Some Judgements of Perception

Moore G. E. "Some Judgments of Perception" PAS. New Series. v. 1 9 . 1 9{8 pp. {-29. Reprinted by Gourtesy of the Editor of the Aristotelian Society: 1918 www-a ri stotel i ansoci ety. org. u k.

PAPERSRBAD BEFORETHE SOCIIITY. 191A- 19L9_

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Meet'ingat 22, Albemarle Street, W. 1, on Noaember4th, 1918, at 8 p.m.

:IHE PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. I.-SOME

JUDGMENTS B y G .E .

OF PERCEPTION. l \{ o o n s .

I tt'ANt to raise some childishly simple questions as to what we are doing when rve make judgments of a certain kind, which we all do in fact exceedingly commonly make. The kind of judgments I mean are those which we make when, with regard to something which \ye are seeing, lve judge such things as " That is an inkstand," " Thab is a tableclobh," " That is a door," etc., etc.; or when, with regard to somebhing which we are feeling with our hands, we judge such things as " This is cloth," " This is a finger," " This is a coin," etc., etc. Ib is scarcely possible, I think, to exaggerate the frequency with rvhich lve ntake sucir judgments as these, nor yet the certainty rvith which we are able to make vasb numbers of them. Any man, who is noc blind, can, at almosbany momenf of his waking life, except when he is in the dark, make a large number of judgments of the first kind, with the greatest certainly. He has only to look about him, if he is indoors, to judge with regard to various things which he is seeing, sucli things as " That is a rvindow," " That is a chair," " This is a book"; or, if he is out-of-doors, such things as " That is ir house," "Thal is a motor-ear," " That is a nan," or "'l'lult, is a sto n e , "" T hat is a tre e ," " T h a b i s u , c l o u ri ." ol ' rrs, ' \r rrl tl l

(i. o. l\looRD. l] 1ir li0s uc h. i r t d g r n e l r t s ' rv lr0 rr, r' on ol lrlirrrl, tlo irr f lr , c bc 0lI SLallt ly as I'il'r'ts of Ittole cottreven il', as a lttlt--,wo ol)ly ttralic tlttlrn is thllt'' u'hen we tuaktl such plicatecl jrtrlgmcnts. Wha'l' I rneart " Tliis chair Hullo ! that olotlli has stopperl"' or ,1'oagtlturrt.a-s" looks like a nian or "'Ihat i. ,ior. comforbable bhan tirab one," l
S OME JU D G}fE N TS OF P E R C E TTION .

of opi rri ontl i at there w .s no i .cousist er r cyir r r r r r r ir r Lr r ir r irLlr r gr r L the'. were i' the IJniverse thousancrsof inkstands &'rl tru.s anrl sto'es and stars,and that yet bliere rvasirr it no such thi'g as matter. And perhaps the definition of rnatter, which ho adopted, was such that there rearry was rro inconsisbency'irr maintaining this. Perhaps,similarrv, other phirosolrhorslr*v. sometimes adopted definitions of t,he exDressions.' rrrr.rLc.iill things" and. ',physical ofuects,',rvhich wer" such thaL rr,ll tho judgments of this kind thab we make rlight quite well be Lrrre, without its being true that there are in tlie Universe any material things whatever. Perhaps,even, there may be some justification for adopting definibions of those terms which lvould yield the surprising result that rve may, with perfect consistency,maintain that the lvorld is full of minerals and vegetablesand animals, of all sorts of clifferent kinds, and thab yet there is not to be found in it a single material thing. I do not know rvhetherthere is or is'ot any utility i'usiug the terms " material thing " or (' physissl objecb" in such a sense as this. But, rvhetherthere is or nol, I cannoI help thinking that there is amplejustification fbr using then in another:sense_a sensein which from the proposition that there are in the universe s*ch things as i.kstands or lingers or clouds, it srrictly foilows that there are in it at least as many material things, and in which, therefore, we can izor consistently maintain the existence of inkstands, fingers, and clouds, while denl,ing that of rriaterial things. The kinds of judgment which f have mentioned, and. thousands of others lvhich might easily be mentioned, are obviouslyall of the same sorbin one very iurportant respecta respect in which, for instance, such judgments as ,,This is an emotion," " This is a judgment," ,, This is a colour,,,are not of the sauresort as they are. And it seems to rne that we are certainly using the term ,. material thing,, in a correct and useful way, if rve expless this important common property which they have, by saying that of each of them the same can truly be said as was said of the judgment ,,That is an

G. E. MOORE'

.. There is an ,, proposition ilrl<st,ill}d : that,, just as from the is at least one material irrkeband" it follows that there There is a tablecloth"' it' thing, so from the proposilion " one material thing; ancl follows thab there is at least We can certainly use the similarly in all the other cases' inksbands' tablecloths' fingers' .rp.".riorr' " Things stcch as such as thesein a cerLainvery clouds,stars, otc.," to mean things understand' though we ma'y important respect, which we all " the term " material thing not be able to define it' And used to mean simply things c"rtuinty is and can be correctly it may be' Some such as these in that respecL-wh'Ibt:vel uttrrely things such as these term is certainly requirecl b-or"tt"" srr frrr rt's-1.can see'there is no in that imporbani rcspect; rrttrl' ttsctl itt lhig sensc except the terrn which cu.ttbo ""ttt"'lly r' ,l rti v i tl o ttts ' T h us understoo' l ' ,, te rrrr t . . t . r inl l, lr r r rg"s ,r,,,1i t,* for an i m' t' l ri rrg" rx rl t' rr' i Il l ytl < l e ss b a nd l Jttt t,c r t r r" t t t t r { , r r t ' i trl ' $ lllllllo' wltir:lt t ' r ' r 1t t t t ' ( ir 1rotl, t r ttl,11 1;l,io tt, in t his s en s e ' t h e n i t i s r\ r r,l, tI wrr Ilfllt'( ] t ' " "' " t ' lr c Ler lu f or t he t r u t h o f b h e ,,lrvr, tltt llttLl, ll' lllrl t ' ( r ( 11[ lIlt ' l t t ec es s s ar y fof t hingS, t han iS n e C e S S a I y l t.rr l,lrrrl,l,lrctc r r lr r lr t iller ial rr. rrrl.r to deal' k ind wit h whic h I pr o p o s e t,lr, ' I r rtllr ,,1'.;rttlg tttolr t 'o[ s t he j u d g menbs t he t r ut h of t he s e llrrt r r, nr.t. (rrl.lrlrtl t t ec es s ar y f or implied' by them' 1"1 tlrrLrrirr rrr:l,rrrtllyrrsserbed in or logically truth of what is necessary for bhe rl rvl irlrlrroir,chbhe tluestion is things' by asking *'hat-ib t,lrt: nsset'Liotl that the'r'e are material as thesg we make such judgmenrs t'irt, we acbuaily assert when are' I how much is necessary certain reasons for ioubting the clearly' tban if we approach think, brought out *oth *o'i" told us a Many philosophers have question in any other rvay' in the they suppose to be involved very greal deal as to what them and some' at least' among existence of material things;

thi'gs " suchthingsasinkseemto hu,r" *ruoi r'f " i"i"tia} think of only onetypeof flngersuoattooa'' But I can stand.s, is such of material things' which ' view as to the it rvould "o"t"'o"oo answer those who hold thai it is tolerably "i"*' *ttut

S OIIE JU D GME N TS Ol ' P E Ii C E I' ri ON .

give to the simple question : WhaNis it that I am judging, wlrurr I judge, as I now do, that that is an ink-eband? The tylrc ol' view I mean is bhabto which the view that MilI Ruggests, rvlrtirr he explains what he means by saying thal l\{rr,bLtr is rr Permanent Possibiiity of Sensation,and also the vicrv ur. r,icws which Mr. Russell seems to suggesbin his " Our l(utiwlerlgt:,rl' the Exhrnailorld," seem to belong. In the casc of viuvs oi this kind, ib is, I think, tolerably clear what answer those who hold them would give to all the quesbionsf want to raise about judgmenbsof the kind I have described. But it doesnot seeur to me at all eerbain that any view of this type is true ; antl certainly many philosophers have held and do hold thab aII viervs of this type are false. But, in the case of those who do hold them to be t'alse,I do not know, in any single case,what answer would be given to all the questions which I wanb to raise, In the caseof philosophers,who do not accept any view of the MiII-Russell type, none,so far as I know, has nradeit clear rvhab answer he would give bo all my questions: some havo made it clear what ans\yer they would give to someof them ; but many, I think, have not even made it clear what answer they would give to any. Perhaps there is some simple and satisfactory answer, which has escaped me, that such philosophers could give ro all my questions; but I cannot help thinking fhal assumptions as to the nabure of material things have too often been made, without its even occurring to those who made them to ask, what, if they were brue, we could be judging when we make such judgments as these ; and that, if this quesbion had been asked, it lvould have become evideqt that those assurnptions were far less certain than they appeared to be. I do not know that there is any cxcuse rvhateverfor calling all judgments of the kind I rrrean " judgments of perception." AII of them ale, of course,,jrllgrrrr'rrbsnbout thirtgs rvhich we are at the rnourerrt porceiving, sirrcc, by definition, they are j udgmentsabout tl i i ngs rvl ri cl rrvc tlc sceir r gor f eeliug wit h our

( i. E. M OORE.

donbt' also busetlllplrL someIrrrrrrls; rrlrcl rrll of lhern &re' no bhe the thing in tluesbion' But Lhirrgwhich we perceivc aboub I am both about a thing rvhich mere facb Lhat, a judgrnenb is perceive something which I perceiving, ancl also tu"tl opoo to be a sufficienb reason for aboub that lhiug, cloes oot seern and..I do not know that calling it a judgmenb of perception; of if it for calling all judgments there is any obher reason tnut' rvanl of perception' I do not the kincl I rnean judgments me to seems lhem are so' Rut ib therefore, to asserb lhat' atl of a in of t'hem are so' cluit'e plain thab enorrnous numbers juclgment' which I now make' perfecLly legilimabe sense' This be see(Is to me quite plainly to tcr tlrc elfecb th:atthat is a cloor' it thc t]-pl." sense that I make a ,jrrrlgnronlof percepbion,in is a door' ancl assert'in it no lxrcrlttscI rio, in f'lct,''seebirat thrr'b w h i l t I s e e I' of course'percei ve' r r r or r rt , lt ir t tr v lu l L I s o o ; i rtttl somebhingwhich itt rvlrich [.iutlge' rvibhregarclto Itr cvt't'.yt,rt,s,r i t i s a so-and-so' th at to y h a n c l s ' I t t t lr , ' r ' it r g o t' i c trl i rtg* i ' f' o r touch' that i t i s i n ty t Hir r r l, l.l,y t ' , ' r t t ts tt i g l ]l ' t" i ' re t' i v t' I th i n k ' fai rl y say thab the r r I t r r r r ; i" i l ' l rrL t'tti " tl , w e c a n ' lr r r ' 1, percepti on' A nd r r r ttrl (fs L i o lils a j u d g me n t o f ir r r l' r r r r r r r l, ,t'I k i n d I mean are' qui te t t t t l ttl ttrrso f j u c l g rn e n t'o f ttt" r ' n( , r ilr or lir They are not t.' f p e rc e p ti o ni n th i s sense' l, lr r r r r l. y ' , . lr r rl g rrtc ttt' s mi sbaken' I are th a t l o me o f th em r t ll, l, , r ' t , lr t rs i rrrp l o "o'i'l I see lvith regard to an animal which rrrn,1 , lot irrstattcc,juclge, pig' .h""p, when in fact it is a rr.t,:r. rlista'cc, birat iL'i. " I that fact not due to the Ancl here my jutlgment is ceriainly a be to I cannot' possibly see a thing see it to be a sheepI since judgment of It' therefore' is not a sheep, unless it is one' such And moreover' even where p"r"iptioo in this sense' of nob allvays be a judgmenb a judgment is true, it' rnay in whereas I only see the thing perseption, for the reason that' a such of i's I judge ib to be quesbion,the kind of bhing which for any one' by sight alone'-to nabure, thab it is impossiUle kind' IIow to draw the line perceive anything to ie of that of kind' which ale judgments bebween judgments oi t'liis

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perception,and those rvhich are not, I clo rrot lirr.rv. ,l,lrir.l, is 1,. say, I do not knorv rvhabcondit , ionsr nr r st lr o f r r llillr r r lir ) , , r . , 1r ' that I may be trul y sai cl to lt a pt : t 't , cit : it tIrt1, 1,siglr [ ,or . l, or r clr , such thi ngs as thab thab i s i l door ',t lr is is r r lir r gcr iLr . , r rrl r , t ,t t t t , n,, tl1 i nferri ng them. S ome peop le r nay r l. r r lr t ,t , lr ir r lillr r Ll,il, is 'o very unphiiosophicalin me to say that we t)t)t:)' curr])Ll'or)ivo sr.lr thi ngs as these. tsub i t see m st o m e t hir t r ve dr , ir r . r . r lir r r . y life, constantly talk of. see,ing such thirgs, a'd tiub, rvlr.rr rv, ri, s0,we are neither using language incorrectly, nol rrrlliirrg rrrry mi stake about the facts-sup posing som et hiug t o occur . wlr ir r r r never doesin fact occur'. The truth seemsto me to be thar rvtr are using the term " perceive" i' a way rvhich is bobh prcrfeclly correcf and expressesa kind of thing which constanLly tlocs occur,only that somephilosophershave not recognisedthat thi$ is a correct usageof the lerm and have nob been able to defiru: it. I ain not, ther.efore,afraid bo say that I do nolv percoive that that is a door, arrd that that is a finger. Only, of course, rvhen I say that I do, I do not mean to assert thab parb of what I " perceive," when f ,, perceive,, these things, may not be somebhingrvhich, in an important sense,is knorvn to me only by inference. ft would be very rash to assert thaL ,,perception,,, in this senseof the word, entirely excludes inference. A1l that seemsto me certain is that there is an irnportant and useful senseof the word ,,perceptiou,',which is such that the amount and kind of inference, if inference Lhere be, which is involvetl in my present perception,that that is a door.,is no bar to the trubh of the asseltion that I do perceive bhat it is one. Vast numbers,then, of the kind of judgments with rvhich I propose to deal seenrto me to be, in an jmporbant antl legitiurate sense, judgmentsof perception altlrough I am nob preparetl tr_rdefiue, ; any furbher than I have dorre,rvhat thitt sengeis. And though ib is tnre that the cluestionsrvlrich I slu]l t.rise aplrly jusb as mucl i to l hose of thcm rvl i i clrr iLc r r oL. jut lgr r r cr rol'per ls cept ion as to thoso rvhich arc, ib is, of collr.,sc, iliso tt.rro blrrr,tthcy apply just as to tlrosc rvhicli .l'e rrs L' Llr,sr:rvhiclr aro trot ; so 'ruoh

S OME JU D GME N TS OI' P E R C E P TION .

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(;' E' IlOoItE'

wibh a large and important class thr[ I shall bc renlly dealing p e rc e p ti o n ' crn o r)g. iudgr nt ' r r tof s which' if I undersbandthem Ib is true that, if certaio views seriously enbertained' wete t'rue rightly, some philosophers have of them should be that ones, it would be quite impossible .any philosophers seem to me judgments of perception' For some as do in facl knorv such things to have denied that we ever also we ever know them but these, and others not' only thab know do if in facb' I nevel that they are ever true' And' that Lrue' it will' of course' follow such a thing, or if it is nevet since I cerbainly cannob'in thir I never perceive such a thing i un]e1s T both know it and scttse,peroeivo anything '"hJtuut'' of suclt t'o rtttl a sufficient refutation il is t,rrrrl. llrrb it ""'i* know do w e to c a s e si n w h i ch vi trw st r s llr t r s r 's, ir n l rl yt' o l ro i trL ,t'l,is,,l|t.'r.,,I1,yu,, kriow, r'eally is a finger: thlrl srtr.lrt,lrirrgs. I i b ' a n d y o i a l l k n ow i N ' A nd i s rro r l, r t t lr lr r lr or lli 't' : I l tn o l forrvard bring to any philosopher I,lrirrl'rv. trtt.ysrtlt:ly"ltoll""g" th e p ro p o s i ti on thab * : t tt' I rt' v ti ttle i th e r o f rn v r r t f lr lr r r { r rit ' d: th a t i t i s not true' w hi ch rr,,l ,k t t , r t vil, , , r ' of tl re p ro p o s i ti o n i:: upo[ some premiss *n]:n ,1,,r'* rrol', itt, solllo poittt, rest is the proposition which ib tr'lttlttrrisou,liss ce'bain than I'r'.)',,ntl questions whether rve do ever rrr ,L,sigttorl bo atback' The whebher there are any maberial lirrow strclt bhings as t'hese'and is to be questions which there Llrirrgs,seem to me, therefore' quite is it are quesbionsrvhich 'What does' rro need to take seriously: they tit" affirmative' io t"*"i"ty' *itft answer' easy to and what is really dubious' I think, need'to bs t'aken te'ioo'ly' is a finger' or whether I know is not the question whether this I am wlrut' in certain respects' that it is, but the question to it is' And this is the question knowing, when I know that which I will now address mYself' be thing which seems to me to To begin witf' there is one judgment's' It is unfortunately very certain indeed about such how properly to express' ]'n:t' a thing which I do not know it which r to every rvay of expressing seem to me to be objecbions

can think of. But I hope I may be able to make tny urearrirrg clear, in spite of the inadequacy of rny expression. Tho thirrg rls I mean is a thing which may to some people seem so oLivit.rtts to be scarcely worth saying. But I cannot help bhinl
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{}. E. I\IooRE.

one' p i ck out (tl tu ( L, t / s , r v ltIt rm t ra]i e s u c h a j u d g me n t' I c a n ' hd tlte bime' about rvhich I rrrnonll llrc objecLsllresented to rne at zrr'general I am not ,,,,r,r,r,r.l.ittgib ; bub I have orrly said thab a thing of the kind' judging noith ,ego,rtl to this obiect that it is the predicateof my for which blte term, which seemsbo express my secondproposijudgment, is a name' And I have limited in which ib d'oesnot' tioo ir. this way, becausethere are cases' I am not doing this' as at first sight, seem quito so certain that When' for instance' I in the two instances I have jusb given' seeing' " This is a judge with regard' to something, which I am water"' or even rvhen I soap-bubble," or " This is a drop of quite so plain' juclge " This is a spot of inl<," it may not seem regard' to the very object thab I rnay nob be judging, with rvhole i', it'"lf, a rvhole soap-bubble'a lrlrscnl,crlt'o mc, tttaiit in'bhe is' ib ahvays of rvrrlot,rtr ll rvllolc spot of ink' as 111,11, ta ke the presenl ed n e v e l I r t lis lit , tttlt',rr0 c o i l r,th a t crrsr . , rrl r , rit rv h o l e i nksband'or a ,rl r . 1r ' r l, ; r , lr ,rrvr lt t l,io l tI rl rnj u d g i n S, to b e a th i s w i Ll ' of coul se' rr.l r r r lr . c oir r . ' l' lr 0 s Orto f re a s o nw h y I s a y o f a chi l cl i shorder' l ',., ' 1, \ ' r , r r rtr, o it r ry o tte ,a n tl i t i s o b v i o u s l y o b vi ousthab i n such l i rrl I ' r r t r t t . t ,s t r . yl l rrrbi t s e e u tsto me q u i te objecb thab ib is a ;r , iri,(' I rrttt tt,L .ludging of Lhe presentecl i t d' oesseem to be rvlr , , l, 'r lt r t p ot r v a te t,i n -th e w a y i n w h i c h object that it rrl,r'i,rtsllrab I atl not judging of tLr'i'spresented' myself to saying is rr.rrirrkstand. Thab is *n1f limit lh1''.n" " I anr nol Suct81ng so-and-so a is Thab juclge " I t1,'rLr:rnl,,rvhen about which my judgment' rvillr regarclto the pr.,"nt"tl object' ques|ion' As uuch as this is, bhat il is a thing of the kind' in any child can see' Nobody seemsto me to be a thing which as that rvhen he judges such things will suppose,lbr a *o-"ol a t'ree"' he is judging' with t:guld " Tiris is a sofa," or " This is his judgment plainly is' to the presenbeclobject, aboub which lvhole tree : he can' al most" that it is a whole sofa or a be a parb of the surface of a suppose that he is judging it bo a tree' And certainly in the sofa or a parb of the surface of kind which rve make' rvhether case of mosbjuclgrnents of this

SOITE JUDGTIENTS OF I'ERCEI'TION.

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in the caseof aII or not, this is plainly the caso: we are rrob judging, wibh regard to the presented object about which our judgrnent plainly is, that it is a thing of tlie kinrl, for whiclr the term which appears to expless bhe predicate of our- ,jrrrlgment, is a name. And that this should bc tmc ol tnrtsl judgments of this kind, whether of all or nol, is quito sulliciorrL for my purpose. This much, then, seems to me to be very celbain indeed. But I wiil try to make clearer exactly what I mean by it, by menbioning a ground, on which I imagine ib might perhaps be disputed. The object of rvhich f have spoken as tlle object, about which, in each parbicular case,such a judgment as this always is a judgment, is, of course, always an objecb of the kind which somephilosophers would call a sensation, and obhers would call a sense-datum. Whether all philosophers,when they talk of sensatious,mean to include among them such objects as these, I do not know. Some,who have given a great deal of abtenbion to the subject, aud for whom I have a greab respect, talk of sensationsin such a way, that I cannobbe sure what they are talking about at all or whether there are such bhings. But nany, I think, undoubtedly do mean to include such subjects as these. No doubt, in general, when they call them sensations, they mean to attribute to them plopelties, which ii seems to me extremely doubtful rvhether they possess. And perhaps eveu those who caII thern sense-data,rnay, in part, be attributing to them properties which it uray be doubbful rqhether they possess. If we wanf to define a sensation or a sense-datum, in a rnanner which will leave ib not open to doubt whabsorb of things \r'e are talking of, and thab bhereare such things, I do not know thab we can do it bebter than by saying that sense-data are the sort of things, about which such judgments as these always seem to be rnade-the sort of things rvhich seem to be the real or ultimate subjecis of all such judgments. Such a way of dolirring how bhe terrn " sense-

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G. E. I1 0 0 RE.

very satisfactory; bub I am tliltrrrrr" is rtscd, may nob seern as any which can be inclinod bo think ib may be as satisfacbory to obviate some mlslbuncl. Antl it is celtainly calculated since everybody can see' f unclerstandings which maa arise; am describing as lla thing think, what bhe thing is which I judgment, when he judges " That about which he is mJking his such a thing' even if he does is an inkstand.," and thaithere is to it' nob agree that this descripbionapplies call that some of those who would I can, fn fact , imagine "woold it about is deny that my judgmen| this thing a sensation spolien of as the sensation at all. It would somebimes be of t'his inkstand' in this instance' which mediates my perception ^some of those who would so speak of And I can imagine that' wlie n I judge " This is an inkit nright be inciinecl to say tltaL inkstand which I perceive' stnurl," rn1' judgrnoul is rillorrblhis the scnsationwhich mediates rln(l ttot,,ilr ttry stlttstttlt' rrll' rllrortt p c rl i a p s i m a g i ne that the rr.y 1, r , r ' , , , ' 1, t ,ti,' f, r ril " ' l ' l ro y l rrrry th e i n k s ta n d onl y i n t' he rrr.rrrur l, r t' trt lr llir losrrry 1 " l rc o 1 ' b i oorrf m y mi n d i n such u-* ut r,r.rrr.llr r r . lil lr r r lr gst' l rtri rrk s trl n tll l o fo re rn a k e a j u dgment about l l rrl ,, ot t t : t ril' is lr t ' lo ro ttty ttri trtl 'I c a n s t t . t r lt r . lt rtl g l " ttn ta b o u i th e rrte d i a b i n g sensati onabal l ; r1 ,,rv lr t t :tlr a c tu al l y expresstng s t r , : ltt I jut lg rn c rrbi s b h e o rre I a tn I' lt r r t , ;rrr,l Srrcha view' if it' is held' rvlrott I srr,t'"'I'his is au inkstancl'" false' and is what I have r{rrcnr$t,() Itle to be tluibe cerbainly put most clearly the irrlenrletl to deny. ind perhaps I catr fult", by saying thab' if (which may r'orrsullwhy it, seems to -" is this inkstand' that thing be doubted) tbere is anytliing which of this sense-datum' is cerbainly not given to me independently make a judgment about it in such a sense that I can possibly sense-d'atum' I am not' of rvhich is not ajudgment about this this inksband' and that my course,denying that I do perceive about ii' Both these judgment is, in a sense, & judgmenb obviously true' I am only things seem to me to be quite is also' in another sense' a ,ttaintrioiog that my judgment mediatesmy perception judgment about this *tot"-tlutirnt which

tlotls of the inksland. ThoSe who say that this sense-tlaLuttt ttltrrit course' of mediate my perception of the inkstand, would, that my perception of the inkstand is, in a sense' depetrrltlnt 't'he upon the senBe-clatum;that it is clependentis irnplied irr bc mere statement that it is mediated by it' But ib rrright wlrich' maintained thab ib is dependenton ii only in the seusein when the idea of one object is called up in my mind, ihrough up association,by the iclea of anot'her, the idea which is called 'What wish to I is dependent on the iclea which calls it up' is mainiain, and what seems to me to be quibe certainly true' sensethis on bhat my perception of this inksband is dependent datum, in a quite different and fal more intimate sensethan this' It is dependenb on ib in the sense thab, if there is anything I am whish is this inkstand, then, in perceiving that lhing, knowing it only as li,a bhing which stands in a certain relation up bo this sense-datum. when the idea of one object is called second the in my mind by the idea of another, I do not know firs[ : objeit onty as f/zething which has a certain relabion to t'he second judgment the about on the contrary, I can make a object, rvhich is not a judgment aboub the first' And similarly me in the case of two sense-dala rvhich are presenbed bo which thing as the only simultaneously, I do not knorv the one of this has a cerbain relafion to the obher:' Rut in the case to be me to seelns case the inkstand sense-datumancl this is this which thing plainly quite different. If there be a thing inkstand ab aI], it is certainly only known to me as the Il is sense-datum' this to relabion wliich stands in a certain is sense-datum bhis not given to me, in the sense iu which only giue.r. If there be such a thing at all, it is quite certainly Russell Mr' which in sense in bhe f,norno to me by descripbion, known is usesthat phrase; ancl the description by which ib is in that of being th'e thing rvhich slands bo this sense-datum a such make I when a certain relabion' That is to say, I am judgment as " This inkstancl is a good big one " ; what l/i'r'sin a ,.uity ;oaging is: " There is a thing rvhich stands to

SOME JUDGTTENTS OF PERCEPI'ION.

t.l

lir

G. E. MOOIIE.

thing is a ccrta,itrrelolion, antl which is an inkstand, and that object' lrig e11s"-vr'hs1 e " tlt''is" stands for this presented g
one: I do not need to identify eibhel as th'etlting which ltas this relation to this other tliiug. But I cerbairrly cannot thtts directly identify the two coins. I have nob forrr bhirrgs presented to me (7) tlr'is sense-dabutn,(2) tlt'at seuso-drrtutn, (3) thdscoin, and (q tlL&tcoin, but two only-lDis sense'datum 'W'hen, therefore, I and tltat sense-datum. .judge " Tlt'is is a judgment judgment abor.rt the one a is certainly coin," my judge " And tltat is also a coin," it is sense-datum,and rvhen I certainly a judgment aboub the obher'. OnIy, in spite of what ny language might seem to imply, I arn cerbainly not judging either of the one sense-daturnthat it is a whole coin, nor yet oi the other tliat it is oue. This, then, seems to me fundamentally cerbain about judgments of this kind. Whenever rve tnake such a judgment we can easily pick out an objecb(rvhether rve call ib a sensaliouol a seuse-datulrlor not)' whicli is, in an easily intelligible sense, th,e object rvhich is the real or ultirnate subjecbof our judgment ; and yet, in many cases at all evenLs, rvhat we are juciging with regard to this object is certainly not that it is an o\fect of the kind, for which the ierm rvirich appearsto express bhepredicate of oul judgment, is a nanre. But if this be so, rvhat is it thab I am judging, in all such cases,about the preseuted object, rvhich is the real ol ultiurate subjecbof nry judgment ? It is aNbhis point thab we come to cluestionsrvhich seem to me to be leally uncertain and difficult l0 answer. To begin with, there is one answer which is naburally suggestedby the reason I have given for saying that, in this case,il is quite obvious tbat I anl llob judging, lvith regard to this presented objecb,Lhat i,t is an inkstand, rvhereasib is nob in the san)e way, quite obvious fhat, in making such a judgnrenbas " This is a soap-bubble" or " This is a tlroll of rvaler'," rvhich ury,jur-lgruerrL I ruay not be judging, of tlie object rr,boub lr:ally is rr, sol.1l-bubbleor lr tli'o1rof is, thirb tlLribvely t-rLrjecb i L is r lr r iboolt viot t st llal I r lt . , rvater' . ' l ' l rc l ei LsotrI qi tvt:i s LITTLL

l(;

soME JUDcMENTS oF PERCEPTToN.

G. E. M OORE.

at f roL Lrrkoflris presentett object to be a wlt'ole inksland: that' inkstand' an of surface rrrosb,I orrly take it to be part of the Andt his leas onna b u ra l l y s u g g e s ts th a tth e tru eansrvettoour presented rluesLion rnay be thai what I am judging of the inkstand' an of surface oU,lectis just that it is a part of the This anewer seems to me to be obviously on quite a different be an level from the suggesbionbhat I am judging it realiy to judging not I am inkstand. It is not childishly obvious bhat I am it to be part of the surface of an inkstand, as ib is that one' whole not judging it to be an inkstand-a an inkdo tnt view, when I say such bhings as " That is stand," " That is a door," " This is & coin," these expressions parb of the would really only be o looso wny r-rfsaying " Thab is " 1l'lru,lis |8,rt of tho surface of a door," surfaceo1'trrrin]<sLourl," o f tr c o i tt' " Arrtl bherew oul d' I "'l' lr is is lr r lr l, of l ,l trrs tttftrtrtl i l t tl rc fl ' cl that w e shoui d l l rir r li, 1, lr r . ir r lr l. yrr tro l ,l ri rrgs rtrl rri s i rrg to be a rl r, rlr r r l- , ur ui,I 'rlt ttrtl ,,,H r,l .y . W l rl r,l 'l ,rLl i rs t s i g l rt,appears I a p l rc a r to be asserti ngof a u ' l l rrt' tl trs 1 ,r r , r ' r r r l,t t, tt r, t t t , :1 l1,l' rl tl ' , l' lr:rl i l , i s ttf Il rl o t' trl i nk i n d , I am nob real l y i ,r\ ' , , n l, lr ir r 11 al l ' ,r ir r . rLit r y,lr l' I lr c t,l ri rrgi rr tl rte s ti o nt' h a t i t i s o f that ki nd at r,v , , r r l,l,lr , r r r t s r ;trp l i [rlocf a n e a s y e x p l a n a ti o n' A nd moreover' rl l,lrrrrvirrrvwcl'e true, ib would offer an excellenbillustration ,rl t.lr()tlillirrence between a thing known only by description free rrrrrln lltilrg not so known, and would show holv entirely judge I when lr',,ui rrtystery that distincbion is. On this view, be judging: " That inksband.is a good big one " I shall in effecb is part of " There is one and only one inkstand of which lhis good big the surface,aDd the inkstand of which this is true is a o n e. " I t wouldbeq u i te c l e a rth a tb h e p a rto fth e surfaceof the whole the inkstand was given to me in a sense in rvhich part was not, just as it is in fact clear that I do now " see" this nod do I which in a sense in of the surface of bhis inksband, facb' is' in it while " see" the whole; and that my judgment, parbicular abottt both the whole inksband, and' also about one p a r bof it s s ur f ac e ,i s a b o u tth e m i n tw o e n ti re l y di fferentserrses.

17

This view is one, which it is, at first sight, I think, very natural to supposeto be true. But before giving the reasons, why, nevertheless,it seems to me exbremelydoubtful, I think it is desirableto try to explain more precisely what I mean by it. The rvord " part " is one which is often used exbremely vaguely in philosophy; and I can imagine thab some people would be willing to assent to the proposition that this sensedatum really is, in some sense or other, a " part " of this inkstand, and that rvhal I am iudging with regard to it, when f judge " This is an inkstand," is, in effect," This is an inkstand,

I

I

I t

i

of which thi,s is a part," who would be far from allowing that this can possibly be what I am judging, rvhen once they understand whab the sense is in which I am here using the word " part." 'lVhat this sense is, I am quite unable to define ; but I hope I may be able bo make my meaning sufficiently clear, by giving instances of things rvhich are undoubtedly " parts " of other things in the sense in question. There is, it seemsto nre, a sense of the word " parf," in which rve all constantly use the word rvith perfect precision, and rvhioh, thelefore, we all understand very rvell, however little we may be able bo define if. It is the sense in rvhich the trunk of any tree is undoubtediy a parb of that tree; in rvhich this finger of mine is undoubtedly a palt of my hand, and my hand a parb of my body. This is a sense in which evcry part of a material thing or physicai object is itself a material thing or physical object ; and ib is, so far as I can see,the only proper sense in which a material thing can be said to have parts. The view which I rvish to discuss is the view thab I am judging this presenbed object bo be a parb of an inkstand, in this sense. And the natule of the view can perhaps be brought out more clearly, by mentioning one importarrb corol).ary which rvould follow from it. I aur, of course,at this rroruent, seeiug rnany palts of the sulfirceof Llris inkstand. llut ull these parls, except one, aro, i rr fucl , l l rcrnsel vcspal bs of t lr at or r e. Thu, tonc is t hc onc c'f rvlriclrwt: slroukl natunilly spctli as " t/t.t:ltaL-L of flrc srrrfirco It

S OMT JU D GME NTS OF P E R C E P TION .

Itt

If)

G. E' MooRE'

of the surface of this t.lrat,I arrr now seeing" or &s "tlt"is part' surface of this inkirrl<st,autl." There is only one part of the all the ot'her parts parbs' stand, which iloes thus contain, as thab I am judging bhat I am now seeing. And, if it were true of an inkstand this presented object to be a part of the surface this presented that at ail, in the senseI mean, it would follow an inkstand" be lrue object must, if my judgment "This is part' which contains (as it cerfainly is), be ideniical with this there is plainly no utt ,t" other parts which I am seeing: since be identified' That is other part *ilh *hicL it could possibly objoct that it is to suy, if I am really judging of this presented the sense I mean' it parb of the surface of an inlstand, in is true of what I rnusl, bo the caso thtt evcrything which inkstand " is' in fact' slroul
on the assumption that this sense-datum can otrly oxisL ntl ltlrrg as it is perceived, or on the assutnption thab ib cart otrly tttsinbstr long as it is perceived by m,e. Of others I suspocl tlrrrL tlrtry may have some force,though I arn quite unublo to soo llrrlt t,lroy have any. Such, for instance,ale all thoso which {rsstllrtooilhor that this sense-datum is a sensation or foeling of tnino, itr r.r, sensewhich includes the assertion lhat ib is depondctti ott rtty mind in tho very same sense in which my perceptiou of il obviously is so; or that it is causally dependent on rny body in the sense in which my perception of ib admittedly is so. But others do seem to me to have great force. I rvill, however, confine myself to trying to state one, which seems to me to have as much as any. It wiII be found that this one involvos an assumption, which does seem to me to have great force, but which yeb seems to me to be doubtful. So far as I know, all good arguments against the view that this sense-datum really is identical with ihis part of the surface of the inkstand, do involve this same assumption, and have no more force than it has. But in this, of course, I may be rvrong. Perhaps some one wiil be able to point out an argument, which is obviously quite independenbof it, and which yet has force. The argumeut I mean involves considerations which are exceedinglyfamiliar, so familiar tha1,I am afraid every one may be sick of hearing them alluded to. But, in spite of this fact, it seemsto me not quite easy to put it quite precisely, in a way which will distinguish it clearly from other arguments involving the same familiar considerations, bub which do not seem to me bo be equally cogent. I want, therefore, bo try to put it with a degree of precision, which will prevent inelevant objections from being made to it-objections which lvould, I think, be relevant against some of these other arguments, but are not, I think, relevant against it. The fact is lhat we all, exceedirrgly coruuronly, when, at each of two tirnes, separatcd by ir longer or sliorter interval, we see a part of t,lrusurl'irccol' rr rnrllcrirr,lLlrirrg,irr iho scnsein lvlfch I

S OME .IU D GME N TS OT' P E R C E P TI()N .

2l

G. E. M OORE.

surface of this inkstand' or arrr uow seeing this part of the a surface and at another wherr ab one time we see such the second occasion' t'he perceive one by touch, make' on same parb of the juclgment " TlLds pari of a surface is the thab rvhich I rvas seeing (or surface of the same thing, as Horv cornmonly we all do this perceiving by touch) just iorv'" I iook at this inksland' and then can scarcely be exaggerated' occasionI judge " This palb.of I look again, and on the second sane as' or at least contains the surfaceof this inkstand is the parb of' the parb of ils surface a part which is the same as a Or I look ab tiris finger and which I was seeing just now'" jtrtlgt" olt Lhe secondoccasion'" This parb then I touch ib, a'rti I is Lhc srrtneas one of those I was of the surfaceof t'lrisfirrgel c o tts L i l rrtl iyd e n ti fy a parb of a * .u i o g jus b now. " r V t' ' ' i i t' l trrs s u r{'a ccof lr r r r ll, , r t ir t ,l t,l ri rrg rv l ri c l rrv tl ri re p e rc e i vi ngatoneti me a t a n o tl re r' ' i l t/' /'1/'' tl rc tl i v i rrg w i l h rr pr r lt ,lv lr it ' lrwo j ri d g e ..T h i s i s the same l v e N rrr v ,wlt r . t t r v r l r l. l t,Iri s -w l re n j ust now " ' t ' lr i rrgrts I w a s s e e i n g o r to u c h i ng l rrrl l ,o l l, lt . .s r t t t r l th e p o s s i b i l i ty that the rvr.,.l ' r ' ' r llr J r 'r,I r rt lr ) L" t" " tt b o e x c l u d e th e i n te rval ;. thab i t i rr r lt t t ' s Lt otutt ir y h a v e c h a n g e dd u ri n g 1 ,rr,r'1, occasion'either in shape or irr lr'rr.llytlillerenL, oti bhe second' what i1'was oII the firsb' sizt ttr tpality, ol in all three' from wliich rve are here 'llrat is to say, the sense of sameness d'oes not exclude change' concerned with is one lvhich cleariy on general grounds' in ail We may even be prepared to assert' in queslion cerlainly must have such cases, that the surface one is a greab difference -in changed. But nevertheless there occur lvhioh of of such cases'both respect,,between two kinds iu-bo I watch sourebodyblowing air exceedingly commonly' If happens' ab qertain stages in the a chiid's ba1loon,ib constantly to blie part of the surface process, thab I judge with ':ega'd than st'age'not only that it ts larger which I am seeing J' Or' larger' 'fto' if'"t it is perceptibly it was ab an earlier stage'bub 'if doll' I may judge ab a cerbain i'idiu-'oUber uo of face the I pull patch of recl colour on its cheek stage in the process bhat the

not only is different in shapefroru whab it was aL tho lrtrgirrrrirrs, bub is perceptiblyso : ib rnay, for irtstartce, lrc rr, 1rt''r'cr'lrl,ilrly flatter ellipse than it lvas Lo start with. Or, il' I rvtrt,eltrr I){rlsr)rl ol' (,ltrr blushing,I may judge at a certir,itrst,ageLliut a rrtttLlitt1rrr.t'L surfaceof hi s face n0t ol rl )' i s tl i fl ' elent it r color t r l'r ot r rr vlr ir l il, was, when I saw ib before he begrur to blush, lnL ts Ttrt'tt:1tti'ltl,11 rvtrtlrr so-perceptibly redder. In enormoustrulrtborsof clt,strs thus judge of a surface secn ab a given tirrre thal it, is blrrrs different in size,or in shape,ol in colour, ftt-rlttrvltiit, Tterceptibly it was when we saw it before. BuL casesare tL ]o&s[,trrlrrrlily numerous in which, though we rnighL, on genera,l gtt-rrttrds be prepared [o asselt that ib nut'st have changed iu sorne respec!,we should not be prepared to assert bhat it had, in any respecb whatever, changed percepti'bly. Of this pari of this surface of this inkstand, for instance, I am cerlaiuly nob prepared to assert that it is now percepbibly differenb in any respecbfrom what ib was when I saw ib just now. And similar casesare so numerous bhat I need not give further instances. We can, therefore,divide cases,in which we,judge, of a part of a surface rvhich we are seeing, " This is the same parb of the surfaceof the same material thing as the one I saw just now," into cases rvhere we should also judge " BLrt it is pelcepLibly different frorn what ib lvas then," and cases in which, oven though we mighb assert " It must be different," lve ate cerLainly not prepared to asserbthat ib is pcrcept'iblyso. But now let us consider the cases in whicli rve are not prepared lo assert that the surface in question has changed perceptibly. The strange fact, from whicli the argumenb I mean is drawn, is that, iu a very large nunrber of. such cases, it seems as if ib were unmistakably true that the presenbed object,about ivhich rve are making our judgment when we talk 0f " This surface" ab bhe later time, i,s perceptibly difl'erenb, from thab aboul which we are making ib when we talk of the surface I sarv just now. If, at the later time, I am at a sufliciently gleaLer distarrce frotu the surfrtce, the presen|ed

22

G. E. MOORE.

bo be perobject which correspondsto it at the time seerns before' smaller,than the one which correspondedto it ""priUty the laber If I am looking at ib from a sufficientlyobliqueangle' in different presentedobject often seems to be perceptibly I am If unnp"-u perceptibly flatter ellipse, for instance' I had formerly when on, it, *itn blue spectacles loot iog "f perceptibly none, the later presented objecb seems to be ib different in colourfrom the earlier one' If I am perceiving it by sight by touch alone,whereasformerly I'was perceiving perceptibly alone, the later presented object seems to be it is nob thab fact the of respect different from bhe earlier,in other the on coloured,at all, wltcrcts tire carlicr was,and thab'

thc ourlier had not hand, ib ltas tttrrtrlilt Lirtrt'rtrlltltrrllil'itrs,whiclr it ' t ln t t l t t l ' a t r t l y e b i t got. All tlr,s $ t r t ' t t t $ l, o lr r r r r s 1' liLir rt t ' s f lr , t ; l llr r r , l o f t l r e s r t r f u c e rrr ilko s lllrso lrrt.r, lyr r 0 r lillir |c t r r u: t , r rt , lt t l t ' lr ut' i l i s l r c r c o p t i b l y irr rlttr'rl'iott\vr\ tr , t t \ir r l/ lr t . , lr i! l( j( l t ' o. ir r r lgt r rvlrcro there r t rlrlli,r'r'rrl,lto ttt tvlt lt l t l, wlLr t s olt lr ll' it t t t ls , I t lr l r t r s o ' is olr l itltl! |orceplibly rrr ,r\lun1,, lrr ttrrrl,r r t lr l,l, lr : r ,ltlr r rlr r l' r r tPt ' t t s t r t t Lr lt it i8 eo' Bub tl r r l t t t r ll' it lr l t r r r t ' 11r ' 1,w( ' t lli[ y rlrll.r.trl' It,ttt l,ltt ' , ' 111 we do still rrv r.rrrvllrt. tv,t t lt t t t ' l, ir r r t l' lt r l r llr lr t t ' t r r t t Lt lill' c l e r r c e ' T]ris surface is l,nl,in tttr Io .lrtrl gr lr r l t , lr r : s t lr [ it t r t rit r t lr t t ls liot r : perception, in any rr0l,,so l'irr [s I cllrr [oll lvillr cortaiuty by if or touched it way tlill'crcrrl frorn rvhrll it was when I saw has changed jusb now; I aur ruol preparetl to assert that it impossible absolutely It seems, therefore, to be perceptibly. be identical with that bhe surface seen ab the later bime should seen at' the earlier the ol,rject presenbed then, ancl the surface for the simple reason identical with the object presented !hen' seen surface I am not that, whereas wibh regard' bo the later

diffe-rent preparecl to judge thab it is in auy way perceptibiy later the to regard from thab seen earlier, it seems that wibh is perceptibly different sense-clatumI cannobfail to judge that it are perceptibly frorn the earlier one: Lhe fact that they seems'in short' that different simply slares me in the face' Ib is not' so far as I wheu, in such a case,I judge: " This surface

SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION.

23

can tell, perceptiblydifferent from the ono f gawjust now,', I cannot possibly be judging of the preseniedobject ,,Th,* is not, Bofar as f can tell, perceptiblydifferenbfrorn that object which was presentedto me juot now,,' for the sirnple reason tbat'I can tell, as certainly, almost,as f cau tell anything, thab it is porceptiblydifferent. That ig the argument,as well as I can put it, for saying that this presentedobject is nor identical with this part of the gurfaceof this inkstand; and that, therefore, when judge I " This is part of the surfaceof au inkstand,,,I am not judging of this presentedobject, which neverthelessis the ultimate subjectof my judgment, that it is part of the surface of au inkstand. And this argument doesseem to me to be a verv powerfulone. But nevertheleseit does not seem to me to be quite conclusive,becauseit rests on &n assuuptiou, which, though it seemsto me to have great force,does not seem to me quite certain. The assumption I mean is the assumption that, in suchcasesas thoser have spokenof, the later presenteclobject really is perceptiblydifferent from the oarlier. This assump_ tion has,if I am not mistaken,seemedto many philosophers to be quite unquesbionable;they have never even thought of quostioningit; and I own that it usedto be so with me. And I am still not sure that I may not be talking sheer nonsense in suggestingthab it can be questioned. But, if I am, I'rn no longerable to see that I am. What now seemsto me Lo be possibleis that the sense-datumwhich correspondsto a treo, which I am seeing,when I am a mile offl may not really be perceivedto basmaller than the one,which correspondsto the sametree, when I see ii from a distanceof only a hundred yards,but that it is only perceivedto seemsmaller; thab the sonse-datum which correspondsto a penny, which I am seeing obliquely,is nob really perceived.to DBdifferent in shapefrom that which corresponded to the penny, when I was straight in front of it, but is only perceiveclto seemdifferent_that all

SOME JUDGI\TTNTS OF PEITCEP'I'I()N. ol

),

G. E. MOORE.

and' the ot'her the one seenuse\l\ptical lhat' is perceived is that I have presenhd t'o me when citcular; bhat the t"tt*t-iu'o"t colour in perceived to ba different' the blue spectacles";lt; bub only t'o *; when I have not'' present;;; one bhe from presented when I that bhe sense-datum seenL so; and finally in any way nob perceived' to be different touch this finger is

from bhalpresented;;;fi;;"

ib' but on! !o t1'''' t":j::'i be and the ot'her nob to

one bo be coloured do not perceive the and the ot'her no[' rtt" u"t seezlscoloured tliat only but so, have' of courge' to ; ;;-p"ssible' we shall If such a view which I have expressed " maintain that the iti circular"' "t'e-xpelience frour the 6Nls1-('seenrs i*'"t" by saying one soc'?rs an so on-involves ., se4ns bl*e," " ,.'.,..,;;;.,lottrctl"' aucl relal
t^frafttris presented':Oi:t: i:ltt theu ir *"t*' '"u"in'it*tt this inkstand; part of the suriace of is ident'ical 'uit'tt ini' jl.e^.::t:t' as in the cases,suppottl:,ttto,'. lrom since,rvhen r iudge, diffelenl peLcepbibly fal as I can,tell, ,.o ,,ri, is question in of lhe,

bejudging_ 1Y".":::::-11t" rvhatft *u., r -igi,r l="ut 1,:i"-::]t'rff;t:';ttf.T as *"t"-not'' -so that bheyurto far tlie brvobhabis perbeirveen u'un"""' tii :l;:'fft shape "''it^ to be of t celbain size' seems t;" ceptible,being that ";t aritl incomoatible to be of a difl'ereut or colout, and the omet.'

;;l

size, shape or colour. Of course, in those cases'ils irr Llra'l of the balloon being blown up, where I " perccivtr " t'lrul' tlrrr surface has changed,e.g.in size,it would have t0 lrtr srlrrrit,hxl that I do perteive of the two sense-datattol ntortrly llurl l'lrtry saarzdiflerent in size, but that they are so. l3ut I Lhirrk it' would be possible to mainbain that bhe senstritt wlrir:lr, irr these cases,I " perceive " them to ba differenb, is a tlifli:n:ttl, otttr from that in which, both in these and in bhe obhers,I lxrLt:t:ivt' so. them to &eertu Possibly in making this suggestion that serlse-tla[u,itt orsos where most philosophers have assumedunhesibatingly that lhoy are peruiuecl to be different, ate only really perceived to sutn different, I am, as I said, talking sheer nonsense, though I canuot, at the moment, see that I am. And possibly, even if this suggestion ibself is not nonsense,even if it is true, there may be other fatal objections to the view that this presented object really is identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. But what seems to me corbain is that, uuless this suggestion is brue, then this presenteil object'is cetbainly nol identical with this part of the surface of this inkstand. And giuceit is doubtful whether it is not nonsense,and still more doubtful whether ib is true, ib muet, I think, be admitted to be highly doubtful whether the bwo aru identical. But, if they are not identical, then what I am judging with regard bo this presented objecb, when I judge " This is an inkstand," is certainly not that it is ibself part of the surface of an inksband ' and heuce,it is worth while to irequire further, what, if I am not judging this, I can be judging with regard to ib. And here, I think, the first nabural suggestion to rnake is that just as, when I talk of " this inkstand," what I seern really to mean is " thp inkstand of which thi,s is pa,r't of the surface," so that the inkstand is only known to me by description as the inkstand of which this material surface is part of the surface, so again when I talk of " this rnaterial 8urface,"what I really rnean is " tJt'cmaterial surface lo which U

26

(;. E. trooRn. S O}IE JU D G}TE N T S OF P E R C E P TION .

llrr.s (prcsented object) has a certain relation," so fhat this srrrface is, in its turn, only known to me by descliption as lha surfaoe rvhich has a certain relation to this presented object. If that were so, then what I should be judging of this presented objecb,when f judge ,'This is part of the surface of an inkstand," would be not that, it is itself such a part, bub that the thing which stands to it in a certain relation is such a part: in short, what I should be judging rvith regard to il, u'ould. be " There's one thingi and one only which stands to fiir,r iyr this relation,and bhe thirrg which doesso is part of the surfaceof arr inkstand." But if we are to l,dopbtlie view that something of rhis sor'l is what wc riro .judgirrg, t,lrcre occurs &t, onco tlre prtrssirrg q u e s t ion: W I r at , o rr c rrl t,l rc rrrr t,l rc rc l rrt,i o rrl rc w i t,l r regurtl to w h i c lr wc r uc . jr r r l g i rr1l 1 ,l ,rrrlo, rrc ;l rrrlo rrl .yo rrc tl ti rrg sl ands i ni b 1 ,. t, lr is 1r ' . s r , r r l, .rl . l ' .j r,r,li , ,\rrrl l ,l ri s i s rl rl rro s ti orrt,o w hi ch, scl i ri l 'r r r ; | [ n' w, n{rl r.,,l ' l ,l r' s r:1 ,l ri l o s o 1 r' l r0rv]to r' s, I01l r hol d (as ru r.n) ' r l, r ) t lr r r t .llr ri 1 rl r,s l rrl ,r,,I o l ri c r,t i s z .o l i d enti cal w i th thi s ,' l l ,l ri s i rrl i s L rr,n tl ,,rrr,c a l s ol that there real l y ;rrr r fr,, l llr r . r r r r lr r r :r. r,rr.r nr . llr r r r ;,1, l r r ' l ri ,.lrl r , rrrrrl rll rc L n rl y p re d i c a tedthat i b i s thi s o l l ,l ri s i n l i s l a n d (th a t i s to say, w ho rej ect 1 ,rrl r, , , [ l, lr r r. ir r r ' llr.rr :r.l lv r , ' r v sol' l, lr cMi l l Ii rrs s e l l y p e ), h a v e g i v e n anythi ng l i ke a r,lcirl rurswcr'. It rlocs rrot seernto have occurred to them that it rctluires all tnsw('r, clric{ly, I think, because it has not oc(jurred to thcru bo usli what we can be judging when q'e make .judgments of this solt. Tliere are only two answers, bhat I can think of, whiclr rnight be suggesbedwith any ptausibiliby. Many philosophers, rvho take the view that the presented objects about which we make these judgments are sensationsof ours, and some even rvho do not, are in the habit of talking of " lhe causes" of bheseobjects as if we knew, in the case of eaeh, that it had one and only one cause; and many of them seem to think that this part of the surface of this inkstand could lrc correcbly described as l/zc cause of this presented object. 'l'he1'suggest,thclclbre, the view thal whab I am judging in

27

this casomight be: ., This presented. object has one and onry one cau.e,and that oauseis part of the surfaceof an inkstand.,, It soemsto me quite obvious that tltis view, at all events,is utterly untenable. I do not believe for a moment, nor does any one, and certainly therefore do not judge, that this presentedobject has only one cause: I believe that it has a wholeseriesof different causes. I ao, i' fact, believethat this part of the surfaceof this inkstand is one amongthe causesof my perceptionof this presenteci. object: that seemsto me to be .a very well established scientific proposition. And I anr preparedto admit that. there m,aybe good f"" ,frlrf.ig t.hati,t is one among the cause, ".u.oo. ,ni, freseoted object itself, though_Icannot myself seethat "t there aie any. But that it is Lbe only cause of this presented object I cerbainly do not believe,nor, I think, does anybody, uoa n..,.. my judgment certainlycannot be,,Thn cause of iti, i. parbof the surface of an inkstand.,, It might, no doubt, be possibleto define some l;ind,of causal relation, such that it _lglrt be plausibly held that it and it alon

part bu)ar way. H"il::T;i.,":i",:1 L,*: see,be necessarily "..J',#:lL very complicated. And, even when rvehave

got it, it seemsto me it would be highly improbablewe could truly say that what we are judging in these casesis : ,,This presentedobject has one and only one cause,of this special kind." Still, I d.onot wish to deny that some such view may ltossiblybe true. The only other suggestionI can make is that there nray be someultimate, not further definable relation, which we nriohi -u;;;"J;;':;: for instance,call the relation of ,,Uui"g suchthat we might conceivably judgig be : ,, Thereis one and only onething of which this_p*seoi.d t. a manifestation, ffi, and tlwt thing is parb of the surface of an inkstand.,, Antt hereagain,it seemsto me jusb possiblethab this may ltea Lnre accountof whab we

srighresb sign rhar , ;"T:,jll':.';;;;,I'lj,rt.Ji:i;l,,lii] "'"

i

G. E, ]IOOITE.

to what bhe Possibly other suggestions could be made as supposed relation is, with ,"gurJto rvhich it could be plausibly arc itt rYc judgments, that iD all cases,where rve nlake these aucl orrly ontr fact jutlging of the presenteclobjecb" There is one rolution'" Ilut it tnin! wnictt stands to this obit'tlt in l/iis

I

se em s t om eablea s b y g l ' v 1 1 .' trl r| i l rl w } re th trr| l rcrei guttysttt;l t tlrtr irtrlgtrrorrtrrlully iH tlI relabiolr ab all ; whetltrlr', Lltr.t.tlf,rt'tl, th i s f or r n, ar r c lwlrc tl rtl t.' l Itrl t.r' l .rl t.t.,l ,.Iri H l l rl rl ,rl ft,l rcstrrfarl tl rl f th is ir r k s t ant lr t llr,Il y i s l i ' tl .rtr,trIrrtttr.l ry rl rts rl ri l tl i rrrrl r,s//rzIl ri rrg l' lr in 1'r'rrstrttt'rrrlrl b'i rrr:t' vi l rv t'l rrrl ' w l rrl t' l r ' itlr lto l l' ;r llr ' llr l But i i ' i t i s n ' t , , l r t t rl ll, ' r llr "' tl' ' i tt rr prrrt' ol ' Ll rtl r ' l' .;r ' r ' l' tltll arn j u t i g i l r g i s l , l r ;r ' l' l' lttr r 1 ' tr ' :illtl' "1 tr ' "ttltl ttt' tr ltl lo l trl l trt l l tl ssi l l l tl ' S ul f a c o o f i l l r i t r l lsl,r r tt' 1 . Ilt"t' ' oI w l rrrl I havc b r r l , l ,ll:r ' l \t' r ' ltttt r l' lr ll\r ' r r ( ) ltl{ ' vitr v alt e r n a L i v e !1 r ' r vr r o f llr itr l y1rr,' i l l uru[err, ; r l l c t l l l r r : i \ l r l l Iir r :r r r ,' ll lll"' ft"tr r llr'rgl w l ti cl t I have ll: r . l t r l t l t , ' t r r t t i ' l r l l 1' , r r t"ltr r l ttt;' ttr :llt"l l;r ll' I' lr ;r l" :r r ' r'rtttl i tl l i tr-r tl tem' l' \' llr ' ' , t t l r t , l , t, lrt l l r r r r l r , '1. t'l ' l vl ri cl r i t coul rl r r r llr r ' Ilttiv' ' t:ir l llr,' t , ' t t t o l , l r t t t l ' tr ' lt;tlIr ' ' t o f t' ltrr srLrfaco of bhi s 1 ' r t' tl' I rr r l y l r , ' 1 r t ' r ' r l t t ' ;tl,r :r lIlr r r l' tl tr ; Ilr t l' r r l l' llr ' :i l l l fl r(l o of aD i nkrrr l l i L l r . l r , l . r , r ' i t r l cc,l tlr r r .l, r i, 1 1 ;' r | :t' l ' l' lr r r y lr o lr l' itr sl rot't' thol though ril, r t , n t l . , . r t ' i t u i l l l i sl,lu l( 1 , r r l' :r ll. ir r l' lr c l l tri vtl rsc' there i s t , l r c t t r u ' e p l c n t y o f tttir ' tct ir r ' l tlr ir r g s rv hi c h

stantls

itr

:r tltr ll,;litt

1 1 ' l;1 l1 o tt lo

lrr r t , l r i r r g i r r i t o f w l r i t llr it,( 1 ( ) lll( l| r ltlylttllisstr r ttltltlr a | ,r ' lisa Thi s tlta t, llr o u g lr , wllcII I a sscr t' " ur a t e l i a l t h i n g :

i s an

i nk-

it follows froru it stancl," rnY assertioltis Lltte,rltttl is such that one inkstand' and' that bhere is in the Universo at leasl yet it does nob follow therefore, ab least orte tnaterial thing' is a material thing' from il that there is anybhing which " I am judging this preWhen I judge " This is an inkstand whic'ir is such that' sented objecb to possessa cerlain properby' that property' there are inkif there ate lhings, rvhiclr po-ssess is such that nothing stands and material things, but which in judging" it is itself a rtratelial tlting; so bhat which possesses judging.ot really always llull there are ma[erial tlrings, we irre of lreilrg a IIIiiteIIal sotnt' o//rr'i'pI'operLy,rvlricli is llol bhi-tt

SOME JUDGMENTSOF PERCEPTION.

29

thiug, that there are things which possessa/. It seems to me quite possible, of course, that some view of this type is the truo one. Iudeed, this paper mey be regarded, if you like, as 8,n arsumenb in favour of the proposition that some such vie$, lr?,?rs, be true. Certainly one of my main objects in writing it was to put as plainly as f can some grave difficulties which Beemto me to stand in the way of any other view; in the hope that somo of those, who reject all views of the Mill-Russell type, may explain clearly which of the alternatives I have suggestedthey would adopt, or whether, perhaps, some obhet which has not occurredto me. Ib does not seem to me to be always sufticiently realised how difficult it is to find.any answer to my question ,, What &re we judging in these cases?,, to which there are not very grave objections, unless we adopt 8n answ€r of the Mill-Russell type. That an answer of this typo u bhe true one, I am not myself, in spite of these objections, by any rueans convinced. The truth is f am completely puzz)ed as to what the true answer can be. At the presenc moment, I am rather inclined to favour the view that what f am judging of this presented. object is that it is itself a part of the surface of an inkstand._that, therefore,it really is identical with this part of bhe surface of this inkstand, in spite of the fact that this involves bhe view that, where, hitherto, I have always supposed myself to be perceiving of two presented objecrs that they really rvere different, I was, in fact, only perceiving that they seemed, to be different. But, as I have said, it seems to nie quite possible tbat this view is, as I have hitherto supposed,sheer nonsense; ancl,in any case,there are, no doubt, other serious objections to the view that this presentetr.object is this part of the surface of this inkstand.