Shaping U.S. Military Forces: Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World

Shaping U.S. Military Forces: REVOLUTION OR RELEVANCE IN A POST–COLD WAR WORLD

D. Robert Worley

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

Shaping U.S. Military Forces

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), former Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.A.) Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Thérèse Delpech, Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Atomic Energy Commission), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, and Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Shaping U.S. Military Forces R EVOLUTION OR R ELEVANCE A P OST –C OLD W AR W ORLD D. Robert Worley

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut • London

IN

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Worley, D. Robert (Duane Robert), 1949– Shaping U.S. military forces : revolution or relevance in a post–Cold War world / D. Robert Worley. p. cm. ISBN 0–275–99031–1 1. United States—Armed Forces—Reorganization. 2. United States—Military policy. I. Title. UA23.W7768 2006 355.30973—dc22 2005034801 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2006 by D. Robert Worley All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2005034801 ISBN: 0–275–99031–1 First published in 2006 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

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To Carl H. Builder

Contents

Tables and Figures

ix

Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

xiii xv

Acronyms Introduction

1

Chapter 1.

Directions for Transformation: Three Views

15

Chapter 2.

A Short History of Defense Reform

31

Chapter 3.

Army

51

Chapter 4.

Air Force

95

Chapter 5.

Navy

131

Chapter 6.

Marine Corps

175

Chapter 7.

Special Operations Forces

209

Chapter 8.

Joint Commands

233

Chapter 9.

Unified Action and the Nature of Disunity

247

Conclusion

257

Notes

267

Index

287

Tables and Figures

TABLES 3.1

Army Divisions (1989)

79

3.2

Mobility of Army Divisions

82

3.3

Army Non-Divisional Brigades

86

3.4

Cold War Army Divisional Force Structure

90

4.1

Roles and Typical Missions of Aerospace Power

119

4.2

Air Force Combatant Aircraft in the 1990s

122

4.3

Air Force Mobility Aircraft in the 1990s

124

5.1

Fleets and Numbered Fleets

165

6.1

Typical MAGTF Composition

204

6.2

Typical MAGTF Ground Inventory in the 1990s

205

6.3

Typical MAGTF Air Inventory in the 1990s

206

8.1

Regional and Functional Commands 1992

239

8.2

Regional and Functional Commands 2005

240

FIGURES 3.1

Army Division

78

3.2

Maneuver Battalion

80

x

Tables and Figures

4.1

Air Force Wing

126

6.1

Marine Division

196

6.2

Marine Aircraft Wing

198

6.3

Force Service Support Group

200

6.4

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group

200

6.5

Marine Air-Ground Task Force

201

7.1

Navy Special Warfare Group

217

7.2

Army Ranger Battalion

219

7.3

Special Forces Group

222

7.4

Force Reconnaissance Company

228

8.1

Combatant Command Types

234

8.2

Typical Organization of Unified Theater Command

235

Joint Task Force Organization

237

8.3

Preface

This book grew out of the need to describe the culture and structure of the uniformed services to students studying defense policy in the context of a graduate program in U.S. government. The typical student works on a congressional staff, has no military experience, works for a member of Congress without military experience, but has a keen interest in the practical aspects of military force structure. Other students work in the executive branch, some are journalists, and they have similar interests. It is customary when discussing defense policy to make the distinction between declaratory policy—what we say—and employment policy—what we do. Between them exist the intermediate levels of force development policy and force deployment policy. The former deals with the size and shape of the military forces necessary to undergird our declaratory and employment policy. The latter deals with where those forces are deployed during peacetime. This text is about force development policy—what military force to build, which is the domain of the services and Congress—and attempts to provide readers with an understanding of how the services will respond to external influences that suggest change to their size and shape. Only one book focuses on the character of the services, Carl Builder’s The Mask of War. In fact, Builder’s thesis is the origin of this book’s premise that the services are by far the dominant influence in force development. If his thesis is true, then it is more important to understand the services than to understand the role of Congress, the president, the secretary of defense, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A military institution’s character, organization, and weapons vary over time, but they vary at different rates. Their character and organization are the most stable, and their weapons are constantly undergoing technological improvement. Force

xii

Preface

planners commonly measure military end strength in terms of divisions, wings, and battle groups, and, therefore, organization could not be excluded from this discussion. Weapon system acquisition consumes a great deal of Washington’s energy, but weapon system detail is minimized in this version of the text. When describing a system as large, complex, and dynamic as our national military establishment, precision is not an available option. Generalizations, with all the attendant shortcomings, provide the only tractable approach. One hopes that the generalizations presented capture the salient features of the object under analysis. This is not a history book. It relies heavily, however, on specific historic events that have had profound effects on the services and their conceptions of war. One accomplished academic suggested removing the “ancient history” and focusing on the current needs of the country. This, I believe, is a partial explanation for why the ideas offered by the academic community are so often without effect. The importance of military forces to national security demands that the critics take the time to understand the thing they are criticizing—to change something, one must know what holds it together. Those readers who have served in uniform may recoil at the characterizations of their institution. A typical response is “you got the other services about right, but not mine.” While the qualities cultivated by the services represent a strong conservative force inhibiting change, those same qualities are the source of excellence in our nation’s military.

Acknowledgments

The Johns Hopkins University Washington Center for the Study of American Government has contributed richly to this work. Special thanks are owed to my students who have been exposed to various versions of the text. Many are young congressional staffers working long hours for modest pay who somehow find the time and energy for graduate study. Special acknowledgment is owed those who provided guidance and patience at the beginning of my career at Rand. Carl H. Builder stands as an example of what a mentor should be. He set a standard that I aspire to but consistently fall short of. Paul K. Davis introduced me to net assessment and force structure analysis, although I must confess to having been a very slow student. James P. Kahan helped me overcome my training as an engineer and pushed me down the path of policy analysis. All three showed great courage and intellectual integrity in putting forth their results even when those results were unpopular. Sharing these characteristics are three newer colleagues, James Locher, a principal architect of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Colonel Douglas Macgregor, USA, and Captain Daniel Moore, USN, bureaucratic insurgents all.

Acronyms

ACOM ADA AFSOC AI AMC ANGLICO ARG ARNG ASD(SO/LIC) AWACS BAI BDA BUD/S BUR C4I CAS CBIRF CEC CECOM CENTCOM CIA CINC CNO

Atlantic Command air defense artillery Air Force Special Operations Command air interdiction Air Mobility Command air-naval gunfire liaison company amphibious ready group Army National Guard assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict airborne warning and control system battlefield air interdiction bomb or battle damage assessment Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (school) Bottom-Up Review command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence close air support Chemical-Biological Incidence Response Force cooperative engagement capability Communications Electronics Command Central Command Central Intelligence Agency commander in chief chief of naval operations

xvi

Acronyms

CONUS CORDS DCA DIA EUCOM FLIR FMF FORSCOM HAHO HALO HARM HIC ICBM ISR JFCOM JROC JSCP JSTARS JTF LANTCOM LIC LRRP MAC MACV MAF MAGTF MANPAD MEB MEF MEU MIC MOOTW MOS MRC MSC MTMC MTW NATO NCA NORTHCOM OCA OPLAN OPORD OSD OSS

Continental United States Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support defensive counter air Defense Intelligence Agency European Command forward-looking infrared Fleet Marine Force Forces Command high altitude, high opening high altitude, low opening high-speed anti-radiation missile high-intensity conflict intercontinental ballistic missile intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Joint Forces Command Joint Requirements Oversight Council joint strategic capabilities plan joint surveillance target attack radar system joint task force Atlantic Command low-intensity conflict long-range reconnaissance patrol Military Airlift Command Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Marine Amphibious Force marine air-ground task force man-portable air defense (system) marine expeditionary brigade marine expeditionary force marine expeditionary unit mid-intensity conflict military operations other than war military occupational specialty major regional contingency Military Sealift Command Military Traffic Management Command major theater war North Atlantic Treaty Organization national command authorities Northern Command offensive counter air operations plan operations order Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Strategic Services

Acronyms xvii

PACOM PAVE PSYOP QDR RAF REDCOM RMA ROTC SAC SACEUR SAM SAS SEAD SEAL SOAR SOC SOF SOUTHCOM SPACECOM SRIG SSC STRATCOM STRICOM SWAT TO&E TRADOC TRANSCOM UCP UDT USA USAF USAFE USAR USAREUR USMC USN

Pacific Command precision avionics vectoring equipment psychological operations quadrennial defense review Royal Air Force Readiness Command revolution in military affairs Reserve Officer Training Corps Strategic Air Command Supreme Allied Command Europe surface-to-air missile Strategic Air Service suppression of enemy air defenses sea-air-land Special Operations Aviation Regiment special operations capable special operations forces Southern Command Space Command surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group small scale contingency Strategic Command Strike Command special weapons and tactics table of organization and equipment Training and Doctrine Command Transportation Command unified command plan underwater demolition team United States Army United States Air Force United States Air Force Europe United States Army Reserve United States Army Europe United States Marine Corps United States Navy

Introduction

We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our cold war forces. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles and missions that characterized the past forty years. We must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces—not just make them smaller.1 —Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman Senate Armed Services Committee

What does it mean to transform the force? Senator Sam Nunn, then chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in 1992 that we must go forward, not with a smaller Cold War force, but with a different force. He was calling for a significant departure from the past, a transformation in today’s parlance. The senator clearly meant more than the continual change that characterizes U.S. military evolution. Modernization, too, is continuous, and given the inventory of aging equipment, certainly there is a need for modernization, but that cannot be what Senator Nunn meant either. During the Cold War, some spoke of a revolution in military affairs, the RMA. And more recently, Congress advocated experimentation as the way ahead. We spoke of these things long before September 2001, so we cannot be talking about change driven by those attacks. Transformation must be something more. By outward appearances, today’s military is principally a smaller version of our Cold War forces, despite the fact that threat, missions, and strategies have changed. For over 40 years there was a broad consensus to maintain large forces-in-being, contrary to previous historical trends. As evidenced by the steady decline in defense spending since 1985, that consensus has evaporated, and a new equilibrium is being sought. Restructuring efforts in the 1990s have disappointed some. Paying for an exhausting tempo of military operations in

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the face of declining budgets has exacerbated the problem, redirecting funds earmarked for modernization of weapon systems toward the conduct of military operations. Evidence of transformation is modest. The impetus for transforming U.S. forces comes from a variety of sources. The president is the ultimate user of military force. Each presidential administration has the responsibility and authority to conduct foreign policy, including the threat and use of force. A credible military undergirds U.S. foreign policy. Only Congress, however, has the authority to raise and maintain the military and to appropriate funds to that end. But it is the uniformed services that have the responsibility to organize, equip, and train the force. The president, the Congress, and each of the uniformed services play active and sometimes antagonistic roles. There has been no lack of reform effort at the highest levels of the defense bureaucracy following the Cold War. Under the leadership of General Colin Powell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reexamined the roles and missions of the services. Recommendations followed from internal reviews and from independent commissions and panels. According to observers, change occurred only at the margins. Resisting the powerful forces of Congress and the president, the highly institutionalized cultures of the uniformed services offer the best explanation for why the U.S. military is a smaller, not a different, force well over a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Participants in the debate over post–Cold War force structure often speak of “transforming the force” as if there is a single “force,” a common starting point, and an agreed upon destination or at least a general direction. None of these is true. Each service represents one or more distinct cultures, capabilities, and conceptions of war. Each of these represents a unique point of departure for transformation. Moreover, more than one transformation is possible. One transformation might be from a large garrison force designed to deter and defeat the forces of the former Soviet Union to an expeditionary force more relevant to the many third-world interventions of today. A second transformation might be from the industrial-age force designed in the 1980s to deter and win the country’s major wars to an information-age force designed to deter and win the major wars of 2025 and beyond. A third transformation often called for is from service warfare to joint warfare. Each of these transformations leads in different directions, and each has its own constituency. What does it mean to transform the force? PLACING TRANSFORMATION IN THE PROPER POLICY CONTEXT In defense circles, it is customary to speak of declaratory policy and employment policy.2 Declaratory policy, in short, is what we say we will do. Employment policy, on the other hand, is what we actually do—that is, observable behavior concerning the use of national power, including military force. Examples of declaratory policy include many forms of official documents and

ChapterTitle Introduction 3

the public statements of government officials. Recent legislation requires the president to provide Congress with an explicit national security strategy. This document serves as the primary statement of U.S. declaratory policy, communicating intentions to allies, friends, foes, and neutrals. Publication of the national security strategy begins a process that produces a national military strategy from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Planning Guidance from the secretary of defense. These latter two documents drive force development policy—what force to build—and force deployment policy—where to position elements of the force. Force development policy governs transformation of the force. The president’s national security strategy drives the transformation only from a near-term perspective. The national security strategy of the United States has been associated with the word containment for several decades throughout which a political consensus existed to maintain a standing army. The post–Cold War strategic debate has ranged from global hegemony to a new isolationism, but no stable political consensus has formed around any of the strategic alternatives. Regardless, in this environment described either as strategic vacuum or strategic vacillation, transformation is demanded. The strategic pendulum may swing faster than the Defense Department can respond. In addition to driving force development, declaratory policy is intended to influence our friends, enemies, and neutrals without resorting to force. Unless undergirded by the appropriate force, properly deployed, the audience it is intended to influence will see the nation’s declaratory policy as empty and not credible. An employment policy not undergirded by appropriate military force will lead to the same conclusion and to exhaustion. The law prescribes two distinct chains of command. One governs the use of force; the other governs the production of force. The president, by law, sits at the top of both chains. In practice, the president is firmly in control of the user chain of command, and Congress controls the producer chain of command. The president and the secretary of defense head the user chain of command. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is their principal advisor on military matters. The president and secretary issue orders, through the chairman, to the commander of one of the combatant commands. The president is the principal user of military force and thus determines U.S. employment policy. Since the end of the Cold War, employment policy has kept the force engaged around the world at an unprecedented rate3 at the same time that the force has been undergoing a dramatic reduction in size. The recent employment of force can be characterized as the conduct of many small wars or interventions rather than as preparation for war between major powers. Clearly, employment policy, if not undergirded by the appropriate force, will apply pressure to transform. And this pressure is closely aligned with the unique view of the sitting president. Again, the pressure from employment policy is on transformation for the near term. Although the Constitution gives Congress a strong role to play in the use of force—the power to declare war—Congress has largely abdicated that

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responsibility to the president, except for war between great powers such as the First and Second World Wars. The president is in firm command of the use of force. The uniformed military’s role in the user chain of command is through the combatant commands. The combatant commands translate political objectives into military objectives and plans, and they conduct military operations. The department secretaries and service chiefs are excluded from the chain of command governing the use of military force. Presidents nominally head the producer chain of command. Orders flow from the president or defense secretary to the civilian secretaries of the military departments—the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—to the uniformed chiefs of the four services. Presidents have had limited success in this chain of command. For all practical purposes, Congress, with its constitutional authority to raise armies and maintain navies, and holding the purse strings, sits at the top of the producer chain of command. The armed services, however, put the options on the table for congressional consideration. The services determine organizational structures (e.g., armored divisions, carrier battle groups, and fighter wings), doctrinal methods of operation, and training programs. Blind spots and parochialism can lead the services to produce an incomplete force for the nation. At any point in time, a president can employ only the force that Congress and the services have produced. Congress has the authority to legislate change. It acts through authorization and appropriation legislation. It has done so in several major reorganization acts since World War II, most recently the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Still, Congress has been reluctant to impose organizational and doctrinal change on the uniformed services, choosing instead to focus on the acquisition of weapon systems and manpower levels. Congress, as the bill payer, understood that the defense budget would follow historical trends after the Cold War and has been the major voice for transforming the force rather than just reducing its size. Members of Congress, however, have not specified what the transformed force should be. The most explicit guidance is about reducing redundancy and achieving efficiencies. While there are a variety of pressures at work to transform military capability, there are also countervailing pressures that resist change. The most obvious pressures for change are the altered strategic landscape and a decreased budget. To compete for a share of a declining budget, services must show relevance to today’s needs. At the same time, service culture is a strong conservative force. To the extent that transformation requires new equipment, 10- to 20-year delays associated with acquisition can be expected. To compound the tension between these opposing forces is the great uncertainty about the nature of military forces the country will need 20 years in the future. Transformation for the near and long term may require different processes and lead in different directions. An old saying originating between the world wars states that “the Navy mans the equipment and the Army equips the man.” The Navy remains equipment-centric. The Air Force was born and remains equipment-centric.

ChapterTitle Introduction 5

The mechanization of the Army that occurred in the industrial age has moved it toward being equipment-centric. Military equipment takes years or decades to develop and field. Once fielded, weapons remain in the inventory for decades (50 years for some ships). Some of the weapons currently in the acquisition pipeline were initiated in response to Cold War requirements. Transformation that requires initiation of a new weapon system requires that it compete with established acquisition programs and thus represents a threat to powerful proponents within the services and their congressional supporters. The light Army, the Marine Corps, and special operations forces remain man-centric. Capital-intensive organizations can be expected to take longer to change than those that are labor intensive. The uniformed services are the providers of the force. They put the options on the table. They are accused of preferring to modernize their weapon systems rather than fundamentally changing the way they fight. Their cultures, forged in war, are conservative in nature and distrustful of radical change. But to maintain their share of the budget, the services must demonstrate relevance in the present and promise relevance in the future. To change something, one must understand what holds it together. The late Carl Builder suggested looking at the different services as a psychologist would look at individuals.4 The behavior of each is strongly determined by its birth, its most dramatic successes, and its most traumatic failures. Understanding service “psychology” or culture shows what each holds dear, what each will seek, and what each will resist.

WORDS MATTER: A LEXICON FOR TRANSFORMATION Transformation and transition. Those who study organizational change and behavior make a distinction between transformation and transition. Transition implies a management desire to move an organization from the current to a desired state, from a specific origin to a specific destination. Transformation, on the other hand, implies a management desire to move from the current state along some desired path, from a specific origin along some general direction toward some unspecified destination. When organizational leaders decide to change what exists and to implement something new, they engage in transition processes. A transition is the process of achieving a known new state over a set period of time. Transformation is the emergence of a new state of being out of the “remains” of the old state. In contrast with transition, the new state is unknown until it takes shape.5

Both transition and transformation require plans and processes. The Defense Department’s official position is that “transformation is a journey, not a destination.” But the choice of the word transformation was not based on a review of the scholarly literature in organizational behavior, and the choice should be considered a coincidence.

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Threat-based and capabilities-based analysis. For decades, U.S. force planners began their processes with analysis of the threat, the word threat referring to a known enemy. The threat represented the problem that force planners must solve. After the Cold War, capabilities-based analysis replaced threatbased analysis. The original formulation was that, absent a known enemy, the services would decide which capabilities they needed. One of the patterns of history is that war exposes the mismatch between those forces we want and those we need.6 The original move to capabilities-based thinking set the stage for a repeat of developing a force consistent with a conception of future warfare that was demonstrably wrong when real war came. Fortunately, this formulation was later replaced by the idea that there are many threats to be countered but that there were generally applicable capabilities that could counter them—capabilities-based analysis became threat-based analysis by another name. During the Cold War, force planners prepared for the most dangerous threat and were frequently unprepared for the most likely. This preference was quite reasonable when the most dangerous threat was an adversary with massive nuclear and conventional forces. The assumption was that the force that was prepared for major war—the most dangerous case—could handle the most likely threats as “lesser-included cases.” Today, there are two possible ways to look at the most likely and the most dangerous cases. One orientation is that the most dangerous threat is from a great power conflict in the future and that the appropriate action is for the United States to focus on its role in the system of states, preserving alliances against an emerging competitor; the most likely threats include the many failed and failing states and the insurgencies they nurture. Another orientation is that the most dangerous threat is the insurgency environment we face now, exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the potential future great power war cloaked in unknowns can safely be ignored for the time being. Conceptions of war. Each service has the statutory responsibility to organize, equip, and train its forces. Those responsibilities are legally circumscribed by the directive authority and control by the secretary of defense and by the needs of the combatant commands. Each service has one or more conception of war that constitutes an important part of its culture and that drives its efforts to organize, equip, and train. Through these conceptions each service interprets the threat and the stimulus and formulates a response. One simple and useful way to distinguish between these conceptions is based on whether they are oriented toward major wars or small wars; the difference between major and small wars is not measured by the number of forces committed, the number of casualties, or the war’s duration. The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual of 19407 provides characteristic differences that serve as definitions. • Major wars are conducted between “first rate” powers. Small wars are the interventions of a major power into the affairs of a lesser power, typically failed or failing states.

ChapterTitle Introduction 7 • “In a major war, diplomatic relations are summarily severed at the beginning of the struggle. [In small wars] diplomacy does not relax its grip on the situation.” • “In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal— the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces.” “The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people.” In small wars “the mission will be to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing civil government.” • In major wars, the organized forces of peer states seek decisive battle. In small wars, the forces of a major power often clash with irregular forces, and the conflict typically degenerates into guerrilla warfare. “Irregular troops may disregard, in part or entirely, International Law and the Rules of Land Warfare in their conduct of hostilities.” • “In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.”

Major force categories and levels of conflict. American force planners are responsible for assuring the proper mix of strategic nuclear, general purpose, and special operations forces. The mix of forces must be suited to the full spectrum of conflict, including high-, mid-, and low-intensity conflict. This taxonomy was created for force planners and not to describe conflict to the individual combatant. • High-intensity conflict has as its dominant characteristic the large-scale exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. It may be preceded, accompanied, and followed by other forms of conflict. • Mid-intensity conflict has as its dominant characteristic the direct force-on-force clash between conventional, forces—the organized forces of states. Mid-intensity conflict may escalate to high-intensity conflict, and it may be accompanied by the isolated use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. • Low-intensity conflict has as its dominant characteristics social conflict, failed or failing states, and the employment of irregular, militia, or guerrilla forces using terrorist tactics.

Transformation, revolution, innovation, and experimentation. “Military transformation is the act of creating and harnessing a revolution in military affairs. It requires developing new technologies, operational concepts, and organizational structures to conduct war in dramatically new ways.”8 Transformation is just another name for RMA. Two prominent examples of past revolutions are worth a short summary. The Napoleonic revolution was largely driven by social and political change. The small professional armies of monarchs were no match for a nation at war. New organizations were required to command, move, and supply these huge armies; corps and brigade were created as complete combined-arms formations. Most of the weapons used in the Second World War showcased in the First, but it wasn’t until the technologies of flight, the internal combustion

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engine, and the radio were harnessed by new combined arms organizations and doctrine that the revolution was complete. The current RMA, its beginning recognized during the Cold War, remains on its journey from the industrial age to the information age. The RMA presently posited includes exploitation of innovations in precision munitions, intelligence-gathering sensors, stealth, and information processing. In the definitive study on innovation during the interwar period between the two world wars, Williamson Murray and Allan Millett define three types of innovation.9 Some innovations result in equipment, some in new procedures, and some change the context in which a particular type of battle takes place. The latter type of innovation is indistinguishable from a revolution in military affairs. The British combined advances in radar and fighter aircraft to alter the context in which the fighter and bomber interacted in battle. Although the Germans had arguably better equipment, the British redefined the battle and emerged victorious in the Battle of Britain. Other innovations discussed include armored warfare, amphibious warfare, close air support, and carrier warfare. Murray and Millett caution about the ability to manage innovation in any reasonable sense. Stephen Rosen, in another excellent book in the area of military innovation, finds that there is very little agreement on explanations for militaries’ failure or success at innovation.10 Without explanations of the past that generalize, one has no tools with which to predict or control the future. Rosen studies many of the same innovations as Murray and Millett but differentiates between operational innovations (how militaries fight) accomplished in peacetime and wartime and technological innovations (new tools). In 1998, Senators Dan Coats and Joseph Lieberman delivered a memorandum to the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command (now the Joint Forces Command) instructing him to experiment. Experiments can take many forms. The thought experiments and rigorous analysis conducted by the Germans to understand the failures of the First World War and to develop solutions for the next war qualify as experimentation. Analytic war games, as conducted by the Naval War College, can be played out over sand tables, maps, or complex computer models. And experiments can be conducted as military exercises with forces in the field, at sea, and in the air. Any real battle serves as an experiment, a natural experiment, producing hard evidence requiring interpretation. But to make the products of experimentation real, organizations and doctrine must change, and these new organizations must be trained in the new doctrine. THE DIRECTIONS OF TRANSFORMATION What does it mean to transform the force? Three distinct views are discernable from the literature. One is painfully overdue, one is apparently perpetual, and one is oriented toward the uncertain future beyond 2025. Each potentially impels force transformation in different directions. The year 2025

ChapterTitle Introduction 9

is chosen somewhat arbitrarily but is based on the widely held assumption that the United States will face no peer or near-peer competitor for at least 20 years, thus positing that the country is currently transiting an interwar period, a period characterized by small wars rather than by wars between major powers. The three types of transformation are: • Transformation from a garrison force for the Cold War to an expeditionary force for the small wars of 2000 to 2025. • Transformation from service warfare to joint warfare. • Transformation from an industrial-age force to an information-age force—the dominant interpretation of the revolution in military affairs, the RMA.

Using the language of organizational behavior—transitions from known origins to known destinations and transformations from known origins to unknown destinations—the change to an expeditionary force could have and should have been a transition. The RMA being the dominant view of transformation, the shift to a small-wars environment was not explicitly recognized and acted upon. The RMA is necessarily a transformation with no known destination; no one knows what an information-age force looks like. The transformation from service to joint warfare could have and should have been a transition, but service recalcitrance and lack of civilian leadership have prevented the specification of a joint operational architecture, a definition of what it means to fight as a unified force. With no destination defined, the path to joint warfare, unfortunately, remains a transformation rather than a transition. Each of these transformations is described briefly below and then elaborated in successive chapters. Garrison Force to Expeditionary Force: 2000–2025 Some would argue that the transformation should be from a force built for the great power conflict of the bipolar era to a small-wars force capable of operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum as characterized by current operations. The president, as the source of declaratory and employment policy, is the primary driver of this transformation. The pressure to conduct small wars may wax and wane with changing presidents. Therefore, the pressure to pursue this transformation may come and go more rapidly than the Defense Department’s ability to respond. Most would agree that the number of small wars and the number of man-made and natural disasters will remain high. Whether future presidents will choose to employ U.S. forces to deal with them is unknowable. Each president will bring his or her own views, and the world will present an array of unpredictable choices. The president conducts military operations through one of the combatant commands. Those commands had no choice but to deal with the upheaval in the strategic environment and the shift to small wars. Even though the law

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requires the services to provide the forces needed by the combatant commands, the service providers were not quick to respond. Those dominant elements within the services that exist to conduct major war see this transformation as a threat to their real mission. They will likely treat a small-wars capability as a “lesser-included case” of the major-war capability they desire. The Force for the Next Major War: Beyond 2025 Great power conflict will return, but there is no reason to believe that it will be fought as past great power wars or as the small wars of the interwar period. The dominant school of thought on transformation is largely silent on the changed strategic environment, instead continuing the RMA initiatives firmly rooted in major war thinking of the Cold War. This transformation is about building a force capable of fighting a peer or near-peer enemy 20 or 30 years into the future with different tools and methods than are employed today. The enemy for that war is unknown. When, where, and how the war will be fought is equally uncertain. Regardless, this transformation is taking place as the services modernize and apply new capabilities in the spate of interventions following the Cold War. There are variations within this view. A strategy for such a transformation could be about conserving resources with a preference for research and development over procurement. The expression associated with this view is “skipping a generation.” New weapon systems would be developed to prototype stage or even to procurement in small numbers. Instead of entering large-scale procurement and fielding, intellectual and financial resources would be plowed back into development of the next generation. Or, given the uncertainty over the nature and timing of the next major war, another strategy could be about holding on to the status quo Cold War force until the future reveals itself. A second group, by far the strongest group, argues that transformation is about moving from an industrial-age force to an information-age force. This view places its primary focus on major war and is less concerned with the many small wars that occur between major wars. More accurately, they make no distinction between major and small wars. Adherents to this school have a decided emphasis on technology, a typical American predilection. They cite the Gulf War as the first information war,11 referring to the ubiquitous information technology employed in precision-guided munitions and the destruction of Iraq’s ability to see, decide, and act. Some argue for an entirely new way of warfare in the information age; the less radical see information technology greatly increasing the performance of proven warfare methods. A transformation driven by information technology requires funding of research and development and procurement of new systems. At one extreme, major weapon systems—tanks, planes, and ships—may be second to precisionguided munitions and all forms of information technology. One could expect strong resistance from the services’ most capital-intensive branches whose careers and survival in combat are wedded to their weapon system platforms

ChapterTitle Introduction 11

rather than to munitions remotely fired through what they might pejoratively refer to as office equipment. On the other hand, preparing for the next major war will likely resonate with the major-war cultures within the services, allowing them to ignore the transformation to a small-wars force. Force development policy is a product of the executive branch but is more strongly represented by service interests than those of the president or secretary of defense. Congress has a long-demonstrated interest in acquisitions and can be expected to play a powerful role in this transformation. The services will put the options on the table, and Congress will exercise the power of the purse. A system acquisition will transcend three or four administrations, and a president is unlikely to play a prominent, successful role in this acquisitionoriented transformation. Service Warfare to Joint Warfare The word joint is used in a variety of contexts. The meaning derived from each context is legitimate, but the variety of meanings makes it difficult— perhaps impossible—to determine exactly what greater jointness might be. Both efficiency and effectiveness are at stake, and achieving one often comes at the expense of the other. Joint sometimes refers to legally designated organizations, including the Joint Staff, unified combatant command headquarters, and joint task force headquarters. Joint sometimes means the strategic and operational responsibilities of these headquarters. At other times, joint is a synonym for uniform, suggesting a singleness, a oneness, as a joint solution to a complex communications problem or a solution to a problem of interest to more than one service—for example, infantry weapons (or tactics) to the Army and Marine Corps or strike fighters (or tactics) to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. At times, joint means simply multiple or all services—that is, a committee of service representatives with no one in charge. And sometimes joint means the sum of all parts—that is, from the joint force commander and staff, through the service component headquarters, to the tactical service units: from top to bottom, all-inclusive. For the material development community, joint often means service interoperability—for example, interoperability of Army and Marine Corps ground communications or of Air Force and naval aircraft communications. Achieving jointness, given all of these meanings, is indeed a daunting bureaucratic task. Congress has long called for greater cooperation and sharing between the services. The call for improved jointness is the basis for the 1947 legislation that created today’s Department of Defense. After World War II, the issue was one of efficiency. The War and Navy Departments developed redundant capabilities, particularly in the area of logistics. Today, some ask why the United States has three air forces and is investing heavily in a fourth rotary-wing air force in the Army. Aircraft have been proposed to meet the requirements of all services, but some have been rejected by the services.

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Congress has intervened to force service organizations together and to draw clear lines between them. Congress has legislated the creation of some joint organizations to foster a capability that the services were neglecting—special operations, for example. Another venue for promoting better joint operations is through the roles and functions assigned to the services through legislation. The services hold dearly to their assigned functions and compete for new functions that fit with their culture. With function comes money. Congress has also intervened in the area of personnel policy—for example, requiring that an officer serve in a joint assignment to be eligible for promotion to admiral or general. At the same time, Congress has steadfastly refused the creation of a general staff on the Prussian model that would guarantee a career path for the development of officers competent to fill command and staff positions and who understand the proper application of land, air, sea, amphibious, and special operations forces. The unified commands argue jointness from the perspective of military effectiveness rather than efficiency. Forces from multiple services were once permanently forward deployed in Europe and developed habitual relationships through collocation and exercises. Today’s service forces arrive in response to an emerging crisis having never trained together. Service forces are integrated for the first time in combat and, even then, with contradictory conceptions of war. There is little reason for optimism that the age-old service-to-joint transformation will succeed in the foreseeable future. The need remains nonetheless. TRANSFORMATION IS A JOURNEY, NOT A DESTINATION The force prepared for the possibility of the Cold War turning hot was tested in the Gulf War and, despite the long staging time, was found to be not only sound, but overwhelming. The dominant service conceptions of war were vindicated. When asked what the new force should be for an uncertain future, the response is that “transformation is a journey, not a destination.” Given this response, and given the overwhelming recent success, is it any wonder that the services conservatively hold to proven methods and tools and prefer to incrementally advance in an evolutionary fashion? Major wars fought between great powers, and the lessons in warfare they provide, are episodic and thankfully are separated by decades. In the intervening decades, major powers intervene in the affairs of lesser powers and sometimes come in contact with the organized forces of third-world states or the irregular forces of political factions. These interventions may offer a laboratory to evolve operational concepts for future great power conflict. Or the lessons we learn may be relevant only to small wars against lesser powers, and we may find ourselves unprepared for the next great power war, as we have been in the past.

ChapterTitle Introduction 13

Several important actors shape the future U.S. military. The president, secretary of defense, and combatant commanders will exert strong pressures through the use of military force. The secretary of defense, secretaries of the military departments, and Congress will exert strong influence in the production of military force. The uniformed services, however, are the strongest actors, and understanding them is paramount. But before attempting to describe the conceptions of warfare that drive service behavior, the three alternative views of transformation are described in greater detail, and then recent high-level reform attempts are reviewed.

CHAPTER 1

Directions for Transformation: Three Views

Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk from here? That depends a good deal on where you want to get to. I don’t much care where, Then it doesn’t matter which way you walk, —so long as I get somewhere. Oh, you’re sure to do that if you only walk long enough. —Alice and the Cheshire Cat1

Transformation is a journey, not a destination. Although this common retort may be accurate, it provides no direction, no vision, and no priority. Certainly the agencies of government that must act deserve more specificity than this. There are obvious reasons to change. One reason to transform the military is that the missions it performs have changed. At the end of the decades-long Cold War, the use of the military instrument changed from deterring great power war to great power interventions against lesser powers. Another reason is that new technology makes it possible to change, and an opponent that embraces the right technology may gain the upper hand. Perhaps the most obvious reason to change is that there are always efficiencies to seek. Three different transformations are discernable, but the Defense Department communicates an undifferentiated view. One transformation is based on changes in the geo-strategic environment. Another is based on weapons technology. A third is based on integration of the armed services.

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STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATIONS A major premise of this work is that another clash of great powers is inevitable, and, therefore, it is appropriate and productive to view the present as an interwar period. Past interwar periods have been far from peaceful. Indeed, such periods can be characterized by frequent and costly conflict between lesser powers and by great power interventions. Readiness, defined within this framework, requires a transformation of the force from one designed for an era of great power conflict to one designed for an interwar period. Two cases illustrate transformation driven by significant changes in the strategic environment. One is a story of transforming a navy designed for global commerce protection into a navy designed for concentrated fleet engagements in local waters. The other is a story of transforming a continental army designed for great power war into an army designed for policing a far-flung empire. General characteristics of strategic transformation are derived from these illustrative cases. Transformation and Modernization: Order Matters Chancellor Otto von Bismarck maintained a strong army and a modest navy consistent with Germany’s status as a continental power. Kaiser Wilhelm saw Germany as a world power and his ascendancy brought about a significant change. He envied Britain’s fleet, and by 1897 Germany had 8 new battleships compared to Great Britain’s 62. But to implement fully the Kaiser’s naval fantasies, he needed a building plan and an operational plan to justify his High Seas Fleet. Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz was appointed State Secretary for the Navy to provide both plans. His operational concept, called risk theory, was not to confront the Royal Navy on an equal footing, but to threaten a part of it so as to alter the balance between Great Britain and its principal competitors. His building plan was to slowly increase the rate of ship production and to incrementally increase the size of each ship—a “brick by brick” building of the fleet to maintain the support of his parliament and to not provoke the British into a competition. The early 1900s found the British Empire and its navy in decline. The recently appointed First Sea Lord, Admiral Jackie Fisher, inherited a large navy of battleships, gunboats, and small men-of-war distributed to the four corners of the globe deployed mostly for commerce protection and gunboat diplomacy. Fisher sensed the need for a transformation. The new British operational concept was to impose a distant blockade on the nascent German fleet. A close blockade would have put British ships at risk from submarines and minefields in Germany’s home waters. His first step was to consolidate many of the smaller remote squadrons, to disestablish some, and call as many ships home as possible to form the Grand Fleet stationed in the ports along the eastern seaboard of England and Scotland. It had long been easy to deny Germany access to the Atlantic through the Dover Strait. With the Grand

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Fleet on Britain’s eastern seaboard, it could also deny Germany access to the Atlantic through the Scotland-Norway gap. Atlantic commercial flows were thus assured. Old ships and small ships were discarded; 154 left service early in Fisher’s tenure. From the savings in ships and crews, Fisher was able to pursue his second step. There was a growing sense among naval architects that technological improvements in propulsion, armor, armament, and gunnery had been made piecemeal and that dramatically new ship architecture could better exploit the individual improvements. The all-big-gun battleship, the dreadnought, was the result. A new building program began in October 1905 based on the new design, and the first ship of the class delivered in February 1906 immediately rendered all of Tirpitz’s new battleships obsolete. Fisher could have called for expansion—a larger navy to handle all the old missions plus containment of the Germans, who traditionally had not figured prominently in the equation. But he did not. He could have argued for preservation of the force he inherited in the face of declining political support for an increasingly irrelevant force posture. He did not. Or he could have called for modernization, replacing all the old ships with more modern ships. But he did not. Instead, Fisher first recognized that the new geo-strategic environment required a change. Second, he devised a new operational concept appropriate to the new environment. Third, he reorganized and redeployed the navy, within the fiscal means available, to support the concept. The transformation freed resources, and from the savings he began a modernization program to strengthen his new organization and operational concept. Had Fisher modernized first, he would have modernized a global commerce-protection navy. To the contrary, he transformed the navy into one organized and trained for decisive fleet engagements, and then he modernized it with the right equipment. Order matters. The British Army and the Interwar Era In the days following the First World War, Great Britain had to make hard strategic choices. Knowing that its true source of strength was its economy and that it would not face another great power competitor for at least 10 years, Britain chose to focus on rebuilding the economy and deferring military investment. Because priority was given to the economy, the primary military and naval mission was policing the empire. For the army, this meant garrisons around the world to show presence and keep the peace. Air forces were employed in an attempt to provide a cheaper alternative to manpower. An additional expeditionary force was built to bolster the garrisons should contingencies arise beyond the local force’s capacity. None of the great continental powers were modernizing their armies and, therefore, Britain, separated by water from the continent, had little incentive to modernize its army even if resources had been available.

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That the advantage had shifted to the defense had surprised many, and it resulted in a bloody stalemate on land and at sea during the War to End All Wars. J.F.C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart were busy prescribing fastmoving mechanized warfare as necessary to break the stalemate in the next great power war on the continent.2 The British were thinking about the next great power war but neither investing in nor experimenting with the forces to fight it. The Germans benefited from British thinking, added their own rigorous analysis, and began experimenting and investing earlier for the next war. The British Army was unprepared for WWII, the next war between great powers, as were the armies of France and the United States. The cost of that unpreparedness was high. General Characteristics of Strategic Transformation Both Fisher and Tirpitz were responsible for significant transformations in the years preceding the First World War. Both formulated a new operational concept. Tirpitz developed risk theory—the idea of threatening only a part of the enemy navy; Fisher settled on a distant blockade of the enemy navy. Tirpitz built a navy to undergird his country’s desired new role in the world; Fisher built a navy appropriate to the changed threat environment. Both wanted a large fleet of big ships. Both were constrained by resources. Great Britain’s army was even more severely constrained by resources after the war. The fine continental army that began the war had to be transformed to an army for expeditionary and police operations in distant lands. That’s what strategic choice is about—means must be subordinated to ends, and risks must be assumed. If these are exemplars of strategic transformation, then we might define this type of transformation by these characteristics: recognition of a changed geo-strategic environment; a new or changed operational concept appropriate to the environment; redeployment of the force; and, finally, a change in the way the force organizes, equips, and trains to undergird the new operational concept. REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has its clear origins in the longterm technological competition of the Cold War, a competition between two great power alliances supported by great economic strength. Soviet generals were some of the first to draw attention to the phenomenon and referred to it as a revolution in military technology, but the term RMA was also used. A legendary figure within U.S. defense circles, Andrew Marshall,3 successfully shifted common usage to RMA, fearing too great an emphasis on technology. A literature survey reveals the changing nature of the RMA from its relatively focused beginnings to its current status as a catchall term for any and all so-called transformational efforts. It has been used to describe the long-term

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technological competition between the two superpowers, as a recurring historical phenomenon, and as a synonym for the militarization of the information revolution. The Gulf War and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq are pivot points in the etymology of RMA. The RMA as a Long-term Technological Competition A wise strategy pits one’s enduring strengths against the enemy’s enduring weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Throughout much of the Cold War, the NATO alliance employed the offset strategy. Warsaw Pact strength was in numbers. Unable to compete quantitatively, NATO chose to rely on its technological advantage to offset quantity with quality. But the Pact was not without technical competence and it had considerable industrial capacity that produced large numbers of conventional and strategic nuclear weapons. A technological advance on one side caused a technological counter on the other. The current conflict, waged by non-state actors employing terrorist tactics against the secular state, is neither a long-term technological competition nor an arms race between peers. It is an asymmetric competition of strategy and tactics. Still, the U.S. response is strongly technological. Not all wars are fought on the battlefield; some are waged through economics and budgets. A cost-imposing strategy guides actions in this type of warfare. Such strategies lurked quietly beneath the surface during the Cold War. One of the Soviet Union’s enduring weaknesses was the need to defend the longest border in the world. America’s strength was in technology. The existence of a fleet of American strategic bombers required the Soviets to invest heavily in air defenses of radar, surface-to-air missiles, and supersonic fighter-interceptors. Announcement of a bomber that would fly under the existing radar rendered the air defense system irrelevant. After heavy investment in research, development, and fielding of a new defense system, the announcement of a stealth bomber rendered the new system irrelevant again. The current strategic environment has reversed the U.S. position with respect to cost-imposing strategies. The American response to a few countries possessing a small strategic nuclear capability is to ring the perimeter of the United States with an expensive ballistic missile defense system. Terrorist attacks employing commercial aircraft result in a reallocation of resources to defend airspace and airports, while terrorists can turn to seaports, trains, and vulnerable infrastructure. America is now the victim of a cost-imposing strategy, and the need to find a sustainable response is more important than ever. The RMA as a Historic Phenomenon Military historians have identified a dozen or more RMAs. Military exploitation of the stirrup, the longbow, and the chariot are often cited as changing the nature of warfare. The Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the Second World War offer rich examples of more modern RMAs. To some,

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the Gulf War demonstrated the culmination of an RMA and to others it provided a first glimpse of an RMA in progress. Historians agree on many of the RMAs and agree that they evolve over decades or centuries. RMAs are characterized not by speed but by magnitude of change. The French revolutionaries and Napoleon militarized the rising phenomenon of nationalism. They committed the nation to war against the small, professional armies of neighboring monarchs. Although technological improvements contributed, Levée en Masse was a social rather than technological change.4 The sheer size of an army composed of an impassioned public required new combined arms organizations—corps and brigade—that could move and fight independently. Feeding such an army required logistical and administrative innovations on a grand scale. Great minds were challenged to understand this mammoth change in warfare, and the era produced the classic works of Jomini and Clausewitz. Jomini was studied at West Point by the officers who would rise to command in the American Civil War. Large, impassioned citizen armies also characterized the War Between the States. The industrial revolution was accelerating and had produced three technologies whose exploitation and combination would produce another RMA that continues to be studied today. The rate of fire of the breach-loading rifle rendered irrelevant shoulder-to-shoulder tactical formations, requiring dispersal at the tactical level. The railroad and steamboat allowed the rapid movement and supply of large armies over unprecedented distances. The telegraph allowed command and intelligence information to flow even more rapidly. The technological advances that accompanied the Second World War are uncountable. The war began with horse cavalry regiments and biplanes and finished with armored divisions, jets, and atomic bombs. On the European continent, the internal combustion engine and the radio were exploited by combined-arms organizations of armor, infantry, artillery, and aircraft that could penetrate the static defenses characterizing the First World War. A new model of command allowed tactical commanders at the point of penetration to exercise the maximum initiative to exploit success. It is common in the RMA literature to be reminded that only 10 percent of the German army penetrating France’s defensive Maginot Line was mechanized, and horsedrawn carts were common in the supply train. Murray and Millett make useful distinctions on the matter of military innovations5 that took place during the period between the world wars: technical, operational, and technological innovations. The innovations demonstrated in the Battle of Britain serve to clarify. Improved tactical fighter aircraft and improved radar were innovations at the equipment level and represent technical change. Procedures and organizations to integrate equipment into a new operational concept—an integrated air defense system—constituted an operational change. Together, they changed the context in which the fighter and bomber interacted, representing a technological change. Even though the Germans had better equipment and tactics, they could not prevail. It is interesting to note that the interwar period is studied not from the perspective of the small wars

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that took place but from the perspective of transformation of the force for one great power war to the next. Warfare at sea was revolutionized in the WWII Pacific. The major fleet engagement changed from a gun dual at ranges within visual sight to engagements by the carrier aircraft of fleets that never met. The amphibious assault, discredited in WWI, was conducted by army and marine forces in both theaters after considerable developmental effort. The closing days of the war and the use of the atomic bomb ushered in the nuclear era. Although organizations and doctrine were required, the nuclear revolution may be a singularity; it is a revolution almost exclusively defined by technology. Vietnam is often called the “helicopter war” and the “captain’s war.” Battles were commanded by young officers in small units, and U.S. troops moved around the theater of operations with unprecedented speed by helicopter. Troop concentrations could be achieved where needed within minutes or hours. The operational movement by railroad in the Civil War was accelerated into the tactical time frame by the helicopter a century later. One result was that a typical infantryman participated in significantly more days of combat in a one-year tour of duty than his WWII predecessor experienced in four years. Another result was the rapid evacuation of the wounded to life-saving treatment facilities that previewed in the Korean War. The oceans constituted both a defensive barrier and an obstacle to offensive operations abroad. Global responsibilities, or ambitions, would require the ability for America to project power over long distances. The world wars certainly showed the magnitude of the problem. Prepositioning forces in Europe mitigated the problem during the Cold War. For some Soviet officers, from the perspective of a historically continental power, the Gulf War was a demonstration of the “Reconnaissance Strike Complex.” Within a time frame measured in months, the United States projected massive combat power halfway around the world and with precision munitions decisively defeated an enemy, a nonpareil event. For others, the opening of the war was a preview of the next RMA, information-age warfare. The early phase of the conflict showcased precisionguided munitions and attacks on headquarters, communication systems, and ground-based air defense systems. The enemy’s ability to see and communicate was taken away in the opening round. A hundred-hour ground war was required to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait, but the question of whether the entire war could have been fought with precision weapons hung in the air. Historians have demonstrated their ability to identify, describe, and explain past RMAs given the context provided by ample passage of time. Several decades must pass before the Gulf War will be properly understood in the context of one or more RMAs. There is nothing to suggest that U.S. decision makers can control an RMA—a transformation with an unknown destination and an unknown peer competitor. Many dramatic changes in warfare tend not to be associated with a new technology or with one weapon system replacing another. Rather, the new enters as a

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supporting arm to the established supported arm, and the supported/supporting relationship eventually reverses. The WWI army welcomed aircraft as scouts. Artillery, horse cavalry, and infantry branches all resisted mechanized weapons, but both aircraft and armor were eventually welcomed as supporting arms to the dominant supported arm of the time—infantry. Aircraft and submarines were similarly welcomed into the Navy to scout and screen for the dominant battleship. World War II saw widespread reversals in the supported/supporting relationships between branches. The battleship eventually supported the carrier as aviation became the dominant branch. Armor became the dominant component of the maneuver force with infantry and artillery in support. Within the Navy, the submarine moved from its fleet support role to independent operations. The Army’s air force took on an independent rather than a supporting role, arguing ever since that ground forces were either irrelevant or suited only to a supporting role by conducting mopping up or occupation duties. The changing relationship between the branches within an individual service is painful, even traumatic at times. The relationships between the services have proven to be even more problematic. The RMA from Industrial-Age to Information-Age Warfare The Defense Department’s transformation planning guidance begins, “The United States is transitioning from an industrial age to an information age military.”6 The most current label for the information-age RMA is network-centric warfare. In the final analysis, network-centric warfare is barely more than a 1970s formulation beginning to manifest itself in new operational concepts. The name most closely associated with network-centric warfare is Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski. However, it would be an egregious error to exclude Admiral William A. Owens, who advanced the system-of-systems concept. Owens, in turn, is presaged by Dr. Thomas P. Rona and his description in the mid-1970s of the extended weapon system.7 The trend, perhaps beginning when the carrier displaced the battleship, is of replacing the indivisible weapon system—the platform—with the extended weapon system. In an extended weapon system, sensors, decision makers, and shooters are physically distinct objects geographically separated and linked through the electromagnetic spectrum.8 Some examples may help clarify the distinction between a platform and an extended weapon system. Tanks and battleships epitomize the platform. So, too, does an aircraft whose primary munitions are bullets or gravity bombs unguided after release. However, when an aircrew releases munitions and the guidance to target is accomplished by external actors—for example, by satellite or by laser designators on the ground—the concept of the extended weapon system begins to dominate the platform concept. Owens, a very successful submariner, joint warfare champion, and visionary, spoke of the RMA as the system of systems.9 He asserts that a system should not

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be designed in isolation nor designed to interoperate only with like systems (a platoon of four tanks). Instead, each system should be designed to interoperate with the larger heterogeneous system of systems. He offers a three-part taxonomy, wisely cautions against an overreliance on it, and asserts that the RMA will occur at the intersection of these three technological areas. • Sensors: intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) • Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence (C4I) • Precision-guided munitions (or precision-guided forces, more generally)

Cebrowski, a navy aviator, expanded the concept to network-centric warfare.10 The label suggests a shift in emphasis from the systems that collectively comprise the system of systems to the network that lashes the system together. Network-centric thinking is intended to replace platform-centric thinking. As explicated, network-centric warfare continues along the lines of Rona and Owens in its highly technical orientation and seems an obvious extension of their formulations without improvement. Tom Barnett provides the most interesting and organized critique of networkcentric warfare.11 He argues not against network-centric warfare but for limits on expectations to help avoid the fatal pitfalls of technological hubris. Cebrowski asserts that information superiority leads to speed of command, which then leads to the speed and precision that achieves mass effects without massed forces, and thus forecloses enemy options and stops wars. Barnett cautions that networkcentric warfare’s claimed ability to stop wars parallels the omnipotent claim of early airpower zealots. Network-centric warfare requires a peer or near-peer competitor. “Networkcentric warfare longs for an enemy worthy of its technological prowess.” The opponent must have sufficient technological sophistication to succumb to our high-speed, high-technology interactions and must be willing to fight the way we want to fight. Standing almost alone, Barnett recognizes the demands of an interwar period. He cautions that the significant investment in information technology can only slow the needed adaptation of the force to the needs of the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Furthermore, Barnett suggests that the type of networking needed for small wars is constructive networking with the engaged parties more than the internal networking of friendly forces for major wars. Network-centric warfare also promises better employment of forces by allowing well-informed lower echelons to adapt to the operational situation without waiting on direction from higher echelons. Decision makers at all levels will share a common picture of the battle space. The common picture, however, enables commanders at the highest levels to make tactical decisions. Barnett cautions that senior decision makers must stay in control or the destructive cycle could outstrip the political cycle it is intended to affect. There appears to be an insatiable desire for information that could easily lead

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to overload in the command post, slowing rather than speeding the process. The effects on command processes are not at all understood. Both Owens and Cebrowski’s conceptions favor the “many and the cheap.” The expensive can be acquired only in small numbers, and scarce, potent resources demand more centralized management. The cheap can be acquired in large numbers, distributed ubiquitously, and managed in a highly decentralized manner. Barnett reminds us that cheap-and-many runs counter to a strong American predilection for the technologically sophisticated, “the few and the costly,” as represented by the NATO offset strategy. Furthermore, the laws of physics and economies of scale often argue against the small—for example, the seaworthiness and capaciousness of oceangoing ships grows with size faster than do costs. Pushing America to small and cheap is a monumental undertaking. A remarkably fluffy article, written by two distinguished authors and published in a prestigious journal,12 forced a response from the other side.13 Prominent marines appear to be less than enthusiastic and sometimes hostile toward the network-centric vision. Much of the fractious discussion can be traced to the distinct service cultures of the Navy and Marine Corps and their separate realities of warfare. The system-of-systems concept is championed by those in the Navy who have traditionally concerned themselves with manning the equipment, while their Marine Corps brethren avidly equip the man. General Paul Van Riper, a marine infantryman, sees a revolution based on knowledge rather than on technology. Van Riper also brings the issue of certainty to the fore. One can imagine a submariner, captain of a surface combatant ship, or a carrier aviator, who deals with vast, empty oceans and skies, sprinkled only with small numbers of highly lethal targets worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars. A quest for certainty and precision, and the promise of information technology, is both appealing and rational. At the same time, it is easy to imagine a small team of riflemen patrolling the dusty streets of Hue or Mogadishu, friend, foe, and innocent walking hand in hand. These man-centric, small-wars forces accept the inherent uncertainty of their environment, even embrace it. The force that excels in an uncertain environment is positioned to prevail. By this line of reasoning, pursuing certainty is an exhaustingly expensive Chimera. The solution, instead, is to invest in the knowledge—the “know-how”—of decision makers at all levels. Van Riper and Hoffman remind us of Clausewitz’s trinity of warfare composed of primordial violence, chance, and reason and compare it unfavorably with Owens’s technical trinity of precision munitions, sensor (ISR) systems, and C4I information systems. They offer an alternative tripartite view: commander, reliance on the commander’s initiative, and C4I information systems in a supporting role. Preparing the decision maker is the focus of this RMA. Against criticism of its heavily technological emphasis, apologists ineffectively argue that the system of systems is not the RMA, but one RMA.14

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The disagreement over network-centric warfare is not entirely explained by the service affiliation of the belligerents. One contributor to the networkcentric warfare vision cites Lord Nelson’s “band of brothers” and their victories at Trafalgar and Aboukir as examples of networking.15 Through advanced preparation, ships’ captains executed decisive battles with a minimum of orders during the fight. This raises an important point. By networking, do we mean networking through the electromagnetic spectrum or networking through culture, common experience, and training? The RMA as Synonym for Transformation The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to chart a new course after the Cold War in a document entitled Joint Vision 2010. Its mere publication was a remarkable accomplishment, overcoming considerable bureaucratic obstacles. Its critics were numerous and less than charitable. During deliberations, the RMA was an unavoidable topic. It was decided that the word revolution was, well, too revolutionary, and it frightened off conservative elements within the Defense Department. The word transformation was chosen instead. Transformation meant change, and everyone understood change.16 The proponents of RMA thinking continued marching to the same tune under a new banner. They ignored the change in the strategic environment as the Cold War ended, ushering in an interwar period of small wars. Transformation, to this community, is just a new name for the RMA. Because the RMA driven by information technology, and focused on major war, is the dominant view of transformation, the other transformations have been pushed aside. JOINT WARFARE The word joint is one of the more overused and abused words in defense circles. Nevertheless, some speak of the transformation from warfare as practiced separately by the services to joint warfare. There are two distinct problems to solve. One problem is with the production of force, and the other with the use of force. Both should be thought of as integrating capabilities to accomplish specific missions—mission integration. Forces, or capabilities, are built separately by the services. The services create organizations to implement the functions assigned to them in law. They then equip them, develop doctrine for them, and train them to that doctrine. Integrating these separate service capabilities is left to someone else in the user chain of command. The combatant commander must achieve mission integration from forces built and trained separately. The producer chain of command has an abundance of participants— including congressional authorizing and appropriating committees and subcommittees, the presidents’ Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and the services—and is responsible for assuring that

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the forces produced are mission-integrated forces or, at a minimum, forces that can be integrated to accomplish the missions assigned to the combatant commands. Congressional Concern for Efficiency In the name of jointness, Congress has a perennial interest in efficiency. Senator Nunn, one of the principal architects of the landmark “joint” legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, attempted in 1992 to reinvigorate reform efforts following the Cold War. The sequence of actions that followed, reviewed in the next chapter, consumed significant energy but failed to produce meaningful change. Nunn’s presentation to the Senate provides an example of Congress’s recurring interest in duplication of effort and the assumed inefficiencies associated with redundancy. His presentation identified “ten broad areas where there appears to be substantial duplication and potential opportunity for streamlining.” First on Nunn’s list is the projection of airpower by both the Navy and the Air Force. Second are the contingency or expeditionary forces provided by both the light Army and the Marine Corps. All four services provide helicopter forces. Also on the list are theater air defenses—protection of the force from air and missile attack—a capability truly independent of any one service. One of Congress’s recurring favorites since WWII is the overlap of logistics and support activities. Congress has the constitutional authority to raise and support America’s armed forces, and only Congress can appropriate funds for such purposes. While not the only perspective, research, development, procurement, and maintenance of weapon systems is a dominant perspective of Congress. It is understandable why its concerns are often equipment rather than mission oriented. Weapons are built in congressional districts, missions are not. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees must look across the services at the total force, but their subcommittees are divided along service lines that mirror the schisms in the Defense Department they criticize. Combatant Command Concern for Effectiveness The joint commands include standing combatant commands and temporary joint task forces with responsibilities at the strategic and operational levels of war. They are commanded by four- and three-star admirals or generals. Joint command comes at the end of an officer’s long career in a single service. The assumption is that 30 years of tactical experience is adequate preparation for command at the strategic and operational levels of war. It is further assumed that 30 years of single-service command is adequate preparation for joint (multiservice) command. In major wars, the overall theater commander commands the assigned fighting forces. The far more common case in the interwar period has been to

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create an ad hoc joint task force (JTF) with assigned mission, area, and forces. The JTF is most often commanded by the commander of a single-service organization, borrowed for the developing mission. Forces are prepared separately by the services and arrive in theater during a crisis for the joint force commander to integrate into a coherent whole. The commander must simultaneously assemble a command and staff team, prepare a plan in response to an emerging crisis, and absorb separate tactical service forces that have not trained together. A crisis requiring the use of force is the wrong time to solve problems unattended to by the producer bureaucracy. • Only recently has joint experience been prerequisite to promotion to the rank of general or admiral and, therefore, prerequisite to joint command. But joint assignments are limited to three years, after which officers must return to their service. All promotions are by service; there is no separate career path for “joint” officers. • Only recently has specialized joint education been prerequisite to joint assignment, but it is common to be assigned to a joint command for several months before receiving the education. And joint assignments are commonly cut short by several months if completing the assignment will interfere with the officer’s service career progression. • Service forces have steadfastly resisted the transformation from major to small wars and continue to provide the wrong force to the combatant commander who has no choice but to deal with the many small wars of the interwar period.

All military operations are conducted under the legal authority of one of the combatant commands with often unqualified staff officers and separately prepared service forces that have not trained together. The joint force commanders’ interests in military effectiveness are shared by Congress, but Congress’s interest in effectiveness is episodic, often tweaked by failures that accumulate over time. Legislative interest in military effectiveness tends to address the authorities over the command of forces. Very important contributions to military effectiveness have come from this form of congressional “interference.”

TRANSFORMATION IS A JOURNEY, NOT A DESTINATION Rosen suggests that there is insufficient evidence from which to draw conclusions about successful innovation. Murray and Millett are only slightly more confident. Allowing for their caution and wise counsel, there are four characteristics that have accompanied successful and unsuccessful innovation: specificity of threat, a military culture of innovation, misuse of history, and rigidity.17 The most obvious ingredient of successful innovation is “a specific military problem the solution of which offered significant advantages to further the achievements of national strategy.” Britain’s need to protect itself from air

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attack from the Continent led to innovations with radar-based air defense; no such urgency was perceived in the United States. The Japanese and American need to project power in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean demanded the development of carrier aviation; the European powers did not feel the same pressure; land-based aviation had sufficient range to project power on the Continent and in the sea approaches. The Marines’ need to seize forward operating bases forced them to develop an amphibious warfare capability where the continental Army would not. The horrible carnage and stalemate of WWI drove interwar German processes to create blitzkrieg. A specific threat and a sense of urgency were lacking prior to 9/11. Post– Cold War RMA advocates argued for creating an artificial urgency to defeat an unspecified peer competitor beyond anyone’s planning horizon. The RMA remains driven by technological possibilities rather than by strategic need. The threats posed by the interwar period beginning in 1989 had little effect on defense transformation. Innovation is either promoted or inhibited by military culture. A military culture of innovation is characterized by focusing on problems, asking the right questions, challenging cherished beliefs and orthodoxy, and honestly interpreting data provided by history and experimentation. A culture inhospitable to innovation is characterized by beginning with answers and preferred solutions, and by rigid loyalty to orthodoxy and preordained outcomes—validating revealed wisdom. Murray and Millett suggest that both the interwar German army and American navy had honest processes supportive of change; the French army and British and American air forces did not. The current American process is best described as validating revealed wisdom. Someone, from a position of power or influence, settles on a solution and a slogan. Slogans are then translated into programs for development and procurement. Current examples are rapid decisive operations, operational net assessment, and network-centric warfare. Organizations that failed to innovate would “Twist [history’s] lessons to justify current doctrine.”18 World War I showed that fighter escorts were needed to accompany strategic bombers. But escorts were rejected by the British Royal Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Corps with claims that the “bomber will always get through.” They continued to ignore reality well into WWII at great cost in lives and aircraft. All the world’s navies rejected unrestricted warfare as practiced by German U-boats in WWI even after Germany came close to starving Great Britain. The French army held to the defense and “methodical battle.” Allied air forces held to daylight strategic bombardment as an absolute doctrine. Both already had the answer, they just needed to work out the implementation details in their experimentation and analysis. The Naval War College designed fleet exercises that focused on problems and questions, the fleet executed them, and the college evaluated them honestly. The German army commissioned dozens of studies to understand the problems of the Great War. The difference lay in the rejection or acceptance of historical fact that did or did not support the preferred belief system.

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For some who are responsible for the future of the force, looking at history is like trying to navigate a winding mountain road through the rear view mirror. To invest for the future while ignoring history forces the decision maker to rely on theories unsupported by evidence, more accurately called faith than theory. All evidence is generated in the fleeting moment of the present and immediately belongs to the past, to history. To ignore the past is to ignore the facts, the evidence, and reality. Draconian measures affected both German and Russian military culture. Germany was denied an army as a condition of armistice. Von Seect had no choice but to rely on his general staff. Critical and creative thinking was required for promotion. The Soviet Union’s officer corps was also “downsized.” Stalin’s purge produced an officer corps loyal to the top of the command hierarchy. At least one post–Cold War American service chief demanded that the officer corps, including the service’s war college, read off of a single sheet of transformational music, and the chief provided the sheet. Innovation is not forthcoming absent dissension and competition. A failure to innovate is a failure of leadership and the culture that it fosters. In general, the many elements of the Defense Department continue doing what they have always done and call it transformation.

CHAPTER 2

A Short History of Defense Reform

An object in motion tends to stay in motion, and an object at rest tends to stay at rest, unless the object is acted upon by an outside force. The change of motion is proportional to the imposed force and goes in the direction of the force. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. —Sir Isaac Newton Laws of Motion

Bureaucracies are designed to perform repetitiously a prescribed set of tasks effectively and efficiently. Ordering a bureaucracy to transform itself is asking it to do something it is not designed to do. The services have strong cultures, rooted in history, and forged in war. Their cultures are conservative in nature and distrustful of radical change. If Newton’s laws apply, then to achieve dramatic change in the uniformed services, external forces must be applied in the desired direction to overcome the expected resistance. The direction and magnitude of the force applied should be something more than arbitrary. The forces for change come from several external sources. Technology makes change possible; in the hands of the enemy, technology can make change necessary. Armed conflict between peers occurs episodically, and survival in the face of a potent enemy provides a strong force for change absent in interwar periods. In general, Congress authorizes the services to change as they see fit and appropriates resources to that end; periodically, Congress and the president demand overdue change through legislation and executive order.

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The creation and use of armed force are complex, expensive, and contentious issues. The framers of the Constitution certainly had a great deal to say about the topic. Unpreparedness has been an American tradition, the standing force of the Cold War being an anomaly. The modern defense establishment was born in massive legislative reform following WWII and has been the subject of considerable legislative attention since. Legislation in 1986, conducted before the end of the Cold War was in sight, is the most recent attempt. Of the periodic attempts at reform following WWII, most dealt not with the composition of the armed forces, but with the authorities over the production and use of force. Attempts to alter the roles, missions, and functions of the services have been modest and have affected change only at the margins. External pressure to change force structure—the organized, equipped, and trained units of the services—have been almost entirely about the number rather than the type of units: the size rather than the shape of the force. It is worth reviewing past efforts before looking to transformation of today’s force. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES AND THE RISE TO GREAT POWER STATUS The Army and Navy have different bases in the Constitution. Congress is granted the authority to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a navy. The Marine Corps’ constitutional legitimacy derives from the Navy’s, and the Air Force’s constitutional legitimacy derives from the Army’s. Congress is also authorized to organize and arm the militia of the various states and to call forth the militia into the service of the United States. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.

The choice of wording—raise armies and maintain a navy—is neither accidental nor inconsequential. The “king” was not to have an army. The federal government would have to take its case to the people and to the states to go to war. The militias of Virginia and Pennsylvania dwarfed the federal army. Throughout most of America’s history, the federal army was a small cadre of “regular army” that kept the arts alive and was prepared to bring the state militias and rapidly expanding army up to professional standards in times of war—an army of citizen-soldiers. This orientation dominated the Army and Department of War from its inception through WWII. Fear of a standing army is a well-established British tradition. Insistence on strong civilian control over the uniformed services is another tradition and

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finds expression in the persistent congressional rejection of anything resembling the Prussian General Staff, a permanent body of career staff officers, largely strategic planners. Distrust of military institutions coupled with the protection offered by vast oceans produced an American tradition of unpreparedness for war. The tension between the desire for effective command of the armed forces and the fear of bestowing too much authority in a single individual or entity continues today. The oceans no longer protect. America was unprepared for WWI, leaving its allies to bear the brunt of the war while America mobilized at a safe distance. Following the armistice, America demobilized. The cycle of late mobilization, stumbling into a war elongated by initial unpreparedness, and immediate demobilization was repeated in WWII, leaving the country unprepared for the Korean War. Following cessation of hostilities in Korea, America maintained a standing military throughout the Cold War. At the outset of WWII, the United States had evolved a defense establishment rooted in the separate constitutional authorities for an army and navy. The prewar design produced separate Departments of War and Navy. The Navy Department was ready to respond as a direct instrument of the president’s foreign policy below the threshold of declared war for the frequent interventions against lesser powers or minor interventions against major powers. The War Department was ready to mobilize the economy and an army should Congress declare war, something done only when threatened by a major power. Readiness of the naval services meant ready to act on foreign shores within hours, days, or weeks. Readiness in the War Department meant ready to mobilize the country for war. In the language of the time, the army equipped the man while the navy manned the equipment. Put another way, the Navy was equipment-centric or capital-intensive, while the Army was man-centric or labor-intensive. The Navy Department was a self-contained air, land, and sea force. Its fleet and its small standing army of naval infantry could handle an array of missions short of declared war. The War Department made elaborate plans to mobilize an army with an understandable fixation on the many men needed to fill the ranks. The Army entered the war as an infantry force of citizen-soldiers and left the war as a victorious mechanized air and land force. The significant lead times required to build ships had long been recognized, and now it was clear that industrial-age armies and air forces required the same persistent attention. The equipment centricity of the industrial-age force asserted itself across the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The magnitude and intensity of WWII, coupled with the unimaginable advances in technology during the war, showed the inadequacy of a defense establishment primarily divided by the threshold of declared war. The Korean War marked the beginning of the full-blown Cold War and reinforced that conclusion. For the Cold War, a full-spectrum standing force would be required—a force for interventions against minor powers (small wars), for minor interventions against major powers (e.g., show of force), and to deter

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or defeat a great power (major war). The standing force would have to have the ability to be scaled up on short notice. The threshold of war ceased to distinguish the Navy and War Departments. The Second World War exposed many shortcomings of the prewar peacetime establishment. Some problems were solved during the war. The complexity of others required deferment of resolution until after the war. Many of the perceived problems derived from separate naval and military institutions that produced duplication of capability, friction between the services, and convoluted command arrangements. Resolution was pursued after the war under the rubric of unification. UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE MODERN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is somewhat of an accident of history and a wartime expedient. It began at the Arcadia Conference convened in Washington, D.C., soon after the American declaration of war following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt met to establish formal cooperative channels. The conferees recommended establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff consisting of the British Chiefs of Staff (uniformed chiefs of the air, land, and sea services) and their “United States opposite numbers.” The recommendation was implemented nearly immediately and meetings began in January 1942. The “Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff” came into being by default and first met the next month.1 The Arcadia Conference also formally defined terms: “‘Combined’ signified collaboration of two or more nations while ‘joint’ was used to designate the inter-service collaboration of one nation” [emphasis added].2 Given that there is no supranational body above the sovereign state, it is understandable why allied nations must collaborate. Collaboration between the services rather than their command by a higher federal body seems to suggest that some degree of sovereignty had accrued to the services. The original JCS was a committee of service chiefs with no one in charge; its small staff and its associated processes were quickly shown inadequate at the Casablanca Conference (January 1943), also attended by Churchill and Roosevelt, that produced the decision to press for the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. The British planning staff was large and was assigned duties full time. The U.S. staff was small and drawn from the service staffs on a part-time basis. The demands of war forced expansion of staff and adaptation of processes throughout the war. By the end of the war, the JCS sat above nearly 20 major committees and boards, each coordinating Army and Navy activities. The JCS remained a committee with no one in charge. The civilian-led Departments of War and Navy grew in size and authority as well during the war. On matters of war, the president dealt directly with the uniformed service chiefs rather than with the civilian secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. The wartime JCS dealt with the use of force,

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while the civilian-led departments dealt with the production of force. This division of labor became more pronounced during the war; it continues to be problematic today. The concept of a unified command is rooted in WWII Europe. Soon after victory in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower was made commanding general of U.S. Forces, European Theater by order of the JCS (June 1945). With Army forces assigned, it was a unified command in name only. The Strategic Air Command was established soon thereafter. Unified command in the Pacific was not achieved even by war’s end, the theater having been divided between the Army and Navy. True unified command of U.S. armed forces would have to wait on war’s end, congressional hearings, and legislation. A system of combatant commands was formally established by President Truman in 1946. Commands were to be either unified (multiple services) or specified (single service). Both functional and regional commands were considered. Regional commands would have authority for all military operations in a specific geographic area. Functional commands—more properly called mission-oriented commands—would be narrowly tailored—for example, designed for strategic bombardment or for defense of the Panama Canal. Region rather than function became the dominant discriminator between the commands. But the regions’ boundaries were drawn to preserve single-service dominance within. The Air Force staked its claim to its preferred conception of an independent air war and strategic bombardment; the Army and Navy divided the earth at waters’ edge. Although unified commands had nominally arrived, the original combatant commands were single-service, specified, commands. Service dominance had not been weakened by Truman’s plan, but the conditions were established for future efforts in that direction. Even before war’s end, studies had begun to address the many apparent organizational and procedural shortcomings. After the war, both houses of Congress, the services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were deeply engaged in reform studies. Army General George C. Marshall preferred real unity of command over the armed forces rather than a system of coordinating committees. Army Air Forces General Hap Arnold concurred. Admirals King and Leahy felt the war showed the superiority of joint coordinating committees to unitary command. Congress held hearings on unification of the Departments of Navy and War immediately after war’s end. The unification hearings led to legislation creating the modern defense establishment in 1947. Key legislation continued the process of reform in 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986, augmented with minor legislation and executive orders along the way. The National Security Act of 1947 created the “National Military Establishment” and the position of Secretary of Defense at its head. The Act, as since amended, constitutes the body of law governing the armed forces of the United States, second in importance only to the Constitution. The 1947 Act gave statutory authority to the existing JCS. Many of the standing boards and committees survived. The Office of Strategic Services was removed from the JCS and elevated to independent status as the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The Act began the long road to unification of the armed forces under a single secretary. The Navy Department remained intact, but the War Department was replaced with Departments of Army and Air Force. All three were executive departments with secretaries of cabinet rank. The secretary of defense was little more than a coordinator with a small staff. The four services were compartmented within the three civilian-led departments. The responsibilities and authorities assigned to the elements of the Department are differentiated as roles, missions, and functions. One often hears “roles, missions, and functions” or “roles and missions” as a single word. At times each word is treated as virtually synonymous, but each has a meaning and an origin.3 The term role dates from the 1947 Act. The Act established the primacy of a service in a single element—air, land, or sea. The Army and Air Force were true to the division by element, and each became a separate uniformed service under its own civilian-headed executive department. The Navy was clearly the sea service, but it defied the pure elemental design by retaining its own aviation. The Marine Corps was assigned primary responsibility for amphibious warfare, not an element at all, and it too retained its own aviation. The naval services collectively spanned the elements. The division of labor was deeply flawed. Having established the services by element, the law remained weak on missions and functions. President Truman attempted to remedy this shortcoming with Executive Order 9877 (July 1947). The first defense secretary quickly convened a conference of service chiefs at Key West, Florida, to negotiate and clarify functions.4 The Key West Conference (March 1948) produced a staff paper, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” which Secretary of Defense James Forrestal forwarded to President Truman with the recommendation that it replace 9877. The 15-page paper is commonly referred to as the Key West Agreement.5 The Agreement made the distinction between primary and collateral functions. Services were authorized to create force structure and to expend resources to implement their primary functions. Collateral functions were those in support of other services for which no additional funds would be forthcoming. The Agreement assigned functions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well. Functions assigned to the JCS, as a collective, included that of principal advisor to the president, strategic and logistics planning, establishing the unified and specified commands and designating one JCS member as executive agent for each command and for certain operations, and for providing general direction of combat operations. The Agreement left unresolved the assignment of strategic air warfare.6 Forrestal again assembled the service chiefs and secretaries to address the issue at the Newport Conference in Rhode Island (August 1948). The Air Force laid exclusive claim to strategic bombardment and the atomic bomb, but the Navy argued that the atomic bomb could be applied as part of the naval campaign, and, so equipped, naval aviation could make a strong contribution to the strategic effort. This function remained a bone of contention and grew into

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one of the best-known interservice squabbles, known as the revolt of the admirals, when the requisite carrier program was cancelled and a new Air Force bomber program continued. By the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force were designated “military departments” and lost their executive department status; their secretaries lost cabinet rank and positions on the National Security Council. The National Military Establishment was renamed the Department of Defense and gained executive department status. At its head, the secretary of defense was made the principal assistant to the president on all defense matters. The 1949 legislation provided for a chairman of the JCS and allowed an expansion of the Joint Staff from 100 to 210. The chairman presided over meetings but had no vote; he had responsibility for “inducing agreements,” but he had no directive authority. Even with a chairman, the JCS remained a committee with no one in charge. Eisenhower continued Truman’s efforts at reform in 1953.7 The somewhat independent joint boards lost statutory authority and their responsibilities were transferred to the Defense Department, where they were under the authority of its secretary. Eisenhower’s desire to strengthen civilian control resulted in reassignment of executive agency for the combatant commands from the JCS and one of its service chief members to the secretary of a military department. The chain of command from the president to the field commander went through a civilian secretary, bypassing intermediate uniformed military officers, including the JCS. COLD WAR REFORM EFFORTS Major legislative reform in 1958, initiated by President Eisenhower, marks the beginning of the long-term technological competition of the Cold War. Timing of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 was largely driven by advances in intercontinental ballistic missile technology, annunciated by the Soviet launching of the Sputnik communications satellite (November 1957). The legislated reforms, however, were more far reaching. Eisenhower initiated the legislation with a message to Congress in which he announced that warfare by element—air, land, and sea—was over. The services may be separated by element, but warfare was not. separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concerted effort . . . singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service.8

Accordingly, general-purpose forces, as opposed to strategic nuclear forces, were to be organized under unified commands. In the roles, functions, and missions context, the word “mission” dates from the 1958 Act that assigned broad, operational missions (the uses of force) to the combatant commanders.

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The chairman was made executive agent for the unified commands. Command of forces now went from the president to the combatant commander through the chairman of the JCS rather than through a service chief (since 1947) or through the secretary of a military department (since 1953). The services and military departments were increasingly force providers with authorities exclusively along the producer chain of command. The 1958 Act caused significant change in the JCS structure. Ike wanted a strong, dedicated staff rather than committees from the service staffs. The many joint coordinating committees reporting to or through the JCS were replaced by the more traditional staff structure of a warfighting command— a true joint staff was born. Just as important, the individuals populating the Joint Staff were full-time employees. To support these new responsibilities, Congress authorized an increase from 210 to 400. The staff was not to have executive authority. The Joint Staff worked for the JCS, and not for the chairman, who had no vote. The tension persisted between the desire for a strong, professional, full-time unified staff and the congressional distaste of a Prussian-style general staff. The JCS remained a committee with no one in charge. Since 1947, the Air Force chief of staff and the chief of naval operations had command authorities over strategic air forces and naval forces. At Eisenhower’s request, Congress rescinded all legislation granting command authorities independent of the defense secretary. Twenty years of relative organizational stability followed the 1958 legislation. Vietnam occupied the attention of senior decision makers throughout much of the 1960s and 1970s. The new powers vested in the defense secretary in 1958 were not fully used until Robert McNamara was appointed in 1961. McNamara instituted management reforms that created an Office of Systems Analysis that rationalized programs across all the services for the first time.9 Process improvements included analysis by major force programs10 rather than by service and linkage of planning, programming, and budgeting across the Department. The same period saw the creation of several defense agencies assigned to the JCS, including the Defense Nuclear Agency (1959) and the Defense Communications Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency (1961). In the mid 1970s, the preponderance of defense agencies were transferred from the JCS to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where they reported to the defense secretary through under secretaries and assistant secretaries. The end of the Vietnam War was followed by across-the-board personnel reductions that resulted in some consolidation of the Joint Staff. A 15 percent reduction in 1974 was repeated in 1976 and resulted in merger and reduction of Joint Staff directorates. The changes were temporary, and the traditional staff structure reasserted itself by 1982. The draft system, specifically the allocation of deferments, grew increasingly corrosive during Vietnam. A lottery was introduced as a temporary measure, but the president’s authority to draft expired in 1973. Conscription ended, ushering in the all-volunteer force.

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By the late 1970s, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the failed attempt to rescue hostages from Tehran, there was a growing perception that the joint chiefs were not providing quality advice. JCS chairman General David C. Jones, USAF, and Army Chief of Staff Edward C. “Shy” Meyer attributed the shortcoming to the dual role played by the service chiefs. The JCS was a committee of service chiefs collectively responsible for providing advice to the president, and the members of the JCS were service chiefs responsible to and for their services. Prominent studies went further.11 The services and their chiefs were captive of processes focused on modernization for the future rather than on the operational accounts of today’s combatant commanders. Joint Staff processes remained dominated by service positions, and its recommendations were untimely and watered down. Arguments were common to abolish the JCS and replace it with a council of experts with no service responsibilities. The commandant of the Marine Corps was added as a permanent member of the JCS in 1978, having had only limited membership since 1952. General David C. Jones, Air Force chief of staff (1974–1978) and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1978–1982), precipitated legislative action in an appeal to the House Armed Services Committee on February 3, 1982, as his term as chairman drew to an end. He concluded by saying, “We do not have an adequate organizational structure today.” Soon afterward, retired Marine General Victor C. “Brute” Krulak convinced Senator John Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to convene hearings with the objective of returning to the organizational arrangements of WWII and service primacy. Battle lines were drawn. Jones’s replacement as chairman, Army General Jack Vessey, attempted to reverse course and aligned with Reagan’s new secretary of defense, Caspar “Cap” Weinberger. Weinberger’s objections were not based so much on the merits but on his concern that admitting organizational disarray might jeopardize congressional support for the administration’s desire to expand defense spending. Critical studies continued to pile up,12 and pressure continued to build to a head by the mid-1980s. In the Senate, Sam Nunn, Barry Goldwater, and William Cohen and in the House, Dick White, Ike Skelton, Bill Nichols, Les Aspin, and John Kaisich led legislative efforts ably supported by staffers Jim Locher and Arch Barrett. Former secretaries of defense expressed unanimous support for reform during testimony. In January 1985, Goldwater became chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Republican Goldwater and Democrat Nunn worked handin-hand for reform. Democrat Aspin assumed the chair of the House Armed Services Committee. Reagan’s national security advisor, Bud McFarlane, took a positive stance and convinced the president to create a blue ribbon panel to look at reorganization. The panel, led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, grew to support congressional efforts. A major study conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee diagnosed the organizational problems and laid out legislative objectives.13

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Objectives included improving advice to the president, National Security Council, and secretary of defense; strengthening civilian control; clarifying responsibilities of the combatant commands and enhancing their authorities over assigned forces; improving the effectiveness of joint operations through training, doctrine, and education; and achieving efficiencies. As the legislative process progressed, opposition from the Pentagon stiffened. Army Chief of Staff Shy Meyer, a strong but minority voice, proposed even more radical reform than Congress was considering, but the general response from the Pentagon bureaucracy was overwhelmingly negative. Reagan’s Secretary of Navy John Lehman, Secretary of Air Force Russ Rourke, and Marine Commandant P. X. Kelley, in strong language, predicted dire consequences for the country should the legislation pass.14 The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 198615 is the most important defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. The legislation was shepherded by Goldwater and Nunn in the Senate and Nichols in the House. It was conducted in parallel with Cohen-Nunn legislation addressing special operations forces and low-intensity conflict. It is difficult to find meaningful reform in this period without Senator Nunn’s skillful involvement. The chairman of the JCS was made the principal advisor to the secretary of defense, the National Security Council, and the president. Under the former arrangement, the committee of service chiefs was the principal advisor, and the chairman could do little more than forward the committee’s consensus view. Equally significant, the Joint Staff was assigned to work for the chairman rather than for the committee. The size of the Joint Staff was raised from 400 to 1,627, reflecting an expanded circumscription of the Joint Staff. The new law allowed for the possibility of someone being in charge of the JCS should that individual be willing and able. The Act gave the chairman increased responsibilities and authorities for strategic and logistics planning, joint warfighting doctrine, and programming and budgeting. A Joint Staff directorate was created to handle the new joint training and doctrine development responsibilities assigned to the chairman. A vice chairman was authorized and made the second ranking officer in uniform, below only the chairman. A Joint Requirements Oversight Council ( JROC, jay-rock), a committee of vice service chiefs chaired by the vice chairman, was charged with reviewing service-generated requirements from an overarching “joint” perspective. Another new directorate was derived to focus on programming and budgeting and to be the secretariat for the new JROC. A Joint Strategic Planning System was put in place to help the chairman exercise his new responsibilities. Combatant commander authorities over assigned forces were increased. Modernization for the future and specialization increasingly characterized the services; readiness for present-day operations and achieving synergy from specialized service forces was increasingly the province of the combatant commanders. Resources continued to flow from the services to their components in the combatant commands, but the combatant commander was given

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greater authority over those resources, specifically with respect to joint training, force organization, and force employment. The joint task force was insinuated between the unified command and the services along the user chain of command. The service components, however, remained very powerful. A program for joint specialty officers, a continuing favorite of Representative Ike Skelton, was mandated. Officially blessed joint assignments were now required for promotion to the rank of general or admiral. Specialized joint education was prerequisite to assignment to these posts. The result by the mid-1990s was a marked improvement of joint staff personnel but without a corresponding improvement in their civilian counterparts in the Pentagon. The intention was to improve the chairman’s advice to the president by improving the quality of the chairman’s staff. The unintended consequence was a shift in power favoring the uniformed military over career civil servants and political appointees.16 THE END OF AN ERA Immediately following the Cold War, a “peace dividend” was expected by those who incorrectly equated the absence of great power conflict with a period of peace. Throughout the period, presidents would be unable to discipline themselves in the use of force, and Congress would be unwilling to discipline presidents. The democratic peace theory—that democracies tend not to war and that democracies tend not to war against each other—was used to justify the use of force around the world to spread democracy or to make the world safe for democracy. The overwhelming evidence is that stable democracies and stable autocracies are equally prone to war; but stable democracies and autocracies are much less prone to war than are states transitioning between the two forms of government.17 Given the evidence, one should easily have anticipated a period of widespread hostility after regimes artificially propped up by the Soviet Union collapsed. Few did. The Cold War elevated the logic of “east-west” over that of “north-south.” The east-west logic was about conflict between two powerful alliances separated by ideology; it was about survival of the nation and of the free world. The north-south logic was about the existence and widening of the gap between the haves and the have-nots. While overshadowed by the east-west conflict, attention to the problems associated with the north-south gap remained temporarily suspended. National animosities were held in check as historic adversaries chose sides with one great power or another. With the passage of the bipolar era, ancient rivalries erupted within and across the artificial boundaries of the colonial past. As the checks and balances of superpower competition vanished and the use of force accelerated, a rapid and painful drawdown of force structure was in progress. The invasion of Panama and the Gulf War followed almost immediately. The invasion of Panama to dispose of a corrupt government was at the time most readily interpreted as a continuation of the Monroe Doctrine—the

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United States exercising hemispheric hegemony—rather than as the United States pursuing a strategy of global hegemonic primacy. The Gulf War facilitated the decline in the size of the force that began its downward trend two years earlier. Operation Desert Storm was fought during the opening months of 1991 with the military forces the United States had acquired in anticipation of war with the Soviet Union. Forces were moved from Europe to Saudi Arabia. Military units that performed well in combat were redeployed from the Persian Gulf to the United States, many to be disbanded. In the Gulf War, a U.S.-led alliance overwhelmingly defeated the Iraqi military. The international makeup of the coalition assured many that the collective security arrangement remained intact. The Iraqi military was a very large, third-rate force that was equipped and organized along the lines of the Warsaw Pact forces that the NATO alliance had prepared for. The victory offered those so inclined to conclude that existing military force structure was well suited to the new world order. Resistance to changing Cold War force structure was vindicated. The overwhelming victory in the Gulf allowed the increasing small-wars activity to be ignored as if background noise. The Clinton-Gore victory over Bush-Quayle marked the final handoff from the World War II generation to the Vietnam generation. The Clinton and Bush administrations that followed were not received well by the Pentagon. Vietnam-era veterans holding senior positions in the military quietly hold a special contempt for elected officials and political appointees that they consider to be “chicken hawks” or “draft dodgers.” Application of the terms is not limited to those who left for Canada or went to jail. It applies equally, correctly or incorrectly, to those who used deferments, those who joined the National Guard, those who used their parents’ status to get special treatment, and those who simply chose not to serve. Greater respect seems to be accorded to those who went to jail. Clinton squandered what little political capital he had on a campaign promise to provide equal opportunity for homosexuals in the military. Then, with no strategy,18 the administration was drawn into the small-wars era as artificial states like Yugoslavia and Somalia collapsed. With the veil of the Cold War removed, ancient conflicts reasserted themselves. An era of small wars emerged predictably, and the United States was unprepared with a strategy for the use of force and with a force unprepared for the mission. The Bush II campaign included rhetoric on transformation and a strategy based on the limited use of force.19 The only clear message about transformation was that it would not be a continuation of Cold War force structure. As for the use of force, candidate Bush made it clear that he would not use the force for nation building as did his Democratic predecessor. The Bush campaign strategy of selective engagement was discarded and a strategy of hegemonic primacy went into full force after September 11, 2001. By then, the producer chain of command had squandered the chance to transform the force for 12 years (1989–2001). The United States projected combat power

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to Afghanistan to defeat at best a third-rate Taliban army. The Taliban itself was not a direct threat to the United States but instead the critical enabler to the direct threat, Al Qaeda. The Taliban military was quickly defeated, but the war continues. The United States then projected combat power to Iraq, and after another third-rate military force was defeated, victory was declared and the war continues. A major-war conception continues in the face of a small-wars reality. A new rationale was required to link heavily interventionist tendencies with the small force available. For decades, the Pentagon used a two-war force-sizing construct. The force must be sufficient to defeat one enemy and have enough reserve to deter or defeat a second who might be tempted to exploit the opportunity provided by the first. More recently, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld put forward a “10-30-30” force-sizing construct. According to the national military strategy, the military must be capable of defending the homeland, deter aggression in four distinct regions of the world, defeat military aggressors in two separate conflicts, and conduct some smaller scale contingencies. To achieve this ambitious set of objectives, the force must be prepared to deploy to a distant theater within 10 days, defeat an enemy in 30 days, and be prepared to fight again 30 days later. One can imagine the country’s ability to project combat power to defeat the military of problem states one at a time, certainly given the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military forces. The force can be deployed, employed, redeployed, and employed again. The concept is more readily believed by those who have not been in combat for any length of time. The “major combat operations” may be over quickly. But each quick military victory is followed by years or decades of the real war. Such is the nature of small wars. And the responsibility for establishing security and “post-conflict reconstruction” falls to the same military that is assumed to be available to fight elsewhere after 30 days’ rest. The phasing logic of major combat operations followed by post-conflict reconstruction is itself leftover major-war thinking that does not fit small wars. POST–COLD WAR REFORM EFFORTS Several reform efforts were attempted at the highest levels of the defense bureaucracy following the Cold War. Reform efforts include reviews conducted internal to the Department of Defense and by independent commissions. The formation and implementation of recommendations are often foiled by logrolling between the services. The need for change was contested by the overwhelming victory over the Iraqi army. While there has been no significant reform by Congress since the Cold War ended, two major types of reform have been attempted within the DOD—roles and missions reform and force structure reform. The former largely deals with the roles and functions legally assigned to the services that define the boundaries and friction points between them. With function comes authority and money. The latter type of reform deals with the major force units provided by the services for use by combatant commanders. The major

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force units and their internal organization are left to the services. The dialogue, then, is limited to the number of those units. Roles, Missions, and Functions Reform Goldwater-Nichols legislation directs the JCS chairman to review roles and missions at least every three years. Chairman Crowe conducted the first in 1989, but the abrupt end of the Cold War overshadowed the report and called into question the validity of its underlying assumptions. Nunn delivered a major address on the floor of the Senate in 1992. In that address he warned Congress and the nation that our Cold War force structure would not and could not survive. He challenged Congress and the Pentagon to rethink and reshape the military, rather than just to make it smaller. We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our Cold War forces. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles and missions that characterized the past forty years. We must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces—not just make them smaller.20

As chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell took up Nunn’s challenge in the congressionally mandated chairman’s examination of service roles and missions (more properly called roles and functions). However, to many congressional leaders, including Nunn, the recommendations of the February 1993 report 21 dealt with restructuring at the margins. Frustrated, Congress established an independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.22 The purpose of establishing an independent commission was to free it from the negotiated settlements that take place between the services and other defense bureaucracies. Characteristically, such commissions employ an abundance of retired military personnel imbued with the same parochial views that shape the outcomes of studies conducted inside the bureaucracy. Between the Commission’s establishment and its report, two significant events took place. First, the Republican Party won control of both houses of Congress; consequently, Nunn’s authority was greatly diminished. Second, Dr. John P. White, the highly regarded head of the Commission, was nominated to the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense, putting him in the position of criticizing the bureaucracy he would soon help lead. These two events substantially weakened the perceived independence of the commission and the political force behind restructuring. The commission’s report came out in May 1995 and again dealt with reform at the margins.23 The Bureaucratics of Force Structure Reform Force structure has also been reviewed after the Cold War. Both force development policy (what force to have) and force deployment policy (where

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to position the force) were at issue. During the Bush presidency (1989–1993), Chairman Colin Powell attempted to define a “base force” below which the United States could not perform its duties as a superpower. Led by Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the first Clinton administration (1993–1997) conducted a Bottom-Up Review. The first Quadrennial Defense Review was conducted during the second Clinton administration (1997–2001). The QDR of the Bush administration (2001–2005) fizzled from lack of civilian guidance and then came to a halt on September 11, 2001. Since the Truman administration, the national military strategy has had as its focus deterring, and, if necessary, winning, a global war against the Soviet Union. Strategies link ends, ways, and means. In modern force planning, the ways of the strategy have been represented variously by the need to win two wars, two and a half wars, two wars and a lesser-included case, or two nearly simultaneous wars. Two wars, as a deterrent, because a second belligerent might be emboldened while a one-war force is committed elsewhere. The so-called half war was a counter to a communist-inspired insurgency. Lesserincluded case also meant a half war but implied that it could be handled by the force designed for two major wars. In today’s interwar period, the half wars (now called smaller scale contingencies) drive force structure, but planning for major war still dominates and is a strong conservative influence.24 Which wars and half wars to consider is the next level of detail. A range of planning scenarios—the events leading up to hostilities and the forces that can be brought to bear—establish the set of critical assumptions. For many practical purposes, the choice of scenarios predetermines the outcomes of analyses—sizing, shaping, and positioning the force.25 A regional conflict was important primarily in the context of global war as the precipitating event or opening round.26 The significance of regional conflicts was about to change. As the Soviets began to show signs of strategic fatigue, foresighted thinkers, most notably in uniform, began to plan for change. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, these officers were considering the changing strategic environment and the implications for force structure. The declining threat from the Soviet Union would not support the large, standing Cold War military and its budget. Given the removal of the common threat, alliances might shift and our forward-basing arrangements might be challenged. Three efforts, separately initiated, eventually coalesced in the Joint Staff. In June 1986, Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickham, Jr., challenged strategic planning assumptions, specifically about the warning time available for mobilization and deployment of U.S. forces in response to Warsaw Pact mobilization. The simple act of challenging one long-held assumption precipitated the reexamination of many. In May 1987, Major General George Lee Butler, USAF, became vice director of the Joint Staff planning shop (J-5). His grasp of the changing strategic environment would energize the directorate. Butler convened the Roundtable on Warning in April 1989 that brought together intelligence analysts, force planners, and force programmers in a dialogue that soon would prove critical.

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On a separate tack, the budget analysts in the J-8 met with congressional staff and the president’s Office of Management and Budget. The J-8 initiated the first Quiet Study to consider the force structure implications of the coming budget cuts. The study was quiet because OSD civilians and the services were not yet ready to consider force reductions. The study assumed a declining budget but no change in strategy; Chairman Crowe thought that a change in strategy should come from the president. From Powell’s position as Reagan’s national security advisor in 1988, he witnessed firsthand the dramatic change in Soviet capability and behavior. As a lieutenant colonel in the 1970s he had watched the Army budget decline by almost 50 percent without adequate planning. The freefall produced what became known as the hollow force. He did not wish to see another unplanned drawdown. But when Powell was appointed commander in chief of U.S. Army Forces Command in April 1989, he found Army thinking holding steady. The Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the president to deliver a national security strategy. The Bush administration began a National Security Strategy Review (NSR-12) in early 1989. Everything was on the table, including the president’s National Security Strategy; the chairman’s National Military Strategy and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the secretary’s Defense Planning Guidance that translates all departmental inputs into action. The strategic environment was changing dramatically and quickly. It would be unreasonable to expect everyone to accept a change of this magnitude readily or simultaneously. To be unprepared for a resurgent Soviet Union could be fatal to national survival; to be unprepared for the interwar period would at most risk national interests. There was considerable corporate knowledge, skill, and tools to analyze global thermonuclear war and massive conventional war in Europe. There was no corresponding competence in analyzing “lesserincluded cases.” Disagreements were many. There appeared to be agreement that being the only superpower implied considerable global responsibilities. Rather than using a specific threat, like the one formerly posed by the Soviet Union, to justify U.S. force structure, force structure would be defined as desired capabilities to meet superpower responsibilities. The more likely threat in Southwest Asia would be Iraqi aggression on the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, Soviet interests and abilities would neither require nor allow their response. A broader view was needed and included greater emphasis on Latin America, the Pacific Rim, and the Middle East. The shift in strategic thinking was from global to regional wars. There were disagreements about whether the coming budget cuts would be 10 or 25 percent and whether the Base Force would be reached by 1994 or 1997. Paul Wolfowitz chaired the Defense Department’s NSR-12 steering committee. The Joint Staff, supported by Chairman Crowe, pushed for the shift to regional emphasis but was resisted by Wolfowitz, who had been instrumental in establishing the European-centric scenarios that drove force structure analysis in the Pentagon and who wanted to continue the emphasis on Europe.27

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Critical mass had been reached in the Joint Staff by late 1989. Butler was awarded a third star and assumed directorship of the J-5 in July 1989. Powell was appointed chairman in October 1989. The chairman, the J-5, and the J-8 found common cause. Goldwater-Nichols had moved the authority of principal advisor to the president from the service chiefs to the chairman and provided the chairman with a strong staff. All of the elements were in place to establish a Base Force. Base-force thinking accepted the new strategic environment and impending fiscal pressures and responded with a significantly different force deployment policy. The Cold War concept of “forward defense” denoted substantial combat forces garrisoned in Europe with war plans to deploy more. The Joint Staff argued for forward presence and engagement. Establishing forward presence required two steps. The first step was to redeploy forces from Europe to garrison in the United States. The second step was to deploy smaller forces on a rotating basis to theaters around the world showing presence to potential adversaries and to engage potential coalition partners. Service resistance and support was predictable. The Army and Air Force, long garrisoned in Europe, were against the proposed force deployment policy. The naval services had long been in the forward presence business and remained silent. To implement forward presence, forces would be organized into Atlantic, Pacific, Strategic, and Contingency forces. Most heavy combat forces would come home and be part of the strategic reserve to be shared by the Atlantic and Pacific Commands as reinforcements for major wars. The Atlantic and Pacific Commands would establish forward presence with assigned forces. Both would assume reduced forward basing. Strategic nuclear forces would be under single command. Light forces in the continental United States would be organized under the Contingency Command for global response. Seven regional scenarios were used, none of which led to global war. The new standards, an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait28 and a North Korean invasion of the South, topped the list, followed by a third scenario with both conflicts conducted simultaneously. Another scenario saw Russia attacking Lithuania and Poland. Smaller scale contingencies included coups in the Philippines and in Panama. A final scenario, a decade or more in the future, considered an unnamed expansionist superpower. Powell, unlike Crowe, did not wait for the president to provide a new strategy. He took his message directly to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney without first building a consensus among the service chiefs. Now that the JCS had someone in charge, there appeared to be little need to convene the committee of service chiefs until a decision had been reached between the chairman and his civilian bosses. The strategy provided a rationale for keeping a force necessary for the country to meet its putative responsibilities as the only superpower. Without such a rationale, it was feared, the expectations of a peace dividend would produce another hollow force or could produce withdrawal into isolationism. The time to take the message to the pubic had arrived. Nunn made three

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public speeches in March and April 1990; Powell spoke in April. A speech was prepared for President Bush to deliver on August 2, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait. Political momentum dissipated. The classified Defense Planning Guidance contained the language of a primacy strategy that had to be withdrawn after it was leaked to the media.29 A stable consensus on national security strategy had yet to be reached, but the 40-year old strategy of containing and deterring the Soviet Union had been permanently displaced. The size of the force would continue its decline through the floor that Powell had hoped to establish. The Clinton administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR)30 was equally marginal at affecting change. The review was conducted from within the Department by Les Aspin, then defense secretary and former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. The effort was called “bottom up” to reflect two concerns. First, it was felt that after the Cold War, a force review should be conducted from the ground up and, second, that it should not be driven top down by budgetary pressures—a swipe at the Bush administration’s allegedly budget-driven Base Force analysis. The BUR focused on two scenarios, “aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and an attack by North Korea against the Republic of Korea.” The review considered four major force-sizing options: • win one major regional contingency (MRC), • win one MRC while holding in a second, • win two nearly simultaneous MRCs, and • win two nearly simultaneous MRCs plus conduct smaller operations.

The Review concluded by recommending a force structure to meet the most stressing scenario, to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs while maintaining forward presence and conducting smaller scale operations. The BUR force was a smaller, but not a fundamentally different, force. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was the next attempt. The 1995 report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces recommended that the Department of Defense lead a strategy and force structure review at the beginning of each administration. Congress made the recommendation law in 1996.31 Congress also authorized a National Defense Panel formed of private-sector national security experts to review the results of the QDR and to follow up with its own analysis. The QDR employed three types of scenarios. The first scenario was the by-now-familiar two nearly simultaneous major theater wars involving Iraq and North Korea. The second involved a smaller scale contingency (SSC) but assessed the sufficiency of the currently planned force, apparently continuing with the assumption that a “half war,” or SSC, is a lesser-included case that can be handled by the two-MRC force. The third scenario examined the notion of a major war in the 2015 time frame between a U.S. force with

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modernized weapons and the forces of an unnamed regional great power but did not attempt to evaluate alternative force structures. The next QDR got off to a poor start and died a premature death. The new Bush administration had declared force transformation to be a priority32 and quickly settled on Dick Armitage, a hands-on manager, for the number two position at the DOD. Senator Dan Coats, a one-term senator with a demonstrated interest in force transformation, and Paul Wolfowitz, a recurring political appointee, appeared to be the leading contenders for the top position. At the last minute, Donald Rumsfeld, a former defense secretary who had been participating in transformation studies, also a hands-on manager, was appointed. Wolfowitz became deputy secretary, and Coats went on to become ambassador to Germany. Armitage joined Powell as number two at the State Department. The State Department was led by combat veterans, the Department of Defense was not. The first year of Rumsfeld’s tenure as defense secretary was one of indecision and mounting tensions. The word transformation echoed in Pentagon corridors, but the service chiefs were excluded from the conversation while Rumsfeld sought the trusted counsel of Andy Marshall, whose office is charged with looking 15 to 20 years into the future. The needs of the combatant commands were for small wars now. Rumsfeld offered a concentration on ballistic missile defense and on offensive long-range bombers without explicitly citing China as the next great power threat. Neither dealt with small wars. The Army, implicitly, would be starved to pay the bills of the revolution in military affairs. Pentagon processes ground to a halt, transformation sputtered, and Rumsfeld’s political capital plummeted. Talk of Rumsfeld’s replacement became common. The QDR was dead as an instrument of change. The two-war force-sizing construct remained. The report spoke in generalities. Rumsfeld’s personal behavior during the attack on the Pentagon and his performance in the days following earned him the leadership position he had lost. And he rose to the occasion. Still, no one knew clearly what transformation was. But even with his newly acquired power, he could not directly challenge the Army and its chief of staff Eric Shinseki without incurring reciprocation from Senator Inouye of Hawaii. The Army would be allowed to pursue its tracks-to-wheels transformation until it failed in the eyes of Congress, after which the secretary could cut two more Army divisions to free resources for RMA priorities. Shinseki will be remembered for his sound advice concerning the number of troops required to occupy Iraq (a number taken from an existing Central Command war plan) rather than for his failure to understand the country’s need for a transformed Army. A SMALLER, NOT A DIFFERENT, FORCE The Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Reviews began with a fresh assessment of the threat, a strategy to counter the threat,

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and concluded with the force structure to undergird the strategy. Regardless, they all came up with about the same answer.33 What these efforts had in common was a reliance on the assumption that U.S. armed forces must be configured to win two nearly simultaneous major wars against regional powers rather than a global war against a superpower. The demands of small wars were assumed away. They also relied on service and Pentagon insiders to provide the expertise necessary to conduct the analysis—sources of both expertise and conservatism. There have been no meaningful post–Cold War reform efforts from Congress. The members of Congress with knowledge of military matters who were so instrumental in major legislative efforts of the mid-1980s—Nunn, Goldwater, Cohen, Aspin—have moved on. A new elite began to form in the mid-1990s around Senator Joseph Lieberman, Senator Daniel Coats, and Representative Mac Thornberry. They pushed for transformation under the rubric of experimentation. Lieberman and Coats moved on before critical mass was reached. Change-resistant roles and functions have kept the boundaries between the services intact. Force structure reviews focus on “above the line” units—Air Force wings; Army divisions; Navy carriers, submarines, and surface combatants; and Marine expeditionary forces. These studies leave unit organization to the services, limiting the debate to numbers and not much else. A decade after the Cold War, the United States had what Senator Nunn said it should not have: a smaller Cold War force. The rationale for producing a service—a warfare conception—comes from within the service. The services dominate the producer chain of command, and the production of force remains in the hands of committees with no one in charge.

CHAPTER 3

Army

sustained land combat to seize and hold terrain to close with and destroy the enemy the citizen-soldier, the soldier-statesman, and the soldier-scholar we fight the big ones

Only an army can conduct sustained land combat to seize and hold terrain in support of national political objectives. The demonstrated ability and will to deploy an army serves as a strong deterrent. The Marine Corps, too, seizes and holds terrain in support of national objectives, but orients on expeditionary warfare rather than on sustained land combat and major war. And there lies the tension between the two services. The country often requires an expeditionary force with high strategic mobility but rarely requires an army for major war. The Marine Corps wins battles; the Army wins wars. Does the country need a standing army? Can it afford to maintain one? Can it afford not to? At one theoretical extreme is the maintenance of a large standing army. At the other extreme is the maintenance of a small but solid foundation from which a large army can be raised. Between lies a myriad of options. The Army is highly dependent on the other services. The heavy Army cannot get to war or be sustained in war without the Navy and the Air Force. But the Army is unable to make strategic lift tradeoffs; the Army is at the mercy of Congress to intercede on its behalf to assure that the other services provide the necessary lift. The Army cannot fight a war without airpower but

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cannot make the acquisition tradeoffs internally as does the Marine Corps. Only a small part of the Army is capable of forcible entry, and the Army can be dependent on the Marine Corps to establish a beachhead. Because of these dependencies, the Army is often the strongest proponent for joint operations. The Air Force is derived directly from the technology of flight and the airplane is its tool of war. The Navy, too, is dependent upon technology and its ocean-going tools of war. The Army, in addition to its focus on people, has been about the art of war, with less emphasis on the tools of war. Recent technological advances in tanks and helicopters have changed that emphasis, but the arts as practiced by the combat arms survive at the core and define the Army. The Army culture is toward the offense, with doctrine to close with and destroy the enemy, and it favors overwhelming firepower to manpower and maneuver. More than the other services, the Army has its roots in the citizenry. To raise and maintain an army requires broad public support. People and raw materials must be wrested from other enterprise. During the American Revolutionary War, building and maintaining public support occupied much of General Washington’s energy. Every wartime president since has faced the same challenge. The size of the Army grows to huge proportions in war and contracts in peace. The professional soldier keeps the arts alive in peace, but the citizen-soldier fills the Army’s ranks in war. Today’s army is an allvolunteer force; conscription ended in 1973. The volunteer army is smaller and more proficient than the conscript army that served in Vietnam, but an important check on the president’s use of force has been removed and the Army’s relationship with the American people has changed dramatically. The significance of ending the draft should not be underestimated. No other service can match the Army’s history of producing soldier-statesmen. George C. Marshall, perhaps the quintessential soldier-statesman, after serving as army chief of staff (1939–1945) went on to become secretary of state (1947–1949) and secretary of defense (1950–1951). He also won the Nobel Peace Prize (1953) as the architect of the plan bearing his name to rebuild postwar Europe. After the great World War II naval battles in the Pacific, it was an Army general, Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the occupation forces in Japan. Another Army general, Dwight Eisenhower, went on to become president as had Army generals before him. To lead an army in war is to lead people, lots of them, toward a strategic vision. These are the qualities of a national leader as well. Throughout most of America’s history, the federal army was a small, professional cadre that kept the arts alive and was prepared to bring the states’ militias up to professional standards when necessary. The War Department was about mobilizing an army for a major war. The country’s slowness to recognize and respond to strategic warning is well documented. The cost of an unprepared army coupled with strategic surprise has been measured in significant loss of life, a long pattern in American history.1

Army

53

The Cold War was a unique period in American history when the nation felt that maintenance of a standing army was justified. The Army became accustomed to providing standing heavy forces, and many within the Army’s leadership believe victory in the next war will be through fast-moving armor and artillery. The will of Army leadership in the 1990s was diametrically opposed to the pressure to be relevant to the small wars of the new interwar period. The country asks many things of its army, and its institutional culture is necessarily complex. The following sections briefly develop a handful of strong cultural strains within today’s Army. This review is inevitably bound up with the Army’s relationship with the American people. From a different perspective, Army culture is understood through its dominant branches—infantry, armor, artillery, and, recently, helicopter aviation—and their weapon systems. Army officers rise through their careers in these branches, and only officers from the dominant branches rise to the highest levels of command and to the senior positions in the Army bureaucracy responsible for producing the next generation army. Army force structure is presented next, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of how the various transformations are affecting the Army and how Army culture is affecting transformation. CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT The country expects a great many things from its army. The range of expectations may be too much for any single institution to satisfy. Rather than a history of the Army at war, selected wars are featured below to highlight major shifts in the country’s army. More discussion is given to what came before and after the war than to the war itself. Particular attention is paid to the closing days of the Second World War, the transformation to an occupation force, and the transformation to the Cold War force precipitated by the Korean War. The Vietnam War, too, is highlighted but as an unpleasant aberration that distracted the Army from being true to its self-image. The Army, more than the other services, has been through several types of transformation. Some transformations are cyclic and some are enduring. One enduring shift was from the army for defense of North America to an expeditionary army for operations on foreign soil. One of the most prominent cyclical shifts is from the skeleton of an army to an army raised for a specific purpose and its subsequent demise. A related shift is to the transformation of an army for war against a major power into an army of occupation or for small wars. An army in need of transformation is an army unprepared to meet the country’s needs. These interrelated transformations produce strong preferences within the Army’s institutional culture. The most prominent repeating transformation of the Army is the vicious cycle of creation and destruction. A small federal army, initially bolstered by an amateur, volunteer force, at times expanded by conscription, stumbles into war unprepared. After the war, made more costly by initial unpreparedness,

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the major-war army is drawn down, and the cycle begins anew. As the United States rose to great power status, its army was unprepared for the SpanishAmerican War, the First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean War. An army was raised and maintained throughout the Cold War—an anomaly in American history. In addition to the country not having an army of sufficient size, proficiency, and modernity for major wars, throughout the Cold War the Army was mismatched for the many small wars that erupted. An army of occupation in Japan was mismatched to the combat task in Korea. An army whose culture was born in World War II was mismatched to the war in Vietnam. But the army prepared for World War III was very well matched, “overmatched,” to the demands of the Gulf War against a third-world country that arrogantly created its army in the image of a major power. Several cultural strains are developed. The first is a fear of unpreparedness in general because of the country’s rejection of a standing army and a second more specific fear of unpreparedness for major wars against great powers. In response, the Army is oriented toward major war and against occupation, small wars, and nation building.2 According to the institution’s belief system, these missions are a distraction from the main mission of winning America’s major wars, an army prepared for major war can handle these distractions in stride, and preparing for nation building will destroy the warrior ethic. A corollary preference is for the organizations of a big army for major war over the organizations suited to rapid deployment and small, expeditionary operations. Major wars, mobilization, and massive deployments require sophisticated planning, and the Army exhibits a strong preference for deliberate planning over crisis-action planning. In its ways of war, the Army culture is oriented toward integrating all elements of combat power—combined arms warfare. Part of this culture is the painful disconnect between air and ground operations. And the Army has a preference for offense over defense and for overwhelming firepower over maneuver and manpower: armor, attack aviation, and artillery over infantry. The Army is the most doctrinal of the services. Doctrine is voluminous and the force trains to execute doctrine. Perhaps the emphasis on doctrine is a residual effect of having to raise a mass army for major war with appropriate warfighting behavior inculcated in the citizen-soldier through doctrine. But when change is needed, doctrine is just one more thing that must be changed. The Army favors doctrinal behavior to risk taking and innovation. The Early Years: The Unpreparedness of a Continental Power From the birth of the nation, the state militias constituted the raw force, organized and equipped, but at a readiness level well below that of a standing, professional force. The federal army would provide a small, professional cadre that studied and exercised to keep the arts alive and, when the nation

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called, bring the states’ militias up to standards for contemporary warfare. The citizen-soldier concept is deeply ingrained in the Army. It has manifested itself in the National Guard, the reserve officer corps and its expansion through the land-grant colleges, and through failed proposals for universal military training for men.3 The National Guard has its roots in the militia and predates the United States and its army. The Massachusetts militia dates to 1636. The militias were mobilized for reprisals against Indian attacks, or they were mobilized to augment British regulars against the French. Colonial wars were often spillovers from major-power wars in Europe. By the time the French and Indian Wars in North America (1689–1763) and the Seven Years War in Europe (1756–1763) came to an end, Prussia dominated Europe, Britain dominated the seas and foreign empire, and France had lost most of its overseas possessions. The French defeated, the colonists no longer needed British protection, but administering Britain’s overseas acquisitions would require additional taxes from the colonists. The stage was set for colonial revolution. The state militias were well established by the beginning of the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783). A revolution is hard to start, harder to sustain, even harder to win, and a citizenry willing to take up arms is a key factor in each. The colonists’ zeal for war was not unbounded. Taxes had to be raised, farms left unattended, mercantile flows interrupted, and lives lost. The physical hardships of soldiering were severe. America survived its revolution, established a republican democracy, and rejected everything about the monarchy that led to the revolt. Standing armies were one of those things rejected, as was the penchant of European monarchs to war against one another. America would have none of that. The victory by an unruly army of citizen-soldiers over the professional army of King George III seemed to prove the possibility of defending the nation’s interest without a standing army. Any oppressor would carry the burden of projecting and sustaining its army across an ocean to a distant continent, much of it unfamiliar wilderness inhabited by hostile locals. To the extent possible, the army would be put away and resurrected when needed. Anti-federalist sentiments remained high throughout the war; the states had yet to trust each other or the idea of a federal body. During the war, the Articles of Confederation declared a perpetual union between the states, while individual states retained their sovereignty. The Articles prohibited the states from maintaining standing armies but required each to maintain a militia in proportion to its population. After the revolution, America considered establishment of a standing army. Washington’s American and Rochambeau’s French regulars had performed well, accounting for the preponderance of victories. Washington also remembered the frequent times that the militia refused to fight or fled outright, while the public preferred to remember the small number of militia victories. Washington was aware of the country’s sentiment against a standing army and its economic inability to maintain one, and he accepted a compromise between trained regulars and untrained militia.

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Postwar proposals included an academy to develop a professional officer corps, an expansible army built on the officer corps, universal obligation and training for men, federal standards for training militia, and Regular Army units not fully manned in peacetime to be rounded out by small units from a federalized militia in wartime. But in 1792, when America was considering a more professional army, French revolutionary amateurs defeated the outnumbered professional armies of the European monarchs. Popular thought prevailed over official belief with regard to professional versus amateur armies. Mass armies were built from an aroused citizenry, while professional armies could be only small. Mass armies became the means for waging wars between major powers. Well after the war, the federalist view eventually held sway, but many of the prewar prejudices survived in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Standing armies were sometimes housed in the homes of the populace, and they invited wars of imperialism. Favoring a design resting on several state militias over a single federal army forced the president and Congress to make a convincing argument to the several states to impress their militia into federal service. The “king” should have no standing army; having one would only lead to trouble. The Constitution granted Congress the authority to declare war and to raise an army for it, but no appropriations exceeding two years would be made to that end. Congress could raise an army for war, but when the need expired, so would the army. Most of the Army was disestablished in the late 1700s. President Thomas Jefferson (1801–1809) was philosophically opposed to a standing army in peacetime for the classic reasons, but he was not afraid to expand the army or navy when needed. But if it must exist, then it must be useful. The Corps of Engineers was reestablished at West Point with a military academy.4 The standing army of West Point professionals would build roads and canals, inland and coastal fortifications, and explore the frontier. Sylvanus Thayer, heading the Academy from 1817 to 1833, firmly established the French tradition. Thayer sent Dennis Hart Mahan to study in France. Mahan would remain on the faculty for 40 years, during which he instilled a respect for the study of military history as the way to understand the enduring principles of war and as the path to professional mastery. The generals who commanded on both sides of the Civil War studied Thayer’s texts and methods. The names Thayer and Mahan are synonymous with the professionalization of the Regular Army. The army under Prussian Fredrick the Great was the dominant military force and set the standard of excellence prior to the American Revolution. Contemporary European war was perfect war; the small professional armies of monarchs fought over dynastic interests. The citizenry was neither mobilized nor targeted. The Napoleonic Wars (1799–1815) that followed the American Revolution were total war—the energy of the entire nation was mobilized. Napoleon began his costly march to Moscow as the War of 1812 began in North America. Napoleon’s forces became bogged down in the Iberian Peninsular War (1807– 1814) when Spanish citizens resisted foreign occupation, and the term guerrilla

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war was coined, literally, small war. Great Britain’s Lord Wellington was perfecting the reverse slope defense on the peninsula.5 Napoleon, master of the offense, and Wellington, master of the defense, would meet at Waterloo (1815), and the Lion of France would withdraw defeated. Just prior to the War of 1812 (1812–1814), army capability looked impressive on paper. But supplies were old, battalions were unmanned, and those that existed were untrained and poorly commanded. The army’s performance was predictable. The war was marked by a series of poorly planned and executed battles and skirmishes. Nothing in this war recommended warfare by citizen-soldiers, certainly not offensive warfare against a great power to seize and hold terrain. A military decision not forthcoming in the war, political resolution was sought. Failing to drive the British from Canada, the country turned elsewhere to satisfy its expansionary desires. The Army would follow. New England governors refused to provide their militias on the constitutional grounds that Congress had the authority: “To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions.” The 1812 offensive operations against the British in Canada did not qualify, but the resulting 1814 British descents on Washington and Baltimore did. One of the few bright spots in the army of 1812 was Winfield Scott, promoted to brigadier general at the age of 27. Scott’s peers in the Regular Army were products of West Point, which had emulated the prestigious French schools that taught the military engineering, fortification, and tactics suited to major war in Europe. After the war, Scott played a strong role in the Army’s adoption of The Hand Book for Infantry, the first tactical doctrine created by the Army, based on the European methods of war that he avidly studied. He later wrote manuals for artillery and cavalry. By the late 1820s, the Army had adopted doctrine suited to European warfare.6 A professional army would have doctrine and would train to it. The Florida Indian Wars were quite a separate matter. American military operations in the Southeast were inseparable from the issues of Spanish presence, slavery, and the Indian uprisings associated with increasing white settlements. From the Creek Wars (1813–1814), General Andrew Jackson seized most of Georgia and Alabama. Jackson commanded again in the First Seminole War (1817–1818). Augmented with militia and Creek Indians, he laid waste to the three largest Seminole villages. The war eventually resulted in Spain’s negotiated withdrawal east of the Mississippi River. Further weakening Spain’s empire, Latin American states declared their independence, and the United States declared European powers unwelcome in the hemisphere in 1823. The Second Seminole War (1837–1841) would be different. Winfield Scott would be one of six generals who commanded. Early commanders, including Scott, sought decisive engagement and relied on large maneuver units that required heavy supply trains ill suited to the inhospitable terrain; the enemy preferred ambush and withdrawal. Scott blamed the failure of his

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campaign on “undisciplined, untrained, and unfit” volunteers and logistics rather than on his inappropriate conception of war. Some later commanders shifted from attacks on the enemy force to attacks on their sustaining base, crops, and villages, and they adopted negotiation, deception, starvation, and bloodhounds. Some divided the territory into small areas, each with a defensible outpost from which small patrolling forces could keep continuous pressure on the enemy without requiring heavy trains. The blue-water navy was equally unprepared to support in brown-water operations, because it lacked flat-bottom boats, tactics, and inland waterway navigation skills. The United States Regular Army was patterned sufficiently on British and European models, in fact, that in 1835 it was not much better prepared for guerrilla warfare against the Seminoles in Florida than Napoleon’s soldiers had been for the guerrillas of Spain.7

The public tired of war, taxes, and the unsavory methods that characterize this type of warfare. The great Western powers have come to grips with the horrors of conventional force-on-force warfare, perfect war, but find disagreeable the methods of unconventional warfare. Perhaps the Army’s preference for conventional war is a direct reflection of the public’s wishful thinking about the purpose and conduct of war. Or, perhaps, the problem lies with those political decision makers who commit the Army to combat. The Florida Wars . . . show how government, having committed itself to solving a human and political problem with military force, was trapped in a policy as ineffective as it was costly.8

The Army entered the war conceptually unprepared, painfully learned and adapted, and when the war ended it quickly forgot what it had learned. West Point continued to teach conventional warfare appropriate for the properly behaving armies of “civilized” states. the United States Military Academy did not, as an institution, formally address the problems of Indian fighting. This precisely mirrors the attitude of its parent organization, the U.S. Army. The army of the nineteenth century, by and large, treated the Indian Wars as a nuisance and a disagreeable distraction from the real business of the American professional soldier, preparing for the next conflict with a European power.9

The School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry was established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881 by Commanding General of the Army, William Tecumseh Sherman, a veteran of the Second Seminole War. But at no time in the nineteenth century did the school offer course work in the Seminole Wars or any of the Indian Wars. The Army failed to institutionalize the lessons learned in these complex wars at either West Point or Fort Leavenworth. Weigley, commenting on the aftermath of the Indian Wars,

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identifies a pattern beginning in the 1800s that would continue through the 1900s and persist into the twenty-first century. A historical pattern was beginning to work itself out: occasionally the American Army has had to wage a guerrilla war, but guerrilla warfare is so incongruous to the natural methods and habits of a stable and well-to-do society that the American Army has tended to regard it as abnormal and to forget about it whenever possible. Each new experience with irregular warfare has required, then, that appropriate techniques be learned all over again.10

The Mexican-American War (1846–1848) provided the Army its first significant conventional battles since the War of 1812. The Army made land marches of continental proportions, conducted amphibious operations, bombarded and laid siege to a major city, and occupied a foreign capital. The war marked the first time the U.S. Army invaded an enemy’s territory by sea. Joint army and navy operations were common on the Pacific and Gulf Coasts. Mexico was debilitated by its struggle for independence from Spain (1810– 1821) and the War of Texas Independence (1832–1836) after which Texas seceded from Mexico. President John Tyler (1841–1845) offered statehood to Texas just before leaving office. General Zachary Taylor was ordered to advance as soon as Texas voted for statehood. The advance was seen as an act of provocation by many on both sides of the border and was called unconstitutional by many in the United States. The United States annexed Texas in 1845. Hostilities began on May 8, 1846, and President James Knox Polk (1845–1849) asked Congress for a declaration of war three days later. The Mexican-American War left Mexico with its territory reduced by half and the United States reaching from coast to coast.11 The Mexican army looked very much like the armies of great powers in Europe, although Mexico also maintained a system of frontier garrisons to fight Indians and protect Mexican settlers. Its large standing army was three times the size of the American Army and was commanded by officers from the aristocratic class following a path to political power. Enlisted soldiers came from the depressed classes. Conscripts were drawn by quota from the various regions, and regions often sent those they were most willing to be without. The Regular Army of the United States was commanded at the lower echelons by graduates of West Point and had developed some of the qualities of a professional army. But higher-ranking officers often achieved their positions through political patronage. After the United States declared war, the ranks swelled with volunteers, producing another enthusiastic amateur force. Volunteers came by state and elected their own officers. Enlistments were for the duration of the war. Congress authorized 50,000 volunteers and got them on first call May 15, 1856. Regular Army generals such as Winfield Scott were against the volunteer armies, while President Polk championed the citizen-soldier.

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For combined-arms operations, divisions were authorized and formed. A division was composed of two brigades, each with two infantry regiments and a machine-gun battalion, and an additional brigade of field artillery. After less than a year, the public on both sides had tired of war and taxes. Something decisive needed to be done. Winfield Scott landed 12,000 troops using purpose-built surfboats carrying 40 soldiers each following a four-day bombardment and siege of Vera Cruz (March 1847). It would remain the largest amphibious operation ever conducted until World War I. From Vera Cruz, Scott marched 260 miles and took the fight to Mexico City. Civil war broke out. Mexican pride was mortally wounded. The war formally ended with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 1848). The American Civil War (1861–1865) was a war between peer continental powers. Following the Mexican-American War, Army officers were instrumental in building the nation’s railroad and telegraph networks. The same army exploited railroad, telegraph, and advances in weaponry during the war. Like the Napoleonic wars, both North and South employed mass armies of impassioned amateurs rather than small professional armies, but they gained competence as they gained experience. The large, hierarchical organizations of major war—armies, corps, and divisions—were rebuilt. Armies and corps moved over large distances to achieve mass over enemy forces and achieve decisive tactical victories. Battles were woven together into campaigns executed over many months. Campaigns were woven together to achieve strategic objectives. Moving these large forces over continental distances to achieve mass and then maneuvering large, concentrated forces in proximity to the enemy was the operational level of war between the strategic and tactical. Fine tactical commanders failed to grasp the complexity of the operational level. Strategy was well beyond most. In addition to a hierarchy of organization, major wars demand a hierarchy of thought. Advances in artillery and in the accuracy, range, and rate of fire offered by the breach-loading rifle forced dispersal of the advancing troops. A concentrated attack became suicidal, and the advantage began to shift to the defense. A new, or ancient, form of warfare appeared. Sherman recognized that civil war was more than a war between armies; it was a war between peoples. The will of the people would have to be attacked. Sherman’s march to the sea and the naval blockade of the South were consistent in effect and combined to strangle the economy in accordance with Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan. After the Civil War, the country let its warfighting army atrophy. The country garrisoned an army of occupation in the South for reconstruction, turned its back on Europe and its eyes westward. A frontier constabulary army was needed. Small units dotted the plains in frontier outposts. The American Army became a standing army for nation building—building the American nation.12 Many of those who were manning the frontier outposts had become disaffected from society, having spent their entire adult lives in war. Drunkenness and desertion were epidemic. Some Regular Army officers commanded desolate outposts, while others commanded coastal fortifications defending

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ports and harbors against foreign powers. Some spent their time in solitude studying and writing on the arts of war. Assuming Empire: The Unpreparedness of a Global Power The Spanish-American War (1898) is a tipping point in American history. Expansionist thought in the citizenry was to spread American ideals, morals, and institutions across the North American continent, but to extend beyond the continent would lead to downfall as it had for Rome. Mirroring public sentiment, its army was suited to continental expansion and defense of the homeland. Coastal artillery was a prominent branch in the Army, but projecting power off of the continent for offensive operations and occupation was not part of Army thinking. Thinking in the Navy, on the other hand, saw the country’s continued expansion through commerce and the need for distant coaling stations and foreign basing in Hawaii and the Philippines for commerce protection. The son of West Point’s Dennis Hart Mahan, Alfred Thayer Mahan, was a leading proponent for the navalist view, as was Theodore Roosevelt. On the world scene at the end of the nineteenth century, Spain held tenuously to its foreign empire while the United States was in ascendancy and chafing against the continued presence of European powers in the Western Hemisphere. The objective was to drive Spain out of the hemisphere, and policy was to attack Spain anywhere on the globe toward that end. The Cuban revolution against Spain offered an opportunity, and the ambiguous sinking of the Maine precipitated action. Army coastal artillery would protect the U.S. coast from Spanish shipping, leaving the Navy free to project power globally. Admiral Dewey attacked the Spanish in the Philippines and defeated them quickly. Lacking an army of occupation, a long revolution began. Joint ArmyNavy operations in the far Pacific and in the Caribbean were common and problematic. The country, once again, had not prepared a proper army. The battleship Maine exploded on February 15, 1898. Congress authorized the formation of corps, divisions, and brigades along Civil War lines on April 22 and declared war on April 25. Dewey seized Manila on May 1. Early May saw divisions and corps forming. The new 8th Army Corps left San Francisco for Manila on May 25. Three poorly trained divisions sailed for Cuba in June. The war ended in August with an army of 275,000. Within two months, the new army began to fade, and the last remaining corps was disestablished on April 13, 1900.13 The war brought an end to Spain’s great-power status. The United States gained the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Guantanamo Bay lodgment in Cuba. Hawaii was annexed. The Virgin Islands were purchased from Denmark. Occupation, not combat, forces were needed for the newly acquired empire. Rudyard Kipling called for America “to take

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up the white man’s burden,” the European notion that foreign empire was not only permissible but a sacred obligation that brings civilization to nonwhite nations. The United States acquired, somewhat inadvertently, elements of empire and acquired great power status in the vacuum left by Spain’s rapid withdrawal from the world scene.14 It also acquired the resentment of its colonies’ natives. Filipino insurrectos waged an insurgency war (1899–1902). Initially, late-arriving U.S. troops used conventional methods against the insurgents with devastating effect, and the insurgents quickly reverted to guerrilla methods. The American Army would again have to learn how to fight an insurgent enemy, and it did. Search and destroy tactics were resurrected, houses and crops were burned, hostages were taken and tortured, and civilians relocated. The War Department overmobilized. The Department was composed of almost independent bureaus that sustained the frontier constabulary. It acquired more troops than could be used in the war, more than the bureaus could feed, clothe, equip, and care for. Dysentery, typhus, and malaria were serious problems. Secretary of War Russell Alger was the lightening rod for public and congressional outrage. After much hand wringing, President William McKinley replaced Alger with Elihu Root, who conducted the transformation of the Army from Indian fighting to a modern army for foreign wars. Root’s far-reaching reforms included creation of an army general staff on the Prussian model. The last commanding general of the army was replaced by the first army chief of staff in 1903—chief of staff to the civilian secretary of war. The Army War College was established for professional study at the senior level. Root’s personnel reforms are the bases of today’s policies.15 The independent bureaus that provided material and services to the army in the field were brought under greater centralized control. No reform before or after comes close to those following the Spanish-American War. The Army was transformed from a continental army for North America to an army for foreign empire. Having dealt with the internal imperfections of a War Department designed after war in 1812, the question of how to garrison the new empire became paramount. Imperialists wanted to expand through commerce and to defend forward, while their opponents preferred allocating scarce resources to defend the homeland. To defend widely across the Pacific was to spread the force thin. Japan could easily concentrate and overwhelm any American outpost. The march on the long road to unpreparedness for World War II had begun. The seeds were planted for Douglas MacArthur’s colonial army that was unprepared and driven out of the Philippines immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor.16 The punitive expedition into Mexico (1916–1917) against Francisco “Poncho” Villa expanded the public reputation of General John H. “Blackjack” Pershing. The 6,600-man, 300-mile incursion failed to bring Villa to justice, but it did inflict punishment on Mexican-American relations, inflame the Mexican Revolution, and establish Villa as a folk hero. It came close to

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bringing down the new Mexican government that President Wilson had helped install. The expedition portended mechanized warfare, with airplanes, field telephones, heavy artillery, and troop-carrying and armored trucks under Pershing’s command. It also demonstrated the superiority of the new National Guards and their mobilization—part of Root’s reforms—to reliance on the militia and volunteer system. The country would be better prepared, but not well prepared, for the mass mobilization for the coming world war. Congress was slow to raise an army for the Great War in Europe (1914– 1919). American entry to the war was late, after tremendous casualties had been sustained by both sides. But the American Expeditionary Force under Pershing tipped the scales. Expectations from the six-month Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) were that wars would be short, confined affairs. But by the turn of the century the advantages had shifted so strongly to the defense that warfare moved to the trenches and to stalemate. The outset of WWI, again, found the Army without the combined-arms organizations for major war. Garrisoning coastal fortifications and foreign outposts did not require them. The largest formations to survive were singlebranch regiments of horse cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Divisions were hastily formed and would have to fight under foreign command until the U.S. First Army was established in July 1918. The original plan called for five corps, each with 187,000 men and four combat divisions. Each corps would have two additional divisions to receive and organize troops after they arrived in Europe, where they would train behind French or British lines. Eventually, nine corps and three army headquarters would be created, some sent home soon after they were established. America’s involvement in the five-year war was limited to the final year and a half. After raising an army for the War to End All Wars in Europe, it was used and dismantled. Marines—who had been engaged in small wars around the globe— consolidated small units into regiments and deployed quickly. The Corps’ recruiting posters spoke of “professional soldiering” to contrast itself favorably against the “citizen-soldier” of the mobilizing army. The notion of raising an army from an aroused citizenry was under attack. The tension would grow as the United States rose to great-power status. The airplane, tank, and radio had débuted in the First World War, but acceptance came neither quickly nor easily. The Army had begun experimenting with aircraft in its Signal Corps to be used for communications, scouting, and artillery spotting. An Italian was making extraordinary claims for airpower, and renegade army officers in the United States and Great Britain joined the uprising that would divide the armies of all the major powers into separate air and land services. The Second World War (1939–1945) also found the nation unwilling, unprepared, and slow to engage. As depression gripped economies around the world, tensions began to rise again in Europe. The United States established four field armies in 1932 to train units in their assigned areas, but they were unmanned. By 1936 there were no troops assigned to corps headquarters

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and only a few at army headquarters. Not a single division was prepared for combat in 1939. Branch schools of artillery, infantry, and cavalry remained autonomous—there was no institutional proponent for combined-arms warfare. Doctrine was drawn from the end of WWI: infantry would engage in close combat with rifle and bayonet following preparatory artillery fire and supported by tank in the attack. Infantry was the dominant, supported branch, and everything else was supporting. Everything, that is, but the air branch. The Air Corps pursued bombardment, not integration with ground forces. Exercises were used to prove the virtues of obsolete organization and doctrine. On September 1, 1939, the same day Germany invaded Poland, General George C. Marshall became army chief of staff. Marshall displaced hundreds of generals and colonels to make room for more aggressive and less hidebound officers to rise. He appointed Lieutenant General Leslie McNair to develop the force. The 1st and 2d Armored Divisions were established in July 1940 in response to Germany’s successful blitzkrieg. McNair established more honest exercises in 1940 and 1941. The Air Corps remained aloof. Even considering the two new armored divisions, the Army entered WWII as an infantry force. The army that entered North Africa did not distinguish itself.17 The failures were not so much the citizen-soldiers that filled the ranks as they were failures of command of major-war organizations. The anti-tank weapons provided late were inadequate to the task. Aircraft were parceled out to the corps commanders where they were poorly utilized, giving the first evidence that airpower required centralized management. Competence grew throughout the war. Bad doctrine, equipment, organizations, and commanders were pushed aside. At the height of World War II in Europe, most U.S. Army forces were organized into army groups, literally a group of armies.18 Below army was corps. Division was self-contained and whole for combat. Corps was a modest headquarters for the command of divisions and for planning major tactical operations.19 Corps was expected to continue for the duration of the war as divisions came and went. Army reached around corps to support divisions directly, thus allowing corps to concentrate on the fight. The corps designed by McNair was to be flexible, lacking organic assets and sustainment responsibilities. In Europe, Lieutenant General George Patton commanded Third Army and Omar Bradley commanded First Army. While most of the Army’s air force pursued strategic bombardment and autonomy from the mud soldier, counterrevolutionary army air force officers partnered with ground commanders such as Patton and Bradley to form potent air-ground teams. Divisions in the Pacific were also organized under armies and corps. Army forces conducted amphibious operations and fought in the jungles alongside marines in Admiral Chester Nimitz’s naval campaigns. They also fought in General Douglas MacArthur’s 6th Army in his return to the Philippines. Not a fast-moving mechanized army, the army in the Pacific was an infantry army.20 And it was part of an air, land, and sea force.

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The final year of the war in the European theater saw the pinnacle of the major-war army. Patton’s Third Army at the end of WWII is the army as it wants to see itself: a large, fast, mechanized, lethal, and fully integrated combinedarms team. The Army certainly did not want to return to the infantry army that entered the war, nor did it want to be the infantry army that conducted amphibious operations on the islands and that fought in the jungles in the Pacific. The year prior to victory in Europe left an indelible mark on the Army. Through unimaginable hardship, the bad had been excoriated and only the best survived. Surely this is the army the country should have—an army to win America’s major wars. But this Army could not and would not survive. A familiar pattern was repeated in the years following WWII. The people and Congress were anxious to “bring the boys home.” Certainly the Army would be smaller than the world war army of 115 divisions.21 While its size was rapidly changing, so too was its fundamental character. America would require occupation forces for Germany, Austria, Trieste, Italy, and Japan. The Navy and Air Force would not be asked to lay aside their equipment and assume occupation duties, and the Marine Corps would withdraw over the horizon and prepare to provide its services from the sea. Occupation responsibilities would fall to the Army. Ten divisions were the postwar authorization for the active-duty army. Four infantry divisions were assigned to the 8th Army occupying Japan. Its two corps headquarters were disestablished in April 1950. Regiments had only two of their three battalions and lacked their authorized tank company. Veterans of WWII were being replaced by the young and inexperienced whose “motivations had much more to do with post service education and low-interest loans and little to do with being prepared for battle.”22 Combined-arms training was rare, officers were accompanied by their families, and the 8th Army became a “9 to 4” colonial army reminiscent of the prewar army in China and the Philippines. The Korean War (1950–1953) began with the North’s invasion of the South and, once again, caught America unprepared without a warfighting army.23 Elements of the occupation force in Japan were hastily thrown together and sent to Korea with the predictable results. The 8th Army crumbled and was driven all the way to the southernmost tip of the Korean Peninsula. Unlike the world wars, U.S. forces had to bear the brunt of the attack from the beginning. The amphibious landing at Inchon, just below the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea, reversed the course of the war. The 8th Army broke out of the perimeter in the south. MacArthur, pleased with the results of his first landing on the west coast, initiated another on the east coast, drawing the Chinese into the war, bringing more battlefield disasters, and resulting in his dismissal. Each side held the upper hand at some point, but in the end, conditions were returned to the status quo ante. Command structure above and within division was at best inadequate. Corps headquarters were reestablished. The failures of the constabulary army were in command, unit cohesion, worn out WWII equipment, and almost

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nonexistent relations with coalition forces, including the South Koreans. Task Force Smith was one of the early-arriving units. Although only a battalionsize unit, its fate came to represent the Army’s unpreparedness in the early days of the war.24 The North Koreans employed tanks, and, as in North Africa, the Army had insufficient anti-armor capabilities. But this was not fast-moving mechanized warfare on the open plains. The mountainous terrain of Korea allows only narrow corridors, the largest of which is appropriate for a company of a dozen or so tanks. Nor did North Korea offer industrial targets to airpower zealots. Virtually all cities and towns were devastated by air with little or no military effect. Navy and Marine Corps integration of airpower with tactical ground forces proved effective. This was an infantry-dominated, combinedarms war.25 The Air Force had predicted that strategic bombers with atomic weapons could win and even prevent wars. The new logic apparently applied only to total war and not to wars of limited objectives. Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.26

The tension between professional soldiers and citizen-soldiers would be exacerbated by the demands of limited-objective wars. Reservists and citizen-soldiers stand ready, in every free nation, to stand to the colors and die in holocaust, the big war. Reservists and citizen-soldiers remain utterly reluctant to stand and die in anything less.27

One lesson of the Korean War was that the armed forces must be ready for war, not just ready to mobilize for war. The United States would maintain a standing army throughout the Cold War. Rather than a mass army for total war, the country would need a large, proficient, and deployable army for wars of limited objectives on foreign soil. Truman established a precedent by seeking a United Nations resolution to justify a police action rather than asking Congress for a declaration of war. The idea of monolithic communism was born, the build-up of NATO forces began, and Truman initiated military assistance to the French in Indochina. The conflict in Vietnam began as a small war, a war that, according to most army officers, could be accommodated by the forces designed to deter Soviet aggression against Europe and to win two major wars. Vietnam provides the perfect example to contrast the Army’s major-war mindset with the incompatible demands of small wars.28 The conflict began with the participation of multiple arms of the U.S. government, including the State Department, the Agency for International

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Development, the CIA, and Army advisors. Unfortunately, each element reported to a separate superior in Washington rather than to a common superior in Vietnam as prescribed by the Kennedy administration’s Overseas Internal Defense Policy.29 Ambassador Robert Komer arrived in 1967 to be that common superior and to establish the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. But Komer’s arrival came too late, and he reported to a military command. Marines had landed in 1965 and imposed their own small-wars culture in the northern provinces, and the major-war army had established its dominance in the southern provinces and at the top echelon of command. The generals who represented this culture had studied the great wars at West Point and had their trial by fire as young officers in WWII in the shadow of the legendary field commanders of that war. “I will be damned if I will permit the U.S. Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war,” proclaimed one Army general.30 President Lyndon Johnson consciously made the decision not to build a public consensus to national commitment in Vietnam for fear that the public would not support both a war and his Great Society programs. Enlistments were short, and tours of duty in Vietnam were for a year. Male college students received deferments, and a class schism resulted that helped divide America. No attempt was made at widespread mobilization of the National Guard during the Vietnam conflict for a compelling reason. It is not uncommon for an entire company of infantry to be overrun in combat. If that company were Regular Army, its soldiers would have been drawn from cities and towns across the country. Had the company been from the National Guard, they could all have come from a single high school in middle America. There is a political price to pay for deploying National Guard combat units, and Johnson was unwilling to pay that price. What support there was for the war would have eroded rapidly. Support eroded nonetheless. The Army’s “Total Force” structure was determined during the Cold War and was strongly influenced by post-Vietnam politics. Those who believed that the lack of widespread public support played a significant role in that strategic defeat set about to structure the Army so that it would be impossible to undertake another such adventure without first building the public commitment. To assure that a president would have to commit the American people before he committed the Army, senior decision makers internally split divisions between the active and reserve. The split failed to prevent overseas commitments. Because of the split, the Army cannot conduct operations without first activating elements of the reserve component. Yet reserve activation is accomplished without much fanfare and without congressional or public debate. Another constitutional check was lost. Modernization accounts were raided to fund operations in Vietnam, and equipment aged rapidly. Drugs, race, morale, and equipment problems portended a dismal future. After Vietnam, Army leadership began to rebuild

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and modernize the Army in the image of the VE-day army to pick up where it left off and go toe-to-toe with Warsaw Pact forces. The major-war army discarded the hard-won lessons of irregular warfare just as it had done after the Seminole Wars and immediately returned to its preferred conception.31 A counterinsurgency army is not what the Army wants to be. The Powell Doctrine is often considered another hangover from Vietnam. Actually, it is the response of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger that followed the truck-bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon (1983).32 Its elements include using overwhelming force, having clear objectives, and securing the commitment of the American people before committing the force as a last resort. The logic certainly resonated with the generation of generals who earned their combat experience in Vietnam—the generals who prosecuted the Gulf War. The Powell Doctrine, point by point, is the antithesis of the tenets of the Marines’ Small Wars Manual. The Cold War: Preparedness for Great Power War The realities of the Cold War included large standing armies, a mature in-place coalition, an extensive network of modern infrastructure in theater, and specialized doctrine developed to counter the Warsaw Pact threat and its known doctrine and known order of battle. An army to deter and defeat the Soviet Union would be a big army, a mechanized army, and a thoroughly modern army. The demands of the Cold War reshaped the spartan corps of WWII into what it is today—the principal Army combat command. During the Cold War, American corps were under the operational command of a combined (multinational) army, and not under command of an American army. NATO’s combined armies, the Northern and Central Army Groups, were each paralleled by an allied tactical air force. There was no joint force commander sitting directly atop a combined army and combined air force. The implications were many. The United States would not flow information from its national intelligence assets through the NATO chain of command. Instead, information flowed to the senior U.S. commands; for the Army, that was corps. Corps became the doctrinal center of intelligence in the Army hierarchy. Similarly, each nation sustained its own forces. U.S. corps acquired a divisionsized support command. The design of all lower echelon organizations assumes extensive corps support. Gone was McNair’s lean WWII corps headquarters. The joint initiatives mandated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation did not alter NATO’s command structure. The major-war Army and Air Force oriented on the European theater were well positioned and highly motivated to ignore congressional pressure for greater jointness. The Air Force and Army agreed to a doctrine that allowed the pursuit of service doctrines for separate air and land wars. AirLand Battle, Cold War doctrine, codified the relationship between air and land forces.33 The expected scenario involved an initial wave of Warsaw Pact forces attacking westward across the inter-German border to clash with

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NATO ground forces. The first wave would be followed by a second. An operational maneuver group would be poised to exploit a breakthrough. The Pact’s objective was to penetrate NATO defenses and then drive deep to the English Channel and the Atlantic. The Soviets fought the close fight only to move deep into Europe. For NATO, falling back to trade space for time meant relinquishing German territory and was thus unacceptable to its German ally and host. Ground maneuver against the second wave would require attacking eastward across the inter-German border and invading Pact territory, something that NATO was not prepared to openly plan or train for. Unable to fall back or attack forward, NATO ground forces had no choice but to defend in place against the first wave; NATO air forces would attack subsequent waves in what was called follow-on forces attack. Targets for air attack were passed up the hierarchy from division to corps to combined army where commanders nominated them laterally to their air force partner. Those commanders with responsibility for conduct of the land war had no authority over the air resources that could be brought to bear. The realities of the European theater drove Army and Air Force doctrine and reinforced the perennial air-ground split that originally drove the two services apart and keeps them apart today. Preparation for WWII had other effects on Army doctrine. Maneuver warfare theory argues that defeat of the enemy is accomplished by moving deep to the enemy’s soft rear, where the command, logistics, and fire support are located. Attack on the rear or flank causes the attacked force to cease to function as designed; destroying forces occurs easily or is unnecessary after their defeat. The alternative, attrition warfare, is to pursue destruction first as a means to achieve defeat. Destruction of the enemy’s front line forces is a more costly road to its defeat, according to maneuver theory. In the context of maneuver warfare theory, NATO and Pact forces planned to fight differently. The objective of Soviet maneuver was to penetrate and move beyond the close fight to NATO’s soft rear areas. The close fight served a purpose only if it supported movement into the enemy’s rear. In contrast, U.S. Army doctrine made corps responsible for planning and conducting deep and rear operations to support close operations. Deep and rear operations were means to an end, where the end was destruction of enemy forces in the close fight— attrition warfare in its purest form. The U.S. Army embraced the language of maneuver warfare, but steadfastly practiced attrition warfare reinforced by geopolitical realities and the air-land split. The Army had little choice. In the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), the Iraqi military employed Warsaw Pact equipment and organized it as a Pact force. Its primary purpose, however, was as an instrument of internal security. Loyalty was more important than military competence. The Iraqi army was large but was poorly trained and incompetently commanded. Coalition forces (many from NATO) had decades to prepare to fight a great power similarly organized and equipped. Iraq’s third-world force crumbled on first contact with the forces of a great power alliance.

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The Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) had been prosecuted like WWI, including static defenses, trench warfare, and poison gas. To invade Kuwait, Iraq moved large forces over significant distances, which was no mean feat. But it then reverted to form and established a static defense replete with burning trenches. Many lessons have been drawn from the overwhelming defeat of Iraq, but one should be very cautious applying lessons derived from the great-power defeat of a third-world military to any future conflict between great powers.34 The Interventions of the Interwar Era The many interventions by the United States into the affairs of lesser powers have imposed strains on Army force structure. The demands of Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq are severe. The Navy and Air Force are not asked to give up their heavy equipment to patrol the streets at night. The burden falls to the Army and Marine Corps. But an armored division prepared for major war is not much better suited to nation building than a fighter wing or a carrier battle group. The strains on the Army for the interwar period will have a destructive effect regardless of how the Army responds. If the many people required for nation building are drawn from its major-war, combined-arms organizations, then the capability housed in those organizations will decay. If the equipment-centric, major-war organizations remain intact, then the people-intensive forces suited to small wars will be exhausted while the major-war army appears irrelevant. If combat power is put in the active component and support forces in the reserve component, then the active component will appear irrelevant, the reserve component heavily committed overseas, and the governors will lack the capabilities to handle disasters at home. Reversing roles leaves the governors with armored divisions when military police and civil affairs troops are needed for domestic disaster relief, and it leaves the active component incomplete for military operations overseas. Current Cultural Characteristics and Divides The modern institutional army exhibits several strong and interrelated cultural characteristics. The most obvious is its preference for major war over small wars. It continues with a strong preference for professional over part-time soldiering. The Army embraces history and doctrine. Its doctrine is for major war, closing with and destroying the enemy military, and not for small-wars operations amid civilians. Major war requires strategic thinking and deliberate planning, and the Army has a preference for those over the crisis-action planning required for short-notice interventions. The Army fights America’s big wars. Big wars are fought by big armies, big mechanized armies. Big armies are organized into big hierarchies. The result is that almost every organization in the Army is designed under the assumption

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that it will fight as part of a larger ground force. The consequences include the inability to deploy a small force without disabling the large and expensive major-war organizations further up in the hierarchy. In major wars, combat forces are at the front and support forces deep in the rear. In small wars, the front is everywhere and support forces designed for major war are unprepared for the tactical fight that will inevitably find them. Major wars pit the forces of peer powers against each other. Armies fight armies and navies fight navies. Defeat is accomplished by the destruction of the enemy’s front-line combat force. The Army has preferences for offense and massive firepower over manpower and maneuver. Until recently, the major-war organizations were built from scratch, used, and discarded for each major war, including the Civil War, Spanish-American War, both World Wars, and Korea. They became permanent during the Cold War and remain today. The Army will consider a great many changes, but the major-war organizations will be retained regardless of their apparent relevance to the interwar period. The lack of these organizations is a guarantee of unpreparedness for the next major war. The senior officers who commanded in Vietnam served as young officers during WWII. They brought with them the lessons of major war, and their conception was ill suited to small wars. Infantry and helicopter aviation asserted themselves against the Army conception of mechanized warfare to close with and destroy an enemy willing to fight “properly.” The young officers who served learned the small-wars environment, but the institutional army did not. The officers in command of the Army during the Gulf War applied the Powell Doctrine and exorcised their demons. The conception, formed in the last year of WWII, unequivocally reasserted itself. The many small wars that followed the Gulf War have reopened the schism between the modern, mechanized, equipment-centric army and the man-centric infantry army. As one Army commander said in Iraq, “The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we wargamed against, because of these [Fedayeen] paramilitary forces.”35 The Army is not without significant small-wars capabilities—but to a large extent, those did not fare well as part of the major-war army and were legislatively removed from Army stewardship and assigned to the Special Operations Command in the late 1980s. The Army has a preference for combined-arms over single-branch solutions. The branches once dominated Army bureaucracy; combined arms was the province of only the highest echelon organizations that did not exist in peacetime. But modern warfare has pushed combined arms operations down to all but the lowest echelon. The career of an Army officer who rises to the top of the institution is characterized by command and staff assignments in successively larger combined-arms organizations. By simple and logical extension, this career path prepares officers for command and staff assignments in joint organizations. If only tactical aviation was a branch that would join the combined arms team! The cycle of building and destroying combined-arms organizations, leaving

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single-branch organizations in their place, was put to an end during the Cold War. But separate branch cultures remain. Each branch has its separate entry point and cultural home, and all officers retain a strong relationship with their branches through which promotion and assignments are made. The Army has a preference for deliberate planning over crisis-action planning. The Cold War Army was the lead proponent for war planning. Officially, the Joint Staff and the combatant commands are responsible for preparing war plans, but Army officers, often graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies,36 dominate war planning through the joint organizations and the combatant commands’ Army components. Army officers dominate through the competence that is demanded by their service culture. Throughout the Cold War, Army force structure was determined by the major-war plans for Europe, Korea, and Southwest Asia. Force structure of the naval services was driven by continuous forward presence, not war plans. An unintended consequence of the connection between war plans and force structure is that when the great-power threat subsided so too did the majorwar plans and the traditional justification for Army forces. The strategic level of war was left to planners rather than commanders. The deliberate planning cycle was repeated every two years. There was no need to train planners; planners fresh from school could apprentice at the elbow of an experienced planner. Training instead focused on plan execution in the tactical time frame. Commanders were trained only at the tactical level of war. Adapting to the enemy was left to the producer chain of command back in the states. Today’s commanders are not trained to adapt in the face of the enemy. The Army has a preference for professional over part-time soldiering. The militia and volunteer systems that once augmented the Regular Army in time of war are gone, having been replaced by a far superior system of U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard. But the tension persists between the “professional” Regular Army and the citizen-soldiers of the Reserve and National Guard. And the reduced size of the force, the split across active and reserve components, and the high deployment rates make Reserve forces anything but reserve. The democratic check on the president’s use of force once lay in his ability to mobilize the states’ militias and volunteers to the cause. By Vietnam, the fulcrum had shifted to the president’s ability to maintain a conscript army. The all-volunteer force of 1973 greatly weakened the check. The check is now between the president and the heavily deployed National Guard, in which the citizen-soldier concept still dominates. The voice of the citizen-solder will grow until the Army finds a new balance across the active and reserve components, until presidents discipline their use of force, or Congress disciplines presidents. The public’s relationship with the Army is through the citizensoldier, and that relationship has brought down presidencies before. There is an additional strain in the Army culture but it is hard to find on paper. Army officers around the world conduct foreign relations—the

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Army provides soldier-statesmen. In the age of sail, the captain of a sailing frigate served as diplomat and ambassador. The mantel passed to the Army, the tipping point being the 1898 Spanish-American War. The Army’s dominance at the strategic level and its claim to soldier-statesmen peaked during the Cold War. Army generals held almost exclusive command of the European, Central, and Southern Commands and of forces in Korea. The end of the Cold War appears to mark the end of that dominance. Since then, Marines have dominated the Southern Command, shared the Central Command, and have even headed the European Command, as has one Air Force general. It remains to be seen whether this is a personality-driven and temporary aberration or a sign of the Army’s relative decline in militarystrategic and political-military affairs. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF COMBINED ARMS WARFARE The general officers who populate the senior decision-making positions in the Army all began their careers three decades earlier. They followed similar career paths with alternating positions of command and staff in successively larger combined-arms organizations. This progression shapes the culture of the institutional Army and deserves further examination. Branches and Weapons In addition to an officer’s relationship with the Army, each man and woman has a strong bond with a single branch. The following sections identify the branches, the weapons of war employed by each branch, and the role each branch plays in the Army’s combat organizations. It is this complex of relationships that sets the stage for intra-army struggles and, in turn, shapes the behavior of the Army toward the other services. Branches are characterized as either combat arms,37 combat support,38 or combat service support.39 The combat arms branches of armor, artillery, and infantry dominate. Soldiers rely on their weapons for survival in combat, train in their proficient use, and naturally form a bond with those weapons. Such bonds have consequences. Coastal artillery dotted U.S. coastlines to protect against the threat of enemy ships long after the airplane replaced the ship as the principal threat. Horse soldiers fought valiantly to protect their mounts and methods of warfare after a variety of superior vehicles had been incorporated into the Army. Today’s modern army can equally be expected to defend its tools even in the face of superior (but unproven) alternatives. Officers of only a few branches—armor, infantry, and artillery—dominate Army behavior and planning. Aviation, specifically attack helicopter-based aviation, has been added to the list recently. It is not unreasonable to say that the Army’s preferred conception of war places armor in the dominant supported role and all other branches in the supporting role.

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There has been a role for the foot soldier—the infantryman—throughout history. To complement the infantry, the javelin and longbow could inflict casualties on the enemy before the opposing forces came into direct contact, sword on shield. The javelin and longbow gave way to the cannon, the sword to the musket.40 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the commander engaged the enemy with infantry and cannon fire, committing his horse cavalry, able to move rapidly across the battlefield, for shock at the decisive place and time. Horse-drawn cannon have been replaced with self-propelled artillery and mobile rocket launchers. Under duress, the cavalry traded in the horse for the tank, but the transition was not complete until well into the twentieth century.41 The weapons have changed and the battlefield has expanded in space, speed, and lethality, but the basics remain the same. The principal component of infantry is the soldier. Infantry units are the most people-intensive in the army. Their weapons are relatively simple, including rifles, automatic weapons, handguns, grenades, mortars, and a variety of heavier shoulder-fired weapons. But above all else, the primary weapon of infantry warfare is the infantryman. In comparison, the other branches are more equipment centered; their weapons are more expensive, heavy, mobile, and complex. Infantry can be delivered over intercontinental distances by airlifter and parachute, or they can be moved cross country by helicopter or truck. Some accompany tank forces in an armored personnel carrier. But once on foot, they share weapons, tactics, and physical hardship known throughout the ages. The modern main battle tank is a land-going dreadnought combining mobility, lethality, and survivability. It is capable of high speed in open terrain, and its tracks allow it to travel off road. It is heavily armored for high survivability and heavily armed for high lethality at ranges up to three miles. Its computercontrolled gun gives it precision even while moving over uneven terrain at 45 miles per hour. In the Army’s preferred conception of warfare, all other arms support armor as typified by the tank. Light tanks remain popular in many countries. What the world calls a light tank, the Army calls an armored reconnaissance/airborne assault vehicle. Its possible replacement is called an armored gun system. Anything but a tank. The light tank does not fit the Army conception. Direct fire weapons, like the tank or common rifle, fire directly at their target along a visible line of sight. Indirect fire weapons engage their targets through a higher trajectory arch often over obstacles to sight. Indirect fire weapons are employed at all echelons. A member of a squad uses a rifle-mounted grenade launcher. Platoons, companies, and battalions use mortars of increasing size. But artillery is the indirect fire weapon of choice at the higher echelons. The artillery piece is capable of firing high explosive munitions far in front of the maneuvering force’s forward elements or in support of maneuver elements engaged in close combat with enemy forces. Concentrated artillery fires can be shifted across the battlefield within minutes, giving the commander the ability to add pressure where it is needed without resorting to cumbersome

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troop movements. Artillery units at the higher echelons increasingly employ rocket launchers to attack targets before they are within range of conventional artillery. The air-ground interface is complex and is a common source of fratricide. Close air support, battlefield air interdiction, and air defense lie along this divide. These functions are at the heart of the “joint problem” between the Army and Air Force. The Army is prohibited by law from acquiring fixed-wing combat aircraft. The attack helicopter was developed to support infantry in the close fight (close air support) and to provide armed escort to movements on the ground or by troop-carrying helicopters. The role was expanded to prevent reinforcement and resupply (battlefield air interdiction). Later, the attack helicopter evolved to provide the same support to armored forces, and it can be used for armed reconnaissance and deep attack. The helicopter remains vulnerable even to small arms fire. Close air support and battlefield air interdiction can be prosecuted by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Artillery can provide fires for the close fight. The Air Force objects to using its aircraft—costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars—as flying artillery. Ground forces, whether armor or infantry, are extremely vulnerable to attack from the air. The Army can rely on the Air Force to protect it from air attack or it can protect itself with a combination of radar and air defense artillery. Because the Army ground commander has no authority over Air Force assets, the Army invests heavily in defending itself. Few third-world countries, however, pose such a threat. The purpose of air defense is to provide a protective umbrella over ground forces. Just as indirect fire weapons range from grenade launchers to mortars to artillery to rocket launchers, air defense weapons are designed to defend forces of different size. Air defense systems include shoulder-fired weapons for the smallest tactical units, systems mounted on wheeled vehicles for larger tactical units, and complex computerized systems of radar and mobile surfaceto-air missile launchers that provide protection over forces spanning a large geographic area. Air forces are reluctant to fly in proximity to friendly ground forces with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs). Combined Arms All of the pieces must fit together. No branch fights alone. All branches— combat, combat support, and combat service support—must be present on the battlefield. And they all must be integrated in a mutually supporting way— combined arms warfare. All commands, except the smallest, are combinedarms commands that integrate the branch specialties. Combined arms tempers branch specialization. Tanks cannot fight alone. Due to limited visibility from within the tank and the defensive force’s ability to channel offensive forces with natural and man-made obstacles, the tank is at a serious disadvantage in some situations.

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For example, when attacking a well-entrenched enemy, tank forces take up positions that minimize their vulnerability while maximizing their ability to fire on the objective. Distant artillery allows infantry to penetrate defensive obstacles under protection of suppressive fire. Tank forces support by fire and join the assault when conditions become favorable. To accomplish combinedarms attack, infantry and artillery must be able to cover the same terrain at the same speed as the tank. Hence, tracked, rather than wheeled, infantry carrier and self-propelled, rather than towed, artillery support the tank force. The largest killer of infantry since WWI has been automatic weapon (machine-gun) and artillery fire. The infantry cannot maintain the speed of tank forces, yet tank forces cannot fight effectively without infantry. The compromise is for infantry to travel in a lightly armored tracked vehicle that better matches the speed and mobility of the tank but allows infantry to dismount to conduct infantry operations. The thin armor is sufficient only to protect mounted infantry from automatic weapons and fragments from exploding artillery rounds, but not from tank rounds, anti-armor munitions, or direct artillery hits. Armored personnel carriers are neither sufficiently armored nor armed to engage tank forces. Combat in urban areas also puts tanks at a disadvantage. A lone rifleman in an upper floor can force each tank to “button up,” which greatly reduces the tank crew’s visibility. An infantry squad at street level is also vulnerable to fire from rooftops. However, a single tank, accompanied by infantrymen on foot can be an effective combat force. The infantry uses the tank as a shield against small arms fire and protects the tank by providing better all-around visibility. A tank force strung out single file along mountain roads is an ineffective and vulnerable force. The only combat power facing the enemy is the single tank at the front of the column. Korea, the Balkans, and the Zagros Mountains in southern Iran present such terrain. Tanks interspersed in a truck convoy can be effective escorts. When infantry or armor forces are advancing, artillery must keep pace. The self-propelled howitzer—a lightly armored, tracked vehicle—was created to support rapidly moving armored forces. Lighter towed howitzers more commonly support slower-moving infantry. The towed artillery piece, capable of being moved by helicopter or by truck, was well suited to the infantry battles of Vietnam. Once a network of artillery bases was established, with interlocking fields of fire, the mobility of the artillery piece became moot. In the expansive Iraqi desert, tanks would have quickly outrun the range of supporting artillery had not artillery been able to match the battlefield mobility of armor. Combat engineers are within reach of the leading tactical forces or ahead of them. In the offense, they build bridges and breach minefields. In the defense, they emplace obstacles, including minefields, and prepare protective barriers. Observation and variants of utility helicopters are used for battle management. A light observation helicopter can be used for reconnaissance or for directing artillery fire. More exotic derivatives of the observation helicopter

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are heavily armed with rockets, missiles, and machine guns for the armed reconnaissance role and night operations. An army without fuel and food withers and dies. A number of helicopter and truck types move and sustain the force. Lift helicopters are capable of carrying troops or medical evacuation litters, general cargo, or a towed artillery piece or light armored vehicle slung beneath. Larger helicopters can quickly move units between relatively secure places on the battlefield. The unglamorous wheeled vehicle provides the lifeline to the rest of the army. The number of trucks and other wheeled vehicles in the Army are perhaps uncountable. Most are general purpose; some are specialized to carry fuel or heavy equipment such as a tank. Skilled use of combined arms is at the heart of the art practiced by today’s army commander. Army attack helicopters and Air Force attack aircraft integrated into the combined-arms equation produce an extremely powerful and flexible capability. Nothing works unless everything works. Every function on the battlefield is indispensable. The next section addresses the larger combinedarms formations of division and brigade and the reorganization of the pure company and battalion into flexible combined-arms formations. MAJOR COMBINED-ARMS ORGANIZATIONS The Army’s fighting units contain combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. An armor or infantry officer’s first assignment is to lead a tank or infantry platoon. But from there on, career progression for those who rise to the top of the Army requires alternating command and staff positions in successively larger combined-arms organizations that bring together all the combat and support forces in the Army. Division is an Army touchstone. Division is purely tactical, as are its subordinate units. A very small percentage of officers ever serve above the division level, and most officers understand their role in the context of division. The specified division types are armored, mechanized, infantry, light infantry, airborne, and air assault. A table of organization and equipment (TO&E) governs the composition of each type. The armored and mechanized divisions are called heavy divisions. The other divisions are infantry-based divisions and are further distinguished by their principal mode of transportation. The types of divisions in the Army have been relatively constant since WWII,42 but their internal composition is continually reexamined.43 The appearance of the air assault division, based on the mobility of the helicopter, is one notable exception; the lack of the post-WWII constabulary division is another. The Division Division has its own assets, including a large staff, maneuver battalions, artillery battalions, aviation squadrons, combat support and combat service support battalions, and brigade headquarters. Figure 3.1 shows the structure

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of a notional army division. Combat support and combat service support battalions include military police, engineer, military intelligence, air defense, and medical. The division commander ascends the ranks as an armor, infantry, or artillery officer. His coordinating staff is headed by a chief of staff, a colonel with brigade command experience who supervises the staff through assistant chiefs for personnel, G-1; intelligence, G-2; operations, G-3; and logistics, G-4. Each assistant chief of staff has a substantial staff in his or her service. Each assistant chief of staff is a lieutenant colonel, but the G-3 is senior among equals. He has commanded a maneuver battalion, is an armor or infantry officer, and has excellent potential for career advancement. The special staff includes functional expertise in fire support, engineering, transportation, communications, ordnance, and medical.44 Brigade is a headquarters with commander and staff but no combat resources of its own. Brigade, commanded by a colonel, is a command echelon between division and its battalions. Brigade staff is a scaled down version of division staff. Rather than G-1 through G-4, brigade staff offices are designated S-1 through S-4 with the same functional responsibilities as their counterparts at division. Three of the brigade headquarters are equipped to take on two or more of the division’s 10 or so maneuver battalions and the requisite support. A fourth brigade headquarters commands the division’s aviation and cavalry units. A fifth commands the division’s artillery battalions. The division commander assigns the brigade a mission, an area, and the resources necessary to accomplish the mission. Assigned resources typically include maneuver battalions, the direct support of an artillery battalion, aviation, engineers, air defense, and logistic support. One brigade will be

Figure 3.1.

Army Division.

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designated the main effort and receive the preponderance of forces. The other brigades support the main effort. One may be held in reserve. The process of forming these combined-arms teams is called task organization. From the assigned battalions, a brigade commander typically forms battalion task forces. In a heavy division, a battalion task force is formed from a mix of tank and mechanized infantry companies as befits the mission assigned. The battalion task force commander repeats the process by forming company teams from the platoons of the assigned companies. The nature of a division’s maneuver units—its battalions—determines the weapon systems it employs and the division’s mobility characteristics. The composition of the various division types is summarized in Table 3.1. Battalion is the lowest echelon with a staff. Units from battalion down have responsibility only for the close fight. Echelons above battalion have responsibilities for close, deep, and rear operations. There is some variability across maneuver battalions, but the general organization is shown in Figure 3.2. All have a headquarters and headquarters company under which a small staff of S-1 through S-4 and combat service support platoons are organized.45 Each battalion has an Air Force tactical air control party attached. All but the lightest battalions have an additional combat support company.46 The battalion’s combat forces are in three companies, each of which is composed of three platoons.47 One of the post-Cold War changes was to reduce tank battalions from four to three companies. In garrison, a battalion is pure—that is, a tank battalion is composed of three tank companies, each of which is made of three tank platoons of four tanks each. A pure battalion provides a certain economy in terms of maintenance, supply, and personnel specialties but rarely provides the best mix of forces for combat. In garrison, it is organized for efficiency, not for effectiveness. Depending on the type of battalion, there are between 500 and 800 personnel, with 90 to 95 percent from the enlisted ranks. Table 3.1 Army Divisions (1989) Division Type Armored Mechanized Infantry

Light Infantry Airborne Air Assault

Ground Maneuver Elements 6 tank battalions 4 mechanized infantry battalions 5 tank battalions 5 mechanized infantry battalions 8 infantry battalions 1 tank battalion 1 mechanized infantry battalion 9 infantry battalions 9 airborne infantry battalions 9 air assault battalions

Troops 17,002 17,304

11,476 10,227 17,220 19,124

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Figure 3.2.

Maneuver Battalion.

The tank platoon has four tanks. The M1A1 Abrams is the current main battle tank with a crew of four. The Abrams can shoot on the move with great accuracy and can engage an enemy at 3,000 to 5,000 meters. It weighs 70 tons. The Abrams and NATO equivalents were pitted against Soviet armor in the Gulf War and were overpowering. A tank platoon for lighter forces can be built on a light tank, the M551 Sheridan.48 The composition of the mechanized infantry platoon mirrors that of the tank platoon, but with a tracked and lightly armored infantry carrier in place of the tank. The M113 armored personnel carrier was replaced by the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The Bradley has much greater lethality than its predecessor but is a very expensive infantry carrier. The M113 carries 11 infantrymen and a crew of 2, while the M2 carries 6 infantrymen and a crew of 3. The Bradley weighs almost three times that of the M113 and has roughly the same physical dimensions as the tank. The rifle platoon has greater variability than the equipment-centric platoons. Three squads per platoon are typical, and the squad is typically composed of nine men: a squad leader and two four-man fire teams. There have been specialized coastal, anti-tank, field, and air defense artillery units. Coastal defense artillery has gone by the wayside. The poor performance of anti-tank guns early in WWII resulted in their demise. Air defense artillery units have largely abandoned the rapid firing gun for missiles. Field artillery remains strong with both guns and missiles. When one speaks of artillery, one means field artillery. Field artillery provides fire to support maneuver. The division’s artillery brigade (DIVARTY, div-artie) employs weapon systems appropriate for the maneuver battalions it supports. Typically, one artillery

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battalion is assigned to each brigade in direct support. If division has a fourth artillery battalion, it is held back to provide reinforcing fires and to attack targets selected by division rather than by the brigades. A field artillery firing battery is the organizational equivalent of the company in that it is commanded by a captain. The composition of the artillery firing battery changes over time but typically has three or four artillery pieces. Towed 105-mm and towed 155-mm guns commonly support infantry forces. The self-propelled 155-mm howitzer supports armored forces. Firing batteries at higher echelons increasingly employ multiple-launch rocket systems.49 The weight of the ammunition imposes a serious burden on the logistics system. Each army division has an air defense artillery battalion that provides protection from air attack. Air defense artillery (ADA) battalions have an organization similar to the artillery battalion. Missiles have replaced rapid-fire cannon. An ADA firing battery provides short-range, low-altitude air defense against helicopters and lower-flying fixed-wing aircraft. The primary building block is the Stinger surface-to-air missile that can be shoulder-fired or vehicle mounted.50 An aviation brigade is designed and assembled according to the needs of the various division types. There are attack helicopter, assault helicopter, medium helicopter, and command aviation battalions, but no Army division has all of the battalion types. The aviation brigade also has a cavalry squadron. The cavalry squadron is a small unit providing eyes and ears to the division commander. In cavalry units, squadron is at the same command level as battalion, and troop is equivalent to company. The squadron typically moves rapidly and forward of the division, gathering intelligence, causing the enemy to suspend movement or reveal its position, and exploiting enemy weakness. It is often assigned a mission to find and fix the enemy. It is a mix of attack and observation helicopters; tracked, armored fighting vehicles; and artillery. The attack helicopter battalion provides close air support for ground forces. The primary aircraft of the attack battalion is the AH-64 Apache tank-killing attack helicopter. The Vietnam-era AH-1 Cobra lingers in the inventory in support of infantry forces. The assault helicopter battalion provides air mobility for infantry forces. The UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter is the primary troop carrier for air assault operations and carries 11 infantrymen. A medium helicopter battalion provides air mobility for infantry forces employing a larger helicopter, the CH-47 Chinook. The Chinook carries 33 troops or 24 litters, eight tons of cargo, a towed artillery piece, or light armored vehicle slung beneath. The air assault division has a command aviation battalion that provides heliborne battle management capabilities for large-scale airmobile operations. The battalion has three companies, one for each brigade. Division Mobility Besides their composition and the missions they undertake, the division types are distinguished by their strategic, theater, and tactical mobility. Strategic

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mobility is a measure of the ability to move a division from the United States to a theater of operation. Tactical mobility refers to a unit’s ability to move while in contact with the enemy. And theater mobility refers to the unit’s ability to move from one place in the theater to another, possibly involving large distances. Table 3.2 lists the types of Army divisions in service since early in the Cold War and compares their mobility characteristics. In quite a different sense, it is worth noting that infantry forces can, albeit slowly, cover terrain that are barriers to tracked and wheeled vehicles, including mountains, jungles, swamps, and the interiors of buildings. Heavy Divisions Armored divisions and mechanized divisions are collectively called heavy divisions. Their maneuver elements are tank and mechanized infantry battalions. The armored division has six tank and four mechanized infantry battalions, while the mechanized division has five of each. Battalions are organized under one of three maneuver brigades. The heavy division’s aviation brigade can also be used as a maneuver element, rapidly moving anti-armor and antipersonnel capabilities anywhere on the battlefield. Some divisions retain “infantry division” in their names for historical reasons, when they are, in fact, mechanized divisions. Heavy divisions are ideally suited to warfare on the central German plains and the deserts of the Levant, where there are sufficiently wide-open spaces. Forests, jungles, mountains, and cities are not heavy-force friendly. The heavy divisions have low strategic mobility, but can move rapidly once in theater. The Gulf War provides an example of how long it takes to get heavy forces to a theater (six months), and how fast the ground war can be conducted once forces are in theater (100 hours). Not all conflicts allow for lengthy buildups. Not all conflicts end so quickly. The heavy division’s poor strategic mobility is due to its weight. Specifically, the Abrams tank cannot be carried on a standard railroad flat car in the United States or in Europe. Nor can the majority of the rail system support the special

Table 3.2 Mobility of Army Divisions Division Type

Strategic Mobility

Theater Mobility

Tactical Mobility

Armored Mechanized Air Assault Infantry Light Infantry Airborne

low low low medium high very high

medium medium very high low low mixed

high high low low low low

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rail car required. The largest Air Force airlifter can carry one Abrams in sustained operations. Prepositioning in Germany mitigated these problems, but for combat elsewhere, large, heavy forces stationed in the United States must deploy from inland forts over special rail to seaports for transport by ship to the theater of operations. Deployment to undeveloped or uncooperative theaters exacerbates lift problems. The six-month Gulf War buildup was a remarkable feat. Theater mobility, moving forces from one place on the battlefield to another, is limited by the combination of weight and tracks. Weight destroys bridges, tracks destroy roads, tracks break, and engines fail. Specialized heavy trucks can move tanks rapidly over paved roads. Tank crews arrive fresh and without the need to repair engines and tracks. Infantry-Based Divisions The infantry, light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions are infantry based. The infantry and light infantry divisions are discussed together, followed by separate discussions of the airborne and air assault divisions. The light infantry division and the infantry division have good strategic mobility but low theater and tactical mobility. Each has nine infantry battalions. The infantry division has a tank battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion as well and therefore has lower strategic mobility than the light infantry division. These two heavy battalions can be employed as separate maneuver elements or parceled out to the infantry battalions. The 2d Infantry Division in Korea is a nonstandard infantry division with a mix of two tank, two mechanized, and two infantry battalions. The mobility mismatch between the infantry battalions and the heavy battalions is mitigated by the ever-shrinking maneuver space between Seoul and the demilitarized zone. Infantry-based divisions are more suited to peacekeeping assignments than heavy divisions due to the large numbers of infantrymen and their inherent flexibility. They are also better suited to urban operations than their heavier counterparts for the same reasons. The infantry division, with its additional armor, is superior to the light infantry division in combat power and flexibility. Although not entirely neglected during the Cold War, infantry-based divisions were not near the heart of the Army. Light infantry divisions were typically planned for combat operations in Korea. Today, the 10th Mountain Division, a light infantry division, has become a staple for combatant commanders worldwide, including recent operations in Somalia and Haiti. In recent decades, all regular infantry divisions have been in the National Guard. The heavy-to-light mix appropriate for the Cold War now leaves the infantrybased divisions bearing a disproportionate share of the load and heavy divisions employed in missions for which they are poorly suited. The airborne division has very high strategic mobility, but once on the ground has low theater and tactical mobility. In general, paratroopers quickly

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become foot soldiers. After the initial invasion of World War II, airborne divisions were light infantry. There is currently only one airborne division in the Army, the 82d Airborne Division. Air Force transport planes located near Fort Bragg can lift a brigade of the 82d anywhere in the world within hours. The division, or its subordinate units, can parachute to landing zones within close proximity to strategic targets, like airports or main supply routes, to defend or seize them for subsequent use. One of the three airborne brigades is on 24-hour alert at all times. Because the 82d is infantry based, it is well suited to sustained small-wars operations and is heavily deployed, but the value of its high strategic mobility is thus squandered. The 82d arrived in Saudi Arabia very early in Operation Desert Shield to protect the Saudis’ forward air bases. Had Iraqi tank forces attacked them, they would have lacked the combat power to hold their objective. In such situations, rapidly deploying light forces serves the dubious function of trip wire. The attacking force must decide to attack U.S. ground forces and invite escalation, but they would not face a potent force. The enemy faces a strategic, not a tactical, decision. For much of the post–Cold War period, the 82d had a single “tank” battalion of M551 Sheridans. The Sheridan, unlike the Abrams tank, can be air-dropped by parachute and transported by any of the Air Force’s airlifters. Entering service in 1966, the Sheridan remained well suited to airborne operations and support of infantry in urban environments. It was air-dropped into Panama during Operation Just Cause (1989). The airborne division’s aviation brigade is almost identical to the light infantry division’s. In addition to air assault, attack, and cavalry units, the airborne division has an air reconnaissance squadron. Artillery support is provided by lightweight, towed artillery that can be air-dropped or towed behind wheeled vehicles. The basic rifle platoon structure is similar to platoons in other infantry-based divisions. The air assault division—infantry air lifted by helicopter—also has low strategic mobility, but high theater mobility. Once dismounted from the helicopter, air assault forces have the low tactical mobility of the foot soldier. The Army began experimenting with the Sky Cavalry concept after the Korean conflict between 1956 and 1957. The Army and Marine Corps employed airmobile operations during the Vietnam conflict with great effect. The introduction of this new organization was not without problems. The original concept was to base the Sky Cav beyond the enemy’s reach and to rapidly insert and withdraw infantry for combat operations.51 The conventional Army thought that the new unit should share in the hardship and forced the Cav to base in Vietnam, requiring each unit to siphon off a third of its combat power for base defense. During Vietnam, the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division dropped their airborne and armor structures, respectively, to become air assault divisions. The Cav has since reverted to armor. The 101st retains

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its name but is organized and equipped as the only air assault division in the Army. The air assault division’s aviation brigade is significantly larger than those of other division types, but composed of the same smaller units. The brigade has a headquarters unit and an air reconnaissance squadron. Towed howitzers airlifted by the Blackhawk provide artillery support. Unimpeded by ground speeds, the air assault division can deploy and redeploy infantry rapidly across the battlefield as the situation dictates. Other division types are possible. The motorized division existed in WWII and has been experimented with for some time since. The 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, was such a division. While the deployable division was supported primarily by a variety of tracked vehicles, trucks, and Humvees, the division experimented with less traditional means including off-road motorcycles and dune buggies. Logically, it is infantry supported by wheeled vehicles in a compromise having the strategic mobility approaching that of an infantry division with the battlefield mobility of the heavy divisions. In reality, it was a division headquarters that kept the flag flying and that was fleshed out with combined-arms battalions of motorized infantry and antiarmor companies and with maneuver battalions equipped with old tanks and old armored personnel carriers. The constabulary division was formed for occupation after WWII. Constabulary divisions were designed purposefully in postwar Europe. In Japan, infantry divisions degenerated into constabulary divisions. Rather than infantry battalions trained for combat, soldiers carried side arms and patrolled city streets and the countryside. They remained infantry divisions in name but did not train for combat. The ill-fated Task Force Smith sent to Korea was formed from these constabulary forces. The Germans developed an airlanded division early in World War II. Different than the airborne division, the airlanded division was designed to be an infantry division delivered by landing at a secure airbase, possibly secured in advance by airborne forces. The light infantry division the U.S. Army developed during World War II was an unfinished product with a different meaning than it has today. The Army first formed an infantry division of men. When the need became clear for a division to fight in the mountains of Italy, for example, one light infantry division was given the specialized training and transportation assets, including mules, appropriate for infantry operations in mountainous terrain. The light infantry division was then named the 10th Mountain Division. Airborne, motorized, or mechanized infantry forces could similarly be constructed. Separate Brigades and Armored Cavalry Regiments Besides the brigades that are subordinate to divisions, the Army has nondivisional brigades called separate brigades. Their composition is summarized in

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Table 3.3. Another organization, the armored cavalry regiment, is sufficiently similar in structure to be included in the same discussion. Like divisions, armored cavalry regiments and separate brigades are designed for employment under a higher echelon, the corps. These nondivisional brigades are capable of commanding up to five battalion-sized maneuver elements during sustained operations and up to seven for brief periods; their size is not fixed. The Troops column of Table 3.3 contains the approximate number of troops assuming the maneuver elements shown. The airborne special forces group does not conduct operations as a unit but, rather, is deployed as somewhat independent detachments. Corps, Armies, and Army Groups The very largest army organizations—those above division—are corps, army, and army group. More than just size distinguishes these higher echelons from the lower. Division and below are purely tactical. Echelons above division have responsibilities at the operational and strategic levels of war. Through the Cold War, corps became the Army’s dominant warfighting command structure. Unlike division and below, the higher echelons have no fixed organization. All, however, have the familiar staff structure. During WWII, corps was a headquarters element that could take on frontage and divisions as dictated by the army commander above. The army echelon retained responsibility for providing logistics support to the divisions assigned to corps. Today’s corps is far more complex. In addition to a significant staff, it has its own resources, including artillery, aviation, intelligence, and signal brigades. Corps also has an armored cavalry regiment and may have separate

Table 3.3 Army Non-Divisional Brigades Unit Type Separate Armored Brigade Separate Mechanized Brigade Separate Infantry Brigade

Separate Light Infantry Brigade Separate Airborne Brigade Armored Cavalry Regiment Airborne Special Forces Group

Maneuver Elements 3 tank battalions 1 mechanized infantry battalion 2 tank battalions 2 mechanized infantry battalions 3 infantry battalions 1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 tank battalion 3 infantry battalions 3 airborne infantry battalions 3 armored cavalry squadrons 3 special forces battalions

Troops 4,961 5,306

6,144 4,142 4,099 5,042 1,385

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brigades that have adequate organic combat service support to take on missions separate from division. In a major land war, as the NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict was expected to be and WWII was, a division might be exhausted after only a few days of battle. It could be pulled off-line to rearm, refuel, and refit. If heavy casualties had been sustained, the division might have to be reconstituted with fresh lower-echelon units. Corps, on the other hand, was expected to continue on the battlefield indefinitely, taking on new subordinate units to sustain operations. In major war, division conducts land combat, and corps conducts sustained land combat. Corps, army, and army groups are necessary for major wars—large-scale, long-duration, middle-intensity wars against the militaries of major powers. If part of a larger ground force, corps receives orders at the operational level of war and translates them into tactical orders for lower echelons. Many of its combat decisions involve assigning missions to divisions. Corps is responsible for shaping the battle so that its divisions can win theirs. Corps is doctrinally responsible for making decisions that impact the battle four to five days into the future. In contrast, doctrine requires divisions to plan only 24 hours into the future. Armored cavalry regiments (ACR) and separate brigades are corps assets. An armored cavalry regiment provides eyes and ears to the corps commander. Patton’s term was reconnaissance in force. The ACR moves ahead of the corps’ main force of divisions and makes contact with the enemy, forcing it to assume a defensive posture or to reveal its position. If the ACR finds weakness, it has the combat power and aggressive command culture to exploit it. If it finds a superior force, it disengages, notifies corps, and continues probing the enemy line, or it will remain and fix the enemy until divisions arrive. The separate brigade, too, has its own assets independent of a division. One likely mission for a separate brigade is identical to a division’s mission but on a seam, a boundary between two corps where friction and the need for coordination are high. Corps has a division-sized element, the corps support command (COSCOM, coss-comm), that provides combat service support for all units of the corps. Corps also has access to national intelligence assets and is doctrinally responsible for analyzing and disseminating intelligence products to its subordinates. The design of divisions, cavalry regiments, and separate brigades assume a great deal of external support provided by the parent corps. If corps is the highest ground echelon in theater, as was the case in Operation Just Cause in Panama, it is responsible for the operational level of war. In fact, corps’ role in Just Cause can be seen as portending the small-wars role of the interwar period. Until recently, there have been five standing army corps; four of them planned primarily to fight as part of a larger ground force, typically a coalition force. The fifth was also capable of fighting as part of a larger ground

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force, but it was prepared to respond to smaller contingencies as the ground force or the force. V and VII Corps were forward deployed, prepared for the close fight, and were well integrated into a specific coalition structure: NATO’s Central Army Group. Both were in a defensive position prepared to take the brunt of the expected Warsaw Pact attack. III Corps, headquartered in central Texas, planned and trained for strategic and operational movement to enter the close fight as part of a larger ground force: either NATO’s Northern or Central Army Group. III, V, and VII Corps were fitted with heavy divisions and represent the major-war army. The missions of these three corps drove Army doctrine, organizational design, equipment acquisition, and training. In the major-war army, the culture included a heavy reliance on deliberate planning, heavy forces, major-war organizations, and a negligible joint culture at the corps echelon and below. XVIII Airborne Corps is made of lighter forces and is prepared for contingencies around the world on short notice. This corps best approximates the Army’s small-wars force. XVIII Airborne Corps shares strategic and operational movement with III Corps. It was employed as part of a larger ground force in the Gulf War, but it was prepared to be the largest ground component in theater, contained a broad range of light and heavy forces, and relied on crisis action planning. The airborne corps maintained good relations with the Air Force for mobility, but not for integrated air-ground combat. It is fitted with one heavy division, one light infantry division, and the Army’s only airborne and air assault divisions—including every battalion type in the Army. It has long been hard to characterize I Corps and therefore hard to justify its existence. Headquartered on the Pacific Coast in Washington, I Corps planned to deploy its generally light forces to Korea or elsewhere in the Pacific. It had, in fact, returned from Korea in the mid-1980s and has been in search of a mission ever since. Planning strategic, operational, and tactical movement produces a different corps than does planning a tactical defense. Perhaps this explains VII Corps’ performance in the Gulf War. VII Corps was responsible for a much larger area of operations in the Gulf than in Europe, and it was responsible for a long operational march rather than defense in place. Its communications were inadequate to the larger area and movement requirements.52 Its forward movement was painfully slow, and it could not match the speed of the heavy division to its left.53 III Corps, well prepared for strategic and operational movement, was not used. In major wars, two or more corps are assembled into armies. Oddly, command of an army is not the career high point it might appear to be, and certainly was in World War II and Korea. The career path is from division, to corps, to commander of a unified combatant command. Today, the six armies are either a component headquarters subordinate to a unified command or an administrative headquarters with reserve units assigned. Armies were assembled into army

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groups during the Second World War, but those were Allied commands, not U.S. commands. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE Army personnel and units on active duty constitute the active component— regardless of a soldier’s status as a member of the Regular Army, U.S. Army Reserve, or Army National Guard. The remainder of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve comprise the reserve component. Another way to classify Army forces is as either combat, combat support, or combat service support. The post–Cold War active-reserve mix is a legacy of Vietnam. Today’s reserve component forces are heavily committed overseas. Calculating a new active-reserve mix has been deferred and remains, apparently, insoluble. At the height of the Cold War, the Army National Guard had 10 divisions, 19 separate brigades, 4 armored cavalry regiments, 2 special forces groups, and 20 field artillery brigades.54 About 30 percent of the total Army was in the National Guard. At the same time, the Guard constituted about 50 percent of the Army’s combat units. Table 3.4 shows the division-level Army force structure on October 1, 1990. The preponderance of heavy divisions is in the active component, while the infantry divisions are in the National Guard. Some active component divisions had only two active duty brigades with the third brigade—a roundout brigade—in the Guard. Other Guard brigades are designated as roundup brigades, meaning that they would constitute a possible fourth brigade to be added to a standard three-brigade division. Three active component divisions were below their standard strengths.55 The Army measures itself in active duty end strength—an M-day force. M-day is mobilization day, the day the nation decides to mobilize for war. On M-day, only fully trained and equipped units from the active duty Army are available for deployment. Those individuals in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard must be called up from their civilian lives and mobilized into their respective units. After mobilization, units undergo varying amounts of training before they can deploy. The roundout brigade concept failed. Mobilized National Guard brigades were never deployed to the Persian Gulf. Active component brigades with the same training status ratings were deployed immediately.56 Much fingerpointing ensued and bitterness remains, but the active component holds the purse strings and authority over training ranges and funds, and the active component makes the deployment decisions. An “us versus them” attitude is officially denied but immediately apparent.57 The nature of the Guard dictates that the companies of its divisions are geographically distributed across one or more states in National Guard armories, making it virtually impossible to train together as a unit. And it is unit skills and mastery of the complexity of battle management that are needed to succeed in combat. Units whose contribution is dominated by individual skills—e.g., pilots,

Table 3.4 Cold War Army Divisional Force Structure Type Armored

Division

Component

1st Cavalry Division

USA (⫹ roundout) USA USA (2 brigades) USA ARNG ARNG

CONUS

1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

USA

CONUS

USA

Germany

USA (⫹ roundout) USA

CONUS

USA

Germany

USA (⫹ roundout) ARNG

CONUS

ARNG

CONUS

2nd Infantry Division

USA (6 battalions) ARNG ARNG ARNG ARNG ARNG

Korea

USA, USAR

Alaska

USA

CONUS

USA (⫹ roundout) USA

CONUS

ARNG

CONUS

USA

CONUS

1st Armored Division 2nd Armored Division 3rd Armored Division 49th Armored Division 50th Armored Division Mechanized

Infantry

26th Infantry Division 28th Infantry Division 34th Infantry Division 38th Infantry Division 42nd Infantry Division Light Infantry

Airborne

6th Infantry Division (Light) 7th Infantry Division (Light) 10th Mountain Division (Light) 25th Infantry Division (Light) 29th Infantry Division (Light) 82nd Airborne Division

Locale

Germany CONUS Germany CONUS CONUS

CONUS

CONUS

CONUS CONUS CONUS CONUS CONUS

Hawaii

(continued )

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Table 3.4 Cold War Army Divisional Force Structure (continued ) Type

Division

Component

Locale

Air Assault

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

USA

CONUS

Motorized

9th Infantry Division (Motorized)

USA (⫹ roundout)

CONUS

*

Taken from the 1991 edition of the Association of the United States Army’s “Divisions of the United States Army.” USA indicates U.S. Army, ARNG indicates the Army National Guard, and USAR indicates U.S. Army Reserve. CONUS is the continental United States

equipment operators, or small artillery units—might be expected to attain postmobilization proficiency more quickly than large units whose collective skills are paramount—e.g., armored or infantry brigades and divisions. Today, Army divisions, with contingency responsibilities around the world, have two of their three brigades in the active component. In some European divisions, one active brigade is forward deployed with the other in the United States. The third brigade is a National Guard roundout brigade. The division headquarters remains, preserving flag positions, but the division itself is becoming hard to find. National Guard forces are continuously deployed around the world. TRANSFORMING THE ARMY “Transforming The Army is a bad idea.” So began a monograph submitted in draft to the Army War College.58 The opening line did not survive the editor’s pen. The underlying notions were that the country expects many things from its Army; there is more than one army within the Army; and that each army required its own transformation. In the face of small budgets and high operating tempo, resistance to change is self-destructive. The Army must remain relevant or it will continue to suffer losses in the budget competition. But relevance to what? Some argue for relevance to the many expected small wars at the expense of the ability to fight major wars. Others argue for maintaining a major-war capability for unexpected but high-stakes conflicts at the risk of appearing irrelevant or ill suited to frequent small wars. Still others argue that relevance is determined by the ability to fight America’s major wars 20 years hence. Regardless of where relevance for ground forces is found, most agree that relevance will be determined in the context of joint forces.

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An early post–Cold War view of transformation was digitizing the battlefield. III Corps, the heart of the major-war army, was chosen as the object of transformation. The corps’ existing equipment received digital appliqué linking each Abrams and Bradley. The process began by digitizing a small tactical unit, learning through experimentation, and applying the lessons to successively larger units. Essentially, the approach began with known warfighting structures and methods and added information technology to improve performance. This approach—automating existing practices—has generally resulted in failure in the business world. An alternative approach would have begun with the question, “given all of the new information technology, how would we fight differently?” Another view of army transformation came from Colonel Douglas Macgregor, a successful cavalry officer with a doctorate in international relations.59 The proposal was to move away from divisions and toward something resembling the brigade-level combat teams that appeared toward the end of WWII. The logic is also reminiscent of the armored cavalry regiment. Unlike other proposals, Macgregor began with the assumption of a joint air-ground team rather than an Army solution that would later be integrated with a separate Air Force solution. His transformation accepted the current inventory of equipment and rearranged it with organization and doctrine. Macgregor’s reward was to be banished to the National Defense University with no teaching responsibilities and a career cut short.60 A third view, the approved view, of transformation is known as the objective force. The objective force did not begin with an acceptance of current equipment. Instead, it would be built on an entirely new family of equipment designated the Future Combat Systems, including 18 manned and unmanned vehicles and systems linked through an electronic network, thus deferring transformation of the force for a decade or more. Any given family member may be weaker (less survivable and lethal) than the main battle tank, but it would regain its potency through improved situational awareness provided by information technology. The formation would regain its survivability by virtue of remote sensors extending situational awareness well beyond visual range. Lethality would be provided by non–line-of-sight precision weapons. Bold and risky, the concept required simultaneously solving a host of technical and operational problems. Proven equipment and methods were being abandoned in favor of unsubstantiated claims. The problems predicted are coming true.61 This transformation did, however, ask the question, “given all of this information technology, how would we fight differently?” An interim force was also proposed; it would be based on something other than a tank or infantry fighting vehicle, but not something requiring years of research and development. The debate on Army transformation was reduced to one of wheels versus tracks. An updated version of a lightly armored, wheeled vehicle employed by the Marine Corps was chosen. Lethality and survivability were sacrificed in favor of being light and rapidly deployable. Senators from Hawaii and Alaska showed their support by drawing Stryker

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Brigades to their home districts. Ironically, they were both home to light infantry, and light forces gave way to medium-weight forces. The Army overall got heavier, not lighter. Each transformation produces a force-on-force solution for conventional warfare. None is intended to solve the small-wars problem. Only Macgregor’s was inherently joint. The interim and objective forces are driven by technological opportunity and an obsession to be lighter to arrive sooner rather than accepting an ordered arrival of air forces, special operations forces, and light forces followed by heavy combat power. The objective force is a clear example of the RMA transformation from the industrial-age force for major war to the information-age force for major war. The network, not the platform, is the centerpiece. Like other RMA transformations, it is unguided by any specific future enemy and is not oriented on the people-intensive demands of small wars. Since 1989, the Army has fared poorly in the name of transformation. Only recently (2003) has the Army begun to abandon major-war thinking and adapt to the small wars of the interwar period. And that work began only when an Army general with a strong special operations background was brought back from retirement to be Army chief of staff.62 Senior officers in the Army are acutely aware of the price of unpreparedness, but the Army remains at the mercy of Congress. The words “Task Force Smith” summarize the institutional Army’s fear of giving up its majorwar orientation in favor of constabulary duties and small-wars capabilities. But holding on to major-war forces, and thus failing the relevancy test for the small wars of the interwar period, brings increased pressure from Congress and reinforces the downward spiral. Establishing a small-wars force will come at the expense of major-war forces. The major-war army simply cannot stomach transformation from the Cold War force to the small-wars force. The movement from a heavy mechanized force toward a lighter infantry force would be regarded by WWII architects and their successors as a movement backward in time. It might be regarded by the Vietnam generation as achieving the balance necessary to operate across the full spectrum of conflict that the nation might demand of it. Those officers whose combat experience was forged in 100 hours of combat in the Persian Gulf would likely align themselves with the view that a modern army is a mechanized army. The WWII generation is long gone, but there were giants among them, and their legacy survives in history, doctrine, and training. The last of the Vietnam War generation still dominates Army higher leadership, but this soon will pass. Combat, regardless of its duration, is an intense experience and lessons learned are indelible and immutable. The Gulf War generation is rising to power, and their views will be felt. The Gulf War experience will clash with the experience of Somalia (1992–1993), Haiti (1994–1995), Afghanistan (2002– ), and Iraq (2003– ), just as the WWII experience clashed with the Vietnam experience.

CHAPTER 4

Air Force

to fly and fight independent and indivisible airpower airpower uber alis victory through airpower “slow sucks”1

Unlike the other services, the Air Force is a modern occurrence. The technology of flight and its phenomenal advances in the interwar years of the 1920s and 1930s were of equal interest to the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, but the Air Force was born of the Army. Navy and Marine Corps aviators were naval officers first and airmen second. The renegade Army aviators’ first loyalty was to flight and to the promise of airpower. The Air Force was founded in 1947 after irreconcilable differences between the Army’s aviators and its mud soldiers culminated in their separation. Being independent of the Army meant the freedom to prosecute an air war separate from the ground war, with a separate mission and a separate budget. The obverse is also true. An air war separate from the ground war justifies an air force autonomous from the Army. Autonomy of mission is still a driving force. The airplane entered military service as a scout vehicle. A lone pilot could reconnoiter over a battlefield and provide information to the ground commander, or he could fly beyond the battle area and identify troop movements and strongholds. Quickly, small bombs were carried. Machine guns were added and aerial duels began. But the aircraft capable of bombardment became the principal aircraft with the air-to-air fighter taking a secondary role.

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The bomber pilot dominated the Air Force during WWII, at the Air Force’s birth, during its formative years, and through the Vietnam conflict. During WWII, only the large bomber had the range and payload to inflict damage deep inside the enemy homeland. The smaller, tactical aircraft—the pursuit aircraft—was relegated to bomber escort, defending allied bombers and attacking enemy bombers. Eventually, the pursuit moniker gave way to the term fighter escort or simply fighter. The atomic bomb made its delivery vehicle—the long-range, strategic bomber—the most potent weapon system in the nation’s arsenal. The Soviet Union’s ability to deliver atomic ordnance to the continental United States in like aircraft dictated the need for the interceptor, an aircraft that could launch from the United States and fly at supersonic speeds to intercept the invading bomber formation before it came within range with its lethal payload. After rendezvous with the enemy bomber and its escort, the interceptor had to defeat both. Rather than dogfights, the interceptor would fire missiles with atomic warheads into the formation. Advances in aircraft technology and aerial refueling continually extended the range of tactical aircraft until they were competing with bombers in range and were vastly superior in air-to-air combat. Giving the fighter the supersonic speed of the interceptor and the strategic range of the bomber altered the equation. Advances in munitions technology from heavy gravity bombs to precisionguided munitions further shifted the balance to the fighter. But in the early days of the Air Force, the long distances and heavy payload associated with strategic bombardment required a bomber. Through much of the Cold War, institutional thinking associated with nuclear conflagration overshadowed thought about precision munitions. Vietnam was the tipping point from bomber- to fighter-pilot domination. The transition was complete when the Strategic Air Command was disestablished in 1992. Today, the fighter pilot firmly dominates Air Force behavior and decision making. What remained constant in this shift from bomber to fighter was the belief in airpower’s independence from, and supremacy over, other arms of war. Some assert that conditions following the Cold War argue for a shift from short-range fighters back to long-range bombers. Others argue that trends militate against manned flight altogether. The Air Force is also the primary provider of space-based communications and intelligence systems that compete for resources in the background. Fighter-pilot dominance, like any single-branch dominance, impedes movement on other fronts. While doctrine, command hierarchy, and appreciation of history characterize the Army, the Air Force is better understood by its theory, technology, and focus on the future. The body of thought called airpower theory is presented first, followed by the birth and early development of the Air Force. A presentation of the post–Cold War Air Force—its weapons, organizations, and missions—concludes the chapter.

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THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF AIRPOWER THEORY Airpower theory, formally stated in the aftermath of the First World War, split ground and air forces in the interwar period. The theory has evolved since then, but its core has remained remarkably stable. The theories, doctrines, and beliefs of the Army and Navy are centered contextually in perfect war and major war. The Marine Corps and parts of Special Operations Forces are centered in small wars where elements of imperfect war are inevitable. Airpower thinking is centered in the context of major war and imperfect war. Perfect war and major war are related but not synonymous. Major wars are fought between major powers; small wars are major power interventions into the affairs of lesser powers. In major wars the center of gravity of each power is generally its combatant force; armies fight armies on the field of battle, and navies fight navies on the high seas. The center of gravity, a term Clausewitz borrowed from Newtonian mechanics, is the point at which all force should be directed. When the enemy military is overcome, the victor may impose its will to compel the desired political outcome on the vanquished. In imperfect war, the center of gravity, the point to be attacked, is generally the weakest point: the civilian population that lacks the benefit of organization, training, and discipline. Noncombatants are the immediate target in imperfect war. Perfect war is a very modern notion and is embroiled with the development of the just war tradition. One school suggests that wars must be initiated, fought, and terminated according to a set of rules. Within that ideology are those who see the rules governing war as an absolute moral issue and others who see the rules in a more practical light. Without rules, the second group argues, there will be a continual revanchist cycle of war; with rules there is the hope that the once-belligerent neighbors will be able to live in peace after war termination. A third group argues that war is immoral regardless of how it is fought, and morality is best served by using whatever unrestricted means will end it soonest. Perfect war is the ideal in modern major wars, but when a state’s survival is perceived to be at risk and the military balance shifts against it, imperfect war is often the only course of action remaining short of acquiescence. In small wars, the imbalance between opposing military forces makes perfect war impossible. The Prophet: Douhet and the Birth of Airpower Theory A preference for the offense was common in the armed forces of all nations prior to the First World War, but technological advances left them without the means for offensive action. The advantage shifted to the defense in WWI and the result was prolonged trench warfare. The great fleets of Germany and England (perfect war) failed to produce decision, and unrestricted (imperfect) war was waged by German U-boats against commercial

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shipping. The “cult of the offense” steadfastly held that defense could not be decisive. Much of postwar thinking was about how to reassert the offense to break the stalemate on land and at sea. The great land-power thinkers looked to armor-led combined-arms formations. Naval thinkers redoubled their efforts on the great-fleet formula that had produced stalemate. Aviation enthusiasts looked to the sky and a new form of warfare that made armies and navies obsolete. Italian general Giulio Douhet (due-hay) is the acknowledged prophet of airpower.2 Douhet made his controversial views public in 1921 and continued to espouse his theories throughout the decade.3 An important premise requisite to understanding airpower theory and its champions is Douhet’s assertion that “the character of future wars is going to be entirely different from the character of past wars.” “Clinging to the past will teach us nothing useful for the future.” He later referred to the stultifying effects of those “who make ready for the future by looking at the past” and advocated “breaking off all continuity with the past.”4 The technology of flight changed everything; the history of warfare was irrelevant. Contrast this beginning to the novel idea at the U.S. Army Military Academy in the early 1800s that professionalism is established through the study of history in search of the enduring principles of war. To be an airpower enthusiast is to be ahistoric.5 Douhet asserts that airpower has the unique ability to compress time. Recalling the protracted trench warfare of the First World War, Douhet argues that the war could have been settled with half the destruction had it been inflicted in three months rather than four years or with a quarter of the destruction inflicted in eight days. Massive bomber formations unimpeded by fortifications and entrenchments could fly deep to the enemy heartland and inflict the devastation quickly and bring war to an end in its infancy.6 In his early writing, Douhet expresses a strong preference for the offensive use of airpower, bombardment, and for the bomber as the primary weapon system. His stridency increases in his later writing to declare defensive applications of or against airpower to be wasteful. Douhet’s thinking discards the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Bombers would bring devastation to the civilian masses directly, delivering explosive, incendiary, and chemical bombs. “The explosives will demolish the target, the incendiaries set fire to it, and the poison-gas bombs prevent fire fighters from extinguishing the fires.” The preference for the offense is expressed in the words, command of the air. “To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself.”7 Douhet’s air war would be prosecuted in phases. The first phase establishes command of the air by destroying the enemy’s aviation at its air bases and then destroying the enemy’s aviation industry so that its airpower cannot be reconstituted. In the second phase, bombers attack undefended civilian population centers with impunity. The country must have the political will and the

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physical means to ruthlessly exploit the advantage provided by command of the air. The importance of initially establishing air superiority appears unanimous. Army commanders find great virtue in establishing air and sea superiority prior to conduct of land operations. Navy commanders make no argument against the singular importance of air superiority as part and parcel of establishing superiority at sea. To conduct offensive war by air, Douhet argued for two types of aircraft—one for bombardment and one for aerial combat—and two types of organizations— units of bombardment and units of combat—made up of the respective aircraft. Both bomber and combat aircraft were based on a common airframe but with payload tradeoffs made between offensive bombs and defensive guns, armor, and speed.8 Units of combat would clear the skies for bombers. The number of combat units would be only proportionally stronger than the enemy.9 Once command of the air had been achieved, only units of bombardment would be of value. A unit of bombardment “must have the potentiality to destroy any target on a given surface.” The concept was to apply destruction uniformly over a large area. “Aerial bombardment can certainly never hope to attain the accuracy of artillery fire; but this is an unimportant point because such accuracy is unnecessary.” Artillery targets (i.e., perfect war and military sites) are hardened; aerial targets (i.e., imperfect war and civil centers) are not. Large targets, not small, were the objective and were to be destroyed in a single attack to achieve the greatest destruction in the shortest possible time. To this end, Douhet urged advances in munitions and argued that nothing should be held in reserve. Defensive operations against attacking bombers, including anti-aircraft artillery and pursuit aircraft, squander resources defending against potential attack rather than real attack.10 Anti-aircraft artillery can only guard points, and all points must be guarded because they are all potential targets for bombers. Defended targets are avoided in favor of the poorly defended. Pursuit aircraft waste time seeking in empty tracks of air while bombers destroy where they choose. Pursuit aircraft cannot compel bomber forces to battle.11 Destroying the enemy air force in aerial combat is the least effective method of establishing command of the air.12 Douhet not only asserts the superiority of the air arm, but the irrelevancy of armies and navies. In his earliest writing he argued for an independent air force. In his later writing he argued against any other form of air force. Placing air forces above the army in the field and the navy at sea “cannot be considered to constitute a real air force.” They are “auxiliary aviation,” “worthless, superfluous, harmful ” [emphasis in original].13 “National defense can be assured only by an Independent Air Force of adequate power.” “Defenses on land and sea will no longer serve to protect the country behind them.”14 If properly applied, command of the air is necessary and sufficient, and there should be no diversion of means from that end.15 For those wishing to reassert the offense, Douhet provided a way.

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Douhet’s Disciples Brigadier General Billy Mitchell and Air Chief Marshall Hugh Trenchard were Douhet’s principal disciples in the United States and Great Britain, respectively. The list of American disciples is long, including Generals Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Carl M. Spaatz, and Curtis E. LeMay. The best recognized modern-day disciple is Colonel John Warden. The U.S. Air Force remains an institution in which Douhet’s beliefs are refined, practiced, and passed on to future generations. Billy Mitchell published his views in popular magazines in the mid-1920s.16 Rather than the clarity and focus of Douhet, Mitchell’s writing is diffuse and often self-contradictory. Some of this might be explained by Mitchell’s recognition of and acquiescence to public sentiment toward post-WWI isolationism. Selling an offensive doctrine, let alone one based on an unproven technology, is a difficult sell in a political climate of isolationism and made even more difficult during an economic depression. Mitchell’s actions stood taller than his words, and some of those actions are discussed later. Douhet’s disciple spread the gospel within the United States, but proselytization was frustratingly slow. Mitchell continued to assert a strong role for aviation saying that land-based aviation—not a navy and not coastal artillery—is the best defense against an invading navy.17 Today’s Air Force largely ignores the anti-ship mission. “The menace of submarines from below and aircraft from above constitutes such a condition that the surface ship as an element of war is disappearing.”18 Mitchell proposed a single Department of National Defense with separate Departments of Army, Navy, and Aeronautics, the Independent Air Force that Douhet championed in Italy and Trenchard won in England. Britain was the only major power to establish an independent air force after the First World War, but reversed its decision prior to the Second, returning carrier aviation to the navy. The issues identified and positions advocated by the earliest airpower champions are continually revisited. John Warden is the clear intellectual lead in present-day American airpower thinking.19 Warden’s analysis uses a single variable, air superiority, to explain outcomes of past wars, thus making impossible an explanation based on other variables. But there is little dissension about the importance of air superiority. Warden continues with the assertion that an all-out offense is the best course of action. He continues with Douhet’s assertion that command of the air should be pursued as an all-or-nothing concept. To achieve air superiority, Warden recognizes the advances and threat posed by land-based defenses and he attacks them before moving on to attack the enemy’s air bases. To establish air superiority, Warden refines Douhet’s targeting preferences to include the aircraft production chain, from operating bases back to sources of raw materials and including the power and transportation networks in between. He carries forward the idea that air-to-air warfare is the weakest form of offense.

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Warden gives greater specificity to Douhet’s “vital centers.” He views the enemy as a system expressed as five concentric circles with leadership in the inner circle. Key production, critical infrastructure, the population, and air forces in the field define the successively larger circles, respectively. Uniquely, Warden pursues all objectives simultaneously rather than sequentially.20 In the use of air forces, he puts air superiority first followed by interdiction and places close air support in a distant last position. Status of the Theory Airpower thinkers share many beliefs, but as grand as initial airpower thinking was, it grew between the world wars. Since Douhet, most contributions to the theory are best categorized as refinements. But there have been some notable deletions and additions. The principle of indivisibility grew out of WWII. Spaatz, along with many others, argued against the idea of distinguishing between strategic and tactical aircraft. Making the distinction could split the air force in two, with one being independent and the other being subordinated to the Army. The belief that the bomber would always get through gained prominence in the 1930s.21 Technological advances in the bomber conspired with the existing belief that air defenses constituted a poor use of resources. “Nothing can stop the aircraft but the aircraft.” One can excuse Douhet and his disciples from not foreseeing the elaborate ground-based air defense systems enabled by radar, such as those that first appeared in Britain to defend against the German Luftwaffe, those ringing the Cold-War Soviet Union, those that protected NATO Europe along a line from the tip of Scandinavia to the heel of Italy, and those that punished U.S. flyers attacking North Vietnam. The premise that bombers will always get through has properly been excluded from the theory. But twenty-first-century interventions into the poorest countries of the world may lull us back into that belief, resulting in a lack of preparation to penetrate air defense systems in the future. Douhet insisted that command of the air was total, there were no highways in the sky; he was not contemplating uses of airpower below the level of total war. For example, during Operation El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. air attack on Libya, aircraft flying from England were denied overflight rights by Spain and France, thus requiring their route through the Strait of Gibraltar—there are, in fact, highways in the sky. Douhet’s total command of the air has been relaxed to tolerate localized and temporary conditions of air superiority. The concepts of imperfect and perfect war have presented a dilemma for airpower thinkers since the advent of strategic bombardment. British forces attempted precision bombardment against German infrastructure early in WWII, but the technology of the time simply did not allow it. They turned to massive bombing of cities, terror bombing, imperfect war in the extreme. Massive area bombardment directed at the enemy’s will, once the only alternative offered by technology, is being replaced by precision. One can forgive

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early advocates for failing to anticipate the remarkable advances made in precision munitions in the following several decades. Modern U.S. airpower thinking applies increasing precision with greater concern for reestablishing perfect war. Modern airpower thinking retains the idea of the independent application of airpower. There is also agreement on the need to centrally manage airpower within a theater of operations. But the two are not the same. In general, expensive weapons are acquired in small numbers, and if they are potent weapons, then they must be managed to assure that they are used rather than allowed to sit idle. Inexpensive weapons, in contrast, can be acquired in large numbers and widely distributed; their utilization rate is of little interest. Every weapon must be managed somewhere in the hierarchy. Aircraft costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars will be managed high in the hierarchy, at the theater level. The more common artillery piece has found a locus of control at the division level in the Army. Rifles are ubiquitous and are controlled at the very lowest level in the hierarchy. But a compelling argument for controlling a weapon type centrally—that is, high in the hierarchy—is not an argument for applying it independently. All prominent airpower enthusiasts agree that only airmen can comprehend war waged by air, and only airmen can command air forces. When Douhet and Mitchell witnessed the trench warrior’s inability to see beyond the next hundred yards, then it was understandable why the claim would be made that only airmen could understand the nature of air warfare against distant cities. But that claim must not go unchallenged today. If the public’s will is the target of attack, then one can imagine that sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and psychologists might have something significant to contribute to the discussion. If the enemy’s ability to wage war is the target of attack, then economists and industrialists might possess some relevant knowledge. During WWII, General Hap Arnold created civilian boards of economists and industrialists to select the targets that would most damage Germany’s war production capacity. The strategic bombing survey that followed the war also was conducted largely by civilian economists and industrialists. It is difficult to reconcile the statement that only airmen can command and the evidence that other than airmen are best qualified to select targets and to assess effects. Furthermore, several instruments are available to achieve morale and industrial effects. Physical destruction delivered by air is only one of them. But being one of several instruments fights against the independent application of airpower and argues instead for application of airpower integrated with complementary instruments—combined-arms warfare. Through the evolution of airpower thinking, there have been some different opinions on what to attack. There has always been agreement on attacking “vital centers” and “centers of gravity” after air superiority has been established. Douhet preferred to attack the enemy’s will and to a lesser extent its ability to resist, but he left to the air commander the decision of what exactly to target. Others preferred to attack the enemy’s transportation network to interdict

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troops and supplies. The Air Corps Tactical School referred to the enemy’s war-making ability as its “industrial web.” Mitchell’s early thinking showed a preference to attack the enemy army but later shifted to attacking population centers to better support the quest for autonomy. Warden’s thinking puts attack on enemy leadership at the head of the list, followed by the aircraft chain and logistics chain. Meilinger, consistent with Douhet, reminds that intelligence must identify the strategic pressure points for attack.22 Again, one must ask why that is a task for airmen. The evidence suggests that it is not. The WWII U.S. preference was to attack the enemy’s ability to wage industrial-age warfare. The British retained a preference for attacking the enemy population’s will to wage war. The cause-and-effect relationship so central to airpower theory has yet to be established even though considerable effort has been expended in the pursuit. It remains, perhaps, the most contentious issue in how the United States wages war. Douhet postulated that civil aircraft could be converted to military use within hours, and pilots could be converted to military use even more quickly simply by changing uniforms.23 Given the great sophistication of today’s bombers, it is hard to imagine converting commercial passenger liners to bombardment duties in only hours, but the statement was not fanciful when it was made. Commercial pilots, many trained by the military, do in fact make the transition to military duties rapidly and smoothly. Flight and aircraft maintenance skills can be maintained cost effectively in the reserve component, quite unlike the ability to maintain the skills necessary to maneuver large ground forces. An air force can be an on-call force of tremendous power.24 Prophet and disciples agreed on the importance of close civil-military relations. In science, when a theory fails to explain and predict outcomes, a common response is to look for preconditions that are correlated to the contradictory outcomes. Douhet’s theory, as refined, appears to have far greater validity in major war, and even greater validity in total war. The conditions surrounding small wars appear to greatly reduce the applicability of the theory. Instead of narrowing the domain of applicability, the domain has been expanded to include both air and space power under the rubric of aerospace power buttressed by the claim of their indivisibility. The theories embraced by the other services are derived from evidence from war or operational tests, while the Air Force’s original theory was necessarily the product of vision and logical inference. When confronted with evidence contradicting the theory, the explanation is that political leaders failed to apply airpower thoroughly, as if war were not constrained by politics, or that advancing technology would make things better next time. In science, a theory that cannot stand up in the face of facts ceases to be a theory. It is better described as faith. Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell all shared the reality of their time. Few people had flown, fewer had flown in war, even fewer could envision the future, and only a handful of those had the rank or position to lead the change demanded by the technology of flight. Resistance was predictable and strong.

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The introduction of airpower into the national defense equation was a truly transformational event played out over decades. THE BIRTH AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE At the beginning of the twentieth century, European powers expected that wars would be fought quickly and decisively; their armed services had offensive doctrines. But technological advances—including the machine gun, artillery, barbed wire, and poison gas—left the armed forces without the means to conduct offensive warfare. The defense had risen to ascendancy, and the result was trench warfare and stalemate. The war was anything but quick and decisive. Tanks and airplanes were present but in a weak form and always in support of the dominant infantry branch. Aircraft served well in a supporting role as scout, spotter for artillery, and for communications. At sea, aircraft similarly served as scout and for communications, but always in support of the battle fleet. Gestation and Birth Douhet’s vision held great sway in the air forces of major powers in the period between world wars, including the United States, England, Germany, and Italy. In the United States, theory was turned into doctrine at the Army Air Corps Tactical School located at Maxwell Field in Alabama. Doctrine plays a critical role in the services, driving organizational design, equipment acquisition, and training. And Air Corps doctrine between wars was strategic bombardment. There was no detailed tactical doctrine until it began to emerge in response to the demands of early WWII operations in North Africa. In Great Britain, the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service were merged into a single service, the Royal Air Force (RAF), in 1917 as a result of German bombing attacks on London. But in the United States, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps retained their own aviation branches. Billy Mitchell, assistant chief of the Army Air Service (1920–1925), was envious of the independent air force achieved in Britain and fearful of additional rounds of congressional downsizing. In the interwar period, Mitchell pushed Army fliers to compete in air races and to set distance and endurance records. The Navy found these public appeals to be unmilitary and unprofessional, but Army aviators knew that appropriations were proportional to political support. In 1921, Mitchell used the German battleship Ostfriesland captured during the war to demonstrate the use of airpower for coastal defense. The exhibition was an obvious affront to the Navy whose mission was to defeat the enemy navy at sea before it reached American shores and to the Army’s coastal artillery branch that provided a last line of defense. The Navy established an experimental design that would allow collection of data in a scientific way. Mitchell’s flyers first had difficulty finding the

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anchored battleship and, after finding it, had a hard time hitting it. Frustrated, Mitchell violated the experimental design and attacked the motionless, undefended ship with a heavier bomb dropped from an altitude that would have been within range of a battleship’s typical complement of anti-aircraft guns. A large assembled audience watched the once lionized battleship tip, roll, and go under. The opportunity to collect meaningful scientific data had been squandered. It was made clear that an air-delivered bomb could sink an undefended ship at anchor; Mitchell concluded the irrelevance of navies. Dedicated airmen were risking life and limb attempting to develop airpower with obsolete and worn-out equipment from the last war. In 1925, when the Navy dirigible Shenandoah crashed and killed 14 men, Mitchell attacked the War and Navy Departments’ leadership with charges of “incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration.” He wanted a centralized and independent air service like Trenchard had achieved in Britain. For this final act, General Billy Mitchell was court-martialed in 1925, found guilty, and resigned in January 1926. A part of the Army Signal Corps in World War I, the Army Reorganization Act of 1920 established the Air Service as a combat arm on a par with infantry and artillery. The Army Air Service gained even more independence within the Army in 1926 as the Army Air Corps. Each branch of combat arms has a school, and the Air Service would be no exception. The Air Corps Tactical School turned Douhet’s vision into the doctrine that drove the design of U.S. Army air forces.25 As WWII loomed, “they allowed their doctrine to become their strategy.”26 Strategic bombardment dominated the Tactical School’s curriculum in the interwar period. The Army Air Corps stood almost unanimously against the use of airpower to support ground forces. A lone naval aviator taught a course on the integration of aviation into fleet operations. But one of the Army Air Corps’ own, Claire Chennault, became somewhat of the antichrist to the strategic bombardment cult. He predicted the ground-based warning systems and pursuit tactics that would combine to prevail against the massive bomber formations that would appear over England from the Continent in the next war.27 Anti-aircraft-artillery thinking also declined in Maxwell’s curriculum, but attention to air-ground operations reached zero. The result was a very imbalanced air arm by entry to WWII. Douhet and Mitchell would have approved. The interwar Army General Staff was accused of skewing the results of ground maneuvers (experiments in today’s parlance) to prove the validity of preconceived ideas and obsolete WWI doctrine of infantry-led combined arms. But strategic bombardment champions were equally guilty of skewing the results of air maneuvers to justify strategic bombardment doctrine and to discredit pursuit doctrine. By 1932 bombers had improved to the point that there would be no need for pursuit aircraft in achieving air superiority, or so it was held by airpower orthodoxy at Maxwell through the 1930s. The bomber would always get through.

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In England, the idea of Douhet’s independent air force under the title of Royal Air Force was showing some cracks. England, once a leading pioneer in carrier-based aviation, found itself far behind. The strategic bombardment thinking that dominated the Royal Air Force had produced a neglect of tactical uses in general and carrier-based aviation in particular. Responsibility for the development of naval aviation was belatedly returned to the Royal Navy. World War II Air forces auditioned in the First World War in a weak form but demonstrated tremendous power in every theater of the Second. Technological advances in aircraft and munitions continued at a phenomenal pace throughout the war. Interwar theories and doctrine were subjected to the harshest reality. Several policy choices were important in the development and application of airpower. America’s slow mobilization and late entry left its allies to fend for themselves in the beginning as the United States geared up its industrial base unmolested. The Europe-first decision left secondary and tertiary theaters in the Pacific employing “economy of force” methods. Most importantly, the demand for unconditional surrender enabled extraordinary applications of force, including wholesale bombing of cities. This was total war. The Royal Air Force divided tactical and strategic airpower into Fighter Command and Bomber Command. Critically important personalities commanded each. Hugh Dowding commanded Fighter Command during the Battle of Britain, and Arthur “Bomber” Harris commanded Bomber Command from February 1942 to the end of the war. A third command, Coastal Command, defended the maritime approaches to England, including antisubmarine warfare. After subduing its continental neighbors, but before attacking Russia, Germany turned its attention to Great Britain. The Battle of Britain began in summer 1940. German bombardment of Britain was confronted by a grand innovation combining radar and pursuit aircraft.28 Air defense fighters did not have to protect every point on the ground, they did not have to maintain a constant presence aloft, and they did not have to perpetually search the skies for potential attacks. Instead, fighter aircraft on the ground could be vectored to intercept an invasion force and use their superior aerial combat capabilities to inflict debilitating losses on the bomber formation before it delivered its payload. Dowding not only commanded the system, he was the key driving force in its development. Contrary to Douhet’s prescriptions, Dowding held his tactical airpower in reserve and for the defense. Dowding’s defensive use of airpower proved decisive. In September, Germany made the serious error of shifting to night terror attacks on cities without establishing air superiority. Having sapped the energy from Germany’s strategic offense, the Brits took the air war to the Continent. British studies in 1941 showed that precision, bombing raids on cities placed no more than 30 percent of their bombs within five miles of their targets, and in other cases only 10 percent.

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Precision bombing as a concept failed. Massive, night, area bombing targeting the “morale of the enemy civil population” began in February 1942. The incendiary bomb was preferred over explosive. Under Bomber Harris, Bomber Command launched thousand-plane raids, its first against Cologne in May 1942.29 The U.S. Eighth Air Force joined the fray in May 1942. But German aircraft production expanded. Based on the considerable damage done to Cologne and Hamburg, Harris proposed massive bombardment of Berlin instead of the Normandy invasion. Harris was true to Douhet’s thinking, but political masters prevailed.30 Development of U.S. air forces accelerated rapidly in the run up to the war. General Hap Arnold, regarded by many as the architect of the U.S. Air Force, played the critically important role of placing officers where they needed to be—to win the war and to develop the air force. As chief of the Army Air Corps since 1938, Arnold sat coequal with Army and Navy service chiefs on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.31 In the interwar period, a new generation of officer grew up in the split culture of air and land warfare within the Army. The preponderance of aviators belonged to the church of strategic bombardment, but there were contrarians and agnostics. Arnold had a firm grasp of which officers conformed to orthodoxy and which did not. Eighth U.S. Air Force would join Bomber Command in England long before an invasion force could be assembled. But the land war would begin in North Africa and jump across the Mediterranean before the invasion across the Channel. In North Africa, doctrine based on vision was confronted with the hostile reality of war. There was no meaningful civilian concentration, no meaningful industrial base, and no intricate rail or road transportation infrastructure to attack. Prewar bombardment doctrine contributed to the Army’s poor performance at Kasserine Pass. One of the great lessons of North Africa came from RAF doctrine that before 1942 had divided aviation assets and allocated the pieces down to the army corps echelon. When a corps was idle, so too were its air assets.32 Airpower advocates had clear and irrefutable evidence that airpower needed to be centrally managed rather than parceled out.33 The rising officers then witnessed airpower integrated into amphibious operations in Sicily. Having gained considerable experience in the south, the command team would move to England to begin preparations for invasion through the north of France. It was in North Africa that “tactical doctrine” began to emerge. Tactical doctrine is not very descriptive other than to suggest that it is not strategic bombardment doctrine. In the language of the time, strategic doctrine meant an independent air war against the enemy’s soft rear. Tactical doctrine meant the pursuit doctrine of aerial engagement or it meant airpower integrated with ground forces, what ground forces call combined-arms doctrine. One did not discuss the operational level of war during WWII, but many of the interdiction operations conducted by air forces would likely be included in this category today.

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From late 1943 until D-Day, Allied air forces conducted all forms of operations throughout the European theater. Operation Carpetbagger provided logistics to resistance forces disrupting German command and control from the very beginning. Throughout the period, air forces conducted continual attacks against rocket and flying bomb launch sites.34 Coastal Command, supported by Bomber Command, laid mines and conducted anti-submarine warfare in the Channel from January to April 1944. During Big Week, February 20 through 25, bombers conducted classic attacks against aircraft and the aircraft industry. The American daylight attacks of February to May 1944 established air superiority over all of Europe. In April, bombers were directed to execute the Transportation Plan, interdiction operations against rail, road, oil, and communications networks, which aimed at isolating German forces in Normandy from their logistics base. Bomber Harris predicted that interdiction bombardment would be ineffective, but he was shown wrong. Against the ferocious opposition of the bomber barons, on April 1, Allied strategic bombers were put under Eisenhower’s command to ensure their efforts would fully support the invasion plan. Bomber operations shifted from massive night bombings of cities to interdiction. Allied airpower virtually destroyed the French railroad system in northern and western France in the two months before the invasion, which gave Eisenhower and Allied ground forces a major advantage in the Battle of Normandy. From June on, strategic bombers were used against tactical targets. Airpower was everywhere. On D-Day (June 6, 1944), the Ninth Air Force was the U.S. contribution to the Allied Expeditionary Air Force,35 and the Eighth Air Force was the U.S. contribution to the Allied Strategic Air Force.36 Of the Ninth Air Force’s two tactical air commands, Brigadier General Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada’s command supported Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s First Army invasion force at Normandy,37 while Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland’s command supported Lieutenant General George Patton’s Third Army.38 During the interwar period, Quesada had learned the dominant and the dissenting doctrines at Maxwell and then learned division and corps doctrine at Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff College. Quesada arrived in North Africa with an open mind. Unlike Quesada’s broad background, Weyland’s experience had been purely with pursuit aircraft. His previous command had been theater-wide command of air forces in the Caribbean and the Panama Canal Zone. He was less than enthusiastic about reporting to Patton, who had openly criticized airpower in North Africa. Operation Overlord employed airpower at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and exposed the effects of strategic bombardment doctrine; the “bulky command channels designed and used for long-range bomber missions were poorly suited for air support of a fluid ground battle.” The real war demanded change in doctrine and equipment. After the invasion force had established itself on the Continent, Bomber Command

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reverted to terror bombing of German cities. The U.S. Eighth Air Force would follow. Flight crews in the Eighth Air Force suffered horrible losses conducting strategic bombardment across Europe in WWII. For these men the probability of survival was worse than for soldiers in Patton’s Third Army or for marines in the Pacific. The tactical air commands of the Ninth Air Force showed the capacity to learn and adapt. The Eighth Air Force, despite the evidence and the huge loss of life and material resources, never lost faith in its ways. Advances in the range and capability of long-range bombers and fighter escorts continued unabated throughout the war, promising better results in the future. The Pacific theater was divided to give General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz their own wars. Nimitz got the newest carriers, and MacArthur had to make do with land-based aviation for much of the war, reflecting the primary and secondary theater ordering. China constituted a distant tertiary theater, and Claire Chenault commanded air forces there. Chenault was a pursuit pilot and had taught pursuit tactics at Maxwell. Chenault was so out of step with the bombardment theory and doctrine that dominated the Army Air Corps that he retired in 1937. He soon moved to China as an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek and formed the storied Flying Tigers to fight the Japanese. When the United States officially entered the war, the Flying Tigers became the Fourteenth Air Force with Brigadier General Chenault in command. Chenault thought that a small air fleet of mostly pursuit aircraft and a few bombers could defeat Japan through interdiction operations. Such heresy would be tolerated only in a tertiary theater that did not tie up significant airpower assets. Hap Arnold selected George C. Kenney to be MacArthur’s deputy for air and commander of the Fifth Air Force. Kenney’s airpower thinking put air superiority first and then integration with ground operations, including interdiction. When B-29s were sent to the Pacific in late 1944, Kenney wanted to employ them to interdict Japanese logistics flows in support of MacArthur’s war. Arnold instead assigned the new bombers to the Twentieth Air Force and commanded them himself from Washington. The idea of centralized command in theater and the indivisibility of airpower were not put into practice. Arnold was not about to put the country’s premier bombers in the hands of someone whose thoughts were cluttered with tactical uses. As amphibious operations acquired air bases within range of Japan, Army bombers brought the war directly to Japanese cities. The initial results were indecisive. Arnold put Curtis LeMay, former commander of the Eighth Air Force in the European theater, in charge with orders to achieve results. And he did. LeMay discarded conventional high-altitude, daylight, precision bombing with low-level, nighttime, area, incendiary bombing. Although firebombing inflicted more damage, the atomic bomb was more efficient, bringing extreme damage in a short period of time with a small number of aircraft. Advances in munitions brought the time compression that Douhet claimed

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and would have understood. Service competition ensued immediately to provide alternative means for delivering the bomb. Across WWII theaters, across countries, and across services, there was little or no debate about the critical importance of establishing air superiority. There was much advocacy for integrated air-ground operations from Army leaders like Patton and Bradley. German blitzkrieg owed much of its success to integration of air-ground operations, but Germany’s focus on tactical aircraft and uses left it weak in its strategic bombardment of Britain. Strategic bombing enthusiasts made the predictable argument that tactical uses diverted resources better allocated to strategic attack. There is considerable disagreement and ambiguity about the interpretation of evidence concerning strategic bombardment and the independent application of airpower. In the Pacific and European theaters, the effects of strategic bombing did not conform to the vision. Japanese bombing of Chinese cities stiffened the will of the Chinese. The British populace, when subjected to German bombardment, showed great resilience, as did its industry. Under British and American bombing of Germany, the German people were far more steadfast than expected, and the German aircraft industry expanded under the onslaught. Throughout WWII, U.S. air forces became increasingly tactical. The Ninth Air Force relocated from North Africa to England, the Twelfth in Italy, the Tenth in the India-Burma theater, and the Fifth in Southeast Asia were all tactical. The Twentieth Air Force, scattered across the Pacific, retained a consistent strategic orientation throughout the war. One can interpret this progression in at least two ways. The reality of war demanded that the air arm be integrated with other arms in accordance with the enduring principles of war. Or one can interpret it to be evidence that traditional thinkers had not yet fully embraced the new way of war. If they had, the war could have been won with airpower alone, won sooner, and won with fewer Allied casualties. In the classic Arms and Men,39 Walter Millis said: The one great determining factor which shaped the course of the Second War was not, as is so often said and so generally believed, independent air power. It was the mechanization of the ground battlefield with automatic transport, with the “tactical” airplane and above all with the tank. Air power in its independent form was, in sober fact, relatively ineffective. It was the teaming of the internal combustion engine in the air and on the surface, in order to take the traditional objectives of surface warfare which, together with the remarkable development of electronic communications, really determined the history of the Second World War.

Today, many of the interdiction operations conducted in WWII likely would be considered at the operational rather than tactical level of war. Chenault’s operations in China, Eighth Air Force’s isolation of the coast for the D-Day invasion, and Kenney’s proposed use of B-29s to support MacArthur would fall into this higher level of war. One could conclude that balance between

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tactical, operational, and strategic missions (and aircraft) is better than a concentration in any one mission area. Immediately following the war, Army Air Forces established the Strategic Air Command to consolidate its strategic capabilities. In 1946, it established a single Tactical Air Command to parallel SAC. Air forces were to remain divided for the moment. Kenney was made commander of SAC but, due largely to his political aspirations, neglected the Air Force’s crown jewels. LeMay brought the moribund SAC to life as the strong arm of the early Cold War. Quesada commanded TAC. The Cold War and the centrality of the atom bomb quickly solidified SAC’s dominance. Quesada was unable to achieve a balance between strategic and tactical airpower. Air forces were to be indivisible, and that meant strategic. After a series of frustrating assignments, Quesada retired. After the war, Chenault helped establish the Chinese Air Transport company that worked with the CIA and later became Air America. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz would become the first Air Force service chief. His credentials were impeccable. He commanded the Eighth Air Force in 1942, Northwest Africa Air Force in 1943, and the U.S. Strategic Air Force (USSTAF) in Europe in 1944. In postwar unification hearings, Spaatz declared the indivisibility of airpower and the preeminence of science over man. Postwar Planning The closing years of WWII were the prenatal period for the United States Air Force. The Army Air Forces formed the Post War Division during the war with no war mission, only the pursuit of autonomy.40 The Air Force achieved complete independence from the Army in 1947 following congressional unification hearings and bold new legislation. The unification hearings were lengthy, and predictions included purely bureaucratic claims on budget share, neglect of important missions, and the ability of airpower to prevent war or win it alone. Navy Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman surmised in congressional testimony that if the air arm remained in the Army, it would dominate it and half of the defense budget. Leaving the Army would limit the Air Force to only one third of the budget.41 The emphasis on budget share is a persistent theme in interservice relations. The Army Air Corps declared the Navy’s carrier obsolete during congressional unification hearings. The carrier could easily, they claimed, be defeated by land-based bombers, just as the Ostfriesland had been sunk. Only U.S. land-based air could attack enemy air bases and make possible a safe carrier approach. But if land-based aviation could and must reach enemy land first, what was the value of ship-based aviation? There should be only one air arm. The British attempt at a single air arm showed the consequences, but the belief survived despite the evidence.

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Marine Lieutenant General Ray Geiger testified with a recommendation against air force autonomy at the same unification hearing.42 He presciently argued that a separate air arm would neglect certain critical air missions, specifically close air support for ground forces. Close air support, demonstrated in the 1920s in Nicaragua by marine aviators, and employed with effect in the Pacific, was near and dear to the Marine Corps’ heart. The voices of Army aviators who conducted similar integrated air-ground operations on the Continent and in the Pacific were drowned out by voices for an independent air force and strategic bombardment. Army Air Forces claimed that a ready air force could prevent war but that an army could only respond after a situation is out of hand.43 A war-weary Congress and American public were anxious to believe this promise. Sadly and quickly, the outbreak of the Korean War disproved the claim that airpower would either prevent or win war. An oft-recounted maxim is that a country prepares for the next war based on the successes of the previous war. In this case, Air Force planners were preparing to fight the next war with weapons and bombardment doctrine proven inadequate in the past. More correctly, Air Force planners were not preparing to fight the next war at all; they were preparing for autonomy. The naval services, on the other hand, developed tactics and tactical weapons in the two decades after WWII. The Navy and Marine Corps were prepared to support the ground war in Korea. The Air Force was not.44 Before the range of the bomber allowed it to reach foreign shores and return, the Air Corps’ justification for bombers was the destruction of the enemy navy at sea, thus usurping the Navy’s raison d’être. When the technological limits of range increased to allow intercontinental bombing, strategic bombardment of the enemy’s homeland became the justification for bombers. From defensive bombardment of an invading navy to offensive bombardment of foreign soil, the demand for bomber groups remained the same, only the justification changed. Just as the doctrine of strategic bombardment was selected to achieve autonomy, so too was the threat.45 As postwar planning proceeded, Russia emerged as the probable enemy, but, the Army Air Corps asked, “could a vast continental state like Russia be defeated with airpower?” Germany had conquered over half of Russia, but she never surrendered. The Air Corps preferred Germany and Japan to Russia as a threat because they better justified service existence. The Air Corps moved from preferred strategy to preferred enemy. The initial postwar air force plan specified 105 aircraft groups, 80 of which were strategic including 40 very heavy bomber groups, 2 heavy bomber groups, and 45 fighter escort groups. Later plans called for 75 groups, a skeleton version of the 105-group postwar air force.46 The greatest planned deployment of air groups was coastal and throughout the Pacific even though the polar routes provided the greatest opportunity. Japan was chosen as the enemy.47 Bases were proposed throughout Latin America as well. There had been no major power in the Southern Hemisphere

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and none were on the horizon, but the Air Corps was going to protect U.S. interests there with airpower because it justified bases. With one very heavy bomber group and one fighter escort group per base,48 more bases meant more groups, more groups meant more planes, and more planes meant a greater share of the budget. In addition to pursuit of bases and budget, airpower enthusiasts advocated a strong aircraft industry. Maintenance of the aircraft industrial plant was the most important single factor. It was not an example of industry lobbying Congress for an air force, but an air force demanding its industry. The strong relationship between the Air Force and the aerospace industry remains today.49 National security was not the end of Air Corps planning; an independent air force was. Strategic bombardment was the doctrine consistent with autonomy. The bomber was the weapon of choice. Nothing was allowed to distract the institution from its quest. Wars of Limited Objectives Critics of Douhet and his disciples argue that many of the airpower enthusiasts’ claims do not apply to wars of limited objectives. Wars of limited objectives, unfortunately, are the norm. The first post-WWII test came in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South. The Korean War, like the North Africa campaign, was not well suited to warfare by strategic bombardment. North Korea was not an industrial power. The Air Force destroyed every city and town, and the enemy’s will and ability to wage war survived. The hard-won lessons of WWII were already lost and had to be rebuilt. It was shown clearly that not only could airpower not prevent war, it could not win war alone or even in combination with other arms. Weyland, Patton’s former air boss, commanded the Far Eastern Air Forces in Korea and after the war commented that “an astounding facet of the Korean War was the number of old lessons that had to be relearned.”50 By the time the Korean War began, pilots with air-ground experience had retired, as had been their tactical aircraft. The tactical air forces—auxiliary air forces, as Douhet called them—proved extremely useful when integrated with ground forces. Tactical aviation was vindicated. The lesson, however, was not learned by the Air Force. One of the most accomplished air commanders of WWII, Curtis LeMay, went on to become Air Force chief of staff, where he lost significant political battles with Defense Secretary McNamara. He lost over Kennedy’s strategy of flexible response that replaced Eisenhower’s massive retaliation. LeMay even lost over the acquisition of major weapon systems, including the next generation fighter-bomber.51 His single-mindedness about strategic air forces coupled with his poor performance in the political arena led to the Air Force’s unpreparedness for Vietnam. By the time the United States escalated combat operations in Vietnam, the Air Force had returned to its strategic mission. But now, strategic meant

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nuclear. It had strike aircraft to deliver nuclear bombs on land targets and interceptors designed to fly long distances at high speed to intercept a Soviet bomber formation and fire nuclear tipped missiles into it. Neither bombers nor interceptors were suited to engage Soviet-built fighters flown by competent North Vietnamese pilots. Nor were they well suited to conducting close air support or interdiction missions in support of ground forces in South Vietnam or along the Ho Chi Minh Trail bringing supplies and troops to the South through neighboring Laos and Cambodia. Without relevant aircraft in the inventory or in the acquisition pipeline, the Air Force, pushed by McNamara, bought modified F-4 Phantoms, an aircraft developed by the Navy Department. Air-ground competence had to be rebuilt again for Vietnam. The price of forgetting is high in human and material costs. Airpower was not centrally managed in theater, nor was it indivisible. The institution was split between tactical and strategic aircraft. The air war against North Vietnam was waged by USAF and Navy fighter bombers with entirely separate command and control and virtually no substantive cooperation. Even more astonishing from the point of view of the indivisibility of air power was the fact that the Strategic Air Command waged its own air campaign over South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972 with no connection to those in charge of the air war in the South. Like Korea, Vietnam was not an industrial power. The industrial base, including aircraft manufacturing, was in the Soviet Union and was beyond American political will to attack. By 1967, the North Vietnamese fielded the most formidable air defense ground environment in history. Rather than Douhet’s total war thinking, airpower was used against North Vietnam as a coercive instrument, more like classic gunboat diplomacy, to alter the calculation and set the terms for favorable negotiations.52 Unconditional surrender was not one of the demands. Orthodox thinking demanded a “proper air effort” that never came. President Lyndon Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder from 1965 to 1968.53 Prior to the Tet Offensive beginning in February 1968, the primary burden for the ground war in the South was carried by Viet Cong guerrillas amid civilian populations. Resources, both supplies and personnel, flowed from the South Vietnamese citizenry either on a voluntary or coerced basis. Interdicting supply flows from the North was largely irrelevant and failed to force the North to the bargaining table. President Richard Nixon authorized Operation Freedom Train and Operations Linebacker I and II throughout 1972.54 During the 1968 communist Tet Offensive, the Viet Cong guerrilla force had been wiped out. Afterward, the primary combat responsibility fell to the North Vietnamese army. The logistics demanded of an invading infantry army were far more complicated than supplying local guerrillas, and the same interdiction operations succeeded in bringing the North to the negotiating table. During Vietnam, the fighter pilot gained an edge over the bomber pilot but fell short of dominance. Over 27,000 precision bombs were dropped in Vietnam with great effect. But to an Air Force dominated by strategic (nuclear)

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thinking, precision was just not important. The institution could not absorb the lesson. A new rift now divided the Air Force. Once again, the Air Force imagined a new way of war enabled by technology. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait, two new Air Force mindsets collided. Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice, General Michael J. Dugan, Air Force chief of staff, and protégé Colonel John Warden imagined a new way of air war and marketed it under the banner of global reach—global power. Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, however, headed the dominant school. Once again, claims were common that airpower could win the war alone or that ground force would be needed only for mopping-up operations. In Warden’s updated version of Douhet’s theory, centers of gravity or vital centers were given greater specificity and described as a series of concentric circles with the highest priority targets in the center. Leadership, its headquarters, and its ability to communicate with forces in the field were the principal targets. From there, the circles radiated outward to include key production capability, transportation networks, and the population. The enemy force in the field was the outer ring and given the lowest priority. Warden applied his model to Iraq and proposed an air campaign that he believed could roll back the Iraqi invasion without engaging the ground force. Warden’s plan was strategic attack in its pure modern form. It specifically excluded attack on enemy forces in the field. It would attack all other targets simultaneously. Warden proposed a six-day war with 1,000 sorties per day. He called it Instant Thunder as a pejorative slap at the slow escalation of Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder. Warden cautioned against diverting air resources from the strategic center to tactical forces in the field, a mistake he claimed was made in World War II. The overall theater commander, Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, found the plan enticing. The theater air force commander, General Horner, and the new dominant school saw Warden’s plan as retrograde, idealistic thinking. Horner sent Warden back to Washington with prejudice, but Warden’s thinking continued to be felt. Horner was responsible for the time-phase plan that was put into action.55 The first phase was directed at destroying the Iraqi air defense system. The second phase aimed at disabling the Iraqi leadership and crippling the regime’s command and control. And the third phase aimed at attacking and destroying the enemy’s ground forces. The dominant new school let go of the idea that all force must be thrown at the strategic center (or it concluded that the armed force was the strategic center). The plan included a full range of strategic, interdiction, and tactical targets. Like North Vietnam, Iraq had invested heavily in a formidable air defense system. Its defeat was a major accomplishment that allowed coalition airpower to roam freely over Iraq’s army. Air Force planning capabilities were extraordinary. And perhaps for the first time, the Air Force showed a capacity for planning and executing at the operational level of war. Not only was Coalition airpower quantitatively and qualitatively overpowering, the Air Force’s theater-wide centralized planning process assured very high sortie rates. Airpower was employed to the fullest.

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The Navy had nothing comparable and had no choice but to submit its aircraft and cruise missiles to Air Force planning dominance.56 Prior to the beginning of the ground war, the Iraqis made an incursion into Saudi Arabia in what became known as the Battle of Khafji.57 As the battled progressed, the air operations center continued executing the plan until Horner personally intervened. Glosson candidly and admirably said that “it was not the Air Force’s finest day.” At Khafji, the opportunity and need arose to shift from the independent application of airpower against static ground forces to integrated air-ground operations against an attacking ground force. It is reminiscent of the lessons learned early in the Normandy invasion—methods suited to strategic attack are not necessarily well suited to fluid ground warfare. The plan did not call for countering the Iraqi incursion. The Air Force did recover, but only through the efforts of the highest level of command leadership. The new Air Force had successfully shifted away from Douhet’s focus on population and industry and toward destruction of forces in the field. It retained the belief in the independent application of airpower. It continues, however, to be unprepared for integrated air-ground operations. In contrast to early claims, communications were never severed between Hussein and his forces in the field. Not a single member of Iraqi leadership was killed in attacks on Baghdad. The air campaign inflicted terrible damage on Iraqi forces in the field—an important objective of the war—but Iraqi forces did not withdraw until the ground war was initiated. The eventual direct attack by an air-ground force provided the motivation for the Iraqi army to withdraw from Kuwait with or without orders. Perhaps the most dangerous outcome of the Gulf War was the expectation of almost bloodless losses displacing the Vietnam syndrome. Precision munitions were used in smaller numbers in the Gulf War than in Vietnam, but this time the voice for precision in the institution spoke loudly and the nuclear advocate was silent. The Air Force had changed. It is in this conflict between area bombing with nuclear warheads versus precise bombing with conventional warheads that the Gulf War was fought. Warden’s supporters argue that he was right and the war should have been fought by air and against leadership rather than against forces in the field. Warden’s apologists say that, while he was misguided in his rejection of attacking the enemy force, he was entirely right in rejecting the old strategic (nuclear) policies of the old Air Force and replacing it with thinking appropriate to precision munitions. Warden’s critics argue that he was a throwback to Douhet and a failed theory.58 In 1991, Air Force Secretary Rice stood down both the Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command and stood up the Air Combat Command in their place. Indivisibility was the justification. The precision revolution continued after the Gulf War. In 1999, 90 percent of aircraft available were capable of delivering precision-guided munitions in Serbia when only 10 percent were capable in the Gulf War. Usage of precision

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munitions went from 8 percent in the Gulf War to almost 30 percent in Serbia. The billion-dollar, subsonic, stealth, B-2 bomber débuted flying from its specialized hanger facilities in Missouri. Still, this was a frustrating use of airpower. There was no deep consensus to commitment within the United States or within NATO, creating severe targeting constraints. The goal was to stop ethnic cleansing; the response was to destroy military airfields, factories, oil and electrical production, scores of bridges, and government buildings when they were empty at night. The weather provided few good flying days. President Clinton announced that no ground forces would be used, which created the conditions for the enemy to hunker down and wait it out; in the language of combined arms warfare, no dilemma was presented to compel the enemy—only a single arm would be employed for coercive purposes. When Serbia’s chief ally, Russia, withdrew its support and Albanians threatened a ground offensive, Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic capitulated. A chorus of voices in defense of airpower said that a proper air campaign concentrated on the strategic centers of gravity would have brought quicker resolution to the conflict. Afghanistan showed one of the shortcomings of air forces based on tactical fighters. Without proximate land bases, fighters must fly long distances to deliver small payloads. The same is true for some modern bombers, but the venerable B-52 could fly the long distances, loiter, and deliver large payloads when and where needed. Great “transformational” advances were claimed when B-52s delivered precision munitions directed by special operations forces on the ground riding burros. Certainly it was a different plane and different communications equipment, but Americans on burros used radios, planes, and bombs to support ground operations in Nicaragua in the 1920s. A modern development is the Air Force’s claim on space. One now speaks of aerospace power rather than merely airpower. It is not surprising that aerospace power is claimed to be indivisible and requires independent application.59 THE POST–COLD WAR AIR FORCE Rather than an open debate on airpower theory, the contest has shifted to air missions, but it is a change of venue, not a change of issue. The set of missions that an air force is capable of executing constitutes the set of taskings that a joint force commander can assign to his air component. Aircraft are designed and procured to execute some range of missions. Doctrine establishes the methods that organizations use to employ their acquired equipment. The force is organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish missions. It is in this context that a force achieves balance or imbalance. Air Missions Douhet’s “command of the air” is currently referred to as air control. The prophet allowed for nothing less than total command of the air without

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mention of temporary or localized control. Modern-day Air Force doctrine is more flexible on the matter. Both air superiority and the stronger condition of air supremacy are prominent in modern thinking. Some degree of air control is established through two distinct missions: suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD, seed) and offensive counterair (OCA). Most states, including lesser powers that cannot afford to maintain an air force, have invested in ground-based air defense systems that pose a threat to manned aircraft. Ground-based air defense is made of mobile or fixed radar, computerized fire control systems, and missile launchers. The air defense system of a major power also includes fighter-interceptor aircraft. The first phase of establishing air control is to suppress or destroy the enemy’s air defense capabilities. The SEAD mission can be accomplished by general-purpose or specialized fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, or ground forces. SEAD can temporarily open an attack corridor for offensive counterair operations. OCA is classic Douhet: attacks directed against enemy air bases and aircraft on the ground. Douhet would use bombers for this mission, but the modern Air Force uses a multirole jet configured for ground attack. Defensive counterair (DCA) missions could be accomplished by fighter aircraft or fighter interceptors, but the Air Force prefers to leave this mission to ground-based systems and the Army. In small wars, there has been little threat from manned aircraft. The proliferation to lesser powers of medium-range missiles, and the American tendency to intervene within range of these missiles (defend forward), makes this an increasingly important mission area, but one that is conducted under the name theater ballistic missile defense. The name theater missile defense includes missiles that do not follow a plunging ballistic path—that is, cruise missiles. With air control established, the Air Force can pursue the ultimate objective of Douhet’s air force—strategic attack. These missions are directed at the will of the enemy, its war-making infrastructure, or its command hierarchy depending on the situation and targeting preferences of the command structure. Other air missions are more integrated with ground operations and find less favor within the institutional Air Force. These missions include air interdiction (AI), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and close air support (CAS, kass). Both AI and BAI missions attack enemy military capability before it can be brought to bear against friendly ground forces. They isolate the battlefield so that the ground commander can win the current fight. The distinction between AI and BAI is proximity to friendly ground forces and the concomitant need to coordinate. AI missions can be conducted with little or no coordination between air and ground forces; they are conducted against uncommitted or moving enemy ground forces, surface transportation networks, supply facilities, and headquarters. BAI missions attack enemy land forces that are not yet in the close fight but that could soon affect the battle; they require greater coordination between air and ground forces. The CAS mission is the most contentious and requires the greatest degree of air-ground coordination. The CAS target is enemy ground forces in close

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proximity to or engaged with friendly ground forces. The possibility for fratricide is highest in this mission. The characteristics that make an aircraft well suited for aerial combat make it poorly suited to CAS. Air forces continue to serve in the information-gathering role, including long-range strategic reconnaissance and more tactical photoreconnaissance. Another information-gathering function is called bomb damage assessment (BDA) or, more generally, battle damage assessment. The purpose of BDA is to determine the extent of damage done and the need to reattack. It has always been a difficult problem, and modern-day precision munitions make it even more difficult because damage is so localized. The list of missions given above represents the doctrinal lexicon of the late Cold War and AirLand Battle in Europe. Table 4.1 shows the post–Cold War roles and missions favored by the Air Force.60 The newer listing shows a stronger intermingling of space-based missions that represents the service turf struggle over the new warfare medium and its weapons. With mission comes money. The former list, much preferred by the Army, included a greater emphasis on ground support missions like CAS and BAI. Air Force Weapons of War Douhet preferred an air force of predominantly two types of aircraft. The bomber was to be designed for what we today call offensive counterair and strategic attack missions. The pursuit aircraft, derived from the bomber, would

Table 4.1 Roles and Typical Missions of Aerospace Power Roles

Typical Missions

Aerospace Control

Counterair Counterspace

Force Application

Strategic Attack Interdiction Close Air Support

Force Enhancement

Airlift Air Refueling Spacelift Electronic Combat Surveillance and Reconnaissance Special Operations

Force Support

Base Operability and Defense Logistics Combat Support On-Orbit Support

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be tweaked for aerial combat. Today’s mission set is broader than Douhet imagined, and the Air Force retains a preference for a multirole aircraft that can accommodate the expanded mission set. Rather than starting with the bomber as the general-purpose platform, the modern Air Force begins with an aircraft designed for aerial combat and then configures it for a wide range of missions spanning strategic attack, OCA, AI, and CAS. The bomber persists in the inventory but is no longer at the center of Air Force thinking. The Air Force fighter aircraft inventory is a “high-low” mix. That is, rather than a single aircraft type, the mix contains a relatively small number of premier fighters and a larger number of lightweight fighters. Today’s fighter is a multirole aircraft, no longer constrained to escort bombers. It can perform as a long-range, supersonic fighter-interceptor; a bomb-carrying strike aircraft; a missile-firing tank killer; or an air-to-air fighter. A fighter can be reconfigured daily. There is an inherent flexibility in the air fleet over time. Fighter aircraft weapon systems operate in three spheres for aerial combat. The largest sphere allows the aircraft to engage an enemy aircraft well beyond visual range. Radar extends the pilot’s visual range, and a radar-guided, medium-range missile provides lethality. The heat-seeking, short-range missile allows the pilot to engage the enemy at closer range, and a cannon is the weapon of last resort for a close-in gunfight. Some very expensive systems have failed if the pilot has to resort to cannon. Engaging an enemy beyond visual range greatly increases the potential for fratricide. The on-board electronics intended to prevent fratricide is called identify-friend-or-foe (IFF), but it is not foolproof. Rules of engagement not to fire beyond visual range without an independent direct observation renders the radar largely irrelevant. Incorporation of sophisticated radar adds a great deal of weight, complexity, and cost. The multirole fighter can quickly be shifted from one role to another. Air force tactics employ the fighter to gain air superiority, to attack the enemy’s strategic targets, and to support ground forces. Shifting from one phase of the air war to another requires apportionment of aircraft between the various roles so that aircraft can be reconfigured (a modest process in terms of time). An apportionment that satisfies the air commander may not satisfy the ground commander. During the Vietnam War, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all flew the F-4 Phantom with slight differences. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Navy’s F-14 high-end fighter interceptor approached the performance of the Air Force’s F-15 high-end fighter,61 but the Navy’s aircraft was retired without replacement. The current Navy F/A-18 strike fighter has rough parity with the Air Force’s F-16 light fighter.62 The Air Force’s developmental air superiority fighter, the F-22 Raptor, will leave the other services very far behind in the competition. Continuing with the multirole theme, fighter-bomber and fighter-attack variants have been proposed for the Raptor. The F-22, F-15, and F-16 are all poorly suited to ground support, designed primarily as fighters for aerial combat and modified for other roles.

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Two other aircraft in the post–Cold War inventory have been designated as fighters. The F-111, more light bomber than fighter,63 was retired without replacement after the Cold War. The F-117 Nighthawk is the first production stealth aircraft.64 It is more an attack aircraft than a fighter. Its subsonic speed and compromises made for stealth would make it hopelessly outmatched against a true fighter. The A-10 Thunderbolt II is a subsonic, two-engine jet that performs superbly in the close air support role against armored forces. The A-10 is the first Air Force aircraft specifically designed for the close support of ground forces. It is also the first aircraft to be delivered from the manufacturer directly to the reserve component. The A-10 is an unglamorous aircraft and is called the Warthog by its enthusiasts.65 The B-52 Stratofortress has been America’s long-range, strategic, heavy bomber since 1952. Douhet might have considered this the ultimate aircraft. It was designed to deliver nuclear bombs anywhere on the face of the Earth. It is perhaps the classic acquisition horror story. Its production was over schedule and over budget and never met the performance specifications. It was to fly supersonic but could not with only four engines. A costly redesign employed eight engines but it still failed to break the sound barrier. The Strategic Air Command waged a private war with B-52s and conventional bombs against North Vietnamese forces in the South, and the B-52 carpet-bombed huge tracts of land during the Gulf War. It flew close air support missions in Afghanistan. A half century after first flight, the B-52 still serves admirably as an all-purpose bomb-truck. The B-1 Lancer was to replace the aging B-52, an Air Force requirement in 1969. The prototype B-1A was a swing-wing, medium- and high-altitude bomber capable of flight at more than twice the speed of sound. The program was canceled in 1977 by the Carter administration and resurrected by Reagan four years later; the Mach 1.2 B-1B bore little resemblance to its predecessor. It was to be a low-altitude bomber and missile carrier. Its airframe was significantly stronger to handle the rigors of low-altitude flight, and its design incorporated new stealth technology and other advanced countermeasures to allow it to penetrate radar defenses. One hundred Lancers were produced between 1985 and 1988 at a cost of $1 billion each. The B1-B was not used in the Gulf War, and the mission was left to the venerable B-52. The B-2 Spirit, the flying wing, is a subsonic bomber that can deliver a large payload of conventional or nuclear weapons. Its ability to penetrate enemy air defense is attributable to its employment of stealth technology. Like the B-1B, it was not used in the Gulf War. Air Force aircraft employ a variety of missiles and bombs. The simplest are the gravity bomb and the glide bomb.66 The air-to-ground missile arsenal also includes missiles that can be remotely guided to high-value targets from standoff range by transmitting a television or infrared image back to the cockpit. Smaller and less expensive air-to-surface guided missiles can be fired from

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standoff range at tactical vehicles. Larger aircraft like the B-52 can launch low-flying cruise missiles against ships or ground targets. One type of air-to-surface missile is guided by the enemy’s own radar—the high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM). Ground-based radar is the “seeing” half of an air defense system and is coupled to the surface-to-air missile “shooting” half. The radar serves as a beacon to guide anti-radiation missiles from the aircraft to the radar. For aerial combat, supersonic air-to-air missiles are carried to defeat enemy aircraft at short and medium ranges. Short-range missiles are guided by tracking the heat from its target’s engines by using infrared seekers. Medium-range missiles are radar-guided and greatly extend the range from which a pilot can fire on the enemy. Newer medium-range missiles are smaller, lighter, and faster than their predecessors. A missile’s internal radar guides the missile to its target. This fire-and-forget capability allows the pilot to engage multiple enemy targets in rapid succession. Existing missiles and bombs continually improve, and new munitions continue to enter the inventory. As their cost, precision, range, and destructive capacity grow, munitions are gaining in importance relative to the delivery platform. Table 4.2 shows the combatant aircraft found in the Air Force inventory and their spread through the active and reserve component in the decade following the Cold War.

Table 4.2 Air Force Combatant Aircraft in the 1990s

Aircraft

First Service

Active

1972 1979 1967 1982

403 804 225 54

Fighters F-15 Eagle F-16 Fighting Falcon F-111 “Aardvark” F-117 Nighthawk Strategic Bombers B-52 Stratofortress B-1B Lancer B-2 Spirit Ground Attack A-10 Thunderbolt II OA-10 Thunderbolt II Command and Control E-3 Sentry (AWACS) EF-111 Raven *

Planned operational aircraft

1964 1971 1983

85 94 20*

1976 1976

72 72

1977 1981

29 29

National Guard

Reserve

126 634

150

9

64 30

24 12

Total 529 1,588 225 54 94 94 20* 160 114 29 29

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The Air Force also procures and operates aircraft for command and control and electronic warfare purposes. These aircraft carry a large payload of sophisticated electronics. The E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS, a-wax) is an airborne command post. It provides the capabilities of an air traffic control center, monitoring a large airspace, to a military decision maker who can prioritize threats posed by enemy aircraft and vector fighters to them as well as coordinate refueling operations. The RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft carries equipment to monitor the electromagnetic spectrum including communications traffic. The E-3 AWACS and the RC-135 are modified Boeing passenger liners. The E-8C, also based on the Boeing 707, coupled to Army ground stations is collectively referred to as the joint surveillance target attack radar system ( JSTARS, jay-stars). JSTARS was rushed from prototype into operations in the Gulf War to provide a surface picture to the ground force commander. It is designed to detect slow-moving targets and can distinguish between wheeled and tracked vehicles. Systems like the AWACS and JSTARS may be at the heart of a true revolution in combined-arms warfare. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) constitute a major threat to aircraft operating in enemy airspace. Before firing a SAM, the target aircraft must be detected and tracked and the SAM guided to its target by radar. Electroniccountermeasures aircraft often accompany a multiship strike formation to detect, sort, identify, and nullify enemy radar by a variety of means, including jamming. The EF-111A Raven is such an aircraft carrying three and a half tons of electronic equipment. In addition to its electronic countermeasures, the Raven has the day-night, terrain-following capability of the F-111. The EF-111 was retired without replacement, leaving the mission to naval aviation. The Air Force invested in stealth technology at the expense of electronic countermeasures. The Air Force provides a large fleet of airlifters—including the C-5, C-141, C-17, and the C-130—and it provides specialized aircraft to refuel the rest of the air fleet, giving it global reach without resort to intermediate land basing. The C-5 Galaxy can carry the Army’s heavy equipment including tanks (although only one at a time) and helicopters. It can also be used to deploy Air Force maintenance and support equipment so that, for example, a fighter wing can deploy to a forward operating base by air. The C-141 Starlifter is a broad-spectrum airlifter used to deploy forces over intercontinental distances by airlanding or airdrop, to resupply forces, and to extract wounded. The legendary C-130 Hercules propeller-driven airlifter can move personnel, equipment, and supplies within the theater of operations and land at austere airfields. It has been a workhorse since first delivery in 1956, conducting extensive operations in Vietnam and in every conflict since. The C-17 Globemaster is the newest airlifter in the inventory. It combines the strategic range and lift of the retiring C-141 with the forward access provided by the C-130. The Air Force also operates a variety of small aircraft for general transportation of personnel and cargo, including dignitaries.

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Table 4.3 shows the post–Cold War noncombatant aircraft inventory and its spread across the active and reserve component. The Air Force operates two aerial refuelers: the KC-10 Extender and the KC-135 Stratotanker. The Stratotanker is yet another aircraft derived from the Boeing 707. The Extender is a modified Douglas DC-10 commercial airliner than can both refuel other aircraft and haul the cargo and personnel to make the Air Force self-deploying. The Extender can carry roughly twice as much fuel as the Stratotanker. The Air Force operates high-altitude, all-weather photoreconnaissance aircraft that provide national leaders and regional combatant commanders with standoff surveillance of the battle area. A U-2 spy plane provided the photographs of Soviet missile bases in Cuba to President Kennedy after an earlier U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union during the Eisenhower administration. The subsonic U-2 was followed by the higher and faster flying (Mach 3.2⫹) SR-71, which first saw service during the Vietnam conflict. It has been retired without replacement. The Air Force plays an important role for all services by providing airborne weather reconnaissance. The same type of aircraft performs as a hurricane tracker operating from an Air National Guard base in Mississippi.

Air Force Organizations There is a command hierarchy in the Air Force, but the hierarchy is not as important in understanding the Air Force as it is in understanding the Army. Airpower theory is the most important component in explaining and predicting

Table 4.3 Air Force Mobility Aircraft in the 1990s

Aircraft Airlifters C-130 Hercules C-141 Starlifter C-5 Galaxy C-17 Globemaster III C-21 C-22 C-9 Nightingale Refuelers KC-10 Extender KC-135 Stratotanker

First Service

Active

National Guard

Reserve

Total

1966 1964 1970 1993 1984 1963 1968

98 241 70

173 16 11

606 12 28

70

4 4

0

877 269 109 0 74 4 10

1981 1965

59 457

30

158

10

59 645

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Air Force institutional behavior. Air Force organizations are inherently flexible. In Army parlance, there is no fixed table of organization and equipment. Aircraft and air units can and do move freely from one organization to another. More importantly, the organizations in the hierarchy are more administrative than warfighting constructs. Aircraft are drawn from across several organizations to form a flight (the lowest echelon in the Air Force hierarchy) task organized for a specific mission. The organizations that most closely represent deployed combat forces are wings and squadrons. Wings are organized under a numbered air force with three-star command. In this regard, numbered air forces are parallel to an Army corps. Numbered air forces, in turn, are assigned to an Air Force major command, which often doubles as the Air Force component of a combatant command. The major commands with operational responsibilities include the Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces in Europe, and Air Force Special Operations Command. The fundamental flying organization is the wing. By comparison, the wing is at the same command level as the Army’s brigade—that is, it is commanded by a colonel. As the Air Force decreases from its Cold War size, wings are increasingly being commanded by brigadier generals. This behavior is not unique to the Air Force, nor is it peculiar to modern times. Each service can be seen to act to preserve general officer billets. But there is a more compelling influence at work. As the number of wings has decreased, their size has increased. As the emphasis has shifted from fighter wings to composite wings and expeditionary air forces, the wing has become more complex. Wings are made of flying squadrons and several smaller supporting groups, including an operations group for planning and targeting, a logistics group for maintenance and supply, a support group providing base security and air field repairs, and an air control squadron—the combat equivalent of civilian air traffic controllers (see Figure 4.1). Most air bases are structured to accommodate a wing. Flying squadrons vary in size, but fighter squadrons typically number 18 or 24 aircraft, attack squadrons number 18, and bomber and airlift squadrons number between 10 and 20. Squadrons are homogeneous—that is, they are made up of a single aircraft type. Wings, on the other hand, may be composite—that is, composed of squadrons of different aircraft types. Fighter wing composition has changed in the post–Cold War era. A more traditional fighter wing might contain a mix of one air superiority squadron (F-15C Eagle), one strike fighter squadron (F-15E Strike Eagle), and two multirole fighter squadrons (F-16C Fighting Falcon). But today’s wings have a wider mix of capabilities. During the spring of 1995, the 52d Fighter Wing in Germany included one air superiority squadron, two multirole fighter squadrons, and a ground attack squadron (A-10).67 The 366th Wing was even more whole for combat in the same time frame; it included an air superiority squadron, a strike fighter squadron, a multirole fighter squadron, a refueler squadron (KC-135), and even a small bombardment squadron (from B-52 Stratofortress to B-1B Lancer).

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Figure 4.1. Air Force Wing.

The former Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) have been subsumed by the Air Combat Command (ACC). SAC, formerly a specified command in the chain of command to the president, was the major proponent of strategic bombardment, its aircraft, and its pilot. SAC’s demise marks the most recent and perhaps final step in the passing of the baton from the bomber pilot to the fighter pilot. All bombers, fighters, command and control, reconnaissance, combat delivery, electronic warfare, and air rescue aircraft units and personnel in the contiguous United States are assigned to ACC. Four numbered air forces are assigned to ACC, which is the Air Force component to the U.S. Joint Forces Command. Strategic airlifters and refuelers are assigned to the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Air Force component to the U.S. Transportation Command with worldwide responsibility for transportation. Two numbered air forces are assigned to the AMC. The Air Force Space Command in Colorado is responsible for space-based assets and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operations. Space-based assets are primarily communications, navigational, and meteorological satellites. The ICBM force includes Minuteman II and III and Peacekeeper missiles. Two numbered air forces report to the Air Force Space Command. The

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Air Force operates satellite launch centers on the east and west coasts. The Air Force Space Command was formerly the Air Force component to the U.S. Space Command and now the U.S. Strategic Command. The Air Force Special Operations Command is the Air Force component to the U.S. Special Operations Command. Its units operate the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft for close air support, ingress and egress, and psychological operations for special operations forces. The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE, you-say-fee) and Pacific Air Forces, are both a major command of the Air Force and the air component of a unified combatant command, the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Pacific Command, respectively. The Air Force Materiel Command and Air Education and Training Command are also major commands but with administrative rather than operational responsibilities. The Air Force Material Command is the largest command in the Air Force by personnel count and budget. It conducts research and development of equipment—including aircraft, missiles, and munitions—and then logistically supports them in the field. An extensive network of laboratories, test centers, and logistics centers comprise the command’s subordinate units. Branch Selection and Career Progression The careers of officers who rise to the top positions in the Air Force are tied to a particular weapon system. The airplane one flies determines assignments and promotion potential. Air Force officers are either flyers or not. The terms rated and non-rated make the ultimate distinction in the Air Force pecking order. Flyers are pilots, weapon system officers, or navigators. Not being a pilot severely restricts the assignments and career opportunities of an officer. Aircraft are either shooters or movers and their flight officers are labeled accordingly, making the second most important distinction in career prestige. Fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft are shooters. Attack aircraft pilots are too close to the Army to be taken seriously in the Air Force pecking order. Movers are unglamorous cargo- and troop-carrying airlifters. During war, movers provide the lifeline to air and ground forces. During peace they are the principal aircraft of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. But being imminently useful does not confer prestige. Everyone in the Air Force is in service of the pilot, and the fighter pilot is preeminent. Patton told Eisenhower that he would gladly accept Weyland as one of his corps commanders and described him as “the best damn general in the Air Corps.”68 High praise indeed from a ground commander who held no truck with the mediocre. The commander who understands the integration of forces, combined-arms warfare, is prepared for joint command. But nothing in a twenty-first-century fighter pilot’s career progression constitutes preparation for command of a joint force integrating across the elements of air, land, and sea. Flying a modern supersonic fighter requires costly initial training and makes considerable demands on psychomotor and cognitive skills.

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The skills necessary to fly and fight, to survive and win, are perishable. But a culture focusing on the independent application of airpower does not produce officers qualified for joint command. Dominant Processes Squadrons do not fight as a unit. Many would not like to have wings and squadrons described as administrative units rather than combat units, but these organizations are providers of sorties (French for exit). Several squadrons and wings contribute sorties that are collected into multiship mission packages (e.g., for an air strike). A large strike mission might be composed of 32 bomb-carrying fighters, 16 fighter escorts, 8 Wild Weasel aircraft to destroy enemy radar, 4 jammer aircraft to blind enemy air defenses, and 15 tankers to refuel the group. This is the Air Force’s equivalent to task organization. (Depending on faith in stealth, the same mission might be accomplished with 8 stealth F-117s and 2 tankers for refueling.) Two important planning processes are worth mentioning: preparation of the air tasking order (ATO) and mission planning. Each day the air and land commanders negotiate and recommend an apportionment of air assets to their superior joint force commander three days in advance of operations. The ATO is prepared and promulgated daily, assigning missions to wings and squadrons. With those assignments, individual flight crews plan their mission, including fuel, munitions, and routes. Decision makers aboard an AWACS may override a strike mission in real time if, for example, a planned target has already been destroyed; a high-value, time-critical target has been identified; or a planned refueling tanker has become unavailable. Flight crews do not select their own targets. Active Component versus Reserve Component The Air Force retires aging aircraft to the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard, thus passing higher per flight-hour maintenance costs out of the active component. Still the reserves claim lower maintenance costs and superior pilots. It is relatively inexpensive to maintain a pilot’s proficiency in the reserve component. Some reserve pilots are commercial pilots who periodically refresh their skills on combat aircraft or military transport aircraft. Due to their length of service, reservists often have considerably more total time in the cockpit than their younger active-duty counterparts. Time in the cockpit earns a great deal of respect regardless of active or reserve status. The active component will continue to keep fighter squadrons in the active component and the attack pilots and transport pilots in the reserve. During peace, great demands will be put on the refuelers and cargo pilots needed to support peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. Those planes and pilots will be reservists. Unlike Army National Guard combat

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units, Air National Guard units made of transport planes provide a very useful disaster relief capability to the state governors. SUMMARY The strategic bomber is no longer the darling of the Air Force, nor is the bomber pilot in control. The fighter and its pilot are now the focal point. Strategic targets and an air campaign separate from the ground war, however, are still the Air Force priority. Airlift, attack, and bomber aircraft programs will quickly be sacrificed to produce the next generation air superiority fighter. A preference for superior aerial combat produces an aircraft with high speed and maneuverability for aerial combat. A multirole aircraft optimized for aerial combat is not the best aircraft to integrate with ground forces. Command positions will continue to go to fighter pilots. The institution will keep fighter squadrons in the active component by keeping the unglamorous but imminently useful mobility squadrons in the reserve component. The Air Force provides an extremely potent capability and exhibits a great deal of flexibility in what it can provide. Organizations are not rigid; aircraft self-deploy and quickly move from wing to wing. A single strike fighter might be fitted for aerial combat one day, close air support to ground forces the next day, battlefield air interdiction in support of ground forces the next, and attack of strategic targets the following day. There is also a great deal of flexibility in the strike package that can be configured and scaled for a variety of missions at the operational and strategic levels of war. Thinking in the Air Force, however, can be very rigid. Doctrine is theory put into practice, where it guides training, organization, and equipment acquisition. “For the Army, doctrine describes how to fight. For the Air Force, doctrine describes what to believe.”69 The Air Force is ahistorical, and it is ever forward looking, always pursuing advanced technology. It will continue to pursue stealth, precision, and information technologies. To the Air Force, joint means fighting the air war for the joint force commander. The optimal way to accomplish that is by consolidating authority over the air assets of all services. The career progression of Army and Marine Corps combat arms officers prepares them for joint force command. The career progression of Air Force pilots does not.

CHAPTER 5

Navy

independent command at sea defeat the enemy navy at sea forward presence freedom of the seas

The United States Navy, as an institution, is steeped in tradition, much of it derived directly from the dominant naval force at the time of the Navy’s birth— the British Royal Navy. When a captain set sail from England, after crossing the horizon, he was not only captain of the ship but also an ambassador vested with the decision-making authority of the king and queen. Modern communications systems allow the political and military hierarchy to remain in constant contact with the fleet, but independent command at sea remains the pinnacle of a navy officer’s career. The independent, even defiant, nature of the Navy is perhaps its hallmark as an armed service. Besides the medium in which they fight, independent command is what binds navy officers of all countries and what best distinguishes the U.S. Navy from the other services. The Navy has expanded and contracted in extreme ways, undergone significant structural change, and absorbed dramatic technological revolutions. Contraction includes being forced to scuttle its own ships as a condition of World War I armistice. Technological change includes the progression from wooden-walled, sail-powered ships to steel-sided, fossil-fuel-powered ships; the progression from a battleship’s big guns to carrier-based aviation and cruise missiles; and the progression from conventional fuel to nuclear power and now to gas turbine. Yet, through all these changes, the Navy remains faithful to its traditions.

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The technology of flight caused a revolution that split the Army into separate air and ground services. The same technology caused the Navy to restructure internally and to integrate aviation into the existing institution. The Army’s aviators rebelled against their institution; the Navy’s aviators integrated into theirs. They were naval officers first and pilots second, more loyal to their service than to their weapons. Today’s aviator dominates Navy thinking, as did the battleship captain until the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the decade following the Cold War, the Navy posture, particularly the primacy of forward presence through the aircraft carrier, has remained constant. When measured in the number of ships and personnel end strength, the Navy’s size has decreased substantially. But when measured in the number of missile launch tubes, the Navy has grown. The Air Force invested heavily in stealth and precision munitions while Navy aviation stealth investments failed and resisted investments in precision. The Navy’s lagging position in precision (and geography) put it in a largely auxiliary role in the Gulf War. The Navy’s recent declarations focus on global demographic trends toward large urban centers within 200 miles of a coastline—a littoral rather than an open ocean emphasis. Its behavior, in contrast, is more consistent with a focused competition with the Air Force over the long-range precision strike mission. This chapter begins with a review of the two dominant naval strategies, guerre de course and guerre de main, to give primacy to naval strategy over naval weapons and organization. Strategy is followed by a discussion of modern naval development, including some of the battles that shaped present-day Navy thinking. It includes a discussion of planning in the absence of a known foe, drawing an analogy between the post–World War II and post–Cold War periods. The chapter then describes today’s ships and weapons, major organizations at sea, and concludes with a discussion of naval transformation for the twenty-first century. NAVAL STRATEGIES AND NAVIES Although uniforms and traditions of the United States Navy were taken directly from the Royal Navy, for most of America’s first century the two were polar opposites in naval strategy. Those strategic poles are guerre de course and guerre de main (or guerre d’escadre). The former strategy, often adopted by weaker naval powers, required a navy for coastal defense, commerce protection, and commerce raiding. Continental powers often were weaker naval powers by strategic design. The latter strategy was more likely to be adopted by an insular state with extra-territorial interests that saw control of the seas through defeat of enemy fleets as its navy’s raison d’être. Only a substantial economic power could afford such a strategy; only a country dependent on trade or intent on expansion could justify it. Strategies and navies. A strategy links ends, ways, and means. A country can pursue a course of action with resources inadequate to its objectives, but that is not a strategy linking ends, ways, and means; it is wishful thinking,

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self-deception, and a formula for failure. Devoting excessive resources to achieve objectives or to set objectives too high is to invite overextension, exhaustion, and failure. An effective strategy accepts some risks. A naval strategy is undergirded by a navy, and the two strategies mentioned above are built upon different navies and by different ship inventories. If the nation’s need is commerce protection (end), then a guerre de course strategy might serve by providing a dispersed navy (way) of many aggressively commanded frigates (means). If the nation’s needs are to defeat an enemy navy at sea (end), then a guerre de main strategy serves by providing a concentrated fleet (way) of capital ships and their auxiliary combatants (means). Other linkages of ends, ways, and means are possible. Guerre de main. For an insular state separated from continental powers by oceans and dependent on imported resources for its industrial input and on foreign markets for its industrial output, control of sea-lanes can be a matter of national survival. But defending commerce everywhere is an exhaustive exercise. Instead, such a power may choose to sweep the enemy navy from the seas, either by holding it in port through blockade, by destroying it in port, or by destroying it through decisive fleet engagement at sea. Destruction of the enemy fleet is the prime objective, and that objective is accomplished by powerful ships concentrated into a large fleet. An insular power deriving great wealth from trade at sea may choose a guerre de main strategy and may be able to afford the necessary fleet of powerful ships. Britain, Japan, and the United States have been such insular powers and have opted for global or regional control of the seas over time. Germany, France, and Russia have adopted a guerre de main strategy at times in their history, behaving as insular powers rather than as proper continental powers. They have not fared well, and a Taoist may argue that they failed because they did not follow the natural order of things. Continental geography has remained constant throughout America’s history, yet the country has successfully employed both strategies. Clearly there is more to the geo-strategic environment than geography, and changing transportation and communications technology certainly complicate the assessment. Determining whether the United States is a continental or an insular power in today’s environment may or may not be a useful exercise. The type of navy required to support a guerre de main strategy is based on the most powerful ship available, one capable of winning a decisive fleet engagement. Such engagements are won through concentration. In the age of sail and the age of the big-gun battleship, concentration meant concentrating the volume of fire on each ship and the concentration of ships into a powerful fleet. Such a fleet could concentrate fire on a similarly concentrated enemy fleet. The complex dance of powerful ships while in contact with the enemy is the fleet action, and the fleet must remain together, concentrated, to maintain proficiency in fleet actions. The technology of flight changed everything. From the aircraft carrier, concentration of fire on the enemy formation could be achieved without

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concentrating ships and concentrating firepower on the combatant ship. The carrier caused fleets to disperse just as the machine gun forced infantry to disperse from the tight formation. But dispersion was not unlimited. The fleet still needed to operate as a collective for mutual support and self-defense, requiring a mix of ships, resulting in the present-day carrier battle group. Guerre de course. Global commerce at its best increases wealth and benefits all trading partners. But dependence on maritime commerce represents a great vulnerability as well. The dominant power’s dependence on the sea makes a guerre de course strategy attractive to its competitors. Not all countries require control of the seas, and not all have the means to provide a navy suited to the competition. Countries with more modest needs often find it economical to adopt a guerre de course strategy, to build ships and operate a navy commensurate with limited ends in mind—specifically, harbor and coastal defense, commerce protection, and commerce raiding. A defensive guerre de course strategy has as its ends coastal defense and commerce protection; if offensive, it may assert commerce raiding against ships or ashore. In its extreme, a guerre de course navy supports gunboat diplomacy and conducts expeditionary warfare or even power projection ashore for sustained operations. Defensive guerre de course and coastal defense. A great power need not be a great naval power. Great continental powers, like Germany and Russia, have generally allocated their resources to military forces (including both land and complementary air forces, depending on the technology of the time) and invested in naval forces primarily to guard their flanks at sea. Such powers may invest in coastal defense. Countries with active overseas trade frequently find the need to oppose global or regional powers over commerce at sea. Oceans are vast and a commercial ship sailing independently at sea is hard to find; if found and overcome, it constitutes only an isolated loss. Harbors are few and fixed; a commercial ship must eventually be at port. Thus, commerce protection is often a matter of small warships escorting convoys of commercial ships through chokepoints and harbor approaches, defending against less seaworthy commerce raiders. Some countries have favored strong regional navies to defend sea approaches to their shores or, less nobly, to extract tribute by effecting sea control over commercial routes within their sphere of influence. From the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, the Barbary States of North Africa maintained relatively strong regional navies for commerce raiding against unarmed merchantmen transiting Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. In the same period, shore craft with a single gun conducted commerce raiding in the Caribbean. Piracy remains a common practice today in the waters around Indonesia. Commerce interdiction, a legalistic combination of commerce raiding and commerce protection, is a large component of counterdrug operations in the Caribbean. Offensive guerre de course and commerce raiding. Commerce raiding extends guerre de course from defensive to offensive. Commerce raiding employs hit-and-run tactics to destroy or capture resources at sea or ashore including commercial flows, military logistics, and troop transports. A small navy

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employing these tactics can tie up a large fleet. Gentlemanly cruiser rules and prize rules—providing crews safe passage or even escort to shore—would later be abandoned for unrestricted warfare at sea as practiced by submarines in the world wars—sinking commercial or warships unannounced and without regard for survivors in complete contradiction of international naval conventions. A navy to undergird this strategy is not based on the capital ship. Instead, it is based on a vessel less expensive to build and operate, one that can outrun a ship of the line but defeat lesser ships, one that can be purchased in larger numbers. For several centuries, that ship had been the frigate, combining powerful guns and great speed. The frigate could break blockades established by a great naval power and establish blockades against lesser naval powers. It was a modestly sized warship powerful enough to overcome commercial ships and the small warships that may accompany them or those that populate the navies of lesser powers, and it was fast enough to outmaneuver or outrun the dominant warship of a guerre de main navy. After the age of sail, the light cruiser with big guns and light armor replaced the frigate in this role. The submarine has proven its ability as a commerce raider in both world wars but has not yet been fully exploited in this role, certainly not by the United States. Because of their armament and independence, these smaller ships are ideally suited to hunt the commercial ships carrying the lifeblood of the insular power’s economy. Gunboat diplomacy and power projection ashore. A special variant of commerce raiding is called gunboat diplomacy, the coercive use of force. When capture is more important than destruction, or when firepower is too indiscriminate, marines are sent ashore. Raids and larger expeditionary operations of short duration can also be employed if sufficient land forces are available. “Coercion requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want—worse off not doing what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”1 Gunboat diplomacy, or naval diplomacy, was once accomplished by a heavily gunned sailing frigate in the harbor with a diplomat aboard to negotiate a treaty on terms more favorable than what otherwise might be had. This coercive use of force is no longer solely a naval matter. Long-range precision strike, or standoff warfare, is a coercive use of force possessed in a meaningful sense only by the United States. The destructive capacity of weapons has improved considerably since the age of sail, but there has been no corresponding improvement in the diplomatic arm. When forces are required ashore for expeditionary or sustained operations, navies provide the ability to project power around the world. Landings can be opposed (amphibious assault) or unopposed (administrative). Amphibious assaults were conducted widely throughout the European and Pacific theaters of WWII. General-purpose ground forces (armies) and specialized naval infantry (marines) are transported, landed, sustained, and withdrawn by navies. Ground forces in the Gulf War (1991) were landed administratively in the ports of Saudi Arabia. During the Gulf War, 95 percent of tonnage was delivered by sea. Only a navy can provide the strategic lift for power projection operations.

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The ability to establish secure lines of communications to transport troops and supplies is the domain of an offensive guerre de course navy. A large continental power or a smaller regional power may find that a guerre de course strategy inexpensively meets its security needs. A continental power desiring regional expansion may be served by guerre de course. The United States, during its expansion westward, adopted the guerre de course strategy of a continental power and employed it throughout the Civil War—a war between continental powers. With many characteristics of an insular power— dependence on commerce, separated by oceans from enemies—early America could not afford a guerre de main strategy and a capital-ship navy. Nor did it need such a navy. A Brief History of Guerre de Main Alfred T. Mahan’s 1890, The Influence of Seapower on History2 provides a vision for navies that is still studied today. Although written by an American, it articulates a view held by navalists around the world. It compares in influence with von Clausewitz’s and Jomini’s work on land warfare following the Napoleonic Wars. In fact, Jomini was translated from the French and studied at West Point while young Mahan’s father was an instructor there. Mahan and other naval strategists presume that countries with strong maritime commerce eventually come to war at sea. For them, the primary objective of a navy is to defeat another navy in the main. Mahan advocated powerful ships of the line, concentration of the fleet, and decisive fleet engagements. Commerce protection and forward presence, in contrast, require splitting the fleet into remote squadrons that cannot train in fleet actions. The history of guerre de main is told in the account of decisive fleet actions. Fleet engagements such as those between the English and the Spanish in the sixteenth century were melees. Oil paintings and official histories suggest only a bit more organization than a barroom brawl once the fight had been joined. The evolution of the powerful man-of-war with double and triple decks of big guns favoring the broadside was paralleled by a tactical evolution to a sternto-bow line formation that maximized the broadside’s destructive capacity. Because engagements may occur unexpectedly, the fleet would often travel in its fighting formation—the battle line. The term “ship of the line” dates to this age of armed sailing ships. Following the campaign of the Spanish Armada (1588), tactics were developed to concentrate the firepower of the fleet’s guns on the enemy formation. Concentration was achieved by minimizing the spacing between ships, increasing the firepower and rate of fire of the individual gun, and by stacking guns two and three tiers aboard a ship. Including a less capable ship in the line diluted the desired concentration of firepower. Big fleets of big ships equipped entirely with big guns achieved the ultimate in concentration. Splitting one’s fleet, even briefly, puts both parts at risk because either might be isolated and defeated by what would otherwise have been an inferior fleet.

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The Battle of the Glorious First of June (1794) is the first significant battle at sea that was conducted well beyond the sight of land. Ashore, the French Revolution was at risk of collapse due to widespread shortages and threatened famine. To ameliorate the situation, a convoy of over 130 merchant ships was to embark from the Americas for France with only a handful of French warships to escort it across the Atlantic. The French battle fleet was to sail out from Brest to protect the convoy in the final approach through contested waters. The French admiral had orders not to seek decisive engagement with the English, but rather to assure safe arrival of the convoy. Admiral Lord Richard Howe commanded a similarly sized English fleet of warships. Howe escorted a convoy of merchantmen out of the English Channel to uncontested open waters and then loitered in the area to meet the French fleet. The two battle fleets met against strong odds 400 miles west of Brest. Howe returned home to a hero’s welcome with evidence that the English fleet could slug it out with the powerful French and win. The convoy, however, arrived unscathed in French port only a few days later. The British preference for the decisive fleet engagement over commerce raiding gave them a grand tactical victory but allowed the French to achieve their strategic goal. Perhaps the greatest naval commander of all time, the English Viscount Horatio Nelson, defeated the numerically superior French fleet in the Battle of the Nile in 1798. The defeat began the end of Napoleon’s adventure into Egypt but, more importantly, guaranteed the Mediterranean to the English with strategic effects rippling throughout Europe. In 1805, Lord Nelson encountered the combined French and Spanish fleet off the coast of Portugal and defeated it in the Battle of Trafalgar. The defeat ended Napoleon’s hope of invading England, cost Nelson’s life, and permanently shifted the balance at sea to England, where it stayed until the end of the age of sail. Trafalgar is one of the last great encounters of wooden ships. France was forced to abandon guerre de main in favor of guerre de course, behaving as a proper continental power. Still, the British feared that Napoleon could recover by capturing the Danish fleet. Rather than accept the risk, they sailed into Copenhagen Harbor in August 1807 and demanded surrender of Denmark’s fleet; the Danes refused. The English bombarded the city and seized the ships in what the Danes refer to as the Rape of the Fleet. The American Civil War (1861–1865) brought exploding shells, ironsides, steam power, and torpedoes (static harbor mines). The war lacked decisive engagements at sea, being principally a guerre de course between two continental powers with blockades and significant naval operations conducted far up the commercial artery of the Mississippi River. The Spanish-American War (1898) was one of shore bombardment, amphibious landings, and occupation. Land operations ashore forced the Spanish fleet out of the harbor, where it was attacked by the U.S. fleet in coastal waters off Santiago, Cuba. The Battle of Santiago was interpreted as an early validation of Mahanian thought. Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish force in Manila

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Harbor, not in blue water. The war removed Spanish influence from the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific. Japan’s turn-of-the-century rise to power provided unequivocal evidence of the importance of decisive fleet engagements. At the conclusion of war in 1895, China ceded the Kwantung Peninsula to Japan, but Germany, France, and Russia demanded that it be returned. Japan acquiesced, only to have Russia seize it for itself in 1898 and then occupy Manchuria. Without a declaration of war, Japan launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur at the tip of the Kwantung Peninsula (February 1904), destroying part of Russia’s Pacific Fleet and bottling up the rest, thus initiating the Russo-Japanese War. The remaining ships in Port Arthur attempted a breakout in an attempt to merge with the unmolested fleet at Vladivostok, resulting in the Battle of the Yellow Sea (August 1904). Russia sent its Baltic Fleet halfway around the world in reprisal. Admiral Heihachiro Togo, Japan’s greatest naval hero, met Admiral Rozhdeslvenski’s Baltic Fleet in 1905 in the strait between Japan and Korea. The Battle of Tsushima Strait virtually destroyed the remainder of the Imperial Russian Navy in a single encounter and was interpreted as clear validation of Mahanian thinking. (Togo’s fleet was the first to use naval radio in battle and made extensive use of the globally available Whitehead torpedo.) Three major land battles took place along the extension of the Trans Siberian Railroad to Port Arthur. The defeat of Russia’s navy left the railroad as the only means of sustaining its war effort, and the land war quickly turned in Japan’s favor. The internal revolution Russia had hoped to prevent by uniting the country around a victory put the country in turmoil. The value of these decisive battles at sea was measured in the effects they had on land. The naval arms race between Germany and Great Britain produced two guerre de main navies. Both included the most modern all-big-gun battleship, the dreadnought. The sea battles of 1914 and 1915 between the British and Germans were indecisive. The Battle of Jutland in 1916 was the fleet engagement of World War I. Britain’s Grand Fleet had the German High Seas Fleet blockaded in the North Sea. The battle commenced May 31, 1916, 70 miles off the coast at the mouth of the Baltic between Denmark and Norway. Of the 250 warships, 25 ships were sent to the bottom along with 9,000 men. At the end of the battle, the balance in the North Sea was as before. Both sides had sought a major engagement at sea, but it was strategically inconclusive. From then forward, Germany’s fleet was held in port, sometimes venturing out but unwilling to risk engagement with the British. On February 1, 1917, the Germans began their U-boat war, marking the shift in strategy from guerre de main to guerre de course. Two lessons might be taken from this. First, as had been the case many times in history, a blue-water navy can render a similar navy impotent by blockading (or destroying) it in port. Second, even when the two fleets do engage at sea, a decisive conclusion is not guaranteed. Perhaps it suggests that great fleets are too valuable to risk in battle. The German army bore the brunt of combat

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in WWI after losing prewar budget battles to the navy; the submarine navy and coastal defense forces also suffered under capital-ship dominance. There were relatively few large naval engagements during the age of fighting sail and through the era of the battleship. But as both the Battle of Tsushima Strait and the Battle of the Nile epitomize, a decisive tactical engagement at sea can have immediate and enduring strategic consequences on land. The Battle of the Glorious First of June offers an example of a decisive fleet engagement failing to achieve the desired strategic effect. It also suggests the superiority of meeting a fleet as it leaves or returns to port rather than relying on good fortune and good scouts to bring the fleets together in ocean expanses. The Battle of Jutland offers an example of stalemate and the lack of decisive conclusions to fleet encounters. The Battle of Santiago and the Battle of the Yellow Sea show the potency of joint sea and land operations. A Brief History of Guerre de Course Sustaining a guerre de main strategy is expensive. Only a great economic power can afford it. A lesser economic power cannot hope to compete symmetrically. The asymmetric response—guerre de course—is more affordable and perhaps more effective, attacking the insular power’s weakness, its dependence on commerce by sea. The history of guerre de course is not written as a series of decisive engagements. Instead, it is a story of achieving strategic objectives through prolonged campaigns against commerce that erode the enemy’s ability and will to wage war, attacking the enemy’s weakest point rather than its strongest. Careful readers may wish to relate this to a similar principle in airpower theory—that is, that bombing a country’s industrial base and civilian population will destroy its ability and will to wage war—and to the principle in maneuver warfare theory prescribing attack on weakness. During the American Civil War (1861–1865), both continental powers employed guerre de course. The Union Anaconda Plan was intended to choke the Confederacy by denying it commerce with Europe. The Union blockaded ports and conducted significant naval operations up the Mississippi River, a prominent commercial artery into the interior. The Confederacy also practiced guerre de course after breaking the leaky Union blockade. Captain Raphael Semmes of the Confederate Navy and his Alabama set the standard for commerce raiding at sea. In less than two years, he sank 60 merchantmen without loss of innocent life. Semmes would approach the merchant ship, announce his intentions, and allow the crew to take to the boats before destroying the ship. His methods were considered the model for future warfare. The expressions cruiser rules and prize rules capture the essence of Semmes’s gentlemanly commerce raiding or cruiser warfare as it is sometimes called. Those rules would later be abandoned for unrestricted warfare practiced by submarines in the world wars—sinking logistics, troop, or warships unannounced and without regard for survivors in complete contradiction of international naval conventions.

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The end of the nineteenth century brought a new imperialism to the world scene. Bismarck had unified Germany around Prussia and achieved a balance of power in Europe by diplomatically isolating France and through a series of short, decisive wars. Kaiser Wilhelm II replaced his grandfather and envisioned Germany as a world power, not just a continental power. His weldpolitik elevated the balance between the great European powers from a continental to a global contest. The new imperialism of the European powers was accompanied or driven by the belief that a nation constrained by fixed borders and unable to expand was condemned to death. France could not expand to the north because of the dominant position achieved by Bismarck, and so France’s need for expansion must inevitably lead to competition in the Mediterranean. In opposition to Mahanian thought, Admiral Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile Aube, French minister of marine (1886–1887), was the leading adherent of the guerre de course strategy and the jeune école, literally the young school or new school.3 The jeune école advocated commerce warfare. Aube’s writing on the matter dates to 1873. His earliest writing favors smaller gunboats over the massive ironclads. Along with a preference for smaller boats came a preference for the younger officers who commanded them and a reduction in the number of posts for senior officers. The choice of strategy effects personnel and creates proponent groups from the stakeholders. Admirals trump lieutenants. Aube began with the premise that the navy’s job was to defend French colonial empire against England. His strategy was guerre de course with preservation of empire as its ends and ruthless commerce destruction on the high seas and coastal defense to prevent landing of an army as its ways. Against England and Germany, Aube proposed coastal defense and concentration. Italy joined the enemy list because it lay on the route between France and its empire in the Levant. Italy had no commerce to destroy, blockade of its coastline was an intractable proposition, and the only option remaining was to attack its coastal cities. The old school would undergird this strategy with battleships, cruisers, and static mines. The means employed by the jeune école would include torpedo boats, gunboats, cruisers, and a mother ship. The 100-foot torpedo boats and gunboats proved unseaworthy in experiments, leaving the strategy inadequately supported by means. The technology of the times strongly influenced Aube’s thinking. Railroads allowed an army to relocate quickly to oppose a landing. The need to concentrate the force—the army by railroad and the navy by steam propulsion—could be transmitted electronically. A dispersed steam navy could operate independently and concentrate at a designated place and time when summoned. Aube stopped work on four battleships begun in 1880 to concentrate on cheaper methods, including cruisers and torpedo boats. Aube’s successors, however, restarted the battleship program in 1887. Decisive engagement of two powerful navies at sea is an example of perfect war. Ships and sailors are combatants. The lives of innocents are not directly involved. But Aube, and many of his contemporaries, saw war as the negation

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of law and rejected the notion of perfect war. Commercial shipping and coastal populations were legitimate targets. Aube accurately predicted the nature of future naval operations. His asserted that “the weakest fleet would rest in its bases and refuse combat; the stronger would be forced to do the same for the torpedo; the only real activity would be commercial warfare; that would be absolutely merciless.”4 Although his small boats were inadequate, Aube’s predictions were borne out in WWI. The Tirpitz navy had been so wedded to Mahanian thought that Germany was unprepared for warfare at sea after the indecision at Jutland. When Germany initiated its U-boat war, it had to learn in wartime what France had learned over three decades of experimentation and development. A more balanced prewar navy may have served Germany better and left more resources for its continental army. Even the Atlantic theater of WWII was productively prosecuted by guerre de course navies, including German U-boat operations (commerce raiding) to strangle Britain and the opposing Allied convoy escort operations (commerce protection) so vital to victory. In the Pacific, after U.S. battleships were destroyed in the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, the only option immediately available was for the few available aircraft carriers to conduct raids against shore (including the Doolittle raid on Tokyo), and for an unprepared submarine force to conduct commerce raiding against Japanese shipping. Even allowing for initial unpreparedness, U.S. submarines are credited with the majority of Japanese tonnage lost at sea. A more balanced prewar navy may have better served America’s needs for convoy escort, strategic lift, and amphibious assault in the Atlantic theater and commerce raiding against a vulnerable insular power in the Pacific theater. The Strategic Choice Guerre de main has as its objective the destruction of the enemy fleet in decisive battle—strength against strength, a clash of titans, and decision at sea. The words repeated most often in discussing a guerre de main navy are “mass” and “concentration.” A guerre de main navy abhors a geographically distributed fleet, and it abhors a weak ship. The ship is measured side by side against a ship of its own kind and concentrates both lethality and survivability in one platform. In the era of the battleship, lethality was provided by big guns, and survivability was provided by heavy armor. In the era of carrier aviation, a carrier’s lethality is provided by its aircraft’s munitions, and its survivability is provided by its aircraft’s range. The carrier itself provides mobility. Guerre de course, in contrast, seeks to cripple the enemy through commerce warfare—pitting strength against weakness, death by a thousand cuts. A guerre de course navy favors distributed operations; it abhors concentration that might risk a traumatic loss in a single engagement. It seeks a ship that is powerful only in a relative sense, often being strong relative to unarmed merchantmen. Its measure of lethality against merchant ships is firepower, while

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its measure of survivability against capital ships is speed. But technology has changed the equation. Today’s guerre de course ship must have speed relative not to the battleship but relative to missiles and the carrier’s planes. Therefore, it must derive its survivability from some attribute other than speed. The modern analogue to the copper-bottomed, fast frigate is the attack submarine, its survivability provided by stealth. Choosing between the two strategies is often settled on economic terms. It is not an either-or choice, but rather a decision to choose a fleet flexible enough to adapt as the situation demands. The U.S. Navy faces no competitors today, and the maintenance of a capital-ship navy consumes resources that could be applied elsewhere. Maintaining such a navy is expensive; not maintaining one is risky. The high cost of entry makes the rise of a peer competitor unlikely or, at worst, a slow, costly, and easily observed process.5 U.S. NAVAL PROGRESSION THROUGH THE COLD WAR For most of America’s early history, it vacillated between the desire to have no navy at all and maintaining a guerre de course navy. Early advocates for a capital-ship navy were vocal but always in the minority. But the balance was shifting toward guerre de main as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth. The U.S. Navy’s contribution to WWI was technologically and industrially significant but minimal in actual combat at sea. A guerre de main strategy and pursuit of a capital-ship navy centered on battleships left the Navy unprepared for WWII, just as it had been for WWI. The aviation and submarine branches were subordinated to, not coequal with, surface warfare and the “gun club” of battleship captains and admirals. As in World War I, the U.S. contribution to the war in the Atlantic was convoy escort (commerce protection). During the largest amphibious landings in history, the Navy provided strategic lift, commerce protection, fire support ashore, and sustainment. The early and persistent response in the Pacific theater was commerce raiding: air raids against land and raiding at sea by submarine; war termination came after bombing large population centers— unrestricted warfare. The Navy supported innumerable amphibious landings, mostly to capture air and seaports. The Pacific was the site of the largest fleet actions in history. Favoring the capital ship for fleet engagements, the Navy repeatedly has been unprepared for imperfect war and for limited war. It has been repeatedly unprepared for commerce protection, blue-water escort duty, and small-boat, brown-water operations close to shore. A Guerre de Course Strategy and a Frigate Navy During and after the Revolutionary War, American naval operations were directed toward coastal defense and commerce raiding. Early in U.S. history, the navies of the individual states undertook the mission of coastal and harbor

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defense. The American colonies maintained a mosquito fleet for attacking and seizing ordnance and stores ships. This era saw several great naval powers— the British, German, Dutch, and French. During the siege of Boston, General George Washington reminded his commanders, “The Design is to intercept the Enemy’s supplies, not to look for the Enemy’s Armed Vessels.”6 Beyond the defensive, John Paul Jones took the fight to British settlements on the Gulf Coast and to the British homeland for strategic effect. After conducting operations on British soil in 1778, Jones said, “Not all their boasted navy can protect their own coast, and that the scene of distress which they have occasioned in America may soon be brought home to their own shores.”7 The situation in the twenty-first century has been reversed. The competition with Britain continued well beyond the Revolutionary War. The English fleet once guaranteed the colonies’ ships safe passage in the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates; the guarantee ended as the colonies declared independence from their guarantor. For America to fend for itself, Secretary of War Henry Knox promoted the purchase of six ships, copper bottomed for speed, to raid and harass rather than to fight Britain’s ships of the line. “Fight any ship of your class, even the largest; run free when you have to; be ready to sally forth and pounce at will.”8 For two decades following the signing of the Constitution, the new country had a strong preference for a frigate navy that could outsail more powerful ships and outfight the rest. When the Navy Department was established in 1798, its first secretary, Benjamin Stoddert (1798–1801), was a strong proponent for a ship-of-theline navy. He argued for a dozen ships comparable to Britain’s most powerful, carrying 74 guns each, and misrepresented them to Congress as defensive weapons. Six of Stoddert’s dozen ships of the line were authorized in March 1806, but their construction was delayed while the frigate navy fought the Barbary Wars (1801–1807). Hostilities continued between Britain and France throughout the Barbary Wars. The great Battle of Trafalgar (1805) shifted the balance in the Atlantic to Britain, removed the American option to balance by alliance with France, ended Napoleon’s hope of invading England, and forced France to adopt a guerre de course strategy. The fleet action at Trafalgar and the Rape of the Fleet (1807) had strong effects on U.S. congressional thinking as well. Having 6 or having 12 of Stoddert’s 74-gun ships would be no more useful than having none; dozens of 74s would be needed to compete with Britain. The congressional conclusion was that ships of the line are for offense, not for defense, and that they provoke great powers. Frigates, on the other hand, overwhelm minor powers and harass major powers; gunboats defend coasts and harbors. Congress asked the hard question, “a navy for what?” and the answer dictated appropriations over the objections of those favoring ships of the line. In 1807, as U.S. and British relations degenerated on the road to the War of 1812, the U.S. frigate navy withdrew from the Mediterranean to the American coast. In May 1812, Secretary of Navy Paul Hamilton called

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for a plan of operations for the coming war. Commodore John Rodgers proposed a concentration of America’s ships, a squadron, to sail far from American shores. Commodore Stephan Decatur, Rodgers’s junior, argued for the strategy adopted by the French after Trafalgar. Frigates would sail alone, or perhaps in pairs, far from shore and well supplied for extended operations. Captains would sail without detailed instructions, giving maximum emphasis to their individual enterprise. Single ships, Decatur argued, would be strong enough to overpower any convoy. The probability of a frigate encountering a stronger enemy force would be lower than that of a squadron, and, if the encounter did occur, only a single ship would be lost rather than the bulk of the U.S. fleet concentrated in a single squadron. Both Decatur and Rodgers theorized that U.S. ships in distant waters would draw British warships away from U.S. harbors, easing the effects of blockade. The British had not withdrawn from North America after the American Revolutionary War ended in 1783. They maintained a presence along the Great Lakes and allied with the Indians in the western frontiers. During the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803– 1815), France dominated the European continent and Britain dominated the seas. Commerce rivalries, blockade against U.S. shipping, and boarding of American ships and impressment of sailors into British naval service continued to entangle the United States in Europe’s turmoil. To save American honor and alter Britain’s policies, a hawkish Congress proposed attacking Britain’s forces in Canada. Three uncoordinated land attacks in 1812 conducted by unprepared forces all ended in failure. More failures followed in 1813. Oliver Hazard Perry defeated a superior British fleet on Lake Erie (September 1813). The defeat rendered the British army’s position in Michigan and Ohio untenable. The British countered by mounting a diversion in Chesapeake Bay, to enter the Hudson River from Lake Champlain and sever New England from the Union, and to capture New Orleans and block commerce along the Mississippi River. The diversion on the Chesapeake resulted in the burning of government buildings in the new U.S. capital (August 1814). In September 1814, U.S. naval forces under Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough defeated the British on Lake Champlain. Britain’s great army commander, Lord Wellington, recommended that the government agree to a treaty with the United States. General Andrew Jackson’s famed defensive victory at New Orleans came after the Treaty of Ghent had already ended the war. The fleet actions in the Great Lakes region could have been interpreted in more than one way. One interpretation would have been to draw attention to the vulnerability of a country like Britain conducting military and naval operations thousands of miles from its sustaining base. Another interpretation would be to buttress the argument of those who favored decisive fleet actions and a guerre de main navy. The former interpretation had no constituency in America, and the latter did. The latter interpretation prevailed.

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The War of 1812 over, problems in the Mediterranean once again came to the fore. A squadron and a 74-gun ship of the line prepared to sail under the command of William Bainbridge. The aggressive Decatur acted more quickly and with a squadron of nine ships set sail with the American consul general aboard his flagship, a 44-gun frigate. Decatur captured a 46-gun Algerine frigate inside Gibraltar in June 1815 and anchored in Tripoli’s harbor. He offered the dey a choice of accepting a treaty without tribute or having his navy seized and his capital city bombarded. Decatur continued along the coast “negotiating” outcomes favorable to the United States and Europe. The issue of tribute was not resolved by decisive fleet action, nor by commerce raiding, but through coercive diplomacy at the point of a gun. Hagan offers this as the beginning of America’s “golden age of gunboat diplomacy.”9 President James Monroe (1817–1825) and his secretary of state John Quincy Adams were the architects of a new naval policy for an era of hemispheric expansion. The means included coastal fortifications and floating gun batteries in home waters and a few ships of the line to drive off enemy blockades and to allow frigates and lesser ships to escape for commerce raiding. Monroe unleashed a campaign against commerce raiding that cleared Spain’s Caribbean islands of pirates in less than two years (1821–1823). Adams succeeded Monroe as president (1825–1829) and continued clearing the Gulf of Mexico of buccaneering. Piracy flourished in the Caribbean and Gulf for three centuries under nominal Spanish sovereignty, but by 1826, the region had become safe for commerce. In the context of Manifest Destiny, and precipitated by the Texas War of Independence (1835–1836), the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) resulted in the acquisition of much of the southwest United States. The Texas War of Independence was fought with mostly European tactics employing infantry, cavalry, and artillery in a series of big land battles. The opening battle of the Mexican-American War took place on April 25, 1846, over contested land in Texas. The Pacific Squadron seized Monterey and San Francisco in July 1846 and Los Angeles in August, but the Mexicans did not retire from the war, quickly throwing U.S. forces out of Los Angeles. A third land force marched to California from Kansas. Army-navy squabbling easily could have lost California. Rather than an overland march to capture Mexico City, General Winfield Scott conducted the largest amphibious landing in history. Scott landed 12,000 men near Vera Cruz on the Gulf coast of Mexico (March 1847) to prosecute a land campaign that included a 260-mile march on Mexico City. The resulting Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (February 1848) ceded Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and California to the United States. Naval operations during the American Civil War (1861–1865)10 tell three stories. Perhaps the most important story is one of industry and commerce. In terms of technological change, it is the story of the end of the armed sailing frigate, the first contest between ironclad gunboats, heavy shot giving way to exploding shell, and the torpedo (static mine). Almost all navy actions were within sight of land, with the typical operation being a joint water and

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land operation. Neither navy was of any account at the beginning of the war. Only the North was able to mount a meaningful building program. And the Union strategy, implemented under the name of the Anaconda Plan, was one of coastal blockade and strangulation that denied the Confederacy the revenues of its agricultural products and brought England’s textile industry to its knees. The Mississippi River was a “sea-lane” vital to commerce and was the site of significant naval operations. In early 1862, army-navy operations were conducted up the Mississippi in Tennessee and Missouri. Only the Battle of New Orleans could qualify as a purely navy operation, and even that was followed by an army occupation of New Orleans. The Transition to Guerre de Main and Concentration of the Fleet For the United States, 1898 to 1918 was a period of transformation from guerre de course to guerre de main.11 The strategy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was one of commerce raiding and coastal defense against stronger naval powers and commerce raiding and coastal offense against weaker naval powers—the strategy followed by a continental power. The strategy emerging for the twentieth century was the strategy of an insular power, one based on ships of the line, fleet engagements, and command of the seas. After the Civil War, the 1870s’ Congress did not dissolve the navy as it had after the Revolutionary War. It returned the navy to its prewar role of guarding overseas enterprise.12 The Navy was almost at bottom in size and prestige and was struggling with the transition from sail to steam, including the acceptance of engineers as officers. The mid-1880s began the transformation to a British-like navy. A new age of European imperialism closed markets to the United States, and Germany began a naval arms race with Britain. The United States had to rethink its position and adopt an appropriate strategy. The dominant naval thinking in the last decade of the nineteenth century was expressed by Alfred T. Mahan and championed by Theodore Roosevelt.13 The Spanish-American War (1898) was an inherently joint sea-land operation. Battleships were used primarily for blockade and not for fleet engagement at sea. The Battle of Santiago was the result of a land campaign that applied pressure to force the Spanish fleet out of its protective harbor, where it was defeated close to shore by the waiting U.S. navy. Some Spanish ships ran aground. Rather than learn the lesson of joint operations, the battle in coastal waters was interpreted as validation of Mahanian thought. In Manila Harbor, Commodore George Dewey defeated the Spanish navy, but an American army of occupation was not available, giving a Filipino insurgent movement time to ripen. Once the Army arrived, the Navy departed and left the Army to contend with the insurgency. The Spanish-American War changed America’s position in the world—Spain was gone from the Caribbean, the Philippines, and Guam—and it cemented the shift from guerre de course to guerre de main.

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Before America’s entry into World War I, the official Navy position was for a navy larger than the combined navies of Britain, Germany, and Japan— a three-power navy. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921), argued for a navy second to none—at least a one-power navy. The Senate was willing to pay for a navy that was second best, second only to Great Britain. The Battle of Jutland showed the potency of the dreadnought. The inconclusiveness of the battle, however, was apparently ignored, and the United States embarked on a massive capital-ship building campaign. When Germany shifted to commerce raiding after Jutland, the U.S. Navy was unprepared for commerce protection and anti-submarine warfare. All work on battleships and heavy cruisers was halted during the war to allow the industrial base to concentrate on lighter ships for convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare.14 “The American Navy’s part in the World War was not rich in direct physical contact with the enemy.”15 The U.S. Navy’s role was convoy escort, with scores of destroyers escorting hundreds of cargo and troop ships against German U-boats. Although the engagement of two powerful guerre de main navies of capital ships proved indecisive in 1916, the guerre de course navy of German submarines was successfully starving Britain. Allied convoy escort forced the U-boat to come to the destroyer rather than sending the destroyer to find the elusive submarine. Significant contributions were made through technological innovation and manufacturing prowess. One example is provided by the “splinter boat” subchasers. A simple 110-foot, three-engine, three-screw, wooden boat was armed with a depth-charge gun and a three-inch conventional gun and was fitted with two other American innovations. Hydrophones were put aboard that could detect submerged U-boats, and radiophones were added for communications between the boats. Operating in threes to triangulate, the splinter boats proved formidable sub hunters in the Channel and Mediterranean.16 No American battleship fired a shot in anger during WWI.17 After the submarine threat was neutralized, the United States returned to construction of capital ships. The war was a distraction from the quest to acquire a capitalship navy. Armistice was declared on November 11, 1918. War termination was accompanied by a Chautauqua of conferences in Paris, London, and Washington, which resulted in a host of treaties and the League of Nations. German crews scuttled their own ships interred at Britain’s Scapa Flow ( January 1919). The international community was not willing to accept responsibility for freedom or neutrality of the seas, perpetuating the vacuum to be filled by the major powers on a self-help basis. Unrestricted warfare was prohibited and the stage was set for unpreparedness in the next war.18 By 1921 the gun club was firmly in charge of the U.S. Navy. The terms ship of the line and line-of-battle ships gave way to capital ship, a designation formally used in the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1921–1922 that encompassed both battleships and battle cruisers. The designation only later was applied to aircraft carriers. Lesser continental powers had

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greater interest in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—auxiliary combatants. Treaties governed both the size of the signatories’ fleets and the ratio between their fleets. The U.S. Navy was required to sink or scrap 28 battleships. The conference broke the Anglo-Japanese alliance. With the Panama Canal open, Navy Secretary Daniels divided the fleet between Atlantic and Pacific ports. In December 1922, the Atlantic fleet contained old and weak ships, while the more modern and powerful ships were under command of the Battle Fleet in the Pacific. Still, the Mahanian argument, championed by Admiral William S. Sims, president of the Naval War College, was to concentrate into a single great fleet. Prior to America’s entry into World War II, Germany used its battleships as commerce raiders against merchant ships, a huge overmatch. The pocket battleships, small and within treaty limits, were also employed in this role. After Germany’s continental victory over France, four powerful French battleships were harbored in the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kebir. The British issued an ultimatum to the defeated French, but the French refused in 1940 as the Danes had refused in 1807. The British succeeded in sinking three of the four rather than see them in German hands. The British sent the carrierbased Swordfish—a single-propeller, slow- and low-flying biplane suited to long patrols and submarine hunting—after the modern Italian battleships in Taranto Harbor. The battleship was on its way out. A lucky air-delivered torpedo (again by Swordfish) hit on the Bismarck’s rudder and rendered the ship indefensible to British surface ships (May 1941). Churchill sent land-based bombers with huge 12,000-pound bombs after the remaining German battleships, including Bismarck’s sister ship, the Tirpitz. The vulnerability of surface gunships to carrier-based and land-based aviation was demonstrated beyond any doubt. For the United States, operations in the Atlantic from 1941 to 1945 were a replay of WWI, with commerce raiding German U-boats practicing unrestricted warfare and Allied convoy escorts providing commerce protection. WWI U-boat operations had been seen as “an aberration rather than a precedent;” following the war, the United States returned to building a capitalship navy and was unprepared for the return of guerre de course.19 The WWII Allied convoy system and organization was created from scratch, having been lost after WWI. The unglamorous convoy escort war in the WWII Atlantic was strategic and decisive.20 The navy that underwrites this element of power may be unglamorous, but if left unattended renders irrelevant the nation’s industrial capacity and military might. Guerre de course also played a prominent role in the Pacific. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor removed from action 8 battleships and 21 other ships on December 7, 1941. Two British battleships, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, soon sortied from Singapore but were attacked and sunk by Japanese land-based aviation. The two carriers delivering aircraft to Wake and Midway Islands, and the one battleship in California, were spared. The raid on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war. The battleship option

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removed, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, having seen the effectiveness of U-boat operations in the Atlantic, immediately ordered “unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan.” The only immediate recourse was to launch hit-and-run air raids from carriers and to use submarines as commerce raiders, but the Navy was unprepared for this form of warfare.21 Congress suspended and then canceled the Montana-class battleship (super dreadnought) program in June 1942. The unpreparedness began with the Mahanian assumption that the enemy’s capital ships were the principal objective. The battleship being the centerpiece of fleet engagements, submarines were used in a supporting role to screen and scout for the battle group. When directed to the offense, tankers delivering oil to resource poor but heavily industrial Japan became the principal targets. As commerce raiders, submariners were severely hampered by the lack of prewar strategy,22 tactics,23 and experimentation with torpedoes.24 The unpreparedness took two years of fleet action to repair. Older, more conservative captains were reassigned. Younger, more aggressive, risk-taking commanders were appointed and the spirit of the independent-sailing frigate captain was revived. In addition to merchantmen, submarines also sank 1 battleship, 8 aircraft carriers, and 11 cruisers. Approximately 55 percent of Japanese losses were inflicted by submarine.25 The Navy’s submarine force and all service aviation could have been employed for a guerre de course strategy against Japan, an island nation with great industrial output entirely dependent on resources from the co-prosperity sphere it hoped to conquer. The British, in fact, had earlier planned a submarine force to bottle up the Japanese fleet in port until the big navy could arrive.26 Prior to the war, a guerre de course strategy was proposed against resource-poor Japan by Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell.27 The WWII Pacific theater saw guerre de main in the extreme. The Battle of Coral Sea (May 4–8, 1942) marked the turning point in naval warfare where fleets engaged beyond visual range through the long-range bomb-carrying aircraft of the carrier. The Battle for Midway (June 3–6, 1942) was a turning point in the Pacific war, with the United States shifting to the offense. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (November 12–13, 1942) saw the first application of radar-carrying battleships to night warfare and forced the rapid relocation of command from the bridge to the internal command information center (CIC) that exists today. The Marianas campaign provided the largest naval aviation battle of the war, downing almost 350 Japanese aircraft in eight hours ( June 19, 1944) and bringing an end to the Imperial Navy’s air arm. The Battle for Leyte Gulf (October 25–26, 1944) is the largest naval battle in history and the last battleship-on-battleship fight. From this point forward, the Japanese navy was relegated to an “auxiliary” and Allied forces moved to the offense with the Navy projecting air and land forces ashore. Spector said, “the fighting methods which were to spell the downfall of Japan had come of age in the seas and beaches of the Gilberts and Marshalls. Those methods were the coordinated amphibious assault and fast carrier warfare.

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Backed by the awesome industrial output of the United States, they were to prove unstoppable.”28 The Navy developed other capabilities that French Admiral Aube would recognize immediately. A squadron of 12 small boats could approach a much larger ship at 60 knots, fire 48 torpedoes in five seconds, and run.29 These mosquito boats are reminiscent of the splinter boats built to chase submarines in World War I. “At the end of World War II, not a single combatant ship in the United States Navy was used for the purpose for which it was designed.” The most obvious changes were the role reversals between the carrier and the battleship: the supported became the supporting. The submarine defensively supporting the battleship in fleet engagements by screening and scouting took on independent, offensive missions against commerce flows. The big-gun battleship was the centerpiece of every great navy upon entry to WWII. The war in the Atlantic was one of troop and supply convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare, guerre de course rather than guerre de main. The British fleet had essentially cleared the Mediterranean of German and Italian ships and submarines prior to the arrival of the U.S. Navy, which could then concentrate on supporting the Allied amphibious operations in North Africa, Italy, and southern France. Even though the majority of Japanese shipping was destroyed in guerre de course operations conducted by submarines, the war in the Pacific was the scene of the largest naval battles in history, guerre de main in the extreme. The U.S. Army’s glory days were in the last year of mechanized warfare on the European continent, while the Navy’s were in the Pacific defeating a first-rate naval power at sea. One should not underestimate the effect on either institution of their mammoth achievements while the world watched. Postwar Planning without a Foe The years immediately following the world wars have enough in common with the years immediately following the Cold War to deserve some attention. All three of these periods left planners without a specific threat to provide focus. In each case, planners had great difficulty in justifying their needs, regardless of their service. Neither reorganization of U.S. forces nor the possible United Nations’ force affected navy planning.30 The view that the enemy of a navy was another navy caused post-WWII navy planners to initially ignore Russia as a threat. Russia had no navy. Russia had inadequate access to year-round warm-water ports. Instead, planning focused on Germany and Japan. They had powerful navies in the past, and would undoubtedly rebuild them in the future. Subsequent plans put Britain in the role of potential enemy because of the Mahanian belief that commercial rivals will eventually engage in war. The first postwar plan had neither strategic concept nor particular enemy. No threat or even type of threat was identified. The Navy was to

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be a worldwide—excluding the Indian Ocean—peacekeeping force. Other plans, simply stated, were to not decommission any aircraft carriers or to not give up anything that was built or captured. An identified foe gives focus to war planners. Without a foe, where does a planner turn for intellectual guidance? As the Navy was planning its new structure, it distributed official policy against “public announcements, other than praise, about any type of naval force.” Publicly stating that carriers were more important than battleships, for example, would denigrate those sailors who had served and sacrificed. Moreover, other services could use any official negative comment against the Navy in budget wars, and public support would erode. The Navy would not openly debate the issues. The United States Naval Institute Proceedings had fostered open debate across the ranks since 1873 and the capacity for selfexamination and open debate had survived until 1941, but that capacity had been lost by war’s end.31 Stated national policy also made naval planning more difficult. The Yalta Conference of February through December 1945 stressed Russian cooperation, not competition. Secretary of Navy Forrestal, however, thought Russia was the new threat as early as September 1944. Based on Forrestal’s opinion, the Navy planned on the Soviet threat without discussion with the president, the State Department, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Official U.S. foreign policy was friendship with Russia. The Navy couldn’t claim its preferred enemy. Even assuming that Russia was a potential enemy, Senator David Walsh, a Navy supporter, said Russia was not a sea threat and was not particularly vulnerable to attack by sea or by air. How can a guerre-de-main navy justify itself against an enemy lacking a navy? Because guerre de main sees the enemy of a navy as another navy, the institutional navy’s goal since 1889 has been to build a navy second to none. Because of the belief that massed battle at sea is decisive, the measure of a navy is its capital ships. In WWI, the Navy calculated the number of capital ships it needed based on the number of enemy capital ships. One postWWII Navy plan calculated the size of the navy to be twice that of the sum of all other navies. A real navy fights navies, and an honorable navy does not attack commerce. The shift from Atlantic to Pacific after victory in Europe was a critical turning point in U.S. Navy culture. Few officers retired during the early years of the war. But because of the Europe-first strategy, victory in Europe marked the time when non-aviation admirals in the Atlantic were allowed to retire, and aviators were transferred to the Pacific. But planning at headquarters was still dominated by surface ship admirals. Early plans for the postwar navy, constructed after victory in Europe and during the Pacific campaigns, looked like a scaled down wartime navy. Aviators began to dominate as WWII came to an end. In the first postwar promotion of Regular Navy line captains to flag rank, 14 of the 18 newly appointed admirals were aviators. Other events began to shift the center from

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the battleship navy to the carrier navy. Artemus Gates, prominent industrialist and WWI Navy air hero, was appointed assistant secretary of the navy. Navy Secretary Forrestal was a WWI naval aviator as well. Two aviators who had distinguished themselves in the Pacific were appointed to the number one and two positions at the Naval Academy at Annapolis in July 1945. It marked the first time an aviator had held either of these prestigious positions. These aviators raised the next generation of midshipmen. Submariners also rose in prominence. Like aviators, they relied on emerging technology and were opposed to surface-ship dominance. Although the number of submarine flag officers was relatively stable throughout WWII and beyond, those admirals were in command of submarine forces, not in top Navy Department positions. They began to find their way into the senior decision-making bureaucracy only after the Korean War. At one point, navy aviators said they could make no more planning progress until the general mission of aviation within the Navy was made clear. They deferred to the institution. The end result was a new balance struck between surface, aviation, and submarine warfare officers. The Navy adjusted internally. But the events of WWII and the efforts of Forrestal assured the progression to domination by the air branch. Today’s navy is as dominated by aviators as the prewar navy was dominated by the gun club. Internationalism and Dispersal of the Fleet James V. Forrestal is perhaps second only to Mahan in influencing Navy strategic thinking. The preeminent position attained by the Navy in WWII and the unsettled relationship with the Soviet Union both allowed and required a new strategy. Rather than Mahan’s hemispherism and fleet concentration near the coasts, Navy Secretary Forrestal (1944–1947) advocated internationalism and worldwide dispersal. He believed the navy should be at sea, around the globe, prepared to act anywhere on short notice. In the event of a threat to the homeland, Forrestal’s widely distributed force, like Mahan’s, would join and concentrate to defeat the enemy navy at sea. Congress and the American public wanted to believe the Air Force’s claim that it could not only end wars, it could prevent them. Congress acted on that belief in April 1949 by funding the Air Force’s B-36 strategic bomber program and canceling construction of the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, the United States. That sequence of actions spawned what has been called the revolt of the admirals.32 The Navy argued that strategic bombers were of value only in all-out nuclear war and that the United States would need a broad range of options rather than the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. This view was adopted a decade later by the Kennedy administration. During the Korean War (1950–1953), the large, modern Midway-class carriers were on the Atlantic coast and in the Mediterranean as Cold War deterrents against the Soviets; the smaller, older Essex-class carriers supported the hot war in Korea. From the Mount McKinley command ship on September 11,

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1950, MacArthur commanded the amphibious assault at Inchon that turned the tide of the war by cutting off the North Koreans’ supply and forcing them to withdraw. Following a less successful operation on the east coast of the peninsula, the Navy withdrew 105,000 troops in December 1950. The “pattern of logistical support, gunfire and carrier air cover of the Allied ground troops, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and blockade of the enemy coast” characterized navy operations in the Korean conflict.33The Korean conflict demonstrated that strategic bombardment could neither prevent war nor end it. The Air Force had put so much stock in strategic bombardment that it had neither the aircraft nor the tactics to fight a war of limited objectives. In contrast, both the Navy and Marine Corps had focused on the tactical uses of aircraft and were better prepared. Tactical carrier-based naval aviation was vindicated and a new round of carrier construction began.34 President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a staunch fiscal conservative with the pre-WWII American distaste for a standing military that, by imposing a large drag on the economy, could destroy what it was intended to protect. Ike inherited a nuclear monopoly, and he used that monopoly and the threat of massive retaliation to keep the Soviet Union at bay while pursuing limited U.S. interests. Beneath that umbrella, he used carriers and marines to affect gunboat diplomacy against lesser powers. But America’s nuclear monopoly did not last. The Kennedy campaign included the allegation that when confronted by the Soviet Union, the United States could only go nuclear or acquiesce. Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara wanted a more flexible response that could be calibrated to conditions. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations built a more balanced force of strategic nuclear forces for total war, general-purpose forces for conventional warfare and wars of limited objectives, and special forces for unconventional warfare and low-intensity conflict. Having the means to respond to all levels of conflict would prove too tempting. During the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 18–29, 1962), the Navy prevented the delivery, and monitored the removal, of offensive Soviet missiles. The Navy, a deep-blue navy, had lost the age-old guerre de course skill of boarding and searching ships. Coast Guard personnel were required. The quarantine force was made of smaller ships for commerce interdiction and anti-submarine warfare, including the WWII-era small-deck carriers. Larger carriers remained on patrol around the world or took up station beyond the shipping lanes to provide air support in case Cuban forces attacked Guantanamo. The Navy has been accused of provoking or providing the excuse for war. The unexplained sinking of the Maine at Havana led to declaration of war against Spain in 1898, and questionable events off the coast of Vietnam led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson broad authority to wage war. The initial response was a 64-ship air strike against bases ashore that resulted in the first prisoner of war. Task Force 77 of two carriers grew to four and five carriers. From Yankee Station, carrier aviation

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contributed to the bombardment of North Vietnam, requiring penetration of unprecedented ground-based air defenses. From Dixie Station, it provided tactical air support to ground forces in South Vietnam. The Navy also conducted commerce interdiction operations—guerre de course, stop and seize—along the coast and up the Mekong River Delta. The blue-water navy was unprepared; equipment and methods had to be created in situ. Operation Market Time interdicted supplies along the coast. Destroyers were too deep draft to patrol the coast, and U.S. Coast Guard shallow-draft patrol boats were deployed. Commercially available shallow-draft aluminum boats used to transport oil riggers in the Gulf of Mexico were adapted as Navy “swift boats.” Operation Game Warden took commerce interdiction up the Mekong River. Commercially available fiberglass, shallow-draft, pleasure boats were weaponized to patrol rivers. The Delta was a hostile environment, and ambushes were common. Lives were lost while equipment and tactics were developed. The Army and Navy later formed a Mobile Riverine Force and conducted joint operations in the Delta reminiscent of Civil War operations up the Mississippi River.35 Vice Admiral Elmo Zumwalt took command of Navy forces in Vietnam in September 1968. During the 1960s, while the United States was distracted by the Vietnam conflict, the Soviets began building a blue-water navy, but in the late 1970s it reverted to a navy as a coastal adjunct. Congress diverted modernization funding to operations in Vietnam. To a U.S. navy in decay, the Soviet navy looked menacing. Aviators dominated the Navy and protected carriers. Admiral Hyman Rickover, the powerful champion of the nuclear navy, protected submarines. The surface navy suffered most. Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt (1970–1974), a surface warfare officer, proposed an operational concept to counter the Soviet navy. His navy had two distinct missions: (1) to keep seas open for commercial and military traffic and (2) to project power.36 His navy would be based on the familiar concept of a high-low mix. A carrier battle group would form around one or more large-deck carriers to constitute the high end, and a surface action group formed around three to seven sea control ships would constitute the low end. The sea control ship is a small-deck carrier carrying helicopters for antisubmarine warfare and short-takeoff-and-landing fixed-wing jets for land attack and air defense. In times of relative peace, two carrier battle groups could keep station in the deep-blue Pacific and Atlantic. A larger number of surface action groups would deploy into the littoral—including the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and the various contentious straits—providing low-cost forward presence and sea control. In times of minor conflict, the surface action group acts as the forward element and first responder for gunboat diplomacy. More than one could provide additional support to an amphibious ready group with embarked marines. A large-deck carrier could be on station soon if necessary. When the contest was between major powers, the carrier battle groups and the surface action groups would trade places. The carriers move to where

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they are needed to project power. A second carrier battle group can join the first for greater concentration if warranted. More would come out of training workups to move forward. The surface action groups would move to deep water or contested straits to provide convoy escort or selectively take up position to provide blockade or increased anti-submarine warfare support to the carrier. The small sea control ships did not find favor with industry, nuclear power advocates, Congress, or naval aviators. The SCS program survived, but it grew into today’s amphibious carrier at over twice its original size.37 Ronald Reagan’s influential Secretary of the Navy John Lehman set as his objective a 600-ship navy and almost succeeded. Lehman wanted a large navy based on capital ships—large-deck carriers and battleships. The intelligence community argued that the Soviet Union was a continental power, not an insular or maritime power, and that the Soviets had a largely defensive guerre de course strategy and navy. They had a very brief flirtation with a guerre de main navy and found it too expensive and not complementary to their continental interests. The Soviets, however, had made a significant investment in ballistic missile submarines to threaten the United States with nuclear weapons. The correct response from the United States was an investment in anti-submarine warfare and countermine warfare, argued Lehman’s advisors. Budget and personnel analysts argued that even if a 600-ship navy could be built, it could not be sustained with financial and personnel resources. Lehman, like Kaiser Wilhelm II, wanted a large navy first and looked second for an operational concept to justify it. The afterthought strategy was to open an additional front by attacking the Soviet homeland from the north, ostensibly tying up continental forces that could not participate elsewhere on the Eurasian landmass. The Navy provided commerce protection during the Iran-Iraq war (1980– 1988). Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged as U.S. vessels and small surface ships were sent into the Persian Gulf to provide armed escort. The frigate Stark was hit by an Iraqi air-launched missile (May 1987). Samuel B. Roberts, sister ship to Stark, hit an Iranian mine (April 1988) and had to be hauled back to the United States. Large-deck aircraft carriers would not enter the Gulf to provide greater combat power, and the cruiser Vincennes was sent instead. The Aegis-equipped cruiser was designed to operate in threes in open waters providing air defense for the carrier, not to operate independently in confined waters. An Iranian gunboat harassing merchant traffic fired on the Vincennes and, with tensions high, the Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian passenger airliner (July 1988). During the Gulf War (1990–1991), some carriers entered the Gulf while others launched air strikes from hundreds of miles away. The Air Force, operating from Saudi air bases, demonstrated precision munitions with unprecedented effect. Naval aviation was clearly upstaged. The needed mine-sweeping ships were in the Reserve. Over 95 percent of forces and supplies, however, arrived by ship. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan reversed the advantage with carrier aviation launching sorties into landlocked Afghanistan and the

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Air Force lacking adequate bases within range of tactical aircraft. Air Force strategic bombers flew intercontinental distances to attack third-world targets and to support ground forces. Gunboat Diplomacy: The Enduring Naval Mission At the same time that the Navy was vacillating between coastal defense and forward presence, the federal Army often decayed into a small professional cadre or became a continental or constabulary force in support of America’s expansion westward. The Founders’ distrust of standing armies repeatedly left the Army unprepared. Congress’s dislike for the high cost of a navy constrained the Navy to a guerre de course strategy and fast frigates with audacious captains. While the Army was unprepared for war, the Navy was often accused of participating in, or precipitating, undeclared wars. Asserting a warship, like trip-wire ground forces, into a crisis area can either diffuse the situation or precipitate escalation, and either may be the desired consequence. Gunboat diplomacy lies in the gray area between coercive diplomacy and undeclared war.38 These operations are about the president’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations; diplomacy, even aggressive diplomacy, was the domain of the State Department, and declared war was the domain of the War Department. At the high end of guerre de course are offensive operations at sea, in foreign harbors, and even ashore. Classic gunboat diplomacy implies a certain degree of standoff, and long-range strike with precision-guided munitions launched from land- or carrier-based aviation, surface ship or submarine, and perhaps someday from space, are all logical extensions. Marines are put ashore when capture is more important than destruction or when the consequences of collateral damage are too high. Hagan refers to the period between 1816 and the transition to steam power toward the end of the century as the golden age of American gunboat diplomacy. It began when the Navy returned to Algiers to settle the Barbary Wars. War termination was sealed by treaty but negotiated by the threat of bombardment from a warship in the harbor. In the early days, gunboat diplomacy was “To offer aid and protection to our commerce and to look after the interests of our citizens.” It was often about seeking fair treatment for stranded sailors, support of whaling operations, and later to secure safe passage of gold bullion in the Pacific. Significant changes were afoot at the turn of the century, and gunboat diplomacy took on the complexion of “naval imperialism.” Convoluted with popular thinking—including “white man’s burden” and Teddy Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—the perceived great power threat from Germany in the Caribbean, and the impending Panama Canal, America offered, as one of the “civilized nations,” to be the “international police power in the Western Hemisphere.” Naval forces intervened and occupied, sometimes for extended periods of time. The new gunboat diplomacy had “the objective of altering the political and social structure of the occupied country.”

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Adaptations and Transformations The Navy, even more than the other services, has a reputation for resistance to change. Given the continuous and dramatic changes absorbed, the reputation is undeserved. Perhaps the defiant nature of the institution resists change from outside the sea service. The Navy has been as separated from the public as the Army has been connected to it. One obvious change was from wooden walls to steel hulls. Associated with that change was the change in motive force from wind and canvas sail to coal-fired boilers and steam. Another associated change was the reluctant acceptance of engineers into the officer corps. It is hard to imagine today a navy officer lacking engineering competence, and the Annapolis curriculum is heavily engineering oriented. Steam power required overseas coaling stations or the ability to seize them. As the era of American continental expansion closed and Mahan published his treatise, the United States, led by navalists, acquired overseas possessions and became an imperial power. The Navy became fixed on capital ships and concentrated fleets rather than coastal defense or independent sailing frigates as the strong arm of diplomacy. The Navy held diplomatic primacy until victory in the Pacific. Frigate captains of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries sailed only with broad policy guidance that they interpreted given the situation they found themselves in. Lacking modern communications, captains were expected to act independently and could return home to court-martial and dismissal or to a hero’s welcome. The guerre de course strategy demanded, in addition to considerable seamanship, a politically sophisticated captain, because the objective of gunboat diplomacy was to affect the political situation ashore. The guerre de main strategy of the blue ocean did not require such political sophistication, nor did the guerre de course strategy of Atlantic convoy escort in the world wars. While the great Pacific battles of WWII cemented the guerre de main culture and elevated electrical engineering, they also marked an end of diplomatic primacy. The mantle passed to the Army—symbolized by the Japanese surrender to General Douglas MacArthur—where it has remained since, and where it is perhaps only now in decline.39 The Navy also lost its strategic distinction. For decades Americans wanted a “quick, painless, distant, and decisive way to win wars.” The Navy offered the country that option until the delivery of the atomic bomb by the Air Force at the end of WWII. The Air Force was not shy about claiming its ability to meet the nation’s needs alone. Air Force leadership lobbied hard in public announcing that armies and navies were obsolete. Accordingly, much of Navy postwar planning treated the Air Force as the threat. The unit of action at sea also has changed dramatically over time. From 1812 to 1890, training was for single-ship action, rather than for fleet action. With the fleet divided, the Navy could not practice fleet maneuver or amphibious operations. After the First World War, Admiral Sims, president of the Naval War College, argued for Mahanian concentration of the fleet. But after

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German crews scuttled the remainder of their fleet at Scapa Flow rather than have it parceled out to the victors, it made no sense to concentrate in the Atlantic. The more menacing threat was Japan, but there were insufficient port facilities in the Pacific and the Navy remained divided into three fleets (Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic) with the newest ships with the biggest guns in the Pacific. The needs of the WWII Pacific created huge formations: fleets of task groups and task forces. Forrestal’s postwar globally dispersed navy required smaller formations, battle groups, based on a large-deck aircraft carrier, battleship, or amphibious ships, and fleets became shore headquarters. There is no Mahanian concentrated fleet today, but the present-day scalable carrier battle group is sufficient to defeat any enemy navy. Its purpose, however, is to project power ashore. Flexibility of composition remains a hallmark of formations at sea. Command of the ship, long accomplished through direct observation of the battle from the bridge, shifted to the interior of the ship where the battle space was indirectly sensed through the electromagnetic spectrum. World War II marks the point at which the typical naval battle began to occur beyond visual range. During the age of sail, small, fast ships were used to scout ahead of the fleet to provide early warning, but communications were so poor that the fleet traveled in its fighting formation. WWI saw small, carrier-based aircraft used very effectively as scouts providing the fleet with warning and time to maneuver against or escape an enemy fleet. In both cases, the ship’s guns fired at targets that could be seen from the bridge. Today, a bewildering array of sensors is fed into a ship’s combat information center. From here, not the bridge, the commander surveys the surface, air, and undersea battle spaces. These three views continue to dominate the command structure aboard ship. Lethality has shifted from guns to planes to missiles. For centuries, big guns provided the lethality of the world’s navies. Carrier-based aircraft extended the range of the ship’s firepower beyond that of even the largest guns. Year by year, cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are having their guns removed and replaced by guided-missile launchers. Guided missiles are more expensive than traditional munitions and must be fired more judiciously. Firing an expensive missile beyond visual range introduces new problems. Firing at an unseen target risks fratricide. Not being able to assess the battle damage inflicted by a missile risks firing more missiles than necessary or allowing a target to escape with minor damage. A piloted aircraft capable of delivering less expensive munitions mitigates some of these problems but puts a pilot at risk of death or capture. Propulsion again shifted as oil replaced coal to fire ship’s boilers, and then nuclear power replaced fossil fuels. All modern attack and ballistic missile submarines employ nuclear power to produce steam to drive a turbine generator. The result is quiet operation and very long range without refueling. Many of the larger surface combatant ships are also nuclear powered. The gas turbine engine, the same technology found in jet aircraft and in the Army’s main battle tank, has become increasingly popular. Gas turbine engines are

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common in surface ships, while some older auxiliary ships still employ diesel power. The nuclear power plant frees considerable space formerly used for engine fuel, and the nuclear-powered carrier has ample room to carry fuel for its embarked air wing and its gas-turbine escorts. Some adaptations are more enduring than others. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor eventually killed the Navy’s next-generation battleship program. Delivery of the atomic bomb by Air Force long-range bombers killed the Navy’s next-generation carrier program. The war in Korea vindicated tactical aviation as employed by the Navy and Marine Corps, and the carrier program was resurrected. During Vietnam the Navy was uncontested at sea, but the airpower projected ashore was heavily contested by robust ground-based air defense systems; the Navy lacked a brown-water capability and had to build the boats and create tactics from scratch. After every brown-water experience, the Navy dismissed shallow draft and had no relevant equipment, training, or doctrine. It is a Mahanian, guerre de main, blue-water navy at heart. TODAY’S NAVY Through much of the Navy’s modern history, it has had as its objective defeat of other navies rather than provision of the best navy for the nation’s needs. To the extent that both objectives produce equivalent naval capability, then one objective serves as well as the other. To the extent that they produce different capabilities, the wrong objective can quickly squander the national treasure. Navies are expensive. Other naval missions have been treated as lesser-included cases. But today’s debate is not between guerre de main and guerre de course strategies. There is no competing navy. The maritime strategy of the twenty-first century is about projecting power ashore, the high end of offensive guerre de course. At issue is the appropriateness of a capital-ship navy, centered on the large-deck aircraft carrier, as the principal means to undergird the strategy. Means must be allowed to dictate the ways and ends of strategy only in the short term. Given the dominance of aviators, particularly carrier-based strike fighters, one can predict that manned aircraft solutions will be proposed for many problems. And strike fighters require carriers, and the bigger the carrier the better. Without a serious threat from the sea, the Navy is looking to the littorals for its mission and its relevance. Some may argue that the littoral view is about self-preservation of the Navy, and they may be right. The view to the littoral, however, is an accurate, important, and compelling view, very well aligned with the desires of U.S. presidents to “police the empire.” The institutional navy is devoting significant intellectual capital to understanding the ends of the new maritime strategy. There will be no competing navy in the foreseeable future, and the guerre de main culture is temporarily submerged. If submerged for a generation or more, the culture may be lost and need to be re-created if and when a peer

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competitor emerges. The competition with the Air Force over long-range precision strike, however, may well produce a navy equally adept at striking land or striking ships from great distance. The aggressive guerre de course culture of the fast attack submarine is also submerged, leaving this warfare competency to atrophy. Cold War and Post–Cold War Legacies The naval services were not sized and shaped to defeat the Soviet navy during the Cold War. The agreed upon threat was a continental and not a maritime power. The requirement for year-round forward presence made greater demands on the naval services’ size and shape. The naval services are conducting many of the same missions after the Cold War as they did during. But operating tempo has increased, while the size of the force has decreased. During the Cold War, the Navy had important major-war and small-war missions. Carriers, and the ships to accompany them, were prepared to defeat the Soviet navy, in port if possible, and then to strike the Soviet heartland. A fleet of ballistic missile submarines operating quite separately from the carrier navy provided the Navy’s contribution to the nuclear triad and as such represents an extreme in deliberate planning and major-war culture. Attack submarines independently hunted Soviet ballistic missile submarines. At the same time, the carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups were constantly forward deployed and were expected to respond to a variety of unplanned contingencies. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps maintained a strong crisis-action planning and expeditionary warfare culture unlike the deliberate planning and garrison culture shared by major elements of the Cold War Army and Air Force. The end of the Cold War marked the decline of the role played by ballistic missile submarines and the demise of the independent role played by attack submarines, and, hence, the role of the submariner has been devalued. The surface action group is also in decline, as is the role of the surface warfare officer. That and other trends have forced the aviator into a dominant role that the battleship captains once enjoyed. In an interwar period, balance is critically important so that when a peer competitor arises and the threat becomes clear, the balanced force is better postured to adapt and respond. Ships and Weapons of the Cold War and Post–Cold War Eras Modern ships have obvious physical differences, but, more importantly, they differ in function, or the role they play in a tactical formation. Aside from their differences, many carry the same weapon systems aboard, increasingly an array of missiles. One of the repeating issues in military weapon systems is the mix of forces to obtain. A common approach is to provide a high-low mix, as seen in the

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Air Force fighter aircraft inventory. We will see it again in naval aviation and navy surface combatants. Rather than only a high and a low ship class, navies’ ships range from the capital ship—the super carrier and the battleship—to the cruiser, the destroyer, and the frigate, each existing in more than one form. Each is discussed below. Aircraft carriers. There are five classes of aircraft carriers since the beginning of the Cold War: the Midway-, Forrestal-, Kitty Hawk-, Enterprise-, and Nimitz-class. The John F. Kennedy represents a single-ship class but shares significant characteristics with the Kitty Hawk-class. The carrier is crewed by 3,000. The embarked wing employs an additional 1,800 to 3,400 and brings eight squadrons of fighter and attack aircraft, electronic warfare and early warning aircraft, and anti-submarine warfare helicopters. Only the newer carriers with longer landing decks and hefty catapults can handle the 73,000pound F-14 Tomcat—originally designed as a fighter interceptor to defend the carrier against Soviet bombers but now retired. In addition to the ship and air wing crews, carriers have carried a detachment of 72 marines. Battleships. The battleship was once the capital ship of every navy of note. The four Iowa-class battleships of the United States Navy—Iowa, New Jersey, Missouri, and Wisconsin—were originally completed in 1943 and 1944. Each was refurbished and reactivated between 1982 and 1988. Originally designed for the ship-to-ship slugfest, they later protected the carrier and were eventually relegated to the shore bombardment role. Because the battleship is heavily armored, the damage inflicted by many mines might be limited to repainting the hull. No other navy in the world had a comparable ship in the second half of the twentieth century. These battleships are smaller than the modern super carrier, and all are conventionally powered. They are crewed by over 1,500 naval personnel. The 16-inch gun is their hallmark. In addition to the nine big guns, the battleship carries 12 5-inch guns and 4 rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns. It is also capable of launching anti-ship and land-attack missiles. All are retired. Cruisers. Although not as heavily gunned as the battleship, cruisers could be acquired in larger numbers. Being the more common ship, they conducted most of the ship-to-ship engagements of World War II. Large cruisers employed 12-inch guns, heavy cruisers 8-inch, light cruisers 6-inch, and anti-aircraft defense cruisers had 5-inch guns. Today’s cruisers employ missiles rather than guns. Some are nuclear powered, and some are conventional oilfired ships. Their primary role is to provide anti-aircraft defense for carrier battle groups. Ships so equipped are called Aegis Cruisers. In addition to antiaircraft missiles, they also carry anti-ship missiles, and some have land-attack and anti-submarine missiles. The cruiser could provide the same air defense capability to the surface action group but is more likely to be the centerpiece of a surface action group relying on its missile launching capacity for lethality. Destroyers. Early torpedo boats drove battleships—unable to deflect their guns to defend themselves—out of harbors and coastal waters. The torpedo boat destroyer, later just destroyer, was the response. Its mission was to protect

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the capital ship. Later, the mission of the destroyer grew to firing torpedoes against battleships and larger cruisers, winnowing down the enemy’s fleet before the larger, more expensive battleships engaged head to head. The development of sonar and the attendant ability to detect submarines led to another change of mission for the destroyer. With the proper equipment installed, it can protect a battle group or convoy against submarines. It carries a variety of helicopters for multiple missions. Some destroyers are equipped with the same Aegis system carried by the cruiser. Frigates. During the age of wood and sail, the frigate was the centerpiece of a guerre de course navy. Modern frigates were originally used as convoy escorts, but their acquisition ended after WWII. They were brought back by the Kennedy administration for anti-submarine warfare armed with torpedoes and limited anti-aircraft capability to provide an anti-submarine capability to the carrier task force. Older frigates had a small number of three-inch or five-inch guns for the anti-aircraft role. Newer frigates employ guided missiles and are designed to escort convoys, amphibious task forces, and replenishment ships. Amphibious ships. The amphibious navy, commonly called the gator navy, constitutes a third distinct navy culture in addition to the strategic nuclear navy and the carrier navy. The gator navy delivers and supports marines. A handful of ship types represent this unique capability. The nature of the mission requires that ships be seaworthy enough to transit open oceans and shallow draft enough to hit the beach. The amphibious assault ship is the centerpiece of the amphibious ready group. It resembles a small aircraft carrier. It can carry conventional landing craft, helicopters, and the vertical-takeoffand-landing Harrier “jump jet” but is not large enough to support launch and recovery of conventional jet aircraft. This ship can be configured to serve in two distinct roles. In its primary role, amphibious assault, it carries assault helicopters, amphibious tractors, and 1,900 marines. In its secondary role, sea control, the ship’s complement would include five Harriers and six antisubmarine warfare helicopters. The amphibious transport dock is the principal troop ship, carrying 700 to 900 marines. It is capable of lifting itself out of and lowering itself into the water to disgorge landing craft from within. It also carries troop-carrying helicopters. Submarines. There are two fundamentally different types of submarines: ballistic missile and attack submarines. Ballistic missile submarines are designed to move undetected around the globe and to launch missiles at ranges in excess of 5,000 miles, each Trident missile having multiple, separately targetable nuclear warheads. The attack submarine has had two separate missions. Its strategic role is to hunt down and kill enemy ballistic missile submarines and to attack submarines and surface ships. In its other mission, the attack sub protects the carrier battle group. Submarines bring a great deal of versatility to the maritime: they deliver special forces, conduct reconnaissance, and, perhaps most importantly, are fully capable of being the centerpiece of an offensive guerre de course strategy. Some believe that only the submarine is survivable in future war.

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Auxiliary ships. A variety of vessels support surface combatants: mine countermeasures ships, auxiliary ships, destroyer tenders, submarine tenders, ammunition ships, and stores ships. A command ship, originally designed as part of the amphibious navy, carries commander, staff, and an array of communications systems and is currently in high demand as a floating headquarters for a variety of missions in the maritime. Maritime prepositioning ships carry large Marine Corps (and more recently Army) equipment sets and are properly considered part of the amphibious navy. They are forward deployed and can be relocated near hostilities in a crisis, where they mate with the necessary personnel, greatly reducing response times in deploying land forces. The hospital ship accompanies the amphibious navy during combat operations and is available to support any combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian assistance operation. Shipboard guns. Present shipboard artillery includes eight-inch, fiveinch, and three-inch guns. Munitions are high explosive and impact detonated, proximity fused, altitude fused, or armor piercing. The Phalanx, a 20-mm multibarrel gun, provides close-in defense of ships against aircraft and missile attack; they are found on virtually every surface ship type. As ships undergo major overhaul, larger guns are being replaced with missile launchers. Cruise missiles. The Harpoon anti-ship missile can be launched from an aircraft, surface ship, or submarine and is radar guided with a range of about 80 miles. The Tomahawk anti-ship missile has a 285-mile range and can be launched from surface combatants or submarines. The Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM, tee-lamb) has a 1,400-mile range with nuclear or conventional warhead. Surface-to-air missiles. Air defense capabilities include radar-homing missiles with short (10-mile) to long (100-mile) range. One older missile carries a nuclear warhead, still on some cruisers and destroyers, to be used against large air formations. For small surface ships—for example, a support ship without sophisticated weaponry—a marine with a shoulder-fired, heatseeking missile might be the only air defense available. Air-to-air missiles. Short-range, heat-seeking missiles are fired at aircraft within visual range. Longer range, radar-guided missiles are fired at aircraft beyond visual range. Although they are increasingly precise, visual confirmation by a second source is often required before use. The radar is a significant cost and weight driver for aircraft design. It also broadcasts the aircraft’s location to the enemy well beyond visual range. Air-to-surface missiles. The high-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) is employed in the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission. It is fired from a specially configured tactical aircraft called the Wild Weasel. The Maverick air-launched missile (like its anti-tank cousin) has a 14-mile range and relies on the reflection from a laser designator directed from an aircraft or surface vessel. The Penguin is launched from a helicopter and is fire and forget, requiring no external postlaunch guidance.

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Battle Forces, Groups, and Task Forces The Navy tends toward ad hoc organizations at sea. That is not to say that they are random collections of ships; indeed, there is a great deal of regularity to naval formations, but their size and exact composition is determined by the demands of the task assigned. Some of the higher-level organizations—fleets, numbered fleets, and battle forces—are better thought of as permanent headquarters. Groups and task forces, in contrast, are better understood as temporary formations of ships at sea. As a practical matter, there are four common formations—carrier battle group, surface action group, amphibious ready group, and submarine striking force—none of which has a rigid configuration. Task organization of naval forces was a concept born in WWII to provide the commander with the flexibility to respond to rapidly changing requirements. A task or battle force commander may choose to further subdivide assigned forces into task-organized groups, units, and elements. A battle force is a permanent inventory of ships assigned to a numbered fleet; the ships are organized into temporary (six-month) battle groups on a rotational basis. In recent history, a battle group has been centered on either a carrier or a battleship accompanied by other surface combatants and submarines. Somewhat of a generic term, a battle group can be formed around a carrier, surface ship, or amphibs. Carrier battle group. A carrier battle group forms around an aircraft carrier and its embarked wing. A guided-missile cruiser adds air defense and considerable firepower. One or more destroyers or frigates provides surface escort, and one or more attack submarines might be assigned for group defense. A support ship may be assigned if the group’s task requires integral sustainment. A carrier task force is the high-cost option and carries considerable combat power and flexibility. Surface action group. Lacking the battleship option, a surface action group can be formed around a large guided-missile cruiser. The capital ship could be accompanied by, for example, a guided-missile cruiser, one or more destroyers or guided-missile destroyers, three guided-missile frigates, and a support ship. The surface action group is a mid-cost naval option. Escorting a convoy of troop or supply ships might require a small surface action group composed of a number of frigates or destroyers at relatively low cost. The escort carrier no longer being a part of Navy inventory, the amphibious assault ship could substitute in that role. Amphibious ready group. The Navy’s amphibious ready group (ARG, argh) is an integral part of projecting the marine air-ground task force around the world. The group has no fixed composition but might include a command ship, small-deck aircraft carrier, and a variety of ships supporting the transport and landing of marines. It might be bolstered by maritime prepositioning ships. The ARG might be joined temporarily by a carrier battle group if warranted by the immediate situation. The standard Marine Corps contingent associated with the ARG is the marine expeditionary unit (MEU).

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Submarine strike forces. Although ballistic missile submarines operate very independently, they are assigned to submarine strike forces to provide an integrated offensive nuclear strike capability. The boomer captain executes only his assigned portion of the integrated operating plan under authority of the United States Strategic Command, which also commands intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers with nuclear weapons. Fleets and Numbered Fleets The two-ocean navy, an expression first used in 1940, exists today under the commanders of the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. The two fleets are each subdivided into numbered fleets, actually headquarters ashore with the commander on a flagship at sea. The relationship between fleets and numbered fleets is administrative; for operational purposes, numbered fleets are aligned with one of the regional unified commands (European, Southern, Central, or Pacific Commands). For purposes of headquarters economy and Navy-wide standardization, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet headquarters are being merged, but geography may prevent the goal from becoming reality (see Table 5.1). Neither a fleet nor a numbered fleet has a rigid structure, or, in Army parlance, there is no standard table of organization and equipment. Ships move freely from one fleet to another, as the global situation requires. The commander organizes into task forces the ships assigned to the numbered fleet where and when appropriate to meet the requirements of the immediate situation. Fleet Training Cycles Although the armed services have a strong preference for describing their organizations as strict hierarchies, each is better described as a matrix organization. Upon entry into WWII, the dominant navy structure was the type command. All ships of a particular type were assigned to a homogeneous type command—for example, destroyers were assigned to a destroyer command.

Table 5.1 Fleets and Numbered Fleets Fleets and Numbered Fleets Atlantic Fleet Second Fleet Sixth Fleet Pacific Fleet Third Fleet Fifth Fleet Seventh Fleet

Area of Responsibility Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea Mediterranean Sea Headquartered in San Diego, California Pacific Ocean Persian Gulf Far East and Indian Ocean

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The type command survives today in the administrative chain of command in a supporting role to a heterogeneous naval force in the operational chain of command—for example, a numbered fleet, task force, or battle force. A ship is normally under both administrative and operational commands. The naval services employ a rotational readiness posture. Approximately 30 percent of the Navy’s ships, submarines, and air squadrons are at sea at any given time. Another 30 percent are training to take their place. Another 30 percent are in port for conventional overhaul after returning from an overseas deployment. Ten percent are in major overhaul. Typically, a ship in port will receive new crewmembers while undergoing conventional overhaul. The unit—the ship and its crew—requires about six weeks of refresher training. It then undergoes about six months of intermediate training under its type command and advanced training under a numbered fleet command. Deployments at sea are generally for six months. Crises may extend the deployment. Depending on the type of ship, major overhaul may take a year or more. Each ship undergoes major overhaul every five years. Aviation units debark and train ashore when their carrier is undergoing maintenance. The Navy’s preference for forward deployment is expressed as a preference for operational readiness over structural readiness. That is, given fixed resources, one could dedicate those resources to either a large navy in port but little at sea or to a smaller overall navy with a greater percentage at sea. Warfare Areas: Surface, Aviation, and Submarine Next to their loyalty to the Navy, officers are most closely aligned with their warfare area. The title “line officer” applies to surface warfare, aviation warfare, and submarine warfare officers. These three warfare areas dominate the Navy as clearly as do a few combat arms branches dominate the Army. Like the Army, but unlike the Air Force and Marine Corps, insignia and rating badges worn on the uniform clearly distinguish an individual’s specialty. There are line officers whose duties are restricted or limited to, for example, engineering. Only officers of the unrestricted line can command at sea, and, in general, they command most shore installations as well. As with the Army’s Military Academy at West Point, graduation from the Naval Academy at Annapolis bestows a considerable career advantage. Other candidates come from college programs and from the enlisted ranks. After commissioning, ensigns attend a school appropriate for their warfare area. Like Army branches, each warfare specialty has a home where new officers attend their basic school and return to attend intermediate and advanced courses throughout their career. Aviators are qualified upon completion of initial training and before assignment to ship. Officers of all other warfare areas must earn their qualification in an operational unit. A submariner’s career is concentrated in either attack or ballistic missile submarine assignments, although crossing over is not uncommon. The attack

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boat was built to hunt down and destroy enemy ballistic missile submarines and surface ships. Ballistic missile submarines, called boomers, are part of the nuclear triad along with strategic bomber aircraft and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Boomers do not participate in fleet actions, nor is independent and aggressive action expected of their captains. This is no place for “audacious to reckless” officers. Surface warfare officers aspire to command of surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Experience is gained at sea, and the ambitious surface warfare officer qualifies in as many watch positions as possible, including engineering, gunnery, anti-submarine warfare, damage control, communications, and command information center watch officer. Surface warfare officers, who have spent their careers mastering the elements of command at sea, are excluded by law from command of the aircraft carrier, the Navy’s principal warship. A surface warfare officer who commands a cruiser has career potential for promotion to admiral. Amphibious warfare—that portion of the Navy that operates hand-in-hand with the Marine Corps—is a subspecialty of surface warfare and not a glamorous one. Command of an amphibious ready group is generally followed by retirement. Two positions leading to admiralship are reserved for aviators: command of the carrier and command of its embarked air wing. Command of the carrier is reserved for aviators by 1926 law.40 Command of the carrier’s embarked air wing goes to an aviator as well.41 An aviation officer is associated with either carrier-based or land-based aircraft. Carrier-based aviator specialties range from piloting supersonic strike aircraft, to bombardier/navigator, to fixedwing or rotary-wing electronic warfare. The principal land-based aircraft track submarines or haul cargo and troops. Unlike surface warfare officers, young pilots spend their time at sea flying and are exempt from watch qualification. Late in the aviator’s career, a pilot destined for carrier command often will be assigned to an amphibious or support ship for a remedial course in running a ship at sea. Ships under their stewardship suffer accordingly. Not all career paths lead equally to admiralship. Advantage is to the carrier aviator. The surface warfare officer with a carrier background has a career advantage over the typical submariner or another surface warfare officer with cruiser or destroyer service or with a background in amphibious warfare. Carrier-based aviation is preferred to land-based, and assignment to attack submarines is preferred to boomers. The law that reserves command of carriers to aviators, designed to break the dominance of surface warfare officers, has produced the current imbalance between the branches. The end of the Cold War has marked a serious reduction in the independent role played by attack submarines and, hence, the role of the submariner. That and other trends have forced the aviator into as clear a dominant role as the battleship captains once enjoyed. Maintaining a balance across warfare areas has been near impossible. Dominance by the battleship captain replaced dominance by the frigate captain. Surface dominance retarded exploitation of the emerging technologies of

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flight and submarines. The latter half of WWII in the Pacific brought balance across the three warfare areas, but the balance quickly shifted to aviation, where it remains today. This imbalance has the same potential to stifle innovation as did the earlier imbalance. NAVY TRANSFORMATION A ship may remain in the fleet for 50 years or more. Transformation of the Navy must begin with an examination of first principles—a strategic review— or the debate will be limited to the number of ships in the fleet: size, not shape. The early navy was designed for coastal defense of harbors and ports. Mahan’s guerre de main strategy called for a fleet concentrated in coastal waters designed to defeat the enemy navy at sea. Forrestal’s strategy put forward presence and sea control first and required a globally dispersed navy; it could, if necessary, concentrate to defeat an enemy navy at sea. Lehman added the need to open a second front against a continental enemy. Today’s strategy is at the high end, the offensive end, of guerre de course—projection of power ashore through gunboat diplomacy and expeditionary warfare. It is a navy that Eisenhower would appreciate. The ends of the current maritime strategy include freedom of the seas and the ability to respond quickly to prevent or control crises. Forward presence is the primary mechanism to achieve both freedom of the seas and crisis response. Forward presence dictates a globally dispersed navy. Freedom of the seas subsumes commerce protection. The latter assures the flow of commercial or military goods to and from the United States. The former is voluntary and an international rather than a purely national responsibility. Freedom of the seas was once guaranteed, or contested, by the navies of the great powers. Once a British obligation, today, the United States guarantees freedom of the seas with its navy. If freedom of the seas and crisis response are the ends of the maritime strategy, then the ways of the strategy are to be examined next. Since Forrestal, forward presence has been established by the large-deck carrier and its escorts. If forward presence requires continually patrolling five regions, and if each carrier at sea is shadowed by another in training workup and another just returned from deployment, then 15 carriers are required. Carriers do not sail alone, and simple arithmetic determines the size of the fleet. Not much can be done beyond seeking shipboard efficiencies. Zumwalt attempted the mission with a high-low mix of battle groups but was rejected by powerful bureaucratic forces. The 15-carrier navy stood for years. Since the Cold War the number of regions patrolled decreased from five to four, producing a 12-carrier navy. Operational tempo has been high in the interwar period, and amphibious ready groups have patrolled in place of a carrier battle group. The “tyranny of forward presence” and the carrier assumption make meaningful transformation problematic.42

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Rather than transformation through the ends and ways of strategy, transformation is most strongly taking place through means. At the rhetorical level, the Navy has oriented on the demographic trend to cities in coastal areas. The Marine Corps is largely dragging the Navy into the littoral, where it does not want to be. Forward . . . From the Sea The Navy’s post–Cold War transformation began with a new maritime concept: . . . From the Sea, released in 1992.43 The title is noteworthy; the Navy would project power not on the sea, but from the sea. Justification would not be derived from an enemy navy, but from the need to project power ashore. An elaboration, Forward . . . From the Sea, was released in 1994 and reasserted Forrestal’s forward presence. The new orientation, strongly influenced by gators and marines, is toward the littoral environment, the water and land adjacent to continental coastlines. It is in this region that the majority of the world’s cities, populations, and conflicts exist. The trend toward urban population concentration shows no signs of abatement. Command of the high seas does not necessarily imply mastery of the littoral. Coastal waters are shallow and irregular with complex currents and tides that disadvantage large, oceangoing ships, and they are inhospitable electromagnetic environments for complex and expensive systems developed for open waters. Inexpensive mines, diesel submarines, land-based aviation, and sea-skimming cruise missiles all constitute significant threats in littoral waters, where the Navy has been consistently unprepared to operate. The Marine Corps’ part of the concept was released as Operational Maneuver From the Sea in January 1996 and includes Ship to Objective Maneuver. Rather than charging headlong into the teeth of the enemy on a well-defended beach, the new concept calls for using coastal waters as maneuver space, allowing marines to go ashore where landings are unopposed, as did MacArthur in the Pacific.44 Bypassing the beachhead altogether, Marines plan to strike by moving directly from ship to the objective inland. The equipment implications are significant. Naval aviation begs for longer range. Long-range cruise missiles are already replacing guns aboard surface combatants and submarines. All types of landing craft, that once made a straight dash to the beach, require much longer range and speed to maneuver beyond the horizon. Transporting marines inland requires longer-range, troop- and supply-carrying aircraft. Providing close air support to marines deep inland requires an aircraft that can fly long distances and loiter on call. At issue is the littoral extent. Whatever the answer, it defines the line of contention between long-range precision strike by the Navy and Air Force, and between land operations by the Marine Corps and the Army. The Navy contends that the littoral extends 650 miles inland. If 70 percent of the world’s population lives within 200 miles of the coastline, then extending the littoral to 650 miles could theoretically add at most 30 percent. Projecting air

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or land power deeper is expensive but, as operations from the Indian Ocean into Afghanistan demonstrate, is sometimes necessary. The questions must be asked, at what point is airpower better projected by long-range Air Force bombers, and at what point are ground operations better handled by the Army with its greater capacity for sustained operations? Long-Range Precision Strike One of the great interservice rivalries has been between the Navy and the Air Force over the deep, or long-range, strike mission. It began early in WWII, when Lieutenant Colonel Jimmie Doolittle flew Army B-25s off a Navy carrier to harass Japan. The Navy lacked an aircraft with the requisite range and payload; the Army Air Force lacked an air base within range. Air Force delivery of the atomic bomb at the end of the war accelerated the competition. The revolt of the admirals was over which service would conduct deep strike. The Navy’s Vietnam-era A-6 Intruder carried a big payload, day or night, and in any weather. The Navy’s subsequent A-12 program was caught up in the contest and was cancelled, and the A-6 was later retired without replacement. Precision has been added to the competition, but there is no reason to predict any final resolution. The Gulf War demonstrated Air Force dominance in the competition, but Afghanistan again showed the value of carrier aviation, just as it had during the Korean War. This is an expensive, but constructive, competition. The F/A-18 Hornet in the current Navy inventory simply cannot compete against existing or planned Air Force capabilities; the Navy is evidently relying on precision munitions launched from surface-ship and submarine, yet aviators dominate the institution. As guns are abandoned for missiles, so too is the ability to provide the volume of fire needed by marines ashore. In previous interwar periods, the dominant role played by the Navy has been gunboat diplomacy, providing firepower or its threat as the coercive element of State Department efforts to achieve limited objectives short of war. Hagan describes Eisenhower’s gunboat diplomacy as, “the finite application of force to effect discrete political ends in distant places.”45 In Wes Clark’s book, Waging Modern War, his description of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo has a familiar ring. He says, “Operation Allied Force was a modern war—limited, carefully constrained in geography, scope, weaponry, and effects.”46 Perhaps what we are calling modern war is just good old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy fought with modern weapons. One can expect a long-term competition between the two services under the rubric of long-range precision strike. Network-Centric Warfare and the Cooperative Engagement Capability The Navy is the least doctrinal of the services. Certainly there is an extensive school system in the high-technology navy, but competence is built at

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sea through an apprentice and journeyman system, rather than through mastery of textbook doctrine. Moreover, where the Army has separated combat development from the fielded force, the Navy learns and adapts in the fleet more than ashore. The Navy established a Fleet Battle Experiment program to rotate the experimental effort from numbered fleet to numbered fleet. An office at the Naval War College orchestrates the efforts. One of the more interesting transformation activities has been experimentation with the cooperative engagement capability. Through it, the Navy set a standard for experimentation unmatched elsewhere in the Defense Department. A real problem was attacked, real learning took place, and the process was conducted in the fleet. Other experimentation programs are better characterized as putting on demonstrations to prove preconceived notions. Cooperative engagement capability (CEC) challenges cherished traditions. Whether it proves to be a step forward or backward remains to be seen. The CEC collects the sensor inputs of all ships in the formation into a single picture—more complete than that available to any individual ship—and shares that picture across the formation. When subjected to attack by plane, ballistic missile, or cruise missile, the defensive shot is assigned to the ship best positioned. The promise of information technology and network-centric warfare has been greater independence of operations by pushing authority as far down the command hierarchy as possible. The reality is the possibility of centralized decision making, including the firing of a ship’s weapons by remote, potentially rendering a captain incapable of defending his own ship. The cherished cultural tradition of independent command at sea is threatened. More generally, the Navy is pursuing certainty and is, intentionally or unintentionally, sacrificing independence. It is not difficult to understand why the Navy is pursuing certainty. A blue-water navy operates amid huge empty expanses of ocean perhaps dotted with small, potent, and valuable targets. But that is not the nature of conditions ashore. The independent nature of the early American frigate captain, “audacious to reckless,” was lost but redefined in WWII within the context of huge formations. “Every skipper was the technical, as well as operational and administrative, master of his ship. The massed concentration of those autonomous units gave the admiral in tactical command massed power that was reliable and flexible in application.”47 In the same era, the independent command culture had to be recreated, at great cost, in the submarine force, where it survived through the Cold War chasing Soviet ballistic missile submarines and surface ships. Attack submarines are now relegated to screening for the battle group, as they were early in the Pacific theater, and to standing offshore waiting to be provided target coordinates for their cruise missiles. The British navy was transformed from the Nelsonian ideal at Trafalgar to the lackluster organization at Jutland. Radio communications aboard ship in Britain’s Grand Fleet enabled admirals to issue detailed orders to every ship captain. The result was captains waiting for orders rather than seeking the

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initiative, the antithesis of the navy under Nelson. Information technology may be transforming the U.S. Navy from its WWII Pacific ideal to its own Jutland with ship captains robbed of initiative and independent command. Consistent with the evolving cooperative engagement capability and reorientation from blue-water operations, the arsenal ship was proposed to provide sea-based firepower for the land battle, as the retired battleships once did. The ship would carry four to five times the land-attack capability of guided missile cruisers and frigates and with a small crew of 50. It would have survivability provided by stealth—that is, a low signature across the electromagnetic spectrum. Part of the low-signature solution derives from the fact that its weapons would be fired by remote from the existing Aegis-equipped ships with their sophisticated electronics suites. The program competed for resources with the next-generation destroyer, the DD-21, and was cancelled in 1997 after the death of its chief proponent, Chief of Naval Operations Mike Boorda. Admiral Cebrowski, as president of the Naval War College, argued for a new class of small, fast, configurable ship called streetfighter acquired in small numbers and operating in the littoral. His views show a consistent preference for the many and the small (cheap) over the few and the large (expensive). The idea is reminiscent of French Admiral Aube and jeune école, but it lacks the driving strategy of guerre de course. It is consistent with independent command but runs afoul of the same obstacles faced by Zumwalt and Aube.48 Post-9/11 Efforts Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the naval services are attempting to move to an operational concept called sea strike. The expeditionary strike force will comprise an expeditionary strike group, something recognizable as a beefed-up ARG, perhaps buttressed by a maritime prepositioning force and a carrier strike group derived from the current carrier battle group, together augmented by guided-missile submarines and surface combatants. The concept requires a deep upheaval in the way the Navy does business. It challenges the number of forward presence patrol stations, its rotational model of readiness, overhaul schedules, and career progression. Rather than maintaining uniform forward presence year-round, the ability to surge would be the dominant concept—a shift from operational to structural readiness. The Navy could gain advantage in the long-range precision strike competition via guided missiles rather than manned flight, and the expeditionary strike force could shift the balance to the Navy Department. Only the Navy Department can provide an integrated air-land-sea force. The Army and Air Force can only bring pieces. CONCLUSION Before Mahan, warfare at sea was frequently discussed in the borrowed language of land warfare. In land warfare, one makes the distinction between

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attrition warfare and maneuver warfare rather than between guerre de main and guerre de course. The Army’s preference for the offense and the decisive battle is identical to the Navy’s preference for offense and the decisive fleet engagement. Both are about a war of attrition or annihilation of the enemy’s combat forces. In the language of Clausewitz, the center of gravity is the enemy strength rather than its weakness. The indecision of the Battle of Jutland did nothing to shake this belief within the Navy. The North Vietnamese refusal to meet for decisive engagement did nothing to shake this belief within the Army. Real navies fight navies, but today’s Navy is without peer. Throughout history, the dominant naval power generally favored a guerre de main strategy and a capital-ship navy; the weaker naval powers favored a guerre de course strategy and a coastal-defense, commerce-protection, commerce-raiding navy. Clearly, our competitors will favor a strategy asymmetric to our strengths. The turn from the deep blue ocean to the gray and brown waters of the littorals will bring the Navy into conflict with lesser powers employing strategies whose ends are to deny access to U.S. forces. The means supporting anti-access strategies include quiet diesel submarines in coastal waters, interference with the electromagnetic spectrum that the United States has become so dependent on, and all modern forms that weaker powers have employed under the concept of defensive guerre de course. We must now, without losing our dominant maritime power status, develop a counter to their guerre de course strategy. A guerre de main strategy is not an effective counter to an opponent who will not join you for decisive engagement. The capital-ship navy that implements the strategy must be challenged. Security strategy is properly a struggle between presidents and Congress, the ultimate users and producers of military and naval forces. Post–Cold War presidents have been extremely interventionist in the absence of a peer competitor that might have been aroused. Congress, with constitutional authority to provide and maintain a navy, focuses on equipment and the size of the force. Maritime strategy is left to the Navy. Congress must ask, as it did in the early 1800s, “a navy for what?” and resource that navy.

CHAPTER 6

Marine Corps

to win battles and build marines every marine a rifleman a force in readiness soldiers from the sea

The existence of the Marine Corps has never been guaranteed. Marines are not mentioned in the Constitution, and the Corps’ existence has been challenged throughout its history by presidents, the Army, and its parent service, the Navy. The Corps traces its birth to the Second Continental Congress, which, on November 10, 1775, authorized raising two battalions of marines for the war for independence from Britain. The United States Congress established the Marine Corps as a separate service in 1798 and made it part of the Department of Navy in 1854. A pattern of attack on the Marine Corps from within the executive branch and countervailing protection from Congress has produced a unique relationship between the Corps and the people’s branch.1 The Corps lives in the ambiguous area between the Army and the Navy and between conventional and special forces. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are separated by the element in which they fight—land, sea, and air. The Marine Corps unifies warfare across the elements—globe, anchor, and eagle. Special operations forces and strategic nuclear forces are also designed around a warfighting domain rather than for warfare in a specific element. For much of its history, the Corps served the Navy as a force to seize and defend advanced operating bases. But to be relevant to the nation’s needs, the Corps has sometimes found itself fighting as a second land army, as in World War I and in Vietnam, making it a burden rather than a benefit to the Navy and putting it

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in competition with the Army. During the first half of the twentieth century, marines were frequently referred to as “State Department Troops” conducting operations in the Caribbean, Central America, and wherever else U.S. interests were at risk. In the modern vernacular, these operations are called nation building, and they often involved the parallel assumption of public administration duties in the city and counter-insurgency warfare in the jungle, a domain shared with special operations forces. Protection for U.S. legations abroad was another function commonly provided by the Corps throughout its history, and marines continue to guard American embassies around the world today. In opposition to the conventional wisdom of the time, the Marine Corps developed the amphibious doctrine and equipment employed by Allied forces in WWII. Marines were among the first to use airpower to bomb and strafe in direct support of ground forces in Haiti and Nicaragua while the Army’s aviators were struggling for autonomy from the ground force. To be relevant in the atomic era, marines pioneered the use of the helicopter to avoid concentration at the beachhead and on the battlefield. Survival of the Corps is based on economy, innovation, and relevance to the nation’s needs. While internal economies may characterize the Corps, its capabilities overlap with the Army, and special operations forces allow for charges of redundancy and excess within the Defense Department. In low-intensity conflict, from small wars to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, marines often lead. In major wars, the Marine Corps seizes operating bases for the other services and opens access for the Army and Air Force, the forces of decision, and can serve as a second land army. Although the law establishes amphibious operations as the Marine Corps’ unique responsibility—and therefore its justification for existence—its true uniqueness lies in its general-purpose utility in being a force for all seasons.2 CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT The Marine Corps has two strong cultural strains. One is attack into the teeth of the enemy as in the Pacific campaigns of World War II—amphibious assault. The other is for expeditionary interventions as continuously conducted from the 1850s to the 1930s—small wars. Combined arms operations of air, land, and sea elements are integral to both cultures, and the marine rifleman is always front and center. Current Marine Corps conceptions and capabilities derive from the parallel development of a small-wars culture, interrupted by WWI, and an amphibious assault culture that developed in time for WWII. During major war, the expeditionary, small-wars culture is temporarily submerged in favor of amphibious assault and forcible entry for follow-on forces, but its small-wars culture continues to distinguish the Corps from the other services. The combined arms orientation remains a constant in major or small wars.

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Early History: Soldiers Who Go to Sea In centuries past, decision at sea was accomplished by infantry battle aboard ship after ramming and boarding. The ship was designed to give advantage to the boarded infantry. Marines were marksmen who fought from the topsails, they manned the cannon, and they were a ship-borne infantry that attacked from ship to ship and led “blue jackets” ashore in raids. In the eighteenth century, the Royal Marines constituted an important part of the professional British navy. A small group of navy captains relied on marines to impress sometimes-unwilling sailors and to prevent their mutiny once the ship was underway. The United States Marine Corps is the direct descendant of its British forerunner. Today, senior enlisted marines play prominent roles in initial officer training for the United States Navy, and marines provide a security force for the ship’s captain. Marines guard the gate. Much of the Corps’ early history is a search for a clear mission and relevance. Relevance was the easier of the two. In this same era, indeed, until after the Korean conflict, the United States Army was a modest cadre of professionals around which a continental army could be formed. The Corps’ relevance was easily established as a small standing army to do the president’s bidding beneath the threshold of declared war above which an army would need to be raised. With the Navy’s close association with the State Department’s diplomatic mission abroad, Marine Corps relevance was again easily established. Marines continue to act as legation guard and to evacuate embassy personnel under threatening conditions. Finding a clear mission has been far more elusive than showing relevance.3 Small Wars After early presidential challenges to its existence, the Corps established its relevance as a second land force by assisting the Army in the Florida Indian Wars (1817–1842). Operations against indigenous populations have all of the characteristics of small wars and few, if any, of the characteristics of war waged against a major power. Prior to the American Civil War, the Navy and its naval infantry supported the State Department in gunboat diplomacy, punitive expeditions, and a variety of diplomatic interventions. In the 1950s, they intervened in the Western Hemisphere, in the Pacific, and in Asia. Marines guarded Americans abroad and avenged their losses. The Civil War (1861–1865) brought the Marine Corps home and divided it between the Union and Confederate states. Noted for its marksmen, the Marine Corps left the Civil War having demonstrated no specific function and no successful amphibious assaults. Following the war, marines maintained law and order at home and protected citizens abroad. By the turn of the century, the Navy had become dependent on coal-fired boilers for propulsion and, in turn, on coaling stations. During the SpanishAmerican War (1898), marines provided direct support to the Navy by seizing

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and holding advanced bases for the steam navy, including a coaling station at Guantanamo, Cuba. The Corps was authorized increased end strength after the sinking of the Maine and doubled in size during the war. After the war, Army and Marine Corps forces were involved in the Philippine insurgency (1899–1902). Marines were called upon to protect American and European legations in Peking and to put down the Boxer Rebellion (1900–1901) in China. Commodore George Dewey, after waiting over two months for Army forces to arrive, said “If there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have received us with open arms, and there would have been no insurrection.”4 The insurgency continued on Mindano until 1914. Marines conducted three major and three lesser interventions in the Caribbean in the decades surrounding WWI. The major interventions were in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The lesser interventions included a punitive expedition against Mexico, seizure of territory for the Panama Canal, and landings in Cuba as one vicious dictator replaced another. U.S. foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean included controlling sea-lanes for transit of the Panamanian Isthmus and denying a presence to foreign powers. The Panama Canal opened (1914) within weeks of declarations of war in Europe. In addition to preventing meddling by European powers, a priority was placed on protecting U.S. business interests, including Cornelius Vanderbilt’s trans-isthmus railroad and American fruit company plantations. To accomplish these ends, policy sought to establish local political stability and stimulate economic development. The first of the minor interventions contributed to the seizure of territory for the Panama Canal (1902). The United States encouraged a rebellion that separated the Panamanian Isthmus from Colombia and won a favorable treaty from the newly independent Panama. To protect American interests, marines entered Nicaragua (1912–1913) as its brutal dictator brought the country close to bankruptcy. In another minor intervention, marines helped overthrow what President Wilson called a government of butchers in Mexico (1914). The Mexican revolution against a government dominated by business and the Catholic Church eventually produced an election and a constitution. In one of the longer interventions, marines occupied Haiti (1915–1934) in response to a bloody revolution. Another major intervention into the Dominican Republic (1916–1924) resulted in marines establishing a military government. Marines returned to Nicaragua again (1926–1933), picking up where they left off from the earlier half of the intervention to provide for free elections with an insurgency in the background. Whether the U.S. government was deposing or installing tyrants, the marines were there. A lasting legacy in the Western Hemisphere was established. For much of its history, and specifically the first half of the twentieth century, the Marine Corps has been employed continuously in small wars. Insurgencies

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and other political instabilities in what we now call third-world countries often threatened U.S. strategic, or just plain commercial, interests. The Marine Corps was often deployed to reestablish order. Today we would describe the conditions as failed states and refer to the operations as peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and nation building. Marines separated the factions, established a constabulary, restored the judicial system, and provided public works, including the provision of education and medical care. In general, these operations were conducted within an environment containing some mix of bandits and rebel insurgents. Marines conducted tactical operations, typically in remote jungle environments and against guerrilla forces. The experiences of this period were codified in the Small Wars Manual of 1940.5 According to the manual, the typical small-wars deployment begins by establishing a base of operations, and an enclave around it, in the capital, at a seaport, or at the head of a river. “Sooner or later, it is inevitable that small wars operations will degenerate into guerrilla warfare conducted by small hostile groups in wooded, mountainous terrain.” Marine forces may be spread the “length and breadth of the land,” widely dispersed, and outnumbered in some areas. From the initial base of operations, mobile columns move inland to establish, fortify, and defend advanced bases and to cordon off an enclave to protect natives. Flying columns then operate from those advanced bases. The force commander can issue orders only “in general terms and the details of execution delegated to subordinate commanders.” “It has generally been found that the rifle platoon of three squads is the basic unit best suited to combat such tactics.” Infantry platoons should be organized for independent patrols or outpost detachments. Establishing advanced bases and high degrees of initiative at the lowest echelons are the norm in small wars specifically and in the Marine Corps generally. The Small Wars Manual was used as a textbook at the Quantico Basic School, where every new marine officer is educated. The quintessential marine, Lewis “Chesty” Puller, was from this era of small wars between 1915 and 1935. Puller, who earlier earned an officer’s commission in Haiti and commanded a company in the Nicaragua occupation, later taught at the Basic School. One of his first students was Second Lieutenant Lewis Walt, who later became the commander of marine forces in Vietnam and later the commandant of the Marine Corps. The small-wars culture was thus passed to successive generations. As foreign policy, American interventions and nation building attempts have a bleak history, particularly with respect to the tendency for the marine-built native constabularies to be used later to support the rise of a dictator. It was common for marines to provide the officers of a constabulary, the Guardia, and fill the enlisted ranks from the indigenous population. After marines left the Dominican Republic with a stable government from 1922 to 1924, General Rafael Trujillo later used the same constabulary to establish himself as dictator. Anastosia Somoza, backed by the Guardia, made himself president of Nicaragua in 1936. Marines were returned to the

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Dominican Republic (1958–1963) to help strengthen the army of dictator François “Pappa Doc” Duvalier.6 The era of U.S. imperialism in Latin America formally came to an end prior to World War II. President Theodore Roosevelt’s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine included unilateral intervention, and President Wilson reserved the right to decide which Latin American governments to recognize as legitimate. But between 1929 and 1933, as the Organization of American States was being formed, these same states asserted that “no state has the right to intervene.” In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt’s inaugural address introduced the good neighbor policy toward Latin America. While U.S. unilateral intervention nominally ended, the Marine Corps’ small-wars culture survived intact. Military operations in Vietnam bring this culture into relief. Army General William C. Westmorland, overall commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, relied on conventional Army doctrine employing massive firepower, large unit maneuver, and a search-and-destroy strategy. Marine General Lewis Walt, Chesty Puller’s former student, argued for a clear-and-hold strategy that first protected the indigenous populations in their villages from the insurgents. In short, the Army strategy was to destroy the enemy in the field to bring peace to the villages, while the Marine strategy was to bring peace to the villages to defeat the enemy, and then to destroy the enemy in the field.7 The Marine’s approach can be traced to the Small Wars Manual and its experience with insurgencies. The disagreement on strategy was resolved only when the Marines were withdrawn from Vietnam. The small-wars culture survives today. The First Marine Expeditionary Force was chosen to lead the initial intervention into the failed state of Somalia (1992), Operation Restore Hope, to provide a secure environment to allow distribution of relief supplies.8 The Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade, after having fought in Operation Desert Storm to free Kuwait, sailed directly to Bangladesh and Operation Sea Angel to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief after devastating floods. Throughout the Cold War and the years after, marines have been called upon to do countless evacuations of diplomatic personnel from states on the verge of failure. The small-war, expeditionary orientation remains at the heart of Marine Corps institutional culture and capability. A Second Land Army The Great War (1914–1918), with U.S. involvement beginning only in 1917, represents a temporary change of mission for the Corps. Marines served as a force in readiness and as a second land army, but the country continued to use marines as an intervention force throughout the war. Marines performed well in Europe, but the war opened a rift between the Army and the Marines that survived for generations, created two potential futures for the Corps, and raised the question of why the country had two land armies.

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The punitive expedition into Vera Cruz, Mexico (1914), had recently brought to public attention the difference between being ready to fight and being ready to mobilize, as stated in a Harper’s Weekly editorial. There wasn’t any fuss about their mobilizing. There never is. Just an order issued and . . . one regiment after another are on their way to Cuba, or Mexico, or the worlds’ end. Where they are going isn’t the Marine’s concern. Their business is to be always ready to go.9

The Marine Corps entered World War I as a supporting arm of the Navy, but Marine Commandant George Barnett declared the Marine Corps to be the nation’s force in readiness. The Marine Corps provided one fifth of the initial echelon of Army General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force before the United States could raise an adequate army. Assistant Commandant John A. Lejeune elaborated on the new purpose of the Marine Corps. If the United States faces a naval enemy, then the Marines will seize and defend advanced bases for the Navy. If not, then the Marines would be the advanced guard of the Army. The Marine Corps would be a force in readiness while the country mobilized its army for war, and the Marine Corps would provide forcible entry and establish forward operating bases for a follow-on continental army for large-scale and sustained combat. A rift opened between the Army and the Marine Corps as expansion of the Corps in wartime competed with Army expansion efforts, and as the Corps functioned as a second land army fighting side by side with U.S. and European armies, and fighting well. The War Department and Army conception were of the citizen-soldier, drawn from civilian life at the last minute into a mobilizing army, even though the evidence of past success with this method was less than stellar. The Marine Corps conception was of professional soldiering. Marine forces eventually were dwarfed as the United States mobilized an army of citizen-soldiers that quickly gained combat experience. With recent success in battle, the Corps continued to push for larger combat units but was countered by repeated attempts to break them into smaller support units. Not yet reaching division in size, the WWI Marine fighting organization was the brigade with two regiments and a machine-gun battalion.10 Pershing originally broke up the regiments to use marines as guards and military police.11 Marines suspected an Army attempt to keep them out of battle, making a mockery of their recruiting slogan, “first to fight.” The regiments were quickly rebuilt, but the Corps failed to convince Pershing to accept the idea of a marine division. The experience gained through attacking a determined and entrenched enemy in Europe would be put to good use after the war as marines prepared for amphibious operations against another determined and entrenched enemy in the Pacific. The Marine Corps experienced a seven-fold expansion during WWI. Parris Island (South Carolina) and Mare Island (California) were established to provide initial individual training—a place to build marines. Unit training

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would be conducted at the new base at Quantico, Virginia—a place to prepare to win battles. The Marines’ combat accomplishments, especially early in the war at Belleau Woods, earned the Croix de Guerre from the French and the title Teufelhunder, Devil Dog, from the Germans. The American press was lavish in its reporting of marines in combat, widening the rift between the two land services. Officers such as George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower remembered; the rift continued for a generation and helped keep marines out of Europe in WWII. The competition was thus precluded in the European theater, but the Pacific theater provided ample opportunity for the Army– Marine Corps rift to widen. Marine Major General Holland M. “Howling Mad” Smith commanded the Fifth Amphibious Corps composed of Marine and Army forces, including the Army’s 27th Infantry Division commanded by Army Major General Ralph C. Smith. The tension grew as these forces fought together at Makin, Eniwetok, and the central Saipan campaign. The corps commander eventually relieved from duty the commanding general of the Army division. The “Smith versus Smith” controversy rippled through the Pacific and back to Washington. The rift widened. The press and Hollywood contributed by taking sides. The Army was a standing army throughout the Cold War and became an all-volunteer force in 1973. The tension between citizen- and professionalsoldiers remains between the Regular Army and the Army National Guard. The Army–Marine Corps competition is no longer about professional versus citizen soldering. Today the issue is strategic mobility. Light forces, forward deployed aboard ship, are still capable of forcible entry and to be the first to fight. Rather than accept this temporal ordering of forces, the Army has chosen to sacrifice the lethality and survivability of its heavy armored forces in exchange for earlier arrival. It is a destructive competition. If the Army succeeds in becoming light and more rapidly deployable like the small-wars Marine Corps, who will fight America’s major wars? Amphibious Assault During WWII, the Marine Corps’ forte was amphibious assault. The failed British-led attempt at Gallipoli in 1915 convinced most that an opposed landing was too complex, too costly, and perhaps impossible. All the advantages accrued to the defender. In anticipation of the Pacific campaigns of WWII, marines developed the capability to conduct amphibious operations against the conventional wisdom of the time. It began in fits and starts with the advanced base force. The Spanish-American War (1898) gave the United States a far flung empire; Japan’s convincing defeat of the Russian Imperial Navy in the RussoJapanese War (1904–1905) provided the need to defend it. At the time, there was congressional interest in expanding bases within the United States but not in building bases overseas. The Marines’ justification for existence was

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to conduct operations ashore in support of the fleet, and the Navy’s General Board, dominated by Mahanian thinking, recommended in 1900 that marines be given the mission to seize the advanced operating bases the Navy needed. The Marines’ advanced base force would deploy to defend hastily developed bases abroad as needed. The Army Coastal Artillery Corps provided a similar service for permanent bases, at home and in the Philippines. The advanced base force was the dominant Marine concept from 1900 to 1916 until interrupted by the war, but little real progress was made. Marines never truly embraced the defensive mission. The Navy Board was willing to remove marines from the ships’ company to free personnel for the advanced base force, while ship captains in 1903 were assigning the same shipboard duties to marines as to sailors, which distracted marines from organizing and training for the new mission. The country kept the Corps busy with expeditionary operations, thus giving the Marine Corps a reason to resist permanent specialized units for advanced base defense. Competition with the Army over defense of the Philippines also slowed progress. Not much improved until 1913; units were formed and serious fleet exercises at Culebra, Puerto Rico, began in 1914, giving the Navy General Board its first evidence that marines were taking this critical mission seriously. John Lejeune, soon to become commandant, met Pete Ellis during the Culebra exercises and was infected with his offensive notions for the Pacific. As the World War loomed, Congress was more supportive of building combatant ships than the troop transports that marines would need. Wartime shipbuilding also created additional demands for marines to man ships’ companies. During WWI, marines fought as a second land army and landings were unopposed. Marines left the war focused on large unit operations on land, not on seizing and defending advanced bases. The years immediately following the war brought significant change to the amphibious movement within the Corps. In 1920, John Lejeune became commandant; the Quantico Advanced Base Force was renamed the East Coast Expeditionary Force; and property in San Diego and Quantico were purchased for training in expeditionary operations, subsuming advanced base defense. By 1920, the Advanced Base Force was gone. An enigmatic officer, Major Pete Ellis, predicted the inevitability of war with Japan and the Marine Corps’ inevitable role. Officers like Holland M. Smith brought Ellis’s ideas to reality in a time of extreme fiscal constraints, the Depression, and against conventional wisdom. Against this backdrop, twenty-first-century complaints that transformation requires large sums of money ring hollow. Ellis argued forcefully for the need to seize the base from an entrenched enemy before defending it. To effect such a landing under the sea and shore conditions obtaining and in the face of enemy resistance required careful training and preparation, to say the least; and this along Marine Corps lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high morale; they must be skilled water men and jungle men who know it can be done—Marines with Marine training.12

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Amphibious assault was discredited in 1915, even before the United States entered WWI. Allied forces from Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and France attempted to force open a supply route between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. Success meant opening a supply line to allow Western logistical support to the Russians, thereby keeping open a second front against Germany and its allies, threatening Istanbul itself, and possibly Turkey’s withdrawal from the war. The peninsula of Gallipoli guards the passage between the two seas. The Allies failed partly because of a piecemeal commitment of forces that provided the Turks with enough warning time to reinforce attacked positions. The conventional wisdom from that point forward was that all advantages accrued to the defender. For whatever reason, the successful German amphibious operation against the Russians at Riga, Latvia, in 1917 did nothing to sway opinion. At Riga, the Germans did not employ a frontal assault against a defended beachhead, choosing instead an indirect approach, landing at an unopposed site, movement over land, and then encirclement of the objective. Resistance to offensive amphibious operations was even stronger than to defense of advanced bases. Within the Corps, the glory days as a second land army and regimental operations in WWI remained strong influences. Landings were unopposed. The small-war marines who continued fighting the banana wars in the Caribbean felt that they had missed the “big show.” The pressure from within was for large units and preparations as a continental army—a force in readiness. The Navy was focused on capital ships and fleet engagements and not on supporting operations ashore, and the failure at Gallipoli was a fresh memory. There were also significant technological problems to overcome, specifically providing firepower during the vulnerable period of time when light infantry was assaulting an opposed beach. There was no such thing as an amphibious tank, both lethal and survivable near water’s edge, and artillery had to be landed later. Sequencing naval gunfire, naval aviation, and the later-arriving armor and artillery posed a daunting problem of organization and command. Assuming solutions to these problems, the logistical aspects of loading equipment and supplies aboard ships for offloading during the assault represented an overwhelming problem alone. Against these negatives, the 1914 fleet exercises were begun again in 1924 and continued until World War II. The shift from expeditionary to amphibious orientation took place in the 1930s.13 In December of 1933, the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces were abolished and were replaced by Fleet Marine Forces that absorbed expeditionary forces returning from Nicaragua and China. The Tentative Landing Operations Manual (1935) established the doctrine that Allied forces would use in WWII. The companion Text for the Employment of Marine Corps Aviation (1935) specified the role of aircraft in support of amphibious operations. The division of the WWII Pacific theater was largely driven by ArmyNavy rivalry. During the Pacific campaigns, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz received the newest equipment, including carriers and carrier-based aviation,

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for his northward advance to Japan. Marine and Army forces conducted frontal assaults on small, well-fortified islands with great loss of life. The original concept was island hopping, attacking each island in turn. Island hopping was quickly replaced by leapfrogging, attacking islands essential to the objectives and bypassing fortified but inessential islands allowing them to whither from lack of logistic support. General Douglas MacArthur was given the southern theater and moved east and north to retake the Philippines. MacArthur conducted amphibious operations predominantly with older Navy surface ships and land-based aviation. The invasion of Borneo, an island the size of California, was not conducted as a series of frontal assaults on the model of Gallipoli. Rather, MacArthur used the sea and land as maneuver space, on the model of Riga, landing his forces away from fortified positions, maneuvering over the ground to cut off and isolate fortified positions. Jungle marches were slow and unsupported by carrier aviation. MacArthur’s army had to build airfields every 200 miles so as not to outrun the range of tactical, land-based aircraft of the time. Large numbers of casualties were taken by arduous jungle marches and disease in addition to those sustained at the hands of the enemy. Throughout the Pacific campaigns of the early 1940s, MacArthur publicly deplored the frontal assaults used by Nimitz’s fleet, claiming them to be too costly and unnecessary. In 1950, Army General Omar Bradley testified before Congress that “never again” would such amphibious operations be employed. In September 1950, the same General MacArthur looked to the Marines to lead the multinational amphibious landing at Inchon, the strategic masterstroke that changed the direction of the war. Such has been the nature of amphibious operations. They have been complex and costly tactical undertakings with their consequences at the strategic level of war. They are battles upon which wars are won or lost. Soon after the conclusion of the war, Commandant Alexander A. Vandegrift commented on the role the Corps had played in developing amphibious doctrine used by armies, navies, and marines of the Allied forces during WWII. Despite its outstanding record as a combat force in the past war, the Marine Corps’ far greater contribution to victory was doctrinal: that is the fact that the basic amphibious doctrines which carried Allied troops over every beachhead of World War II had been largely shaped—often in the face of uninterested and doubting military orthodoxy—by U.S. Marines, and mainly between 1922 and 1935.14

Amphibious operations have been by no means the sole province of marines. The Allied armies conducted larger campaigns beginning with amphibious operations into North Africa, Sicily, Italy, the south of France, and ultimately, the Allied invasion at Normandy. However, the final decisive battles in the European theater were fought and won on the plains of Europe with fastmoving, heavy, mechanized forces, forging the modern Army’s conception of war. Amphibious assault in the Pacific forged the concept for the Corps.

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In postwar negotiations, the Corps gave up its specialized parachute, raider, and defense battalions, and the Army gladly left amphibious operations to the Corps. Integrated Air-Ground Operations The technology of flight was new and primitive during WWI. The Army and Marine Corps both employed aircraft for communications, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting. Not having a natural home, Army aviation began in the Army’s signal branch. But flying over stalemated trench warfare, where thousands of lives were lost over a few yards of mud, Army aviators imagined a new type of war that allowed them to fly over the infantry and artillery battle, taking the fight to the enemy population and industrial base. Marine aviators saw a powerful new tool in combined arms warfare. The nascent advanced base force would provide the rationale and home for marine aviation. The first marine aviators were directed to organize an aviation detachment at Philadelphia with the Advanced Base Force in December 1913. In preparation for America’s entry into the World War, Army air forces focused on bombing ground targets, while Navy aviation concentrated on anti-submarine warfare and dragged marine aviation with them. The Navy focused on bombing submarines at sea; marines proposed bombing them in port. The United States declared war on the Central Powers in April 1917. When the submarine war ended, marines shifted to bombing in support of British and Belgian ground forces. The marines’ first aerial victory was recorded in September 1918, and their first aerial supply drop, in support of besieged French forces, followed in October. Armistice came in November, and marine aviators left the war without having supported marines on the ground. The senior marine aviator had to make amends following the war, saying, “the only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations.”15 Following the war, marine aviators returned to formulating a role for the fledging technology in their advanced base force concept, the defensive forerunner of amphibious assault. But that would have to wait; the immediate need was for small-wars operations in the Caribbean. In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, marines used aviation for reconnaissance, supply, and medical evacuation. Rudimentary close air support had been demonstrated by 1919 in Haiti. True close air support had developed by 1927 when marine aviators were among the first to employ air-to-ground communications while dive-bombing and strafing an organized enemy in Nicaragua.16 The 1930s marked the transition from expeditionary land operations and defense of advanced bases to the more inclusive amphibious operations that included offensive amphibious assault. By Pearl Harbor, the Marine Corps had grown to two divisions, stopped from expansion to a third by Chief of Naval Operations Stark. Still, the principal Marine Corps organization deployed

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forward in the Pacific was the defense battalion of less than 1,000 men. The Corps would soon grow to six divisions and their air complement. Marines beat back a Japanese amphibious assault at Wake Island in December 1941. The Japanese force contained a light cruiser, three destroyers, and three transport ships with 450 naval infantry. The marine force involved was a defense battalion, spread over the three-island atoll, and largely equipped with coastal artillery and infantry. The defense battalion was responsible for the first sinking of a Japanese surface vessel in the war, and the Japanese assault was thwarted. Four lone marine fighters chased the retreating flotilla and sank a second destroyer. Wake Island was the last time coastal artillery and infantry would prevent an amphibious assault. But the Japanese returned within two weeks, and this time brought two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers, six destroyers, and a determined 1,500-man landing force. Marine aviation was wiped out and the surviving marine aviators took up rifles. Thinking it too little, too late, the U.S. Navy commander in the Pacific recalled a relief force built around the carrier Saratoga. One thousand Japanese soldiers landed against 85 marines. Prisoners of war were shipped to Shanghai with some beheaded along the way for sport.17 Being left without air cover was a painful pill to swallow. U.S. forces soon shifted to the offense. The Battle of Coral Sea (May 4–8, 1942) was the first battle at sea waged beyond visual range of the combatant ships. It was a battle won and lost based on carrier aviation. The Battle of Midway ( June 3–6, 1942) was also won at sea. One marine fighter squadron flew off of the Saratoga to land at Midway as the carrier withdrew from the aborted reinforcement of Wake Island. Two land-based marine squadrons were wiped out, and marine aviation was shown inadequate and obsolete. The victory at Midway was a victory for the surface navy and carrier-based aviation, not for marine defense forces. The real lesson, however, came during the massive allied offensive operations against Japan in the South Pacific, specifically, the Battle of Guadalcanal (August 1942 to February 1943). The airfield under construction on Guadalcanal was within range of land-based Japanese aviation. Early in the amphibious assault, the Navy withdrew its three carriers. From the Navy perspective, carriers were better employed against the enemy navy and were too valuable to risk supporting marines ashore. The costs were high. Whenever questions are asked about why the Marine Corps requires its own air force, “Guadalcanal” is the marine’s immediate response. Three Guadalcanal veterans rose to become commandant, institutionalizing the lesson learned about tightly integrated air-ground operations under a single commander.18 Divergent conceptions of war continued to leave the Marine Corps with less than optimal air support during their frontal assaults against a determined and capable enemy. While under command of General George C. Kenney and his Far East Air Force, the 1st Marine Air Wing was kept idle or underemployed.19 As marines and soldiers captured airfields ever closer to Japan, Army B-29 bombers were firebombing Tokyo, drawing favorable media attention

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back home. During the Iwo Jima landings, the Navy sent a carrier task force north to attack Japan. Task Force 58 included eight marine air squadrons prevented from providing air support to their fellow marines in the most costly battle in Marine Corps history. Marines were suspicious of the Navy’s motives for forming Task Force 58.20 Marine general and aviator Roy Geiger, former commander of the WWII First Amphibious Corps (ground and air components), having witnessed an atomic bomb test, argued for new methods of amphibious assault. The rapid build-up rate and concentration on the beachhead required by Marine Corps doctrine made it subject to obsolescence if the enemy could bring atomic weapons to bear. The Corps began experimenting with emerging helicopter technology soon after the end of WWII and published Employment of Helicopters (Tentative) in 1948. The helicopter served mostly in Korea as a scout and ambulance, but it became integral to Marine Corps operations in Vietnam and remains so today. Rather than concentrating air assault in a specialized division, as does the Army, air assault is integral to all Marine Corps operations, in the amphibious assault and in subsequent operations ashore. The integrated air-ground orientation in the Marine Corps produces tremendous friction when marines fight side by side with the Army and Air Force. Theoretically, the United States Air Force commanded all air operations in Vietnam from Saigon in the south. As a practical matter, the Marine Corps commanded its own aircraft from Danang in the northern provinces. The friction was significant, could not be resolved in theater, and was referred all the way to the president of the United States; the problem was resolved only when marines were withdrawn from Vietnam. In addition to its land-based air operations at Danang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai, marines also flew off carriers bombing North Vietnam and interdicting logistic and troop flows along the Ho Chi Minh Trail running from North to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. During the Gulf War, the United States Central Command employed a multinational and multiservice air component command. Ostensibly, the employment of all aircraft was to be planned by this single headquarters entity, headed primarily by the United States Air Force. The Marine Corps successfully withheld its airpower from the higher command, just as it had done in Vietnam. Service competitions, fed by different conceptions of war, are manifest in divergent priorities under fire. The Navy’s first priority is to defeat the enemy navy at sea. Lacking an enemy navy, the Navy’s current priority appears to be the long-range precision strike mission in competition with the Air Force. Supporting marines in amphibious operations is not at the top of the Navy’s list of priorities. The Air Force’s preference for an independent air war gives priority first to air superiority and aerial combat. Lacking an enemy air force, or following its defeat, the priority goes to strategic bombardment or its modern incarnation, long-range precision strike. Support for ground forces is of tertiary interest at best.

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Throughout the history of Marine Corps aviation, it has been pulled away from the conceptual ideal of integrated air-ground operations. During WWI, marine aviators were drawn by the Navy to anti-submarine warfare. From WWII until today, marine squadrons have been drawn away from support of ground forces to back up Navy carrier squadrons. WWII marine aviators were drawn into carrier operations against Tokyo, arguably part of the publicity competition between the Army and Navy, and an entire marine air wing was underemployed while under command of Army air forces. Marine Corps aviation successes in the Pacific were largely in aerial combat and against shipping rather than support of marines on the ground. The Air Force’s retirement of its electronic warfare aircraft without a replacement shifted the load to Navy and Marine electronic warfare squadrons. Opting out of a program to upgrade the principal Navy and Marine Corps fighter-attack aircraft left marine aviators worrying that Navy flyers would get the interesting missions—long-range strike, not close air support.21 All recent trends, including increasingly expensive aircraft, are pulling marine aviators into the Navy–Air Force competition over long-range precision strike and away from support of marines ashore. Throughout modern Marine Corps history, marines have consciously made tradeoffs, giving up heavy artillery and armor and making up the loss with tactical aircraft. These tradeoffs are the basis of an expeditionary or amphibious force. Turning over its aircraft to another service makes it light and vulnerable and brings back memories of Wake Island, Guadalcanal, and Iwo Jima. Army light infantry understands the problem well, but as a producer of land forces the Army cannot make air-ground tradeoffs, nor does the institutional Army favor light infantry. Survival “The United States does not need a Marine Corps; . . . the United States wants a Marine Corps” [emphasis in original].22 With great confidence in its abilities, and clear recognition of its ambiguous position in the cracks between the other services, the Corps understands the need to show unquestioned value to the country to assure its survival. It consistently has shown its utility in foreign interventions below the threshold of major war, but the Corps’ uncontested role as lead in amphibious assault is something rarely called for, continuing the Corps’ tenuous political position. The need for a Marine Corps was called into question soon after the nation’s birth. The 1798 law establishing the Corps specified separate legal and administrative authorities over marines by the Army when ashore and by the Navy when at sea. In 1801, Navy Captain Thomas Truxton argued against the existence of the Corps, recommending that if there were marines at all they should be only in small detachments and then under direct command of Navy officers aboard ship or at shore installations. The first half of the nineteenth century did not bode well for the Corps. There were fewer than 1,000 marines in 1820. From 1825 to 1829, the Board

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of Navy Commissioners, led by Captain John Rogers, continued Truxton’s argument, and in December 1829, President Andrew Jackson recommended abolition of the Corps and its absorption into the Army. Neither the Senate nor the House Naval Affairs Committee would act on Jackson’s recommendation. Expansionist Jackson ordered all available marines to be detailed to the Army in support of the Indian wars against the Creeks (1836) and the Seminoles (1837–1841). The Marine Corps left the Civil War (1861–1865) having demonstrated no specific function. In 1866, with less than 2,000 men in uniform, Congress again debated abolishing the Corps but decided against it. The baton that passed from Truxton to Rogers passed to William F. Fullam.23 The shift from sail to steam disrupted careers and self perceptions. The specialized engineering expertise required of mechanization challenged the age-old dominance of the general purpose officer of the line, and line officers sought new warfighting responsibilities. Mechanization also brought a new professionalism to the enlisted ranks. Why, some Navy line officers asked, can’t Navy officers and sailors provide their own security aboard ship and at shore installations? Furthermore, why can’t Navy personnel conduct landing operations, they asked. Fullam’s proposition was quickly made manifest in a Senate bill in 1894 recommending that the Marine Corps and five regiments of Army artillery form a Corps of Marine Artillery that would be part of the Army.24 Senate Naval and Military Affairs Committees refused to act. Recognizing President Theodore Roosevelt’s (1901–1909) predilection against the Corps and that his tenure was drawing to a close, Fullam and like-minded Navy officers initiated another attack in 1908. Roosevelt wanted to merge the Marine Corps into the Army “with no vestiges remaining.” Roosevelt’s Army chief of staff, General Leonard Wood, wanted the Corps absorbed into the Army coastal artillery branch. Roosevelt eviscerated the Corps in executive order, but Congress restored the Corps’ duties aboard ship.25 Roosevelt’s secretary of war, William H. Taft, became President Taft (1909–1913), appointed an unpopular commandant, and persisted in the attack. Under continuous attack, marine officers formed the Marine Corps Association in 1913 to lobby for survival. President Wilson’s (1913–1921) election brought an end to Taft’s influence, but Fullam continued. The Great Depression (1929–1941) forced President Herbert Hoover (1929–1933) to make hard choices, including drawing down the force. Under fiscal pressure, foreign expeditions were becoming increasingly unpopular and troops were being withdrawn. Force structure was in decline. Hoover, a Quaker, was against foreign intervention and more strongly oriented on hemispheric defense. The General Board, however, pressed for the Corps to concentrate on its coming wartime mission: seizure and initial defense of advanced bases, but there were too few marines for both expeditionary duties and wartime preparations. Hoover proposed that all marine aviation be transferred to the Army Air Corps, that the Marine Corps be responsible for all base defense, and that the Marine Corps relinquish expeditionary duty.

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This view to efficiency has generally been from the legislative rather than the executive branch, but the Depression was an extraordinary time. Secretary of Navy James V. Forrestal, observing the battle for Iwo Jima with the Fleet Marine Force commander, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, is often quoted as telling General Smith that, “The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.” Less often quoted is that the general turned to an aide and said quietly, “When the war is over and the money is short they will be after the Marines again, and a dozen Iwo Jimas would make no difference.” In the aftermath of WWII, Congress convened hearings to consider the unification of the United States Armed Forces to address matters of efficiency and unity of command. For the Air Force, unification hearings were about independence from mud soldiers; for the Army it was about budget share; and for the Navy it was about retaining its aviation branch and autonomy. But for the Marine Corps, the unification hearings were a fight for existence. In an unguarded moment, one Army general gave a common Army view. As for the Marines, you know what Marines are. They are a small, fouled-up Army talking Navy lingo. We are going to put those Marines in the regular Army and make efficient soldiers out of them.26

And in a celebrated speech, Marine Corps commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, clearly communicated what was at stake.27 We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go.

Preparations for hearings included classified JCS papers not made available to the Marine Corps. Commanding General of Army Air Forces Carl Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower argued for the Marines to be a small, ready, and light force to provide guards for ship and shore duty and to protect citizens ashore. Small meant less than 60,000 in total and organized in units of no greater than regimental size. Under their proposal, marines would not require artillery or aviation. Marine participation in amphibious operations would be limited to waterborne duties operating ship-to-shore vessels; Army soldiers would provide the land force. There would be no need for wartime expansion of the Corps to interfere with Army mobilization.28 President Harry Truman (1945–1953), a WWI Army artillery officer, was explicitly anti-Navy and anti–Marine Corps, referring to the Corps pejoratively as the “Navy’s police force.” The Marine Corps was not represented at Key West in 1947 when the big services debated roles and missions. It was not until 1952 that the commandant of the Marine Corps was allowed to sit on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for

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matters relevant to the Corps. The commandant became a full member of the JCS only in 1978. The Marine Corps Bill of 1952 put some Marine Corps survival issues to rest, or beyond the president’s and the service’s reach.29 The Corps’ minimum size was set at three marine divisions, air wings, and supporting forces. The principal opposition to the legislation was the Chief of Naval Operations.30 Not all, or even many, Navy officers are against the Marine Corps. The existence of a robust Corps makes the Navy Department a self-deploying, self-sustaining, self-contained sea, air, and land force. The Marine Corps is secure in its competence and insecure in its ambiguous and therefore tenuous position. It has been subjected to a cycle of attack from within the executive branch followed by protection from the legislature. Congress has expressed a repeated concern for efficiency, something the Marine Corps is aware of. Congress, with interests throughout the United States, is likely to support a wide variety of military bases, research and development, and procurement of weapon systems. The president is more likely to settle on a single conception of warfare, strategic monism, the reliance on a single service or branch. Throughout the continuous attacks, the Marine Corps has been accused of having undue influence on Congress, but innovation, performance in combat, economy, and emphasis on balance may be the best explanation for congressional support. The Marine Corps has a record of innovation, driven by its constant struggle for survival. Its record includes pioneering in the area of amphibious operations, integrated air and ground operations, and vertical envelopment by helicopter. It continues to innovate to show relevance through its efforts to develop the capability to fight in urban environments and in its creation of a chemical/biological incidence response force after the sarin gas attack in Japan. The Marine Corps survives by being an economical force. It claims to provide about one-sixth of America’s ready combat forces at only one-tenth of the cost. Its officer-to-enlisted ratio is the lowest of all the services at one to nine, with the Army and Navy at one to five and the Air Force at one to four. The Corps continues to prefer avoidance of costly acquisitions dependent on risky research and development in deference to updating proven weapon platforms. The current dependence on revolutionary tilt-rotor aircraft and the advanced amphibious tractor threaten that pattern. The man-centric versus equipment-centric orientation may minimize the public’s association of the Corps with acquisition horror stories, but it also means the Corps lacks the widespread industrial constituency to lobby in its favor. Amphibious assault, the unique basis of the Corps, has rare utility, produces high casualties, and is a mission coveted by no other service. Amphibious assault onto opposed beach is rare, perhaps as outdated as coastal artillery and horse cavalry. Seizing airports, seaports, and operating bases and other infrastructure seems to be a more enduring need. Moving ashore to operate in austere environments remains a capability of constant demonstrable value to an interventionist country.

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Several tensions continue to permeate the relevance and survival of the Corps. One tension is between the large combat units required for major war and the many small units needed for expeditionary operations. Another tension exists between the glamour of the few major wars and the many unglamorous small wars. Warriors run to the sound of guns. The ambivalent use of aircraft as general purpose naval aviation rather than support for ground forces is a powerful stressing function. These stressing functions will determine the future shape of the Corps, its utility to the country, and its survival. Current Cultural Characteristics and Capabilities The statutory functions of the Corps shed little light on the institution. Functions include amphibious operations and naval expeditionary operations. Also included is “land-based defense of advanced naval bases” dating from 1900. Collateral land operations included airborne, airmobile, air operations in support of land, and special operations. Marines provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including the establishment of temporary military governments, a reference to the Corps’ small-wars capability. Missions such as “in support of naval forces, airborne, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, intelligence, land- and sea-based operations, and aerial photoreconnaissance” allow marine aviation to be siphoned off as part of the Navy as in WWII. The Marine Corps provides both small-war and major-war capabilities. The Marine Corps Hymn says, “We will fight our country’s battles.” Battles, not wars. The Corps prides itself in small unit operations carried out with great tactical proficiency, but it makes no claims about single-handedly prosecuting a major war. The landings at Inchon and Iwo Jima are examples of winning battles that achieve strategic and operational objectives. When it comes to winning big wars, marines are anxious to be the first to fight, but they understand that big wars are won by the big services. The Corps’ culture is toward crisis response rather than deliberate planning. The Cold War, a long period of great power conflict, is characterized by many knowns. Preparing for great power war took the form of a detailed planning of force deployment and employment. The Marine Corps had a role to play in the big war plans, but its day-to-day existence is better characterized as a small force prepared to enter any number of countries to execute any number of missions and to do it with only six hours warning. The end of the Cold War changed little in this orientation. The Marine culture is to plan quickly, put the force ashore, and expect the young officers and noncommissioned officers to improvise. It is a crisis action planning culture, not a deliberate planning culture. Advancing technology has affected all aspects of warfare, but the Marine Corps remains focused on the individual rifleman. The principle, already well established, is stated clearly in the Small Wars Manual, and remains an unquestioned principle in today’s Corps.

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Infantry, the arm of close combat, has been the most important arm in small wars because, from the very nature of such wars, it is evident that the ultimate objective will be reached only by close combat. The policy that every man, regardless of his specialty, be basically trained as an infantryman has been vindicated time and again, and any tendency to deviate from that policy must be guarded against. . . . Sooner or later, it is inevitable that small wars operations will degenerate into guerrilla warfare conducted by small hostile groups in wooded, mountainous terrain. It has generally been found that the rifle platoon of three squads is the basic unit best suited to combat such tactics.31

Every enlisted marine is trained to serve as a rifleman, and every marine officer is trained to serve as a platoon commander. A marine’s roots are in the rifle platoon. Every marine—whether destined to become a truck driver or a mechanic, whether active duty or reservist—is first trained as a rifleman. From Vietnam to Somalia to Iraq, small ad hoc units have been drawn from supply personnel and the motor pool to successfully conduct rifle operations. Every marine in combat knows exactly what training the man next to him has, even if he doesn’t know his name. And that matters. Every marine officer candidate—whether drawn from Annapolis, the enlisted ranks, or following college graduation—attends the Basic School, boot camp for officers, at Quantico, Virginia. Upon graduation, officers have learned their place in the marine rifle platoon, and only then do they move on to branch-specific training. They may go to an Army school for armor or artillery, or they may attend a Navy facility for flight school, but first they must become marines. It is the marine officers’ common heritage at the Basic School learning to command a rifle platoon that makes them marines, not the specialized skills acquired elsewhere. The Marine Corps is credited with pioneering close air support in Nicaragua in the 1920s. In WWII the Navy left marines with inadequate air cover at Guadalcanal to pursue and defeat the enemy fleet at sea. The Marines vowed never again to be left without tactical aviation. Tactical air operations are tightly integrated into their warfighting methods. The Marine Corps, to remain light and expeditionary, makes tradeoffs between all elements of the combat arms. They opt for light over heavy artillery, small numbers of tanks, light armored vehicles, and infantry. The loss in ground combat power is balanced by tightly integrated tactical airpower. And that airpower can be launched from ship or operate ashore from austere bases. It is a mission and orientation that the Air Force has found to be an inefficient use of airpower despite its own extraordinary success cooperating with Patton’s Third Army in WWII Europe. During WWII, the Marine Corps had specialized defense, raider, parachute, and infantry battalions. Considering themselves an elite force, there were some units more elite than others. Today’s Corps takes great pains to avoid the stratification found in today’s Army. Any battalion can be given the necessary training to become special-operations capable. A marine is a

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marine regardless of military occupational specialty and regardless of active or reserve status. Every marine a rifleman—slogan, policy, and practice, this principle permeates the Corps. MARINE DIVISIONS, WINGS, AND SUPPORTING FORCES Marine forces are organized under Marine Forces Atlantic (mar-for-lant) and Marine Forces Pacific (mar-for-pack). From the Navy perspective, these organizations are type commands, a force provider in the administrative chain of command, the chain governing the production of military force. From the Marine Corps perspective, they are part of the operational chain of command, the chain governing the use of military force. For purposes here, these organizations will be referred to as fleet marine forces and the Navy perception used.32 Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific are closely aligned with their parent Navy organizations, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, but those organizations are being merged and that fact will ultimately affect the Corps. The principal organizations of fleet marine forces are the marine division; marine air wing; force service support group; and surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group. There are three of each on active duty and the equivalent of a fourth in the Marine Corps Reserve. The elements of fleet marine forces are assigned to one of three operational commands—marine expeditionary forces—one headquartered in the mid-Atlantic states, one in southern California, and one in Japan. Marine Division While the Army has several division types, there is only one type of division in the Marine Corps: the marine division. The marine division, as shown in Figure 6.1, bears a strong organizational resemblance to the Army infantry division. The division contains three infantry regiments of three infantry battalions each, an artillery regiment, one tank battalion, one light armored infantry battalion, one amphibious assault battalion, and one reconnaissance battalion. The light armored infantry and the amphibious assault battalions are similar in function to the Army’s mechanized infantry battalion, but employ amphibious vehicles. The marine division is commanded by a major general. Since the Vietnam War, there have been four marine divisions named simply as the 1st through 4th Marine Divisions. Supporting units and aircraft wing are located in close proximity to the division. Comparing the marine division to an Army division can be misleading. Unlike an Army division that is designed as part of a larger ground force, the marine division is the ground component of an air-ground task force or it provides smaller ground units to such a task force. In general, the Army builds up from the division, while the Marine Corps breaks the division down.

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Figure 6.1.

Marine Division.

Composition of the marine division begins with the rifleman. Two riflemen, an automatic rifleman, and a team leader (a corporal) comprise a fire team. The squad is built from three fire teams and is led by a squad leader who holds the rank of sergeant. Three squads comprise a platoon, which is commanded by a second lieutenant, who, in turn, is supported by a staff sergeant and accompanied by a radioman. The rifle platoon is the basic building block of the Marine Corps. The company assembles rifle platoons and integrates the full complement of combined arms capabilities available to the Marine Corps. Three platoons comprise a company commanded by a captain. Additional weapons are available to the company, including mortar and heavy machine guns. The company commander is tethered to the rest of the force through a handful of backpack radios. The company commander is able to bring to bear the full range of combined arms, including artillery, armor, and close air support.

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Marine company commanders are expected to employ the full range of arms with great initiative. Infantry companies are assembled into infantry battalions. There are three companies in a battalion and three battalions in a regiment, commanded by lieutenant colonels and colonels, respectively. Battalion and regiment have additional weapons, support units, and staff. In garrison, the specialized battalions remain together to achieve economies in training and maintenance. In deployed formations, these battalions can be used as separate maneuver elements or parceled out to reinforce smaller infantry units. The tank, light armored infantry, and assault amphibian battalions are discussed separately below. The tank battalion can be used as a maneuver element separate from the infantry regiments, or, more commonly, its individual companies or platoons can be allocated to infantry regiments or battalions. The Corps has been trading in its older-generation main battle tank for the newer main battle tank used by the Army. The Corps is often a generation behind in such matters, preferring the older model because it is smaller and lighter than each successive Army model. Projecting marines from the sea requires specialized equipment in addition to the ships that carry them. The amphibious assault vehicle, the light armored vehicle, and the helicopter are the most common pieces of equipment that support amphibious operations. The amphibious Navy brings additional landing capabilities. The primary weapon system in the light armored infantry battalion is a lightly armored, wheeled, amphibious vehicle that carries riflemen protected from automatic weapons fire and artillery fragmentation. It is called the light armored vehicle (LAV) and carries six marine infantrymen. The LAV is “street legal” and can exceed 60 miles per hour on the open road or in open terrain. The infantrymen are permanently assigned to the battalion. The LAV’s high speed provides the commander a certain amount of combat power that can quickly move from one place on the battlefield to another to reinforce a ground unit in contact with enemy forces. The LAV battalion also performs well as a forward reconnaissance element running ahead of the infantry units, often in close concert with marine aviation. The assault amphibian battalion is built from the amphibious assault vehicle, a lightly armored, tracked vehicle that carries marines from ship to shore and beyond. Generically, it is called an amphibious tractor, or amtrac. The amtrac debarks from ship filled with riflemen and can maneuver at sea under its own propulsion at roughly seven knots (eight mph). Once it hits the beach, it is capable of carrying marines inland as an armored personnel carrier. Infantry forces are not assigned to the amtrac battalion. Instead, the amtrac battalion supports infantry battalions in the assault. The amtrac in current inventory can carry 21 fully equipped marines compared to 11 and 6 that can be carried by the Army’s venerable M113 and current M2 infantry fighting vehicle, respectively. The amtrac currently

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under acquisition is designed to carry 17 to 18 combat-equipped marines, a rifle squad. Although designs have improved since WWII, the amtrac’s seven-knot speed has not increased appreciably. The developmental amtrac is capable of sustaining 25 knots (29 mph) and can reach 41 knots (47 mph) with the mobility of the tank. It will allow marines to debark from ship over the horizon, maneuver at sea, and assault at a place and time of their choosing. The new amtrac is an important element in the transition away from the frontal assault into the teeth of the enemy. Marine Aircraft Wing The marine aircraft wing is composed of marine air groups which are, in turn, composed of squadrons (see Figure 6.2). A major general commands a wing, a colonel commands a group, and a lieutenant colonel commands a squadron. Squadrons typically employ a single aircraft type—for example, supersonic fighter/attack aircraft (Hornets) or vertical/short takeoff and landing, ground attack aircraft (Harriers). Separate squadrons exist for heavy lift, medium lift, utility, and light attack helicopters as well as fixed-wing observation aircraft.

Figure 6.2.

Marine Aircraft Wing.

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The marine air group is somewhat analogous to the Air Force composite wing. Each marine air group has a headquarters, an air base squadron, and an air traffic control unit that allow the group to be based and operated independently. Squadrons or individual aircraft can be moved from group to group with relative ease. Fixed-wing and helicopter squadrons are assigned to separate air groups. A final aircraft group contains separate squadrons for electronic warfare, refueling, and transport aircraft. There are operational requirements that form the basis for separate Air Force and naval aviation acquisitions. All of the above-mentioned aircraft can operate from land bases or from aircraft carriers at sea. The Harrier and helicopters can operate from austere or even undeveloped bases due to their vertical takeoff capabilities. The Navy and Marine Corps have also shown a preference for air-to-ground combat, while the Air Force prefers a plane built for air-to-air combat. In expeditionary operations against insurgent forces, marines can assume or establish air superiority, making air-ground operations the primary mission. War against a peer competitor requires the orientation of the Air Force to establish air superiority. None of the U.S. aviation branches have faced a serious competitor in the air since early in the Vietnam conflict. Special operations forces also have very capable air-ground capabilities and also assume a permissive air environment; lacking it, another air force must establish the permissive air environment. The aging fleet of heavy and medium lift helicopters is a second important component of ship-to-shore capability. The helicopter is not an efficient flying machine, and its range is limited. But its ability to take off and land from small ships and in small open spaces makes it invaluable in amphibious assault and subsequent airmobile operations on land. The tilt-rotor Osprey is the most important acquisition program to the Corps. The Osprey is capable of vertical takeoff and landing like a helicopter, then after rotating its propeller system forward, can fly with the efficiency of fixed-wing aircraft. This aircraft is planned to replace both heavy and medium lift helicopters. The prototype Osprey can move 24 combat-equipped marines, 20,000 pounds of internal cargo, or 10,000 pounds of externally slung cargo. Its increased range and carrying capacity will allow the marines to operate from over the horizon to conduct raids deeper inland. Its critics argue that operations deep inland are the province of the Army and Air Force, not the naval services. Others argue that the high cost of the aircraft makes it unreasonable to go too far forward into the hostilities; the same argument was voiced when the CH-46 helicopter first entered service in Vietnam. Supporting Forces In past decades, battalions and companies not assigned to the division or the air wing were assigned to Force Troops. Force Troops later split into a force service support group and a surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence

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group. Since then, the elements of the latter were moved under the Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters. The force service support group is made of battalions (see Figure 6.3), each of which supports a specific function. The battalions are divided into companies. Companies or smaller detachments can be separately assigned to support elements of the marine division as required for a specific mission. Medical and dental battalions are manned by Navy personnel. The surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group is composed of battalions and companies (see Figure 6.4). Each unit contains marines with specialized skills and equipment that provide the commander with command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. The air/naval gunfire liaison company, ANGLICO, provides the commander with small units of marines, many parachute qualified, that can deploy deep to call and correct fire from ships at sea or naval aviation. ANGLICO units often operate outside the Marine Corps and train with Army contingency forces or wherever their specialized skills are required. The communications battalion provides electronic communications between the elements of the Navy/Marine force, while the radio battalion concerns itself with

Figure 6.3.

Force Service Support Group.

Figure 6.4. Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group.

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201

enemy communications. The force reconnaissance company contains highly trained marines who can be placed deep into enemy territory for observation and direct action. These marines are parachute and scuba qualified. The remotely piloted vehicle company operates tactical, overhead intelligence collection assets. The intelligence company contains platoons and smaller units for operation of intelligence sensors, topographic analysis, photo interpretation, foreign language translation, tactical deception, and the synthesis of all collection resources. MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES The Army expects its divisions to conduct operations under command of a larger ground force, the corps. The Marine Corps, in contrast, expects to form air-ground task forces from its divisions, wings, and support units. These elements of the fleet marine force are better understood as administrative organizations that provide the forces from which a marine air-ground task force (MAGTF, mag-taff ) is formed for a specific mission. There are three sizes of MAGTF, but each is structured as shown in Figure 6.5. The MAGTF commander and staff comprise the command element supported by the communications and intelligence assets selected for the specific mission. The smallest and most common MAGTF is the marine expeditionary unit (MEU, mew) with a single infantry battalion and a composite air squadron as its air and ground combat elements. The largest MAGTF is the marine expeditionary force (MEF, meff ). The MEF has a division and an air wing as its ground and air combat elements. The marine expeditionary brigade (MEB, mebb) has a regimental ground combat element and an air group for its air combat element. A MAGTF might also take on a naval construction force (Seabees) of regimental, battalion, or component size. Navy corpsmen—combat medics—are tightly integrated into marine units. Some of the best to wear the Marine Corps uniform have been Navy corpsmen.33

Figure 6.5.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces

From the smallest to the largest, MAGTFs carry the logistics necessary to support themselves ashore for 15, 30, and 60 days, respectively. Some are oriented on forcible entry—going where they are not welcome. They cannot rely on host nation support or modern infrastructure and must bring everything with them. Marine Expeditionary Force For a large operation—relative to the Marine Corps, not to the Army and Air Force—the division, air wing, and support units combine into an MEF under the command of a lieutenant general. There are currently three MEF headquarters (I MEF is headquartered in southern California, II MEF in the middle Atlantic, and III MEF in Okinawa). Fleet marine forces, the products of the administrative chain of command, are permanently assigned to an MEF. III MEF has been significantly under strength since the end of the Vietnam conflict. These large warfighting organizations have been constructed with more than one division as the ground combat element. During the Vietnam War, the III Marine Amphibious Force had regiments of the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Marine Divisions and air groups from the 1st and 3rd Marine Air Wings. During the Gulf War, I MEF had two marine divisions assigned. With only three divisions on active duty, such formations quickly exhaust the resources of the Corps. The more common single-division marine expeditionary force has been deployed for large-scale humanitarian assistance missions like the one in Somalia. Marine Expeditionary Brigade Under command of a brigadier general, an MEB conducts smaller operations than an MEF. There are three permanent MEB headquarters, but forces are assigned only when needed. The typical MEB is formed around a regimentsized ground element, an air group, and the necessary support forces. The MEB can be the operational command, or it can be the vanguard of a larger MEF in the making. In general, an MEF does not deploy. Instead, MEBs are deployed and composited until an MEF is formed, the MEF is employed, and it breaks down into MEBs again for redeployment. The amphibious MEB is designed for large-scale, forcible entry from the sea—amphibious assault; each MEF can deliver one or two MEBs in this configuration. III MEF will be consumed after forming a single MEB. There are prepositioned variants of the MEB. Marines can quickly be flown to mate with prepositioned equipment. The maritime prepositioning force MEB is heavier than the typical MEB; it is made up of armor and mechanized forces. There are maritime prepositioning squadrons of four or five ships each in the Atlantic Ocean, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and Guam/Tinian in the Pacific Ocean. Prepositioned heavy equipment reduces strategic lift

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and global response time. Approximately 18,000 marines and sailors fly to mate with the equipment stowed on the ships of a maritime prepositioning squadron to form a heavy brigade within one to two weeks of warning. Each MEF has an air contingency force MEB that can embark within 18 hours of notification. They are lightweight MEBs that can be deployed by strategic airlift (Air Force). They can be deployed as a separate force or deployed to be composited with a maritime prepositioning force or with a smaller MEU afloat. It assumes a previously seized, lightly defended, or undefended airfield. Marine Expeditionary Unit The smallest and most common MAGTF is the marine expeditionary unit formed around an infantry battalion and composite aircraft squadron. The MEU headquarters are permanent, standing organizations,34 and fleet marine forces are assigned temporarily as needed. Amphibious ships train individually before forming into the amphibious ready group (ARG). Simultaneously, a marine battalion is augmented with amphibious vehicles and forms a battalion landing team. After training as a unit, marine aircraft join their ground forces to form the MEU. The MEU and ARG join. The MEU may qualify as special operations capable (SOC).35 The entire process takes six months and results in an ARG/MEU(SOC) ready for deployment. It deploys at sea for another six months. The ARG/MEU(SOC) then returns to home port where it is on standby for an additional month after which it disbands, allowing for personal leave, equipment repair, and preparation for another 18-month cycle. At least three MEUs are afloat at all times. The MEU is capable of executing a variety of missions on six hours notice. The missions include the evacuation of American diplomats and citizens from hostile countries, hostage rescue, and recovery of downed aircrews. Amphibious raids and security operations to protect American lives and property are also capabilities inherent in the MEU. Extractions and raids may be conducted at night and over long distances. The MEU is capable of providing mobile training teams to forward deployed forces or allies, and it is capable of providing civic action, including medical, dental, and limited engineering services. Perhaps one of the most frequent operations conducted by the Marine Corps is the non-combatant evacuation operation, NEO (knee-oh). Marines afloat may be called upon to evacuate State Department personnel and other U.S. citizens from a country where their safety is threatened. Another standard mission, not executed as often, is the seizure of an airport or seaport for use by follow-on forces, including a larger marine air-ground task force. An MEU afloat conducts its many assigned missions in a highly distributed fashion. In a single day, the 22d MEU(SOC), holding station off Liberia, conducted operations in nine countries. Operations included humanitarian assistance, protection of U.S. citizens’ lives and property, and training with allies.36

Table 6.1 Typical MAGTF Composition MAGTF MEU MEB (prepositioned) MEB (amphibious) MEF

Marines and Sailors 1,000 ⫺4,000 16,500 4,000 ⫺18,000 30,000 ⫺60,000

Ships

Ground Element

Air Element

Supplies (days)

4–7 amphibs

battalion

composite squadron

15

4–5 MPS ships 15–21 amphibs, 1–2 carriers 44–56 amphibs, 2–4 carriers

regiment regiment

air group air group

30 30

division

air wing

60

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205

Other Operational Organizations and Missions A special purpose MAGTF can be formed for specific operations, like mobile training teams; small independent actions; reconnaissance, intelligence, and target acquisition. Marines provide a variety of security services. The Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force CBIRF (see-burf) was activated in April 1996 to deploy to high-risk events. It was to be a stopgap effort until National Guard forces could assume the mission. The CBIRF still stands. The Marine Corps provides a Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team (FAST) to provide security for a variety of Navy events, including transfer of nuclear fuels or weapons at submarine facilities. Marines aboard ships guard nuclear weapons as well as serve as the ship captain’s security force. The Marine Corps continues to provide security for American embassies around the world. Typical MAGTF Inventories Every MAGTF is uniquely configured for a specific mission. Table 6.1 shows a typical composition for each of the MAGTF types. Table 6.2 shows a typical inventory of ground units and equipment. Table 6.2 Typical MAGTF Ground Inventory in the 1990s

Ground Unit Tactical Vehicles Tank Amtrac LAV Artillery 155 mm 105 mm Mortar 81 mm 60 mm Anti-tank TOW Dragon Automatic Weapons 40 mm, Mk-19 12.7 mm, M-2 7.62 mm, M-60 Air Defense Hawk Launchers Stinger Teams

MEU

MEB

MEF

Battalion

Regiment

Division

4 12 8–17

14 47 33

44 208 110

4 4

36 —

96 —

8 12

24 36

72 108

8 24

48 72

144 216

26 20 50

114 138 206

600 425 601

— 5

8–16 45

16 90

206

Shaping U.S. Military Forces Table 6.3 Typical MAGTF Air Inventory in the 1990s

Air Unit Ground Attack AV-8B A-6E Fighter/Attack F/A-18A/C F/A-18D Electronic Warfare EA-6B Heavy Lift Helicopters CH-53E Medium Lift Helicopters CH-53A/D CH-46E Light Lift Helicopters UH-1N Observation OV-10A/D Refueling and Transport KC-130

MEU

MEB

MEF

Squadron

Group

Wing

6 —

40 10

60 10

— —

24 12

48 24

—

6

6

4

16

32

— 12

12 48

12 60

4

12

24

2

6

12

2

6

12

Table 6.3 shows typical air inventories for the MAGTF types. SUMMARY Throughout the Cold War, the carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups were constantly forward deployed and were expected to respond to a variety of unplanned contingencies. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps maintain a strong crisis action planning and expeditionary warfare culture unlike the deliberate planning and garrison culture shared by major elements of the Cold War Army and Air Force. During the Cold War, permanent headquarters with huge war plans against a known enemy dominated Pentagon thinking. Following the Cold War, the ad hoc joint task force ( JTF) has become the instrument of choice for conducting military operations abroad. A JTF can have separate component commands for Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and special operations forces. Alternatively, depending on the mission, it might be structured with a joint ground component commander and a joint air component commander. The JTF structure is quite similar to the MAGTF structure but with the Army

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providing a corps or division as the ground component and the Air Force providing assets for the air component. An MEF, particularly one with two divisions and upward of 100,000 troops, consumes the operational Marine Corps. In doing so, the country is left without a rapidly deployable shock force, thereby creating a strategic vulnerability. Expeditionary forces are designed to deploy quickly, to seize and establish an operating environment, and to withdraw after forces designed for sustained operations arrive. The logical extension of compositing from an MEU, to MEB, to MEF, is to prepare for Army and Air Force takeover. The logic of having three MEFs is questionable at best. The need for one can be made. The other two MEF headquarters should have their resources reorganized into standing JTF headquarters. These JTFs would logically be oriented on small wars or low-intensity conflict with a command structure dominated by marines, but capable of absorbing appropriate forces from the other services. The country has invested in the Marine Corps, and the Corps has provided combined-arms teams across the elements of air, land, and sea. In short, MAGTFs are JTFs in every sense except the bureaucratic sense. The Marine Corps has organized, equipped, and trained under the assumption that it will deploy light expeditionary forces on short notice. The force must deploy from ship to shore. Marine infantry is designed without large quantities of heavy armor and heavy artillery; tactical aircraft compensates for the corresponding shortfall in firepower. When the Marine Corps is employed in larger, multiservice formations, one of two things happens. Marine forces are employed as designed by assigning them a separate mission and area of operations. Or marine forces are taken apart, the ground and air forces assigned to the joint land component and joint air component of a JTF; the result is a force poorly used—a competent combined-arms force sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic jointness.

CHAPTER 7

Special Operations Forces

Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. Special operations forces cannot be mass produced. Special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies.1

Modern special operations forces live in the shadows of the big services and in the cracks between them. The services have marginalized career paths, organizations, doctrine, equipment, and training for forces that do not conform to the service conception. Even strong presidential interest has failed to sway the services. Special operations forces had to be established distinct in law because the Army, Navy, and Air Force consider special operations and low-intensity conflict to be side work. Multiple rounds of legislation were required to create new alignments and assign new authorities after stripping them from the services. In essence, a fifth service has been created in the face of poor stewardship by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Late Cold War legislation specifies exactly which forces would be designated as special operations forces (SOF, soff) and assigns them to the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). One of the root issues at the legislative birth of SOF is the commingling of forces for special operations and low-intensity conflict. The expression special operations connotes small, elite fighting forces striking and departing quickly. In contrast, low-intensity conflict (LIC, lick) generally entails protracted peace operations, nation building, and humanitarian assistance sometimes in an environment of guerrilla insurgency. Some parts of SOF are fully capable in both special operations and low-intensity conflict.

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces

Special operations are conducted across the full spectrum of conflict. They can be discrete actions taken outside the context of a war—for example, hostage rescue. They can be economy of force operations interdicting supplies and harassing forces in the enemy’s rear, such as those operations conducted in Burma and China in World War II. They can be the principal military response to low-intensity conflict, including training and advising indigenous forces. And special operations can be discrete actions within the context of conventional war—for example, the raids conducted preliminary to the Normandy invasion and to the Pacific island campaigns. Special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations are distinct activities. The designation special operations forces, however, is defined in law to include forces designed for all three. Special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations can be mixed and can dominate in the context of low-intensity conflict as well as be part of conventional operations in major wars. There are no neat boundaries. This chapter provides a brief history of special operations forces sufficient only to demonstrate the nation’s general unpreparedness in this warfare area. The Army, Navy, and Air Force each provide special operations forces, sometimes complementary and sometimes overlapping. The important distinctions to be made are in each force’s selection criteria, training, organization, and emphasis. The chapter ends with questions about the state of SOF with respect to the war on terrorism. But first, the mission space and its implications are presented. MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES Of the many applications, special operations are best known by one mission—direct action—quick, violent strikes by small teams to rescue hostages, to extract hostile captives, and to conduct sabotage. Direct actions also include seizure of ships, airports, and seaports. But SOF capabilities extend well beyond direct action. SOF is also capable of combat search and rescue, the recovery of downed pilots or any other individual who may be injured and within denied or hostile territory. The non-combatant evacuation mission refers to larger operations that typically extract embassy personnel from threatening environments. Specialized reconnaissance is an operation to observe and gather information, often covertly, often in denied or hostile territory, and often for weeks or months. Two additional missions are important areas of SOF competence, and both are based on the ability to train foreign military and paramilitary forces. Foreign internal defense assists a friendly government by training its forces to resist internal insurrection and by advising those forces so that they do more good than harm (counterinsurgency). Effective foreign internal defense requires the coordinated efforts of all instruments of national power, not just the military instrument. Special operations are equally adept at training and assisting indigenous forces in opposition to an unfriendly government, a mission area

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211

called unconventional warfare (proinsurgency). Unconventional warfare, however, is often used to mean anything other than conventional warfare. Both foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare require forces that are regionally oriented, language trained, and culturally sensitive. Two newer missions have been assigned to SOCOM: counter proliferation and counterterrorism. Rather than missions, they are purposes for which direct actions and specialized reconnaissance may be conducted. Counterproliferation is about preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism is directed at terrorists themselves. There is a certain economy to special operations forces. While they constitute 3.5 percent of personnel, they consume only 2 percent of the Defense budget. But the economy runs deeper than these numbers suggest. The use of special operations forces is often in lieu of much larger conventional forces. Even more importantly, proper and timely application of SOF can prevent or diffuse conflict. At the same time, they are scarce resources and thus expensive. The operations they undertake are high risk; they are expected to have a big payoff, but failure can be very costly militarily, politically, and diplomatically. The loss of a single individual in a small community is a large personal loss, immediately felt, and it represents the loss of a scarce resource and the product of expensive training that is not quickly replaced. The loss of a single aircraft and crew or a small unit is a significant fraction of total SOF capability. These forces are not expendable. What forces for special operations have in common is undetected ingress and egress by sea, air, or land; rigorous selection processes; demanding and lengthy training; a preference for the night and for high-fidelity mission rehearsal; and small-unit, light infantry tactics. Each difficult step in the selection and training process produces individual confidence and a sense of camaraderie within the small community. The same confidence and camaraderie separates them from the rest; specifically, it separates them from conventional forces who dominate the production of force from Washington and dominate the use of force in the regional combatant commands. Forces for special operations are divided within as well. They draw from different age groups, rely on different selection processes, and undergo different training. Not all forces for special operations are created equal. SOCOM is authorized to acquire weapons systems not provided by the big services. Specialized aircraft, for example, begin with a standard military airframe and undergo extensive modification. Many of these systems support the specific requirements of inserting and extracting small SOF teams undetected over long distances. SOCOM has extensively modified helicopters commonly found elsewhere in the U.S. military inventory. They are equipped with sophisticated electronics systems that allow all-weather, day-night, lowaltitude, terrain-following flight, and they rely more heavily on countermeasures than on stealth. All are capable of aerial refueling. SOCOM is invested in the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey program to produce an SOF version with capabilities

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces

consistent with the rest of its air fleet. In general, SOF rotary-wing aircraft from small to medium are Army, and fixed-wing and heavy rotary-wing aircraft are Air Force. The parachute is a favorite vehicle for deep insertion, although there are other methods available when objectives are proximate to oceans or navigable waterways. Basic parachute training teaches a low-altitude exit (500–1,200 feet) and static line (immediate opening) technique. Advanced free-fall technique is referred to as high-altitude exit (30,000 feet), low-altitude opening (HALO, hay-low). High-altitude exit, high-altitude opening (HAHO, hayhoe) is another advanced technique. Small teams, independently operating well inside hostile territory, sometimes clandestinely, require small, lightweight communications and intelligence devices not provided by the big services. SOCOM adapts existing military and civilian small arms. Weight, accuracy, and rate of fire are important characteristics of SOF small arms. Close-quarters combat requires different weapons than those commonly found in conventional forces. Beyond forces for special operations, SOF also includes civil affairs and psychological operations personnel by law. Psychological operations (PSYOPS, sigh-ops) can be applied in conventional war to encourage enemy desertion, for example, or in an insurgency environment as part of a hearts-and-minds campaign. Information operations is an expression currently in vogue that sometimes subsumes PSYOPS and is another mission assigned to SOCOM. Civil affairs personnel, mostly reservists, bring an array of talents commonly associated with public administration. They can restore or establish public utilities, health care and educational facilities, and even law enforcement and judicial institutions. They are most likely to support conventional forces. It is the oddity of the SOF mission space that lethal operations are conducted in parallel with what many would call nation building, actions that have many of the characteristics of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Rather than mission, what truly ties these operations together is that they are not central to the cultures of the established services. They are different, and therefore special. The expression military operations other than war (MOOTW, moo-twa) connotes the big services’ attitude toward operations that are anything other than the direct clash of conventional forces. This is a messy mission space with its own lexicon that has never quite captured the complexity and ambiguity of small wars. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CREATION, DESTRUCTION, AND UNPREPAREDNESS Two types of special operations histories are available. One starts with missions—usually direct action and irregular warfare—and is told in the stories of the units that execute them. The other type of history starts with the forces currently designated in law as SOF and traces the histories of those units. The two histories have a great deal in common, but there are forces

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213

included in each that are not included in the other. The history of legally designated SOF is more appropriate to understanding the culture of current U.S. Special Operations Forces, but including those forces not currently assigned adds some useful insights. Although it is customary for special operations forces to trace their roots to before the Revolutionary War, their clearer origins are in World War II,2 and they have an even closer relationship to the Vietnam era. Present-day Army Rangers claim a strong relationship with the Ranger battalions of WWII. Darby’s Rangers were the first ashore at Omaha Beach, disabling German strongholds. Marine Raiders conducted hit-and-run amphibious assaults in the Pacific, sometimes inserted by submarine. But much of special operations history is about counterinsurgency, including Army General Black Jack Pershing in the Philippines, the Army’s Merrill’s Marauders in Burma, and Marine counterinsurgency operations before WWII. These histories invariably include references to the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual as the foundation of U.S. counterinsurgency thinking. Even before victory was declared in WWII, the services were under the budget axe, and the big services, designed for great power war, quickly jettisoned those things that were not central to their core. Forces for unconventional and special warfare were sacrificed without qualm. All three air commando groups and Army special forces were stood down, amphibious scouts and raiders were disestablished, and Army Rangers were completely disbanded. Only civil affairs forces survived, and they survived only until postwar reconstruction efforts were completed in the European and Pacific theaters. Postwar legislation assigned the unconventional warfare mission to the CIA during peacetime and to the Army in wartime, with the consequence that the Army would neglect the capability in peacetime and be unprepared in wartime. Special operations forces were born again under the Kennedy administration. The Green Berets were to conduct unconventional warfare (actually foreign internal defense) and be an economy of force solution to combat the communist insurgency in Vietnam. Their employment would change as conventional forces built up and came to dominate. Navy SEALs would conduct interdiction operations in the river delta region in the south while marines were fighting on hard ground in the north. Post-Vietnam rhetoric echoed what followed WWII. The big services were anxious to return to major war preparations. But the sentiment following Vietnam carried with it repugnance of counterinsurgency. A general downsizing and a distaste for small wars proved to be a crippling pair. Army special operations groups were cut from seven to three. The big services would turn toward great power war and turn their backs on as much of the Vietnam experience as possible. Rather than learn what worked and what did not, the services and the country chose to learn not to get involved in messy wars. That would lead again to unpreparedness for the inevitable and unglamorous.

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces

The convincing 1967 defeat of Arab forces by Israel motivated some to shift to a different strategy. Europe became the battleground for Arab terrorists as well as for homegrown dissidents originally brought together against the war in Vietnam. Israeli athletes were attacked at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. In July 1976, Israeli special forces conducted a hostage rescue at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. A dozen Hanafi Muslim terrorists stormed three buildings in Washington, D.C., in March 1977 and held them for 39 hours. In October 1977, Germany’s counterterrorist unit successfully executed a hostage rescue from Arab terrorists aboard a hijacked Lufthansa passenger jet grounded in Mogadishu, Somalia. The German hostage rescue prompted President Jimmy Carter to ask whether the United States had similar capabilities and received assurances from the Pentagon that it did. America’s approach to these special operations was the hasty response option. Talented people from across the services would be assembled at the last minute for a daring rescue. It was a formula for unpreparedness and an example of the lesser-included-case thinking of the big services. A month later, November 1977, the Army established a special operations unit for counterterrorism, Delta Force. Delta’s first operational mission would come when Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. After diplomatic initiatives failed, the Carter administration attempted a rescue in April 1980. It would be an extremely complex first mission. Operation Eagle Claw is better known as Desert One, the remote rendezvous point 200 miles from Tehran where the operation was aborted and disaster quickly followed. Hastily (but competently) modified Air Force aircraft were to refuel eight Navy helicopters flown by Marine and Air Force pilots to deliver Delta personnel.3 The post-Vietnam decimation of CIA case officers made it all the worse. Joint Task Force 1-79 was formed ad hoc to plan and command the operation. It did so in secrecy, which contributed to coordination problems between the elements that would execute the plan. Preparations took place separately around the world. The force came together, and the mission met with disaster at Desert One. The operation was aborted after too few helicopters successfully completed the long first leg through a debilitating sand storm. Aircraft on the ground collided, turning frustration into a fiery catastrophe. The aborted attempt showed the assurances given to Carter to be unfounded. The terrorist onslaught continued; in May 1980, British Strategic Air Service violently extracted hostages from the Iranian Embassy in London. The 1983 bombings of the Marine barracks and American and French embassies in Beirut, Lebanon, added urgency. The rescue of U.S. medical students from the Caribbean island of Grenada in the same month confirmed the existence of old problems and demonstrated that special operations forces, not conventional forces, needed to plan special operations. Operation Urgent Fury, October 25–28, 1983, was planned and executed under the authority of the U.S. Atlantic Command, an almost

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215

exclusively Navy command and very conventional. The plan employed SOF in daylight in opposition to SOF doctrine. Special Operations Forces were given inappropriate missions, and all forms of coordination were poor. The entire process was four days from conception to execution and was conducted with no rehearsal. Confusion was the operative word. The executive branch had demonstrated its inability to address the problem. Congress was finally forced to intervene. Three rounds of legislation were required to force the Pentagon to resolve the problems associated with bringing together forces at the last minute to conduct special operations.4 These were not lesser-included cases, and the hasty response option was not good enough. Legislation in 1986 established the Special Operations Command, mandated an assistant secretary of defense for special operations and lowintensity conflict, ASD(SO/LIC), and a Board for Low-Intensity Conflict on the president’s national security council. Two additional rounds of legislation were required to make it stick against service resistance. SOCOM is unusual in that it has characteristics of the supported combatant command when it leads in counterterrorism operations—supporting combatant command when a regional combatant command integrates special operations into a wider plan or operation—and as a service when it procures equipment not provided by the big services. ASD(SO/LIC) performs the role of the civilian secretary of a military department representing SOF in Pentagon processes. The Board for Low-Intensity Conflict has never been established, and there remains no national policy for this domain, which includes the global war on terrorism. Terrorist attacks continued. The 1986 Berlin nightclub bombing was linked to terrorist Abu Nidal and he to Libya. The response against Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon, was conducted by conventional air forces. Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988 killing 243 passengers, 16 crew members, and 11 people on the ground. Again, Libyan sponsorship was apparent. The first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was followed by the September 11, 2001, attack that finally brought home the message. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated SOCOM in the lead rather than a supporting role in the war on terrorism. There are several recurring themes in the history of SOF. One of the most prominent is that as conventional forces are merely reduced after major wars, SOF is completely disbanded. Another is that the conventional force officers who dominate major-war commands use SOF for missions they are poorly suited to. A third pattern is that the OSS and CIA have more readily embraced the mission space and its forces than have the big services. Forces for special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations are assigned to SOCOM. Like the other combatant commands, forces are organized under Army, Navy, and Air Force component headquarters. Forces so organized are described below.

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces

NAVY SPECIAL WARFARE Personnel assigned to Navy Special Warfare number almost 5,000. Over 4,000 are enlisted personnel. Two groups best characterize these forces: Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen and the better-known SEALs (sea, air, land). SEALs trace their roots to the underwater demolition teams (UDTs) of WWII. UDT personnel, in turn, were drawn from Navy construction battalions (SEABEEs) and trained to conduct hydrographic reconnaissance and demolition of obstacles prior to amphibious assaults. Marines created a similar capability but extended their reconnaissance further inland. But the modern-day SEAL teams are really a product of Vietnam, authorized in December 1961. The Navy trained two UDTs in small-unit infantry tactics and intelligence collection and reestablished them as the first SEAL teams in January 1962. Their first operations were in the Mekong Delta at the southern tip of South Vietnam. The four remaining UDTs were similarly transitioned into SEAL teams in 1983. The experience base built in Vietnam was gone by the time of the Grenada invasion. The SEAL platoon of 16 men is the primary operational unit of Navy special warfare. The platoon can be divided into two squads or four elements. The typical SEAL is a young man on his first enlistment who has passed a rigorous selection and training process. He is led by far more senior veterans than would be found in a similarly sized conventional infantry unit. An officer gains seven years or more experience before being assigned tactical command of a SEAL platoon. SEALs are parachute qualified but prefer to come and go by water, and special boat units provide the means. SEALs use a variety of watercraft for ingress and egress, ranging from converted nuclear-powered submarines to inflatable rafts. The big Navy provides carriers and submarines when needed, but the smaller craft are procured and operated under SOCOM’s authority. Navy special boat units operate small surface craft, some of which constitute the brown-water navy that the big Navy has historically neglected. At the high end, the fast patrol cruiser is suited to operations close to shore and finds employment in drug interdiction. Other boats are suited to coastal patrol and riverine operations. At the low end are inflatable craft that a WWII veteran would recognize.5 SEALs can be inserted over modest distances in something like an underwater jet ski with the swimmer exposed. A mini-submarine launched from the back of a Navy nuclear-powered fast attack sub can transport four swimmers over long distances with less physical stress. These assets are organized into a SEAL delivery vehicle team. The various operational units are collected under a Special Warfare Group, one in Coronado, California, and the other in Little Creek, Virginia, as shown in Figure 7.1. Naval special warfare units assigned to the regional combatant commands provide a permanent forward presence for rotating special warfare forces.

Special Operations Forces

Figure 7.1.

217

Navy Special Warfare Group.

The Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL School (BUD/S, buds) has three phases. The first phase is eight weeks and begins with four weeks of physical conditioning. The fifth week is the infamous Hell Week of rigorous training under conditions of sleep deprivation. The last three weeks of phase one train in the methods of underwater hydrographic reconnaissance. The second phase of seven weeks teaches diving skills and produces the basic combat diver. The third phase of ten weeks is primarily about land warfare; it includes six weeks of training in land navigation, small-unit tactics, repelling, and infantry weapons and demolitions followed by four weeks of integration and practical application of acquired skills. Only about 20 percent of applicants complete the training. Enlisted and officer train together in BUD/S, but officers attend an additional four-week course afterward. Graduates of BUD/S attend the three-week Army jump school and are then assigned to a six-month probationary period on a SEAL team or a SEAL delivery vehicle team, where they earn their qualification. Some will later qualify for HALO and HAHO. Training done within the platoon includes air operations, special weapons, communications, ordnance, and swimming. Some team members attend the 12-month Army Special Forces medical training. Some graduates attend an additional 10 weeks of training on the SEAL delivery vehicle. Rigorous training in mission planning and execution continues during an 18-month platoon workup that concentrates on the mission

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requirements of the individual platoon. Some platoons are on station, some are 24 or 48 hours from arrival, and all are prepared to arrive within 72. As heavily armed small units, Navy SEALs are capable of conducting reconnaissance, intelligence collection, search and rescue, hostage rescue, and training of foreign forces. They are also capable of direct action, including sniper operations, laser designation of a target for air strike, sabotage, and underway ship assault. SEALs have never forgotten their WWII roots in hydrographic reconnaissance, and, although they have a range of capabilities today, they are firmly focused on direct action. SEAL Team Six, oriented on counterterrorism, is the Navy’s analogue to the Army’s Delta Force. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES The Army provides the most comprehensive set of capabilities to SOCOM. Army forces are under three-star command headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Assigned forces include special forces groups, the ranger regiment, the special operations aviation regiment, civil affairs commands, and psychological operations groups. Army Rangers Rangers are at the nexus of special and conventional forces. At their core, they are light infantry. They are, however, more selective, train harder, have a higher leader-to-led ratio, and are expected to perform to a higher standard. They have traditionally been assets of the division and corps echelons of the conventional army. As part of conventional forces, they have performed important functions, and they have frequently been poorly employed. Ranger battalions were created after WWII began. There had been no similar capability since the Civil War. The first ranger battalion was organized under Major William O. Darby along the lines of British commandos and began training in June 1942. Six ranger battalions and a ranger-like regiment served during the war: three in the Mediterranean, two at Normandy, one in the Philippines, and Merrill’s Marauders in Burma. All were quickly disbanded at the end of the war. Six ranger companies were created after the initial hostilities in Korea and were attached to divisions. Rangers received six weeks of training in land navigation and sabotage followed by four weeks of cold weather training. They deployed to Korea in late 1950 and were initially used to infiltrate and attack behind enemy lines. Later, they were often poorly used to initiate a conventional infantry attack and to defend fixed positions. The ranger companies were deactivated in autumn of 1951. Army Rangers gained a more permanent status during the Vietnam conflict. Long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs, lurps) were a common activity, typically lasting seven days with the last one or two days spent lying in ambush; the ambush was followed by the immediate extraction of the six-man

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team in a single Huey helicopter. They were volunteers without benefit of today’s Ranger School. The LRRPs were collected into 13 ranger companies organized under the 75th Infantry Regiment, where they conducted operations in Vietnam from February 1969 to August 1972. The present-day 75th Ranger Regiment is its direct descendant. In January 1974, the Army ordered establishment of a ranger battalion in the 75th Regiment. The second battalion was established in October 1974, and the third battalion was established 10 years later in October 1984, a year after Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. The three battalions were combined into the 75th Ranger Regiment in 1984, although the battalions are not collocated. All three battalions participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama. Today’s 75th Ranger Regiment has roughly 2,000 soldiers. The regiment has three battalions plus a headquarters company. A ranger battalion of 580 rangers, as shown in Figure 7.2, is divided into three rifle companies and a headquarters company that includes communications, fire support, and medical support. A rifle company is made of three rifle platoons of 45 men each

Figure 7.2. Army Ranger Battalion.

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and a weapons platoon of 22. Each rifle platoon has three rifle squads and one machine-gun squad. The lower ranks who make up the largest numbers in ranger units are young men on their first enlistment who volunteer for the ranger regiment. He undergoes the three-and-a-half-week Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP) that has a 60 percent completion rate. After 6 to 12 months, he may meet the requirements to attend Ranger School. Ranger School is 10 weeks long and has a 35 percent completion rate (candidates from RIP have a 90 percent completion rate). About 60 percent of candidates are volunteers from all over the Army, and the remainder comes equally from other services and other countries. There is a one-month preliminary course for physical conditioning followed by combat training conducted at four bases offering different environments. In each environment—wooded, desert, mountain, jungle and swamp—candidates train in land navigation, patrol, ambush, and raid. Rangers jump, repel, and train in small boat operations against competent opposing forces. Food and sleep deprivation and physical exhaustion are the norm throughout. Most graduates return to their unit of origin in the conventional forces, never to serve in a ranger unit. The purpose and focus of the school is to develop individual leadership skills that apply throughout the Army. The typical soldier in a ranger battalion has not attended Ranger School, and the typical graduate of Ranger School never serves in a ranger battalion. Every leader in every ranger unit, however, has attended the school. Rigorously trained, aggressive young men led by experienced noncommissioned and commissioned officers is a potent formula. Rangers can seize airports for follow-on forces, conduct long-range reconnaissance missions, and conduct direct actions requiring larger units than are typical of SEALs or Delta Force. They can be well used in concert with the smaller special operators. Each battalion can deploy in less than 18 hours. One battalion is always ready for immediate deployment. Tours within the regiment are generally for three years. Given that rangers train for 48 weeks per year, more than three years is hard to endure. Rangers train periodically in a variety of terrain and climates, including mountain, jungle and swamp, and cold weather. All are jump qualified, and some are combat swimmers. Army Special Forces: The Green Berets Although quite capable of direct action, Army Green Berets are more centered in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. Special Forces is a branch in the Army like armor and infantry. Green Berets are equally at home in peace operations and in war. Rather than the formula of aggressive young men coupled with experienced leadership as applied in the Rangers and SEALs, Green Berets build on maturity from top to bottom.

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Foreign language skills are not just to facilitate communications with locals but are part of a larger cultural connection. Rather than quick in and out operations, Green Berets stay. In peace and stability operations, they establish relationships and build confidence and trust. If and when there is a transition to war, the relationships previously established are invaluable to conventional forces. Army Special Forces and rangers claim the same historical descendents. But rather than the raids and ambushes associated with the Rangers, the Green Berets’ true roots are in the World War IIOSS. They conducted infiltration behind enemy lines in Europe and Asia. Three-man teams were airdropped into France, Belgium, and Holland to train and advise partisan movements and to conduct guerrilla operations. OSS Detachment 101 in Burma trained guerrilla forces to fight against the Japanese. They also conducted reconnaissance and direct actions. Postwar law gave responsibility for unconventional warfare to the CIA in peacetime and to the Army in wartime. During the Korean War, these same types of forces conducted direct action and sabotage, established escape and evasion routes, and worked with partisans. While George Marshall, Chesty Puller, and Billy Mitchell are exemplars of their respective services, Army Major General William “Wild Bill” Donovan epitomizes Special Forces. Donovan—“lawyer, diplomat, public official, and combat leader”—headed the OSS and later its successor, the CIA. A Kennedy initiative in 1963 caused an unimagined expansion of special forces in Vietnam. Green Berets conducted direct action, strategic reconnaissance, and trained tribesmen in the remote regions of the country. They also conducted hearts-and-minds operations, building schools and hospitals, and conducted a wide range of civil-military relations. Later in the war they were assigned to small fixed outposts easily overrun by larger conventional forces. As the war expanded, so too did the force, which caused a lowering of standards, including dropping the second language requirement and extending the applicant pool to include candidates on their first enlistments. The change produced a cowboy image that is very different from the reality of Special Forces today. Special operations forces cannot be mass produced. Special Forces almost ceased to exist after the Vietnam War. The country and the big services wanted to return to more conventional conceptions of war. In the field, the basic operational unit is the 12-man A-detachment, better known as the A-team.6 The A-team is composed of 10 experienced noncommissioned officers (senior sergeants) commanded by 2 officers. A captain leads with a warrant officer as second in command, or both may be warrants each with significant experience from prior service as a senior enlisted man. The team can be split for smaller operations. When necessary, two or more A-teams can be assembled under a B-detachment, a very small command element. Two or more B-detachments can be assembled under command of a C-detachment, another small command element without standard composition. In garrison, Special Forces are organized under two-star command at Fort Bragg. Command authority spans five active-duty special forces groups and

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training authority over two National Guard special forces groups. The groups are not collocated. Each group has a regional orientation. Fifty-four A-teams are authorized per group, but authorized limits are difficult to reach and maintain. A special forces group has three battalions, a headquarters company, and a support company (see Figure 7.3). Each battalion has three companies, and each company has six A-teams. One A-team is trained in combat diving, and one is trained in parachute free fall (HALO). All are multilingual, jump qualified, and cross-trained in at least two other specialties. In El Salvador, Special Forces were used as an economy of force. They trained Salvadoran government forces in counterinsurgency operations rather than relying on the direct involvement of conventional U.S. forces: classic foreign internal defense. During the Reagan administration, Special Forces supported anti-government forces in Nicaragua: classic unconventional warfare. During the Gulf War they conducted deep reconnaissance operations for conventional forces and after the war provided large-scale relief to the Kurds in northern Iraq. In the 1990s, Special Forces, like rangers, began to look like assets of the Army corps echelon, supporting conventional warfare rather than focusing on the unconventional.

Figure 7.3. Special Forces Group.

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Already airborne qualified, applicants sequence through a three-phase, 21-day assessment and selection course. The first phase assesses the emotional and psychological suitability of the candidate. The second phase assesses physical endurance, and the third phase tests leadership. About 50 percent are selected to attend the qualification course. The first phase of the qualification course develops skills of land navigation and patrol. The second phase is military occupational specialty training— weapons, engineer, medical, or communications—that lasts from over three months to almost a year, with medical training being the longest. Crosstraining is the norm. Officer and enlisted train separately until phase three, when they form into A-teams to train mission planning and execution. The qualification course has an 85 percent completion rate. Delta Force A fourth type of special forces detachment, Operational Detachment Delta, more commonly referred to as Delta Force, was activated in November 1977, specifically for counterterrorism: offensive action against terrorists. Delta was modeled on the British Special Air Service. In addition to the habitual resistance from the big services, there were other problems in forming the counterterrorist force. The United States has an aversion to giving police-like powers to military forces. Delta, in fact, would do the kinds of things that might be expected of a big-city police department’s special weapons and tactics teams. And abroad, foreign governments prefer to use their own forces rather than accept the domestic political consequences of allowing U.S. forces to conduct highly visible hostage rescues. The selection process for Delta includes medical, psychological, and physical fitness assessments. Applicants are mature non-commissioned and warrant officers drawn from across the Army. If applicants enter the program without the Special Forces designation, they generally depart so qualified. About 10 percent are selected for a five-month operator’s course that teaches individual skills, team training, HALO and HAHO parachute training, and close-quarters combat. The classic use of Delta is the takedown, a term used by others in the community as well. Delta members are prepared to assault aircraft, embassies, and any place where hostages might be held. When possible, a takedown is preceded by realistic mission rehearsal, including rehearsing in the precise model of aircraft or a mock-up of the building to be assaulted. But Delta was used in Mogadishu alongside conventional forces. It was used for Scud missile hunting in the Gulf War, also in support of conventional forces. It is currently used in conjunction with conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 107-man Delta Force assembled for the Tehran rescue is not the typical operational unit. The basic unit is a four-man team trained in close-quarters combat. The package put together for a hostage rescue might include an appropriately sized assault team, two two-man sniper teams, a sweeper team,

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and a small command element. Delta receives specialized air support from a battalion of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Army Aviation The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment is headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and commands four battalions. Battalions are distinguished largely by aircraft type. One battalion operates smaller aircraft, including the small, heavily armed Little Bird helicopter and special derivatives of Blackhawk utility helicopters; the battalion provides primary support to Delta. Another battalion operates two dozen medium lift helicopters, and a third battalion flies a mix of specialized utility and medium lift helicopters suited to transporting larger ranger units. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations The largest part of special operations forces, about 10,000 men and women, are organized into four civil affairs commands. About 96 percent are in the Army Reserve. They plan, direct, and conduct civil affairs with their specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil governments. Civil affairs commands are under a one-star general and are organized with two subordinate brigades and an additional battalion designated for special operations. There is one civil affairs battalion on active duty. During periods when civil affairs operations are uncommon, it makes a great deal of sense to retain those skills in the reserve component. Their civilian jobs provide the perfect training ground to maintain their skills. With the high operational tempo of the early twenty-first century, the active-reserve mix makes far less sense. Conventional land forces, like armored divisions, are tasked to do civil affairs missions for which they are not organized, trained, or equipped. There are three psychological operations groups. One is on active duty, and two are in the Army Reserve. Each group has three battalions. Their purpose is to influence civilian and military audiences. Once known for delivering their products by leaflets, they are now a multimedia distributor. The Air Force provides specialized airborne platforms capable of radio and television broadcast, but the Army is the principal provider of psychological operations personnel and of informational content. Civil affairs and psychological operations are not central to conventional Army thinking. Neither are they central to special operations thinking given the present focus on direct action. AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Air Force special operations forces trace their roots to WWII Air Commandos in Burma. They delivered and supplied interdiction forces on the ground and provided intelligence. Bomber crews called the Carpetbaggers

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worked with the OSS in Europe by distributing leaflets as a cover for inserting Army special forces to train and advise partisans in France. Like their Army brethren, they were disbanded after the war. They were reborn as Special Air Mission crews in Korea. Approximately 13,000 airmen, 100 fixed-wing aircraft, and 60 rotarywing aircraft comprise Air Force special operations forces organized into six wings or groups around the world. The entire capability came close to being absorbed into the Army in 1990 to avoid the difficulties associated with integrating across service boundaries. Air Force aircraft provide critical support for Special Operations Forces on the ground, including close air support and the ability to operate deep. But supporting ground forces is not what the big Air Force is about. Air Force SOF include ground forces with training similar to their counterparts from the Army and Navy. Small teams of combat controllers provide the interface between air and land forces. They are capable of establishing landing zones, including the use of demolitions. They also provide communications, air traffic control in forward areas, and terminal control for close air support and air strikes. The activities of the 400 combat controllers are quite foreign to the institutional Air Force. Green Berets are often qualified on the same equipment and procedures, but the Air Force owns the equipment and prefers to provide personnel and equipment as a package. Air Force SOF provide a pararescue capability that is crucial to conventional air force operations that sends aircrews deep over enemy territory. Such an air force must be able to extract flight crews that go down and are likely injured and possibly trapped in an aircraft, a mission called combat search and rescue. The parachute jumpers who do this mission are called PJs. The capability is equally suited to rescuing SOF and conventional aircrews. The abilities on the ground are also valuable in disaster relief operations associated with earthquakes and hurricanes. After Air Force basic training, aspiring PJs and combat controllers begin specialty training with a 20 to 30 percent probability of completion. The first 10 to 12 weeks are used for physical conditioning and selection. The next four to five weeks qualify candidates as combat divers. They then attend the Army’s three-week basic jump school followed by four weeks of free-fall parachute training and two to three weeks of survival school. Those destined to become combat controllers attend a 16-week course in basic air traffic control followed by 12 to 13 weeks of combat air control school, while PJs attend 32 weeks of combat medical school training similar to the Army Special Forces’ near year-long program. Combat controllers, pararescue personnel, and combat weather teams are assembled into special tactics squadrons. There are six on active duty and a seventh in the reserve. The resources of a special tactics squadron are drawn upon to form a special tactics unit tailored to a specific need. In addition to the special tactics squadrons, the Air Force provides both fixed- and rotary-wing squadrons. Nine of the 12 squadrons are on active

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duty. Fixed-wing SOF aircraft are almost entirely built on the airframe of the ubiquitous, propeller-driven, Vietnam-era C-130 Hercules. One C-130 variant is equipped primarily for low-altitude, all weather infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of SOF in hostile territory. It is also capable of refueling SOF helicopters. Another variant is designed primarily for refueling all SOF aircraft but can also conduct infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply. Two additional C-130 variants are specially designed for psychological operations and electronic warfare. The best known variant, the AC-130 Spectre Gunship, provides precision fire, including direct attack, close air support, interdiction, armed escort, and armed reconnaissance. The Spectre hosts a side-firing 105-mm howitzer, a 40-mm canon, and a 25-mm Gatling gun. On board fire control computers are capable of precisely engaging two targets simultaneously. The Spectre was used with great effect in densely populated areas in the invasion of Panama. One Spectre gunship and crew was lost to an SA-16 surface-to-air missile while repelling an Iraqi attack on marines at Khafji during the Gulf War. There are four squadrons of rotary-wing aircraft, all of which are on active duty. The workhorse is a heavily modified Vietnam-era CH-53 Sea Stallion. Much of the lift capacity of these aircraft is consumed by precision avionics vectoring equipment that provides all-weather, terrain-following, radar and enables low-altitude, long-range penetration. It also carries a forwardlooking infrared system that provides television-quality images for targeting. Air crews fly with night-vision goggles. SURVIVING RIFTS Assigning special operations forces from the big services to a single, joint command went a long way toward resolving the problems that exist across service boundaries. But rifts remain. Some forces capable of special operations escaped assignment to SOCOM. The Few, the Proud, the Excluded The Marine Corps sees itself as an elite force, but it resists having an elite within the elite. Any marine battalion after a six-month work up may earn special operations capable (SOC) designation and be capable of many missions claimed by SOF, including combat search and rescue, non-combatant evacuation, and in extremis hostage rescue. One advantage accrues to the Corps in being on station and able to execute these missions six hours after warning. But there is an elite within the elite: the marines of Force Reconnaissance. The Marine Corps houses a capability similar to the Navy SEALs, but those individuals and units are not designated as Special Operations Forces in law. They have been in existence since WWII. When the SEALs were first established in the early 1960s, marines were concerned that training with the SEALs would compromise their standards. The initial reluctance passed as

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SEALs proved their mettle in Vietnam. One hundred force recon marines were serving quietly with SOCOM in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2004, and another 4,000 marines were assigned to SOCOM in 2005. Applicants for force recon must already have served from three to five years. The typical applicant has completed his first four-year enlistment with an excellent record. He has already completed recruit training, infantry training, advanced specialty training, and assignments in the fleet. The selection process takes a month and includes medical, physical endurance, and written tests. Only about 20 percent of applicants are selected. Once selected, the applicant attends the six-month Force Reconnaissance Individual Training School and then the eight-week Force Reconnaissance Advanced Training School. Force Recon marines are jump qualified and combat divers; they have competence with foreign weapons; and they are trained in survival, evasion, resistance, and escape techniques. They are capable of HALO and HAHO jumps in addition to standard military parachute jumps. In preparation for deployment, they are assigned to a marine expeditionary unit (MEU) for six months of unit training. Once deployed, they are capable of long-range reconnaissance, amphibious hydrographic survey, raids, close air support, and advanced diving. They sail with the ARG/MEU(SOC) for its six-month deployment at sea. They are also capable of operating independently. Force Reconnaissance is not a Marine Corps career branch. After five years in Force Recon, the individual marine returns to the general population. There are three companies of marine force reconnaissance (see Figure 7.4), each assigned to one of the fleet marine forces as part of the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence group (SRIG) in garrison. A recon team is made of three to five marines led at least by a staff sergeant, who would be the senior enlisted man in a standard marine rifle platoon. Four to five such teams, and the indispensable Navy corpsman, comprise a recon platoon. The platoon is commanded by a captain, who would normally command a company. Up to six platoons make a company, although maintaining all six is rare. The company also has a headquarters platoon including support and is commanded by a lieutenant colonel, who would otherwise command a marine battalion. Another company within the SRIG might also qualify as “special.” The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO, ang-gli-co) also relies on deep insertion of small teams to put eyes on targets for artillery, aircraft, and naval guns firing from a distance. There are three companies of about 300 men, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel and each comprising two platoons. The standard detachment of 12 men is commanded by a captain or major. The platoon’s enlisted personnel include a single staff sergeant and two sergeants, and all have artillery or communications specialties. There is no question about the competence of the Navy SEALs, but one must ask why the Navy should have been directed to create a force so similar to a long-standing capability already provided by the Marine Corps (other

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Figure 7.4.

Force Reconnaissance Company.

than Kennedy’s personal interest). Alternatively, one must ask why the Marine Corps in general and marine force reconnaissance specifically escaped legal designation as SOF and immediate assignment to SOCOM. A Matter of Scale and Stratification The SOF truths include the ideas that special operations forces cannot be mass produced and that quality is more important than quantity. The small wars of the interwar era demand larger numbers than special operations forces can provide. Twenty-first-century conflict is rooted in failing or failed states and even failing societies. Unlike the failing banana republics of the Marine Corps’ small wars era, today’s failings are continental in scope. If the problem is to be addressed intelligently, then the approach lies in the orchestration of all instruments of national and international power, not in sharpening the military instrument. Legislation went a long way toward bringing together air, land, and sea capability for small special operations. But SOF is increasingly called upon to conduct small wars along with conventional forces, and the juxtaposition remains problematic. Unconventional warfare (and foreign internal defense) may be properly executed by small forces—an economy of force measure—as represented by the Green Berets. Direct actions may be conducted by small teams of SEALs and Delta. But small wars are not small. Special operations

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forces are not the small-wars force for the twenty-first century. Small wars are a matter for larger forces properly organized, trained, and equipped. Operations in Afghanistan brought together special operations forces, the Army’s conventional light infantry, marines, and the strategic bomber force. The kind of problems that occurred with the “hasty response option” recurred in Afghanistan. A Matter of Conception Low-intensity conflict is a complex and ambiguous area. The Defense Department frequently coins new terms to better describe the mission space, but always falls short. Military operations other than war, low-intensity conflict, security assistance and stabilization, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, small wars, nation building, and post-conflict reconstruction all capture some aspect of the domain, but none seems to suffice. McClintock traces Special Forces’ doctrinal roots to the post-WWII period when native-speaking European immigrants were recruited to return to Europe and wage guerrilla war against the Soviets should they invade and occupy.7 They were to be guerrillas using terrorist means. Special Forces, as “aggressor forces,” were to apply the same methods in exercises to train U.S. conventional forces in what to expect from opposing guerrillas. The logic of “fight fire with fire” runs through doctrine and application in Vietnam and Central America. The Kennedy emphasis on counterinsurgency forces created some interservice rivalries involving mission, resources, and warfighting conception. The assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General John C. Munn (1960–1963), argued that “there was no need to become guerrillas to fight guerrillas: Counter-guerrilla operations are neither new nor sensational to the Marines. . . . Probably no force in the world is better equipped and organized for counter-guerrilla operations than the U.S. Marine Corps.”8 Without attempting to resolve the merits of McClintock’s conclusions, suffice it to say that the Marine Corps fights guerrilla wars differently than Army Special Forces, and assigning the low-intensity conflict mission to the Corps would produce a different response. Is SOF a Coherent Force for the War on Terrorism? Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld designated SOCOM as lead in the global war on terrorism. Conceiving of the current global conflict environment as a war on a tactic must eventually pass and be replaced by something with more intellectual depth. One alternative conception is as a regional or global insurgency employing terrorist means. A counterinsurgency strategy requires the orchestration of all instruments of national power. A counterinsurgency strategy—any strategy—must link ends, ways, and means. The ends of rebuilding the globe’s failing and failed states are beyond the means

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of any one state, even the means of the “only remaining superpower.” It likely requires orchestration of all the instruments of international power and may be beyond even those means. Neither the secretary nor the combatant commander has authority over the instruments of national power necessary to prosecute a global counterinsurgency. The United States remains unprepared for counterinsurgency of any scale. counterinsurgency was seen as essentially a matter of training the host nation’s military establishment in counter guerrilla tactics. . . . However, as experience in Vietnam, Guatemala, and El Salvador showed, the ability to defeat guerillas in the field was not sufficient for counterinsurgency. The direct lesson was seldom articulated: that to defeat guerillas is not to defeat an insurgency. The implied lesson, however, that successful counterinsurgency required a coordinated interagency effort, had been taught over and over again. Despite this widespread recognition of the need, there was no success in implementing the lesson.9

The forces legally designated as special operations forces and subsequently assigned to SOCOM were determined in rounds of legislation in the late 1980s while great power conflict and major war still dominated thinking and resource allocation. Some forces assigned to SOCOM were actual units—for example, the 75th Ranger Regiment. But most were branches within the big war services that had been orphaned—for example, the Army branches of special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Members of these branches lacked career advancement on a par with favored branches such as armor officers and fighter pilots. One of the contentious choices of the late 1980s’ legislation was whether to mix both special operations and lowintensity conflict functions into one command; Army special forces were equally comfortable in both worlds. Much of the designation of SOF was to provide career progression, equipment acquisition authority, and budget protection for military specialties not central to the big services conception of war and self-image. SOF were not designated to constitute a coherent force for a war that had not yet been imagined. Cold War SOCOM was a force provider whose forces would be allocated to regional combatant commands who would then integrate them with already assigned and much larger conventional forces. The regional combatant commands used the full range of forces produced and provided by the “five services.” The post-9/11 SOCOM is a user of force with respect to the war on terrorism. There is no reason to assume that those orphaned specialties designated as SOF during the Cold War constitute a coherent force for the prosecution of the war on terrorism. Certainly some very capable and relevant pieces are present in the collection, but a coherent force cannot be assumed. As a user of force, the SOCOM commander may require a much wider range of forces to be apportioned for purposes of planning. And the command must be capable of commanding special, unconventional, conventional, and

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perhaps even strategic nuclear forces in operations. Alternatively, SOCOM can define the war on terrorism so that it can be conducted solely with forces assigned since the Cold War. The regional combatant commands will resist the SOCOM change of mission and will prevail. If SOCOM is unprepared to command other than special operations forces and the need arises to command a broader range of forces, we can expect the kind of failure that occurred at Desert One. The “hasty response option” may have returned. More importantly, providing for the security of the United States in the midst of a violent global insurgency is not a problem to be solved by the isolated military instrument developed for war between two superpower alliances. The solution requires orchestration of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments. The vacuum at the national level cannot be remedied by the military. The requirements established by the Nunn-Cohen Amendment include: • A combatant command for special operations forces • An assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict • A separate major force program (MFP), budget, for special operations forces • A board for low-intensity conflict on the National Security Council

SOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC), and MFP-11 satisfy the first three requirements, but the Board for Low-Intensity Conflict has never been implemented. The interagency policymaking function and policy products of the Board are lacking. The absence of the statutorily required policymaking body, or its equivalent, is critical given the SOCOM change of mission. SOCOM cannot make up for the lack of national policy governing all instruments of national power.

CHAPTER 8

Joint Commands

forces assigned to a combatant command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the commander of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the combatant command has been assigned authority.1

When the president of the United States orders the use of military force, that force will be applied under the legal authority of the commander of one of the combatant commands. The topic of this chapter is the combatant commands and their role in the user chain of command. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the several types of joint commands, their organizations, their origins in World War II, and their evolution through the Cold War. The chapter concludes with a description of the current system of combatant commands with emphasis on evolution in the post–Cold War period. THE JOINT COMMANDS The user chain of command begins with the president of the United States. The Defense Department lexicon once specified an entity known as the national command authorities (NCA)—the president and the secretary of defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors—but that term has fallen out of favor.2 Regardless, orders are transmitted from the NCA through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to one of the combatant commands. The chairman neither originates nor approves orders—he transmits them. The chairman’s primary influence in the use of force is as the principal military advisor to the NCA. All military operations are conducted under the authority

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of the legally designated commander of one of the combatant commands—the men formerly known as CinCs (sinks).3 The law authorizes two types of combatant commands—unified commands and specified commands. A unified command employs forces from more than one military department and generally has forces from all services. A specified command employs forces from a single service. There are no specified commands in existence today, although they remain authorized in law. Unified commands are either regionally or functionally oriented, although no mention of the distinction is made in law. Regional unified commands have responsibility for all military operations in an explicitly assigned area. Their assigned area of responsibility (AOR) is their theater, and they are variously referred to as theater, regional, or geographic commands. Functional unified commands have worldwide responsibility for a single military function—for example, transportation, special operations, or strategic reserve. Figure 8.1 depicts a taxonomy of combatant commands. In addition to the unified and specified commands, another type of command once held a place of prominence: the joint command. A joint command had assigned forces from multiple services but lacked operational command authority over assigned forces. Like the early JCS, joint meant a committee of service representatives with no one in charge. A formal definition of operational command was provided in 1959, and there has been nothing designated

Figure 8.1.

Combatant Command Types.

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as a joint command since. Combatant command was defined later as a form of command reserved for legally designated combatant commanders. Although entirely inconsistent with modern legislative intent, joint today in practice often connotes the weaker form of authority of the 1950s. Regional Unified Command Organization The organization of a notional theater command is shown in Figure 8.2. Each of the services provides a component command subordinate to the unified command. Special operations forces also contribute a component headquarters. The commander is supported by the traditional staff structure.4 Resources (forces and money) are in the hands of the component commands rather than in the hands of the combatant commands. This structure, dominated by powerful service components, assures that “joint plan” means “sum of service plans” rather than a single, unified plan and the ensuing unified action. Regardless of legislative intent, the combatant commander remains weak in the process of resource allocation within his area of responsibility. In addition to the service components, the regional combatant command is supported by functional combatant commands with respect to a specific plan or operation. Since the beginning of the interwar period, there have been functional commands with global responsibilities for transportation, special operations, strategic nuclear forces, space and information operations, and the strategic reserve of general-purpose forces.

Figure 8.2. Typical Organization of Unified Theater Command.

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Commands enter into supported/supporting relationships with respect to a specific war plan or military operation; typically, functional commands are supporting and theater commands are supported. Functional commands, however, can be tasked directly by the NCA and can be the supported command with respect to that operation. Unified commands are established to accommodate enduring missions. Unified command establishment requires approval from the president and secretary of defense. Subordinate unified commands, also called subunified commands, can be established for semienduring missions by the defense secretary and a combatant commander. For example, the Pacific Command has a subordinate unified command for Korea, and another subordinate command was established for the war in Vietnam. Subordinate unified commands have the same service component and joint staff structure as a unified command. Military operations short of major theater war cannot be allowed to unduly distract the combatant commander from his broader, more enduring missions. Most operations are conducted by a joint task force ( JTF) temporarily formed for a specific contingency. The invasion of Panama, Operation Just Cause, and the air raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon, offer examples of this type of operation. Most JTFs are formed ad hoc. A JTF can be formed by any legally designated joint force commander, including the commanders of unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and established JTFs. JTF commanders are authorized to stand up subordinate JTFs, but they do not. The JTF commander, typically a three-star general or admiral, is assigned a mission and an area and is allocated forces. Each has a typical joint staff, but the component structure has some variability. The JTF might have the same service component structure as its parent unified command, as shown in Figure 8.2. Alternatively, the component structure might be functional (in this context, functional means elemental). It is increasingly common to form a joint force air component command ( JFACC, jay-fack), joint force land component command ( JFLCC, jiff-lick), and joint force maritime component command ( JFMCC, jiff-mick) as the JTF component structure, as shown in Figure 8.3.5 This solution mirrors and perpetuates the strengths and weaknesses of design by element. The Joint Strategic Planning System is designed to support the chairman in accomplishing his statutory obligations. The unified command plan (UCP) establishes the combatant commands according to their enduring missions. The joint strategic capabilities plan ( JSCP, jay-scap) tasks the commands to develop operations plans (OPLANs) and apportions forces to the commands for planning purposes. The forces for combatant commands memorandum (Forces For) assigns forces to combatant commands, making the command responsible for the preparedness of assigned forces. Forces are allocated when an OPLAN becomes an operations order (OPORD).6 Increasingly, the forces allocated for a specific mission were neither apportioned nor assigned. The entire Joint Strategic Planning System may be in need of an overhaul given the high tempo of operations and small force structure.

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Figure 8.3.

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Joint Task Force Organization.

Origins of Unified Command The concept of a unified command is rooted in WWII Europe. Soon after victory in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower was made commanding general of U.S. Forces, European Theater by order of the JCS. The Strategic Air Command was established soon thereafter. Unified command in the Pacific was not achieved even by war’s end. Unification of U.S. armed forces would have to wait on congressional hearings and legislation. The original unified command plan—the 1946 Outline Command Plan— was signed by President Truman in December 1946. Within a year, eight commands were established. The recently created Strategic Air Command was quickly established as a specified command in December. In January 1947, the Pacific Command (Navy), Far East Command (Army), and the Alaskan Command (Army Air Forces) were established. The European Command (Army) was established in March. In November, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, was established as both a specified command and as the Navy component of the European Command. The Caribbean Command (Navy) was also established in November. The Atlantic Command (Navy) was the last to be established in December. Region rather than function was the dominant discriminator between the commands. But the regions’ boundaries were drawn in such a way as to preserve single service dominance within. The Air Force staked its claim to its preferred conception of an independent air war based on strategic bombardment; the Army and Navy divided the world at waters’ edge. Service dominance had not been weakened by the Outline Command Plan, but the conditions were established for future efforts in that direction.

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The Changing Context Since establishment after the war, the evolution of the system of unified commands has been driven by continuous change in two broad contextual areas. Changes came both in organizational authorities and in the geo-strategic environment. A few of the more prominent features of these changes are highlighted here. Congress and the president were responsible for shifts in authority through legislation and executive order. Several trends in organizational authority are apparent and serve as a backdrop to changes in the UCP. Civilian authority over the uniformed services was increased by adding power to the secretaries of the military departments. At the same time, authorities were shifted from the individual services to joint organizations, and the authorities of the defense secretary were continuously strengthened overall. Unified commands rose while the single-service specified commands declined. The JCS, established in WWII as a committee of service chiefs with no one in charge and without statutory authority, grew into a prominent body with a chairman and its own staff. Authority to appoint combatant commanders shifted from service chiefs to the NCA, and the services were removed from the user chain of command. There were also major shifts in the geo-strategic environment that drove change in the UCP. The Arab-Israeli War in 1973 drew attention to the Middle East, and rising communist presence drew attention to sub-Saharan Africa. The period of 1983 to 1989 witnessed rising tensions between the superpowers, punctuated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the ensuing CarterReagan buildup (1980–1990), and the subsequent diminution of threat from the Soviets (1989– ). The last major defense reform legislation, Goldwater-Nichols 1986, was firmly embedded in Cold War and great power conflict thinking. No major reforms have been attempted since the Cold War ended or in the face of the global conflict inaptly named the war on terrorism. Within this legislative and geo-strategic backdrop, three issues demanded attention but defied stable solution. One issue was assignment of geographic areas not considered central to great power conflict and vital national interests. The boundaries of these leftover areas shifted regularly, but sub-Saharan Africa was always in the orphaned group. Another issue demanding attention but defying resolution was the assignment to a combatant command of forces resident in the continental United States—the strategic reserve. A third issue was the defense of U.S. airspace—first against attack by long-range bombers and then by intercontinental ballistic missiles. POST–COLD WAR COMBATANT COMMANDS The UCP has undergone continuous change throughout the Cold War, but the fundamentals can be easily understood. In general, the number of combatant commands and the size of their staffs remained roughly constant

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throughout and following the Cold War. The pool of forces assigned to them, however, contracted significantly. At the peak of Cold War force structure, forces were forward deployed in the planned theater of operations assigned to the command that would employ them. Reinforcing forces were located in the United States. U.S.-based forces typically had a capstone alignment with one combatant command and were apportioned accordingly. Table 8.1 shows the combatant commands in 1992. The end of the Cold War precipitated a rapid and considerable drawdown of force structure. A greater part of total force structure came to reside in the continental United States, while the number of combatant commands remained fixed. At the same time, fewer and fewer forces were available to meet the commands’ needs. Forces once dedicated to a single command came to have many contingency relationships with many commands (multiple apportionment). An army unit formerly trained, equipped, and stationed on the German plains and prepared to defend against a Warsaw Pact threat is now stationed in the United States and is prepared to fight in the Balkans, Korea, Southwest Asia, Haiti, or Somalia. The European Command experienced the greatest loss of dedicated forces. The Atlantic Command, once a navy command, was the greatest recipient of forces as they returned home. Its geographic responsibilities included the Atlantic Ocean and the eastern seaboard but grew to include the entire continental United States, excluding an area along the Pacific Coast. In a subsequent change, the Atlantic Command became the Joint Forces Command, a functional command, and lost all of its area responsibilities. The Northern Command was established with Joint Forces Command’s former area responsibilities in and around North America. The current system of combatant commands is depicted in Table 8.2. Each combatant command is described in further detail below. U.S. Strategic Command Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is a functional unified command with global responsibilities for strike in support of the global war on terrorism, for

Table 8.1 Regional and Functional Commands 1992 Unified Combatant Commands Regional

Functional

U.S. Atlantic Command U.S. Central Command U.S. European Command U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Southern Command

U.S. Space Command U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Strategic Command U.S. Transportation Command

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Shaping U.S. Military Forces Table 8.2 Regional and Functional Commands 2005 Unified Combatant Commands Regional U.S. Central Command U.S. European Command U.S. Northern Command U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Southern Command

Functional U.S. Joint Forces Command U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Strategic Command U.S. Transportation Command

missile defense of the continental United States, and for space and information operations in support of the other combatant commands. STRATCOM is headquartered near Omaha, Nebraska, with strong remnants of the former Space Command (SPACECOM) remaining in Colorado Springs. Early in the Cold War, as the services independently developed their nuclear delivery mechanisms, they separately targeted the Soviet Union. Separate targeting resulted in considerable overlap and Air Force bombers potentially flying through the fireball of Navy missile detonations. Joint targeting was the first step, requiring establishment in 1960 of an organization—the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff—to produce the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP, sigh-op), but there was no command to unify them in the stronger sense. From this humble but important beginning, STRATCOM was established in January 1992 after the Cold War ended.7 Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines—the nuclear triad—were assigned to STRATCOM. On October 1, 2002, the old STRATCOM was disestablished, and a new command was established with the same name but a new mission—global strike. STRATCOM is now responsible for short-notice attacks on, for example, heavily fortified, high-value targets. Furthermore, the potential for STRATCOM attacks, to be conducted within a regional combatant command’s area of responsibility, are creating as of yet unresolved command relationships. Nuclear and conventional munitions as well as conventional forces are within the new STRATCOM purview. The ultimate deliberate planning, narrow spectrum, equipment-centric culture is now responsible for crisis action planning and combined-arms operations. Command has alternated between Air Force and Navy officers, and only recently has been commanded by a marine. Force assignment remains problematic. Since 1993, strategic bombers, reconfigured to employ conventional (non-nuclear) munitions, were assigned to the Air Force component of Joint Forces Command. Ballistic missile submarines remain assigned to STRATCOM. Army and Marine forces for land

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strike are also assigned to other unified commands, predominately to Joint Forces Command. The new STRATCOM also subsumed SPACECOM and inherited its mission for space and information operations. All military space-based assets—for example, communications, navigation, weather, warning, or intelligence-gathering assets—are under STRATCOM. Over 90 percent of military communications leaving and entering the Persian Gulf theater of operations went through communications satellites. U.S. Transportation Command Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) is a functional unified command with global responsibility for movement of troops and supplies. TRANSCOM, established in 1987, and headquartered in East St. Louis, Illinois, consolidates all strategic lift assets under one commander. Given the United States’ force posture to defend forward, the command is of critical strategic significance. It is not glamorous duty, and its role is generally given inadequate attention. It is, for example, largely excluded from unified command training. The assumption in training is that forces and supplies will arrive as planned. Given the desire of opponents to keep forces out rather than engage them after a successful landing, the assumption is a very bad one, but as the two world wars have shown, it has always been a very bad assumption. TRANSCOM’s functional responsibilities include management of air, sea, rail, and truck assets from bases in the United States to delivery to the theater of operations. TRANSCOM has Army, Navy, and Air Force transportation commands assigned. They are the Air Mobility Command, the Military Transportation Management Command, and the Military Sealift Command. In addition to the global transportation responsibility, the command was given responsibility in 2003 for distribution of equipment and supplies. Combatant command has been dominated by Air Force generals. U.S. Special Operations Command Special Operations Command (SOCOM, so-comm) is a functional unified command responsible for providing special operations forces to the regional combatant commands and recently was made lead in the global war on terrorism. SOCOM, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, was established in 1987, but only after legislation demanded it. It resulted from long-running conflict within the executive branch between the president (user of military force) and the services (producers of military force). The big services steadfastly neglected the function. The command is unusual in that it has characteristics more like a service providing forces organized, trained, and equipped to the regional combatant commands. Special operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations

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forces are assigned to SOCOM and are organized under Army, Navy, and Air Force components. Command has been dominated by the Army. U.S. Southern Command Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a regional unified command, headquartered in Miami, Florida, with area of responsibility including Latin America and the surrounding waters but excluding Mexico. SOUTHCOM was established in June 1963, subsuming the area and responsibilities of the Caribbean Command, which dates to the opening of the Panama Canal and World War I. Responsibilities shifted from defending the southern maritime approach from European powers to conducting political-military interactions within Latin America. Defending the Canal remained a core mission throughout. Long an almost exclusively Army command with borders drawn at the shore, counterdrug operations and incremental changes elsewhere in the unified command plan have forced it to become truly unified. Assigned forces are minimal, mostly limited to counterdrug operations. Command has been almost exclusively Army since establishment after WWII, but has recently gone to marines. SOUTHCOM is better understood as a political command rather than a warfighting command. South America has been the most militarized continent in past decades but has never been home to a great power. Latin American presidents commonly wore the uniform of an army general, and their preferred communications path to the United States was not through the State Department or CIA but through SOUTHCOM’s Military Advisory Groups and a U.S. Army colonel. Not until the Carter administration, accompanied by post-Vietnam anti-military sentiment, did diplomatic relations take on a more traditional appearance. The transition to an interwar period has forced other unified commands to shift from a warfighting orientation to a theater engagement orientation, the norm in SOUTHCOM from its inception. U.S. European Command European Command (EUCOM, you-comm), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is a regional unified command with area of responsibility spanning the Scandinavian countries, the European land mass including Turkey, Middle Eastern countries bordering the Mediterranean, Africa excluding the Horn of Africa, and the surrounding waterways. EUCOM is the command most affected by the shift from great power to interwar period. Apparently the dominant combatant command of the Cold War, EUCOM was really a planner and a provider of U.S. forces to NATO, headquartered in Mons, Belgium. The chain of command governing the use of force was through NATO organizations and did not pass through EUCOM. As a force provider, EUCOM dominated Army and Air Force thinking on training and doctrine and set the norms worldwide for both. EUCOM defined the big-war culture.

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Once the consummate deliberate planner for the ultimate major war, and a force provider rather than a warfighter, EUCOM became responsible for planning and executing rapidly against emerging crises throughout the “European” theater that includes Africa. It also undertook the task of aiding the former states of the Soviet Union through the Partnership for Peace, thus becoming more like the political SOUTHCOM on a grand scale. It is impossible to quantify the stabilizing force provided by EUCOM’s presence during the Cold War and during the difficult transition afterward. The EUCOM commander is dual-hatted with the grandiloquent title of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, a NATO position. An Army general has typically commanded,8 but Air Force and Marine generals have commanded since the Cold War. U.S. Pacific Command Pacific Command (PACOM) is a regional unified command headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii. PACOM has the largest area of responsibility of any unified command, over half the earth’s surface, including vast expanses of empty waters and almost 60 percent of the world’s population. The command’s AOR spans the Pacific Ocean and includes China, Mongolia, Japan, the Koreas, India, Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. PACOM has considerable organizational infrastructure oriented on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. PACOM has subordinate unified commands in Korea, Japan, and Alaska, and a functional command with theater-wide special operations responsibility. Throughout the Cold War, PACOM was second in stature to EUCOM. An admiral has always commanded PACOM. PACOM’s service components are U.S. Army Pacific, Pacific Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, and Marine Forces Pacific with forces arrayed throughout its area of responsibility, including Alaska and the west coast of the continental United States. U.S. Central Command Central Command (CENTCOM) is a regional unified command, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, with area of responsibility spreading across what is alternatively called South or Central Asia, including the “stans,” the former Soviet states, the Horn of Africa, and much of the Middle East (excluding Mediterranean states). The original CENTCOM and its predecessors were attempts to solve two disparate problems: regions and forces unassigned to major theater commands. South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa south of the Sahara were not areas sought after by the major-war theater commanders. They were unassigned or given short shrift as secondary land theaters with respect to the NATO-Warsaw Pact war. The other problem was the disposition of forces in the continental United States (CONUS) that were not assigned to a major

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theater command—the strategic reserve force. Naval forces home stationed in the United States were on rotational deployments to major theaters. The Air Force successfully lobbied to have its stateside squadrons assigned to a majorwar theater, mostly to EUCOM. Thus, the strategic reserve was largely an Army issue with forces assigned to the Continental Army Command, later to become Forces Command. The adjustment was problematic and slow. Strike Command (STRICOM, stri-comm) was established in January 1962. STRICOM’s mission was to provide a general reserve for the other combatant commands, to train the assigned force, to develop joint doctrine, and to plan and execute contingencies as ordered by the JCS. Army and tactical air forces in CONUS that were not assigned to other theaters were assigned to STRICOM, but STRICOM had no regional responsibilities. By December 1962, the commandant of the Marine Corps feared a worldwide generalpurpose forces command. By December 1963, STRICOM had been assigned an area of responsibility to include the Middle East, southern Asia, and Africa south of the Sahara.9 Through 1962 and 1963, STRICOM was the solution to the unassigned forces problem; from December 1963 until its demise in December 1971, STRICOM was the solution to both problems of unassigned forces and unassigned areas. In January 1972, the Readiness Command (REDCOM) was established, a redesignated STRICOM without sub-Saharan Africa in its area of responsibility. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and increased growth of Chinese, Cuban, and Soviet presence in sub-Saharan Africa by 1976 brought greater attention to the region. In October 1979, the defense secretary ordered establishment of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for the Middle East and Africa, and REDCOM stood up the RDJTF in March 1980. The Soviet’s 1979 Christmas invasion of Afghanistan took place in the short period between the secretary’s order to create the RDJTF and its establishment and precipitated the Carter Doctrine with respect to the Persian Gulf. The Navy and Marine Corps proposed a global strike force without the overhead of a unified command with area responsibilities—a functional command with forces and a mission. The European and Pacific Commands sought responsibility, citing the fact that they had assigned forces and were closer to the Gulf than the Florida-headquartered Readiness Command. REDCOM had forces but lacked forward bases. Rejecting the alternative proposals, the president approved establishment of CENTCOM on January 1, 1983, and CENTCOM assumed all responsibilities of the RDJTF. The RDJTF stood down immediately, and REDCOM followed in September. CENTCOM remained headquartered in Florida and still lacked forward bases and assigned forces. From birth, CENTCOM was only a secondary theater in Cold War planning.10 The Gulf War (1990–1991) completed CENTCOM’s transition from a backwater to become the country’s principal warfighting command. Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait provided the United States with unprecedented access to bases and facilities in the region. The forces employed by

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CENTCOM are typically assigned to the European Command, the Pacific Command, or the CONUS-based Joint Forces Command, making them force providers with respect to military operations in the Levant. Forces are assigned where they live rather than where they will fight. Combatant command has rotated between Army and Marine Corps generals. U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Forces Command ( JFCOM), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, is a functional unified command without area or global responsibilities. The command has authority over assigned forces in CONUS not assigned elsewhere, and it is responsible for providing CONUS-based forces from all services to the regional combatant commanders, the users of force. JFCOM is the force provider—the strategic reserve. JFCOM traces its lineage from the post-WWII Navy Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), to the post–Cold War Atlantic Command (ACOM) in 1993, to Joint Forces Command with an assigned area of responsibility, and finally to the present Joint Forces Command. Today, JFCOM is without an area of responsibility and without a war plan, but with the preponderance of U.S. forces assigned. It has moved from a warfighting command to a functional command without much more than a name change. The Atlantic Command became Joint Forces Command in October 1999. Rather than the approach taken by the STRATCOM—disestablish the old command, establish a new command appropriate for the new mission, and keep the old name—ACOM just changed names. It was a conscious decision advocated by the combatant commander of the time, Admiral Harold Gehman. It has been a costly decision. JFCOM’s true roots are in STRICOM established in 1962 and REDCOM established in 1972. JFCOM is the “chief advocate for jointness” and interoperability. It is the lead agent for joint training and the provider of service forces to other commands. It is the joint force integrator tasked to recommend changes to doctrine, organization, training, education, material, leadership, and personnel. And, it is executive agent for joint experimentation. Words like “advocate,” “agent,” “recommend,” and “support” riddle JFCOM’s mission statement and do not connote the strong command authorities given in law. JFCOM has yet to establish its own identity, and its relevance is constantly in question. Four component commands report to JFCOM—Atlantic Fleet, Air Force Air Combat Command, Army Forces Command, and Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. Command had always been held by an admiral until October 1994. Since then, the position has been held by Marine, Army, and Navy four-stars. U.S. Northern Command Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the newest of the unified commands. While most of the Defense Department defends forward, NORTHCOM

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defends the homeland and the air, land, and sea approaches extending 500 miles beyond the coast. It has regional responsibility for North America (including the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgins Islands) and is headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado. NORTHCOM inherited the area and the land defense mission formerly assigned to JFCOM that in turn were inherited from Army Forces Command. There has always been a mismatch between power projection forces assigned to Forces Command (an airborne corps and a heavy mobile corps) and the mission of land defense of the United States. Reassigning continental land defense from JFCOM to NORTHCOM brought an end to the mismatch between mission and forces for JFCOM; NORTHCOM now has the mission with virtually no assigned forces. The mission has not been taken seriously for a very long time. NORTHCOM inherited another mission from JFCOM: military assistance to civil authorities in the continental United States. This mission is perhaps NORTHCOM’s most critical contribution to national security and the most problematic. A great many working relationships between federal, state, and local agencies must be defined, built, and exercised. NORTHCOM cannot solve these problems; it is not in command. These problems are beyond even the highest level of the federal government, given the fact that governors, mayors, local law enforcement, and emergency medical services are not federal and will always carry the heaviest burden in consequence management. Also at issue are the roles of the active and reserve military organizations, particularly the role of the National Guard. The Guard is ideally suited to integrate with state and local agencies for consequence management but prefers to organize as combat forces. The reserve units well suited to consequence management in the United States (military police, engineers, medical, and civil affairs units) are in heavy demand for nation building overseas and are unavailable for use by governors. NORTHCOM cannot solve these problems either.

CHAPTER 9

Unified Action and the Nature of Disunity

The purpose of command is to bring a unity of effort from a diversity of means. General William E. DePuy, USA Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. President Dwight D. Eisenhower

The purpose of command is to achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means. Not long ago, the diversity of means for an army commander included infantry, horse, and cannon. Today’s force commander must achieve unity from a diversity of means that includes a variety of aircraft, surface and subsurface ships, increasingly sophisticated munitions independent of their launch platforms, and a rapidly changing array of sensors that collectively allow the commander to engage the enemy far beyond visual range. Unified commands and joint task forces are the organizations designed to support the commander responsible for achieving unified action from U.S. armed forces. The long-established principle of unity of command provides a means to achieve unity of effort. The principle is codified in the Constitution, granting command of the armed forces exclusively to the president as commander in chief, rather than to the legislature, where dissension and compromise could produce paralysis. The constitutional check on the executive’s sole authority to command in war is the exclusive authority of the legislature to declare war; a decision of such great and irreversible consequences that the framers thought a period of dissension and deliberation was not only justified but required.

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While unity of command may be accepted in theory and prescribed in law, it has been exceedingly problematic in practice. One of the best-publicized examples is the failure to achieve unity of command in the WWII Pacific. The Pacific theater was divided in such a way so as to placate the egos of General MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and their respective institutions. The press weighed in unabashedly; major newspaper chains agreed on the need for unity of command and differed only on their choice of commander. Unity of command was demanded by all but was never achieved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee with no one in charge, failed to honor its own unassailable principle. Failure to achieve unity of command and unified action certainly predates World War II. And many of the problems of WWII were repeated in Vietnam (1961–1975) and the Gulf War (1990–1991) and continue to appear today. There should be no expectation of resolution in the foreseeable future regardless of rhetorical claims to the contrary. The problem is multidimensional and deep. Attempts at resolution are superficial, expensive, and ignore the root causes. The source of disunity lies in division of the services along the elemental lines of air, land, and sea. From this original sin, services developed different theories of warfare, models of command, and physical and procedural systems. Each is appropriate for the individual service, but the result is a collection of parts not designed for assembly into a unified, coherent whole. The individual services simply conceive of war and warfare differently, and those conceptions determine how each service organizes, equips, and trains. The attempted solutions include imposition of a single commander atop separate service commands, before- or after-the-fact kludging together of physical systems, a variety of cross-service familiarization exercises, and bloated, cumbersome bureaucratic processes supported by multiservice committees with no one in charge. Far more effective has been the repeated resort to design by coherent warfighting functions rather than by the warfighting elements of air, land, and sea. THE IRRATIONALITY OF DESIGN The immense problems of government—and defense—defy solution by a single monolithic organization, a single doctrine, and a single tool. Deconstruction of a problem into its constituent pieces to determine its root causes defines analysis. Solutions also must be decomposed. Decomposition can bring focus, economy, and excellence of the individual pieces. But decomposition may or may not produce components that can be assembled into a coherent whole. The sum of optimized pieces cannot produce a solution superior to the optimized whole. To optimize a complex whole, however, is an intractable proposition. Even if possible, a complex system can be optimized only for a single problem and can easily produce a brittle solution, one well suited to a specific problem but very poorly suited to even closely related problems.

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When optimized systems fail, they fail catastrophically. Decomposition with the attendant suboptimization is the only alternative. Thus, the lines along which the decomposition occurs are critically important if the pieces are to be composed into a coherent whole that is suitable to a meaningful range of problems. There are many important design criteria, but one or two primary criteria dominate any design, while the other criteria remain manifest at secondary levels. Prior to WWII, the executive branch had separate and coequal Departments of War and Navy. The country did not maintain a standing army. The War Department was about mobilizing an army for major war. The Navy and Marine Corps constituted a force in readiness that responded to the president’s needs below the threshold of declared war. This arrangement survived through WWII. After the war, the decomposition by threshold of war was abandoned in favor of decomposition by the elements of air, land, and sea. The War Department split into Departments of Army and Air Force with great bureaucratic pain. The Army and Air Force since have maintained their distance with the Air Force resisting subordination. The Navy retained its aviation and its naval infantry. The Marine Corps retained its aviation as well. The unified commands were divided at water’s edge. Many of today’s joint warfare problems can be traced to the decision to divide service responsibilities by the element within which they fight. There is ample evidence that the elemental solution—like any solution—has produced problems of integrating the separately built pieces. There is further evidence that functional design has been repeatedly relied upon to solve the problems created by elemental design. Strategic nuclear forces, special operations forces, and amphibious forces have all integrated across the elements for a specific function—a mission space. Only general-purpose, or conventional, forces have escaped and remain divided along elemental lines. General DePuy speaks of achieving unity of effort across a single service, although he mentions the two-service concept of airland battle. Command and control means many things to different people. To some, it evokes the image of a communication network, to others the qualities of leadership. Increasingly it has been described as an information exchange system. An officer who aspires to successful command must understand that behind these ingredients is a process designed to concentrate the immense combat power of an Airland Battle force against the enemy in order to win engagements, battles, campaigns and wars. It is a process that unifies the efforts of thousands of men performing a bewildering array of battlefield functions each one of which is utterly essential to success. This process produces unity of effort from a diversity of means.1

Achieving unity of effort is conducted under the rubric of joint, an illdefined or abused word at best. Under one of its stronger meanings, joint means uniform, as in a uniform solution to an acquisition problem of interest to one or more service—for example, infantry weapons to the Army and

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Marine Corps or strike fighters to the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Such joint solutions are often seen more as compromise solutions than as uniform solutions. A weaker meaning of joint is simply as shorthand for multiservice. The odd expression joint interoperability means nothing more than service interoperability—for example, communications interoperability between Army and Marine Corps ground vehicles or between Air Force and naval aircraft. But doctrinal, procedural, and technical interoperability is generally accomplished by patching together service solutions rather than by finding a uniform solution. The weakest meaning of a joint capability is one offered by a single service to the joint commander—service masquerading as joint. The word joint has a formal meaning. Joint “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”2 Operations are joint when three requirements are met: (1) a joint force commander is appointed in the legally prescribed manner; (2) joint (not service) doctrine is used; and (3) forces from two or more military departments (not services) are involved. The method of establishing unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces is specified in law and satisfies the first requirement. Creating a unified command requires approval by the president and secretary of defense. The commander is subject to Senate confirmation. A combatant commander can create a subordinate unified command with only the approval of the secretary of defense. Any legally designated joint force commander, including a joint task force commander, can create a JTF and appoint a commander. The second requirement is for joint doctrine, but joint doctrine is service doctrine by another name. It is generally written by a single service and blessed as joint when the mission or function is dominated by the authoring service. For contentious missions and functions—for example, close air support—joint doctrine is a committee product, negotiated by the interested services to the lowest common denominator or by allowing each service’s doctrine. The third requirement is for forces drawn from more than one military department; Navy and Marine Corps operations are not joint. Joint operations evidently exclude those mission spaces that have achieved coherence and only refer to mission spaces with problems integrating the big services along elemental lines; an odd irony indeed. Joint responsibilities often refer to the responsibilities of the joint commands. These responsibilities are at the strategic and operational levels of war rather than at the tactical level. If we truly achieve unity of effort, then jointness will be practiced at all levels of war, not just the highest. Joint most often simply means all or multiple services or a committee of service representatives with no one in charge. Too many highly visible operations conducted by a single service in an interwar period challenge the relevancy of the other services and their claim on budget. Punitive or coercive

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air strikes that could be conducted by either the Air Force or Navy are conducted jointly. Small operations that could effectively be conducted either by a Navy–Marine Corps team or by an Army–Air Force team are conducted by all four services. Such service “cooperation” can be expected to continue. Former Marine Commandant Charles Krulak called these “little league rules” where everybody gets to play.3 Bringing the services together to guarantee their respective budget share adds complexity, risks mission failure, and costs lives. The question the joint force commander must answer is, what force mix achieves the best political-military objectives and costs the fewest American lives. But the multiple advocacy system and lack of leadership favors little league rules over effectiveness. In short, joint means solving the problems created by elemental design. Joint is a term that immediately shifts discussion from the effectiveness and efficiency of armed forces to bureaucratic boundaries. A great deal of friction occurs at those boundaries and produces far more heat than light. There is no theory of joint warfare that makes sense of the empirical evidence. Combined arms warfare, on the other hand, has a robust theory readily supported by the historical record. It focuses attention on effectiveness and efficiency. CLASH OF THEORIES The U.S. services are vocally anti-theoretic, preferring to see themselves as imminently pragmatic. Theories do, however, separate the services in critically important ways. Two expressions—combined arms theory and strategic monism4—perhaps best capture this root cause of disunity. Combined arms theory can be characterized simply by three principles derived from thousands of years of observation: the complementary, dilemma, and asymmetry principles. The complementary principle refers to one’s own force: “by combining the various combat arms into single organizations (i.e., functioning under one commander), we can compensate for each arm’s weakness through another arm’s strength.” The dilemma principle refers to the effects of combined arms operations on the enemy force: “for the enemy to successfully defend himself from one arm, he must become vulnerable to another.” The asymmetry principle refers to the selection of the place and time of battle: to fight the enemy with unlike weapons under conditions that favor one’s own weapons over those of the enemy.5 The dilemma principle best characterizes combined arms theory. Either an unattended minefield or infantry equipped with shoulder-fired antitank weapons separately presents a problem to an approaching tank column. The solution to the problem presented by the minefield is to move slowly, each tank closely in trail of another. The solution to the problem presented by infantry weapons is to disperse and move rapidly through the killing zone. If both weapon systems are employed together, however, actions taken to reduce the effects of one arm magnify the effects posed by the other.

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Multiple arms are not necessarily combined arms. Naval gunfire, artillery, and aerial bombardment all present a serious problem but not a dilemma; the problems presented by these arms have the same solution: disperse, hunker down, and wait it out. Killing fires are thus reduced to suppressive fires that cannot be sustained forever. The coercive use of force requires the ability to do harm, to make it better for the adversary to do as we wish rather than resist. Retaliation, as part of deterrence, also requires the ability to do harm. A single arm, or multiple similar arms, is sufficient to inflict harm. Compellence, compelling the enemy to submit to our will, on the other hand, begs for combined arms warfare. The Army and Marine Corps embrace combined arms warfare in both theory and practice. The Air Force conception rests on the independent application of airpower, the antithesis of combined arms theory. The Navy shares the Air Force’s monism with respect to strike warfare. The Navy is, however, distinctly a combined arms organization when fighting a competent opponent at sea. By the time the services have organized, equipped, and trained according to their respective conceptions, little can be done to overcome the clash of theories. MODELS OF COMMAND Command, as DePuy defined it, can be achieved in a variety of ways. One taxonomy includes three distinct models of command: command by plan, by direction, and by influence.6 In command by plan, decisions are made in a centralized fashion at a higher echelon headquarters, incorporated in a detailed plan of operations, approved by the commander, and promulgated throughout the force for execution—centralized planning and decentralized execution. Command by direction also centralizes decision making in the higher echelon commander, but detailed orders are promulgated directly by the commander to subordinate commanders in real time as the situation develops. Under the third model, command by influence, a higher echelon commander provides only general guidance on objectives and leaves details to subordinate commanders at the site of action. Each of the services consciously or unconsciously employs a specific model dictated by its own conception of war. The Army preaches command by influence, practices command by plan, and longs to return to command by direction of the era when a commander could survey the entire battlefield from horseback. Information technology may enable, not require, the Army to return to this method of command. The Air Force is an inherently command-by-plan organization, producing a plan that binds aircraft, munitions, and targets at the highest level—the theaterwide air tasking order—and mission plans at the squadron level prepared by the tasked flight crews. Decision makers aboard airborne command posts can override plans in real time—for example, when a planned target was previously destroyed or a refueler is unable to rendezvous as planned. Command by plan is the dominant model of the Air Force, augmented by command by direction.

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The Navy’s core notion of independent command at sea drives its model of command. The Navy speaks of command by negation, a command-byinfluence and command-by-direction hybrid. Ship captains in a carrier battle group, for example, know the admiral’s intentions and their own responsibilities within the battle group. They are expected to carry out their responsibilities without further guidance, but they are subject to the admiral’s command override if they stray too far from his intentions. The objective is to achieve maximum initiative at the ship level and to free the higher commander to concentrate on larger fleet issues. Information technology in the Navy, as in the Army, threatens to replace command by influence with command by direction as the dominant model. The Marine Corps preaches and practices command by influence to achieve the greatest initiative possible at the small, tactical unit level, perhaps the natural outgrowth of the small-wars culture that requires small units to operate independently. Command by influence is the only practical model for the Corps. One might expect special operations forces to also adopt command by influence. Special operations forces are expected to exercise great individual initiative tactically. They are, however, very much a command-by-plan organization. Their preferred method of operation is to plan in great detail, rehearse as realistically as possible, and then execute with great precision at night. Command by plan dominates direct actions, while command by influence dominates unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. The individual services achieve command over and within their forces differently, and they engineer their systems accordingly. Present-day approaches to unify service forces can do little to resolve these differences. INTEROPERABILITY The services’ conceptions of war and methods of command drive how they organize, equip, and train. DePuy acknowledges that many equate command and control with the complex information system that supports the commander and his staff. But the services build their weapon systems and command information systems in accordance with their conceptions of warfare. Their different procedures require that different information be communicated, and they communicate through different lexicons and through different physical systems designed using different engineering approaches. Lashing these systems together, through front-end design or after-the-fact patching, is referred to as achieving interoperability, one of the many meanings of the word joint. The number of interfaces to join is uncountable; some are more important than others, but which ones? There is no unified conception of warfare to guide resource allocation to achieve the interoperability that matters most. A unifying culture or conception of war is lacking. Nor is a single conception desirable—monism at the highest conceptual level. But within a reasonably

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bounded warfighting domain—a function or a mission space—a unifying conception makes sense and has proven successful. Within the domain of amphibious assault, the Navy and Marine Corps have achieved a unified conception, and that conception dictates priorities for physical and procedural interoperability. Within the domain of special operations, for these same reasons, coherency has been achieved. In both of these areas, the solution spans the elements rather than separates them. EXAMPLES OF FRICTION AT THE JOINTS The conceptual differences between the services consistently manifest themselves on the battlefield, risking mission accomplishment and wasting lives and material resources. Prominent examples of conceptual differences manifest when major-war and small-wars cultures, expeditionary and sustained operations cultures, or integrated and separate air-ground cultures are juxtaposed. Problems present in WWII were repeated in Vietnam and in the Gulf War. America’s longest war, Vietnam, is rich in such examples. U.S. military presence in Vietnam progressed from counterinsurgency advisory forces (small-wars culture), to initial Marine combat forces (smallwars culture), and to large-scale Army and Air Force combat forces (majorwar cultures). The initial combat forces coalesced under the Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) in the northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, an area designated as I Corps. Army and Air Force combat units soon flowed into the southern provinces of II, III, and IV Corps. Forces from all four corps7 were under the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV, mack-vee). The Strategic Air Command prosecuted its private war from 35,000 feet by B-52s. The Pacific Fleet Command retained command over carrier-based air strikes and support of ground forces. The big-war army fought its war in the three southern corps of South Vietnam and dominated MACV. Having the wrong conception of war brought its own problems, but other significant and distinct problems were created when the big-war army tried to impose its conception on the small-wars operations of the CIA, SOF, and the Marine Corps. Perhaps the most glaring example of differing conceptions in Vietnam occurred at the strategy level between the commanding generals of the bigwar Army and the small-wars Marine Corps. Senior Army commanders at MACV relied on conventional Army doctrine employing massive firepower, large maneuver forces, and a search-and-destroy strategy, while senior Marine generals argued for a clear-and-hold strategy that gave priority to protecting the indigenous population in their villages from the insurgents. Once denied access to resources in the villages, the insurgents were forced to retire to the field in larger units to survive and operate. The Army would destroy the enemy in the field to bring peace to the villages. The Marines would bring peace to the villages to drive the enemy into the field for destruction.

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The Marine’s approach can be traced to the Small Wars Manual and the Corps’ experience with insurgencies. MACV required reporting of large-unit operations, battalion and above, and interpreted the Marine’s low numbers as a lack of aggression and competence. Young Army officers who studied the masters of the great wars while at West Point quickly realized the inappropriateness of the major-war army conception, but the generals who served as lieutenants in WWII would not yield. Lyndon Johnson threatened the JCS with the recall of a retired marine commandant to command the overall war effort.8 The disagreement on strategy was resolved only when marines were withdrawn from Vietnam. Differences were not limited to the generals’ strategies. Air-ground operations were also problematic. In I Corps, both air and ground operations were planned and executed by III MAF. Ground operations in II, III, and IV Corps were planned and executed by Army commanders with the corresponding tactical air operations conducted under the authority of the Air Force headquartered in Saigon. This arrangement was reasonably workable until an increasing number of Army divisions began conducting operations in I Corps. Marines had insufficient aviation to support both Marine and Army divisions. Since III MAF commanded the air space in I Corps, the Air Force was inhibited from providing air support to the Army. Tremendous bureaucratic wrangling ensued while lives were lost. The problem was resolved only when marines were withdrawn from Vietnam. Prolonged operations brought the Army and Air Force closer in Vietnam, just as it had in past wars. But when the war was over, the services went their separate ways, rebuilding according to their individual conceptions of great power war in Europe—separate air and land wars. Acclaimed as validation of Goldwater-Nichols legislation to improve jointness, the Gulf War is properly discussed as separate air and land battles.9 Both the Army and the Air Force were devastatingly effective against a large force organized and equipped like the Warsaw Pact force that coalition forces were designed to defeat. The superiority of U.S. military forces certainly was demonstrated, but explanations beyond that—jointness or the separate application of airpower—are speculative at best.10 U.S. CENTCOM employed a multinational and multiservice air component command. Ostensibly, all aircraft were to be commanded by this single headquarters entity dominated by the United States Air Force. But the Air Force had an air war to prosecute against strategic targets; Navy aviation was split between defense of the fleet, strategic attack, and support of ground forces; and the Marine Corps integrated its aviation with ground maneuver. The Corps successfully withheld its aviation from the higher command, just as it had done in Vietnam. The Air Force did not generate the necessary sorties in support of ground forces when the land offensive began. The Joint Force Air Component Command appears to be a replay of the post-WWII Air Force failed attempt to establish authority over the aviation of all services. The struggle continues.

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Apparently, about a half million troops establishes America’s upper bound without declaring and mobilizing for war. That limit was reached in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In a war of this size, all four (five) services must participate fully. Short of mobilization there is no other choice, and the clash of warfare conceptions is predictable. But smaller expeditions that could be accomplished effectively by a single service, for all the wrong reasons, attract all services. Little league rules continue to plague those small operations that might better be prosecuted by fewer services. In Operation Urgent Fury (1983), the invasion of Grenada, all four services and special operations forces were involved when the operation might better have been prosecuted by an Army–Air Force or Navy–Marine Corps team with minor support from the other services. In Operation El Dorado Canyon (1986), the air raid on Libya, both carrier-based aviation from the Gulf of Sidra and long-range fighter-bombers from England were used.11 In Operation Just Cause (1989), the invasion of Panama, the desire to participate caused a SEAL team to be assigned an airbase seizure mission— a mission better suited to a larger ranger or marine command. All services, like neglected siblings competing for their parents’ attention, will demand participation, and there is no civilian or uniformed authority willing to discipline them—not the national command authorities, not the unified commands, and not the JCS chairman. The authority exists; the will does not.

Conclusion

No military organization can reform itself. —Alfred Thayer Mahan1

In the decade and a half following the Cold War, the United States produced a smaller but not a different military force. The producer chain of command attempted to maintain its next-generation weapon system acquisition programs derived from Cold War requirements and attempted to hold on to as much of its Cold War force as possible. The user chain of command, in contrast, was confronted with the demands of an interwar period. The high tempo of operations that began in the Clinton years and accelerated under the younger Bush, coupled with the reduced force size, created change in the field while forces were in contact with the enemy. The services, the dominant players in the producer chain, buttressed by their benefactors in Congress, failed miserably to transform the force from one designed for great power conflict into a force designed for small wars in the third world. Had the end of the Cold War been recognized for what it was—a transition from an era of great power conflict to an interwar era dominated by small wars and gunboat diplomacy—a rational plan could have been adopted. Either the transition was not recognized or it was ignored in favor of continuing parochial pursuits. The evidence would suggest that both are true. The nation’s defense needs 10, 15, or 20 years hence are unknowable. But the country’s immediate needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall were far more predictable. Recognition of the changed strategic environment could have, should have, led to a shift from major-war thinking to small-wars thinking. That shift in thinking could and should have been followed by a change as

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significant as Britain’s strategic transformations preceding and succeeding World War I. The president’s national security strategy is dutifully translated into the chairman’s national military strategy. Hosts of other planning documents are developed that focus largely on what equipment to buy. And yet the force is not transformed. Transformation, apparently, has taken place only in battle, governed by employment policy. Yet most Pentagon force development processes are bound up in declaratory policy, and they are dominated by the institutional services focused on major war. The “invisible hand” of slowly changing service cultures steers a steady course. Special operations forces, parts of the light army, and the Marine Corps were already small-wars oriented and immediately felt the strain of carrying the main effort while the big services continued to prepare for major war. The Navy would not be asked to dock its ships and send its troops ashore. The Air Force would not be asked to park its aircraft to free personnel for the complex work of small wars. The burden of transforming from major war to small war would fall to the Army. The big army would be forced to change to be relevant in opposition to its newly acquired equipment-centric nature. It would resist mightily. That the Army chose to retain organizations for major war rather than for small wars went unchallenged in the producer chain of command, but the relevance of heavy divisions was challenged in the user chain of command when heavy forces were assigned infantry missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. THE CONTINUING NEED FOR EXTERNAL INTERVENTION The services alone cannot transform the military capability of the United States. The Army cannot decide to withdraw forward deployed forces from Korea or Europe. The Air Force cannot prepare forward operating bases in uncooperative countries. The services cannot decide which missions to accept. The president will continue to define declaratory and employment policy to drive the transformation. Congress remains focused on acquiring weapon systems and can thus guide modernization, but it has avoided declaratory and employment policy. The services can be expected to pursue modernization of their weapons and to resist change in their view of warfare. Congress will need to intervene on both fronts to accomplish anything more than modernization. The president appoints the service chiefs, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands subject to Senate confirmation. The combatant commands are firmly rooted in the near-term use of force. The law requires that the services provide forces for the combatant commands, not the forces the services want to build. If the services are not providing the forces that the combatant commands need today—for example, heavy forces for mid-intensity conflict instead of light forces for low-intensity conflict—then service chiefs and secretaries are at fault.

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The service chiefs and secretaries dominate the producer chain of command. The president can nominate a custodian or a change agent and the Senate must approve. Custodians will fight for their service’s share of the defense budget and champion the service’s programs. To a significant extent, custodial service chiefs reflect the culture of the service and its past. Change agents, instead, look farther down the road, may challenge existing programs, and may defy service culture. The president and the Senate must look for those nominees with a vision and the will to see the vision through. Both the chief executive and Senate have failed in that responsibility. Weak managers prefer weaker subordinates. Deep change may require more than the few years allotted to service chiefs. Custodians and ineffective change agents need to be removed early. None of this is likely. It appears that only Congress can lead the transformation from service to joint warfare. Presidents have been surprisingly weak in this role. Congress has shown an episodic interest in strengthening the joint chain of command governing the use of force, but its interest in the producer chain of command is largely limited to efficiency and the acquisition of weapon systems that are the domain of the services and their branches. Innovations often challenge ongoing acquisition programs. A proposed innovation has no formal constituency or funded proponent, and it often threatens ongoing acquisition programs that have a constituency and have attracted a multiyear funding stream. Congress might have considered flushing the acquisition pipeline of programs driven by Cold War requirements. This action, while dramatic, would have freed resources and removed an impediment to transformation. But important Army artillery and helicopter programs were killed only after years of foot dragging. Hugely expensive tactical aircraft programs continue. Greater pressure needs to be applied from Congress to force the Army and Air Force into cooperation and joint capabilities. Cooperation need not require the Air Force to give up its ability to conduct independent operations, but it must be forced to join the combined arms team. The Army’s inability to procure slow, low-flying, fixed-wing aircraft suited to close air support and ground attack and the Air Force’s preference for high-flying, supersonic fighter aircraft will continue to force the Army to pursue an expensive rotary-wing substitute, and the expensive substitute will pursue an independent mission. Strategic air and sea lift is critical across the entire conflict spectrum and to all services, but neither is central to the providing service’s conception of war. Congress must remain vigilant to ensure that the Air Force and Navy acquire mobility assets in sufficient numbers and type to satisfy the needs of the combatant commands, not just the needs of the Air Force and Navy. In time of war, the executive branch must ensure that mobility assets are employed to meet the needs of the supported unified combatant commander rather than the needs of the service component commander. The Air Force provides a “public utility” for the entire Defense Department. The Air Force is the leading provider of space-based communications

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and surveillance assets. The institution and its forward-leaning and technologyembracing nature virtually assure its continued dominance, but not necessarily its success, in this area. It sometimes shortchanges the Navy in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, taking an Air Force–centric view that projects power on land. Although the Air Force is increasingly engaged in information warfare and information services, development along these fronts may be impeded by the dominance of the fighter pilot. The same dominance may impede the shift from manned to unmanned aircraft. Both may require intervention by Congress. The Navy is as dominated today by aviators as it was during WWII by battleship captains. This may blind the Navy to non-aviation solutions, or it may inhibit non-aviation innovations by dominating the competition within the Navy. Congress should revisit the legislation that favors aviators in important commands so that a balance between aviators, submariners, and surface warfare officers is restored. Congress and the secretary of defense must focus on balance across, and the gaps between, the services. Congress must ask, “a force for what?” and resource that. BALANCING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER An important transformation took place during the Cold War and became deeply ingrained. Prior to WWII, the president exercised his constitutional duty to conduct foreign policy through the State Department. When necessary, below the threshold of declared war, the State Department could exercise coercive diplomacy through the Navy Department—gunboat diplomacy and landing of marines. The War Department stood ready to mobilize an army should Congress declare war. In 1947, the Departments of War and Navy were unified under the new Department of Defense. The merger was deemed necessary by the evidence offered by the clash of great power alliances in WWII. The intent of legislative reform since has been to improve military efficiency and effectiveness. The unintended consequence was a strengthened military instrument isolated from the diplomatic instrument. That division may have been appropriate for the great power struggles of WWII and the Cold War, but small wars require the orchestration of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The State Department atrophied at the same time the military was strengthened. The State Department’s Agency for International Development (USAID), the economic instrument, weakened. The Department’s Information Agency (USIA), the informational instrument, was disestablished by Congress and its remnants scattered across the State Department. The State Department no longer has the capacity to lead. Only the military has the capacity. The consequences are a militaristic U.S. foreign policy and a military instrument tasked for missions it is neither suited to nor inclined to

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execute. No alternative is possible without legislative reform on the scale of the National Security Act of 1947 that created the major-war system. Lacking recognition of the need, reform will continue to focus on sharpening the military instrument, revisiting, instead, Goldwater-Nichols 1986. Congress and the president must focus on the balance across, and the gaps between, all instruments of national power. UNIFYING THE PRODUCER CHAIN OF COMMAND Much of the history of unified command has been the stitching together of service forces separately built. Much more obvious coherence in unified action has been achieved through functional design. With or without explicit awareness, the legislative and executive branches have turned to functional solutions to overcome the problems created by the 1947 division by the elements of air, land, and sea. Why does the country have four air forces? Why does the country have two land armies? Both are questions that presuppose that decomposition by element is a sound basis of design. The answer to both questions is that we don’t. Those who ask the question lack a basic understanding of U.S. armed forces. Unified action has been achieved through functional design in several significant areas—for example, strategic nuclear forces, special operations forces, and amphibious forces. In these solutions, a mission space or portion of the conflict spectrum came first and elemental considerations and geographic areas were secondary at best. The number of combatant commands has remained roughly constant, between seven and nine, since their earliest appearance following Victory in Europe. The military forces they share have waxed and waned through the decades and continue their post–Cold War decline. The pool of forces is small and must meet the needs of all the combatant commands. At least two approaches are possible. A solution relied upon in the past has been to assign the preponderance of forces to the combatant command with strategic priority. The receiving command has the authority to organize and train the force as necessary. Strategic priority has shifted from the European Command to the Central Command. Very few forces, however, are assigned to the Central Command. Forces are allocated as needed. The alternative approach is to produce military capabilities and combatant commands with uniform interfaces designed to integrate whatever forces are allocated when needed. The interface between combatant commands and the shared capabilities provided must be simple and uniform. There is little reason to expect a regional combatant command like CENTCOM to produce uniform standards across the combatant commands and the services while prosecuting military operations on a large scale. The use and production of forces are entirely different matters. The services have mature and complex processes in place to produce the capabilities necessary to execute their missions in accordance with their

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conceptions of war. Through force development processes the services create organizations that they equip, develop doctrine for, and train. Separately developed service capabilities often cannot be integrated into a coherent whole. There is no unifying process of force development across the services. It is left to the regional combatant commander to unify them during a crisis. JFCOM now has the mission but has yet to rise to the task. Readiness for the Present and for the Future Joint Forces Command has been subjected to significant external forces following the Cold War. The command has changed from a regional combatant command of a purely naval character, to a combination of regional and functional command, to a purely functional command without an area of responsibility. Functions have been piling up. In short, JFCOM has moved from the chain of command governing the use of military force to the chain of command governing the production of military force; it has responsibilities more like a service than a warfighting command. Secretary Rumsfeld declared transformation to be the JFCOM mission. If JFCOM is to transform the force, then it must be organized to reflect the shift from the use of force to the production of force. Its organization does not match its mission, and the disparity will not be resolved by tinkering on the margins. Its proper organization must squarely address a well-known dilemma: the tension between preparing for current conflicts and preparing for future conflicts. But today’s situation is not without precedent. Past efforts of the services and combatant commands provide constructive analogies to the present situation. After the war in Vietnam, each service needed simultaneously to rebuild and to remain ready for major war in Europe. The Army, in particular, was faced with these two problems simultaneously. Its conclusion was that preparing for present and future operations were different matters—today’s needs would always take precedence over tomorrow’s. The Army created different commands for each. The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC, tray-dock) was created and imposed atop the branch schools against considerable resistance from the armor, infantry, and artillery branch commandants. Imposing a combined arms command over formerly independent branches is very similar to appointing a unifying command over independent service forces. Forces Command (FORSCOM) was established with responsibility for today’s readiness. Most informed observers would credit this division of labor, and specifically TRADOC’s Army-wide force development role, with transforming the army that left Vietnam into the army that fought the Gulf War. If readiness for today and transformation for tomorrow were too much for one commander in a single service, it is unreasonable to expect that one commander can address both issues across all four services. There is also precedent in the combatant command structure. SOCOM departed from the standard unified command line-and-staff organization to

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better represent its dominant role as a producer of special operations forces. STRATCOM was disestablished and then reestablished with a new organization that better represents its change of mission from the Cold War to its global strike mission. ACOM, undergoing an equally dramatic change of mission, merely underwent a name change and left the organization intact—JFCOM. In 2005, JFCOM’s organization remains that of a combatant command firmly rooted in the user chain of command. JFCOM’s line organizations, its components, are the service force providers. This is just what one would expect if JFCOM is the joint analogue to the Army’s FORSCOM—the force provider. In addition to the force provider responsibility, JFCOM has the responsibilities of TRADOC and of the Army Material Command. If JFCOM were organized to be the joint force developer, then one would expect its line organizations to be the service force developers. No such relationships exist. If JFCOM were organized to be the joint material developer, then one would expect its line organizations to be the service material developers. No such relationships exist. Instead of being represented in line organizations, force development and material development functions are spread across competing staff elements in JFCOM. Line organizations and staff organizations exist for entirely different purposes, yet JFCOM’s organization has resisted the change from the user to the producer chain command. The name “general-purpose forces command” is used below to draw attention to the successful approach to solving the multiservice problems associated with special operations forces and strategic nuclear forces. It is the very thing the Marine Corps commandant feared Strike Command would become in 1962. Unified Command for General-Purpose Forces JFCOM has at least three distinct responsibilities, and each requires separate management with coherent orchestration of the whole. The three responsibilities are force provider, force developer, and material developer. The first responsibility is as force provider. Today, the preponderance of forces permanently resides in the United States assigned to JFCOM, and they are temporarily allocated worldwide to regional combatant commands. The force provider is responsible for assuring the readiness of assigned forces for deployment on short notice. The receiving combatant command employs the force. Readiness is defined in terms of the ability to provide specific capabilities through today’s organizations applying today’s doctrine and employing today’s equipment—readiness for today. The second responsibility is force development. Force development defines force capabilities and the organizations, doctrine, and equipment that implement them. The Army and Marine Corps speak of combat development while the Navy speaks of warfare development. Regardless of the name chosen, the force developer is responsible for defining and developing the capabilities of the current generation, the next generation, and the generation after next.

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The third responsibility is material development. Equipment interoperability is difficult to achieve within a single service, and it has been even more difficult to achieve across services. Information technology for collecting, transmitting, storing, and processing information increasingly provides the joint force commander’s weapon system, and JFCOM has been assigned responsibility for achieving interoperability across these systems. These three responsibilities are distinct and require different treatment. Three separate commands should be created: Material Development Command, the material developer; Capabilities Development Command, the force developer; and Readiness Command, the force provider. Each should be a subordinate unified command of the existing JFCOM. Under this design, headquarters staff would have no operational responsibility, and instead would support the commander in orchestrating the efforts of the subordinate unified commands. Staff elements might include resourcing and budgeting; research, development, and acquisition; readiness reporting; and capability assessments rather than the J-codes typically found in the user chain of command. The Material Development Command would likely be the smallest subunified command because its domain would encompass only the integrating command and control systems and a handful of other material development items requiring a uniform product. Service material development commands would be assigned as components—line organizations. The Capabilities Development Command is the most complex of the subordinate unified commands. The service force development commands would be the assigned components. The most complex responsibility of the Capabilities Development Command is the continual absorption of new capabilities and the advancement from one generation to the next—transformation of the force. The Command is responsible for defining and developing the needed force capabilities of the current generation, next generation, and generation after next. Each generation provides capabilities that are the product of organization, doctrine, and equipment. Once these capabilities are defined and developed, the Capabilities Development Command defines the appropriate training programs to integrate the many moving parts. The purpose of the Readiness Command is to assure readiness of the force as measured against the standards set by the force developer. The components currently assigned to JFCOM should be assigned to Readiness Command. Because the Capabilities Development Command determines new capability requirements, the components of Readiness Command should be reorganized so that assigned forces are organized into single-service or multiservice organizations under appropriate command that can train together on a regular basis. Readiness Command would have permanent combined arms (joint) headquarters and permanently or rotationally assigned units. Readiness of whom, for what, and when would be defined not by Readiness Command, but by the Capabilities Development Command. An example may serve to clarify the responsibilities of these commands. Long-range precision strike employs sensors and shooters from any service.

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Cruise missiles can be delivered from a variety of airborne platforms, surface ships, and submarines. As recently as the air war over Kosovo, targets were independently targeted and separately attacked by the Air Force and Navy. Long-range bombers flying from the United States arrived over Europe to find that their targets had been attacked by naval forces operating from the Adriatic. Reminiscent of the independent targeting across the nuclear triad, the solution is a single targeting organization, coherent doctrine, and training. The Capabilities Development Command could define this capability by defining its organization, establishing its doctrine and performance measures, and defining appropriate training programs. The Material Command would ensure that the weapons and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) associated with long-range precision strike were delivered fully interoperable with the evolving capability. The forces comprising the long-range precision strike capability would be assigned to Readiness Command, and they would be organized and trained according to Capabilities Development Command doctrine. JFCOM is not organized for success. The production of military force remains the province of a committee with no one in charge. HEADQUARTERS FOR LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT The many crises that emerge are typically handled, not by a combatant command, but by a joint task force ( JTF) created in response to the crisis. Every headquarters in the military hierarchy is permanent except the JTF headquarters responsible for the operational level of war. While the services have continuously pushed combined arms warfare down to the lowest levels in their hierarchies, joint warfare remains the domain of the four-star unified command. Although the services have created permanent combined arms headquarters throughout their hierarchies, joint headquarters below the unified command are made ad hoc. The United States remains unprepared at the operational level of war and unprepared for emerging crises. When addressing this obvious shortcoming, two specious arguments are offered. First, that such a headquarters would sit idle when there was no crisis. No explanation is given for why all the other headquarters in the hierarchy are exempt from this generalization. Second, that there are no resources available for the new headquarters—to stand up one headquarters would require standing down another to pay for it. And it is service headquarters that would be stood down. Improving jointness and initial response for the crises common to an interwar period can be accomplished by creating standing JTF headquarters for that portion of the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Two examples follow. The Marine Corps should convert its marine expeditionary force headquarters into JTF headquarters oriented toward the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. Beyond that, the Corps should concentrate on its smaller expeditionary brigades (MEBs) and units (MEUs). Perhaps one of the two

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CONUS-based MEF headquarters can be justified, but the MEF headquarters in Okinawa cannot. An MEF headquarters exists in the western Pacific, as does an MEB and an MEU headquarters, but without a full complement of division, air wing, and support forces. In addition, a light Army division is assigned to the Pacific Command under I Corps, a corps headquarters in search of a mission. Recognition of these realities could result in the disestablishment of the MEF headquarters and of I Corps headquarters and conversion of the freed resources to a true JTF headquarters. The MEF culture should prevail to capitalize on the ingrained integrated air-ground mindset. The fleet marine forces and the army light infantry division should be assigned permanently to the JTF headquarters, and the headquarters should be prepared to command additional forces from the Navy and Air Force. In the continental United States, several JTF headquarters prepared to conduct expeditionary and small-wars operations could be built from the resources freed by disestablishing the headquarters of a corps and its divisions and of a numbered air force. The Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps already possesses the expeditionary and crisis action planning culture appropriate for small wars. Its divisions contain every type of battalion in the Army. The assumption that divisions fight as part of a larger ground force should be dropped and replaced with the assumption that task forces will be formed from any mix of infantry, armored, mechanized infantry, airborne, air assault, and aviation resources on a mission basis. The new joint Army–Air Force structure should emphasize JTFs larger than those provided by Marine airground task forces. Although there remains no solution to the joint problem below the fourstar level, the devolution has accelerated and deepened. The responsibility for integrating service forces is now often the responsibility of an Army or Marine Corps colonel prepared for tactical command. As problematic as their lack of preparation for joint command, these commanders are unprepared for decision-making responsibilities in the strategic and operational time frames. There are no headquarters organized, trained, and equipped for this mission. FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER The ability of the U.S. government to transform military forces since the end of the Cold War is truly unimpressive. A great deal of money and rhetoric has been thrown at the transformation from service to joint warfare without much to show for it. A great deal of money and rhetoric has been thrown at the transformation to the information-age force for an unknown future enemy without much to show for it. Very little effort has been expended on the transformation to the small-wars force except by those actually engaged on the third-world battlefield. Our troops deserve better.

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. Senate, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia speaking on “The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services’ Roles and Missions” to the Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (July 2, 1992), pt. S9561. 2. Paul H. Nitze, “Arms, Strategy and Policy,” Foreign Affairs 5 ( January 1956): 187–198. 3. One estimate places the increased tempo at 400 percent for the Air Force and 300 percent for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. See Stephen P. Aubin, “Stumbling Toward Transformation: How the Services Stack Up,” Strategic Review 5 (Spring 2000): 39–47. These estimates precede the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. 4. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysiss (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 5. Levy Amir and Uri Merry, Organizational Transformation: Approaches, Strategies, Theories (New York: Praeger, 1986), 190. 6. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 300–328, 369–415. 7. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940). 8. Hans Binnendijk, ed., Transforming America’s Military (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), xvii. 9. Murray and Millett, 268–269, 304–310. 10. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 11. Alan D. Campen, ed., The First Information War: The Story of Communications, Computers and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992).

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CHAPTER 1 1. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland. 2. See, for example, Armored Warfare, which collects J.F.C. Fuller’s lectures delivered in 1931. To examine similar thinking taking place across the Channel by Captain Charles de Gaulle, see his The Army of the Future. 3. Andy Marshall has been appointed by every president since Nixon. Marshall, the first and only director of the Office of Net Assessment, played a prominent strategic role in the long-term technological competition. For many Soviet policy elite, Marshall was the enemy. Jay Winik, “Secret Weapon: The Pentagon’s Andy Marshall Is the Most Influential Man You’ve Never Heard Of,” Washingtonian Magazine, April 1999. 4. In 1793, the French established mass conscription and trained a force of approximately 800,000 men within a year. This marks the point at which war became total war mobilizing the nation and all its resources. 5. Murray and Millett, 268, 304–310. 6. Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, 3. 7. Rona is credited with coining the term information warfare in 1976. Alan D. Campen and Douglas H. Dearth, eds., Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Realities (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1998), iii, 401–402. 8. C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control and the Common Defense (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1996), 289. 9. William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” Military Review (May– June 1995): 15–19. William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1995): 35–39. William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000). 10. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1998): 28–38. 11. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1999): 36–39. 12. Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 1996): 20–36. 13. Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret.), and Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hoffman, USMCR, “Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare,” National Security Studies Quarterly (Summer 1998): 1–19. Lieutenant General John E. Rhodes, “Network Centric Works for Marines,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (September 1998): 2. 14. James R. Blaker, “Revolution(s) in Military Affairs: Why the Critique?,” National Security Studies Quarterly (Winter 1999): 83–89. F.G. Hoffman, “Why the Critique? An Author’s Response,” National Security Studies Quarterly (Winter 1999): 89–91. 15. Personal communication with Commander John Dickmann, a nuclear submariner detailed to navy staff to help put Admiral Cebrowski’s thoughts on paper. 16. Personal communication with Hans Binnendijk, director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, at the National Defense University Transformation and Education Workshop, September 25, 2002. 17. Murray and Millett, 310–325. 18. Ibid., 327.

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CHAPTER 2 1. The previously existing Joint Board of the Army and Navy was staffed by lesser officers to coordinate matters of mutual interest to the Army and Navy but was not suited to wartime command. The JCS absorbed the Board’s duties by March 1942. 2. Organizational Developmentof the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942–1989 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1989), 2. 3. Daniel T. Kuehl and Charles E. Miller, “Roles, Missions, and Functions: Terms of Debate,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 1994): 103–105. 4. The principals at the Key West Conference were Secretary of Defense James Forrestal; Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, a temporary wartime position; Admiral Louis E. Denfield, Chief of Naval Operations; General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and General Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The Marine Corps was not represented as a service. 5. Republished as “Blueprint for Teamwork: Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Army Information Digest 3 (May 1948): 40–52. 6. According to the Key West Agreement, strategic air warfare is “Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making capacity to the point where he will no longer retain the ability or the will to wage war.” 7. The 1949 amendments allowed the president to reorganize the Defense Department as necessary subject to congressional veto. President Eisenhower forwarded Reorganization Plan Number 6 to Congress on April 30, 1953. It became effective on June 30, 1953. 8. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, message to Congress, April 3, 1958. 9. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). 10. The 10 original major force programs are strategic forces; general purpose forces; intelligence and communications; airlift and sealift forces; guard and reserve forces; research and development; central supply and maintenance; training, medical, and other general personnel activities; administration and associated activities; and support of other nations. An eleventh was added in 1986 for special operations forces. One would think that the dramatic changes since the 1960s would have caused more change in the major force programs. Forty years later, even McNamara was surprised to find that they had not changed. 11. President Carter constituted a study group under Richard C. Steadman. The group’s report came out in July 1978, and its recommendations were almost entirely about Joint Staff procedures. 12. Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, eds., Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the Conservative Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, December 1984). Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn, eds., Toward a More Effective Defense: The Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985). 13. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), commonly referred to as the Locher Report after James Locher III, the principal committee staffer responsible for the effort.

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14. William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, “The Case for JCS Reform,” International Security 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/1986): 69–97. MacKubin Thomas Owens, “The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform,” International Security 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/1986): 98–111. James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). 15. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99–433, October 1, 1986. 16. Robert Holzer and Stephen C. LeSueur, “JCS Chairman’s Rising Clout Threatens Civilian Leaders,” Defense News (June 13–19, 1994): 29. James Kitfield, “Pentagon Power Shift,” Government Executive (April 1994): 72. Edward N. Luttwak, “Washington’s Biggest Scandal,” Commentary 97, no. 5 (May 1994): 29–33. 17. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20, 1 (Summer 1995): 5–38. 18. The campaign was conducted with “it’s the economy, stupid” as its message. National security and the use of force were not prominent issues. Peace was upon us. 19. Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest: Life after the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs ( January/February 2000): 45–62. 20. Senate, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia speaking on “The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services’ Roles and Missions” to the Committee on Armed Services, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record ( July 2, 1992), pt. S9561. 21. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993). 22. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1995). 23. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles and Missions Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, August 1995). 24. Jeffrey Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning (Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, 1998). 25. Known as Defense Guidance Scenarios and since the late 1970s as the Illustrative Planning Scenarios. 26. In one Cold War scenario, the road to global war began with a Soviet invasion through the Caucasus Mountains in a grab for Iranian oil fields. 27. Wolfowitz had been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (1977–1980). 28. The Iraqi scenario included Soviet air support for Iraq as a compromise offered by Butler to Wolfowitz. 29. Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Imagines New Enemies To Fight in Post-Cold War Era,” New York Times, February 17, 1992, section A; page 1; column 4. 30. Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, October 1993). Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, September 1, 1993). 31. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, PL 104–201, subtitle 13, Force Structure Review, sect. 921–926, referred to as the Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996. 32. Bush campaign speech at Citadel on September 23, 1999. “Gov. Bush and Defense,” Washington Post, September 26, 1999, B6.

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33. Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities To Improve the Next Review, GAO/ NSIAD-98-155 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, June 1998), 4. The 1989 force structure and those of the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review are compared.

CHAPTER 3 1. See Frederic Louis Huidekoper, The Military Unpreparedness of the United States: A History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915 (New York: Macmillan, 1916) and Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., America’s First Battles: 1776–1965 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986). 2. Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967); and The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). 3. Universal military training for men was considered after both world wars just as it was considered after the War of American Independence. Weigley 1967. See also, Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, 1932), 331–333. 4. The Corps of Engineers was reestablished in 1802, conjoined with a military academy at West Point, New York. For its first 64 years, the Academy was an engineering school and would remain the only American engineering school for over 20 years. 5. Wellington sought defensive position on the reverse slope of terrain, requiring the enemy to attack, often uphill and with obstructed vision, into his position. After the enemy had spent itself in the disadvantaged attack, Wellington would counterattack. 6. Weigley 1967, 170–171. 7. Weigley 1967, 160. 8. Virginia Peters, The Florida Wars (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1979). 9. Captain Thomas T. Smith, “West Point and the Indian Wars, 1801–1891,” Military History of the West 24, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 31. 10. Weigley 1967, 161. 11. In addition to Texas, America added “New Mexico,” an area that includes the modern states of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California, as well as parts of Wyoming, Colorado, and Oklahoma. The Gadsden Purchase added more to the American Southwest in 1853. The British, French, and Russians retained interests on the Pacific Coast, but these issues would be resolved with diplomacy. 12. David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U. S. Army 1917–1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). 13. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 16–18. 14. Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American Century (New York: Henry Holt, 1998). 15. Emery Upton, The Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904). Upton carried the torch for a professional army and had a great deal of influence on Root’s thinking. 16. Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

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17. “Kasserine Pass, 30 January–22 February 1943,” by Martin Blumenson, in America’s First Battles, 1776–1965, eds. Charles E. Heller and William A Stofft, (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1986), 226–265. 18. American ground forces were under the 12th and the 6th Army Groups (allied) commanded by General Omar Bradley and Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, respectively. Ground forces of the United Kingdom were organized under the 21st Army Group (allied) commanded by British General Bernard Montgomery. 19. Wayne H. Haislip, “Corps Command in World War II,” Military Review 70(5), (May 1990): 22–32. Haislip commanded XV Corps in Patton’s Third Army. He provides an excellent comparison of World War II and Cold War corps. Written just prior to the Gulf War, it provides an important snapshot in time. 20. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1998), 193–196. Twentyone divisions were committed in the Pacific: 19 infantry, 1 airborne, and 1 cavalry division organized as infantry. 21. During WWII, the U.S. Army committed 68 divisions to Western Europe and Italy. It committed 89 divisions at the end of WWII: 66 infantry, 16 armored, 5 airborne, 1 mountain, and 1 cavalry division. If non-divisional units were assembled into divisions, there would have been 6 more infantry divisions and 20 more armored divisions, for a total of 72 infantry divisions, 36 armored divisions, 5 airborne divisions, 1 mountain division, and 1 cavalry division for a total of 115 division equivalents. George Forty, US Army Handbook 1939–1945 (Hersham, England: Ian Allan, 1979), 67. 22. Heller and Stofft 271. 23. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963). Fehrenbach is considered the indispensable classic on the Korean War. 24. The North Koreans began their assaults with armor. Task Force Smith had no anti-tank mines, its 75-mm recoilless rifles and 2.36-inch rocket launchers were ineffective, and it had no tanks of its own. North Korean tanks broke through the line, attacked deep to isolate the force from adjacent units, prevented reinforcement and resupply, and then enveloped and destroyed the force. Under-strength regiments had no defense in depth and no reserve. They collapsed, leaving behind their weapons, wounded, and dead. U.S. and Australian air forces strafed South Korean and U.S. ground forces. The task force was built on the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith. Under the circumstances, Task Force Smith performed better than could be expected. 25. The potential use of atomic weapons against conventional ground forces, however, remained problematic. Battlefield dispersion was the perceived solution, and the Army experimented with a pentagonal division design and with helicopters to that end. A pentagonal division was composed of five battle groups with five infantry companies and a mortar battery each. The triangular division, however, survived. 26. Fehrenbach 427. 27. Fehrenbach 658. 28. Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 29. National Security Council, United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy, September 1962. 30. Brian M. Jenkins, The Unchangeable War, RM-6728-ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1970), 3. The general remains anonymous.

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31. Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 32. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 303, 434. This logic is variously called the Powell, Cheney, or Weinberger doctrine. The complete list is “commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake; go in only with clear political and military objectives; be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still; only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people and the Congress; commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.” The “exit strategy” principle was added later, derived from the requirement to have clear objectives. 33. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, Va.: Historical Office Training and Doctrine Command, 1984). 34. Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2, 139–179. 35. Lieutenant General William Wallace, Commanding General U.S. Army V Corps, March 27, 2003, quoted, for example, in Austin Bay, “Battlefield Clockwork,” Washington Times, April 1, 2003, 16. 36. After a year at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the “best” receive battalion command assignments and the “brightest” are invited to stay an additional year at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), after which graduates are often assigned to the planning staff of a higher echelon command. Command is the path to promotion; staff is too often the path to retirement. 37. The combat arms branches are air defense artillery, armor, aviation, corps of engineers, field artillery, infantry, and special forces. 38. The combat support branches are chemical corps, military intelligence, military police corps, and signal corps. 39. There are 15 combat service support branches, including two legal, chaplain, civil affairs, finance, ordnance, quartermaster, and transportation branches; reserve staff specialists; and six medical branches. 40. More properly, the infantryman is a rifleman. A unit of professional foot soldiers, with muskets longer than the musketeers were tall, was a Spanish innovation that marked the transition from siege warfare to mobile warfare on the plains. The name infantry derived from the common practice of associating the name of one of the Spanish princes—the infantes—with a military formation. The Swede Gustavas Adolfus favored the musketeer over the pikeman and made infantry the dominant branch supported by horse cavalry for shock and artillery in the field rather than for siege. This transformation took place in the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) that preceded the Treaty of Westphalia. 41. Forty 92. The U.S. Army had two horse cavalry divisions on the eve of World War II. 42. See Forty 67–97 for descriptions of Army divisions from 1939 to 1945. 43. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1997). 44. The experts of the special staff are organized under the coordinating staff. For example, the Fire Support Officer is typically the commander of the division’s artillery brigade and reports to the assistant chief of staff for operations, the G-3. For purposes of bridge building or road repair, engineers report to the G-4, but for emplacing or breaching obstacles (e.g., minefields), they report to the G-3. The personal staff

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includes the chaplain, the command sergeant major, adjutant, aide-de-camp, and other assistants to the commander. 45. Combat service support forces include medical, communications, logistics and transportation, mess, and maintenance platoons. 46. Infantry battalions have a combat support company with a heavy mortar platoon (107-mm) and an anti-tank platoon. Rather than a combat support company, mechanized infantry battalions have an anti-tank company with vehicle-mounted anti-tank weapons. The lightest forces might employ smaller mortars (60-mm) integrated into the rifle companies rather than organized under a combat support company. 47. In addition to the rifle platoons, a rifle company has a weapons platoon of three mortar sections (81-mm) and two anti-tank sections with shoulder-fired antitank weapons. 48. The M-551 Sheridan is the Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle. It is lightly armored, and its armament includes a combination 155-mm gun and missile launcher. It has roughly the same external dimensions as a main battle tank but is about one-quarter the weight. 49. The 105-mm howitzer has a range of well over 8 miles, the 155-mm howitzer has a range of almost 14 miles, and the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) has a 300-mile range. 50. Three or four ADA battalions can be assembled into a brigade for corps or higher echelons with a larger area and force to protect. A variety of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), principally the Patriot, provide a protective umbrella over a much larger force against traditional air threats. Newer SAMs provide protection against tactical ballistic missiles. Larger areas are protected by the emerging Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system, also built from SAMs and specialized radar. 51. The Sky Cavalry would have been based well behind front lines and projected power well forward of the line. It would have been based in Thailand or Laos and projected power into Vietnam. Marines might have based offshore. 52. New Mobile Subscriber Equipment was being fielded at the time, compounding the communications shortfalls caused by the larger area and march distances and the lack of modern German infrastructure. 53. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). XVIII Corps, VII Corps, and the First Marine Expeditionary Force were arrayed left to right along the northern Saudi border. XVIII Airborne Corps’ 24ID(Mechanized) was on VII Corps’ left flank. VII Corps’ heavy divisions could not keep pace with 24ID, which had similar terrain and longer distances to travel. 54. In 1989, the Army National Guard had 7 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and 1 mechanized division. It also had 10 infantry, 6 mechanized, and 3 separate armored brigades. 55. The 2d Armored Division had only two brigades. The 2d Infantry Division had only six battalions with old equipment organized under three brigades. The 9th Infantry Division had only two brigades with old equipment, one in the active component and one in the Army National Guard. 56. The Army’s Roundout Concept after the Persian Gulf War, Congressional Research Service, October 1991. 57. Army National Guard: Combat Brigades’ Ability To Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-95–91, June 1995.

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58. D. Robert Worley, W(h)ither Corps? (Carlisle, Pa.: Army War College, 2001). 59. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997). 60. Richard J. Newman, “Renegades Finish Last,” U.S. News & World Report (July 28, 1997): 35. Thomas E. Ricks, “A Test Case for Bush’s Military Reform Pledge? Some Decry Transfer of Reform Advocate to Army Staff Job,” Washington Post (February 20, 2002): 13. 61. Paul L. Francis, Defense Acquisitions: The Army’s Future Combat Systems’ Features, Risks, and Alternatives, General Accounting Office, GAO-04–635T, April 1, 2004. 62. General Pete Schoomaker had a distinguished career in both conventional and special operations forces culminating in service as commander in chief of the Special Operations Command (1997–2000).

CHAPTER 4 1. Always quotable, General Larry Welch USAF (ret.), former Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and fighter pilot conveyed this sentiment in a personal conversation while he was president of the Institute for Defense Analyses. It accurately reflects the sentiments of the fighter pilot community that dominates the Air Force. 2. Douhet commanded Italy’s first aviation unit, the Aeronautical Battalion (1912– 1915). His 1915 criticism of Italy’s preparations for the Great War led to his court-martial and imprisonment. When Austrian air forces defeated the Italian army at Caporetto on the Austro-Italian front in late 1917, his conviction was overturned, and he returned to duty. Benito Mussolini appointed Douhet head of the air service in 1922. 3. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, Dino Ferrari, trans. (New York: CowardMcCann, 1942). The Ferrari translation includes Douhet’s original work published in 1921, Il dominio dell’ aria, his additions of 1926, and his 1928 work. A meaningful subset is included in Roots of Strategy, Book 4, and subsequent footnote references are to that publication. 4. Douhet 300, 302, 338. 5. Williamson Murray, “The United States Air Force: The Past as Prologue,” in America’s Defense, ed. Michael Mandelbaum (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989). 6. Douhet 288. 7. Douhet 297. 8. Douhet also identified the need for a reconnaissance plane in his later writing. 9. Douhet 308. 10. Douhet 292. 11. Douhet 326. 12. Douhet 307. 13. Douhet 338. 14. Douhet 283. 15. Douhet 301. 16. The Saturday Evening Post articles of 1924 were collected and published in book form in 1925. See William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925). The material is reprinted in Roots of Strategy, Book 4, 406–515, and further references are to this source.

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17. Mitchell 429. 18. Mitchell 428. 19. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (New York: to Excel, 1998). 20. Warden 146. 21. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin told the British House of Commons on November 10, 1932, that “The bomber will always get through.” 22. Philip S. Meilinger, Colonel, USAF, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Maxwell, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995). 23. Douhet 399. 24. Douhet 332. 25. The Army Air Service’s school was originally established at Langley, Virginia. In 1922, it was renamed the Air Service Tactical School, and in 1926 was renamed again as the Air Corps Tactical School. It moved to Maxwell Field, Alabama in 1931. It survives today as the Air University’s Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base. 26. Hughes 51. 27. Hughes 55–56. 28. Murray and Millett 265–299. 29. The first “1,000-plane” raid was conducted against Cologne on May 30, 1942, with 1,158 planes dropping 1,500 tons of explosives. 30. Air Vice Marshall Harris witnessed the “futility of trench warfare” in WWI from the air. In the interwar period, he flew bombing raids against rebellious Iraqi’s, including the use of poison gas. Churchill directed his air forces to bomb cities, and Harris enthusiastically implemented his orders. Churchill lost his enthusiasm as the end of the war approached and morality reentered the political equation. Harris became the lightning rod for the moral outrage against the late war firebombing of Dresden. 31. Hap Arnold graduated from West Point at the lower end of the 1907 class and was assigned to infantry. He later transferred to the signal branch, then the home of aviation. He learned to fly from the Wright brothers, became a protégé of Billy Mitchell, and was a Washington air planner in the First World War. 32. Vincent Orange, Coningham (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 132–137. 33. Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II (New York: Random House, 1997), 188, 198. 34. In similar operations, Coalition forces would hunt Scud missiles in the Gulf War almost 50 years later. 35. The Ninth Air Force was composed of two tactical air commands, one bomber command, and one troop carrier command; the air force had its own photoreconnaissance, and each subordinate command had its own tactical reconnaissance. The two tactical air commands contained a total of five wings subdivided into 18 groups. Its bomber command had three wings of 11 groups, and its troop carrier command had three wings of 14 groups. Quesada commanded the IX TAC, and Weyland commanded the XIX TAC. 36. Eighth Air Force commanded three bombardment divisions and one fighter command. The three bombardment divisions commanded 14 wings of 40 groups. Its fighter command was made up of 3 wings of 15 groups. It, too, had its own reconnaissance capability. 37. Thomas Alexander Hughes, Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1995).

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38. David N. Spires, Patton’s Air Force: Forging a Legendary Air-Ground Team (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). 39. Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1956), 283. 40. Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943–1945 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 14. Smith was a major doing doctoral research. To the Air Force’s credit, he went on to the rank of major general before retiring. 41. Testimony of Rear Admiral Forrest Sherman, U.S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on S.84 and S.1482, Unification of Armed Forces, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945 511. Cited in Smith 17. 42. Testimony of Lieutenant General Ray S. Geiger, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, December 7, 1945, U.S. Senate, Hearings on S.84 and S.1482 559. Cited in Smith 19. 43. Smith 48. 44. Smith 28. 45. Smith 35–53. 46. Smith 58, 64. 47. Smith 78. 48. Smith 82, 83, 111. 49. Smith 75, 106. For comprehensive coverage, see James H. Straubel, Crusade for Airpower: The Story of the Air Force Association (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace Education Foundation, 1982). 50. Spires 315. 51. Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). The TFX went into production as the F-111. 52. Robert A. Pape, Jr., “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 103–146. 53. Operation Rolling Thunder was conducted from March 2, 1965, to October 31, 1968. 54. Operation Freedom Train was initiated in April 1972. Operation Linebacker I was conducted from May 10, 1972, to October 23, 1972, and was followed by Linebacker II from December 18, 1972, to December 29, 1972. 55. Brigadier General Buster Glosson was Horner’s air plans chief. Lieutenant Colonel David Deptula, a name often associated with Warden, was also a principal intellect in the planning process. 56. The Navy and Marine Corps were able to withhold sorties for protection of the carriers and for air support of ground forces. 57. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 267–288. 58. Williamson Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, Md.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1995). 59. Grover E. Myers, Aerospace Power: The Case for Indivisible Application (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986). 60. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Air Force Manual 1–1, Volume I, March 1992, 7. 61. The F-15 Eagle first flew in 1972 and is regarded as the world’s finest air superiority fighter. It was designed to replace the F-4 Phantom. The two-engine, Mach 2.5⫹ F-15 saw extensive service in the Gulf War.

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62. The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a Mach 2+ single-engine, multirole jet aircraft. The F-16 has been produced in larger quantities than the more expensive F-15. The Falcon, too, performed well in the Gulf War. 63. The F-111 is unofficially called the Aardvark. It is a multipurpose, supersonic, tactical fighter-bomber. It employs a terrain-following radar that allows it to fly low to penetrate enemy air defenses. It is retired. 64. The F-117A Nighthawk uses parts of existing aircraft but employs stealth technology. Its debut in the 1989 Panama invasion was less than stellar, but it performed well in the Gulf War. 65. The A-10’s main armament is a 30-mm Gatling gun that fires depleted uranium spikes at the rate of 3,900 per minute, making it a superb tank killer in the Gulf War. It can fire air-to-ground or air-to-air missiles and carry conventional bombs. It flies slow and low, and its single pilot rides in a titanium bathtub for survivability. 66. The GBU-15 is unpowered but is guided by remote control during its glide path. 67. Air Force Magazine 58–62, June 1995. 68. Spires 312, 27. 69. General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.).

CHAPTER 5 1. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). 2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890). 3. Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871– 1904 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987). 4. Ropp 166. 5. Interested readers are directed to David Jablonsky, ed., Roots of Strategy, Book 4 (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999). It includes both Mahan’s Influence of Seapower, 43–146, and the major alternative maritime strategy, Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 149–261. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 1991) is about the development and evolution of the U.S. Navy. For a one-volume history of the Navy at war, see Stephen Howarth, A History of the United States Navy 1775–1998 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). 6. Hagan 2. 7. Hagan 12. 8. Hagan 34. 9. Hagan 92. 10. Howarth 178–212. 11. Hagan 228–258. 12. Hagan 183–184. 13. The Naval War College was established in 1884 at Newport, Rhode Island, for higher study, including naval strategy and naval policy. Its first publication was Mahan’s Influence of Seapower, the product of Mahan’s lectures there. 14. Hagan 252–255. A building program was initiated for anti-submarine craft and transports on July 21, 1917, more than a year after Jutland (May 31, 1916).

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15. Fletcher Pratt, The Navy: A History (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing, 1941), 398. He lists the physical contacts in a single paragraph. 16. Pratt 391. For another significant technological innovation, the antenna mine, see Pratt 393-397, or Howarth 314–315. 17. Pratt 398–411. 18. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 forbade Germany from having submarines. Germany abrogated the treaty in May 1935. 19. Hagan 296. 20. Arnold Hague, The Allied Convey System 1939–1945: Its Organization, Defence and Operation (St. Catherines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2000). 21. The United States was signatory to a treaty at the London disarmament conference of 1930 banning unrestricted warfare at sea. Yarnell’s orders fell to Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who, as a captain, had delivered a lecture in 1920 at the Naval War College saying that any navy committed to commerce raiding would follow the same model as did the Germans. Hart and Yarnell earlier had served together in the post-WWI CNO’s planning office. There were naval thinkers who understood this form of warfare, but dominance by the gun club, and later by the aviators, prevented such thinking from becoming a naval capability. 22. Since Teddy Roosevelt’s tenure in the White House (1901–1909), the strategy to defeat Japan had been guerre de main without preparation for the kind of commerce warfare that submarines could prosecute independently, guerre de course. 23. Tactics included submerged sonar attack; periscope attack was considered too risky. The fleet submarine’s submerged speed was a sluggish 8 knots while the typical merchant ship was somewhat faster at between 10 and 12 knots. On the surface, however, the fleet submarine could sprint at nearly 20 knots. The end-around tactic emerged. Upon sighting a surface ship at a distance, the submarine would plot a course to place itself well ahead of the enemy ship’s path and then lie in wait for it to pass. The end-around and the surface attack at night with radar were devastatingly effective. Hagan 328–331. 24. From 1941 to 1943 in the Pacific, submarine performance was abysmal. The great majority of torpedoes missed their targets due to faulty depth control. Those that found a target often failed to detonate. Boat captains were blamed and the Naval Ordnance Bureau refused to question its own torpedo. Among the many failures was the inability of the submarine force to have any meaningful effect on the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Admiral Charles Lockwood took command of submarine forces in the Pacific in April 1942. Lockwood arranged his own live-fire exercise and found the Mark 14 to consistently swim 11 feet too deep. The Ordnance Bureau rejected the challenge and Lockwood repeated the tests. The Bureau finally acquiesced in August 1942, but the problem was not remedied until October 1943. See James F. DeRose, Unrestricted Warfare: How a New Breed of Officers Led the Submarine Force to Victory in World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), 17–66. The Germans also had low-sailing torpedoes and faulty detonators. German officers were court-martialed for dereliction of duty. No action was taken against U.S. officers. See Hagan 238 and DeRose 3. 25. Hagan 330–331. 26. Peter Padfield, War Beneath the Sea: Submarine Conflict During World War II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 19.

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27. Rear Admiral Yarnell, appointed Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet on October 15, 1937, proposed a “naval war of strangulation against Japan” to be prosecuted by a coalition of British, French, Dutch, Russian, and American navies. No fleet actions were proposed. Hagan 262, 285. 28. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985) is the classic on the Pacific theater. Quoted in Hagan 323. 29. The “patrol boat, torpedo,” or PT boat, was 70 feet by 20 feet and displaced 32 tons. 30. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 106. 31. Pratt 410. 32. Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945– 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998). 33. Dean C. Allard, Revolt of the Admirals, quoted in Hagan 342. 34. Supercarrier construction, the Forrestal-class, was authorized in 1951, the first ship of class had its keel laid down in 1952, was launched in 1954, and was commissioned in 1955. 35. Hagan 372–373. Thomas J. Cutler, Brown Water, Black Berets: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1988). 36. Hagan 376. 37. The sea control ship (SCS) costs one eighth of a nuclear carrier. It displaced 17,000 tons versus the World War II 27,000-ton Essex-class carrier. 38. Kenneth J. Hagan, American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy 1877–1889 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919– 1991: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, 3rd Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 39. Truman originally directed that the surrender be to MacArthur. After complaints from the Navy Department, he modified his directions to stipulate the surrender aboard a Navy ship. MacArthur presided over the surrender, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Admiral William F. Halsey attended, and the ceremony took place aboard the battleship Missouri. 40. USC Title 10, Subtitle C, Part II, Chapter 549, Section 5942, (a). “To be eligible to command an aircraft carrier or an aircraft tender, an officer must be an officer in the line of the Navy who is designated as a naval aviator or naval flight officer and who is otherwise qualified.” 41. The commander of the carrier’s embarked air wing is called the CAG (carrier air group). Formerly, the CAG was the senior squadron commander, a commander by rank. In the early 1980s, a formal position was created for a true CAG, a captain by rank. 42. Dan Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 11–21. 43. . . . From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century was published in September 1992 as a white paper. It was elaborated on in 1994 by Forward . . . From the Sea, and in 1997 was followed by Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept. Missions include powerful but unobtrusive presence, strategic deterrence, sea control, on-scene crisis response, projection of precise power, and provision of sealift for major, sustained operations. 44. Jon T. Hoffman, “The Legacy and Lessons of the New Guinea Campaign,” Marine Corps Gazette 77, no. 9 (September 1993): 74–79.

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45. Hagan, This People’s Navy, 350. 46. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), xxiv. 47. Hagan, This People’s Navy, 339. 48. Greg Jaffe, “Debate Surrounding Small Ship Poses Fundamental Questions for U.S. Navy,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2001, 1.

CHAPTER 6 1. For more thorough historical development, readers are referred to one of the excellent histories, including J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story, 3rd Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), Allan R. Millett, Semper Fields: The History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: Free Press, 1991), and Robert D. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1962). 2. In July of 1996, the author was visiting an Army office in the Pentagon and found a sign posted over the general’s door proclaiming, “We Fight the Big Ones.” A month later, when visiting the Marine Corps base at Camp Lejuene, North Carolina, the author found a sign with the words “We Do Windows.” 3. Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, 1880–1898 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993). 4. Quoted in Heinl 113. 5. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940) reprinted (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1972). 6. Smedley D. Butler, War Is a Racket (New York: Round Table Press, 1935). Butler is one of the marine legends, perhaps the icon, of this era. He provides a candid and cynical assessment of his contributions to U.S. foreign policy in the age of imperialism. 7. Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines’ Other War in Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1989). Michael A. Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965–1972 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997). The Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) established enclaves at Danang, Phu Bai, and Chu Lai along the coast as they arrived. The Marines then created a series of Combined Action Platoons to expand the enclave system. A squad of marines lived and worked in villages and hamlets with permission of the village chief. The village provided two squads of male civilians. The three squads formed a Combined Action Platoon that protected the village against the South Vietnamese insurgents, the Viet Cong. 8. In an interview with Army General Binsford Peay III, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command in 1996, the general resisted the notion that the command would stand up ad hoc joint task forces to conduct operations in theater. He eventually acquiesced, saying that he would stand up a joint task force to conduct a humanitarian assistance–disaster relief mission, but then only under Marine command, because “they wouldn’t [foul] it up.” 9. Harper’s Weekly 55, no. 2844, 1922. Quoted in Heinl 164. 10. Marine infantry regiments were composed of 3,600 men organized into three 1,100-man infantry battalions and machine gun, headquarters, and supply companies.

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11. A familiar pattern, the Navy repeatedly attempted to break large marine units into small detachments aboard ship, as military police and guards or as logistical shore parties. 12. Moskin 221; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951), 27. 13. Commandant John H. Russell banned in 1935 the word expeditionary in preference to amphibious for Marine Corps unit names. During the Vietnam era, amphibious again replaced expeditionary to avoid comparison to the colonial French expeditionary forces formerly present in Vietnam. Commandant Al Gray (1987–1991) later restored expeditionary to the nomenclature. 14. Isely and Crowl, 4. 15. Peter B. Mersky, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to the Present, 3rd edition (Baltimore, Md: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1997), 13. 16. Moskin 164, 169. 17. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: a Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (New York: Galahad Books, 1963), 138. 18. Guadalcanal veterans Alexander A. Vandegrift (1944–1947), Clifton B. Cates (1948–1951), and Randolph McC. Pate (1956–1959) all rose to become commandant of the Marine Corps. 19. Heinl 474. 20. Moskin 360. 21. Rowan Scarborough, “Rejection of Hornet May Sting Marines: Some Aviators Fear Navy Will Rule Skies,” Washington Times, February 16, 1998, A10. The aircraft in question is the F/A-18 E/F model Super Hornet designed for longer range and improved capabilities in precision strike. 22. Victor H. Krulak, First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984), xvi. Thomas E. Ricks, Making the Corps (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 196. 23. William Fullam continued his assault on the Marine Corps throughout his career, beginning as a lieutenant in 1889 and continuing as a commander in 1909 and captain in 1913. 24. Senate Bill 2324 was referred to as the Mandelson-Sherman Bill. See Heinl 101–106. 25. Heinl 153–158. 26. Hienl 516. 27. General A. A. Vandegrift, USMC, Senate Hearings, 1946. Gordon W. Keiser, The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944–47 (Baltimore, Md: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1996), 49. 28. Frank Marutollo, Organizational Behavior in the Marine Corps: Three Interpretations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 74. 29. Public Law 416 of the 82nd Congress. The Marine Corps Bill is more formally known as the Douglas Mansfield Act of 1952. 30. Keiser 129. 31. Small Wars Manual 1940, 44. 32. For several decades Marine Corps forces have been organized as Fleet Marine Forces (FMFs). During the Vietnam era there were three Fleet Marine Forces: FMF Atlantic, FMF Pacific, and FMF Western Pacific. After the Vietnam War, only the

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Atlantic and Pacific commands survived and marine forces in the Far East were reassigned to FMF Pacific. 33. One of the men immortalized in the statue commemorating the raising of the flag on Mount Surabachi on Iwo Jima was a corpsman, HM-3 John Bradley. 34. The 11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs are headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California. Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, is home to the 22d, 24th, and 26th MEU headquarters. The 31st is stationed in Okinawa, Japan. 35. The MEU(SOC) workup includes specialized training for individuals and small units. Individuals train for urban snipers and scout swimmers, for example. Units train for boat raids, evacuation of noncombatants, humanitarian assistance, mass casualty evacuation, and mountain warfare. As an example of the process, one rifle platoon is selected to receive specialized training in the tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, TRAP. Marines afloat are able to conduct a TRAP on short notice for any service or ally. They are limited in range, perhaps to 75 kilometers from the shore. Special operations forces have a sophisticated rescue capability, but marines often have the advantage of being on scene. The recovery of Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady from Bosnian Serb territory was executed with one hour’s notice. If the MEU goes ashore as a force, the TRAP platoon reverts to its normal function as one of the battalion’s rifle platoons. 36. Edwin Howard Simmons and J. Robert Moskin, eds., The Marines (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Heritage Foundation, 1998), 321. Operations were conducted simultaneously by the 22d MEU(SOC) in Liberia, Senegal, Spain, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Slovenia, and Greece.

CHAPTER 7 1. These “SOF Truths” have been in use since the mid-1980s and first publicized by General Wayne A. Downing, third Commander in Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command (1993–1996). 2. U.S. Special Operations Forces (Tampa, Fla.: Special Operations Warrior Foundation, 2003). The book recounts the history of special operations forces replete with individual stories and photographs. It is an excellent example of how the special operations community sees itself and is presented with a rare combination of authority and aesthetic. See also Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997) and Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Portland, Oreg.: Frank Cass, 1998). 3. Charlie A. Beckwith, Delta Force: America’s Counterterrorist Unit and the Mission To Rescue the Hostages in Iran (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanivich, 1983). Harry G. Summers, Jr., provides an unflattering response in Military Review (November 1983): 21–27. 4. Public Law, PL 99–661, November 14, 1986; PL 100–180, December 4, 1987; and PL 100–456, September 29, 1988. 5. The Zodiac Combat Rubber Ready Craft delivers SEALs, other SOF, and marines over short distances. 6. The A-team has a great deal in common with the Office of Strategic Services’ operational groups of the Second World War. See Adams 37.

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7. Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, 1940–1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992). 8. McClintock 182. 9. Adams 196.

CHAPTER 8 1. U.S. Code, Title 10, 164. 2. A memorandum from the Director of the Joint Staff to the Joint Staff Directors dated January 11, 2002, began “The Secretary of Defense [Donald Rumsfeld] has directed that the use of the term ‘National Command Authorities,’ be discontinued.” 3. A memorandum signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, dated October 24, 2002, directed that “the title ‘Commander in Chief’ shall be used to connote the President of the United States of America. Further, this memorandum discontinues use of the acronym ‘CINC’ (meaning ‘Commander in Chief’) for military officers.” 4. The typical joint staff has a director and a handful of directorates, including a J-1 for personnel, J-2 for intelligence, J-3 for operations, J-4 for logistics, and J-5 for plans and policy. 5. In many instances, the joint component commands exist only notionally. When coalitions form, the common practice is to combine armies, combine air forces, and combine navies. The headquarters above is tasked with unifying the efforts of the combined (multinational) components. In these cases, the letter C replaces the J in acronyms (e.g., CFACC instead of JFACC, and C-3 instead of J-3). The commander above can attempt to impose jointness on the combined armies, air forces, and navies or attempt to deconflict their largely independent operations. The latter is the norm. 6. The chairman’s joint staff supports the chairman in his responsibilities. The J-5 is responsible for construction of the UCP and the JSCP. The J-8 is responsible for the Forces For Memorandum. The J-3 allocates forces when so ordered by the NCA. 7. A blue ribbon panel in 1969–1970 recommended the establishment of STRATCOM, but the panel’s recommendations were not acted upon. 8. General Lauris Norstad, USAF, commanded EUCOM from November 1956 to November 1962 during the Eisenhower administration that favored massive nuclear retaliation over land forces. 9. Sub-Saharan Africa had been unassigned from WWII until the Atlantic Command stood up a small rapid deployment joint task force for operations in that region in 1960. 10. CENTCOM’s major war plan was to counter a Soviet invasion through the Caucasus Mountains into Iran to seize Iranian oil fields by entering Iran through the Zagros Mountains in the south, largely supported by XVIII Airborne Corps.

CHAPTER 9 1. General William E. DePuy, “Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, The Tool of Doctrine,” Army Magazine, August 1988. 2. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication JP 1–02, June 5, 2003. 3. Quoted in John A. Tirpak, “Strategic Control,” Air Force Magazine 82, no. 2 (February 1999).

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4. Eisenhower’s massive retaliation strategy relied heavily on strategic nuclear forces and strategic bombardment, too heavily according to Kennedy’s presidential campaign. Eisenhower’s (relatively speaking) strategic monism gave way to Kennedy’s broad spectrum, flexible response strategy, with expanded reliance on unconventional, conventional, and strategic nuclear forces. The expression “strategic monism” most often refers to this distinction. 5. Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991), 91–111. 6. Thomas J. Czerwinski, “Command and Control at the Crossroads,” Parameters, Autumn 1996: 121–132. Other words have been used, typically German, and different taxonomies proposed. Czerwinski’s is complete, parsimonious, and intuitive. 7. Corps in the Republic of Vietnam was not corps in the sense of a military command echelon. The South Vietnamese clustered provinces into four political-military administrative districts—corps. 8. H. R. McMasters, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 268. Johnson’s candidate for overall command of forces in Vietnam was General David Monroe Shoup, USMC, Medal of Honor winner at Tarawa and former marine commandant (1960–1963). 9. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). 10. Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2: 139–179. 11. The official explanation is that there were inadequate numbers of attack aircraft aboard the two carriers in the Gulf to attack all of the desired targets simultaneously. Absent land basing and overflight rights, an all–Air Force operation was impossible. An all-Navy operation was bureaucratically unacceptable.

CONCLUSION 1. Quoted in Elting Morrison, Men, Machines and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), 38–39.

Index

Adams, John Quincy, 145 Advanced base force, 182, 183, 186 Advanced operating bases, 175, 183 Air control, 117, 118 Air defense: Air Force, 121, 122, 128; Army, 75; British, 20, 28; Douhet, 101, 106; Iraqi, 21, 115; Navy, 154, 155, 159, 161–164; Soviet, 19; Vietnam, 114, 154, 159 Air interdiction (AI), 118, 123 AirLand battle doctrine, 68, 119, 249 Air superiority, 102, 110; Air Force, 101, 118, 120, 188; Battle of Britain, 106; Big Week, 108; Douhet, 99; Kenney, 109; Maxwell, 105; Warden, 100, 101 Air supremacy, 118 Air tasking order (ATO), 128, 252 Amphibious assault, 21, 132; Gallipoli, 184; Geiger, 188; Japanese, 187; Korea, 153; Marine, 176, 177, 182, 185–189, 192, 202, 213; Navy-Marine, 254; Pacific, 149 Amphibious operations, 191; Allied, 150, 185; Army, 59, 64, 65, 107; Bradley, 185; MacArthur, 185;

Marine, 176, 181–186, 193; Navy, 157, 188; Pacific, 109 Anti-submarine warfare: Atlantic, 150; Channel, 106, 108; Cuban Missile Crisis, 153; Lehman, 155; Marine, 189; Navy, 147, 186; Zumwalt, 154, 155 Armitage, Richard, 49 Arnold, Henry H., 35, 100, 102, 107, 109 Aspin, Les, 39, 45, 48, 50 Aube, Hyacinthe-Laurent-Theophile, 140, 141, 150, 172 Autonomy of the air arm: Air Force, 64; Douhet, 99; Marine, 176; Mitchell, 103, 104, 105; Navy, 191; postwar planning, 111, 112, 113; Trenchard, 100, 106 Bainbridge, William, 145 Balance of power, 140 Barnett, George, 181 Base force, 45, 183 Battle (bomb) damage assessment (BDA), 119 Battle for Leyte Gulf, 149 Battle for Midway, 149

288

Index

Battle of Guadalcanal, 187. See also Naval Battle of Guadalcanal Battle of Jutland, 138, 139, 147, 173 Battle of New Orleans, 146 Battle of Santiago, 137, 139, 146 Battle of the Glorious First of June, 137, 139 Battle of the Nile, 137, 139 Battle of the Yellow Sea, 138, 139 Battle of Trafalgar, 137, 143 Battle of Tsushima Strait, 138, 139 Battlefield air interdiction (BAI), 75, 118, 129 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 20, 137, 143 Boorda, Jeremy Michael, 172 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), 45, 48, 49 Boxer Rebellion, 178 Bradley, Omar, 64, 108, 110, 185 Butler, John Lee, 45, 47 Capabilities-based analysis, 6 Carter, Jimmy, 121, 214, 238, 242, 244 Cebrowski, Arthur, 22–24, 172 Central Intelligence Agency, 35 Chain of command: producer, 3, 4, 25, 38, 42, 50, 72, 257–259; user, 3, 4, 41, 233, 238, 257, 258, 263, 264 Chenault, Claire, 109–111 Cheney, Richard, 47 Churchill, Winston, 34, 148 Civil affairs, 70, 210, 212–215, 218, 224, 230, 241 Clark, Wesley K., 70 Clausewitz, Karl von, 20, 24, 97, 136, 173 Coastal defense, 104, 132, 134, 139, 140, 142, 146, 156, 157, 168 Close air support (CAS), 250; Air Force, 118, 129; Army-Air Force, 75, 259; Geiger, 112; Marine, 169, 186, 189, 194, 196; special operations, 225–227; Vietnam, 114; Warden, 101 Coats, Dan, 8, 49, 50 Coercive diplomacy, 145, 156, 260 Cohen-Nunn legislation, 40 Combined arms theory, 251, 252 Command by direction, 252, 253 Command by plan, 252, 253

Command information center (CIC), 149, 167 Command of the air, 98–101, 117 Commerce protection, 16, 61, 132–134, 141, 142, 147, 148, 155, 168 Commerce raiding, 132, 134, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142, 145, 146–148 Constitution, 3, 32, 35, 56, 67, 143, 175, 247 Conventional warfare, 58, 93, 153, 211, 222 Counterinsurgency, 210, 213, 222, 229, 230, 254 Counter proliferation, 211 Counterterrorism, 211, 214, 215, 218, 223 Creek Indian Wars, 57 Cruiser rules, 135, 139 Darby, William O., 213, 218 Decatur, Stephan, 144, 145 DePuy, William E., 247, 249, 252, 253 Dewey, George, 61, 137, 146, 178 Direct action, 201, 210–212, 218, 220, 221, 224, 253 Disaster relief, 70, 127, 128, 176, 180, 212, 225, 229, 243 Donovan, William, 221 Doolittle, Jimmie, 141, 170 Douhet, Giulio, 97–109, 113–121 Dowding, Hugh, 106 Dugan, Michael J., 115 Duvalier, François, 180 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 72, 188, 202, 267; administration, 144; General, 55, 128, 147, 257; President, 57, 58, 133, 173, 190; unification, 211 Ellis, Pete, 183 Expeditionary operations, 54, 135, 183, 193, 199 Flexible response, 113, 153 Forcible entry, 52, 176, 181, 182, 202 Foreign internal defense (FID), 210, 213, 220, 222, 228, 253 Fullam, William, 190 Functional command, 235, 236, 239, 243–245, 262

Index Gallipoli, 182, 184, 185 Geiger, Ray Stanley, 112, 188 Goldwater, Barry, 39, 50 Goldwater-Nichols legislation, 26, 40, 44, 46, 47, 68, 238, 255, 261 Gunboat diplomacy, 16, 134, 135, 145, 153–157, 168, 170, 177, 257, 260 Harris, Arthur, 106–108 Hasty response option, 214, 215, 229, 231 Hegemonic primacy strategy, 3, 42, 48 Hoover, Herbert, 190 Horner, Charles, A., 115, 116 Hostage rescue, 203, 210, 214, 218, 223, 226 Humanitarian assistance, 127, 128, 163, 176, 179, 180, 202, 203, 209, 212, 229, 243 Independent application of air power, 22, 35, 103, 107, 109, 111, 114, 188, 237 Independent command, 131, 171, 172, 253 Indirect fire, 74, 75 Information operations (IO), 235, 240, 241 Inouye, Daniel K., 49 Insurgency, 6, 45, 62, 146, 176, 178, 209, 212, 213, 229–231 Interoperability, 11, 245, 250, 253, 264 Jackson, Andrew, 57, 144, 190 Jeune école, 140, 172 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 67, 114, 255 Jomini, Antoine Henri, 20, 136 Jones, David C., 39 Jones, John Paul, 143 Just war (justum bellum), 97 Kelley, P. X., 40 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 67, 113, 124, 152, 153, 162, 213, 221, 228, 229 Kenney, George C., 109, 110, 111, 187 Key West Agreement, 36 King, Ernest, 35 Knox, Henry, 59, 143 Komer, Robert, 67

289

Leahy, William, 35 Lehman, John, 40, 155, 168 Lejeune, Joseph A., 181, 183 LeMay, Curtis E., 100, 109, 111, 113 Lieberman, Joseph, 50 Long-range precision strike, 132, 160, 169, 170, 172, 188, 189, 265 Low-intensity conflict (LIC), 7, 40, 153, 176, 207–210, 215, 229, 230, 258 MacArthur, Douglas: Japan, 72; Korea, 85; Pacific, 129, 130, 173, 177, 189, 205, 268; Philippines, 82, 84 Macdonough, Thomas, 144 Macgregor, Douglas, 92, 93 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 61, 136–141, 146–152, 157, 159, 168, 172, 183 Mahan, Dennis Hart, 56, 61 Main effort, 79 Major regional contingency (MRC), 48 Major theater war (MTW), 48, 236 Marine aviation, 186, 187, 190, 193, 197 Marine Corps Bill of 1952, 192 Marshall, Andrew, 18, 49 Marshall, George C., 35, 52, 64, 182, 221 Massive retaliation, 113, 153 McNair, Leslie, 64, 68 Meyer, Edward C., 39, 40 Mitchell, Billy, 100–105, 221 Modernization, 1, 2, 17, 39, 154, 258 Monroe, James, 145, 156, 180 Nation building, 42, 54, 60, 70, 176, 179, 209, 212, 229, 246 National command authorities (NCA), 233, 256 Naval aviation, 149, 153, 199 Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 149 Nelson, Horatio, 25, 137, 171 Nimitz, Chester, 64, 109, 184, 185, 248 Nixon, Richard, 114 Non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), 203, 210, 226 Objective force, 92, 93 Operation Desert Storm, 42, 180

290

Index

Operation Just Cause, 84, 87, 219, 236, 256 Patton, George S., 64, 65, 87, 108, 109, 110, 113, 127, 194 Peace operations, 179, 209, 220 Perry, Oliver Hazard, 144 Pershing, John, 62, 63, 181, 213 Planning: crisis action, 88, 193, 206, 240, 266; deliberate, 54, 70, 72, 88, 160, 193, 206, 240 Policy: declaratory, 2, 3, 258; employment, 2, 3, 9, 258; force deployment, 3, 44, 47 Powell, Colin, 2, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 68 Prize rules, 135, 139 Psychological operations, 127, 210, 212, 215, 218, 224, 226, 230, 241 Puller, Lewis B., 179, 180, 221 Punitive expeditions, 177 Quesada, Elwood, 108, 111 Rape of the Fleet, 137, 143 Reagan, Ronald, 39, 121, 222, 238 Reverse slope defense, 57 Revolution in military affairs (RMA), 1, 7–9, 18, 49 Rice, Don, 115, 116 Rickover, Hyman G., 154 Riga, Latvia, 184, 185 Rodgers, John, 144 Rogers, John, 190 Roles and missions, 2, 36, 43, 44, 119, 191 Roosevelt, Theodore, 156 Root, Elihu, 62, 63 Rumsfeld, Donald, 43, 49, 215, 229, 262 Sabotage, 210, 218, 221 Scott, Winfield, 57, 59, 60, 145 Search and rescue, 210, 218, 225, 226 Seminole Indian Wars, 57, 58, 68, 190 Shinseki, Eric, 49 Sims, William S., 148, 157 Smith, Holland M., 182, 183, 191, 221 Smith, Ralph C., 182

Spaatz, Carl M., 100, 101, 111, 191 Specified command, 36, 126, 234, 237, 238 Specialized reconnaissance, 211 Special operations, 12, 193, 203, 209– 231, 234, 235, 243, 254 Special operations forces (SOF), 7, 12, 40, 93, 117, 127, 176, 206, 209–231, 241, 249, 253, 256, 261, 263 Special warfare, 213, 216 Stability operations, 221 Standing army, 3, 32, 33, 51–60, 66, 87, 177, 182, 249 Stark, Harold R., 149, 186 State Department Troops, 176 Stealth, 19, 117, 121, 123, 128, 129, 132, 142, 172, 211 Stoddert, Benjamin, 143 Strategic attack, 110, 115, 116, 118, 119, 255 Strategic bombardment, 28, 35, 36, 64, 96, 101–113, 126, 153, 188, 237 Strategic monism, 192 Strategic reconnaissance, 119, 221 Strategy: collective security, 42; containment, 3; national military, 3, 43, 45, 258; national security, 3, 46, 48, 258; selective engagement, 42 Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), 118, 163 Taft, William H., 190 Task Force Smith, 66, 85, 93 Task organization, 79, 128 Theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), 118 Theater missile defense (TMD), 118 Thornberry, Mac, 50 Threat-based analysis, 6 Tirpitz, Alfred, 16, 17, 18, 141, 148 Togo, Heirachiro, 138 Trenchard, Hugh, 100, 103, 105 Trujillo, Rafael, 179 Truman, Harry S, 35, 36, 37, 45, 66, 191, 237 Truxton, Thomas, 189, 190 Unconventional warfare, 58, 153, 211, 213, 220, 221, 222, 253

Index Unification, 34, 35, 36, 111, 112, 191 Unified action, 235, 247, 248, 261 Unity of command, 35, 191, 247, 248 Unity of effort, 247, 249, 250 Vandegrift, Alexander A., 185, 191 Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 178 Vessey, Jack, 39 Villa, Pancho, 62 Walsh, David, 151 Walt, Lewis W., 179, 180 War: guerrilla, 57, 58, 59, 179, 194, 229; imperfect, 97, 99, 101, 142; of limited objectives, 66, 113, 153; perfect, 56, 58, 97, 99, 101, 140; total, 56, 66, 101, 103, 106, 114, 153

Warden, John, 100, 101, 103, 115, 116 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 6, 211 Weinberger, Caspar, 39, 68 Weldpolitik, 140 Wellington, Duke of (Wellesley, Arthur), 57, 144 Weyland, Otto P., 108, 113, 127 Wickham, John A., 45 Wilhelm II (kaiser), 16, 140, 155 Wilson, Woodrow, 63, 147, 178, 180, 190 Wolfowitz, Paul, 46, 49 Wood, Leonard, 190 Yarnell, Harry E., 149

291

About the Author D. ROBERT WORLEY is a Fellow with the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center for the Study of American Government. He previously held adjunct faculty positions at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and UCLA’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. He has served as a defense policy analyst at the National Security and Army Research Divisions of Rand, the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies’ Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. Before beginning his professional career, he served in the United States Marine Corps with one tour in Vietnam.