Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cass Military Studies)

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SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE MILITARY Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

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Social Sciences and the Military An interdisciplinary overview

Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

ISBN 978-0-415-37646-4

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Social Sciences and the Military

Social Sciences and the Military presents a clear view of interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary approaches to military and conflict-resolution studies from an international perspective, offering a thorough analysis of new thinking and movements within the social sciences when studying the military. Since the end of the Cold War, military operations other than war – crisisresponse operations, the fight against terrorism and hi-tech warfare – have posed a new set of human and social challenges for the militaries of all countries, problems of an intensity never before seen in peacetime. Sociology, social psychology, anthropology and the science of conflict are grappling with these issues, common to all armed forces, with a new fervour. Social Sciences and the Military offers an up-to-date view on the state-of-the-art of this theme, defining the new study trends in the field. Containing essays by some of the most highly regarded scholars on the subject, including David Segal, John Allen Williams, Donna Winslow, Vladimir Rukavishnikov, Slavek Magala and Joseph Soeters, this book is essential reading for all students of civil–military relations, conflict resolution and military studies in general. Giuseppe Caforio is President of the Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution Research Committee of the International Sociological Association. He is a founding member of ERGOMAS as well as being a member of several other institutes of research. He holds degrees in Strategic Sciences, Law, Political Science and Communication. His recent publications include: The Sociology of the Military (1998), The Flexible Officer (2001), the Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (2003) and (together with G. Kuemmel) the Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September 11th (2005).

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Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome Trust in the gods, but verify Rose Mary Sheldon Clausewitz and African War Politics and strategy in Liberia and Somalia Isabelle Duyvesteyn Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954–60 Defending the northern tier Michael Cohen The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale Edward George Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651 ‘The Genius of this Age’ Stanley Carpenter Israel’s Reprisal Policy, 1953–1956 The dynamics of military retaliation Ze’ev Drory Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War Enver Redzic Leaders in War West Point remembers the 1991 Gulf War Edited by Frederick Kagan and Christian Kubik Khedive Ismail’s Army John Dunn

Yugoslav Military Industry 1918–1991 Amadeo Watkins Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914–1918 The list regiment John Williams Rostóv in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920 The key to victory Brian Murphy The Tet Effect, Intelligence and the Public Perception of War Jake Blood The US Military Profession into the 21st Century War, peace and politics Edited by Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr. Civil–Military Relations in Europe Learning from crisis and institutional change Edited by Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Karl Haltiner and Jürgen Kuhlmann Strategic Culture and Ways of War Lawrence Sondhaus Military Unionism in the Post Cold War Era A future reality? Edited by Richard Bartle and Lindy Heinecken Warriors and Politicians U.S. civil–military relations under stress Charles A. Stevenson Military Honour and the Conduct of War From Ancient Greece to Iraq Paul Robinson Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy India, Iraq and Israel Timothy D. Hoyt Managing Defence in a Democracy Edited by Laura R. Cleary and Teri McConville

Gender and the Military Women in the armed forces of Western democracies Helena Carreiras Social Sciences and the Military An interdisciplinary overview Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

Social Sciences and the Military An interdisciplinary overview

Edited by Giuseppe Caforio

First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2007 Selection and editorial matter, Giuseppe Caforio; the contributors, their contributions Typeset in Times by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN10: 0-415-37646-7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96677-5 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-37646-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-96677-8 (ebk)

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors

ix xi

Introduction: the interdisciplinary and cross-national character of social studies on the military – the need for such an approach

1

GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

PART I

General issues 1 Challenges of the twenty-first century, social sciences and strategic thinking

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23

VLADIMIR RUKAVISHNIKOV

2 Current developments and trends in social research on the military

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DAVID R. SEGAL

3 Military organization and culture from three perspectives: the case of army

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DONNA WINSLOW

4 Political science perspectives on the military and civil–military relations

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JOHN ALLEN WILLIAMS

5 Social history and the armed forces: military education and social change SLAWOMIR MAGALA

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6 From a psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach and beyond in military research: current status and trends

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JACQUES MYLLE

7 The study of workgroups in the military: an organisational aesthetics perspective

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ENRICO MARIA PIRAS

PART II

New issues and emerging trends 8 Conceptual insecurity: new wars, MOOTW, CRO, terrorism, and the military

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WILFRIED VON BREDOW

9 How the military can profit from management and organization science

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ERIK DE WAARD AND JOSEPH SOETERS

10 The military in post-communist societies in transition

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MARIAN ZULEAN

11 Trends and evolution in the military profession

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GIUSEPPE CAFORIO

12 Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective

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MARINA NUCIARI

13 Between legitimacy and efficiency: a comparative view on democratic accountability of defence activities in democracies

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HANS BORN AND INGRID BEUTLER

Index

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Illustrations

Figures I.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 12.1 12.2 12.3

UN Peacekeeping operations timeline TG023’s Command Team Effectiveness Model Difference in heartbeat pattern under imbalanced versus balanced conditions Logo of the International Military Testing Association Terrorism as threat perception and mission assigned Opinions in favour of conscription Trend of reasons for choosing a career as an officer Main qualities of the “good officer” Perceived social image of the military profession Index of women’s military integration in NATO countries Cultural map of 81 societies Support for gender equality in nine cultural zones

5 128 130 138 227 227 228 229 231 241 249 251

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 9.1 9.2 12.1 12.2 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5

Characteristics of the three perspectives on organizations Integration perspective Differentiation perspective Fragmentation perspective Three approaches to flexibility Definitions of modularity Index of women’s military integration in NATO (IWMI) Position of NATO countries according to PDI, UAI and MAS dimensions Characteristics of political systems and oversight bodies in selected states General powers of parliament Budgetary powers of parliament Powers concerning peace support operations Parliamentary powers to influence government’s procurement decisions

69 73 76 80 184 187 242 258 267 270 273 274 277

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13.6

Parliamentary powers to influence government’s defence policy decisions 13.7 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: category ranking 13.8 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: country ranking 13.9 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in different democratic systems 13.10 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies

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Contributors

Hans Born is Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). His projects focus on: democracy and the use of force; civil–military relations; accountability of the security sector; human rights of armed forces personnel. His recent publications include the Handbook on “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector”, jointly published in 30 languages by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and DCAF in 2003; The Double Democratic Deficit (2004); Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practices for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies (2005); Who is Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Agency Accountability (2005); and Civil–Military Relations in Europe (2006). Wilfried von Bredow, PhD, teaches international relations at the Institute for Political Science at Philipps University Marburg (Germany). Among his main research interests are Germany’s foreign and security policy, the development and the demise of the East–West conflict, civil–military relations and the future of the military profession. His latest publication is Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden (VS Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften, 2006). Ingrid Beutler, BA, LLB, LLM, is an international lawyer and former research assistant at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). She is currently consultant at the Office of the Special Advisor to the United Nations Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace. Giuseppe Caforio is a retired general in the Italian Army. He is president of the Research Committee 01 “Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution” of the I.S.A., vice-president of the Italian Inter-university Centre of Historical and Military Studies, founding member of the ERGOMAS, as well as being a member of several other research institutes. He is also an outside consultant of the governmental Italian Centre of Strategic and Military Studies. He has a Strategic Sciences degree, a Law degree, a Political Science degree, and a Masters degree in Communication Science. His most recent publication is Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (2003).

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Contributors

Sllawomir Magala Professor of Cross-Cultural Management at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Head of the Department of Organizational and Personnel Sciences. His most recent publication is Cross-Cultural Competence (Routledge, 2005). He teaches “Global Networks of States and Markets”, “Machiavelli and von Clausewitz for Managers”. His current interests include the studies of post-communist transformations, paradigmatic gambles in social science and management of knowledge and tradition. His research networks include: Standing Conference on Organizational Symbolism and Standing Conference on Management and Organization Inquiry. He is Editorin-chief of Journal of Organizational Change Management and Journal of Cross Cultural Competence and Management. He is on the editorial board of Qualitative Sociology Review. Jacques Mylle graduated from the Royal Military Academy. He started his career as an Armoured Reconnaissance officer. Appointed Chief Officers’ Selection, he graduated as a psychologist. In 1991 he was called to the Royal Military Academy as Head of the Psychology Department. Master in Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, he earned a PhD in Psychology with a thesis on The Structure of Post-traumatic Stress Reactions After a Man-Made Disaster. His main field of research is in modelling factors that contribute to the optimisation of a soldier’s behaviour in peace-support operations. He is also involved in several forums of applied military psychology. Marina Nuciari has been Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Economics, University of Torino, since 1992. She is Professor of Military Sociology, Course in Strategic Sciences, University of Torino and a founding member of the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), since 1986. She was Chairperson of ERGOMAS 1992–6 and has been a member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, since 1993. She is a member of the International Sociological Association, and of its Research Committee n. 1 – Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution. She is a member of the Associazione Italiana di Sociologia (AIS) and the author of many volumes and articles in the fields of general sociology, military sociology and cross-cultural research. Enrico Maria Piras is a doctoral candidate in “Information Systems and Organisation” at the University of Trento, Italy, and member of RUCOLA (Research Unit on Cognition, Organisational Learning and Aesthetics). His areas of research include micro-practices of organising and control, gender studies, considered from an organisational aesthetics perspective. Currently he is working on research on the relation between organisational learning and norm production in the Italian Armed Forces. Vladimir Rukavishnikov has been Professor in the Department of Global Politics and International Relations of the State University – Higher School of Economics in Moscow since the autumn of 2003. Formerly he was affiliated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. His research focuses on democratisa-

Contributors

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tion, public opinion and value changes in Russia, and on civil–military relations and foreign and security policies. He has written over 200 scholarly articles, essays, papers and books in Russian and other languages. His works were published in more than 12 different countries. His latest monograph (in Russian), entitled Cold War, Cold Peace (Moscow, 2005), analyses the public perception of the USSR/Russia in the USA and Europe from the early 1930s until the present day. David R. Segal is Director of the Center for Research on Military Organisation, and Professor of Sociology, Government and Politics, and Public Policy, at the University of Maryland. He is a former president of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society, and the District of Columbia Sociological Society, and a former chair of the Section on Peace, War, and Social Conflict of the American Sociological Association. Joseph Soeters is a Professor of Management and Organisation Studies at the Netherlands Defense Academy; he is also affiliated with Tilburg University and TIAS Business School as a Professor of Organisational sociology. His research interests focus on international military cooperation, the use of organisation studies in operational military situations, as well as evaluation of policy programmes in developing countries. He has published over 150 articles and chapters in books (in seven languages) and he has (co-)edited and authored ten books in Dutch and English, the most recent one on civil wars and terrorism (Routledge, 2005). E.J. (Erik) de Waard graduated from the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in 1994. He became a platoon commander in the Air Mobile Brigade. He subsequently studied business administration at Radboud University, Nijmegen, and fulfilled a number of operational executive functions in the world of business. Since 2001 he has worked as an assistant professor at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, where he teaches organisational strategy and design. He is currently preparing his doctoral thesis on modular design in the armed forces. John Allen (“Jay”) Williams is Professor of Political Science at Loyola University, Chicago, and is Chair and President of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Dr Williams chairs the Academic Advisory Committee of the National Strategy Forum in Chicago. He retired as a Captain in the US Naval Reserve with 30 years of commissioned service. He co-authored U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (with Sam C. Sarkesian and Fred B. Bryant) and co-edited and contributed to The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War (with Charles Moskos and David R. Segal). Professor Doctor Donna Winslow is an award-winning anthropologist. She is

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Contributors

the former coordinator of the Programme for Research on Peace, Security and Society at the University of Ottawa. She currently holds the Chair of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam and teaches at Royal Netherlands Military Academy in Breda. She began developing the field of military anthropology from 1995 to 1997 as a technical advisor to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. In the following years she conducted several other researches among Canadian Forces deployed to Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, the Golan Heights and on European Defence. All these studies have been published. Marian Zulean, PhD in Sociology, holds a Masters degree in International Affairs/International Security. Currently he is an adviser with the National Security Department at the Office of the Romanian President and Associate Professor at the University of Bucharest. As an academic, he taught Policy Analysis, International Security and Civil–Military Relations. He is a member of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), RC01 of International Sociological Association and ERGOMAS. His latest publications are: “Civil–military cultural gap in Romania”, in Military Missions and their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th, G. Caforio and G. Kummel (eds) (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 2005).

Introduction The interdisciplinary and cross-national character of social studies on the military – the need for such an approach Giuseppe Caforio Premise The need for interdisciplinary, cross-national studies of the military Modern social-scientific study of the military is usually traced back to the work of Samuel Stouffer’s team in the United States in 1942–5, the results of which were published following the Second World War (Stouffer, 1949). As is widely known, this was a study conducted jointly by a team of sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, statisticians and others; an approach, that is, that was certainly interdisciplinary and perhaps (but I leave this assessment to historians of the social sciences) also transdisciplinary1 ante litteram. In the subsequent development of studies and researches on the military, this interdisciplinarity – understood, as I shall describe more fully below, as the cooperation and interaction of various scientific disciplines – instead of growing and expanding to extend the array of disciplines involved, has been lost. The more properly sociological studies, although often carried out by scholars from neighbouring disciplines, such as political scientists,2 have continued in accordance with a line of investigation of their own, while other disciplines – history, psychology, political science,3 law, etc. – have taken other roads, without much interaction between them. Today, the increased complexity, diversification and importance of the military function imperiously calls us back to interdisciplinary, cross-national studies of the military. I introduce this dimension, aimed at overcoming national boundaries, because both the problems and the dimensions of deployment of national armed forces now amply exceed the confines of individual countries and can no longer be studied and solved in a narrow national perspective. But why does one feel today, much more than in the past, a need for the cooperation of several disciplines in the study of the military? A theoretical, scholarly need has probably always existed in this direction but, as often occurs for the social sciences, this need finds currency and instruments when problems of a practical, concrete nature become urgent, as already occurred for our subject of study at the time of The American Soldier.4 A more specific analysis of the conditions in which the military operates

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today is given later in this chapter, but for now it is sufficient to point out that the parallel and often contemporaneous existence of new and old forms of warfare, the increased conflict following the end of the bloc politics, and the growing constabulary aspect (see Janowitz, 1960) of many missions, pose the military and its leaders (at all levels) a new set of problems with respect to the recent past. As recently summarised by Harry Bondy (Bondy, 2003), many new terms have appeared in the literature to indicate this change, like “fourth-generation warfare”, “revolution in military affairs”, “postmodernism”, and “postglobalism”, so that “military culture can only be understood and shaped by an inter-disciplinary approach that addresses individual and group behaviour”.5 If the scholar, the researcher, must provide elements of knowledge and interpretation of the phenomena that can invest the military today, it no longer seems possible (or sufficient) for this to occur in a satisfactory way with a monodisciplinary approach, because there are too many factors of various origins that impact and determine these phenomena. I am not the first to express this need, of course. Let me cite here, as one example among several, what Joseph Soeters recently wrote: Problem based research – and this is what decision-makers ask for – does not account for disciplinary boundaries. It is for this reason that sociologists should integrate their efforts with social and organizational psychologists, political scientists, scholars in public administration and even anthropologists . . . This new development may bring back the old idea of one holistic social science. (Soeters, 2000: 136) Moreover, single disciplines can also gain advantage from a broader, interdisciplinary approach, as the following example, drawn from the old research, The American Soldier, demonstrates. Dealing with pre-army experiences in childhood, Samuel Stouffer writes: Psychiatry has been so predominantly clinical that very little statistical evidence exists as to the presence or absence in a cross section of American people of experiences which, according to various psychiatric theories, might predispose people to confront new situations effectively or ineffectively. The body of data now to be reviewed is, with all its inadequacy, almost unique. The American Soldiers were representative of every aspect of American life . . . What a representative cross section of these soldiers has to say about its childhood experiences is therefore of interest going well beyond concerns about adjustment in the Army. Through modern methods of sampling and of question design, the machinery now exists to assemble even better inventories in the future for representative cross sections of the entire American public. (Stouffer, 1949: 130)

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Terminological clarifications It seems advisable to precede further development of this topic with some terminological stipulations, as the terms “interdisciplinarity”, “multidisciplinarity” (or “pluridisciplinarity”) and “transdisciplinarity” have often been used either as synonyms or at least with little semantic precision. It is not out of place to recall here that the term “transdisciplinarity” in particular gave rise to a real school of thought whose roots go back to a conference held in France in 1970.6 And, in reality, since scientific disagreement seems to have occurred particularly between the two concepts of “interdisciplinarity” and “transdisciplinarity”, it seems especially important to fix the confines between the two and explain the choice made here for the former. This also because, historically, the term “multidisciplinarity” represented only a specification of interdisciplinarity, to signify that the initial interaction between two disciplines was becoming interaction between several disciplines (Sztompka, 2003). Following, therefore, what I feel is a prevalent current of thought on this point,7 I accept here the definition of interdisciplinarity as a process in which a certain aspect, problem or phenomenon is studied with the contribution of various disciplines that cooperate to achieve a common result of greater knowledge. Each discipline retains its independence and its boundaries, in this case. We instead have transdisciplinarity when the boundaries between the various disciplines have been exceeded from the start and the approach to the phenomenon to be studied is effected within a stable system that is already multidisciplinary in itself and aimed at joint problem-solving. It means that different social scientists belonging to different disciplines work together for a single specific project. The choice of the term “interdisciplinarity” to define the type of approach that seems necessary in studying the military today derives from my personal conviction that the transdisciplinary approach is more proper when an organisation exists, such as those offered as examples by theoreticians of this concept,8 that unites scholars of different disciplines and keeps them in a single place of study and research (today also virtual) to define, plan and study a research subject, often specific and limited, in a joint, unitary way, with shared methodologies. This is a condition that has occurred rarely, perhaps partially only once, in social research applied to the military9 and to our knowledge does not now appear to be present, for our sector, anywhere in the world; and that, in any case, to be achieved, seems to require first passing through a phase of interdisciplinarity. Indeed, the current general condition of the various social sciences is what Piotr Sztompka (Sztompka, 2000) describes as “the growing specialisation, differentiation and fragmentation, i.e. internal disintegration, of each socialscientific discipline”. And even if, as the author goes on to say,10 a simultaneous tendency towards interdisciplinary integration is in progress, it appears far from having remedied the consequences of the extreme specialisation mentioned above. And since the approach of the behavioural sciences to study of the

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military is certainly no exception to this general framework, it seems pragmatic to shoot for a first possible and, as will be shown later, necessary objective like that of interdisciplinary study of the military and its actions and interactions. We have, in fact, to go on step-by-step and, particularly from a practical point of view, we cannot suddenly go from the current prevailing mono-disciplinarity in studying the military to trans-disciplinarity, because science, empirical science, like nature, non facit saltus. Therefore, the purpose of this project is to create the conditions that drive scholars to reach an interdisciplinary mindset, through the knowledge of what the contribution of different disciplines could be in studying the subject. This approach should create the basic knowledge necessary for transdisciplinary studies and empirical researches. The other term that characterises the title and the subject of this chapter, “cross-national”, has also been preferred to other current terms, such as “international” and “transnational”, to cite the most common. Cross-national is meant here as defining an approach which, without neglecting national peculiarities, acknowledges on the one hand a growing parallelism of problems and situations in the different countries (at least those at a comparable stage of development), and on the other proposes to identify, through comparative surveys, lines of development and possible common solutions. It has been preferred both to the term “international”, which seems better suited for identifying the external relations between countries than comparing their internal situations, and to “transnational”, which seems more appropriate for a transcending (in progress partially and locally, but far from being generalised and complete, see Deaglio, 2004) of national borders and specificities than a comparison of situations and problems.

The general framework of change The end of the Cold War and the resulting disappearance of the two opposing blocs of states, whose equilibrium was nevertheless a strong guarantee of the preservation of some sort of status quo, opened a Pandora’s box from which have progressively and tumultuously emerged religious wars, ethnic conflicts, the disintegration of states and the birth of new state entities often in conflict with each other – phenomena all strongly at odds with the free-trade and globalisation needs of the victors in that war. Free trade, the very force that enabled the West to win the confrontation with the opposing bloc, the champions of statism, needs a peaceful, pacified world for its development where it can expand and conquer markets. This has produced an initial and extraordinary growth of constabulary operations (see Figure I.1), and later also of conventional but asymmetric warfare11 against states that, rightly or wrongly, appeared to prevent the conditions necessary for the ongoing globalisation. For lack of a better term,12 they have been called “new wars” (see Mary Kaldor, 1999), while others, to define the salient aspect of the geopolitical framework, have spoken of a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993).

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100 90 80

Percentage

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1948

1950s

1960s

1970s

1980s

1986–9

1990s

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Figure I.1 UN Peacekeeping operations timeline (Source: data from un.org/Depts/dpko/ timeline).

Kaldor herself, in a later publication (Kaldor, 2001), characterises the new wars as follows: A typical new phenomenon is armed networks of non-state and state actors. They include: para-military groups organised around a charismatic leader, warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, fanatic volunteers like the Mujahadeen, organised criminal groups, units of regular forces or other security services, as well as mercenaries and private military companies. The form of warfare that is waged by these networks is what I call “new war”. These new forms of warfare appear to be characterised by a prevalently political and ideological (often religious) nature,13 by a diligent effort to exploit the media,14 by consciously and determinedly ignoring any ethical standard. As Kaldor further writes (2001): “The strategy is to gain political power through sowing fear and hatred, to create a climate of terror, to eliminate moderate voices and to defeat tolerance.” The essence of the resulting war operations could also be described as organised crime (illegal or private violence) or as massive violations of human rights (violence against civilians). Further, the financing of this type of war generates a particular type of economy, thus described by Kaldor (2001):

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Giuseppe Caforio Because these networks flourish in states where systems of taxation have collapsed and where little new wealth is being created, and where the wars destroy physical infrastructure, cut off trade and create a climate of insecurity that prohibits investment, they have to seek alternative, exploitative forms of financing. They raise money through loot and plunder, through illegal trading in drugs, illegal immigrants, cigarettes and alcohol, through “taxing” humanitarian assistance, through support from sympathetic states and through remittances from members of the networks.

Rationality in the conduct of war, a heritage of Western thought at least since the writings of Clausewitz, now appears to be called into question by this type of war, because, as Barylski, for example, writes, “When your enemies realize that your rational strategy has them cornered, they may behave ‘irrationally’ in order to undermine it” (Barylski, 2003).15 This is what happens in the practice of terrorism, where the very definition of the concept is rather controversial among scholars.16 I have lingered over this new type of warfare precisely because it is new, but I hasten to point out that it does not replace either traditional warfare, a phenomenon that is still current and extensive, and indeed rendered more complex by new technologies (technical warfare), or constabulary operations, whose strong growth I have already shown, and which is not only quantitative.17 It is merely a new form of conflict that joins the previous ones and helps to make contemporary warfare increasingly complex and composite. All this in an international scenario that, as José R. Serano (2000) observes, sets three new limits on all military intervention by the developed countries, namely, having broad international legitimation, if possible by the UN (re-emergence of the concept of just war), avoiding “collateral damage”, and being carried out by international coalitions – broad, if possible – as further proof of legitimacy. But what interests us most here is seeing the consequences of this different international conflict scenario and understanding what changes it brings for the exercise of the military function, and why the need typical of the time of The American Soldier to provide sound answers to new, real problems for those operating in the military is renewed today. It is this need for rational solutions or, rather, for elements of knowledge for identifying such solutions, that gives rise to the push for scientific research in the social field, as well as (a matter of no small importance) the assigning of means to conduct it. And it is the complex nature of these problems that motivates (it is the thesis of this chapter) the recourse to an interdisciplinary and cross-national research. As I have had to occasion to write, for example (Caforio, 2001), operations of a constabulary nature have already brought substantial differences in the exercise of command for officers at the various levels, since: 1

The decision-making process is decisively shifted towards lower levels of the hierarchy.

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Even small units find themselves interacting with units of other nations that are often characterised by quite different professional ethical codes and value systems. Relational problems can also arise in regard to local populations of different cultures, religions, etc. The officer has to deal with different rules of engagement from operation to operation, rules he or she must know how to interpret in the concrete case and make lower ranks understand and apply. It is often necessary to cooperate with non-governmental organisations, whose way of thinking and operating can be quite different from that of the military units. Due to the oft-cited “CNN effect”, the commander at each level finds himself having to compete with the media in ensuring news is quickly transmitted to his own military leadership. Even commanders at lower levels often take on a political role. Not infrequently, the line of national command overlaps the international one (or ones), with possible elements of uncertainty or contradiction. An unusually high frequency of deployments in missions has become commonplace, with personal and family problems for all personnel.

Flanking constabulary operations with operations of conventional but asymmetric warfare and new wars has brought another range of new conditions, such as (without pretending to be exhaustive): 1 A muting, almost a disappearance, of the difference between war and peace situations. 2 The prospect of war without end against an enemy whose objectives are unclear.18 3 The absence of a Clausewitzian rationality in the adversary’s behaviour.19 4 The difficulty of clearly identifying adversaries and predicting their moves.20 5 The necessity of operating in a generalised situation of guerrilla warfare. 6 A radical asymmetry between the sides in the value attached to human life. 7 The blurring of the boundary between combat forces and civilian populations. 8 The civilian populations of countries that supply units or support the war effort become targets of terrorist attacks. 9 The taking and unscrupulous use of hostages. 10 The spectre of imprisonment no longer guaranteed by international laws of war. 11 A steady trickle of human losses, with heavy effects on unit morale. 12 The presence in conventional operations of many aspects typical of constabulary operations (such as multinational contingents, CNN effect, political role of commanders, relational problems with local populations) which make the necessary models of conduct more complex.

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All of this occurs in a framework in which the stress factors characteristic of war as such are nevertheless all still present. As described in the prevailing literature, they can be summed up as a condition where nearly all of the individual’s needs are compressed and deprived of gratification, the threats relate to the essential aspects of the person (life, physical integrity), radical value conflicts are created (contrast between moral codes and combat codes), individualism is often stifled, and the individual ego is assailed by anxiety, fear, pain, uncertainty and a sense of impotence (see, among others, Stouffer, 1949). The heavily changed scenario in which the armed forces of the developed countries find themselves operating is clearly perceived by those who work within them, as countless studies have shown (so numerous that I would be hard put to select citations), and also leads to concrete requests on their part, first and foremost for greater and different preparation of military personnel, especially officers; as De Waard and Soeters note in Chapter 9, military personnel, and particularly officers, need to acquire an ambidexterity, i.e. to no longer rely on one specific competence only, but be able to cope with seemingly contradicting demands. In a recent cross-national study coordinated by me,21 for example, seven out of ten officers declared that they encountered shortcomings in their basic preparation during their constabulary deployment and indicated a series of topics and disciplines that they hoped would be focused on and/or studied more in that preparation. The list of these disciplines reveals a strongly felt need for interdisciplinarity in education as well: they ask to be better trained in foreign languages, international law, international politics, intercultural management, communication science, history, sociology, and the study of religions, to indicate only the most important. In addition, we have to consider that in approaching problems that occur in everyday military practice, boundaries between academic disciplines are highly artificial and clearly unproductive. Problem-based research is what the military needs, and in following such an approach interdisciplinarity will be inevitable.

Interdisciplinarity and the study of armed forces The state of affairs As mentioned in the first section of this introduction, various disciplines deal with the social study of the military. However, only some of them have an operational dimension, meaning those disciplines to which those in authority normally turn to gain elements for insight, prediction and the resulting planning of the military. They are easily recognisable by the fact that, in the developed countries, they correspond to government study centres or, if private, ones that are nevertheless used by government agencies dedicated to the armed forces. It is common for armies to have study centres on military and social psychology (often specialised in psychometrics and aptitude selection), strategic and international studies institutes (sometimes connected, others separate), study

Introduction

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centres devoted to the sociology of the military, institutes for the study of military history, and at times leadership studies centres. Other disciplines, like cultural anthropology, ethical philosophy, political economy, literature, conflict resolution science (or the neighbouring polemology and the like) and organisation science, to list only a few, despite conducting studies on the military and despite being at times (see The American Soldier) called to contribute to government-commissioned studies on the subject, generally do not have their own centres for study and research on the military and are not even included, normally, in multivalent study centres. As regards the study of the military, therefore, a group of disciplines exist that have greater public recognition than others. But even staying within the first group, it is extremely rare for centres devoted to other studies to set up joint researches. To give examples from my own experience, there is a European centre for psychological studies (psychometrics and aptitude selection) on the military, the International Military Testing Association (IMTA), which every year holds interesting and well-attended study conferences on issues of interest to it,22 as well as a large association of European scholars of military sociology, the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS), which promotes several international conferences and a broad biennial conference, but they have no point of contact, nor mutual knowledge, and they are still quite far from promoting joint research initiatives. On a larger scale, there is a research committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution, which, in the framework of the International Sociological Association (ISA), unites all scholars of the sociology of the military at the world level and, with a nearly identical name, there is an association of political scientists who devote themselves to the study of the military in the International Political Science Association (IPSA), but so far their collaboration has not managed to extend beyond periodic exchanges of good wishes and invitations to the other’s initiatives. A third worldwide association on this theme, the InterUniversity Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), no longer has a relationship with the IPSA, even though its membership is not limited to sociologists.23 And if this occurs for international non-governmental associations, free from governmental constraints and public regulations, it is not difficult to imagine what the situation is between the different study centres within the individual countries. Recognition of this situation has led to my project for attempting to overcome it, also in view of the fact that, looking at the general landscape of the social studies, we see that interdisciplinary and cross-national approaches are becoming the rule and the “new deal” for social research today. This is a trend that must also be rationally applied to the study of the military, organised according to a new dimension (not a single discipline but the social sciences in general), broader involvement (not only national studies but, as far as possible, crossnational ones), and with an approach directed more at the future than the past (more study of the lines of trends and development than analyses of past situations). Thus, this book is aimed at giving the reader a first worldwide view of

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the new aspects, tendencies and contributions of the human sciences (all human sciences) in studying the military universe. The book’s perspective is therefore that of verifying, through the contributions of specialists in the individual disciplines, the status of studies on the military in each one, in order to create a common platform of knowledge for scholars and organisations interested in an interdisciplinary approach to the subject. This verification is limited only to a few disciplines, chosen in relation to their significance for the study of the military, a choice that is far from exhaustive and only provides a sampling. Purposes and content of the book The first part of the book attempts – to my knowledge for the first time in the history of our field of study – to give an account of the approaches of different disciplines to the study of a complex organism and phenomenon like the military. This part is both descriptive of the various approaches as they are today, and prospective of the tendencies and lines of development of the selected disciplines. It opens with a chapter by Vladimir Rukavishnikov that expands, specifies and deepens the picture of the current international situation that I have already briefly sketched in the preceding section, devoted to the general framework of change, and that he defines as follows: “The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policy around the world.” But there is more than one reason for this transformation. In addition to geopolitical changes, Rukavishnikov points to globalisation and the new technologies applied to the military, with the consequent revolution of military affairs. An exposition of global strategic thinking, Rukavishnikov’s chapter delineates the political fundamentals and then goes on to identify the challenges of the twenty-first century as drivers for strategic thinking, challenges that appear largely linked to social change. Here strategic thinking and the social sciences find a reason for synergetic collaboration aimed at creating a general security architecture for today’s globalised world. One of the interesting aspects of this chapter is that, although it offers a worldwide vision, it is written by a Russian scholar and therefore from a vantage point that differs from the pre-eminent (American) literature on the topic. The reader will thus find interesting elements for comparison and contrast with the rather America-centric chapters by the sociologist David R. Segal and the political scientist John Allen Williams that follow. Segal, with his chapter on “Current developments and trends in social research on the military”, offers a broad historical picture of social and behavioural science research on the military from Herbert Spencer up to our times.

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He starts stating that: Current concerns in social and behavioral science research on the military reflect in part the philosophical foundations of the social sciences, in part the applied orientation of military behavioral science that emerged in the twentieth century, and in part recent developments in social science conceptualization and methodology, as well as changes in the modern world system and in the nature of warfare. The theme of the changed military function in the post-Cold War and the resulting challenges that this change poses to the social sciences in studying the military is particularly present in Segal’s contribution. The social sciences in the study of the military today, says Segal, also appear to be characterised by an extensive internationalisation of the field, due both to the emergence of problems common to numerous countries – from the shift away from conscription to the changed spectrum of missions entrusted to the military – and to the sharing among several countries of the responsibility of guaranteeing international security. But they have also been gaining in social importance: Segal points out, in fact, that military studies since the end of the Cold War “have grown significantly in substance, in size, and in impact both within the disciplines and more broadly in society.” He also points out that the approach of the social sciences24 to the military in America has been interdisciplinary from the start. The chapter then offers a broad overview of the themes dealt with, especially by the dominant American sociology of the military, over time. The anthropological point of view is presented in the chapter by Donna Winslow, who prefers to document it through a concrete subject of investigation: the largest (and most studied) armed force, the army. The chapter emphasises the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach since no subject can be examined thoroughly from a single point of view. Starting from different observation points, each one provides focused information and different levels of insight that, integrated, can bring us closer to a full comprehension of the investigated subject. Winslow’s investigation into her chosen concrete subject, the army, is therefore carried out by analysing the literature on army culture according to three perspectives – integration, differentiation, fragmentation – where the integrated approach refers to the themes and the fundamental structures of the organisation and its formal values, the differentiated approach refers to analysis of the subgroups and to informal cultures, and the fragmented one refers to the contradictions and ambiguities internal to the organisation’s culture, of which single individuals are often bearers. This leads to an analysis that starts out from a macro level – that of the organisation as a whole – and arrives at the micro level of the single individual. In the course of this analysis, a significant difference of coherence is pointed out between the three levels: from a general coherence at the macro level, to a

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coherence internal to single groups in the differentiated approach, to an incoherence at the fragmented level. But this incoherence is not negative, says Winslow, “the fragmentation perspective will be the most useful concerning the complexity of the future”. Her reference to the future regards the use of the military in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), but it seems to me that it can be extended to deployment in asymmetric warfare operations. On the advisability of having different vantage points, however, Winslow feels that the winning approach is the multidimensional one, which takes in all three of the perspectives. So if one can say that Segal’s chapter lays special emphasis on the internationalisation of military studies, that of Winslow undoubtedly places it on interdisciplinarity. In defining the military culture, finally, Winslow, drawing on Schein (1996), distinguishes three levels of culture: artefacts, espoused values, and basic assumptions. This partitioning connects her chapter with that of Enrico Maria Piras (Chapter 7), where, in an organisational aesthetic perspective, the theme of artefacts as a characterising cultural element is fully developed. John Allen Williams presents an overview of the contribution of political science to military studies. He, too, places the accent on the necessity of making these studies more interdisciplinary, because “as militaries assume more domestic security functions traditionally associated with police forces, a sophisticated understanding of the military is more important than ever before”. His overview appears aimed at highlighting the importance of the political science perspective in studies of the military. Indeed, says Williams, the contribution that political science can make to the study of the military is central because, precisely in an interdisciplinary perspective, “political science is the core of interdisciplinary studies of the military”. He, too, as already mentioned, adopts an America-centric perspective, declaring: “Although the center of gravity in military sociology may well be shifting toward Europe, scholars of the military who identify themselves as political scientists are primarily from the United States.” Notwithstanding this, the confines between sociological studies of the military and those conducted from a political science perspective are rather fuzzy and therefore the author is careful to define what studies, in his view, have a purely political science perspective, noting that “while sociologists look at relationships between and among groups in society, political scientists are largely concerned about the relationships of individuals and groups with formal governmental institutions”. Interdisciplinarity does not mean loss of identity of the competing individual disciplines. Finally, Williams also emphasises a phenomenon that not only regards political science but the other disciplinary approaches to the military as well, which is the sizeable presence of military professionals among scholars of military studies: the figure of the soldier–scholar already identified by Morris Janowitz (1960) is increasingly present in bibliographies on this theme, says Williams. Slavomir Magala takes a historian’s view of a theme typical of political

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science: power, particularly the power of the military–industrial complex. Describing first of all how the power of the nation-state survived regional aggregations and alliances, through a historical excursus that covers the whole period of the Cold War and with a parallel USSR–US comparison, he then asserts that, in both of these big countries, the military is attributed powers that escape all democratic control. It is therefore necessary to place special attention on the professional training of military officers, so that it inculcates a democratic mentality in them that will produce an internal control of the armed forces. And since the primary factor of democracy is education, of both military personnel and civilians, the fundamental question that poses itself is: can military education and education about the military promote sustainable loyalty to alert and knowledgeable citizenry? According to the author, the problem is a grave one for today’s Russia. In analysing imperialism, Magala points out that, historically, this pertained precisely to the USSR, and contemporary Russia does not appear to have sufficiently come to terms with or disavowed it. Having staked out the role of history in the education both of citizens in general and of military cadres in particular, Magala asserts the importance of correct historical reconstruction in preventing imperialistic tendencies. For these reasons, the history of Russia needs to be rewritten: this, he writes, “is the main problem of the European Union as far as Russia (the state and civil society) and Russian armed forces are concerned; how to facilitate Russian reconciliation with their own past on terms other than those dictated by the power elite commanding absolute power in the authoritarian state.” Indeed, a civilian and military education of this type “is a threat to European integration, global stability and gradual reconstruction of a community of democratic civil societies, free of the hidden injuries of an authoritarian state which uses militarization as a chief instrument of domestic and foreign policy.” The contribution of psychology and the behavioural sciences is offered by Jacques Mylle, with a chapter whose purpose is not “to write an encyclopaedia of military psychology but to demonstrate through a selection of topics which issues were addressed in the past, and how they are dealt with nowadays in a military context.” Mylle first lays out a synthesis of the history of psychology in general and identifies four milestones that particularly interest military psychology, namely the experimental approach in studying the mind, the discovery of the unconscious, the interactionist view, and the integrative view of the human being as a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity. Added to them for the study of the military is “the dramatic change of the operational context”, which takes on the importance of a fifth milestone in such studies. And it is precisely from the integrative view of the person of the soldier that the need for the contribution of diverse disciplines to the study of the military arises, since “the human being is a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity and, hence, an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to explain as much as possible of the observed variation in behaviour”.

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Mylle then moves to a review of the researches and initiatives of the behavioural sciences in the study of the military in various fields of application, such as education, training, mission rehearsal, organisation, operations, operations support and clinic, pointing out how all these fields show the necessity of not staying within the narrow framework of the discipline but of realising an approach that is as interdisciplinary as possible. This necessity derives not only from the already mentioned integrative view of the soldier’s person, but also from a new de facto situation where military operations are prevalently multinational, multicultural and multiservice. Enrico Maria Piras’ chapter is centred on recouping sensoriality over pure rationality, and utilises aesthetics as science of sensory knowledge as an alternative to the processes of rational knowledge. To do this Piras makes use of concrete case studies on some workgroups in the Italian military forces using in particular the organisational artefacts as windows to look inside the workgroups. This is a very interesting approach precisely because it realises one of those different – and totally different – vantage points needed for better knowledge of the subject of study called for in the fundamental essay by Donna Winslow. The investigation of organisational artefacts allows Piras to discover and describe situations and states of mind of individuals and groups that are hard to analyse through the usual processes of rational, Cartesian knowledge. In the first of the three cases examined, this type of investigation brings him to materialise the particular sense of family belonging of special units, irrespective of nationality, displayed by an Italian paratrooper contingent, a sense of belonging identified as pathos, as state of mind, even partially unconscious. In a second case study it is a single artefact that takes in an aesthetic category of beauty and a charge of feelings perceived by the members of a group and by them only: an element therefore of cohesion and identification of the group itself. And it is again the category of beauty, this time contrasted with the grotesque, that is used to show the negative impact that the use of artefacts to perform an unrealistic drill for the benefit of a general visiting the unit has on the morale and self-esteem of the members of a third group examined. The concrete exemplification that Piras presents to us in this chapter thus offers an interesting new way of looking at group processes in the military. In Part II, I wanted to give, through the contributions of other colleagues, some concrete examples of an approach to individual case studies that is no longer solely monodisciplinary. This second part is intended to give greater concreteness to the book, treating, where possible in an interdisciplinary fashion, some individual emerging themes which certainly regard the new security landscape but do not pretend to exhaust the subject: evolution of the military profession, women soldiers, application to the military of management theory, problems of democratic control over the armed forces emerging from an increased presence of the military in public life, the ongoing transition in the East European countries, and the current and new

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forms of struggle constitute a set of topics and issues of great currency and importance, probably the most significant ones today and for the medium-term future, even if certainly not the only ones. The link between the two parts is therefore represented by the intention of taking, for the first time, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the military, but then applying it to the concrete reality of the subjects of greatest topicality. It is an intention, often superseded by the reality of the single contributions, which, in both parts of the book, often make recourse to a broad exemplification of concrete cases, so that it appears difficult at times to distinguish where a theory is being presented and where an application of it is being made. However, I consider this concreteness a positive feature of this work, regarding as it does the sphere of a special sociology, a sociology applied to a concrete subject of social investigation. My hope is that the combination of the two parts of the book can provide both the basic stimulation for an interdisciplinary approach to study of the military and a concrete demonstration of its feasibility.

And to conclude So, to finish up this introduction, all that remains is to point out that the need for an interdisciplinary/multidisciplinary approach to an ever-more-complex subject of study, just as the military is a commonly felt one – even with differing and competing motivations – by the scholars from various disciplines present in this book: the superiority of an examination of the subject of investigation from different vantage points advocated by Donna Winslow finds full confirmation and acceptance here by all the contributors. Emphasis is also placed by all on the profound change that the military function has undergone at the turn of the millennium (the transformation of war cited by von Bredow), whether determined by geopolitical factors and globalisation (Rukavishnikov), or by military operations becoming prevalently multinational, multicultural and multiservice (Mylle), or perhaps also by the historical inversion of the influence of the military organisation on civilian ones (De Waard and Soeters). Here the problem arises on how the culture external to the military, such as national culture, can affect the organisation (Winslow). Finally, many of the contributors to this volume (Born, Caforio, Mylle, Nuciari, Piras, Rukavishnikov, Segal, Zulean) emphasise the need for crossnational research, whether due to the multinational nature of missions (Mylle), or to the commonality of problems in the different countries (Rukavishnikov, Caforio), or to the growing transversal, transnational homogenisation of the various parts of the military (Piras). The basic assumptions of this volume – the profound change of the military function, the need for an interdisciplinary, cross-national approach to its study – thus appear to be amply analysed and demonstrated in the various chapters,

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which, precisely in the difference of the various methodological approaches, offer a first sampling of this new and necessary dimension of military studies. As a result, this volume aims to offer itself as a model for those who, taking up the challenge, wish to venture into multidisciplinary research on single concrete aspects and themes of our subject of study.

Notes 1 For definitions of “interdisciplinarity” and of “transdisciplinarity”, see the following section. 2 Such as Samuel Huntington, for example. 3 As proof it is significant that there are two distinct international associations of scholars of the military, one within the framework of the International Sociological Association, the other part of the International Political Science Association, without much communication between them. 4 In a general sense, Marilyn Strathern expresses this same concept when she writes: Bluntly put, one way in which the social sciences “advance” is in response to current issues, especially when couched in terms of public concern. These are moments which present themselves as requiring attention, whether or not they were on any else’s agenda before. . . . The point is that when they come to a head, that is, when they seem imperative to study, one must gather what tools there are to hand to deal with them. . . . Indeed, such situations are often identifiable by the multi- or inter-disciplinary nature of the expertise they seem to summon. (2002) Samuel Stouffer, in his introduction, dealing with the job of the Research Branch, wrote: Its purpose was to provide the Army Command quickly and accurately with facts about the attitudes of soldiers which, along with other facts and inferences, might be helpful in policy formation. (Stouffer, 1949: 5) 5 The same concept is expressed by Barylski (2003), in relation to the preparation of politico-military elites: “We need criteria that bring together elements from political science, military science, and Western ethical tradition to develop and evaluate the performance of our civilian and military leaders as they intervene in ethno-national conflicts”; and, further: “New types of professional will have to be trained to perform these roles which blend civilian and military functions.” It is interesting to point out here that, perhaps for the first time, cooperation of the ethical disciplines together with the more traditional politico-military ones is invoked. 6 The workshop “L’interdisciplinarité – Problèmes d’enseignement et de recherche dans les universités”, held in Nice (France) from 7 to 12 September 1970 (Proceedings published by OECD in 1972). On that occasion, Jean Piaget was the thinker who first coined the word “transdisciplinarity”. In his contribution, Piaget gives the first known definition of transdisciplinarity, as follows: “Enfin, à l’étape des relations interdisciplinaires, on peut espérer voir succéder une étape supérieure, qui serait ‘transdisciplinaire’, qui ne se contenterait pas d’atteindre des interactions ou réciprocités entre recherches spécialisées, mais situerait ces liaisons à l’intérieur d’un système total sans frontières stables entre les disciplines” (Proceedings, p. 144). 7 See, for example, Basarab Nicolescu (1999), Helga Nowotny (2004), Julie Thompson Klein (1996) and Joseph Kockelmans (1979). In particular, Julie Thompson Klein gives the following definitions of three of the four terms examined here:

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9 10 11

12 13

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Interdisciplinarity – a label for a variety of interactions that aim to integrate concepts, methods, data, or epistemology of multiple disciplines around a particular question, theme, problem, or idea; Multidisciplinarity – the juxtaposition of disciplines in an additive rather than integrative and interactive fashion, producing an encyclopedic alignment of multiple perspectives; Transdisciplinarity – a higher stage of interaction that entails an overarching framework that organizes knowledge in a new way and, in a new discourse, cooperation of multiple sectors of society and stakeholders in addressing complex problems. (1996) Oren Lieberman writes that “Interdisciplinarity means bridging between humanities (alpha-sciences), natural sciences (beta-sciences), social sciences (gamma-sciences), and the arts” (Lieberman, 1994). Julie Thompson Klein et al. (2001) reports that transdisciplinary interests are addressed by such diverse groups as CIRLA (Center for Interdisciplinary Research in the Liberal Arts), CIES (Centre Interfacultaire d’Etudes Systémiques), CETSAH (Centre d’Etudes Transdisciplinaires – Sociologie, Anthropologie, Histoire), the Center for Theoretical Study in Prague, the Institut Universitaire Kurt Bosch, and the Santa Fe Institute. In addition, we can cite the US Transdisciplinary Tobacco Use Research Centers and the DACH project. The DACH project is an international cooperative effort across Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The project surveyed researchers on a broad range of questions about transdisciplinary research, from preconditions to criteria of evaluation (Dahinden et al., 2000; Defila and Di Giulio, 2001). See The American Soldier, Samuel Stouffer (ed.) (1949). Writing that, in conclusion: “Thus, we are witnessing intra-disciplinary disintegration accompanied by inter-disciplinary integration” (Sztompka, 2000). According to Alvin and Heidi Toffler (Toffler and Toffler, 1993), it is the coexistence in the world of countries in three different stages of civilisation (agrarian, industrial, technological), often brought into close contact by globalisation, that can cause asymmetric conflicts, when military confrontation between countries belonging to different stages occurs. In addition, they write that The coexistence of three fundamentally different types of civilizations . . . heightened the threat of small, hot wars between states scrambling to safeguard their vital interests. Economic and ethnic rivalries, political demagoguery, religious fanaticism, the erosion of nation-states’ sovereignty, and various allied causes are likely to produce more, not less, armed conflicts in the coming years. Against this background, the Tofflers insist that we need to rethink how we make war and how we make peace. They describe what they see as “a true revolution in military thinking” taking place in response to today’s changing economic and technological imperatives. As to the new face of war, the authors point to the increasing threats of nuclear terrorism, chemical and biological weaponry, genetically engineered “superplagues”, and other horrors of technologically aided warfare. For a broader insight of this new face of war, see Chapter 8. Which reminds me of what one sees in some old Italian towns, where a bridge from the fifteenth century or so can still bear the name of “Ponte Nuovo” (“New Bridge”). Also the confrontation of blocs of states typical of the Cold War had an ideological character, of course. The difference is that the clash then was between two ideologies that we might call “evolved”, both tending to a rationality of their own and offspring in any case of the same civilisation, while today Western ideology finds itself up against much more primitive belief systems, spawned by very different civilisations and often indifferent to the principles of rationality that characterise our world. On the use of media by terrorists, see the deep analysis by J.L. Marret (2003), where he states: “Le médias occidentaux . . . sont des fabricants de représentation du terrorisme” (p. 45).

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15 A significant example is offered by Barylski himself where he writes, referring to the war in Kosovo: Most of our military planning and investment went into the modernization of more conventional warfare. Hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of fighting power was mobilized against Milosevich’s small, lightly armed units who moved from town to town and terrorized the Kosovar Albanians. Military and paramilitary units equipped with Kalashnikovs, Lugars, knives, and clubs implemented horrific ethnic cleansing while NATO generals enthralled their publics with images of the new high-tech warfare. After several weeks of this new warfare and billions of dollars of material costs, it became clear that Milosevich’s despicable gangs had been able to drive some 800,000 into exile in a matter of weeks. (Barylski, 2003, 6) 16 I can quote here two official definitions. The first is from the US Mitchell Commission (2001) and states: “Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population.” The second comes from the European Commission and defines terrorism as an “Offense intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country.” 17 In the 1990s, indeed, constabulary operations often took on a tougher aspect, that is, compulsion with military force, where agreements did not appear possible or were not respected, so that traditional peacekeeping was flanked by what is called “muscular peacekeeping” or “second-generation peacekeeping”. 18 In the case, for example, of the fight against Islamic fundamentalism (“war on terror”, as American President George W. Bush has called it), reasonable demands on the part of the fundamentalists have not emerged, beyond the broad one of smashing Western imperialism. 19 Lee Harris writes in this regard in Policy Review: Behind this shared assumption stands the figure of Clausewitz and his famous definition of war as politics carried out by other means. The whole point of war, on this reading, is to get other people to do what we want them to do: It is an effort to make others adopt our policies and/or to further our interests. Clausewitzian war, in short, is rational and instrumental. It is the attempt to bring about a new state of affairs through the artful combination of violence and the promise to cease violence if certain political objectives are met. (Harris, 2002) 20 Such as to lead some authors to claim the need for interpretation through the use of complexity theory (Gore, 1996; Thomas, 2003). 21 See Caforio, The Flexible Officer, 2001. The study was conducted on a sample of 371 officers from nine different countries, all with prior experience of participation in MOOTW. The concept of flexibility is also amply employed by De Waard and Soeters in Chapter 9. 22 As well as other international occasions of this type, such as the International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, which celebrated its fortieth anniversary in Oslo (Norway), May 2004. 23 It may be interesting to note that several scholars devoted to the study of the military are members of more than one of the mentioned international associations, so that there is some overlap among them. 24 He examines, in particular, the developments of sociological thought, social psychology and political science on the theme.

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Bibliography Barylski, V. Robert, “Learning from the Chechen and Kosovo Wars – Standards for Ethnonational Conflicts”, paper presented at the IUS Biennial Conference, Chicago, 2003. Bondy, Harry, “Toward a Postmodern Transformation of Military Culture”, paper presented at the 2003 International Biennial Conference of the IUS, Chicago. Caforio, Giuseppe, The Flexible Officer: Professional Education and Military Operations Other Than War – a Crossnational Analysis, Gaeta, Artistic and Publishing Company, 2001. Calhoun, C., “Introduction to Roundtable on Rethinking International Studies in a Global Context”, Items & Issues (U.S. Social Science Research Council), 2002, 3: 1–4. Dahinden, U., Bonfadelli, Heinz and Leonarz, Martina, “Biotechnology: Dimensions of Public Concern in Europe.” In: Scholz, R.W., Häberli, Rudolf, Bill, Alain and Welti, Myrta (eds) Proceedings of the International Transdisciplinarity 2000 Conference: Transdisciplinarity – Joint Problem Solving Among Science, Technology and Society. Workbook II: Contributions to the Mutual Learning Sessions, Zurich, Haffmans, 2000, pp. 47–51. Deaglio, Mario, Postglobal, Bari, Laterza, 2004. Defila, R. and Di Giulio, A., “Inter- and Transdisciplinary Processes – Experience and Lessons Learnt.” In: Kaufmann-Hayoz, R. and Gutscher, H. (Hrsg.), Changing Things – Moving People, Strategies for Promoting Sustainable Development at the Local Level, Themenheft Schwerpunktprogramm Umwelt. Birkhäuser, Basel, Boston, Berlin, 2001, pp. 337–56. Gore, John, Chaos, Complexity and the Military, Washington, National War College, National Defense University, 1996. Habib, H.B., Towards a Paradigmatic Approach to Interdisciplinarity in the Behavioral and Medical Sciences, University of Karlstad, Karlstad, 1990. Harris, Lee, “Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology”, Policy Review, 114, 2002. Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), Summer 1993, 22–49. Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait, New York, Free Press, 1960. Kaldor, Mary, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999. Kaldor, Mary, “Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control”, paper presented at the Nobel Peace Prize Centennial Symposium, 6–8 December, 2001. Klein, J. Thompson, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1990. Klein, J. Thompson, Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities, and Interdisciplinarities, Charlottesville, University Press of Virginia, 1996. Klein, J. Thompson, Grossenbacher Mansuy, W., Häberli, R., Bill, A., Scholz, R. and Welti, M. (eds), Transdisciplinarity: Joint Problem Solving among Science, Technology, and Society, Basel, Birkhäuser, 2001. Kockelmans, Joseph, Interdisciplinarity and Higher Education, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979. Lambert, R. “Blurring the Disciplinary Boundaries”, Divided Knowledge: Across Disciplines, Across Cultures, Newbury Park, CA, Sage, 1991, pp. 171–94. Lieberman, Oren, Interdisciplinarity to Transdisciplinarity: Rethinking the Boundary in Architectural Learning, paper presented at the University of Strathclyde, 1 September, 1994.

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Marret, Jean Luc, Terrorisme: les strategies de communication, Paris, C2SD, 2003. Mittelstraß, Jürgen, “Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science”, Innovative Structures in Basic Research (Ringberg-Symposium 4–7 October 2000), Max-PlanckGesellschaft, Munich, 2002, pp. 43–54. Nicolescu, Basarab, O manifesto de transdisciplinaridade, São Paulo, Triom, 1999. Nowotny, Helga, The Potential of Transdisciplinarity, Interdisciplines, 2004. Online, available at: www.interdisciplines.org/interdisplinarity/papers/5. Royaumont Project, Transdisciplinarity: Stimulating Synergies, Integrating Knowledge, 1998, Paris, UNESCO. Schein, Edgar H. “Three Cultures of Management: the Key to Organizational Learning”, Sloan Management Review, 40–51. Serano, José Romero, “Ideas estrategicas para el pròximo milenio.” In: Pere Vilanova and Rafael Martinez (eds) Seguridad y defensa en el siglo XXI, 2000, 11–18. Soeters, Joseph, “Military Sociology in the Netherlands.” In: Kuemmel, G. and Puefert, A. (eds) Military Sociology: the Richness of a Discipline, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2000. Somerville, M. and Rapport, D. (eds) Transdisciplinarity: Recreating Integrated Knowledge, Oxford, UK, EOLSS, 2000. Stouffer, Andrew Samuel (ed.), Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949. The first two volumes, under the better-known title of The American Soldier, were published in 1947. Strathern, Dame Marilyn, “In Crisis Mode: a Comment on Interculturality.” In: Barry, A. and Slater, D. (eds) Economy & Society, spec. issue, “The Technological Economy”, 2002, 31: 250–67. Strathern, Dame Marilyn, “Robust Knowledge and Fragile Futures.” In: Ong, Aihwa and Collier, Stephen (eds) Oikos and Anthropos: Rationality, Technology, Infrastructure, Oxford/New York, Blackwell, 2005. Sztompka, Piotr, “Cultural Trauma: the Other Face of Social Change”, European Journal of Social Theory, 2000, 3, 449–66. Sztompka, Piotr, “Toward a Transdisciplinary Social Science.” In: Kosinski, L.A. and Pawlik, K. (eds) Social Science at the Crossroads: Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Science and Social Policy in the 21st Century, ISSC, Paris, 2003. Thomas, Leonard, “Complexity, Non Linear Thinking and Intelligence Analysis”, paper presented at the 2003 International Biennial Conference of the IUS, Chicago. Toffler, Alvin and Toffler, Heidi, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1993. Ziman, J. “Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity in Research.” In: Cunningham, R. (ed.) Interdisciplinarity and the Organization of Knowledge in Europe, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999, pp. 71–82.

Part I

General issues

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Challenges of the twenty-first century, social sciences and strategic thinking Vladimir Rukavishnikov

Introduction The end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policy around the world. Today the world is located at a transitional stage, from the East–West confrontation that formed the model of international relations in the twentieth century to a new pattern of international relationships, creating a huge opportunity for constructive cooperation and the settlement of conflicts by political means, dialogue and compromise. Although there are certain grounds to name this period as Cold Peace, all of us know that the world order of the twenty-first century belongs to those who build it. Now it is time to think on how to build it – a future of greater peace, security, prosperity and freedom – and to predict the possible problems. There had been a sharp growth in the number of internal crises, civil wars and violent ethnic conflicts around the globe during the years after the end of Cold war.1 This means the entire world has unfortunately not rid itself of military dangers. One may also add that less predictable regional armed conflicts had displaced the previously overarching but predictable global one. The geography of armed conflict in the last decade of the past century had changed as well. Europe, which during the years of Cold War did not have a single armed conflict, had quite a few. It leads social scientists and the military analysts to new debates on war and peace issues both in a “Clausewitzian” and non-Clausewitzian way of thinking, while at the same time trying to look to the future, to understand the new world order.2 The politicians and the military leaders, in their turn, focused on the implications of the rapid geopolitical change and economic globalization accompanied by the scientific–technological revolution on the security sector, on the debates about new missions of the armed forces and their organizational structure, maintenance and training.3 Armed forces have to adjust not only to a new strategic environment of international relations but also to a rapidly changing society. Almost everywhere the process of defining a new foreign policy, security and military strategy is unfolding. The objective is to provide guidelines on how the armed forces could be used in support of national security and defense policy in a new security environment.

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Several fundamentals determine policy of the state in both long-term and short-term perspectives in each country. They are national interests, goals, values, current military might and economic capacities, present-day internal and external threats, and the burden of history. Interests are the main driving force of politics. Vital interests include the securing of the integrity and inviolability of a country’s territory, and the repulsion and cessation of aggression against the nation and its allies. While the military power still retains significance in relations among states, an ever-greater role is being played by economic, political, scientific and technological, ecological and information factors. The process of globalization forces the nation-states to adhere to a cooperative international system with all sorts of mechanisms for non-violent conflict regulations where armed forces are mainly viewed as an instrument of collective security. Each nation steps into the future carrying the heritage of its own past. This past leaves its mark on the development of society, and on the way people think, including the way the military staff thinks. For instance, quite recently regarding NATO’s intention to accept new members, the Russians favored describing the process as “NATO expansion,” while the Americans and the Europeans tended to refer to the process as “joining NATO,” otherwise simply as “NATO enlargement.” Terms “expansion” and “enlargement” are virtually identical terms in English but not in the Russian language, where they have different meanings: “expansion” has a distinctly aggressive connotation. But, of course, not only historical experience equips minds for making military–strategic calculations. The way of examination of newly emerged challenges is equally important. As the global economy is becoming increasingly interdependent, the old threats and new challenges taken together tie the security and well-being of people in any country to events beyond their borders more than ever before. Indeed, today incidents formerly considered peripheral to national security – the spread of ethnic and religious conflict, the breakdown of law and order in faraway regions, or the disruption of trade agreements and environmental disasters – can pose real threats to both national and global security. That is why in the first section of this chapter we present a brief review of main global challenges together with a general discussion of the impact of science on security thinking. Challenges of the twenty-first century may be considered as drivers for strategic thinking,4 and social science helps to discover most important drivers in time. We have to point out the complicated relationship between the social science and re-making of strategy. Theoretical debates in the social sciences are almost always perceived by the military analysts as “rather abstract” and “nonpragmatic” ones. Indeed, the conclusions and recommendations of civilian experts are often articulated in a “too scientific” way, but over and over again such a discussion serves as an impulse for the broader public discourse on policy, and about the role of the military as a national and/or international instrument in safeguarding the nation and shaping the new global order. That is why, in a most obvious way, the indirect influence of social sciences on contemporary military thinking may be found in the official strategic documents, which –

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no matter how they would be named – needed to declare clearly the list of threats, challenges and goals to be achieved. The task for analysts is to dispel the real security threats, both immediate and longer-term ones, and to recommend possible paths and methods for countering them. Three kinds of documents are most important in this regard: the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept.5 The National Security Concept represents formally adopted general political goals on protecting the citizens, society and state against external and internal threats of any nature, taking into account the available resources, and conforming to the level of guarantees which provide the global and regional security system. This document defines the security objectives and reviews the risk factors that currently threaten the security of the given country. The Military Doctrine presents a system of strategic views, principles and approaches to ensure national security in military–political and military terms. The doctrine explores the military–strategic environment, and defines defense policy priorities and directions of employment, build-up and development of the Armed Forces in the interest of national security and promotion of peace and stability in the region and the world as a whole. The Foreign Policy Concept is a system of views on the content and main areas in the foreign-policy activities of the given state. The legal basis of these documents consists of the Constitution of the state and other legislative acts that regulate the activity of certain bodies of state power in foreign and security policy, generally recognized principles and norms of international law, and international treaties signed by the name of the given state. The rearrangement of the hierarchy of threats that occurred after the Cold War and the terrorist attack that occurred in the USA on September 11, 2001, have been reflected in a revision of earlier approved strategic documents. The public perception of threats has changed as well, and this fact was registered by opinion polls.6 Due to a lack of room in this chapter, we’ll take a brief look on general changes in concepts and doctrines, focusing mainly on American and Russian grand strategies.7 Being permanent members of the UN Security Council, possessing a substantial potential and resources in all spheres of the activity and maintaining intensive relations with the leading states of the world, the USA and the Russian Federation exert a significant influence on the formation of the world order of the twenty-first century.

Global challenges and the impact of science on security thinking When speaking about the impact of science and technology on the military thinking, one always recalls the invention of nuclear weapons that forced the revision of military strategy in the second half of the twentieth century. During the years after the creation of nuclear weapons, there was a consensus that the big war of the future would most probably be a worldwide nuclear war. The enemies were to be the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, on one side, and the USA and its NATO allies, on the other side. The projected World War III

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considered as the decisive clash between “the world of communism” and “the world of capitalism.” Strategists both in the USA and the USSR agreed that the basic form of combat actions in this war would be the nuclear strikes by ICBM and heavy bombers and the counter-actions of the anti-air and anti-missile defense forces in deflecting these strikes. Strategic offensive operations in ground theaters of military actions were planned as the way to exploit the nuclear strikes of strategic forces. The war was expected to be short, although the possibility of a protracted war was not excluded. Older people may remember in this regard a theory of “massive nuclear retaliation,” which some time ago was popular both in the USA and the Soviet Union; it was based on the conviction that the first sudden massive nuclear strike could not be successfully implemented without the act of retaliation.8 At the end of the 1960s, when Soviets and Americans had actually reached nuclear parity, the two sides began to lose their illusions concerning the possible outcome of the global nuclear war. According to the classical theory of war, each side considers victory to be its ultimate goal. But what does “a military victory” mean in the classic sense? First, it is the total defeat of the enemy’s armed force as the main objective of destruction. Second, it is the undermining of the enemy’s economic power. Third, it is the replacement of the unfriendly government which started the war (plus the destruction of the enemy’s political system as the ideologically motivated goal), and, then, peace enforcement. Could the victor achieve all above-mentioned goals in the nuclear war? The answer was negative. There would be no victor in such a clash, but all of humanity would be annihilated. The conclusion was a result of scientific researches, first of all. As a consequence of this sad truth, the threat of nuclear weapon use lost its former value in the theory and practice of containment of communism, which was the core of US foreign policy, and US security and military doctrines since 1948.9 With the end of the nuclear stand-off between the Soviet Union and the United States, nuclear weapons lost much of their relevance for international security.10 Nonetheless until recently the military considered the nuclear deterrent as the ultimate mean of defense, and the weapons of mass destruction are still around in very large numbers. The immediate threat of global nuclear war has significantly declined, thanks to the efforts of many states, above all Russia and the United States. The world has undoubtedly gained from the diminishing of a scale of this deadly threat, but the number of state-members of the “nuclear club” is growing despite the efforts of the international community to stop the process of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.11 On the other hand, over the last decade, the nature of the nuclear threat has fundamentally changed, and now it varies from the large-scale attack against Russia by its possible enemies (the central point of view on this issue, commonly held in Russia) to the use of one or a few devices by a socalled “rogue nation” or subnational terrorist groups against the United States or one of its allies (a popular version in the West). Countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons – by slowing the spread of nuclear capabilities among states,

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assuring that nuclear devices do not get into the hands of terrorist groups, and protecting existing stockpiles – has thus become as high a priority for leading nuclear powers as deterring major nuclear attacks.12 Scientific and technological expertise is essential to any country’s security. It is the foundation of economic and military strength, intelligence capabilities, and international prestige – all of which contribute to national strategy. Turning back to the starting point, we have to say that science and technology, unquestionably, are drivers for change in the military–strategic thinking, and the history of nuclear weapons may serve as the best proof of it. The military always attempt to exploit advanced technology, even though the cost of the modern high-tech weaponry tends to be very high. The age-old “projectile vs amour” problem continues to live. It has always led to the competition between projectile and amour designers, which ultimately resulted in the appearance of new, highly effective means of conducting war that have a great influence on tactics and strategy of combat operations.13 The revolution in military affairs and the onset of information warfare and operations is silent, but it creates a truly strategic gap between the countries, those that benefit from its advantages, and those that cannot afford to renovate their armaments. The point to be stressed here is the dynamics of global defense spending. After the end of the Cold War, defense expenditures of the main powers fell significantly.14 Today, the tendency is the opposite – defense spending is increasing essentially not only in the USA but also in the EU, Russia, China, India and the like.15 What is important in this regard is that new types of weaponry for interstate wars, not for local low-intensity conflicts or fighting against terrorists, are currently on production lines.16 The dynamics of defense spending is the indicator of dominant strategic viewpoints. Does the new rise of defense spending mean that inherited geopolitical ideas still influence the thinking of military strategists and politicians? Is it possible for an interstate war to break out somewhere, and if so, between whom and by whom is it to be undertaken? On these questions the policy analysts should be ready to present an answer, maybe in a circumlocutory form. Indeed, the great uncertainty created by the growth of total world military expenditure is the challenge humanity is facing today to its long-term security, to its very survival. Looking through the press reports and mainstream publications in the domain of international studies, one may conclude that present-day thinking about global security has narrowed down to little more than five-to-seven international issues. The first issue is international terrorism. This theme has occupied the headlines and front pages of newspapers and magazines since the September 11 terrorist attack in the US. Worldwide terrorist incidents revive fears of 9/11 and ignite talk about the global terrorist network of Islamic extremists. The endless war in Chechnya (or the counter-terrorist operation, as the Russian officials name it) can be included in this news group as well. What is more or less clear from the Russian experience is that, to counter terrorism, the government must coordinate justice and home affairs to good effect. The state must react, but

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avoid over-reacting. The clear understanding of the roots of terrorism in each case is also important; we have to notice that, up to now, the UN has never agreed on what is terrorism, because the discrepancy concerning the definition of terrorism still exists. The second issue is the non-stop conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians that has been running since the late 1940s; sporadic acts of violence in that area leave the world in despair. This issue is a heritage of the Cold-War past that overshadows the observed future. Although today’s Russia is trying, together with Europe and the USA, to break that deadlock, it is becoming clear a few suggestions for radical resolution of the protracted conflict are not enough. The third issue is US-lead military interventions and their consequences; the latest cases to mention are Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003). While Americans insist that we are entering a new epoch of war and the twentyfirst century will be the American century, Europeans argue America’s “global war on terrorism” neglects lessons from the past.17 There are no concrete benefits that justify the costs and risks of US “global leadership” (a euphemism for “world policeman”), but there are several alternatives to American global leadership, including greater reliance on the UN and regional security organizations, etc. The fourth point is a long-drawn-out problem of proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. This enduring issue has many dimensions; the “leaks” of information about the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran fire the constant public interest in this theme. Misunderstanding between the USA and the Russian Federation concerning the essence of the Iranian atomic energy program may be noted in this regard. The fifth issue is an increased traffic of narcotics from Asia (basically Afghanistan and South-East Asia). The media emphasize the necessity of international cooperation in the joint struggle against this real global threat. The rise of drugs flowing over the Afghan–Tajikistan border has emerged after the fall of the Taliban regime. It is an indicator that neither the new central government, nor the US-led coalition peacekeeping forces are effectively controlling the situation in Afghan provinces. The sixth issue is the illegal immigration and the illegal traffic of people to the EU and the Russian Federation, which increase the profits of international organized crime despite all the efforts of the international community and police to fight it. Immigrants are often recruited by terrorist cells; a concentration of such people in certain areas creates social tension which, in its turn, jeopardizes inner stability. The last, but not least, point to mention is political turnouts that change the local and international political landscapes. Democracy is on its way over the planet, although no one can say that there is a one-way, or unidirectional, causeand-effect relationship between ongoing democratization and stability and peace on the global level; and/or that there are no facts to support a reverse tendency. What is quite clear is that the “export of democracy” on American bayonets is becoming a factor jeopardizing regional stability, as the post-Saddam Iraq shows.

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Important as these issues are, the longer-term global problems have not gone away. The above-mentioned issues form an inadequate basis for long-term policy, and the security and military doctrines focused only on immediate threats are myopic. Global demographic trends should be mentioned ahead of other new challenges. The entire world will soon be older and far less Caucasian and Christian than today. This shift will demand an appropriate reaction, on regional, national and international levels. Thus demographic factors will serve as catalysts and shapers of political instability and conflicts inside and among nations. It’s always hard to know where the fire hazard could be. But there is a fear we’re facing the problem that could actually be dangerous for present-day great nations.18 For instance, in 1950, Europe and Russia comprised 22 percent of the global population; at the beginning of the twenty-first century this share is about 10–13 percent; by 2050 it will be near to 7–8 percent. In short, the population of the largest part of the world that served as the locus for most twentieth-century history will shrink dramatically in relative terms.19 The mentioned demographic change raises a question concerning far-reaching consequences for the key elements of national power – economic, military and political – and for each great nation’s weight within the international community. Global ecologic trends are also hard to ignore. Global warming is a security problem that is still underestimated.20 Environmental degradation is partly responsible for mass deaths. Rising sea levels, environmental problems, famine and disease will all contribute to making conflicts more likely. It is still a question on whether the international community as a whole is ready to attack the underlying causes of insecurity. It has also meant new tasks for the military around the world. The rise of inequality in levels of social and economic development between nations is another global security challenge. Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, says, “We know that we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty and that we cannot build freedom on foundations of injustice.” Huge income inequality and poverty, government corruption, ethnic frictions and nationalism are acting in developing countries, together with a blind hatred towards the USA and other richer nations, as determinants of potential internal and regional conflicts, which may rise from these pressures in the foreseeable future. They may be terrorist in style, or even more traditional-like wars between states. To resume, today we know that global security means far more than the absence of global conflict. We also understand that lasting peace requires a broader vision or the so-called idea of comprehensive security which includes the people-centered concept of human security. Human security is complementary to state security. The concept of comprehensive security encompasses not only the safeguarding of integrity of the sovereign territorial state by arms, but the security of the individual citizen, who has to be protected in all aspects of their life, namely in their human dignity and their worth as a human being. Specifically, human security has to address the enormous amounts of national

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wealth and human resources derived into armaments and armed forces, while countries failed to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, thirst, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazards.21 It became clear by the end of the twentieth century that the issues the national security doctrines were dealing with were not of the type that they should be addressing. We have acknowledged that, today, the pillars of what we now understand as (global) human security and traditional national security are interrelated. We should also admit that, in each country, the attitude of the ruling elite to security serves as an orientation for national security and military doctrines, intelligence activity and the foreign policy. The strategic tasks, as defined by the government in charge, must be operationalized through the set of political and military–strategic aims that should be pursued both nationally and internationally. Therefore let us take a closer look on how the new vision of security has been reflected in the re-making of concepts and doctrines of small and great countries.

Changes in strategic concepts and doctrines Security is about war and peace, integrity of the state and stability of the region, interests of individual, society, state and international systems, etc. The very emergence of this broad definition is an illustration of ties between modern social science and modern strategic thinking. The bipolar global division, the persistent ideological struggle, and the threat of global nuclear war, which had a strong geopolitical impact on military–strategic thinking during the second half of the previous century, had gone. The collapse of the Soviet Union totally transformed the strategic landscape, forcing a rethinking of the basic assumptions behind national foreign and defense policies around the world. The new state of affairs called for new responses. The post-Cold War question that even the Pentagon strategists had great difficulty answering was, “Ready for what?” At the present time, in the national security concepts and military doctrines of the bulk of small nations, the following basic strategic aims may be found: • • • •

To defend the country against an armed attack from abroad. To protect, in close cooperation with civilian authorities, the territory and people of the country against non-military security threats. To prevent the emergence or re-emergence of armed conflicts in a nearby country or the region. To prevent the spreading of external conflicts to the national territory and/or subdue conflicts in neighboring countries (in the framework of international peace operations including peacekeeping and peace enforcement).

This list is a mix of tasks derived from both traditional and modern attitudes to security. The strategists in small countries have to make choices based on priorities that are viewed through the prism of national interests and simultaneously

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keep in mind the limitations on a country’s resources. Other considerations must, at most, be secondary. Generally speaking, when the military leaders and policy-makers lose sight of this governing principle, the policy is held hostage to other concerns, and it becomes incoherent and indefensible. Adaptability, civilian and military cooperation are considered to be the central prerequisites for the governments of small countries to act freely with regard to choosing means and methods in situations of crisis and armed conflict. Since work on the strategic documents is still in progress, the expressed positions are to be understood primarily as tentative ones. However, in our view, they reflect a current state of military thinking in the small-nation group.22 Social scientists and military analysts published a great deal about Soviet and American military strategy and perceptions – and misperceptions – of one another.23 Less attention has been given to a comparison of security and military policies of former adversaries in the post-Cold war epoch. Meanwhile grand strategies of these two international actors remain the main factors in determining the world order of the twenty-first century, to a certain extent at least. During the 1990s, America’s military establishment was not constructed to take on and deal with specific threats, and, perhaps, the real reason for keeping 1.5 million American men and women in uniform was to guard against a reconstitution of the global threat from Moscow. In June 1998, the US Congress formed the National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart–Redman Commission). Retrospectively, the reports and hearings of the Hart–Redman Commission should be considered as an important part of internal debates about the nature of future wars, US strategy and of US defense budgets that took place from the early 1990s.24 The Hart–Redman Commission had revised the U.S. Strategy of National Security for the 21st Century adopted by the Clinton administration.25 According to the Clinton strategy, the USA should have the level of military personnel and money needed to fight two major regional conflicts – MRCs, in “Pentagonese language” (a journalist’s joke) – nearly simultaneously and win. The Hart–Redman Commission had refused that basic principle. By the end of the twentieth century, nobody doubted that America possessed an overwhelming conventional military superiority that would not be undone for a decade or longer “if Russia continued to chase its own tail” (as some Western authors of the time said). Russia’s passive reaction in the case of NATO action against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Russian debacle in Chechnya in 1996 proved that the Russian (non-nuclear) threat had grown consistently weaker and less focused abroad with every passing day. Yet the Pentagon leaders were not aware of this; the Hart–Redman Commission energetically argued for a new strategy for the twenty-first century with a focus on terrorism as a main treat. It had issued warnings of possible large-scale terrorist attacks. Later, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 became an additional argument that backed the recommendation of the Commission for modernizing the entire national security policy. The National Security Strategy of the United States, prepared by the Bush administration, was published in 2002, and now it is often named as the Bush

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doctrine (National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: Office of the President, September 2002). It was considered as being especially timely as the Americans viewed the challenges of the post-9/11 world.26 The definition of US national security was widened to include homeland security. The document focused on terrorist nets and rogue states trying to get weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the most important threats to US national security. These threats motivated a proposed shift from a policy of non-proliferation of WMD toward a policy of counter-proliferation, a revision of curriculum in military academies and the reforming of the system of security and intelligence agencies, to name a few visible steps on a practical level. Since the end of the Cold War, policy-makers and theorists have debated when and how the United States should use armed force. The Clinton administration broadened the grounds for military action but remained cautious in practice. The Bush administration argued for more restricted use but has adopted an activist posture since September 11 (Brown, 2003). The key word for the document was “pre-emption.” The Bush doctrine stated that the USA will use force against the newly emerging threat before it was completely formed, and its adherents insist on the difference between a “pre-emptive” action and a “preventative” war.27 Perhaps the administration remembered that the very idea of “preventive war” was condemned by the Nuremberg tribunal as the cover for aggression, and therefore preferred to use another term. Historically, the major attention in state politics is allocated to the military aspects of national security and relations with nations that may pose external threats. The Bush doctrine proclaims that in the future the USA will not allow the creation of military parity with America by any state, as was achieved by the USSR in the recent past. The price of American hegemony in the world can no longer be described as burdensome due to its special role and special obligations, etc. Really, the US defense budget is greater than that of the world’s next ten military powers added together, and, as some people say, “America enjoys a global military dominance that combines the transoceanic reach of the Pax Britannica with the military power of Imperial Rome at the height of its powers.” It is easy to find in this comparison an allusion to the lamentable end of the past great empires. Georgetown University Professor G. John Ikenberry characterized the Bush strategy in the following words: In the shadows of the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, sweeping new ideas are circulating about U.S. grand strategy and the restructuring of today’s unipolar world. They call for American unilateral and preemptive, even preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the willing – but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community. At the extreme, these notions form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force, and meting out justice. It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for countries that challenge Washington’s standards of

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internal and external behavior. It is a vision made necessary – at least in the eyes of its advocates – by the new and apocalyptic character of contemporary terrorist threats and by America’s unprecedented global dominance. These radical strategic ideas and impulses could transform today’s world order in a way that the end of the Cold War, strangely enough, did not. (Ikenberry, 2002) While, during his first four years, George W. Bush presided over the redesign of US strategy, over the next four, his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world, says Professor of History at Yale John, Lewis Gaddis. And, he adds, “Some midcourse corrections, however, are overdue. Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy” (Gaddis, 2005). Professor Gaddis’ words on restoring security and promoting democracy around the world speak for themselves, and so require no additional commentary. As a matter of fact, the Bush doctrine was a fundamental twist compared with the previous strategy of democrats, and here we want to attract attention to the change of attitude toward allies and partners noticed by Gaddis. There was a presumption that the US world leadership would be indefinitely sustained because of the automatic followership of traditional American allies in Europe. It was true for the Cold War period when the European allies were frightened of the Soviet Union. It was true for the 1990s when Europeans were scared of occurrences in the Balkans. Now they aren’t. Preparing for the war against the Iraq president Saddam Hussein, the US president was no longer choosing between war and no war, but rather war alone or war with allies. Germany and France voiced protest against the “pre-emptive” war against Iraq without UN sanctions. Russia, the USA partner in “the global war on terror,” was also against that war. This means there are clouds on the horizon, perhaps, slightly underestimated in the strategic equation of the Bush administration: Russia with its nostalgia for a former superpower status, for one; the burning European ambition for independent foreign and defense policy, for another. Some suggest that China as the potential superpower of the twenty-first century could be a third. In combination with one another and with Islamic fundamentalism and the widely spread anti-American mood in the Muslim world feeding terrorist nets, such a “grand anti-US hegemony cocktail” could pose a serious geostrategic threat to American interest in the future, even if the imagined coalition would be a fragile one. The alternative is real partnership relations for the USA with the other major actors of global politics. For the Americans, prominent threats include: • • •

International terrorism. “Rogue states” hostile to US interests. Proliferation of WMD (threats by potential adversaries and terrorists to acquire or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery28).

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•

Threats to democracy elsewhere, including the former Soviet Union successor states. Regional instability and humanitarian problems: local internal political conflicts that undermine friendly governments, and clashes between ethnic, national, religious or tribal groups that produce forced mass migration, threaten innocent lives and undermine internal stability and international order; attempts by regional powers hostile to US interests to gain hegemony in their regions (through aggression or intimidation, subversion and lawlessness, etc.). Threats to US prosperity and economic growth that can come from a variety of sources (global environmental degradation; the illegal drug trade; international crime and illegal immigration, etc.).

•

•

The Bush administration, like its predecessor, the Clinton administration, sees only external threats for America; there is no definition of internal threats in the strategic documents issued by these two presidents at least. In this regard the post-Cold War American perception of threats and national goals differs from what we have found in the Russian strategic documents. And we have found that it is ultimately impossible to explain Russia’s grand strategy without looking at the domestic roots of foreign conduct. Reluctantly, the post-communist Russian leadership agrees with the old wisdom that the nation’s international standing depends to a tremendous extent on economics as well as on military might, on the state of its internal affairs, and the capacity of its leadership for achieving recognition of its domestic policy in the outside world. In this respect Russia’s affairs are currently far from dazzling. The Russian national interests, security and foreign policy goals, and the military policy during the first years of post-communist development of this country under President Boris Yeltsin (1992–9), were poorly and vaguely articulated. The NATO operation against Yugoslavia during the days of the Kosovo crisis triggered the growth of anxiety concerning the potential external enemies among both the Russian military and the public at large. The Russians thought the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east of Europe in opposition to Russia’s objections finalized the detriment of Russian military security. The armed forces and the government have adopted a viewpoint that magnifies both the internal and external threats to Russia that they perceive, and they regard those threats as growing in number and saliency.29 The years 1999–2000 marked a watershed in Russian security thinking analogous to that which occurred in the USA. During that time, President Yeltsin resigned and was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, who, being Prime Minister, had launched the second Chechen war in August 1999, and was elected in his own right in March 2000. The shift in the military perception of risks that the nation ought to be guarded from by the armed forces is associated with the second Russian president coming into power. At that time, the revised editions of the National Security Concept of Russia,30 the Military Doctrine31 and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation32 were revealed. Although quite

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recently all these documents have been reworked and adjusted again to a new security environment due to the beginning of the second presidential term of Mr. Putin, who was re-elected in 2004, the principal positions exposed in 1999–2000 have not been radically changed despite the turn in foreign affairs toward closer cooperation with the West made by the Putin administration after 9/11. Russia’s key threat is internal. It is associated with terrorism, the immediate consequence of the recent revolt in Chechnya that challenged the country’s territorial integrity in the 1990s, and with today’s instability in Northern Caucasus, which is linked to a large extent to Chechen terrorist activity. Safeguarding the integrity of the territory and strengthening the statehood of the Russian Federation are top priorities for President Putin when compared with any domestic and foreign-policy objectives. There are no external enemies to Russia today – President Vladimir Putin always says – and his position is echoed in the official strategic documents.33 However, analyzing the Russian military doctrine, national security and foreign policy concepts, one may easily come to the conclusion that the present-day unipolar world order, with the US dominance, is actually considered as unacceptable for Russia (yet it has not been openly named an external threat to Russia’s security) – and this is why Russia always says the role of the UN must be strengthened. Perceived foreign threats also include military build-up changing the balance near the borders of Russia and its allies, anti-Russian policies of certain neighboring governments, and the US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty announced by G.W. Bush.34 The documented threat assessments are clearly the culmination to date of a long-standing process by which the Russian military and government have forsaken the optimistic Westernizing postures and visions of the initial post-Soviet years and returned in many respects to assessments and demands for specific policies that evoke the Soviet mentality and period.35 But there is a significant difference: despite the very fact that global ambitions are declared in the RF foreign policy concept, as in the “good old times,” in reality the goals and national interests of post-Soviet Russia have no global character.36 Terror is not a new phenomenon, but for the first time in the world history “international terrorism is a strategic threat,” as has been stated in the European Security Strategy. In the Russian strategic documents, international terrorism is also considered as the newly emerged threat, which challenges both global and domestic security. The struggle against the internal terrorist threat, which was the principal justification for armed intervention in Chechnya in 1999, has become a key feature of President Putin’s policy since coming to office. Moscow also emphasized the alleged links between Osama bin Laden’s “Al Qaeda” and Chechen rebels.37 It looks like the current US attitude toward bin Laden’s Al-Queda network, albeit the Russian position on this issue has been formulated over two years before the September 11, 2001 event. September 11 emotionally shocked Russia to much the same degree as it did other nations. President Putin came out in favor of Russia joining the international counterterrorism coalition led by the United States after 9/11. Later, Russia’s president

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warned that his country might use pre-emptive strikes if the neighboring states provide a shelter for Chechen terrorists. That warning showed that the Bush principle of pre-emption had being admired and exploited in Putin’s rhetoric – but, happily, not in his actions. All in all, this allows us to speak about certain signs of similarity of attitude toward the terrorist threat between the Americans and the Russians. Concerning the problem of non-proliferation of WMD, we again face a resemblance of views on this strategic risk. The official positions of Russia and the USA on this topic match to a high degree. Of course, the Russian national security policy is not exclusively focused on risks of international terrorism and WMD, or disagreements concerning the American deployment of national missile defense (NMD) systems and NATO enlargement to the Russian borders.38 These are just parts, although key parts, of a broader context. The fundamental national interest of the Russian Federation is to preserve and develop good relations, if not strategic alliances, with its neighbors and all world powers to cope with challenges of the twenty-first century, but not at the expense of national pride and sovereignty. The official strategic documents of the United States and the Russian Federation admit that both nations need to secure the cooperation of a number of groups, nations and international organizations to protect themselves from traditional and newly emerged threats. There is a common understanding that new challenges can only be tackled at the global level. One nation, even one as powerful as the USA, cannot keep the lid on this boiling pot of global problems. But there are essential differences in long-term strategies. In short, Russia’s strategic worldview is fundamentally at odds with the American one, and, perhaps, with American perspectives on international security. For the Americans, the United States must remain engaged in exporting democracy and exerting leadership abroad in order to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and advance US interests, first of all. If the United States chooses not to lead in the post-Cold War world, it will become less able to secure the basic objectives outlined above. The Bush administration is disappointed with the UN and convinced that, without active US leadership and engagement abroad, threats to US security will worsen and the window of opportunities will narrow. For the Russians, US dominance is a factor jeopardizing world stability; they consider a united Europe and Russia as two of the most important actors that can and must talk across the Atlantic as equals about how to make the world a more peaceful place. Once that happens, the United Nations can be developed to work more effectively. The reader may ask whether the similarity of viewpoints on two main strategic risks have formed a sufficient base for US–Russia partnership to provide genuine security for the entire world in a dynamic international context of the twenty-first century or not. To resume, in the USA, Russia and other major international actors the debates about the new strategy began long before the 9/11 tragedy. The terrorist events of 9/11 altered many things, it influenced the shift in the US–Russia and NATO–Russia relationships, but it was not an event akin to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Certainly, the beginning of the present century brought remarkable changes in national politics of former rivals. But military strategies have not changed so greatly. The perception of certain nations as foes, the distrust and misinterpretations of the policy of “others” based on prejudices rooted in the past, are still influential forces. Yet the old strategic views are still largely in force; not much new thinking has penetrated the facilities of nuclear theology of old in the light of what is new.

Conclusion Important characteristics of the military–strategic environment at the end of the twentieth century included: the increasing number of states possessing, or developing, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare; policies of genocide toward ethnic minorities and religious entities; settlement of territorial and border disputes by means of military hostilities; armed secessionism; international terrorism. Some of these features were drawn from the reality of present-day Europe, Asia and Africa, where there are areas with active or “frozen” conflicts, each of which under “favorable circumstances” could evolve into an open, large-scale fire and a threat to peace for the entire world. In the twenty-first century, the international environment is more complex and integrated than at any other time in history. The number and diversity of nations, organizations and other actors vying for influence on international relations continues to grow. A deep connection exists between national, regional and global security, on one hand, and the unfolding process of economic and cultural globalization, on the other. This connection is not always discernible, but its influence on national long-term policy is indisputable. Social studies highlight two conflicting developments in the present-day epoch of globalization that any national security strategy must manage: increasing economic integration combined with the growth of nationalism (not excluding its most ugly disruptive ethnic form in certain cases) and new global challenges. Along with additional possibilities for socio-economic progress, the expansion of human contacts, globalization gives rise to new dangers, especially for economically weak states, and increases the probability of large-scale financial and economic crises that may pose a threat to regional and global stability. During the twentieth century, the focus of attention was only on state security – concerns arising from outside threats, and for preservation of borders, i.e. integrity of states. This way of thinking brings the attention of the international community to the architecture of security, with which we operate, and to the understanding of deficiencies of the global system which actually allows the use of force, ignoring the opinion of the international community. The last leads to global insecurity and vice versa. What are the alternatives? One is associated with the concept of human security, which emphasizes that it is more important to address threats to individuals, rather than threats to nations. The very appearance of the concept of human security is a manifestation of the influence of

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modern social sciences on strategic thinking. As we seek to meet the challenges outlined above – combating international terrorism, reacting on ecological changes and demographic pressures, maintaining democracy, stability and peace – we come to new missions for the armed forces. As a result of an increased emphasis on various forms of international cooperation, states are demanding greater flexibility from their armed forces.39 In this respect it is certainly possible to put forward many questions. These questions are not only “philosophical,” but also very relevant on a “practical” level. Putting these questions first, we want to emphasize the point that the media, the scientific community, including the policy expert community as its part, ought to be debating military ends and means. The society needs to have that discussion, and the government needs to provide the strategic context for it in its official documents. Otherwise the general public understands less and less about the military and the objectives of contemporary state policy. Few people actually realize how deeply the military is involved in security thinking and foreign policy developments.40 An enlargement of international military cooperation eventually questions national sovereignty. This is an argument in favor of the dialogue between social scientists, policy-makers and the military in dealing with the security challenges, boosting governmental support for science and improving education, including military education. Generally speaking, political and social changes, along with geopolitical changes, are colossal drivers for military–strategic thinking. Strategy depends upon a vision of the geopolitical situation, perceived threats, national goals, military capacity and economic standing of the given country in the world. The last decade was characterized by a growing similarity of the threat perception around the world, although the difference between the great nations and the smaller ones existed. While the first group considered the risk of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction as the main rising threats, the second group was preoccupied with unresolved regional problems and local conflicts, trans-border organized crime, illegal migration, etc. The shift to democracy in Russia and other former socialist states coincided with profound changes in the world order and the entire European security architecture. The internal socio-political and economic transformations pull ex-socialist European countries out from one alliance and push them into another, compel governments to reduce military personnel, to end conscription and to create a combatready professional army, etc. This creates difficulties of its own, as the military in Europe have to react in a measured way to social change. On the one hand, the military cannot be so alien from the society they are defending that no one wants to join them. On the other, if young people are not up to the demands made on those heading the military, we also have a problem. Adjusting to both international and domestic changes means a reconstruction of military establishment, doctrines and cultural ethos which was inherited from the past. What the military leaders of the USA and other like-minded strategists need is to get rid of old phobias, to overcome the myopic vision of national security and to understand a range of challenges of the twenty-first century.

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A set of new global security challenges demands somber and responsible responses from all states, especially the leading international actors. Social sciences identified the global challenges as security problems long before politicians and military analysts started a dispute about how to deal with them. Scientists around the world call for an urgent and determined integrated approach for coping with new challenges, but – we have to repeat – alas, the politicians and the military heads actually ignore their appeals, being preoccupied with the evaluations of immediate threats, with calculations of necessary means and “rational” limitations. We can analyze the present, but, in fact, we cannot predict the exact future. Precisely because the future is neither decipherable nor determined, military analysts and social scientists face a similar mission: to identify threats, trends and global challenges. The discussion of how to balance security and civil liberties without violating constitutional principles and international law, democratic values and other relevant constraints should be combined in the “age of terror” with a discussion in the public arena about alternatives to war.41 Contributions from academics and security experts elaborate on both the conceptual underpinnings and the practical realities and – crucially – the military reforms needed to achieve security for a state.

Notes 1 In the last decade, from 1990 to 2000, around the world there were almost 120 armed conflicts, in which about six million person were killed and 300 million more became refugees. From 40 confrontations that took place in the world on December of 2000, 15 had religious causes, eight were on an ethnic grounds, six were connected to drugdealing, five from ideological disagreements and two because of territorial claims. 2 The East–West global confrontation was more than just a traditional clash of national interests between the rival states; it was ideologically motivated. Since the Cold War formally ended, the debate about the future of international politics started. The new world order means the end of the ideological cleavage between the ex-socialist and capitalist bloc countries, but nobody knows what kind of international system is coming to survive. The debates concerning grand strategies, security strategies and military strategies in new circumstances occurred in both the NATO countries and Russia and other ex-socialist states. For the Western views, see: Mearsheimer (1990); Rosenau (1990); Hippler (1994); Roberts (1995); Freedman and Freedman (1996). Alas, for a lack of space in this chapter, we cannot discuss what scientific concepts better serve to explain the new global order. The exotic view on this issue can be seen in Hoffmann (2002). 3 Gyarmati and Winkler (2002). 4 The term “a driver” is used to mark an underlying force that is variable and can lead to an unavoidable change over the next ten-to-fifteen years. Driver categories are necessarily broad, such as demography, natural resources, or the environment. Discussions on drivers, particularly the interaction of drivers, form the foundation of the scenario-building exercise. The findings of these discussions were then assembled in patterns that constitute potential scenarios for the future. As such, the scenariobuilding exercise is a bottom-up process. During the course of discussion, the focus on drivers narrows. For example, the demographic driver is often transformed into the impact of dramatic changes in populations or large-scale immigration on the given economy and society, as well as the future of the national armed forces.

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5 Generally speaking, in the USA there is a perceptive distinction between the national security doctrine or grand strategy with an emphasis on principal and long-term defense and foreign policy goals (geopolitical aims), the security strategy at large, oriented to the elimination of threats to the very existence of the state or stability of society, or diminishing them to the rational level of risk, and the military strategy with its concrete tasks, limits and means of obtaining precisely formulated aims (Art, 2003). In Russia such a distinction between three levels of strategy traditionally is not so evident. In fact, the essence of post-Soviet Russia’s grand strategy may be drawn, first of all, from the annual presidential messages to the Federal Assembly, and the national security doctrine approved by the president. But when the military doctrine is considered, the Russian military analysts often underline its “comprehensive and normative character,” exaggerating its virtues, in our view. 6 The collection of popular opinions in various European countries was reviewed in Vlachova (2003). 7 The concept of grand strategy had emerged from the work of military analyst Basil H. Liddell Hart, published in 1967; its roots may be found in the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz. The grand strategy involves the country’s ability to mobilize all its resources – military, economic, political, cultural – in aspiring toward a principal political aim. Hart’s views on strategy centered the attention of analysis on nonmilitary dimensions of strategy such as economic–industrial mobilization, diplomacy and domestic political culture. These observations underscored that peace and war are equally significant in achieving security for a state. Although the US officials who make security strategy documents rarely use that term, studying how they arrange resources for certain tasks means understanding the essence of US grand strategy (see Hahn, 1997). 8 In the Cold War past, the military analysts considered many “theories”: massive retaliation, damage limitation in nuclear exchanges, or controlling escalation in more limited scenarios. As for the late Cold War period, see Shtaudenmayer (1982). 9 In our view, since the time of the Soviet inclusion in the nuclear race, US policymakers have understood that the ultimate purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter global war, not to fight it. 10 For the post-Cold War re-examination of nuclear issues, see Haglung (1999) and Freedman (2004). 11 In a world community totaling nearly 195 state-members of the UNO, seven have declared their possession of nuclear weapons in the past century, and only one of them – South Africa – has cancelled its nuclear arms program; North Korea and Israel are also believed to possess such weapons, even if undeclared (see Horton, 2000; on Israeli nuclear forces, see the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2002, pp. 73–5 and the information on the Russian website www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/ 2004/29-01-04.htm). At least 20 or more states have chemical weapons, ten or more possess biological weapons, and a dozen or more have operational ballistic missiles. The number of states in each category threatens to grow as expertise and technical capability grow with each passing year. See Rethinaraj (2002); Carter (2004); Deutch (2005). 12 Schneider (1999); Lavoy et al. (2000); Levi and O’Hanlon (2005). For debates on nuclear terror, see Graham (2004); Potter et al. (2004); Wolftal (2005). 13 I am actually speaking about various classes of weapons systems designed for the possible wars of the twenty-first century: nuclear weapons of a new generation, including mini-nukes and bunker-nukes, strategic missiles, smart bombs and rockets of the air force and anti-air defense, the navy’s cruise missiles and anti-tank guided missile systems, electronic warfare, and so on. The process, that began with the application of “Star Wars” technology to the tactical battlefield first demonstrated in “Desert Storm” and then in wars in Kosovo and Iraq in a limited way, is unfolding. 14 The Clinton administration in the mid-1990s faithfully followed in the footsteps of its

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18 19

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21 22

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predecessor, President George Bush senior, in fixing the need of American manpower at about 1.5 million people on active duty, and defense spending in the range of about $250 billion a year. For instance, in spring 1996, the US Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, had asked Congress for $242.6 billion in spending authority for fiscal year 1997. We have to say that US military spending and staffing at that time exceeded that of Russia and the major powers of Western Europe combined. Russia’s military spending of that time was less than one-tenth of the US defense spending. According to the recent SIPRI report, the total of global defense expenditures in 2004 is over US$ one trillion, that is close to the peak of the Cold War period. It is likely that in the fiscal year of 2005 the US defense budget will double that of the mid1990s. The quick rise of defense spending in the EU countries and Russia may be identified as the consequence of the NATO action against the former Yugoslavia (the war for Kosovo in 1999); the pace has accelerated after the September 11, 2001 events. While, in 1999, Russia planned to spend only about 93 milliard rubles on defense, in 2005 it spent 549 milliard rubles in current prices (or about US$18.8 billion), that is twice more than in 1999 if one takes into account the inflation rate. The anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons that are developing in the USA, together with the new Russian warheads, which are capable of piercing the American antimissile shield, are difficult to classify as antiterrorist weapons. The cited weapons are the products of the Reagan strategic initiative (or the “Star war” program) announced in the early 1980s. See also Utgoff (2002). Although the events of 9/11 exposed a new and dangerous form of terrorism, the global war against terror is by its very nature a war with no simple conclusion (Rukavishnikov, 2002a; b). The American post-11 September strategy, the role played by the military and public attitudes have been analyzed from the European perspective in Hassner (2002). Almost all population growth will occur in developing nations. Population growth and global poverty pressures will generate more emigration from poorer to richer areas and deplete resources further. The European Union and the Russian Federation are entering an unprecedented crisis of aging, with an expected climax in the mid-2020s that is not far from the present day. According to demographic projections, Russia is expected to further contract in the next five decades to somewhere near 118–120 million people, the level achieved in 1960. For Russia with its basically conscription army, an aging and declining population – especially among native Russian males – might impact on military capacities that its potential foes may seek to exploit, some strategists say. We have to notice that despite the common understanding of the validity of the problem, there was no agreement concerning the effects of global warming and measures to reduce them – take the Kyoto Treaty as an example. The EU and Russia ratified the treaty, but the USA refused to join them. For materials of the UN-organized discussion on this issue, see State and Human Security in the “Age of Terrorism” (2004). For reasons of space, we do not tackle the issue of security-sector reform in small nations, which is widely recognized as key in the context of post-conflict reconstruction of so-called “failed states” and states emerging from violent internal or inter-state conflict. See Bryden and Hanggi (2004). The analysis of key strategic documents of that time and evaluation of numerous other sources clear shows now, through political decisions at the highest levels, that the armed forces of both sides were organized and constantly trained in exercises to carry out the option of an offensive war. Only in the mid-1980s, with the advent of the Gorbachev era in the USSR, was greater emphasis given to defensive tasks, though even this did not lead in any fundamental ways to the abandonment of earlier plans in the USA. For books see, inter ana, Intriligator and Jacobsen (1988); Jacobsen (1990).

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24 There were suggestions of massive spending on battlefield computers, space-based sensors and other information technology to enable the US army to extent its conventional superiority indefinitely, producing new military triumphs like the 1991 Desert Storm operation with almost no US casualties and vast destruction to the other side. The idea had strong backers among the military. 25 After the Cold War ended, US grand strategy changed in only minor ways. One may find a discussion of the Clinton strategy in Ripley and Lindsey (1997); Mazzari (2000). 26 There was a variety of views about the immediate impact of that event on US policy and international relations; see Both and Dunne (2002); Cox (2002); Cronin (2002); Ifantis (2002); Talbott and Chanda (2002). 27 American critics of the concept of pre-emption, used for the justification of the intervention in Iraq, put their concern in plain words: “The whole idea that we should have a war now so we don’t have to fight one later has always struck a lot of people as really bad. It’s a case of logic overriding common sense, evoking the Vietnam-era talk of destroying a village in order to save it.” Admirers of the Bush strategy pointed out on the following distinction between pre-emption and prevention. “Pre-emption” meant taking military action against a state that was about to launch an attack; international law and practice had long allowed such actions to forestall clear and immediately present dangers. “Prevention” meant starting a war against a state that might, at some future point, pose such risks. In mounting its post-September 11 offensive, the Bush administration conflated these terms, using the word “pre-emption” to justify what turned out to be a “preventive” war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Gaddis, 2005). 28 Including non-traditional forms such as so-called “dirty bomb,” “envelope-bombs” with biological components, etc. 29 Clearly these are largely political concerns about possible threats that would reduce and even potentially marginalize Russia’s role in European and even Eurasian security processes. The last are not, for the most part, military threats against Russia or its vital strategic interests. The large-scale external threats to Russia are basically hypothetical in nature. They can and must be neutralized by political means with reliance on the state’s military might, and first and foremost on combat-ready strategic nuclear forces and general-purpose forces with precisely functioning command and control, communications, intelligence and early-warning systems. 30 The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation was approved by the National Security Council on 5 October 1999. In our view, Russia’s grand strategy is really committed to a broader (comprehensive) approach to security, which recognizes the importance of and interplay between political, economic, social, informational, demographic and environmental security risks, in addition to the traditional internal and external threats. Due to diversification of the content of security, a large list of risks in various fields is presented as well. 31 The Russian Federation Military Doctrine was approved by the presidential decree of 21 April 2000. 32 President Putin approved the new foreign policy concept on 28 June 2000. This foreign policy concept replaces the previous one published in 1993, which was felt to no longer correspond to the changing realities of the contemporary international system. 33 There is nothing new in Putin’s statements, because the previous (Yeltsin’s) national security doctrine, which was published in December 1997, clearly stated that no foreign country posed a threat to Russia’s security. 34 Contrary to Yeltsin’s politics, Putin intensifies military reforming and, each fiscal year, asks the parliament to increase defense expenses. 35 In addition, in 1999 the Russian armed forces conducted the biggest exercise of their post-1991 history, known as Zapad (West)-99, which was a starting point of a series of analogous exercises interpreted by some American military observers as openly anti-Western. As this estimate showed, the feeling of distrust to the Russians and the

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37 38 39 40

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suspicions toward Russia’s foreign and security policy had not disappeared in America, either. In our view, there is no need to overemphasize anti-Western sentiments among the Russians who worry more about domestic problems than external enemies, and their real security concerns are with Chechen terrorists, drug traffic and illegal immigration from neighboring countries. While Africa and Latin America traditionally occupied an essential part of the text of the US foreign policy documents, where the reader may discover that the US has its (distinctly articulated) national interests and aims in almost all parts of the world, only a few sentences were devoted to the Russian activity on these continents in the RF foreign policy concept issued in 2000. Perhaps the most significant feature of that concept was the emphasis it placed on Russia’s foreign policy capabilities. It noted “the limited resource support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, making it difficult to uphold its foreign economic interests and narrowing down the framework of its information and cultural influence abroad.” Elsewhere, the concept argued that a “successful foreign policy . . . must be based on maintaining a reasonable balance between its objectives and possibilities for attaining these objectives. Concentration of diplomatic, military, economic, financial and other means on resolving foreign political tasks must be commensurate with their real significance for Russia’s national interests.” The Russian leadership has the perception of an “Islamic extremist terrorist’s International” threatening the southern regions of the former Soviet Union and the stability of the Russian Federation as well. After the US’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Russian authorities decided that Russia’s strategic arsenal should be renovated despite the signing of the US–Russia treaty on the limitation of the strategic arsenals of both sides in 2002. In this regard, the role of social scientists in implanting of the democratic civilian control over the national security and military policy has become indispensable. The military of each country has its own culture and traditions when dealing with the future problems and present local and global tasks. The US government (long before the tragic events of September 11) had become increasingly dependent on its military leaders and heads of the security and intelligence agencies to formulate and implement its security and foreign policy. Of course, the president has the last word. For instance, in the case of peacekeeping operations, the military experts can debate over the best way to carry out this mission, and the diplomats can determine how best to restore order and stability afterward, but these issues have no bearing on the political decision to intervene. Anyone trying to understand the interplay between the US military and US foreign policy must pay attention for a defense demagogy during the presidential election campaigns. In adopting the heightened sense of threats, the candidate may well have been guided as much by the interests of the military–industrial complex urging higher defense spending as by a greater role for the Pentagon in the framing of national policy at large. Here I am speaking of wars that were not prevented, or more accurately, wars and conflicts that are not being prevented.

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Faces of Nuclear Terror and the Need for a Prioritized Response,” Foreign Affairs, May/June. Rethinaraj, Gopi (2002) “Threats and Perceptions of Nuclear War in South Asia,” Swords and Ploughshares, 16, 1, Summer, 22–4. Ripley, R.B. and Lindsey, J.M. (eds) (1997) U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Roberts, B. (ed.) (1995) Order and Disorder after the Cold War. Cambridge, MA, London: the MIT Press. Rosenau, J.N. (1990) Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rukavishnikov, V. (2002a) “The Russian Perception of the American ‘War on Terror,’” Central European Political Science Review, 3, 9, Fall, 92–139 (in English). Rukavishnikov, V. (2002b) “The Russians and the American ‘War on Terror’: Lessons Learned During the First Year After September 11,” International Problems, 4, (Belgrade, English, with summary in Serbian). Schneider, Barry R. (1999) Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats. Westpoint, London: Praeger. Shtaudenmayer, W. (1982) “Strategic Concepts of 1980s,” Military Review, 3. State and Human Security in the “Age of Terrorism”: the Role of Security Sector Reform (2002) Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva, Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Talbott, S. and Chanda, N. (eds) (2002) The Age of Terror and the World After 11 September. Oxford: Perseus. Utgoff, V. (2002) “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” Survival, 44, 2, Summer, 85–102. Vlachova, Marie (ed.) (2003) The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe. Belgrade: The Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, and the Center of Civil–Military Relations (CCMR), Belgrade. Wolftal, Jon B. (2005) “The Next Nuclear Wave,” Foreign Affairs, January/February.

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Current developments and trends in social research on the military1 David R. Segal

Current concerns in social and behavioral science research on the military reflect in part the philosophical foundations of the social sciences, in part the applied orientation of military behavioral science that emerged in the twentieth century, and in part recent developments in social science conceptualization and methodology, as well as changes in the modern world system and in the nature of warfare. As the social sciences evolved from social philosophy to independent academic and scientific disciplines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were strongly influenced by the ideological and humanistic concerns of the day. Military organization, and war as a social process, were given little attention. However, the institutional presence of the military was acknowledged. Herbert Spencer (1908), an early social Darwinist, saw social organization evolving from primitive military forms to advanced industrial societies. By contrast, Karl Marx and his followers saw military forces as necessary for the imperialism that capitalist industrial societies would have to pursue as they exhausted domestic raw materials and markets. More frequently, the military provided the organizational context within which theorists who were concerned with grand narratives addressed general substantive concerns. For example, Max Weber (1968), in his economic history, acknowledged the role of the military as the agent of the state for the legitimate monopolization of organized violence, and drew heavily on the Prussian Army as the prototype in developing his general model of bureaucratic organization. Emil Durkheim (1951) viewed participation in the military as one of the social conditions affecting the rate of suicide. Spencer’s expectations have not been realized in the modern world. Most major industrial societies are also military powers, and neo-Marxist scholars point to the role of the military in international capitalist expansion. In many nations, such as Switzerland and Israel, the military plays a major integrative role in society. In developing nations, the military has repeatedly played a significant role in modernization, although there is little consensus on the reasons for this among sociologists, economists and political scientists. Even in modern nations, where the military frequently plays a less central role, it is likely to affect the lives of a large proportion of the population through its impact on economic, political, familial and educational institutions. In the early twenty-first century, one cannot read a newspaper in any major city in the world

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without being struck by the impact of the military, and increasingly, journalistic representations of contemporary military affairs include references to the work of social scientists who study the military.

Early twentieth century Although the center of gravity of military social science for most of the twentieth century was the United States, Boene’s (2000) analysis of the growth of military sociology in the United States reflects its slow start, relative to other social science disciplines. Of his catalogue of publications in the field, only about 5 percent were published before 1942. He attributed the slow growth of the field largely to ideological liberalism, a meliorist orientation to social problems within the discipline and war-weariness after World War I. This was not to say that war and the military were disregarded by social science generally. Many of the early contributions were by psychologists and political scientists, and this ultimately produced an interdisciplinary orientation in social science analysis of the military that has continued. Psychologists, particularly during World War I, focused on individual abilities and behavior, and sought to make contributions through the development of aptitude testing for the military (Yerkes, 1921), and understanding of effectiveness (Munson, 1921). Military testing did not advance much between the two World Wars, but was reinvigorated in 1939 with the establishment of the Army Personnel Research Office. Military forces have been drawing on the contributions of psychologists, particularly in the areas of psychometrics and training, since then, and there has been significant technology transfer to the civilian realm. Virtually all contemporary selection and classification tests, including those used by industry and by higher education, are descendants of the original tests developed for the US Army. Political scientists, for their part, sought to understand war as part of the process of international relations, reflected, for example, in Charles Merriam’s project on the causes of war, conducted at the University of Chicago with support from the Social Science Research Council. This project ultimately led to Quincy Wright’s (1942) seminal study of war. However, little attention was paid to the military as a social institution, an organization, an occupation or a profession.

World War II The World War II period was a turning point for both the social scientific study of the military and for social science generally. The United States, to a greater extent than other nations involved in the war, mobilized large numbers of economists, psychologists, political scientists and sociologists in a variety of research and analysis roles in support of the war effort. Thus, the field of military social science was initially dominated by Americans. Because the problems studied, like most important social issues, were not contained within the boundaries of a single discipline, these researchers established a pattern of interdisciplinary

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collaboration. Because the army was the largest service, military social science emerged primarily (but not exclusively) as the study of ground combat forces. And because the research was aimed explicitly at helping to manage the army and the war, it emerged primarily as an applied field – one oriented toward organizational and small group processes, rather than toward national or transnational concerns. As a policy science, it was largely concerned with army policies regarding soldiers and small units, rather than national policies regarding the army, and because of the nature and size of the mobilization, it focused primarily on the enlisted ranks rather than the officer corps. Psychology in the army expanded beyond selection and classification testing into training research, human engineering, social psychology, and physiological psychology and after the war came to dominate military social science. In 1959, the psychologists who worked for all of the American services formed the Military Testing Association. Many of the social scientists who were mobilized in non-research roles in World War II recorded their experiences and observations in the social science literature, including, for example, George C. Homans’ (1946) observations of social relations on a small warship that ultimately contributed to his formulation of exchange theory, and Tamotsu Shibutani’s (1978) study of demoralization in a company of Japanese-American soldiers. Indeed, in 1946 the major sociological journal of the day, American Journal of Sociology, published a special issue on “Human Behavior in Military Society.” Reuben Hill (1949) conducted a landmark study of the stress that military service imposes on families: a topic that has come dramatically to the fore in the twenty-first century. World War II also saw the War Department drawing on the knowledge of manpower economists to help to manage the personnel assets of the nation in support of the war (e.g. Ginzberg et al., 1959). This disciplinary perspective has become increasingly important within the Department of Defense in the decades since World War II. The major substantive sociological knowledge base of the field in the World War II period, as well as major conceptual and methodological advances in the discipline of sociology, came from the reporting of the results of experiments and surveys conducted by the Information and Education Division of the War Department. The four volumes of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, including the two-volume American Soldier studies authored by Samuel A. Stouffer and his sociological and psychological colleagues (1949a, b), covered a range of topics including cohesion, leadership, primary groups, morale, race relations (the army was still racially segregated), communication and persuasion, that helped establish the research agenda of sociology and social psychology for years to come. The methodological contributions of this team to survey research, data analysis and experimental design changed the face of quantitative sociology and social psychology. Indeed, 35 years after the publication of The American Soldier, the major journal in sociological social psychology, Social Psychology Quarterly, published a retrospective review of the impact of this work (Clausen, 1984a, b; Lumsdaine, 1984; Smith, 1984; Williams, 1984). As a

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result of these studies, the American military continued to use survey research as a personnel management tool after World War II, much as it had continued to use selection and classification tests after World War I. Other World War II research, such as the work of Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz (1948) on the social dynamics of German army units, based on the interrogation of German prisoners of war, reflected the permeability of the boundary between social science and military intelligence. Perhaps the major examples of this permeability were the Strategic Bombing Surveys conducted in Germany and Japan at the end of the war. These large-scale studies of the effects of bombing civilian targets, based on analyses of documents, site visits, interrogations and interviews, involved hundreds of military and civilian analysts, overseen by an interdisciplinary board that included psychologist Rensis Likert and economist John Kenneth Galbraith. Some of the methods used in intelligence gathering, such as POW interrogation, would not be permitted under current US federal regulations regarding research on human subjects, but these efforts have had continuing impact on the field. In general, the topics that were studied during World War II have retained central positions in the current research agenda of military social science, even as that agenda has been broadened by changes in military organization, civil–military relations, the nature of military conflict, and other global trends.

The Cold War After the war, most social scientists who had participated in the war effort returned to their colleges and universities, or, in a few cases, their more applied pursuits, and with few exceptions, turned their research efforts to other social institutions and processes. The major disciplinary exception was psychology, where the US Army Personnel Research Office ultimately evolved into the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in the last years of military conscription. Psychology dominated military social science during most of the Cold War period. Although publications reflecting World War II experiences continued to appear, there was little new research in other disciplines, despite a minor increase during the Korean War. During the Korean War, the focus on group processes that had started in World War II continued. Roger Little (1969) conducted research reaffirming the importance of interpersonal processes for motivation and support in combat, and the Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University studied race relations in the newly racially integrated US Army (Bogart, 1969). Both the army and the air force became principal sponsors of extramural research on small group processes, in part as a consequence of the army’s research on leadership and cohesion in World War II and Korea, and also influenced by the apparent success of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in using principles of group dynamics in support of troop indoctrination and the building of military morale (Lifton, 1963), as well as demoralizing American prisoners of war through “brainwashing.”

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In the mid-twentieth century, there were occasional attempts by scholars to describe the structural relationships between military forces and their host societies in the modern world. C. Wright Mills’ (1956) The Power Elite and Harold D. Lasswell’s (1941) developmental model of “the garrison state” were among the most important of these. However, it was not until the 1960s that sociology and political science focused on the military as a viable academic field. At the turn of the decade, Samuel P. Huntington (1957), a political scientist at Harvard University, and Morris Janowitz (1960), a sociologist at the University of Michigan, published books on the nature of the military profession and its relationship to the state (in Huntington’s case) and to society (in Janowitz’s case). The professionalism theme came to dominate the research agenda of the field, and political scientists and sociologists in a number of nations began to address the issues raised by Huntington and Janowitz in their own nations. This concern with the relationships among the military, the state and society added civil–military relations to the sociological agenda, and shifted the focus of the field from the conscripts and enlisted personnel who held center stage in the World War II research to the officer corps and the nature of the military profession. One reflection of the tendency toward symmetry of the Cold War was the emergence of military sociology in the Soviet Union. The Military Sociology Department of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy was established in 1967 (Obraztsov, 2003). The 1960s saw the growth of an organizational infrastructure in military social science with the establishment of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society (IUS), a small group of American scholars from several universities who met periodically to discuss their research, initially at the University of Michigan, and then at the University of Chicago. The IUS has grown to an international and interdisciplinary group of more than 600 scholars that meets every two years, but still maintains the atmosphere of an invisible college rather than a professional association. At the international level, the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society (RC 01) of the International Sociological Association was formed, and began to bring military sociologists from a number of nations (including the Soviet Union) together every four years at the World Congresses of Sociology. This research committee has evolved into the Research Committee on Armed Forces & Conflict Resolution. A parallel Research Committee on Armed Forces & Society was formed within the International Political Science Association in 1981. More recently, scholars concerned with military sociology in Europe have formed the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS). Also reflecting the increasing globalization of social science analysis of the military, in the late twentieth century, the Military Testing Association became the International Military Testing Association, with the incorporation of members from many nations. Another reflection of the internationalization of the field was its incorporation of social scientists who were concerned with development processes in former colonized territories. One of the dimensions of this concern was the role of the military in the development process (e.g. Janowitz, 1964). While much of the

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concern in this area focused on authoritarian military rule, a special interest among American scholars early in the second half of the twentieth century was the ongoing war of national liberation in French Indo-China, the subsequent Americanization of the Vietnam War, and the eventual implications of that war for American military organization and military manpower policy.

The Vietnam War Just as World War II had been an inflection point for military social science, so too was the Vietnam War. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, for the first time in American military history, elected not to use the military’s reserve components to mobilize for the Vietnam War, but to depend on selective conscription of the large baby-boom generation to man the force. The social unrest in America during the 1960s, which spread through the Western world, was largely directed at the inequities of this conscription process, which placed the burden of waging the war disproportionately on the shoulders of the poor. Research by sociologists and political scientists on the internal dynamics of the armed forces during Vietnam focused largely on themes that had characterized military social science during World War II and the Korean War: group dynamics of leadership and cohesion (e.g. Savage and Gabriel, 1976), and race relations (e.g. Moskos, 1973). Added to these were drug use (e.g. Helmer, 1974) and the shortcomings, inequities and failures of the system of military conscription then in place (e.g. Curry, 1985). A more long-term consequence was a concern with the re-entry of war veterans into society, and with the way the nation treats its military veterans (e.g. Scott, 2004). Before the Vietnam War was over, debates had begun in America, and among military sociologists, on ending conscription and manning America’s military force with volunteers. The debate on conscription brought labor economics into a central position in the social scientific analysis of the military, as the nation discussed whether labor market dynamics could be substituted for conscription as a means of raising America’s Cold War military (e.g. Friedman, 1967). The issue of military conscription was widely debated in the early 1970s, and the 1972 defense appropriation provided funds for the establishment of an all-volunteer military force (Segal, 1989: 34–8). In January 1973, the US Department of Defense announced the end of peacetime conscription for the first time since World War II. This would not be the first all-volunteer military force that America had. Voluntarism had been the rule, rather than the exception, through American history, and conscription had never been a popular alternative. However, it would be the first time America maintained a large standing force on a voluntary basis. Earlier in US history, we had ended conscription and demobilized in interwar periods. Given the bipolar tensions between East and West at the end of World War II, and the advent of military aviation and nuclear technology that deprived nations of the luxuries of time and distance from the battlefield when war broke out, we had never demobilized after World War II, and starting in 1973, sought to

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maintain a standing Cold War force on a voluntary basis. The USA’s national leadership decided that it had also been an error not to mobilize the reserve components for the Vietnam War. The failure to use these citizen-soldiers disrupted an historical linkage between the American military and the American people, and steps were taken to reconfigure the force so that we would not go to war again without the reserves. The appropriate role of the reserves in the total force has emerged as an important concern in military policy and military social science. The decision to end conscription in 1973 had a number of major impacts on military social science. First, the American military recognized that, while there had been prior volunteer military forces in the United States, they had always been demobilized inter-war cadre forces. The nation had never attempted to maintain a large standing force on a volunteer basis. A large volunteer force was a challenging social experiment. The services showed a new willingness to draw on, and support, social and behavioral science research in support of organizational effectiveness to make this experiment a success. While the behavioral science programs of the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Zeidner and Drucker, 1983) were dominated by psychology, they at times had sociological, economic, anthropological and historical components. Thus, military social science grew in terms of both in-house research and extramural funded research, both in universities and in the research and development industry. Indeed, the post-Vietnam War volunteer military has undergone a major interdisciplinary evaluation by social scientists at least once a decade (e.g. Bowman et al. 1986). Second, the substantive focus of the field was broadened. During the Vietnam War and the post-Vietnam years, there was increasing recognition that social trends in America were having an impact on the military. The armed forces had been racially integrated during the Korean War, but both America and her armed forces had been punctuated by racial tensions during the Vietnam War and postwar periods. Drug use had increased greatly in the American youth population, and this was reflected in the young people coming into the military. Women were entering the American labor force in increasing numbers, and the military had to confront the issue of gender integration. The manifestations of these trends in the military, which were common to the Western industrial nations to varying degrees, all became part of the subject matter of military social science, and drew on the expertise of a number of disciplines. Third, the growth and broadening of the field led to significant increases in research and writing at a time that the major social science journals, perhaps because of the ideological opposition to the Vietnam War that existed within social science disciplines, were unwilling to publish articles on war and the military. This, coupled with increasing fragmentation and specialization of publication outlets in social science, led to the establishment of two specialized journals, Armed Forces & Society, which was published by the IUS, and Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Both are interdisciplinary and international,

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and are now in their fourth decade of publication. They have been joined more recently by Military Psychology, published by the Society for Military Psychology, a group that recognizes and indeed celebrates the contributions of non-psychologists to the field. Fourth, military social science began to reconceptualize the nature of military service and its relationship to society. One facet of this reconceptualization was to question the uniqueness of the military institution as the state’s agent for the legitimate management of violence, and to explore the isomorphism between military service and other forms of employment (Biderman, 1967). In particular, Moskos (1977) suggested that with the replacement of conscription by a volunteer force recruited by labor market dynamics, military service was being transformed from a values-based vocation to an economically based job. Moskos’ formulation, which was referred to as the Institutional and Occupational models (I/O), had implications for understanding both the individual soldier and military organization (Segal, 1986), turned the focus of military social science from the officer corps toward enlisted personnel once again, and came to dominate the research agenda of the field as increasing numbers of nations abandoned conscription in favor of volunteer forces (Haltiner, 1999). Scholars in other nations went on to apply Moskos’ models to their nations (Moskos and Wood, 1988). Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the study of the military by social scientists became increasingly internationalized. For example, in the Soviet Union, the Lenin Political–Military Academy began training military sociologists. France saw the evolution of the Centre of Social Sciences Study of Defence (Martin, 2000). In Germany, a series of research efforts led to the establishment of the German Armed Forces Institute of Social Research – SOWI (Klein, 2000). Social Science Research on the military expanded markedly in Israel, where perhaps uniquely in the Western world, due, it would be suggested, to the large percentage of Israeli professors who are reserve military officers, large numbers of university-based scholars as well as military-based scientists have contributed to the knowledge base (Ben-Ari et al., 2000). Many of the dimensions of change that had been specified in Moskos’ American-based formulation, as well as derivatives of the formulation, came to dominate the agenda of international military social science in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first century, even as the applicability of the model has been debated (Caforio, 1988; Sorensen, 2003). For example, one derivative of the hypothesized convergence between military service and civilian occupations was the potential for military unionization, which already existed in some European nations, and this became an active area of research in the 1970s, particularly by political scientists and labor economists (e.g. Taylor et al., 1977). Closer to the specifics of Moskos’ model, the formulation suggested that the basis of legitimacy of the military institution was shifting from normative values of service to the dynamics of the market economy, and that therefore recruitment appeals would shift from character qualities such as duty, honor and country, to compensation. This change was assumed by the military recruiting structure, and only recently has it been acknowledged that even in the

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absence of appeals to character in recruiting advertising, patriotic values have been as important, or more important, in the recruiting process than economic considerations (Woodruff et al., 2006). The formulation also assumed that military personnel would become less committed to the general military role of soldier and more to their specific occupational specialty, and that their reference groups would be people who shared their occupations outside the military rather than other soldiers in different occupations. Research has shown that the former expectation is correct, and military personnel in the late twentieth century defined their appropriate duties in terms of specific military occupations (Segal, 1995). However, in terms of general reference groups, military personnel were more likely to root their identities in their familial roles (Woodruff, 2003) or religious affiliations (Trainor, 2004) than in their military roles or in an external occupational community. Moskos’ formulation suggested that women would increasingly be integrated into the military on an equal basis, and indeed, while full equality has not been achieved, major changes have taken place in the numbers and roles of women in military service both in the United States and in other nations (Segal, 1995; Siefert, 2003). This dimension is just one reflection of increasing concerns with diversity, including continuing concerns with racial and ethnic equality (Moskos and Butler, 1996; Battistelli, 2003), and emergent concerns with sexual-orientation integration (Scott and Stanley, 1994; Dandeker, 2003). Moskos’ formulation also posited a change in the nature of the relationship between the military and the families of its personnel, from a posture of inclusion to one of exclusion. In fact, the modern military is an increasingly married force which competes for commitment with the families of its personnel (Segal, 1986), has faced demands from those families (Stanley et al., 1990), and has attempted to accommodate them in recognition of the effect they have on commitment, retention and performance (Bourg and Segal, 1999). Perhaps most dramatically, Moskos’ formulation posited that the missions of the occupational model would focus less on the waging of conventional interstate wars, and increasingly on the constabulary or peacekeeping types of operations that Janowitz had hypothesized to be the focus of military professionals in the post-World War II world (e.g. Moskos, 1976). Indeed, while the major powers largely avoided involvement in United Nations peace operations during the Cold War, the United States did get involved on a continuing basis in peace operations conducted under other auspices (Segal and Segal, 1993). Emerging norms of burden-sharing in pursuit of international security elicited increasing participation in peace operations by nations whose military participation after World War II had been constitutionally constrained, such as Japan (Kurashina, 2003) and Germany (Klein and Kummel, 2000), by newly democratized Central and Eastern European nations, and by nations of the developing world. These new forms of participation became part of the subject matter of military social science.

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The current state of knowledge The nature of military organization, and the relationship between armed forces and society, began to change markedly in the 1980s. Some of the changes that have been observed reflect the military increasingly adopting management strategies from civilian corporate enterprise. When the Cold War ended in Europe, military budgets in many nations were diminished, and the size of military forces was reduced significantly (Segal and Babin, 2000). At the same time, military missions were redefined from the waging of large-scale wars to contingency operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Downsizing, a strategy being used in the corporate world to deal with economic downturns, was adopted by the military, and as was the case in the corporate world, military downsizing produced problems both for victims and for survivors of the process (Wong and McNally, 1994). These processes took place overseas as well (Hamilton et al., 2001). As forces were downsized, some military bases grew as a result of realignment of functions, and their growth had positive effects on the economies of surrounding communities (e.g. Hicks and Raney, 2003). However, a larger number of military bases were closed, and civilian communities that hosted those bases experienced the same kinds of economic challenges that are confronted when industrial plants close. Thus, the relationship between military bases and their host civilian communities became a focus of sociological, economic and political research. We learned that communities that have a major military presence have less racial segregation in housing, and less racial inequality in employment than other communities, supporting the assertion by most host communities that military bases were an economic asset. However, we also learned that gender discrimination in employment, in terms of higher unemployment, lower wages and lower returns to human capital for women, was higher in communities with a major military presence (Booth et al., 2000). While forces were being downsized, the number of contingency operations expanded markedly, and the survivors of downsizing – both individuals and military units – found that they were asked to do more work with fewer available resources, both in terms of taking on new missions (e.g. Segal et al., 1999), and in deploying for old missions more frequently. Both processes have potential implications for morale and for retention (Reed and Segal, 2000). One way of accomplishing an increasing number of operations was to have those jobs most clearly requiring military competence and military status performed by military personnel, but taking other jobs that had previously been performed by military personnel and having them done by civilian employees of the services. The US Department of Defense (DoD), for example, employs roughly 700,000 civilians, making up about 20 percent of the DoD workforce. An additional 20,000 military positions were scheduled to be transferred to civilian employment in 2004–5, with more civilianization conversions in 2006 and beyond. Another adjustment involved adopting yet another corporate strategy: outsourcing. Rather than having government employees perform tasks that had

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previously been done by military personnel, the military services increased the degree to which they contracted out support, and in some cases, core functions. The use of civilian contractors to support the US military is not a new process. Civilian contractors have been used to support military operations since before the Civil War. However, the period starting with the end of the Cold War in Europe represents a unique phase in this relationship, during which civilian contractors are being used to offset a downsizing of the active military force when the number of missions and frequency of deployments is increasing. The implications of having large numbers of civilian contractor personnel, who are not subject to military discipline and are not combatants under the terms of the laws of war, being co-located with military personnel in a combat zone are in the very early stages of exploration (e.g. Kelty, 2005). Social science research on the privatization of military functions is currently ongoing in a number of countries (Jager and Kummel, forthcoming). One strategy to deal with increased numbers of missions and deployments with a reduced active military force that was not drawn from the civilian corporate world was a change in the use of reserve forces. As noted above, the reserves had not been mobilized by the United States in the Vietnam War, and despite the fact that, in the post-Vietnam years, the active and reserve components have been conceptualized as a “total force,” the image of the reserves has been that of a force in reserve, to be used only in the case of an emergency. For the National Guard, which serves as an agent of state government unless federalized, the state missions were regarded as paramount. With the downsizing of the active force, by the end of the 1980s, almost as much of the US Army’s combat force was in the National Guard as in the active army. When the United States went to war on the Arabian Peninsula in 1990 after Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, the total force was called upon. At the maximum strength of Operation Desert Storm, more than 73,000 Army Reserve and National Guard personnel were in the combat theater, accounting for about one-quarter of all army personnel there. However, the reserve units that were deployed were largely transportation, medical, military police and other support units. Three National Guard combat brigades that were intended to bring active duty combat divisions to full strength were activated but not judged combat ready, and were not deployed. In the wake of the Gulf War, programs were put in place to improve the deployability of the National Guard. In the mid-1990s, the US Army experimented for the first time with overseas deployment of reserve component personnel for contingency operations, initially serving as the majority of the American contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. The evaluation of this experiment was conducted by a team of psychologists, sociologists and economists (Phelps and Farr, 1996). Other nations had previously used reserve personnel as peacekeepers. The success of that experiment led to expanded use of the reserves for contingency operations, generally in relatively small numbers, for six-month deployments. America’s invasion of Iraq in 2002, however, changed the role of the reserves

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from participants in contingency operations to participants in continuous operations, called up in larger numbers than at any time since World War II (between 40 and 50 percent of the personnel in Iraq in 2005 have been from the reserve components), and for longer periods of time – sometimes a year or more. This has had implications not only for the reserve component personnel, but also for their families and their civilian employers. And it has required that the research agenda of military social science, which had focused on the active force, be expanded to include the reserves as well. This change is not restricted to the United States, but has been observed in other nations as well. Many of the topics of current research extend long-term research traditions. Despite increasing international disfavor with military conscription and feelings that, the less universal conscripted service is, the more inequitable it is likely to be, discussions in the United States about whether the Global War on Terrorism can be sustained without a return to conscription, and in both Western and Eastern Europe about the future of conscription (Malesic, 2003) have kept this a focus of current research. The nature of the military profession likewise remains an active research area, and where early Cold War conceptualizations of the profession were limited to the active duty officer corps, the era of more highly educated, technically competent and career-oriented volunteer forces has raised questions of whether enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers, both active and reserve, should be included in the profession, whether the specialization of armed forces requires that we regard each branch as an autonomous profession, and the ways in which changes in the military profession reflect broader changes in the sociology of professions (Abbott, 2002). The research that has been done on the military profession reflects another interesting characteristic of contemporary military social science. Both in Europe (Caforio, 1998, 2002) and in the United States (Snider and Watkins, 2002), the major studies have been executed by interdisciplinary research teams. The processes of group dynamics that became focal points of research have continued to be active areas. The study of leadership has largely been the province of social psychologists, who to some extent have abandoned contingency and transactional approaches in favor of transformational models of leadership, based on charisma-like qualities (Bass, 1998; Bartone, 2003). Major changes have taken place in the conceptualization of cohesion in military units, focusing in part on the fact that the social cohesion based on homogeneity that was identified in World War II research as being important for the military has been used repeatedly as an argument against diversity in military forces without being shown to have a positive impact on performance (Segal and Kestnbaum, 2002), while task cohesion, based on contributions to common goals, does not require homogeneity. While many of the topics of military social science remain unchanged, the theoretical perspectives brought to bear on them reflect changes in the social science disciplines. Thus in the 1990s, questions that had been raised during the days of conscription by Janowitz and Huntington about relations between the military, the state and society, and reflected in the early years of the volunteer

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force in attitude research by Bachman et al. (1977), were recast in terms of the trend toward culture studies in the social sciences, and questions were raised about whether the culture of the military was divergent from the culture of its host society (e.g. Feaver and Kohn, 2001). This latter project was executed by an interdisciplinary research team. Research showed that the American military does have a distinct culture, as would any profession studied, but that it is consistent with the culture of the broader society that it defends. This research topic achieved sufficient visibility in the late twentieth century, that like the topics of organizational change and military professionalism in the 1960s and 1970s, it has become a focus of European military social science in the twenty-first century. Indeed, in some ways the center of gravity of military social science has shifted from North America to Europe, although the research agenda is largely isomorphic with developments in the USA. In addition, anthropology, which is the social science most closely associated with the study of culture, but which had very little impact in the twentieth century, became more active in the study of the military (e.g. Frese and Harrell, 2003). Another focus of late-twentieth-century sociology was postmodern theory, and the language of postmodernism, which was adopted from the humanities by the social sciences, and increasingly appeared in analyses of soldiers (e.g. Battistelli, 1997) and military organization (e.g. Moskos, 2000). Moskos’ formulation has been particularly influential. Like his earlier conceptualization of the transition from an institutional to an occupational model, he postulated a shift from modern to postmodern military organization along a number of empirical dimensions, some of which mirrored the components of his earlier formulation, such as gender roles and the relationship between the family and the military. Others referred to more strategic and macro-organizational dimensions, such as changes in major mission and force structure, where the I/O model had focused on more micro-organizational dimensions such as recruitment appeals and role commitment. Like the I/O model, the postmodern model has been applied in a range of national settings (Moskos et al., 2000), and like other recent projects, the research has been conducted by an interdisciplinary team. The major finding has been that, while Western industrial nations vary in their degree of modernity, there is no truly postmodern military. Indeed, a major critique of the postmodern military formulation pointed out that the template used to study it was rooted in positivistic science, which postmodernism would reject, and that a truly postmodern military would be no military at all (Booth et al., 2001). One of the dimensions of Moskos’ postmodern model was the sexualorientation integration of the military, a process that has taken place in most European nations, and to which a considerable amount of social science literature has been devoted. Two other trends in social science research on diversity in the military are notable. The first is that other nations began to pay greater attention to gender integration in their armed forces (e.g. Dandeker and Segal, 1996). The second was that increased attention has been paid to the intersections of race, class and gender, rather than focusing on disadvantaged statuses one at a time (Booth and Segal, 2005). Important examples, which reflect an important

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emerging historical perspective in military sociology as well as the concept of intersectionality, are Moore’s (1996, 2003) studies of African-American and Japanese-American women who served in the US military in World War II. Another contemporary perspective that has been applied to traditional problems in military sociology is that of the life course. While much research was done in the last quarter of the twentieth century on the post-service status of veterans compared to their peers who did not serve, it was primarily done from a status attainment or bridging environment perspective. In the main, it suggested that in the United States, men who served in World War II or the Korean War benefited from their service relative to their peers who did not serve, that this benefit did not extend into the Vietnam War and current volunteer force periods, that minority men benefited more than white men, and that among women veterans, minority women benefited more than white women (Segal, 2005). More recently, the life course perspective has been used cross-nationally (e.g. Rohall et al., 2005) by sociologists, psychologists, by historians and even by criminologists to clarify the dynamics by which military service, and particularly service in wartime and in combat, affects the post-service life trajectories of veterans (e.g. Sampson and Laub, 1996). The changes that have taken place in the missions of the twenty-first century, and the technological and political context within which those changes have taken place, have broadened the scope of military social science. Changes in communication technology have altered the relationship between armies deployed at war and the society they defend, and between deployed soldiers and their families back home. World War II was seen on the home front through the eyes of war correspondents whose copy passed through the hands of military censors before it appeared in the next day’s newspapers, and in newsreels the following week. Headlines from the Vietnam War appeared on television the same day, with film on the evening news. The Gulf War was covered in part by CNN reporters in Baghdad reporting on the arrival of American bombs and rockets, and Operation Iraqi Freedom has been covered in part by reporters from the print and broadcast media embedded in military units and using modern communications media to file their stories in real time. These changes have altered the relationships between the military, the media, the state and society. At the level of the individual soldier, communications technologies for contact with families back home have progressed from mail, through telephones and faxes, to widespread use of the Internet (Ender and Segal, 1998). These technologies alter the relationships within military families when soldiers are deployed, and raise issues of information security to new levels. The nature of the missions on which these soldiers are deployed has also expanded the scope of military social science. The field as it grew during World War II focused on conventional military forces, allied with similarly organized forces, and facing similarly organized adversaries. The Vietnam War sensitized military forces, and military social science, to the differences associated with unconventional war, which reduced the relevance of large conventional military

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formations, and emphasized the political dimensions of warfare, although the Gulf War closed the twentieth century with a conventional war. The late twentieth century saw major nations like the United States moving into the arena of peace operations. They had largely been excluded by Cold War peacekeeping doctrines that emphasized impartiality, since the major nations were likely to be interested parties in any area of the world in which conflict occurred. Thus, during the second half of the twentieth century, peacekeeping had largely become the domain of “middle powers,” such as Canada, the Netherlands, the Nordic nations and smaller nations such as Fiji. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, with the Cold War over in Europe, peacekeeping norms changed, with more deviations occurring from impartiality, minimum use of force and host-nation consent. Major powers became increasingly involved in peace operations, becoming less martial and more constabulary in their orientations, but also challenging the primacy of the middle powers in the peacekeeping arena. At the same time, nations with more pacific security policies, such as Japan and Germany, which had been limited by their post-World War II constitutions with regard to their military forces and to out-of-area military operations, were encouraged under new international norms of burden-sharing to become involved in multi-national peace operations, becoming more martial in their orientations (Segal and Kurashina, 2007). Central and Eastern European nations, other industrial nations that previously had been more isolationist, and developing nations also became more involved in multinational peace operations in response to the new burden-sharing norms. And the operations, in turn, became increasingly concerned with non-state actors such as insurgencies and terrorism, rather than conventional military operations. All of these changes have been incorporated into the field of military social science. While military studies are still a small subfield of the social science disciplines, in the last half century, and particularly since the end of the Cold War in Europe, they have grown significantly in substance, in size, and in impact both within the disciplines and more broadly in society. It is increasingly common to find social scientists quoted in news stories about armed forces and military operations in both print and broadcast media. Interest in the applied aspects of the field has grown in many nations – most dramatically in the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, as they have dealt with issues of potentially ending military conscription, adopting democratic models of civilian control of the military, modernizing and professionalizing their forces, and addressing issues of gender integration and military families (Bebler, 1997; Callaghan and Kernic, 2003; Sarvas, 1999; Vlachova, 2003; Zulean, 2003). There has been a moderate growth of academic interest in military social science, with a slowly growing number of colleges and universities offering courses in the field, accompanied by a growing concern with the national and transnational implications and consequences of the nature of the military institution and its relationship to the state and to citizenship (e.g. Kestnbaum, 2002). And there has been increased social science attention paid to air and naval forces, which were largely overlooked during the twentieth century.

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Note 1 The preparation of this chapter was supported in part by the Army Research Institute under Contract W74V8H-05-K-0007. The interpretations presented here are solely those of the author.

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3

Military organization and culture from three perspectives The case of army Donna Winslow

Introduction When I hear the word gun, I reach for my culture. Alexander Gerschenkron The popular grasp of “culture” is similar to the concept of “opposition” – a concept from semiotics – which suggests that we know something by knowing what it is not. For example, hot is not cold and up is not down. This opposition does not, however, inform us on the temperature of “hot” nor the exact height of “up.” Thus we have an idea of what up and hot are, but we do not have scientific accuracy or measurement. This is similar to the way we often conceive of culture. We have an intuitive understanding of what it is and what it is not, yet when faced with the challenge of determining and measuring culture exactly, we end up with a plurality of definitions and methods. After much consideration I have adopted a pluralistic approach since it provides a varied assortment of lenses for viewing army culture. Inspired by the work of Martin (1992), Martin and Meyerson (1988) and Frost et al. (1991), I will analyze the literature on army culture according to three perspectives: Integration, Differentiation and Fragmentation. These levels of analysis flow from macro to micro: that is from the Integrated to Fragmented perspective. The macro, Integrated approach leads us to the large brushstrokes, major themes, structures and formal values of the organization. The Differentiated approach gives us insight into the sub-groups and informal culture(s) within the organization and, finally, the Fragmented approach shows us how individuals grasp different and sometimes contradictory and ambiguous fragments of the organizational culture. Let us take the metaphor of music for a moment. Technically music is a collection of acoustic vibrations but that is not what we think of when we think of “music.” Just as in culture, we have an intuitive grasp of what is and what is not music. It implies an act of performance in the way that culture implies social interaction. The Integration perspective to organizational culture can be likened to a performance of the national anthem – everyone sings together the same words and the same tune in harmony with each other. The Differentiation perspective is like a symphony – everyone playing different pieces of the music

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which comprise a totality. The Fragmentation perspective can be considered like jazz improvization. The individual musicians master their instrument and have basic shared understandings of the principles of music, however what emerges is unpredictable and is created in the moment by the social interaction of the musicians in the performance. It is thus irregular and can never be repeated over and over in the same way as a symphony or national anthem can. Each of these forms of performance is music, and tells us something about music (notes, keys, tempos, etc). Each of them alone does not comprise all of music, however they all tell us something about some aspect of music. By examining all three forms of music, we have a larger grasp of what music is and can be. In a similar way I am proposing to examine organizational culture and in particular army culture using three analytical approaches. The reader will see in this chapter that army culture contains elements congruent with all three perspectives. By combining the perspectives, by multiplying the levels of analysis, we can more fully interpret army culture. In particular we will see how culture research can explore the interplay between homogeneity, conflict and ambiguity in the organization. After briefly outlining my methodology in the next section, I will examine three perspectives (Integration, Differentiation and Fragmentation) used in studying organizational behavior, see how studies of the army can be viewed according to these perspectives and how they can inform us about the nature of army culture.

Method The complexity of the field of organizational culture exerted certain demands upon my methodological approach and gave rise to an “economy of explanation.” This economy of explanation requires a respect for the three levels of analysis with only a few examples to illustrate them due to limitations of space. The meta-theoretical model is outlined in Table 3.1. Briefly, studies were classified as “Integrationist” if they assumed or supported the idea of broad coherent patterns across the organization and/or placed an emphasis on a stable set of ideas, values and norms characterizing the organization as a whole. The reader will see that the majority of work on army culture falls into this category. Studies were classified as “Differentiated” if they looked at specific groups or subcultures within the organization. Differentiation studies defines culture in terms that are similar to the Integration approach – culture is shared. However, it is the group and not the entire organization that has consistency. Consensus exists within the boundaries of subcultures which might find themselves in opposition to each other or to the organization. The Fragmented perspective perhaps most adequately explains the chaos of war, yet it is the least used in studies of military culture. In a Fragmented approach, culture is a loosely structured and incompletely shared system that

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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the three perspectives on organizations Features

Perspective Integration

Differentiation

Fragmentation

Orientation to consensus

Organization-wide consensus

Sub-cultural consensus

Multiplicity of views (no consensus)

Relation among manifestations

Consistency

Inconsistency

Complexity (not clearly consistent or inconsistent)

Orientation to ambiguity

Exclude it

Channel it outside subcultures

Focus on it

Metaphors

Culture as glue, organization as machine or “little society”

Subgroups as islands Culture as web, of clarity in a sea organization as jungle of ambiguity

Source: Martin, 1992: 13.

emerges dynamically as cultural members experience each other, events and the organization’s contextual features (Martin, 1992: 152).

Integration perspective Within the Integration perspective, we can observe two major approaches to the subject: the views that organizations have culture vs. organizations are culture. According to Jordan (1995), the first approach is functionalist while the latter is symbolic (and, we might add – cognitive). Organizations have culture In the approach “organizations have culture,” theoreticians attempt to understand the culture of a whole group, the functions that culture performs in maintaining the group, or the conditions under which the group and its culture develop. Culture is just one variable among several others such as structure, tasks, technology, etc. As a dependent variable, researchers examine how the organizational culture can be shaped by particular practices such as leadership. As an independent variable, researchers examine how culture external to the organization (such as national culture) can affect the organization. Examples of this in military sociological research are Soeters (1997) and Soeters and Recht (1998). In his 1997 study, Soeters uses Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) approach to studying differences between different national labor forces. Hofstede found four cultural1 dimensions that expressed national differences: power distance (perceived and accepted social inequality and the relation to authority); individualism (importance attached to leisure time, family life and comfortable living conditions);

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masculinity (importance attached to income growth and the possibilities of promotion); and, uncertainty avoidance (level of anxiety when confronted with unknown situations). Soeters applied these dimensions to military academies and found that the cultural profiles of military cadets in 13 countries differed with one another according to nationality. Culture can also be mapped or measured on a scale of values, e.g. strong or weak cultures2 or efficient and inefficient cultures.3 The major goals of this approach are to determine how to mold and shape internal culture in particular ways and how to change culture according to the needs of management. Culture is thus perceived as an attribute of the organization which can be manipulated. It is often reduced to values and norms. An example of this is the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report on American military culture in the twenty-first century (2000). Although the authors clearly say they are studying culture, and that their definition of culture is “how things are done in a military organization” (CSIS, 2000: xviii), they only study the extent to which members say they support traditional military values and how members feel about the organization. Their study does not appear to be based upon any observation of how things are actually done. The CSIS study draws upon the work of James Burk (1999) who also defines military culture in terms of essential elements. Burk’s work centers on elements of formal military culture and particularly how war-fighting determines central values, beliefs and symbols – discipline, professional ethos, ceremony and etiquette, cohesion and esprit de corps.4 In Integration studies, such as the CSIS one, the health of the organization is measured by the extent to which these elements are shared by members of the organization. Organizations are culture In the “organizations are cultures” approach culture is not something an organization has, it is something an organization is. This approach is ideational or symbolic.5 Researchers seek to identify and document the various symbolic forms through which the culture of an organization expresses itself, and identify the patterns of subjective meaning embodied in the content and context of cultural practice. Organizations are seen as expressive forms and manifestations of human consciousness. “An organization may be viewed as a specific cultural setting in which human actors . . . construct social realities and negotiate meaning for their lives” (Jermier, 1991: 230–1). Culture thus becomes a root concept for understanding human ideas and behaviors expressed in the organization. Schein is often used in describing military culture (e.g. Arnold, 1996; Widen, 1997) and, as a result, studies in this tradition define military culture as the deep structure rooted in the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs and traditions that collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations among members. It is a form of glue that holds people together (Snider, 1999: 14). Authors working in Schein’s (1990) tradition distinguish between three levels of culture:

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Artifacts – such as uniforms, unit patches, berets (these artifacts also mark different army sub cultures such as Regiments. Artifacts also include flags, ceremonies, monuments, plaques, pictures, etc. Espoused values – these defined sets of values appear in military doctrine and statements about ethos, codes of service, oath of enlistment, etc. These espoused values underpin the formal structure of the organization and the importance of the chain of command. Basic underlying assumptions – these are the ultimate source of values and actions. They are not written down but permeate conceptual modes.

Let’s examine just a few basic underlying assumptions of the US Army as described by Scroggs (1996). According to Scroggs, the core concept of combat defines all assumptions – “We must fight and win the nation’s wars.” To enhance war-fighting competence, the army needs to be internally focused. That is, the army looks inward to address and resolve the challenges of maintaining or improving its professional war-fighting competence.6 Another assumption described by Scroggs is “Muddy Boots can do it all” which means that army personnel do not need special training for peacekeeping operations if their combat skills are up to speed. Another spin on this is that a good combat leader can do anything, such as talk to media, congressmen, etc. The “Muddy Boots can do it all” attitude is similar to the “can-do attitude” which also stems from combat realities. McCormick tells us that the US Army, to a greater degree than the other services, sees itself as the nation’s loyal servant. As a result, “senior officers convey a more dutiful ‘can do’ attitude with respect to civilian directives, even if these actions are antithetical to the Army’s national interests” (McCormick, 1998: 59). Carl Builder’s Masks of War (1989) is also in this tradition of research. Builder examines the specific service cultures of the US military according to five aspects: 1 2 3 4

5

Altars of worship (the US Army believes in utter devotion to the country through service). Terms of self measurement (the US Army measures its health in terms of its people). Preoccupation with toys versus the arts (the US Army is more focused on the basic skills of soldiering). Degree and extent of intra-service (or branch) distinctions (in the US Army, the basic distinction is between the combat arms and all the others who are in a support role to the combat arms). Insecurities about service legitimacy and relevancy.

Builder then goes on to describe how these underlying assumptions translate into specific service identities and behavior, and how they affect strategy, analysis and military planning. According to Builder (1989: 33), the US Army sees itself first and foremost, as the nation’s obedient and loyal servant and the

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neutral instrument of state policy. In this way the army is able to divest itself of political responsibility in spite of the political nature of the tasks it is asked to perform. Another form of “organizations are culture” studies focuses on the symbolic aspects of the army. Some of the best examples of this work are to be found among Israeli anthropologists studying the IDF (Israeli Defense Force). Ben-Ari (1998) looks at the ways in which military meanings (publicly shared symbols, metaphors, images, etc.) are organized and used. Using a social constructionist framework,7 he explains how soldiers and officers in field units make sense of soldiering and commanding. Symbolic studies also look at rites and rituals which are seen as crucial links between ideologies that provide the framework for collective life and the associated forms of individual experience. Army rituals range from the small routines, such as saluting, to the complex ceremonies of change of command, military funerals, etc. There are also informal ceremonies among peers. For example, my own work on Airborne rites of initiation (Winslow, 1999b) shows how soldiers are proving their readiness to participate in the group regardless of the personal cost, thus gaining peer group acceptance. In a similar vein, Sion’s (1997) work focuses on the symbolic processes that young men serving in the Israeli infantry undergo. In particular she looks at army service in the IDF as a rite of initiation into becoming a full male member of Israeli society. The attributes of manhood in this situation are physical condition, self-control, professionalism, aggressiveness and heterosexuality. Symbolic studies often entail the study of language as an expression of culture. Elkin did a very interesting study of soldier’s language in the 1940s. He looked at the use of acronyms and even obscenities to show how these expressions “give the soldier a unique universe of discourse which help distinguish him, and thus they become a binding in-group force” (Elkin 1946: 415).8 Hockey found the same significance over 40 years later. He tells us that swearing is a generalized practice for non-officers. The wholesale use of such language, taboo in much of civilian life, reinforces and symbolizes the status of masculine soldier.9 As Morgan et al. (1983: 11) have remarked: “The use of language is rich in symbolic significance. It carries patterns of meaning which do much to evoke and define the realities of organizational life, and is a topic central to the analysis of organizational symbolism.” Summary Both these views (culture as something an organization has vs. something an organization is) portray organizational culture as being shared by members, either in terms of shared values and attitudes or overlapping interpretative frameworks. This promotes the idea of organization-wide consensus and consistency as summarized in Table 3.2. The Integration perspective gives the reader insight into the broad organizational patterns and structures. It describes what is often easily observable –

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Table 3.2 Integration perspective Features

Integration perspective

Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors

Organization-wide consensus Consistency Exclude it Culture as glue, organization as machine or “little society”

that is, rites and ceremonies, dress codes, formal behavior, etc. In its symbolic studies, it tries to uncover underlying assumptions or cultural codes which guide formal behavior. The Integration perspective represents the bulk of writing on army culture – by military personnel particularly reflect this monolithic view of culture. Army culture is seen as a “thing” that sets the army apart, makes it unique. All of these articles and books share the view that army culture constitutes a whole, which should be shared by all members – if the organization is “healthy” or “strong.” Members learn it through socialization and participation in organizational rites and ceremonies. Leaders play an important role in preserving culture, creating it, molding it and transmitting it. From an Integration perspective, there is – or at least there should be – consistency between the various components of the organization and a general widespread agreement and understanding of the organization’s culture (which often means ethos or core values).

Differentiation perspective In the 1990s, some theorists10 began to criticize the idea of organization-wide consensus and consistency. In the Differentiation approach, authors believe in a lack of consistency and a lack of consensus among organization members. They question the degree of homogeneity in organizations and place emphasis on difference, diversity and variation in groups in terms of their interests, objectives and action. This approach is very similar to the Integration perspective in that the group is like a little society and members of the group share a common culture, although there is difference between groups. Organizations are studied in terms of different subcultures which develop due to common experiences, environment, interaction patterns, etc., and they are analyzed in terms of ethnicity, gender, professional background and functional position in the organization. The subcultures co-exist in harmony, conflict or sometimes in indifference to each other. In terms of army culture, we find studies of different functional categories, e.g. Airborne, Rangers, Infantry, Artillery and so on; of command positions such as privates, NCOs, officers; and of race, gender, ethnicity. Similar to Integration studies, Differentiation research defines culture as that which is shared among members of the group. Within each subculture there is consensus. Unlike Integration research, however, Differentiation studies define the boundary of a culture at the group level of analysis (Martin, 1992: 96).

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“Consensus occurs only within the boundaries of subcultures. Ambiguity is channeled so that it does not intrude on the clarity which exists within these sub cultural boundaries” (Martin, 1992: 12). Ambiguity exists, but in the interface between subcultures. The Differentiation perspective can also unveil the workings of power in organizations, acknowledge conflicts of interest between groups, and attend to differences of opinion. For example, there have been studies of the experience of women in the army. In Canada, Davis and Thomas indicate that women in the combat arms have found themselves in an environment that does not foster an atmosphere of acceptance. The world that women enter is a world that defines and reinforces gender roles in a way that is in conflict with the role of a woman in the combat arms. The motivations and behaviors of each woman are interpreted in a way that leaves no room for women to be there because they “want to do the job.” On the other hand, women understand that they will have to become “one of the guys” if they are going to succeed. In the end, there is nowhere for them to go because they cannot achieve either of these conflicting roles (Davis and Thomas, 1998: 13). There have also been many studies of diversity in the armed forces (see Soeters and van der Meulen, 1999, as an example of an international collection on the subject). These include everything from issues of homosexuality to gender, from race to ethnicity. These studies do not engage the reader in a discussion of army culture in general, but they do describe the difficulties army culture has had in adapting to change imposed from without, i.e. as a result of social and political trends in the wider society (e.g. Mershon and Schlossman, 1998). The Differentiation perspective can also demonstrate just how important informal culture can be and the positive (and negative) impacts it can have on an organization. Anna Simons’ (1997) book is a narrative description of team life, leadership styles, personalities and motivations of the NCOs who make up Special Forces teams. Simons shows that the ability of the men to work together as a cohesive team is dependent for the most part on their ability to bond. Different social mechanisms ensure this through training, shared experience and of course the personalities of individuals who are able to cooperate with each other. In contrast, my own work (Winslow, 1999a) on regimental subculture demonstrates how unit cohesion can be a double-edged sword. In Canada, regiments have at times formed subcultures with their own loyalties which can be at odds with loyalty to the Canadian Forces. Even though loyalty is perceived as a positive state in the military, the article shows that highly intense unit cohesion can, at times, be divisive for the army. What is clearly an effective and necessary attitude for the battlefield can then become an exaggerated force that undermines good order and discipline.11 One of the most interesting studies of enlisted culture is Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture (1986) in which John Hockey used participant observation field methods to study infantry privates in the British Army. Hockey shows how cohesion, teamwork and conformity with organizational demands also influ-

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ences patterns of resistance. From the moment a recruit enters basic training, he/she begins to learn the “unofficial” ways of coping with army life. For example, there is a pattern known as “skiving” which seems to contradict the official ethos of “doing the job.” “Skiving” is part of an overall strategy by privates of “looking out for Number One.” A private’s survival strategy implies using every opportunity to make life easier. However what is most significant is the change that takes place once the privates find themselves in an operational environment in Northern Ireland. Faced with intense danger, “looking out for Number One” means being the best soldier you can be in order to survive. In the field “looking out for Number One” and “doing the job” finally converged. “Skiving” (or not doing one’s job) would put the privates at physical risk, therefore it was abandoned as a practice. This study highlights how an informal value (such as “looking out for Number One”) can be dysfunctional in garrison, yet essential to good soldiering in the field. Ingraham’s (1984) The Boys in the Barracks is a similar type of study of the garrison life and habits of American soldiers below the rank of sergeant. It gives the reader a unique look at garrison life in the 1980s where there was a clear distinction among non-commissioned members who were there for a short time and those who were “lifers.” The non-lifers expressed explicit antimilitary norms. As in Hockey’s British study, stealing within the primary group was not tolerated but outside of the barrack group it was an accepted mode of behavior, and theft from the organization was not considered a crime but as exacting one’s due. It is interesting to note that Sion and Ben-Ari found the same phenomenon in the IDF. As Bryant (1974: 251) has observed, these activities are often unofficially approved of by officers since the initiative, resourcefulness, aggressiveness and decisiveness associated with stealing are also characteristics of a “good soldier.” The Institutional/Occupational distinction has become one of the most widely referred to models in military sociology. This model is based upon the work of Morris Janowitz (1970, 1977). Changing technology, according to Janowitz, created new patterns of combat and therefore modified organizational behavior in the military. In short, the more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower the differences between military and non-military establishments (Janowitz, 1970: 143). Building upon the work of Janowitz, Charles Moskos (1973: 266) made reference to a “continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures.” Thus the Institutional/Occupational model began with an Integration perspective. This model assumes a monolithic military on a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures. Moskos, however, added a Differentiation perspective, pointing out that to argue that the military is either an institution or an occupation “is to do an injustice to reality. Both elements have been and always will be present in the military system” (Moskos, 1988: 57). This seems to be reflected in what Moskos calls the segmented or plural military. The plural military is both convergent and divergent with civilian society, and it simultaneously displays organizational

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trends that are civilianized and traditional. Moskos adds, however, that the segmented military “will not be an alloy of opposing trends, but a compartmentalization of these trends.” He argues that the plural model does not foresee a “homogeneous military” lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles, instead, “the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces” (Moskos, 1973: 275). Thus subcultures appear in the organization according to institutional or occupational orientation. This theme has been picked up in many studies. For example, McCormick (1998) refers to it as “corporate” vs. the “muddy boots” army. Summary A Differentiation perspective can give the reader insight into the informal groupings and power relations in an organization. Similar to the Integration perspective, Differentiation studies observe formal patterns and behavior in groups, as well as the underlying assumptions that guide behavior in groups. In addition, Differentiation studies describe the organizational conditions that allow for the emergence of subcultures. From a Differentiation perspective, an organization is seen as divided, broken into constituent parts that, more often than not, are in conflict with each other – an orchestra where each musical section is doing its own thing. However, within the different subgroups there is a shared culture – enclaves or “islands” of consensus. From a Differentiation perspective, informal leadership may play as important a role as formal leadership in setting standards and upholding the “unwritten rules” which guide members’ actions as much (if not more) than the formal ones.

Fragmentation perspective The Fragmentation perspective grew out of a dissatisfaction with research focused on finding consistent cultural patterns (whether they be organization wide or just within subcultures), thereby excluding paradoxes, uncertainties and contradictions that do not fit the pattern. Fragmentation research argues that organizations have inconsistent, unclear and dissonant cultural manifestations. Ambiguity is the essence of organizational culture (Martin, 1992: 130). According to Frost et al.’s (1991: 8) description of the Fragmentation approach, “Consensus and dissensus co-exist in a constantly fluctuating pattern influenced by Table 3.3 Differentiation perspective Features

Differentiation perspective

Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors

Sub-cultural consensus Inconsistency Channel it outside subcultures Subgroups as islands of clarity in a sea of ambiguity

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changes, for example in events, attention, salience, and cognitive overload. Any cultural manifestation can be, and is, interpreted in a myriad of ways.” This view, which sees culture as dynamic and multivocal, represents a radical departure from those views that depict culture as a mechanistic, hierarchical system of stable relationships and universal symbols. In addition, the Fragmentation approach points out that there is not one authoritative voice of interpretation for the researcher. There are many voices and many meanings whose understandings overlap, collide, enhance and silence one another. This is similar to a postmodern approach where authors acknowledge the existence of alternative realities to be uncovered, and they look at just how differently people in the same organization understand and experience organizational reality. In postmodernism, culture is an open-ended creative dialogue of subcultures, factions, individuals etc. The activity of culture is “plural and beyond the control of any individual” (Clifford, 1983: 139). Thus individuals share some viewpoints, disagree about some and are ignorant or indifferent to others (Martin and Meyerson, 1988: 117). “The assumption is that a multiplicity of views exists; ambiguity and change may appear in any number of places and vary with issues that the organization faces” (Ginger, 1988: 727). Thus in addition to consistency there is also inconsistency and dissonance. In the Fragmentation perspective, an organization is a web12 of individuals, sporadically and loosely connected by their changing positions on a variety of issues. Their involvement, their subcultural identities and their individual selfdefinitions fluctuate, depending on which issues are activated at a given moment (Martin, 1992: 153). Groups coalesce around specific issues and are context dependent. Subcultures are therefore fleeting, issue-specific coalitions that may or may not have a similar configuration in the future. It is important to remember that it is not an absence of culture in an organization that creates ambiguity, it is the presence of a fragmented one which is loosely structured and incompletely shared. The organization’s culture emerges dynamically as cultural members experience each other, events and the organization’s features (a shared frame of reference or shared recognition of relevant issues (see Feldman, 1991: 154)). Martin has written extensively on the Fragmentation perspective and gives us the following definition of culture from this point of view: As individuals come into contact with organizations, they come into contact with dress norms, stories people tell about what goes on, the organization’s formal rules, and procedures, its informal codes of behavior, rituals, tasks, pay systems, jargon and jokes only understood by insiders, and so on. These elements are some of the manifestations of organizational culture. When cultural members interpret the meanings of these manifestations, their perceptions, memories, beliefs, experiences, and values will vary, so interpretations will differ – even of the same phenomenon. The patterns or configurations of these interpretations, and the ways they are enacted, constitute culture. (Martin, 1992: 3)

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This perspective is the least used in approaches to the army, although some recent Institutional/Occupational research hints at it. Some authors suggest that varying perspectives can be held by the same persons in different circumstances. For example, Ben-Ari (1998) tells us of the existence of two kinds of professionalism within the IDF. One is combat and operationally oriented, while the other is administrative and technical. The French military sociologist Bernard Boene makes the same argument. Speaking of institutional and occupational forces, he notes that, “their relationship is one of dialectical tension: the full expression or incarnation of one logic is necessarily frustrated by the inescapable presence of the other” (Boene, 1990: 25). Other military research has hinted that confusion and paradox are the rule rather than the exception. For example, Sabrosky et al. (1982) have described the US military as “organized anarchy.” Although government appointees and military officers in charge do what they can to see that decisions are made in a structured, “rational” manner, information still becomes lost in the system, directed to the wrong people, or both. Similarly, during a crisis, the wrong people may try to solve a problem because of their prowess at bureaucratic gamesmanship, or the right people (because of mismanagement or oversight) may be overlooked or sent elsewhere. (Sabrosky et al., 1982: 142) They ironically note that this may not be such a bad thing: The existence of bureaucratic inertia, fragmentation of authority, and relative lack of efficiency may be a collective blessing in disguise in certain circumstances. Elected and appointed officials are not always paragons of intelligence and wisdom, and the inability of the military bureaucracy to execute rapidly some radical (or reactionary) executive proposal could have some inadvertent utility. (Sabrosky et al., 1982: 149) Certainly, the Fragmentation perspective seems to describe the chaotic nature of ground warfare. War, like chaos, is an intricate, turbulent, multi-component processes, beyond effective monitoring and reasonable approximate depiction or prediction. And war, like chaos, exceeds the capacity of a single individual to understand it sufficiently to exercise effective control – regardless of the resources at his or her disposal Von Clausewitz’s fog of war suggests the same, as does his dictum that war is the “province of chance.” Similarly, Beaumont (1994: 89) cites Rommel’s account of battle as a junior officer who frequently found himself in situations where confusion reigned. But as a commanding general, things had not changed much. In his race against France in 1940, Rommel met with constant confusion, delays, units acting out of phase, inadequate maps, communications failures,

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wild confusion and at one point confessed, “I had no idea where the main body of the division was.” Rommel’s descriptions of grappling with complexity and disorder conformed in spirit to Eisenhower’s admission that he had made several major decisions without basis in certainty when doing things that were so risky “as to be almost crazy” (cited in Beaumont, 1994: 89). Even though much of the focus of books on military incompetence is on individual incompetence (e.g. Dixon, 1976; David, 1997), inevitably the fragmentary character of the battlefield and military organization for battle is described. David (1997), Dixon (1976) and Watson (1997) give us tales of misinformation, fragmentary information, imprecise wording of orders, inadequate reconnaissance, poor logistics, inappropriate equipment and meddling politicians. Dixon (1976) and Watson (1997) also note that not only is battlefield chaotic, leaders can be unpredictable and illogical as well as incompetent. I can imagine that this fragmentary nature of the battlefield applies in Iraq. But perhaps the Fragmentation perspective will be most useful concerning the complexities of the future. It can be a useful analytical tool to deal with the confusion and ambiguity associated with peace operations. In the future, as missions become more complex and military roles polyvalent, boundaries will become unclear. Will the army be called upon to build democracy in far-away lands in addition to defending it? Factors that contribute to confusion include: a lack of strategic direction, expanded scope, limited intelligence, political and cultural diversity, multiple players, media intensity, lack of (or limited) rule of law, changes in mission and changing rules of engagement. Whether as part of stable operations (e.g. Cyprus and the Sinai) or in the more unstable ones (e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan), peace missions reflect ambiguities, constraints, challenges, obstacles, risks and frustrations that differ – at least qualitatively – from those experienced in conventional operations (see Pinch, 1994; Winslow, 2000; Winslow and Everts, 2000). Chaos theory (see Beaumont, 1994; Moore, 1996) offers some concepts that could be used to explain patterns. In peace operations where an apparently minor action can lead to unpredictable effects, one is reminded of the analogy of the Lorenz effect where the flapping of a butterfly’s wings can create conditions for an unstable weather system on another continent. This is all the more true given the media intensity and public scrutiny of military operations. A tactical decision can now have unpredictable political repercussions and a relatively small field event can turn into a political crisis. Summary From a Fragmentation perspective, organizational culture is characterized by ambiguity and loosely shared understandings that hold the members together in a loose web of relationships. As Clifford Geertz put it, man “is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun; I take culture to be those webs” (Geertz, 1973: 5). Members of the organization do not interpret or share organizational structures and symbols in the same way. From a Fragmentation perspective, the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of modern-day armies and

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Table 3.4 Fragmentation perspective Features

Fragmentation perspective

Orientation to consensus Relation among manifestations Orientation to ambiguity Metaphors

Multiplicity of views (no consensus) Complexity (not clearly consistent or inconsistent) Focus on it Culture as web, organization as jungle

the tasks they are asked to perform create a lack of clarity and confusion. In fact, any attempt to create a cohesive culture is doomed to fail since diversity, ambiguity and fluidity are the characteristics of modern organizational culture. Leadership seems to be decentered, that is, it does not play the determining role in the culture of the organization as it does in the Integration perspective. Culture is an open-ended creative dialogue of subcultures, various factions, individuals, etc. Because the activity of culture is “plural,” it is “beyond the control of any individual” (Clifford, 1983: 139). Leaders can set the boundaries of the dialogue; however, they cannot determine the outcome.

Culture change – three perspectives In this section, we will see what adopting one of the three perspectives means when trying to introduce change within an organization. Integration approach to culture change Certainly there is no universal formula for producing effective change, and no widely accepted procedure for implementing it (Druckman et al., 1997: 7). However, if one takes an Integration view of culture, then one holds certain assumptions about what culture is and what actions need to be taken in order to induce culture change. Organizations are assumed to be integrated wholes, little societies, normally stable and consensual. Culture change will be instituted to establish, maintain or return to a stable state. Because the organization is seen as homogeneous and culture as being shared by all the members, change can be introduced like dropping ink into a glass of water. From the top to the bottom, the change will occur until the entire glass of water is the same color. In the same way the leaders at the top of an organization can set the tone and implement a change process. Once the mechanisms and policies are in place, they can assume that it will occur more or less systematically throughout the organization. If there is interim conflict or ambiguity concerning the change, it is because of faulty implementation or it is a temporary state of affairs. Problems will disappear once most organizational members understand and are “on board.” The Integration literature on change can be divided into two approaches – case studies of change and advice to executives (Ouchi and Wilkins, 1985: 476). This is a very instrumental view – that culture or parts of it might be managed,

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controlled and intentionally changed (Alvesson and Berg, 1992: 29). When this form of cultural engineering is proposed, manageable concepts (values, norms, etc.) and mechanisms (levers) for changing them are identified. For example, Druckman et al. (1997: 90) mention the following mechanisms for changing/ forming/maintaining a culture: a unique and clearly articulated ideology; the recruitment of like-minded employees; the use of symbols to reinforce cultural attributes; repetitive socializing and training of employees in the key cultural values; the appraisal and rewarding of behavior consistent with the desired culture; and the design of an organizational structure that reinforces the key cultural values among all organization members. In pulling these levers, the role of management in an Integration approach is clear. Leaders choose the basic change and/or are responsible for implementing it. They pull the levers. They engineer the change. The organization is seen as some sort of mechanistic system in which management identifies some destination (vision or end state) and then drives the organization in the right direction while watching at checkpoints along the way (DiBella, 1996: 370). This approach assumes that change is a linear process and that the changed vision or new end state is fixed and can be collectively shared. Leaders can create strong cultures by shaping norms, instilling beliefs, inculcating values and generating emotions (see Peters and Waterman, 1982). Leaders communicate what is going to happen and they maintain control over how it will happen. According to Schein (1990: 2) “the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture.” Again Schein’s work is often cited by military writers. For example Widen (1997: 20) affirms that “The strategic leader should recognize that military cultures exist, that they impact the armed forces, and that they can be managed.” Dunivin (1997) also maintains that senior US military leaders are the best catalysts to produce a paradigm shift of US military culture. In the Integration approach, diversity, difference and dissent are treated as problems to be ironed out, rather than issues to be explored or possible catalysts for change. In the end, culture is just another lever that management can pull in order to institute change or improve performance in the organization. If we were to summarize the integration approach to military culture change, it would be encapsulated in the words “top-down” and “planned.” Differentiation approach to culture change The Differentiation perspective assumes that organizational subcultures exist and are related to specific variables such as department, function, profession, work groups, religion, gender, race, ethnicity, etc. Groups are embedded in different contexts or patterns of interaction which lead to collective understandings that differ by group (Van Maanen and Barley, 1985: 48). Different subcultures set up social boundaries compared to other groups with which they may be in conflict or in accommodation. According to the Differentiation perspective, change can result from a struggle among groups, with varying degrees of power

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to impose and resist change (Martin, 1992: 10). Different groups will try to place their representatives in strategic positions and one way to control change is to control the promotion process, thus those who support a new culture can rise to positions of power within the organization. The Differentiation approach is critical of culture change imposed from the top. There are inherent contradictions in the idea that the same kinds of values and behaviors exist and therefore the same kind of controls can be imposed upon diverse groups in an organization. Employees do not act as passive recipients of cultural change. They react, resist and reinterpret these changes. In his work on the British Army, Hockey shows how the behavior of privates departs from, is deviant to, can be contrasted with, the expectations and dictates embodied in the official manuals. “This has enabled me to show how relationships between NCOs and men, officers and men, and men and men, are very much a negotiated order” (Hockey, 1986: 141). The organization itself then needs to be looked at as a series of accommodations, negotiations and bargains. The presence of subcultures in an organization can affect change due to their contradictory interpretations of a change (see Hauser, 1998, for a discussion of this). Some studies draw attention to the ways internal loose coupling can dampen the flow of information in an organization. However, most Differentiation studies offer a “snapshot” of a particular subculture at a single point in time. They rarely discuss change. The presence of multiple cultures in an organization means that strategies for planned change may have to consider simultaneous, multiple and interdependent changes within and between culturally heterogeneous groups. If we were to summarize the Differentiation approach to culture change in an organization, then we would have to use the word “negotiated.” Fragmentation approach to culture change The Fragmentation perspective assumes that organizational culture is already fluctuating and unstable, therefore analysis seldom offers clear and comforting prescriptions for action concerning culture change. The idea is that formal organizations may be the stage for complicated, tangled interactions giving rise to unintended results. In short, if you push on one side you have no idea what will come out the other. According to Bolman and Deal (1997: 23): Taking action in an organization is like shooting a wobbly cue ball into a large and complex array of self-directed billiard balls. So many balls bounce off one another in so many directions that it is hard to know how things will look when everything settles down. Ambiguity is the operating principle, not something that is an intermittent state in an otherwise stable environment. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 92, 183) state that organizational cultures are so heterogeneous that it is impossible to introduce planned change. Things do

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change, but according to their own logic, not according to anyone’s plans. If change is attempted, it is difficult to predict what the result will be. Therefore Fragmentation studies of change offer few guidelines for those who would normatively control the change process (see Martin and Frost, 1996: 609). In fact, leaders may not be able to send clear signals at all, since whatever they do will be interpreted and reinterpreted in unexpected and unintended ways. Their roles are less central and less effective than that portrayed in the Integration perspective, since their influence depends on others’ interpretations and the effect of these interpretations on behavior. Similar to the Differentiation perspective, organizational members are not seen as passive recipients of culture change, they are imaginative consumers of leaders’ visions. As Bryman (1996: 286) points out, one of the implications of the Fragmentation perspective for leaders is that their strategies for change are problematized. There are, however, a few indications of how to approach change using a Fragmented approach. Alvesson and Berg (1992: 168) describe the need for dialogue. Leaders can therefore set the parameters of the dialogue, even though they cannot control the outcome (Bryman, 1996: 285, 287). Leaders’ messages can frame organizational responses. In this way, a new state of affairs is created through accommodation, negotiation and bargaining. Change will be something that is continually being negotiated. It represents an inter-subjective world where the meanings of any organizational change are likely to be temporary and partial. Since those holding power will have more influence, some of their meanings will prevail over others, with varying degrees of success (see Fineman, 1994: 81). If we were to summarize the Fragmentation approach to culture change in an organization, then we would have to use the word “emergence” which implies that change will emerge from the dialogue that occurs between organizational members. It cannot be planned. Summary In Rosen’s study of military innovations, he observes that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to know what causes change. “Factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be considerably less important, not important at all, or even inversely important in another study” (Rosen, 1991: 5). In order to even attempt change, I believe that all three perspectives must be taken into consideration so that a wide range of strategies can be developed. To be aware of culture in terms of the three perspectives increases the likelihood of success. It also allows organizational members and leaders to question their basic assumptions. In this way, culture is not only seen as a thing to be changed but as a dynamic system. Change, then, becomes a form of organizational learning. The organization continually “learns how to learn” by maintaining processes that critically examine key assumptions, beliefs, tasks, decisions and structural issues.

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Conclusions I began this discussion by saying that our understanding of culture was intuitive. Do we regard it as an objective “fact” located “out there” in the external world, or as a subjective “essence” which is constructed via a “network of meaning”? Do we think of culture as real and concrete, or as essential and abstract? Do we think of culture as homogeneous or as heterogeneous? My answer is that it depends on the perspective that you adopt. Throughout this chapter, I have been pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of all three perspectives and giving a few examples of how they have been used in the study of army culture. My underlying assumption was that the strength of the approach has been this multidimensionality, that using all three perspectives enhanced understanding of army culture. Why does using all three perspectives make sense? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that army culture reflects the chaos of warfare. Accepting the assumption that combat lies at the heart of army culture as its raison d’être, we can observe the integrative processes that are set in motion to control the essentially chaotic task of waging war. This produces a structured set of patterning (hierarchy, espoused values, etc.) in a fragmentary, fluctuating and fluid environment that characterizes (the fog of) war. This creates the dynamic and contradictory impulses characteristic of a rational organization that demands that soldiers be warriors who can kill and be killed in a very irrational environment. Thus the cross-pull between order and chaos becomes a principle of army culture and becomes visible in many forms (highly ritualized promotion ceremonies and drunken initiations and hazings, rationality of tactics and the raw emotions of battle skill training, etc.). In my view the dialectic between order and chaos constitutes the real heart of army culture. In an army organization, strong currents and undercurrents co-exist, creating linear orderliness and formalistic hierarchical authority, rigorous physical training, fixation on details, suppression of individuality. Yet at the same time the use of the idea of the art (which is a creative and intuitive process) of war, the gut feelings of leadership are necessary. Like canoeists trained on a lake to shoot rapids,13 when they enter the raging stream of water and the rapidly changing currents, they quickly abandon the rhythm and sense of order and concentrate mainly on staying upright. Decisions and actions thus become a mix of deliberate thought and reflex mixed with a certain form of creativity and instinct. Since I believe that the core dialectic of army culture is the structuring of chaos, which creates a dynamic tension between ordering and chaotic forces, between integrative and disintegrative forces, I do not think that this core will not change in the near future – even if armies are primarily involved in operations other than war. As soldiers can attest to, peace operation environments are very chaotic. However, since the chaos of peace operations is qualitively different from the chaos of war, then the structuring of that chaos is also bound to change. Thus the shift in missions will impact on army culture, but not destroy its core dialectic.

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Notes 1 According to Hofstede, culture is a collective “programming of the mind” which distinguishes members of one national culture from another. 2 See, for example, Kotter and Heskett (1992) and Deal and Kennedy (1983), who measure organizational culture’s internal consistency and impact on members. 3 See for example, Peters and Waterman (1982) or Denison (1996), who examine the organization’s ability to fulfill goals and innovate. 4 Burk (1999: 447) defines discipline as the behavior of military personnel in conformity with previously prescribed rules, command, instruction and drills. Ethos refers to the normative understandings that define the corporate identity, code of conduct and social worth of the officer corps. Ceremonies are the rituals of collective action that mark certain events or passages to new rank or status within the life of the military unit. Etiquette is the normative prescriptions that guide or control interpersonal behavior, especially between those of different rank or status. Cohesion refers to the emotional bond of shared identity and camaraderie among soldiers within their local unity. In sociological terms this means horizontal or primary group integration. Esprit de corps is the commitment and pride soldiers take in their military establishment and its effectiveness. In sociological terms, this means vertical or secondary group integration. 5 In a summary of symbolic approaches to culture, Alvesson and Berg (1992: 131) have classified ten out of 12 perspectives as what would be considered integrative. 6 This is very similar to Finer’s (1976) analysis as to why the British Army does not concern itself with politics. He maintains the professionalization of the officer corps resulted in the army becoming more self-centered, and the attention of those in command was concentrated on the development of increasingly sophisticated military skills. 7 According to Berger and Luckmann (1967), because of societal mechanisms, social constructs are internalized in collective and shared mental symbolic universes. Social constructivism thus looks at the processes of symbolic interaction and meaningmaking engaged in by organizational members. 8 Elkin (1946: 419) also noted how soldiers’ language expresses virility, masculinity and freedom from social restraint characteristic of the exclusively male military world of that time. 9 Other work on army language includes Irwin’s (1993) observations of the language habits of Canadian NCOs. Whatever their background, they cultivate a form of speech full of grammatical errors, and sprinkled with expletives in order to seem not too well educated or distant from their men. Other forms of verbal behavior have also been studied. Ladkani (1993) did an ethnographic study of marching or running cadences during infantry training in Fort Benning, Georgia. Complementing the “muscular bonding” that is going on through joint physical exercise, the cadence allows for expression of collective experience (e.g. the sergeant’s relentless demand for cleanliness) and anxiety (e.g. about death and violence). 10 For example, see Alvesson (1996) and Martin (1992). 11 Similarly, Watson (1997: 173) describes how sub or peer groups can generate their own values, beliefs and ideologies that may have little to do with the formal military system. 12 This image depicts culture as a web of diverse, loosely coupled, and volatile networks of symbols and relationships. According to Sabrosky et al. (1982), military structure is also more like a web or network than a pyramidal bureaucracy of reporting relationships. 13 Metaphor taken from Beaumont (1994: 124).

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References Alvesson, M. (1996) Communication, Power and Organization. New York: Walter de Gruyter. Alvesson, M. and Berg, P.O. (1992) Corporate Culture and Organizational Symbolism. New York: Walter de Gruyter. Arnold, L.E. (1996) Cooperation or Conflict: The Interaction of U.S. Military Forces and Nongovernmental Organizations in Military Operations Other Than War. Thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Beaumont, R. (1994) War, Chaos, and History. London: Praeger. Ben-Ari, E. (1998) Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions, and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Berger, H.S. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Anchor. Boene, B. (1990) “How ‘Unique’ Should the Military Be? A Review of Representative Literature and Outline of a Synthetic Formulation.” European Journal of Sociology 31: 3–59. Bolman, L.G. and Deal, T.E. (1997) Reframing Organizations: Artistry Choice and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Bryant, C.D. (1974) “Socialization for Kaki-Collar Crime: Military Training as Socialization Process.” In Bryant, C.D. (ed.) Deviant Behavior: Occupational and Organizational Bases. Chicago: Rand McNally. Bryman, A. (1996) “Leadership in Organizations.” In Clegg, S.R., Hardy, C. and Nord, W.R. (eds) Handbook of Organization Studies. London: Sage. Builder, C.H. (1989) The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Burk, J. (1999) “Military Culture.” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press. Center for Strategic and International Studies (2000) American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: the CSIS Press. Clifford, J. (1983) “On Ethnographic Authority.” Representations 1, 118–46. David, S. (1997) Military Blunders: How and Why of Military Failure. London: Robinson. Davis, K. and Thomas, V. (1998) Chief Land Staff Gender Integration Study: Experience of Women Who Have Served in the Combat Arms. Ottawa: Department of National Defense. Personnel Research Team, Sponsor Research Report 98–1. Deal, T.E. and Kennedy, A.A. (1983) “Culture: a New Look Through Old Lenses.” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 19, 4. Denison, D.R. (1996) “What is the Difference Between Organizational Culture and Organizational Climate? A Native’s Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm Wars.” Academy of Management Review 21, 3, 619–54. DiBella, A.J. (1996) “Culture and Planned Change in an International Organization: a MultiLevel Predicament.” International Journal of Organizational Analysis 4, 4, 352–72. Dixon, N. (1976) On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. London: Random House. Druckman, D., Singer, J.E. and Van Cott, H. (eds) (1997) Enhancing Organizational Performance. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Dunivin, K.O. (1997) Military Culture: a Paradigm Shift? Air War College Maxwell Paper No. 10. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base. Elkin, F. (1946) “The Soldier’s Language.” American Journal of Sociology 51, 414–20. Feldman, M.S. (1991) “The Meanings of Ambiguity: Learning from Stories and

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Metaphors.” In Frost, P.J., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C.C. and Martin, J. (eds) Reframing Organizational Culture. London: Sage. Fineman, S. (1994) “Organizing and Emotion: Toward a Social Construction.” In Hassard, J. and Parker, M. (eds) Towards a New Theory of Organizations. London and New York: Routledge. Finer, S.E. (1976) The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Frost, P.J., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C.C. and Martin, J. (eds) (1991) Reframing Organizational Culture. London: Sage. Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Ginger, C. (1988) “Interpreting Roads in Roadless Areas: Organizational Culture, Ambiguity, and Change in Agency Responses to Policy Mandates.” Administration and Society 29, 6, 723–57. Hauser, M. (1998) “Organizational Culture and Innovativeness of Firms – an Integrative View.” International Journal of Technology Management 16, 1–3, 236–55. Hockey, J. (1986) Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture. Exeter: Exeter University Publications. Hofstede, G. (1980) Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hofstede, G. (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London: McGraw Hill. Ingraham, L. (1984) The Boys in the Barracks: Observations on American Military Life. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Irwin, A. (1993) Canadian Infantry Platoon Commanders and the Emergence of Leadership. MA Thesis. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary. Janowitz, M. (1970) Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology. Chicago: Quadrangle Books. Janowitz, M. (1977) “From Institutional to Occupational: the Need for Conceptual Clarity.” Armed Forces and Society 4, 51–4. Jermier, J.M. (1991) “Critical Epistemology and the Study of Organizational Culture: Reflections on Street Corner Society.” In Frost, P.J., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C.C. and Martin, J. (eds) Reframing Organizational Culture. London: Sage. Jordan, A.T. (1995) “Managing Diversity: Translating Anthropological Insight for Organizational Studies.” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 31, 2, 124–40. Kotter, J. and Heskett, J. (1992) Corporate Culture and Performance. New York: The Free Press. Ladkoni, J. (1993) Sweating, swearing and singing: Cadences as United States Military Culture. Miami: University of Miami. McCormick, D. (1998) The Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transition. New York: New York University Press. Martin, J. (1992) Cultures in Organizations: Three Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, J. and Frost, P. (1996) “The Organizational Culture War Games: a Struggle for Intellectual Domination.” In Clegg, S.R., Hardy, C. and Nord, W.R. (eds) Handbook of Organization Studies. London: Sage. Martin, J. and Meyerson, D. (1988) “Organizational Cultures and the Denial, Channeling and Acknowledgment of Ambiguity.” In Pondy, L., Boland, R. and Thomas, H. (eds) Managing Ambiguity and Change. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Mershon, S. and Schlossman, S. (1998) Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

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Moore, J. (1996) “The Death of Competition.” Fortune 15 April. Morgan, G., Frost, P.J. and Pondy, L.R. (1983) “Organizational Symbolism.” In Pondy, L.R., Frost, P.J., Morgan, G. and Dandrige, T.C. (eds) Organizational Symbolism. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Moskos, C. (1973) “The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?” Pacific Sociological Review 16, 2, 255–79. Moskos, C. (1988) Soldiers and Sociology. Virginia: United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Ouchi, W.G. and Wilkins, A.L. (1985) “Organizational Culture.” Annual Review of Sociology 11, 457–83. Peters, T.J. and Waterman, R.H. (1982) In Search of Excellence. New York: Harper and Row. Pinch, F. (1994) Lessons from Canadian Peacekeeping Experience: a Human Resources Perspective. Ottawa: FCP Human Resources Consulting. Rosen, S.P. (1991) Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Sabrosky, A., Thompson, J. and McPherson, K. (1982) “Organized Anarchies: Military Bureaucracy in the 1980s.” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 18, 137–53. Schein, E. (1990) “Organizational Culture.” American Psychologist 45, 2, 109–19. Scroggs, S.K. (1996) Army Relations with Congress: the Impact of Culture and Organization. PhD Duke University. Simons, A. (1997) The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces. New York: The Free Press Sion, L. (1997) Images of Manhood Among Combat Soldiers: Military Service in the Israeli Infantry as Rite of Initiation from Youthood to Adulthood. MA Thesis. Jerusalem: Hebrew University. Snider, D.M. (1999) “An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture.” Orbis 45, 1, 11–26. Soeters, J.L. (1997) “Value Orientations in Military Academies: a Thirteen Country Study.” Armed Forces and Society 24, 1, 7–31. Soeters, J.L. and Recht, R. (1998) “Culture and Discipline in Military Academies: An International Comparison.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 26, 2, 169–89. Soeters, J.L. and van der Meulen, J. (1999) Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces. Tilburg, the Netherlands: Dutch University Press. Van Maanen, J. and Barley, S. (1985) “Cultural Organization: Fragments of a Theory.” In Frost, P.J., Moore, L.F., Louis, M.R., Lundberg, C.C. and Martin, J. (eds) Organizational Culture. Beverly Hills: Sage. Watson, B.A. (1997) When Soldiers Quit: Studies in Military Disintegration. Westport, CT: Praeger. Widen, Lt. Col. S.C. (1997) United States Military Cultures: a Mandatory Lesson for Senior Service College Curriculum. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College. Winslow, D. (1999a) “ ‘Misplaced Loyalties’: the Role of Military in Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Two Peace Operations.” In McCann, C. and Pigeau, R. (eds) The Human in Command. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 265–82. Winslow, D. (1999b) “Rites of Passage and Group Bonding in the Canadian Airborne.” Armed Forces and Society 25, 3, 429–57 Winslow, D. (2000) “Leadership Challenges in Peace Operations.” In Essens, P., Vogelaar, A. and Winslow, D. (eds) The Human in Command. Tilburg, the Netherlands: Dutch University Press. Winslow, D. and Everts, P. (2000) “Inter-Cultural Challenges for NATO.” In Schmidt, G. (ed.) NATO: The First Fifty Years. London: Macmillan.

4

Political science perspectives on the military and civil–military relations John Allen Williams

Introduction Militaries have traditionally been at the center of a State’s national security policy. They will also play an important role, together with other institutions, in responding to new threats to national security highlighted by terrorist attacks around the world. As militaries assume more domestic security functions traditionally associated with police forces, a sophisticated understanding of the military is more important than ever before. Given the profound implications of these developments for civil–military relations and military professionalism, Giuseppe Caforio’s call for studies of the military to be both cross-national and interdisciplinary is timely.1 This chapter presents an overview of the contribution of the discipline of political science and of some prominent political scientists to studies of the military and civil–military relations. It does not pretend to be comprehensive, but rather suggestive of the importance of the political science perspective in such studies.2 Readers from other disciplines may find some portions of this perspective to be useful in their own work, but in any event will have a better idea of the contributions of this approach and its practitioners. Although the center of gravity in military sociology may well be shifting toward Europe, scholars of the military who identify themselves as political scientists are primarily from the United States. Nevertheless, pathbreaking work is being done by European political scientists, two of whose work is highlighted below.

The political science approach Political science shares many characteristics with other social sciences, especially that branch nearest to it, sociology. Categorizations are always arguable, and military analyses can hardly avoid dealing with some matters of traditional concern to political scientists. In fact, much of the work performed by political scientists, the author included, is also military sociology. Similarly, some of the work of renowned military sociologists, such as Charles C. Moskos and David R. Segal, lies closer to political science and government. Indeed, David Segal holds appointments in both sociology and government at his university.

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There is no single characteristic that identifies a particular work as one of political science, but political science writings often reflect a combination of characteristics. Primary among these is a focus on governmental institutions. While sociologists look at relationships between and among groups in society, political scientists are largely concerned about the relationships of individuals and groups with formal governmental institutions. As Giuseppe Caforio notes elsewhere in this volume, the sole client of the military is the state, and no other client is permitted. The control of the state over the military and the context in which military members practice their profession is not only economic, but comprehensive. Accession, promotion, training, missions, force structure, etc. are all determined directly or indirectly by conditions set by the state. The control of the state over the military as an institution is not transitory, but continuous. Therefore, considerations of the state and its impact on the military are often in the foreground of any discussions of civil–military relations. Political scientists are concerned with power and formal authority. For political scientists, an important characteristic of a relationship is power and its effect on the distribution of costs and benefits in society. They want to know, in the words of Harold Lasswell (1936), “Who gets what, when, how.” This focus, while often useful, sometimes causes political scientists to miss important social interactions not related to power, coercion, or allocating costs and benefits. Many political scientists can best be categorized as students of conflict. These security specialists are interested in the military primarily insofar as it relates to force employment, national security strategy and the achievement of state goals. In such studies, issues of military professionalism and civil–military relations are relevant insofar as they affect military effectiveness or the evolution of the force over time. Some political science studies rely heavily on “scientific” techniques. This sometimes detracts from the readability of political science literature and its accessibility to those not schooled in the mysteries of the discipline. In the minds of some observers, especially those less interested in the development of theory or who do not have a strong background in mathematics, these techniques sometimes obscure more than they illuminate. More so than in the humanistic disciplines, there is a preference for generalizations and theory building. As Feaver pointed out (1999: 212), “political scientists, as opposed to historians, tend to look for patterned generalizations of cause and effect.” With many exceptions, they are likely to produce nomothetic as opposed to ideographic studies – that is, they are interested in patterns rather than idiosyncrasies. Most frustrating to some is the use of quantitative methods of varying degrees of sophistication. These range from nominal level measurement statements to statistical analyses ranging from simple cross tabulations to multiple regressions and formal modeling. Not every political science study will evidence all of these characteristics, of course, but they do illustrate some general tendencies.

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Examples from political science We turn now from general considerations to the work of some prominent political scientists in order to assess the contribution of the discipline to studies of the military and of civil–military relations. The typology presented below of some notable political scientists who have done or are doing work on the military and civil–military relations is offered in the awareness that the most useful typologies are those that are both exclusive and exhaustive – that is, they account for all the cases under discussion and divide the examples by criteria that clearly differentiate them. In addition, the criteria should be theoretically based. The following categorization falls short of these criteria, but it does attempt to highlight important authors whose writings display common characteristics.3 Categorization is complicated by the fact that these very prolific writers often cross the boundaries of the typology. The writings of the authors discussed below all have continuing relevance for military studies in the new century. All but the late Harold Lasswell and Morris Janowitz continue to be active scholars.

The trailblazers: Harold D. Lasswell and Samuel P. Huntington No review of political science contributions to the study of the military and civil–military relations would be complete without emphasizing the important contributions of two early pioneers, Harold D. Lasswell and Samuel P. Huntington. The former is best known in this area for his warnings about the growth of what he termed a “garrison state,” and the latter for his writings on military professionalism and the requisites for effective civilian control. Lasswell’s career is interesting from an interdisciplinary perspective, as well. Works such as Psychopathology and Politics (1930) established him as one of the founders of the field of political psychology. Harold D. Lasswell first aired his concerns about the garrison state in 1937, as Japanese troops were on the march in China (Lasswell, 1937, in Stanley, 1997).4 He expanded his ideas in 1941 in a more widely quoted article in the American Journal of Sociology and updated them in 1962 in the light of subsequent events (Lasswell, 1941, in Huntington, 1962: 77–116). The clearest exposition of his thesis is found in his early article, in which he expressed his fear that civilian institutions may not be equal to the strain imposed on them by an expansion of the emergency then unfolding: “The upshot may be the rise of the garrison state to replace the civilian state” (1937: 43). Lasswell noted in the same article that specialists in violence would run a garrison state, with other aspects of society “systematically subordinated to the fighting forces.” Different types of states value different skills. For example, in the business state, the predominant form in the West, the distinctive skill is “bargaining in the competitive market,” where the state “has been associated with the institutions of representative and responsible government, and the free forum.” Other types of state have been seen historically, such as the official bureaucratic state, where “all organized activities are directed by the

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government, and hence the duly constituted officials.” Examples include China prior to 1911 and, to some extent, the large states prior to 1914. A variant of this pattern is the party bureaucratic states, such as seen in the Soviet Union. Lasswell closed with the optimistic thought that the garrison state is not inevitable, but protracted crises increase the danger.5 By 1941 he refined his argument to suggest that the specialists in violence who are the core of a garrison state will include expertise in areas heretofore regarded as civilian, such as administrative organization, personnel management and public relations (1941: 59).6 Chillingly, the rulers will rely on war scares to keep the population compliant, and, when these have lost their effectiveness, some “bloodletting” to help preserve the “virtues of sturdy acquiescence in the regime. . .” (1941: 69). No value relativist, Lasswell believed that there are implications for scientists who are “friends of democracy” and who wish “to defend the dignity of human personality.” Even if the garrison state were to come to pass, there are several areas of inquiry that would help preserve as many civilian values as possible, including civilianizing the ruling elite (1941: 71–2). In 1962, Lasswell returned to the notion of maintaining civilian values in a world where conflict made military values important. He suggested the importance of “the absorption of the military by the multivalued orientation of a society” (Huntington 1962: 107), a position that would put him at odds with Huntington. Samuel P. Huntington first made the case that the military is a profession, the defining characteristics of which are expertise (in the management of violence), responsibility (for the security of the state) and corporateness (self-aware professional identity) (1957: 11–18). There is a distinctive military mind, best described as conservative realism, which believes that the nature of the individual and the realities of international relations require that states maintain strong military forces to defend themselves. It further believes “that war is the inspiration of politics, that the military are the servants of the statesman, and that civilian control is essential to military professionalism” (1957: 79) For this reason, reinforcing these tenets of military professionalism rather then trying to civilianize the military best ensures civilian control. This is “objective” civilian control. It is, in his view, a serious mistake to involve the military in politics or to try to civilianize the military. If the military is professional, civilian control is guaranteed. The American liberal tradition has not been hospitable to the military. On the one hand, it has tried to reduce the size of the military to the point that it could not pose a threat to civilian authority. Huntington calls this a policy of extirpation. Another policy is to sacrifice military characteristics by “the refashioning of the military institution along liberal lines.” This policy of “subjective” military control he called transmutation (1957: 155). Huntington was critical of Lasswell’s partial solution to the garrison state of minimizing the distinction between political and military functions. This Huntington called “fusionism,” in which the military would include non-military factors in their thinking and take on non-military responsibilities (1957: 349–51). The complexity of the inter-

Military and civil–military relations 93 national strategic landscape and the multitude on non-military factors that affect US military success pose a problem for military leaders whose preference is to focus primarily on military factors. The Soldier and the State remains one of two standard reference points for discussions of military professionalism, civil–military relations and civilian control of the military. The other is the late sociologist Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (Janowitz, 1960 and 1971).7 Janowitz was a strong believer in subjective civilian control of the military, so these two classic books continue to frame the discussion very well. Normative theorists: Sam C. Sarkesian, Don M. Snider and Eliot A. Cohen One of the important constructs of Morris Janowitz was his notion of the soldier–scholar. The militaries of the world have provided numerous examples of this kind of individual throughout history. This section includes two such soldier–scholars, now retired from active service, and a distinguished nonmilitary scholar, all with close connections to US military and civilian leaders. Following a military career that included enlisted service in the occupation of Germany, as a Special Forces officer in Korea, as an airborne officer, at the US Military Academy, and as an infantry officer in Vietnam, Sam C. Sarkesian turned his attention to scholarly issues concerning the military and civil–military relations. This work ranged from sophisticated analyses of revolutionary guerilla warfare and terrorism (Sarkesian, 1975b, 1984, 1986) to military effectiveness (with Williams, 1990), military sociology (1980), military professionalism (1975a), and professional military education (with Williams and Bryant, 1995). He emphasizes the central role of the president and the national security establishment in making effective military policy (Sarkesian et al., 2002). Some of Sarkesian’s work was done in collaboration with scholars from his own and from other disciplines. These include political scientists, an historian and a psychologist (Sarkesian et al., 1995; Sarkesian and Connor, 1999). In his writings, Sarkesian highlights the importance of military professionalism to combat effectiveness, and the important role of special forces in the US military. In his view, military officers have the responsibility to speak out in their area of expertise, even when their opinions may differ from those of their civilian masters. He notes that “the military profession itself must be philosophically broadened and encouraged to involve itself judiciously in the policy arena. . . . This cannot be done by adhering to a notion of the military profession as a silent order of monks isolated from the political realm” (1998: 97, 99). He remains concerned that the military must at the same time preserve “the culture and virtues suited to its unique mission” and be aware of the limits of such “constructive political engagement as defined by the military professional ethos and the American democratic system” (1998: 107, 112). Sarkesian’s contributions to the profession and to the field of military studies include assuming the presidency of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed

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Forces and Society (IUS) from Morris Janowitz. He did much to institutionalize the organization and put it on a solid footing for the post-Janowitz era. In this case, it was not only political science as a discipline that advanced the interdisciplinary study of the military, but a political scientist whose vision and organizational skills were crucial to the advancement of the field. Don M. Snider completed his military career at the highest levels of civil–military relationships in the United States, serving in his last tours of duty in the White House on the National Security Council Staff and then in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Then, after retiring and directing political–military research for five years in an influential thinktank in Washington, DC, he returned to the US Military Academy at West Point. Many of his writings have been concerned with issues of military professionalism in general and army professionalism and army officership in particular (Snider et al., 1999; Snider and Watkins, 2000). He is also a prominent scholar and commentator on issues of professional military education (Snider et al., 2001). Snider publishes in military publications as well as prestigious academic venues, and has added much toward our understanding of civil–military relations and how these relate to the effectiveness of the military profession. He was among the first to trace the effects of new legislation increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggesting that a new norm of jointness, indeed a new military profession, was emerging (1996, 2003). While much of Snider’s work has a decidedly policy focus, he is also a prominent commentator on the areas of the expert knowledge of military professions and how that knowledge is best practiced by military professionals in the American civil–military context (Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995). His latest work brings together several interdisciplinary strands of research on army service as a professional calling, rather than simply as participation in a large bureaucracy (Snider and Matthews, 2005). Eliot A. Cohen is among the most prominent US scholars writing about military command, civilian control and most effective ways in which to apply military force. His book, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (2002) is a magisterial account of the relations between military leaders and civil authority in a democracy. Cohen chose four historical examples that support his view that civilian leaders must frequently insist on prevailing against military leaders, even on military subjects. His examples were Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben Gurion – all of whom had strong opinions about the manner in which their respective wars should be fought. They were not, as their military opponents sometimes supposed, naive amateurs or armchair generals. They had studied military matters closely, and were more qualified than many of their generals to make strategic decisions. Cohen suggested that the American military became politicized during the Cold War. Military academy cadets became congressional interns, strategy was taught in the war colleges and civilians were discouraged from developing their

Military and civil–military relations 95 expertise in military affairs (2002: 204). He did not suggest a sinister motive for this development; it comes from the increasingly close connection between force in politics, “reinforced by the increasing gap between traditional military values of hierarchy, order, loyalty, and self-sacrifice and a civilian world that seems increasingly egalitarian (at least in work habits), fluid, individualistic, and acquisitive” (2002: 205). Cohen believes that civilian leaders must become involved in the details of military matters so that they can dominate such discussions with the military. This does not mean that civilian leaders should dictate to the military; indeed, each of the four leaders chosen valued candid advice from their militaries. Civilians should not simply issue orders, but should intensively push their leaders and probe for their best advice. He argues for an “unequal dialogue,” not for blind civilian domination of the process. He said of successful civilian wartime leaders, “Much of their genius lay in their ability to tolerate disagreement; even more in their ability to retreat from their own poor decisions or simply to change their minds” (2002: 173). Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Cohen writes, President Lyndon B. Johnson did not interfere much in the details of the Vietnam War, apart from some rules of engagement and target selection. Even in those cases he often accepted the views of his military advisors. The greater problem was that no one in authority, civilian or military, had a coherent strategy for prosecuting the war. It is hard to disagree in principle with the notion that civilian leaders should exercise close control over the military. The issue is the degree to which these leaders should defer to military judgments in areas of particular military expertise, rather then substitute their own civilian “military” judgment. A complication is that the line between “civilian” and “military” strategic expertise is not so sharp; civilian and military strategists alike differ with one another, misunderstand the nature of strategic challenges, and have difficulty in determining acceptable risk. In such a situation, it is up to the civilians to assert themselves. This is no guarantee of success, however. As these words are written, there are problems with the pacification and reconstruction of Iraq, and it appears that civilian leaders in the USA should have paid closer attention to military warnings – especially about the number of troops that would be required to win the peace after a successful initial battle. New institutionalists/formal theorists: Peter D. Feaver and Deborah D. Avant Peter D. Feaver has augmented his academic career with high-level service on the staff of the US National Security Council and as an officer in the Naval Reserve. This is reflected in his academic work, which combines academic rigor and real-world experience. For Feaver, the problem of how to control the military is similar to the problem addressed by James Madison in Federalist 51: how to frame a government strong enough to govern, yet also obliged to control itself. The military version of this is what Feaver calls the “civil–military

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problematique”: how do you have a military that is strong enough to be effective that does not also pose a threat to democratic political institutions (Feaver, 1996)? Like most students of civil–military relations in the United States, Feaver is not concerned about anything as dramatic as a military coup. He is concerned, however, about the degree to which military leaders follow the directions of their civilian masters. He uses agency theory to predict when the military will work (follow the directions of their civilian masters) or shirk (not follow the directions of their civilian masters). Military obedience, he says, is more likely when “civilians will detect and punish military misbehavior . . .” (Feaver, 2003: 14; 1998). He sees agency theory as an alternative to the dominant theory of Samuel P. Huntington, while agreeing with Huntington that there is a distinction between civilians and the military. Feaver’s theory is more dynamic than Huntington’s, in that both civilian and military actors in advanced democracies anticipate the actions of the other in an ongoing strategic interaction. The degree to which civilian control is effective will depend on a number of factors, including the issue, the style of the president and the personalities in the military hierarchy. Normatively, Feaver is of the view that even if civilians are wrong, it should be their call. As he says, “Regardless of how superior the military view of a situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. . . . [C]ivilians have the right to be wrong” (Feaver, 2003: 6). Feaver has also done important interdisciplinary work. He was co-principal investigator with historian Richard D. Kohn on a project examining the “culture gap” between the civilians and military. This was a major collaborative effort with scholars from many disciplines, and resulted in an edited book that marks the state of research on civil–military relations in the United States (Feaver and Kohn, 2001). Perhaps the most important contribution of this project was a set of survey data that is the most complete and current on US civilian and military attitudes. The project also spawned scholarly collaborations of significant scholarly and practical importance, such as Feaver’s timely work with Christopher Gelpi on civilian and military attitudes toward the use of force and their willingness to incur casualties in the process (Feaver and Gelpi, 2004). Illustrating the crossover between sociology and political science, they use the sociological method of survey data to shed light on a traditional political science issue, the use of force. There is also an international dimension to the civilian–military culture gap work spearheaded in the US by Feaver and Kohn. The issue has been addressed more recently by scholars associated with RC01: Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association and the European Research Group on the Military and Society (ERGOMAS). This research, carried out in 2004, will be published in 2006.8 Like Feaver, Deborah D. Avant views the relationship between civilians and military as one of principal and agent, and has used this perspective to examine civilian control as it applies to both military effectiveness and the accountability

Military and civil–military relations 97 of military policy in a democracy. Avant (1994: 138) understands the importance of historical context in understanding civil–military relations. She looked at the ability of the British Army to adapt in the Boer War and in Malaya, and compares this with the difficulties of the American Army in adapting in Vietnam. In her view, one of the most effective mechanisms of civilian control is the military personnel system. It permits civilian leaders to select for advancement those military leaders most in sympathy with civilian perspectives, and thereby ensure that military leaders who wish to be promoted will remain in harmony with them (1994: 47). In general, the unified civilian leadership will more effectively exercise control over the military than a leadership that is divided. This type of institutional system maximizes the integration of doctrine with grand strategy, but sometimes at the cost of the skill and resources devoted to military preparedness (Avant, forthcoming). Avant’s later work looks at various indicators of the degree of crisis in American civil–military relations (1998) and the attitudes of the military toward new missions (Avant and Lebovic, 2000). Her latest project concerns the growing degree to which ostensibly military functions are performed by civilians (2004). This privatization of security has implications not only for the conduct of war but for civil–military relations. Civilian contractors are different kinds of agents than military organizations. Though under different circumstances they may provide more or less effectiveness and greater or lesser integration with societal values, their use always changes the political control of force, or who guards the guardians. This changed principal–agent relationship has gained mounting importance, in the US particularly, as more and more of what used to be performed by soldiers is done by civilian contractors. In the past, contractors were mainly useful for maintaining complex weapons systems. They now provide other services, including advanced training that directly impacts combat on the battlefield. In the first Gulf War, there was one contractor for every 50 soldiers; in the recent war in Iraq, there was one contractor for every ten soldiers (2004: 153). The implications of the changed political control in the US include a reduced role for congress, reduced transparency and greater opportunities for adventurous military policy (2005).9 Structuralists/IR theorists: John J. Mearsheimer, Michael C. Desch and Stephen J. Cimbala John J. Mearsheimer is perhaps the most influential grand theorist of conflict of his generation, and much of his work bears directly or indirectly on civil military relations. Mearsheimer’s first book was a contribution to the discussion then raging about the role of conventional as opposed to nuclear forces in the defense of Western Europe (1985). This significant volume had a profound effect on military thinking and ultimately on the US military. It was followed by a critical analysis of the work of B.H. Liddell Hart (Mearsheimer, 1988) which suggested that Liddell Hart’s theories were neither as influential nor as original as he claimed.

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Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2003), demonstrates the applicability of realist theory to international relations in general, and international conflict in particular. The “tragedy” is that: Great powers that have no reason to fight each other – that are merely concerned with their own survival – nevertheless have little choice but to pursue power and to seek to dominate the other states in the system. . . . [S]tates recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. (2003: 3–5) Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” predicts, for example, that the United States and China will engage in an intense rivalry not unlike the superpower competition in the Cold War if China’s power continues to increase. The hope that a stronger China will not try to become a regional hegemon in Asia is wishful thinking. Mearsheimer’s views on the primacy of land power and the relative ineffectiveness of strategic bombing and naval blockades (except in concert with strong land forces) have important implications for the structure of military forces and the way military leaders are trained. Michael C. Desch, a student of Mearsheimer’s, is more directly concerned with issues of civilian control of the military. His work reflects a solid understanding of history and is accessible to a non-specialized audience. Desch is not concerned that there may be a military coup, but suggests that the main issue for civilian control is this (1999): “can civilian leaders reliably get the military to obey when civilian and military preferences diverge?” Desch set forth a structural theory that “expects civilian control of the military to be strongest in the face of a challenging international threat environment and weakest when that threat environment is comprised largely of domestic threats.” (1998a, b). This is a different conclusion from that of Harold Lasswell, who feared that a long period of international crisis would cause the emergence of a garrison state. For Desch, it is precisely that challenging environment that increases civilian control, such as during the Cold War (1998b: 591–2). The best environment for civilian control is when external threats are high and internal threats are low; the worst environment is when external threats are low and internal threats are high” (1999: 14). Like Cohen, Desch is firmly of the belief that it is best for civilian preferences to prevail over those of the military. Stephen J. Cimbala is an extraordinarily perceptive and prolific political scientist whose works range from history (1997) to strategic studies (Cimbala, 1984, 2000a; Sarkesian et al., 2002) to nuclear warfare (1998; 2000b) and the difficulties of maintaining deterrence in the face of nuclear proliferation (2002a). It is difficult to convey the breadth of Cimbala’s scholarly activities in a brief summary, but one would be hard pressed to think of an area of military studies that has not been illuminated by Cimbala’s work. Cimbala has a particular gift of clear exposition of complicated subjects, and commands a wide readership of specialists and non-specialists alike.

Military and civil–military relations 99 Cimbala’s work on military persuasion (2002b) brings together concepts from military history, politics and psychology in order to study issues from Clausewitz to cyber-war. In particular, political objectives must be coordinated with military operations and not considered separately. Cimbala is also an influential scholar on the issue of conflict termination (2001), whose advice is frequently sought by government and the media. A student of Clausewitz, Cimbala applies Clausewitz’s insights on friction to situations confronted by militaries today, including peace operations and other small wars (2000a). He has also written in opposition to excessive US unilateralism and the importance of the US standing together with Canada and the European democracies (Forster et al., 2005). A recent article by Cimbala on military transformation in the influential professional military journal, Joint Forces Quarterly (2005), shows a combination of strategic and tactical insights and an awareness of the implications of transformation for civil military relations (2005: 28–33). Perhaps the most important “transformations” of the US military have involved the end of conscription and the integration of the active and reserve components of the military into the “total force.” The former resulted in “an empowered military with smarter and more motivated people” (2005: 30). The latter bound the nation’s military to pursue only those wars that had public support sufficient to permit the reserve force mobilization necessary to pursue a war of any significant scope or duration (2005: 30–2). He takes issue with Eliot Cohen’s view (Cohen, 2002: 187) that this was an inappropriate limitation on choice for civilian officials, arguing that the army “belongs not to the Congress or the President but to the American populace” (Cimbala, 2005: 32–3). New European theorists: Anthony Forster and Hans Born Some of the most pathbreaking work in applying political science perspectives to problems of civil–military relations is being done by British scholar Anthony Forster, both alone and with frequent co-authors Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey. Building on the work of military sociologists, Forster, Edmunds and Cottey (including some 30 international collaborators) use the methodology of political science to study civil–military relations in European postcommunist societies. Their comparative analyses dealt with democratic civilian control, military professionalism, and issues of the military and society (Cottey et al., 2002a, b; Forster et al., 2002, 2003). Their work introduces new conceptual frameworks through which to understand civil–military issues and highlights such issues as military reform. Forster’s own work includes an important interdisciplinary monograph on armed forces and society in Europe (2005) and is an extension of his earlier collaborative work. As the Cold War recedes, it is apparent to Forster that there are many similarities in European civil–military relations. His discussion references previous scholarship, including that of the author of this chapter (Moskos et al., 2000), and is relevant to contemporary issues of the military and society.

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Militaries are considered to be political actors, operating in a strategic concept that affects the kind of military a society will have. Hans Born is a Dutch scholar working in Switzerland as a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). There he coordinates two DCAF working groups of great relevance to civil–military relations: Parliamentary Accountability of the Security Sector and Legal Aspects of Security Sector Governance. Many of the products of these working groups are designed to be relevant to decision-makers, as suggested by their titles: “Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector,” “Democratic Accountability of the Security Sector in Member States” (for the Council of Europe), “Civil–Military Relations in Europe” (with the European Research Group on Military and Society) and “Making Intelligence Accountable: Legal Standards and Best Practices for Oversight of Intelligence Agencies.” Born’s scholarly work also focuses on democratic accountability, such as the effect of crises and institutional change (Born et al., 2006), intelligence accountability (Born et al., 2005) and the use of force (Born and Hänggi, 2004). Like Forster, Born emphasizes the importance of comparative studies of civil–military relations, rather than “insular case studies.” Parliamentary control of the military is based on authority (legal powers), ability (expertise and resources) and attitude (critical attitude), and requires all conditions to be fulfilled to be effective.10

Political science as the core of interdisciplinary studies of the military This discussion has focused on the unique contribution of some important political scientists to the study of the military and civil–military relations. But in addition to its contribution as a discipline, political science is uniquely well positioned to integrate studies of other disciplines. Most political scientists are trained social scientists who understand the language and mores of normal science. They can read and understand studies ranging from the purely historical to efforts by psychologists or sociologists to find patterned regularities in behavior using advanced statistical techniques. Political scientists have also influenced the thinking of scholars from other disciplines. Lasswell and Huntington, in particular, have had a long-lasting impact. As David Segal pointed out, “most military sociologists today do not recognize the impact that Lasswell’s thinking had on Morris Janowitz, and subsequently his students, and their students . . .”11 Political scientists who do not themselves do quantitative studies are often familiar enough with the strengths and limitations of such studies to comprehend their degree of importance and to collaborate with others more familiar with that mode of analysis. Collaboration is especially common with sociologists, whose discipline is closest to political science (Moskos et al., 2000). Indeed, many political scientists do work that is indistinguishable from that done by sociolo-

Military and civil–military relations 101 gists. The work of most of the political scientists discussed above regularly crossed disciplinary borders. Interdisciplinary studies, of course, are not non-disciplinary studies. Such studies are best pursued by scholars with a strong foundation in their own discipline, as well as an appreciation for the contributions of other disciplines and an understanding of how research is conducted in those disciplines. Not all worthwhile studies will be interdisciplinary, or, for that matter, cross-national. But if the subfield is to achieve its full potential – both in intellectual development and in its contribution to public policy – scholars will need to look beyond their own disciplines and beyond the borders of their own countries.

Notes 1 I thank Giuseppe Caforio for the invitation to participate in the 2004 Interim Conference of the RC01: Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution of the International Sociological Association in Ankara, Turkey, from which this chapter is drawn, and more broadly for his scholarship and his leadership of the Research Committee. I am particularly indebted to James Burk and Michael P. Noonan for their suggestions for the overall conceptualization of these issues. I have received valuable advice from most of the authors referred to in this chapter, as well as from Aaron Belkin, Michel Martin, Charles C. Moskos, and David R. Segal. I appreciate the help of all of these scholars in developing my thinking on these matters. 2 See Peter D. Feaver (1999) for an earlier and more exhaustive treatment of this subject. Given Feaver’s germinal contributions to civil–military relations theory and his insightful observations, his article is a particularly valuable resource. 3 I am indebted to Michael P. Noonan for the organization of this section. He should not be held accountable for my version of his ideas. 4 Stanley’s introduction provides an exceptionally perceptive overview of Lasswell’s garrison state construct. Page references are from this book. 5 In view of current security threats and their likely long duration, Lasswell’s caution seems especially important. 6 This is a close paraphrase of Lasswell’s words. 7 Morris Janowitz was Founding Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), where such discussions continue to this day. The IUS has remained faithful to Janowitz’s vision and encourages rigorous social science research with an interdisciplinary and international focus. 8 Giuseppe Caforio took a leading role in this research. 9 I thank Deborah Avant for clarifying my wording in this section. 10 Personal communication, August 29, 2005. 11 Personal communication, June 20, 2004.

References Avant, Deborah D. (1994) Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Avant, Deborah D. (1998) “Conflicting Indicators of ‘Crisis’ in American Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 24 (3): 375–87. Avant, Deborah D. (2004) “The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force,” International Studies Perspectives, 5: 153–7.

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Avant, Deborah D. (2005) The Market for Force, the Consequences of Privatizing Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Avant, Deborah D. (forthcoming) “Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness,” in Risa Brooks (ed.) Fighting Power: The Causes and Consequences of Military Effectiveness, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. Avant, Deborah D. and James Lebovic (2000) “US Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions,” Armed Forces and Society, 27 (1): 37–56. Born, Hans and H. Hänggi (2004) “Governing the Use of Force under International Auspices: Deficits in Parliamentary Accountability.” In: SIPRY Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Born, Hans, L. Johnson and I. Leigh (eds) (2005), Who is Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Services Accountability. Dulles, VA, Potomac [formerly Brasseys] Publishers. Born, Hans, M. Caparini, Karl Haltiner and J. Kuhlmann (eds) (2006) Civil–Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crises and Institutional Change, London, Routledge. Cimbala, Stephen J. (ed.) (1984) National Security Strategy, Choices and Limits, New York, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (1997) The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century, University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press. Cimbala, Stephen J. (1998) The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (2000a) Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (ed.) (2000b) Deterrence and Nuclear Proliferation in the TwentyFirst Century, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (2001) Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (2002a) The Dead Volcano: the Background and Effects of Nuclear War Complacency, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (2002b) Military Persuasion in War and Policy: the Power of Soft, Westport, CT, Praeger. Cimbala, Stephen J. (2005) “Transformation in Concept and Reality,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 38: 28–33. Cohen, Eliot A. (2002) Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, New York, CA, Free Press. Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Forster (2002a) “The Second Generation Problematic: Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces,” Armed Forces and Society, 29 (1): 31–56. Cottey, Andrew, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Forster (2002b) Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, Basingstoke, Palgrave. Desch, Michael C. (1998a) “Soldiers, States, and Structures, The End of the Cold War and Weakening U.S. Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and Society, 24 (3): 389–405. Desch, Michael C. (1998b) “A Historian’s Fallacies, A Reply to Bacevich,” Armed Forces and Society, 24 (4): 589–94. Desch, Michael C. (1999) Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press. Feaver, Peter D. (1996) “The Civil–Military Problematique, Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society, 23 (2): 149–78.

Military and civil–military relations 103 Feaver, Peter D. (1998) “Crisis as Shirking, an Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 24 (3): 407–34. Feaver, Peter D. (1999) “Civil–Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 211–41. Feaver, Peter D. (2003) Armed Servants, Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Feaver, Peter D. and Christopher Gelpi (2004) Choosing Your Battles: American Civil–Military Relations and the Use of Force, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Feaver, Peter D. and Richard H. Kohn (eds) (2001) Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–Military Gap and American National Security, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Forster, Anthony (2005) Armed Forces and Society in Europe, Basingstroke, Palgrave. Forster, Anthony, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds) (2002) The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces, Basingstoke, Palgrave. Forster, Anthony, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds) (2003) Soldiers and Society in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change, Basingstoke, Palgrave. Forster, Anthony, Peter Kent and Stephen J. Cimbala (2005) The U.S. NATO, and Military Burden Sharing, London, Frank Cass. Huntington, Samuel P. (1957) The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations, New York, NY, Vintage Books. Huntington, Samuel P. (ed.) (1962) Changing Patterns of Military Politics, New York, NY, The Free Press. Janowitz, Morris (1960/1971) The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait, New York, NY, The Free Press. Lasswell, Harold D. (1930) Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press. Lasswell, Harold D. (1936) Politics, Who Gets What, When, How, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill. Lasswell, Harold D. (1937) “Sino-Japanese Crisis, The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State,” The China Quarterly, 11: 643–9. Lasswell, Harold D. (1941) “The Garrison State,” American Journal of Sociology, 46 (4): 455–68, reprinted in Stanley (1997): 55–75. Mearsheimer, John J. (1985) Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. (ed.) (1988) Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. (2003) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, NY, W.W. Norton. Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds) (2000) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, New York, NY, Oxford University Press. Sarkesian, Sam C. (1975a) The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society, Chicago, IL, Nelson-Hall Publishers. Sarkesian, Sam C. (ed.) (1975b) Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Chicago, IL, Precedent Publishing. Sarkesian, Sam C. (ed.) (1980) Combat Effectiveness, Cohesion, Stress, and the All-Voluntary Military, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publications.

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Sarkesian, Sam C. (1984) America’s Forgotten Wars: the Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press. Sarkesian, Sam C. (1986) The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press. Sarkesian, Sam C. (1998) “The U.S. Military Must Find Its Voice,” Orbis, 12 (3): 423–37. Sarkesian, Sam C. and Robert E. Connor, Jr. (1999) The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century, London, Frank Cass. Sarkesian, Sam C. and John Allen Williams (eds) (1990) The U.S. Army in a New Security Era, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner. Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams and Fred B. Bryant (1995) Soldiers, Society and National Security, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner. Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala (2002) U.S. National Security, Policymakers, Processes, and Politics, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner. Snider, Don M. (1996) “The US Military in Transition to Jointness Surmounting Old Notions of Interservice Rivalry,” Airpower Journal, Fall: 16–27. Snider, Don M. (2003) “Jointness, Defense Transformation and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession,” Parameters, XXXIII (3): 17–30. Snider, Don M. and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds) (1995) U.S. Civil–Military Relations, in Crisis or Transition, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Snider, Don M., project director, and Lloyd J. Matthews, editor (2005) The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd Edn, Boston, McGraw Hill. Snider, Don M. and Gayle L. Watkins (2000) “The Future of Army Professionalism, A Need for Renewal and Redefinition,” Parameters, XXX (3): 5–20. Snider, Don M., John A. Nagl and Tony Pfaff (1999) Army Professionalism: The Military Ethic and Officership in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December. Snider, Don M., Robert F. Priest and Felisa Lewis (2001) “The Civilian–Military Gap and Professional Military Education at the Precommissioning Level,” Armed Forces & Society, 27 (2): 249–72. Stanley, Jay (ed.) (1997) “Harold D. Lasswell,” Essays on the Garrison State, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers.

5

Social history and the armed forces Military education and social change Sl awomir Magala

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together. (Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell Address Speech, January 17, 1961) Contrary to all public declarations, President Eisenhower had delegated to major theater commanders the authority to initiate nuclear attacks under certain circumstances, such as outage of communications with Washington – an almost daily occurrence in those days – or presidential incapacitation (twice suffered by President Eisenhower). This delegation was unknown to President Kennedy’s assistant for national security, McGeorge Bundy – and thus to the president – in early 1961, after nearly a month in office, when I briefed him on the issue. Kennedy secretly continued the authorization, as did President Johnson. (Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets, 2002)1

Introduction President Dwight Eisenhower, whose military career as a commander-in-chief of allied forces in Europe after the Normandy invasion preceded his political career, which resulted in winning elections for the presidency of the United States, had sounded the above-mentioned warning in 1961. His warning against the military–industrial establishment evoked a vision of hidden networks and cunning passages filled by bureaucrats, officers, researchers, entrepreneurs and managers networking under the cloak of secrecy. They were supposedly secretive and uncontrolled, very influential as lobbyists yet barely seen in the media (if media decided to trace them or, at least, suggest they are up to some mysterious activities), let alone analyzed in serious political debate of concerned citizens. Eisenhower’s warning came at the time of aggressive Soviet policy of communist expansion, when Soviet military planners were about to launch the

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attempt to station nuclear weapons in Cuba, and when serious strategic think tanks pondered the question of “mutually assured destruction” and the ability to survive the first nuclear attack – and to retaliate. His warning was sounded in the period when the USA’s industrial domination of the “free world” assured an increasingly affluent lifestyle for the growing middle class. This optimism, reflected in the enthusiastic response to John F. Kennedy’s call to young Americans to join the Peace Corps and help the rest of the world reach the USA living standards, had also prompted a large-scale “war on poverty” (and Johnson’s successful improvement of urban housing and education for the poorest). The Soviet political elite, unable to “destalinize” the system in spite of lip service being paid to millions of its victims in Kruschtschev’s famous speech at the twentieth party congress, proclaimed that the state’s target was a classless society, for which the existing one should fight like an army. Russians went on constructing a militarized state, diverting all resources toward military planning and imposing radical totalitarian inequality on Russian society (and societies they had occupied after World War II). The Americans insisted on preserving inequalities (of talent, wealth, power), but demonstrated the “stretching” capacities of a flexible and accommodating middle class as an achievable and desirable target for upward social mobility (and emphasized the attractiveness of the United States as the world’s number one destination for immigrants). While Soviet upward social mobility met sharp limits separating the political power elite from the rest of society (including most of the professional bureaucracies initially serving as channels of upward social mobility for peasants and industrial workers), which had to be enslaved and exploited so that “benevolent” dictatorship could implement its plans, Americans preached a class society based on capitalist markets subjected to a benign control by parliamentary democracy. They hoped to expand their middle class so as to include all those who wanted to “take chances” in pursuit of liberty, property and happiness (and thus appeared to pose no limits to the upward social mobility of immigrant masses). In the case of the Soviets, the military had priority in designing and managing social processes, and their right to do so had never been questioned. In the case of the USA, the military had to work through networking and persuasion, and their right to do so was systematically questioned, albeit sometimes belatedly. The Cold War tends to be underestimated and partly forgotten, especially its ideological climate. Corporate managers did not shy away from proclaiming that “what is good for General Motors is good for the United States,” and an affluent society of conspicuous consumption turned other-directed organization men with their household-dedicated women into a lonely crowd of a huge middle class, just about to begin bowling alone, but still enjoying the relatively quiet intermezzo between the war in Korea (1950–3) and the outbreak of protests against the involvement in Vietnam (1966–8). The rise of the suburban middle class was expected to defuse class struggle, eliminate industrial strikes and end racial discrimination in the southern states of the USA. It did – at the time, and for the time being.

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Eisenhower’s warning remains important. Cloaked in the secrecy imposed on intelligence communities, or inaccessible because of the arcane peer control of high-tech elite research teams, many developments in the contemporary military–industrial establishment remain unknown, uncontrolled and understudied. Lucky incidents, as – for instance – the making of the Internet, or, rather, its emergence out of the secretive labyrinths of venture capital, high-tech military industries, advanced research in corporate labs and top universities, and generational clusters – allow us to see but a fleeting glimpse of the entire constellation of Silicon Valleys on the make.2 Some of them manage to break free of military or commercial control (as did the Internet and the World Wide Web); some disappear forever from the public eye and will – eventually, hopefully – be reconstructed, some day, from the archives of the National Security Administration, military intelligence data or diaries of CIA executives. Eisenhower’s ideal of an alert and knowledgeable citizenry is also continually undermined by the multi-mediated communications, shaping citizens’ attention span (and shortening it to the zapping distance from the next “cut” of images and soundbites), shaping the agenda for public discussions and competing for a scarce resource in networked societies: the undivided, serious, reflexive attention of individual citizens. The longer the distance separating us from the Cold War, the more we learn about the all-pervasive influence of the military and their think tanks upon the very civil society and its democratic political agenda they were supposed to protect and respect as their superior in a political and moral sense. The more clearly we also see, to use Gavril Kharitonovitch Popov’s words, how Stalin managed to privatize the Russian war effort and to turn the end of World War II into an expansion of his version of militarized and totalitarian state socialist society.

The West Side story, or the double-edged sword of civil defense World politics in the twenty-first century will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the twentieth century – that is, from the unintended consequences of the Cold War. (Chalmers Johnson, 2000: 229) The very same President Eisenhower who warned against the military–industrial establishment when leaving office in January 1961, had no qualms about disavowing any direct knowledge of the “Militant Liberty” program, articulated in a classified National Security Council directive in 1958 and recommending troop education (following brainwashing of the US prisoners of war captured by the Chinese and Northern Koreans, the US Army worried about increasing the resistance to such techniques among soldiers), as well as public education and information programs. All these were thought to strengthen the resistance to communist infiltration and subversion and were based on an idea that:

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This is an important point, because it shows how political controls can be avoided by the military and their political neutrality violated – without a major public debate about the role of the armed forces in shaping civil society’s political agenda. This would have been impossible if communism remained one of the many political options in a democratic society. However, the international espionage and sabotage conducted by the agents of Comintern and Soviet policy conducted under the ideological banners of communism facilitated the exclusion of the communist option from a legitimate range of choices in democratic societies. Soviet colonial policies in post-Yalta central and eastern Europe provided a justification for ideological exclusion of communism from the US political agenda. Different European trajectories of countries with a strong Communist Party participating in legal elections – for example, France and Italy – resulted in different policies, some of which (for instance the “Gladio” project and P2 massonic lodge network in Italy) are still partly shrouded in secrecy. Adam Yarmolinsky, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (a lawyer, editor and educator) had investigated this complacent attitude of civilian institutions, which were supposed to control the military and quoted crucial fragment of the Senate investigative committee hearings. His findings are interesting, because he has been working with the political controllers of the military, and he was not hostile to the latter – appreciating, for instance, the military establishment’s accomplishments, especially as far as education of individuals drawn from lower classes or the diminishing of racial inequalities in society at large went. Nevertheless, he was very much concerned that the military–industrial (one is almost tempted to say military–industrial–academic–political) establishment pervaded – in the words of M.J. Rossant, Director of The Twentieth-Century Fund, which sponsored his research – “every nook and cranny of our national life almost without our knowing it.” Here, therefore, is where we see most clearly the hidden injuries of the Cold War, even on a morally right side of it, within the democratic state, which had been the opposite of the “evil empire.” Wars, cold or hot, rarely leave combatants untainted: Putting the study of Communism into a “nonpolitical” category – as a “given” – was a particular concern of Senator Strom Thurmond of the Senate investigating committee. His exchange with Rear Admiral D.F. Smith Jr., at the time Chief of Information for the Navy, is an illustration: Senator Thurmond: I think most people, certainly you and I, are in agreement that all military people should not make official expressions or participate in partisan politics, or make official expressions that are inconsistent with the foreign policy of this country.

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Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. Senator Thurmond: Or the national policy of this country. Admiral, statements on communism, the enemy, is a different situation, is it not? Admiral Smith: I agree that it is, sir. Senator Thurmond: In other words, you would not consider speaking against communism as involving foreign policy, would you? Admiral Smith: No, sir. Senator Thurmond: Communism is the common enemy of the United States and the free world, and every true patriot would be against communism? Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. Senator Thurmond: Is that not right? Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. Senator Thurmond: So that there should be no objection to military personnel making expressions or making speeches on the subject of Communism, the insidious nature of it, their aims and designs, the techniques of subversion and so forth. Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. Senator Thurmond: Are you in accord with that? Admiral Smith: I am completely in accord with it, sir, and I never give a speech but what I throw a few nasty cracks about Communism. (Yarmolinsky, 1971: 228–9) The above exchange between a senator, whose role consisted of checking compatibility of military initiatives in a broader society with democratic institutions and public control of rules and agendas, including the distinction between partisan politics and limits of the involvement of the military in the latter, and a representative of the army bureaucracy (on top of that – of one of the most secret arms of the armed forces) lets us see that the “controlling” arm of a democratically elected parliament is “weak” and “permissive,” giving the military a free hand in disseminating political propaganda, provided it is linked to the threat of communist infiltration, subversion and contributes to the increased alertness of citizens. The social and political functions of the “war on communism” or “war on terrorism” are ideological (nobody accepts Communist Parties

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as legitimate participants in a political arena) and social (disciplined citizens take over duties that otherwise would have to be performed by the military and by the government). Citizens, trained to defend themselves against nuclear attack, are supposed to be “on the front line” of the Cold War, while the military assume, almost without saying, the role of champions of preventive psychological warfare, which is waged in order to render US citizens less vulnerable to the communist propaganda and more “sympathetic” to the Western values of political democracy and market economy. The above senate hearings took place in 1961, the very year that Eisenhower left office. However, ten years earlier, another, less “visible” platform had already been created, allowing for a much broader influence of military planners on civil society, under the general label of “civil defense.” The introduction of the concept and the construction of infrastructure for “civil defense” meant that the influence of the army spilled over into the area of psychological manipulation of the mass of citizens. Ideological alertness in the face of an external threat has been complemented by the internal, domestic intervention on an organized, institutional scale. A new general screenplay (a doomsday scenario) for the mass of the US citizens has been “written” and rehearsed; citizens were supposed to manage their emotions and to overcome their fear of nuclear destruction. Here, again, the influence of the Cold War upon our present predicament and political marketing is quite clear: the invention of the civil defense projects served a very useful purpose of preventing the outbreak of panic, while at the same time involving all citizens in “do-it-yourself” selfdefense initiatives: Emotion managers would control nuclear terror by promoting civil defense to American people. Civil defense would teach Americans what they needed to know about nuclear weapons. It would also spell out norms specifying appropriate responses to a nuclear attack. Finally, it would elaborate the techniques that Americans could use to control their emotions regarding nuclear war. (Oakes, 1994: 46) The East River Project was a study of Cold War systems of emotion management, commissioned by Truman and undertaken by Associated Universities, a think tank, which included top US universities, either Ivy League (Cornell, Columbia, Harvard, The University of Pennsylvania, Yale) or other top research universities (Johns Hopkins, MIT, the University of Rochester). The commissioning agencies included the Federal Civil Defense Administration, National Security Resources Board and the Department of Defense. The aim of the study was to convince US citizens that, given relevant and accurate information, training and preparations, they could face a potential nuclear war and maximize their chances of survival by undertaking rational actions – taking steps to implement lessons learned during the civil defense exercises designed and disseminated by the military and their faithful think tanks. By exercising their roles in a future

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possible nuclear war, US civilians were rehearsing their obedience to the military planners. Let us notice that all this happened without any major modification of the laws nor of the legal regulation of the functioning of the democratic institutions. As contemporary researchers phrased it: Project East River undertook to domesticate the psychological warfare tactics that were employed against America’s enemies abroad. The propaganda instrumentarium used against the Communists would be retooled as emotion management techniques for psychologically manipulating the American people. The weapons devised to protect the United States from its enemies would now be turned against its own citizens, but, of course, in their own interest. The rationale for the use of psychological warfare techniques abroad and the justification for their incorporation into domestic civil defense were the same: national security. (Oakes, 1994: 51)3 The East Side story, or how the other side of the Elbe was ruled The secrecy, which would have to envelope the army, would provide an ideal ground for conspiracy. The country would be at the mercy of the generals unless (which would lead to much the same results) its civilian rulers militarized themselves, like the general secretary of the Russian Communist Party who became a marshal. (Andreski, 1968: 174) Contemporary studies, which are meant to deconstruct the Cold War policies in the Western world, are slowly but surely reaching the level of academic recognition and spilling over to the public domain. Suffice it to mention the study of a cultural struggle for cultural supremacy in the world media between the communist and Western cultural managers and their political sponsors (see Caute, 2003), or studies of the political background of methodological and sociological choices made by managers of scientific communities in the Cold War period (see Fuller, 2001; Amadae, 2003). However, these studies tend to be one-sided.4 While there are numerous studies of the Western side of the “iron curtain,” studies of processes that went on east of Elbe are much less frequent and are based on very few documentary sources – mainly due to the conscious prevention of research and discouraging of investigations on the part of the contemporary Russian government in general, and of a former KGB operative, Vladimir Putin, in particular. This conscious attempt to prevent further analysis of historical documents is based on an assumption that any reconstruction of the conduct of state organs in post-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union is bound to result in a general re-evaluation of the status of the Soviet Union as a state (and to reveal many more crimes against humanity leading to the acquisition of status of a perpetrator of systematic, planned genocide). The recent celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the capitulation of Nazi

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Germany has been viewed as an occasion not to reflect on the past, but as an opportunity to continue pretending that the past never happened. The presence of some Western politicians in Moscow in May 2005 is a shameful episode of the European Union and a step back from a resolute support for the Ukrainian independence from Russian colonial rule in December 2004. Citizens and media audiences have been offered a victory parade – but neither the role of Stalin’s Russia in provoking the outbreak of World War II, nor Stalin’s crimes against citizens of all nations, including the Russian one, have ever been mentioned. A realistic presentation of the victory parade would have to include its lesserknown episodes and stages. Front soldiers, who had been allowed to march through the Red Square in 1945, had been quietly disarmed and loaded to trains, which took them to the camps of the Gulag. The reason they had been sentenced to this Gulag archipelago was that they had moved through Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany and thus might have noticed that the paradise of the working class had less to offer in terms of material standards of life then these “bourgeois” states – not exactly the party line in the heavily censored media. Awareness of the crimes committed by uniformed officials of the Soviet state, including the officers and soldiers of the army, police and special forces (secret police, counter-espionage, military units of the Ministry of the Interior), could trigger a change of mind and heart of the world at large, and of the very enslaved and oppressed Russian masses. World public opinion – including in Russian itself – might decide that crimes the Soviet Russians perpetrated in a systematic way belong to the crimes of genocide and have thus to be responded to in a way in which Nazi genocide was dealt with. This would involve a huge program of rethinking Russian history and re-evaluating all Soviet institutions. It would also call for more openness of state-controlled documents, for searching through the archives, secret archives and hidden documents in order to establish the responsibility of war criminals – state functionaries of the Soviet Union. Who has been guilty of genocide? As Norman Mailer says in the closing words of his novel about the CIA: “I would ask: Whom? In the immortal words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ‘Whom? Whom does this all benefit?’ ”(Mailer, 1991: 1122). Novels on the CIA are quite numerous in the USA, and in spite of secrecy, so are the non-fictitious publications (Mailer lists more than three pages of them in the preface to Harlot’s Ghost, including, for instance, Dirty Work: the CIA in Western Europe, edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf in 1978, or Peter Wyden’s Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story, published in 1979). They are not in Russia. Had they been published, Russian citizens would have been given a chance to reflect on the power of their militarized and autocratic state. They would be able to decide what to do with their own past and with the collective burden of generations of enslaved citizens of the Soviet Union – they would stand a chance of de-sovietizing, of getting rid of the curse of a “homo sovieticus.” This part of the post-Cold War political agenda of world’s democracies and of the agenda of the Russian civil society, whose emergence had been

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delayed for too long for Europe’s good, still remains to be written, but the sooner we face the problem of what to do with Russia so that it allows its citizens to mature in moral and civil terms, the better for the further development of the European Union. Moreover, some international tribunal could be summoned in order to perform an act of judgment analogous to the judgment meted out in the Nuremberg trials. One might imagine the start of a UNO-sponsored and managed program of helping to re-socialize the Russian citizens subjected to de-socializing influences for so many generations and allowing them to come to terms with the legacy of genocide, colonial oppression and aggression against all neighboring nations. Such a program of moral rehabilitation would have required many activities, procedures and close collaboration with democratic movements in Russia. Let us look at its feasibility from the point of a relatively minor problem – that of rewriting of Russian history books, especially of those books in which they interpret Soviet state policies in the years 1939–47, i.e. between the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact, with which Stalin and Hitler started World War II as aggressive dictators dividing Europe in Communist–Nazi complicity, and the Fulton speech, in which Churchill used the expression “iron curtain” for the first time, thus finally putting an end to illusions cherished by F.D. Roosevelt, who returned from Yalta to the US Congress with the message that the Americans “will get along with the Russians just fine.”5

Learning from history: a militarized empire can only be right Ideologies may come and go, but empire is historically more resilient, a power system, which tailors its legitimizing ideology pragmatically and even cynically to the demands of political exigency. To attempt to maintain even a socialist-justified but over-extended and late Soviet Empire in an era of imperial decolonization may indeed have proved anachronistic; but the Soviet Empire may still turn out to be the latest rather than the last manifestation of imperialism. (Pearson, 2002: 199) My interest in a possibility of overcoming this resistance of a neopaternalist autocratic ruler in contemporary Russian society has been triggered by a conversation held in the early years of the twenty-first century in Tallin, Estonia. When working on an EU-sponsored change project in the Ministry of Economics, I had once shared a morning bus from a hotel outside the city to the city center with a young schoolboy, aged 14, who turned out to be a Russian citizen of Estonia. He lived in a former Red Army base housing block, where his parents, formerly civilian specialists servicing the army, decided to stay rather than return to Russia, where their chances for economic success would be bleaker. They resented the loss of privileges they enjoyed at the expense of the majority of

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Estonian population under the Soviet rule and the necessity to learn Estonian in order to become eligible for full citizenship, but they were attracted by the country’s new economic opportunities. The boy knew nothing about Soviet aggression in 1940, nor was he aware of the fact that forced settlement of Russians in Estonia was part and parcel of Russification and Sovietization campaigns, which had also included mass executions and deportations of Estonian citizens by members of Soviet army, police and secret police, authorized by Stalin and by the government of Soviet Union. The boy would have none of this. His concept of history was forged by bowdlerized descriptions of the great military leaders, brave foot soldiers and holy motherland, which bravely embraced any other nation which happened to be within the reach of her armed forces. That these commanders and soldiers were fighting to enslave other nations and maintain an empire he took for granted. He was reading about great military leaders of the past – Kutuzov, Suvorov, Zhukov – and dreaming of the time he might possibly return to Estonia crushing the local population and restoring Russian domination, which he clearly was looking forward to. Intrigued by his blind belief that Soviet soldiers have the right to return to all the countries they had once conquered and excited by his total refusal to acknowledge Estonians’ right to anything else than patient waiting for Russians to return and claim what belongs to them (i.e. restoring colonial domination maintained by supreme military power), I had started consulting Russian history textbooks and decided to focus only on the most sophisticated of them (it soon became clear that the popular mass of history textbooks from which children are taught in grammar and high schools prepares them only to be obedient servants of a strong, autocratic state, never questioning the right of this state to make sovereign decisions at the expense of all other nations and never raising the question of huge moral, legal and material responsibility of Russians vis-à-vis their neighboring nations). No mention had been made of rationally planned acts of genocide, which were meant to benefit the Soviet state’s power elite in expanding its sphere of influence, or reinforcing total control of the entire population. The results of this check were interesting – they pointed out some awareness of the problem, but somehow marginalized, delegated to the footnotes and explained away from the point of the state’s raison d’etre. For the sake of brevity, we shall quote only two cases: the explanation of the background of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact and its secret clause, which meant a joint invasion and partition of the Republic of Poland (which Molotov called “the bastard of Versailles”), and the case of a brutal murder of around 20,000 Polish officers – prisoners of war – ordered by Stalin and executed by the military units of the Soviet Ministry of Interior. All victims were handcuffed and shot in the back of the head from close distance, then buried in mass graves near Smolensk. The massacre, which came to be known as the “Katyn´ forest massacre” (although it was conducted at a number of locations) was reluctantly admitted by the Soviet government at the end of the 1980s, but an attempt to conduct an investigation establishing the complicity of Soviet state functionaries has been sabotaged by the Russian Federation’s Military Prosecutor’s Office

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under Putin, who explicitly refused to acknowledge the Katyn´ massacre as an act of genocide. Here is a sample of the background explanations of the origins of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact, which triggered the outbreak of World War II: The Soviet government knew that German army was poised to attack Poland. Aware of the inevitability of war and of the fact they the Soviets were ill prepared for it, they made a sharp turn in inner politics and decided to forge closer ties with Germany. On August 23 1939, a German–Soviet pact of non-aggression has been signed with immediate implementation and for ten years (the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact). A secret protocol had been added with a demarcation of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. Germany acknowledged Soviet interests in the Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia and Finland) and in Besarabia. (Orlov et al., 2005: 388) Let us note that Poland is mentioned only at the beginning in the context of an imminent German invasion. Once the pact has been signed, Poland disappears (if she did not, one would have to ask why a peaceful neighbor was considered a legitimate spoil) and the Soviet government is presented as merely securing the Russian share in German conquests, without, however, being in any way responsible for, or contributing to, the outbreak of World War II. The description gets better: Under new international circumstances, the Soviet government started implementing German–Soviet agreements of August 1939. On September 17, after the Polish army had been defeated and the Polish government fell, the Red Army entered Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. On September 28, a German–Soviet agreement on “friendship and frontiers” had been signed reinforcing the bond of these territories with the rest of the Soviet Union. At the same time Soviet Union pressed for signing agreements on stationing Soviet troops, on the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and obtained them. After the entry of Soviet troops elections had been held in these republics, legislative organs were established, and communist forces won. In 1940 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became republics of Soviet Union. (Orlov et al., 2005: 388) Apart from historical mistakes – the Polish army was not defeated on September 17, nor did the Polish government “fall” on that day – the above fragment reads like propaganda from 1939. The Red Army does not enter Poland, but “Western Ukraine” and “Western Byelorussia.” Nor does it occupy the Baltics; it is simply the presence of the Red Army which somehow changes the laws and makes communist forces win, so that the occupied nations become part of the Soviet empire. The authors acknowledge thus on the next page:

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Slawomir Magala As a result, Soviet union incorporated large territories with a population of 14 million. State border moved westwards from 300 to 600 km. Political agreements of 1939 delayed Nazi attack against Soviet Union for two years. (Orlov et al., 2005: 389)

A Russian child gets the impression that Russians were facing mortal threat in 1939, but luckily managed to avoid it by agreeing to attack Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and provide the Nazis with strategic raw materials (Lutwaffe planes bombing London were flying on Soviet oil generously provided by Stalin). But they also understand that something should be said about the Soviet government’s conduct – ruthless predatory aggression against neighboring nations and close collaboration with an equally criminal regime. They demonstrate quite surprising restraint, and manage to produce the following alibi: If the non-aggression pact, signed in August 1939, was a step to a certain extent imposed on Soviet Union, the secret protocol, and agreement on friendship and frontiers, and other inner political acts [my emphasis] of Stalin’s government, which happened during the war, were a breach of sovereignty of some nations of Eastern Europe. (Orlov et al., 2005: 389) In other words, general policy was legitimate, but some unfortunate acts went too far and thus might infringe on sovereignty of some (few) Eastern European nations. The above fragments clearly demonstrate the gap between our – European – knowledge of World War II and what is being offered as a teaching aid to the Russians students in Putin’s Russia. Bridging this gap is a challenge, which calls for a joint international effort. It is a political, moral and historical scandal that genocide is presented to Russian children as unfortunate “inner political acts.” The fact that hundreds of thousands of Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian citizens were executed, jailed, starved in concentration camps, stripped of all their possessions and transported to Siberia or Kazakhstan in the same sort of trains Jews were transported to concentration camps by the Soviets’ Nazi friends should not and cannot be presented to children of perpetrators of those crimes as “inner political acts.” If they continue to be presented in this way, young generations of Russians will be deprived of a chance to grow up morally, to mature as responsible members of civil society, and will continue to be the cannon fodder of absolutist regimes, which uses all state institutions, including the army, as the personal property of the power-holders. While Orlov et al. do not dare to mention Katyn´ and Soviet genocide, a few historians do, but then they clearly indicate that the timing of an international discussion about the Soviet state’s crimes against humanity basically provides an alibi, and explains why this problem was not and should not ever be raised by international bodies. In a chapter on Soviet–Polish relations in the years 1941–4, Balashov and Rudakov state firmly that:

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Final breakdown of Soviet–Polish relations took place in the fall of 1943 in connection with the so-called Katyn´ affair. On March 13, 1943, Berlin announced that mass graves of the Polish officers had been discovered in the forest of Katyn´ near Smolen´sk. They had been murdered by the organs of NKVD in spring of 1940. On March 20, 1943, the Polish émigré government turned, as did the German one, to the International Red Cross asking them to investigate the matter. Soviet government retaliated accusing “London Poles” of collaboration with Nazi Germany. On April 25, 1943, Stalin’s government broke diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile. (Balashov and Rudakov, 2005: 272) This is the text a student of Soviet history reads: only those who stray to the footnote on page 272 can read a trace, a residue, a small remnant of a feeling of guilt, which must have been felt by those authors: The participation of Soviet special services in executing Polish officers, prisoners of war of 1939 near Katyn´ had been acknowledged by the Soviet government as late as the end of 1980s and accordingly, the Russian government apologized to the Polish one. Nevertheless, when evaluating the position of Soviet Union with respect to this problem in spring of 1943, one should take into consideration that acknowledging their guilt, the Soviet government would weaken the anti-fascist coalition and the resistance in Eastern Europe. It was under the influence of such considerations that the Soviet Union categorically denied executing Polish officers and blamed the executions on German state organs. A special commission formed after the liberation of Smolen´sk, led by the member of Academy of Sciences of Soviet Union, V.P. Potemkin, confirmed official statements about executions claiming they happened under German occupation. (Balashov and Rudakov, 2005: 272) This is the tip of the iceberg. What is being offered as a textbook of history turns out to be lightly disguised political propaganda of a militarized Stalinist state. No historians, political scientists, sociologists or social psychologists are invited to investigate the case or, for that matter, numerous other cases, in which the role of the Soviet state and of the Russian armed forces might be judged, evaluated and brought to international justice. The role of the Red Army in perpetrating crimes of genocide, the role which can lead to an international investigation of criminal acts committed by members of this army against all European nations, including their own, thus remains safely undiscussed, unmentioned and unproblematic.

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Social history and the armed forces If the United States is to avoid becoming a militarized society, the public and its civilian representatives must retain the ultimate right of decision on such central political issues as counter-revolution and insurgency, war and peace. (Yarmolinsky, 1971: 420) The worldwide experience of countries dependent on the export of oil and minerals suggests a powerful debilitating long-term effect of resource dependency upon both growth rates in the economy and the integrity of national political, legal and administrative institutions. The temptations of “rent seeking” – to exploit privileged institutional access to “extractive” export revenue – gravely weaken incentives to build rule-governed institutional regimes. This is above all true in those countries, such as post-Soviet Russia and postcolonial Nigeria, that inherited already devastated institutional landscapes upon the end of the previous regime, that is, communist and colonial, respectively. (Lynch, 2005: 243)6 When comparing the social history of contemporary United States and Russia (something that has not been done in Europe ever since Marquis de Custine went to describe the Russian empire, trying to provide a counterpart to Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”), one is often reminded of the notorious phrase used by the late US president, Ronald Reagan, who called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” When we accept this description, then we have no qualms about seeing the US military as a benevolent donor of the Internet,7 while the Russian military remains a weapon of authoritarian, at times totalitarian state, responsible to no one, but to the political authorities of Russia, which, in turn, act opportunistically, with no concern for international law or human rights, and with no procedure to conduct open public debates, assign responsibility for acts of criminal violence and campaigns of genocide, and to come to terms with the past record of crimes and misdemeanors both inside the Soviet Union and behind its borders. Russian war crimes have not been a topic of international debate due to many circumstances, of which the influence of the communist-inspired agents d’influence (“useful idiots,” as Sartre and public intellectuals similar to him had been described by the Komintern specialists) or outright spies (as Kim Philby and his Cambridge team, who fulfilled Stalin’s orders and planted a bomb in an airplane that carried the Polish general Sikorski from Gibraltar to London) were key factors. Putin’s moral and political kitsch – or the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the capitulation of the Third Reich – must be seen for what it was: a desperate attempt to ward off the specter of the past genocide, the ghost of responsibility, and to postpone the ultimate liberation of Russians from the yoke of their state-controlled social development. It is also an alternative to an honest discussion of the place of the armed

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forces in a civil society and of their role in safeguarding this civil society’s democratic institutions. The Spanish or Portuguese military had managed to survive dictatorship and to support democratic transformations. However, the legacy of genocide prevents the Russian military, who carry the burden of crimes against humanity on their backs, from doing the same – they are, to put it bluntly, “blackmailed” by former KGB agents and their present masters. If they manage to face their responsibilities and heritage, they stand a chance of ending this blackmail. Can they manage, if they are watched over by increasingly specialized “special forces,” which are paid to commit those crimes on a daily basis trying to keep Chechnya within the power sphere of Moscow’s current rulers? Let us hope they can. There must be an alternative to the vicious circle of violence, authoritarianism, autocracy and disenfranchising of the majority of citizens. However, the moral outrage at a lack of accountability for criminal activities of Soviet troops in the course of World War II (looting, rape, random killings) and for the criminal misbehavior of Soviet authorities, which did not hesitate to execute their own troops if the latter failed to attack or dared to fall back (NKVD troops were stationed behind Soviet front lines with orders to shoot their own soldiers, if those wanted to retreat), is difficult to translate into an international institutional form. Responsibility for Soviet genocide rests with the Russian Federation as the direct descendant of the Soviet Union. An inability to prosecute members of their own Russian armed forces or of special services must be seen as a refusal to meet international obligations and to investigate crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, which do not have a judicial deadline and never “expire.” This, then, is the main problem of the European Union as far as Russia (the state and civil society) and Russian armed forces are concerned: how to facilitate Russian’s reconciliation with its own past on terms other than those dictated by the power elite commanding absolute power in the authoritarian state. Russians tanks do not threaten Madrid anymore (though Russian jets infringe on Latvian air space and the Russian military maintain – among others – the mafia republic in Moldova, increasingly obsolete and corrupt anti-European military base in Kalinigrad and a neocolonial wasteland of terror in Chechnya). But Russians’ ignorance about their own history and about their personal responsibility, about the Russian military’s unpaid moral and material debt for playing the role of accomplice, both in triggering the outbreak of World War II and in attempting to enslave nations (including most of central Europe) is a threat to European integration, global stability and the gradual reconstruction of a community of democratic civil societies, free of the hidden injuries of an authoritarian state that uses militarization as a chief instrument of domestic and foreign policy. There are, fortunately enough, voices in contemporary Russia that do point in this direction. Gavril Popov, the first democratically elected mayor of Moscow after the fall of the Soviet Union, refers directly to the veterans of World War II and declares that the Russian government does not have the right to celebrate the anniversary of the end of World War II, since this end in fact meant a lease of

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life for the neo-Stalinist system of genocide (as practiced in Chechnya, as of the present writing); and a serious celebration of this anniversary would have to include a major enquiry into the responsibility for crimes against Russians, against citizens of former Soviet republics, and against the nations of Eastern Europe – all of whom became victims of the Stalinist terms on which World War II has been concluded. Popov writes: Our government should tell our veterans: yes, you had defeated fascism. Praised be your victory. But you hadn’t enough intellect nor courage to strive for a reform of Stalinist socialism. You are personally responsible for the road which Stalin forced our country and the whole world to take. Nobody among you equals Dekabrists, who drew conclusions after the great motherland war of 1812 and stood up against repulsive social system of Russia. This is why democratic forces in Russia in the years 1989–1991 had to do what could have been done better if you had chosen to act – after all, you had weapons in your hands. [. . .] As it is, those European leaders who refused to show up for victory celebrations are right, and not those who agree to play their role in celebrating the anniversary of Stalinist aggression. (Popov, 2005: 6) Let us hope that some day these words will be printed in history textbooks for both school children and cadets in military academies in Russia. The Russian military, definitely one of the most corrupt and isolated professional groups in the history of human societies, deserve a helping hand from democratic societies. They are already receiving some assistance. The lives of the crew members of the “Kursk” submarine could have been saved were it not for the lack of action of the Russian military. Somebody among Russian admirals – trained by their Soviet masters – must have given the order to weld the safety locks, rendering them useless in times of emergency. We can only speculate that this was done because the secrecy around a new type of torpedo was considered more important than the lives of the entire crew. On the other hand, lives of the small submarine crew members have been saved due to modern communication technology. When the wife of one of the threatened crew members talked on a cellular phone and understood the danger, the news was out and it became more difficult for the Russian admirals to pretend they were able to act themselves. Still, in spite of clear evidence to the contrary, they issued curious official statements in which they claimed that they would have been able to do it on their own – and much better at that. Luckily, the unfortunate crew members did not have to experience the practical application of those curiosities on themselves and lived to tell the tale. Can we hope that these Russian sailors will exercise pressure on their Sovietized superiors to change and to make the Russian Army less of a threat to Russians and to the rest of humanity? Can we help them, by starting a discussion about a moral blackmail of the powerholders who – like Putin – refuse to come to terms with the criminal past of the Soviet Union and its Red Army and hold their past cowardice (which Popov was writing about)

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against them? Locks on Soviet nuclear weapons would be much safer if they were in the hands of democratic leaders of a responsible mass of knowledgeable citizens. By trying to bring the day of honest discussion about Soviet genocide closer, we are helping Russians to establish a civil society, dispelling the specter of Cold War and helping ourselves in defusing the danger of a militarized, aggressive state which continues the history of “evil empire” and still teaches its population a docile, bowdlerized, propagandized version of their collective past.

Notes 1 Cf. after Johnson (2004: 97). 2

The debate over network protocols illustrates how standards can be politics by other means. Whereas other government interventions into business and technology (such a safety regulations and antitrust actions) are readily seen as having political and social significance, technical standards are generally assumed to be socially neutral [. . .] But technical decisions can have far-reaching economic and social consequences, altering the balance of power between competing businesses or nations and constraining the freedom of users. Efforts to create formal standards can bring system builders’ private technical decisions into the public realm; in this way, standards battles can bring to light unspoken assumptions and conflicts of interest. (Abbate, 1999: 179)

3 Oakes calls this influence of the military planners upon civilian life in the USA under the constraints of the Cold War a militarization by non-military means: Civil defense militarizes life by non-military means, using techniques of emotion management in order to train Americans to manage themselves. As a result, they will solve the problem of nuclear terror and thereby fulfill the moral requirements of American national security policy. (Oakes, 1994: 77) 4 This judgment has to be qualified, to a certain extent, by evoking many local studies in regional languages. For instance, there is a lively literature, partly triggered by the new access to the postcommunist archives, in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary (see, ´ for instance, Staniszkis, 2003; Dudek, 2004; Spiewak, 2005). 5 “We are going to get along with the Russians just fine” (New York Times, March 1, 1945, p. 1) – see Lynch, 2005: 239. 6 Lynch does not harbor many illusions and looks for analogies of the Russian predicament in Romania and Serbia: “A neopatrimonial state within the framework of façade democracy is being consolidated, as in Romania and Serbia under Ion Iliescu and Slobodan Milosevic, respectively” (Lynch, 2005: 251). 7 Historians of the Internet do stress the fortunate dissolving of military authority: In the 1990s, the Internet proved adaptable enough to make the transition to private commercial operation and to survive the resulting fragmentation of authority. The Internet’s decentralized architecture made it possible to divide operational control among a number of competing providers, while its open and informal structures for technical management were able (at least in the near terms) to survive new commercial and political pressures. (Abbate, 1999: 219–20)

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References Abbate, Janet, Inventing the Internet, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999. Amadae, S.M., Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: the Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003. Andreski, St., Military Organization and Society, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968 (first published 1954). Balashov, A.I. and Rudakov, G.P., Istorija Velikoj Otchestvennej Voyny 1941–1945 (The History of the Great Motherland War 1941–1945), Piter, Moscow, 2005. Caute, David, The Dancer Defects: the Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Dudek, Antoni, Reglamentowana rewolucja: Rozklad dyktatury komunistycznej w Polsce 1988–1990 (Controlled Revolution: Decline of Communist Dictatorship in Poland 1988–1990), Arkana, Kraków, 2004. Fuller, Steve, Thomas Kuhn: a Philosophical History for Our Times, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001. Johnson, Chalmers, Blowback: the Costs and Consequences of American Empire, Little, Brown and Company, London, 2000. Johnson, Chalmers, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic, Holt, New York, 2004. Lynch, Allen C., How Russia Is Not Ruled: Reflections on Russian Political Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. Mailer, Norman, Harlot’s Ghost, Michael Joseph, London, 1991. Oakes, Guy, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1994. Orlov, A.S., Georgev, W.A., Georgeva, N.G. and Sivohina, T.A., Istoria Rossii: Uchebnik (The History of Russia: a Textbook), 2nd edn, Moscow State University of M.W. Lomonosov, Historical Faculty, Moscow, 2005. Pearson, Raymond, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, Palgrave, Basingstoke & New York, 2002. Popov, Gavril, 1941–1945: Zamyetki o woynie (1941–1945: Notes on the War), Olimp Agency, Moscow, 2005. Staniszkis, Jadwiga, Postkomunizm: Próba opisu (Postcommunism: Tentative Description), Slowo/obraz terytoria, Gdan´sk, 2003. S´piewak, Pawel, Pamie¸c´ o komunizmie (Remembering Communism), Slowo/obraz terytoria, Gdan´sk, 2005. Yarmolinsky, A., The Military Establishment: its Impacts on American Society, Harper & Row, New York, 1971.

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From a psychological to a behavioural-sciences approach and beyond in military research Current status and trends Jacques Mylle Imagine an infantry platoon, somewhere in Iraq, progressing towards the outer house blocks of a village that has to be taken. The spearhead section reports to the platoon commander that these houses are not only occupied by enemy troops whose fire prevents them from entering the village but that they also use local civilians – elderly men, women and children – as a living shield. Continuing to progress under enemy fire is excluded. Asking for fire support to be able to penetrate into the town will certainly provoke a slaughter; resuming the progress, the lieutenant and his men will be confronted with the consequences of the platoon commander’s decision: an apocalyptic scene of corpses ripped apart, heavily mutilated bodies, screaming survivors . . . His norms and values will probably prohibit him from asking for fire support . . . but suppose all platoon members have taken a pill which will “protect” them from remembering these traumatogenic events and hence from long-life feelings of guilt . . . Is it science fiction or (nearby) reality? For sure, those tablets are not available yet in the units but research labs are thoroughly studying and experimenting with substances aiming at suppressing fear, a dampened formation of remembrances and their accompanying emotions, and hence feelings of guilt. (Baard, 2003)

The above example shows clearly a multi-faceted problem: an interaction between biological, neuro-physiological, psychological and ethical aspects of the human being. Even if progress is made each day within each scientific discipline, a number of questions can only be solved adequately in an interdisciplinary way.

Introduction Thinking about human behaviour is probably as old as humanity itself. But the framework within which this thinking takes place has evolved throughout history; moreover, two cultures have existed and still exist side-by-side; i.e. science and literature. In this chapter we will focus on the scientific development.

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It is not our aim to write an encyclopaedia of military psychology, but to demonstrate through a selection of topics which issues were addressed in the past, and how they are dealt with nowadays in a military context. We start with an overview of some milestones in the history of psychology; in a second section we highlight some “pure” psychological phenomena; the third section deals with an enlargement to the behavioural sciences; next we address a number of interdisciplinary subjects; finally we focus on how a number of military scientific forums have evolved too. Searching through literature databases shows that interdisciplinarity is understood in different ways, depending on the setting people are working in. A team involved in the treatment of a patient in a mental health clinic, which is composed of, say a psychiatrist, a psychiatric nurse, a clinical psychologist and a social worker, will be called an interdisciplinary team. All co-workers are specialised in human sciences sensu latu. An expert in ballistics and a psychologist, studying together the suppression effect of non-lethal weapons, also form an interdisciplinary team where human sciences and applied sciences are intertwined. Furthermore, it is clear that psychology uses a number of support or aid disciplines without therefore qualifying the problem at hand as an interdisciplinary problem; for example, psychological testing implies the use of psychometrics and hence of mathematics. We will structure the chapter in a double way: first in a time perspective, as stated in the title; and second according to a number of “fields of application” (Duyker et al., 1958). He considers four fields of application: school, organisation/enterprise, clinic and research methodology. Each of those fields of application can have a military character: “school” covers education, training and mission rehearsal; “organisation” encompasses all human resources aspects, but also all operations-related and operations-support issues; “clinic” deals with all mental health issues; and “research” is done in military academies, laboratories and research agencies both on the national and international level – for example, NATO Research and Technology Organisation1 – and in each of the Services and at joint level as well. It must be stressed that, with respect to human sciences, the main aim of these institutions is not to develop new methods but, rather, to apply them to issues belonging to one of the former fields.

Overview From ancient times until 1879, “psychology” – literally translated as the “study of the soul” – was part of philosophy.2 Military behaviour was not studied per se, but has been described in epic stories. An example of what in the twentieth century became “combat stress reactions” was already addressed, among others, by Livy (Titus Livius, n.d.) in his book on the second Punic War (218–201 BC) when describing the behaviour of Hannibal’s soldiers: “They did not even have the courage anymore to bear their own bodies, no more hope to sustain. Some of them were dragging their

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legs; others, in black despair, collapsed . . .” [our translation]. Other authors have written analogue stories about other wars; for example Theucydides (n.d.) about the Sicily campaign of the Greek (AD 413). Until the nineteenth century, a lack of psychological knowledge has often led to misinterpretation of soldiers’ behaviour in war. Combat stress reactions were considered to be signs of cowardice; so, as a consequence, a lot of these unfortunate soldiers were sentenced to death. Even during the First World War, psychiatrists did not know how to deal with this phenomenon as described, for example, by the well-known Canadian psychiatrist, McAndrews (Debacker, 1996). Explanations such as “home sickness”, “soldiers’ heart” (Myers, 1870) or “irritable heart” (Da Costa, 1871) have been put forward. A first milestone in the development of psychology as a science was around 1860, because the focus was put on the “experimental method” in studying the “mind”, and thus was the precursor of cognitive psychology which expanded enormously after the Second World War. For example, Donders (1868) was already interested in decision-making processes (implying discrimination between simple stimuli such as green and red light, and selection of an appropriate response; i.e. press a certain button), using his well-known reaction time subtraction method (1865). The military relevance of these processes is quite straightforward; it suffices to think, for example, as a tank commander: is the acquired target – say a tank – friend or foe? If the latter applies, which ammunition do I have to choose to destroy it? The chances are high that the reaction time of detecting, discriminating, selecting response and engaging the target will make the difference between “hit” and “be hit”. A second milestone was set by Freud in Paris in 1885 when he learned to look from a totally different perspective at mental disorders – i.e. a clinical perspective – and introduced the notion of the “unconscious”. Furthermore, his conceptions have been heavily influenced by his experiences as a medical doctor in the First World War. The foundations of what became Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders Edition III 3 in 1980 have been documented by Freud (1896, 1916, 1919)! A third milestone causing a dramatic shift in psychological research paradigms has been set by Kurt Lewin (1935), who stated that behaviour (B) is a function of both a person’s characteristics (P) and situational influences (S); in short B  (P, S).4 This means that different persons act differently in a given situation, and that a given person acts differently in different situations, and that there exists an interaction between both P and S. This means that searching for the “one-size-fits-all person” such as the ideal leader, for example, is condemned to fail, as proven again by Stogdill (1974) in a meta-study. A fourth milestone has to do with the integration of the mind–body relationship. Unlike authors who contend that psychological phenomena are only epiphenomena of neurobiological structures and processes (e.g. Lamme, 2004; Wolters, 2005), we believe that human behaviour is determined in a multiple

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and heterogeneous way. Facets of P that have to be considered are four-fold: biological, psychological, social and spiritual. There is no doubt that the prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in social behaviour; among others, in being conscious of, and in respecting, norms and societal values. To date, all soldiers are trained to be good (global) citizens too, and have internalised the core values of a democratic society. But how to explain then that misbehaviour in operations seems to be ubiquitous, even in situations where the rules are clear? Let us take a recent example, the wellknown transgressions by American solders in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. As a consequence, the court-marshal has a basis to sue the trespasser, but it has no insight in the relationship between cause(s) and effect. Without expert testimonies from a psychologist, for example, the court will not be able to take possible extenuating circumstances into account. Moreover, these four facets of the person interact and can be in turn cause and effect. For example, psychosomatic complaints – such as stomach ulcers – are the somatic “expression” of a lack of control over workload. A lack of meaningfulness of the assigned tasks in peace support operations (PSO) leads to demotivation and to lower performance, if not to avoidance behaviour, or to burn out. These interactions show clearly that the human being is a bio-psycho-sociospiritual entity and, hence, an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to explain as much as possible of the observed variation in behaviour. Depending on the subject matter, neurologists, specialists in (neuro)imaging, (psycho)pharmacologists and psychologists have to work together while, in other cases, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and jurists have to cooperate; in a number of cases, psychologists and experts from natural/applied sciences have to be coworkers on equal terms. A fifth milestone – not at the level of theoretical development but at the contextual level – is the dramatic change in operational settings in the 1990s since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. These changes can be developed along two lines. First, peace support operations became prevalent over classic warfare and, second, taskforces became more and more multinational and multicultural, and even multi-service. It goes without saying that both changes have had an enormous impact on military education, training, organisation and ways of intervening, especially in the beginning.5 These changes have been discussed at great length but have meanwhile become “common business”. Doctrines have been established6 and manuals written. Therefore we will not dwell on it.

Military psychology In fact, one can wonder whether there is a need for a sub-discipline like military psychology. Do the “fields” within psychology – like social, clinical, developmental, experimental – not suffice? Unlike Reuven and Mangelsdorff, who contend in their introduction to the Handbook of Military Psychology (1991) that military psychological topics constitute an intersection of the above-

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mentioned fields (1991: xxv), we believe that military psychology covers, instead, the union of it. For example, studying group cohesion falls under group dynamics as a part of social psychology. Measuring vigilance under conditions of sleep deprivation is typically done by means of an experiment; but studying the effect of particular substances to counter the fatigue is at the intersection of psychophysiology and experimental psychology. Treatment of post-traumatic stress victims using a particular form therapy is a “pure” clinical topic, but evaluating the effect over time of psychosocial support (e.g. given by a patient’s most significant others) on post-traumatic stress reactions implies (at least) three sub-disciplines: developmental, clinical and social psychology. Education, training and mission rehearsal Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the number of conflict areas in Europe and abroad, and the number of crisis response operations under the auspices of the United Nations, has grown tremendously. Long-term deployments and reallife operations were at the basis of psychological problems, non-existing in the Cold War era. For example, the confrontation with life-threatening danger and the misery of the local population has put new topics at the forefront, such as stress and stress management, or the impact of cultural differences on interpersonal relationships; at the family level, deployed soldiers had to learn to be a partner, father or mother at a distance, and the partner at home had to learn to assume a number of roles and activities assumed otherwise by the deployed partner. In humanitarian operations, soldiers had to learn to behave as social workers. The HFM task group, TG023 on Team Effectiveness, worked on military command teams (as opposed to executive teams) and has created a model (Figure 6.1) and an instrument to assess the current status of variables put forward in the model and their impact on team effectiveness (Essens et al., 2005). The aim is, in the first place, to give commanders a tool for autoevaluation and improvement of the team’s functioning, usable in educational (e.g. staff college), training and even operational settings. Organisation As stated in the introduction, we consider under this header all human resources activities from advertising and recruitment, over selection, function allocation and promotion to exit from the armed forces. Nearly all Western countries are facing staffing problems, especially in attracting and keeping a sufficient number of valuable collaborators. Given that the ratio of qualified people selected to the number of vacancies is often lower than one, a problem of optimal allocation arises too. It is thus not surprising that human resources decision-makers invest a lot in applied psychological research subjects such as market analysis, publicity, image building, selection tools,

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PROCESSES

OUTCOMES

Task

Task-focused behaviours

Task outcomes

Organisation

Team-focused behaviours

Team outcomes

Mission framework A A R

Leader

Team member

Process adjustment loop

Team Conditions adjustment loop

Organisational learning loop

Figure 6.1 TG023’s Command Team Effectiveness Model.

function allocation tools, career incentives, etc. These issues are not only recurrent themes at the annual conference of the International Military Testing Association (see below, p. 138), but a number of NATO workshops have been organised too, especially focusing on officers, among others, in Monterey (1999) and Brussels (2004) (in parallel with IMTA’s annual conferences).7 More and more private and public organisations offer employee benefits on top of the wage. Defence organisations are not an exception to this rule, hoping by doing so to be competitive and attractive in the labour market, and to bind personnel to the employer. Often a number of these benefits are taken for granted or considered self-evident by the soldier, and hence lose their incentive value. Just to name a few benefits applicable in the Belgian Armed Forces (but surely also in a number of other countries): medical care free of charge, reduced costs for a variety of services (public transport, holiday travels, cultural activities, housing, etc.), use of military facilities for private activities (e.g. sports accommodation), use of daycare centres. Operations and operations support Modern operations become more and more a problem of information management, especially at command level: network-centric warfare is the new leading theme.

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There is no doubt that one of the core tasks of leaders at all levels of the hierarchy is to make decisions. An important question is how to support and improve decision-making, especially in stressful conditions such as operations. This challenge has been taken up by the Human Systems Integration Division of the US Naval Warfare Center among others, in the context of tactical antiaircraft combat in coastal environments and is well-known under its acronym, TADMUS (Tactical decision-making under stress). The TADMUS programme (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2000) aims to apply recent developments in decision theory and in human–system interaction technology to design a decision support system that will enhance decision-making under these highly complex conditions. The primary goal is to present relevant information in a format that minimises mismatches between the cognitive characteristics of the human decision-maker and the response characteristics of the decision-support system that parallels the cognitive strategies humans already employ, and thus to reduce the number of decision-making errors. The system relies on models postulated by naturalistic decision-making theory. We will not elaborate on this decision-making system here; more detailed information can easily be found on the Internet.8 Information becomes more and more critical in modern battle space, even at the bottom level of the hierarchy. The question, at heart, is how to improve performance in information management? A question also referred to as “augmented cognition”. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States (DARPA) is running a programme aiming at improving warfighter information intake under stress.9 The goal of this programme is to substantively enhance the information-management capacity of a human–computer entity, and by doing so, to increase human performance in diverse, stressful, operational environments. Specifically, this programme will empower the soldier’s ability to successfully accomplish the functions currently carried out by at least three individuals. The main objective is to significantly improve performance by developing a closed-loop computational system in which the computer adapts to the state of the soldier. Experiences with long-term deployments of Belgian Army units in the Balkans in the 1990s have led to the introduction of a uniformed field psychologist in the staff of each brigade, in support units of the same size and on the division level. The core business of these military psychologists can be summarised as “mental readiness” and encompasses four assigned task domains: job satisfaction, good leadership, group cohesion and, last but not least, psychosocial support of the soldier. Therefore, these psychologists are called “counsellor in mental readiness”. Their primary role is thus to be a force multiplier and not to be a problem solver. Moreover, the need for psychosocial support of the most significant others of the soldier on deployment became quickly clear. Therefore, a second psychologist was added to each brigade garrison to take care of the rear detachment, the home front and the remaining units of the garrison, while the first psychologist is on deployment with the taskforce.10

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On paper, things were clear, but in practice – especially on deployment – some problems arose due to the dual role of the psychologist: he or she is at the same time an advisor to the commander and a counsellor of the individual soldier. Clinic In this section we will put the emphasis on military mental health issues and, more specifically, on topics that are on the cutting edge of care development. Needless to say, soldiers deployed in military operations – especially in high intensity conflicts – may be subject to intense stressors. Some of these soldiers will suffer from stress-related syndromes (e.g. Gulf War syndrome, Balkan syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia), anxiety disorders, (acute) stress disorders, (partial) post-traumatic stress disorder or depression. A classic matter of debate with regard to treatment of these syndromes/disorders can be synthesised as “Tablets OR talks”. “Tablets” is the solution preferred by biological-oriented psychiatrists; on the other hand, “pure” clinical psychologists are advocates of “talks”. Those who adhere to a more moderate position will opt for a combination and thus for “Tablets AND talks”. But recently, a new approach emerged: “No Tablets NO talks”. According to the French psychiatrist, David Servan-Schreiber (2003), the whole problem can be summarised as an equilibrium between the (neo)cortex – knowledge – and the limbic system – emotions – which is “visible” in a coherent heartbeat pattern; an imbalance leading to a chaotic pattern (Figure 6.2). Servan-Schreiber recommends a treatment that consists of (a combination of) seven methods: affective communication (to reach a secure attachment with most significant others), acupuncture, EMDR, light therapy, meditation, physical training and nutrition supplements11 (especially the fat acid Omega-3). The Belgian psychiatrist Michael Maes adheres, in his book From Freud to Omega-3 (2005), (more or less) to the same vision. We will not comment here on the validity proof of the methods; they just have proved to work, even in non-clinical settings, as demonstrated during the last European Conference of Traumatic Stress (Stockholm, June 2005). These ideas certainly are relevant for the military at the level of prevention (e.g. food quality, team building exercises), intervention (using the mentioned techniques) and follow up of effect measures (it is good to be open to alternative solutions, but one should remain critical too). Chaos

Coherence

Figure 6.2 Difference in heartbeat pattern under imbalanced versus balanced conditions (source: www.guérir.fr).

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Military behavioural sciences The term “behavioural sciences” was coined by James Grier Miller (1916–2002) to describe an integrative multidisciplinary approach to the development of a broad theoretical framework for the biological and social sciences. He was a psychologist, psychiatrist and educator who had a profound impact in several disciplines, including involvement with the clinical psychology section of the Veterans Administration (Pickren, 2003). Just as in military psychology, the military behavioural sciences have their raison d’être too, for the same reasons. Soldiers need to have some characteristics that civilians do not need (as much) and have to work in environments which pose alternative, often more-demanding challenges than civilian workplaces. Within NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation (RTO), which has six “technical panels”, human science research studies fall typically under the Human Factors and Medicine Panel (HFM).12 The Human Factors part covers topics that affect military personnel’s ability to acquire, process and make effective decisions using task-critical information. Areas of interest include selection, training, gender and minority issues, anthropometry, design of information displays and controls, communications and teamwork, human error, fatigue management, cognitive engineering, performance enhancement and aiding, and function allocation including in automated systems. Typical activities with respect to a particular subject matter are exploratory teams, research task groups, workshops and lecture series. If the subject matter does not fit into one of the particular panels, which is often the case with interdisciplinary study objects, it will be put under the “umbrella” of the Studies, Analysis and Simulation panel (SAS). This was, for example, the case with the long-term strategic study on Human Behaviour Representation (LTSS-51) (described below, p. 135).

Education, training and mission rehearsal It is stating the obvious that most of the typical (individual) military behaviours have to be learned in training. The issues at heart here are twofold: 1) how to optimise the teaching and learning processes; and 2) how to optimise the learning environment at a reasonable cost/benefit rate. The first question is addressed by cognitive psychology, which studies (among others) the relationship between perception and motor behaviour. Learning from an example demonstrating the behaviour to be learned – also called social learning – is an intuitively often used method. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has proved that the human brain possesses particular neuronal structures13 and pathways between the perceptual cortex and the motor cortex that facilitate this way of learning (Bekkering, 2005). In the same vein, many executive jobs rely on eye–hand coordination; e.g. aiming at a target with a rifle. The conclusion of research on this particular topic is also: I-do-what-I-see. In other

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words, building a correct mental scheme is essential for a good execution, and “anchoring” these schemes requires (frequent) rehearsal. The second question has a lot to do with simulation. Given the cost of military personnel and material, defence services rely more and more on simulation for training purposes. Moreover, modern simulation tools allow the representation of different aspects of the human being. This holds particularly for the training of commanders and their staffs. In simulation, mission rehearsal allows for evaluating the impact of particular decisions. Military and civilian specialists in the field of command and control, of training and of simulation (hardware and software), meet annually in the United States at the Computer Generated Forces Conference.14 Organisation Military leadership is beyond doubt one of the most important concerns. So it is not surprising that there exist (defence) research agencies specialised in this area. For example, the Dutch TNO works on several programmes related to the Human-in-Command, especially on solutions for problems in the area of digitisation of command.15 Two Human-in-Command Conferences have been held under auspices of Defence researchers in Kingston (1998) and Breda (2000) respectively. The proceedings of both have been published in book form. The purpose of the first one is: to explore and understand the implications of this human intervention and the ways that science can make it more effective. The book brings together experienced military leaders and researchers in the human sciences to offer current operational experience and scientific thought on the issue of military command, with the intention of raising awareness of the uniquely human aspects of military command. It includes chapters on the personal experiences of senior commanders, new concepts and treatises on command theory, and empirical findings from experimental studies in the field. (McCann and Pigeau, 2000) The second one focuses on the particular context of Peace Support Operations: These operations require qualities of commanders and their teams that are in addition to the qualities that are normally needed to conduct successful combat operations. Material, doctrine, and training must be tailored to fulfil their functions, but it is the quality of the human in command that leads to successful missions in ambiguous situations. What are these qualities and what are the ingredients for effective operations? The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations combines personal experiences of commanders, empirical data on peace support issues, and theoretical models. It provides the reader with insight into current issues such as leadership, mission

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characteristics, mission preparation and training, crisis management, operational conditions and processes, multinational cooperation, and effectiveness of individual commanders, units, and missions. (Essens et al., 2001) Operation and operations support The mission statement (Verbanck, 2002) of the Belgian counsellors in mental readiness reads: Through a preventive approach, in a multidisciplinary team, we want to guarantee the mental readiness within the Armed Forces, in a relationship of mutual trust and confidence in the commanders, the soldiers and their most significant others, and finally with the colleagues of the curative sector. It states explicitly that they do not work on their own but in strong collaboration with other colleagues such as the social worker, the “padre” or the moral counsellor and the members of the Psychology Department of the Royal Military Academy. This “team approach” is already emphasised in education during the leadership seminars at the Staff College for officers of various levels of command. A (yet exploratory) international behavioural sciences16 field study in Afghanistan has shown different conceptions of the leadership function. These differences are clearly culturally determined; e.g. the power distance (Hofstede, 1991) between superiors and subordinates. For example, British, Turkish and, to some extent, German officers expect “blind obedience”, whereas Dutch and Danish superiors rely much more on communication with, and consultation of their subordinates. In the United Kingdom, Turkey (and Germany) power distance is proven to be high, as opposed to the Netherlands and Denmark where it is known to be low. This particular difference has been at the basis of some frictions among countries, and impacts strongly on command and control because of a different “working style” (Manigart et al., 2005). Clinic An integrated approach to the human being – be it specifically with respect to healthcare – is also endorsed by the American Psychological Association (APA), and within it by the Society for Military Psychology. “Health Care for the Whole Person” (HCWP) is an initiative of the APA’s president, Ron Levant, that is growing at a high pace. HCWP is about mending the mind–body gap and it aims at improving the quality of healthcare nationwide. The programme leader’s efforts are to build a strong partnership of health, consumer and public health groups to endorse a vision of healthcare that integrates mental and behavioural health services. Eight committees, including psychologists, family physicians, paediatricians, economists, nurses, social workers, emergency medicine

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physicians, internists, and public health experts, work together to assemble the evidence and rationale for integrated care. Committees span science to practice and to policy.17 Since their introduction in the nosography of mental disorders,18 posttraumatic stress reactions (PTSR) and particularly post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)19 have been extensively studied by different kinds of researchers. Psychologists remain mostly at the descriptive level and, if they go into causal relationships, their explanations are mainly hermeneutic. The most important argument for a more integrative behavioural science approach is implied by the definition criterion F; namely, the individual, social and occupational functioning. Hence, peers, superiors, psychologists and social workers have to be sensitive to signs that might be indicative of not wellmanaged traumatogenic events.

An interdisciplinary approach in military context The relevance of an interdisciplinary approach in military-related issues has, in the first place, to be derived from content-based evidence and scientific hypotheses. Growing interest is also shown in the number of publications in a given time frame. A search through the most extensive psychological literature database, PsychInfo, resulted in 207 hits. A total of 20 per cent of the publications stem from the last five years, as opposed to more than 70 per cent in the former 55 years, and hence some 10 per cent stem from before 1950. Education, training and mission rehearsal The long-term strategic study on human behaviour representation (LTSS-51), stated: Human Behaviour Representation (HBR) can be used as a tool to support the development and operational use of new concepts and systems for the future. HBR also helps to better train and use existing forces and equipment, and to improve operations in the new environment. Emerging technologies will have a great impact on the implementation and on the military use of such HBR in the future. It offers support in different application areas; examples are thinking automated opposing forces (training and exercise), closed simulation systems (defence planning), Decision Support Tools (support to operations), and virtual environments (acquisition). It is concluded that HBR is a critical element for many military simulations, including that of individual combatants and non-combatants, teams, platforms, military and non-military organisations, groups and crowds . . . (Anon., 2001) To reach the set goals, the workgroup was composed of participants stemming from ten different NATO countries and with various backgrounds such as com-

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puter scientists, specialists in simulation and psychologists from different orientations (organisational, social, psychometric). Long-term quartering out of the country and deployments all over the world call for distance learning and training. Developing a potent learning environment, that is accessible anytime and anywhere, has become a crucial factor for military instruction and education. Moreover, research in education – more specifically Aptitude–Treatment–Interaction (ATI) research – has shown for a long time that it is important for effective learning to take individual differences into account (Cronbach and Snow, 1969). It has also been shown that, everything else kept constant, the more actively the student is involved in his or her learning process, the better the results are; hence, attention has to be paid to interactive instructional methods. Information and Communication Technology (ICT), more particularly Computer Based Training (CBT), meets these requirements (Adams et al., 1987). It is not surprising that this has been long acknowledged by large organisations such as the Unites States Armed Forces. One of the most recent implementations is found at the United States Military Academy, West Point (USMA): since 2004, all cadets have been equipped with a laptop computer, which can be connected to the wireless network of the Academy.20 The Belgian Military Academy intends to follow this procedure, starting in September 2005. To make the electronic learning platform into an effective learning instrument requires a close interaction between teachers, course designers, educational researchers and ICT specialists because there is much more at stake than replacing books with computers. Organisation Many military occupations are stressful by their very nature. The natural question that arises is how to improve selection and classification for stressful occupations. Heslegrave and Colvin (1998) concluded that: 1 2 3

A number of psycho-physiological measures have predictive validity. People who cope successfully appear to share some personality traits. Occupations have to be analysed in terms of stress dimensions to provide a rationale for the identification of valid predictors and criteria of successful performance in stressful jobs.

In each defence organisation, different people with different professional competencies are involved in different aspects of the well-being of the soldier and of his/her most significant others. The main problem is that each of them is looking at the “reality” from his or her own perspective. Their expertise is seldom brought together, causing suboptimal solutions to the problem, due to “biased” actions, overlaps and omissions (for example, believing that someone else is responsible for a particular issue). The Belgian Defence Staff has felt the need to bring together the experiences

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from the field and the scientific expertise in behavioural sciences by creating the “Psychosocial Platform” at the level of the Deputy Chief of Staff Well Being. This platform is composed of, among others, representatives of the Centre for Mental Health of the Central Military Hospital, the Counsellors for Mental Readiness, the Human Resources Directorate General, the Defence Social Service, and the Behavioural Sciences Department21 of the Belgian Royal Military Academy. Women in uniform in the armed services have become common. A particular facet that has to be taken into account when having female co-workers is pregnancy, which can adversely impact on the functioning of the organisation. Unintended pregnancies negatively impact on families, communities and society as a whole but in the military, unwanted pregnancies of unmarried, active-duty women can encroach upon mission accomplishment. In operational and overseas environments, the consequences are even amplified. A multidisciplinary effort, called “Choices”, was set up to reduce unplanned pregnancies. Results showed that unmarried, active-duty women (younger than 27 years old) who did not attend “Choices” were three-times more likely to have an unplanned pregnancy. This multidisciplinary approach shows promise in reducing unplanned pregnancies, thus ensuring readiness and mission accomplishment (Hughes and Staren, 2003). Operation and operation support Particular kinds of soldiers have to work (and to live) in a very small space; e.g. aircrews in long-haul carriers, or sailors in the machine room of a ship. Alongside the effect of all other stressors, it is important to investigate what the effects are of confinement and isolation on performance, and the relationship with coworkers in the same environment. Everything else kept constant, the ergonomic aspects of the working space may be crucial for success in operations. The doctoral dissertation of Nathalie Pattyn22 aims at: 1 2

Developing new methods for measuring human cognitive performance by integrating psychological, ergonomic and neuro-physiological data. Trying to isolate molecular substances with a signal function for mood changes and perception of interpersonal relationship by studying in particular the vomeronasal organ.

In summary, this study is at the crossroads of psychology, psychometrics, molecular biology, neurophysiology and ergonomics. Psychosocial support in crisis response operations and in humanitarian operations is not only a matter for military personnel, but also impacts on the most significant others. It is trivial to say that appropriate information, education and training is needed both for soldiers and their relatives, but the implementation is far from trivial: which needs have to be covered? What competencies must be available in what kind of agencies or parts of the military organisation? How should the military cooperate with representatives of other countries and cultures or even deliver support to units of other countries?

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The HFM Task Group 020 on Stress and Psychological Support in Modern Military Operations (SPSiMMO) deals with these issues. Although the task group, which counts civilian and military professionals as members from 18 different NATO and PfP23 countries, is composed mainly of psychologists belonging to different sub-disciplines, other disciplines such as sociology, psychiatry and medicine are also represented. The scope is on prevention as well as on intervention, educational, instruction and training, organisational and treatment issues. Combating terrorism is probably one of the “hottest issues” in NATO’s R&D bodies24 and countries. Prompted by the September 11 2001 events, the SAS 049 specialist team on Counter Terrorism started its activities in April 2002 and delivered a report in 2003. It is not difficult to imagine that, aside from a contribution of applied sciences in developing tools or techniques for detection and identification of human beings or objects, human sciences have a role to play; for example, in profiling (potential) terrorists, threat assessment or preparing for the consequences of a (large-scale) terrorist attack. Clinic In actual research on PTSD, we observe a shift to molecular biology and neurophysiology to determine the correlates of PTSR/PTSD. It is needless to stress the importance of these research lines for psychopharmacology as a treatment form. Just to name one recent collaborative research project between the Central Military Hospital of the Dutch Armed Forces and the University of Utrecht concerning the Glucocorticoid Receptor Functioning in Deployment Related PTSD (de Kloet et al., 2004). The aim of the study is to determine what the links are between psychological, endocrinological, and immunological alterations. Oslin et al. (2004) evaluated the effects of the Unified Psychogeriatric Biopsychosocial Evaluation and Treatment (UPBEAT) programme, which is an interdisciplinary mental health care management program, on the behavioural health symptoms of hospitalised elderly veterans (i.e. more than 60 years old). The title shows clearly the interdisciplinary approach to the problem studied. Moreover, the study had a longitudinal design; i.e. the status of participants was assessed every six months over two years. The treatment outcomes were generally good but, contrary to expectations, and notwithstanding a theoretical and practically sound intervention, the programme had no or very limited added value to the classic care approach. It is not only the soldiers themselves in operations that deserve the attention of defence agencies but also their relatives in routine situations. For example, in his doctoral dissertation, Slack (2004) investigated the factors influencing interdisciplinary team-member agreement with social worker assessments of domestic violence incidents in the United States Air Force. This team composed of professionals (social work, law enforcement, legal, clergy, healthcare, family specialists and military command representatives) was entitled the Family Maltreatment Case Management Team (FMCMT).

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Evolution of military psychological forums To start with, it is worth mentioning that there exists a permanent professional forum for military psychologists – the Society for Military Psychology – and that it has been represented as an occupational group in the largest and most powerful association in the world, as Division 19 of the American Psychological Association (APA)25 since 1945. The Society for Military Psychology encourages research and the application of psychological research to military problems. Members are military psychologists who serve diverse functions in settings including research activities, management, providing mental health services, teaching, consulting, work with Congressional committees and advising senior military commands. The shift from a purely psychological approach over a behavioural approach to interdisciplinary cooperation is also visible in most of the military scientific forums. A number of these forums have been mentioned in the introduction of this book. Below, some others seem worth mentioning here. Obviously this list is far from complete. Over the years since their creation, we do not only observe a general tendency of broadening the scope of conference cycles and symposia, but we also feel the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach, and therefore new forums have been set up. At the beginning, the International Military Testing Association (IMTA) was a pure American affair and, as its name indicates, focused only on testing issues. The origin and link with psychometric applications are clearly reflected in its logo (Figure 6.3). The later internationalisation is reflected in the small “i” that was subsequently added to MTA. In the last five years, papers are increasingly addressing other behavioural sciences issues, especially in the realm of operations other than war or the impact of multicultural multinational military settings. By-laws have been changed accordingly but the name has been kept.26 For example, at the fortyeighth annual meeting (Singapore, October 2005), team effectiveness issues constituted a new particular subject. The International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, which started in the early 1960s, has been, and still is, intended to be a forum to address all psychological and related subject matters. So, presentations deal with all five of the fields of application27 which is more or less transparent through the leading themes: Competencies for Crisis Response Operations (2003), Leadership in Calm and Chaos (in the Network Centric Warfare Era) (2004), Ensuring Psycho-

Figure 6.3 Logo of the International Military Testing Association.

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logical Readiness and Resilience for Deployed Forces (2005). Since 2000, psycho-neuro-physiological issues have also been brought to bear; for example, the Lytaev and Popovitch paper (2003). The International Military Mental Health Conferences (IMMH), created in 1998, fulfil a particular need, as can be derived from its mission statement:28 [IMMH] is an interdisciplinary forum where practitioners meet with researchers, is open to everyone who is involved in the bio-psycho-socialspiritual well-being of the soldier (e.g. medical doctors, psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, etc.), welcomes especially “field experts” such as commanders who have had to deal with or feel concerned by the announced theme, and aims at establishing guidelines for cooperation and best practice in a multinational multicultural operational environment. Its objectives are realised mainly through a varied series of presentations and multinational interdisciplinary workshops. For example, the themes from past conferences were: Multiple Facets of Trauma and Care (2001), Major Disasters in Military Settings: Challenges for Co-operation (2002), Psychosocial Dimensions of Veterans Care (2003), Unwanted Behaviours in Military Operations (2004). The European Research Group on the Military and Society (ERGOMAS), as its name suggests, should have its centre of gravity in military–societal questions studied by European sociologists and political scientists but, meanwhile, psychologists and even psychiatrists have become involved, too; moreover, unlike its name, it is no longer limited to European participants since it has US members too. The actual multinational, interdisciplinary character is explicitly stated in its by-laws:29 Joint transnational research and intercultural comparisons in thematically oriented interdisciplinary working groups constitute the core of ERGOMAS. ERGOMAS promotes empirically and theoretically oriented European research cooperation and international scientific communication. ERGOMAS is a public, non-profit, politically and ideologically independent professional organization of scientists. Its purposes shall be pursued by the activity of Working Groups and the Biennial Conferences of ERGOMAS. Finally, there is a whole range of different types of documentation about military behavioural sciences applications that both researchers and practitioners can rely on. Besides books, technical reports, field manuals and web pages – both on the national and international level – there exists also international scientific journals such as Military Psychology or the Journal of Political and Military Sociology.

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Conclusion People have always shown an interest in human behaviour in general and in military behaviour in particular, as can be derived from literature, whether scientific or artistic. As all sciences, psychology – as an independent science – has evolved most of the time step-by-step, but some findings have changed scientific thinking within psychology remarkably. We identified four milestones which are highly relevant to military psychology: the experimental approach in studying the mind; the discovery of the unconscious; the interactionist vision B  f(P, S); the integrative vision on the human being as a bio-psycho-socio-spiritual entity. The fifth milestone, which is rather typical for the military, is the dramatic change of the operational context, the kind and variation of missions, known as crisis response operations, mostly under the auspices of the UN or NATO. Therefore, we believe that military psychology and, by extension military behavioural sciences, have their raison d’être on the basis of, first, the peculiarities of the soldier that distinguish him or her from the civilian, and second, the specific situations that soldiers have to work in, that are quite different from the civilian work environment. We have illustrated stepwise, through a few examples from different fields – namely, education, training and mission rehearsal, organisation, operations and operations support, and finally clinic – the need for the military behavioural scientist to follow the pace of development in the field of different human sciences (and not only in their own discipline) in order to be able to better understand the complexity of human behaviour and the relative contribution of their own discipline. Moreover, more than ever before, an interdisciplinary team approach is required because operations are multinational, multicultural and multiservice. The military behavioural scientist is, just as any high-skilled co-worker, forced to life-long learning to remain efficacious. We have highlighted a number of forums that contribute to the updating of his/her competencies and a number of particular sources as well.

Notes 1 See www.rta.nato.int. 2 1879 is the year of the opening of Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig; the date that is commonly accepted as the birthday of psychology as an “independent” discipline. 3 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, 3rd edn (1980). 4 See Lewin (1935), Chapter 3, “Environmental forces in child behavior and development”. 5 See, for example, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacekeeping/menu-en.asp. 6 See, for example, www.mod.uk/jdcc/pso.htm. 7 Hence, for precise contents, see the proceedings of IMTA 1999 and 2004 on www.internationalmta.org. 8 See, for instance, www.tadmus.spawar.navy.mil or www.sci.sdsu.edu/cerf/content/ tadmus.html.

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9 See www.darpa.mil/ipto/programs/augcog. 10 Taskforces were at that moment battalion-size units composed of several units of the brigade plus some external reinforcements. 11 In a strict sense, the phrase “no tablets” seems not to hold, but the author means classic medication prescribed by a medical doctor. 12 www.rto.nato.int/. 13 The Broca area, to be precise. 14 See, for example, www.maad.com/index.pl/computer_generated_forces. 15 www.tno.nl/defensie_en_veiligheid/subthemas/commandovoering_en_operat/human_ in_command/. 16 This research project involves (for the time being) partners from Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, and deals both with psychological and sociological aspects; i.e. at the individual, group, community and national culture level. 17 Email, 4 May, 2005 from Division 19 president, Brad Johnson to the members. 18 PTSD is described both in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) and in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Latest editions are respectively DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1990). 19 PTSD is defined as: having experienced a sudden life-threatening event (criterion A), suffer from unvoluntary intrusive recollections (criterion B), numbing and avoidance behaviour (criterion C), neuro-vegetative hyper-arousal (criterion D), during more than one month (criterion E). The symptoms shown have a significant adverse impact on social and professional functioning or other domains considered important to the subject. 20 www.dean.usma.edu/ietd/wireless.cfm. 21 The Behavioural Sciences Department encompasses four “Chairs”, i.e. Psychology, Law, Ethics and Social Sciences. 22 Nathalie Pattyn is a medical doctor and lecturer at the Air Force Department of the Royal Military Academy of Belgium. Her research project is granted by the Belgian Defence (Human Factors and Military Operations – project HF-10) and by the European Space Agency. 23 Partnership for Peace, which regroups former Eastern European states not yet members of NATO. 24 See www.rta.nato.int/Pubs. 25 For detailed information, see www.apa.org/divisions/div19. 26 By-laws and proceedings of former conferences are available on www.internationalmta.org. 27 An overview of the aims of IAMPS can be found in the proceedings of the 39th IAMPS (Brussels, 2003). Proceedings (since 2000) are published on www.iamps.org. 28 As presented at the 7IMMH conference in Brussels, 2004. To date, there is no IMMH website. 29 See hem.passagen.se/itl/bylaws.html.

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Bekkering, H. (2005) Daadwerkelijk zien [perceive actively], De Psycholoog, 40–4. Cannon-Bowers, J.A. and Salas, E. (eds) (2000) Making Decisions Under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training, Washington, DC: APA Books. Cronbach, L. and Snow, R. (1969) Individual Differences in Learning Ability as a Function of Instructional Variables. Final Report, Stanford University, CA: School of Education. Da Costa, J.M. (1871) On irritable heart: a clinical study of a form of cardiac disorder and its consequence, American Journal of Medical Science, 16, 17–52. Debacker, M. (1996) Introduction to the International Conference on Stress Management in Peace Keeping and Humanitarian Operations, Brussels. de Kloet, C., Vermetten, E., Kavelaars, A., Meulman, E. and Heijnen, C. (2004) Glucocorticoid Receptor Function in Deployment Related PTSD, Paper presented at the 7th International Military Mental Health Conference, Brussels, Belgium. Donders, F.C. (1868) Over de Snelheid van Psychische Processen: Onderzoekingen gedaan in het Physiologisch Laboratorium der Utrechtsche Hoogeschool, 1868–1869 [About the Speed of Psychic Processes: Research undertaken in the Physiological Laboratory of the Utrecht High School, 1868–1869], Second Series, II, 92–120. Duyker, H.J.C., Palland, B.G. and Vuyk, R.J. (1958) Leerboek der Psychologie, Wolters: Groningen. Essens, P., Vogelaar, A., Mylle, J., Blendel, C., Halpin, S. and Bazamski, J. (2005) Command Team Effectiveness, the Netherlands: TNO. Essens, P., Vogelaar, A., Tanercan, E. and Winslow, D. (eds) (2001) The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt. Freud, S. (1896) L’hérédité et l’étiologie des néuroses, G.W. Bd. 1 [Heredity and the Etiology of Neuroses], Se.3, 141–61. Freud, S. (1915) Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, in: James Strachey et al. (eds) (1953–74) The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, The Hogart Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, London. Standard Edition 14, 275–300. Freud, S. (1916–17) Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychanalyse [Introductory Lectures into Psycho-analysis], Wien. G.W. Bd. 11. Freud, S. (1919) Introduction to Psycho-analysis and the War Neuroses, in: James Strachey et al. (eds) (1953–74) The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, The Hogart Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, London. Standard Edition 17, 205–10. Heslegrave, R. and Colvin, C. (1998) Selection of personnel for stressful operations: the potential utility of psychophysiological measures as selection tools, Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 3, 1, 121–39. Hofstede, G. (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, London: McGraw Hill. Hughes, T. and Staren, D. (2003) Reducing unintended pregnancy in young, single active duty women in an overseas environment, Military-Medicine, 168, 1, 11–14. Lamme, V.A.F. (2004) Weg met de psychologie! [Down with psychology!], Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 59, 91–110. Lewin, K. (1935) A Dynamic Theory of Personality. Selected Papers (Translated by Adams, D.K. and Zener, K.E.), New York and London: McGraw Hill Book Co. Inc. Livius (n.d.) Ab urbe condita. Vangheluwe G. (Trad.), 7979, Antwerpen: De Standaard. Lytaev, S. and Popovitch, V. (2003) Military Professional Serviceability: Methodology

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and Modeling, paper presented at the 39th International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, Brussels. McCann, C. and Pigeau, R. (eds) (2000) The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experiences, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Maes, M. (2005) Van Freud to Omega-3 [From Freud to Omega-3], Antwerpen: Standaard uitgeverij. Manigart, P., Soeters, J. and Winslow, D. (2005) Cultural Diversity in Multinational Crisis Response Operations: Preliminary Review of the Literature and Case Studies, Royal Military Academy of Belgium: unpublished report. Myers, A. (1870) On the Aetiology and Prevalence of the Disease of the Heart Among Soldiers, London: J. Churchill. Oslin, D., Thompson, R., Kallan, M., TenHave, T., Blow, F., Bastani, R., Gould, R., Maxwell, A., Rosansky, J., Van Stone, W. and Jarvik, L. (2004) Treatment effects from UPBEAT: a randomized trial of care management for behavioral health problems in hospitalized elderly patients, Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry and Neurology, 17, 2, 99–106. Pickren, W. (2003) James Grier Miller (1916–2002), American Psychologist, 58, 9, 760. Reuven, G. and Mangelsdorff, D. (eds) (1991) Handbook of Military Psychology, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Servan-Schreiber, D. (2003) Guérir [Healing], Paris: Editions Robert Laffont. Slack, M. (2004) Factors influencing interdisciplinary team member agreement with social worker assessments of domestic violence incidents in the United States Air Force, Dissertation Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences, 64, 10A, 3847. Stogdill, R.M. (1974) Handbook of Leadership: a Survey of Theory and Research, New York: Free Press. Theucydides (n.d.) The History of the Peloponesian War (Translated by Richard Crawley). Online, available at: webatomics.com/Classics/thucydides/Pelopwar.html. Verbanck, F. (2002) De Raadgever Mentale Operationaliteit [The Counsellor in Mental Readiness], Workshop, Belgian Defence Psychologists, Royal Military Academy, 8 January. Unpublished document. Wolters, G. (2005) Gedragscontrole. Vrije wil of neurale processen? [Control over behaviour. Free will or neural processes?], De Psycholoog, 40, 24–9. World Health Organisation (1990) International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th edn), Geneva: author.

7

The study of workgroups in the military An organisational aesthetics perspective Enrico Maria Piras

Introduction Aesthetics, a branch of philosophy founded in the eighteenth century, has from its establishment challenged the primacy acknowledged to rational thinking by proposing a different epistemology. It has accorded relevance to the knowledge capabilities of human senses and empathy and only later it has focused its attention to a specific object coming to be identified as the ‘philosophy of art’. The aesthetic dimension of everyday life has been neglected in contemporary social research, especially after the Second World War as a reaction to what Pierre Guillet de Montoux has named the ‘aesthetic totalization’ performed by Fascism and Nazism (2004). In the last two decades social sciences seem to have rediscovered aesthetics as an epistemology, a dimension of society or as a method. Sociology has rediscovered art as a form of knowledge and there is growing interest in the use of art-based (Finley and Knowles, 1995) and art-like methods (Barry, 1996), or in the instruments of art critique to analyse social processes (Degot, 1987; Taylor, 2004). A discussion of the debate is clearly not an aim of this contribution, but it is enough to say that organisational aesthetics has emerged as a new approach in the field of organisational studies (Strati and Guillet de Montoux, 2002). Given the commonsense equation aesthetic  beauty  art the art worlds and related organisations have been, and still are, the preferred objects of interest of many scholars fascinated by aesthetics. However, many researches and reflections propose a different way to conceptualise organisational aesthetics as a ‘holistic approach’ (Strati, 1992) useful to describe and analyse any possible organisation or aspect of organisational life. This approach has addressed topics such as the use of five senses in gathering data and understanding organisational life, or the relevance of the tacit dimension of knowledge (Strati, 1999); it has made use of the aesthetic categories (such as beauty, ugly, grotesque, sublime, disgust, tragic, to name just a few) as analytic and descriptive tools (Ramírez, 1991; White, 1996; Strati, 2000; Pelzer, 2002). It has stressed the relevance of materiality in shaping organisational activity (Gagliardi, 1990a) and has used art as a metaphor for organisation and leadership (Guillet de Montoux, 2000), just to put forth a non-exclusive list of topics.

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This work aims at reflecting on the contribution that organisational aesthetics can offer to the empirical study of the military, a research area still not explored by this approach. The overall idea behind this work is that understanding military institutions can benefit from an aesthetic approach as much as this theoretical perspective can profit from studying them, as this looks a promising field for stimulating reflective thought on this analytical framework. Drawing from an empirical research (Gherardi et al., 2004) I will focus on some dimensions of military life arguing these can be analysed differently (I do not dare to say better) when considered from an aesthetic perspective. In this work I will restrain my reflections to the study of workgroups, as this is the empirical setting I made my research on, even if I believe some consideration might apply to the study of other aspects and dimensions of the military.1 In the following pages I will present and discuss some field notes from my ethnographical research on some workgroups in the Italian military forces, the intentions being not to give an exhaustive account of their culture and behaviour but only to show some possible applications of organisational aesthetics to the study of the military. To do so, given the limited space, I shall try to reflect on organisational artefacts as windows to look inside the workgroups. I will then present the theoretical framework underlying this approach and conclude with some remarks on methods.

The pathos of organisational artefacts In this section I will briefly analyse the role of artefacts in the organising processes of some military workgroups I observed. In recent years there has been a strong critique of the idea that artefacts are merely tools to be considered in their instrumentality (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), claiming the objects are the ‘missing masses’ of social theory (Latour, 1992) and acknowledging them, the so-called ‘non-human actors’, the same agency traditionally attributed only to humans. This critical position is shared by scholars from various fields, ranging from cognitive science (Hutchins, 1995), science and technology studies (STS), workplace studies, cooperative learning, participatory design and organisational aesthetics (Strati, 2005). All these perspectives share a constructionist approach to social theory and are aware of the relevance of micro-level social action, where artefacts play a role in continuously reproducing the social world by mediating meanings and activities. The aesthetics approach, in particular, stresses that artefacts are symbols of organisational life (Berg, 1987), are perceived and judged by senses and have pathos, as well as logos and ethos (Gagliardi, 1996; Strati, 1999), and that their use requires a practical knowledge. Artefacts are ‘primary cultural phenomena’ (Gagliardi, 1996: 568) that limit and structure the sensory experience of the members and are pathways of action in organisational life (Gagliardi, 1990b). Many organisational artefacts have been explored in literature in the last two decades, from chairs (Strati, 1999) to offices (Davis, 1984; Hatch, 1990; Cairns, 2002), from architecture (Berg, 1987; Rosen et al., 1990;

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Kersten and Gilardi, 2003) to images (Schneider and Powley, 1986) and the list could easily go on. Here I want to draw the reader’s attention to some military artefacts to show the fruitfulness of following this line of research in bringing forth new understanding of the culture of different workgroups. I also argue that even a superficial analysis of them can be of great help in indicating to researchers how to fine-tune the next steps in the research process. The entrance of the barracks As I first stepped into the barracks of a special corps of the Italian Army, waiting for my contact to arrive, I noticed a wide array of different artefacts hanging from the walls. In front of me was the motto, written in black ink, 40 (approx.) centimetres long, gothic characters on the white wall, in English and not in Italian. On my left I could observe some A4 white pages where records of the best performances in some training activities, as short distance run or bar tractions, were printed with the names of the record holders by the side. On my right there were photographs of the division in various missions abroad, depicting some members of the unit in relaxed poses and smiling faces. In two distinct photographs were depicted the two last presidents of the Italian Republic visiting the troops. One of them was signed and there was a handwritten dedication by the President himself; in the picture the President was also smiling. Nearby there were some plates with the logos of other units, mostly not Italian ones. Pictures and plates were alternated with no particular order but still not in a messy way. From the open door of one of the officer’s office I could see a keffiah, the typical black and white Palestinian scarf, hanging from a metal bookcase behind the desk and a rainbow peace flag by its side. The overall feeling they inspired in me was a sense of provisional though studied aesthetics. Everything in that space suggested the idea of possible modifications. Newer records in training activities, new missions abroad and new collaborations, new pictures of a new president’s visit could have easily altered that space. At the same time, that space suggested the possibility for the individual to modify it, i.e. breaking a record or substituting the Palestinian scarf with other objects. These artefacts are, in Per Olof Berg’s terms, ‘the physical vestiges of a corporate culture’ (1987: 25). They are symbols of organisational life, imbued with meanings clearly understandable to their members that call for an interpretation by the researcher. The choice to have an English motto, accompanied with the plates of foreign (special) units and the pictures of the missions abroad suggests the unit members feel themselves to be part both of the Italian Army and the international community of special units. They suggest that part of their selfrepresentation is to be found in the typical professional activities rather than in the belonging to the Italian Army, as confirmed by one of my informants who later admitted to feel more ‘a special force member’ than a component of the specific corps he served.2

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All the pictures depict smiling and relaxed people, both militaries and the two presidents, giving a sign of warmth to the hall. The poses of people depicted are relaxed, suggesting the pictures have been taken during work activities but not in highly formalised moments like parades. The dedication and the smiling face of the president on the photograph suggest friendliness and the respect the head of the state grants to the unit. Pictures and plates tell a story to those who have the necessary information to decode it. They are time markers (Berg, 1987) and evoke the missions of the last few years. They are physical signs that recall that Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo are not just geographical expressions but relevant time spans in this particular organisational life. They are also physical signs left to posterity, to those enrolling now and tomorrow, to remind them of the history of the unit. In this sense, they work just like the A4 paper sheets with the best performances written in, there to tell newcomers ‘where other colleagues have arrived’, to use the words of one soldier of the workgroup. Unlike the plates and the pictures of the unit, some other artefacts described above could easily be found in totally different contests. At the time of my research, in 2003, the keffiah and the peace flag were quite commonly worn and displayed by pacifists, people who would have found it strange, if not insulting, to see them in the office of a young officer training to fight in the Iraq war. They are positioned in an office, which is not a common space. The officer explained to me that the keffiah had no political meaning but it was just a present received during a mission by a foreign soldier; the peace flag was displayed there as a way to reaffirm his conviction that military missions he took part in are to be considered peacekeeping missions, even if not considered as such by those who generally made use of that symbol.3 These artefacts do not belong specifically to the context of analysis and at least one of them could easily look out of place (the flag). Nevertheless they come to be legitimate organisational artefacts by virtue of being inaccessible to sight, or not overtly displayed in a communal space, and by being re-symbolised in a process that attributes new meaning to them. In this sense these artefacts constitute a boundary for the group, as their acceptance lies in a shared understanding of their meanings. The trousse The same line of reasoning could be followed to understand the relevance of another artefact observed in a group of maintainers in the Italian Air Force whose task is to take care of the airplane engines. According to the rules, a maintainer should pick one tool at a time from the rack, use it on the engine, put it back on the rack, pick another one, and so forth. This procedure is aimed at avoiding losing tools and leaving them in the airplane engine, which may provoke fatal incidents. The strict execution of the prescribed procedure would require the maintainers to spend a lot of time moving from the engine to the rack, back and forth, and would cause even more problems when the engine to be inspected had to be left far away from the tool rack. The solution to the problem was found in building a trousse (“box”, in French), an artefact not

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present in the job guide of the group. It is a mobile drawers unit on four wheels. At the base of each drawer they glued a sheet of bright yellow paper; then they placed a piece of black foam rubber on it and cut it so as to allow each single tool to fit into the holes created. This artefact allows them to carry all of their tools with them all the time and to keep them under control: they just need to look inside the drawers of their trousse at the end of their work and see if there is a yellow empty space. With a simple glimpse they can tell if there is anything missing and understand by its empty shape which it is. They have built more than one of these mobile units, all identical. Each of the four drawers of the trousse contains a given type of tool and their disposition is the same in every trousse. However, even though they are identical, they are not interchangeable; there is a trousse for every two maintainers, they work in pairs and are responsible for it and the tools it contains. The trousse may be used as an example to explain what is meant by the logos, ethos and pathos of artefacts, and brings to the fore the contribution that aesthetics makes to the understanding of this workgroup. The trousse has logos, ontology. It is a work device, something rationally designed to save time. The moving capabilities granted by the wheels makes it a far more versatile artefact than the rack fixed to the wall, allowing time to be saved. The artefact also has an ethos, meaning it ‘comprises its unwritten principles, its moral codes, its deontologies, and the constant regulation of its legitimacy’ (Strati, 2005: 25). In the specific case we have the violation of a rule (use of the rack) and the constitution of a new set of rules to regulate the use of the trousse: it ‘belongs’ to two people, they never change their trousse with teammates or people not belonging to the group; they are responsible for it. In addition to this, an aesthetics approach can help us to see the too-often neglected dimension of the pathos of the artefact. The trousse is a time marker (Berg, 1987) and separates two eras: before the trousse and after it, characterised by different work practices. The divide between before and after is marked by an act of creation, the construction of a new artefact not described anywhere in the strict procedures of their work activities. There was always a proud tone when the workers told me the story of the trousse. They stressed the fact that no other unit had thought of building something similar. The trousse, though, embodies the pride of creativity. It also stands as a symbol of the bravery of the members of the unit for using a non-legal artefact. Bravery here is merged with pride, in the sense that they feel authorised, in a way, to alter their work practices, affirming they know ‘how the work has to be done’ better than those who have written the job guide, or ‘the bible’ as they call it. Nevertheless, it is not perceived as a blasphemous act to modify ‘the bible’. The members make use of another artefact, a linguistic one: they refer to the trousse and to other new artefacts they’ve created as ‘optimisations’. With this brilliant move the members of the group of maintainers reconfirm at once the overall validity of the manual they are supposed to follow strictly and their modifications to it, presented as something that makes perfect what was already very good. The trousse is also, and most of all, a material artefact that is appreciated aes-

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thetically. Those who use it can tell by pushing it if it needs maintenance; they are able to understand by the creaks it produces if it is overloaded or if the tools inside are placed incorrectly; they can see little marks that distinguish one trousse from another; and by virtue of sight they can tell if every tool is in its place; they smell the grease and the oil that has touched the tools during the repairs. Use the trousse requires knowledge, possessed by those who belong to the unit and have access to this artefact. This knowledge has a tacit dimension, not expressible through words (Polanyi, 1962, 1966); it is a knowledge gained with practice and it rests not in the rational faculties but in the sensorial realm. And it is with the senses that the members of the workgroup judge it a beautiful object, appreciated for the pleasantness to the eye and for its sharp style. Beauty and functionality merge in the artefact. But I shall come to discuss the role of the beauty in more extensive terms in the next section. It may look like this artefact is a poor one, not deserving of too much attention. Its relevance, instead, has to be found in the particular work setting it has been created. If an airplane falls or has a minor incident, the maintainers who worked on it are suddenly investigated. Every single step of their activity is regulated by a job guide and its rules are sacred. The creation of a new artefact is a rule-breaking activity, no matter how much it alters the prescribed procedures. In this setting what might be overlooked as a minor change assumes the connotation of a risky personal initiative. The trousse is the way in which the workgroup shows its ability in innovating and defining new procedures. Moreover, the gain of time granted by it allows the member of the unit to depict themselves as people who deeply love their work: at risk of personal consequences they introduce an artefact only to do their job faster and better. Understatement, still, has to be the rule; the trousse is not legitimate and its use may cause problems. The beauty of the artefact lies both in the physical aspect and in the emotion it arouses in the members of the workgroup.

Beauty (and other aesthetic categories) in the military Aesthetic philosophers have deeply reflected on aesthetic categories, mostly as a way to discuss art. In this century, though, art has escaped museums to find its place in society. From the ready-made by Marcel Duchamps to the so-called relational aesthetics (Bourriaud, 2002), the idea that art and real life are distinct has been radically challenged. In this sense, following Gianni Vattimo (1977), we can argue that paying attention to the beauty can be transferred from art works to social practices. More extensively, we can argue that this can apply not just to beauty but to every aesthetic category such as ugly, grotesque, tragic, comic, sublime, sacred and so on (for an extensive discussion of aesthetic categories in philosophy, see Milani, 1991, or the review made by Strati, 2000). Beauty certainly occupies a special position among aesthetic categories, having a tradition dating back from the first Western philosopher to the present day with a continuous shift of meaning (Bodei, 1995). The organisational scholar is not required to become a philosopher or to study all the detailed

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history of each and every aesthetic category s/he utilises before using one. The philosopher David A. White suggests that organisational scholar’s aim is not to develop the debate around those concepts, but to use them in order to analyse; in this respect a mistake such as a wrong attribution to an author would make no real difference as far as the concept proves useful to organisational analysis or description (White, 1996). In other words, the wide philosophical literature on every aesthetic category can be a useful repertoire of insights and can stimulate reflections to the organisational scholar. The concept of beauty, in the various ways it has been given, is by far the most used. The path-breaking research by Rafael Ramírez on the beauty of the social organisation (Ramírez, 1987a, b, 1991) drew on the idea of Susanne Langer (1942, 1962) of beauty as ‘pattern that connects’, to show that the perception people had of the three organisations under analysis originated from the strong link felt between the organisation and the surrounding social environment of which it was a part. The concept of beauty has come to be widely used since then (Ramírez, 1996; Strati, 1996, 1999; White, 1996), but some others categories have also become common tools in organisational analyses, like the kitsch (Kostera, 1997; Linstead, 2002), the disgust (Pelzer, 2002) or the sublime (Guillet de Montoux, 2000, 2004). In this section I will try to show how useful some aesthetic categories have proven to be in understanding some workgroup processes, restricting my discussion to beauty and grotesque. The group I was observing was setting up a drill to be performed for a visiting general. The members of the group considered the drill quite easy and even boring. They showed no concern for making any mistakes, but they were unhappy with the job they had been given; they considered the whole thing not as a real drill but a big fake. They were not asked, they explained to me, to perform as if a situation like that could really happen for real, but only to strictly follow every rule. They even had a special jargon word to describe this manuallike drill, a completely unrealistic action to be performed just to impress the audience. The existence of such a word clearly meant that drills like the one I could observe were not an unusual event in the life of the workgroup. One of the members of the unit, particularly annoyed with this activity, explained to me all the differences between the ‘real action’ and the fake drill. They were mostly about security measures prescribed by manuals but never, or almost never, strictly followed during action. These rules regarded the thickness (and the heaviness) of the bullet-proof jacket, the use of protective glasses, of knee caps and elbow caps, the greasy mimetic camouflage, the use of leaves and branches to disguise themselves. Other rules prescribed the weapons to be used for that particular action, while another rule allowed only shooting twice at the target. My informant was particularly irritated by having to use the rifle instead of the pistol. He explained to me that he felt ridiculous; since he was the shortest of the unit, and hardly tall enough to enrol in the corps, he had always felt a better proportion between his limbs and a little pistol rather than his arms and the large rifle. Some autonomy is granted in the unit in the choice of a favourite weapon, and he developed an ability to use pistols rather than rifles. He felt less

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confident with rifles, he explained. He added that day he felt even less confident: the thicker and heaviest bullet-proof jacket they were forced to use reduced his agility and he was not able to place the rifle correctly between the arm and the chest because of the thickness of the jacket. He also added that he would not use all the protections required for the drill in a real action, but would wear a light bullet-proof jacket in order to feel free to move and be quicker. Beauty here is symmetry, proportion among parts of the body and the artefacts used to complete it and to create, together with it, the military body that I shall consider an artefact in itself. This idea of beauty, Pythagorean, as Bodei remind us (1995), is a concept that connects the individual to its artefact and to his teammates. The relevance of the proportion derives from a self-observation in relation to the others. The fitness of a certain artefact for a certain body depends on some aesthetic evaluation of ‘good proportion’ seen in the unit, established by sensorial judgement. Moreover, the beauty in this case also relates to the ‘good feelings’ the person feels when he uses the pistol instead of the rifle. A consideration can be made about the workgroup: it is a work environment that allows and encourages people to feel at ease with their bodies and let them evaluate for themselves what equipment to use, at least in real action situations. The drill This is not true, though, when the unit happens to perform drills in front of generals. In this case the beauty of the free-moving body is opposed to the ridiculousness of the clumsy overloaded soldier. Clumsiness is a relative sensorial feeling; it derives from the diverse arrangement of the body, and its parts, and the organisational artefacts. It is the unusual and not pleasing feeling that something is out of place or out of scale. The usual tactile feelings are swept away by new, disturbing elements. The disturbance can be explained in terms of subsidiary awareness turned to focal awareness, using the distinction drawn by Polanyi (1962). When we use a hammer to drive a nail, explains Polanyi, we are feeling both the hammer in our palm and the nail on the wall: when we strike the nail we perceive the head of the hammer has struck the nail, but do not feel the handle of the hammer striking the palm of our hands. We are aware both of the hammer and of the nail, but we have a distinct kind of awareness of the two: a focal awareness on the nail and a subsidiary awareness on the palm of our hand. The hammer becomes, then, a part of the body we’re not aware of until something unexpected happens, i.e. we miss the nail and hit the wall. This is what I meant above when I argued that the military body, the soldier body plus all the artefacts carried, has to be considered a single organisational artefact. In a normal situation all the artefacts, i.e. weapons and bullet-proof jacket, are not present to the soldier’s awareness as they are merged with his body, and the soldier is only conscious of them in a subsidiary way. But the rules of today’s drill are making him feel his body and the other artefacts, too long and too heavy, and he has to be focally aware of

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them. This, of course, disrupts the usual flow of action. He is aware of all the (unusual) components of his equipment as they impose themselves on his attention by disturbing him. The ridiculousness of the situation is the fragmentation of the artefact ‘body-of-the-warrior’ into smaller parts: rifle, eye protection, knee cap, camouflage and so on. Beauty and grotesque In this representation, beauty is opposed to grotesque, another aesthetic category. Grotesque is a form of ugliness, a transformation of the ugly into something comic, as other categories like the ironic, the humoristic, the caricature, the kitsch and the like. The comic categories are what familiarise us to ugliness, eliciting laughter rather than disgust. The distinctive feature of grotesque is that it has some caricature aspects not recognised as such. The grotesqueness of the situation depicted by my informant rested on the different ways the workgroup and the visiting general perceived the drill. While, he supposed, the general was convinced he was observing a representation of a combat-like activity, my informant was feeling with all his body the fake nature of it. The grotesque, though, is perceived only by the members of the unit, not by the spectators; for them the drill can even be beautiful, and the general, in fact, complimented the unit after it. The different aesthetic categories used by the members of the unit and the general indicate a ‘conflict of different aesthetics’ among the members of the same organisation. The whole drill is imbued with power relationships; the drill has to be performed according to the rules and the aesthetic taste of the general. In this case I indicate with the word ‘aesthetics’ the presentation of the bodies, something quite easy to spot in the presentation generally required in every work space (Tyler and Taylor, 1998). By the use of ‘grotesque’ to describe the situation, though, the members of the group take a little revenge on the general, implicitly described as a person not able to tell a real action from a fake drill. The attention paid to sensorial perceptions and aesthetic judgements opens new possible ways to interpret power relations as impositions of one’s aesthetic to someone else. In this perspective, power is something inscribed in the bodies of those who experience it. Power is recalled by the focal awareness it is necessary to have on the artefacts, it is felt with the heaviness of the equipment, it is smelled in the greasy cream they cover their faces with in order to disguise themselves and in the odour of their sweating bodies, it is seen in the clumsy moves of the team mates, it is heard in their heavy breaths. It is not relevant to discuss here if the general had really perceived the drill as being realistic. What matters is to notice that the members of the group believed so and used a linguistic artefact to communicate (‘grotesque’) and reaffirm this belief. As seen above, in discussing the role of physical artefacts, we can see how a linguistic artefact can be used as a tool to continuously rebuild the boundary of the workgroup. In this case it also comes to be defined by the belief that they hold a secret: they, and only them, know what is really going on.

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I shall go back to the beauty for a final remark. I have shown the Pythagorean conception of beauty when the soldier explained to me his preference for pistols. Here we have the concept of beauty referred to the action, not to a physical artefact. It emerges as a counterposition to the grotesque fake drill and it refers to the ‘real’ situation. The grotesque is such because it spoils the beauty of the freedom felt by soldiers when they are able to decide for themselves what equipment to use. The sense of beauty is related here to the sense of rhythm perceived through the senses when they perform the same actions with no limitations. The sense of rhythm, another aesthetic category, is not something that requires clocks to be understood. The members of the workgroup know, with their body, what the action should be and how it feels to do it unconstrained. They feel the flow of their bodies on the terrain, the ‘choreographies’ created to attack the enemy, the absence of pauses in the action, the clockwork mechanics of the whole unit moving together. Beauty, then, is more than a mere adjective to be used to describe an action; it is something that structures the actions itself. The group has to train in order to perform some attack schemes in an uncertain context. The uncertainty rests on the unforeseeable enemy reaction. The beauty and rhythm of the action are what guide the training and the rehearsal of the drill. Its judgement rests on the sensorial feelings of the member of the unit. These feeling are what Gagliardi (1990b) has termed as ‘sensory maps’. They are not natural but learned, though this learning cannot be rational, but only aesthetic. The ‘light’ bullet-proof jacket, for instance, becomes light and comfortable after months and months of heavy training.

Organisational aesthetics: an outline Organisational aesthetics has an intrinsic multidisciplinary nature, given the common ground it shares with philosophy, namely the aesthetic. Reflection on topics as the concepts of beauty, the knowledge-gathering faculties of the five senses, art and empathy as a form of understanding date back to the beginning of Western philosophy. Only in the eighteenth century did Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten reunify the field, creating a new word, ‘aesthetics’, and defining it ‘the science of sensory knowledge’ (Baumgarten, 1750–8). He considered it a form of knowing distinct from the predominant Cartesian rationality, as something that paves the way to logical understanding. Some decades earlier, the Neapolitan philosopher Gianbattista Vico, in describing the principles of his ‘scienza nuova’ (new science), considered the rational and the poetic as two irreducible forms of knowledge, according his favours to the latter (Vico, 1725). In the next couple of centuries, aesthetics has been considered mainly as a ‘philosophy of art’ and only in the last few decades has there been a renewed interest to rediscover the roots of the discipline and the epistemic counterposition stated at its origins (Barilli, 1989). Organisational scholars who make use of this approach have conceptualised it in different ways, somehow referring, implicitly or overtly, to a different

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philosophical background (for an overview see, for example, Stephen Linstead and Heather Höpfl, 2000). In this work I have considered aesthetics as a form of knowledge based on the sensorial faculties of human beings who have five sense plus one, where the sixth sense is the aesthetic judgement, or the capacity to judge through the senses (Strati, 1992). The emphasis on the sensorial faculties and judgement underpins the relevance given to the practical knowledge of organisational members and its role in continuously reconstructing the organising processes through their interactions. This perspective stresses the materiality of organising, contrasting those organisational theories that usually depict organisations as populated by bodiless minds (Strati, 1999). The sensory or aesthetic experience is an ineffable and elusive one. It escapes rational definition and can only be understood by means of empathy, ‘standing in someone else’s shoes’, as the saying goes. My understanding of the uneasiness felt by the soldiers obliged to wear greasy camouflage on their face on a hot and sunny May morning cannot be fully explained in rational terms. I could feel the same temperature of the sun, but only imagining myself with that thick cream of my face I could understand their discomfort. Aesthetic research rests on the gathering faculties of the researcher’s senses and his/her willingness to activate them in the context of analysis (Strati, 1999). Imagination is the way to explore and ‘live’ organisational life, rather than just studying it while remaining detached from it. The evocation allows the investigation of an organisation even after a long period of time. Patricia Yancey Martin, for instance, has produced a journal article some 20 years after collecting her field notes (Martin, 2002). In the introduction she explains she had taken notes about her feelings while conducting a research in a residential organisation for the elderly. Those bits of notes, though, had to be left aside while writing the research report, according to the predominant positivistic paradigm of that time that required the researcher not to put anything ‘personal’ in the research. These bits, however, were what allowed her to relive in the imagination her experience and write about it more than 20 years later.4 As sensorial faculties of both researchers and organisational members come into play in a research project, it is relevant to explore these crucial elements in the processes of sense-making. Rational/logic thinking aims at ‘purifying’ understanding and theorising from the qualitative datum of sensorial experience. This produces an over-rationalised depiction of both organisations and researchers: if an organisation is deprived of its physicality, the same must happen to the researcher too. These elements are central in organisational aesthetics as they become what is to be observed and the lenses for observation. Aesthetic categories are verbal and written artefacts that allow the sharing and discussion of aesthetic experiences but they are not ‘natural’ or individual products. Beauty or ugliness are agreed, or contested, by the organisational actors. The reflection on how they are socially constructed and whose aesthetic prevails leads a researcher to investigate power relations and the processes of modification of such structuring elements of organisational culture. The idea of

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what is beautiful, ugly, tragic and so on is produced, reproduced and negotiated by actors in their everyday activities. These categories, then, are both a tool for description and an object or study of the aesthetic researcher. The relevance accorded to empathy and to the ineffability of the knowledge gathered by means of an aesthetic approach requires the researcher to solve the difficult problem of how this understanding can or should be proposed to the academic community. This is one of the most debated points, in fact; as John Van Maanen points out, the style of writing becomes an essential part of the theory proposed (Van Maanen, 1995). Some suggest translating in rational terms whatever has been discovered by empathic understanding (Gagliardi, 1996; Taylor, 2004; Hancock, 2005). Others suggest the text should be ‘open’ to interpretation; the author describes what s/he has seen and leaves it for the reader to interpret it (Strati, 1999). Some scholars reject the formalised ways of presenting a work and write instead evocative texts, such as plays or dramas (Steyaert and Hjorth, 2002); among them it is impossible to quote those who choose to communicate with performances, ephemeral by definition. In recent years there has been a growing number of conferences accepting or even encouraging submission of performances instead of papers. This raises the question of how this experience can become part of a community that still communicates through journals and books. Still, it is an indicator of the relevance of the problems emerging when trying to dig under the surface of rationalist explanations of organisational behaviour.

On aesthetic research: some remarks on method While controversies arise and grow among the scholars who use organisational aesthetics, there is one firm point about the methods needed: they have to be qualitative. The data presented here as field notes have been collected in an ethnographic study conducted mainly with participant observation and some interviews. Participant observation and in-depth interviews are the most common ways to conduct an aesthetic research. It is not just a linguistic game to underline that, here, participant observation gains a more profound meaning. In general we use this expression to highlight that the researcher’s presence ‘in the field’ is perceived by the others and so s/he becomes an actor (Bruni, 2003). When carrying out aesthetic research ‘participant observation’ reminds us of the effort the researchers have to put in, in order to ‘put themselves in the other’s shoes’. Participation means empathically living the situation explored. To elicit the tacit dimension of knowledge, some prefer to use art-related methods. David Barry suggests asking the interviewee to draw a picture of him/herself in the work setting and then describe and analyse it together with the interviewer (Barry, 1996). Steve Taylor has written a drama based on a personal organisational experience and then has analysed it together with his research team (Taylor, 2004). These and other forms of inquiry rest on the belief that artistic forms of expression can help to surface buried meanings and feelings that can then be grasped analytically or empathically.

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The choice of method depends on the particular way the researcher interprets the aesthetic approach. For those who believe in the impossibility of transforming the empathic understanding into logical reasoning, the open text or the performance provides a good way to share his/her knowledge. Those who, on the contrary, are convinced there is a way to formalise and define the aesthetics of the organisation will probably be keener on art-related methods. But, as every researcher knows, the choice of a method is also a matter of opportunity. In the military settings I explored, for example, I believe it would have been strange to propose that people did drawings while they were sat in the mud.

Conclusions The aim of this contribution was to present a new way to look at the processes of the workgroup in the military. As Fabrizio Battistelli (1990) has brilliantly demonstrated, military studies can benefit from an approach of looking at military institutions as organisations. Here I have tried to present how some workgroups in the armed forces looked like if seen ‘under the lens of aesthetics’, to use Strati’s powerful metaphor (1996). In the first section I have tried to show the relevance of artefacts in the creation of boundaries between different workgroups, where differences rest not in the mere possession of the artefact, but in the shared meanings it is given. The artefacts have been considered as objectsin-use, emphasising the social relations they become part of, becoming a part of what Knorr Cetina has defined as a ‘postsocial society’ (1997). While some studies insist on the prosthetic function of military artefacts (Bishop and Phillips, 2002, 2004), I have tried to show they also possess pathos, are imbued with meanings and emotions, and are judged through the senses. They become constitutive parts of the military body, an artefact itself. Restricting the discussion to beauty and the grotesque, I proposed a way to analyse some military phenomena using some aesthetic categories. This process of analysis brings to the fore pleasure or displeasure in performing certain tasks, the role played by physical perceptions and aesthetic judgement, the contrasting aesthetics sheltered within the same organisation by different groups. These elements are useful tools in the attempt to look for new perspectives on some traditional sociological concepts like control, power and cohesion (Piras and Fraccaroli, 2005) which have a notorious relevance in military studies. Adopting a micro-level perspective, and discussing some artefacts, I have tried to see workgroup cohesion as resting on the shared pathos felt by members for some organisational object. I also proposed to observe power as something continuously ‘felt’ by the body and not just inscribed in the body (Foucault, 1991). I stress here the relevance of the study of the body and the artefacts of military institutions because I believe they have a special relevance in this setting. Enrolling involves moving far away from home towns, being transferred when promoted, having a dispersed work setting. The workplace is constituted by barracks, various shooting ranges outside the military camp, the temporary and often self-constructed structures built during missions abroad, places where

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international drills are carried out, and so forth. A special forces’ group I could observe used two different shooting ranges in one week, one because there was the carcass of a helicopter to exercise with and the other because it was near a lake where they had their swim training. The same week they exercised crossing a river in a non-restricted area and planned to spend a week simulating an intrusion behind enemy lines in the surrounding forests. They are required to move to other regions to perform international drills or to train with heavy weapons only allowed in a special training camp. I believe the sense of belonging in such a disseminated work setting rests also on the cohesive symbolic force of the artefacts. For those involved in warfare, some artefacts are vital to survive. Parachutes, weapons, visors, protective items are all accurately maintained; they are given names and arouse feelings of pride, shelter, force. They mean more than just what they are designed for. Some other artefact, by no means less important, recalls the unit history and traditions, or the small histories of their members. The relevance of corporeality, the tacit nature of many skills, and the overload of symbols make the military a very interesting workspace to be explored by aesthetics. Hopefully, this approach may say something interesting to those concerned with military studies.

Notes 1 I would like to thank CeMiSS (Centro Militare Studi Strategici – Military Centre for Strategic Studies) that sponsored the research project I draw my data from, and all the other researchers: Silvia Gherardi (coordinator), Adalgisa Battistelli, Franco Fraccaroli and Michela Giampietro. 2 Whenever referring to my field notes I will use the masculine form: all the groups I happened to observe were entirely composed of males. 3 In those days in Italy, and many other parts of Europe, the rainbow-coloured flags with the word PEACE written in the middle were commonly displayed in windows. In particular, in Italy, the flag came to be seen as a symbol used mainly by the leftist parties and the Catholics. 4 The article, after a double-blind review process, was named by the prestigious journal, Human Relations as the best article published that year in the journal. The article would have probably not been published even in a minor journal some years before. This is probably a good example of how what is regarded ‘scientific’ is historical, and that it may rapidly change its meaning.

References Barilli, R. (1989) Corso di estetica, Bologna, Il Mulino. Barry, D. (1996) ‘Artful inquiry: a symbolic constructivist approach to social science research’, Qualitative Inquiry, 2(4): 411–38. Battistelli, F. (1990) Marte e Mercurio. Sociologia dell’organizzazione militare, Milano, Angeli. Baumgarten, A.G. (1750–8) Aesthetica I–II, Frankfurt am Oder, Kleyb. Berg, P.O. (1987) ‘Some notes on corporate artifacts’, Scos NoteWork, 6(1): 24–8. Bishop, R. and J. Phillips (2002) ‘Sighted weapons and modernist opacity: aesthetics, poetics, prosthetics’, Boundary 2, 29(2): 157–79.

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Bishop, R. and J. Phillips (2004) ‘The slow and the blind’, Culture and Organization, 10(1): 61–75. Bodei, R. (1995) Le forme del bello, Bologna, Il Mulino. Bourriaud, N. (2002) Relational aesthetics, Paris, Les Presses du Reel. Bruni, A. (2003) Lo studio etnografico delle organizzazioni, Roma, Carocci. Cairns, G. (2002) ‘Aesthetics, morality and power: design as espoused freedom and implicit control’, Human Relations, 55(7): 799–820. Davis, T.R.V. (1984) ‘The influence of the physical environment in offices’, Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 271–83. Degot, V. (1987) ‘Portrait of the manager as an Artist’, Dragon, 2(4): 13–49. Finley, S. and J.G. Knowles (1995) ‘Researcher as artist/Artist as researcher’, Qualitative Inquiry, 1(1): 110–42. Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish, Harmondsworth, Penguin. Gagliardi, P. (ed.) (1990a) Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the Corporate Landscape, New York, de Gruyter. Gagliardi, P. (1990b) ‘Artifacts as pathways and remains of organizational life’, in P. Gagliardi (ed.) Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the Corporate Landscape, New York, de Gruyter, pp. 3–38. Gagliardi, P. (1996) ‘Exploring the aesthetic side of organizational life’, in S.R. Clegg, C. Hardy and W.R. North (eds) Handbook of Organization Studies, London, Sage, pp. 565–80. Gherardi, S., E.M. Piras, A. Battistelli, F. Fraccaroli and M. Giampietro (2004) Le culture professionali ed i valori fondativi della coesione di gruppo nelle Forze Armate, Rapporto di ricerca. Trento, Dipartimento di Sociologia e Ricerca Sociale. Guillet de Montoux, P. (2000) ‘Performing the absolute: Marina Abramovic organizing the unfinished business of Arthur Schopenhauer’, Organization Studies, 21(0): 21–59. Guillet de Montoux, P. (2004) The Art Firm: Aesthetic Management and Metaphysical Marketing from Wagner to Wilson, Stanford, CA, Stanford Business Books. Hancock, P. (2005) ‘Uncovering the semiotic in organizational aesthetics’, Organization, 12(1): 29–50. Hatch, M.J. (1990) ‘The symbolic of office design: an empirical exploration’, in P. Gagliardi (ed.) Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the Corporate Landscape, New York, de Gruyter, pp. 129–46. Hutchins, E. (1995) Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Kersten, A. and R. Gilardi (2003) ‘The barren landscape: reading US corporate architecture’, in A. Carr and P. Hancock (eds) Art and Aesthetics at Work, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 138–53. Knorr Cetina, K. (1997) ‘Sociality with objects: social relations in postsocial knowledge society’, Theory, Culture & Society, 14(1): 1–30. Kostera, M. (1997) ‘The kitsch-organization’, Studies in Cultures, Organizations and Societies, 3: 163–77. Langer, S.K. (1942) Philosophy in a New Key, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Langer, S.K. (1962) Philosophical Sketches, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press. Latour, B. (1992) ‘Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artifacts’, in W.E. Bijker and J. Law (eds) Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 225–58. Latour, B. and S. Woolgar (1979) Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of Scientific Facts, London, Sage.

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Linstead, S. (2002) ‘Organizational kitsch’, Organization, 9(4): 657–82. Linstead, S. and H. Höpfl (eds) (2000) The Aesthetics of Organization, London, Sage. Martin, P.Y. (2002) ‘Sensations, bodies, and the “spirit of a place”: aesthetics in residential organizations for the elderly’, Human Relations, 55(7): 861–85. Milani, R. (1991) Le categorie estetiche, Parma, Pratiche editrice. Pelzer, L. (2002) ‘Disgust and organization’, Human Relations, 55(7): 841–60. Piras, E.M. and F. Fraccaroli (2005) ‘Les pratiques de la cohésion de groupe: une perspective ethnographique’, in A. Battistelli, M. Depolo and F. Fraccaroli (eds) La qualité de la vie au travail dans les années 2000. Actes du 13ème Congrès de Psychologie du Travail et des Organisation de Langue Française, Bologna, CLUEB, pp. 392–400. Polanyi, M. (1962) Personal Knowledge, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Polanyi, M. (1966) The Tacit Dimension, Garden City, NY, Doubleday. Ramírez, R. (1987a) ‘An aesthetic theory of social organization’, Dragon, 2(4): 51–63. Ramírez, R. (1987b) ‘The relationship between aesthetic theory of social organization and some theories of organizational symbolism’, Dragon, 2(4): 65–84. Ramírez, R. (1991) The Beauty of Social Organization, München, Accedo. Ramírez, R. (1996) ‘Wrapping form and organization beauty’, Organization, 3(2): 233–42. Rosen, M., W.J. Orlikowski and K.S. Schmahmann (1990) ‘Building buildings and living lives: a critique of bureaucracy, ideology and concrete artifacts’, in P. Gagliardi (ed.) Symbols and Artifacts: Views of the Corporate Landscape, New York, de Gruyter, pp. 69–84. Schneider, S. and E. Powley (1986) ‘The role of images in changing corporate culture: the case of A.T. & T.’, Dragon, 1(2): 5–44. Steyaert, C. and D. Hjorth (2002) ‘ “Thou art a scholar, speak to it.” – on spaces of speech: A script’, Human Relations, 55(7): 767–97. Strati, A. (1992) ‘Aesthetic understanding of organizational life’, The Academy of Management Review, 17(3): 568–81. Strati, A. (1996) ‘Organizations viewed through the lens of aesthetics’, Organization, 3(2): 209–18. Strati, A. (1999) Organization and Aesthetics, London, Sage. Strati, A. (2000) ‘The aesthetic approach in organization studies’, in S. Lindstead and H. Höpfl (eds) The Aesthetics of Organization, London, Sage. Strati, A. (2005) ‘Organizational artifacts and the aesthetic approach’, in A. Rafaeli and M. Pratt (eds) Artifacts and Organizations, Hove, Erlbaum Lawrence Associates, pp. 23–39. Strati, A. and P. Guillet de Montoux (2002) ‘Introduction: organizing aesthetics’, Human Relations, 55(7): 755–66. Taylor, S.S. (2004) ‘Presentational form in first person research: off-line collaborative reflection using art’, Action Research, 2(1): 71–88. Tyler, M. and S. Taylor (1998) ‘The exchange of aesthetics: women’s work and “the gift” ’, Gender, Work and Organization, 5(3): 165–71. Van Maanen, J. (1995) ‘Style as theory’, Organization Science, 6(1): 133–43. Vattimo, G. (ed.) (1977) Estetica moderna, Bologna, Il Mulino. Vico, G. (1725) Principi di una Scienza Nuova, Napoli, Mosca. White, D.A. (1996) ‘ “It is working beautifully!” Philosophical reflections on aesthetics and organization theory’, Organization, 3(2): 195–208.

Part II

New issues and emerging trends

8

Conceptual insecurity New wars, MOOTW, CRO, terrorism, and the military Wilfried von Bredow

Introduction In the modern international system, the armed forces usually function as an instrument of the territorial state. They are formed, paid for and utilised in the name of the state’s security. In this context, security means primarily sufficient military strength in order to deter any possible aggressor from penetrating the state’s territory or to defend the territory, in case of an attack from the outside. This defensive role is complemented by an offensive role: armed forces have been used in order to expand the political and economic weight of a state and to gain or exercise regional hegemony. Throughout the twentieth century, the offensive function has, by and by, lost its legitimacy. This did not and does not impede the use of organised violence in different forms, by different actors (many non-state actors among them), and with different political (or other) motives and goals. We can call these two main functions of the armed forces “traditional functions”. These functions converge in the capacity of waging war. The organisation of the armed forces, their structure, strategic doctrines and tactics, their armament and equipment have changed considerably over time. One cornerstone of the perception of the military and the military self-perception has remained unchanged: armed forces are created and sustained in order to fight, to go to war. They strive for victory in the name and interest of the state (nation-state or multinational state) to which they have pledged their allegiance. During the years of the East–West conflict, and with a special dynamism after the end of that bipolar international system, other forms of organised violence occurred. The process of globalisation decreased the role of the state. According to some observers, the transformation of the international system also causes a “transformation of war” (van Creveld, 1991). The notion of sovereignty is losing some of its former relevance. In some areas of the world, governments are proving themselves less and less capable of running their states. Failing states are becoming a security problem not only for their inhabitants. Local conflicts and wars are developing a considerable spillover effect into the zones of peaceful everyday-life elsewhere. In short, local wars always have a global dimension.

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In order to prevent these negative effects and to contain local violence, the international community has developed some concepts of humanitarian intervention, peace-making and peacekeeping missions. These missions usually comprise civil and military elements. With regard to the long history of warfare and military actions, the roles of the military in such missions are not completely new, but they are, in many respects, different from the military roles we usually think of when dealing with modern armed forces. This is especially so for the North Atlantic theatre of the East–West conflict after 1945. The armed forces of the states in this area (some of them number among the leading actors in the international system) are thus dismissing part of their traditional functions and missions. They are challenged by the necessity to take over new and non-traditional functions and missions. This concerns not only the armed forces of the great and middle powers, but also those of smaller states that are trying to re-define their place in the international order in an affirmative and constructive way. The various aspects of change in the national and international politicomilitary balances are difficult to identify and to disentangle. This is the main reason for a certain conceptual insecurity as opposed to a comprehensive theory of the new forms of violent conflicts and the role of the armed forces in their containment. In this chapter, we shall look more closely at the ongoing political and academic debates about the changing nature of war and the consequences of this development for the armed forces, mainly in the Western world.

Political framework Before looking deeper into the consequences of the new, or at least recently reemphasised, changes in military affairs, it is necessary to think about the structural changes in the sphere of politics. The range of missions for the armed forces are determined by the political system of a state, or by the political head of a non-state actor. Even in conflicts where paramilitary and private actors prevail, the classic observation by von Clausewitz (1989: 605) “that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means”,1 has not become obsolete. In most cases, the organised use of force fulfils political goals, or goals that can be easily translated into political goals. These goals differ according to the historic, geographic and cultural context. Societies, organised as states, and the international system are two principal sources of change in the military – the third one being, of course, military technology. The nature of politics has certainly not changed. However, this is probably the only stable continuity we can build upon, as all three of the principal factors of change in the military have, indeed, changed themselves. Military technology has rapidly advanced over the past few decades. The end of the East–West conflict is more than just the end of one specific conflict between great powers and their respective alliances. It is the beginning of a postmodern interlude in world politics. The current international system is different from the bipolar system we

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lived in during the second half of the twentieth century. The number of actors, as well as the number of categories of actors in the international system, has grown considerably. States seem to be losing a certain part of their structural strength in politics. In order to have a name for these dramatic changes, some scholars of international relations use the term “end of the Westphalian system”. This system developed in Europe in the seventeenth century. At its core is the sovereign state, defined by territory, borders, population and internal order. The state has the monopoly on legal physical violence and is, among other things, responsible for law-making, the settlement of disputes and law enforcement. The international system is mainly an inter-state system. It is anarchical in so far as there are no political authorities above the state. States can rely on their power and on their leaders’ ability to make rational use of it. The national interests of states dominate international politics and the methods of best realising these interests. Conflicts between states are settled by power, either in a diplomatic or, if regarded as effective and comparatively cheap, in a military way. The actors’ attempts to mutually balance their power, political and military alliances to provide for collective defence, and a minimalist set of binding rules for the behaviour of states, characterise the Westphalian system. The principles of this modern state system have frequently been disregarded in the centuries following the peace treaty of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648. Still, it makes sense to analyse the expansion of this system from Europe all over the globe with the help of this model. During the twentieth century, however, the structures and principles of the globalising Westphalian system changed deeply. Towards its end, the key pillars of the Westphalian system seemed to be cracking. The main reason for this development is the growing difficulty of (most) states to effectively organise their societies, to remain the central institution of their citizens’ loyalty, and to provide sufficient protection against risks and threats from beyond their borders. National economies are becoming more and more interdependent, which diminishes the ability of a state bureaucracy to plan and implement a national economic policy. Ecological problems can only be dealt with on a macro-regional or global scale: states as single actors are mostly incapable of ecological problem-solving. This development comprises optimistic and pessimistic aspects. A bleak outlook into the future stresses the anarchical and disorderly features of the current international system, where violence remains a most important ingredient of power (Kaplan, 2000). On the other hand, optimists among political science experts point to the wave of democratisation after the end of the East–West conflict. They claim that democratic societies would have serious problems mobilising their citizens for the purpose of waging war if the military enemy were also a democratic society. They conclude that the risk of war among authentic democracies is close to zero. Even if it is still too early for the assumption of a universally valid “law” of democratic peace (Russett, 1993), it is hardly contestable that inside some

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macro-regions of the planet (like North America since the nineteenth century or Western Europe since the end of the Second World War), inter-state war is no longer a meaningful political option for policymakers. This is, however, only part of the overall assessment of future violence. In some regions, organised violence and war will accompany humankind into the next millennium. Even in Europe, border conflicts and inter-ethnic wars continue to occur. On some continents, internal wars have become quite “normal”, as have military coups and periods of military dictatorships.

New wars In his historic overview on the development of war in modern times, Kalevi Holsti (1996) distinguishes three kinds of war. Institutionalised war occurred in the eighteenth century between the states of the expanding European international system and was a rather domesticated, highly professional form of war. Then, with the French Revolution, the flush of victory of nationalism as the most forceful mobilising ideology for modernising societies began. One of the consequences of this development was the formation of mass armed forces. Wars between mass armed forces developed the tendency to become total wars, a term already used by Clausewitz, albeit with a quite different meaning. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed two world wars, which represent the terrible climax of this development. The second half of this century was characterised by the rise of yet another form of war, called “people’s war” or “wars of a third kind”. These wars are also total wars in a certain sense, but on a restricted level. The indigenous people fought the liberation wars of the decolonisation era in order to create a political community against the colonial power. The purpose of such wars is often to politicise the masses, to turn them into good revolutionaries and/or nationalists. Civilians not only become major targets of operations, but their transformation into a new type of individual becomes a major purpose of war. Since the distinction between combatant and civilian is blurred or indistinct, it is not surprising that the brunt of casualties are suffered by the inhabitants of villages, towns, and cities. (Holsti, 1996: 39) This typology is certainly helpful, not so much because it offers clear distinctions, but because it makes us aware of the hidden continuities between these forms of war. We ought not to forget, for example, that it was not only the decolonisation era that saw many wars of the third kind, as described by Holsti. Some centuries before, the colonial wars of the European powers in the Americas, Africa and Asia displayed similar features (and similar cruelties). In an attempt to give an overview of the various names and concepts of the military conflicts that fall into this “third kind”, Roger Beaumont (1995) lists among others: dirty war, guerrilla war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, limited war, proxy war, surrogate war and low-intensity operations. These wars are, to

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a large degree, intrastate conflicts between comparatively weak governments and comparatively strong opponents, and they are, indeed, predominantly small wars. They may, however, easily escalate into major threats for third parties, in either the neighbourhood or elsewhere. Small wars are usually local wars. Territorial control plays an important role in these wars, but mainly on the level of official war aims and the motivation to fight. The fighting itself can be transferred into other regions, e.g. into the urbanised parts of the world. There are enough examples to illustrate this horizontal escalation, such as the struggle between radical Kurds and Turks in Germany and acts of terrorism in Western Europe in the 1970s, etc. The literature on guerrilla warfare of the past few decades provides a vast array of empirical material to study their tactics and strategy. They combine primitive warfare and cruelty with high-tech sophistication and hyper-modern propaganda. Their intensity ranges from sporadic terrorism to secretly prepared genocide. The current discussion about war in the post-East–West conflict era is structured around the notion of “new wars” (Kaldor, 2000; Münkler, 2002; HerbergRothe, 2003). Some features of the new military missions, like fighting insurgents (“stability operations”), have a tradition of their own.2 They formed a less visible, but always present part of conventional modern warfare. There are, indeed, many similarities between guerrilla and counterguerilla warfare in the decolonisation era of the twentieth century and today’s “new wars”. However, the different political framework and the so-called “revolution in military affairs”3 are demanding “fundamentally new military doctrines and organizations” (Sloan, 2002: 16). A different political framework is of salient importance for the shaping of the “new wars”. This is important to note in order to remain sensitive to the impact of political factors on the outbreak, the waging and, eventually, the de-escalation of those violent conflicts that fall into the category of “new wars”. They originate in zones with weak or failing states. Holsti (1996: 40) argues that they will continue into the future because, in many parts of the world, states are not strong enough to successfully monopolise the means of organised physical violence. The conflicts in question do not become militarised because of the strength of a state, but because of its instability and weakness. When a state is unable to integrate the interests of different groups, when it lacks the ability to contain internal tensions and to sustain law and order, the consequence may well be the outbreak of internal clashes and civil wars. Mary Kaldor (2000) insists on the category of “new wars” because wars like those in former Yugoslavia or in many parts of Africa are distinctively different from “old wars” with regard to their goals, the usage of violence and their financing. Ideological and geopolitical confrontations are less important than the clash of collective identities. This implies a fight against every single member of the other ethnic, religious or otherwise defined group. Forced migration, mass violation, ethnic cleansing and genocide belong to the methods of violence in such new wars. Financial resources for the participants of such wars come from

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different sources – a considerable part through a symbiosis of the war fighting groups with organised crimes (drug-trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, prostitution). Herfried Münkler (2002, 2003) regards asymmetry as one of the salient features of the new wars. Asymmetric warfare is not a completely new phenomenon: “In a sense, all warfare is asymmetrical as there are never identical belligerents” (Pfanner, 2005: 151). In today’s world, the differences between belligerents are more dramatic than ever before. The USA have a high-tech military at their disposal which can be rapidly deployed all over the planet. In recent wars in Africa and on other continents, the decisive factor was not high-tech weapons, but second-hand small arms. Acts of terrorism have become an integral part of asymmetric warfare. As Münkler (2003: 9) states, greater material resources and a more advanced technological development will not automatically tip the scale between victory and defeat. The militaries of the rich Western countries may be the winner in an open battle (like the USA winning the Gulf War in 2003 without much resistance from the Iraqi troops). The fundamental aim of asymmetric warfare “is to find a way round the adversary’s military strength by discovering and exploiting, in the extreme, its weaknesses” (Pfanner, 2005: 151). The main weakness of complex societies is their infrastructure. Striking against non-military targets often causes spectacular damage. The “new wars” at the fringes of the Western world are comparatively cheap for those who wage them: Most of these wars are not fought by well-equipped armies but by the hastily recruited militias of tribal chiefs or heads of clans, plus the armed followers of warlords and the like. Above all, the weapons used in the new wars are cheap – small arms, automatic rifles, anti-personnel mines and machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks. Heavy weapons are only rarely used and, when they are, consist mostly of remnants from the stockpiles of the Cold War. That wars of this type can be fought – and even fought successfully – is mainly due to the fact that they are not decided on the battlefield between two armies but drag on interminably in violence directed against the civilian population. (Münkler, 2003: 15) A second salient feature of new wars is their partial privatisation. The emergence of warlords and their privately recruited militaries (often including child soldiers) in zones with failing or failed states is no surprise but, instead, a logical consequence. The war economies in these zones are able to tap into the flows of capital and goods in the world market: “Apart from oil and strategic raw materials such as ores and minerals, gold and diamonds, the warlords use above all illegal or fraudulently certified goods to finance their wars and frequently to accumulate enormous fortunes” (Münkler, 2003: 17).

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Revolutions in security affairs It is quite normal today to use the terms “revolution” and “revolutionary” with regard to current changes in warfare. We should be aware that these terms have two different (although not mutually exclusive) meanings. Generally, they characterise the enormous technological developments in military technology, like in “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). However, they also refer to strategic, operational and tactic innovations in two quite different political frameworks: first, the anti-colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century within the East–West conflict (see, among others, Beaufre, 1972) and second in the turbulent postEast–West conflict era. Until 1990, the threat perceptions of Western countries had been dominated for more than four decades by the anticipation of a nuclear and/or a non-nuclear (conventional) aggression from the Soviet Union and its allies. Even the decolonisation wars in Africa and Asia were always connected with the main threat of Soviet- or communist-inspired aggression. Within this political framework, a first revolution in security affairs occurred. The rapid development of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with a global reach brought about a kind of strategic stalemate. After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the nuclear “superpowers”, the USA and the Soviet Union4 built their defence against each other on the concept of “mutually assured destruction”. Nuclear peace was an uneasy phenomenon, but it seems to have worked. The main task of the protagonists of the East–West conflict’s armed forces was to demonstrate a credible deterrence. In the case of the deterrence failing, NATO troops in Western Europe had the mission to defend the territory against the aggressor. The capacity to do so, however, was necessary in order to make deterrence more credible. The virtualisation of war in Europe and between the “superpowers” was a first and rather dramatic revolution in security matters, for it guided the adversaries towards a kind of antagonistic cooperation – as expressed in a whole range of arms-control agreements from the 1960s to 1990. In this period, the armed forces of the Western countries became more of a bureaucratised organisation, and military leadership implied more managerial skills than in the past. Before the East–West conflict was about to enter its last phase, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos (1981: 11) stated bluntly: “In short, the military profession as a whole has become similar to large bureaucratic, non-military institutions. It has, in effect, become civilianised.” In the same year, Michel Martin described the development of the French military establishment since 1945 as a passage from “warriors to managers” (1981). This trend was sustained by technological change, as well as by the intricate nuclear strategic “balance of terror”. Underneath the nuclear level, the armed forces of many Western countries (although not all of them – the German Bundeswehr being the most prominent exception) were engaged in wars. Most of these wars were a mixture of guerrilla war and conventional war. For these wars, the armed forces needed warriors more urgently than managers. At the same time, the international community5 started to regard the containment of violence in local or regional conflicts as a high-priority goal – not in all

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cases, but in those where violence appeared to be especially dangerous for the neighbouring countries or especially evil. In the 1950s, the United Nations developed the instrument of international peacekeeping: [A peacekeeping force consists of] military components from various nations, operating under the command of an impartial world body and committed to the absolute minimum use of force, which seek to reduce or prevent armed hostilities. The more generic term peacekeeping operations includes not only peacekeeping military forces but also such diverse and usually smaller peacekeeping enterprises as observer groups, truce commissions, investigatory missions, and the like. The peace soldier is, therefore, one who serves in a military capacity under a command authorized by an internationally accepted mandate and who adheres to impartiality while subscribing to the strictest standards of absolute minimal force functionally related to self-defense. (Moskos, Jr., 1976: 4) These are definitions of the traditional kind of peacekeeping. During the East–West conflict, the Security Council of the United Nations initiated a whole range of what we now call traditional peacekeeping operations. Moskos Jr., who had looked more closely into UNFICYP6 peacekeeping operations, contended the necessity of special training for peacekeeping soldiers: “Contemporary standards of military professionalism must undergo fundamental redefinition to meet the requirements of the peacekeeping role” (Moskos Jr., 1976: 10). This role implied a neutral and status quo-oriented stand by the military: “The interposition of UN forces came only after the belligerents had separated of their own accord” (Hillen, 2000: 86). A famous saying, attributed to Dag Hammerskjöld and to Charles Moskos, stated that peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it. The peacekeeping role combined the traditional image of the soldier as warrior with the non-traditional image of the soldier as a constable. Under the auspices of the East–West conflict, peacekeeping was mainly a business for smaller and middle powers, neutral and non-aligned countries or countries (like Canada, for instance) that developed a generally acclaimed political preference for mediation and brokerage in international politics. After the end of the East–West conflict, the nuclear balance of terror ceased to be a point of reference for the maintenance of armed forces. In addition, grand-scale conventional warfare between big powers or alliances became quite an unlikely scenario. Instead, small wars with different degrees of asymmetry and of different intensity, peacekeeping and a whole range of military missions other than war fighting seemed to occupy the imagination of the military planners. The enormous pace of the military technological development in some countries, mainly of course, the United States, generated a revolution in military affairs. The increasing demand for military intervention in nasty fringe wars (from Somalia to Bosnia, from Rwanda to Chechnya, from East Timor to Haiti)

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and the unprecedented growth of international terrorism generated a revolution in the perception of security. Both processes had, and continue to have, a remarkable impact on strategic, operational and even tactical thinking in the military. An impressive reflection of this most recent revolution in security affairs can be found in the official security strategies of the United States and the European Union.

European threat perception On 12 December 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS). A common European security policy has not yet been created. The slowly emergent patterns of this policy are, in fact, new patterns. It is therefore easier for the EU than for many states (including the individual EU member states) to focus its security strategy on current and anticipated threats. The European Security Strategy defines the following global challenges and key threats to Europe. Global challenges are the indissoluble linkage of internal and external aspects of security, the considerable dependence on an interconnected global infrastructure, poverty and disease in developing countries, competition for natural resources, and energy dependence. The list of key threats comprises terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and their impacts on European interests, state failure and organised crime. The European strategic objectives are, according to ESS, to: • • • • •

Fight terrorism both on the civil and on the military level in cooperation with other countries, notably the USA. Strengthen the international control of WMD non-proliferation. Intervene in regional conflicts in order to help restore and build peace. Build security in Europe’s neighbourhood, notably the Balkans, the Near East and the Mediterranean area. Develop an international order based on effective multilateralism with stronger international organisations and regimes.

The policy implications for Europe are: • • •

To become more active in pursuing these strategic objectives. To become more capable in terms of military forces without duplications. To develop more coherent policies for crises and post-crisis situations.

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The security sector and military transformation This document reflects clearly the structural change in the international system. It is based on a more comprehensive approach to security and security policy. One of its implications is the necessity to redefine the functions and structure of the security sector and especially the armed forces. This necessity is, with a different emphasis, also present in the often-quoted September 2002 National Security Strategy of the USA. The term “security sector” is comparatively new in the security discourse. Experts in security-sector reform use it either in a broader or in a more limited sense. The latter definition comprises armed organisations like the regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, police forces and the intelligence agencies. The broader definition widens the scope and integrates private security firms, other non-governmental actors with certain interests in security matters, and even the judiciary in the security sector (see Edmunds, 2003: 15). Security-sector reform refers mostly to post-communist countries and those of the former Third World, which undergo a transition process and want to democratise. A well-functioning democracy is hardly thinkable without successful democratic control of the armed forces and other security agencies. The complex transition process should be based on a comprehensive security approach. The necessity of a comprehensive approach does not only stem from political factors. The impact of economic and cultural globalisation, the re-emergence of ethnic and religious militancy, international terrorism, in short the very nature of the new threats and risks, demand a thorough security-sector reform not only in new democracies, but also in the well-established Western democratic societies. For the Americans, the Somali intervention in the early 1990s, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 2003 Gulf War against the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein are painful examples for the problems the stronger military party will meet without a well-adapted security sector. In the information Age, it’s not just smart weapons that win wars. It’s the total package – the total information picture that is important. Even with long-range precision weapons, you still need a network that gets you inside your opponent’s decision cycle. Aidid beat the Army in Mogadishu and Al Qaeda beat the Navy in Yemen because, in both cases, they had better information about us than we had about them – exactly the same situation that existed on September 11, 2001. (Berkowitz, 2003: 117) These are also telling examples for the necessity to adopt a comprehensive approach to the political, economic, social, religious and security aspects of the country where the intervention takes place in the name of democratisation and disarmament. In the future, the armed forces of the Western countries will often be engaged in new missions. They will have to create peace between civil war parties. They

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will control truces in traditional peacekeeping missions, but they will also have to protect the population against attacks by insurgents in robust or strategic peacekeeping7 missions. They will have to fight the troops of ruthless warlords in the name of the international community. These new missions in violent conflicts and new wars demand, with special pressure, a cautious redefinition of the functions, mental and physical condition, range of capacities and, last but not least, of the professional self-perception of the soldiers serving in the armed forces. The catchword for this process in Western armed forces is transformation.8 Transformation of the security sector is complex and far from approaching its end. In the two remaining sections of this chapter, we shall zoom in on the character of the new missions and on the military profile of soldiers performing them.

New missions The changes in the ways to wage war and the enlargement of the concept of security have led to new security strategies with a new canon of security threats and risks. The response to these new threats and risks is partly a military one, partly a civil one. In order to prevent and contain the horizontal escalation of conflicts and crises, the international community introduced crisis response operations (CRO). This kind of military human intervention has had many different names in the past decade. It is part of an international crisis management, which is mainly, but not only, organised in the framework of the United Nations. NATO now uses the term “crisis response operations” instead of the older term, “peace support operations” (PSO). There are many slightly different definitions of PSO in related literature. A representative example is the 1997 definition by the Swedish armed forces: PSO is the military term used to cover both peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations. PSO differ from war in that they are complex operations that do not have a designated enemy but are designed as part of a composite approach involving diplomatic and generally humanitarian agencies to achieve a long-term peace settlement. Military activities in PSO will be, without exception, part of a wider strategy in support of political goals. (Schmidseder, 2003: 26) A 1999 definition in the British Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 is a little broader: PSO was a term first used by the military to cover peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE) operations, but is now used more widely to embrace not only PK and PE but also those other peace related operations, for example, conflict prevention, peace making, peace building, and humanitarian operations, which are principally the preserve of civilian agencies.

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Instead of PSO, the United States used in their manuals and directives the term “military operations other than war” (MOOTW). NATO differentiates between six kinds of PSO or CRO: • • • •

• •

Conflict prevention (CP): preventive deployment, early warning, surveillance, sanctions and embargoes, non-combatant evacuation operations. Peace-making (PM): mainly diplomatic activities like good offices, mediation, conciliation, diplomatic pressures. Peacekeeping (PK): observation, interposition force, transition assistance, arms control. Peace enforcement (PE): enforcing sanctions and embargoes, protection of humanitarian operations, establishment and enforcing of no-fly-zones, establishing and protecting safe areas or exclusion zones. Peace-building (PB): military aid to civil authorities, assistance to refugees or displaced persons. Humanitarian operations (HUMOPS): humanitarian aid, disaster relief, protection of human rights.

These operations are not always, but mostly “operations other than war”. However, even when they include fighting, they are categorically different from traditional war-fighting operations. This is the reason why these new missions demand a new profile and a renewed professional self-understanding of the soldier.

New military Around the turn of the century, military sociologists debated what some of them called (to the chagrin of some of their colleagues) the “postmodern military”. The Postmodern military is characterized by five major organizational changes. One is the increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. The second is the diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank, and combat versus support roles. The third is the change in the military purpose from fighting wars to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense. The forth change is that the military forces are used more in international missions authorized (or at least legitimated) by entities beyond the nation state. A final change is the internationalization of military forces themselves. (Moskos et al., 2000: 2)

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Postmodernity and/or postmodern features of current history were widely discussed in the 1990s. Today, this quasi-ironic perspective on the time we live in has somehow lost much of its aggressive freshness. In spite of this, the diagnoses of the authors Moskos, Williams and Segal which were collected in order to depict the changes in the organisation of the armed forces in such different countries as Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and, of course, the United States, converged. The political environment of the armed forces generated new challenges for them, and they had to respond by adapting their structures and skills to meet the new requirements. The Swiss military writer and former general, Gustav Däniker (1992), was one of the first to paint the outline of the new soldier of the twenty-first century. He did not shy away from occasional idealism, but this made his essay provocative in the most positive sense of the word. Here are (with some alterations and additions) some of his propositions for the future (or futuristic?) soldier in Western armed forces. •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The armed forces will have to fulfil mainly functions of prevention, intervention and restoration of order. Deterrence and traditional combat will not disappear. They will, however, become of secondary importance. Military intervention by third parties in a local conflict is the first step towards a reconciliation process. The “enemy” is not to be defeated and destroyed, but his/her actions have to be stopped in order to prepare him/her for a kind of re-education. The motivation, and the moral and political basis of the soldier’s professionalism is no longer or not solely his or her allegiance to the nation-state, but a kind of cosmopolitan perception of the necessity to defend human rights, prevent genocide and other atrocities, and to keep or enforce peace. To balance a strong military patriotism and a more cosmopolitan perspective is not always easy. As crisis response operations (CRO) are in nearly all cases a reaction of the international community, military units will have to get used to serving in multinational frameworks (Kretchik, 2003). The military will no longer seek military victory. Instead, the soldiers will have to create and protect suitable conditions for comprehensive and stable peace settlements, which integrate former enemies. War criminals will have to be caught by the armed forces which will act as a police force. These individuals will be brought before an international criminal court and will be held personally responsible for their violations of the law. The soldiers are not allowed to think and behave according to purely military norms and rules. At least among the officer corps, a genuine ability to think in political and diplomatic terms will become part of their education and training. Flexibility and multi-functionality are becoming as important on the battlefield as fire and mobility.

176 •

• •

•

Wilfried von Bredow The armed forces will have to build up special forces against especially dangerous threats like terrorism by extremist groups and their backers. Soldiers in these kinds of forces are, indeed, warriors. They will have to fight both on the level of sheer physical violence with “primitive” weapons and on the level of a highly advanced network-centric warfare model (Berkowitz, 2003: 113). Military activities within CRO often overlap with paramilitary police activities. A certain constabularisation of the military is probable. It is important to keep in mind that these elements of the armed forces’ functions do not replace their traditional missions (deterrence and defence) but complement them. The role of the classic “mud soldier” (Wilson, 1989) tends to be underestimated in the military establishment. In some militaries, a certain gap may develop between a spirit of strong commitment to the warrior aspects of the soldier’s role among the rank and file and younger officers on the one side, and more positive attitudes towards crisis response operations among the military establishment on the other (for the USA, see: Rinaldo, 1996; Franke, 1997).

Do these elements form a coherent picture of the new military? Probably not. In military circles, there is no consensus about the weight of the different elements in the future role of the soldier.

Conclusion New wars, new missions, new militaries – there are many valuable arguments that create a case for a deep structural change in the profession of arms. On the other hand, the closer we look into the empirical evidence presented by the various authors, the more we develop a slight scepticism. Edward Newman (2004) contended that the “new wars” debate needs a historical perspective. The same is certainly true for the “new missions” debate and the “new” or “postmodern military” debate. Two strands of research seem to be especially necessary. First, we need some more and conclusive information on the impact of globalisation, the changing role of the state and the emergence of sub-state violence markets on the concept of security. Second, we shall have to investigate the consequences of the strange process of asymmetrisation of war and organised violence. There is also the need for a third cluster of research. In most Western societies, the relatively unproblematic balance of civil–military relations and the different ways of securing democratic control of the armed forces are perhaps endangered by a growing gap between civil society and the military. Will the armed forces of the future become a small, highly professionalised fringe group, the guardians of a society that does not really care for them? This is not a probable scenario, but also not an unthinkable one.

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As the threats and risks of our security will continue to infringe on our everyday life, we should emphasise the possibilities of early warning, prevention and early containment of violence. This is now a global task.

Notes 1 This observation has recently been severely questioned by authors like Martin van Creveld and John Keegan. Their valuable arguments enlighten the discussion on the relationship between the political and military spheres, but by no means have they diminished the insights of this enigmatic Prussian political philosopher. 2 Roger Beaumont (1995: 23) notes that concern about what he prefers to call “small wars” has increased since the end of the East–West conflict, “the occurrence of many such conflicts as a kind of background static in international affairs is not a recent novelty”. This is certainly correct. These kinds of war have come to the foreground. 3 Elinor C. Sloan (2002: 3) provides a useful survey on the many competing and mutually complementary definitions of this complex notion: Definitions of a revolution in military affairs are wide and varied and perhaps as numerous as its analysts. They range from those that capture with sweeping simplicity the essential nature of RMA (an RMA “is simply a revolutionary change in how wars are fought and won . . .”) to those that highlight its defining characteristics (an RMA “involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations . . .”) to those that enunciate its specific elements (an RMA is “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations”). 4 The term “superpower” is somewhat misleading. It was used in order to emphasise the considerable gap in nuclear armament between the USA and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the other nuclear powers on the other hand. The Soviet Union was only in this respect a “superpower”. With very few exceptions, the USSR was, however, never capable of matching the pace of the USA in the field of military technological innovation. 5 The term “international community” is a euphemism. Basically, it means the majority of governments in the United Nations plus a growing number of non-governmental organisations. 6 The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was formed in 1964. It is still operating on the demarcation line between the two communities of Turkish Cypriots in the north, and Greek Cypriots in the south. 7 A quite convincing plea for strategic peacekeeping is published by Dandeker and Gow (1997). 8 “The subject of military transformation has expanded to the point that it transcends focused discussion”, writes Stephen J. Cimbala (2005: 28). It is, indeed, the crux with simple names for complex processes so that they tend to lose their meaning.

Bibliography Bateman III, R.L. (ed.) (1999) Digital War: The 21st Century Battlefield, New York, ibooks. Beaufre, André (1972) La guerre révolutionnaire, Paris, Librairie Arthème Fayard. Beaumont, R. (1995) “Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions”, The Annals, 541: 20–35.

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Berkowitz, B. (2003) The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century, New York, The Free Press. Bouldin, M. (2003) “Keeper of the Peace: Canada and Security Transition Operations”, Defense and Security Analysis, 19 (3): 265–76. Bulman, T.P. (1999) “A Dangerous Guessing Game Disguised as Enlightened Policy: United States Law of War Obligations During Military Operations Other Than War”, Military Law Review, 159: 152–82. Cimbala, St. J. (2005) “Transformation in Concept and Policy”, Joint Force Quarterly, 38: 28–33. Cohen, E.A. (2004) “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 27 (3): 395–407. Dandeker, Ch. and J. Gow (1997) “The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success”, Armed Forces and Society, 23 (3): 327–47. Däniker, G. (1992) Wende Golfkrieg: Vom Wesen und Gebrauch künftiger Streitkräfte, Frankfurt/Main, Report Verlag. De Landa, M. (1991) War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York, Swerve Editions. Donald, D. (2003) “Neutral is Not Impartial: the Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking”, Armed Forces and Society, 29 (3): 415–48. Downie, R.D. (2005) “Defining Integrated Operations”, Joint Force Quarterly, 38: 10–13. Edmunds, T. (2003) “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation”, in W.H. Germann and T. Edmunds (eds) Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: a Framework for Assessment, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 15–30. European Council (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Paris, The European Union Institute for Security Studies. Franke, V.C. (1997) “Warriors for Peace: the Next Generation of U.S. Military Leaders”, Armed Forces and Society, 24 (1): 33–57. Garofano, J. (2003) “War Operations and Combat Missions”, in J. Callaghan and F. Kernic (eds) Armed Forces and International Security: Global Trends and Issues, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, pp. 303–7. Gray, Ch. H. (1997) Postmodern War: the New Politics of Conflict, New York, The Guilford Press. Harries-Jenkins, G. and C.C. Moskos, Jr. (1981) “Armed Forces and Society”, Current Sociology, 29 (3): 1–82. Herberg-Rothe, A. (2003) Der Krieg: Geschichte und Gegenwart, Frankfurt/Main, Campus. Hillen, J. (2000) Blue Helmets: the Strategy of UN Military Operations, 2nd edn, Washington, DC, Brassey’s. Holsti, K.J. (1996) The State, War, and the State of War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kaldor, M. (2000) Neue und alte Kriege: Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Frankfurt/Main, Suhrkamp. Kaldor, M. (2003) Global Civil Society: an Answer to War, Cambridge, Polity Press. Kaplan, R.D. (2000) The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, New York, Vintage Books. Kober, A. (2002) “Low-intensity Conflicts: Why the Gap Between Theory and Practise?”, Defense and Security Analysis, 18 (1): 15–38.

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Kretchik, W.E. (2003) “Multinational Staff Effectiveness in UN Peace Operations: The Case of the U.S. Army and UNMIH”, Armed Forces and Society, 29 (3): 393–413. Martin, M. (1981) Warriors to Managers: the French Military Establishment Since 1945, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. Moskos, Jr., Ch. C. (1976) Peace Soldiers: the Sociology of a United Nations Military Force, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Moskos, Ch. C., J.A. Williams and D.R. Segal (eds) (2000) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Münkler, H. (2002) Die neuen Kriege, Reinbek, Rowohlt. Münkler, H. (2003) “The Wars of the 21st Century”, International Review of the Red Cross, 85 (849): 7–22. Newman, E. (2004) “The New Wars’ Debate: a Historical Perspective is Needed”, Security Dialogue, 35 (2): 173–89. Pfanner, T. (2005) “Asymmetric Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action”, International Review of the Red Cross, 87 (857): 149–74. Reed, B.J. and D.R. Segal (2000) “The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers’ Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention”, Armed Forces and Society, 27 (1): 57–78. Rinaldo, R.J. (1996) “Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW?”, Joint Force Quarterly, Winter: 111–16. Rodin, D. (2002) War and Self-Defense, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Rojahn, Ch. (2000) Militärische Antiterroreinheiten als Antwort auf die Bedrohung des internationalen Terrorismus und Instrument nationaler Sicherheitspolitik: Das Beispiel Amerika, Munich, Herbert Utz Verlag. Rose, D.G. (2001) “Peace Operations and Change in the US Military”, Defense Analysis, 17 (2): 139–58. Rose, M. (1998) “Military Aspects of Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned from Bosnia, from a Commander’s Perspective”, in W. Biermann and M. Vadset (eds) UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia, Aldershot, Ashgate, 153–67. Russett, B. (1993) Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles of a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Schmidseder, K. (2003) Internationale Interventionen und Crisis Response Operations: Charakteristika, Bedingungen und Konsequenzen für das Internationale und Nationale Krisenmanagement, Frankfurt/Main, Peter Lang. Serewicz, L.W. (2002) “Globalization, Sovereignty and Military Revolution: From Mercenaries to Private International Security Companies”, International Politics, 39 (1): 75–89. Sloan, E.C. (2002) The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press. Vogelaar, L.W. and E.-H. Kramer (2004) “Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions”, Armed Forces and Society, 30 (3): 409–31. van Creveld, M. (1991) The Transformation of War, New York, The Free Press. Von Bredow, W. (1997) “Global Street Workers? War and the Armed Forces in a Globalizing World”, Defense Analysis, 13 (2): 169–80. Von Clausewitz, C. (1989) On War. Indexed Edition, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Voskuilen, M. et al. (2002) “Scenario Development for Crisis Response Operations: How to Include the Mental Component?”, TNO Defence Research, August 30, The Hague: 1–7.

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9

How the military can profit from management and organization science Erik de Waard and Joseph Soeters

I hope this process of applying knowledge from business settings will help future Army leaders at different levels to be as effective as possible, both in peace and war. (Isenberg, 1985)

Introduction In the history of mankind, military practice has dominated thinking about organizing and organizations. Armed forces in the Roman Empire, imperial China and the Ottoman Sultanate demonstrated the use of organizational principles long before Max Weber published the foundations of modern organization theory. More than 2,500 years ago, the Chinese general Sun-Zsu (2004) authored a small book on the way wars could be won using proper strategies and tactics. This little book has nowadays become a best-selling management book, a sort of “bible” of strategic management. One of the reasons for this current popularity is Sun-Zsu’s emphasis on the intelligent deployment of resources and the importance of outsmarting one’s competitors, whereas he deems the use of violence as the last resort and least preferred strategic maneuver. Much later, but still more than a century ago, German thinkers like Carl von Clausewitz and the already mentioned Max Weber deeply influenced managerial theories on strategy and structure, basing their ideas on well-established military practices. Very recently, some management theorists have become inspired by the way the military (like the USA Marine Corps) is firing up and energizing their workforce (Katzenbach and Santamaria, 1999). In general, though, the diffusion of management knowledge goes the other way around nowadays. In the twenty-first century, little military knowledge and theorizing finds its way to civilian firms and institutions. On the contrary, in this chapter we aim to show that civilian management and organization science is helpful in improving today’s military performance. We will illustrate this using some basic concepts applied in current management and organization theory. The first concept to mention in this connection is flexibility. This concept has become important in attempts to understand and influence organizations’ responsiveness to changing business conditions. Using the concept in a military

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setting may help to improve the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of largescale international military deployments. However, the search for flexibility can lead to different strategic managerial concepts. We will relate two of those concepts to modern military operations and discuss them in depth. The first of those two concepts is networking. Networking foremost emphasizes the organizations’ need for cooperation with others. No longer can organizations rely on their own specific competencies only. Operations, risks, areas of operation, technologies and societal impact are becoming too vast to be comprehended and dealt with by one single organization, no matter how large a single, individual organization may be. The same applies to the military: even the US armed forces are incapable of executing large-scale missions on their own, as operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show every day. Networking – i.e. inter-organizational collaboration – is the inevitable answer to this development, for firms as much as for the military. Yet, networking influences organizational design. This is where the other concept, modularity, becomes relevant. Systems are said to have a high degree of modularity when their components can be disaggregated and recombined into new configurations – possibly with new components – with little loss of functionality (Schilling and Steensma, 2001). This mixing and matching of product components or organizational modules has the potential to create tailor-made systems, that can react flexibly to changes in the environment. Current military deployment is also based on the general principles of modularity. The sum of different units from the various services, branches and countries creates an enormous military capacity on the basis of which specific configurations of resources can be composed. Flexibility can be achieved because the units can be recombined in different ways, leading to a system that is capable of transforming itself into different taskforces in order to perform a wide variety of tasks. Finally, we will deal with the concept of ambidexterity; this concept makes us aware of the fact that current organizations can no longer rely on only one specific competence (Birkenshaw and Gibson, 2004). Today’s business organizations must be equally skilful in coping with seemingly contradictory demands like exploitation and execution of activities on the one hand, and exploration of future opportunities on the other. To put it differently, business firms nowadays need to focus simultaneously on being both innovative and cost efficient. The military is facing similar contradicting demands, as they need to be specialized in applying violence and in peace-enforcing, but at the same time they need to be good at peacekeeping which is most of all communicating and talking to people. How can those seemingly contrasting demands be balanced and united in one and the same organization? We will close this chapter with conclusions and avenues for future research, indicating even more theories and practices from management and organization science that can be fruitfully implemented in the military. We hope this chapter will constitute a clear example of the way the armed forces can profit from interdisciplinary approaches to military studies.

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Flexibility Over the past two decades the international security environment has changed considerably. Departing from a relative stable security environment during the Cold War, Western armed forces are nowadays exposed to all kinds of different threats. In this respect terrorism, the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, ethnic and religious rivalry, territorial disputes, the abuse of human rights, the dissolution of states and other risks of a wider nature are mentioned in NATO’s Strategic Concept.1 A great deal of agility is needed to successfully counter all these different threats. First of all, most individual countries do not have sufficient military means to support their vast individual security ambitions. Most European countries have gone through major downsizing operations, causing a significant loss of each country’s military capacity. International cooperation is seen as the best way to safeguard common Western security ambitions despite these reductions. In addition, traditional war-fighting capabilities were not sufficient to cope with the current security risks. The military product portfolio had to be expanded with new ways of operating, such as peacekeeping, nation-building and humanitarian relief. Third, countries have to be capable of executing different operations simultaneously. In theory it is possible that a peace support operation to solve a territorial dispute or to stop ethnic rivalry between population groups, and a humanitarian operation to support refugees in a flooded area, are taking place at the same time. Fourth, these new operations are based on different competencies, values and norms than the ones used for traditional war fighting. A soldier is no longer only a warrior, he or she also has to be some sort of a diplomat who is capable of winning the hearts and minds of local people in a crisis area. Finally, high-tech weapon and information systems get a more prominent role in modern military operations. The quantitative loss of troops and resources must be counterbalanced by the advanced performance of modern technologies. The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) tries to achieve this by exploiting the opportunities offered by the information era. In order to cope with all these changes and challenges, armed forces need to adjust and become more flexible. In business research, the concept of flexibility has been around for more than 25 years, resulting in roughly three flexibility approaches. First of all, the general approach considers flexibility as a necessary quality that organizations need to possess in order to adjust to a changing environment or stimulate innovative processes. The functional approach focuses on specific aspects of the organization, like implementing flexible labor contracts, flexible production lines and flexible information systems. The actor approach, finally, states that personal traits of stakeholders in the organization are predominant in the ambition to achieve flexibility. Table 9.1 provides some examples of these three approaches. Based on an extensive literature survey, Volberda (1998) concluded that flexibility is determined by the interaction between management’s adaptive capabilities and the organization’s responsiveness. On the one hand, managers must

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Table 9.1 Three approaches to flexibility General approach • Flexibility means an ability to adapt aspects of the organization rapidly in the face of new opportunities or threats in the environment (Birkinshaw and Hagström, 2000: 5). • Organizations that move quickly are flexible (Ashkenas et al., 1995: 8). Functional approach • The flexibility and speed offered by advanced manufacturing technologies (AMT), when properly implemented, allow firms to design and commercialize new generations and variants of products faster than ever before (Lei, et al., 1996: 515). • The use of externalized workers adds flexibility to work arrangements and complements the stability provided by the internalized workforce (Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 1993: 218). Actor approach • The only kind of strategy that makes sense in the face of unpredictable change is to become adaptive. Success will be determined by the leadership’s competence in making a particular set of choices within the sense-and-respond model’s framework (Haeckel, 1999: xvii). • The values of the elite inner circle are more important than those of the executive director or of the entire staff in predicting innovation (Hage and Dewar, 1973: 287).

have the dynamic capabilities to respond at the right time in the right way to changes, opportunities or threats in the environment. On the other hand, the organization must possess structural, cultural and technical characteristics that support this need for speed and adaptation. According to Volberda (1998: 97), there should be a balance in this interaction. Neither management’s control capacity nor the controllability of the organization may dominate. In other words, the organization’s management with high adaptive capabilities can never make up for an organization architecture that is too rigid. An organization with sufficiently adaptive structural, cultural and technological characteristics may fail if its managers lack the vision and power to make the organization respond to changes in the market and organizational environment. Its weakest dimension determines the system’s overall flexibility. A good business case to mention in this respect is Microsoft’s development of the X-Box. In 2001 Microsoft decided to enter the market for game consoles. Microsoft’s managerial intention was then, and still is now, to create a digital entertainment revolution. The introduction of the X-Box was the first step toward an integrated system that links all kinds of entertainment and information sources, such as the Internet, television, radio, movie channels and, of course, computer games. However, Microsoft itself did not have sufficient organizational capabilities to support this strategy. The firm is pretty good at developing software, but developing computer games is a completely different story. Moreover, the firm does not even have sufficient operational facilities of its own to live up to the ambition of producing 1.5 million game consoles per year. Therefore, to obtain the missing capacities and competencies, Microsoft decided to start collaborating with other companies. A network evolved with participants all contributing something specific to the development of the X-Box, such as the

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DVD drive, the microprocessor, graphics, memory chips, keyboards and controllers. Even the production and assembly needed to be organized as a joint effort of various participants. This example shows that, by bringing the organizational capabilities in line with its ambitious strategy, Microsoft was capable of successfully entering a new market within a very short time frame, despite its unfamiliarity with the field and the fierce competition it faced.

Networking Let us now translate these flexibility insights to the current military context. The X-Box case underlines the fact that, at the managerial level, networking has become a predominant strategy. Networks are groups of autonomous organizations that are directly or indirectly related through strategic alliances. They can be directed at a large number of different objectives: research and development, cost reduction, the setting of a standard, building-up critical mass, expanding the market as well as the delivery of a product or service. Under the influence of several factors, such as an increasing competition, rapid technological developments, higher demands from customers and internationalization, networks have become more and more popular in the world of business (De Man, 2004). This trend also occurs in the defense sector. The most important reason for this is the fact that (inter)national collaboration offers the best possibilities to realize the present political security ambitions in spite of the aforementioned reductions in size and the increased task variation. Institutions such as NATO, EU and the UN have increasingly begun to organize their deployments around multinational (combined) and multiservice (joint) ad hoc coalitions in order to meet the security risks. The combined units of several countries ensure an extended military potential to draw from; and, dependent on the task, those units are selected specifically for the purpose. This strategy shows a lot of similarities with the quasi-integration networks from the business sector. Dussauge and Garrette (1999) describe quasi-integration networks as networks that try to achieve the same advantages as traditional mergers or acquisitions. Inter-firm cooperation focuses on long-lasting, horizontal integration of specific activities to reap economies of scale and scope and realize cost savings. However, only an adequate level of mutual adjustment between the participating organizations can guarantee the effectiveness of such mixed taskforces. Military taskforces are no fixed formations. The set-up of every deployment is different. The operations in Afghanistan are different from the ones in Iraq or Bosnia, but even in Afghanistan the operations, and hence the organizational set-ups of the troops, vary a lot. Sometimes even during the mission, drastic changes in the composition of the forces take place. Given the fact that the participating units do not have the time to train together, that they are from different nationalities and cultures, speaking their own language and using their own equipment and procedures, one can imagine that it is difficult to be on the same “wavelength.” To cope with these problems, military taskforces rely heavily on standardization processes.

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Yet, not only the increased importance of international cooperation, but certainly also the new way of warfare has stressed the need to standardize. The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is the military response to the opportunities and threats coming along with the new information technologies. Alberts et al. (1999) describe NCW as follows: NCW focuses on reaping the potential benefits of linking together – or networking – battlespace entities; that is, allowing them to work in concert to achieve synergistic effects. NCW is built around the concept of sharing information and assets. Networking enables this. A network consists of nodes (entities) and links among them. Nodes to things (sense, decide, act) and information, both as inputs to decisions and in the form of decisions themselves, is passed over links from one battlespace entity, or node, to another. Linking battlespace entities together will greatly increase productivity by allowing us to get more use of our battlespace entities. With the establishment of the concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF), NCW is also acquiring a more prominent place in European thinking about security and military deployment. The NRF, a combined international force of about 20,000 soldiers, must be deployable at very short notice in crisis-response operations. In the most extreme case this force must be able to wage a campaign independently in a hostile arena for at least a month. For Europe this implies a drastic improvement of its military technological possibilities. Strategic bombers, multi-role fighters, military transport planes, tanker planes, precision ammunition, cruise missiles, satellites and reconnaissance and communication assets are resources that Europe is still rather short of, but these assets are essential for modern operations exploiting the information advantage. The European defense industry, however, is too fragmented, resulting in a great diversity of technologies, weapons and weapon systems and, consequently, a lack of compatibility. It is not surprising that certain countries prefer to follow the leading technology of the United States; after all, as the pioneer of expeditionary deployment and NCW, the USA creates as it were the standard for modern military deployment (De Waard and De Man, 2004). This view is in accordance with the standardization battles that are fought in the high-tech business sector. It offers firms more advantages to be linked to a larger network than a smaller one, because this stimulates a positive feedback movement, reinforcing the stronger and weakening the weaker (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). The dominant position Microsoft has obtained since the introduction of its Windows operating system shows that setting a standard can offer huge profits for a single organization. However, it is also very risky for organizations to develop a standard on their own. In the early 1980s, Philips invested heavily in its V2000 VCR system. Ten years later, Sony did the same with its minidisk technology. Nevertheless, both systems failed to dominate the market and the R&D costs were never recovered. Organizations have learned from the past and nowadays they team up in their search for standards. These standardiza-

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tion networks have two aims. First of all, by licensing the technology that has been developed, companies can make money. Moreover, after setting a standard, organizations can obtain revenues from complementary products based on that standard (De Man, 2004). Yet, all this networking has dramatically changed the competitive environment. In today’s world, there is no longer a competition going on between single organizations; entire networks have started rivaling each other instead. This trend of networks competing with one another shows many similarities with the rivalry between the USA and Europe concerning security issues. Increasingly more European countries call for strengthening the European defense industry. “If Europe does not begin to cooperate much more intensively within the coming ten to fifteen years, we will incur an enormous technological backlog and cease to play any significant role in the world,” according to Frans Timmermans, a Dutch Labor Party MP and a member of the defense work group of the European Convention (Van Velzen and Stekete, 2003). Bringing the cooperation to a higher level will not only narrow the technological gap with the USA, but will also make Europe less dependent on the USA in determining its own security policy. This trend is also known in the business world. Doz and Hamel (1998) speak of building up a sufficient degree of critical mass, or in other words, the establishment of alliances to provide enough counterbalance against new powerful competitors and to secure one’s autonomy and business opportunities.

Modularity So networking has become essential to counter current threats and risks, and to modernize Western armed forces. With Volberda’s flexibility model in mind, one could say that these strategic networking decisions have had major consequences for the organization of military forces. The high-tech, tailor-made formations that are formed by blending together modules from different arms, services and countries are based on the general principles of modularity (see Table 9.2). Table 9.2 Definitions of modularity • Modularity is a general systems concept: it is a continuum describing the degree to which a system’s components can be separated and recombined, and it refers both to the tightness of coupling between components and the degree to which the “rules” of the system architecture enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of components (Schilling, 2000). • Modularity is a special form of design that intentionally creates a high degree of independence or “loose coupling” between component designs by standardizing component interface specifications (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). • Modularity is a general set of design principles for managing the complexity of largescale interdependent systems. It involves breaking up the system into discrete chunks that communicate with each other through standardized interfaces or rules and specifications.

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All these definitions stress the fact that modularity is about independent or autonomous subsystems functioning together. This process is based on – as Baldwin and Clark (1997) prefer to call it – visible design rules and hidden design parameters. The hidden design parameters refer to the autonomy of a subsystem. A subsystem can be seen as a black box with one common restriction. Namely, the subsystem is entirely free in its internal design as long as its output complies with the general rules or specifications of the overall system. The visible design rules deal with the process of integrating the autonomous units to a system that functions as a whole. It is best to determine the visible design rules at an early stage, because they form the backbone of the system’s overall performance. Imperfect or incomplete modularization will only show at the end of the process after the components have been connected. According to Baldwin and Clark (1997: 86), visible design rules can be divided into three categories: architecture, interfaces and standards. It is interesting to take a closer look at the modular characteristics of military forces and see how the three visible design rules work out in military practice. Architecture deals with questions like: what modules will be part of the system? What will their functions look like, and what will be the number of participating modules? The second question particularly gets a lot of attention in military policies. In order to successfully execute a variety of tasks, each multinational crisis response unit is built on the following essential operational capabilities: timely force availability, effective intelligence, deployability and mobility, effective command control and communications, logistics sustainability, survivability and force protection, and effective engagement. The focus on these essential operational capabilities leads to multinational military formations that are functionally grouped. Each participating country offers one or more specific functional contributions, such as strategic lift, air-to-air refueling, engineers, light infantry, air reconnaissance, etc. Complementing each other’s specific resources and competencies is the underlying principle of this functional grouping. The process of mixing and matching military units into a working system relies heavily on interfaces. As mentioned above, military taskforces are built along national or functional lines. According to Kramer (2004), this way of assembling may create problems if operational units are structurally dependent on other units. However, this is exactly what happens in everyday practice, as the following example demonstrates. In June 2002, the Dutch armed forces deployed their third rotation of troops in Afghanistan. The main element of this company-size unit consisted of three infantry platoons, a logistical support platoon, an engineers unit and a medical group. This formation was tailored for the mission and so the units came from different parts of the parent organization; they were therefore not used to working together. Furthermore, none of the sub-units could independently execute its task. On the contrary, the units depended heavily on one another for their security and logistical support. The situation was made even more complex by the fact that the Dutch unit was fitted into a German battle group. This – very

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common – example shows that crisis response units generally do not comply with the principle of modularization. They are part of a larger military force and depend heavily on external command, control and support for the execution of their tasks. So, creating autonomous organizational modules is, most of the time, the exception instead of common practice. To counterbalance this lack of autonomy, special attention needs to be paid to the collaboration of units. After all, the overall effectiveness of a military taskforce depends on the effective linkage of all the different contributions. The use of liaison devices must help in accomplishing these connections. However, Snook (2000) emphasizes that this integration process is not as easy as it seems. Despite the use of prescribed rules, a detailed flight plan and up-to-date radio systems, two well-trained and experienced US Airforce F-15 fighter pilots shot down two US Army Black Hawk helicopters, killing all 26 people on board. The incident could even take place under the watchful eye of an AWACS aircraft controlling the airspace. This all happened during Operation Provide Comfort in 1994 over Northern Iraq. The accident makes painfully clear that lacking integration of resources and procedures can have dramatic consequences in a complex organization, such as a military taskforce. In the military, not only efficiency and effectiveness are at stake (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), but failing integration can also cost lives. The third visible design rule mentioned by Baldwin and Clarke (1997) is standardization. Using standards helps loosely coupled modules to achieve synthesis when working together. This is not a new insight for Western armed forces. Since its inception, NATO has put a great deal of effort in to standardization processes. NATO defines standardization as: The development and introduction of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and retain the desired levels of compatibility, interchangeability and commonality in the field of operational, procedural, material, technical and administrative capacities in the context of the pursuit of interoperability. Compatibility is defined as the usefulness of products, processes or services for common use in specific circumstances in order to meet relevant needs without causing any unacceptable interactions. Interchangeability is defined as the capability of a product, process or service to be used instead of another in order to meet the same need(s). Commonality is defined as the situation that has been achieved when the same doctrine, procedures or equipment are used.2 During NATO’s early years, the participating members were still relatively autonomous, and standardization was mainly focused on basic levels of compatibility, such as using the same caliber ammunitions, types of fuel and operational procedures. Gradually cooperation increased and so did the need to standardize. However, this need has grown exponentially during the last decade when operations became more modular and multinational. It became clear that being compatible alone was not enough. The continuation of a mission meant, for example,

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that certain units, weapon and information systems or staff elements had to be replaced by assets from another country without the loss of functionality. Therefore, the need for interchangeability and commonality as far-reaching forms of standardization is gaining ground rapidly in modern military operations. However, all kinds of political processes complicate this development enormously. Some of these have already been mentioned in the previous section in relation to the motives for networking. Yet, becoming flexible through networking and a modular organizational design is not sufficient. The softer aspects of the organization also have to be taken into account. The fact that modern military operations ask for servicemen and women with a flexible mindset will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

Ambidexterity Until recently, organizations were used to operating in one single – national, institutional, technological – context in one particular way, belonging to one particular type of organizational configuration (Mintzberg, 1979). Organizations used to be good at one particular process – e.g. mass vs batch production or production vs sales – like a football player who has a good right foot or a good left foot. But times are changing. Markets are expanding rapidly, technologies are becoming more complex, costly and risky, and high demands on the organization are following each other at an increasingly faster pace. Organizations can no longer afford to develop long-term strategies because today’s profitable insights will be tomorrow’s obsolete losses. As a consequence, organizations need to resize and reshape continuously (Knoke, 2001). More specifically, to cope with these permanently changing conditions, organizations need to be equally skillful in seemingly contradictory abilities. They need to execute today’s operations and practices (exploitation), while simultaneously developing tomorrow’s strategy and innovations (exploration). Organizations need to move quickly to new opportunities (adapting), whereas an equally important capacity is alignment, a clear sense of creating and delivering value in the short term. Those companies who are most successful in combining and balancing both competencies are most likely to survive the hyper-competition that is evolving in the global economy (He and Wong, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). But this is not the only set of contrasting demands organizations are facing today. Organizations nowadays may be forced to downsize their operational workforce, while at the same time they feel urged to recruit new employees who will provide them with new knowledge and ideas. Organizations cannot evade collaboration with other organizations (as we saw before), but simultaneously they need to compete with the same organizations, albeit in different areas, products, technologies or elements in the value chain. Organizations may be successful in mass production and sales. But to be more competitive they will try to come up with niche-specialty branding, an example of which is the Swedish low-cost fashion retailer, Hennes and Moritz, asking top designers like Karl

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Lagerfeld and Stella McCartney to craft a collection for their retail stores. Like piano players and percussionists who need to be equally skillful with their right and left hand, and football players who try to develop their “weak” foot, organizations nowadays need to be ambidextrous: good at dealing with seemingly contradictory demands at the same time. But how does all this relate to the military? The military also faces seemingly contradictory demands. They need to be ready for action, violent action if need be. At the same time they are requested to hold their fire when they operate in peacekeeping missions in which talking to the people is more important than shooting at them. In fact, they should be prepared to shift from talking to shooting in a matter of seconds. A Dutch unit experienced this very clearly in Iraq in August 2004, when they were ambushed by 50 to 100 warriors and were forced to immediately change their usual friendly attitude into real fighting and firing. Since the use of violence is an everdecreasing part of the military’s job, the military should be prepared for all sorts of other tasks that society has put on their shoulders. These new tasks (civil– military cooperation, humanitarian relief) challenge the military in more ways than one: no longer can commanders pay exclusive attention to the cohesion in their own unit, which traditionally was their main concern. In today’s operations, this internal concern remains important. However, the military also need to bridge to other people outside the unit but inside the mission (e.g. military from other nations), and they especially need to build linkages to the local people in the area of operation and to other actors operating in the area, such as NGOs. Traditionally, the military – like other uniformed organizations – was used to balance the cold side of their organization during peace conditions and the hot side of their organization during action (Soeters, 2000). This clearly has always been a form of ambidexterity. Nowadays, however, the military have to cope with many more contrasting demands in the fields of operations. As a consequence, like today’s business firms, the military also need to obtain combinative capabilities in order to become ambidextrous. They need to be equally skillful in contradictory demands, which they have to cope with simultaneously. The question, however, is how they can (learn to) do that. In the management and organization literature (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004), two types of ambidexterity are distinguished: structural and contextual. Organizations relying on structural ambidexterity tend to separate units or teams for either alignment (exploitation) or adaptation (exploration). In this way, specialization is enhanced, roles and tasks are well-defined and the coordination of the organization’s activities takes place at the strategic apex. Contextual ambidexterity, on the contrary, implies that individual employees divide their time between alignment-focused and adaptability-focused activities. These employees see their activities coordinated by people on the front line, which implies that their roles and tasks are relatively flexible, and they themselves need to have a relatively generalist attitude. These two “solutions” may be helpful guidelines for the military to solve the problems coming along with the contradictory demands made upon them.

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Structural ambidexterity would imply specialization between a) units that focus on war fighting, terrorist hunting and other activities that imply the use of violence and b) units that concentrate on peacekeeping, Cimic (civil–military cooperation) activities, nation-building and humanitarian relief. In this way, one would have Special Forces on the one hand and peacekeeping forces on the other. Every unit would be dedicated to specific tasks and all units would be separated from each other, both in training and operations. Another option in this line of thinking is international specialization, allowing for instance the Dutch to concentrate their resources on logistics and Cimic, whereas the British troops would focus on special operations. Although this type of (international) specialization will undoubtedly occur to some degree in the near future, this option has some serious limitations. Specialization decreases the flexibility of the operational resources, which – as we saw before – is an important feature in today’s organizations, the military in particular. Besides, this option assumes that operational conditions are either suited for Special Forces or for peace soldiers. This assumption will be violated over and over again, as experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate every day. The very essence of the military’s job is their competence in the control and the use of force, if needed. If, in a certain situation, violence is not in the air at all, other actors, like NGOs or local authorities, can do a much better job. Hence, structural ambidexterity seems to be less applicable than contextual ambidexterity in today’s military. Contextual ambidexterity (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) emphasizes that military personnel, especially commanders at all levels, need to be generalists. They need to have a broad view of their work, being alert to opportunities and challenges beyond the confines of their own jobs; they need to act like brokers, always looking to build internal and external linkages and, if needed, they have to be comfortable wearing more than one hat. And, perhaps most of all, they need to be able to immediately switch from communicating and negotiating to the actual use of violence. To make sure that commanders at all levels obtain such a broad view of their work, the military should explicitly start paying attention to these features. They should do so in their training programs as well as in their decision-making processes concerning who will be promoted to the higher ranks. Only the “ambiapt” commanders should arrive at the organization’s top, because they are the ones who can shift and display the mental flexibility that is needed so much in today’s military. As is also shown in the previous sections, flexibility is the keyword in improving today’s ambidextrous, military performance.

Conclusions and avenues for future research Although choosing the path of flexibility is inevitable, the concepts that have been discussed show that this choice has major organizational consequences. Networking and adding new ways of operating to the traditional military portfolio seem quite understandable. However, these strategies are in an early stage of their development, and embedding them firmly in the military organization still

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leaves room for improvement. To support this process, existing business research offers a lot of leads. Let us start with the organizational structure of the armed forces in general. Adjusting the focus and structure of the parent organization can have a positive influence on the deployment of troops. Many multinationals in the business sector have struggled to change from vertically oriented bureaucracies to more horizontally oriented organizations. In this respect collaborating with external partners, working in projects and teams, and delegating authorities to frontline managers are examples of successful strategies. The armed forces can learn from these business experiences. In a military context we also see a growing need for cooperating with a variety of external partners, such as armed forces from partnering countries, non-governmental organizations, international institutions and local politicians. The units deployed to crisis areas resemble project organizations. Every single mission is conceived as a project and specific assessments are made with respect to the number of troops and the functions needed. Furthermore, because the forces deployed are frequently of battalion or smaller size, the new ways of organizing have to cascade down to the units operating in the actual area of operations. Business cases can help military organizations in adjusting to these changing circumstances by overcoming their traditional design based on far-reaching functional concentration and hierarchical control. Second, the tension between assembly flexibility and operational flexibility requires further attention. The assembly process of military taskforces is based on differentiation along functional and national lines. However, the integration of these different functional and national contributions into a system that works as a whole is not so self-evident. Yet, successful integration determines to a large extent the operational flexibility of a taskforce in the field. Critical accidents, such as the Challenger disaster (Vaughan, 1996) and cases of friendly fire (Snook, 2000), can help to explain the reasons for bad integration. By analyzing these accidents and understanding why mistakes such as failed joint cooperation, neglected safety procedures, technical failures, group failures and human error happen, we can learn to improve the process of interrelating organizational elements. Normal accident theory (Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 1993) and theory on highreliability organizations are useful starting points in this respect (Weick, 1987, 1993; LaPorte et al., 1989; Roberts, 1989, 1990, 1993; LaPorte and Consolini, 1991; Weick and Roberts, 1993). With the introduction of NCW, technology will play an increasingly important role in modern military deployment. However, developing common, innovative technologies and equipment is expensive, and a lot of countries do not have the financial means for this. Therefore, just like in the business world, industrial collaboration may be deemed the best way to keep military technology affordable, innovative and compatible. Despite these considerations, many countries do not want to give up on their national autonomy and they only want to cooperate with others if this is clearly in their own interest. But this national thinking is probably counterproductive, because experiences from the business sector have demonstrated that it is possible for companies to be independent and

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at the same time be more innovative and profitable as a consequence of collaborating with others. So it would be wise to look deeper into this evidence from the business sector and see what these experiences can contribute to the development of the global defense industry and the organizational set-up of military deployments. Furthermore, another way to keep modern high-tech armed forces flexible and affordable is through well-considered outsourcing strategies. However, outsourcing so far has not been used very often as a strategic tool; it has been used more frequently as an instrument to counter financial cutbacks and reductions. Contracting out mess facilities, security services and ICT services is quite safe because they do not touch the core of the military organizations. Yet, more fundamental choices are, most of the time, avoided. When it comes to these fundamental choices, the business world is again way ahead of the military community. Here the hurdles to outsource core functions such as R&D, manufacturing and marketing have already been taken. In their search for flexibility, organizations are changing the way they think about their organizations, their value chains and their competitive positions. It is no longer useful for a company to own all its strategic sources. The motto seems to be: concentrate on your core capabilities and leave the rest to specialized companies. In contrast to the business sector, armed forces have a tendency to cling to their past and keep tight control over all their assets. However, the threat of further budget cuts renders this strategy very dangerous. Slowly the armed forces are being stripped down entirely and even the core organizational elements are not spared. To turn the tide, fundamental questions need to be answered. Do we need heavy armored tanks and artillery pieces given our expeditionary strategy? Why do we concentrate on all tasks in the military spectrum and not only on the ones we are really good at, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian aid? Is it wise to cover the entire military value chain nationally or is it better to specialize in one or two aspects, such as logistics and engineering, and leave the rest to other countries? Only after such questions have been answered properly can well-considered investment and divestment decisions be made. Business experiences with strategic outsourcing can help the armed forces in this process (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The problem, however, is not that military decision-makers and commanders are unaware of these developments in the business sector, in fact, they realize that these developments do have implications for their own organizations. However, top officials in defense departments and Headquarters often lack the power, endurance and wisdom to turn knowledge into action. As this “knowledge-doing-gap” has also been observed in the business world, this is another example of where the military could profit from insights that have been developed in civilian organization studies (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000). If this chapter has contributed in demonstrating the relevance of management and organization science for improving today’s military performance, it has fulfilled its objectives.

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Notes 1 NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999. 2 NATO documents, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-6.

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Research Challenge, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley (April). Lawrence, P.R. and J.W. Lorsch (1967) Organization and Environment: Differentiation and Integration, Boston, Harvard Business School Press. Lei, D., M.A. Hitt and J.D. Goldhar (1996) “Advanced manufacturing technology: organizational design and strategic flexibility,” Organization Studies, 17/3, 501–23. Mintzberg, H. (1979) The Structuring of Organizations: a Synthesis of the Research, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall. O’Reilly, C. and M.L. Tushman (2004) “The ambidextrous organization,” Harvard Business Review, 74–81. Perrow, C. (1984) Normal Accidents, New York, Basic Books. Pfeffer, J. and R.I. Sutton (2000) The Knowing–Doing Gap: How Smart Companies Turn Knowledge into Action, Boston, Harvard Business School Press. Roberts, K.H. (1989) “New challenges to organizational research: high reliability organizations,” Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 3 (3), 111–25. Roberts, K.H. (1990) “Some characteristics of one type of high reliability organization,” Organization Science, 1 (2), 160–76. Roberts, K.H. (1993) New Challenges to Understanding Organizations, New York, Macmillan. Sagan, S.D. (1993) The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Sanchez, R. and J.T. Mahoney (1996) “Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge management in product and organization design,” Strategic Management Journal, 17 (Winter Special Issue), 63–76. Schilling, M.A. (2000) “Toward a general modular systems theory and its application to interfirm product modularity,” Academy of Management Review, 25 (2), 312–34. Schilling, M.A. and H.K. Steensma (2001) “The use of modular organizational forms: an industry-level analysis,” Academy of Management Journal, 44 (6), 1149–68. Shapiro, C. and H.R. Varian (1999) Information Rules: a Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Boston, Harvard Business School Press. Snook, S.A. (2000) Friendly Fire: the Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Nothern Iraq, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Soeters, J. (2000) “Culture in uniformed organizations,” in: N.M. Ashkansy, N.M. Ashkanasay, C.P.M. Wilderom and M.F. Peterson (eds) Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate, Thousand Oaks, Sage, pp. 465–81. Sun-Szu (2004) The Art of War, Foreign Language Press, Beijing. Van Velzen, T. and M. Stekete (2003) “Joint European Fighter: De (on)mogelijkheden van een Europees jachtvliegtuig” (“Joint European Fighter: the (im)possibilities of a European jet fighter”), De Ingenieur, 115 (116), 20–7. Vaughan, D. (1996) The Challenger Launch Decision, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Volberda, H. (1998) Building the Flexible Firm: How to Remain Competitive, New York, Oxford University Press, Weick, K.E. (1987) “Organizational culture as a source of high reliability,” California Management Review, 29, 112–27. Weick, K.E. (1993) “The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: the Mann Gulch disaster,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 628–52. Weick, K.E. and K.H. Roberts (1993) “Collective mind in organizations: heedful interrelating on flight decks,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 357–81.

10 The military in post-communist societies in transition Marian Zulean

Introduction Ten years ago, in March 1995, the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies co-sponsored, jointly with the National Endowment for Democracy, a “ground-breaking” conference on “Civil–Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy.” The main goal of the conference was to offer an informed answer to the stringent policy questions on “who should guard the guards” of the former communist countries, what would be the role of the military in the post-Cold-War era, and what patterns of civil–military relations should be implemented. Samuel P. Huntington, one of the “founding fathers” of civil–military relations theory, was invited as a keynote speaker to the conference. He presented a rather optimistic view on the chances of success for building healthy democratic civil–military relations in Eastern Europe, considering the lessons learned from “the third wave” of democratization in Latin America and South Europe (Huntington, 1995: 17). The main factors, identified by Huntington, as guarantors of a successful transition were related to the growing acceptance of the norms of military professionalism and civilian control, the interest of both military and civilians for such control, and the low political and social cost comparative with high benefits for society. In his concluding remarks, Joseph Nye, then the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, tried to answer the questions and elaborated some policy recommendations, basically drawn from the Huntington’s theoretical model of “objective civilian control”: The proper response is the liberal “bargain” which defines specific rights and responsibilities for both the military and civilian leadership. The military must recognize that it is accountable to the rule of law; it must remain nonpartisan and respect civilian authority. For their part, civilians must respect the military’s special role in society, must provide adequate funding for appropriate military roles and missions, and must educate themselves so they can interact positively with the military. (Nye, 1995: 14)

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Those conclusions were important for the policy-makers who had created some months earlier an institution, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), to be in charge of defense-related cooperation between NATO and partner countries. The PfP Framework Document already required that partners should establish democratic control of their armed forces.1 In fact, the issue of democratic control of armed forces in Europe came as a pressing issue on the agenda of policymakers immediately after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. That was codified, in 1994, in a special document for the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later OSCE), under the title “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security” (Ghebali, 2003). Soon after (September 1995), NATO’s Study on NATO Enlargement established more detailed conditions on civil–military relations for the countries willing to join NATO. Therefore, the problem of the militaries in relations with parent societies in transition to democracy became an important issue on the agenda of stakeholders, both national policy-makers and international institutions that offered assistance for democratization. By now, ten former communist countries have been evaluated with regard to their implementation of the Western pattern of civil–military relations, declared “graduates” and become NATO members, while some others are in the waiting room. Today, the engagement of the West to promote democracy at the global level, particularly the US policy, became more evident. As the US President, George W. Bush, recently put it at the swearing-in ceremony for his second term of office: “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” but “America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling” (White House, 2005). That raises the question of any lesson learned from the success stories of East European transitions to democracy and building democratic civil–military relations, tailored to the needs of any region around the globe. The social science literature that focused on transition of what was seen, then, as the “East European bloc” is very rich. Military and societies in transition were at the center of research in many academic disciplines, such as military sociology, political science, geopolitics, international relations or “transitology.” Although extensive, the literature has rather a mono-disciplinary or, at most, multi-disciplinary approach. Some of the research projects, carried out in the late 1990s, had an interdisciplinary approach. However, except for some “taking stock” papers and the results of some interdisciplinary research on civil–military relations, there are quite a few evaluations or synthesis of knowledge acquired from the study of the military in East European transition. In conclusion, there is a double knowledge gap: at the academic level, there is no universal knowledge on democratic state-building and the role of the military in that process, while, at the policy level, there is a need for a tailored model of civil–military relations. What is the universal knowledge concerning civil– military relations drawn from East European experience? What is the contribution of the major social science disciplines or interdisciplinary studies in explaining the process? These are the main questions this study would like to answer. After 15

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years of studying the civil–military relations in transition societies, a complex synthesis of the acquired knowledge is not only possible, but also necessary.

The logic of the research The first part of this chapter presented the basic rationale of the research and the grand tour questions. However it is necessary to present the logic of research and methodology in detail, so as to clarify what the knowledge gap is and how the research goals will be met. Some people consider that the implementation of Huntington’s liberal model has been a success in the majority of East European countries, and there are a lot of studies that describe civil–military relations. So, what kind of fresh knowledge could this chapter bring? On the other hand, there is a growing dissatisfaction among academics related to the application of Huntington–Janowitz’s basic works in contemporary practice (see, in particular, the work of Feaver, Nelson, Burk, Schiff and Forester). However, none of them succeeded in making a fundamental criticism as in proposing a revolutionary paradigm change, taking the form of a new theory. An additional criticism is related to the misunderstanding of the policy transfer. The “imperial” thinking on transferring a Western pattern of civil–military relations without a cultural and social understanding of the recipient country is often criticized. Even though the implementation of the liberal pattern in Eastern Europe was evaluated as being successful, from a legalistic or a traditional institutionalist view, the question of how institutions work in practice in Eastern Europe or the possibility of successfully transferring a similar pattern to new circumstances still needs to be questioned. Starting from the needs presented above, this study intends to analyze both theoretical and empirical studies related to the military in the post-communist countries in transition, produced by many disciplines. The method employed for argumentation is the critical review and interpretation of written literature. The interpretation of the literature will deepen the understanding of the knowledge produced by disciplines on the military in post-communist transitions, will explain the complex phenomenon, dismiss the conspiracy theories and escape from the ethnocentric views. Thus, the ontological subject of the study is “the military in post-communist societies in transition.” Each term of the proposition is a basic subject of a specific discipline. If “the military” is the main subject in military sociology, the “post-communism” concept was studied by “transitology,” a branch of political science. While the concept of “society” is the main subject of sociology, “East Europe” could be considered a common concept for geopolitics, international relations or Sovietology. However, all these concepts were parts of a broader “civil–military relations” paradigm. The following part of the study will review and analyze the knowledge produced by military sociology, political science, geopolitics, political geography, Sovietology, transitology, and all hybrid or interdisciplinary studies on

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civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. The focus would be not on disciplines themselves, but on their basic concepts and methods employed or that could be employed in a more complex research: civil–military relations, professionalization, institutionalism, space, power, globalization or path-dependency.

Military sociology, political science and interdisciplinary studies: civil–military relations, professionalization, military organization, institution vs occupation The military was an important subject of study for the core social sciences, such as political science or sociology. However, a systematic theory of the relations between military and society began to emerge only after World War II. Among the disciplines, military sociology, particularly American military sociology, produced the most complex knowledge to help to understand the role of the military in a democratic society. A recently published Handbook of the Sociology of the Military presents a rather comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach of the studies about the military, the main topics being related to social change, political control, restructuring and downsizing military organizations, new missions and military culture (Caforio, 2003). However, the most important topic that became heavily debated and researched in both political science and military sociology is the broader relation between the armed forces and the state or the parent society – “civil–military relations.” The term “civil–military relations” became popular through the seminal work The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations, written by Samuel P. Huntington in 1957. Although Professor Huntington was mostly connected with the political science departments of Harvard University, some of his concepts were borrowed from and related to sociology, so that his book is considered as a basic tool by both military sociologists and political scientists. One of the main theses of Huntington’s work is the identification of two forces that shape military institutions in every society: “a functional imperative which depends on the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative coming from dominant social forces, ideologies and institutions in society” (Huntington, 1957: 2). The interaction of these forces represents the nub of the problems of civil–military relations.2 Although Huntington’s study was written in 1957, within the Cold War context, its conclusions are valid as a starting point for any research of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe, particularly as it was presented as an ideal-type model for the transition of the former communist countries. Political scientists, such as Amos Perlmutter, Bengt Abrahamson, Eric Nordlinger, Alfred Stepan or Constantine Danopoulos, continued the study of civil–military relations, especially in Latin America or Southern Europe while others, such as Roman Kolkowitz, Timothy Colton, William Odom or Dale Herspring, have studied the Soviet pattern. The official framework in political science for the study of civil–military relations was the Research Committee 24 under the International Political Science Association aegis.

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On the other hand, as Callaghan and Kernic put it, military sociology is the main scientific endeavor, part of the wider social science framework that focused on the armed forces or the military (Callaghan and Kernic, 2003: 14). In this respect, Morris Janowitz is considered as the “founding father” of military sociology (Burk, 1993). The Janowitz book, The Professional Soldier (1960), offers a detailed empirical study of the American professional soldier during the twentieth century, taking into account data on soldiers’ social origins, motivations, lifestyles, status, prestige and other characteristics. Concerning the issue of civil–military relations, he developed a partially opposite perspective to that of Huntington’s. Thus he notes that the changes occurring at the level of technology, society and army missions led to an increasingly politicized role for professional soldiers. Still, the supremacy of civilians could be achieved through “inter-arms” competition, or the competition for resources and influence. In this respect, Janowitz considers that military institutions are convergent with civil society, with the military profession following the social and political changes of society as a whole. The two viewpoints left behind a two-headed legacy within the paradigm of civil–military relations, the theory of divergence of the civilian and military spheres, and the theory of their concordance (Schiff, 1995). Sociological studies dealing with civil–military relations continued to develop after the 1960s, either under the aegis of the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) “Armed Forces and Society” or the Research Committee 01 on “Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution” of the International Sociological Association. In Europe the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) was set up, a group pursued more cross-national and interdisciplinary research (Caforio, 2003: 24–6). Some of their members shared common interests and published in the journals Armed Forces and Society or Journal of Political and Military Sociology but it can be assessed that there were not many interactions between the academic fields; they were rather “tribes” pursuing research within their own paradigms. The demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the bipolar world found the branches of both political science and military sociology, interested in armed forces and societies, in a crisis. Therefore, Eastern Europe became a “laboratory” of quasi-experiments, offering opportunities for further research. First of all, there was a push from inside the mainstream of the CMR paradigm to criticize the liberal pattern as a model applicable elsewhere. Among the criticisms, James Burk’s is the most complex and complete (Burk, 2002: 12). He considers that the liberal theory underwriting Huntington’s work is primarily concerned with protecting democratic values against external threats while the civic republican theory underwriting Janowitz’s work is primarily concerned with sustaining democratic values, particularly the civic virtue of citizen– soldier. The fact that the military must sustain and protect democratic values are important flaws in the effort to promote the civil–military paradigm elsewhere (Burk, 2002: 14–15). Burk also gives a brief presentation of the main efforts of political scientists to revolutionize the Huntington–Janowitz paradigm, pointing

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out the contributions of Michael Desch (structural–cultural model), Peter Feaver (principal–agent model) and Deborah Avant (private military). But here is not the place to develop them; they were mentioned to underline that a flawed theoretical model which worked for a mature democratic state was imposed on the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. Second, there was another push offered by the opportunity to test theories and bring fresh knowledge from the experience of East European transitions to the general theory. A review of the main empirical studies might offer better inductive knowledge, generalizations or theories to understand the relations of the military with its East European parent society. There were some early studies, written in the 1990s by Daniel Nelson, Ronald Linden, Constantine Danopoulos, James Gow and Anton Bebler, but they had a narrow focus, either on one particular issue of civil–military relations or as a case study. However, after the majority of the East European countries had joined the Partnership for Peace and the OSCE had launched its “Code of Conduct” (1994), the issue of civil–military relations ranked high on the agenda of both policymakers and academics. Some important interdisciplinary studies appeared in the late 1990s, either initiated by military sociologists or political scientists. The first endeavor worth mentioning is a collection of case studies, edited by Anton Bebler (Bebler, 1997). The first part of the book provides a backdrop for analyzing Eastern European countries, while the second part presents the case studies. The second useful citation is a set of two books, initiated by political scientists, edited by Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (Danopoulos and Zirker, 1996, 1999). Both volumes describe the common features of postcommunist regimes across the Eurasian area. They found four complementary processes of transition: depoliticization, departyization, democratization and professionalization. While depoliticization means keeping the militaries out of politics, departyization is closely related with de-communization (getting rid of the Communist Party chain of control within the army) and discouraging the armed forces to serve the interests of a particular party. Democratization of civil–military relations and professionalization are processes closely related with the implementation of Huntington’s liberal model in Eastern Europe. Although the books provide rather descriptive presentations of a country’s transitions, following the four processes identified by Danopoulos and Zirker (depoliticization, departyization, democratization and professionalization), what is important is the conclusion that even though Huntington’s model set up similar hopes, the outcomes were rather divergent and they begin to explain the phenomenon. In a later paper, Danopoulos and Zirker explain the diverging outcomes through a powerful variable: variance of religion (Danopoulos and Zirker, 2002). The explanation seems rather reductionist, based on the late Huntington paradigm of the clash of civilizations. However it is a hypothesis that should be tested further. Approaching the year 2000 and beyond, one may find an increasing number of research projects and individual studies of civil–military relations in Eastern

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Europe. There are four studies worth mentioning, two of them purely empirical studies and, another two, comprising more complex interdisciplinary research based on a common analytical framework. The first is a collection of case studies, published by the journal Armed Forces and Society (Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 2002: 383) that describes the evolution of civil–military relations in eight post-communist states (Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria). The main findings are related to the emergence of common features and some differences in transition. Among the common features shared by all the countries are: a massive decline of funding and recruitment; lack of civilians expertise in defense and the lack of important involvement of military officers in politics. The basic differences are related to the exercise of civilian authority within the government structures and the progress made toward a democratic civil–military pattern. Although the study failed to focus broadly on the larger context of transition, it is an important starting point for a comparative survey of civil–military relations in the post-communist world. The second is a book, another collection of empirical studies, written by political scientists or practitioners on Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and a regional SEE study (Betz and Lowenhardt, 2001). In it, the authors analyze some specific aspects of civil–military transitions. This time, an introductory chapter, written by Chris Donnelly, then the special adviser of NATO’s Secretary General, set the goals for the research (the need for a fresh analysis, in-depth evaluation of CMR and offering an impetus for educating people on CMR). Donnelly concludes that there is not a single Central and East European country with a satisfactory CMR; moreover, many Western countries face difficult issues of military reform (Betz and Lowenhardt, 2001: 9). The conclusions of the study explain the main causes of common issues in the post-communist states, offer recommendations to get the CMR right in practice and for a research agenda. One of the reasons for the troubles with CMR is due to an underestimation of the complexity of the issue. Moreover, the CMR has not been understood properly by scholars and policy-makers from both Eastern and Western Europe (the main issue of CMR is that armed forces must be effective and effectively managed). Another reason is the misunderstanding on the existence of a unique model of CMR in the West, or the basic structure for the armed forces. The confusion had existed from the very beginning, when they tried to re-define the CMR paradigm. Alternative terms, such as “civil control” or “political control,” “civilian management” came up, but none was satisfactory. As a result, the practice of CMR became more shallow than substantive. Some recommendations were important outputs of the research. On the policy level, the establishment of a correct legal basis for democratic control is considered important, but much more important is the system to be enacted. Another recommendation is that the civilian leadership should decide what kind of army they want. On the research agenda, it was demonstrated that the old CMR theory was misleading and the new research should no longer focus on civilian control but on proper civilian

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management of the army. Another finding of the research is that, by the year 2000, the term “post-communist states” is outdated, so the research should focus on a better-defined cluster of states. Although these two studies brought together researchers and practitioners from other disciplines to discuss and carry out research, they were rather multidisciplinary approaches. However, two more complex interdisciplinary studies are worth mentioning because they put together concepts and methodology, and set up a common analytical framework. The first important interdisciplinary project was carried out in 1998, with the results published later by Jurgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, along with findings on lessons learned and general trends. This comparative study brought together both Western and Eastern European analysts and investigated whether a common security landscape (in Karl Deutsch’s terms) is developing in Europe, as well as exploring the idea of a “common-risk society.” The study is important, not only for the findings but also for methodology. Thus, three social scientists from different disciplines came together with the research coordinators and set up a complex theoretical framework that helped not only the description of case studies but also to set up the indicators for crossnational comparisons, in-depth explanation and prediction. Thus a complex set of factors that could explain the CMR transition in the specific countries, from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, were grouped as such: international context, national domestic context (political, cultural, economic and social) and weight of history. The main findings are rich, both for theory and for the practice of CMR. Although the findings are not definitive, it appears that a common-risk society is indeed emerging in Europe, with many similarities in building new missions for armed forces, but with different layers (Western, Central and Southeast Europe, and the Russian Federation). Among the similarities, the phenomena of moving from the hard to soft security concerns, decline of mass armies and importance of flexible forces are the most important. The latest and more complex interdisciplinary research project focused on the transformation of civil–military relations in a comparative context, and was coordinated by Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster. It explores emerging patterns of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe and implications for a more general understanding of the changing nature of civil–military relations in the contemporary world (Cottey et al., 2002a, b).3 Among the products of the project are three books, each focused on an important aspect of civil–military relations. The first book focused on the issue of democratic control of the military, the second deals with the professionalization of armed forces while the third one has a broader approach on the relations between the military and their post-communist societies. Each volume combines complex analytical frameworks and descriptive case-study chapters, while the conclusions summarize the findings. In the first volume (Cottey et al., 2002a), by defining democratic control as political control by a legitimate, democratically elected government, the authors

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succeeded in identifying a variation in the extent of democratic control across the post-communist world: a successful group of countries, basically the admitted and candidate countries to NATO membership, and another two clusters (one cluster containing Russia and Ukraine with the former Yugoslav states in the other). Among the factors that explain the variation are: legitimacy and progress to democratization, efforts to integrate with the West and structural factors (traditions and state capacity). The second volume (Cottey et al., 2002b) explain the process of building professional armed forces by changing the roles, missions (territorial defense, power projection, neutral or combination) and system of education. The last volume (Cottey et al., 2003) define armed forces–society relations in terms of importance and legitimacy of five possible roles: territorial defense, nation-builder, regime defense, domestic assistance and military diplomacy. In transition from the regime defense and decline of national security role, the countries differ but mostly overlap the clusters found in the democratic-control-issue book. In a very recent issue of the European Security journal, the authors successfully summarize the main findings of such a complex project (Cottey et al., 2005). They claim that the relative homogeneity of communist CMR has been replaced by a significant diversity across the region, with a Westernized and consolidated pattern of the countries admitted or candidates to NATO membership, and Russia, Ukraine and former Soviet states as a semi-authoritarian pattern. The main drivers of change were the collapse of communism, external influence, social changes and changes in military technology and strategy. There are also interesting lessons learned from the East European transition for the study of civil–military relations in general. Thus, it may be assessed that we experience a global democratic revolution and a trend away from praetorianism. Second, there is a shift away from conscription and the role of the military as nation-builder. Third, there is a need for further study on political economy’s influence on CMR and the impact of economics on security policy (Cottey et al., 2005: 12–15). Also as an outcome of the same research project, one of the authors, Anthony Forester, revealed, in a separate paper, the main epistemological shortcomings of CMR theory. Forester claims that: This epistemological challenge to the field of “old” civil–military relations can be summarized by three propositions: first the atheoretical approach of “old” civil–military relations is now seriously being questioned by the greater theoretical rigour in the Social Sciences; second, the dominance of analytical realism is being challenged by the new developments in our knowledge, especially from post-positivist theoretical approaches and the normative turn in International Relations rooted in constructivism [. . .]; third, the ghettoisation of CMR is under serious challenge from outside the traditional field of “old” CMR as scholars anchored in different fields of inquiry have engaged in analysis of many issues . . . (Forester, 2002: 7)

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From the papers, books and research project presented above, it can be assessed that military sociology and political science were the main disciplines that tried to explain the evolution of civil–military relations in post-communist Europe. The interdisciplinary studies of civil–military relations, based on Huntington–Janowitz paradigms, were useful for both understanding the process, designing institutions and evaluating the progresses. What is the general knowledge from the transition of East European civil–military relations? There were not only similar goals or similar ideal–types set up, but also some similar processes. Thus, as Danopoulos and Zirker demonstrated, all the countries experienced the processes of depoliticization, departyization, democratization and professionalization, but in different degrees. Moreover, a massive decline in funding and recruitment, a lack of civilian expertise in defense and the lack of important involvement of military officers in politics are similar experiences in Eastern Europe (Jones and Mychajlyszyn, 2002: 383). Also, setting up the legislative and constitutional basis as a first step in making the military more accountable is important, but more important is how to enact the system, as Chris Donnelly put it. Similar common processes were brought up by the interdisciplinary study coordinated by Callaghan and Kuhlmann: moving from the hard to soft security concerns, decline of mass armies, importance of flexible forces and an emerging common security landscape. The complex interdisciplinary research of Cottey et al. went beyond the common description of transitions and tried to clarify are the main factors that explain the success or failure of transition. Thus, a principal observation for the successful transition was a shift away from praetorianism, conscription and changing the role of the military as nation-builder. Equally important are observed the differences and epistemological shortcomings that help us to better understand the transition. Thus the main epistemological shortcomings are related to the misunderstanding of the complexity of the CMR issue, the importance of the “weight of history” variable, the need for more theoretical rigor, the need for post-positivist approaches and need for interdisciplinarity. The study would further explore the knowledge produced by other disciplines that were marginalized, would evaluate their importance and would recommend their incorporation in a more complex interdisciplinary or transdiciplinary approach.

Sovietology, transitology and democratic consolidation: pathdependency Huntington’s theory of civil–military relations was based on the assumption that the social imperatives were constant (particularly in US history) and only the external threats alone could explain the evolution of civil–military relations. This was not a powerful argument to explain the complex transition in Eastern Europe, where social imperatives (ideologies and institutions), as defined by Huntington, are characterized by a dynamic change, with serious influences upon the configurations specific to civil–military relations. Moreover, a recent

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study pointed out the role of the “weight of history” variable in explaining the dynamic process of building a democratic CMR (Callaghan and Kuhlmann, 2000). Therefore it is necessary to explain the origin of the variance among the East European transitions, explain the influence of prior heritage on the tracks of transitions and expand the focus of description and explanation to states and regions. Thus, an additional explanatory model, not static like Huntington’s, but a dynamic one could bring an additional understanding of transition. That method is provided by the path-dependency theory, which was largely used by the subfield of political science, called “transitology/consolidology.” Scholars of pathdependency focus on the legacy of prior regimes as a constraining factor in explaining the transition process. That legacy could have created difficulties and challenges to democratic consolidation. The path-dependency theory could also explain the diversification of patterns within what was considered a relatively unitary “Eastern bloc.” But the CMR studies after 1990 did not consider it explicitly, despite the fact that there is a large amount of knowledge, produced prior to 1990, by the former school of “Sovietology” that can be exploited to explain the role of legacy (what Callaghan and Kuhlmann called the “weight of history”). There is a plentiful literature, that describes the communist pattern(s) of civil–military relations during the Cold War. Among the studies, three authors are relevant for this study, Roman Kolkowitz, Timothy J. Colton and William Odom.4 In Kolkowitz’s opinion (1967), the pattern of civil–military relations in the communist countries was a conflictual one, the soldiers being constantly tempted to intervene in politics. The single party tries to counterbalance this intention through the establishment of some mechanisms of control and indoctrination of the military. Colton (1990: 3–44) has a different vision, discovering a so-called participative pattern, which has many similarities with the Western one. Thus, he maintains the “(Communist) Party versus military dichotomy,” but rejects Kolkowitz’s idea that the party would need to control the military, because the Communist Party’s policy was consistent with the interests and to the advantage of the officers. William Odom (1978) conceives a consensual pattern of civil–military relations in communist countries, accepting the idea of some occasional conflicts between the army and the political leadership. In his view, the army was an administrative arm of the Communist Party, there being rather more union than division between the two. The military’s inclination toward conservatism makes the army a natural ally of the single party, as Odom considers. One can see that there was no consensus among the Sovietologists on assessing the communist CMR (there was not such a unique CMR model). Even before 1990, some Sovietologists considered that Huntington’s model does not apply to communist states. Mark Kramer, for example, dismissed Colton and Odom’s approaches for the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. He correctly predicted that “If Soviet leaders were to reduce their commitment to maintaining

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political and military hegemony in Eastern Europe, civil–military relations might change dramatically” (Kramer, 1985: 45–66). In a recent paper, an exponent of the former Soviet studies, Dale Herspring, demonstrates that Huntington’s paradigm, particularly his dichotomization of civil and military spheres, is irrelevant in explaining the CMR in former Soviet or communist East European countries. It was perhaps applicable in the early years of USSR, but not later. He bases his demonstration on some empirical data from the USSR and East Germany, in the 1980s, when the military enjoyed considerable autonomy, the political commissar was transformed into a political officer.5 Thus Herspring considers that Huntington’s model was drawn from US, British, French and German experiences, and that Soviet experience proved how a subjective control model can be transformed, over time, into an objective one (Herspring, 1999: 573). Even though Herspring’s demonstration needs more evidence and arguments, it is important that it proved the irrelevance of Huntington’s model for Eastern Europe as a whole and the fact that East Europe was not a unitary “bloc.” Another shortcoming of CMR theory was related to its narrow approach and its dismissal of the broader theories of democratization. After the triumph of “the end of history” paradigm (Fukuyama, 1992) and the dismissal of Sovietologists for the sin of not predicting the fall of communism, there was a theoretical vacuum when it came to explaining transitions and, particularly, variations of transitions among what was seen as a unitary bloc – Eastern Europe. The vacuum was immediately filled by the sub-fields of “transitology/consolidology” or by democratic consolidation theory. CMR studies and “transitology” ignored each other. For example, a search for the word “military” using the EBSCO database (accessed in June 2005) in one of the main journals for transition studies, East European Politics and Society, offered only six hits, only one of them referring to “civil–military relations.” This offers an argument for the necessity of borrowing concepts, methods or knowledge by the researchers of other disciplines. As far as the importance of knowledge produced by transitology/consolidology as branches of political science, there were longer debates and tensions within the political science discipline. Thus, authors such as Valerie Bunce and Phillipe Schmitter debated the relevance of literature produced by studying South European experiences within the sub-fields of “transitology and consolidology” to explain the transitions in Eastern Europe (Schmitter and Lynn, 1994; Bunce, 1995). The consensus of area experts is not only that the transitology/consolidology model produced by South European and Latin American experience of limited use to comprehend East European transitions, but it is also flawed and outdated to comprehend even Southern Europe transitions themselves. So the knowledge produced by “democratic consolidation” theory on East European cases can enrich and help to re-interpret the previous transitions in South Europe and Latin America. Thus, if one agrees with the demonstration, it can be concluded that Huntington’s model “presented” to the Marshall Center conference in 1995 was based on a flawed assumption, that “civilian control” of the military should be the focus of reform.

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In spite of all the tensions, there was a consensus that a democratic consolidation paradigm develops (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Even Valerie Bunce, a very critical political scientist, agreed that the interacting arenas, established by Linz and Stepan, namely civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, economic society and stateness, are basic conditions to evaluate consolidated democracies and essential components of a democratic system. The usefulness of applying Linz and Stepan’s theoretical framework for explaining the variation of transition, by striking a balance between structural explanation and the transitions approach, is shadowed by the absence of testable hypotheses and operationalizing variables. Despite the disputes and tensions, there is a broader knowledge produced by the democratic consolidation theory or by the “transitologists/consolidologists.” Moreover, the path-dependency methodology is a very useful tool that could be integrated by the scholars that study civil–military relations. Valerie Bunce, in a very recent paper, used the post-communist studies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to rethink the understanding of the democratization process (Bunce, 2003). In her conclusions she recommends regional and cross-regional studies in order to bring additional further arguments for understanding democratization as a global process (Bunce, 2003: 192).

Geopolitics, political geography, international relations: space, power and globalization While the role of geographical studies is increasing today, boosted by globalization, the contribution from this area in describing or explaining the civil–military relations in Eastern Europe was rather marginal. The main reasons are: the failure of classical geopolitics to explain complex phenomena, or to bring evidence for theories, and its application as an ideology to influence political decisions (see the influence of Mahan on Theodore Roosevelt or Houshofer’s influence on Rudolf Hess), corroborated with the ignorance of mainstream social sciences (sociology, economics and political science) to consider space, power and geography.6 However, geopolitics could be considered an important scholarly analysis during the twentieth century. Some of the concepts produced by Kjellen, Ratzel, Mackinder or Houshofer not only influenced other social sciences, such as international relations or political science, but directly influenced political decisions. Concepts such as “containment,” “domino theory,” “realpolitik” or “linchpin states” became notorious during the Cold War in the academic realm, promoted by George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski or Henry Kissinger. The main critique for geopolitics is that it lacks evidence in building theories and explanations, despite recent efforts to replace the “orthodox” geopolitics with critical geopolitics.7 The question remains: how did the knowledge produced by geopolitics influence specific issues, such as civil–military relations in Eastern Europe? The influence was rather indirect, due first to the power of some scholars in geopolitics to influence political decisions, corroborated with the popularity of

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geopolitics among the East European academics and policy-makers8 and, second, through the export of its concepts to other social sciences. I would argue that the popularity among the militaries and policy-makers of the classical Mackinder’s dictum: “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the world” (Mackinder, 1919: 265–78) was a powerful axiom among the Great Powers regarding Eastern Europe. The geopolitical vision promoted by people such as Dr. Brzezinski, who advised a special US strategy for Eurasia and NATO enlargement was based on Mackinder’s dictum and it became very popular among the decision-makers who promoted a Western pattern of civil–military relations (Brzezinski, 1997). Moreover, on the policy level, the speech of President Bush, delivered in Warsaw, that stated that: “All Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the chance for security and freedom . . .” (White House, 2001) was understood in Eastern Europe as a symbolic message that the USA is interested in promoting its policies in the “Heartland” space. As for the export of geographical or geopolitical concepts and their incorporation in the rhetoric and methodology of core social sciences, such as political science or sociology, the main reason for that was the globalization phenomenon that blurred the territorial boundaries, re-oriented the state-centric analysis and opened the disciplines toward the notions of space and geography. Thus, the geopolitical concept of “Eastern Europe” became, in the 1990s, not only an important ontological subject of study but also an important academic “area study” for political science and international affairs. It is important to explain how “Eastern Europe,” previously seen as a unitary region, evolved over the past 15 years in such a way that it disappeared,9 or it has been split among many clusters. Alan Dingsdale, who reviewed the geographical research in the 1990s, has identified four paradigms that underpin geographical studies: redefining personal, group and territorial identity; transition and transformation; the New Europe and the New World Order. Then he criticizes them and calls for a closer association of locational, societal and cultural theories of space to construct new geographies of Eastern Europe after socialism, trying to answer the question of whether Europe is a continent or a culture (Dingsdale, 1999). His study is another argument in favor of the interdisciplinary approach. As one of the political scientists that emphasize the importance of geopolitics in understanding the democratization process in Eastern Europe, Professor Whitehead considers that “Geography may not entirely dictate any nation’s democratic destiny, but Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a region where the effects are likely to remain pivotal” (Whitehead, 1999). Whitehead’s arguments start from the assumption that each potential democracy in CEE is fixed in a territorial matrix that exposes it to powerful crosscurrents, different geopolitical settings generating different opportunities or constraints for democratization. There are later studies in political science or economics that provided additional evidence for Whitehead’s conclusions which will be presented below, but one of

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the more powerful empirical and interdisciplinary explanation using economics, geopolitics and political science’s methodology was published after ten years of transition in the journal World Politics (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000: 1–37). Kopstein and Reilly tried to answer the question: “how did the countries that began the post-communist journey from similar starting points end up so far from each other”? They demonstrated statistically the plausibility of the thesis that geographical proximity to the West exercised a positive influence on the transformation of communist states, while isolation hindered that transformation (they did so through a complex statistical test of “neighbor effects”). The final conclusion of the Kopstein and Reilly study is that the integration of spatial and temporal factors is essential to a deeper understanding of the post-communist world. Thus, the main conclusion for our study of the military in East European societies is the necessity of integrating temporal arguments (path dependency theory) with geography for the analysis of political and social change. The concepts of space and power were imported earlier by another sub-field of social science: international relations (IR). The dominant paradigm of IR during the Cold War was Realism. One of its modern founding fathers, Hans Morgenthau, borrowed many concepts from his native Germany, where geopolitics was an important “science” in the first half of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War brought an implosion of the Westphalian system, a decrease of the importance of realism’s basic concepts of national interests and sovereignty, and the emergence of new paradigms, critical and opposed to realism or neo-realism. Thus the focus on power and military force, the monopoly of violence that might have been important for Huntington in 1957, lost its meaning. Constructivist approaches, with their thesis of the social construction of reality (borrowed from sociology), postmodernists, feminists, globalists or critical theorists show a richness of the IR discipline, but they were only marginally involved in explaining civil–military relations in East European transitions. The main gap that recent critics of IR theories became aware of between the theory and practice, would soon be considered in civil–military relations theory (Lepgold and Nincic, 2001). Security studies could close the theory–practice gap on the military and society if it used the constructivist paradigm in explaining the new role of the military, threats perception and drafting the new national security strategies.

Conclusions The fall of communism was a shock, both to the study and understanding of democratization process and to the practice of designing a desirable pattern of civil–military relations for East European countries. Although the policy requirements created a relatively unique model of civil–military relations, the outcomes of transition are very diverse. These conclusions present the universal knowledge concerning the civil–military relations, produced by the major social sciences studies, evaluate the contribution of each discipline and of interdisciplinary studies, and recommend a more complex research, based on interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary approaches.

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The main conclusion is that there is no unique model of civil–military relations in Eastern Europe. Building a “Western type” model of civil–military relations was like hitting the ground running, since not only was there no such unique Western model, but the Western models evolved themselves during the last 15 years. Also, the focus of reform on “civilian control” was important as a “Damocles sword” for not letting the military intervene in the democratization process, but was misleading since the military were already under some sort of civilian control, by the former communist regime. Instead, a focus on a broader security sector would have been better because, in the majority of communist countries it was not the military but the intelligence or security forces (or paramilitary) that were the main supporters of dictatorial regimes. There were many differences among the post-communist transitions, but many similarities, as observed by military sociologists and political scientists. The main differences are related to the misunderstanding of the complexity of the CMR issue, by both Western and Eastern European policy-makers, the capacity to enact the legislative framework and the main factors that explain the success or failure to implement such a democratic civil–military pattern. Among the similarities were: depoliticization, de-partyzation, professionalization and democratization; setting up the legislative framework as a first step in implementing a democratic CMR; a massive decline in funding and personnel; a lack of civilian expertise; a lack of involvement of militaries in politics; or the emergence of a common security landscape and a shift away from praetorianism and conscription. Although the interdisciplinary studies (Callaghan and Kuhlmann, 2000; Cottey et al., 2002a, b, 2003) were more complex and brought a better understanding of CMR transition, they noticed their own narrow focus, and therefore the necessity to expand the interdisciplinarity and bring fresh knowledge and methods from disciplines that were marginal in explaining CMR. Disciplines, such as Sovietology, would bring a “reservoir” of useful knowledge to the understanding of the role of historical legacy (“weight of history”). Pathdependency theory and methodology would better explain the broader process of democratization and the variation of the outcomes. Moreover, the “international context” set of variables, as conceived by both cited interdisciplinary studies, and their concepts of power, influence, space, geography and globalization, brought by geopolitics or IR theory, would deepen the understanding of the process. In addition, cultural studies and anthropology could help to bring understanding and aid the design of a feasible model of civil–military relations that could be adopted elsewhere, including in the Middle East. A critical review of the literature highlighted the necessity of interdisciplinary studies to better explain the more complex phenomena through overcoming the shortcomings of fragmented knowledge. A recent epistemological push to overcome those shortcomings, brought about by positivism and postmodernism, proposes not only interdisciplinary but also a transdisciplinary approach to explain complex phenomena.10 The complexity of civil–military relations in a postmodern world, the democratization in the Arab world, a revolution in military affairs and new

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global missions for the military require both a cross-national and a transdisciplinary approach. Moreover, there is an additional methodological push for multiple argumentation and interdisciplinarity in the policy-analysis field.11 Thus, this study tried to prepare the ground and propose a transdisciplinary approach for the study of civil–military relations in the Western world, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space, and to make policy recommendations for the global push of democratization. That kind of transdisciplinary research could be realized by a team of military sociologists, political scientists, experts in geopolitics, IR academics, “transitologists,” anthopologists and policy scientists. It is beyond the powers and intellectual capacity of an individual researcher as he/she would require the postmodern spirit of Leonardo da Vinci to pursue such an endeavor. Finally, as we noted in this chapter, there is an opportunity for the promotion of democracy at the global level. Therefore a new agenda of research should investigate, in an interdisciplinary fashion, the new role of armed forces in a global society. The investigation should start with criticism of the Huntington–Janowitz paradigm and the study of experiences from the recent wave of democratization in Eastern Europe. It is time to replace Huntington’s book, The Soldier and the State, with a new one: The Soldier and the Globe.

Notes 1 See Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, Ministerial Communiqué (1994) North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10–11 January. 2 The simplest way of reducing the military’s power within the state is through the maximization of the power of a certain civil group, to the disadvantage of others (subjective civilian control). This type of control can be witnessed in developing countries. In Huntington’s view, the notion of objective civilian control is opposed to subjective civilian control and represents the maximization of military professionalism, rendering the army neutral in the political realm. To achieve perfect objective civilian control, a clear separation of responsibilities between the military and civilians is necessary, the military becoming a professional body dealing with the management of force within the state. 3 The research project “The transformation of civil–military relations in comparative context” with UK funding and leadership lasted for about five years, engaged about 50 researchers and practitioners from the area and has, as an outcome, three edited books and many research papers. 4 See Colton, T.J. and Gustafson, T. (eds) (1990) Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil–Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Princeton University Press: Princeton; Kolkowitz, R. (1967) The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton University Press: Princeton; Odom, W. (1978) “The party–military connection: a critique,” in Herspring, D. and Volgyes, I. (eds) Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems, Westview Press: Boulder. 5 In Herspring’s view, a political commissar is an officer appointed by the Communist Party whose tasks include missions such as changing the soldiers’ value systems, controlling the behavior of officers and motivating troops for combat, while the political officer never assumed the role of changing value systems or controlling officers. He/she was, instead, a staff officer. 6 For the explanation of the failure of mainstream social sciences to consider space and

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global concepts, see Taylor, P.I. (1996) “Embedded Statism and Social Sciences: Opening Up to New Spaces,” Environment and Planning, 28: 1917–28. For the revival of geopolitics and critical geopolitics see: Newman, D. (ed.) (1999) Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, Frank Cass: London, and Sicherman, H. (2002) “The Revival of Geopolitics,” The Intercollegiate Review, Spring: 16–23. For a recent and comprehensive analysis of geopolitics, see Cohen, S.B. (2003) Geopolitics of the World System, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. For the influence of geopolitical knowledge among the Russian military and policy-makers, see the case of Alexander Dugin, a popular Russian nationalist philosopher who used to have a powerful influence on President Putin. For an introductory analysis of transforming the East Europe concept in political science, see King, C. (2000) “Post-communism: Transition, Comparison and the End of Eastern Europe,” World Politics 53: 143–72. The difference between interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity is – generally – the following: while the former refers to the cooperation of two or more existing disciplines, pulling together concepts and methodology, the latter refers to a collective and synergic enterprise in response to the need to use human knowledge and analytical powers to understand large and complex systems. For a detailed analysis on interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, see the conference proceedings of UNESCO (1998) “Transdiciplinarity – Stimulating Synergies, Integrating Knowledge,” Division of Philosophy and Ethics, or Giuseppe Caforio (2004) “Interdisciplinary and CrossNational Character of Social Studies on the Military: the Need for Such an Approach,” paper presented to the RC01 Conference, Ankara. For problem-based research, see Soeters, J.M. (2000) “Military Sociology in the Netherlands,” in Kummel, G. and Prufert, A. (eds) Military Sociology: the Richness of a Discipline, Nomos, Baden-Baden.

Bibliography Bebler, A. (1997) Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist States, Praeger: Westport and London. Betz, D. and Lowenhardt, J. (2001) Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, Frank Cass: London, Portland. Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard, Basic Books: New York. Bunce, V. (1995) “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?,” Slavic Review, 54, 1, Spring: 111–27. Bunce, V. (2003) “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience,” World Politics, 55, January: 167–92. Burk, J. (1993) “Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society,” Armed Forces and Society, Winter, 19, 2: 167–8. Burk, J. (2002) “Theories of Democratic Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 29, 1: 7–29. Caforio, G. (ed.) (2003) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers: New York, Boston, Dordrecht, London, Moscow. Caforio, G. (2004) “Interdisciplinary and Cross-National Character of Social Studies on the Military: the Need for Such an Approach,” paper presented to the RC01 Conference, Ankara. Callaghan, J. and Kernic, F. (2003) Armed Forces and International Security, LIT Verlag: Munster. Callaghan, J. and Kuhlmann, J. (2000) Military and Society in 21st Century, Munster–Hamburg–London: LIT Transaction Publishers.

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Cohen, S.B. (2003) Geopolitics of the World System, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Colton, T.J. (1990) “Perspectives on Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” in Colton, T.J, and Gustafson, T. (eds) Soldiers and the Soviet State, Princeton University Press: Princeton. Cottey, A., Edmunds, Th. and Forster, A. (eds) (2002a) Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe, Palgrave, Houndmills: Basingstoke. Cottey, A., Edmunds, Th. and Forster, A. (eds) (2002b) The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces, Palgrave, Houndmills: Basingstoke. Cottey, A., Edmunds, Th. and Forster, A. (eds) (2003) Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, Palgrave, Houndmills: Basingstoke. Cottey, A., Edmunds, Th. and Forester, A. (2005) “Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe,” European Security, 14, 1, March: 1–16. Danopoulos, C. and Zirker, D. (1996) Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Westview Press: Boulder. Danopoulos, C. and Zirker, D. (1999) Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc, Westview Press: Boulder. Danopoulos, C. and Zirker, D. (2002) “Civil–Military Relations Theory in the Postcommunist World,” Working Paper No. 38, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva. Dingsdale, A. (1999) “New Geographies of Post-Socialist Europe,” The Geographical Journal, 165, 2, July: 145–53. Forester, A. (2002) “New Civil–Military Relations and its Research Agendas,” Working Paper No. 83, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva. Fukuyama, F. (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, Avon Books: New York. Ghebali, V.Y. (2003) “The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security,” DCAF Document No. 3, Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Herspring, D. (1999) “Samuel Huntington and Communist Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society, 25, 4, Summer: 557–77. Huntington, S.P. (1957) The Soldier and the State, Vintage Books: New York. Huntington, S.P. (1995) “Reforming the Civil–Military Relations,” Journal of Democracy 6, 4: 9–17. Janowitz, M. (1960) The Professional Soldier – a Social and Political Portrait, CollierMacmillan Ltd: London. Jones, C. and Mychajlyszyn, N. (2002) “Overview: Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe in Former Communist Societies,” Armed Forces and Society, 28, 3, Spring. King, C. (2000) “Post-communism: Transition, Comparison and the End of Eastern Europe,” World Politics 53: 143–72. Kolkowitz, R. (1967) The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton University Press: Princeton. Kopstein, J.S. and Reilly, D.A. (2000) “Geographic Diffusion and Transformation of the Postcommunism World,” World Politics, 53. Kramer, M. (1985) “Civil–Military Relations in the Warsaw Pact: the East European Component,” International Affairs. Larrabee, S. and Szayna, Th. (1995) East European Military Reform after the Cold War, Rand Corporation: Santa Monica. Lepgold, J. and Nincic, M. (2001) Beyond the Ivory Tower: the IR Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance, Columbia University Press: New York.

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Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore. Mackinder, H. (1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality, Consable: London. NATO (1995) Study on NATO Enlargement, Brussels, September. Newman, D. (ed.) (1999) Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, Frank Cass: London. Nye, J. (1995) “Concluding Address, Civil–Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy,” NED International Forum. Online, available at: www.ned.org/forum/ reports/civil_mi.html. Odom, W. (1978) “The Party–Military Connection: a Critique,” in Herspring, D. and Volgyes, C. (eds) Civil–Military Relations in Communist States, Westview Press: Boulder. Schiff, R. (1995) “Civil–Military Relations Reconsidered: a Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces and Society, 22, 1: 7–25. Schmitter, Ph. and Lynn, K. (1994) “The Conceptual Travels of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?,” Slavic Review, 53, Spring: 173–85. Sicherman, H. (2002) “The Revival of Geopolitics,” The Intercollegiate Review, Spring: 16–23. Soeters, J.M. (2000) “Military Sociology in the Netherlands,” in Kummel, G. and Prufert, A. (eds) Military Sociology: the Richness of a Discipline, Nomos, Baden-Baden. Taylor, P.I. (1996) “Embedded Statism and Social Sciences: Opening Up to New Spaces,” Environment and Planning, 28: 1917–28. UNESCO (1998) “Transdiciplinarity – Stimulating Synergies, Integrating Knowledge,” Division of Philosophy and Ethics. Whitehead, L. (1999) “Geography and Democratic Destiny,” Journal of Democracy, 10, 1: 74–9. White House (2001) “Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University,” Press Release, June 15. Online, available at: www.whitehouse. gov/news/release/2001/06/print/20010615-1.html. White House (2005) “President Sworn-In to Second Term,” Office of the Press Secretary, January 20. Online, available at: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/print/ 20050120-1.html.

11 Trends and evolution in the military profession Giuseppe Caforio

The military professional If Whitehead (1961) was right that ancient society was a coordination of trades whereas modern society is a coordination of professions,1 it is immediately apparent that analysing and defining their professional aspects and monitoring their development and trends are central to study of the military. By coordinating and interacting with other professionals, military professionals will make their contribution – whether positive or negative – to shaping the broader society. They will be the ones to provide the external representation of the military, after having formed and moulded its inner soul. If we consider the military profession in the general context of the other professions, we cannot fail to take account of the fact that it manages a complex of collective resources of such a magnitude and for such vital purposes for the community that its study takes on a fundamental importance for the comprehension of society itself. But who is the military professional? It must be said at the outset that the literature on the subject has long debated whether one can speak of a profession in the proper sense for military personnel and, if so, the professional species to which they should be assigned. This debate has focused chiefly on the professional figure of the officer, leaving aside that of the NCO, so for the moment we shall restrict our analysis to the literature regarding this figure,2 deferring until later an examination of how valid this limitation can still be considered today. Study of the occupation of officer requires ascertaining first of all whether we can speak of the military officer as a professional in a strict sense, and then investigating whether this categorisation has a historical variance or if it can be considered, starting naturally from its origin, as a sufficiently constant designation. Various approaches have tried to define the content of the officer’s occupation by applying a series of theoretical models created to define a profession in a strict sense. Sticking to the best-known and most meaningful, a first model defines a profession by the existence of a certain set of attributes (Greenwood, 1957). The set of attributes varies according to the theoretical constructs of the different

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authors. The ones that have most influenced subsequent thought on the military professional are those of Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960), which therefore deserve to be outlined here. For Huntington there are three attributes that define a profession in the strict sense: expertise (acquired through prolonged education and experience), responsibility (towards the society at large) and corporateness (as self-awareness of the professional group). He wrote: “A profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics” (1957). His conclusion is that the profession of officer today has all three attributes of a profession; in contrast to ancient times, as “Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warrior of previous ages”. For Janowitz there are five attributes that define the professional ideal-type, namely a core of hard-to-master, socially important skills, an own organisation, autonomy or self-rule, a code of ethics and a system of compulsion. According to Janowitz, in the officer’s occupation one of these attributes – autonomy – is clearly absent. However, due to the fullness of the content of the other attributes, this occupation can be considered a profession, even if not completely. A second model used in the literature has been the process model, in which the officer’s occupation has been examined in terms of the professionalisation process and historical acquisition of social legitimation (Van Doorn, 1965). It emphasises the process rather than the product, and places the emphasis on the historical variance of the concept of profession, thereby avoiding the static nature of the attribution-based model. Applying this model to the officer’s occupation leads one to define it as an atypical profession, since its genesis has followed a process that is somehow the reverse of the other professions: first commission, monopoly, high social status and a code of ethics; then the establishment of training schools, and only at the end the creation of professional associations (Van Doorn, 1965). A further attempt at conceptualisation has been made by Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1977), through the creation of a “pluralist” model (also called a “segmented” or “fusionist” model) in which the profession is distinguished in segments or fractions, depending more on function/specialisation than on rank or category. Within the military some of these segments display specifically military professional characteristics, others characteristics similar to neighbouring civilian professions (engineers, physicists, etc.), so that one cannot speak of a unitary military profession (Deagle, 1973; Jordan and Taylor, 1973; Moskos, 1973). The debate has developed over time and in the course of the rapid changes that the professional content of the officer’s occupation was undergoing in the last part of the twentieth century. In this framework, authors like Cathy Downes (1985) have wondered whether the officer’s occupation was losing its professional characteristics with the changing situations and content. Downes’ thesis is that applying an attribution approach reveals only partial and limited convergence between the concrete content of the officer’s profession and its ideal-type, as defined according to a set of attributes in the literature. The officer’s occupation would thus seem to be a profession in decline.3

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Subsequently improvement in the characterisation and classification of the category of the professions in general has helped to better define the profession characteristics of the officer. Essential in this regard is the distinction between independent and dependent professions (Prandstraller, 1997), where the officer’s occupation is clearly ranked among the latter. The military profession is thus included among those closely incorporated in an organisation and strongly dependent on it: for soldiering, the organisation is the state and the state is the military’s sole client. The occupation of officer is therefore defined as a unique example of fusion between profession and organisation where strictly professional aspects and bureaucratic aspects are present simultaneously, with the former prevailing over the latter to varying degrees depending on the service, the country and the period of reference. The officer’s occupation thus moves along a continuum that ranges from organisation to profession (in a strict sense), with an individual, case-by-case placement that is a function of time and space (Harries-Jenkins, 1975). The definition of the military profession as a bureaucratic one, dependent on an organisation, appears to be accepted in the prevailing literature today,4 but membership in it is no longer considered to be limited to the category of officers. Non-commissioned officers, considered for some time to be a semiprofession (for semi-professions, see Etzioni, 1969), now seem, at least in all the developed countries, to have completed the historical process that has led them to be considered a profession – according to some, a new profession (Prandstraller, 1997). Indeed, NCOs no longer fit the mould of the sergeant, the eighteenth-century serra gente whose main task was keeping squads of soldiers united and in close ranks in combat. Today’s NCOs go through a training process that in many countries leads to a university degree (or diploma) and acquire specialisations that enable them to master a sector of activity that, in complexity and importance, can be considered the equivalent of what is normally entrusted to a junior officer. Having briefly defined the military profession we can now turn to its historical development, focusing, in light of the above, almost exclusively on the figure of the officer. The role of the officer has of course always existed in armies the world over and in every era. One can debate and make distinctions as to where and when it was a role, where an occupation, where it had adscriptive characteristics of choice, where it displayed genuine professional connotations, but such a discussion would take us too far in time and space from the purposes of this work. It is sufficient here to give an account of how historical social research has reconstructed the birth of the military profession in modern and contemporary times, up to the current ideal-type. It is widely recognised in the historical research that, at least up to the mideighteenth century, officer education had few or no professional characteristics, at least as we mean them today and how we have sketched them in the foregoing pages. The choice of officers was almost always adscriptive, determined by the

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social class into which one was born; military units were often purchased by those who wished to command them; the noble by birth were considered to have – by nature and by primary education – the qualities and knowledge to command. The field of battle, when it presented itself, did the rest, both in terms of selection and experience. All this changed between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, with some temporal differentiation according to the various currents of historical thought. On the factors of change, however, there is sufficient agreement among historians (see, for all, John Gooch, 1988). There are essentially two: technological evolution, consequent on or co-agent with the Industrial Revolution, and the creation of mass armies, stemming from the French Revolution. It is quite clear, for example, that the development of artillery obliged the officer to acquire technical knowledge that could not have been part and parcel of his family education, just as the necessity of commanding, moving and supporting logistically great masses of men required knowledge and experience that could not be improvised. The result is the first schools for officers, the first military “universities”, to draw a parallel with the professions already recognised at the time. And on this point there is a first disagreement among the historians: there are those who trace the officer’s professionalisation process back to the spread of these schools, created in response to a need for standardised military training (for all, see Teitler, 1977), and those, like the already cited John Gooch, who trace this process to the social change in officer recruitment that results from the technological and social transformations mentioned above. When the selection of officers is no longer by birth but by merit, then, says Gooch, one can speak of the birth of the military profession. About a century passes between the two events: the first military schools start springing up in the mid-eighteenth century,5 while the possibility of access to military academies for the sons of the bourgeoisie becomes generalised in Europe around a hundred years later (Gooch, 1988). Over that time span, new social and technical conditions required a standardisation of problems and solutions in the field that was much less felt previously, and therefore it became necessary to prepare officers in somewhat uniform fashion,6 leading to the creation of the military schools. Access and attendance at these schools, however, requires more ability and resolve than the offspring of the nobility are able to provide,7 so the state turns to the sons of a middle class that is then on the rise and that sees an appointment as an officer as a further instrument for rapid social promotion. The officers of the second half of the nineteenth century thus appear to be professionals already, with their own university-level training institutes, their own codes of ethics – by now quite homogeneous among the different armies – and strong esprit de corps. Traces remain of their origins and of the process of change in the social make-up of the different services and specialities: the officers in technical weaponry, artillery and the corps of engineers are now mostly

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sons of the bourgeoisie; the cavalry remains more the prerogative of the nobly born. This is a condition that will persist in Europe until it gradually fades away in the first half of the twentieth century. Parallel to this professional development is a strong growth in military culture and thinking. Authors like Carl von Clausewitz, Antonio Jomini, William Napier, Denis Hart Mahon and Nicola Marselli are some of the protagonists of this cultural trend in the various countries. Technological evolution continues in the ensuing decades and its increasing impact on military operations brings a specific characteristic to the military profession not shared, at least at the time of their birth, by other professions: the creation of a separate elite of military professionals, the general staff corps. Here the training provided by the military academies was no longer sufficient for access: further, more specialised preparation was needed. This appears to be a first affirmation of the principle of continuous, career-long training that will later be extended to other professions.8 By accentuating the characteristics that had led to the development of a military profession in the proper sense (deployment of large masses of soldiers and technological evolution of weaponry), the wars of the twentieth century inevitably increased the need for professionalism of officers, but at the same time brought about an internal change in the content of this professionalism, one that would cause sociological analysis to hypothesise a transition from the figure of the heroic leader to that of the manager,9 from a leader offering chiefly command skills to an executive excelling especially in organisational skills. This is a dichotomy that seems to reproduce in a modern key the old contrast between the “natural” qualities of the nobly born and those “acquired” by the new professional. Today this debate appears to be superseded by recognition that, depending on the post covered, both capacities must be present in the officer, as well as of the fact that leadership can also, to a certain degree, be taught and learned.10 As everyone knows, the second half of the twentieth century is characterised almost entirely by the period and theme of the Cold War. Not coincidentally, the contradiction between an instrument – the military – created for war and the persistent absence of warfighting in the four decades of the East–West standoff was a constant point of discussion regarding tendencies to consider the military professional’s activity as nothing more than a “job like any other” in a big government bureaucracy, as the armed forces had now become in most of the developed countries. But then, as Marina Nuciari (2006) shrewdly observes: With a certain irony of history, right when, at the end of the 1980s, the debate on the military profession seemed to die out in consolidated agreement as to its nature and the internal contradictions due to the “forced peace” of deterrence, the force of things leads to new interrogatives, motivated as is always the case by another “great” change. The End of the Cold War (upper case is mandatory) brings the armed forces to the fore, in different measure in the various countries but with great prominence in Italy, with tasks that are no longer reducible to one pole or the other of the professional

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Giuseppe Caforio scheme but appear so “other” as to generate a new set of names in an attempt to adequately label a phenomenon that even after fifteen years many still define as “new”: the new missions, or missions other than war.

Indeed, with the start of the new millennium, the function of armed forces appears to be undergoing a series of such profound changes that it is still difficult to diagnose their range. Patrick Mileham (2003) for instance describes the complexity of these changes: Armies, Navies and Air Forces are organisations whose purpose has long since shifted from the relatively straight-forward, practical function of fighting, to an enormously complex institutional matrix of processes and procedures, carried out by numerous inherent and out-sourced resources, human and material, to achieve certain ends. This is especially so because one cannot say that a specific new function has been assigned to the armies, or a previous one abandoned: concretely, armed forces have gone back to making war, they continue to be an element of dissuasion, they are engaged more and more in peace support operations; but they retain the task of defending the national territory and are increasingly called on to contribute in various tasks like fighting terrorism, providing relief in the event of natural disasters, controlling international arms-trafficking, and so forth. All this in the presence of far-reaching social and structural changes, such as, in Europe, the abandonment of conscription and the transition to an all-volunteer force. The professional content of the officer’s occupation is clearly thrown into confusion by this: consolidated experiences are (temporarily?) marginalised, new knowledge is required of field commanders,11 officer training courses tend to increase in depth and duration, those of NCOs become of university level. The new military professional is at a crossroads: should officers be “jacks of all trades” or should they be sliced and diced among different specialisations, according to the old prediction of a segmented profession (see above, p. 218)? At this point we can pose the question of the uniqueness and specificity of the military profession. The obligatory reference here is to a well-known study by Bernard Boene (1990) that retains its relevancy and starts out as follows: “Central to the study of ‘armed forces and society’, whether the approach be that of sociology, political science or legal doctrine, is the question of how unique the military really is – and ought to be”. Boene’s study is an expression of a discussion on the nature and specificity of the military profession due to the new question raised by the long period of deterrence – is the military occupation like another? – but it goes beyond the historical contingency out of which it arose and provides, I think, universal, permanent elements for understanding this profession.

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In every context, whether old or new, the military professional displays two peculiar characteristics, ones not shared with other professional categories: the power/duty to take binding, life-and-death decisions regarding him or herself and other human beings; and the power to violate, legitimately, a number of “civilian taboos”, as Boene calls them; taboos essential for human coexistence, such as the prohibitions against killing human beings or taking them captive, destroying goods or taking them for one’s own use, and so forth. In order to be able to exercise this violence, these powers, without upsetting organised society, without overwhelming it, the “manager of organised violence”, as the military professional has also been called,12 cannot be subject only to external checks (so-called political control over the armed forces), but needs a self-limitation of his or her own, a code of ethics that guarantees society (and him or herself) that the wholly atypical functions entrusted to him or her will be exercised properly. This is why traits not generally necessary for other professions are required here. They are, as described by Boene: permanent, universal traits, related to the sacred character of war for any society, once it has embarked on such a course – obedience, loyalty, unlimited liability for service, a stronger degree of coercive institutional authority – as well as to its violent nature. (1990: 58) And they are aspects that would remain unchanged even if war were to evolve into a fully robotised, push-button, remote control affair: the handful of men and/or women in hardened command posts would still experience and, to operate effectively, would still need a degree of divergence from civilian ways. (1990: 58) They are those characteristics that a French general referred to in the 1970s13 in pointing out that an officer is no ordinary public servant: he or she must answer a calling, made up of keen interest in things military, dedication to the common good, acceptance of risk to life and limb and of the peculiar obligations of the profession of arms. The military professional has as client the state, we have said, and another of his or her peculiarities is that this client, a reverse monopolist (since no other client is permitted but the state), has precise control over his or her professional activity. The client, that is, does not limit itself to asking the military professional for the service it needs at that moment, but exercises complete control – and not only economic, which would be normal – both over the provision of the service and the professional’s entire way of being and of organising him or herself. This is what is called political control over the armed forces. Various theorisations exist on the modalities of this control, as well as dedicated study centres and research institutes,14 and a chapter in this book is devoted

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to it, so here we shall give only a brief description to indicate its impact on the content of the military profession. According to those considered the fathers of contemporary thinking on the military, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, political control over military power is primarily exercised through the professionalisation of the officer corps. The military professional’s attitude towards politics is therefore part of the code of ethics and conduct of the profession itself and takes concrete form in reality mainly in an internal control. As is known, however, the solutions given by the two authors to the problem of internal control are quite different, not to say opposing. According to Huntington (1957), this control is ensured by rigid separation of the military professional from politics, a kind of neutralisation of the profession with respect to the political power: the officer does not get involved in politics. For Janowitz (1960), instead, internal control is achieved mainly through interiorisation by the individual military professional of the dominant, fundamental values of national society, and therefore through participation in the country’s political life. Whichever of the two solutions one wishes to consider more appropriate (or, probably, a blend of the two), what we are interested in pointing out here is that, in the subsequent literature as well, the existence of an internal political control is part of the content of military professionalisation. These are the lines of historical development that the military profession has followed in Europe and North America. But there are other parts of the world where this development has taken on particular aspects and characteristics that deserve to be mentioned briefly. I refer here to the “Third World” countries, where the armed forces have taken on particular political and social roles. This phenomenon has characterised the countries of Latin America especially, but in more recent periods it has manifested itself in nearly all countries that have emerged from a process of decolonisation, both in Asia and Africa. However, since it first manifested itself in the Latin American countries, where the decolonisation process mainly occurred in the nineteenth century, this is the context I shall be referring to in these notes. The creation of independent national armies in these countries took place in a situation of interdependence with Western European nations, which found themselves in the phase of construction or expansion of capitalism. This relationship appears to have had concrete, practical influence in linking the new armed forces, still lacking traditions of their own, to a dominant capitalist class that asked them first and foremost to maintain a social order dominated by market relations. When a process of politico-social democratisation was later grafted on to the initial freemarket philosophy, the armed forces continued to support the pre-existing social order, both by backing the capitalist elite and by taking its place when it showed itself incapable, inept or corrupt (situations quite frequent in the examined context). In the absence of other military traditions on which the armies of these countries might draw, their failure to accept democratic principles and the subordination of the armed forces to the popular will continued from the initial stages of decolonisation into the following century and up to our own times. Fernando

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Bustamante (1991), for example, explains the propensity of the militaries of the Latin American countries to intervene in the political sphere in this way: The military “pressure” on the political sphere appears to be the fruit of the militaries’ need to resolve the failures and dysfunctions resulting from an asynchronous development between “modernisation” and the rationalinstrumental logic prevalent in the barracks (“islands of modernity”), and the inability of civil political society to provide the armed forces with a compatible and congruent environment. (1991: 39, my translation from the Spanish) This has produced a type of military professional with peculiar characteristics with respect to the Euro-Atlantic model that was nevertheless its source of inspiration; above all, a strong anti-progressive, markedly traditionalist ideological stance, one that, overall, is that, when applying Charles Moskos’ well-known institution/occupation model (Moskos, 1977 and 1986), must be defined as rigidly institutional. The officer produced by this context poses him or herself as a staunch defender of the traditional values of society, which he or she watches over and with which he or she actively interacts in order to prevent deviations from these values, also by force of arms. The projection of his or her professional interest is much more towards the “internal enemy” than towards any external threats to the country state. Political control internal to the military in the sense described by Samuel Huntington (1957), namely as a clear-cut separation of the profession from politics, appears to be non-existent here, replaced by an autonomous ideological control that is often linked to a minority sector of national society.

The process of change in the military profession The first to emphasise a process of change under way in the military profession and to clearly delineate its future developments was Morris Janowitz (1960). Countless studies have followed, as a response (in the political science and sociology literature, mainly) to the obvious changes of the international context and of the military function. But as we have had occasion to study these changes almost step-by-step through a series of field surveys conducted in their most significant period,15 we shall look at the changes in the attitudes and opinions of the officer corps of a good sample of advanced democracies through empirical research data, rather than through the vast and varied literature on the topic. Although the comparison is general because the participating countries were not always the same in the various surveys (even if there is a nucleus of countries that always participated16), and the questions to which we refer were posed in a similar but not identical way in some questionnaires, we feel that comparison is possible and correct: those who wish to go deeper into this aspect can consult the literature cited in the note to get a clearer idea.

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The first interesting datum to evaluate is how the military professional’s perception of the national security threat changes in the period in question, a period that extends from 1991 to 2004 and is dense with profound changes on the international scene. The most felt threats at the start of the period appear to be mass immigration from Third World countries, a conflict between Third World countries involving one’s own country, and the possibility of nuclear blackmail, both by Third World countries (read the so-called “rogue states” in American political discourse) and by non-state terrorist organisations. At the end of the period, the threat perceived by military professionals appears to have changed: migratory flows and the possibility of involvement in outside-area wars rank significantly lower among their concerns, while fears relating to the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and internal security, particularly the growth of organised crime, rank higher. Greater coordination, especially in Europe, in curbing clandestine immigration and inroads made towards resolving conflict in the Balkans thus seem to have had some weight in altering the assessment of national security threats, just as the materialisation and expansion of the terrorist menace have certainly had an effect in an opposing direction. This datum on the trend of the perceived threat is helpful for seeing how the attitudes of military professionals react to the missions assigned to their armed forces: for verifying, that is, the parallelism that exists between the two elements. Among the priority tasks that the interviewees assign to their armed forces, defence of the national soil and the provision of disaster relief to civilian populations, and, abroad, participation in PSOs, remain high on the list throughout the period and across the various cited surveys. Increasing importance is shown for the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as helping police forces combat organised crime. A graph enables us to compare the trends during this period of the perception of the terrorist threat and of the importance of the mission to deal with this threat (the most topical) (Figure 11.1). The plotted data clearly show that, in the run-up to 11 September 2001, there was a sizeable decline in the perception of the terrorist threat among military professionals, and a corresponding, albeit more cautious, decline of support for antiterrorism missions. The situation changes radically after the cited event, of course. The increased concerns for the internal security of the examined countries can in part be read as a result of the increased threat of terrorism. The change in the perception of the threat, and the different emphasis placed on the tasks of the armed forces as a result, seem to have contributed powerfully to changing the opinions of military professionals regarding recruitment of the national armed forces. Although a strong shift towards abandoning conscription in favour of volunteer armed forces (where this had not already be done, as in the USA) was already being manifested in the 1980s in public opinion in the

Percentage

Trends and evolution in the military profession 69

100

68

90

67

80

66

70

65

60

64

50

63

40

62

30 Threat Mission

61 60 59

227

20 10 0

1991

2000

2004

Figure 11.1 Terrorism as threat perception and mission assigned.

advanced democracies, it had met with considerable opposition among military professionals due to a number of – all things considered – valid reasons.17 But it is these new events and, especially, the strong and growing participation in PSOs,18 that convince military professionals that conscripted armed forces are no longer suitable, either for taking on this type of mission or for the emerging fight against terrorism. This change of attitude on the part of the military professional is clearly echoed in the research data. Although the percentage of those who feel that the draft ensures a steady exchange of values, opinions and perceptions between society and the armed forces remains high from 1991 to 2004,19 both the percentage of those who feel there is a natural link between democracy and conscription and those who feel conscription is less costly than an all-volunteer force20 fall considerably during the period. The change in these data over the period in question is graphed as well, in Figure 11.2. Also significant is the percentage drop that 80 70

Percentage

60 50 40 30 20

Democracy = conscription

10

Less costly

0 1991

1995

Figure 11.2 Opinions in favour of conscription.

2004

228 Giuseppe Caforio occurred between 1991 and 199521 for those who feel the draft distributes the national defence burden more fairly: from 72 per cent to 44 per cent. Having outlined the main factors of change that act on the military profession, as shown by the available data, let us now take a look at the change of attitudes and values that effectively materialises in the military professional in the period. Here the available research data allow us to examine changes in career choice reasons, in the military ideal-type that the interviewees have in mind, and in their estimation of the profession’s social prestige. With regard to the first question, professional choice due to a specific interest in military matters and to a desire to command remain high in the period; the desire for adventure and the desire to serve one’s country both rise steadily; and career choices linked to the education opportunities offered by the military and to an interest of a technological nature in the instrumentation and equipment used in the military decline just as noticeably. Choices related to the profession’s ethical values and those motivated by job security remain constant, but at a less-significant level. The trends during the period of the most interesting reasons for choice are shown in Figure 11.3. Substantially, what seems to change in the examined period is the profession’s appeal, at least for some of its aspects. If being an officer still came across as a somewhat bureaucratised job in 1991, with good possibilities of professional training, access to advanced technologies and job security, in 2000 it gives more room to adventure, as well as to ethical and patriotic motivations. 60

Adventuring Serving Military interest Education Technology

50

Percentage

40

30

20

10

0 1991

1995

2000

Figure 11.3 Trend of reasons for choosing a career as an officer.

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Although there is a rather immediate and evident reason for the upswing in the desire for adventure – namely the exponential growth of PSOs, often with deployments out-of-area and overseas – the increase of the reason of serving one’s country appears to be more mediated. It appears to be related to the multinational nature of the PSOs carried out in the 1990s, where constant comparison with contingents from other countries seems – also on the basis of other indicators – to have increased the nationalistic spirit already proper to military professionals.22 The ideal-type of the officer was determined by selecting the human and professional qualities that the respondents felt should characterise the military professional. Asked to choose from a set of 18 different qualities, the interviewees confirm, in all the surveys examined here, a core of essential qualities for the profession that includes, in the top spots, the ability to lead, professional expertise, discipline, a sense of responsibility, determination and patriotism. Ranked at a slightly lower level, but still confirmed over time, is a second group of traits such as mental openness, the spirit of sacrifice, initiative and physical appearance. Unlike what one might have expected, obedience does not number among the most prized qualities, ranking outside the top ten in all four surveys. For the difficult choices, the modern officer of the surveyed countries thus seems to rely more on his or her own sense of responsibility and the spirit of discipline – understood, probably, as mental discipline – than on passive obedience to superiors’ orders. As already stated, the trend over the period, depicted graphically in Figure 11.4, confirms the core essential qualities as determined above. Of these, the spirit of discipline rises appreciably, while a sense of responsibility or determination fall somewhat. The other characteristics are more or less stationary, with a constant pre-eminence of leadership. Among the qualities in the second group, not included in the graph, there is an increased appreciation for mental openness and an ability to take initiative. 12

Percentage

10

Leadership Responsibility

8

Expertise

6

Discipline

4

Determination Patriotism

2 0 1991

1995

2000

2004

Figure 11.4 Main qualities of the “good officer”. Note “Expertise” was not included in the list of qualities in the 2004 survey.

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In short, it does not appear that the changes that occurred in the period, though significant, are reflected in the ideal-type of the officer cultivated by the military professional, unlike what happened with the reasons for professional choice. This implies that the professional identity perceived by the interviewees remains the same as ever, even in the different contexts and with partially changed functions and tasks. This would seem to confirm various judgements asserting that the fundamental ethical and educational core of the military must remain the same, even in the presence of the changes mentioned earlier. At bottom, it is what UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was already saying (in the 1950s) when, referring to peacekeeping, he observed, “It is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it” (Moskos, 1976). As for the social origins of the members of the military profession, here identified through the father’s occupation, we find a tendency to endo-recruitment (sons of officers and NCOs especially: percentages ranging from 12 per cent to 30 per cent depending on the country) that is always appreciable but shows a slight downward trend over the examined period. Another interesting internal aspect of the profession that seems to be influenced by the ongoing process of change is the sociocultural extraction of officers. Harries-Jenkins (1990: 119) points out in this regard that it is possible that the military profession is subject to a process of proletarianisation. The data on the paternal occupation of officers and their trend in the period seem to confirm this tendency. But what the research data point up especially is that a hypothesis of proletarianisation does not constitute a mere statistical curiosity: both the career choices and the cultural model of the officer (as seen above) – in addition, naturally, to the reasons for professional choice – show that they are influenced by the individual’s social origin. The interviewees’ perceived image of the profession does not display sizeable variations in the period 1991–5, while it varies considerably in the subsequent one, 1995–2004. The interviewed officers in this last year seem to have a social image of their profession that is less positive overall than in the preceding period, as shown in the graph in Figure 11.5. This datum is probably in need of further confirmation because polls conducted on public opinion in general in the countries concerned show an opposing trend for this perception.23 The interviewees’ satisfaction with the professional activity carried out appears to remain quite high (averaging over 70 per cent), and the decline in perceived social prestige does not seem in any way correlated to reasons of professional dissatisfaction. In the first place, every possible correlation is excluded by a comparison between the two variables, and then, looking for comparison at the data on dissatisfaction, this item declines during in the period from 11 per cent to 5.2 per cent.

Future trends A good starting point for identifying some possible trends of the military profession is to listen to the opinions expressed in this regard by the officers inter-

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35

Percentage

30 25

1991

20 15

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10

2004

5 4

5

6

7

ne ga tiv e)

3

(v er y

2

8

1

(v er y

po si tiv e)

0

Figure 11.5 Perceived social image of the military profession.

viewed in the researches, with particular reference to the 2001 survey (Caforio, 2001), which was specifically aimed at probing the views on professional preparation of officers who had participated in missions that came under the heading “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW).24 A common datum, regarding over 70 per cent of the interviewees, is that the preparation given to them by their training institutes is no longer adequate for the array of missions that the officer is called upon to carry out today. One interesting aspect of this datum is that it cuts across all the ranks involved in the research (from lieutenant to colonel), i.e. it applies to educational processes that have changed over time. What is more, the percentage of those dissatisfied with this basic preparation increases in parallel with the number of months that the officer spent on MOOTW: it is not, that is, a reaction to a first impact with missions of this kind but a datum that consolidates with experience. The shortcomings in professional preparation are prevalently perceived to be in the sector of the behavioural sciences, including foreign languages. They are manifested particularly in: 1

2

Understanding people, i.e., to interact effectively with the local actors present on the territory (the civilian population, local political and religious authorities, factions in conflict), but also with the international actors in the field (officials representing the UN, the WEU, NATO, etc., as well as members of NGOs). To fulfil this requirement, a basic education is needed that provides better grounding in intercultural management techniques, social communication techniques, languages, international relations, history, religions, sociology and cultural anthropology. Knowing the moods of one’s soldiers, i.e. to cope with the problems and psychological stresses that deployment in, and carrying out, these kinds of

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Giuseppe Caforio operations often generates in soldiers: the greater knowledge deemed necessary here is mostly in the area of sociology and psychology. Knowing the rules that relate to the whole network of official and unofficial relations that a unit commander has to manage in relation to the other social actors present locally: here, greater knowledge of international law and politics is requested most, but also of NATO procedures, military regulations and administrative rules.

The necessity of coping with these needs, which are largely new (at least for their extension), together with that of preparing the military professional for combat command in any event, has led to a series of far-reaching and significant changes in the programmes of the training institutes, as well as in the organisation and duration of the courses. This is a general datum that emerges from analysis of the training procedures of all the democratic countries that were the focus of our researches. Indeed, we see that, prior to the 1990s, the military professional’s basic training appeared to be characterised, nearly everywhere,25 by a kind of self-sufficiency, and isolation with respect to the national education system. The isolation was formal (separate regulations), institutional (little cooperation between military academies and civilian universities) and educational (little permeability between the two sets of institutions: only occasionally were cadets able to study in civilian universities and civilian students at military academies, and only for a few roles). The change, which began in the 1990s and is still ongoing,26 appears to be headed in two directions: the first tends to bring the military professional’s education process progressively closer to the national education system: comparability of programmes, equivalency of diplomas, uniformity of regulations and sharing of teachers are the most common elements. The second direction of change is aimed at expanding the general preparation, especially of officers,27 and this is achieved both through a longer duration of the basic programme (which tends to increase from four years to five) and through the implementation of life-long learning at various career levels, which makes it possible to postpone some military studies28 that have had to be eliminated from the basic education to make room for new university subjects. The widespread dissatisfaction with the basic preparation shown by the officers interviewed in 2001, when these changes were already largely in progress,29 demonstrates that updating the basic preparation is struggling to keep pace with the needs of the military profession in practice, which are often new and in any case quite differentiated. This is a situation that is likely to continue, at least in the medium term, leading also to the new problem of preparation that is differentiated, at least in part, within the same armed force according to officer seniority. This once again poses the question, already put forward in the literature, of whether the future military professional should become a “jack of all trades” or if the officer corps should be fragmented and divided among different specialisations, according to the old prediction of a segmented profession. At present it seems that the prevalent choice in the most advanced armies is a

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compromise between the two: the preparation of the officer with command functions is broadened and deepened – also during his career – flanking him with professionals (often but not always military) specialised in particular sectors. Finally, regarding predictions on the future developments of the profession, the 2004 survey enables us to report some recent opinion data on future officers, the great majority of whom feel their country’s military commitment is likely to increase in the medium term, with a consequent substantial increase in the financial resources devoted to the sector: 84 per cent of the sample holds this view, with 50 per cent expecting the growth to be considerable. Interestingly, a parallel survey conducted on the future civilian elites of the same countries – represented by a broad sample of university students – leads to similar results, even if the numbers are somewhat different: 48.5 per cent of these students feel that military budgets are destined to rise, against 27.7 per cent who think they will stay the same. Although giving adequate importance to PSOs, the future officers feel, with a majority of 86.4 per cent, that the military should be prepared to cover the whole spectrum of possible missions, war included. From the indicators cited here – and also from others – it appears that the importance and the role of the military profession is destined to expand, at least in the medium term, in response to increased perceptions of a national security threat, clearly attested to by the generalised expectation of a necessary increase in military expenditures, expenditures that, in themselves, have always been considered unpopular. The picture that emerges, therefore, is of a development of the military profession – inclusive of the two categories, officers and NCOs – oriented towards expanding the professional training, both basic and subsequent, and, probably, towards partial segmentation into sectors of specialisation. The military profession appears to be moving towards more and more interaction with the various sectors of organised society, both national and supranational, taking on increased importance in the configuration and development of society itself, at least in the medium term. This makes the issue of political control over the instrument managed by these professionals, the armed forces, even more acute. The spectre of war – or at least of a diffuse international conflict situation – has thus pushed to the fore in the new millennium, making hopes of an end of history (Fukuyama, 1989) and a peace dividend (Tonelson, 1989) disappear. In such a situation, a profession defined as “management of organised violence” cannot but find new importance and significance and, for what interests us here, new interest for study.

Notes 1 Thereby harking back to Talcott Parsons’ thesis that the professions have become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies (Parsons, 1939: 457). 2 Also because, at the time to which we refer here, the literature on the figure of the non-commissioned officer is nearly non-existent.

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3 For a more detailed account of the debate on the military profession in those years, the reader is referred to a study of mine from the same period (Caforio, 1991). 4 Prandstraller (1997). We have also to cite that the term “professionals” was and is used to indicate soldiers members of an all-volunteer force too. As Patrick Mileham, for instance, writes (2003): “for several years the British Army was promoted as ‘The Professionals’, the implicit message being that the Army was a serious and responsible institution and that the term embraced all its members, not just commissioned officers”. 5 We can recall here, without pretending to be exhaustive, the creation of the Russian Academy of St Petersburg (1723), the Regia Accademia di Artiglieria e Genio in Turin (1726), the Prussian War Academy (1756) and the Ecole Militaire de Paris on the heels of the French defeat at Rossbach, followed by the Royal Military College Sandhurst, the French Military School of Saint-Cyr, and the United States Military Academy at West Point (all between 1799 and 1802). 6 A precondition for the birth of a profession, according to Teitler, who states: “I may affirm that the professional approach to problems is wholly dependent on the possibility of being able to tackle these problems on a standard basis – to recognise and to assess them – and to apply cut and dried standard solutions” (Teitler, 1977: 12). 7 Also powerfully at work here is the social prejudice that says soldiering is ingrained in the nobleman from birth and therefore he does not need to “go to school” to learn it. 8 The creation of the war schools in Europe dates from those years: in France the Ecole d’Application d’Etat-Major (1819), in Great Britain the Camberley Staff College (1858), in Italy the Scuola Superiore di Guerra in Turin (1867). 9 See, for example, Badaracco (2002) and Keegan (1989). 10 Currently leadership courses are included in the training process for army officers in all the developed countries. In some of them (such as Canada) there are actual military schools specialised in the sector. 11 See below (p. 231) on the educational shortcomings bemoaned by officers deployed in new missions. 12 See Samuel Huntington (1957), but the phrase was taken up by many others after him. 13 General André Beaufre, “Officier pour quel office?”, Le Figaro, 3–4 June 1971. 14 Such as, to cite only the most important, the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Geneva. 15 The cross-national surveys referred to go from 1991 to 2004; the related data have all been published. The surveys were carried out in the years: 1991/2 (eight participating countries, 4,659 cases, published in Caforio, 1994); 1995/6 (ten participating countries, 2,959 cases, published in Caforio, 1998); 1999/2000 (six participating countries, 873 cases, published in Manigart and Jelusic, 2001); 2000/1 (nine participating countries, 416 cases, published in Caforio, 2001); 2004 (13 participating countries, 1,327 cases, in press, Caforio, 2007). 16 France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland. However, almost all the remaining countries – namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA – have participated in at least two of the five surveys carried out, thus making it possible to test the changes over time. 17 It is one thing when citizens are direct, personal participants in the military, another when this function is delegated to a restricted group of professionals. The disappearance of the duty of every male citizen to devote part of his life to military service is not only a technical–organisational passage, but a significant political and social one whose consequences on the relations between civil society and armed forces can be summed up in the statement that it leads to a demilitarisation of society and to a remilitarisation of the military, at least in some of its components (Haltiner, 1998).

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18

19 20

21 22

23 24 25 26

27 28

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The decline of conscription significantly reduces the sectors of society involved in defence: at the level of public opinion, the number of citizens who have had personal experience of the military becomes less and less, but also among the national elites, both political and non-political, members of parliament, government leaders, opinion leaders and opinion makers with direct experience of military life nearly disappear. One must bear in mind here the exponential growth of the number of peacekeeping missions from the 1980s to 2000 and beyond, missions that have become an important (at times preponderant) part of the commitment of national armed forces. To report one datum, albeit partial, just the PSOs under UN auspices rose from 16 at the start of the 1980s to 90 in 2000. Here the motivations mentioned in Note 17 are at work. The question posed took into account the global cost of conscription, in not only monetary terms. It was formulated as follows: “Looking at the whole national economy, does conscription cause more costs than AVF, because of the waste of human resources?” The item was not reproposed in the later surveys. It may be interesting to note in this regard that the data from European research (1991/2, see note 15) show that a common defence identity is struggling to emerge among European officers. The ethical reference of the officers of the European countries examined remains fully national and the strategic thinking appears to be more oriented towards national interests than European ones (see Caforio, 1994). Which for several countries is explained by the greater visibility that PSOs have given to the military. Which include primarily PSOs and then a series of other missions such as providing disaster relief, controlling mass immigration and combating drug trafficking. With the partial exception of Germany. Although common to all of the examined countries, the process begins and unfolds at different times in each one, so that the movement that brings the military academies closer to the civilian universities creates a procession of countries with, for example, Germany, Slovenia and Switzerland in the lead and Bulgaria and Poland bringing up the rear (the situation in 2000). But also the preparation of NCOs receives much more attention today: see the setting up, in several countries now, of NCO schools that lead to a first-level university degree. Considering that, as Marina Nuciari wrote in 2001, and as confirmed by the most recent international events: The professional military culture still exists in its “conventional” features, since everywhere the primary purpose of armed forces remains the preparation and conduct of war, and the idea of a warless society seems to be pertinent more to the “heaven of ideas” than to political reality. (Nuciari, 2001: 61–2)

29 Bearing in mind that only the officers with the rank of lieutenant or, at the most, captain could have been trained according to the new orientations.

Bibliography Badaracco, Joseph (2002) Beyond Heroic Moral Leadership: Conversations on Leadership, 2000–2001, London, Center for Public Leadership. Boene, Bernard (1990) “How ‘unique’ should the military be? A review of representative literature and outline of a synthetic formulation”, European Journal of Sociology, 31: 3–59. Bustamante, Fernando (1991) “Consideraciones sobre algunos factores relevantes en la

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profesionalización militar en cuatro paises latinoamericanos”, FLACSO-Chile, Serie Relaciones internacionales y Politica Exterior, No. 2, 322.5 B968. Caforio, Giuseppe (1991) “The state of studies of the military professions”, in J. Kuhlmann and C. Dandeker (eds) Stress and Change in the Military Profession Today, Munich, SOWI, pp. 21–74. Caforio, Giuseppe (1994) “The military profession in Europe”, Current Sociology, 42 (3), Winter, monographic issue. Caforio, Giuseppe (ed.) (1998) The European Cadet: Professional Socialisation in Military Academies, Baden-Baden, Nomos. Caforio, Giuseppe (ed.) (2001) The Flexible Officer, Gaeta, Artistic & Publishing Company. Caforio, Giuseppe (ed.) (2007) Cultural Differences Between the Military and the Parent Society, forthcoming. Deagle, Edwin (1973) “Contemporary professionalism and future military leadership”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 406: 162–70. Downes, Cathy (1985) “To be or not to be a profession: the military case”, Defence Analysis, 3: 147–71. Etzioni, Amitai (1969) The Semi-Professions and their Organization: Teachers, Nurses, Social Workers, New York, The Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis (1989) “The End of History”, The National Interest, 16: 3–18. Gooch, John (1988) “La professione militare in europa dall’eta’ napoleonica alla II guerra mondiale” (“The military profession in Europe from the Napoleonic age to World War II”), in G. Caforio and P. Del Negro (eds) Ufficiali e Società: Interpretazioni e modelli, Franco Angeli, pp. 47–64. Greenwood, Ernest (1957) “Attributes of a profession”, Social Work, 2: 44–55. Haltiner, Karl (1998) “The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?”, Armed Forces & Society, 25 (1): 7–36. Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn (1975) “Professionals in organisations”, in J.A. Jackson (ed.) Professions and Professionalisation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 51–103. Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn (1990) “The concept of military professionalism”, Defence Analysis, 2: 117–30. Huntington, Samuel (1957) The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Janowitz, Morris (1960) The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait, New York, Free Press. Jordan, Amos A. and Taylor, William J. (1973) “The military man in academia”, Annals, 406: 129–45. Keegan, John (1989) The Mask of Command, New York, Penguin. Kourvetaris, George and Dobratz, Betty (1977) World Perspectives in the Sociology of the Military, New Brunswick, Transaction Books. Manigart, Philippe and Ljubica, Jelusic (2001) European Defence Restructuring: Military and Public View, Luxembourg, European Communities. Mileham, Patrick (2003) “Professional armed forces: concepts and practices”, in T. McConville and R. Holmes (eds) Defence Management in Uncertain Times, London, Frank Cass. Moskos, Charles (1973) “The emergent military: civil, traditional or plural?”, Pacific Sociological Review, 16: 255–80. Moskos, Charles (1976) Peace Soldiers: the Sociology of a United Nations Military Force, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press.

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Moskos, Charles (1977) “The all volunteer military: calling, profession or occupation?”, Parameters, 7: 2–9. Moskos, Charles (1986) “Institutional and occupational trends in armed forces: an update”, Armed Forces and Society, 12 (3): 377–82. Nuciari, Marina (2001) “Officers education for MOOTWs: a comparative research on military and civilian agencies’ problematic relationships”, in G. Caforio (ed.) The Flexible Officer, Gaeta, Artistic and Publishing Company, pp. 61–88. Nuciari, Marina and Caforio, Giuseppe (2006) “Perché i soldati si fanno uccidere. Le motivazioni degli ufficiali italiani”, in G. Rochat and N. Labanca (eds) Perché i soldati si fanno uccidere?, forthcoming. Parsons, Talcott (1939) “The professions and social structure”, Social Forces, 17: 457–67. Prandstraller, Giampaolo (1997) Guardare alle professioni, Milan, Franco Angeli. Teitler, Gerke (1977) The Genesis of the Professional Officers’ Corps, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications. Tonelson, Alan (1989) “The end of internationalism?”, The New Republic, 13 February. Van Doorn, Jacques (1965) “The officer corps: a fusion of profession and organization”, European Journal of Sociology, 6: 262–82. Whitehead, Alfred N. (1933) Adventures of Ideas, New York, News American. Whitehead, Alfred N. (1961) Adventures of Ideas, New York, Macmillan.

12 Women soldiers in a transcultural perspective Marina Nuciari

Introduction This chapter deals with the vexed question of female integration into military forces. To explain the trend leading to the entry of female personnel within armed forces, an interdisciplinary viewpoint is unavoidable, since the topic itself calls for more than a single-discipline approach. To a certain extent, a Durkheimian view will be followed in this chapter, considering that, on the one side, many human sciences can apply to the topic of female participation in military affairs, and that, on the other side, an overall sociological outlook can give the necessary unifying vision to it. Among the disciplines actually having something to say about our topic, sociology, history, political economy, psychology, cultural anthropology, juridical science, gender studies, organisational science and political science are involved to a minor or major extent, and it would be nonsense to give here a review of existing contributions in each discipline to the study of our topic. On the contrary, several disciplines’ outcomes are employed by many scholars dealing with the issue of women and the military, and this is evident when analysing some major contribution to the topic. It is evident, in fact, that when trying to say something more than a mere description of the phenomenon and its various trends, factors and concepts from all the abovementioned disciplines are inevitably recalled. This position will be clarified using some theoretical models created and proposed by different scholars, either for the specific topic of women’s position in the military or for the general societal change process; these models will be progressively interconnected in order to reach a general theoretical explanation of the variety and diversity characterising the process of women and armed forces relationships.

Theories of societal change: economic, political and cultural development and their application to women’s integration in the armed forces As an introduction to the main steps followed in this chapter, we can use Mady Segal’s (1995) model of female–military relationships as a departure point. The model, in its first version, was formed by many different variables, defined by

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Segal as structural, military and cultural variables, which refer to and use economic, psychological, historical, juridical, technological, anthropological as well as organisational elements. The model has recently been redefined and enlarged in order to better include other countries’ experiences (Iskra et al., 2002), adding some political variables referring to a political-science approach. A first general model of the women–military relationship According to Segal, the main factors affecting the changing role of women in the armed forces can be grouped into three sets of variables, each of them defining a specific dimension: a military dimension, a sociostructural dimension and a cultural dimension (Segal, 1995). Military variables are considered in a wide sense, and include the national security situation, the kind and level of military technology, the combat-to-support-function ratio, the structure of forces and the policies driving accession to the military. Social structure variables include a country’s demographic pattern, characteristics of the labour force (women’s participation in the labour force and occupational gender segregation), the state of the civilian economy (expansion or depression), the structure of the family (average age of marriage and maternity, role responsibilities sharing). Cultural variables such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family, social values underlining the above definitions, public discourse about gender and gender equality, values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity. A modified and enlarged version of the model has been presented recently, where political variables such as national security situation, civil–military relations, political ideology, current leadership policies, public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc., are added. Each set of variables provides positive and/or negative effects on women’s entry into the armed forces, and this variance is considered under an historical point-ofview as well as with a socio-economic change approach. What is valuable in this model, already in its early presentation and even more in this last version, is the fact that it shows the inevitable interaction among many different levels and sectors of human reality where phenomena must be observed in order to understand a specific object: in this case, the object is the access of women in a social subsystem, the military, where gender-role distinction receives its absolute expression. Armed forces have been traditionally defined as all-male societies; a strict link, even a sort of identification, has always been recognised between masculinity and the practice of war; aggressiveness expressed in humanity’s inclination to combat has long been associated as a typical masculine personality trait. We could say that the phenomenon of women in the military, considered in its current configuration, cannot be approached or understood without paying attention to, in principle at least, all fields where human action manifests itself, and this is correct because it touches a perpetual topic of the human condition. This is why I believe above that to explain the trend leading to the entry of female personnel into armed forces, an interdisciplinary viewpoint is unavoidable.

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The latest version of Segal’s model provides a first attempt to reconcile different levels of analysis, where many specific bulks of knowledge must be considered in the analysis of a single social phenomenon. Its applicability seems, at first, to be slight rather universal, since the possible variety of empirical results can arise from the ‘simple diversity’ of each empirical case. For a synchronic point of view, the model can be applied to different countries, where a diachronic dimension is given when considering each case in its historical and social change dimension. A different point of view arises when a cross-cultural approach is needed: if the women–military relationship is considered from a comparative perspective, then a question arises about what makes the same set of variables play together in so many various ways, especially when societies under comparison are rather similar in a wide variety of traits, as well as belonging to the same geographic area. A good example of cross-cultural comparison between many countries where the position of women in the military has been analysed is the group of countries belonging to NATO, and a large part of our discussion will be based on the observation of NATO countries.1 Here differences are currently great, even though some similarities result from proximity, mutual adaptation across time, general social and political processes, and proactive actions bound to adopt, stepby-step, similar policies. Then the answer to the question could be found in trying to assess if some of the four types of variables in the model could have a different weight or function in the determination of situations and progressive changes. I have already had the opportunity to raise this question before, observing that at an attentive analysis of Segal’s discussion, the cultural dimension appears to be crucial, since it appears always at the background and beside every change in the other three dimensions (Nuciari, 2002). The social construction of gender, both feminine and masculine, is culturally determined, and it changes within the same culture across time, but also according to different cultures. The change in cultural values about women’s social roles is linked also to changes in the definition of family roles, so that the move away from traditional conceptions of family and family duties, and the growing supportive policies outside the family, permit a greater participation of women in military activities. Even demographic restrictions can be influenced by changes in the conception of gender and a consequential opening of labour markets to women, thus this last set of cultural variables seems to have a major causation capacity. A cultural approach is then needed, and social change as a general process has to be considered. Thus, it is my opinion that it is necessary to distinguish between: 1 2

the opening to women of military roles per se, and the widening of gender integration in the armed forces (that is, the progressive accessibility for women to every military role, direct support to combat and true combat roles included).

For the mere entry of female personnel in the military, the main cause is linked to social change, and especially to economic and social develop-

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ment, in Western societies and in many non-Western countries, over the last century; economic and technological change have specific impact over military organisations. Value change, on the other side, provides a better explanation to the second phenomenon. Social policies to improve female participation and career advancement in the armed forces can help, but they cannot stand alone if the general culture of a society does not change in order to support a different definition of male and female social roles, and of family roles as well.2 Since the change in social values means a change in a crucial part of the general culture, this is the sense I give to the statement according to which culture matters – including for women in the military.3 An index of female soldiers’ integration

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

Ita

l Po y la G n er d m an G y re ec Tu e r H ke C ze un y ga ch ry R Lu ep u xe b m lic bo u Fr rg an Po ce rtu ga Sp l U ni Be ain te d lgiu K m N ingd et he om rla nd s N U o ni te rwa d y St at D en es m a C rk an ad a

Score

From a different perspective, by putting together a similar but not identical number of variables, Helena Carreiras (2002) proposed an integration index of women in the military. From an analysis of this, she argues that servicewomen integration is not a unilinear process at all, in the sense that it does not seem to be linked to time or to the increasing number of women in the ranks; a distinction has to be made, on the contrary, between those factors that concern women’s ‘simple presence’ in the system and those referring to women’s ‘qualified’ presence. Carreiras’ index can also be used to sustain the cultural hypotheses mentioned above, as demonstrated in her essay cited above. In her research, Carreiras has plotted together data from 18 NATO countries, for each one of them the integration index has been calculated, thus giving rise to a cross-cultural image of the level of integration of women in each country is military. The strength of this effort is really in its capacity to provide not only a measure for integration, but also the possibility of comparing different situations. By making use of this possibility, as Figure 12.1. shows, differences are

Figure 12.1 Index of women’s military integration in NATO countries (2000 data). (0  lower integration; 20  higher integration) (source: Carreiras, 2002, Figure 7).

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relevant, and call for some explanatory reasons, since we deal here with countries belonging to an institutional alliance such as NATO! Different indicators have been chosen to build the index, including organisational structure and organisational policy indicators.4 Table 12.1 shows how the index has been formed. In Carreiras’ words: Structural variables refer to the overall representation of women in active duty forces (1), occupational sex segregation (3) and rank distribution (5). These indicators are usually considered of major importance to determine the extent of women’s roles in the military. The impact of related policies is also captured through the inclusion of indicators pertaining to the existence of segregation practices (6), and presence or absence of formal limitations in occupational (2) and hierarchical terms (4). Hence, beyond the question of relative numbers, other dimensions of the integration process are included that concern respectively the structure of opportunities and power distribution. This is why, together, these indicators contribute with more than 70% to the indexes’ overall weight. Finally, the index includes two additional indicators relative to existing programs or policies aimed at confronting erosion factors, such as those derived from the difficult conciliation between family and a military occupation (6) or sexual harassment and gender equity monitoring (7). Since it has been recognised that these factors have a strong impact over integration processes, attention given by policymakers to ‘quality-of-life’ areas should be taken as important elements for the qualification of women’s presence in the military.5 Table 12.1 Index of women’s military integration in NATO (IWMI) (2000) Variable (weight)

Indicator

Measurement

1 Global representation (3)

1 Percentage of women in total active force

0  0–2%; 1  2–5%; 2  5–10%; 3  10%

2 Occupational integration (6) 2 Formal functional restrictions 3 Percentage in traditional functions

0  total; 1  many; 2  few; 3  none 0  90–100%; 1  66–89%; 250–66%; 3less than 50%

3 Hierarchical integration (6) 4 Formal rank restrictions 0  total; 1  partial; 2  none 5 Percentage in officers 0  0–1%; 1  1–5%; ranks 2  5–10%; 3  10% 0  total; 1  partial; 2  none

4 Training segregation (2)

6 Segregation in basic training

5 Social policies (6)

7 Family programmes 0  no; 3  yes 8 Harassment and gender 0  no; 3  yes equity monitoring

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By applying the index to the situation of the various NATO countries where data were available, a general assessment of female integration within the military is given in Figure 12.1. Looking at the graph, the relative positions of the 18 countries presents a high variety, but nevertheless, the curve can be split into three portions: from 0 to 8 points (rather low integration), from 9 to 14 points (medium integration) and from 15 to 20 (high integration). Countries belonging to each portion can be considered to be part of the same cluster, which can be named as follows: an English-speaking or Anglo-Saxon countries cluster (USA, UK and Canada); a North-Europe cluster of countries (Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium); a Central–South Europe cluster (Germany, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy); and an East-Europe cluster of countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland). The East-Europe cluster, with Turkey and half of the South-Europe cluster (Italy and Greece), belong to the lower integration portion; the second half of the South-Europe cluster (Spain, Portugal), along with part of the North-Central Europe cluster (France and Luxembourg) occupy the central (mid-integration) position; the higherintegration portion is formed by the North-Europe cluster and English-speaking countries cluster (Belgium, UK, Netherlands, Norway, USA, Denmark and Canada). Even though some relative positions could be affected by recent changes in restriction and numerical presence (Carreiras’ data, at best, refer to the 2002 situation), nevertheless results are rather sharp, and encourage the following question: is there any common factor explaining this high variety? Among the possible explanations, time, the organisational format of the military, the personnel accession policies are the most frequently addressed, some of them also sustained by theoretical assumptions. Carreiras’ efforts do not sustain the explicative capacity of time (integration does not seem to increase with time), while the organisational format (conscription or AVF) has an effect over female presence, ‘but does not seem to have the same influence on overall integration’.6 Personnel accession policies, on the other hand, could be considered as a mirror of the socio-political and economic situation of a country, where legal rules and opportunities applied to every citizen in the labour market are signals of the overall integration of women in a given society. Socio-cultural aspects, then, such as values and gender-related issues, are at stake. Similarity and diversity within countries: explanations from social change and development theories The above observations can be summarised in the two following propositions: •

The entry of women in the military is driven mainly by structural and military variables (as defined by Mady Segal, 1995); these variables are strongly affected by socio-economic change.

244 •

Marina Nuciari Women soldiers’ integration is driven by cultural variables, such as the social construction of the notions of gender and family, social values underlining gender and family definitions, public discourse about gender and gender equality, values concerning the ascriptive definition of social roles and the question of equity.

As far as the first proposition is concerned, socio-economic change has had a strong impact on military organisations, and it was the cause of the well-known process of ‘civilianisation’, defined and described by Janowitz in the early 1960s, and became a common prominent trait in every contemporary Western (and some non-Western) armed forces. With civilianisation, many technical roles are aligned with roles in big civilian corporations; there is an increase of highly bureaucratic roles and of scientific–technological and managerial content roles as well. The organisational structure becomes similar to that of a civilian administration, and the professional practice, expected to remain essentially peaceful, removes the perception of activities in the military as intrinsically combat related. Such a process, in my opinion, progressively reduces impermeability of military roles with respect to women: women, in fact, are already accepted in parallel roles within civilian society. The process of civilianisation goes along with female emancipation and progressive integration in every occupation and profession within Western societies, and it makes possible the opening of professional roles to women in the armed forces even in the absence of national emergencies or demographic shortages. To a certain extent, it is no longer possible to keep the armed forces as a world apart. The second point stresses the role of culture: since women usually enter the military in a segregated way or with relevant limitations, the level and scope of these limitations are strongly affected by culture, and by cultural change in particular: when career opportunities are at stake, when selective criteria for advancement become more subjective, then discrimination and segregation can remain untouched if social values (that is, culture) about gender remain more or less untouched as well. As I have stated above and elsewhere (Nuciari, 2002), values change – including the prevailing of value orientations based on universalistic principles combined with the so-called principle of achievement (as opposed to the traditional ascription principle) as well as of equity-based reasoning as far as citizenship rights and duties entitlement based on gender are concerned – which provides a better explanation of growing gender integration in the armed forces (that is, the progressive accessibility for women to every military role, direct support to combat and true combat roles included), than to the opening to women of military roles per se. The simple presence of women in the armed forces in the various countries can be found historically, in various forms, mainly peripheral to the military core roles, and without any intention towards gender integration. In the first half of twentieth century, Women’s Corps in the UK, Canada or USA, as in many other Western and non-Western countries, are examples of a certain recognition of women’s capacity to serve in case of emer-

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gency (war mobilisation), but where segregation was the rule. In this respect, in fact, all historical accounts about women and the armed forces begin with statements such as ‘women have always participated in military forces’, or recall occasions and situations where women’s contribution was worthy of recognition. But it is an entirely different phenomenon when female soldiers are considered to be members of an organisation where roles and tasks are assigned without distinction in terms of gender. This is a very recent occurrence, and rather rare in its accomplishment, but it can be considered as the final point of a sort of developmental process where the starting point is the possibility given to women to serve in the military organisation in some peripheral – but necessary – roles, such as nurses, or even drivers or administrative personnel. From simple presence to full integration, a long road has to be run, along which transitional situations are the rule, and variety a persistent trait. Considering women’s integration in the military as a developmental process could mean imagining a linear change going through steps, a path recalling a somewhat traditional vision of social and economic change (Rostow, 1961), where every change is inevitably driven by social forces so that any society will follow a similar path. Modernisation theorists, from classic evolutionism and Marxist tradition to contemporary scholars such as Daniel Bell (1973, 1976) and many others, have stated that the rise of industrial society has meant a break with past ‘traditional’ societies, and that this discontinuity is the mark of the modern society in a general and all-embracing sense. With major or minor emphasis, economic determinism is present in virtually all modernisation theories, in the sense that a certain type of social assessment must contain a given variety of elements, and this is obtained by a sort of social necessity by means of which economic, social, political and cultural institutions are pushed to change and to adjust one another in given geometries. Convergence theorists in the economic field (Kerr et al., 1960), and even globalisation theorists from positive as well as negative sides (Omahe, 1993; Stiglitz, 2002) do reflect this conviction about a general trend to a shared model of society, driven by the diffusion of the industrial system of production. On the other side, however, differences in development level as well as in institutional assessment are considered under a comparative viewpoint and explained by means of cultural differences. Emphasis on culture is now predominant in many analyses of economic, social and political change, and this outlook can also be a great help in the study of the women–military relationship. Bearing in mind the distinction between ‘simple presence’ and ‘integration’, in this chapter the position of female soldiers in the various countries is analysed as part of the general process of socio-cultural change, following the traditional–modern–postmodern trend proposed by Inglehart’s works (1997 and 2004). But this position can have different meanings according to different cultures. According to Inglehart’s results, the modernisation process seems to be conditioned by cultural legacies and by religious traditions in a way that gives rise to many different paths to social change, even when the level of economic development is similar amongst nations.

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Moreover, some rather obvious observations have to be pointed out: that cultures differ from one another, that gender is a social definition and that gender relations are culturally defined. In a changing and dynamic situation, however, national cultures are subjected to changes, and in a globalised condition these changes can help to reduce cultural differences; and these differences are not unlimited, but, on the contrary, they can be measured according to a definite and limited number of indices. In a transcultural perspective, cultural diversity can be compared according to the five cultural dimensions model proposed by Geert Hofstede in 1980. In the following paragraphs we shall try to explain the above assumptions according to the following steps: •

•

• •

National cultures can be grouped in various clusters according to some general dimensions, and two research-based types of cultural mapping will be here recalled, from Inglehart’s and Hofstede’s works respectively. Countries can be ranged in a Gender Equality Scale (GES), measuring the level of gender gap in a great number of societies, and GES can be considered in the light of the above mentioned cultural maps (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Countries can also be grouped in clusters according to their similarities in the process of female entry and integration in the respective military forces. Clusters according to gender gap can be compared with clusters according to military integration, to test the hypothesis according to which the simple presence of women can be a consequence of socio-economic development, but the path towards integration is culturally dependent.

Modernisation and human development: the role of culture A certain link between socioeconomic development, value change and political democracy has been supposed or taken for granted by many scholars for decades, even though links have been questioned as far as causal variables are concerned: the main question, however, is a classical question making reference to Marx’s theory of socio-economic change on the one side, and to Weber’s explanation of capitalistic industrialisation on the other. A century later, however, we could rely on Dahl’s conclusion when saying that ‘the exact nature of the relationship among socio-economic modernization, democratization and the creation of a democratic culture is almost as puzzling today as it was a quarter-century ago’ (Dahl, 1998: 35). Recently a tentative attempt to demonstrate the existence of a complex syndrome named Human Development (HD) using empirical and wide-range data has been made by Ronald Inglehart and others (Welzel et al., 2003). HD as a theoretical construct is proposed as an integrating framework formed by the three main factors usually used when arguing about societal change and development. These three components are socio-economic development, value change and democracy; their integration gives rise to complex societies where

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economic factors, on the one side, shared values on a second and political institutions on a third side work together to realise what can be considered to be ‘the core principle of modernization’, that is ‘the broadening of human choice’ (Lewis, 1955: 9–19). This concept is taken as central in Inglehart et al.’s tentative attempt to integrate ‘major changes in socio-economic structure, political culture and political institutions’, with Amartya Sen’s approach on human capability; that is, the capability of human beings to choose the lives they want must also be considered (Sen, 2000). Socio-economic development provides individual resources, which Inglehart indicates as the means-component of human choice; cultural change indicates ‘the growing emphasis on self-expression’ as ‘the central motivating factor leading people to demand broader choice, that is, its motives-component; political democracy provides effective rights so that human choice could be exerted, and it is indicated as its rules-component.’ In the author’s words (Welzel et al., 2003: 7): Individual resources, self-expression and effective rights are the three components of Human Development, and represent its means-motives-rules components. These components become increasingly widespread through the process of socio-economic development, cultural change and democratisation respectively. Yet, Human Development is not a teleological concept, in that it does not imply that the three processes go upwards together in a linear direction. This concept goes a step further than the modernisation theory proposed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) (where the impact of cultural zones was shown on self-expression values beyond the effects of economic development), and it indicates that the role of cultural zones is complementary to the playing factors of Human Development. This theory of social change provides us with a general framework where the analysis of female entry and integration in the military can be done using a cross-cultural viewpoint, and by means of an integrated interdisciplinary approach, since it helps to consider at an operative level economic data and theories, social values (cultural) changes, and political structures and processes. By means of Inglehart’s cultural maps, we can compare national situations by considering wider cultural zones, and give to different processes a theoretical ground for interpretation. The cultural map and the cultural clusters of countries The last version of the cultural map presented by Ronald Inglehart et al. in the final round of their World Values Surveys will be used here, which is drawn from the recently published volume, Human Beliefs and Values (2004: 12, 14). In this map (as in the previous ones) a rather stable (even though on the move) set of reciprocal positions are occupied by the 81 countries surveyed, so that a certain

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number of cultural clusters can be distinguished, based on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. These two dimensions, quoting from Inglehart, reflect most of the key values examined in the Values Surveys. Since hundreds of questions were asked in these surveys, it would not be feasible to compare the values of each public on each topic separately. [Here] the orientations of these publics [are compared] on two important dimensions that sum up the cross-national variation on scores of narrower values. These two dimensions tap: 1

2

Traditional authority vs Secular–Rational authority. This dimension is based on a large number of items that reflect emphasis on obedience to traditional authority (usually religious authority), and adherence to family and communal obligations, and norms of sharing; or, on the other hand, a secular worldview in which authority is legitimated by rational–legal norms, linked with an emphasis on economic accumulation and individual achievement. Survival values vs Self-Expression values. This reflects the fact that in post-industrial society, historically unprecedented levels of wealth and the emergence of the welfare states have given rise to a shift from scarcity norms, emphasizing hard work and self-denial, to postmodern values emphasizing the quality of life, emancipation of women and sexual minorities and related Postmaterialist priorities such as emphasis on self-expression. (Inglehart et al., 2004: 11)

A look at the map shows the presence of clusters of countries highly consistent with the groups of countries where analysis on female-soldier integration has been possible using data from Helena Carreiras. They also permit further distinctions to be described later in the chapter. Clusters of countries in the cultural map are defined by Inglehart by means of some cultural traditions, drawn from Huntington’s cultural zones (1994, 1996) and very similar to those already presented in previous rounds of the World Values Survey (1997, 2000); these cultural, rather homogeneous zones are named according to some broad dimensions such as language or geographical position, but mainly according to religious traditions, taken by Inglehart as the true dominant factor able to discriminate between similarities and diversities, thus functioning as a latent assimilatory factor. We have, in fact, an English Speaking group, as well as groups for Protestant Europe, a Catholic Europe, Excommunist countries, Orthodox countries, Confucian countries, South Asian, African and Latin American countries. Each cluster has distinctive characters and positions on the two cultural dimensions shown in the map: For example, the historically Protestant societies tend to rank higher on the Survival/Self-Expression dimension than the historically Roman Catholic societies. Conversely, all of the former communist societies rank relatively

Secular–rational values

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2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0

Traditional values

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

Figure 12.2 Cultural map of 81 societies (source: Inglehart and Welzel, 2004).

low on the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. The historically Orthodox societies form a coherent cluster within the broader ex-communist zone – except for Greece, an Orthodox society that did not experience communist rule, and ranks substantially higher on Self-Expression values than the other communist societies. The Islamic societies fall into two clusters: a larger group containing the mainline Islamic societies (Indonesia, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Egypt) constitutes a relatively compact group in the Southwest quadrant of the map; while the Islamic societies that experienced communist rule (Azerbaijan and Albania) are much more secular than the rest of the Islamic societies. (Ibid.: 15) Cultural traditions are then considered to be affecting the trend described in Inglehart’s first work, from materialism to postmaterialism in Western societies, and subsequent works that demonstrate the existence of a path from Traditional, through Modern to Postmodern society. Thematising the transition as a change from prevailing Survival values and Traditional Authority to prevailing SelfExpression values and Legal–Rational authority, this theory has tried to

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demonstrate the causative capacity of economic development in pushing societies upwards from tradition to postmodernity. The evidence seems to be that the process is not simply nonlinear, but is also not culture-free. Different societies surveyed as different countries do cluster together in groups forming traditional cultural zones, and they maintain similarities within them and differences across them over time. As far as our topic on female integration in the military is related to economic, social and cultural change, a question arises as to whether a typology as such make sense as far as female soldiers are concerned. A formal specification of this last proposition could be the following main hypothesis: socio-economic development is important in determining the entry of women into the military, but culture is even more important in affecting career and true integration by means of effective policies. To this respect, the cultural definition of gender is part of the topic, as we are going to consider later in this chapter. The gender equality scale From the same research programmes, a specific assessment of the gender relationships in the various countries under survey is available where, by means of the same data set, a Gender Equality Scale is built up, by nation, by per capita GDP and by other variables such as age cohort and societal modernisation indicators (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). The scale is intended to measure the attitudes towards gender equality in a given population, by means of several indicators, taking into consideration the fact that women’s emancipation is a multidimensional phenomenon where inconsistencies are possible in different social sectors: Women working in sectors such as education, health, and voluntary organizations, reflecting traditional sex roles of women as caregivers, may encounter fewer barriers than those challenging conventional sexual stereotypes in military, political, and religious institutions. Equal opportunities policies reflecting common classical liberal beliefs may prove more popular than strategies designed to achieve affirmative action, gender parity, or positive discrimination for women. (Inglehart and Norris, 2003: 30–1) The scale is formed by five items taken from the four rounds of the World Values Surveys,7 and the ranking of nations in the Gender Equality Scale ‘provides preliminary support for the proposition that attitudes toward traditional or egalitarian roles for women and men vary systematically according to levels of economic development’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2003: 32). Ranking on a 100-point scale the nations surveyed in 1995–2001, it looks evident that countries ranking as most egalitarian belong to the most affluent quadrant of the cultural map (mean score on the 100-point scale is 80 per cent), the right-upper side where Self-Expression values and Legal–Rational authority

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Percentage disagree: men have U S/ more right to a job C an ad a/ Au s/ N W Z es tE ur op La e tin Am er ic a Ea st Su Eu bro Sa pe ha ra n Af ric a So ut h As ia O th er Is la m ic Ea st As Ar ia ab co un tri es

Support gender equality 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Figure 12.3 Support for gender equality in nine cultural zones (source: Inglehart and Welzel, 2004). Notes Regional groupings Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco; Other Islamic: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Indonesia, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey; Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe; Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom; Eastern Europe: Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia; English-speaking: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA; Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela; East Asia: China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan; South Asia: India, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam.

principal are absolutely dominant, with a certain tendency towards Postmodernity, a condition that Inglehart has called as a process of erosion of institutional authority and the rise of citizen participation in politics and in the society at large. These countries (Finland, Sweden, West Germany, Canada, Norway, Spain, East Germany, New Zealand, United States, Australia) are in their large majority postindustrial societies also in terms of GDP, and are followed by a large number of industrial societies (such as Latin American countries and postcommunist countries) where gender equality is lower, with a mean score of 68; a last group is formed by agrarian societies (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Philippines, Iran, Armenia, Nigeria, Morocco, Egypt, Bangladesh and Jordan) where the mean score on the Gender Equality Scale is around 60 per cent, and many countries score much less. Income and wealth are not considered as the only variables responsible for different levels of gender-equality recognition since, looking at the cultural map, the position of countries can differ in the socio-cultural dimension even when it could be similar as far as GDP is concerned. In Inglehart and Norris’ words:

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Marina Nuciari Religious traditions seem to have an enduring impact on contemporary value systems. . . . Postindustrial societies prove to be the most secular and postmaterialist, but within this group there are distinctions between the Protestant countries of northern Europe and the historically Roman Catholic nations of Western Europe, reflecting the fact that their publics have relatively similar values on political, religious and economic questions, as well as similar attitudes toward gender roles, child rearing and sexual behavior. And the ex-Communist states form another cluster. . . . The publics in Latin American countries also share relatively similar values. The most traditional and materialistic publics live in the Sub-Saharan African countries (Tanzania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Uganda), proving similar to some of the Islamic North African and Middle Eastern nations (e.g. Egypt and Jordan) [. . .] A society’s culture reflects its entire historical heritage, including religious traditions, colonial ties, the experience of Communist rule, and its contemporary level of economic development. Attitudes toward gender equality are central to this much broader and more diffuse process of cultural change. (2003: 156)

This last statement has central relevance for our issue on women’s participation in military organisations, and datasets about cultural zones and gender equality (based on subjective statements of surveyed publics) are both useful to better explain differences among countries where female soldiers are a complex and many-sided reality.

A tentative typology of women–armed forces and culture linkages After some 50 years, women in the armed forces have not yet reached a unique status in every military institution, their status being continuously affected by different paces of change in the various national countries. Their status levels are greatly varied so that it is difficult to trace a uniform picture. What we can do is to take some situation as being pivotal to a specific type, and to describe then a tentative typology of servicewomen and society relationships. Data from CWINF permit the comparison of 18 out of the now 25 countries belonging to NATO, so that it has been possible to cluster the various countries about which coherent and rather systematic data are available according to seven factors, which can then give an idea of the position and integration of servicewomen in the military organisation. These factors are the following: time (year of the legal/formal acceptance of female personnel in military ranks); restrictions as far as roles, functions and specialties are concerned; ceiling, according to which servicewomen are accepted until a given percentage over total force; format of the armed forces, based on draft system or AVF; presence and type of social policies, family policies and proactive attitudes in order to facilitate

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recruitment and retention of female personnel; recruitment and training modalities (integrated or not); deployments in operative theatres.8 By considering the differences in the modalities presented by each factor, countries can be grouped in clusters according to relative similarities, whose resemblance with those shown in Inglehart’s map are actually very relevant: these similarities permit us to speak of four (but to a certain extent, as we can see further on, five) clusters, namely a North-Central-European cluster (split into two sub-clusters, North and Central European), a South-European cluster, an English-speaking cluster, and an Eastern-Europe cluster. Confronting these clusters with those presented in Figure 12.2 (considering the obvious absence of a large number of nations included in Inglehart’s map that do not belong to NATO), it seems possible to rename some of the groups following Inglehart’s definitions: the North-European cluster can be renamed as the Protestant countries cluster, the Central-European cluster and South-European cluster belong together to the Roman Catholic area, the English-speaking cluster is coincident with Inglehart’s English-speaking zone, and the Eastern-Europe cluster is part of the zone named by Inglehart as post-communist countries. The main differences among the clusters, leaving aside the ‘time’ factor, are given by the relative percentages of servicewomen both globally and in the various hierarchical ranks, the existence or not of restrictions in recruitment and career advancement, the quality and quantity of social policies and proactive orientations towards integration, and the ways through which training and deployment are addressed. The North-Central European cluster is formed by North-European countries and, according to Inglehart, characterised partly by a traditionally Protestant culture and partly by a traditionally Catholic culture. Countries included here are Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany; France could also fit better here than within the South-European cluster. Strictly speaking, this cluster could be divided into two sub-clusters according to the dominant traditional culture, even though it is not possible here to go too far with these distinctions. Actually, this distinction between two religious traditions is of some help in grouping Northern and Protestant countries on the one side (Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands), and Central and mainly Catholic countries on the other side (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and France). In the definition given by Vicki Nielsen, in the first subgroup we can find ‘the most progressive countries where female soldiers are concerned’,9 being countries where female soldiers have been allowed to serve in almost all posts since the mid-1980s. Actually, representation of women in these countries remains rather low relative to some other NATO countries. In this subgroup, a common trait is the early appearance of a general trend towards integration (when compared with other NATO countries). Restrictions in role assignment are very low or non-existent, at least on a formal basis, no ceiling was imposed on recruitment from the beginning, and a strong bulk of social and family policies have been adopted to sustain not merely recruitment but also female personnel’s careers and retention. As far as training is concerned, this is totally integrated, and deployments in

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operative theatres, usually in Crises Response Operations, are not only possible but practically sustained (this is especially the case in Norway and Denmark).10 The second subgroup is formed by mainly Catholic countries, such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and France. Here similarities can be seen in a later arrival of women in the services, around the 1970s and after, and by persisting restrictions in role assignments, gradually but only very recently reduced or abandoned: in France, quotas for female enlistment were abandoned in 1998; in Germany a ruling from the European High Court of Justice was needed in January 2000 to prompt the government to change legislation so that women could enter into the Bundeswehr without restrictions; Belgian women soldiers enjoy a better integration, more similar to the one in the Northern subgroup. In some other respects, in fact, this subgroup has many indicator modalities in common with the Northern subgroup, such as the presence of strong proactive orientations towards family policies (Luxembourg, Germany), or a certain attention being paid to reduce possible obstacles to female adaptation to military life. In general it seems that a double-sided orientation is present: on the one side, full integration is declared in legal terms, while some restrictions (for combat roles, for example) are maintained on the other; proactive integration policies are pursued, while differences in some training standards are maintained (as in the cases of Germany and France). The South-European cluster comprises Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the four Southern European countries that started opening up entry to their armed forces to women in the 1980s and 1990s, later than in the previous group and in some cases with many restrictions. Here we find the cases of the most recent opening up of services to women (Greece and Italy), and the presence of ceilings and exclusions from various roles or posts (Greece in particular, and Italy to a certain extent for quotas). The relative exclusion of female personnel from some specialties and from combat positions is not legal in every instance (in Italy, Spain and Portugal, all posts are open in principle), and only in Greece are women banned by law from combat tasks, from line officers’ roles in the army, and from the majority of roles in the navy and the air force.11 The English-speaking cluster represents the peak in terms of servicewomen presence: United States, Canada and United Kingdom, in fact, record the highest presence of women soldiers when compared with all the other NATO countries (14 per cent, 11.4 per cent and 8.1 per cent respectively).12 All three countries legally accepted women in the forces very early in the last century (in some cases, just a few years after the end of the Second World War), gave them some posts in the 1970s and almost all posts around the end of the 1980s. According to information given by the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces in 2001,13 US servicewomen has been deployed all over the world in combat as well as noncombat specialties, with the only exclusion being direct ground combat positions since 1993. A similar situation is found for Canada, where in 1989 a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decided that ‘all restrictions barring women from employment in the Canadian Forces be removed, the sole exception being service in submarines’, but this last restriction was abolished in 2001.14

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The case of the United Kingdom is rather similar. Since the early 1990s, women soldiers ‘were allowed to serve at sea in surface ships, including combatants, and all aircrew roles were opened’,15 and now they are integrated into the three services with the only exceptions of Royal Marine Commandos, Royal Armored Corps and in the RAF regiment, that is in those units where primary duty is direct combat. Justifications for these restrictions include medical reasons and combat effectiveness. What makes this cluster homogeneous is the early arrival of women on the scene, and the early removal of almost all restrictions in comparison with all the other NATO countries. This prolonged experience gave rise to a certain pivotal role for the Anglo-Saxon militaries as examples of female integration and advancement, even though this was not totally realised in practice. At a structural level, however, the early date of entry, the early abandonment of ceilings and role restrictions, and, most importantly, integration programmes and policies strongly devoted to continuous improvement reflect an advanced situation with respect to female integration. The East-European cluster should include all the new NATO member countries, but here only data for the first three ‘new entries’, that is for Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland, will be considered. A general overview shows a situation where women soldiers remain somewhat in the minority in the services (with the exception of Hungary, where they numbered 9.6 per cent in 2001). Legal requirements for admittance into the European Union (the so-called aquis communautaire) has necessitated many changes and restructuring in the armed forces, in the light of democratisation on the one side, and reduction and rationalisation on the other side. Downsizing usually has unfavourable consequences for female employment in the services (and also elsewhere!), while equal opportunities policies are part of the spirit of the European Union and of the mainstream of communitarian policy. This double-sided trend has various and different effects on size, recruitment, career and the general integration of women, so that it is difficult to ascertain something common in even these three countries. Generally speaking, restrictions to the soldier’s role were strongly present before entry into NATO, and are now slowly being abandoned; social and family policies are changing as well, in order to assure better opportunities. Restructuring and rationalisation, however, seem to be the main goals now motivating the armed forces’ courses of action, and policies on female soldiers are simply a part of this. In a somewhat isolated position, Turkey does not match with any of the above clusters, belonging to different traditions and cultural frameworks. In Inglehart’s map, Turkey is positioned in the South-Western quadrant, where countries scoring high on Traditional Authority and Survival Values are located, while this position is borderline with the upper part of the map. This singularity can also be found in the relationships of women and the military: women have been accepted into military academies since 1955, but recruitment was then stopped, and only in 1992 were women cadets allowed again into academies. This means that women are accepted in officers’ roles only, and they serve

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mainly in technical, administrative and logistics services. As a consequence, their number within the total force is very limited, and it does not exceed 4 per cent of the total number of cadets.16 If training for women cadets is similar to their male counterparts, deployment (in peacekeeping operations) is limited to medical units. The reasons given for this limitation to officers’ roles relates to the fact that the recruitment of female soldiers in the rank and file is unnecessary because of the abundance of young males willing to serve in the forces, and this situation seems likely to remain stable in the near future.

How culture matters: an Hofstedean explanation We have said that culture has a crucial impact on the relationships between women and the armed forces. To a certain extent, the consideration of the position of countries in the Cultural Map derived from Inglehart’s work according to the two main cultural dimensions (Traditional authority vs. Secular–Rational authority and Survival values vs. Well-being values) helps to understand differences in the situations of female soldiers. The position of each country on the GES in Figure 12.3. gives more insights into the women–military relationships in the various countries under investigation and in each cluster, especially if we compare the GES made by means of World Values Surveys with the Index of Women Integration made by Carreiras: if we remove from the first scale the countries that are not present in the second, the ranking of countries on the two scales is strikingly similar! This is further evidence of the strict relationship between each military and its society or, better, between each military and the culture of its society. In wishing to better explore the cultural dimension, we can rely on another well-known theory of cultural diversity, presented by Geert Hofstede and based on wide and replicated empirical surveys all around the world. In this theory, five cultural dimensions are considered, and measured by means of corresponding indices: Power Distance Index (PDI), Individualism/Collectivism Index (ICI), Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Masculinity/Femininity Index (MFI), and Long–Short Time Orientation (LTO). Countries surveyed by Hofstedean programmes have given rise to specific scores on each dimensional index, and according to relative scores, groups of countries can be distinguished according to relative similarities. PDI measures the extent to which social hierarchies and different power distributions are legitimated and accepted within a culture: a high score on PDI means a highly hierarchical culture, where a low score means a more egalitarian culture. Individualism/Collectivism Index measures the relative prevalence of collectivity over the individual (high ICI) in a somewhat Durkheimian definition of the subjection of the individual to the group, and to his/her in-group in particular; on the opposite side, a low ICI means that culture is mainly individualistic and that the individual is free to define his/her own life with little or no relevance given to in-groups. UAI is the measure for the capacity of culture to accept uncertainty and to accept what the future will take with low or no

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anxiety: a high value means a high inability to cope with uncertainty, a low score indicates a culture where uncertainty is taken as normal; the consequence is a strong need for norms and rules in the high UAI cultures, and a low need and impatience for too-rigid and detailed rules in low UAI cultures. A culture can promote self-assertion and aggressiveness in interpersonal relationships, thus supporting a ‘masculine’ way of behaviour, or emphasising care and attention to others, promoting solidarity and reciprocity in a so-called ‘feminine’ type of behaviour; these are the definition given by Hofstede of ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ cultures. Among the many consequences, a masculine culture sees a larger role differentiation among genders, while feminine cultures do not stress differences in gender roles. LTO index measures a particular consideration of time which seems to be typical of Chinese and Oriental cultures, where a long-term orientation prevails and is consistent with Confucian ethics, thus sustaining parsimony, patience, endurance and the capacity to follow long-term projects. By using three out of the five dimensions, countries considered here in relation to female military personnel integration can also be grouped according to their respective position on some of the culture dimensions – results are rather similar to the clusters already formed using other factors. Dimensions considered relevant in this respect are Power Distance, since hierarchy is related to the military, to a ‘conventional’ and traditional image of military institution when hierarchical authority is stressed and vertical lines prevail, to a new and modern image when Power Distance is low and there is a tendency to flat organisational patterns; Masculinity/Femininity, which measures aggressive/assertive values against caring and expressive orientations, are not equally adequate to an all-male or a diverse military society; and finally Uncertainty Avoidance, where extended rule systems and certainty are positively or neutrally evaluated, and change is considered as a danger or as chance. Looking with the lenses of these three dimensions, a certain degree of cultural similarity can be asserted among countries manifesting similar positions in women–military relationships, as can be shown in Table 12.2. In the Englishspeaking cluster, culture is not so hierarchical; rather, it is open to innovation and change, and it does not assert masculine orientations more than femininity ones. In the North-Centre Europe cluster, the situation differs: cultures are far less hierarchical, mainly oriented to feminine values, and rather open to change and innovation in the northern subcluster, while the central subcluster (France and Belgium) shows higher Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance, linked to more masculine value orientations. In the South-Europe cluster, values are generally more inclined to recognise social hierarchies, are rated highly against uncertainty and relatively more masculine. Turkey scores high on Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance, and it is in a mid-position on the Masculinity–Femininity Index. Eastern countries show a generally strong Uncertainty Avoidance, medium Power Distance and a relatively more Masculine than Feminine orientation, a set of traits very similar to the South-European cluster.

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Table 12.2 Position of NATO countries according to PDI, UAI and MAS dimensions Country

PDI

UAI

MAS

Cluster

Canada USA United Kingdom

L M L

M M L

M M/H M/H

English-speaking cluster

Norway Netherlands Denmark Belgium Germany Luxembourg France

L L L M/H L – H

M M L H M/H – H

L L L M M/H – L/M

North-Centre European cluster

Spain Portugal Italy Greece Turkey

M H M H H

H H H H H

L/M L H M M

South-European cluster

Czech Republic Hungary Poland

M M/L M/H

H H H

M H M

East-European countries

Source: author’s adjustment from G. Hofstede, 1997. Notes L  low score on dimension; M  medium score; H  high score; M/H  medium/high score; L/M  low-medium score.

Given these differences in the general culture of the various countries, our main hypothesis (formulated earlier, p. 250) finds an appreciable degree of confirmation, since a certain degree of consistency can be found with the more or less positive and proactive orientations towards female integration into military institutions and the general characteristics of national cultures.

Conclusion The assertion posed at the beginning of this chapter is that there should be some general reasons that can explain the large variety of situational traits characterising the relationship between women and armed forces in contemporary societies which – it must be underlined – belong to the same alliance (NATO), are all highly industrialised countries (whilst at different stages of advancement), and are part of a unique cultural area, the Western culture in a broader sense. But we have seen that the situations of female personnel can be grouped in clusters of countries where policies can be seen to differ enough from one to another. Comparing these clusters with those found by Ronald Inglehart as a result of his worldwide research on socio-cultural change and political development, we have found a strong coherence between the two, showing that social policies implemented by countries to improve female participation in the military are also

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ruled by similar discriminative dimensions. In order to find a causal factor for female integration within the military, according to Carreiras’ research, time is not a good predictor of growing integration; while, in Segal’s theory, social, structural, political and cultural elements play a synergic and complex role in helping or hindering the status of women in military roles. The final assertion debated in this chapter is that different societies contain different cultures that, according to Hofstede’s research, can be compared by means of a small number of complex dimensions (thus considering many different traits): the specific position of each national society on each dimensional index describing the general culture shows acceptable coherence with the related women–military relationships as far as integration and proactive dispositions are concerned.

Notes 1 This choice is obligatory because a database on female soldiers, where data can be easily compared, is only available for NATO countries; and, for the same reasons, most cross-national analyses deal, mainly or totally, with NATO data. 2 These observations are developed in M. Nuciari (forthcoming). 3 For a wide-ranging discussion of social change and development all around the world see Harrison and Huntington (2000). 4 See Carreiras (2002: 5). 5 Carreiras (2002: 5–6). 6 Carreiras (2002: 5–6). 7 The five items are as follows: men make better political leaders than women; men should have more right to a job than women; university education is more important for a boy; it is necessary for women to have children to be fulfilled; woman wants to have children as single parents. 8 This topic has been developed in Nuciari, M. (forthcoming). 9 Nielsen (2001: 26). 10 See CWINF, Year-in-Review, Special Edition, 2001 (Updated Web Edition, 2002). 11 See on this: www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/greece.htm. 12 Data from CWINF. 13 www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/us.htm. 14 www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/canada.htm. 15 www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/uk.htm. 16 See for data, www.nato.int/ims/2001/win/turkey.htm.

References Bell, D. (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York, Basic Books. Bell, D. (1976) The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New York, Basic Books. Carreiras, H. (2002) Gender Integration in the Armed Forces: a Cross National Comparison of Policies and Practices in NATO Countries, CWINF, Annual Conference, Brussels (May). Dahl, R.A. (1998) ‘Development and democratic culture’, Journal of Democracy, 334–9. Harrison, L.E. and Huntington, S.P. (2000) Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, New York, Basic Books. Hofstede, G. (1997) Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind, New York: McGraw-Hill.

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Huntington, S.P. (1994) The Clash of Civilization?, Foreign Affairs, 72, 3: 22–49. Huntington, S.P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster. Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R. and Baker, W.E. (2000) ‘Modernization, cultural change and the persistence of traditional values’, American Sociological Review, 65 (February): 19–51. Inglehart, R. and Norris, P. (2003) Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World, New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. (2004) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence, New York, Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Diez-Medrano, J., Halman, L. and Luiskx, R. (2004) Human Values and Beliefs: a Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Surveys, Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores, S.A. de C.V. Iskra, D., Trainor, S., Leithauser, M. and Segal, M.W. (2002) Women’s Participation in Armed Forces Cross-nationally: Expanding Segal’s Model, Paper presented at ISA World Congress, Brisbane (7–13 July). Kerr, C., Dunlop, J.T., Harbison, F. and Myers, C.A. (1960) Industrialism and Industrial Man, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Lewis, W.A. (1955) The Theory of Economic Growth, Homewood, Richard D. Irvin. Nielsen, U. (2001) ‘Women in Uniform’, NATO Review, Web Edition, 49, 2: 26. Nuciari, M. (2002) ‘Women in the military: sociological arguments for integration’, in G. Caforio (ed.) Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, New York, Kluwer/Plenum Publishers. Omahe, K. (1993) The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, 2nd edn, New York, Harper. Rostow, W.W. (1961) The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Segal, Mady W. (1995) ‘Women’s military roles cross-nationally: past, present and future’, Gender and Society, 9, 6: 757–75. Sen, A. (2000) Development as Freedom, New York, Anchor. Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents, New York, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Welzel, Ch., Inglehart, R. and Klingemann, H.-D. (2003) ‘The theory of human development: a cross-cultural analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, 42 (April).

13 Between legitimacy and efficiency A comparative view on democratic accountability of defence activities in democracies Hans Born and Ingrid Beutler Introduction During situations of national emergencies, natural disasters, conflict and war, state institutions have to act quickly and decisively in order to divert dangers. Every state and its society needs to have a competent political leadership and government agencies which are able to act efficiently. From the point of view of democratic governance, however, it is equally important that the decisionmaking process and its outcomes are accepted and valued by the people. In other words, in a democracy it is essential that the processes and outcomes of the state institutions are legitimate. The relationship between efficiency and legitimacy in democratic societies is complex. Efficiency means that the political system is working in a quick and effective way. Legitimacy means that the members of a polity recognise the right of their rulers to govern, to exercise state power and to demand obedience.1 Second, the relationship between efficiency and legitimacy can be problematic in democracies. In times of crises, there is not always sufficient time to debate publicly and in depth the actions needed to avert the dangers. Especially in times of emergencies, a contradiction can arise between the need for quick decision-making and the citizen’s right to transparent decisionmaking as well as parliamentary oversight. In spite of this contradiction, a democratic political system has to be both efficient and legitimate. A political system that is efficient but not legitimate can hardly be called a democracy. Democratic political systems that are ineffective have the danger of becoming illegitimate in the long term as people will have difficulty in accepting and supporting continuous inefficient political leadership. Therefore democracy and efficiency are not two opposite concepts. Democracy is a type of political system whereas efficiency is criterion which can be applied to any sort of political systems. For most of human history, claims to legitimate rule were based on, as Max Weber has shown, traditional, religious or hereditary grounds. In modern political systems, ‘the legitimacy of the power-holder to command rests upon rules that are rationally established by enactment, by agreement, or by imposition’.2 Democratic legitimacy, according to political scientist Robert Dahl, emphasises

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that government should be ‘responsive and accountable to the demos, a sovereign authority that decides important political matters either directly in popular assemblies or indirectly through its representatives’.3 For this reason, parliament is the natural forum to enable democratically accountable decisions to be made, providing oversight and control of a states’ defence activities. Indeed, in a democratic polity, parliament is the central locus of accountability for any governmental decision-making, including defence policy. Parliamentary involvement with defence policy goes back many centuries. It has been evidenced that the birth and rise of early representative assemblies in Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries was linked to defence policy. Most monarchs of the later Middle Ages had urgent military needs. Their sometimes defensive but often aggressive and expansionist policies led the monarchs ‘to seek advice, assistance, support and consent not only of important individuals, but also of corporate bodies which, in some sense, represented the wider community’.4 Not all monarchs liked the idea of representation, but their aggressive foreign policies necessitated the emergence of proto-parliaments from the twelfth century onwards. Starting in the eighteenth century, great thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as Montesquieu, have reserved an important role for parliament in the system of checks and balances, referring to a separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. The separation of powers is the idea that the power of government should be split among two or three branches of the state, preventing any person or group from gaining too much power. This idea of the Trias Politica and similar ideas have influenced the constitutions of many democratic states, notably the USA. Of course, in current democratic polities the role of parliament may differ, from ornamental to substantial, in controlling defence policy. Although it is taken for granted that parliaments play a role in the system of checks and balances, there is hardly any comparative research data available about the exact role of parliaments in various democracies. In this chapter, focus is made on accountability mechanisms adopted in various democracies throughout the world as they strive for legitimate and efficient policy decisions. In this chapter, ‘accountability’ is regarded as a general term for any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their particular publics.5 The accountability of the measures taken by a democracy in such situations depends to a large extent on the parliamentary oversight mechanisms provided for within the state. ‘Accountability’ is now recognised prominently as one of the core values of democratic governance across a variety of disciplines. ‘Accountability’, the obligation to be called ‘to account’, is a method of keeping the public informed and the powerful in check.6 The relevance of democratic and parliamentary accountability has undergone a renaissance in post-Cold War Europe and has been placed on the public and academic agenda in many European states for a variety of reasons.7 First, with the abolition of military conscription in several European countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal), a critical debate has been raised on the democratic control of the armed forces as many express

Between legitimacy and efficiency 263 fear that an all-volunteer force is more difficult to control democratically than a conscript army. Second, over the last decade there has been a general downsizing of the armed forces, yet there has been an expansion in the tasks expected of them. Such demands, on the budget and personnel, strain political–military relations. Third, with increasing international military activity, the democratic and parliamentary control of international military cooperation and institutions is also becoming increasingly relevant. This is not only true for smaller member states of, for example, the EU and NATO, but also for bigger states such as France and the United Kingdom. For example, in the wake of the Iraq War, which caused controversy in British society and parliament, the British parliament is now investigating whether the power of government to deploy troops abroad and to declare war has to be limited.8 Furthermore, ‘democratic and civilian control’, as defined by international organisations such as NATO and the OSCE, calls for the reforming of political–military and civilian–military relations in accordance with democratic principles as a requirement of membership. This is particularly applicable to post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe who have had to restyle political–military relations according to democratic principles. Before reforming the security sector, transition societies adopted new constitutions, gave powers to legislatures and installed civilian ministerial control over the military. Hence, the democratic (and civilian) control of defence activities is conceived as necessary for institutionbuilding, good governance and security at both the international and national levels. This chapter first dwells on those principles of democratic control as enunciated at the international level, and then addresses mechanisms and principles of parliamentary control at the national level.

Democratic control of defence policy as an established international norm With the changing security environment throughout the world, it is imperative that the democratic control exercised over defence activities in each state is clearly defined and undertaken. At the international level, the main aim must be to create a climate of stability in which economic development and cooperation can prosper, and where peace and stability can reign. With these objectives in mind, a number of norms and standards have been defined by international bodies that establish parameters as to how defence policy should be conducted within the growing family of democratic states. Although such definitions apply to public governance in general, a few specifically mention the security sector.9 Within the UN system specifically, identification has been made of the importance of ‘democratising security to prevent conflict and build peace’ (UNDP Human Development Report, 2002). Referring to the democratic peace thesis, which posits that democracies do not go to war against each other, the UN stresses the crucial role of democratic control of the military, police and

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other security forces for human development and human security; furthermore, it lays out a set of principles for democratic governance in the security sector.10 The democratic control of defence activities has also been articulated as a political standard by a number of regional organisations and fora such as OSCE, NATO,11 EU,12 the Council of Europe13 and the Inter-American Summit process. Together with PACE Recommendation 1713 (2005), the OSCE has gone the furthest so far with the adoption in 1994 of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which contains the most innovative provisions on ‘the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services and the police’.14 This ‘politically binding’ instrument is the only document which elaborates on the substance of democratic governance of the security sector. In its sections VII and VIII, it establishes the basic components of democratic control of defence activities, which include: • • • •

The primacy at all times of democratic constitutional civilian power over military power. The subjection of armed forces to the norms and prescriptions of international humanitarian law. The respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the armed forces personnel. The commensurability of the domestic use of force with the needs of enforcement and prohibition of the use of force aimed at restricting peaceful and lawful exercise of human rights or at depriving people of their individual or collective identity.15

Although no clear-cut definition or single model of democratic control of defence activities can be exemplified, a set of general principles and ‘best practices’ can be identified: 1

2

3 4

5 6

A constitution and laws, defining the primacy of the political leadership over the military, as well as the responsibilities of the government and parliament in times of war and peace.16 A system of checks and balances, as defined by the constitution, between the three branches of state, avoiding the executive acquiring unchecked power over the military and other important security services, such as the intelligence services and paramilitary units. A civilian minister of defence, who has both top military and civilian advisors at his or her disposal. Parliamentary oversight, as the elected representatives are able to offer or withhold democratic legitimacy to the government’s security policy and the military. Maximum transparency and openness of the military, allowing media, research institutes and other NGOs to do their work. A military that is at ease with itself,17 in terms of tasks assigned and its image in society.

Between legitimacy and efficiency 265 These points show that democratic accountability is a broad issue, involving societal, political and legal issues, and that parliament is an important issue in democratic accountability, but by no means the only one.

The role of parliamentary accountability mechanisms As Winston Churchill noted, parliament is the workshop of democracy, and it is within that workshop that the limits to, the powers necessary for, and the control of activities of the state, including defence activities, are determined. While parliaments may range from the ornamental to significant governing partners, they have some common characteristics, which include three basic functions to perform: representing the people, making (or shaping) laws and exercising oversight. Parliaments articulate the wishes of the people by drafting new laws and overseeing the proper execution of those policies by the government. In short: the parliament is the mediator between government and the people. Although we take it for granted that modern government must be democratic, in the sense of deriving its authority directly or indirectly from the people, states differ in shaping legislative–executive relations. Furthermore, there are no universal standards or best practices for parliamentary oversight given that accepted practices, legal procedures and parliamentary structures in one established democracy may be unthinkable in another. Although there is no single set of norms for civil–military relations, there is a general agreement that democracies adhere to principles of democratic civil–military relations. Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is a sine qua non condition for democracy. The ultimate power of parliament is to send the government home (no-confidence mechanism), to block budgets or stop or delay the legislation of new laws.18 Generally speaking, the no-confidence vote is characteristically for parliamentary political systems only; in presidential systems, in most cases, the president is elected by the people directly and not by parliament. From these powers (and the credibility to use this power) derives all other powers vis-à-vis the government. In more specific terms, with regards to the defence sector, we can identify the following parliamentary defence oversight powers: 1

2

General powers: these include powers that are, in principle, applicable to all fields of government. In most countries these powers include: the right to initiate or to amend laws, to raise questions, to summon members of the executive and their staff to testify, to summon members of civil society, access to classified information, the right to carry out parliamentary inquiries and the right to hold hearings. Budget control: the right to allocate and amend defence budget funds – on the level of programmes, projects and separate line items; the right to approve or disapprove any supplementary defence budget proposals (during the fiscal year) and having access to all relevant defence budget documents.

266 3

4

5

H. Born and I. Beutler Peace support operations: the right to approve (or not) to send troops abroad, the mandate, the budget, risks of military personnel involved, rules of engagement, command/control, duration of the mission and the right to visit troops on missions abroad. Defence procurement: involvement of the parliament in the government’s decision concerning contracts, specifying needs for new equipment, selection of manufacturer and assessing offers for compensation and off-set. Security policy and planning documents: the right to amend or to approve (or not) the security policy concept, defence concept, crisis management concept, force structure/planning and the military strategy.

Together, these control instruments cover the most important aspects of any military, which is planning, operations, money, people, equipment and policy.

Parliamentary oversight powers in 16 democracies in Europe and northern America Focusing on the five parliamentary defence oversight powers identified in the previous section, namely, control exercised generally over the budget, peace support operations, defence procurement, and security policy and planning documents, the ability and power of parliamentary structures to influence and control defence activities will depend to a large extent on the type and ‘degree’ of democratisation within the state. Therefore, to facilitate a comparative analysis of parliamentary oversight powers, 16 democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area have been selected that are examples of both presidential and parliamentary democratic structures, from both West and Eastern Europe as well as Canada and the United States (see Table 13.1). The data is derived from comprehensive research on parliamentary oversight in NATO members and associated states. This research data is the product of a joint activity, conducted in 2002 and updated in 2005,19 of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels.20 The data reflects how parliamentarians perceive their powers of oversight as provided in their responses to questionnaires completed either by members of parliament or the staff of the parliamentary defence committee (or the equivalent). Although the ‘degree’ of democratisation within any state is a contested concept, we here define a ‘democratic’ political system as inclusive, participatory, representative, accountable, transparent and responsive to citizens’ aspirations and expectations.21 Table 13.1 shows that the sample of countries includes both ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies. ‘New’ democracies are countries that had, until recently, authoritarian regime, including former-communist countries and Turkey. ‘Old’ democracies refer to Western democracies that have enjoyed a democratic governance system for longer than 15 years. Therefore, a true democracy must have the capacity to conduct parliamentary oversight over its defence activities. In a democracy there should be no area of

Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Parliamentary

Parliamentary Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Plebiscite Parliamentary Presidential Westminster Parliamentary Presidential

Czech Republic Denmark France Germany

Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

New New Old New New Old Old Old New New New

New Old Old Old

Old

Transition democracy (‘New’) versus established democracy (‘Old’) Monarch, represented by Governor-General President (Art. 63 Const.) Monarch (Art. 19 Const.) President (Art. 15 Const.) Minister of Defence (Art. 65a Const.) during peace time; Federal Chancellor during wartime President (Art. 29 Const.) President (Art. 79 Const.) Government (Art. 98 Const.) President (Art. 134 Const.) President (Art. 92 Const.) Monarch (Art. 62 Const.) Government (Ch. 7, Art. 3 Const.) Elected by parliament in times of war President (Art. 104 Const.) Sovereign President (Art. 2 (2) Constitution)

Commander-in-Chief

Note 1 As classified by Freedom House. Online, available at: www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/democracies.pdf.

Westminster Parliamentary

Canada

Political system1

Table 13.1 Characteristics of political systems and oversight bodies in selected states

Parliament (Art. 19 Const.) Parliament (Art. 68 Const.) Parliament (Art. 96 Const.) Parliament (Art. 116 Const.) Parliament (Art. 65 Const.) Parliament (Art. 63 Const.) Parliament (Ch. 10, Art. 9 Const.) Confederation (Art. 8 Const.) Parliament (Art. 87 Const.) Parliament Parliament (Art. 8 Constitution)

Parliament (Art. 39 Const.) Parliament (Art. 19 Const.) Parliament (Art. 35 Const.) Parliament (Art. 80a Const.)

Parliament

Declaration of war

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state activity that is a ‘no-go’ zone for parliament, including defence activities, with parliamentary involvement providing legitimacy and direct democratic accountability. Political system characteristics of the 16 selected democracies The degree of parliamentary oversight possible today depends on the institutional and democratic measures implemented in each state. Table 13.1 illustrates that, of the 16 states selected for the purposes of this analysis, 11 are parliamentary democracies and five are presidential democracies. In parliamentary systems, it is the parliamentary body who has the final say in most, if not all, matters of state. The United Kingdom and Canada are representative of a Westminster parliamentary system22 whose particular features include an executive branch made up of members of the legislature; the presence of opposition parties; and an elected legislature, or a system in which one house is elected and the other appointed. Switzerland is described as having a ‘plebiscite parliamentary system’ given that executive power and parliamentary control is checked by popular referendums. Presidential political systems are generally of the nature whereby the president will have a degree of direct executive control as head of state and head of government. However, in spite of the power vested in the president, not necessarily all presidential systems have weak parliaments when it comes to defence policy. Due to the separation of powers, the US Congress has a strong position vis-à-vis the executive. This is especially so when the opposition has a majority in one or in both Houses where it can obstruct presidential policy substantially. Additionally, in France, where the president has traditionally farreaching authority in defence and security issues, the president is only powerful when his or her party is also the ruling party. In case of co-habitation, the parliament can limit the powers of the president. Apart from Switzerland, all other states have a commander-in-chief, both during peace time and war time. This individual is generally provided for in the constitution as a ‘political’ commander-in-chief, that is, with a largely ceremonial role, being either the president (France, Poland, Romania, Turkey, US); the Governor-General, who is granted the right to perform this role by the sovereign power (in Canada, the British monarch grants this right to the governor-general); the sovereign (Denmark, Spain, the UK); the Minister of Defence (Germany during peace time or Federal Chancellor during war time); or the government (Sweden, the Netherlands). In some countries with parliamentary systems, their head of state is also retained as the commander-in-chief, such as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia and Spain. However, in all states included in the study, it is parliament who is granted the power to declare war. This power is generally provided in the constitutions of the countries, except in Canada and the UK, which do not have written constitutions. Germany falls into a unique category whereby it has a parliamentary government with the head of state completely excluded from the executive and holding

Between legitimacy and efficiency 269 a rather ceremonial role.23 In the UK, the power to declare war was traditionally considered a Royal Prerogative possessed by the sovereign which now rests with the executive. However, prior to British involvement in Iraq in 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair departed from precedent by seeking parliamentary approval for British participation in the war. Should Parliament not have approved, the Prime Minister indicated he would not formally advise the monarch to exercise the Royal Prerogative and declare war. With the Prime Minister supported by an overwhelming Labour majority in the British House of Commons, and with the support of the opposition Conservative Party, there was little likelihood that Parliament would vote down the motion recommending participation in the war. It remains to be seen whether a future government with a small majority or in a minority in the House of Commons would seek parliamentary approval prior to the exercise of the Royal Prerogative.24 This matter is the subject of a current inquiry by the House of Lords Constitution Committee. As represented in Table 13.4, the powers given to Parliament in ‘peace support operations’ are stated as limited in the case of the UK due to the fact that, if interpreted narrowly, it is unlikely that Parliament would debate the sending of troops abroad on peacekeeping operations as they generally involve much less overall danger for the forces than would an armed conflict. Compared with other countries, Switzerland does not have a military supreme commander-in-chief during peace time.25 This is a consequence of the federal decentralisation of the military and the lack of standing forces in Switzerland. The command and control over the armed forces, especially the right to declare war or make peace, and the right to mobilise the militia, lies in the hands of the federal parliament. Whether it be a parliamentary or presidential political system, when a country is contemplating involvement in war, arguably the norm has been established that this power should lie with parliament. Considering the immense consequences for any state should it go to war, that decision should lie with those representatives elected by the people. With the majority of states now embracing the ideals and institutions of a full democracy, decisions prior to the ultimate decision to go to war must be overseen and controlled by the very institution that makes that final decision. Parliamentary involvement will ensure that defence activities and decisions are made to serve the state as a whole and to protect the constitution, rather than narrower political or sectional interests. General powers of parliamentary oversight The classification of the ‘general powers’ of parliament to oversee defence includes the power to initiate legislation on defence issues; to question the minister of defence; to summon military and other civil servants to committee meetings and to testify; and to hold hearings on defence issues. These ‘general powers’ of parliament are evident in the majority of states analysed. Such powers are identified in Table 13.2 as belonging either to parliament itself or to the committee dealing with defence issues. The results of Table 13.2 show that the parliaments in all selected states possess all these general powers of

16 (100%)

Total general powers of parliament (per specific power)

Notes X the parliament possesses the power. O the parliament does not possess the power.

Source: DCAF/NATO PA research 2005.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

To initiate legislation on defence issues

Table 13.2 General powers of parliament

15 (94%)

X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X X

To question the minister of defence

16 (100%)

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

To summon military and other civil servants to committee meetings and to testify

16 (100%)

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

To obtain documents from the ministry of defence and military

15 (94%)

X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X X

To hold hearings and inquiries on defence issues

78 (98%)

5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%) 3 (60%) 5 (100%) 5 (100%)

Total general powers of parliament (per country)

Between legitimacy and efficiency 271 parliament, except for Turkey, whose parliament seems to be weaker, as explained below. In all selected states, parliament has the power to initiate new legislation, whether through the cabinet or by the president introducing bills. Generally, this power is not granted to the Select Committee. Though all parliaments have this right, most parliaments exercise this right only in exceptional situations. Legislation is nowadays a very complex, specialist and time-consuming issue. Many parliamentarians do not have the expertise or the time to go into the details of developing new legislation. Therefore, in practice, most parliaments have delegated the legislative function to the government and only approve, reject or amend legislation. Only in exceptional cases do individual members of parliaments come up with their own legislative initiatives, for example, if the government refuses to come up with a proposal. In most states, legislation on defence issues can be amended or rewritten by parliament. These powers, to design and initiate defence legislation, are some of the greatest powers that a parliament can possess to determine the defence policy of the country. By being able to influence where and when new legislation is required, or existing legislation is amended, the parliamentarian has the power to oversee, to a degree, the direction of defence policy. With only the exception of Turkey, all parliaments can question the minister of defence. Similarly, the summoning of members of the military and civil servants to parliamentary committee/plenary meetings and to testify is a common legislative power in the selected states (except in Poland). In all states examined, without exception, the parliament is granted the power to obtain documents from the ministry of defence and/or the military. This is an important power that leads to greater transparency and accountability of governmental and military decisions and actions. In the majority of states, parliament is granted the power to conduct inquiries into defence issues and hold hearings on those issues. Turkey is the only country where parliament is denied the power to question the ministry of defence and to hold hearings about defence issues. Parliament and budget control The power of the purse is at the heart of parliamentary control. Most countries have developed or are developing a systematic approach for the evaluation and approval of budget proposals, for example, a Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). Basic characteristics of modern government defence budgeting systems in relationship to the role of parliament include:26 • • •

Legality: all expenditure and activities should be in keeping with the law as enacted by parliament. Power of amendment and allocation: parliament has the right to amend and allocate the defence budget fund. Transparent defence budgeting: parliament has access to all necessary documentation to enable transparent decision-making.

272 •

H. Born and I. Beutler Specificity: the number and descriptions of every budget item should result in a clear overview of government’s expenditure, enabling parliament to control the budget at three levels, i.e., defence programmes, projects and line items.

Our analysis shows that in almost all of the countries selected, parliament is granted the important power and ability to approve, amend or to allocate defence budget funds (see Table 13.3). The power to amend and allocate defence budget powers is limited in a few states by the inability to control the budget by line items, that is, on what specific items the budget will be spent. Although most countries grant parliament access to all defence budget documents, the level of control over the budget varies. The legislature’s role in budget control helps to provide transparency in decisions concerning defence and security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending – using ‘the power of the purse’ in defence matters. Parliament and peace support operations One of the greatest tools of parliamentary oversight is the constitutional or legal right to approve or reject the use of force. Prior authorisation is an especially valuable right because once the troops are sent abroad it is difficult for a parliament to undo the government’s decision – withdrawal could endanger the ongoing mission and damage the international reputation and credibility of the country. Our research shows that wide variation exists between countries regarding the constitutional and legal powers of parliament to oversee PSOs (see Table 13.4).27 The parliaments of Canada, France, Poland, Spain, and the Congress of the United States do not have the power of prior authorisation. The majority of these countries are Westminster Parliamentary Systems (UK and Canada) or presidential– parliamentary democracies such as France, Poland and the USA,28 where the president is the commander-in-chief and has special prerogatives concerning foreign and security policy. The parliaments of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey have the power to approve or reject PSOs in advance. All these states (except Romania) are parliamentary democracies.29 The data presented in Table 13.4 show that there is a great variety of ways in which parliaments control the deployment of troops abroad in PSOs. It turns out that there are parliaments that have strong oversight powers, e.g. Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, and weak parliaments, e.g. Canada, the UK and Poland. Further analysis of this data shows that four models can be distinguished with regard to parliament’s involvement in the authorisation of PSOs: 1

Parliament has the right of prior authorisation of PSOs, including the right to discuss and influence the details of the PSO (e.g. as in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands).

15 (94%)

Total budgetary powers of parliament (per specific power)

Notes X the parliament possesses the power. O the parliament does not possess the power. – not available or not applicable.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X O X

Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

Has access to all defence budget documents

Table 13.3 Budgetary powers of parliament

15 (94%)

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X

Has the right to amend, approve and to allocate defence budget funds

9 (56%)

O – X X X – X – X X X O O X X X

Control the defence budget by line items

41 (85.42%)

2 (67%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 3 (100%)

Total budgetary powers of parliament (per country)

10 (63%)

Total power of parliament over PSOs (per specific power)

6 (38%)

O X X O X – X X O O – X O O O O 10 (63%)

O X X O, only a posteriori X X X X O O X X X O O X 8 (50%)

O X X O X – X X O O O X X O O X 4 (25%)

O O X O X – O X O O O O O O O X

Approval of the Duration of Operational budget of the mission the mission issues1

Notes X the parliament possesses the power. O the parliament does not possess the power. – not available or not applicable. 1 Operational issues include rules of engagement, command and control, and risk assessment.

O X X O X X X X O X O X X X O O

Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

Approval of Mandate of sending troops the mission abroad a priori

Table 13.4 Powers concerning peace support operations

14 (88%)

X X X X X – X X X X X X X O X X

52 (54.17%)

1 (16.67%) 5 (83.33%) 6 (100%) 1 (16.67%) 6 (100%) 2 (33.33%) 5 (83.33%) 6 (100%) 1 (16.67%) 2 (33.33%) 2 (33.33%) 5 (83.33%) 4 (66.67%) 1 (16.67%) 1 (16.67%) 4 (66.67%)

Parliament has Total power of the right to visit parliament over the troops on PSOs (per country) missions abroad

Between legitimacy and efficiency 275 2

3

4

Parliament has the right of prior authorisation but not the power to influence the detailed aspects of PSOs (including rules of engagement, duration of the mission and mandate), giving government full authority once parliament has authorised the mission (e.g. as in Romania and Turkey). The third group of parliaments does not have prior authorisation power. Government can decide to send troops abroad on peace missions without the legal obligation to consult parliament. Nevertheless, parliament is informed about the deployments. This is the case, for example, in Canada, France, Poland, Spain, the UK and the USA. A fourth type of parliament has no authorisation power or right to information about future or current PSOs. This type of parliament was not represented in those studied.

Aside from the extent to which parliaments have the power to authorise PSOs, the parliaments of all three groups often possess the power of the purse over funding for PSOs. Parliaments can use this power during debates on the annual defence budget and debates on any additional budget requests for ongoing PSOs. For example, the US Congress stopped funding for the US troops committed to the UN PSOs in Somalia in 1992–3 after the first casualties were incurred in 1993.30 However, generally speaking, the power of the purse does not compensate for the lack of a constitutional power of prior authorisation, given the difficulty of pulling back troops in mid-mission. It is also not impossible (although less common for rich Western countries) for the government to have access to alternative, non-national sources of funds to continue the deployment. Parliament and defence procurement Defence procurement is an important step in the sequence of actions needed to set up and to implement any given security policy. Parliament plays an essential role in ensuring that procurement decisions focus on the right issues, and to remedy the situation should there emerge a wrong trend or wrongdoing. This would entail parliament’s involvement in the entire procurement process, from the preparation phase, during the procurement itself and after, during the lifecycle of the programmes. Whether parliament is granted any powers in determining the procurement of equipment, goods, ammunition and services is a matter of much variation in the countries studied. However, a number of essential principles have been identified that apply directly to procurement and, hence, are important in all countries:31 • • •

•

Foresight: with the exception of extreme urgency, all decisions must be made in the light of future requirements. Efficiency: the decision-maker is accountable to ensure such to the nation. Simplicity: defence equipment is intended to be used under extreme conditions, however it is often served by personnel who, although well-trained and educated, have not the education and the technical skills of engineers. Interoperability: nobody works or fights alone, but in coalition.

276 •

• •

H. Born and I. Beutler Affordability: the country should be able to pay for it without jeopardising other segments of the national economic and social life, of the national budget and of defence programmes. Sustainability: there should be no major or additional unscheduled costs. Transparency: in all decision-making.

Our results show that, generally, parliament has limited control over the government’s procurement decisions. This is especially evident in Denmark, Macedonia, Romania and Spain, where parliament has no say. In only four of the selected states does parliament have the right to disapprove the contracts made by government (Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and the United States). In those same states, along with Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the minister of defence is obliged to provide the parliament with detailed information on procurement decisions. The lack of this right deprives parliament of the ability to approve or disapprove specific defence procurement projects. A few parliaments are involved in the process of specifying the need for new equipment. This is the case in Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA. In the case of the USA, the power of the US Congress is derived from the US Constitution which grants Congress ‘the power to raise armies’. While Congress may not have the specific power to ‘disapprove’ contracts, it may prevent a contract from going into force by not appropriating money for that contract. The comparison between different offers and the final selection of a manufacturer and product is decided by the parliament only in the Czech Republic, Netherlands and the USA; but it seems to be an executive prerogative in the rest of the countries under analysis. Only in those same three countries is the parliament involved in assessing offers for compensation and off-set. With the differing powers of all parliaments, it is largely the power of the purse that enables (or otherwise) the parliament to influence the government’s procurement policy. Parliament and security and defence policy Generally, politicians have limited interest in defence policy and have little active engagement in the formulation and supervision of national security and defence policy and the armed forces. Yet, to ignore the importance of parliamentary involvement and debate is to ignore the fact that the defence decisions made by the ministry of defence and the armed forces in any country concern vast resources, the lives of citizens and the welfare of the country. Furthermore, although politicians may not be routinely occupied in matters of national defence, they may become interested or involved during a crisis or emergency. It is at this point that it may be discovered that the defence policy is not as expected, or that the armed forces are not as compliant and effective as they thought they were.32 The civilian control of defence policy is a national responsibility and therefore any policy change and

4 (25%)

Total parliamentary power over procurement (per country)

Notes X the parliament possesses the power. O the parliament does not possess the power. – not available or not applicable.

O O O O X (above C25mill.) O O X X O O O – O O X

Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

Parliament right to disapprove contracts

7 (44%)

O O O O X (above C25mill.) X O X (above C80,000) X O O O X O X X

Minister of defence obliged to provide parliament with information on procurement decisions

8 (50%)

X X O X X O O X O O O X X O O X

Parliament involved in specifying needs for new equipment

Table 13.5 Parliamentary powers to influence government’s procurement decisions

4 (25%)

O X O O X O O X O O O O O O O X

Parliament involved in selecting producer

4 (25%)

O X O O X O O X O O O O O O O X

Parliament involved in assessing offers for compensation and off-set

22 (35%)

1 (20%) 3 (60%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%) 1 (20%) 0 (0%) 5 (100%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%) 0 (0%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%)

Total parliamentary power over procurement (per country)

10 (63%)

Total parliamentary power to influence defence policy (per specific power)

Notes X the parliament possesses the power. O the parliament does not possess the power. – not available or not applicable.

O X O X X X X X O X O X X O O X

Canada Czech Republic Denmark France Germany Hungary Macedonia Netherlands Poland Romania Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States

Security policy concept

9 (56%)

O X O X X X X X O O O X X O O X

Defence concept

8 (50%)

O X O O X – X X O X O X X O O X

Force structure and planning

Table 13.6 Parliamentary powers to influence government’s defence policy decisions

5 (31%)

O X O O X – O X O O O O X O O X

Military strategy

23 (50%)

0 (0%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 4 (100%) 2 (50%) 3 (75%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%) 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (100%)

Total parliamentary power to influence defence policy (per country)

Between legitimacy and efficiency 279 decisions should focus on the processes of deliberation and justification in the national public sphere. With regard to security and defence policy formulation, we see some interesting differences between the parliaments studied. Only a small majority of parliaments are granted the power to define the security policy and defence concept, with this majority being diminished as regards the military–technical policy, a power which is generally left to the military. In those countries whose parliaments are lacking the power to oversee policy formulation (Canada, Denmark, Poland, Spain, Turkey and the UK), this power is often compensated by the power of the purse. Therefore, new defence policy initiatives can be blocked by rejecting the budget. In Westminster parliaments, such as Canada and United Kingdom, the lack of power by parliament to approve security and defence policy is only limited in so far as it does not possess the power to determine the policy, yet executive policy statements engender discussion and debate in parliament, who hence plays an essential role in reviewing, testing and improving national policy decisions. In general, the greater the degree of parliamentary power over security and defence policy, the more transparent and accountable defence policy decisions. This power is especially important as increasing multilateral agreements are being entered into by national governments. Such agreements effectively give the government extra executive power over their own national parliaments. On a number of occasions, national governments have used both NATO and the EU to negotiate and conclude agreements and take policy decisions without the input of their national legislatures.33 With increasing participation by states in military operations abroad, such as peace support operations, the associated policy changes that may be required in each national defence policy framework should ensure that policy decisions are legitimised by those elected by the people.

Conclusion Democratic accountability through parliamentary power In the strive for democratic accountability, citizens must be provided with the ability to hold decision-makers to account for the power that has been delegated to them. This democratic accountability gives legitimacy to the rulers of a polity and, arguably, in a democratic polity, is only wholly possible through the granting of sufficient powers to parliament through procedures that are regarded as sufficiently fair and participatory. The ultimate democratic legitimacy of the parliament rests substantially on the extent to which they are trusted instruments of the democratic state which created them. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, little comparative data is available about the actual role of parliaments in defence affairs in democracies, including general legislative powers, budget control, control over peace support operations (PSOs), control over defence procurement as well as parliament’s

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role in the decision-making of security policy. Table 13.7 shows to what extent parliaments possess these powers in the 16 selected democracies. On analysis of which broad powers parliament is granted over defence activities (represented in Table 13.7), it is apparent that most, if not all, parliaments are granted what is termed ‘general’ powers, such as the power to initiate legislation on defence activities and to question the minister of defence. Some 98 per cent of parliaments are granted these ‘general’ powers. Most parliaments are also granted a range of powers to control the defence budget (81 per cent) and to influence decisions concerning peace support operations (56 per cent). Only 50 per cent of parliaments analysed grant their parliament the power to influence security and defence policy. The least powers granted to parliament are those to influence governments’ defence procurement decisions (35 per cent). One might conclude that general/legislative powers and budget control belong to the minimum standards of democratic and parliamentary control of defence activities because these powers are possessed by nearly all parliaments. On the other hand, the power to control PSOs, defence procurement and defence policy is possessed by far fewer parliaments in the EuroAtlantic area. Looking to what extent parliaments of specific countries possess these powers, Table 13.8 provides us with a very mixed picture. Table 13.8 shows that the strongest parliaments can be found in the United States and in the Netherlands, and the weakest parliament in Turkey. In the former two cases, the USA and the Netherlands possess political systems with a substantial role for parliament in defence activities, leading to the conclusion that, in these countries, an effective system of checks and balances exist. In Turkey, the parliament possesses only 35 per cent of possible powers of parliament to oversee defence policy, leading to the conclusion that its parliament plays a rather ornamental role in defence activities. This signifies that Turkey’s system of checks and balances is heavily impeded by an imbalance in favour of executive power to the detriment of parliament. The other 13 parliaments can be positioned somewhere between a strong parliamentary oversight system in the US and the Netherlands vis-à-vis the weak parliamentary oversight system in Turkey.

Table 13.7 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: category ranking Ranking in order of defence activities over which parliaments is granted power

Average (%)

1 2 3 4 5

98 81 56 50 35

General powers of parliament Budgetary powers of parliament Powers concerning Peace Support Operations Parliamentary powers to influence security and defence policy Parliamentary powers to influence governments’ defence procurement decisions

Between legitimacy and efficiency 281 Table 13.8 Parliamentary powers over defence activities: country ranking Parliament granted extensive powers over defence activities

          ↓

Parliament granted limited powers over defence activities

Ranking

Percentage average of powers possessed by parliament (%)

Netherlands, United States Germany Czech Republic Switzerland Macedonia Sweden Denmark United Kingdom, France Romania Hungary Poland Spain Canada Turkey

93 87 82 75 72 69 60 57 57 54 51 47 41 35

Towards explaining parliamentary powers over defence activities How can this mixed picture of parliamentary oversight powers in the selected democratic states be explained? In trying to find explanations, we have divided the total sample of 16 democratic states into two groups of parliaments: 1

2

Parliaments granted extensive powers over defence activities, being the eight strongest parliaments as presented in Table 13.8; these are the parliaments of the Netherlands, USA, Germany, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Macedonia, Sweden and Denmark. Parliaments granted fewer powers over defence activities, being the eight weakest parliaments as presented in Table 13.8, being the United Kingdom, France, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Spain, Canada and Turkey.

To explain the variety of parliamentary powers, we have linked parliamentary power to the type of political system and the level of democratisation. With regard to political system, as explained before, we distinguish presidential– parliamentary, parliamentary and Westminster parliamentary political systems (see Table 13.9). Table 13.9 shows that parliaments with strong oversight powers are likely to be found in parliamentary political systems and that relatively weaker parliaments are likely to be found both in presidential and Westminster-type political systems. This might be explained by the fact that, in parliamentary political systems, the position of parliament and its powers is backed by the ultimate power to sack the government. This is a power lacked by presidential political systems as, in these systems, the president is elected by the people directly. Admittedly, also in Westminster-type parliamentary systems, parliament has the

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Table 13.9 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in different democratic systems Presidential democracies

Parliamentary democracies

Westminster system democracies

Parliament granted extensive power over defence activities

United States

Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Switzerland Czech Republic Macedonia

–

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

France Poland Romania Turkey Hungary

Spain

UK Canada

power to sack the government. Nevertheless, parliaments in Canada and the UK have relatively weak oversight powers regarding defence activities because of the so-called ‘Royal Prerogative’ which shields the government from parliamentary involvement in defence activities. Prerogative powers are nonstatutory powers, handed down direct from monarchs to ministers over many years, allowing government, among other things, to go to war, to deploy troops in military operations overseas, to sign treaties and to regulate the Civil Service without parliamentary involvement. The prerogative power to go to war was criticised by various members of both Houses of the British Parliament in the wake of the Iraq War. Currently (Autumn 2005), the House of Lords is investigating whether to deny the executive its power to go to war and to deploy troops abroad. Spain and the United States are important exceptions to these classifications of strong parliaments in parliamentary systems and weak parliaments in presidential or Westminster-type political systems. In the case of the United States, this can be explained by the strong position of Congress in defence activities due to its constitutional power to raise and to maintain armies and the navy. This power gives Congress extensive budget control powers up to the level of line items (in theory, no pencil can be bought by the Pentagon without Congressional approval). It is not clear why the Spanish parliament (Cortès) is weak while being embedded in a parliamentary political system. It remains to be seen whether its recent dictatorial past or its colonial heritage might provide an explanation. In addition to the differences in political systems, a second explanatory factor for the variances in the role of parliament in defence activities might be found in the level of democratisation. Our analysis shows, however, that there is only a weak relation between parliamentary defence oversight powers and the level of democratisation (Table 13.10). According to our categorisation, ‘new’ democracies are those postcommunist countries in Central and Eastern Europe who have had to restyle

Between legitimacy and efficiency 283 Table 13.10 Parliamentary powers over defence activities in ‘new’ and ‘old’ democracies ‘Old’ democracies

‘New’ democracies

Parliament granted extensive power over defence activities

United States Netherlands Germany Denmark Sweden Switzerland

Czech Republic Macedonia

Parliament granted fewer powers over defence activities

France UK Canada Spain

Poland Romania Turkey Hungary

political–military relations according to democratic principles. Before reforming the security sector, transition societies adopt new constitutions, give powers to legislatures and install civilian ministerial control over defence activities. However, the specific powers granted to parliament to increase the democratic accountability of decision-making over defence activities is a product of democratic evolution. Those states that are more mature democracies have gradually granted their parliaments these powers in response to changing security threats and evolving democratic values. Often, emerging democracies face difficulties in developing strong institutions and decision-making processes to deal with defence activities. Difficulties emerge from the security sector itself as well as the often inactive and complicit stance or active encouragement of nondemocratic behaviour by civilian actors in government or parliament.34 Often the security sector in emerging democracies still retain high levels of autonomy and prerogatives,35 as well as practices that contradict democratic norms. Developing institutions that rein in these tendencies and assert control is one of the primary tasks of these new democracies. In mature democracies, on the other hand, democratic control and accountability of defence activities is often problematised by the sheer size of defence establishments36 where opportunities for shirking increase.37 Numerous studies have also warned about a growing gap between military and civilian sectors regarding attitudes and beliefs.38 In new democracies, this gap is compounded by a continuous divide over views on human rights and their systematic violations by security forces under previous regimes. This calls attention to the importance of social, cultural and educational aspects in military and society relations across all democracies, old and new.

Notes 1 Coicaud, J.-M. (2002) Legitimacy and Politics: a Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 10–11. 2 Gerth, H. and Wright Mills, C. (1991 [1948]) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Routledge, London, p. 294.

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3 Dahl, R.A. (1999) ‘Can international organizations be democratic?’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds) Democracy’s Edges, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 19–36. 4 Graves, M. (2001) The Parliaments of Early Modern Europe, Longman, London, pp. 13–14. 5 Mulgan, R. (2003) Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, p. 8. 6 Mulgan, R. (2003) Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, p. 1. 7 See Born, H., Haltiner, K. and Malesic, M. (eds) (2004) Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, Nomos Vergasgesellschaft, Baden-Baden. 8 House of Lords Constitutional Committee, Call for Evidence: War Making Powers, 11 August 2005. United Kingdom Parliament, London. 9 For example, UNCHR, ‘Ensuring that the military remains accountable to the democratically elected civilian government’, Resolution 2000/47 (2000); OSCE, ‘The democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police’, (specified by a detailed set of provisions) Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994); Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly), ‘Democratic oversight of the security sector in member states’, Recommendation 1713 (2005); see also Hänggi, H. (2003) ‘Making sense of security sector governance’, in H. Hänggi and T. Winkler (eds) Challenges of Security Sector Governance, LIT Verlag, Münster, p. 14. 10 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, pp. 85–100. Online, available at: hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/. 11 Partnership For Peace Framework Document (10 January 1994). Online, available at: www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm; Council of Europe’s Report (12 June 2002), AS/POL (2002) 07REV.2, point 34 (concerning Serbia and Montenegro’s membership application). 12 See also ‘EU backs Turkish curbs on power of military’, Financial Times, 30 July 2003. 13 This Motion explicitly refers to the work of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. See PACE (2005) Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States, Recommendation 1713. Online, available at: assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA05/EREC1713.htm. 14 Quoted from Ghébali, Y.-V. (2003) The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (3 December 1994): A Paragraph-by-Paragraph Commentary on Sections VII and VIII (Democratic Control and Use of Armed Forces), DCAF Document no. 3, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, March, p. 17. 15 Ghébali, 2003. 16 Unclear or overlapping responsibilities of the head of state, cabinet and the minister of defence can lead to numerous frictions and a tense political atmosphere, as happened in many post-socialist countries, which constitutions equivocally defined the responsibilities of the main political actors involved 17 Lunn, S. (2002) The Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Principle and Practice, DCAF Working Paper, Geneva. Online, available at: www.dcaf.ch/publications/ Working_Papers/81.pdf. 18 Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. (1999) ‘Government accountability in parliamentary democracy’, in A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, and B. Manin (eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 281. 19 Many thanks to R. Büscher, German Bundestag; T. Fuior, Advisor to the Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security, Deputies Chamber, Romania; I. Rogers, UK House of Commons Select Committee; J. Reed, Secretary of the US

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

31

32 33 34

Senate, Parliamentary Services; A. Ocer, Defence Committee, Turkey; P.Y. Breuleux, Secretary, Defence Committee, Switzerland; A. Demyanets, Razumkov Centre, Ukraine; M. Karlowski, Chancellery of the Sejm, Bureau of Research, Poland, for their 2005 updates. Special thanks to Dr Wim F. van Eekelen, Member of the Netherlands’ Senate and Vice-President of NATO PA and the support of NATO PA staff as well as Members of Parliament and staff of the parliamentary committees. Freedom House, Democracy Overview. Online, available at: www.freedomhouse. org/ratings/index.htm. The Westminster parliamentary system is used in most Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth nations such as Australia, India, the Republic of Ireland, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. See Germany Armed Forces: Background Papers, German Embassy, Washington, DC. Online, available at: www.germany-info.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/armedforces.html. See, for example, ‘Brown calls for MPs to decide war’, BBC News, 30 April 2005. Online, available at: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4500295. stm. During peacetime, the Chief of Staff assumes the position of supreme leader as primus inter pares. Additionally, Switzerland does not have a head of state or prime minister, but a ceremonial position of an annually rotating president. Born, H., Fluri, P. and Johnsson, A. (eds) (2003) Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, Handbook for Parliamentarians, IPU/DCAF, Geneva/Belgrade, pp. 131–2. Born, H. and Urscheler, M. (2003) ‘Parliamentary accountability of multinational peace support operations: a comparative perspective’, in Born, H. and Hänggi, H. (eds) The ‘Double Democratic Deficit’: Accountability of the Use of Force Under International Auspices, Ashgate Publishers, Aldershot, pp. 53–72. The research was carried out in cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat and the parliamentary defence committees of the 16 selected countries. Karatnycky, A. and Piano, A. (eds) (2002) Freedom in the World: the Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001–2002, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, pp. 736–7. Karatnycky and Piano (2002). Damrosch, L.F. (2003) ‘The interface of national constitutional systems with international law and institutions on using military forces: changing trends in executive and legislative powers’, in C. Ku and H. Jacobsen (eds) Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 49. Faupin, A. ‘Defence procurement decision-making and lobbying: a West European view’, (DCAF). Online, available at: www.dcaf.ch/publications/epublications/Dem Oversight_Turkey/Faupin%20English.pdf; Van Eekelen, W.F. (2005) The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement: Requirements, Production, Cooperation and Acquisition, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Occasional Paper no. 5. Online, available at: dcafnew.isn. ch/_docs/occasional_5.pdf. See Bland, D.L. (1999) Parliament, Defence Policy and the Canadian Armed Forces, School of Policy Studies, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Online, available at: www. queensu.ca/sps/defence/publications/claxton1/claxton1.pdf. For example, the first two Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) military operations (Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in Congo) did not require consent from most of the national parliaments of participating states. A good example is Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s recent proposals for institutional reform to strengthen the state’s response to terrorism sharply accelerate an already

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ongoing trend. See ‘Putin issues plan to tighten grasp, citing terrorism: overhaul of political system opponents call it step back’, New York Times, Tuesday, 14 September 2004, A1. That trend and the recent proposals for reforming the political system overshadow and subsume any specific threats to democracy coming from the armed forces or other state security agencies. See Agüero, F., The New ‘Double Challenge’: Simultaneously Crafting Democratic Control and Efficacy Concerning Military, Police and Intelligence. Online, available at: www.clubmadrid.org/cmadrid/fileadmin/ 1-Ag_ero.pdf. Stepan, A. (1988) Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Expert scholars will even affirm, for instance, that ‘There is arguably greater democratic accountability within the security sector in new democracies like South Africa than obtains in many established democracies like India, France or the United Kingdom’ (G. Cawthra and R. Luckham (eds) (2003) Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, Zed Books, London, p. 18). Feaver, P. (2003) Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Feaver P.D. and Kohn, R.H. (eds) (2001) Soldiers and Civilians: the Civil–Military Gap and American National Security, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Index

11 September 2001 31, 35, 137 Abbate, Janet 121 Abbott, Andrew 57 Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq 126 Adams, T. 135 Afghanistan 28, 188–9 agency theory 96 Al Qaeda 35 Alberts, D.S. 186 Alvesson, M. 81, 82–3 Amadae, S.M. 111 ambidexterity 182, 190–2 American Psychological Association (APA) 133–4, 138 American Soldier, The (1949) 1, 2, 9, 48 Anderson, James K. 48 Andreski, S. 111 anti-colonial wars 166, 169 aptitude testing 47 aptitude–treatment–interaction (ATI) research 135 Arango, Roger L. 53 architecture 188 Armed Forces & Society 52–3, 201 army organization and culture: culture change perspectives 80–3; differentiation perspective 73–6; fragmentation perspective 76–80; integration perspective 69–73; method 68–9; overview 67–8 Army Personnel Research Office, US 47 Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, US 49, 52 Arnold, L.E. 70 Ashkenas, R. 184 Asia 250–6 Associated Universities, US 110–11 asymmetric warfare 4, 7–8, 166

Australia 250–6 autonomy 193–4 Avant, Deborah D. 95–7, 202 Baard, E. 123 Babin, Nehama E. 55 Bachman, Jerald D. 58 Baker, W.E. 247 Balashov, A.I. 116–17 Baldwin, C.Y. 188, 189 Barilli, R. 153 Barley, S. 81 Barry, David 144, 155 Bartone, Paul 57 Barylski, Robert 6 Basanez, M. 247–8 basic training 232 Bass, Bernard 57 Bastani, R. 137 Battistelli, Fabrizio 54, 58, 145, 156 Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb 152 Beaufre, André 169 Beaumont, Roger 78, 79, 166 beauty in the military 149–53 Bebler, Anton 60, 202 behavioural sciences approach 123–4, 131–4 Bekkering, H. 131 Belgian Military Academy 135–6 Belgium 129, 133, 241–3, 258 Bell, Daniel 245 Ben Gurion, David 94 Ben-Ari, Eyal 53, 72, 78 Berg, P.O. 81, 82–3, 145, 146, 147, 148 Berkowitz, B. 172, 176 Betz, D. 203 Beutler, Ingrid 261–83 Birkinshaw, J. 182, 184, 191, 192 Bishop, R. 156

288

Index

Blair, John D. 58 Blair, Tony 269 Blow, F. 137 Bodei, R. 149 Boene, Bernard 47, 78, 222–3 Boer War 97 Bogart, Leo 49 Bolman, L.G. 82 Bondy, Harry 2 Booth, Bradford 55, 58 Born, Hans L. 99–100, 261–83 Bourg, Chris 54 Bowman, William 52 Boys in the Barracks, The (1984) 75 Britain see UK British Joint Warfare Publication 3–50 173–4 Bruni, A. 155 Bryant, C.D. 75 Bryant, Fred B. 93 Bryman, A. 83 Brzezinski, Z. 210 budgetary control 271–2, 280 Builder, Carl 71 Bunce, V. 208–9 bureaucratization 169 Burk, James 70, 199, 201–2 Bush administration, US 31–4, 35, 36, 198, 210 Bustamante, Fernando 224–5 Butler, John Sibley 54 Caforio, Giuseppe 1–16, 53, 57, 89, 90, 101, 200, 201, 217–33 Cairns, G. 145 Callaghan, Jean 60, 201, 204, 206, 207, 212 Canada 74, 241–3, 250–6, 258, 266–83 Cannon-Bowers, J.A. 129 career choice reasons 228–9 Carlton-Carew, Miranda A. 94 Carreiras, Helena 241–3, 248, 256, 259 Caute, David 111 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 70 Central and Eastern Europe, social research 60 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), US 112–13 Centre of Social Sciences Study of Defence, France 53 Chechnya 27, 31, 34, 35, 119 China 33, 98 Chinese People’s Liberation Army 49

Churchill, Winston 94 Cimbala, Stephen J. 93, 97–9 civil–military relations: examples from political science 91–100; political science approach 89–90; political science as core of interdisciplinary studies 100–1 Civil–Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy conference (1995) 197 civil–military relations, Eastern Europe: geopolitics/political geography/international relations 209–11; logic of the research 199–200; military sociology/political science/interdisciplinary studies 200–6; overview 197–9; path-dependency 206–9 civilian control of military 89–101, 223–5 civilian personnel 55–6 Clark, K.B. 188, 189 classical theory of war 26 Clausen, John A. 48 Clemenceau, Georges 94 Clifford, J. 77, 80 Clinton administration, US 31, 32, 34 coalitions 185–6, 193 cognitive psychology 125 Cohen, Eliot A. 93–5, 99 Cold War 25–6, 33, 98, 163–4, 169, 170, 221–2; and Russia 111–13; social research 49–51, 60; and the US 105–11 colonial wars 166, 169 Colton, T.J. 207–8 Colvin, C. 135 combat stress reactions see post-traumatic stress reactions communication technologies 59 communism, war against see Cold War competences, need for 8 comprehensive security approach 172–3 Computer Generated Forces Conferences, US 132 conceptual insecurity: European threat perception 171; new military 174–6; new missions 173–4; new wars 166–8; overview 163–4; political framework 164–6; revolutions in security affairs 169–71; security sector and military transformation 172–3 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1944) 198 Connor, Robert E. Jnr. 93 conscription 51–2, 53, 57, 99, 226–7, 262–3

Index 289 Consolini, P.M. 193 contextual ambidexterity 191, 192 conventional warfare 4, 6, 7–8 Cottey, Andrew 99, 204–5, 206, 212 crisis response operations (CRO) 173–4, 176 Cronbach, L. 135 cross-national studies, need for 1–16 culture change: differentiation approach 81–2; fragmentation approach 82–3; integration approach 80–1 culture gap, civil–military 96 culture linkages, gender integration 252–6 culture studies 58 culture, role in gender integration: cultural map/clusters 247–50; gender equality scale 250–2; Hofstedean explanation 256–8; overview 246–7 Curry, C. David 51 Czech Republic 241–3, 258, 267–83 Da Costa, J.M. 125 Dahl, R.A. 246, 261–2 Dandeker, Christopher 54, 58 Däniker, Gustav 175–6 Danopoulos, Constantine 202, 206 David S. 79 Davis, K. 74 Davis, T.R.V. 145 Davis-Blake, A. 184 De Kloet, C. 137 De Man, A.P. 185, 186, 187 Deagle, Edwin 218 Deaglio, Mario 4 Deal, T.E. 82 Debacker, M. 125 defence activities, parliamentary powers 281–3 defence policy, parliamentary control 263–5, 276–9, 280 defence procurement, parliamentary control 275–6, 277–8, 280 defence spending: dynamics of 27; parliamentary control 271–2, 273, 274–5, 280 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), US 129 Degot, V. 144 democratic accountability: defence policy 263–5; Europe/North America 266–79; overview 261–3; parliament 265–6, 279–83 democratic consolidation 206–9 democratization 28, 165; see also Eastern Europe

demographics trends 29 Denmark 241–3, 258, 267–83 Desch, Michael C. 97–9, 202 development theories and gender integration 243–6 Dewar, R. 184 DiBella, A.J. 81 Diez-Medrano, J. 247–8 differentiation approach to culture 67–9, 73–6, 81–2 Dingsdale, A. 210 diversity issues 54 Dixon, N. 79 Dobratz, Betty 218 Donders, F.C. 125 Donnelly, Chris 203, 206 Downes, Cathy 218 downsizing 55–6, 183, 263 Doz, Y.L. 187 Drucker, Arthur J. 52 Druckman, D. 80 Dunivin, K.O. 81 Dunlop, J.T. 245 Durkheim, Emil 46, 238 Dussauge, P. 185 Duyker, H.J.C. 124 early twentieth century, social research 47 East European Politics and Society 208 East River Project 110–11 Eastern Europe, civil–military relations geopolitics/political geography/international relations 209–11; gender integration 250–6; logic of the research 199–200; military sociology/political science/interdisciplinary studies 200–6; overview 197–9; path-dependency 206–9; political–military relations 263 ecological trends 28 Edmunds, Timothy 99, 172, 204–5, 206, 212 education 127, 131–2, 134–5; see also training efficiency 261–3 Eisenhower, Dwight 79, 105–6, 107 Elkin, F. 72 Ellsberg, Daniel 105 Ender, Morten G. 59 Essens, P. 127, 133 Estonia 113–14, 115, 116 ethical code 223–4 Etzioni, Amital 219

290

Index

Europe: as ally of US 33; civil–military relations 99–100; civilian contractors 56; defence industry 186, 187; downsizing 183; gender integration 250–6; parliamentary oversight powers 266–81; social research 53, 58; threat perception 171; see also Central and Eastern Europe; Eastern Europe European Conference of Traumatic Stress (2005) 130 European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) 9, 50, 96, 139, 201 European Security 205 European Security Strategy (ESS) 171 European Union 279 Everts, P. 79 external threats: Russia 35; US 33–4 Falk, William W. 55 Farr, Beatrice J. 56 Feaver, Peter D. 58, 90, 95–7, 199, 202 Feldman, M.S. 77 Ferguson, Charles D. 40 Fineman, S. 83 Finley, S. 144 flexibility 181–2, 183–5, 193 foreign policy concept 25, 34–5 Forester, A. 205 Forster, Anthony 99–100, 199, 204–5, 206, 212 Foucault, M. 156 Fraccaroli, F. 145, 156 fragmentation approach to culture 67–9, 76–80, 82–3 France 33, 53, 169, 241–3, 258, 267–83 Franke, V.C. 176 Frese, Pamela R. 58 Freud, S. 125 Friedman, Milton 51 Frost, P. 67, 72, 76, 83 Fukuyama, Francis 208, 233 Fuller, Steve 111 Gabriel, Richard A. 51 Gaddis, John Lewis 33 Gagliardi, P. 144, 145, 153, 155 Garrette, B. 185 garrison state 91–3, 98 Garstka, J.J. 186 Geertz, Clifford 79 Gelpi, Christopher 96 gender integration 52, 54, 58–9; importance of culture 256–8; role of

culture 246–52; theories of societal change 238–46; typology of women, armed forces and culture linkages 252–6 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 100, 266 geopolitics 209–11 George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies 197, 208 Georgev, W.A. 115 Georgeva, N.G. 115 German Armed Forces Institute of Social Research (SOWI) 53 German–Soviet non-aggression pact see Ribbentrop–Molotov pact Germany 33, 53, 169; gender integration 241–3, 258; parliamentary control 267–83; World War II 113–17 Gerschenkron, Alexander 67 Ghebali, V.Y. 198 Gherardi, S. 145 Giampietro, M. 145 Gibson, C. 182, 191, 192 Gilardi, R. 146 Ginger, C. 77 Ginzberg, Eli 48 Ginzberg, Sol W. 48 global challenges 25–30 Goldhar, J.D. 184 Gooch, John 220 Gottfredson, M. 194 Gould, R. 137 Greece 241–3, 258 Greenwood, Ernest 217 Guillet, de Montoux, Pierre, 144, 150 Gulf War 56, 59, 97, 168 Haeckel, S.H. 184 Hage, J. 184 Hagström, P. 184 Halman, L. 247–8 Haltiner, Karl 53 Hamel, G. 187 Hamilton, V. Lee 55, 59 Hammarskjöld, Dag 230 Hancock, P. 155 Handbook of the Sociology of the Military 200 Hänggi, H. 100 Harbison, F. 245 Harrell, Margaret 58 Harries-Jenkins, Gwyn 169, 219, 230 Hart–Reed Commission 31 Hatch, M.J. 145 Hauser, M. 82

Index 291 He, Zi-Lin 190 healthcare: cutting edge developments 130; integrated approach to 133–4 hegemony, US 32–4, 35, 36 Heijnen, C. 142 Helmer, John 51 Hennes and Moritz 190–1 Herberg Rothe, A. 167 Herma, John L. 48 Herspring, D. 208 Heslegrave, R. 135 Hicks, Louis 55 Hill, Reuben 48 Hillen, J. 170 Hitt, M.A. 184 Hjorth, D. 155 Hockey, John 74–5, 82 Hofstede, Geert 69, 133, 246, 256–8, 259 Holsti, Kalevi J. 166, 167 Homans, George C. 48 Höpfl, Heather 154 Hughes, T. 136 human behaviour representation (HBR) 134–5 Human Beliefs and Values (2004) 247–8 Human in Command: Peace Support Operations 132–3 human resources activities 127–8 human security 29–30 Hungary 241–3, 258, 267–83 Huntington, Samuel P. 4, 50, 57, 91–3, 96, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206–7, 208, 211, 213, 218, 224, 225, 248 Hutchins, E. 145 Ikenberry, G. John 32–3 illegal immigration 28 independent national armies 224–5 Inglehart, Ronald 245, 246, 247–8, 250–2, 255 Ingraham, L. 75 institutional model of military 53, 54, 57, 75, 78, 225 institutionalized war 166 integration approach to culture 67–73, 80–1 Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) 9, 50, 93–4, 201 interdisciplinary studies: armed forces 8–15; civil–military relations 200–6; military research 134–7; need for 1–8; political science as core 100–1 interfaces 188–9 internal threats, Russia 35

International Applied Military Symposium 138–9 International Military Mental Health Conferences (IMMH) 139 International Military Testing Association (IMTA) 9, 50, 128, 138 International Political Science Association (IPSA) 9, 50, 200 international relations 209–11 International Sociological Association (ISA) 9, 50, 96, 201 international terrorism 6, 27–8, 137; Russian response 35–6 Iran 28 Iraq 28, 33, 56–7, 95, 126, 191, 269, 282 Isenberg, D.J. 181 Israel 28 Italy 241–3, 258 Jager, Thomas 56 Janowitz, Morris 2, 12, 49, 50, 57, 75, 93, 100, 199, 206, 213, 218, 224, 225 Jarvik, L. 137 Jermier, J.M. 70 Jick, T. 184 Johnson, Chalmers 107 Johnson, L. 100 Johnson, Lyndon B. 95 Jones C. 203, 206 Jones, Joseph C. 55 Jordan, A.T. 69 Jordan, Amos A. 218 Justen, J. 135 Kaldor, Mary 4–5, 167 Kallan, M. 137 Kaplan, R.D. 165 Katy´n massacre, Poland 114–15, 116–17 Katzenbach, J.R. 181 Kavelaars, A. 137 Kelty, Ryan D. 54, 56 Kennedy administration, US 106 Kernic, Franz 60, 201 Kerr, C. 245 Kerr, S. 184 Kersten, A. 145 Kestnbaum, Meyer 57, 58, 60 Klein, Paul 54 Klingemann, H.-D. 246, 247 Knoke, D. 190 Knorr Cetina, K. 156 Knowles, J.G. 144 Kohn, Richard H. 58, 96 Kolkowitz, R. 207

292

Index

Kopstein, J.S. 211 Korean War 49, 59, 106 Kosovo 28, 34 Kostera, M. 150 Kourvetaris, George 218 Kramer, E.H. 188 Kramer, Mark 207–8 Kretchik, W.E. 175 Krushchev, Nikita 106 Kuhlmann, Jurgen 204, 206, 207, 212 Kummel, Gerhard 54, 56 Kurashina, Yuko 60 Kursk submarine incident 120 Kwong, Y.Y. 59 Lamme, V.A.F. 125 Langer, Susanne 150 LaPorte, T.R. 193 Lasswell, Harold D. 50, 90, 91–3, 98, 100 Latin America 225, 250–6 Latour, B. 145 Latvia 115, 116 Laub, John H. 59 Laughton, Charlotte Jeane 54 Lavoy, Peter 40 Lawrence, P.R. 189 leadership 57, 132–3, 221 Lebovic, James 97 legitimacy 261–3 Lei, D. 184 Leigh, I. 100 Lenin Political–Military Academy 53 Lepgold, J. 211 Lewin, Kurt 125 Liddell Hart, B.H. 97 Lifton, Robert J. 49 Lincoln, Abraham 94 Linstead, S. 150, 154 Lithuania 115, 116 Little, Roger 49, 52 local wars: containment 169–71; spillover effects 163–4, 167 Lockwood, Robert S. 53 Lorsch, J.W. 189 Louis, M.R. 67, 76 Lowenhardt, J. 203 Luiskx, R. 247–8 Lumsdaine, Arthur A. 48 Lundberg, C.C. 67, 76 Luxembourg 241–3, 258 Lynch, Allen C. 118 Lynne, K. 208 Lytaev, S. 139

Macedonia 267–83 Mackinder, H. 210 Maes, Michael 130 Magala, Slawomir, 12–13, 105–21 Mahoney, J.R. 187 Mailer, Norman 112 Malesic, Marjan 57 Maman, Daniel 53 management science, lessons from; ambidexterity 190–2; flexibility 183–5; future research 192–4; modularity 187–90; networking 185–7; overview 181–2 Mangelsdorff, D. 126 Manigart, P. 133 Manos, Angela M. 55 Martin, J. 67, 69, 73–4, 76, 77, 82, 83 Martin, Michael Louis 53 Martin, Michel 169 Martin, Patricia Yancey 154 Marx, Karl 46 Masks of War (1989) 71 Maxwell, A. 137 McCann, C. 132 McCormick, D. 71, 76 McCroskey, C. 135 McNally, Jeffrey 55 McPherson, K. 78 McSwain, H.W.J. 149 Mearsheimer, John J. 97–9 mental health issues 130 Mershon, S. 74 Meulman, E. 137 Meyerson, D. 67, 77 Microsoft 184–5, 186 Middle East 250–6 Milani, R. 149 Mileham, Patrick 222 Militant Liberty program, US 107 militarized empires 113–17 military: postmodern 174–6; transformation of 172–3 military academies/schools 220–1 military bases 55 military doctrine 25, 34–5 military operations other than war (MOOTW) 174, 231 military profession: future trends 230–3; process of change 225–30 military professional 217–25 Military Testing Association, US 48, 50 military victory, definitions of 26 military–industrial establishment, US 105–7, 108–9

Index 293 Mintzberg, H. 190 missions: new types of 173–4; rehearsals for 127, 131–2, 134–5 modularity 182, 187–90 Moldova 119 Moore, Brenda 59 Moore, J. 79 Moore, L.F. 67, 76 Morgan, G. 72 Morgenthau, Hans 211 Moskos, Charles C. 51, 53, 54, 58, 75–6, 89, 99–100, 169, 170, 174, 175, 218, 225, 230 multi-national peacekeeping operations 60 Münkler, Herfried 167, 168 Munson, E.L. 47 Mychajlyszyn, N. 203, 206 Myers, A. 125 Myers, C.A. 245 Mylle, Jacques 13–14, 123–40 narcotics trafficking 28 National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, US 31 National Endowment for Democracy 197 national security concept 25, 29–30, 34–5 National Security Strategy of the United States 31–2, 172 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): action in Yugoslavia 31; definition of standardization 189–90; definitions of missions 174; member–ship 34, 36, 198; military research 128; negotiation of multilateral agreements 279; Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels 266; Research and Technology Organization 124, 131, 137; Response Force 186; role in Cold War 169; Strategic Concept 183 Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, US 52 Netherlands 132, 137–8, 188–9, 191, 192, 241–3, 258, 267–83 Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 183, 186, 193–4 networking 182, 185–7 new democracies 266–8, 282–3 new military 174–6 new missions 173–4 new tasks 191 new wars 4–8, 166–8 New Zealand 250–6 Newman, Edward 176

Nielsen, Vicki 253 Nincic, M. 211 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 219, 222 non-military targets 168 Norris, P. 250–2 Norway 241–3, 258 Nuciari, Marina 221, 235, 238–59 nuclear weapons 25–7, 28, 32, 110–11, 169 Nuremburg tribunal 32, 113 Nye, J. 197 O’Reilly, C. 190 Oakes, Guy 110, 111, 121 Obraztsov, Igor 50 occupational model of military 53, 54, 58, 75, 78 Odom, William 207–8 officers: evolution/education of 219–25; as professionals 217–19 old democracies 266–8, 282–3 Omahe, K. 245 operational settings 126 operations/operations support 128–30, 133, 136–7 organization and culture: culture change perspectives 80–3; differentiation perspective 73–6; fragmentation perspective 76–80; integration perspective 69–73; method 68–9; overview 67–8 organization science, lessons from: ambidexterity 190–2; flexibility 183–5; future research 192–4; modularity 187–90; networking 185–7; overview 181–2 organizational aesthetics: beauty in the military 149–53; method in aesthetic research 155–6; organizational aesthetics 153–5; organizational artefacts 145–9; overview 144–5 organizational skills 221 organizational structure 193 Orlikowski, W.J. 145 Orlov, A.S. 115 Oslin, D. 137 Ouchi, W.G. 80 outsourcing 55–6, 97, 194, 244 Palestine 28 Palland, B.G. 124 parliamentary accountability mechanisms 265–6; Europe/North America 266–81

294

Index

parliamentary oversight, general powers 269–71 parliamentary powers 279–83 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 198, 202 path-dependency 206–9 Pattyn, Nathalie 136 peace support operations (PSOs) 4–6, 60, 126, 132–3, 164, 170–1, 173–4, 227, 229, 280; parliamentary control 272–5 Pearson, Raymond 113 Pelzer, L. 144, 150 people’s wars 166–7 Perrow, C. 193 Pfanner, T. 168 Pfeffer, J. 194 Phelps, Ruth H. 56 Philips, S. 194 Phillips, J. 156 Pickren, W. 131 Pigeau, R. 132 Pinch, F. 79 Piras, Enrico Maria 12, 14, 144–57 Poland 114–15, 241–3, 258, 267–83 political control of military 89–101, 108, 223–5 political framework 164–6, 167 political geography 209–11 political science perspectives on civil–military relations: in Eastern Europe 200–6; examples 91–100; political science approach 89–90; political science as core of interdisciplinary studies 100–1 political system characteristics 268–9 politicization of the military 94–5 politics, separation of military from 224 Polyani, M. 149, 151 Pondy, L.R. 72 Popevitch, V. 139 Popov, Gavril 107, 119–21 Portugal 241–3, 258 post-traumatic stress disorder/reactions (PTSD/PTSR) 130, 134, 137 postmodern military 174–6 postmodern model 58–9, 77 Potter, William C. 40 Powley, E. 146 Prandstraller, Giampaolo 219 pre-emptive action 32, 33, 36 presidential political systems 265, 266, 267–83 principal–agent relations 96–7 prisoners of war (POWs), interrogation 49 professional developments 233

professional image 230 professional preparation 231–2 Professional Soldier, The 93, 201 professionalism 78, 92, 93–4, 299–300 psychological approach to military research: history of psychology 124–6; military psychology 126–30; overview 123–4; psychological forums 138–9 Puryear, R. 194 Putin, Vladimir 34–6, 115, 118, 120 racial issues 52, 58–9 Ramirez, R. 144, 150 Rani, Curi 55 Reagan administration, US 118 Recht, R. 69–70 recruitment 53–4, 226–7 Reed, Brian J. 55 Reilly, D.A. 211 reserve forces 56–7 Reuven, G. 126 Ribbentrop–Molotov pact 113–16 Rinaldo, R.J. 176 Roberts, K.H. 193 Rochlin, G.I. 193 Rohall, David E. 55, 59 Romania 267–83 Rommel, Field Marshall Erwin 78–9 Rosansky, J. 137 Rosen, M. 145 Rosen, S.P. 83 Rosenhek, Zeev 53 Rossant, M.J. 108 Rostow, W.W. 245 Royal Military Academy, Belgium 133 Royal Prerogative 269, 282 Rudakov, G.P. 116–17 Rukavishnikov, Vladimir 10, 23–39 Russett, B. 165 Russia: security strategies 25–30, 31, 34–9; social history 118–21; social research 50, 53; under communism 111–13; and World War II 113–17 Sabrosky, A. 78 Sagan, Scott D. 40, 193 Salas, E. 129 Sampson, Robert J. 59 Sanchez, R. 187 Santamaria, J.A. 181 Sarkesian, Sam C. 93–5, 98 Sarvas, Stefan 60 Savage, Paul L. 51 Schein, E. 12, 70, 81

Index 295 Schiff, R. 199, 201 Schilling, M.A. 182, 187 Schlossman, S. 74 Schmahmann, K.S. 145 Schmidseder, K. 173–4 Schmitter, Ph. 208 Schneider, S. 146 science, impact on security thinking 25–30 Scott, Wilbur 51, 54 Scroggs, S.K. 71 secular–rational authority 248–52 security policies, parliamentary control 276–9, 280 security revolutions 169–71 security sector reform 172–3 security strategies, Russia/USA 25–39 security thinking, impact of science 25–30 Segal, David R. 10–11, 46–60, 78, 99–100, 174 Segal, Mady W. 54, 55, 238–9, 240, 243, 259 self-expression values 248–52 Sen, A. 247 Serano, José 6 Servan-Schreiber, David 130 Shapiro, C. 186 Shibutani, Tamotsu 48 Shils, Edward 49 Sicilia, G. Thomas 52 Siefert, Ruth 54 Simons, Anna 74 Singer, J.E. 80 Sion, L. 72 Sivohina, T.A. 115 Slack, M. 137 Sloan, E.C. 167 Smith, M. Brewster 48 Smith, Rear Admiral D.F. Jnr. 108–9 Snider, Don M. 57, 70, 93–5 Snook, S.A. 189, 193 Snow, R. 135 social history: and the armed forces 118–21; civil defence 107–11; learning from 113–17; overview 105–7; Russia 111–13 social image 231 social origins, military professionals 230 social prestige 228–9 social research developments/trends: Cold War 49–51, 60; current state of knowledge 55–60; early twentieth century 47; overview 46–7; Vietnam War 51–4, 59; World War II 47–9, 59 social trends, impact on US military 52

societal change theories: first general model of the women–military relationship 239–41; index of female soldiers’ integration 241–3; overview 238–9; similarity and diversity within countries 243–6 Society for Military Psychology 133–4, 138 sociology 200–6 Soeters, Joseph 2, 69–70, 74, 133, 191 Soldier and the State, The (1957) 93, 200, 213 soldier–scholars 93–5 Sony 186 Sorensen, Henning 53 Soviet Union see Russia Soviotology 206–9 Spain 241–3, 258, 267–83 Special Operations Research Office, John Hopkins University 49 specialization 3–4, 192 specificity of military profession 222–5 Spector, Leonard S. 40 Spencer, Herbert 46 Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture (1986) 74–5 Stalin, Joseph 114–15, 120 standardization 185–7, 189–90 Stanley, Jay 54, 91 Stanley, Sandra Carson 54 Staren, D. 136 Steensma, H.K. 182 Stein, F.P. 186 Stekete, M. 187 Steyaert, C. 155 Stiglitz, J.E. 245 Stogdill, R.M. 125 Stouffer, Andrew Samuel 1, 2, 8, 48 Strategic Bombing Surveys 49 strategic concepts/doctrines, changes in 30–7 Strati, A. 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 154, 155, 156 stressful occupations 135–6 strong parliaments 280–3 structural ambidexterity 191–2 Studies in social Psychology in World War II (1949) 48 study centres 8–9 Study on NATO Enlargement (1995) 198 Sub-Saharan Africa 250–6 subcultures 73–6, 81–2 Sun-Zsu 181

296

Index

Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (2002) 94 survival values 248–52 Sutton, R.I. 194 Sweden 267–83 Switzerland 267–83 symbolic studies 72 Sztompka, Piotr 3 TADMUS (tactical decision-making under stress) 129 Tanercan, E. 133 Taylor, S. 144, 152, 155 Taylor, William J. 53, 218 technology 22, 186–7, 193–4 Teitler, Gerke 220 TenHave, T. 137 terrorism, international see international terrorism Third World countries, armies in 224–5 Thomas, V. 74 Thompson, J. 78 Thompson, R. 137 threat perceptions: Europe 171; military professionals 226–7 Thurmond, Strom 108–9 Tonelson, Alan 233 total wars 166 traditional authority 248–52 traditional functions 163–4 Tragedy of Great Power Politics, The (2003) 98 training 127, 131–2, 134–5, 220–1, 222, 231–3 Trainor, Stephen C. 54 transdisciplinarity 3 transitology 206–9 Turkey 241–3, 258, 267–83 Tushman, M.L. 190 twenty-first century challenges 23–39 Tyler, M. 152 UK 74–5, 97, 192, 241–3, 258, 267–83 Ukraine 112 Ulrich, D. 184 UN (United Nations): Human Development Report 263–4; leadership role 36; peacekeeping operations 5, 127, 170 United Psychogeriatric Biopsychosocial Evaluation and Treatment (UPBEAT) programme 137 US: civil–military relations 92–3, 97, 99; and the Cold War 105–11; gender

integration 241–3, 250–6, 258; military culture 71–2, 75, 78; parliamentary oversight powers 266–83; security sector reform 172–3; security strategy 25–39; social research 47–54, 55–60; technology 186 US Air Force 52, 137 US Army Personnel Research Office 49 US Department of Defense 55 US Military Academy, West Point (USMA) 135 US National Guard 56 US Naval Warfare Center 129 US Strategy of National Security for the 21st Century 31 Uzzi, B. 184 values-based model of military 53 Van Clausewitz, C. 164, 166, 181 Van Cott, H. 80 Van Creveld, M. 163 Van der Meulen, J. 74 Van Doorn, Jacques 218 Van Maanen, J. 81, 155 Van Stone, W. 137 Varian, H.R. 186 Vattimo, Gianni 149 Vaughan, D. 193 Velzen, van T. 187 Verbunck, F. 133 Vermetten, E. 137 veterans 59 Vico, G. 153 Vietnam War 95, 97, 106; social research 51–4, 59 Vlachova, Marie 60 Vogelaar, A. 127, 133 Volberda, H. 183–4 voluntarism 51–2, 53, 59, 226–7, 263 Von Bredow, Wilfried 163–77 Vuyk, R.J. 124 Waard, E. de 181–94 Waldrop, P. 135 warfare, new forms of 4–8, 163–4, 166–8 warlords 168 Watkins, Gayle L. 57, 94 Watson, B.A. 79 weak parliaments 280–3 weak states 167–8 weapons of mass destruction see nuclear weapons Weber, Max 46, 181, 261 Weick, K.E. 193

Index 297 Welzel, Ch. 246, 247 Westminster parliamentary system 267–81 Westphalian system 165 White, D.A. 144, 150 Whitehead, L. 210–11 Widen, Lt. Col. S.C. 70, 81 Wilkins, A.L. 80 Williams, John Allen 10–11, 12, 58, 89–101, 174 Williams, Robin M. 48 Wilson, G.C. 176 Winslow, D. 11–12, 67–84, 133 Wirtz, James J. 40 Wolters, G. 125 women soldiers see gender integration Women’s Corps 244–5 Wong, Leonard 55 Wong, Pol-Kam 190 Wood, Frank R. 53 Woodruff, Todd D. 54

Woolgar, S. 145 workgroup study: beauty in the military 149–53; method in aesthetic research 155–6; organizational aesthetics 153–5; organizational artefacts 145–9; overview 144–5 World War II: Russian involvement in 112, 113–17, 119–20; social research 47–9, 59 Wright Mills, C. 50 Wright, Quincy 47 Yarmolinsky, A. 108–9, 118 Yeltsin administration, Russia 34 Yerkes, R.M. 47 Yugoslavia 31 Zeidner, Joseph 52 Zirker, Daniel 202, 206 Zulean, Marian 60, 197–213

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