Southern European Welfare States Problems, Challenges and Prospects
George Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis
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Southern European Welfare States Problems, Challenges and Prospects
George Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis
Southern European Welfare States
Also by George Katrougalos LA CRISE DE LEGITIMITE DE L’ ADMINISTRATION: Le Cars de la Grèce CONSTITUTION, LAW AND RIGHTS IN THE WELFARE STATE AND BEYOND THE RIGHT TO LIVE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE THE SOCIAL STATE IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (editors)
Also by Gabriella Lazaridis ELDORADO OR FORTRESS? Migration in Southern Europe (co-edited with R. King and C. Tsardanidis) GENDER AND MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (co-edited with F. Anthias) INTO THE MARGINS: Migration and Social Exclusion in Southern Europe (co-edited with F. Anthias)
Southern European Welfare States Problems, Challenges and Prospects
George Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis
© George Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis 2003 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–65537–0 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Katrougalos, George. Southern European welfare states: problems, challenges, and prospects/ George Katrougalos and Gabriella Lazaridis. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–65537–0 (alk. paper) 1. Europe, Southern—Social policy. I. Lazaridis, Gabriella. II. Title. HN650.7.A8 K37 2002 361.6⬘1⬘094—dc21 2002072305 10 12
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
To Aude To Joanna
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Contents List of Tables
viii
List of Figures
xi
Glossary
xii
Acknowledgements
xiv
Introduction 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
xv
The Southern Welfare States in the European Context The Carrot and the Stick: Employment, Unemployment and Labour Market Policies Gender Inequalities, Family and Social Welfare: Continuity and Change Social Security: Pensions and Social Minima National Health Systems: An Originality of the South? Migration into Southern Europe: Some Reflections on Policy Implications Concluding Considerations: Are Southerners Becoming More European than Southern?
1 31 69 93 123 167 191
Notes
200
Bibliography
211
Index
229
vii
List of Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1
Perception of corruption of the administration in selected European countries, USA and Japan Indices of economic liberalism in EU countries Government expenditure Introduction of principal social legislation in various countries Social expenditure as percentage of GNP, 1990–96 Military and education expenditure Social assistance expenditure as percentage of social security, 1980–92 Receipts of social protection by type and category as percentage of total receipts Financing of social security Distribution of income in the EU Percentage of persons below the poverty line before and after social transfers (excepting pensions), 1995 Indices of poverty in the European South Poverty in the European South and the European Union as percentage of the population, 1993–5 Unemployment rates (percentage of civilian labour force) in the member states of the EU15, 1961–99 Population and labour force characteristics of Southern European countries, 1970–90 Fertility rates in Southern European member states, 1965, 1990, 1995 Structure of the child benefit package (i) Structure of the child benefit package (ii) Net disposable income of a lone parent Overview of family benefits in Southern Europe, 1993 Employment by economic sector and gender in Southern European countries as percentage in 1999 Employment by economic sector in Southern European countries as percentage, 1975, 1985, 1996, 1999 Male and female employment by economic sector in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 1977, 1985, 1996, 1999 Employment rates by educational achievement for the 25–9 age group, 1994 Evolution of social expenditure in Spain, 1975–95 (percentage of GDP) viii
14 15 16 19 21 23 24 26 26 27 28 29 29 32 35 75 79 79 80 82 88 88 89 90 96
List of Tables ix
4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15
Gross domestic product and defence expenditure: annual variation as percentage Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1995 Average old age-survivors’ benefit per person aged 65 or over Qualification requirements and services Detailed breakdown of social protection expenditure (Greece) Detailed breakdown of receipts by type and sector of origin (Greece) Detailed breakdown of social protection expenditure (Italy) Detailed breakdown of receipts by type and sector of origin (Italy) Detailed breakdown of social protection expenditure (Portugal) Detailed breakdown of receipts by type and sector of origin (Portugal) Detailed breakdown of social protection expenditure (Spain) Detailed breakdown of receipts by type and sector of origin (Spain) General Regime and special schemes, 1996 Percentage of population with public health care coverage in OECD countries, 1960 and 1995 Life expectancy at birth: the Southerners and the world, 1900–96 Life expectancy at age 65 and 80 Infant mortality, 1900–96 Maternal mortality, per 100,000 births, 1970–95 Overall health indicators – diseases Rate of health systems according to the WHO’s World Health Report 2000 Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1985–97 (OECD estimates) Expenditure for sickness/health care, as percentage of GDP (EU estimates) Total health expenditure (WHO’s estimates) Health spending, as a share of GDP 1960–96 Public share in total health spending, 1960–97 (OECD estimates) Expenditure for disability, as percentage of GDP Recipients of main disability programmes as a percentage of the population, 1975–95 Main components of health care expenditures as percentage of total, 1970–90
97 97 101 104 109 110 113 113 115 116 119 120 121 124 126 127 127 128 128 128 130 131 131 131 134 135 135 136
x
List of Tables
5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 5.25 5.26 5.27 5.28 5.29 5.30 5.31 5.32 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.36 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.40 5.41 5.42 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5
Comparative statistical data of health care in Southern Europe Pharmaceutical expenditure in Southern Europe as percentage of GDP, 1975–93 Subjective evaluation of national health systems Evolution of subjective evaluation of national health systems, 1992–6 Subjective evaluation of health care deprivation The activity of major insurance funds in health service provision, 1996 Number of insured persons per doctor in major regions, 1998 Analysis of social benefits for sickness/health/disability care IKA hospitals, 1994–7 Hospital activity by type, 1993 Inhabitants per doctor and bed, and average nursing time Efficiency of hospitals Hospitals, beds, doctors and nursing personnel, by speciality, 1993 Regional distribution of all kinds of health institutions, 1995 Detailed breakdown of the social benefits of health care Hospital efficiency, 1995 Number of patients per general practitioner Total expenditure of the SNS, 1985–95 Health expenditure per district and region, 1995 Analysis of social benefits for sickness/health/disability care Distribution of the expenditure of the SNS, 1985–95 Expenditure by type of activity Public health institutions Analysis of social benefits for sickness/health/disability care Expenditure by type and function, 1998 Hospitals by category, 1995 Efficiency of hospitals, 1995 Evolution framework of immigration laws in Southern Europe Population of refugees in Southern Europe, 1995–6 Structural funds and the European South Public debt in the EU, as a percentage Public deficit as a percentage of GDP Social expenditure in core countries of the state-corporatist model and in Southern Europe as a percentage of GNP Government consumption as a percentage of total consumption
137 137 138 138 139 141 141 143 144 145 146 146 147 151 153 154 154 156 157 158 159 160 162 163 164 165 165 179 183 195 195 196 197 199
List of Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1
Confidence in the Church Social protection benefits by function, 1997 Growth of social expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1980–96 Social expenditure in Greece, 1968–2000 Social expenditure by category Unemployment rates as percentage of the civilian labour force in Southern Europe, 1960–99 Youth unemployment rates as percentage in Southern Europe, 1986–98 Male and female youth unemployment rates (seasonally adjusted percentage) in the EU, 1986, 1992, 1998 Employment by sector in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and EU Women’s labour market participation rate, 1998 Old age and survivors’ pensions expenditure, 1990–97 Annual evolution of social and defence expenditure, in relation to the GDP variation as a percentage, 1970–91 Financing of pension systems Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1985–97 (OECD estimates) Health-sickness benefits by category Subjective evaluation of national health systems in the EU and the European South in 1996 Foreign legal resident population in Southern Europe, 1950–90, as percentage of total population Asylum applications in Southern Europe, 1987–96 National origin of asylum applicants in Southern Europe for 1996 (Principal national groups) Divergence of social expenditure between Southern European countries and (i) EU average and (ii) core countries of the state-corporatist model, 1990–98, as a percentage of GNP
xi
4 13 20 22 24 37 37 38 38 89 96 98 98 132 136 139 171 182 182
197
Glossary ARS CEOE Cig CIGO CIGS CSS EMU ENPALS ESF ESY EU GSEE HMSO ILO IKA INE-GSEE INEM INP INPDAI INPDAP INPGI INPS INSALUD IRCCS ISPESL ISS KEK KESY LAEK Minimo vitale
District Health Authorities of Portugal Confederation Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Associations) Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (Wage Supplementation Fund in Italy) Ordinary Fund (in Italy) Special Fund (in Italy) Higher Health Council of Italy European Monetary Union National Welfare and Assistance Institute for Artists of Italy European Social Fund Greek National Health System European Union Confederation of Trade Unions of Greece Her Majesty’s Stationery Office International Labour Organisation Institute for Social Insurance of Greece The Institute on Labour Relations of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Greece National Employment Institute in Spain National Institute of Previsión of Spain National Welfare Institute for Industrial Managerial Employees of Italy National Welfare Institute for Employees of Public Authorities of Italy National Welfare Institute for Journalists of Italy Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (National Social Welfare Institute of Italy) Instituto Nacional de la Salud (National Institute of Health of Spain) Institutes of Shelter and Cure of Italy Advanced Institute for the Prevention and Emergency of Work of Italy Higher Institute of Health of Italy Centre for Vocational Training in Greece Central Health Council of Greece Fund for Employment and Vocational Training (Greece) Social Assistance Scheme in Italy xii
Glossary xiii
OAED
Greek Manpower Organisation – Organisation for the Employment of the Labour Force and Vocational Training OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OGA Organisation of Agricultural Insurance of Greece PASOK Greek Socialist Movement (now Party) PPS Purchasing Power Standards PSOE Spanish Socialist Party SEV Association of Greek Industrialists SNS Servino National de Salude (National Health System of Portugal) SSN Servizio Sanitario Nazionale Italian (National Health Service of Italy) TEU Treaty of European Union (Maastricht Treaty) TGSS Tesorerva General de la Seguridad Social (General Social Security Revenue Office of Spain) UGT Union General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers in Spain) USL Unitarie Sanitarie Locali (Local Health Units of Italy)
Acknowledgements This monograph is the first to be entirely devoted to the analysis of social policy in Southern Europe and therefore fills an important gap in the available literature. The initial impetus for this book arose from an informal discussion Gabriella Lazaridis had with Professor Graham Room back in 1994, whereby a gap in the relevant literature was identified. We would like to thank Maria Koumandraki from the Department of Geography of the University of Dundee for helping us with locating some of the secondary material. We also thank Professor Russell King for giving permission to reproduce the table entitled ‘Population and Labour Force Characteristics of Southern European Countries, 1970–90’ (see Table 2.2), which first appeared in King and Konjhodzic, 1995, Labour Employment and Migration in Southern Europe, Sussex University discussion paper no. 19. We would also like to express our gratitude to Jo Morgan for undertaking the preparation of the final manuscript. GEORGE KATROUGALOS GABRIELLA LAZARIDIS
xiv
Introduction: The European South and the Welfare State
The analysis of social policy in Southern Europe has occupied a marginal place in European literature on social welfare. This monograph is the first in English to be devoted to the comparative analysis of social policy developments and welfare in the four southern member states of the European Union. It will be contextualised within the broader political, economic and social environments of these countries. The volume does not seek to encapsulate the entire Southern European region; other countries bordering on the northern coast of the Mediterranean which constitute part of the geographical region defined as ‘Southern Europe’, such as Cyprus and Malta, have not been included. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have been selected because, although they have distinctive features, ‘they also share many experiences which give them an element of common identity’ (Williams, 1984: i), thus allowing us to group them together as a ‘family of nations’ (Ferrera, 1996: 18). It was not until recently (mid-1990s) that the academic debate started dealing in more detail with the study of the ‘South European Welfare State’. The famous studies by Flora and Heidenheimer (1982), EspingAndersen (1990) and Castles (1995) have paid lip service to the study of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Esping-Andersen (1990) for example, has included Italy in one of his three welfare types, but not Greece, Portugal and Spain. According to him, Italy is among the ‘corporatist welfare states’, where the state is less active in provision of welfare than the social democratic one, but more active than the liberal, which goes back to the historical precedent of the Bismarckian era, where the state granted certain social rights to citizens. He does, however, emphasise that there is ‘no single pure case’, as welfare in different countries often draws on a plethora of different principles and approaches. It was in the early 1990s that the idea came about that the four Southern European countries may constitute a separate cluster in the universe of welfare states. Leibfried (1992; 1993b) pointed out the existence of a ‘Latin Rim’ model of welfare, mainly characterised by rudimentary systems of social protection, a strong influence of Catholic tradition and a solid presence of family as a key welfare provider. These were seen as being ‘backward and xv
xvi Introduction
defective in forming and implementing their social policies, but will presumably follow along the lines of development of the “historical” firstcomer countries in the foreseeable future’ (Trifiletti, 1999: 50). Later studies have been critical of Leibfried’s work; some, like Trifiletti (ibid.) for example, for disregarding the way in which the historical development of certain policies has shaped their current form; others stressed the necessity of taking into account additional factors, like central questions concerning the pattern of capitalist development of these countries, class formation and the role of the state, the complex relations between statism, family support and soft-budgeting (Petmesidou, 1996b) and the influence of left-wing ideologies and presence of clientelistic networks (Ferrera, 1996). Taking into account some of these factors, Ferrera (1996) made out a case for considering these countries in terms of a distinctive Southern European model. This is identifiable less in terms of the specific mechanisms used for services than in the pattern and character of service delivery, which is closed, particularistic and strongly dependent on the relationship of patron and client. The role of the state is limited. In his view, the systems are not so much fragmented as polarised, with a sharply defined dualism distinguishing those who are best protected from the others. Despite these common features, the argument put forward in this book is that the institutional originality of the social protection system of the Southern European countries under study (in comparison to the state-corporatist model) is not enough to constitute a new, fourth world of welfare in Esping-Andersen’s typology. Anyway, there are important limitations to any type of classification, and most countries contain a mixture of competing paradigms rather than identification with a single model. Having said that, this type of analysis provides a useful method for discussing different types of system, and identifying the specific of welfare states in a comparative framework. One purpose of this book is to try and explore whether Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute a new model, or a separate cluster within existing welfare state typologies. The argument we put forward is that the Southern European welfare systems are underdeveloped species or a sub-category of the ‘state-corporatist’ welfare model; within this sub-category, one can identify two clusters, one consisting of the Iberian peninsula and another of Greece and Italy. However, the particular characteristics of each country make it rather difficult to talk about a ‘common’ pattern even within these ‘clusters’. For example, Italy urbanised earlier in the post-war period, while Greece and Spain did so in the 1960s and Portugal even later. Italy and Spain are more industrialised than Greece and Portugal, although there is a profound division between south and north Italy as to degrees of urbanisation and industrialisation. An additional point of differentiation is the exceptionally high rate of female employment in Portugal, similar to Scandivanian levels, which could be working against the traditional patterns of familism in this country.
Introduction xvii
These differences have influenced the response to social welfare demands. Italy, for instance, has the most highly developed social security system among Southern European countries (Trifiletti, 1999: 50) and an economic and social development comparable with the ‘core’ countries of the EU. Historical diversities in the formation of the political system and the social protection structures, differences in the levels and composition of unemployment, spatial differences in family composition and demographic ageing, female employment, the position of women in society and in the economic trajectories of these countries, are only some examples of the divergences within this group of countries, which have had an influence not only on policy priority, but also on policy structures and content. Moreover, although social policy institutions in Southern Europe may share similar characteristics, most of them common with those of other corporatist countries, the socio-political etiquette which inspires their functioning is hugely different. In the chapters that follow we will discuss in detail some elements which, according to Ferrera (1996), come to reveal an ‘unbalanced distribution of protection across the standard risks and … the various functions of social polity’. We examine the underdevelopment of family benefits and services and their impact in gendering the welfare state, the relatively high-protection of some categories of the population in terms of the relatively generous pensions and other benefits received in comparison to other underprotected cohorts of the population, such as the low-protection of the unemployed (especially due to the lack of a safety net for the uninsured) and of irregular workers and workers in the informal economy including non-citizens of the EU. We also look at the universalistic approach to health care systems. The above mentioned features have been influenced by challenges of both an internal and external nature that these countries have been confronted with. The external challenges stem principally from the processes of globalisation and from the European economic and monetary union, which exert pressures inter alia for economic and bureaucratic rationalisation, and for containment of costs in social expenditure in an era where tax increases are unpopular and not so effective as a means of increasing tax revenues, due to the relatively large size of the informal sector. The impact on budgetary constraints is exacerbated by the diminishing resilience of familism and of particularistic-clientelistic forms of subsidisation. Hence, lack of financial means to subsidise social policies is an important factor but cannot be put forward as the only justification for the unbalanced development of these countries. Trifiletti (1999: 50–1) argues that a particular sensitivity to a small number of what she calls ‘first order social risks’ (that is risks against which the family cannot adequately protect itself, such as the risk of death and the risk of losing a steady job) are perceived as risks that can potentially damage the ability of the family to function as it has done, that is to provide a buffer zone against other types of social risks against which more
xviii Introduction
developed welfare systems mobilise resources. This sensitivity to a small number of ‘risks’ has been persistent in all four countries and is reflected in policies formulated, despite their fragmentary nature. Also reflected is the vulnerability of public institutions to partisan pressures and manipulations. Welfare manipulation often takes the form of political clientelism – especially in Greece and Italy – where favours (such as a job in the public sector, assistance in obtaining a subsidy from the welfare bureaucracy) are exchanged for votes. This is facilitated by the presence of a ‘soft’, nonWeberian state in terms of bureaucratic professionalism and autonomy, partisan penetration of welfare administration, personal links and the presence of patron–client networks. The failure of these nations to ‘modernise the civil service in a “Weberian” sense prior to the mass expansion of welfare programmes’ (Ferrera, 1996: 30) and the reputation for ineffectiveness and corruption, administrative lethargy and defective policy co-ordination has profound implications for their capacity to respond to new challenges from the EU to the development of national policies in Southern Europe. The institutional commonalities which span the southern countries derive to an extent from their relatively recent and rapid economic growth and development. The most important difference between the countries of Southern Europe and those of Continental Europe is the late industrialisation of the former and their rapid change from mostly agrarian societies to ones strongly oriented towards the service sector. Southern Europe had a slow rate of decline in the number of agricultural workers if compared to other parts of Europe, followed by a jump to services without prior peaks of employment in industry. ‘Late industrialisation, insufficient penetration of market mechanisms and the overwhelming presence of the state in social and economic life are all factors which have been decisive in forming the economic and social life of these countries’ (Sapelli, 1995: 10). The pace and degree of industrialisation has not been uniform throughout Southern Europe; the experience of the Basque region, Catalonia and Navarra in Spain, and Emilia Romana, Veneto, Lombardy and Piemonte in Italy, for instance, differs from that of southern Italy, Greece and Portugal, where agrarian structures were extensively reproduced and the jump from agriculture to services more pronounced (Petmesidou, 1996b: 98). The rapid shift to post-Fordist economic and social structures from the mid-1970s onwards, took place prior to Fordist production and the accompanying patterns of collective solidarity and universalist social citizenship being fully developed (ibid.). The large numbers of self-employed – amounting in Greece to 46.7 per cent, in Italy to 28.7 per cent, in Portugal to 27.3 per cent and in Spain to 26.4 per cent of the working population in the mid-1990s (Eurostat, 1995d) – the large informal sector, reaching 45 per cent of GDP in the Greek case, and the multiple employment, allow for high employment flexibility. In this environment, collective forms of solidarity and universalism in
Introduction xix
welfare provision tend to be relatively weak. The historical and socio-political peculiarities of the Southern European countries can be said to reflect economic, structural and institutional differences between the four; such differences are important elements of our understanding of the nature of these systems, the reasons why the welfare state in these countries developed only to a limited extent and their future prospects. As we show in this book, in none of the four countries are the welfare reforms adequately introduced to meet the needs of those who have been penalised as a result of demographic changes, changes in the labour market, in family and employment patterns, the uncertainties surrounding the future of economic growth as well as ideas from the EU of how welfare should be provided and administered. Are national governments likely to change their approach to welfare provision? It depends on pressures from outside (EU mainly) and below (society). In the present economic and demographic climate of recession and increase of the elderly population, these pressures are becoming more real and stronger than ever before. The book was written jointly. The initial idea and plan for the book came from Gabriella Lazaridis, who also undertook the cumbersome tasks of finding a publisher and editing the various drafts. The preparation of the first draft of chapters on gender and family, employment/unemployment and migration patterns rest with Gabriella and the first draft of chapters on typologies of welfare regimes, health and pensions rest with George Katrougalos. We are therefore jointly responsible for any errors and any weaknesses of the book. We discuss the development of and major reforms in health care, social security benefits, social assistance, and make references to personal social services where appropriate; we also analyse trends in the labour market, unemployment, demographic and family changes. The themes covered do not exhaust the list of possible topics of analysis. Little is said, for instance, about education, housing, new emerging forms of personal social services in Southern Europe. Equally little attention is paid to how social policy might develop in the future; this will depend on how different governments of different political orientations tackle a plethora of political, economic, fiscal, social and cultural problems faced by the welfare states in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, this book was more or less completed at the end of 2001, but some of information has been updated at the proof stage. However, the shortage of primary official data, most of which are published with a considerable delay, did not enable us to provide in all cases up-to-date data. However, as our principal goal is to demonstrate the general trends and salient characteristics, we feel that this has not affected our analysis. Thus, comparative analyses of Southern European social policies remain a potential fertile area of further investigation and analysis and are likely to assume increasing importance within the European Union, because of increasing pressures for welfare expansion in
xx Introduction
an era when the future of economic growth is uncertain and the ideas of how welfare should be provided and administered ample. We hope that this book will make some contribution in illuminating the profound but little-analysed developments in social policies within the European South from a comparative perspective, and the understanding, from a comparative perspective, of some of the forces that have affected and continue to affect the development of social policy in these countries.
1 The Southern Welfare States in the European Context
Introduction In recent years there has been an explosion of models and classifications which try to depict the peculiarities of the Southern European welfare states. These seem somehow disproportionate to the narrow base of statistics and the amount of existing research (based on primary data) on social policy in the area. Although typologies are not a panacea for the analysis of welfare structures, they can be useful not only for understanding how the social security systems in these countries work but also for demonstrating the inherent weaknesses of the systems and for suggesting remedies for these. In this chapter, we shall first look at the problem of the specificity of a ‘South European’ deviation from other welfare models. Within this framework, after having examined and criticised the principal theoretical models of welfare, we shall proceed to the drawing of an outline of the principal characteristics of the welfare structures of the Southern European member states of the European Union. We will argue that these welfare systems all share the basic institutional characteristics of the ‘state-corporatist’ welfare model. However, the delayed founding and overall underdevelopment of the welfare state in the area, together with a number of similarities in social structures and economy, clearly place the Southern European countries in a distinctive sub-category of the model. Within this sub-category, two clusters are discernible, one made up of the Iberian countries and the other Italy and Greece. Different historical traditions and, especially, the dissimilar weight of patronage and clientelism are the main factors of this differentiation. As recent literature suggests, there are arguments in support of a distinct South European welfare model. Even authors who had in the past declared themselves ‘agnostic’ on the existence of a separate ‘South European Welfare State’ seem to have been converted (Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 1997a). However, the answer to this question largely depends on the criteria used in the analysis and the classification that these imply. The simplest imaginable typology, for instance, would be the traditional opposition between ‘Beveridgean’ 1
2
Southern European Welfare States
systems, based on the idea of universal entitlement according to need and ‘Bismarkian’ ones, based on work performance and the insurance principle. However, this classification (within which all South European countries under consideration here should be classified as Bismarckian, as their social systems are insurance-based) is neither useful nor functional. This is due first to the generality of the typology and second the general trend of convergence between these two initially diametric poles. Whereas in the beginning, the insurance schemes were obligatory only for some categories of the working population (principally these of low income who could not spare money for their non-productive years), the gradual expansion of the insurance and the achievement of full employment have left relatively few people uncovered. Moreover, even universalistic welfare states, such as the Scandinavian ones, have introduced social schemes partially funded by contributions. The European Commission (European Commission, 1997c) has adopted another descriptive typology, which divides its member states into four groups, the basic criteria being the financing of the social protection systems by the insurance principle or by taxation and their overall maturity. In this typology, Greece, Spain and Portugal form a model of their own, not because they have institutional originalities but because their welfare structures are still in their infancy. Italy, on the contrary, is part of the group of the more mature European welfare states based on insurance, like France, Belgium or Germany. However, the categorisation that seems to embrace multiple criteria in the most comprehensive way is the influential division adopted by EspingAndersen (1990) in three archetypes, the ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’:
1. The Scandinavian or Social Democratic model, which is that of a ‘public service state’ essentially financed by taxes, characterised by the principle of universality and the public provision of services rather than the distribution of cash incomes. As most of the flat rate benefits are universal, entitlement to them is an extension of (social) citizenship. 2. The Continental ‘state-corporate’ model, which is ‘a distribution state’, mainly financed by the contributions of employers and employees in work-based insurance schemes and characterised by social transfers in cash, related to earnings. Entitlement to social rights is founded on social status and work performance. 3. The liberal, Anglo-Saxon model, which is tax-financed, with its main features being universality, but also means-tested services and relatively low flat-rate benefits. The model is characterised by the residual character of the social protection mechanisms vis-à-vis the market.
Southern Welfare States 3
Within the framework of this classification and from an institutional point of view (regarding the scope, the financing and the underlying organisational features, as well as the central issue of ‘de-commodification’, i.e. the degree to which social rights do not depend on the rules of the market), it is difficult to perceive a fundamental, structural difference between the South European countries, and the standards of the Continental model. The scope of the social protection system in these countries is not universalistic but categorical and work-focused, the benefits being calculated on the basis of salary and insurance contributions. (There is an important exception related to the health protection system, to which we will refer later on.) Moreover, the overall effectiveness of the social protection systems in Southern Europe is minimal and its scope of protection far less comprehensive than in the other, more socially advanced EU member states, often failing to guarantee income maintenance. In addition, Greece, Spain and Portugal – but not Italy, with the exception of the South – form a distinct group of ‘laggards’ with regard to social spending, despite the extraordinary increase of social expenditure in the 1980s (see Figure 1.3, p. 20). Due to this specificity, some scholars (Leibfried, 1992; Kosonen, 1992; Abrahamson, 1992; Bislev and Hansen, 1991) have added to the Esping-Andersen classification a fourth, rudimentary South European or ‘Latin Rim’ model, in which the welfare state is a ‘semi-institutionalised premise’.
A distinct Southern European or ‘Latin Rim’ model Leibfried was among the first to propose the existence of a Southern model (Leibfried, 1992). He suggested that Southern European countries are close to the Anglo-Saxon model in the sense that they favour entry into the labour market and offer residual protection measures. Moreover, they are marked by the decisive influence of the Catholic Church; they have economic structures in which agriculture is still important and they have strong traditional families which play the role of a primary safety net. Due to these features and the overall delay of the establishment of welfare structures, the welfare state in Southern Europe still remains a half-institutionalised premise. Of all these points, one is incontestable. This is the delay in the construction of the welfare state, which reflects the relative economic underdevelopment of the Mediterranean European South. There is also a clear correlation between low social expenditure and low GDP (Eurostat, 1993b). All the other presumed characteristics are far more disputable. The biggest misunderstanding of all is its purported resemblance to the liberal model. The residual character of social protection in Southern Europe results from the state’s inability to satisfy social needs, and not from an inherent confidence in the self-regulation of the market and individual thrift, as in the liberal model. Not only was there never a deeply embedded belief in market
4
Southern European Welfare States
self-regulation and efficiency, but generally market forces have always been traditionally very weak and state-protected (Petmesidou, 1991). The distinctive feature of the model cannot be Catholicism either. Greece is not a Catholic country and, unlike the Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church does not play a significant role in welfare services. The Greek Orthodox Church has never explicitly favoured a particular political formation, nor has there ever been a Christian-Democratic party in Greece. Moreover, different patterns of relationships with the state and the civil society did not allow the development of large-scale institutionalised voluntary organisations, as in the countries of the Latin Rim. In Greece the intervention of the Church in social matters is generally limited to the level of philanthropic assistance.1 There are other reasons that Catholicism cannot be a distinctive element of such a model. First of all, the influence of the Catholic Church is not exclusive in this area, but it constitutes a significant characteristic of the Continental model itself (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 39; Wilensky, 1982). Even the principle of subsidiarity is shared by core countries of the European Union like Germany where, in addition, it is considered to be a constitutional principle.2 Moreover, as shown in Figure 1.1, the cultural and ethical influence of the church is of equal, if not of greater importance than in many other European countries.3 Finally, the unquestionable influence of Catholicism has always been paired with an important movement towards the secularisation of social policies, as demonstrated in the examples of the laws of 1836 in Spain (Estvill, 1992; Morena and Sarasa, 1991) and of 1890 in Italy (Ascoli, 1992), that transferred the responsibility for the supply of services from the church to the local authorities.
Persons saying they have confidence in the Church 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 SP
GR*
IT
IRL
BEL
DK
GER
FR
NETH
Figure 1.1 Confidence in the Church Note: * For Greece the data is from 1997. Sources: Listhaug (1984: 115); for Greece, V-Project Research Consulting (1997).
UK
USA
Southern Welfare States 5
With regard to socio-economic structures, as already illustrated in the introduction, it is true that Spain, Greece and Portugal, but not Italy, are still lagging behind the European average, but they are fast leaving behind traditional, pre-capitalist patterns of economic organisation. The decline of the agricultural sector is highly indicative of this trend. Whereas, for example, one in four Greeks and almost one in five Spaniards were employed in the primary sector in the 1980s (Katrougalos, 1996) these figures had fallen in the 1990s by more than half. In 1997 only 8.4 per cent of the active population in Spain and 13.7 per cent in Portugal worked in agriculture. The respective figures for Italy and Greece were 6.8 per cent and 20 per cent (UNDP 1999a: 184; World Bank, 1999). Admittedly, all countries have common patterns of familism and strong kinship networks (see Chapter 3). Still, due to economic development, the traditional familism seems to be in crisis and there is a clear trend towards the ‘nuclear’ family. Moreover, the increase in female employment, especially in Portugal (OECD, 1999d), and the move towards a new, two-earner, double-career family model is gradually replacing the old one which was based on the male breadwinner. Kosonen (1992) suggested a ‘peripheral’ model, which would include Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland, which allegedly have in common the low level of social expenditure, the insurance principle and many traditional characteristics with regard to the role of women. However, the classification of Ireland in the same institutional family with the three other countries does not look very convincing. Regarding both its structure of social protection receipts (tax-financed, see Table 1.9, p. 26) and its scope of benefits (semi-universalistic, see Table 1.8, p. 26), it is clear that Ireland belongs to the same group as the United Kingdom, namely to the liberal model, also shaped by the strong Beveridgean influence.
The ‘semi-peripheral’ or ‘welfare society’ model Another approach suggests the existence of a semi-peripheral welfare state. This follows Wallerstein’s paradigm of semi-periphery (Wallerstein, 1974; 1984), according to which countries of ‘intermediary’ or ‘late’ economic development, like Portugal, Spain, Greece, Mexico, Brazil and even Taiwan and Korea, constitute a group with distinct economic and sociological features, where Fordist industrial relationships have never been fully consolidated. According to the argument, shared mostly by Portuguese writers (Santos and de Sousa, 1994; Hespanha, 1999) but not exclusively (Marinakou, 1998), the main particularity of the semi-peripheral model is the existence of a weak welfare state in a strong society of solidarity. The most distinctive feature that differentiates this ‘welfare society’ from the traditional, institutionalised model of the welfare state is the survival of an informal societal network of support, based on family and kinship relationships. Santos and
6
Southern European Welfare States
de Sousa use the term ‘quasi Welfare State’ or ‘lumpen-Welfare State’ (Santos and de Sousa, 1994: 27). The first term is shared even by official texts, such as the Portuguese White Book of 1998 on Social Security Reforms (Livro Branco da Seguranca Social). This model has the advantage of focusing on some peculiarities of the least developed social security systems of the European South, correlating them with the positioning of these countries in the world economic system. Of course, the logic of the argument does not allow Italy, or eventually even Spain, to be classified in the same group as Portugal and Greece. Italy is undeniably a ‘core’, not ‘semi-peripheral’ country, being one of the G8, the eight most industrialised countries of the world. Nevertheless, this argument is not especially enlightening regarding the institutional and organisational features which would differentiate the ‘semi-peripheral’ model from the others. It is characteristic that only Santos et al. (Santos and de Sousa, 1994: 53), somehow en passant and without extensive justification, write that the Portuguese welfare state is closer to the Scandinavian paradigm than the Continental one. Furthermore, regarding the bonds of societal solidarity,4 considered the most characteristic feature in the semi-periphery, the crisis of traditional familism and kinship entails the weakening of the informal, personal networks. It is characteristic that even the authors of this school recognise an emerging ‘crisis of cultural legitimacy’ of the existing family model (Marinakou, 1997).
Ferrera’s ‘Southern European Welfare State’ Perhaps the most influential argument about a ‘Southern European Welfare State’ has been put forward by Ferrera (Castles and Ferrera, 1996; Ferrera, 1996; 1997; 1999). He and others following his argumentation (Rhodes, 1997a; Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000), define the basic characteristics of the model as follows: 1. A highly fragmented and ‘corporatist’ income maintenance system, displaying an internal polarisation: peaks of generosity (especially regarding pensions) for privileged strata of the population (for example public functionaries) coexist with gaps in protection. An important fraction of the population remains without effective social coverage, especially the formerly employed and the unemployed, those in flexible forms of employment (temporary, part-time) and those working in the informal sector or having irregular jobs (Castles and Ferrera, 1996). 2. A low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere and a highly collusive mix between public and non-public actors and institutions. For instance, the national health system staff are allowed great margins of freedom to render services on a private basis and even the NHS itself
Southern Welfare States 7
3. 4.
5.
6.
7.
contracts out to private health centres (the Spanish conciertos, the Italian centri convenzionati). Public institutions also display a low degree of state power proper, as they are highly vulnerable to partisan pressures and manipulations. Moreover, southern welfare systems have traditionally emphasised civil society solutions such as church, family and private charity in combination with parallel public institutions, providing, in other words, a ‘rudimentary welfare state’ (Rhodes, 1997a: 316). The strong influence of the Catholic Church. The persistence of clientelism and the formation of elaborate ‘patronage machines’ for the selective distribution of cash subsidies (Ferrera, 1996: 17ff). A differentiation between the corporatist traditions in the field of health care and the establishment of national health services based on universalistic principles. The lack of an efficient, rational, Weberian type administration, the ‘uncivicness’ of political culture and the weakness of civil society which result in the bureaucratisation and the legislative over regulation of the system (Niero, 1996: 118; Ferrera, 1997: 149, 235). The prominence of parties as the main aggregators of social interests and the existence of a radical Left, not allowing the formation of consensual policies.
Most of those points do reflect the situation in the European South, especially in Italy and Greece. Despite this fact and although this model generally avoids the oversimplifications of other similar propositions, there are several points that need to be raised. It is to these that we now turn our attention.
A critical approach to Ferrera’s South European model 1. There is an inherent methodological inconsistency in the argument, at least with regard to the Esping-Andersen typology. It should be clear that if one accepts the typology of the ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ as a system of reference, one should use its criteria in order to add a fourth one. This is because every classification is a descriptive system that attempts a generalisation of common features, using some predefined criteria, in order to be used as a heuristic tool for drawing a topology of common features and further identifying problems and trends. However, the ‘Latin Rim’ model is not actually based on EspingAndersen’s criteria, but on a different framework of socio-political data. As we have seen, Ferrera has introduced a new set of political and sociological parameters that differentiate the Southern European countries inside the state-corporatist model. Therefore his propositions do not actually imply
8
Southern European Welfare States
the existence of a new model, but merely suggest the existence of a subvariation within the structural matrix of the existing ones. Consequently, the question is not whether there are any particularities of the South European model in comparison with the continental statecorporatist archetype (of course there are), but whether these particularities, by reference to the above mentioned criteria and not exogenous others, could be seen as constituting a distinct model. To this purpose, a re-reading of Esping-Andersen is highly illustrative of the characteristics of the Southern welfare states. It is true that the author has included only Italy in the set of his comparative data and in a less well-known essay has expressed doubts as to whether until recently Spain and Portugal had genuine welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1992). Still, it should be clear that according to his classification, all four countries are typically state-corporatist. 2. There are a number of substantial reservations concerning the fundamentals of the proposed model. To begin with, some of the proposed features (clearly among them corporatist fragmentation, the public deficit in welfare provision and the influence of the Catholic Church) are shared by the other Continental states. Some, however, are not common to all four Southern countries, at least to the same extent (for example, the tradition of clientelism and patronage). It is true that some of the features common with the other countries of the Continental model are found to a superlative degree in the European South. For instance, one sees the hyperfragmentation of insurance funds in Italy and Greece and the resulting huge inequalities (see Chapter 4). Still, the degree of corporatism is, by the explicit definition of Esping-Andersen, determined by the number of major occupationally distinct pension schemes. It is not only Italy and Greece, but also France which are characterised by a strong degree of occupational fragmentation as well as by a dualistic system of social protection. Portugal, on the other hand, offers a clear example of a relatively low degree of fragmentation (Ferrera, 1996: 19). The same is true with regard to the treatment of the ‘selective generosity’ of the pensions for the privileged strata of the population, usually public functionaries. Naturally, by definition, civil service pensions are occupational in nature. According to Esping-Andersen, the special treatment of civil servants ‘reflects the legacy of etatism and corporate privilege’ throughout the whole conservative model (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 81) and the degree of ‘etatism’ of a social protection system is measured by the expenditure on government employee pensions as a percentage of GDP (ibid.: 73). Furthermore, according to Esping-Andersen, in all the corporative state-dominated insurance systems, preservation of status differentials is a key element and social security is ‘highly occupationally segregated with particularly pronounced civil-servants’ privileges’ (ibid.: 26, 85–6). 3. The influence of the Catholic Church as a distinctive feature of the model has already been criticised above in relation to Leibfried’s
Southern Welfare States 9
classification. Still, the ‘Catholic factor’ contributes to a trend analysed further below, that is an internal differentiation of the Southerners into two separated clusters, comprising Italy and Greece on the one hand and Spain and Portugal on the other. As we shall demonstrate below, the Iberian social protection systems, under the additive influence of absolutism and corporatism, have typically been shaped by the Catholic Church’s fundamental encyclical principle of subsidiarity (Subsidiarium Officium). According to the latter, the state intervenes only when the individual or family capacities are exhausted (Morena and Sarasa, 1991). This concept has never been influential in Greece, where the state has always been considered an employer of first resort, public employment being the optimal carrier option (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the subsidiarity principle is not the sole element of Catholic social thought.5 Equally important is the emphasis on a Catholic version of corporatism that impregnates many Catholic encyclicals (cf. especially the ‘Quadregissimo Anno’ of Pius XII, 1931) and has exerted a major influence on the authoritarian and fascist regimes of the Iberian Peninsula. The most characteristic corporate charters of Catholic influence have been the Portuguese Constitution of 1933 and the Spanish ‘Fuero de los Espanoles’.6 The latter attributed large competence of public law to the syndicates and associations and established a corporate assembly. The integration of the corporations inside the state had also been the dominant form of the administrative and economic organisation in fascist Italy;7 still, the absence of long authoritarian rule resulted in a different socio-political mixture, where clientelism was a much more important factor than corporatism. 4. The establishment of national health systems with universalistic aspirations has been proposed as a decisive factor of differentiation, resulting in ‘an original mix of corporatism and universalism’ (Ferrera, 1997: 29). The assumption of universalism as a distinct characteristic of the model based on this sole element, however, seems exaggerated. First of all it is a relatively recent feature. It was not until the late 1970s that Italy adopted a universalistic approach in this area and the other three Southern European countries followed during the next decade. Moreover, universality still remains a halfinstitutionalised premise. For instance, the Portuguese National Health Service covers approximately 75 per cent of the population; the remaining 25 per cent, especially those in the civil service and the military, participate in special additional occupational schemes (Gouveia Pinto, 1997: 142; see Chapter 5). Even in Spain, where coverage reaches 98.5 per cent of the population, of which 93 per cent are covered by the ‘compulsory’ insurance scheme, 1 per cent obtain means-tested subsidies from the state and 4.5 per cent of the population, mostly civil servants, are insured through special schemes (Jakubowski, 1998). The basic difference of a universalistic health system when compared to an occupational one lies in the funding of the former by taxation and the
10 Southern European Welfare States
latter through the social insurance. Still, the Southern NHS are not completely emancipated from social insurance, which, especially in Greece and Italy, funds about 40 per cent of total expenses (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the institutional characteristics of the NHS are not sufficient to distinguish the South Europeans from the other countries falling under the ‘Continental model’ states, as they are not uniform in all Southern countries (see Chapter 5). 5. Clientelism has been suggested as a permanent feature of the political system and the system of social protection. This factor is clearly predominant in Greece and in Italy but much less so in the Iberian countries, which have a different, more corporatist tradition. It seems that in Spain and Portugal clientelistic policies are embedded only in some geographical areas and special sectors (for example invalidity pensions). For this reason, in the words of Garcia (1999: 158), ‘clientelism should not be considered as a universal cultural characteristic of Southern Europe’. On the contrary, in Greece and in Italy, it has not been traditional corporatism but patronage that functioned as a substitute for the welfare state, establishing vertical, instrumental channels of articulation of demands (Tsoukalas, 1986; Mouzelis, 1978; Filias, 1981; Fargion, 1997).8 Epecially in Greece, the Catholic – or the fascist – corporatism, which meant to integrate the individual into an organic entity, has been completely alien to the dominant societal ideology, despite the efforts of the short-lived dictatorship of Metaxas (1936–40). Therefore, each professional group attempts to create special linkages and relationships to the public power in an ad hoc and not ‘organic’ manner and this process results in an acute political incrementalism (Petmesidou, 1987; Ascoli, 1987). Within this framework, special relations develop between the state and interest groups, primarily within the public sector. With regard to Greece, one should also take into account the fact that after the civil war (1946–9) the state tried to directly manipulate the organisations of the working class, by dismantling leftist trade unions and establishing state-funded ones, in order to marginalise the influence of the Communist Party. This effort resulted in a dual syndicalism, marked by the parallel existence of official, state-supported and ‘dissident’ trade unions, a factor accentuating the polarisation of political life. For this reason, the proliferation of insurance and pension funds in Greece and Italy should not be seen as a result of traditional corporatism but as a by-product and outcome of clientelistic networks of state patronage. There are cases where special insurance ‘privileges’ have not been provided to a friendly clientele, but were the outcome of a long struggle of an ‘outsider’ trade union (the case of the strong trade union of Greek construction workers is typical, traditionally under the hegemony of the Communist Party). In the latter case these ‘privileges’ are nothing more than a form of deferred wages (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 81).
Southern Welfare States 11
However, in both Italy and Greece, the expansion of a highly fragmented pension system has been used generally for distributing differentiated entitlements to selected party clienteles.9 On the contrary, the extended authoritarian rule in Spain and Portugal resulted in a different pattern of a state-dominated system, characterised by the exclusion of organised interests and a more uniform ‘state charity’ pattern of welfare (see Santos and de Sousa, 1994; Guibentif, 1997; Rhodes, 1997a: 9). Hence, the strength and durability of absolutist rule has been a decisive factor of differentiation between the countries of the South. Greece has known shorter intervals of dictatorial rule – eleven years in total from 1936 to 1940 and from 1967 to 1974 – compared to almost four decades in Spain and Portugal. The fascist rule in Italy also lasted for a long period, but since the end of World War II the country has had a normalised political life. Accordingly, the four countries could be grouped into two clusters, one (clientelism dominated) comprising Italy and Greece10 and the other (corporatism dominated) comprising Spain and Portugal. This different political legacy also determines the possibilities of consensusbased neo-corporatist arrangements of welfare reform, which are much easier to undertake in Spain and Portugal than in the other two countries. It is illustrative of the fact that in Portugal, the social partners have agreed on five similar ‘pacts’ since 1987. The last of these (1996) links employment promotion measures with numerous social security and fiscal reforms, including minimum incomes and favourable tax treatment of health, education benefits and old age pensions (Rhodes, 1997a). 6. The most important flaw of Ferrera’s model is its ‘Italian bias’, that is a projection of the characteristics of the Italian system to the other three countries. This is clear, for instance, with respect to Ferrera’s central argument about the ‘iper garantismo’, the purported ‘super generosity’ of the pensions systems as an essential peculiarity of the ‘Southern Welfare System’. Prima facie this assumption is not unsubstantial. The net replacement ratios for pensioners in the four southern European countries are, nominally, among the highest in the EU. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that in Greece, Spain and Portugal the wages are substantially lower than the European average and often very close to the poverty threshold, it is understandable that lower replacement ratios would not ensure the survival of the recipients. The real situation of the level of pensions is far from being ‘generous’, for all countries except Italy. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, with reference to calculation of the pensions benefits in PPS (Purchasing Power Standards), the Italian pensioner receives 135 per cent of the average benefit in the EU, while his Greek counterpart gets only half and the Portuguese a third of this amount (Eurostat, 1994c). Admittedly, there is an important inequality between various categories of pensioners in the South, especially in Greece and Italy. More specifically,
12 Southern European Welfare States
some employees of the public sector maintain important advantages with regard to the contributions period and the replacement rate in comparison with the blue-collar workers of the private sector. Still, similar gaps between ‘high’ and ‘low’ protection constitute a general characteristic of the Continental model. As Esping-Andersen has demonstrated, it is generally in the ‘corporatist’ welfare states that the allocative (risks versus needs) and distributive (protected versus unprotected) implications of the model have resulted in a real gap between a clientele of strongly covered ‘insiders’ of the market on the one side, and growing numbers of underprotected ‘outsiders’ on the other (Schulte, 1999: 212). Accordingly, the ‘iper garautismo’ hypothesis is not completely true for Greece, nor probably for Spain or Portugal (see Chapter 4). 7. If one avoids the pitfall of regarding all Southerners as replicas of the Italian case, and focuses the analysis on the overall structure and scope of their social protection system, one will see that Italy and Greece share a lot of similarities not common to the Iberian countries. As shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.5, in those countries the state provides disproportionate benefits for the old and for survivors, while it grants lesser protection for health and minimal coverage for family and child care (see Chapter 3) or other risks (Anttonen and Sipila, 1996; cf. Ferrera, 1997: 233). This disproportionate distribution of social security benefits in favour of the old age pension is a salient characteristic both for Greece and Italy, which actually tends to become aggravated over time. In 1999 for instance, in Greece, the respective figures were as follows: Pensions 71.06 per cent, Social Assistance 5.21 per cent, Health 18.88 per cent, Other 4.85 per cent (Greek Social Budget, 1999: 25). This situation is the corollary of the competitive mechanics of polarised pluralism, which in both Italy and Greece during the post-war period facilitated the development of similar patronage practices aimed predominantly at increasing the pension benefits of various professional categories. This took place to the detriment of less particularistic goals associated with the general interest (such as the development of a network of social services in the fields of health or day care). The dissimilar political situation in the Iberian countries has produced different outcomes. The structure of benefits in both Spain and Portugal is much closer to the European median and, generally, more balanced. Portugal, Ireland and Netherlands are the only countries of the EU where the health benefits are more important than old age/survivors’ benefits (Eurostat, 1994b; 2000b). It is noteworthy that the revised, unified data of the ESSPROS (European System of Social Protection Statistics) offers ever more substantial support in favour of the lack of any important deviation between the European South (even concerning Italy and Greece) and the state-corporatist model (ESYE, 2000). According to this data (Tinios, 2000: 24) the cumulative percentage of old age and survivors’ benefits in Greece, for instance, represented 49 per cent of total social expenditure for 1996, in comparison
Southern Welfare States 13 Spain
Portugal
Greece
Italy
Old age-survivors Unemployment
Health Family-Maternity
Figure 1.2 Social protection benefits by function, 1997 Source: Eurostat-ESSPROS (2000).
to 45 per cent for the EU average. Therefore, as Tinios argues, this new evidence shows that one of the basic arguments of Ferrera is based on ‘a statistical misunderstanding’ (ibid.: 30). 8. The same internal differentiation of the Southerners into two clusters is also discernible with regard to other proposed features of the model, such as the lack of an efficient, rational, Weberian-type administration, and the persistence of incidents of corruption. Of course it is not possible to accurately define the degree of rationalisation or corruption of the administrative system. Still, there is some evidence of different patterns in this field amongst the four countries. An indication of this differentiation could be found in the Corruption Perceptions Index, elaborated by the Berlin-based international nongovernmental organisation Transparency International. This represents the average scores which individual countries have been given by various independent surveys, carried out by institutions such as Gallup International, the World Bank or the University of Basel. In the index there are three figures given for each country. The first is its overall integrity (or corruption) ranking (out of ten). A ten equals a perfectly transparent country while zero equals a completely corrupt one. The third column indicates the number of surveys in which the particular country has been included. A high number
14 Southern European Welfare States
indicates a high degree of deviating opinions. The second column indicates the variance of the rankings in different surveys. According to this index, the four Southern countries score in two easily discernibly clusters: Portugal and Spain score above the median of the scale (five), even better than France or Belgium. On the other hand, Greece and Italy rank behind all the other EU countries, with a score below five. As shown in Table 1.1, the comparison with the respective data for 1995 reveals that this is a constant trend. 9. A comparable situation exists with respect to the degree of ‘etatism’. Italy and Greece, much more than the other countries, are characterised by a contradictory situation. The public deficit in the field of social protection coincides with the strong presence of the state in most sectors of economic and social life. This prima facie paradox is the direct corollary Table 1.1 Perception of corruption of the administration in selected European countries, USA and Japan Country rank in 1999 1 2 5 8 9 11 13 14 17 18 21 22 25 27 29 31 36 38 39
Country rank in 1995 2 4 6 5 9 10 8 19 12 13 11 16 15 22 18 26 20 – – 19 28 30 33 –
Country
1999 CPI score
Denmark Finland Sweden Iceland Netherlands Norway Switzerland Luxembourg United Kingdom Germany Ireland Austria USA Portugal France Spain Japan Slovenia Estonia Belgium Hungary Greece Italy Czech Republic
10.0 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.6 8.0 7.7 7.6 7.5 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.0 6.0 5.17 5.3 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.6
Source: Transparency International (1999).11
Standard deviation
0.8 0.5 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.8
Surveys used
9 10 10 6 10 9 11 8 11 10 10 11 10 10 10 10 12 6 7 9 13 9 10 12
Southern Welfare States 15
of the predominance of patronage policies, which compel the state to intervene sporadically and without any predefined strategy in every aspect of socio-economic life, not in order to regulate it rationally, but rather to satisfy an ephemeral clientele. Thus, in a strange way, there is neither economic liberalism, nor this modicum of social security for all, which ensure maturer interventionist welfare states. This is clearly shown in Table 1.2, which presents the results of a survey co-published by 47 institutes worldwide of similar neo-liberal aspirations, comparing economic freedom in 115 countries from 1975 to 1995. Despite the ideological bias of the survey which demonstrates the advantages of the ‘free economy’, it is useful in showing trends and practices in this field. It has used 17 objective variables, including inflation variability, government consumption and taxes on an international trade study. In the second column the rating of the countries appears on a scale of one to ten, with one being least economically liberal, and ten being most liberal. In the third column their world ranking appears. Again Spain and Portugal form a cluster of their own, scoring close to the average of the European Union, close to the level of countries such as France or Austria (Denmark and Sweden are clearly different cases, because of their overdeveloped welfare services). Italy and Greece occupy the two last positions. This fact is also reflected at the level of collective values and views on the role of state. In Portugal, for instance, the majority of the population think that it is not the state but private citizens who have the primary responsibility for individual welfare (Hespanha, 1999: 134, quoting Table 1.2 Indices of economic liberalism in EU countries Countries United Kingdom Netherlands Ireland Germany Belgium Finland France Austria Portugal Spain Denmark Sweden Italy Greece
Rating
World ranking
7.3 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.0
(7) (21) (21) (25) (29) (36) (36) (41) (42) (42) (42) (42) (55) (64)
Sources: Fraser Institute (1997); Gwartney and Lawson (1997).
16 Southern European Welfare States
Franca). In Greece we see the opposite. Here it is the state which is seen as responsible for the fulfilment of basic needs, mostly through the network of clientelistic relationships (Petmesidou, 1991). In Greece, total government expenditure now exceeds 50 per cent of GDP, almost twice the level of 1975 and this growth has led to persistently large budget deficits, especially during the 1980s. The situation is similar in Italy, where budget deficits have been exceedingly large in recent years, although at a somewhat lower level than in Greece (see Table 1.3). 10. Southern Europe, predominantly Greece and Italy, is also characterised by the existence of a huge informal economic sector, a ‘grey’ or ‘black’ market economy,12 often protected by corrupted sectors of the administration (Morin, 1990). In Spain and Portugal this hidden economy is estimated to constitute some 15–22 per cent of GDP (Bermeo, 2000a: 270), while the percentage for Greece could be approximately 30–45 per cent (Canellopoulos, 1995; Eurostat, 1995a; Petmesidou, 1996b) (see Chapter 2). For Italy the respective figures are likely to be closer to those of Greece than of those in the Iberian countries (Ferrera, 1997). The income from these activities can act as a safety valve against poverty in a way not revealed in official statistics. On the other hand, because of its irregular nature, it distorts the normal functioning of the market and favours administrative corruption, whereas the implied tax evasion does not permit the state to invest the necessary resources in welfare expenditure.
The South European ‘variant’ as a sub-category of the state-corporatist model One cannot but agree with Ferrera that the ‘conservative-corporatist’ political scenario of continental Europe (is) much more complicated in the Table 1.3 Government expenditure Total government expenditure/GDP ratio
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Deficit of general government budget as a percentage of GDP
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Spain
44.2 46.1 49.6 49.0 48.9 51.2 52.7 50.3 49.7
50.7 51.7 53.6 53.9 54.0 57.9 54.6 52.9 53.2
43.5 41.7 42.9 46.4 45.7 46.5 45.3 45.5 45.9
40.5 41.9 43.0 44.5 45.5 48.7 46.9 45.8 44.1
⫺11.5 ⫺14.4 ⫺16.1 ⫺11.5 ⫺12.3 ⫺14.2 ⫺12.1 ⫺9.1 ⫺8.2
⫺10.7 ⫺9.9 ⫺11.0 ⫺10.2 ⫺9.5 ⫺10.0 ⫺9.5 ⫺7.4 ⫺7.3
⫺3.6 ⫺2.3 ⫺5.5 ⫺6.4 ⫺3.3 ⫺6.9 ⫺5.7 ⫺4.9 ⫺3.8
⫺3.3 ⫺2.8 ⫺4.1 ⫺4.9 ⫺3.6 ⫺6.8 ⫺6.3 ⫺6.6 ⫺4.8
Sources: Fraser Institute (1997); Gwartney and Lawson (1997); International Monetary Fund (1998); World Bank (1995).
Southern Welfare States 17
South, significantly altering the strategies of the various actors’ (Ferrera, 1997: 30). This is clear and undeniable. The ‘Southerners’ do represent a distinct group within the family of the Continental welfare states, a variant of this model. They are merely underdeveloped species of the Continental model, welfare states ‘in their infancy’, with their main common characteristics the immaturity and relative inefficiency of the social protection systems (Gough, 1996: 13, who also includes Turkey in his ‘rudimentary assistance regime’) and some comparable social and family structures. Not only are their founding principles undeniably Bismarkian, but also their current institutional, organisational and economic features bear the ‘signature’ of the Continental state-corporatist model. Our thesis is that the undeniable deviations are either the result of the delayed development of the social protection systems and/or the outcome of the aforementioned distortions of the administrative and political system. It is noteworthy that even the authors who support the institutional distinctiveness of these countries, after a while do not refer to it as a model but rather as the outcome of a chronic disease, speaking about the ‘southern institutional syndrome’ (Rhodes, 1997a: 15). More characteristically, Matsaganis (1999: 22) writes that ‘in the social protection systems of Southern Europe there are all the distortions of the “conservative model” but to a higher degree’. However, as there is some clear evidence of convergence with the other European state-corporatist states (see the concluding remarks of the book), we will continue to consider the Southern member states of the EU as a group of countries with many social, political and administrative affinities. That is, we will treat them not as a fourth model in the Esping-Andersen classification, but rather as the ‘discount edition’ of the Continental one (Abrahamson, 1992: 10). Still, one should refrain from regarding all Southern EU member states as similar. Not only could they be grouped in two clusters (Greece and Italy on one side, Spain and Portugal on the other), as already mentioned, but even within each cluster, the differences are rather important, especially between Italy and Greece, countries of unequal socio-economic development. Other factors of differentiation remain. For instance, the exceptionally high female employment in Portugal puts this country in a category of its own in the European South. Furthermore, immense regional disparities within each country should also be taken into consideration. Of course the cleavage between the poor Italian South and the overdeveloped North (Fargion, 1997) offers the most illustrative example of extreme differentiation, but it is not an isolated case. In Spain there are similar differences, for example between Autonomous States like the Basque Country, where the right to a minimum income is a justiciable claim and others, like Aragon or Cantabria, where similar programmes are discretionary and rather insufficient with regard to local social needs (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997). This intra-state territorial diversity is less evident in Greece and Portugal, because of the centralist, unitary organisation of the political system and the relative
18 Southern European Welfare States
weakness of the regional authorities. However, the inequalities of peripheral development result, even in these countries, in fragmented social policies, especially in the poorer regions where lack of adequate infrastructure, know-how and trained personnel result in huge gaps in social protection. Still, even between areas of similar economic development, as for instance Oporto and Lisbon, differentiation exists due to the variance of available resources (Garcia, 1999: 169).
General characteristics of the social protection systems in Southern Europe After having presented the discussion on the existence of a Southern European model, we now proceed to the analysis of the general characteristics of the social protection systems of the countries of the region. At present, all of their constitutions establish the principle of the ‘Social State’13 either explicitly14 or by means of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a number of social rights.15 Actually, social rights were present in the earlier constitutions of the aftermath of the World War I and more specifically in the Constitutions of Greece (1927, articles 19–24), of Italy (1927), of Portugal (1933, articles 12–21) and of Spain (1931, 1938). However, this does not constitute a particularity of the South (Ferrera, 1999), as practically all the countries of the Continental model enshrine this principle16 or include in their constitutional texts an analytical enumeration of social rights17 (Katrougalos, 1998). At a sub-constitutional level, the legal entitlement to services or, more often, to monetary transfers in cash, is guaranteed by an analytical and meticulous aggregate of public law regulations. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the welfare provisions are largely based on the insurance principle, connecting social benefits to contributions and consequently, to the salary of the workers. Inevitably, social rights are not universal, but categorical and work-focused. This institutional commitment sharply contrasts to one of the most striking characteristics of the social protection system in the Southern European countries, that is, the delay in the development of the welfare state. This is strictly associated with the overall delay of economic development, as there is a clear correlation between insufficient social expenditure and low GDP (Eurostat, 1994b; Commission Européenne, 1998: 7). As already mentioned, all of them (with the exception of the Italian North and some regions in Spain) have been, till very recently, rather poor agricultural countries, characterised by late and incomplete industrialisation. The gap between them and the ‘core’ European countries has not been overcome yet. For instance, in the 1990s, the GDP per head in Greece and in Portugal still amounted to only 65 per cent of the Union average (Eurostat, 1994b).
Southern Welfare States 19
Table 1.4, which presents the principal steps of the establishment of fundamental social legislation in selected countries illustrates the institutional delay of welfare state formation. A compulsory insurance scheme against unemployment was not introduced in Portugal until 1975 – in 1974 only 20 per cent of the population had insurance coverage (Hoffmann, 1983). The democratisation of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the least developed countries of the region, was concomitant with an effort to build the structures of a genuine welfare state. The rise in power of the socialist parties favoured the process. Over the 1980–92 period, the Southern states have
Table 1.4 Introduction of principal social legislation in various countries Accident insurance Germany Austria France Belgium Italy Spain Portugal Greece Average year for the Continental model without the Southern states Denmark Norway Sweden Finland Average year for the Scandinavian model UK Ireland USA Canada Australia Average year for the liberal model
Health insurance
1881–4 1887 1898 (vol.) 1903 (vol.) 1898 1900 1913 1915 1890
1883 1888 1930 1894 (vol.) 1886 (vol.) 1919 (1942) 1935 1934 1896
1898 (vol.) 1894 1901 (vol.) 1895–1917 1901 Without Finland ⫽ 1897 1906 (vol.) 1897 (vol.) 1930 1930 1902 1913
1892 (vol.) 1909 1891–1910 (vol.) 1963 1913 Without Finland ⫽ 1900 1911 1911 – 1971 1945 1946 Without USA ⫽ 1934
Old age insurance 1889 1906–27 1910–30 1900 (vol.) 1898 (vol.) 1939 1935 1934 1908
1891 (vol.) 1936 1913 1937 1919 Without Finland ⫽ 1915 1908–25 1908 1935 1927 1909 1918
Unemployment insurance 1927 1920 1914 1944 1919 1919 1975 1945 1924
1907 1906 1934 1917 1916
(vol.) (vol.) (vol.) (vol.)
1911–20 1944 1940 1940 1945 1933
Note: vol. ⫽ subsidised voluntary insurance. Sources: Katrougalos (1996); Flora and Heidenheimer (1982: 59); Pierson (1991: 108); Bouzas (1994: 422); SSA (1997).
7 6 5 4 %
3 2 1 0 P
IT GR* SP L UK F DK IR NL D B Growth 1980–90
EU 8
Ireland
7
Sweden
6
Denmark Finland
5
Netherlands 4
France
3
Germany Belgium
2
Austria 1
UK
0
Luxembourg Italy
–1
Spain –2
Portugal
–3
Greece Growth 1990–96
Figure 1.3 Growth of social expenditure as percentage of GDP, 1980–96 Note: Greece: 1980–89. Source: European Commission (1993); Eurostat (1999a).
Southern Welfare States 21
had a real growth of social protection expenditure per capita of approximately 70 per cent, whereas the corresponding figure for the six highestspending member states was only 31.7 per cent and the EU average 40.6 per cent (Eurostat, 1994b; see also Figure 1.3). Still, it is noteworthy that the expansion of the welfare structures, contrary to the situation in other European states which profited from the continuous economic development of the 1960s, occurred in a period of general economic recession. Hence, the exceptional rate of social expenditure growth in the European South was not sustainable in the long term, as it took place in an economic environment of retrenchment. As shown in Figure 1.3 and Table 1.5, only Portugal managed to have a percentage of growth of social expenditure above the European average, while, on the contrary, Greece had the third worst performance among the EU countries. Between 1990 and 1993, when for the rest of the European countries there was a considerable increase in social expenditure by approximately 4.1 per cent per year, Greece reduced its per capita expenditure in real terms (see Table 1.5). In contrast, Portugal scored an impressive increase of 13 per cent. This trend can be partly explained by the return of the conservatives to power for three years (1991–4). During this period the percentage of GDP attributed to social expenditure fell from 22.7 per cent to 22 per cent (Eurostat data). The official Greek figures, according to the General Budget, are respectively 19.22 per cent and 18.9 per cent (Ministry of National
Table 1.5 Social expenditure as percentage of GNP, 1990–96
EU Greece Sweden Denmark Finland Netherlands France Germany Belgium Austria UK Luxembourg Italy Spain Portugal Ireland
1990
1993
1996
25.4 22.7 32.9 30.3 25.5 32.5 27.7 25.4 26.8 26.7 23.1 23.5 24.1 20.4 15.5 19.1
29.0 22.0 38.6 33.5 35.4 33.7 31.2 29.1 29.0 29.0 28.8 25.2 26.0 24.4 21.0 20.8
28.7 23.3 34.8 33.6 32.1 30.9 30.8 30.5 30.0 29.5 27.7 26.2 24.8 22.4 21.6 18.9
Sources: Eurostat (1999a,b); Eurostat-ESSPROS (2000).
Average growth 1990–96 3.3 0.6 1.9 3.6 6.6 ⫺1.6 3.1 5.1 3.2 2.8 4.6 2.7 0.7 2.0 6.1 ⫺0.2
1997
28.2 23.6 33.7 31.4 29.9 30.3 30.8 29.9 28.5 28.8 26.8 24.8 25.9 21.4 22.5 17.5
22 Southern European Welfare States
Economy of Greece, 1999: 30). Actually, since 1991 the gap between Greece and the European average began to enlarge again, after almost a decade of the opposite trend. After the socialists’ comeback, this trend was once again reversed and in 1996 the respective figure was 19.25 per cent (Greek General Budget data) and in 2000, 20.2 per cent. Although this figure is worse than the historical peak of 21.46 per cent, reached in 1987, due to the effort of reduction of public expenses, the social expenditure as percentage of total government expenditure was higher than ever in 2000 (see Table 1.5 and Figure 1.4). It is noteworthy that in the EU, between 1993 and 1996, expenditure on social protection as a percentage of GDP showed a slight downward trend. This continued in 1997 and was due partly to renewed growth in GDP but also to a slowdown in the growth of social protection expenditure (in particular a decrease in unemployment benefits). Still, although in some countries (more particularly the Scandinavian states and Ireland) a reduction of social expenditure took place, its rate increased in Portugal, Italy and Greece (see Figure 1.3). Another important factor for Greece’s weaker social performance, in comparison with Spain and Italy, is the significant strain that military expenses impose on the state budget, as a result of the perpetuation of the political tension with Turkey. Although military expenditure has fallen from 5.2 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 4.5 per cent in 1996, Greece spends almost three times as much for this purpose as the other Southern countries and almost double the NATO average (see Table 1.6 and Chapter 4 p. 97ff.). The consequences are not limited to welfare expenditure but also to other, lato sensu social functions of the state, such as education.
25
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
20 15 10 5
19 68 19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00
0
Social expenditure as percentage of total government expenditure Figure 1.4 Social expenditure in Greece, 1968–2000 Source: Ministry of National Economy of Greece (2000: 30).
Social expenditure as percentage of GNP
Southern Welfare States 23 Table 1.6 Military and education expenditure Public expenditure on education (% of GNP)
Italy Spain Greece Portugal NATO average
Military expenditure (% of GNP)
1985
1996
1985
1996
5.0 3.3 2.9 6.1 –
4.7 4.9 3.0 7.2 –
2.3 2.1 5.2 – 3.3
1.9 1.5 4.5 – 2.7 (1992)
Sources: Katrougalos (1996, Tables 2a and 2b); UNDP (1999a: 188 ff; UNESCO (1998); UN (1993); World Bank (1993); World Bank (1999); SIPRI (1998).
The structure and scope of the social protection system In Italy and Greece (but not in Spain and Portugal) the bulk of income transfers is absorbed by old age pensions and to a lesser degree, invalidity pensions (Figure 1.2). These are, in principle, calculated on the basis of the previous salary and the contributions paid. The rates of these contributions differ widely across occupational categories and economic sectors, with private employees generally paying the highest rates. However, due to the fragmentation of the social insurance units and the plethora of related schemes, especially in Greece and Italy, there is a considerable divergence of the benefits paid to different categories of the retired population. In Greece, even the family allowances (except for a special allowance for the fourth child), unlike all other EU countries, are wage-related. They are equal to one per cent of the monthly salary, and in 1991 represented only 1.4 per cent of total social benefits. The amount of benefits that households receive in the domain of family allowances or childcare is far below the EU average. The disproportionate distribution of the social benefits between the elderly and the non-aged population is a salient characteristic of the state-corporatist model. Whereas the welfare state covers about 50 per cent of the day care needs of Swedish or Danish children, the coverage is below 5 per cent in Italy (EspingAndersen, 1994: 16) and below 3 per cent in Greece. Still, as already discussed above and shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.5, the analogy is exceptionally disproportionate in the South and more especially so in Italy and Greece. The basic reason for this underdevelopment of childcare is that it remains by and large the family’s responsibility. These services are traditionally provided by women (full-time housewives) and although this model is eroding gradually (especially amongst the younger generation living in urban centres) because of rising female employment, as we argue in
24 Southern European Welfare States
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% StateGreece corporatist model
Italy
Portugal
Old age – survivors
Spain
Health
Family – children
Figure 1.5 Social expenditure by category Source: Eurostat-ESSPROS (2000); see also Figure 4.1.
Table 1.7 Social assistance expenditure as percentage of social security, 1980–92
Greece Italy Portugal Spain
1980
1985
1990
1991
1992
Change 1980–92
1.3 9.1 2.3 2.1
1.2 8.7 6.1 6.0
0.9 8.8 4.7 8.1
n/a 9.6 4.1 7.9
1.1 (1994) 9.1 3.8 8.4
⫺0.2 0 1.5 6.3
Sources: Kalisch et al. (1998: 11); Eardley et al. (1996).
Chapter 3, the state has not yet filled the emerging vacuum. The emerging needs of women are partly met by ‘third country’ migrant women who are employed as nannies or domestic workers (see Chapter 6). A factor of differentiation, which partly explains the dissimilar pattern of welfare benefit distribution in the Iberian countries, especially in Spain, is, since the beginning of the 1980s, the departure of their social protection systems from the traditional orientation of income protection towards a system focusing more on economic growth and employment support (Rhodes, 1997a: 38). The new paradigm has workfare characteristics and is targeting the excluded through means tests (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997). Another common characteristic in most Southern European countries, subsequent to the predominance of insurance-based benefits, is the very low expenditure on social assistance. This is particularly low in Greece and relatively higher in Italy (see Table 1.7). The situation remained stable during the last decade, with the exception of Spain, where the number of beneficiaries of means-tested benefits increased ten-fold from 1982 to 1992. In this year social assistance schemes covered 12 per cent of the population, as a response to high unemployment and job instability (see Chapter 2),
Southern Welfare States 25
which constituted a very important danger for the social cohesion of Spain (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997). Nevertheless, the new social assistance programmes are rather extensions of the contributory ones, failing to reach the real outsiders of the market and those excluded from the market, thus reconfirming the ‘corporatist’ character of the system. In addition, and contrary to the median Continental ‘core’ countries, until recently the southern welfare systems lacked any kind of universal minimum income support scheme. Portugal was the first to introduce such a scheme (in 1996), while local and regional schemes exist in Italy and Spain. In Greece there is still no income maintenance for non-insured young persons, for instance first job-seekers, despite the existence of a very low universal non-contributory public assistance pension for the elderly over 60. The unemployment benefits are also dependent on previous employment, up to a maximum of 70 per cent of the last salary, and last for limited time periods (see Chapter 2). This situation reveals an important gap in the protection of the outsiders of the market. According to estimates of the European Commission (Commission Européenne, 1998: 11), in 1993, 25 per cent of the Europeans unemployed for more than three months did not receive any unemployment allowance (although they had access to some kind of non-contributory minimum income support system). The respective percentage for Portugal, Greece and Italy was 66 per cent. The lack of the safety-net provided by a nationally based minimum income support system in Greece and Italy makes the situation of the long-term unemployed rather precarious. Regarding the financing of the social security system, there is an absolute dominance of contribution based social insurance schemes (see Tables 1.8 and 1.9). Although the idea of an equal distribution of the expenses between the State, the employers and the employees has been discussed recently within the framework of a social dialogue prior to the adoption of the reforms of the insurance legislation in all four countries, the traditional institutional patterns remain almost intact. Only the National Health Systems and family allowances are financed principally by the state. Yet, in practice, the public purse also covers the deficits of the insurance units. Accordingly, as shown in Table 1.8, the pattern of financing is similar to the average of the state-corporatist model. The data provided by the European Commission in its third report on Social Protection in Europe in 1995 shows that the implicit tax rate increased from 35 per cent in 1981 to 42 per cent in 1995. In the latest figures, approximately two-thirds of the financing of social protection in the European Union still comes from contributions, some 60 per cent of this paid by employers. This includes voluntary as well as statutory contributions (that is, 40 per cent of total funding) and 30 per cent from taxation, virtually all of this from general taxes. In the Southern European countries there is a similar situation, as most revenue comes from contributions. The proportion derived from social
26 Southern European Welfare States Table 1.8 Receipts of social protection by type and category as percentage of total receipts Countries
Greece Spain Italy Portugal Average in statecorporatist model1 Average in Scandinavian model Average in liberal model EU15
General government contributions
Social contributions Employers
Protected persons2
1997
1990
1997
1990 1997
59.0 71.3 67.9 57.1 65.26
60.8 69.7 67.4 46.7 65.8
39.4 54.4 52.9 37.1 32.75
37.6 52.2 50.3 28.6 36.6
19.6 16.9 15.0 20.0 28.2
60.35 52.9
32.6
40.46
22.45
27.56
6.65 12.86
7.5
8.43
49.45 55.6
41.75
37.85
25.8
23.3
15.95 14.55
8.8
6.6
28.8
65.0
62.4
42.0
38.4
23.0
6.2
5.2
Employees’ contributions
Employers’ contributions
Tax
Other
16.8 3.7 29.6 37.3 23.6 12.5 13.9 25.6 36.8 15.9
39.2 10.0 40.2 37.4 52.8 23.0 53.3 33.1 31.1 31.8
39.8 81.5 26.8 21.7 20.5 63.3 30.6 32.8 18.6 43.4
4.2 4.8 3.4 3.6 3.1 1.2 8.5 13.5 31.8 8.9
1990
1997
33.0 26.2 29.0 33.7 28
29.6 27.1 30.5 43.3 29
32.4
Total
Other receipts
1990
23.2 17.5 17.1 18.1 29.25
24.0
1990 1997 8.0 9.6 2.5 3.3 3.1 2.1 9.2 10.1 6.55 28.4
Notes 1 Without the southerners. 2 Employees, self-employed, pensioners and others. Source: Eurostat-ESSPROS (2000).
Table 1.9 Financing of social security
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands UK
Source: European Commission (1997c).
contributions is greater in Spain and Italy, accounting for over 65 per cent of total receipts, which is similar to the core countries of the corporate model (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany) (Commission Européenne, 1998, p. 10; Eurostat, 2000b). It is only in Portugal that this type of financing is slightly less than 50 per cent.
Southern Welfare States 27
The persistence of poverty The persistence of wide-scale poverty is not only a societal characteristic, but also a symptom of the reduced effectiveness of the social protection system in the Southern European countries. For this reason it is analysed in this chapter, which aims to describe the general characteristics of the welfare states of the European South. Due to the limited available resources and the overall delayed economic development, for a long time extended poverty was endemic in Southern Europe. In Greece for instance, according to some estimates, the percentage of the population below the poverty line, defined as the average income of the typical worker’s household, was approximately 73 per cent in the 1930s (Kremalis and Yfantopoulos, 1992: 84). Besides that, these countries were never prosperous (with the exception of northern Italy). Another reason for this situation was the very large inequality of income distribution. The Gini coefficient for Greece, for example, is estimated for the late 1930s at 0.6140, falling slightly to 0.5936 in the late 1940s (Kremalis, 1991; Kremalis and Yfantopoulos, 1992: 84). In the 1960s there was a definite improvement (G1963 ⫽ 0.3115), which continued in the 1970s (G1974 ⫽ 0.2921) and in the 1980s (G1982 ⫽ 0.2409 in the urban and 0.2307 in the rural areas) (Karagiorgas, 1990: 110, 117, 157). Despite the improvement in the 1980s, the fragmentation of the social protection systems still perpetuates flagrant inequalities and does not eradicate poverty (Da Costa, 1990). As shown in Table 1.10, in the four Southern Table 1.10 Distribution of income in the EU
Greece Portugal Italy Spain Austria Germany Belgium Ireland UK Luxembourg France Netherlands Denmark EU (without Finland and Sweden) Source: Eurostat (1998).
Income of the poorest decile of population (% of total)
Income of the richest decile of population (% of total)
Ratio of the income of richer 20% to poorer 20% of population
2.2 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.3 4.1 4.4 2.6
26.3 27.7 22.9 24.9 22.8 22.7 22.5 26.6 26.1 23.6 22.8 20.0 20.2 24.0
6.6 7.1 5.4 6.0 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.9 5.6 4.8 4.5 3.5 3.1 5.5
28 Southern European Welfare States
countries the poorest group of the population has the smallest percentage of national wealth in Europe. Taking into account the relatively low GDP in comparison to the median European average and the lack of any substantial minimum income support, one can easily understand the precariousness of the existence of these households. Another indication of the persistence of flagrant inequalities is the ratio of the income of the richer 20 per cent to the poorer 20 per cent of population, which is worse in all four Southern countries than in the rest of the EU. There are also a number of other specific determinants of differentiation within each of the countries. For instance, the uneven spatial application of social policies and its repercussion on poverty is a permanent characteristic of the less centralised countries, Italy and Spain. By and large, nevertheless, the redistributive impact of social security is negligible, as is the rule with the state-corporatist model in general (EspingAndersen, 1990: 27) but it has a more acute, more obvious character in the South. According to the findings of a recent analysis of inequality in Greece by income source, the social protection system actually contributes to the growth of income inequality (Papatheodorou, 1998), albeit marginally. While the income from social protection schemes represents 19.8 per cent of the total income, it contributes to 3.8 per cent of total inequality. In any case, as shown in Table 1.11, social transfers appear to be considerably less effective in mitigating poverty, especially so in Italy and Greece, than in the rest of the European Union. Their impact upon inequality also highlights similar patterns. As indicated in another recent survey (Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakloglou, 2001) analysing the correlation of social protection expenditure and inequality, the related Gini and Atkinson indices reach their highest values in the Mediterranean countries – Portugal, Greece, Spain and, to a far lesser extent, Italy. As a result of the aforementioned factors, Spain, Portugal and Greece (together with Ireland) display the highest incidence of poor households in the European Union. Italy’s figures are relatively lower, even lower than Table 1.11 Percentage of persons below the poverty line before and after social transfers (excepting pensions), 1995 Country
Before social transfers
After social transfers
Greece Spain Italy Portugal EU12
22 27 21 28 26
21 19 19 20 18
Sources: Eurostat (1999c); OKE (2000).
Southern Welfare States 29
those of the UK and of France (see Table 1.12). Actually, ‘two Italies’ are also easily discernible in terms of poverty: in the Centre-North the average poverty rate is only 9 per cent, while in the South it reaches a rate of 26.4 per cent (Saraceno, 1992; Ferrera, 1997). Poverty in Greece and Portugal is considerably higher than the average of the EU (see Table 1.13). Until the late 1980s, the poor population was principally composed of ‘traditional’ categories of poor (Room, 1990), especially the elderly, the single parent families, the rural and large households (Bouzas, 1990). Consequently, poverty usually does not turn into exclusion and misery, as the ‘primary social net’ and principally the family alleviates the economic pressure. Moreover, the huge underground economy, especially in Greece and, to a lesser degree, in Italy, allows people to have a second job in the ‘black’ or ‘grey’ economy and, thus to gain an invisible, additional income that makes the difference for their survival (Mingione, 1998) (see Chapter 2). Still, circumstances are changing rapidly, as the new patterns of postindustrial development produce massive unemployment in many urban regions (through deindustrialisation) (Tsakloglou, 1999). Accordingly, a ‘new poverty’ is emerging, in addition to the traditional one, associated Table 1.12 Indices of poverty in the European South Real GDP per capita
Poverty
Poorest 20% Richest 20% Richest to (1980–94) (1980–94) poorest (20%)
Italy Spain Greece Portugal
6,174 5,669 – –
37,228 24,998 – –
UNDP Human Long-term Poverty Index unemployment
50% of Below median income $14.40 per (1989–94) day (1989–95)
6.0 4.4 – –
6.5 10.4 – –
2.0 21.1 – –
Sources: UNDP (1999b: 149 ff); OECD (1997b; 1998b).
Table 1.13 Poverty in the European South and the European Union as percentage of the population, 1993–5 Country
1993
1995
Greece Spain Italy Portugal EU12
24 19 18 29 17
21 19 19 20 18
Sources: Eurostat (1997; 1999); OKE (2000).
Rank
5 14 – –
Value %
11.6 13.0 – –
8.1 12.5 5.6 4.1
30 Southern European Welfare States
with rural stagnation and decline (Pereirinha, 1997). As unemployment becomes endemic in many areas, the ability of the family to cope with the new situation should not be taken for granted. (It is true that the Spanish example has shown that exclusion can still be avoided even in societies with exceptionally high unemployment growth and job instability, mostly through interfamily redistribution (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997); however, this could happen because of the uneven distribution of economic strain in the Spanish population.) The situation is far from being uniform from one country to another. Hence, the rate of unemployment in Spain during the mid-1990s remained steadily above 20 per cent of the active population, while in its other Iberian counterpart it was below 7.3 per cent and in Greece and Italy it oscillated round 9 and 12 per cent respectively, in the case of Italy, slightly above the EU average. The same diversity exists with respect to long-term unemployment (more than one year). Whereas between 1985 and 1992 this kind of unemployment, as a percentage of the total, has fallen in the EU from 52 per cent to 43 per cent and in Spain and Portugal from 53 per cent to 30 per cent and from 60 per cent to 45 per cent, respectively, it has increased in Greece from 43 per cent to 50 per cent. Of the unemployed 45 per cent are young persons under 25 (data of Institute of Work INE/ GSEE for 1995; see Chapter 2). After this first ‘panoramic’ view of the welfare system in the European South, it is easy to reconfirm our initial assumption that, despite the important differences from country to country, it fits perfectly in the organisational matrix of the Continental model. It shares all the basic features of the latter (Esping-Andersen, 1994: 16), often to an exaggerated degree. Social insurance is highly occupationally segmented and inordinately biased towards pensions; social services are underdeveloped; entitlement is related to the employment and contribution record and emphasis is on the role of the family as the core unit of social care. However, its overall effectiveness is low, both with regard to its redistributive impact and the alleviation of poverty. In the chapters that follow we shall proceed to a more extensive analysis of its components.
2 The Carrot and the Stick: Employment, Unemployment and Labour Market Policies
Introduction In an era of recession and high rates of unemployment throughout Europe (see Table 2.1), all Southern European countries, and especially Spain and Greece, stand out as member states of the European Union who have serious labour market problems. Unemployment reached unprecedented heights in the 1980s and 1990s. Spain had the highest unemployment rate, hitting the 24 per cent mark in 1994. Greece, Italy and Portugal reached 7.3 per cent, 9.6 per cent and 12 per cent respectively in the mid- to late 1990s. The employment crisis confronting these countries since the 1980s is so serious that job creation was used in political campaigns for attracting votes. ‘Guaranteeing a future for our proud youth’ or ‘one million jobs’ were amongst the slogans heard during Papandreou’s and Berlusconi’s electoral campaigns in the early to mid-1980s and in 1994 respectively. This was done even though these countries found themselves in times of economic recession, with relatively large social security deficits and public debts.1 At the same time, during the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, we saw a move towards flexibilisation (numerical and functional); decline of employment regulations in terms of restrictions on the freedom of firms to use particular work practices; new forms of less secure work contracts replacing old traditions of paternalist and protective employment regulations; and the commitment to secure full-time employment. This move from a carrot to a stick approach will be analysed in the light of major policy initiatives for labour market reform and for creating jobs and tackling unemployment adopted within the limits imposed by the structure of the workforce, the changes in economic performance and the significant innovations in domestic policymaking in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In all four countries there is a division between the protected core of the labour market and the rest, 31
32
Table 2.1 Unemployment rates (percentage of civilian labour force) in the member states of the EU15, 1961–99 Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
B 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.8 2.2 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.3 4.2 5.5 6.3 6.8 7.0 7.4 9.5 11.2
DK
D
1.3 1.3 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 2.8 3.9 5.1 5.9 6.7 4.8 5.2 8.3 8.9
0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.8 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.7 3.9 5.6
GR 5.9 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.2 4.2 3.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.7 4.0 5.8
SP
F
IRL
2.4 1.6 2.0 2.8 2.6 2.2 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.6 3.4 2.9 2.6 3.1 4.5 4.9 5.3 7.1 8.8 12.0 14.0 16.0
1.3 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.8 4.0 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.8 6.2 7.3 8.0
5.3 5.2 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.8 5.5 6.3 6.0 6.7 6.2 5.8 7.9 9.8 9.7 9.0 7.8 8.0 10.8 12.5
I 5.1 4.4 3.6 4.0 5.0 5.4 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.1 6.0 5.9 5.0 5.5 6.2 6.7 6.7 7.2 7.1 7.4 8.0
L
NL
0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 2.3 0.0 2.4 0.0 2.9 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.8 0.0 5.6 1.2 5.6 2.4 5.7 2.4 6.4 2.4 8.9 2.4 11.9
A
P
FIN
S
UK
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.5 3.5
2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 1.7 4.4 6.2 7.3 7.9 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.2
1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 2.9 4.0 2.8 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.3 3.9 5.9 7.3 6.0 4.7 4.9 5.4
1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.5 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.6 3.3
1.2 1.7 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.1 2.2 2.0 3.2 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.6 5.6 8.9 10.3
EU15 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.7 3.9 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.8 7.4 8.7
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
11.1 11.1 10.3 10.3 10.0 8.9 7.5 6.7 6.6 7.3 8.9 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.2 8.8 8.3
9.0 8.5 7.1 5.4 5.4 6.1 7.4 7.7 8.4 9.2 10.1 8.2 7.2 6.8 5.6 5.1 4.6
6.9 7.1 7.2 6.5 6.3 6.2 5.6 4.8 5.6 6.6 7.9 8.4 8.2 8.9 9.9 9.4 9.0
7.1 7.2 7.0 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.4 7.0 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.4
18.0 20.0 22.0 21.0 21.0 20.0 17.0 16.0 16.0 19.0 23.0 24.0 23.0 23.0 21.0 19.0 17.0
8.1 9.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.8 9.3 8.9 9.5 10.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
14.0 15.5 16.9 16.8 16.6 16.1 14.7 13.4 14.8 15.4 15.6 14.3 12.3 11.6 9.8 7.8 6.0
7.7 8.1 8.5 9.2 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.1 8.8 9.0 10.3 11.4 11.9 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.2
3.5 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.2 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.7
9.7 9.3 8.3 8.3 8.0 7.5 6.9 6.2 5.8 5.6 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.3 5.2 4.0 3.6
4.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.3
7.8 8.5 8.7 8.4 6.9 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.0 4.2 5.7 7.0 7.3 7.3 6.8 4.9 4.7
5.5 5.2 5.0 5.3 4.9 4.3 3.2 3.2 6.7 11.9 16.6 16.8 15.6 14.8 12.7 11.4 10.1
3.7 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.7 3.1 5.6 9.1 9.4 8.8 9.6 9.9 8.2 7.8
11.1 11.1 11.5 11.5 10.6 8.7 7.3 7.0 8.8 10.1 10.4 9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.3 6.5
9.1 9.7 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.1 8.3 7.7 8.2 9.3 10.7 11.1 10.7 10.9 10.6 10.0 9.6
Source: European Commission (1999b: 104–5).
33
34 Southern European Welfare States
especially those in temporary and irregular employment, those working in the informal sector and the unemployed. We have what Perez Diaz and Rodriguez (1994) have called ‘four cornered societies’, comprised of socioeconomic spheres with different income, job and welfare opportunities. These spheres, however, often crosscut and intercept each other. Within this kaleidoscope, people more often than not tend to combine the different job, income and welfare opportunities offered by the four spheres. Our aim in this chapter is to review the major aspects of employment and related developments in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In so doing, we will try to indicate features which are common to all four countries and highlight major disparities in labour market performance and policies adopted to combat unemployment. Some policy reforms are linked to strategies of social concertation, as for example was the case in Italy and in Portugal in the 1990s and in Spain in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The context: changes in the economy and labour market trends The model of capitalist development followed by the Southern European countries is characterised by: late industrialisation; the persistence of traditional agrarian social arrangements; high rates of economic growth in the 1960s;2 relatively high numbers of small-scale units relying on the flexible use of family labour and flexible hired labourers from non-EU member states (many of whom are seasonal migrants from nearby regions – see Chapter 6); limited diffusion of a proletarianised manufacturing working class; until recently, low rates of female participation in the formal economy; and a dynamic process of informalisation of economic activity. Structural change in employment patterns from the 1960s onwards has its roots in a number of factors. These include the two oil shocks; the rapid transition to post-Fordism (before Fordist production structures had been fully developed); the expansion of service employment; the democratisation of union organisation after the fall of dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and Spain; and the preparations of these three countries for becoming full members of the European Community. Some important demographic, socio-economic and labour market characteristics have been summarised in a table compiled by Iosifides and King (1996), which is self-explanatory (Table 2.2). Italy had a high (3 per cent) annual average rate of growth of GDP from the mid-1970s until 1990. A positive climate was created by the economic expansion of the 1980. Within that decade, total employment rose by more than 1.5 million. Nevertheless, employment increased by a yearly average of 0.5 per cent in the period 1975–90. Restructuring and reorganisation in the industrial sector gradually reduced labour demand. As a result, and after two decades of positive growth, in the 1990s Italy experienced a drop in the
Labour Market Policies 35 Table 2.2 Population and labour force characteristics of Southern European countries, 1970–90 Italy
Greece
Spain
Portugal
1970
1990
1970
1990
1970
1990
1970
1990
52.8 20.9
56.9 24.3
8.8 3.2
10.1 4.0
33.6 13.0
39.0 15.3
8.7 3.3
9.9 4.7
14.9 6.0 59.5 86.8 33.5 5.3
15.4 8.9 61.1 78.1 44.5 10.8
2.3 0.9 57.8 85.8 31.2 4.2
2.5 1.5 60.9 75.8 43.5 7.2
9.9 3.1 62.1 96.4 29.2 2.5
10.0 5.3 58.8 76.8 40.9 15.9
2.7 0.9 N/A N/A N/A 2.5
2.7 2.0 73.1 85.6 61.3 4.6
Percentage employed in: Agriculture 20.2 Industry 39.5 Services 40.3 Percentage 33.3 self-employed
9.0 32.4 58.6 28.8
40.8 25.0 34.2 N/A
24.5 27.4 48.2 48.6
27.1 35.5 37.4 26.4
11.8 33.4 54.8 23.8
30.0 32.9 37.1 N/A
17.8 34.8 47.4 29.7
Population* Economically active* Male Female Activity rate % Male Female Percentage unemployed
Note * denotes millions Sources: King and Konjhodzic (1995); Iosifides and King (1996).
employment rate when, between 1990 and 1994, it fell by 3.7 per cent. In 1995, Italian unemployment reached the 11.9 per cent mark (see Table 2.1), 22 per cent in the South as opposed to 7.2 per cent in the North, with the long-term unemployment rate amounting to 7.6 per cent of the total unemployment rate (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000: 194). In Spain, there was a dramatic fall in employment during the period 1975–85 when the employment rate fell by 1.5 per cent per year; 2.25 million jobs were lost. Most job losses were in the primary sector as well as in shipbuilding and manufacturing (especially textiles and the car industry), while employment in the service sector increased by 3 per cent (OECD, 1996b: 57). This was a dramatic departure from the years prior to Franco’s death – at that time, Spain had enjoyed one of Europe’s lowest rates of unemployment (around 1.5 per cent of the total population) – and a reflection of the departure from a tradition of paternalist and protective employment regulations and a commitment to full employment. Unemployment climbed to 21 per cent in 1986 and to 24 per cent in 1994 (see Table 2.1), ‘the most extreme condition of high unemployment among OECD countries’ (Encarnacion, 2000: 32). This can be partly explained by the collapse of formerly protected inefficient firms (Rhodes, 1997b); industrial restructuring
36 Southern European Welfare States
and modernisation; return migration; and partly by the populist policy of high real wage growth from 8 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 12 per cent in 1986 and the increase of social security contributions pursued in the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as the high redundancy costs (Argandona, 1997; European Commission, 1997b). Economic globalisation and integration has further exacerbated the bleak picture. Unemployment continued during the high growth of the economy (it increased by an annual average rate of 4.5 per cent) in the late 1980s as well as during the 1990s and reached a peak in 1994 when it soared to 24 per cent (European Commission, 1997b; Encarnacion, 2000: 32; Lazaridis, 1996: 10; Rhodes, 1997b). It is estimated to be around 20 per cent even if one discounts those who claim benefits while working in the informal economy (Dolado and Jimeno, 1995). Prior to 1973, unemployment in Portugal was virtually non-existent (less than 2.6 per cent; see Table 2.1). However, unemployment increased after 1974; within a year it had reached 3.5 per cent of the active population. It continued increasing and by the mid-1980s had reached 8.7 per cent of the active population (see Table 2.1). Despite the fact that employment expanded by an average yearly rate of 5 per cent of GDP in the late 1980s, this was not accompanied by a dramatic fall in the unemployment rate. Unemployment, although lower (4.7 per cent in 1999; see Table 2.1), has remained a major concern of the Portuguese government throughout the 1990s (Bacalhau and Bruneau, 2000: 138). Similar to Portugal, unemployment in Greece till the late 1980s was not such a major problem as in Spain (see Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). It was virtually non-existent during the 1960s and 1970s (unemployment was around 1.9 per cent in 1979; see Table 2.1). This can be explained in terms of the massive emigration of Greeks in the 1960s and early 1970s; the public sector which acted as a large employer;3 the large numbers of self-employed; and the ungenerous unemployment benefits on offer, which created a disincentive for people to remain unemployed. Female participation in the labour market increased at a high rate (the annual average rate being 3.8 per cent) during the period 1975–85, partly as a result of an equal opportunities campaign launched by the PASOK government in the early 1980s (see also Chapter 3). During the same period there was an increase in unemployment by an annual average rate of 22.2 per cent for men and 24.4 per cent for women. By the mid-1990s total unemployment had reached 9.6 per cent of the labour force (Table 2.1). This was brought about by a number of factors: the recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the economic crisis due to intense competition from other low-wage economies in light-manufacturing goods which led to the loss of Greece’s market share, return migration, economic restructuring and deindustrialisation, the closing of numerous ‘ailing’ firms, and the stagnation of investments (Symeonidou, 1996: 74; Karakatsanis, 2000: 240–43). The youth and women were especially hard hit by unemployment. The rates of unemployment for these groups were approximately 29 per cent and 15 per cent respectively (OECD,
37 25
Unemployment rate (%)
20
15
10
5
Portugal
98
96
19
94
19
92
19
90
19
88
Spain
19
86
19
84
19
82
19
80
Greece
19
78
19
76
19
74
19
72
19
70
19
68
19
66
19
64
19
62
19
19
19
60
0
Italy EU15
Figure 2.1 Unemployment rates as percentage of the civilian labour force in Southern Europe, 1960–99 Source: Data obtained from European Commission (1999b: 104–5).
50 Youth unemployment rate (%)
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
EU15
Figure 2.2 Youth unemployment rates as percentage in Southern Europe, 1986–98 Sources: Eurostat (1990; 1994a; 1995d; 2000a).
Male and female youth unemployement rate (%)
38 Southern European Welfare States 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
male 86
female 86 Greece
male 92 Spain
female 92 Italy
male 98
Portugal
female 98 EU
Figure 2.3 Male and female youth unemployment rates (seasonally adjusted percentage) in the EU, 1986, 1992, 1998 Sources: Eurostat (1990; 1994a; 2000a).
1996
1975 100%
100%
50%
50%
0%
0% GR
SP
I
EU*
P
GR SP
I
P
1985
EU 1999
100%
100%
50%
50% 0%
0% GR SP
I
P
GR SP
EU*
Agriculture
Industry
I
P
EU
Services
Figure 2.4 Employment by sector in Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and EU Note: EU* for 1975 and 1985 refers to the then EC. Source: European Commission (2000).
1996c: 63). This could be attributed to the idiosyncratic approach to labour market reform undertaken since the 1980s which brought about the proliferation of fixed-term contracts. As shown in the following section in this chapter, in an attempt to tackle unemployment, all four countries embarked on a deregulation programme in the 1990s. As a result there has been a proliferation of precarious fixedterm contracts, while the informal economy continues to grow.
Labour Market Policies 39
The above mentioned trends in job losses are closely related to changes in the economic performance of these countries. It is to this issue that we now turn our attention. The economies of Southern Europe experienced rapid growth in the period after World War II, with Italy gradually becoming one of the leading industrial economies in Europe. All four countries have recorded high growth rates with an average annual growth of GDP per capita ranging from 3.6 per cent in Italy to 5.8 per cent in Greece (Williams, 1984: 9). Since the mid-1970s, the Southern European countries have experienced a rapid decline in agriculture in terms of its contribution to GDP and its capacity to provide employment4 and the rapid shift to an alternative income source in the service sector (tourism, public sector, etc.) (see Figure 2.4). Employment in agriculture declined from an average of 26 per cent in the 1970s to approximately 13 per cent in the 1990s. Employment in the tertiary or service sector expanded in all four countries from an average of approximately 37 per cent in the 1970s to around 51 per cent in the 1990s (King and Konjhodzic, 1995). ‘The service sector contains three aspects that are particularly relevant to Southern Europe: the growth of the public sector and its relation to a traditional and contemporary form of the clientelist state; the development of tourism; and the expansion of banking and other financial services’ (Iosifides and King 1996: 72). These changes have been accompanied by urbanisation (Italy urbanised in the post-war period while the other three countries did not urbanise until the mid-1960s), increasing unemployment and high inflation. Before Fordist production structures were developed, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had all experienced a leap forward to post-Fordism. Despite the rapid expansion of employment in the service sector, even as recently as the mid-1990s, there were regions in Italy (e.g. Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Piemonte), Spain (e.g. Navarra, Catalunia, Pais Basco) and Portugal where employment in industry exceeded 35 per cent of the labour force (Petmesidou, 1996b: 98). Industrial employment shows intercountry contrasts, with employment in this sector declining in Italy since the early 1970s, peaking in Greece and Portugal in the early 1980s and decreasing since then. Industrial employment peaked in Spain in the mid-1970s, decreased from 1975–84 and increased thereafter (Iosifides and King, 1996: 73). Moreover, in some areas, such as southern Italy, the whole of Greece and most of Portugal, the shift from agriculture to services has been more pronounced. The tertiarisation of the economy has been accompanied by flexible working conditions and, as mentioned above, an increase in female employment and the persistence of self-employment in all the four countries under study. For example, the percentage of selfemployed in 1994 ranged from 46.7 per cent in Greece to 27.3 per cent in Portugal. In all four countries it was above the average for the twelve countries then in the EU (17.4 per cent) (Eurostat, 1995a).
40 Southern European Welfare States
Multi-occupation and short-term contracts are observed in all four countries. The percentages of short-term contracts vary from one country to another. In 1994 these ranged from 7.3 per cent in Portugal to 33.6 per cent in Spain (the EU12 average was 8.9 per cent) (Eurostat, 1995b). Part-time work was, in all four countries, significantly lower than the EU average (15.4 per cent in 1994) (ibid.), and ranged from 4.8 per cent in Greece to 8 per cent in Italy. Of course one must bear in mind that a large percentage of second or short-term jobs are located in the informal sector. The informal sector is therefore an important form of ‘unemployment and/or sub-employment relief’: A basic feature of economic change has been its uneven nature: industrialisation has taken a different form in the different countries with the development of a ‘sophisticated manufacturing base in the areas of engineering and chemicals’ in Italy, for example, and the prevalence of traditional technologies in food and textiles in Greece and Portugal … there are also differences within countries, notably the dualist nature of Italian economic development and the disparities between northern and southern Italy with the growth of large-scale mass production industries in some northern regions and the development of more flexible smallscale industries in central and north-west regions. (Lazaridis, 1996a: 8; see also Bartlett, 1993: 113, 134–6) The North–South divide in Italy is also pronounced in terms of employment rates. In 1998, for example, employment in the (four) regions with the highest levels (accounting for 20 per cent of the population aged 15 to 64) – Trentino-Alto-Adige, Emilia-Romagna, Valle d’Aosta and Veneto – averaged 61.5 per cent of working-age population, some 22 per cent points higher than in the (three) regions with the lowest levels – Calabria, Sicilia and Campania – where it averaged only 39.5 per cent. (European Commission, 1999a: 69). This gap in employment rates is mirrored by a gap in unemployment rates between North and South Italy. The regional disparity in employment in Spain is narrower than in Italy. The average employment rate in the late 1990s in the North-east of the country (Comunidad Foral de Navarra and Catalunia) was some 16.5 per cent higher than in the region with the lowest rate, Andalucia in the South (European Commission, 1999a: 71). The rate of unemployment is higher in urban centres (Catalunia, Valencia, Madrid) and amongst women in low employment regions. There are also regional employment disparities in Greece. Virtually all regions, except Attiki, experienced a decline in employment during the 1990s. The Ionian islands, Crete and Epirus were most affected. Regional disparities in Portugal are wider than in Greece, with the Centro where the
Labour Market Policies 41
employment rate was around 83 per cent in 1998 and Madeira, Alenejo and Acores where the employment rate was around 16 per cent in the same year (European Commission, 1999a: 73–4). In both countries, however, changes in employment have not been accompanied by corresponding changes in unemployment5 (ibid.). This suggests that most new jobs went to young, first entrants into the labour market, or that we have an exodus from the labour force, or that serious questions can be posed about the nature of unemployment figures in both countries. Over the 1970–90 period, male activity rates in Southern Europe have decreased, with the exception of Portugal. During the same period we have an increase in female activity rates from 30 per cent in 1970 to approximately 45 per cent in Italy, Greece and Spain in 1990 and 61.3 per cent in Portugal. The social significance of this increase, as well as changes in attitudes towards the role of women and ‘modest’ efforts made by the respective governments in encouraging women to participate fully in the labour market, will be discussed in Chapter 3. Activity rates have been influenced by a number of factors discussed in the introduction to this book, namely the processes of urbanisation and emigration, both of which created labour shortages in the primary sector, as well as social, political and cultural changes. Warren (1994: 92) has defined the informal economy as ‘market activity in legal goods and services that is not registered with the state, not taxed … and not subject to any other state imposed regulation on business’. Estimates of the percentage of the population in each country working in the informal economy vary according to region and sector of economic activity. The informal economy produces an estimated 22 per cent of the GDP in Portugal (Bermeo, 2000b: 270), between 30 per cent and 45 per cent of the GDP in Greece (Canellopoulos 1995; Eurostat 1995a) and constitutes 21–5 per cent of total employment in Spain (Bermeo, 2000b: 270). In Italy, this hidden economy seems to constitute 25 per cent of GDP according to some (The Economist, 1997), whereas according to others (Ferrera, 1997) the respective figure is closer to Greece than to the Iberian countries. The persistence and expansion of informal economic activities, as an alternative process of income generation, has had profound implications on employment in these countries. Informalisation reinforces labour market segmentation, which in turn involves the ‘compartmentalisation and isolation of different groups of participants in the labour market’ (Iosifides and King, 1996: 73). More stable and secure jobs are offered in the primary than in the secondary labour market. Flexible use of family members, in response to seasonal labour shortages in agricultural labour, goes back well prior to the tertiarisation process. These features, along with familism (see Chapter 3) and clientelism, constitute elements of a complex and distinctive mode of income generation and distribution with important effects on the implementation of employment policies. Individual and social group access to clientelistic networks does not favour collective solidarity but rather has strengthened the role of the family as
42 Southern European Welfare States
a strategic unit of decision-making regarding the employment opportunities of its members, especially in Greece and in southern Italy. It also acts as a safety-valve during times of economic distress such as unemployment. Hence familism is a key component of the clientelistic forms of social organisation in Southern Europe, which in turn are closely related to the practice of appropriating resources by political means. Related to this issue is the concept of soft-budgeting. Soft-budgeting refers to ‘an accounting practice by individuals, families/households and enterprises in which the strict condition that earnings must always be greater than, or at least equal to expenses is not obeyed, simply because someone else is paying the difference’ (Petmesidou and Tsoulouvis, 1994: 22). Imbalances like this are met via clientelistic means. In other words, statism, familism and softbudgeting are three pillars which compensate for and to a certain extent legitimise the lack of inter alia effective labour market policies. This brief outline of some important aspects of the southern European economic and labour market sets the scene for our subsequent analysis of some important aspects of the environment within which passive and active labour market policies have taken place.
Labour market policy reforms In the late 1970s and early 1980s, all four countries had relatively restrictive employment protection legislation (for example, strict job demarcations and work schedules; strict rules for dismissals). This was considered to be one of the factors contributing to the rapidly growing unemployment rates discussed above. At the same time, the informal sector allowed a degree of labour flexibility and deregulation. Employment regulations were easily circumvented and as a result, irregular and ‘concealed’ forms of employment, extensive second job holding and the evasion of juridical rules have been common phenomena. These were further exacerbated by the inflow of large numbers of undocumented third-country migrants in the 1980s and 1990s – accommodated by these less restrictive de jure sets of employment regulations. The latter may be among the factors that contributed to the lack of success of the implementation of the various regularisation programmes that have since been introduced in all four countries (see Chapter 6 ‘Migration into Southern Europe’). This phenomenon is ‘the Janus face of the Southern European labour market’, one side characterised by rigidity and the other by flexibility and irregularity. It is the Janus face of the labour market that partly allows for the relatively high levels of unemployment discussed in the previous section to be tolerated in an environment where unemployment insurance is a big burden on national budgets. As mentioned in the previous section, some of the unemployed hold jobs in the informal economy; others supplement underpaid regular or irregular jobs with a second job. Yet others are the young and women, that is people
Labour Market Policies 43
not seen as family breadwinners in these ‘male breadwinner’ societies (it is the family’s responsibility to look after the young and the men’s to look after their wives, daughters, sisters, mothers – the role of the family as a buffer against the economic repercussions of unemployment will be discussed in Chapter 3). The situation described above is greatly facilitated by a ‘tango’ danced between employers and workers aimed at evading the law and circumventing employment regulations. This constitutes one of the main characteristics of the Southern European labour markets. Of course one must stress that the degree of labour flexibility and the deregulation of employment conditions and procedures as well as the mix between rigidity and irregularity varies from one locality to another. This variability depends on a number of factors such as: sector of production prevailing in the area; size and type of firms; adjustments to changes in the labour market and to pressures exerted by the EU convergence criteria; extent of state intervention and policy styles; and labour market reforms. Since the 1980s, labour market reforms have focused on ways to tackle unemployment and one of Janus’ faces, labour market rigidity. In an attempt to improve labour market performance and combat unemployment, governments introduced various employment policy reforms. Labour market reforms in the South tend to be highly politicised. This trend can be traced back to the years when these countries were under authoritarian regimes and the sensitivity of the unions and the left-wing parties to any shift of power between capital and labour in the period following the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Therefore attempts to reform usually provoked massive unrest and often strikes. Moreover, such reforms were more often than not introduced through public intervention and often aimed at fulfilling particularistic goals. The 1990s however, constitute a turning point for Italy and Portugal in particular, as reforms introduced were now based upon a consensus-building process and reflected wider social arrangements for redrawing the boundaries between the state and society. Governments introduced market forces into many parts of the economy and deregulation measures for labour markets. This manifests a departure from a logic of reciprocity, of an immediate exchange of benefits between the state and the social partners. In Greece, Italy and Spain on the other hand, the highly politicised and conflictual character of industrial relations limits the possibility of broad social arrangements on policy reform. We will now look in more detail at the labour market reforms introduced in each of the four countries.
Italy Employment policy reforms Italy has a mix of labour market policies, with little weight given to general employment benefits. The Italian system of social protection shares the basic characteristics of the corporatist welfare regime, in that it is a ‘combination
44 Southern European Welfare States
of employment-based insurance and universal provision, but … corporatism and patronage continue to play an important role’ (Hantrais, 1995: 222). Decision-making with regard to social insurance is highly centralised and policy implementation is highly fragmented. There is no comprehensive strategy of labour market intervention but rather policies are fragmented into numerous legislative acts adopted ad hoc in response to particular problems. They comprise a large number of schemes that roughly correspond to different professional groups of the unemployed and different causes of unemployment (for example, collective versus individual dismissals) (Papadopoulos, 1998a: 87): The fragmentation and disparities in the income support system for the unemployed, with extreme differences and gaps in the level of social protection given to core and marginal workers, are the result of a complex system guaranteeing full time, stable jobs for core workers (traditionally males in the middle age groups) through employment protection measures, income support to laid-off workers and a public monopoly in job placement. (Dell’Aringa and Lodovici, 1996: 177) Under this system, those who cannot secure full employment and establish contributive entitlements in the formal labour market are offered little protection. Unemployment policies are often linked with policies developed as substitutes for unemployment insurance, such as invalidity pensions. Moreover, Italy is the only European country without assistance benefits for those who exhaust the unemployment benefits (ibid.: 173). Italy introduced unemployment insurance in 1919, much earlier than Greece, Portugal and Spain. However, the level of insurance benefits has been low when compared to other European countries. Temporary wage subsidies were introduced in the 1940s. These were transformed into extraordinary subsidies for crisis-ridden industrial sectors in the 1950s. Moreover, regular unemployment benefits were introduced in the 1960s; these, however, were low. Until the end of the 1960s, state intervention took the form of ordinary allowances for total unemployment and an ordinary earnings replacement fund, known as Cig (Cassa Integrazione Guadagni [Wage Supplementation Fund]),6 for partial unemployment (reductions in working hours). This was unique in Europe in terms of its generosity and duration (Gualmini, 1997: 72–3). The Cig is subdivided into the Ordinary Fund (CIGO), which provides compensation for temporary reductions in working hours due to accidents or cyclical causes; and the Special Fund (CIGS) introduced in 1968, which provides compensation for reductions in working hours resulting from industrial restructuring. In the latter case, workers can maintain their contract with the firm even if they are out of
Labour Market Policies 45
work for a relatively long period of time (years). In other words, CIGS compensates for total working time lost for a period of time (and since the 1980s, even permanently). These passive measures, together with the special earnings replacement benefits linked to the restructuring of firms and situations of crisis, made the Italian unemployment benefits the most generous in Europe (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000: p. 189). From 1968–73, a number of measures were introduced, including early retirement for some categories of workers; that is to those unemployed under the CIGS scheme. Workers with a minimum of 15 years of social security contributions were eligible. All the above rested on a contribution-based mechanism. They operated together on the principle of numerical hiring lists, which was kept in place until the late 1980s. In the 1970s, a number of new instruments were created to cope with the rising number of unemployed at the local level. The aim was to guarantee income to the unemployed as a right. Public intervention in income support during unemployment was supported on the grounds that benefits allow an efficient search for work and job matching. Until the 1980s, the main approach followed was avoidance of redundancies and lay-offs through the use of collective action and public resources. In the 1980s, we see a shift from passive to active labour market policies, that is to say the emphasis on ‘the right to an income’ was replaced by ‘the right to a job’. Among the innovations introduced are: on-the-job training contracts; vocational training; part-time work; contracts of atypical work and so on. With the exception of on-the-job training, the other innovative measures did not expand as much as initially expected. Training competence was transferred to the regions. As Gualmini (1997: 71) remarks, ‘Italian unemployment policies are based on a very sectoral and incremental logic. They frequently overlap, and are often intertwined with policies in other policy sectors, as when early retirement and receipt of invalidity pensions became functional substitutes for unemployment insurance in the 1970s and 1980s.’ In the 1980s job creation was above the EC average (between 1980 and 1991 total employment in Italy increased by more than 1.5 million). However, since the late 1980s we have seen an increase in the level of unemployment (see Table 2.1), which in 1988 reached the 22.8 per cent level in the South, as opposed to 7.5 per cent in the Centre–North (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000: 194). The main approach followed until the late 1980s was avoidance of lay-offs and redundancies through use of collective action and public resources. Solidarity contracts introduced in 1984 were based on collective agreements and aimed at promoting work-sharing initiatives. Moreover, early retirement schemes were used to solve industrial crises during a period in which there was an outcry for an increase in retirement age in order to ease the financial burden of pensions. Until the early 1990s expenditure on labour market programmes was rather low; it was 1.8 per cent of GDP compared to a European average of
46 Southern European Welfare States
2.9 per cent in 1992 (Dell’Aringa and Lodovici, 1996: 179). Active measures concentrated on promotion of fixed-term contracts and employment subsidies (reduction of social security contributions) for those at risk of losing their jobs. The latter were also favoured by the Wage Supplementation Fund (Cig), early retirement schemes, and solidarity contracts mentioned above. However, the level of ordinary unemployment benefits and the numbers of those eligible for income support are low. People with no employment experience and the self-employed, for example, are not eligible for any benefit. Income support depends on the type of job, the sector, the size of the firm and whether the job was lost due to collective dismissal or not. The least favoured under this system are those who work in small firms, particularly service firms. Unemployment insurance benefits are granted to workers who have been dismissed or have resigned from their jobs. There are two such benefits: 1. The so-called ‘ordinary unemployment benefit’ is equal to 30 per cent of a person’s remuneration during the last three months of employment. It can be obtained for 180 days and eligibility presupposes having paid contributions for at least two years. It is also used as a means for subsidising seasonal work. The unemployed worker has to register at the employment office and to be available for work (refusal of two job offers results in the loss of benefit entitlement). 2. The so-called ‘mobility benefit’ is equal to 80 per cent of a person’s gross remuneration during the first year of unemployment. Its duration varies from one region to another but can reach a maximum of four years in some regions in southern Italy. Eligibility presupposes an employment record of at least 12 months and lay-off within collective dismissals due to a crisis. In the case of ‘ordinary benefit’, the unemployed worker has to register at the employment office and to be available for work (refusal of two job offers results in loss of benefit entitlement). People with no previous employment record are not entitled to these benefits. The social assistance scheme (Minimo Vitale) provides some support to those who have lost entitlements to all other unemployment insurance benefits. This varies from one region to another; in general though, these are available to groups at risk of poverty, such as lone parents, families of prisoners and the elderly. They are calculated on the basis of the average daily net wages during the three months preceding unemployment. The replacement rate was 20 per cent of the reference earnings; in 1993 and 1996 it was increased to 25 per cent and 30 per cent respectively but could not exceed 584 ECU per month (Papadopoulos, 1998a: 89). The Minimo Vitale benefit is taxable. Often disability pensions are (mis)used as
Labour Market Policies 47
assistance benefits thus increasing their duration. Also, one can use different benefits in sequence, for example one can combine Cig and mobility benefits. In the 1990s, with the recession and the socio-political changes that took place, including the ‘Mani Polute’ (clean hands) action, which threw the ruling class out of office in an attempt to combat corruption, the need for reform became a priority in public debates on labour market policies. Active policies aimed at job creation increased in the 1990s, especially at the regional and local levels. The government introduced legislation in favour of the modification of the system of shock absorbers so as to facilitate the deregulation of employment conditions and procedures. Reforms included the creation of temporary jobs especially for those whose benefit was about to expire. Therefore, workers on mobility lists, in Cig, or the long-term unemployed could, under the temporary job schemes introduced in 1993, be employed for two years in social works. The aim was to tackle the rigidity of the Italian labour market which was until then heavily regulated. Deregulation was supported by the unions and the employers’ association, Confindustria. Hence, labour flexibility in terms of working time and conditions increased; this reduced adjustment costs during industrial restructuring and recession. Passive labour market policies were modified (law 223/91) and the ban on collective dismissals was removed. Hiring procedures were changed in that the compulsory list established under Cig was replaced by the principle of free choice, thus improving the options available to employers. Moreover, the system of social shock absorbers was modified by extending the instruments of income protection, inter alia. The use of mobility benefits, solidarity contracts and temporary reductions of working time increased. Mobility procedures and the Cig were extended to the service sector and small firms, the level of ordinary unemployment benefits was raised to 40 per cent of previous earnings, and wage rigidities were reduced. The social pacts of 1992 and 1993 inter alia abolished the scala mobile (inflationlinked wage escalator) 46 years after its introduction. Reforms of the collective bargaining system (clearly defining the roles and interrelations between the national and company/local levels) had repercussions upon labour market policy (Gualmini, 1997: 70). Therefore, in the 1990s we have a return to concertation and experimentation with consensual solutions to combat unemployment and the introduction of structural reforms. The latter ‘reorganised the entire system of job placement, creating new space for private actors in the regulation of the labour market and promoting new active policies for local development’ (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000: 194). However, the use of Cigs, mobility benefits and early retirement schemes had negative effects too. These are summarised by Dell’Aringa and Lodovici (1996: 188–9) as follows. Hirings and lay-offs were frozen. This discouraged labour mobility in the primary sector and increased the difficulties of finding secure jobs for those with little or no experience. The
48 Southern European Welfare States
black economy expanded as workers on Cig benefits and so on preferred to work in the informal sector during the period they had a right to benefits. We saw an increase of mass dismissals, with the unions in agreement, due to the greater generosity and fewer risks associated with mobility benefits linked to collective dismissals as opposed to unemployment benefits linked to individual dismissals. In the mid-1990s, long-term unemployment amounted to 7.6 per cent of total unemployment (ISTAT, 1995). The above reforms did not remedy the problems inherent in the economic, social and geographical dualism between North and South, the sectoral dualism between competitive and non-competitive sectors, or the low level of female and youth employment. Employment services remained underdeveloped, and the implementation of training and retraining schemes had not been successful. More reforms were needed. The objective of the ‘pact for work’ approved under the Prodi government by the Minister of Labour, Treu, in 1996/7 was the reform of the employment policies. This included: decentralisation of employment offices; dismantling of the public monopoly system of mediating labour supply and demand; reform of the system of vocational training and building links with the education system; introduction of temporary work; new policies for local development; grants for job creation in the Mezzogiorno; and the reorganisation of public job schemes. This was followed by a social pact – the so called ‘Christmas pact’ of the D’Alema government – in 1998. The decentralisation of employment services was introduced and the regions and provinces are now responsible for job placement and the promotion of pro-active employment policies. This is a radical innovation in the nature and style of public regulation of the labour market. Finally, the 1999 Budget Law included provisions for reform of the social shock absorbers (passive unemployment cash benefits). So in the 1990s, ‘concertation emerged as the formal and institutional model for the mediation of interests … concertation was not only consolidated, but was also extended horizontally and vertically’ (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2000: 202). It introduced concessions for both the employers and the labour force.
Spain Employment policy reforms Until the mid-1970s, there was little problem with unemployment in Spain. Jobs were protected by the state and those who could not find jobs emigrated. Under the Franco regime, high dismissal costs (redundancy payments and administrative procedures to authorise dismissals) protected permanent jobs; work organisation was governed by labour regulations (ordenanzas labourales). Hence, during the Franco era, Spain enjoyed one of Europe’s lowest rates of unemployment (Encarnacion, 2000: 32).
Labour Market Policies 49
After Franco’s death and the consolidation of Spanish democracy (1977), Spain’s economy opened up to the outside world. The two oil shocks in the 1970s and the rapid liberalisation of the labour market meant job losses, high inflation, tax increases and workers’ grievances over loss of purchasing power. In an environment where the two most important unions (Union General de Trabajadores [UGT] and Confederacion Sindicat de Comisiones Obreras [CCOO], close to the Socialist and Communist parties respectively) defended laws protecting permanent employees, the government had to act swiftly. Its response was a form of ‘strategic neo-corporatism’. The government ‘conceded a substantial narrowing of wage differentials and the maintenance of Francoist employment protection, in return for wage moderation and an “implicit pact” between workers and economic managers under which the costs of economic modernisation would be accepted’ (Rhodes, 1997b: 114). The willingness of employers and unions to co-operate with the state has been attributed by Rhodes (1997b: 105) to their ‘organisational weaknesses and their joint concern to avoid social conflict given the fragility of democracy’. Thus unions legitimised themselves as social actors, employers were rewarded and the state promoted modernisation of the economy. Nevertheless, this tripartism was shortlived, as further attempts in the early 1990s by the government to unload responsibility for labour market policies onto the social partners failed, resulting in introduction of new measures unilaterally. Trade unions ceased to be a critical partner of either the state or the employers, and employers felt less need to compromise with the demands of a weakened labour movement in a highly fragmented labour market. When collective bargaining was introduced after the transition to democracy, the regulation of contracts was modified under the Moncloa Accords (signed by Spain’s democratically elected leader Adolfo Suarez in 1977) and the workers’ statute of 1980. The Moncloa Accords committed political parties from different parts of the ideological spectrum to cooperation aimed at economic and political stabilisation. These, together with newly formed trade unions and employers’ associations gave support to the government’s stabilisation programme. Moderation of wages was at the heart of the programme as a strategy to combat rising inflation and deal with the inflexible wage bargaining system. Wages were fixed on predicted inflation rates. The government adopted a ‘safety valve’ approach to the employment crisis (Rhodes, 1997b: 114). It is worth noting here that subsequent pacts negotiated between 1978 and 1986 were forged in the form of tripartite agreements between government, trade unions and employers’ associations or bilateral accords between employers’ associations and the unions (for example: the Interconfederal Framework Accord signed by the Confederacion Espanola de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE) and the UGT, which sought to stabilise and reform industrial and labour relations and regulate pay guidelines, working hours and productivity and also to draft
50 Southern European Welfare States
the Workers’ Charter which recognised the workers’ right to strike, legitimacy of trade union representation, etc.). The National Employment Accord signed in 1982 was the first accord to be signed by all the relevant actors (employers, government and labour). Its principal aim was to confront unemployment by creating jobs in the public sector. Another accord (the Social and Economic Accord) signed in the mid-1980s sought to inject more flexibility into the labour market by reducing restriction on part-time work and seasonal employment, increasing options for temporary employment and lowering the minimum wage standards for workers under 18 (Encarnacion, 2000: 39–40). Most of these pacts, however, negotiated increases in the ‘social wage’ and stipulated increases of state spending on education, housing and various welfare benefits. Hence, from the 1980s onwards, the government’s strategy for achieving wage moderation was based on encouraging further casualisation of employment. Since 1986, however, reforms have been introduced unilaterally by the government. These were not based on social concertation,7 which by the mid-1980s had broken down. The era of co-operation was not replaced by the era of confrontation in industrial–labour relations. Democratic institutions were no longer at risk, and the concertation process seemed to be a state-led strategy of regime change lacking the institutional foundations that characterised democratic corporatism (Bermeo, 1994: 609; Martinez and Blyton, 1995: 357). One other reason given for its demise is the rising unemployment which ‘conditioned the nature of the policies that [the socialist] PSOE felt were necessary for the country to overcome its economic problems’ (Encarnacion, 2000: 42) such as fiscal austerity and structural reform. Concertation had no place in an environment characterised by a quasi-Thatcherite economic and monetary discipline and marketdriven modernisation. A key component of the reform process was deregulation of the labour market aimed at reducing the costs involved in the hiring and firing of workers. Such reforms were cutting right through the heart of the working class. In an attempt to deal with restrictive dismissal procedures, low-cost, fixed-term contracts were legalised in 1980, despite the fact that the protection of permanent contracts remained in place. These reforms were introduced with the consent of the labour movement due to the economic recession and growing unemployment. Temporary contracts were seen by the unions as a quid pro quo for their demands for a reduction of overtime as a means of employment creation (Bentolila and Dolado, 1991: 85; Fina, Meixide and Toharia, 1989: 122–4; Rhodes, 1997b: 115). The irony is that casualisation of employment proved detrimental to their strength. At the same time, new restrictions on geographical mobility and mobility between occupational categories were introduced, which prevented adjustment to market conditions (Rhodes, 1997b: 107). The social dialogue failed during the late 1980s, which was a period characterised by economic
Labour Market Policies 51
growth. As a result, labour market reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s were introduced unilaterally by governments in consultation with employers’ associations rather than by a tripartite agreement between government, employers’ associations and the unions. The effects on employment were dramatic; the reforms had an immediate effect on unemployment rates, which declined from 22 per cent in 1986 to 16 per cent in 1990 (see Table 2.1). Nevertheless, fixed-term contracts with no firing costs introduced in the mid-1980s had a detrimental effect on training, human capital formation, innovation and productivity as these tend to discourage investment by firms in personnel training. Moreover, deregulation of fixed-term contract work led to a segmented labour market (OECD, 2000b: 54). ‘Expansion of temporary employment – which was largely “involuntary” – strengthened the bargaining power of those on a permanent contract (insiders), leading to higher wage settlements …’ (ibid.). Hence, the dualism of the Spanish labour market continued with those ‘in’ permanent contracts and hence ‘insiders’ and those ‘on the margins’ and hence more vulnerable to changes in labour demand. Those ‘on the margins’ tend to be the young and women. Trade union reactions to government attempts to encourage youth employment by reducing employers’ social security contributions and fixing payment at the level of statutory minimum wage were far from helpful. These attempts were denounced as ageist and as undermining the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. New reforms were introduced in the early 1990s. A bill was introduced to amend the 1980s Workers’ Statute and a decree law was introduced in 1993 on measures to reduce the budgetary costs of unemployment insurance and to promote employment via further deregulation of the labour market. New contracts were introduced aimed at combating unemployment and the expansion of the informal economy. Some were training and apprenticeship contracts but the bulk of them were contracts used for specific tasks and seasonal work. ‘Most of the one third of the work force now employed on a fixed-term basis have been recruited on such contracts’ (Rhodes, 1997b: 108). These are renewable for up to three years, unlike for example the training and apprenticeship contracts that incurred annulment costs. The fixed-term contracts did not fall outside the regulations limiting functional mobility. Moreover, apprenticeship contracts were introduced with relatively low social security contributions and reduced wages (ibid.). In addition, restrictions on part-time work were lifted and restrictive dismissal procedures were relaxed. In theory the cost of dismissal from a standard contract has been 20 days per year of service up to one year. In practice, however, the agreed sum has been higher in order to prevent claiming unfair dismissal in which case the cost rises to 45 days per year of service. Redundancy payments for collective dismissals can be around 50 days per year of service for each worker affected. In 1993, organisational and production reasons were added to the existing grounds for collective
52 Southern European Welfare States
redundancies (namely technological and economic exigencies). Later, incentives in the form of public subsidies to employers and reductions in social security contributions were provided to employers for the transformation of temporary positions into more permanent jobs. This pact was triggered by the unions’ fear of the potential of privatisation by the rightwing government which came into office in 1996 and the relative weakening of left-wing parties due to corruption and internal divisions. Although it is difficult to estimate the effects of these reforms, the sharp distinction between temporary and permanent work contracts and the cultivation of this ‘culture of temporary contracts’ may have long-term effects. These include: a downward pressure on wages; insecurity due to potential dismissals; negative effects on productivity due to the associated reduced emphasis on training; and enhanced labour market dualism. Attempts in the early 1990s to revive concertation were not successful. For example a social pact designed to ease the introduction of recent unemployment measures collapsed, as the package put forward by the government was rejected by the unions. The government could no longer convince the unions to accept its proposed labour market policies on promises of welfare expansion – employers’ social costs are high and budgetary restrictions tighter than ever. Unemployment As illustrated earlier in this chapter, unemployment in Spain is much higher than in other Southern European countries, reaching its peak in 1994. According to Argandona (1997: 197), even if one takes into account participation in the informal economy, unemployment is only reduced by around 3.5 per cent, that is to approximately 20–21 per cent. One could include among the factors contributing to the rise in unemployment the rather generous unemployment benefits.8 In the 1980s we saw the expansion of the unemployment benefit coverage from 25–70 per cent of the workforce. Unemployment benefits became more generous. They were untaxed until January 1994, and paid on a sliding scale of 80 per cent of previous income in the first six months, 70 per cent from six to 12 months and 60 per cent from 12–24 months. In 1992, a number of changes were introduced in entitlements to unemployment benefits in order to reduce the disincentives to work. The minimum period of work to qualify for benefits was increased from six months to one year. The duration of benefits was reduced from an average of 20–12 months. Unemployment insurance9 coverage fell to 62 per cent in the mid-1990s. A lump sum unemployment insurance benefit was abandoned and eligibility requirements were tightened up. The beginning of benefits was delayed until the exhaustion of severance payments. Long-term unemployment was concentrated in groups which have no entitlement to unemployment
Labour Market Policies 53
benefits such as the young and women with no work experience. A number of controls were introduced against fraud in addition to making unemployment insurance benefits subject to social security contributions. This succeeded in reducing the budgetary cost of unemployment insurance by 33 per cent. Other schemes which could contribute to a reduction of the unemployment rate are: lump sums to the long-term unemployed who decide to become self-employed; higher subsidies for employment and vocational training of people with special needs; and various initiatives related to working time and vocational training. It is to the last two that we will now turn our attention. Working time Work sharing was initially non-existent in Spain, while the extent of parttime work has been limited. Part-time work has not become popular despite the fact that it was facilitated by the 1984 employment reforms. In 1993, only 6.3 per cent of workers were employed part-time (Grubb and Wells, 1994: 31). This has to do partly with the fact that it incurred the same social security costs for employers as full time work. In 1993 new reforms were designed to make part-time work more attractive. Under these reforms, employers’ contributions have been relaxed for those employed less than 12 hours per week and they cover only industrial accidents, workrelated illnesses and payment of wages. Furthermore, in 1993 overtime was made less attractive to employees by replacing premium rates for overtime (75 per cent above ordinary rates) with standard ones. Moreover, a system of early retirement (without this being compulsory) allows companies to rejuvenate their workforce. For example, workers received 60 per cent of their state pension entitlement at the age of 60, 76 per cent at age 62, and 92 per cent at age 64. Jobs could also be created or saved by reducing hours of work to 35 hours per week, a policy proposal opposed by the Spanish government during EU negotiations. Since 1999, legislation concerning part-time and temporary work has been modified. The new legislation aims at boosting these by reducing social security contributions on new part-time permanent contracts and equalising accrued rights of pensions to those on full-time contracts. Vocational training Fixed-term contracts, labour market segmentation and high labour volatility have had a detrimental effect on training. Firms adopted a short-term outlook towards competitiveness and hence there was little investment in human capital formation (Rhodes, 1997b: 117). The national vocational training system has been deficient. This is partly due to poor co-ordination between the three basic training bodies, namely the Foundation for Vocational Training, the Ministry of Education and the Public Employment
54 Southern European Welfare States
Office. Under the National Programme of Professional Training (1993–6) some activities were transferred to the regions. Some regions (the Basque Country, Valencia) have more flexible and effective training structures than other regions depleted by unemployment such as Andalucia, where the institutional infrastructure remains inadequate (Rhodes, 1995). In 1999, active labour market policies received funding amounting to 0.7 per cent of the GDP, but no systematic research exists on the implementation of these policies and their effectiveness. Nevertheless, participation in training programmes is weak when compared to other OECD countries (Spain ranks 19th among the 24 OECD countries) (OECD, 1999a). Employment protection legislation tends to reduce the turnover of core workers and leads to employers treating temporary workers not covered by such legislation as cheap, rather than providing incentives for workers to embark on firm-specific training programmes by undergoing a period of lower earnings, or for firms to provide general training for their employees (OECD, 2000b: 55). Hence workers in temporary jobs experience difficulties in securing access to more stable jobs. Instead, they tend to move from one temporary job to another or to rotate from a temporary job to unemployment and then back to another temporary job. The young are especially affected by this phenomenon, as almost 75 per cent of them work on fixed-term contracts (ibid.). On the other hand, the plethora of fixed-term contracts and the high unemployment rate do not mean downward pressure on wages since wages are negotiated by core workers with stable jobs sheltered from unemployment risks. Lower wages paid to temporary workers tend to compensate for higher wages paid to core workers. The level of employment protection legislation was reduced through the 1997 labour market reform under which a new permanent contract with lower firing costs was introduced for the recruitment of those exposed to unemployment (for example: youth, long-term unemployed and so on). This was reinforced by cuts in social security contributions over a two-year period. Individual dismissals were justified with lower severance payments. Agreement to avoid renegotiations of wage settlements at different bargaining levels was reached between social partners. Since the reform was implemented, the unemployment rate has dropped while the number of permanent contracts has increased (OECD, 2000b: 57). However, the proportion of workers under fixed-term contracts has remained at approximately 33 per cent of total employment reflecting an increase of fixed-term contracts in the public sector, while there was an increase in part-time contracts as a result of a new subsidised part-time contract in January 1999. Permanent contracts increased as well (2 million such contracts were signed from January 1998 to October 1999) (OECD, 2000b: 27). Incentives will be extended and redesigned to benefit groups of workers whose employability in permanent employment has not increased.
Labour Market Policies 55
Portugal Employment policy reforms In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the Portuguese economy suffered from severe structural problems associated inter alia with a large inefficient primary sector, an inefficient secondary sector, high state intervention in price regulation and market processes, and bad infrastructure. Despite these problems the Portuguese labour market has performed very well since the mid-1980s. Labour supplies continued to be absorbed and unemployment remained low by EU standards (see Table 2.1). This was in spite of job losses in the primary sector and increasing female participation rates in the secondary and tertiary sectors, low educational qualifications (resulting in low-skilled labour) even by South European standards and a relatively low percentage of salaried workers when compared with Greece, for example. This is partly due to the fact that the Portuguese labour market displays a high degree of flexibility in spite of the rigidity in much of labour market legislation. Since 1990, Portugal has been ahead of Greece in terms of GDP per capita. Greece now occupies the lowest position among the EU member states. Of course wage dispersion and earnings differentials are high. Legislation supporting atypical forms of work was introduced earlier in Portugal than in Spain: legislation on fixed-term contracts was introduced in 1976. At the time, despite reforms introduced as far back as in the 1960s to permit collective agreements on wages, unions had little power to negotiate salaries, work conditions and labour relations. Wages were low, often supplemented by agricultural production for self-consumption, petty-trade and remittances from emigrants. It was after the revolution of 1974 that union rights improved and collective bargaining, minimum wages and social security-related reforms were introduced (many of which were included in the 1976 constitution). Among the most important changes were the establishment of minimum and maximum wages; paid vacations; a shorter working week; limits on collective and individual hiring and firing; and the payment of a 14th wage. Fixed-term contracts were important for employment growth in the 1980s, when employers were trying to cope with the stringent restrictions associated with dismissal regulations (no severance payment was due for workers employed on an atypical basis). In 1983, non-permanent contracts accounted for approximately 23 per cent of wage employment. By the end of the 1980s, new legislation introduced measures which made non-permanent contracts more difficult. For example, severance payments for atypical work were introduced; nonpermanent workers were given an incentive to move to permanent jobs and the conditions under which such contracts could be used were limited. As a result, there was a decline in temporary contracts in the 1990s and by the mid-1990s non-permanent contracts accounted for approximately 12 per cent of wage employment.
56 Southern European Welfare States
The present mechanism of social concertation was introduced in 1984. Since then, wide social pacts have been concluded in the context of a strategic framework for improving national competitiveness in the sphere of the economy. As a result, changes in incomes policy, tax regimes, pensions, benefits and vocational training were introduced. One of the most important agreements reached was the Economic and Social Agreement of 1990. It focused on improving the international competitiveness of Portuguese firms and on promoting the growth of real wages, the target being the EU average, under non-inflationary conditions. The 1990 agreement paved the way for a wider reform of labour law in line with employers’ pressures. In addition, a recommendation on working time to be reduced to 40 hours per week by 1995 was introduced and flexibilisation of work schedules was encouraged; implementation would be decided by collective agreements. However, due to problems with implementation, the socialist government imposed the 40-hour work week by law in 1996. Another important step towards the reinforcement of social concertation is the so-called ‘short-term social pact’ signed in 1996. The agreement, inter alia introduced regulations for child labour, adopted a policy of local initiative programmes for job creation and facilitated the implementation of measures such as a more flexible organisation of working time based on functional flexibility. In addition, the regulations governing temporary and part-time work were revised, the goal being to create incentives for part-time work. Changes in the social security system initiated by this accord are discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, a minimum income scheme was introduced, while the maximum period for unemployment assistance payments was increased to 15 months for those whose unemployment insurance benefits had been exhausted and to 30 months in other cases. The pact also introduced training measures, including on-thejob training. Portugal still suffers from a low level of educational attainment as many young people tend to leave school without qualifications. The mechanisms for the transition from school to working life tend to be insufficient. Consequently, the development of skills and competencies is a priority. This is important as it is likely to facilitate re-employment and reduce the vulnerability of those who lost their jobs and those at risk (for example, young people who want to enter the labour market for the first time). A specific programme aimed at developing youth information and educational guidance (AZIMUTE) was introduced in the late 1990s and employment training programmes are being restructured to meet the needs of target groups; programmes are now monitored more systematically (introduction of performance indicators). A quarter of all the unemployed can benefit from active labour market policies (OECD, 1999b: 113). Such schemes are also preventive in that their purpose is to ensure adaptability of the target groups to changing needs.
Labour Market Policies 57
In 1998 and 1999 employment increased at an annual rate of about 2.5 per cent (OECD, 1999b) because of the boom in the construction industry and services. Youth unemployment is one of the lowest in Europe (10.3 per cent in 1998). Self-employment is higher than in the other OECD countries (with the exception of Greece and Turkey). Its share is approximately 26 per cent of total employment, while the proportion of part-time work remains one of the lowest in the OECD (estimated at approximately 11 per cent of total employment) (ibid.). Long-term unemployment is, however, of some concern. Unemployment Before the mid-1970s, unemployment figures were so low (see Table 2.1) that the terms ‘unemployment’ or ‘unemployed’ were rarely mentioned in labour market studies in Portugal. Most preferred to include the unemployed in a wider group of ‘non-active’ individuals, which included the retired. In those days surplus labour was absorbed by emigration and the military. In the mid-1970s, unemployment started to rise. It increased from 1.3 per cent of the active population in the early 1970s to 7.9 per cent in the late 1970s (see Table 2.1). This was a result of the oil shock, the aftermath of de-colonisation and the half a million retornados (returnees) from former colonies10 as well as the tightening up of immigration laws in receiving countries which up till then served as a destination for surplus labour. Despite efforts made to create jobs, unemployment has remained relatively high in comparison to the early 1970s. Nevertheless, in the mid1990s, Portugal’s unemployment rate (7.3 per cent in 1995 and 4.7 per cent in 1999) was far below that of Greece, Italy and Spain, and of the EU average (10.7 per cent in 1995 and 9.6 per cent in 1999) (see Table 2.1). The gap between male and female unemployment is small compared to Spain, for example. Female youth unemployment decreased between the mid1980s and the early 1990s. Young workers seem to have better prospects of finding a job than adult women over 24. Those at risk are mainly women with an intermediary level of education and job experience who have taken time off to attend to family responsibilities. Large-scale restructuring, plant closures and downsizing during the recession that erupted in 1991 increased the risks of unemployment. Regional inequalities in terms of unemployment are less marked in Portugal than they are in Spain (for example, Andalusia, Extremadura) and Italy (mainly the South). Having said that, unemployment is lower in northern and central regions and highest in the South (for example, the unemployment rate in Alentejo is nowadays above 11 per cent; in Setubal in the mid-1980s it reached the 20 per cent figure) (Marques, 2000: 188). Today, ‘because of the central role ascribed to the state, the ideology and political action of political parties place a great deal of emphasis on the problem of employment and unemployment’ (Bacalhau and Bruneau,
58 Southern European Welfare States
2000: 138). Three nationwide surveys were carried out in 1978, 1984 and 1993 by Bacalhau and Bruneau (2000) on public perceptions about unemployment covering the whole of Continental Portugal. In the 1993 survey in particular, unemployment was perceived as a very important social problem faced by Portuguese society. Respondents pointed to the government as agents for resolving the problem. Therefore unemployment is politically important in Portugal. Since the mid-1970s however, social security in Portugal is governed by the parameters of the 1976 constitution. The unemployment insurance scheme was introduced in 1974. Decree Law No. 20 of 1985 extended unemployment benefit rights, calculated as a direct percentage of former earnings, to those who had lost their jobs. The unemployment compensation system consists of two schemes: unemployment insurance (which applies to all the insured); and unemployment assistance (which applies only to full-time employees and is a means-tested benefit). Unemployment insurance benefits are granted to those who have been rendered unemployed involuntarily, are available for and capable of work and have registered at the employment office. They must not be in receipt of invalidity or old age pensions (for details on the latter see Chapter 4). If one has exhausted the entitlement for unemployment insurance benefits, one can claim unemployment assistance. Moreover, there is an early retirement scheme. In 1997, a scheme for a guaranteed minimum income was established. This was an important development in a climate of slow economic growth (0.7 per cent on average in the early 1990s as opposed to 4.8 per cent on average in the late 1980s) (Hampson, 1997: 172). The duration of benefits depends on the age of the claimant. For example, the entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits is up to ten months for those under the age of 25 and up to 33 months for those aged 55 or over. In 1988, significant reforms contributed to the improvement of benefits and the widening of coverage to include new entrants into the labour force. Nevertheless, access to unemployment benefits is limited. Entitlements to unemployment benefits are strict in that they require three years’ uninterrupted insurance contributions. Earnings from part-time work lead to the suspension of unemployment insurance. An unemployment assistance scheme provides means-tested benefits to those who are not entitled to unemployment insurance. In the mid-1990s, people receiving financial aid received on average ‘the equivalent of the minimum wage (about US $350 per month) which is less than half of the national average earnings, which in turn are the lowest in the European Union … [Moreover] redundancy payments and unemployment benefits rose together only from 0.2 to 0.4 per cent of family incomes’ (Cabral, 2000: 232). Hence, the incentives to indulge in voluntary unemployment are simply not there. Pluriactivity and participation in vocational training schemes conceal pervasive underemployment.
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Vocational training Vocational training was traditionally linked to schools and in the past there were few guidance services specifically for adults. In the mid-1980s, only 5 per cent of young people were receiving any technical or vocational training. By the end of the 1980s, vocational guidance was only available in about one-third of schools. Various attempts have been made to rationalise non-school vocational training in recent years. These are managed by the Employment and Vocational Training Institute. It is organised on a regional basis and is responsible for the implementation of employment policy, management of employment grants and training programmes. A new institution (INFONOR) established in 1996 aims at enhancing innovative procedures in training. Nowadays, a large number of young people are kept off the ‘dole’ thanks to a set of ‘vocational training courses’ financed by the EU and a series of schemes subsidising self-employment. The number of people estimated to be kept off the ‘dole’ in the mid-1990s was around 150,000 (Cabral, 2000: 232). Many of the resources for the development of active labour market policies come from the European Social Fund. In the period 1994–99 the funds allocated to Portugal amounted to 2,654 million ECUs. Despite this, in comparison with other Southern European member states, educational opportunities remain limited, which makes training important as a mechanism for compensating for the lack of general educational opportunities (Rhodes, 1995: 312–13). However, the success of the existing training system is low and requires further development ‘establishing nationally recognised standards in skill and development’ (OECD, 1996a, 1991). An individualised programme with systematic interaction combining training, guidance, and job entry was introduced in mid-1998 for the long-term unemployed.11
Greece Employment policy reforms The Greek ‘formal’ labour market seems to be more inflexible than that of the other three countries. The 1980s were characterised by strong government intervention in setting higher minimum wages not always in line with changes in productivity or levels of unemployment. This may have been necessary, because the minimum wages have been among the lowest in Europe, but it had a negative effect on unemployment, which became an acute problem especially among the young and women. To tackle the problems of rising unemployment, policy reforms were introduced in the 1990s by the government in a unilateral way, that is without the consensus of the trade unions. These included the abandonment of the automatic inflation indexation system for wages. The employment laws which were passed in 1996 and in 2001 provided incentives for
60 Southern European Welfare States
job creation and improvement in the functioning of the OAED.12 Reforms in the vocational training system and regulations for the funding of vocational training were also introduced in an attempt to avoid corruption and to improve its functioning. Moreover, the launching of the social dialogue between social partners (employers, employees) and the state in 1997 and again in 2000 put the issues of work flexibility and the shift from passive to active labour market measures on the agenda. The policy measures put on the agenda by government officials were inter alia the following: ●
● ●
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In times of high demand for labour, employees can work up to ten hours per day or 40 hours per week, while at times of low demand their working time can be reduced. Work time flexibility is aimed at reducing overtime work and associated costs and provides incentives for job creation. Hence workers who in the past were employed for extra hours during peak seasons now lose their overtime pay. Institutionalisation of part-time work in the public sector. Setting a ceiling as to the maximum percentage of part-time workers in the private and public sectors. Introduction of early retirement schemes and cuts in pensions of those who have a job generating an income of around or above 800 euros per month. Social protection measures for those in atypical work. Reduction in the non-wage labour costs for employment by enterprises of people in groups hit by unemployment (for example, the unemployed over 50 years of age, the young or the unemployed in sectors hit by recession such as textiles, the steel industry and shipbuilding). Measures combating evasion of contributions to IKA by firms which have proceeded to dismissals but failed to pay off their debt to IKA. Encouragement of the formation of local employment pacts between enterprises, OAED and various social actors by providing subsidies to enterprises operating in areas hit by deindustrialisation and hence unemployment (for example, subsidies towards non-wage labour costs, subsidies towards training programmes, and so on) willing to enter into such pacts. Decrease of dismissal compensation paid by firms to salaried workers.
These issues have been opposed by representatives of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Greece (GSEE) and parties of the opposition. The employment pacts were seen by GSEE as a way of introducing flexibilisation through the back door. GSEE has proposed the reduction of working time to 35 hours per week without reduction in salaries, as a measure for combating unemployment. The Association of Greek Industrialists (SEV) however, proposed the introduction of two-speed unemployment benefits: one for six months from OAED and one for a longer period from the state budget. They also suggested more work flexibility, flexible wages, work sharing,
Labour Market Policies 61
relaxation of the strict conditions concerning group dismissals, exemption of up to two years for employers from paying contributions for newly employed persons and reduction of employers’ contributions to LAEK (the Fund for Employment and Vocational Training managed by OAED). Due to the great divergence of positions of the two parts, the social dialogue produced no concensus and hence the government decided to introduce new legislative measures unilaterally covering most of the above mentioned measures aimed at the deregulation of the labour market. Such ineffectiveness on the part of the unions may further erode union credibility and strength, unless the particular demands of those employed in the informal sector (women, the young, migrants) and the unemployed can effectively be articulated along with those of the rest of the union movement. Working time Elaborate labour market legislation regulating working time was introduced in the 1980s and much of it still remains in place. Law 1387 of 1983 sets limits on the number of employees who can be dismissed (around 2–3 per cent per month). Other pieces of legislation regulate overtime, weekly rest periods and night work. Legislation aimed at increasing flexibility of working time was introduced in the 1990s. Part-time work as well as fixedterm contracts were strongly supported alongside the possibility of using a fourth shift. These were seen by the government as steps towards stimulating productivity and job creation. However, little use of these types of contract has been made, due perhaps to the large informal sector, where most of these jobs are to be found. ‘Plant-level flexibility has led neither to productivity-increasing technological upgrading nor to sustaining job creation’ (Seferiades, 2000: 65). Informal activities do of course contribute to unemployment relief (Leontidou, 1993). The paradox is that at the same time we have a growing ‘crisis of informalisation’ with an increase in the informal/invisible jobless rate (Seferiades, 2000: 65). New legislation introduced in 1998 encouraged further flexibilisation (see above) in an attempt to preserve existing jobs and the formation of new ones. The five main innovations stipulated are the following: 1. reduction of overtime costs by calculating working time over a longer period (thus permitting work of up to ten hours per day with a limit of a 48-hour week); 2. introduction of employment contracts based on a national minimum wage in areas of high unemployment (opting out, in other words, from collective agreements signed at the firm or the sectoral level); 3. promotion of part-time work as this amounts in Greece to only 4 per cent of total employment; 4. increasing the effectiveness of existing active labour market programmes – new employment subsidy programmes run by the Organisation for the
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Employment of the Labour Force (OAED) through new centres for the promotion of employment, providing the young unemployed the opportunity to gain work experience; 5. use of labour inspectors. (OECD, 1998a: 70–72) Unemployment13 Until the mid-1970s unemployment was not seen as a major problem in Greece. Unemployment was kept low by means of massive emigration during the period 1955–75, a bloated public sector,14 a long tradition of selfemployment and ungenerous unemployment benefits (see below) creating a disincentive for people to remain unemployed. The situation has changed since then. Although unemployment in Greece is not as high as it is in Spain, Greece is cited as the second highest unemployment country of the EU in the relevant literature (Symes, 1995). The rates of youth (29.8 per cent of the total number of unemployed in 1995) and long-term unemployment (52.4 per cent in 1995) have been particularly worrisome (Seferiades, 2000: 60). Reasons cited in the literature include: structural rigidities associated with the employment protection legislation mentioned above, which in turn restricts flexibility and raises labour costs (European Commission, 1997a: 38); increased participation of women in the labour market; contraction of employment in the primary sector; and lack of investments, especially by the private sector. Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge that these structural rigidities operate alongside a flexible informal economy. Unemployment is characterised by dualism, hitting certain social groups, such as first-time job-seekers and women, hard (Karakatsanis, 2000: 241). This reflects traditional cultural norms and practices, whereby the male breadwinner is expected to be the main provider in the family. It is worth noting here that ‘social criteria’ (such as family status, number of children, level of family income, etc.) rather than professional qualifications and work experience per se, were in the 1980s an important factor for getting a job in the public sector, especially in low-ranking posts. One of the most important coping mechanisms is the strong support offered by the family to its unemployed or underemployed members (see Chapter 3). ‘The quid pro quo relations inherent in both Greek political clientelism as well as in personal familism have protected most Greeks against the negative consequences of unemployment by informally institutionalising several stop-gap measures’ (Karakatsanis, 2000: 245). One such measure has traditionally been the extensive patronage-based recruitment to the Greek public sector, the latter acting as the main source of employment creation especially during periods when governments sought to bolster their electoral support. As people retired (early retirement was encouraged with generous pensions) freeing up public sector positions, new party faithfuls entered. ‘From 1981 to 1990, general government employment grew at three times the rate of
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private-sector employment, increasing at a rate of approximately 30 per cent of the Greek workforce – about double the OECD average’ (ibid.: 251). The public sector, alongside a highly rigid labour market awarding generous severance payments to dismissed workers, restricting dismissals and preventing unilateral reductions in working hours by management, were acting as a shield against increases in unemployment rates. Since 1994 and the introduction of law 2190/1994, which aimed at establishing an objective and transparent system of recruitment to the public sector, the traditional clientelistic practices have allegedly subsided. Moreover, because the process of joining the EMU has exerted pressure towards the retrenchment of public expenses (due to the criteria thresholds of article 109 of the Treaty of the European Union which Greece has tried to fulfil) there has been a slight decrease in the numbers employed in public administration. In consequence, the public sector can no longer play its traditional role as a safety valve against the pressures of unemployment. This gap in social protection by the public sector is partially filled by the civil society, especially by family and kin (see Chapter 3). Passive measures for the unemployed In Greece, there is no national minimum income scheme for individuals and families with insufficient resources. No general non-contributory minimum exists (European Commission, 1999a: 458):15 Thus, a person who is neither old nor has special needs, but has neither a job nor contributory entitlements nor source of income, is not entitled to any support from the state, as evidence of low income and of living in poverty are not in themselves enough to entitle one to any support from the state. (Ferrera, 1996: 20) An unemployment benefit scheme is available for first-time job-seekers between 20 and 29 years of age and for some repatriate groups (European Commission, 1999a: 412, 518). Unemployment benefits are granted on a contributory basis (financed by employers’ and employees’ contributions – the two parties contribute 3 per cent and 1 per cent of gross salary respectively).16 The benefits are not generous and last for a relatively short time. Eligibility depends on a number of factors: the applicant must have worked at least 125 days during the 14 months prior to the termination of employment (different regulations exist for those employed on a seasonal basis). Hence, of those registered as unemployed, only about half receive unemployment benefits. The duration of the benefit depends on the number of days the applicant has worked over the 14 months prior to dismissal, as well as on the person’s age. Those who have worked 125 days receive the benefits for five months
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whereas those who have worked for 300 days or more receive them for a year (Demekas and Kontolemis, 1997: 35). Such meagre benefits are unlikely to create work disincentives or the risk of an unemployment trap. Young people who have never worked are not entitled to receive unemployment benefits. The only allowance given to the young unemployed (aged between 20 and 29) is of short duration (five months only) and rather modest (25,000 drachmas per month) (Law 1545/1985), that is approximately one-fifth of the minimum salary. Those eligible must have been registered as unemployed within three months after having completed either their 20th year of age or their military service or obtained a degree or finished their studies. The benefit is granted after having remained unemployed for a year or having earned less than 80 wages within a year. This gap in social protection by the public sector is filled by other sectors, namely the family and kin. Parents have the obligation to support their children until they get full employment. Other actors include some particularistic networks, the informal sector and the Greek Orthodox Church (Leontidou, 1993; Symeonidou, 1995; Cavounidis, 1996; Karantinos et al., 1992: 34–5; Katrougalos, 1996: 56). Vocational training A coherent and systematic policy of vocational training is still lacking in Greece. The low unemployment rates of the 1970s and early 1980s (see Table 2.1) provide a partial explanation. During the 1980s, ‘the active labour market policies, especially in the field of vocational training and reorientation of unemployed people remained rudimentary and did not have any considerable influence on the overall structure of the social protection system (Law 1116/1981, Law 1262/1982)’ (Katrougalos, 1996: 54). Spending on labour market programmes increased rapidly in the 1980s – between 1985 and 1987 public expenditure on such programmes increased by 63 per cent in nominal terms (Karantinos et al., 1992: 27; Stathopoulos, 1996). However it still remains the lowest in the EU, absorbing 0.39 per cent of the GDP in 1992 (Katrougalos, 1996: 54). With regard to active employment measures such as vocational training and subsidised employment, these are rather rudimentary when compared with other EU countries, such as Portugal (0.33 per cent, 0.07 per cent), Denmark (0.47 per cent, 0.43 per cent), Germany (0.42 per cent, 0.34 per cent), France (0.44 per cent, 0.26 per cent) and Ireland (0.48 per cent, 0.43 per cent) amounting to only 0.16 per cent and 0.08 per cent respectively of the GDP in the early 1990s (OECD, 1995, cited in Petmesidou, 1996a: 341). The active labour market policies (training, subsidised employment) in operation since the late 1980s are mainly funded by the European Social Fund (ESF) and other EU programmes.17 These mainly aim at providing vocational training to young people with no qualifications (school drop-outs) and at helping those who have skills to update them, as well as promoting
Labour Market Policies 65
self-employment (Symes, 1995: 40). These came about as part of the European Community’s transition programme (1982–7) aimed at facilitating the transition from school to work for those aged 14–18 and to prepare young disadvantaged people for a better entry into adult and working life (Blakely, 1990: 16). Other programmes were introduced under the third phase (1984–9) of the Young Worker Programme whose objectives were, inter alia, to enable participants (aged between 18 and 28) to gain vocational experience. An integrated approach started to emerge from 1989 onwards, when the social dimension of the then European Community was advanced further. Young people also benefited under the Social Charter of 1989 that Greece had signed. They were to be entitled to ‘initial vocational training of a sufficient duration to enable them to adapt to the requirements of their future working life’ (point 23). Moreover, Greek ‘youth’ benefited from programmes introduced in the late 1980s, such as Petra (1987) which aimed to enhance the participation of young workers in networks of training activities, and Youthstart, which brought the problem of youth unemployment in the forefront of the political debate and agenda for action. It identified young people as one of the groups especially encountering problems in the labour market, a cohort in need of special attention. Regarding national efforts, the Greek Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED) provides subsidies to employers for hiring young unemployed people (aged between 18 and 25). It also gives subsidies to young people for creating their own micro-businesses and especially to those who set up a business in a ‘high in unemployment area’ (mainly deindustrialised areas such as Lavrion, North Evia, Patra etc.). In addition, it provides financial assistance to those who employ disadvantaged groups, such as young delinquents, refugees, migrants, people with special needs, ex-drug addicts and lone parents. Moreover, since the late 1980s the resources for vocational training schemes have been increasing, as Community aid helped to increase the percentage of GDP devoted to education by an average of 0.22 per cent, and contributed to the introduction of some active labour market measures (European Commission, 1995b: 22). A thorough evaluation of the impact of ESF funding in Greece is lacking. Nevertheless, as Petmesidou (1996a: 342) notes, quoting a former minister of labour, ‘the 700 billion drachmas of the first CSF [Community Support Framework (1989–93)] for the labour market policy were spent “without planning, without a developmental and social policy orientation and, consequently, without any substantial impact on the enhancement of human resources” ’. During the implementation of the First Support Framework, a large number of fictitious centres for vocational training (KEKs) sprang up. These totally lacked any experience and know-how in organising and delivering such training courses. Their primary aim was to appropriate the financial resources available from the ESF ‘while workers and the unemployed cooperated with this colossal manipulation in return for meagre benefits’
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(Petmesidou, 1996a: 342). The picture has slightly improved since the implementation of the Second Support Framework (1994–99); this is due to the introduction of new legislation aimed at rationalising vocational training by allowing only certified centres to deliver training courses (ibid.). An evaluation of these projects and their success in combating youth unemployment is, however, lacking. Moreover, the institutions responsible for the implementation of the programmes do not keep records of who benefited and in what way. As a result, an evaluation of these programmes becomes almost impossible (interview with officials in the National Institute of Labour).
Conclusion This chapter has concentrated on employment and labour market policies in Southern Europe. Policy-makers had to deal with demands for flexibility and efficiency in a labour market which is highly heterogeneous and fragmented, creating cohorts of marginalisation and different forms and degrees of exclusion, especially amongst undocumented migrants, the young, etc. In all four countries the debate among policy-makers about how best to tackle unemployment focused in the 1980s and more so in the 1990s on labour market flexibility as a way of boosting the employment figures. The labour market flexibility issue, whether numerical, wage-level or working-time flexibility (fixed-term, part-time or temporary), is, however, much more complicated than was once thought to be. It is closely linked to unemployment benefit systems as well as to demands for vocational training and new support structures promoting collaboration between various social actors and the state. At the level of wages, all four countries have accepted the EU minimum wage regulations. Could these be reformed to allow for sub-minimum wages at regional and local levels thus taking into account variations in supply and demand of labour, skills etc.? Would this contribute to the creation of jobs? Unemployment in Southern Europe is not always associated with the loss of a steady full-time job, as it may result from inability to get a job in the first place by those outside the labour force who face difficulties in making the initial entry into employment (for example, the young and people in early retirement). Often regular and marginal employment go hand in hand. Full-time employment in the informal sector may result in uncompensated unemployment. Variations in labour market structures and policies, and the interrelation between the formal and informal sectors make conclusive interpretations of such issues and related policies risky and cumbersome and invite relative, partial and inconclusive answers. As shown in the next chapter, household organisation and social structures impact on patterns of economic activity and on the degree of protection different people seeking work may have. For example, eligibility
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requirements for job-seekers can become flexible if someone has the right connections in the public sector. The case of participation in training programmes which affect prospects of recruitment is similar. Also, women tend to concentrate on atypical forms of employment. Hence ‘eligibility conditions based on a continuous employment history and minimum weekly hours or earnings thresholds exacerbate women’s unequal access to benefits’ (Grimshaw and Rubery, 1997: 293). Finally, the family may be assigned a subsidiary welfare role that may lead people to consider themselves inactive rather than unemployed. This is particularly relevant to young people and to women. In terms of other types of flexibility, although all four countries have a weak welfare state, elaborate labour market legislation has been introduced, aimed at regulating employment and working time. Moreover, the informal sector and clientelistic networks may reduce the risk of unemployment through atypical forms of support for participation in active labour market policies, for instance. Regarding social dialogue, in Italy and Portugal we have the re-emergence of concertation in the 1990s, with wide-ranging social agreements which have led to reforms in working conditions, welfare provision, etc. In Spain on the other hand, social concertation slowed down after attempts at promoting social pacts in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The fixed-term, unemployed and informal workforce remain beyond the reach of the major unions, like GSEE in Greece, linked to the PASOK and UGT (Union General de Trabajadores) which are under the umbrella of the Socialist Party and CCOO (Confederacion Sindicat de Comisiones Obreras) in Spain which is close to the Spanish Communist Party. As the social solidarities of the past are weakening, organised labour finds it difficult to find a means to successfully represent the interests of the highly segmented labour force in Spain (Burgess, 2000; Encarnacion, 2000) and Greece (Seferiades, 2000). In all four countries trade union support has dropped over the last two decades and trade union discourse has lost its appeal as ‘the voice of labour against capitalism’. Other forms of solidarity and alliances are currently in the process of being built along ethnic rather than class lines. Rising unemployment has become a salient political issue in Southern Europe in general and in Spain in particular. Compensatory policies for the unemployed have been key components of trade union lobbying. However, the benefits offered vary from one state to another and from one region to another. Italy’s benefits are very modest when compared to Spain’s and Portugal’s (Fawcett and Papadopoulos, 1997: 15), while in Greece benefits are the lowest in the EU (Symeonidou, 1996: 73). Moreover, access to benefits varies in that large numbers of people lose their benefits over time, while others do not qualify for state compensation schemes as the work they do is not bound up with official definitions of work, namely that recognised and regulated by the state. As Bermeo (2000b: 269) puts it, ‘the
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wage economies of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece are supplemented by sizeable non-wage and informal economies and both of these supplemental economies help to mitigate unemployment’s most negative effects’ by providing an important source of income for those officially unemployed. A wide range of activities, including clandestine work in all sectors of the economy, provide an alternative process of income generation intimately bound up with the formal economy of these countries and is deeply embedded in the social fabric of Southern European societies (Mingione and Magatti, 1995).
3 Gender Inequalities, Family and Social Welfare: Continuity and Change
Introduction Until the 1990s, comparative work on the gendered dimensions of systems of social provision in Southern Europe was rather scarce. The short-sightedness of male-centred approaches has contributed to mystifying the bases of male domination and female subordination in these societies. Recent years have seen the proliferation of single-country studies, formulating generalisations and thus overlooking differences in the form and degree of gender inequality within these countries. In this chapter we shall show how the triad of institutions – the welfare state, the family and the labour market in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal – interact, shaping the specific gender orders by which relationships between men and women are constructed. Taking into account cultural assumptions and legal stipulations about the rights and obligations attributed to men and women, we will look at the different aspects through which gender inequality is manifested (especially, participation in the labour market, women’s role in the family and household, the discrimination of women within social security), touching upon themes of change and continuity across systems of social provision. As Orloff (2000: 2) put it, ‘the relationship among welfare states, families and labour markets provides an explanation for the prevailing “gender cultures” in Southern Europe’. The following questions are addressed: how do women and men in Southern Europe reconcile employment and family life? To what extent does social policy in Southern Europe reinforce a male breadwinner/female care-provider model of the family? We will try to answer these questions by looking at labour-force participation for men and women in brief (for more details see Chapter 2), the role of the family and of the church in encouraging traditional gender roles, and the role of the Southern European welfare states in discouraging gender equality. 69
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A rapid transformation in the role of women in Southern European societies has taken place during the last two decades or so. As a result the gap between old and new generations and also between rural and urban settings has broadened. Young women and especially those living in large cities, do seem to aspire to greater involvement in paid work than their parents’ generation; older patterns of behaviour are breaking; as we shall show below; there is a rural–urban difference as well as a difference between cohorts of population depending on their age, education, income etc. As Gonzalez, Jurado and Naldini (2000: 11) put it, ‘this situation defines, as it were, a transitional phase in between two different gender orders, when elements of tradition and modernity continue together’. Hence, the importance of cross-national and sub-national differences on issues such as family change or women’s involvement in the labour market must not be overlooked; it is important to stress these two dimensions of change and continuity of gender roles in both the private and public domains. Moreover, although the lack of services and employment opportunities vary from one location to another, a distinctive familistic culture in all four countries encourages reliance on the family. The primacy of the family in welfare provision raises questions about the type of gender relations within and outside the household that family policies in Southern Europe sustain and legitimise.
Gender, family and the welfare state The family in Southern Europe is a strong institution. It is defined as a social unit founded on heterosexual marriage. Discriminating effects result from the privileged treatment of this special kind of living arrangement (for example, constitutional rights are offered only to heterosexual married couples) which in turn determines eligibility for tax relief and social security entitlements. Thus different forms of interpersonal relationships and personal living arrangements, such as, for example, same sex partnerships and other forms of relationships outside the traditional form of marriage, are either not supported by social policies or not equally protected and discriminated against by the social security systems of the Southern European member states. An exception is Italy, where since the late 1980s cohabiting couples could officially register their partnership (Hantrais, 1995: 88–9). This intolerance to difference has to do with values and beliefs embedded in Southern European cultures which prescribe different kinds of behaviour for men and for women and imply restrictions on women’s freedom. According to the so-called ‘honour and shame value system’, a woman must preserve her sexual purity whereas a man must defend his and his family’s honour. Women have to be protected from the sexual advances of men, as men’s reputation/honour largely depends on this. A man’s ability to protect his honour will, as Goddard (1989: 168) writes, ‘provide a guide to his reliability and effectiveness in the public spheres of economic and
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 71
political activity’. ‘This value system legitimises patriarchal control or codes of conduct that men try to reinforce over women’ (Lazaridis, 1995: 283). The control of women is supported by the church, be it Catholic or Orthodox, according to which women are associated with the morally weak, easily deceived and prone to sin Eve, whose sexual powers must be controlled.1 The majority of offspring live with their parents until they get married, with the exception of those who migrate for studies or for work. Therefore we have lengthier periods of cohabitation between generations than in other Central/Northern European countries. During this time, they are financially supported by the family irrespective of whether they have a separate income. Family obligations are of course defined and redefined during various stages of the life-cycle. Personal connections, kin, neighbours and the extended family are an indispensable resource. The family continues to be the primary system of social protection and care; when the children become adults and parents older, the caring roles change in that the younger generation is now responsible for the care of the elderly. At the same time, ‘for every young working woman there is at least one older woman (mother or mother-in-law) who may not live in the same household but who plays an active part in taking care of children’ (Ruspini, 2000: 108). So although the family often appears to be nuclear in reality its form is often extended. The traditional family arrangement based on the ‘male-breadwinnermarriage’ is still the norm, not so much in large cities like Athens, Barcelona, Lisbon, Madrid or Rome – although traces of it have not disappeared especially amongst middle-aged people – as in rural areas. Idealising this traditional family arrangement means reproducing personal relationships of power and dependence among family members; as Leitner (2001: 103) argues, in earnings-related benefit provision, ‘the husband is employed (full time) and acquires social security entitlements for himself and his dependants, whereas the wife is the family worker and receives social protection only indirectly through her husband’. What does this two-tier system mean for women? If we take retirement benefits as an example, the benefits granted to those elderly who do not have matured contributive entitlements, which is the case with women who may have had a history of discontinuous employment or have been in part-time employment due to the need to look after a dependant family member, is much lower than the benefits received at the age of retirement by someone who has had a full career in the formal economy (see Table 1 in Ferrera, 1996: 20). This disruption of career is often encouraged by limiting the supply of public social services to a minimum, an issue which will be discussed later in this chapter. A minimum duration of insurance coverage is required to acquire eligibility to earningsrelated pension; whereas in Italy this minimum qualifying period is as low as five years of contributions, Greece, Portugal and Spain require 15 years of coverage (Leitner, 2001: 103). Thus those working discontinuously, who
72 Southern European Welfare States
are most likely to be women, do not meet the qualifying conditions and are thus restricted from access to pension schemes. With regard to those women who decide to retire earlier in order to look after a grandchild, or an elderly infirm spouse, the final benefit received is affected as the calculation takes into account the period of insurance coverage – the maximum period of insurance coverage is 35 years in Greece and Spain and 40 years in Portugal, whereas in Italy there is no limit to it. However, women’s economic dependence on the family is not seen as a social problem (Saraceno, 1994). The family constitutes a safety net against social exclusion and the help provided by public or private services is less crucial; dependency on welfare provisions is regarded as ‘bad’, which is often used in political discourse to justify keeping the supply of social services to a minimum. Only in the last resort does the welfare state step in to substitute the family carer or the breadwinner. In Southern Europe, the notion of ‘subsidiarity’ means family first, state last resort. The state, in other words, intervenes when family resources are exhausted and does not have the ‘socialising’ approach one would find in, for example, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) social-democratic regime. It also requires a specific organisation of work within the household where one adult member functions as the family breadwinner while the other cares for the family. This is crucial in understanding gender relations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain as when care is provided by the state institutions this is not without associated stigma. The role of the market as a provider of social services has expanded in recent years with the influx of undocumented migrant women who take up caring jobs. Thus the price of allowing women to enter the labour market is by and large falling either on to the family budget (for example, hiring informal paid work – see Chapter 6), or on to family and kinship support networks. Earnings-related social insurance schemes exclude non-working wives, thus treating them as their husbands’ dependants. The breadwinner is, of course, entitled to social protection on the basis of social rights earned by contribution payments, whereas the unpaid family carer derives entitlement only indirectly from her husband. Family benefits help maintain the traditional division of labour. Earnings-related schemes often grant additional credits for unpaid care work, such as care of children, thus partially compensating for time spent undertaking caring work. The length of periods credited varies from one country to another; for example, this is up to six months of coverage per child in Greece and Italy (in both cases available only to mothers), two years in Portugal, one year in Spain. Italy also has a subsidised pension scheme for housewives. In addition, there are old age benefits available for spouses and survivors of persons who are covered by an earnings-related scheme; in Greece for example, the spouse receives a flat-rate supplement for a dependent spouse, whereas a survivor receives 70 per cent of the deceased’s pension. In Italy and Portugal the survivor receives 60 per cent
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 73
of the deceased’s pension (in Italy this is income-tested), and 45 per cent in Spain. However, such benefits are low when compared to entitlements gained from employment. Hence gender discrimination is being maintained. Entitlement for family work ‘does not result from direct but indirect social rights’ (Leitner, 2001: 108). Furthermore, such benefits reflect the norm of heterosexuality combined with the institution of marriage. There is a discrimination against alternative forms of living together. The privileged treatment of traditional family arrangements based on the principle of subsidiarity on the one hand and entitlements for spouses alongside a limited supply of public social services, helps maintain the traditional division of labour where one person functions as the family breadwinner and the other as the family carer. During the last three decades, the number of women employed has increased. This has forced policy-makers in the respective member states to concern themselves with the issue of making care work public and thus helping couples (and especially women) to combine family life and employment. We will now turn our attention to the extent to which Southern European welfare states support parents in reconciling family and working life. As we shall show, although there are variations, all four countries rank low in terms of childcare provision (especially for children up to three years of age), levels of maternity benefits, and welfare support for families with children. This is in great contrast to other member states of the EU, such as Denmark, France, Belgium, which have extensive public provision of childcare for children under the age of three. Childcare provision All four Southern European countries have the sixth year as the age of compulsory schooling. In terms of childcare provision for children up to three years of age, as mentioned above, all four countries have minimum provision; only 3 per cent of children up to three years of age are covered in Greece, 2 per cent in Spain, 6 per cent in Italy, with only Portugal offering a slightly higher coverage (12 per cent). This is very low if compared with the 50 per cent in Denmark, 33 per cent in Sweden, 30 per cent in Belgium and 23 per cent in France. However, child provision for children between three and six years of age is better; at the low end of the provision continuum is Portugal (48 per cent) followed by Spain and Greece2 (at 64 per cent being close to the EU average) and Italy at the high end of the continuum (91 per cent) (Ruxton, 1996; Papadopoulos, 1998b). Underprovision of services implies that a large amount of the work to be done is carried out by women and assumes that there are women at home ready to do it, be they citizens (traditional full-time housewives) or strangers (hired help) (see Chapter 6). As Addis (2000: 129) writes, ‘some of the pathologies of the Italian welfare state are linked to the unrecognised need to provide care to families … caregivers are recognised as useless dependants; not as providers of domestic
74 Southern European Welfare States
goods, but as consumers lacking an adequate source of case’. This is true for all four countries. Hence early retirement, false invalidity pensions and misuse of hospitals to park frail elderly people, are ‘creative’ attempts to finance care (ibid.). Often the replacement costs for the services a woman no longer offers for her family are high. But the net gain for her is smaller than for a person who can rely on extended family to perform such care and domestic work. Maternity, paternity and parental leave The arrangements for paid maternity leave in the four countries differ. In Greece paid maternity leave is given for 16 weeks with 100 per cent income replacement; but it pays the lowest maternity benefits of the four. Similar to Greece, in Spain this is given for 16 weeks on 75 per cent income replacement, whereas this is more generous in Portugal (18 weeks on 100 per cent replacement rate) and in Italy (22 weeks on 80 per cent replacement rate). Spain and Portugal provide the right to paternity leave (two days and five days respectively with 100 per cent income replacement). Arrangements for parental leave vary: in Spain, Greece and Portugal there is no statutory entitlement to paid parental leave. People who interrupt their career to look after their children have to do so without pay. Italy offers six months, Spain 12–36 months, Portugal six to 24 months, while Greece offers the shortest period of parental leave in the EU, three and a half months (six months for lone parents), which is offered only to those employed by companies with more than 50 employees, thus excluding all those employed by small companies (Ruxton, 1996; Ditch et al., 1996; Papadopoulos, 1998b). The lack of adequate state provision of childcare, generous maternity, paternal and parental leaves, in combination with the fact that nowadays women either cannot afford or do not wish to leave the labour force to raise children, may be contributory factors to the reduction of the birth-rate. Changing family structures: demographic similarities and differences According to the European Observatory on National Family Policies, in order for a population to reproduce itself, each woman needs to have 2.1 children (European Commission, 1998a: 5). Every country in the EU has a fertility rate3 below replacement level. However, there are variations in the timing of the decline in fertility rates. For example, although in most Northern member states of the EU fertility rates began to fall in the midto late 1960s, it was not until the mid- to late 1970s that the Southern member states followed a similar path. Italy and Spain experienced a rapid decrease in fertility rates from the mid-1960s and early to mid-1970s respectively (see Table 3.1), in spite of legislation which until 1975 in Italy and 1978 in Spain prohibited abortion, dissemination and use of contraception, and the strong influence of the Catholic Church. They now have the lowest fertility rates in Europe
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 75 Table 3.1 Fertility rates in Southern European member states, 1965, 1990, 1995 Country
1965
1990
1995
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
2.30 2.66 2.94 3.14
1.41 1.27 1.33 1.43
1.32 1.17 1.18 1.40
Sources: Eurostat (1993a); European Commission (1998a: 6).
(in 1995 the respective numbers were 1.17 in Italy, 1.18 in Spain, 1.32 in Greece and 1.40 in Portugal (European Commission, 1998a: 6). However, both Italy and Spain have ‘heterogeneous fertility patterns between the regions’ (Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci, 1992) indicating the existence of different family cultures within each country.4 Birth outside marriage is not common. Therefore there may be a correlation between declining fertility rates and delayed marriages. Another explanatory factor for the drop in fertility is the late entry of women into the labour force and the lack of a corresponding development of related social services, family allowances and child benefits etc. Some therefore have argued that instead of pro-natalist policies, improvements in policies designed to help women reconcile family demands and child-rearing and paid work may lead to higher fertility rates (Del Boca, 1996; Fagnani, 1996). Such policies may include increasing the availability of flexible working hours, part-time work and job-sharing and a more flexible childcare system provided by welfare authorities, etc. Moreover, women are having their first child at an older age than previously. The mean age of women at first birth has risen by around one to two years since 1970, which may mean an increase in lone motherhood, as cohabitation in these countries is rare. We also have an increase in births outside marriage; the largest increase was in Portugal (from 7.3 per cent in 1970 to 18.7 per cent in 1995) and Spain (from 1.4 per cent in 1970 to 10.8 per cent in 1995), while in Greece the respective numbers remain low (1.1 per cent in 1970 and 3.0 per cent in 1995). In Italy women have fewer babies outside marriage than in Spain and Portugal (2.2 per cent in 1970 and 8.1 per cent in 1995) (European Commission, 1998a: 15). Concerning teenage pregnancies, there are large differences between Southern European countries: the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 was 25 in Portugal and 22 in Greece, while the fertility rates in Spain and Italy in this age bracket were lower (12 and nine respectively) for the 1990–95 period (UNICEF, 1996). The majority of teenage pregnancies end in abortion. Patterns of family formation and dissolution are changing throughout Southern Europe and point to a greater degree of instability and a gradual move towards a more complex and diverse set of behaviour in terms of family formation. The crude marriage rate in all four countries is lower in 1995
76 Southern European Welfare States
than in 1970. There is a variation between the four countries. In Italy the reduction in the number of marriages began in the 1970s. However, throughout the 1980s marriage remained the central choice of young adults; despite a moderate increase in family breakdown by the mid-1990s the crude marriage rate was only 4.9. This trend is evident especially for women younger than 25, in all regions, especially in the North and Centre. In spite of the fewer marriages, around 90 per cent of children under 24 live with their parents irrespective of whether they are financially independent. (European Commission, 1999c: 34). In Portugal during the 1990s, the crude marriage rate was 6.6. In Spain a similar reduction in number of marriages to that observed in Italy began in the early 1980s, especially among people marrying before the age of 25. The delay of marriage in both countries has been attributed to a number of factors, such as high unemployment rates (see Chapter 2) especially for young people, opting for higher education, cultural shifts concerning sexual relations before marriage (Jurado Guerrero and Naldini, 1996: 47). Regarding alternative living arrangements, according to Jurado Guerrero and Naldini (1996: 47–8), ‘in Italy and Spain, existing data point to the low degree of cohabitation … the percentage of unmarried couples in Italy is … very low …’. Cohabitating couples with children represent only 0.1 per cent of all households in Greece and Italy, 0.7 per cent in Portugal and 0.9 per cent in Spain (European Commission, 1998a: 16). In the mid-1990s, lone parent families with children under 16 as a proportion of all families with children under 16, ranged from 6.7 per cent in Greece to 7.1 in Spain, 7.3 in Italy and 8.4 in Portugal (European Commission, 1998a: 22). Nowadays in the EU an increasing number of children are living in a more diverse range of family types, such as with one of their parents as part of a lone parent family, or with their non-married parents in cohabitating couple families (heterosexual or same sex), or in reconstituted families involving only one of their natural parents. However, it is still very uncommon in Southern Europe to be living with non-married parents (0.4 per cent in Greece, 2.0 per cent in Spain, 0.1 per cent in Italy and 1.8 per cent in Portugal) (European Commission, 1998a: 26). In both Italy and Spain most unmarried couples live in urban areas. ‘Alternative living arrangements such as cohabitation and single-person living arrangements are not yet institutions, and are still viewed as acts of the individual will which break with routine, and may well not be positively sanctioned’ (ibid.: 50). Divorce laws were introduced in 1970 in Italy and 1981 in Spain. Divorce is not a substitute for separation but ‘added to separation as a legal step’; many couples go no further than the separation stage. Divorce rates are lower than in other European countries. In Greece, for example, the crude divorce rate was 0.7 per cent in 1980, amongst the lowest in the EU alongside those of Portugal (0.6 per cent) and Italy (0.2 per cent); the rate of divorce has increased since, the respective figures for 1995 being 1.1 per cent for Greece, 0.5 per cent for Italy and 1.2 per cent for Portugal (European
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 77
Commission, 1998a: 13). Nevertheless, marriage as an institution seems to still be very important and childbirth outside wedlock in Greece remains low (2 per cent in 1994) (Symeonidou, 1996: 80). The average age at which women marry for the first time has increased since 1970. The increase has been greatest in Italy (two and half years) and least in Portugal (six months). Remarrying is also in decline which means that fewer people are marrying overall (European Commission, 1998a: 9–10.) As already mentioned, cohabitation still remains a rare form of relationship formation in Southern Europe (Kiernan and Estaugh, 1993). So, it seems that ‘romantic love’ which Giddens (1992: 61) associates with the idealised notion of falling in love for ever, is gradually, but only gradually, giving way to confluent love, which incorporates an ‘active, contingent love’, without any expectation of permanency. Traditional expectations of older generations, that people will get married and have children, still hold, but as the process of detraditionalisation goes on, partners will have to reconcile decisions about living together (whether to institutionalise their relationship or not, whether to have children and if so when and how) with their labour market position. The changing family structures and behaviour, the decreasing fertility rates and emerging female employment patterns will affect the division of labour by sex. The crucial question which Southern European societies are likely to be faced with in the next decades is ‘who will take care of the elderly?’ The elderly In all countries of the EU the proportion of the population aged 65 years and over is increasing. Within Southern Europe, there are variations between the respective countries in relation to ageing. Indeed, one can identify three groups, each with a different balance between the proportion of the population aged up to 19 and the proportion aged 60 plus. First, we have Italy, where ageing is advanced; as Sgritta in the Family Observer (European Commission, 1999c: 34) says, ‘in 1996 Italy became the only country in the world in which the number of older people exceeded that of the young’. Pension payments in Italy make up more than 70 per cent of social expenditure (ibid.). Second Greece: while ageing is not so advanced as in Italy, it is becoming more so as the years go by; in 1996, half the social budget was spent on social insurance (mainly pensions) (European Commission, 1999c: 31). Third, we have Spain and Portugal where the proportions of young and older people are relatively balanced (European Commission, 1998a: 7). The largest increase in life expectancy at birth between 1970 and 1995 was observed in Portugal with an increase of 7.1 years for men and 7.8 years for women and the lowest in Greece with an increase of 4.9 years for men and 6.4 years for women. What is of interest to us here is that in all four countries life expectancy for women has increased by a greater degree than for men. In 1995 life expectancy for
78 Southern European Welfare States
men at birth ranged from 75 years in Greece to 71.3 years in Portugal, and for women, it was highest in Spain (81.5 years) and lowest in Portugal (78.6 years) (ibid.). The aged dependency ratio (balance between the proportion of the population aged 65 years and above to that aged 15–64) in the period 1970–96, increased from 17 to 25 in Italy, from 17 in Greece and 15 in Spain to 23, and from 16 to 22 in Portugal. The burden of ageing, in spite of cash benefits (see Chapter 4), falls on the shoulders of women. However, as mentioned earlier, this is reciprocal as one has to take into account the contributions older people make in terms of informal care of children and sick relatives, as well as volunteering work (formal and informal). These indirect contributions are central to the survival of the Southern European ‘nuclear’ family. The interdependencies between the population of working age and older people should not therefore be underestimated. The family has to provide care for its elderly as there are few social services available. For example, in Greece there are now around 233 Open Care centres (KAPI) run by local government providing facilities for those capable of looking after themselves and with no need of serious medical care. Men see it as a place for recreation, while women attend only occasionally for health check-ups as looking after their children’s house or children leaves little time for recreation. However, it is socially stigmatising for a family to place a parent in an old people’s home or nursing home even if the old person suffers from a chronic health problem. As Symeonidou (1996: 81) points out, ‘in Greece the overall population in old people’s homes and geriatric clinics is only 8 per cent of the total population aged 65 years and over as opposed to 8–11 per cent in western Europe’. As a result many women stop working in order to look after a dependent parent and hence become economically dependent on their husbands. Doing this is an important element of reciprocity in family care. In Greece the institution of ‘home help’ and ‘care at home’ was introduced in 1992; however, the implementation has been weak. A number of programmes for care of dependent old people are run by the Church of Greece and by the Red Cross. Some criticism could be levelled at the criteria on which those who receive help are selected (for example, frequent church-goers). In Italy, according to the Indicatore della Situazione Economica (ISE) scheme introduced in 1998, a family which requires some form of social service should answer a questionnaire and provide information on family composition and wealth. Depending on the number of people who live on a given income, whether the parent is single, whether there is a person with special needs in the family etc., one assumes an income. Income transfers to families Family allowances (income-related) and tax allowances5 Family benefit refers to any benefits granted to offset family maintenance costs (Council of Europe, 1972: 4). Family allowances refer to cash benefits
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 79
granted to families based on either family characteristics such as number of children, family income, family structure, or child characteristics, such as age of child, mental and physical ability of child (Dumon and Nuelant, 1994: 9). Income-related family benefits and tax allowances are available in all four countries. But unlike other EU member states, Greece, Italy and Spain do not have a system of universal child or family allowances paid regardless of incomes (European Commission, 1998a: 58). In Greece and Spain family benefits vary according to number of children6 and in Italy according to number of persons in the household. Tax allowances vary according to number of dependants in Greece and Portugal, and number of children in Italy. The value of child benefit packages varies between the four countries. Table 3.2 below shows how the child benefit package is constructed for a couple with two school-age children where both parents are earning one and a half average earnings (rich family), whereas Table 3.3 shows the same for a couple with three school-age children, with one earner on half the average earnings (poor family). As we can see, at low earnings only Italy delivers some of the child benefit package through child tax
Table 3.2 Structure of the child benefit package (i) (i) Couple with two children. Two earners, 1.5 ⫻ average male earnings and 1.5 ⫻ average female earnings. ECU purchasing power parity. Before housing costs. May 1996 Country
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Child tax allowance/ credit 19.46 9.31 28.98 22.58
Non-meansMeanstested child tested child benefit benefit 15.31
40.74
Health costs ⫺37.61 ⫺11.05 ⫺15.82 ⫺18.73
School costs
Total
⫺152.22 ⫺155.06 ⫺66.32 ⫺68.06 13.16 ⫺8.54 36.05
Source: European Commission (1998a: 59).
Table 3.3 Structure of the child benefit package (ii) (ii) Couple with three children. One earner on 0.5 ⫻average male earnings. ECU purchasing power parity per month. Before housing costs. May 1996 Country
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
Child tax allowance/ credit
Non-meanstested child benefit
Meanstested child benefit
40.74
50.99 278.65 66.83 31.61
27.92
Source: European Commission (1998a: 58).
Health costs
School costs
Total
⫺56.41 ⫺332.63 ⫺338.05 ⫺16.87 ⫺79.12 210.59 ⫺23.73 43.09 ⫺28.65 ⫺11.64 32.06
80 Southern European Welfare States
allowances or credits. Moreover, in Greece and Italy families with higher earnings have negative child benefit packages as cash benefits do not compensate for the charges parents have to pay for health and educational costs for children (European Commission, 1998a: 50). Regarding unemployed lone parents, if one looks at the net disposable income of a lone parent as a proportion of the net disposable income of a couple with the same earnings and number of children, it becomes clear that Greece is the only Southern European country where lone parents are consistently worse off than couples and Spain is the only country in Southern Europe where lone parents are consistently better off than couples. In general, in Italy and Portugal, lone parent families are treated slightly more generously than couples by the tax/benefit system. The picture, of course, varies with number of children and earnings. For example, with one child on half average earnings a lone parent in Portugal is 5 per cent better off than a one-earner couple on half average earnings. However, if the lone parent were on one and a half average earnings they would have only 98 per cent of the net income of a couple. With two children on half average earnings a lone parent in Italy is 6 per cent better off than a oneearner couple on average earnings. If the lone parent were on average earnings they would have the same net income as a couple, and if the lone parent were on one and a half average earnings they would have only 96 per cent of the net income of a couple (see Table 3.4). A comparison of the benefit income packages to which unemployed lone parents are entitled shows that earnings-replacement rates increase progressively with each child. However, the rate of increase differs from one country to another; for example, in Greece, replacement rates of the benefit packages available to an unemployed lone parent with one child aged seven and an unemployed lone parent with four children is 20 percentage points; in other words, a form of income redistribution takes place towards
Table 3.4 Net disposable income of a lone parent As a proportion of the net disposable income of a couple with the same earnings and number of children. Before housing costs. May 1996 Country
Half average earnings 1 child
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
85 100 104 105
Half Average Average 1.5 ⫻ average 1.5 ⫻ average average earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings 1 child 2 children 1 child 2 children 2 children 68 106 107 107
92 97 101 103
Source: European Commission (1998a: 64).
82 100 102 105
94 98 101 98
88 96 101 100
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 81
lone parents with children. In Italy, Portugal and Spain, this difference is 6, 5 and 9 percentage points respectively, which is far below the European average (Papadopoulos, 1998a: 132–3). Moreover, in Italy there seem to be no significant differences between the treatment of lone parents and that of couples with children; the same is true for Spain, with the exception of lone parents with very young children (under a three years old), who are treated more favourably (ibid.: 13). In Italy these may be either contribution-based or tax-based and are paid to workers for their spouse and children. Each person who has a dependant has a right to a deduction of tax otherwise due. Moreover, there are family allowances (assegni familiari) given to workers; these are means-tested, based on the worker’s income bracket (there are 16 brackets) and number of dependants. An amount is given for the dependent spouse and an amount for each child. Since 1978 these are tax exempt. They were increased in the mid-1990s in order to deal with the fertility rates crisis. Entitlement to these is lost if the wife’s income takes the family income above a threshold and hence encourages women to stay at home. ‘Besides being job centred, the “assegni” are patriarchal in that they assume that whatever is given to the head of the family will be fairly redistributed to the wife and to the other members of the family’ (Addis, 2000: 135). There are no programmes to help the children of people who are divorced or enter single parenthood and have no job. The fact that the welfare state in all four countries is insurance-based implies that unless a woman is working, the main route of access for her to transfers from the welfare state is through marriage to a worker. The welfare state is therefore ‘not only familist, but also patriarchal, in that it assumes and reproduces women’s dependence on men’ (Addis, 2000: 127). The family allowance for dependent children was increased in 1997 in Spain in line with inflation forecasts. A small percentage of a family’s real expenses is deducted from its taxable income; this weakens the fiscal protection of the family (European Commission, 1999c: 38). As in Greece, there are special benefits for larger families. Family benefits (non-income-related) Non-income-related family benefits are not available in Italy and Spain whereas they are in Greece and Portugal where they depend on number and age of children. Portugal has the lowest age limit; benefits are paid for all children up to the age of 15 and can be extended for another ten years for those who continue in education. In Greece, Italy and Spain benefits are paid for children up to the age of 18, but whereas in Greece the limit can be extended up to the age of 22, Italy and Spain have no such provision (Hantrais, 1995: 90). Other cash benefits include a marriage benefit in the form of a lump sum paid at the wedding, which exists only in Greece and Portugal, and a marriage allowance which is paid monthly by the employer (this exists only in
82 Southern European Welfare States Table 3.5 Overview of family benefits in Southern Europe, 1993 Country
Child allowances
Birth allowances
Greece
Vary according to income
Benefits exist – but is not available to all
Italy
Means-tested
Benefit does not exist
Spain
Means-tested
Benefit does exist
Portugal
Universal
Benefits exist
Income-related family benefits
Non-income-related family benefits
Benefits exist – vary according to number of children and whether lone parent – tax allowances Benefits exist – vary according to number of persons in the household – special allowance for lone parents – tax deductions (esp. pre-school care costs) Benefits exist – vary according to number of children – tax deductions (esp. pre-school care costs) Benefits exist – various schemes – tax deductions
Benefits exist, some are taxable – vary according to number of children and age of child Does not exist
Does not exist
Benefits exist, are non-taxable – vary according to number of children and age of child
Sources: Compiled from Dumon and Nuelant (1994: 17); Papadopoulos (1998b: 52–3).
Greece). In addition, there are birth allowances (see Table 3.5); these are universally granted in Portugal (indexed). In Italy (with the exception of Trento-Alto-Adige) and Spain these do not exist, whereas in Greece they are indexed and restricted to those working in the public sector and to some persons covered by certain forms of insurance in the private sector (Dumon and Nuelant, 1994: 12). There are also non-financial benefits, such as exemption for military service for family reasons and preference in job allocation and location. Family policy and familism Although all four countries may be described as countries with a strong ideological commitment to the family, as shown above, family state support is minimal, with the possible exception, recently, of Portugal. This
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 83
rests in the ideological assumption that the family is the main provider of welfare for its members. The family unit is operating as ‘a social clearing house mediating the difficult relationships between a variegated labour market and equally variegated income maintenance systems’ (Ferrera, 1996: 21). This process is defined as ‘familism’. The family is also perceived by its members as the main vehicle for social mobility. In the Greek case: this belief is embodied in the social practices of almost all social classes though a system of attitudes, visions and expectations which produce a special kind of solidarity within the family collective … solidarity remains firmly within the private sphere, as an inter-generational responsibility towards the family unit … the development of notions of social responsibility or social solidarity, essential for the creation and functioning of a civil society, encounter enormous obstacles. (Papadopoulos, 1998b: 55) Therefore, reciprocal obligations associated with bonds of kinship and marriage are very important. A principle of mutual solidarity between family members is the norm. The importance of such linkages is attributed by some to the inadequacies in social welfare; the family is thus filling the gaps in the welfare state, which in Southern Europe is very inadequately developed (Martin, 1996: 34). They can be seen as substitutes of public intervention or as complementary to it (ibid.). The familistic nature of the Southern European welfare model explains the embryonic form of the regime as regards family policies. As mentioned above, it is primarily women who are contributing a lot of the non-market work that helps families survive. Despite the importance of the family in caring for children well into adulthood and in spite of the strong moral and ideological emphasis on the role of the family in holding society together, there is a lack of family policy (Gauthier, 1995). In the Italian case, the reasons for this are summarised by Bimbi (2000: 72) as being the following: first, a reaction to fascism which produced ‘explicit pronatalist family policies and categorical policies for lone mothers’; second, the model of welfare which stipulates residual state responsibility for family welfare and puts emphasis on family care for children and relatives supported by a law on relatives’ obligations; third, the importance of traditional forms of matrimonial and intergenerational ties despite changes in demographic trends – this points to the ‘hegemony of a shared cultural model, whose hallmark is the importance of the family group’. In terms of gender relations, a pattern of power relationships among members of the family and the residual family policy reinforce the role of women as the main carers of children and the elderly. It also reinforces the reproduction of private patriarchal relationships (Walby, 1990), whilst a shift towards public patriarchal relationships still remains in an embryonic
84 Southern European Welfare States
form. Women’s different experiences and structural position seem to militate against their full access to the rights of citizenship (Walby, 1997: 173). Social citizenship depends upon being a worker for full access to citizenship rights, as ‘significant aspects of income maintenance payments by the state, pensions, and related welfare provision are provided as a result of wage employment’ (ibid.). As shown earlier in this chapter, those women who are not employed fall back on meagre levels of support (such as pension benefits), often derived via their spouses, so long as they stay married. Women who work part-time or have interrupted their employment for a period of time, in order to be able to meet their commitments to the care of children and/or elderly relatives, are often not able to get access to a decent pension, as this is incompatible with the role of carer. Walby (1997: 173) rightly poses the questions: ‘should women only be entitled to citizenship if they behave like men and have lifetime commitment to paid employment’? ‘And if so, what are the implications for those who need care’? These are important questions as under the rules of the Southern European welfare systems paid employment is the main route of access to decent support in old age. One solution would be for women to stop being exploited at home and enter the labour market and at the same time demand that their position as carers is supported by coherent childcare policies which would reflect the value of caring work to society ‘whether it be done in private or in public’ (Lister, 1990: 464). She also states that the entry of women into the public sphere in order to obtain economic and social rights should be actively encouraged. As we show in the following section, during the last couple of decades, the younger generation of women in Southern Europe has entered the public sphere. This has rendered them a double-shift worker, juggling the responsibilities of paid employment and caring work. To quote Lister (ibid.), ‘if women are to be fully integrated into full democratic citizenship, radical changes in personal and domestic life are required’. In Southern Europe, such changes are yet to take place. At the same time, one could argue that such changes must be made in order for women to gain full-citizenship. As Walby (1997: 178) argues, ‘the male-dominated family-household is incompatible with full citizenship. Social citizenship for women is incompatible with, and unobtainable under, women’s confinement to the family and the vagaries of a dependency relationship upon a private patriarch’. Having discussed the limitations of the welfare state in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to socialise some form of privatised domestic labour through more nurseries, publicly provided care for the elderly and other dependants at levels which would satisfy women’s needs, and having looked at tensions between social citizenship for Southern European women and their location as carers in the family, we will turn our attention to these women’s economic citizenship and the extent to which they have been included in or excluded from effective participation in paid work.
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 85
Gender inequalities in the labour market Different welfare regimes have a different impact on women’s labour market participation. Here we will try to explain how the labour market in the four countries under study is gendered and look at factors which determine women’s employment. As Langan and Ostner (1991: 130) argue: different gender categories have different relationships with the process of commodification and decommodification. Men are commodified, made ready to sell their labour power on the market, by the work done by women in the family. Thus men and women are ‘gendered commodities’ with different experiences of the labour market resulting from their different relationship to family life. Such social rights as these are deeply embedded in local traditions and differ according to gender. Men’s position in the labour market is protected; in contrast, women are often disadvantaged by restricting their access to employment and emphasising their role as carers. However, as Langan and Ostner (ibid.: 131) argue, ‘women might be commodified and decommodified by welfare regimes depending on their relationship to the family’. In other words, the family plays an important role in the welfare state of Southern European societies by providing services but also ‘a sense of continuity, stability, belonging, and of mutual obligation’ (ibid.). Therefore ‘an appreciation of the domestic division of labour and women’s pivotal role in the processes of reproduction of modern societies is crucial in understanding the gendered nature of the welfare state and its associated social stratification’ (ibid.). As shown in the previous section, the role of women as carers places them at a disadvantage in access to income (Glendinning, 1990). Women’s private dependency in the family is an obstacle to women’s citizenship. Women are not treated as individual wage earners although changes in the labour market and in living standards have called for double-earner families. Also reforms in law and ‘woman-friendly policies’ have encouraged women’s entry into the labour market. To sustain employment levels the civil service in the Southern European member states has become a major employer, thus shifting women’s partiarchal dependence from the husband to the state. Working women often rely on other women (migrant women) to provide childcare so that they remain in full or part-time employment. It is thus women who enable other women to go out to work. Comparable data reveals trends in women’s employment patterns which are common in all four countries. During the 1950s and until the mid1960s the participation of women in the Spanish labour market increased, while in Italy it decreased. Since the early 1970s the proportion of women working kept increasing in both countries (from around 20 per cent in the
86 Southern European Welfare States
1970s to around 35 per cent in the 1990s). Nevertheless, in 1996 the female participation rate for Italy was 43.7 per cent of the working population, whereas for the EU15 it was 57.4 per cent (Bettio and Villa, 2000: 158). Women were incorporated into paid work at a time when the tertiary sector was expanding. In the early 1990s, Spain had the highest proportion of non-employed women in OECD countries with 72.6 per cent of workingage women being either unemployed or non-working (Cousins, 1999: 78). In the case of Italy, the low participation of women in the labour market is because of the lack (or scarcity) and low quality of services substituting for women’s traditional care-giving work, which makes the participation cost high. In addition, as Addis put it (2000: 123), ‘some of the direct transfers are regulated so as to give incentives for non-participation’. There are also labour market policies which prevent hiring and promoting women in the private sector. These policies, which Addis (ibid.: 124) calls ‘handicap-privileges’, range from long maternity leave which prevents the hiring of marriageable women (in the case of Italy, five months mandatory at 80 per cent pay at birth, plus six months elective at 20 per cent of the wage within the first two years), to mandatory retirement age at 55 for women in the private sector preventing women from re-entering the labour market at an older age (now abolished by the Dini reforms; see Chapter 2); long weekly hours curtailing the time available for childcare for a couple who are both working full time. As a result, women enter the labour market relatively late, but continue to work full-time after the birth of the first child ( Jurado Guerrero and Naldini, 1996: 56). In Italy, a North–South economic dualism exists which is mirrored in the welfare services. Among southern families, the male-breadwinner regime prevails, marked by little presence of women in the labour market and high male unemployment (Ruspini, 2000: 89). This interacts with the peculiarities of the Italian welfare state model, which is characterised by a strong heterogeneity of social policies due to decentralisation (even provincial and local authorities have developed different criteria and means tests for the allocation of benefits and services). In Portugal, during the colonial wars and emigration which took place in the 1960s, there was a demand for female labour. ‘By the beginning of the 1970s, female participation in the labour market was superior to that of other more developed European countries’ (Andre and Feio, 2000: 55). The economic modernisation which took place in the 1970s contributed to the greater equality of opportunities between men and women in finding jobs in the professional sectors, characterised by instability. In the mid-1980s growth of the economy was accompanied by increase in the employment of women, especially in commercial areas and tourism, personal and domestic services, catering, health and social services. The highest increase in the rate of female activity was observed in the Azores and Alentejo. Nevertheless, weak development of social structures and services, especially
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 87
regarding childcare and care for the elderly, hinder the promotion of female labour activity in spite of the fact that the idea of the ‘woman at home’ is fading away as an outdated stereotype as the contribution made by women’s earnings is an indispensable addition to the family income. Men have been particularly hit by unemployment in areas where cost reduction strategies are in operation in sectors of traditionally intensive industrial labour (mainly in the North and Centre of the country). Nevertheless, increasing flexibility has hit both men and women. However, the vulnerability of female employment is experienced in different ways in different parts of the country; for example in Lisbon and the South, we have unemployment and growth of temporary contracts whereas in the North and Centre, an externalisation of professional work. Finally in the 1960s, Greek women represented less than 30 per cent of the total working population in the country, whereas in the 1990s this figure has risen to around 35 per cent (Lazaridis and Syngellakis, 1995; Vaiou, 1996). Regarding sectoral distribution of women’s employment, most are concentrated in the service sector (47.5 per cent), followed by agriculture (35.4 per cent) and industry (17.1 per cent). The relatively high activity rates in the primary sector are not shared by Spain and Portugal, the respective numbers being 13.7 per cent and 22.6 per cent. We can observe occupational segregation in agricultural activities and service-type jobs (health and social services in particular) for women and in civil construction for men. Family responsibilities weigh unevenly with highly educated professional women on the one end, able to externalise a significant part of the domestic shores by hiring migrant labour and less favoured groups of women who need to work in order to supplement the family income, on the other (see Table 3.9). Social policy offers little to support working mothers and by and large counts on strong female solidarity and the notion of mutual obligation in families. Clientelism plays a crucial role. In all four countries, the way in which women allocate their time has changed. They are spending less time child-bearing (as mentioned earlier on, fertility rates have fallen), but the time they spend in caring for the increasingly frail elderly makes the likelihood of them spending less time in caring doubtful (Lewis, 1993: 6). At the same time, there is little evidence to suggest a change in Southern European men’s behaviour. There are of course significant differences in terms of the attitudes on the part of men in different regions and amongst different age cohorts within the different Southern European countries; however it is difficult to give an accurate picture without detailed attitude surveys and an elucidation of region-specific social, economic, cultural and political conjunctures; but such data is hard to subject to comparative analysis. During the 1990s, in Greece and Spain, women’s employment rates have remained lower than the EU average (43.4 per cent). It seems that despite legislation at EU and at national levels aiming at improving women’s
88 Southern European Welfare States
opportunities at gaining access to jobs and increasing women’s participation in the labour market, women find it more difficult than men to pursue economic activity. Women’s increasing participation rates are connected with the growth of self-employment and expansion of the public services. Changes in the occupational structure of all four countries, which resulted in a sharp decline in the percentage of workers in agriculture (see Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8) result in many women nowadays working either in lower-skilled service jobs in the public sector, or in the informal economy. Hence women’s employment is polarised to a large extent between work in the public sector and work in the informal economy. The growth of flexibility in Southern Europe has by and large depended on the availability of women as part-time workers in the informal sector, which provides employment opportunities for women albeit under worse conditions of service. According to official statistics, part-time work is rare (see Figure 3.1) but data may underestimate the amount since many women work in the informal economy and their activities go unrecorded in the official employment statistics. Unrecorded also is home-working, a widespread form of employment in Southern Europe as Table 3.6 Employment by economic sector and gender in Southern European countries as percentage in 1999 Agriculture
Greece Spain Italy Portugal EU
Total
Male
17 7.4 5.4 12.6 4.4
15.6 8.6 5.9 11.2 5.1
Industry
Female Total 19.3 5.3 4.5 14.4 3.5
22.9 30.6 32.4 35.3 29.3
Services
Male
Female
Total
29 40.3 38.8 44.4 39.3
12.7 13.6 21.1 24.1 15.6
60.1 62 62.2 52.1 66.3
Male Female 55.4 51.1 55.2 44.4 55.6
68 81.1 74.4 61.5 80.9
Source: European Commission (2000: 85, 89, 90, 93, 97).
Table 3.7 Employment by economic sector in Southern European countries as percentage, 1975, 1985, 1996, 1999 1975*
Greece Spain Italy Portugal EU
1985
Agr
Ind
Ser
Agr
Ind
33.2 22.1 15.8 33.9 11.1
29.2 38.3 38.5 33.8 39.5
37.5 39.7 45.7 32.3 49.4
58.9 16.2 11 22.2 8.3
25.7 31.9 33.5 39 34.4
1996 Ser
Agr
Ind
45.4 20.3 22.9 52 8.6 29.4 55.5 6.7 32.2 38.8 12.6 36.1 57.3 5.1 29.9
Note * data for Greece 1977. Source: European Commission (2000: 85, 89, 90, 93, 97).
1999 Ser
Agr
Ind
Ser
56.9 17 62 7.4 61.1 5.4 51.3 12.6 65 4.4
22.9 30.6 32.4 35.3 29.3
60.1 62 62.2 52.1 66.3
89 Table 3.8 Male and female employment by economic sector in Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 1977, 1985, 1996, 1999 Agriculture
Industry
Services
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Greece 1975 1985 1996 1999
26.8 24.3 18.2 15.6
48.1 37.9 23.9 19.3
33.9 30.4 28.1 29
18.4 16.5 13.7 12.7
39.3 45.3 53.7 55.4
33.5 45.6 52.4 55.8
Spain 1975 1985 1996 1999
22.7 17.2 9.8 8.6
20.5 13.9 6.4 5.3
42.6 38.1 37.9 40.3
26.8 16.8 13.6 13.6
34.7 44.7 52.3 51.1
52.7 69.3 79.9 81.1
Italy 1975 1985 1996 1999
14.4 10.7 6.8 5.9
18.1 11.5 6.4 4.5
42.8 37.8 38.1 38.8
28.5 24.5 21.7 21.1
42.8 51.5 55.1 55.2
53.3 64 72 74.4
Portugal 1975 1985 1996 1999
– 19.6 43.4 44.4
– 26.2 13.6 14.4
– 45 43.4 44.4
– 29.9 26.9 24.1
– 35.4 44.8 44.4
– 43.9 59.5 61.5
Rate (%)
Source: European Commission (2000: 89–90, 93, 97).
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Greece
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Southern Europe Women’s labour market participation rate Women working part-time as percentage of all working women Figure 3.1 Women’s labour market participation rate, 1998 Source: European Commission (1999c: 31).
90 Southern European Welfare States Table 3.9 Employment rates by educational achievement for the 25–9 age group, 1994 Country
Low women
Low men
Medium women
Medium men
High women
High men
Greece Italy Spain Portugal
42.1 36.7 31.7 64.9
91.1 84.3 75.1 89.7
48.7 62.4 49.6 74.7
90.4 85.9 79.7 88.7
78.4 78.4 66.0 93.9
91.2 90.5 83.8 94.9
Source: Eurostat (1996).
well as other forms of atypical work, such as agricultural work on family farms, family helpers in small businesses, informal seasonal work in the tourist industry and personal services. The most prevalent flexible work in Southern Europe is overtime. It is often preferred by firms over part-time work. In Greece, for example, changes in the legislative framework in 1990 enabled firms to remain open for longer hours and to integrate greater flexibility in working time. Men (48 per cent of the labour force) are more likely than women (34 per cent of the labour force) to work extra hours (Karantinos et al., 1997). However flexible work, including piecework and fixed-term contracts, is more widespread than official data suggests; as Stratigaki and Vaiou (1994) put it, ‘atypical’ work is so typical that that word is a misnomer. Advocates of flexibility stress that it may provide solutions to a range of issues, including problems related to equal opportunities. By enabling women to work at varying times of day and for varying lengths of time, it may lead to a fair division of labour by sex. This can be achieved by helping women to reconcile family and working life and by contributing to a restructuring of family roles. On the other hand, part-time workers’ opportunities for training and advancement are meagre (see Chapter 2). The paradox here is that on the one hand, atypical work opens up opportunities for women in that it facilitates entry into the labour market, but on the other hand, the short duration contracts where applicable and the low opportunities for advancement inevitably mean that women often are likely to remain economically dependent on their spouses. Hence, although flexibility provides a much needed supplement to the family income, women’s role in the family largely remains unaltered. Moreover, women who work part-time are heavily penalised under social security arrangements which provide for earnings-related benefits; they therefore continue to rely on the male spouse to ensure welfare entitlements. Women’s concentration in these types of jobs is due to a lack of alternatives and of accessible and affordable social infrastructure that would enable women to look for such alternatives (Vaiou, 1996: 67). ‘Restrictions
Gender, Family and Social Welfare 91
are stronger among low-income women who do not have access to private caring services and usually live in areas where public social infrastructure is inadequate and/or deteriorating (ibid.).
Conclusion In this chapter we have analysed the interaction between the welfare state, the family system and the labour market in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Southern European families present indicators of deep change and continuity. The most important changes include increase in female employment, a drop in the number of marriages, the appearance of free unions, the sharp decline in numbers of extended family households, conjugal instability and a decline in fertility rates. However marriage as an institution is still important and hence cohabitation and birth outside marriage are rare. Despite the secularisation process, the influence of the church and traditional values still remain and can be associated with a high intensity of family ties and the way in which obligations are perceived between generations. This makes individualisation of living arrangements difficult. We discussed gender inequalities in the welfare state of the aforementioned countries and the way in which certain policies (or lack of policies) reinforce the male-breadwinner, female-carer model; of course there are important signs of change as regards women’s position; for instance, the growing participation and higher performance of women in education increases their employment chances. The difficulties of combining family and employment for women have been outlined; we have shown how flexibility in employment facilitates women’s entry into paid employment (albeit more often than not in the informal sector), but at the same time strengthens or encourages the persistence of traditional gender relations within the family. We have also looked at the extent to which the absence of family policies and the meagre development of services in these countries have contributed to the persistence of the ‘family paradigm’ where care is the responsibility of women. The massive entry of women into the labour market from the 1970s onwards, which was motivated either by particular political contexts or by the pattern of specific economic development, has led to a slow but progressive mutation of gender roles within families and society. The cultural valorisation of the professional work of women prevents family life and duties from keeping young educated women away from the labour market even when a dual wage is not necessary. On an optimistic note, a great deal has been achieved for Southern European women since the 1970s. As Cousins (1999: 131) claims, in terms of women’s rights and opportunities, labour market participation, decline in fertility rates and the like, it is possible to distinguish a break in the experiences of different generations of women, ‘two biographies’ (Garrido, 1992), in that the life experiences of
92 Southern European Welfare States
the younger and older women have progressively diverged. However, two forms of discrimination remain; first, women’s participation in public life, employment, politics, etc. is lower than in other countries of the EU. Second, work is still very unequally divided in the home, in that many women still spend a lot of time on activities traditionally considered women’s work (housework and caring). A lot of progress needs to be made towards a more equal sharing of domestic chores. To quote Andre and Feio (2000: 70), ‘while the dynamics of wider social change induced by changes in the labour market are extensive, there remains a significant degree of inertia in the sphere of family organisation’. Informal care is becoming an increasingly important issue in Southern Europe where the family is regarded as a welfare state substitute. The absence of family substitution services in an era where the rest of Europe is looking for ways to reactivate the family in its role of carer, makes life difficult for women as ‘compulsory altruists’ (Land and Rose, 1985). Many would argue that solidarity between family members must be safeguarded. How could this be achieved first, without overburdening women, second, in an era of great geographical mobility, third, with the proliferation of new family forms and lifestyles, and fourth, in an era where informal networks which have traditionally sustained the family are breaking down? Organised voluntarism could play a crucial role alongside new forms of interactions between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’. Will this Southern family model persist in the future or change? The current crisis of the welfare state will make it difficult to develop more generous family benefits. The importance of family and kinship networks is likely to inhibit change because of the greater probability of social control within the networks. The negotiation of relations between genders has started and will continue in favour of a more symmetrical relationship. The decline in fertility and increase in longevity will have an impact on the ability of women to care for the elderly. This may lead to the deinstitutionalisation of family solidarity and marriage as the dominant family institution. Existing structures may collapse as we move towards a united Europe with new opportunities for a new division of labour and the care of children and the recognition and acceptance of new family forms and the individual’s freedom of choice in the field of sexuality and reproduction.
4 Social Security: Pensions and Social Minima
Introduction In Southern Europe, old age pensions are by far the largest single social security benefit. Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, a rapid increase in pension spending took place in all four countries. The driving forces for this change were the lack of proportionality between pensions and contributions, as well as the deteriorating ratio between pensioners and the active working population. We will deal elsewhere in this book with the basic challenges faced by social security systems today, such as demographic pressure and the ageing of the population (Gronchi, 1996; Chand and Jaeger, 1996), changes in the labour market and family patterns. (see Chapters 2 and 3). As a result of factors such as demographics, changes in family patterns and lifestyles, social security systems have been under mounting pressure as pension expenditures systematically exceed contribution receipts. Pension fund deficits and debt accumulation of public pension schemes inevitably increase the burden on the government budget in periods of retrenchment. For these reasons, the future of the public pension system has been a critical issue on the political agenda in all the recent general elections in Spain, Italy, Greece and, to a lesser degree, in Portugal. This is due both to the critical financial situation of the social security accounts and the political necessity to reduce the public deficit in order to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria. Due to the commonality of problems, all Southern European countries have been pursuing pension reforms in the two last decades, introducing major changes in the structural characteristics of the pension system, preventing early retirement, reducing benefit revaluation, modifying the calculation formula by increasing the level of contributions and raising the retirement age. Emphasis is being placed on reductions in pension generosity, the homogenisation of pension arrangements and the abolition of the privileges of special categories (Kalisch and Aman, 1999). In addition, the presence of complementary funded schemes, which should provide additional coverage to the compulsory schemes, has been rapidly growing. 93
94 Southern European Welfare States
Private pension arrangements are also being promoted. They are not yet, however, of significant importance. Following the general structure of this book, the pensions systems will be examined from a ‘bird’s eye view’ in part one of this chapter, with the scope of the analysis focusing on their structural characteristics and their relative position in the European context. The findings of this analysis confirm the initial working hypothesis of this book that the Southern European social protection systems generally fit into the Central European ‘state-corporatist’ welfare model. Their internal differentiation into two clusters, with one comprising Italy and Greece and the other the Iberian countries, also seems justified. Special attention is paid to the alleged ‘generosity’ of the systems and the recent implementation of minimum income schemes. This is done because the presence of the first and the absence of the second are supposed to be two of the basic attributes of the ‘Southern Welfare Model’. In the second part we examine facets of the social security systems of the four countries. It is not, of course, possible to describe the social security systems and their related provisions in depth or in detail. This is not only because of the limitations of space, but also because of the continuously changing landscape of the related legislation. Therefore we try to present a comparative view of the services provided, in order to show the general status and the ‘ethos’ of the systems and to highlight the most important organisational features, as shaped by the reforms of the last decade.
General overview Constitutional and legal aspects The constitutions of all four countries provide for the right to social security for their citizens.1 The case law of the courts generally accepts the binding character of these provisions and their character as a fundamental right (Katrougalos, 1998; Kontiades, 1997; Kremalis, 1991; de Vergottini, 1991; Vida Soria, 1991; Alarcon Caracuel, 1993; Hoffmann, 1983). However, it usually conditions their fulfilment on the availability of public resources (see, for instance, the judgements of the constitutional courts of Italy, Cor.Cost. 160/1974, 64/1975, and of Spain 146/78). Although in principle constitutional protection covers only citizens, legal immigrants generally enjoy similar rights, due to a number of international conventions (Katrougalos, 1995). The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (18 December 1990), guarantees the equal protection of rights for all immigrants. In article 7 it stipulates that the member states ‘undertake, in accordance with the international instruments concerning human rights, to respect and to ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their territory or subject to their jurisdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention without distinction of any kind’.
Social Security 95
Among other related treaties is the I