SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY A RADICAL PHILOSOPHY READER
This page intentionally left blank.
SOCIALISM, FEMIN...
64 downloads
2272 Views
2MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY A RADICAL PHILOSOPHY READER
This page intentionally left blank.
SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY A RADICAL PHILOSOPHY READER
Edited by Sean Sayers and Peter Osborne with an introduction by Christopher J.Arthur
London and New York
First published 1990 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1990 Radical Philosophy All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Socialism, feminism and philosophy: a Radical Philosophy reader. 1. English philosophy I. Sayers, Sean II. Osborne, Peter 192 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Socialism, feminism and philosophy: a radical philosophy reader/ edited by Sean Sayers and Peter Osborne: with an introduction by Christopher J.Arthur. p. cm. Essays previously appeared in the journal Radical Philosophy between 1984 and 1989. Includes bibliographical references. 1. Feminism. 2. Women and socialism. 3. Philosophy, Marxist. 4. Human ecology. I. Sayers, Sean. II. Osborne, Peter. HQ1206.S665 1991 305.42–dc 20 90–34954 ISBN 0-203-41198-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-72022-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0 415 05627 6 (Print Edition) ISBN 0 415 05628 4 pbk
CONTENTS
Notes on Contributors INTRODUCTION Christopher J.Arthur
vii
1
Part I Feminism and philosophy 1
2 3 4
5
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND THE TENSIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY Jean Grimshaw
9
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER Christopher J.Arthur
27
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET Ross Poole
46
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY: A CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES Susan F.Parsons
69
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POSTMODERNS: DEVELOPMENTS IN A FEMINIST AESTHETIC Pauline Johnson 100
Part II Socialism and philosophy
vi SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
6
7
8 9
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY: A VERSION OF PASTORAL? Jonathan Rée
125
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD: A CRITIQUE OF G.A.COHEN Sean Sayers
140
ANALYTICAL MARXISM: A NEW PARADIGM? Joseph McCarney
170
SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY: BEYOND STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY Roger Harris
179
Part III Nature and human nature 10 WOMEN, HUMANITY AND NATURE Val Plumwood
213
11 HUMANISM=SPECIESISM? MARX ON HUMANS AND ANIMALS Ted Benton
237
12 THE HUMAN BODY IN SOCIAL THEORY: REICH, FOUCAULT AND THE REPRESSIVE HYPOTHESIS Russell Keat
277
Index
307
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Christopher J.Arthur is Lecturer in Philosophy at Sussex University. He was educated at the Universities of Nottingham and Oxford. He is the author of Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel (Blackwell, 1986), and editor of Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (Lawrence & Wishart, 1970) and of E.Pashukanis, Law and Marxism (Ink Links, 1978). He was a founder member of the Radical Philosophy Group. Ted Benton teaches sociology at the University of Essex. His previous publications have included books on the philosophy of social science and structural Marxism, as well as numerous articles on realist philosophy of science, history and philosophy of the life sciences, and Marxist theory. His current research focuses on the relationships between socialism and environmental issues. Jean Grimshaw teaches philosophy and cultural studies in the Department of Humanities at Bristol Polytechnic. She is the author of Feminist Philosophers: Women’s Perspectives on Philosophy (Wheatsheaf, 1986), and of various articles and reviews. She is a member of the editorial collective of Radical Philosophy. Roger Harris has taught philosophy at Middlesex Polytechnic since 1968. He is active in NATFHE, the Further and Higher Education Teachers’ Union—formerly a branch and regional officer, and currently a delegate to the association’s National Council. Pauline Johnson is a Lecturer in Sociology at Macquarie University. Her research interests include feminist theory, ideology and art, and contemporary critical theory. She is currently writing a book on main intellectual trends in modern feminism. Russell Keat is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Lancaster, and Director of its Centre for the Study of Cultural
viii SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Values. He is the author of The Politics of Social Theory (Blackwell and Chicago University Press, 1981) and, with John Urry, of Social Theory as Science (Routledge 1975, 2nd edn 1982); and has recently co-edited with Nick Abercrombie a collection of papers on ‘Enterprise Culture’ (Routledge, forthcoming). He has been a member of the Radical Philosophy editorial collective since 1975. Joseph McCarney teaches philosophy at South Bank Polytechnic, London. He is the author of The Real World of Ideology (Harvester, 1980), Social Theory and the Crisis of Marxism (Verso, 1990), and of various articles on the philosophies of Marx and Hegel. Peter Osborne teaches philosophy and history of ideas at Middlesex Polytechnic. He is the editor of Socialism and the Limits of Liberalism (Verso, 1990). He has published a number of papers on Adorno’s philosophical and cultural theory and is a contributing editor, with Andrew Benjamin, of Philosophy and Art: ICA Documents (Free Associations Press, forthcoming). He has been a member of the Radical Philosophy editorial collective since 1982. Susan F.Parsons is Principal of a part-time course in the Department of Adult Education, leading to a Certificate in Theological and Pastoral Studies from the University of Nottingham. She has taught philosophy as part of the humanities degrees of Nottingham Polytechnic and in a variety of evening classes. As a result of this experience, she is committed to adult education, to the serious discussion of feminism, and to the exercise of philosophy in an interdisciplinary setting. Ross Poole was educated at Sydney University, Australian National University, and Oxford University. He has published articles in academic and radical journals in Australia and in England, and is completing a book entitled Morality and Modernity to be published by Routledge. He teaches philosophy in the School of History, Philosophy and Politics at Macquarie University, Sydney. Val Plumwood is a research associate of Sydney’s Macquarie University where until recently she taught courses in philosophy of social theory, environmental philosophy and feminist theory. She has published widely in these areas, and also on environmental areas such as forestry, and has been a long-time activist on both environmental and women’s issues. She now makes her home in the rainforest near Braidwood on the southern tablelands of New
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ix
South Wales where she is completing a book on ecofeminism. She is a frequent contributor to public discussions, including radio, TV, newspapers, conferences, workshops and community talks, on this and related topics in green theory. Jonathan Rée teaches philosophy and history of ideas at Middlesex Polytechnic, and has been a member of the Radical Philosophy collective since its formation. His books include Proletarian Philosophers (Oxford University Press, 1984) and Philosophical Tales (Methuen, 1987). He is now working on a study of the human voice. Sean Sayers teaches philosophy at the University of Kent. He was one of the founding editors of Radical Philosophy. His publications include Reality and Reason: Dialectic and the Theory of Knowledge (Blackwell, 1985) and, with Richard Norman, Hegel, Marx and Dialectic: A Debate (Harvester Press and Humanities Press, 1980). Together with David McLellan, he has recently edited a volume of papers on Socialism and Morality (Macmillan, 1990). He is currently writing a book on work and human nature.
This page intentionally left blank.
INTRODUCTION Christopher J.Arthur
Original versions of the chapters in this anthology appeared in Radical Philosophy; it represents very well the concerns of the magazine. Radical Philosophy first appeared in January 1972 and has come out three times a year since then. The founders and most of the early contributors had been students in the 1960s. Our intellectual formation was characterised by a disjunction between the ferment of radical and critical ideas coming out of the student revolt and the narrow sterile orthodoxy pervading the academic system in which we were trained. In those days professional philosophy was dominated by the analytical approach in its most philistine form—so-called ‘ordinary language philosophy’. The Radical Philosophy Group was formed in 1971 to organise publications and conferences which would provide a forum for the discussion of ideas excluded from the existing institutions. We were the first of the radical subject-based groups that emerged around that time to answer a need felt right across the spectrum of learning. (For more about the intellectual context, and original objectives, of Radical Philosophy see the Introduction by Roy Edgley to Radical Philosophy Reader, London, Verso, 1985.) Since those days much has changed: analytical philosophy is in decline and no new paradigm has established itself; the thinkers previously excluded from the curriculum (such as Hegel, Marx and Sartre) are now generally taught. Nonetheless, the continued success of the journal shows it still fulfils a felt need. But what exactly is the project calling itself Radical Philosophy? The Radical Philosophy magazine reaches a more diverse readership than any other philosophy journal. This is because RadicalPhilosophy turns its face partly towards the philosophy departments, but also 1
2 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
partly towards the radical left. In the first case it is concerned to contest the terrain of establishment philosophy, e.g. to redefine the ‘canon’ to be studied. In the second case it is concerned to improve the philosophical awareness of radical movements and to contribute to socialist theory. This has been all the more necessary in recent years because so much of the left in the academy is prone to espousing uncritically the latest ‘French fashions’. Radical Philosophy has generally been characterised by a sceptical and tough-minded scrutiny of overblown claims and language. ‘Clarity is not enough’, as someone once said of analytical philosophy, but it is certainly desirable. We commend the present papers to the reader in the hope that they are both radical in their concerns and rigorous in their argument. A recent debate in The Times Higher Education Supplement (7 April 1989 and 12 May 1989) on the character and achievement of Radical Philosophy brought out one important ambivalence in the definition of these radical concerns. Ted Benton and Sean Sayers quoted from the founding statement: ‘that the Group will not attempt to lay down a philosophical line’. In response Joseph McCarney claimed that such a negative definition seems to allow that anything excluded by the existing establishment might be considered radical. He pointed out that Radical Philosophy has not in fact treated Marxism as a position on a par with all others in ‘a boundless receptivity to ideas’. Certainly Marxism is inescapable for critically minded people: one has to take account of it, if only to reject it. But the journal has never taken a formal position for or against Marx, still less elaborated any particular Marxism (although, again as McCarney pointed out, the more dialectical tradition going back to left-Hegelianism has been present in much of the work). The pieces included in this book reflect this: the influence of Marx is present in some, but by no means all. At the same time, the journal has remained responsive to new ideas and debates in philosophy and on the left. In recent years, feminist and green ideas have been influential and given rise to controversy. They have been discussed in Radical Philosophy, and this is reflected in the present collection. An uncontentious definition of our project would be that Radical Philosophy is a journal of socialist and feminist philosophers. ***
INTRODUCTION 3
For this book the papers have been organised into three parts in accordance with the most important current concerns of radical circles, and hence of our magazine. First there is a section on feminism and philosophy. We are pleased that Radical Philosophy has been an important forum for the discussion of issues in feminist theory. Second we have a section on socialism and philosophy which reflects important current debates about the renewal of the Marxist tradition. Finally we have a section called ‘Nature and Human Nature’. We begin with some pieces related to feminist issues. The discussion that has gone on in feminist thought involves a number of related strands. One elementary task is the recovery and interpretation of the past, either in the form of rescuing the voices of women themselves (see Grimshaw below) or of a critical scrutiny of what the (male) luminaries of the philosophical tradition have had to say about women (see Arthur). Another task is to bring a feminist perspective to bear on the standard philosophical domains, such as ethics (see Parsons), as had earlier occurred with Marxist influenced social-structural perspectives (see Poole for both). The same need applies to the new theoretical problematics that emerged coincident with the rise of feminism, such as critical cultural theory (see Johnson) and ecology (see Plumwood below). Grimshaw discusses readings of that prototype feminist Mary Wollstonecraft. She emphasises the need to situate her work in the eighteenth-century context, and shows how its tensions arise (in ways familiar to modern feminism) from using, and at the same time contesting, the moral and political perspectives out of which it comes. Arthur takes up a debate on the role assigned to women in Hegel’s philosophy, notably his admiration for Antigone’s moral quality. Poole argues that modern conceptions of morality, markets and masculinity exist on the same terrain and cannot be understood except in relation to each other. Parsons assesses the understanding of morality that emerges from feminist writing. She distinguishes three broad trends: liberalism, naturalism, and ‘social constructionism’. She thereby sheds light on both moral philosophy and feminist concerns. Finally, in this part, Johnson subjects to critical scrutiny the supposed appropriateness of post-modernist aesthetics to feminist art theory and practice. In the second part, papers are presented relating to Marx-
4 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
ismand socialism. Ever since Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach (‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is—to change it.’), the status of philosophy for Marxism has been controversial. Marx ceased doing ‘philosophy’ in favour of ‘science’; yet it seems clear a philosophical ‘moment’ is necessary in situating Marx’s project. The problem is especially acute when one considers the needs of the proletariat charged with ‘changing it’ (see Rée). The need for contestation on the philosophical level is illustrated, negatively at least, by the perennial attempts by well-meaning souls to ‘give Marxism a philosophy’ drawn from sources alien to it, such as Kantianism, functionalism, or, today, ‘rational choice theory’ (see Sayers’ and McCarney’s rebuttals below). As far as the more specifically political is concerned there is a perennial tendency to assimilate socialism merely to a form of liberalism. Bernstein started this one, and it is running again today under such banners as ‘pluralism’, ‘civil society’, etc. (see Harris). Rée meditates on the ambivalences of ‘philosophers’ to ‘the people’ outside the institutions, and of the proletarians who set out to ‘philosophise’. He begins with a report on a new visit to Jock Shanley, a participant in the movement whose history was investigated in Rée’s book Proletarian Philosophers (OUP, 1984). Sayers and McCarney are both concerned to criticise influential variants of self-styled ‘analytical Marxism’, in the former case G.A.Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (criticised for its undialectical method), and in the latter case Jon Elster’s Making Sense of Marx. Harris conducts a searching examination of the most important moments of philosophy down to contemporary appeals to the concept of ‘civil society’ in order to argue for a conception of democracy that steers a course between romantic individualist pluralism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the tension that has plagued the left between spontaneous mass-mobilisation and Spartan discipline. The final part, on ‘Nature and Human Nature’, concerns the complex interdeterminations, the continuities and discontinuities, of culture and biology, of humans with other natural beings. Of course the topic of human nature is as old as philosophy, but today it is seen to present more complex problems than ever; there is the problematisation of gender stereotypes which are themselves articulated with the supposed humanity/nature dichotomy (see Plumwood); likewise new theories of the self still
INTRODUCTION 5
have to contend with the self’s embodiment (see Keat); while even a theory like Marx’s which always claimed to be a naturalism needs re-examining in the light of new ecological thinking (see Benton). Plumwood presents a conceptual framework in which to locate the considerable variety of responses to the traditional dichotomy of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ and its association with others— mind and body, humans and animals, ‘man’ and ‘nature’. The masculine ideal of the rational control of nature has thus been intertwined with the domination of women by men. She argues for an eco-feminism transcending such oppositions. Benton argues that we must take a fresh look at Marx in the light of the concerns of so-called ‘new’ social movements. He concentrates here on how the early work of Marx relates to ecology and animal welfare. He concludes that Marx’s conception of the human relationship to nature and to other species is problematic and needs substantial revision, because it relies often on an over-sharp human/animal dualism. Keat argues that both Reich and Foucault help us to understand the distinctively ‘human’ character of human bodies, by removing them from the category of exclusively biological entities. *** The reader is invited to take other pathways through this book than that indicated by the editorial arrangement. Thus those interested in feminism can take Val Plumwood’s piece together with the first section; those primarily interested in ethics may turn first to Poole and Parsons; and so on. As noted above, an earlier Reader was published in 1985: it was based on issues 1–36. The present collection covers issues 36– 52. The selection was made by Chris Arthur, Jean Grimshaw, Peter Osborne and Sean Sayers, and approved by the editorial collective of Radical Philosophy. We have chosen to avoid reproducing pieces already reprinted elsewhere, or that substantially overlap with other such publications. Among those ruled out by these criteria are the following: Susan Easton, ‘Hegel and feminism’ (RP 38)—see Hegel and Modern Philosophy ed. David Lamb, London, Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 30–55.
6 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Ruth Levitas, ‘New Right Utopias’ (RP 39)—see her The Ideologyof the New Right, Cambridge, Polity, 1985. Joseph McCarney, ‘What makes theory critical?’ (RP 42)—see his Social Theory and the Crisis of Marxism, London, Verso, 1990. David Macey, ‘Lacan in Context’ (RP 35)—see his Lacan in Contexts, London, Verso, 1988. István Mészáros, ‘Marx’s “Social Revolution” and the Division of Labour’ (RP 44)—see his The Power of Ideology, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989. Jerry Ravetz, ‘Ideology in the Philosophy of Science’ (RP 37)— see his The Merger of Knowledge with Power, Mansell (forthcoming). Barry Richards, ‘The Eupsychian Impulse’ (RP 48)—see his Images of Freud: Cultural Responses to Psychoanalysis, Weidenfeld Dent, 1989. Sean Sayers, ‘The need to work’ (RP 46)—see On Work, ed. R.E. Pahl, Oxford, Blackwell, 1988, pp. 722–41.
Part I FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
This page intentionally left blank.
1
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND THE TENSIONS IN FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY Jean Grimshaw The history of the reception and interpretation of Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman is a complex and fascinating one.1 It was praised by many of her radical contemporaries, including Tom Paine and Mary’s husband, the radical anarchist philosopher and social theorist, William Godwin. It was condemned, sometimes vitriolically, by other contemporaries, including, notoriously, Horace Walpole, who called Mary a ‘hyena in petticoats’ and refused to have her book in his library. The Historical Magazine declared, in 1799, that her work should be read ‘with disgust by any female who has any pretensions to delicacy; with detestation by everyone attached to the interests of religion and morality’. It was not only men who condemned it. Many women disliked it intensely, including Hannah More, who felt justified in condemning it without even having read it. The fate of the Vindication cannot be separated from views of Mary’s personal life, nor from the fate of radical political ideas in the wave of repression and political reaction that dominated English politics in the years after the 1790s. Mary’s name and her work were tarred with the brush of French-style liberty, free thought, free love, irreligion, the undermining of family life, and all those things that were anathema both to conservative political orientations and to nineteenth-century evangelicalism. Apart from the memoir published after her death by her husband William Godwin,2 obituaries were mostly ambivalent or condemnatory, and no biography was published until 1884, nearly 100 years after her death. One gets the impression that few people in the nineteenth century can actually have read the Vindication, and that Wollstonecraft’s reputation was an embarrassment to the 9
10 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
bourgeois, evangelical and philanthropic modes in which much Victorian feminism was cast. Some contemporary judgements are hardly less damning. Lundberg and Farnham, in their book Modern Woman: The Lost Sex (1959) wrote: Mary Wollstonecraft was an extreme neurotic of a compulsive type. Out of her illness arose the ideology of feminism, which was to express the feelings of so many women in years to come. Unconsciously…Mary and the feminists… wanted to turn on men and injure them. …Underneath her aggressive writings, Mary was a masochist…as indeed all the leading feminist theorists were in fact. By behaving as she did Mary indicated… that she was unconsciously seeking to deprive the male of his power, to castrate him.3 In the Pelican History of England, the historian J.H.Plumb writes about what he calls the ‘self-conscious intellectual bohemianism’ which deliberately set out to live in defiance of accepted moral codes. Men and women had lived in sin frequently enough in the eighteenth century, but they had felt no compulsion to justify their acts on the highest ethical principles. The intellectual bohemians, Godwin, Shelley, Mary Wollstonecraft and their circle, sinned for the sake of revolt rather than for enjoyment and then justified themselves by the principles of liberal philosophy. Squalid as their lives were, they had important consequences for English literary tradition.4 This is perhaps one of the most egregiously ignorant and prejudiced judgements on Wollstonecraft that I have come across. Most nineteenth-century critics, then, and some twentiethcentury ones, seem scarcely to have read the Vindication, and thus failed to notice that not even on the most casual reading could one find in it an apology or justification for loose living or sexual libertinism. It was Wollstonecraft’s life and reputation which largely determined how she was perceived. Ironically, however, if Wollstonecraft was often perceived by earlier critics as a radical and libertine, contemporary perceptions of her, often by feminist writers, have been very different. One of the most recent essays on Wollstonecraft is by Cora Kaplan.5 Kaplan’s critique
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 11
concentrates on the text of the Vindication, and from its pages emerges a very different Wollstonecraft. Kaplan argues that a central theme of the book is a deep ambivalence about sexuality, even a violent antagonism to the sexual; an exaggeration of the role of the sensual in the lives of women which recapitulates that of Rousseau, and a fear of the disruptive power of female sensuality. In the Vindication, Wollstonecraft turned against feeling and sensibility, and they are seen as reactionary and regressive. As Kaplan puts it: Sexuality and pleasure are narcotic inducements to a life of lubricious slavery. Reason is the only human attribute appropriate to the revolutionary character, and women are impeded by their early and corrupt initiation into the sensual from using theirs.6 Wollstonecraft’s programme for women, far from being that of ‘free love’ or sexual libertinism, is that of a strenuous programme of renouncing the sensual; her ideal is that of a life in which Reason is triumphant, but at the cost of the death of female pleasure and sexuality. Rather similarly, Diana Coole’s7 discussion of the Vindication stresses the way in which the book seems at times to require of women an almost ascetic dedication to duty, and a rejection of passion or self-indulgence. Both Kaplan and Coole and other commentators suggest that Wollstonecraft’s feminism could really only apply to middle-class women; the Vindication is, in essence, a liberal or bourgeois feminist tract which, while indeed calling attention forcefully to many aspects of sexual injustice and inequality, failed to address the lives of working-class women or even to challenge in any fundamental way the norms of bourgeois marriage and family life. Coole suggests that Wollstonecraft basically shared much of Rousseau’s idealised vision of the patriarchal bourgeois family, away from the corruption and ‘false manners’ of the city. And Kaplan writes that in Wollstonecraft’s text, with its stress on the potential virtues of those in the ‘middle’ class and on the importance of Reason, idealised humanity appears as a rational, plain-speaking bourgeois man. In one sense, I do not think that these judgements are wrong; they represent the ‘Wollstonecraft’ who appears in the pages of the Vindication far more adequately than those judgements which
12 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
have seen Wollstonecraft as a libertine. But if many earlier critiques of Wollstonecraft failed to pay any attention to the text of the Vindication at all, I think that some contemporary discussion, in focusing so closely and sometimes exclusively on the text of the book, has failed fully to see the ways in which Wollstonecraft’s work resists easy classification. The Vindication has often been criticised for being rushed, hasty and repetitive. There is some substance in these criticisms; it was written in six weeks, in the heat of a political situation. But it is not just that the text itself sometimes appears rushed; it should, I think, be read as provisional. In other words the ‘Wollstonecraft’ of the Vindication does not adequately represent, all by itself, Mary Wollstonecraft’s thinking about the situation of women and the response she thought that they should make. Virginia Woolf wrote of Wollstonecraft: ‘Every day…something was born in her that thrust aside her theories and forced her to model them afresh’.8 The Vindication needs understanding not only in the context of Wollstonecraft’s life, but in the context of her other writings and the ways in which these wrestled with the dilemmas thrown up by eighteenth-century politics, both radical and reactionary, and by contemporary views on literature and philosophy and on the nature of femininity. These dilemmas were of course cast in an eighteenth-century form, but they are ones which, in altered shape, feminism still continues to encounter. Wollstonecraft never had an answer to any of these dilemmas that could satisfy her for long; and it is perhaps the restless and provisional quality of her work that often makes it speak most strongly to those who, nearly 200 years later, often encounter similar dilemmas. Her struggle was formed around a number of features of eighteenth-century thought and politics. Central, of course, were the radical political ideas of her time. Mary herself became part of the circle of radical London intelligentsia, including Tom Paine, Thomas Holcroft, her publisher Joseph Johnson and her husband William Godwin, who believed passionately in the cluster of political ideas which centred around the critique of autocratic government and hereditary privilege, belief in the natural right of individuals to self-determination, and belief in the perfectibility of human nature and institutions if only corruption and privilege could be swept away. Mary was also heir to a steady stream of writing in the eigh-
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 13
teenth century about the nature and situation of women. She had almost certainly read feminist writers such as Catherine Macaulay; but there were men too, such as some radical teachers in Dissenting Academies, who had written about the social oppression of women. As Barbara Taylor points out, in her history of Owenite socialist feminism, it was not too hard to see an analogy between a critique of aristocratic government and a critique of the despotic power of men in families.9 Wollstonecraft herself drew such analogies frequently; she also compared the idle and corrupt state of the aristocracy to the state of degradation into which she thought women had fallen. Not all of the radical circle to which she belonged were by any means fully committed to feminist analysis or goals, but lip service at least was paid to questions about the oppression of women. The eighteenth century saw, in fact, a growing interest in questions about femininity and female consciousness. This was importantly related to changes in the social situation of women. The precise nature of changes in eighteenth-century family patterns remains a matter of historical dispute, but what is at least clear is that, increasingly, for middle-class women, the home was no longer also the workplace, and married women were not generally seen as independent economic actors or helpmates. The home of the nouveau-riche bourgeois was becoming a display case for affluence, and his wife’s role was being reduced to that of a decorative accessory in this display. The only route to security (of a sort) for a woman was a marriage in which she was wholly dependent, and for the woman who was not married, the prospects were bleak indeed: the often humiliating and penurious ‘careers’ of governess or lady’s companion (both of which Wollstonecraft experienced), or a dependence on the charity of some male relative. This total dependence of women on and within marriage was a central target of nearly all feminist critique in the period. But the eighteenth century also saw the beginnings of an idealisation of family life and the married state that remained influential throughout the nineteenth century. The eighteenth century moved away from the cynical and overtly sexually exploitative views of women which had tended to characterise the Restoration period; but moved away, also, from those religious views which had seen women simply as Eve the temptress, the occasion of man’s sin. Women became, as Janet Todd puts it, ‘the fair sex’, the Protes-
14 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
tant virgin.10 And there are two related aspects of eighteenthcentury thought about women which are central to understanding Wollstonecraft: the idea that virtue is gendered, that it is different for women and for men, and that it is female ‘sensibilities’, women’s particular psychological characteristics, which fit women for a specifically female type of virtue (but also disqualify them from that type thought appropriate to the male, and render them weaker and potentially easily corruptible). The overt disparagement of women displayed, for example, by Lord Chesterfield in his letters to his son, was displaced by the musings of writers such as Addison and Steele, in new journals such as the Tatler and the Spectator, on the virtues of the ‘fair sex’; a sentimental vision of the gentle, feeling, but subordinate wife and mother. But it is above all the philosophy and other writings of Rousseau which form a backdrop to Wollstonecraft’s work, and central to this is Rousseau’s account, in Emile, of female nature, his prescriptions for female upbringing and female virtue. Emile is Rousseau’s account of the sort of upbringing that would help to form the model citizen and enable him to develop the qualities of autonomy and self-determination; and the book portrays, too, Rousseau’s vision of the rural family and simplicity of life which alone would enable the citizen to remain uncorrupted by the evil manners of the city. Emile’s virtues are to be those of selfsufficiency, hardiness and independence of mind. Above all, he is to learn to make his own judgements based on his own experience, and to be beholden to no-one else for his opinions; Rousseau even suggests that Emile should not learn to read whilst still a boy. But when we turn to the education of the girl Sophie, who is to be Emile’s companion, it is a different story. Just as Emile is to be truly a man, so Sophie is to be truly a woman. ‘But for her sex,’ Rousseau writes, ‘a woman is a man.’ Yet where sex is concerned man and woman are unlike; each is the complement of the other; the difficulty in comparing them lies in our inability to decide, in either case, what is a matter of sex, and what is not.11 Rousseau’s own conclusions were that almost everything was a matter of sex; and he paints a broad picture of female psychology, female sensibility and female virtue which underly his pre-
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 15
scriptions for Sophie’s education. Resemblances and differences, he argues, must have an influence on the moral nature. The female is a female always, the male only a male from time to time, and the characteristics of woman will always inflect our conception of her virtue. What then are her characteristics? Woman, Rousseau believes, has a power over men, the power of charming and captivating them and of inflaming their senses. Women ‘so easily stir a man’s senses and fan the ashes of a dying passion’ that were they not to be carefully contained and controlled, ‘the men, tyrannised over by the women, would at last become their victims, and would be dragged to their death without the least chance of escape’.12 It is in their beauty, their wit and their wiles that women exercise their influence over men; attempt equality with men, and they will simply lose that power—they will become inferior. Women have their own skills, characteristic of the sex. Observe a woman, Rousseau says, and see how she exercises her skills of sympathy and sensibility, see how acute her observations of other people are, see how she knows how to charm and even get her own way by her wiles. She is not capable of abstract reasoning or of general principles; but her skills will complement those of men. Undermine these by the wrong education, and she will not become equal with men, she will simply become an inferior woman. Remove her from male control and conceive of her as independent, and she will lose those very qualities which make her estimable and desirable. Woman not only possesses a different nature from man; she is also bound, by the constraints of her life, to different principles of virtue from those which apply to men. Above all, she has a responsibility to her husband, and to her children, to ensure that her reputation is above reproach (Rousseau, like many others, regarded doubt about the paternity of one’s children as the ultimate indignity and shame for a man). Hence, he writes: You must follow Nature’s guidance if you would walk aright. The native characters of sex should be respected as nature’s handiwork. You are always saying, ‘Women have such and such faults, from which we are free.’ You are misled by your vanity; what would be faults in you are virtues in them; and things would go worse if they were without
16 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
these so-called faults. Take care that they do not degenerate into evil, but beware of destroying them.13 Thus, for women, unlike men: Worth alone will not suffice, a woman must be thought worthy; nor beauty, she must be admired; nor virtue, she must be respected. A woman’s honour does not depend on her conduct alone, but on her reputation…. ‘What will people think’ is the grave of a man’s virtue and the throne of a woman’s.14 Women must therefore, above all, learn to be obedient, dutiful, modest and chaste, accustomed to pleasing men and submitting to their will. But Rousseau does not wish women just to be servile slaves of men, or dutiful drudges. He is wholly enamoured with a romantic vision of idyllic marriage based on idealised complementarity of the sexes. And he is afraid that women’s sensibility and desire to please can easily be corrupted and turn into infidelity, coquetry and false refinement of manners. His prescriptions for female education are largely a response to these worries. Little girls, he writes, should be allowed to romp and play: ‘Everything which cramps and confines Nature is in bad taste.’15 They should develop what Rousseau really sees as ‘natural graces’, unspoilt by the artificialities, ‘deceitful’ pleasures and corruption of fashionable city manners. But while they are developing this ‘natural’ grace and charm, they should also be closely confined and taught from an early age to please, to be docile and to obey, to submit to injustice without complaint. And, he writes, ‘the genuine mother of a family is no woman of the world, she is almost as much of a recluse as the nun in her convent.’16 The charms of a (rural) family life are enough for her; she may, under certain circumstances, be shown the corrupt pleasures of the city, but only so that she will come to despise them and that they will not have for her the fatal attraction of the totally unknown. In the Vindication, it was perhaps above all the idea that virtue was gendered, that it should be different for women and men, that Wollstonecraft attacked. ‘The first object of laudable ambition,’ she writes, ‘is to obtain a character as a human being, regardless of the distinction of sex.’17 Virtue should mean the
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 17
same thing in a woman as in a man. And it is Reason, she argues, that is the foundation of virtue: It is a farce to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of its own reason. This was Rousseau’s opinion respecting men. I extend it to women, and confidently assert that they have been drawn out of their sphere by false refinement, and not by an endeavour to acquire masculine qualities.18 Women have indeed been degraded, Wollstonecraft argues, by the sort of femininity to which they have been required to aspire. They have become ‘insignificant objects of desire’, and their training in coquetry, sensuality and sensibility has undermined both their strength and their usefulness. The minds of women, she writes, are not in a healthy state, and she compares the state of women to the state of false refinement, vanity and immorality into which the aristocracy, especially in France, had sunk. The list of pejorative words and phrases she uses to describe women is long and striking; a few examples will convey the general impression. Women are enervated, their feelings are false and overstretched, they have factitious and corrupt manners, a romantic and unnatural delicacy of feeling; they are prone to sensuality, sentimentality, artificiality, coquetry, doting self-love, vapid tenderness, and a deluge of false sentiments. They languish like exotics and supinely dream life away. Wollstonecraft’s response, in the Vindication, to her own critique of the degradation of women does indeed at times seem to fall into the ascetic denial of female pleasure and the strenuous searching for virtue of which Cora Kaplan writes. Thus the degraded female is contrasted with the chaste wife and, above all, the serious and enlightened mother; ‘false’ sentiments are contrasted with things such as the ‘dignity of conscious virtue’ and the qualities of perseverance and fortitude. Wollstonecraft argues that love and sensual passion are usually incompatible with mutual respect and friendship. She even at one point suggests that an unhappy marriage may be advantageous for a woman, and that the neglected wife may make the best mother. She argues that women often waste their lives looking for a husband who will love them with fervid affection, and that if a woman is not satisfied with her husband, she is less likely to ‘model her soul to suit
18 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
the frailties of her companion’, and more likely to devote herself wholeheartedly to the acquisition of reason and virtue and the exercise of these in bringing up her children. If this were all that she had to say on the subject, her vision of life for women would indeed be depressing. But these sorts of statements in the Vindication represent only one ‘pole’ of an unresolved dilemma to which Wollstonecraft constantly returned and never solved to her satisfaction, which is that of how women are to combine feeling and sensibility with the life of reason, independence and virtue to which they should also aspire. Rousseau did not suppose that the strict confinement and dependence of women which he recommended would lead to the denial of women’s sensibility or sexuality. He thought, rather, that only if women were confined could these things flower in natural and uncorrupt ways. In his depiction of the relationship between Emile and Sophie he ascribes great importance to the maintenance of a sexual relationship between them, in which Sophie is to take as much pleasure as Emile, and never to be coerced by him into sex against her will. Nor, as I have said, did he want women to be just servile drudges. He distinguishes between corrupt ‘artificial’ charms and ‘natural’ unspoiled graces, and sees the former as the consequence of allowing freedom to women. In the Vindication, Wollstonecraft does not in fact always draw a simple opposition between a life of reason and one of feeling and pleasure. Rather, like Rousseau, she often contrasts ‘natural’ emotions of the heart, or simple or ‘reasonable’ pleasures, with those which are degraded or corrupt. But whereas Rousseau sees the dependence and confinement of women as a remedy for this corruption, Wollstonecraft sees these as its cause. And if at times in the Vindication she appears to recommend what Cora Kaplan calls ‘a little death’—the death of female pleasure and sexuality, this is somewhat out of line with much of the rest of her work (as well as with her own struggle with the sexual and emotional aspect of her life, which is vividly portrayed in her letters). Despite the strenuous assertion in the Vindication that virtue in a female should be the same as in the male, Wollstonecraft remained attracted to the idea that women did have special qualities, which, while not in themselves virtues, could lead to virtue. In 1787, whilst a governess in Ireland, she wrote a partly autobiographical novel, Mary: A Fiction. It is written in the style of eigh-
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 19
teenth-century ‘sentimental’ fiction, with a repertoire of rhetorical devices which aim to convey pathos and to arouse emotion in the reader, and a central theme is that of ‘sensibility’, a capacity for exquisitely intense and refined feeling, and for compassion with the sufferings of others. Yet in the novel Wollstonecraft is ambivalent about sensibility. Her heroine writes about it as follows: Sensibility is the most exquisite feeling of which the human soul is capable; when it pervades us, we feel happy; and could it last unmixed, we might form some conjecture of the bliss of those paradisiacal days, when the obedient passions were under the domination of reason, and the impulses of the heart, did not need correction…. Softened by tenderness, the soul is disposed to be virtuous…. Sensibility is indeed the foundation of all our happiness; but these raptures are unknown to the depraved sensualist, who is only moved by what strikes his gross senses.19 Here, again, Wollstonecraft is drawing a distinction between true sensibility, which leads to virtue, and depraved sensualism. ‘The passions are seldom properly managed,’ she writes; ‘they are either so languid as not to serve as a spur, or else so violent as to overleap all bounds.’ Wollstonecraft wrestled throughout her work with the problem of whether and how women could achieve sensual and emotional happiness in a way that was compatible with their independence and recognition as rational beings, and with the problem of how they could express and use qualities of feeling and sensibility, which she often implicitly sees as particularly theirs, without becoming mere coquettes or creatures of sensual impulse alone. Her heroine, in Mary, cries out: Every cause in nature produces an effect; and am I an exception to the general rule? Are desires implanted in me only to make me miserable? will they never be gratified? shall I never be happy? My feelings do not accord with the notion of solitary happiness. In a state of bliss, it will be the society of beings we can love…that will constitute a great part of our happiness.20 In Mary, there is no resolution of this dilemma. ‘I cannot live
20 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
without loving,’ the heroine says, ‘but love leads to madness’;21 and the novel ends with a recommendation of resignation, fortitude and the suggestion that death would be a desired end. In common with other critics of her time, Mary often sees the sentimental novel itself as helping to trap women into illusive reveries of romance. In Mary, the heroine ‘read all the sentimental novels, dwelt on the love scenes, and had she thought while she read, her mind would have been contaminated’. In the Vindication, Mary is highly critical of novel-reading. In her unfinished novel, Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman, it is the reading of Rousseau’s sentimental (and best-selling) novel Julie which enlivens the captivity of the heroine and gives her hope, yet also serves to trap her further back in inertia and illusion. In her own life, Mary seems to have achieved some measure of reconciliation between the need for love and happiness and the need to be independent in her relationship with William Godwin. In her fiction, she may adhere at times to the model of the chaste heroine, common in the eighteenth-century sentimental novel, and in the Vindication, she appears at times to see sexuality as a dangerous and diversionary force, to be overcome as quickly as possible by the power of reason. The heroine in Mary, married young against her will to a husband from whom she then lives apart, displays nothing but fear and disgust at the idea of sexual relations with her husband. But again, despite these strands in Wollstonecraft’s work, the picture of relationships between women and men which emerges in her life and work is not one which excludes or marginalises sexuality. Sexuality is a problem for women because it is so often seen to define their very being, and because it is so often associated simply with pleasing men and with the denial of female integrity or independence. Yet Mary was not really happy with any ideal of a sexless, companionate marriage (like that of John Stuart Mill); there is certainly evidence from her letters that in her own life sexual desire and satisfaction were both known and welcomed, and there is not a hint in the letters of anything like Mill’s relegation of sexuality to a ‘lower’ or merely ‘animal’ pleasure. The problem Mary wrestled with and never found a solution to was how to conceptualise and to satisfy female desire and pleasure in a world in which women were indeed, to use her own phrase, often regarded merely as ‘insignificant objects of desire’, and in which sexual pleasure
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 21
could often only be had at the expense of the sacrifice of independence or reputation. Wollstonecraft’s dilemmas were of course cast in eighteenthcentury form. Her thoughts on the situation of women were expressed in the language of eighteenth-century political theories which stressed Reason and Autonomy. Her writings were shaped and coloured not only by perceptions of the oppression of women, but also by the sentimentalisation and idealisation of women, and some of Mary’s own writings were deeply influenced by the style and rhetoric of eighteenth-century sentimental fiction. Yet the dilemmas she encountered continued to be important in feminist thinking and writing, albeit in a changed shape. Mary, as I have said, developed a stringent and polemical critique of female socialisation. Women, she argued, are taught merely to please, to be flattered and to obey. This both undermines their capacity for leading useful or rational lives and channels their desires and pleasures into vain and trivial objects and modes such as fashion and fiction. She often pictures women as sunk into a state of degradation for which there is nothing good to be said. A similar picture of women’s socialisation has been quite common in feminist writing. An influential book by Elena Belotti, for example, written in 1976, entitled Little Girls, draws a depressing picture of female socialisation which is strikingly similar to that of Wollstonecraft.22 Belotti sees the ‘natural’ lively and active ‘self of the little girl as crushed by the overwhelming weight of a training in dependence, passivity and triviality. And she, like Wollstonecraft, sees women as trapped in passive and illusive dreams by such things as romantic fiction, and as constrained in their very selves by the importance laid on female appearance. An even more striking picture of the ‘degradation’ to which women have sunk is offered by Mary Daly. In Daly’s work, almost everything that women learn to desire is ‘wrong’ in the sense that it undermines female creativity and autonomy, and almost every facet of female socialisation helps to channel female desire into these ‘wrong objects’. Women often appear in her work simply as passively shaped or moulded by the malign forces which conspire to trap them, and their supposed passivity is emphasised by some of the language Daly uses to describe ‘unregenerate’ women; words such as ‘puppet’ or even ‘fembot’.23 Yet other feminist critics have seen something skewed or dis-
22 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
torted about this sort of picture of women’s lives and of female desire. What sense can we make, for one thing, of the idea of a ‘natural’ or ‘regenerate’ female self if this is seen as something wholly distinct from the real historical lives and desires of women? Doesn’t the picture of women as simply passive victims of a malign and misogynistic culture misrepresent the relationship women have to cultural forms such as fashion or fiction? Is it not the case that women have, despite their frequent oppression and enforced dependence, developed particular strengths and capacities and priorities which might be built on rather than just rejected? A central problem in feminist critique has been that of how to conceptualise the oppression of women in ways that do indeed recognise how that oppression may be internalised and may limit or constrain women’s aspirations for themselves, whilst at the same time not lapsing into either a puritanical critique of all female desire, or a derogatory view of women’s lives which sees them as having little that is of value in them. At times, especially in the Vindication, Wollstonecraft can seem to lapse into both; yet there are other strands in her work which move in a different direction. The picture of the ‘regenerate’ woman which dominates the Vindication stresses above all the importance of independence. Rousseau argued that if women were independent they would lose their power over men. That, writes Wollstonecraft, is her very point. ‘I do not wish them to have power over men, but over themselves.’ But the ‘independence’ of the Vindication often seems to be a matter of a lone and strenuous mental struggle to cultivate Reason and fortitude and reject desire. In Wollstonecraft’s fiction, however, embryonically and tentatively, other themes emerge. Central to both her novels was the theme of female friendship. In Mary: A Fiction, the friendship between the heroine and another woman ends in death and disillusionment. In The Wrongs of Woman, however, the relationship between women is portrayed rather differently. The heroine of the novel, Maria, has been incarcerated in an asylum by her husband, and a central theme of the novel is the relationship between Maria and her jailor Jemima. Jemima has led a life of brutal poverty, squalor and oppression. An insulated being…she loved not her fellow creatures, because she had never been loved…. Thus degraded, was
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 23
she let loose on the world, and virtue, never nurtured by affection, assumed the stern aspect of selfish independence.24 Jemima’s energy has all been devoted to survival; her role in the novel is often to temper the feverish excesses of sensibility to which Maria is prone. Yet ‘independence’, in conditions of brutality and squalor, can only be achieved at the price of the death of human love and affections. And if Jemima’s reason tempers Maria’s sensibility, it is Maria’s female qualities of compassion, empathy and tenderness which allow Jemima for the first time to experience joy in human intercourse and pleasure in a relationship with another human being. Wollstonecraft’s work, then, taken as a whole, does not simply imprison feminist thinking in a puritanical denial of female pleasure, nor does it simply consign ideas of female virtues and strength to the flames. It wrestles, rather, often in uncomfortable and problematic ways, with the problem of how women can achieve sexual and emotional happiness in ways that do not require them to sacrifice their independence or integrity; and with the problem of how female ‘sensibility’ can be detached from its destructive forms whilst still continuing to inform human relationships. The other main strand of modern critique of Wollstonecraft is that which sees her, despite her impassioned plea for the equality and independence of women, as speaking only to middle-class women, and recommending only a form of ‘equality’ which accepts uncritically both class divisions, the institution of marriage and norms of rationality which are closely related to bourgeois ideals of masculinity. Again, there are aspects of the Vindication which give substance to these criticisms. In it, Wollstonecraft sees the urgency of her critique of femininity as lying largely in the fact that it undermines the seriousness with which women undertake the task of motherhood. She does not question the responsibility of women for motherhood, nor, apparently, the institution of marriage; and she makes few suggestions as to what else might be needed to change the situation of women other than strenuous efforts at achieving a mental independence. Yet this sort of judgement on Wollstonecraft’s work as a whole is inadequate. In The Wrongs of Woman, for example, Maria is led, by her devastating experience of marriage, to reflect on its
24 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
nature, and, whilst claiming that, with proper restrictions and safeguards for women, she would revere the institution, she declares that, as presently constituted, it simply leads to immorality. Relationships between men and women should be based on fidelity, and mutual affection, but not on the arbitrary power and caprice of the man. The view of marriage in The Wrongs of Woman begins to shade into that characteristic of many Owenite socialist feminists, both men and women, who commonly maintained that marriage was a central site of female oppression and that relationships between women and men should be voluntary and based on love, and on a simple and easily retractable agreement to live together. Nor was Wollstonecraft unaware, of course, of the sufferings of poor women; she may have sometimes assumed that middleclass women would have servants, but, as in her own life, this was often not much more than a pragmatic response to necessity, and she was well aware of the destitution and poverty which afflicted many women. Jemima, in The Wrongs of Woman, was one of her vehicles for vividly depicting these. Wollstonecraft’s work, whilst remaining in many ways within a framework bounded by bourgeois liberal political ideas and by conceptions of femininity and women’s nature which were characteristic of her time, nevertheless constantly tends to undermine or run up against the limits of these. She lacked any profound or adequate analysis of the social and economic situation of women; yet hers was not a narrow or blinkered view which conceived of emancipation only for a bourgeois female elite. Many of her aspirations were broad and radical and closer to Owenite socialist feminism than to bourgeois reformism; the tensions and uncertainties in her work often arise from what Barbara Taylor has called the ‘dialogue between reformist premises and utopian aspirations’ which characterised much of what she wrote.25 She is very critical of the oppression of women in marriage, yet committed also to an ideal of emotional fulfilment in a sexual relationship, and her writings experiment with views of this relationship, none of which finally satisfy her. She is bitterly critical of male behaviour, and of the power which enables men to tyrannise over women, yet also, in the Vindication, describes the virtues to which women should aspire as ‘manly’, and wishes that women could become more ‘masculine’. It is tensions and problems such as these which have characterised a great deal of feminist philosophy. Feminist per-
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 25
spectives both use and commonly at the same time challenge those moral and political perspectives which form the background to their birth. Mary Wollstonecraft was neither simply ‘reformist’ nor ‘radical’, she was both, and it is the tension between these which makes her work still so poignant, readable and relevant.
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 52 (Summer 1989) 1 Pelican, 1975 (referred to as the Vindication throughout). 2 Godwin’s memoir, and his motives for writing it, have been the subject of considerable discussion. The memoir stressed Mary’s personal life rather than the achievements of her writing, and it is arguable that Godwin bears some responsibility for the ways in which Mary’s work has often been denigrated, or eclipsed by discussion of such things as her liaison with Imlay. See, for example, Alison Ravetz, The Trivialisation of Mary Wollstonecraft: A Personal and Professional Career ReVindicated’, Women’s Studies International Forum, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1983. 3 Quoted in Dale Spender, Women of Ideas, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, p. 113. 4 J.H.Plumb, England in the 18th Century, Pelican, 1950, p. 165. 5 Cora Kaplan, ‘Wild Nights’, in Cora Kaplan, Sea Changes; Culture and Feminism, Verso, 1986. 6 Kaplan, ibid., p. 35. 7 Diana Coole, Women in Political Theory, Wheatsheaf, 1988. 8 Virginia Woolf, Women and Writing, ed. Michèle Barrett, Women’s Press, 1979, p. 99. 9 Barbara Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem, Virago, 1983. 10 Janet Todd, Sensibility: an Introduction, Methuen, 1986. 11 Rousseau, Emile, Dent, Everyman’s Library, 1974, p. 321. 12 Rousseau, ibid., p. 322. 13 Rousseau, ibid., p. 326. 14 Rousseau, ibid., p. 328. 15 Rousseau, ibid., p. 330. 16 Rousseau, ibid. 17 Wollstonecraft, op. cit., p. 82. 18 Wollstonecraft, op. cit., p. 103. 19 Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary: A Fiction, Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 53–4. 20 Mary Wollstonecraft, ibid., p. 40. 21 Mary Wollstonecraft, ibid., p. 62. 22 Elena Belotti, Little Girls, Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1975.
26 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
23 See, for example, Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology, The Women’s Press, 1978, and Pure Lust, The Women’s Press, 1984. 24 Mary Wollstonecraft, The Wrongs of Woman, Oxford University Press, p. 82. 25 Taylor, op. cit., p. 7.
2
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER Christopher J.Arthur
INTRODUCTION The feminist interrogation of philosophy can take two forms. It can examine what philosophers have had to say about the nature and destiny of woman: here the record is one of almost universal sexism (Kennedy and Mendus, 1987). In addition, it may ask if this is merely a local problem or if the entire discourse of philosophy should be subject to feminist critique (Lloyd, 1984; Plumwood, 1988; Grimshaw, 1986). I will touch on the second question only briefly at the end. But in this paper I shall be concerned mainly with what Hegel says about woman and gender relations. In the first part I shall look at what he says about Antigone. In the second part I shall look at the master-slave dialectic and the possibility of applying it to marriage. Here I shall draw on Hegel’s own marriage. In the final part I shall consider if it is—in general—possible to save Hegel for feminism. Throughout I am in part responding to an excellent recent paper by Susan Easton (1987) in which she brings forward a wealth of evidence designed to absolve Hegel of the more serious charges against him. Certainly there is much that stands in need of defence. It might have been expected that Hegel’s anti-naturalistic idealism would have saved him from the grosser forms of sexism; but, just as private property and monarchy turn out to incarnate necessary moments in the actualisation of freedom, so also does Hegel endorse the bourgeois family and its gender divisions as ethically necessary to social cohesion. The absurdity of his stereotyping is revealed in such remarks as that in conception the female provides the mate27
28 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
rial element and the male the spiritual (more exactly: ‘the subjectivity’ §368 addition, Philosophy of Nature p. 175). Although he met brilliant self-educated women (see below on the two Carolines) his official philosophy accepted and vindicated gender stereotyping and included a vigorous assertion of gender associations with the public/private distinction in social life. I shall show below that Hegel’s relegation of women to a secondary role in social life is not disturbed by his evident fascination with the heroic figure of Antigone. How, then, can someone be a feminist and a Hegelian? To begin with one can argue that Hegel is not as sexist as he looks— Susan Easton defends Hegel in this way. She thinks, also, that one could usefully draw on Hegel’s master-slave dialectic for an understanding of the position of women. Finally one could argue that his prejudices are inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the system and the latter should have led to their abandonment (see Hodge’s trenchant 1987 paper). Easton believes that Hegel cannot be accounted a vulgar sexist who ascribes roles and behaviour to women in virtue of some supposed naturally given predisposition, or functional relation to the male order. In the section on the family in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he contrasts man and woman in terms of rationality and feeling, and uses this to exclude woman from the public domain. Easton suggests that on closer examination the Philosophy of Right ‘reveals a tension between Hegel’s conservative reductionism and a more progressive anti-reductionist standpoint’ (p. 34). This is because ‘the family provides a means of escape from the subjectivism of the state of nature through an institutional commitment to an ethical universal’ (p. 34). The family transcends rather than instantiates the merely biological. Easton, through close textual analysis, has no trouble in establishing this. She concludes that Hegel’s conception of the family does not ‘devalue women’s biological existence’ but it does ‘subvert it from its prime position as the principal determinant of their social and political lives’ (p. 36). Certainly it is true that Hegel situates gender attributions within ‘ethical life’, i.e. the roles are derived from socio-cultural determinations. Women also are ascribed an ethical capacity to recognise objective duties of their own inscribed in this order. Easton has grounds for claiming that Hegel does not present a naturalistic reduction of women’s role in society. But I want to argue
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 29
that in one respect her claims are overstated (Antigone), and in another area omit some useful texts, in which Hegel discusses the family, and which document his own marriage. Finally I will come back to the question of how exactly the mediation of family structure is supposed to supersede the natural and cast doubt on Hegel’s account.
I ANTIGONE Antigone is mentioned in both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right. Easton claims that Hegel recognises her as a genuine developed moral agent. Her main concern is to show that Hegel’s analysis of woman does not restrict her simply to the realm of the subjective but that she has a rational and ethical capacity. Antigone is brought in to demonstrate this. The immediate difficulty here is that Hegel does indeed use the term ‘subjective’ of her. In the paragraph in his Philosophy of Right on sexual difference in the family he says: Family piety is expounded in Sophocles’s Antigone…as principally the law of woman, and as the law of substantiality at once subjective and on the plane of feeling, the law of the inward life, a life which has not yet achieved its full actualisation. (§166) He refers us to his treatment of Antigone in his Phenomenology of Spirit, but without remarking that the dialectic there has a somewhat different strategic purpose (see below). This is illustrated in the fact (more favourable to Easton’s thesis) that the term ‘subjective’ does not seem to appear in the Phenomenology treatment. Hegel locates Greek tragedy in the context of the emergence of political forms to regulate archaic tribal society, a situation combining behaviour based on ties of kinship with that based on more abstract considerations of political authority. The play in question concerns the refusal of Antigone (representing the old family certainties) to bow to the dictates of political reason espoused by Creon. Hegel believes that it is not accidental that this contradiction explodes around the question of death, given
30 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
its different meanings within the two value systems. I cannot do better here than quote at length from Bernard Cullen’s (1987) illuminating exposition of this theme: In one sense the death of any citizen is a contingent event that could happen to anyone, especially anyone involved in political or social struggles; it remains external to that struggle and does not modify its content significantly. But in another sense, as a moment in the life of a family, such a death is a fundamentally significant and necessary milestone…. Thus people can be model citizens, can work for the good of the city, can risk their lives in defending the state; but…when death strikes, their spiritual home is with their family, who will receive their body and will strip death of all its inessentials—death in some cause or another, in one manner or another, against this or that enemy—and return them directly into that ontological continuity maintained by the religion of their ancestors. It matters little to Antigone that Eteocles was struck down while defending the city and that Polynices, his brother, was a traitor to the city. As far as she is concerned, they are both her brothers, and they are both entitled to a proper funeral in accordance with tradition. (p. 17) Hegel’s analysis opposes divine law and human law to each other as equally valid and he says that it is in this opposition that ‘tragedy in the realm of the ethical’ arises (Natural Law, 105; Phil. Right, §166; Phen., 449; History of Philosophy I, 446). The fates of Antigone and Creon are supposed to be strictly symmetrical. Antigone expresses the standpoint of divine law—as she does in the play, telling Creon: I did not think your edicts strong enough To overrule the unwritten unalterable laws Of God and heaven, you being only a man. They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting, Though where they came from none of us can tell. (lines 450–5; p. 138) Creon is supposed to represent the standpoint of human law. This
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 31
sexual distribution is not accidental but flows from ‘the opposing nature of man and woman’ (Phil. Right, §166; also Phen. 280). It is, however, essential to Hegel’s account that these standpoints be distributed because he argues that the protagonists must not choose between them (Phen. 279). The positions need to be adopted unthinkingly in the first instance; one does what one has to do in accordance with one’s sex; only in the attempt to live out its principle does each consciousness clash uncomprehendingly with the other which it regards as an unfortunate obstacle thrown up by reality. Since it sees right only on one side and wrong on the other, that consciousness which belongs to the divine law sees in the other side only the violence of human caprice, while that which holds to human law sees in the other only the selfwill and disobedience of the individual who insists on being his own authority. For the commands of government have a universal public meaning open to the light of day; the will of the other law, however, is locked up in the darkness of the nether regions, and in its outer existence manifests [itself] as the will of an isolated individual which, as contradicting the first, is a wanton outrage. (Phen. 280) In the realm of actuality, where both principles are valid, the protagonists are humbled and destroy each other. It is in this alwaystoo-late awakening to guilt that the tragic dénouement exists. What are we to make of this as an analysis of the Antigone? Anyone who reads Sophocles, and then reads Hegel’s Phenomenology, is led to wonder if he has read the same play as Hegel. (This is a common reaction. Kaufmann’s 1971 defence of Hegel is mere bluster.) As a reading of Sophocles it is perverse; but perhaps Hegel can be saved from conviction on this count if one assumes that his treatment of the issues is an independent one conducted with the benefit of historical hindsight, and supersedes that of the uncomprehending playwright. Sophocles is not, nor could he be, a dialectician. Hegel, by contrast, attempts to force tragedy in general, and the Antigone in particular, into a shape of dialectical reciprocity which is peculiarly rigid. What he says about divine law is roughly correct but his claim that the standpoint of human law is equally valid does not apply.
32 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Sophocles clearly takes the standpoint of Antigone. At no point does she experience any guilt for her actions or any tragic awakening. She is clearsighted throughout. She never accepts her punishment is merited; she experiences only a Christ-like moment of doubt, as explained below. Hegel leads us up the garden path by citing: ‘Because we suffer we acknowledge we have erred.’ (Phen. 284. Easton, p. 37, does not notice this ‘quote’ is spurious.) This passage is an adaptation (to put it politely) from the play by Hegel and used to support his general position. But reference to Antigone’s speech reveals that the statement in question is a hypothetical one. It forms part of an agonised plea beginning ‘What law of heaven have I transgressed?’ (Not ‘human law’ notice.) In this context she says: ‘But if it is the will of the gods, and I have sinned, I will acquiesce in my fate.’ (line 926, p. 150; see also Kaufmann’s discussion.) ‘If I am wrong…’ she is saying. She finishes by saying that, if the guilt is Creon’s, may he learn the truth ‘in suffering as great as mine’. And he does of course, thus vindicating Antigone’s position. (For an acute analysis of Antigone’s final speech see Steiner Antigones 277–83.) In the opinion of Siegfried Melchinger (1974), ‘Antigone is not guilty, and she does not feel so. Nor does Sophocles think her guilty. To be deserted by the gods is man’s lot in tragedy; it is part of the human condition.’(82) But in truth Antigone’s dreadful fate (to be walled up in a cave to die) is legitimated for the audience in terms of a tragic story line indirectly in the sense that she is fated to suffer for her family; as the chorus says at one point: ‘This is the expiation you must make for the sin of your father [Oedipus].’ (line 852, p. 149) But for Antigone to suffer such ‘cosmic justice’, as a result of her daring to defy the state, does nothing to vindicate Creon’s edict of course. Indeed it should be observed that for the Athenian audience the tragedy is as much—or more—Creon’s. Through Antigone the gods teach him a lesson. For her death provokes the suicides of Haemon and Euridyce (Creon’s family). As the chorus concludes at the end, failing to hold the gods in awe, his pride has brought him down. According to Melchinger (1974), ‘certain of Creon’s traits, in Antigone, were unmistakably meant to suggest Pericles’ (19). (‘His title was strategós, and this is Antigone’s designation for
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 33
Creon.’ (86)) Sophocles was warning Pericles not to overstep the mark. Melchinger concludes: It is not (as Hegel thought) the conflict between the good of the state and love for the family as two ideas of equal importance that is so relevant. The essential moral is in the warning to those in power not to transgress those unwritten rules that set limits to political action. (86) It is not accidental that of all Greek tragedies it is the Antigone that appeals most to the modern romantic consciousness; we identify with Antigone as an existential figure, and perceive the suffering of Creon subsequent to her death as a rather insignificant coda. The Athenian audience, however, would relate strongly to this vindication of divine law. It is noticeable, by the way, that the indictment by the blind prophet concentrates on Creon’s treatment of the body of Polynices; his treatment of Antigone is added on just to fill out the charge sheet as it were.
ETHICAL ACTION So much for Hegel’s reading of Antigone. The main point at issue is not this but Easton’s reading of Hegel—of what Hegel thinks Antigone is about. So let us turn to that. Easton’s claim is that Hegel does not dismiss Antigone’s rebellion as ‘subjective’ but sees it as ‘rational’. This is a false dichotomy. There is a third way. Let us first look more closely at Hegel’s contrast between Antigone and Creon. The difference between them is not a contingent one. It is grounded in the fundamental character of the epoch. The basic split in the ethical order is that between self-conscious human law, openly enacted by the community, and, confronting this, divine law representing ‘the simple and immediate essence of the ethical sphere’, whose substance is unconsciously present as ‘a natural ethical community—the Family’ (Phen. 269). In it the man represents the family in the public sphere while the woman remains ‘the guardian of the divine law’ (p. 275). Their relationship mediates the extremes of spirit: universal self-consciousness
34 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
is chiefly manifest in the man, unconscious individualised spirit in the woman (p. 278). Easton notes that ‘Hegel sees tragedy disappearing with the development of modern society predicated on individualism, being replaced by romantic art concerned with the “boundless subjectivity” of passion rather than the clash of ethical principles’ (p. 40). She concludes that it follows from this that ‘while Antigone’s choices are governed by love, Hegel does not perceive love as mere subjectivity but rather sees subjectivity as alien to tragedy’. Thus the focus on love in his Antigone ‘does not in itself entail a reductionist position provided it is clear that this quality is not biologically based’ (p. 40). Easton is quite right to insist that Hegel regards Antigone’s behaviour as informed by ethical considerations rather than merely natural feeling or a subjective emotional reaction. Her rebellion is not the caprice of natural wilfulness. She knows what is her duty. But Easton is wrong to characterise this consciousness as a self-reflective rational consideration of ethical principles and their consequences if acted upon (p. 37). For Hegel associates her with the ethical substance only as it is ‘implicit’; ‘unconscious’; ‘immediate’ (i.e. unreflective); ‘the law of weakness and darkness…of the underworld’ (p. 286). This is explicitly contrasted with the known, accessible, positive law of the polity, self-consciously promulgated and justified. Antigone doggedly rejects all the ‘political’ arguments of Ismene and Creon. When Creon points out that it is illogical to give equal honour to good and bad Antigone replies ‘Who knows? In the country of the dead that may be the law.’ (p. 140) Such human verdicts are of no moment in Hades, she holds. One feels that Antigone would share Rousseau’s suspicion that reason is the enemy of true morals (Inequality, 68–9). Of course Rousseau relies on the immediacy of natural compassion, Hegel’s Antigone on the imperatives of traditional culture. This is why Antigone is assigned by Hegel to represent the immediacy of the ethical substance. This standpoint is not a subjective one because, although its articulation appears in actuality as an individual commitment, it is grounded in the objective order of meanings in a (disappearing) tribal society. But equally it is not the standpoint of self-conscious reason. Creon is assigned that; although he does not appreciate that the traditional meanings are still a power to
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 35
be reckoned with, presupposed by the community in its essential fabric, and guarded by its gods and women. Easton brings forward in support of her reading the following passage: ethical consciousness is more complete, its guilt purer, if it knows beforehand the law and the power which it opposes, if it takes them to be sheer violence and wrong, to be a contingency in the ethical life, and wittingly, like Antigone, commits the crime. and Hegel continues with the earlier-cited spurious quotation (Easton, p. 37, quoting from Baillie’s translation 491=Miller 284) This passage is rather aberrant however. It does not cohere very well either with Hegel’s earlier stress on the necessary character of the actions, nor with the particular stress on Antigone’s unreflective representation of ‘the law of darkness’. In general, Easton’s reading of the Antigone, and hence the reading she tries to find in Hegel, is too modern, I feel. We moderns commit an anachronism when we retell Antigone’s story as one of heroic individualism (e.g. Anouilh). We don’t admire her for burying dead brothers (content) but for her moral quality (form). For the real Antigone family duty is of the essence. It is relevant here to remark Hegel’s distinction between Sittlichkeit and Moralität. Moralität refers to the form of all genuinely moral action, namely the conscientiousness of the individual agent but it is considered in abstraction from any concrete content. Sittlichkeit, conversely, refers to the concrete ethical life of an objective social order which provides in its customs and institutions a content for its members’ convictions. The Phenomenology discusses Sittlichkeit as spirit in its immediacy, as a social form to be historically superseded, while Sittlichkeit in the Philosophy of Right is a fully actualised self-mediated whole within which the moment of the family represents the ‘natural immediate phase’ (§157), hence, as against the more mediated whole, one of subjective feeling. As was remarked above, the Philosophy of Right (§166) situates Antigone at this level. But at the same time the family is not so much a natural unit as an ethical one, as Hegel’s stress on the institution of marriage shows. While Hegel asks us to read into Antigone the standpoint of Sittlichkeit what we tend to do is to celebrate her as the representative of
36 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Moralität, a phase in Hegel’s system either post-Sittlichkeit (Phenomenology) or pre-Sittlichkeit (Philosophy of Right), but in either case a self-mediated rather than socially mediated ethic. Moralität seeks to moralise a non-moral world (Phen. p. 365). We like Antigone precisely because for us she represents conscience in the face of a wicked world. In the Philosophy of Right,Moralität is reconciled with the world in that in the ethical order of the modern state it finds itself and has objective principles provided to it on which to act. But in the Phenomenology Hegel had not yet worked out such a modern verison of Sittlichkeit. At this stage in his thinking it appears only as a world of ethical harmony pre-dating the questionings of conscience and forever lost. This immediate identity of nature and spirit breaks down under the weight of its own contradictions—illustrated in the Antigone. For him—and I think he is broadly correct here— Antigone’s actions are informed by this original Sittlichkeit which is prior to the more reflective standpoint of Moralität, which arises only in the modern world in Hegel’s history. He there explains it as follows: For self-consciousness, its knowledge…is…like the ethical consciousness which knows its duty and does it, and is bound up with it as with its own nature; but it is not [a fixed] character, as that ethical consciousness is which, on account of its immediacy, is a specifically determined spirit, belongs only to one of the ethical essentialities, and has the characteristic of not knowing [i.e. Antigone]. (p. 364) For it is essentially the movement of the self…to become conscious of itself as a universal…It is bound only by duty, and this substance is its own pure consciousness, for which duty cannot receive the form of something alien [e.g. as the will of the gods?]. (pp. 365, 366) In conclusion let us note that the powerful figure of Antigone breaks through the dialectical web spun about her by Hegel. As Hodge (p. 135) points out, so far from accepting the ‘passive’ position assigned women by Hegel (Phil. Right §166), Antigone, in taking her stand, rebels against the patriarchy—to the despair
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 37
of Ismene, who chooses differently: ‘O think, Antigone; we are women; it is not for us to fight against man; our rulers are stronger than we.’ (p. 128) So far from internalising human law and accepting guilt she defies the tyrant to the last. Walled up alive ‘she dares to escape that punishment by taking her own life, an act of civil disobedience quite unlike that of Socrates’ (Hodge 152). Interestingly, in making the same comparison Hegel reverses all the terms of Hodge’s account: neglecting Antigone’s deviance, he presents her as passively acquiescent (and to be praised on that account); while Socrates, for refusing to make a choice of punishment when it is offered him, is convicted of dumb insolence. (History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 441.) Yet when Hegel compares them on the question of reason he elevates Socrates above Antigone on grounds we have already explored. Socrates has to find truth within himself through thought ‘as truly objective as subjective’; but objectivity here has the significance of substantial universality, and not of external objectivity; thus truth is now posited as a product mediated through thought, while untrained morality, as Sophocles makes Antigone say (vers. 454–7), is ‘the eternal law of the gods; and no one knew from whence it came’. (History of Phil 386) (Today’s Greenham woman is curiously reminiscent of Antigone. For a start, after a nuclear exchange there certainly will not be enough people to bury the dead. This is why it is virtually sacrilegious, and the ‘public reason’ of Mrs T is dismissed as sheer violence and wrong in ethical life, and the laws of the state can be broken. The legitimation is not in terms of the shades of the dead but of the yet unborn. Also feeling rather than reason is appealed to in some statements, and their essential duties as women, potential mothers, etc., rather than a universal code.) For Hegel Antigone is ‘the noblest of figures that ever appeared on earth’ (History of Phil. 441). Nevertheless, I conclude that, although Hegel finds in Antigone a paradigm of ethical commitment, within his scheme of ethical development she does not achieve the level of self-conscious universal reason. This is to be actualised in the modern state within the public sphere by men.
38 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
II LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE One area which has suggested itself to some as peculiarly relevant to women’s liberation is the famous analysis of lordship and bondage in the Phenomenology. Simone de Beauvoir attempted such a project in her Second Sex—but it has to be said that it isn’t really Hegel’s view, but Sartre’s master-slave dialectic, which influenced her. De Beauvoir has been ably criticised by Genevieve Lloyd (1983). This has not prevented Susan Easton from reasserting the validity of the original project in her paper on Hegel and feminism. Both Lloyd (pp. 298–9) and Easton (see her 1986 review of Lloyd’s Man of Reason pp. 73–4) say that women do not enter into Hegel’s account of the master-slave dialectic and that he does not make any connection between the latter and the family. Both seek to make such connections. But what both have missed is that, although these discussions are widely separated in the Phenomenology, in Hegel’s manuscript System der Sittlichkeit of a few years earlier he explicitly relates them. What I want to point out is that when Hegel himself makes connections between lordship and marriage it is to legitimate the subordination of women. In this early manuscript, written in Jena in 1802–3, he conceptualises the family on the basis of the development of lordship and bondage. The relation of master and servant is rooted in natural facts (p. 125) but it can acquire the stability of a social form, it can be ‘ethical’ (p. 126): this is seen in the family (p. 127). The family is ethical even though in it the man is the authority. H.S. Harris, in his introduction to the text, sums up thus: In the household it is the ‘difference of living might’ that makes itself evident, so that the master’s word is law. But the obedience involved here is ethical obedience. The family members are not the father’s servants, he gives orders, and they obey, in the interests of the family as a whole. (p. 42) So internalised oppression is fine it seems. Against this ideological legitimation it is enough to point out that internalised slavery is still slavery. Easton (1987) argues that Hegel’s master-slave dialectic is very relevant to the situation of the woman condemned to domestic
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 39
labour (pp. 49–50). It is precisely one of the defects of Sartre’s appropriation of the master-slave that he leaves out the mediation of labour, she points out (1986), following Lloyd (1983, 300). In fact Hegel himself failed to develop the idea of the objectification of the slave in his work in the Encyclopaedia version of this dialectic. He speaks only of ‘fear of the lord’, and ‘community of need’, holding the relationship together. This latter rather puzzling concept is perhaps based on the System der Sittlichkeit version of the dialectic: The master is in possession of a surplus, of what is physically necessary; the servant lacks it, and indeed in such a way that the surplus and the lack of it are not single [accidental] aspects but the indifference [identity] of necessary needs. (p. 126) Hegel makes then the transition to the family but insists that the surplus is now ‘common’. ‘Difference is the superficial [aspect] of lordship. The husband is master and manager, not a property owner as against the other members of the family’ (p. 127). (In the Philosophy of Right, §170, he goes so far as to link the origins of marriage with property.) He forgets that the necessity of patriarchal marriage lies exactly in the above necessary need, namely the woman’s lack of economic independence; and this continues to shape its dynamic as long as she cannot leave it, for the same reason. But what of the key thing in the Phenomenology version, namely liberation through production? According to Hegel’s analysis a dialectical reversal takes place whereby it is the servant rather than the master who achieves the more human being because, whereas the master’s satisfactions are only fleeting, albeit continual, the servant in realising himself through work becomes aware of himself in the permanence of its results. The analogy between slaves and subjugated women as unpaid, low status workers is obvious. Easton has no trouble developing this point. At the same time she finds cause for hope in the dialectical reversal implicit in Hegel’s analysis. Nevertheless, in so far as the argument in the Phenomenology relies on the idea that the slave achieves a sense of self-worth through objectification in labour, there are problems about this model where housework is con-
40 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
cerned. Hegel abstracts from the determinate social forms of forced labour, but if we situate labour in its contemporary context what do we see? Although modern wage-labourers have no identification with their work in the capitalist labour-process they do know that this work is worth something; it is objectified in value, than which nothing is more permanent in the capitalist accumulation process. But household labour is not thus socially recognised and valued. So, in spite of the genuine objectification involved, domestic labourers do not experience much sense of selfworth through it. At best in some obscure way they sense the fetishism involved in value and regard their own contribution as more ‘real’. Much of the present wave of feminism started from terminally bored housewives, but if Betty Friedan and company had a sense of self-worth it probably came from an education. In short, no Hegelian dialectic of women’s liberation can be based on housework. The disintegration of the family may rather be consequent on women’s recognition outside it, in suffrage, wage work, etc. reacting back on it. Certainly Hegel signally failed to draw radical lessons from his own explicit linkage in his System der Sittlichkeit of the master-slave relation and marriage.
HEGEL’S MARRIAGE This gives us the occasion to consider that Hegel himself married. How did he assume the role of lord and master? Mind-boggling though it is to speculate about a love-affair with Hegel (der Anstrengung des Besgriffs is just not in it), he courted and won a well-born lady named Marie in Nuremberg in 1811, when he was 41. Indeed we have two surviving poems sent to her. Here is a taste: Narrow bands dividing us fall away! Sacrifice alone is the heart’s true way! I expand myself to you, as you to me. May what isolates us go up in fire, cease to be. For life is life only as reciprocated, By love in love is it alone created.
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 41
To the kindred soul abandoned, The heart opens up in strength gladdened. Once the spirit atop free mountains has flown, It holds back nothing of its own. Living to see myself in you, and you to see yourself in me, In the enjoyment of celestial bliss shall we be. (to his fiancée, 13 April 1811. Letters p. 237) However, it is worth noting that, although Hegel had become friendly with the romantic circle in Jena when he lived there, his views were not theirs. (Ursula Vogel, 1987, has given a fascinating portrait of this group and especially of its revolt against gender stereotypes.) At the centre of the group was the remarkable Caroline Schlegel-Schelling but the leading propagandist was Friedrich Schlegel whose novel Lucinde (1797) created a public scandal. Hegel charges Schlegel with making marriage a superfluous ceremony if all that matters is love. Hegel argues that love is only a feeling while marriage is a substantive ethical tie (Phil. Right §164 and additions pp. 262–3). Marie seems to have expressed the typical romantic conception that where duty enters love is lost; but Hegel tried to impress on her that marriage as a ‘religious bond’ meant more than any earthly happiness. This sort of thing offended Marie, and he had to write a couple of letters trying to persuade her that he wasn’t running down their feelings in elevating the spiritual side of the matter. With the marriage at last on the agenda, Hegel wrote (13 July 1811) to his friend Caroline Paulus, the novelist (not to be confused with the other Caroline whom she and Hegel disliked), about his happiness, and Marie interjected comments in the margin. Where Hegel refers to Caroline’s husband Professor Paulus as ‘the lord and master’ (Letters p. 247) Marie appends the following fascinating comment: Despite the length at which my lord and master goes on in his epistle, and as humble as the little corner he assigns me may be, I nonetheless know that the good Caroline Paulus will not lose sight of me. I have already raised my little voice in the course of my master’s discourse. But each time I
42 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
respectfully silenced myself again, though I would gladly have confirmed many a thing at greater length. (p. 248) The irony expressed here captures beautifully the paradox that marriage meant to a woman of spirit. There was no doubt that it meant acceptance of subordination: the best that could be achieved was an ironic acceptance of the female condition, an internal transcendence—but in reality a capitulation to inequality of recognition.
III NATURE AND SPIRIT The figure of Antigone, and the question of gender generally, is bound up with, and has to be situated within, Hegel’s treatment of the arising of spirit from nature, from the life of feeling to that of self-conscious reason (ethics). Easton (1986) argues that the family is a fundamental mediating moment between unconscious nature and pure self-legislating reason. This certainly accords with Hegel’s first philosophy of spirit (1803/4) in which he described the evolution of spirit out of the natural bases of human existence along three fundamental dimensions: a) the family, b) labour (see part 1 of Arthur, 1988), c) language. The problem in Hegel’s understanding of the family as such a mediating moment is that it is precisely the woman who is assigned to represent one dimension, and the man the other, and, even in ethical relations (such as the family is understood to bear) there is repeated the master-servant structure. We saw that both the master-slave and family dynamics are given an original role in the growth of spirit out of nature. The master-slave struggle is a lower stage than the family because although it raises consciousness from natural desire to self-consciousness it is not yet ethical as it will be when translated into the family. (The master-slave dialectic is really about consciousness in general as against immersion in nature; it does not deal with social situations of ethical import.) But the conflation of the two in Hegel’s early work facilitates gender stereotyping even in the ethical realm. The two ‘crunch’ quotations from the main works considered are as follows: From the Phenomenology (280):
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 43
Nature, not the accident of circumstances or choice, assigns one sex to one law, the other to the other law; or conversely, the two ethical powers themselves give themselves an individual existence and actualise themselves in the two sexes. From the Philosophy of Right: 165. The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has a rational basis and consequently acquires an intellectual and ethical significance. This significance is determined by the difference into which the ethical substantiality, as the concept, internally sunders itself in order that its vitality may become a concrete unity consequent upon the difference. Both of these passages exhibit the extraordinary ambiguity of Hegel’s dialectic. Is it a top-down or a bottom-up movement? First we have the mystical idealist notion of the concept sundering itself and seeking to actualise its elements. Secondly we have the naturally given concrete difference raising itself to social significance. Hegel seems to combine the worst kind of idealism with the worst kind of naturalism. He presents a conceptual argument for gendered social roles while at the same time attributing these to the two sexes in virtue of their supposed essential characteristics. For example, it is obvious that the distribution of the ‘two laws’ is not a contingent one. The structure of my argument has been as follows: a) Is Hegel’s sexism rooted in naturalistic assumptions about the female essence? b) It cannot be: because in his social theory he opposes strategies which base themselves on what is natural to man. In his theory natural determinations are superseded (aufgehoben) within the realm of freedom established in the modern state through spiritual self-determination. c) But in the mediations elevating the structure of reason over nature it turns out that the moment of transcendence is achieved mainly within the male sphere and the female represents mainly the moment of continuity with the natural ground of human life. This happens precisely in virtue of her
44 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
essential affinities with nature. Thus Hegel reproduces the nature/reason split within the social, in spite of his insistence that the social cannot be reduced to the natural. Hegel, in endorsing the conditions of women’s oppression according to ‘the necessity of the concept’ is of course only being true to his method of providing a rational reconstruction of the existing order; he accommodates within the state all the contradictions of the present state of things including those involved in the situation of women. Is this conservative prejudice to be corrected by a more faithful, and critical, application of the fundamental principles (Hodge)?—or must such a ‘Young Hegelian’ move be wanting (Marx)? Throughout this discussion of Hegel’s sexism I have accepted the terms of his gender stereotyping, in which the masculine is clearly closer to the human ideal than the feminine in virtue of the male’s greater scope for rational self-determination in the objective realm of spirit. However, to finish, let us recall that the entire tradition of Western philosophy may well be defective, not just in identifying the masculine with the human, but in identifying the human with the masculine (Lloyd, 1984; Plumwood, 1988). If this is the case Hegel’s account of transcendence may presuppose a distorted vision of the human and the natural.
REFERENCES This chapter, now revised, was first published in Radical Philosophy 50 (Autumn 1988) Arthur, C.J. (1988) ‘Hegel’s Theory of Value’ in M.Williams, ed., Value, Social Form and the State, Macmillan, Basingstoke. Cullen, Bernard, ‘Hegel’s Historical Phenomenology and Social Analysis’ in Lamb (1987). Easton, Susan M., ‘Hegel and Feminism’ in Lamb (1987) (an expansion of her paper in Radical Philosophy 38, 1984). Easton, Susan M., Review of Lloyd (1984) in Explorations in Knowledge Vol. III, No. 1, 1986. Grimshaw, Jean (1986) Feminist Philosophers, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton. Hegel, G.W.F. (1892) History of Philosophy, trans. E.S.Haldane and F.H. Simpson, Routledge, London.
HEGEL AS LORD AND MASTER 45
Hegel, G.W.F. (1984) Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christine Seiler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Hegel, G.W.F. (1975) Natural Law, trans. T.M.Knox, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V.Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Hegel, G.W.F. (1970) Philosophy of Nature, trans. M.J.Petry, George Allen & Unwin, London, Vol. 3. Hegel, G.W.F. (1965) Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Hegel, G.W.F. (1979) System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H.S.Harris and T.M.Knox, SUNY Press, Albany, NY. Hodge, Joanna, ‘Women and the Hegelian State’ in Kennedy and Mendus (1987). Kaufmann, Walter (1971) ‘Hegel on Tragedy’ in W.Steinkraus, ed., New Studies in the Philosophy of Hegel, New York. Kennedy, E. and Mendus, S., eds (1987) Women in Western Political Philosophy, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton. Lamb, David, ed. (1987) Hegel and Modern Philosophy, Croom Helm, London. Lloyd, Genevieve (1984) The Man of Reason, Methuen, London. Lloyd, Genevieve (1985) ‘Masters, Slaves and Others’ in R.Edgley and R.Osborne, eds, Radical Philosophy Reader, Verso, London (previously in Radical Philosophy 34, 1983). Melchinger, Siegfried (1974) Sophocles, trans. D.A.Scrase, Ungar, New York. Plumwood, Val (1988) ‘Women, Humanity and Nature’ in Radical Philosophy 48. Rousseau, J.-J. (1973) Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, trans. G.D.H. Cole, Dent. Sophocles, Antigone (1947) trans. E.F.Watling, Penguin, Harmondsworth. Steiner, George (1984) Antigones, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Vogel, Ursula, ‘Humboldt and the Romantics: Neither Hausfrau nor Citoyenne’ in Kennedy and Mendus (1987).
3
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET Ross Poole
Two conceptions of morality dominate contemporary discussion: utilitarianism, which specifies the content of morality in terms of the maximisation of total happiness or want satisfaction, and Kantianism, which defines morality in terms of formal principles of consistency. One purpose of this paper is to locate these conceptions in a larger discursive context; that provided by a conception of the market as the primary mechanism for the distribution of social goods. The claim that there are conceptual linkages between utilitarianism and a concept of the market is not, perhaps, very controversial. After all, there are well known historical associations between utilitarianism and both classical and neoclassical accounts of market behaviour. Despite these affinities, I will argue that it is not utilitarianism, but a form of Kantianism which supplies a morality adequate to the market, though a Kantianism which is informed by much the same conceptions of individuality and relations between individuals as utilitarianism and which retains most of the substantial moral content of utilitarianism. Indeed, from the perspective provided by the market, the common ground between utilitarianism and Kantianism appears much more significant than their differences. The concept of the market defines an important aspect of a ‘public’ sphere of social existence: as such, it is contrasted with a ‘private’ realm of domesticity and personal relations. This contrast plays an important role in the construction of gender. The public realm of the market, with its associated conceptions of individuality, purposive action and rationality, is a male domain; the ‘nether world’ (Hegel) of the family, with its associated principles of relationship, care, and emotion, is one in which female 46
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 47
identity is constructed and contained. These two realms exist in a relationship of mutual presupposition and exclusion; and the nature of each is determined by what it excludes.1 Thus, to the extent that utilitarian and Kantian moralities are conceptually linked to the public—and male—domain of market behaviour, they too are characterised by the exclusion of the personal and emotional—and female—from their domain. The various figures which are constructed in this paper—of utilitarianism and Kantianism, of the market, of masculinity, and so on—are discursive ones. What I wish to argue is that these figures exist within the same conceptual terrain, and that we will not understand any of them very well unless we locate them in relation to each other. Of course, the conceptual structures displayed are historically specific ones, and have real (extra-discursive) causes and effects. But it is not my intention to explore these. At most, I will occasionally assume that the various figures constructed play an important role, not just in moral philosophy and our ordinary moral consciousness, but also in defining for us certain aspects of our own identity and that of the social world we inhabit. But the extent to which this assumption is justified must be left to the judgement of the reader.
THE MARKET We may construct a concept of a simple market economy out of three elements: 1) The individual (whom I will assume, for reasons which will emerge shortly, to be male). This individual must be supposed to have a variety of wants which are largely self-directed (i.e. the conditions for their satisfaction do not make essential reference to the wants of other individuals). The objects required to satisfy these wants are ‘goods’. 2) The social division of labour. The various processes by which goods are produced are distributed amongst distinct individuals or groups of individuals. Since individual wants are various, individuals exist in a situation of interdependence, in the sense that any given individual is dependent for the satisfaction of his wants on the productive activity of others. 3) Private ownership. The goods produced, and presumably the
48 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
means of producing them, exist as private property. Hence they are not available directly to satisfy the wants of those who do not own them. This tension—between interdependence and private ownership—is resolved through exchange: individuals exchange goods which they own but do not want for goods they want but do not own. Thus, goods become commodities. We may also suppose that money exists as a medium of exchange, where money is a good which both measures the exchange value of other commodities and is exchangeable with them. In a market situation constructed in this way each individual will strive to further his interests, i.e. maximise the satisfaction of his wants. In order to do so he must participate in exchange relations. But in order to do this, he must possess, and presumably have produced, goods that other individuals want. Thus, selfinterest must become socially productive. Again, each individual will strive to further his interests by exchanging his own goods for as much as possible and by purchasing the goods of others for as little as possible. However, so long as coercion is not brought to bear, each must accept a price determined by market forces, that is, by the ratio of the supply of similar goods to the effective demand for them. Those who are fortunate or skilful will benefit, and those who are unfortunate or stupid will suffer. However, as fluctuations in supply and demand are reflected in the price of commodities, those individuals who are able to relocate their productive activity will use this information to move away from areas of over-production to those where demand exceeds supply. Hence, there will be a tendency towards an equilibrium of supply and demand. At this happy point, those wants which find expression in the market, that is, the wants of those engaged in socially productive activity, will be satisfied by the market. Further, since it is not possible for individuals to determine the selling price of their goods, the best way to maximise the satisfaction of their wants through market activity is to improve their productive efficiency. Thus, the market will tend towards maximising the quantity of goods produced by given amounts of human productive activity. These results may be called ‘invisible hand’ theorems (after Adam Smith) where the point of this phrase is to pick out the fact that under certain social conditions, results are achieved which
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 49
may be desirable but which are not brought about by actions which are designed to bring them about. Rather, they are achieved by indirection: individuals pursue their own essentially self-directed goals; but, as a consequence of their activity, the wants of many others are satisfied. There is, in other words, a hiatus between the intentional content of individual activity and its overall social significance.2 If the commodities exchanged include the capacity to perform productive work (‘labour power’), i.e. the scope of the commodity market is extended so as to include a labour market, then the concept of a simple market economy becomes that of a capitalist or ‘possessive’ market.3 While this transition affects the detail, it does not affect the substance of the invisible hand theories outlined above. The wages of labour will also be determined by market forces; some will benefit and some will suffer as a consequence; but so long as there is free movement in the market place, those involved will be able to move from one kind of production to another, and the tendency will be for labour to be employed in those areas where there is a demand. If the commodity labour power were produced in the same way as other commodities, then there would also be a tendency for there to be an equilibrium between the supply of labour and the demand for it. However, there are, as we shall see in a moment, good reasons not to make this assumption. Neither of the concepts of a market economy that I have outlined corresponds in any simple way to any past or present social reality. In every society there are positions, e.g. of status, which carry with them entitlement to social goods independently of the market; there are also goods, such as prestige, honour, attractiveness, which only roughly correlate with those goods distributed through market activity. Still there is no doubt that the market has been a pervasive feature of modern social life, and it has been the construction of a concept of a market which has seemed to many social theorists from the eighteenth century on to provide the key to the understanding of much that is characteristic of, and specific to, the advanced societies. There is, however, one dimension in which the concept of the market is not just incomplete with respect to, but also parasitic on, another aspect of social existence. The social relations constituted by the market presuppose a sphere of social life in which the individuals who participate in the market are themselves pro-
50 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
duced and reproduced. For a market society just as I have described it would not reproduce itself. To do so it would require that purely self-interested individuals enter into relationships with each other in order to produce, nurture and care for other selfinterested individuals just like themselves. To make sense of the apparent sacrifices of self-interest involved here we would at the very least have to assume the existence of goods of a quite different kind to those involved in ordinary market transactions. To comprehend the social processes necessary, we also need to suppose that there are human relationships—certainly those between parent and child, probably those between parents—which are conceptually distinct from the contractual and voluntary engagements for mutual benefit typical of the market.4 In other words the motivations and relationships required here are qualitatively quite different to those characteristic of market behaviour. So it is necessary to assume the existence of a sphere of social life other than that of the market and constituted by quite different kinds of relationships. This is the realm of personal life, and will consist principally of the family, though it may also contain other intimate relationships. The relationship between the two spheres is a complex one. Clearly, at least some individuals participate in both. It is plausible —and realistic—to assume that those who participate in market relationships are paradigmatically male heads of households (thus, the male personal pronoun is appropriate to refer to them) who represent their families in that sphere. Thus, the self who participates in the market does so both as an individual and also as a representative of the household unit. This male individual will also represent the wider public world of order, rationality and work (of which more in the following section) within the family. In which case, it will be the woman (mother, wife) who embodies in her existence the principles of family life and the practices of nurturance, love and support that it requires. Thus, the duality between public and private also infects the private sphere itself. Indeed, that this must be so is clear from the perspective of reproduction. For if the private and domestic realm is to reproduce not just the physical individuals but also the structure of individuality required by public life, then it must contain within itself an embodiment of that public individuality. In this way, the private realm supplies the principles of its own transcendence.
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 51
THE INDIVIDUAL It is now time to develop the structure of individuality required by the market. So far, the market individual has been minimally characterised: as male, and with a variety of largely self-directed wants. Now, for such an individual to participate satisfactorily in market relations, he must be capable of moving from one kind of productive activity to another. Thus, he must conceive of himself as having an identity which is quite distinct from any specific kind of production that he is involved in. He is not, for example, defined by his occupancy of a given social role, except the highly abstract one of worker, and, perhaps, that of husband/ father/ head of household which pertains to his private responsibilities. The relationship between an individual and any particular kind of productive activity is a contingent one. This contingency is even more marked in the possessive market model, where the individual is an owner of his capacity to work, and this particular item of property must be alienated regularly in market transactions.5 Thus, the market requires a conception of individuality which is abstracted from specific kinds of productive activity, though the capacity to perform productive work must be assumed to be part of the individual essence.6 In a similar way, the goals of individual activity take on an abstract and non-specific character. Each individual undertakes a given activity of production, not to achieve ends which are intrinsic to it (‘internal goods’, in MacIntyre’s phrase7), but as a means to an end which is equally achievable in other ways, and is thus external to any particular kind of activity. Indeed, the market itself is a complex mechanism which provides an indefinite variety of means for individuals to pursue essentially the same goal. It is a matter of some nicety to specify what that goal is. It must be conceived of as being sufficiently non-specific to be produced equally by a wide variety of activities and at the same time having sufficient substance to move individuals to action on its behalf. In certain narrowly defined contexts, it is possible to identify this goal simply as the acquisition of money—which is quantifiable, additive and universally desired. But this merely postpones the problem. In the last resort, it is its exchangeability with other commodities that makes money desirable, and we still need to know in general terms what it is that makes the possession and consumption of commodities desirable.
52 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
This problem was resolved by earlier utilitarians by positing pleasure or happiness as the ultimate object of all desire, and pain as the ultimate object of all aversion, where these were conceived as measurable psychological states distinct from the activities which produced them. The pleasure/pain continuum was, on this account, the analogue of the possession of money; and, indeed, according to Bentham, precisely correlated with it.8 Later utilitarians have sought to avoid the empirical implausibility of this account in various ways: perhaps by the thesis that each individual has, as a kind of meta-desire, the desire maximally to satisfy all his other desires, or by a formal characterisation of the nature of preference behaviour. The point of these manoeuvres is to provide an absolutely general way of specifying what it is to want something without being committed to the idea that there is one substantive thing (psychological state or whatever) which is always wanted. The precise solution to this problem is of no great importance here. Often I will adopt the jargon of speaking of individuals seeking to maximise their ‘utilities’, without pretending to have a precise account of what this means. The major point to bear in mind is that however we characterise the final goal of individual behaviour, it must take on a highly abstract and nonspecific character, and thus correspond to the equally abstract character of the goal-seeking individual. Mediating between these two abstractions are the various determinate activities which individuals undertake to achieve this goal: the production and exchange of commodities. In general terms, these are characterisable as ‘work’, where that word is used to specify activities which are conceived as having only instrumental value, i.e. where the only purpose in undertaking them is that they are necessary to achieve the required goal.9 This context determines a highly specific form of rationality which is identified with seeking and finding more efficient means of achieving given ends. On this account, the rational agent is the one who minimises the work required for the goals pursued. I have mentioned that the desires of these individuals are largely self-directed. The point of this condition is to preclude certain kinds of altruistic behaviour which, if pervasive in the market, would interfere with the operation of the invisible hand. Thus, if participants in market transactions were moved by the circumstances of those with whom they were bargaining, they would not enforce the competitive price; if employers were moved
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 53
by the plight of their unproductive employees, they would not introduce more efficient methods of production; if entrepreneurs were more sensitive to the feelings and aspirations of their debtors, they would not enforce bankruptcies; and so on.10 Of course, if actuality corresponds to concept, in the long run it is non-altruistic behaviour which produces the most beneficial result, but that run can be very long and the suffering of many specific individuals remains uncompensated as far as they are concerned. Widespread sensitivity to the plight of individual others would react to this, and the long-run tendencies remain unactualised. Hence, the proviso of pervasive self-interest. This proviso is not arbitrary, but meshes with the concept of individuality constructed so far. According to this concept, the identity both of the individual and of his goals is given independently of the activity he undertakes to achieve these goals. But it is not just the activity of production and exchange which must be conceived instrumentally; so too must the other individuals with whom the individual enters into relationship. These can only be conceptualised as a means to the already conceived end of utility maximisation. Thus, the self-directedness which is required for optimal market behaviour emerges as part of the very structure of purposive activity. Within these structures, it is impossible to conceive of activity which is genuinely other-directed, i.e. which takes the well-being of another as the goal of one’s activity. Of course, this only applies within the public sphere: the structure of personal life is quite different. Indeed, the male self who occurs in the market already, qua head of household, represents the women and children comprised by it. Family relations and those between friends and lovers presuppose different principles from those involved in the market; however, to the extent that they do, they will require different conceptions of individuality and of the relations between individuals. Thus, for example, the relationships that hold between market individuals are both impersonal and universalistic. That is to say, individuals occur in these relationships only through the medium of the property (including property in labour-power) they own; and the extent of possible relationships is limited only by the extent of the market. A morality which is appropriate to these relationships will be equally impersonal and universalistic: it will concern relationships between unknown others, and it will specify rights and duties which hold between owners of property and makers of contracts.
54 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
On the other hand, the relationships involved in family life are essentially particularistic: they involve a differential evaluation of those tied by bonds of kin; and the commitment and responsibilities which it engenders do not hold generally. The particularity here is not necessarily that of specifiable characteristics; it is picked out through the personal possessive pronoun; thus the commitments are to ‘my child’, ‘my wife’ or whoever. Paradoxically, the impersonal and universal sphere is also that of rampant egoism; the sphere of family life, thus egocentrically demarcated, is one in which egoism is—in principle—transcended. This does does not mean that the private and the personal has a better claim to moral centrality than the public and the impersonal. They are indeed both sides of the same coin, with the nature of each defined by what it excludes. The public sphere of production and exchange excludes the emotional, insofar as this is transformed by the operation of reason into ordered and calculable self-interest. The private sphere of domestic life excludes reason, except insofar as this is represented by the males who also figure in market relations; femininity is constructed in terms of emotion divorced from rationality. Since production and work are defined in terms of public activity, these are excluded from the private sphere, which becomes the sphere of consumption. Universality is excluded, so the domestic becomes a sphere of limitation. It is within this framework that masculinity and femininity come to be constructed as different, opposed, but essentially parasitic on each other. So too, morality will come to have a dual character: one appropriate to the public and male domain; another to the private and female sphere.11 The claims of these moralities are different, and may even be opposed; but they too are dependent upon each other. I will return to the relationship between the spheres of social existence and their attendant moralities later. For the moment, however, I will concentrate on the morality appropriate to the realm of public life.
MORALITIES AND SOCIETIES The concept of morality is not, except perhaps in the most schematic sense, a universal, but needs to be constructed for every form of social life. This is not just a matter of the content of
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 55
morality but also of its form. Thus, according to a certain (highly idealised) account of the ancient Greek polis, this form of political life defines a situation in which there is no systematic dissonance between the conditions necessary for the flourishing of the (adult, male, citizen) individual and the well-being of the community as a whole. Indeed, individual flourishing is in part definable by the contribution made to social well-being, because the identity of the individual is constituted as such by participation in the life necessary to sustain the polis. In this situation, an appropriate morality—indeed, if we are to believe Aristotle, the appropriate morality—is one concerned primarily with excellence of character. In a market society, on the other hand, the identity of the individual is given independently of any social relationship wider than the sphere of his private domain. Others with whom he comes in contact in the market exist either as means or as impediments to the furtherance of his own ends, not as fellow citizens united by joint participation in a common project. The interest of each individual is conceptually quite distinct from those of others and though the various invisible hand theorems locate a systematic relationship between the conditions for the satisfaction of one individual’s wants and the satisfaction of the wants of others, nevertheless there is a significant discontinuity between the motivational content of individual behaviour and its overall social significance. The link between individual self-interest and the interests of others is only maintained if certain limits are placed on the expression of self-interest. Thus, for example, the market requires the institution of private property, so that individuals may use or exchange goods which they have acquired in appropriate ways, e.g. by production or exchange. However, a purely self-interested individual will as soon steal as produce or exchange; indeed, will do so sooner if this is a more efficient way of maximising his utilities. Again, exchange relations presuppose a framework of contract, so that obligations incurred are honoured when the time is appropriate. However, self-interested individuals will break contracts just as soon as it is in their interests to do so. But unless individuals have some assurance that property will be respected and contracts kept, they will have no motivation to involve themselves in production and exchange. So without some constraints on the operation of self-interest, the market would soon collapse into brutal chaos.
56 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
The problem is in part resolved by the existence of a body of law which defines the institutions of property and contract and provides sanctions for infringements. However, this does not address what is at the crux of the matter. Law itself stands in need of justification, i.e. of an answer to the question ‘Why should one obey the law?’ Further, the stability of a legal system requires that there be a widespread belief in its legitimacy, i.e. the belief that what is proscribed by law ought to be proscribed. Thus, the existence and functioning of law presupposes that there is an extra-legal justification for it. It is the task of morality to provide such a justification. Nevertheless, though the role of morality requires that it be distinct from law, it will bear a close conceptual resemblance to it. Morality will, like law, be concerned to regulate relationships between individuals whose only bond is mutual self-interest; it will, like law, not be concerned primarily with motivation or character, as these are already defined by the market and thus must be taken as given; like law, the major concern of morality will be to specify the limits on individual behaviour necessary to make social life possible; and finally, morality and law will both confront the individual as something other, as a restraint on the exercise of his natural inclinations. Which is to say that morality, like law, will take the form of duty which is distinct from, and opposed to, the material world of self-interest. The content of morality—the range of duties which it specifies —is not difficult to describe, at least in general terms. Morality will consist of just those restrictions which are necessary for the market to operate: property, contract, and so on. Unsurprisingly perhaps, most modern moral philosophers have simply taken that content for granted, and turned their attention to what they conceived to be a more difficult and important task: of locating this content within a coherent and rationally based morality.12
UTILITARIANISM AND THE MARKET The most familiar and obvious morality for a market society is utilitarianism. After all, the glory of the market is the extent to which it claims to maximise production in just those directions in which human wants exist and to minimise the effort involved. If the satisfaction of wants can be equated with happiness, and
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 57
effort with pain, and the ratio of happiness to pain with utility, then utility seems to be just what the market provides, and utilitarianism just what it needs. There are many conceptual linkages between this account of the market and utilitarianism in its modern (i.e. post-Bentham) versions. First, there is the conception of happiness or utility as something distinct from the various activities which give rise to it. As we have seen, this concept of a final goal is implicit in the account of individual motivation presupposed by the market. It is equally involved in any systematic presentation of utilitarianism: various happinesses must be conceived as commensurable and even quantifiable items, and thus distinct from the range of qualitatively distinct activities which individuals participate in. Further, both utilitarianism and market theory display the same notion of rationality: ends are given, and all that reason can do is to minimise the costs involved in achieving those ends. And finally, the utilitarian calculus makes no essential reference to such contingencies and particularities as friendship and love. To be sure, these have their instrumental value or disvalue as sources of pleasure or pain, but then so too do other forms of consumption. And utilitarianism strictly enjoins us to count all subjects of happiness and pain as equal; and not to give any particular consideration to those near and dear to us. Utilitarianism as a morality is as impersonal as the market in its distribution of rewards and punishments. Nowadays, psychological hedonism is—correctly—assumed to be logically distinct from utilitarianism as a moral theory. However, if the self-interest characteristic of market behaviour is conceived to be the way in which pleasure-maximising behaviour is translated into the currency of commodities and exchange, then psychological hedonism is causally linked with the goal of ethical hedonism. Further, from the assumption that generalised utility is the source of moral obligations, and the thesis of pervasive selfinterest, it is an easy matter to deduce just those limitations on individual behaviour which are necessary for the market to survive. Thus, the union between utilitarian morality and market theory seems an appropriate and happy one. There is, however, a crucial problem. A utilitarian morality may specify just the limitations required by the market; however, for these to exist as duties or as obligations, they must have some purchase on the motives of those subject to them. If the general
58 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
happiness is the ground of obligation, it must provide or imply a reason for those subject to the obligation to act in the ways prescribed. I use the notion of a ‘reason’ here very broadly. It is intended to capture the idea that when one knows what one ought to do one has ipso facto some motivation (not necessarily a sufficient one) so to act. To inform an individual that he ought to do something is, in this broad sense, to provide him with a reason for so acting. Thus the account provided by utilitarianism of what is morally obligatory must be such as to explain, or to link with an explanation of, its purchase on the motives of those subject to it. Clearly, this generates problems for utilitarianism. The content of a utilitarian morality is the general happiness; but the psychological basis of market behaviour is concern for oneself. Is there a place there for this other concern which now seems necessary? There are two ways in which a place might be made. The first is to postulate, as part of the psychological equipment of those subject to utilitarian morality, a sentiment of generalised benevolence: the capacity to desire the happiness of others and to feel an aversion to their suffering.13 Given that such a sentiment exists, perhaps in a latent form, then the function of moral discourse will be to activate it. There are, however, a number of insuperable difficulties facing this move. Empirically, experiences of benevolence, fellow-feeling and the like are familiar enough, but these are of their nature directed towards particular and usually specifiable others. This is reflected in the account of the market constructed here, in that the operation of these sentiments is channelled into the private sphere where they may take as their objects those with whom individuals share their personal life. But the obligations necessary to regulate market behaviour concern unknown others, or those for whom one has no personal feeling. These obligations come into play in just those areas where benevolence is lacking. Further, the conceptualisation of the market from which the invisible hand theorems derive is one which precludes benevolence. This is not to say that it requires active animosity; on the contrary, it operates on the basis of a rational concern for one’s own well-being and a disinterest in the well-being of others. Indeed, as argued above, the structure of purposive behaviour which is implicit in the conceptualisation of the market only has a place for the interests of others insofar as these are rationally assessed as means to maximise the independently conceived utility of the individual.
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 59
The second way in which an attempt may be made to secure a motivational basis for a utilitarian morality is through the structure of rational self-interest. After all, it is in the interests of individuals that the structure of private property and contract on which the market depends is maintained in existence. For this to be the case, it is necessary that individuals by and large restrict the operation of self-interest in various ways (e.g. to respect the property of others and to keep contracts even where there is a good chance of profiting by not doing so). Thus the obligations derivable from the principle of generalised utility turn out to be in the rational self-interest of those subject to them, and the apparent conflict between duty and obligation turns out to be the conflict between long- and short-term interests.14 However, the concept of rationality derived from the market is not strong enough to sustain this position.15 On any given occasion when self-interest prompts a breach of obligation, a selfinterested individual will reason as follows: While I depend on this institution (property, contract) and its existence depends on people generally respecting it, it is highly unlikely that my not doing so will make a significant difference. It may be the case that if everyone reasons as I do, then the institution on which they and I depend will break down, and this will be a pity. But again, the fact that I reason this way is of negligible relevance to how other people reason. Hence, I will breach the obligation. But everyone will reason in this way: if so, then the institutions on which the market depends will collapse. One response to the free-rider’s reasoning16 is to propose a system of coercion which is so efficient, with sanctions which are so terrible, that it will never be rational to reason in this way because the probability and the extent of punishment will always outweigh the probability and extent of gain. However, this merely postpones the problem. The morality in question must also apply to those who must enforce the law and punish breaches of it. But it is easy enough to generate free-rider problems for them: cases where their own rational long-term selfinterest conflicts with the obligations they must respect if market society is to endure. And this problem cannot, on pain of regress, be solved in the same way.
60 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
I conclude, therefore, that despite—or even because of—its conceptual linkages with market theory, utilitarianism does not provide an adequate morality for a market society. Utilitarianism combines a theory of motivation and of rationality with the claim that generalised utility is the ground of obligation. The accounts of motivation and rationality are both derivable from a theory of market behaviour; and, given that theory, there is some reason to suppose that utility is maximised. However, if one adheres to the theory of motivation, the account of rationality is not strong enough to yield the motivational restrictions necessary to sustain market society.
KANTIANISM AND THE MARKET17 The nub of the free-rider’s reasoning is that he wants to make use of an institution and yet he also makes himself an exception to the principles embodied in that institution. That he reasons in this way is precisely what is required by the form of rationality— reason as instrumental—with which he is equipped. The role of reason in this sense is to seek out the most efficient means of attaining given ends. It places behaviour in a causal milieu, and works out the consequences of alternative courses of action. That action which maximises the ratio of happiness to pain for the agent must be selected. The free-rider estimates, correctly, that the consequences of any of his actions on the institutions on which he depends are near enough to nil; hence he can, and does, ignore them. But if everyone so reasons and so acts, and they will do so if they are equipped with the same notion of rationality, then the institutions on which they depend must collapse. This line of reasoning does, however, offend against some notion of rationality, even if it is not that so far discussed. To make oneself an exception to a principle to which one is otherwise committed involves a certain kind of inconsistency. In certain cases, there may be principled grounds on the basis of which an exception can be made. But this is not the case for the freerider. His only ground is that it is in his interests to make himself an exception to the principle, and it is incompatible with the adherence to any principle that it may be breached whenever selfinterest prompts a breach. Further, it is just the potential use of this ground for exemption from the principle which engenders a
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 61
multiplicity of exceptions, and leads to the collapse of the institution which embodies that principle. Let us assume then that a requirement of consistency can be imported into the operative concept of reason. This has some independent motivation: it is, after all, a principle of reason which is often employed in the realm of discourse and argument. In the present context, it supplements the concept of instrumental reason by providing a constraint on the way in which goals may be pursued; it provides that, if an agent makes use of an institution, e.g. that of property or contract, then, if all things are equal, he must not make himself an exception to the principle embodied in that institution. Nor does the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause provide an automatic exemption. The ground appealed to must be such as, when it is allowed to others, to be compatible with the continued existence of the institution. Further, it must be such that a self-interested agent be prepared to allow it to all other selfinterested agents. He cannot, in other words, make himself an exception just because he is himself. There is an important corollary to this line of reasoning. The place of other agents in the calculations of instrumental reason is purely as means (or impediments) to independently conceived ends. However, a principle of consistency applies as much to agents as to actions. If one’s self-conception is as a property owner, a maker of contracts, and, in general, as an individual free to participate in a wide range of productive activities, this selfcharacterisation must also form part of one’s conception of others. It is not just one’s principles of behaviour which must be available to others, but also those principles which constitute selfidentity. Thus, other individuals must figure in one’s reasoning and one’s behaviour, not just as means, but as agents (property owners, contract makers, radically free individuals) in their own right. Rationality as consistency conceives of the activity and even the identity of self-interested individuals in the market place as related, not just causally, but also conceptually via principles of which they are all instances. It commits the agent to acting on the basis of principle and thus to taking into account not just the effects of what he does, but the principles which his behaviour instatiates. This may also involve a calculation of effects, but not so much the actual effects of behaviour as the hypothetical effects of the adoption of a certain principle by all agents in relevantly
62 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
similar positions. If such effects are incompatible with the existence of the institution on which the agent depends, then the action is precluded. It is often argued against moralities which rest on an appeal to formal principles of universality and consistency that they lack determinate content. This complaint may be justified if the principles are conceived of as supplying the entire content of morality. However, in the way in which such a morality is presented here (and, perhaps, for the more plausible versions which have been argued for in the literature), it takes as its field a pre-existing conceptual content: the concept of property, contract and the dominance of self-interested motivation may be taken as given. The role of the formal principle is not to provide an alternative content to morality; but rather to restrict the operation of those principles of behaviour which already exist. Self-interest is not so much over-ridden, as constrained, and—what is more— constrained in just the ways necessary to preserve the market structures within which it operates and flourishes. The constraints imposed by this concept of rationality will be experienced as the demands of duty as opposed to the natural thrust of inclination. But on one condition: the principles of reason must be supposed to have a motivational presence in the individual. If this were not the case, reference to such principles could not constitute reasons for the individual to act in the required way, nor could they have any influence on those subject to them. Hence, the individual subject to this morality must be supposed to be equipped with a form of rationality other than that of purely instrumental reason.18 The relationship between a morality of this kind—which I will, without further argument, characterise as Kantian—and utilitarianism is a complex one. Clearly, they provide quite different and incompatible accounts of the basis of morality and the nature of moral obligation. Still, at another level there are similarities and complementarities. Adherence to the formal principles of a Kantian morality will preserve the market structure, allow for the operation of the invisible hand and thus maximise the utilities of those involved. Thus, these formal principles do serve a utilitarian goal, even though they are not justified by an appeal to that goal. Again, the motivations which Kantianism assumes to move individuals to action, apart from considerations of duty, are just those of maximising one’s own utility which form the motiva-
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 63
tional basis of utilitarianism. From the perspective of a market society, Kantianism plays the role of a necessary complement to utilitarianism, rather than something essentially opposed to it. Utilitarianism corresponds to the psychology and the morality which operates within the market; Kantianism is needed to define the structures within which the market operates. However, for these complementarities to exist, utilitarian considerations must be subordinated to Kantian ones.
HOME FROM MARKET The market presupposes a qualitatively separate sphere of social existence within which the individuals who participate in the market are themselves produced and reproduced. As I have mentioned, these two realms may be defined in terms of a number of converging contrasts: between public and private; between reason (now in an extended sense) and emotion; between work and consumption; between self-interest and altruism; between universality and particularity; and finally—constructed out of such contrasts— the distinction between male and female. These contrasts form the basis for two distinct conceptions of morality. Male individualiy, at least in its public representation, is constructed as an abstraction from particular activities. It is free in the sense that no particular kind of market activity is essential to it. That morality must take the form of duty is a necessary counterweight to such radically free individuality. The content of duty is provided by the reason of these individuals, a reason which requires that those abstract individuals subject to it recognise the equally abstract individuality of those with whom they have market transactions but not personal relations. This entails a requirement of equality, perhaps of justice. Even utilitarianism which, as is well known, has problems with the concept of justice, does recognise the basic moral equality of all those subject to pleasure and pain. Kantianism, here, as always, more insightful into the requirements of market society, demands equal and mutual recognition of radically free but rational individuals. Within the private sphere, matters are very different. If, on this conception of public life, male individuality involves the radical freedom not to be tied to specific roles, the complementary conception of female moral identity is constructed out of the
64 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
woman’s role in reproduction and in terms of the associated responsibilities of nurture and care. If male individuality seeks ends which essentially pertain to self (and, perhaps, to those represented by self), women must take the interests of others as sufficient basis for action. But not, of course, all others: only those within the same private sphere (husband, child). Even the structure of motivation is different. What moves men to action are emotions which have been transformed by the requirements of reason into channels of efficiency and consistency; feminine emotions, devoid of reason, are everywhere infected by excess and particularity. Hence, the lack of proper regard for what is due to impersonal and unknown others; the lack of a sense of justice, which has—notoriously—been supposed to be characteristic of women.19 This lack, if such it is, should not be confused with a lack of morality as such. Women figure in a different arena of moral discourse to the one in which the public conception of justice is constructed.20 The two arenas are not independent; indeed, each Requires the other. But the two conceptions of morality exist in a state of tension, making incompatible demands and relating in different ways to the motivations of those subject to them. Hence, their essential complementarity is only ensured where the private sphere is properly subordinated to the public conceptions of reason, order and justice, which are, in principle, embodied in the male head of household. There are a number of further ways in which the two moralities may be contrasted. For example, the morality of the market place manifests itself in the form of duty and, as such, imposes itself on the unmoral inclinations of those subject to it. Transgression of duty is an ever present and conceptually available possibility. The individual is aware that the path mapped out by self-interest passes through the boundary defined by morality. To cross that boundary may involve punishment or guilt, but that is all. The self of the transgressor remains intact. The corresponding conception of female identity is, on the other hand, defined much more tightly in terms of existing within certain relationships and performing certain associated activities. Withdrawal from these relationships or failure to carry out these activities is, of course, always possible, but such failures will take a different form, and have different consequences, from a transgression of public morality. Failure must involve, not just punishment and guilt, but a real threat to individual identity. To conceive of such failures in sys-
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 65
tematic terms is to envisage not a mere infringement of the moral law, but a loss of self. In this sense, the morality of the private realm is part of the identity of those subject to it in a way that the morality of the public world is not. The realm of the private also infects male identity. If qua market individual, male identity is that of abstract individual, it is also constituted in relation to the domestic world as head of household/husband/ father/ breadwinner, and failure to perform the tasks associated with these roles may well threaten male self-identity. This is not the place to explore these and other contrasts between public and private morality and the conceptions of male and female moral identity constructed out of these. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that each, by excluding the other, relies on an impoverished conception of human life and relationships; and that since each presupposes the other, neither can claim a self-sufficient moral status on its own. But how the tensions between them are to be resolved is another matter.
BEYOND MARKET MORALITY To return to the main theme: in general terms, what I have been concerned to show is that the two most influential modern accounts of morality occupy the same conceptual terrain as a certain account of market behaviour. To locate utilitarianism and Kantianism within this larger discursive context may do something to explain, if not the strength, at least the persistence of these two accounts of morality. If anything lies at the centre of modern thought about social life it is the concept of the competitive market constructed by the great tradition of political economy in the eighteenth century. But to locate utilitarianism and Kantianism in this context should also expose the limitations of these two moral traditions. Despite its theoretical and ideological significance, it is dubious whether this concept of a market has ever been an adequate model of the economies of advanced societies. It ignores or downplays the significance of class and power, of corporation and monopoly, and of the relationships between state and the economy. But more important than the question of its empirical adequacy is the need to develop a moral perspective on the basis of which the representations of human nature, human relations and human goals supplied by this model can be
66 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
evaluated. If the argument of this paper is correct, these representations also form part of the implicit content of Kantian and utilitarian moralities; which lack, therefore, the requisite independence to provide a critical perspective on them. I have already said something of a different limitation to utilitarian and Kantian moralities. To the extent that they provide moralities appropriate to the market, they presuppose a distinct sphere of social life in which the individuals who participate in the market are produced and reproduced. Insofar as they provide moralities appropriate to a certain conception of public life and the conception of male identity constructed in terms of it, they are inappropriate to the associated conception of private life and the conception of female identity constructed out of it. To do better than utilitarian and Kantian moralities it is necessary to discover or construct a morality which is informed by quite different conceptions of social existence. We must be able to envisage a form of life in which the competitive market is not the dominant mode of distribution and where there is no systematic hiatus between the intentional content of individual behaviour and its overall social significance. Further, we must be able to conceive of a society in which the divisions between two spheres of social life (public and private) and between two kinds of human existence (male and female) are overcome. And these are not small matters.21
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 39 (Spring 1985) 1 Cp. Genevieve Lloyd, ‘Public Reason and Private Passion’, Politics 18, 1983, pp. 27–37, esp. p. 28: ‘what has happened has not been a simple exclusion of women, but a constitution of femininity through that exclusion…. Femininity has been constructed, through exclusion, as a necessary “complement” to maleness.’ See also Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, London, Methuen, 1984, esp. Ch. 7. 2 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R.H.Campbell and A.S.Skinner, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, Vol. I, Book IV, Ch. ii, p. 436. The theorem about private interests and public benefits is stated particularly clearly in Book I, Ch. ii, pp. 26–7, without, however, the phrase ‘invisible hand’ being used. The modern versions of this theorem show that the equilibrium state of a competitive market is Pareto optimal. See, e.g., the account in
MORALITY, MASCULINITY AND THE MARKET 67
3
4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13
14
D.M.Winch, Analytical Welfare Economics, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, Ch. 3. The term ‘possessive’ is due to C.B.Macpherson. See the two models of market society provided in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; reprinted 1972, pp. 56–61. See also Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 1944; reprinted Boston, Beacon Press, 1957, esp. Chs 4–5. On this theme, see Carole Pateman, ‘Women and Consent’, Political Theory 8, 1980, pp. 149–68. A point emphasised by Macpherson in his account of ‘possessive individualism’. See The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 3 and passim. Cp. Marx: ‘Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and when the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence indifference.’ Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, Introduction, p. 104. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, London, Duckworth, 1981, pp. 175–6. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Ch. 6, a selection from which appears in C.B.Macpherson, ed., Property, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978, pp. 46–9. Cp. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, on the distinction between labour and work. See the discussion in Christopher McMahon, ‘Morality and the Invisible Hand’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10, 1981, pp. 247–77, esp. pp. 252–3, 262–3. Thus the well known ‘double standard’. For a recent discussion, see Frigga Haug, ‘Morals Also Have Two Genders’, New Left Review 143, Jan–Feb 1984, pp. 51–67. Cp. Nietzsche: ‘[Philosophers] wanted to furnish the rational ground of morality—and every philosopher hitherto has believed he has furnished this rational ground; morality itself, however, was taken as “given”.’ Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R.J.Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1976, Part Five, #186, p. 90. See, for example, J.J.C.Smart, ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, in J.C.C.Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973: reprinted 1983, p. 7 . This seems also to have been Hume’s position in his later writings; see, for example, ‘An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals’, Section IX, in Hume’s Enquiries, ed. L.A.Selby-Bigge, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, pp. 268–84. Hume was at least tempted towards some such position as this in his earlier writings; see, e.g. A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Section (ii), ed. L.A.Selby-Bigge, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967, p. 492: ‘For whether the passion of self-interest be esteemed vicious or virtuous, ‘tis all a case; since itself alone restrains it.’ See also the discussion in Genevieve-Lloyd, ‘Public Reason and Private Passion’, pp. 29–30, and in The Man of Reason, pp. 54–6. However, he had certainly rejected this
68 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
15 16 17 18
19
20 21
view by the time of the Enquiry, see Section V, Part II, pp. 218–19; and also the discussion of the ‘free-rider’ (not using that term) in Section IX, Part II, pp. 282–3. The standard modern treatment of the free-rider is Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963; reprinted 1977, esp. Ch. 2. This response was that of Hobbes, whose ‘fool’ is the seventeenthcentury ancestor of the free-rider; see Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott, Oxford, Blackwell, n.d., Part I, Ch. 15, pp. 94–6. In this section, I make use of some arguments presented in Ross Poole, ‘Reason, Self-Interest and “Commercial Society”: the Social Content of Kantian Morality’, Critical Philosophy 1, 1984, pp. 24–46. In Rawls’s ‘original position’ agents reason about the structure of society behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. they do not know what position they will occupy in society. This device provides a way in which the use of instrumental reason will yield much the same result as the application of a more universalistic concept of reason in an epistemologically less exiguous context. Still, this does not resolve the motivational problem, and Rawls must suppose that the rational individuals subject to the rules of justice are also equipped with a ‘sense of justice’. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, especially Chs I, II, VIII. A number of theorists of morality have remarked on the failure of women to achieve the moral standards of civilised society, e.g. Rousseau, Hegel, Freud. For discussion, see Carole Pateman, ‘“The Disorder of Women”: Women, Love and the Sense of Justice’, Ethics 91, 1980, pp. 20–34; Genevieve Lloyd, ‘Public Reason and Private Passion’, ‘Rousseau on Reason, Nature and Women’, Metaphilosophy 14, 1983, pp. 308–26, and The Man of Reason, esp. Ch. V. For a fascinating account of the differences in moral awareness between men and women, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982. Thanks to Tony Skillen and Genevieve Lloyd for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
4
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY A consideration of alternatives Susan F.Parsons As a feminist and a moral philosopher, I have for some time been interested in the understanding of morality which emerges from the great variety of feminist writing. It has, first of all, been intriguing that the shift from liberal to radical and socialist feminisms has been paralleled by developments within moral philosophy generally and this process reveals many of the same concerns and disillusionments with liberal morality in particular. Part of what I want to do here is to outline the reasoning which lies behind this move away from the prevailing tradition of thinking regarding morality, so that it is more clear to us exactly what difficulties the question of gender raises in the process. However, it seems to me that the alternative approaches also are not without their problems. The moral arguments of some feminists raise again the spectre of naturalism in which critical distance is sacrificed and the point of being particularly ‘moral’ seems to be lost. Likewise the arguments of others suggest such a thoroughgoing social determinism that the person who decides or is responsible for her behaviour and values is lost. Thus the other purpose of this piece is to try to understand the problems inherent within these non-liberal approaches to feminist morality. I think I am probably a ‘sceptical feminist’ but of a different variety to Janet Radcliffe Richards. My scepticism is not based on the belief that an unbiased examination of the ‘facts of life’ will yield the obvious solution to our problem, if we only would choose to view them rationally. Rather, mine is based on a concern that feminist issues are challenging moral philosophy in such radical ways that we need to tread with care over the ground in front of us. We should be more clear than I think we now are 69
70 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
about what new beliefs regarding morality will be required of us, and ought really, I think, to be questioning quite seriously whether and in what sense we are ready to adopt a much-altered view of what morality is, how it works within the individual’s own decision-making, and what moral imperatives might finally mean. It would be ironic indeed if the moral enthusiasm with which feminists have, throughout the years, pleaded their case were to result in such a total revamping of the moral enterprise that the possibility for future changes of this kind became more remote. I would finally like to argue, therefore, for an understanding of morality in which the elements of attachment and imagination are balanced, a view which I think is a more constructive way forward for moral philosophy, and which also illuminates feminist concerns more sensitively.
LIBERALISM In moral philosophy, liberalism is characterised by a particular approach to moral issues which has provided the rhetoric for political thinking about social and legal policies, and its influence in this regard is so widespread as to pass almost unnoticed in our society. Its history reveals its central concern with rational behaviour. Thus the belief that we can by the reasonable acceptance of principles control our actions to conform to what we know is good or right is the keystone of its construction of morality. What is required of the moral person is the choice, in a moment of freedom and detachment, of the principles for behaviour which one is prepared to live by, and a corresponding commitment to some ideal or value which is believed, felt or held to be important. Nothing necessarily limits this chosen commitment, and it is viewed as an entirely personal matter in which the mature individual engages in reflection upon those abstract directives which could form the basis for responsible choices. One’s principles then become general, universalisable statements which serve as the first premise in a practical syllogism and it is up to each moral agent to guide future decisions in accordance with these. Rational behaviour is understood to be the control of choices, that is, reaching practical conclusions by calculating the best means to one’s chosen end, or the best way of carrying out one’s general principles. Living with other agents within a liberal
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 71
society should present no difficulties for the majority of evaluative decisions, since we are free to choose how we wish to live, but this freedom can become the rallying cry of liberation movements which seek to extend social and political tolerance of personal choice. Problems emerge when it becomes clear that there is no limit, on this account, to what can be chosen as a first principle, since the description of these is formal and empty of particular evaluative content.1 This argument would be incomplete, therefore, without some suggestion that there are bounds to the kinds of things which may be chosen and that these limits are a feature of the nature of rationality. From the writings of Kant to those of Rawls, Gewirth, or Nagel, the argument is that the structure of our moral thinking in itself furnishes the necessary criteria for values, which those who are rational recognise and conform to. Those who seek for the autonomous self-legislation which this view of morality supports, discover the implicit demand for consistency and noncontradiction, at the very least, in their moral reasoning or, more than this, may realise the basis for altruism inherent within our capacity for generalised, universal thinking.2 The hope here is to discover the basis for an absolute morality, which is universally applicable and relevant, and which can serve as the basis for a sense of justice beyond the particular interests or backgrounds of any group of individuals. This absolutism is predicated on the assumption that such universal standards will not be found as part of the world, that moral values are not part of the ordinary furniture of our social or physical environment, but rather are uniquely discovered as rational necessities which require our obedience. On this view, rationality is more than a method for solving problems but yields substantive moral principles which are self-justifying and authoritative. These cluster around the notion of the equal worth of persons. The judgement of equality is founded on the capacity for reasoning about what is good (Kant), or an innate sense of justice (Rawls), or the fact that persons are prospective agents with intentions to fulfil (Gewirth and Singer). In this way, a kind of common denominator is indicated to which social and practical problems can be referred for solution and the basis for a liberal society is laid. The liberal understanding of morality relies on the belief that each of us is capable of transcendent consciousness, that we can withdraw from the impulses of the body, the conditioning of our
72 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
social milieu, and the limits of the natural environment in order to reflect upon what is the case and what ought to be done. This faculty for self-knowledge and criticism is central to liberalism, the only question being whether the principles for behaviour upon which morality relies are chosen or discovered by the free rationality of the moral agent. Morality is understood to be a special human activity both because its objects are epistemologically unique and ontologically autonomous, and because its activity of practical reasoning epitomises the control which knowledge can have over behaviour. Liberal moralists are concerned to provide a description of moral reasoning which best represents these distinctive elements and thus retains the peculiar character of human consciousness in its relation to the world.3 In the early work of Simone de Beauvoir, the emphasis on this type of freedom of choice is applied to feminist concerns. Like the Sartrean ontology upon which it is built, de Beauvoir’s understanding of the life and consciousness of woman is divided between a concern for the material embodiment of her self, and for the nihilating capacity of her human consciousness. Insofar as the body is concerned, ‘the data of biology’ demonstrate that certain physical facts ‘cannot be denied—but in themselves they have no significance’.4 The human body may be ‘the instrument of our grasp upon the world’, by means of which we develop a peculiar perspective upon our environment, but it does not ‘establish for [woman] a fixed and inevitable destiny’.5 Thus, the ‘body is not enough to define her as a woman’,6 but furnishes only the material stuff of existence upon which the transcendent consciousness works. The activity of this nothingness, pour-soi, is to distinguish itself from being, en-soi, and it does so by refusing to abandon its unique identity as freedom and by constantly determining the meaning or value of whatever comes its way. The risk of choice which this constant freedom entails brings dizziness, but women can accept, in the same way as men, a resolve to avoid all forms of bad faith, mauvaise foi, in order to lead an authentic life. Woman is the victim of no mysterious fatality, the peculiarities that identify her as specifically a woman get their importance from the significance placed upon them. They can be surmounted, in the future, when they are regarded in new perspectives.7
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 73
To remain fully human demands the constant tension of being and nothingness in which the individual projects herself into being by means of her intentions and schemes for living, and it is in this process that values are created by human agency. The ‘enormous burden’ of such creative responsibility has, so far, only been bearable to men, but it is her belief that women will come one day ‘to regard the universe as [their] own…to justify the universe by changing it, by thinking about it, by revealing it’.8 It is thus consistent with the understanding of humanness which this type of existentialism represents that women are understood to have fundamentally the same requirements of rational moral behaviour as men. Janet Radcliffe Richards, in The Sceptical feminist, searches for the rational principles by which such feminist moral thinking could be guided. Like de Beauvoir, she argues that women have the same capacity for judgement and valuation as men, and that, to be consistent with this, women must discover independently of their biological nature what principles best encapsulate and protect the worth of persons. After a careful and detached scrutiny of ‘the proper place of nature’, Radcliffe Richards believes that reason alone can reveal the necessary precepts for use in solving the practical issues of women’s lives. She suggests: ‘The first of these principles is that the most important purpose of society is to improve the well-being of sentient things, which should all be as well off as possible.’9 With this rational guide, we are saved the problem of the utterly free choice which continually plagued Sartre’s attempt at moral philosophy, and find the missing link between the insistence upon personal decision and the recognition that we live with other persons in society.10 In addition to this statement of the end which moral judgements should be seeking to fulfil, there is also a principle regarding means, namely: ‘everyone’s wellbeing is to be considered equally; when social structures are planned no individual or group is to be given more consideration than any other’.11 Radcliffe Richards argues that these principles are ‘intuitively acceptable’ to rational persons and their consistent working out is the project of the critical feminist as she seeks for the distribution of equal rights in her society. Thus, the history of feminist thinking in the modern world reveals some very close links with this type of moral reasoning.
74 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
From the early days during the Enlightenment through to the development of utilitarian thinking in the nineteenth century, feminists have made use of this understanding of rational moral behaviour in order to plead the case for women’s rights. It has been a strong point of their arguments that the liberation of women is not merely consistent with liberal views of morality but that opposition to such extensions of justice is self-defeating in that it contradicts its own presumptions. Liberal feminists thus persevere in their application of universal principles and assume that biological facts can get no purchase here. The insistence upon the special character of moral values means a rejection of naturalism of any kind. If values are not part of ‘the fabric of the world’,12 if good is a non-natural property, then morality relies upon the human acts of willing, choosing, valuing, practically reasoning. And the logical extension of this, as feminists saw, was that descriptions of their physical or psychological natures could in no way entail evaluations of the meaning or importance of these facts. Valuing is personal and, accepting the abstract definition of what constitutes such personhood, feminists find no grounds for the exclusion of women from this special human activity, nor from its natural outcome in the revision of society.13 However, such a view of reason may prove to be itself the victim of the genderedness which it seeks to overcome by its transcendence; its very abstractions may be implicitly formulated in a gendered way. Instead of presenting an understanding of reason which is in fact available to both men and women, Western thinkers have predicated their descriptions of this human faculty on two assumptions: first, that nature is understood to be feminine and it is nature which reason transcends in order to function at all, and, second, that women are understood to be more bound by their embodiment while reason is capable of thinking itself beyond this prison: ‘Rationality has been conceived as transcendence of the feminine; and the “feminine” itself has been partly constituted by its occurrence within this structure.’14 The irony is, as Lloyd suggests, that ‘Gender, after all, is one of the things from which truly rational thought is supposed to prescind’,15 so the discovery of ‘the maleness of the Man of Reason’ will not come as a welcome insight to those who believe that reason is beyond such relativities and determinations. If woman is the being who is formed as one of the terms in the dualism, if she is ‘the Other’ which it is the project of free rationality to elude,
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 75
then participation in moral reasoning, understood in this way, becomes an implicit recognition of the superiority of the male, and particularly inappropriate for a feminist project. This genderedness of our concepts is embodied by liberal societies in the division of public from private areas of life. The presumption that human beings are rational, metaphysically free, prudential calculators of marginal utility—and all think alike in this regard in the public sphere of politics and understanding—is used as a contrast model for the qualities and activities in a private world from which the public sphere is bifurcated theoretically.16 The difficulty is not just that the moral principles appropriate to the public realm may not fit the needs and realities of the private,17 but, more than this, that they may no longer be workable at all, once the separation upon which they are founded has been exposed. Liberal feminism works so long as its devaluation of the private sphere is acceptable to women, so long as women view their problem as restriction or confinement which can be overcome by transcendence, by entering the public realm on the same terms as men. But when the private realm is itself asserted to have important insights into the nature of good and to provide a fund of moral values unavailable in the public, then the method of reasoning founded upon such contradictions breaks down. It is thus dishonest at that point to claim the irrelevance of gender in the formulation of these principles in the first place. Many current moral debates conducted in liberal terms, like those involving abortion or new fertilisation techniques or even our treatment of animals, suffer, I think, from exactly this kind of difficulty in applying rational principles. It becomes clear in the course of these arguments both that abstract principles, like equal worth or respect for agency, may not be full enough for all our moral needs and thus distort to some extent our understanding of the issues, but also that to use them at all relies upon an acceptance of a dualistic framework which may no longer be tenable. As liberal feminists try to make use of this approach to moral decision, they may find that the transcendence of reason around which it revolves turns out to be illusory. Is it really possible for us to discover a ‘decontextualised and ahistorical’ definition of justice which all “‘right-minded people” would accept’?18 The
76 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
claim that such abstractions are self-verifying may be merely disguised prejudice, for they only seem convincing within the sociohistorical context out of which they emerge. The moral and political recommendations of liberal feminists could, therefore, be viewed as culturally relative, not universally sound as they believe, and to be unaware of this determination of our moral ideas and values is to promote the illusion that the rational person can utter and believe timeless truths. The case becomes ‘enfeebled’ because it recognises no perspective from which its own can be challenged. The attempt at complete objectivity results in isolation and estrangement from the real lived conditions which feed the moral consciousness in the first place and it is an awareness and sensitivity to these which may provide us with the grounds for social and political change. Liberal thinking is thus characterised by a longing for objectivity, but it does not escape the suspicion that its construction of rational moral precepts is context-dependent. The intention of providing such a picture of rationality is to assure us of a kind of aloof perspective from which to comprehend and judge particular cases, so that values come to reside in the world and attach themselves to facts wherever we consider them appropriate. However, the adopting of moral onlooks may not really take place in such a neatly segregated way.19 Our acceptance of particular values may have a great deal to do with our sensitivity to certain facts which take on importance as we reflect on our situation, and our attempt to encapsulate these values into condensed generalisations may only disguise their attachment to the facts from which they emerged. The proponents of this model may be attempting to escape the inevitable vertigo of moral reasoning by promoting a ‘consoling myth’ of transcendence which is unsuitable and illusory. It is only an illusion that our paradigm of reason, deductive argument, has its rationality discernible from a standpoint not necessarily located within the practice itself…. The cure for the vertigo, then, is to give up the idea that philosophical thought, about the sorts of practice in question, should be undertaken at some external standpoint, outside our immersion in our familiar forms of life.20 Abandoning the myth may help us to avoid the simplistic moral
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 77
psychology which divides desires or commitments from beliefs and struggles to reattach them in some way.21 And it may also encourage us to appreciate the presence of moral realities within our world, in and amongst the ordinary facts we perceive.
NATURALISM An alternative style of thinking about morality is available in naturalism and, while in many ways its proponents’ values overlap with those of liberalism, nevertheless its view of decision-making is distinctive and it presents another interpretation of rationality. The structure of naturalistic morality is built up around human nature; some description of this nature forms the central core from which the motives for moral behaviour spring and to which moral actions are directed. Under the influence of Aristotelian thinking, naturalism views the moral project as teleological, its raison d’être being to bring to fulfilment those features of our humanness which are present as potentialities within us and which constitute our uniqueness as human.22 To act rationally is to train oneself in the choices which will allow the realisation of one’s nature. Thus rationality is not transcendent in the same way as in the previous model, for human nature is not considered something confining or restricting which must be overcome in order to discover what is good. Rather, rationality works within the boundaries set by what we are. In general, because this nature of ours is multi-faceted and multi-layered, there is plenty of space within it for self-transcendence to occur, in moments of thoughtfulness or self-reflection. Butler considered this to be the primary function of the conscience, knowledge shared with oneself about one’s attitudes or behaviour, and it requires no metaphysical detachment in order to function as a critical yet sympathetic judge of our selves.23 What is needed, therefore, is some understanding of our nature, since this furnishes the entire context of moral thinking, and as we develop and deepen this knowledge of ourselves, so our moral reasoning becomes more relevant and fortunate. Naturalism thus warrants the grasping of moral issues ‘from the inside out’.24 Moral decisions are related ultimately, not to the first premise of a syllogism which sets out some universal imperative or principle of action, but rather to some characterisa-
78 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
tion of our selves, our problems, our possibilities. This characterisation is both evaluative and descriptive; it is formulated both as a set of beliefs about our basic human needs, interests, and distinctive properties, and as an implicit appraisal of the relative importance and desirability of these features. Some hierarchical ordering of these makes the act of choosing what to do more clear, for decisions become a matter of discerning, considering, discriminating within the context of these priorities what is to be done in given circumstances. The understanding of human nature provides a more or less elaborate and detailed specification of the kinds of things which are held to be true of oneself and which one ought also to make true by one’s choices. Thus, morality is as much a matter of being a certain kind of person as it is of doing certain kinds of things. It requires the development of those qualities of character by which moral discernment also improves, and reciprocally, the ability to distinguish the important features of a situation is what the attainment of a virtue consists in. In moral upbringing what one learns is not to behave in conformity with rules of conduct but to see situations in a special light, as constituting reasons for acting; this perceptual capacity, once acquired, can be exercised in complex novel circumstances, not necessarily capable of being foreseen or legislated for by a codifier of the conduct required by virtue, however wise or thoughtful he (sic) might be.25 The circularity of this process is unavoidable since naturalism claims no standpoint outside our natures from which we could view the progress of morality or make any sense of its activities. It represents therefore an alternative moral epistemology. Feminists have also used this model in order to express the special nature of women’s lives. Radical feminists, in particular, have asserted the uniqueness of woman, the positive qualities of her character, the important insights which she brings to moral considerations. Rather than appealing to some abstract understanding of what constitutes personhood, radical feminists assert the necessary link between biology and personal identity, so that, in particular, men and women are understood to be two different kinds of person. The biological makeup of each is claimed to be more than a mere factual description of external properties, since any such description is, at the same time, an assessment of rele-
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 79
vant features which have moral import. What has been mistaken in the past, according to this view, is not what the liberal feminists argue—namely that woman’s value has been tied to her embodiment, a tie which rational thought and judgement can finally detach—but rather that the understanding of the meaning or value of that embodiment has been wrong. And this reassessment can only take place from within gender, not from outside, from within the onlook regarding one’s embodiment, not from without. The inappropriateness of the evaluative descriptions of women’s nature from our tradition is increasingly felt by women who now, on the basis of their own lived experience, call for other features of their natures to be given credit, to be considered ‘salient’, to be rendered meaningful within a new onlook. It is the point of radical feminist writings to offer this new vision of woman and, through their utopian fictions, to provide some happier prospect for the renewal of society in which women’s morality predominates. In the work of Carol Gilligan on the moral development of women, a subject which had always remained hidden within studies of the purported moral development of human beings, she illustrates the pervasive maleness of the model of moral maturity which has so far been used in work of this kind. Men have described morality in terms familiar to them and have thereby considered boys, in their development, and men, in their later life, as the ones who develop most fully, while girls never reach the final crowning stages and are thus classified as ‘morally immature’. Freud already had proclaimed this in his observation that women refuse ‘blind impartiality’ in decisions and thus have an inadequate sense of ‘justice’,26 an observation which Gilligan’s discussions with women confirm. The result has been a lived contradiction, expressed by Virginia Woolf as ‘a mind which was slightly pulled from the straight and made to alter its clear vision in deference to external authority’.27 Women experience this in self-doubts, and in a divided conscience, when their ‘public assessment and private assessment…are fundamentally at odds’,28 and the resulting confusion constitutes the major hurdle in women’s moral development. What emerges from Gilligan’s study is that women consider moral issues in quite a different way to men, that indeed the liberal model of morality, which is so widely assumed to belong to humanity in general, is alien to women, fitting uncomfortably to their lives and misrepresenting their ideas
80 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
and interests. Thus, ‘a morality of rights and noninterference may appear frightening to women in its potential justification of indifference and unconcern’.29 Women seem much more concerned, in their definition of what constitutes morality, with relationships, interdependence, intimacy. To question the belief that this latter is a deformed or immature morality is to begin to undermine some fundamental assumptions about what the logic of morality is. Gilligan herself begins to interpret this in terms of rejecting ‘the Greek ideal of knowledge as a correspondence between mind and form’, in favour of ‘the Biblical conception of knowing as a process of human relationship’.30 Her challenge is that the essence of morality may, in fact, be its perspective-bound, relational quality. This point is pressed home most vehemently in the writings of Mary Daly, and her work reveals the extreme implications of taking such an ‘inside’ view of morality. The critical part of her analysis is a methodical investigation of man’s creation of woman, a vivid and gruesome study of the way in which man makes woman into ‘the Other’. Man’s understanding of woman as less human, as imperfect or deficient in relation to himself, as incapable of transcending nature, as an object or possession requiring his moulding and direction, reveals the fundamental link between his moral ideas and his own embodiment. He is revealed as the one who seeks domination, who attempts to control nature, who makes and produces things, who creates culture and its images, and he does these things as the natural expression of his physiological makeup. His morality is bound up with his interpretation of his own biology, and is thus labelled ‘phallic morality’ and its social outcome, ‘patriarchy’. Daly’s critique is intended to be sweeping and general, for she wants to expose the entire worldview which has been built up around male nature as it expresses itself in every place and time. As her positive suggestion, she urges the expression of woman’s own embodiment, by means of reclaiming the language of misogyny. All words are to be rewritten with feminist meanings foremost and, by means of this simple trick, the domination by the alien body-mind of man will be broken.31 These new insights come, not from some external perspective, but from looking hard at the words which women have, up until now, been willing to utilise for their own self-understanding, until the penny drops and they see their own oppression. Likewise, this freedom is gained by
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 81
a reinterpretation of actions, which once again does not rely upon women abandoning what comes naturally to them. Those activities which have been kept in their place within patriarchal societies, which have been mistrusted and labelled ‘sin’—most importantly women’s spirituality and communion with nature—these are to be freed from determination by male priorities and fears, and allowed full freedom of expression and realisation as woman’s superiority. Woman’s own self-image is restored to her by means of finding within her place and her own nature those qualities by which she can experience the joy of living and the world, hopefully, can be freed from its devastation by man. She then can see the various features of her life which have been distorted and misjudged, and, viewing them in a new light, come to evaluate herself positively. Daly’s feminist recreation of woman is naturalistic reasoning about moral values; the meaning of the moral imperatives in her scheme is to be discovered within her reinterpretation of the meaning of gender. Her portrayal of the situation as a struggle between female and male, life and death is separatist, dualistic, and uncompromising, for there is no possibility of one seeing the other point of view by leaving their own nature behind.32 What is called for here is the reconsideration of our view of gender ‘from the inside out’, and it reveals just how deeply these issues may cut into our moral epistemology. To reconsider moral concerns in this area is to look more closely at what exists within the terms of our available moral vocabulary until we recognise something new and discern a different reality. The issue which radical feminism finds at the heart of morality is the need for such renewed vision. However, it is the logic of this moral vision which constitutes the central problem facing a naturalistic account. This is the root of the challenge, by liberal thinkers, that such moral reasoning is guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy.33 Women who identify goodness with whatever a woman does, and assume evil to be by definition what is of male origin or intention, are committing this fallacy and the problem with engaging in his fallacious reasoning is that moral language becomes either contradictory or redundant. Since, according to the liberal model, it is by means of our rational distance from embodiment that we are capable of evaluation at all, ‘naturalistic’ feminists seem to depend upon an objective principle of judgement which their description of good, as ‘equivalent to what is female’, cannot accommodate. If good is
82 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
defined as a natural property, then the use of the word ‘good’ becomes unnecessary; if it has some special meaning, then it is contradictory to define it in purely naturalistic terms. Naturalism therefore seems self-defeating. Morality which prides itself upon being intrinsically partisan leaves no room for getting outside by means of increasing generalities or abstractions. The notion of a transcendent rationality has been one way of avoiding the narrowness, and ultimate circularity, of this concern by indicating to us the rational necessity for discovering independent criteria by which to assess particular actions or policies, criteria which can be applied to any circumstance at any time. Naturalism runs the risk of being so deterministic in its description of the basis for moral evaluation that the force of ‘ought’ is lost in its moral prescriptions. Many radical feminist arguments seem to reiterate what has previously been said of women in a new guise, namely that ‘biology determines destiny’. The response of radical feminists to the history of male determination of biology is to urge a reversal of values, but within the same overall confines of physical determination. The landscape is still dominated by sexual differences; biology is both the problem and the solution.34 What is in danger of being lost from such an account is the fact that how biological realities shape our thinking and acting is partly, at least, up to us. This argument does not demonstrate well enough how our interpretations of biology interact with physical realities in the first place. Is the force of one point of view overcome by the force of another? Does the change from one view to another occur without language and thought? If the vocabulary of our oppression is utterly alien to the new one of liberation, then how do we recognise its presence or appreciate its importance to life? If the process of this reevaluation of biological facts does not occur on the basis of some detached criterion, which radical feminists seem intent upon debunking, then how it does take place needs more careful examination. Otherwise we are left with the need for some conversion to a new point of view, a conversion shaped by realities more powerful than our consciousness of them. While naturalism makes it easier to understand the attachment of an onlook to its natural grounding and context, which is essential to its construction of morality, it makes more difficult the prospect of coming to find a common ground by means of each individual leaving behind the particular aspects of her perspective.
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 83
If rational considerations are bounded in the way that naturalism suggests, then this affects relations between women and men very deeply. The notion of two separate moralities can result in a distortion of our full understanding of what morality is. There are instances of imperatives for men’s lives which require of them also a concern for relationships, for sacrifice of their personal interests to benefit the group and these suggest that morality is one, though it may be bisexual.35 There are increasing numbers of men who believe themselves to be genuinely in sympathy with the values and qualities of life which radical feminists admire. Thus, they also decry the elimination from public life of the values traditionally consigned to the private realm, and it seems particularly inappropriate to call their concern self-centred, or deviously power-seeking, merely because they are biological males.36 Male writers have been just as damning of phallic morality, seeing in it all the fears and insecurities which plague the psyche of man and encourage his pretentious destruction of nature.37 How are we to understand these moral arguments if the gulf between men and women is so wide? Surely we do find ourselves in sympathy with some of what is said; we can at least make sense of it and appreciate its impulses. Naturalism makes plain to us the discreteness and particularity of vision which is characteristic of both moral and aesthetic values, but it also requires some description of the hinges which remain for the door between two points of view to be opened successfully. The emphasis in naturalism on the particularity of moral onlooks can mask the presupposition which nevertheless seems to be essential to morality of any kind—namely, that its impulse is towards the general and inclusive. Without such transcendent appeal, moral language may become superfluous and the claim of feminists no more or less important than those of anyone else looking after their own interests. Naturalism furnishes this by means of a conception of shared human nature, thus confining the spaces in which moral thinking takes place. Its description of this, however, can become just as decontextualised and ahistorical as the liberal emphasis on universal rationality. Unless we recognise our participation in the creation of this context, we will be left with a preconditioning of life too heavy to be shifted by creative thought. Particularities of embodiment may shape our evaluations, but these are, in the end, what we make of them. How such generalisations regarding the essence of human nature
84 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
actually work in our moral reasoning becomes an important matter, therefore, and one which we should handle with care.
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM Yet another way of understanding morality is available from those who would claim that moral ideas and values are a construct of various social conditions, including both material and ideological elements. Rather than emphasising the autonomous person who freely decides how to act as in the liberal approach, and rather than assuming that human nature by itself can form a sufficient background for choices, this approach presumes the priority, both historically and epistemologically, of the social over the individual. The distinctive features of this approach are, firstly, the moral significance which is given to roles and relationships within a certain social order, and, secondly, an observation that our language and therefore our thought are confined to the parameters of the socially defined. The first aspect is expressed by the claim that the general moral principles and particular practical guidelines which we use for decision-making are the products of the needs and interests of the social group. They are already established as possibilities when we reflect upon a given situation or problem. We learn our behaviour and our self-identity in the first place as members of a group and in the process of this practical education, a way of life in which we also share is imposing itself upon us. Once again, Aristotle is the seminal figure here in demonstrating the link between value and social function, and, according to this case, in suggesting that practical decisions can be related non-syllogistically to statements of one’s role, rather than to general principles or universal imperatives.38 Our understanding of ourselves as moral beings is fundamentally shaped by networks of relationship and institutional customs, and we are therefore acting out these pre-existing patterns in our personal choices.39 Values are thus part of the fabric of society into which we are woven; they embody social concerns and they confirm the social ordering necessary for a way of life to continue. Without such foundation, they lose their attachment to the very realities to which they are intended to bring meaning.40 The second aspect of this approach is expressed in the Wittgensteinian notion of language games, which suggests the limits of
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 85
our rational transcendence and the concurrent determination of consciousness and behaviour. We are always thinking within one strand of language or another, and there is no place altogether outside these which can provide us with a pivotal point. Thus, once again, the supposed objectivity of liberal principles collapses into particular context-dependent concerns of particular groups or individuals.41 Morality cannot therefore be a matter of leaving or transcending some world in order to discover what one ought to do, nor does it require us to return to impose this advice upon ourselves. Rather it is a matter of learning how to play the game and discovering within the rules what one is expected to do in order to qualify as a player. How we see ourselves and how we learn to act within various social contexts are parts of the same process, and their interdependence makes the link between thought and behaviour real.42 What is creative about our moral reasoning must then be the construction of new variations which are possible within these bounds, and they are tested by whether or not they work successfully in these terms. There are feminist writings which rely upon this social constructionist model of morality, and its distinctiveness becomes more clear when we consider the way in which gender issues cut across its field. These feminists have tried to demonstrate the determination of women’s lives by the various role models and opportunities for expression which society makes available, and have shown how women’s consciousness and morality is an internalisation of such outward social necessities. When young, women are taught their self-identity in terms of certain expectations and possibilities, and learn to relate moral decisions about behaviour to these directly, from statement of role to evaluative conclusion. Thus, de Beauvoir is again used, this time for her belief that women are made, not born; it is the intention of this view to disclaim ‘biological essentialism’ of any kind which would materially and physically determine what woman is. Social roles and relationships not only define women’s lives and become deeply carved into their self-understanding, but they are learned as behaviour patterns which have moral importance and which express, in a social way, what women understand themselves to be personally. It is the task of the critical feminist to become aware of these determinations by using available language and thought, and by means of this description of the nature of women’s lives, to test the fit between any particular set of social
86 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
institutions and some notion of what would be more fulfilling for women. There is no attempt here to discover universal principles which apply to all persons regardless of gender, nor to find some ahistorical understanding of women’s nature that can be used as a permanent foundation for revision. Rather, these feminists believe that within present realities lie the seeds of change, which the women who understand the morality of the present order can nourish, by their critical insights, into a healthier new society grown out of the past. Juliet Mitchell is a good example of this type of feminist thinking, particularly in her early book, Women’s Estate. It is important for women to be precisely aware of the economic functions which their lives are meant to perform, to see how the four social structures of Production, Reproduction, Sexuality, and Socialisation oppress their lives and build upon their supposed biological weaknesses and proclivities. The second step is to understand the ideological covering of these functions, since it is this which women take into their consciousness and are thereby produced as women. Ideology provides the sense of historical continuity and gives the illusion of a permanent, autonomous source of value. In each of these areas, women are exploited by cultural necessities and made to believe that these functions are essential to their nature. To understand this is to become critically aware of the imperfections, or contradictions, of the present social order, and it is in the gap between these and her own self-awareness that woman’s new understanding is to make its impact.43 Thus we begin with the factual questions: ‘What is the situation of the different structures today? What is the concrete situation of the women in each of the positions in which they are inserted?’ and we discover there the sources of change. A revolutionary movement must base its analysis on the uneven development of each structure, and attack the weakest link in the combination. This may then become the point of departure for a general transformation.44 Mitchell understands this change as the breakup of ‘an oppressive monolithic fusion’,45 after which each of these functions can begin to discover a new identity and express themselves as ‘lifegiving’, rather than as institutionalised death. It is her hope that a new social order can be devised out of the antipathies and alien-
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 87
ation of the old, which will more adequately express the ‘biosocial universal’ of human existence, and it is this which furnishes the basis for the moral consciousness to pry open the oppression of any given order. Rosalind Coward, on the other hand, rejects the ‘base/ superstructure’ model of Mitchell’s analysis, in which revolutionary morality can get a grip, and offers instead a description of the tightly knit relation of consciousness to culture. Like radical feminists, she claims that women’s consciousness is produced and structured by an ideology which expresses the biological and psychological needs of men. The interest of men in promoting their particular perception of sexuality and in developing a culture which expresses this phallic superiority, has so far dominated human history. This universality of cultural production demonstrates the way in which biological realities are mediated via social constructions and discourses. Therefore, unlike radical feminists, she claims that there is no way to get back through all of this to a pure or unstructured conception of what the reality underlying it all might be. As a result, she is more pessimistic about changes within the terms so far established. Her book is an attempt to demonstrate, that various accounts of the family or the history of the family rely on a notion of the sexual drive as a given, which has as its aim sexual reproduction. Concomitantly, men and women are theorised as having radically different aims and pleasures; sexual relations and sexuality are seen as the same thing, both deriving from absolute sexual difference in the service of reproduction.46 This determination of our categories of thought is so profound that Coward believes all of the discourses so far used to understand ourselves have relied, with the exception of psychoanalysis, ‘on a notion of sexuality identity (and therefore sexual regulation) as pre-given’.47 It thus becomes ‘virtually impossible’ for us to break out of this circle and understand ourselves in any other way. Discourse analysis, however, does provide for Coward a critical basis, for it helps us to find what is invisible or hidden within what exists. In the fullness of the discourse, there are oversights, lacunae,
88 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
the ‘blanks on the crowded text’. To see these blanks, something more than close attention is needed. What is required is a new gaze, an informed gaze, itself not the product of any one individual, but made possible by changes on (sic) the exercise of vision, changes in social and political conditions.48 The unique challenge of feminism is to ask unasked questions and, in so doing, to make the gaps in present structures more obvious. In this task of deconstructing what is given, new possibilities can emerge, but these are understood, not as somehow more adequate to an underlying humanness which might lie outside our discourse, but rather as more adequate to the particular discourse of feminism itself. Having untied the link between our language and some foundational reality, there is left only our language, in one form or another, and its relative values and moral expressions. Freudian analysis at least provides a critique of sexual constructions from the standpoint of an ‘initial bisexuality’, but Coward herself goes further into eradicating ‘the individual’, who is supposed to go through such sexual developments, from discourse altogether. The result of her version of social constructionism is that the idea of a coherent subject who is either the outcome or the origin of social roles is seen as ‘a fantasy’. Thus, ‘not only is identity a construct, but it is also continuously and precariously reconstructed’.49 In the end, male and female are constructions of social identities relying upon this notion of a centred self which has instincts, dispositions, anatomical characteristics, and behavioural patterns, and it is only in finally coming to terms with, and rejecting, this that feminism can carry through its radical argument for getting beyond dualism. This view of morality understands values, therefore, to be fundamentally expressive both of social requirements in themselves and of the human exigencies around which the society is formed. Values are created out of material conditions; they constitute the meaning that has been constructed out of the lives and circumstances of the participants in society.50 Their authority is thus understood by those within the system, as it were, and cannot be grasped independently of this. What becomes more problematic here is to explain, without reference to a transcendent rationality, how a society could ever imperfectly express its required values, or vice versa, how any values could ever be used as critical of the
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 89
society from which they emerged in the first place. Without reducing itself to a blind tautological statement that what a society values is what it values, this view must both maintain that values are intelligible within a way of life, and that social and historical changes occur on account of the imperfect fit of values to the realities which they supposedly serve. The dialectical method of resolving this problem suggests that, due to the historical (i.e. nonstatic) character of human social life, it is always conceivable for the individual or group awareness to stretch beyond its horizons into future possibilities. However, either these must rely on some unrealised potential which exists now within the order of things, and that requires some ‘base’ which the ‘superstructure’ imperfectly mirrors, that is, a non-linguistic reality against which the language of values can be measured. Or this method needs some view of the outer reaches of imagination or thought which would have to be, to some extent, free of being fixed by social realities, and indeed be capable of judging or criticising them; and this thought might then be considered ‘unreal’ and lose its character of immanence because we could not get a handle on its meanings. Part of the case which is made here is the same as the one the liberals hoped to make, namely that biology and value are not necessarily linked in any authoritative way. Women who realise this can thus be freed to reconsider the meaning of their biological existence in ways that may be felt as more authentic, and this view seems to suggest that it is possible for us to do this. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the reflective woman to do so. On the other hand, its description of the social character of language and values makes it plain that whatever those links have been thought to be, however the ties between biology and value have been knitted, has served and continues to serve as an expression of some underlying need or reality. While we would like therefore to fly as birds into imaginative new principles of judgement, we discover our feet of clay which fix us in an even more rigidly determined reality. In turning to Freud, both Mitchell and Coward find evidence for this universalism of patriarchy. While the former believes that Freud is describing women in a particular society— namely under the conditions of advanced capitalism—which might ultimately be overthrown so that their ‘true’ natures could be realised, the latter considers such optimism to be naive, since the base in human nature upon which the revolution could be constructed is believed to be deterministic.51 The freedom which
90 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
is supposed to be produced by this realisation of our social determination seems therefore to be elusive. We are still not the makers of ideology, no matter how unattached it may be from natural realities, and thus the totality of women’s oppression seems more unassailable than ever.52 One wonders why we are thinking about it. Ultimately, social constructionism can become too concerned to debunk our notion of what is ‘real’ by claiming that our handle on reality is linguistically shaped. Thus, ‘the categories through which we appropriate “the real” in thought are discursively constructed rather than given by the real’. At one level, this insight is ‘tautological to the point of banality’, since it only serves to indicate that ‘our knowledge of the real cannot exist outside discourse’. Admitting that this is the case, however, does not require us to sever the bonds of knowledge and reality altogether, so that all becomes discourse or varieties of language use.53 We can avoid the dogmatism of distinctive viewpoints, and the determination of moral values by non-moral realities, not by doing away with these distinctions altogether, but by making wiser and more careful use of them. Indeed Barrett, quoting Timpanaro, calls this a kind of ‘extraordinary arrogance’ which conjures away external reality by claiming the only valid object of study to be our knowledge of objects of study.54 Giving us the perspective of the divine but without any of its power seems of little point. To focus so exclusively on how our thought understands itself is to lose the initial attachment to natural human activities which language must have in order to be learned, and to overlook the discernment of ‘salient’ features of reality which it is the concern of morality to represent in some overall pattern of meaning. What is challenged by these issues is the nature of the moral agent. While the initial enthusiasm for this approach was surely fired by personal experience and concern, it ends by threatening the existence of a person at all who might have lived this or could alter it. On the one hand, this is a way of describing our complicity in the structures that shape our lives such that no individual guilt is incurred. Since we are utterly the products, mind and body alike, of material or ideological conditions, it is more easily understandable that so many women live out their lives in perfect conformity to their situation, without question or even unhappiness. If we are what we have been made to be, then no disruption can or need occur, and personal responsibility is absolved. Here is
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 91
the passivity of the consciousness which only receives from its surroundings the material it requires for moral reflection. On the other hand, the extent of this impersonal determination makes us feel the hopelessness of our circumstances even more keenly, but without giving us the necessary grasp of some reality by which to shift the present one. No longer may a revolution be effected by a poem,55 since even this will be shaped by prevalent meanings and existing possibilities. This viewpoint encourages us to look back upon ourselves, our language, and our values in a way which might be consoling, but which leaves us with no way to grasp the future that is not yet determined because it has not yet happened. How that future is to come about may not be predestined, and it is certainly part of our moral experience to sense some risk, some responsibility, some decision by which it may be realised. The phenomenology of the moral consciousness reveals the active attempt of individuals to grasp or make sense of their situations in ways that are novel, and indeed it may be this very activity upon which future hopes inevitably must be founded. What this suggests is that we need to find some balance in this perspective between the inner and the outer points of view. One of the things we can do is to examine the windscreen of the car we are driving so that we can notice its cracks, see where it is smudged, observe the way in which the particular material of which it is made distorts our vision of what is around us, or find the clear spaces by which we can get a good view of what lies ahead. In this way, we become aware of our finitude, our limitations, our unique perspective which constitutes our identity as persons with a point of view. But it is quite another thing actually to drive the car, an activity in which staring at the windscreen would be a serious liability since it is what we need to use in order to be able to get anywhere at all. Unless we desist from the activity for which windscreens were originally devised and found practicable, we must sometimes merely use them to go forward without noticing them. So with our moral concepts and language. It is the human activity of making sense of life which gave rise to these in the first instance, albeit in a social environment, and they retain what meaning they have in the context of human purposes and pursuits, interests and intentions. Examining them to see just how limited and proscribed they are, finding the bits of dirt that blur our moral vision, criticising the criteria which are used for judgement, is necessary for moral clarity, but is not the end in
92 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
itself. The point of such refinement of moral vision is to move forward towards a closer approximation of language and reality, or of social mores with the human activities from which they spring. Feminist challenges in this area may turn out to be an instance of Williams’s claim that ‘reflection may destroy knowledge’, since what we find here is, ultimately, the inability to provide moral knowledge or guidelines when one is so heavily sedated by an overdose of self-reflection.56
CONCLUSION Feminist writings, by contributing to the present criticisms of moral epistemology, have left in their wake a great number of issues which now call for some imaginative and sensitive handling if we are to develop in our understanding of the moral enterprise. We need to consider an account which is not only more satisfactory in its understanding of feminist concerns, but also more adequate as a rendering of the logic of moral reasoning, for these two are inextricably bound up with one another. From the liberal perspective on morality, feminism seems to provide no unusual or disturbing challenge, since its requirements are believed to fit comfortably with the general principles for just treatment and considerations of equal rights which are central to its moral prescriptions. Continuing dissatisfaction from feminists in this area seems inappropriate since their needs are so easily accommodated. Feminist issues are either treated as trivial because their resolution seems, on liberal grounds, so patently obvious; or they seem to be irrelevant to liberal principles, because any attention paid to the uniqueness of the women’s issue, as opposed to any other, is an unnecessary fuss for such abstractions as justice and equality; or they are considered to be uninteresting for any ‘real’ concern of morality since feminist demands are personal or partisan. There are presumably many who believe that the theoretical moral issues raised by feminism have therefore been resolved and nothing further remains to be said, though there may be a lot more to do to clear away the remnants of injustice. The way in which liberalism expresses its concern for women’s issues is to emphasise what it takes to be the obvious need of any morality, namely, some general principles regarding what ought to be done. These are understood to have a
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 93
rational necessity which enhances the human freedom by means of which they are discovered and, thus, they are believed to be the best hope for retaining distinctively human qualities. Having distilled this essence of morality, liberalism need only pursue the practical business of applying its principles in an even-handed way. This is what moral reasoning requires and, in its exercise, there are no gender distinctions. The trouble with both the naturalistic and social constructionist accounts is that the temptation to generalisation is once again present, although the lines are drawn in slightly different ways. In the first case, the move towards finding a common denominator in human nature leads to a tension within its account of morality. Beginning with an analysis of the way in which decisions are tied up with our understanding of ourselves, it helpfully illuminates the particularity of moral choices. Yet it increasingly presses for the description of the foundation for morality and in so doing conjures up abstractions of another kind to liberalism, but which are nonetheless ahistorical and essentialist.57 The recognition of this natural grounding becomes a statement of such overall patterns that it lends itself to an endless search for counter-examples. In this case, what begins as a genuine reconstructive task using feminist insights ends as either hopelessly separatist or too vague for the derivation of any helpful guidelines. Indeed, unless analysis of the logic of onlooks regarding our humanness is handled with more care, there will be nothing to prevent the traditional, long-lasting descriptions of the male-female relationship from being trotted out once again, with a reactionary sneer of disdain. Likewise, in social constructionism, the effect of feminism has been to make us aware of the very deep consciousness and symbolic value of gender as it seems to express itself over and over again in the construction of social organisations, roles, and relationships. As a critique of the way in which value is expressed and ordered in social groups, this perspective challenges us to be more self-aware of the determination of thought and language by these gender categories, but its conclusions seem morally selfstultifying. Feminist questions arose in the first instance, presumably because of some gaps or imperfections in the fit between moral injunctions, with all their underlying assumptions, and lived experience. To raise questions about the confinement of women’s lives by social definitions was to discuss something about which women cared and which was therefore understood
94 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
to be more than a bland factual analysis of what does and does not exist. However, not only the original morality, but now also one’s concern about it are viewed as instances of the unintentional construction of meanings; for the spaces which we think we have ‘chosen’ to occupy as social revolutionaries are in fact the ones laid out for us by the available options. What reality there was to begin with, against which the present order of things seemed to measure up so badly, now turns out itself to be fabricated, as a projection of present meanings. Once we understand this, there is nothing available to us for moral awareness, and moral sensitivity becomes reduced to the one-dimensional phenomenon of thought thinking about itself. Such generalities require detachment to be grasped but there is nothing further to be done with them; morality can be abandoned as ‘humanistic’ or ‘essentialist’. My concern with these tendencies in naturalism and social constructionism is for the loss of the person, which becomes either a particular instance of general human essence or a decentred self. It seems to me that this is not only too high a price to pay for the feminist insights which may be derived from these accounts, but also an unnecessary abstraction for any development of practicable feminist morality. And this is the task which really now should face us. Perhaps I could just begin to sketch out such an account. Morality is a matter of personal development in sensitivity towards ourselves and the others with whom we share life, a sensitivity which is practised by deepening one’s insights into present social realities, by learning to discern the nuances of meaning in the language and thought which confront us, and by committing ourselves to realising some possibilities as more fulfilling than others. As in artistic creation, we can hear more harmonies or visualise more arrangements, the more attuned we become to what is already there; our innovative contribution comes as we make those real, and we are fortunate when they do in fact work. Human nature provides the overall context in which the reasoning mind searches for its possible courses of action, and it does so within the confines of social structures. Moral thinking comes up against social and natural realities that are not entirely of our own making and these are subject to continuous historical changes. This can be seen, not as a limitation to our moral questioning, but rather as a source of its purpose and significance, since ultimately there are choices which will or will not succeed,
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 95
in the here and now, in creating human fulfilment. We understand what these might be as our sensitivity to particular instances and realities develops. The active dialogue between the changing aspects of our humanness amidst various social interactions and our enquiring imagination is what shapes moral questions and their answers. Reality and imagination are bound together. We can form our new self-understanding imaginatively out of the materials given to us by taking advantage of the spaces within what is there. In this process, new meanings will emerge as the dimensions of our insight are opened out, and we will discover the sources of moral inspiration for use in the future.58
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 47 (Autumn 1987) 1 See the discussion of this problem in Sartrean ethics by Mary Warnock, Existentialist Ethics, London, Macmillan, 1967, pp. 18–52. For the issues raised by the prescriptivist account see J.L.Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981, esp. part 4 on ‘Universalization’. Mackie states: ‘On this view there are only formal, but no material, constraints on what can count as moral. The form, universal prescriptivity, is determined by the logic of moral terms, but the content is entirely a matter for decision by the person—or of course it may be a group of persons—who makes the moral judgements or subscribes to and adopts the moral system’ (pp. 85–6). 2 H.J.Paton, The Moral Law, London, Hutchinson University Library, 1969, pp. 67–8 [The categorical imperative]. See also Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970. 3 See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London, Fontana, 1985, for a discussion of the impasse between two aspects of moral thinking: on the one hand the risk of free choice which morality implies and, on the other, the attempt to ground this choice in some limiting facts about rationality. 4 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, New York, Bantam Books, 1974, p. 31. 5 Ibid., p. 29. 6 Ibid., p. 33. 7 Ibid., p. 685, my italics. 8 Ibid., p. 671. 9 Janet Radcliffe Richards, The Sceptical Feminist, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982. 10 See de Beauvoir’s recognition of the insufficiency of freedom alone to resolve the problems of women, op. cit., ‘It is not to be supposed, how-
96 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
11 12 13
14 15 16 17
18 19
20 21 22
23 24 25 26
ever, that the mere combination of the right to vote and a job constitutes complete emancipation.’ (p. 639). Her thinking in response to this, however, creates problems for the liberal model; see Ann Foreman, Femininity as Alienation, London, Pluto Press, 1978, Ch. 8. Radcliffe Richards, op. cit., p. 121. Mackie, op. cit., p. 15. Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Dublin, 1793: ‘Let woman share the rights and she will emulate the virtues of man; for she must grow more perfect when emancipated, or justify the authority that chains such a being to her duty—if the latter, it will be expedient to open a fresh trade with Russia for whips’ (p. 256). Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason, London, Methuen, 1984, p. 104. Ibid., p. ix. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1981, p. 118. See Marjorie Weinzweig, ‘Philosophy, Femininity and Feminism’, Philosophical Books, Vol. 24, No. 3, July 1983, for a discussion of the inappropriateness of the notion of freedom as ‘self-control’ which is possessed by both men and women, particularly in the areas of sexual relations and of pregnancy and childbirth. See also Radcliffe Richards’s reply. Jean Grimshaw, ‘Feminism: History and Morality’, Radical Philosophy 30, spring 1982, p. 3. Donald Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement, London, SCM Press, 1963: ‘if I do deliberate concerning the formulation or acceptance of a typical onlook, it is misleading to depict the logical structure of this deliberation either in terms of a decision—that and a decision—to which are completely independent, or in terms of a decision—that which is totally dependent on a decision—to’ (p. 137). John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist, Vol. 62, No. 3, July 1979, pp. 346 and 341. John McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ The Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. LII, 1978, p. 18. See G.J.Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 20, London, Macmillan, 1967: ‘if it were not the case that there existed a certain range of considerations, having to do in general with the welfare of human beings, about which most people cared very much some of the time, and cared to some extent much of the time, then not only would moral argument, however conclusive, be pointless and ineffective; moral discourse would simply not occur’ (p. 71). Bishop Joseph Butler, Sermons (1726), edited by W.R.Matthews, London: Bell, 1969. See the very clear discussion of this matter in Mary Midgley, Beast and Man, London, Methuen, 1980, pp. 266–74. McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’, p. 331. McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’, p. 21. See also his description of ‘salience’ in ‘Virtue and Reason’, pp. 344–5. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982, p. 18. See Sigmund Freud, ‘Femininity’, in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, New York, W.W.Norton & Co, 1933: ‘Women have but little sense of justice…. We also say of women
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 97
27 28 29 30 31 32
33 34
35 36 37 38
39 40
41
that their social instincts are weaker than those of men, and that their capacity for the sublimation of their instincts is less’ (p. 184). Quoted by Gilligan, op. cit., p. 16. from Virginia Woolf, A Room ofOne’s Own, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1929, p. 76. Gilligan, op. cit., p. 16. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid., p. 173. Mary Daly, Pure Lust, London, The Women’s Press, 1984; see the entries in ‘Websters’ First New Intergalactic Wickedary of the English Language’. Thus Daly abandons hope for a Tillichian overcoming of dualism by means of increasing abstraction, in favour of a more gnostic, and Jungian opposition of forces. Compare Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father, Boston, Beacon Press, 1973 in which there is a ‘beyond’ described in Chs 3, 4 and 7, with Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, London, The Women’s Press, 1979, and Pure Lust, in which no such ‘place’ exists. See especially Radcliffe Richards, op. cit., pp. 25–9 passim. Alison Jagger, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1983; see pp. 98, 107. Cf. Janet Sayers, Biological Politics, London, Tavistock, 1982, p. 188. This problem also seems to be characteristic of the feminist writings of Luce Irigaray, as discussed by Margaret Whitford, ‘Luce Irigaray and the Female Imaginary: Speaking as a Woman’, in Radical Philosophy 43, summer 1986. Frigga Haug, ‘Morals also have Two Genders’, New Left Review, Vol. 143, Jan/Feb 1984. For a good example, see Robert Paul Wolff, ‘There’s Nobody Here But Us Persons’, in C.Gould and M.Wartofsky, eds, Women and Philosophy, New York, G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1976, pp. 128–44. See particularly Brian Easlea, Science and Sexual Oppression, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981, and Fathering the Unthinkable, London, Pluto Press, 1983. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1962, trans. Martin Ostwald. See Book One, Section 7 in which goodness is related to function. See also Dorothy Emmet, Rules, Roles and Relations, London, Macmillan, 1966; Philippa Foot, ‘Goodness and Choice’, The Aristotelian Society, Suppl. VI. XXXV, 1961; and G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ and ‘On Brute Facts’, in Analysis, Vol. 18, 1958. F.H.Bradley, ‘My Station and Its Duties’, in Ethical Studies, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1927. See A.C.McIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976, for a description of the history of ethics from this viewpoint. See also his argument that unless such community is restored in the modern world, morality will have lost its meaning for us. The confusion of moral perspectives in our day leaves us with no way of choosing between available alternatives without a meaningful social context. After Virtue, London, Duck worth, 1982. See Williams, op. cit., Ch. 2 on ‘The Archimedean Point’. See also McDowell, ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’,
98 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
42
43 44 45 46 47
48 49 50
51
52 53 54
55 56 57 58
in Eva Schaper, ed., Pleasure, Preference and Value,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983 for a critique of this possibility. Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969, trans. G.E.M.Anscombe and Denis Paul: ‘It is our acting which lies at the bottom of the language-game’ (para. 204). See also Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London, Hutchinson, 1949. Juliet Mitchell, Woman’s Estate, New York, Vintage Books, 1973. See particularly Chs 5 and 6 which illustrate these conditions of women’s lives and consciousness. Ibid., p. 122. Ibid., p. 150. Rosalind Coward, Patriarchal Precedents: Sexuality and Social Relations, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, p. 188. Ibid., p. 259. See also her article on ‘Psychoanalysis and Patriarchal Structures’ co-authored with E.Cowie and S.Lipshitz in Papers on Patriarchy, Lewes: Women’s Publishing Collective, 1976, in which she describes more fully the acquisition of gender consciousness in children. For an anthropologist’s analysis of this universal gender construction, see Sherry B.Ortner, ‘Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?’ in M.Z.Rosaldo and L.Lampher, eds, Woman, Culture and Society, California, Stanford University Press, 1974. Ibid., p. 1, quoting from Althusser. Ibid., p. 265. See also her book, co-authored with John Ellis, Language and Materialism, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, esp. Chs 1 and 5 which offer a critique of humanistic reification. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1974: ‘language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men…. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product’ (pp. 50–1). Coward, ‘Re-reading Freud’, Spare Rib, May 1978. She also criticises the limitations of Marxism for its economic determinism, which tends to yield a universalist thesis regarding the necessary ideology of women’s oppression. See ‘Re-thinking Marxism’, m/f 2, 1978. See the critiques of both Mitchell and Coward in Sayers, op. cit., pp. 134–45 and Foreman, op. cit., pp. 48–51. Michèle Barrett, Women’s Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis, London, Verso, 1984, pp. 34–5. Ibid., pp. 35–6. See also the review by Howard Feather, ‘Reconstructing Structural Marxism’, Radical Philosophy 43, summer 1986, in which similar epistemological problems are discussed with reference to Althusser, particularly p. 35. Attributed to Virginia Woolf. See how this problem is described by Joseph McCarney, ‘What Makes Critical Theory “Critical”?’, Radical Philosophy 42, winter/spring 1986. Williams, op. cit., especially Ch. 9, ‘Relativism and Reflection’. See my initial attempt to formulate this in ‘Feminism and Moral Reasoning’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, special issue on Women and Philosophy, June 1986. My thinking throughout this piece has been greatly stimulated by Sabina
FEMINISM AND THE LOGIC OF MORALITY 99
Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics, Oxford, Basil Black well, 1983. While I have not quoted directly from this work, I want to acknowledge her provocative analysis of moral epistemology and to express a hope that one day I can investigate her suggestions in a more full and direct way. My thanks also to the members of the Radical Philosophy Group for very helpful comments on the first draft of this paper, which has benefited from their careful attention.
5
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS Developments in a feminist aesthetic Pauline Johnson Contemporary feminist art theory and practice has, by and large, turned away from a modernist affirmation of the autonomy of art from life towards a post-modern problematisation of the specific category of the aesthetic. The modernist assertion of the freedom of the autonomous work is held to be inconsistent with feminism’s requirements for a committed art responsive to the needs of a determinate public. To a contemporary feminism concerned to establish the specificity, the legitimate difference, of the feminine, a post-modern ethos which repudiates any hierarchisation of world-views and endorses a democratic pluralism as the only defensible value appears as the more attractive option. The following paper interrogates the supposition of the radical inappropriateness of a modernist aesthetic to the critical requirements of a feminist perspective and challenges the supposed appropriateness of a post-modern standpoint to these needs. Part I of the paper considers a specific case of modernism’s relevance to a feminist art practice. I examine the, admittedly not unambiguous, support Woolf’s feminism finds in her allegiance to a modernist aesthetic developed by the Bloomsbury group. The second part of the paper considers the unacceptable consequences of a radical, indiscriminate jettisoning of the main aspirations of modernist art theory for a feminist aesthetic. Several attempts at constructing a post-modern feminist art are critically evaluated and the fundamental inadequacy of these enterprises is traced to an underlying incoherence in the objectives of a post-modern feminism.
100
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 101
I WOOLF’S FEMINISM AND A MODERNISTIC AESTHETIC Leading feminist interpreters of Virginia Woolf’s aesthetics have identified two seemingly incompatible perspectives in her work. Woolf’s feminism is, they argue, a product of a penetrating sociological analysis of the material and psychological constraints which have traditionally worked to inhibit women’s capacity to produce great art. On one level, then, Woolf disavows any romantic, idealist convictions, fully acknowledging that works of art are not ‘webs spun in mid air by incorporeal creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings and are attached to grossly material things like health and money and the houses we live in’.1 For Michèle Barrett and Simon Watney,2 Woolf’s feminist recognition of the politics of art production and reception cannot be reconciled with her equally solid allegiance to the modernist aesthetics of Roger Fry and Clive Bell which unequivocally repudiates any conception of the political character of art. Woolf’s commitment to an aesthetic purity and ‘freedom of mind’ represents a seeming romantic disregard for the sociological reality of the class and gender specific influences which condition all creative and receptive activities. On this point of view, Woolf’s feminism appears to leave off where her ‘materialist critique of the social position of the writer in the prevailing conditions of literary production’ ends and her modernist picture of the freedom and purity of the aesthetic begins.3 Whilst by no means attempting a full defence of the unambiguous appropriateness of modernist art theory to a feminist aesthetic, my aim here is to contest the idea that there is a radical incompatibility between Woolf’s feminism and her allegiance to a modernist aesthetic. In place of the idea of a fundamental rift between Woolf’s feminism on the one hand and her modernism on the other, I argue for the existence of conflicting possibilities and tendencies within the aims and methods of modernism upon which a discriminating account of its essential relevance for a feminist aesthetic can be based. In the present context it is not possible to embark on a comprehensive account of the main characteristics of modernist art theory and practice. Accordingly, I merely propose to examine the relevance of aspects of the specific modernist aesthetic elaborated by Woolf’s Bloomsbury colleagues, Bell and Fry, to the construc-
102 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
tion of her feminist perspective. I suggest that elements of the aims and techniques formulated by Bloomsbury art theory are essential to the articulation of this perspective. The modernism of Bloomsbury aesthetics Barrett and Watney’s influential critique of Woolf’s modernism rest, I suggest, on the failure to distinguish between two conflicting implications which attend the conception of the radical autonomy of the aesthetic proposed by modernist art theory. Although Marcuse’s seminal essay on The Affirmative Character of Culture’ is specifically concerned with the twofold implications of a humanist-realist tradition in autonomous art, we can, I hope to show, usefully employ the most general outlines of his analysis to assess the several possibilities and significances of a modernist art practice.4 Baldly stated, this analysis holds that an art practice which asserts the autonomy of the work from life can both sustain an elitist and conservative withdrawal from the ‘bad’ reality of the everyday while at the same time retaining an emancipatory significance by virtue of its critical distance from an oppressive present. The essential conservative spirit of a modernist disavowal of all human concerns and interests as fundamentally irrelevant to the purity of the aesthetic is nowhere more apparent than in the cultural aristocratism of Ortega y Gasset’s dehumanisation thesis.5 To Ortega, the dehumanised focus of modernist art offers a means for arresting the degenerate, levelling cultural egalitarianism of modern society. Because the appreciation of modern art requires a sophisticated audience capable of raising itself above the merely narrow, sectarian philistine interests of contemporary society, the aesthetic becomes the arena in which the cultural aristocrats of the modern era posit their own positive social identity. In the works of the moderns: ‘We have…an art which can be comprehended only by people possessed of the peculiar gift of artistic sensibility—an art for artists and not for the masses, for “quality” and not for the hoi-polloi’.6 Whilst lacking the radicalism of Ortega’s formulations, a similar cultural elitism is apparent in the Bloomsbury group’s attempted justification of modernist art. For Fry and Bell also, the ability adequately to appreciate post-impressionist art distinguishes a cultural elite from the irredeemably philistine masses.
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 103
Any discussion of content, the politics of reception and conditions of cultural production is, to them, irrelevant to the aesthetic, which appears only as ‘significant form’.7 The art work does not, they maintain, properly concern itself with any reality which exists outside it but constitutes its own hermetically sealed selfreferring ‘world’. Watney rightly points to the romantic and elitist conception of the ideal audience which underlies this aesthetic doctrine.8 On his view, Bloomsbury aesthetics appears as an idealist attempt to reduce the appropriately equipped viewer to a mere aesthetic sensibility from whom all determinate sociological characteristics have been effectively effaced. Moreover, their advocacy of the radical disengagement of the work from all human commitments and social interests seemingly involves Bell and Fry in an elitist appeal to an audience which considers taste and its cultivation an absolute end in itself. Watney suggests that for all Fry’s strictures against Victorian culture, Bloomsbury art theory with its proposed radical separation between art and life does not leave behind the middle-class values of snobbery and social conventionalism. In Bloomsbury aesthetics, the capacity to appreciate the ‘right’ pictures appears as the supreme social arbiter.9 At this stage in the discussion it would appear that the conception of the radical autonomy of the aesthetic formulated by Bell and Fry is entirely unsuited to the requirements of a feminist art theory, which inevitably proposes an explicitly ideologically committed aesthetic and expresses a profound interest in the character of the relations between art work and a determinate life experience. Yet at another level, it would appear that modernist art theory does not serve in any total, unambiguous sense a fundamentally conservative and elitist politics. In a provocative essay entitled ‘Modernity—An Incomplete Project’, Habermas points to the survival of vestiges of the essential emancipatory aspirations of Enlightenment thinking within the temper of modernism.10 According to Habermas, a modernist consciousness has inherited aspects of the Enlightenment’s interrogation of the controlling impact of tradition and the authority of the merely conventional. Modernity, he comments, ‘revolts against the normalising functions of tradition: modernity lives on the experience of rebelling against all that is normative’.11 This rebellious spirit, this aspiration towards a new, free subjectivity not constrained by the crushing, levelling norms of social convention, is arguably evident also in Bloomsbury art theory.
104 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Alasdair MacIntyre—who is a strong supporter of this reading of the significance of Bloomsbury aesthetics—suggests that Bell and Fry developed a critical dimension implicit in the moral philosophy of their associate, G.E.Moore.12 A central proposal of the Principia Ethica is that the ‘good’ be viewed as a simple, indefinable property and propositions declaring something to be good as aesthetical ‘intuitions’ incapable of proof or disproof. MacIntyre argues that Bloomsbury absorbed the radical aspect of this ethical system which, by making the ‘good’ a natural, unanalysable property discernible by the ‘sensitive individual’, appeared to offer a release from the oppressive moral conformism of the earlier generation.13 A balanced picture of the spirit of Bloomsbury would emphasise the twofold, conflicting implications of the attempt to construct an account of the disengaged purity of the aesthetic. Hence the persuasive force of Watney’s suggestion that the radical autonomy thesis simply establishes a new basis upon which a cultural elite is able to recognise and affirm the quality of its judgement and taste against the philistinism of the uncomprehending masses. Yet this conception of the radical autonomy of the aesthetic also seemingly expresses a revolt against the normalising function of tradition and articulates an aspiration towards the construction of an aesthetic consciousness liberated from the shackles of entrenched social convention. On this account, the modernist thesis of the purity of the aesthetic is able to sustain an essentially critical perspective on the present for it is precisely this disengagement of the work from the interests, commitments and norms of the everyday which enables the autonomous work of art to articulate an alternative, critical reality. I suggest that, in this latter aspect, the modernists enter into essentially sympathetic relations with a feminist interrogation (itself rooted in Enlightenment thinking) of the apparent inevitability of established tradition and the merely received social norm. The modernist no less than the feminist aims to break with the repressive function of the traditionally sanctioned norm. Like the feminist, the modernist refuses to credit the merely traditional with the authority of a ‘second nature’. Both, in their various capacities, offer a provocative challenge to the supposedly self-evident certainties of an unquestioned existence. It is in the light of the twofold conflicting implications funda-
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 105
mental to a modernist aesthetic identified above, that the complex character of Woolf’s feminism can best be understood. The modernism/feminism connection in Virginia Woolf In her major study of Woolf’s feminism, Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision, Nancy Topping Bazin argues that Woolf’s protest against existing forms of appropriate feminine subjectivity is informed by a vision of an androgynous subjectivity which, to her, corresponds to the real possibilities of the self.14 This vision of a transcendent androgynous self is conceived as a mediated unity in which presently constituted norms of masculinity and femininity are fundamentally transformed. Neither existing masculinity nor traditional feminity is, to Woolf, appropriate to her vision of ideal subjectivity which can only be realised in the freedom of the aesthetic sphere. This critical perspective on the norms of appropriate femininity and masculinity is powerfully developed by Woolf both in her fiction and in her essays and letters. A well-known piece entitled ‘Professions For Women’ usefully summarises her discoveries about the condition of psychic and emotional subordination required by modern conventions of the feminine.15 Woolf stresses that women are continually haunted by a debilitating image of an ideal feminine type: an ideal she expresses in the motif ‘The Angel in the House’. ‘The Angel in the House’ requires women to sacrifice their own judgements and desires, enforcing their adoption of a totally empathetic perspective which subordinates itself to the desires and wishes of others. To Woolf, this emotional enslavement must be unequivocally repudiated if women are ever to attain the ‘freedom of mind’ necessary to the elevation of the aesthetic attitude. While lacking the independence of mind necessary to the freedom of the aesthetic consciousness, the fundamentally egoless, empathetic feminine consciousness provides an essential counterpoint to an equally debilitated, unfree masculine selfabsorption. Whereas feminine subjectivity finds itself overwhelmed by and assimilated into the point of view of the other, the masculine ego must attempt to subjugate and absorb the perspective of the other. Woolf’s ironic attitude towards the foibles of masculine self-preoccupation is clearly evident in the following passage from The Years where Peggy is talking to a male writer at a party:
106 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Her attention wandered. She had heard it all before, I, I, I,— he went on. It was like a vulture’s beak pecking, or a vacuum-cleaner sucking, or a telephone bell ringing. I.I. I. But he could not help it…. He could not free himself. ‘I’m tired’, she apologised, ‘I’ve been up all night,’ she explained. ‘I’m a doctor’—The fire went out of his face when she said ‘I’. That’s done it—now he’ll go, she thought. He can’t be ‘you’—he must be ‘I’. She smiled. For up he got and off he went.16 To Woolf, neither presently constituted femininity nor traditional masculinity represent forms of consciousness suited to the purity and freedom of the transcendent aesthetic attitude. Woolf’s fiction suggests, however, that the unconstrained aesthetic consciousness represents not so much a negation of the feminine and masculine attitudes but rather a synthetic unity of aspects of both. As Bazin points out, Lily Briscoe’s efforts in To The Lighthouse to produce an aesthetically satisfying painting are represented by Woolf as a struggle to reconcile the feminine with the masculine attitude.17 To Lily, Mrs Ramsay appears in the inhibiting guise of the ideal feminine; as ‘The Angel in the House’. Yet Lily’s final liberation involves more than the negation of this oppressive ideal of an empathetic, subordinate, self-denying femininity: it is not to be sought in a conversion to the self-absorbed male egoism of Mr Ramsay. Woolf holds that the androgynous aesthetic consciousness combines the principle of the feminine, an anonymous, selfforgetful world typified by a generalising, abstract consciousness, with a characteristically masculine orientation towards the world of immediate, particular appearances. On this account the authentic, complete awareness of ‘reality’ requires a pattern of perception which synthesises a peculiar ‘feminine’ sense of the harmonious generality, with a typically masculine attention to the ceaseless passing of the specific details of immediacy. Only when Lily is able to respond positively to both modes of perception can she complete her painting with an aesthetically satisfying design. Lily’s painting finally draws together the solid triangular shape which represents the figure of Mrs Ramsay with the taut, linear distinct form expressive of the masculinity of Mr Ramsay. Woolf’s search for an elusive, ideal androgynous self which transcends the traditional, gender-differentiated experience of the everyday draws upon a modernist aesthetic which posits a tran-
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 107
scendent sphere of aesthetic purity and freedom. For Woolf, the emphasis of modernist art theory on the radical autonomy of the aesthetic from the everyday, gives expression to her feminist call for a new form of self-awareness which does not simply articulate but radically transcends presently constituted gender-specific forms of subjectivity. Woolf’s repudiation of realism—her turn from narrative and from naturalistic characterisation towards a highly contrived, self-reflexive structure—appears, then, as a search for an artistic form adequate to her vision of a transcendent, androgynous aesthetic consciousness. Woolf’s modernist experimentations in style and form are, I suggest, subordinated to, rather than obstructive of, her feminist objectives. In her interpretative piece on Woolf’s fiction entitled ‘Thinking Back Through Our Mothers’, Marcus points out that: ‘What some readers have seen as her incapacity to create character is not an incapacity at all but a feminist attack on the ego as male false consciousness. She will not supply us with characters with whom we may egoistically identify’.18 Woolf’s refusal of an egocentric idea of character, the despised I, I, I of masculine subjectivity, rests, in the first instance, on a belief in the transcendent truth of an androgynous consciousness which totalises a feminine awareness of the general and eternal with a supposed typically masculine consciousness of the empirical, of the immediate particularities of surface appearances. The transcendent, autonomous realm of the aesthetic which permits the suspension of naturalistic representation and characterisation apparently offers Woolf the ‘freedom of mind’ necessary to her experimental vision of an androgynous subjectivity. It appears, then, that we require a more balanced assessment than that proposed by Barrett and Watney of the relevance of Woolf’s modernist allegiances to her feminist objectives. Just as the modernist conception of the transcendent, autonomous character of the aesthetic permits expression to Woolf’s critical vision of an ideal, androgynous consciousness, so the modernist experimentations in literary technique prove, as Marcus suggests, highly appropriate to Woolf’s specifically feminist critique of established conventions of characterisation. Yet, whilst acknowledging the relevance of a modernist aesthetic to the feminist purposes of Woolf’s fiction, we should not overlook the real obstacles also presented by a radical autonomy thesis to the construction of a fully plausible feminist aesthetic. As previously noted, there is, following Marcuse’s profound analysis
108 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
in ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’, a twofold significance to the assertion of the autonomy of the work of art. On the one hand, autonomous art, with its conception of the radical separation between art and life, allows expression to the desire for a better life: for a life which transcends the oppressive, unfree conditions of the everyday. Woolf aims in her fiction to construct a vision of reality from whose vantage point we may understand both what is oppressive about the present, and how it should be changed. Yet, as previously indicated, there is a reverse construction to be put upon this aspiration towards a transcendent reality preserved within the autonomous work. Given that the modernist’s autonomy thesis involves the radical severing of art from life, the progressive, emancipatory desire for a better, a freer life is rendered in merely abstract, ideal terms. It could, on this point of view, be argued that in Woolf’s fiction a real, concrete dissatisfaction with a repressive, patriarchal life experience receives only an abstract, aestheticised and, hence, inadequate response. Locked within the autonomy of the pure work of art, Woolf’s proposal for a new form of human subjectivity can appear only as the striving after a new, alternative androgynous mode of perception. The concrete desire for a better, freer life is rendered abstract. In the language of Marcuse, it appears only as the desire for an enriched soul. For Woolf, the ideal androgynous subjectivity appears merely as a pure, complete aesthetic sensibility. It does not articulate any real prospects for the fundamentally altered life experience of the emancipated personality. The merely aesthetical, abstract character of the ideal, androgynous consciousness to which Woolf’s fiction aspires is nowhere more evident than in her biographical fantasy Orlando. Orlando appears in the form of a pure transcendent subjectivity unconstrained by history, time or determinate personality. Woolf introduces Orlando as a young male living in the sixteenth century and leaves the character a mature female located in the twentieth century. Orlando’s main task, the realisation of his/her true, complete, androgynous self, is conceived in purely psychological terms. Woolf here presents the aspiration towards the completed, emancipated personality not as the concrete demand for a transformed, enriched life experience but as the psychic journey of the self towards a new, authentic, unified state of consciousness; a quest which occurs essentially outside history and quite independently of any determinate life experience.
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 109
It is necessary to stress at this point that, as a major study on the specific character of art in modernity, Marcuse’s essay on ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’ primarily concerns itself not merely with a content analysis of particular genres but also with an investigation of the structural relations instituted between recipient and autonomous work. On this analysis, the great realist tradition of autonomous art no less than the anti-realism of a modernist art practice appears as a merely aestheticised portrait of an alternative life experience.19 Marcuse’s critique of the ambiguous ideological significance of art in modernity is, therefore, on no account to be confused with a Lukácsian defence of realism in the face of the aestheticist, abstract perspective presented in the specifically modernist work. Marcuse’s analysis would not allow us to attempt to overcome the twofold conflicting implications of Woolf’s adherence to a modernist aesthetic by simply advocating a turn by feminist aesthetics to a realist art practice. According to Marcuse, the aesthetic transfiguration of the radical demand for a new, emancipated, life experience into a merely consoling, affirmative portrait of an alternative, ideal state of mind or condition of the soul, hangs on the dynamics specific to the tradition of autonomous art itself. Accordingly, the great realist works are considered by Marcuse to be firmly implicated in the affirmative character of art in modernity.20 Although Woolf’s commitment to the main spirit and doctrines of a modernist aesthetic is by no means wholly inconsistent with her feminism, it seems that serious obstacles confront any attempt uncritically to adopt her work as the model for an appropriate contemporary feminist aesthetic. As already noted, the radical autonomy thesis she adopts means that, in Woolf’s hands, all feminist aspirations towards a radically reconstructed life experience become merely aestheticised. They are rendered into the abstract demand for a new sensibility or way of looking at the world. There appears, then, good reason to look well beyond the limits of a modernist art theory to locate the main lines of an adequate contemporary feminist aesthetic. As already noted, the turn today in feminist art theory is, in the main, away from a modernist affirmation of the autonomy of art from life towards a post-modernist problematisation of a distinct category of the aesthetic. For the remainder of the discussion I propose critically to consider some of the leading characteristics of this post-modernist turn in contemporary feminist art theory
110 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
and practice. In particular, I suggest that the adequacy of this trend towards a post-modern feminist aesthetic depends on its ability to negotiate an important and challenging task. From the preceding discussion of the import of Woolf’s commitment to a modernist aesthetic for her feminist objectives, it seems that the main index to the adequacy of a feminist post-modern alternative to a modernist art theory rests on its ability at once to preserve the critical stance available to modernism’s confrontationist separation between art and life while at the same time overcoming the merely abstract, aestheticist character of Woolf’s representation of an alternative life experience.
II TRENDS IN A POST-MODERN FEMINIST AESTHETIC Despite the fact that there is, as yet, no fully established body of theoretical literature on the issue of a post-modern feminist aesthetic, it appears that the ethos of a post-modern perspective has permeated many important currents in contemporary feminist art theory and practice. I propose to begin the discussion with a very general outline of the main tenets of a post-modern perspective. I then consider ways in which the general spirit of a post-modern viewpoint has influenced, in more or less explicit terms, a variety of recent experimentations in feminist art practice. Finally, I consider the ways in which the various problematic aspects of these experimentations reflect upon the viability and coherency of the underlying project and philosophy of a post-modern feminist aesthetic. The spirit of the post-modern In an influential work entitled Theory of the Avant-Garde, Peter Buerger makes a useful distinction between main aspects of modernism, the avant-garde and post-modernism.21 We saw earlier that a leading dimension of a modernist aesthetic concerns the attempt to create an hermetically sealed autonomous sphere of the work of art. The modernist characteristically refuses to accept contents given outside his/her art from social tradition but aims at constructing a wholly self-referential world of the work of art. From the outset, modernism regarded itself as a very radical
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 111
movement which aimed to dispense with all merely conventional perceptions and to construct a ‘pure’ art not bound by the normalising function of the merely traditional. As Buerger reads it, there is a significant difference between the main lines of a modernist aesthetic and the phenomenon of the avant-garde. Whereas modernism with its characteristic self-reflexivity represented the culmination of the historical development of the notion of the autonomy of art, the avant-gardists saw themselves as mounting a provocative challenge to the whole conception of the specificity of the aesthetic. They protested against the apparent uselessness of an art which regarded itself as an end in itself; as having a value separate from the concerns and interests of everyday life. As Jochen Schulte-Sasse puts it: The historical avant-garde of the twenties was the first movement in art history that turned against the institution ‘art’ and the mode in which autonomy functions. In this it is different from all previous art movements whose mode of existence was determined precisely by an acceptance of autonomy.22 Yet there remains a sense in which the avant-gardists carried on the essential spirit of a modernist aesthetic. Even though they repudiated the core modernist concept of the autonomy of the art work, the avant-garde shared with the early modernists a rebellious repudiation of the merely traditional and an affirmation of the untried, the experimental, the new. Only with the appearance in the 1950s and 1960s of the postmodern phenomenon has a serious challenge to the central values and principles of modernism as a totality been mounted. Unlike the avant-gardists, the post-moderns do not share the modernist’s conception of the new and unconventional as primary values. Against ‘high’ modernism, the post-modern’s claim is that it is simply not possible to shake off all merely conventional, traditional perceptions and perspectives in the attempt to create a ‘pure’ work of art. Contemporary theorists of this school point to the inadequate ahistoricism of a modernist project which aims, in the name of the experimental and the new, to transcend the normative conventions of all particular, historically specific, culturally circumscribed worldviews. For the post-modernists, to recognise such
112 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
historical character is to acknowledge that any attempt at radical transcendence of the norms and perspectives given by historical circumstance is implausible.23 They characteristically refuse any attempted privileging of worldviews and endorse a democratic pluralism as the only possible value. Post-modernism holds that the standardisation of any particular perspective or value is to be definitely avoided. It affirms a pluralism of values and outlooks which are considered reducible to a mere plurality of styles and genres. As we shall see, it is this easy acceptance of a relativist outlook and the suspension of the search for any perspective from which the present can be evaluated, which is strongly contested by Habermas and the other leftist critics of the post-modern standpoint. Its characteristic refusal to elevate any one specific value, perspective or mode of representation to the level of a normative standard makes the post-modern ethos immediately attractive to several leading trends in contemporary feminist art practice. Although, as already indicated, the theorisation of the relevance of post-modernism to a feminist aesthetic remains largely undeveloped, the influence of the post-modern spirit is nevertheless evident in many contemporary feminist experiments in the arts. Attracted by the relativisation of all social experiences, by the absence of normative standards and by the affirmation of a nonhierarchical ordering of differences, a number of otherwise very distinct forms of feminist art practice appear to have been powerfully influenced by the general ethos of the post-modern. The post-modern and feminist art Laura Mulvey’s often cited paper entitled ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ represents a seminal contribution to the development of a contemporary feminist aesthetic.24 Perhaps more than any other work in the field, this piece marks the turn away from a conception of the appropriateness of the universalising aspirations of a modernist aesthetic to feminist art theory and practice. Mulvey appears as one of the precursors of the so-called feminism of difference which has in recent years become dominant in many areas of women’s studies. To Mulvey, a feminist aesthetic must proceed from a fundamental awareness of the gender-specific character of all human subjectivity in a patriarchal society. Its most important and challenging task is, she intimates,
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 113
systematically to refuse all attempts to represent as universal the specific interests, perceptions and desires of a patriarchally socialised masculinity. According to Mulvey, a feminist aesthetics is faced with the hitherto largely unrecognised necessity of constructing a qualitatively new experience of pleasure which does not merely reflect the scopophilic nature of masculine desire. In a certain loose sense, then, Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ articulates central features of a post-modern outlook. Mulvey limits the appropriate task of a feminist aesthetic to the construction of a mode of representation which corresponds to the specific difference of the experience of femininity in a patriarchal society. In keeping with the spirit of post-modernism she is content to define the project of a feminist aesthetic as the attempt to eradicate the universalising standardisation of a specifically masculine social experience and mode of perception. There is, I suggest, a fundamentally problematic aspect to the whole project of a post-modern feminist aesthetic as formulated by Mulvey and others. A post-modern feminism has conflicting allegiances which render its aspirations incoherent and selfdefeating. As an historically determinate phenomenon, feminism articulates, in the name of an Enlightenment evocation of the possibility of an emancipated, rational social life, a protest at the unfreedom, at the psychic and material constraints which ensure a subordinated femininity. Historically, feminism appears as a protesting consciousness made possible by a critical humanist interrogation of a repressive ideology which strives to attribute a natural status to all socially constituted phenomena. The critical consciousness of Enlightenment thinking is, it seems, a precondition of the historical appearance of a feminist repudiation of the traditional tasks and psychologies attributed to women. Yet, whilst a feminist protest has its roots in Enlightenment thinking, the relationship of the post-moderns to an Enlightenment aspiration towards the free, rational construction of social life is, as Habermas stresses, an equivocal one. To the post-moderns, the Enlightenment’s hopes for the emancipatory power of reason involve the attempted universalisation of a cultural and gender-specific construct: man conceived as a free, reasoning consciousness. On this point of view, the attempt to project conscious self-determination as humanity’s main historical task appears to rest on a culturally constituted and ultimately implausible conception of a fundamental opposition between the
114 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
constrained, unfree world of social tradition and the unconstrained realm of a constitutive rational faculty. This sphere of a valorised rationality is, as Lloyd and other contemporary feminists point out, characteristically equated with the masculine while the constrained world of the uninterrogated passions is typically tied to the feminine.25 The point of the present argument is not to attempt to marshal support for the ideal of androgyny against the assertion of the positive difference of the feminine, for there is, as the so-called feminists of difference point out, every reason to suppose that androgyny only appears as an ideal objective from a specifically patriarchal standpoint according to which the feminine appears as, in the words of Aristotle, ‘a certain lack of qualities’. The positing of an androgynous subjectivity as an ideal suggests an assessment of the feminine as an incomplete subjectivity to be augmented by valorised, alien ‘masculine’ attributes. Contemporary feminism’s insistence on the necessary assertion of the legitimacy of the feminine as a positively different subjectivity emerges, then, as a significant advance in the development of feminist thought. Yet there remains an ever-present danger here that, rather than positing this positive difference as the goal of a conscious, practical, collective struggle, a feminism of difference will be tempted to assert the legitimate difference of a presently constituted, patriarchally circumscribed femininity. This temptation cannot be resisted, I suggest, by a feminism which uncritically allies itself with the relativism of a post-modern outlook. To the extent that the post-moderns consider the critique of the universalistic character of its formulation grounds for a repudiation in toto of the Enlightenment’s aspiration towards the construction of a free, rational, social life, it appears unable to posit the emancipated personality as the task of progressive social movements. To a post-modern feminism the affirmation of the positive specificity of the feminine characteristically appears not as the lack of a movement determined to make a specific identity for women through collective social action, but rather as an assumption of the identity which has been made for women by a patriarchal cultural tradition. This lack of any substantive critical orientation towards the terms of a received patriarchal social identity, which I am claiming to be typical of post-modern feminism, will be illustrated shortly by a brief discussion of several contemporary experimentations in a feminist art practice.
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 115
A critical feminist consciousness cannot, it seems, adopt a simple one-sided orientation towards the aspirations articulated by Enlightenment thinking. While the universalistic claims made on behalf of a cultural and gender-specific conception of reason must be interrogated, the dependence of feminism as an historical phenomenon on the Enlightenment’s hopes for a free, rational social life must also be acknowledged if feminism’s character as a protest against the received norms of a patriarchal femininity is to be retained. Against the various post-modern feminisms, I suggest, therefore, that the Enlightenment project which looks to the constitution of the emancipated personality as humanity’s main historical task must be embraced and reformulated by feminism. Without the critical assumption of this project, feminism is, as already indicated, left with no perspective from which a present, repressively constructed femininity could be challenged. My aim here is to show that any attempt to affirm the positive difference of the feminine which considers this difference, not in the light of a task to be achieved but as an already arrived at specificity, can only offer a conservative collaboration with a patriarchal construction of the feminine. Experiments in a post-modern feminist art practice: an assessment From amongst the wide range of recent experimentations in a feminist art practice, three stand out as the more typical bearers of a post-modern spirit. All of these apparently very diverse trends in women’s art see the attempt to find a mode of representation able to express a feminine specificity or difference, while undercutting the traditionally negative positioning of such representations, as the primary task of a feminist aesthetic. One formulation of this enterprise which has its significant advocates both in the fine arts and in feminist literary theory suggests that a non-subordinated image of the feminine requires the development of new, experimental forms of representations. Some of the work of the important American feminist Judy Chicago exemplifies this attempt to construct a specifically feminist visual form. In their well known test entitled Old Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology, Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock critically evaluate Chicago’s Female Rejection Drawing in the light of her professed attempt to find an abstract form appropri-
116 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
ate to the expression of a non-subordinated, specific experience of female sexuality.26 In this particular work Chicago endeavours to produce in an abstract form reminiscent of a flower an image of the distinctive character of women’s desire as a decentred, multiple, diverse pleasure of the body. Chicago says of this picture: I couldn’t express my own sexuality by objectifying it onto the projected image of a man but only by inventing an image that embodied it. This is basically a feminist posture but I don’t think it was possible before the development of abstract form.27 As Parker and Pollock point out, however, Chicago’s strategy of using abstract form in an attempt to produce a new, positive image of feminine sexuality, an image not regulated by patriarchal representations, is necessarily a failure. Chicago’s work is inevitably inserted into a system of established representations about the sexuality of women. Her evocation of a flower-like image as a graphic illustration of women’s sexuality is readily received and accommodated by a pre-existing set of oppressive, negative images of the alluring, dangerous character of women’s desire. Parker and Pollock formulate their objection as follows: Within male-dominated culture, its language and its code of representation, it is not possible to produce in any simple way an alternative, positive management of the image of women. The image of women is the spectacle onto which they project their narcissistic fantasies.28 The attempts made by Chicago in the fine arts and by Hélène Cixous and others in literature to identify new modes of representation adequate to the expression of the positive specificity of the feminine appear as an inadequate realisation of a critical feminist outlook in the arts. Limiting their objectives to the construction of an image of the non-subordinated difference of the feminine, these art workers inevitably find their work inserted into and given significance by a system of patriarchal representations. The attempt to formulate a mode of representation adequate to the positive specificity of the feminine is an ambition shared also by the feminist advocates of women’s traditional creative practices. In her essay entitled ‘Is There A Feminist Aesthetic?’ Silvia
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 117
Bovenschen critically assesses a trend within contemporary feminist art towards the assertion of craft works: embroidery, weaving, sewing and so on, as not merely artistically inferior to the socalled ‘high’ fine arts but as different, as specific, kinds of creativity which have been grossly devalued in a patriarchally arranged ranking of creative achievements.29 This strategy of asserting women’s traditional craft skills as of value equal to the so-called ‘high’ arts quite evidently participates in the anti-universalising spirit of the post-modern ethos. This feminist project has, moreover, assimilated the post-modern’s refusal of the historical separation between the arts and crafts essential to the modernist’s assertion of the autonomy of the pure art work. It is, however, not at all clear that the attempt to re-evaluate the worth of the so-called feminine crafts contributes to the construction of a feminist consciousness critical of a patriarchally ascribed femininity. One should not, as Bovenschen points out, ‘foster the false illusion that our sewing teachers indeed pointed in the right direction’.30 In a patriarchally organised modern society, the traditional feminine skills of embroidery, weaving and sewing have been the mark of the subordinated, domesticated, privatised experience considered appropriate to women. To attempt merely to assert these activities as positively different, as specific creative practices rather than negatively different from valorised masculine achievements in the ‘pure’ arts, is to surrender the real sense of a feminist protest at the constrained, restricted nature of the experience and opportunities available to women in a modern patriarchy. Not only is the scope of this ambition extremely limited; its specifically critical feminist character is very doubtful also. Without the demand for the radical abolition of gender-specific limits to ‘appropriate’ creative activity, the repressive ideology of a gender-based nature remains secure and ineffectively contested. Whilst on the one hand admitting the cultural, merely traditional, character of the construction of feminine attributes and skills, the feminist celebration of these achievements seemingly attributes to them the status of a peculiarly feminine property. The proposed re-evaluation of traditional feminine creativity does not, in any practical sense, disturb the convictions of a repressive, essentialist ideology of the feminine. Finally, I turn to a brief consideration of a trend within contemporary feminist aesthetics which has, more explicitly than the
118 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
options considered so far, adopted a post-modern perspective. This trend towards a theorised use of post-modern ideas is described by Craig Owens in an essay entitled ‘The Discourse of Others: Feminists and the Post-Modern’.31 According to Owens, a feminist post-modern strategy in the fine arts strives at once to embrace or affirm the image of the feminine as different, as specific, and to resist the domination or control of this image by the voyeuristic, normative gaze of the masculine spectator. The photographic exhibitions of Cindy Sherman are presented as one of the main examples of this explicit post-modern feminist strategy in the arts. These photographs, which typically depict Sherman herself as a 1950s film star, attempt to impede and subvert the voyeuristic look characteristically courted by this genre. Sherman’s own obvious, underscored awareness of the predatory nature of the look from which she seeks to shield herself is seemingly designed to compel the spectator to become conscious of the voyeuristic character of his/her reception of the feminine. An unproblematic relation between image and receiver is impeded. Sherman presents a highly conventional image of modern feminine subjectivity while refusing to permit the easy regulation of this image in accordance with patriarchal norms and standards. Sherman, the ’50s beauty, refuses to exist for the benefit of the normative masculine gaze. The exaggeratedly conventional image of the feminine strives to emancipate itself from the normative gaze of any other merely culturally constituted mode or style of human subjectivity. According to Owens, Sherman’s photographs underline and parody the conventionality of the traditional norms of the regulation feminine ‘type’ in modern Western society. In this sense her work affirms the anti-essentialism which marks the post-modern outlook. For Sherman, as for the post-modern feminists in general, emancipation apparently means only a liberation from the normative privileging of any specific, culturally constructed mode or ‘style’ of human subjectivity. All that is proposed is an affirmation of the particularity of gender-based norms and the refusal of a repressive universalisation of the standards of a peculiarly masculine, culturally constituted subjectivity. Conclusion It appears that contemporary feminist aesthetics confronts a signif-
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 119
icant dilemma. On the one hand, as the discussion of Woolf s feminism has suggested, there are serious obstacles to feminism’s wholesale adoption of the aims and methods of a modernist aesthetic. On the positive side, a modernist aesthetic which articulates a conception of the radical disjunction between art and life is very appropriate to Woolf’s vision of a transcendent, androgynous ‘real’ self which empowers her fiction with a profound critical perspective on the oppressive, inauthentic character of existing gendered subjectivity. Drawing on the modernist conception of the transcendent nature of the aesthetic, Woolf’s work articulates a conception of the ideal, emancipated self which presents a critical alternative to the oppressive, restricted experience of femininity encountered in everyday life. At the same time, however, and again a feature of Woolf’s commitment to a radical autonomy thesis, her vision of an emancipated, androgynous self is conceived in terms of a mere aesthetic sensibility. Locked within the autonomy of the work of art, Woolf’s proposal for a new form of human subjectivity appears as a mere striving for a new androgynous perspective. Androgyny is for her most aptly described not in terms of its concrete realisation in a new emancipated personality but as a mode of perception most fittingly evoked in the form of the abstract, visual representation. Thus Lily’s final authentic vision in To The Lighthouse culminates not in a changed practical orientation towards life but in a mere aesthetic satisfaction at the momentary realisation of her more complete, androgynous mode of perception in a fitting visual design. Hence, although the ideal subjectivity posited by Woolf empowers her fiction with a strongly critical standpoint, the merely aesthetical character of this ideal means that her critique ultimately fails to project a practical imperative. As already suggested, the alternative vision proposed in her art functions as a compensatory, substitute gratification which siphons off and renders harmless the radical need for changed gender relations to which her works, in their passionate critique of existing relations between the sexes, also give expression. Whilst Woolf’s critique of the truncated character of given gendered subjectivity finally appears as a call not for a changed life but as only the demand for a new mode of perception, at least her art does preserve the protest at an unfree, subordinated femininity essential to a feminist outlook. This critical impulse is, as we have seen, sacrificed in the relativist perspective assimilated by a post-
120 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
modern feminist aesthetic. Its characteristic repudiation of the Enlightenment project which looks upon the emancipated personality as the task of historical activity, means that, for a postmodern feminism, the attempt to construct a conception of the positive specificity of the feminine cannot appear as the practical goal of a social movement. Rather, the attempt to identify the positive difference of the feminine appears as the mere attempt to assert the specific, positive identity of an already ascribed femininity. To a post-modern feminism, the ‘feminine’ appears as merely one ‘style’ of subjectivity amongst others which must be protected from the normative encroachments of other ‘styles’ of subjectivity. Any radical dissatisfaction with the repressive conventions of a patriarchal femininity is, to all intents and purposes, lost to a pluralistic ‘recognition’ of the legitimate specificity of the various modes of a gendered social existence.
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 45 (Spring 1987) 1 Woolf, V., A Room of One’s Own, cited in M.Barrett, ed., Virginia Woolf: Women and Writing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York and London, 1979, p. 5. 2 See Barrett, M., ibid, and Watney, S. ‘The Connoisseur as Gourmet’ in Formulations of Pleasure, Dennett et al., eds, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. 3 Watney, S., ‘The Connoisseur as Gourmet’, op. cit., p. 79. 4 See Marcuse, H., ‘The Affirmative Character of Culture’, Negations, Penguin University Books, London, 1972. 5 See Ortega y Gasset, J., The Dehumanisation of Art, Princeton University Press, 1968. 6 Ibid., p. 7. 7 See Bell, C., Art and Fry, R., Vision and Design. 8 See Watney, S., ‘The Connoisseur as Gourmet’, op. cit., p. 77. 9 Ibid., p. 77. 10 See Habermas, J., ‘Modernity—An Incomplete Project’, The AntiAesthetic Essays on Post-Modern Culture, Foster, H. ed., Bay Press, USA, 1983. 11 Ibid., p. 5. 12 MacIntyre, A., After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Duckworth, 1981. 13 Ibid., p. 16. 14 See Bazin, N., Virginia Woolf and The Androgynous Vision, Rutgers, 1973.
FROM VIRGINIA WOOLF TO THE POST-MODERNS 121
15 Woolf, V., ‘Professions for Women’ in Barrett, ed., Virginia Woolf: Women and Writing, op. cit., p. 58. 16 Woolf, V., The Years, quoted in Barrett, ed., Virginia Woolf: Women and Writing, op. cit., p. 21. 17 See Bazin, op. cit., for a discussion of the feminist politics of To the Lighthouse. 18 Marcus, J., ‘Thinking Back Through Our Mothers’, in Marcus, J., ed., New Feminist Essays on Virginia Woolf, University of Nebraska Press, 1981. 19 Marcuse does not specifically refer to a modernist tradition and my usage of his analysis involves an adaption of only the most general outlines of his diagnosis of the conflicting implications of autonomous art. 20 Indeed it is the implications of a tradition of an autonomous realist art with which Marcuse is particularly concerned. 21 Buerger, P., Theory of the Avant-Garde, University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 22 Schulte-Sasse, J., ‘Foreword’ to Buerger, op. cit., p. xiv. 23 See Lyotard, J.F. ‘What is Post-Modernism?’ in The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Bennington and Massumi (trans.), University of Minnesota Press, 1984; and Jameson, F., ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’, The Anti-Aesthetic, Foster, H. (ed.). 24 Mulvey, L., ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Screen, 16:3, 1975. 25 See Lloyd, G., The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy, Methuen, 1984. 26. Parker, R. and Pollock, G., Old Mistresses: Women, Art and Ideology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. 27 Ibid., p. 130. 28 Ibid. 29 See Bovenschen, S., ‘Is there a Feminist Aesthetic?’ in Weckmueller, trans., Feminist Aesthetics, Ecker (ed.), The Women’s Press, 1985. 30 Ibid., p. 47. 31 Owens, C., ‘The Discourse of Others: Feminists and Postmodernism’, in The Anti-Aesthetic, Foster (ed.), op. cit.
This page intentionally left blank.
Part II SOCIALISM AND PHILOSOPHY
This page intentionally left blank.
6
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY: A VERSION OF PASTORAL? Jonathan Rée
I write in and about an embarrassment: how should I, a philosophy teacher, respond to people who are also committed to philosophy, but cut off from official philosophical institutions? It was partly to focus my attention on this problem that I revisited a much-respected acquaintance a few days ago. He is Jock Shanley, a former upholsterer and trade union leader, now 83 years old and retired to a suburb near where I work in north London, where he reads, watches TV, and leafs through Marxism Today, wondering facetiously whether he is the only Marxist left in Britain. Shanley is happy to be described as a ‘proletarian philosopher’. His acquaintance with philosophy began when, as an apprentice in Aberdeen in the early 1920s, he attended university extramural classes in economics. Of the theories surveyed in the course, the only one which made sense to him was Marxism, and he plied the tutor with questions about it. The tutor first reacted by accusing Shanley of being a ‘plant’ from the National Council of Labour Colleges, a Marxist organisation for independent working-class education, of which Shanley had not in fact heard at that time. But eventually the tutor was sufficiently pleased with Shanley to arrange for him to be offered a scholarship to Aberdeen University, on the understanding that he would spend two years working for the Liberal Party once he got his degree. Shanley rejected that offer and, with a grant from the Amalgamated Union of Upholsterers, spent two years (1924–6) as a full-time student at the Central Labour College, the residential counterpart of the NCLC, in Earls Court, London. It was there that he learned the
125
126 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
ideas about materialism and dialectics by which he still organises his life and thought. As he talked to me about his analysis of current politics— Reagan’s raids on Libya, the British Communists’ amnesia about the working class—he constantly referred to its philosophical foundations, playing back sections from an indexed taperecording of key philosophical quotations from Marx and Engels, and paying homage to Tommy Jackson as ‘the proletarian philosopher of the 1920s and 1930s, whose wit I cannot match’. Shanley does not ‘believe in philosophy’, however; he regards himself as an ‘anti-philosophical philosopher’. But his anti-philosophy, he is convinced, is indispensable for enlightened and effective social and political action.1 My own opinions, for what they are worth, do not disagree with Shanley’s. The embarrassment is that they don’t correspond to them either. If I have more patience with the intricacies of technical philosophy, this may merely reflect the luxurious ideology of a professional; so too may my belief that philosophy can validly and valuably lead to utter uncertainty, rather than to firm conviction. But it would be facile to discard the problem by trying to separate popular from academic philosophy, and praising the former for its vital engagement with reality, whilst scorning the decadent aestheticism of the latter. For, on the one hand, popular philosophies may turn out to be modelled mainly on academic ones; and on the other, academic philosophies characteristically involve an image, a ‘wild idea’ as Hegel put it, of something called ‘the people’.2 The idea of an autonomous ‘popular philosophy’, therefore, may be no more than a wishful projection of the academic imagination.
VINDICTIVE ARTISANS It seems obvious that philosophy has traditionally been antidemocratic. In the Republic, Socrates conjures up a lurid vision of what would happen if ordinary craftspeople were permitted to ‘take a leap out of their trades into philosophy’. Such artisanphilosophers might be ‘the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts’; but if they dabbled in philosophy they would be no better than a ‘bald little tinker’ who comes into money and ‘takes a bath and puts on a new coat’, grotesquely fancying that he might be
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 127
able ‘to marry his master’s daughter’. For the dignity of philosophy, according to Socrates, has an attraction even for those who are unable to understand it—‘whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are cramped and maimed by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts’.3 But Socrates’s attitude is not unambiguous: if he associated sophistry with ‘the public’, he also went out of his way to demonstrate, in the Meno, the innate wisdom of a slave. And Christian high culture has often elaborated this sort of story into resonant fables about enfeebled learning being revived on its death-bed by self-taught peasants, or pure fools, or street-wise kids, amazing their sophisticated seniors by their information or their uncluttered insight. The original is presumably Luke’s story of the 12year-old Jesus running away from his artisan home, to be found three days later ‘in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them, and asking them questions’ so that ‘all that heard him were astonished at his understanding and answers’.4 Such intellectual David-and-Goliath stories must have helped thousands of outsiders to conceive and even to fulfil an ambition of entering into an intellectual elite—like Dirk Rembrantsz, the Dutch cobbler and amateur astronomer who, after much discouragement, won acceptance as part of Descartes’ circle;5 or AntonWilhelm Amo, the Ashanti slave who made a career for himself in eighteenth-century German academic philosophy.6 But there will always be a mean-minded suspicion that people moved by such ambitions are just social climbers—traitors to their class, not champions of it. After all, stories which celebrate and romanticise the wisdom of outsiders or the oppressed are standard elements of elite cultures, rather than straightforward alternatives to them. They are versions, in fact, of pastorals—that is to say, of idealised stories which, as William Empson put it, are ‘about’ the people, but not ‘by’ or ‘for’ them.7 Anyone who might be thought to ‘represent’ the people in such a scenario will naturally be suspected of betraying them. But during ‘the scientific revolution’, things began to change. It became possible to give a militant and vindictive interpretation to the role of the artisan-philosopher and to make it more proletarian than pastoral. Francis Bacon attempted to rewrite the history of philosophy by praising the down-to-earth artisanal practicality of the pre-Socratic philosophers at the expense not only of the Sophists but also of Plato and Aristotle with all their ‘professorial
128 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
pomp’.8 A possible model for the heroic Baconian ‘workman’ was Bernard Palissy, a sixteenth-century Parisian potter whose quest for a perfect white glaze led him to write and lecture in Paris about his technical discoveries, in gleeful rivalry with the official philosophers. Palissy introduced himself to his readers as follows: How can a man understand and discuss the workings of nature if he has not read the Latin books of the Philosophers? So it might be asked of me, for I prove by experiments that the theories of many philosophers are fallacious…. You will learn more about natural philosophy from the instances contained in this book than you could learn in fifty years reading the theories of the ancient philosophers.9 In many ways, it is the same voice, more than two centuries later, which heralds a brave new world of working-class socialist revolution. In the Jura in 1807, Charles Fourier (1772–1837) hailed the imminent demise of two and a half millennia of misbegotten philosophical time-wasting: To complete the humiliation of these modern Titans, God has willed that they should be confronted by an explorer who is a stranger to the sciences, and that the theory of universal movement should end up as the property of a man who can hardly even read or write. It is a mere shopassistant who is going to destroy all those libraries of political and moral philosophy, the despicable fruit of charlatanries ancient and modern…. This will not be the first time that God has made use of the lowly in order to humble the proud, or that he has chosen a man of extreme obscurity to deliver an all-important message to the world. Fourier saw himself as an outsider whose destiny was to dispose of ‘the idiocies of the philosophers’ at last. I—who know nothing about the mechanism of ideas and have never read a word of Locke or Condillac—haven’t I had sufficient ideas to be able to discover the entire system of universal movement?
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 129
After twenty-five centuries, he declared, ‘nothing remains for the philosophers but confusion and despair’. Do we really have to deck ourselves in long black mourning robes in order to inform the political and moral philosophers that their fatal hour is sounding, and that their vast libraries of books are all going to sink into nothingness; that Plato, Seneca, Rousseau, Voltaire and the rest, with all their choruses of doubt, ancient and modern, are going to be swept away by the great river of oblivion?10 There are some striking ambivalences, if not paradoxes, about the role which Fourier designs for himself here: the proletarian who is uncontaminated by official philosophy, and determined both to excel in it and to overthrow it. The character was to have hundreds, if not thousands, of real-life embodiments in nineteenthand twentieth-century Europe and America. The most notable, probably, is Joseph Dietzgen (1828–88), the Rhineland tanner and Social-Democrat whose name became a byword for ‘proletarian philosophy’ from St Petersburg to Chicago and New York, Glasgow, Liverpool, South Wales, the Netherlands and on to Petrograd again.11 There were also fictional versions, such as Earnest Everhard, the exigently named ‘proletarian philosopher’ hero of Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1908). The proletarian philosophers are robustly evolutionist, materialist, and socialist; what is hard to make out is why they saw their revolutionary project as requiring them to pay any attention at all to philosophy. Why didn’t they just ignore it, as one of the most insignificant of all the elements of the old immoral world?
PHILOSOPHY AND HERO-WORSHIP The history of philosophy is not just a matter of doctrines, positions, and arguments. It also involves the aspirations, the passions, and the disappointments of those who set their heart on being a philosopher, even though they may have only a remote idea of what such an existence might mean. Philosophy’s past, in other words, belongs not only to intellectual history, but equally to a field which might be called history of intellectuals. This deals with organic intellectuals as well as traditional ones; with autodi-
130 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
dacts and non-academics, whether plebeian, petty-bourgeois, middle-class or patrician; and with women as well as men, children as well as adults. The history of intellectuals is not a wholly positive discipline: its subject-matter includes idealised and unreal figures which people fall in love with, and hate, and aspire to embody in themselves or impress upon others. It deals with ‘subjective careers’ as much as with objective ones; the history of intellectuals, in short, is a story not only of facts and probabilities, but of dreams and fantasies too: adventures of humiliation and exultant hero-worship, rather than accumulations of impassive theory. A main source of information for any history of intellectuals is provided by the regulations of academic institutions. These certainly help to explain the quite special prestige which has often been associated with the idea of philosophy. In the universities of late medieval Europe, the term ‘philosophy’ referred paradigmatically to three texts of Aristotle—the Physics, the Ethics (Nicomachean), and the Metaphysics. Under the title of ‘the three philosophies’ these had been added to the older ‘seven liberal arts’ to complete the provision of the arts faculties. This ideal curriculum had an essentially temporal sense: philosophy was to be studied after the seven arts, and it was upon an examination in philosophy that graduation to the rank of Master in the arts faculty would depend. Only after that could you become a student in one of the small ‘professional’ faculties—traditionally, law, theology or medicine. Thus philosophy was the name of a stage, rather than a subject: it was the culmination, normally the last year or two, of a liberal or pre-professional education. There was the same ladder for teachers too: they would begin by lecturing on junior subjects, the philosophy class being reserved for the senior and best paid masters. Thus the figure of ‘the philosopher’ was institutionalised as a kind of supreme symbol of liberal culture, a cynosure for the ambitions of all those wishing to improve their mind for its own sake. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, increasingly sharp distinctions were made between ‘secondary’ and university education—distinctions which involved both epistemological discriminations between levels of knowledge, and moral ones between levels of ‘maturity’. The philosophy class found itself torn in both directions. In Germany and especially in France it became mainly secondary; in Scotland and America mainly university; and other countries developed intermediate arrangements. Philosophy’s posi-
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 131
tion at the divide between secondary and university education seems to have enhanced its popular image as the crown of liberal culture. At the same time, it encouraged directly political hopes to be attached to it—from the conscientious concern with the propagation of civic virtue in Scottish and American philosophy classes, through the famously progressive rhetoric of the French philosophes, and the quasimilitary organisation of French philosophy teaching in the nineteenth century, to the radical teenage dreams of Hegel, Hölderlin and Schelling, looking forward to the ‘revolution that will be made by philosophy’. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in other words, the idea of philosophy was associated in many people’s minds not only with intellectual majesty, but with political power as well.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS The values and procedures actually promoted by the philosophy masters in their classrooms, however, did not entirely correspond to their splendid and dignified public image. The purpose of the classical philosophy class, as defined by its traditional place in the curriculum, was to reflect on the earlier years of the students’ education, to form a unified view of them, and to draw out their implications for the conduct of life. There would also be classroom discussions based on textbooks and the master’s lectures, and a background of reference to a philosophical canon, which was established in its present form in the seventeenth century: a set of classics organised into a three-part history of ancient (pagan); medieval (pre-Renaissance Christian); and modern (eclectic). These factors placed a very significant constraint on the kind of education given in the philosophy class, beneath and beyond the differences of explicit doctrine amongst leading authors which are the stock-in-trade of orthodox histories of philosophy. For the philosophical canon has a structure which sets it apart from those of other academic subjects. The difference is that the philosophy class is willing to treat its classics as erroneous as well as indispensable; indeed it can be their exemplary failure to live up to philosophical ideals which makes them canonical. Hence a main task of the philosophy master would be to use the classics not as examples to be emulated but as warnings about the terrible worm
132 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
of abstraction or ‘metaphysics’ which always threatened to attack sound thinking and reduce it to the inanity of a philosophical system.12 The peculiarly negative character of the philosophical canon has given the philosophy class an attractive tinge of diffidence, and a tendency towards anti-academic populism. The philosophy class has had the vocation of undermining academic pretentiousness and intellectual vainglory, and has hence been capable of seeing itself as the people’s fifth column in the academy, the professoriate’s enemy within. So Malebranche’s Search after Truth (1675– 8) is actually a guidebook to scholarly error, and even includes a grudging commendation of the minds of women and children, whose exclusion from academic institutions was supposed to keep them free of metaphysical debility.13 The same theme was taken up, at least in prefaces and asides, by many of the celebrated philosophical writers of the eighteenth century. In 1710, for example, Berkeley presented his own Principles as offering the educated the opportunity to rejoin ‘the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain, common sense’.14 In the Treatise, 30 years later, Hume explained how it was philosophy’s task to expose the ‘fictions’ of ‘false philosophy’ and lead its errant students, humbler and wiser, back to common sense; for, as he put it, ‘the true philosophy approaches nearer to the sentiments of the vulgar, than to those of a mistaken knowledge’.15 The same theme was enthusiastically promoted by the self-styled ‘Common Sense Philosophy’ of Reid and Stewart, which soon spread not only to America but to France as well.16 And Kant’s case for the public usefulness of philosophy classes was that they would show up the ‘arrogant pretensions’ through which scholars impose their ‘endless controversies’ on ‘the great mass of humanity’.17 It is not surprising, therefore, that the philosophy masters who have been most revered and adored within the philosophical world have been celebrated for their hesitant sincerity and their tongue-tied self-doubt, rather than for their positive doctrines. Even Hegel was famed for his perplexed stammering when he lectured. And Jules Lachelier, who dominated the highly centralised national corps of philosophy masters in France at the end of the nineteenth century, was noted not for his magnificence but for his sweet simplicity. Emile Boutroux recollected his teaching as follows:
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 133
He would size up the difficulties. He would stop to think and cast around. He hesitated, started up again, and then stopped. One day he said: ‘I think the best thing for you to do, will be to forget everything I have ever told you.’18 Such stories of heroically diffident philosophy masters suggest that the profession has been marked by a horror of intellectual assertiveness: their patron saint would not be Aquinas, but rather Socrates; not Pangloss, but Candide. Their hero would not be the robed professor, but the good plain artisan and man of the people, and their politics would be not elitist but pastorally democratic.
SILENT PHILOSOPHERS: THE CASE OF ENGLAND The institutional situation of philosophy means that the philosophical class was bound to look very different from the outside than from the inside. Outsiders would think of it as majestically concentrating all the virtue of liberal culture within itself, or at least as pretending to do so, and would expect the philosophy masters to be eloquent, confident and superb. But viewed from within, the class would harbour an upside-down intellectual culture of self-deprecation, hesitancy, and pastoral democracy. Youngsters moving up into the philosophy class could be expected to experience some disappointment; but the situation of real outsiders—‘proletarians’ like Fourier in the Jura, or Dietzgen in the Rhineland, or Everhard in Jack London—was even more awkward. As working people with a longing for science, or poetry, or music, or art, they were desperate to get away from the ‘simplicity’ and ‘purity’ and ‘common sense’ in which, as a class, they were supposed to be submerged; they did not wish to glory in the dignity of labour, whatever bourgeois socialists or democratic philosophy masters might say.19 And by focusing their desires on philosophy, they were embracing a particularly acute form of this contradiction. They might hope to take the subject by storm, as the pinnacle of the academic culture of an oppressive ruling class; they might hope to commandeer and transform it in the name of the dispossessed. But then, owing to the sceptical, pastoral and anti-academic tendencies already implicit in philosophy, they would find the philosophers either welcoming them and
134 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
applauding them for their good sense, or criticising them for straying from the paths of the masses whom they claimed to represent. (I am referring to a predicament peculiar to philosophy, not repeating the old and unconvincing story about academic knowledge inevitably ‘incorporating’ its benficiaries into the ruling elite.) I shall now offer an illustration from the history of English philosophy. Philosophy classes of the kind common in Scotland, Europe and America in the eighteenth century were not established in England till the second half of the nineteenth century.20 The first English professional philosophy journal, Mind, introduced itself in 1876 with the observation that philosophy in England was ‘distinguished from the philosophical thought of other countries by what may be called its unprofessional character’. The editor, George Robertson, went on to explain that ‘except in Scotland … few British thinkers have been public teachers with philosophy for the business of their lives’. But when he resigned the editorship 15 years later, he was able to observe that ‘the avowed “professors” are now there in no small number, south as well as north of the border, and in the sister island’.21 From the beginning, English professional philosophers have exhibited that streak of hesitancy which is such an important (and amiable) part of traditional philosophical institutions. The first of them was T.H.Green (1836–82), who transformed the lives of dozens of influential students at Oxford by his strenuous social idealism. He was notoriously hard to understand when he lectured, but his ‘speculative impulse’ was said to glow so intensely that ‘when it touched minds of the same temper, it struck fire’. The ‘enthusiasm’ of his students was ‘not for any definite project or idea’, but still they all believed ‘in philosophy’, and ‘the belief was not the less real because it was vague’.22 Cambridge soon had several professional philosophers cast from the same mould. James Ward (1843–1925), the first Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic at the university, was admired by his students (as G.E.Moore recalled) ‘because of his extreme sincerity and conscientiousness, but partly also because of his melancholy. He was a man who found things very difficult…. He talked; and, while he talked, he was obviously thinking hard about the subject he was talking of and searching for the best way of putting what he wanted to convey.’ F.W.Maitland recalled his teacher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) as ‘a supremely
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 135
great teacher…. I sometimes think that the one and only prejudice that Sidgwick had was a prejudice against his own results.’ And Moore said of his teacher McTaggart (1866–1925) that ‘what influenced me most was his constant insistence on clearness…on asking the question “What does this mean?”…. What immense pains he always took to get clear, even though he did not always succeed’.23 G.E.Moore is the paragon of the second generation of professional philosophers in England. Moore was a silent man. Quentin Bell recalls a discussion of ‘Moore’s famous taciturnity: he was accused of silencing a generation. “I didn’t want to be silent,” he replied. “I couldn’t think of anything to say”’.24 Roy Harrod said that Moore ‘was the mildest and simplest of men…. If the veneration which his young admirers accorded him matched that due to a saint, we need not think that they were mistaken’.25 Leonard Woolf described Moore as a ‘simple’ and a ‘silly’ of ‘extraordinary beauty of character and of mind’. His achievement, according to Woolf, consisted in ‘substituting for the religious and philosophical nightmares, delusions, hallucinations, in which Jehovah, Christ, and St Paul, Plato, Kant and Hegel had entangled us, the fresh air and pure light of plain commonsense’.26 On the evidence of these testimonials, the orthodox idea of Moore as a revolutionary is extremely near-sighted. On the contrary, the intellectual virtues which drew such praise on Moore are precisely those which had always been fostered by the classic philosophy class; the words of admiration which he evoked from his acquaintances are the same as those which had been used to describe ideal philosophy masters for two centuries and more: common sense, simplicity, and, above all, silence. The continuity extends to political attitudes too. Moore did not give direct expression to political views, in spite of his connection with well known opinion-holders like Woolf, Keynes and Russell. But his philosophical ideals involved the traditional philosophical reverence for ‘the people’. He gave expression to it, for instance, in a diary entry in 1893, when he was still a student. He is describing a meeting in Cambridge addressed by a member of the London County Council: He was a genuine workman, like Tom Mann, but not fiery, or with a strong understanding and great power of speech. He was simple and gentle, as could be…. He was a steady
136 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Liberal and Progressive; and I could not help thinking much better than before of the London labourers, seeing that they chose him as their candidate.27 It is striking that what Moore loved in this ‘genuine workman’ was precisely those qualities for which Moore himself was to be loved: simplicity, gentleness and quiet reticence. Presumably, though, the councillor would have been unhappy with the circle of identifications which Moore made: he would have expected a philosopher to be more impressive than Moore, and would surely have been uneasy at the patronising pastoralism through which he gained credit for the people he represented purely through his reassuring lack of ‘a strong understanding and great power of speech’.
THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE PEOPLE: PROLETARIAN OR PASTORAL? My argument so far has been that, if you consider philosophy as a European institution going back to the seventeenth century and beyond, rather than as a set of universal doctrines going back to Socrates, you will notice a constantly repeated (but seldom remembered) set of themes, images, and words, connecting the ideals of the philosophy class to the supposed virtues of ‘the people’: common sense, simplicity, and a silent reproach against excessive theory. This ‘pastorally democratic’ attitude, as I have called it, prepares a perplexing reception for any members of the ‘people’ who manage to force an entrance into the philosophical world. Now there is a distinction, as has already been noted, between the relatively docile, pastoral figure of ‘the philosopher of the people’, and the vindictive and militant ‘proletarian philosophers’ such as Fourier, Dietzgen, or Earnest Everhard. But this distinction between proletarian and pastoral may not go very deep. If the proletarian philosopher refuses to play the part of sweet simplicity in the philosopher’s pastoral romance, he will be consigned to a mock-heroic subplot, like the tinker in Plato who gives himself airs and hopes to marry his master’s daughter. The basic lesson was pointed out half a century ago by William Empson, when he examined the idea that ‘proletarian’ literature differed from
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 137
pastoral in that it was not only ‘about’ the people, but ‘by’ and ‘for’ them too. The difficulty with ‘proletarian literature’, he confessed, was that ‘when it comes off I find I am taking it as pastoral literature’.28 The proletarian philosopher, I think, is always in danger of reverting to pastoral type. What begins as a subversion of pastoral, ends as another version of it. Of course no philosophers—whether popular or proletarian or professional—are entirely confined by the plots I have described. Certainly Jock Shanley isn’t. I am sure he will rebuke me for the ideas I have tried to set out here, as he has rebuked me in the past, for what he sees as my typically academic evasions, all part of the ‘world-wide search for a Marx without dialectics and even a doubtful materialist’. ‘What an excellent self-portrait you have written,’ he told me; ‘you have studied everything and understood nothing.’ But fortunately, he went on, the world is still being transformed—‘in a real, as distinct from a philosophic, sense… [by] practical men who believe that the “positive outcome of philosophy” is science, though they have never heard of Dietzgen— or for that matter Marx.’ I respectfully challenge you—write a positive explanation of your own philosophy and see where you get to. At least we Proletarian philosophers failed while trying…. You may feel I am rude. Well, I come from a robust school. The University (Aberdeen) I failed to enter had a motto: ‘They say, what say they, let them say.’ That is my reply to my critics. A few weeks later, Shanley wrote again: As I write, I give my attention partially to a T.V. programme. Some people are tidying up Highgate Cemetery, cutting down the undergrowth, exposing the tombs of the Victorians, and making the cemetery a pleasant place for the intelligentsia of Hampstead and Highgate to take a stroll. I think you do just that, in philosophy, with your account of ‘Proletarian Philosophers’, but, alas, you only dig amongst our dead bones—our tombs—and miss the spirit in which we lived. Sad! But life goes on: the crisis Marx foretold, in Chapter 32 of Capital, is upon us. Except that the working class has not yet found the unity he saw as necessary. It will be built, I
138 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
expect, by proletarian philosophers of whom we know nothing at present. I do not expect the philosophy, or the practice, will mature in our Academic Institutions—if British Capitalism lets them exist that long…. Only ten years ago I would be trying to break into your philosophy class to challenge them to state what philosophy they have found to challenge the dead—as I am politically— the ‘Proletarian Philosophers’.29 I really do not know how to respond to that challenge. Every time I read it, it reduces me to silence.
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 44 (Autumn 1988) 1 Jock Shanley, interviewed, 25 April 1986; letter to the author, 19 June 1986. 2 ‘Die wüste Vorstellung des Volkes’, Philosophy of Right, Para. 279. 3 Republic, VI, 495 d-e (Jowett translation). 4 Luke, II, 46–7. 5 See Baillet, Vie de M.Descartes, II, 555; cited in Descartes, Oeuvres, eds Adam and Tannery, V. 265–7; XII, 470, 480–1. 6 See Paulin Hountondji, African Philosophy, London, Hutchinson, 1983, 111–30. 7 William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral, London, Chatto & Windus, 1935, 6. 8 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon, From Magic to Science, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968, 52. 9 Bernard Palissy, Discours admirables (1580), cited in Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon, 8. 10 Charles Fourier, ‘Théorie des Quatre Mouvements’ in Oeuvres Complètes, 3rd edn, Paris, 1846, I, 102, xxxv, 191, 15, 14. 11 See Jonathan Rée, Proletarian Philosophers: Problems in Socialist Culture in Britain, 1900–1940, Oxford University Press, 1984. 12 So Marcuse went wrong when he suggested that ‘academic sadomasochism, self-humiliation and self-denunciation’ were introduced into philosophy by Wittgenstein and Austin; they are, rather, a consequence of structural constraints on the philosophy class. (See Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, 179.) 13 Nicolas Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérite (1675–8), ed. Genevieve Rodis-Lewis, Paris, Vrin, 1946, III v. 14 George Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction, I.
PROLETARIAN PHILOSOPHY 139
15 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), ed. P.H.Nidditch, Oxford University Press, 1978, 222–4. 16 In 1833, Victor Cousin claimed that ‘there can be hardly any college (collège royal) in France which does not teach Reid and Stewart’. See Nicholas Phillipson, ‘The Pursuit of Virtue in Scottish University Education: Dugald Stewart and Scottish Moral Philosophy in the Enlightenment’, in Nicholas Phillipson, ed., Universities, Society and the Future, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1983, 82–101, 84. 17 Critique of Pure Reason, A viii; B xxxiii. 18 Cited in André Canivez, Jules Lagneau, Professeur de Philosophie, Strasbourg, 1965, 257. 19 See Jacques Rancière, La Nuit des proletaries, Paris, Fayard, 1981; introduction trans. as ‘Proletarian Nights’, Radical Philosophy 31, summer 1982, 10–13; and Le Philosophe et ses pauvres, Paris, Fayard, 1983. 20 See Jonathan Rée, ‘Philosophy as an Academic Discipline: the changing place of philosophy in an Arts Education’, Studies in Higher Education, III, 1978, 5–23. 21 Mind I, 1876, 1; XVI, 1891, 557–60. 22 R.H.Nettleship, Thomas Hill Green, A Memoir, Oxford, 1906, 97. 23 Paul Levy, Moore: G.E.Moore and the Cambridge Apostles (1979), Oxford University Press, 1981, 59, 82, 108. 24 Quentin Bell, Virginia Woolf, London, Hogarth, 1972, II, 215. 25 Levy, op. cit., 10. 26 Leonard Woolf, An Autobiography (1960–69), Oxford University Press, 1980, I, 40, 87, 93; II, 405. 27 Levy, op. cit., 51. 28 Empson, op. cit., 6, 21. 29 Jock Shanley, letters to the author, February and April 1984.
7
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD A critique of G.A.Cohen Sean Sayers The dialectical method, Marx insisted, was at the basis of his account of society. In 1858, in a letter to Engels, he wrote: In the method of treatment the fact that by mere accident I again glanced through Hegel’s Logic has been of great service to me…. If there should ever be the time for such work again, I would greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence, in two or three printer’s sheets, what is rational in the method which Hegel discovered.1 But he never did find the time for this work. As a result, Marx’s dialectical method and the ways in which it draws on Hegel’s philosophy remain among the most controversial and least well understood aspects of Marx’s work. My purpose in this paper is to explain some of the basic presuppositions of this method and to bring out their significance for Marx’s theories. I shall do so by focusing critically on G.A.Cohen’s account of Marxism in Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence.2 In this important and influential work, Cohen contrives to give an account of Marxism in entirely non-dialectical—indeed, in anti-dialectical—terms. By criticising Cohen’s views I will seek to show that the dialectical method is the necessary basis for an adequate theory of history and an indispensable part of Marx’s thought. The major purpose of Cohen’s book is to develop and defend a particular interpretation of historical materialism, the Marxist theory of historical development. Cohen claims that his account is an ‘old-fashioned’ and a ‘traditional’ one (p.x); and, indeed, in certain respects it is. For, in contrast to the tendency of much 140
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 141
recent Marxist writing, Cohen strongly emphasises the materialistic and deterministic character of Marx’s theory of history. He insists that the development of the productive forces is the primary motive force for historical change, and portrays Marxism as a form of technological determinism. However, there are various different forms of materialism, not all of them Marx’s. In particular, it has been a standard part of ‘traditional’ Marxist philosophy to criticise mechanical forms of materialism and to insist that a dialectical form of materialism is needed in order to comprehend the complexity and richness of concrete historical processes. Cohen manages to ignore this aspect of the traditional picture almost entirely, and what little discussion he devotes to dialectic is hostile and dismissive. The basis of this hostility is not far to seek. It is revealed by another major purpose of Cohen’s book. For, as well as presenting an interpretation of historical materialism, he is attempting to vindicate the analytical method in philosophy; and although he does not say it in so many words, it is apparent that he regards this as irreconcilable with the dialectical aspects of Marx’s work. Cohen is right about this, I shall argue: dialectical philosophy does, indeed, involve methods and assumptions which are ultimately incompatible with those of the analytic approach. However, against Cohen I will argue that dialectic is the necessary basis for a satisfactory theory of history and an indispensable part of Marx’s thought. Cohen’s use of the analytic method and his rejection of dialectic leads him to give a systematically distorted account of Marx’s theory of history, which is neither faithful to Marx’s own thought, nor adequate for an understanding of the concrete reality of history. This is what I shall try to show.
THE ANALYTIC VS. THE DIALECTICAL METHOD What, then is Cohen’s analytical method? Unfortunately, Cohen himself never spells this out, although it is an important part of his purpose to defend and vindicate it. First, it should be noted that a philosophy can be described as ‘analytical’ in two distinct senses. One may mean by this term simply that the philosophy is part of the twentieth-century tradition of analytical philosophy. Cohen’s work is certainly ‘analytical’ in this sense, and this is immediately apparent from its outward style: the use of formal
142 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
logical notation, abstract symbols, numbered sentences, and so forth. Cohen himself talks of ‘the standards of clarity and rigour which distinguish twentieth-century analytical philosophy’ (p.ix). However, these virtues are not peculiar to twentieth-century analytical philosophy; indeed, they are not even particularly characteristic of it. Anyone who has read a representative selection of work in this tradition will be well aware that, all too often, it is needlessly obscure in style, cloudy in thought and not noticeably more rigorous in argument than the work of any other major school of philosophy. Clarity and rigour are the virtues of good philosophy, of good thought in all fields; they are no monopoly of analytical philosophy. Cohen’s work has these virtues to a high degree; but that is because it is good philosophy, not because it is in the analytical tradition. Twentieth-century analytical philosophy has been a diverse tradition and it is not easy to make generalisations about it. However, that is not my purpose here, since Cohen’s philosophy is also ‘analytical’ in a further and deeper sense. It is analytical not merely in its style and form, but in its very presuppositions and content. And it is analytical in a very traditional sense. For, like the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Cohen relies on the method of analysis. He insists upon analysing the whole that he is considering into its component parts. He insists upon separating and isolating the different elements and aspects of the given concrete totality, and considering and defining these in isolation. The effect of this method is to produce a fragmented and atomised picture of reality. Underlying this method, as Cohen makes clear, is what could be called a logic of external relations.3 For, according to Cohen, things are what they are, and have their essential nature in themselves, quite independently of the relations in which they stand. In general, things—or ‘terms’ in Cohen’s language—are not affected by their relations or context. In other words, relations are external to, and independent of, the things or terms related: ‘the terms bound by relations do not belong to the structure these relations constitute’ (p. 35). One is reminded of Locke’s view that relation is ‘not contained in the real existence of things, but [is] something extraneous and superinduced’.4 Things are what they are; they have their being purely in themselves and quite independently of the context of their relations. ‘Everything is what it is and not another thing’—Bishop Butler’s
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 143
slogan5 admirably sums up the logic of this sort of analytical approach. This logic is rejected by dialectical philosophy. Dialectic insists that in order to understand the concrete nature of things it is vital to see them in the context of their interconnections with other things within a wider whole. For dialectic, concrete and particular things are always and essentially related, connected to and interacting with other things within a larger totality. This context of relations is internal and essential to the nature of things, not external and accidental. By contrast, the analytical approach, with its logic of external relations, has the effect of removing things from their context and producing an abstract account of them. It has the effect of fragmenting the world into a disconnected series of atomic particulars and, thereby, producing a mechanical account of reality. To substantiate and illustrate these points let us now turn to Marx’s theory of history and Cohen’s account of it.
FORCES AND RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION Cohen’s account of Marxism is very closely based on Marx’s 1859 ‘Preface’. In part, this reads as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.6 An important and valuable part of Cohen’s work consists in the careful and detailed accounts he gives of the various theoretical terms that Marx here uses. However, although Cohen’s analyses
144 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
of the meanings of particular terms are often very helpful and instructive, the general picture that emerges of Marx’s theory is more questionable. For example, Cohen’s discussion of the notion of the productive forces is full, useful and important. The productive forces of a society are composed mainly of the means of production (i.e. instruments of production and raw materials) and labour power (i.e. ‘the productive faculties of producing agents: strength, skill, knowledge, inventiveness etc.’ (p. 32)). The relations of production are the economic relations of society. The set of economic relations prevailing in a particular society constitutes its economic structure, its economic basis. So far so good. However, Cohen insists that forces of production and relations of production be regarded as entirely distinct and separate from each other. The productive forces are one thing, the relations of production another: ‘productive forces are not part of the economic structure’ (p. 28); ‘production relations alone and not productive forces constitute the economic structure’ (p. 29). The separation of the different elements and aspects of society is certainly an essential part of any scientific account of it. Analysis—the distinction of different things—is without doubt an indispensable feature of all understanding and all knowledge. Dialectic does not deny this. Indeed, dialectic goes further and insists that analysis should not be regarded as a merely intellectual and mental process, as a purely conceptual and logical activity, the work of thought alone. For in the concrete historical process itself, different aspects and features separate themselves. The division and conflict between forces and relations of production, for example, is a real historical distinction, a part of the process of actual economic development; and only subsequently does it come to be grasped and reflected accurately in economic thought. Nothing is cloudier and less helpful than the attempt to merge all distinctions together and insist that, in reality, ‘all is one’. ‘As though’, in Marx’s words, ‘this separation had forced its way from the textbook into real life and not, on the contrary, from real life into the textbooks’.7 Dialectic does not deny the reality of distinctions, nor the need for them in thought. But it does insist that in concrete reality different and opposed things are also in unity. It rejects the exclusive, rigid, absolute, either/or distinctions of analytical thought. In particular, forces of production and relations of production are
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 145
different and conflicting aspects of a single process: the productive activity of people in society. These different aspects exist in unity. Their unity as well as their difference must be recognised if their nature is to be properly understood. Thus productive forces are productive forces only in the context of certain relations of production. A machine, for example, requires people to build, operate and maintain it—only given these is it a productive force. A machine is a productive force only in the context of certain relations of production in which it is employable productively. No doubt it is possible to remove a machine entirely from its surrounding social relations and consider it purely abstractly and in isolation. This is what Cohen does in his account of productive forces. But then one is no longer considering it as a productive force, but merely in its abstract material aspect, as a physical object. A machine is regarded in this way by the physicist or the engineer. This is perfectly valid and legitimate, if your interest is confined to its material properties, since a machine is indeed a physical object—a certain configuration of metal and other materials—and remains so, whatever the social context in which it is placed. The historian, however, is interested in the machine not merely as a physical object, but as an instrument of social production, as a productive force. And a machine becomes a productive force only in certain social contexts, only in certain relations of production. These relations are essential—that is to say, internal and not merely external—to its being as a productive force.8 Similar remarks apply to labour-power, the other major constituent of the productive forces. Labour-power—‘the productive faculties of producing agents’ (p. 32)—cannot be understood if it is abstracted and isolated from the social relations in which it is exercised. Man is an essentially social creature, and his powers and capacities are essentially social. In particular, to consider labour power in its abstract and isolated individual form is to blind oneself to one of the most significant means for its development: social cooperation. Cooperative production—that is, socially coordinated, as opposed to mere individual, production— not only increases the labour power of the individual in a variety of ways, but also brings a ‘new power’ into being: ‘the social productive power of labour or the productive power of social labour’.9 As Marx says, ‘not only have we here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means of cooperation, but
146 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
the creation of a new power, namely the collective power of the masses.’10 This new collective power is something more than the sum of its parts. An observation by Napoleon, cited by Engels, well illustrates this. The French cavalry were poor riders, but well organised and disciplined; the Mamelukes, on the other hand, were excellent horsemen, but undisciplined. The result, according to Napoleon, was that Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, and 1000 Frenchmen defeated 1500 Mamelukes.11 Labour-power cannot be defined in isolation from social relations, since social cooperation itself is a powerful productive force. Modern labour, in particular, is essentially social labour. In engaging in it, man develops his powers and capacities as social powers and capacities, for ‘when the labourer cooperates systematically with others he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the capabilities of his species’.12 So, here too, the conclusion is that productive forces and relations of production cannot be entirely separated and abstracted from each other. The productive forces are what they are only in the context of the appropriate relations of production. These relations are thus internal and essential to them, not purely external and distinct.
NATURE AND SOCIETY Cohen supports his account of the forces and relations of production with a very interesting discussion of the distinction between nature and society. According to Cohen, ‘The… distinction between forces and relations of production is, in Marx, one of a set of contrasts between nature and society…. The matter or content of society is nature, whose form is the social form’ (p. 98). Cohen’s account of these contrasts is among the most valuable and illuminating parts of his book. However, here again, there is the same analytic tendency to make absolute and rigid distinctions between these opposites where a recognition of their essen-
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 147
tial relations and unity is also needed. Cohen, in fact, sees that in concrete circumstances society and nature always exist in unity. However, his method and logic preclude him from incorporating this insight into his theory; and he insists that these aspects are logically or ‘conceptually’ distinct and must, in thought, be held apart. Viewed physically, production appears stripped of its social form…. Production in its asocial aspect is ‘material production’, this being the content…of production. And that content may be described in illuminating abstraction from the form with which it is integrated…. So if we look through the social form we discern something conceptually separate from it:…material production. (pp. 98–9) It is certainly vital to make a distinction between the material and the social. Moreover, Cohen is right to stress that Marxism, as a form of materialism, sees the material level as basic and as the primary determinant of historical development. But Cohen makes it an either/or matter. Society and nature, form and content, are portrayed as exclusive opposites, with the social form made entirely external to and logically independent of the material content. The dialectical view, by contrast, is that these opposites, as well as being different and opposed, interact and interpenetrate; and it rejects any rigid antitheses here, ‘as though’, in Marx’s words, ‘these were two separate “things” and man did not always have before him an historical nature and a natural history.’13 At times Cohen himself sees this. For example, he says, The material description captures a society’s underlying nature. In this sense of ‘nature’, nature is of course a product of history, changing in and as a result of social forms. Humanity in social organisation thrusts itself against its environment, altering it and its own human nature, for it develops its own powers and needs in the course of the encounter. (p. 96) But at other times (and these are the more characteristic ones), he ignores this interaction and describes history as a process of
148 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
‘adjustment to nature’ (p. 285), as though nature were a purely external and immutable constraint to which society had to conform. This is not a satisfactory way in which to interpret Marxism. Nature and society are not purely external to each other; on the contrary, they interpenetrate and mutually transform each other. Society not only adapts itself to nature, but also, and on an everincreasing scale, society adapts and transforms nature to its needs. The rigid, analytic separation of the natural from the social tends to blind Cohen to these facts. Like Feuerbach, he tends not to see ‘how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and the state of society’.14 These problems come out clearly in Cohen’s attempt to assimilate Marx’s theory to that of the Sophists. He writes, Social arrangements cannot alter physical necessities, but social arrangements can be altered. When they are confused with the necessities they arrange, they appear to partake of the immutability of the latter. The Sophist’s distinction between nature and convention is the foundation of all social criticism and Marx’s distinction is a development of it. (p. 107) Physical necessities—if by that is meant the laws of nature— cannot be altered. That is true. But nature can be altered by human activity—it is not ‘immutable’. The development of human productive power enables man to control nature and to overcome the constraints of his environment; not by transcending or abolishing the laws of nature, but by using them. Freedom, in the Marxist view, is based upon ‘the recognition of necessity’.15 For Marx, social revolution is not just a matter of changing the social form on the basis of an unaltered and unalterable nature. The Sophists indeed said: nature is fixed, but human conventions and social forms are alterable. But Marx is profounder than this. He maintains that social forms are not merely ‘conventional’ and not changeable just at will. Definite material conditions of production impose definite social forms, and it is through the development of material conditions that social relations change. Man, through labour, alters nature in accordance with his needs and is, in the process, altered by it. There is an interaction here.
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 149
Labour is…a process in which both man and nature participate…. He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces…in order to appropriate nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature.16 Marx’s social criticism, therefore, has an entirely different basis from that of the Sophists. For Marx, socialism is not an alternative form of society, an ideal which it is possible to realise because social forms are merely conventional and alterable. Socialism, for Marx, is the outcome of a real and present social movement, which is the product of the material forces at work in present, capitalist society. The social criticism he talks of is a material and a practical one. Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.17
RELATIONS AND PROPERTIES At the basis of Cohen’s account of Marxism, as I have emphasized, is the philosophical theory of external relations. It is now time to focus attention upon this theory and to criticise it. According to Cohen, society is made up of people and productive forces. These are the ‘terms’ of society, the substantial entities—the material elements—related by social relations to make up society: ‘persons and productive forces are the only terms bound by production relations’ (p. 31). These relations, Cohen insists, are external to, separate and distinct from, the terms related: ‘the terms bound by relations do not belong to the structure those relations constitute’ (p. 35). Cohen discusses these views with reference to the following passages from Marx. A negro is a negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cot-
150 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
ton. It becomes capital only in certain relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold itself is money.18 But Marx also writes, To be a slave or to be a citizen are social determinations, the relationship of man A to man B.19 And also, Capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing.20 Commenting on these passages, Cohen writes, Marx describes capital, slaves, etc., in two divergent ways. On the one hand, he insists that capital is a relation and not, like a machine, a thing; on the other hand, he allows that it may be a thing, for example a machine placed in certain relations…. The two forms of speech are incompatible. (pp. 89–90) He then goes on to argue that it is incorrect to talk of capital, or a slave, as a relation. Capital, he insists, is a particular sort of thing (a machine, say) placed in certain social relations; and, likewise, a slave is a different sort of thing (a person) in certain relations. To make this point, Cohen appeals to the notion of a ‘relational property’. A husband is a man related by marriage to a woman: he is not also a relationship of marriage. Being a husband is a property of that man, one he has in virtue of that relationship, and commonly styled a relational property. Being capital and being a slave are, similarly, relational properties of means of production and men. More specifically they are social relational properties, whereas being means of production and being a man are not. The latter are possessed inde-
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 151
pendently of the social form. Remove the social form in thought experiment and those properties persist. (p. 90) Cohen here wants to distinguish ‘relational’ from other properties. The idea is that some properties—those material properties which make a man a man and a machine a machine—are more basic and essential (i.e. internal) than the ‘relational’ properties. The social relations, the social form, that these things assume (slave, capital) are, by contrast, inessential and external. This whole picture needs questioning. Productive forces are productive forces only in the context of the necessary relations of production—in the absence of these they are mere useless objects. A spinning jenny, therefore, is a machine for spinning cotton only given certain relations of production. Transferred to a stone age society it would be a mere physical object of no productive use. Likewise, a stone axe has no place in our society as a productive force but only as a museum exhibit. If, by ‘thought experiment’, the social form is removed from capital, what is left is not a productive force but a mere physical object. Similar arguments apply to the other example discussed by Cohen. People are essentially social animals. Their social relations are not external and inessential to their nature as human beings. This was certainly Marx’s view: The further back we trace the course of history, the more does the individual…appear to be dependent and to belong to a larger whole…. Man is a zoon politikon (social animal) in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal, but an animal that can be individuated only within society.21 If, by ‘thought experiment’, a human being were entirely removed and abstracted from all his social relationships, he would be unlikely to survive the first few days of infancy; but, even if he did so, he would emerge as a mere animal of the human species, without any individuality or other distinctively human characteristics. The upshot of this discussion is, again, that concrete things exist in relations; and the essential point that dialectic makes is that these relations are not merely external, but internal to the things related. The notion of a ‘relational property’ to which
152 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Cohen appeals is no help to his case, it only confuses the issue. Nonetheless, a word should be said about it since it was introduced by G.E.Moore22 to combat the Hegelian philosophy of internal relations and has since become a standard part of the orthodoxy of analytical philosophy. Relational properties are supposed to be those properties which a thing has simply by virtue of the relations in which it stands to other things; and such properties are contrasted with the nonrelational properties, which are supposed to be intrinsic to a thing, regardless of its relations. The assumption underlying this distinction is our old friend, the doctrine of external relations: the view that relations are extrinsic and external to things. According to this theory, as we have seen, things are what they are and have the essential properties that they have, intrinsically and quite independently of their relations to other things. Thus, the properties which things have in virtue only of their relations are supposed to be merely accidental and inessential properties. A man is a person in himself and essentially; only accidentally does he occupy a particular social role and relate to others. At first sight, this distinction looks simple and clear-cut, but these matters are by no means as straightforward as the advocates of the notion of relational properties suggest. The problem is that all properties are relational; all the properties which things have exist by virtue of their relations. As Hegel says, properties are ‘the determinate relations of the thing to another thing; property exists only as a mode of relationship between them’.23 He gives the following illustration: By properties of herbs, for instance, we understand determinations which not only are proper to something, but are the means whereby this something in its relations with other somethings maintains itself in its own peculiar way, counteracting the alien influences posited in it and making its determinations effective in the other.24 The language Hegel uses here is doubtless strange and unfamiliar, but the idea that he is expressing is surely a clear and a profoundly important one. A thing reveals the particular properties it has only through its relations to other things; indeed, only through its opposition to and negation of them, its ‘counteracting’ them. As Spinoza said, ‘omnis determinatio est negatio’ (all
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 153
determination is negation). Only by reflecting light in a certain way does a thing manifest colour; only in and through its mechanical interactions with other bodies does an object manifest mass; only through its relations to other things in space does a thing show its shape, and so on and so forth. In short, all properties are ‘relational’, and the concept of a ‘relational property’ gets us nowhere. But this is not the end of the matter. The problem still remains of whether there is a useful distinction to be drawn between the intrinsic and essential properties and relations of things, their internal relations, on the one hand, and their extrinsic, external and inessential properties and relations, on the other. The strong Hegelian view is that all relations are internal. However, it is not my purpose to defend such a position here. All that I am arguing is that the opposite extreme—Cohen’s position—that all relations are external and extrinsic to the nature of things, is incoherent and unsatisfactory. Some, at least, of the relations of a thing must be internal. And, in particular, historical materialism maintains that their social relations are internal and essential features of the nature of both people and productive forces. Things and relations are not purely external to each other, not absolutely distinct and separate. These are not either/or exclusive categories. In concrete reality these opposites pass into each other, they exist in unity. This sort of language no doubt has a mysterious sound to it and may well appear ‘cloudy’ and ‘evasive’ as Cohen charges, but it is not so. On the contrary, it embodies the crucially important idea of dialectic that concrete things must be understood in the context of their relations and in a dynamic fashion. For how opposites can be united is intelligible only when we see that the relations between them are not fixed and stationary, but that opposites interpenetrate and pass into each other. To see here an abstract, isolated, individual person or thing, there a disembodied structure of social relations, in the analytic manner, is no way in which to understand society. In concrete social reality it is rather the case that people are active. They enter into social relations, they interact with other people and things according to more or less set patterns, they are active in their social roles; and, in so being, they produce and reproduce their social relations. Conversely, too, their social relations enter into them, and give shape and form and structure to their activities and thoughts and intentions. There is a constant process of interaction
154 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
and interpenetration between a person and his social relations; and hence unity as well as conflict between these opposites. The same is true of the interaction of the forces and relations of production. These opposites also interact, interpenetrate and pass into each other. The concentration of the instruments of production and the division of labour are…inseparable one from the other. … As the concentration of instruments develops, the division develops also, and vice-versa…. Every big mechanical invention is followed by a greater division of labour, and each increase in the division of labour gives rise in turn to new mechanical inventions.25 The general point is this: relations do not remain external to terms. There is no absolute division or opposition between things and relations. Things do not remain merely ‘in themselves’, shut up, closed off and isolated from other things. Things enter into their relations, act and interact with other things, manifest their properties. And, conversely, its relations and properties enter into the thing and are its properties. This is what Hegel is saying when he writes, The inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy stops short consists essentially in holding fast to the abstract thing-in-itself as an ultimate determination, and in opposing to the thing-in-itself…the determinateness and manifoldness of the properties; whereas in fact the thing-in-itself essentially possesses this external reflection within itself and determines itself to be a thing with its own determinations, a thing endowed with properties.26
CAUSALITY AND NECESSARY CONNECTION I have been arguing that terms and relations, productive forces and relations of production, the material and the social aspects of society, must not be regarded as entirely distinct and separate from each other. In concrete conditions these are contradictory opposites which interpenetrate and exist in unity. In response, no doubt, the objection will be made that I am misrepresenting the
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 155
analytical approach and being unfair to Cohen in my criticisms. Analysis, it will be said, is a tool of thought; and it is the peculiar power and privilege of thought to be able to abstract and to separate in theory things which in reality are inseparably united. Indeed, Cohen defends his method in just these terms. Given a certain level of development of the productive forces …a certain set of production relations, or social form, is appropriate…. But we may always abstract from the social form and display the current state of the relation between man and nature, and the material relations between men underlying their social relations…. The relationship between man and nature is ‘mediated’ by the social form: it does not occur outside it. The development of nature, described in socio-neutral terms, is therefore an abstraction. But it is a theoretically important abstraction. (pp. 97–8) Elsewhere, Cohen describes such abstractions as ‘illuminating’ ones. And indeed they are, so long as it is remembered that they are abstractions, and that in concrete reality matter and form, nature and man, are also essentially related. The analytic approach, however, and its underlying either/or logic, requires that each term is isolated from its opposite, and that an impassable logical gulf is created between them. This method produces ‘abstractions’ to be sure, but not ‘illuminating’ ones. According to Cohen, there is no ‘logical’ connection between terms and relations, form and content, the material and the social levels: the relations between them are purely external and contingent; they are ‘conceptually separate’ (p. 99). He illustrates this by saying, We may envisage a complete material description of a society—a socio-neutral description—from which we cannot deduce its social form. It will provide extensive information, detailing the material abilities and needs of persons, the resources and facilities available to them, their scientific knowledge. But ownership patterns, distribution of rights and duties, social roles will go unremarked. (p. 94)
156 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
Here we are being presented with the atomised and fragmented picture of the world which is the necessary outcome of the analytic method. There is no necessary connection between the material aspects of society and its social forms. This is Hume’s picture of the world: ‘All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, but we never can observe any tie between them: they seem conjoined, but never connected’.27 According to this logic, there are no necessary connections between events. Any event could follow any other; it is ‘logically possible’ for any sort of society to be associated with any sort of material means of production. Marx’s idea was different: ‘The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord: the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist’.28 The necessary connection between a society’s productive forces and its social relations was one of Marx’s great discoveries. It may seem possible to have any sort of society—a socialist society even—based upon the hand-mill. Indeed, a large and influential body of romantic and utopian thinking is based upon just this idea. According to Marx, however, this is not possible. It is not, that is to say, a real, historical possibility. A scientific understanding of events involves a knowledge of the laws and necessities governing them. Hence it involves a knowledge of the real and concrete possibilities inherent in a situation, as opposed to the merely apparent and abstract, or ‘logical’, possibilities. Cohen, like other philosophers in the analytic tradition, devotes considerable time and ingenuity to exploring various unreal but ‘logically possible’ cases.29 However, to say that something is ‘logically possible’ means only that it is not selfcontradictory; and, as Hegel says, Every content can be brought under this form, since nothing is required except to separate it from the relations in which it stands. Hence any content, however absurd and nonsensical, can be viewed as possible.30 For this reason, questions of ‘logical possibility’ should be of no interest to philosophers, historians, or anyone else concerned with the real world. The proper subject-matter of philosophy, as Hegel says, is actuality; and Marx would surely have agreed, at least with the spirit of this.31 As one comes to understand reality scientifically, one comes to
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 157
grasp the real connections between apparently unrelated events. A knowledge of the concrete nature of things involves a knowledge of the laws governing them: their necessary processes of development and their connections with other things. Usually we regard things as unaffected by each other…. Everything is thus put outside of every other. But the aim of philosophy [and science, n.b.] is to banish indifference and to ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen to stand over and against its other.32 Conversely, The less education a man has, or, in other words, the less he knows of the specific connections of the objects to which he directs his observation, the greater is his tendency to launch out into all sorts of empty possibilities.33 As I have been arguing, the analytic picture of the world and the logic of external relations have precisely the effect that Hegel here describes. This philosophical method separates things from their relations. It portrays things as ‘loose and separate’, merely contingently and externally related. This is Hume’s picture of the world; and, as Hume himself was well aware, it leads to a total scepticism about science. For, on this account, there can be no valid basis for scientific theories of the lawlike and necessary behaviour of things. In other words, this philosophy provides a logical framework which undermines scientific knowledge. It is therefore incapable of illuminating Marx’s theory of history, which claims to be a scientific theory. This fragmented, Humean picture of the world is the underlying basis of a great deal of contemporary analytical philosophy. It is the underlying basis of Cohen’s account of Marxism, as I have shown. Cohen, of course, knows perfectly well that there is a connection between the material productive forces and social relations, and that it is the purpose of Marx’s theory of history to describe this connection. Cohen himself does not believe that there could be a socialist society based upon hand production. Nevertheless, he insists that the connection between the forces and relations of production is not a logical or ‘deductive’ one. Rather, he maintains, the relation is a purely contingent, external
158 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
and Humean causal one. Cohen, in other words, accepts Hume’s premises: he accepts Hume’s fragmented picture of the world; but he is unwilling to accept Hume’s sceptical conclusion: ‘Though we cannot deduce social relationships from a material description, we can infer them more or less confidently, by dint of general or theoretical knowledge’ (p. 95). Given Cohen’s premises, however, this is just what cannot be done. Starting, as Cohen does, from the analytical picture of the world as composed of discrete and unconnected, ‘loose and separate’ particulars, it is not possible to infer anything beyond the immediately given. If ever a philosophical result has been demonstrated conclusively, it is surely this one, by Hume’s celebrated arguments. Uncritical and unsupported talk of ‘inferences’ will not do here. Hume, by contrast, spells out the sceptical implications of the analytical view with uncompromising clarity: It is evident that Adam, with all his science, would never have been able to demonstrate that the course of nature must continue uniformly the same…. Nay I will go further and assert that he could not so much as prove by any probable arguments that the future must be conformable to the past.34 Marxism claims to give an account of the laws of historical development. It maintains that there is a necessary connection, an internal relation, between the development of the productive forces and changes in the relations of production and in the political and ideological superstructure. This theory cannot be understood in terms of a logic which has the effect of fragmenting social and historical processes into isolated parts and denying the connections between them.
THE MECHANISTIC OUTLOOK So far I have been concerned with the philosophical and logical assumptions which are at the basis of the analytical approach. Now let us look at the effect of this method when it is applied. This effect is simply stated. The analytical approach produces a mechanistic picture of the world. The reasons for this are not hard to see.
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 159
Analysis involves dissecting and decomposing a given whole into its constituent parts. Underlying this approach, as we have seen, is the doctrine of external relations. The assumption is that the whole is merely a collection of externally related parts, which are not essentially affected by their relations to each other in the whole. Thus in the analytic division of the thing into its component parts, the parts, it is claimed, are not altered: nothing is lost; clarity and precision are gained: ‘In thus dismembering the thing, it is understood, we disintegrate and take to pieces the attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own act of disintegration.’35 These methods and assumptions seem particularly satisfactory and appropriate in the case of mechanical objects and systems. For mechanical action is external action; and a mechanical system appears, at least initially, to be a mere assemblage of parts, indifferent to each other and in purely external relation. ‘In its superficial form’, as Hegel says, ‘the mechanical nexus consists in the parts being independent of each other and of the whole’.36 A clock, for example, appears to be a mechanism in which the parts are related to and act upon each other purely externally. Analysis of the clock, taking it to pieces, does not affect the parts: they are self-subsistent objects, indifferent to their relations to each other and to the system as a whole. However, although this account may appear satisfactory for purely mechanical systems, it is clearly not adequate to describe higher and more complex material forms. In a living organism, a plant or an animal, there are also differentiated parts and organs; but these parts are not in merely external relation to each other or to the organism as a whole. The different parts or organs of an organism are internally and essentially related to the whole. The single members of the body are what they are only by and in relation to their unity. A hand, e.g., when hewn off from the body is, as Aristotle observed, a hand in name only, not in fact.37 The severed hand ceases to be a living organ—it dies and putrefies.38 In other words, its relation to the living organism is internal and essential to its nature as a living thing. It may seem that the advent of transplant surgery has refuted these ideas, but I do not think it does so. There are important dif-
160 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
ferences between such surgery and the process of dismantling and re-assembling a clock. A bodily organ, unlike a mechanical part, is not a self-subsistent entity. Artificial means must be used to preserve it during the time when it is severed from the body. Moreover, the parts of the body cannot simply be re-assembled after surgery: the organ must be grafted on to its new body, and steps taken to ensure that the graft is not ‘rejected’ and that the living whole of the organism re-establishes itself. Essentially similar processes occur in plant grafting. In talking in this way of ‘organic wholes’ and ‘vital unity’ it may seem that I am appealing to idealistic and mystical notions; but there is no basis in what I have been saying for such criticisms. The point I am making is a simple one and does not in any way transcend a purely materialistic understanding of biology. I am merely insisting on the fact that living organisms cannot adequately be understood as systems of self-subsistent and merely externally related parts. That is to say, biological phenomena cannot be successfully comprehended in purely mechanical terms. This point is made by Hegel with great clarity as follows. The limbs and organs…of an organic body are not merely parts of it: it is only in their unity that they are what they are, and they are unquestionably affected by that unity, as they also in turn affect it. These limbs and organs become mere parts only when they pass under the hands of the anatomist, whose occupation, be it remembered, is not with the living body but with the corpse. Not that such analysis is illegitimate: we only mean that the external and mechanical relation of whole and parts is not sufficient for us, if we want to study organic life in its truth. And if this be so of inorganic life, it is the case to a much greater extent when we apply this relation to the mind and the formations of the spiritual world.39 As Hegel here says, the analytical approach and the associated mechanical worldview is a wholly unsatisfactory basis for understanding social and historical phenomena. It labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 161
change the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it is our intention to comprehend…. The error lies in forgetting that this is only one half of the process, and that the main point is the reunion of what has been parted.40 The analytic method is closely associated with the mechanistic world-view, as I have stressed. It thus seems to have a legitimate sphere of application to mechanical objects. The problems appear to arise only when it is applied beyond this sphere. But this is not in fact so. The dialectical idea that things are essentially and internally related applies, in some respects, even to inorganic things. It is particularly important to emphasise this fact in order to avoid the creation of a dualistic divide between the organic and inorganic worlds, and in order to avoid any temptation to posit a ‘life force’ in living things which transcends the material world. Even in the realm of purely inorganic, physical phenomena, the mechanical view is an abstract and metaphysical one. It portrays physical objects in an idealised fashion, as unaffected by their relations. Mechanics, as Wittgenstein says, ‘describes the movements of the mechanism on the assumption that its parts are completely rigid’.41 But real mechanical objects are not like this: ‘Do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t think of that at all’.42 The pieces and parts of a real clock, for instance, do not remain indifferent, but gradually ‘wear in’ to one another; and eventually wear out altogether, as with all machinery. But such facts play no part in mechanics, which views things in an abstract and idealised form. Of course, the mechanical outlook has played an extremely important role in the development of the scientific understanding of nature, and it is not my intention to reject such methods and assumptions altogether The error comes when such methods and assumptions are made into a universal philosophy and emphasised in an exclusive and one-sided fashion. Their abstract character is forgotten and they are employed as though they alone formed an adequate basis for understanding reality. The result is an abstract and metaphysical view of the world.
162 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
HISTORICAL AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM We have reached the conclusion that society is not a mechanism: it is not like a clock, in which separate and self-subsistent parts act externally on each other. Society is an organic whole, in which the different parts and aspects exist as such only in relation to each other and in relation to the whole. I shall finish off by briefly pointing to some of the implications of this account for Marx’s theory of history. In doing so, I shall at last be emerging from out of the undergrowth of abstract logical and philosophical argument into what, for most Marxists at least, will be more familiar terrain. In his account, Cohen places strong emphasis on Marx’s materialism. He rightly argues that Marx gives primacy to the development of the productive forces in his theory of history. However, Cohen’s analytic method leads him to stress the role of technological development in a one-sided and exclusive fashion. The development of the productive forces is made into the sole active force in historical development. Marxism is reduced to a form of technological determinism. Historical change is portrayed as a linear causal process. Movement always comes from ‘below’, as it were, from the material level; and it is transmitted ‘upwards’ in a causal and mechanical fashion. ‘The productive forces,’ writes Cohen, ‘strongly determine the character of the economic structure while forming no part of it’ (p. 31). The economic structure in turn determines the character of the political superstructure. Economic relations and political forms are the mere effects, the mere outcome of a particular level of development of the productive forces. The relations of production and the superstructure are thus regarded as inactive results, with no independent life or internal dynamic of their own. This is a mechanical interpretation of the historical process. For it is characteristic of the mechanical outlook, as we have seen, to regard causal action as purely external: motion and change always come to things from outside. Mechanical things are thus inert and passive: they have no internal activity of their own, but can only transmit motion which comes to them from elsewhere. As Locke puts it, A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 163
rather a passion than an action in it…we observe it only to transfer but not produce motion.43 A distinctive feature of Cohen’s interpretation of Marxism is his insistence that it is a sort of functionalism. ‘History,’ he writes, ‘is, fundamentally, the growth of human productive power and forms of society rise and fall according as they enable or impede that growth’ (p.x). According to Cohen, Marx gives a functional explanation of the character of the relations of production and of the superstructure. These are explained in terms of the fact that they are conducive to the development of production: ‘Economic structures are as they are because, being so, they enable human productive power to expand…superstructures are as they are because, being so, they consolidate economic structures’ (p.xi). It is true, as Cohen stresses, that this functionalist account involves the idea of an ‘interaction’ between the forces and relations of production in the historical process. Not only do the productive forces determine the relations of production, but also the relations condition the forces: ‘First, they promote the development of the forces…. Second, they help to determine the particular path development takes…. Finally, the relations influence the rate of productivity development’ (p. 165). At first, it may appear that these views do not accord with the idea, which I have just attributed to Cohen, of history as a linear causal process; but there is no contradiction here. Mechanical things do both interact and also transmit motion in a linear fashion. For example, I strike a billiard ball with a cue and this ball hits another and sets it in motion. In the process, the motion of the first ball is changed. Each ball acts on the other—an interaction occurs. But it is an interaction between passive and merely inertial objects, that are not in themselves active, but which merely transmit the motion imparted by my shot. For this reason such mechanical systems are said to be ‘lifeless’. The same principles are at work in Cohen’s account of history. Despite the interaction of forces and relations, the sole dynamic element in history, according to Cohen, is the development of the productive forces. The master thesis of historical materialism puts the growth of human productive powers at the centre of the historical
164 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
process, and it is to this extra-social development that society itself is constrained to adjust. (p. 285) Economic relations and political forms are merely ‘functional’ to the prevailing level of technological development: in themselves they are inactive and inert. Social processes are thus lifeless, without any independent development or internal activity of their own. The dynamic of history comes from outside of history; and, without this external push, the social mechanism would grind to a halt. It is for this reason that Cohen needs to posit a transhistorical tendency for the productive forces to develop: his socalled ‘development thesis’ (Chapter 6). To explain this transhistorical tendency, he appeals to an equally trans-historical human nature. People are ‘somewhat rational’ and have ‘compelling needs’ (p. 152), and both these features of our nature, it is suggested, are pre-social, biological endowments. It is these purely biological needs which are the ultimate motive principle of history, the active force which is transmitted through the system— the mainspring, as it were, that keeps the historical mechanism in motion. Thus far, Cohen. We are a long way from Marx. Indeed, all this is barely recognisable as Marxism, for Marx’s account is the direct opposite. First of all, Marx does not attempt to deduce history from human nature; on the contrary, he argues that human nature and human needs are the product of history. Needs lead to production, but also production leads to the creation of ‘new needs’.44 There is a dialectical interaction here, in which neither term is inert or passive, and in the course of which social productive activity and human nature are both transformed. However, ‘the essential point to emphasise’, says Marx, is that…production and consumption…appear as moments of a single process in which production is the actual point of departure and accordingly the predominant moment. Consumption, as a pressing necessity, as a need, is itself an internal moment of productive activity.45 In other words, in so far as the development of production can be understood in terms of meeting needs—as, indeed, it can, in that production is completed in consumption—it is not abstract, trans-
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 165
historical needs which are in question, but needs which have developed historically in a particular form of society. Furthermore, Marx does not see society as a lifeless structure, merely functional to external developments. Historical materialism is the opposite of this mechanistic theory: it gives a dialectical account of historical development. Social processes have their own internal dynamic, their own inner contradictions. The different aspects of society—forces and relations of production, base and superstructure—are aspects of a single whole, internally and organically related, in dialectical interaction and conflict. It is these interactions, these conflicts, these contradictions—which are internal to society—that lead to historical change. In the process, none of these aspects is inert or passive: the forces and relations of production and also the superstructure are all transformed and developed. ‘The conclusion we arrive at, says Marx, ‘is that production, distribution, exchange and consumption…all constitute members of a single whole, differences within a single unity…. Interaction takes place among the various moments. Such is the case with every organic unity’.46 This is the dialectical account of history given by Marx, and it differs entirely from Cohen’s mechanical interpretation. The differences are clearly spelled out by Engels in the well known series of letters that he wrote towards the end of his life. In them he insists that the economic system and the superstructure are not simply the immediate and direct products of the prevailing form of production. Although their character is certainly conditioned predominantly by the development of the productive forces, it cannot be reduced to this factor alone. On the contrary, the economic system, for example, acquires its own distinctive character and its own inner dynamic. Through the division of labour, trade and commerce become areas of activity increasingly independent of production. They acquire, in short, a degree of ‘relative autonomy’. Where there is division of labour on a social scale, there the different labour processes become independent of each other. In the last instance production is the decisive factor. But as soon as trade in products becomes independent of production proper, it follows a movement of its own, which, while it is governed as a whole by production, still in particular respects and within this general dependence fol-
166 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
lows laws of its own:…this movement has phases of its own and in turn reacts on the movement of production.47 The same is true, even more clearly, of political and legal institutions and of art, religion and philosophy. None is purely ‘functional’ to the development of production. Each of these spheres, while in general being determined by the development of production and by economic forces, has its own relatively autonomous process of development, its own relative independence. Each affects the others and the material base. Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., development is based on economic development. But all of these react upon one another and also upon the economic basis. It is not that the economic condition is the cause and alone active, while everything else is only a passive effect. There is, rather, interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.48 Here we have the concept of a ‘relatively autonomous’ sphere, distinct from other areas of social activity, yet essentially related to these and interacting with them within the social totality. This idea is by now a familiar one. It is the idea of an organic part of an organic whole. This notion is an essential part of Marx’s theory, and indispensable for a genuine understanding of society and history. But Cohen has no comprehension of the dialectical basis of Marx’s thought. When he comes to discuss these ideas he can only caricature them. He talks, for instance, of ‘that zig-zag “dialectic” between forces and relations, with priority on neither side, which is widely favoured’ (p. 138). This sort of thing doesn’t deserve a response, except to emphasise that Marx, when he talks of the ‘interaction’ and ‘contradiction’ between forces and relations, does not regard these moments as having equal weight. On the contrary, like Engels, he makes clear throughout his work that he regards production and the development of the productive forces as the most powerful and as the ultimately decisive forces. In short, he is a materialist. But never a mechanical materialist after the manner of Cohen. Marx’s materialist theory of history is quite distinct from the abstract and metaphysical views propounded by Cohen. It cannot adequately be understood using a
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 167
purely analytical approach. This is what I have been arguing. As Engels says, What these gentlemen all lack is dialectics. They always see only here cause, there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction…that here everything is relative and nothing absolute— this they never begin to see. Hegel has never existed for them.49
NOTES This chapter was first published in Radical Philosophy 36 (Spring 1984) 1 Marx to Engels, 14 January 1858: Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, n.d. p. 121. 2 G.A.Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978. Otherwise unattributed page references in this article refer to this work. 3 A.C.Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, Methuen, London, 1934. Chapter 4 gives a clear account of the idea of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ relations in the Hegelian tradition. For an application of these ideas to Marxism, see B.Ollman, Alienation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971. 4 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 11.25.8. 5 This saying was used by G.E.Moore as the motto of his Principia Ethica (1903), and thereby achieved modern currency as one of the slogans of the analytic movement. 6 Marx, ‘Preface’ (1859) to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, in Preface and Introduction to A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1976, p. 3. 7 ‘Introduction’ (1857), ibid., p. 17. 8 Cohen’s attempt to portray productive forces as mere material entities denies this. However, he tacitly recognises the point I am here making in the definition he offers of ‘productive forces’. ‘To qualify as a productive force’, says Cohen, ‘a facility must be capable of use by a producing agent in such a way that production occurs (partly) as a result of its use, and it is someone’s purpose that the facility so contributes to production’ (p. 32). The first clause of this definition is consistent with Cohen’s general views. That a thing is capable of productive use refers solely to its material features. However, the second clause, with its talk of people’s purposes, clearly brings in a reference to the way in which people relate to the productive forces, and hence a reference to relations to production. This is further evidence that the productive forces cannot be defined independently of the relations of production. (I am indebted to Prof. Howard Smokler for pointing this out to me.)
168 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
9 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961, p. 329. 10 Ibid., p. 326. 11 Engels, Anti-Dühring, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, pp. 176–7. 12 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 329. 13 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, Part I, ed. C.J.Arthur, International Publishers, NY, 1978, pp. 62–3. 14 Ibid., p. 62. 15 See, for example, Engels, Anti-Dühring, Part I, Ch. XI; C.Caudwell, ‘On Liberty’, in Studies in a Dying Culture, Bodley Head, London, 1938. 16 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, p. 177. 17 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 56–7. 18 Marx, ‘Wage Labour and Capital’, Selected Works in One Volume, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1970, p. 79. 19 Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 265. 20 Marx, Capital, Vol. III, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1962, p. 794. 21 Marx, ‘Introduction’ (1857), pp. 9–10. 22 G.E.Moore, ‘External and Internal Relations’, Philosophical Studies, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1922, pp. 281ff. 23 Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A.V.Miller, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1969, p. 487. 24 Ibid., p. 114. 25 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1955, p. 121. 26 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 490. 27 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1955, p. 85. 28 Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 95. 29 See, for example, Chapter 3, Section 2. 30 Hegel, Logic (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part I), trans. W.Wallace, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd edn, 1975, Section 143z, p. 203. 31 ‘Actuality’ is a technical term in Hegel’s philosophy with distinctly idealistic overtones. See S.Sayers, ‘The Actual and the Rational’, in D.Lamb (ed.), Hegel and Modern Philosophy, Croom Helm, London, 1987. 32 Hegel, Logic, Section 119z, pp. 173–4. My bracket. 33 Ibid., Section 143z, pp. 203–4. 34 Hume, ‘An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Enquiry Concerning Human Nature, p. 188. 35 Hegel, Logic, Section 38z, p. 62. 36 Ibid., Section 136, p. 192. 37 Ibid., Section 216z, p. 280. The reference is to Aristotle, Politics, 1253a, 19ff. See also, Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M.Knox, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1952, Section 270 (add.), p. 283. 38 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part II), trans. A.V.Miller, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, Section 248z, p. 18.
MARXISM AND THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 169
39 Hegel, Logic, Section 135z, pp. 191–2. 40 Ibid., Section 38z, p. 63. 41 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1st edn, 1964, Section 1–120, p. 37. 42 Ibid., Section 1–122, p. 37. 43 Locke, Essay, II.21.4. Cf. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Section 25: ‘The things which we perceive…are visibly inactive; there is nothing of power or agency included in them.’ 44 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 49. 45 Marx, ‘Introduction’ (1857), p. 23. 46 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 47 Engels to C.Schmidt, 27 October 1890, Selected Works, p. 684. 48 Engels to W.Borgius (H.Starkenburg), 25 January 1894, Selected Works, p. 694. 49 Engels to C.Schmidt, 27 October 1890, Selected Works, p. 689.
8
ANALYTICAL MARXISM: A NEW PARADIGM? Joseph McCarney
I agree with a great deal in Gregor McLennan’s review of Jon Elster’s Making Sense of Marx (Radical Philosophy 42), and most of all with his idea of the book’s importance. He may well be right in thinking it ‘likely to dominate discussions of Marx and Marxism for the next decade’. There is also likely to be widespread assent to his view of it as ‘the flagship for a new armada of Marxist analytical scholarship and reassessment’. The names of the other captains in the armada would have to include those McLennan mentions of G.A.Cohen and John Roemer. Here, one might suppose, is the long-awaited marriage of analytical philosophy and Marxism. Elster’s book may not be the last word on all, or any, of the themes and findings of the new school, but it is surely the best general guide and compendium. As such, its publication does not simply mark the height of current academic fashion, but is an event of real importance on the intellectual scene. Against this background there is one aspect of McLennan’s review with which I would like to take issue. It is his tribute to the ‘fair-minded feel’ to the book, and his claim that Elster is ‘sympathetic to the Marxist project’. The book does not feel in the least fair-minded to me. On the contrary, it could serve as an anthology of varieties of critical unfairness. On the evidence of it, Elster could be regarded as sympathetic to the Marxist project only in so far as that is compatible with a marked lack of sympathy with the project’s founder. In amplifying these remarks, I shall not be engaging directly with the central theses of the book. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that nothing here is a substitute for that vital task. It will, however, be necessary to point to 170
ANALYTICAL MARXISM 171
flaws in the details of some specific arguments. What is at stake in those cases is not for the most part of great moment in itself. Nevertheless, they provide clues as to the author’s relationship to his subject which can supplement what is gained from formal statements of his programme and conclusions. In particular, they offer an invaluable perspective on issues of fairness and sympathy. Views on these issues must in their turn have implications for the book’s reception, for they help to shape the context in which it is located and discussed. The simplest kind of unfairness in Elster’s reading is misrepresentation. Again and again the line of Marx’s argument is bent, and always in the direction of making it untenable. A couple of examples will have to suffice here. Elster dismisses Marx’s views on the antagonism between English and Irish workers with the remark: ‘Ruling classes can exploit prejudices, but they cannot create them’ (Making Sense of Marx, p. 22. All page references are to this work unless otherwise indicated). In the passage in question, however, Marx’s claim was not that the antagonism was ‘created’ by the ruling classes but that it was ‘artificially kept alive and intensified’ by them (pp. 21–2). The difference is crucial in its setting. The desire to refute what, on Elster’s own showing, Marx does not hold is found elsewhere. Thus, for instance, he cites Marx’s defence of Fourier and other ‘organizers of labour’: it ‘was not their view, as Stirner imagines, that each should do the work of Raphael, but that anyone in whom there is a potential Raphael should be able to develop himself without hindrance’. This defence relies for its point on the assumption that the potential to be a Raphael is not universal. Yet Elster interprets it so as to fit with his belief that Marx’s corpus as a whole never ‘refers to differences in natural talents’ (p. 88). Later the point is caricatured further. Elster attacks the ‘Utopian’ idea that ‘everybody could be a Raphael’ while referring to the earlier discussion in a way plainly meant to imply that the idea was held by Marx (p. 201). Yet the distinction between it and his actual view that everybody who could be a Raphael should be allowed to does not need labouring. Another kind of unfairness, all too familiar when analytical philosophers turn to Marx, is the Stalinist smear. Elster notes that Marx found himself compelled, in his own words, to ‘say to the workers and the petty bourgeois: it is better to suffer in modern bourgeois society, which by its industry creates the material
172 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
means for the foundation of a new society that will liberate you all, than to revert to a bygone form of society’. Elster comments: ‘Substitute the peasantry for the petty bourgeoisie and primitive socialist accumulation for modern bourgeois society and you have the classic justification for Stalinism’ (pp. 116–17). This procedure is so useful it seems a pity to stop there. Thus, substitute the unemployed and market forces and you have the classic justification for Thatcherism. The point is not just that Elster is indulging in the kind of uncontrolled analogising he castigates when he thinks he finds it in Marx (see e.g., pp. 508–10). It is also that the analogy in this case is singularly inept. Stalinism did not, as Elster is well aware, rely on ‘saying’ to the peasants in an effort to persuade them of the need for sacrifices. It typically worked through coercion and terror. Moreover, its programme has to be conceived as pure loss of life and the amenities of life on the part of those who suffered it for the sake of a hypothetical future. The impression that Elster wishes to link Marx with such projects is strengthened a little later by a reference, on the basis of the same discussion, to his ‘philosophy of history that allows one to regard pre-communist individuals as so many sheep for the slaughter’ (p. 118). Some account should, however, have been taken of Marx’s apparent belief that his recommendations will be of benefit to his audience themselves: their outcome ‘will liberate you all’. It is understandable that someone writing at the present time should be oppressed by a sense that such an outcome is only to be won, if at all, by the travail of generations. But this would not have been so obvious to Marx writing in January 1849 in the midst of a European revolutionary upheaval. Elster’s treatment of the case points to some of his chief weaknesses as a commentator: his abstract, formalising style of thinking and lack of feel for the specificity of the contexts in which intellectual positions are advanced; more generally, his lack of an active historical sense. This blind spot may help to explain another feature of his method, the tendency to treat all of Marx’s writings as one vast text to be assessed primarily for internal coherence. Thus, he assembles a number of passages in order to exhibit the inconsistencies in Marx’s references to Christianity (pp. 506–8). The sources extend in time from the 1840s to the 1870s. They range from private notebooks to preparatory outlines to material published by Engels to works whose publication was overseen by Marx himself. Given this provenance, it is hardly surprising that
ANALYTICAL MARXISM 173
inconsistencies can be found. The absence of any could only mean that one’s subject had stopped thinking about the topic at an early stage. Elster shows no feeling for the heterogeneity of his evidence, nor any of the caution it should induce. This is all the more surprising since he had earlier quoted a remark that might have given him pause. It comes in a letter to Engels: ‘Whatever shortcomings [my writings] may have, they have the advantage of forming an artistic whole, which can only be achieved through my method of never letting them into print before they lie wholly before me’ (p. 42). This gives grounds for attending to the distinction between what Marx let into print and what he did not, and even between those categories and what was never intended for print in the first place. In this connection one may also note Elster’s comment that Capital II is ‘certainly one of the most boring works ever written by a major author’ (p. 142). He is, of course, aware that the work we know by that title was put together by Engels, exercising considerable editorial discretion, from manuscripts left after Marx’s death, and was not written by Marx to be read in its present form. In view of this, his comment is surely something of a cheap gibe. The meanness of spirit shown here and elsewhere in the book will surprise those who know Elster’s other writings. The various ‘Replies’ to critics, for instance, have a remarkable balance and liberality, being always ready to reshape a thesis in the light of objections, conceding a point where it seems necessary and holding the line firmly where it does not (Inquiry 23, 1980; Theory and Society 12, 1983). They are, in short, a model of how to conduct intellectual debate. It is true, and mildly amusing, that an astringent note tends to creep in when Elster is responding to critics outside the inner circle of the new ‘Marxism’. Then one finds also the same favourite devices of the analytical movement as were applied to Marx. There is, for instance, the ingenuously pained admission of inability to understand: ‘I confess my inability to make any interesting sense of Marx’s article “On the Jewish Question’” (p. 504 note). In dealing with Anthony Giddens in particular, this device is made to work overtime (Theory and Society 12, 1983). Even in these cases, however, everything proceeds well within the conventional bounds of academic discussion. No doubt the contrast between them and Marx owes something to the decencies appropriate to arguing with contemporaries. But it would scarcely be to Elster’s credit to take this as a complete
174 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
explanation. Something must be due to the fact that in these debates he is confronting thinkers he respects as he does not respect Marx. At this point one comes near the heart of the problem of his book. For the attitude it reveals to its subject is best characterised as a kind of intellectual contempt. To say this is not itself to criticise either Marx or Elster. The fact must nevertheless be acknowledged. The nature and basis of Elster’s contempt are sufficiently shown in the tenor of his complaints. Marx has ‘a cavalier attitude to the canons of explanation’ (p. 35). There is an ‘omnipresent bias of wishful thinking’ in his work (p. 438). Most revealing and persistent of all is the charge of ‘lack of intellectual discipline’ (pp. 317, 390, 508). These habits of mind are naturally enough reflected in the detailed analyses, which are variously characterised by Elster as ‘rambling’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘confused’, ‘incoherent’, ‘rather absurd’, ‘downright silly’ and ‘a conceptual jungle’. It may be said that he shows himself somewhat insensitive to the comic possibilities that arise, against this background, when he turns to authors of whom he approves, as when we are assured that ‘[G.A.] Cohen’s approach is characteristically lucid’ (p. 244). The incongruity here may oblige the reader to pinch herself to get things back in their true proportions, with Cohen as one of our ablest professors and Marx as what he professes. The low regard Elster has for the subject of his book has a more serious aspect. For it may well be thought an odd qualification for the author of a study of more than 500 pages. Moreover, the overwhelmingly negative tone of the study must give rise to the question of how such an intellectual pygmy could merit attention on this scale. It may be surmised that, in the course of the writing, Elster gradually became alive to the pressure of this question. At any rate, the final paragraph tries to strike a positive note, by indicating the sense in which he regards himself as a Marxist: speaking now for myself only, I believe it is still possible to be a Marxist in a rather different [i.e. non-traditional, JM] sense of the term. I find that most of the views that I hold to be true and important, I can trace back to Marx. This includes methodology, substantive theories and, above all, values. (p. 531)
ANALYTICAL MARXISM 175
This is a useful check-list, and it should be asked how far the items on it will bear scrutiny. Elster’s account of Marx’s methodological achievement is prominent among the aspects of his book that merit full-scale independent treatment. Even a brief glance is, however, enough to show that what he says about it amounts to the faintest of praise and what he could claim to have derived from it in a personal way is wholly mysterious. Marx’s central contribution is taken to be the idea that uncoordinated actions may come to grief through the mechanism of unintended consequences (pp. 44, 48). This is the phenomenon which Elster, borrowing from Sartre, calls ‘counterfinality’. It is one of the two main species of social contradictions discussed at length in his earlier work Logic and Society. The second is called ‘suboptimality’, and involves the kind of intentional production of suboptimal consequences of which the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the paradigm. The contrast lies in the fact that, while suboptimality is a game-theoretic notion presupposing strategic rationality on the part of the players, counterfinality can arise only at a pre-strategic, pre-game-theoretic stage. This stage is, for Elster, the true home of Marx’s methodological expertise. Thus: ‘Although strategic interaction is crucial in economic life, both within and between classes, Marx took little explicit account of it’. Moreover, what he says is ‘hardly more coherent and systematic than what may be discovered in Hobbes, Rousseau or Tocqueville’, and he is ‘sometimes confused’ with respect to a ‘crucial’ element of it (pp. 14–15). Indeed, he scores badly for game-theoretic competence in general. Thus, he commits the cardinal error of violating the principle of ‘mutual rationality’ (p. 298). His inadequacy also shows itself in less basic, but still important, areas, as in his ‘narrow pre-strategic conception of power’ (pp. 406, 421). To see the force of this assessment, one has to invoke an idea that runs through Elster’s work and is made most fully explicit in one of the sets of ‘Replies’ to critics referred to earlier. It is that the conceptual distinction between counterfinality and suboptimality ‘corresponds to’ the ‘historical divide’ between traditional and modern societies (Inquiry 23, 1980, pp. 216–17). It follows that while Marx’s methodological contribution may be of use to the anthropologist or ancient historian, it can have little to offer the student of capitalism. It follows also that he himself lacked the conceptual tools needed to do justice to a central object of his
176 SOCIALISM, FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
social science, the formation and interaction of classes in modern societies. What actively interests Elster, as any acquaintance with his writings will show, is the application of game-theoretic insights to those societies, not the parametric predicaments of traditional actors. It now becomes difficult to see what could be of personal significance for him in Marx’s method. Indeed, one might ask how Elster could possibly respect Marx, since he is a complete duffer at game theory. The truth of this matter is surely not hard to discern, and the only puzzle is why Elster should wish to deceive himself about it. Faced with the claim that Elster finds some of Marx’s substantive theories to be ‘true and important’, one can only ask ‘what theories’? On almost any medium-sized topic one chooses, his verdict will be found to be harshly dismissive. Fleshing out some of the epithets listed earlier, one may note that Marx’s views on ‘man and nature’ are said to be ‘either rambling and incoherent, or inherently trivial’ (p. 55). His discussion of religion is described as ‘arbitrary and largely incoherent’ (pp. 493–4). Going beyond the list, one may cite the assertion that the writings on international politics are ‘largely devoid of theoretical interest’ (p. 17). It is true that occasionally a less hostile conclusion is revealed, but even then what is chiefly remarkable is the grudging and patronising way it is framed. To take a representative case: Marx’s ‘sociology of economic knowledge was quite an impressive achievement, in spite of being flawed by its reliance on functional explanation and the labour theory of value’ (p. 504). It would be easy to give further instances at this level. Instead, however, it may be more rewarding to deal in broad strokes with the two main divisions of Marx’s substantive theorising, as conceived by Elster. The first, the theory of history, is on Elster’s presentation comprehensively vitiated by ‘the a priori nature of his reasoning—the speculative, teleological strand in his thought’ (p. 432). The position as regards the second, economic theory, is sufficiently indicated by noting that the two ‘main pillars’ of the analysis of capitalism as an economic system, the labour theory of value and the theory of the falling rate of profit, have both, according to Elster, ‘conclusively been shown to be invalid’ (p. 119). In general, his view of Marx’s status as an economist is fairly caught in McLennan’s focusing on the phrase ‘a minor post-Ricardian’ (p. 513). If one steps back from Elster’s own account to ask what elements of
ANALYTICAL MARXISM 177
substantive theory he could reasonably claim to take over from Marx, there seems only one serious candidate. It can be argued that he accepts some version of Marx’s conception of classes and of modern society as structured by class divisions. The use to which he wishes to put these elements is accurately described by McLennan: ‘he recommends that classical formulations be conceived anew as various possibilities and strategies in a gametheory-based model of collective action.’ What is valuable in Marx is the gr