and friendly to Athens (Toi~ 'A9Jtvaim; t1tLnlbElo;), because he had not spoken in favour of a full-scale war effort. 74 And in the period after mobilisation his reputation had suffered still further because of the delay at the Isthmus, and the slow progress of the march afterwards. The present hold-up in front of Oenoe seemed worst of all; for during this time the Athenians were bringing their property into the city, and the Peloponnesians considered that, if it had not been for the delaying tactics ofArchidamos, they might have made a rapid advance and found all this property still outside the walls. Thus, during the siege of Oenoe, there was bitter feeling in the army against Archidamos. The reason why he still held back was, they say. because he expected that the Athenians would not face the idea of letting their land be devastated and would make some conciliatory gesture while it was still untouched. 75 Archidamos' dilatoriness, described by Thucydides in such striking terms, is, in my view, related to his xenia with Perikles, and I propose to suppon that view by showing that this and some other sections of books 1-2 simply make no sense unless we accept it. On the other hand, if we do accept this view, then the problematic sections fall into a pattern which is logically in accord with similar sections in Thucydides and factually consistent with what we know of ritualised friendship from other sources. The obvious alternative explanation is the one implicitly accepted in modem research: that Archidamos, being a man of intelligence and moderation, was opposed to the war on practical grounds. He simply foresaw that, given the prevailing balance of power, Sparta could not win it, and therefore resorted to dilatory tactics. It is true that this explanation cannot be totally discarded: Thucydides , J Thucydides 2.18, ci~d here; this should be ~ad with the comments of Gomme (1945 -81 ) vo!.U, 67ff. 74 The rderencc is to Archidamos' conciliatory speech in Thucydides 1.80-85. 7$ Adapted from the translation by R. Warner, Thucydid~s: Hislory of the Ptlopo,.n~sian War (Harmondsworth, 1972), my italics.

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himself makes somr allusions to it. But hr makes rven clrarer allusions to the view propounded here - in fact, he almost states it explicitly. For what is the role of 2.13, in which the xenia between Perikles and Archidamos is revealed? A considerable mental effon is needed to grasp the full impon of this fact, to realise that the, to us, unusual characteristics of ritualised friendship were for Thucydides self-evident. He took it for granted that powerful individuals from different communities were involved in networks of alliance; that a continuous flow of gifts, resources, favours and services was the compulsory expression of this involvement; that the alliances were structured by an aristocratic code of conduct and buttressed by an heroic ethos; and, finally, that they were inherently opposed to communal interests. So obvious a pan of his reality were these features of ritualised friendship, that it sufficed to indicate them all with the aid of a few simple words. And that is precisely what Thucydides does in 2.13. One qualification is necessary. It might legitimately be asked, why, if this was the case, Thucydides did not make an explicit refrrence to it. In my view, the reason why he docs not say that Archidamos' tactics flowed from xenia is that he did not have such information as would pass the test of his critical methods: he guessed it. And thus, instead of stating the connexion, he suggested it. By constantly presenting Archidamos' actions as seen by the Peloponnesians - Uthey said", Uit was thought", are the recurring formula - Thucydides makes it clear that neither he, the story-teller, nor Archidamos, the actor, shared this view. On the other hand, the xenia itself he presented as an objective fact. What he signified by this fact was a general obligation to help one's panner - an obligation which, by the standards of action to which Thucydides was accustomed, did not exclude the possibility of subordinating the entire interests of the Peloponnesians to it: this possibility is foreshadowed by the examples of Pausanias and Themistokles in Book 1, and is fully realised in the case of our other two xenoi-dyads. Archidamos and Perikles, in a similar fashion, pursued a cenain policy which tried desperately to reconcile their private involvement with their public responsibilities. Both were criticised by the demos for not making satisfactory representation of communal interests. And both had in the end to sacrifice their xenia in order to remain in power. By a refined mastery of composition, Thucydides thus interweaves the story of the escalation of the rivalry between Athens and Spana with thr story of the tragic friendship between Perikles and Archidamos. If Archidamos' behaviour indeed flowed from his cautious character, then chaptrr 2.13, in which the xenia is revealed, would be a casual aside providing a mere anecdote, an almost redundant piece of information. If, however, the view propounded here is

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accepted, then chapter 2.13 becomes a clue to the behaviour of the two leaders, a central motif which runs through the first two books. The events leading to our next incident can briefly be summarised. Following the peace of Nikias in 421 B.C., a major reshuffle of political alliances took place. In 419 B.C., Athens entered into an alliance with Argos and her allies, Elis and Mantinea. The quadruple alliance at once initiated a series of expeditions against Epidaurus, a city allied with Spana. Thucydides describes the Spanans' motives for taking counter-measures in exceedingly lucid terms: first, her Epidaurian allies were in distress; secondly, some of her allies in the Peloponnesus had revolted; finally, other allies were not well disposed towards her. Thus, for fear of more desertions, the Spanans assembled an army which Thucydides would later describe as "the finest Hellenic army that has ever been brought together ... a force that looked as though it could hold its own not only against the Argive League but against another such League in addition". This army, now, under the leadership of Agis, son of Archidamos, marched against Argos. The two rival armies, the Peloponnesian and the Argive, were forming up in order of battle, the Peloponnesians securing for themselves a more advantageous position, when our remarkable incident occurred: The greater part of the army of the Argives and their allies, so far from realising how dangerous their position was, thought that they were going to fight on very favourable conditions, with the Spartans cut off in their own country dose to their city. But two men among the Argives - Thrasyllos, who was one of the five generals, and Alkiphron, who was proxmos of the Spartans - just when the armies were on the point of meeting, went forward, held a conference with Agis, and urged him not to bring on a banle, saying that the Argives were prepared to submit to fair and ~ual arbitration any complaints that Sparta had to make against them, and to make a treaty and live in peace for the future. In saying this they spoke entirely for themselves, with no authority from the mass of the army. Agis, too, in accepting their proposals, acted on his own responsibility, and did not even discuss the question with the majority. He took into his confidence only one man among the high officers who were serving with him, and made a truce for four months, in the course of which time the Argives were expected to carry out what they had promised. He then immediately led his army off, giving no explanation to any of his other allies. 76 It is necessary to indicate that existing interpretations of the passage are unsatisfactory. Gomme recognises the difficulty but leaves it unresolved. 77 Bury and Meiggs misrepresent the text: "The soldiers of both Thrasyllos and Agis were confident of victory, but the generals were of another mind. Agis, as well as his antagonist, considered his position precarious, and 76 77

Thucydides 5.59.4-60.1, adapted from me translation by R. Warner. Gommc (1945-81) vol.lV, 82-3.

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consequently they came to terms... "./~ But everything in the text suggests that the Peloponnesians, including Agis, were hoping to carry a major victory. Another modem interpreter, Kagan, reaches an explanation only at the cost of introducing elements and logical links which are absent from Thucydides' text: "Thrasyllos and Alkiphron were oligarchs who wanted to avoid a breach with Sparta. They spoke to Agis on their own authority, without consulting the people. They were encouraged to think that their actions would be applauded by the people both because they would have extricated the Argive army from a potentially dangerous situation and because the blame for the failure to engage and defeat the Spartans could be laid to the Athenians, who had failed to appear".'9 But, to point to one difficulty alone, Thrasyllos and Alkiphron could not have been encouraged to think that their actions would be applauded by the people, since the greater pan of the Argive army thought that they were going to win. The clue, I suggest, is the word proxenos. Once again, the implications of this word can only be conveyed by a cumbersome paraphrase: that Alkiphron had xeno; in Spana - Agis was, in all probability, one of them; that he held the Spanan proxeny in consequence of this xenia; that in Argos, he had a group of followers around him who, out of loyalty to him, were supponing Spana and were therefore opposed both to other factions in Argos and to the demos. Once we accept these implications of the word, the difficulties in interpreting the passage are removed. What happened on the battlefield, in fact, was that Alkiphron and Thrasyllos, who belonged to the same Argive faction, perceived that the battle between Argos and Spana would jeopardise their interests. They therdore prevailed upon Agis, who represented the Spartan end of the network and happened to be, at the same time, the leader of the Peloponnesian army, to do his best to aven the banle - explaining, probably, that such a banle would run against his own interests, too. And, as a favour to a xenos, Agis avened the battle. That this interpretation is not too far-fetched, can be seen in our last incident. The pattern observed in the first two examples appears here in its full light: Thucydides probably had in this case first-hand information of every single move. To set the scene, we must move slightly back in time to the complex political combinations that followed the peace of Nikias. In Athens, it will be remembered, the question was whether or not to conclude an alliance with the Argives and their allies. An alliance with the Argives, the bitter J.8. Bury and R. Mtiggs, A History of Gruu (I.ondon, 1975), 4th edn., 289. TIn P~au of Nidas and th~ Sidli"" Exp~djtion (Ithaca and London. 1981) 100, repeating an argumenr ser our originally in Cltwital Philology 4 (1962) 209·18. 711

~ D. Kag2n.

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enemies of Sparta, would necessarily mean the end of the recent alliance with Sparta. The most prominent figure among those who wished to dissolve the alliance with Spana was Alkibiades. It seemed better to him to have an alliance with the Argives, not least because he considered himself to have been slighted by the Spanans. For the Spartans had negotiated the alliance with Athens through Nikias and Laches, not himself. They had overlooked him because of his youth, and failed to show the honour that was due him on account of his proxeny with Spana, which he had inherited from his ancestors. Publicly, Alkibiades did his best to discredit the Spartans. He alleged that they were not trustworthy, that their only object in concluding the treaty with the Athenians was to be able in this way to crush the Argives and proceed then against the Athenians themselves. He sent a personal message to the Argives, urging them to come to Athens with the Mantineans and the Eleans as quickly as possible, and stating that he would do everything he could to bring about an alliance. The Argives sent their envoys at once. At the same time, however, a rival embassy from Spana also arrived in Athens - an embassy which the Spartans thought would be acceptable to the Athenians. The embassy was intended to forestall the Athenian-Argive alliance and, at the same time, offer some concessions and explanations for previous moves made by the Spanans. The ambassadors spoke in front of the Athenian Council on these points, making it clear that they had come with full powers (autokratores) to reach an agreement. This speech made Alkibiades afraid that, if repeated in front of the Assembly, it might persuade the demos not to enter into the alliance with Argos. He therefore resoned to an intrigue. We can now follow Thucydides literally: By giving pistis to the Spartans, he persuaded them that, if they made no mention of their full powers in the Assembly, he would give Pylos bade to them (which was one of the objects of the embassy], saying that he himself would get the Athenians to agree to this, just as it was now he who was opposing the idea; he would also arrange for the other points to be settled. His plan was to drive a wedge between the Spanans and Nikias, and also he intended by attacking them in the assembly for having no sincerity in their intentions and for never saying the same thing twice to bring about the alliance with Argos, Elis and Mantinea. And so indeed it happened. When they came forward in front of the people and, in reply to a question, said just the opposite of what they had said in the Council - namely that they had not come with full powers - the Athenians lost all patience with them, and listened instead to AJkibiades, who now attacked the Spartans even more bitterly than before. They were in fact prepared to bring in the Argives and those who had come with them immediately and to make them their allies. 8o

It is unnecessary to dwell here on the counter-measures taken by Nikias 10

Thucydide1 5.45.3·4, adapted from the translation by R. Warner.

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to save the Spartan alliance. Suffice it to say that Alkibiades' intrigues proved in the end successful, and the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis and Mantinea was brought about. To unravel the intrigue itself, the best way to proceed seems to be by answering the questions that, according to Thucydides' most authoritative commentators, bring out the difficulties in the text: "(1) Why should the Spartans listen at all to their enemy Alkibiades rather than to Nikias their friend? (2) How did Alkibiades persuade them that their denial would help their cause? (3) How, after this, could Alkibiades and Endios collaborate so closely in 413/12?,,81 The answers are as follows. (1) The Spanans were not merely 'Spanans', the representatives of their states. For among them was Endios, son of Alkibiades, who was a hereditary xenos of Alkibiades, son of Kleinias, the Athenian. 82 It is typical of Thucydides that he does not state this fact at this point of his narrative. The explanation for this is that the existence of xenia could be conveyed in a number of roundabout ways. When Thucydides, or any other writer for that matter, says that two persons - say, A from city A' and B from city B' were on friendly terms with each other, or that they themselves or their ancestors exchanged favours, or that A was proxenos of B' or B of A', then we can be almost sure that this presupposes a xenia network. Thucydides himself provides the proof. For example, Endios and Alkibiades are frequently presented in his history as engaged in the exchange of favours. An explicit announcement of their xenia, however, is delayed until the last book. 83 The implication must be that Thucydides assumed that the description of these exchanges sufficed to convey the idea of xenia. Another example is furnished by Alkibiades' Argive network. In 5.43.3, Alkibiades is said to have sent a message to Argos privately (idiai) bidding them to come at once. He said that he himself would co-operate with them to the utmost. Again, this exchange seemed to Thucydides perfectly adequate to make it clear that xenia was involved. In 6.61.3, he could thus refer to "Alkibiades' xenoi in Argos" as to a detail which had already been introduced. In sum, question (1) poses a difficulty only because it rests on erroneous assumptions. The ambassadors listened not to an enemy, but to a friend. The Spanans at home hoped that Endios, Alkibiades' xenos, would prevail on Alkibiades and bring about the cancellation of the Athenian-Argive alliance. In fact, the contrary happened: it was Alkibiades who prevailed on Endios to disregard his ambassadorial duties and make it possible for himself to bring about the Athenian-Argive alliance. II

Gomrne (1945·81) vol.JV, 51·2, followins the formulation of ~ problem by J. Hameld, 1940) 89ff. Thucydidcs 8.6.3 . Thucydidcs 8.6.3.

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(2) Alkibiades' m~thod in persuading the Spanan envoys to betray their city's interests provides the answer to the second question. Clearly, Alkibiades did not trick them: the pistis he gave, and his unbroken friendship with Endios, show this. Alkibiades succeeded in persuading the envoys to deny their being autokratores because he did not deal with them merely in the capacity of state representatives. He himself and Endios were xenoi, and xenia was a 'whole-person' relationship: the two men's public and private spheres of action merged inseparably into each other. The negotiations were not guided merely by the concern to make the best possible representation of their community's interests: there were other considerations at work, no less important. We cannot tell in each particular case what these considerations were: our sources, with an eye on the political, are too one-sided to reveal other aspects of the relationship. However, the range of possibilities can be guessed from the types of exchange outlined in the previous sections of this book: xenoi were bound by affective ties, compelled by economic interests, and constrained by standards of conduct. It is a reasonabl~ guess that such considerations were enough to compensate Endios for this diplomatic fiasco. The passage thus presents difficulties only if we assume that ancient diplomats, like their modern counterparts, were motivated by a single-minded drive to succeed in the representation of their communities. But if it is recognised that the fulfilment of their missions was not the sole measure of their success; that they judged themselves by standards different from those of the societies which they represented; and that in addition to their membership of political communities, they were involved in a private matrix of external pressures and obligations - then these difficulties disappear. (3) Not only did Alkibiades' manoeuvre not put an end to the friendship with Endios, but it seems to have intensified it. There can be little doubt that, in 415 B.C., after Alkibiades' recall from Sicily, it was Endios who secured his admission into Sparta. And the two men continued to interact even after Alkibiades fled Spana. When already in Persia, Alkibiades privately offered Endios his aid in organising the revolt in Ionia and thus securing the Persian alliance for Sparta. The credit for this would go to Endios, not to the Spanan king Agis, Alkibiades' enemy.84 And this is precisely the pattern that can be detected in our first two incidents and that emerges from dozens of other cases: armies would go to war, while xeno; pursued their individualistic interests; cities would engage in diplomacy, while xeno; conducted their own rivalries through the agency of political institutions. Alkibiades of Athens acted in concert with Endios of Sparta against Nikias of Athens, a man whom the Spartans believed to be friends of 114

Thuqdides 8.12.2, d. 8.17.2.

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theirs and who was connected by ties of xenia with Pausanias, the Spartan king. 85 Inter-state relations and networks of ritualised friendship thus followed independent courses. If this fact is recognised, then the third difficulty raised by Thucydides' commentators will also be removed. The generalisation may thus be risked that neither the formal institutions of the polis nor the informal factions within the polis were the only foci of power shaping inter-state politics. There was the funher factor of upperclass coalitions extending beyond the bounds of the city. 86 These coalitions consisted of a leader, surrounded by a narrow circle of kinsmen and friends, from the inside; of xenoi attached to the leader, also surrounded by kinsmen and friends, from the outside; and of a third circle of lower-class, unrelated people, attached to both former groups not on a kinship or quasi-kinship principle, but in return for payment, or in full personal dependence, as slaves. These action-sets, varying both in their overall size and in the relative size of each of its constituent elements, form throughout Greek history a ubiquitous phenomenon. Thucydides provides a good example of their panern of operation: ... th~e was an Athenian called Kylon, a vietor of the Olympic Games, belonging to a noble family, and a powerful man himself. He had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who at that rime was the tyrant of Megara. Kylon went to Delphi to consult the god, and the reply he received was that he was to seize the Akropolis of Athens... Theagenes gave him some troops and, summoning his own friends (philol1 to join him, ... he seized the Akropolis with the intention of making himself tyrant... 87

In fact most, if not all, of the exchanges of goods and services considered in this study were conducted within the framework of such groups. For one peculiar feature of these groups was the multiplicity of uses to which they could be put, and it is this versatility which deserves closer examination. When Alkibiades disobeyed the summons recalling him to Athens, the Athenians "sentenced him and those with him" (ot f,1£t'!xdvOtl) to death. 88 Alkibiades, like most xeno; figuring in this study, was always accompanied by a close circle of followers - so close that the Athenians deemed them indistinguishable from himself. In the sources, these followers are denoted by a variety of unimpressive words, "those with/around/following some-

u l.ysias 18.10 (On 1M Proptrly of Nitias' Brothn). The stress should be on the word ·coalitions·, 5i~, as the case of Alkibiades and Nikiu shows. there were clearly several within a single ciry. I.

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body", or simply Hone's phi/oi orland hetairoi orland epitedeioi u being the general formula. 89 But whenever we catch a glimpse of their composition, an amazing variety is revealed. A passage from Herodotus provides a typical example. When Polykrates, tyrant of Samos, was treacherously murdered by Oroetes, Oroetes did not know what to do with Polykrates' hetairoi, and his dilemma gave Herodotus an opponunity to describe their composition. They included: Demokedes from Croton, a physician; some Samians evidently free men; and a funher group, designated as the xeno; and douloi of the followers themseives. 9O Evidently, all members of an entourage could, in case of need, act as all-purpose attendants. There seems to have been, however, a meaningful differentiation of tasks. Apan from the slaves, the need for whom is selfevident, we frequently encounter physicians and soothsayers. These specialists seem to enjoy almost as high a status as the leader, and their function requires no explanation. What is less obvious is the need for citizens and

xenot. Citizen-followers could promote their patron's interest at home. It might not be incidental that Alkibiades' case reminded Thucydides of the tyrants of the sixth century, who allowed the city to be governed by the laws Hexcept that they took care to see that there was always one of their own men in office". 91 Followers could assume political offices, put up motions in the assembly, canvass for agreeable candidates, and generally enhance their patron's good reputation. Alkibiades' epitedeioi were successful even to the extent that they succeeded in having him elected strategos. And when Alkibiades sailed in, after he had spent eight years in exile and held a long record of treacherous dealings, his public image had improved to the extent that the common crowd of Piraeus and the city gathered to his ships, filled with wonder and desiring to sec the famous Alkibiades. Some of them said that he was the best of the citizens; that he alone was banished without just cause, but rather because he was ploned against by those who had less power than he and spoke less well and ., For example, Thucydides 1.3.3; 5.42.1; 6.53.]; 8.65.1. Xenophon, Anaba$is 1.5.8; Hellenica 3.1.10; 3.5.4; 5.2.36; .~.3. 13; 6.5.6·8 (numerous refercnces). l.ysias B.19 (Against Agoratus); lsocratt$, Lett~ 2.8,13; uttv 6.]2; Demosthenes 20.59 (Against Uplines); 56.7 (Against Dion)'sodorus); (59).99 (Against Ntana); Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 12.2, 13.1 (d. Calhoun (1913) 7 n.3 and Aurenche (1974) 15-29). Th~ followers are sometimes described in inscriptions: M.B. Walbank (1978) no.85.line 27. IG 11 2 109; IG 11 2 226. For the Hellenistic period, see Polybius 5.48.12; 5.63.1; 4.48.12; 13.6. As some of these laner examples show, in the Hellenistic age the expression 01 :'CfQ£ nva Kerns to have become a paraphrase for the person himself. I know of no serious study of this important subject. 90 Hcrodotus 3.] 25 . 91 Thucydidn 6.54.6. The expression o+Wv autci1v includes both relatives and friends, MnCC my rendering as 'one of their own men'.

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ordered their political doings with a view to their own private gain, whereas he was always advancing the common weal, both by his own means and by the power of the state. 92

Citizen-followers would also be of help by virtue of their own networks abroad. For example, the followers of Podanemos of Phlius were the xeno; of King Archidamos of Spana; the followers of Prokles of Phlius were the xeno; of Archidamos' son, Agesilaos. 93 Thus, the networks of the followers would be added to those of the leader and constitute a significant extension of his power. Small wonder, therefore, that apan from the immediate interests that a leader could secure by means of his close followers, he had a permanent interest in extending it. A 'benefaction' - preferably supplied by a xenos from abroad at a low cost (Section 4.3) - was marvellously suited to that end. Once the demos was persuaded that the leader was a 'good man', the number of his followers would increase and the avenues for political ascendancy would be open. The second element in the entourage - the xeno; - played a complementary role. Polykrates took with him his hetairoi's xeno;, apparently in order to facilitate his movements: a friend's friend was almost as valuable an asset as the friend himself. But there was much more to it than that. For a xenos-follower, a foreigner himself, would form the link with other factions abroad. And this is why, in a xenia network, the crucial links were those between fathers bound by xenia and each other's sons: a son of a xenos would become a member of the panner's entourage. Pharnabazos' son performed precisely this task among Agesilaos' followers, just as the Athenian Phrynon's son would have done at Philip's coun. 94 And such was generally the role of the children (and family) of xmo; in the entourage of rulers: it is not difficult to recognise here the pattern of foster-parenthood. It would have been in the patron's interest to feed, protect and benefit his followers, and it seems that their promotion to citizenship in the patron's city was one of the manifestations of this interest. Personal patronage would thus be exercised through the vehicle of political institutions. The Greek world was thus interlaced with a web of informal alliances which were not congruent with the official foci of power of the city-states themselves. Appendix C lists these extended alliance groups for the period Xenophon, HellmiC4 1.4.13...., d. 1.4.19, where the group designated as ~i'edeioi indudes a cousin, oiktrioi and philoi. 91 Xenophon, Hellmiu 5.3.13. The term ol ,uQl noMvfJ&OV includes both Podanemos and his followen, and it is therefore impossible to tell whether the followers acquired meir xenia wim Archidamos mrough the agency of Podancmos, or, via rJnS4, Podanemos through one of his followers. Both options must have been open. 94 Xenophon, HelinriC4 4.1.40 and Demosthencs 19.230, 233 (De falsa u,atio"e). 92

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of the Peloponnesian War by the political units to which they belonged. Perhaps the most significant feature of these groups to emerge from this list is their permanence. For, in the vast majority of cases, the co-operative interactions mentioned in this study flowed from relationships which were either inherited or had been established earlier. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Alkibiades. Only once (out of some 12 instances) did he start a relationship with a view to co-operation; in most of the cases, he availed himself of well-entrenched connexions (Appendix C).9S These factions were only to a very minor extent fettered by political ideologies. Alkibiades, for instance, was opposed to the alliance between Argos and Sparta despite the fact that his Argive xeno; professed oligarchic ideas (they effected an anti-democratic cOtlP).96 Pausanias, king of oligarchic Sparta, "was on exceptionally friendly terms with the leaders of the popular faction in Mantinea t>.9 7 And Thrasyboulos in 404 B.C. effected a pro-democratic coup by means of an army of retainers provided - to judge by its composition and Thrasyboulos' connexions - by a Thracian xenos. 98 After the victory and the restoration of democracy, Thrasyboulos' retainers were befittingly rewarded with Athenian citizenship. Factions of ritualised friendship thus cut across the ideological division between oligarchy and democracy. Not even the welfare of their own communities would prevent them from pursuing their particularistic interests. A puzzling feature of Greek inter-state politics was the betrayal of a city by friends from the inside. It is true that sheer bribery did playa part. But repeatedly, the 'traitors' turn out to be proxeno; of the attacker's communities or xeno;, philo;, ep;tede;o; of the commanding generals. 99 These factions, moreover, showed a remarkable capacity for expansion. They grew by a process which can most aptly be described as 'pyramiding'; several lesser leaders, each accompanied by his own followers, and each controlling valuable resources, became the follower of a more powerful leader. 'The composition of the ruling circles of the Persian, Macedonian and Hellenistic ruling circles shows that this is indeed how they were formed, Within each circle two distinct elements stand out: a narrow core of intimates (kin, friends, xeno;); and a wide periphery of xeno;. It is this 9S The relationship with Phamabazos (Xenophon. H~lIen;ca 1.3.12). AJkibiadrs' collection of a hundred talent5 in the Ceramic gulf (Xenophon, H~lIen;ca 1.4.8) can be anributed either to an arg,.,o/ogia or to provision by xeno;. as in t~ case of Peisisrratos (Aristotle, Th~ Athenimr Constitution 15.2·3, d. Section 4.4, p.90). 96 Thucydides 6.61.3. 97 Xenophon, Htllenica 5.2.3. 91 Ct. Middleton (1982). 99 ct. Losada (1972).Gerolymaros (1986) reaches the same conclusion through the analY5is of proxen~s.

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periphery which is of most interest for our purposes. For, insofar as the central leader could satisfy the needs of these xenoi in terms of protection and resources, and insofar as he could render them assistance in subduing their enemies, there was no limit to the ability of the periphery to expand. First, a leader himself could have an almost unlimited number of xeno;. Secondly, the lesser leaders brought with them both their own followers and their own xeno;, and the process would repeat itself the lower we descend the pyramid and the further we move away from the centre. It is this feature which accounts for the astonishing ethnic diversity of the ruling circles: the inclusion of foreign leaders was a necessary price of expansion. The relevant evidence may briefly be reviewed. The Persian circle of syngenei5 included oriental non-Persians and Greeks both as client-rulers and as office-holders on the king's behalf. Quantitative evidence is missing, but the scanty literary fragments point to eight landed estates in the Persian empire held by Greeks as against 21 by non-Greeks. This would seem to indicate a general trend 100 since it accords both with the examples discussed elsewhere in this study - of Greeks being drawn into the high spheres of power at the Persian court - and with the pattern displayed in Cyrus' attack on Artaxerxes: it is a reasonable guess that, had the expedition succeeded, Cyrus' non-Persian xenoi would have been put in positions of power. Macedonia under Philip and Alexander displayed a similar pattern. Thcopompos' venomous statement concerning Philip's hetairoi (U some were from the land to which he himself belonged, others were from ThessaIy, still others from the rest of Greece ... nearly every man in the Greek or Barbarian world of a lecherous, loathsome, or ruffianly character flocked to Macedonia and won the title of 'Philip's hetairo;' It), 101 suggests that both the heads of surrounding tribes and Greek citizens were absorbed by the centre. This seems to be confirmed by casual references to particular persons becoming hetairai or receiving gifts (timber, grain, estates) from Philip, 102 '00 Cook (1983) Fig. 12 facing p. 178. See funher Hofltetter (1918) and Wiesdt6f~ (1980) for Greeks in Penian service. 101 FG"H 115 F 2H, d. Demosthenn' remark thlt Athenians expelled for loose morals had been recruited to Philip's court (Demosthcnes 2.19 (~c01fd Oly.tthi«)). Ind lsocrates' remark thlt Philip had around him the ablest of Ma~nianl as well as famous and intelligent men from Greece ((socrates 5. t 9 (To Philip)). 101 For example, Kallias of Chalkis was named one of Philip'. hetai"oi (Aeschines 3.89 (Alamst Ctesiphcm); Aeschines himself was accused of having become Philip's xmas and pbilos (Demosthenes 19.314 (D~ Falsa Ltgatione); Philokrates and Anchinn were given houses. timber and grain by Philip (Dcmosthmes 18.41 (On th~ OoWN). 19.145); Xenophron. one of 'thirty tyrants' in Athens., who clearly acted as a Mtairos (Dcmosthena 19.196h Demaratos of Corinth was a xmas of the Macedonian royal family turned into Iwtairos (Bave (1926) 00.253). For I collccrion of the secondary eviMnce on Ma~nian h~t4iroi. see Thomes (1955).

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and by some prosopographical data. The people explicitly referred to as hetaira; of Alexander in the list compiled by ~rve, which I use as a sampling base, clearly fall into three groups: (a) 31 individuals from Macedonia proper; (b) 9 from neighbouring territories (Lyncestis, Elimiotis, Orestis, Amphipolis, Eordaea); and (c) 17 from remote cities or ethne (Larisa, Teos, Crete, Acarnania, Cyprus, Pharsalus, Corinth, Mytilene, Cardia, Epirus, Thrace, and Persia).103 It is not difficult to recognise in the 9 people from group (b) the chieftains of tribes subdued in the first imperialistic expansion of the Macedonian kingdom. Nor can there be any doubt that the individuals from remote areas (group (c)) were either xeno; of old, promoted to positions of power, or the heads of subdued enemies turned followers. After the dismemberment of Alexander's empire, this trend seems to have intensified. Studies of the epigraphical evidence from the Hellenistic ~riod show conclusively that the phi/a; of the rulers were not imposed from above, from within the narrow circle of Macedonian dynasts, but were recruited from below, from among the elites of the Greek cities. 104 Acting simultaneously as leaders of civic factions and officials of the central power, these elites were able to hold together empires that might stretch over three continents. lOS In sum, throughout its history, the Greek city was torn by conflict between upper-class factions who derived their power and resources from foci of power which lay outside its boundaries. Networks of alliances linked factions from several cities and radiated from the great empires located at the fringes of the world of cities, creating a system of external friendships that could offer rewards - wealth, fame, position - even more tempting than those of the city itself. It was a system that had not changed significantly since the days of the epos. What had changed was the range of services available for exchange: when the city came into being, the services that could be performed through political institutions came to be added to the The groups are as follows: (a) Nos. ~9, 57, 83. 157. 164,269,357.380,412,445,466, 467,~80,~94,501.502.545.554.556,598.602,603.606,613,621. 782, 802,645.648, 700, 757. (b) Nos. 37 (Lyn«sris). 250 (Lyn«sris), 1~3 (Elimioris). ~39 (EJimioris), 4~6 (Orcstis), 627 (Orcstis), 780 (E1imiotis), 668 (Eordaea). (c) Nos. 101 (Amphipolis). 139 (Ph.nalol). 253 (Corinrh). 258 (Greece ?), .102 (Mytilene). 308 (Gre«e ?), 317 (Cardia), 17 (Teos), 292 (Greece ?), 350 (Thrace), 427 (lIIyria). 46~ (Mytilene), ~86 (Penia), 521 (Lari~), 544 (Cme), 5~8 (Epirus). 586 (Penia. to judge by the name), 788 (Acamania). 719 (Cyprus). Nos. 72. 745 and 789 are unclassifiable and are therefore left out of account. In doubtful casn I have accepted Berve's conjectures. 104 Habicht (1958); Herman (t 980/1); Walbank (198~a). 10$ Cf. Bagnall (1976). who providn a good example of how remote territories would be controlled through networks of friends. In the third century B.C.. the 'Ptolemaic possessions' outside Egypt included Cyrenaica, Cyprus. Phoenicia, Palestine. Code·Syria. and parts of Asia Minor and the Greek islands. 10J

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repertoire of 'private' services that had circulated in the pre-political world. By the same token, however, there emerged a class of men who, unlike the aristocracy, the rich, and their clients, were free of such ties of dependence and uninvolved in the alliance system. This was the demos, and it is to the point of view of the demos that we now turn. 5.6 TREASON AND PATRIOTISM

The betrayal for private gain of fatherland (patris) and fellow-eitizens (andres), wrote Pausanias in the second century of our era, had been endemic in Greece since the earliest days. The concrete examples with which he illustrates this general proposition are highly relevant to our subject: In the reign of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, the king of Persia, the cause of the lonians was ruined because all the Samian captains excrpt eleven ~rayed the Ionian fleet. After reducing Ionia, the Persians enslaved Eretria also, the most famous citizens turning traitors - Philagros, the son of Kyneas, and Euphorbos, the son of Alkimachos. When Xerxes invaded Greece, Thessaly was betrayed by Aleuades, and Thebes by Attaginos and Tim~enidas, who were the foremost citizens of Thebes. After the Peloponnesian war, Xenias of Elis attempted to betray Elis to the lakedaimonians under Agis, and the so-called xeno; of Lysander at no time relaxed their efforts to hand over their countries to him. In the reign of Philip, son of Amyntas, Lakedaimon is the only Greek city to be found that was not betrayed; the other cities in Greece were ruined more by treachery than they had previously been by PIague.... 106

The remarkable thing about Pausanias' diatribe is the incongruity between the elevated status of his actors - captains, leading citizens, xeno; and their ponrayal as traitors. People possessed of such laudable traits can hardly be fitted into any familiar stereotype of 'traitors'. 'Elites' are commonly regarded as the most authentic representatives of their societies, embodying traits which reside in their inferiors only to a lesser degree. Pausanias, on the other hand, pictures the elites of the Greek cities as the enemies of their own societies, and it is this picture that calls for an explanation. The very fragmentary evidence indicates that, in the early days of the polis, the portrayal of the elites in such terms would have been inconceivable. For Homer. as we have seen, it was self-evident that the hero should remain loyal to his xeno; above al1. 107 And two centuries or so later, Pindar 106 Pausanias 7.10.1-3. The passage carries the history of Greece down to the conquest by the Romans on similar principln. 107 a. Finley (1977) 116-17. The evidence produced by Glftnhalgh (1972) for 'patriotic pride' in the age of Homer shrinks to insignificance when compared with some of the genuinely patriotic utterances from the Classical age cited below.

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could still pamt a favourable picture of Thorax of Larisa, a man who harboured Xerxes and opened the way for Mardonius' invasion of Greece. lOR The conclusion must therefore be drawn that the critical outlook which Pausanias expressed and clearly accepted without question had been extricated, by means of a gradual and painstaking process, from converst' premises. An anecdote incorporated into Herodotus' history might point to the first germs of the emerging alternative. Mardonius, having invaded Athens, sent a messenger to the Athenian Council in Salamis offering friendship. Lykidas, one of the councillors, declared that it seemed to him best to receive the offer and lay it before the Assembly. "This was the opinion which he declared", comments Herodotus, "either because he received money from Mardonius, or because the plan pleased him". But the Athenian councillors were so wroth that they stoned Lykidas to death. 109 Only dim traces are visible of the process by which this crude form of communal solidarity became refined and gathered ideological weight. But we can sec enough to conclude that it did so in opposition to upper-class individuals united by xenia. Throughout Greek history, it was the community that arrayed itself against the one-time hero, against xenoi plotting its plundering, subjection and exploitation. In the first instance, the community defended itself b}' punishing them. In Athens, ostracism was perhaps the best-known instrument of punishment. The people who were ostracised at the beginning of the fifth century were of high social status, of noble birth, and some of them, like Themistokles, are known from literary sources for their involvement with the Persians. llf} It seems thus likely that even if in later times ostracism became a tool of political rivalry inside Athens,lll its original purpose was to restrict the ability of upper-class citizens to draw on foreign allies in order to subvert the people's rule. "Kallixenos traitor", says one potsherd from the early fifth century, unmistakably echoing an angry cry of the Demos; "Aristeides, brother of the Persian general Datis", says another (Fig. 15a,b), and there can be little doubt that what was envisaged here were Persian magnates acting in concert with Athenian xeno; to the detriment of the Athenian collectivity. The Peloponnesian War was punctuated by events which fit a similar pattern. The xenoi of rival forces who preferred their private alliances to communal duties were criticised, banished or executed. Perikles gave his 11111 Pindar, Pythian 10 and Herodotus 9.1. It should be noted, however. thar the poem preceded the inva~ion. 1M Herod()tu~ 9.5. 110 Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 40ff. give a usdul catalogue. III Cf. Finley (1973h) 26.

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E. Vanderpool in H~spma 19 (1950) 390; and Meigs and Lewis (1969) 42). As 'brother- is a convenient synonym of 'unos' - Pylades, for instance, in plays by Eunpldes js styled both as Orestes' xmos and brother (Eur. E.l. 83 and Or. 1015)-it is evident that the idea of treason is here expressed through the" metaphor of ritualised friendsillp.

estate to the demos as proof of his loyalty, but his patriotism and abstinence from bribery were nonetheless impugned. 112 ArchidamOi himself, as we have seen, was severely criticised, and his case reminded the Athenians of Pleistoanax, son of Paosanias, who fourteen years before the .ar had been banished from Spana on account of a similar, apparently inexplicable, withdrawal from Attica. 1 U The Spartans refrained from their original idea of imposing a fine on Agis (the king who failed to give battle at Argos) and of razing his bOUie, but they enacted a law preventing him from leading an army OUt of the city without the consent of ten Spanan advisers elected by the city. I 14 The Argives made an angry demonstration against those who made the truce without consulting the many (Plnhos): Thrasyllol eteaped In Thucydides 2.60, he iI made to answer such chUJel. Thucydidcs 2.21.1. He wu luapcacd of "bcqJ penuadcd 1¥itb the aid of 1IIODC1-• .... Thucydidcs 5.63.4. IU tl)

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159

being stoned by the skin of his teeth, and his property was confiscated. And Themistokles, the Athenian, after his death in Asia Minor, had to be buried in Attica by his relations, without the Athenians' knowledge - "for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been banished for treason". 11~ There are good reasons to believe that it was with similar situations in mind that the Athenian law of treason was formulated: "if anyone shall be traitor of the po/is,... he shall be tried before a popular jury (dikasterion), and if he be convicted, he shall not be buried in Attica, and his property shall be confiscated". 1 16 But there were subtler means at hand by which to curb aristocratic power. An intriguing process comes into play whenever a group subjected to self-imposed regulations enters the scene. "After the rise of cities", observed a student of primitive societies, "men became something different from what they had been before".117 The case for ancient Greece can be illustrated by the example of Alkibiades. This inveterate aristocrat, whose own behaviour was clearly shaped by the ideal of the Homeric hero, could at the same time declare himself a "lover of his city" and crave desperately for recognition by his fellow Athenians. The same ambivalence runs through the careers of most of the other major figures of Greek history. They tried persistently to have the best of both worlds: like Alkibiades, they engaged in intrigues by means of xenia connexions; but, when required, they posed as loyal citizens. I 18 Xenia and patriotism pulled in two opposing directions, and, in practice, xenia could be preferred to patriotism. But the fact remains that patriotism would not be left unrecognised. For the community set new ideals of behaviour and generated hitherto unknown criteria for passing moral judgements. It devised new points of reference for interpreting the world, and imposed a way of thinking which took the city as its point of departure. Most important, it prompted its members to remodel their own personalities to meet these standards. What set Agesilaos and Alkibiadcs apart from the pre-state heroes was that they yielded - however panially - to this drive. What distinguished Perikles and Archidamos from Diomedes and Glaukos was their repudiation of xenia II ~

Thucydides 1.138.6. Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7.22. 117 Redfield (1953) v. 1111 For example, when Xenophon's patron, Agesilaos, received a letter offering xenia and phi/ia with the Great King of Persia, he is said to have told the messenger: "Tell his majesty, that there is no need for him to send me private Imers, but, if he gives proof of friendship for Sparta, and goodwill towards Greece, I on my part will be his friend with all my heart. But if he is found plotting against them, let him not hope to have a friend in me, however many letters I may receive" (Xcnophon, Agesi/aus 8.3). The whole C'Ssay may be viewed as an unsuccessful attempt to iron out the inconsistency ~een A~ilao~' image as a loyal xenos and an obedient servant of his city. 116

160

Obligations: Heroic and Civic

however nominal this repudiation may have been - in order to conform to the ideals of the city. Loyalty to the demos, the country, the polis originally a mere response to threats to the whole community - was gradually superseded by an ideological gloss which took on a life of its own. "The most valuable thing in man's life", says Demosthenes, accusing Aeschines of treason and xenia with Philip, "is supporting the policy of the many, and having the same friends and the same enemies as your fatherland (patris)".119 This was, then, the premise that had to be accepted, that had to become self-evident, in order to make it possible to discover that the line separating traitors from patriots was, in fact, almost identical with the line separating the upper classes from the lower: Who then are the people who commit these monstrous crim~ [i.e. embezzling public money, fomenting political troubles, overthrowing governments, etc.) ? Persons who fancy themselv~ important enough to be called xe"o; and philoi of Philip, men itching for military commands and eager for military distinction, men who claim superiority over the common people (hoi polloi). At Megara the other day was not Perillos tried before the Three Hundred on a charge of visiting Philip? And did not Ptoedoros, the first man in all Megara for wealth, birth and reputation, come forward and beg him off, and send him back to Philip? The sequel was that one of the pair returned with an alien army at his back, while the other was hatching the plot at home. Indeed, there is no danger, no danger whatsoner, that requires more anxious vigilance than allowing any man to become stronger than the people. 120 We must return to the incidents analysed in the previous sections in order to realise that, despite its explicit bias, Demosthenes' rhetoric is not unduly removed from reality. The upper classes of the Greek city were involved in a network of alliances across community lines; the lower classes were confined within their laterally insulated communities; and the upper classes did display more solidarity with those of their kind outside their communities than they did with the lower classes inside them. The portrayal of the 'foremost of citizens' as traitors is thus central to an ideology that was propagated by the demos (or on their behalf) to protect themselves - and the community as a whole - from external, upper-class coalitions. Alkibiades was, indeed, accused of serious crimes. But the speeches portraying him in an unpleasant light were written with one clear purpose in mind - to win over the support of the demos. Thus they say what the demos would like them to say. When it suited a speaker to attack Alkibiades, he accused him of treason, of aiming at tyranny, of sexual depravity, and, 119

Demosthenn 18.284 and 280 (0" tbe Crown). a~rly, the orator was using a diche.

el., for very similar phrases, lsocrates 16.41

(Ccmct17tmg th~

Ttam of HorKS); Plato, Laws

12.9S5b-c; and Polybius 1.14. 110 Dtmosthenes J9.295 (Dt Falsa ugatio"t), d. 18.109ff. (On the Crown).

6 TreaS01I and Patriotism

161

generally, of not acting in conformity with civic norms. When a speaker wanted to defend Alkibiades, he played down Alkibiades' adventures abroad and presented him as a loyal citizen. 121 However, in the extant sources, another point of view persisted. Thucydides more than once makes it clear that Alkibiades acted from personal motives of self-interest. Not even once, however, does he condemn him on that account; never does he call him by any of the derogatory terms used above - let alone 'traitor'. Indeed, he even makes him maintain that what clearly was treason was not treason. 121 It is therefore likely that from the moral standpoint of Thucydides the identification of xenia with treason was by no means obvious. In the Greek world of the cities, then, unlike in the modern world, the notions 'treason' and 'patriotism' had overtones of class conflict. Considerations of nationalism, on the other hand - considerations which lend to the modern concepts their most distinctive colouring - were almost entirely absent. The Greeks who co-operated with the Persian kings a century before Demosthenes, and who would co-operate with the Hellenistic rulers not many years later, came from the same high aristocracy as those who co-operated with Philip of Macedon. As to Alkibiades - true, he betrayed his inferiors in his native city, but he remained loyal to his upper-class friends abroad; he violated the principles of action imposed by the demos, but remained faithful to the heroic principles of ritualised friendship. This tvidcnce is summarised in ~ag('r (1967). Thucydides 6.92.4, d. 4. t 14.3, where the same argument is attributed to Brasidas. Polybius would later spell out a very similar viewpoint. see Polybius 18.13- J" with Walhank (1957·82) vol. II, 564·70. 121

122

CONCLUSION I have attempted in this study to abstract for the purposes of analysis a category of social relationships and values which can be identified both in the pre-political world and in the Classical and Hellenistic worlds of the Greek cities. 'Ritualised friendship' forms a connecting thread, as it were, between these worlds, and serves as an analytical tool to throw into perspective cenain aspects of ancient society. Perhaps the most important conclusion that emerges from this way of looking at the ancient evidence is the persistence, in the world of the cities, of the horizontal cleavage between the upper and the lower classes - which, though perhaps not as deep as that observed in the world of Odysseus, l was certainly deeper than is commonly held in modem research. A minority of people at the top of the social pyramid strove to differentiate themselves from those below them, and employed a variety of means to that effect. Apart from a separate code of manners, fictive genealogies, the cultivation of leadership qualities, and certain occupations, it was through their participation in a social sphere outside the city that they distanced themselves from their inferiors. The main prerequisites for entering this sphere were wealth, power and status; the main avenues of access, guest-friendship and marriage. The ancient world was thus united at its highest social level by a web of complex alliances. However, this was a superficial unity. Neither the Greek world as a whole, nor any individual polis, came close to anything which might be termed a "nation'. Neither the Greek world - since, despite some claims to unity on the basis of cultural homogeneity, the upper-class alliances did not respect either cultural or ethnic boundaries: the Persian. Macedonian, and Hellenistic 'enemies' formed an integral part of the Greek network. Nor the individual polis - since the most significant social division of the ancient world, that between the upper and lower classes, was not confined within its bounds. Having discarded the model of the nation state for the social structure of the ancient Greek world, we are left with a type of agrarian society which has been described by Gellner. In the characteristic agrarian state, according to him, "the ruling class forms a small minority of the population, rigidly separate from the great majority of direct agricultuI

Finley (1977) 1H.

162

163

Conclusion

ral producers, or peasants". Below this horizontally stratified minority, there is "another world, that of the laterally separated petty communities, which generally live inward-turned lives, tied to the locality by economic need" (see diagram). 2

'\,...~....- stratified, hori7.ontally

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~....-;segregated layers of military, administrative. clerical and sometimes commercial ruling class

laterall)' insulated communities or agricultural producers

It seems to me that of all the models that arc available, it is this which best accommodates the details of the evidence. However, allowing for these basic similarities between ancient Greek society and the societies from which Gellner's generalisation is drawn, ancient Greece displayed features which cannot easily be found in any type of agrarian society, and it is to the elucidation of these peculiarities that we must finally turn. What makes the case of ancient Greece unique is the polis itself. The polis superimposed itself upon this archaic form of social structure and evolved, 2

Adapted from Gellner (1983) 9-10.

164

Conclusion

in a sense, out of the conflicts created thereby. Most major political moves of Greek history - wars, invasions, revolutions - can be explained in terms of this struggle: the d~mos, the lower-elasses, and the polis, on the one hand; the aristocracy, the upper-classes, and coalitions outside the polis on the other. For roughly two centuries in the Classical age the lower classes extricated themselves from dependence on their superiors and set up an alternative form of social organisation. The one-time heroes thus lost their effective supremacy. Some were transformed into right- and duty-bearing members of formally constituted political bodies, while others joined their peers outside the city, seeking, with their help, to regain power. In the Hellenistic age, these attempts were now crowned with success; most cities were manipulated, if not effectively ruled, by leaders of factions supported by rulers abroad. The simultaneous involvement of the upper classes with the city and with foreign rulers had important consequences, too, for the structuring of the societies outside the city. The petty kingdoms on the fringes of the Greek world, or the Macedonian and Hellenistic monarchies, were in some respects reminiscent of the social pyramids headed by the Homeric heroes. Yet there were important differences. First, in the Homeric world, friendship (philia and xenia) was, apart from marriage, the only bond to create enduring obligations between peers. In the Classical and Hellenistic worlds, friendship indeed remained the main bond, but there were in addition relationships of subordination and superordination which to some extent were institutionalised. People who originally started their careers in the Persian, Macedonian and Hellenistic ruling circles as philo;, xeno;, and hetairai, would quickly become generals, satraps, treasurers and the like in the royal administration: the basic obligations of friendship came to be superseded by obligations of service. Secondly, although these societies shared, both in terms of the circulation of resources and the ritual of social relations, some features with European feudalism, they were not feudal in the proper sense of the term. It will suffice to refer back to the bestowal of landed estates in order to make this point clear. Given the nature of the evidence, it is hard to penetrate the intricacies of the practice, but even so it seems clear that such grants followed no common pattern. There were important geographical and chronological differences in the way in which the relationships between the grantors and grantees were structured, and, furthermore, the grants never became an indispensable element of the bond: one man could serve, support, and be loyal to another man on the basis of friendship and exchange of benefits

Conclusion

165

alone without receiving a landed estate from him. Unlike in feudal Europe,] the two institutions of ritualised personal relationships (there, vassalage) and the granting of estates (there, the benefice), never merged together to give rise to a new system of social relations. , Cf. Ganshof (1964) 15ff.

C)

APPENDIX A

XENOI, IDIOXENOI AND DOR YXENOI The list below roughly follows the chronological order of the sources (not the dates of the individuals engaged in the bond). If a relationship is attested in several sources, the later source(s) are cited together with the earliest. Secondary sources are only included here for the sake of completeness; the generalisations in the text are based on evidence stemming from the time period defined in the Introduction. This selection of sources is dictated by the terminology used in the texts; it thus comprises only a small fraction of the instances delimited by the definition of ritualised friendship. In all the passages cited, there is either explicit reference to xenia, idioxenia or doryxenia (hospitium, in the Roman sources). or, as in the case of Tydeus and Hippolochos, the existence of the bond follows necessarily from its existence between their ancestors. PX2 and PX t mean, respectively, xenoi through grandfathers and fathers. (The term patrikoi xenoi covers both possibilities; hence my 'ancestral xenoi'.) Ancestors not styled explicitly as xenoi are only listed if they are said to have interacted within the context of xenia. The absence of either PX2 or PX t indicates that the bond was generated during the lifetime of the partners themselves. (The terminology, however, is not compelling: two people might be called simply xeno; even if they inherited the relationship. Such might have been the case of Perikles and Archidamos.) With the exception of the Homeric examples, the historicity of which it is unnecessary to discuss here. fictional cases are marked F; cases in which the borderline between imagination and reality seems unclear are marked F? Cases in which the persons involved had, for a variety of reasons, not formally become xenoi, but the word appears in the text (one expresses his wish to become another man·s x~nos; an offer of xenia is rejected; the existence of xenia is an accusation or insinuation which cannot be verified) are marked NX.

166

Appendix A

167

Name and proven;1nce

N;1me and provenance

Referm~

Oineus (Lycia] Tydeus [Lycia)

Bdlerophon (Argos] Hippolochos [Argos)

11.6.215

II. 6.21 S

PXI

Diomtd~

Gbukos [Argosl

II. 6.224.231

PX2

Paris [Troy)

Harpalion [P;1phl;lgoni;1)

1/.13.660-1

Euphrtes (Ephyra)

Phyltus [Doulichion?]

II. 15.532

Hektor (Troy)

II. 17.150

Htktor [Troy)

SarpWon [Lycia) Ph3i nops l [Abydos)

P';2mos [Troy)

Et"rion IImbrosl

1/.21.42

:c

Agamtmnon [Mycmc)

Amphimedon [Ithaca)

Od.24.114

:lJ

Iphitos [Oech2lial

Od. 21.13.21

Odysseus [lthacal

Idomtneus [Crrte)

Od.19.191

Odysseus [Ithaca)

Beggu 2 [Crete)

Od.17.522

Odysseus (Ithaca]

Alkinoos (Phaeacial Pheidon [Tht1proria) Begg;1,l [Crete)

Od.9.18

(Lycia)

Ody~us

[Ithaca)

Odysseus [Ithaca) Dmetor [Cyprus] Telemachos (Ithaca) Telem;1cho5 [Ithaca) Themi~tokles

(Athtns] Pindu (ThtbtsJ Pindar IThebts) Pindar [Thebts)

Rem;1rk,

11. 17.S84

-

~

~

.-L

'--"

J)

4-J

Cl ~

:>-NX

'-...-/'

Od.14.322 Od.17.442

Peisistratos (Pylos)

Od.15.195~

PX2

Mentes' (Taphos) Timokreon

Od.1.176.0I7. 313.417 Timocr., fro I = Plut. Thmr;sl. 21

PX2

(Rhodes) Thusyhoulm (Acugas]

Pind. I. 2.48

Hiero (Syracusc)

Pind. P. 3.69

Thorax

Pind. P. 10.64

[Th~saly)

II.e. Apollo in disRUisc. Odysscus in disgui~. 'I.e. Athena in disgUise.

1 I.e.

:::l.

,0 .

168 Name and provenance Pindar [Th~sl Herakl~

Xcnoi, Idioxenoi, and Doryxenoi Name and provenance

Reference

Thearion

Pind. N. 7.61

Remarks

[Aegin~1

Aiakos IAeginal

Pind. N. 7.86

F

Strophios (Phocis)

Pind. P. 11.34

F

[Amycl~el

Omtcs [Amyc:lael

Pylades [Phocis)

Pind. P. 11.16; Eur. EI. 82; Soph.EI.16

F

Croesus [Lydial Chileos [Tegeal Kleomenc.-s (Sparta)

AdraCitos IPhrygial Unknown ;u"o; ISparul Isagoras (Athens)

Hdt. 1.43

F

Pausanias (Sparta)

Hegetondes [Cosl Etearc:ho5 (Oaxus) Phanes [Halicarnassus) Unnamed king [Ethiopia I Pythios [Lydia!

Hdt.9.76

(Thebes! Omtts

Themison (Thera) Camby~s

[Persia I

Camby~

(Persia) Xerxes [Penial

Hdt.9.9 Hdt. 5.70; d. Arist. All,. Pol. 20

Hdt. 4.154 Hdt.3.7 Hdt.3.21

Hdt.7.237

Demaralos

Periander (Corinth I

Thrasyboulos (Miletus)

Hdt.l.20; Diog. uert. 1.95

Histi:aios (Miletus) Ari5tagoras (Miletusl Simoni
Unnamed xeno; [Naxosl Skylax (Mindusl

Hdt.S.30

Polykrates' followers (Samosl Perikles [Athensl Alkihiades (Athens) Alkihiades (Athens) Brasidas (Sparta)

F?;NX

Hdt.7.29

XerxeS (Penia)

[S~mosl

F

[Spart~1

Hdt.5.33

M~i~tias

Hdt.7.228.3-4

(Acarnanial Amasis [Egyptl

Hdt. 3.39,40

Unnam~xmo;

Hdt.3.125

(Unknownl Archidamos (Sparta)

Thuc. 2.13; Plut. Per. 23.2

Endios [Spartal Unnamed xeno; (Argos) Unn;lmed xeno; (Thessalyl

Thuc.8.6.3 Thuc.6.66.3; 0100. 13.5.1 Thuc. 4.78.4

PXJ

Appendix A Name and provenan<:e

169

Rcm,lrks

Name and provenance

Referen"c

Perdikku (Macedonl Agamemnon (Argosl House of Ag2mcmnon [Argos)

Unn3med x,no; (ThcssalyJ Strophios IPh()(is)

Thuc.4.1.17.2 Aesc:hyl. A. H80

f

P)'ladcs (Ph
Aeschyl. Ch. 562

..·.I'X 1

Herakles (Thebnl

Keyx [Trachisl

Soph. Tr. 40

r

Aia~

Hektof (Tro)·J

Soph. Ai. 817

F

Heraklc.-s rl1lcbes)

Eurytos IEuryteial

Soph. Tr. 263

F

House of Agamemnon [Argosl

Phanoteu'i [Phoc.-isl

Soph.F.45~

F

Hektor [Troy I

Rhesos lThracel

fur. Rht$ . .

f

lason [Iolcus]

Unnamed nno; IUnknownl

Eur. Mt'd. 613

F

Priamos [Troy)

Polymcstor [Thri1cel

F.ur.llu.7

F

Polydoros (Troy I

Polymesror /Thrace)

F.ur.lftc. 19.82

f. PXI

Uekabe (Troyl

Polym~tor

Eur. flee. 710

F

PolyneikC's [Thebes]

Unnamed xl'no; [Unknown I

fur. PI,. 402

F

Polyneikes [Thebes]

Theseus [Athens)

fur.

Sophoklcs (Athens)

Hermesileos (Chios)

FGrH 392 {Ion}

Cnro (Athensl

Unnamed xena' IThessaly)

Plat. Cr;t. 4.se. 5.ld

Menon

The Great Kmg (Persia)

Pbt. Ail'''. 78e-
PI:uo (Athens)

Dion

[Pl:al.ll.ett~,. 3.316c

Andocidc.-s (Athensl

Unknown xmOl [Delphi (?) and elsewhere (?)1

Ando4:. I. 132

AndocidC'S (AthensJ

Unnamed king.'i and individuals [Unknownl

Andoc. 1.145

Andoeidt'S [Athensl

Archelaos IM2(edonl

Andoc:.2.11

Kephisoooros (Thebes)

Unn:1mcd xenos [Athensl

1.)'5.

(Salamis)

(Lari~1

n.s

(Thrace)

(Syracuse I

Sit"". 9.JO

fro 78

F

PXI

PXI

170

Xenoi, Idioxenoi, and Doryxenoi Name and provenance

Reference

Eunomos [Athens)

Dionysiu5 (Syracuse)

Lys.19.19

Andocides [Athens) Lysias [Athens) Pausanias [Sparta)

Unnarmd rulers (Unknown)

Lys.4.48

Thrasydaios [Elisl Diognetos (Athens)

P. Ox,. 1606.168; Plut. Mor. 835f

Agcsilaos [Sparta)

Artaxerxes II [Persia) Pharnabazos son [Persia] Apollophancs (Cyzicus)

X(n. Ag~s. 8.3; Plut. Agts. 23.6 Xm. Hell. 4.1.39; Plut. Ages. 13.1 Xm. Hell. 4.1.29; Plut. Ages. 12.1

AgC'Silaos (Sparta]

Unnam~x~o;

Xen. Age". 2.23

Agtosilaos [Sparta)

Mausolos (Caria)

Xen. A~s. 2.2'"

Agnilaos [Splrel' AgesilaO$ [Sparta)

Tachos (Egypt)

Xm. Ages. 2.27

Prokles and his followers [Phlius)

Xm. H~II. 5..tI3

Cyrus [Persia) Cyrus [PersilJ Cyrus [Penil) Cyrus [Persia)

Unnamed king [India)

Xen. Cyrop. 6.2.1

Klearchos [Spartal Aristippos [Thessaly) Proxenos (Barotia)

Xen. A"ab. 1.3.3, cf.1.1.9

Cyrus [Persia)

Sophainetos [Stymphalos)

Xm. AMb. 1.1.11

Cyrus (Persia)

SokratC'S (Achaeal Proxenos [Baroria)

Xen. A"ab. 1.1.11 Xen. A"ab. 3.1.4, 5.3.5

Kleandros [Sparta)

Xm. A"ab. 6.6.35, 7.1.8

Menon [urisa)

Ariaios [Persia)

Xen. A"ab. 2.6.28, 2.1.5,2.4.15

IImenias (Thebes)

Unnamed ruler (Persia)

Xen. Hell. 5.2.35

Apollophanes [Cyzicus]

Pharnabazos (Penial

Xen. Hell. 4.1.29; Plut. Ages. 12.1

Name Ind provenance

Agesilao5 (Sparta] Agesillos [Spartl)

Xenophon [Athens) Xmophon (Athens)

4

Remarks

lys.18.1O

I

NX

[T~eaJ

F

Xen. AMb. 1.1.10 Xen. A"ab. 1.1. 11

NX

For tM discussion of the problems involved in this passage, see Hornblower (1982) 174-5.

171

Appendix A

Name and provenance

Nam~ and

provenance

R~ference

Antalkidas [Spana)

Ariobarzancs [Persia)

Xen. Hell. 5.1.28

Archidamos [Spana)

Podantmos and his followers [Phlius)

Xtn. Hell. 5.].1]

Ahr:adatas [Susa)

Unnam~kinK

Xen. C)·rop. 5.1.3

~m05thenc."S

Anaxinos (Oreus)

Atschin.3.224

Thrasyllos (Siphnos)

Poltmam~tos

lsocr. 19.5

Speaker in lsocr. 19 (Siphnos)

Unknown xeno, (Paros)

Isocr.19.18

Thrasyllos and the Speaker (Siphnos)

Unknown xt>no, (Troezen)

Isocr. 19.22

Philippos

Isocr.17.43

[Ath~s)

Sopaios (Bosporu'i)

Philippos (Athens)

Sopaios' son (Bosporusl

Isocr.17.43

Hippolaidas [Athens?)

Sopa ios' Wn (Bosporus)

boer. 17.]8

Isokratcs (Athens)

Klearchos [Htraclt:a ]

lsocr. Letter 7.13

bokrates (Athens)

Tlmmhros [Heraclea)

Isocr. I.etter 7.13

Isokratc."S [Athens)

bson (Pherae)

Isoer. I.e"" 6.1

lsokrates (Athens)

Pol)'alko~

lsocr. I~tt" 6.1

lsokra tc."S [Athens)

Childrtn of lason [Pherae)

Satyros

Apolloph:ants (Pydna)

d. Diod. 16.55

Philip (Macedon)

A('s"'hin('s (Athens)

l)('m.18.51.284; 19.314

Philip (Macedon)

Pythoklc."S (Athens)

Dem.19 ..H4

Philip (Macedon)

Philoet a!. [Thehcs)

I~m.

Pasion [Athens)

Unnamed xeno, [Lampsacus)

Oem.50.18

Pasion (Athens)

Kle:an:ax

Dem.50..S6

P:asion [Athens)

Ept'r.uos (Tenedosl

F?

[Bactria)

(Athens)

(Athen~)

Remarks

(Unknownl

:-c :-

QJ 4-J

PXI

:D -.

..::...

'-'

QJ 4-J

Cl ~

PXI. NX

>-

2-

c'

0

[Pherat) Isoer. l.etter 6.4 Dem.19.194;

19.140

ITen~os)

Oem.5CU6

'for the reading Poly:alko, rat~r that Pol)·alkes. see P. ]4 n. 75

NX

172 Name and provenance

Xenoi, Idioxenoi, and Doryxenoi

Name and provC1lanct

Referenct

Nikostrltol (Athms]

Unnamed :unoi [Unknown]

Dem.53.1-12

Aristonous [Athms] Archebiades [Athens)

lykon [Heradea] lykon [Heraclea)

Dem.52.3

Meidi'l [Athens)

Plootlrchos [Eretrial Nausikrarn (Carystus) Unnamt'd ;dioJCenoi [Unknown)

Androkln (Athens) Alexlnckr (~ta«don)

Remarks

Oem. 52.3 Oem. 21.1 10

[Dml.) 35.8 fGrH 12,SF4 (Ch:uts);

d. Ael. Var. Hist. 8.7 Call. Ep;gr. 2a

Ht'fakIeitos [Haliclrnassus}

Kallimachos [Cyrene)

lason (lokus)

Iphitos [Phocil)

Apoll. Rhod. 1.208

Antiochus II(?) [Syria)

Unn:amed idioxeno; [Unknown)

Welles (1934) no. 17

Imylch [Phomieiln Sicily?)

Lyson [Greek Sicily?)

IG XIV.279

Kraugis [Megalopolis)

Kleandros (Mantinea]

Philopoimrn [Megalopolis)

Kleandros [Mantinea)

Polyb. 10.22.1; P1ut. Philop. I; Paul. 8.49.2 Polyb.10.22.1; Paus. 8.49.2; Plut. Phi/op. 1

Philopoimm [Megalopolis)

Timolaos [Sparta)

Polyb. 20.12.2; d. Paus. 8.51.2; P1ut. Ph;/op. 1

Archidamos [Spartl]

Nikagoras [Mn5CflC)

Polyb.5.37.2

Araras [Sicyon]

Nikophanes [Mtgalopolis)

Polyb.2.48.4

PXI

Aratos [Sicyonl Eummes [Pergamuml Amlus [Pergamum)

Kt>rkidas [Mtjalopolis) Unnamed JCeno; [Rome] Unnamed xeno; IRome)

Polyb.2.48."

PXI

Logbuis

Antiochus Hierax [Syria)

Polyb.5.74.4

lason [Thessaly]

Nepos, Timoth. 2

Pholos [Pholoe)

Apollod.2.5.4

Unnamed JCeno; [Thebes)

Arr. Anab. 1.9.9

[~Igel

Timothe05 [Athms) Hnakles [Thebn) Philip [Ma«don)

F

PXI

Polyb.24.S.3 Polyb.33.18.2

F

173

Appendix A

Name and provenance

Rtmark~

Name and provenance

Reference

Alexander (MaCt'don)

Unnamedxeno;

Arr. Anab. 1.9.9

Themistokles (Athens) Belesys [Babylon}

Lysithtides [Unknown) Leader of Arabs (Arabia)

Diod. t 1.56;" d. Plut. Them. 26

l.ibys JRuler of area aroundSiwah)

Aristokritos [Sparta)

Diad. 14.1.3.5

l.ibys (Rulerof arta around Siwah)

l.ysander (Spart2)

Diod. 14.13.5

PXl

Lihys [Rulerof area around Siwah)

libys [Sparta)

Diod. 14.13.5

PXI

Philip [Macedon)

Unnamed xt"noi [all of Greece)

Diod. 16. 91.5~

Hephaistion [Pella)

Ballonymos [Tyre)

Xenodikos (Acragas)

Unn:amed idio;unoi (Gcla)

Diod. 17.47; d. Curt.4.1.19 Diod.20']1

Agathokles (Therm:ae Himeraeae)

Ophellas (Ruler of Cyrene)

Diod.20.70.3

Polyperchon (MaCt'don)

Unnamed ;d;ox~no; [Unknown)

Diod.20.20.2

Polychares (Messenel

Euaiphnos (Spartal

Diod. 8.7; d. Paus. 4.9.1

F

Pherekydes (Syros)

Perilaos

Diog. Laen. 1.116

F?

Thcmistokles JAtMns)

Nikogenes [Aegae)

Plut. "lMm;sI. 26; d. Diog.l.aert. 1. 101-2

Kotys [Thrace)

Unnamed x~nos (Unknown]

Plut. Mor. 174d

F?

Solon (Athens) Solon [Athens)

Epimenidn (Crete) Anacharsis (Scythia)

F?

Solon (Athens)

Chilon [Sparta)

Plut. Mor. 157d, H8a Plut. Sol. 5.2; Diog. Laen. I. 102 Plut. Mor. 151 f

f?

Diokles (Unknown)

Thain

Plut. Mor. 146c

F?

Periandt'f [Corinth)

Amasis (Egypt)

Plut.Mor.152f

F?

Philip (Macedon)

Philon (Thebes)

Plut. Mor. ) 78c

[~~)

Diod.2.H.6

[M~sene)

F?

[MjJ~sl

"For the problems concerning Lysitheides, d. Hofstetter (1978) no. 205.

,

174 Name and provenance

• I

.:

,

•

",:,

:

:

'.

~

.',,:

'. ' :

Xenoi, Idioxenoi, and Doryxenoi Name and provenance

Refermtt

Ktphalos (Syracuse)

Plut. Mar. 83Sc

Demaratos (Corinth]

Philip

P1ut. A/tx. 9; d. Dem.18.295

KJeinias (Sicyon) KJeinias (Sicyon)

Unnamed Icings [Macedon, Egypt?] Unnamed xmo; {Arsos) Unnamed xmo;

PeriJcles (Athens)

Aratos (Sicyon]

An axerxes [penia] Lysander (Sparta) Lysander (Sparta] Dion [Syracuse] Dian [Syracuse) PhililtOS [Syracuse] Dionysius [Syracuse)

(Macedon)

Rtmarks

Pluto Arat. 4.2 Plut. Arat. 3.1 Pluto Arat. 3.1

PXl

(Af'8os)

Anralkidas (Sparta) Unnamed xmo; (Miletus)

Plut. Artax. 22.3

Unnamed xmo; (Unknown)

Plut. L)'s. 13.4, 19.1; Paus.7.10.3

Synalos [urthage)

Plut. Dio" 25.6

K2J1ippos [Athms] Unnamed xmo; (Adria)

Plut. Mor. 1761; d. Di01f 55ff.

Archyta. and fellow Pythagoreans [Tarentum)

Plut. Diem 18.2

Dionysiul [Syracuse]

Plato [Athens}

Pluto Dimt 22.1

Agesilaos [Spana]

Unnamed xmo; [Asia)

Plut. Mor. 212e

F?

Pyrrhus [Epirus)

uius Fabriciul (Rome)

Pluto Pyrr. 20.1

NX,F?

Archill [Athens)

Archias

Plut. Pelop.

Alexander [Macedon) Hiero (Syracuse)

Pholcion (Athens] Pynhus (£pi",,]

Plut. PhaG. 17.19

Agi.

Xmias (Elis]

PaUl, 3.8.4; d. 7.10.3

Philip (Macedon)

ArtabazOi [Penial

Curt. 5.9.1,6.5.2; d. Diod. 16.52.3

Hephaisrion (PeUa]

Two unnamed hospites (Sidon)

Curt. 4.1.17; d. Plut. Mor. 340c

[Sparta)

Plut. Lys. 8.1

Plut. Dian 11.4

to

fTheba)

Paus.6.12.3

.

"

'

,,

.' ,,:

,

• I

.:

::,

:

:

'.

~

.',.:

175

Appendix A Name and provtnance Alkibiadn [Athens)

,

Remarks

Name and provenance Alkibiades 7 (Unknown)

71f Harpokration's dncription of Alkibiades of Phegous as sugg~tion

·A).x~L(l00u ~ is correct (a

which is somewhat reinforced by the homonymity), then Alkibiades of Phegous referred to in Andocides 1.65 (0" th~ MY$t~ri~s) cannot be the cousin and fellow-exile of Alkibiadcs arrested by Thrasyllos in 409 B.C. (Xenophon, HtllnJica 1.2.13). If, Ind only if. Harpokration is right, Alkibiades of pt,egous is a %~"OJ of unknown origin who became an Athenian citizen. presumlbly by virtue of the effo"s of his Athenian panner. Cf. Davies (J 973) no. 600 VI.C.

.

"

'

,,

.' .,:

APPENDIX B

XENIA, PROXENIA AND CITIZENSHIP

Reference 1. Hdt. 8.136; d. W. I

2. Aeschin. 3.258-9; d. W.2 3.lsocr.15.166;d. W.5 4./GI J 23;d. W. 11

n 0

"'<

~ CQ

5. Ion of Chios, FGrH 392; d. W.18 6. Thuc. 2.29.5·,2.67.2

....

J

City granting the deaee and date Athens [before 480 B.C.) Athens [before 48 1/0 B.C.) Athens [co 475 B.C.) Athens [466-40 B.C.I Athens (440/39 B.C.) Athens [431-30 B.C.]

Name and provenance ofgranrtt Alexandros [Macedonia] Anhmios [ZeJea) Pindar [Thebes) Athenaios [Thespiae] Hmnesilaos [Chios] Sadokos, son of Sitallees [Thrace]

~

c.

3:

I» .... ~

~.

!!.

7. Thuc. 2.85.5; d. W. 32 8. Thuc. 3.52.5 9. Amen. 3.108f-109a; Suidas,s.v.Anas;d. W. 70 10. Thuc. 8.92.8;cf. W. 74 II./G I) 118; d. W. 27 and 86 12./GI J I17;d.W.90 tJ. Thuc. 5.43.2, 6.89.2

Athens [429-8 B.C.) Spana [427 B.C.) Athens [c. 41413 B.C.) Athens [41211 B.C.) Athens [408nB.c.J Athens [407/6 B.C.) Spana [sincec. 550 B.C., d. Davies (1971) 16)

Nikias [Gonyn) La leon [Plaraea] Ana

[Messapial Thoukydides [PhanaJus) Apollodoros [SelymbriaJ Archclas [Macedonia] Alleibiades [Athens)

Xmosin granting city

Identified by

Peisistraatos? Hippias? Themistoklcs?

ex.f. belween ancestors [Hdt. 5.9.4; Arin. Arb. Pol. 15.2J d. Wallace (1970) 202

Mepkles

xmos;poem (Pind. P. 7J nam6 [decree itself] xmos [rexritself] family ties [Thuc. 2.29.1)

?

Sophokles Nymphodoros of Abdera (pro:cmos) Niki~the

general? ;)

Dcmosthmes or Eurymedon namesake in Athens? Alkibiades Andocides Endios

n

0

"

'<

::!.

CQ

J .... ~

name [text itself] name [teXt itself] hereditary pbilos [Thuc.7.33.4J name [text itself] ex.f. [decree itself] xmos [Andoc.2.11] hereditary xmos [ThUc. 8.6.3]

c.

3:

I» .... ~

~

!!.

Refcnncc

City granting the decree and d2te

Name and provenance ofgrantft

Xnrosin granting city

Wentified by

14./G 1'113-; DmI. 12.10; d.O.3

Athens (401B.C.)

Evagoras (Salamis]

Nikophemos? Aristophann? Konon?

ex.f. [Lys. 19.23.36; lsocr. 9.54. 51)

IS./G III 20. with Lewis and Stroud (1979) 16./G III 103 -; d. O. 10

AthalS (39312 B.C.]

Evagoras (Salamis]

Konon

ex.f.

Athens (369/8 B.C.]

Dionysios (Syracu5C)

Eunomos

17./G II 106;ef. T.13S

Athens (36817 B.C.]

Koroibos (Sparta]

namesake

name

18./G 112 110

A~

Mmdaos (Pelagonia]

Timotheos

ex.f.

Athens (355/4 B.C.]

Lachar~ son of Charcs

Chares,the

20. IG 11 2 133

AthalS [355/4 B.C.]

Philiskos (Sestus]

21. Dem. 21.200

Euboea? (bdore 350 B.C.]

Demosthcnn (Athens]

22.IG Jl 237-; d. 0.16

Athens (33817 B.C.]

23./G II l 405-;d. 0.21

Athens

Phonnion [Acamania] Amyntor. son of OenKtrius [Unknown I

l

[36312 B.C.]

19./G 11 2 130

l

(33~3 B.C.]

KEY: T... Too (i 948) vol. 2 W.· M. B. Walbank (1978) • • citizenship; abKncc of - = proxmy

(Apollonia]

O. = Osborm (1981-83)

[decree irsclf)

xmos [Lys.19.19]

(decree itself) son's name Athmaios (T.148] ~raJ?

Generals of 36615 B.C. Ploutarchos

name (dKrec itsdf) ewrgesi4 (decree irsclf)

xmos (~m.21.110]

Phormion

name; inherited Xnti4 [Thuc. 2.80; d. O. vol. 4 p. 44]

namesake?

name [PA no. 750]

ex.!. = exchange offavours

,

• I

.;

,

•

,:::,

:

:

'.

~

.',.:

,

APPENDIX C

NETWORKS OF RITUALISED FRIENDSHIP DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (432 - 404 B.C.) The identification of the relationships has been made according to the characteristics of the bond traced in the previous sections: terminology of ritualised friendship (xeno;, philo;, epitede;o; etc. from different cities, Section 2.1), terminology of proxeny (Section 5.4), or exchange of resources or services characteristic of ritualised friendship (Chapters 4 and 5). Proxenies are only listed from the point of view of the proxeno;, not of the cities granting the title. Individuals attested epigraphically have only been included if both their name and origin are known. In doubtful cases I have accepted M.B. Walbank's conjectures.

,

180

• I

.:

.,:

::,

:

:

'.

~

.',.:

,

Networks during the Peloponnesian War

Political unit and name

Relarionship with ...

Rtference

Idtnrifitd by ...

Acha~1I

AmENS

W.50

prx.t.

Sitalkes [l1uace)

11me. 2.29.1 d. W. 30

r.f.r

NymphodorO$

Perdikkas [Macedonia)

Thue.2.29.6

r.f.r

Nymphodoro5

All-fENS

Thue.2.29.1-3

prx.r.

Demosmenes (ArhmsJ

Thuc.7.57.10

rJ.r.

Alea Asteas

All-fENS

W.49

prx.r.

Andros Antiochides Phanosthenes

ATHENS All-fENS

W.60 W.60

prx.r. prx.t.

Argos Alkiphron UnnarMd

SPARTA SPARTA

Thuc.5.59.4 Thuc. 5.76.2,5.82.3, 5.83.2 Thuc.5.59.4

prx.t. prx.t.

Thuc.5.40.3

prx.t.

SPARTA AUcibiadn [Arhms]

Thuc. 5.40.3 Thuc.6.61.3

prx.r. rJ.t

Endios (Sparta] Unnamed

Thuc. 6.89.2, 5.45.2, 8.6.3

r.f.t.; ex.f.

Thuc.8.17.2

r.f.t

Thuc. 8.17.2

exJ.

Thuc. 6.29.3, d. 6.61.5

rJ.t

Thuc. 6.61.3; lsocr. 16.9

r.f.t.x; ex.f.

[Andoc.] 4.30; Satyros in Athen. 12.534d, d. Plut. AI,. 8.6

ex.f.

Thuc. 6.89.2, 5.43.2 Thuc. 8.14.1; d. [Andoc.) 4.30

prx.t. rJ.r.

lykon

Abdna Nymphodoros

Acaman;a

Unnamed

Thrasyllos Eustrophos Aison UnnarMd

Athnu Alkibiades Alkibiades

Agis (Sparta] SPARTA

prx.t.

[Mil~os)

Alkibiades Alkibiades Alkibiades Alkibiades

Alkibiades Alkibiade-s

Chalkideus lSparta' Unnamed lManrineaJ Unnamed lArgos) Unnamed (Ephesos) SPARTA Unnamtd IChios}

.

"

'

,,

.' .,:

Appendix Politic~1

unit and name

c:

Relationship with ...

181

Referentt

Identified by ...

Alkibiades

Tissaptlcmes [Persia)

TImc.8.45-8

r.f.t.; e:d.

Alkibiades

W.86

prx.r.; ex.f.

Hipponikos

Apollodoros (Selymbria) Seuthes [TIlrace) Pharnabazos [Persia I Unnamed {Ceramic gulf) Archelaos [Macedonia) Anas IMesupia) Unnamed [Akarnania) Anas [Messapia) SPARTA

Kallias

SPARTA

Lakedaimonios, son of Kimon

SPARTA

Perikles

Archidamos [Spanal Pausanias [Sparta)

Alkibiades Alkibiades Alkibiades Andocides Demosthenes Demosthenes Eurymedon

Nikias Nikia5 GmriruJ Xanthippes

Chios T ydeus, son of Ion

CIa:ommae Herakleidn Cleonae The fatherof Echembrotos C"idus Proxenides

Xen. Hell. 1.5.17; ex.f. (estate) 2.1.25; Diod. B.l0S.3ff. d.t. Xen. Hell. 1.3.12 Xen. Hell. 1.4.8

ex.f.(?)

Andoc.2.11

d.t.; ex.f.

Thuc 7.33,4

d.t.

Thuc.7.57.10

d.t.

Thuc.7.33.4

d.t.

Inferred from Xen. Hell. 6.3.4 Xen. Symp. 8.39 Inferred from Andoc. 3.2; d. Aeschin. 2.172 Thuc. 2.13.2

prx.t. prx.t. prx.t.

d.t.

lys.18.10

d.t.

Diod. 13.27.3

prx.t.

ATI-fENS

W.63

prx.t.

Kimon [Athens)

TIme. 8.38.3; d. F. Jacoby in CQ 61(1947)I,n.9

~~.f.

ATHENS

W.47

prx.t.

ATHENS

W.80

prx.t.

ATIiENS

W.64

prx.t.

SYRACUSE

182

Networks during the Peloponnesian War

Political unit and name

Relationship with ...

Reference

Identified by ...

Co/opho" ApoHophanes

ATHENS

W.39

prx.t.

Corcyra Peithios

ATHENS

Thuc.3.70.3

prx.t.

Corilfth AristeUs

POTIOAEA

Thuc. 1.60.3; 2.67.4

prx.t.

Unnamed

CORCYRA

Thuc. 3.70.1; Diod. 12.57.2

prx.t.

Gorty$ Nikias Polypos

ATIiENS ATHENS

Thuc. 2.85.5 W.91

prx.t. prx.t.

Sotimos

ATHENS

W.46

prx.t.

LIma Aristonous

ATHENS

W.29

prx.t.

Nymphodoros [Abdera] Unnamed [Thesuly] Nikonides [TheS$lly) ATHENS Andokides [Athens) ATHENS

Thuc.2.29.6

d.t.

Thuc.4.137.2

r.f.t.

Thuc.4.78.2

d.t.

W.24 AmicK. 2.11

poe.t. r.f.t.; ex.f.

W.90

prx.t.

Demosthenes and/or Eurymedon? [Athens)

Thuc. 7.33.4;cf. W. 70

d.t.

Alkibiades [Athens)

Thuc.S.17.1

d.t.

ATHENS

Thuc. 3.2.3; Arist. Pol. 1304a9;d. W.38

prx.t.

Alkibiades [Athens]

Xen. Hell. 1.3.12

r.f.t.

Hnacl~a

Maudo"i4 Perdikkas Perdikkas Perdikkas Krisan Archelaos Archela(o)s

Meuapi4 Artas

Milno$ Unnamed Mytik"e Dexandros

The Pnsi4" Empirt Phamabllos

uu

Appendix C: Political unit :and n:ame ... Tissaphern~

Relationship ..... Ith ... Alkibl:ad~s

Rderence

identifIed

Thuc. 8.47.2

d .t.

"y ...

(Athens!

Orchommus Potamodoros

ATHENS

W.4.~

prx.r.

Eurytion

ATHENS

W.4.S

prx.r.

ATHENS

W.74

prx.l.

ATHENS

W.48

rrx.l.

Eurymachos (ThchesJ

Thuc.2.2.2

d.t.

Pharsa/us Thoukydides

Ph/ius Polystraros

P/alaea Naukleid~

and his

followers

~

Sdalhus Oiniadcs

ATHENS

W.87

prx.t.

-

ill ~

v

Se/ymbria

~

Apollodoros

ATHENS

W.86

ex.f.:prx.t.

Empedos

ATHENS

W.27

rrx.r.

L

'-'

Q) ~

Sici/)' Archonides

ATHENS

W.66

prx.t.

[kmon

ATHENS

W.66

rrx.r.

,-.-J

Agis

Thrasyllos (Argos!

Thuc.5.59.4

ex .f.

Archidamos

Perikl~

Thuc:. 2.1 ].2

r.f.l.

(AthensJ Brasidas

Unnamed [Thes.sal)·)

Thuc. 4.78.1

d.r.

Unknown

bkon (Platac:a! Niki3s (Athens!

Thuc ..~.52.5

r. f. t.

Lys.18.10

d.t.

BYZANTIUM

Xen. Hell. 1.1..35

prx.t.

Alkibiades

Thuc.8.17.2

ex.f.

H~e1()(hos

ERETRIA

Meiggsand lewis (196Q) no. 82

prx.t.

Herakle1tos

ERETRIA

Syll.' 106

prx.t.

SPARTA

Thuc.5.64.1

prx.t.

Klearchos Chalkideus

Taras

TeRea Unnamed

->-.

~

,0

Sparta

PausaOlas

Cl

184

Networks during the Peloponnesian War

Political unit and n:ame . . .

Relationship with ...

Rderence

identified by ...

Thasos Sons of Apemamos

ATHENS

W.61

prx.t.

Sthorys

ATHENS

W. 78

prx.t.

Naukleides and followers IPlataeal

Thuc.2.2.2

d.t.

Nikonides

Perdikkas [Macedonial

Thuc.4.78.2

d.t.

Unnam~

Perdikkas IM3ccdonia I

Thuc.4.U7.2

d.t.

Kallippo~

ATHENS

W.65

Strophakos

Chalkidians

Thuc. 4.78.1

prx.t. prx.t.

Thoukydid('S

ATHENS

Thuc. R.92.2

prx.t.

N)'mphodoros IAhderal

Thuc.2.29.1

r.f.t.

Tb~lHs

Eurymach05

Thessaly

Thrace Silalkes

KEY: d.t... ntuali~ friendship terminology prx.t.... proxeny terminology ex,f.... exchange of faVOUr!! r. = ritual W... M. B. Walhank (197M).

BIBLIOGRAPHY Adcock, Sir F. and D.J. Mosley (1975) Diplomacy in Ancient Gruce. London. Adkins, A.W.H. (1960) M~';tand R~sponsibility. A StudyofG,~~k Valu~s. Oxford. (1963) , "Friendship" and "self-sufficiency" in Homer and Aristotle', Classical Quarterly. n.5. 13, 33-45. (1971) 'Homeric values and Homeric society" Journal of Hellenic Sttldi~s 91. 1-14. (1972a) Moral Valu~s and Political R~haviour in Ancient Greece, from HomeT to the End of the Fifth Century. London (1972b) 'Homeric gods and the values of Homeric society', Journal of Hdlenic Studies 92, 1-19. Amit, M. (1970) 'Hostages in Ancient Greece' Rilfista di filo/ogia e di istruzione classica 98, 129-47. Andreades, A.M. (19.13) A History of Greek Public Fi"ance, translated by C.N. Brown. Cambridge, Mass. Andreau J., P. Schmitt and A. Schnapp (1978) 'Paul Ve)'ne et I'evergetisme" Annates E.s.C. 33, 307-25. Atkinson, K.M.T. (1952) 'Some ohsen'ations on Ptolemaic ranks and titles" Aeg)'ptus 32, 204-14. (1972) 'A hellenistic land-conveyance" Historia 21, 45-74. Aurenche, O. (1974) Les groupes d'Alcibiade, de l.iogoras et de Tellcros. Paris. Aymard, A. (1954) 'Philip~ de Macedoine, otage a Thebes" R~vue des etudes anciennes 56, 15-36. [Reprinted in Etudes d'histoire ancienne (Paris, 1967), 418-38.J (1958) 'Us ttrangers dans les cites grecques aux temps c1assiques" Recueils de la Socihi J~an Bodin 9, 119-39. Badian, E. (1958) Foreign Clienttlae. Oxford. Bagnall, R.S. (1976) The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions Outside Egypt. Lciden. Belshaw, C.S. (1965) Traditional F.xchange and Modem Markets. Englewood Cliffs, N.j. Bennet, M. (1979) 'Spiritual kinship and the baptismal name in traditional European society', in L.O. Frap~1I (ed.), Principalities, Powers and Estates: Studits in Medieval and Early Modem Gor.'ernment and Society (Adelaide) 1·13. Benveniste, E. (1951) 'Don et echange dans Ie vocabulaire indo-euro.,een" L'Annee socio/ogique 3e serie, II, 7-20. IReprinted in Problemes de linguistique generale, vol. I ( Paris, 1966), 315-26. (1969) u vocabulaire des institutions indo-~uropeen"es, 2 vols. Paris. Berve, H. (1926) Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographisch" Grundlage, 2 vols. Munich.

185

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Stahl in. G. (1954) ';fvo~. ~fvl~ ..... in G. Friedrich (ed.l. Theologisches Wort~buch zum Neuen Testament V (Stuttgart, 1954) 1-36. [English translation by G.W. Bromiley (1967)] Ste. Croix. G.E.M. de (1972) The Origins of the Peloponnesian War. London. (1974) 'Ancient Greek and Roman maritime loans'. in H. Edey and B.S. Yamey (eds.), Debits, Credits, Finance and Profits. (A collection of papers presented to William Baxter.) (London) 41-59. (1981) The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greelr World. London. Stirling. P. (t 968) 'Impartiality and personal morality', in Peristiany (ed.) (1968) 49-64. Taillardat, J. (1982) 'CZ»IAOTH1:, nl1:TI1: et Foedus'. Revue des ttudes grecques 95. 1-14. Tegnaeus, H. (1952) Blood-Broth~s. An Ethno-Sociological Study of the Institution of Blood-Broth~hoodwith Special Reference to Africa. Stockholm. Thome5. F.e. (t 955) 11 problema degli eteri nella monarchia di Alessandro Magno. Turin. Thompson, H.A. (1953) 'Athens and the Hellenistic prince5', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 97. 254-61. Tod, M.N. (193.1-48) A Selection of Greelr Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols. Oxford. Veblen, Th. (1970) The Theory of the Leisure Class. first published 1899. London. Vernant. J.-P. (1980) Myth and Society in Ancient Greece. translated by J. 1.I0yd. London. Veyne. P. (1976) Le pain et Ie cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme poIi· tique. Pa riSe Walbank. F.W. (1940) Philip V of Macedon. Cambridge. (1951) 'The problem of Greek nationality" Phoenix 5. 41-60. (1957-82) A Historical Commentary on Polybius. 3 vols. Oxford. (1984a) 'Monarchies and monarchic ideas'. in F. W. Walbank (ed.). The Cambridge Ancient History. 2nd edn .• VII.I (Cambridge) 62-100. (1984b) 'Antigonus and Macedonia'. in F. W. Walbank (ed.). The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd edn .• VII. I (Cambridge) 221-56. Walbank. M.B. (1978) Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century B.C. Toronto and Sarasota. Wallace. M.B. (1970) 'Early Greek proxenoi'. Phoenix 24. 189-208. Weber. M. (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. edited by T. Parsons. New York. Weinfeld. M. (1970) 'The covenant of grant in the Old Testament and in the ancient Near East'. Journal of the Am~ican Oriental Society 90. 184-203. (1973) 'Covenant terminology in the ancient Near East and its influence on the West'. Journal of the American Oriental Society 93. 190-9. Welle5, e.B. (1934) Royal Co"espondence in the Hellenistic Period. New Haven. Whitehead. D. (1977) The Ideology of the Athenian Metic. Cambridge. (1982/3) 'Sparta and the thirty tyrants'. Ancient Society 13/14. 105-30. Wiesehofer. J. (1980) 'Die "Freunde" und "Wohltater" des Grosskonigs', Studia Iranica 9. 7-21. Wilhelm, A. (1942) 'Proxenie und Euergesie', in Attische Urkunden. V (Vienna) 11-86.

Bibliography

195

Wilson. B.R. (ed.) (1970) Rationality. Oxford. Wipszycska. E. (1961) 'The bwQ£o of Apollonios the Dioiketes in the Memphite Nome'. Klio 39. 153-90. Wolf, E. (1969) 'Kinship, friendship and patron-c1i~m relations" in M. Damon (ed.), The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (london) 1-22. [Reprinted in Schmidt er al. (eels.) (J9n) 167-78.] Wolski, J. (1973) 'MH~I1:M01: er son imponancc en Grece a I'epoque des guerres mediques" Histona 22, 3-15. Worrle, M. (1978) 'Epigraphische Forschungen zur Geschichte Lykiens', Chiron 8, 201-96.

INDEX OF SOURCES Nott: The sourcn listed in tM Apptndica are not included. UTERARY TEXTS - GREEK

AESCHINES

Magna Moralia

L Against 'r;",arcbus

2....ll..J la46

~

2.. On thl' F.mbassy 2Il Z1 Hl

94n.~

Politics

2.1n.~

2, 1161b6 l, 12K7b 30

12n.6 127n.,ln 47n.22 140n.62.

154 ill .t. Against Ctt.iphon ~

3Kn.9.1 154n. lUl.

~

ill

Uln.~

4n. .h 54n. ~ 66n. ~ 68n. rt l24n. 21 AESCHYLUS

224

19n. ,12, .1On. ~ 33n. Z2 l22n. U

.17n.81

I Prohlt",s I 29 2 950'128

94n.68

Rhttor;c 21381h19 ARRIAN

19n.31

AnalMsis U.i L11JI

122n.1.5

till (fabk:!l

ATHENAEUS 4167b 4 167"

44n.2 108n. ill

F.umi'nidts 269.75 ANTHOLOGIA PALATINA 7,98 ANDOCIDES

1. On

125n.28

F.pigram 2a

l06n.

145 2.. On his

un

.150. U. RtfU",

81n..10 H2n.ll

11 2J}

APOLLODORUS

260. 52• .u (caption) l24n.24

LY 262.3

oM (caption)

1,13.3·6 ARISTOPHANES 1021 147ff. ARISTOTLE

154n. U!.1 97n.~

100 (Tabk J)

139n.~

IS

140n.59

124n.2J

1.ll On thl' C,mlln i.l lU1{Tablc.l). 154n. 102 ~

76n. U. 9On.

!ll

2ti i5...S.

Kl ~

76n. 1..! 15.1n. ~ 21n.39 USn. 50 76n. ~

0(" Gmnationt A"imalium

722hlO ft";(a Nicomachta IIHhS 116()J4 1161h12·17

2.. .~cond Olynthiac 1.2 1. Un thi' Ptau 8 17. ()n Hd/ontSJus! II H.. ()n tht Chnsontst

88n.48

Athmian Constitution

~

76n.H

1...L for th(" l.ibtrty of tilt Rlmdians

frogs

.u

DEMADES ()n tht Tlw/llt YtaN 21 DEMOSTHENES

~

Birds

T~

26n.55

,h.S

fflt MysltritS

~

CALLIMACHUS

l09fl. 280 284

145 189.90

37n.87 79n.ll 19 0.31

140n.62 3n. 4, 1600. 120 16Un. ill 30.4,.15n, 79. 160n. l l j

1..i. nt fal.., ugation(" ill 139

62. (caprion).

IOn. I. lHo. 93

1.2.2.=5 l..tY

ill 196

H2n.3.l 89n,SJ 82n. 33, 154n. l.!l2 4n.5 26n..~ 1 340. 74 121n.9

197

Index 19h

I 54n. 1ill.

2H 230

Un. 79

23.l

248

HH 259·66 268 273 29.~

305·6 309 314 343

127n.37,152n.94 152n.94 3n.4 80n.26 73n. I,X2n. .lJ 80n.1.!l 76n.11 35n. 79. 160n. 120 81".2,2 81n.29 35n. 79. 110 {Table .n. IHn. lU2. -H8n.48

2!1 Against uptints il 21. Against Mtidias 110

2llli 21. Against A,istoaatts HU 154 1lI 21.. Against Aphobos I .i ~

151 n. .&2

~

4.l

ill (1'~ble :!l ill (T ~ble 11

3In.6H

!

2.1 8.Z

i8n.

29n.!cl 93n.6b

~

DlONYSIUS OF UALICARNASSUS

lsatus 6. Isocrates Ui

2Hn.62. 16n. .lli

EURIPIl>ES

Andromache 1.J9n. 5H

Hutra 8l H3

50n. 11

22n.

±L 1..i8. (cJptlonl 3"n.8.6 36n.8h,

1241

1340 Huuba

.l4n. 7S, l14n.25

710ff.

27n.i8. 47n.21 27n.iH.

Hdma

291

63n.6.2

Ion 551

09n.5X 09n. iH.

1039

Mtdta 613· 14 21n.

1$ 1n. 82

~

Hn. ~ 610. !l1.(SdW!iOll), 65n. z.L 7On. lti (schu/",n)

Oust~s

15In.~

1015 Rhtsus 335

76n.8 82n. .12 76n.8

80n.21 76n.!!

DlOOORUS SICULUS 4,·H,~·8

49n.l.::.. 7Hn. e!

1103

fUn.H

2.. Against Aristogiton

Z

liJ L25

65n.hX

OINARCHUS

L Against Dnnosthnttts 4!l

u:.

IHn.2(,

2070 3.4 DlOGENES LAF.RTlUS

.4-H &Jrr

159. Against Nt"tra) ~

107n.

110 (Table 11

i6.. Against Oionysodorus

Z

K4n.40

1975 1

5n.~

153. Against Nicostratusl ill

USn. 50

11..Z.6

U1i

!rl. 96n. 8l

!

2hn.51,X'Jn.ii

Hln.29

.ill.. Against Po/)'t:lts La 22n.4I,65n.68,6Sn.7I,93n.61 21 12n.6 1.6 22n.41 • .15n. 78.39n.9i,65n. 71.92n.

! 2.1

~

l.6.-S...S 17 18 1·2

UJ

Against Timotheus

12. Against Callippils J

2.1n.~

2..Jn. N KHn.4H 7)n. 1

47n.!!!

69n.H!l 61. (caprinn)

2h

14. Il.~

14 19 S lh..iJ

249-50

94n.62.

ill

11 71 2

1A...Z...4

140n.61 14On. hQ

l i Against lAcritlls R·9

47n. l1i 47n. 1Jt IOhn.ill I06n. ill

11 44 2

l..Ub

124n.24 96n.ZH

22n. 44. ill (captinn) 9~n.W

FGltH

72F6 (Agalhoklts of Cyzicus) 108n. ill 76F4 (Duris of Samos) 108n. ill 9OF59 (Ni,ol:lu~ of Damascu\) 10n. 115 F209 (Theopompos of Chi~) .19n. l.!lli 44n. -. 115F224 (Thropompos of Chlo\)

'4

15 4 n. l.!l.J

115f2258 (Theopompo§ of Chios) 106n. 1 ~

Index

198

392F6 (H~rmnilaosof Chios) 104n.~ 472f6 (Ag~thoklnof Cyzicus) 1~ (Table}) 688F9 (Kte5i~s of Cnidus) 51n. .H 688F 15 (Ktesias of Cnidus) 108n. 121, 110 (T~ble

11

1U

151n.89 151n.89

ill 122n.

!b U5n. 50 127n.35

76n.

lit 90n. 60

127n. .lZ l.15n.50 4Hn.2J,9Hn.~ 135n.1O J6n.Hb 54n.~ 98n.~

II .Lll

126n..\3 54n. ..l2 90n. .H

].21

46n.~

.Lll.

46n. 14.60n.56 17n. 19, 71n. 89 21 n. 39, 135n. .18n.92, l.15n. 50 9On.58 90n.!! IS In. 90 14n. 13.41n.l 70n.86,89n.51 79n.24 54n. ~ 15. (caption) 102n. JJl2 107n. ill 123n. U 34n. ~ 38n. ~ 68n. ~ Zln. ~ 54n.39 109 (Table:ll 107n.ill ill (Table 3) 4On. 102, l04n. 106, 109 (Table:ll 119n.64On. 102, 122n. Ln 109 (Tab~ 11 21n.39 135n.50 135n.1O I.lIn.50 91n. 62. llQ (Table 3) -109 (T~b~}) USn. 50 109 (Table 3) 138n. 55 4.Jn.1.. 109 (T~ble}) 76n.11 76n. U

III

.Lll ll1l ~

ill .l..1lS

.hIll .1...Hfi

.un un

UJ.B !...1..li ~ ~

4.172.2

ill i...U .t.2..1 .t.2..Y

.w..b1 .Lll

Ll1J.

.uu. i..6.3

.un .uJ ~

.uM ~

M.1 6.1U 6.ZO fW1. 6JI2

Lll:1 2.l8..:..2 1..1.lb

HELLENICA OXYRHYNCHIA HERODOTUS 1.20·2 1.34·45 1.61 1.64 1.67 1.69 1.74 1.74.6 1.77 2,114-15

6Jlbff. 6...ll.S U 1...1.l.:!1

.ro

96n.Z& 2On. Hs 89n. 10 66n.11 38n.89,45n. 13.84n.~9Qn.ii 59n.ll 45n.U 135n.50

7228,4

8.i ILli 8.Jli 8...I.lD. R.l.l6

2..l ti 2.16.J 2..22 UflZ 2....1ili

26n.~34n.~

79n.21 J.1n. U 39n. 99, 107n. 119,llQ (Table .1) 135n.50 UQ (Table 11 157n.1illl 157n.109 22n.42 22n. 42, 122n. ~ 122n. ~ 98n.90

HF.SIOO

Works a"d Days 263-4 320-4

79n.M 124n.21

HOMER

Iliad 2.623 3 3S 1-4

.l...ll.4 U66 6,119·236 Ufl8

UU 6219·20

6224ff

6..lli 6234·5 7,287ft. 8..J..lO 9 149·56 9,291·8 104U 10495 11623·5

l.l.Zill. 13824 IS,525ft. 16,140ff. 17 140{f

OdysMy I. 115H 1.187·8 1.307·8 1 309· 1 1 4,129·)2 4613·1 K R..54S·6

2...l.8. 9266·7

21n.40 125n.28 18n.29 38n. ~ 68n. Zj 58n.48 63n.61 36n.8.6, 6On.11 In.l,59n.49 49n.2.261n.~

60n.i6. 60n.i6. 109n. ill 100n.ill 98n.n 98n.S! 125n.27,125n.28 21n.38 6On.56 61n.61 M (caption) 124n.20 58n.48 59n.50 18n.25 77n. 16.60n.58 79n.21.84n.~

63n.64

.lln.71. 135n.50 125n.28

Index 10 336 H.16

14.191 H. J4279 J4185·6 14.321·6 J4 324-5 14,414

15 JII·19 17512 21.11·42 21 14·23

21 26·8 2.Lll 2..1..M! 2..l..n 24 114 24.1 Hff. HYPER IDES 1. Again$t Dnnosthenn

18n.29 125n.28 35n.80 17n. 22, .56n. 40 79n.21 96n.1!J. 79n.21 l25n.28 63n.6! 38n.88 5Rn.4R 41n.2 124n.24 60n.ll 61n.60 22n.tl 38n. 91, 59". 51 101n.99 88n.48 71n.R9 75n. 7

~

II

II

!L. funeral Speech 10

76n.8

ISAEUS 11... On t~ F.staU of Hagnias 94n.~

4l.:.l ISOCRATES L To Dnnonic,"

121 n. II 26n.ifi

21 LNicodes 4.. Panegyricus U 1. To Philip

45n. ~ 68n. ~ 7On. a.s.

65n.

105n. ill

11 l..S.... Antidosis

84n.40

~

th~

Team of Horus

!l 11.. l'rapevticus 1 ~

6 U .l!

16On.lli 29n.63. 106n.~ 47n. 21, R:ln, .37 95n.25. 21n. & 95n. ZZ 93n.6I

C!.. Aeginnic," i 17n.21,34n.74,68n.79,96n.81 ~ 35n.82 lH 27n. ~ ~ Zb 97n. M U 11

II utter 2.8,13 (To Philip, I)

96n.8.3

94n.7.1. 105n.111 151 n. 89

~

70n.

~

121n.1O

utter H. (To the Ruins of My/ilmt) 26n. ill JOSEPHUS jtwish Antiquit~s 12.J48

18n. .2..8.

13 126 14 122

18n.28 23n.46,35n.Hj

l'he j~ish War LJJU

23n.46

KOCK, J., ('..<>micorum Alticorum fragmmta vol. III, no..H3 (Phomicidas) 109n. 126

LYSIAS

!L. Against AndO€ides !8 I I Against Ago,atus ~

a

35n.21 151".82-

Against Alcibiades

1A.26 100n. ill 1..8.. On the Property of Nicias' Brother 10 23n.48.15On.89 1.2. On the Praperty of Aristophanes 18 97n.84 2.5 65n. ~ 6I (caption) .lb 94n. Zl !O. 94n. Zl !J 96n.&3 MENANDER Monostichoi

16n.18

PAUSANIAS ~

Evagoras

l6.. Concernin,

utter 6 (To the Childrm of jason) 26n. .so. 34n. Lt 151n. 82 utt" Z (To Timotlmls) 26n. SO. 47n. ~

615 154n. Ull 124n.U

1.2 ill ~

199

.... 4f(

!.ti 1JL6 6....12..J 7 10 1-3

uu.

140n,12 96n.ZH 68n. 79 21n.39 36n.M 156n.1Jl6

35n.H.l

PINDAR Nnnean 1.2{hl

129n.43

Pythian

.ll1 2Jl2 10

liL6.6

18n.26 135n..m 157n. lD.H 17n.20

PLATO Crito

lli Laws

729eff.

27n. 57, 65n. 71, 87n. 46 12.5n. .2..8.

200 950b 9He 9SSb·c Leun-Z Symposium

lliiJ

Index 125n.28 125n.28 16On.lli 49n.28 6..2 (c~prion)

A/nand" Aralus 1..1 Cimon I.h. EumtntJ 1.0

84n.!£} 122n.15

1llf

98n.&i

81.1

54n.16.

Trachi"iat 6&Zl

124n.24 124n. .M 124n.24

22n.!1

STOBAEUS .1.9 p.3S8 !.l p.W (Charondas) STRABO

21n.39

TElES

UO(Tabk 1)

21

112n. ill

44n.8

THEOGNIS

143-4 12Sn.18 71n.&i

125n.28

THEOPHRASTOS Characlns

29SB·C

57n.~

Ptlopidas ill Pnk/t'

2M 2.U

21n.38

THUCYOIDES Ll.l

21n.39

LLl U!U

n

Philopomrnr 1 Solon

22n.45.35n.8.1

U

68n.~

Thmri"Olle. 2..6....1

47n.1.8

ThtUUS

3Off.

98n.&i

83n.16 97n.86

1..1.0 (Table 11

POLYBIUS ~

.. 48 12 5...3.1.2. .t..lH SAlt12 U1...1

1M. .t.z!1.j

1.1.!

16On.lli 151n.89 28n.6..2 123n. 1.8 151n.89 l5In.89 103n. 103. 103n. 11M l04n.ill6 26n.~

16n. 17. 460. ~ 22n.45. 35n.81 116 ISln. &i 18.11·14 16In.1ll 2{LH 15n. 15,43n.4,70n.87, 122n.~ 21 43 18 112n.lll M....Ll 47n.22 S2n.ll lUI 31 2S I 18n.27 B 182 47n. ~ 7On. 85

il Ulll

SOPHOCLES A;ax

817ff.

6On.5.6

2On.ll 151n.89 21n..19 21n.n

u.u

LH£l:j

143n.~

Lll6 1 118·}O I J 29 3 Lll.6. Lll8

15On.8.Z

42n. 3. 47n.

~

i l l (T:able 11

8CJn.ll 13Sn. SO 94n. Z!.. 109 (Table:!h 122n. !!.

POLYAENUS ~

16n. 1.8. 125n.28

Ll..5.

Mora/ia ~

BOO PhiiOlltltS

248·54 274-6

PLUTARCH 6 1.0..1.1

OMipu. al CoIonu.

ISem. i l l

3n.3. 144. 145 143n.73 12n.6 76n. II. 1S8n. ill 138n. .55 78n. 19.1S8n. i l l 78". I..i 78n.2.0 9On.S1 139n.58 l04n. Ul8 21n.1i 139n.58 119n.7 161n. III 21n.39 I 1em. 7 l04n. 1.01 21n.39

2...1J 118 2....l.Z...I 2..l..L..I 2....2!l 2...6.ll

2.65.8·9 2.!12.l.

UZJ .l.l.3 l.ZA .l...S.l..1

.LZ!U ~

4.114,) 4 1192 4 132,2 ~

5 1924 .ul.l

ISln.~

71n.89, 138n. 56

i..4.l 5...fi..l

5 45 ).4 5 594.60 5..6..3.A.

~

J

147n.8O 145n.16 1S8n. l..H

Index 6.53.1 6.54.6 6.55.1 6.61 6.92.4 7.33.4 8.6.3 8.6.1 8.6.8 8.12.2 8.17.2 8.65.1

l50n. 88, 151n. 89 15ln.91 21n.39 148, 150n.88, 153n.96 161n.122 7On.85, 105n. 110 19n.33, 148n.82, 148n.83 29n.6.1 21n.39 49n.84 49n.84 151n.89

TIMOKREON

Fragment 1

123n.19

XENOPHON A~silaus

3.4 4.4 8.3

lOOn. 92 1.1.2 1.1.9 92n.6.1 1.2.1 lOOn. 92 68n.79, lOOn. 92, lOOn. 96 1.2.3 12On.8 1.2.3-5 47n. 16 1.2.12 45n. 12 1.2.23 390. 101,47n. 16, 66n. 73,9On.55 1.2.26-7 1.3.2 18n.23 1.3.3 92n.63 1.3.12 126n.31,126n.32 1.4.3

lOOn. 9..

104.8

lOOn. 92 ISln.89 54n.36 106n.1I3 127n.35 9On.56 47n.17 54n.37 125n.29 92n.63 5n.8,100n.96 47n.20 12Jn.29 500.30 26n.52 47n.20 68n. 79

204.1

2.5.27 2.604-5

].1.4 3.1.8 3.2.4 4.8.7 5.3.5 6.1.23 7.1.8

7.2.25 7.3.2 7.3.20 7.6.17 7.8.8 7.8.17

18n.24 106n. 116 77n.17 76n. 10 110 (Table 3), 114n. 137 110 (Table 3), 114n. 137

Cyropudia

1.4.26 3.3.4 4.6.2 5.1.3 6.2.1 8.2.7 8.6.5 8.7.13 8.17

18n.28 135n.50 57n.42 38n.90 46n.14,47n.20,57n.42,89n.49 67 (caption), 78n. 20 106n.113 49n.28 114n.137

Htllnrica

54n.37 10n.l,49n.26 159n. 118

A"abasis

1.5.8 1.6.7 1.7.7 1.9.3 1.9.12 2.1.5

201

1.3.12 1.4.2

1S3n.95 21n.39 104.8 153n.95 104.13-4 152n.92 1.4.19 152n.92 1.5.17 106n.1I6 1.7.22 H9n.116 2.1.3 142n.71 2.1.25 l06n. 116 204.28 21n.39 3.1.1f1. 2In.39,34n.75 3.1.5 104n. 109, 110 (T~ble 3) 108n. 120, 109 (T3ble 3), 114n. 138 3.1.6 3.1.10 151n.89 3. I. 10fl. 107n.117 3.... 11

3.5.4 4.1.29ft. ".1.34-5 4.1.39 4.1040 5.2.3 5.2.35 5.2.36 5.3.13 6.3.4 6..~A

6.5.6-8

125n.30

15ln.89 45n. 11,46n. IS In.2 15n.15,58n.47,60n.57 28n.61,152n.94 153n.97 5n.9 15 In. 89 38n.90, 15In.89, 152n.93 USn. 51 135n.50 H In. 89

Hitro

3.7

19n.30

Mmrorahi/ia

2.9.3-8

87n.45

Index

202

INSCRIPTIONS - GREEK no. 138 IOn. 34 OSBORNE (1981-83) nos. 1-6

A"",",' of Iht Brilish School at Athms 51 (1962) 144

Bull. £pi"

127n. 37 21n. 38

(1978) 145 (1984) J 14

Chiron 8 (1918) Worrle (1978) 112n.129 CompttS RtfUlus tk L'Audm.;t da ;;II

IJlScriptiorrs J.Bousquet(1975) 139 101n.116 CRAMPA,J. (1969-72), lAbrmmda no. 43 11n.18

Haperia 19 (1950) 25-6

26n.53 158 (caption) 62 (caption)

19(1950)390 20 (1951) and pl.2Sc IG 11 400

11 916 IJ 19

I' 23 I) 27 " 65 " 91 " ltO " 127 "3 lS6 1 162

.' 1~ 1-' 1154

11 1 109 11 1 111 111 223 111 226 11 1 240 11 1 401 111 561 111 655 XII.8.156 XIV.279 XIV.2432

21n.39 62 (caption) 1350.52 21n.39 135n.52 135n.52 137 (caprion) 132n.47, 123 (caprion) 134 (caprion) 135n.52 135n.52 135n.52 136 (caprion) 151n.89 135.52 nne 18 lSln.89 88n.48 85 (fable I) 127n.37 85 (fable 1) 85 (fable I) 16n.17,64(caprion) 53 (caption)

MEiGGS AND LEWIS (1969)

no. 4 no. 7 no. 91 00.93 pp.40-2

132n.48 2Op.34 82n.30 107n.116 157n.l10,158(caprion)

18n.28 141n.63

PFOHL (1967)

26n.54

no. 10

Sardis 7 (1) no. I

110 (Table 3)

SEC 1.366 26.86 26.1623

112n. 128 127n.37 37 (caption)

27.135

28.60 =Shear (1987) SHEAR (1978) p.6. lines 80-2

2On.36

85 (Tabk 1) 86n.43

syII' 195 302 307 332

360 3~

367 374 503

2On.34, 127n.37 110 (Table 3) 85 (Table l) 110 (Table 3), 1I3n. 136 76n.9 71n.89 85 (Table I) 83n. 38,85 (Table I), 86n. 43, 97n. 86 135n.51

TOO (1933)

no. 34

4n.6,14On.59

M.B. WALBANK (1978)

no. 9 136 (caption) 137 (caption) no. 64 151n.89 no. 85 no. 86 142n.68 no. 87 133 (c_prion) 141n.66 nos. II, 3~ 74 nos. 1,2,5, 18,30,4',60,66,70,90 141n. 65 nos. 10, 13, 20, 21, 23, 26, 28, 31, 33-7, 40-~ 44, 51, 53-9,62, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 79,83,84,89,92-4 141n.67 nos. 1,2,5,18,30,47,60,66,70,90 142n. 69 nos. 1-94 141n.63 nos. J-4, 6-17, 19-29,31-44,45,46,48-59, 61-5,67-9,71-89,91-4 141n. ~ WEtES (1934) no. II nos. 10-13 no. 3, para. 5

108n. 124 110 (Table 3), 113n. 135 139n.58

OGIS

no.l no.4 no. 55

I06n.115 85 (Table I) 111 (Table 3), 1I2n. 130

u;tschrift fi, Papyro/ogit u"d Epigraph;' 33 (1979) = Fischer (1919) III (Table 3), 114n. 142

Index

203

LEXICA ~~

HESYCHIUS ~£ivoe;

12n.7

12n.7

12n.7

~fvot

SUIDAS ~mov

6On.55

OTHER ANCIENT SOURCES CURTIUS

MACCABEES

6.5.1·5

7On. 85

DOSSIN. G. (1952) Co"~spo,,dmu th ItUmah·Addu

no. 20

1.11.31

180.28

NEPOS Dift4mn J0.1

5"n.37

OLD TESTAMENT 1. S.mud 18.1 1. Samuel 24, 26

"8n.2S

790.21

GRAYSON. A.K. (1972) Assyria" Royal

'''scriptio"s vol. 1,48-9

890. 49

1. Samuel 27, 5-6 2. Samuel 1.26

S8n... 8 108n. 122 58n.48

KENT. R.G. (1953) Old Persia"

p. 115, XVs .nd AVs

66n. 74, 67 (caption)

TACITUS

Historin 1.5" LlVY 1.1.1

540.37

122n. IS

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES Note: The names lisred in rhe AppendiCft are nor included.

Abradaras, 38n. 90 Achilles, 22, 25 (caption), 1090. 127 Ach isch, 108n. J22 Adkins, 18 Adr.sros, 110, 127 Aenras, 122n. IS Aeschines, 3,4, 100.1,23,35,54,66,81,82, 110, 124, 127, 140n. 62, 154n. 102, 160 Agamemnon, 22,37,38,59, 101 Agarhok'es (~cipienr of tlo,~a), 111 Agathokles (Sicillian tyrant), 12", 125n. 26 Agrnor, 26n. 50 Agnilaos, I, 2, JOn. I, 1", 15, 28, 36, 38, 45-7, 49, 51, 58-60, 65n. 68, 66, 125, 129, 135n. SO, 152, 159 Agias, 99 Agis, 143, 145, '46, 149, 156, 158 Aiakes, 102 Aias (son 01 o;leus), 21 Aias (!K)n of Tdamon), 21, 6On. S6 Akanthos, 21n. 39 Akastos (Athenian archon), 76 Akasros (Peleus' friend), 2.. (caprion) Aleuades, 156

Alexander (me Great), IOn. I, 43, 58n. "8, 75, 83, 84n. 40, 85, 86, 106, 108, 1 B, J22, IS", J55 Alexander III, 110 Alexander IV, 127n. 37 Alexander (of Epirus), 110 Alexandras (of Troy), 125, 126 Alkibiades (of Athens), 8, 19,20,36, ...., 71n. 90, 116-18, 128, B8n. 56, 142, 143, 147.51, 153, 155, 159-61 Alkibiacks (of Spana), 19, 20n. 36, 148 Alkimachos, 1S 6 Alkiphom, 1"3, 145, 146 Alkmeon,89 Afyanes, 121, 135n. SO Amasis, 17, 46n. I", 60, 71, 98, 102 Ammonios, J03 Amorges,51 Amphimedon, 38, 59, 101 Amphitryon, 135n. 50 Amyntas, 23, 82, 156 Amyntas ('of Asia·), 110 Anaxinos, 66 Andoci~,35,82,88

204

Index

Androkleidcs. 5 Androkles, 62 (caption) Andromachos, 103 Antalkidas, 44 Antmor, 122n. IS Antigonos I, 107n. 117. 110 Anrigonos Doson, IS, 42, 49, 70, 122n. 14 Anriochos I (of Syria), 108, 110, 112 Antiochos III, 103, 110, Ill, 112 .Anriochos IV, 52, 53 Anriochos Hierax, 23 Anriochos I (of Commagene), 35-7 (caption) Anripatn (Alexander's successor), 78n. 19, 83,85 Anriparn Uewish prince). 22. JSn. 81 Aphareus, 26n. SO Apollo-Hellos, 37 (caprion) Apoliodoros (Athmian writer), 24, 52 (caprion) Apoliodoros (of Leonris), 12n. 6 Apollodoros (01 Oineis), 12n. 6 Apollodoros (son of Pasion), 22, 39, 65, 92, 93,96 ApoUodoros (of Sttymbria), 142 ApoUonios, 111 ApoIlophanes (of Cyzicus), 46 Apollophanes (of Pydna), 26, 34n. 74. 121 AratuSt 22n. 45 Archebiades, 27, 47n. 21 Archedemos, 87 Archelaos, 78n. 19, 82 Archias (of Athens), 21 Archias (of Thebes), 21 Archils (xmas of Sarmans), 135n. SO Archidarnos ((ifth-cmtury Spartan king), 3, 38,45n. 10, 71, 143, 144, 145, 152, 158, 159, 166 Archidamos (third-century Splrtan king), 28n. 62, 123 Ariaios,47 Ariobarzanes, 110 Amtagora. (tyrant of Cyme), 102 Aristagora. (tyrant of Cyzicus), 102 Arisragoras (of Milerus), 118, 119, 120, 122n. 16 Aristeidcs, 157, 158 (caprion) Arisrippo5y 45, 99, 100, 101 Aristobulus, 23 Aristodikides, 108, 110, 113 Aristollos. III Aristomma, 110 Ariston, 102 Arislonous. 47n. 18 Aristophanes (of Olynthus), 47n. 22 Aristophanes (poet), 62 (caprion) Aristophanes (son of Nikophemos), 65. 94n. 71, 96, 97 Aristotle, 19, 30. 62 (caprion), 76, 90, 93

Arknila05 (example of name), 21n. 38 Arkesilaos (of Sparta), 20 ArkesilaOl (of Thasos), 20 Artabazos, 58n. 48 Artaphrmes, 122n. 16 ArtIS, 105 Artaxerxes I, 100n. 113 Artaxerxes 11,45,66,90, 100, 106, 119, 1S4 Artemis, 114n. 141, 137 (caprion) Arthmios, 8On. 28 Asandros. J07n. 117 Ashur-uballilt 89n. 49 Asopi05, 104 Athena. 18, 134 (aprion). 137 (caprion) Athenaeus., t 08 Athenai05 (of Sparta), 21 n. 39 At~aiOl (of Thespi$), 21n. 39, 1.. ln. 66 Atresridas. 81 Attaginos, 156 Audoleon, 85 Autokrator, 47n. 22, 65 Bellerophon,36n. 86,60, 63n. 65 Buve,155 8oiotios, 21n. 39 Boulagoras, 112n. 128 Brachylles, IS, 42, 43, 70 Brasidas, 104, 119, 120, 161n. 122 Bum, 117, 145 Camby~

46, 9011.55 Cassander, 110, 113 Chalkideus, 21n. 39 Chares, 12n. 6 Charlemagne, 46n. 14 Cheirisop~ 99, 100 Chiron, 24, 2S (caprion), 26, 27 (caption) Chrysermos, 111 Crito, 12, 27, 35, 87 Croesus (lydian ruler), 19, 20n. 34, 48n. 23, 89, 98, 127, 135n. 50 Croesus (an Alkrneonid), 19 Cyrus II, 46, SO, 88,98. l06n. 113, 108, 109, 135n.50 Cyrus (the younger), 4, Sn. 8, 14, 18, 28, 36. 39, 45, 47, 54, 57, 88, 91, 92, 98-101, 104-5, 106, 119-21, 126, 129, 1S4 Daphnis, 102 Darius I, 14. IS, 40, 41, 43. 49, 70, 84n. 40, 89, 91. 102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 114, 122n. 14, USn. SO. 156 Dlrius II, 110 Darius III. 110 Oatis, 1S7, 1S8 (caption) David, 48n. 25, 58n. 48, 61n. 61, 108n. 122 Davies, 97 Demades, 75, 88n. 48

Index Oem.rams (of Corinth), 84, 154n. 102 Dema,atos (01 Sparta), 43, 91, 107, 109, 114, 116 Demetrios Poliorketes, 87, 88 Demokedn, 151 Demoni1cos, 121 Demos, 65, 67 (caption) Demosthenes (general), 105 Demo$t~nes (Ofator), 3,31,35, 47n. 22,54, 62 (~prion), 66, 13·76, 80·2, 124, 139, 140, 160 Deu1calion, 20 Dicitrephn, 131 Dikaiarchos, I 11 Dinarchus, 80, 82 Diodorus, 124 Diognctos, 23, 63, 64 (caprion) Diomcdes, 1, 2, 5, 12, 17, 49, 51, 57n. 43, 58·61, 66, 70, 159 Dionysius (of Sicily), 49, 106 Dionysios (Thracian), J03 Duris, 108 Echekrates, 103 Eetion,22 EJectra, 36n. 86 Empedocles, 62 (caption) Endios, 19, 20. 143, 148, J49 Epicharmos, 85 Epyaxa.47 Etearchos, 71, 123 Eteokles. 38 EU.Jiphnos, 960. 78 EuchaFn,8S Eudoxos,6Sn.68 Eukleides, 131 Eukrates, 23 Euktemon (archon). 131 Euktcmon (pentceontarch), 93 Eumaeus,55 EUrMnes (of Cardia), 112 Eummcs (of Pcrgamum), 47 Euphttes,61 Euphorbos, IS6 Euripides, 22, SO, 124, 158 Eu'ldike, 23 Eu'llochos (of Larina). 18 Eu'llochos (of Mapcs1a), 102 Eu'lmcdon, 105 Euthykratcs. 73. 88n. 48 Evagor.s,44,6S, 94n. 72,97,105.106

205

Gob'las,57 Gommc,145 Gongylos, 47, 108, ltO, 113, 114 Gordias, 127 Gorgos (brother' of Periander), 19, 20n. 34 Gorgas (01Ia505), 85, 86 Hannibal, 16, %n. 14 Ht'Jttorides, 22 Hekabe (or Hecuba), 34, 124 Hekror, 6On. 56, 123, 124n. 20 Helen, 125 Hellen, 20, 21 Hephaistos, 63n. 64 Hera, 134 (caption) HerakJritos, 26n. 55 Heraklcs, 37 (caption), 52 (caption), 124 Hermes. 52 (caption) Herodotus, IS, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 54, S5 (caption), 60, 68, 16, 118. 121, 123, 151, 157 Herophantos, 102 Hcsiod, J24 Hicro I, 18 Hicro 11, 36 Hierokles, 131 Hippias (of Athens), 44, 91, 110, 116 Hippias (of Elis), 26n. 50 Hippoklm, 102 Hippolaidas, 93 Hippolochos, 166 Hippomedon, 85.86 Hisriaios, 39, 40, 102. 104, 107. 109, 122n. 14 Homer, 21. 63, 76, B2, 156 Hy~des, 75, 88n. 48 Hyst2spe5, 156

ldomcneus, 38 Imilcho, 63, 64 (caprion) Imylch, 63, 64 (caption) lolaos, 20, J27 Iphik,atcs, 23, 44 Iphiros, 41, 58, 60, 61, 66, 124 Isagoras, 45 Ishi·Adad, 79n. 21 Isme·Dasan, 79n. 2] Ismmias.5 I socra tes, 17,26,35,45,47, 65, 70, 83, 94, 95, lOS, 121, 124 Jason, 26n. SO, 27, 34

Gellner. 162. 163 GerBis, 107n. 116 Glau1cos (lykian), I, 2. 5, 12, 17, 49, 51, 57n. 43, 58-61, 66, 10, 123, 125, 159 Glaukos (Spartan), 96n. 78 Glaukothea, 35

Jona~an,S8n.48,61m.61

Kegan, 146 Kallias (of Chalkis), IS4n. 102 Kallias (son of Hipponilc.os), 44, 76, 80n. 28, 13Sn.51

206

Index

Kama. (of Sphmos), 85, 86 Kalligeitos, 29n. 63 Kallixenos (mipimt of estate), 111 Kallixenos (victim of ostracitm), 1S7, 158 (caption) KephUria~,47n. 21 Kephisodotos, 28 Kephdophon, 12n.6 K~hS, 19, 127 Kimon, 21, 117 KJandros. 22, 35 Kleanor, 99, 100 Klearchos (lsocrares' xmos), 26n. SO, 65, 70 Klcarchos (mercmary commanda'), 17, 45, 41, 91, 92, 99, 100, 104, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126 Klcinias, 19 Kleitarchos, 140ft. 62 Kleitos, 85 KJcoboulos, 49 Kleomcncs I, 45, 76n. 11 KIeomcncs III, 28n. 62, 123 Knopias, 103 Koes, 109, 122n. 14 Koinos, 110, 113 Komanos, 111 Konan, 94n. 71,105 Kotys, 54 KnteUas, 110 Kraugis,22 Kmssig, 113 Kylon. 150 Kyncas, 156 Labynetos. 98 Laches, 147 Laistner, 117 Lakcdaimonios, 21 Lakon,21n.39 Laodamas, 102 Lelch,69 Leontia~ S

Leocychidas, 45n. 10, 76 Libys (of Cyrcne), 21 Libys (of Spana), 21 Lkhas (example of name), 21n. 38 Lichas (of Spana), 20, 21n, 38 Lichcs (of 111asos), 20, 21 n. 38 Logblsis, 23 Lypmis, 90, 91, 127n. 37 tykaon,22 Lykidas, 157 Lykon (of Athens), 108, 110 Lrkon (of Heraldea), 21 Lysander, 21,44, 142n. 71, IS6 Lyaias, 23, 28, 96 Lysimlchol (King), 83, 85, 112 Lysimachos (UNOS of Ptolemy?), 112

lysitheidcs,47n. 18 Lyson, 63, 64 (caption) Maiandrios, 79n. 24 Mania, 34n. 75, 101n. 117 Mardonius, 157 Marek. 142 Masistes, 1220. 14 MlnoU, IS (caption) Mausolus, 139 Medea, 27, 35 Mcdistas, 127n. 37 Mcpbates, 118 MCSabyzos, 104 Mega, 61, 63n. 64 Mqpsrias, 26,34n. 74 Mcidias, 140 Meigs, 145 Mcmnon, 110 Mcnander, 16n. 18 Menckrltes, 132 Mmelaos, 63n. 64, 84n. 40, 125, 126 Menon, 47, 99, 101, 104 Mm~, 18,58,59,60,77 Metiochos, to' Metrodoros (father of honorand), 85 Metrodoros (tyrant), 102 Milriadn, 44, 102, 109. 135n. SO Minnion,86 Mithrida~ (of PanNI), 23 Mnasiades, 103 Mnesimacho., 1l0, 112, 114 Naphur, 89n. 49 Ncon, 15,42,49, 122n. 14 Ncoprolemos, 97n. 86 Nausikrates, 62 (caprion) Nektabanis, 6Sn. 68 Nikagoras, 28n. 62, 123 Nikanor, 11I Nikcratos (mover of decree), 85 Nikcratos (son of Nikias), 23 Nikias (of Athens), 23, 145-9, 1SOn. 86 Nikias (of Crete), 141n. 66 Nikogencs, 47n. 18 Nikoklcs, 26n. SO, 84n. 40 Nikophemos,96 Nikostratos, 29, 93 Nymphodoros, 137, 138 Odysseus, 17, l5, 38,41, SO, 55, 56, 57n. 43, 58, 60, 61, 63n. 64, 66, 74, 96, 101, J35n.50, 162 0ilcus,21 Oincus, 36n. 86, 60 Oiniades, 131, 133 (caption) Omphale, 124 Ophellas, 125

Index Or6tn, 22, 36n. 86,50,158 Oroetn, lSI Orontas, 100 Pambi!, 102n. 101 Parapira, 58 Parke, 97, 98 Pasion (Athenian banker), 22, 35, 39, 47, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96 Pasion (of Megara), 99, 100, 126 Pausanias (traveller and geographer), 156, 157 P:iusanias (Sparran genn-al), 22, 23, 41-3, 47, 89, 91, 116, 144, 158 Pausanias (Spartan king), 150, 153 Peirithoos, 98n. 89 Peisistratos, 21, 44, 76, 90, 91, 127n. 37, 153n. 95 Peleus, 24, 25 (caption), 26, 27 (caprion) Perdikkas II, 119n. 7 Perdikkas (Philip's brother), 23 Perdikkas (son of Koinos), 110, 113 Periander, 19, 121 Perikleidas, 21 n. 39 Perikles, 3, 36, 45n. 10, 71, 78, 143, 144, 157, 159, 166 Perillos, 160 Phaidimos, 63n. 64 Pharnabazos, 1,2,3,34n. 75,46,47,51,58, 153n.95 Pharnaba~s'5On,15,28,45,47,58,66,152 ~don. 79n.21.96 Philagros, 156 Philip II, 3, 23, 35, 39, 43, 44, 58n. 48, 73, 74, 76,81,82,84n.40,88n.48,89, 106, 110, 113, 121, 122, 127, 152., 154, 156, 160, 161 Philip V, 46n. 14 Philippides, 83, 85, 86, 97n. 86 Philiskos, 110 Philistides, 14On. 62 Philokratn, 81, 82, 154n. 102 Philon, 103 Philoneikn, 84n. 40 Philopoimm, 22, 35 Philoxenos (example of narne), 21 Phoibidas, 5 Pholos, 26n. 52, 52 (caption) Phoxidas, 103 Ph ry non, 127n. 37, 152 Phryon's 5On, 152 Phylakos, 107, 110 Phyleus,61 Phylopidas, 81 Pindar, 17, 18, 45, 129, 156 PiS5Outhnes, 108 Pitt-Riven, 32-4 Pbro, 49, 62 (caprion)

207

Pleistoanax, 76n. II, 158 Ploutarchos (of Eretria), 140 Plutarch, 20, 57, 112 Pnytagoras, 108 Podanemos, 152 Polemainetos, J7, 34n. 74 Polemokrates, 110, 113 Polyalkes, 34n. 75 Polyalko, 26n. 50, 34n. 75 Polybiu~ 15, 18,23,35,38,42,43,53, 103, 112, 123 Polybos, 84n. 40 Polychar~ 96n. 78 Potydoros, 124 Potykles, 92 Polykrates (of Argos), 103 PoIykrates (of Samas), 17,41, 46n. 14,60, 71, 15 I, 152 Polymestor, 34, 124 Polyxeinos, 2 Jn. 40 Popilius taenas, 52-4 Poseidoni05, 127 Porasimto, 102 Pouilloux, 21n. 38 Priam, 22, 124 Proitos, 63n. 65 Prolcl~ 152 Promathos, 26 Proteus, 126 Proxmides, 137 (caprion) Proxenos (of Boeotia), 4, 14, 26, 28, 45, 47, 99, 100 Proxenos (of Cnidus), 137 (caption) Proxenos (example 01 name), 21 Psammara, 102n. 101 Psamrnerichos (I and II, Pharaohs), 101-2 Psammetichos (son of Gorgas), 19 Psammetichos (5On of Theokles), 19, 101-2 Ptoedoros, 160 Ptolemaios (recipient of estate), J 13 Ptolemy I, 85 Ptolemy II, 85, 111, 112 Ptolemy III, 111, 112 Ptol~y IV, 102-3, J 11 Ptolemy (5On of lysimach05), 111, 112 Ptolemy (5On of Ptolemy), 110 Ptolemy (5On of Thraseas), 103, 111, 114 Pylades, 22, 36n. 86, 50, 158 Pyrilampes, 67 (c:iption) Pyrrhus,36 Pythagoras (of Selymbria), 136 (caption) Pythagoras (of Sparta), 99, 100 Pytharchos, 108, 109 Pytheos, 110 Pythios, 38, 45, 59, 84n. 40, 89 Pythodoros, 47 Pythokles, 35n. 79

Index

208 Rahn. 15n. 14 R.rneses II, 101 Rhesus, 98n. 89, 98n. 90 Rostovtzeff, 114 Roy. 98

Salviat. 21n. 38 Samios, 21n. 39 Sa~n, 123 Satyros (of Athens). 26, 34n. 74, 121 Satyros (of Bosporus), 106 Saul. 48n. 25. 58n. 48 Scipio Aemilianus, 18 Scopas, 78n. 19 Senrbeus. tit Seuthes, 18. n. 106 Shalmaneser III. 51 (caprion) Simonides (mov~ of decree). 85 Simonides (poet), 26. 135 Sitalkes, 90. 137 Sky)ax. 118. 120 Socrates (Athenian philosopher), 4, 12, 27. 35, 78n. 19. 87 Sokrates (Boeotian). 103 Sokrates (Cyrus' xmas), 45. 99, 100 Sopaios, 29n. 63 Sophaineros, 45. 100 Sophocles. 60n. 56 Sosibios, 103. III Sosis, 99. 100 speaker in lsocrates 19, 35. 94 speaker in Lysias 19, 94n. 71 Suatokles, 87. 88n...7 Stratris, 102 Strophios, 22 Symnesis. 39. 45. 47. 90 S~05On, 14. 15,41.49.70.89 Tamos, 99 Tegnaeul, 59 Telamon,21 Telemachos, 18, 58. 59,

Too, «

n

Terrs, 127n. 37 Theagenes, ISO Thcmison, 34n. 74, 38. 71. 123 Themistoldes, 43, 47n. 18. 79n. 23. 9t, 94n. 71. 109. 116. 117. 122. 123. 124n. 20, 135n.50. 14~ 15~ 159 Theokles, 19. 102 Theomestor.39 Theopompos, 39. «, 154 Theophrastos. 83 Thenippos, 85, 86

Thessalos, 21 Thetis. 24, 26, 27 (caption) Thibron, 104 Thorax. 17. 1S7 Thoukydidn (of Pharsalus), 141 n. 66 Thrasyboulos (of Arhens). 153 Thrasyboulos (of Miletus), 121, 122 Thrasydaios, 39 Thrasyllochos. 35 Thrasyllos (Argive general). 145, 146, 1S8 Thrasyllos (xmas of Polemainetos), 17 Thucydides. 21. 21,41,43. 78, 90, lOS, 119. 122, 137, 138. 142-8, ISO. 151. 161 Timagoras, 29n. 63 Timegenidas, 156 Timokrares. 80n. 28 Timokreon, 123 Timotheos. (Athenian general), 82 Timotheos (Isocrares' xenos). 47n. 22. 65. 70. 121 Tissaphernes, 116. 125 Tydeus. 61. 166

Van Genncp. 68-9 Veblen. 129 Veyne,97 Walbank, M.B.. IS. 133 (caption), 136 (caption). 141 Will, 117 Xanthippos, 45n. 10 Xenagoras, 122n. 14 Xenias (of Arcadia). 99. 100. 126 Xenias (of Elis). 156 Xenocrates. 78n. 14 Xenophon.... 5n. 8.14.15.18.26.46.47. 49.66.67 (caprion). 77. 81n. 29. 87. 88, 90. 92, 98. 119, 121, 125, 129. 135 Xmophon (example 01 name), 2 t Xenophron. IS"n. 102 Xerxes, 38. 39, 41. 42. 45. 47. 59. 66. 67 (aption), 89, 91, 108-10, 113, 135n. SO. 156, 1S7 Youns man (from lsocrates, Trapniticus), 83, 88. 93. 9S Zenon. 85. 86 Zeus, 61, 124i Saviour. 105i Xmios. 56. 66. 125

Indn

209

INDEX OF SUBJECTS accountability, 2, 6, 10, 79n. 24, 93 ad~/phos, Stt 'brother' administration, 106, 114n. 140, 115, JJ9, 164 adorodoltetos, 76-8; U~ also bribery adorotatos, SH adorodoketos affection, 13, 17-18,48, 129, 149 agenu, 39, 83,95, 97n. 86, 142 agreerMnts, 53, 54, 93, 95, 132; SH also documents and symbolon alliances, 5,9, 14,23, 34, 36,43,44,46, SO, 53 (caprion), 59, 60, 74, 98, 102, 134 (caption), 137, 144-9, 152, 156, 179-84, allies, 29,44,45,54,56-7, 74, 79, 84, 86, 90, 116, 141, 145, 157 altruism, 32, 48, 121 ambassadors, U~ embassies amity, 13, 32, 80 Anabas;s, s~~ Ten Thousand ana"ltaios, 10 ancestral proxt,,;a, proxmos, 133, 135, 137, 138, 147 ancnrral xtnia, xmos, I, 21,59, 69-72, 82, 92, '02, 125, 138, 141, 152, 148, 166f{' bank operations, 39, 93, 94, 95 baptism, 69 benefactions, ~~ t"ngts;a benefih, s~t n4n~si4 ~rith, 16n. 17, 58n. 48 betrayals, sn r~ason blood-brothnhood, 32, 33, 55 (caption) blood rituals, 33n. 71, 54, 55 (caprion), 59, 68,69 boethtia, 4, 23, 25 (caprion), 48, 121-2, 129; Stt also opportune help bond-friendship, 32, 33, 127, 129n. 44 booty,97 bonowing, S~t loans bribery, 5, 7, 73, 73-81, 1S3, 1S8 'brother'. 18, 22, 2.l, 33, 46n. t 4, 55 (aption), 58n. 48, 59, 19n. 21, 89n. 49 burnucracin, g t administration burial, 26, 135, 136 (caption); $H also epitaphs caprives, 57; ~t also slaves charis, 28, 41, 42, 48, 91, 108, 129, 135 chieftains, 99, 142, 155 chremaUl, In money city: in conflict with ritualised friendship, 1-1, 14.4, 144, 153, 163, 16~; enforcement agencies of, 5-6, 30, 95; as a self-conscious community, 6, 132, 142, 157; friendship within, 29-3 I; formal

institutions and rules of, 30, 78, 138, 142, ISO, 164; given as gift, 43, 108, 111-12; anirude to bribny, 73-81; ideals propagated by, 97, 159-60; attitude to rai5ing troops by xmoi, 104-5; as partners in proxenies, 130-42; turning xmia into proxmia, 132-42; clashing with upper-cialS coalations, 138, 163 citizenship: obigarions of, 3, 4; ideals of, 18, 79, 151, 159, 161; gr~nrs of, lOS, 141; incompatible with '~"trgts",', U5n. 53. promotion to, 140-2, 152, 177-8 dassn: conflict of, 8, 119, 130, ISS, 160-4; up~ and lower, 28, 34, 73, 74, 104, 128-9, 149, IS 7, 160; pursuih appropriate to, 129; ~e also dites, dmros clients, 14, 38, 39, 102, 156 client rulers, IS, 39, 40, 41, 49, 10, J02, 103, 1S4 communities, stt city compadral.go, ~t godparenthood comparative perspective, J 1-4 conspicuous expmditure, 97 consubstantiality, SS (caption), 66 corruption, n, 87, 88; ste also brihery courtiers, see roy~1 offici~ls

dt-brs, 41,48, 121; unrepayable, 122; su also loans declararion, 59, 68, 11, 133 (caption) de~ttes, 75, n, 84-8, 130, 13', 135, 137 (caprion), 138 donas, 3, 41,73, B3, 144, .46, 147, 156, 1S7, 160, 161, 164; $It also classes dex;a, 46, 49, 50-4, 57, 58; ue also handshake, pledges dex;osis, see ha"dshalt~ documents, 16n. '7,77, 95, BO, 131, 135, 137 (caption); SN also agreements, decfftS doctoni, 15 I donations, oh honorem, 97; ue also liturgies dor~tJ, 76, 108, 109, III-IS, 135; Stt also ""dn estates, gifh dorema, see doron dorodo#tia, 75, 76; ut also bribery dOrmt, dora, 60, 15, 16, 77, 90, 108; Stt also ""der estates, gifh doryxlnos, 10, 11,57,166 dowries, 26, 121, J29 qafitarian ethos, ~t ""tln ritualised friendship elites, 34, 104, 155, 156; ~t also classes, social srarus

210

Index

embassi~

45, 65, 76, 112, 115, 139, 147, 148 encounter, 41-58, 101 epitedeia, epikdeios, 10, 12, 93, 119n. 7, 130, 143. lSI, 152, 153, 179 epitaphs, 5n. 8, 26, 129, 132, 136 (caption); see also burial estates, 18, 100, 103, 106-lS, 154; given as gifts, 61, 104, 107-8, 111-12; reason of grant, 107; documentarion of, 107; types of, 107, 109, 112-13; in Penian. Macedonian and Hellenistic empires, 109-111; ownenhip of, 113-14; revocation of, 114; and feudal benefices, 164-5 i S« dlso dare" etiquette, 41-4 ftltrglSia: communal, lS, 84-6, 105, 135, 152; private, 24-5 (caption), 42, 46, 57, 58, 101. J04, 107, 108, 112, 129; as stamng mechanism, 25, 47-9, 101 eungeta: private, 10, 107, 112; Persian court tide, 13, 41, 107; communal, 131, 135 exchange, see gifts expertise, 96, 103-4, 129-30, 151 factions,S, 142-56, 164; composition of, 150-2, 154-5; and political ideologies, 153; expansion of, 153-4 family, see kinship 'father', 18, 59 favoun, 3, 4, 28, 100, 121, 122, 148; see also ,har" feasting, 57, 59, 66, 136 feudalism, 2, 38, 59, 107. 118, 164-5 fictitious kinship, ue NIUIer kinship fidelity, see ""der rirualised friendship, norm of loyalty of followers, 44, 86, 90, 111, 122, 146, 148-56 foreigneR, 3, 4; see also mangen 'foster-brother', 59 foster-parenthood, 22-6, 35, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 135, 137 (caption), 152 fraternity, see 'brother' friends, friendship: in general, 4, 11, 12, 14, 42, 43, 56, 76, 80, 83, 84, 93, l15, 120, 127, 144, 149, 150, lS3, 160, 161; unritualised, 16, 29-31, 32-4, 58; of friends, 27, 47, 65, 152; wimin the city, 29-3 I; of communities, 143, 148, 149 gesrures, 24 (caption), 25 (caption), 27 (caprion), 37 (caption), 43. 5On. 33, 5 I (caption), 52 (caption). 53 (caption), 55 (caprion), 56, 57n. 43, 60n. 55, 6On. 56, 64 (caption), 134 (caption), 137 (caption) gi~ exchange of, 3. 7, 13, 42, 45, 50, 51

(caption), 52 (caption), 58, 59, 70, 76, 78, 135, 144; spirit of giving of, 10, 89, 90, 95, 108-9, 109; of initiation, 24 (caption), 41, 58, 60-3, 71; symbolic, 24, 32, S0, 58, 60, 66, 67 (caption), 69, 84, 129; counter-gifts, 41, 60, 61 n. 61, 80, 97; cities given as, 43, 108, 112; of real use-value, 59, 61, 73, 75, n, 81-J 1S; and tra~ 61, 80, 95; of hospitality, 70; as bribes, 73-81; in Homeric society, 78-9; long-term effect of, 80, 91-2; estates granted as, 81, 107 i slaves as, 81; natural produet5 as, 81-8; given to cities, 83, 86, 142; troops supplied as, 84, 105; money .15, 88-92; valuables as, 88-97; as taXeI, 89, 90; as loans, 92-3; as civic privileges, 135; ut also dorta godparenthood, 12n. 9, 19,27 (caprion), 32, 33, 72n. 92, 118, 127, 128 'good s~~ ~~sia grain, 1ft u"tIn natural products grammata, 1ft letters 'grandfather', 18 gratitude, 1ft cham GCftks in Penian service, 43, 98, 154, 157, 161 purlns. 46, 49, 54 guest-friend(s), sn XePfOl, ritualised friendship guest-friendship, see ritualised friendship

deed"

handshake, 37 (caption), 46, 50-3, 63, 64 (caption), 134 (caprion); su a/so d~x;a, gesrures hand-tokens, 54 Hellenistic ruins, su .,,,dn ruling circles hetairia, hetairas, 10, 12, 18, 19, 38, 55, l22n. 13, lSI, 152; Macedonian court title, 8, 13, 44, 73, 106. 113, 154, ISS, 164 hero: me raming of, 2, 7, 78, 138, 157, 159, 160, 164; Homeric, 1, 2, 6, 34, 72, 88, 104, 156, 159, 164 hilteuia, biltetes, sn supplication homonymity. 20-1, 141, 177-8 homot,.ap~%as, 125; see also consubstantiality, feasting horltio", hm-Itia, see oaths hospitality, 10, 28, 59, 6On. 55, 66, 70, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 132 hospitium, 38n. 95, 39, 46n. 14, 54n. 37, 122n. IS, 166 hostages, 23, 28, 100, 126-7

.

idioxePfos, 4, 10, II, 166 initiation, see .",tIn rites interest (in moneylending), 93, 94 interests: communal, 3, 75, 79, 86, 139, 140,

211

Index • 142, 152, 153; private, 48, 86, 123, 126, 142, 149, 152, 153, 161; a king's, 115; communal subordinated (0 private, 130 introduction, 47, 101 Ionian revoh, 14, 118·19 kinship: ral, 16·29, 19, 31, 32, 34, 49, 80, 84, 128, ISO, ISJ; pseudo- , 16·29,32-3, 46n. 14,63,69, 128, 133 (caption), 135; adoptive, 32; riwal, 32 Ittm.sh!O, 48n. 24 letten, 26, 47, 65, 89n. 49, 93, II~ 121, 159n. 118 libations, 49, S0, 66 liturgies, 65, 83, 86, 92, 96-7, 116 livestock, su rmdn natural products loans, 28, 39,65,67 (caption), 92-4, 96, 121, 128, 129 loyalty, lee under ritualiKd friendship marriage, 13, 14, 16, 24 (caption), 26, 27 (caprion), 29, 31, 36, 42, SO, 91n. 62, 138, 1S0, 162, 164 meals, see feasting mediators, 46-7, 52 (aption), 101, 123, 138 ~runaries: soldi~, J0, J7-18, 98, 100·4, commanden, 17,45,98-101, 103 metals, 79, 89, 90, 96 money, 42, 46,65,75,76,83,86,88·92,95, 101, 113, 119, 121 naming, 7, 19-22, t 02, ."1 narion, J62-3; ue also nationalism nationalism, 117, 161, 162 natural produm, 82·8i grain. 82·6, 154; livestock, 82; timber, 82·3, 88, 154 netWorks, 6, 7, 8. 22, 74, 80, 81. 82, 84·6, 129, 138. 139, 144, 146, 148, 150·2, ISS, 160. 162, 179·84 oaths. 49, S0, 54, 55, 59, 71, 76, 125 obligations: civic, 2·8; of ritualised friendship, 2·8, to, 18.54,61,120·8, 140, 144, created by grant of estate!l, 113·15, 164·5; of proxen;a, 139 oiltnos, o;lce;otes, 10, 19, 28, 29, 31, 105 opportune help. 28; su a/so btHlhna ostracism. 157-8 outsiders, set strangers

pappos, see 'grandfather' parernity, stt 'father' patri#tt proxe"ia, ste anctSrral proxnria patriltos xenos, see ancestra' xenia patriotism, 15n. 14, 73, 78n. 19. 156-61 parronage (Roman), 38 patron-client bond (analyrical term), 39

Pdoponnesian War, 119, 143·53, 157, 179-84 phi/ia, 3, 19,23,30,46, 73, lOS, 120, 141 phi/os: private, 1, 10, 12, 18,23,38,46,47, SO, 51, 56, 57, 87, 106, 107, 108, 112, 122n. 13, ISO, 153, 164, 179; Hetlenisric court title, 8, 13, 38, SO, 103, 106, 108, 109n. 126. 112, 155; of communities, 23, 126, 135; Persian court ririe, 42, 106, 108; see also u"der ruling circles phi/aleS, see affection pistlJ, pistis, 46, 49·50, 54, 57, 58, 147, 149; see also pledges pledges, 46, 47, 98; see also dexia, pista,

symbalorr plunder, 97, 102 precious objects, 13,58·67,81, 89 preliminaries, 44-58 polis, set city p~rty; pub'ic, 3, bequeathed to xmos, J7, 96, 129; confiscation of, 95, 159; estates as, 112-14; see a/so estiltes, natural products, safekeeping proxenia, see proxtntt-s proxmies,4, 15,75, 122, 130-42, 145, 1S3; relation to xmia, 27, 71, 135, 139, 146; 135, 137, J47; inheritance of, recommendations to, 137-41, 177·8; peculiarity of Spartil, 138n. 55; renewal of, 138; implying xmia, 139-40, 146; multiple, 139; fifth-emrury Athenian, 141-2, 180-8 ransom. 22, 42, 57, 93, 122, J28, 129 rroprocity, 41, 60, 61, 80, 84, 90, 91, 92, 93, 100. 101, 108·9, 121. 124, 136 recommendations: to citizenship, 141, 177-8; to proxmia, 137-41, 177·8; to xenia, 46·7,65 recruirment. 97·105; see also troops rmewal: of xmia, J7,45, 58, 60, 63, 65, 70; of proxmia, 138, Jtt also u"dn rites resources, 7, 73·115, 15J; su also lI"dn estates. Bifts, money, troops revenge, 23, 125, 128, 129, 135n. 52 right hand~ see dtxia rirC'S: of initiarion, 7, 29, 30, 33, 58·69, 120, 133; of passage, 68·9; see also renewal ritual kinship, 31·4, 59 ritual objects, 49-50, 53-5 (caption) ritual warfare, 57 rirualised friendship: in conflict with communal principle, 1·7, 143·4, 153, 157-9; morn of, 1,2,118·28; violations of, I, 51, 54, 66, 71, 123-7; obligations of. 2·8, 10, 18, 54, 61, 120·8; norm of loyalty of, 3, 13, 39, 49, 50, 121, 128, 156, 16l; evidence for, 7, 13·16, 41·3,

212

I"dex

68, 118-20; definition of, 8, 9, 10-13, 162; terminology of, 10-13, 96n. 78, 179; 'stronger than kinship', 33n. 72; egaliterian ethos of, 37-9, 57, 61; social units of partners in, 11-12., 32, 166-75; not specifically Greek, 12; its affinity to kinship, 16-29; bequeathed to descendants, 16-17, 69-72, 135, 141; termination of, 17, 71·2, 135; its affinity to friendship, 29-31; in a cross-cultural penpective, 31·4; status of partnen in, 34-40, IS 1-61; and marriage, 36; and dient rulers, 39-40; etiquette of, 41-4; its role in mediation, 47; and the gods, SO, 66, 124-5; and the pooling of foren, 97-105; and the grant of estates, 108; and treason, 116-18, 128, 142-61; sanctions of, 126-7; services performed in the name of, 128-30; responsible for proxmin, 141, 146; and political ideologies, 1S3; and international politics, ISO; sn also 'brother" 'sons' ritualised relationships, 7, 31-4, 69 royal officials, 29n. 63, 40, 42, 44, 49, 70, 83, 85, 86, 95, lIS, 116, 137, lS4, ISS, 164 royal pages, 126n. 34, 127 ruling circles, 8, 75, 84, 109-11; Hellenistic, 8, 38, 44, SO, 103, 142, 153, 1S5, 164; Macedonian, 8, 153-4, 164; Persian, 8, 13n. II, 66, 103, 1S3-4 safekeeping, 27, 94-6, 124, 129 security (in moneylmding), 65, 93, 95 sentiments, see affection services, 81, 128-30; ritual, 25 (caprion), 26, 81, 129, 135, 136 (caption); private, 81, 129-30, 1S6; political, 81, 130, 146, 1S5, 1S6 sharing out, see liturgies slaves, 56, 81, 150, 151 social status, 34-40, 74, 97, 103, 104 soldiers, see troops 'sons', 22-3, 28, 42., 48n. 25, 1S2 soothsayers, 17, 34,45, 151 spo"dai, 46, see also libations, truce strangers, strangeness, 4, 10, 11, 12, 43, 58, 62 (caprion), 68, 69, 72, 92., 94, 95, 103, 108,130·1, 136n. 54,139 submission, 37·40, 44, 45, 49, 56, 89, 90, 121, 1S5

supplication, 33n. 72, 54-8 symOOlorr, 53 (caprion), 55, 59, 61, 62 (caption), 67 (caption) symbolism, 7, 8, 36, SO, 51, 58, 59, 60·1, 72., 132 symmachos, ue alliances, allies syrretMs, 2J syrtgenes. Syrtgeneia, 10, 19, 38, 45, 106n. 116, 154; Ptolmlaic COU" ride, 38; Penian title, 8, 13, 42, 154 syrristanai. ue inrroduction, recommendations

cou"

taxes, 90, 111, 112, J IS Ten Thousand, the, 4·5, 49·50, 97·101, 119-20, 125, 126 timber, ue "nder natural produet5 trade, traders, 34n. 7S, 4S, 61, 71, 80, 95, 123, 128 treachery, see treason ~ason,2,4,8, 76, 79,80,116-18,140,153, 156·61 ",carin, 4, 46n. 14,53 (caption), 59, 98, 118, 134 (caprion); SN also alliances trierarch)', 92; see also liturgies troops, 42, 81, 90, 97-105, 111, ISO truce, 46, 49, 145 trust, 14, 48, 84, 92., 100; ue also ritualised friendship, norm of loyalty of valuables, 88·97; see also loans, money, precious objects vengeance, see meRge wealth, circulation of: 8, 7J-S, 81, 96, 104, 105, 144; see also ""dn gifts, city, money, grain women, as partnn's in xenia, 34 widioxmos, ue idioxenos xenia: private, 60; communal, 132, 136; see also feasting, gifts of initiation xeineie. x~;"ie. xemos. xenia. xenos: private 1-23, 24 (caprion), 26·8, 30, 31, 33·9, 45-7, 50, 56~66, 68·71, 73, 74, n, 82, 87, 88, 91-7, 98-102, 104, 118-29, 131-44, 146, 148-61, 164, 166, 179; of communities, 38, 135; sa also under ritualised friendship xeinoi patroio;. see anastral xntia xenoktonia, 3, 54, 66, 124, 125

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