H. Roos, SJ.
en Kierkegaard
and Catholicism
Translated from
the Danish with the Author's sanction by
RICHARD M. BRA...
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H. Roos, SJ.
en Kierkegaard
and Catholicism
Translated from
the Danish with the Author's sanction by
RICHARD M. BRACKETT, S.J.
The Newman Press ⢠Westminster, Maryland
1954
"B
Imprimi potest:
REV. WILLIAM E. FITZGERALD, S.J.
Praep. Prov. Nov. Angl.
March 12, 1954
Nihti, obstat:
REV. FRANCIS X. MEEHAN
Censor Deputatus
Imprimatur:
ffr RICHARD J. GUSHING
Archbishop of Boston
March 17, 1954
Copyright, 1954, by THE NEWMAN PRESS
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 54-7545
Printed in the United States of America
3J
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE vii
INTRODUCTION ix
CATHOLIC TENDENCIES IN KIERKEGAARD 1
Critique of Luther 3
The Principle of Action 12
The Analogy of Being 15
Objective Authority 20
ANTI-CATHOLIC TENDENCIES IN
KIERKEGAARD 26
The Subjective Basis of Faith 27
The Paradox 39
Rejection of the Church 41
SUPPLEMENT
Catholic Literature in S0ren
Kierkegaard's Library 45
REFERENCES 51
BIHLIOGRAPHY 59
ABBREVIATIONS
Soren Kierkegaard's Complete Works, Volumes I-XIV, published
by A. B. Drachmann, J. H. Heiberg and H. O. Lange,
Copenhagen, 1901 f. . . . S.V.
Soren Kierkegaard's posthumous Journals, Volumes I-IX, pub
lished by P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr, Copenhagen,
1909 ff. . . . Pap.
Catalogue of Dr. Soren A. Kierkegaard's Library, Copenhagen,
1856 . . . Ktl.
H. Denziger: Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declara-
tionum de rebus fidei et morum, editio 23, Friburg 1937
. . . Denz.
VI
Translator's Note
The following treatise on S0ren Kierke
gaard was originally a lecture delivered to the S0ren
Kierkegaard Society in Copenhagen. The author, Fr.
H. Roos, S.J., is professor of German literature at the
University of Copenhagen. In a most objective man
ner, Fr. Roos attempts to delineate Kierkegaard's
thought, analyzing both the Catholic and anti-
Catholic tendencies in the writings of the Danish
existentialist.
In the citations from Kierkegaard's works,
I have preferred, where possible, to give the standard
English translation and references are made to these
works already translated into English, as well as to
the original Danish editions of S0ren Kierkegaard's
v 11
volumes: S. K.'s Complete Works, Vols. I-XIV, pub
lished by A. B. Drachmann, J. H. Heiberg and H. O.
Lange, Copenhagen, 1901, ff. and S0ren Kierke
gaard's Posthumous Journals, Vols. I-IX, published
by P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr, Copenhagen, 1909, ff.
Those citations from the Journals not included in
Alexander Dru's English translation (Oxford Univer
sity Press: 1938) are marked with an asterisk.
The translator wishes to thank the following
publishers for their kind permission to quote from the
English translations of Kierkegaard's works: Prince
ton University Press (Either/Or, The Sickness unto
Death, Attack upon Christendom and The Works of
Love); Oxford University Press (The Journals of
S0ren Kierkegaard and The Present Age); American-
Scandinavian Foundation (Concluding Unscientific
Postscript and Philosophical Fragments). Further
information and credit to translators and publishers
are given in the References and in the Bibliography.
RICHARD M. BRACKETT, S.J.
Weston College (Weston, Mass.)
January 1,1954
v 111
Introduction
S0ren Kierkegaard's own contemporaries
were the first to raise the problem of the Danish
philosopher's relation to Catholicism. Hans Peter
Kofoed-Hansen (1813-1893), one of Kierkegaard's
most influential champions,1 was received into the
Catholic Church on July 9, 1887 by His Excellency,
Most Rev. John von Euch. "It is not at all unlikely
that Kofoed-Hansen was greatly influenced by the
critique of the Lutheran Reformation, contained in
the final volumes of Kierkegaard's posthumous works;
indeed, this critique favored certain points in the
doctrine of the Catholic Church."2
The generation following Kierkegaard poses
the same problem. Georg Brandes, the famous Danish
literary critic, writes in this manner in his treatise on
Kierkegaard: "In Kierkegaard, Danish intellectual
life was forced to its uttermost extremity, to a preci
pice from which a leap had to be taken into the black
abyss of Catholicism or to that point where freedom
beckons."3 H0ffding considers the possibility of what
would have happened had Kierkegaard lived longer.
He writes, "It would be idle speculation to attempt
to decide what position S0ren Kierkegaard would
have taken, had his life been prolonged. His sympa
thy for Catholicism, along with his recognition of the
principle of freedom to form one's own opinion of
Christianity (Feuerbach), open contrary possibili
ties." 4
In his book entitled Danske Filosoffer,
(Danish Philosophers), H0ffding compares Kierke
gaard with Cardinal Newman: "The attack Kierke
gaard launched upon the established Church [Danish
Lutheran] and the notion of Christianity was based
on a similar position held by John Henry Newman a
few years earlier (1836-1843) when he attacked the
Anglican Church and thereby was led to embrace the
Catholic faith. . . . Since Kierkegaard frequently de
clares that Christianity is distorted in the Protestant
Church to a far greater degree than in the Catholic
Communion, he is in close agreement with Newman,
whose acquaintance, unfortunately, he never made.
We shall, however, not venture to say that Kierke-
gaard, had he lived longer, would have travelled the
same path as Newman."B
Although other leading authors have only
cursorily considered this problem of Kierkegaard's re
lation to Catholicism and have intimated it in their
writings, the entire question came once again to the
fore in the years after World War I; it was at this time
that a systematic and probing investigation of the
matter was undertaken. Today, there exist Catholic
authors, theologians and philosophers, who have
studied Kierkegaard and suggest Catholicism as an
answer.6 Foremost among these scholars are Theodor
Haecker, Romano Guardini, Erich Przywara, and
Aloysius Dempf. According to Hermann Diehm, the
contributions of these Catholic thinkers have created
a "new development in controversial theology."7
The Austrian writer, Ferdinand Ebner (1882-1931)
was actually the first Catholic philosopher to be
aware of Kierkegaard's importance. In 1917, at the
age of thirty-five, he was reconverted to the Catholic
Church, after having studied the works of the Danish
philosopher. Through his book, Das Wort und die
geistigen Realitaten,8 and his articles published in
Brenner,9 Ebner exercised a powerful influence upon
Theodor Haecker. Haecker, in turn, not only learned
Danish in order to translate Kierkegaard but was
* Brenner, a periodical published in Innsbruck, Austria.
xi
also led by him to Christendom, just as he was led by
Newman to Catholicism.
Romano Guardini's studies of Kierkegaard,
in particular his two excellent articles, "Der Ausgang-
spunkt der Denkbewegung S0ren Kierkegaards" and
"Vom Sinn der Schwermut" ("The Starting Point of
S0ren Kierkegaard's Thought" and "The Meaning of
Melancholy"), have gained the distinction of being a
most expert presentation and skillful interpretation of
the Danish philosopher. The classical work on Kierke
gaard, from a Catholic standpoint, is Das Geheimnis
Kierkegaards (The Mystery of Kierkegaard) by
Father Erich Przywara. This work was published by
the famous Jesuit in 1929. The possessor of a sover
eign mastery of Kierkegaard's writings, i.e., his works
translated into German, Fr. Przywara manifests a
profound knowledge of the philosophical currents
influencing Kierkegaard and delves into the problem
of the Dane's relationship with Catholicism. He main
tains that Kierkegaard, through his demand for ob
jective authority and his tenets concerning ordination
as the foundation of the pastoral office, has over
stepped the boundaries of Lutheranism and is there
fore on the road to Holy Mother the Church. His
thesis in this relatively short but compact book is that
one discovers in Kierkegaard an anonymous Catholi
cism. We may criticize Przywara's tendency to syste-
x 11
matic logic and his somewhat daring interpretations,
but we should at the same time be mindful that he
has viewed the entire problem and has provided a
solution to many difficulties. In this connection, we
must also mention Hans Urs von Balthasar.9 In his
Apokalypse der deutschen Seele (Revelation of the
German Soul), the author attempts to probe into
Kierkegaard's innermost thoughts on life. Finally, we
call attention to the second chapter of Le Drame de
fHumanisme Athee (published in English by Sheed
and Ward, 1950, under the title, The Drama of Athe
istic Humanism) 10 in which the French Jesuit, Henri
de Lubac, contrasts the doctrines of Nietzsche and
Kierkegaard on religious problems.
We now focus our attention upon Kierke
gaard himself and the first question we should ask
ourselves is: How well was he acquainted with Ca
tholicism? In his journeys to Berlin and during his life
here in Denmark, Kierkegaard never knew a living
Catholicism. He had neither Catholic relatives nor
friends. Since he is a literary author, we ought to in
quire further: Did Kierkegaard meet Catholicism in
the domain of literature? If so, what were his Catholic
sources? This problem, as far as I can judge, has not
yet been satisfactorily solved. We possess, to be sure,
Kierkegaard's posthumous Journals, wherein he pre
sents an accurate picture of himself for our study. It
xi
is necessary, too, to discover how his professors at the
University, particularly his theology teachers, pre
sented Catholicism.
On the basis of accurate research into
Kierkegaard's posthumous works, we are justified in
concluding that he never read the great classical
Catholic thinkers, either the scholastic philosophers
of the Middle Ages (e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas) or the
great controversialists of the Baroque period, Suarez,
Bellarmine, and the others. This is probably due to
his deficient sense of the historical and to the fact
that Catholic philosophy and theology in Kierke
gaard's time was rather poor. At the beginning of
the 19th century, Catholic theology and philosophy
was, so to speak, down in a trough of the sea. Never
theless, it is an interesting experiment in the realm of
thought to reflect upon what might have happened
had Kierkegaard met Thomas Aquinas or the Fathers
of the Church, who conducted Newman into Mother
Church. Kierkegaard read the Fathers of the Church
only in the translation of Muus.11 He is thought to
have known Augustine from his position in Church
History and not from his own study, although he
possessed the large Maurist edition of Augustine's
works, published in eighteen volumes.12
In the light of this complete void in Cath
olic theology and philosophy, his strong reaction to
xiv
the reading of two Catholic authors becomes doubly
interesting. I refer to Mohler and Gorres. Johann
Adam Mohler (d. 1838) was a professor of theology
at Tubingen and Munich. He is the founder of the
historical Tubingen school and probably the most
important controversial theologian since the Refor
mation. Directly influenced by the Fathers of the
Church, his dogmatic works are profoundly classical
and widely read at the present time. Josef von Gorres
(1776-1848) was not a theologian, but a journalist
and politician. Following a stormy and violent youth,
he returned to the Catholic faith at the outset of his
twenties. As one of the leaders of the Romantic
movement, he was summoned to Munich where he
taught history at the University. In his political writ
ings, he fought for the Church's freedom and op
posed vigorously the interference of the State in
ecclesiastical jurisdiction; so effective was his enter
prising work that Napoleon labelled him "the Fifth
Great Power."
As far as we know, Kierkegaard first came
in contact with the works of Mohler during his univer
sity years. It was by chance that he saw a review of
Mohler's Symbolik eller fremstilling af de dogmatiske
modsaetninger imellem katolikkerne og protestan-
terne efter deres offentlige bekendelse (Symbolism
or Exposition of the Dogmatic Opposition between
xv
Catholics and Protestants According to Their Public
Creed). This book, the most important of Mohler's
works, appeared in 1832 and is particularly note
worthy for its clear analysis of Schleiermacher's the
ology and the philosophy of Hegel. A review of this
treatise appeared in the periodical of foreign theo
logical literature published by Clausen and Kohlen
berg (Vol. II, 1834). Kierkegaard probably read this
review in November, 1837, when he wrote the follow
ing comment on it in his Journals: "It seems to me
that we can settle the controversy between Catholics
and Protestants by inquiring whether the freedom by
which man receives divine grace is conditioned by
the activity of the Holy Spirit or whether this free
dom finds its foundation in man himself. The Prot
estants have expressed their opinion that human
nature is of itself incapable of receiving grace and
must first, so to speak, be transformed anew. As to
the Catholic point of view, Dr. Mohler (he is the
nearest source I have available) writes (in Clausen
and Hohlenberg's Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 137):
'the divine calling, which goes out to man for the
sake of Christ, is issued not only in the outward invi
tation announced in the Gospels but in the inner
activity of the Holy Spirit as well, for it is the Holy
Spirit who awakens the slumbering powers of man.'
I must therefore conclude that man, according to the
xvi
teaching of the Catholic Church, has the power to
receive grace (in the proportion in which it is offered
him), but first he must be internally disposed to
accept it and thereby his powers are awakened; this
doctrine certainly cannot be labelled Pelagianism. It
appears, however, that Mohler does not discuss this
doctrine elsewhere in his work. It is my opinion that
a solution to this problem on both sides would lead
to a better understanding of each other." 13 *
It is most probable that Kierkegaard never
read Mohler's greatest work, Symbolik. However, we
do know for certain that he was acquainted with an
other book of Mohler's, namely, the dogmatic-historical
monograph entitled Athanasius der Grosse und die
Kirche seiner Zeit, besonders im Kampfe mit dem
Arianismus (Athanasius the Great and the Church,
The Struggle with Arianism), Mainz, 1827. Kierke
gaard must have read this treatise in his studies.
Among his dogmatic theology notes we discover
brief references to it. Two entries in his Journals,
dated December 6, 1838, illustrate how engrossed he
had become in Mohler's work. The second note is
most interesting: "Starting on page 165, Mohler gives
a summary of Hilary's work on the Trinity in twelve
volumes. Oddly enough, I have now devoted some
years to dogma and have never heard these volumes
mentionedâthey are indeed powerful; I am tempted
x v 11
to say of them what King Pyrrhus said of the Roman
Senate: it is a realm of lapidary thoughts, wherein
each one presents a norm for the points of view ex
pressed in any treatise in speculative dogmaâI must
read this work; at the present moment, I feel over
whelmed by it, as when the Nile's waters blessed
Egypt"14*
The importance of this notation is note
worthy, since Kierkegaard wrote three exclamatory
remarks in the margin beside it. The series of lectures
on Christian Symbolism conducted by Professor Mar-
tensen during the winter of 1839-1840 are further
proof that Kierkegaard had been occupied with the
study of Mohler.
Equally interesting is Kierkegaard's reaction
upon reading Gorres' Athanasius. In the same year,
1838, he wrote: "During these last few days, I have
been reading Gorres' Athanasius not only with my
eyes but with my whole beingâin the depths of my
heart."15 This Journal note is significant if we recall
the fact that here we are concerned with an essen
tially Catholic book. Gorres' Athanasius, published
in 1838 in four editions, was written during the so-
called Kolner Ereignis (Cologne Incident). At this
time, there was open strife between the Catholic
Church and the Prussian government in the Rhine-
land. Prussia aimed to suppress the freedom of the
xv 111
Church and establish a State Church, subject only to
civil authority. The Archbishop of Cologne, Clement
August Droste zu Vischering, dared to oppose the
designs of the government and subsequently on No
vember 11, 1837 was sentenced to prison and taken
to Minden, where he was placed in chains. This
"Cologne Incident" served as a flourish of trumpets
to raise a strong barrier against the Prussian govern
ment's designs. In a very short time, there arose a
Catholic consciousness, the result, in particular, of
Gorres' Athanasius; Gorres, with a powerful mastery
of language, defended the cause of the Church and
excoriated the State's encroachment in ecclesiastical
affairs. Kierkegaard's perusal of this treatise lends
credence, in my opinion, to the probability that his
later invectives and bitter irony directed against the
Danish State Church may have their foundation in
Gorres' Athanasius.
We will not emphasize the fact that Kierke
gaard read Franz von Baader.16 Baader was captivated
by anti-rationalism and in his lectures on speculative
dogmaticsâthe work Kierkegaard studiedâhe as
signed a new theological-gnostic interpretation to
dogma.17 If we are mindful of the vast amount of
literature with which Kierkegaard came in contact
during his formative years, then his reaction to the
two Catholic writers, Mohler and Gorres, is most
xi x
remarkable and his admiration for Hila
tate is all the more striking in its si
regards Catholic literature, Kierkegaai
a compiled edition of the Latin work:
dictine mystic, Lucius Blosius,18 an
prayerbook, entitled Prayers and Med
Alphonsus Liguori (Aachen, 1840).19
Kierkegaard read Blosius since he men
approval.20 The same is true in the case or i_iiguun a
prayerbook.21 What course might Kierkegaard's
thought have taken, if only he had encountered clas
sical Catholicism to a greater extent and become
more intimately acquainted with its doctrines in daily
life?22
xx
I
Catholic Tendencies in Kierkegaard
If Kierkegaard's attitude on Catholicism
was somewhat conditioned by his deficient knowl
edge of its true essence, it was still further influenced
by his singularly dialectical tenor of mind. His posi
tion with relation to Catholicism was in itself dia
lectical; to quote the oft-used phrase, it was an
"antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipa
thy." This dialecticism is quite apparent in the fol
lowing two diary annotations written during his last
years: "The Retreat. It is a unique type of retreat
that we must make. Back to the monastery, from
which Luther fledâthat is the truthâthis is what must
be done. Yet, we do not mean that the Pope shall be
victorious or that the Papal police shall lead us back
there. The fault with the monastery was not asceti
cism, celibacy, etc. . . . No, asceticism and all that
is related to it is the very first essential required of
witnesses to the truth. Consequently the decision that
Luther made was wrong; this cannot be denied, one
must accept it. It has therefore constantly struck me
how God can be found in the Lutheran doctrine; be
cause, wherever God's assistance is given, there will
the progress that is made recognize the fact that the
debt is becoming greater, the matter more difficult.
On the contrary, however, the human tendency is to
desire that things be made easier, and progress con
sists in this." 23 The above Journal note was inscribed
in the year 1854. Kierkegaard maintained the same
dialectical position in an article entitled "Salt," dated
March 30, 1855. "Protestantism, viewed from a Chris
tian standpoint, is quite simply a fraud, a dishonesty
which adulterates the teaching of Christianity, its
perception of the world and life itself, as soon as it
becomes a principle for Christianity, not as a remedy
(corrective) for any particular time and place.
Wherefore, to enter the Catholic Church would be a
rash act which I shall not commit, but which one
will expect, since in these times it is as though the
nature of Christendom has been entirely forgotten,
and even the best exponents of Christianity are only
beginners."24
With these citations as a background for
our investigation, I shall now point out where we
may find in the literary production of Kierkegaard
noteworthy indications of his "anonymous Catholi
cism," to use Przywara's term. In the next chapter, I
shall examine those points where Kierkegaard stands
in diametrical opposition to the Catholic concept of
life.
CRITIQUE OF LUTHER
The first consideration we shall take up in
Kierkegaard's relation to Catholicism is his critique
of Luther's person and actions; this critique perme
ates the entire period of the Danish philosopher's
literary productivity and is particularly striking dur
ing the last years of his life. Also, we will note that
this critique is dialectical, i.e., we can note passages
wherein Kierkegaard is speaking positively concern
ing Luther and the Reformation. Yet, in comparison
with these positive texts, the negative criticisms are
even more abundant and violent in tone. One will
notice, too, that Kierkegaard's critique of Luther is to
be found exclusively in his private papers and manu
scripts. "In his published works, Kierkegaard always
spoke with the greatest reverence for Luther."25 The
following will serve to indicate his censure of Luther:
"he has denied, where he should concede"; he is not
content that his principle be a corrective; it must be-
come a norm of life; the secular and worldly element
in Luther's Reformation gained its influence in Chris
tianity. The aim of the entire Lutheran critique is
stated in this manner in the Journals: "The correc
tives. It is a disastrous error for one to become accus
tomed to applying the corrective and thereby grow
impatient and attempt to make the corrective a norm
for others; this is an attempt to confuse everything."20
There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard is
here concerned with Luther since in another text he
has this to say on the Lutheran principle: "Lutheran-
ism is a correctiveâbut a corrective made into the
norm, the entire thing is eo ipso confusing in the next
generation (when the conditions it was meant to cor
rect no longer exist). And with each generation,
things become worse, until finally the corrective,
which had established itself as self-subsistent, gives
way to the exact opposite of its original determina
tion. And this is actually the case. The Lutheran
corrective, considered by itself as the whole of Chris
tianity, produces the most refined type of worldliness
and paganism."27
The same train of thought is evident in this
excerpt (1849): "The misfortune of Christianity is
clearly that the dialectical factor has been removed
from Luther's doctrine on faith and as a result it has
become a pretext for pure paganism and epicurean-
ism; people forget entirely that Luther insisted on
faith in contrast to fanatically eccentric asceticism."2S
We receive the impression, upon reading
these excerpts, that Kierkegaard was not on the same
wave-length with Luther. In another annotation
dated 1851 we read, "In the third volume of Henry
Calvin's Me, I read in a reference to Luther that
when the time should be at hand for him to die and
draw up his last will and testament, and people de
sired that there be witnesses on hand, he said, 'That
is not necessary, since I am quite well known both on
earth, in heaven and hell; my name will bear its own
weight.' Here Luther is so naively humorous that it
is almost frivolous."29 *
Another notation from the Journals, writ
ten three years later, attacks Protestant narrow-mind
edness and its lack of heroism: "The minister is so
readily at a loss because of it, that at present he is not
at all the Christian one would point out as a model;
he can easily be suspected and distrusted. Catholi
cism, on the other hand, always has some members
who are Christian in character. Then, too, the Protes
tant clergymen contrive this deception: that there
live in the land true Christians, people who are pri
vately true, genuine Christiansâyes, after all, we are
all true Christians in our hidden fervor, we are all
models. Charmant! If the New Testament should
voice an opinion on what constitutes a genuine Chris
tian, it wouldâin perfect agreement and exquisite
fashionâdeclare that it is just as impossible to be a
genuine Christian privately as it is to fire a cannon se
cretly." 30 â¢
In the second Journal note following the
above quotation, we read: "O Luther, Luther! You
have a great responsibility; for the closer I look, the
more clearly I see that you have overthrown the Pope
âand have set 'the public' on the throne. You have
altered the New Testament concept of the 'martyr'
[the 'witness'] and have taught men to seek victory
by the numerical."31
One gathers the impression that, as the
years pass, this critique becomes sharper and more
penetrating: "The more I look upon Luther, the more
convinced I am that he was a confused man [literally,
'out of his wits']; it was a comfortable type of reform
that consists in casting off all burdens and making life
easyâthis is an easy way of finding friends to helpâ.
The true reform always aims to make life more diffi
cult, to lay on burdens; and the true reformer is
therefore always put to death, as an enemy of man
kind. This verse alone of Luther's, 'Listen to me, thou
Pope,' etc., seems to me to be almost loathsomely
worldly. Is that the sacred earnestness of a reformer,
concerned only with his own responsibility, who
6
knows that all true reform consists in becoming more
inward? Such an utterance is a perfect reminder of a
journalist's slogan, or something similar. This un
blessed polemic attitude, this desire to overthrow the
Pope, is the source of Luther's confusion."32
Reflecting thoughtfully upon Luther's
abandoning his vocation to the monastery life,
Kierkegaard says, "In view of the error in leaving the
monastery, this flight (from the monastery) appears
so simple, yet upon closer consideration, what violent
collisions slumber here, because it is the precise char
acteristic of the genuine Christian that he does not
belong to this world. But Luther was no dialectician,
so constantly was he aware of only one side of the
matter." S3 *
Though Protestants reprove Catholicism for
its remissness in fulfilling its duty to spread the mes
sage of Sacred Scripture, Kierkegaard, nevertheless,
wrote these bitterly ironic lines on the subject of
Bible Societies: "The Bible Societies, those erroneous
models of the mission, are essentially like all the
other companies that operate on money and in such
a worldly manner they hustle about, spreading the
Bible, just as other companies in their enterprises.
The Bible Societies have caused irreparable harm.
Christianity has long been in need of a religious hero,
who in fear and trembling before God had the cour-
age to forbid people to read the Bible. This is just as
necessary today as it is to preach against Christian
ity." M
The strongest attack on Protestantism, from
a religious standpoint, is discovered in two notations,
dated 1854, expressing the same idea: "Protestant
ism is quite untenable. It is a revolt, occasioned by
proclaiming 'the Apostle' (Paul) to the neglect of the
Master (Christ). As a corrective for a given time and
under certain conditions, it may have its importance.
Otherwise, should there be question of maintaining
Protestantism, it should be done in this manner: we
admit that this doctrine is a mitigation of Christian
ity, which we men have allowed ourselves, leaving it
to God to agree to it. And, in place thereof, Protes
tantism is trumpeted abroad as an advancement in
Christendom! No, this is perhaps the most marked
concession that is made to the numerical, this numer
ical which is the hereditary enemy of Christianity,
which wants to be Christian but which loses or re
duces its ideality, and prides itself upon its material
numbers."35
It is clear from this text that Kierkegaard,
in employing the pair of contraries, the one and the
many, is not considering the opposition between re
ligious freedom of thought and strict adherence to
dogma, but rather that much more profound oppo-
8
sition: ideality (from a Catholic point of view, the
striving for sanctity) and religious secularism. The
same concept is expressed in these equally plain and
sharp lines composed during the same year: "Luther
âthe Reformation. Luther is the direct opposite of an
'Apostle.' The 'Apostle' expresses Christianity in
God's interest, his authority is from God and in His
interest. Luther expresses Christianity in the interest
of man, is in truth the reaction of mankind against
Christianity in God's interest. Therefore we have
Luther's formula: 'I cannot do otherwise,' which is
not at all that of the Apostle. Behold, here, what con
fusion arises if we call Luther an Apostle."36
The concept of Luther's expression of
Christianity "in the interests of man" leads in genuine
Kierkegaardian fashion to a further conclusion. "In
his extreme anguish [Angst], Luther discovered this
principle of 'fighting in fear and trembling and
anxiety until death'; it is this principle which must
be proclaimed as unique and universal (the golden
principle); and it is not in every generation that
there is one individual who has undergone such a
similar test."37 * How close to Catholicism this con
sideration brings Kierkegaard: "I do not intend to
reintroduce the monastery, even if I could; my pro
posal is only that we become consciousâwhat truth
9
there is in thisâthat we are approaching the truth by
our concessions. â¢
⢠*» 1H A
Building on this concept that Protestantism,
from being a "consolation" in an extraordinary situa
tion, where man "in fear and trembling and anxiety
fights to the death," is made into a universal principle,
Kierkegaard discusses the problem of "Catholicism-
Protestantism" and, in my opinion, develops it in one
final consideration: "Are not Catholicism and Protes
tantism related to each other likeâthis may seem
strange, but it is actually the case physicallyâlike an
edifice which cannot stand to a buttress which can
not stand alone, whereas the entire structure is quite
safe and firm, as long as it is kept together, the edifice
and the buttress which supports it. In other words:
is not Protestantism and Lutheranism a corrective;
and has not the fact that Protestantism has been
made into a regulative produced great confusion?
. . . For, in order to be able to perceive clearly
whether and to what extent Protestantism can stand
alone, it is desirable to select a country where there
is no Catholicism. It would then be apparent whether
Protestantismâpresuming that it is degeneratedâ
would lead to a state of corruption, to which Cathol
icismâpresuming that it is degeneratedâwould not
lead, and whether this does not point out that Prot
estantism is not fit to stand alone." 39
10
Kierkegaard now engages in an interesting
experiment in thought. He compares the "thoroughly
worldly" Catholic prelate with a Protestant bishop,
who is "quite the counterpart of the Catholic." How
will the Catholic judge his bishop? "I think that he
will say (quite fittingly): it is not my position to pass
judgment upon the higher clergy; yet, nevertheless,
the Catholic will easily see that it is worldliness. And
why will he easily see it? Because the Catholic sees
at the same time an entirely different side of Chris
tianity expressedâa thing that the prelate must put
up with, for side by side with him there walks one
who lives in poverty, and the Catholic has a pro
found concept that this is truer than the prelate's
manner of life, which, alas, is nothing but worldli-
ness.
« A(\
How can we now pass judgment in a Prot
estant land, "where we have for a long time neglected
asceticism, fasting, the cloistered orders, and those
who proclaim by their lives of poverty the message
of Christendom; how can we pass judgment when we
have abandoned these, indeed, have considered them
to be ridiculous and foolish?
"Look, say the contemporaries one to an
otherâbehold this Lutheran frankness, watch him at
the turtle soup, there is no connoisseur like him,
watch him at the oyster banquet, see how he can suck
11
enjoyment from every situation, and how shrewdly
he looks to his own gain; so let us admire his Lutheran
frankness! High he soarsâin Lutheran frankness-
high above the lower and more imperfect ideal of
entering a monastery, of fasting, of preaching Chris
tianity in poverty, high he soars above it all in free
dom of spirit and Lutheran frankness! The noble
ideal is not to wander away from the world, to flee
from itâno, genuine Lutheranism is like the prelate,
for this is godliness; his contemporaries not only put
up with this or take pains to ignore it; no, they regard
it with admirationâas though it were godliness."41
Kierkegaard concludes this comparison with the fol
lowing observation: "And thisâas I maintainâcannot
happen in Catholicism." 42
The texts that we have cited from Kierke
gaardâand we could suggest many moreâprove that
we do find in the Danish philosopher a tendency to
Catholicism, an "anonymous Catholicism" (Przy-
wara); perhaps Brandes and H0ffding are both cor
rect when they state that we don't know what path
Kierkegaard's life might have taken, had he lived
longer.
THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION
In addition to these polemical utterances
which bring Kierkegaard near to Catholicism, there
12
are certain positive tendencies which likewise point
in the direction of the Catholic position; this is espe
cially true of his emphasis upon the principle of
action in contrast to that of faith.43 Kierkegaard's
argumentation in this consideration is naturally dia
lectical. "When I consider 'works,' my thought is
drawn to Catholicism. In order not to be misunder
stood, I will noteâa thing that is indeed not neces
sary or ought not to be necessary to noteâthat
everything that Catholicism has taught concerning
the meritoriousness of works is absolutely to be re
jected." 44 *
This notion finds its strongest expression
in The Works of Love, particularly in Kierkegaard's
discourse on the subject, "Love is the fulfillment of
law." In the same book he states, "It is a work of love
to remember the departed"; here he is close to the
Catholic faith and practice. When we recall that
Luther termed St. James's Epistle, with its strong
emphasis on the necessity of good works, "an epistle
of straw,"45 it becomes interesting to see what attrac
tion this Epistle had for Kierkegaard. The first chap
ter of James's Epistle he calls "my very first, my
beloved text." 46
We shall now consider the Kierkegaardian
concept "imitation," which plays a major role in his
philosophy; indeed, it is a key-word in his system of
13
thought. "There is more meaning to Catholicism
simply because it has not entirely forgotten imita
tion." " * The concept of "imitation" is perfectly
coherent with his idea of Christ as the "model." "No,
surely Christ did not come to destroy the lawâHe
Himself is the fulfillment of the law. This is an en
tirely qualitative aim: the fact that He is the model
and it is He we must imitate." "8 *
It is not a contradiction to maintain that
God is love and that we must "die"; rather, one is a
logical corollary of the other. Kierkegaard goes as far
as to say, "Only a man with a purpose can be a Chris
tian." ta * He grants the will an important role in the
process of Christian education, a concession quite the
opposite of Luther's teaching on the "enslaved will."
It is our will that frees us from "the illusion of the
senses," "the baser representations," and keeps us in
harmony with "objective" reality, the reality of God.
As a consequence, Kierkegaard had early in life re
jected the doctrine of predestination. "From every
point of view, the concept predestination may be
considered as an abortion, since it has unquestionably
arisen in an attempt to relate freedom and God's
omnipotence; it solves the riddle by denying one of
the concepts and consequently explains nothing," he
wrote in 1834 at the outset of his Journals.â¢
14
THE ANALOGY OF BEING
This emphasis on the cooperation of the
will in the attainment of salvation and the conse
quent rejection of the doctrine of predestination
leads us to another essential concept where Kierke
gaard moves further away from Protestantism and
nearer to Catholic teaching on the analogy of being.
The analogy of being can best be enunciated in its
classical form, as it was formulated by the fourth
Lateran Council (1215): "Between the Creator and
the creature there is certainly a resemblance but at
the same time there is also a greater disparity." 51
The Reformation, by its doctrine maintaining God's
absolute omnipotence and man's utter weakness,
stressed this greater disparity and this consideration
does have some foundation. (Kierkegaard calls it
"distance-theology.") The Reformation, however,
overlooked the other side of the truth, namely, that
amid this disparity there is found a certain resem
blance.
In other words, the Reformation forgot the
dialectical in relation to God. The concept of God's
absolute omnipotence led to the doctrine of predes
tination. The concept of man's utter weakness and
total corruption, on the other hand, led to the conse
quences which Kierkegaard is careful to point out in
his critique of Luther and Protestantism. In logical
15
sequence, there is the Protestant principle of God's
"AWeinwirksamkeit" [sole efficacy] in contrast to the
Catholic principle of God's "AWwirksamkeit" [al
mighty efficacy] in and with His creatures. This latter
concept is naturally Thomistic. The transcendency
of God is demonstrated by the fact that He as "the
first Cause" (causa prima) creates really autonomous
"secondary causes" (causae secundae). It may be
advantageous to recall some examples from St.
Thomas: "Since God possesses Being in its entire per
fection, it follows that He is able to communicate it
to others, giving His creatures the power to act self-
existently." 52 And again, "The nearer a creature is
by nature to God, the less it is determined by Him,
and to that greater degree does God allow the crea
ture to determine itself."53 9 The potency of the free
* Translator's note on reference 53: Father Roos has
followed a reading which seems to be inaccurate. He based him
self on the Parma edition of the De Veritate, where we read:
"Unde quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus ab eo
inclinatur, et magis nata est se ipsum inclinare." De Veritate, Q.
22, a. 4 corp. Editio: P. Lethielleux, Paris, 1884, and the Parma
edition, Musurgia, New York, 1948.
The text, in a critical edition recently published, is as
follows: "Unde quanto aliqua natura est Deo vicinior, tanto minus
ab alio inclinatur, et magis nata est se ipsum inclinare." De Veri
tate, cura et studio P. Spiazzi, O.P., Ed. IV, Marietti, Turin, 1949.
Cf. Bulletin Thomiste, IV (1934-5), n. 94, p. 58;
also, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, P. Heris,
1928, p. 806, n. 1. These two articles contain a fine evaluation of
the recent correction made on this Thomistic text.
16
creature seipsum agere ad finem [to direct himself
towards an end] is the characteristic of his supreme
likeness to God and as such is an outpouring, so to
speak, of the Causa prima.
Kierkegaard states this precise notion and
doctrine in a somewhat difficult text, yet it is a text
extraordinarily clear: "The whole question of God's
omnipotence and goodness and its relation to evil
(instead of the distinction that God works good and
only permits evil) can perhaps be explained quite
simply in this manner. The greatest act that can be
performed by any being, greater even than any end
to which it can be created, is to make it free. In order
to be able to do that omnipotence is necessary. . . .
God's omnipotence is therefore His goodness. For
goodness means to give absolutely, yet in such a way
that by taking oneself back one makes the recipient
independent. From finite power comes only depend
ence, and omnipotence alone can make something
independent, can create something out of nothing
which endures of itself, because omnipotence is al
ways taking itself back. Omnipotence cannot be
involved in any relation to the other, since there is
nothing to which it has any relation; it can give with
out giving away the very least part of its power: it
can make the other independent. This is what is in-
17
conceivable; omnipotence can not only bring forth
the most imposing of all things, the world in its vis
ible totality, but it can create the most delicate of all
things, a creature independent of it. Omnipotence
can lay its hand so heavily upon the world and yet
can make its touch so light that the creature receives
independence. It is only a miserable and worldly
picture of the dialectic of power to say that it be
comes greater and greater in proportion as it can
compel and make things dependent. Socrates knew
better: the art of using power is to make free.â
Creation out of nothing is once again the expression
of omnipotence for being able to make things inde
pendent. It is to him who made me independent,
while he nevertheless retained everything, that I owe
all things. If in order to create man God had lost any
of his power, then he could not have made man inde
pendent." "
This Kierkegaardian chain of thought is
Thomistic through and through and is in complete
opposition to the Lutheran point of view.55* This
* Translator's note on reference 55: Cf. Cornelio
Fabro: "Foi et Raison dans 1'oeuvre de Kierkegaard," Revue des
Sciences PMosophiques et Theologiques, Vol. 32 (1948), p. 171;
also, Fabro's article, "Jaspers et Kierkegaard," Ibid., Vol. 37
(1953), pp. 209-252. A fine comparison between Kierkegaard's
philosophy and the Thomistic system is presented by Dr. James
Collins in his book, The Mind of Kierkegaard, Regnery (Chicago:
1953).
18
agreement between Kierkegaard's thought and Cath
olic philosophy serves to point out how very wrong
Hermann Diehm is in stating that "Catholicism is the
most undialectic conception" that exists, although he
is speaking, in the text I refer to, only of the
Church.58
There are many other tendencies in
Kierkegaard which bring him extremely close to
Catholicism. Here, we shall point out briefly the "in-
tellectualistic" element in Kierkegaard's concept of
Christ. Thus, we will understand that, for Kierke
gaard, faith in Christ is not merely a subjective quan
tity. It is not a matter of indifference whether I
believe in the divinity of Christ or not. The divinity
of Christ is most assuredly one of those truths objec
tively revealed in the Person of Christ. It is possible,
then, to observe in Kierkegaard a tendency to replace
the Protestant fides qua (the act of faith) with the
Catholic fides quae (the deposit of faith). In this
connection, I mention Ruttenbeck's observation: "In
stead of Protestant individualism, the church is con
ceived as a community (fellowship); instead of
vindicating subjectivity, Kierkegaard advances an
objective faith which is independent of all subjectiv
ity. Such utterances point without doubt in the direc
tion of Catholic Christendom." "
19
OBJECTIVE AUTHORITY
There is yet another consideration where
Kierkegaard in a certain manner approaches Cathol
icism: his concept of the apostle as a man, called by
God, who speaks with authority, i.e., with power, and
therefore can demand the absolute adherence of
those whom he addresses. The Danish philosopher
draws an exact distinction between the "Christian
Address" and the "Sermon." "The difference between
a Christian Address and a Sermon. The Christian
Address deals to a certain extent with doubtâa Ser
mon operates absolutely and entirely through au
thority, that of Holy Scripture and of Christ's
apostles. It is therefore neither more nor less than
heresy to entertain doubt in a sermon, however well
one might be able to handle it. The preface to my
'Christian Discourses,' therefore, contains the phrase:
// a sufferer who has run wild in many thoughts. A
Sermon presupposes a priest (ordination); a Chris
tian Address can be by a layman." 5S
The type of address used by the Christian
preacher is "indirect," "imaginative," 59 whereas the
sermon presupposes an ordained priest who speaks
with authority. Kierkegaard was quite occupied with
this problem in his Book on Adler. He never pub
lished this treatise which he wrote in 1846-1847.
However, he did publish anonymously two short
20
essays: "May a man let himself be put to death for
truth's sake?" 60 and "On the difference between a
Genius and an Apostle." 61 Following an account of
his concept "authority," he writes in the second of
these two essays: "Perhaps this will be the case with
some readers, as it was with me: that when thinking
of 'authority,' I happen to think of magister Kierke
gaard's 'Edifying Discourses,' in which he, with such
strong emphasis and accentuation, repeats in almost
every preface: 'they are not sermons, because their
author has no authority to preach.'"62
Kierkegaard discloses the difference be
tween the Genius and the Apostle: "Genius is, as the
word itself shows, immediateness (ingenium, that
which is inborn, primative, primus, original, origo,
etc.), it is a natural qualification, genius is born. . . .
It is otherwise with the Apostle. The word itself indi
cates the difference. An Apostle is not born; an
Apostle is a man called and appointed by God, re
ceiving a mission from him."ea An Apostle mounts
the pulpit with authority. "What is authority? Is it
the profundity, the excellence, the cleverness of doc
trine? Not at all! . . . Authority is, on the contrary,
something which remains unchanged, which one can
not acquire even by understanding the doctrine per
fectly. Authority is a specific quality, which, coming
from elsewhere, becomes qualitatively apparent
21
when the content of the message or of the action is
posited as aesthetically indifferent."6*
Whence does this authority come? Kierke
gaard answers: "Authority is a specific quality either
of an Apostle's calling or of ordination. To preach
simply means to use authority; and that is exactly
what is completely and utterly forgotten in these
times."65
Kierkegaard returns frequently to this no
tion: "What is the qualitative, the specific essence of
the 'sermon'?" "1) In the first place, it is spoken by a
priest. A priest is what he is through ordination. He
represents the possibility of scandal. The paradox.
Nowadays that is entirely forgotten, as though it had
never been known. It is all nonsense to talk about
genius, talent, studies, eloquence and becoming vest
ments, etc. 2) In the second place, authority. A priest
must use authority, he must say to men: You shall.
He must do that even though they put him to death,
though all men fell away from Christianity and al
though every one would accept it so long as it was
put in the form: I humbly beg the respected, learned
public to consider fairly the following eternal
truths." 66
To this authority on the side of the Apostle
there corresponds a dutiful submission on the part of
the faithful. "The whole of modern philosophy is
22
therefore affected, because it has done away with
obedience on the one hand, and authority on the
other, and then, in spite of everything, wishes to be
orthodox."6T In this regard, it is important to note
Kierkegaard's clear position, that this authority comes
"either from the apostolic calling or from ordination."
Of course, Kierkegaard is careful to point out that
there is a difference between the Apostle and the
ordained priest: "It follows consequently that there
is and remains an infinite qualitative difference be
tween Christ and each one of the elect. Christ him
self is the sphere of the paradox and the elect
participate in and bear the character of belong
ing to this sphere." "8 * The words which Kierke
gaard employs point in the direction of Cath
olic teaching. Since the Catholic priest is a priest
essentially through ordination, the sacrament of
holy orders which is but a sharing (participatio) in
the priesthood of Christ (indeed it is a partnership),
he serves, by his ordination to the priesthood, as a
"beaconâthe character of belonging to this sphere,"
by the very fact that he receives an indelible charac
ter.69 Many of Kierkegaard's concepts which are
found in this short essay, "The Difference between a
Genius and an Apostle," are difficult to fathomâthey
may be well exemplified, not in Catholic dogmatics,
but in Graham Greene's novel, The Power and the
23
Glory, the substance of which tends to point out the
Catholic priest's spiritual authority, entrusted as it is
to weak and fragile human nature: the priesthood in
the priest. E. Geismar has taken pains to remind us
that Kierkegaard's philosophic thought can hardly
be reconciled with Protestant dogmatics. He main
tains that Kirkegaard's theory on the Apostle
"would have led him directly to Catholicism, if it had
been elaborated," and he states that "when this
theory on the Apostle is extended to include the
ordained priest, then we are on the road that leads
straightway to Catholicism." 70 On the other hand,
L0gstrup is of the opinion that Kierkegaard's tenets
on the Apostle manifest a logical evolution of his
principal thesesâwhich are diametrically opposed to
Luther's teachingâyet, he is unable to evaluate the
passages wherein Kierkegaard is speaking of the or
dained priest. He thinks, however, that in Protestant
ism, in its dogmatic system, there is no provision for
the office of preaching.71 Hermann Diehm writes that
neither Geismar nor L0gstrup are correct, because "if
this alone is tantamount to having foreboding Cath
olic tendencies, one then finds no church and no ser
mon, and dogmatics are entirely explained in a
philosophy of existentialism." 72 But the question is
whether Geismar and L0gstrup are not more justified
in accepting the Kierkegaardian philosophy as non-
24
Protestant. Since the problem, by what right does the
church impart a spiritual authority through ordina
tion, now arises, we are forced to a further consid
eration: successio apostolica. He who accepts this is
no longer Protestant, but eo ipso Catholic.
25
II
Anti-Catholic Tendencies in
Kierkegaard
In the last chapter, I attempted to examine
those aspects of Kierkegaard's philosophical thought
which point in the direction of Catholicism; I shall
now consider those ideas and concepts which are
either in apparent or actual opposition to Catholic
doctrine. First I shall mention the anti-intellectualism
of Kierkegaard. This philosophic attitude is quite
naturally conditioned by its counterpart: Hegel. In
contrast to the Hegelian rationalization of the doc
trines of faith, Kierkegaard posits the paradox, which
always bears within itself the possibility of scandal.
In his opposition to Hegel, Kierkegaard is anti-
rationalistic. We do not upbraid him for this attitude;
on the contrary, Catholicism can follow him quite
some distance along this path. His anti-rationalism,
26
however, is further accentuated by an exaggerated
anti-intellectualism. The latter element is historically
conditioned by Kant's system of philosophy, with
which Kierkegaard had a profound acquaintance. In
the first half of the 19th century, it was almost im
possible to escape the Kantian influence; even Cath
olic philosophers and theologians were obliged to
recognize it. I refer to the fideism of De Bonald and
Bautain who regarded faith as the only fount of re
ligious knowledge. The tenets of fideism were con
demned by the Catholic Church in 1840 (Denz.
1622)
THE SUBJECTIVE BASIS OF
FAITH
With Kierkegaard, the issue revolves
around the ancient problem: the relation between
faith and reason. On one occasion, he employed a
formula very close to the Catholic position: "Love
stands in the same relation to law as reason does to
faithâthere is no conflict between the law and love,"
he wrote in The Works of Love.73 He does not deny
the importance of reason or underestimate its value.
How could he do this, being of such an intellectual
stamp? "Truly, it is not knowledge that defiles a man,
far from it; knowledge is like sheer transparency,
precisely when the most perfect and clear; just as the
27
most perfect water is tasteless."74 There are two
Kierkegaardian objections to knowledge. The first is
that "knowledge is infinite indifference." 75 Faith, on
the other hand, is one's individual assumption of a
position. "Knowledge as such is impersonal and must
be communicated impersonally. Knowledge posits
everything in possibility, and is to that extent outside
the reality of existence in the possibility. The indi
vidual first begins his life with ergo, with faith." 76
The second objection to reason is that "the intellect
counts and counts, reckons and reckons, but it never
attains the certainty which faith possesses." " Fur
thermore, since reason never attains certitude,
Kierkegaard concludes, "Faith is thus not an under
standing, or the inference of an understanding, but
a choice which must be made just when knowledge
has balanced the opposing possibilities." 78 It is pos
sible to understand this statement in the Catholic
sense, since, according to Catholic teaching, faith
possesses an infinitely greater certitude than reason
because it is founded on God's authority, while
reason has its basis in human insight; then, too, the
deposit of faith can never be completely compre
hended by reason, not to mention, in some instances,
even the possibility of its perception.
Kierkegaard, though, would go a step fur
ther. He would maintain the opinion that reason is
28
not of the slightest value on our path to faith. Cathol
icism, in its middle path between Hegelianism and
fideism, maintains that there is a logical foundation
for faith, an introductory knowledge, which is ca
pable of demonstrating the preambles of faith, the
existence of God and the historical fact of revelation;
Kierkegaard rejects this road to faith (praeambula
fidei) as being worthless and in itself impossible.
Catholic doctrine, on the other hand, holds that the
act of faith, in order to be an act consonant with
man's rational nature, must find its basis and rational
confirmation in the "argumenta" and "signa certis-
sima" (Denz. 1790); Kierkegaard claims that this
rational foundation for faith can guarantee at the
most only probability. According to him, to believe is
"to choose in the equilibrium of contradictory possi
bilities." 79 Since faith presupposes an "election" and
a "leap," we can likewise leap over all these rational
considerations. Consequently, Kierkegaard must re
ject any discussion that attempts to prove the exist
ence of God; but the proof of God's existence plays
an important role in the foundation of the Catholic
faith. In his work, The Sickness Unto Death, Kierke
gaard considers the existence of God a "postulate."
This concept has no objective validity. Objectively,
there always remains uncertainty which can never
be removed. The route, along which Kierkegaard in
29
his Sickness Unto Death travels and demonstrates
the dialectic of despair, leads ultimately to the con
clusion that the concept of "finiteness" can hardly be
grasped unless viewed in the light of the idea of
"infiniteness."80 The concept "finiteness" in itself
postulates its opposite "infiniteness." And this idea is
not something fanciful. It springs from the necessity
of understanding the "finite." It is, so to speak, die
Bedingung seiner Moglichkeit [the condition of its
possibility]. It is interesting that Kierkegaard, with
out being conscious of it, is reverting to the ancient
proofs for the existence of God. Not only does he
claim that our existence "is founded" on the trans
cendency of God; at the very outset of his book, The
Sickness Unto Death, he states, "a self must either
have constituted itself or have been constituted by
another." 81 He chooses the second member of the
disjunction. It is this precise disjunction "by itself" or
"by another" that is the foundation for the proofs of
God's existence devised by the scholastics of the
Middle Ages who followed Aristotle. This presup
poses causal thought. Since, however, Kierkegaard
never abandoned his Kantian prejudice, he was un
able to reconcile his own ideas with Thomistic meta
physics. We might ask whether a sober analysis of
man's existence must not necessarily follow the
Thomistic metaphysics, even though the manner of
30
its expression naturally differs from that of the clas
sical proofs for the existence of God.
According to Catholic teaching, the act of
faith has its foundation on the authority of God, who
can neither deceive nor be deceived. But the path to
faith (the so-called praeambula fidei) must be acces
sible to reason and absolutely certain. Not only the
existence of God but the historical fact of revelation
belong to these praeambula. Both these truths must
be logically secure, before one can elicit an act of
faith. Kierkegaard rejects even the possibility of a
rational proof for the existence of God; furthermore,
and just as vigorously, he denies that it is possible for
an historical-philological method to arrive at any cer
titude on the factual existence of revelation. What,
then, is his foundation for faith?82 He points to Holy
Scripture, where there can be no question of any
other attitude but that of absolute submission. The
critical problem: what confidence can I place in the
Holy Scripture?, seems not to have occurred to him.
Nevertheless, he cannot entirely escape the difficulty
of assigning some foundation for faith. He would
seem to be satisfied with the fact that men, who were
contemporaries of Christ, believed in Him. He writes
in Philosophical Fragments: "If the contemporary
generation had left nothing behind them but these
words: 'We have believed that in such and such a
31
year God appeared among us in the humble figure of
a servant, that he lived and taught in our community,
and finally died,' it would be more than enough. The
contemporary generation would have done all that
was necessary; for this little advertisement, this nota
bene on a page of universal history, would be suf
ficient to afford an occasion for a successor, and the
most voluminous account can in all eternity do noth
ing more."83
We see then that the purely critical prob
lem of the historical existence of Christ does not in
terest Kierkegaard; he is occupied with the historical
fact under an entirely different aspect, namely,
whether this Person was God. But how do we arrive
at any certainty concerning this problem? He points
in his Journals to Christ's words in the Gospel, "Do
according to my words and you shall know" (John
7:17). This utterance plays an important part in the
Kierkegaardian foundation of faith. He says: "One
can believe first and imitate secondly . . . one can
imitate first and believe secondly . . . Christ, who
never attempted to prove the truth of his teaching or
to provide a foundation for it, used only the proof:
'If any man do the will of my father, he shall know
of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I
speak of myself' (John 7:17). Herein is contained
the idea that the positing of an act is necessary in
32
order to arrive at that point where the decision of
faith can exist; this is a hazardous venture. It is not
thus (as some have maintained, reversing the order):
first the proof and then the venture (which anyway
is a self-contradiction and nonsense), no, first the
venture, then the proof comes afterwards."8* *
A year later (1851), he wrote: "The world
has quite thrown off Christendom's point of view.
In the New Testament, the matter is quite simple.
Christ says, 'Do according to my words and you shall
know.' Consequently, there comes first the decisive
action. With the assistance of the will, your life
comes into collision with all of reality, and then you
will find something to think upon, rather than doubt;
in both the first and the second instance, you will
need Christendom, as a model and as a gift."85 *
The same thought appears under another
formula: "The imitation. The imitation of Christ
(correctly understood, consequently not self-torment,
hypocrisy, or righteousness of conduct, etc.) is its
own guarantee that Christianity is not becoming
poetry, mythology, an abstract ideaâthis it has almost
become in Protestantism."86 * If we analyze such
passages as these, we will reach the following con
clusion: understanding-act, i.e., imitation, this must
be reversed. Imitation must come first: I must first
adapt myself in my practical life, as if I were con-
33
vinced of the truth of Christianity, and then, and as
a consequence thereof, I will come to an understand
ing of the truth of Christianity. The imitation fur
nishes the guarantee that Christianity is true. A
"decisive action" which brings me into "collision with
the whole of existence" places me in the situation
where I "need" Christendom. Thus, I accept it, even
though I am not convinced of its objective truth. It is
precisely this little word "need" that betrays a weak
ness in Kierkegaard's thought. In this manner, the
objective validity of Christianity becomes a function
of my needs. In his valuable book, Die Existenzdia-
lektik von S0ren Kierkegaard [The Existential Dia
lectic of S0ren Kierkegaard], published by the S0ren
Kierkegaard Society, Hermann Diehm arrives at the
very same conclusion: "By imitation, man discovers
that he 'needs' Christianity. Grace corresponds with
this 'need' in the perfecting of the imitation. Imita
tion, at the same time, furnishes a guarantee that
Christianity is not becoming poetry, mythology, an
abstract idea. In this manner, the truth of Christian
ity is entirely reduced to subjectivity."87 This he
terms a "fatal condition." Man is forced to presup
pose an historical fact, the actual existence of which
he has knowledge of only from the testimony of con
temporary witnesses, and he then accepts divine
revelation on the basis of his inner experience, as it
34
reveals itself in him. Catholicism can never agree
with this position: in all intellectual honesty, it is
logically impossible, a "vicious circle." It is to be
noted that a modern Protestant Kierkegaardian
scholar like Hermann Diehm is in perfect accord with
Catholic doctrine on this point.
Kierkegaard says: "Conviction must be
first; by that I mean that the personality, the argu
ments must be accorded an inferior level . . . argu
ment is not the basis for faith in the Son of God, but
conversely; faith in the Son of God is itself the wit
ness. No arguments can confirm one's conviction, on
the contrary, the conviction confirms the argu
ments." 8S * Thus, Kierkegaard must reject the objec
tive truth of Christianity and rely on the personal,
subjective element: not only is "subjectivity truth,"89
but the converse is true likewise, "truth is subjectiv
ity." Therefore, he will state: "There is only one proof
for the truth of Christianity: the inner proof, the
argumentum spiritus sancti."90 * Hermann Diehm
correctly observes that this position is quite impos
sible.91 We must first be certain of the historical
reality of revelation and then pursue its subjective
signification for mankind. The reality of revelation,
e.g., its historical existence, precedes faith, but the
converse is not true. A blindly-chosen position on
faith, based only on inner experience, can never guar-
35
antee the factual existence of revelation. Christianity,
in its entirety, builds upon historical fact. And histor
ical facts can never be demonstrated by inner expe
rience. It is because of this that Catholicism, in its
classical foundation for faith, proposed by the Vati
can Council, will point not only to "interna Spiritus
Sancti auxilia" (the inner assistance of the Holy
Spirit), which, by the way, corresponds with Kierke
gaard's "argumentum spiritus sancti"âbut also to the
"externa argumenta" ond "signa certissima" (Denz.
1790).
Catholicism maintains the doctrine that
man, assisted by a purely historical-philological ap
proach, can prepare himself in a genuinely philo
sophic and quite satisfactory manner for these "ex
terna, argumenta": the miracles of Christ, especially
His own Resurrection. We demand, of course, proof
of the authenticity of the narrative and we must
establish the trustworthiness of the witnesses. Herein
lie the greatest difficulties and they cannot be under
estimated, especially since we are dealing with mod
ern skepticism, which denies outright the possibility
of such a procedure. In order to illustrate the fact
that this method, as an intellectual procedure, is
quite satisfactory, we cite the example of John Henry
Newman who discovered the path to Catholicism in
this fashion. This procedure demands certain psycho-
36
logical presumptions: a tranquil, rational system of
thought, a critical eye for critiqueless critique, and a
good measure of skepticism against the modern skep
ticism which often becomes a very pleasant and com
fortable cushion on which to repose.
The inner testimony of the Holy Spirit
cannot provide the whole foundation of faith, be
cause that rests only on the words of Christ. And the
words of Christ need further verification or con
firmation. Moreover, Kierkegaard errs when he states
that "Christ never attempted to prove the validity of
his teaching or to provide any basis for it." 92 * On
the contrary, Christ says in St. John's Gospel, "But I
have a greater testimony than that of John: for the
works which the Father hath given me to perfect, the
works themselves which I do, give testimony of me,
that the Father hath sent me" (John 5:36). And, in
another text, "If I do not the works of my Father,
believe me not. But if I do, though you will not be
lieve me, believe the works: that you may know and
believe that the Father is in me, and I in the Father"
(John 10:37-38). Again, "If I had not done among
them the works that no other man hath done, they
would not have sin" (John 15:24). Finally, the pas
sage Kierkegaard so frequently cites, "Do according
to my words and you shall know," does refer to an
inner confirmation, but only consequent upon man's
37
eliciting an act of faith with absolute certainty; the
text does not refer to an act of faith which is made
"ad experimentum." Imitation of [Christ's] doctrine
does provide a more profound understanding of it,
but the initial acceptance of the teaching must find
its basis on other grounds.
Summa summarum: if Christianity rests
upon historical factâand it does, unless one takes
refuge in a philosophy of existentialismâit can hardly
be founded on interior perception alone; the histor
ical character of Christianity demands an historical
demonstration and this must necessarily be accom
plished by natural means and not by something
which is uncontrollably supernatural, although "the
future" shall reveal that from the very beginning
grace accompanied this historical demonstration.
Kierkegaard's concept of existential faith
is in complete accord with his basic, fundamental
understanding of existential truth, which, according
to him, does not consist in objective knowledge and
the validity of objective reality, but rather in subjec
tive existence. "Only the truth which edifies is truth
for thee."9S Yet, no matter how much one can con
cede that "existence in truth" has a certain impor
tance and value in one's perception of truth, no
matter how correct one is in stating that a certain
willingness to follow the perceived truth conditions
38
his own perception of truth, "existence in truth" can
by no means be the logical primary. Indeed, such an
intellectual dialectic cannot conceal the simple fact
that both perception and imitation must find their
norm in objectivity alone. Truth is, according to St.
Thomas Aquinas, the conformity of our intellect with
objective reality. Between ontological truth (the
thing in itself) and ethical truth (the truth for me)
lies logical truth, the personal recognition of truth.
THE PARADOX
Kierkegaard's anti-intellectualism is in ac
cord, too, with his definition of the God-man as the
absolute paradox, the absurd. "The absurd isâthat
the eternal truth has come into being in time, that
God has come into being, has been born, has grown
up, and so forth, has come into being precisely like
any other individual human being, quite indistin
guishable from other individuals." 94 "That God has
come into being," "that God's eternal being is
bounded by the dialectical determinations of exist
ence"âthis he terms a "contradiction." 95 If Kierke
gaard would only say that we cannot fathom the
mystery of the God-man, that this truth is supra
ratfonem, then Catholicism would agree with him.
But we cannot agree that this truth is "self-
contradictory." The Incarnation does not mean that
39
Christ ceases to be God and becomes enchained in
the dialectic of existence. Rather, it means that a
human nature, which from the moment of conception
the divine Person has made His own, now comes into
existence in a unity which is founded in the divine
Person. It is not the case of a divine nature becom
ing a human person. The two natures preserve their
relative independence in the hypostatic union in one
divine Person. The manner in which a human, cre
ated nature is elevated to the divine Person surpasses
our understanding. One cannot, on this account,
hastily conclude that this is a positive impossibility,
a contradiction.
By logical necessity anti-intellectualism
led Kierkegaard to subjectivism and consequently to
individualism. He is the prophet of individualism.
We can understand this position more clearly if we
take into consideration his opposition to Hegel on
the one extreme and his criticism of the Danish
State Church on the other. He has not, perhaps,
avoided the identical error, for which he reproves
Luther so strongly: I mean that his "corrective" has
become a "norm." Just as Kierkegaard did not have
an understanding of the historical, so too did he pos
sess a deficient notion of the "church," which is, of
course, a New Testament term. As early as 1848 we
discover the following note in his Journals: "We do
40
not need a revision of Christianity; what does matter
is that we remove 1800 years, as if they had not
existed."96 *
His final battle with official Christendom
was but a logical consequence of this attitude. This
becomes quite obvious in his article entitled "Salt" in
The Fatherland (March 30, 1855): "For in the last
resort, precisely to the concept 'church' is to be
traced the fundamental confusion both of Protestant
ism and of Catholicismâor is it to the concept of
Christendom?" 97
REJECTION OF THE CHURCH
It is important to note in this'connection
that Kierkegaard never encountered Catholicism's
classical notion of church, understood in the sense
of Corpus Christi Mysticum. Otherwise, he would
never have written these lines: "How did the greatest
thinker of the Middle Ages defend 'indulgence'? It
was by the assistance of the teaching which views
the church as a mystical body, in which all of us, as
in a social contest, participate in the church's vested
interests."98 *
Kierkegaard's relation to Catholicism was
of "double significance," as was everything in his life.
He is a two-faced Janus, looking forward and back
ward. No other Protestant theologian understood
41
and perceived so clearly as he the weakness of Prot
estantism. Neither has anyone carried further the
original position of Protestantism, the individual's
solitary meeting with his Savior God. It would there
fore be wrong to speak of himâas some writers have
doneâas an anima naturaliter catholica. On the
other hand, as Brandes and H0ffding suggest, we do
not know where Kierkegaard's path in life might
have led him, had he lived longer. It is, however, true
that for many of our outstanding contemporary
thinkers he has been a "way-station" to Catholicism.
Unfortunately, Kierkegaard was unable to
meet his opponents in religious circles, on which
occasions he could have discussed the matter. As a
result, he delved steadily deeper into his own
thoughts, without ever coming into collision with the
"corrective" he needed. For Catholics he is a nega
tive proof for the necessity of an "official deposit of
faith." The latter is far from being a hindrance to
one's development; contrariwise, it serves as both a
corrective and an incentive to it. Had Kierkegaard
struggled through the barrier to the possibility of a
living, teaching church, his path in life would have
taken another course. Therefore, his contemporary,
John Henry Newman, with whom he had many
traits in common, is the greater of the two. Newman
did not surrender his "subjective dedication to
42
truth," the subjective quality of truth, which was of
such value also to Kierkegaard; but, beyond this,
Newman discovered the path to history, to the
Church, and to objective authority, as it is found in
the Church's teaching power." Even Newman's lit
erary style bears witness to this. It does not possess
Kierkegaard's piercing passion; it is clearer, more
tranquil and beautiful. It is not by any means acci
dental that both these thinkers are bringing about a
renaissance in our own days.
43
Supplement
Catholic Literature in Soren
Kierkegaard's Library
The following Catholic works, i.e., books
written by Catholic authors and treating Catholic
subjects, are found in the Catalogue of Dr. S0ren A.
Kierkegaard's Library, sold at a public auction on
Tuesday, April 8, 1856.
Abraham a St. Clara, Samtliche Werke, 22 Vol. Pas-
sau and Lindau, 1835^54. (Ktl. 294-311)
Augustini Aurelii Opera. Opere et studio monacho-
rum Ordinis S. Benedicti e Congregatione S.
Mauri. Editio tertia. Venice, Vols. I-XVIII,
1797-1807. (Ktl. 117-134)
Bernardi Clarevallensis Opera. Basil. 1566. (Ktl. 427)
Blosii Ludovici O.S.B., Opera omnia Lovanii, 1568.
(Ktl. 429)
45
Bona, J. Card., Grundsätze und Lehren zu einem
christlichen Leben. Aachen, 1840. (Ktl. 434)
Bonaventura, S., Opuscula, 2 Vol. Lugd. 1647. (Ktl.
436-438)
Bücherkunde der katholisch-theologischen Literatur.
Augsburg, 1837. (Ktl. 978)
Calmet, A. O.S.B., Biblisches Wörterbuch, übersetzt
von Glöckner. 4 Vol. Leignitz, 1751-1754. (Ktl.
67-68)
Chateaubriand, F. R., Die Märtyrer oder der Tri
umph des Christentums. 2 Vol. Darmstadt, 1810.
(Ktl. 465)
Fenelon, Sämtliche Werke. 2 Vol. Leipzig, 1782.
(Ktl. 1912)
, Werke religiösen Inhalts, übersetzt von M.
Claudius. 3 Vol. Hamburg, 1822. (Ktl. 1913)
Nueste Geschichte der Kirche Christi von der
Wahl des Papstes Pius VII im Jahre 1800 bis auf
die Regierung des hl. Vaters Gregor XVI im
Jahre 1833. 6 Vol. 2te Auflage. Augsburg, 1836-
1838. (Ktl. 156-157)
Görres, J., Die christliche Mystik. 4 Vol. Regensburg
und Landshut. 1836. (Ktl. 528-532)
, Athanasius 4rte Auflage. Regensburg, 1838.
(Ktl. 1673)
46
, Die Triarier: H. Leo, P. Marheineke, K.
Bruno. Regensburg, 1838. (Ktl. 533)
Günther, A., Süd- und Nordlichter am Horizonte
spekulativer Theologie. Wien, 1832. (Ktl. 520)
, Der letzte Symboliker. Wien, 1834. (Ktl.
521)
, Die Juste-Milieus in der deutschen Philos
ophie gegenwärtiger Zeit. Wien, 1838. (Ktl.
522)
, Eurysteus und Herakles: Meta-logische
Kritiken und Meditationen. Wien, 1843. (Ktl.
523)
, and Pabst, J. H. Janusköpfe. Zur Philos
ophie und Theologie. Wien, 1834. (Ktl. 524)
Hefele, K. J., Patrum Apostolicorum opera. Editio
tertia, Tübingae, 1847. (Ktl. 152)
Ausführliches Heiligen-Lexikon. Cöln und Franck-
furt, 1719. (Ktl. 570)
Jocham, M., Moraltheologie oder die Lehre vom
christlichen Leben nach den Grundsätzen der
katholischen Kirche. I Teil. Sulzbach, 1852. (Ktl.
583)
, Leben des ehrwürdigen Ludwig de Ponte
aus der Gesellschaft Jesu. 2 Vol. Sulzbach, 1840.
(Ktl. 1957)
47
Kempis, Th., De imitatione Christi. Paris, 1702. (Ktl.
272)
Liguori, Alphonsus von, Hl., Die Herrlichkeiten Ma
rias. 2 Vol. Aachen, 1839. (Ktl. 625-626)
, Vollständiges Betrachtung- und Gebetbuch.
Aachen, 1840. (Ktl. 264)
Maistre, J. de, Les soirees de St. Petersbourg. Tome
I et II, Bruxelles, 1837. (Ktl. 1919-1920)
Möhler, J. A., Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche
seiner Zeit. 2 Vol. Mainz, 1827. (Ktl. 635-636)
Muus, C. H., Justinus Martyrs Apologier, Polykarps
Brev til Philippenserne, Brevet til Diognetus og
Clemens Romanus, oversat af K0benhavn,
1835-36. (Ktl. 141)
Postelmayer, B., Leben und Thaten der Heiligen
Gottes für das christlich-katholische Volk. 3 Bde.
2te AuHage. Augsburg, 1836. (Ktl. 725)
Preces Catholicae-Christianae ex missali et breviario
Romano desumptae. Tübingae, 1841. (Ktl. 460)
Pyrker, Joh., Legenden der Heiligen. Wien, 1842.
(Ktl. 727)
Salviani Massiliensis et Vincentii Lirinensis Opera.
Edidit Stephanus Baluzius. Editio quarta, 1743.
(Ktl. 757)
48
Silesius, Joh., Angelas, Cherubinischer W anders
mann. Sulzbach, 1829. (Ktl. 783)
, Angelus, Heilige Seelenlust. Geistliche Lie
der. Herausgegeben von W. Winterer und H.
Springer. Mannheim, 1838. (Ktl. 208)
Abhandlungen Sinesischer Jesuiten über die Ge
schichte, Wissenschaften, Künste, Sitten und
Gebräuche der Sinesen. Leipzig, 1778. (Ktl.
657)
Staudenmaier, F. A., Enzyklopädie der theologischen
Wissenschaften als System der gesamten Theo
logie. Mainz, 1834. (Ktl. 69)
, Darstellung und Kritik des hegelschen Sys
tems. Mainz, 1844. (Ktl. 789)
Streiwolff und Klener, Libri symbolici Ecclesiae Ca-
tholicae cum notis, prolegomenis indicibusque.
Tom. I et II. Goettingae, 1838. (Ktl. 805-806)
Suso, H., genannt Amandus, Leben und Schriften.
Herausgegeben von M. Diepenbrock. 2te Au
flage, Regensburg, 1837. (Ktl. 809)
( PS. ) Tauler, J., Nachfolge des armen Lebens Christi.
Neu herausgegeben von N. Casseder. Frankfurt,
1821. (Ktl. 282)
Tauler, J., Predigten. Herausgegeben von Kuntze
und Bilsenthal. 2 Teile. Berlin, 1841. (Ktl. 245-
246)
49
, Predigten auf alle Sonn- und Festtage im
Jahr. 2 Vol. Berlin, 1841. (Ktl. 247)
Tertullian, Samtliche Schriften. Ubersetzt und bear-
beitet von Fr. Anton von Besnard. Augsburg,
1837. (Ktl. 151)
Das neue Testament. Ubersetzt von C. und L. van
Ess., Sulzbach, 1817. (Ktl. Appendix I, 15)
50
References
1. Aage Kabell: Kierkegaardstudiet i Norden, 1948, p.
64.
2. P. P. J0rgensen: H. P. Kofoed-Harisen. Med saerligt
henblik til S0ren Kierkegaard, 1920, p. 554.
3. Georg Brandes: S0ren Kierkegaard, 1877, p. 271.
4. Harald H^ffding: S0ren Kierkegaard som Filosof,
1892, p. 158.
5. : Danske Filosof er, 1909, pp. 170 ff.
6. Theodor Haecker: S0ren Kierkegaard und die Phi
losophie der Innerlichkeit, 1913; Der Begriff der
Wahrheit bei S0ren Kierkegaard, 1932; Chris
tentum und Kultur; cf. hans Kierkegaardsover-
saettelser med de respektive "Nachworte."
Romano Guardini: Der Ausgangspunkt der
Denkbewegung S0ren Kierkegaards. Vom Sinn
der Schwermut. Unterscheidung des Christ
lichen, 1935, pp. 466 ff. Erich Przywara, SJ.:
Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards, 1929. Alois
Dempf: Kierkegaards Folgen, 1935.
7. Hermann Diehm: Die Existenzdialektik von S0ren
Kierkegaard, 1950, p. 2.
8. Ferdinand Ebner: Das Wort und die geistigen Reali
täten, 1921; Wort und Liebe, 1935. Hildegard
51
Jone: Fur Ferdinand Ebner. Stimmen der
Freunde, 1935.
9. Hans Urs v. Balthasar: Apokalypse der deutschen
Seele, I 695.
10. Henri de Lubac, S.J.: Le Drame de rHumanisme
Athee, 1945, pp. 71 ff. This book was published
by Sheed & Ward, 1950, under the title: The
Drama of Atheistic Humanism. Also from the
Catholic viewpoint: Regis Jolivet: Introduction
a Kierkegaard, 1946; Pierre Mesnard: Le Vrai
Visage de Kierkegaard, 1948.
11. Ktl. no. 141.
12. Ktl. nos. 117-134.
13. Pap. I A 37 (p. 16).
14. Pap. II C 30 (p. 341); A 304 (p. 129); Ktl. nos. 635-
636.
15. Pap. II A 745 (p. 256); in English translation: The
Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard, A Selection
Edited and Translated by Alexander Dru, Ox
ford University Press, 1938 (199, page 58); Ktl.
no. 1673.
16. Pap. I C 27-33 (p. 203, ff.); S.V. IV, 311.
17. M. Grabmann: Geschichte der katholischen Theolo-
gie, 1933, p. 216.
18. Ktl. no. 429 Ludovici Blosii Opera Omnia, Lovanii
1568.
19. Ktl. no. 264.
52
20. Pap. VIII, 1 A 437 (p. 193), 450 (p. 200); IX A 429
(p. 249).
21. Pap. X 1 A 137 (p. 103) and Dru, 888, page 297.
22. Cf. Supplement: Catholic Literature in S0ren
Kierkegaard's Library.
23. Pap. XI 1 A 134 (p. 93); The Journals of S0ren
Kierkegaard, A Selection Edited and Trans
lated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University,
1938 (1318, p. 502).
24. S.V. XIV, 47-48; Attack Upon Christendom, Trans.
by Walter Lowrie, Princeton Univ. Press, 1944
(p. 34, "Articles in the Fatherland").
25. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 156.
26. Pap. X 4 A 596 (p. 413); Journals, Dru (1260, p.
468).
27. Pap. XI1 A 28 (p. 23); Journals, Dru (1298, p. 495).
28. Pap. X 1 A 213 (p. 147); Journals, Dru. (899, p.
300).
29. Pap. X4 A 325 (p. 185).
30. Pap. XII A 106 (p. 74).
31. Pap. XI 1 A 108 (p. 75); Journals, Dru (1310, p.
500).
32. Pap. X 1 A 154 (p. 113); Journals, Dru (889, p. 298)
33. Pap. X4 A 394 (p. 239).
34. Pap. IX A 442 (p. 254); Journals, Dru (847, p. 274).
35. Pap. XI 2 A 162 (p. 175); Journals, Dru (1387, p.
539).
53
36. Pap. XI 2 A 266 (p. 269); Journals, Dru (1406, p.
547).
37. Pap. XI 2 A 303 (p. 321).
38. Pap. XI 2 A 304 (p. 323).
39. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 323 f.); Journals, Dru (1327, p.
509-510).
40. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 326); Journals, Dru (1327, p.
511-512).
41. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 327); Journals, Dru (1327, p.
512-513).
42. Pap. XI 2 A 305 (p. 327); Journals, Dru (1327, p.
513).
43. Pap. XI 2 A 301 (p. 316).
44. Pap. XI 2 A 301 (p. 316).
45. "gegen sie" (John's Gospel, 1st Epistle of St. John,
Paul's Epistles, especially to the Romans, Gala-
tians, Ephesians; Peter I); Luthers Werke (Er-
langen udg. edition) LXIII (1854), p. 115.
46. Pap. X 4 A 323 (p. 183); Journals, Dru (1225, p.
446).
47. Pap. X4 A 354 (p. 205).
48. Pap. X4 A 366 (p. 216).
49. Pap. XI 2 A 436 (p. 432).
50. Pap. 1 A 5 (p. 3); Journals, Dru (2, p. 1).
51. "Inter creatorem et creaturam nan potest tanta simili
tude notari, quin inter eos major sit dissimili
tude notanda." Denz. 432.
54
52. Q. disp. de spir. creat.; a. 10, ad 16.
53. De Ver.; q. 22 a. 4 corp.
54. Pap. VII 1 A 181 (p. 116, £.); Journals, Dru (616, p.
180-181).
55. "God foresees, ordains and works all by His un
changeable, everlasting and infallible Will; by
His thunderclap, the free will is enslaved on
earth and is brought to annihilation." Luther:
On the enslaved will (Op. lat, Vol. VII, 1873,
p. 133).
"We think that the newborn man's reason, heart
and will, with relation to the spiritual and the
divine is naturally incapable of knowing, be
lieving, grasping, thinking, willing, beginning,
fulfilling, working, cooperating with anything,
and that man is completely ruined and dead in
relation to the good." Form. Cone. Sol. decl. 11,7
(J. T. Mullen Die symbolischen Biicher der
evangeiisch-lutherischen Kirche, 1928, p. 589).
56. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 92; also see "Die romisch-
katholische Theologie . . . ist im tiefsten dia-
lektisch": Karl Earth, Kirchliche Dogmatik II,
Die Lehre von Gott, (1940) 660.
57. W. Ruttenbeck; S0ren Kierkegaard, der christliche
Denker und sein werk, 1929, p. 233.
58. Pap. VIII 1 A 6 (p. 6); Journals, Dru (629, p. 192);
S.V. VI, p. 319; VII, p. 232.
59. Pap. VIII 2 B 81, 22 (p. 151).
60. S.V. XI 55-91.
61. S.V. XI 93-109.
55
62. S.V. XI 101.
63. S.V. XI 97; Kierkegaard: The Present Age, trans. A.
Dru & W. Lowrie, Oxford Univ. Press, 1940, p.
142-143.
64. S.V. XI 100; The Present Age, p. 148.
65. S.V. XI101; The Present Age, p. 149.
66. Pap. VIII 1 A 434 (p. 192); Journals, Dru (716, p.
224).
67. S.V. XI106; The Present Age, p. 158.
68. Pap. VII 2 B 235 (p. 66).
69. "On the other hand, ordination bestows an indelible
character." S.V. VII 232.
70. E. Geismar: S0ren Kierkegaard III, 1927, p. 81.
71. K. E. L^gstrup: Die Kategorie und das Amt der
Verkundigung im Hinblick auf Luther und
Kierkegaard, Evang. Theologie 1949, p. 263.
Cited in H. Diehm, op. cit, p. 136.
72. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 135.
73. S.V. IX, 103; The Works of Love, trans, by David F.
Swenson & Lillian Marvin Swenson, Princeton
University Press, 1946, p. 86.
74. ibid., 223; The Works of Love, p. 188.
75. ibid., 224; The Works of Love, p. 189.
76. ibid., 221; The Works of Love, p. 186.
77. ibid., 103; The Works of Love, p. 86.
78. ibid.. 224; The Works of Love, p. 189.
56
79. ibid., 218; The Works of Love, p. 184.
80. Cf. the following: H. Ogiermann: Kierkegaard,
Orientierung, XV (1951), no. 9, pp. 100, ff.
81. S.V. XI, 127; The Sickness Unto Death, trans, by
Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press,
1946, p. 18.
82. Cf. H. Ogiermann, op. cit., p. 113, ff., no. 10.
83. S.V. IV, 266; Philosophical Fragments, trans, by
David F. Swenson, Princeton University Press,
1936, p. 87.
84. Pap. X 3 A 454, 455 (p. 308).
85. Pap. X4 A 349 (p. 202).
86. Pap. X4 A 354 (p. 206).
87. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 178.
88. Pap. XI A 481 (p. 307).
89. S.V. VII, 169.
90. Pap. X1A481 (p. 308).
91. H. Diehm, op. cit., p. 181.
92. See reference 84.
93. S.V. II, 318; Eitlier/Or, trans, by David F. Swenson,
Lillian M. Swenson, and Walter Lowrie, Prince
ton University Press, 1946, Vol. II, p. 294.
94. S.V. VII, 176; Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
trans, by David F. Swenson, completed by Wal
ter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1941, p.
188. Also: A Kierkegaard Anthology, edited
57
by Robert Bretall, Princeton University Press,
1947, p. 220.
95. S.V., IV 251; Philosophical Fragments, p. 72.
96. Pap. IX A 72 (p. 40).
97. S.V. XIV, 48; Attack Upon Christendom, trans, by
Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press,
1944, p. 34.
98. Pap.X4A369(p. 218).
99. Erich Przywara: Kierkegaard-Newman. Newman
Studien. (Erste Folge) 1948, pp. 77-101.
58
Bibliography
The Works of Kierkegaard in
English Translation
1. L. M. Hollander, Selections from the Writings of
Kierkegaard. 239 pp. University of Texas Bulle
tin No. 2326. 1932.
2. The Diary of a Seducer (from Either/Or, Vol. 1,
translated by Knud Pick. 173 pp. The Dragon
Press, Ithaca, N.Y.). 1935.
3. Philosophical Fragments, translated and with an in
troduction by David F. Swenson. 105 pp.
Princeton University Press. 1936.
4. The Journals of S0ren Kierkegaard: A Selection
edited and translated by Alexander Dru. 603
pp. Oxford University Press. 1938.
5. Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing: Spiritual
Preparation for the Feast of Confession (Part
One of Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits).
Translated and with an introduction by Doug
las V. Steere. 207 pp. Harper's. 1938.
59
6. The Point of View for My Work as an Author (in
cluding two notes about "The Individual" and
"On My Work as an Author"), translated by
Walter Lowrie. 174 pp. Oxford. 1939.
7. Fear and Trembling, translated by Robert Payne.
192 pp. Oxford. 1939.
8. The Present Age (latter part of "A Literary Re
view") and "Two Minor Ethico-Religious Trea
tises," translated by Alexander Dru and Walter
Lowrie. 163 pp. Oxford. 1940.
9. Christian Discourses (including "Discourses about
the Lilies and the Birds"-"The High Priest"-
"The Publican"-"The Woman that Was a Sin
ner"), translated by Walter Lowrie. 309 pp.
Oxford. 1940.
10.
»_/AlUlU. J.O'IV.
Stages on Life's Way, translated by Walter Lowrie.
472 pp. Princeton. 1940.
11. For Self-Examination, translated by Edna and
Howard Houg. Augsburg. 1940.
12. Fear and Trembling, translated by Walter Lowrie.
209 pp. Princeton. 1941.
13. Repetition, translated by Walter Lowrie. (With an
essay, "How Kierkegaard Got into English," by
W. L.) 200 pp. Princeton. 1941.
14. Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life:
Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions.
Translated by David F. Swenson. 117 pp. Augs
burg Publishing House, Minneapolis, 1941.
15. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by Walter
Lowrie, 231 pp. Princeton. 1941.
60
16. The Lilies and the Birds, translated by A. S. Aid-
worth and W. S. Ferric. Daniel (London). 1941.
17. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the "Philosoph
ical Fragments," translated by David F. Swen-
son; completed and edited by Walter Lowrie.
579 pp. Princeton University Press and Amer
ican-Scandinavian Foundation. 1941.
18. Training in Christianity (and the Edifying Dis
course which accompanied it), translated by
Walter Lowrie. 275 pp. Oxford. 1941; Princeton,
1944.
19. For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!
(and Three Discourses, 1851), translated by
Walter Lowrie (except the final discourse,
"God's Unchangeableness," translated by David
F. Swenson). 243 pp. Oxford, 1941; Princeton,
1944.
20. The Gospel of Sufferings (Part III of "Edifying
Discourses in Various Spirits"). Translated by
A. S. Aldworth and W. S. Ferric. Daniel (Lon
don), 1942.
21. Edifying Discourses: Volume I, translated by David
F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Augs
burg, 1943.
22. Edifying Discourses: Volume II, translated by
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.
Augsburg, 1944.
23. Either/Or: a Fragment of Life: Volume I, translated
by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swen
son; Volume II translated by Walter Lowrie.
387 pp., 304 pp. Princeton, 1944.
61
24. The Concept of Dread, translated by Walter Lowrie.
154 pp. Princeton, 1944.
25. Kierkegaard's Attack upon "Christendom," trans
lated and with an introduction by Walter
Lowrie. 303 pp. Princeton, 1944.
26. Edifying Discourses: Volume III, translated by
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.
Augsburg, 1945.
27. Edifying Discourses: Volume IV, translated by
David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson.
Augsburg, 1946.
28. Works of Love, translated by Lillian Marvin Swen
son. 330 pp. Princeton, 1946.
29. A Kierkegaard Anthology, edited by Robert Bretall.
487 pp. Princeton University Press, 1947.
62
A NOTE ON THE TYPE
IN WHICH THIS BOOK WAS SET
This book is set in Caledonia, a Linotype face created
in 1939 by W. A. DWiggins, which is by far one of the
best book types created in the last 50 years. It has a
simple, hard-working, feet-on-the-ground quality and
can be classed as a modern type face with excellent
color and good readability. The designer claims Cale
donia was created by putting a little of each of Scotch
Roman, Bulmer, Baskerville and Bodoni together and
producing a lively crisp-like book type. This book
was composed and printed by the York Composition
Company, Inc., of York, Pa., and bound by Moore
and Company of Baltimore. The typography and de
sign of this book are by Howard N. King.