SAVING HUMAN LIVES
Issues in Business Ethics VOLUME 21
Series Editors Henk van Luijk, Emeritus Professor of Business...
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SAVING HUMAN LIVES
Issues in Business Ethics VOLUME 21
Series Editors Henk van Luijk, Emeritus Professor of Business Ethics Patricia Werhane, University of Virginia, U.S.A.
Editorial Board Brenda Almond, University of Hull, Hull, U.K. Antonio Argandoña, IESE, Barcelona, Spain William C. Frederick, University of Pittsburgh, U.S.A. Georges Enderle, University of Notre Dame, U.S.A. Norman E. Bowie, University of Minnesota, U.S.A. Brian Harvey, Manchester Business School, U.K. Horst Steinmann, University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Germany
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
Saving Human Lives Lessons in Management Ethics
by
ROBERT ELLIOTT ALLINSON Soka University of America T e Ch Th C inese Un U iversity of Hong Kong
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-13
1-4020-2905-5 (HB) 1-4020-2980-2 ( e-book) 978-1-4020-2905-9 (HB) 978-1-4020-2980-6 (e-book)
Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springeronline.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2005 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
To my wife, Iréna, whose unfailing support and brilliant suggestions inform this book and grace my existence. To the bravery of the late Justice Peter Mahon, Stuart Macfarlane f and Captain Gordon Vette who risked their careers and their lives to research and investigate the events that made up the disaster on Mt. Erebus, whose work may serve as an inspiration to us all for the courage that humanity needs to struggle for the cause of justice.
Saving Human Lives is an attempt to demonstrate how ethical management can save human lives. Its thesis is explored through a detailed investigation of case studies all of which support the thesis that greater attention to ethics in management would have saved human lives. To this author, the saving of human lives is the greatest possible contribution ethics can make to management and it is to this end-goal that this book is dedicated. As one reads through the chapters one readily notice parallels to numerous global crises and disasters that have occurred since the preparation of this book. The Columbia space shuttle disaster is an ominous reminder that the lessons of history were not learned in the Challengerr space shuttle disaster. The terrible events of September 11 in the United States are horrific reminders that the lessons of management ethics could also have prevented the needless loss of lives. In both of these recent cases, warnings of the impending disasters were out there but were neglected or trivialized. The prioritization of ethics as is strongly argued for throughout this volume would have not tolerated such a neglect of the advance warnings of the serious, potential threat to human lives. To give special thanks to those who have helped in the preparation of this volume, I wish to thank the contributions of Stuart Macfarlane, Captain Gordon Vette, Mrs. Justice Mahon, Mrs. Jim Collins and Peter McErlane all of whom gave valuable information which aided my investigations into the disasterr on Mt. Erebus enormously. All of these individuals were kind to give of their personal time when I visited with them in New Zealand and provided both materials and a focus to my investigation which was immeasurable in its value. Without the opportunity for personal interviews with all of the aforementioned, there would have been no way of obtaining crucial information which has remained unpublished. I also wish to thank Roger Boisjoly for keeping an extensive, personal correspondence with me that shed invaluable light on my investigations of the Challengerr space shuttle disaster. I wish to thank the University of Canterbury which offered me Erskine Fellowship that enabled me to come to New Zealand. I was able to deepen my investigations of the disaster on Mt. Erebus that I had originally undertaken over a decade earlier. Some of the material in this book originally appeared in my earlier volume, Global Disasters: Inquiries into Management Ethics.
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The materials in the chapters on the Challengerr disaster and the disaster on Mt. Erebus are revised and new chapters have been added including case studies of the Titanic disaster and the Vasa disaster. The chapters on the Challengerr disaster and the disaster on Mt. Erebus contain key points never before published which cast great light on these disasters and provide powerful support for the thesis of the present book that ethical management could have prevented these disasters.
TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 ACCIDENTS, TRAGEDIES AND DISASTERS.....................1 THE RULE OF ACCIDENTAL ..........................................3 THE EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ERROR......................3 THE EXPLANATION OF A BREAKDOWN OF A MATERIAL OR TECHNICAL COMPONENT AND ITS COROLLARY, “RISKY TECHNOLOGY” ..................3 RISKY OR UNRULY TECHNOLOGY? .............................4 THE EXPLANATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA OR BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT............................6 ACCIDENTS WILL HAPPEN .............................................7 THE WORD ‘ACCIDENT’ ..................................................8 THE BELIEF IN MONOCAUSALITY............................ 12 MULTI-CAUSALITY AND MULTIPLE RESPONSIBILITY .............................................................14 FAULT FINDING AND THE SCAPEGOAT ....................15 WARNINGS AND ETHICS ...............................................17 FREEDOM AND ETHICS..................................................18 NOTES ................................................................................19 CHAPTER 2 THE INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND BUSINESS ......................................................21 ETHICS AS INVOLVED IN THE GOALS OF AN ORGANIZATION...............................................................22 ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE...................................................................... 33 ix
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ETHICS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ...........................................33 THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS .................34 THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF ETHICAL COMMUNICATION: RESPECT FOR PERSONS............34 ETHICS AND INFORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION ..........................................................36 ETHICS AND FORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS ........................................................................37 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE EQUIVALENCE IN EFFECT OF COMPETING NORMATIVE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS ..............................................................39 NOTES ................................................................................46 CHAPTER 3 THE BUCK STOPS HERE AND IT STOPS EVERYWHERE ELSE AS WELL......................................................................48 THE BUCK STOPS HERE .................................................48 THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE ..................................... 50 THE MANAGER’S TASK .................................................52 THE MANAGER AS EDUCATOR AND FACILITATOR OF GOOD WILL.................................................................53 NOTES ................................................................................55 CHAPTER 4 CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER PREVENTION MANAGEMENT ....................................................................60 CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE “BAND-AID” APPROACH ........................................................................60
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CONCEPTUAL PREPAREDNESS....................................64 THE EXPLICIT PRIORITIZATION OF A SAFETY ETHOS ......................................................66 THE INDEPENDENTLY FUNDED SAFETY BOARD WITH FULL VETO POWERS OVER OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ...........................................67 NOTES ................................................................................68 CHAPTER 5 THE VASA DISASTER ....... ...................................................71 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE VASA ............................72 THE STABILITY TEST .....................................................73 THE QUESTION OF BALLAST .......................................74 THE WIND PRESSURE ON THE SAILS .........................75 THE VASA’S S CENTER OF GRAVITY ..............................76 WHY THE VASA CAPSIZED.............................................76 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................82 NOTES ................................................................................82 CHAPTER 6 THE TITANIC C DISASTER......................................................84 METAPHYSICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS .............................84 LOSS OF LIFE ....................................................................87 REPORT OF THE COURT (BRITISH REPORT) .............87 THE COLLISION ...............................................................87 CAUSES OF THE DISASTER ...........................................88 WARNINGS........................................................................88 WARNINGS TO PASSENGERS .......................................91
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SPEED OF THE SHIP.........................................................92 WEATHER..........................................................................92 CAUSES OF DEATHS .......................................................92 HOW ELSE COULD THE TITANIC DISASTER BEEN PREVENTED? ....................................................................92 THE SAILING ORDERS....................................................93 RELEVANT DESIGN FEATURES ...................................94 RIVETS ...............................................................................94 THE INADEQUACY OF THE HUMAN ERROR HYPOTHESIS.....................................................................96 LIFEBOATS........................................................................ 97 THIRD-CLASS PASSENGERS .........................................98 NEARBY RESCUE POSSIBILITIES ................................99 THE RESCUE BY THE S.S. “CARPATHIA”..................... 99 S.S. “CALIFORNIAN”.........................................................99 N FINDINGS OF THE COURT ...........................................101 LOOK-OUT.......................................................................101 SPEED ...............................................................................102 RECOMMENDATIONS................................................... 102 NOTES .............................................................................. 104 CHAPTER 7 THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER DISASTER.........107 A BRIEF SYNOPSIS ........................................................108 KEY WORDS....................................................................109 THE WORD ‘ACCIDENT’ ..............................................109 CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING CAUSE .......................112 DECISION MAKING .......................................................115
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THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.........................................................115 THE DECISION MUST BE MADE UNDER PRESSURE........................................................................117 A FIXED DEADLINE MUST BE MET...........................118 A WRONG DECISION WILL HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES............................................................119 THE PRESENCE OF IRREGULARITIES.
..................120
ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO CHALLENGER LAUNCH .......................121 (a.) THE LACK OF ANY CLEAR UNIFORM GUIDELINES AS TO MORAL CRITERIA ....................123 (b.) A FORMULA FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN AN ARGUMENT.....................................124 (c.) WHAT WOULD COUNT AS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONCLUSIONS ........................126 (d.) THE LACK OF U UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT INPUT IS RELEVANT TO A DECISION .......................126 THE LACK OF A SPELLED OUT DECISION MAKING MECHANISM .................................................130 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ......................................131 THE LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION ..................134 RESPONSIBILITY: BOTTOM UP ..................................137 TOP DOWN RESPONSIBILITY .................................
139
DORMANT STAGE .........................................................139 THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE ...............................
141
NOTES ..............................................................................143
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CHAPTER 8 POST-CHALLENGER INVESTIGATIONS.........................154 THE WORD ‘ACCIDENT’ ..............................................154 THE CONFLATION OF GENERAL UNKNOWN RISK OF SPACE TRAVEL WITH THE SPECIFICALLY FOREKNOWN RISK OF THE O-RINGS ...........................................................................155 SAFETY PRIORITY.........................................................157 DECISION MAKING .......................................................157 SAFETY FIRST?...............................................................158 IS THERE A GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY NOW? ...............................................162 WERE MIDDLE MANAGERS SIMPLY FOLLOWING POLICY? ...........................................................................163 WERE THE MIDDLE MANAGERS MORAL?..........
164
WAS THE CHALLENGER DISASTER A MISTAKE?...165 WAS THE CHALLENGER DISASTER AN ACCIDENT? .....................................................................165 WAS THE CHALLENGER DISASTER THE INEVITABLE OUTCOME OF CULTURAL DETERMINISM? AND, WAS MORAL CHOICE AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY THEREFORE IRRELEVANT AS AN EXPLANATION? ................................................166 THE HISTORY OF O-RING EROSION..........................168 NORMALIZED DECISIONS? .........................................170 LINKS BETWEEN TEMPERATURE AND EROSION ...................................................................... 170 TRUSTING ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF DEVIANCE? .....................................................................173
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FAITH IN THE SECONDARY SEAL? ...........................173 DID ENGINEERS BELIEVE THAT THE CHALLENGER WAS SAFE TO FLY?.............................176 WERE THE ENGINEERS UNAWARE OF WHAT WAS A PROBABLE OUTCOME? .....................178 THE QUESTION OF “HARD DATA” ............................180 ETHICAL DECISION MAKING .....................................181 CONCLUSION..................................................................182 NOTES ..............................................................................183 CHAPTER 9 THE HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE E DISASTER .........198 THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER AND MULTI-RESPONSIBILITY ............................................ 199 THE ORDERS.................................................................. 202 BOTTOM UP RESPONSIBILITY .................................. 204 TOP DOWN RESPONSIBILITY .................................... 208 A DYSFUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT ....................... 209 THE LACK OF A CLEAR ATTRIBUTION OF DOMAINS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR OFFICERS.....210 THE LACK OF THE ISSUANCE OF CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS ..............................................................210 TECHNICAL COMPONENT...........................................212 THE CLOSING OF THE DOORS....................................213 THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE .................................. 213 CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT..................................218 NOTES ..............................................................................220
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CHAPTER 10 THE KING’S CROSS UNDERGROUND FIRE ................. 223 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORKS COMPARED ................................................................ 224 FENNELL’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK.....227 THE USE OF WORDS .....................................................228 THE CAUSE OF THE FIRE.............................................230 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FIRE: TOP DOWN .........233 RESPONSIBILITY: BOTTOM UP ..................................235 THE IMPORTANCE OF A SAFETY ETHOS ............. 246 THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN BLOCKING THE FLOW OF INFORMATION ..............247 FENNELL’S RECOMMENDATIONS: THE PRIMACY OF SAFETY...................................................249 PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS...........................251 NOTES ..............................................................................252 CHAPTER 11 THE DISASTER ON MT. EREBUS ....................................256 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DISASTER .....................258 THE CHIPPINDALE REPORT ........................................258 JUSTICE MAHON’S CRITIQUE OF THE CHIPPINDALE REPORT.................................................259 THE EVIDENCE FROM THE FLIGHT-DECK TAPES ...............................................................................260 VETTE’S TEXT................................................................265 MACFARLANE’S NOTES ON VETTE’S TEXT ...........265
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MACFARLANE’S REPLY TO 1. (THAT THE CHANGE IN COMPUTER FLIGHT PATH DID NOT MISLEAD THE CREW)..................................266 MACFARLANE’S REPLY TO 2. (THAT PILOTS VIOLATED INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DESCEND BELOW 16,000 FEET) .....................................................268 MACFARLANE’S REPLY TO 3. (THAT THE CREW WERE UNCERTAIN OF THEIR POSITION)....270 MACFARLANE’S REPLY TO 4. (THAT RADAR WOULD HAVE SHOWN EREBUS AHEAD) ................271 TAKING A PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEW .................272 THE WHITEOUT PHENOMENON ............................ ... .272 PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH: TAPES ............274 THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH.....................276 MISMANAGEMENT .......................................................278 THE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER ..................................280 DEFECTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE .........283 DEFECTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM .....................................284 SUMMARY OF MANAGEMENT DEFECTS ................285 THE LACK OF ANY SAFETY ETHOS..........................287 TOP DOWN RESPONSIBILITY .....................................287 NOTES ..............................................................................289 APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 11 ......................................313 APPENDIX ONE ..............................................................313 APPENDIX TWO .............................................................316 APPENDIX THREE..........................................................320 NOTES ..............................................................................320
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CHAPTER 12 MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND TECHNO-ORGANIZATION ...............................................322 NOTES..............................................................................332 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................334 INDEX...................................................................................347
CHAPTER 1 ACCIDENTS, TRAGEDIES AND DISASTERS A prime thesis of this book is that a leading cause of man-made, corporate or organizational disasters is a lack of accountability, especially on the part of top management. This lack of accountability can be traced to or at least shown to be compatible with a certain metaphysical view of the world, the view of determinism. The thesis of determinism is that no matter what human beings do, or do not do, certain outcomes are inevitable. In ancient Greek times, to believe that certain outcomes were inevitable was to believe that one was a tool of the play of the gods, or of Fate. In terms of highly consequential and unfortunate events of life such a view that one was ruled by Fate was linked with the idea that life was inevitably tragic. Tragedy as a form of drama came into being to justify the fated outcomes and in the process to ennoble the participants in the tragic events. The usage of such terms in these modern times has degenerated.1 Whenever a disaster is described as a ‘tragedy’, one does not need to further inquire into the cause or causes of this event because it has now been lifted outside of human power into the domain of Greek drama and fate. As a tragedy, it was fated to be and the only response is to accept it (and others of its kind) as part of the inescapable human situation. One may mourn it and sympathize briefly with the victims. But one is freed (by thinking of it as a tragedy) from the need to consider how one may prevent like disasters from happening in the future. While it may be objected by the reader that this is too purist a view of the everyday person’s understanding of the word, ‘tragedy’, it is the view of the present author that one must be careful both of unconscious associations in one’s own mind and the associations that such a word usage creates in the minds of future readers. The word ‘tragedy’ possesses a grand and influential history. The tragic heroes and heroines of Greek and Shakespearean tragedy generally stood for higher values and it was because they stood for those higher values combined with some internal character flaws that they determined their own fate. They come down as heroes and 1
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heroines to present readers precisely because of a combination of nobility and internal character flaws that brought about their own end. It is Oedipus’ desire to know coupled with his arrogance and rash action that in the end is the cause of his own tragic fate. It is Antigone’s placing of her ethical principles above the law of the land coupled with her open defiance of her uncle, the king, that brings about her tragic fate. It is Macbeth’s ambition to be king coupled with a susceptibility to be influenced by Lady Macbeth that causes him to commit murder. In the cases of disasters caused by a combination of a lack of sound management practises and a lack of ethics on the part of senior and line management, there are no noble heroes or heroines and character flaws should play no role in a properly managed organization. While few today would be willing to subscribe to a view that life was fated or tragic in the high sense of the term, it is the thesis of the present author that other forms of determinism rule today. The idea of chance or accident has overtaken the whimsical actions of the Greek gods and the mysteries of Technology have overtaken the mysteries of the three Fates of Greek mythology. Such beliefs which can be referred to as determinism by Accidents and determinism by Technological/Organizational complexity are argued in the course of this work to be key factors which have influenced decision making that has led to disastrous outcomes. While these are certainly not the only factors, they can play a role in influencing or justifying additional key factors such as a lack of ethical and epistemological accountability. In his book, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, Charles Perrow has given birth to the idea that certain technological disasters are inevitable due to the interlocking complexity of technology and bureaucratic organizations and that accidents under such circumstances become normal and expected. With such a thesis, cosmic and technological determinism are woven into the same fabric.
ACCIDENTS, TRAGEDIES AND DISASTERS
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THE RULE OF ACCIDENTAL The tacit thesis that the leading cause of disasters is the accidental typically manifests itself in three different forms. One form in which the accidental appears is in the guise of human error; the second form in which the accidental appears is in the guise of a breakdown of a material or technical component, the third form in which the accidental appears is through the inertia of compliance with the mechanisms of organizational routines. This is not intended as a complete list of the manifestations of the accident or the mistake; it is only intended to be illustrative and educational.
THE EXPLANATION OF HUMAN ERROR Human error appears in a number of guises. It can appear simply as human error. It can appear as pilot error, operator error, faulty judgement, a judgement call, and so on. In one and all of these forms, it is ultimately ineliminable because human error is accepted as a fundamental human condition. Human beings, being finite and imperfect, cannot avoid error. As there will always be human error, there is not much that can be done about it. The inevitability of human error is noted in such popular phrases as ‘we all make mistakes’; ‘nobody’s perfect’; and even, ‘it’s human a nature’; or, as a justification for someone accused of an error, ‘I’m only human’. Since human error is ineliminable (under anyone’s view), if the disaster is caused by human error, then the disaster was not preventable and the matter can be put to rest.2
THE EXPLANATION OF A BREAKDOWN OF A MATERIAL OR TECHNICAL COMPONENT AND ITS COROLLARY, “RISKY TECHNOLOGY” One often hears the phrase, ‘it was the part that was faulty.’ If the explanation offered as the cause of a disaster is not human error, it
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will most frequently be a malfunctioning component part. A famous example of the faulty part explanation is the O-ring malfunction explanation of the Challengerr disaster. Since ultimately all material parts are finite and imperfect and subject to breakdown, it is inevitable that eventually any and every part may malfunction. Hence, the explanation of the breakdown of a material component appears, like the explanation of human error, to be ineliminable. Sometimes the material part explanation is compounded with the use of the phrase, ‘high risk technology’ so as to imply that there is even a greater likelihood of a parts breakdown the higher the technology that is in use. What is forgotten in the parts analysis are usually several key questions such as why was such technology chosen in the first place (in the case of the Challenger, the malfunctioning O-rings were the least safe out of four engineering designs submitted). Thus, it was not so much a case of ‘risky technology’ (that was bound to go wrong), but a case of risky choice on the part of the management that selected the design to be built. Other key questions that are usually neglected in the ‘malfunctioning part’ explanation are: Were there regular, recent and thorough inspections of the part in question? Did the part pass rigorous safety standards? Did any warnings exist that such a part was likely to malfunction with disastrous consequences? The answer to the third question, the existence of prior warnings that the part was likely to malfunction with disastrous consequences was ‘yes’ in the case of the Challengerr disaster as there was an eight year history of red flagged warnings concerning the continued reliance on the O-rings.
RISKY OR UNRULY TECHNOLOGY? From Perrow’s title of his book, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (1984, 1999) to Diane Vaughan’s title of her 1996 book, The Challenger Launch Decision, Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, one gains the impression in postChallengerr literature that one is a victim today to the ever increasing advances in risky technology. Vaughan states in her preface that,
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5
‘The practical lessons from the Challengerr accident warn us about the hazards of living in this technological age’. In the last sentence of her preface she writes, ‘This case directs our attention to the relentless inevitability of mistake in organizations - and the irrevocable harm that can occur when those organizations deal in risky technology’. But there was no necessity to fly if the technology were that risky or to choose that technology in the first place. The O-ring design of giant rubber gaskets keeping combustible hot gases from leaking out ranked fourth out of four submitted engineering designs and according to one important article co-written by Trudy Bell, Senior Editor of the engineering journal, IEEE Spectrum and Karl Esch, ‘The Space Shuttle: A case of subjective engineering’, Vol. 26, No. 6, June 1989, p. 44, [curiously omitted from her list of sources] was the chief cause of the Challengerr disaster. (IEEE is the acronym for the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers). The real culprit was nott the ‘risky technology’ of her subtitle, which locates the risk in the technology but ‘risky assessment’, which locates the risk in the decision to employ technology while not basing that decision on known safe designs and continued use on performance data and not on subjective judgements. The phrase ‘risky technology’ mistakes the effect f for the cause. It is more appropriate to speak of risky assessment (not ‘faulty judgment’ for that could be an even more sophistic version of the fallacious inevitable human error hypothesis y discussed above). ‘Risky assessment’ clearly locates the problem in the choice of unreliable and in the case of where life and death risks (of others) are being taken, unethical assessment strategies. Perhaps the best descriptive phrase to use is ‘ethically and epistemologically reckless assessment’. What is lost in the pseudo-concept of technological hazard or risky technology is that there is no need to choose a risky or an unruly technology. Turner and Pidgeon are mistaken (as is Vaughan) when they say that ‘ ... Vaughan points out that the shuttle and its operation were at the cutting edge of high performance aerospace systems. [certainly not the O-rings!] As a consequence the engineers were dealing with the ongoing development of an ‘unruly’ technology’3. Not so, there was no need to choose the poorest design available. Safer designs were available at the time. The Aerojet’s design was safer. In fact, the solid rocket joints have actually been completely
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redesigned. There are now three O-rings and when the boosters are firing, the pressure from the booster makes for a tighter seal. The astronauts now have access to explosive bolt escape hatches and are now provided both with parachutes and space pressure suits. The astronauts are now informed of any potential problems with a launch in question4. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight below, the astronauts could in fact have been saved with the installation of an abort system whereas Vaughan states that no abort system was possible (despite the fact that an abort system was indeed possible according to a number of sources which are not to be found in her bibliography, including Mike W. Martin and Roland Schinzinger, Ethics in Engineering, Second Edition, New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1989 and even in a source that she frequently cites, Richard Lewis, Challenger: The Fateful Voyage, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, which points out that it was an issue of policy not possibility that no abort system was installed) leaving her readers with the impression that the two civilians and five astronauts were helpless victims of risky technology. According to Schwartz, at the time of the Challengerr launch, NASA was cutting their safety budget by half a billion dollars ((New York Times, 24 April, 1986) and their quality control staff by 70% ((New York Times, 8 May, 1986).5
THE EXPLANATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL INERTIA OR BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT While this is not a common manifestation of the accidental cause, it can be cited as one. The explanation is that as bureaucracy in organizations increase there is a tendency for human responsibility for decisions to be supplanted by bureaucratic processes. As a result, as the good poet says, ‘there is many a slip twixt cup and lip’. While large organizations inevitably breed inertia, what is neglected in this explanation is that if the decision making of the organization poses life and death consequences for certain individuals, then such decision making cannot be left to the vagaries of inertia.
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Management is responsible for ensuring that life and death decisions are not allowed to be decided by bureaucratic drift.
ACCIDENTS WILL HAPPEN One of the most prevalent of beliefs that tends to undermine the project of disaster prevention management before it gets underway is the belief that accidents are inevitable given the cosmic design or lack of design of the universe. Just as the belief in the inevitability of human error can function as a strong disincentive to developing an orientation towards disaster prevention, the belief that accidents will happen and there is no way to prevent them also functions as a strong disincentive to building a comprehensive program of disaster prevention management. The important thing to focus on for the present moment is that both of these are beliefs; they are not established facts in any sense off the word. While no one would attempt to argue for the possibility of eliminating human error, that is not the same as arguing for the possibility of reducing human error to an ineliminable minimum. That human error can be reduced in its occurrence and its effects is one of the by-products of disaster prevention management. How this occurs will be demonstrated in the empirical cases to be examined. But the first step is to demythologize the belief that human error cannot be eliminated. The term ‘demythologize’ is preferable to the term ‘deconstruct’ because while deconstruction can take place to serve a number of purposes, the motive behind demythologizing is to attempt to take away the power of the belief in question to influence choices and behavior by showing that the belief is a myth. While human error cannot be eliminated, one can reduce the importance of this fact by replacing the phrase ‘there will always be human error’ with the phrase, ‘the incidence and the effects of human error can be greatly reduced’. Likewise, with the thesis, ‘accidents will happen’; there is no need to argue that accidents will never happen. In order to properly demythologize the phrase ‘accidents will happen’, it can be altered to read, ‘corporate disasters are largely not accidents at all, but nearly always functions of mismanagement’. Thus, one need not lock horns
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with the view that “accidents are inevitable”. All one needs to do is to provide sound arguments that disasters of the sort that this book addresses are hardly accidental in their occurrence but arise from a series of bad management practises. These bad management practises can be said to arise from a lack of ethical sensitivity or an ethical consciousness.
THE WORD ‘ACCIDENT’ If the view that is presented in this book turns out to be correct, it is rather important that one avoids the use of the word ‘accident’ to refer to the kinds of disasters under discussion. According to its dictionary definition, the word ‘accidental’ carries with it both the connotations of something that occurs by chance and something nonessential or incidental.6 The use of the word d ‘accident’ in this connection carries with it the connotation that whatever happened (as the Challenger “accident”) was inevitable (since accidents are inevitable and the Challengerr disaster was an accident, it was inevitable), and therefore could not have been prevented. As will be discussed below, literature concerned with the Challengerr disaster abounds with the term ‘accident’ to refer to the Challengerr disaster. Even the title of the Presidential Report claims to be the Report of the Presidential Commission ... on the Challenger Accident. It is indeed unfortunate that such a prestigious body adds its weight through its choice of language to the belief system that disasters such as the Challengerr were not preventable and, also, as the word ‘accident’ also connotes, were somewhat trivial in nature. (One does not refer to an earthquake, for example, as an accident even though it was not preventable by known human means). While the Presidential Committee might not have thought that the Challengerr disaster was not preventable, their use of the term ‘accident’ in the title and throughout their report carried with it an influence all of its own. The thesis that “accidents will happen” and that therefore nothing can be done to prevent their occurrence reaches its logical fulfillment in the thesis of Charles Perrow that accidents are so inevitable and therefore non preventable that we are even justified in calling them
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“normal”. Such a usage does extreme violence to the concept of an accident which by definition would be an occurrence that was not a regular occurrence and therefore abnormal rather than normal. Perrow’s intention must be to create the impression that “accidents” are part of the normal sequence of events. But statistically this is not the case. Nevertheless, we find the main title of his book to be Normal Accidents where he not only refers to such major disasters as Three Mile Island as accidents (here, he is not alone as the Presidential Report also refers to the Three Mile Island Accident), but moreover that nothing at all can be done to prevent their occurrence. Nothing could be further from the thesis of this present book. Perrow’s view, however, cannot be simply dismissed. He argues that high technology of today carries with it such interlocking complexity that it is impossible to eliminate the possibility of accidents. The problem with his analysis is that one must bear in mind that his thesis that “accidents are inevitable and normal” is a belief, and not a given fact. Some of the evidence that he provides in his book does not support his conclusion. For example, in his treatment of the Erebus disaster, which occupies three pages of discussion, he cites the complexity and the coupling of the system that resulted in the substitution of the wrong programming for the pilot to follow. In the chapter of this present book, ‘The Disaster on Mount Erebus’, it is argued that the fact that this substitution went undetected and/or was not communicated to the pilot was due to faulty management practises and a lack of an ethical imperative both of which could have been otherwise.7 If one leaves it as simple “complexity and interactive coupling”, then management is not responsible. The Erebus example, at the very least, does not support Perrow’s conclusion that this disaster was ineliminable unless one simply wants to hold onto the implacable belief that the complexity of causes in and of itself is of such a nature that there is no place at all for the concept of responsibility. The ‘accident’ and ‘tragedy’ language pervades many sources. Claus Jensen’s book on the Challengerr published by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 1996 bears the title, No Downlink, A Dramatic Narrative about the Challenger Accident and Our Time. In Rosa Lynn B. Pinkus, Larry J. Shuman, Norman P. Hummon, Harvey Wolfe,
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Engineering Ethics, Balancing Cost, Schedule, and Risk, Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle, published by Cambridge University Press in 1997, the term ‘accident’ appears on page 140 when describing the Challenger, ‘accident’ is used three times in the next two pages, ‘tragic accident’ on pp. 240 and 278 (a double whammy), and forms part of the title of chapter 14, thus appearing as a header of every page from p. 277 to p. 327 in the powerfully influencing phrase, ‘The Challenger [sic] Accident’. When the Challenger disaster is referred to as a tragedy it summons up an aura of inevitability and nobility when in fact, it was horrific and not tragic at all. To reference it as ‘tragic’ implies not only that it was noble and hence in some important sense worthy and redeeming but also implies that it was fated and thus unpreventable. The term ‘tragedy’ takes the responsibility for the decision out of the hands of the launch decision makers altogether and assigns the responsibility to a higher force. Today it is the gods of Technology instead of the gods of Fate. The meaning of ‘tragedy’ as mournful serves to focus attention on the victims and not on those responsible decision-makers. In Caroline Whitbeck’s, Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research, published by Cambridge University Press in 1998 there is a mixed usage. The term ‘accident’ is freely interspersed with ‘disaster’ thus diluting the meaning of ‘disaster’. For example, the word ‘accident’ appears five times on p. 144 to three uses of ‘disaster’. On p. 145, ‘accident’ appears three more times. The very first page of Perrow’s new Afterword to his 1999 edition of Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies features the word ‘accident’ no less than ten times and the word ‘accident’ occurs repeatedly throughout his Afterword. Whatever arguments that do appear conferring ethical responsibility to decision-makers, the incessant reference to the outcome as an ‘accident’ trivializes and neutralizes the ethical responsibility supposedly attributed to decision-makers. The subliminal effect of this word usage in terms of influencing the possibility of future Challenger like disasters cannot be ignored. At the same time it reveals metaphysical belief systems most likely shared by those who made the decision to launch: a metaphysical beliefs that exempted them from responsibility in advance. It is important to take note of metaphysical belief systems that are ethically neutering and to address this issue.
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The practise of employing the words ‘accident’ and ‘tragedy’ in literature on the Challengerr and other corporate disasters is endemic. Diane Vaughan, whose later book on the Challengerr was to attract much attention, was to make an early start as an arch user of the accident and tragedy language. On the first page of her article, ‘Autonomy, Interdependence, and Social Control: NASA and the Space Shuttle Challenger’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35, Number l, March 1990 the word ‘accident’ appears nine times, three times further buttressed by the adjective ‘technical system’ and once by the adjective ‘normal’. The word ‘accident’ is employed a total of forty-seven times in the course of her article. ‘Tragedy’ appears twice on page one and a total of nine times during the course of her article. In a later article, as mentioned above, she switches her preference to ‘tragedy’ as in the title, ‘The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, the Challengerr Tragedy’, California Management Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 1997. (Here the concept of “risky work” also makes an appearance – the real question is whose choice is it and whether it is necessary to work under risky conditions). Such language implies a lack of responsibility since accidents do happen and tragedies are of course due to Fate. Occasionally, there has been a change from the use of the word ‘accident’ to the word ‘incident’ as in the title of Joseph R. Herkert’s otherwise excellent article, ‘Management’s Hat Trick: Misuse of “Engineering Judgement” in the Challenger Incident’, in the Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1991. Herkert’s usage in his article is evenly distributed between the two terms ‘accident’ and ‘incident’. In ‘Risk Reporting And The Management of Industrial Crises’, Dorothy Nelkin does raise the issue of the use of words and the importance of the proper word choice. For example, she asks, ‘Was Three Mile Island an ‘accident’ or an ‘incident’?’ And she goes on to comment that, ‘Selective use of adjectives can trivialize an event or render it important ... define an issue as a problem or reduce it to a routine’. Cff , Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 25, Number 4, July 1988, p. 348. Nevertheless, the trend to use the accident and tragedy language carries on. An interesting new trend may be indicated in the Post-Modern mixture of the language of ‘disaster’, ‘accident’ and even ‘catastrophe’, ‘catastrophic accident’ and ‘calamitous accident’ at several junctures to describe the
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Challengerr disaster in Ann Larabee, Decade of Disaster, published by the University of Illinois Press in 2000. (While the present author originally thought that the ‘Post-Modern’ description was tongue in cheek, it was later discovered that Larabee’s work on the Challenger actually received the Postmodern Culture Journal’s Electronic text award). The addition of the word ‘catastrophe’ to describe the Challengerr disaster betokens the powerful hand of both Chance and Fate at once since one tends to think of catastrophes, like a Comet crashing into earth, as something which is not due to man’s actions and at the same time is unpreventable. ‘Calamity’ is not much better. It emphasizes the woeful side of the matter and thus falls in more with the ‘tragedy’ language while still borrowing the association with Chance and Fate that are connoted by ‘catastrophe’. With such a variety of descriptions the Challenger disaster becomes more and more opaque in Larabee’s treatment, at one point even becoming a ‘necrodrama’, thus casting the Challengerr disaster as an even more ghoulish spectacle than a ‘tragedy’. A ‘necrodrama’ presumably would be a kind of horror movie which would provide delectable appeal to those of certain theatrical and amoral (or immoral) palettes. Perhaps the change from ‘tragedy’ to ‘necrodrama’ is a reflection of the changing sensibility of the times.
THE BELIEF IN MONOCAUSALITY While it may be argued that no one takes the thesis of single causality seriously nowadays, there is a great deal of discussion of the concept of “human error” which seems to attempt to place blame ffor disasters on the shoulders of a particular individual or individuals. Such an approach, which tends to ignore systemic management factors would seem to be subject to the belief that events take place in isolation from a network or system of interacting causes. Whenever there is a strong effort to fix blame on a certain individual or group, such as is noticed in the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster or the case of the disaster at Mt. Erebus which was and still is argued by the Air New Zealand to be a case of “pilot error”, there is frequently a behavior known as, ‘scapegoating’. This
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was especially true of the Presidential Commission’s findings in the case of the Three Mile Island disaster where they argued that ‘the major cause of the accident was due to the inappropriate actions by those who were operating the plant’8. Even in the case of where multiple causes are sometimes considered as in the Presidential Report on the Challengerr disaster, the causes are separated out as if they operated in isolation from each other as single causes, divided into technical causes on the one hand and faulty management causes on the other. In this case, as will be seen below, it is not at all clear that the technical cause can properly speaking be considered as a cause, or at least, not as a primary cause as it is so designated in the Presidential Report. If the idea of causality is to be utilized, it must be borne in mind that no cause operates in splendid isolation from other causes. The belief in monocausality may lead the unwary thinker in the direction of eitherr finding particular scapegoats on which to affix blame or it may lead the unwary thinker in the direction of singling out technical factors on which to place major blame. A cause cannot operate singly: it always operates as an ingredient in a network of connections. In order to better appreciate the causes of a disaster, it is best to steer clear of the belief in single causes operating alone or in small clusters apart from some systemic background out of which they emerge. The reason why it is important to fully appreciate the systemic origin of any particular cause is that one way of initiating a change in how disasters may be approached is to look for the systemic causality in addition to the particular causation of any particular element in that system. It is not that by paying attention to systemic factors that one will ignore particular causes, but one will be in a better position to initiate a possible change in the causal pattern if the matter is approached both from the perspective of the individual causal agent and from the perspective of the systemic background out of which that causal agent arises. When the systemic background is fully considered, it should be discovered that no one cause operates or can operate in isolation from both a general system of causation and the cooperation of a series of co-contributing causes. Some so-called single causes, such as a technical defect in an O-ring design in the case of the Challenger disaster are not, properly speaking, single causes at all, as by themselves they possess no capacity for action but are set
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into motion by the direction for action given and the actions taken by top management. The series of co-operating causes exists by virtue of the fact that each individual particular cause contributes some element of support to that general direction.
MULTI-CAUSALITY AND MULTIPLE RESPONSIBILITY In place of the concept of monocausality, one can think in terms of multi-causality, that is, that a number of causes can and in fact do contribute to the emergence of an event and that any one of these causes can effect the changing of this event. An illustration of the operation of multi-causality is the phenomenon of a mother awakening to the hearing of her baby’s crying. The mother’s awakening is not an event that occurs in isolation and it cannot occur in isolation. In order for the mother to awaken, air must exist in order to carry the sound waves; the mother’s hearing and anticipation must be in a state of receptivity and readiness to receive the sound even while asleep. One of the factors that predisposes the mother to be receptive is the fact that she is (and understands herself to be) responsible for the baby in virtue of the fact that she is the mother of the child. This is the systemic factor. Another ingredient in the emergence of the event is that there is air for the sound waves to travel. If one transfers this example to an organizational context, the relationship of mother to child has to do with an established hierarchy of authority, or a systemic basis for the causal action to occur; the existence of the air may be taken to represent the communication channels that must exist for the action to take place; the mother awakening also requires a certain degree of the assumption of responsibility on the part of the mother for being responsible to the child. Rather than there being no cause for the event, the example cited demonstrates that there are multiple causes for the event and all causes must be co-present in order that the event occur. The notion of multiple causality brings along with it the notion of multiple responsibility. Instead of asking, in this case, what is the cause of the mother’s awakening? (the question formulated in
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this way assumes that there is a single cause for any event), one must learn to ask of each individual, what is her/his part in the emergence of this event? The notion of multiple causality does not reduce the responsibility of any one factor in the emergence of any event but extends the responsibility of all factors.
FAULT FINDING AND THE SCAPEGOAT Finding who is at fault is to assume that there is one and only one individual in every situation who is responsible. This individual is the scapegoat: the one who takes the blame. The technique of looking for and finding someone on whom to blame a situation is called scapegoating. When scapegoating is successful, one may think that one has solved the reason for the occurrence of a disaster. One may then think of appropriate punishment to dole out to the scapegoat. When this has been decided and the scapegoat (in some unusual incidents there may be scapegoats especially when diverse individuals can be seen or are seen to be acting as a group) has been punished, then the riddle of the occurrence of the disaster has been “solved”. That other disasters may arise is unfortunate and inevitable as there will always be human error. However, one can always discover and root out the scapegoats and the process goes on. The problem with the technique off scapegoating is nott only that it may be unfair to the scapegoat but that by thinking that one has discovered the cause of the disaster, one is alleviated from the responsible of searching further for the entire constellation of factors (which may or may not include the scapegoat). Whenever a scapegoat is searched for or cited as the cause of any catastrophe, one may be duly suspicious whether the true culprit or culprits have been found. Scapegoating is not a means of finding and assigning responsibility. It is a means of avoiding finding and assigning true responsibility. Wherever one finds the scapegoat mentality at work, responsibility has been abrogated, not shouldered. An analysis of causality leads one away from scapegoating and towards the discovery of the real
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responsibility for any event, which is always, and in every case multiple and never single. A good illustration of the awareness of multiple causality may be found in Churchill’s response to his horrified discovery that Singapore, rather than being an impregnable, proved to be highly vulnerable to a Japanese land invasion. In his history of World War Two, Churchill comments: ‘I ought to have known. My advisers ought to have known and I ought to have been told, and I ought to have asked.’9 This multileveled response of Churchill’s beautifully reveals the multiple nature of causality. It is possible that the Japanese invasion of Singapore could have been prevented. This is not a mere matter of the 20-20 vision of hindsight. What is interesting and well reflected in Churchill’s statement is that it could have been prevented in a number of different ways. In other words, it could have been prevented by taking different actions or by different single causes. Churchill himself could have known. If he did not know, he could have asked those who did. There were others who should have known as well. Those others (his advisers) not only should have known: they should have informed him (without his asking for the information) if they had had the knowledge. If the others had not known, Churchill, by inquiring of them, may have stirred them to find out. If the others had known, Churchill, by inquiring of them, may have been able to obtain the information. If they knew, they should have informed him. However, it is equally true that the disaster might have been prevented by the expedient of Churchill questioning his advisers on this issue. On the other hand, it was also true that his advisers should have found this out by themselves. Having found out the information, they then could have informed Churchill on their own without waiting for him to inquire of them. Any one of these eventualities might have been enough to change the course of events. The point being, there was no single cause for the success of the invasion, either. One could say that as Commander in Chief, Churchill’s ignorance was the reason for the Japanese success. He did not take the steps which could have prevented invasion. Or, one could say that his commanders in the field taking no action to inform him were the reason for the Japanese success. This is all apart from the efficiency of the Japanese military operation, which obviously had something to do with the successful
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outcome. The statement of Churchill’s reveals that the Japanese could possibly have been repelled in a number of different ways. Thus, there is no single cause for their success either. Their success was made possible by Churchill and his commanders having done nothing to defend Singapore from a land invasion in addition to their own well-taken action. The final outcome of the taking of Singapore is a case in point of multiple causation.
WARNINGS AND ETHICS It is amazing that in nearly every r case study of disaster that follows that warnings existed that could have prevented the disasters. Only in one case, that of the disaster on Mt. Erebus was there no warning. But in that case it was the actual lack of a warning, that should have been present, that precipitated the disaster. In no case was there an example of a single warning. Warnings were multiple and in many cases were marked by a sense of urgency and in some cases were continuous over a long period of time. The question is, why were the warnings not heeded, or in the one case, not provided? It is the thesis of this book that the lack of attention to warnings is a most serious symptom of both a lack of the will to communication, which will be discussed in Chapter Three, below, and a lack of ethical consciousness. That it is a lack of a will to communicate is self-evident. If one either does not provide warnings when they are crucially necessary or pay attention to warnings when they are of paramountt importance, this is evidence of a lack of free flowing communication. But what lies underneath the lack of communication? Of course on one level a lack of providing communication results from a fear that communication will not be listened to and, even worse, single one out as a troublemaker. A lack of listening to communication, of not taking it seriously, is sometimes explained in terms of there always being warnings and most of them turn out to be hoaxes. If one listened to every warning that was issued, one would never get anything done. While superficially such an explanation seems plausible, when one considers that the warnings that are discussed in this present volume
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are warnings of life and death, a lack of attention to such warnings takes on a different significance. It appears that what is in back of a lack of paying attention to warnings is a poverty of moral imagination: an incapacity to draw out the consequences of not heeding warnings in terms of the loss of life that not heeding warnings will bring about. Such a poverty of moral imagination is in effect moral blindness. The question naturally arises, what is the reason for the existence of moral blindness? While multiple answers can be given to account for the existence of moral blindness, it is apparent that an ethical consciousness is not considered a significant perspective. One attempt at removing moral blindness is to attempt to restore the importance of an ethical consciousness. In order to do so, a rule of thumb is to consider whether providing or heeding a warning will save human lives. If providing or heeding a warning will have the consequence of saving lives, the injunction to provide and heed warnings will take on the significance of an ethical imperative. Making the providing and the heeding of warnings into an ethical imperative may have an effect curing moral blindness.
FREEDOM AND ETHICS The first step in preventing disasters is the recognition that disasters are preventable for the most part. This may sound like a very obvious step to make but the omission of this step is one of the most major obstacles that hinders successful disaster prevention.10 This chapter in particular has been devoted to attempting to laying the groundwork for the thesis that disasters are preventable in principle. What has been stressed in this opening chapter is that in a universe in which everything is determined by forces outside of human control, whether it be the Fates or the complexities of high-risk technology, ethical concern will have no place. If it is granted that one possesses a certain measure of freedom to influence the course of events, then having recourse to some ethical direction is of great assistance. Empty freedom without a sense of direction is blind; an ethical direction without the capacity to implement it meaningfully is lame.
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So far this discussion has been devoted to the possibility of freedom. It is now time to turn to the possibility of ethics.
NOTES 1
Consider the use of the word ‘tragedy’ in the title of Corporate Tragedies: Product Tampering, Sabotage and Other Disasters (by I.I. Mitroff and R.H. Kilman), New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. While the authors of the volume may not at all intend the reader to view the issues that they discuss as inevitable and beyond our control, the word ‘tragedy’ carries with it a power all of its own to influence readers in this direction. When it appears in a title, the word carries with it even greater influence. Shrivastava, for example, in the very first line of the preface to his very ffine work, Bhopal, Anatomy Of A Crisis, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987, refers to Bhopal as the Bhopal tragedy. Consider also the title of Romzek’s and Dubnick’s excellent article on the Challenger, ‘Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challengerr Tragedy’, Public Administration Review, May/June 1987, pp. 227-238. Consider Diane Vaughan’s use of the word tragedy in, ‘The Trickle-Down Effect: Policy Decisions, Risky Work, the Challengerr Tragedy’, Management Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, Winter 1997, p. 86-7. The notion of C California the Challengerr as a tragedy ennobles the personalities of the crew and civilians as if they were making a choice to fly in the face of great dangers and thus to become tragic heroes and heroines. In fact, they had no idea of the risk they were taking and were unfortunate victims and nott tragic heroes or heroines. 2 Human error, or pilot error, has been a frequent explanation given by commercialairlines for commercial airline disasters and has had a strong effect on the popular mind. John Nance writes: ‘... throughout the history of commercial-airline accident investigation the pattern had been the same: The discovery that a human failure was the immediate cause of an accident almost always put an end to the investigation. Pilot error. Maintenance error. Procedural error. Controller error. As if there were no need to look further - no need to see that such accidents are the effects of other causes, causes yet to be addressed’. Cf., John J. Nance, Blind Trust, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1986, p. 73. 3 Barry A. Turner and Nick F. Pidgeon, Man-Made Disasters, Second Edition, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1997, p. 182. 4 According to a private interview conducted by the author with a current astronaut f Robert E. Allinson Review of The Challenger Launch Decision, Risky at NASA. Cf., Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, Transactions/Society, NovemberDecember, 1997, pp. 98-102. 5 Cf., f Howard S. Schwartz, Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay, The Theory of the Organization Ideal, New York and London: New York University Press, 1990, p. 103. 6 Webster’s New International Dictionary, Latest Unabridged, 2nd Edition.
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Charles Perrow, N Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies, New York: Basic Books, 1999, pp. 130-132. 8 As quoted in Charles Perrow, N Normal Accidents, Living With High-Risk Technologies, New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 26. 9 Winston Churchill, T The Second World War, Vol. IV, Chapter III, London: Cassell, 1951, p. 43. The source of this quotation was A.L. Minkes, The Entrepreneurial M Manager , Harmondsworth: Penguin Business Books, 1987, p. 25. The author is indebted to Professor Minkes for private discussions of Churchill’s view of multiple responsibility. 10 The thesis that disasters must be first conceived d of as preventable plays a decisive I estigation into the King’s role in the conceptual framework of Fennell in his Inv Cross Underground Fire, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988. Cf., f Chapter Ten, below. That the concept that corporate disasters (in his vernacular, ‘corporate tragedies’) are not preventable is a necessary first block to be removed in preventing them is a claim that is also put forth by Mark Pastin in his book, The Hard Problems of Management, Gaining the Ethics Edge, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1986. When Pastin asked a group of executives why they did not anticipate tragedies, ‘they responded that tragedies are not predictable’, (p. 130). Pastin goes on to state that, ‘Almost every corporate tragedy from thalidomide to Bhopal was forewarned. But in many cases, the warnings were so obvious and/or uncannily accurate that we can only conclude that managers refused to consider them,’ (p. 175, emphasis his).
CHAPTER 2 THE INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND BUSINESS The orientation of this book is that business ethics is not a separate subject from business administration. This is not to say that business cannot be conducted with a very low priority given to ethics. It is only to say that there is no inherent conflict between the nature of business, properly conceived, and ethical behavior. Business can be conducted with a very high priority given to ethics. This does not mean that all business that conducts itself by giving a very high priority to ethics will be successful. But that a business that gives a high priority to ethics will necessarily be unsuccessful is also not the case. There will always be situations in which choices must be made between profit and ethics. But this only means that ethics does possess a place in business, properly conceived. The danger of separating business from ethics is that one can easily justify unethical business practises by saying to oneself, f or to others, ‘this is business’, as if business were a separate domain which wore an ethics proof vest. Just as in the Mafia movies when before a contract is carried out, the contract killer says, ‘nothing personal’, so, the businessman could always say, ‘after all, this is business’, or, ‘business is business’, which means that ethics is not considered. This attitude can be seen in such statements as, ‘when I go home to my family, I will put on my ethical hat. Now, I am wearing my business hat’. If one were to attempt to start up a business and only later were to consider whether to apply ethics to modify the results of that discipline, it would be entirely possible that conflicts would result between what were perceived as the proper pursuit of that discipline and ethical considerations. The argument presented here is that it is more efficient (in addition to being more true) to take ethical considerations into account in the construction of the definition of the discipline. There are three fundamental ways in which ethics is involved in the definition of business enterprise. Firstly, ethics is
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involved in terms of the setting of the goal or goals of the business enterprise. Secondly, ethics is involved in terms of the establishment and the maintenance of the inward ties and the expressive communicative infrastructure of the business organization. Thirdly, ethics is involved in the very conduct of business in terms of a trust between employers and employees, between trading partners and between businesses and customers. This last feature of ethics has received treatment by others and thus will be mentioned only in order to make the entire treatment of ethics more complete.
ETHICS AS INVOLVED IN THE GOALS OF AN ORGANIZATION No organization, even if it were interested in profitability as a prime goal, could avoid producing some kind of social benefit or avoid intending at least in some part to achieve some kind of goal which is other than purely making money. Even the examples of a mint that mints coins or a printer that prints paper notes to be used as currency are literally making money but they are also providing a service, that is, creating the means for everyone to have a medium of exchange, which is a utilitarian benefit. Every r business enterprise that involves providing a service or making a product must provide a service or make a product which is something other t than the profit that is to be generated from the service or the product. Even the businessperson who sets out simply to make a profit must have some idea as to how to go about doing this. ‘Making a profit’ does not give the businessperson starting up, any idea as to what to do or how to do it. The profit motive is a non-user friendly Pole-Star. The goal of simply ‘making money’ does not give one any direction as to how to start up, continue a business enterprise, or offer any suggestion as to what kind of business enterprise to start up in the first place. If something else were to be required in order to start up a business enterprise in addition to defining the essence of the goal of business as being ‘the business of business is to make money’, or ‘business is buying and selling’, (in Chinese the word which is translated as ‘businessperson’ is ‘buying and selling person’), then there must be
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some other element which is the defining feature of business f margin. The directive to make enterprise in addition to the profit profits is too empty: it does not define business. One must add in something else such as, to produce a product that is needed, or to provide a service that is needed.The notion of filling some kind of social need must be taken into account when one is starting up a business enterprise. What is really lacking here is a fuller definition of business enterprise than the technically correct definition of the ownership or use of capital investment, land or labour in order to generate revenue for the owners. A definition of business enterprise that includes the creation of social value or the fulfillment of social need is needed before one can really understand what is meant by the word ‘business’ in the first place. It is understood that the desire for the acquisition of personal or family wealth is a need that arises from and is fostered by the fact that one is born into a system in which one must gain wealth in order to survive. One is not born into a system in which one is entitled to a comfortable, guaranteed income unless one happens to be born into royalty. But such a need is common to all who are born into a system in which some become engineers, some become physicians and some lawyers. What then should the motivation be for entering into the world of business? It cannot simply be that one considers that one can make more money than one can make by being an engineer because the desire to make ‘more money’ is a product of a social and an economic system; it is not inherent to the nature of trading or business. The question really is, what lies at the basis of business activities? What is being suggested here is that at the bottom of the motivation of the businessperson there is some desire to contribute to the overall social benefit. Regardless of what kind of social and economic system one is born into, one is born into a greater society. In some form or another, one’s deeper desires are to be affiliated with, recognized by and contributory to that society. In its most primitive form, the desire to be an accepted member of society is actualized by the desire to obtain personal wealth. This is corroborated d by the fact that the drive to obtain personal wealth cannot be actualized without taking social needs into account. While it could be argued that the fulfillment of social needs is not a self-conscious ethical act, it certainly can be selfconscious as it was in the case of Henry Ford to be cited below and in
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the case of many Japanese companies today. If it is not a self-conscious ethical act, it can become self-conscious utilitarian choice. If a deontologist were to consider the satisfaction of social needs to be the right course of action, then engaging in business could be construed as an ethical activity from a deontological viewpoint as well. Whether or not one also derived a profit from one’s actions would be a separate question from whether or not one’s actions produced social value. If one’s actions produced social value such actions can be construed as ethical whether or not they are also profitable. It is not only with respect to defining business enterprise that one must take into account the issue of social values. If one consults the typical kinds of definitions of economics one finds in an economics textbook, one can find implicit references to the creation of social value or the fulfillment of social needs. In order to show that ultimately human beings are producers and producers of social value, one may examine some standard definitions of economics that appear in arguably the most famous and influential textbook of economics in the United States. For the purposes of this examination, one may make reference to the work of Paul A. Samuelson, the economist who revolutionized economics at MIT and together with Robert Solow, turned MIT into the institution that best embodied mainstream economic thought for some three decades. The gifted Samuelson, though firmly in the Keynesian camp was able to unite a century’s worth of economic insights into a single, coherent theory the neo-classical synthesis - that dominated economic discourse from the 1950s through the 1980s. His textbook provided the basic education in economics of the present author among many others. In the Twelfth Edition of Samuelson’s classic textbook on economics published in 1980, one finds a list of definitions of economics that provide an opportunity to illustrate how definitions of economics cannot be complete without a reference to social values and social needs even though in the following definitions the references are not always fully obvious. The first definition that is given is: ‘Economics is the study of those activities that involve production and exchange among people.’ 1 The above definition possesses the advantage of referring to people as the obvious agents of economic transactions without whom
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economic transactions would make no sense as there would be no one to produce goods or services and no one to exchange them and no one to receive them. It all but comes out and states that economics cannot be defined without a reference to social values or needs. However, without an explicit reference to the fulfillment of social needs or the creation of social value, it is incomplete as a definition of economics since it does not refer to the motivation or end-purpose of economic endeavors. By referring to production and exchange a glimmer of the mechanisms of economic activity is offered. The second definition offered is: ‘Economics analyzes movements in the overall economy - trends in prices, output, and unemployment. Once such phenomena are understood, economics helps develop the policies by which governments can affect the overall economy.’ 2 This definition loses some of the advantages of the first definition by making the reference to the ultimate providers and recipients of economic transactions nearly non-existent. However, its reference to unemployment is unwittingly people oriented. Everyone psychologically fears unemployment and the use of this word in a sentence makes it crashingly clear that it is people who would be unemployed. It also possesses the unique advantage of referring to the behavior of governments since government monetary policy, for example, obviously effects human economic behavior. However, how and why movements in economy take place remains shrouded in mystery and hence this definition is perhaps even less adequate than the first definition which at least makes reference to production and exchange. The third definition offered is: ‘Economics is the science of choice. It d productive studies how people choose to use scarce orr limited resources (land, labor, equipment, technical knowledge) to produce various commodities (such as wheat, beef, overcoats, concerts, roads, missiles) and distribute these goods to various members of society for their consumption.’ 3 This definition is without doubt the best so far. Like the first definition, an explicit reference is made to people as both the agents and the ultimate recipients of economic actions. The mentioning of specific commodities such as overcoats makes it very obvious that economics is involved in providing value for people and by
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extension possesses social value and for the same reason is involved in fulfilling social needs without which it would serve no purpose whatsoever and in fact would not possess any reason for being in the first place. By making explicit reference both to the examples of concerts and missiles this definition of economics makes it very clear that economics cannot be defined without reference to value and/or disvalue. It only lacks an explicit reference to the function of economics as a provider of social needs and a creator of social value to be more complete on the ethical side of economic activity and an explicit reference to the basic forms of economic activity such as capital investment, labour, rent and trade to be more complete on the business side of economic activity. The fourth definition of economics that is given is the following: ‘Economics is the study of how human beings go about the business of organizing consumption and production activities.’4 This definition possesses the advantages of the first and the third definitions of explicitly referring to people or human beings. It also possesses the distinct advantage of referring to business thus displaying the important feature of economics that economics cannot be defined without reference to buying and selling, renting or trading. The mention of consumption and production is advantageous because it only requires a moment’s thought to realize that it is human beings who need to consume and benefit from consumption and that consumption cannot take place without production (of either goods, services or labour). It is hardly complete since the mere mention of production does not offer a hint as to the mechanisms of production. The fifth definition that is given is the following: ‘Economics is the study of money, interest rates, capital, and wealth.’5 While this would seem to be the most technically correct definition so far and resembles in this way the technical though limited correctness of the fourth definition while possessing the obvious advantage of an economy of expression, it possesses the disadvantage of concealing that it is people who set pay scales or interest rates and people who risk or lose capital and people who accrue wealth. The reference to wealth, however, does possess the advantage of making it very obvious that economics is concerned with the creation of value. In this case it is monetary value which is indicated. Again, some of the
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main instruments of the production of revenue such as manufacturing, trade, labour, rent, and sales are omitted from the definition. The sixth and last definition offered appears to be an effort to summarize the variations of definitions that can be offered: ‘Economics is the study of how people and society choose to employ scarce resources that could have alternative uses in order to produce various commodities and distribute them for consumption, now or in the future, among various persons and groups in society.’ 6 This summary definition possesses the advantages of comparative comprehensiveness and economy while making explicit reference to people and society, thus displaying that it is people and society who are the agents and the ultimate recipients of economic activities. It also possesses the advantage of explicitly stating that the purpose of economic activity is the production of commodities for people thus making it abundantly evident that people are the end users of economic activities and that it is thus social needs and social values that are being filled. While none off the above definitions explicitly refer to social needs or social values, social needs and social values are implied by all the definitions of economics that are offered thus suggesting that it is impossible in principle to define economics without taking into account social needs or social values in the first place. The means of production are not referred to in this definition and thus how production and distribution take place and why they take place is not indicated. It is interesting to note that in the third and in the sixth definition offered, a reference to scarce or limited d resources is indicated. This most likely is the influence of the tradition of economic thought which can be traced back to such figures as Malthus. Theoretically, one could approach economics as the study of abundantt or over abundantt resources. This would appear to be a question of circumstance, not principle. However, the reference to scarcity does seem to presuppose an ethical value which is either thrift or the value of distributive justice. The question, which is left unstated is, how does one manage production and distribution when the resources are limited? The question seems to imply that some attention in economics must be paid to making sure that resources either do not completely run out or that they are equitably distributed. Some concern is being shown for either the future of economic pursuit or
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the equity of its distribution or both. In either case, the reference to scarcity seems to suggest that some ethical value is at stake even if it is only meant that the ethical value is one’s egoistic survival. It seems to follow from this lengthy analysis that it would make sense to include the idea of social value and or social need in the very definition of business or business enterprise just as it would make a definition of economics more intelligible if the notions of the fulfillment of social needs or the providing of social values were included as part of its definition. It would also seem that any useful definition of business enterprise should include the major forms of the production, transmission and distribution of wealth just as any complete definition of economics should make reference to the major mechanisms of wealth production. One might venture a definition of business which includes a direct reference to the how of production and consumption (thus satisfying the technical needs of the definition) which at the same time refers directly to the motivation or the endpurpose of business activity in the first place. While it is certain that the following definition is by no means problem free, it possesses the advantage of making the concept of social value and the means of creating that social value explicit and thus presents itself as a userfriendly definition for the business person. Business enterprise may be defined as the ownership or use of capital investment, labour or property to produce a product, or to provide a service that fills some existent social need, or creates a new need to be filled, or creates some social value and by so doing, it is usually hoped that an economic benefit or reward is generated for the owner or owners. This definition of business is more user-friendly than the definitions of economics that appear above because it both explains how products or services are produced and states that such a production fills social needs (whether pre-existent or created) and fills these social needs by creating social value. It also possesses the advantage of making a direct reference to the notion of an economic benefit or reward instead of profit because such notation carries the advantage of including economic behavior that was not aimed at profit as a net result such as barter economics, non-profit business ventures and other trading relations. The main point which the above list of examples of definitions and the analysis of such definitions is designed to illustrate is that the very definition of business requires
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input from ethics in order to make sense of what it means to start or operate a business in the first place. Whether one’s real desire were to fill some social need or whether the social need were one which should be filled is another story. The point is, one cannot have a business enterprise in the first place unless one takes social needs into account. While this seems to be implied or stated in definitions of economics, it does not always appear to be stated or implied in such definitions of business that one may find. Business has no definition if social needs and social values are excluded when one attempts to define business. Thus, it is more honest and more descriptive of the essence of business to take ethical values (e.g. producing goods or services for others) into account when attempting to define the essential subject matter of business itself. Even the choice to be a business person is a choice which cannot but depend upon or refer to human value. Making of money is not an end in itself. Money serves the purposes of storing up security against the future thus implying that one must value the future in order to justify the saving of money. What sense can be made out of a life devoted to making money without a wanted outcome and a method for bringing the outcome into being? Even the example of the stockbroker who were to claim to be a stockbroker simply to make money could not be a stockbroker without serving some social need, which in this case, might be to assist other people in making money from the money that they have already made, but which was only earning bank interest. He or she need not have this social need in mind as his or her main motivation, but he or she cannot help but serving this social need if he or she were to make his or her own profits. If it were to sound circular that the social need that is served, is, in this case, also making money, one must keep in mind that in this case part of the money is being made for others, and thus social value is created for others. Thus, the stockbroker, even if her or his prime motive were to make a large profit for herself or himself, cannot avoid making money for others. She or he may lose money for others too, but in theory, at least, she or he cannot make money without some others making money, for if all her or his transactions were to result in losses for her or his customers, she or he would find herself or himself without a clientele. The directive to ‘make money’ is not sufficient to enable the stockbroker to conduct her or his business.
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The stockbroker must know what to do and how to do it. She or he must know how and when, in this case, to buy and sell stocks and which stocks to buy and sell and which stocks to hold. Thus, her or his business enterprise cannot be simply defined as a means of making money. Whether or not the provider of the service, or the manufacturer of the product, has in mind any social value to be gained from that service or product, the service or product must provide some social value. It may be argued that some services (such as prostitution), or some products (such as weapons), provide disvalue rather than value, but it would be difficult to provide an example of a good produced, or a service provided, that did not provide some social value. There may be debate as to whether the net effect of the product or service is a value or a disvalue to society, but this does not affect the point that every good produced, or every service provided, does not produce some social value however minimal, or however counterbalanced it is by some social disvalue that is produced. What follows from this is that there is no such activity as a business venture that is totally divorced from producing some social value. Whether or not the social value is intended by the provider of the service or the manufacturer of the product does not affect the truth of this essential fact. If it were true that every business enterprise must produce some social value, then to take the consideration of value as part of what is produced is a consideration which may be entertained at the very beginnings of a business enterprise. If one were to consider that ethics were relevant to business, then one could even take ethical considerations into account in large measure when one were contemplating the roles of business organizations. In 1984, Roger Smith, the CEO of G.M. reportedly stated that the responsibility of CEO’s and Boards of Directors needed to be expanded beyond the traditional concept of being responsible only to the shareholders of a company. Responsibility should be widened, according to Smith, to include the natural environment; the economic health of the entire country [this could be expanded beyond national boundaries] and the welfare of future generations.7 The notion that business is not there only to make a profit is, of course, not new to Smith. The original Henry Ford, the inventor of the model T, also held the view that
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business has other concerns than the interests of its stockholders when he said: ‘For a long time people believed that the only purpose of industry is to make a profit. They were wrong. Its purpose is to serve the general welfare’.8 The stockbroker may concentrate on her or his own profits to a large degree and focus only as needs be on the profits of her or his clientele. But the fact that she or he cannot make money without making money for some others, and thus creating social value for some others, means that social value or ethics is not something which is inherently in conflict with her or his desire to make money. In fact, she or he cannot make money without making money for at least some others (even if in some cases these others are not her or his clients), so that she or he cannot help but producing social value, even if she or he were to have no interest in producing social value. One must bear in mind that for a business to embrace ethics as part of its definition, it does not mean that a business should give up the value of making profits. Values which are non-profit values, can serve as a motivator at the same time that one is motivated by profit values. Ethics need not be seen as something antagonistic to the profit motive; it can exist alongside of the profit motive and even contribute to the profit motive. The separation of business and ethics is a part of a Western culture that considers that what is ethically good must belong to a non-body realm and that what is profitable cannot be ethical. For the Western mind, the notion that ethical and materialistic motivations can exist alongside of each other and even enhance each other is one which is a difficult notion to thoroughly accept. What is being said is that the relation between business and ethics may be perceived as an internal relation, not as an relationship between two external realms. In the Protestant Ethic, if one were to earn a great deal of money, that would be a sign that one might have been favoured by the Deity. But in this case ethics and business are still perceived as belonging to two separate realms. What is being maintained here is that ethics and business can co-exist in the same realm. The position developed here is different from what Adam Smith was saying in his early formulations of the theory of wealth. For Smith,
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while one was ethically minded, one’s main economic intent was to consider one’s private interest and the “invisible hand” would benefit society as a whole. While Smith certainly believed that the entrepreneur must be ethical in her or his business behavior, ethics was built into business enterprise as a frequent side-effect of business enterprise. It was not the motivating cause behind business activity and the individual was perceived of as seeking her or his own selfinterest. To quote Smith’s famous passage: ‘... every individual ... intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention ... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.’9 While this can, of course, be disputed, it is interesting to note that for Smith there not only was no necessary conflict between the demands of business and the demands of morality; there was a probable correlation. If one were to pursue one’s self-interest, the interests of morality were likely to be served. Unlike Smith, one need not relegate socially produced ethical values to the status of a sideproduct which is created as an indirect effect of following one’s own self-interest. Social ethics need not be seen as something extrinsic to or antagonistic to the profit motive; it can exist alongside the profit motive and even contribute to the profit motive. The modern day counterpart to Adam Smith is Milton Friedman who has vigorously championed the idea that, ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business - to use its resources and engage in activities to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud.’10 Friedman actually separates ethics from business to a greater degree than does Smith since Smith sees an ethical outcome as a likely side effect of pure business activity, while Friedman considers that possible unethical outcomes from business activities need to be redressed by government action and will not be taken care of by business pursuit alone. The position developed in the present work differs from Friedman’s, in that the
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present author argues that ethics can be an ally to business, whereas for Friedman it is an impedimentt and an antagonist. The position of the present author resembles Smith’s, in that business and ethics are not perceived as being in conflict. It differs from Smith’s, in that the present work argues that ethical concerns are necessary parts of business enterprise, whereas Smith sees them as probable but gratuitous side effects. The position of the present author, unlike both Smith’s and Friedman’s, takes the view that self-conscious ethics can be a part of the goals of the business organization.11
ETHICS AND THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE There is another way in which ethics is already a part of business, which is at the basis of both the goals of business discussed above and the communicative infrastructure to be discussed below, and that is in terms of the moral relationship that lies at the very basis of agreements and contracts. The very idea of trade requires a moral relationship between at least two persons. One cannot conduct business without the trust required to keep agreements. It is impossible to eliminate the waiting time between the delivery of a product or service and the payment. Whichever comes first, there is always a time of trust. The relationship between buyer and seller requires morality. The moral relationship always underlies the communicative infrastructure between business partners and employer and employee relationships. Without an underlying moral relationship, business agreements between partners and contracts between employer and employee would not be possible.
ETHICS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION Up until now this inquiry has been largely limited to the examination of what a business enterprise is attempting to accomplish externally,
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or the outside goals of an organization. The inside of a business organization or its management structure can also be examined for ethical content. What is being claimed is that there is a fundamental congruence between the principles of sound managerial organization and fundamental ethical principles. It is surprising to discover that ethical considerations are already inherent in the basic rules of sound organization. Whether such ethical considerations are explicit is another matter, but ethical principles can be discovered to lie at the heart of the basic rules of how to manage organizations effectively.
THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE: FORMAL AND INFORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS From the standpoint of management, one of the most pervasive and important factors related to the ffunctioning of a business enterprise is that of communication. The key concerns of management, such as leadership, motivation, organization, interpersonal interaction, problem solving, and decision making all involve communication. Unless one were to consider a one person firm, the quality of communication is a very important factor in an internally well managed organization. The quality of communication can in large measure be determined by what can be termed ‘the desire or the will to communicate’. Firstly, one can examine the will to communicate from an ethical perspective in general; secondly, one can examine the will to communicate from the perspective of informal channels of communication; thirdly, one can examine the will to communicate from the perspective of formal reporting channels.
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF ETHICAL COMMUNICATION: RESPECT FOR PERSONS One perspective which cuts across most if not all ethical and religious perspectives can be defined as, respect for persons. As
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one’s most fundamental value, there would be few instances, if any, in which one would be willing to violate one’s respect for persons. If the concept of ‘respect for persons’ were analyzed, it is observable that one’s attitude is the same whether the source of the attitude of respect for persons is the value that this attitude is a reflection of what is right, regardless of consequences (or deontological ethics), or the value that this attitude will conduce towards the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons (utilitarian ethics) or the value that this attitude will conduce towards the greatest possibility of self-realization on the part off everyone (individual or general eudaemonism). The selection of this principle of ethics thus cuts across the false dichotomies between deontology, utilitarianism and eudaemonism and allows one to be ethical without worrying if one must first decide if deontology or utilitarianism or eudaemonism were correct before one can choose to be ethical. In addition, it is of interest that this principle appears to be both a cultural and a religious universal. One can trace this notion back to the Golden Rule both of the Judaeo-Christian and the Confucian heritage which in its negative formulation in Confucius reads, ‘Never do unto others what you would not like them to do onto you’.12 One can also find this most basic principle in early Buddhism.13 The classic philosophical source for the notion of treating persons with respect is Kant’s Categorical Imperative which in the most user friendly of its three versions reads, ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, both in your person and in the person of all others, never merely as a means, but also always as an end’.14 This concept of respect can be expanded to include the natural environment and future generations if one views ‘respect for persons’ to be too anthropocentric or present bound. For simplicity’s sake the expression ‘respect for persons’ is employed, since despoiling the environment and upsetting the natural balance inevitably implies a disrespect for living persons and future generations. It is also to be understood that the concept of ‘respect for persons’ does not imply a disrespect for animals or other “non-persons” such as extra-terrestrial life that may be discovered in the future. The concept of a person may need to be expanded in the course of time. In a day to day business context, when one is treating another as a person, one relates to that other not merely as an employee, but as a
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full human being. While this might translate into many different fundamental modes of relating to the other, such as with politeness, recognition of the other’s human rights and human needs, the ultimate translation for according respect to another as a person is to communicate with that person, whether directly or indirectly, as an equal. It is in this sense that the Founding Fathers of the United States considered that ‘all men are created equal’. This did not mean that they were created equal in endowment but it did mean that they were created equal in moral worth. In the Japanese Management System, this is shown in non-verbal forms of communication such as the practise (honored in former times more than at present) in giving lifetime employment to employees, which makes the employee feel as valued and safe as the employer, and following the ringi system of decision making, which makes the employee feel that her or his opinion matters just as much as the opinion of her or his employer. This does not mean, of course, that there are no hierarchies of authority in a business context. But given those hierarchies, communication must be respectful. Respectful communication means both that one listens to the other, and that one talks to the other with an attitude that the other deserves to be both talked to and listened to. This might entail going out of one's way both to talk to the other, and to encourage the other to talk to one. Such an attitude springs from the fundamental ethical tenet that one’s primary attitude towards others is one of respect.
ETHICS AND INFORMAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION The establishing of viable informal channels of communication is one extremely important method of ensuring that the will to communicate has some way of manifesting itself. It is not enough to possess the intention of respecting personhood; it is necessary to the concept of respecting persons to ensure that that respect will be actualized. Otherwise, respect for persons will remain a hollow attitude which possesses no outlet and hence will not really constitute a genuine respectful relation to persons.
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The setting up of informal channels such as common rooms, tea rooms and coffee shops, which are genuinely frequented by all members of an organization, thus giving access to all members by all members, is a non-verbal communication that one really does possess an attitude of respect for persons. The legendary stories of such figures as Tom Watson, Sr., Konosuke Matsushita and Soichiro Honda walking the factory floors, and Akio Morita eating in the cafeteria with his blue collar workers, are other examples of demonstrating that a genuine respect for persons does exist. IBM’s Open Door policy is another example of an informal channel, which comes close to being a formal reporting channel, and thus cuts across the strict line of formality and informality. While all of these can be seen as integral aspects of good business policy, they can also be seen as emanating from a basic ethical attitude. Once again, there is no fundamental conflict between good business policy and ethical values. In fact, it may be argued that the providing of these communication channels in the right spirit actually provides the conditions that make ethical relations possible. By the same token it may be argued that it is an ethical spirit that generates the concept of these channels in the first place. The division between sound management policy and the attitude of respect is a pseudo-distinction.
ETHICS AND FORMAL REPORTING CHANNELS Under the category of formal reporting channels, one can include the explicit responsibility for communicating clearly those sets of tasks which each level within the hierarchy is responsible for carrying out. Without the notion of a clear-cut set of responsibilities belonging to each member in a vertical chain, it is difficult to understand on what basis each member of a chain reports to another, except in terms of pure authority. Thus, every level mustt carry with it a clear-cut set of responsibilities, so that it is clear what must be reported upon, in addition to, to whom one is responsible for reporting. If what an individual is responsible for, and to whom an individual is responsible, is not communicated to the individual, then that individual has not been treated respectfully for their role in the
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organization has not been defined. In addition to the matter of the possible neglect and/or conflict of responsibilities that might ensue, it is also not clear from the reporting individual’s standpoint, what matters that individual should report upon. It is also unclear to the individual who should receive the report, what matters she or he should expect to receive reports upon, from which individuals. The absence of clear-cut and clearly communicated sets of responsibilities both to act upon, to report upon, and to receive reports about, undermines the process of communication both from the management standpoint and also undermines the importance of the communication process from an ethical standpoint. If there were clear-cut formal reporting lines of communication, without the accompanying designated content which is to be communicated, it would be difficult to understand on what basis each member of a chain were to report to another except in terms of pure authority. Now, it can be said that the notion of clear cut divisions of responsibility and reporting channels are simply elements of sound management policy. If there were an absence of knowing what one is responsible for, the notion of reporting channels leading to and from one’s level in the hierarchy would be without efficacy. Likewise, if there were a clear-cut notion of what one is responsible for, without the presence of reporting channels, one would function as an isolate within an organization, and this can lead to management mistakes of great magnitude. What is of interest to note here is that the presence of clearly defined roles of responsibility and formal reporting channels are not only the basis of organization in the first place: they are the consequences of a fundamental ethical orientation. The organization which functions without a clear-cut set of reporting channels functions disrespectfully, since it is not according individual persons any means for significant communication. An organization which does not set out both unique responsibilities for each level of power, and a clear line of reporting channels, treats all individuals within that organization with disrespect. Of course, the presence of the mechanisms would be but empty forms if they were not informed by a genuine spirit of the will to communicate. But the absence of such mechanisms is at the same time the trademark of an unethical organization, because no genuine means for communication are available, a and therefore, there is no
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way in which respect for persons can be made manifest. While it is certainly not a new idea that clear-cut and clearly assigned roles of responsibility and reporting channels are the very basis of sound management policy, it is of interest to note that these very same mechanisms are a key ingredient in the formation of an ethical organization. In the chapters to follow, the consequences of not possessing clear-cut formal reporting channels will be illustrated by the examples that are studied. It will be especially obvious in the cases of the Challenger disaster, the King’s Cross fire disaster and in the disaster on Mt. Erebus how the absence of clear-cut reporting channels was a major contributory r cause of the ensuing disasters. In conclusion, the examination of sound mechanisms for communication and appropriate management structures and procedures shows that these mechanisms are at the same time, forms of ethical communication. It seems to be the case that not only is ethics required for the formulation of the goals and thus the matter (goods or services) of business organizations but that business organizations which are organized on the basis of sound management principles provide the forms without which ethical communication and ethical action within the firm cannot be actualized. Ethics is required for business and in the sense that proper business organization is required for ethical business relations inside the firm, business is required for ethics.
THE ARGUMENT FOR THE EQUIVALENCE IN EFFECT OF COMPETING NORMATIVE ETHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS In the end, the school of ethics to which one belongs is not ultimately significant in determining ethical outcomes. In other words, the same actions may be generated whether one is following deontological or utilitarian principles. Of course, this is not to say that there are no conflicts between outcomes that may be predetermined from different ethical starting points, but such conflicts may be resolved by adopting a multi-positional ethical framework. Before examining
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a multi-positional ethical framework, it is interesting to become aware that the same behavior may be generated by opposing justification systems. To illustrate the harmony that exists between competing ethical frameworks, it is useful to briefly examine the fundamentals of the leading ethical schools. Deontological ethics may be defined as that version of ethics in which one embraces m values from the standpoint of what one holds to be absolutely right or wrong regardless of consequences. While the word originates from the Greek for duty, its use since refers more to the absoluteness of the choice. Sometimes, deontological ethics is also called formalist ethics to emphasize that one’s values are held regardless of the context. Utilitarian ethics may be defined as that version of ethics in which one embraces or disengages from values from the standpoint of what social benefits or harms may be produced. Nowadays, consequentialism is a term used interchangeably with utilitarianism. Eudaemonistic ethics, not so common any more, may be defined as that version of ethics in which one embraces values from the standpoint of how an individual achieves his or her greatest self actualization. Egoistic ethics (such as Ayn Rand’s ethics) is basically the pursuit of self-interest, and thus would not distinguish ethics from the typical picture of business as the pursuit of self-interest. As a result, such a definition of ethics adds nothing at all to the current conception of the non-ethical pursuit of business, and therefore adds no contrast for a fruitful discussion. Ayn Rand is like Adam Smith without the proviso that the greatest good for society will frequently come about through the device of the invisible hand, or like Friedman without the proviso that the greatest good for society will come about through the survival of the fittest. In other words, Rand seems to endorse self-interest without any regard for the public welfare. Hedonism is the unbridled pursuit of pleasure, perhaps even at the expense of egoistic self-interest. Hedonism, like egoism, adds nothing substantial to the prevailing concept of the non-ethical pursuit of business and hence provides no contrast for a fruitful discussion. Religious ethics can by and large be perceived as a species of deontology though the source of the deontology in this case may not be a matter of personal choice but may come about through religious
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upbringing. For practical purposes, religious ethics may still be regarded as a variation of deontology. Of course this is arguable since it may be contended that one embraces one’s religion out of egoistic motives such as the motive to save one’s place in Heaven. Freud argued that religion was adopted to satisfy psychological needs and hence in a way could be said to have been maintaining that religion served a utilitarian purpose. For the sake of this discussion, however, it is the absolute rightness or wrongness of certain acts according to one’s religious beliefs that is relevant and hence for present purposes religion may be considered to be a branch of deontological ethics. Some writers prefer to designate religious ethics as command ethics. In this sense, one is commanded to perform certain acts or refrain from others regardless of whether one considers these acts to be right or wrong. From this perspective, religious ethics is not deontological. However, since one’s consideration of what is absolutely right or wrong is identical with one’s religious values, in another sense religious ethics is still deontological although there is a specific source of what is considered right or wrong, such as written scriptures. Virtue ethics, which is growing in popularity, extols the merits of character rather than specific acts, but is still either deontologically or eudaemonistically based. Eudaemonism or self-realization ethics adds the concept of the realization of one’s higher, fuller or complete nature to the egoistic concept of self-interest and hence transcends egoism proper. While not popular in the present age it may possess value despite its rather archaic appellation. In some ways, the three main schools of ethics cannot be absolutely distinguished from each other. While utilitarianism might seem to be favored by businessmen, one’s absolute choice to be a utilitarian must be either a deontological one or an arbitrary one. Kant, who is perceived as the arch deontologist, tests his main ethical principle, the Categorical Imperative, in some of its formulations, by appealing to a consequentialist criterion. Plato’s philosophy was certainly a blend of deontology, eudaemonism and utilitarianism. The entire deontologist versus utilitarian debate can be seen as a pseudoconflict. Plato argued that one should be just, both because of the intrinsic goodness of justice (a form, it may be argued, of deontology) and because of the results that it brings (a form of utilitarianism).
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Plato adds an additional component to the deontological-utilitarian or formalist-consequentialist mix by saying that when one values justice both for its own sake and for its results, one thereby derives one’s truest happiness as well. In this respect Plato’s ethical philosophy was a blend of all three ethical ingredients. In the Republic Plato has Socrates say that justice must be placed in the highest class of things: ‘... as a thing which anyone who is to gain happiness must value both for itself and for its results’. (Republic, V, 358) Within the mixture, Plato takes the side that justice is to be valued more for its own sake than for its results, but this does not detract from his view that it is to be valued for both reasons and thatt it can be valued for both is what places it among the highest class of things. ((Republic V, 366) The reliance upon the deontological-consequentialist-eudaemonistic mix with a slight built-in bias towards deontology offers a way out of dilemmas that confront the pure deontologist, the pure consequentialist and the pure eudaemonist. For example, the classic critique of utilitarianism’s ‘greatest good for the greatest number’ is that an injustice for a particular class could result, such as the slavery of a minority. The built in deontological portion rules out this version of consequentialism. On the other hand, if following the directive of producing the greatest good for the greatest number runs the risk of producing a mediocre society, then the deontological portion or the eudaemonistic portion can act as a corrective. This was Plato’s approach. While it may appear odd to classify Plato as a hybrid of deontologist, consequentialist and eudaemonistic elements, he does not think that one must make a choice between the Right and the Good. While it is traditional to describe Plato’s ethic as a form of eudaemonism, such a label does not take sufficient account of his emphasis on the intrinsic value of justice. Most properly understood, valuing justice both for itself, and for its results, also brings about the greatest human fulfillment, so that Plato’s ethics is actually a blend of all three types. While Plato’s writings are not all consistent with each other on this point, in his key works, he did not see a conflict between the demands of happiness and the demands of morality. Indeed, if one understood Plato’s separate works as intending to emphasize different aspects of life, then the different works need not be interpreted as inconsistent with each other. If one considers that Plato’s vision of the Republic is for him the best and the happiest
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society, and in this work he is emphasizing the focus of society as a whole, then the demands of deontology and utilitarianism can be seen to merge. If profit making can be seen to represent a wider social interest, then it need not be intrinsically incompatible with an ethical orientation. That Plato saw it this way is clear from his division of society to include a capitalist class for whom making money is the prime value. The presence of this class is, for Plato, one of the ingredients in what he considers to be the best or most just society. It is an encouraging sign that some writers today are seeing that deontological or formalistic ethics and utilitarian or consequentialist ethics need not be seen as competing ethical viewpoints, but may be regarded as complementary perspectives. All that is lacking, to some extent, is the incorporation of the eudaemonistic perspective as well. As a result, one can be a deontologist in some respects, a eudaemonist in others and a utilitarian in yet other respects. One’s choice of ethics can be context driven, that is, relative to the type of choice that one is making, without one becoming a relativist proper, that is, one whose ethics is wholly determined by the context or culture in which one finds oneself. While Plato’s ethics was a blend of all three types, one would hardly class Plato as a relativist. Within the limits of this present work, ethics is viewed from a utilitarian standpoint when one refers to ethics as the social values which no business enterprise can escape from creating. This is still not an absolute utilitarianism, since it remains one’s deontological choice that it is good to create social values. Ethics is viewed from both a deontological standpoint and a utilitarian standpoint when ethics is examined as a defining feature of the communicative infrastructure of a business organization. Ethics is viewed from an eudaemonistic standpoint when one considers that it is through business enterprise understood in its proper sense that some people can realize their full natures. It may be said that when business activities and internal business communication are both carried out in an ethical fashion that one’s virtues (and the virtues of others) are enhanced. In this sense, this constitutes a virtue ethics as well. As one acts nobly, one builds one’s character. As one creates a proper business structure, one provides the environment for others to develop their character as well. Just as Aristotle argued that one
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became good by performing good acts, one cannot separate right actions from virtue ethics. Properly speaking, they require each other. It may be argued that from the standpoint of utilitarianism that ethics may be a component of business, but from the standpoint of deontology that ethics can become the antithesis of business whenever business violated certain absolute ethical principles. For example, if one were a drug dealer, then, while one would produce some social good (jobs), one would produce far greater social evil (drug addiction). From the standpoint of deontology, this is ethically wrong even if some extremely minor social benefits were to be produced from the standpoint of the utilitarianism of the drug dealer and his employees. This particular business (not business in general) would also be considered ethically wrong from the standpoint of a wider utilitarianism which took not only the interests of this business into account, but the interests of the entire society. Thus, it would appear that from the standpoint of deontology and wider utilitarianism, ethics and certain forms of business, to use Plato’s metaphor from the Philebus, will not mix. Another solution to the problem of the appearance of certain kinds of business operations as unethical is simply to understand that when certain boundaries are crossed an innocent or good activity can lose its goodness. Eating is good, but gluttony may lead to illness. Or, one may simply adopt the position that the subject of one’s treatment is limited to legitimate businesses, not illegal ones. This, however, to a certain extent, begs the question. Even illegal and unethical businesses have their own internal ethics, such as the code of the Mafia. But for the purposes of this book, it is important to remember that the ties between ethics and business are only being stressed in order to show the relationship between social values and business enterprises and not thereby to justify all business enterprises. While even the drug dealer produces some good, however minimal and outweighed by the harm she or he produces, her or his business activities are still value related. It would be marvelous if one could put a stop to the drug business by adopting a eudaemonistic ethic and attempt to persuade dealers to understand that they can make money and realize their happiness in another way without producing such terrible social harm. But since drug dealers cannot normally be so convinced, that is why one requires legislation and a police force. Not every social
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problem can be corrected by an understanding of ethics, whether deontological, utilitarian or eudameonistic ethics. Underlying the utilitarian seeming approach taken to ethics presented here are fundamental deontological values such as not condoning murder, criminal businesses, mob violence, treachery, deceit, false representation and other dishonest business practises. (To be fair to utilitarianism, the same values can be generated from a utilitarian base by thinking in terms of consequences such as, if everyone were a murderer, then the greatest good for the greatest number would not be achieved, and so on, but this is a more roundabout method). The main point is that the data base from which one starts is the data base of ethical business. For the purposes of this work, the data base is limited to that of legitimate business. This is not to say that illicit business may not possess an ethical justification but this is a separate question altogether. Within the scope of this present work, by limiting oneself to legitimate business as a data base, one builds in a deontology before setting out to examine the inherent connection between ethics and business enterprise from a utilitarian standpoint. One could also have an underlying eudaemonistic base as well since part of what is being said here is that businesses can become more meaningful for their owners and workers as they become more ethically aware. The ethical business organization becomes a business community in which all members feel a sense of belonging. While in the ensuing discussion, it may appear as if it is the utilitarian perspective which is awarded the most attention, it would not be fair to say that this is an exclusive ethical justification. With respect to the setting up of the definition of business, the built-in dimension of ethics appears to be utilitarian but this choice of definition is itself deontologically weighted. With respect to the ethical basis for agreements and contracts, the built-in dimension of ethics appears to be both deontological and utilitarian and even eudaemonistic, although primarily utilitarian. With respect to the choice of the ethical goals of a business, while it can be said that these goals are utilitarian (or eudaemonistically) based, the choice of such a utilitarian base remains deontological. With respect to the role that ethical values play in communicative infrastructure, it is clear that ethical values are chosen because of deontological, utilitarian and eudaemonistic considerations.
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NOTES 1. Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics, Twelfth Edition, New York: McGraw Hill, 1980, p. 4. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Donald P. Robin and R. Eric Reidenbach, Business Ethics, Where Profits Meet Value Systems, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989, p. 7. 8. Ibid., p. 161. 9. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan, (ed), New York: Modern Library, 1937, p. 423. Patricia Werhane has argued in her Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. viii that even this quotation of Adam Smith’s was intended to be understood as applicable only in the context of a level playing field and a well-defined framework of justice. Cf., f also, p. 130, et passim. Thus, Smith cannot be construed to be the patron of robber barons. Smith, it must be recalled was a Professor of Moral Philosophy. In his book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he states that regarding the rules of justice: ‘... the most sacred regard is due to them’. He also states that ‘Without this sacredd regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential difference between a man of principle and honor and a f Knud Hakonssen, (ed.), Adam Smith, The Theory of worthless fellow’. Cf., Moral Sentiments, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002, pp. 204, 189. But it is also true that Smith thought that given a just society, the pursuit of self interest frequently led in the direction of justice for society as a whole. Smith thus conceived of business interests conducted inside the framework of justice as not merely linked with ethical interests but as frequent causes of ethical outcomes. 10. Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits’, reprinted in Raziel Abelson and Marie-Louise Friquegnon, Ethics for Modern Life, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987, p. 287. [Originally taken from Friedman’s, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 133.] 11. For a view which considers Smith to be closer to ethics than Friedman but for different reasons than those of the present author, cf., f Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982, pp. 62-69.
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12. Analects, XV, 23; Chung Yung, ch. 13. For a fuller discussion of the f Robert E. Allinson, ‘The Confucian Golden Rule: A Golden Rule, cf., Negative Formulation’, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 12, 1985, pp. 305315. 13. Hajime Nakamura, ‘The Significance of “Harmony” in Buddhist Thought’, in Robert E. Allinson and Shu-hsien Liu (eds), Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspectives, East and West, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1988, p. 102. It is interesting in this regard to consider Thomas Donaldson’s and Thomas W. Dunfee’s intriguing notion of Hypernorms developed in some detail in their persuasive book, Ties That Bind, A Social Contracts Approach to Business Ethics, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999. 14. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 429. Cff , Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, T. K. Abbott (trans.), London: Longmans, 6th Edition, 1963, p. 47.
CHAPTER 3
THE BUCK STOPS HERE AND IT STOPS EVERYWHERE ELSE AS WELL ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everywhere Else As Well’ is a new phrase which can serve as the cornerstone for the new epistemological and ethical foundations that are to be laid. The phrase reveals that responsibility for acts and decisions lies with everyone and at all times and is not restricted to any one person, place or committee.1 While the lion’s share of responsibility may belong to Top Management in that Top Management carries with it the responsibility to educate every member of a business community to take this phrase seriously, this phrase is thoroughly democratic and is not limited to Top Management.2 This phrase is the cornerstone of effective disaster prevention management and it emphasizes that moral responsibility is truly everybody’s business.3 Before discussing further how the incorporation of this phrase functions in sound and ethically based decision making in an organization, it is opportune to take time out to find out what is wrong with its predecessor, ‘The Buck Stops Here’.
THE BUCK STOPS HERE ‘The Buck Stops Here’ seems a harmless enough phrase. Why should a phrase like this one cause any trouble? It is the contention of this book that precisely this phrase lies at the very heart of communication impediments that prevent the very free flow of information and consequent action that makes disaster prevention a reality. The origin of the phrase lies of course with Harry Truman who displayed this phrase on his desk with the meaning that if a problem reached the Oval Office, it would not be passed over to be resolved
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by someone else. In other words, Truman was not going to abrogate responsibility. He would not pass the buck. This would seem to be an honorific enough origin for a phrase. What began as a good intention, however, has unfortunately been subject to considerable abuse. In an organization made up of many levels of authority, every other level of authority can then pass the buck of responsibility to the highest level. If the buck stops at the highest level, then it does not stop anyplace else. The attitude cultivated by such attribution of responsibility only to the very highest level is one of non-responsibility. t Such an attitude is a recipe for disaster. Of course, if Truman’s acceptance of the buck stopping at his door were accepted by every r top executive, the effects of responsibility lying only with the top executive would be greatly ameliorated. Because, at least one person would be taking responsibility and if that person were the chief executive, the beneficial effects of this would be enormous. However, if the chief executive also interpreted this phrase to mean that responsibility lay elsewhere, then the effects would be disastrous. The new conceptual foundation advanced in this work has as one of its major components the revision of the phrase, ‘The Buck Stops Here’ to ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everywhere Else as Well’. The revised phrase carries with it the implication that responsibility exists at every level of authority no matter how picayune and no matter how elevated. What this means is that responsibility is shared. In ensuing chapters it will be demonstrated how this can effect the prevention of disaster situations from arising. In nearly every disaster situation that is analyzed it will be discovered that at some level or another information was available which could have prevented the disaster from happening but the information was either not sharedd with the parties who possessed the capability or authority to act upon it or if it were, it was not acted upon. The information flow was impeded. Either those with the information did not pass it on or those who did receive the information did not act upon it. In the case of those with the capability and authority to act on information received, their not acting upon it was a manner of nott receiving it. They received the information but discounted its importance. Hence, they did not really receive it in a true sense of the word ‘receive’. In either case, there
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was a communication jam. Either the information was not passed on or it did not get through. What the rest of this chapter will argue is that the unwillingness to assume responsibility for action or the lack of free flowing information is the source of most if not all disasters. This chapter focuses on the power of the phrase, ‘The Buck Stops Here’ to stop the free flow of information.
THE WILL TO COMMUNICATE The topic at the heart of this discussion is the will to communicate. In order to have successful communication both the parties who send the information and the parties who receive the information must have the belief that communication is desired and that it will bring about a positive benefit. If the sending party is of the belief that her or his information will not have any effect or that it is not desired, then the information will not be passed on. If the receiving party is of the belief that she or he already knows all of the answers, then she or he will neither be receptive to any information received nor will she or he request information. If the sending party knows or surmises that her or his information will not receive a hearing, then her or his will to communicate is destroyed. If the receiving party is not really interested in hearing information or soliciting information, then her or his will to communicate is destroyed since proper communication requires a sender, a receiver and an inquirer. The concept of feedback which is an important facet of communication is in this model understood to be part of reception. A true reception of information includes an acknowledgement of information received and a response. Receiving information is not simply a passive act. It involves letting the party who has sent the information know that the information has been received and in what manner the information that has been received is being considered, e.g., it will be considered at some time in the future, it will receive immediate attention, and so on. The notion of acting upon is also understood to be part of receiving information as again the model of reception is not one of simply passively observing and taking no action. If, for example, the only person who is in a position to act upon certain information is
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given that information and does not act upon that information (and such information should be acted upon) then that person has not received the information in the full sense of the word. If all levels of an organization really believe that ‘The Buck Stops Here’ means that all effective decision making and all power resides at the top, then there is no communication between the levels of the organization. Where the will to communicate has been destroyed then there is no communication of any importance. In this condition, the organization is a disaster waiting to happen. If, on the other hand, all levels of an organization truly believe that the powers that be strongly desire communication and that there is a reasonable prospect that information will be listened to and acted upon, then within that organization it may be said that there is a will to communicate. When it is said that all levels of an organization must believe that communication is desirable, what is meant is that the very top levels of the organization must also possess this belief. The free flow of information can only exist when there is no point at which the information flow is dammed up. If the belief structure of an entire organization is such that, ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everyplace Else as Well’, then each and every member of an organization has the responsibility to solicit information, to pass information on and to act on such information when it is appropriate. It is not merely desirable to pass information on in the interests of an efficient organization: it is the responsibility of each member of an organization to make sure that the information is passed on. What this means is that it is the responsibility of each member of an organization to ensure that the information is not only passed on but that it is received. By the same token, it is the responsibility of those who receive the information to truly attend seriously to the information that is received. In order for this process to be effective, communication cannot be impeded at any point. If there is a structure or structures within an organization that make the free passage of information difficult or impossible, then such structure or structures must be altered. But this is not the complete answer. The most important element in the process is the will to communicate. If that will is present, then the necessary structures
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will be altered. If that will is not present, then all the changes in organizational structure in the world will not amount to anything.4 The will to communicate can be strengthened by the adherence to the rephrasing of ‘The Buck Stops Here’ to ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everyplace else as Well’. This phrase implies that each level of an organization possesses a unique and an indispensable importance. Any level of an organization possesses the power to block the communication process. By the very same token, every level of an organization possesses the power to enhance the communication process. But the communication process is not likely to be enhanced unless it is truly believed in by all participating parties that the buck stops everywhere.
THE MANAGER’S TASK It is the task of the manager to make sure that the passage of information in any organization be as complete, unrestricted and as speedy as possible. If there are any kinks in the bureaucratic communication line, then wherever those kinks exist, potential disaster areas exist. Crisis or disaster will strike at the weakest links of an organization and the weakest links of an organization are those links where there is a stoppage of the flow of information. In Chinese medicine, there are two elements which are considered vital for the healthy functioning of the body. There is the material element and there is energy component. The energy component is called the chi. In Chinese terms, for there to be good health, the chi must be able to flow smoothly. If the chi is not functioning, then the structure will collapse. If the chi is functioning well, then nearly any structure can work. In organizational terms, the flow of information is the chi of an organization. Where there is a blockage of the chi, the structure of an organization will be powerless. Where there is a free and unimpeded flow of chi, the structure of an organization will be able to function with maximum effect.
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THE MANAGER AS EDUCATOR AND FACILITATOR OF GOOD WILL One of the vital tasks of the manager is education. One tends to think of the manager as an administrator and or as a leader, but rarely as an educator. But good administration and good leadership cannot be carried out unless there is good will. The will to communicate is evidence of the presence of good will. If there is a will to communicate in a company then good will is present in that company. If there is no will to communicate in a company or a feeble will to communicate in a company then good will is absent or nearly absent in that company. There has been much discussion of the concept of the empowerment of individuals in an organization. But the lack of a will to communicate results in the enfeeblement of the organization no matter how much individuals might feel empowered. How is good will produced? Good will cannot be manufactured. It is the natural result of all parts of a company following the precept, ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everyplace Else as Well’. The manager’s task is the task both of educating herself or himself and of educating the company. The ideal person to initiate this process of education, of course, would be the CEO. If it becomes clear that the CEO desires that this policy of the buck stopping everywhere be implemented, then the implementation will have a good beginning. But a beginning is not sufficient. All levels of the company or organization must themselves really believe that such a policy is a necessary one and this, of course, requires education. Without the firm belief in the importance and the effectiveness of this policy, it cannot work. The willingness of management to perceive itself in this educative function is crucial to the operation of the system. The management must retain its own responsibility while at the same time ensuring that all levels in the hierarchy of responsibility shoulder their share of responsibility. The willingness of management to participate actively in this approach is the backbone of the system. It is conviction of this book that the establishing of both the will and the means of communication is the strongest possible method of disaster prevention available to an organization. The presence of both the will and the means of communication are evidence of the
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presence of good will in an organization. The presence of good will can only be maintained by the continuing n and the pervasive existence of a two way will to communicate at all levels. But such a will to communicate in turn depends upon the manager’s self-understanding of the importance of the existence of good will and her or his determination in seeing to it that the will to communicate is continuously actualized at all levels. The manager does not only require self-education; she or he must also be a continuous teacher. In addition, the manager must be a leader; she or he must take an active role not only in self-education and educating others; she or he must take an active role in implementing the will to communicate in her or his organization. One’s success in establishing the will to communicate in a company is directly proportional to one’s success in supplanting the notion of ‘The Buck Stops Here’ with the notion of ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everyplace Else as Well’. The notion of the buck stopping here and d also everywhere else at once is the notion of a business organization as not only a network of communication but also as business community. What is being discussed in large measure is the formation of a business ethic that is not only a formula for making business ethical but for making a business community possible. When a true business community is present, rather than there existing different levels of hierarchies what exists are different members of a community. A member of a community will naturally not only feel responsible for spotting potential disasters, requesting information, passing information on and acting upon such information received, but moreover will feel a keen sense of responsibility for making the business work. The same conditions for effective disaster prevention are the conditions for the success of a company. This is not to say that these conditions, when present, will ensure success. But it is very difficult to envision a successful company in which there is no sense whatsoever of belonging to a community.
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NOTES 1. The idea of ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everywhere Else as Well’ initially appeared in Robert E. Allinson and Leonard Minkes, ‘Principles, Proverbs and Shibboleths of Administration’, International Journal off Technology Management, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1990, pp. 179-187. A similar argument that sharing responsibility does not diminish any particular person’s share is developed by Michael J. Zimmerman in his essay, ‘Sharing Responsibility’, collected in Peter A. French, The Spectrum of Responsibility, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 275-289. The emphasis here is on the point that multiple causality extends the sense of responsibility but the point is substantially the same. An important implication of both Zimmerman’s and the argument of the present author is that the pseudoproblem of how or whether a corporation (which is manifestly not literally a person) can be considered morally responsible or should responsibility only be attached to individuals within a corporation is dissolved. If responsibility is something which can be shared without being diminished (Zimmerman) or, as the present author would prefer to put it, is something which is extended d when there is more than one actor, [the word ‘share’ carries with it for some readers the idea of dividing up responsibility such that if two actors share in the responsibility for something, then each share might be less than if one bore the responsibility alone], then both a corporation and an individual member acting on behalf of that corporation can be held accountable. This would appear to put paid to Velasquez’s argument that, ‘if we accept the view that moral responsibility for wrongful corporate acts rests with the corporation, we will tend to be satisfied with blaming or punishing only the corporate entity ... If we are to deter corporate wrongdoing ... our blame and punishment must travel behind the corporate veil to lodge with those who knowingly and intentionally bring aboutt the corporation’s acts’. Cf., Manual G. Velasquez, S.J., ‘Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do’, Business & Professional Ethics Journal, vol. 2, n. 3, Spring, 1983, pp. 1-18. Secondly and most importantly, Velasquez’s argument rests on a literal distinction between a corporation and its members such h that a corporation cannot possess intent. Consider his statement, ‘Since the acts off a corporation are constituted or brought about wholly by bodily movements that are under the direct control of agents other than itself, it is inappropriate to blame or punish the corporation r for those acts’. But this line of reasoning seemingly neglects the important fact that members of a corporation and in particular directors of a corporation are vested with the responsibility to make decisions on behalf off the corporation and the corporation is in turn responsible for decisions made by such members since these decisions are not made in the personal capacities of such members but in their capacities as representatives of the corporation. If this argument is not made then only the assets of individuals could be attached for damages and not the greater assets of a corporation. It would appear that Velasquez’s argument is vitiated on other grounds as well. On the one hand, there is the empirical fact that corporations are held accountable in practise for errors made by their employees, e.g., the Exxon Corporation was originally supposed to to pay out around U.S.$5 billion in
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government claims over the Exxon Valdez oil spill which took place in March, 1989. However, this decision has since been appealed and quashed. In any event, Velasquez could argue here that such an accountability was illicitly extracted. It is not wholly irrelevant to consider, however, that in U.S. law that corporations are already considered as persons (in a legal sense and not in every sense) and are considered morally and legally responsible. Thus, the issue of whether philosophers can decide if a corporation is a person first in order to decide moral or legal responsibility has already been decided upon by courts. That corporations may not be persons in every sense is irrelevant since they have been considered by U.S. courts to be persons in the sense that they can be considered culpable even of corporate manslaughter. Cf., People v. Rochester Railway and Light Co. 195 N.Y. Y 102; (1909) 88 N.E. Reporterr 22 and State v. Lehigh Valley Railway Co. 90 N.J. Law 372; 103 Atlantic Reporterr 685. In the former case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York was delivered by Hiscock, J. who stated that: ‘... we have no doubt that a definition of certain forms of manslaughter might have been formulated which would be applicable to a corporation, and make it criminally liable for various acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance when resulting in homicide ...’ Velasquez is well aware of French’s argument that a corporation may be considered to have intent if one takes into account the ‘CID’ structure (Corporate Internal Decision Structure) and quotes French’s point that the CID structure ‘accomplishes a subordination and synthesis of the intentions and acts of various biological persons into a corporate decision’. But this is insufficient in Velasquez’s terms since in certain cases, at least, ‘to the extent that a corporate act is the unintentional result of the concatenated actions of several corporate members, the corporate act may be an act for which no one is morally responsible: it is an unintentional happening’. But this argument, however subtle, does not take account of the central notion of this chapter which is that shared responsibility extends the concept of responsibility to every member of an organization and to the extent to which there is an omission of a necessary action, that individual or individuals and the corporation at large are nevertheless responsible. An extended discussion of this occurs in Chapter Nine of this book, ‘The Herald of Free Enterprise Disaster’, especially n. 14. Michael Keeley’s and David Ozar’s concern that if a corporation is construed along the model of a moral person, then corporate accountability might be lost is also addressed by the principle that ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everyplace Else as Well’. With the application of this principle both the corporation (as the body which is endowed with responsibility) and individuals within the corporation are jointly responsible. The notion of the joint and multiple attribution of responsibility is amply illustrated in the case of the British ferry disaster taken up in Chapter Nine. For Keely’s and Ozar’s arguments, Cf., Michael Keeley, ‘Organizations as NonPersons’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15: 1981, pp. 149-154 and David T. Ozar, ‘The Moral Responsibility of Corporations’, in n Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H. Werhane (eds.), Ethical Issues in Business, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979, pp. 294-300. Ozar seems to acknowledge the notion of shared responsibility
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among individuals within a corporation in his chapter; he still finds difficulty with the notion of finding a corporation morally responsible though he plainly wavers on this point: ‘If a pollution control device malfunctions and the community suffers the consequences of a dangerous pollutant, we might not hold the corporation morally responsible for the injury. Here, too, however, the use of the excuse is qualified. Both the individuals and corporations are required to exercise a reasonable degree of care to avoid accidents. If they fail to do so, then they are held morally responsible for acting negligently and they are not excused in the same way for what happens as a result’. Cf., Ibid., p. 297. For a further discussion of Ozar, Cf., below, Chapter Eleven, n. 75. 2. In their joint article, ‘The Moral Dimension of Organizational Culture’, Waters and Bird attempt to find ways to ‘strengthen the moral dimension of an organization’s culture’ which include seniorr management articulating an ‘explicit managerial ideology’. Cf., James A. Waters and Frederick Bird, ‘Moral Dimension of Organizational Culture’, Journal of Business Ethics, 6, 1987, pp. 15-22. While the present author would prefer the word ‘ethos’ to ideology, Waters and Bird do seem to stress that the CEO possesses an educative responsibility. It is the proposal of the present author that the phrase ‘The Buck Stops Here and It Stops Everywhere Else as Well’ be adopted as part of an explicit managerial ethos. This ethos would also include a safety first priority as will be discussed in the sequel. It may be noted that the taking on of ethical imperatives as partt of an overall managerial ethos would be considered to be the adoption of goals that were both goals forr and off an organization as is implicit in the arguments of both this and the following chapters. There should be no conflict between goals which would be considered the goals of and the goals forr an organization when one is considering the managerial ethos. Cf., Michael Keeley, ‘Organizations as Non-Persons’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15: 1981, pp. 149-l55 for a discussion of this distinction. The incorporation of ethical goals into an overall managerial ethos would also appear to solve the conflict perceived by Ladd to exist between the dictates of personal morality and management objectives in his article, ‘Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations’. Cf., Thomas Donaldson and Patricia H. Werhane, Ethical Issues in Business, A Philosophical Approach, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983, pp. 125-136. For approaches that do not see an incompatibility in including ethical goals in organizational goals, Cf., Kenneth Goodpaster, ‘Morality in Organizations’, Ibid., pp. 137-145 and Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982, Chapter two. With regard to the recommendation that safety be given top priority, Thomas Dunfee argues: ‘Although absolute safety is an unrealistic goal, managers must give the highest priority to safety. The principle is one of ethics rather than law, and therefore extends beyond the obligations imposed by government regulation’. Cf., Thomas W. Dunfee, ‘The Case For Professional Norms of Business Ethics’, American Business Law Journal, Vol. 25, 1987, p. 404. For arguments that Top Management bears a special responsibility for transmitting ethical goals throughout a corporation, Cf., Kenneth R. Andrews, ‘Can the best corporations be made moral?’, Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1973, pp. 57-64, Payne, Dinah, et. al., ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct: A Collective Conscience and Continuum’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 9, iss. 11,
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November, 1990, pp. 879-889 and Michael Simmons, ‘Creating a New Leadership Initiative’, Industrial and Commercial Training, Vol. 22, iss. 5, 1990, pp. 3-7. 3. There is a subtle difference here between the emphasis in this book on taking moral responsibility for decision making at every level and the extrinsic adoption of business ethics by the setting down of explicit codes of conduct. The latter understanding of business ethics is afforded by such articles as Bodo B. Schlegelmilch, ‘The Ethics Gap between Britain and the United States: A Comparison of the State of Business Ethics in both Countries’, European Management Journal, Vol. 7, No. l, 1989, pp. 57-64. The difference between the emphasis in this book and what is covered in explicit codes of ethics in companies is well illustrated both by the definition of and specific examples cited of ethical codes by Bodo B. Schlegelmilch and Jane E. Houston. Their definition of a corporate code of ethics is: ‘A statement setting down corporate principles, ethics, rules of conduct, codes of practice or company philosophy concerning responsibility to employees, shareholders, consumers, the environment or any other aspects of society external to the company’. Cf., Schlegelmilch and Houston, ‘Corporate r Codes of Ethics in Large U.K. Companies’, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 23, No. 6, 1989, p. 11. Such a definition does not seem to include a concept of responsibility forr managerial decision making inside the firm. It also does not specify any need for a prioritization of ethical policies such as a safety first priority. In the main, most ethical codes concentrate on employee conduct with community, environment and customers coming in second. Ibid., p. 15. One solution to this problem is the formulation of general credos as opposed to formal codes. As Thomas W. Dunfee writes: ‘The credo can send a signal that managers are expected to incorporate ethical considerations into all aspects of their personal decision making. Individual responsibility is emphasized, each manager must apply the general credo in a manner appropriate to his/her responsibilities. The general credo employed by Johnson & Johnson is widely thought to have been a major factor in its decision to pull Tylenol off the market when cyanide was discovered in some capsules’. Cff Thomas W. Dunfee, ‘The Case For Professional Norms of Business Ethics’, American Business Law Journal, Vol. 25, 1987, p. 391. 4. As Christopher Stone notes in Where the Law Ends, ‘We can restructure the corporation’s information processes so as to make it gather and channel vital data to those in a position to do something about it. But what is to guarantee that the person in authority, supplied the information, will act upon it? ... We can make companies install special officers in charge of particular problem areas. [one of Stone’s own solutions] But what is there to guarantee that, the special executive having been instituted, the other officers will not undermine him in all the subtle ways open to them?’ Cff , Where the Law Ends, The Social Control of Corporate Behavior, New York: Harper and Row, 1975, pp. 228-229. A striking example of a system of explicit reporting channels already in place which individuals both in the role of transmitter and receiver chose to ignore is the case of the Challengerr disaster detailed in Chapter Seven, below. It is odd that so little attention has been given by major philosophers to the conceptual problems related to corporations. According to an insightful article by Walter Robert Goedecke, ‘... a major area of modern life and modern law is neglected by the philosophers. Austin did not deal with corporations,
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nor has H.L.A. Hart in his works. John Rawls has nothing on corporations in his monumental Theory of Justice. Dworkin discusses the problems of social justice without reference to corporations’. [Hegel, Goedecke points out, is a major exception with respect to classical figures]. Cf., ‘Corporations and the Philosophy of Law’, The Journal of Value Inquiry, IX, Summer, 1976, p. 81.
CHAPTER 4
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER PREVENTION MANAGEMENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE “BAND-AID” APPROACH In the literature that exists so far, the phrase ‘crisis management’ has been widely employed. But this terminology is ambiguous. ‘Crisis management’ can be taken to refer either to managing a crisis after it has arisen, that is, intervening in a crisis situation or managing in such a way that a crisis does not arise in the first place. The blanket phrase ‘crisis management’ is thus a conceptual blanket that covers a multitude of sins. It is best to avoid the usage of such a label since the inclusion of the word ‘management’ in such a label implies that the process so labeled is envisioned as a solution to the problem of crises in general. This, however, is not really the case. At best, socalled crisis management addresses only crises that have already arisen and usually only when such crises have become either imminent or already actualized disasters. It is best therefore to avoid the use of the blanket phrase ‘crisis management’ altogether, and when it is used, to consider carefully if what is truly meant by such a phrase is ‘crisis intervention management’ or more truly, since a socalled crisis is not recognized as such h until it is an imminent or actual disaster, ‘disaster intervention management’. In the so-called ‘crisis management’ literature, the crisis is normally seen as that which eventuates as a consequence and is not usually conceived of as something other than the disaster itself. For Shrivastava, in his excellent book, Bhopal, Anatomy of a Crisis, the terms crisis and disaster are used more or less interchangeably. In some instances, his use is nearly opposite to that of this volume in that the disaster for Shrivastava is that which effects the crisis, whereas in the usage of
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the present volume, the crisis is that which precedes and can be in fact part of the cause of the disaster.l In the usage in this book, the word d ‘crisis’ is used in conformance with its dictionary definition as a decisive or critical moment or turning point when things can take a dramatic turn, normally for the worse, although if caught at this stage they can also be modified.2 In the Chinese language, the symbol for wei ji is a combination of two words, ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’. ‘Disaster’ is also used in conformance with its dictionary definition as a ‘sudden and extraordinary misfortune’ to signify the actual onset of the climactic event itself.3 As it will be noted particularly in the analysis of the Challengerr disaster to follow, crisis and disaster can be seen as forming a continuum in which a crisis if not stopped eventually leads to the disaster event. However, in nearly all of the literature on the subject, the words ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ are used interchangeably which provides the reader with much confusion. Since ‘crisis management’ is used in the literature to refer for the most part to either how one responds to an existent crisis or how one might anticipate crises and therefore be able to respond to them, crisis management most often connotes crisis intervention management whether after the onset of the disaster or in anticipation of the disaster.4 In either of these two modes, it is nevertheless a band-aid approach since it either comes into effect after the wound or primarily addresses itself to having a band-aid ready to cover the wound immediately so that the wound does not bleed overly much. Mitroff, Shrivastava and Udwadia, writing jointly, while still using the language of crisis management, argue well for a proactive rather than a reactive model of crisis management. Corporations are not to passively await a crisis and then react when a crisis hits them. They are to be more prepared and actively anticipate crises. Prevention, however, is not the primary purpose off even this sophisticated model of crisis management: ‘Indeed, prevention of all crises is not the basic purpose of planning and crisis management’.5 In a later article, Mitroff argues that every organization should engage in crisis planning which he defines as follows: ‘... crisis planning is a process of continual asking “what if” a set of crises hit us simultaneously? What are we prepared to do? Are we trained both intellectually and emotionally to handle a major crisis? In other words, the purpose of
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crisis management is to teach an organization to confront, in advance, the stress that will arise when a crisis happens’.6 This notion of crisis management may perhaps best be understood as anticipatory crisis intervention rather than crisis prevention proper. While it shows an advance from the simple reliance upon fixed contingency plans, it is nevertheless geared towards conceiving of reactions to various types of contemplated events.7 Mitroff does also speak of an entire organization as being proactive ratherr than reactive. Nevertheless, if crisis management does not involve a change in one’s conceptual foundations as is argued above, it is not at all clear how an organization can become proactive. The presence of a special crisis management team or a crisis manager may even operate as a disincentive for the rest of the organization to take responsibility for being crisis prevention managers. Consider carefully the probable influence of ‘The Buck Stops Here’. In Mitroff's writings, as in Shrivastava’s, the words ‘crises’ and ‘disasters’ are used virtually interchangeably, thus seemingly not sharing the view of this book which is that crisis and disaster are better understood if differentiated as different phases of a crisis on a continuum, the disaster being the final or most actualized phase of the crisis. However, Mitroff certainly does share the view that a d ‘disaster’) does give off early crisis (for the present author, read warning signals before it occurs.8 However, this is not quite the same as the argument presented in this book which would urge that the real crisis lies in the prior blockage of communication channels and the absence of a sound epistemological and ethical foundation for multiresponsibility for action and decision making. Mitroff’s earlier view tends to illustrate the current view of crisis management as that which operates for the most part after the fact; e.g., his recommendation that organizations should have a permanent, trained crisis management team.9 In the approach suggested in this volume, the crisis is perceived as the active stage on a crisis continuum which is already existent in a dormant stage, the eventual outcome of which is all too frequently the disaster itself. While the approach in this book could also be labeled crisis prevention management, since the concern of the present author is primarily with the prevention of disasters, the label, ‘Disaster Prevention Management’ is to be preferred. In a more
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fundamental sense, the way to prevent disasters is to prevent the arising of crises, either dormant or active. Thus, the way to prevent disasters from arising is through a crisis prevention management style. A major aspect of the change in epistemological foundations that is being suggested in this book is the change from management as seen as geared simply to profitability to management seen as being geared to the prevention off crises. The prime focus of the model presented in this volume is not to wait for disasters to happen and then to react to them but to attempt to prevent them from happening in the first place. Of course, there is in certain instances a very thin line which divides preventive designs from how those same designs operate in the case of an imminent disaster occurrence. However, it is still important to note that the focus is on prevention rather than response to disaster. This is not to say that crisis management understood strictly as an approach designed primarily to deal with disasters after they occur and also as a means of anticipating possible disasters and preparing for them is not an indispensable business function. A strong stand has been taken here mainly to differentiate such an approach from crisis or disaster prevention proper. While it would be suicidal to have no contingency plans ready to cope with conceivable disasters, the point being emphasized here is that one must be careful not to be therefore lulled into the point of view that disasters are inevitable and thus one need not exercise equal vigilance in their prevention. A good work that spells out the notion of crisis management clearly is Sidney Fink’s rather unfortunately titled, Crisis Management, Planning For the Inevitable, published by the American Management Association in 1986. While the book is mainly a primer in how to deal with disasters after they happen, Fink does relate that according to the Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, a full thirteen months before the disaster (which he refers to as an ‘incident’), a senior engineer wrote a strongly worded safety warning describing an almost identical accident [sic] to the one that ultimately occurred at TMI and how these same conditions could happen at TMI and that therefore clear safety instructions should be passed on to operators, but nothing happened and the memorandum was bogged down in chains of command and channels of communication (an all too familiar story
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as can be seen in the case of the Challengerr disaster and the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster) and was never even seen by the operators until after the accident [sic].10 Despite this virtually foreseen dimension of the disaster at TMI, the Presidential Commission finally resolved that ‘we are convinced that an accident like Three Mile Island was eventually inevitable’.11 Unlike the Presidential Commission, Fink is clearly aware of the prevention component of crisis management butt this component is not given the major emphasis in his book which in the end seems to be an example of anticipatory crisis intervention management.12 But for even anticipatory crisis intervention management to be truly effective, it would require, as is argued in this present work, a change in one’s entire epistemological foundations. Despite his statement that this key memorandum was ‘sidetracked in chains of command and channels of communication’, there is no recommendation in his book for an overhauling of the epistemological foundations with special attention to be given to the need for clear chains of command and channels of communication. But without precisely this sort of overhaul, such disasters as TMI and the others treated in this volume will occur over and over and over again.
CONCEPTUAL PREPAREDNESS It may be recalled by some readers that the motto of the Boy Scouts of America is ‘Be Prepared’. Such a motto has a strong parallel with the concept of conceptual preparedness introduced here. Conceptual preparedness is not equivalent to either drawing up a contingency plan for various imagined disaster possibilities nor is it the delegation of such a responsibility to a special task force. In the Boy Scouts, the idea was that each and every Scout had the personal responsibility of being prepared and this had to do with a sense of continuous vigilance rather than a conjuring up of all the possible things that might happen to one. Conceptual preparedness is a frame of mind rather than any particular plan or organizational structure or set of questions to pose. Conceptual preparedness for an organization as a whole is a frame of mind that entails that an absolute freedom of
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communication exists within every level of an organization and an absolute freedom of communication between one level of organization and another whether one is moving within the organization horizontally from one level to another, vertically from one level to another, or moving outside of the organization to make contact with or receive communication from outside organizations. The perspective that this book is arguing that must be put in place is a mentality that provides for an ease of operation that pervades an entire organization. It is the existence of this mentality that equips an organization to be sensitive to the prevention of disasters regardless of what particular kinds of disasters might happen to arise. Conceptual preparedness differs from ‘what if’ or crisis planning in that contingency management or crisis planning is limited by the particular questions that might be asked of the disasters that are imagined as possible occurrences. While such a questioning frame of mind must be incorporated into any optimal form of crisis prevention management, it would be a mistake to identify the core of crisis prevention management exclusively with ‘what if’ thinking. ‘What if' thinking is still a form of the ‘band-aid’ approach to crisis management albeit its greater sophistication. The ‘what if' approach still does not call for a complete change in epistemological foundations but maintains the same epistemological foundation and anticipates how to utilize that structure in dealing with various imagined possible concrete situations. Even the best intentioned ‘what if’ model is limited to being a kind of anticipatory form of crisis intervention management and is not really a crisis prevention model at all. The reason for this is that there has been no examination of the mentality and consequent management style that lies behind the arising of crises in the first place. The ‘what if’ school of crisis management still maintains that there is nothing wrong with current fundamental epistemological foundations but concentrates itself on how to tactically employ current resources to their best effect. It lacks therefore any basic strategy to fundamentally effect a genuine crisis prevention management objective. The ‘what if’ form of anticipatory crisis intervention differs from conceptual preparedness in general in that it is still finite in its possible courses of action. It resembles what may be considered to be possible tactics of intervention rather than an overall strategy of
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prevention. The limits of the ‘what if’ approach show up when a possible disaster situation arises that has not been envisioned. But it is not only that the best ‘what if’ thinkers cannot possibly envision all future possibilities since ‘what if’ thinking must form a vital part of any crisis prevention management strategy. It is also that the ‘what if’ thought process is limited to specific courses of action as its modality; it has not fully embraced the general thesis that the entire mentality must be altered.
THE EXPLICIT PRIORITIZATION OF A SAFETY ETHOS In the context of disaster prevention management, the logical culmination of an ethical consciousness which places respect for persons as its top priority is a consciousness that places matters of safety first in an organization especially when safety concerns possible matters of life and death. It is therefore of great assistance to specify the main thrust of an ethical consciousness within an organization to be towards the attempt to always give the first priority to the safety of life and limb of organizational members and members of the general public who are served or affected by the organization. Such a prioritization may be called the establishment of a safety ethos for the organization. (Such a concern can be expanded to include an environmental concern as well since a healthy environment is a condition for the long term safety of the general public). While the need for an explicit safety ethos may not be clear until one considers the case studies to follow in some detail, some general observations can be made. First off all, the establishing of a safety ethos for an organization empowers members of that organization with an ethical imperative. This gives all members of an organization both a greater sense of responsibility and also focuses their ethical responsibility by prioritizing it. The explicit prioritization of a safety ethos can serve as a motivator for everyone within an organization to be on the look-out for potential danger signals. In addition, the establishing of a safety ethos also provides a certain degree of peer
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pressure which can serve to protect members of an organization so that they might feel more safe to speak out without the possible loss of their job security. With no strong safety ethos that is embraced by Top Management, those who might spot some potential danger might well be disinclined to speak up if by speaking up they potentially could alienate some authority figure. A safety ethos can also serve as a source of authority for those in Top Management to appeal to when confronted with pressures from the outside such as political or financial pressures. The CEO can always turn down appeals to cut corners by saying that he has his hands tied: he is fully committed to a safety first prioritization.
THE INDEPENDENTLY FUNDED SAFETY BOARD WITH FULL VETO POWERS OVER OPERATIONAL DECISIONS There is always the distinct possibility that cases may exist in which clear lines of communication and clear areas of authority and a genuine spirit of communication is present and yet certain individuals may fear to speak out for fear of losing their jobs. Even the presence of a safety ethos may not bring with it a sufficient protection if a particular CEO is not fully behind the safety ethos. In such a case, it is important to have a management structure to provide even more protection than can be provided by a safety ethos by itself. Such protection can be provided by an independently funded Safety Board which can be a channel for receiving and sending warnings of possible disasters without the fear of endangering job security. If such a board is independently funded it can pursue its findings and announce its findings without fear of endangering its own employment. If such a board is given a full veto power over operational decisions, such as for example, the decision to launch the Challenger, then a safety first prioritization can be more assured of being truly actualized. If, for example, as is the case even with the most current management structure at NASA, the decisions of a Safety Board can be overidden, then a safety first prioritization is being given only lip service. The granting of both financial independence and full veto powers to a Safety Board is the
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only assurance that safety first considerations will be given a strong possibility of being actualized. The granting of such powers to a Safety Board can also be seen to be in the interest of a CEO or of the Board of Directors of a firm. In the eventuality that outside pressures are brought to bear on an organization to take actions that might endanger safety the CEO can always justify her or his refusing to bend under pressure by saying that it was not her or his decision to make. The granting of full veto powers to the Safety Board gives the CEO even more freedom to refuse to bend under pressure than the existence of a safety ethos would by itself. The CEO does not have to fear for her or his own job appointment if the decision not to take action does not come from her or his office. While this fear could conceivably still operate for the Safety Board itself, it is a less likely channel to be subject to outside political or economic pressure. If the Safety Board is also being subjected to such pressures despite its mandate to enforce the safety ethos, it may be necessary to consider how more protection can be given to those appointed to Safety Board seats in terms of job security in the same fashion as the members of the Supreme Court of the United States are given lifetime appointments so that their opinions will not be subject to outside political or economic pressure.
NOTES 1. Paul Shrivastava, Bhopal, Anatomy of a Crisis, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987, pp. xv, xvi. 2 . Websters’s New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 2nd Edition. 3. Ibid. Of course, it could be argued that the very idea of a misfortune conjures up the picture of fortune’s wheel taking a sudden turn and in this sense the choice of the word ‘disaster’ rather than ‘accident’, for example, is arbitrary. However, since disaster is not nearly in as active use as ‘accident’ or ‘tragedy’, given the limitations of language choice, ‘disaster’, in terms off semantics, in the opinion of the present author, does allow for the sense of responsibility to be present more so than ‘accident’ or ‘tragedy’. Itt goes without saying that the types of disasters under consideration are the ones which are man-made or for which corporate bodies can be considered responsible rather than natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, typhoons, tidal waves and the like. 4. In an article which deals with the organizational dimensions of disaster (and developing a view of disaster prevention management more consonant with the view
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developed above), when referring to the literature of disaster studies from post World War Two to 1976, Barry Turner argues that, ‘Disaster planning literature aimed at management ... begins with the assumption that a catastrophe will occur, and directs attention to the forming of emergency committees and the organization of rescue and relief plans’. Cf., f Barry A. Turner, ‘The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters’, ‘Administrative Science Quarterly, Sept. 1976, Vol. 21, pp. 380-381. 5. Ian I. Mitroff, Paul Shrivastava and Firdaus E. Udwadia, ‘Effective Crisis Management’, The Academy of Management EXECUTIVE, Vol. l, No. 3, p. 285. (Mitroff’s disclaimer that crisis managementt is not primarily aimed at the prevention of crises is all the more surprising considering the title of an earlier article of his, ‘Teaching Corporate American To Think About Crisis Prevention’, The Journal of Business Strategy, Spring, 1986, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 40-47). 6. Ian I. Mitroff, ‘Crisis Management: Cutting Through the Confusion’, Sloan Management Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, Winter, 1988, p. 17. 7. A fairly standard view of crisis management as consisting of contingency plans can be found in Robert F. Hartley, Management Mistakes, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983, 1986, p. 284. 8. Op. cit., p. 189. Ibid., p. 19. The importance of a crisis team is emphasized by Littlejohn in his book Crisis Management, A Team Approach, where he argues that ‘... the designation of a select team of individuals both to plan for and to manage the crisis represents the pinnacle of effective crisis management’. New York, AMA Membership Publications Division, 1983, p. 11. 9. In more recent writings, Mitroff’s view seems to have evolved and comes much closer to the viewpoint of the present, respective author. In particular, in his article ‘Crisis leadership’ he writes, ‘The best form of crisis leadership is crisis prevention’. However, what he means by this is to ‘put the proper CL programs and mechanisms in place before a major crisis. Conduct brain-storming sessions as to how you can better amplify early-warning signals, that all impending crises send out. ... There is almost always someone who knows beforehand that the crisis is about to happen. When early warning signals are picked up and acted upon, crises might be prevented, or its ill effects greatly diminished’. Cf., f Ian Mitroff, ‘Crisis Leadership’, Executive Excellence, Provo, August 2001. Crisis leadership is an approach that he advocates which replaces crisis management and this innovation possesses much in common with the viewpoint of the present author. It still emphasizes ‘having mechanisms and structures in place’ rather than the entire organization becoming an organization which is organized around the core principle off the prioritization of safety as in the view taken in this volume, but the differences in the points of view in Mitroff’s latest approach and that of the present author are shrinking. 10. Sidney Fink, Crisis Management, Planning for the Inevitable, AMACON, New York, 1986, pp. 11-12. 11. Ibid., p. 8. It is interesting to speculate if Perrow was influenced by or influenced this Presidential commission since he wrote a report for it. He appears to make no mention of the warning memorandum in his work. Cff , Normal Accidents, Living
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With High- Risk Technologies, p. vii. and his chapter, ‘Normal Accident at Three Mile Island’, pp. 15-31. 12. Another work which approaches crisis management from the angle of anticipatory crisis intervention is Gerald C. Meyers and John Holusha, When It Hits the Fan, Managing the Nine Crises of Business, New American Library, New York, 1986. (The title should provide a strong clue to the orientation of the book as crisis intervention rather than crisis prevention).
CHAPTER 5 THE VASA DISASTER While it may seem strange to reach so far backwards in time, it is important to consider a case from the more distant past so that it becomes evident that despite the fact that from the present perspective the case of the Vasa would be considered to be a case of low technology, the causes of the disaster are not greatly different from the cases of disaster that occurred in high technology environments. It is important to take note of this when one considers that one finds so many theses these days that connect man-made disasters with the riskiness and complexity of high technology. After a brief consideration of the case of the Vasa, it should be clear that the more things change, the more they remain the same. On the 10th of August, 1628 the warship Vasa, the oldest ship in the Royal Swedish Navy, set out on her maiden voyage, capsized in a slight squall and sank in Stockholm harbor. While fortunately there were no victims in this disaster, nevertheless there are lessons to be learned. The same patterns of causality that are to be found in subsequent disasters are already to be seen in the Vasa disaster. On the 5th of September, 1628, a Naval Court of inquiry was held at the Tre Kronor Palace in Stockholm. The court was composed of seventeen persons six of whom were members of the Council of the realm. The King’s half brother, Lord Admiral Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm was acting chairman. The inquiry found no one guilty and no definitive conclusions were reached as to the cause or causes of the disaster. The parallel here with the verdict of the Privy Council (the British counterpart to the Supreme Court in the United States) discussed below in Chapter Eleven and the Appendices with regard to the Air New Zealand disaster on Mount Erebus three hundred and fifty-one years later is rather stunning. No one was officially reprimanded or punished. After the inquiry, a group of the experts of the court assembled in order to analyze the records and attempt to find an explanation. There is a record of this meeting. It is difficult to
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ascertain the causes of this disaster for a great number of reasons not the least of which is that the testimonies of witnesses at the main inquiry held on 5th September 1628 were obtained under the threat of severe punishment and the penalties were harsh. Immediately after the disaster the surviving captain, Söfring Hansson, was arrested and put into prison and the day after, on August eleventh, a preliminary inquiry was held between him and the shipbuilder. This chapter is based on the book WHY VASA CAPSIZED which was written by Captain (ret.) Curt Borgenstam, R.Sw. N. Engineer and Anders Sandström.1 The wreck of the Vasa was located in 1956 by Anders Franzén and was salvaged in 1961 by Anders Franzén. This has proved to be a great source for the determination of the proximate causes of the disaster. The Vasa now stands in the Vasa Museum in Stockholm and is a magnificent and awesome sight for the visitor.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE VASA King Gustav Adolf commissioned the ship to be built by Henrik Hybertsson who became ill and died in the course of the construction and the work was completed by his assistant, Hein Jacobsson. A probable key point brought out in the book, WHY VASA CAPSIZED, was that the shipbuilder had planned the Vasa to have one enclosed battery deck.2 The King, however, decided upon two gun decks, possibly inspired by a Danish ship, Sancta Sophia, which was outfitted with two gun decks, which was being built at the same time as the planning and design of the Vasa, (1624-1627). The hull, however, had already been built and though it was modified, the modifications did not contribute to stability. The point is that the hull had not been designed for a ship that would carry two battery decks. The question which arises is, why was construction not stopped when it became obvious that the safety of the crew would be endangered? While it can be alleged that it was the wrath of the King that was feared it can also be said that the King had not been informed of the importance of the priority of a safety ethic.
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THE STABILITY TEST In the presence of Admiral Klas Fleming, the Vasa was given a stability test while it was still being fitted out at the quay outside of the Royal Castle. It was found to be unstable. Neither of the shipbuilders, Hein Jacobsson or Johan Isbrandsson, who were interrogated by the Court of Inquiry, were present at the test or were informed of its outcome. The question arises as to why they were not invited, why they were not informed of its results and further, why had they not inquired as to the results of the test. It is equally surprising that they themselves did not give the Vasa a stability test. One might well ask why both Admiral Fleming and Captain Söfring Hansson agreed to take the Vasa to sea after the failure of the stability test. Of course, the answer is pressure from above. According to Borgenstam, ‘... the King had in writing ordered that ‘both the Vasa and the Kronan [another ship commissioned at the time] shall be ready by the next Jacobi, (that is 25th July), and if not, those responsible would be subject to His Majestys disgrace.3 Neither Admiral Fleming nor Captain Hansson said anything about the stability test in their testimony at the inquiry. At the hearing the boatswain Matsson testified that Hansson had told the Admiral that the ship was unstable. The Admiral and the Captain ordered thirty men to run from one side of the ship to the other. According to Borgenstam, ‘The first time’, said boatswain Matsson, ‘it heeled over one plank, the second time two planks and the third time three planks’. (The similarity with the O-ring erosion in the space shuttle Challengerr to be discussed below in Chapters Seven and Eight must be noted. Here, it was considered that the ship could stand a list of three planks without capsizing. In the case of the Challenger, it was considered that if the O-rings could burn one-third of the way through that they had a three to one safety margin.) Then, he said, that the Admiral had ordered the testing to be stopped and said that ‘if they had run over the ship one more time she would have capsized’. (The Admiral sounds a bit like Boisjoly in his warnings of disaster if the Challengerr were to be launched). The Admiral had also uttered a wish “that His Royal Majesty had been home”.4 The King, Gustav II Adolf was leading the campaign overseas against
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Poland. However, it took only one day for a letter to reach him on the twelfth of August, 1628, and inform him that his ship, the Vasa, had capsized. Thus, he could also have been informed of the stability tests prior to the sailing. Since the sailing was on the tenth of August and the King’s original deadline was the 25th of July, the ship was already delayed. What difference would one more day have made? (The similarities with the Challengerr again come to mind). While it can be said that the proximate cause of the disaster was the decision for the Vasa to set sail in spite of the negative results of the stability tests, the cause which underlay this decision was the absence of a safety first priority and hence a disregard for the lives of the crew. Underlying the lack of a safety first imperative was a ethical disregard for the potential loss of human life. The decision not to heed safety requirements was a decision which can be said to be an unethical decision. Therefore, the underlying cause of the Vasa disaster was a lack of ethics.
THE QUESTION OF BALLAST In the course of the inquiry, the interrogator stated that the shipbuilder (Hein Jacobsson) had said that if he had been informed that the ship was unstable, then he would have seen to it that it was loaded down one foot deeper. Why had he not been informed? Was Admiral Fleming too concerned aabout the military considerations that if there were more ballast added that the gun ports would have been too low to have been effective? Is this why he did not choose to inform the shipbuilder? Why had the shipbuilder not performed his own stability test? Why had he not asked to be present at the stability test that he knew would be performed? Why had he not inquired as to the results of the test when it was completed? The Vasa had a limited space for ballast. She was so heavily built and armed that the available weight margin for the ballast was ‘... clearly insufficient to give her the much needed weight stability.’5 According to Borgenstam, in the section, ‘Why the Vasa Capsized’, of the thirteen reasons cited, ballast is listed as the tenth. Borgenstam stated that about twice as much ballast as was carried was needed but that
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amount could not have been accomodated and would have brought the gun ports too close to the water.6 Reasoning after the fact, Borgenstam concluded that a total of 130 additional tons of ballast was needed.7 On the other hand, while this view seems most plausible, Admiral Klas Fleming, whose view must have been very influential at the time, argued that less ballast was needed, not more.8 Of course, Admiral Fleming’s view may well have been influenced by purely military considerations, not nautical ones. In his exchange with Matsson, he stated that ‘You are carrying too much ballast: the gunports are too close to the water!’9 No one knew how much weight was needed for ballast as calculations of that sort were not possible in the 17th century. However, by reasoning backwards from the failure of the stability test it would have been obvious that more ballast was needed and it could have been added until the ship passed the stability tests. Thus, it was not the lack of precise measurements that was really the problem. If the ship could not pass the stability tests, it should not have been allowed to sail. If it did, and the gun ports were brought too low, it would have had to have been brought back into port and not approved as a military vessel until some adjustments were made. The most obvious rectification would have been a considerable reduction in the top weight. Most 17th century warships had such a low form stability that they were entirely dependent for weight stability by ballasting.10
THE WIND PRESSURE ON THE SAILS There was very little wind. At the main inquiry, Lieutenant Petter Gierdsson testified that, ‘The weather was not strong enough to pull out the sheets ...’11 However, as Borgenstam pointed out, the process was probably quick and dynamic as the squall came up suddenly.12 (Again one thinks of the Challengerr and the wind shear!). Even though it was a light wind, because off the low form stability of 17th century warships, they were very sensitive to the position of the center of gravity. Even a small change in the center of gravity, such as might be occasioned by the sudden onset of the wind, would completely change their stability characteristics.13 This was shown in
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the earlier stability tests where 30 sailors running side to side three times nearly capsized the Vasa.
THE VASA’S CENTER OF GRAVITY During the inquiry the judge asked the shipbuilder Johan Isbrandsson ‘why the superstructure was heavier than the lower part?’ 14 In the analysis attempted after the inquiries (a most interesting procedure which might benefit inquiries in the present age), a number of those present testified that the ship was heavier above than below and that it could not carry the superstructure. By reasoning backwards from today’s calculations, Borgenstam concluded that if the center of gravity of the Vasa had been only about 5-10 centimeters lower, she would not have capsized in the harbour.
WHY THE VASA CAPSIZED Borgenstam offers thirteen reasons why the Vasa capsized. In none of the thirteen reasons which are given is a lack of ethics cited as a consideration. While it might sound strange to posit the lack of something as a cause, it is no more strange than it is to say that malnutrition or a lack of food is a cause of death. It would be of interest to take note of the morally relevant considerations which lie at the heart of most of the reasons which are given by Borgenstam. The first reason given (these are not in any order of priority) is that originally the Vasa had been conceived of as a small ship and the plans were altered so that she was completed as a large ship.15 The new dimensions did not match with the timber already cut.16 What is missing in Borgenstam’s analysis is that the shipbuilder should have informed the King of this problem at once and, if the problem compromised the safety of the vessel, the King also should have been so informed. In the part of the book, WHY VASA CAPSIZED, which was written by Anders Samström, entitled, ‘The Vasa and the King’s Specifications’, what is missing in Borgenstam’s analysis is supplied.
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Samström reports that the shipbuilderr objected that the timber did not match the King’s specifications. The King replied, reasonably enough, that if the ships cannot be built according to the specifications that the contract be set up such that the larger ship should be completed first.17 Samström further mentions that the King was influenced in his decision by the Domesnäs disaster. (Borgenstam earlier made reference to this disaster in which ten Navy ships were lost in a storm in September of the same year). 18 Both of these points seem to indicate that the King was not as mad as would have appeared if one judges from the ornateness of the adorning art work that would appear to have made the Vasa a strange choice for a warship. His concern about the Navy shows a responsible mind at work. That he was agreeable to modify his earlier decision to follow certain specifications when it became obvious that the material was unsuitable shows an accomodating mind. Why then was there such hesitation to approach him when the Vasa failed its stability tests? The second reason given is that the production of the Vasa was delayed and the work on the Vasa, in the end, was carried out in great haste. While this, too, appears to be a technical reason, it also veils a morally relevant consideration at its core. Upon deeper inspection, if a shipbuilder approves of building a ship in great haste, he again fails to take the future safety of the crew into consideration. The hasty construction is a result of a lack of ethical considerations. The hasty construction while a secondary cause is itself an effect. It is not a first cause. If a safety first ethic had been in force, hasty construction would not have been allowed. The third reason, which is often cited as a key factor, is that the Vasa had been originally designed to carry one gun deck but in the end was outfitted with two. While this certainly appears to be a strong proximate cause, again it is the effect of a lack of an ethical prioritization. Surely, it would have been known by the shipbuilder that the ship’s design did not permit two gun decks. And, while attempts were made to strengthen the hull, this did little to increase the stability of the ship. Once again, a lack of ethics ruled the situation. The fourth reason given was that the Vasa was conceived of as an experimental ship aiming at a maximum of armament and thus little
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attention was given to factors such as stability. This reason implicitly exposes the lack of a safety first priority. If the first priority is military experimentation then the crew should certainly have been informed of the unsafe condition of the vessel. By not informing the crew, there is no consideration given to the possible loss of the crew once the ship set out to sea. (Once more one thinks of the astronauts and the civilians on board the Challengerr who were not informed of the dangerous condition of the O-rings and the hazard this posed for their lives). While the ship fortunately capsized while it was still in the harbor and hence all the crew was saved, that would not have been possible if the ship had made it further out to the open sea. Had the crew been lost at sea they would have died as hapless victims of a military experiment. The analogy with the Challengerr disaster which was to occur three hundred and fifty-eight years later is not lost. The fifth reason does not appear to possess any obvious lack of ethical considerations at its source. The fifth reason given is that Henrik Hybertsson became seriously ill and died a year before the Vasa was completed. As a result, the work had to be handed over to his assistant, Hein Jacobsson. Thus, there was a discontinuity in management. The sixth reason cited was the change in armament plan. This appears to repeat the third reason although more detail is specified. One of the details is that from the beginning the first plan specified an armament heavier than the hull could carry. This was not a change in the armament plan as it was part of the original plan. However, this is not the main point. The main point is that this, too, is at bottom the result of a lack of an ethical priority. If the armaments were known in advance to be too heavy for the hull it was obvious from the beginning that a design deficient ship was being built. It was the ethical responsibility of the shipbuilder to communicate this to the King. Safety was being compromised in the very design of the ship. Once again, one considers the choice of the O-ring design in the case of the Challenger. The seventh reason given was that the hull plus the armaments was much heavier than was customary at the time. The hull was also of exceptionally generous dimensions. Again, these seemingly technical considerations mask a more insidious cause. As it was known in advance that the hull was of exceptionally generous dimensions and
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added its weight to the weight of the armament, then ethical considerations were ignored. To ignore the future safety of the crew which would set out in an unsafe vessel was to be ethically irresponsible. An ethically responsible decision would have been not to build the hull in such a fashion. The presence of the prioritization of ethical decision making would have ruled out the construction of such a hull in the first place. The size and weight of the hull is a secondary cause, not a primary cause. The primary cause was a lack of a safety first priority which in turn was due to the lack of a moral imperative. The eighth reason given was that there were no known methods for calculating stability. In the opinion off this present author, this reason is insufficient. While there were no advanced means as would be available now there certainly were ways of estimating stability which were actually carried out at the time. If the lessons of those tests that were available had been heeded, the ship would not have been permitted to sail. Thus, it was not the lack of sophisticated engineering calculations that was a reason for the disaster. It was the failure to follow the known means of estimating stability that were practiced at the time. The failure to heed the lessons of the failed stability tests was due to a lack of an ethical imperative. The ninth reason given was that no methods for controlling the weight were practiced. This reason veils its morally relevant cause. That no methods for controlling the weight were practiced is an effect, although it became a secondary cause. The primary cause was that there was no overriding ethical priority. If there had been an overriding ethical priority, then weight control would have been practiced to ensure that safety standards were being met. In the absence of a safety first priority there was insufficient reason to practice weight control. The tenth reason given was the insufficient ballast. While this reason has been explored above it can be reiterated that the lack of ballast conceals a deeper reason as its cause. The lack of ballast is the result of a lack of a safety first prioritization. Of course, it can be argued that all of the reasons feed on one another such that no one reason stands by itself. The lack of sufficient ballast might in the end be traced back to the original design of not taking into account two gun batteries. But what is important is that at every design stage and at
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every decision, morally relevant considerations were suppressed. Thus, in the end, it was the lack of an ethical consciousness or an ethical sensibility that was the true and fundamental cause of the Vasa disaster. Of course, it can also be said that it was the lack of warning the King of the problem and thus a fundamental failure of communication was present. There was foreknowledge of the disaster that would ensue. But that warning was not communicated to the person in charge. There was most obviously a lack of the will to communicate. The eleventh reason given was that the Vasa was allowed to sail even though the stability test carried out in the presence of the Admiral indicated that she was too weak and unstable. While here for the first time it would appear that Borgenstam is entertaining a lack of ethics as a cause of the disaster, he does not make this inference. He argues that, ‘The reason for this was surely shortage of time (she was already delayed, and the King had put great pressure on all responsible for her quick completion). Another reason for this was that nobody seemed able to suggest any way of curing the lack of stiffness.’19 While no one could deny the felt pressure to meet the King’s deadline, in order to meet the schedule, ethical considerations had to be sacrificed. In other words, it was not only a case of needing to finish a project on time; it was also a case in which an unethical decision had to be made in order to complete the project on time. If there had been a moral imperative, the tests would have been heeded regardless of the King’s displeasure. As pointed out above, the sailing of the vessel was already past the deadline. What difference would the delay of one day have made in notifying the king of the failure of the stability test? Of course, there is another reason that may be hidden here. If the king had been so notified, he might well have asked why such a major problem had been undetected and/or unreported until the very last moment? Fear of authority may well have been a decisive factor in not informing the King earlier. Perhaps it is not surprising that the writer of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’ was a Scandinavian, Hans Christian Anderson. Was King Gustav Adolf his model? But what is lacking then is the education of the person in authority in the primacy of the moral imperative. The reason offered that no one could suggest any way of curing the lack of stiffness is not a sufficient reason to permit the vessel to sail.
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The twelfth reason offered appears to be due to a weakness in management rather than an ethical weakness. The twelfth reason was that there was no coordination between those responsible for the building of the hull, the decoration, the rigging, the ballast, and the armament. A sound management structure which offered both formal and informal communication channels for horizontal communication would probably have solved this problem. Of course, this is not strictly speaking a pure management weakness since a lack of communicating the choice of armament, for example, to those building the hull, would also possess ethical implications. The thirteenth reason offered was that the Vasa’s center of gravity was too high such that the sudden squall of wind of eight knots was sufficient to make her capsize. However, as the authors implicitly recognize, this in a sense was a secondary cause since the usual way of avoiding this would have been to increase the ballast which would have brought the gun ports down too low to be effective. As argued above the lack of ballast is itself a secondary cause as the primary cause was the absence of an ethical sensibility which would have considered the lives of the crew above all else. At the end of his section, entitled, ‘The Vasa and the King’s Specifications’, Anders Samström, brings up a vexing thought. He mentions that it was brought out during the inquiry, that during the discussion of the construction of the Vasa, her captain, Söfring Hansson says, ‘I fear that the same thing will happen to the ship which Hein Jacobsson is now building, for it is being built in the same way’. Of course it is only a hypothesis, though a reasonable one, that the ship to which he was referring was the Nyckln which was completed in the Naval Yard in 1630. But the Nyckln served without incident in the Navy for many years. In the last sentence of the book, Samström states that the Nyckln was more fortunate than the Vasa. But this analysis is insufficient. If the sister ship of the Vasa was indeed the Nyckln, and it was built in the same fashion, then if it did not capsize, the implications are puzzling indeed. It cannot simply be that it was more fortunate. It would mean either that the entire previous analysis is mistaken or that some important changes were made in the construction of the Nyckln. Since it is not likely that the previous analysis is wholly mistaken, it must follow that some significant alterations were made during the construction
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of the Nyckln. On this one must await the carrying out of further research on the details of the construction of the Nyckln.
CONCLUSIONS Though the Vasa was, compared to the present time, a construction of low technology, the primary causes of its capsizing are not different from the causes of the more recent disasters studied such as the causes of the Challengerr disaster or the disaster on Mount Erebus. In the case of the Vasa, information was available at the time that could have been communicated to the King. Had such information been communicated and had the King been willing to act on such information, the ship could have been saved. The fate of the Vasa was predictable and was not unforeseen. While no lives were lost, this was due to the fact that it capsized before it left the harbor. That the King did not receive warnings in advance was certainly a key element in what occurred. Thus a will to communicate was definitely absent in the case of the Vasa. In addition to the lack of communication, there was an absence of a safety first prioritization that would have ensured that the King receive the information that the Vasa was unsafe. Thus, behind the lack of communication was a lack of ethical priorities. One must look to the subsequent disasters to be studied to see if a pattern has already begun to emerge.
NOTES 1. Curt Borgenstam and Anders Sandström, WHY VASA CAPSIZED, trans. by Curt Borgenstam and Klas Melmerson, Stockholm: Vasa Museum, 1995. 2. Ibid., p. 24. 3. Ibid., p. 31. 4. Ibid., p. 31. 5. Ibid., p. 43. 6. Ibid., p. 56. 7. Ibid., p. 55. 8. Ibid., p. 51.
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9. Ibid., p 51. 10. Ibid., p. 43. It should be noted that one off the authors, Captain Curt Borgenstam, taught Warship Design to the Marine Engineering Cadets at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm. 11. Ibid., p. 45. 12. Ibid., p. 45. 13. Ibid., p. 43. 14. Ibid., p. 49. 15. Ibid., p. 57. 16. Ibid., p. 21. 17. Anders Samström, WHY VASA CAPSIZED, p. 74. 18. Curt Borgenstam, WHY VASA CAPSIZED, p. 21. 19. Ibid., p. 58.
CHAPTER 6 THE TITANIC DISASTER METAPHYSICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS It is apposite that this volume include the case of the most famous of all management disasters, that of the Titanic. The case of the Titanic well illustrates all of the weak metaphysical and ethical foundations that are the basis of the disasters studied in the course of this volume. One epistemological thesis that is well illustrated in the case of the Titanic is the curious mixture of an attitude of invincibility, that no disaster could befall the Titanic and the strange accompanying bedfellow belief, that disasters are inevitable and belong to the realm of Fate and are in any case beyond the reach of human prevention. It is an odd conjunction of belief systems but upon analysis perhaps is not as odd as first appears to the eye. In a way, one could say that these belief systems complement and strengthen each other. Both beliefs are absolutes. The belief that one’s own system m is invincible is an absolute. This absolute can survive alongside of the absolute that if something did happen it would be impossible to prevent it. That one’s own system is invincible gives credence to the accompanying belief that this kind d of invincibility can only be threatened by that which is beyond control. It is a kind of hubris that is akin to the ancient Greek hubris that no harm can befall one except that, of course, which is fated. By the same token, the notion that disasters are inevitable is a belief that strengthens the belief that m is invincible. The idea of the inevitability of one’s particular system disaster is an inevitability that is so inevitable that it has no relevance. The invincibility thesis was well expressed by Captain Edward Smith, ‘I cannot imagine any condition which would cause a ship to founder. I cannot conceive of any vital disaster happening to this vessel. Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that.’1 The disaster, similar to the Challengerr disaster, and the disaster on Mt. Erebus, revealed two 84
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complementary belief systems. One belief system was “nothing can happen to us”. Just as NASA operated from an invincibility thesis and Air New Zealand was famous for its slogan ‘Nobody Does it Better’, the Titanic was perceived of and even spoken about as unsinkable. The problem with this belief system is that it created an atmosphere of complacency. Precautions were not taken which could have prevented the collision or have minimized the consequence of its effect. If an attitude of finitude and vulnerability had replaced one of invincibility, it would have resulted in a greater care being taken when navigating in iceberg laden waters. Speed would have been reduced. Lifeboat drills would nott have been ignored. Warning messages would have been heeded. A change in course to avoid the icebergs would most likely been decided upon. All of these actions were not taken because of an attitude of heedlessness. Heedlessness or recklessness is a direct consequence of a belief in invincibility. It is only if one believes oneself to be invincible that one is mindless of dangers. While it seems self-contradictory, at the same time that one maintains the invincibility thesis, one maintains the thesis that ‘accidents will happen’ and when they do, ‘accidents are inevitable and thus unpreventable’; it is the very unpreventability of accidents that allows the thesis ‘accidents will happen’ to coexist with the thesis of invincibility. One is invincible under all normal conditions. If a condition is abnormal, then it is by definition outside of the boundaries of invincibility and therefore does not need to be taken into consideration. For example, of course the Titanic would be vulnerable to being sunk by a torpedo. But since it was not wartime, such a threat would not be considered one that one needed to be concerned about. And, if it should occur, such an occurrence would be mentally filed under the concept of inevitable accidents, a thesis which can happily coexist with the thesis of invincibility. In fact, the twin theses are wedded together. For, when an “accident” happens and the invincible proves vulnerable, it is proof that ‘accidents will happen’. It is almost as if the self-image of invincibility were that of Zeus, but even Zeus was subject to the laws of Fate. If, on the other hand, the invincibility thesis is replaced with a vulnerability thesis, there is no great need to have recourse to the thesis of ‘accidents will happen’ when something goes wrong. When something does go wrong, it is expected that it will since one has already subscribed to
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the vulnerability thesis. However, since one knows that one is vulnerable, one at the same time will take all possible precautions to prevent disasters and to minimize the consequences of their effects when they occur. It is important to note that both theses are abrogations of responsibility for what happens and this is the ring that weds the theses together. If ‘nothing can happen to us’ is held, it follows that one is not responsible for what happens since one is protected, as it were, by the magic spell of invincibility. If an accident does occur, similarly one is not responsible for the occurrence of the accident since accidents by definition are random, inevitable, and unpredictable events. One can hold the two theses together because both theses operate via forces that are beyond the scope of human responsibility. The two theses are in a way two sides of the same coin. No responsibility is taken for either side of the coin. One simply flips the coin. If one is invincible, there is no need for precautions. If one suffers an unpreventable accident, there is also nothing that could have been done to avert it. While the theses appear on the surface to contradict each other, and logically are selfcontradictory, there is no real self-contradiction between the two theses (which is why they can be maintained together) since invincibility is viable only during the normal course of events and not viable during inevitable accidents, and inevitable accidents, by definition not taking place during the normal course of events, are not factored into the original definition of invincibility. In the opinion of the present author, what is most notable about the Titanic disaster, is that, exactly like all of the disasters studied in this volume, it could have been prevented. It was not an inevitable accident. And moreover, even had it occurred, many of the lives lost could have been saved. There were many warnings of the imminent danger that the Titanic was in, but none of the warnings were heeded. A lack of respectful and thus ethical communication was perhaps the leading cause of the Titanic disaster. The Titanic represents a graphic illustration of how powerful metaphysical beliefs are. It is only the belief in the Titanic’s invincibility that must have overriden the need to communicate the messages to the Captain and at the same time the lack of ethical sensibility or moral imagination that if such messages were left unheeded, what the consequences would be. There is a
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multi-causal analysis of the reasons behind the Titanic disaster to follow. But behind all the contributing causes, it can only be the power of metaphysical belief that stifled the moral imagination. Of course, if safety had been the overriding priority of the ship, such an ethical consciousness would have overridden the metaphysical belief system. But metaphysics, not ethics, was the dominant force.
LOSS OF LIFE According to Discovery there were more than 2,000 passengers and crew who set out (2,201 persons on board).2 According to the American report, there were 2,223 persons on board.3 According to the British report, 1,490 lives were lost. According to the American report4, 1,517 lives were lost and 706 were saved.5 (Other reports mention the figure of 705). According to an April 12, 1912 article in the Engineering News, W. W. Jeffries, General Passenger agent of the White Star line counted the number of lives lost at 1442.6 According to Discovery, 1,523 men women and children lost their lives when the “Titanic” sunk.7 While in general, most of the information in this chapter is based on the British Board of Trade Inquiry, “Report on the Loss of the Titanic”, observations from other sources, including the American report, are included.
REPORT OF THE COURT (BRITISH REPORT) THE COLLISION Three days into her maiden voyage, E J Smith received several ice warnings from other ships. He altered his course further South to avoid danger but did not change fast speed. At 11:40 PM Sunday lookouts high in the crow’s nest spotted an iceberg and rang a warning bell three times to the Bridge. The ship turned hard a’port but it was too late.8 At a little before 11:40, one of the look-outs in the crow’s-nest struck three blows on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead, following this immediately
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afterwards by a telephone message to the bridge, “Iceberg straight ahead”.9 Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order “Hard a-starboard,” and immediately telegraphed down to the engine-room “Stop. Full speed astern”. But it was too late. On 11:40 p.m. on 14th April, 1912 she struck an iceberg and at 2:20 a.m. on the next day, she foundered.
CAUSES OF THE DISASTER Right Honourable Lord Mersey, Wreck Commissioner stated: ‘The Court, having carefully enquired into the circumstances of the above mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons appearing in the Annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship was due to collision with an iceberg, brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated.’10
WARNINGS At 9 a.m. (“Titanic” time) on that day a wireless message from the s.s. “Caronia” was received by Captain Smith. It was as follows: “Captain, ‘Titanic’ - West-bound steamers report bergs growlers and field ice in 42 degrees N. from 49 degrees to 51 degrees W., 12th April ...” This message refers to bergs, growlers (icebergs of a small mass), and field ice (frozen sea water floating in a much looser form than pack ice) as sighted on the 12th of April, at least 48 hours before the time of collision. Captain Smith acknowledged the receipt of the message. At that time the “Titanic’s” position was about lat. 43
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degress 35 minutes N. and long. 43 degrees and 50 minutes W. At 1:42 p.m. a wireless message from the s.s. “Baltic” was received by Captain Smith. An extract of this message was: “Greek steamer ‘Athenai’ reports passing icebergs and large quantities of ice today in lat. 41 degrees 51 minutes No. long 49 degrees 52 minutes W....” Captain Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message also. At the time the “Titanic’s” position was about 42 degrees 35 minutes N., 45 degrees 50 minutes W. Mr. Ismay the Chairman and Managing Director of the White Star Line was on board the “Titanic” and it appeared that the Master handed the Baltic’s message to Mr. Ismay almost immediately after it was received. About 1:45 p.m. (“Titanic” time), on the 14th a message was sent from the German steamer “ “Amerika ” to the Hydrographic Office in Washington: “ ‘Amerika’ passed two large icebergs in 41 degrees 27 minutes N., 50 degrees 8 minutes W., on the 14th April.” This was a position south of the point of the “Titanic’s” disaster. It was passed to the “Titanic”. According to the report, “Being a message affecting navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken to the bridge. So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard by anyone on board the “Titanic” outside the Marconi room. There were two Marconi operators in the Marconi room, namely, Phillips who perished, and Bride, who survived and gave evidence. Bride did not receive the “Amerika message nor did Phillips mention it to him, though the two had much conversation together after it had been received. I am of opinion that when this message reached the Marconi room it was put aside by Phillips to wait until the “Titanic” would be within the call of Cape Race (at about 8 or 8:30 p.m.), and that it was never handed to any officer of the “Titanic”.11 However, here, the conclusions drawn by Mr. Mersey appear unfounded. It seems most unlikely that if Bride and Phillips had “much conversation together it [the message] had been received” that
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Bride made no mention of such a significant message. In fact, presumably, since it is only Bride who survived, one has only Bride’s word on it that Phillips received the message and that Phillips failed to communicate the message to Bride. At 7:30 p.m. a fourth message was received and said by the Marconi operator Bride to have been delivered to the bridge. This message was from the s.s. “Californian” to the s.s. ““Antillan,” but was picked up by the “Titanic.” It was as follows: “To Captain, ““Antilla”, 6:30 p.m. apparent ship’s time; lat. 42 degrees 3 minutes N., long. 49 degrees 9 minutes W. Three large bergs five miles to southward of us. Regards, Lord.” According to the report, incredibly enough, “Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message”.12 Is it possible that Bride did not deliver this message at all? There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the “Titanic” at 9:40 p.m. This was from a steamer called the “Mesaba”: “From “Mesaba” to “Titanic” and all east-bound ships. Ice report in lat. 42 degrees N. to 41 degrees 25 minutes N., long. 49 degrees to long. 50 degrees 30 minutes W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number of large icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.” According to the report, “This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate vicinity of the “Titanic”, and if it had reached the bridge would perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been delivered to the Master or to any of the officers”. 13 The explanation in the report, incredibly enough, was that the Marconi operator was very busy from 8 p.m. onward transmitting messages for passengers on board the “Titanic” and the probability is that “he failed to grasp the significance and importance of the message ...” 14 According to Mr. Mersey, “I am satisfied it [this message] was not received by him [Captain Smith]”. According to the American report, there was no general discussion of these warnings among the officers, no conference called to discuss
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these warnings, and no heed was given to them.15 According to the British report, Mr. Lightroller, the second officer, reported that both he and the Master knew that the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightroller testified that the Master showed him the “Caronia” message about 12:45 p.m. and before going off watch had reported that “he made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied a him that the “Titanic” would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he came on watch again at 6 p.m.”16 Mr. Lightroller testified that at 6 p.m., he does not recall having been told about the “Baltic” message which had been received at 1:42 p.m.17 The extent of the non reporting of warning messages is extreme. Mr. Lightroller testified that he asked Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), at what time we should reach the vicinity of the ice and says that he thinks that Mr. Moody reported about 11 o’clock.18 If this testimony is correct, then the second officer of the Titanic knew full well the approximately correct time to anticipate the ice collision. However, Mr. Lightroller testified further that this time did not agree with his own mental calculations which showed an even earlier anticipation time (of 9:30 p.m. which in his testimony he even changed to between 7 and 8 o’clock). In any event the point is that both Mr. Moody and Mr. Lightroller expected that they would reach the vicinity of ice before midnight which is when it was met. However, when questioned as to whether he was afraid that they might run across a growler (a low-lying berg), he answered that he judged that they would see it at a distance of probably two miles.19 At 9:30 p.m., Mr. Lightroller instructed the crew on the crow’s nest “to keep a sharp look-out for ice, particularly small ice and growlers”.20 At 10 o’clock, Mr. Lightroller handed over the watch to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, (dead) telling him that “we might be up around the ice any time now”. That Mr. Murdoch knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of Hemming, a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7:15 p.m., Mr. Murdoch told him that “... we are in the vicinity of ice”.
WARNINGS TO PASSENGERS According to the American report, no general alarm was sounded and no systematic warning was given the passengers.21 Mrs. George
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Stone, a first-class passenger reported, “Not a single warning was given in the part of the ship in which I was ... We could have died like rats in a trap for all the warning we received”.22
SPEED OF THE SHIP “The entire passage had been made at high speed ... and this speed was never reduced until the collision was unavoidable.”23 The fourth officer estimated the “Titanic’s” speed at 22 knots from 7:30 p.m. to the time of the collision.
WEATHER The weather from 6 p.m. onwards to the time of the collision was perfectly clear and fine. The stars were out. There was no moon which would have affected visibility. There was also a drop of temperature of 10 deg. in slightly less than two hours and though this is not an indication of ice, according to Sir Ernest Shackelton: “if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the time of the year, I would consider that I was approaching an area which might have ice in it”.24
CAUSES OF DEATHS According to Titanic, 1994, one could not have lasted more than 2030 minutes in the ice cold water as it was 28 degrees F. or 4 degrees under freezing temperature. Most of the “Titanic’s” casualities died from exposure to ice cold water, not to drownings.
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HOW ELSE COULD THE TITANIC DISASTER BEEN PREVENTED? According to an April, 1912 issue of the Scientific American, “Had the “Titanic” been running under a slow bell, she would probably have been afloat today.” [emphasis in original]25 According to the Scientific American, half speed, as she should have been, would have saved the ship.26 According to Unger, “Had the lookouts been equipped with binoculars, they would almost certainly have seen the iceberg in time for the ship to have avoided it.”27 The British Report takes exception to this and states that the provision of binoculars would have made no difference.
THE SAILING ORDERS Besides the book of Ship’s Rules, every master when first appointed to command a ship is addressed by special letter from the Company, of which the following passage is an extract: “You are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent and ever watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the slightest risk which can be avoided”. Mr. Sanderson, one of the directors, in his evidence says with reference to the above letter: “We never fail to tell them in handing them these letters that we do not wish them to take it as a mere matter of form; that we wish them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgement to us that they have read them, and that they will be influenced by what we have said in those letters”.28 The Master could have turned southward instead of west; or he could have reduced speed. He did neither. According to the record, the reason why the Master continued on in his present course and rate of speed is that for the past twenty-five years, “the practise of liners using this track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp look-out to enable them to avoid the danger. This practise, it
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was said, had been justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it”.29 As incredible as such a justification is, perhaps it does illustrate the power of a belief system to rule the human mind. If a course of action has been reliable in the past, one should consider that it is justifiable. It stretches credulity, however, no matter how powerful this belief system was, that it could be said to override a safety first priority ethic. It would seem that such a belief system could only flourish in an ethical vacuum. As such, the previous ships can be said to have been saved from disaster by chance and not by design. After the Titanic disaster, the routing was altered, which indicates that one counter-example was sufficient to set such reasoning aside. According to the report, the root of the rationale of following the course of past experience was “... probably to be found in competition and in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the judgment of navigators”.30 This conclusion would be more consistent with the absence of a safety ethic rather than its presence. In the inquiry, several suggestions were made as to possible influences on Captain Smith. One was that he was influenced by the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and also of a conversation of which he may have had knowledge which transpired between Mr. Ismay and the Chief Engineer at Queenstown concerning the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal. Whereas Mr. Mersey does not credit either of these influences, it is the opinion of the present author that both of these influences may have contributed to the fatal negligence of Captain Smith.
RELEVANT DESIGN FEATURES
RIVETS When the French oceanographic group IFREMER made their dive to the “Titanic” in 1996, Paul Matthias, president of Polaris imaging, discovered that the exact cause of the sinking of the “Titanic” was that the rivets on the starboard side of the “Titanic” which held the plates to the hull’s cross beams had popped open, creating splits the
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size of a hardcover book. (There was no gash, as popularly supposed, resulting from the collision with the iceberg). The question then becomes, why did the rivets pop? While any conclusions require more evidence than is available from a sample of two rivets out of two to three million rivets, the scientific analysis of two retrieved rivets from the “Titanic” reveals a most significant finding. Paul Foecke, the metallurgist who performed the microscopic examination of the “Titanic’s” rivets discovered that the slag content was a dangerously high 9.3%, a concentration that would have made the rivets extremely brittle and substantially weaker than they would have been with an appropriate amount of slag. (2% of slag is added to wrought iron to give it strength) Further, the slag streaks were supposed to run lengthwise along the rivet but instead made a 90 degree turn at the head end in the rivet. This, according to Foecke, was a major area of weakness.31 Foecke even found a 1906 metallurgical reference book which defined medium quality wrought iron as containing 2% to 2.5% slag. However, this does not mean that that was the standard at the time. If it were the standard at the time, and if a subsequent examination of a statistically significant number of rivets revealed the same results, one would be forced to draw the conclusion that the choice of materials for the construction of the “Titanic” seriously compromised her safety. For Unger, though he is a greatt spokesman for multi-causality, he does not utilize the term, “Neither the design nor the construction of the Titanic caused the disaster”.32 He does, however, point to a host of other factors: “... the root cause was a lack of understanding of the limitations of the technology on the part of those who should have known better. The catastrophe was brought on by a combination of poor judgement (excessive speed, not posting extra lookouts), bad management (inadequate lifeboat capacity, no lifeboat drills, no binoculars for lookouts), and perhaps near criminal malfeasance (on the part of the “California’s” captain). But his reasoning for not including design as one of the multiple factors is shaky. He argues that the sister ship, the Olympic, operated reliably for several decades. But that is only because the Olympic did not hit an iceberg! It should be stressed that according to the report, “... if the “Titanic” had been subdivided in the longitudinal method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been able, if damaged as
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supposed, to remain afloat ...” (36) [emphasis added] This one piece of information the present author founds astonishing. It should be noted that the “Titanic’s” transverse compartments did have watertight bulkheads but, incredibly, no watertight tops. As a result, as each compartment filled up with water, the water spilled over into the adjacent compartment much in the fashion as compartments in an ice tray, when overfilled, spill over into the compartments next to them. The wreck commissioner, Mr. Mersey, makes the following comment relevant to naval design: “It seems to me that the Board [Board of Trade] should be empowered to require the production of the designs of all passenger steamers at an early period of their construction and to direct such alterations as may appear to them to be necessary and practicable for the purpose of securing proper watertight sub-division”.33
THE INADEQUACY OF THE HUMAN ERROR HYPOTHESIS It is commonplace to attribute disaster to the chance concatenation of a number of human errors. But there is no chance concatenation here. There is a multi-causal explanation because many factors contribute to the final outcome. But all of these factors are symptomatic of a pervasive neglect of safety precautions and thus a poverty of ethical imagination. The human error explanation omits that in each area of a contributing cause, there is an accompanying human responsibility. For example, there is a responsibility for naval design; there is a responsibility for taking action to warn the passengers, and so on. The human error explanation is incomplete and inaccurate for it emphasizes only the finiteness and fallibility of human beings and does not emphasize the lack of ethics - and the connection between the lack of ethics and the lack off a safety first priority. Once the connection between a high priority for safety and an ethical attitude has been made plain, it is to be hoped that safety will receive more consideration in the future. One advantage of philosophical investigations of what normally are considered the province of either naval architects, lawyers, or navigators is that a strong connection
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between a safety priority and ethics can be clearly spelled out. This is why the expression, ‘safety ethic’ is preferred as it leaves no doubts as to the connection. It is not being maintained that there is no incidence of a disaster occurring which is the result of human error. What is being maintained is that great care must be taken not to conflate the concepts of “human error” and “ethical responsibility”. Ethical errors are not the results of miscalculations such as mistakes one might make by adding up some figures incorrectly. Ethical errors (in the context which is relevant) are the outcome of not placing safety first. Not placing safety first is a lack of ethics, not the result of inevitable human error. It is important that such a distinction be made. For example in the Final Report of the Estonia, the Committee stated that in the case of the Herald, “... the need for practical and efficient transport seems to have taken priority over safety considerations”.34 What can be added to this observation is that the lower priority given to safety considerations is a reflection of an ethical error. Ethical error, as opposed to “inevitable human errors” can be altered. Both the “Titanic” and the “Estonia” could have slowed down! Excessive speed was pointed to as a fundamental cause of each one of these disasters. (179)35 In the case of the Estonia, the clam door was pointed to as a preferable design choice (in the language of the present author, ethically superior)36, though it is not mentioned in the conclusions.
LIFEBOATS According to the report, there had been neither a proper boat drill nor a boat muster. Preventative measures thus were conspicuous by their absence. At the time of the attempt to save the passengers, the ethical priorities were high. Captain Smith, the Master, Mr. Wilde, the Chief Officer, Mr. Murdoch, the First officer and Mr. Moody, the Sixth Officer, all went down with the ship while performing their duties. The “Titanic” carried lifeboats in a number sufficient to accomodate approximately half of the total number m aboard. She carried lifeboats adequate for 1,179 persons (1,176 according to the American report)
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out of a total of 2,201 persons aboard. It must be noted that when the last lifeboat was boarded and away a total of approximately 1,500 people remained stranded on deck only to go down with the ship. According to the American report, there was a lack of preparation which was obvious at the time of the loading of the lifeboats. As a result of the confusion, there was inadequate use made out of the available lifeboats. The subcommittee stated that the failure to utilize all lifeboats in their recognized capacity for safety unquestionably resulted in the needless sacrifice of several hundred lives which might otherwise have been saved.37 One is forcibly reminded of the failure to supply “lifeboats” (explosive bolt hatches, parachutes and space pressure suits) which might well have saved the crew and passengers aboard the Challenger.
THIRD-CLASS PASSENGERS According to the British report, ‘They were not unfairly treated’.38 The report endeavors to explain the lower percentage of third-class passengers saved in terms of ‘... the greater reluctance of third class passengers to leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their luggage, by the difficulty in getting them up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the ship ...’ 39 However, it must be noted that the very location of third-class passengers indicated a lack of ethical considerations in the first place. The British report categorically denies any preferential treatment given to first- and second-class passengers in boarding the lifeboats.40 But 62.46 per cent of the 325 first-class passengers survived, in contrast to 37.94 per cent (25% according to the American report) of the 1,316 third-class passengers, while, of the women in the first-class accomodation, 97.22 per cent were saved, as opposed to 46.66 per cent of those in third-class, and of the children, all those travelling first- and second-class were saved, while 65.38 per cent of those travelling third-class were killed. The report cites “the difficulty in getting them [third-class passengers] up from their quarters, which were at the extreme ends of the ship” as a reason for the disproportion. But answers, “No”, to the question, “Was the
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construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any class of passenger ... to take full advantage of any of the existing provisions for safety?”41 It is also the case that according to certain reports, third class passengers were held back until all first and second class passengers were given time to board the life boats.42
NEARBY RESCUE POSSIBILITIES
THE RESCUE BY THE S.S. “CARPATHIA” As soon as the dangerous condition of the ship was realized, messages were sent by the Master’s orders to all steamers within reach. The Cunard steamer, “Carpathia”, 58 miles away, announced that she was coming to the assistance of the “Titanic”. Messages were being sent out up until a few minutes of the foundering of the “Titanic”. Eight distress rockets were sent off at intervals and, in addition, Mr. Boxall used a Morse light in the direction of a ship whose lights he saw at a distance off about five or six miles. Although since the time of the report there is some dispute over which ship this was, according to the report, “There appears no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the “Californian””.43 On receipt of the “Titanic’s” first distress message, the Captain immediately ordered the ship to be turned round and driven at her highest speed (17 1/2 knots) through the dangerous waters in the direction of the “Titanic”. He was able to arrive in 4 hours time. Eventually, Captain Rostron of the “Carpathia” picked up 712 persons, one of whom died shortly afterwards. Captain Rostron’s behavior was exemplary.
S.S. “CALIFORNIAN” The evidence from the “Californian” speaks of eight rockets having been seen. The one Marconi operator on board the “Californian” was asleep. The story behind the sleeping Marconi operator, according to
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Colonel Gracie’s account is that around 11 p.m., when the Captain of the “Californian” saw a ship approaching from the east, which he was advised to be the “Titanic”, he ordered this message sent: “We are stopped and surrounded by ice”. To this the “Titanic’s” wireless operator replied, “Shut up, I am busy. I am working Cape Race”. The operator placed priority on sending private messages of passengers despite the issues of navigation and life and death that were at stake. (Titanic, 1998) At 11:30 p.m., the wireless operator of the “Californian” went to sleep. While it appears to the present author that the sleeping operator displayed an appalling lack of responsibility, it is also appalling that eight distress rockets could have been seen without any action taken. Some of the evidence appears to be in dispute. Ernest Gill, a crewman aboard the “Californian” stated that he saw the lights of a very large steamship about 10 miles away and a white rocket and thought that it must be a vessel in distress. He wondered “why the devil did they not wake the wireless man up?” He said that the crew were talking about the disregard of the rockets. On the other hand, Captain Lord of the “Californian” scoffed at the story and maintained that he knew nothing of the disaster until the next morning.44 According to Gracie, however, both the British report and the evidence of the American investigation concurred that it was gross negligence that sealed the fate of all that were lost. Gracie was indefatigable in his search for truth. He attended numerous court hearings in the USA and tracked down as many survivors as possible. Largely due to the effects of his exposure to the icy waters of the Atlantic, he succumbed in December of the fateful year of 1912. According to Gracie’s account, the Captain and crew watched the lights of the “Titanic” from the deck of their ship and plainly saw the white rockets that were sent up. In Gracie’s words, “Captain Lord {the Captain of the “Californian”] was completely in possession of the knowledge that he was in proximity to a ship in distress. He could have put himself into immediate communication with us by wireless had he desired information of the name of the ship and the disaster which had befallen it. His indifference is made apparent by his orders to ‘go on Morseing’, instead of utilizing the more modern method of the inventive genius and gentleman, Mr. Marconi, which eventually saved us all.”45 What we do know is that at 6:30 p.m., Lord himself
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sent the message that he knew of icebergs in the vicinity. If he had been aware of a ship in distress, why would he not have done everything possible to attempt to communicate with her? At one point in his testimony to the U.S. Senate subcommittee, he states that the Titanic was clearly visible and was only 4 miles away.46 The “Californian” saw a vessel stop at 11:40 p.m. This was the time of the collision of the “Titanic” with the iceberg. The “Californian” saw eight distress rockets between 12:45 to 1:45 a.m. It was only five to six miles away (it has been estimated no more than ten miles). Why did the “Californian” not come to the rescue of the “Titanic”? According to the report, “... when she [“Californian”] first saw the rockets, [she] could have pushed through the [loose] ice without any serious risk ... Had she done so she might have saved many if not all of the lives that were lost”.47 [emphasis added] According to the American report, officers of the “Californian” admit seeing rockets in the general direction of the “Titanic”. The Senate subcommittee stated, “In our opinion such conduct, [replying to the distress rockets by signalling from a large white light] whether arising from indifference or gross carelessness, is most reprehensible, and places upon the commander of the “Californian” a grave responsibility ... Had assistance been promptly proffered, or had the wireless operator of the “Californian” remained a few minutes longer at his post on Sunday evening, that ship might have had the proud distinction of rescuing the lives of the passengers and crew of the Titanic”.48
FINDINGS OF THE COURT LOOK-OUT “... in view of the night being moonless ... it is not considered that the look-out was sufficient. An extra look-out should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a sharp lookout should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an officer.” 49
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SPEED No directions were given to reduce speed.50
RECOMMENDATIONS Of the recommendations made by the court, two stand out. One of the recommendations refers to decisions regarding naval design; the other to operational decision making. With regard to decisions regarding naval design, that a newly appointed Bulkhead Committee investigate the possibilities of providing a double skin carried up above the waterline; or, a longitudinal, vertical watertight bulkhead on each side of the ship and/or with watertight transverse bulkheads. In addition, the Committee should investigate the practicability of providing decks above the waterline and investigate the practicability of increasing the protection given by sub-division such that the ship could remain afloat.51 With regard to operational decision making, that when ice is reported in or near the track of the ship the ship should proceed in the dark hours at moderate speed or alter her course.52 The American report stated that “The openings through deck E were not designed for water-tight closing, as the evidence shows that flooding over deck E contributed largely to the sinking of the vessel”.53 These two provisions seem very simple although the first may be complicated to implement. That neither was done seems to imply that a less than high priority was given to safety considerations. This can only mean that ethical thinking was absent. The “solutions” are not unthinkable. They probably were thought about. That they were not thought of seriously was not due to the difficulties of thinking them up. That they were not thought of seriously was due to the fact that safety was not given a prioritization in thinking. Ethical considerations were not foremost. Had ethical considerations been foremost, one or both of these two recommendations, one for shipowners and shipbuilders and one for pilots, could have been implemented.
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In the American report, the committee recommended that laws be revised so that no ship may leave an American port unless it required sufficient lifeboats to accomodate every passenger and every member of the crew. The committee further recommended that passengers and crew be assigned to lifeboats before sailing, routes to boats be posted and that boat assignments be based on the convenience of location of the boat to the room in question. The committee further recommended that steamships carrying more than 100 passengers be required to carry searchlights, and that a wireless operator be on duty 24 hours per day. While the British report did make recommendations of this nature, they were much weaker in nature in that they were in the form of recommendations to the Board of Trade for its consideration and subject to its qualification as it sees fit, and not recommendations for implementation in law. No recommendations were made regarding the prior assignment of passengers to specific lifeboats. According to an August 15, 1912 article in the Engineering News, neither report strongly assigned responsibility to anyone for the disaster.54 It is the opinion of the present author, however, that both reports did emphasize deficiencies in naval design. The British report, unlike the American report which seems silent on this issue, did strongly cite the speed of the ship as the prime if not the sole cause of the disaster. Both reports strongly cite the negligence of the captain of the “Californian”. In the British report, to the question “What was the cause of the loss of the “Titanic”, and of the loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred?”, the answer given is simply “Collision with an iceberg and the subsequent foundering of the ship”.55 On the other hand, at the very beginning of the report, the Wreck Commissioner does state that “The Court, having carefully enquired into the circumstances of the above mentioned shipping casuality, [the “Titanic”] finds, for the reasons appearing in the Annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship was due to the collision with an iceberg, brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated”.56 It is, in the opinion of the present author, not the excessive speed of the ship, which is the proximate cause of the disaster, but the general attitude of a lack of a safety ethic which is the initiating cause of the
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excessive speed. The lack of a safety ethic is the general underlying cause which manifests itself in not listening to warnings given, not inspiring officers to communicate urgent warnings, not being cautious in dangerous waters, nott having enough lifeboats on board for all passengers, and not having the proper design for maximum safety in case of impact. The lack k of a safety ethic is in turn influenced from a twin metaphysical belief system that the Titanic was unsinkable, in this case explicitly articulated as such by its Captain, and the unarticulated metaphysical belief that disasters were in any case unpreventable. Clearly this disaster was preventable and was both foreseen and forewarned. The Captain was certainly negligent but it is important to note that it was in the area of ethics that he and some members of his crew were negligent.
NOTES 1
Titanic: Fortune & Fate, Catalogue from the Mariners’ Museum Exhibition, Beverly McMillan and Stanley Lehrer, The Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, Virginia: Simon & Schuster, 1998, p. 16. 2 Titanic: The Investigation Begins; Titanic: T The Anatomy of a Disaster, 1997, Discovery Communications, Inc., Videotape. 3 S. Res. 283, “Titanic” Disaster Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate, Sixty-second Congress, Second session, Directing the Committee on Commerce to Investigate the Causes Leading to the Wreck of the White Star liner “Titanic”, Part 15, Digest off Testimony, Washington, GPO, 1912. These figures are confirmed by the U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing into the Titanic disaster. Cf., f Stephen J. Spignesi, The Complete Titanic, From the Ship’s Earliest Blueprints to the Epic Film, Secaucus, N. J.: Carol Publishing Group, 1998, pp. 122, 161. 4 S. Res. 283, “Titanic” Disaster Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce of the United States Senate, Sixty-second Congress, Second session, Directing the Committee on Commerce to Investigate the Causes Leading to the Wreck of the White Star liner “Titanic”, Part 15, Digest off Testimony, Washington, GPO, 1912. 5 Spignesi, 1998, p. 122. 6 Spignesi, 1998, p. 204. 7 Titanic: The Investigation Begins; Titanic: T The Anatomy of a Disaster, 1997, Discovery Communications, Inc., Videotape. 8 Titanic, Vols. I-IV, New York: Greystone Communications, Inc., A & E Television Networks, Hearst, ABC, NBC, 1994.
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Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 30. 10 Ibid., p. 1. 11 Ibid., p. 27. 12 Ibid., p. 27. 13 Ibid., p. 28. 144 Ibid., p. 28. 15 Spignesi, 1998, p. 123. 16 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 28. 177 Ibid., p. 28. 18 Ibid., p. 28. 199 Ibid., p. 28. 200 Ibid., p. 29. 21 Spignesi, 1998, p. 125. 22 Titanic: Fortune & Fate, Catalogue from the Mariners’ Museum Exhibition, Beverly McMillan and Stanley Lehrer, The Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, Virginia: Simon & Schuster, 1998, p. 104. 23 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 29. 244 Ibid., p. 29. 25 Spignesi, 1998, p. 192. 26 Spignesi, 1998, p. 193. 27 Stephen H. Unger, Controlling Technology, Ethics and the Responsible Engineer, 2nd Edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994, p. 64 28 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 24. 299 Ibid., p. 30. 300 Ibid., p. 30. 31 Spignesi, 1998, p. 266. 32 Stephen H. Unger, Controlling Technology, Ethics and the Responsible Engineer, 2nd Edition, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994, p. 66. 33 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 61. 34 Final Report of the Estonia, pp. 140-141. [Add in full citation] 35 While speed as a cause is not mentioned in the conclusions, in the Final Report of the Estonia, it is mentioned that speed was maintained right up until the time of list developing, p. 175. Similar to the “Titanic” - speed was maintained until time of collision. 36 Final Report of the Estonia, p. 144. 37 Spignesis, 1998, p. 126. 38 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 41. The controversy over the treatment of passengers in different classes calls attention to the importance of being able to consult different official reports of the disaster. One is especially strongly
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reminded of the importance of possessing access to different official reports when one considers the disaster on Mt. Erebus. 399 Ibid., p. 40. 400 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 70. 41 Ibid., p. 71. 42 Titanic, Vols. I-IV, New York: Greystone Communications, Inc., A & E Television Networks, Hearst, ABC, NBC, 1994. 43 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 41. 44 Titanic, Vols. I-IV, New York: Greystone Communications, Inc., A & E Television Networks, Hearst, ABC, NBC, 1994. 45 Colonel Archibald Gracie, Titanic, A Survivor’s Story, Phoenix Mill-ThruppStroud- Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998, pp. 23-24. 46 Spignesi, 1998, p. 148. 47 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 46. 49 Spignesi, 1998, pp. 125-6 49 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 64. 50 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 64. 51 Ibid., p. 72. 522 Ibid., p. 73. 53 Spignesi, 1998, p. 124. 54 Spignesi, 1998, pp. 206-7. The thesis off multi-responsibility is obvious when one considers the different figures the action of any of whom could have changed the course of the events: the Captains of the Titanic and the Californian come most forcibly to mind. 55 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 71. 56 Report of the Loss of the “Titanic” (S.S.), The Official Government Enquiry, 30 July 1912, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 1.
CHAPTER 7 THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER DISASTER In the case of the launch of the Space Shuttle Challengerr which resulted in the deaths of five crew members and two civilian passengers aboard, the disaster will be treated as the final event in a linkage of events which led up to this moment. Those moments immediately preceding the launch of the Challengerr are indicative of a crisis situation which is already fully actual. The events which precede in time, going back eight years, are indicative of a crisis situation which is dormant. The prevention of the Challengerr disaster could have taken place at any time either during the dormant or during the active stage of the crisis. The end result of the crisis was the disaster event. It is most apposite to begin with a brief synopsis of the basic elements of the launch. After this short synopsis, three stages of the crisis will be treated: (A) the after-math; (B) the active stage; (C) the dormant stage. The categories under which the disaster will be subsumed are as follows: Words; Decision Making; Management Structure; The Language of Communication; Responsibility; The Will to Communicate. The category of Words will be applied to the aftermath and to the active stage; Decision Making will mainly be treated in the active stage; Management Structure spans both dormant and active stages; The Language of Communication will be treated in the active stage; Responsibility will be treated in the dormant and the active stages; The Will to Communicate will be treated in all three stages. As a result, instead of a chronological sequence of events, the analysis will cut across time since the key explanatory concepts apply in different (and sometimes multiple) stages. For present purposes, the understanding of the power of the explanatory concepts is more significant than the chronology of events so that apart from the brief synopsis, the structure of the exposition will follow the
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categories of explanation. The reader should bear in mind that there is some overlap between the various categories so that issues treated under one category will sometimes reappear under another. This is because to some extent the categories are means for convenient classification but human action, being a whole, cuts across such classifications in many cases.
A BRIEF SYNOPSIS On January 28, 1986 at 11:38 A.M., the Challengerr was launched. 73 seconds later the faultily and unethically designed space shuttle broke apart (contrary to popular belief, it did not explode since the crew compartment was intact and the crew and passengers were very much alive at the time it made impact with the ocean) in a fireball that has been referred to as an “accident”. The myth that everyone was killed instantaneously in an explosion persists in current literature. The problem with this myth is that it curtails inquiry into why the passengers and crew were not provided with an escape system. The inappropriateness of the term ‘accident’ is vividly illustrated by the content of the quotation of Roger Boisjoly with which Patricia Werhane concludes her chapter on her fascinating study of the Challenger: I can’t characterize it as an “accident” at all. It was a horrible, terrible disaster. But not an accident. Because we could have stopped it. We had initially stopped it. And then the decision was made to go forward anyways.1 Aboard were seven human beings including two civilians, one of whom was a junior high school and high school teacher who was to initiate the Teacher In Space program, Ms. S. Christa McAuliffe. According to the Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, the cause of the “accident” was a ‘... failure in the joint between the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor’.2 The conclusion of the Presidential Commission was that ‘... the cause of the Challenger accident [sic]
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was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor’.3 At a later point in the report, the Commission also assigns a contributing cause of the “accident” which they attribute to a flaw in the decision making process to launch the Challenger.4
KEY WORDS In the analysis of key words that are of importance in this instance, three in particular bear notice: (i) accident; (ii) cause; (iii) contributing cause. While all three of these words figure prominently in the after-math stage, the two senses of cause are also of importance to examine as they appear in the active stage of the crisis.
THE WORD ‘ACCIDENT’ The word ‘accident’ figures only in the after-math stage. The use of the word does not appear until after the event and it appears as a description of the kind of event that was supposed to have happened. It is not unimportant to begin with the after-math because the aftermath is the opening door to the event. It defines how the event examined has been interpreted and hence the key words used in the after-math period must be subjected to close scrutiny for they will affect the entire reading of the case. When the word, ‘accident’, is employed, the meaning that is conveyed in ordinary English is that something has happened that was not foreseen and was unpredictable a and unavoidable. Thus, if the present author carries a pitcher of milk and while carrying it, it slips out of his hand and breaks, spilling the milk, it can be said, it fell accidentally. Someone could say, ‘you should be more careful’. But if someone says this, the implication is always that, ‘accidents will happen’ and in the best of all possible worlds, there will always be accidents.
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If the above example is now escalated to a considerable degree to a traffic accident in which the present author unintentionally runs over a small child who has run out in front of his automobile, it still may be said that this was an ‘accident’ meaning that it was not an intentional act. If after examination it appears that such an event was unavoidable, it will be considered appropriate to call this an accident. In such a case, the word ‘accident’ carries with it the connotation that accidents to a certain extent are unavoidable. If, on the other hand, self-examination leads the present author to the reflection that he could have avoided running over the child, it would not be correct to describe the event as an accident. If, for example, the present author had been paying enough attention to the road and not at that moment been adjusting his seat-belt (which he both could and should have done before starting to drive his vehicle), he most likely could have seen the child run out into the street and could have taken evasive action. In this case, self-examination leads him to the conclusion that he could have foreseen what was going to happen and could have prevented it. The present author may then consider that he did not simply run over the child by an unavoidable meeting in space-time, but that he is guilty of manslaughter. In the first case, that of spilling the milk, a close examination might also have revealed that he could have watched his step more closely and hence could have avoided spilling the milk. But the consequences of this act are not so great as to make this self-examination very important or useful. After all, this is a good use of the word ‘accident’ since there will be other cases of this kind which will be unpreventable a in part because they are not considered important enough to attempt to prevent and in part because many of them are truly unpreventable. However, in the case of the child whose life the present author has taken, it is clear that one would like to avoid such events in the future and therefore it is prudent to be very careful in one’s choice of words. For example, if one persists in the employment of the word ‘accident’ to describe one’s running over the child, it is entirely possible that one might not take any steps to avoid such an ‘accident’ from reoccurring. After all, accidents will happen. What can you do about it? Since the concept of loss of life is not so minute as the loss of milk, it is not entirely suitable to classify the running over the child as an accident but it is more appropriate to consider it to be a case of manslaughter.
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By now, the case in point should be crystal clear. If the Challenger disaster is referred to as an ‘accident’, it is being conceived of as an event that could not have been avoided and by extension all further events of similar kinds should (and will) be considered as accidents. There is not a great deal one can do about accidents since accidents will happen and accidents are inevitable. This kind of classification of the Challengerr disaster thus puts one off from investigating it very closely. It also, to a certain extent, minimizes its importance as the concept of an accident is closely tied up in one’s mind with something rather trivial. One would not, for example, call an earthquake that claimed 7 lives an ‘accident’ even though it may well have been an event which was unavoidable. Perrow’s proposal to utilize the term ‘accident’ for losses of life under 100 is not entirely suitable since the designation of the Challengerr disaster as an accident would blind one to the fact that the disastrous outcome was foreseen and could easily have been prevented. The public significance of the Challengerr disaster also makes it natural to refer to it as a disaster despite the fact that a small number of lives were lost. But the primary reason why the term ‘disaster’ is preferable as a term of description is that it is so obvious that the Challengerr disaster could have been prevented that it was not accidental in any sense of the term. The use of the word ‘accident’ to describe the Challenger disaster is a key to further interpretation of the event. Each time it is used in reference to the disaster, all of the associations that occur with the term ‘accident’ receive reinforcement. The continued use of the word ‘accident’ continually predisposes readers to consider that what happened could not have been avoided and that what is more it was rather trivial. The occurrence of the word ‘accident’ takes place in the after-math to the disaster but it forms the overall impression of the entire sequence of events that led up to it as having been a series of unrelated circumstantial errors. As a result, its choice as a term of reference is extremely consequential. The leading source for the use of this term is the classical source of information concerning the Challenger disaster, the Report of the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C.: GPO Superintendent of Documents, 1986 (to go out of print very soon after publication). The choice of this term for the title of the work not only predisposes the reading of the report
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with all the associations of the term m ‘accident’ but in all consequent references to this work the term ‘accident’ receives more and more reinforcement. In the ordinary person’s mind, all that will be left of the report is most likely the impression left by the title since that would be the most that anyone would have heard of it except those directly concerned. Even after an accurate analysis has been done, by summing up one’s results under the word ‘accident’, one effectively neutralizes even an analysis which may have been aimed at arguing that this disaster could have been prevented. Such is the power of a simple, ordinary English word.
CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING CAUSE The reason why these two particular terms have been selected for analysis is that they appear in the Presidential Report as titles of chapters and as terms which describe why the Challengerr disaster occurred. In the Presidential Report the primary cause of the accident is taken to be a technical fault and the contributing cause is taken to be the flaw in the decision making process. In a chapter entitled, ‘The Cause of the Accident’, it is stated that, ‘The consensus of the Commission and participating investigative agencies is that the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failure in the joint between the two lower segments off the right solid Rocket Motor.’5 At the end of this chapter, under ‘Conclusion’ it is stated that, ‘In view of these findings, the Commission concluded that the cause of the Challenger accident [note the continuing use of the term, ‘accident’] was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor.’6 In another chapter entitled, ‘The Contributing Cause of the Accident’, it is stated that, ‘The Commission concluded that there was a serious flaw in the decision making process leading up to the launch of flight 51-L.’7 What one is led to think from the Presidential Report from the use of the words is that the technical defect is the main cause of the disaster. The problem with this impression is that if one’s primary attention is centered upon the technical defect, one may not take sufficient pains to address the putatively minor cause of the flaw in the decision
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making process. However, if there is a main cause and a contributing cause, the most accurate impression with which one should be left is to devote the brunt of one’s energies to taking care of the main cause and the remaining energies to deal with the more minor cause. It is important, therefore, that one is clear as to which is the main cause and which the minor cause. In order to show that the President’s Commission has the priorities reversed, it may be useful to considerr an analogy. If a father, in his decision to punish his child by striking her with a belt, chooses a belt with a loose buckle and in striking the child the buckle flies off and hits her in the eye, thereby blinding her, would it be correct to say that the loose buckle is the primary cause of the accident (the term ‘accident’ is correctly used here) and the father’s decision and act of striking her the secondary cause? One’s reaction is to find this sort of description unnatural. One would consider it far more natural to say that the father’s decision to punish the child was the primary cause of the accident. Why? Because one realizes that the chain of events which resulted in the child’s blindness was set into motion by the action of the father which resulted from his decision. If the father had not decided to punish the child, the loose belt buckle would have harmed no one as it hung from the belt in the closet. The only way in which it came to harm anyone was by being an instrument of someone’s will. As an inanimate object, it possessed no power on its own to initiate any sequence of events. If this analogy is carried over to the Challengerr disaster, then the management decision to launch the Challengerr becomes the primary cause of the disaster. The O-ring defect becomes the loose belt buckle. By itself, the O-ring defect was harmless. It only became harmful when it was used as an instrument in a launch. One can even extend the analogy a bit further. The decision makers were aware, as was the father, that the O-ring had a defect (that the belt buckle was loose), but since the belt buckle had never come off before, the father was not concerned. One reason he was not concerned was that the safety of his child was not paramount in his mind. What he was intent upon was punishment. It could be argued that if the O-ring had been operative, one also would not have had a disaster. Therefore, we are entitled to consider the O-ring the cause of the disaster. The difficulty with this line of
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reasoning is that it is entirely possible that not only the O-ring was defective but that there might have been some other technical malfunction further along down the line. The Challengerr might have contained a series of booby traps, the O-ring simply being the first in line. In a direct interview with the author and a scientist employed at NASA at the time, for example, the scientist maintained that when the Challengerr blew up [the scientist’s wording] everyone initially thought that it was the main engine because that had been suspect for some time. Because of the fact that more than one technical malfunction was possible, the ultimate responsibility for the disaster was the overall decision that the Challengerr was safe. The technical malfunction that did in fact cause the Challenger to break up into pieces and eventually cause the death all of the astronauts and civilian passengers was one which the management did know about beforehand and need not therefore have caused the Challenger to disintegrate and ultimately cause the death of the astronauts and the civilian passengers. In other words, the management had control over the O-ring and not vice-versa. What is of assistance in the prevention of further disasters is the putting in place of a mechanism and a consciousness which will prevent decisions being carried out to launch future Challengers which are known to have safety problems. It is important to remember that the technical defect of the O-ring could not, by itself, have harmed anyone. It possessed no responsibility for blowing up the Challenger and causing the deaths of the astronauts and the civilians. The reason that it possessed no responsibility for the Challengerr disaster is that it did not, by itself, decide to act. It seems more appropriate, then, to describe the technical defect of the Challengerr with the term proximate cause and the decision to launch the Challenger, the primary cause. In the labeling system provided by the Presidential Report, even iff the analysis within the report places a strong responsibility on the decision making procedure, the labels, as titles of chapters, carry an influence of their own. One may not remember the detailed arguments regarding the management structure, but what one can remember is that according to the Presidential Report, the finding was that ‘... the cause of the accident was the O-ring’. One is far more inclined to remember the leading actress in a famous film that one saw years ago than the supporting
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actress. And that is why one’s choice of words plays such an important role.
DECISION MAKING To simplify the task, it is best to concentrate on the decision-making in the active stage of the crisis only. In the Presidential Report, the flaw in the decision making process is a contributing cause of the Challengerr disaster. This analysis must be extended. The decision making process can be seen to have four separate and co-contributing defects: (I.) The Atmosphere of the Decision Making Process was Not Conducive to Good Decision Making; (II.) The Lack of Standardized Criteria for Decision Making (a.) The Lack of any Clear Uniform Guidelines as to Moral Criteria; (b.) The Lack of a Formula for the Attribution of the Responsibility of The Burden of Proof in an Argument; (c.) The Lack of Understanding of What Would Count as Sufficient Justification for Conclusions; (d.) The Lack of Understanding of what Input is Relevant to a Decision (III.) The Absence of a Chain of Command or the Lack of Exercise of a Chain of Command in the Final Decision Making; (IV.) The Lack of a Spelled Out Decision Making Mechanism (such as unanimous vote, secret ballot, majority vote, consensus, etc.)
THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS The atmosphere of the decision to launch the Challenger was the atmosphere of a crisis. It is curious because the crisis was at this point in time, largely self-inflicted. In other words, the crisis was not forced upon those who were in the process of deciding to launch the Challenger. It was brought about by their own previous actions and decisions, a fact that will be examined later under the topic of responsibility. There was no external crisis at that point which needed action to resolve. And yet, the atmosphere of the decision
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making process was one that one would expect to obtain during a crisis situation. The problem with the atmosphere of a crisis is that unless there is a crisis to resolve, (and even then it is dubious whether a crisis atmosphere in the decision making process is helpful), the conditions of a crisis atmosphere make it more difficult to make a judicious decision, not less.8 What is a crisis atmosphere? It is not difficult to define. A crisis atmosphere is one in which a decision must be made under a great deal of some kind of pressure, usually to meet a fixed deadline, where a wrong decision is very likely to have grave consequences and is characterized by the presence of time pressure, hurried decisions, sometimes at strange times of the night, and very possibly irregular to unethical steps in the decision making process.9 All of the above conditions were present in the case of the decision making atmosphere in which the decision to launch the Challenger was made. Obviously, these are not ideal conditions under which to make a judicious decision. What is interesting to observe is that normally, for crisis situations, such conditions are unavoidable because one is forced to make a decision under the conditions of a double or multiple bind. The conditions of a double or multiple bind are such that one is forced to make one decision and no matter which decision one makes, the consequence requires one to take a serious risk. The concept of being forced to make a decision is an important one. For example, in the case of having to take some action to free hostages, if one does not decide to act, the hostages may be killed. Such a crisis situation impels an atmosphere of crisis which is difficult to dispel. In the case of the Challenger, if there had been no decision to launch the Challenger, what would have been the consequences? No lives would have been lost, certainly. The curious feature of the atmosphere which was present during the Challenger launch decision was that it was not a forced choice but it was made under all of the conditions of a forced choice. The crisis, thus, was self-imposed. In what follows it can be shown that all of the conditions of a crisis atmosphere were present.
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THE DECISION MUST BE MADE UNDER PRESSURE There is no question that the decision to launch the Challengerr was made under highly pressurized conditions. This is indicated not only by the time constraints which are discussed under the time deadline below, but by the fact that the participants felt under pressure. This, in itself, is not an ideal state in which to make a judicious decision. Even the Commission itself at several points acknowledges the existence of pressure. It does, curiously, reverse itself but its own findings remain self-contradictory on this. The engineer, Bosijoly, whose early warning memo about the O-rings went ignored, stated, ‘I felt personally that management was under a lot of pressure to launch’.10 Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy used their positions of authority to apply informal pressure on the others to overcome any resistance to launching. Mr. Mulloy’s influential statement was, ‘My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?’11 Mr. Hardy’s was, ‘I’m appalled at your recommendation’12 (to the original recommendation of Thiokol against launching). In two places in the Presidential Report, the Commission acknowledges that pressure exists. In one chapter significantly entitled, ‘Pressures on the System’, it is stated that: ‘Pressures developed because of the need to meet customer commitments, which translated into a requirement to launch a certain number of flights per year and to launch them m on time. Such considerations may occasionally have obscured engineering [read: ethical or safety concerns].’13 In another place in the Report, it is stated that: ‘The Commission concluded that the Thiokol Management reversed its position [not to launch] and recommended the launch of 51-L, at the urging of Marshall and contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accomodate a major customer.’14 Curiously, at another point in the Report, the Commission seems to have forgotten these statements when it states that: ‘The Commission concluded that the decision to launch the Challengerr was made solely by the appropriate NASA officials without any outside intervention or pressure.’15 There were a variety of external pressures. For example, it was thought important that the shuttle should be perceived as operating on a routine basis. So, that required a certain number of lifts per year
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and not a number of delays.16 When one contemplates the phrase ‘major customer’, one imagines that there was a great deal of commercial pressure involved which, in the end, may well have been an extremely influential factor. One only wonders who the unnamed f n. 14; n. 30) ‘major customer’ was. (Cf.,
A FIXED DEADLINE MUST BE MET Here, there was definitely the concept of a fixed deadline. But the date actually selected was not the only, the last, or even the most optimal available date among the choice of alternatives. It certainly was not the optimal date in terms of weather conditions. Here, because the deadline was in fact a fairly flexible one, and was chosen from a wide range of options, it is difficult to understand why it was treated as a fixed deadline. It is almost as if the crisis situation were self imposed. It is obvious that one must select a time frame for a launch. But there is a difference between a schedule and a fixed deadline. What is not clear was the urgency in meeting that particular fatal deadline of January 28, 1986. The background for the launch of the Challengerr was that it had already been postponed three times and scrubbed once. The only postponement that had to do with weather conditions was a postponement that occurred on January 25, 1986. It is strange and unsettling that the even less ideal weather conditions of the 28 of January were not considered sufficient to warrant another postponement.17 The non-double bind, free choice status of the deadline of the 28 of January must be considered carefully. There was no urgent